Category: Politics

MIL-OSI Economics: Five years already!

Source: – Press Release/Statement:

Headline: Five years already!

The Canadian Renewable Energy Association celebrates 5th anniversary.

Ottawa, June 30, 2025—The Canadian Renewable Energy Association (CanREA) is proud to celebrate its fifth anniversary on July 1, 2025. CanREA launched on July 1, 2020, during the global pandemic, as the merger of Canada’s wind and solar industry associations (CanWEA and CanSIA), with the important addition of energy storage to the mandate.

Created to provide a unified voice for solar energy, wind energy, and energy storage in Canada, CanREA has since grown to a total of more than 330 members, with seven member Networks (federal, BC, Alberta, Saskatchewan & Manitoba, Ontario, Quebec and Atlantic Canada) and three national Programs (Operators, BTM Solar & Storage, and Utility GRID Integration), as well as four successful annual Summits, nearly 30 staff members, 10 annual networking events, an ongoing series of industry webinars, and the second-largest social media community of all the Canadian trade associations in any sector.

“I want to thank our members for their support over the past five years, which has enabled our advocacy work and helped secure many key successes for the industry so far. This five-year milestone is an occasion to look back and see how far we have come, but more importantly, to look ahead. CanREA is committed to advancing the Canadian wind, solar and energy storage industries for the next five years, and for many more years to come,” said Vittoria Bellissimo, CanREA’s President and CEO.

CanREA is marking the anniversary by launching a new Awards Program, and other activities throughout the year.

Top 5 priorities for 2025-26

As we enter our new fiscal year on July 1, 2025, CanREA has defined five ambitious new strategic objectives to guide our priorities. These include:

Executing a comprehensive advocacy plan to effectively respond to evolving government mandates;

Optimizing outcomes for ongoing procurement processes in Ontario, BC and Quebec;

Executing on our new BTM strategy;

Building strategic alliances to enhance key messaging, collect information on project economics, and advocate for infrastructure and other support initiatives, including energy corridors opportunities;

All the while providing excellent membership value for all our members.

Top 10 accomplishments: Annual report card 2024-25

Looking back on the past year, there is a lot for CanREA—and the industry—to celebrate. Here is a recap of Top Ten accomplishments of 2024-5, starting with the most recent items:

Advocacy in Ontario: CanREA successfully worked to reduce barriers and improve clarity for access to agricultural land and Crown land, shaping the LT2 contracts and RFPs that were launched in late June. This is the first time in a decade the industry can bid on new wind and solar projects in Ontario!

Advocacy in Manitoba: CanREA expanded the Saskatchewan Network to include Manitoba this year and devoted a Policy Director to this mandate. CanREA’s recommendations to Manitoba’s Minister of Finance were reflected in Manitoba Hydro’s 600 MW Call for Power for Indigenous Majority-Owned Wind, for which the Request for Expressions of Interest (REOI) was issued in June.

Indigenous engagement: This year, CanREA’s new Director of Indigenous Engagement led efforts to enhance Indigenous cultural awareness for the staff and Board of Directors, develop the outline for CanREA’s Indigenous Reconciliation Action Roadmap, expand the Indigenous Business Pavilion at ETC, and collaborate with Indigenous Clean Energy (ICE) to present CanREA’s Manitoba Wind Energy Indigenous Equity Summit in June.

Advocacy in BC: CanREA expanded its presence to BC this year, with a new BC Director, a new BC Network, and a MOU with Clean Energy BC. CanREA is now working with BC Hydro to support the integration of renewables into the grid in its new Call for Power, announced in May, and its two new requests for expressions of interest relevant to energy storage, announced in June.

Advocacy in Quebec: CanREA successfully worked to optimize the ongoing procurement process in Quebec. One highlight: in May, Hydro-Québec launched a 300 MW solar energy tender. This milestone represents the first major solar procurement in Quebec, part of a broader objective to develop 3,000 MW of solar capacity by 2035.

Utilities: CanREA launched a new Utility GRID Integration program in May. Evolving from CanREA’s NRCan-funded Electricity Transition Hub, the program helps members integrate clean, affordable and reliable electricity into Canada’s power grids.

Go Solar Guide 2025: In March, CanREA’s new BTM Solar and Storage Program launched a new and improved edition of our annual Go Solar Guide, encouraging more Canadians to generate their own solar energy at home and work, and listing of all CanREA’s solar installer members. Now available as a web portal, the information is free and accessible to all.

Advocacy in Atlantic Canada: CanREA is building momentum in Atlantic Canada, enabled by a new, full-time Policy Manager based in New Brunswick. Our renewed advocacy efforts have led to policy wins across the region, including the Nova Scotia Green Choice Program RFP, which awarded 625 MW of wind in January, nearly double the original call for 350 MW.

ITCs: CanREA successfully advocated with the federal government to optimize and accelerate the Investment Tax Credits (ITCs) in Canada, as the Clean Tech ITC was implemented into law in the fall.

Procurement calendar: In October, CanREA launched a new Clean Energy Procurement Calendar, which we continue to monitor and update as new procurements get announced or come online across the nation.

Quotes

“I want to thank our members for their support over the past five years, which has enabled our advocacy work and helped secure many key successes for the industry so far. This five-year milestone is an occasion to look back and see how far we have come, but more importantly, to look ahead. CanREA is committed to advancing the Canadian wind, solar and energy storage industries for the next five years, and for many more years to come.”

—Vittoria Bellissimo, President and CEO, Canadian Renewable Energy Association (CanREA)

For media inquiries or interview opportunities, please contact: 

CommunicationsCanadian Renewable Energy Associationcommunications@renewablesassociation.ca

About CanREA 

The Canadian Renewable Energy Association (CanREA) is the voice for wind energy, solar energy and energy storage solutions that will power Canada’s energy future. We work to create the conditions for a modern energy system through stakeholder advocacy and public engagement. Our diverse members are uniquely positioned to deliver clean, low-cost, reliable, flexible and scalable solutions for Canada’s energy needs. For more information on how Canada can use wind energy, solar energy and energy storage to help achieve its net-zero commitments, consult “Powering Canada’s Journey to Net-Zero: CanREA’s 2050 Vision.” Follow us on Bluesky and LinkedIn here. Learn more at renewablesassociation.ca.

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The post Five years already! appeared first on Canadian Renewable Energy Association.

MIL OSI Economics –

July 1, 2025
MIL-OSI United Nations: UN Secretary-General’s remarks at the International Business Forum at the Conference on Financing for Development [bilingual, as delivered; scroll down for all-English]

Source: United Nations secretary general

This Forum reflects a fundamental fact.

Development is everyone’s business.

And the private sector is an essential partner in helping countries climb the development ladder, and achieve the Sustainable Development Goals.

Businesses are not just engines of jobs and economic growth.

They help propel the innovation, technology and investment that development demands.

We are here to boost support for initiatives that benefit people and planet.

We meet against the backdrop of an incredibly challenging global environment.

As we gather in Sevilla, trade barriers and macroeconomic risks are rising.

Major aid cuts are making a bad situation even worse.

Mistrust and geopolitical divisions are blocking effective global solutions.

And the financing gap for the Sustainable Development Goals has ballooned to $4 trillion.

When the world came together for this conference 10 years ago in Addis Ababa, countries recognized that achieving the Goals was impossible without mobilizing private capital at scale.

One decade later, we continue to fall short.

Last year, investment in infrastructure in developing countries dropped by 35 per cent — including in key sectors like renewable energy, water and sanitation.

And foreign direct investment has declined two years in a row, with investment flows largely bypassing Least Developed Countries altogether.

We need to create the conditions to change course.

And that begins here in Spain.

The Sevilla Commitment document includes important steps to get the engine of development revving again:

Through new domestic and global commitments that can channel public and private finance to the areas of greatest need…

By overhauling the world’s approach to debt to make borrowing work in service of sustainable development…

And by reforming the global financial architecture to reflect today’s realities and the urgent needs of developing countries.

The Sevilla Commitment also puts forward a number of specific actions to unlock private sector investment in sustainable development.

This includes steps to strengthen the way we blend public and private capital together to maximize the use of public money in crowding-in private funds.

It includes new approaches to manage currency risk that prevent otherwise promising investment opportunities from securing the capital required.

And it includes a call to review financial regulations to ensure that risk weightings are well-designed, and help — not hinder — institutional investors from embracing projects in frontier markets.

These are significant steps, informed by lessons learned over the past 10 years.

When, one looks at today’s world, the crises in the ODA, the crises in the global funds available, it is absolutely evident that we need to be able to multiply the resources available for investments.

And the main obligation, in my opinion, of public development banks, most national and international, should be today concentrated, not essentially, in their operations, and I understand the pressure of any bureaucracy to do their own things, but those public funds available in developing banks, should be more and more put to work to multiply resources through the risking private finances and private investments.

Giving guaranties, stablishing coalitions, in which they are the first risk takers, and creating the conditions to massively increase the massive private finance and private investment in countries in which without the necessary derisking it is practically impossible to see enough development.

This is a new mentally that we need to guaranty in the investment banks, the pubic investment banks, both national and international.

Señoras y senõres,

En todo momento, contamos con el liderazgo y la visión de todos ustedes para llevar adelante el espíritu de colaboración y adoptar soluciones audaces.

Al reunir a los líderes de los sectores público y privado, a los reguladores y a los bancos de desarrollo, podemos garantizar que esta conferencia no es un final, sino un principio.

El comienzo de una nueva era de acción y colaboración en algunos de los problemas más urgentes a los que se enfrenta hoy nuestro mundo.

Y un nuevo amanecer para la manera en que se financia el progreso del desarrollo en todo el mundo.

Gracias a todos ustedes por participar en este importante esfuerzo. Espero que la participación conjunta de los sectores público y privado pueda multiplicar los recursos que tenemos.

Sabiendo que mucha más inversión es necesaria en el mundo de hoy, pero que hay mecanismos que permiten que los fondos públicos disponibles movilicen muchísimo más que hoy la financiación y la inversión privada.

*****
[All-English]

This Forum reflects a fundamental fact.

Development is everyone’s business.

And the private sector is an essential partner in helping countries climb the development ladder, and achieve the Sustainable Development Goals.

Businesses are not just engines of jobs and economic growth.

They help propel the innovation, technology and investment that development demands.

We are here to boost support for initiatives that benefit people and planet.

We meet against the backdrop of an incredibly challenging global environment.

As we gather in Sevilla, trade barriers and macroeconomic risks are rising.

Major aid cuts are making a bad situation even worse.

Mistrust and geopolitical divisions are blocking effective global solutions.

And the financing gap for the Sustainable Development Goals has ballooned to $4 trillion.

When the world came together for this conference 10 years ago in Addis Ababa, countries recognized that achieving the Goals was impossible without mobilizing private capital at scale.

One decade later, we continue to fall short.

Last year, investment in infrastructure in developing countries dropped by 35 per cent — including in key sectors like renewable energy, water and sanitation.

And foreign direct investment has declined two years in a row, with investment flows largely bypassing Least Developed Countries altogether.

We need to create the conditions to change course.

And that begins here in Spain.

The Sevilla Commitment document includes important steps to get the engine of development revving again:

Through new domestic and global commitments that can channel public and private finance to the areas of greatest need…

By overhauling the world’s approach to debt to make borrowing work in service of sustainable development…

And by reforming the global financial architecture to reflect today’s realities and the urgent needs of developing countries.

The Sevilla Commitment also puts forward a number of specific actions to unlock private sector investment in sustainable development.

This includes steps to strengthen the way we blend public and private capital together to maximize the use of public money in crowding-in private funds.

It includes new approaches to manage currency risk that prevent otherwise promising investment opportunities from securing the capital required.

And it includes a call to review financial regulations to ensure that risk weightings are well-designed, and help — not hinder — institutional investors from embracing projects in frontier markets.

These are significant steps, informed by lessons learned over the past 10 years.

When, one looks at today’s world, the crises in the ODA, the crises in the global funds available, it is absolutely evident that we need to be able to multiply the resources available for investments.

And the main obligation, in my opinion, of public development banks, most national and international, should be today concentrated, not essentially, in their operations, and I understand the pressure of any bureaucracy to do their own things, but those public funds available in developing banks, should be more and more put to work to multiply resources through the risking private finances and private investments.

Giving guaranties, stablishing coalitions, in which they are the first risk takers, and creating the conditions to massively increase the massive private finance and private investment in countries in which without the necessary derisking it is practically impossible to see enough development.

This is a new mentally that we need to guaranty in the investment banks, the pubic investment banks, both national and international.

Ladies and gentleman,

Throughout, we are counting on the leadership and vision of all of you to carry forward the spirit of collaboration and bold solutions.

By uniting public and private sector leaders, regulators and development banks, we can ensure that this conference is not an end, but rather a beginning.

The beginning of a new era of action and collaboration on some of the most urgent issues facing our world today.

And a new dawn for how we finance development progress around the world.

Thank you all for being part of this important effort. I hope that the joint participation of the public and private sectors can multiply the resources we have.

Knowing that much more investment is needed in today’s world, but that there are mechanisms that allow available public funds to mobilize much more private financing and investment than today.

MIL OSI United Nations News –

July 1, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: The Status of the Chagos Archipelago – Part I: History of the Disputes Surrounding its Status and the Creation of a UK-US Military Base

Source: US Global Legal Monitor

The following is a guest post by Clare Feikert-Ahalt, a senior foreign law specialist at the Law Library of Congress covering the United Kingdom and several other jurisdictions. Clare has written numerous posts for In Custodia Legis, including Revealing the Presence of Ghosts; Weird Laws, or Urban Legends?; FALQs: Brexit Referendum; 100 Years of “Poppy Day” in the United Kingdom; and most recently Mr. Bates vs. The Post Office Spurs Possible Law Change.

A small, but important, island known as Diego Garcia has given rise to a number of legal challenges and international agreements that date back to Britain’s colonial era. The challenges surround whether the detachment from Mauritius, and subsequent colonization of the Chagos Archipelago, which consists of several islands and atolls remotely located in the center of the Indian Ocean, including the island of Diego Garcia, was lawful, and whether the removal and prohibition on the return of its inhabitants occurred within the bounds of the law. A recent agreement between the United Kingdom (UK) and Mauritius settles the disputes, by returning Chagos Archipelago to Mauritus and providing the UK with continued use of a military base, which I will describe in a post tomorrow. Today I will look at the history that preceded the agreement.

UK Colonization of Chagos Archipelago

One of the driving forces for the UK colonization of Chagos Archipelago was the establishment of a defense facility, to be operated jointly with the United States (US). Almost immediately upon detaching the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius and establishing the colony of the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) the UK, after undertaking a survey to determine the most appropriate location for a defense facility, entered into an agreement with the US to allow Diego Garcia to be used for defense purposes. The US subsequently constructed, and jointly operated with the UK, a defense facility that according to the UK government provides “crucial strategic capabilities, which have played a key role in missions to disrupt high-value terrorists, including Islamic State threats to the UK.”

History of the Chagos Archipelago and Diego Garcia

The BIOT, which includes Diego Garcia, was the last colony established by the British as its colonial era entered into its waning days and Mauritius was on the verge of obtaining independence. In 1965, the government of the UK and a representative of Mauritius signed an agreement detaching the Chagos Archipelago from the territory of Mauritius.

The agreement between the UK and Mauritius provided the legal foundation for the UK to establish the BIOT as new colony in the Chagos Archipelago, which initially included three other islands detached from Seychelles that were later ceded back to the Seychelles upon their independence in 1976. In return for the detachment of the Chagos Archipelago, the UK government provided Mauritius with a grant of £3 million (approximately US$4 million), along with a commitment to return the islands to Mauritius at a later date when it no longer needed the territory for defense purposes. Once under UK control, in 1966, the UK signed an agreement with the US to establish a military base on the largest island, Diego Garcia.

Independence of Mauritius Leads to Legal Dispute over Territorial Definition

Mauritius was granted independence from the UK in 1968, but the definition of Mauritius, contained in the Mauritius Independence Act 1968, which became its constitution and was promulgated by the government of the UK prior to Mauritius’ independence, does not include the Chagos Archipelago. Instead “Mauritius” is defined in section 5 of the 1968 Act as “the territories which immediately before the appointed day constitute the Colony of Mauritius.” The Mauritian government later claimed that its independence was made conditional upon the detachment of the Chagos Archipelago from its territory and disputed the sovereignty of the UK over the Chagos Archipelago.

This bilateral dispute progressed through numerous meetings, international exchanges, courts and tribunals for a period of 60 years until the UK and Mauritius signed the recent agreement providing sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago to Mauritius..

United Nations Resolution of 1966

In 1966, the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) adopted a resolution condemning the British for exercising sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago and calling for it to be returned to Mauritius. In the same year, the UK and US reached an agreement providing for the use of an island in the Chagos Archipelago for defense purposes. The agreement provided that the UK government would take any administrative measures necessary to ensure the defense needs were met, which included the resettlement of the inhabitants of the islands.

Challenges Regarding Status Continue

The challenges faced by the Chagossians, along with their efforts to reclaim Diego Garcia are well detailed and documented in the decisions of the courts in which they lodged their claims.

The UK entered into an agreement with Mauritius in 1972 whereby it agreed to pay Mauritius £650,000 (approximately US$875,000) for the cost of resettlement of people displaced from the Chagos Archipelago. The UK reached an additional agreement with Mauritius in 1982, under which it paid a further £4 million (approximately US$5.4 million) to be placed into a trust fund for the Chagossians removed from the islands as a final settlement of all claims, without admitting liability.

Despite these agreements and settlement, Mauritius continued to challenge the legitimacy of British sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago and the Chagossians challenged the legality of their resettlement and exile from Diego Garcia. During these challenges, and in response to a judgment from England’s High Court, the UK government conducted a feasibility study in 2002 into the return of the Chagossians to Diego Garcia. The study concluded that if the Chagossians were permitted to return to live on Diego Garcia, the costs of long-term inhabitation would be prohibitive and that natural events, such as flooding and seismic activity “would make life difficult for a resettled population.”

Advisory Opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ)

In 2019, the ICJ issued an advisory opinion that the decolonization of Mauritius was not completed lawfully and that an international agreement was not possible when one territory was under the authority of the other. The ICJ stated that the UK “has an obligation to bring to an end its administration of the Chagos Archipelago as rapidly as possible.” The UK government acknowledged the opinion, but noted it was not legally binding. It stated that it did “not share the court’s approach” and asserted that it has exercised sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago since 1814. The UK affirmed that it stood by its commitment “to cede sovereignty of the territory to Mauritius when it is no longer required for defence purposes.”

While advisory opinions from the ICJ are not binding, the UK government in 2025 acknowledged that they do “carr[y] significant weight; in particular it is likely to be highly influential on any subsequent court/tribunal”. This advisory opinion had a “meaningful real-world impact on the sustainability of UK sovereignty and the operation of the Base.” In particular, the UK government determined that if Mauritius made another legal challenge, its “… longstanding legal view is that [the UK] would not have a realistic prospect of success.”

The advisory opinion was followed in 2021, by a case heard by the Special Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea relating to the delimitation of the boundary between Mauritius and the Maldives and the court ruled that the sovereignty of Mauritius over the Chagos Archipelago could be inferred from the advisory opinion made by the International Court of Justice.

The Congress of the Universal Postal Union also recognized Mauritius as responsible for making decisions regarding international postal services in the Chagos Archipelago. The UK government determined these decisions “confirmed the risk that a future (binding) case could be brought successfully against the UK” and that this “would create serious real-world operational impacts for the Base.”

Between the years 2021-2022, the UK used diplomacy and bilateral initiatives to attempt to steer Mauritius away from commencing further legal challenges, but these were unsuccessful and “… it became clear by mid-2022 that the only viable means to halt the process was to enter negotiations” and the start of these were announced in November 2022. They resulted in the May 2025 agreement, which I will describe in tomorrow’s post. Stay tuned!

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MIL OSI USA News –

July 1, 2025
MIL-OSI: DataGrail Report: Consumer Demand for Data Privacy Surges, Driving Up Business Costs as Data Deletion Requests Rise
Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

SAN FRANCISCO, June 30, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Consumers are reclaiming control of their personal data—and businesses are feeling the impact. DataGrail’s newly released 2025 Data Privacy Trends Report shows a surge in data deletion and do not share requests, skyrocketing privacy expectations globally, and a failure by companies to honor consumer consent – driving up compliance costs across the board.

DataGrail 2025 Privacy Trends Report Highlights:
- Data deletion requests are surging, rising 82% year-over-year, surpassing access and do not sell requests for the fourth consecutive year.
- Compliance costs are skyrocketing, largely due to the manual processing of Data Subject Requests (DSRs). Managing DSRs now costs businesses an estimated $1.26 million annually per 5 million unique website visitors—a 43% increase over 2023.
- “Do Not Sell” (DNS) requests are gaining significant traction, with an increase of 37% over 2023. This increase is worth noting as organizations face heightened scrutiny from bodies like the California Privacy Protection Agency (CPPA), which has focused litigation on ensuring companies honor these opt-out requests.
- New state laws are driving more action. Seven new U.S. state laws went into effect in 2024. As a result, 41% of DSRs in 2024 came from states with active privacy laws – an increase of 229% from the 12.5% of DSRs we received from states with active privacy laws in 2023.
- 69% of businesses violate consumer consent. Despite consumers setting their opt-out preferences, businesses continue to deploy tracking cookies, risking fines, lawsuits, and damage to their brand.
“Our 2025 report clearly shows that consumers are taking control over their data privacy rights and are actively exercising those rights by demanding deletion of their data,” said Daniel Barber, co-founder and CEO of DataGrail. “This surge in DSRs, particularly deletions, is making compliance more expensive for organizations. The privacy landscape, driven by stricter laws and heightened enforcement globally, means proactive data privacy management is no longer optional but mandatory for brands.”

“The trends highlighted in DataGrail’s 2025 report underscore a critical shift in the data privacy landscape,” said Ryan O’Leary, Research Director, Privacy and Legal Technology, IDC. “The significant increase in data deletion requests, coupled with rising compliance costs and continued violations of consumer consent indicates that organizations need to prioritize robust data privacy management.”

Consumers expect privacy regardless of location or legislation
Around the world, consumer demand for control over personal data is seeing momentum. Globally, 31.5% of DSRs came from countries without privacy laws. In the U.S., 46.6% of requests were made by people in states that didn’t have privacy laws in effect.

Majority of businesses not honoring do not sell preferences
As consumers automate do not sell requests, a majority of organizations are not honoring those requests, putting their organizations at risk for regulatory scrutiny, potentially leading to costly fines, lawsuits, or reputational damage to their brand. An audit of 5,000 websites reveals that 69% of organizations fire 3 or more cookie trackers despite website visitors opting out. This means organizations have not correctly implemented consent mechanisms and are tracking consumer activities to retarget them with ads without their consent.

Data brokerage industry tops list for most data privacy requests
Privacy requests in 2024 among data brokers were the highest category of requests across industries. Driven by the California Delete Act, which put renewed pressure on data brokers to honor deletion requests, combined with an uptick in companies that delete data, heightened concern over data breaches, political uncertainty and AI’s expanding use of personal data. These factors are driving a surge in consumer privacy actions and reshaping the data landscape.

Methodology
DataGrail analyzed the Data Subject Requests (DSRs) it helped process on behalf of customers from January 1 to December 31, 2023. The customer set has more than 700 million records, where a “record” is defined as a single, individual record associated with a unique identifier within a customer’s database. To determine the cost of processing requests, DataGrail used Gartner’s manual processing estimate of $1,524 per DSR.

To normalize the data across various company sizes, DataGrail calculated DSRs per one million identities. To account for variability, DataGrail used a “10% trim mean” calculation to determine benchmarks. The dataset includes DSRs submitted under the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) and General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), along with DSRs received in the U.S. and globally that don’t fall under those regulatory umbrellas. As a United States-based company, with primarily U.S.-based customers, DataGrail’s dataset may skew toward DSRs from the U.S.

About DataGrail
DataGrail is the data privacy company for this era. We help brands minimize risk, stay a step ahead of consumer and employee expectations, and safeguard their reputation. Our complete, data privacy platform is powered by patented Risk Intelligence technology that detects shadow IT and makes vulnerable data visible so brands can proactively manage risk. Leveraging responsible automation at scale and the largest integration network in data privacy, DataGrail automates privacy workflows across systems to perform risk assessments, accelerate data subject request (DSR) fulfillment, and optimize resources.

Headquartered in San Francisco, the world’s most trusted brands partner with DataGrail on their data privacy journey, including Salesforce, FanDuel, Dexcom, Databricks, among others.

Media Contact
press@datagrail.io

The MIL Network –
July 1, 2025
MIL-OSI: BTC Miner Cloud Mining: A Million-Dollar Opportunity Amid Crypto Market Turbulence
Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

New York City, NY, June 30, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — The global crypto market continues to sway between volatility and opportunity. Bitcoin has broken through key resistance levels several times in the past month, only to swiftly retrace. Ethereum is navigating complex upgrades, while XRP has surged and plummeted under legal clouds and geopolitical ripples. In such an environment, many investors are asking a pressing question: Is there a way to participate in crypto while still earning stable, predictable returns?

A rapidly growing UK-based company, BTC Miner, believes it has found the answer.

Cloud Mining, No Hardware Required

Unlike traditional mining, which demands expensive hardware and technical know-how, BTC Miner champions a cloud mining model. Users do not need to purchase mining rigs, pay sky-high electricity bills, or worry about outdated hardware. By registering online and purchasing a mining contract, BTC Miner allocates computing power across its global data centers, where mining operations run automatically.

“We want everyday people to enjoy the benefits of mining income,” says the BTC Miner team. “Cryptocurrency shouldn’t belong exclusively to a handful of tech insiders.”

$500 Welcome Bonus Lowers Entry Barriers

To help more users experience cloud mining with zero risk, BTC Miner offers an attractive welcome bonus:

New users who register instantly receive a $500 bonus, which can be used to purchase a $500 mining contract. Users can start earning daily profits without depositing their own funds upfront.

This means even newcomers with no prior crypto experience can safely dip their toes into the mining world — an especially appealing proposition during volatile times.

FCA Regulation Ensures Compliance and Safety

Unlike many unregulated crypto projects, BTC Miner is officially registered in the UK and operates under the strict oversight of the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).

“Compliance is the cornerstone of our business strategy. The security of investors’ funds and the transparency of our operations are our highest priorities,” BTC Miner states.

All client funds are held in top-tier bank accounts and secured with SSL encryption and insurance protection.

Referral Rewards Create Multiple Income Streams

BTC Miner goes beyond mining profits by offering a generous referral program. The platform’s two-tier commission system works as follows:
- Earn 7% commission on the total investments of every user you directly refer.
- Earn an additional 2% commission if your referred users bring in new users themselves.
This dual-layer structure means that even those who prefer not to expand their own investments can still build substantial passive income simply by sharing their referral link.

How to Make Money: Four Simple Steps

BTC Miner makes it simple for anyone to earn crypto profits through four easy steps:
1. Register an Account
  Visit https://btcminer.net and sign up for a free account to claim your $500 welcome bonus.
2. Select a Mining Contract
  Explore various cloud mining plans on the platform, choosing one that suits your budget and timeframe.
3. Start Mining Automatically
  Once you purchase a contract, the system assigns mining power and begins operations automatically — no technical expertise required.
4. Daily Profit Settlement
  Every 24 hours, the platform calculates mining earnings and credits them to your account balance. Users can track profits in real time via their dashboards.
Additionally, users can maximize earnings through BTC Miner’s referral program, inviting others to join and invest.

Stable Earnings, Paid Daily

BTC Miner guarantees that all mining profits are calculated and settled every 24 hours, providing a level of fixed daily income that shields users from the extreme volatility that often plagues traditional crypto trading. For investors seeking consistency, this model offers a refreshing alternative.

Cloud Mining Rising in Popularity Amid Market Instability

With global crypto markets remaining unpredictable, investors are increasingly looking for ways to generate returns without being exposed to constant price swings. BTC Miner — combining regulatory compliance, the convenience of cloud mining, and innovative revenue streams — is emerging as a leading solution for those seeking to balance crypto potential with financial stability.

From first-time crypto explorers to seasoned investors, many are starting to view BTC Miner as a trusted shield against market volatility — and a gateway to substantial passive income.

Ready to unlock your own million-dollar opportunity in cloud mining?
Visit BTC Miner and claim your $500 welcome bonus： https://btcminer.net

Official email: info@btcminer.net

Attachment

The MIL Network –
July 1, 2025
MIL-Evening Report: Sexy K-pop demons, a human lie detector and shearers on strike: what to watch in July

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By John Mickel, Adjunct Associate Professor, School of Justice, Queensland University of Technology

Tomorrow marks exactly halfway through 2025. Luckily there’s a suite of streaming options to help get you through the mid-year bump.

We’ve got iconic classics celebrating major anniversaries, as well as an animated K-Pop spectacle, and a documentary trawling through the controversial tenure of former Queensland premier Joh Bjelke-Petersen.

Joh: Last King of Queensland

Stan

The new documentary film Joh: Last King of Queensland offers a dramatised account of Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen’s premiership from 1968 to 1987.

Directed by Kriv Stenders, using reenactments (Bjelke-Petersen is played by Richard Roxburgh), archival footage and contemporary interviews, the film portrays him as a complex and polarising figure. Roxburgh highlights Bjelke-Petersen’s rhetorical simplicity. He presented himself as an advocate for “ordinary” Queenslanders, especially in rural and conservative communities.

We are given a man who is socially conservative, economically ambitious and politically divisive. A man who profoundly shaped Queensland’s governance and development. But while the film effectively captures his popular appeal and role in the state’s economic transformation, it simplifies key aspects of his political ascent.

In particular, it doesn’t capture the complexities of electoral mechanics, internal party manoeuvring and the influence of the public service.

Bjelke-Petersen’s legacy continues to polarise. To supporters, he remains a visionary who championed economic growth and conservative values. To critics, he presided over an era of democratic erosion, civil rights suppression and entrenched corruption.

His story reflects the enduring tension between executive authority and democratic accountability in modern Australian political history.

– John Mickel

Read more:
Joh: Last King of Queensland captures Bjelke-Petersen’s political persona – but omits key details of the story

Jaws

Various platforms

Steven Spielberg’s Jaws, released 50 years ago, was the first summer blockbuster, received Academy Awards for sound, editing and music, and became the first film to earn US$100 million at the United States box office.

Chief of Police Martin Brody has recently moved from New York City to Amity Island with his wife and two children. As the small town prepares for its crucial 4th of July celebrations, a series of shark attacks threatens the festivities – and the town’s summer economy.

The mayor insists on keeping the beaches open for “summer dollars”. When the shark strikes again, local fisherman Quint is hired to hunt it down. Brody and visiting marine biologist Matt Hooper insist on joining the expedition to save the island.

Apart from one scene using real underwater shark footage from Australians Ron and Valerie Taylor, the shark was mechanical. The mechanical shark sank … a lot. No wonder Spielberg named the temperamental and unreliable shark after his lawyer.

With the lack of a functioning shark, Spielberg made the artistic decision – echoing Alfred Hitchcock – to suggest the shark’s presence rather than show it outright in the film’s first half. Even without appearing onscreen, the shark has an overwhelming presence and effect on the audience, thanks to John Williams’ music.

Jaws is now a cinema classic.

It launched Spielberg’s illustrious career, scared an entire generation from going into the water, and also inspired a new generation of marine activists – such as myself – who love sharks and the ocean.

– Will Jeffery

Read more:
Jaws at 50: the first summer blockbuster is still a film that bites – even when the shark didn’t work

KPop Demon Hunters

Netflix

KPop Demon Hunters is an animated movie that follows a Korean girl band, Huntrix, whose members happen to be covert demon hunters. Their songs and slays have the power to maintain the barrier between the human world and the underworld (called the “honmoon”).

Annoyed demon overlord Gwi-ma (voiced by Lee Byong-Hun) greenlights a devilishly sexy boy band, Saja Boys, to steal the girls’ fans (and their souls). The attack proves to be more than a challenge for lead singer, Rumi (Arden Cho), who has a dark secret she’s keeping under wraps.

For fans of the Spider-Verse films, the animation style will be familiar: a blend of 2D and 3D techniques, with a high-contrast colour palette. KPop Demon Hunters goes an aesthetic step further by adding some distinctive anime touches, such as by using the chibi style, when characters have intense reactions.

The film also showcases several musical interludes voiced by actual K-pop stars such as EJAE, Kevin Woo, Andrew Choi and Rei Ami – as well as an anthem performed by members of TWICE, famous for their 2016 megahit Cheer Up.

To older viewers, the success of this watchable yet somewhat predictable flick may be puzzling, but KPop Demon Hunters will resonate with any Gen Zs in the house. After all, it has catchy tunes, jokes that land, female empowerment, epic battle scenes, and a smidge of teen romance.

There’s also a deeper thematic around the duality of identity, and a message about confronting one’s own demons.

– Phoebe Hart

Poker Face, season two

Stan

Charlie Cale (Natasha Lyonne) is back for season two of Poker Face. Creator Rian Johnson is clearly a lover of the whodunnit genre. Between Poker Face and the Knives Out films, Johnson continues to pay homage to the format while pushing it into new directions.

Poker Face takes the format of the inverted detective story, made famous by popular series Columbo (1968–2003), where the episode opens with the killer committing the crime, only for the detective to arrive on the scene.

The joy of Poker Face lies in the viewer trying to figure out how the detective will catch the killer, while also enjoying comedic allusions to several genres. Charlie Cale has a unique skill in that she can always tell when someone is lying: “bullshit”, she calmly says when someone doesn’t tell the truth.

Season two continues the show’s all-star cameo lineup from different eras of popular culture. Standouts include Cynthia Erivo in the opening episode, Cheers star Rhea Perlman, Katie Holmes, and Awkwafina accusing Alia Shawkat of sleeping with her grandma to steal a rent-controlled apartment.

The strongest episode of the season features John Cho and Melanie Lynskey, where Charlie meet a group of scammers at a hotel bar. Cho plays the scammer and Lynskey is his unwitting victim. When Lyonne’s Charlie becomes involved, it becomes a game of who is playing who.

The episodic format never feels tired, as each mystery’s eccentricities and generic allusions shift in each episode. Natasha Lyonne’s performance anchors the show, allowing for the emotional beats to shift seamlessly, from the sadness of death, to the humour of each ridiculous situation.

– Stuart Richards

Sirens

Netflix

Much like The Perfect Couple (2024–), or Succession (2018–23), Sirens offers all the guilty pleasures of watching wealthy but dysfunctional families scheme and unravel inside their opulent homes. It contains the usual metamodern mix of irony, plot twists, clever dialogue and dark comedy (with hints of murder) we’ve come to expect from series that rank in Netflix’s top ten.

However, it’s not quite as binge-worthy or provocative as other shows in this genre. It also drags in the middle. You could probably watch the first episode and the last chapter to follow the narrative and catch all the best scenes.

Sirens tries to distinguish itself by foregrounding strong female leads, and leaning heavily into its postfeminist take on manipulative women of different ages competing against each other. They’re not fighting over the man (played by Kevin Bacon), so much as his estate and the social capital that comes with it.

Unlike Poison Ivy and other 90s classics I have explored, Sirens presents a more sympathetic and nuanced portrayal of the sexy, younger class usurper. Simone DeWitt (played by Milly Alcock) is the working-class personal assistant determined to improve her social positioning by any means necessary.

The series also attempts to elevate itself through images and sounds which reference Greek mythology, with lots of scenes of beautiful women perched precariously on cliff tops, while hapless men are lured in by their haunting high-pitched singing.

The ambiguous politics of it all will leave you wondering if you, too, have been just as expertly manipulated.

– Susan Hopkins

Sunday Too Far Away

Brollie and ABC iView

Released 50 years ago, Sunday Too Far Away deals episodically with a group of shearers led by Foley (Jack Thompson), and the events leading up to the national shearers’ strike of 1956.

The shearers are a ragtag group held together by rum, unionism and competitiveness – as Foley must deal with the camp cook from hell, as well as a threat to his “gun” status.

Like its contemporary Wake in Fright (1971), Sunday also centres on rural male mateship. But while Wake in Fright is revolted by it, Sunday strives for an elegiac celebration that might have drawn from Henry Lawson, of union-based mateship as the only defence against the harshness of life.

It is hard to overstate Sunday’s importance for the Australian film industry and for its producer, the South Australian Film Corporation (SAFC), founded in 1972 by the new Labor government. Sunday would be the organisation’s first film, budgeted at $231,000, with the commonwealth providing half this figure. It was a remarkable demonstration of maximum involvement by a state government body.

Sunday was accepted into the Directors’ Fortnight at Cannes, the first Australian film bestowed the honour, and it went on to win eight of the 12 awards on offer at the Australian Film Institute Awards. The success of Sunday Too Far Away, followed closely by Picnic at Hanging Rock (1975) and Storm Boy (1976), succeeded in establishing the SAFC as a prime mover in Australian film.

– Michael Walsh

Read more:
Sunday Too Far Away at 50: how a story about Aussie shearers launched a local film industry

Michael Walsh is a consultant for the SAFC on its digitisation project. He has previously written a commissioned history for the organisation.

John Mickel, Phoebe Hart, Stuart Richards, Susan Hopkins, and Will Jeffery do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Sexy K-pop demons, a human lie detector and shearers on strike: what to watch in July – https://theconversation.com/sexy-k-pop-demons-a-human-lie-detector-and-shearers-on-strike-what-to-watch-in-july-259907

MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

July 1, 2025
MIL-Evening Report: Sexy K-pop demons, a human lie detector and shearers on strike: what to watch in July

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By John Mickel, Adjunct Associate Professor, School of Justice, Queensland University of Technology

Tomorrow marks exactly halfway through 2025. Luckily there’s a suite of streaming options to help get you through the mid-year bump.

We’ve got iconic classics celebrating major anniversaries, as well as an animated K-Pop spectacle, and a documentary trawling through the controversial tenure of former Queensland premier Joh Bjelke-Petersen.

Joh: Last King of Queensland

Stan

The new documentary film Joh: Last King of Queensland offers a dramatised account of Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen’s premiership from 1968 to 1987.

Directed by Kriv Stenders, using reenactments (Bjelke-Petersen is played by Richard Roxburgh), archival footage and contemporary interviews, the film portrays him as a complex and polarising figure. Roxburgh highlights Bjelke-Petersen’s rhetorical simplicity. He presented himself as an advocate for “ordinary” Queenslanders, especially in rural and conservative communities.

We are given a man who is socially conservative, economically ambitious and politically divisive. A man who profoundly shaped Queensland’s governance and development. But while the film effectively captures his popular appeal and role in the state’s economic transformation, it simplifies key aspects of his political ascent.

In particular, it doesn’t capture the complexities of electoral mechanics, internal party manoeuvring and the influence of the public service.

Bjelke-Petersen’s legacy continues to polarise. To supporters, he remains a visionary who championed economic growth and conservative values. To critics, he presided over an era of democratic erosion, civil rights suppression and entrenched corruption.

His story reflects the enduring tension between executive authority and democratic accountability in modern Australian political history.

– John Mickel

Read more:
Joh: Last King of Queensland captures Bjelke-Petersen’s political persona – but omits key details of the story

Jaws

Various platforms

Steven Spielberg’s Jaws, released 50 years ago, was the first summer blockbuster, received Academy Awards for sound, editing and music, and became the first film to earn US$100 million at the United States box office.

Chief of Police Martin Brody has recently moved from New York City to Amity Island with his wife and two children. As the small town prepares for its crucial 4th of July celebrations, a series of shark attacks threatens the festivities – and the town’s summer economy.

The mayor insists on keeping the beaches open for “summer dollars”. When the shark strikes again, local fisherman Quint is hired to hunt it down. Brody and visiting marine biologist Matt Hooper insist on joining the expedition to save the island.

Apart from one scene using real underwater shark footage from Australians Ron and Valerie Taylor, the shark was mechanical. The mechanical shark sank … a lot. No wonder Spielberg named the temperamental and unreliable shark after his lawyer.

With the lack of a functioning shark, Spielberg made the artistic decision – echoing Alfred Hitchcock – to suggest the shark’s presence rather than show it outright in the film’s first half. Even without appearing onscreen, the shark has an overwhelming presence and effect on the audience, thanks to John Williams’ music.

Jaws is now a cinema classic.

It launched Spielberg’s illustrious career, scared an entire generation from going into the water, and also inspired a new generation of marine activists – such as myself – who love sharks and the ocean.

– Will Jeffery

Read more:
Jaws at 50: the first summer blockbuster is still a film that bites – even when the shark didn’t work

KPop Demon Hunters

Netflix

KPop Demon Hunters is an animated movie that follows a Korean girl band, Huntrix, whose members happen to be covert demon hunters. Their songs and slays have the power to maintain the barrier between the human world and the underworld (called the “honmoon”).

Annoyed demon overlord Gwi-ma (voiced by Lee Byong-Hun) greenlights a devilishly sexy boy band, Saja Boys, to steal the girls’ fans (and their souls). The attack proves to be more than a challenge for lead singer, Rumi (Arden Cho), who has a dark secret she’s keeping under wraps.

For fans of the Spider-Verse films, the animation style will be familiar: a blend of 2D and 3D techniques, with a high-contrast colour palette. KPop Demon Hunters goes an aesthetic step further by adding some distinctive anime touches, such as by using the chibi style, when characters have intense reactions.

The film also showcases several musical interludes voiced by actual K-pop stars such as EJAE, Kevin Woo, Andrew Choi and Rei Ami – as well as an anthem performed by members of TWICE, famous for their 2016 megahit Cheer Up.

To older viewers, the success of this watchable yet somewhat predictable flick may be puzzling, but KPop Demon Hunters will resonate with any Gen Zs in the house. After all, it has catchy tunes, jokes that land, female empowerment, epic battle scenes, and a smidge of teen romance.

There’s also a deeper thematic around the duality of identity, and a message about confronting one’s own demons.

– Phoebe Hart

Poker Face, season two

Stan

Charlie Cale (Natasha Lyonne) is back for season two of Poker Face. Creator Rian Johnson is clearly a lover of the whodunnit genre. Between Poker Face and the Knives Out films, Johnson continues to pay homage to the format while pushing it into new directions.

Poker Face takes the format of the inverted detective story, made famous by popular series Columbo (1968–2003), where the episode opens with the killer committing the crime, only for the detective to arrive on the scene.

The joy of Poker Face lies in the viewer trying to figure out how the detective will catch the killer, while also enjoying comedic allusions to several genres. Charlie Cale has a unique skill in that she can always tell when someone is lying: “bullshit”, she calmly says when someone doesn’t tell the truth.

Season two continues the show’s all-star cameo lineup from different eras of popular culture. Standouts include Cynthia Erivo in the opening episode, Cheers star Rhea Perlman, Katie Holmes, and Awkwafina accusing Alia Shawkat of sleeping with her grandma to steal a rent-controlled apartment.

The strongest episode of the season features John Cho and Melanie Lynskey, where Charlie meet a group of scammers at a hotel bar. Cho plays the scammer and Lynskey is his unwitting victim. When Lyonne’s Charlie becomes involved, it becomes a game of who is playing who.

The episodic format never feels tired, as each mystery’s eccentricities and generic allusions shift in each episode. Natasha Lyonne’s performance anchors the show, allowing for the emotional beats to shift seamlessly, from the sadness of death, to the humour of each ridiculous situation.

– Stuart Richards

Sirens

Netflix

Much like The Perfect Couple (2024–), or Succession (2018–23), Sirens offers all the guilty pleasures of watching wealthy but dysfunctional families scheme and unravel inside their opulent homes. It contains the usual metamodern mix of irony, plot twists, clever dialogue and dark comedy (with hints of murder) we’ve come to expect from series that rank in Netflix’s top ten.

However, it’s not quite as binge-worthy or provocative as other shows in this genre. It also drags in the middle. You could probably watch the first episode and the last chapter to follow the narrative and catch all the best scenes.

Sirens tries to distinguish itself by foregrounding strong female leads, and leaning heavily into its postfeminist take on manipulative women of different ages competing against each other. They’re not fighting over the man (played by Kevin Bacon), so much as his estate and the social capital that comes with it.

Unlike Poison Ivy and other 90s classics I have explored, Sirens presents a more sympathetic and nuanced portrayal of the sexy, younger class usurper. Simone DeWitt (played by Milly Alcock) is the working-class personal assistant determined to improve her social positioning by any means necessary.

The series also attempts to elevate itself through images and sounds which reference Greek mythology, with lots of scenes of beautiful women perched precariously on cliff tops, while hapless men are lured in by their haunting high-pitched singing.

The ambiguous politics of it all will leave you wondering if you, too, have been just as expertly manipulated.

– Susan Hopkins

Sunday Too Far Away

Brollie and ABC iView

Released 50 years ago, Sunday Too Far Away deals episodically with a group of shearers led by Foley (Jack Thompson), and the events leading up to the national shearers’ strike of 1956.

The shearers are a ragtag group held together by rum, unionism and competitiveness – as Foley must deal with the camp cook from hell, as well as a threat to his “gun” status.

Like its contemporary Wake in Fright (1971), Sunday also centres on rural male mateship. But while Wake in Fright is revolted by it, Sunday strives for an elegiac celebration that might have drawn from Henry Lawson, of union-based mateship as the only defence against the harshness of life.

It is hard to overstate Sunday’s importance for the Australian film industry and for its producer, the South Australian Film Corporation (SAFC), founded in 1972 by the new Labor government. Sunday would be the organisation’s first film, budgeted at $231,000, with the commonwealth providing half this figure. It was a remarkable demonstration of maximum involvement by a state government body.

Sunday was accepted into the Directors’ Fortnight at Cannes, the first Australian film bestowed the honour, and it went on to win eight of the 12 awards on offer at the Australian Film Institute Awards. The success of Sunday Too Far Away, followed closely by Picnic at Hanging Rock (1975) and Storm Boy (1976), succeeded in establishing the SAFC as a prime mover in Australian film.

– Michael Walsh

Read more:
Sunday Too Far Away at 50: how a story about Aussie shearers launched a local film industry

Michael Walsh is a consultant for the SAFC on its digitisation project. He has previously written a commissioned history for the organisation.

John Mickel, Phoebe Hart, Stuart Richards, Susan Hopkins, and Will Jeffery do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Sexy K-pop demons, a human lie detector and shearers on strike: what to watch in July – https://theconversation.com/sexy-k-pop-demons-a-human-lie-detector-and-shearers-on-strike-what-to-watch-in-july-259907

MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

July 1, 2025
MIL-Evening Report: We have drugs to manage HIV. So why are we spending millions looking for cures?

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Bridget Haire, Associate Professor, Public Health Ethics, School of Population Health, UNSW Sydney

Alim Yakubov/Shutterstock

Over the past three decades there have been amazing advances in treating and preventing HIV.

It’s now a manageable infection. A person with HIV who takes HIV medicine consistently, before their immune system declines, can expect to live almost as long as someone without HIV.

The same drugs prevent transmission of the virus to sexual partners.

There is still no effective HIV vaccine. But there are highly effective drugs to prevent HIV infection for people without HIV who are at higher risk of acquiring it.

These drugs are known as as “pre-exposure prophylaxis” or PrEP. These come as a pill, which needs to be taken either daily, or “on demand” before and after risky sex. An injection that protects against HIV for six months has recently been approved in the United States.

So with such effective HIV treatment and PrEP, why are we still spending millions looking for HIV cures?

Not everyone has access to these drugs

Access to HIV drugs and PrEP depends on the availability of health clinics, health professionals, and the means to supply and distribute the drugs. In some countries, this infrastructure may not be secure.

For instance, earlier this year, US President Donald Trump’s dissolution of the USAID foreign aid program has threatened the delivery of HIV drugs to many low-income countries.

This demonstrates the fragility of current approaches to treatment and prevention. A secure, uninterrupted supply of HIV medicine is required, and without this, lives will be lost and the number of new cases of HIV will rise.

Another example is the six-monthly PrEP injection just approved in the US. This drug has great potential for controlling HIV if it is made available and affordable in countries with the greatest HIV burden.

But the prospect for lower-income countries accessing this expensive drug looks uncertain, even if it can be made at a fraction of its current cost, as some researchers say.

So despite the success of HIV drugs and PrEP, precarious health-care systems and high drug costs mean we can’t rely on them to bring an end to the ongoing global HIV pandemic. That’s why we also still need to look at other options.

Haven’t people already been ‘cured’?

Worldwide, at least seven people have been “cured” of HIV – or at least have had long-term sustained remission. This means that after stopping HIV drugs, they did not have any replicating HIV in their blood for months or years.

In each case, the person with HIV also had a life-threatening cancer needing a bone marrow transplant. They were each matched with a donor who had a specific genetic variation that resulted in not having HIV receptors in key bone marrow cells.

After the bone marrow transplant, recipients stopped HIV drugs, without detectable levels of the virus returning. The new immune cells made in the transplanted bone marrow lacked the HIV receptors. This stopped the virus from infecting cells and replicating.

But this genetic variation is very rare. Bone marrow transplantation is also risky and extremely resource-intensive. So while this strategy has worked for a few people, it is not a scalable prospect for curing HIV more widely.

So we need to keep looking for other options for a cure, including basic laboratory research to get us there.

How about the ‘breakthrough’ I’ve heard about?

HIV treatment stops the HIV replication that causes immune damage. But there are places in the body where the virus “hides” and drugs cannot reach. If the drugs are stopped, the “latent” HIV comes out of hiding and replicates again. So it can damage the immune system, leading to HIV-related disease.

One approach is to try to force the hidden or latent HIV out into the open, so drugs can target it. This is a strategy called “shock and kill”. And an example of such Australian research was recently reported in the media as a “breakthrough” in the search for an HIV cure.

Researchers in Melbourne have developed a lipid nanoparticle – a tiny ball of fat – that encapsulates messenger RNA (or mRNA) and delivers a “message” to infected white blood cells. This prompts the cells to reveal the “hiding” HIV.

In theory, this will allow the immune system or HIV drugs to target the virus.

This discovery is an important step. However, it is still in the laboratory phase of testing, and is just one piece of the puzzle.

We could say the same about many other results heralded as moving closer to a cure for HIV.

Further research on safety and efficacy is needed before testing in human clinical trials. Such trials start with small numbers and the trialling process takes many years. This and other steps towards a cure are slow and expensive, but necessary.

Importantly, any cure would ultimately need to be fairly low-tech to deliver for it to be feasible and affordable in low-income countries globally.

So where does that leave us?

A cure for HIV that is affordable and scalable would have a profound impact on human heath globally, particularly for people living with HIV. To get there is a long and arduous path that involves solving a range of scientific puzzles, followed by addressing implementation challenges.

In the meantime, ensuring people at risk of HIV have access to testing and prevention interventions – such as PrEP and safe injecting equipment – remains crucial. People living with HIV also need sustained access to effective treatment – regardless of where they live.

Bridget Haire has received funding from the National Health and Medical Research Council. She is a past president of the Australian Federation of AIDS Organisations (now Health Equity Matters).

Benjamin Bavinton receives funding from the National Health and Medical Research Council, the Australian government, and state and territory governments. He also receives funding from ViiV Healthcare and Gilead Sciences, both of which make drugs or drug classes mentioned in this article. He is a Board Director of community organisation, ACON, and is on the National PrEP Guidelines Panel coordinated by ASHM Health.

– ref. We have drugs to manage HIV. So why are we spending millions looking for cures? – https://theconversation.com/we-have-drugs-to-manage-hiv-so-why-are-we-spending-millions-looking-for-cures-258391

MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

July 1, 2025
MIL-Evening Report: We have drugs to manage HIV. So why are we spending millions looking for cures?

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Bridget Haire, Associate Professor, Public Health Ethics, School of Population Health, UNSW Sydney

Alim Yakubov/Shutterstock

Over the past three decades there have been amazing advances in treating and preventing HIV.

It’s now a manageable infection. A person with HIV who takes HIV medicine consistently, before their immune system declines, can expect to live almost as long as someone without HIV.

The same drugs prevent transmission of the virus to sexual partners.

There is still no effective HIV vaccine. But there are highly effective drugs to prevent HIV infection for people without HIV who are at higher risk of acquiring it.

These drugs are known as as “pre-exposure prophylaxis” or PrEP. These come as a pill, which needs to be taken either daily, or “on demand” before and after risky sex. An injection that protects against HIV for six months has recently been approved in the United States.

So with such effective HIV treatment and PrEP, why are we still spending millions looking for HIV cures?

Not everyone has access to these drugs

Access to HIV drugs and PrEP depends on the availability of health clinics, health professionals, and the means to supply and distribute the drugs. In some countries, this infrastructure may not be secure.

For instance, earlier this year, US President Donald Trump’s dissolution of the USAID foreign aid program has threatened the delivery of HIV drugs to many low-income countries.

This demonstrates the fragility of current approaches to treatment and prevention. A secure, uninterrupted supply of HIV medicine is required, and without this, lives will be lost and the number of new cases of HIV will rise.

Another example is the six-monthly PrEP injection just approved in the US. This drug has great potential for controlling HIV if it is made available and affordable in countries with the greatest HIV burden.

But the prospect for lower-income countries accessing this expensive drug looks uncertain, even if it can be made at a fraction of its current cost, as some researchers say.

So despite the success of HIV drugs and PrEP, precarious health-care systems and high drug costs mean we can’t rely on them to bring an end to the ongoing global HIV pandemic. That’s why we also still need to look at other options.

Haven’t people already been ‘cured’?

Worldwide, at least seven people have been “cured” of HIV – or at least have had long-term sustained remission. This means that after stopping HIV drugs, they did not have any replicating HIV in their blood for months or years.

In each case, the person with HIV also had a life-threatening cancer needing a bone marrow transplant. They were each matched with a donor who had a specific genetic variation that resulted in not having HIV receptors in key bone marrow cells.

After the bone marrow transplant, recipients stopped HIV drugs, without detectable levels of the virus returning. The new immune cells made in the transplanted bone marrow lacked the HIV receptors. This stopped the virus from infecting cells and replicating.

But this genetic variation is very rare. Bone marrow transplantation is also risky and extremely resource-intensive. So while this strategy has worked for a few people, it is not a scalable prospect for curing HIV more widely.

So we need to keep looking for other options for a cure, including basic laboratory research to get us there.

How about the ‘breakthrough’ I’ve heard about?

HIV treatment stops the HIV replication that causes immune damage. But there are places in the body where the virus “hides” and drugs cannot reach. If the drugs are stopped, the “latent” HIV comes out of hiding and replicates again. So it can damage the immune system, leading to HIV-related disease.

One approach is to try to force the hidden or latent HIV out into the open, so drugs can target it. This is a strategy called “shock and kill”. And an example of such Australian research was recently reported in the media as a “breakthrough” in the search for an HIV cure.

Researchers in Melbourne have developed a lipid nanoparticle – a tiny ball of fat – that encapsulates messenger RNA (or mRNA) and delivers a “message” to infected white blood cells. This prompts the cells to reveal the “hiding” HIV.

In theory, this will allow the immune system or HIV drugs to target the virus.

This discovery is an important step. However, it is still in the laboratory phase of testing, and is just one piece of the puzzle.

We could say the same about many other results heralded as moving closer to a cure for HIV.

Further research on safety and efficacy is needed before testing in human clinical trials. Such trials start with small numbers and the trialling process takes many years. This and other steps towards a cure are slow and expensive, but necessary.

Importantly, any cure would ultimately need to be fairly low-tech to deliver for it to be feasible and affordable in low-income countries globally.

So where does that leave us?

A cure for HIV that is affordable and scalable would have a profound impact on human heath globally, particularly for people living with HIV. To get there is a long and arduous path that involves solving a range of scientific puzzles, followed by addressing implementation challenges.

In the meantime, ensuring people at risk of HIV have access to testing and prevention interventions – such as PrEP and safe injecting equipment – remains crucial. People living with HIV also need sustained access to effective treatment – regardless of where they live.

Bridget Haire has received funding from the National Health and Medical Research Council. She is a past president of the Australian Federation of AIDS Organisations (now Health Equity Matters).

Benjamin Bavinton receives funding from the National Health and Medical Research Council, the Australian government, and state and territory governments. He also receives funding from ViiV Healthcare and Gilead Sciences, both of which make drugs or drug classes mentioned in this article. He is a Board Director of community organisation, ACON, and is on the National PrEP Guidelines Panel coordinated by ASHM Health.

– ref. We have drugs to manage HIV. So why are we spending millions looking for cures? – https://theconversation.com/we-have-drugs-to-manage-hiv-so-why-are-we-spending-millions-looking-for-cures-258391

MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

July 1, 2025
MIL-Evening Report: Trump’s worldview is causing a global shift of alliances – what does this mean for nations in the middle?

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Dilnoza Ubaydullaeva, Lecturer in Government – National Security College, Australian National University

Since US President Donald Trump took office this year, one theme has come up time and again: his rule is a threat to the US-led international order.

As the US political scientist John Mearsheimer famously argued, the liberal international order

was destined to fail from the start, as it contained the seeds of its own destruction.

This perspective has gained traction in recent years. And now, Trump’s actions have caused many to question whether a new world order is emerging.

Trump has expressed a desire for a new international order defined by multiple spheres of influence — one in which powers like the US, China and Russia each exert dominance over distinct regions.

This vision aligns with the idea of a “multipolar” world, where no single state holds overarching global dominance. Instead, influence is distributed among several great powers, each maintaining its own regional sphere.

This architecture contrasts sharply with earlier periods – the bipolar world of the Cold War, dominated by the US and the Soviet Union; and the unipolar period that followed, dominated by the US.

What does this mean for the world order moving forward?

Shifting US spheres of influence

We’ve seen this shift taking place in recent months. For example, Trump has backed away from his pledge to end the war between Russia and Ukraine and now appears to be leaving it to the main protagonists, and Europe, to find a solution.

Europe, which once largely spoke in a unified voice with the US, is also showing signs of policy-making which is more independent. Rather than framing its actions as protecting “Western democratic principles”, Europe is increasingly focused on defining its own security interests.

In the Middle East, the US will likely maintain its sphere of influence. It will continue its unequivocal support for Israel under Trump.

Amid shifting global alliances, the Trump administration will continue to support Israel, led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
noamgalai/Shutterstock

The US will also involve itself in the region’s politics when its interests are at stake, as we witnessed in its recent strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities.

This, along with increasing economic ties between the US and Gulf states, suggests US allies in the region will remain the dominant voices shaping regional dynamics, particularly now with Iran weakened.

Yet it’s clear Trump is reshaping US dynamics in the region by signaling a desire for reduced military and political involvement, and criticising the nation building efforts of previous administrations.

The Trump administration now appears to want to maintain its sphere of influence primarily through strong economic ties.

Russia and China poles emerging elsewhere

Meanwhile, other poles are emerging in the Global South. Russia and China have deepened their cooperation, positioning themselves as defenders against what they frame as Western hegemonic bullying.

Trump’s trade policies and sanctions against many nations in the Global South have fuelled narratives (spread by China and Russia) that the US does not consistently adhere to the rules it imposes on others.

Trump’s decision to slash funding to USAID has also opened the door to China, in particular, to become the main development partner for nations in Africa and other parts of the world.

And on the security front, Russia has become more involved in many African and Middle Eastern countries, which have become less trustful and reliant on Western powers.

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Xinping see opportunities to spread their influence in the Global South.
plavi011/Shutterstock

In the Indo-Pacific, much attention has been given to the rise of China and its increasingly assertive posture. Many of Washington’s traditional allies are nervous about its continued engagement in the region and ability to counter China’s rise.

Chinese leader Xi Jinping has sought to take advantage of the current environment, embarking on a Vietnam, Malaysia and Cambodia push earlier this year. But many nations continue to be wary of China’s increasing influence, in particular the Philippines, which has clashed with China over the South China Sea.

Strategic hedging

Not all countries, however, are aligning themselves neatly with one pole or another.

For small states caught between great powers, navigating this multipolar environment is both a risk and an opportunity.

Ukraine is a case in point. As a sovereign state, Ukraine should have the freedom to decide its own alignments. Yet, it finds itself ensnared in great power politics, with devastating consequences.

Other small states are playing a different game — pivoting from one power to another based on their immediate interests.

Slovakia, for instance, is both a NATO and EU member, yet its leader, Robert Fico, attended Russia’s Victory Day Parade in May and told President Vladimir Putin he wanted to maintain “normal relations” with Russia.

Then there is Central Asia, which is the centre of a renewed “great game,” with Russia, China and Europe vying for influence and economic partnerships.

Yet if any Central Asian countries were to be invaded by Putin, would other powers intervene? It’s a difficult question to answer. Major powers are reluctant to engage in direct conflict unless their core interests or borders are directly threatened.

As a result, Central Asian states are hedging their bets, seeking to maintain relations with multiple poles, despite their conflicting agendas.

A future defined by regional power blocs?

While it is still early to draw definitive conclusions, the events of the past few months underscore a growing trend. Smaller countries are expressing solidarity with one power, but pragmatic cooperation with another, when it suits their national interests.

For this reason, regional power blocs seem to be of increasing interest to countries in the Global South.

For instance, the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organisation has become a stronger and larger grouping of nations across Eurasia in recent years.

Trump’s focus on making “America Great Again,” has taken the load off the US carrying liberal order leadership. A multipolar world may not be the end of the liberal international order, but it may be a reshaped version of liberal governance.

How “liberal” it can be will likely depend on what each regional power, or pole, will make of it.

Dilnoza Ubaydullaeva does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Trump’s worldview is causing a global shift of alliances – what does this mean for nations in the middle? – https://theconversation.com/trumps-worldview-is-causing-a-global-shift-of-alliances-what-does-this-mean-for-nations-in-the-middle-257113

MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

July 1, 2025
MIL-Evening Report: Trump’s worldview is causing a global shift of alliances – what does this mean for nations in the middle?

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Dilnoza Ubaydullaeva, Lecturer in Government – National Security College, Australian National University

Since US President Donald Trump took office this year, one theme has come up time and again: his rule is a threat to the US-led international order.

As the US political scientist John Mearsheimer famously argued, the liberal international order

was destined to fail from the start, as it contained the seeds of its own destruction.

This perspective has gained traction in recent years. And now, Trump’s actions have caused many to question whether a new world order is emerging.

Trump has expressed a desire for a new international order defined by multiple spheres of influence — one in which powers like the US, China and Russia each exert dominance over distinct regions.

This vision aligns with the idea of a “multipolar” world, where no single state holds overarching global dominance. Instead, influence is distributed among several great powers, each maintaining its own regional sphere.

This architecture contrasts sharply with earlier periods – the bipolar world of the Cold War, dominated by the US and the Soviet Union; and the unipolar period that followed, dominated by the US.

What does this mean for the world order moving forward?

Shifting US spheres of influence

We’ve seen this shift taking place in recent months. For example, Trump has backed away from his pledge to end the war between Russia and Ukraine and now appears to be leaving it to the main protagonists, and Europe, to find a solution.

Europe, which once largely spoke in a unified voice with the US, is also showing signs of policy-making which is more independent. Rather than framing its actions as protecting “Western democratic principles”, Europe is increasingly focused on defining its own security interests.

In the Middle East, the US will likely maintain its sphere of influence. It will continue its unequivocal support for Israel under Trump.

Amid shifting global alliances, the Trump administration will continue to support Israel, led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
noamgalai/Shutterstock

The US will also involve itself in the region’s politics when its interests are at stake, as we witnessed in its recent strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities.

This, along with increasing economic ties between the US and Gulf states, suggests US allies in the region will remain the dominant voices shaping regional dynamics, particularly now with Iran weakened.

Yet it’s clear Trump is reshaping US dynamics in the region by signaling a desire for reduced military and political involvement, and criticising the nation building efforts of previous administrations.

The Trump administration now appears to want to maintain its sphere of influence primarily through strong economic ties.

Russia and China poles emerging elsewhere

Meanwhile, other poles are emerging in the Global South. Russia and China have deepened their cooperation, positioning themselves as defenders against what they frame as Western hegemonic bullying.

Trump’s trade policies and sanctions against many nations in the Global South have fuelled narratives (spread by China and Russia) that the US does not consistently adhere to the rules it imposes on others.

Trump’s decision to slash funding to USAID has also opened the door to China, in particular, to become the main development partner for nations in Africa and other parts of the world.

And on the security front, Russia has become more involved in many African and Middle Eastern countries, which have become less trustful and reliant on Western powers.

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Xinping see opportunities to spread their influence in the Global South.
plavi011/Shutterstock

In the Indo-Pacific, much attention has been given to the rise of China and its increasingly assertive posture. Many of Washington’s traditional allies are nervous about its continued engagement in the region and ability to counter China’s rise.

Chinese leader Xi Jinping has sought to take advantage of the current environment, embarking on a Vietnam, Malaysia and Cambodia push earlier this year. But many nations continue to be wary of China’s increasing influence, in particular the Philippines, which has clashed with China over the South China Sea.

Strategic hedging

Not all countries, however, are aligning themselves neatly with one pole or another.

For small states caught between great powers, navigating this multipolar environment is both a risk and an opportunity.

Ukraine is a case in point. As a sovereign state, Ukraine should have the freedom to decide its own alignments. Yet, it finds itself ensnared in great power politics, with devastating consequences.

Other small states are playing a different game — pivoting from one power to another based on their immediate interests.

Slovakia, for instance, is both a NATO and EU member, yet its leader, Robert Fico, attended Russia’s Victory Day Parade in May and told President Vladimir Putin he wanted to maintain “normal relations” with Russia.

Then there is Central Asia, which is the centre of a renewed “great game,” with Russia, China and Europe vying for influence and economic partnerships.

Yet if any Central Asian countries were to be invaded by Putin, would other powers intervene? It’s a difficult question to answer. Major powers are reluctant to engage in direct conflict unless their core interests or borders are directly threatened.

As a result, Central Asian states are hedging their bets, seeking to maintain relations with multiple poles, despite their conflicting agendas.

A future defined by regional power blocs?

While it is still early to draw definitive conclusions, the events of the past few months underscore a growing trend. Smaller countries are expressing solidarity with one power, but pragmatic cooperation with another, when it suits their national interests.

For this reason, regional power blocs seem to be of increasing interest to countries in the Global South.

For instance, the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organisation has become a stronger and larger grouping of nations across Eurasia in recent years.

Trump’s focus on making “America Great Again,” has taken the load off the US carrying liberal order leadership. A multipolar world may not be the end of the liberal international order, but it may be a reshaped version of liberal governance.

How “liberal” it can be will likely depend on what each regional power, or pole, will make of it.

Dilnoza Ubaydullaeva does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Trump’s worldview is causing a global shift of alliances – what does this mean for nations in the middle? – https://theconversation.com/trumps-worldview-is-causing-a-global-shift-of-alliances-what-does-this-mean-for-nations-in-the-middle-257113

MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

July 1, 2025

MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Concludes the 2025 Article IV Consultation with the Republic of Serbia and Completes the First Review Under the Policy Coordination Instrument

Source: IMF – News in Russian

June 30, 2025

Serbia’s prudent macroeconomic policies have supported economic resilience in an uncertain global environment. After a brief slowdown in early 2025, growth is expected to reaccelerate in 2026 and 2027.
The authorities are maintaining fiscal discipline and implementing macro-critical structural reforms under the Policy Coordination Instrument, having completed the first review. While Serbia faces domestic and external uncertainties, it has built strong buffers to withstand potential shocks.
Reinvigorating reforms to improve the business environment and governance would help sustain Serbia’s strong growth over the medium term.

Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the 2025 Article IV Consultation with the Republic of Serbia and completed the first review of Serbia’s performance under the Policy Coordination Instrument (PCI).[1] The authorities have consented to the publication of the Staff Report prepared for the consultation and the review.[2]

Serbia’s macroeconomic performance remains resilient amid a challenging global environment. IMF staff projects real GDP growth at 3 percent in 2025, rising to 4 percent in 2026 and 4.5 percent in 2027. Headline inflation has returned to National Bank of Serbia’s target band (3 percent +/-1.5 percentage points), driven by declining energy prices and moderating core inflation. The monetary policy stance is appropriately restrictive.

Despite increased public investment, the fiscal deficit remains under control due to strong revenue performance and prudent management of current spending. While the current account deficit has widened, reflecting higher imports supporting the public investment drive and weak external demand, international reserves remain ample.

Fiscal structural reforms are progressing, including in further strengthening public financial management and public investment management. Energy sector reforms are also advancing but more remains to be done to ensure financial sustainability and operational efficiency in state-owned energy enterprises. Reinvigorating reforms to strengthen the business environment and improve governance is important for supporting Serbia’s growth rates over the medium term.

Downside risks to the outlook are elevated. A global slowdown and further geoeconomic fragmentation could weigh on exports and foreign direct investment. Domestically, heightened political tensions could erode consumer and investor confidence. But Serbia is well-positioned to manage potential shocks— international reserves and government deposits are high, public debt is declining, and banks are well-capitalized and liquid.

At the conclusion of the Board discussion on the Republic of Serbia, Ms. Gita Gopinath, First Deputy Managing Director, made the following statement:

“Serbia’s prudent macroeconomic policies and strong engagement with the IMF have delivered impressive results. Growth has been resilient, and fiscal and external buffers have strengthened. Reflecting these accomplishments, Serbia received its first-ever investment grade sovereign rating in 2024. Under the Policy Coordination Instrument (PCI), the Serbian authorities have continued their commitment to sound economic policies and structural reforms.

“In light of easing inflation and heightened domestic and external challenges, the planned fiscal expansion focused on growth-enhancing investment, can help cushion the near-term slowdown while boosting medium-term growth. Fiscal policy anchored to the deficit target, which safeguards hard-earned fiscal credibility and contains pressures on current spending, is critical. As the current investment cycle winds down, gradual fiscal consolidation is needed to rebuild buffers against external shocks. Advancing fiscal structural reforms remains essential, particularly to strengthen public financial management, enhance governance and transparency in public investment management, and address emerging fiscal risks.

“A restrictive monetary policy stance remains appropriate until disinflation is firmly sustained. While banks have been resilient and systemic risks remain contained, financial intermediation would benefit from additional improvements in regulatory and supervisory frameworks, including by closer alignment with EU standards. Continued progress on strengthening AML/CFT is also important.

“Further energy reforms remain crucial for securing sustainable and stable energy supplies. Increases in grid fees and electricity tariffs would improve cost recovery and the financial strength of energy state-owned enterprises and allow for investment in a more diversified and less carbon-intensive energy mix.

“Serbia faces medium-term challenges including from population aging. Enhancing productivity will be critical to sustaining income convergence with advanced economies. This will require structural and governance reforms to attract higher value-added FDI and domestic private investment to support growth. Improving the business environment will require measures to enhance commercial judicial frameworks, foster innovation, and strengthen governance.”

Executive Board Assessment[3]

Executive Directors agreed with the thrust of the staff appraisal. They commended Serbia’s prudent macroeconomic policies and strong commitment to reforms and welcomed the satisfactory performance under the Policy Coordination Instrument. Noting the heightened domestic and external risks to the outlook, Directors emphasized the importance of sustaining fiscal discipline, rebuilding buffers to shocks, and increasing productivity to support more sustainable growth.

Directors underscored that a fiscal deficit of 3.0 percent of GDP or lower would allow for priority investment spending, while preserving hard won credibility. They recognized the authorities’ commitment to adhere to the wage and pension special fiscal rules, which should help to keep public debt firmly on a downward path and support investor confidence. Directors welcomed the focus on ensuring transparent, accountable, and efficient government operations. Measures to improve public financial and investment management and fiscal risk management will help to maintain fiscal discipline, while ensuring the delivery of quality public investment. Directors also underscored the need to strengthen tax administration capacity. They welcomed the authorities’ commitment to addressing domestic arrears and preventing the accumulation of new arrears.

Directors agreed on the need to maintain a monetary policy tightening bias to achieve sustained disinflation. While noting that the banking sector has been resilient and systemic risks remain contained, Directors stressed the need for continued efforts to enhance regulatory and supervisory frameworks, including through closer alignment with EU standards. Continued efforts to strengthen AML/CFT frameworks are also important.

Directors highlighted that energy sector reforms remain essential to secure sustainable and stable energy supplies and support decarbonization. Accordingly, they welcomed the authorities’ commitment to strengthen the financial viability of energy state owned enterprises and support investment in a more diversified energy mix. In this regard, ensuring cost recovery through increased household electricity tariffs is important.

Directors agreed that ambitious structural and governance reforms are critical to achieving strong and sustainable medium term growth. Noting the impact of the aging population, Directors stressed the need to enhance employment opportunities for women and youth and to ensure better matching of skills with evolving labor market demands. They also supported intensified efforts to improve the business environment, including by enhancing commercial judicial frameworks, fostering innovation, and improving governance. Continued efforts to reduce corruption are important.

It is expected that the next Article IV consultation with the Republic of Serbia will be held on the 24-month cycle.

Serbia: Selected Economic and Social Indicators, 2024–27

	2024	2025		2026		2027
	Est.	PCI Request	Proj.	PCI Request	Proj.	PCI Request	Proj.
Output
Real GDP growth (%)	3.8	4.2	3.0	4.2	4.0	4.5	4.5

Employment
Unemployment rate (labor force survey) (%)	8.6	8.5	8.5	8.4	8.4	8.3	8.3

Prices
Inflation (%), end of period	4.3	3.4	3.3	3.3	3.2	3.2	3.2

General Government Finances
Revenue (% GDP)	40.9	41.2	40.9	40.9	40.4	40.9	40.1
Expenditure (% GDP)	42.9	44.2	43.9	43.9	43.4	43.9	43.1
Fiscal balance (% GDP)	-2.0	-3.0	-3.0	-3.0	-3.0	-3.0	-3.0
Public debt (% GDP)	47.5	47.7	46.8	46.9	46.5	46.4	46.4

Money and Credit
Broad money, eop (% change)	13.6	8.0	7.8	7.8	8.0	8.3	8.8
Credit to the private sector, eop (% change) 1/	8.5	7.9	9.3	5.7	9.6	9.2	10.5

Balance of Payments
Current account (% GDP)	-4.7	-5.1	-5.4	-5.2	-5.6	-5.5	-4.5
FDI (% GDP)	5.6	5.1	4.4	4.8	4.8	4.7	4.4
Reserves (months of prospective imports)	7.3	6.6	7.0	6.3	6.5	5.9	6.5
External debt (% GDP)	61.9	60.3	61.3	58.7	59.3	55.9	54.8

Exchange Rate
REER (% change)	2.3	…	…	…	…	…	…

Sources: Serbian authorities and IMF staff estimates. 1/ Calculated at a constant exchange rate to exclude the valuation effects.

[1] Under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country’s economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board.

[2] Under the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, publication of documents that pertain to member countries is voluntary and requires the member consent. The staff report will be shortly published on the www.imf.org/Serbia page.

[3] At the conclusion of the discussion, the Managing Director, as Chairman of the Board, summarizes the views of Executive Directors, and this summary is transmitted to the country’s authorities. An explanation of any qualifiers used in summings up can be found here: http://www.IMF.org/external/np/sec/misc/qualifiers.htm.

IMF Communications Department

MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Camila Perez

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/30/pr-25228-serbia-imf-concludes-2025-art-iv-consult-completes-1st-rev-policy-coor-instrument

MIL OSI

MIL OSI Russia News –

July 1, 2025

MIL-OSI USA News: Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Ensures Efficient Funding Processes and Decisions for Energy and Critical Mineral Projects
Source: US Whitehouse
STREAMLINING FUNDING APPLICATIONS AND ENSURING EFFICIENT USE OF TAXPAYER FUNDS FOR ENERGY AND CRITICAL MINERAL PROJECTS: Today, President Donald J. Trump signed a Presidential Memorandum that fosters interagency coordination when funding energy and critical mineral projects to better prioritize the use of taxpayer funds and end wasteful duplicative processes.
- The Memorandum encourages agencies to share information with the National Energy Dominance Council (NEDC) regarding both pending applications for funding and existing funding commitments for energy, critical mineral, or critical material-related projects.
  
  This gives the NEDC insight as to whether funds across the Federal government are utilized appropriately and where they are most needed, without redundancies, and the ability to communicate suggestions on fund deployment to agencies.
  
  This also enables the NEDC to serve a coordinating function between agencies that are evaluating potential funding recipients, eliminating the need for duplicative diligence workstreams across agencies.
- The Memorandum further directs the development of a common application for Federal funding opportunities in the energy and critical mineral space to allow for applicants to apply simultaneously to multiple funding programs using one streamlined application.
CUTTING BUREAUCRATIC RED TAPE: This Memorandum fulfills President Trump’s broader commitment to make government more efficient and support our domestic energy industries.
- Agencies currently engage in duplicative diligence processes when reviewing funding applications for energy infrastructure and critical mineral and critical material projects.
- Applicants are burdened with requirements to complete multiple, complex, and substantially similar applications. Agencies conduct substantially the same diligence redundantly in order to make funding decisions.
- Streamlining this application process and increasing information-sharing across agencies will enable the Federal government to make faster, better funding decisions.
UNLEASHING AMERICAN ENERGY: President Trump is cutting red tape to unleash American energy.
- On Day One, President Trump declared a National Energy Emergency to eliminate bureaucratic barriers, unleash innovation, and restore America’s position as the world’s leading energy producer.
- He established the NEDC to advise on strategies for improving the processes for permitting, production, generation, distribution, regulation, and transportation across all forms of American energy.
- His Administration has cut down significant regulatory barriers in the energy space already by reforming NEPA, deregulating under the Endangered Species Act, granting regulatory relief under the Clean Air Act, and more.
MIL OSI USA News –
July 1, 2025
MIL-OSI USA News: Presidential Permit Authorizing Steel Reef US Pipelines LLC To Operate and Maintain Pipeline Facilities at Burke County, North Dakota, at the International Boundary Between the United States and Canada

Source: US Whitehouse

class=”has-text-align-left”>By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States of America (the “President”), I hereby grant this Presidential permit, subject to the conditions herein set forth, to Steel Reef US Pipelines LLC (the “permittee”). The permittee is a limited liability company organized under the laws of the State of Delaware and owned by affiliates of Steel Reef Infrastructure Corp., a Canadian privately held corporation organized under the laws of Canada. Permission is hereby granted to the permittee to operate and maintain existing pipeline Border facilities, as described herein, at the international border of the United States and Canada at Burke County, North Dakota, for the export from the United States into Canada of natural gas liquids, but not including natural gas subject to section 3 of the Natural Gas Act, as amended (15 U.S.C. 717b).

This permit does not affect the applicability of any otherwise-relevant laws and regulations. As confirmed in Article 2 of this permit, the Border facilities shall remain subject to all such laws and regulations.

The term “Facilities” as used in this permit means the portion in the United States of the international pipeline project associated with the permittee’s February 23, 2022, application for an amendment to its existing permit, and any land, structures, installations, or equipment appurtenant thereto.

The term “Border facilities” as used in this permit means those parts of the Facilities consisting of an 8.625-inch diameter pipeline in existence at the time of this permit’s issuance extending from the international border between the United States and Canada at Burke County, North Dakota, to and including the first mainline shut-off valve or pumping station in the United States, and any land, structures, installations, or equipment appurtenant thereto.

This permit is subject to the following conditions:

Article 1. The Border facilities herein described, and all aspects of their operation, shall be subject to all the conditions, provisions, and requirements of this permit and any subsequent Presidential amendment to it. The permittee shall make no substantial change in the Border facilities, in the location of the Border facilities, or in the operation authorized by this permit unless the President has approved the change in an amendment to this permit or in a new permit. Such substantial changes do not include, and the permittee may make, changes to the average daily throughput capacity of the Border facilities to any volume of products that is achievable through the Border facilities, and to the directional flow of any such products.

Article 2. The standards for, and the manner of, operation and maintenance of the Border facilities shall be subject to inspection by the representatives of appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies. Officers and employees of such agencies who are duly authorized and performing their official duties shall be granted free and unrestricted access to the Border facilities by the permittee. The Border facilities, including the operation and maintenance of the Border facilities, shall be subject to all applicable laws and regulations, including pipeline safety laws and regulations issued or administered by the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration of the U.S. Department of Transportation. The permittee shall obtain requisite permits from relevant State and local governmental entities, and relevant Federal agencies.

Article 3. Upon the termination, revocation, or surrender of this permit, unless otherwise decided by the President, the permittee, at its own expense, shall remove the Border facilities within such time as the President may specify. If the permittee fails to comply with an order to remove, or to take such other appropriate action with respect to, the Border facilities, the President may direct an appropriate official or agency to take possession of the Border facilities — or to remove the Border facilities or take other action — at the expense of the permittee. The permittee shall have no claim for damages caused by any such possession, removal, or other action.

Article 4. When, in the judgment of the President, ensuring the national security of the United States requires entering upon and taking possession of any of the Border facilities or parts thereof, and retaining possession, management, or control thereof for such a length of time as the President may deem necessary, the United States shall have the right to do so, provided that the President or his designee has given due notice to the permittee. The United States shall also have the right thereafter to restore possession and control to the permittee. In the event that the United States exercises the rights described in this article, it shall pay to the permittee just and fair compensation for the use of such Border facilities, upon the basis of a reasonable profit in normal conditions, and shall bear the cost of restoring the Border facilities to their previous condition, less the reasonable value of any improvements that may have been made by the United States.

Article 5. Any transfer of ownership or control of the Border facilities, or any part thereof, or any changes to the name of the permittee, shall be immediately communicated in writing to the President or his designee, and shall include information identifying any transferee. Notwithstanding any such transfers or changes, this permit shall remain in force subject to all of its conditions, permissions, and requirements, and any amendments thereto.

Article 6. (1) The permittee is responsible for acquiring any right-of-way grants or easements, permits, and other authorizations as may become necessary or appropriate.

(2) The permittee shall hold harmless and indemnify the United States from any claimed or adjudged liability arising out of construction, connection, operation, or maintenance of the Border facilities, including environmental contamination from the release, threatened release, or discharge of hazardous substances or hazardous waste.

(3) To ensure the safe operation of the Border facilities, the permittee shall maintain them and every part of them in a condition of good repair and in compliance with applicable law.

Article 7. The permittee shall file with the President or his designee, and with appropriate agencies, such sworn statements or reports with respect to the Border facilities, or the permittee’s activities and operations in connection therewith, as are now, or may hereafter, be required under any law or regulation of the United States Government or its agencies. These reporting obligations do not alter the intent that this permit be operative as a directive issued by the President alone.

Article 8. Upon request, the permittee shall provide appropriate information to the President or his designee with regard to the Border facilities. Such requests could include information concerning current conditions or anticipated changes in ownership or control, construction, connection, operation, or maintenance of the Border facilities.

Article 9. This permit is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this thirtieth day of June, in the year of our Lord two thousand twenty-five, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and forty-ninth.

DONALD J. TRUMP

MIL OSI USA News –

July 1, 2025
MIL-OSI USA News: Providing for the Revocation of Syria Sanctions

Source: US Whitehouse

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) (NEA), the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003 (Public Law 108-175) (Syria Accountability Act), the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-182, title III) (CBW Act), the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019, as amended (22 U.S.C. 8791 note) (Caesar Act), the Illicit Captagon Trafficking Suppression Act of 2023 (Public Law 118-50, div. P), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, it is hereby ordered:

Section 1. Background. The United States is committed to supporting a Syria that is stable, unified, and at peace with itself and its neighbors. A united Syria that does not offer a safe haven for terrorist organizations and ensures the security of its religious and ethnic minorities will support regional security and prosperity. The Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury have taken initial steps towards this goal through the issuance on May 23, 2025, of General License 25 and a waiver of sanctions under the Caesar Act.

Sec. 2. Policy. It is the policy of the United States to recognize that circumstances that gave rise to the actions taken in the Executive Orders described in section 3(a) of this order, related to the policies and actions of the former regime of Bashar al-Assad, have been transformed by developments over the past 6 months, including the positive actions taken by the new Syrian government under President Ahmed al-Sharaa. This order supports United States national security and foreign policy goals by directing additional actions, including the removal of sanctions on Syria, the issuance of waivers that permit the relaxation of export controls and other restrictions on Syria, and other actions to be taken by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Commerce, as well as by other executive departments and agencies (agencies) of the United States, without providing relief to ISIS or other terrorist organizations, human rights abusers, those linked to chemical weapons or proliferation-related activities, or other persons that threaten the peace, security, or stability of the United States, Syria, and its neighbors.

Sec. 3. Revocation of Syria Sanctions. (a) Effective July 1, 2025, I hereby terminate the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13338 of May 11, 2004 (Blocking Property of Certain Persons and Prohibiting the Export of Certain Goods to Syria), and revoke that order, as well as Executive Order 13399 of April 25, 2006 (Blocking Property of Additional Persons in Connection With the National Emergency With Respect to Syria), Executive Order 13460 of February 13, 2008 (Blocking Property of Additional Persons in Connection With the National Emergency With Respect to Syria), Executive Order 13572 of April 29, 2011 (Blocking Property of Certain Persons with Respect to Human Rights Abuses in Syria), Executive Order 13573 of May 18, 2011 (Blocking Property of Senior Officials of the Government of Syria), and Executive Order 13582 of August 17, 2011 (Blocking Property of the Government of Syria and Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to Syria).
(b) Pursuant to section 202(a) of the NEA (50 U.S.C. 1622(a)), termination of the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13338, as modified in scope and relied upon for additional steps taken in Executive Order 13399, Executive Order 13460, Executive Order 13572, Executive Order 13573, and Executive Order 13582 shall not affect any action taken or pending proceeding not finally concluded or determined as of July 1, 2025, any action or proceeding based on any act committed prior to July 1, 2025, or any rights or duties that matured or penalties that were incurred prior to July 1, 2025.

Sec. 4. Accountability for the Former Regime of Bashar al‑Assad. I find that additional steps must be taken to ensure meaningful accountability for perpetrators of war crimes, human rights violations and abuses, and the proliferation of narcotics trafficking networks in and in relation to Syria during the former regime of Bashar al-Assad and by those associated with it. Perpetrators of such actions threaten to undermine peace, security, and stability in the region, and thereby constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.
(a) I hereby expand the scope of the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13894 of October 14, 2019 (Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Syria), as amended in and relied on for additional steps taken in Executive Order 14142 of January 15, 2025 (Taking Additional Steps With Respect to the Situation in Syria), to deal with that threat, and accordingly further amend Executive Order 13894 by:
(i) striking section 1(a) and inserting, in lieu thereof, the following:
“Section 1. (a) All property and interests in property that are in the United States, that hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of any United States person of the following persons are blocked and may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in:
(i) any person determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State:
(A) to be responsible for or complicit in, or to have directly or indirectly engaged in, or attempted to engage in, any of the following in or in relation to Syria:
(1) actions or policies that further threaten the peace, security, stability, or territorial integrity of Syria; or
(2) the commission of serious human rights abuse;
(B) to be a former government official of the former regime of Bashar al-Assad or a person who acted for or on behalf of such an official;
(C) to have engaged in, or attempted to engage in, activities or transactions that have materially contributed to, or pose a significant risk of materially contributing to, the illicit production and international illicit proliferation of captagon;
(D) to be responsible for or complicit in, to have directly or indirectly engaged in, or to be responsible for ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, instances in which a United States national ((i) as defined in 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(22) or 8 U.S.C. 1408, or (ii) a lawful permanent resident with significant ties to the United States) went missing in Syria during the former regime of Bashar al-Assad;
(E) to have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of:
(1) the former regime of Bashar al-Assad;
(2) any activity described in subsections (a)(i)(A)–(a)(i)(D) of this section; or
(3) any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order;
(F) to be owned or controlled by, or to have acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order; or
(G) to be an adult family member of a person designated under subsections (a)(i)(A)–(a)(i)(D) of this section.”; and
(ii) striking section 2(a) and inserting, in lieu thereof, the following:
“Sec. 2. (a) The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and other officials of the United States Government as appropriate, is hereby authorized to impose on a foreign person any of the sanctions described in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, upon determining that the person, on or after the date of this order:
(i) is responsible for or complicit in, has directly or indirectly engaged in, or attempted to engage in, or financed the obstruction, disruption, or prevention of efforts to promote a Syria that is stable, unified, and at peace with itself and its neighbors, including:
(A) the convening and conduct of a credible and inclusive Syrian-led constitutional process;
(B) the preparation for and conduct of supervised elections, pursuant to the new constitution, that are free and fair and to the highest international standards of transparency and accountability; or
(C) the development of a Syrian government that is representative and reflects the will of the Syrian people;
(ii) is an adult family member of a person designated under subsection (a)(i) of this section; or
(iii) is responsible for or complicit in, or has directly or indirectly engaged in, or attempted to engage in, the expropriation of property, including real property, for personal gain or political purposes in Syria.”
(b) I additionally amend Executive Order 13606 of April 22, 2012 (Blocking the Property and Suspending Entry into the United States of Certain Persons With Respect to Grave Human Rights Abuses by the Governments of Iran and Syria Via Information Technology), by removing the following text from the preamble: “Executive Order 13338 of May 11, 2004, as modified in scope and relied upon for additional steps in subsequent Executive Orders” and replacing it with: “Executive Order 13894 of October 14, 2019, and relied upon for additional steps and further amended in subsequent Executive Orders.”

Sec. 5. Caesar Act. The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall examine whether the criteria set forth in section 7431(a) of the Caesar Act have been met, and on the basis of that examination may, pursuant to the Presidential Memorandum of March 31, 2020 (Delegation of Certain Functions and Authorities Under the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020), suspend in whole or in part the imposition of sanctions otherwise required under the Caesar Act. If the Secretary of State determines to suspend in whole or in part the imposition of such sanctions, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall provide the briefing to the appropriate congressional committees required by section 7431(b) of the Caesar Act within 30 days of such determination. Further, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall continue to review the situation in Syria, and if the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, determines that the criteria set forth in section 7431(a) are no longer met, the Secretary of State shall reimpose sanctions.

Sec. 6. Syria Accountability Act. I hereby determine pursuant to section 5(b) of the Syria Accountability Act that it is in the national security interest of the United States to waive the application of subsection (a)(1), with respect to items on the Commerce Control List (supp. No. 1 to 15 C.F.R. part 774) only, and subsection (a)(2)(A) of the Syria Accountability Act only. The Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees the report required under section 5(b) of that Act.

Sec. 7. CBW Act. (a) Pursuant to section 307(d)(1)(B) of the CBW Act, I hereby determine and certify that there has been a fundamental change in the leadership and policies of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic. Accordingly, I hereby waive the following sanctions imposed on Syria for the prior use of chemical weapons under the former regime of Bashar al-Assad:
(i) the restriction on foreign assistance under section 307(a)(1) of the CBW Act;
(ii) the restriction on United States Government credit, credit guarantees, or other financial assistance under section 307(a)(4) of the CBW Act;
(iii) the restrictions on the export of national security-sensitive goods and technology under section 307(a)(5) of the CBW Act and on all other goods and technology under section 307(b)(2)(C) of the CBW Act; and
(iv) the restriction on United States banks from making any loan or providing any credit to the Government of Syria under section 307(b)(2)(B) of the CBW Act.
(b) The Secretary of State shall transmit this waiver determination and report as required by sections 307(d)(1)(B) and (d)(2) of the CBW Act to the appropriate congressional committees. This waiver shall be effective 20 days after it has been so transmitted.

Sec. 8. Counterterrorism Designations. (a) The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General, shall take all appropriate action with respect to the designation of al-Nusrah Front, also known as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and other aliases, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization under 8 U.S.C. 1189 and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under 50 U.S.C. 1702 and Executive Order 13224, as well as the designation of Abu Muhammad al Jawlani, commonly known as Ahmed al-Sharaa, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist.
(b) The Secretary of State shall take all appropriate action to review the designation of Syria as a State Sponsor of Terrorism consistent with section 1754(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115-232; 50 U.S.C. 4813(c)), section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act (Public Law 90-629, as amended; 22 U.S.C. 2780), and section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (Public Law 87-195, as amended; 22 U.S.C. 2371).

Sec. 9. United Nations. The Secretary of State shall take appropriate steps to advance United States policy objectives at the United Nations to support a Syria that is stable and at peace and to support Syrian efforts to counter terrorism and comply with its responsibilities and obligations concerning weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and biological weapons. The Secretary of State is further directed to explore avenues at the United Nations to provide sanctions relief in support of these objectives.

Sec. 10. Implementation. The Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Commerce, as appropriate, are hereby authorized to take such actions, including adopting rules and regulations, as may be necessary to implement this order. The Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Commerce may, consistent with applicable law, redelegate any of these functions within their respective agencies. The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Secretary of Transportation, as appropriate, is authorized to exercise the functions and authorities conferred upon the President in section 5 of the Syria Accountability Act and to redelegate these functions and authorities consistent with applicable law. All agencies of the United States shall take all appropriate measures within their authority to implement this order, consistent with applicable law.

Sec. 11. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or
(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
(d) The costs for publication of this order shall be borne by the Department of State.

DONALD J. TRUMP

THE WHITE HOUSE,
June 30, 2025.

MIL OSI USA News –

July 1, 2025
MIL-OSI USA News: National Security Presidential Memorandum/NSPM-5

Source: US Whitehouse

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE

THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE

THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION

THE SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY

THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

THE DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

   AGENCY

THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CHIEF OF

   STAFF

THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND

   BUDGET

THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL

   SECURITY AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND HOMELAND

  SECURITY ADVISOR

THE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR ECONOMIC

  POLICY

THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE

THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND

TECHNOLOGY POLICY

THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF

   AMERICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS

THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE SMALL BUSINESS

   ADMINISTRATION

THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR

   INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

   MANAGEMENT

SUBJECT:       Reissuance of and Amendments to National Security Presidential Memorandum 5 on Strengthening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba

Section 1. Purpose. The United States recognizes the need for more freedom and democracy, improved respect for human rights, and increased free enterprise in Cuba. The Cuban people have long suffered under a Communist regime that suppresses their legitimate aspirations for freedom and prosperity and fails to respect their essential human dignity.

My Administration’s policy will be guided by the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States, as well as solidarity with the Cuban people. I will seek to promote a stable, prosperous, and free country for the Cuban people. To that end, we must channel funds toward the Cuban people and away from a regime that has failed to meet the most basic requirements of a free and just society.

In Cuba, dissidents and peaceful protesters are arbitrarily detained and held in terrible prison conditions. Violence and intimidation against dissidents occur with impunity. Families of political prisoners are retaliated against for peacefully protesting the improper confinement of their loved ones. Worshippers are harassed, and free association by civil society organizations is blocked. The right to speak freely, including through access to the internet, is denied, and there is no free press. The United States condemns these abuses.

The initial actions set forth in this memorandum, including restricting certain financial transactions and travel, encourage the Cuban government to address these abuses. My Administration will continue to evaluate its policies so as to improve human rights, encourage the rule of law, foster free markets and free enterprise, and promote democracy in Cuba.

Sec. 2. Policy. It shall be the policy of the executive branch to:

(a) End economic practices that disproportionately benefit the Cuban government or its military, intelligence, or security agencies or personnel at the expense of the Cuban people.

(b) Ensure adherence to the statutory ban on tourism to Cuba.

(c) Support the economic embargo of Cuba described in section 4(7) of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (the embargo), including by opposing measures that call for an end to the embargo at the United Nations and other international forums and through regular reporting on whether the conditions of a transition government exist in Cuba.

(d) Amplify efforts to support the Cuban people through the expansion of internet services, free press, free enterprise, free association, and lawful travel.

(e) Not reinstate the “Wet Foot, Dry Foot” policy, which encouraged untold thousands of Cuban nationals to risk their lives to travel unlawfully to the United States.

(f) Ensure that engagement between the United States and Cuba advances the interests of the United States and the Cuban people. These interests include: advancing Cuban human rights; encouraging the growth of a Cuban private sector independent of government control; enforcing final orders of removal against Cuban nationals in the United States; protecting the national security and public health and safety of the United States, including through proper engagement on criminal cases and working to ensure the return of fugitives from American justice living in Cuba or being harbored by the Cuban government; supporting United States agriculture and protecting plant and animal health; advancing the understanding of the United States regarding scientific and environmental challenges; and facilitating safe civil aviation.

Sec. 3. Implementation. The heads of executive departments and agencies (agencies) shall begin to implement the policy set forth in section 2 of this memorandum as follows:

(a) Within 30 days of the date of this memorandum, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of Commerce, as appropriate and in coordination with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Transportation, shall initiate a process to adjust current regulations regarding transactions with Cuba.

(i)    As part of the regulatory changes described in this subsection, the Secretary of State shall identify any entities or subentities, as appropriate, that are under the control of, or act for or on behalf of, or for the benefit of, the Cuban military, intelligence, or security services or personnel (such as Grupo de Administracion Empresarial S.A. (GAESA), its affiliates, subsidiaries, and successors), and publish a list of those identified entities and subentities with which direct or indirect financial transactions would disproportionately benefit such services or personnel at the expense of the Cuban people or private enterprise in Cuba.

(ii) Except as provided in subsection (a)(iii) of this section, the regulatory changes described in this subsection shall prohibit direct or indirect financial transactions with those entities or subentities on the list published pursuant to subsection (a)(i) of this section.

(iii) The regulatory changes described in this subsection shall not prohibit transactions that the Secretary of the Treasury or the Secretary of Commerce, in coordination with the Secretary of State, determines are consistent with the policy set forth in section 2 of this memorandum and:

(A) concern Federal Government operations, including Naval Station Guantanamo Bay and the United States mission in Havana;

(B) support programs to build democracy in Cuba;

(C) concern air and sea operations that support permissible travel, cargo, or trade;

(D) support the acquisition of visas for permissible travel;

(E) support the expansion of direct telecommunications and internet access for the Cuban people;

(F) support the sale of agricultural commodities, medicines, and medical devices sold to Cuba consistent with the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.) and the Cuban Democracy Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 6001 et seq.);

(G) relate to sending, processing, or receiving authorized remittances;

(H) otherwise further the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States; or

(I) are required by law.

(b) Within 30 days of the date of this memorandum, the Secretary of the Treasury, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall initiate a process to adjust current regulations to ensure adherence to the statutory ban on tourism to Cuba.

(i)    The amended regulations shall require that educational travel be for legitimate educational purposes. Except for educational travel that was permitted by regulation in effect on January 27, 2011, all educational travel shall be under the auspices of an organization subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, and all such travelers must be accompanied by a representative of the sponsoring organization.

(ii)   The regulations shall further require that those traveling for the permissible purposes of non academic education or to provide support for the Cuban people:

(A) engage in a full-time schedule of activities that enhance contact with the Cuban people, support civil society in Cuba, or promote the Cuban people’s independence from Cuban authorities; and

(B) meaningfully interact with individuals in Cuba.

(iii) The regulations shall continue to provide that every person engaging in travel to Cuba shall keep full and accurate records of all transactions related to authorized travel, regardless of whether they were effected pursuant to license or otherwise, and such records shall be available for examination by the Department of the Treasury for at least 5 years after the date they occur.

(iv) The Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Secretary of Transportation shall review their respective agencies’ enforcement of all categories of permissible travel within 90 days of the date the regulations described in this subsection are finalized to ensure such enforcement accords with the policies outlined in section 2 of this memorandum.

(c) The Secretary of the Treasury shall regularly audit travel to Cuba to ensure that travelers are complying with relevant statutes and regulations. The Secretary of the Treasury shall request that the Inspector General of the Department of the Treasury inspect the actions taken by the Department of the Treasury to implement this audit requirement. The Inspector General of the Department of the Treasury shall provide a report to the President, through the Secretary of the Treasury, summarizing the results of that inspection within 180 days of the adjustment of current regulations described in subsection (b) of this section and annually thereafter.

(d) The Secretary of the Treasury shall adjust the Department of the Treasury’s current regulation defining the term “prohibited officials of the Government of Cuba” so that, for purposes of title 31, part 515 of the Code of Federal Regulations, it includes Ministers and Vice-Ministers; members of the Council of State and the Council of Ministers; members and employees of the National Assembly of People’s Power; members of any provincial assembly; local sector chiefs of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution; Director Generals and sub-Director Generals and higher of all Cuban ministries and state agencies; employees of the Ministry of the Interior (MININT); employees of the Ministry of Defense (MINFAR); secretaries and first secretaries of the Confederation of Labor of Cuba (CTC) and its component unions; chief editors, editors, and deputy editors of Cuban state-run media organizations and programs, including newspapers, television, and radio; and members and employees of the Supreme Court (Tribuno Supremo Nacional).

(e) The Secretary of State and the Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations shall oppose efforts at the United Nations or (with respect to the Secretary of State) any other international forum to lift the embargo until a transition government in Cuba, as described in section 205 of the LIBERTAD Act, exists.

(f) The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Attorney General, shall provide a report to the President assessing whether and to what degree the Cuban government has satisfied the requirements of a transition government as described in section 205(a) of the LIBERTAD Act, taking into account the additional factors listed in section 205(b) of that Act. This report shall include a review of human rights abuses committed against the Cuban people, such as unlawful detentions, arbitrary arrests, and inhumane treatment.

(g) The Attorney General shall, within 90 days of the date of this memorandum, issue a report to the President on issues related to fugitives from American justice living in Cuba or being harbored by the Cuban government.

(h) The Secretary of State and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development shall review all democracy development programs of the Federal Government in Cuba to ensure that they align with the criteria set forth in section 109(a) of the LIBERTAD Act.

(i) The Secretary of State shall convene a task force, composed of relevant agencies, including the Office of Cuba Broadcasting, and appropriate non-governmental organizations and private-sector entities, to examine the technological challenges and opportunities for expanding internet access in Cuba, including through Federal Government support of programs and activities that encourage freedom of expression through independent media and internet freedom so that the Cuban people can enjoy the free and unregulated flow of information.

(j) The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall continue to discourage dangerous, unlawful migration that puts Cuban and American lives at risk. The Secretary of Defense shall continue to provide support, as necessary, to the Department of State and the Department of Homeland Security in carrying out duties regarding interdiction of migrants.

(k) The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall annually report to the President regarding the engagement of the United States with Cuba to ensure that engagement is advancing the interests of the United States.

(l) All activities conducted pursuant to subsections (a) through (k) of this section shall be carried out in a manner that furthers the interests of the United States, including by appropriately protecting sensitive sources, methods, and operations of the Federal Government.

Sec. 4. Earlier Presidential Actions. (a) This memorandum amends sections 1 and 3 of National Security Presidential Memorandum 5 of June 16, 2017 (Strengthening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba) (NSPM-5), and reissues NSPM-5 in its entirety. It does not otherwise amend the text or timelines reflected in the original NSPM-5 and is not intended to direct agencies to repeat actions already implemented under that NSPM.

(b) This memorandum supersedes and replaces both National Security Presidential Directive 52 of June 28, 2007 (U.S. Policy toward Cuba), and Presidential Policy Directive 43 of October 14, 2016 (United States-Cuba Normalization).

(c) This memorandum does not affect either Executive Order 12807 of May 24, 1992 (Interdiction of Illegal Aliens), or Executive Order 13276 of November 15, 2002 (Delegation of Responsibilities Concerning Undocumented Aliens Interdicted or Intercepted in the Caribbean Region).

Sec. 5. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this memorandum shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or

(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(b) This memorandum shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.

(c) This memorandum is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

(d) The Secretary of State is hereby authorized and directed to publish this memorandum in the Federal Register.

DONALD J. TRUMP

MIL OSI USA News –

July 1, 2025
MIL-OSI USA News: Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Provides for the Revocation of Syria Sanctions
Source: US Whitehouse
TERMINATING SANCTIONS ON SYRIA: Today, President Donald J. Trump signed a historic Executive Order terminating the Syria sanctions program to support the country’s path to stability and peace.
- The Order removes sanctions on Syria while maintaining sanctions on Bashar al-Assad, his associates, human rights abusers, drug traffickers, persons linked to chemical weapons activities, ISIS or its affiliates, and Iranian proxies.
- The Order directs the Secretary of State to evaluate suspending sanctions, either in whole or in part if specific criteria are met, under the Caesar Act, a law that sanctions the Assad regime for atrocities.
- The Order permits the relaxation of export controls on certain goods and waives restrictions on certain foreign assistance to Syria.
- The Order directs the Secretary of State to review Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s (HTS) designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.
- The Order directs the Secretary of State to review HTS and Ahmed al-Sharaa’s designations as Specially Designated Global Terrorists.
- The Order directs the Secretary of State to review Syria’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism.
- The Order directs the Secretary of State to explore avenues for sanctions relief at the United Nations to support stability in Syria.
GIVING SYRIA A CHANCE TO SUCCEED: President Trump is committed to supporting a Syria that is stable, unified, and at peace with itself and its neighbors.
- President Trump wants Syria to succeed—but not at the expense of U.S. interests. While seeking to reengage constructively, this Administration will continue to guard against all threats and monitor progress on key priorities: taking concrete steps toward normalizing ties with Israel, addressing foreign terrorists, deporting Palestinian terrorists and banning Palestinian terrorist groups, helping the United States prevent a resurgence of ISIS, and assuming responsibility for ISIS detention centers in northeast Syria.
- U.S. sanctions were imposed in response to the Assad regime’s brutal actions against the Syrian people and their direct support for terrorism in the region.
- Recent positive changes and actions taken by the Government of Syria, after the fall of the brutal Assad Regime, demonstrate promise for a stable and peaceful future.
- Removing sanctions will support Syria’s efforts to rebuild and counter terrorism without empowering harmful actors.
- A unified Syria that protects its people and rejects extremism strengthens security and prosperity in the Middle East.
- This policy aligns with U.S. goals to promote peace and stability in the region while holding accountable those responsible for past atrocities or terrorism.
PROMISE MADE, PROMISE KEPT: President Trump is delivering on his commitment to give Syria a chance to rebuild and thrive by lifting sanctions and ensuring accountability for harmful actors.
- On May 13, President Trump announced he would be lifting sanctions on Syria to “give them a chance at greatness.”
  
  President Trump: “The sanctions were brutal and crippling and served as an important — really an important function — nevertheless, at the time. But now it’s their time to shine … So, I say, ‘Good luck, Syria.’ Show us something very special.”
- The Treasury Department quickly took the first step in lifting sanctions on Syria by issuing a general license, known as GL25, to authorize transactions involving the interim Syrian government, its central bank, and state-owned enterprises. Simultaneously, the State Department issued a 180-day waiver of sanctions under the Caesar Act.
- President Trump is now fully delivering on that promise by taking bold action to implement the termination of the Syria sanctions program.
- The world should take notice—if you want to take meaningful steps towards peace and stability, then the United States is willing to move rapidly to support you.
- President Trump hopes that Syria’s new government “will hopefully succeed in stabilizing the country in keeping peace.”
- President Trump believes “there is great potential in working with Syria to stop Radicalism, improve Relations, and secure Peace in the Middle East.”
MIL OSI USA News –
July 1, 2025
MIL-OSI USA News: Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Strengthens the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba
Source: US Whitehouse
STRENGTHENING THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD CUBA: Today, President Donald J. Trump signed a National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM) to strengthen the policy of the United States toward Cuba.
- This NSPM restores and strengthens the robust Cuba policy from the President’s first term, reversing the Biden Administration’s revocation that eased pressure on the Cuban regime.
- The NSPM ends economic practices that disproportionately benefit the Cuban government, military, intelligence, or security agencies at the expense of the Cuban people.
  
  Direct or indirect financial transactions with entities controlled by the Cuban military, such as Grupo de Administracion Empresarial S.A. (GAESA), and its affiliates are prohibited, with exceptions for transactions that advance U.S. policy goals or support the Cuban people.
- It enforces the statutory ban on U.S. tourism to Cuba and ensures compliance through regular audits and mandatory record-keeping of all travel-related transactions for at least five years.
- The NSPM supports the economic embargo of Cuba and opposes calls in the United Nations and other international forums for its termination.
- The NSPM amplifies efforts to support the Cuban people through the expansion of internet services, free press, free enterprise, free association, and lawful travel.
- It ensures the “Wet Foot, Dry Foot” policy remains terminated to discourage dangerous, unlawful migration.
- The NSPM ensures that engagement between the United States and Cuba advances the interests of the United States and the Cuban people, including through promoting human rights, fostering a private sector independent of government control, and enhancing national security.
- The NSPM mandates a review of human rights abuses in Cuba, including unlawful detentions and inhumane treatment, and requires a report on fugitives from American justice living in Cuba or being harbored by the Cuban government.
PROMOTING A STABLE, PROSPEROUS, AND FREE CUBA: President Trump is committed to fostering a free and democratic Cuba, addressing the Cuban people’s long-standing suffering under a Communist regime.
- The Cuban people have long suffered under a Communist regime that suppresses their legitimate aspirations for freedom and prosperity, arbitrarily detains dissidents, and holds political prisoners in inhumane conditions.
- Violence and intimidation against dissidents occur with impunity, while families of political prisoners face retaliation for their advocacy.
- The regime harasses worshippers, blocks free association by civil society organizations, and denies free speech, including through limited internet access and the absence of a free press.
- The Cuban government harbors fugitives of American justice and fails to meet the basic requirements of a free and just society.
HOLDING THE CUBAN REGIME ACCOUNTABLE: President Trump is continuing efforts from his first term to stand with the Cuban people and hold the regime accountable.
- In his first term, President Trump implemented a robust policy towards Cuba, reversing the Obama Administration’s one-sided deal that eased restrictions without securing meaningful reforms for the Cuban people.
- Now, President Trump is once again implementing a firm policy stance.
  
  President Trump is fulfilling his campaign promise: “As president, I will again stand with the people of Cuba in their long quest for justice, liberty and freedom.”
- President Trump also recently implemented a new travel ban that applies to Cuba.
  
  It lists Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism and cites its failure to cooperate or share sufficient law enforcement information with the United States, its historical refusal to accept back its removable nationals, and its high visa overstay rate.
MIL OSI USA News –
July 1, 2025
MIL-OSI USA News: Presidential Permit: Authorizing Junction Pipeline Company, LLC to Construct, Connect, Operate, and Maintain Pipeline Facilities at Toole County, Montana, at the International Boundary Between the United States and Canada

Source: US Whitehouse

class=”has-text-align-left”>By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States of America (the “President”), I hereby grant this Presidential permit, subject to the conditions herein set forth, to Junction Pipeline Company, LLC (the “permittee”). The permittee is a limited liability company, organized under the laws of the State of Texas. Permission is hereby granted to the permittee to construct, connect, operate, and maintain pipeline Border facilities, as described herein, at the international border of the United States and Canada at Toole County, Montana, for the import from Canada into the United States of crude oil and petroleum products of every description, refined or unrefined (inclusive of, but not limited to, naphtha, liquefied petroleum gas, natural gas liquids, jet fuel, gasoline, kerosene, and diesel), but not including natural gas subject to section 3 of the Natural Gas Act, as amended (15 U.S.C. 717b).

This permit does not affect the applicability of any otherwise-relevant laws and regulations. As confirmed in Article 2 of this permit, the Border facilities shall remain subject to all such laws and regulations.

The term “Facilities” as used in this permit means the portion in the United States of the international pipeline project associated with the permittee’s April 8, 2021, application for an amendment to its existing permit, and any land, structures, installations, or equipment appurtenant thereto.

The term “Border facilities” as used in this permit means those parts of the Facilities consisting of a 30-inch diameter pipeline extending from the international border between the United States and Canada at Toole County, Montana, to and including the first mainline shut-off valve or pumping station in the United States located approximately one quarter of a mile from the international border, and any land, structures, installations, or equipment appurtenant thereto.

This permit is subject to the following conditions:

Article 1. The Border facilities herein described, and all aspects of their operation, shall be subject to all the conditions, provisions, and requirements of this permit and any subsequent Presidential amendment to it. The permittee shall make no substantial change in the Border facilities, in the location of the Border facilities, or in the operation authorized by this permit unless the President has approved the change in an amendment to this permit or in a new permit. Such substantial changes do not include, and the permittee may make, changes to the average daily throughput capacity of the Border facilities to any volume of products that is achievable through the Border facilities, and to the directional flow of any such products.

Article 2. The standards for, and the manner of, construction, connection, operation, and maintenance of the Border facilities shall be subject to inspection by the representatives of appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies. Officers and employees of such agencies who are duly authorized and performing their official duties shall be granted free and unrestricted access to the Border facilities by the permittee. The Border facilities, including the construction, connection, operation, and maintenance of the Border facilities, shall be subject to all applicable laws and regulations, including pipeline safety laws and regulations issued or administered by the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration of the U.S. Department of Transportation. The permittee shall obtain requisite permits from relevant State and local governmental entities, and relevant Federal agencies.

Article 3. Upon the termination, revocation, or surrender of this permit, unless otherwise decided by the President, the permittee, at its own expense, shall remove the Border facilities within such time as the President may specify. If the permittee fails to comply with an order to remove, or to take such other appropriate action with respect to, the Border facilities, the President may direct an appropriate official or agency to take possession of the Border facilities — or to remove the Border facilities or take other action — at the expense of the permittee. The permittee shall have no claim for damages caused by any such possession, removal, or other action.

Article 4. When, in the judgment of the President, ensuring the national security of the United States requires entering upon and taking possession of any of the Border facilities or parts thereof, and retaining possession, management, or control thereof for such a length of time as the President may deem necessary, the United States shall have the right to do so, provided that the President or his designee has given due notice to the permittee. The United States shall also have the right thereafter to restore possession and control to the permittee. In the event that the United States exercises the rights described in this article, it shall pay to the permittee just and fair compensation for the use of such Border facilities, upon the basis of a reasonable profit in normal conditions, and shall bear the cost of restoring the Border facilities to their previous condition, less the reasonable value of any improvements that may have been made by the United States.

Article 5. Any transfer of ownership or control of the Border facilities, or any part thereof, or any changes to the name of the permittee, shall be immediately communicated in writing to the President or his designee, and shall include information identifying any transferee. Notwithstanding any such transfers or changes, this permit shall remain in force subject to all of its conditions, permissions, and requirements, and any amendments thereto.

Article 6. (1) The permittee is responsible for acquiring any right-of-way grants or easements, permits, and other authorizations as may become necessary or appropriate.

(2) The permittee shall hold harmless and indemnify the United States from any claimed or adjudged liability arising out of construction, connection, operation, or maintenance of the Border facilities, including environmental contamination from the release, threatened release, or discharge of hazardous substances or hazardous waste.

(3) To ensure the safe operation of the Border facilities, the permittee shall maintain them and every part of them in a condition of good repair and in compliance with applicable law.

Article 7. The permittee shall file with the President or his designee, and with appropriate agencies, such sworn statements or reports with respect to the Border facilities, or the permittee’s activities and operations in connection therewith, as are now, or may hereafter, be required under any law or regulation of the United States Government or its agencies. These reporting obligations do not alter the intent that this permit be operative as a directive issued by the President alone.

Article 8. Upon request, the permittee shall provide appropriate information to the President or his designee with regard to the Border facilities. Such requests could include information concerning current conditions or anticipated changes in ownership or control, construction, connection, operation, or maintenance of the Border facilities.

Article 9. This permit is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this thirtieth day of June, in the year of our Lord two thousand twenty-five, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and forty-ninth.

DONALD J. TRUMP

MIL OSI USA News –

July 1, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Rep. Dina Titus Introduces GLOBE Act of 2025 to Protect LGBTQI Rights Worldwide

Source: United States House of Representatives – Congresswoman Dina Titus (1st District of Nevada)

Congresswoman Dina Titus today introduced the Greater Leadership Overseas for the Benefit of Equality (GLOBE) Act of 2025 to protect LGBTQI rights by codifying into law protections and safeguards for the rights of LGBTQI people around the world.

“No person should suffer from discrimination because of who they are or whom they love,” Congresswoman Titus (NV-01) said. “Under the Trump Administration, the U.S. is failing to protect the rights of LGBTQI people at home and abroad. This bill will help restore our role in promoting LGBTQI rights around the world and punishing regimes that persecute people based on their sexual orientation or gender identity.”

The GLOBE Act of 2025 would codify in law the Special Envoy position, require the State Department to document cases of human rights abuses and discrimination against LGBTQI people around the world, and institute sanctions against foreign individuals who are responsible for egregious abuses and murders of LGBTQI populations. Additionally, the bill ensures fair access to asylum and refugee programs for LGBTQI individuals who face persecution because of their sexual orientation.

“Through his executive orders and anti-DEI initiatives, President Trump has attacked fundamental human rights and the dignity of the LGBTQI community,” Congresswoman Titus said. “The GLOBE Act counters this by outlining a vision for U.S. leadership in the protection of LGBTQI rights globally.”

The GLOBE Act of 2025 has been endorsed by the following organizations: Council for Global Equality, Human Rights Campaign, Equality California, American Jewish World Service, Outright International, PAI, Amnesty International USA, Silver State Equality, Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), Women’s Refugee Commission, Ipas, Foreign Policy for America, Center for Reproductive Rights, Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Reconstructionist Rabbinical Association, Rabbinical Assembly, and Human Rights First

Robert Bank, President and CEO, American Jewish World Service, said, “As a global human rights organization rooted in Jewish values, American Jewish World Service believes that every person is created b’tzelem Elohim — in the Divine image — and equally deserving of dignity, respect and protection. Appallingly, more than 60 countries have codified anti-LGBTQI+ hate into law. The GLOBE Act however can be a powerful tool for combatting this bigotry. We applaud Congresswoman Titus for her leadership on this issue. Now, we urge Congress to pass the GLOBE Act and make preventing and responding to global LGBTQI+ discrimination and violence a foreign policy priority.”

Keifer Buckingham, Managing Director of the Council for Global Equality, said, “At a moment when the illegal dismantling of USAID, illegal withholding of Congressionally appropriated foreign assistance, and the politically motivated restructuring of the State Department disproportionately threaten LGBTQI+ communities globally, the reintroduction of the GLOBE Act is both timely and critical,” said Council for Global Equality Managing Director Keifer Buckingham. “Genuine leadership on human rights demands accountability for those responsible for grave violations against LGBTQI+ persons, wherever these abuses occur.”

MIL OSI USA News –

July 1, 2025

MIL-OSI: Ellomay Capital Reports Results for the Three Months Ended March 31, 2025

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

TEL-AVIV, Israel, June 30, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Ellomay Capital Ltd. (NYSE American; TASE: ELLO) (“Ellomay” or the “Company”), a renewable energy and power generator and developer of renewable energy and power projects in Europe, USA and Israel, today reported its unaudited interim consolidated financial results for the three month period ended March 31, 2025.

Financial Highlights

Total assets as of March 31, 2025 amounted to approximately €721.2 million, compared to total assets as of December 31, 2024 of approximately €677.3 million.
Revenues for the three months ended March 31, 2025 were approximately €8.9 million, compared to revenues of approximately €8.2 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024.
Profit for the three months ended March 31, 2025 was approximately €6.8 million, compared to loss of approximately €4.9 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024.
EBITDA for the three months ended March 31, 2025 was approximately €2.9 million, compared to EBITDA of approximately €1.6 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024. See below under “Use of Non-IFRS Financial Measures” for additional disclosure concerning EBITDA.

Financial Overview for the Three Months Ended March 31, 2025

Revenues were approximately €8.9 million for the three months ended March 31, 2025, compared to approximately €8.2 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024. The increase in revenues mainly results from revenues generated from our 19.8 MW and 18.1 MW Italian solar facilities that were connected to the grid in February-May 2024 and in January 2025, respectively.
Operating expenses were approximately €4.6 million for the three months ended March 31, 2025, compared to approximately €4.6 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024. Depreciation and amortization expenses were approximately €4.2 million for the three months ended March 31, 2025, compared to approximately €4.1 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024.
Project development costs were approximately €1 million for the three months ended March 31, 2025, compared to approximately €1.4 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024. The decrease in project development costs is mainly due to projects that reached “ready to build” status, which results in the commencement of the capitalization of expenses related to such projects into fixed assets.
General and administrative expenses were approximately €1.7 million for the three months ended March 31, 2025, compared to approximately €1.6 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024.
The Company’s share of profits of equity accounted investee, after elimination of intercompany transactions, was approximately €1.2 million for the three months ended March 31, 2025, compared to approximately €1.3 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024.
Other income was approximately €0.2 million for the three months ended March 31, 2025, compared to €0 for the three months ended March 31, 2024. The income during the three months ended March 31, 2025 was recognized based on insurance compensation in connection with the fire near the Talasol and Ellomay Solar facilities in Spain in July 2024 due to loss of income in 2025.
Financing income, net, were approximately €7.2 million for the three months ended March 31, 2025, compared to financing expenses of approximately €3.3 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024. The change in financing expenses, net, was mainly attributable to higher income resulting from exchange rate differences that amounted to approximately €10.7 million for the three months ended March 31, 2025, compared to loss from exchange rate differences of approximately €0.6 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024, an aggregate change of approximately €11.3 million. The exchange rate differences were mainly recorded in connection with the New Israeli Shekel (“NIS”) cash and cash equivalents and the Company’s NIS denominated debentures and were caused by the 5.9% devaluation of the NIS against the euro during the three months ended March 31, 2025, compared to a revaluation of 0.8% during the three months ended March 31, 2024. The increase in financing income for the three months ended March 31, 2025 was partially offset by an increase in financing expenses of approximately €0.9 million in connection with derivatives and warrants for the three months ended March 31, 2025, compared to the three months ended March 31, 2024.
Tax benefit was approximately €0.9 million for the three months ended March 31, 2025, compared to tax benefit of approximately €0.8 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024.
Loss from discontinued operation (net of tax) was €0 for the three months ended March 31, 2025, compared to a loss from discontinued operation (net of tax) of approximately €0.3 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024.
Profit for the three months ended March 31, 2025 was approximately €6.8 million, compared to loss of approximately €4.9 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024.
Total other comprehensive loss was approximately €4.9 million for the three months ended March 31, 2025, compared to total other comprehensive income of approximately €12 million in the three months ended March 31, 2024. The change in total other comprehensive income (loss) is primarily as the result of foreign currency translation adjustments due to the change in the NIS/euro exchange rate and by changes in fair value of cash flow hedges, including a material decrease in the fair value of the liability resulting from the financial power swap that covers approximately 80% of the output of the Talasol solar plant (the “Talasol PPA”). The Talasol PPA experienced a high volatility due to the substantial change in electricity prices in Europe. In accordance with hedge accounting standards, the changes in the Talasol PPA’s fair value are recorded in the Company’s shareholders’ equity through a hedging reserve and not through the accumulated deficit/retained earnings. The changes do not impact the Company’s consolidated net profit/loss or the Company’s consolidated cash flows.
Total comprehensive income was approximately €1.9 million for the three months ended March 31, 2025, compared to total comprehensive income of approximately €7.1 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024.
EBITDA was approximately €2.9 million for the three months ended March 31, 2025, compared to approximately €1.6 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024.
Net cash from operating activities was approximately €0.3 million for the three months ended March 31, 2025, compared to approximately €1.2 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024.
On February 16, 2025, the Company issued in an Israeli public offering an aggregate principal amount of NIS 214,479,000 of newly issued Series G Debentures, due December 31, 2032. The net proceeds of the offering, net of related expenses such as consultancy fee and commissions, were approximately NIS 211.7 million (approximately €56.7 million as of the issuance date).

CEO Review for the First Quarter of 2025

In the first quarter, the Company’s revenues amounted to €8.9 million, an increase of approximately 9% in revenues compared to the corresponding quarter last year. These revenues do not include the Company’s share of Dorad’s revenues. The Company presented an increase of approximately 81% in EBITDA compared to the corresponding quarter last year (€2.9 million compared to €1.6 million in the corresponding quarter last year). The Company’s first quarter is a winter quarter and is characterized by low production and revenues compared to the other quarters of the year.

In the first half of 2025, the Company recorded significant progress in the start of construction and connection to the grid of new projects, which are expected to contribute to revenue growth in the near future.

In Italy – Financing agreements were signed for solar projects with a total capacity of 198 MW (of which 38 MW are already connected to the electricity grid), and a transaction was signed and consummated with Clal Insurance to enter as a partner (49%) in the aforementioned 198 MW. Construction work on 160 MW has begun and construction is progressing as planned. The remainder of the portfolio held by the Company (100%) is approximately 264 MW solar, of which 124 MW have received construction permits and the rest are expected to receive permits in the near future. These 264 MW are scheduled to begin construction in the last quarter of 2026.

In the US – The Company is advancing additional solar projects with a capacity of approximately 50 MW (beyond the existing portfolio (49 MW) which has completed construction), which are expected to begin construction during 2025. The intention is that these projects will be able to enjoy the full tax benefit currently in effect. The addition of battery storage to each of the projects is also under planning.

In the Netherlands – the Company received, after March 31, 2025, a license to increase production at the GGG facility by 64%. Licenses to increase production at the two additional facilities are in advanced stages. The new regulation for the obligation to blend green gas with fossil gas will commence according to the law in January 2027 (a delay of one year), but the targets for the first year have increased. Agreements have been signed for the sale of green certificates issued under the new regulation at a price of approximately €1 per certificate. The blending obligation is expected to significantly increase the profitability of operations in the Netherlands at current production capacity. The expected increase in production capacity from 16 million cubic meters of gas per year to around 24 million cubic meters of gas per year is expected to add significantly beyond that.

In Israel – the Company is in negotiations with the Israeli Electricity Authority for compensation for delays and war damage to the Manara project. Ellomay Luzon (50% owned) provided a notice of exercise of its right of first refusal on the Zorlu-Phoenix transaction for the sale of Dorad’s shares. Ellomay Luzon and another shareholder exercised their right of first refusal with respect to all of the shares offered (15% of Dorad’s shares), and, subject to the timely fulfillment of the conditions to closing, Ellomay Luzon and the other shareholder are expected to share these shares in equal parts.

In Spain – The Company’s development activity in Spain focuses on battery storage, due to the high volatility in electricity prices in Spain, which stems from an excess of renewable energy during the transition seasons and causes damage to the stability of the grid. In the Company’s assessment, the solution is a significant increase in storage capacity, which is currently at very low levels in Spain. Regulation in Spain is also starting to move in this direction.

Use of Non-IFRS Financial Measures

EBITDA is a non-IFRS measure and is defined as earnings before financial expenses, net, taxes, depreciation and amortization. The Company presents this measure in order to enhance the understanding of the Company’s operating performance and to enable comparability between periods. While the Company considers EBITDA to be an important measure of comparative operating performance, EBITDA should not be considered in isolation or as a substitute for net income or other statement of operations or cash flow data prepared in accordance with IFRS as a measure of profitability or liquidity. EBITDA does not take into account the Company’s commitments, including capital expenditures and restricted cash and, accordingly, is not necessarily indicative of amounts that may be available for discretionary uses. Not all companies calculate EBITDA in the same manner, and the measure as presented may not be comparable to similarly-titled measure presented by other companies. The Company’s EBITDA may not be indicative of the Company’s historic operating results; nor is it meant to be predictive of potential future results. The Company uses this measure internally as performance measure and believes that when this measure is combined with IFRS measure it add useful information concerning the Company’s operating performance. A reconciliation between results on an IFRS and non-IFRS basis is provided on page 17 of this press release.

About Ellomay Capital Ltd.

Ellomay is an Israeli based company whose shares are registered with the NYSE American and with the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange under the trading symbol “ELLO”. Since 2009, Ellomay focuses its business in the renewable energy and power sectors in Europe, USA and Israel.

To date, Ellomay has evaluated numerous opportunities and invested significant funds in the renewable, clean energy and natural resources industries in Israel, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and Texas, USA, including:

Approximately 335.9 MW of operating solar power plants in Spain (including a 300 MW solar plant in owned by Talasol, which is 51% owned by the Company) and 51% of approximately 38 MW of operating solar power plants in Italy;
9.375% indirect interest in Dorad Energy Ltd., which owns and operates one of Israel’s largest private power plants with production capacity of approximately 850MW, representing about 6%-8% of Israel’s total current electricity consumption;
Groen Gas Goor B.V., Groen Gas Oude-Tonge B.V. and Groen Gas Gelderland B.V., project companies operating anaerobic digestion plants in the Netherlands, with a green gas production capacity of approximately 3 million, 3.8 million and 9.5 million Nm3 per year, respectively;
83.333% of Ellomay Pumped Storage (2014) Ltd., which is involved in a project to construct a 156 MW pumped storage hydro power plant in the Manara Cliff, Israel;
51% of solar projects in Italy with an aggregate capacity of 160 MW that commenced construction processes;
Solar projects in Italy with an aggregate capacity of 134 MW that have reached “ready to build” status; and
Solar projects in the Dallas Metropolitan area, Texas, USA with an aggregate capacity of approximately 27 MW that are connected to the grid and additional 22 MW that are awaiting connection to the grid.

For more information about Ellomay, visit http://www.ellomay.com.

Information Relating to Forward-Looking Statements

This press release contains forward-looking statements that involve substantial risks and uncertainties, including statements that are based on the current expectations and assumptions of the Company’s management. All statements, other than statements of historical facts, included in this press release regarding the Company’s plans and objectives, expectations and assumptions of management are forward-looking statements. The use of certain words, including the words “estimate,” “project,” “intend,” “expect,” “believe” and similar expressions are intended to identify forward-looking statements within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. The Company may not actually achieve the plans, intentions or expectations disclosed in the forward-looking statements and you should not place undue reliance on the Company’s forward-looking statements. Various important factors could cause actual results or events to differ materially from those that may be expressed or implied by the Company’s forward-looking statements, including changes in electricity prices and demand, regulatory changes increases in interest rates and inflation, changes in the supply and prices of resources required for the operation of the Company’s facilities (such as waste and natural gas) and in the price of oil, the impact of the war and hostilities in Israel and Gaza and between Israel and Iran, the impact of the continued military conflict between Russia and Ukraine, technical and other disruptions in the operations or construction of the power plants owned by the Company, inability to obtain the financing required for the development and construction of projects, inability to advance the expansion of Dorad, increases in interest rates and inflation, changes in exchange rates, delays in development, construction, or commencement of operation of the projects under development, failure to obtain permits – whether within the set time frame or at all, climate change, and general market, political and economic conditions in the countries in which the Company operates, including Israel, Spain, Italy and the United States. and general market, political and economic conditions in the countries in which the Company operates, including Israel, Spain, Italy and the United States. These and other risks and uncertainties associated with the Company’s business are described in greater detail in the filings the Company makes from time to time with Securities and Exchange Commission, including its Annual Report on Form 20-F. The forward-looking statements are made as of this date and the Company does not undertake any obligation to update any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise.

Contact:
Kalia Rubenbach (Weintraub)
CFO
Tel: +972 (3) 797-1111
Email: hilai@ellomay.com

Ellomay Capital Ltd. and its Subsidiaries
Condensed Consolidated Statements of Financial Position
	March 31,	December 31,	March 31,
	2025	2024	2025
	Unaudited	Audited	Unaudited
	€ in thousands		Convenience Translation into US$ in thousands*
Assets
Current assets:
Cash and cash equivalents	35,148	41,134	38,021
Short term deposits	36,301	–	39,268
Restricted cash	656	656	710
Intangible asset from green certificates	195	178	211
Trade and revenue receivables	5,911	5,393	6,394
Other receivables	15,518	15,341	16,786
Derivatives asset short-term	650	146	703
	94,379	62,848	102,093
Non-current assets
Investment in equity accounted investee	40,107	41,324	43,385
Advances on account of investments	547	547	592
Fixed assets	487,100	482,747	526,914
Right-of-use asset	41,276	34,315	44,650
Restricted cash and deposits	15,569	17,052	16,842
Deferred tax	8,525	9,039	9,222
Long term receivables	13,882	13,411	15,017
Derivatives	19,855	15,974	21,478
	626,861	614,409	678,100

Total assets	721,240	677,257	780,193

Liabilities and Equity
Current liabilities
Current maturities of long-term bank loans	20,761	21,316	22,458
Current maturities of other long-term loans	5,866	5,866	6,345
Current maturities of debentures	47,233	35,706	51,094
Trade payables	9,928	8,856	10,738
Other payables	8,913	10,896	9,642
Current maturities of derivatives	40	1,875	43
Current maturities of lease liabilities	733	714	793
Warrants	1,740	1,446	1,882
	95,214	86,675	102,995
Non-current liabilities
Long-term lease liabilities	32,673	25,324	35,344
Long-term bank loans	242,177	245,866	261,972
Other long-term loans	29,578	30,448	31,996
Debentures	186,691	155,823	201,951
Deferred tax	2,652	2,609	2,869
Other long-term liabilities	950	939	1,028
Derivatives	135	288	146
	494,856	461,297	535,306
Total liabilities	590,070	547,972	638,301

Equity
Share capital	25,613	25,613	27,707
Share premium	86,275	86,271	93,327
Treasury shares	(1,736)	(1,736)	(1,878)
Transaction reserve with non-controlling Interests	5,697	5,697	6,163
Reserves	7,381	14,338	7,984
Accumulated deficit	(3,567)	(11,561)	(3,859)
Total equity attributed to shareholders of the Company	119,663	118,622	129,444
Non-Controlling Interest	11,507	10,663	12,448
Total equity	131,170	129,285	141,892
Total liabilities and equity	721,240	677,257	780,193

* Convenience translation into US$ (exchange rate as at March 31, 2025: euro 1 = US$ 1.082)

Ellomay Capital Ltd. and its Subsidiaries
Condensed Consolidated Interim Statements of Profit or Loss and Other Comprehensive Income (Loss)
	For the three months ended March 31,		For the year ended December 31,	For the three months ended March 31,
	2025	2024	2024	2025
	Unaudited		Audited	Unaudited
	€ in thousands (except per share data)			Convenience Translation into US$*
Revenues	8,860	8,243	40,467	9,584
Operating expenses	(4,627)	(4,563)	(19,803)	(5,005)
Depreciation and amortization expenses	(4,238)	(4,055)	(15,887)	(4,584)
Gross profit (loss)	(5)	(375)	4,777	(5)

Project development costs	(1,045)	(1,415)	(4,101)	(1,130)
General and administrative expenses	(1,662)	(1,620)	(6,063)	(1,798)
Share of profits of equity accounted investee	1,189	1,286	11,062	1,286
Other income	198	–	3,409	214
Operating profit (loss)	(1,325)	(2,124)	9,084	(1,433)

Financing income	11,483	631	2,495	12,422
Financing income (expenses) in connection with derivatives and warrants, net	(376)	536	1,140	(407)
Financing expenses in connection with projects finance	(1,375)	(1,501)	(6,190)	(1,487)
Financing expenses in connection with debentures	(1,741)	(1,711)	(6,641)	(1,883)
Interest expenses on minority shareholder loan	(476)	(554)	(2,144)	(515)
Other financing expenses	(294)	(713)	(8,311)	(318)
Financing income (expenses), net	7,221	(3,312)	(19,651)	7,812
Profit (loss) before taxes on income	5,896	(5,436)	(10,567)	6,379
Tax benefit	922	828	1,424	997
Profit (loss) from continuing operations	6,818	(4,608)	(9,143)	7,376
Profit (loss) from discontinued operation (net of tax)	–	(312)	137	–
Profit (loss) for the period	6,818	(4,920)	(9,006)	7,376
Profit (loss) attributable to:
Owners of the Company	7,994	(3,613)	(6,524)	8,647
Non-controlling interests	(1,176)	(1,307)	(2,482)	(1,271)
Profit (loss) for the period	6,818	(4,920)	(9,006)	7,376

Other comprehensive income items
That after initial recognition in comprehensive income were or will be transferred to profit or loss:
Foreign currency translation differences for foreign operations	(9,538)	1,124	8,007	(10,318)
Foreign currency translation differences for foreign operations that were recognized in profit or loss	–	–	255
Effective portion of change in fair value of cash flow hedges	4,264	10,461	5,631	4,613
Net change in fair value of cash flow hedges transferred to profit or loss	337	457	(813)	365
Total other comprehensive income	(4,937)	12,042	13,080	(5,340)

Total other comprehensive income (loss) attributable to:
Owners of the Company	(6,957)	6,656	10,039	(7,526)
Non-controlling interests	2,020	5,386	3,041	2,186
Total other comprehensive income (loss)	(4,937)	12,042	13,080	(5,340)
Total comprehensive income for the period	1,881	7,122	4,074	2,036

Total comprehensive income for the period attributable to:
Owners of the Company	1,037	3,043	3,515	1,121
Non-controlling interests	844	4,079	559	915
Total comprehensive income for the period	1,881	7,122	4,074	2,036

* Convenience translation into US$ (exchange rate as at March 31, 2025: euro 1 = US$ 1.082)

Ellomay Capital Ltd. and its Subsidiaries
Condensed Consolidated Interim Statements of Profit or Loss and Other Comprehensive Income (Loss) (cont’d)
	For the three months ended March 31,		For the year ended December 31,	For the three months ended March 31,
	2025	2024	2024	2025
	Unaudited		Audited	Unaudited
	€ in thousands (except per share data)			Convenience Translation into US$*

Basic profit (loss) per share	0.62	(0.28)	(0.51)	0.67
Diluted profit (loss) per share	0.62	(0.28)	(0.51)	0.67

Basic profit (loss) per share continuing operations	0.62	(0.31)	(0.52)	0.67
Diluted profit (loss) per share continuing operations	0.62	(0.31)	(0.52)	0.67

Basic profit (loss) per share discontinued operation	–	(0.02)	0.01	–
Diluted profit (loss) per share discontinued operation	–	(0.02)	0.01	–

* Convenience translation into US$ (exchange rate as at March 31, 2025: euro 1 = US$ 1.082)

Ellomay Capital Ltd. and its Subsidiaries

Condensed Consolidated Interim Statements of Changes in Equity

Attributable to shareholders of the Company

Non- controlling

Total

Interests

Equity

Share capital

Share premium

Accumulated Deficit

Treasury shares

Translation reserve from
foreign operations

Hedging Reserve

Interests Transaction reserve with
non-controlling Interests

Total

€ in thousands

For the three months

ended March 31, 2025 (unaudited):

Balance as at January 1, 2025

25,613

86,271

(11,561)

(1,736)

8,446

5,892

5,697

118,622

10,663

129,285

Profit for the period

–

7,994

–

7,994

(1,176)

6,818

Other comprehensive income for the period

–

(9,329)

2,372

–

(6,957)

2,020

(4,937)

Total comprehensive income for the period

–

7,994

–

(9,329)

2,372

–

1,037

844

1,881

Transactions with owners of the Company, recognized directly in equity:

Share-based payments

–

Balance as at March 31, 2025

25,613

86,275

(3,567)

(1,736)

(883)

8,264

5,697

119,663

11,507

131,170

For the three months

ended March 31, 2024 (unaudited):

Balance as at January 1, 2024

25,613

86,159

(5,037)

(1,736)

385

3,914

5,697

114,995

10,104

125,099

Loss for the period

–

(3,613)

–

(3,613)

(1,307)

(4,920)

Other comprehensive income for the period

–

1,088

5,568

–

6,656

5,386

12,042

Total comprehensive income (loss) for the period

–

(3,613)

–

1,088

5,568

–

3,043

4,079

7,122

Transactions with owners of the Company, recognized directly in equity:

Share-based payments

–

Balance as at March 31, 2024

25,613

86,189

(8,650)

(1,736)

1,473

9,482

5,697

118,068

14,183

132,251

Ellomay Capital Ltd. and its Subsidiaries
Condensed Consolidated Interim Statements of Changes in Equity (cont’d)
			Attributable to shareholders of the Company						Non- controlling	Total
									Interests	Equity
	Share capital	Share premium	Accumulated Deficit	Treasury shares	Translation reserve from foreign operations	Hedging Reserve	Interests Transaction reserve with non-controlling Interests	Total
	€ in thousands
For the year ended
December 31, 2024 (audited):
Balance as at January 1, 2024	25,613	86,159	(5,037)	(1,736)	385	3,914	5,697	114,995	10,104	125,099
Loss for the year	–	–	(6,524)	–	–	–	–	(6,524)	(2,482)	(9,006)
Other comprehensive income for the year	–	–	–	–	8,061	1,978	–	10,039	3,041	13,080
Total comprehensive income (loss) for the year	–	–	(6,524)	–	8,061	1,978	–	3,515	559	4,074
Transactions with owners of the Company, recognized directly in equity:
Share-based payments	–	112	–	–	–	–	–	112	–	112
Balance as at December 31, 2024	25,613	86,271	(11,561)	(1,736)	8,446	5,892	5,697	118,622	10,663	129,285

Ellomay Capital Ltd. and its Subsidiaries

Condensed Consolidated Interim Statements of Changes in Equity (cont’d)

Attributable to shareholders of the Company

Non- controlling
Interests

Total
Equity

Share capital

Share premium

Accumulated Deficit

Treasury shares

Translation reserve from
foreign operations

Hedging Reserve

Interests Transaction reserve with
non-controlling Interests

Total

Convenience translation into US$ (exchange rate as at March 31, 2025: euro 1 = US$ 1.082)

For the three months

ended March 31, 2025 (unaudited):

Balance as at January 1, 2025

27,707

93,323

(12,506)

(1,878)

9,136

6,374

6,163

128,319

11,533

139,852

Loss for the period

–

8,647

–

8,647

(1,271)

7,376

Other comprehensive income for the period

–

(10,092)

2,566

–

(7,526)

2,186

(5,340)

Total comprehensive income for the period

–

8,647

–

(10,092)

2,566

–

1,121

915

2,036

Transactions with owners of the Company, recognized directly in equity:

Share-based payments

–

Balance as at March 31, 2025

27,707

93,327

(3,859)

(1,878)

(956)

8,940

6,163

129,444

12,448

141,892

Ellomay Capital Ltd. and its Subsidiaries
Condensed Consolidated Interim Statements of Cash Flow
	For the three months ended March 31,		For the year ended December 31,	For the three months ended March 31,
	2025	2024	2024	2025
	Unaudited		Audited	Unaudited
	€ in thousands			Convenience Translation into US$*
Cash flows from operating activities
Profit (loss) for the period	6,818	(4,920)	(9,006)	7,376
Adjustments for:
Financing expenses (income), net	(7,221)	3,167	19,247	(7,812)
Loss from settlement of derivatives contract	–	–	316	–
Impairment losses on assets of disposal groups classified as held-for-sale	–	601	405	–
Depreciation and amortization expenses	4,238	4,084	15,935	4,584
Share-based payment transactions	4	30	112	4
Share of profit of equity accounted investees	(1,189)	(1,286)	(11,062)	(1,286)
Payment of interest on loan from an equity accounted investee	–	–	–	–
Change in trade receivables and other receivables	6,178	(2,342)	(8,824)	6,683
Change in other assets	(496)	–	3,770	(537)
Change in receivables from concessions project	–	315	793	–
Change in trade payables	1,267	(68)	(31)	1,371
Change in other payables	(5,538)	2,796	4,455	(5,796)
Tax benefit	(922)	(805)	(1,429)	(997)
Income taxes refund (paid)	–	564	623	–
Interest received	351	907	2,537	380
Interest paid	(3,408)	(1,892)	(9,873)	(3,687)
	(6,556)	6,071	16,974	(7,093)
Net cash from operating activities	262	1,151	7,968	283

Cash flows from investing activities
Acquisition of fixed assets	(18,550)	(9,020)	(72,922)	(20,066)
Interest paid capitalized to fixed assets	(876)	–	(2,515)	(948)
Proceeds from sale of investments	–	–	9,267	–
Advances on account of investments	–	–	(163)	–
Proceeds from advances on account of investments	–	–	514	–
Investment in settlement of derivatives, net	–	14	(316)	–
Proceed from restricted cash, net	1,307	1,153	689	1,414
Proceeds from investment in short-term deposits	(39,132)	(28)	1,004	(42,331)
Net cash used in investing activities	(57,251)	(7,881)	(64,442)	(61,931)

Cash flows from financing activities
Issuance of warrants	–	3,735	2,449	–
Cost associated with long term loans	(658)	(638)	(2,567)	(712)
Payment of principal of lease liabilities	(372)	(299)	(2,941)	(402)
Proceeds from long-term loans	306	380	19,482	331
Repayment of long-term loans	(1,792)	(2,357)	(11,776)	(1,938)
Repayment of debentures	—	–	(35,845)	–
Proceeds from issuance of debentures, net	56,729	36,450	74,159	61,366
Net cash from financing activities	54,213	37,271	42,961	58,645

Effect of exchange rate fluctuations on cash and cash equivalents	(3,210)	1,667	3,092	(3,472)
Increase (decrease) in cash and cash equivalents	(5,986)	32,208	(10,421)	(6,475)
Cash and cash equivalents at the beginning of year	41,134	51,555	51,127	44,496
Cash from disposal groups classified as held-for-sale	–	(1,041)	428	–
Cash and cash equivalents at the end of the period	35,148	82,722	41,134	38,021

* Convenience translation into US$ (exchange rate as at March 31, 2025: euro 1 = US$ 1.082)

Ellomay Capital Ltd. and its Subsidiaries

Operating Segments

Italy

Spain

USA

Netherlands

Israel

Total

Subsidized

28 MV

reportable

Total

Solar

Plants

Solar

Talasol

Solar

Biogas

Dorad

Manara

segments

Reconciliations

consolidated

For the three months ended March 31, 2025

€ in thousands

Revenues

945

786

406

3,246

–

3,477

15,061

–

23,921

(15,061)

8,860

Operating expenses

(435)

(105)

(84)

(1,024)

(305)

(3,206)

(11,693)

–

(16,851)

12,224

(4,627)

Depreciation expenses

(225)

(229)

(252)

(2,839)

–

(676)

(1,268)

–

(5,489)

1,251

(4,238)

Gross profit (loss)

313

452

(617)

(305)

(405)

2,100

–

1,623

(1,628)

(5)

Adjusted gross profit (loss)

313

452

(617)

(305)

(405)

2,100

–

1,623

(1,628)

(5)

Project development costs

(1,045)

General and administrative expenses

(1,662)

Share of loss of equity accounted investee

1,189

Other income, net

198

Operating profit

(1,325)

Financing income

11,483

Financing income in connection

with derivatives and warrants, net

(376)

Financing expenses in connection with projects finance

(1,375)

Financing expenses in connection with debentures

(1,741)

Interest expenses on minority shareholder loan

(476)

Other financing expenses

(294)

Financing expenses, net

7,221

Loss before taxes on income

5,896

Segment assets as at March 31, 2025

87,185

13,242

19,475

223,844

60,458

32,801

108,858

180,504

726,366

(5,126)

721,240

Ellomay Capital Ltd. and its Subsidiaries
Reconciliation of Profit (Loss) to EBITDA
	For the three months ended March 31,		For the year ended December 31,	For the three months ended March 31,
	2025	2024	2024	2025
	€ in thousands			Convenience Translation into US$*
Net profit (loss) for the period	6,818	(4,920)	(9,006)	7,376
Financing expenses (income), net	(7,221)	3,312	19,651	(7,812)
Tax benefit	(922)	(828)	(1,424)	(997)
Depreciation and amortization expenses	4,238	4,055	15,887	4,584
EBITDA	2,913	1,619	25,108	3,151

* Convenience translation into US$ (exchange rate as at March 31, 2025: euro 1 = US$ 1.082)

Ellomay Capital Ltd. and its Subsidiaries
Information for the Company’s Debenture Holders

Financial Covenants

Pursuant to the Deeds of Trust governing the Company’s Series C, Series D, Series E, Series F and Series G Debentures (together, the “Debentures”), the Company is required to maintain certain financial covenants. For more information, see Items 4.A and 5.B of the Company’s Annual Report on Form 20-F submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission on April 30, 2025, and below.

Net Financial Debt

As of March 31, 2025, the Company’s Net Financial Debt, (as such term is defined in the Deeds of Trust of the Company’s Debentures), was approximately €170 million (consisting of approximately €303¹ million of short-term and long-term debt from banks and other interest bearing financial obligations, approximately €241.4² million in connection with (i) the Series C Debentures issuances (in July 2019, October 2020, February 2021 and October 2021), (ii) the Series D Convertible Debentures issuance (in February 2021), (iii) the Series E Secured Debentures issuance (in February 2023), (iv) the Series F Debentures issuance (in January, April, August and November 2024) and (v) the Series G Debentures issuance (in February 2025)), net of approximately €71.4 million of cash and cash equivalents, short-term deposits and marketable securities and net of approximately €303³ million of project finance and related hedging transactions of the Company’s subsidiaries).

Discussion concerning Warning Signs

Upon the issuance of the Company’s Debentures, the Company undertook to comply with the “hybrid model disclosure requirements” as determined by the Israeli Securities Authority and as described in the Israeli prospectuses published in connection with the public offering of the company’s Debentures. This model provides that in the event certain financial “warning signs” exist in the Company’s consolidated financial results or statements, and for as long as they exist, the Company will be subject to certain disclosure obligations towards the holders of the Company’s Debentures.

One possible “warning sign” is the existence of a working capital deficiency if the Company’s Board of Directors does not determine that the working capital deficiency is not an indication of a liquidity problem. In examining the existence of warning signs as of March 31, 2025, the Company’s Board of Directors noted the working capital deficiency as of March 31, 2025, in the amount of approximately €0.96 million. The Company’s Board of Directors reviewed the Company’s financial position, outstanding debt obligations and the Company’s existing and anticipated cash resources and uses and determined that the existence of a working capital deficiency as of March 31, 2025, does not indicate a liquidity problem. In making such determination, the Company’s Board of Directors noted the following: (i) the execution of the agreement to sell tax credits in connection with the US solar projects, which is expected to contribute approximately $19 million during the next twelve months, (ii) the Company’s positive cash flow from operating activities during 2023 and 2024, and (iii) funds received from the investment transaction with Clal Insurance Company Ltd. that was consummated in June 2025.

Ellomay Capital Ltd.
Information for the Company’s Debenture Holders (cont’d)

Information for the Company’s Series C Debenture Holders

The Deed of Trust governing the Company’s Series C Debentures (as amended on June 6, 2022, the “Series C Deed of Trust”), includes an undertaking by the Company to maintain certain financial covenants, whereby a breach of such financial covenants for two consecutive quarters is a cause for immediate repayment. As of March 31, 2025, the Company was in compliance with the financial covenants set forth in the Series C Deed of Trust as follows: (i) the Company’s Adjusted Shareholders’ Equity (as defined in the Series C Deed of Trust) was approximately €116.6 million, (ii) the ratio of the Company’s Net Financial Debt (as set forth above) to the Company’s CAP, Net (defined as the Company’s Adjusted Shareholders’ Equity plus the Net Financial Debt) was 59.3%, and (iii) the ratio of the Company’s Net Financial Debt to the Company’s Adjusted EBITDA,⁴ was 6.3.

The following is a reconciliation between the Company’s profit and the Adjusted EBITDA (as defined in the Series C Deed of Trust) for the four-quarter period ended March 31, 2025:

		For the four-quarter period ended March 31, 2025
		Unaudited
		€ in thousands
Profit for the period		2,274
Financing expenses, net		9,118
Taxes on income		(1,641)
Depreciation and amortization expenses		16,651
Share-based payments		86
Adjustment to revenues of the Talmei Yosef PV Plant due to calculation based on the fixed asset model		484
Adjusted EBITDA as defined the Series C Deed of Trust		26,972

The Series C Debentures were fully repaid on June 30, 2025 in accordance with their terms.

Ellomay Capital Ltd.
Information for the Company’s Debenture Holders (cont’d)

Information for the Company’s Series D Debenture Holders

The Deed of Trust governing the Company’s Series D Debentures includes an undertaking by the Company to maintain certain financial covenants, whereby a breach of such financial covenants for the periods set forth in the Series D Deed of Trust is a cause for immediate repayment. As of March 31, 2025, the Company was in compliance with the financial covenants set forth in the Series D Deed of Trust as follows: (i) the Company’s Adjusted Shareholders’ Equity (as defined in the Series D Deed of Trust) was approximately €116.6 million, (ii) the ratio of the Company’s Net Financial Debt (as set forth above) to the Company’s CAP, Net (defined as the Company’s Adjusted Shareholders’ Equity plus the Net Financial Debt) was 59.3%, and (iii) the ratio of the Company’s Net Financial Debt to the Company’s Adjusted EBITDA⁵ was 6.1.

The following is a reconciliation between the Company’s profit and the Adjusted EBITDA (as defined in the Series D Deed of Trust) for the four-quarter period ended March 31, 2025:

		For the four-quarter period ended March 31, 2025
		Unaudited
		€ in thousands
Loss for the period		2,274
Financing expenses, net		9,118
Taxes on income		(1,641)
Depreciation and amortization expenses		16,651
Share-based payments		86
Adjustment to revenues of the Talmei Yosef PV Plant due to calculation based on the fixed asset model		484
Adjustment to data relating to projects with a Commercial Operation Date during the four preceding quarters⁶		899
Adjusted EBITDA as defined the Series D Deed of Trust		27,871

Ellomay Capital Ltd.

Information for the Company’s Debenture Holders (cont’d)

Information for the Company’s Series E Debenture Holders

The Deed of Trust governing the Company’s Series E Debentures includes an undertaking by the Company to maintain certain financial covenants, whereby a breach of such financial covenants for the periods set forth in the Series E Deed of Trust is a cause for immediate repayment. As of March 31, 2025, the Company was in compliance with the financial covenants set forth in the Series E Deed of Trust as follows: (i) the Company’s Adjusted Shareholders’ Equity (as defined in the Series E Deed of Trust) was approximately €116.6 million, (ii) the ratio of the Company’s Net Financial Debt (as set forth above) to the Company’s CAP, Net (defined as the Company’s Adjusted Shareholders’ Equity plus the Net Financial Debt) was 59.3%, and (iii) the ratio of the Company’s Net Financial Debt to the Company’s Adjusted EBITDA⁷ was 6.1.

The following is a reconciliation between the Company’s profit and the Adjusted EBITDA (as defined in the Series E Deed of Trust) for the four-quarter period ended March 31, 2025:

		For the four-quarter period ended March 31, 2025
		Unaudited
		€ in thousands
Profit for the period		2,274
Financing expenses, net		9,118
Taxes on income		(1,641)
Depreciation and amortization expenses		16,651
Share-based payments		86
Adjustment to revenues of the Talmei Yosef PV Plant due to calculation based on the fixed asset model		484
Adjustment to data relating to projects with a Commercial Operation Date during the four preceding quarters⁸		899
Adjusted EBITDA as defined the Series E Deed of Trust		27,871

In connection with the undertaking included in Section 3.17.2 of Annex 6 of the Series E Deed of Trust, no circumstances occurred during the reporting period under which the rights to loans provided to Ellomay Luzon Energy Infrastructures Ltd. (formerly U. Dori Energy Infrastructures Ltd. (“Ellomay Luzon Energy”)), which were pledged to the holders of the Company’s Series E Debentures, will become subordinate to the amounts owed by Ellomay Luzon Energy to Israel Discount Bank Ltd.

As of March 31, 2025, the value of the assets pledged to the holders of the Series E Debentures in the Company’s books (unaudited) is approximately €40.1 million (approximately NIS 161.3 million based on the exchange rate as of such date).

Ellomay Capital Ltd. and its Subsidiaries

Information for the Company’s Debenture Holders (cont’d)

Information for the Company’s Series F Debenture Holders

The Deed of Trust governing the Company’s Series F Debentures includes an undertaking by the Company to maintain certain financial covenants, whereby a breach of such financial covenants for the periods set forth in the Series F Deed of Trust is a cause for immediate repayment. As of March 31, 2025, the Company was in compliance with the financial covenants set forth in the Series F Deed of Trust as follows: (i) the Company’s Adjusted Shareholders’ Equity (as defined in the Series F Deed of Trust) was approximately €115.9 million, (ii) the ratio of the Company’s Net Financial Debt (as set forth above) to the Company’s CAP, Net (defined as the Company’s Adjusted Shareholders’ Equity plus the Net Financial Debt) was 59.4%, and (iii) the ratio of the Company’s Net Financial Debt to the Company’s Adjusted EBITDA⁹ was 6.1.

The following is a reconciliation between the Company’s profit and the Adjusted EBITDA (as defined in the Series F Deed of Trust) for the four-quarter period ended March 31, 2025:

		For the four-quarter period ended March 31, 2025
		Unaudited
		€ in thousands
Profit for the period		2,274
Financing expenses, net		9,118
Taxes on income		(1,641)
Depreciation and amortization expenses		16,651
Share-based payments		86
Adjustment to revenues of the Talmei Yosef PV Plant due to calculation based on the fixed asset model		484
Adjustment to data relating to projects with a Commercial Operation Date during the four preceding quarters¹⁰		899
Adjusted EBITDA as defined the Series F Deed of Trust		27,871

Ellomay Capital Ltd. and its Subsidiaries

Information for the Company’s Debenture Holders (cont’d)

Information for the Company’s Series G Debenture Holders

The Deed of Trust governing the Company’s Series G Debentures includes an undertaking by the Company to maintain certain financial covenants, whereby a breach of such financial covenants for the periods set forth in the Series G Deed of Trust is a cause for immediate repayment. As of March 31, 2025, the Company was in compliance with the financial covenants set forth in the Series G Deed of Trust as follows: (i) the Company’s Adjusted Shareholders’ Equity (as defined in the Series G Deed of Trust) was approximately €115.9 million, (ii) the ratio of the Company’s Net Financial Debt (as set forth above) to the Company’s CAP, Net (defined as the Company’s Adjusted Shareholders’ Equity plus the Net Financial Debt) was 59.4%, and (iii) the ratio of the Company’s Net Financial Debt to the Company’s Adjusted EBITDA¹¹ was 6.1.

The following is a reconciliation between the Company’s profit and the Adjusted EBITDA (as defined in the Series G Deed of Trust) for the four-quarter period ended March 31, 2025:

		For the four-quarter period ended March 31, 2025
		Unaudited
		€ in thousands
Profit for the period		2,274
Financing expenses, net		9,118
Taxes on income		(1,641)
Depreciation and amortization expenses		16,651
Share-based payments		86
Adjustment to revenues of the Talmei Yosef PV Plant due to calculation based on the fixed asset model		484
Adjustment to data relating to projects with a Commercial Operation Date during the four preceding quarters¹²		899
Adjusted EBITDA as defined the Series G Deed of Trust		27,871

____________________________
¹ The amount of short-term and long-term debt from banks and other interest-bearing financial obligations provided above, includes an amount of approximately €4.5 million costs associated with such debt, which was capitalized and therefore offset from the debt amount that is recorded in the Company’s balance sheet.

² The amount of the debentures provided above includes an amount of approximately €6.7 million associated costs, which was capitalized and discount or premium and therefore offset from the debentures amount that is recorded in the Company’s balance sheet. This amount also includes the accrued interest as at March 31, 2025 in the amount of approximately €0.8 million.

³ The project finance amount deducted from the calculation of Net Financial Debt includes project finance obtained from various sources, including financing entities and the minority shareholders in project companies held by the Company (provided in the form of shareholders’ loans to the project companies).

⁴ The term “Adjusted EBITDA” is defined in the Series C Deed of Trust as earnings before financial expenses, net, taxes, depreciation and amortization, where the revenues from the Company’s operations, such as the Talmei Yosef solar plant, are calculated based on the fixed asset model and not based on the financial asset model (IFRIC 12), and before share-based payments. The Series C Deed of Trust provides that for purposes of the financial covenant, the Adjusted EBITDA will be calculated based on the four preceding quarters, in the aggregate. The Adjusted EBITDA is presented in this press release as part of the Company’s undertakings towards the holders of its Series C Debentures. For a general discussion of the use of non-IFRS measures, such as EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA see above under “Use of NON-IFRS Financial Measures.”

⁵ The term “Adjusted EBITDA” is defined in the Series D Deed of Trust as earnings before financial expenses, net, taxes, depreciation and amortization, where the revenues from the Company’s operations, such as the Talmei Yosef PV Plant, are calculated based on the fixed asset model and not based on the financial asset model (IFRIC 12), and before share-based payments, when the data of assets or projects whose Commercial Operation Date (as such term is defined in the Series D Deed of Trust) occurred in the four quarters that preceded the relevant date will be calculated based on Annual Gross Up (as such term is defined in the Series D Deed of Trust). The Series D Deed of Trust provides that for purposes of the financial covenant, the Adjusted EBITDA will be calculated based on the four preceding quarters, in the aggregate. The Adjusted EBITDA is presented in this press release as part of the Company’s undertakings towards the holders of its Series D Debentures. For a general discussion of the use of non-IFRS measures, such as EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA see above under “Use of NON-IFRS Financial Measures.”

⁶ The adjustment is based on the results of solar plants in Italy that were connected to the grid and commenced delivery of electricity to the grid during the year ended December 31, 2024 (two plants) and the three months ended March 31, 2025 (one plant). The Company recorded revenues and only direct expenses in connection with these solar plants from the connection to the grid and until PAC (Preliminary Acceptance Certificate – reached with respect to two of the three plants during the fourth quarter of 2024). However, for the sake of caution, the Company included the expected fixed expenses in connection with these solar plants in the calculation of the adjustment.

⁷ The term “Adjusted EBITDA” is defined in the Series E Deed of Trust as earnings before financial expenses, net, taxes, depreciation and amortization, where the revenues from the Company’s operations, such as the Talmei Yosef PV Plant, are calculated based on the fixed asset model and not based on the financial asset model (IFRIC 12), and before share-based payments, when the data of assets or projects whose Commercial Operation Date (as such term is defined in the Series E Deed of Trust) occurred in the four quarters that preceded the relevant date will be calculated based on Annual Gross Up (as such term is defined in the Series E Deed of Trust). The Series E Deed of Trust provides that for purposes of the financial covenant, the Adjusted EBITDA will be calculated based on the four preceding quarters, in the aggregate. The Adjusted EBITDA is presented in this press release as part of the Company’s undertakings towards the holders of its Series E Debentures. For a general discussion of the use of non-IFRS measures, such as EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA see above under “Use of NON-IFRS Financial Measures.”

⁸ The adjustment is based on the results of solar plants in Italy that were connected to the grid and commenced delivery of electricity to the grid during the year ended December 31, 2024 (two plants) and the three months ended March 31, 2025 (one plant). The Company recorded revenues and only direct expenses in connection with these solar plants from the connection to the grid and until PAC (Preliminary Acceptance Certificate – reached with respect to two of the three plants during the fourth quarter of 2024). However, for the sake of caution, the Company included the expected fixed expenses in connection with these solar plants in the calculation of the adjustment.

⁹ The term “Adjusted EBITDA” is defined in the Series F Deed of Trust as earnings before financial expenses, net, taxes, depreciation and amortization, where the revenues from the Company’s operations, such as the Talmei Yosef PV Plant, are calculated based on the fixed asset model and not based on the financial asset model (IFRIC 12), and before share-based payments, when the data of assets or projects whose Commercial Operation Date (as such term is defined in the Series F Deed of Trust) occurred in the four quarters that preceded the relevant date will be calculated based on Annual Gross Up (as such term is defined in the Series F Deed of Trust). The Series F Deed of Trust provides that for purposes of the financial covenant, the Adjusted EBITDA will be calculated based on the four preceding quarters, in the aggregate. The Adjusted EBITDA is presented in this press release as part of the Company’s undertakings towards the holders of its Series F Debentures. For a general discussion of the use of non-IFRS measures, such as EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA see above under “Use of Non-IFRS Financial Measures.”

¹⁰ The adjustment is based on the results of solar plants in Italy that were connected to the grid and commenced delivery of electricity to the grid during the year ended December 31, 2024 (two plants) and the three months ended March 31, 2025 (one plant). The Company recorded revenues and only direct expenses in connection with these solar plants from the connection to the grid and until PAC (Preliminary Acceptance Certificate – reached with respect to two of the three plants during the fourth quarter of 2024). However, for the sake of caution, the Company included the expected fixed expenses in connection with these solar plants in the calculation of the adjustment.

¹¹ The term “Adjusted EBITDA” is defined in the Series G Deed of Trust as earnings before financial expenses, net, taxes, depreciation and amortization, where the revenues from the Company’s operations, such as the Talmei Yosef PV Plant, are calculated based on the fixed asset model and not based on the financial asset model (IFRIC 12), and before share-based payments, when the data of assets or projects whose Commercial Operation Date (as such term is defined in the Series G Deed of Trust) occurred in the four quarters that preceded the relevant date will be calculated based on Annual Gross Up (as such term is defined in the Series G Deed of Trust). The Series G Deed of Trust provides that for purposes of the financial covenant, the Adjusted EBITDA will be calculated based on the four preceding quarters, in the aggregate. The Adjusted EBITDA is presented in this press release as part of the Company’s undertakings towards the holders of its Series G Debentures. For a general discussion of the use of non-IFRS measures, such as EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA see above under “Use of Non-IFRS Financial Measures.”

¹² The adjustment is based on the results of solar plants in Italy that were connected to the grid and commenced delivery of electricity to the grid during the year ended December 31, 2024 (two plants) and the three months ended March 31, 2025 (one plant). The Company recorded revenues and only direct expenses in connection with these solar plants from the connection to the grid and until PAC (Preliminary Acceptance Certificate – reached with respect to two of the three plants during the fourth quarter of 2024). However, for the sake of caution, the Company included the expected fixed expenses in connection with these solar plants in the calculation of the adjustment.

The MIL Network –

July 1, 2025

MIL-OSI USA: Congresswoman Bice Supports Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act

Source: United States House of Representatives – Congresswoman Stephanie Bice (OK-05)

Washington, D.C.– Today, the U.S. House of Representatives voted on their first appropriations bill, H.R. 3944, the Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act. This legislation includes $452.64 billion for the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs and $18 billion for military construction and family housing, an increase over FY25 funding levels. This is the first of the twelve appropriations bills to be considered on the House floor and the Appropriations committee continues working to pass the remaining bills out of committee for floor consideration

Congresswoman Bice issued the following statement:
“Under the leadership of Chairman Cole, the House passed the Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act. As a member of this subcommittee, I am focused on fully funding veterans’ health care, benefits, and programs and supporting our military families. This bill also reflects the priorities of the Trump Administration by protecting the Second Amendment rights of veterans and preventing funding for DEI initiatives and gender affirming care. I look forward to continuing the appropriations process and working to responsibly fund the federal government.”

MIL OSI USA News –

July 1, 2025
MIL-OSI Africa: Niger’s Prime Minister Joins African Energy Week (AEW) 2025 as Country Eyes Increased Oil Exports

Mahamane Lamine Zeine, Prime Minister of the Republic of Niger, has joined the African Energy Week (AEW): Invest in African Energies 2025 conference as a speaker. During the event – which takes place September 29 to October 3 in Cape Town – Zeine is expected to share insight into the country’s oil and gas projects, detailing initiatives being implemented to increase production and crude exports.

As the largest event of its kind in Africa, AEW: Invest in African Energies represents a strategic platform for African countries to not only promote their respective energy opportunities but foster cross-border collaboration and regional ties. Niger has been leveraging regional relations in recent months to advance oil exports, with infrastructure projects such as the Niger-Benin pipeline. The 100,000 barrel-per-day pipeline started operations in 2024, with oil successfully reaching the town of Sémè Kraké in Benin. The pipeline spans 1,950km and connects Niger’s Agadem oilfields to the Atlantic Ocean. During AEW: Invest in African Energies 2025, Zeine is expected to highlight the impact of the pipeline and how the project will support future oil and gas developments by providing a direct route to export markets.

AEW: Invest in African Energies is the platform of choice for project operators, financiers, technology providers and government, and has emerged as the official place to sign deals in African energy. Visit www.AECWeek.com for more information about this exciting event.

With the start of operations of the Niger-Benin pipeline, Niger is well-positioned to increase crude production. The country is currently promoting new investments in exploration blocks, with several milestones achieved in several months. Algeria’s national oil company (NOC) Sonatrach – in partnership with Niger’s NOC Sonidep – announced plans to revive exploration activities in the country. The companies signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) in 2024, committing to exploring opportunities for cooperation. The agreement paves the way for the companies to form partnerships in exploration, production, refining, petrochemicals and petroleum product distribution. Sonatrach is currently engaged in the country’s Kafra block in northern Niger. The block has featured two exploration wells – KFR-1 and KFRN-1 -, with the discovery of 168 million barrels and 100 million barrels of proven and probably oil reserves, respectively.

Sonatrach is also looking at constructing a refinery and petrochemical complex in Dosso, situated in southwestern Niger. The refinery will have an initial capacity of 30,000 bpd, with potential expansion to 100,000 bpd. Following its completion, the refinery is expected to offer low-cost fuel products for the domestic market. Meanwhile, under the terms of a signed agreement, Sonatrach will provide specialized training program for Nigerien engineers and technicians at Algerian refineries, supporting skills development in Niger.

Niger currently produces approximately 20,000 bpd of crude from the Agadem Rift Basin. In 2024, China National Petroleum Corporation signed a deal worth $400 million for the sale of crude from the Agadem oilfield. This signals new opportunities for crude exports and comes as players in the country make strides towards increasing production. Notably, oil and gas company Savannah Energy is a key player in Niger’s hydrocarbon sector. The company plans to increase production to 5,000 bpd through the development of recently-discovered oil blocks. Savannah’s hydrocarbon license interests cover approximately 13,655 km² – representing 50% of the country’s main petroleum basin, the Agadem Rift Basin. The company has identified 35 million barrels of gross 2C resources across its R3 East discoveries, with an additional 90 million barrels of gross unrisked prospective resources identified from five prospects and leads within tie-in distance to the planned R3 East facilities. With five wells drilled and five discoveries to date, Savannah Energy has witnessed significant success in Niger.

“Niger has significant potential to become a major crude exporter, with projects such as the Niger-Benin pipeline poised to play an instrumental part in getting Nigerien crude to global markets. To unlock the true potential of this project, Niger requires significant investment across the upstream sector. Insights shared at AEW: Invest in African Energies 2025 will support future deal-signing and exploration,” states NJ Ayuk, Executive Chairman, African Energy Chamber.

Distributed by APO Group on behalf of African Energy Chamber.

MIL OSI Africa –

July 1, 2025
MIL-OSI Russia: Georgia and the International Maritime Organization discussed expanding cooperation at sea

Translation. Region: Russian Federal

Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

Tbilisi, June 30 (Xinhua) — Georgian Minister of Economy and Sustainable Development Mariam Kvrivishvili met with International Maritime Organization (IMO) Secretary General Arsenio Dominguez, who is visiting Georgia, in Tbilisi on Monday. The issues of introducing electronic services in Georgian ports, implementing joint projects, developing maritime education and employing seafarers were discussed during the meeting, the Georgian Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development reported.

M. Kvrivishvili emphasized that the maritime sector plays an important role in the country’s economy and its development is one of the priorities for the Georgian government. According to her, Georgia fulfills all obligations stipulated by the international legal instruments of the IMO and consistently maintains high standards in the field of maritime safety, training and certification of seafarers, and environmental protection.

The parties noted the important role of maritime infrastructure in realizing Georgia’s transit potential, including in terms of further development of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route. Particular attention was paid to the Anaklia deep-water port project, which, as M. Kvrivishvili noted, will create favorable conditions for the development of logistics services and an industrial zone in the adjacent territory.

Georgia has been a member of the IMO since 1993. In 2015, the country underwent a voluntary audit, and in 2025, a mandatory audit. –0–

MIL OSI Russia News –

July 1, 2025

MIL-OSI: Progress Software Announces Second Quarter 2025 Financial Results

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

Annualized Recurring Revenue (“ARR”) of $838 million Grew 46% year-over-year
Revenue of $237 million Grew 36% year-over-year
Raises Full Year Guidance for Revenue, Operating Margin, Earnings Per Share, and Cash Flow
Acquires Agentic RAG AI Company

BURLINGTON, Mass., June 30, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Progress Software (Nasdaq: PRGS), the trusted provider of AI-powered digital experience and infrastructure software, today announced financial results for its fiscal second quarter ended May 31, 2025.

Second Quarter 2025 Highlights:

Revenue of $237 million increased 36% year-over-year on an actual currency basis and 35% on a constant currency basis.
Annualized Recurring Revenue (“ARR”) of $838 million increased 46% year-over-year on a constant currency basis.
Operating margin was 16% and non-GAAP operating margin was 40%.
Diluted earnings per share was $0.39 compared to $0.37 in the same quarter last year, an increase of 5%.
Non-GAAP diluted earnings per share was $1.40 compared to $1.09 in the same quarter last year, an increase of 28%.

“We’re extremely pleased with our solid Q2 results” said Yogesh Gupta, CEO of Progress Software. “Revenue contributions were strong across all geographies resulting in ARR of $838 million or 46% year-over-year growth. Our Net Retention Rate was 100%, demonstrating the consistent strength of our product portfolio. Our confidence in the business is reflected in our raised guidance for FY25. Equally important, our integration of ShareFile is going extremely well as we have completed numerous major synergy milestones, and we remain confident in our ability to reach all our ShareFile targets by the end of the year.”

Additional financial highlights included:

	Three Months Ended
	GAAP								Non-GAAP
(in thousands, except percentages and per share amounts)	May 31, 2025			May 31, 2024			% Change		May 31, 2025			May 31, 2024			% Change
Revenue	$	237,355		$	175,077		36	%	$	237,355		$	175,077		36	%
Income from operations	$	38,616		$	27,148		42	%	$	95,461		$	67,086		42	%
Operating margin		16	%		16	%	0 bps			40	%		38	%	200 bps
Net income	$	17,029		$	16,188		5	%	$	61,749		$	47,899		29	%
Diluted earnings per share	$	0.39		$	0.37		5	%	$	1.40		$	1.09		28	%
Cash from operations (GAAP) / Adjusted free cash flow (non-GAAP) / Unlevered free cash flow (non-GAAP)	$	29,996		$	63,681		(53	)%	$	37,068		$	64,073		(42	)%
	$	29,996		$	63,681				$	51,579		$	69,679		(26	)%

See Important Information Regarding Non-GAAP Financial Measures, Liquidity Measures, and Select Performance Metrics and a reconciliation of non-GAAP adjustments to Progress’ GAAP financial results at the end of this press release.

Other fiscal second quarter 2025 metrics and recent results included:

Cash and cash equivalents were $102.0 million at the end of the quarter.
Days sales outstanding was 53 days compared to 41 days in the fiscal second quarter of 2024 and 48 days in the fiscal first quarter of 2025.

“Our second quarter performance reflects the continued strong execution by our teams and this is further reflected in our increase to full year guidance across the board,” said Anthony Folger, CFO of Progress Software. “Our ShareFile business is progressing well and we are ahead of schedule with the integration and moving swiftly towards reaching our synergy targets. On the balance sheet, we again made significant progress on paying down our revolving credit facility, with another $40 million this quarter, putting us on a solid trajectory to hit our goal of $160 million debt paydown this year.”

Acquisition of Nuclia

In a separate press release, the Company also announced today its acquisition of Nuclia, an innovator in agentic Retrieval-Augmented Generation (“RAG”) AI solutions. Nuclia provides unique, easy-to-use agentic RAG-as-a-service technology enabling organizations to automatically leverage their own proprietary business information to retrieve verifiable, accurate answers using GenAI. Nuclia will extend the end-to-end value of the Progress Data Platform while creating new opportunities to reach a broader market of organizations looking to leverage agentic RAG technology.

The acquisition was signed and closed today and is immaterial to Progress’ financials.

To learn more about Nuclia, go to https://nuclia.com/.

2025 Business Outlook

Progress provides the following guidance for the fiscal year ending November 30, 2025 and the fiscal third quarter ending August 31, 2025:

	Updated FY 2025 Guidance (June 30, 2025)		Prior FY 2025 Guidance (March 31, 2025)
(in millions, except percentages and per share amounts)	GAAP	Non-GAAP	GAAP	Non-GAAP
Revenue	$962 – $974	$962 – $974	$958 – $970	$958 – $970
Diluted earnings per share	$1.27 – $1.43	$5.28 – $5.40	$1.19 – $1.35	$5.25 – $5.37
Operating margin	15%	38% – 39%	14% – 15%	38%
Cash from operations (GAAP) / Adjusted free cash flow (non-GAAP) / Unlevered free cash flow (non-GAAP)	$218 – $230	$228 – $240	$216 – $228	$226 – $238
		$285 – $296		$283 – $294
Effective tax rate	17%	20%	19%	20%

	Q3 2025 Guidance
(in millions, except per share amounts)	GAAP	Non-GAAP
Revenue	$237 – $243	$237 – $243
Diluted earnings per share	$0.29 – $0.35	$1.28 – $1.34

Based on current exchange rates, the expected positive currency translation impact on our:

Fiscal year 2025 business outlook compared to 2024 exchange rates is approximately $2.4 million on revenue.
GAAP and non-GAAP diluted earnings per share for fiscal year 2025 is approximately $0.02.
Fiscal Q3 2025 business outlook compared to 2024 exchange rates is approximately $1.7 million on revenue.
GAAP and non-GAAP diluted earnings per share for fiscal Q3 2025 is approximately $0.01.

To the extent that there are changes in exchange rates versus the current environment and/or our expectations, this may have an impact on Progress’ business outlook.

Conference Call

Progress will hold a conference call to review its financial results for the fiscal second quarter of 2025 at 5:00 p.m. ET on Monday, June 30, 2025. Participants must register for the conference call here: https://register-conf.media-server.com/register/BIc386d20e6fbd46acbadafca492a42b35. The webcast can be accessed at: https://edge.media-server.com/mmc/p/bujcypbf/. The conference call will include comments followed by questions and answers. Attendees must register for the webcast and an archived version of the conference call and supporting materials will be available on the Progress website within the investor relations section after the live conference call.

About Progress

Progress Software (Nasdaq: PRGS) empowers organizations to achieve transformational success in the face of disruptive change. Our software enables our customers to develop, deploy and manage responsible AI-powered applications and digital experiences with agility and ease. Customers get a trusted provider in Progress, with the products, expertise and vision they need to succeed. Over 4 million developers and technologists at hundreds of thousands of enterprises depend on Progress. Learn more at www.progress.com.

Progress and Progress Software are trademarks or registered trademarks of Progress Software Corporation and/or its subsidiaries or affiliates in the U.S. and other countries. Any other names contained herein may be trademarks of their respective owners.

CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS
(Unaudited)

	Three Months Ended								Six Months Ended
(in thousands, except per share data)	May 31, 2025			May 31, 2024			% Change		May 31, 2025			May 31, 2024			% Change
Revenue:
Software licenses	$	50,795		$	53,979		(6	)%	$	109,240		$	118,079		(7	)%
Maintenance, SaaS, and professional services		186,560			121,098		54	%		366,130			241,683		51	%
Total revenue		237,355			175,077		36	%		475,370			359,762		32	%
Costs of revenue:
Cost of software licenses		2,987			2,497		20	%		5,912			5,228		13	%
Cost of maintenance, SaaS, and professional services		33,764			22,176		52	%		66,648			44,395		50	%
Amortization of acquired intangibles		10,537			7,398		42	%		20,959			15,257		37	%
Total costs of revenue		47,288			32,071		47	%		93,519			64,880		44	%
Gross profit		190,067			143,006		33	%		381,851			294,882		29	%
Operating expenses:
Sales and marketing		49,677			37,889		31	%		100,973			77,000		31	%
Product development		46,570			35,435		31	%		92,945			70,423		32	%
General and administrative		25,637			21,983		17	%		51,260			43,327		18	%
Amortization of acquired intangibles		26,063			16,316		60	%		51,871			33,705		54	%
Cyber vulnerability response expenses, net		730			3,036		(76	)%		1,467			4,023		(64	)%
Restructuring expenses		1,043			651		60	%		8,072			3,000		169	%
Acquisition-related expenses		1,731			548		216	%		4,221			1,250		238	%
Total operating expenses		151,451			115,858		31	%		310,809			232,728		34	%
Income from operations		38,616			27,148		42	%		71,042			62,154		14	%
Other expense, net		(18,752	)		(7,020	)	167	%		(37,876	)		(14,419	)	163	%
Income before income taxes		19,864			20,128		(1	)%		33,166			47,735		(31	)%
Provision for income taxes		2,835			3,940		(28	)%		5,191			8,908		(42	)%
Net income	$	17,029		$	16,188		5	%	$	27,975		$	38,827		(28	)%

Earnings per share:
Basic	$	0.40		$	0.37		8	%	$	0.65		$	0.89		(27	)%
Diluted	$	0.39		$	0.37		5	%	$	0.63		$	0.87		(28	)%
Weighted average shares outstanding:
Basic		43,053			43,213		—	%		43,154			43,508		(1	)%
Diluted		44,156			43,964		—	%		44,522			44,395		—	%

Cash dividends declared per common share	$	—		$	0.175		(100	)%	$	—		$	0.350		(100	)%

^{Stock-based compensation is included in the condensed consolidated statements of operations, as follows:}

^{Cost of revenue}

^1,560

⁹¹²

⁷¹

^2,755

^1,898

⁴⁵

^{Sales and marketing}

^3,663

^2,458

⁴⁹

^6,695

^4,770

⁴⁰

^{Product development}

^4,984

^3,391

⁴⁷

^9,394

^7,056

³³

^{General and administrative}

^6,534

^5,228

²⁵

^12,580

^10,729

¹⁷

^Total

^16,741

^11,989

⁴⁰

^31,424

^24,453

²⁹

CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS
(Unaudited)

(in thousands)	May 31, 2025		November 30, 2024
Assets
Current assets:
Cash and cash equivalents	$	102,006	$	118,077
Accounts receivable, net		140,122		163,575
Unbilled receivables, current portion		34,136		34,672
Other current assets		49,387		52,489
Total current assets		325,651		368,813
Property and equipment, net		12,474		13,746
Goodwill and intangible assets, net		1,944,387		2,015,748
Right-of-use lease assets		27,351		30,894
Unbilled receivables, non-current portion		29,890		28,893
Other assets		73,839		68,872
Total assets	$	2,413,592	$	2,526,966
Liabilities and shareholders’ equity
Current liabilities:
Accounts payable and other current liabilities	$	75,610	$	113,801
Convertible senior notes, current portion, net		358,051		—
Operating lease liabilities, current portion		8,250		9,202
Deferred revenue, current portion, net		308,360		332,142
Total current liabilities		750,271		455,145
Long-term debt, net		660,000		730,000
Convertible senior notes, non-current portion, net		440,244		796,267
Operating lease liabilities, non-current portion		22,548		26,259
Deferred revenue, non-current portion, net		80,219		72,270
Other non-current liabilities		7,609		8,237
Stockholders’ equity:
Common stock and additional paid-in capital		362,522		354,592
Retained earnings		90,179		84,196
Total stockholders’ equity		452,701		438,788
Total liabilities and stockholders’ equity	$	2,413,592	$	2,526,966

CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF CASH FLOWS
(Unaudited)

	Three Months Ended						Six Months Ended
(in thousands)	May 31, 2025			May 31, 2024			May 31, 2025			May 31, 2024
Cash flows from operating activities:
Net income	$	17,029		$	16,188		$	27,975		$	38,827
Depreciation and amortization		39,568			27,529			78,777			55,073
Stock-based compensation		16,741			11,989			31,424			24,453
Other non-cash adjustments		(1,332	)		(812	)		1,738			515
Changes in operating assets and liabilities		(42,010	)		8,787			(40,971	)		15,317
Net cash flows from operating activities		29,996			63,681			98,943			134,185
Capital expenditures		(495	)		(955	)		(1,785	)		(1,264	)
Repurchases of common stock, net of issuances		(13,478	)		(44,636	)		(37,348	)		(59,553	)
Dividend equivalent and dividend payments to stockholders		(295	)		(7,951	)		(654	)		(16,122	)
Payments for acquisitions		—			—			(1,195	)		—
Proceeds from the issuance of debt, net of payment of issuance costs		—			431,929			—			431,929
Repayment of revolving line of credit and principal payment on term loan		(40,000	)		(337,813	)		(70,000	)		(371,250	)
Purchase of capped calls		—			(42,210	)		—			(42,210	)
Other		2,117			(4,847	)		(4,032	)		(12,253	)
Net change in cash and cash equivalents		(22,155	)		57,198			(16,071	)		63,462
Cash and cash equivalents, beginning of period		124,161			133,222			118,077			126,958
Cash and cash equivalents, end of period	$	102,006		$	190,420		$	102,006		$	190,420

RECONCILIATIONS OF GAAP TO NON-GAAP SELECTED FINANCIAL MEASURES
(Unaudited)

	Three Months Ended						Six Months Ended
(in thousands, except per share data)	May 31, 2025			May 31, 2024			May 31, 2025			May 31, 2024
Adjusted income from operations:
GAAP income from operations	$	38,616		$	27,148		$	71,042		$	62,154
Amortization of acquired intangibles		36,600			23,714			72,830			48,962
Stock-based compensation		16,741			11,989			31,424			24,453
Restructuring expenses		1,043			651			8,072			3,000
Acquisition-related expenses		1,731			548			4,221			1,250
Cyber vulnerability response expenses, net		730			3,036			1,467			4,023
Non-GAAP income from operations	$	95,461		$	67,086		$	189,056		$	143,842

Adjusted net income:
GAAP net income	$	17,029		$	16,188		$	27,975		$	38,827
Amortization of acquired intangibles		36,600			23,714			72,830			48,962
Stock-based compensation		16,741			11,989			31,424			24,453
Restructuring expenses		1,043			651			8,072			3,000
Acquisition-related expenses		1,731			548			4,221			1,250
Cyber vulnerability response expenses, net		730			3,036			1,467			4,023
Provision for income taxes		(12,125	)		(8,227	)		(25,245	)		(16,688	)
Non-GAAP net income	$	61,749		$	47,899		$	120,744		$	103,827

Adjusted diluted earnings per share:
GAAP diluted earnings per share	$	0.39		$	0.37		$	0.63		$	0.87
Amortization of acquired intangibles		0.83			0.54			1.64			1.10
Stock-based compensation		0.37			0.27			0.71			0.56
Restructuring expenses		0.02			0.02			0.18			0.07
Acquisition-related expenses		0.04			0.01			0.09			0.03
Cyber vulnerability response expenses, net		0.02			0.07			0.03			0.09
Provision for income taxes		(0.27	)		(0.19	)		(0.57	)		(0.38	)
Non-GAAP diluted earnings per share	$	1.40		$	1.09		$	2.71		$	2.34

Non-GAAP weighted avg shares outstanding – diluted		44,156			43,964			44,522			44,395

OTHER NON-GAAP FINANCIAL MEASURES
(Unaudited)

Adjusted Free Cash Flow and Unlevered Free Cash Flow

	Three Months Ended								Six Months Ended
(in thousands)	May 31, 2025			May 31, 2024			% Change		May 31, 2025			May 31, 2024			% Change
Cash flows from operations	$	29,996		$	63,681		(53	)%	$	98,943		$	134,185		(26	)%
Purchases of property and equipment		(495	)		(955	)	(48	)%		(1,785	)		(1,264	)	41	%
Free cash flow		29,501			62,726		(53	)%		97,158			132,921		(27	)%
Add back: restructuring payments		7,567			1,347		462	%		13,121			3,356		291	%
Adjusted free cash flow	$	37,068		$	64,073		(42	)%	$	110,279		$	136,277		(19	)%
Add back: tax-effected interest expense		14,511			5,606		159	%		29,253			11,481		155	%
Unlevered free cash flow	$	51,579		$	69,679		(26	)%	$	139,532		$	147,758		(6	)%

RECONCILIATIONS OF GAAP TO NON-GAAP FINANCIAL MEASURES FOR FISCAL YEAR 2025 GUIDANCE
(Unaudited)

Fiscal Year 2025 Updated Non-GAAP Operating Margin Guidance
	Fiscal Year Ending November 30, 2025
(in millions)	Low			High
GAAP income from operations	$	140.7		$	149.2
GAAP operating margins		15	%		15	%
Acquisition-related expense		6.0			6.0
Restructuring expense		9.2			9.2
Stock-based compensation		63.0			63.0
Amortization of acquired intangibles		145.7			145.7
Cyber vulnerability response expenses, net		4.2			4.2
Total adjustments⁽¹⁾		228.1			228.1
Non-GAAP income from operations	$	368.8		$	377.3
Non-GAAP operating margin		38	%		39	%
⁽¹⁾Total adjustments include preliminary estimates relating to the valuation of intangible assets acquired from ShareFile and restructuring expenses. The final amounts will not be available until the Company’s internal procedures and reviews are completed.

Fiscal Year 2025 Updated Non-GAAP Earnings per Share and Effective Tax Rate Guidance
	Fiscal Year Ending November 30, 2025
(in millions, except per share data)	Low			High
GAAP net income	$	56.9		$	64.8
Adjustments (from previous table)		228.1			228.1
Income tax adjustment⁽²⁾		(47.7	)		(48.0	)
Non-GAAP net income	$	237.3		$	244.9

GAAP diluted earnings per share	$	1.27		$	1.43
Non-GAAP diluted earnings per share	$	5.28		$	5.40

Diluted weighted average shares outstanding		45.0			45.4



_{² Tax adjustment is based on a non-GAAP effective tax rate of approximately 20%, calculated as follows:}
	_{Fiscal Year Ending November 30, 2025}
	_Low			_High
_{Non-GAAP income from operations}	_$	_368.8		_$	_377.3
_{Other (expense) income}		_(72.2	₎		_(71.2	₎
_{Non-GAAP income from continuing operations before income taxes}		_296.6			_306.1
_{Non-GAAP net income}		_237.3			_244.9
_{Tax provision}	_$	_59.3		_$	_61.2
_{Non-GAAP tax rate}		₂₀	_%		₂₀	_%

RECONCILIATIONS OF GAAP TO NON-GAAP FINANCIAL MEASURES FOR FISCAL YEAR 2025 GUIDANCE
(Unaudited)

Fiscal Year 2025 Adjusted Free Cash Flow and Unlevered Free Cash Flow Guidance
	Fiscal Year Ending November 30, 2025
(in millions)	Low			High
Cash flows from operations (GAAP)	$	218		$	230
Purchases of property and equipment		(7	)		(7	)
Add back: restructuring payments		17			17
Adjusted free cash flow (non-GAAP)		228			240
Add back: tax-effected interest expense		57			56
Unlevered free cash flow (non-GAAP)	$	285		$	296

RECONCILIATIONS OF GAAP TO NON-GAAP FINANCIAL MEASURES FOR Q3 2025 GUIDANCE
(Unaudited)

Q3 2025 Non-GAAP Earnings per Share Guidance
	Three Months Ending August 31, 2025
	Low			High
GAAP diluted earnings per share	$	0.29		$	0.35
Acquisition-related expense		0.02			0.02
Restructuring expense		0.01			0.01
Stock-based compensation		0.35			0.35
Amortization of acquired intangibles		0.83			0.83
Cyber vulnerability response expenses, net		0.03			0.03
Total adjustments⁽¹⁾		1.24			1.24
Income tax adjustment		(0.25	)		(0.25	)
Non-GAAP diluted earnings per share	$	1.28		$	1.34
⁽¹⁾Total adjustments include preliminary estimates relating to the valuation of intangible assets acquired from ShareFile and restructuring expenses. The final amounts will not be available until the Company’s internal procedures and reviews are completed.

Important Information Regarding Non-GAAP Financial Measures, Liquidity Measures and Select Performance Metrics

Progress furnishes certain non-GAAP supplemental information to our financial results. We use such non-GAAP financial measures to evaluate our period-over-period operating performance because our management team believes that excluding the effects of certain GAAP-related items helps to illustrate underlying trends in our business and provides us with a more comparable measure of our continuing business, as well as greater understanding of the results from the primary operations of our business. Management also uses such non-GAAP financial measures to establish budgets and operational goals, evaluate performance, and allocate resources. In addition, the compensation of our executives and non-executive employees is based in part on the performance of our business as evaluated by such non-GAAP financial measures. We believe these non-GAAP financial measures enhance investors’ overall understanding of our current financial performance and our prospects for the future by: (i) providing more transparency for certain financial measures, (ii) presenting disclosure that helps investors understand how we plan and measure the performance of our business, (iii) affording a view of our operating results that may be more easily compared to our peer companies, and (iv) enabling investors to consider our operating results on both a GAAP and non-GAAP basis (including following the integration period of our prior acquisitions). However, this non-GAAP information is not in accordance with, or an alternative to, generally accepted accounting principles in the United States (“GAAP”) and should be considered in conjunction with our GAAP results as the items excluded from the non-GAAP information may have a material impact on Progress’ financial results. A reconciliation of non-GAAP adjustments to Progress’ GAAP financial results is included in the tables above.

In the noted fiscal periods, we adjusted for the following items from our GAAP financial results to arrive at our non-GAAP financial measures:

Amortization of acquired intangibles – We exclude amortization of acquired intangibles because those expenses are unrelated to our core operating performance and the intangible assets acquired vary significantly based on the timing and magnitude of our acquisition transactions and the maturities of the businesses acquired. Adjustments include preliminary estimates relating to the valuation of intangible assets from ShareFile. The final amounts will not be available until the Company’s internal procedures and reviews are completed.
Stock-based compensation – We exclude stock-based compensation to be consistent with the way management and, in our view, the overall financial community evaluates our performance and the methods used by analysts to calculate consensus estimates. The expense related to stock-based awards is generally not controllable in the short-term and can vary significantly based on the timing, size and nature of awards granted. As such, we do not include these charges in operating plans.
Restructuring expenses – In all periods presented, we exclude restructuring expenses incurred because those expenses distort trends and are not part of our core operating results. Adjustments include preliminary estimates relating to restructuring expenses from ShareFile. The final amounts will not be available until the Company’s internal procedures and reviews are completed.
Acquisition-related expenses – We exclude acquisition-related expenses in order to provide a more meaningful comparison of the financial results to our historical operations and forward-looking guidance and the financial results of less acquisitive peer companies. We consider these types of costs and adjustments, to a great extent, to be unpredictable and dependent on a significant number of factors that are outside of our control. Furthermore, we do not consider these acquisition-related costs and adjustments to be related to the organic continuing operations of the acquired businesses and are generally not relevant to assessing or estimating the long-term performance of the acquired assets. In addition, the size, complexity and/or volume of past acquisitions, which often drives the magnitude of acquisition-related costs, may not be indicative of the size, complexity and/or volume of future acquisitions.
Cyber vulnerability response expenses, net – We exclude certain expenses resulting from the zero-day MOVEit Vulnerability, as more thoroughly described in our filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission since June 5, 2023. Expenses include costs to investigate and remediate these cyber related matters, as well as legal and other professional services related thereto. Expenses related to such cyber matters are provided net of expected insurance recoveries, although the timing of recognizing insurance recoveries may differ from the timing of recognizing the associated expenses. Costs associated with the enhancement of our cybersecurity program are not included within this adjustment. We expect to continue to incur legal and other professional services expenses in future periods associated with the MOVEit Vulnerability. Expenses related to such cyber matters are expected to result in operating expenses that would not have otherwise been incurred in the normal course of business operations. We believe that excluding these costs facilitates a more meaningful evaluation of our operating performance and comparisons to our past operating performance.
Provision for income taxes – We adjust our income tax provision by excluding the tax impact of the non-GAAP adjustments discussed above.
Constant currency – Revenue from our international operations has historically represented a substantial portion of our total revenue. As a result, our revenue results have been impacted, and we expect will continue to be impacted, by fluctuations in foreign currency exchange rates. As exchange rates are an important factor in understanding period-to-period comparisons, we present revenue growth rates on a constant currency basis, which helps improve the understanding of our revenue results and our performance in comparison to prior periods. The constant currency information presented is calculated by translating current period results using prior period weighted average foreign currency exchange rates.

In the noted fiscal periods, we also present the following liquidity measures:

Adjusted free cash flow (“AFCF”) and unlevered free cash flow (“Unlevered FCF”) – AFCF is equal to cash flows from operating activities less purchases of property and equipment, plus restructuring payments. Unlevered FCF is AFCF plus tax-effected interest expense on outstanding debt.

In the noted fiscal periods, we also present the following select performance metrics:

Annualized Recurring Revenue (“ARR”) – We disclose ARR as a performance metric to help investors better understand and assess the performance of our business because our mix of revenue generated from recurring sources currently represents the substantial majority of our revenues and is expected to continue in the future. We define ARR as the annualized revenue of all active and contractually binding term-based contracts from all customers at a point in time. ARR includes revenue from maintenance, software upgrade rights, public cloud, and on-premises subscription-based transactions and managed services. ARR mitigates fluctuations in revenue due to seasonality, contract term and the sales mix of subscriptions for term-based licenses and SaaS. We use ARR to understand customer trends and the overall health of our business, helping us to formulate strategic business decisions.
We calculate the annualized value of annual and multi-year contracts, and contracts with terms less than one year, by dividing the total contract value of each contract by the number of months in the term and then multiplying by 12. Annualizing contracts with terms less than one-year results in amounts being included in our ARR that are in excess of the total contract value for those contracts at the end of the reporting period. We generally do not sell non-SaaS-based contracts with a term of less than one year unless a customer is purchasing additional licenses under an existing annual or multi-year contract. The expectation is that at the time of renewal, such contracts with a term less than one year will renew with the same term as the existing contracts being renewed, such that both contracts are co-termed. Historically, such contracts with a term of less than one year renew at rates equal to or better than annual or multi-year contracts.

For SaaS-based contracts, there is a meaningful percentage of monthly auto-renewing contracts for which annualizing the contracts results in amounts being included in our ARR that are in excess of the total contract value for those contracts at the end of the reporting period.

Revenue from term-based license and on-premises subscription arrangements include a portion of the arrangement consideration that is allocated to the software license that is recognized up-front at the point in time control is transferred under ASC 606 revenue recognition principles. ARR for these arrangements is calculated as described above. The expectation is that the total contract value, inclusive of revenue recognized as software license, will be renewed at the end of the contract term.

The calculation is done at constant currency using the current year budgeted exchange rates for all periods presented.

ARR is not defined in GAAP and is not derived from a GAAP measure. Rather, ARR generally aligns to billings (as opposed to GAAP revenue which aligns to the transfer of control of each performance obligation). ARR does not have any standardized meaning and is therefore unlikely to be comparable to similarly titled measures presented by other companies. ARR should be viewed independently of revenue and deferred revenue and is not intended to be combined with or to replace either of those items. ARR is not a forecast and the active contracts at the end of a reporting period used in calculating ARR may or may not be extended or renewed by our customers.

Net Retention Rate (“NRR”) – We calculate net retention rate as of a period end by starting with the ARR from the cohort of all customers as of 12 months prior to such period end (“Prior Period ARR”). We then calculate the ARR from these same customers as of the current period end (“Current Period ARR”). Current Period ARR includes any expansion and is net of contraction or attrition over the last 12 months but excludes ARR from new customers in the current period. We then divide the total Current Period ARR by the total Prior Period ARR to arrive at the net retention rate. Net retention rate is not calculated in accordance with GAAP and is not derived from a GAAP measure.

Note Regarding Forward-Looking Statements

This press release contains statements that are “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. Progress has identified some of these forward-looking statements with words like “believe,” “may,” “could,” “would,” “might,” “should,” “expect,” “intend,” “plan,” “target,” “anticipate” and “continue,” the negative of these words, other terms of similar meaning or the use of future dates. Forward-looking statements in this press release include, but are not limited to, statements regarding Progress’ business outlook (including future acquisition activity) and financial guidance. There are a number of factors that could cause actual results or future events to differ materially from those anticipated by the forward-looking statements, including, without limitation: (i) economic, geopolitical and market conditions can adversely affect our business, results of operations and financial condition, including our revenue growth and profitability, which in turn could adversely affect our stock price; (ii) our international sales and operations subject us to additional risks that can adversely affect our operating results, including risks relating to foreign currency gains and losses; (iii) we may fail to achieve our financial forecasts due to such factors as delays or size reductions in transactions, fewer large transactions in a particular quarter, fluctuations in currency exchange rates, or a decline in our renewal rates for contracts; (iv) if the security measures for our software, services, other offerings or our internal information technology infrastructure are compromised or subject to a successful cyber-attack, or if our software offerings contain significant coding or configuration errors or zero-day vulnerabilities, we may experience reputational harm, legal claims and financial exposure; and the results of inquiries, investigations and legal claims regarding the MOVEit Vulnerability remain uncertain, while the ultimate resolution of these matters could result in losses that may be material to our financial results for a particular period; (v) future acquisitions may not be successful or may involve unanticipated costs or other integration issues that could disrupt our existing operations; and (vi) expected synergies and benefits of the ShareFile acquisition may not be realized which could negatively impact our future results of operations and financial condition. For further information regarding risks and uncertainties associated with Progress’ business, please refer to our filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission, including our Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended November 30, 2024. Progress undertakes no obligation to update any forward-looking statements, which speak only as of the date of this press release.

The MIL Network –

July 1, 2025

MIL-OSI: Progress Software Announces Second Quarter 2025 Financial Results

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

Second Quarter 2025 Highlights:

Revenue of $237 million increased 36% year-over-year on an actual currency basis and 35% on a constant currency basis.
Annualized Recurring Revenue (“ARR”) of $838 million increased 46% year-over-year on a constant currency basis.
Operating margin was 16% and non-GAAP operating margin was 40%.
Diluted earnings per share was $0.39 compared to $0.37 in the same quarter last year, an increase of 5%.
Non-GAAP diluted earnings per share was $1.40 compared to $1.09 in the same quarter last year, an increase of 28%.

Additional financial highlights included:

	Three Months Ended
	GAAP								Non-GAAP
(in thousands, except percentages and per share amounts)	May 31, 2025			May 31, 2024			% Change		May 31, 2025			May 31, 2024			% Change
Revenue	$	237,355		$	175,077		36	%	$	237,355		$	175,077		36	%
Income from operations	$	38,616		$	27,148		42	%	$	95,461		$	67,086		42	%
Operating margin		16	%		16	%	0 bps			40	%		38	%	200 bps
Net income	$	17,029		$	16,188		5	%	$	61,749		$	47,899		29	%
Diluted earnings per share	$	0.39		$	0.37		5	%	$	1.40		$	1.09		28	%
Cash from operations (GAAP) / Adjusted free cash flow (non-GAAP) / Unlevered free cash flow (non-GAAP)	$	29,996		$	63,681		(53	)%	$	37,068		$	64,073		(42	)%
	$	29,996		$	63,681				$	51,579		$	69,679		(26	)%

Other fiscal second quarter 2025 metrics and recent results included:

Cash and cash equivalents were $102.0 million at the end of the quarter.
Days sales outstanding was 53 days compared to 41 days in the fiscal second quarter of 2024 and 48 days in the fiscal first quarter of 2025.

Acquisition of Nuclia

The acquisition was signed and closed today and is immaterial to Progress’ financials.

To learn more about Nuclia, go to https://nuclia.com/.

2025 Business Outlook

Progress provides the following guidance for the fiscal year ending November 30, 2025 and the fiscal third quarter ending August 31, 2025:

	Updated FY 2025 Guidance (June 30, 2025)		Prior FY 2025 Guidance (March 31, 2025)
(in millions, except percentages and per share amounts)	GAAP	Non-GAAP	GAAP	Non-GAAP
Revenue	$962 – $974	$962 – $974	$958 – $970	$958 – $970
Diluted earnings per share	$1.27 – $1.43	$5.28 – $5.40	$1.19 – $1.35	$5.25 – $5.37
Operating margin	15%	38% – 39%	14% – 15%	38%
Cash from operations (GAAP) / Adjusted free cash flow (non-GAAP) / Unlevered free cash flow (non-GAAP)	$218 – $230	$228 – $240	$216 – $228	$226 – $238
		$285 – $296		$283 – $294
Effective tax rate	17%	20%	19%	20%

	Q3 2025 Guidance
(in millions, except per share amounts)	GAAP	Non-GAAP
Revenue	$237 – $243	$237 – $243
Diluted earnings per share	$0.29 – $0.35	$1.28 – $1.34

Based on current exchange rates, the expected positive currency translation impact on our:

Fiscal year 2025 business outlook compared to 2024 exchange rates is approximately $2.4 million on revenue.
GAAP and non-GAAP diluted earnings per share for fiscal year 2025 is approximately $0.02.
Fiscal Q3 2025 business outlook compared to 2024 exchange rates is approximately $1.7 million on revenue.
GAAP and non-GAAP diluted earnings per share for fiscal Q3 2025 is approximately $0.01.

To the extent that there are changes in exchange rates versus the current environment and/or our expectations, this may have an impact on Progress’ business outlook.

Conference Call

About Progress

CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS
(Unaudited)

	Three Months Ended								Six Months Ended
(in thousands, except per share data)	May 31, 2025			May 31, 2024			% Change		May 31, 2025			May 31, 2024			% Change
Revenue:
Software licenses	$	50,795		$	53,979		(6	)%	$	109,240		$	118,079		(7	)%
Maintenance, SaaS, and professional services		186,560			121,098		54	%		366,130			241,683		51	%
Total revenue		237,355			175,077		36	%		475,370			359,762		32	%
Costs of revenue:
Cost of software licenses		2,987			2,497		20	%		5,912			5,228		13	%
Cost of maintenance, SaaS, and professional services		33,764			22,176		52	%		66,648			44,395		50	%
Amortization of acquired intangibles		10,537			7,398		42	%		20,959			15,257		37	%
Total costs of revenue		47,288			32,071		47	%		93,519			64,880		44	%
Gross profit		190,067			143,006		33	%		381,851			294,882		29	%
Operating expenses:
Sales and marketing		49,677			37,889		31	%		100,973			77,000		31	%
Product development		46,570			35,435		31	%		92,945			70,423		32	%
General and administrative		25,637			21,983		17	%		51,260			43,327		18	%
Amortization of acquired intangibles		26,063			16,316		60	%		51,871			33,705		54	%
Cyber vulnerability response expenses, net		730			3,036		(76	)%		1,467			4,023		(64	)%
Restructuring expenses		1,043			651		60	%		8,072			3,000		169	%
Acquisition-related expenses		1,731			548		216	%		4,221			1,250		238	%
Total operating expenses		151,451			115,858		31	%		310,809			232,728		34	%
Income from operations		38,616			27,148		42	%		71,042			62,154		14	%
Other expense, net		(18,752	)		(7,020	)	167	%		(37,876	)		(14,419	)	163	%
Income before income taxes		19,864			20,128		(1	)%		33,166			47,735		(31	)%
Provision for income taxes		2,835			3,940		(28	)%		5,191			8,908		(42	)%
Net income	$	17,029		$	16,188		5	%	$	27,975		$	38,827		(28	)%

Earnings per share:
Basic	$	0.40		$	0.37		8	%	$	0.65		$	0.89		(27	)%
Diluted	$	0.39		$	0.37		5	%	$	0.63		$	0.87		(28	)%
Weighted average shares outstanding:
Basic		43,053			43,213		—	%		43,154			43,508		(1	)%
Diluted		44,156			43,964		—	%		44,522			44,395		—	%

Cash dividends declared per common share	$	—		$	0.175		(100	)%	$	—		$	0.350		(100	)%

^{Stock-based compensation is included in the condensed consolidated statements of operations, as follows:}

^{Cost of revenue}

^1,560

⁹¹²

⁷¹

^2,755

^1,898

⁴⁵

^{Sales and marketing}

^3,663

^2,458

⁴⁹

^6,695

^4,770

⁴⁰

^{Product development}

^4,984

^3,391

⁴⁷

^9,394

^7,056

³³

^{General and administrative}

^6,534

^5,228

²⁵

^12,580

^10,729

¹⁷

^Total

^16,741

^11,989

⁴⁰

^31,424

^24,453

²⁹

CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS
(Unaudited)

(in thousands)	May 31, 2025		November 30, 2024
Assets
Current assets:
Cash and cash equivalents	$	102,006	$	118,077
Accounts receivable, net		140,122		163,575
Unbilled receivables, current portion		34,136		34,672
Other current assets		49,387		52,489
Total current assets		325,651		368,813
Property and equipment, net		12,474		13,746
Goodwill and intangible assets, net		1,944,387		2,015,748
Right-of-use lease assets		27,351		30,894
Unbilled receivables, non-current portion		29,890		28,893
Other assets		73,839		68,872
Total assets	$	2,413,592	$	2,526,966
Liabilities and shareholders’ equity
Current liabilities:
Accounts payable and other current liabilities	$	75,610	$	113,801
Convertible senior notes, current portion, net		358,051		—
Operating lease liabilities, current portion		8,250		9,202
Deferred revenue, current portion, net		308,360		332,142
Total current liabilities		750,271		455,145
Long-term debt, net		660,000		730,000
Convertible senior notes, non-current portion, net		440,244		796,267
Operating lease liabilities, non-current portion		22,548		26,259
Deferred revenue, non-current portion, net		80,219		72,270
Other non-current liabilities		7,609		8,237
Stockholders’ equity:
Common stock and additional paid-in capital		362,522		354,592
Retained earnings		90,179		84,196
Total stockholders’ equity		452,701		438,788
Total liabilities and stockholders’ equity	$	2,413,592	$	2,526,966

CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF CASH FLOWS
(Unaudited)

	Three Months Ended						Six Months Ended
(in thousands)	May 31, 2025			May 31, 2024			May 31, 2025			May 31, 2024
Cash flows from operating activities:
Net income	$	17,029		$	16,188		$	27,975		$	38,827
Depreciation and amortization		39,568			27,529			78,777			55,073
Stock-based compensation		16,741			11,989			31,424			24,453
Other non-cash adjustments		(1,332	)		(812	)		1,738			515
Changes in operating assets and liabilities		(42,010	)		8,787			(40,971	)		15,317
Net cash flows from operating activities		29,996			63,681			98,943			134,185
Capital expenditures		(495	)		(955	)		(1,785	)		(1,264	)
Repurchases of common stock, net of issuances		(13,478	)		(44,636	)		(37,348	)		(59,553	)
Dividend equivalent and dividend payments to stockholders		(295	)		(7,951	)		(654	)		(16,122	)
Payments for acquisitions		—			—			(1,195	)		—
Proceeds from the issuance of debt, net of payment of issuance costs		—			431,929			—			431,929
Repayment of revolving line of credit and principal payment on term loan		(40,000	)		(337,813	)		(70,000	)		(371,250	)
Purchase of capped calls		—			(42,210	)		—			(42,210	)
Other		2,117			(4,847	)		(4,032	)		(12,253	)
Net change in cash and cash equivalents		(22,155	)		57,198			(16,071	)		63,462
Cash and cash equivalents, beginning of period		124,161			133,222			118,077			126,958
Cash and cash equivalents, end of period	$	102,006		$	190,420		$	102,006		$	190,420

RECONCILIATIONS OF GAAP TO NON-GAAP SELECTED FINANCIAL MEASURES
(Unaudited)

	Three Months Ended						Six Months Ended
(in thousands, except per share data)	May 31, 2025			May 31, 2024			May 31, 2025			May 31, 2024
Adjusted income from operations:
GAAP income from operations	$	38,616		$	27,148		$	71,042		$	62,154
Amortization of acquired intangibles		36,600			23,714			72,830			48,962
Stock-based compensation		16,741			11,989			31,424			24,453
Restructuring expenses		1,043			651			8,072			3,000
Acquisition-related expenses		1,731			548			4,221			1,250
Cyber vulnerability response expenses, net		730			3,036			1,467			4,023
Non-GAAP income from operations	$	95,461		$	67,086		$	189,056		$	143,842

Adjusted net income:
GAAP net income	$	17,029		$	16,188		$	27,975		$	38,827
Amortization of acquired intangibles		36,600			23,714			72,830			48,962
Stock-based compensation		16,741			11,989			31,424			24,453
Restructuring expenses		1,043			651			8,072			3,000
Acquisition-related expenses		1,731			548			4,221			1,250
Cyber vulnerability response expenses, net		730			3,036			1,467			4,023
Provision for income taxes		(12,125	)		(8,227	)		(25,245	)		(16,688	)
Non-GAAP net income	$	61,749		$	47,899		$	120,744		$	103,827

Adjusted diluted earnings per share:
GAAP diluted earnings per share	$	0.39		$	0.37		$	0.63		$	0.87
Amortization of acquired intangibles		0.83			0.54			1.64			1.10
Stock-based compensation		0.37			0.27			0.71			0.56
Restructuring expenses		0.02			0.02			0.18			0.07
Acquisition-related expenses		0.04			0.01			0.09			0.03
Cyber vulnerability response expenses, net		0.02			0.07			0.03			0.09
Provision for income taxes		(0.27	)		(0.19	)		(0.57	)		(0.38	)
Non-GAAP diluted earnings per share	$	1.40		$	1.09		$	2.71		$	2.34

Non-GAAP weighted avg shares outstanding – diluted		44,156			43,964			44,522			44,395

OTHER NON-GAAP FINANCIAL MEASURES
(Unaudited)

Adjusted Free Cash Flow and Unlevered Free Cash Flow

	Three Months Ended								Six Months Ended
(in thousands)	May 31, 2025			May 31, 2024			% Change		May 31, 2025			May 31, 2024			% Change
Cash flows from operations	$	29,996		$	63,681		(53	)%	$	98,943		$	134,185		(26	)%
Purchases of property and equipment		(495	)		(955	)	(48	)%		(1,785	)		(1,264	)	41	%
Free cash flow		29,501			62,726		(53	)%		97,158			132,921		(27	)%
Add back: restructuring payments		7,567			1,347		462	%		13,121			3,356		291	%
Adjusted free cash flow	$	37,068		$	64,073		(42	)%	$	110,279		$	136,277		(19	)%
Add back: tax-effected interest expense		14,511			5,606		159	%		29,253			11,481		155	%
Unlevered free cash flow	$	51,579		$	69,679		(26	)%	$	139,532		$	147,758		(6	)%

RECONCILIATIONS OF GAAP TO NON-GAAP FINANCIAL MEASURES FOR FISCAL YEAR 2025 GUIDANCE
(Unaudited)

Fiscal Year 2025 Updated Non-GAAP Operating Margin Guidance
	Fiscal Year Ending November 30, 2025
(in millions)	Low			High
GAAP income from operations	$	140.7		$	149.2
GAAP operating margins		15	%		15	%
Acquisition-related expense		6.0			6.0
Restructuring expense		9.2			9.2
Stock-based compensation		63.0			63.0
Amortization of acquired intangibles		145.7			145.7
Cyber vulnerability response expenses, net		4.2			4.2
Total adjustments⁽¹⁾		228.1			228.1
Non-GAAP income from operations	$	368.8		$	377.3
Non-GAAP operating margin		38	%		39	%
⁽¹⁾Total adjustments include preliminary estimates relating to the valuation of intangible assets acquired from ShareFile and restructuring expenses. The final amounts will not be available until the Company’s internal procedures and reviews are completed.

Fiscal Year 2025 Updated Non-GAAP Earnings per Share and Effective Tax Rate Guidance
	Fiscal Year Ending November 30, 2025
(in millions, except per share data)	Low			High
GAAP net income	$	56.9		$	64.8
Adjustments (from previous table)		228.1			228.1
Income tax adjustment⁽²⁾		(47.7	)		(48.0	)
Non-GAAP net income	$	237.3		$	244.9

GAAP diluted earnings per share	$	1.27		$	1.43
Non-GAAP diluted earnings per share	$	5.28		$	5.40

Diluted weighted average shares outstanding		45.0			45.4



_{² Tax adjustment is based on a non-GAAP effective tax rate of approximately 20%, calculated as follows:}
	_{Fiscal Year Ending November 30, 2025}
	_Low			_High
_{Non-GAAP income from operations}	_$	_368.8		_$	_377.3
_{Other (expense) income}		_(72.2	₎		_(71.2	₎
_{Non-GAAP income from continuing operations before income taxes}		_296.6			_306.1
_{Non-GAAP net income}		_237.3			_244.9
_{Tax provision}	_$	_59.3		_$	_61.2
_{Non-GAAP tax rate}		₂₀	_%		₂₀	_%

RECONCILIATIONS OF GAAP TO NON-GAAP FINANCIAL MEASURES FOR FISCAL YEAR 2025 GUIDANCE
(Unaudited)

Fiscal Year 2025 Adjusted Free Cash Flow and Unlevered Free Cash Flow Guidance
	Fiscal Year Ending November 30, 2025
(in millions)	Low			High
Cash flows from operations (GAAP)	$	218		$	230
Purchases of property and equipment		(7	)		(7	)
Add back: restructuring payments		17			17
Adjusted free cash flow (non-GAAP)		228			240
Add back: tax-effected interest expense		57			56
Unlevered free cash flow (non-GAAP)	$	285		$	296

RECONCILIATIONS OF GAAP TO NON-GAAP FINANCIAL MEASURES FOR Q3 2025 GUIDANCE
(Unaudited)

Q3 2025 Non-GAAP Earnings per Share Guidance
	Three Months Ending August 31, 2025
	Low			High
GAAP diluted earnings per share	$	0.29		$	0.35
Acquisition-related expense		0.02			0.02
Restructuring expense		0.01			0.01
Stock-based compensation		0.35			0.35
Amortization of acquired intangibles		0.83			0.83
Cyber vulnerability response expenses, net		0.03			0.03
Total adjustments⁽¹⁾		1.24			1.24
Income tax adjustment		(0.25	)		(0.25	)
Non-GAAP diluted earnings per share	$	1.28		$	1.34
⁽¹⁾Total adjustments include preliminary estimates relating to the valuation of intangible assets acquired from ShareFile and restructuring expenses. The final amounts will not be available until the Company’s internal procedures and reviews are completed.

Important Information Regarding Non-GAAP Financial Measures, Liquidity Measures and Select Performance Metrics

In the noted fiscal periods, we adjusted for the following items from our GAAP financial results to arrive at our non-GAAP financial measures:

Amortization of acquired intangibles – We exclude amortization of acquired intangibles because those expenses are unrelated to our core operating performance and the intangible assets acquired vary significantly based on the timing and magnitude of our acquisition transactions and the maturities of the businesses acquired. Adjustments include preliminary estimates relating to the valuation of intangible assets from ShareFile. The final amounts will not be available until the Company’s internal procedures and reviews are completed.
Stock-based compensation – We exclude stock-based compensation to be consistent with the way management and, in our view, the overall financial community evaluates our performance and the methods used by analysts to calculate consensus estimates. The expense related to stock-based awards is generally not controllable in the short-term and can vary significantly based on the timing, size and nature of awards granted. As such, we do not include these charges in operating plans.
Restructuring expenses – In all periods presented, we exclude restructuring expenses incurred because those expenses distort trends and are not part of our core operating results. Adjustments include preliminary estimates relating to restructuring expenses from ShareFile. The final amounts will not be available until the Company’s internal procedures and reviews are completed.
Acquisition-related expenses – We exclude acquisition-related expenses in order to provide a more meaningful comparison of the financial results to our historical operations and forward-looking guidance and the financial results of less acquisitive peer companies. We consider these types of costs and adjustments, to a great extent, to be unpredictable and dependent on a significant number of factors that are outside of our control. Furthermore, we do not consider these acquisition-related costs and adjustments to be related to the organic continuing operations of the acquired businesses and are generally not relevant to assessing or estimating the long-term performance of the acquired assets. In addition, the size, complexity and/or volume of past acquisitions, which often drives the magnitude of acquisition-related costs, may not be indicative of the size, complexity and/or volume of future acquisitions.
Cyber vulnerability response expenses, net – We exclude certain expenses resulting from the zero-day MOVEit Vulnerability, as more thoroughly described in our filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission since June 5, 2023. Expenses include costs to investigate and remediate these cyber related matters, as well as legal and other professional services related thereto. Expenses related to such cyber matters are provided net of expected insurance recoveries, although the timing of recognizing insurance recoveries may differ from the timing of recognizing the associated expenses. Costs associated with the enhancement of our cybersecurity program are not included within this adjustment. We expect to continue to incur legal and other professional services expenses in future periods associated with the MOVEit Vulnerability. Expenses related to such cyber matters are expected to result in operating expenses that would not have otherwise been incurred in the normal course of business operations. We believe that excluding these costs facilitates a more meaningful evaluation of our operating performance and comparisons to our past operating performance.
Provision for income taxes – We adjust our income tax provision by excluding the tax impact of the non-GAAP adjustments discussed above.
Constant currency – Revenue from our international operations has historically represented a substantial portion of our total revenue. As a result, our revenue results have been impacted, and we expect will continue to be impacted, by fluctuations in foreign currency exchange rates. As exchange rates are an important factor in understanding period-to-period comparisons, we present revenue growth rates on a constant currency basis, which helps improve the understanding of our revenue results and our performance in comparison to prior periods. The constant currency information presented is calculated by translating current period results using prior period weighted average foreign currency exchange rates.

In the noted fiscal periods, we also present the following liquidity measures:

Adjusted free cash flow (“AFCF”) and unlevered free cash flow (“Unlevered FCF”) – AFCF is equal to cash flows from operating activities less purchases of property and equipment, plus restructuring payments. Unlevered FCF is AFCF plus tax-effected interest expense on outstanding debt.

In the noted fiscal periods, we also present the following select performance metrics:

Annualized Recurring Revenue (“ARR”) – We disclose ARR as a performance metric to help investors better understand and assess the performance of our business because our mix of revenue generated from recurring sources currently represents the substantial majority of our revenues and is expected to continue in the future. We define ARR as the annualized revenue of all active and contractually binding term-based contracts from all customers at a point in time. ARR includes revenue from maintenance, software upgrade rights, public cloud, and on-premises subscription-based transactions and managed services. ARR mitigates fluctuations in revenue due to seasonality, contract term and the sales mix of subscriptions for term-based licenses and SaaS. We use ARR to understand customer trends and the overall health of our business, helping us to formulate strategic business decisions.
We calculate the annualized value of annual and multi-year contracts, and contracts with terms less than one year, by dividing the total contract value of each contract by the number of months in the term and then multiplying by 12. Annualizing contracts with terms less than one-year results in amounts being included in our ARR that are in excess of the total contract value for those contracts at the end of the reporting period. We generally do not sell non-SaaS-based contracts with a term of less than one year unless a customer is purchasing additional licenses under an existing annual or multi-year contract. The expectation is that at the time of renewal, such contracts with a term less than one year will renew with the same term as the existing contracts being renewed, such that both contracts are co-termed. Historically, such contracts with a term of less than one year renew at rates equal to or better than annual or multi-year contracts.

For SaaS-based contracts, there is a meaningful percentage of monthly auto-renewing contracts for which annualizing the contracts results in amounts being included in our ARR that are in excess of the total contract value for those contracts at the end of the reporting period.

Revenue from term-based license and on-premises subscription arrangements include a portion of the arrangement consideration that is allocated to the software license that is recognized up-front at the point in time control is transferred under ASC 606 revenue recognition principles. ARR for these arrangements is calculated as described above. The expectation is that the total contract value, inclusive of revenue recognized as software license, will be renewed at the end of the contract term.

The calculation is done at constant currency using the current year budgeted exchange rates for all periods presented.

ARR is not defined in GAAP and is not derived from a GAAP measure. Rather, ARR generally aligns to billings (as opposed to GAAP revenue which aligns to the transfer of control of each performance obligation). ARR does not have any standardized meaning and is therefore unlikely to be comparable to similarly titled measures presented by other companies. ARR should be viewed independently of revenue and deferred revenue and is not intended to be combined with or to replace either of those items. ARR is not a forecast and the active contracts at the end of a reporting period used in calculating ARR may or may not be extended or renewed by our customers.

Net Retention Rate (“NRR”) – We calculate net retention rate as of a period end by starting with the ARR from the cohort of all customers as of 12 months prior to such period end (“Prior Period ARR”). We then calculate the ARR from these same customers as of the current period end (“Current Period ARR”). Current Period ARR includes any expansion and is net of contraction or attrition over the last 12 months but excludes ARR from new customers in the current period. We then divide the total Current Period ARR by the total Prior Period ARR to arrive at the net retention rate. Net retention rate is not calculated in accordance with GAAP and is not derived from a GAAP measure.

Note Regarding Forward-Looking Statements

The MIL Network –

July 1, 2025

MIL-OSI NGOs: UK: disappointing High Court arms to Israel judgment ‘does not change the facts’ of Gaza genocide

Source: Amnesty International –

UK: DISAPPOINTING HIGH COURT ARMS TO ISRAEL JUDGMENT ‘DOES NOT CHANGE THE FACTS’ OF GAZA GENOCIDE

Amnesty International UK has expressed disappointment following today’s High Court ruling that the court found it did not have the constitutional authority to intervene in the Government’s policy of supplying spare parts for the F35 fighter jet for use by Israel in the occupied Gaza Strip.

Amnesty International will be considering the implications of the full judgment with more details to follow.

In response to the verdict, Sacha Deshmukh, Chief Executive of Amnesty International UK, said:

“We are disappointed by today’s ruling, but the court has been clear that while it does not have the authority to make a judgment on UK exports of F-35 arms parts, this does not absolve the executive and Parliament from their responsibilities to act.

“The UK has a legal obligation to help prevent and punish genocide and yet it continues to authorise the export of weapons to Israel despite the clear risks that these weapons will be used to commit genocide.

“The horrifying reality in Gaza is unfolding in full view of the world: entire families obliterated, civilians killed in so-called safe zones, hospitals reduced to rubble, and a population driven into starvation by a cruel blockade and forced displacement. These are not isolated tragedies; they are part of a systematic assault on a besieged population

“This judgment does not change the facts on the ground, nor does it absolve the UK government of its responsibilities under international law. The risk that UK arms may be used to facilitate serious international crimes remains alarmingly high. If the courts will not intervene, then the moral and legal burden on the Government and Parliament to act – before more lives are lost and further irreparable harm is done – is even greater.

“The UK must end all arms transfers to Israel if we are serious as a country about our commitments to international law and human rights.”

Interveners

The case, brought by campaigners seeking to halt UK arms transfers to Israel, highlighted the devastating impact of Israeli military operations in the occupied Gaza Strip – attacks that have led to the killing of tens of thousands of civilians, the destruction of essential infrastructure, and the forced displacement of over a million people. These exports have been linked to potential war crimes in Gaza, including bombings in Al-Mawasi, a designated safe zone where at least 90 people were reported to have been killed in a single attack.

Amnesty International UK and Human Rights Watch intervened in the case, submitting extensive documentation and legal arguments demonstrating Israel’s sustained disregard for international humanitarian law, and underscoring the UK’s binding obligation under Article 1 of the Genocide Convention to act to prevent genocide.

MIL OSI NGO –

July 1, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office summons Georgian Chargé d’Affaires – 30 June 2025
Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

News story

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office summons Georgian Chargé d’Affaires – 30 June 2025

The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office protests Georgian Dreams crackdown on civil society, independent media and critical voice in Georgia
Today (30 June 2025), the Georgian Chargé d’Affaires was summoned to the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, where a senior official made clear the UK’s firm opposition to their country’s increasingly harmful trajectory and strongly objected to false claims and public attacks launched by Georgian Dream against the UK and international partners.

An FCDO Spokesperson said:

“The imprisonment of prominent opposition leaders is the latest attempt by the Georgian government to crack down on freedoms and stifle dissent.

“The detention of election rivals is incompatible with any remaining Euro-Atlantic aspirations held by Georgian Dream as well as their own constitutional commitments.

“The UK Government will not hesitate to consider further action should Georgia not return to respecting and upholding democracy, freedoms, and human rights.”

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Published 30 June 2025
MIL OSI United Kingdom –
July 1, 2025
MIL-OSI United Nations: UNDRR deepens support for local resilience at the 12th European Urban Resilience Forum

Source: UNISDR Disaster Risk Reduction

The 12th European Urban Resilience Forum (EURESFO), held in Rotterdam, the Netherlands from 25-27 June 2025, provided an important platform for urban resilience practitioners to reinforce their commitment to accelerating local action on resilience, climate adaptation, and disaster risk reduction in the context of growing urban challenges.

As urban areas in Europe and beyond face cascading risks-from heatwaves and floods to geopolitical instability and infrastructure stress-UNDRR used the platform to underscore the critical role of local governments in driving meaningful disaster risk reduction and climate adaptation.

In a video message to the Forum’s opening plenary, Kamal Kishore, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Disaster Risk Reduction, emphasized three global priorities: strengthening local implementation of DRR strategies, unlocking resilience financing, and scaling up community-driven innovation.

“If we do not reduce risk at the local level, we will not succeed in reducing losses at the global level,” he stated, calling for stronger investment and partnerships to translate plans into action.

UNDRR’s active engagement throughout the Forum showcased its commitment to supporting cities through the Making Cities Resilient 2030 (MCR2030) initiative. Yigyeong Oh, MCR2030 Regional Focal Point for Europe and Central Asia, spoke in multiple sessions, including the opening plenary “Resilience in Crisis: Accelerating Action for a Just Future” and the panel discussion “Building Urban Resilience in an Era of Polycrisis: The Holistic Agenda.” She highlighted how MCR2030 has grown into a global movement of over 1,850 cities, supporting local governments with risk-informed governance, resilience assessments, and stakeholder collaboration.

“In a time of polycrisis, resilience is not a siloed agenda,” Oh noted. “Cities are facing overlapping challenges-climate shocks, economic pressures, and social inequality-and MCR2030 enables them to plan holistically, act collectively, and learn globally.”

UNDRR also co-moderated the workshop “Local Action to Address Extreme Heat – CitiesHitRefresh,” which addressed one of the fastest growing disaster risks in Europe. Zdravko Maxomovic from Kraljevo, an MCR2030 city from Serbia, shared its practical experiences in managing heat risks and contributing to the upcoming second edition of UNDRR’s Flames of Change report, a knowledge product documenting inclusive urban resilience solutions.

Nature-based solutions were another key theme. UNDRR supported the session “Collaborate, Educate, Transform: Building the Future of Nature-Based Solutions in Cities,” where Małgorzata Bartyna-Zielińska from the City of Wrocław, an MCR2030 Resilience Hub, presented its award-winning LifeCOOLCity project. The session underscored the power of peer learning through networks like MCR2030.

Beyond technical sessions, UNDRR joined ICLEI and other partners for a side meeting with Ukrainian cities, including Lviv, an MCR2030 Resilience Hub, focused on the Ukraine Recovery Roadmap and aligning international support with local resilience priorities.

UNDRR also pitched the MCR2030 Climate Resilience Addendum to the Disaster Resilience Scorecard for Cities during the pitch session, offering cities a practical tool to assess and enhance resilience to climate-related risks.

As the Forum concluded, a common message resonated across sessions: Europe has a unique role in shaping standards, fostering multilevel governance, and investing in long-term resilience. UNDRR reaffirmed its commitment to advancing these goals by supporting local governments with tools, knowledge, and partnerships through MCR2030 and other initiatives. With the urgency of accelerating resilience action, the Forum reinforced the need for collective action-local leadership supported by global collaboration-to ensure no city is left behind.

MIL OSI United Nations News –

July 1, 2025
MIL-OSI Canada: Judicial appointment advances access to justice
Source: Government of Canada regional news (2)
Albertans deserve to have a justice system that delivers transparent, fair and timely services. Investing in court resources through judicial appointments maximises capacity in the courts and improves access to justice for those involved in civil, criminal and family matters.

Syra Dhaliwal has been appointed as a part-time justice of the peace in Calgary effective June 30. This new appointment brings the total number of justices of the peace in Alberta to 43. Since June 2023, Alberta’s government has made 33 judicial appointments to improve Albertans’ access to court.

“Appointing judiciary to our courts continues to be a priority as we strive to ensure Albertans have access to an efficient justice system that works better and faster. I am confident Ms. Dhaliwal will serve Albertans well. I welcome her to the Alberta Court of Justice for Calgary and congratulate her on this new role.”

Mickey Amery, Minister of Justice and Attorney General

Lawyers with at least five years at the bar are eligible to apply for appointment as a justice of the peace in Alberta. Appointments are made for a term of 10 years. Each application undergoes a thorough, independent review by both the Alberta Judicial Council and the Alberta Judicial Nominating Committee before being recommended for appointment.

“The Alberta Court of Justice congratulates Ms. Dhaliwal on her appointment as a justice of the peace. Each court appointment is a step towards ensuring timely and effective access to justice for Albertans. I am confident that her background and experience will serve her well.”

James Hunter, chief justice, Alberta Court of Justice

Syra Dhaliwal received her bachelor of laws degree from the University of Manchester, UK, in 2008, and that same year began her legal career working as a legal advocate in the Community Legal Assistance Society’s mental health law program in Vancouver. She was called to the Alberta Bar in September 2012, and then practiced law in the private sector. In November 2013, she studied mediating divorce and family conflicts at the Legal Education Society of Alberta. She most recently practiced law in Calgary in the areas of civil litigation, family law, wills and estates and real estate, from 2018 until her appointment in June 2025 as a part-time justice of the peace for the Alberta Court of Justice.

Quick facts
- Full-time and part-time justices of the peace currently sit in traffic court in Edmonton, Calgary, Medicine Hat, Red Deer, Lethbridge and Grande Prairie. Justices of the peace also sit in the Hearing Offices of Edmonton and Calgary.
- The Hearing Office in Calgary handles applications from Red Deer south to the border of the province. The Edmonton Hearing Office handles matters from north of Red Deer to the territorial border. Click for further information.
Related information
- Alberta’s government is actively recruiting justices of the peace and encourages qualified lawyers to apply. Qualified lawyers who wish to be considered for appointment can access the application form online.
Related news
- Judicial appointments increase Albertans access to court (May 14, 2025)
- Ensuring access to justice for Albertans (May 7, 2025)
- Judicial appointments increase Albertans access to justice (April 9, 2025)
- Increasing court capacity (Jan. 15, 2025)
- Strengthening Alberta’s courts (Dec. 4, 2024)
MIL OSI Canada News –
July 1, 2025

Category: Politics

Joh: Last King of Queensland

Jaws

KPop Demon Hunters

Poker Face, season two

Sirens

Sunday Too Far Away

Joh: Last King of Queensland

Jaws

KPop Demon Hunters

Poker Face, season two

Sirens

Sunday Too Far Away

Not everyone has access to these drugs

Haven’t people already been ‘cured’?

How about the ‘breakthrough’ I’ve heard about?

So where does that leave us?

Not everyone has access to these drugs

Haven’t people already been ‘cured’?

How about the ‘breakthrough’ I’ve heard about?

So where does that leave us?

Shifting US spheres of influence

Russia and China poles emerging elsewhere

Strategic hedging

A future defined by regional power blocs?

Shifting US spheres of influence

Russia and China poles emerging elsewhere

Strategic hedging

A future defined by regional power blocs?

IMF Communications Department

MEDIA RELATIONS

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office summons Georgian Chargé d’Affaires – 30 June 2025

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