Category: Politics

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on strengthening rural areas in the EU through cohesion policy – A10-0092/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on strengthening rural areas in the EU through cohesion policy

    (2024/2105(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Commission report of 27 March 2024 entitled ‘The long-term vision for the EU’s rural areas: key achievements and ways forward’ (COM(2024)0450),

     having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on EU border regions: living labs of European integration[1],

     having regard to its resolution of 8 May 2025 on the ninth report on economic and social cohesion[2],

     having regard to the opinion of the European Committee of the Regions of 15 March 2023 on targets and tools for a smart rural Europe[3],

     having regard to the opinion of the European Committee of the Regions of 1 December 2022 on enhancing Cohesion Policy support for regions with geographic and demographic handicaps  (Article 174 TFEU)[4],

     having regard to Articles 39, 174, 175 and 349 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

     having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027[5],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulations (EC) No 401/2009 and (EU) 2018/1999 (‘European Climate Law’)[6],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 establishing rules on support for strategic plans to be drawn up by Member States under the common agricultural policy (CAP Strategic Plans) and financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1305/2013 and (EU) No 1307/2013[7],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/2116 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 on the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013[8],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy[9],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/694 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the Digital Europe Programme and repealing Decision (EU) 2015/2240[10],

     having regard to the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 240/2014 of 7 January 2014 on the European code of conduct on partnership in the framework of the European Structural and Investment Funds[11],

     having regard to Principle 20 of the European Pillar of Social Rights on access to essential services,

     having regard to its resolution of 4 April 2017 on women and their roles in rural areas[12],

     having regard to its resolution of 8 March 2022 on the role of cohesion policy in promoting innovative and smart transformation and regional ICT connectivity[13],

     having regard to its resolution of 13 December 2022 on a long-term vision for the EU’s rural areas – towards stronger, connected, resilient and prosperous rural areas by 2040[14],

     having regard to its resolution of 23 November 2023 on harnessing talent in Europe’s regions[15],

     having regard to the Commission communication of 27 March 2024 on the 9th Cohesion Report (COM(2024)0149),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 30 June 2021 entitled ‘A long-term Vision for the EU’s Rural Areas – Towards stronger, connected, resilient and prosperous rural areas by 2040’ (COM(2021)0345),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 19 February 2025 entitled ‘A Vision for Agriculture and Food – Shaping together an attractive farming and agri-food sector for future generations (COM(2025)0075),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 3 May 2022 entitled ‘Putting people first, securing sustainable and inclusive growth, unlocking the potential of the EU’s outermost regions’ (COM(2022)0198),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 25 March 2021 on an action plan for the development of organic production (COM(2021)0141),

     having regard to the Commission report of 17 June 2020 on the impact of demographic change (COM(2020)0241),

     having regard to the Commission green paper of 27 January 2021 on ageing – fostering solidarity and responsibility between generations (COM(2021)0050),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 20 May 2020 entitled ‘A Farm to Fork Strategy for a fair, healthy and environmentally-friendly food system’ (COM(2020)0381),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 20 May 2020 entitled ‘EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030 – Bringing nature back into our lives’ (COM(2020)0380),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 17 November 2021 entitled ‘EU Soil Strategy for 2030 – Reaping the benefits of healthy soils for people, food, nature and climate’ (COM(2021)0699),

     having regard to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas, adopted by the Human Rights Council on 28 September 2018,

     having regard to general recommendation No 34 (2016) of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on the rights of rural women, adopted on 7 March 2016,

     having regard to its resolution of 3 May 2022 on the EU action plan for organic agriculture[16],

     having regard to the study commissioned by Parliament’s Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development entitled ‘The future of the European Farming Model: Socio-economic and territorial implications of the decline in the number of farms and farmers in the EU’, published by the Policy Department for Structural and Cohesion Policies in April 2022,

     having regard to its resolution of 24 March 2022 on the need for an urgent EU action plan to ensure food security inside and outside the EU in light of the Russian invasion of Ukraine[17],

     having regard to its resolution of 3 October 2018 on addressing the specific needs of rural, mountainous and remote areas[18],

     having regard to its resolution of 9 June 2021 on the EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030: Bringing nature back into our lives[19],

     having regard to the Commission report of August 2019 entitled ‘Evaluation of the impact of the CAP on generational renewal, local development and jobs in rural areas’[20],

     having regard to the opinion of the European Committee of the Regions of 26 January 2022 entitled ‘A long-term vision for the EU’s rural areas’[21],

     having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 19 February 2025 entitled ‘How post-27 LEADER and CLLD programming could contribute to better implementation of the long-term vision for the EU’s rural areas’[22],

     having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 23 March 2022 entitled ‘Long-term Vision for the EU’s Rural Areas’[23],

     having regard to its resolution of 19 October 2023 on generational renewal in the EU farms of the future[24],

     having regard to Enrico Letta’s report on the future of the single market, published in April 2024,

     having regard to the study requested by Parliament’s Committee on Regional Development, entitled ‘EU Cohesion Policy in non-urban areas’, published by the Policy Department for Structural and Cohesion Policies in September 2020,

     having regard to the declaration on the future of rural areas and rural development policy in the European Union, adopted by the Rural Pact Coordination Group on 12 December 2024,

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Regional Development (A10-0092/2025),

    A. whereas, currently, 137 million European citizens – nearly one in three – live in rural areas, which account for approximately 83 % of the EU’s territory; whereas one third of the population of rural areas lives in a border region; whereas 77 % of land used for farming (134 million hectares) and 79 % of forest (148 million hectares) are located in rural areas;

    B. whereas according to Eurostat, average income in rural areas is 87.5 % of average income in urban areas;

    C. whereas there are still disparities in cohesion policy funding between urban and rural areas, with urban areas receiving three times more cohesion funding than rural areas[25];

    D. whereas since 1991, in rural areas, the LEADER method, subsequently covered by the community-led local development policy instrument (CLLD) through local action groups (LAGs), has demonstrated that it can mobilise and empower local actors around innovative and tailored strategies;

    E. whereas rural areas are a cornerstone of the European economy, home to many ‘hidden European Champions’, and are integral to Europe’s cultural diversity; whereas they are essential for food production and security, serving as guardians of our landscapes, living rural heritage, social and cultural traditions; whereas they play a key role in promoting the strategic autonomy of the EU through the agricultural sector, which remains a strategic priority of the EU; whereas rural areas symbolise many of the aspects that make Europe attractive and liveable;

    F. whereas the promotion of minority languages can enhance awareness of local specificities, increasing the attractiveness of tourism and fostering economic activities linked to culture, education, craftsmanship and traditional products;

    G. whereas the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted a shift in perception among the public, who have recognised the potential of rural areas as a solution to the challenges arising from crises by providing a safer, more sustainable and reliable living environment;

    H. whereas cohesion policy funds alone cannot answer the increasing needs and challenges faced by rural areas in the EU; whereas greater synergies and complementarities with other EU policies, in particular with the common agricultural policy (CAP), must be ensured in order to maximise the impact of investments in rural areas, advancing the modernisation of agriculture and the development of essential services and infrastructure;

    I. whereas over 40 % of land in rural areas is used for agriculture yet sadly the contribution of agriculture, forestry and fisheries to rural regions has decreased, both in economic and employment terms, to 12 % of all jobs and 4 % of gross value added;

    J. whereas Parliament’s study on the future of the European farming model notes that the EU could lose 6.4 million farms by 2040, falling from 10.3 million in 2016 to 3.9 million;

    K. whereas, in accordance with Articles 174, 175 and 349 TFEU, the EU aims to reduce development gaps between the different regions and coordinate its policies, including using the European Structural and Investment Funds to achieve the objectives of economic, social and territorial cohesion, with a particular focus on rural areas;

    L. whereas all regions must remain eligible for funding in future cohesion policy, even strong regions facing significant transformation challenges;

    M. whereas regional actors have a deeper understanding of which projects should be prioritised for support through cohesion funds, ensuring that resources are allocated in a way that best meets the specific needs of their territories;

    N. whereas cohesion policy funds to rural areas should be further simplified with the objective of reducing administrative burdens, not only for the final beneficiaries but also for the relevant authorities, thereby also contributing to increased absorption rates;

    O. whereas rural areas in particular are facing demographic and structural challenges, such as ageing, population decline, brain drain, growing inequalities between men and women, disparities with urban areas, structural changes in the agricultural and forestry sectors, the consequences of natural disasters, the increase of energy and transport prices, a lack of services and infrastructure, in particular for vulnerable people and persons with disabilities, the impact of these challenges on income level and on the labour market, with a consequent higher unemployment rate, and a persistently large digital gap;

    P. whereas demographic challenges are particularly acute in the EU farming population, with the majority of farmers being over 50 years old;

    Q. whereas strengthening cohesion in rural areas requires the adoption of measures and initiatives aimed at supporting families, also by helping young people and parents in balancing family and professional life, thereby contributing to the sustainable development of those communities;

    R. whereas Europe’s rural areas and European farmers already play a crucial role in the climate transition, as they are the most affected by climate change both economically and socially, and whereas thanks to their efforts, some of the adverse impact of agriculture on the environment has been significantly reduced over the years; whereas the EU agricultural sector significantly reduced its greenhouse gas emissions by 24 % between 1990 and 2021 and it is responsible for 72 % of renewable energy production and holds 78 % of the untapped potential;

    S. whereas demographic changes do not affect all countries and regions equally, but have a greater impact on less developed regions, as they exacerbate existing territorial and social imbalances; whereas solutions must be found for regional imbalances and for the uneven pace of convergence between regions, some of which remain stuck in a development trap; whereas less developed regions require particular attention and support, as is the case with the EU’s rural areas and the outermost regions, due to their specific characteristics;

    T. whereas the overall percentage of the population living in rural areas has fallen significantly across the EU over the past 50 years, particularly as a result of ageing and emigration; whereas the highest percentage of people over the age of 65 is found in rural areas[26]; whereas estimates suggest that by 2033 the population of Europe’s rural areas will have shrunk by 30 million people compared with 1993;

    U. whereas the lack of or poor access to healthcare, water services, affordable housing, transport, digital infrastructure, education, financial services and recreational and cultural activities worsen the reputation of regions, and particularly rural, borderland, inland, cross-border, mountainous, insular and outermost regions, as places to live and work, especially for women, young people, ageing populations and minorities; whereas cross-border areas are particularly affected by the lack of regional connectivity in terms of transport and digital infrastructure; whereas rural areas are strongly affected by the lack of stable employment opportunities, which forces young people, in particular women, to migrate;

    V. whereas the availability and quality of water play a critical role in ensuring equitable, sustainable and productive rural livelihoods;

    W. whereas greater emphasis should be placed on preventive measures to strengthen the resilience of Europe’s rural areas to natural disasters; whereas an integrated approach to water resources management is essential both to prevent floods and to cope with droughts, in particular through a coherent use of EU funds;

    X. whereas rural areas, especially in eastern, southern and Mediterranean Europe, are the most directly affected by energy poverty and face specific challenges related to desertification, forest fires, climate change and its associated asymmetrical risks, water resource scarcity and weak infrastructure, which require a targeted approach within cohesion policy;

    Y. whereas rural areas are home to the majority of the EU’s biodiversity, yet protected habitats and species remain in poor conservation status and continue to decline due to climate change and the degradation of soil and water quality, with a negative impact on natural resources; whereas biodiversity loss has severe economic consequences for the agricultural sector and negatively affects the attractiveness of rural tourism;

    Z. whereas the clean energy transition, the diversification of the economy and the expansion of renewable energy sources present significant opportunities for rural and less developed regions, allowing them to leverage their natural resources and geographic advantages and to exploit their full potential for the future production of renewable energy;

    AA. whereas these areas bear the brunt of depopulation, and whereas it is mainly young people leaving them as a result of job shortages and dim career prospects, and this fuels the rural exodus, resulting in an increased share of older residents and a greater risk of social isolation;

    AB. whereas rural areas have the highest share (12.6 %) of young people aged 15-29[27] not in employment, education or training (NEETs);

    AC. whereas generational renewal is one of the nine key objectives of the CAP;

    AD. whereas farms, dairy farms, wine-growers and olive oil producers across Europe go out of business every day, and few farms like these are managed by farmers below the age of 35; whereas the ambitious goals of the green transition entail opportunities and also risks for economic, social and territorial cohesion, as well as for European agriculture;

    AE. whereas the way we produce food has shaped the landscapes that define Europe; whereas dynamic rural areas foster quality food production which in turn supports their economy; whereas reinvigorating these connections between food and territory and revitalising rural areas will be essential for the future of farming in Europe;

    AF. whereas a robust cohesion policy is essential to guaranteeing the effective application of the ‘right to stay’ principle in rural areas, which requires action on many levels, including by fostering economic stability and preventing depopulation; stresses that ensuring access to a basic set of public goods and services for all citizens, especially young people, regardless of where they live, is crucial; whereas it is necessary, to this end, to promote targeted investment in infrastructure, services, education, and innovation;

    1. Welcomes the Commission report of 27 March 2024 entitled ‘The long-term vision for the EU’s rural areas: key achievements and ways forward’ and agrees with its overarching objectives;

    2. Takes note of the four areas of action underpinning the rural vision and the 30 actions making up the EU rural action plan; calls on the Commission and the Member States to place its implementation at the top of the agenda;

    3. Stresses the key role rural areas have to play in shaping the economic models and the social and territorial organisation of the various Member States, particularly as the cradle of agricultural and food production, but also as custodians of an irreplaceable cultural and landscape heritage; notes, however, that their significance remains under-appreciated and inadequately funded; believes that the EU has a duty to push for a true revival and regeneration of these areas, going to extra lengths to endow our rural areas with the right tools to overcome the considerable long-term challenges they are facing and which are having an ever greater impact on regional competitiveness and social cohesion, in order to preserve European diversity and ensure that the Union’s progress does not come at the expense of rural areas and their populations;

    4. Considers it important to develop short supply chains and to promoting the use of labelling schemes to acknowledge the quality and variety of traditional products from rural areas; stresses that public canteens, such as school and hospital canteens, can play a significant role in the development of short agrifood supply chains;

    5. Recognises the key role of small and medium-sized towns as development centres in rural regions and calls on the Commission and the Member States to specifically strengthen their economic, social and infrastructural functions, revitalise city centres, better utilise synergies between rural areas and large metropolitan regions, and ensure more balanced territorial development;

    6. Stresses the urgent need for measures to combat poverty in rural areas by developing targeted strategies to improve social security, create economic opportunities, and support particularly vulnerable populations, in order to break the cycle of poverty;

    7. Stresses that rural areas are key players in mitigating the effects of climate change; emphasises the need for increased investment in research and innovation for rural areas, particularly in the fields of sustainable agriculture, renewable energy, digital transformation and innovative mobility solutions, to enhance the competitiveness and resilience of rural regions and create energy self-sufficiency and new employment opportunities; encourages the sustainable management of forests and the prevention of forest fires, also by promoting the use of biomass which is gathered without harm to forest ecosystems;

    8. Calls for the expansion of renewable energy in rural areas based on their potential to reduce energy costs with the involvement of civil society and local communities; emphasises the need for financial incentives, measures such as renewable energy communities and simplified administrative processes to boost regional energy independence and sustainability while avoiding negative impacts on food production, land availability and prices, as well as on social cohesion; calls for a dedicated financing mechanism for the installation of photovoltaic, wind and other renewable energy sources;

    9. Calls for increased support for the preservation, restoration and conversion of older buildings, including historical buildings, churches and other places of worship, sports halls and schools in rural areas to improve energy efficiency, sustainability and safety; urges investments in the modernisation of public infrastructure while preserving historical structures where possible; calls on the Commission and the Member States to promote targeted policies that support the renovation and energy-efficient retrofitting of rural housing, financial incentives for first-time rural homebuyers, in particular for young people and families, and the development of sustainable and affordable housing projects adapted to the needs of local communities that contribute to the attractiveness and revitalisation of these regions;

    10. Asks the Commission to assess and to implement Article 174, 175 and 349 TFEU in full to close the development gap among regions, including in relation to infrastructure, and to see to it that all EU policies not only apply the ‘do no harm to cohesion’ principle, but also that they follow a more assertive ‘promote cohesion’ approach wherever possible, particularly in rural areas and in areas particularly affected by industrial transition, demographic challenges and depopulation, and those at risk of depopulation, such as outermost regions, islands, border, cross-border and mountain regions;

    11. Calls on the Commission to devise a rural strategy for the post-2027 programming period; urges the Commission and the Member States to ensure the incorporation of a rural dimension in relevant policies and to make sure that the strategy promotes the economic and social development of rural areas and to allocate specific resources to the modernisation of agriculture, supporting rural small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and start-up and promoting short supply chains in order to make rural areas more connected, competitive, resilient and attractive to young people and investors, thereby ensuring balanced and sustainable development in the long term and enhancing the quality of life; stresses, in this regard, the importance of having a truly effective rural proofing mechanism at EU level so to assess the potential of all relevant policies and to mitigate any possible negative impacts they may have on rural areas;

    12. Stresses that in order to ensure the long-term prosperity of rural areas and support a strong agricultural sector to maintain this prosperity in rural areas, it is essential to strengthen the synergies between EU Structural and Investment Funds and Horizon Europe, the EU’s flagship research and innovation programme, and the CAP in the next multiannual financial framework (MFF);

    13. Calls on the Commission to present, by 2027, a report on the application of the rural proofing mechanism to policies and interventions at EU level, as well as the results obtained;

    14. Calls on the Commission to prioritise focused investments and policy measures to support the transition to a new generation of farmers in order to modernise EU agriculture and create more opportunities in rural areas;

    15. Highlights the crucial role of cohesion policy for the development of rural areas as a decentralised, powerful tool for economic and social development, allowing all regions to tackle these specific challenges of the Union; underlines in this regard that cohesion policy should continue to be a key pillar of the MFF post-2027, with an allocation that is maintained at a minimum threshold equivalent to the current MFF 2021-2027 levels, ensuring its fundamental role in reducing regional disparities and shaping a more resilient and competitive Europe that leaves no one behind; calls for the option of providing adequate resources for rural and mountainous areas to be explored in the next cohesion policy framework and complementing GDP at regional level with other indicators; recalls that the fundamental principles of cohesion policy, such as partnership, multi-level-governance, a place-based approach and shared management, must be respected in order to foster development and to meet the specific needs and challenges of rural areas with a particular focus on tools supporting sustainable growth and development and youth and female employment, including among victims of violence against women, and improving services and infrastructure;

    16. Believes that smart specialisation and economic diversification strategies could promote more opportunities in rural areas; emphasises, in particular, the key importance of integrating the concept of smart villages into cohesion policy and of explicitly supporting the development of smart villages, with flexible funding and an integrated approach, as an innovative tool for enhancing the quality of life and revitalising rural areas and services through digital and social innovation and initiatives such as the promotion of working spaces in order to attract workers, including remote workers, and to contribute to revitalising local economies;

    17. Encourages initiatives that promote economic and social sustainability, including support for rural entrepreneurship, rural tourism and new business models based on innovation and digitalisation;

    18. Calls on the Commission to ensure a strong and holistic focus on the development of rural areas in the future cohesion policy, in such a way that all policy initiatives are consistent with the goal of reducing territorial disparities; believes it is essential to devise long-term strategies to support rural areas, centred on the principles of cohesion and sustainability and providing the necessary tools to address demographic, social and economic challenges, in order to ensure that these areas do not become forgotten places, but rather key players in Europe’s future without needing to continually depend on extraordinary measures; calls, in this regard, on the Commission to support the significant development of rural areas in the future cohesion policy, and to commit to setting up local info points and offering a platform and financial support to enable Member States to exchange information and best practice on funding possibilities, with a view to providing local authorities with effective support and assisting with resource management and the implementation of development initiatives; emphasises, furthermore, that the effective participation of regional, local and rural authorities and a strong administrative capacity are crucial for the reduction of the excessive administrative burden and complex requirements for recipients and for the effective execution of cohesion policy funds; highlights that multi-funding still appears difficult in some countries and calls on the Commission to enhance complementarities between the EAFRD and cohesion policy funds;

    19. Stresses the need for an integrated European strategy for the revitalisation of rural areas, including through the development of bio-districts, recognising their potential to diversify the rural economy by targeting fiscal, economic and social measures to maintain the active population; also highlights the value of introducing incentives for the relocation of health, education and public administration professionals, as well as the importance of partnerships between local authorities and the private sector for the creation of new jobs;

    20. Underlines that expanding integrated territorial investment (ITI) plans and unlocking their full potential could establish them as a cornerstone for integrated regional, local, and rural development; emphasises that strengthening ITIs’ role in rural areas is essential to foster territorial cohesion, enhance connectivity and drive inclusive economic growth by supporting key sectors such as agriculture, rural SMEs, tourism and renewable energy; calls, furthermore, for greater flexibility in ITI implementation, increased financial allocations and reinforced synergies with other EU funding mechanisms, including LEADER and CLLD, key instruments for fostering bottom-up participatory rural development and for keeping and restoring living and thriving local rural economies, to maximise impact and actively involve regional and local authorities and civil society in line with the partnership principle;

    21. Suggests that all relevant Directorates-General of the Commission conduct a territorial impact assessment of their respective policies at least twice per programming period; believes that these evaluations would establish a more precise baseline and identify ways to integrate the characteristics of rural areas into EU policies more effectively;

    22. Calls on the Member States to make full use of all measures supporting rural, inland, mountainous, insular and outermost regions, as well as cross-border regions and regions at the EU’s external borders, including those bordering Russia, Belarus and Ukraine which are most affected by the war, to mitigate economic disruption and to secure their future and prosperity; welcomes the new BRIDGEforEU Regulation and asks the Member States to implement it, enhancing the cooperation between cross-border regions to enable economies of scale when providing basic services and infrastructure in the rural areas affected;

    23. Stresses the diversity of the EU’s rural areas, for which the long-term vision calls for solutions that are tailored to the needs and resources of rural areas while reinforcing long-term strategies for sustainable growth; underlines in this regard the need to fully involve local and regional authorities, which are best placed to identify current challenges and needs at the regional and local levels; highlights the importance of maintaining a decentralised model for the programming and implementation of cohesion policy based on the principle of partnership and multi-level governance and a place-based bottom-up approach; calls, therefore, for the strong involvement of regional and local authorities to ensure more direct access for local and regional authorities to cohesion policy funds, reducing bureaucratic complexity and shortening disbursement times, through more streamlined procedures, intuitive digital platforms and increased technical support for local beneficiaries; proposes encouraging the use of pre-financing and advance payment schemes for small projects in rural areas;

    24. Stresses that centralisation may lead to bureaucratic inefficiencies and delays in fund absorption, ultimately reducing the effectiveness of EU investments in rural development;

    25. Highlights that the management approach to rural areas’ development policies needs to be coordinated, integrated and multi-sectoral in its implementation and that reinforcing a multi-level approach in line with the subsidiarity principle is essential to ensure its success;

    26. Highlights that resilience is essential to enable authorities at local and regional levels to mitigate, adapt to and recover from sudden challenges, ensuring community well-being, security and long-term sustainability;

    27. Calls for an adequate share of cohesion policy funding to be allocated to the border regions and calls in this regard for the European Groupings of Territorial Cooperation (EGTCs) to be granted a higher degree of autonomy in selecting projects and using funds, in particular by designating EGTCs as managing authorities for Interreg programmes, strengthening their institutional and financial capacity; recommends furthermore that EGTCs be granted a more significant role in achieving policy objective 5, namely bringing Europe closer to its citizens;

    28. Underlines the need to strengthen democratic and political participation in rural areas by promoting active civic engagement and digital tools; calls on the Commission to support initiatives that foster local democratic processes to improve cohesion between urban and rural regions;

    29. Highlights the need for rural areas to be able to provide essential high-quality services of general interest to the public to improve their livelihood and to harness their strengths to achieve sustainable development, for which they should receive sufficient financial support; underlines, to that end, the need to provide equal access, in particular to vulnerable people and people with disabilities, to all healthcare services, transport and connectivity services, including innovative mobility solutions, specific plans for affordable housing, water services, education and training services, digital infrastructure, and other basic services such as postal and banking services, ensuring their accessibility and affordability in order to guarantee proper living conditions; calls, therefore, on the Commission and the Member States to facilitate access to funding and tailored support measures for social economy initiatives that address local needs and contribute to regional development and, at the same time, to reinforce the financial support offered to rural SMEs, in particular through easing access to financial resources, cooperatives and local value chains that foster economic diversification;

    30. Stresses the strategic importance of water resources for rural areas and highlights the need to provide sufficient resources, under the cohesion policy and in rural development programmes, for maintaining and upgrading the water network; recommends, in particular, the inclusion of measures to combat leakage, improve the efficiency of supply systems and promote the sustainable use of water resources in rural areas;

    31. Regards it as essential to place greater emphasis on preventive measures to enhance the resilience of Europe’s rural areas in the face of natural disasters; believes that an integrated approach to managing water resources is paramount in order to simultaneously prevent floods and tackle drought – two growing threats in many rural regions – within both agriculture and the food sector; acknowledges that depending on the context, building dams and reservoirs or upgrading existing facilities is a priority, while striking a balance between built infrastructure and relatively low cost soft measures, not least because they can be a clean source of energy; notes that although cohesion policy already supports initiatives in this area, additional projects and increased investment are needed, in line with national and regional risk management strategies, to ensure that rural areas are better prepared for, and able to withstand, climate-related extreme weather events;

    32. Stresses the growing threat of climate risks such as natural disasters, desertification and water scarcity for many rural areas in Europe, particularly in southern Europe and in the Mediterranean basin; calls on the Commission to promote forward looking adaptation strategies at national, regional and local levels, including water management, resilient infrastructure and disaster preparedness, and calls for investments in innovative water infrastructure, such as the reuse of treated wastewater and smart irrigation systems, and the construction of reservoirs for rainwater harvesting;

    33. Notes that rural areas suffer from limited access to essential healthcare services, with a shortage of facilities and medical personnel, and therefore calls for improved access to quality healthcare, including mental health services;

    34. Calls on the Member States and local authorities to safeguard essential services that are vital to the development of rural areas by refraining from imposing economic constraints on healthcare in rural areas, as this would lead to the closure, or a fall in the number of, first-aid facilities and basic hospital structures, which should be strengthened;

    35. Calls on the Commission and Member States to develop a plan for mobile medical units and for telemedicine, the strengthening of medical services including medical spa services, community health nurses and digital health solutions and incentives for doctors working in rural and remote areas;

    36. Calls on the Commission to incorporate specific measures targeting areas identified as rural into its eHealth strategy, in order to provide local healthcare units with practical support for technological upgrades, and to promote the services such units offer; stresses that Member States should also be offered a screening programme targeting rural areas and that administrative support should also be put in place to assist with the drawing up of plans and prevention registers; calls on the Member States to take into account the particular characteristics of these areas and to encourage rural pharmacies to be set up, in order to specifically adapt pharmacy networks to a rural area, with coordination arrangements for medicines and medical devices supply, with the aim of streamlining and adapting the needs of healthcare units to the individual area; calls on the Member States to improve the provision of primary care and support services among these pharmacies termed ‘rural’;

    37. Highlights the key role that infrastructure development has to play in the economic and social growth of rural areas, given the need for transport systems, particularly public ones, with the capacity to improve connectivity and access to essential services, for energy networks, including renewables, and for suitable digital connectivity infrastructure; notes, in particular, that the quality of transport and digital connectivity should be improved so that people have easy access to labour, schools, hospitals, public services and job opportunities; underlines that road, rail and maritime transport links need to be developed or upgraded through EU co-funded programmes to reduce the isolation of rural areas, in particular from urban centres, narrowing the existing gap, and to facilitate sustainable mobility of people and goods; calls for a comprehensive strategy to improve mobility in rural areas, with a strong focus on sustainability, the expansion of charging infrastructure and the promotion of e-mobility; emphasises the need for targeted investments in public transport, shared mobility solutions and alternative transport models to ensure accessibility and connectivity for rural populations;

    38. Stresses that the digital divide between rural and urban areas remains significant, hindering equal opportunities for all residents; calls on the Commission and the Member States to accelerate investments in broadband connectivity, including 5G, better mobile coverage, high-speed internet networks, digital farming solutions and rural innovation hubs, ensuring that digital transformation benefits rural communities, while paying special attention to the regions less prepared for this transformation, including remote areas and outermost regions; stresses that these investments are crucial to enhancing productivity, supporting small farms’ entrepreneurship, facilitating remote working, accessing e-services and online teaching and ensuring that rural areas remain competitive in the digital age; stresses the need for digital literacy and vocational training initiatives to support the integration of digital technologies into the rural economy and to bridge the existing technological and economic divides;

    39. Stresses the importance and interconnectedness of military mobility, rural infrastructure development and regional security; underlines the overlap between the EU military mobility network and the Trans-European Transport Network;

    40. Calls for strategies to address vacant buildings and promote alternative housing concepts in rural areas, including affordable housing, renovation projects and intergenerational living; emphasises the need for incentives to repurpose empty properties, support community-driven housing initiatives and ensure sustainable, inclusive living spaces;

    41. Stresses the importance of promoting priority policies that support young people, as the main actors of the rural exodus, and calls on the Commission to ensure them an effective application of the ‘right to stay’ through targeted measures, designed to stem the demographic decline in rural areas and to encourage talented people to remain there; believes that individuals who wish to contribute to the development of their local communities should be provided with ample opportunities, and that it is therefore urgent to eliminate barriers and the significant disparities between young people in urban and rural areas in terms of access to high quality education, economic independence, social and political engagement, and intergenerational social interaction; calls for concrete measures and targeted funding programmes, including a brain drain action plan from the Commission, to support young people and young entrepreneurs, providing them with all the tools and resources they need to help them to access agricultural lands, jobs and business opportunities; notes that such measures should include improved access to public services, educational and cultural facilities, access to housing, low-interest loans and, with due regard to the principle of subsidiarity in fiscal matters, tax-related incentives to help young people build a stable future in line with their aspirations, without needing to abandon their place of origin, and creating incentives to settle down in or return to rural areas; considers it necessary, therefore, to promote measures to diversify the rural economy by harnessing local potential, including in areas outside agriculture and tourism, and to create quality jobs;

    42. Highlights the importance of boosting vocational education and training while also fostering youth-led initiatives and non-formal learning for young people to develop specific skills related to the economy of rural areas, as a tool for social cohesion and quality employment, with a view to combating depopulation in those areas;

    43. Highlights the key role of awareness raising and knowledge-sharing campaigns in advancing various education campaigns and programmes, and the importance of making them an integral part of school curricula; stresses the increasingly worrying data on early school leaving and to that end, calls on national and local authorities to reorganise their school systems to guarantee the right to education in their territories, bearing in mind the serious and objective difficulties they may face; calls on the Member States and local authorities, therefore, not to merge existing schools management structures in those areas;

    44. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to provide for new subsidised credit facilities that can support young entrepreneurs and women in their activities, including alternative forms of guarantees for access to credit; calls for financial support to empower young farmers, ensuring growth in rural economies;

    45. Welcomes the new EUR 3 billion loan financing package from the European Investment Bank (EIB) Group for agriculture, forestry and fisheries across Europe as a tangible initiative to close the funding gaps for SMEs in agriculture and the bio-economy and facilitate financing for young farmers and women; calls on the EIB Group to explore new forms of support to provide liquidity for actors along agricultural and rural value chains;

    46. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to promote local start-ups and incentive programmes for the return of young people and for the purchase and renovation of housing by young people in rural areas;

    47. Calls on the Commission to establish a European fund for youth entrepreneurship in rural areas, with a special focus on regions affected by high youth unemployment and brain drain; notes that this fund should support rural start-ups, innovative agriculture, sustainable tourism and digitalisation through dedicated financial instruments and tax incentives;

    48. Draws attention to the need for universal equal access to measures enabling everyone to develop the high-quality skills they need to achieve their professional goals, and to vocational and educational training; laments the fact that in rural areas, in many fields, the work of women is currently not rewarded with equal opportunities and conditions, as they often face extra challenges, including limited access to job opportunities, a lack of adequate measures to help them juggle work and family, and a shortage of childcare facilities; emphasises the need to foster an environment conducive to female employment, with support for all families, ensuring high quality early childhood education and care systems and parental support;

    49. Calls for increased support for women in rural areas, particularly through measures to improve access to employment, education, healthcare and social infrastructure, as well as protection from violence and violence prevention, to promote their economic and social participation; emphasises that targeted programmes should be created to support female entrepreneurs in rural regions in order to strengthen their economic independence;

    50. Stresses that support for women in rural areas is imperative for a variety of reasons, including promoting gender equality, fostering economic growth, advancing community development, reducing poverty and ensuring environmental sustainability; highlights that women play a multilevel role in rural development, as workers, farmers and business owners, and stresses that their importance in rural areas and local economies is often overlooked; stresses that special attention should be paid to women in rural areas when designing structural social support and regional development programmes; highlights that addressing these barriers is crucial for empowering women and unlocking their full potential in rural communities;

    51. Calls on the Member States and the Commission to boost awareness regarding existing and future EU funding possibilities for women entrepreneurs in rural areas and to make it easier for them to access financial support; encourages the Member States and regional and local authorities to make use of the existing EU structural and investment funds to promote women entrepreneurs;

    52. Calls for gender-equality employment policies and targeted measures to promote a better work-life balance in rural areas, including flexible working models, digital work opportunities, improved leisure and education offerings, and the promotion of community-based care and support structures for families;

    53. Urges the Commission to adopt measures to protect the family farming model that underpins the rural territory, is more environmentally friendly and guarantees food security in the EU; stresses the need for a EU system of incentives to limit the accumulation of agricultural land in private investment funds and the consequent increase in land prices; insists on the protection of small and medium-sized farms by strengthening the role of cooperatives and professional farmers in EU policies; furthermore, encourages the Member States to implement concrete measures to support these farms by simplifying access to credit, modernising rural infrastructure and giving impetus to agricultural cooperatives;

    54. Stresses the key role played by agriculture and the agri-food sector in food production, ensuring food security in the EU and job creation – a role worth championing since as it constitutes a mainstay of the local economy and is a key factor in ensuring sustainable land management, and also drives the growth and development of inland and rural areas, which often enjoy international recognition for their outstanding typical products; notes that it is necessary to help farmers innovate and diversify, while at the same time fostering farm competitiveness; believes that the transition to a more sustainable model requires a balanced approach, mindful of local specificities and the economic needs of rural communities, without imposing changes liable to hinder their long-term development; calls, in this regard, on the Commission and the Member States to take strong and targeted action by reducing excessive regulatory burdens and ensuring fair market conditions, to mitigate the decline in the number of farms and encourage generational renewal; calls for adequate support to promote food self-sufficiency and crop diversification; highlights in particular the specific structural challenges of the outermost regions and their rural areas;

    55. Urges the Commission and the Member States, in order to strengthen food security and ensure that European farmers do not face unfair competition from products that do not meet the same environmental, animal welfare and food security standards, to enforce strict equivalence of production standards for agricultural products imported into the EU and calls  on the Commission, in this regard, to ensure that trade agreements uphold European agricultural standards and ensure a level playing field for EU farmers;

    56. Acknowledges that the ambitious goals of the green transition entail opportunities as well as risks for EU agriculture; emphasises that the number of farms in the EU decreased between 2005 and 2020 by about 37 % and calls on the Commission and the Member States, in this regard, to take action to mitigate the decline in the number of farms and support their revenues and competitiveness, in order to stem the desertion of these areas and encourage generational renewal;

    57. Points to the need to simplify administrative procedures for accessing EU funds by reducing red tape for farmers and small rural businesses and improving coordination between the institutional levels involved in the management of funds in order to ensure that resources are provided more efficiently and in a more timely manner;

    58. Points also to the need to provide these areas, as well as businesses and farm and forest holders, with sufficient financial support, including support for the purchase and maintenance of equipment, with a view to increasing European competitiveness;

    59. Is fully aware that rural areas play a key role in the green and digital transitions; underlines that the transitions have to be implemented gradually, along the lines of achievable goals; calls in this regard for EU funding to be better linked with environmental sustainability and biodiversity protection;

    60. Highlights the need to support rural communities in European regions that have been most adversely affected by the trade in or export of Ukrainian agricultural products;

    61. Points to the importance of compensatory measures for farmers and rural businesses to ensure that the ecological transition is fair and practical and does not lead to new socio-economic disparities; highlight that for this transition to be successful, the full involvement and collaboration of all stakeholders, in particular farmers and foresters, will be key;

    62. Highlights that promoting agriculture is a necessary component of any strategy for rural development, but that on its own it is not sufficient, as not all people in rural areas are employed in the agricultural sector or live in agricultural structures;

    63. Recognises that tourism is frequently a major source of income for rural, mountainous, insular and outermost regions, as well as in the Mediterranean region, with the potential to encourage job creation and entrepreneurship and to draw in growing numbers of visitors curious to discover their nature, traditions and cultural heritage through the unique experiences on offer; believes, for that reason, that tourism should be supported through investment in the rural economy, in synergy with the agricultural, fishing, food and cultural sectors, and that the EU should promote the co-existence and further development of these sectors;

    64. Highlights that rural and agro-tourism can be a complementary activity to agriculture, offering opportunities for diversifying farm incomes and benefiting the development of rural areas, and that resources should therefore be allocated to the development of tourism and HoReCa activities;

    65. Underlines the need to promote rural tourism in a way that is sustainable; highlights the importance of optimising the economic benefits of tourism for rural areas, while minimising the potential negative impacts on local communities and ecosystems;

    66. Emphasises the importance of protecting and promoting linguistic minorities in the rural areas of the EU, recognising them as an integral part of Europe’s cultural heritage and as a driver of regional development; therefore calls on the Commission and the Member States to allocate cohesion policy resources to support projects for linguistic promotion, training, cultural tourism and local entrepreneurship connected to the linguistic and cultural traditions of the regions;

    67. Urges the Commission and the Member States to boost tourism in rural and depopulated areas or areas at risk of depopulation, by financing initiatives that enhance historic villages and traditional local products and establishing new green paths and other nature trails, as well as a label recognising outstanding environments in rural and nature tourism along similar lines to the ‘blue flag’ awarded to beaches;

    68. Notes that in some Member States, municipalities play a crucial role as drivers of regional economic development, benefiting from substantial tax revenues generated by their local economies; highlights that these revenues can motivate municipalities to invest EU cohesion funds in increasing their future tax base, promoting long-term local economic growth and securing long-term tax revenues; to this end, calls on the Commission, with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity in fiscal matters, to initiate a dialogue on the potential benefits of sharing taxes on economic activities with municipalities;

    69. Insists that excessive bureaucracy should not prevent farmers from focusing on sustainable food production and rural economic development; calls on the Commission and the Member States to include a strong rural dimension in the future cohesion policy regulations and to promote better regulation as a matter of priority, in order to reduce administrative burdens and to take steps to ensure the competitiveness of rural businesses, particularly SMEs, cooperatives and citizen-led communities, and to promote easier and more efficient access to funds, cost reductions and simplified application and evaluation processes for EU funding, especially for small beneficiaries; reaffirms that optimising procedures, cutting red tape and enhancing transparency are vital to improving access to the available resources; calls on the Commission, therefore, to provide adequate advisory services and technical assistance to managing authorities, thereby also contributing to increased absorption rates;

    70. Calls for a more integrated approach between EU industrial and cohesion policies, ensuring that regional development strategies are aligned with industrial transition efforts, particularly in northern, sparsely populated areas;

    71. Emphasises the importance of SMEs in technological sectors for rural digitalisation and economic resilience; calls on the Commission to ensure that public measures support local businesses and foster proximity-based economies, avoiding criteria that may disadvantage smaller enterprises;

    72. Stresses the need for better alignment between existing territorial development instruments and Structural Funds, including initiatives such as Harnessing Talent and the Covenant of Mayors;

    73. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility – A10-0098/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility

    (2024/2085(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     

     having regard to Article 175 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility[1] (RRF Regulation),

     having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2023/435 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 February 2023 amending Regulation (EU) 2021/241 as regards REPowerEU chapters in recovery and resilience plans and amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) 2021/1060 and (EU) 2021/1755, and Directive 2003/87/EC[2] (REPowerEU Regulation),

     having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget[3] (Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation),

     having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/765 of 29 February 2024 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027[4] (MFF Regulation),

     having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources[5] (the IIA),

     having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union[6] (Financial Regulation),

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP), and amending Directive 2003/87/EC and Regulations (EU) 2021/1058, (EU) 2021/1056, (EU) 2021/1057, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) 2021/1060, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697 and (EU) 2021/241[7],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2024 on the effective coordination of economic policies and on multilateral budgetary surveillance and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97[8],

     having regard to its resolution of 23 June 2022 on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility[9],

     having regard to the Commission notice of 22 July 2024 entitled ‘Guidance on recovery and resilience plans’[10],

     having regard to the Commission communication of 21 February 2024 on strengthening the EU through ambitious reforms and investments (COM(2024)0082),

     having regard to the Commission’s third annual report of 10 October 2024 on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (COM(2024)0474),

     having regard to the Court of Auditors’ (ECA) annual report of 10 October 2024 on the implementation of the budget for the 2023 financial year, together with the institutions’ replies,

     having regard to special report 13/2024 of the ECA of 2 September 2024 entitled ‘Absorption of funds from the Recovery and Resilience Facility – Progressing with delays and risks remain regarding the completion of measures and therefore the achievement of RRF objectives’, special report 14/2024 of the ECA of 11 September 2024 entitled ‘Green transition – Unclear contribution from the Recovery and Resilience Facility’, and special report 22/2024 of the ECA of 21 October 2024 entitled ‘Double funding from the EU budget – Control systems lack essential elements to mitigate the increased risk resulting from the RRF model of financing not linked to costs’,

     having regard to the study of December 2023 supporting the mid-term Evaluation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility,

     having regard to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) 2024 annual report published on 3 March 2025,

     having regard to the report of September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’ (Draghi report),

     having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 8 October 2024 entitled ‘Mid-term review of the post-COVID European recovery plan (Recovery and Resilience Facility)’[11],

     having regard to the information published on the Recovery and Resilience Scoreboard (RRF Scoreboard),

     having regard to the Commission staff working document of 20 November 2024 entitled ‘NGEU Green Bonds Allocation and Impact report 2024’ (SWD(2024)0275),

     having regard to its in-house research, in-depth analysis and briefings related to the implementation of the RRF[12],

     having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on the situation in Hungary and frozen EU funds[13],

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure, as well as Article 1(1)(e) of, and Annex 3 to, the decision of the Conference of Presidents of 12 December 2002 on the procedure for granting authorisation to draw up own-initiative reports,

     having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Budgetary Control, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety and the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

     having regard to the joint deliberations of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs under Rule 59 of the Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0098/2025),

     

    A. whereas the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) was created to make European economies and societies more sustainable, resilient and better prepared in the light of unprecedented crises in 2019 and 2022, by supporting Member States in financing strategic investments and in implementing reforms;

    B. whereas reforms and investments under the RRF help to make the EU more resilient and less dependent by diversifying key supply chains and thereby strengthening the strategic autonomy of the EU; whereas reforms and investments under the RRF also generate European added value;

    C. whereas the RRF, as well as other EU funds, such as the European instrument for temporary support to mitigate unemployment risks in an emergency, has helped to protect labour markets from the risk of long-term damage caused by the double economic shock of the pandemic and the energy crisis;

    D. whereas RRF expenditure falls outside the ceilings of the multiannual financial framework (MFF) and borrowing proceeds constitute external assigned revenue; whereas Parliament regrets that they do not form part of the budgetary procedure; whereas based on the Financial Regulation’s principle of transparency, citizens should know how and for what purpose funds are spent by the EU;

    E. whereas, due to the lack of progress in introducing new own resources in the EU and the need to ensure the sustainability of the EU’s repayment plan, a clear and reliable long-term funding strategy is essential to meet repayment obligations without forcing difficult trade-offs in the EU budget that could undermine future investments and policy priorities; whereas further discussions and concrete financial solutions will be necessary to secure the long-term viability of the EU’s debt repayment plan;

    F. whereas the borrowing costs for NextGenerationEU (NGEU) have to be borne by the EU budget and the actual costs exceed the 2020 projections by far as a result of the high interest rates; whereas the total costs for NGEU capital interest repayments are projected to be around EUR 25 to 30 billion per year from 2028, equivalent to 15-20 % of the 2025 annual budget; whereas Parliament has insisted that the refinancing costs be placed over and above the MFF ceilings; whereas a three-step ‘cascade mechanism’ including a new special EURI instrument was introduced during the 2024 MFF revision to cover the significant cost overruns resulting from NGEU borrowing linked to major changes in the market conditions; whereas an agreement was reached during the 2025 budgetary procedure to follow an annual 50/50 benchmark, namely to finance the overrun costs in equal shares by the special EURI instrument de-commitment compartment and the Flexibility Instrument;

    G. whereas the bonds issued to finance the RRF are to be repaid in a manner that ensures the steady and predictable reduction of liabilities, by 2058 at the latest; whereas the Council has yet to adopt the adjusted basket of new own resources proposed by the Commission, which raises concerns about the viability of the repayment of the debt undertaken under NGEU;

    H. whereas the social dimension is a key aspect of the RRF, contributing to upward economic and social convergence, restoring and promoting sustainable growth and fostering the creation of high-quality employment;

    I. whereas the RRF should contribute to financing measures to strengthen the Member States’ resilience to climate disasters, among other things, and enhance climate adaptation; whereas the Member States should conduct proper impact assessments for measures and should share best practice on the implementation of the ‘do no significant harm’ (DNSH) principle;

    J. whereas the RRF plays an important role in supporting investments and reforms in sustainable mobility, smart transport infrastructure, alternative fuels and digital mobility solutions, thus enhancing connectivity and efficiency across the EU; whereas it is regrettable that only a few Member States chose to use the RRF to support investments, particularly in high-speed railway and waterway infrastructure, aimed at developing European corridors, despite the encouragement of cross-border and multi-country projects; whereas it is crucial to increase investments in transport infrastructure, particularly in underserved regions, to improve connectivity, support regional cohesion and contribute to the green transition;

    K. whereas by 31 December 2024, Member States had submitted 95 payment requests and the level of RRF disbursements including pre-financing stood at EUR 197.46 billion in grants (55 % of the total grants envelope) and EUR 108.68 billion in loans (37 % of the total loans envelope); whereas three Member States have already received their fifth payment, while one Member State has not received any RRF funding; whereas all Member States have revised their national recovery and resilience plans (NRRP) at least once; whereas 28 % of milestones and targets have been satisfactorily fulfilled and the Commission has made use of the possibility to partially suspend payments where some milestones and targets linked to a payment request were not found to be satisfactorily fulfilled; whereas delays in the execution of planned reforms and investments, particularly in social infrastructure and public services, could lead to the underutilisation of available resources, thereby reducing the expected impact on economic growth, employment and social cohesion;

    L. whereas the ECA has revealed various shortcomings of the RRF, in particular in relation to its design, its transparency and reporting, the risk of double funding and the implementation of twin transition measures;

    M. whereas robust audit and control systems are crucial to protect the financial interests of the EU throughout the life cycle of the RRF; whereas the milestones commonly known as ‘super milestones’, in particular related to the rule of law, had to be fulfilled prior to any RRF disbursements;

    N. whereas the RRF Regulation refers to the RRF’s ‘performance-based nature’ but does not define ‘performance’; whereas RRF performance should be linked to sound financial management principles and should measure how well an EU-funded action, project or programme has met its objectives and provided value for money;

    O. whereas effective democratic control and parliamentary scrutiny over the implementation of the RRF require the full involvement of Parliament and the consideration of all its recommendations at all stages;

    P. whereas the Commission has to provide an independent ex post evaluation report on the implementation of the RRF by 31 December 2028, consisting of an assessment of the extent to which the objectives have been achieved, of the efficiency of the use of resources and of the European added value, as well as a global assessment of the RRF, and containing information on its impact in the long term;

    Q. whereas the purpose of this report is to monitor the implementation of the RRF, in accordance with Parliament’s role as laid down in the RRF Regulation, by pointing to the benefits and shortcomings of the RRF, while drawing on the lessons learnt during its implementation;

    Strengthening Europe’s social and economic resilience

     

    1. Highlights the fact that the RRF is an unprecedented instrument of solidarity in the light of two unprecedented crises and a cornerstone of the NGEU instrument, ending in 2026; emphasises the importance of drawing lessons from its implementation for the upcoming MFF, including as regards transparency, reporting and coherent measurement of deliverables; highlights the stabilising effect of the RRF for Member States at a time of great economic uncertainty, as it mitigates negative economic and social consequences and supports governments by contributing to the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights, by promoting economic recovery and competitiveness, boosting resilience and innovation, and by supporting the green and digital transitions;

    2. Highlights the important role of the RRF in preventing the fragmentation of the internal market and the further deepening of macroeconomic divergence, in fostering social and territorial cohesion by providing macroeconomic stabilisation, and in offering assurance to the financial markets by improving investor confidence in turbulent times, thereby lowering yield spreads;

    3. Welcomes the fact that the RRF is a one-off instrument providing additional fiscal space that has contributed to the prevention of considerable economic and social divergences between Member States with diverse fiscal space; highlights the Commission finding that the RRF has led to a sustained increase in investments across the EU and that the Commission expects the RRF to have a lasting impact across the EU beyond 2026, given its synergies with other EU funds; is, however, concerned that the RRF expiration in 2026 poses a significant risk of a substantial decline in public investment in common European priorities;

    4. Recalls that the MFF and RRF combined amount to almost EUR 2 trillion for the 2021-2027 programming period, but points to the fact that the high inflation rates and the associated increases in the cost of goods and services have decreased the current value of European spending agreed in nominal terms;

    5. Takes note of the Commission’s projection in 2024 concerning the potential of NGEU’s impact on the EU’s real gross domestic product (GDP) by 2026, which is significantly lower than its simulation in 2020 (1.4 % compared with 2.3 %), due in part to adverse economic and geopolitical conditions, and of the estimation that NGEU could lead to a sizeable, short-run increase in EU employment by up to 0.8 %; notes that the  long-term benefits of the RRF on GDP will likely exceed the budgetary commitments undertaken by up to three to six times , depending on the productivity effects of RRF investment and the diligent implementation of reforms and investments;

    6. Highlights the difficulty of quantifying the precise social and economic impact of the RRF, as it takes time for the impact of reforms and investments to become clear; stresses the need for further independent evaluations to assess the effective impact of reforms and investments and for further improvements of the underlying methodology; notes the Commission’s finding that approximately half of the expected increase in public investment between 2019 and 2025 is related to investment financed by the EU budget, particularly by the RRF, but notes that some investments have not yet delivered measurable impact;

    7. Notes that the RRF has incentivised the implementation of some reforms included in the country-specific recommendations made in the context of the European Semester through the inclusion of such reforms in the NRRPs; underlines that there has been a qualitative leap forward in terms of monitoring RRF implementation; recalls that the RRF Scoreboard is used to monitor the progress made towards achieving milestones and targets, as well as compliance with horizontal principles, and in particular the six pillars, namely the green transition, the digital transformation, smart, sustainable and inclusive growth (including economic cohesion, jobs, productivity, competitiveness, research, development and innovation, and a well-functioning internal market with strong small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)), social and territorial cohesion, health, economic, social and institutional resilience with the aim of, inter alia, increasing crisis preparedness and crisis response capacity, and policies for the next generation, children and young people, such as education and skills; highlights that the overall uptake of country-specific recommendations made in the context of the European Semester remains low and has even dropped;

    8. Highlights that in the context of the new economic governance framework, the set of reforms and investments underpinning an extension of the adjustment period should be consistent with the commitments included in the approved NRRPs during the period of operation of the RRF and the Partnership Agreement under the Common Provisions Regulation[14]; observes that the five Member States that requested an extension of the adjustment period by 31 December 2024 relied partly on the reforms and investments already approved under the RRF to justify the extension; takes note of the fact that most Member States have included information on whether the reforms and investments listed in the medium-term fiscal-structural plans are linked to the RRF;

    9. Welcomes the fact that the RRF provides support for both reforms and investments in the Member States, but notes with concern that the short timeframe for the remaining RRF implementation poses challenges to the completion of key reforms and large-scale investments that are to be finalised towards the end of the RRF and to the timely fulfilment of the 70 % of milestones and targets that are still pending;

    10. Recalls that RRF expenditure should not substitute recurring national budgetary expenditure, unless duly justified, and should respect the principle of additionality of EU funding; insists that the firm, sustainable and verifiable implementation of non-recurrence, together with the targeting of clearly defined European objectives of reforms and investments, is key to ensure additionality and the long-lasting effect of additional European funds; recalls the need to uphold this principle and appeals against the crowding out or replacement of cohesion policy by the RRF or other temporary instruments, as cohesion policy remains essential for long-term sustainable territorial cohesion and convergence;

    11. Highlights that prioritising RRF implementation, the lack of administrative capacity in many Member States and challenges posed by global supply chains have contributed to the delayed implementation of cohesion policy; calls on the Commission, in this context, to provide a comprehensive assessment of the RRF’s impact on other financial instruments and public investments, technical support, and the administrative and absorption capacities of the Member States;

    12. Recalls that, in reaction to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the REPowerEU revision contributes to Europe’s energy security by reducing its dependence on fossil fuels, diversifying its energy supplies, investing in European resources and infrastructure, tackling energy poverty and investing in energy savings and efficiency in all sectors, including transport; emphasises that through REPowerEU, an additional EUR 20 billion in grants was made available in 2023, including EUR 8 billion generated from the front-loading of Emissions Trading System allowances and EUR 12 billion from the Innovation Fund; highlights Parliament’s successes in negotiations, in particular on the provisions on replenishing the Innovation Fund, the 30 % funding target for cross-border projects, the focus of investments on tackling energy poverty for vulnerable households, SMEs and micro-enterprises, and the flexible use of unspent cohesion funds from the 2014-2020 MFF and of up to 7.5 % of national allocations under the 2021-2027 MFF;

    13. Recalls its call to focus RRF interventions on measures with European added value and therefore regrets the shortage of viable cross-border or multi-country measures, including high-speed railway and sustainable mobility infrastructure projects for dual use that are essential for completing the TEN-T network, and the related risk of re-nationalising funding; notes that the broad scope of the RRF objectives has contributed to this by allowing a wide variety of nationally focused projects to fall within its remit;

    14. Highlights the modification of Article 27 of the RRF Regulation through REPowerEU, which significantly strengthened the cross-border and multi-country dimensions of the RRF by encouraging the Member States to amend their NRRPs to add RepowerEU chapters, including a spending target of at least 30 % for such measures in order to guarantee the EU’s energy autonomy; is concerned by the broad interpretation adopted by the Commission, which allows any reduction in (national) energy demand to make a case for a cross-border and multi-country dimension;

    15. Welcomes the possibility of using RRF funding to contribute to the objectives of the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP) by supporting investments in critical technologies in the EU in order to boost its industrial competitiveness; notes that no Member State has made use of the possibility to include in its NRRP an additional cash contribution to STEP objectives via the Member State compartment of InvestEU; recalls that Member States can still amend their national plans in that regard; expects the revision processes to be efficient, streamlined and simple, especially considering the final deadline of 2026, the current geopolitical context and the need to invest in European defence capabilities;

    16. Recalls the application of the DNSH principle for all reforms and investments supported by the RRF, with a targeted derogation under REPowerEU for energy infrastructure and facilities needed to meet immediate security of supply needs; encourages the Commission to assess the feasibility of a more uniform interpretation of the DNSH principle between the RRF and the EU taxonomy for sustainable activities, while taking into account the specificities of the RRF as a public expenditure programme;

    Financial aspects of the RRF

     

    17. Stresses that the RRF is the first major performance-based instrument at EU level which is exclusively based on financing not linked to costs (FNLC); recalls that Article 8 of the RRF Regulation stipulates that the RRF must be implemented by the Commission in direct management in accordance with the relevant rules adopted pursuant to Article 322 TFEU, in particular the Financial Regulation and the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation; regrets that the Council did not agree to insert specific rules in the Financial Regulation to address the risks of this delivery model, such as double funding; considers that the rules of the Financial Regulation should be fully applicable to future instruments based on FNLC, including as regards fines, penalties and sanctions;

    18. Notes that only 13 Member States have requested loans and that EUR 92 billion of the EUR 385.8 billion available will remain unused since this amount was not committed by the deadline of 31 December 2023; takes note of the fact that loans were attractive for Member States that faced higher borrowing costs on the financial markets or that sought to compensate for a reduction in RRF grants; points out that some Member States have made limited use of RRF loans, either due to strong fiscal positions or administrative considerations; calls on the Commission to analyse the reasons for the low uptake in some Member States and to consider these findings when designing future EU financial instruments; notes with concern that national financial instruments to implement the NRRPs have not been sufficiently publicised, leading to limited awareness and uptake by potential beneficiaries; considers that a political discussion is needed on the use of unspent funds in the light of tight public budgets and urgent EU strategic priorities; calls for an assessment of how and under which conditions unused RRF funds could be redirected to boost Europe’s competitiveness, resilience, defence, and social, economic and territorial cohesion, particularly through investments in digital and green technologies aligned with the RRF’s original purpose;

    19. Recalls the legal obligation to ensure full repayment of NGEU expenditure by 31 December 2058 at the latest; reminds the Council and the Commission of their legal commitment under the interinstitutional agreement concluded in 2020 to ensure a viable path to refinancing NGEU debt, including through sufficient proceeds from new own resources introduced after 2021 without any undue reduction in programme expenditure or investment instruments under the MFF; deplores the lack of progress made in this regard, which raises concerns regarding the viability of the repayment of the debt undertaken under NGEU, and urges the Council to adopt new own resources without delay and as a matter of urgency; urges the Commission, furthermore, to continue efforts to identify additional genuine new own resources beyond the IIA and linked to EU policies, in order to cover the high spending needs associated with the funding of new priorities and the repayment of NGEU debt;

    20. Notes with concern the Commission’s estimation that the total cost for NGEU capital interest repayments are projected to be around EUR 25 to 30 billion per year from 2028, equivalent to 15-20 % of the 2025 annual budget ; recalls that recourse to special instruments had to be made in the last three budgetary procedures to cover EURI instrument costs; highlights that the significant increase in financing costs puts pressure on the future EU budget and limits the capacity to respond to future challenges;

    21. Takes note of the Commission’s target to fund up to 30 % of NGEU costs by issuing greens bonds; notes that by 31 December 2024 the Commission had issued European green bonds amounting to EUR 68.2 billion;

    Design and implementation of NRRPs

     

    22. Notes that 47 % of the available RRF funds had been disbursed by 31 December 2024, with grants reaching 55 % and loans 37 %, which has resulted in a high proportion of measures still to be completed in 2025 and 2026; is concerned, however, about the ECA’s finding that only 50 % of disbursed funds had reached final beneficiaries in 15 out of 22 Member States by October 2023; calls on the Commission to take the recommendations of the ECA duly into account in order to improve the functioning of any future performance-based instruments similar to the RRF, in particular in the context of a more targeted MFF;

    23. Welcomes the fact that all Member States have surpassed the targets for the green (37 %) and the digital transitions (20 %), with average expenditure towards climate and digital objectives of the RRF as a whole standing at 42 % and 26 % respectively; notes that the ECA has cast doubt on how the implementation of RRF measures has contributed to the green transition and has recommended improvements to the methodologies used to estimate the impact of climate-related measures; highlights the fact that the same methodological deficiencies exist across all pillars of the RRF;

    24. Notes the tangible impact that the RRF could have on social objectives, with Member States planning to spend around EUR 163 billion; underlines that such spending must be result-oriented, ensuring measurable economic and/or social benefits; stresses the need to accelerate investments in the development of rural, peripheral and outermost, isolated and remote areas, and in the fields of affordable housing, social protection and the integration of vulnerable groups, and youth employment, where expenditure is lagging behind; calls for an in-depth evaluation by the Commission, under the RRF Scoreboard, of the projects and reforms related to education and young people implemented by Member States under the RRF; regrets the delayed implementation of health objectives observed in certain Member States, given that the instrument should also improve the accessibility and capacity of health systems, and of key social infrastructure investments, including early childhood education and care facilities; stresses that these delays, in some cases linked to shifting budgetary priorities and revised national implementation timelines, risk undermining the achievement of the RRF’s social cohesion objectives;

    25. Reiterates its negotiating position to include targets for education (10 %) and for cultural activities (2 %); encourages the Commission’s effort to evaluate these targets as a benchmark in its assessment of education policy in NRRPs, through the RRF Scoreboard;

    26. Observes that a large majority of NRRPs include a specific section explaining how the plan addresses gender-related concerns and challenges; is concerned, however, that some NRRPs do not include an explanation of how the measures in the NRRP are expected to contribute to gender equality and equal opportunities for all and calls on the Member States concerned to add such explanations without delay;

    27. Stresses the importance of reforms focusing on labour market fragmentation, fostering quality working conditions, addressing wage level inequalities, ensuring decent living conditions, and strengthening social dialogue, social protection and the social economy;

    28. Notes the tangible impact that the RRF could have on the digital transformation objective, with EUR 166 billion allocated to corresponding plans; welcomes the contributions made under the smart, sustainable and inclusive growth pillar, in particular to competitiveness and support for SMEs; notes the need for an acceleration of investments in transnational cooperation, support for competitive enterprises leading innovation projects, and regulatory changes for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, which are lagging behind;

    29. Stresses that the success of EU investments depends on well-functioning capital markets; calls on the Member States to ensure a more effective and timely disbursement of funds, particularly for SMEs and young entrepreneurs, to streamline application procedures with a view to enhancing accessibility and to implement specific measures to provide targeted support to help them play a more prominent role in the process of smart and inclusive growth;

    30. Is concerned that the achievement of milestones and targets lags behind the indicative timetable provided in the NRRPs, and that the pace of progress is uneven across Member States; regrets the time lag between the fulfilment of milestones and targets and the implementation of projects; highlights that the RRF will only achieve its long-term and short-term potential if the reform and investment components, respectively, are properly implemented; welcomes the fact that, following a slow start, RRF implementation has picked up since the second half of 2023 but significant delays affecting key reforms and investments still persist and have been attributed to various factors, including the revisions linked to the inclusion of REPowerEU, mounting inflation, the insufficient administrative capacity of Member States, in particular the smaller Member States, uncertainties regarding specific RRF implementation rules, high energy costs, supply shortages and an underestimation of the time needed to implement measures; notes that the postponement of key implementation deadlines by some governments to 2026 raises concerns about the capacity of some Member States to fully absorb the allocated funds within the set timeframe of the RRF; stresses the importance of maintaining a realistic and effective implementation schedule to prevent the risk of incomplete projects and missed opportunities for structural improvements; calls on the Commission to ensure that administrative bottlenecks are urgently addressed;

    31. Recalls the modification of the RRF Regulation through the inclusion of the REPowerEU chapter; stresses the importance of the REPowerEU chapters in NRRPs and calls on the Member States to prioritise mature projects and implement their NRRPs more quickly, both in terms of reforms and investments, and, where necessary, to adjust NRRPs in line with the RRF’s objectives, without undermining the overall balance and level of ambition of the NRRPs, in order to respond to challenges stemming from geopolitical events and to tackle current realities on the ground;

    32. Highlights the fact that the RRF could have helped to mitigate the effects of the current EU-wide housing crisis; regrets that some Member States did not make use of this opportunity and stresses the importance for the Member States to accelerate investments in availability and affordability of housing;

    33. Highlights the role of ‘super milestones’ in protecting the EU’s financial interests against rule of law deficiencies and in ensuring the full implementation of the requirements under Article 22 of the RRF Regulation; welcomes the fact that all but one Member State have satisfactorily fulfilled their ‘super milestones’; recalls that the Commission must recover any pre-financing that has not been netted against regular payment requests by the end of the RRF;

    34. Notes the high administrative burden and complexity brought by the RRF; stresses the considerable efforts required at national level to implement the RRF in parallel with structural funds; notes that between 2021 and 2024 the demand-driven Technical Support Instrument supported more than 500 RRF-related reforms in the Member States, directly or indirectly related to the preparation, amendment, revision and implementation of the NRRPs; takes note of the Commission guidance of July 2024 with simplifications and clarifications to streamline RRF implementation but expects the Commission to act swiftly on its promise to cut the administrative burden by 25 %; urges the Commission to give clear and targeted technical support to the Member States, allowing them to develop efficient administrative capacity to implement the milestones and targets; calls on the Commission to decrease the level of complexity of EU public procurement rules which apply to higher-value contracts;

    35. Expresses concern over the complexity of application procedures for RRF funding, particularly for SMEs and non-governmental organisations, which require external consultancy services even for small grants; emphasises that such bureaucratic obstacles contradict the original objectives of the RRF, which aimed to provide rapid and direct financial support; calls for an urgent simplification of application and reporting requirements, particularly for smaller beneficiaries, to maximise the absorption and impact of funds and to assist with their contribution to the green and digital transitions;

    36. Believes that implementation delays underscore the risk that measures for which RRF funding has been paid will not be completed by the 2026 payment deadline; welcomes the Commission’s statement at the Recovery and Resilience Dialogue (RRD) of 16 September 2024 that it will not reimburse non-implemented projects; considers it a shortcoming that RRF funds paid for milestones and targets assessed as fulfilled cannot be recovered if related measures are not eventually completed; encourages the Commission to take into account the ECA’s recommendations related to this and to assess, in cooperation with the Member States, the measures most at risk of not being completed by 31 August 2026; stresses the importance of monitoring these measures, facilitating timely follow-up and working towards solutions to overcome delays;

    37. Notes with concern that the remaining implementation timeframe of the RRF is too short for the implementation of many innovative projects; further notes that innovative projects, by definition, are more difficult to plan and more likely to encounter obstacles during implementation, making them unsuited to the RRF’s strict deadlines; urges the Commission to create future programmes that are flexible enough to give proper answers in changing circumstances and that at the same time guarantee a certain degree of predictability;

    38. Notes that some milestones and targets may be no longer achievable because of objective circumstances; stresses that any NRRP revisions should be made in accordance with the RRF Regulation, including the applicable deadlines, and should not entail backtracking on reforms, commitments or lower quality projects but should maintain the overall ambition and the efficiency of public spending;

    39. Is concerned about the Commission’s uneven assessment of NRRPs, which has led to double standards in the application of the Regulation; is further concerned about the uneven and different definition of milestones and targets from one NRRP to the other, as consistently reported by the ECA;

    40. Highlights that the duration of the Commission’s assessment of payment requests by Member States differs considerably among the Member States and stresses the need for more transparency from the Commission; urges the Commission to accelerate its assessments and to ensure the equal treatment of the Member States; highlights the need to ensure a level playing field across the EU for measures and indicators that are used to assess all RRF projects;

    41. Urges the Member States to increase their efforts to address administrative bottlenecks and provide sufficient administrative capacity to accelerate RRF implementation in view of the 2026 deadline and to avoid concentrating RRF projects in more developed regions and capitals by enabling RRF funds to flow into projects in the most vulnerable regions, thereby serving the RRF’s objective to enhance the EU’s social, territorial and economic cohesion; emphasises the importance of fair regional distribution within the NRRPs while ensuring that RRF funds are allocated based on economic and social impact, feasibility and long-term benefits;

    42. Calls for an 18-month extension of mature RRF projects through an amendment of the RRF Regulation by co-decision, if needed; emphasises that the envisaged extension of projects will be conducted by the Commission based on objective, clear and fair benchmarks; welcomes the possibility of establishing a targeted and performance-based prioritisation and transfer system after the 2026 deadline in order to allow for the finalisation of ongoing projects through other funding schemes, including the European Investment Fund and a possible new European competitiveness fund; urges the Commission to present a strategy to address the huge demand for public investment beyond 2026 without compromising budgetary resources in other critical areas;

    43. Calls for an evaluation of how this framework could enable targeted investments in EU defence supply chains, strategic stockpiles and defence innovation, ensuring alignment with broader European security objectives;

    44. Is concerned that some Member States might choose to forego parts of the amounts or entire amounts associated with their last payment request, thus avoiding the fulfilment of the last milestones and targets;

    Transparency, monitoring and control

     

    45. Takes note of the fact that the Commission had planned to conduct 112 RRF audits in all Member States in 2024; reminds the Commission of its obligation, in accordance with Article 24(3) of the RRF Regulation, to recover funding in case of incorrect disbursements or reversals of measures;

    46. Notes that the Commission relies on its own methodologies when calculating partial payments and suspensions of funds; regrets that these methodologies were only developed two years after the start of the RRF implementation and without the consultation of Parliament;

    47. Welcomes the extensive work of the ECA in relation to the RRF and deems it important to thoroughly assess its findings, in particular its findings that milestones and targets are often rather vague and output-oriented and are therefore not fit to measure results and impacts, and its findings regarding the risks of double funding resulting from overlaps with other policies; notes that the Commission has accepted many but not all of the ECA’s recommendations; stresses that weaknesses in financial controls, as highlighted by the ECA, must be urgently addressed to prevent double funding, cost inefficiencies, and mismanagement of EU funds; calls for enhanced transparency and for the full consideration of the ECA’s recommendations without adding unnecessary administrative burden;

    48. Notes that the ECA’s audits revealed several cases in which funding had been disbursed but the requirements related to the fulfilment of corresponding milestones and targets had not been adequately met; further notes that the Commission framework for assessing the ‘satisfactory fulfilment’ of the relevant milestones and targets contains discretionary elements, such as ‘minimal deviation from a requirement’ or ‘proportional delays’, and that the methodology for the determination of partial payments does not provide an explanation for the values chosen as coefficients, thereby leaving room for interpretation; asks the Commission to provide Parliament with further clarification;

    49. Insists that, as a rule, measures already included in other national plans benefiting from EU funding (e.g. cohesion, agriculture, etc.) should not be included in NRRPs, even if they do not incur any costs; urges the Commission to remain vigilant and proactive in identifying any potential situation of double funding in particular in regard to the different implementation models of the RRF and other EU funding instruments;

    50. Regrets the lack of a proper RRF audit trail and the persistent lack of transparency despite the bi-annual reporting requirement for Member States on the 100 largest final recipients, which was introduced into REPowerEU upon Parliament’s request; regrets the delays in reporting by some Member States and the limited informative value of the information provided, which ultimately prevents compliance checks by the Commission or the ECA; reiterates its call for the lists of the largest final recipients for each Member State to be regularly updated and published on the RRF Scoreboard and to include information on the economic operators involved, including contractors and sub-contractors, and their beneficial owners, and not simply ministries or other government bodies or state companies; further regrets that the current definition of ‘final recipient’ leaves room for interpretation, resulting in different final beneficiaries for similar measures among Member States; calls on the Commission, in this context, to ensure a common understanding of what constitutes a ‘final recipient’ so that this can be applied consistently;

    51. Is concerned about persistent weaknesses in national reporting and control mechanisms, due in part to absorption pressure affecting the capacity to detect ineligible expenditure and due to the complexity of the audit and control procedures, which created uncertainty in the Member States and an overload of administrative procedures; calls on the Commission to provide assurance on whether Member States’ control systems function adequately and to check the compliance of RRF-funded investment projects with EU and national rules; calls for payments to be reduced and, where appropriate, amounts to be recovered in accordance with Article 22 of the RRF Regulation, should weaknesses persist in the national control systems; regrets the reliance on manual cross-checks and self-declarations by recipients of EU funds in the absence of interoperable IT tools and harmonised standards, despite the existence of tools such as the Early Detection and Exclusion System and ARACHNE, whose use is currently not mandatory, thereby risking that expenditure is declared twice; recalls, in this regard, the reluctance of the Member States to make progress in developing the relevant IT tools in a timely manner;

    52. Shares the view of the ECA that the FNLC model does not preclude reporting on actual costs; notes that having clear insights on costs also facilitates the work of control and oversight bodies, as well as the EPPO and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), and enables enhanced public scrutiny;

    53. Reiterates the role of the RRF Scoreboard in providing information for citizens on the overall progress in the implementation of NRRPs; underlines the importance of the Scoreboard in strengthening transparency and calls on the Commission to increase the level of transparency and data visualisation in the Scoreboard;

    54. Recalls that the reporting on the progress of implementation in the RRF Scoreboard is based on information provided by the Member States on a bi-annual basis;

    55. Highlights the important role of the EPPO and OLAF in protecting the EU’s financial interests; welcomes the fact that EPPO investigations into RRF-related fraud and corruption cases have led to several arrests, indictments and seizures of RRF funds; recalls that the EPPO was handling 307 active cases related to the RRF in 2024, corresponding to about 17 % of all expenditure fraud investigations and causing an estimated damage to the EU’s financial interests of EUR 2.8 billion; expects the number of investigations to grow as RRF implementation advances; calls on the Commission to look into the management declarations of the Member States in terms of their reporting of detected fraud and the remedial measures taken;

    Role of the European Parliament

     

    56. Reiterates the importance of Parliament’s role in scrutinising and monitoring the implementation of the RRF and in holding the Commission accountable; highlights Parliament’s input provided through various channels, in particular through various plenary debates, parliamentary resolutions, bi-monthly RRD meetings with the responsible Commissioners, over 30 meetings of the standing working group on the scrutiny of the RRF, numerous parliamentary questions, the annual discharge procedure of the Commission and the regular flow of information and ad hoc requests for information from the Commission; regrets that the model of using milestones and targets to trigger disbursement was not accompanied by adequate budgetary control mechanisms, resulting in a diminished role for Parliament compared to its scrutiny of MFF spending;

    57. Recalls Parliament’s rights as laid down in Article 25 of the RRF Regulation, in particular the right to simultaneously receive from the Commission information that it transmits to the Council or any of its preparatory bodies in the context of the RRF Regulation or its implementation, as well as an overview of its preliminary findings concerning the satisfactory fulfilment of the relevant milestones and targets included in the NRRPs; encourages the sharing of relevant outcomes of discussions held in Council preparatory bodies with the competent parliamentary committees;

    58. Recalls further the right of Parliament’s competent committees to invite the Commission to provide information on the state of play of the assessment of the NRRPs in the context of the RRD meetings;

    59. Regrets the fact that Parliament has no role in the design of NRRPs and is not consulted on payment requests; criticises furthermore the fact that Parliament has not been provided with a clear and traceable overview of the implementation status of projects and payments; expects to be informed about the context of NRRP revisions in order to make its own assessment of the revisions and to have an enhanced role in possible future instruments based on the RRF experience;

    Stakeholder involvement

    60. Regrets the insufficient involvement of local and regional authorities (LRAs), civil society organisations, social partners, national parliaments and other relevant stakeholders in the design, revision or implementation of NRRPs leading to worse policy outcomes, as well as limited ownership; regrets that in the design and implementation of the NRRPs, some Member States have clearly favoured some LRAs or stakeholders to the detriment of others; recalls that the participation of LRAs, national authorities and those responsible for developing these policies is crucial for the success of the RRF, as stated in Article 28 of the RRF Regulation; recalls that Parliament supported a binding provision in the RRF to establish a multilevel dialogue to engage relevant stakeholders and discuss the preparation and implementation of NRRPs with them, with a clear consultation period; calls, therefore, for the maximum possible stakeholder involvement in the implementation of NRRPs, in accordance with the national legal framework and based on clear and transparent principles;

    61. Reiterates the need for regular interaction between national coordinating authorities and national stakeholders involved in the monitoring of the implementation of the NRRPs, in line with the principle of transparency and accountability; stresses that more regular and public communication from the national coordinating authorities is needed to ensure that updated information about the progress of the implementation of NRRPs is made available;

    62. Stresses that decisions should be made at the level that is most appropriate; is convinced that the application of the partnership principle and a stronger involvement of LRAs could make project implementation more efficient, reduce disparities within Member States and result in more and better quality measures with a cross-border and multi-country dimension;

    63. Believes that valuable lessons can be drawn from the RRF to be reflected in the design of performance-based instruments in the next MFF, in particular in the light of the EU’s competitiveness and simplification agendas;

    Lessons for the future

    64. Believes that the combination of reforms and investments has proved successful but that a clearer link is needed between the two; highlights the importance of aligning any funding with the objectives of the instrument and disbursing it in line with the progress made towards them; insists that the level of ambition of NRRPs should not be lowered but should be commensurate with the RRF timeline to ensure their successful implementation;

    65. Is convinced, as highlighted by the Draghi report, that boosting EU competitiveness, decarbonising the EU’s economy and making it more circular and resource-efficient, as well as closing the skills gap, creating quality jobs and enhancing the EU’s innovation capacity, will be central priorities beyond 2026; is concerned that a sizeable funding gap will arise after the RRF ceases to operate at the end of 2026, notably for public investment in common European priorities, since financial resources from national budgets vary significantly among Member States; highlights the need to use the lessons learned from the RRF to better leverage public and private investments with a view to addressing the financing gap in European objectives and transitions, which the Draghi report estimates at over EUR 800 billion annually, while ensuring seamless continuity of investments in common European goods;

    66. Welcomes the enhanced use of financial instruments made possible by the option to channel RRF funds towards the Member States’ compartment of InvestEU;

    67. Urges the Commission to apply the lessons learned and the ECA’s observations, and to ensure that future performance-based instruments are well-targeted, aligned with the aim of financing European public goods and prioritising the addressing of clearly defined strategic challenges, economic sustainability and competitiveness; calls for it to be ensured that all future instruments are designed to measure not only inputs or short-term outputs and progress but also results in terms of long-term impacts backed by outcomes;

    68. Calls on the Commission to conduct an independent evaluation and to report on the RRF impact on private investments at aggregate EU level, in particular on its potential crowding-out effect on private investments and its determinants; calls further for objective and clear analyses from the Commission on how the implementation of reforms and investments within the NRRPs affects the economies of the individual Member States, with special regard to smart, sustainable and inclusive growth; urges the Commission to take the lessons learned from these analyses and from the ECA’s observations on the RRF implementation into account when drawing up its proposals for the next programming period;

    69. Underlines that all EU-funded investments and reforms should be coordinated and coherent with strategic planning at national level and should focus on projects with a clear European added value; underlines the need for a spending target for cross-border and multi-country investments; calls on the Commission to develop a credible methodology to assess the cross-border and multi-country dimensions of EU funded projects;

    70. Highlights that meaningful social and territorial dialogues with a high level of involvement of LRAs, social partners, civil society organisations and national parliaments within the national legal framework are essential for national ownership, successful implementation and democratic accountability; expresses concern over the insufficient involvement of all relevant stakeholders in the implementation and oversight of RRF-funded initiatives; stresses in particular that regions and city councils cannot be mere recipients of decisions, without being given the opportunity to have a say on reforms and investments that truly transform their territories;

    71. Believes that it is essential to adopt differentiated strategies that recognise the cultural diversity of the various regions and enhance their economic and social cohesion instead of applying a homogeneous or one-size-fits-all approach that could be to the detriment of the less developed regions; calls, therefore, for dialogues with stakeholders to be strengthened and more diligently employed as they could inspire future initiatives and mechanisms in the EU and its Member States;

    72. Underlines the requirement of the RRF Regulation to publicly display information about the origin of funding for projects funded by the EU to ensure buy-in from European citizens;

    73. Highlights that the RRD meetings have been an important tool in enhancing transparency and accountability, which are crucial for the optimal implementation of the RRF;

    74. Reiterates that further efforts are required to improve the transparency and traceability of the use of EU funds; stresses the need to ensure that data that is relevant for performance measurement is available and that information on performance is presented in a better and more transparent manner; stresses that the feedback mechanism between performance information and programme design or adjustment should be enhanced;

    75. Considers that better training and capacity-building across all regions and authorities involved, in particular at national level, could have accelerated the RRF’s implementation and enabled the implementing authorities to better adapt to the performance-based nature of the RRF; considers that the Commission could have assisted Member States more at the planning stage and provided earlier implementation guidance, in particular with a view to strengthening their audit and control systems and the cross-border dimension of the RRF;

    76. Highlights the importance of mitigating the risk of double funding; suggests the deployment of an integrated and interoperable IT and data mining system and the development of clear standards for datasets to be applied across Member States, with a view to allowing comprehensive and automated expenditure tracking; calls for improved coordination mechanisms that define clear responsibilities among the bodies involved in the implementation of the various EU and national programmes, while avoiding unnecessary bureaucratic complexity and ensuring an efficient allocation of funds; encourages the integration of advanced data analytics and AI tools to enhance performance tracking, evaluation and reporting to alleviate manual workload and to streamline reporting processes; underlines that such progress can only happen if there is also operational support to digitalise administrations;

    77. Strongly urges the Commission and the Member States to ensure that any type of EU FNLC or EU funding that is performance based complies with EU and national rules, ultimately protecting the financial interests of the EU; reiterates the accountability and responsibility of the Commission and the Member States to ensure the legality and the regularity of EU funding, as well as the respect of sound financial management principles;

    78. Considers that the role of Parliament in the monitoring of the RRF should be further enhanced;

    79. Calls for future performance-based instruments to have a single audit trail to trace budget contributions to the projects funded; underlines the need for project-level auditing to mitigate reputational risks in the eyes of the general public and to facilitate the recovery of funds in case measures are reversed; underlines the need to reduce administrative bottlenecks and burden;

    80. Demands that any possible future performance-based programmes make clearer links between the milestones and targets and the actual projects being implemented; stresses that there should be less of a delay between the fulfilment of milestones and the implementation of projects;

    81. Reiterates its call for an open platform which contains data on all projects, final recipients and the regional distribution of funding, thereby facilitating auditing and democratic oversight;

    82. Stresses that any possible future budgetary decisions on EU borrowing should respect the unity of the budget and Parliament’s role as part of the budgetary authority; highlights the risks of cost overruns for the repayment of debt, resulting inter alia from volatile interest rates; deems it important to ensure from the outset that sufficient funding is available to cover these costs without presenting a detriment to other programmes or political priorities;

    83. Invites the Commission and the Member States to closely assess and learn from instruments and tools such as the RRF, in order to maximise the efficiency and impact of EU funding, investments and reforms, streamline policy objectives, improve the collaboration of the institutions and stakeholders at national and European level, and increase national ownership;

    84. Notes the declared intention of the Commission to draw on the RRF experience when designing its proposals for the post-2027 EU funding programmes, due later this year; acknowledges that the independent ex post evaluation will come too late to feed into the process leading up to the next programming period, but expects the Commission and the co-legislators to take due account of the lessons learned from the RRF and of the recommendations of relevant stakeholders, in particular LRA, civil society organisations and social partners; believes that, as the EU plans for future economic resilience, there is also a need to further mobilise private investment, strengthen capital markets and ensure that public spending remains fiscally responsible and strategically targeted to make the EU more resilient and sovereign in an ever more conflictual geopolitical context;

    85. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, and to the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the proposal for a Council directive laying down detailed arrangements for the exercise of the right to vote and stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament for Union citizens residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals (recast) – A10-0090/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Committee on Constitutional Affairs
    Rapporteur: Sven Simon
    (Recast – Rule 113 of the Rules of Procedure)

    DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

    on the proposal for a Council directive laying down detailed arrangements for the exercise of the right to vote and stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament for Union citizens residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals (recast)

    (09789/2024 – C10-0001/2024 – 2021/0372(CNS))

    (Special legislative procedure – consultation – recast)

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Council draft (09789/2024),

     having regard to the Commission proposal to the Council (COM(2021)0732),

     having regard to Article 22(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Council consulted Parliament (C10-0001/2024),

     having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 28 November 2001 on a more structured use of the recasting technique for legal acts[1],

     having regard to the letter of 8 November 2022 from the Committee on Legal Affairs to the Committee on Constitutional Affairs in accordance with Rule 113(3) of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to Rules 113 and 84 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the letter from the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (A10-0090/2025),

    A. whereas, according to the Consultative Working Party of the legal services of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, the Commission proposal does not include any substantive amendments other than those identified as such in the proposal and whereas, as regards the codification of the unchanged provisions of the earlier acts together with those amendments, the proposal contains a straightforward codification of the existing texts, without any change in their substance;

    1. Approves the Council draft as adapted to the recommendations of the Consultative Working Party of the legal services of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission;

    2. Deeply regrets that the Council, while formally in compliance with Article 22(2) TFEU, has not engaged with the substance of Parliament’s opinion in any meaningful way; points out that this practice is indicative of a wider trend in recent years, for the Council and the European Council to refuse to cooperate constructively and in good faith in a number of pending special legislative procedures; recalls the recommendations contained in its report of 13 December 2023, and reiterates its calls on the Council and on the European Council to collaborate constructively in finding policy solutions that work in the interest of European citizens;

    3. Calls on the Council to notify Parliament if it intends to depart from the text approved by Parliament;

    4. Asks the Council to consult Parliament again if it intends to substantially amend the text approved by Parliament;

    5. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

     

    EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

    Pursuant to Article 20(2)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Article 22(2) TFEU and Article 39 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU), EU citizens residing in an EU Member State other than their own are entitled to vote and stand as candidates in European and municipal elections, under the same conditions as nationals.

     

    Nearly 13.7 million EU citizens – of whom about 11million are of voting age – reside in a Member State other than that of their nationality. Detailed provisions on the political rights granted under EU citizenship are set out in Council Directive 93/109/EC regarding the participation of non-national Union citizens in European Parliament elections in their country of residence.

     

    Despite the arrangements under Directive 93/109/EC, non-national Union citizens still face certain obstacles in exercising their electoral rights in elections to the European Parliament. These concern the accessibility of information, the registration processes, the effects of deregistration in the Member State of origin and the exchange of information between Member States with the aim of preventing multiple voting.

     

    Your rapporteur thus welcomes the proposed revision of Directive 93/109/EC as provided in the Council draft of 16 September 2024. In his viewpoint, the amended proposal by the Council strikes the right balance between on the one hand mobile voters’ and candidates’ needs for timely information, equal treatment with nationals of Member States – including regarding possibilities of advance voting, postal voting, and electronic and internet voting available in a Member State – and the administrative burden on Member States’ national authorities on the other hand.

     

    He is also of the opinion that the Council draft improves at the same time the exchange of necessary information between Members States in order to avoid multiple voting or instances where the same person would stand as a candidate more than once at the same elections, and introduces concrete reporting and data collecting and sharing obligations regarding the application of this Directive in the territory of the Member States thus permitting for the identification of measures necessary to ensure the effective exercise of Union citizens’ electoral rights.

     

    Your rapporteur would therefore propose that the Council draft be approved with no amendments.

     

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

     

     

    ANNEX: LETTER FROM THE COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AFFAIRS

    8.11.2022

     

    Mr Salvatore De Meo

    Chair

    Committee on Constitutional Affairs

    BRUSSELS

    Subject: Opinion on Proposal for a directive of the Council laying down detailed arrangements for the exercise of the right to vote and stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament for Union citizens residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals (recast) (COM2021(0372) – C9‑0021/2022 – 2021/0372(CNS))

    Dear Mr Chair,The Committee on Legal Affairs has examined the proposal referred to above pursuant to Rule 110 on Recasting of Parliament’s Rules of Procedure.

    Paragraph 3 of that Rule reads as follows:

     

    “If the committee responsible for legal affairs considers that the proposal does not entail any substantive changes other than those identified as such in the proposal, it shall inform the committee responsible for the subject matter thereof.

     

    In such a case, over and above the conditions laid down in Rules 180 and 181, amendments shall be admissible within the committee responsible for the subject-matter only if they concern those parts of the proposal which contain changes.

     

    However, amendments to parts of the proposal which remain unchanged may, by way of exception and on a case-by-case basis, be accepted by the Chair of the committee responsible for the subject matter if he or she considers that this is necessary for pressing reasons relating to the internal logic of the text or because the amendments are inextricably linked to other admissible amendments. Such reasons must be stated in a written justification to the amendments.”

     

    Following the here attached opinion of the Consultative Working Party of the Legal Services of the Parliament, the Council and the Commission, which has examined the recast proposal, and in keeping with the recommendations of the Rapporteur, the Committee on Legal Affairs considers that the proposal in question does not include any substantive changes other than those identified as such and that, as regards the codification of the unchanged provisions of the earlier act with those substantive amendments, the proposal contains a straightforward codification of the existing text, without any change in its substance.

    In conclusion, at its meeting of 27 October 2022, the Committee on Legal Affairs, with 21 votes in favour, no votes against and two abstentions[2] decided to recommend that the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO), as the committee responsible, proceed to examine the above proposal in accordance with Rule 110.

     

    Yours sincerely,

    Adrián Vázquez Lázara

    ANNEX: OPINION OF THE CONSULTATIVE WORKING PARTY OF THE LEGAL SERVICES OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL AND THE COMMISSION

     

     

     

    CONSULTATIVE WORKING PARTY

    OF THE LEGAL SERVICES

    Brussels, 7 July 2022

    OPINION

     FOR THE ATTENTION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

      THE COUNCIL

      THE COMMISSION

    Proposal for a Council directive laying down detailed arrangements for the exercise of the right to vote and stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament for Union citizens residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals (recast)

    COM(2021)0732 of 25 November 2022 – 2021/0372(CNS)

    Having regard to the Inter-institutional Agreement of 28 November 2001 on a more structured use of the recasting technique for legal acts, and in particular to point 9 thereof, the Consultative Working Party consisting of the respective legal services of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission met on 1 February 2022 for the purpose of examining, among others, the aforementioned proposal submitted by the Commission.

     

    At that meeting[3], an examination of the proposal for a Council Directive recasting Council Directive 93/109/EC of 6 December 1993 laying down detailed arrangements for the exercise of the right to vote and stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament for citizens of the Union residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals resulted in the Consultative Working Party’s establishing, by common accord, as follows.

    1. The following should have been marked with the grey-shaded type generally used for identifying substantive amendments:

    – in recital 5, the adding of the words ‘in accordance with principles common to all Member States;

    – in Article 3, introductory wording, the deletion of the words ‘Any person who’ and the adding of the words ‘The following persons’;

    – in Article 3, point (a), the adding of the words ‘the person who’;

    – in Article 3, point (b), the adding of the words ‘the person who’.

    2. In recital 5, the words ‘Article 20(2) TFEU’ should be replaced by ‘Article 22(2) TFEU’.

     

    In consequence, examination of the proposal has enabled the Consultative Working Party to conclude, without dissent, that the proposal does not comprise any substantive amendments other than those identified as such. The Working Party also concluded, as regards the codification of the unchanged provisions of the earlier act with those substantive amendments, that the proposal contains a straightforward codification of the existing legal text, without any change in its substance.

     

     

     

     

     

    F. DREXLER  T. BLANCHET  D. CALLEJA CRESPO

    Jurisconsult  Jurisconsult  Director-General

     

    LETTER OF THE COMMITTEE ON CIVIL LIBERTIES, JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS (20.3.2025)

    Mr Sven Simon

    Chair

    Committee on Constitutional Affairs

    BRUSSELS

    Subject: Opinion on the Proposal for a Council Directive laying down detailed arrangements for the exercise of the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament for Union citizens residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals (recast) (2021/0372 (CNS)COM(2021)0732 – C10‑0001/2024 – LIBE/10/00399)

    Dear Mr Simon,

    Under the procedure referred to above, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE Committee) has been asked to submit an opinion to your committee. At their meeting of 6 March 2025, the LIBE Committee coordinators decided to send the opinion in the form of a letter pursuant to Rule 57(1) of the Rules of Procedure. The LIBE Committee discussed the matter at its meeting[4] of 19 March and adopted the opinion at that meeting.

    The Parliament adopted its position in the above consultation procedure on 14 February 2023 by a large majority of the votes cast. The LIBE Committee, as opinion giving committee, issued its opinion to the report of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO Committee), as committee responsible, on 26 October 2022, also by a large majority of its members. On 16 May 2024, the Council decided to re-consult the Parliament on the text agreed by the Council. The LIBE Committee decided to support the recommendation from the rapporteur for opinion that the LIBE Committee sends its views in the form of a letter from the Chair informing the AFCO Committee that it wishes to keep the LIBE Opinion of 26 October 2022 (2021/0372(CNS)), adopted in the consultation procedure of last term. Nevertheless, it takes note of the text agreed by the Council, acknowledging some positive steps taken towards the LIBE opinion.

     

    The LIBE Committee, therefore, calls on the AFCO Committee, as committee responsible, to take into account its views.

     

    Yours sincerely,

    Javier Zarzalejos

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur for the opinion declares under her exclusive responsibility that she did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

     

    PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

    Title

    Laying down detailed arrangements for the exercise of the right to vote and stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament for Union citizens residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals (recast)

    References

    09789/2024 – C10-0001/2024 – COM(2021)0732 – C9-0021/2022 – 2021/0372(CNS)

    Date Parliament was consulted

    25.11.2021

     

     

     

    Committee(s) responsible

    AFCO

     

     

     

    Committees asked for opinions

     Date announced in plenary

    LIBE

    7.10.2024

     

     

     

    Rapporteurs

     Date appointed

    Sven Simon

    14.10.2024

     

     

     

    Discussed in committee

    29.1.2025

    19.3.2025

     

     

    Date adopted

    14.5.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    25

    1

    2

    Members present for the final vote

    Gerolf Annemans, Gabriele Bischoff, Daniel Freund, Charles Goerens, Sandro Gozi, Ľubica Karvašová, Emmanouil Kefalogiannis, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Nicola Procaccini, Bartłomiej Sienkiewicz, Sven Simon, Anthony Smith, Reinier Van Lanschot, Alexandre Varaut, Loránt Vincze

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Marc Angel, Marieke Ehlers, Borja Giménez Larraz, Juan Carlos Girauta Vidal, Branko Grims, Liudas Mažylis, Idoia Mendia, Krzysztof Śmiszek

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    René Aust, Damien Carême, Alberico Gambino, Elena Sancho Murillo, Flavio Tosi

    Date tabled

    16.5.2025

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

    25

    +

    ECR

    Alberico Gambino, Nicola Procaccini

    ESN

    René Aust

    PPE

    Borja Giménez Larraz, Branko Grims, Emmanouil Kefalogiannis, Liudas Mažylis, Bartłomiej Sienkiewicz, Sven Simon, Flavio Tosi, Loránt Vincze

    PfE

    Gerolf Annemans, Marieke Ehlers, Juan Carlos Girauta Vidal

    Renew

    Charles Goerens, Sandro Gozi, Ľubica Karvašová

    S&D

    Marc Angel, Gabriele Bischoff, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Idoia Mendia, Elena Sancho Murillo, Krzysztof Śmiszek

    Verts/ALE

    Daniel Freund, Reinier Van Lanschot

     

    1

    PfE

    Alexandre Varaut

     

    2

    0

    The Left

    Damien Carême, Anthony Smith

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

     : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report – A10-0100/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report

    (2024/2078(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Articles 2, 3(1), 3(3), second subparagraph, 4(3), 5, 6, 7, 11, 19 and 49 thereof,

     having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular to the articles thereof relating to respect for and the protection and promotion of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights in the Union, including Articles 70, 258, 259, 260, 263, 265 and 267,

     having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter),

     having regard to the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2024 entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report – The rule of law situation in the European Union’ (COM(2024)0800), and the annex thereto containing recommendations for the Member States,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 on EU enlargement policy (COM(2024)0690) and its accompanying staff working documents (the Enlargement Package),

     having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget[1] (the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation),

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy[2] (the Common Provisions Regulation),

     having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union[3] (the Financial Regulation), in particular Article 6(3) thereof,

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/692 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1381/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EU) No 390/2014[4],

     having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

     having regard to the UN instruments on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRDP), the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities and the Recommendations of the UN Forum on Minority Issues, and to the recommendations and reports of the UN Universal Periodic Review, as well as the case-law of the UN treaty bodies and the special procedures of the Human Rights Council,

     having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Social Charter, the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the European Committee of Social Rights, and the conventions, recommendations, resolutions, opinions and reports of the Parliamentary Assembly, the Committee of Ministers, the Commissioner for Human Rights, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, the Steering Committee on Anti-Discrimination, Diversity and Inclusion, the Venice Commission and other bodies of the Council of Europe,

     having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence,

     having regard to the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities of the Council of Europe,

     having regard to the memorandum of understanding between the Council of Europe and the European Union of 23 May 2007 and the Council conclusions of 17 December 2024 on EU priorities for cooperation with the Council of Europe 2025-2026,

     having regard to the Commission’s reasoned proposal of 20 December 2017 for a Council decision on the determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law (COM(2017)0835), issued in accordance with Article 7(1) TEU,

     having regard to its resolution of 25 October 2016 with recommendations to the Commission on the establishment of an EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights[5],

     having regard to its resolution of 7 February 2018 on protection and non-discrimination with regard to minorities in the EU Member States[6];

     having regard to its resolution of 1 March 2018 on the Commission’s decision to activate Article 7(1) TEU as regards the situation in Poland[7],

     having regard to its resolution of 19 April 2018 on the need to establish a European Values Instrument to support civil society organisations which promote fundamental values within the European Union at local and national level[8],

     having regard to its resolution of 12 September 2018 on a proposal calling on the Council to determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded[9],

     having regard to its resolution of 13 November 2018 on minimum standards for minorities in the EU[10],

     having regard to its resolution of 14 November 2018 on the need for a comprehensive EU mechanism for the protection of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights[11],

     having regard to its resolution of 7 October 2020 on the establishment of an EU Mechanism on Democracy, the Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights[12],

     having regard to its resolution of 13 November 2020 on the impact of COVID-19 measures on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights[13],

     having regard to its resolution of 17 December 2020 on the European Citizens’ Initiative ‘Minority SafePack – one million signatures for diversity in Europe’[14],

     having regard to its resolution of 10 June 2021 on the rule of law situation in the European Union and the application of the Conditionality Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092[15],

     having regard to its resolution of 24 June 2021 on the Commission’s 2020 Rule of Law Report[16],

     having regard to its resolution of 8 July 2021 on the creation of guidelines for the application of the general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget[17],

     having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2021 with recommendations to the Commission on identifying gender-based violence as a new area of crime listed in Article 83(1) TFEU[18],

     having regard to its resolution of 11 November 2021 on strengthening democracy and media freedom and pluralism in the EU: the undue use of actions under civil and criminal law to silence journalists, NGOs and civil society[19],

     having regard to its resolution of 15 December 2021 on the evaluation of preventive measures for avoiding corruption, irregular spending and misuse of EU and national funds in case of emergency funds and crisis-related spending areas[20],

     having regard to its resolution of 8 March 2022 on the shrinking space for civil society in Europe[21],

     having regard to its resolution of 10 March 2022 on the rule of law and the consequences of the ECJ ruling[22],

     having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2022 on the Commission’s 2021 Rule of Law Report[23],

     having regard to its resolution of 9 June 2022 on the rule of law and the potential approval of the Polish national recovery plan (RRF)[24],

     having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union in 2020 and 2021[25],

     having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on the proposal for a Council decision determining, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded[26],

     having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2022 on the rule of law in Malta, five years after the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia[27],

     having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2022 on growing hate crimes against LGBTIQ+ people across Europe in light of the recent homophobic murder in Slovakia[28],

     having regard to its resolution of 10 November 2022 on racial justice, non-discrimination and anti-racism in the EU[29],

     having regard to its resolution of 24 November 2022 on the assessment of Hungary’s compliance with the rule of law conditions under the Conditionality Regulation and state of play of the Hungarian RRP[30],

     having regard to its resolution of 30 March 2023 on the 2022 Rule of Law Report – the rule of law situation in the European Union[31],

     having regard to its resolution of 18 April 2023 on the institutional relations between the EU and the Council of Europe[32],

     having regard to its resolution of 28 February 2024 ‘Report on the Commission’s 2023 Rule of Law report’[33],

     having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement[34],

     having regard to its resolution of 1 June 2023 on the breaches of the Rule of Law and fundamental rights in Hungary and frozen EU funds[35],

     having regard to the report of its Committee of Inquiry to investigate the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware (PEGA) and to its recommendation of 15 June 2023 to the Council and the Commission following the investigation of alleged contraventions and maladministration in the application of Union law in relation to the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware[36] ,

     having regard to its resolution of 11 July 2023 on the electoral law, the investigative committee and the rule of law in Poland[37],

     having regard to its resolution of 19 October 2023 on the rule of law in Malta: six years after the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia, and the need to protect journalists[38],

     having regard to the Commission communication of 6 December 2023 entitled ‘No place for hate: a Europe united against hatred’ (COM(2023)0051),

     having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union – annual report 2022 and 2023[39],

     having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on extending the list of EU crimes to hate speech and hate crime[40],

     having regard to its resolution of 24 April 2024 on ongoing hearings under Article 7(1) TEU regarding Hungary to strengthen the rule of law and its budgetary implications[41],

     having regard to the conclusion of the Article 7 TEU procedure in relation to Poland, as announced by the Commission on 29 May 2024, following steps taken by Poland to restore compliance with EU rule of law standards;

     having regard to Resolution 2262 (2019) of 24 January 2019 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on promoting the rights of persons belonging to national minorities,

     having regard to the recommendations and reports of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the High Commissioner on National Minorities, the Representative on Freedom of the Media and other bodies of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), to the cooperation between the EU and the OSCE on democratisation, institution-building and human rights and to the annual OSCE hate crime report, in which participating states have committed themselves to passing legislation that provides for penalties that take into account the gravity of hate crime, to taking action to address under-reporting and to introducing or further developing capacity-building activities for law enforcement, prosecution and judicial officials to prevent, investigate and prosecute hate crimes,

     having regard to the special reports of the European Court of Auditors of 17 December 2024 on Enforcing EU Law (28/2024), of 22 February 2024 on the Rule of Law in the EU (03/2024), and of 10 January 2022 on EU support for the rule of law in the Western Balkans (01/2022), and to its review of 28 February 2024 on the Commission’s rule of law reporting (02/2024), and to their respective recommendations,

     having regard to the Political Guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029, presented to Parliament on 18 July 2024 by Ursula von der Leyen, candidate for President of the Commission,

     having regard to the 2024 Eurobarometer surveys on corruption, which show that corruption remains a serious concern for citizens and businesses in the EU,

     having regard to the feedback reports, mission reports, written questions and answers of its Democracy, Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights Monitoring Group (DRFMG)[42],

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,

     having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A10-0100/2025),

    A. whereas the Union is founded on the common values enshrined in Article 2 TEU of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities – values that are common to the EU Member States and are reflected in the Charter and embedded in international human rights treaties; whereas the Charter is part of EU primary law; whereas democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights are mutually reinforcing values which, when undermined, pose a systemic threat to the rights and freedoms of the people living in the EU;

    B. whereas it is apparent from Article 49 TEU, which provides the possibility for any European state to apply to become a member of the European Union, that the Union is composed of states which have freely and voluntarily committed themselves to the common values referred to in Article 2 TEU, which respect those values and which undertake to promote them; whereas EU law is thus based on the fundamental premise that each Member State shares with all the other Member States, and recognises that those Member States share with it, those same values; whereas that premise implies and justifies the existence of mutual trust between the Member States that those values will be recognised and, therefore, that the law of the EU that implements them will be respected[43],[44]; whereas the Member State are required to ensure that any regression in the protection of the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU is prevented;

    C. whereas civil society organisations (CSOs), the legal community, associations, independent media and grassroots movements remain a cornerstone of the rule of law by promoting transparency, accountability and citizen participation in democratic processes; whereas these actors have been instrumental in safeguarding judicial independence, freedom of expression and other constitutional values, often operating under increasing political and legal constraints;

    D. whereas the principle of sincere cooperation in Article 4(3) TEU places an obligation on the Union and the Member States to assist each other in carrying out obligations that arise from the Treaties in full mutual respect, and on Member States to take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations arising from the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union; whereas Member States should refrain from any measures which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives;

    E. whereas in a recent Eurobarometer survey, 74 % of respondents thought that the EU plays an important role in upholding the rule of law and 89 % believed that it is important for all Member States to respect the EU’s core values; whereas, in the current global economic and political context, bolstering citizens’ trust in the rule of law and the resilience of democracies at EU level is a crucial factor;

    F. whereas accession to the EU must always be a merit-based procedure in which there is an assessment of whether an applicant fulfils the Copenhagen criteria, in particular those guaranteeing full respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law, in order to ensure that EU enlargement strengthens rather than weakens the EU and its single market; whereas the fundamental role of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance as a Union instrument is to support the rule of law, democracy and human rights in candidate and potential candidate countries, including the strengthening of democratic institutions and CSOs, as well as progress on good governance and the fight against corruption, the promotion and protection of non-discrimination and gender equality and the strengthening of capacities for conflict prevention and resolution;

    Independence of the judiciary

    1. Underlines that fair and accessible justice is a basic rule of law principle that requires an independent judiciary; reiterates that access to justice is essential for citizens to exercise rights, challenge discrimination and hold decision makers accountable;

    2. Recalls that robust national legal systems are indispensable in Member States, candidate and potential candidate countries, given that the Commission relies on national judicial authorities to enforce EU law, and that they are fundamental to judicial cooperation across the EU and to fostering mutual trust; notes with concern that while some judicial systems may appear robust on paper, this does not always align with reality;

    3. Stresses the need for the impartiality of judges; recalls that the appointment and promotion of judges must be determined solely by their qualifications and not be influenced by political or personal considerations, as the judges   essential for safeguarding judicial independence; recalls that the criteria for nominations and appointments to high-level judicial positions must be fully transparent;

    4. Underlines the important role of the national councils of the judiciary in safeguarding judicial independence; considers it necessary to evaluate the reforms that are in the process of being adopted in different Member States and encourages the adaptation of the composition and functioning of these bodies to the standards established by the Commission and the Council of Europe, and which have been endorsed by the CJEU; calls on the Commission in its future rule of law reports to place a particular focus on the roles, structures and functioning of Member States’ national judicial councils as part of its assessment of judicial independence;

    5. Points out that the prosecution service is a key element in the capacity of a Member State to fight crime and corruption; regrets any governmental or political interference in corruption investigations and recalls that no one is above the law; condemns the misuse of the judicial system for political purposes, including the persecution of political opponents and interference in corruption investigations; stresses that both politically motivated prosecutions and amnesty laws and pardon procedures driven by political interests undermine public trust in constitutional principles and EU standards; highlights the importance of guaranteeing the autonomy and independence of the prosecution service, thereby preventing any political interference in its work, especially from the government; highlights the role of transparent appointment processes for prosecutors as a key factor in maintaining public confidence in criminal justice;

    6. Calls for disciplinary procedures for judges and prosecutors to be handled by independent bodies free from political influence and, where necessary, for the system of disciplinary procedures to be reformed to preclude their use by political authorities to control the judiciary;

    7. Calls on the Commission to maintain constant oversight, ensuring that judges and prosecutors remain independent of the authorities responsible for appointing or reappointing them; calls on the Commission to proactively monitor and swiftly react to risks of rule of law backsliding in areas of judicial independence and access to justice, in line with the principle of non-regression as clarified in recent CJEU case-law;

    8. Notes that the Commission has found that there are structural challenges with regard to improving the efficiency, accessibility and quality of the judiciary of some Member States[45] and of candidate and potential candidate countries; notes that the Commission has found that several Member States have allocated additional resources to strengthening the resilience of justice systems to ensure the timely resolution of cases and reduce backlogs, while in other Member States levels of remuneration continue to pose challenges, often leading to shortages and vacancies; notes that underfunding and understaffing can undermine the accessibility and effectiveness of judicial systems, thus eroding trust in the rule of law; emphasises that adequate remuneration is essential to attract and retain qualified judicial personnel; strongly believes that training is a key element that guarantees the independence of judges, as well as the quality and efficiency of the judicial system; states that an important element of the state of the rule of law and fair proceedings are judicial procedures conducted in a reasonable time frame; notes, in that context, that the justice scoreboard indicates significant discrepancies across the EU legal area;

    9. Encourages the Member States to ensure training opportunities for judges; strongly believes that training should be multidisciplinary, with a particular focus on gender equality; reiterates that adequate resources, including funding, infrastructure and qualified personnel, are crucial for the efficiency and accessibility of the justice system; recognises the role of court staff, including notaries, in numerous Member States; calls on all Member States to follow up on corruption cases within a reasonable time limit so as to not foster a feeling of impunity among their citizens; invites Member States to take advantage of the opportunities offered by digitalisation to simplify procedures and processes, improve efficiency and accessibility, save time and reduce storage costs;

    10. Stresses the importance of independent judicial systems and access to free legal aid in ensuring equal access to justice; reiterates that adequate resources, including infrastructure and personnel, are crucial to improving justice systems; recommends that Member States take concrete steps to improve access to justice for marginalised and vulnerable groups, including adequately funded, enhanced legal aid systems and measures to address language barriers and digital divides;

    11. Recalls that the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report states that serious concerns persist regarding judicial independence in Hungary and that political influence on the prosecution service remains, with the risk of undue interference in individual cases, and that the freedom of expression of judges remains under pressure and smear campaigns against judges continue in the media;

    12. Welcomes the pivotal role of the CJEU in upholding the rule of law across the EU; endorses further initiatives to enhance the resources and the capabilities of the CJEU to effectively address further challenges to the rule of law; reiterates that, in accordance with Article 19 TEU and Article 267 TFEU, national courts cannot be hindered from using the possibility of a referral for preliminary ruling to the CJEU; calls on the Commission to carry out a systematic check in this regard as part of its annual rule of law report, and to start infringement proceedings in cases where national judges face obstacles in this regard;

    13. Regrets the trend whereby some Member States are selectively applying, delaying or failing to implement CJEU and ECtHR judgments and calls for their timely and effective implementation; emphasises that Member States and EU institutions must systematically integrate and implement the latest CJEU case-law to uphold the rule of law and ensure the uniform application of EU law; calls for the swift adaptation of national legislation and institutional frameworks to comply with court rulings;

    14. Reiterates its strong support for the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court (ICC) as essential, independent and impartial jurisdictional institutions at a particularly challenging time for international justice; recalls the need to fully implement the orders of the International Court of Justice, which are legally binding; calls for the Union, its Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to continue to support the ICC;

    15. Urges the Commission, as the guardian of the Treaties, to meet its responsibility for the enforcement of the Union’s basic values, including those laid down in Article 2 TEU and in the EU’s primary law, and not to rely only on citizens going to court themselves to ensure the application of EU law; stresses that the non-implementation of domestic and international judgments is violating the rule of law and risks leaving people without remedy and can create a perception among the public that judgments can be disregarded, undermining general trust in fair adjudication; underlines the fundamental role of the CJEU and the ECtHR in ensuring respect for the law and guaranteeing uniformity in its application; proposes establishing clear deadlines for the implementation of court rulings, as well as a detailed monitoring plan for the implementation of pending judgments; urges the Commission to launch infringement procedures if needed, together with motions for interim measures; calls on the Member States to implement pending judgments of the CJEU and the ECtHR promptly and suggests the establishment of a monitoring unit to monitor the implementation of CJEU and ECtHR rulings relating to democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights in EU countries, and to fully integrate the monitoring unit’s findings into the annual rule of law report; recommends that the Commission, in particular, take action regarding failures to implement CJEU judgments under Article 260(2) TFEU and apply the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation in cases of non-compliance with CJEU and ECtHR judgments where the breach identified affects or seriously risks affecting the Union budget or financial interests; stresses that systematic non-compliance with EU law must entail tangible financial penalties to ensure genuine deterrence; calls on the Commission to assess whether delays or non-compliance with such rulings warrant proceedings for failure to act under Article 258 TFEU; calls on the Commission to systematically analyse data on non-compliance with country-specific views of UN Treaty Bodies;

    16. Welcomes the revision of the Victims’ Rights Directive[46] to close legal gaps, ensuring that victims can access justice and receive support; calls on the Council to include as much as possible from Parliament’s mandate, including provisions ensuring victims’ right to review decisions in criminal proceedings, on access to legal remedies and fair compensation, and on comprehensive support services, particularly for those in vulnerable situations; stresses the importance of effective data collection, of enhancing resource allocation for victim assistance and of safeguarding victims’ privacy and personal data to prevent secondary victimisation and ensure that victims, including undocumented migrants and asylum seekers, can safely report crimes; expects co-legislators to adopt solutions that are victim-centred;

    17. Recognises the essential role of law enforcement in upholding the rule of law and protecting fundamental rights; calls on the Member States to ensure adequate funding, training and resources for the police and law enforcement agencies; calls on the Member States to take into account the Council of Europe’s Code of Police Ethics in this regard; emphasises that any use of force must be strictly necessary, proportionate and subject to clear safeguards; calls on the Member States to introduce guidelines for the transparent, independent and consistent selection, testing and trialling of weapons used by law enforcement agents, based on UN standards, recommendations and guiding principles; notes that this assessment should determine that such weapons are compliant with international human rights law and standards prior to their selection and deployment; calls on the Member States to thoroughly investigate any cases of excessive use of force and discriminatory treatment by law enforcement agencies;

    18. Calls on the Commission to include, as a rule of law concern, the conditions in prisons in future rule of law reports, given the serious and growing concerns across Europe regarding overcrowding, inadequate living conditions and the alarming rates of suicide within prisons;

    19. Calls on the Commission to pay special attention to analysing procedural justice with a view to identifying strengths, gaps, discrepancies and best practice in ensuring transparency, efficiency and fair treatment in strengthening administrative justice across the EU, as a means of ensuring the accountability of public authorities;

    Anti-corruption framework

    20. Stresses that the rule of law requires that persons holding public office cannot act arbitrarily or abuse their power for personal gain; underlines that governments should adopt laws in the interest of the general public and not in the interest of specific individuals;

    21. Reiterates that corruption is a serious threat to democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law in Member States, candidate countries and potential candidate countries; underlines that corruption erodes citizens’ trust in public institutions; deplores the fact that the 2024 Eurobarometer on corruption shows that corruption remains a serious concern for EU citizens and businesses, with 68 % of Europeans considering corruption to be widespread in their country, 65 % believing that high-level corruption cases are not pursued sufficiently and 41 % believing that the level of corruption has increased; considers this a call for the EU to step up its efforts to combat corruption;

    22. Reiterates its call on the Commission to immediately finalise negotiations on the EU’s membership of the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO); notes that such membership will ensure greater transparency, accountability and efficiency in the management of EU funds, the legislative process and the work of the EU institutions, and demands that the annual rule of law report cover EU institutions;

    23. Reiterates its call on all Member States to adopt a code of conduct for judges following the GRECO recommendations, and taking into account the codes applicable at the ECtHR and the CJEU; calls on Member States to create independent mechanisms to investigate alleged violations of the code of conduct and other laws, to improve disclosure and transparency with regard to conflicts of interest and gifts received by the judiciary, and to address the issue of revolving doors;

    24. Calls on the Member States, candidate countries and potential candidate countries, and the EU institutions to enhance transparency and accountability in public institutions by strengthening anti-corruption and conflict of competence legal frameworks and reporting processes to ensure the effective investigation and prosecution of corruption cases, including high-level corruption cases (inter alia those linked to public procurement procedures and those relating to high-risk areas such as ports or land borders), reinforcing oversight mechanisms and bodies and the independence and proper functioning of existing agencies, fostering protection for whistle-blowers, improving integrity frameworks and lobbying for legislation; regrets the lack of relevant progress made and stresses that final convictions and deterrent penalties are necessary to demonstrate genuine commitment to tackling corruption; calls on Member States to ensure the transparency and accountability of lobbying activities, including the establishment or improvement of mandatory lobbying registers and ‘legislative footprint’ mechanisms for tracking the influence of lobbying activities on lawmaking processes;

    25. Acknowledges the important role of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) in safeguarding the rule of law and combating corruption within the EU; encourages the Commission to closely monitor Member States’ level of cooperation with the EPPO; endorses the reinforcement of the monitoring and coordinative powers of the EPPO with a view to strengthening its ability to combat corruption in Member States; calls on the Commission to propose, under Article 86(4) TFEU, an expansion of the mandate of the EPPO to avoid circumvention of EU restrictive measures and cross-border environmental crimes, and to accelerate the revision of the EPPO Regulation[47] and the Directive on the fight against fraud to the EU’s financial interests by means of criminal law[48] in order to safeguard and clarify the primary competence of the EPPO with regard to corruption offences affecting the EU’s financial interests or committed by EU officials;

    26. Urges all Member States that have not yet done so to join the EPPO in order to enhance the effectiveness of the fight against corruption, particularly in relation to the protection of EU funds; calls on all candidate and potential candidate countries to establish a framework for effective cooperation with the EPPO;

    27. Calls on European bodies such as Europol, Eurojust, the European Court of Auditors, the EPPO and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) to improve their cooperation in the fight against corruption and fraud affecting EU finances;

    28. Calls on the Commission to enhance transparency and accountability in all of its communications, visits and meetings, especially with high-level national actors;

    29. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a directive on combating corruption which harmonises the definition of corruption offences in the public and private sector and the corresponding penalties; welcomes the inclusion of preventive measures, including on illicit political financing and training, in the directive on combating corruption, such as effective rules for the disclosure and management of conflicts of interest, open access to information and effective rules regulating the interaction between the private and the public sector; calls on the Member States to also put in place effective rules to address revolving doors, establish codes of conduct for public officials, establish a public legislative footprint, and ensure transparency in the funding of candidatures for elected public officials and political parties; appreciates that almost all Member States now have anti-corruption strategies in place; regrets, at the same time, that implementation and effectiveness vary; calls on the Member States that have not yet done so to develop and implement robust and effective anti-corruption strategies with the involvement of civil society; underlines the importance of the identification, notification, representation and coordination of victims of corruption; calls on the Member States to protect victims of corruption and enable them to have their views and concerns presented and considered at appropriate stages during criminal proceedings; calls on the Member States to ensure that victims of corruption have the right to adequate and proportionate compensation;

    30. Calls on all the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies to strengthen their anti-corruption measures with regard to the disclosure and management of conflicts of interest, open access to information, rules regulating the interaction of EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies with the private sector, revolving doors and the code of conduct for public officials; considers that during their term of office, Members of the European Parliament should not engage in paid side activities with for-profit organisations or businesses seeking to influence EU policymaking; acknowledges the agreement on establishing the Interinstitutional Body for Ethical Standards;

    31. Recognises the crucial role that whistle-blowers play in exposing corruption and promoting transparency across both the public and private sectors; stresses the need to protect whistle-blowers from retaliation and harassment; calls for independent and autonomous whistle-blower protection authorities to be further strengthened and further integrated into broader national anti-corruption frameworks, ensuring a unified and robust approach to combating corruption throughout all Member States;

    Media pluralism and freedom

    32. Welcomes initiatives to promote free, independent and pluralistic media and a safe and enabling environment for journalists such as the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA)[49] and calls for its swift implementation; calls on the Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to improve transparency in the allocation of state advertising online and offline and to follow the recommendations contained in Commission Recommendation (EU) 2021/1534 of 16 September 2021 on ensuring the protection, safety and empowerment of journalists and other media professionals in the European Union; calls on the Commission to provide the Member States with the necessary assistance in transposing the EMFA into national law, and to monitor its implementation, especially in certain Member States that rank poorly in freedom indices; underlines that the EMFA is a crucial milestone in safeguarding the independence, pluralism and integrity of the media landscape across the Union;

    33. Expresses deep concern over the increasing attacks on journalists and publishers, with a disproportionate impact on women; calls on the Commission and the Member States and on candidate and potential candidate countries to ensure the safety and protection of journalists, including investigative journalists and fact checkers who are particularly exposed; highlights the fact that the most common forms of threat include verbal attacks, online harassment, intimidation through social media and email, and legal threats, including cases covered by the Anti-SLAPP (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’) Directive[50], as well as instances of stalking and personal harassment;

    34. Calls on the Member States to fully implement the Anti-SLAPP Directive and Commission Recommendation (EU) 2022/758 of 27 April 2022 on protecting journalists and human rights defenders who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings[51], and to adopt comprehensive domestic anti-SLAPP measures to protect journalists and provide support for those facing intimidation, defamation and limitations on the ability to exercise their profession; recommends that, when transposing the directive, Member States extend its application to also include national cases, since the majority of SLAPP cases occur at the national level; calls on the Commission to put forward proposals to address SLAPP cases not covered under the current Directive;

    35. Calls for the introduction of specific aggravating circumstances in criminal law for offences committed against journalists when such acts are motivated by or connected to their professional activities;

    36. Urges the Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to protect and promote media freedom and pluralism, ensure transparent allocation of public funds, prevent the concentration of media ownership, protect editorial independence and combat disinformation, particularly through robust laws, including specific provisions on media ownership transparency, and independent regulators; underlines the important role of public service media; welcomes initiatives at national level to create a media registry containing public information about ownership and advertising investment in order to ensure transparency, impartiality and verifiability; further calls on Member States to ensure adequate, sustainable and predictable funding and budgetary stability based on transparent and objective criteria for public service media; recommends the creation of a dedicated EU media freedom fund supporting independent journalism and local media outlets;

    37. Condemns the spread of hate speech, including in mainstream and social media, as it poses a serious threat to democracy and the rule of law; calls for stronger enforcement of media regulations to combat hate speech and safeguard a diverse and inclusive media landscape, in accordance with its resolution of 18 January 2024 on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union; underlines the fact that prominent public figures and politicians have to lead by example and need to ensure a respectful debate; recalls that freedom of expression is a fundamental value of democratic societies and should not be unjustifiably restricted; further recalls that any legislation on hate speech and hate crime should be grounded in the principles of necessity and proportionality; underlines that freedom of expression must be exercised within the law and in line with Article 11 of the Charter and should not be exploited as a shield for hate speech and hate crimes; 

    38. Acknowledges that citizens perceive signs of an erosion of democracy fuelled by misinformation and disinformation, and that the spread of false information through social media could lead to the erosion of general respect for the rule of law; calls on digital platforms to take immediate action by ensuring compliance with their own community standards and European laws, including the Digital Services Act[52] (DSA) and competition rules; calls on the Commission to assess such compliance regularly and take measures where necessary; recommends that Member States, candidate and potential candidate countries develop comprehensive strategies to combat disinformation and foreign interference in democratic processes, while safeguarding freedom of expression and media pluralism;

    39. Strongly condemns state control and political interference in media operations; highlights the fact that media regulators must be adequately protected by legal safeguards to ensure their independence and freedom from political pressure, with sufficient budgetary resources at their disposal; underlines the democratic importance of independent media regulators;

    40. Expresses deep concern over the abuse of spyware and the lack of sufficient safeguards against illegal surveillance of journalists; calls on the Commission to implement the recommendations of Parliament’s PEGA Inquiry Committee on banning politically motivated surveillance;

    41. Urges Member States to ensure that the transposition of Directive (EU) 2016/343[53] on the presumption of innocence does not introduce restrictions on the right to report on and inform the public of matters of public interest, including judicial investigations, that are not provided for by the Directive; calls on Member States to review and, if necessary, modify existing national provisions that could limit journalistic freedoms;

    42. Calls on the Member States to ensure that the national coordinators established under the DSA are fully empowered to perform their role in facilitating information exchange and cooperation at the European level;

    Civil society organisations (CSOs)

    43. Agrees with the Commission’s assessment that CSOs, including those advocating for the rule of law and democracy, the protection of marginalised groups, environmental protection and social justice, and human rights defenders (HRDs) are essential for the checks and balances and for the protection of fundamental values and Union law that are a cornerstone of the EU; appreciates that CSOs and professional associations representing groups such as judges, prosecutors or journalists support the rule of law; underlines, in particular, the importance of local, vibrant civil societies in candidate and potential candidate countries, which play a constructive role in the EU accession processes; recognises their role as watchdogs against rule of law violations and their contribution to promoting and safeguarding democratic principles; recalls the need for a safe, supportive and enabling environment for their work;

    44. Highlights the role of civil society and independent oversight bodies in monitoring, verifying and supporting the implementation of the recommendations of the 2024 Rule of Law Report; calls for a structured civil dialogue framework to integrate civil society contributions into the annual rule of law cycle, as recommended by the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC)[54] and civil society networks[55]; reiterates the importance of broad consultation when drafting the report; supports the Commission’s plan to draft a strategy on space for and the protection of civil society and HRDs; recommends that the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders be fully implemented; calls on the Commission to conduct visits to Member States on-site whenever possible, rather than virtually, as on-site visits could paint a fuller and more contextual picture of the local situation;

    45. Is concerned by the growing trend of CSOs and HRDs facing further legal restrictions, a lack of funding, and attacks, which undermine freedom of association, freedom of assembly and freedom of expression; notes with concern that several Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries have imposed disproportionate measures, including the excessive use of force and the detention of protesters to prevent people from participating in protests in some Member States, as well as pre-emptive bans on public gatherings on the vague grounds of security; stresses that courts have overturned such bans in multiple cases; strongly condemns the use of ‘foreign agent laws’, which stifle dissent, harass CSOs and restrict their operations, creating a chilling effect on civil society and HRDs; regrets the fact that restrictions on freedom of assembly, expression and association and the use of excessive force often disproportionately affect specific causes or groups[56];

    46. Stresses that peaceful assembly, freedom of association and expression, and freedom of the arts and sciences are fundamental rights protected by international law and are essential for democracy; condemns the increased pressure on these rights, where proven, and notes the trend of restricting them; condemns also, in this context, episodes of violence against police forces; calls on the Commission to reflect these freedoms in the annual report;

    47. Expresses deep concern about the shrinking civic space and increasing persecution of CSOs and HRDs in the EU, particularly those working on anti-racism, climate justice, LGBTIQ rights, women’s rights and migrant supports; notes that these groups face a range of threats including legal and financial restrictions, funding suspensions, smear campaigns, intimidation and criminalisation; condemns, in particular, the growing repression of climate activism in several Member States, including the misuse of anti-terrorism and organised crime laws and the classification of peaceful climate activists as members of ‘criminal organisations’; calls on the Member States to refrain from disproportionate legal action against such activists; urges the Commission to systematically monitor the situation of these organisations in its rule of law reports and to expand dedicated EU funding for civil society actors combating racism and working on other fundamental rights;

    48. Calls on the Commission to address such breaches in a dedicated pillar of the annual rule of law reports; calls on the Commission to strengthen the protection of CSOs and HRDs, by establishing early warning mechanisms, increasing the transparency of funding for all actors in the scope of the EU Transparency Register and expanding funding to support CSOs to enable them to operate freely and independently;

    49. Urges the Member States to create an enabling environment for CSOs and HRDs, adopt the Anti-SLAPP Directive, and implement Commission Recommendation (EU) 2022/758 to protect CSOs from legal harassment; calls for strengthened independence of national oversight bodies, with adequate resources and safeguards against political interference; encourages support for CSOs in developing and disseminating educational initiatives to ensure broad outreach and accessibility;

    50. Considers that the Commission and the Member States should improve funding mechanisms for CSOs and initiatives that strengthen the judiciary and uphold court independence, namely through the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme and the Justice programme; welcomes the fact that the Commission plans to draft a strategy for protecting civil society, recalls, at the same time, that there should be a special focus on HRDs; calls on the Commission to include a rapid response mechanism to support threatened CSOs and HRDs within the Union, drawing on the model of the EU-funded ‘Protect Defenders’ mechanism, which currently has a non-EU focus only; emphasises that this mechanism could provide resources for advocacy, legal aid and awareness campaigns, while ensuring that these organisations can operate without undue restrictions or harassment; calls for the full and consistent application of the Union guidelines on HRDs in candidate and potential candidate countries; is concerned, however, by the growing trend in some Member States of CSOs and HRDs facing challenges, with new legal restrictions, a lack of funding, and physical or verbal attacks, and by the deplorable acceptance of such practices and the chilling effect thereof, including on their freedom of speech within the Member States[57] and the EU institutions; considers that CSOs and HRDs play an essential supportive role in monitoring Member States’ compliance with the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU;

    Equality and non-discrimination before the law

    51. Recalls that Member States’ legal frameworks must enshrine equal legal treatment and promote equality and the right of individuals not to be discriminated against in judicial proceedings; stresses that the rule of law and fundamental rights are interlinked and that violations of the rule of law have an immediate impact on fundamental rights and disproportionately affect women, minorities and vulnerable groups; calls on the Commission to monitor the effect of any violations of the rule of law on fundamental rights and to ensure that equality and non-discrimination before the law for all people are protected through the use of all relevant instruments, including infringement procedures, where appropriate;

    52. Stresses the need to fight against all types of discrimination before the law; expresses its concern over the lack of progress in and implementation of equality and anti-discrimination laws in some Member States; regrets the fact that, despite existing EU legislation such as Directive 2000/78/EC[58] on equal treatment, gaps in the legal framework and in implementation persist, leaving victims without adequate legal recourse; recalls that Member States’ legal frameworks must enshrine equal legal treatment and promote equality and the right of individuals not to be discriminated against in legal remedy; calls on the Commission to act in cases of non-compliance with these principles; deplores the intention of the Commission to withdraw the proposal for a horizontal equal treatment directive[59] and urges the Council to adopt the directive without further delay;

    53. Is concerned that the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report noted that some Member States fail to effectively prosecute hate crimes or provide sufficient support to victims of hate crimes, undermining trust in judicial systems and perpetuating inequality before the law; calls on the Council to extend the current list of ‘EU crimes’ in Article 83(1) TFEU to include hate crimes and hate speech and calls on the Commission to put forward a legislative proposal on hate crime and hate speech; asks the Commission to focus on hate crimes in its rule of law reports and, in this regard, to closely monitor and record hate crimes;

    54. Underlines that gender-based violence, online and offline, is a major and pervasive offence, as well as a radical violation of fundamental rights, and it violates the principle of equality before the law; calls on the Commission and the Member States to take action against gender-based violence, both online and offline, including violence committed through the use of digital platforms; calls for gender-based violence to be added to the list of EU crimes and for an EU legislative proposal on combating rape based on the lack of consent, also in candidate and potential candidate countries;

    55. Recalls the need for access to sexual and reproductive rights and health and calls for access to safe, legal abortion to be enshrined in the Charter;

    56. Calls on all Member States to protect LGBTIQ rights in compliance with Union law, the Charter, and CJEU and ECtHR case-law, recalls that legal barriers to recognising same-sex partnerships or parenthood across borders persist in several Member States; warns that such practices not only hinder the free movement of LGBTIQ families within the EU, but also violate the rule of law principle of non-discrimination before the law, highlighting the lack of uniform protection for LGBTIQ individuals across Member States; calls on the Member States who have not yet done so to introduce legal recognition of same-sex partnerships; calls on the Commission to recast Directive 2004/38/EC[60] in order to include an explicit cross-border recognition of private and family life rights, including parenthood for same-sex parents, in the light of the latest rulings[61] of the CJEU; stresses that all children are equal before the law and that Member States must act in the best interests of the child, increase legal certainty and reduce discrimination against the children of same-sex parents; recalls Parliament’s position supporting the recognition of parenthood across the EU, irrespective of how a child is conceived or born, or the type of family they have; urges the Commission to present a renewed LGBTIQ strategy that fully addresses the challenges throughout Europe; calls on the Commission and the Council to make LGBTIQ rights a cross-cutting priority across all policy fields; calls on the Commission to put forward appropriate legislative measures to ensure respect for these principles, as well as to rely on infringement procedures against Member States; urges the Commission to present legislative proposals to combat hate crimes and hate speech on grounds of gender identity, sex characteristics and sexual orientation;

    57. Is deeply concerned about the discriminatory measures introduced in some Member States under the pretext of fighting ‘LGBTIQ propaganda’ and ‘gender ideology’ which are contributing to an alarming increase in hate crimes and hate speech targeting LGBTIQ individuals in several Member States and have a negative impact on children, families and workers; highlights the negative impact of such measures on the freedom of expression and assembly for LGBTIQ groups and beyond; emphasises that these actions encourage discrimination against LGBTIQ individuals and contravene EU law; urges the Commission to present a proposal for a binding EU ban on conversion practices in all Member States; notes that in 2024, both the Commission and the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) noted an alarming increase in hate crimes and hate speech targeting LGBTIQ individuals and other minorities in several Member States, stresses the importance of the right to self-determination of LGBTIQ persons and reminds Member States that, in accordance with case-law, the right to self-determination is a fundamental right; therefore urges all Member States who have not done so yet to make sure that LGBTIQ individuals have access to legal gender recognition;

    58. Is deeply concerned by and strongly condemns the rising levels of anti-Semitism across the EU; is also deeply concerned and strongly condemns the rising levels of Islamophobia and all other forms of discrimination across the EU, including acts of violence, intimidation, hate speech and the display of hate symbols in public spaces; calls on the Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to make sure that members of all minorities are equal before the law; calls on the Member States to review laws and policies to ensure that they do not discriminate against minorities, directly or indirectly, and to review any discriminatory legal provisions and regulations; calls for sustained efforts at both EU and national levels to monitor, prevent and prosecute related hate crimes and to protect Jewish and Muslim communities from harassment and violence;

    59. Emphasises that a lack of accountability disproportionately affects minorities’ communities, fair political representation, and economic opportunities; calls for increased transparency in public decision-making processes to ensure inclusive and equitable governance;

    60. Calls on the Member States to fully implement Directive 2024/1500[62] and Directive 2024/1499[63], which establish minimum standards for equality bodies; calls for concrete measures to guarantee their independence and ensure their effectiveness in promoting equality;

    61. Underlines that third-country nationals legally residing in the EU, regardless of their nationality or place of birth, must be treated in a non-discriminatory manner and enjoy fair and equal treatment in the areas specified by existing legislation; points out that third-country nationals, regardless of their nationality, place of birth or residence status, have the right to apply for international protection in compliance with international and EU law, of which the non-refoulement principle is an integral part; calls on the Commission to support the Member States in upholding the rule of law and fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter and in implementing the legislation adopted by the co-legislators; stresses the binding nature of the judgments of the CJEU and the ECtHR;

    62. Urges the Commission to ensure that the free movement of persons within the EU, the right to reside freely, and family reunification are fully respected in the EU territory and that every citizen can enjoy equal rights and fully exercise their rights;

    63. Urges the Commission to strengthen the focus in the annual rule of law report on strengthening the fight against all forms of discrimination in access to justice; calls on the Commission and the Member States to combat discrimination on grounds of racial and ethnic origin, religion or belief, nationality, political opinion, language, disability, age, gender, including gender identity and gender expression, and sexual orientation; urges the Council to reach an agreement on Directive 2008/0140(CNS)[64]; urges the Commission to introduce new pillars in the annual rule of law report focusing on combating all forms of hatred and discrimination as enshrined in Article 21 of the Charter, namely regarding crimes that target minority groups and members of national, ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities, as well as the conditions of civil society in Member States; calls on the Commission to require Member States to collect comparable and robust disaggregated equality data to fully assess the impact of structural discrimination on the rule of law; calls on the Commission to reconsider its position on the Minority SafePack Initiative and to put forward legislative initiatives to safeguard the promotion of minority rights and language rights; reiterates its call for the EU to accede to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages; calls for closer ties between the EU and the Council of Europe on minority rights, including in view of the enlargement process;

    64. Emphasises the need for Member States to address the gender gap in the judiciary and other key democratic institutions; recommends implementing targeted measures to increase women’s representation in senior judicial and public administration positions;

    65. Calls on the Member States to establish national human rights institutions, in accordance with the UN Paris Principles, to guarantee their independence and to ensure that they have the capacity to carry out their tasks effectively;

    Single market and the rule of law

    66. Highlights the importance of the rule of law in ensuring the smooth and efficient functioning of the single market and reaffirms that well-functioning, independent judicial systems, effective anti-corruption frameworks and strong protection of media freedom are crucial for maintaining fair competition, upholding legal certainty and fostering trust among economic operators; underlines that non-compliance and circumvention of European regulations lead to enormous distortions of competition in the internal market; emphasises that reliable and stable rule of law structures are key pillars for investment and trade, which are essential for competitiveness and, therefore, for the capacity of the welfare system and the labour market in the EU;

    67. Stresses that the proper functioning of the single market depends on the effective application of the principle of mutual trust and recognition in both judicial and administrative cooperation; recalls that such trust can only be sustained where the rule of law – as also recommended by the Venice Commission in its rule of law checklist – is fully upheld; indicates that the principle of mutual recognition should be suspended in cases of systemic breaches;

    68. Underlines the negative economic impact that corruption and weak judiciary systems have on investor confidence and cross-border cooperation; is concerned that national governments and institutions which fail to uphold the rule of law may allow anti-competitive behaviour to flourish, or may even actively encourage it for political or economic gain, thereby potentially damaging the EU’s economy and undermining the fairness of its internal market;

    69. Recalls that, within the scope of application of the Treaties, any discrimination on the grounds of nationality is prohibited in accordance with the Charter, and that freedom of establishment, service provision and movement of capital are fundamental to the single market; underlines that the rules regarding equality of treatment forbid overt and covert discrimination by reason of nationality or, in the case of a company, its seat; recalls its condemnation of the reported systemic discriminatory, non-transparent and unfair practices against companies in some Member States;

    70. Condemns systemic discriminatory practices in Hungary, including the misuse of EU funds to benefit political allies, violations of EU competition rules, and the concentration of businesses in the hands of oligarchs with ties to the government; deplores the release of EU funds to the Hungarian Government despite ongoing deficiencies in judicial independence and anti-corruption frameworks; recommends suspending disbursements until all rule of law benchmarks are met; urges the Commission to ensure that EU funds reach the Hungarian population, including through direct and indirect funding mechanisms for beneficiaries independent of the Hungarian Government;

    71. Highlights the importance of addressing economic inequality and social exclusion as threats to democratic participation and the rule of law;

    72. Calls on the Commission to integrate the single market dimension of the rule of law more explicitly into its monitoring mechanisms, with a stronger focus on the uniform and rapid application, implementation and enforcement of existing legislation, ensuring that Member States’ adherence to rule of law principles is assessed not only from a democratic and judicial standpoint but also in terms of its economic impact on the single market and financial stability; requests that the Commission include in its 2025 rule of law report a dedicated chapter on the single market dimension; urges the Commission to use all available legal tools to address rule of law deficiencies, including launching infringement procedures and competition law enforcement powers when necessary, to preserve the functioning of the internal market;

    Rule of law toolbox

    73. Stresses the importance of embedding rule of law milestones in funding instruments such as the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF); deplores the release of EU funds to the Hungarian Government despite ongoing deficiencies in judicial independence and anti-corruption frameworks; recommends suspending disbursements until all rule of law benchmarks are met; urges the Commission to ensure that EU funds reach the Hungarian population, including through direct and indirect funding mechanisms for beneficiaries independent of the Hungarian Government, while maintaining the full impact of the measures taken;

    74. Criticises the Council’s inaction in advancing ongoing Article 7 TEU proceedings, which weakens the EU’s credibility in upholding the rule of law; urges the Council to unblock the next steps in the Article 7 TEU procedure in relation to Hungary, given persistent violations on judicial independence, media freedom and civil society, which necessitate immediate and decisive action; recommends that the Council ensure that hearings take place at least once per presidency during ongoing Article 7 procedures and also that new developments affecting the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights are addressed; emphasises that there is no need for unanimity in the Council in order to identify a clear risk of a serious breach of Union values under Article 7(1) TEU, or to address concrete recommendations to the Member States in question and provide deadlines for the implementation of those recommendations; reiterates its call on the Council to do so, underlining that any further delaying of such action would amount to a breach of the rule of law principle by the Council itself; insists that Parliament should have a more active role in Article 7 TEU proceedings, including the ability to present reasoned proposals to the Council, attend Council hearings and be fully informed at every stage of the procedure;

    75. Welcomes the preventive tools in the rule of law toolbox, such as the annual rule of law cycle, the EU justice scoreboard, the European Semester, EU funds to support civil society, judicial networks and media freedom and the rule of law milestones in the RRF; insists that a closer link between the findings of the 2024 Rule of Law Report and the allocation of financial support under the Union budget is introduced, in terms of milestones, ensuring that EU funds are tied to the achievement of necessary reforms; calls on the Commission to further develop a direct link between preventive and reactive instruments and hence, on the basis of the findings in the annual rule of law reports, to promptly and in a coordinated manner launch infringement procedures, set further steps in applying the Article 7 TEU procedure, and apply the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation and the horizontal enabling conditions related to the Charter, as well as provisions from the Financial Regulation and Common Provisions Regulation; calls on the Commission to assess and report on the potential risks to the Union budget posed by weaknesses in rule of law regimes in the annual rule of law reports starting with the 2025 report; underlines that both the triggering of the reactive instruments and the closure of relevant procedures must be based on the objective criterion of compliance with the rule of law and with EU and international law as interpreted by international courts;

    76. Calls on the Commission to systemically resort to expedited procedures and applications for interim measures before the CJEU in infringement cases; calls on the Commission to revise its policy, outlined in its 2022 communication on enforcing EU law[65], not to use infringement actions for ‘individual’ redress, as this policy has led to serious deprivation of rights for citizens across the EU, especially where their own governments are refusing to comply with EU law or CJEU judgments, also because most of these cases are not merely individual but address strategic and fundamental issues; asks the Commission to report annually on the application and effectiveness of the tools used against breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Member States;

    77. Underlines the need for an ever more comprehensive toolbox ensuring compliance, beyond its budgetary dimension, with EU values across all Union law, including financial instruments, to prevent backsliding; urges the Commission to identify the gaps and present relevant proposals broadening the scope of this toolbox; supports stronger application of the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation, with cross-cutting conditionality in EU funding programmes; maintains its position that frozen EU funds should only be released once meaningful reforms have been fully implemented and rule of law compliance has been verifiably achieved in practice; emphasises the need for consistency and transparency in applying the toolbox to protect Union values, without political considerations and using objective criteria to trigger reactive instruments; highlights the fact that conditionality should equally apply to candidate and potential candidate countries; insists on the importance of Parliament’s role in overseeing the use of those tools; urges the Commission to conduct systematic audits of the distribution of EU funds to prevent conflicts of interest, political instrumentalisation or opacity in fund allocation at the national level;

    78. Insists on the introduction of a performance-based instrument in the multiannual financial framework (MFF) to strengthen the alignment between EU funds and the respect for Union values enshrined in Article 2 TEU such as democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law; requests that the future MFF include robust rule of law safeguards applicable to all EU funds;

    79. Expresses concern that the suspension of EU funds could be misused as a political weapon against civil society and local authorities; recalls that the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation ensures that final recipients should not lose access to EU funds if sanctions are applied to their government; calls for ‘smart conditionality’ that would enable national governments undermining the rule of law to be bypassed by allocating decommitted EU funds directly to local and regional authorities and to non-governmental organisations and businesses that comply with EU law, as well as by simplifying the reallocation of funds intended for the benefit of the Member State in question to other EU programmes; proposes the establishment of a transparent system for local authorities to request EU funds when national governments block or misuse EU funds; stresses the importance of strictly applying the conditionality mechanisms as enshrined in the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance and in the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans in a transparent manner;

    Checks and balances

    80. Underlines the importance of safeguarding the separation of powers and a stable institutional framework in every Member State; calls on the Member States to ensure that any constitutional or legislative reforms affecting the separation of powers fully comply with EU fundamental values and legal principles;

    81. Calls on the Member States to refrain from excessively using accelerated procedures that bypass stakeholder and civil society consultation, including parliamentary scrutiny or emergency powers, as these negatively impact the stability and the quality of lawmaking and democracy; calls on the Member States to set up transparent lawmaking processes following systematic and public consultation with various stakeholders and advisory bodies;

    82. Encourages national governments and parliaments to publish publicly accessible impact assessments and consultation findings for every major legislative proposal;

    83. Underlines the recommendation of the Venice Commission that complaints and appeals in the case of electoral irregularities, in particular with regard to vote buying, ballot-box stuffing and incorrect vote counting, be followed up effectively; recalls the importance of the EU legislation adopted in this regard, namely the DSA, the Digital Markets Act[66], the AI Act[67], Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising[68] and the EMFA; calls on the Commission and the Member States to fully implement these acts and provide adequate public resources for the measures under them;

    84. Calls on the Member States to strengthen the independence of national oversight bodies in order to ensure resources and freedom from political interference; stresses the importance of civil society and HRDs in promoting accountability and protecting fundamental rights;

    85. Expresses deep concern about the rise of extremism and its corrosive effect on democratic norms and the rule of law in several Member States; notes with concern that extremist groups actively target minorities and contribute to a climate of fear, discrimination and polarisation; calls on the Commission to explicitly identify such groups as a threat to democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms, including academic and media independence, in its annual rule of law report; urges the Member States to take decisive action to counter their influence through robust legal frameworks, education promoting democratic values, and support for CSOs countering extremism; calls for coordinated EU action to counter this threat, including through education, social inclusion programmes and, where necessary, legal measures;

    86. Expresses concern about the reported cases of the use of surveillance technologies by Member State governments against journalists, activists, opposition figures and staff of the EU institutions; recalls that the use of spyware must be strictly proportionate and necessary and urges the Commission to present a plan of measures to prevent its abuse without undue delay, making full use of all available legislative means provided by the Treaties, as recommended by the PEGA Committee;

    87. Notes with concern the increasing use of artificial intelligence for national security and law enforcement purposes across the EU, stressing the risks to fundamental rights and freedoms[69]; recalls the need to ensure robust data protection safeguards when Member States or national authorities employ surveillance software; calls for strengthened EU legislation to prevent mass surveillance and discrimination;

    88. Is concerned about foreign interference in the Member States and in candidate and potential candidate countries, including social media manipulation and disinformation by forces both inside and outside the Union to manipulate public opinion and distort democratic debate; stresses the importance of transparency in platform algorithms, independent audits and robust fact-checking mechanisms to combat disinformation and safeguard democracy; calls on major digital platforms to cooperate with national law enforcement authorities to support investigations into illegal online activities; calls on the Commission and the Member States to monitor this and to apply the DSA and the Digital Markets Act swiftly, particularly regarding very large online platforms; calls on the Commission to include greater scrutiny of online platform disinformation in Pillar 3 (Pluralism and Media Freedom) of its rule of law report;

    89. Stresses the importance of academic freedom as an integral aspect of the rule of law and urges the Member States to protect universities from political interference and ensure institutional autonomy; encourages the Member States to foster a culture of the rule of law through awareness campaigns, outreach initiatives and action promoting democratic values and principles;

    90. Invites the Commission and the Member States to consider engaging in a process focused on improving administrative procedures and practices that have an impact on the functioning of key democratic processes and the exercise of checks and balances in line with the EU’s established, shared principles;

    Horizontal recommendations

    91. Recognises the Commission’s rule of law report as a key preventive tool for monitoring the state of the rule of law across the EU, facilitating dialogue between Member States, and guiding reforms in areas such as judicial independence, anti-corruption, media freedom and other checks and balances;

    92. Acknowledges that the Commission’s rule of law report has become more comprehensive since its inception in 2020; deplores, however, the fact that essential elements from Parliament’s 2016 resolution have not yet been implemented and that the Commission has not fully addressed the recommendations made by Parliament in its previous resolutions; considers that these recommendations remain valid and reiterates them; calls for the inclusion in the annual report of important missing elements of the Venice Commission’s rule of law checklist, such as prevention of the abuse of powers, equality before the law and non-discrimination; reiterates its position that the report should cover the full scope of the values of Article 2 TEU, as these cannot be seen in isolation; asks the Commission to explore the potential release, at around the same time, of all reports related to the rule of law or fundamental rights, such as the annual reports on compliance with the Charter or the report by the FRA, in order to enable a simultaneous global debate on these issues; regrets, however, that despite the growing threats of disinformation, propaganda and information manipulation targeting European democracy, a similar peer review practice among the Member States, in support of the efforts of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, has not yet been considered;

    93. Calls on the Commission to expand the scope of the report next year; insists that the Commission’s 2025 rule of law report cover the entire scope of Article 2 TEU and include broader indicators, such as media independence, the role of civil society, fundamental rights, academic and artistic freedom, gender equality, the protection of minorities and vulnerable groups, respect for international law, free and fair elections and the functioning of democratic institutions, in order to provide a fuller picture of rule of law standards across the EU, and in candidate and potential candidate countries;

    94. Calls on the Commission to publish the criteria it uses to select information from civil society, international bodies, national authorities and other stakeholders in the process of their rule of law reporting; repeats its call on the Commission to invite the FRA to provide methodological advice and conduct comparative research in order to add detail in key areas of the annual report, given the intrinsic links between fundamental rights and the rule of law;

    95. Encourages the Commission to use clearer language and transparent assessment rules to evaluate compliance with the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; reiterates its call to the Commission to differentiate clearly between systemic and isolated breaches of the rule of law in Member States, to avoid the risk of trivialising the most serious breaches of the rule of law, and to make clear that when the values of Article 2 TEU are systematically, deliberately and gravely violated over a period of time, Member States could fail to meet all criteria that define a democracy; indicates that the recommendations should better reflect negative findings in the report and be more detailed; believes that the assessment of the fulfilment of previous recommendations should be more precise and qualitative, not relying only on legislative changes but also on real and independent evidence of their implementation in practice; invites the Commission to conduct field visits and provide assessments based on concrete and independent evidence of implementation in practice;

    96. Warns that failing to link monitoring to real consequences risks diminishing the report’s relevance in the Member States; calls for a greater focus on implementing country-specific recommendations, with timelines and measurable benchmarks, including, where relevant, reference to existing opinions of international bodies (e.g. the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission, UN Special Rapporteurs) or relevant court rulings (including from the ECtHR); calls on the Commission to detail the possible consequences in the event of non-compliance, including by referring to specific instruments from the toolbox, which includes budgetary tools and funding conditionality; believes that certain breaches of the values deserve immediate enforcement action and other breaches require recommendations to be implemented urgently; urges the Member States to implement the recommendations outlined in previous reports and commends those Member States that have not only implemented the recommendations but have also exceeded the established standards;

    97. Notes that the release date of the annual rule of law report in July is not conducive to generating sufficient visibility and is contrary to the report’s intended purpose of generating a genuine public debate about its findings; urges the Commission to reconsider the publication date and undertake additional efforts to make its findings widely known in all Member States;

    98. Recalls that decisions taken or not taken by the EU institutions often influence the rule of law situation in the Member States; criticises the fact that the rule of law status at the EU institutions remains outside the scope of the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report; requests that a chapter on the EU’s adherence to rule of law standards, based on an independent review mechanism, be included in the Commission’s 2025 rule of law report;

    99. Proposes a comprehensive interinstitutional mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights covering all the values set out in Article 2 TEU and involving all EU institutions, Member States and candidate countries in order to foster uniformity; reiterates the proposal to create a permanent group of eminent personalities (‘wise persons group’) composed of independent legal, academic and human rights experts, tasked with systematically monitoring rule of law developments in Member States and providing regular assessments, recommendations and early warnings to the Commission; emphasises the need to ensure full independence and objectivity in the composition and functioning of this body, while adapting its mandate specifically to address rule of law challenges;

    100. Believes that EU-level interinstitutional dialogue and cooperation on the rule of law should be strengthened; regrets the fact that the Commission and the Council have so far rejected its offer to enter into an interinstitutional agreement on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights; reaffirms its willingness to resume talks on this agreement; calls on the other institutions, in the meantime, to at least explore further cooperation in the context of the proposed interinstitutional pilot on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights, which would help build trust between the institutions in a practical way, in particular by sharing monitoring, dialogue and meeting practices; calls on the Council to make its rule of law dialogue more inclusive by inviting other institutions, such as the Venice Commission, the Human Rights Commissioner and representatives of Parliament, to its sessions; believes that the Council’s rule of law dialogue should become more interactive, with systematic provision of feedback; calls on the Member States to invest in proper preparation for this dialogue; emphasises that increased transparency would enhance the rule of law dialogue within the Union and therefore invites the Council to provide detailed public conclusions; urges the Council to engage with national parliaments to enhance democratic oversight of Member States’ compliance with EU rule of law standards; stresses that the rule of law report should be evidence-based and objective, addressing the Member States and EU institutions, and should include preventive and corrective measures;

    101. Calls on the Member States to ensure that emergency measures adopted in response to crises (such as pandemics or security threats) are subject to regular parliamentary scrutiny and judicial review, and are strictly time-limited and proportionate;

    102. Considers that cooperation between the EU and international organisations such as the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the UN in promoting and defending democracy, the rule of law, fundamental freedoms and human rights, including the rights of minorities, should be further strengthened;

    103. Encourages the Member States to develop and implement comprehensive civic education programmes that foster understanding of democratic institutions, the rule of law and fundamental rights among citizens of all ages;

    104. Deplores the fact that the Commission has not incorporated many of Parliament’s repeated requests regarding the Commission’s rule of law reports; demands that the Commission issue a communication by 31 December 2025 detailing which of the requests adopted by Parliament in relation to the Commission’s rule of law reports since 2021 the Commission will implement, which it will not, and why;

    105. Welcomes the extension of the Commission’s rule of law report to cover candidate countries, namely Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia, reinforcing the fact that the EU’s fundamental values must be respected not only by current Member States but also by future members during the accession processes; encourages a close evaluation of the rule of law in all countries in an accession process; encourages the Commission to provide concrete recommendations to accession countries on the state of the rule of law, and to ensure alignment with the enlargement report; expects the Commission to include all candidate countries in its 2025 rule of law report;

    °

    ° °

    106. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, the Council of Europe and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI: Node AI ($GPU) Launches Phase 01 of GPU Aggregator with AWS, Azure, Vast AI & More — Alongside GPU DAO & Staking 2.0

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    San Jose, CA, June 04, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Node AI, the decentralized AI compute protocol powered by the $GPU token, has officially announced Phase 01 of its groundbreaking GPU Aggregator — a one-click deployment solution integrating GPUs from AWS, Azure, Vast AI, GCP, RunPod, and 50+ global providers.

    Why it matters:

    • Developers get faster, cheaper, smarter AI compute
    • $GPU holders enjoy exclusive deployment discounts
    • Aggregator boosts network revenue and increases staking value

    With this launch, Node AI is redefining compute accessibility, positioning itself as the go-to AI infrastructure layer in the decentralized ecosystem.

    GPU Aggregator Phase 01: A Unified Compute Marketplace

    The GPU Aggregator is a one-click gateway to global compute — a single interface that connects:

    • AWSAzureVast AIGCPRunPod, and 50+ GPU providers
    • Enables real-time selection of best pricing and performance
    • Offers $GPU-holder-exclusive deployment discounts
    • Makes deploying LLMs and AI workloads frictionless and cost-efficient

    This aggregator launch is a major unlock in Node AI’s goal to democratize access to high-performance compute.

    Decentralized GPU Renting & Lending

    Node AI connects GPU owners and AI developers:

    • Lend idle GPU power and earn $GPU
    • Rent compute on-demand via smart contracts
    • Fully permissionless and automated provisioning

    Whether you’re training a model or serving live inference, Node AI’s infrastructure is enterprise-ready.

    Tokenomics & Revenue Model

    • 100M max supply
    • ~96M circulating
    • No VC or team tokens
    • Real revenue model — ETH fees from compute usage are distributed to stakers

    This sustainable design prioritizes long-term growth and fair participation.

    Real Revenue, Fair Launch, No VC Tokens

    Unlike many competitors, Node AI has:

    • No team tokens or VC allocations
    • 100% real revenue model — ETH from GPU node rentals supports staking rewards
    • A total supply of 100M $GPU, with ~96M in circulation

    This token model is designed for sustainability, favoring long-term holders and infrastructure participants.

    Roadmap Highlights: What’s Coming Next?

    • Scalable AI Endpoints for deploying inference workloads
    • AI Compute Marketplace integration with aggregator
    • Benchmarking Suite for hardware performance transparency
    • GPU Aggregator Expansion with deeper routing intelligence
    • dApp integrations for AI projects to tap into decentralized compute seamlessly

    Hardware Backbone: Built for AI Performance

    Node AI’s compute backbone is built with high-end specs:

    • NVIDIA A100 and upcoming H100 GPUs
    • Enterprise-grade cooling and power infrastructure
    • Redundant systems to guarantee uptime for AI model deployment and inference tasks

    The platform allows users to deploy AI endpoints instantly — a huge leap for accessibility in AI hosting.

    Node AI is Becoming the Backbone of Decentralized AI Compute

    With the GPU Aggregator Phase 01 liveGPU DAO active, and Staking 2.0 generating real ETH rewardsNode AI is building one of the most advanced decentralized AI infrastructures in the space.

    Whether you’re an AI dev, a GPU owner, or a crypto staker — Node AI is where utility, rewards, and decentralization converge.

    Learn more: https://nodeai.app
    Whitepaper: https://docs.nodes.ai/
    Follow: https://twitter.com/NodeAIETH

    Disclaimer: The information provided in this press release is not a solicitation for investment, nor is it intended as investment advice, financial advice, or trading advice. It is strongly recommended you practice due diligence, including consultation with a professional financial advisor, before investing in or trading cryptocurrency and securities.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI USA: Warnock, Tillis Unleash Animal Shelters to Fetch More Donations

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator Reverend Raphael Warnock – Georgia
    Today, Senators Reverend Warnock and Tillis introduced the BARK Act, to make it easier for animal shelters to accept pet food and supplies 
    Senator Reverend Warnock: “This common-sense, bipartisan legislation protects good-faith donations, making the donation process easier and less stressful, allowing much needed resources to go to dogs and cats waiting for adoption instead of being thrown away”
    Senator Tillis: “No shelter pet should have to go hungry when so many pet stores have a surplus of readily available food”
    Washington, D.C. – Today, U.S. Senators Reverend Raphael Warnock (D-GA) and Thom Tillis (R-NC) reintroduced the bipartisan Bring Animals Relief and Kibble Act, which encourages donations to animal shelters by providing liability protections for good-faith donations of pet food and supplies.
    “Georgia animal shelters around the state are struggling to keep their doors open, we should make it easier for local businesses to donate pet food and supplies,” said Senator Warnock. “This common-sense, bipartisan legislation protects good-faith donations, making the donation process easier and less stressful, allowing much needed resources to go to dogs and cats waiting for adoption instead of being thrown away.”
    “Every year, pet stores throw out surplus pet food, which could easily be donated to feed hungry pets in animal shelters,” said Senator Tillis. “This commonsense legislation removes unnecessary bureaucratic restrictions that keep many pet stores from donating food to animal shelters. No shelter pet should have to go hungry when so many pet stores have a surplus of readily available food.”
    The BARK Act will help boost donations of pet food and supplies to animal shelters as shelters across Georgia face overcrowding and rising costs. The bipartisan legislation aims to support overwhelmed animal shelters and reduce wasted pet food and supplies sitting in landfills by providing donor liability protections to businesses, individuals, nonprofits, and government entities that provide good-faith donations of pet food and supplies to animal shelters. 
    This bill is endorsed by the Humane World Action Fund, Best Friends Animal Society, Pet Food Institute, and American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA).
    A companion bill was introduced in the House by Representatives Jamie Raskin (D-MD-08) and Young Kim (R-CA-40).
    Read the BARK Act HERE

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Completes the Third and Fourth Reviews under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement and Approves US$58 Million Disbursement for the Central African Republic

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    June 4, 2025

    • The IMF Executive Board today completed the third and fourth reviews under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement for the Central African Republic (CAR). The completion of the third and fourth reviews allows for an immediate disbursement of SDR 43.22 million (about US$58 million) to CAR to address protracted balance of payment needs and sustaining priority spending on basic public services.
    • Economic growth is expected to accelerate to 3 percent in 2025, up from 1.9 percent in 2024, while inflation is projected to decline gradually. The outlook depends on faster fuel market and governance reforms, and increased grant and concessional financing.
    • Program performance was mixed, while downside risks remain substantial.

    Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed today the third and fourth reviews of the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement for the Central African Republic (CAR). The ECF arrangement, with access of SDR 147.48 million (about US$197 million), was approved by the IMF Executive Board in April 2023 (see Press Release No. 23/129). The completion of these reviews allows for the immediate disbursement of SDR 43.22 million (about US$58 million) bringing total disbursements under the ECF arrangement to SDR 92.29 million (around US$124 million).

    In completing the reviews, the Executive Board also approved the authorities’ request for waivers of nonobservance of the performance criteria (PC) for the end-June 2024 and end-December 2024 domestic primary fiscal balance and net domestic financing. The Executive Board also approved the authorities’ request for a waiver of nonobservance of the continuous PC on non-accumulation of new external arrears. Further, the Executive Board completed the financing assurances review under the ECF arrangement.

    The ECF arrangement is part of coordinated efforts by international financial institutions to support the people of CAR. It will continue to help the country meet the protracted balance of payments needs and sustain spending on basic public services, including in the health and education sectors. Program implementation has helped anchor structural reforms and financing. Fuel supply and revenue have improved. Progress is being made in digitalizing the revenue administration and PFM systems, along with enhancements to the Financial Intelligence Unit and the Court of Audit. Completing the combined reviews creates new opportunities for positive outcomes.

    Economic activity is projected to expand by 3 percent in 2025, up from 1.9 percent in 2024, driven by higher energy use, mining recovery, infrastructure projects, and improved security. Inflation would ease by end-2025, in part helped by the cut in pump prices in May 2025. Still, a tighter fiscal stance is needed to arrest rising debt vulnerabilities. The domestic primary deficit would narrow to 2.1 percent of GDP in 2025 from 4.9 percent in 2024, assuming bold political backing for the agreed measures on tax administration and compliance. Reinforced spending controls are also key ahead of elections and cuts in humanitarian aid.

    The overhaul of the fuel market remains pivotal for macroeconomic stabilization and both sustained and inclusive growth in CAR. The fuel procurement audit should be accelerated to underpin price reforms and address persistent inefficiencies. Despite recent supply increases and price cuts, pump prices remain high due to costly and opaque imports. Transparent use of the recent diesel grant and a thorough audit of costs and margins could help enhance competition, improve supply efficiency, and boost fiscal revenue.

    Following the Executive Board’s discussion, Mr. Kenji Okamura, Deputy Managing Director and Acting Chair, issued the following statement:

    “The Central African Republic (CAR) has shown renewed commitment to structural reforms under the ECF-arrangement despite facing deep-rooted fragility and significant uncertainty. Both financial and technical support from development partners remain vital to the program’s success, to overcome weak capacity, elevated revenue volatility, and to alleviate humanitarian needs.

    “Program performance for the combined third and fourth reviews was mixed, which is being addressed with strong corrective actions. Half of the six PCs for end-June and end-December 2024 were met. Still, the domestic primary deficit and net domestic financing targets were missed by wide margins, as was the continuous PC on non-accumulation of external arrears. The indicative targets for social spending and expenditures via extraordinary procedures were also missed.

    “Strengthening tax compliance and controls is key to boosting revenue but requires strong political support. Accelerating the fuel procurement audit is also essential to address inefficiencies and enable further reductions in pump prices. A well-functioning fuel market is vital for fiscal and macroeconomic stability.

    “Program performance depends on stronger public financial management (PFM), particularly spending controls ahead of the elections. Improved PFM is essential to prevent arrears, limit extraordinary procedures, and ensure effective social spending. It would also help mobilize grants and concessional financing, reduce costly regional borrowing, and safeguard debt sustainability.

    “Enhancing governance will reinforce PFM efforts. Progress in strengthening the Financial Intelligence Unit and the Court of Audit is welcome. Adopting the new forestry code and implementing the mining code are key to unlocking CAR’s growth potential. Prompt operationalization of the asset declaration system is also critical to maintaining donor support.

    “Policies to enhance growth potential and improve equality should be anchored on the National Development Plan (NDP) (2024-2028). A steadfast execution of the NDP is also crucial to catalyze donor support and start attracting foreign private investment flows.

    CAR’s economic program will remain supported by the implementation of policies and reforms agreed among CEMAC regional institutions, which notably aim at supporting an increase in regional net foreign assets which are ultimately critical to program’s success.”

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Tatiana Mossot

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/04/pr-25179-car-imf-completes-3rd-4th-rev-under-ecf-arrang-and-approves-us-58-mil-disburse

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI USA: DHS Unearths TSA Corruption: Sitting US Senator’s Husband Received Blanket Exemption from National Security Review After Traveling with Known or Suspected Terrorist

    Source: US Federal Emergency Management Agency

    Headline: DHS Unearths TSA Corruption: Sitting US Senator’s Husband Received Blanket Exemption from National Security Review After Traveling with Known or Suspected Terrorist

    lass=”text-align-center”>New Hampshire Senator Jeanne Shaheen’s Husband Traveled with a Known or Suspected Terrorist Three Times in A Single Year 
    WASHINGTON —Today, the Department of Homeland Security revealed evidence detailing the politicization of TSA’s watchlisting program under the Biden administration

     Discovered documents, correspondence, and timelines clearly highlight the Biden’s inconsistent application of Silent Partners Quiet Skies and watchlisting programs, circumventing security policies to benefit politically aligned friends and family at the expense of the American people

     
    This includes William “Billy” Shaheen, spouse of fellow democrat and sitting U

    S

    New Hampshire Senator, Jeane Shaheen, while surveilling political opponents like Tulsi Gabbard months after

      
    After Senator Shaheen directly lobbied the former Administrator, Pekoske gave repeated, explicit direction to exclude Shaheen from the Silent Partner Quiet Skies list

    Pekoske granted Billy Shaheen a blanket Silent Partners Quiet Skies exemption despite Shaheen flying with a Known or Suspected Terrorist on three occasions

     
    All the while, Tulsi Gabbard, and many other Americans, were placed on the Silent Partners’ Quiet Skies list with little to no visibility, awareness, explanation, or oversight

      
    Billy Shaheen was hardly the only high-profile individual that was placed on this exclusion list

    This list also included members of foreign royal families, political elites, professional athletes, and journalists

     Shaheen’s blanket exemption has since been revoked

     
    “It is clear that this program was used as a political rolodex of the Biden Administration—weaponized against its political foes and to benefit their well-heeled friends,” said Secretary Kristi Noem

    “This program should have been about the equal application of security, instead it was corrupted to be about political targeting

    Trump Administration will restore the integrity, privacy, and equal application of the law for all Americans, including aviation screening

    ” 
    For far too long, this program has yielded little to no measurable security impact and lay at the expense of the American traveler

     
    A timeline of events:
    • 07/20/2023: William “Billy” Shaheen was a TSA Random Selectee on his flights from Boston Logan International Airport (BOS, Flight #1) to Washington-Reagan International Airport (DCA) and Washington Dulles International Airport (IAD) to BOS (Flight #2)

    Billy Shaheen was flagged for the first time as Co-Traveler with a Known or Suspected Terrorist (KST)

    • Shortly after Billy Shaheen’s travel, Senator Shaheen’s office made an inquiry to TSA about the Senator’s husband receiving enhanced screening on these two flights

    • 10/18/2023: Shaheen was flagged a second time as a Co-Traveler of a KST

    • It was after this flight that Senator Shaheen made a second inquiry to TSA, via a meeting with then Administrator Pekoske, about her husband being on a watchlist

    TSA did not disclose any information on watchlisting

    • 10/20/2023: Shaheen was then approved by then Assistant Administrator for Intelligence and Analysis Nykamp (she departed TSA in March 2025), acting on then TSA Administrator Pekoske’s Authority, to be added to the Secure Flight Exclusion List

    • This means that Shaheen was excluded from any future TSA Random Selectee designation, and Rules-based Selectee designation, such as Quiet Skies, Association Based Rule Selectee designation, or Silent Partner Selectee designation

    • 10/24/2023: TSA Legislative Affairs communicates with then Assistant Administrator for Intelligence and Analysis Nykamp, and refers to the action taken by Nykamp and/or Pekoske to add Shaheen to the Secure Flight Exclusion List

    • Follow on communication provide instructions to TSA Security Operations to ensure the exclusion is accurately captured in the passenger’s boarding pass status

    • Billy Shaheen stayed on the Secure Flight Exclusion List for 18 months until current TSA leadership removed him

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Ranking Member Huffman Statement on Supreme Court NEPA Ruling That Lets Agencies Ignore Climate and Health Impacts

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Jared Huffman Representing the 2nd District of California

    May 30, 2025

    Washington, D.C. – Today, U.S. House Natural Resources Committee Ranking Member Jared Huffman (D-Calif.) released the following statement:
     
    “The Supreme Court once again put polluters first, siding with fossil fuel interests over the communities that bear the burden of more oil drilling and refining. In the face of the climate crisis, the government should be clear-eyed about the threats and act accordingly. But by giving agencies an excuse to ignore foreseeable impacts in their NEPA reviews, the Court has said they can look the other way about the consequences of their decisions if they want. And communities, and our country, will suffer.
     
    “The American people want to know when federal actions will cause environmental and health risks and fuel the climate crisis. Support for NEPA is high among voters of all stripes. They don’t want to let polluters sidestep responsibility. And they certainly don’t want House Republicans’ corrupt, polluter-friendly pay-to-play scheme for NEPA reviews, buried in their Big, Ugly Bill.
     
    “This ruling adds to the chaos and confusion already unleashed by the Trump administration’s sabotage of agencies’ NEPA procedures. This is part of a broader assault on our nation’s environmental protections. Congressional Democrats invested $1 billion to improve NEPA and environmental reviews through the Inflation Reduction Act—an investment that was already producing real results. Now, Republicans are dragging us backward, risking more delays, more litigation, and more harm.”

    ###



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    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Mining in Motion: Ghana Targets Global Artisanal and Small-Scale Gold Mining (ASGM) Integration

    Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

    ACCRA, Ghana, June 4, 2025/APO Group/ —

    Ghana is formalizing its artisanal and small-scale gold mining (ASGM) sector to align with global standards, promote sustainability and boost economic integration. Despite ASGM contributing over 35% to the country’s total gold output, much of the country’s artisanal mining activity remains informal. Speakers during a Mining in Motion 2025 panel outlined steps to address this challenge and accelerate the global integration of Ghana’s ASGM sector 

    The session – titled Integrating ASGM into Global Supply Chains, sponsored by Emirates Gold- examined policy gaps, market barriers and innovative solutions to enhance the credibility and competitiveness of ASGM gold on the international stage. In recent months, Ghana has been making strides to foster a conducive environment for ASGM producers.  

    According to Neil Harby, Chief Technical Officer, London Bullion Market Association, “Recently introduced guidelines have improved Ghana’s capacity to produce small-scale gold, but the risk-reward ratio still lacks.”  

    As such, the Ghana Gold Board, established this year, has been created to oversee, regulate and manage all gold and precious mineral-related activities in Ghana. The Board aims to enhance regulation, maximize foreign exchange earnings, build gold reserves and promote value addition for national economic transformation.  

    “If you look at Ghana’s reserves, they’ve been very static. So, we’ve sat down and looked at how we can leverage gold resources in the country. If we can convert a domestic asset but go through the processes to convert it to a foreign asset, then we can begin to build upon our gold reserves,” stated Dr. Steve Opata, Head of Risk, Foreign Reserves Management at the Bank of Ghana. 

    Meanwhile, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has supported Ghana’s efforts to formalize its artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) sector by addressing illicit financial flows and promoting responsible sourcing through tools like the Due Diligence Guidance and ASM Hub. Collaborating with the Ghanian government, the OECD helps develop policies to regulate ASM, which plays a vital economic role but faces challenges including environmental harm and links to illicit activity. 

    “You have to be sure that you have some understanding of the mapping of the supply chain. You need the management systems to help you understand the circumstances of production around those mine sites. We want to allow commercial relationships between small-scale and artisanal miners and international producers,” stated Louis Maréchal, Sector Lead: Minerals and Extractives, OECD. 

    As a key player in the global precious minerals industry, Emirates Bullion Market offers significant expertise in gold refining and infrastructure development. In recent years, the UAE has become increasingly instrumental in Ghana’s gold sector. In 2024, the country emerged as one of the top export destinations for Ghana’s gold, accounting – alongside Switzerland – for 36.5% of total exports. 

    “Sustainability is conducive to operating with local miners. We want to know how their operations support the communities they come from. We only promote sustainable mining while safeguarding investor interest,” stated Sudheesh Nambiath, Manager, Dubai Multi Commodities Center, Emirates Bullion Market. 

    Meanwhile, Rand Refinery supports Ghana’s gold upstream sector by offering smelting, refining and metal recovery services. The company holds exclusive rights to refine Goldplat’s Ghana output, with a mutual agreement on processing by-products.   

    “Working as a team with in-country producers, ASM producers and large-scale miners, the intention is to unlock productivity at a commercial scale,” stated Jason McPherson, Head of Sourcing and Business Development, Rand Refinery. 

    With the launch of the Ghana Gold Board and strategic upgrades to its mining code, Ghana is aligning its ASGM sector with global standards. The country is positioning itself as a leading destination for sustainable gold sourcing, investment and innovation – proving that responsible mining can drive both local empowerment and global integration. 

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Pro-radical Islam teaching in Pakistan – E-001984/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001984/2025/rev.1
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Emmanouil Fragkos (ECR)

    Teaching in Pakistani schools has been widely criticised for its ideological manipulation in favour of radical Islam. School textbooks contain one-dimensional narratives that emphasise Islamic identity over historical facts about the origin of Pakistanis from ancestors with different religions. In secondary school history books, Hindus are often presented as oppressive enemies of Muslims, while the actual multi-faith past of the region that is now Pakistan is obscured. In Islamic studies courses, jihad is overemphasised as a concept of ‘religious duty’. This approach fosters intolerance and limits critical thinking.

    Pakistani schools are a tool for the political and religious manipulation of the unwilling masses and their weaponisation in favour of Islamist goals, internationally. Educational reform in Pakistan is an essential prerequisite for international peace and security. Relevant recommendations from UNESCO and Human Rights Watch, concerning basic requirements for education in Pakistan, are not taken into account.

    In view of this:

    • 1.Does the Commission consider that the educational reality in Pakistan should be given serious consideration before Member States accept Pakistanis, with or without ‘labour’ agreements, ultimately endangering our citizens?
    • 2.Has the Commission monitored whether resolutions 2012/2843(RSP) and 2015/2515(RSP) have been taken into account in any way?
    • 3.If not, how could the Commission exert pressure on Pakistan to implement basic educational reform, so that at least it does not promote Islamic fundamentalism?

    Submitted: 16.5.2025

    Last updated: 4 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Need for fair trials in Baku – E-002048/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002048/2025/rev.1
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Nicolas Bay (ECR)

    Since the ethnic cleansing of Nagorno-Karabakh, which saw more than 130 000 Armenians forced to flee their ancestral land, several citizens of Armenian origin have been arrested by the Azerbaijani authorities and are currently being tried in Baku. The Ambassador of Azerbaijan to Belgium stated that the trials were public and that diplomats and politicians could attend[1][2].

    With tensions high between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the peace treaty, the EU must remain vigilant as regards respect for fundamental rights, including the right to a fair trial.

    As it is engaged in strategic partnerships with these two Caucasus countries, including a controversial gas agreement with Baku, the EU has a responsibility to ensure its relations are founded on democratic principles. The European Parliament’s support for closer ties with Armenia sends a strong signal for a more balanced commitment[3].

    Is the Commission going to ask the EU Delegation in Azerbaijan to mandate an observer to attend the hearings of these trials on a daily basis to ensure that the international standards of justice and a fair procedure are being upheld?

    Submitted: 21.5.2025

    • [1] ‘The court proceedings are open, any person be it any citizen of any country, foreigner or foreign diplomat or journalist can attend this proceedings. You have your embassy in Baku, they are free to go and to provide directly to you all the information’, reply to Belgian politician Pierre Kompany, on 8 April 2025, at the hearing of Vagif Sadikov, Ambassador of Azerbaijan to the Committee on External Affairs of the Belgian Federal Parliament, on a resolution on Nagorno-Karabakh.
    • [2] ‘Political access to the political prisoners, well I already mentioned well you have excellent ambassador of Belgium in Baku Mr. Ambassador Julien De Fraipont, he is welcomed to attend the court proceedings anytime when he wants’, reply to Belgian politician Els Van Hoof in the same interview.
    • [3] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/B-9-2024-0166_EN.html
    Last updated: 4 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Independence and impartiality of the UNAR (Italian equality body) – E-002106/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002106/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Pina Picierno (S&D), Alessandro Zan (S&D), Marc Angel (S&D), Lucia Yar (Renew), Irene Tinagli (S&D), Krzysztof Śmiszek (S&D), Alessandra Moretti (S&D)

    The Ufficio Nazionale Antidiscriminazioni Razziali (UNAR) is a public equality body established by the Italian Government, responsible for promoting equal treatment and eliminating discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnicity, gender identity and sexual orientation.

    The UNAR falls under Directive 2000/43/EC[1] and, after its transposition into national law, Directive (EU) 2024/1500[2].

    Independence and impartiality should underpin its actions. Nevertheless, the UNAR reports to the Office of the Prime Minister and its director is appointed by the Prime Minister. Therefore, the principles of independence and impartiality are compromised and the office is subject to political influence by the government. The UNAR has been accused of delaying the financing of anti-discrimination projects and breaking off formal relations with civil society organisations and human rights defenders, specifically LGBTQIA+ related associations.

    In view of the implementation of Directive (EU) 2024/1500, in particular Articles 3 on independence and impartiality, 4 on resources, and 5 and 6 that set out the objectives, can the Commission clarify:

    • 1.if the UNAR and the Italian Government are already complying with the provisions applying to equality bodies in the context of the Directive (EU) 2024/1500;
    • 2.if it is already in contact with national authorities regarding the implementation of Directive (EU) 2024/1500;
    • 3.what would the possible actions be if Italy does not comply with the provisions of EU law?

    Submitted: 26.5.2025

    • [1] Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, OJ L 180, 19.7.2000, p. 22., ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2000/43/oj.
    • [2] Directive (EU) 2024/1500 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on standards for equality bodies in the field of equal treatment and equal opportunities between women and men in matters of employment and occupation, OJ L, 2024/1500, 29.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1500/oj.
    Last updated: 4 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Strategic importance of the Central Communication Port for military mobility and EU security – E-002096/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002096/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Michał Dworczyk (ECR)

    With work on updating the Action Plan on Military Mobility and the preparation of a new Multiannual Financial Framework ongoing, I would like to draw the Commission’s attention to the strategic importance of the Central Communication Port – a multimodal project designed as an element of dual-use infrastructure, which is vital both for civilian transport and for the rapid deployment of allied forces in crisis situations. The Central Communication Port is of transnational importance and is able to play a key role in ensuring the EU’s security, especially in light of its location on NATO’s eastern flank and the geopolitical situation following Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Although the project has been significantly scaled back, fortunately, thanks to public pressure, it has not been completely abandoned, and there is still a possibility of adapting it to its original objectives.

    In light of the above:

    • 1.Does the Commission deem the Central Communication Port project to be important for military mobility and EU security, and will the Commission classify the project as a strategic infrastructure element in the updated Action Plan on Military Mobility?
    • 2.Does the Commission consider the Central Communication Port project to be eligible for support under the Connecting Europe Facility, in particular in the area of dual-use transport infrastructure?
    • 3.Is the Commission considering recognising the Central Communication Port as a project of common interest (PCI) or granting it EU support, given its importance for the EU’s resilience and preparedness in terms of military transport, as well as its ability to respond to threats on the eastern flank?

    Submitted: 26.5.2025

    Last updated: 4 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – OPEKEPE (Greek Payment and Control Agency for Guidance and Guarantee Community Aid) scandal – P-002152/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Priority question for written answer  P-002152/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Emmanouil Fragkos (ECR)

    Widespread irregularities and fraudulent government practices have been noted since 2005 in the management of direct payments through OPEKEPE. The practices are now being formally investigated by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), under threat of loss of accreditation.

    Following the revelations, the Government decided to abolish the Agency and transfer the critical payment and audit functions to the Independent Authority for Public Revenue (IAPR). This choice raises serious questions regarding the management accreditation of the new body, the transparency of CAP payments and compliance with Regulation (EU) 2021/2116 on the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy, and in particular Articles 7 and 8 which set out the conditions for accreditation of paying agencies, the obligation of independence and sufficient operational and administrative capacity and the possible withdrawal of accreditation if the criteria are not met.

    Unfortunately, the withdrawal of accreditation will clearly mean the cessation of agricultural payments and the loss of European fund management for our farmers. At the same time, concerns about a cover up of political responsibilities and, ultimately, a lack of accountability are growing.

    In view of the above:

    • 1.Has the Commission assessed the legality of the transfer of OPEKEPE’s responsibilities to the IAPR?
    • 2.Has the Commission asked itself/established whether the conditions for management accreditation to disburse European aid are met by the IAPR?
    • 3.What measures does it intend to put in place from now on to ensure the independence, transparency and sound management of aid to Greek farmers?

    Submitted: 28.5.2025

    Last updated: 4 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Rep. Dan Goldman Leads Effort to Streamline Permitting for Offshore Wind Projects

    Source: US Congressman Dan Goldman (NY-10)

    Appropriations Letter Urges Congress to Fund BOEM’s Office of Renewable Energy Programs, Prioritize Efficiency in Federal Permitting for Offshore Wind Projects 

     

    Offshore Wind Projects Projected to Create 56,000 Jobs by 2030 

     

    Read the Letter Here

    Washington, D.C – Congressman Dan Goldman led 18 of his Democratic colleagues in writing to House Appropriations Subcommittee on Interior, Environment and Related Agencies Chair Congressman Mike Simpson (ID-02) and Ranking Member Chellie Pingree (ME-01) requesting they robustly fund the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management’s (BOEM) Office of Renewable Energy Programs, as well as include language in the FY26 budget to find increased efficiencies in the permitting process for offshore wind projects, which are an economic and national security imperative. 

    “We request that you take action to ensure robust funding for the Department of Interior’s Bureau of Ocean Energy Management’s (BOEM) Office of Renewable Energy Programs that supports the timely review and permitting of offshore wind projects. We also ask that you include report language in the bill that supports finding increased efficiencies in the federal permitting process to allow for projects to come online as fast and proficiently as possible, without compromising the safety and integrity of the review process,” the Members began. 

    Permitting, constructing, and connecting offshore wind to the energy grid is imperative to ensuring the United States’ long-term energy needs are met. Domestic energy demands are projected to rise 50% by 2050 as a result of crypto and AI, and offshore wind will be an essential part of generating the energy necessary to meet the future. However, the benefits of offshore wind extend beyond energy capacity.  

    “By the end of 2024, the industry had already announced more than $9.5 billion in supply chain investments, including investing in the creation of nearly 40 new domestic vessels to serve offshore wind projects. These jobs are inextricably intertwined with project permitting timelines, and investing in BOEM’s permitting capacity will increase job security for thousands of Americans and investment confidence for developers,” the Members wrote. 

    Additionally, offshore wind provides a local, reliable, and infinite source of energy, independent of geopolitical rivals and fluctuations in global energy markets. Fully funding the BOEM’s Office of Renewable Energy Programs and streamlining project permitting will strengthen American manufacturing and make us a world leader in spearheading the green energy transition. Failing to prioritize offshore wind in the federal budget will allow China and other nations to fill the gap. 

    “Committing our support to technologies like offshore wind will also help diversify our grid, making it more safe, reliable, and resilient. It is imperative that we provide BOEM with the resources they need to facilitate the timely, efficient, reliable and accurate review of offshore wind project applications so we don’t slow down this momentum,” the Members wrote. 

    Read the full letter here or below: 

    Dear Chair Simpson and Ranking Member Pingree, 

    As you prepare the Fiscal Year 2026 (FY26) Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations bill, we request that you take action to ensure robust funding for the Department of Interior’s Bureau of Ocean Energy Management’s (BOEM) Office of Renewable Energy Programs that supports the timely review and permitting of offshore wind projects. We also ask that you include report language in the bill that supports finding increased efficiencies in the federal permitting process to allow for projects to come online as fast and proficiently as possible, without compromising the safety and integrity of the review process. As energy demand soars across the country, it is vitally important that we diversify our grid, support energy production in the United States, and build out an offshore wind project pipeline that can contribute to the “all-of-the-above approach to energy supply.  

    Current estimates project that domestic energy demand will grow by 2% annually and by more than 50% by 2050. Due in large part to the increased computing capacity needed to sustain rapidly expanding industries such as crypto and A.I., this unprecedented growth in demand requires a commensurate growth in supply. To meet these needs, to truly take an “all-of the-above” energy approach, and to ensure that we don’t fall behind our geopolitical adversaries in the race for energy dominance, we must ensure that offshore wind remains a part of our energy equation.  

    Over the past decade, the industry has advanced tremendously. By the end of 2024, BOEM had approved 19 GW of energy from offshore wind projects – enough to power 6 million homes — of which 10.8 GW were approved to begin construction. It is imperative that we continue this momentum, in collaboration with other energy sources, to meet the whopping 531 GW of expected grid demand in the coming decades. 

    The benefits of offshore wind extend beyond just energy capacity. They create massive economic investment and significant job opportunities across America, further diversify energy sources in the event of catastrophe, facilitate energy independence and energy dominance, and advance our geopolitical and national security interests. 

    According to a 2024 report published by American Clean Power, in large part due to the American energy credits in the Inflation Reduction Act, the offshore wind industry was projected to create 56,000 jobs across the country by 2030. These jobs span a number of industries and are largely good-paying, stable, manufacturing and marine trades jobs. By the end of 2024, the industry had already announced more than $9.5 billion in supply chain investments, including investing in the creation of nearly 40 new domestic vessels to serve offshore wind projects. These jobs are inextricably intertwined with project permitting timelines, and investing in BOEM’s permitting capacity will increase job security for thousands of Americans and investment confidence for developers. In turn, this will usher in additional spending in domestic offshore wind workforce development and supply chains. 

    Further still, ratepayers stand to gain significantly from the deployment of offshore wind as energy from such projects are projected to save households hundreds of dollars on their annual electricity bills. One study identified that 9 GW of offshore wind energy in New England would save New Englander’s between $2.79 to $4.61 a month on their electricity bill, adding up to about $630 annually. It would also provide nearly $362 million in annual public health savings as it would help prevent thousands of tons of dangerous pollution in our communities. 

    Finally, supporting offshore wind is a national security imperative. Offshore wind provides a local, steady, infinite source of energy that is not subject to the whims of our geopolitical rivals. It allows coastal areas, oftentimes with little space to build large new generation facilities, the ability to meet increased demand without depending on foreign sources of energy. And it provides a critical opportunity to build relationships in developing nations that expand far beyond energy production. Moreover, if we do not meet this demand, China will, which will increase their global footprint and influence. 

    Committing our support to technologies like offshore wind will also help diversify our grid, making it more safe, reliable, and resilient. It is imperative that we provide BOEM with the resources they need to facilitate the timely, efficient, reliable and accurate review of offshore wind project applications so we don’t slow down this momentum. While the industry is still relatively new, we have now seen a number of projects successfully permitted and we must learn from these examples and continue to improve and streamline the federal permitting process. As such, in addition to robust funding for BOEM Office of Renewable Energy Programs, we ask the committee include the following report language in their bill: 

    The Committee understands the value of streamlining the federal permitting process for offshore energy development, including wind power. As such, the committee directs the Bureau of Ocean Management, in consultation with the Department of Commerce, Department of Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Army Corps of Engineers, the Department of Defense, and any other relevant agencies to identify efficiencies in the federal permitting process, including unnecessary duplicative efforts, to responsibly expedite reviews while maintaining comprehensive stakeholder engagement, tribal consultation, and environmental analysis so as to ensure that project development processes carefully consider impacts on marine life and ensure co existence with incumbent industries. 

    Thank you for your consideration. 

    ### 

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Investments in defence and Romania’s budget deficit – P-002191/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Priority question for written answer  P-002191/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Şerban Dimitrie Sturdza (ECR)

    The European Union has approved the creation of the SAFE instrument, the EUR 150 billion European arms fund that will support those Member States that wish to invest in defence industrial production through common procurement. This initiative is welcome in the current geopolitical context.

    However, since Romania has been in the excessive debt procedure (over 3 % of GDP) for four years and Romania had an ESA (standard used in the European Union) budget deficit of 9.2 % of GDP in 2024:

    • 1.How does the European Commission intend to harmonise the implementation of the SAFE programme with the situation of Member States with a major budget deficit, such as Romania, so that access to financing to strengthen defence capacities does not deepen national fiscal imbalances?
    • 2.In view of the high level of the budget deficit estimated for Romania (8.6 % of GDP in 2025), what concrete instruments is the European Commission making available to support Romania in its efforts to strengthen national defence, without compromising macroeconomic stability?
    • 3.What opportunities for financing or participation in European defence programmes are available to Romania in the context of other security initiatives, which do not entail new sovereign loans and can contribute to the development of defence industrial capacities?

    Submitted: 2.6.2025

    Last updated: 4 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – EU response to the Israeli Government’s announcement of 22 new illegal settlements in the occupied West Bank – P-002180/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Priority question for written answer  P-002180/2025
    to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
    Rule 144
    Hana Jalloul Muro (S&D)

    On 29 May 2025, Israeli authorities announced the establishment of 22 new settlements in the occupied West Bank, a move that directly contravenes international law, including UN Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016)[1]. This follows earlier statements by Prime Minister Netanyahu concerning plans to annex up to 30 % of the West Bank. These developments represent a serious escalation of de facto annexation, further eroding the viability of a two-state solution and fuelling instability in the region.

    Despite these repeated breaches, the EU has yet to adopt any effective response, raising serious questions about its credibility and its commitment to upholding international law. Failure to act not only undermines Palestinian rights but also weakens the EU’s stated commitment to a rules-based international order.

    In the light of these serious developments:

    • 1.What steps will the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) take to ensure a strong and united EU response to these illegal settlement expansions?
    • 2.Does the VP/HR intend to propose concrete measures, including potential restrictive actions, to deter further annexation or de facto annexation by Israel’s Government?
    • 3.How does the VP/HR view the credibility of the EU’s role as a mediator in the Middle East peace process, given the Israeli authorities’ continued disregard for international law?

    Submitted: 30.5.2025

    • [1] UN Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016) of 23 December 2016 on cessation of Israeli settlement activities in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem.
    Last updated: 4 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Missions – Mission report following the ECON mission to Paris, France, from 14 to 16 April 2025 – 14-04-2025 – Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs

    Source: European Parliament

    During its mission to Paris, the ECON delegation met the French Finance Minister, the Governor of the Banque de France and the Premier Président of the Cour des comptes, as well as other French government officials, regulatory agencies, businesses, economists and trade unions’ representatives.

    The ECON delegation also met with the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

    Location : Paris, France

    Source : © European Union, 2025 – EP

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – EU funding for NGOs – transparency and administrative accountability – P-001894/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Priority question for written answer  P-001894/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Alexander Sell (ESN), Hans Neuhoff (ESN)

    The European Court of Auditors Special Report 11/2025, entitled ‘Transparency of EU funding granted to NGOs – Despite progress, the overview is still not reliable’, published on 7 April 2025, reveals serious deficiencies in the management of funds allocated to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) between 2021 and 2023. The document states that over EUR 7 billion was granted to organisations that, in many cases, self-declared as NGOs without proper verification by the Commission, and that some of them carried out undeclared lobbying activities in favour of the Commission itself.

    In view of the above:

    • 1.Is the Commission able to provide the full list of NGOs, or putative NGOs, cited anonymously in the ECA report referred to above, along with the specific irregularities identified in each case?
    • 2.Why did the Commission fail to carry out the necessary checks on the legal status, independence and actual activities of the recipients of EU funds, particularly in cases of organisations that self-declared as NGOs, in breach of the principles of sound administration and transparency?
    • 3.Under what procedure and within what timeframe does the Commission intend to launch an internal investigation to clarify any administrative or political responsibilities in the allocation and management of the above-mentioned funds?

    Submitted: 13.5.2025

    Last updated: 4 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Decisions on terrorist attacks in Kursk and Bryansk regions of the Russian Federation were made in Ukraine at the political level — Russian President

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Moscow, June 4 /Xinhua/ — The decisions on terrorist attacks in the Kursk and Bryansk regions of the Russian Federation were made in Ukraine at the political level, Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Wednesday.

    “The blowing up of railway tracks in the Bryansk and Kursk regions is, of course, a terrorist act. The decisions to commit such crimes were, of course, made in Ukraine at the political level,” V. Putin noted during a meeting with members of the government. The Russian President emphasized that what happened in Bryansk was a targeted attack on civilians aimed at disrupting the negotiation process.

    According to the Russian leader, Kiev’s “illegitimate regime is degenerating into a terrorist organization, and its sponsors are becoming accomplices of terrorists.” Ukraine “is trying to intimidate Russia with terrorist attacks” because “it is suffering huge losses and retreating along the entire front line,” the head of state said.

    V. Putin noted that Moscow is not surprised by Kyiv’s refusal to agree to a truce for humanitarian reasons for 2-3 days. According to him, “the Kyiv regime does not need peace at all,” since it would mean the loss of power.

    “Peace means the loss of power. And power for this regime, apparently, is more important than peace and the lives of people, whom they do not consider people at all,” the Russian president pointed out. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Russian economy enters cooling period — Russian Minister of Economic Development

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Moscow, June 4 (Xinhua) — Russia’s economy has entered a period of cooling after high growth rates in the previous two years, Russian Economic Development Minister Maxim Reshetnikov said. The ministry’s press service reported this on Tuesday.

    Speaking in the Federation Council of Russia, M. Reshetnikov noted that more and more industries in the real sector are demonstrating a decline in output. The growth rate of consumer demand is slowing down, and the increase in the population’s income is being sent to savings, while a slowdown in inflation is being recorded, the minister added.

    M. Reshetnikov pointed out that Russia needs to go through the cooling-off period wisely and expressed hope for a timely easing of monetary policy in order to maintain GDP growth rates of 3 percent in the long term. In addition, he also assured that the government is taking steps to optimize the investment programs of the largest companies. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Rep. Nadler and Rep. Wilson Reintroduce Bill Providing a Tax Credit to Living Organ Donors

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Jerrold Nadler (10th District of New York)

    Yesterday, Representatives Jerrold Nadler (D-NY) and Joe Wilson (R-SC) reintroduced the Living Organ Donor Tax Credit Act. The bill will provide up to a $5,000 one-time refundable tax credit to living organ donors who were not reimbursed for the costs related to organ donation by the National Living Organ Donor Assistance Center (NLDAC) or any entity.  

    Our nation’s transplant shortage is dire. Seventeen people die every day waiting for a viable organ according to the Health Resources and Services Administration. Currently, there are around 93,000 Americans on the kidney transplant waitlist, with some having to wait as long as six years to receive a transplant, according to UNOS. Patients waiting for a transplant on average cost the U.S. government at least $77,000 a year on dialysis, which adds up to more than $20 billion a year according to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). Removing the barriers to organ donation will not only increase the number of living donors therefore saving lives, but also will save the taxpayers money. This tax credit would apply to living kidney, liver, lung, pancreas, intestine, bone marrow donors, and any other viable living organ donation. 

    “When an organ donor decides to donate one of their organs to someone else, they aren’t just saving someone’s life—they’re making one of the most selfless, difficult decisions anyone could ever make,” said Rep. Nadler. “However, donors can face tremendous and often prohibitive costs associated with surgery, including the cost of travel, lodging, follow up care, and lost wages in connection to transplantation. That’s why I’m proud to introduce this bill with Rep. Wilson and continue my work to remove roadblocks to organ donation.” 

    “The gift of living donation is truly priceless. The donors who choose the selfless act of giving a lifesaving organ are making a major life decision, whether gifting to a stranger or a loved one. That lifechanging decision should not be burdened by the costs of donation, and this bill will remove that disincentive to ensure that everyone is able to donate an organ if they choose to, regardless of their financial situation,” said Rep. Wilson. “My predecessor House Armed Services Committee Chairman Floyd Spence miraculously received a double lung transplant as the thirtieth in the world to receive the experiment, living an additional 13 years serving America. We are always grateful for Dr. Sesshadri Raju at the University of Mississippi Medical Center in Jackson, Mississippi for performing the procedure in 1988. I previously worked in the South Carolina State Senate to add a red heart for organ donors to South Carolina Driver’s Licenses at the time of registration. Today, I am grateful to expand this piece of Floyd Spence’s legacy.” 

    The bill has been endorsed by the American Association of Kidney Patients, American Kidney Fund (AKF), American Nephrology Nurses Association (ANNA), American Society of Pediatric Nephrology (ASPN), American Society of Transplant Surgeons (ASTS), American Society of Transplantation (AST), Coalition to Modify NOTA, National Kidney Donation Organization (NKDO), National Kidney Foundation (NKF), Polycystic Kidney Disease (PKD) Foundation, Renal Support Network (RSN), and Waitlist Zero. 

    “We need better public policy to increase living organ donation. The Living Organ Donor Tax Credit Act of 2025 represents a positive step forward in helping people who selflessly decide to give the gift of life by donating a kidney by providing a refundable tax credit for associated costs of live organ donation such as lost wages, travel or childcare. People with limited resources should have every opportunity to help save a life,” said LaVarne A. Burton, President and CEO of the American Kidney Fund. 

     “The American Society of Pediatric Nephrology (ASPN) applauds the reintroduction of the Living Organ Donor Tax Credit Act by Representatives Jerry Nadler (D-NY) and Joe Wilson (R-SC). Rates of living kidney donation are declining in the US in both the pediatric and adult populations. This decline persists despite the fact that living donor kidney transplant is well established as the optimal treatment for children and adults with end stage kidney disease due to superior graft and patient survival. This important legislation will encourage living donors and we urge its swift passage,” said President Meredith Atkinson of the American Society of Pediatric Nephrology (ASPN).

         “On behalf of the American Society of Transplantation (AST), representing a majority of the nation’s transplant professionals, our Society strongly applauds and endorses the re-introduction of the Living Organ Donor Tax Credit Act. AST is grateful for the steadfast leadership of Congressmen Nadler (D-NY) and Wilson (R-SC) to protect and support living donation. The Living Donor Tax Credit Act is a patient-focused bill seeking to address financial and policy barriers that might otherwise prevent an individual from providing a lifesaving donor organ.  AST greatly appreciates this bipartisan and patient centric legislation.  We look forward to working with you to advance this key legislation in this 119th Congress,” said Dr. Jon Kobashigawa, President of the American Society of Transplantation (AST).

         “The National Kidney Foundation strongly supports the Living Organ Donor Tax Credit Act as an important step toward removing financial barriers to living donation. This legislation provides tax relief solely for documented, unreimbursed expenses actually incurred by the donor—costs like child/elder care, travel, and lost income. Living donors often face unexpected costs that can reach thousands of dollars, and these expenses should never prevent someone from saving a life. By allowing tax credits for legitimate expenses while maintaining strict documentation requirements, this bill supports donors without compromising the altruistic foundation of organ donation that the National Kidney Foundation has always championed. We applaud Reps. Nadler and Wilson for their leadership and urge Congress to pass this measure that will help save lives while preserving the integrity of our transplant system,” said Kevin Longino, CEO, National Kidney Foundation and a transplant recipient.

         “There’s currently no cure for PKD, and while we await scientific breakthroughs, organ donation remains the most effective long-term treatment,” said Susan Bushnell, President and CEO of the Polycystic Kidney Disease (PKD) Foundation. “This common-sense, compassionate, and cost-effective policy to reimburse living donors for some of the costs of donation will help to remove needless financial barriers, save more lives, and reduce the burden on our federal health system by decreasing reliance on costly, time-consuming, and often unpleasant dialysis treatments. The PKD Foundation is deeply grateful for the longtime leadership of Representatives Nadler and Wilson in championing living donation,” said Susan Bushnell, PKDF’s President & CEO.

    “Living donors are true heroes who should not incur financial losses for the life-saving gift they provide. A tax credit is a straightforward method to acknowledge their generosity while simplifying the reimbursement process,” said Lori Hartwell, President & Founder of RSN and kidney transplant recipient.

         “Why should donors go into debt to give the gift of life? Representative Nadler and Representative Wilson’s Living Organ Donor Tax Credit Act will ease the financial strain and empower more people to say yes to donation. For the past 25 years, the number of living kidney donors has remained stagnant. Waitlist Zero proudly supports this crucial bill,” said Elaine Perlman, Executive Director of Waitlist Zero and President of the Coalition to Modify NOTA.

    A copy of the legislation can be found here.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Kennedy, Cruz, colleagues introduce resolution to designate June as “Life Month”

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator John Kennedy (Louisiana)
    WASHINGTON – Sen. John Kennedy (R-La.), a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, joined Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Texas) and 25 colleagues in introducing a resolution to designate the month of June as “Life Month.”
    The resolution commemorates the U.S. Supreme Court’s overturning of Roe v. Wade in the June 2022 landmark decision Dobbs v. Jackson and affirms that every human life is precious.
    “With too many extreme politicians supporting abortion up until the moment of birth, it’s more important than ever that Americans declare their support for God’s greatest gift, life. I’m proud to help introduce this resolution to designate June as ‘Life Month’ and support the Supreme Court’s Dobbs v. Jackson decision—a win for both the Constitution and the unborn,” said Kennedy.
    “Every human life is worthy of protection, and it is especially incumbent upon Americans and lawmakers to protect the most vulnerable among us. Designating June as Life Month is a recommitment to the American principle that every life has dignity. I call on my colleagues in the Senate to swiftly pass this resolution,” said Cruz.
    Rep. Chris Smith (R-N.J.) introduced the resolution in the House of Representatives.
    “For decades abortion advocates have gone to extraordinary lengths to ignore, trivialize, and cover up the battered baby victim, fostering a culture of denial, disrespect, and bias against the unborn. This resolution designating June as Life Month highlights our moral imperative to protect innocent children’s lives from extermination. It calls our nation to reject willful blindness to the realities of abortion—brutally dismembering helpless babies with sharp knife-like curettes or poisoning babies with pills that literally starve them to death and often result in their bodies being flushed down a toilet. This resolution affirms that the cruel injustice of abortion need not be forever: instead we must defend the unborn and show love and compassion to both mother and child through meaningful assistance and support,” said Smith.
    Sens. John Cornyn (R-Texas), Mike Lee (R-Utah), Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa), Josh Hawley (R-Mo.), Ted Budd (R-N.C.), Pete Ricketts (R-Neb.), Cindy Hyde-Smith (R-Miss.), James Lankford (R-Okla.), Roger Marshall (R-Kan.), Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), Rick Scott (R-Fla.), Thom Tillis (R-N.C.), Todd Young (R-Ind.), Tommy Tuberville (R-Ala.), Joni Ernst (R-Iowa), Jim Risch (R-Idaho), Bill Cassidy (R-La.), John Hoeven (R-N.D.), Eric Schmitt (R-Mo.), Kevin Cramer (R-N.D.), Tim Scott (R-S.C.), Bill Hagerty (R-Tenn.), Mike Rounds (R-S.D.), Jim Justice (R-W.Va.) and Cynthia Lummis (R-Wyo.) also cosponsored the resolution.
    Alliance Defending Freedom, Heritage Action, Susan B. Anthony Pro-Life America, National Right to Life, Human Coalition, Heartbeat International, Family Research Council, Students for Life, Americans United for Life, Family Policy Alliance, Concerned Women for America, Catholic Vote, March for Life, 40 Days for Life, National Pro-Life Alliance, NIFLA, Citizens for Life, Christian Broadcasting Network, Focus on the Family, Liberty Counsel Action and Eagle Forum support the resolution.
    The full resolution is available here.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: MYTHBUSTER: The One Big Beautiful Bill Cuts Spending, Deficit — and That’s a Fact

    US Senate News:

    Source: US Whitehouse
    By every honest metric, President Donald J. Trump’s One Big Beautiful Bill dramatically improves the fiscal trajectory of the United States and unleashes an era of unprecedented economic growth.
    HOAX: The One Big Beautiful Bill increases spending.
    FACT: The One Big Beautiful Bill delivers nearly $1.7 trillion in mandatory savings — a fact that even the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) admits is true.
    FACT: This is the highest level of mandatory savings in history — dwarfing spending reductions from similar reconciliation bills in 2005 ($140 billion), 1997 ($800 billion), 1993 ($370 billion), and 1990 ($440 billion) on an inflation-adjusted basis.
    FACT: The One Big Beautiful Bill’s $1.7 trillion savings are permanent changes to the law — meaning these savings will continue long into the future.
    FACT: This is a reconciliation bill — not an appropriations (budget) bill. This means there is no mechanism for including spending reductions on 99% of government operations, which will come in future legislation.
    HOAX: The One Big Beautiful Bill adds to the deficit.
    FACT: So-called “forecasts” (including by the CBO) predicting higher deficits are based on a false assumption that President Trump’s 2017 tax cuts will expire. In reality, extending the CURRENT tax rates — which this legislation does — has zero impact on the deficit.
    If you cite the CBO’s faulty score, you must also cite CBO’s forecast that President Trump’s tariffs will cut the deficit by $2.8 trillion over the next decade. In other words, even the partisan CBO admits the deficit will be slashed by at least $500 billion over the next ten years.

    FACT: Of course, the $1.7 trillion savings is partly offset by one-time spending on border security and additional tax cuts (NO TAX ON TIPS, NO TAX ON OVERTIME) — which brings the net deficit reduction to exactly $1.407 trillion.
    FACT: Upon enactment the bill — and through increased tariffs revenues, discretionary spending cuts, and reversing Biden-era regulations — the Trump Administration will have taken actions that reduce deficits by at least $6.6 trillion over the next decade.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Economics: What’s new in Copilot Studio: May 2025

    Source: Microsoft

    Headline: What’s new in Copilot Studio: May 2025

    In this edition of our monthly roundup, we’re recapping the biggest news from Microsoft Build 2025 and announcing new resources for Copilot Studio adoption and training. 

    May 2025 was a big month for Microsoft Copilot Studio and there are a ton of features to catch up on. In this edition of our monthly roundup, we’re recapping the biggest news from Microsoft Build 2025, giving a couple of important updates, and announcing new resources for Copilot Studio adoption and training. 

    Microsoft Build 2025 roundup: Our biggest announcements 

    Microsoft Build 2025 brought a wave of updates to Copilot Studio and Microsoft Dataverse, the operational database for agents, introducing powerful new tools for multi-agent systems, enterprise data access, and custom AI tuning. Here’s a quick overview of what dropped in Copilot Studio. 

    Multi-agent orchestration: Copilot Studio now supports multi-agent orchestration, allowing agents built with Microsoft 365, Microsoft Azure AI, and Microsoft Fabric to collaborate by delegating tasks and sharing results to complete complex workflows. Copilot Studio will also support the open Agent2Agent (A2A) protocol, allowing agents to connect to those built on third-party platforms. 

    Computer use in agents: The new computer use capability, currently available to eligible United States-based customers, allows Copilot Studio agents to perform tasks across desktop and web applications, automating repetitive processes like data entry and document processing through AI-powered UI interactions. 

    Bring your own model and Microsoft Copilot tuning: Makers can access more than 11,000 models in Azure AI Foundry and fine-tune them using enterprise data for even more context-rich and valuable agent responses. 

    Other updates include: 

    Get all the details on these announcements in Corporate Vice President Lili Cheng’s blog post. For an even more in-depth update, learn more about how Dataverse supports all these in Corporate Vice President Nirav Shah’s blog post from Microsoft Build 2025. You can also see a roundup of all the Microsoft Dataverse sessions presented at Microsoft Build 2025.

    Build, publish, and monetize agents with the Agent Store 

    Welcome to the Agent Store, your centralized, curated marketplace for agents built by Microsoft, trusted partners, and customers. Accessible through the left side navigation in Microsoft 365 Copilot Chat, the Agent Store makes it easier to browse, try out, and share agents for your business processes without having to build them from scratch. These agents work seamlessly across your Microsoft 365 ecosystem, so you can install an agent once and use it in multiple places. It’s all about speed, trust, and impact at scale. 

    Right now, the Agent Store has more than 70 agents, ranging from knowledge assistants to complex multi-modal orchestrators. You’ll have access to more as makers and software development vendors build and share new agents in the coming months—and the store will offer personalized agent discovery based on your organizational context. For developers, the Agent Store also provides a platform to share your innovative agents with millions of Microsoft Copilot users and grow your user base. 

    With robust support through Copilot Studio and the Microsoft 365 Agents Toolkit, the Agent Store includes both low-code and pro-code development options. Whichever way you prefer to build and deploy your agents, this marketplace helps you reduce development time and costs and get them out there faster. 

    Learn more about finding and publishing agents through the Agent Store on the Microsoft 365 Developer Blog. 

    Publish custom engine agents to Microsoft Copilot Chat: Now generally available 

    The ability to publish custom engine agents built in Copilot Studio directly to Copilot Chat is now generally available and automatically enabled. This means all customers can now unlock powerful new ways to customize and extend Copilot experiences with rich, domain-specific intelligence, right inside the tools people use every day. 

    Previously announced in public preview, this feature allows makers to publish agents built in Copilot Studio to Copilot, with full access to the features that make agents intelligent and useful. That includes topics, orchestration selection, autonomous triggers, analytics, and Azure AI integrations. These custom agents surface seamlessly across Microsoft 365 apps, including Microsoft Teams, Word, Excel, PowerPoint, and Office. 

    Custom engine agents in Copilot support messages, quick replies, Adaptive Cards, multi-turn interactions, and multi-message responses—all backed by robust governance and analytics in the Microsoft Power Platform admin center. Now you can confidently scale custom Copilot experiences across your workforce, without changes to existing agents. 

    General availability brings simplified deployment and seamless integration, turning every custom agent into a first-class participant in the Microsoft 365 Copilot experience. Read more about publishing and deploying agents on Microsoft Learn. 

    Microsoft Graph connectors are now Copilot connectors

    Microsoft Graph connectors are now called Copilot connectors, a name that better reflects their role in powering the Microsoft 365 Copilot experience. 

    Copilot connectors bring external data into Microsoft 365 so Copilot and Copilot Studio agents can retrieve, apply reasoning to, and act on knowledge beyond the Microsoft 365 ecosystem. These connectors eliminate the need for duplicative uploads or clunky copy-paste workflows. 

    For developers and makers, Copilot connectors are the bridge between your existing systems and your AI-powered solutions. Whether you’re supporting sales teams to query customer relationship management (CRM) system records, surfacing insights from product documentation, or building custom agents grounded in real enterprise data, connectors make it possible to create truly contextual and intelligent experiences. 

    The change in name reflects a broader shift: AI isn’t just reading data anymore—it’s working with it. More than 40 Copilot connectors are already generally available or in public preview, including key sources like Gong, PagerDuty, and Unily, so connect your agents and systems in the Microsoft 365 admin center. Read more about building Copilot connectors on Microsoft Learn. 

    Accelerate agentic operations with new adoption resources

    We’re excited to introduce two new resources designed to help your organization get started with Copilot Studio quickly and effectively. Whether you’re launching your first agent or scaling across teams, these tools are built to simplify the building process and drive measurable impact across your organization. 

    Microsoft Copilot Studio Adoption page 

    This centralized hub offers comprehensive guidance for seamless integration across teams. It includes: 

    • Step-by-step setup and deployment guidance.
    • Role-based training for business users, developers and admins.
    • Best practices and support documentation.
    • Tools to help developers and leaders build and scale agents with confidence.

    This page is your go-to destination for enabling success from day one. Explore the Copilot Studio AI Agents Hub. 

    Copilot Studio AI Agents Hub

    Copilot Studio scenarios in the Microsoft Scenario Library 

    Explore 35 new custom agent scenarios across seven functional areas—each designed to showcase real-world value and accelerate adoption. Every scenario includes: 

    • A clear use case with key performance indicators (KPIs) and key users.
    • Agent functionality and flow breakdown.
    • Architecture and key considerations.

    These resources are crafted to help you unlock the full potential of Copilot Studio—empowering your teams to innovate, automate, and scale with ease.

    Microsoft Scenario Library

    Free Microsoft Copilot Studio training for Microsoft Power Platform makers

    If you or members of your team are already familiar with Microsoft Power Platform, you may be wondering how the skills you have built using Microsoft Power Apps or Microsoft Power Automate translate to the world of agents. Microsoft worked with Shane Young, a Microsoft most valuable player (MVP) of 20 years, as part of a paid collaboration to bring you more than four hours of free, hands-on training on YouTube.

    This series of videos will help you get started with Copilot Studio at your own pace so you can walk away with your own agents, ready to use. The training series includes demos, step-by-step builds, and deep dives into product-specific features, broken down into four sections: 

    1. Introduction and demos (7 videos)
    2. How to build a conversational agent (8 videos)
    3. How to build an autonomous agent (10 videos)
    4. Reusing your Microsoft Power Platform skills (4 videos)

    Thousands of Microsoft Power Platform makers have already gone through the training, and we encourage you to spread the word and join in. Start watching or share with your team. You may be the makers who create the next best agent in the Agent Store. 

    More ways to stay up to date on all things Copilot Studio

    Check out all the updates live as we ship them, as well as new features releasing in the next few months.

    To learn more about Copilot Studio and how it can transform your organization’s productivity, visit the Copilot Studio website or sign up for our free trial. 

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI USA: Durbin Questions Witnesses On Nationwide Injunctions During Senate Judiciary Joint Subcommittee Hearing

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Illinois Dick Durbin
    June 03, 2025
    WASHINGTON – U.S. Senate Democratic Whip Dick Durbin (D-IL), Ranking Member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, today questioned witnesses during a Senate Judiciary Joint Subcommittee hearing entitled “The Supposedly ‘Least Dangerous Branch’: District Judges v. Trump.” Durbin first asked the witnesses about nationwide injunctions. Last month, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Trump v. CASA. In that case, the justices are considering whether they should stay the district courts’ nationwide preliminary injunctions against the Trump Administration’s executive order that attempted to end birthright citizenship. During his question, Durbin echoed a hypothetical posted by Justice Sotomayor during the case’s oral arguments.
    “She [Justice Sotomayor] said, and I’m paraphrasing: imagine a new president takes office and decides, because of the epidemic of gun violence in our country, to issue an executive order announcing that he will deploy the military to seize the guns of every gun owner across the country. That executive order would be swiftly challenged in a federal district court—or, more likely, in several district courts. Should a district court be allowed to issue a nationwide injunction to at least temporarily prevent the enforcement of that executive order?” Durbin asked.
    Josh Blackman, a professor at the South Texas College of Law, responded that he did not think the remedy would be in the courts. Kate Shaw, a professor at the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School, responded, “whatever the Constitutional right is… if a president tries to do something that is in clear violation of settled law… an injunction is an appropriate remedy.” Joel Alicea, a professor at the Catholic University of America Columbus School of Law, responded, “I don’t think a judge could issue a universal injunction under those circumstances.”
    “Do you think it is reasonable to expect every single person affected by an executive order, like the one I described, to seek relief through Rule 23 or to file their own lawsuit to seek relief?” Durbin asked.
    Professor Alicea responded, “I don’t think that would be necessary. If you had one person who sought class certification successfully, that would be sufficient.”
    Durbin then asked the witnesses about judge shopping. During the Biden Administration, right-wing litigants flocked to the Amarillo Division of the Northern District of Texas to file their lawsuits. Those litigants filed their lawsuits in Amarillo because only one judge sits in that division—Judge Matthew Kacsmaryk. Litigants knew Judge Kacsmaryk would be assigned to their cases and viewed him as favorable to their arguments.
    “Judge Kacsmaryk is pretty well known for the way he rules. Professor Shaw, do you have any observation on that?” Durbin asked.
    Professor Shaw responded that “those single-judge divisions—like the one in Amarillo, Texas where Judge Kacsmaryk sits—are a genuine problem, but none of the injunctions against the Trump Administration have issued from judges who sit in those single-member districts… we aren’t seeing it now but I do think, regardless of who the president is, these single-judge divisions are a problem that Congress would be well-served to address.”
    Video of Durbin’s first round of questions in Committee is available here.
    Audio of Durbin’s first round of questions in Committee is available here.
    Footage of Durbin’s first round of questions in Committee is available here for TV Stations.
    -30-

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Durbin Statement On President Trump’s Proposal To Codify Devastating DOGE Cuts

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Illinois Dick Durbin
    June 03, 2025
    If passed by Congress, the rescissions package offered by the White House will cut $9.4 billion in federal funding for critical government programs
    WASHINGTON – U.S. Senate Democratic Whip Dick Durbin (D-IL) today released the following statement after President Trump released a rescissions package that, if passed by Congress, would codify cuts made by the so-called Department of Government Efficiency:
    “These sloppy and shortsighted rescissions slash public broadcasting and cut critical global health, HIV/AIDs, democracy, and other stabilization programs that save lives while helping to prevent wars and further develop markets for American goods, including Illinois farmers.  Programs that make up less than one percent of the federal budget are being cruelly cut to fund tax cuts for the wealthiest at the expense of the world’s most poor and our national security interests.  These rescissions are also dangerously targeting public broadcasting, which is critical to providing Americans, especially those in rural areas, with unbiased local news, educational programming, and emergency alerts.
    “We cannot allow this proposal, championed by President Trump, to erode the federal government.”

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Representative Smith releases statement concerning humanitarian aid distribution in Gaza

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Adam Smith (9th District of Washington)

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, Rep. Smith (D-Wash.) released the following statement after an influx of reports of violence around aid distribution sites.
     
    “I condemn rising violence around aid distribution sites in Gaza. The killing of individuals around humanitarian aid distribution sites is unacceptable. There must be an end to violence in the region and no individual should have to confront violence while seeking desperately needed humanitarian assistance. 

    “Israel bears the responsibility to ensure that critically needed and long overdue aid makes it into Gaza reaching those who need it most. The Palestinian people are suffering horribly. Not nearly enough food and humanitarian assistance is being delivered to Gaza and effectively and safely distributed. This must be fixed immediately.   

    “While it is a positive step that Israel lifted the blockade on aid to Gaza, the distribution of aid under this new plan seems haphazard and plagued by chaos and violence. The Israeli government must recognize these shortcomings and immediately fix their plan to stop the humanitarian crisis in Gaza and ensure aid is widely and safely delivered to Palestinian civilians. It is also of the utmost importance that Hamas and other actors are condemned for attempts to disrupt the distribution of aid.  

    “Israel must take every opportunity to reduce tensions, improve access to aid, and prevent human suffering. Fundamentally, the priority for the region must remain a ceasefire, a return of the Israeli hostages, and the delivery of necessary aid to the people of Gaza. A ceasefire will be an instrumental step to improve the flow of humanitarian aid and achieving sustainable peace and stability in the region.”

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: G7 Foreign Ministers Declaration on Maritime Security and Prosperity

    Source: United States Department of State (3)

    Office of the Spokesperson

    The text of the following statement was released by the G7 Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union.

    Begin Text:

    1. We, the Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union, reaffirm the G7’s steadfast commitment to contribute towards a free, open, and secure maritime domain based on the rule of law that strengthens international security, fosters economic prosperity, and ensures the sustainable use of marine resources.
    2. Maritime security and prosperity are fundamental to global stability, economic resilience, and the well-being of all nations, and the conservation and sustainable use of ocean ecosystems is essential to all life on Earth. Over 80% of global trade is transported by sea, and 97% of global data flows through submarine cables. Disruptions to maritime routes pose a direct threat to international food security, critical minerals, energy security, global supply chains, and economic stability. We express deep concern over the growing risks to maritime security, including strategic contestation, threats to freedom of navigation and overflight, and illicit shipping activities. State behaviour in these areas has increased the risk of conflict and environmental damage, and imperils all nations’ prosperity and living standards, especially for the world’s poorest.
    3. We recognize the role of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as the legal framework for governing all activities in the oceans and the seas.
    4. We recall the G7 Statements on Maritime Security adopted in Lübeck (2015) and Hiroshima (2016). We welcome related work presently underway through other G7 ministerial tracks and working groups, on a range of issues including securing undersea cable networks and combating abandoned fishing gear. We welcome, as well, G7 work relating to transnational organized crime and terrorism that touches on the maritime domain, including in relation to piracy and armed robbery at sea, trafficking in persons, and strengthening the maritime law enforcement capabilities of coastal states. We acknowledge the importance of regional maritime security frameworks, to support coastal states to address collectively threats to their maritime security. We welcome existing initiatives, such as the G7++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea (G7++ FoGG, that Canada chairs this year), which has been, the primary forum for dialogue among G7 members and partners on maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.

    Emerging Threat on Safe Seas and Freedom of Navigation and Overflight

    1. Enhancing Stability: We underscore the importance of freedom of navigation and overflight and other internationally lawful uses of the high seas and the exclusive economic zones as well as to the related rights and freedoms in other maritime zones, including the rights of innocent passage, transit passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage, as provided for under international law. We share a growing concern at recent, unjustifiable efforts to restrict such freedom and to expand jurisdiction through use of force and other forms of coercion, including across the Taiwan Strait, and in the South China Sea, the Red Sea, and the Black Sea. We condemn China’s illicit, provocative, coercive and dangerous actions that seek unilaterally to alter the status quo in such a way as to risk undermining the stability of regions, including through land reclamations, and building of outposts, as well as their use for military purpose. In areas pending final delimitation, we underline the importance of coastal states refraining from unilateral actions that cause permanent physical change to the marine environment insofar as such actions jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement, as well as the importance of making every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature, in those areas. We condemn, as well, dangerous vessel maneuvers, the indiscriminate attacks against commercial vessels and other maritime actions that undermine maritime order based on the rule of law and international law. We reiterate that the award rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal on 12 July 2016 is a significant milestone, which is legally binding upon the parties to those proceedings and a useful basis for peacefully resolving disputes between the parties. We reaffirm that our basic policies on Taiwan remain unchanged and emphasize the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as indispensable to international security and prosperity. We welcome the resumption of exports from Ukraine’s Black Sea ports. Freedom of navigation for commercial shipping in the Black Sea must be upheld.
    2. Attempts to Change the Status Quo by Force: We oppose unilateral attempts to change the status quo, in particular by force or coercion including in the East and South China Seas. We undertake to implement means through which to track systematically and report on attempts to change the status quo by force and by the establishment of new geographical facts, including through coercive and dangerous actions on the oceans and seas that might threaten regional and international peace and security.
    3. Protecting Critical Maritime and Undersea Infrastructure: We are seized of the fact that vital energy and telecommunications infrastructure under the oceans and seas connects our economies and is vital to our prosperity. We recall the G7 Joint Statement on Cable Connectivity for Secure and Resilient Digital Communications Networks (2024) and the New York Joint Statement on the Security and Resilience of Undersea Cables in a Globally Digitalized World (2024). We share a growing concern that undersea communications cables, subsea interconnectors and other critical undersea infrastructure have been subject to critical damage through sabotage, poor seamanship or irresponsible behaviour which have resulted in potential internet or energy disruption in affected regions, delays in global data transmission, or compromised sensitive communications. We will enhance our cooperation with industry mitigate risks, reduce bottlenecks to operational tasks while strengthening repair capacities in order to improve the overall resilience of critical undersea and maritime infrastructure. In this respect, we welcome the EU Action Plan on Cable Security adopted in February 2025 by the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
    4. Maritime Crime: Maritime crime, including piracy, armed robbery at sea, maritime arms trafficking and sanctions evasion, human trafficking, illegal drug trafficking and Illegal, Unreported, Unregulated (IUU) Fishing, continues to impede maritime security, freedom of navigation, and our economy and prosperity. We have been working together to tackle these maritime crimes, but maritime illegal activities have extended into new areas, to become an urgent issue to be addressed. We welcome the G7 Action Plan to combat migrant smuggling adopted under Italy’s 2024 G7 Presidency.
    5. Protecting Freedom of Trade: In the past year, indiscriminate Houthi attacks in the Red Sea have endangered maritime security of vessels and their crews, disturbed international trade, and exposed neighboring countries to environmental hazards. Enabled by Iran’s military, financial, and intelligence support, these illegal attacks have also contributed to increased tension in the Middle East and Yemen, with severe repercussions on the intra-Yemeni peace process. The vessel “Galaxy Leader” seized by the Houthis must be released immediately. We appreciate the efforts of all those countries that have engaged to ensure freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, protecting crucial shipping lanes and helping to restore regular flows of trade through the Suez Canal connecting the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian and Pacific Oceans. In this regard, we commend the efforts of EU’s maritime operation “Aspides” and U.S.-led operation “Prosperity Guardian”.

    Safe Shipping and Supply Chain Security

    1. Curtailing Unsafe and Illicit Shipping Practices: The rise of unsafe and illicit shipping practices, including fraudulent registration and registries, poses a significant threat to global trade and environmental sustainability. We are concerned that unsafe and illicit shipping imposes heavy costs on industry, governments and citizens. Russia’s ability to earn revenue has been sustained through its extensive effort to circumvent the G7+ oil price cap policy through its shadow fleet of often older, underinsured, and poorly maintained ships that routinely disable their automatic identification systems or engage in “spoofing” to avoid detection and circumvent international safety, environmental, and liability rules and standards. North Korea continues to pursue its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes and evade sanctions, particularly through its illicit maritime activities, including prohibited ship to-ship transfers of petroleum and other UN-banned commodities. Through G7 coordination, we have exposed North Korea uses of “dark” vessels – those that engage in illicit activity – to circumvent United Nations Security Council mandated sanctions. Russia and North Korea are strengthening their economic relations including through maritime routes, such as the reported transfer of petroleum products from Russia to North Korea Unregulated, “dark” vessels undertake IUU fishing, destroying marine habitats and depleting fish stocks, with negative impacts for biodiversity and food security. Unregulated, inadequately insured “dark” vessels also pose a high risk of maritime accidents, including in fragile ecosystems such as the Arctic and Antarctic. We commit to strengthen our coordination, amongst the G7 and with other partners, to prevent the use of unregistered or fraudulently registered, uninsured and substandard vessels engaged in sanctions evasion, arms transfers, illegal fishing and illicit trade. We encourage relevant International Organizations to improve maritime domain awareness by expanding satellite-based vessel tracking and establishing comprehensive data records of the movement of individual ships and of ship-to-ship transfers, as a means of identifying and tracking illicit maritime activities. We are also committed to capacity building of the countries in the region in law enforcement and Maritime Domain Awareness.
    2. Shadow Fleet Task Force: We invite members of the Nordic-Baltic 8 (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Sweden), and possibly others, to join participating G7 members in a Shadow Fleet Task Force to enhance monitoring and detection and to otherwise constrain the use of shadow fleets engaged in illegal, unsafe or environmentally perilous activities, building on the work of others active in this area. The Task Force will constitute a response by the participating States to the call by the International Maritime Organization in its Resolution A.1192(33) of 6 December 2023 for Members States and all relevant stakeholders to promote actions to prevent illegal operations in the maritime sector by shadow fleets and their flag states, including illegal operations for the purposes of circumventing sanctions, evading compliance with safety or environmental regulations, avoiding insurance costs, or engaging in other illegal activities.
    3. Enhancing Maritime Supply Chain Resilience and Energy and Food Security: Maritime supply chains will continue to underpin the global economy, but these face a variety of threats, both present and future, stemming from both geopolitical tensions and environmental factors. Maritime disruptions raise consumer costs, increase transit times, and can reduce demand in importing countries, which in turn means lower revenues and diminished competitiveness for producers in exporting countries. Such vulnerabilities in maritime transport can undermine energy and food security, particularly for developing nations reliant on stable shipping routes, including Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and Least Developed Countries (LDCs). We welcome maritime initiatives involving and supported by G7 partners intended to promote energy and food security, such as the Grain from Ukraine scheme, and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. We invite cooperation with the African Union (pursuant to Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy 2050) and other relevant International Organizations to identify best practices for enhancing maritime supply chain resilience and for safeguarding energy and food security, including in times of geopolitical crisis.
    4. Promoting Safe and Resilient Ports and Strategic Waterways: Port ownership and operational control matter to national security, as foreign control or influence over critical port infrastructure can create vulnerabilities in trade, in defense and security, and in economic stability. Port resilience is also crucial to economic stability and global trade and yet ports face growing risks from environmental degradation, extreme weather events and geopolitical conflicts. Strengthening port security and modernizing infrastructure are essential to maintaining safe and efficient maritime trade. Ensuring that the ownership and management of strategic waterways and key maritime choke points are not vulnerable to undue influence by potential adversaries is also essential to national security. We underscore the importance of scrutiny of ownership structures and port management and resilience within our own national jurisdictions, including with regard to Information and Communications Technology (ICT) systems, to ensure that adversaries do not gain leverage over supply chains, military operations, or the flow of strategic resources. We will work with partners and with relevant International Organizations to encourage robust cybersecurity standards for port ICT infrastructure, to increase resilience against malicious cyber incidents on maritime logistical networks, to reduce monopolistic power over key supply chain nodes, to promote secure and transparent port ownership, to limit unsolicited or undue foreign influence over critical infrastructures and strategic waterways, and to otherwise encourage greater focus on such potential vulnerabilities.
    5. Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) at sea poses a significant hazard to the marine environment, to the safety of fishermen and other users of the maritime space, and to various marine economic activities. We commit to enhancing diplomatic efforts and to exchanging best practices among national authorities, relevant international and regional organizations, and relevant industry sectors to accelerate the clean-up of UXO from the seas and ocean.

    Sustainable Stewardship of Maritime Resources

    1. Strengthen Enforcement Against IUU Fishing: IUU fishing is a major contributor to declining fish stocks and to marine habitat destruction. It may account for a third of all fishing activity worldwide, at a cost to the global economy of more than US$23 billion per year and with negative consequences for fisheries as an enduring economic asset, including for developing countries. We welcome the Canadian-led Dark Vessel Detection System in Ecuador, Peru, Costa Rica, the Philippines, and members of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) and would see value in replicating the model to support other partners whose fisheries are under threat from IUU fishing. We recognize that data sharing and transparency play a key role in this fight by exposing bad actors and that technological advances can support a robust Monitoring, Control and Surveillance and enforcement landscape. We encourage further progress in addressing IUU fishing, working with and through relevant International Organizations to establish and strengthen rules to sustainably manage fish stocks on the high seas and to improve the enforcement of these measures, including through the further development of detection technologies, aircraft patrols and high seas boarding and inspection of vessels, building upon the 2022 G7 Ocean Deal.
    2. We welcome the Third UN Ocean Conference, in Nice, France, from 9 to 13 June 2025.

    PARTNERSHIPS

    1. This G7 Maritime Security and Prosperity Declaration provides a framework for cooperation with non-G7 Partners, including countries hosting major ports, large merchant fleets, or extensive flag registries as well as relevant regional and International Organizations, such as the International Maritime Organization and ASEAN. We would welcome robust cooperation with Partners to take forward the goals set out in this Declaration, consistent with the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, under the efforts of the G7 countries, including a free, open, prosperous and secure Indo-Pacific region, to build a free and open maritime order based on the rule of law, and of commitment to the sustainable development of the world’s maritime spaces.
    2. We welcome the cooperation on Coast Guard Functions, including the Global Coast Guard Forum hosted by Italy in 2025, as well as the Arctic Coast Guard Forum, which could also support the objectives of this Declaration.

    MIL OSI USA News