Category: Politics

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – The European Water Resilience Strategy – P10_TA(2025)0091 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular Article 191 thereof,

    –  having regard to the Agreement adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP21) in Paris on 12 December 2015 (the Paris Agreement),

    –  having regard to the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), with particular emphasis on the SDG 6 on clean water and sanitation,

    –  having regard to the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, adopted in December 2022,

    –  having regard to the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants of 22 May 2001,

    –  having regard to the precautionary principle and the principles that preventive action should be taken, that environmental damage should, as a priority, be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay, as enshrined in Article 191(2) TFEU,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulations (EC) No 401/2009 and (EU) 2018/1999 (European Climate Law)(1),

    –  having regard to Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy(2) (Water Framework Directive),

    –  having regard to Directive 2006/118/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on the protection of groundwater against pollution and deterioration(3) (Groundwater Directive),

    –  having regard to Directive 2008/105/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on environmental quality standards in the field of water policy, amending and subsequently repealing Council Directives 82/176/EEC, 83/513/EEC, 84/156/EEC, 84/491/EEC, 86/280/EEC and amending Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council(4) (Environmental Quality Standards Directive),

    –  having regard to Directive 2007/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on the assessment and management of flood risks(5),

    –  having regard to Directive (EU) 2020/2184 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on the quality of water intended for human consumption(6) (Drinking Water Directive),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/741 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 2020 on minimum requirements for water reuse(7) (Water Reuse Regulation),

    –  having regard to Directive 2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 establishing a framework for community action in the field of marine environmental policy (Marine Strategy Framework Directive)(8),

    –  having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/3019 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2024 concerning urban wastewater treatment(9) (revised Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive),

    –  having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/1785 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2024 amending Directive 2010/75/EU on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) and Council Directive 1999/31/EC on the landfill of waste(10),

    –  having regard to Council Directive 91/676/EEC of 12 December 1991 concerning the protection of waters against pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources(11),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1991 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2024 on nature restoration and amending Regulation (EU) 2022/869(12),

    –  having regard to Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC(13) (Critical Entities Resilience Directive),

    –  having regard to Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council on 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive)(14),

    –  having regard to Directive 2009/128/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 establishing a framework for Community action to achieve the sustainable use of pesticides(15),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 establishing rules on support for strategic plans to be drawn up by Member States under the common agricultural policy (CAP Strategic Plans) and financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1305/2013 and (EU) No 1307/2013(16),

    –  having regard to Commission Regulation (EU) 2024/3190 of 19 December 2024 on the use of bisphenol A (BPA) and other bisphenols and bisphenol derivatives with harmonised classification for specific hazardous properties in certain materials and articles intended to come into contact with food, amending Regulation (EU) No 10/2011 and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/213(17),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 19 February 2021 entitled ‘A Vision for Agriculture and Food’ (COM(2025)0075),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 on the European Green Deal (COM(2019)0640),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2025 entitled ‘A Competitiveness Compass for the EU’ (COM(2025)0030),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 12 May 2021 entitled ‘Pathway to a Healthy Planet for All – EU Action Plan: ‘Towards Zero Pollution for Air, Water and Soil’’ (COM(2021)0400),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 24 February 2021 entitled ‘Forging a climate-resilient Europe – the new EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change’ (COM(2021)0082),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 18 July 2007 on addressing the challenge of water scarcity and droughts in the European Union (COM(2007)0414),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 11 March 2020 entitled ‘A new Circular Economy Action Plan: For a cleaner and more competitive Europe’ (COM(2020)0098),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 14 November 2012 entitled ‘A Blueprint to Safeguard Europe’s Water Resources’ (COM(2012)0673),

    –  having regard to the EU biodiversity strategy for 2030,

    –  having regard to the COP29 Declaration on Water for Climate Action, endorsed by the European Union,

    –  having regard to the European Oceans Pact announced by Commission President von der Leyen in her political guidelines for the next European Commission (2024-2029) on 18 July 2024,

    –  having regard to the European climate adaptation plan and the European water resilience strategy announced by Commission President von der Leyen in her political guidelines for the next European Commission (2024-2029) on 18 July 2024,

    –  having regard to the EU’s 8th environment action programme,

    –  having regards to its resolution of 5 October 2022 entitled ‘Access to water as a human right – the external dimension’(18),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 19 September 2024 on the devastating floods in central and eastern Europe, the loss of lives and the EU’s preparedness to act on such disasters exacerbated by climate change(19),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 6 October 2022 on momentum for the ocean: strengthening ocean governance and biodiversity(20),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 28 November 2019 on the climate and environment emergency(21),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 14 November 2024 on the UN climate change conference in Baku, Azerbaijan (COP29)(22),

    –  having regard to the Commission report of 4 February 2025 on the implementation of the Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC) and the Floods Directive (2007/60/EC) entitled ‘Third river basin management plans – Second flood risk management plans’ (COM(2025)0002),

    –  having regard to the European Court of Auditors special report 15/2024 of 16 October 2024 entitled ‘Climate adaptation in the EU – action not keeping up with ambition’,

    –  having regard to former Finnish President Sauli Niinistö’s report of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s civil and military preparedness and readiness’,

    –  having regard to Enrico Letta’s report of April 2024 entitled ‘Much more than a market’,

    –  having regard to its resolution of 17 December 2020 on the implementation of the EU water legislation(23),

    –  having regard to the European Court of Auditors special report 33/2018 of 18 December 2018 entitled ‘Combating desertification in the EU: a growing threat in need of more action,

    –  having regard to the European citizens’ initiative (ECI) on the right to water,

    –  having regard to its resolution of 8 September 2015 on the follow-up to the European Citizens’ Initiative Right2Water(24),

    –  having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 64/292 of 28 July 2010, which recognises the human right to water and sanitation,

    –  having regard to the Strategic Dialogue on the future of EU agriculture,

    –  having regard to the European Court of Auditors special report 20/2024 of 30 September 2024 entitled ‘Common Agricultural Policy Plans – Greener, but not matching the EU’s ambitions for the climate and the environment’,

    –  having regard to European Environment Agency report 07/2024 of 15 October 2024 entitled ‘Europe’s state of water 2024: the need for improved water resilience’ (EEA Report 07/2024),

    –  having regard to the Environment Council conclusions of 17 June 2024 on the 8th environment action programme,

    –  having regard to European Court of Auditors special report 20/2021 of 28 September 2021 entitled ‘Sustainable water use in agriculture: CAP funds more likely to promote greater rather than more efficient water use’,

    –  having regard to the European Economic and Social Committee declaration of 26 October 2023 for an EU Blue Deal,

    –  having regard to the Commission proposal of 5 July 2023 for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Soil Monitoring and Resilience (Soil Monitoring Law) (COM(2023)0416),

    –  having regard to its position at first reading of 24 April 2024 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2000/60/EC establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy, Directive 2006/118/EC on the protection of groundwater against pollution and deterioration and Directive 2008/105/EC on environmental quality standards in the field of water policy(25),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety (A10-0073/2025),

    A.  whereas water is essential for life and humanity; whereas the EU has to manage current and future water resources efficiently and respond effectively to the current water challenges, as they directly affect human health, the environment and its ecosystems, strategic socio-economic activities such as energy production, agriculture and food security, and the EU’s competitiveness;

    B.  whereas water is a scarce and limited resource and, while 70 % of the earth’s surface is water-covered, available and usable fresh water accounts for only 0,5 % of water on earth(26); whereas mountains are real water towers and important freshwater reservoirs in Europe, the Alps alone providing 40 % of Europe’s fresh water(27);

    C.  whereas groundwater supplies two thirds of the EU’s drinking water and supports many ecosystems(28); whereas the services provided by freshwater ecosystems are worth over EUR 11 trillion in Europe, and provide considerable health and recreational benefits, such as from angling(29);

    D.  whereas water stress is already occurring in Europe, affecting approximately 20 % of Europe’s territory and 30 % of the population on average every year, figures that are likely to increase in the future on account of climate change(30), despite the fact that total water abstraction at the EU-27 level appeared to decrease by 15 % between 2000 and 2019; whereas the increase in the number and recurrence of extreme weather events such as droughts and floods, and the fact that they are expected to become yet more frequent in the near future, poses a risk to human life and the EU’s food sovereignty and could lead to regions in Europe becoming uninhabitable;

    E.  whereas 78 % of Europeans consider that the EU should propose additional measures to address water-related issues in Europe and 21 % of Europeans consider pollution to be the main threat linked to water in their country(31);

    F.  whereas the human right to water and sanitation was recognised as a human right in a resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly on 28 July 2010;

    G.  whereas the European Citizens’ Initiative Right2Water was the first ever to gather the required number of signatories, calling for the EU to ensure the right to water for all;

    H.  whereas the provisions of Article 14 TFEU and Protocol No 26 thereto on Services of General Interest are key elements to be prominently taken into account in all aspects of the design and implementation of the European water resilience strategy (EWRS), thus safeguarding the status of Europe’s water services as essential public services, and ensuring accessibility, equity, affordability and the maintenance of high quality standards;

    I.  whereas the Member States should follow up on the recommendations of the Commission report of November 2023(32) in order to improve water balances as the knowledge basis for making decisions about water allocation;

    J.  whereas substantive corporate value may be at risk owing to worsening water insecurity, with a decrease in the capacity of production or its complete halt as a consequence; whereas assets in water-stressed regions could become stranded, temporarily or permanently, if assumptions made about water availability and access prove inaccurate, if regulatory responses are unanticipated or if risk mitigation and stewardship plans are not put in place(33);

    K.  whereas the deadline set by the Water Framework Directive (WFD) for European rivers, lakes, transitional waters, coastal waters and groundwaters to achieve ‘good’ status was 2015, with a possible postponement to 2027 under certain conditions; whereas the objective of achieving good chemical status for all EU water bodies by 2027 remains far from being achieved, primarily due to substances such as mercury, brominated flame retardants and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons(34);

    L.  whereas the 2025 report on the implementation of the WFD shows that delays in meeting the WFD’s targets are not due to a deficiency in the legislation but to a lack of funding, slow implementation and insufficient integration of environmental objectives into sectoral policies; whereas analysis has shown that the Member States are not meeting the annual investment needs, which are estimated to be EUR 77 billion, with a financing gap currently estimated at around EUR 25 billion a year; whereas the report also shows the clear need for the Member States to increase their level of ambition and accelerate action to reduce the compliance gap as much as possible before 2027, to increase investment and ensure adequate financing, including via EU funds, to achieve the objectives of their programmes of measures, as well as to put in place additional measures to reduce current persistent environmental challenges to and improve transboundary cooperation;

    M.  whereas the water legislation has been evaluated as fit for purpose; whereas it establishes a framework for the protection of inland surface waters, transitional waters, coastal waters and groundwater; whereas, at the same time, it allows for less stringent environmental objectives to be achieved if socio-economic needs served by such human activity cannot be achieved by other means and it allows for a failure to achieve the objectives for water bodies if the reason for the failure is overriding public interest; whereas the legislation is proportionate and mandates the authorities of the Member States, in line with the principle of subsidiarity, to decide on the overriding public interest; whereas in some cases this may be the protection of the environment and in others a socio-economic activity;

    N.  whereas industry accounts for approximately 40 % of total water abstraction in Europe; whereas the largest categories of the annual water abstraction in the EU-27, according to the statistical classification of economic activities in the European Community (NACE), are abstraction for cooling in electricity generation (34 %), followed by abstraction for agriculture (29 %), public water supply (21 %) and manufacturing (15 %)(35); whereas data on water abstraction and use in the EU is historical and poor(36);

    O.  whereas electricity production is the largest water-abstracting sector, but most of the water is returned to the environment after cooling or turbine propulsion; whereas overall, agriculture is the highest net water-consuming sector at the EU level, as most of the water is consumed by the crop or evaporates; whereas other uses, such as industry and water utilities, abstract and consume comparatively less water, but they can represent significant pressures at a local level, especially on groundwater(37);

    P.  whereas all industrial activity requires water to produce its end products or to support production activities; whereas businesses depend on water for their daily operations, and as water scarcity increases, it can disrupt operations, raise costs and create regulatory and reputational risks;

    Q.  whereas the energy sector relies heavily on water resources; whereas this dependency poses a serious risk as water scarcity can impact energy production processes and supply security, especially where water is used as feedstock or for cooling; whereas the transition to renewable energy, particularly wind and solar energy, offers sustainable and water-efficient decarbonisation pathways and the opportunity to halt or reverse the trend of increasing water consumption;

    R.  whereas water is an essential resource for agriculture in the production of high-quality food, feed and renewable raw materials; whereas agriculture depends on water availability and irrigation helps to shield farmers from irregular rainfall and to increase the viability, yield and quality of the crops, but is a significant drain on water resources; whereas in view of climate change, changing weather patterns and increased frequency of floods and droughts, the importance of water as a resource for the production of high-quality agricultural products and of the need for water to be used efficiently will therefore be fundamental to the security of food supply and to the solutions to address water scarcity; whereas reducing pressure on surface water and groundwater from agriculture must go hand in hand with investment aimed at the use of reclaimed water and innovative desalination technologies, thereby achieving a better water balance as well as promoting clean alternative energies such as green hydrogen;

    S.  whereas global population growth requires increased food production, and the EU must guarantee food sovereignty, as laid down in Article 39 TFEU;

    T.  whereas reliable data on water accounting, that is, the systematic study of the current status and trends in water supply, demand, accessibility and use in domains that have been specified(38), is crucial for an assessment of the current situation in the EU and for European competitiveness;

    U.  whereas the potential of wastewater as an alternative water supply is underestimated, given that 60-70 % of the potential value of wastewater across the EU is currently unexploited(39) and less than 3 % of treated wastewater is reused in the EU(40); whereas there is significant potential for circular approaches to water in households, as only a small amount of the water in households is used for drinking and eating and therefore requires the highest quality standards;

    V.  whereas a very large quantity of water is lost due to obsolete or ageing water networks and the lack of necessary maintenance; whereas investment in the maintenance, improvement and development of resilient innovative irrigation infrastructures is essential for reducing and improving the efficiency of water consumption in agriculture; whereas such improvements in efficiency enable the water saved to be used for other purposes or enable the natural flow rates of watercourses to be maintained;

    W.  whereas clean and sufficient water is an essential element in implementing and achieving a real sustainable circular economy in the EU;

    X.  whereas water leakage is an underestimated global issue, which significantly exacerbates water scarcity, with an average of 23 % of treated water lost during distribution in the EU due to leaky pipes, outdated treatment facilities and insufficient reservoirs(41); whereas the revised Drinking Water Directive included measures to reduce water leakages, as well as risk assessment and management of the catchment areas for drinking water abstraction;

    Y.  whereas in 2021, 91 % of Europe’s groundwater bodies were reported as having achieved ‘good quantitative status’, while 77 % were reported as having ‘good chemical status’(42);

    Z.  whereas in 2021, only 37 % of Europe’s surface water bodies were reported as being in ‘good’ or ‘high’ ecological status, while 29 % achieved ‘good chemical status’(43);

    AA.  whereas the European Environment Agency emphasises that the proportion of surface waters failing to achieve good ecological status is uneven across Europe, and that these are more prevalent in parts of central and western Europe, and stresses that differences in water status between the Member States may be caused by different pressures, but that those differences may also result from varying approaches to monitoring and assessment(44);

    AB.  whereas the quality of surface waters across the continent reflects continuing and combined pressures, in particular diffuse pollution and the degradation of their natural flow and physical features; whereas pollution by nutrients and persistent priority substances, as well as by substances newly emerging as pollutants, continues; whereas groundwaters are affected by diffuse pollution and also suffer from intensive abstraction(45);

    AC.  whereas groundwater supplies 65 % of water for drinking and 25 % of water for agricultural irrigation in the EU(46); whereas it is a finite resource that needs to be protected from pollution and over-exploitation(47);

    AD.  whereas monitoring data from the European Environment Agency indicates widespread pollution by per- and polyfluoralkyl substances (PFAS), commonly referred to as ‘forever chemicals’, in European waters, posing significant risks to aquatic ecosystems and human health; whereas short-chain PFAS trifluoroacetic acid (TFA) has been detected in drinking water all over Europe; whereas PFAS persist in the environment, bioaccumulate in living organisms and cause adverse (eco)toxicological effects; whereas from a group of 6 000 to 10 000 individual substances, only a few have been extensively studied and their impact on human health and environment is known; whereas 99 % of PFAS remain undetected in the environment as a result of limits in monitoring;

    AE.  whereas the lack of EU-wide quality standards for PFAS in groundwater and insufficient monitoring of less-studied PFAS compounds exacerbate the challenge of achieving good chemical status for EU waters in line with the WFD and pose a substantial technical and financial burden on health systems and on water service providers while jeopardising applications of water and sewage sludge reuse;

    AF.  whereas hazardous chemicals, including heavy metals and other pollutants, released into water bodies by industrial activities, significantly impact water quality and aquatic ecosystems(48);

    AG.  whereas pharmaceutical substances are increasingly identified in surface water and groundwater; whereas pollution caused by pharmaceutical residues necessitates advanced water treatment technologies, including membrane filtration, activated carbon treatment, advanced oxidation processes and other innovative purification techniques;

    AH.  whereas Directive 2010/75/EU(49) mandates that the potential aggravation of the impact of industrial discharges on the state of water bodies due to variations of water flow dynamics should be explicitly taken into account in the granting and reviewing of permits; whereas the best available techniques will newly incorporate notions of environmental performance levels related to water and permits, which translate the use of these techniques into environmental performance limit values; whereas this is a welcome change with a potential improvement to the industry’s resilience, as EU installations may already face a lower production capacity seasonally due to water scarcity;

    AI.  whereas urban wastewater is one of the main sources of water pollution, if not properly collected and treated; whereas the objectives of the Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive should not be lowered, and its scope should be extended to other sectors and substances that contribute to water pollution;

    AJ.  whereas nutrient pollution in EU water bodies leads to eutrophication, loss of biodiversity, and degradation of aquatic ecosystems(50); whereas pesticide run-off contaminates surface water and groundwater, threatening water quality and human health;

    AK.  whereas research indicates that exposure in Europe to the synthetic chemical bisphenol A (BPA), which is used in products ranging from plastic and metal food containers to reusable water bottles, is well above acceptable health safety levels(51);

    AL.  whereas soil and nutrient management lies at the basis of improving water quality and availability; whereas the EWRS should focus on improving nutrient management, with the aim of closing nutrient loops to reduce nutrient emissions to waterways; whereas the safe use of sewage sludge in agriculture will also reduce the EU’s very high dependency on the import of phosphorus mineral fertiliser, for example, from Russia; whereas the safe use of sludge should therefore also be considered as contributing to European resilience and strategic autonomy;

    AM.  whereas climate change represents a major threat to water resources and aquatic ecosystems; whereas many impacts of climate change are felt through water, such as more intense and frequent droughts, more extreme flooding and more erratic seasonal rainfall; whereas floods and water scarcity compromise food and water security, and the health of the general population, ultimately affecting social cohesion, economic prosperity and stability, as well as jeopardising the long-term availability of this valuable resource;

    AN.  whereas the European climate risk assessment recognised that Europe’s policies and adaptation actions are not keeping pace with the rapidly growing risks that threaten ecosystems, infrastructure, food and water supply and people’s health, as well as the economy and finance(52);

    AO.  whereas assessments by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change show that the sea level rise due to climate change is leading to an increase in the salinity of soils and freshwaters, compromising ecosystem health and water quality, as well as affecting 80 million Europeans living in low elevation coastal zones and flood plains; whereas freshwater and marine ecosystems are interconnected as riverine pollution, disruption to sediment flows and water shortages all have a very strong impact on the health of marine ecosystems, particularly the coastal ones, as well as on the viability of social and economic activities that depend on them, such as transport, fisheries, agriculture, aquaculture and tourism;

    AP.  whereas prolonged drought, extreme heat and large-scale flooding events, caused by changing weather patterns, will intensify and become more frequent throughout the continent, damaging ecosystems and human health and leading to major disruption to economic activities and decreasing the overall quantity and quality of available water; whereas preserving water resources and the natural functions of rivers, while supplying sufficient water of good quality, is becoming a major challenge that will require increased climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts, effective management and innovative measures to increase water availability; whereas managing water scarcity and flood risks affordably and sustainably will increasingly become important across the EU;

    AQ.  whereas in 2022, Europe experienced its hottest summer and the second warmest year on record, leading to drought impacting over 15 % of EU territory; whereas the average annual economic loss caused by droughts in the EU between1981 and 2010 was estimated at around EUR 9 billion per year; whereas with no adaptation measures, it is estimated that annual drought losses in Europe and the UK could increase to EUR 45 billion per year up to 2100 with warming of 3°C(53); whereas in the period of 1998-2020, floods comprised 43 % of all disaster events in Europe; whereas climate change impacts and socio-economic developments are leading to more frequent flooding, affecting an increasing number of people and causing increasing damage; whereas 12 % of Europe’s population lives in floodplains(54);

    AR.  whereas the cost of inaction in addressing water-related challenges is extremely high, given that 90 % of disasters are related to water(55); whereas without policy action, the cost of economic losses from coastal floods alone could exceed EUR 1 trillion per year by the end of the century in the EU(56) and the economic cost of droughts in Europe could exceed EUR 65 billion a year by 2100(57);

    AS.  whereas significant differences exist between the Member States in water availability, management strategies and usage patterns, and vulnerability to climate change impacts can vary considerably; whereas a tailored approach is required to enhance water resilience and ensure sustainable water management;

    AT.  whereas droughts constitute one of the chief catastrophic consequences of climate change; whereas around 23 % of the EU’s territory is moderately susceptible to desertification and 8 % is highly susceptible to it; whereas Hungary, Bulgaria, Spain and Italy are among the countries most affected, and 74 % of Spain’s surface area is at risk of desertification; whereas the EWRS should look beyond prolonged droughts, but rather address the reality that the semi-arid line is moving north, resulting in increasing areas in the EU that will face chronic long-term unavailability of sufficient freshwater resources;

    AU.  whereas policies related to desertification, water consumption and climate change are closely interconnected; whereas as part of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, the EU reaffirmed in 2015 and later re-confirmed in 2024(58) its commitment to achieving land degradation neutrality by 2030, which, according to the European Court of Auditors special report on desertification, is unlikely to be achieved;

    AV.  whereas water infrastructure can help maintain a constant and predictable flow and supply of water; whereas in 2022, the annual average river discharge across Europe was the second lowest since records began in 1991(59);

    AW.  whereas downstream areas are particularly dependent on upstream water management and abstraction; whereas the Member States should refrain from implementing measures that significantly increase flood risks upstream or downstream of other countries in the same river basin, in accordance with the WFD;

    AX.  whereas nature-based solutions are pertinent interventions that, when tailored to specific ecosystems and needs, can increase resilience in the water cycle and provide multiple benefits in terms of biodiversity protection, carbon sequestration, improved water quality, nutrient retention, supply of drinking water, wildfire prevention and flood risk mitigation; whereas nature-based solutions can enhance the effectiveness and the operable life of water infrastructure, therefore ensuring, in many cases, complementarity of both solutions;

    AY.  whereas natural water retention measures are nature-based solutions that aim to store water in natural, agricultural, forested and urban landscapes;

    AZ.  whereas water is not a commercial product like any other but, rather, a heritage which must be protected, defended and treated as such; whereas, under Directive (EU) 2024/1203 on the protection of the environment through criminal law(60), abstraction of surface water or groundwater within the meaning of the WFD constitutes a criminal offence where such conduct is unlawful and intentional, and causes, or is likely to cause, substantial damage to the ecological status or the ecological potential of surface water bodies or to the quantitative status of groundwater bodies;

    BA.  whereas soil biodiversity and soil organic carbon affect water retention capacity; whereas soil erosion, compaction and certain soil management practices that cause soil degradation lead to a steady decrease in the water retention capacity of soil, which as a consequence exacerbates drought and flood events with a direct negative impact on farming; whereas healthy soil is therefore one of the drivers of water resilience, which itself should be approached and managed at river basin level; whereas better land management is key to preventing disasters;

    BB.  whereas the current multiannual financial framework (MFF) includes an ambitious but non-binding target of dedicating at least 7,5 % of annual EU spending to the biodiversity objectives in 2024 and 10 % in both 2026 and 2027; whereas the new financial framework should incorporate a water perspective with a view to allocating sufficient resources to the future EWRS in order to ensure resilient water ecosystems and infrastructure, and security of water supply, and to facilitate investments in innovative solutions;

    BC.  whereas cohesion funding has played a crucial role in improving water and sanitation services across the Member States; whereas continued support is required to ensure their long-term resilience and compliance with increasingly stringent quality standards;

    BD.  whereas pricing policies can improve the efficiency of water use; whereas such policies are a national competence and account for the regional differences in water availability and the source of water supply; whereas pricing can play a significant role in prompting households and other economic sectors to optimise consumption, as well as in ensuring that water users effectively participate in recovering the costs of water services; whereas pricing policies should also consider affordability for households and small businesses;

    BE.  whereas digitalisation and innovation can effectively assist the Member States, regional bodies and the Commission in collecting data on and monitoring water management; whereas the EU is at the forefront of new technological developments in the water sector, accounting for 40 % of all international patent families in this sector between 1992 and 2021(61), a position that needs to be fostered and nurtured, and the potential of the internal market fully exploited; whereas hurdles for the introduction and scaling-up of new water technologies need to be examined and a just European level playing field guaranteed; whereas continued support for research in water technology innovation is needed to secure and to create jobs and boost European competitiveness;

    BF.  whereas innovation is a crucial tool to help the water sector meet the challenges of the United Nation’s SDGs, adapt to climate change and become more water-efficient;

    BG.  whereas deployment of monitoring and modelling technologies is still lagging behind in many Member States, and the digitalisation of the sector is too slow; whereas provisions on the river basin management plans in the WFD do not explicitly include concrete measures to digitise the water sector; whereas common shortcomings for the current policies harnessing the potential digital solutions are related to the lack of technology guidance, monitoring standards, policy integration, standardisation and public involvement;

    BH.  whereas the water sector is vulnerable to various threats, including physical attacks, cyberattacks and contamination with harmful agents; whereas such incidents could result in widespread illness, casualties and service disruptions, significantly impacting public health, the environment and economic stability; whereas the digitalisation of water management might introduce further security risks in a context of increasing hostile attacks on critical infrastructure; whereas the implementation of the NIS2 Directive and Critical Entities Resilience Directive can contribute to mitigating security risks to vital (drinking) water systems and (drinking) water infrastructure, arising from geopolitical tensions;

    BI.  whereas advances in sensor technology, computing, artificial intelligence (AI) and big data management can help monitor water quantity and quality and inform the operational decisions of the policymakers and water management companies; whereas innovations in nature-based systems to manage water are available and can contribute to resilient water management;

    BJ.  whereas water is a vital component in the life cycle of AI, both in the operation of data centres and the manufacture of hardware; whereas the rapid expansion of AI could result in an exponential increase in water demand; whereas that dependency on an increasingly scarce resource poses significant challenges in terms of sustainability; whereas strategic technologies, such as semiconductors, hydrogen, electric vehicle batteries and data centres, play a key role in achieving a competitive and autonomous EU;

    BK.  whereas chiller and cooling tower systems, based on innovative cooling technologies such as evaporative and closed-loop cooling, are already available and can contribute to reducing water consumption in industrial, heating, ventilation and air conditioning systems applications;

    BL.  whereas research must be promoted with a view to producing alternative active ingredients to combat pests, to ensure greater plant health and reduce the use of inputs and phytosanitary products;

    BM.  whereas water resilience is crucial in education and teaching, and in raising awareness and giving information about the functioning of the water cycle;

    BN.  whereas limited access to water and related infrastructure has a negative impact, especially on women, as it undermines the realisation of other human rights, such as self-determination, economic independence and education;

    BO.  whereas 60 % of European river basin districts are transnational, which makes effective transboundary cooperation crucial; whereas 20 European countries depend on other countries for more than 10 % of their water resources, with five countries relying on more than 75 % of their resources coming from abroad via rivers(62); whereas this cooperation should be strengthened to account for current and future climate challenges such as droughts and floods;

    BP.  whereas United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres appointed a Special Envoy on Water, aiming to enhance international cooperation and synergies among international water processes;

    BQ.  whereas clean water access and sustainable and resilient sanitation infrastructure are key components of the One Health approach, recognising the interconnection between the health of humans and water pollution;

    BR.  whereas water cooperation across borders and sectors generates many benefits, including enhancing food security, sustaining healthy livelihoods and ecosystems, helping address resilience to climate change, contributing to disaster risk reduction, providing renewable energy, supporting cities and industry, and fostering regional integration and peace;

    BS.  whereas geopolitical developments demonstrate that the EU should be ready to withstand the challenges that go beyond the environmental sphere; whereas non-environmental threats, such as recent accidents related to the damaged cable in the Baltic Sea, send the EU a strong message that strengthening transboundary cooperation is key in addressing both the environmental and security-related objectives;

    BT.  whereas about 41 000 kilometres of inland waterways flow through 25 of the Member States; whereas inland waterways, which rely on the availability of water resources, perform a crucial role in optimising water supply and mitigating the impact of droughts and floods, as well as supporting the economic activities and the development of regions;

    BU.  whereas the increasing water scarcity, inequalities in access to water, and external shocks to the water sector have heightened interdependencies, increasing competition for water and leading to complex economic repercussions;

    General remarks

    1.  Welcomes and supports President von der Leyen’s announcement in the political guidelines for the next European Commission (2024-2029) on putting forward a European Water Resilience Strategy (EWRS) addressing water efficiency, scarcity, pollution and water-related risks, as well as the recognition that water is an indispensable resource that is increasingly under stress from climate change and increasing demands;

    2.  Believes that while implementing legislation, economic competitiveness should be taken into account in line with the Competitiveness Compass; calls for the implementation of EU environmental legislation in order to build a resilient and competitive Europe, mitigate and adapt to climate change, halt biodiversity loss, prevent pollution, ensure food security, limit resource use and waste, and strive towards efficient use of resources, including water, while taking into account the precautionary principle, the control-at-source principle and the polluter-pays principle; highlights the fact that water availability impacts the quantity, quality, variety and seasonal availability of foods that can be produced;

    3.  Calls for the EU to integrate its commitments to the COP29 Baku Dialogue on Water for Climate Action and the UN 2023 Water Conference into the international dimension of the strategy;

    4.  Stresses the urgent need to enhance water resilience and management to ensure sustainable freshwater supplies for people, the economy and the environment; emphasises that the EWRS should be developed in coordination with the European Oceans Pact, ensuring a cohesive and integrated approach to managing freshwater and ocean resources, addressing interconnected challenges, enhancing competitiveness and promoting sustainable water management across inland and marine environments, while ensuring a holistic ‘source-to-sea’ approach;

    5.  Insists on the need for a comprehensive and holistic EWRS that integrates water quality, quantity, security, infrastructure, technology and management aspects and includes the restoration of the water cycle as a key element, as it underpins economic activities, ensures resource availability and contributes to climate regulation;

    6.  Stresses the importance of water supply, in particular drinking water, as well as water security of supply; points out that all environmental restoration projects should take into account the water security aspects, prioritising solutions that not only provide environmental benefits, but also guarantee the supply and efficient management of water; emphasises, furthermore, that ecological restoration measures should be carried out in synergy with the development of the EU’s renewable energy potential and not impact the overall energy resilience;

    7.  Recommends that lakes and other freshwater-dependent habitats be included in the strategy, alongside rivers, transitional waters and groundwater, as essential components of the EU’s water resilience efforts;

    8.  Stresses the urgent need to improve crisis-warning systems with regard to heavy water incidents, as well as to improve preventive measures;

    9.  Calls on the Commission to present a European climate adaptation plan, including concrete legislative proposals and actions, particularly regarding infrastructure resilience, water management and nature-based solutions, while prioritising the protection of vulnerable communities, to make the EU more resilient and to lead by example;

    10.  Reiterates that access to clean and safe drinking water and sanitation is a human right; emphasises that this right must be unequivocally ensured, with everyone having access to affordable and good quality water services, including the inhabitants of islands and outermost regions;

    11.  Stresses that no one, whether in public places or private establishments, should be denied access to water supplied from a distribution network intended for human consumption, where available;

    12.  Notes that industrial activities and agricultural production require water to produce their end products or to support production activities, with the amount of water used varying depending on the type of activity; highlights the fact that ensuring Europe’s competitiveness and strategic autonomy requires a water-smart society where technology and data enhance a circular economy, fostering sustainable and water-efficient practices; calls on all relevant actors to accelerate the transition towards water-efficient, circular industry and agriculture by promoting and investing in innovative solutions, including digital tools and technologies, resource recovery, water reuse, renewable energy production, infrastructure, nature-based solutions and inclusive governance mechanisms;

    13.  Urges the Commission to integrate and mainstream the water dimension into internal and external EU policies through a cross-sectoral approach in order to ensure that water resilience, sustainability and security is woven into the fabric of European policies; calls on the Commission, in particular, to carry out a water-related assessment of any regulatory measure, including related to energy, as part of the socio-economic and environmental impact assessment; emphasises that assessing how each EU policy, and EU-funded projects and infrastructure, can impact water resources in terms of quantity, quality and accessibility would ensure that water resilience is a cornerstone of policy formulation and implementation, thus shifting the paradigm from treating water as an infinite resource to recognising its intrinsic value for humanity and for the EU’s ecological and socio-economic landscape and its competitiveness;

    Water efficiency

    14.  Stresses that efficient water use is essential for preserving the EU’s water resources and that water efficiency should be a key objective of the EU; calls, in this regard, for a consequential reduction in water demand, including by addressing excessive leakage levels, investing in research and innovative solutions, modernising industrial and production processes, upgrading water infrastructure, managing water resources and peak demands sustainably, prioritising uses and ensuring that higher water efficiency results in a reduction in overall freshwater consumption as well as in an increase in water availability in water-stressed areas at the local and regional levels; believes that areas affected by prolonged drought and desertification should be given priority;

    15.  Calls for a legislative framework setting sectoral water efficiency and water abstraction targets at basin level, based on up-to-date assessments of water availability and climate risks, including a water valuation approach that accounts for ecosystem services and long-term sustainability, and covering all water uses, including industry, energy, agriculture, public institutions and households; underlines the fact that these targets should be ambitious yet adaptable, taking into account the specific circumstances and progress already achieved by each Member State to ensure continued efforts towards efficiency gains across all regions; stresses the importance of efficient and uniform data collection practices across the Member States and all sectors, including through the use of innovative technologies, as well as real-time data collection points for more transparency on water consumption; emphasises the need to carry out an appropriate assessment of the environmental and socio-economic impacts of water use; stresses that the strategic importance of food production must not be compromised; emphasises that science, research and technology are important for water efficiency and water use as well as for the circular economy in this regard; calls for the creation and promotion of new smart and high-performance irrigation systems, rainwater retention and water from reuse, as well as water-efficient irrigation systems;

    16.  Reiterates the need to develop a common EU methodology for setting water efficiency and water abstraction targets to ensure the sustainable use of available renewable water resources within an integrated water resources management framework which gives due consideration to linkages beyond the water sector through the water-energy-food-ecosystems nexus, thus enabling decision-makers and economic actors to plan the necessary investment to ensure water supply security in an increasingly sustainable manner, while giving due consideration to the characteristics of the water bodies concerned;

    17.  Calls for close collaboration on integrated energy and water resource planning and related technologies across all sectors at national, regional and local levels, including between all stakeholders, in order to establish mechanisms for ensuring coherence across water and energy policies;

    18.  Calls on the Commission to put forward a comprehensive policy on sustainable water management for industry based on reducing, recovering, reusing and recycling, including a focus on the use of water-efficient and circular technologies, water recycling, pollutant reduction strategies and the promotion of closed-loop systems;

    19.  Recalls that the growing threat of water scarcity is jeopardising industries and projects that are key to Europe’s competitiveness drive, including semiconductors, data centres, renewable hydrogen and electric vehicle battery production; notes that these industries will increasingly face pressure to reduce their environmental impact and improve water resource efficiency, including both direct and indirect water usage; calls on the Member States to support water-intensive industries in setting up water-efficiency plans aimed at saving, reusing and recycling water, preventing water pollution and implementing water-efficient technologies; calls on the Commission to incorporate comprehensive water management strategies into relevant EU industrial policies and sector-specific transition pathways, with a particular focus on strategic water-intensive sectors;

    20.  Stresses that knowledge, data, research and technology are key for efficient water use; calls for adequate financial and technical support to be given to the Member States to implement efficient water management measures, including by means of innovative and modern technologies;

    21.  Welcomes the recommendations of the final report of the Strategic Dialogue on the future of EU agriculture underlining that sustainable farming practices and new business models need to be scaled up to promote more efficient use of natural resources, especially water;

    22.  Calls for the transition to a more sustainable and competitive farming model, assisted by the implementation of sustainable practices and innovative solutions that promote biodiversity, reduce chemical inputs and enable water resources to be managed efficiently, including nature-based solutions, regenerative management, smart precision irrigation technologies, digital monitoring systems, advanced treatment methods and smart water distribution networks, optimising consumption and preventing water resource depletion, and that help ensure continued productivity while enabling agriculture to reduce pollution, use pesticides and fertilisers efficiently, improve the hydrological cycle, enhance groundwater recharge and adapt to lower water use; considers that technological solutions can also include measures that can increase water absorption, infiltration and retention in agricultural systems, which are important amid increasing occurrences of both drought and heavy rains;

    23.  Points out that innovative irrigation solutions and practices can enhance water efficiency in agriculture, gaining an economic advantage while also reducing environmental burdens; notes that farmers generally lack sufficient means and incentives to know about water use by crops, actual irrigation applications, the yield responses of crops to different water management practices, and thus current on-farm water-efficiency levels; calls on the Commission and the Member States to incentivise the uptake and support the maintenance of innovative irrigation solutions such as drip irrigation to allow for an active management of water levels and efficient use of water resources, as well as to promote continuous knowledge exchange, so that all relevant stakeholders can share greater responsibility across the entire water supply chain;

    24.  Recalls that the use of nutrients such as nitrate and phosphate is essential for food production, as this activity would not be possible without their use; recommends better consideration of the nutrient cycle in agricultural production and the exploitation of the value in urban wastewater; calls for more research into the effective use of nutrients and the development of nutrient recovery technologies, in order to decrease the Union’s dependence on imported raw materials; recognises the high potential for nutrient recovery from water and calls on the Member States to support the agricultural sector to optimise their nutrient consumption including by using resources (nitrate and phosphorus) recovered from wastewater treatment plants; calls on the Commission to propose an integrated nutrient management action plan to effectively address loss of valuable agricultural inputs, recycling of nutrients, nutrient pollution and inefficiencies in the nutrient cycle; calls for the proper and safe recovery of phosphorus from organic sources and for incentivising investments in its recovery and circular nutrient management in accordance with the Commission’s JRC publication(63);

    25.  Stresses that the current Nitrates Directive is due for revision, as outdated provisions promote the use of artificial fertilisers rather than organic manure; calls for an urgent review of the Nitrates Directive before the end of this year, and its revision to promote circular nutrient management;

    26.  Emphasises, in line with the final report of the Strategic Dialogue on the future of EU agriculture, the need to support the transition to regionally adapted crop and seed varieties and the switch to different crops, with reduced water requirements and greater drought resistance, as well as the need to support the adoption of appropriate soil management practices; considers the need for stronger support for scientific research and technological development related to the breeding of new species, to enable the production and supply of foodstuffs to be diversified and their quality enhanced, while raising the level of protection for human health and the environment; notes the potential of plant varieties that are more resistant to water stress and pests and could play a role in reducing water use and could reduce the environmental footprint of crops;

    27.  Calls for financial and technical support for farmers and rural communities, particularly in water-stressed areas, to help them adopt sustainable land management practices that improve soil and water quality, contribute to biodiversity and mitigate climate change; emphasises the need for special attention to be given to regions that are particularly vulnerable to soil degradation and water scarcity;

    28.  Acknowledges the significant efforts made by farmers to enhance water quality and emphasises the need for an appropriate timeframe to allow the effects of these measures to be accurately assessed;

    29.  Points to the success of the agricultural European Innovation Partnership EIP‑AGRI and calls for the continuation of knowledge exchange, expertise and peer-to-peer learning via the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) Network;

    30.  Notes the links between carbon sinking and water availability, and calls for coherence between the water resilience strategy and carbon farming schemes;

    31.  Reiterates that the Water Reuse Regulation aims at reducing the pressure on water bodies by setting out provisions on reusing water after appropriate treatment extends its life cycle, thereby preserving water resources; emphasises, however, that regulatory, financial and technological barriers, including the economic competitiveness of reclaimed wastewater, risk management planning and the sharing of responsibilities, contribute to the slow uptake of reuse of reclaimed water for agriculture; calls, therefore, on the Commission and the Member States to adopt supportive policies, at both the EU and the local level, that incentivise water reuse practices, taking into account the importance of adapting wastewater treatment and quality requirements to the intended water use; notes that treated wastewater also finds valuable applications in various industrial processes and urban contexts, contributing to reducing the pressure on freshwater resources and the conservation of drinking water; calls therefore on the Commission to assess a possible extension of the scope of the Water Reuse Regulation in order to establish, at EU level, minimum water quality standards for safe water reuse for industrial and urban purposes;

    32.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to specify systems of regulatory and financial incentives for the reuse of treated wastewater in water-intensive sectors and to provide specific funding for the construction of infrastructure connecting wastewater treatment plants and refined water distribution networks; urges a streamlined approach in EU legislation to remove administrative barriers and promote safe and efficient water recycling across the Member States; calls on the Member States to set up national water reuse and saving plans to incentivise cross-sectoral cooperation in water management;

    33.  Reiterates that reused water could alleviate abstraction from rivers, lakes and groundwater for irrigated agriculture; underlines the fact that reused water can contribute to maintaining base flows and minimum water levels during dry periods;

    34.  Highlights the potential of the building sector to save water, for example, with the help of smart sub-metering systems, efficient greywater systems, reuse of domestic wastewater or rainwater harvesting; stresses that the energy performance of buildings can be enhanced by water efficiency, reducing greenhouse gas emissions; calls on the Member States and local authorities to incentivise water-saving features in new buildings; stresses, in this regard, that water-efficient practices should be factored into urban planning; highlights the fact that harvesting rain water as well as using and reusing water efficiently can improve climate adaptation in cities;

    35.  Calls for the transition, in industry and in the energy and digital sectors, to optimised cooling efficiency and alternative cooling methods that are less water-dependent, in order to ensure significant water savings in these sectors;

    36.  Points out that, while households represent 10 % of the overall water consumption in the EU, action on improving domestic water efficiency is also necessary; notes that water-saving technological solutions are readily available and can reduce water consumption in households without compromising comfort or requiring high investment; calls on the Member States to support consumers in transitioning towards such technologies and to strengthen consumer awareness of water consumption and potential efficiency gains by anchoring domestic water efficiency in water, building and consumer policies across the EU;

    37.  Notes that the leakage rates from pipes are high in some Member States, which increases the total share of domestic water consumption; welcomes the provisions of the new Drinking Water Directive on leakage rates and the ongoing work of the Commission to evaluate those rates and set threshold values that will trigger action in the Member States concerned; calls on the Member States to urgently tackle leakage in water supply networks and to fully implement the monitoring and reporting requirements of the Drinking Water Directive, so that the Commission can set a threshold value for leakage by January 2028; emphasises the need for sustainable urban irrigation networks to be modernised, to curb leakages and reduce their water footprint; calls on the Member States to regularly inform the public about the efficiency and effectiveness of their water supplies;

    38.  Points out that public sector organisations provide significant untapped potential for saving water by virtue of their size or their nature as public organisations; believes that the public sector should act as a role model for other sectors;

    39.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to promote easily accessible and free information, training, advisory programmes and information campaigns aimed at raising public awareness of sustainable water resource management;

    40.  Recommends that water-efficiency aspects, such as reductions in water loss and reuse of water, be integrated in the upcoming revision of the public procurement framework;

    Water pollution

    41.  Underlines the fact that the existing EU water policy framework is designed to address the effective management of water resources and the protection and restoration of freshwater and marine ecosystems, but that its poor implementation and enforcement, insufficient funding and lack of proper cost-benefit analyses of the implementation measures undermine its effectiveness;

    42.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to implement and enforce the current legislation, in particular the WFD and its ‘daughter’ directives (the Groundwater Directive and the Environmental Quality Standards Directive), with a particular focus on strengthening the monitoring and reporting mechanisms to ensure that all Member States consistently implement the required water protection measures; recalls the need for sufficient funding to implement these acts;

    43.  Stresses that the chemical pollution of surface water and groundwater poses a threat to the aquatic environment, with effects such as acute and chronic toxicity in aquatic organisms, accumulation of pollutants in the ecosystem and loss of habitats and biodiversity, as well as to human health;

    44.  Calls for the establishment of comprehensive EU-wide quality standards for PFAS in groundwater and surface water; stresses that respective updates of the relevant directives are essential for safeguarding water quality and achieving good chemical status for water bodies as mandated under the WFD;

    45.  Insists that essential uses of PFAS in critical sectors, such as medical devices, pharmaceuticals and products necessary for the twin transition to a climate neutral and digital economy, are not endangered in the context of upcoming legislative and non-legislative proposals; calls on the Commission to propose to phase out forever chemicals (PFAS) – starting with consumer goods – linked to harmful effects on human health and the environment, based on scientific evidence, allowing their use where there are no safe alternatives; underlines the need to scale up investments and accelerate the research and development of equivalent and safe alternatives;

    46.  Calls on the Commission to propose updated limits on PFAS in drinking water, taking into account the latest scientific knowledge;

    47.  Emphasises the urgency of addressing, primarily at the source, and effectively monitoring pollution from pharmaceuticals, bisphenols, antimicrobial resistance genes, persistent organic pollutants and other existing and emerging pollutants, to align with the EU’s zero pollution ambition and the goal of achieving good chemical status for all water bodies;

    48.  Calls on the Commission to close the gaps with enhanced funding and the enforcement of current laws, and the integration of circular economy principles to mitigate pollution at its source and safeguard water ecosystems for future generations; underscores the fact that antibiotic-resistant bacteria and certain emerging pollutants remain insufficiently addressed, necessitating further innovation and investment; emphasises the need for all sectors to apply sustainable production processes and circular practices, proactively preventing pollutants from entering water systems;

    49.  Recalls that microplastics may enter drinking water sources in a number of ways: from surface run-off (for example, after a rain event) to wastewater effluent (both treated and untreated), combined sewer overflows, industrial effluent, degraded plastic waste and atmospheric deposition; calls on the Commission to put forward, in line with the requirements of the Drinking Water Directive, a full risk assessment of microplastics in drinking water, while continuously working on reliable and robust sampling and analytical methods in order to appropriately address the potential threat of this emerging pollutant to sources of water intended for human consumption;

    50.  Emphasises the need to improve the monitoring and regulation of plastic pollution in freshwater and marine environments, with particular attention to microplastics and single-use plastics; encourages the Commission to assess current enforcement mechanisms and consider further measures to protect water quality;

    51.  Calls on the stakeholders to develop safe water contact materials, to substitute BPA and other bisphenols and ensure compliance with Regulation (EU) 1935/2004 on materials and articles intended to come into contact with food(64) and the recently adopted provisions as regards the use of BPA and other bisphenols and bisphenol derivatives (Commission Regulation (EU) 2024/3190);

    52.  Recalls that the revised Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive, in effect since 1 January 2025, imposes new obligations regarding water purification, requiring pharmaceutical and cosmetic producers to cover at least 80 % of the costs of removing micropollutants from wastewater, with the aim of reducing harmful substances in the environment; notes the existence of differing figures and assessments regarding the impact this would have on the pharmaceutical sector and, consequently, on the availability and affordability of medicines, and therefore calls on the Commission to conduct a new and comprehensive assessment of the impact on this sector;

    53.  Calls for increased EU support for local authorities for the modernisation of wastewater treatment plants and the promotion of water reuse, to align with the EU’s zero pollution ambition, ensuring that municipal wastewater management contributes effectively to good chemical and ecological water status;

    54.  Calls for increased monitoring of pesticide residues in water bodies and enforcement of pesticide application regulations to mitigate their impact on water quality; stresses the need for increased funding to support farmers in the adoption of low-input and organic farming practices that reduce reliance on chemical pesticides and fertilisers, as well as to provide appropriate training and independent advisory services to farmers and other operators on the use, effectiveness and toxicity of pesticides, as well as best practice;

    55.  Insists on the integration of circular economy principles to reduce hazardous chemical use in industrial processes; stresses the need for additional funding to support industries in transitioning to clean technologies that minimise water pollution(65);

    56.  Recognises the role of treated sludge as a local and circular source of fertiliser, contributing to soil health, nutrient recycling and reduced dependency on synthetic fertilisers; emphasises the importance of preventing PFAS, heavy metals, microplastics and other harmful substances from entering sewer networks in order to enable the safe and sustainable use of high-quality sewage sludge in agriculture;

    57.  Calls on the Commission to include an overview of measures in an annex to the EWRS, with a timeline for achieving the objectives in question;

    Adaptation to climate change: floods, droughts, stress areas, disaster preparedness

    58.  Calls for the climate adaptation proofing of all new EU legislative and non-legislative acts in order to ensure the integration of climate adaptation into sectoral plans and policy measures affecting water and land use; highlights, in this regard, the need for increased climate ambition as part of the fight against climate change, while urging the Member States to ensure that all climate adaptation measures affecting water use contribute to long-term, improved water resilience; calls on the Commission to take fully into account the geographical and environmental conditions in the Member States, as well as the specific situation of islands, outermost regions and other areas of high vulnerability, such as areas affected by desertification, when adopting new legislative and non-legislative proposals; asks the Commission to present a roadmap for current and ongoing legislative and non-legislative policy measures, including targets and monitoring requirements affecting water and land use;

    59.  Emphasises the need for tailored climate adaptation measures for the Mediterranean region, which faces unique challenges such as prolonged droughts and saline intrusion into freshwater resources;

    60.  Stresses the specific challenges faced by island areas due to the scarcity of drinking water and calls for targeted measures to protect island water resources, including improving rainwater collection and storage infrastructure, and implementing alternative water sources, while enhancing water resource monitoring and management systems; calls, further, on the Member States to take better account of mountainous regions in national adaptation plans in order to meet the specific challenges of water management in mountainous areas;

    61.  Reiterates that climate change mitigation and adaptation solutions should not come at the cost of ecosystem degradation, and should avoid increasing the demand for water- and energy-intensive activities, and should instead prioritise energy- and water-efficient innovation and technologies as part of moving towards a more resource-efficient economy, without undermining its productivity, while ensuring equitable access to water for all; points out that, in order to be effective, climate change mitigation and adaptation solutions should be tailored to national circumstances, while enhancing competitiveness and productivity in the short and long term; points out the possibilities of synergies, in this regard, with innovative energy production such as photovoltaics and biogas, as it can also contribute to an increase in agricultural income;

    62.  Recognises the importance of reserving water for nature and the need to maintain healthy freshwater ecosystems, for the good functioning of the water cycle, for human activities and for mitigating the impacts of droughts and water scarcity; underlines, in the context of restoring freshwater ecosystems and the natural functions of rivers, the importance of removing ‘obsolete barriers’, namely artificial barriers that no longer fulfil their original purpose or are no longer needed, wherever such opportunities exist, on the basis of current knowledge and experience; calls for the establishment of specific programmes for the cleaning and conservation of river channels, ensuring minimum flow and reducing the accumulation of debris and sediment that can affect water storage and distribution capacity;

    63.  Insists that, with climate change impact becoming more persistent, flood and drought management must fully integrate the arising risks, including changing weather patterns, such as increased rain patterns leading to excess of water; is convinced that a combination of monitoring and data collection, preparedness, emergency and recovery responses taking into account the principle of ‘building back better’(66)on the one hand, and adapting societal and economic activities on the other, is essential to reduce vulnerability and increase resilience, especially in the light of the quantitative aspect of water becoming more prominent; stresses, in this regard, the need for climate-resilient nature-based solutions and infrastructure that take into account the impact of extreme climate events in their development to ensure their viability in the face of extreme climate events;

    64.  Recalls that in 2007, the WFD was supplemented by Directive 2007/60/EC on the assessment and management of flood risks, which aims to establish a framework to reduce the adverse consequences of flooding on human health, the environment, cultural heritage and economic activity; notes that making the two directives mutually compatible is achieved through risk management plans and river basin flood management plans as the components of an integrated water management system in which coordination is crucial; recalls that flood prevention is closely connected to urban green spaces, soil protection strategies and investment in drainage networks;

    65.  Stresses that preparedness for water scarcity and drought can be significantly improved in the EU, considering that no drought management plans are in place in several Member States(67); calls on the Member States and, where applicable, competent regional and local authorities, to develop drought management plans, particularly with a view to ensuring the provision of drinking water, ensuring food production and integrating digitalised monitoring, control and early warning systems in order to support effective and data-based decisions on protection, response and communication measures with clearly defined areas of responsibility; points out the need to introduce EU-level provisions as regards drought management plans, similar to the ones on flood management plans;

    66.  Insists, in view of the numerous climatic events, such as floods, droughts and cyclones, which have affected Europe, on the importance of the EU having a robust mechanism for responding to such crises, including systems for warning and providing assistance to the civilian population; points out that digital monitoring, adequate public display of relevant data and early warning systems are key to developing effective drought and flood management plans at the level of the Member States; emphasises, further, the importance of fully using the available EU tools, such as the flood forecasts of the European Flood Awareness System and the Global Flood Awareness System, and the Global Flood Monitoring tool, as part of the Copernicus Emergency Management Service;

    67.  Stresses the importance of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) in helping countries hit by water-related disasters such as flood and droughts; calls for increased funding to provide the UCPM with sufficient and upgraded resources in order to increase preparedness and improve capacity building;

    68.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to enhance citizen preparedness in the event of water-related disasters or crisis; stresses the importance of information campaigns and demonstration exercises in education facilities, public administration and businesses in order to build a ‘preparedness culture’ for citizens;

    69.  Calls on the Member States to systematically renew and upgrade their water infrastructure, including drinking water and sanitation infrastructure, as well as infrastructure regulating river flows, and to invest in innovative solutions based on good practice, making water systems more resilient to climate change, ensuring stable drinking water supply, enabling the early detection of losses and reducing water leakages and waste, while optimising water transport and storage systems; highlights the fact that funding for innovative water infrastructure is insufficient compared to the investment needs across the EU; calls, in this regard, for dedicated funding, on national, regional or EU level, to ensure adequate financing for the development, maintenance and modernisation of water-resilient infrastructure, to foster innovative solutions and technologies and ensure long-term sustainability of that water infrastructure;

    70.  Regrets that, despite the threat that desertification poses to water quality and availability, soil fertility and food production, and despite the fact that 13 Member States have declared themselves to be affected by desertification in the context of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, the Commission is not addressing desertification effectively and efficiently; urges the Commission, therefore, in line with the Council conclusions of 14 October 2024 on desertification, land degradation and drought, to present an integrated EU-wide action plan to combat desertification, land degradation and drought, aiming at building resilience to drought and achieving land degradation neutrality in the EU by 2030, based on a full impact assessment;

    71.  Insists that the agricultural sector be further supported in implementing new technologies to reduce the demand for water, while at the same time increasing access to water, including by supporting water retention and groundwater recharge; calls for research results, for example on seawater desalination, to be made accessible and to facilitate the deployment of innovative desalination solutions; calls on the Member States to create natural water reserves based on up-to-date assessments of climate risks to protect critical water supplies and their catchments, and taking into consideration the environmental and socio-economic impact of developing such reserves; points out that such natural water reserves would complement the WFD’s requirement for Member States to identify water bodies used for drinking water abstraction, making sure they meet the objectives set out in Article 4 WFD and in the Drinking Water Directive, and would ensure their necessary protection; notes that such natural water reserves already exist under different forms in various Member States; stresses that assistance should be given to Member States or local and regional governments to help them develop natural water reserves;

    72.  Notes the potential of retention infrastructure as an example of water generation systems created using the best available, cost-effective techniques that have the lowest environmental impact, including by means of wastewater reuse or rainwater collection, in order to reduce the risks of droughts and floods, increase water security and foster circularity, water reclamation and reuse; believes that water retention facilities may be useful tools provided that they are authorised by local or national authorities under clear conditions, including the capacity of local groundwater to sustain such activities and the need for farmers accessing the water resource to adapt their practices to more sustainable practices, in particular in terms of water needs and water quality; calls on the Commission to use its available tools, including financial support, to streamline this approach among the Member States;

    73.  Deplores the unlawful or intentional abstraction of water, which is likely to cause substantial damage to water bodies; calls for strong dissuasive measures to be applied, including through the criminal law, to protect the ecological status or the ecological potential of surface water bodies or of the quantitative status of groundwater bodies; notes that additional support for training and knowledge transfer for national enforcement capacities is needed;

    74.  Notes the important cross-cutting role of nature-based solutions in addressing the challenges of the triple planetary crisis and restoring the natural water cycle; calls on the Commission and the Member States to prioritise, taking into account the environmental and socio-economic impacts, the deployment of nature-based solutions for water resilience in their policy actions and recommendations, such as the re-wetting of wetlands and peatlands to increase ground water availability and surrounding soil moisture, the restoration and protection of floodplains, natural water retention measures, revegetation as a barrier against floods, and rainwater conservation, in order to strengthen water availability, mitigate climate change risks and support long-term resilience for communities, businesses and food production; underlines that, in addition to nature-based solutions, complementary investment in engineering solutions remains necessary to ensure successful climate adaptation and water resilience in the long term;

    Funding and pricing

    75.  Notes that nature-based solutions and natural water retention measures have the potential to restore groundwater levels and support ecological flows while reducing water-related risks from water scarcity, floods and droughts; notes that in flood management, nature-based solutions cannot usually replace existing solutions and may not be effective for the most extreme events; points out, however, that nature-based solutions can enhance the effectiveness and operable life of grey infrastructure by increasing water absorption capacity, reducing water velocity and regulating peak flows; reiterates, in this regard, that the effectiveness of nature-based solutions is context-specific and must be adapted to the local situation; emphasises in this regard that a ‘one solution that fits all’ does not exist;

    76.  Stresses the need to provide financial support for sustainable innovative methods and solutions, while having due regard to public-private partnerships;

    77.  Stresses, in the context of climate adaptation, the importance of healthy soils in ensuring water security and circularity; emphasises that the natural water retention of soils must be improved through measures to enhance soil health, minimising carbon losses, as well as actions at the level of the water body, such as the stabilisation of riverbanks, including through re-naturalisation, and the restoration of the retention capacities of aquifers;

    78.  Notes that thoroughly designed forest management measures can improve watershed health, regulate water flow and reduce drought and flood stress, given the essential role of trees and forests in water cycle regulation, through their ability to purify water, increase the availability of water resources and improve soil moisture retention; proposes that this be duly considered when the Commission, in cooperation with the Member States, develops Union disaster resilience goals and that it be considered in the development and refinement of disaster risk management and contingency planning; highlights the need, in this regard, for more research, data collection, innovation and funding to support land managers in preventing the impact of environmental stressors such as drought floods and diminishing watershed function;

    79.  Recognises that urban areas are increasingly vulnerable to water-related climate risks such as flooding, water shortages and heat stress; calls for the integration of urban water resilience planning into climate adaptation strategies, including investment in green roofs, permeable infrastructure, rainwater harvesting and storm water retention systems, as well as measures aimed at increasing green and blue spaces in urban areas, in order to mitigate extreme weather impacts and to reduce the risks to human life and property; calls further for the maintenance of, and regained access to, urban waterways in cities;

    80.  Emphasises that the EWRS should ensure adequate funding from public and private sources in order to support the modernisation, upgrading, adaptation and maintenance of resilient water infrastructure, sustainable water management, data collection, research, effective monitoring, digitalisation, upskilling, nature-based solutions, the development and the uptake of innovative water-efficient technologies, as well as to ensure environmental and socio-economic sustainability in line with the goals set by the new European Competitiveness Compass;

    81.  Calls on the Commission to create a separate and dedicated fund for water resilience within the upcoming MFF; believes that specific financial mechanisms should also be established within the European Regional Development Fund and the Cohesion Fund to support water-smart technologies and water investment; strongly believes that, in the interim, water should be prioritised in existing funding frameworks, including the Cohesion Fund; stresses that EU funding mechanisms must incorporate considerations of social equity and affordability, in particular in the context of providing water services to the population, ensuring support for Member States and citizens with greater financial constraints and specific realities, while meeting water management obligations; highlights the importance of adjusting existing funding, subsidies and financing streams related to water management and other related land uses, moving away from outdated engineering solutions to innovative ones, as well as nature-based solutions or a combination thereof;

    82.  Calls for targeted funding, via Horizon Europe and the EIP-AGRI, for field trials on the water relations of different cropping systems; calls for the recognition of the role of women in water policies and for specific funding to be identified to promote their access to agriculture;

    83.  Recalls that the lack of dedicated funding for water or binding funding targets within the current MFF limits the EU’s capacity to direct targeted investment towards essential water resilience measures, including infrastructure modernisation, innovation, climate adaptation measures and the implementation of nature-based solutions, and thus its competitive capacity, as the absence of a water balance creates an additional burden for the economy of the regions; notes that outermost and mountainous regions and islands in the EU are particularly struggling to access funding or public-private partnerships to support local and regional investment in water management and infrastructure;

    84.  Stresses the important role of the European Investment Bank (EIB) in water financing; highlights the fact that the EIB is actively investing in and supporting the water sector; stresses that the EU should collaborate with the EIB to share best practice and calls, further, on the EIB and other financial institutions to strengthen their role in the funding of innovative and resilient water infrastructure, improved sanitation and drinking water infrastructure, digitalisation, as well as to support projects aimed at flood risk reduction, erosion prevention and the revitalization of watercourses, by facilitating favourable conditions for water investment;

    85.  Urges the Commission to explore and promote innovative financing mechanisms, including payments for ecosystem services and green bonds, while ensuring regulatory clarity and safeguards to prevent market distortions; calls on the EIB and other financial institutions to prioritise low-interest loans and credits for Member States and regional and local authorities undertaking large-scale restoration projects, with specific provisions to support economically disadvantaged regions;

    86.  Highlights the importance of public-private partnerships as a source of funding for water investment; calls on the Commission to incentivise private investment in the water sector by creating a supportive regulatory framework that may include co-financing opportunities and public-private partnerships in order to drive innovation, improve infrastructure and ensure sustainable water management solutions across the Member States; underlines, nevertheless, that the involvement of private investment in the EU water sector must not undermine the status of water as a public good and a public service, and that the long-term resilience of the sector, as well as the principles of accessibility, affordability and sustainability must be ensured;

    87.  Calls on the Member States to adopt governance frameworks that clearly define the roles and responsibilities of stakeholders in planning, financing and implementing nature-based solutions; believes that these frameworks should integrate funding from diverse sources, including philanthropic contributions and private-sector partnerships, while ensuring equitable access to resources for small-scale projects, particularly managed at local or regional levels;

    88.  Urges the Commission and the Member States to address water aspects in their budgets and to improve governance within the regions in the use of EU funds;

    89.  Underlines the need to provide targeted financial and technical assistance to municipalities to facilitate compliance with water-related legislation;

    90.  Encourages the Member States to accelerate the granting of authorisations for sustainable and innovative resilient water infrastructure projects to enable their rapid implementation in the face of the urgent challenges;

    91.  Notes that the application of the cost recovery principle on water services, which provides that all water users effectively and proportionately participate financially in the recovery of the costs of water services, remains low to non-existent in several Member States; calls on the Member States and their regional authorities to implement adequate water pricing policies and apply the cost recovery principle for both environmental and resource costs in line with the WFD; calls on the Member States to take into account the long investment cycles when implementing the cost recovery principle and to ensure sufficient funding is available for needed (re)investment;

    92.  Stresses the importance of ensuring that water pricing supports long-term water security by reflecting the economic, environmental and resource costs of water use; encourages the Member States and competent regional and local authorities to ensure that water pricing is economically sustainable, socially fair and promotes efficient water use, and that it reflects the availability of water across different Member States and regions, particularly in water-stressed regions, while safeguarding affordability for households and small businesses; calls on the Member States and competent regional and local authorities to insure transparent water prices and to raise awareness of the value of water services;

    93.  Points out that competent national water authorities will play a central role in implementing new water management and conservation plans at the level of the Member States; calls, therefore, on the Members States to financially and technically increase the capacity of those competent authorities to play a more significant enabling and advisory role in sustainable and future-proof water management and storage infrastructure; believes that EU funds, such as the Just Transition Fund, should be used to further assist Member States and water agencies in implementation;

    Digitalisation, security and technological innovation

    94.  Stresses the potential and the necessity for digitalisation and AI in improving the management and monitoring of bodies of water and water infrastructure, as well as in reporting and ensuring the comparability of data reflecting different geographical flow conditions;

    95.  Calls on the Commission, the Member States and water providers to mainstream transparency and digitalisation as fundamental principles in water management and to enhance the use of management and metering data, with the aim of strengthening monitoring, assessment, accountability and decision-making, while optimising and simplifying reporting obligations; calls for digitally enabled water technologies to facilitate real-time, sample-based and distance monitoring and reporting on water quality, leakages, usage and resources; calls for improved efficiency in the use of public funds and public spending in this area; recognises that widespread deployment of innovative digital technologies needs to be accompanied by digital skills training;

    96.  Emphasises the need to promote digitalisation and data-centric solutions in building a water-smart society; stresses the need to develop digital solutions for monitoring water consumption and optimising the use of water resources across all sectors; calls on the Commission, in cooperation with the Member States, to provide financial support for the implementation of smart water management systems, focusing on the needs of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs);

    97.  Points out that water systems, including water treatment and distribution systems, are considered one of the nation’s critical infrastructures and security pillars, and hence key for the EU’s strategic autonomy, and require increased protection and the ability of utilities to detect, respond to, and recover from physical and cyberthreats and cyberattacks; notes that a higher level of digitalisation comes with new vulnerabilities; points out that, in the event of a threat or an attack, water system operators can lose their ability to control the flow and quality of the water or lose the ability to track the true status of the water system; insists that vulnerability assessments and an emergency response plan should be an integral part of the water management system in every Member State; encourages the promotion of information sharing about threats to cybersecurity and procedures to exchange best practice among operators, as well as to establish a cybersecurity culture through technical security measures, competence building and awareness creation and communication; draws attention to the measures and provisions in the NIS2 Directive and the Critical Entities Resilience Directive which could help mitigate the arising security risks; calls on the Commission to take the lead in reinforcing the EU-level coordination formats and to propose effective tools in the upcoming Preparedness Union Strategy with the aim of ensuring timely preparedness to tackle environmental and non-environmental risks to the water bodies that are threatening the EU’s overall security;

    98.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to increase the involvement of women in decisions regarding water resilience; calls for the adoption of a methodological approach that effectively considers gender-related needs in the implementation of water supply projects, by implementing monitoring, reporting and tracking that use tools and indicators disaggregated by gender;

    99.  Notes that better data and data analysis are key to evidence-based decision-making and the swift identification of small changes in water quality that could present a threat to bodies of water, together with the evaluation of best practice and identification of the most cost-effective and impactful measures;

    100.  Stresses that improved, reliable and interoperable data on water supply, demand, distribution, accessibility and use are needed and that data points need to be established; urges the Commission and the Member States to enhance data collection and improve data interoperability across all levels to support the implementation of current water legislation, as well as to facilitate circular economy and water-smart industrial symbiosis strategies; highlights the fact that data and AI could be used in modelling water and energy consumption as well as reuse and recycling capacities;

    101.  Calls on the Commission to better recognise the fundamental role of the water sector in bolstering EU competiveness by fostering research and innovation and promoting entrepreneurship and talent; emphasises, in this regard, the importance of ramping up innovation in the water sector; points out that the European Innovation Centre for Industrial Transformation and Emissions, created as part of Directive 2010/75/EU, could play a role in this regard, as it evaluates the environmental performance of industrial technologies and gathers information on innovative industrial environmental techniques; points, further, to existing partnerships like the Water4All Partnership, a funding programme for scientific research;

    102.  Believes that there is a need to build and nurture multi-stakeholder platforms to promote innovation uptake at all levels, local and national; recommends that these platforms involve a wide range of participants – the public and private sectors, and civil society associations – to build a coalition of partners to bring about change; supports the promotion of knowledge sharing on how digital water technologies can support the implementation of existing EU water legislation, as well as capacity building at local, regional and national levels; calls on the Commission and the Members States to expand digital skills, and research and development (R&D) programmes targeting water, including through collaboration with universities, research centres and SMEs;

    103.  Acknowledges the critical role of data centres in the digital economy; notes with concern that the rapid expansion of the technology could lead to a substantial increase in AI’s demand for water resources associated with their operations, which could undermine the environmental benefits that AI promises to deliver, such as resource optimisation and carbon emission reductions, and stresses the need to integrate water efficiency measures in their design and operation; urges the Commission to address the use of water resources by information and communications technologies (ICT) and, in particular, by AI and data centres in its EWRS, in particular by encouraging data centres to reuse treated water and to promote the design of more efficient chips and components to reduce the need for cooling; recommends that the Member States prioritise water resilience strategies that address the specific challenges posed by data centres to ensure the sustainability of both the digital and the environmental agendas;

    104.  Recalls that seawater desalination is the process of removing salt from sea or brackish water to make it useable for a range of ‘fit for use’ purposes, including drinking, and that it is thus an important technological solution for people’s livelihoods; notes that, at the same time, desalination is an energy-intensive process and should ideally be done using renewable energy, whenever possible, in order to minimise environmental impacts; reiterates that desalination produces a by-product, brine (a concentrated salt solution), that must be properly disposed of to avoid adverse impacts on the marine environment; considers, therefore, that desalination based on reverse osmosis or thermal technologies should be applied, if other more environmentally sustainable options are not available or cannot be implemented, particularly in remote areas and islands; highlights, in this regard, the ongoing work on new technological solutions, such as microbial desalination cells, offering an environmentally sustainable and innovative alternative to traditional desalination methods, particularly to provide clean water and wastewater treatment to small, isolated locations without electricity;

    105.  Stresses the need for increased funding and R&D into technologies such as innovative desalination techniques in order to increase the efficiency, sustainability and the scaling up of such technologies; calls for research into the possibilities of using such technologies in agriculture to diversify the water supply points and therefore decrease the vulnerability of the sector to water stress;

    106.  Notes that in the last decade, there have been many scientific breakthroughs for making water treatment smarter and more circular, with these solutions offering opportunities for using digital solutions, AI and remote sensing to use water more efficiently and by reusing treated wastewater for irrigation and recovering energy and nutrients from wastewater;

    107.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to address the regulatory obstacles within the single market to facilitate the development, scaling-up, and placing on the market of innovative biotechnology and biomanufacturing solutions and the promotion of cleaner manufacturing and circularity;

    108.  Calls for the funding, development and authorisation of innovative solutions for crop protection and fertilisation, including biological control agents and active substances with lower impact on the environment, which are needed for a just transition to more sustainable agricultural systems;

    109.  Calls for specific programmes to be established for the cleaning and conservation of river channels, ensuring adequate flow and reducing the accumulation of debris and sediment that can affect water storage and distribution capacity;

    Cross-border and international cooperation

    110.  Stresses the need for a comprehensive EWRS that fosters cross-border cooperation, more uniform data collection and reporting, sharing best practice between local, regional and national actors, ensuring sustainable water management and equitable resource distribution among the Member States, preventing water challenges such as scarcity and flood risk from being passed on to other Member States;

    111.  Emphasises that climate change represents a major threat to water resources and aquatic ecosystems; notes that floods and water scarcity compromise food and water security and the health of the general population, ultimately affecting social cohesion and stability; recognises that water resilience is crucial for preventing and addressing current and future health, food, energy and security crises; emphasises that water resilience promotes transboundary water cooperation, serving as a catalyst for peace and security, as countries are interconnected through shared rivers and groundwater resources;

    112.  Calls for increased cross-border cooperation between the Member States in the management of shared river basins and groundwater aquifers and in the effective collection and sharing of data on water quality, pollution levels and water levels; recommends the establishment of regional cooperation centres to coordinate the implementation of joint water resilience strategies, taking into account the climate, social and economic challenges of each territory;

    113.  Calls for enhanced international cooperation, including at the level of river basins, to address the growing water crisis, ensure clean and high-quality water, promote sustainable water management and implement various innovative water technologies, including nature-based solutions; calls for the anchoring of cooperation across borders at operational, tactical and strategic levels;

    114.  Calls for the establishment of cross-border projects under Interreg and other EU funds to improve regional cooperation in the management of water resources, with a particular focus on ensuring the fair distribution of water between sectors and Member States;

    115.  Stresses the need to strengthen EU monitoring capacities through digitalisation and modern technologies, including satellite surveillance and real-time pollution tracking, which are essential for preventing and combating cross-border pollution;

    116.  Urges the Commission to implement a specific diplomatic role dedicated to resolving water-related conflicts, promoting water cooperation and protecting water sources and systems, particularly during armed conflicts and in transboundary contexts;

    117.  Urges the EU to lead international efforts to protect and restore water ecosystems in line with the SDG 6 on clean water and sanitation;

    o
    o   o

    118.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

    (1) OJ L 243, 9.7.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1119/oj.
    (2) OJ L 327, 22.12.2000, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2000/60/oj.
    (3) OJ L 372, 27.12.2006, p. 19, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2006/118/oj.
    (4) OJ L 348, 24.12.2008, p. 84, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2008/105/oj.
    (5) OJ L 288, 6.11.2007, p. 27, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2007/60/oj.
    (6) OJ L 435, 23.12.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2020/2184/oj.
    (7) OJ L 177, 5.6.2020, p. 32, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/741/oj.
    (8) OJ L 164, 25.6.2008, p. 19, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2008/56/oj.
    (9) OJ L, 2024/3019, 12.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/3019/oj.
    (10) OJ L, 2024/1785, 15.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1785/oj.
    (11) OJ L 375, 31.12.1991, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/1991/676/oj.
    (12) OJ L, 2024/1991, 29.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1991/oj.
    (13) OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 164, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2557/oj.
    (14) OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 80, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/oj.
    (15) OJ L 309, 24.11.2009, p. 71, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2009/128/oj.
    (16) OJ L 435, 6.12.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2115/oj.
    (17) OJ L, 2024/3190, 31.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/3190/oj.
    (18) OJ C 132, 14.4.2023, p. 54.
    (19) OJ C, C/2024/7216, 10.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/7216/oj.
    (20) OJ C 132, 14.4.2023, p. 106.
    (21) OJ C 232, 16.6.2021, p. 28.
    (22) OJ C, C/2025/808, 11.2.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/808/oj.
    (23) OJ C 445, 29.10.2021, p. 126.
    (24) OJ C 316, 22.9.2017, p. 99.
    (25) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2024)0358.
    (26) World Meteorological Organization, 2021 State of Climate Services – Water, WMO-No 1278, WMO, Geneva, 2021.
    (27) European Environment Agency, Water resources across Europe – confronting water scarcity and drought, EEA Report 2/2009.
    (28) EEA Report 07/2024.
    (29) WWF, High Cost of Cheap Water, WWF, Gland, 2021.
    (30) EEA Report 07/2024.
    (31) European Commission, Attitudes of Europeans towards the environment, Special Eurobarometer 550, May 2024.
    (32) European Commission: Directorate-General for Environment, et al., Implementation of water balances in the EU – Final report, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024.
    (33) Disclosure Insight Action (CDP) and Planet Tracker, High and Dry. How Water Issues Are Stranding Assets, 2022.
    (34) EEA Report 07/2024.
    (35) European Environment Agency, ‘Water abstraction by economic sector in the 27 EU Member States, 2000-2022’, European Environment Agency website, 5 December 2024, https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/analysis/indicators/water-abstraction-by-source-and/water-abstraction-by-economic?activeTab=8a280073-bf94-4717-b3e2-1374b57ca99d.
    (36) Eurostat, ‘Archive: Water use in industry’, Eurostat website, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Archive:Water_use_in_industry&oldid=196132#Further_Eurostat_information.
    (37) EEA Report 07/2024.
    (38) Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Water accounting and auditing, A sourcebook, FAO Water Reports 43, FAO, Rome, 2016.
    (39) European Investment Bank, Wastewater as a resource, EIB, 2022.
    (40) European Commission: Directorate-General for Environment, ‘Water reuse: New EU rules to improve access to safe irrigation’, European Commission website, 26 June 2023, https://environment.ec.europa.eu/news/water-reuse-new-eu-rules-improve-access-safe-irrigation-2023-06-26_en.
    (41) European Commission: Directorate-General for Environment, ‘Zero pollution: Improved quality and access to drinking water’, European Commission website, 12 January 2023, https://environment.ec.europa.eu/news/improved-quality-and-access-drinking-water-all-europeans-2023-01-12_en.
    (42) EEA Report 07/2024.
    (43) Ibid.
    (44) Ibid.
    (45) Ibid.
    (46) Ibid.
    (47) Ibid.
    (48) European Environment Agency, ‘Industrial pollutant releases to water in Europe’, European Environment Agency website, 30 May 2024, https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/analysis/indicators/industrial-pollutant-releases-to-water.
    (49) Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) (OJ L 334, 17.12.2010, p. 17, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2010/75/oj).
    (50) European Commission ‘Nitrates’, European Commission website, https://environment.ec.europa.eu/topics/water/nitrates_en#implementation.
    (51) European Environment Agency, ‘Public exposure to widely used Bisphenol A exceeds acceptable health safety levels’, European Environment Agency website, 14 September 2023, https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/newsroom/news/public-exposure-to-bisphenol-a.
    (52) European Environment Agency, European Climate Risk Assessment, EEA Report 01/2024.
    (53) Cammalleri, C. et al., Global warming and drought impacts in the EU, JRC Technical Report , Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.
    (54) EEA Report 07/2024.
    (55) Feyen, L. et al., Climate change impacts and adaptation in Europe, JRC PESETA IV final report, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.
    (56) European Environment AgencyEuropean Climate Risk Assessment, EEA Report 01/2024.
    (57) United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, GAR Special Report on Drought 2021, Geneva, UNDRR, 2021.
    (58) Council conclusions of 14 October 2024 on Desertification, Land Degradation and Drought.
    (59) EEA Report 07/2024.
    (60) Directive (EU) 2024/1203 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on the protection of the environment through criminal law and replacing Directives 2008/99/EC and 2009/123/EC (OJ L, 2024/1203, 30.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1203/oj).
    (61) European Patent Office, Innovation in water-related technologies, EPO, Munich 2024.
    (62) EEA Report 07/2024.
    (63) European Commission JRC Science for Policy Report, ‘Technical proposals for the safe use of processed manure above the threshold established for Nitrate Vulnerable Zones by the Nitrates Directive (91/676/EEC)’, 2020.
    (64) Regulation (EC) No 1935/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 2004 on materials and articles intended to come into contact with food and repealing Directives 80/590/EEC and 89/109/EEC (OJ L 338, 13.11.2004, p. 4, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2004/1935/oj).
    (65) European Environment Agency,‘Industrial pollutant releases to water in Europe, European Environment Agency website, 30 May 2024, https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/analysis/indicators/industrial-pollutant-releases-to-water.
    (66) United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, Build Back Better in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction, UNISDR, Geneva, 2019.
    (67) European Commission: Directorate-General for Environment et al. Stock-taking analysis and outlook of drought policies, planning and management in EU Member States – Final Report, Publications Office of the European Union, 2023.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – A revamped long-term budget for the Union in a changing world – P10_TA(2025)0090 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to Articles 311, 312, 323 and 324 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

    –  having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027(1) and to the joint declarations agreed between Parliament, the Council and the Commission in this context and the related unilateral declarations,

    –  having regard to Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 of 14 December 2020 on the system of own resources of the European Union and repealing Decision 2014/335/EU, Euratom(2),

    –  having regard to the amended Commission proposal of 23 June 2023 for a Council decision amending Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 on the system of own resources of the European Union (COM(2023)0331),

    –  having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources(3) (the IIA),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast)(4) (the Financial Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget(5) (the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation),

    –  having regard to its position of 27 February 2024 on the draft Council regulation amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027(6),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 10 May 2023 on own resources: a new start for EU finances, a new start for Europe(7),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 15 December 2022 on upscaling the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework: a resilient EU budget fit for new challenges(8),

    –  having regard to its position of 16 December 2020 on the draft Council regulation laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027(9),

    –  having regard to the Interinstitutional Proclamation on the European Pillar of Social Rights of 13 December 2017(10) and to the Commission Action Plan of 4 March 2021 on the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights (COM(2021)0102),

    –  having regard to the Agreement adopted at the 15th Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (COP 15) in Montreal on 19 December 2022 (Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework),

    –  having regard to the Agreement adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP 21) in Paris on 12 December 2015 (the Paris Agreement),

    –  having regard to the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals,

    –  having regard to the report of 30 October 2024 by Sauli Niinistö entitled ‘Safer together – strengthening Europe’s civilian and military preparedness and readiness’ (the Niinistö report),

    –  having regard to the report of 9 September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’ (the Draghi report),

    –  having regard to the report of 4 September 2024 of the Strategic Dialogue on the Future of EU Agriculture entitled ‘A shared prospect for farming and food in Europe’,

    –  having regard to the report of 17 April 2024 by Enrico Letta entitled ‘Much more than a market – speed, security, solidarity: empowering the Single Market to deliver a sustainable future and prosperity for all EU Citizens’ (the Letta report),

    –  having regard to the report of 20 February 2024 of the High-Level Group on the Future of Cohesion Policy entitled ‘Forging a sustainable future together – cohesion for a competitive and inclusive Europe’,

    –  having regard to the Budapest Declaration on the New European Competitiveness Deal,

    –  having regard to the joint communication of 26 March 2025 entitled ‘European Preparedness Union Strategy’ (JOIN(2025)0130),

    –  having regard to the joint white paper of 19 March 2025 entitled ‘European Defence Readiness 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0120),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 7 March 2025 entitled ‘A Roadmap for Women’s Rights’ (COM(2025)0097),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘The Clean Industrial Deal: a joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation’ (COM(2025)0085),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 19 February 2025 entitled ‘A Vision for Agriculture and Food’ (COM(2025)0075),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 11 February 2025 entitled ‘The road to the next multiannual financial framework’ (COM(2025)0046),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2025 entitled ‘A Competitiveness Compass for the EU’ (COM(2025)0030),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 9 December 2021 entitled ‘Building an economy that works for people: an action plan for the social economy’ (COM(2021)0778),

    –  having regard to the European Council conclusions of 20 March 2025, 6 March 2025 and 19 December 2024,

    –  having regard to the political guidelines of 18 July 2024 for the next European Commission 2024-2029,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 20 November 2024 entitled ‘EU budget and place-based policies: proposals for new design and delivery mechanisms in the MFF post-2027’(11),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Development, the Committee on Budgetary Control, the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety, the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection, the Committee on Transport and Tourism, the Committee on Regional Development, the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development, the Committee on Culture and Education, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, and the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets (A10-0076/2025),

    A.  whereas, under Article 311 TFEU, the Union is required to provide itself with the means necessary to attain its objectives and carry through its policies;

    B.  whereas the Union budget is primarily an investment tool that can achieve economies of scale unattainable at Member State level and support European public goods, in particular through cross-border projects; whereas all spending through the Union budget must provide European added value and deliver discernible net benefits compared to spending at national or sub-national level, leading to real and lasting results;

    C.  whereas spending through the Union budget, if effectively targeted, aligned with the Union’s political priorities and better coordinated with spending at national level, helps to avoid fragmentation in the single market, promote upwards convergence, decrease inequalities and boost the overall impact of public investment; whereas public investment is essential as a catalyst for private investment in sectors where the market alone cannot drive the required investment;

    D.  whereas the NextGenerationEU recovery instrument (NGEU) established in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic enabled significant additional investment capacity of EUR 750 billion in 2018 prices – beyond the Union budget, which amounts to 1,1 % of the EU-27’s gross national income (GNI) – prompting a swift recovery and return to growth and supporting the green and digital transitions; whereas NGEU will not be in place post-2027;

    E.  whereas in 2022 Member States spent an average of 1,4 % of gross domestic product (GDP) on State aid – significantly more than their contribution to the Union budget – with over half of the State aid unrelated to crises;

    F.  whereas the Union budget, bolstered by NGEU and loans through the SURE scheme, has been instrumental in alleviating the economic and social impact of the COVID-19 crisis and in responding to the effects of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas the Union budget remains ill-equipped, in terms of size, structure and rules, to fully play its role in adjusting to evolving spending needs, addressing shocks and responding to crises and giving practical effect to the principle of solidarity, and to enable the Union to fulfil its objectives as established under the Treaties;

    G.  whereas people rightly expect more from the Union and its budget, including the capacity to respond quickly and effectively to evolving needs and to provide them with the necessary support, especially in times of crisis;

    H.  whereas, since the adoption of the current multiannual financial framework (MFF), the political, economic and social context has changed beyond recognition, compounding underlying structural challenges for the Union and leading to a substantial revision of the MFF in 2024;

    I.  whereas the context in which the Commission will prepare its proposals for the post-2027 MFF is every bit as challenging, with the established global and geopolitical order changing quickly and radically, the return of large-scale warfare in the Union’s immediate neighbourhood, a highly challenging economic and social backdrop and the worsening climate and biodiversity crisis; whereas, as the Commission has made clear, the status quo is not an option and the Union budget will need to change accordingly;

    J.  whereas the US administration has decided to retreat from the country’s post-war global role in guaranteeing peace and security, in leading on global governance in the rules-based, multilateral international order and in providing essential development and humanitarian aid to those most in need around the world; whereas the Union will therefore have to step up to fill part of the void the US appears set to leave, placing additional demands on the budget;

    K.  whereas the Union has committed to take all the steps needed to achieve climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest and to protect nature and reverse biodiversity loss; whereas delivering on the policy framework put in place to achieve this objective will require substantial investment; whereas the Union budget will have to play a key role in providing and incentivising that investment;

    L.  whereas, in order to compensate for the budget’s shortcomings, there have been numerous workaround solutions that make the budget more opaque, leaving the public in the dark about the real volume of Union spending, undermining the longer-term predictability of investment the budget is designed to provide and undercutting not only the principle of budget unity, but also Parliament’s role as a legislator and budgetary and discharge authority and in holding the executive to account;

    M.  whereas the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities; whereas breaches of those values undermine the cohesion of the Union, erode the rights of Union citizens and weaken mutual trust among Member States;

    1.  Insists that, in a fast changing world where people rightly expect more from the Union and its budget and where the Union is confronted with a growing number of crises, the next MFF must be endowed with increased resources compared to the 2021-2027 period, moving away from the historically restrictive, self-imposed level of 1 % of GNI;

    2.  Underscores that the next MFF must focus on financing European public goods with discernible added value compared to national spending; highlights the need for enhanced synergies and better coordination between Union and national spending; emphasises that spending will have to address major challenges, such as the return of large-scale warfare in the Union’s immediate neighbourhood, a highly challenging economic and social backdrop, a competitiveness gap and the worsening climate and biodiversity crisis;

    3.  Considers that the ‘one national plan per Member State’ approach as envisaged by the Commission, with the Recovery and Resilience Facility model as a blueprint, cannot be the basis for shared management spending post-2027; underlines that the design of shared management spending under the next MFF must fully safeguard Parliament’s roles as legislator and budgetary and discharge authority and be designed and implemented through close collaboration with regional and local authorities and all relevant stakeholders;

    4.  Calls for the next MFF to continue support for economic, social and territorial cohesion in order to help bind the Union together, deepen the single market, promote convergence and reduce inequality, poverty and social exclusion;

    5.  Considers that the idea of an umbrella Competitiveness Fund merging existing programmes as envisaged by the Commission is not fit for purpose; stresses that the fund should instead be a new instrument taking advantage of a toolbox of funding based on lessons learned from InvestEU and the Innovation Fund and complementing existing, highly successful programmes;

    6.  Stresses that, in particular in the light of the US’s retreat from its role as a global guarantor of peace and security, there is a clear need to progress towards a genuine Defence Union, with the next MFF supporting a comprehensive security approach through an increase in investment; stresses that defence spending cannot come at the expense of nor lead to a reduction in long-term investment in the economic, social and territorial cohesion of the Union;

    7.  Calls for genuine simplification for final beneficiaries by avoiding programmes with overlapping objectives, diverging eligibility criteria and different rules governing horizontal provisions; underlines that simplification cannot mean more leeway for the Commission without the necessary checks and balances and must therefore be achieved with full respect for the institutional balance provided for in the Treaties;

    8.  Insists on enhanced in-built crisis response capacity in the next MFF and sufficient margins under each heading; stresses that, alongside predictability for investment, spending programmes should retain a substantial in-built flexibility reserve, with allocation to specific policy objectives to be decided by the budgetary authority; underlines that flexibility for humanitarian aid should be ring-fenced; considers that the post-2027 MFF should include two special instruments – one dedicated to ensuring solidarity in the event of natural disasters and one for general-purpose crisis response;

    9.  Underlines that compliance with Union values and fundamental rights is an essential pre-requisite to access EU funds; insists that the Union budget be protected against misuse, fraud and breaches of the principle of the rule of law and calls for a stronger link between the rule of law and the Union budget post-2027;

    10.  Underlines that the repayment of NGEU borrowing must not endanger the financing of EU policies and priorities; stresses, therefore, that all costs related to borrowing backed by the Union budget or the budgetary headroom be treated distinctly from appropriations for EU programmes within the future MFF architecture;

    11.  Calls on the Council to adopt new own resources as a matter of urgency in order to enable sustainable repayment of NGEU borrowing; stresses that new genuine own resources, beyond the IIA, are essential for the Union’s higher spending needs; considers that all instruments and tools should be explored in order to provide the Union with the necessary resources, and considers, in this respect, that joint borrowing presents a viable option to ensure that the Union has sufficient resources to respond to acute Union-wide crises, such as the ongoing crisis in the area of security and defence;

    12.  Stands ready to work constructively with the Council and Commission to deliver a long-term budget that addresses the Union’s needs; highlights that the post-2027 MFF is being constructed in a far from ‘business as usual’ context and takes seriously its institutional role as enshrined in the Treaties; insists that it will only approve a long-term budget that is fit for purpose for the Union in a changing world and calls for swift adoption of the MFF to enable timely implementation of spending programmes from 1 January 2028;

    A long-term budget with a renewed spending focus

    13.  Considers that, in view of the structural challenges facing the Union, the post-2027 MFF should adjust its spending focus to ensure that the Union can meet its strategic policy aims as detailed below;

    Competitiveness, strategic autonomy, social, economic and territorial cohesion and resilience

    14.  Is convinced that boosting competitiveness, decarbonising the economy and enhancing the Union’s innovation capacity are central priorities for the post-2027 MFF and are vital to ensure long-term, sustainable and inclusive growth and a thriving, more resilient economy and society;

    15.  Considers that the Union must develop a competitiveness framework in line with its own values and political aims and that competitiveness must foster not only economic growth, but also social, economic and territorial cohesion and environmental sustainability as underlined in both the Draghi and Letta reports;

    16.  Underlines that, as spelt out in the Letta and Draghi reports, the European economy and social model are under intense strain, with the productivity, competitiveness and skills gap having knock-on effects on the quality of jobs and on living standards for Europeans already grappling with high housing, energy and food prices; is concerned that a lack of job opportunities and high costs of living increase the risk of a brain drain away from Europe;

    17.  Points out that Draghi puts the annual investment gap with respect to innovation and infrastructure at EUR 750-800 billion per year between 2025 and 2030; underlines that the Union budget must play a vital role but it cannot cover that shortfall alone, and that the bulk of the effort will have to come from the private sector – points to the need to exploit synergies between public and private investment, in particular by simplifying and harmonising the EU investment architecture;

    18.  Stresses that the Union budget must be carefully coordinated with national spending, so as to ensure complementarity, and must be designed such that it can de-risk, mobilise and leverage private investment effectively, enabling start-ups and SMEs to access funds more readily; calls, therefore, for programmes such as InvestEU, which ensures additionality and follows a market-based, demand-driven approach, to be significantly reinforced in the next MFF; considers that financial instruments and budgetary guarantees are an effective use of resources to achieve critical Union policy goals and calls for them to be further simplified;

    19.  Insists that more must be done to maximise the potential of the role of the European Investment Bank (EIB) Group – together with other international and national financial institutions – in lending and de-risking in strategic policy areas, such as climate and, latterly, security and defence projects; calls for an increased risk appetite and ambition from the EIB Group to crowd in investment, based on a strong capital position, and for a reinforced investment partnership to ensure that every euro spent at Union level is used in the most effective manner;

    20.  Emphasises that funding for research and innovation, including support for basic research, should be significantly increased, should be focused on the Union’s strategic priorities, should continue to be determined by the principle of excellence and should remain merit-based; considers that there should be sufficient resources across the MFF and at national level to fund all high-quality projects throughout the innovation cycle and to achieve the 3 % GDP target for research and development spending by 2030;

    21.  Stresses that the next MFF, building on the current Connecting Europe Facility, should include much greater, directly managed funding for energy, transport and digital infrastructure, with priority given to cross-border connections and national links with European added value; considers that such infrastructure is an absolute precondition for a successful deepening of the single market and for increasing the Union’s resilience in a changing geopolitical order;

    22.  Points out that a secure and robust space sector is critical for the Union’s autonomy and sovereignty and therefore needs sustained investment;

    23.  Underlines that a more competitive, productive and socially inclusive economy helps to generate high-quality, well-paid jobs, thus enhancing people’s standard of living; emphasises that, through programmes such as the European Social Fund+ and Erasmus+, the Union budget can play an important role in supporting education and training systems, enhancing social inclusion, boosting workforce adaptability through reskilling and upskilling, and thus preparing people for employment in a modern economy;

    24.  Insists that the Union budget should continue to support important economic and job-creating sectors where the Union is already a world leader, such as tourism and the cultural and creative sectors; underscores the need for dedicated funding for tourism, including to implement the EU Strategy for Sustainable Tourism, in the Union budget post-2027; points to the importance of Creative Europe in contributing to Europe’s diversity and competitiveness and in supporting vibrant societies;

    25.  Stresses that, in order to compete with other major global players, the European economy must also become more competitive and resilient on the supply side by investing more in the Union’s open strategic autonomy through enhanced industrial policy and a focus on strategic sectors, resource-efficiency and critical technologies to reduce dependence on third countries;

    26.  Considers that, in light of the above, the idea of an umbrella Competitiveness Fund merging existing programmes as envisaged by the Commission is not fit for purpose; stresses that the fund should instead be a new instrument taking advantage of a toolbox of funding based on lessons learned from InvestEU and the Innovation Fund; recalls that, under Article 182 TFEU, the Union is required to adopt a framework programme for research;

    27.  Notes that, in the Commission communication on the competitiveness compass, the Commission argues that a new competitiveness coordination tool should be established in order to better align industrial and research policies and investment between EU and national level; notes that the proposed new tool is envisaged as part of a ‘new, lean steering mechanism’ designed ‘to reinforce the link between overall policy coordination and the EU budget’; insists that Parliament must play a full decision-making role in both mechanisms;

    28.  Emphasises that food security is a vital component of strategic autonomy and that the next MFF must continue to support the competitiveness and resilience of the Union’s farming and fisheries sectors, including small-scale and young farmers and fishers, and help the sectors to better protect the climate and biodiversity, as well as the seas and oceans; highlights that a modern and simplified common agricultural policy is crucial for increasing productivity through technical progress, ensuring a fair standard of living for farmers, guaranteeing food security and the production of safe, high-quality and affordable food for Europeans, fostering generational renewal and ensuring the viability of rural areas;

    29.  Points out that the farming sector is particularly vulnerable to inflationary shocks which affect farmers’ purchasing power; calls for an increased and dedicated budget for the CAP in the next MFF, safeguarding it from possible cuts, in order to maintain its integrity and commonality, as well as the coherence and interconnection between its first and second pillar, and therefore opposes the idea of integrating the CAP into a single fund for each Member State; calls for additional dedicated funding sources to be explored where appropriate, including outside of the CAP, in order to cope with natural disasters and provide incentives to farmers and foresters to contribute to climate change mitigation, biodiversity recovery and nature protection, without measures causing a regression in EU agricultural production;

    30.  Stresses that the new global challenges facing EU farmers, including the present geopolitical situation, climate change and rising input prices, require sound financial allocation in the next CAP; emphasises that, in order to address these challenges, taking into account the lessons learned from the COVID-19 crisis, and to avoid reductions to farmers’ support, the CAP urgently needs an increased budget in the next MFF that is indexed to inflation through annual re-evaluation; underlines, in that respect, that direct payments in the current form generate clear EU added value and should continue to strengthen income security, production and protection against price volatility, better targeting persons actively engaged in agricultural production and the provision of public goods, while respecting realistic and balanced EU environmental and social standards; calls for a fair and efficient distribution of CAP support within and among the Member States; calls for the continuation and reinforcement of measures that maintain production in vulnerable areas and guarantee the viability of rural communities and the adequacy of public infrastructure, specifically regarding digitalisation and particularly through the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development, and the renewed involvement of local and regional authorities in the management of such measures; stresses the need to increase and reform the agricultural reserve in order to respond effectively and rapidly to future crises that the European agricultural sector will have to deal with, and to establish new tools for managing natural, market and sanitary risks, such as an EU reinsurance scheme to better mitigate the effects of future crises and provide greater stability for farmers; emphasises that specific solutions must be found for the farmers in eastern Europe who are most affected by the cascade effects of Russia’s war against Ukraine, such as high input prices, inflation and market disturbances; urges the Commission to continue to set up the necessary financial and legal framework for the food supply chain in order to strengthen the position of farmers and better combat unfair trading practices; calls on the Commission to support EU farmers by promoting agri-food products inside and outside the Union through a dynamic and stronger EU promotion policy; regrets the funding cuts made to the programme on the promotion of agricultural products during the review of the current MFF; emphasises that the next MFF must include dedicated funds for agri-tourism, female entrepreneurship, vocational training and technological innovation in agriculture;

    31.  Recalls that social, economic and territorial cohesion is a cornerstone of European integration and is vital in binding the Union together and deepening the single market; reaffirms, in that respect, the importance of the convergence process; underlines that a modernised cohesion policy must follow a decentralised, place-based, multilevel governance approach and be built around the shared management and partnership principle, fully involving local and regional authorities and relevant stakeholders, ensuring that resources are directed where they are most needed to reduce regional disparities;

    32.  Stresses that cohesion policy funding must tackle the key challenges the Union faces, such as demographic change and depopulation, and target the regions and people most in need; calls, furthermore, for enhanced access to EU funding for cities, regions and urban authorities; recalls that, under Article 349 TFEU, the Union is required to put in place specific measures for the outermost regions and stresses, therefore, the need for continued, targeted support for these regions in the next MFF, including via a reinforced programme of options specifically relating to remoteness and insularity (POSEI);

    33.  Recalls the importance of the social dimension of the European Union and of promoting the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights, its Action Plan and headline targets; emphasises that the Union budget should, therefore, play a pivotal role in reducing inequality, poverty and social exclusion, including by supporting children, families and vulnerable groups; recalls that around 20 million children in the Union are at risk of poverty and social exclusion; stresses that addressing child poverty across the Union requires appropriately funded, comprehensive and integrated measures, together with the efficient implementation of the European Child Guarantee at national level; emphasises that Parliament has consistently requested a dedicated budget within the ESF+ to support the Child Guarantee as a central pillar of the EU anti-poverty strategy;

    34.  Highlights, in this regard, the EU-wide housing crisis affecting millions of families and young people; stresses the need for enhanced support for housing through the Union budget, in particular via cohesion policy, and through other funding sources, such as the EIB Group and national promotional banks; acknowledges that, while Union financing cannot solve the housing crisis alone, it can play a crucial role in financing urgent measures and complementing broader Union and national efforts to improve housing affordability and enhance energy efficiency of the housing stock;

    35.  Points out that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has had substantial economic and social consequences, in particular in Member States bordering Russia and Belarus; insists that the next MFF provide support to these regions;

    The green and digital transitions

    36.  Highlights that the green and digital transitions are inextricably linked to competitiveness, the modernisation of the economy and the resilience of society and act as catalysts for a future-oriented and resource-efficient economy; insists therefore, that the post-2027 MFF must continue to support and to further accelerate the twin transitions;

    37.  Recalls that the Union budget is an essential contributor to achieving climate neutrality by 2050, including through support for the 2030 and 2040 targets; underlines that the transition will require a decarbonisation of the economy, in particular through the deployment of clean technologies, improved energy and transport infrastructure and more energy-efficient housing; notes that the Commission estimates additional investment needs to achieve climate neutrality by 2050 at 1,5 % of GDP per year compared to the decade 2011-2020 and that, while the Union budget alone cannot cover the gap, it must remain a vital contributor; calls, therefore, for increased directly managed support for environment and biodiversity protection and climate action building on the current LIFE programme;

    38.  Underlines that industry will be central in the transition to net zero and the establishment of the Energy Union, and that support will be needed in helping some industrial sectors and their workers to adapt; stresses the importance of a just transition that must leave no one behind, requiring, inter alia, investment in regions that are heavily fossil-fuel dependent and increased support for vulnerable households, in particular through the Just Transition Mechanism and the Social Climate Fund;

    39.  Points to the profound technological shift under way, with technologies such as artificial intelligence and quantum both creating opportunities, in terms of the Union’s economic potential and global leadership and improvements to citizens’ lives, and posing reliability, ethical and sovereignty challenges; stresses that the next MFF must support research into, and the development and safe application of digital technologies and help people to hone the knowledge and skills they need to work with and use them;

    Security, defence and preparedness

    40.  Recalls that peace and security are the foundation for the Union’s prosperity, social model and competitiveness, and a vital pillar of the Union’s geopolitical standing; stresses that the next MFF must support a comprehensive security approach by investing significantly more in safeguarding the Union against the myriad threats it faces;

    41.  Underlines that, as the Niinistö report makes clear, multiple threats are combining to heighten instability and increase the Union’s vulnerability, chief among them the fragmenting global order, the security threat posed by Russia and Belarus, growing tensions globally, hostile international actors, the globalisation of criminal networks, hybrid campaigns – which include cyberattacks, foreign information manipulation, disinformation and interference and the instrumentalisation of migration – increasingly frequent and intense extreme weather events as a result of climate change, and health threats;

    42.  Points out that the Union has played a vital role in achieving lasting peace on its territory and must continue to do so by adjusting to the reality of war on its doorstep and the need to vastly boost defence infrastructure, capabilities and readiness, including through the Union budget, going far beyond the current allocation of less than 2 % of the MFF;

    43.  Notes that European defence capabilities suffer from decades of under-investment and that, according to the Commission, the defence spending gap currently stands at EUR 500 billion for the next decade; underlines that the Union budget alone cannot fill the gap, but has an important role to play, in conjunction with national budgets and with a focus on clear EU added value; considers that the Union budget and lending through the EIB Group can help incentivise investment in defence; stresses that defence spending must not come at the expense of social and environmental spending, nor must it lead to a reduction in funding for long-standing Union policies that have proved their worth over time;

    44.  Underlines the merits of the defence programmes and instruments put in place during the current MFF, which have enhanced joint research, production and procurement in the field of defence, providing a valuable foundation on which to build further Union policy and investment;

    45.  Emphasises that, given the geopolitical situation, there is a clear need to act and to progress towards a genuine Defence Union, in coordination with NATO and in full alignment with the neutrality commitments of individual Member States; concurs, in that regard, with the Commission’s analysis that the next MFF must provide a comprehensive and robust framework in support of EU defence;

    46.  Underscores the importance of a competitive and resilient European defence technological and industrial base; considers that enhanced joint EU-level investment in defence in the next MFF backed up by a clear and transparent governance structure can help to avoid duplication, generate economies of scale, and thus significant savings for Member States, reduce fragmentation and ensure the interoperability of equipment and systems; underscores the importance of technology in modern defence systems and therefore of investing in research, cyber-defence and cybersecurity and in dual-use products; points to the need to direct support towards the defence industry within the Union, thus strengthening strategic autonomy, creating quality high-skilled jobs, driving innovation and creating cross-border opportunities for EU businesses, including SMEs;

    47.  Points to the importance of increasing support in the budget for military mobility, which upgrades infrastructure for dual-use military and civilian purposes, enabling the large-scale movement of military equipment and personnel at short notice and thus contributing to the Union’s defence capabilities and collective security; highlights, in that regard, the importance of financing for the trans-European transport networks to enable their adaptation for dual-use purposes;

    48.  Emphasises that the Union needs to ramp up funding for preparedness across the board; is alarmed by the growing impact of natural disasters, which are often the result of climate change and are therefore likely to occur with greater frequency and intensity in the future; points out that, according to the 2024 European Climate Risk Assessment Report, cumulated economic losses from natural disasters could reach about 1,4 % of Union GDP;

    49.  Underlines, therefore, that, in addition to efforts to mitigate climate change through the green transition, significant investment is required to adapt to climate change, in particular to prevent and reduce the impact of natural disasters and severe weather events; considers that support for this purpose, such as through the current Union Civil Protection Mechanism, must be significantly increased in the next MFF and made available quickly to local and regional authorities, which are often on the frontline;

    50.  Emphasises that reconstruction and recovery measures after natural disasters must be based on the ‘build back better’ approach and prioritise nature-based solutions; stresses the importance of sustainable water management and security and hydric resilience as part of the Union’s overall preparedness strategy;

    51.  Recalls that the COVID-19 pandemic wreaked economic and social havoc globally and that a key lesson from the experience is that there is a need to prioritise investment in prevention of, preparedness for and response to health threats, in medical research and disease prevention, in access to critical medicines, in healthcare infrastructure, in physical and mental health and in the resilience and accessibility of public health systems in the Union; recalls that strategic autonomy in health is key to ensuring the Union’s preparedness in this area;

    52.  Considers that the next MFF must build on the work done in the current programming period by ensuring that the necessary investment is in place to build a genuine European Health Union that delivers for all citizens;

    53.  Underlines that, with technological developments, it has become easier for malicious and opportunistic foreign actors to spread disinformation, encourage online hate speech, interfere in elections and mount cyberattacks against the Union’s interests; insists that the next MFF must invest in enhanced cybersecurity capabilities and equip the Union to counter hybrid warfare in its various guises;

    54.  Stresses that a free, independent and pluralistic media is a fundamental component of Europe’s resilience, safeguarding not only the free flow of information but also a democratic mindset, critical thinking and informed decision-making; points to the importance of investment in independent and investigative journalism, fact-checking initiatives, digital and media literacy and critical thinking to safeguard against disinformation, foreign information manipulation and electoral interference as part of the European Democracy Shield initiative and therefore to guarantee democratic resilience; underscores the need for continued Union budget support for initiatives in these areas;

    55.  Underscores the importance of continued funding, in the next MFF, for effective protection of the EU’s external borders; underlines the need to counter transnational criminal networks and better protect victims of trafficking networks, and to strengthen resilience and response capabilities to address hybrid attacks and the instrumentalisation of migration, by third countries or hostile non-state actors; highlights, in particular, the need for support to frontline Member States for the purposes of securing the external borders of the EU;

    56.  Underlines that the EU’s resilience and preparedness are inextricably linked to those of its regional and global partners; emphasises that strengthening partners’ capacity to prevent, withstand and effectively respond to extreme weather events, health crises, hybrid campaigns, cyberattacks or armed conflict also lowers the risk of spill-over effects for Europe;

    External action and enlargement

    57.  Insists that, in a context of heightened global instability, the Union must continue to engage constructively with third countries and support peace, and conflict prevention, stability, prosperity, security, human rights, the rule of law, equality, democracy and sustainable development globally, in line with its global responsibility values and international commitments;

    58.  Regrets the fact that external action in the current MFF has been underfunded, leading to significant recourse to special instruments and substantial reinforcements in the mid-term revision; notes, in particular, that humanitarian aid funding has been woefully inadequate, prompting routine use of the Emergency Aid Reserve;

    59.  Underlines that the US’s retreat from its post-war global role in guaranteeing peace, security and democracy, in leading on global governance in the rules-based, multilateral international order and in providing essential development and humanitarian aid to those most in need around the world will leave an enormous gap and that the Union has a responsibility and overwhelming strategic interest in helping to fill that gap; calls on the Commission to address the consequences of the US’s retreat at the latest in its proposal for the post-2027 MFF;

    60.  Stresses that the next MFF must continue to tackle the most pressing global challenges, from fighting climate change, to providing relief in the event of natural disasters, preventing and addressing violent conflict and guaranteeing global security, ensuring global food security, improving healthcare and education systems, reducing poverty and inequality, promoting democracy, human rights, the rule of law and social justice and boosting competitiveness and the security of global supply chains, in full compliance with the principle of policy coherence for development; emphasises, in particular, the need for support for the Union’s Southern and Eastern Neighbourhoods;

    61.  Underlines that, in particular in light of the drastic cuts to the USAID budget, the budget must uphold the Union’s role as the world’s leading provider of development aid and climate finance in line with the Union’s global obligations and commitments; recalls, in that regard, that the Union and its Member States have collectively committed to allocating 0,7 % of their GNI to official development assistance and that poverty alleviation must remain its primary objective; insists that the budget must continue to support the Union in its efforts to defend the rules-based international order, democracy, multilateralism, human rights and fundamental values;

    62.  Insists that, given the unprecedented scale of humanitarian crises, mounting global challenges and uncertainty of US assistance under the current administration, humanitarian aid funding must be significantly enhanced and that its use must remain solely needs-based and respect the principles of neutrality, independence and impartiality; emphasises that the needs-based nature of humanitarian aid requires ring-fenced funding delivered through a stand-alone spending programme, distinct from other external action financing; underscores, furthermore, that effective humanitarian aid provision is contingent on predictability through a sufficient annual baseline allocation;

    63.  Emphasises that humanitarian aid, by its very nature, requires substantial flexibility and response capacity; considers, therefore, that, in addition to an adequate baseline figure, humanitarian aid will require significant ring-fenced flexibility in its design to enable an effective response to the growing crises;

    64.  Emphasises that, in a context in which global actors are increasingly using trade interdependence as a means of economic coercion, the Union must bolster its capacity to protect and advance its own strategic interests, develop more robust tools to counter coercion and ensure genuine reciprocity in its partnerships; stresses that such an approach requires the strategic allocation of external financing so as to support, for example, economic, security and energy partnerships that align with the Union’s values and strategic interests;

    65.  Considers that enlargement represents an opportunity to strengthen the Union as a geopolitical power and that the next MFF is pivotal for preparing the Union for enlargement and the candidate countries for accession; recalls that the stability, security and democratic resilience of the candidate countries are inextricably connected to those of the EU and require sustained strategic investment, linked to reforms, to support their convergence with Union standards; underlines the important role that citizens and civil society organisations play in the process of enlargement;

    66.  Points to the need for strategically targeted support for pre-accession and for growth and investment; is of the view that post-2027 pre-accession assistance should be provided in the form of both grants and loans; believes, in that context, that the future framework should allow for innovative financing mechanisms, as well as lending to candidate countries backed by the budgetary headroom (the difference between the own resources and the MFF ceilings);

    67.  Stresses that financial support must be conditional on the implementation of reforms aligned with the Union acquis and policies and adherence to Union values; emphasises, in this regard, the need for a strong governance model that ensures parliamentary accountability, oversight and control and a strong, effective anti-fraud architecture;

    68.  Reiterates its full support for Ukrainians in their fight for freedom and democracy and deplores the terrible suffering and impact resulting from Russia’s unprovoked and unjustifiable war of aggression; welcomes the decision to grant Ukraine and the neighbouring Republic of Moldova candidate country status and insists on the need to deploy the necessary funds to support their accession processes;

    69.  Underlines that pre-accession support to Ukraine has to be distinct from and additional to financial assistance for macroeconomic stability, reconstruction and post-war recovery, where needs are far more substantial and require a concerted international effort, of which support through the Union budget should be an important part;

    70.  Is convinced that the existing mandatory revision clause in the event of enlargement should be maintained in the next framework and that national envelopes should not be affected; underlines that the next MFF will also have to put in place appropriate transitional and phasing-in measures for key spending areas, such as cohesion and agriculture, based on a careful assessment of the impacts on different sectors;

    Fundamental rights, Union values and the rule of law

    71.  Emphasises the importance of the Union budget and programmes like Erasmus+ and Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values in promoting and protecting democracy and the Union’s values, fostering the Union’s common cultural heritage and European integration, enhancing citizen engagement, civic education and youth participation, safeguarding and promoting fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the rule of law; calls, in this regard, for increased funding for Erasmus+ in the next MFF; points to the importance of the independence of the justice system, the sound functioning of national institutions, de-oligarchisation, robust support for and, in line with article 11(2) TEU, an active dialogue with civil society, which is vital for fostering an active civic space, ensuring accountability and transparency and informing policymakers about best practices from the ground;

    72.  Highlights, in that connection, that the recast of the Financial Regulation requires the Commission and the Member States, in the implementation of the budget, to ensure compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights and to respect the values on which the Union is founded, which are enshrined in Article 2 TEU; expects the Commission to ensure that the proposals for the next MFF, including for the spending programmes, are aligned with the Financial Regulation recast;

    73.  Stresses that instability in neighbouring regions and beyond, poverty, underlying trends in economic development, demographic changes and climate change, continue to generate migration flows towards the Union, placing significant pressure on asylum and migration systems; underlines that the post-2027 MFF must support the full and swift implementation of the Union’s Asylum and Migration Pact and effective return and readmission policies, in line with fundamental rights and EU values, including the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility; underlines, moreover, that, in line with the Pact, the EU must pursue enhanced cooperation and mutually beneficial partnerships with third countries on migration, with adequate parliamentary scrutiny, and that such cooperation must abide by EU and international law;

    74.  Underlines that compliance with Union values and fundamental rights is an essential pre-requisite to access EU funds; highlights the importance of strong links between respect for the rule of law and access to EU funds under the current MFF; believes that the protection of the Union’s financial interests depends on respect for the rule of law at national level; welcomes, in particular, the positive impact of the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation in protecting the Union’s financial interests in cases of systemic and persistent breaches of the rule of law; calls on the Commission and the Council to apply the regulation strictly, consistently and without undue delay wherever necessary; emphasises that decisions to suspend or reduce Union funding over breaches of the rule of law must be based on objective criteria and not be guided by other considerations, nor be the outcome of negotiations;

    75.  Points to the need for a stronger link between the rule of law and the Union budget post-2027 and welcomes the Commission’s commitment to bolster links between the recommendations in the annual rule of law report and access to funds through the budget; calls on the Commission to outline, in the annual rule of law report from 2025 onwards, the extent to which identified weaknesses in rule of law regimes potentially pose a risk to the Union budget; welcomes, furthermore, the link between respect for Union values and the implementation of the budget and calls on the Commission to actively monitor Member States’ compliance with this principle in a unified manner and to take swift action in the event of non-compliance;

    76.  Calls for the consolidation of a robust rule of law toolbox, building on the current conditionality provisions under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), the horizontal enabling conditions in the Common Provisions Regulation and the relevant provisions of the Financial Regulation and insists that the toolbox should cover the entire Union budget; underlines the need for far greater transparency and consistency with regard to the application of tools to protect the rule of law and for Parliament’s role to be strengthened in the application and scrutiny of such measures; insists, furthermore, on the need for consistency across instruments when assessing breaches of the rule of law in Member States;

    77.  Recalls that the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation provides that final recipients should not be deprived of the benefits of EU funds in the event of sanctions being applied to their government; believes that, to date, this provision has not been effective and stresses the importance of applying a smart conditionality approach so that beneficiaries are not penalised because of their government’s actions; calls on the Commission, in line with its stated intention in the political guidelines, to propose specific measures to ensure that local and regional authorities, civil society and other beneficiaries can continue to benefit from Union funding in cases of breaches of the rule of law by national governments without weakening the application of the regulation and maintaining the Member State’s obligation to pay under Union law;

    A long-term budget that mainstreams the Union’s policy objectives

    78.  Stresses that a long-term budget that is fully aligned with the Union’s strategic aims requires that key objectives be mainstreamed across the budget through a set of horizontal principles, building on the lessons from the current MFF and RRF;

    79.  Recalls that the implementation of horizontal principles should not lead to an excessive administrative burden on beneficiaries and be in line with the principle of proportionality; calls for innovative solutions and the use of automated reporting tools, including artificial intelligence, to achieve more efficient data collection;

    80.  Underlines, therefore, that the next MFF must ensure that, across the board, spending programmes pursue climate and biodiversity objectives, promote and protect rights and equal opportunities for all, including gender equality, support competitiveness and bolster the Union’s preparedness against threats;

    81.  Points out that effective mainstreaming is best achieved through a toolbox of measures, primarily through policy, project and regulatory design, thorough impact assessments and solid tracking of spending and, in specific cases, spending targets based on relevant and available data; welcomes the significant improvements in performance reporting in the current MFF, which allow for much better scrutiny of the impact of EU spending and calls for this to be further developed in the next programing period;

    82.  Welcomes the development of a methodology to track gender-based spending and considers that the lessons learnt, in particular as regards the collection of gender-disaggregated data, the monitoring of implementation and impact and administrative burden, should be applied in the next MFF in order to improve the methodology; calls on the Commission to explore the feasibility of gender budgeting in the next MFF; stresses, in the same vein, the need for a significant improvement in climate and biodiversity mainstreaming methodologies to move towards the measurement of impact;

    83.  Regrets that the Commission has not systematically conducted thorough impact assessments, including gender impact assessments, for all legislation involving spending through the budget and insists that this change;

    84.  Is pleased that the climate mainstreaming target of 30 % is projected to be exceeded in the current MFF; regrets, however, that the Union is not on track to meet the 10 % target for 2026 for biodiversity-related expenditure; insists that the targets in the IIA have nevertheless been a major factor in driving climate and biodiversity spending; calls on the Commission to adapt the spending targets contributing positively to climate and biodiversity in line with the Union policy ambitions in this regard, taking into account the investment needs for these policy ambitions;

    85.  Stresses, furthermore, that the Union budget should be implemented in line with Article 33(2) of the Financial Regulation, therefore without doing significant harm(12) to the specified objectives, respecting applicable working and employment conditions and taking into account the principle of gender equality;

    86.  Welcomes the Commission’s commitment to phase out all fossil fuel subsidies and environmentally harmful subsidies in the next MFF; expects the Commission to come forward with its planned roadmap in this regard as part of its proposal for the next MFF;

    A long-term budget with an effective administration at the service of Europeans

    87.  Underlines the need for Union policies to be underpinned by a well-functioning administration; insists that, post-2027, sufficient financial and staff resources be allocated from the outset so that Union institutions, bodies, decentralised agencies and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office can ensure effective and efficient policy design, high-quality delivery and enforcement, provide technical assistance, continue to attract the best people from all Member States, thus ensuring geographical balance, and have leeway to adjust to changing circumstances;

    88.  Regrets that the Union’s ability to implement policy effectively and protect its financial interests within the current MFF has been undermined by stretched administrative resources and a dogmatic application of a policy of stable staffing, despite increasing demands and responsibilities; points, for example, to the failure to provide sufficient staff to properly implement and enforce the Digital Services(13) and Digital Markets Acts(14), thus undercutting the legislation’s effectiveness and to the repeated redeployments from programmes to decentralised agencies to cover staffing needs; insists that staffing levels be determined by an objective needs assessment when legislation is proposed and definitively adopted, and factored into planning for administrative expenditure from the outset;

    89.  Emphasises that the Commission has sought, to some degree, to circumvent its own stable staffing policy by increasing staff attached to programmes and facilities and thus not covered by the administrative spending ceiling; underscores, however, that such an approach merely masks the problem and may ultimately undermine the operational capacity of programmes; insists, therefore, that additional responsibilities require administrative expenditure and must not erode programme envelopes;

    90.  Stresses that up-front investment in secure and interoperable IT infrastructure and data mining capabilities can also generate longer-term cost savings and hugely enhance policy delivery and tracking of spending;

    91.  Acknowledges that, in the absence of any correction mechanism in the current MFF, high inflation has significantly driven up statutory costs, requiring extensive use of special instruments to cover the shortfall; regrets that the Council elected not to take up the Commission’s proposal to raise the ceiling for administrative expenditure in the MFF revision, thus further eroding special instruments;

    A long-term budget that is simpler and more transparent

    92.  Stresses that the next MFF must be designed so as to simplify the lives of all beneficiaries by cutting unnecessary red tape; underlines that simplification will require harmonising rules and reporting requirements wherever possible, including, as relevant, ensuring consistency between the applicable rules at European, national and regional levels; underlines, in that respect, the need for a genuine, user-friendly single entry point for EU funding and a simplified application procedure designed in consultation with relevant stakeholders; points out, furthermore, that the next MFF must be implemented as close to people as possible;

    93.  Calls for genuine simplification where there are overlapping objectives, diverging eligibility criteria and different rules governing horizontal provisions that should be uniform across programmes; considers that an assessment of which spending programmes should be included in the next MFF must be based on the above aspects, on the need to focus spending on clearly identified policy objectives with clear European added value and on the policy intervention logic of each programme; stresses that reducing the number of programmes is not an end in itself;

    94.  Underlines that simplification cannot mean more leeway for the Commission without the necessary checks and balances and must therefore be achieved with full respect for the institutional balance provided for in the Treaties;

    95.  Insists that simplification cannot come at the expense of the quality of programme design and implementation and that, therefore, a simpler budget must also be a more transparent budget, enabling better accountability, scrutiny, control of spending and reducing the risks of double funding, misuse and fraud; underlines that any reduction in programmes must be offset by a far more detailed breakdown of the budget by budget line, in contrast to some programme mergers in the current MFF, such as the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI – Global Europe), which is an example not to follow; calls, therefore, for a sufficiently detailed breakdown by budget line to enable the budgetary authority to exercise proper accountability and ensure that decision-making in the annual budgetary procedure and in the course of budget implementation is meaningful;

    96.  Recalls that transparency is essential to retain citizens’ trust, and that fraud and misuse of funds are extremely detrimental to that trust; underlines, therefore, the need for Parliament to be able to control spending and assess whether discharge can be granted; insists that proper accountability requires robust auditing for all budgetary expenditure based on the application of a single audit trail; calls on the Commission to put in place harmonised and effective anti-fraud mechanisms across funding instruments for the post-2027 MFF that ensure the protection of the Union’s budget;

    97.  Reiterates its long-standing position that all EU-level spending should be brought within the purview of the budgetary authority, thereby ensuring transparency, democratic control and protection of the Union’s financial interests; calls, therefore, for the full budgetisation of (partially) off-budget instruments such as the Social Climate Fund, the Innovation Fund and the Modernisation Fund, or their successors;

    A long-term budget that is more flexible and more responsive to crises and shocks

    98.  Points out that, traditionally, the MFF has not been conceived with a crisis response or flexibility logic, but rather has been designed primarily to ensure medium-term investment predictability; underlines that, in a rapidly changing political, security, economic and social context, such an approach is no longer tenable; insists on sufficient in-built crisis response capacity in the next MFF;

    99.  Underscores that the current MFF has been beset by a lack of flexibility and an inability to adjust to evolving spending priorities; considers that the next MFF needs to strike a better balance between investment predictability and flexibility to adjust spending focus; highlights that spending in certain areas requires greater stability than in others where flexibility is more valuable; stresses that recurrent redeployments are not a viable way to finance the Union’s priorities as they damage investments and jeopardise the delivery of agreed policy objectives;

    100.  Believes that, while allocating a significant portion of funding to objectives up-front, spending programmes should retain a substantial in-built flexibility reserve, with allocation to specific policy objectives to be decided by the budgetary authority; notes that the NDICI – Global Europe’s emerging challenges and priorities cushion provides a model for such a flexibility reserve, but that the decision-making process for its mobilisation must not be replicated in the future MFF; points to the need for stronger, more effective scrutiny powers of the co-legislators over the setting of policy priorities and objectives and a detailed budgetary breakdown to ensure that the budgetary authority is equipped to make meaningful and informed decisions;

    101.  Underlines that the MFF must have sufficient margins under each heading to ensure that new instruments or spending objectives agreed over the programming period can be accommodated without eroding funding for other policy and long-term strategic objectives or eating into crisis response capacity;

    102.  Underlines that the possibility for budgetary transfers under the Financial Regulation already provides for flexibility to adjust to evolving spending needs in the course of budget implementation; stresses that, under the current rules, the Commission has significant freedom to transfer considerable amounts between policy areas without budgetary authority approval, which limits scrutiny and control; calls, therefore, for the rules to be changed so as to introduce a maximum amount, in addition to a maximum percentage per budget line, for transfers without approval; considers that for transfers from Union institutions other than the Commission that are subject to a possible duly justified objection by Parliament or the Council, a threshold below which they would be exempt from that procedure could be a useful measure of simplification;

    103.  Recalls that the current MFF has been placed under further strain due to high levels of inflation in a context where an annual 2 % deflator is applied to 2018 prices, reducing the budget’s real-terms value and squeezing its operational and administrative capacity; considers, therefore, that the future budget should be endowed with sufficient response capacity to enable the budget to adapt to inflationary shocks;

    104.  Calls for a root-and-branch reform of the existing special instruments to bolster crisis response capacity and ensure an effective and swift reaction through more rapid mobilisation; underlines that the current instruments are both inadequate in size and constrained by excessive rigidity, with several effectively ring-fenced according to crisis type; points out that enhanced crisis response capacity will ensure that cohesion policy funds are not called upon for that purpose and can therefore be used for their intended investment objectives;

    105.  Considers that the post-2027 MFF should include only two special instruments – one dedicated to ensuring solidarity in the event of natural disasters (the successor to the existing European Solidarity Reserve) and one for general-purpose crisis response and for responding to any unforeseen needs and emerging priorities, including where amounts in the special instrument for natural disasters are insufficient (the successor to the Flexibility Instrument); insists that both special instruments should be adequately funded from the outset and able to carry over unspent amounts indefinitely over the MFF period; believes that all other special instruments can either be wound up or subsumed into the two special instruments or into existing programmes;

    106.  Calls for the future Flexibility Instrument to be heavily front-loaded and subsequently to be fed through a number of additional sources of financing: unspent margins from previous years (as with the current Single Margin Instrument), the annual surplus from the previous year, a fines-based mechanism modelled on the existing Article 5 of the MFF Regulation, reflows from financial instruments and decommitted appropriations; underlines that the next MFF should be designed such that the future special instruments are not required to cover debt repayment;

    107.  Underlines that re-use of the surplus, of reflows from financial instruments and surplus provisioning and of decommitments would require amendments to the Financial Regulation;

    108.  Points out that, with sufficient up-front resources and such arrangements for re-using unused funds, the budget would have far greater response capacity without impinging on the predictability of national GNI-based contributions; insists that an MFF endowed with greater flexibility and response capacity is less likely to require a substantial mid-term revision;

    A long-term budget that is more results-focused

    109.  Emphasises that, in order to maximise impact, it is imperative that spending under the next MFF be much more rigorously aligned with the Union’s strategic policy aims and better coordinated with spending at national level; underlines that, in turn, consultation with regional and local authorities is vital to facilitate access to funding and ensure that Union support meets the real needs of final recipients and delivers tangible benefits for people; underscores the importance of technical assistance to implementing authorities to help ensure timely implementation, additionality of investments and therefore maximum impact;

    110.  Underlines that, in order to support effective coordination between Union and national spending, the Commission envisages a ‘new, lean steering mechanism’ designed ‘to reinforce the link between overall policy coordination and the EU budget’; insists that Parliament play a full decision-making role in any coordination or steering mechanism;

    111.  Considers that the RRF, with its focus on performance and links between reforms and investments and budgetary support, has helped to drive national investments and reforms that would not otherwise have taken place;

    112.  Underlines that the RRF can help to inform the delivery of Union spending under shared management; recalls, however, that the RRF was agreed in the very specific context of the COVID-19 pandemic and cannot, therefore, be replicated wholesale for future investment programmes;

    113.  Points out that spending under shared management in the next MFF must involve regional and local authorities and all relevant stakeholders from design to delivery through a place-based and multilevel governance approach and in line with an improved partnership principle, ensure the cross-border European dimension of investment projects, and focus on results and impact rather than outputs by setting measurable performance indicators, ensuring availability of relevant data and feeding into programme design and adjustment;

    114.  Underlines that the design of shared management spending under the next MFF must safeguard Parliament’s role as legislator, budgetary and discharge authority and in holding the executive to account, putting in place strict accountability mechanisms and guaranteeing full transparency in relation to final recipients or groups of recipients of Union spending funds through an interoperable system enabling effective tracking of cash flows and project progress;

    115.  Considers that the ‘one national plan per Member State’ approach envisaged by the Commission is not in line with the principles set out above and cannot be the basis for shared management spending post-2027; recalls that, in this regard, the Union is required, under Article 175 TFEU, to provide support through instruments for agricultural, regional and social spending;

    A long-term budget that manages liabilities sustainably

    116.  Recalls Parliament’s very firm opposition to subjecting the repayment of NGEU borrowing costs to a cap within an MFF heading given that these costs are subject to market conditions, influenced by external factors and thus inherently volatile, and that the repayment of borrowing costs is a non-discretionary legal obligation; stresses that introducing new own resources is also necessary to prevent future generations from bearing the burden of past debts;

    117.  Deplores the fact that, under the existing architecture and despite the joint declaration by the three institutions as part of the 2020 MFF agreement whereby expenditure to cover NGEU financing costs ‘shall aim at not reducing programmes and funds’, financing for key Union programmes and resources available for special instruments, even after the MFF revision, have de facto been competing with the repayment of NGEU borrowing costs in a context of steep inflation and rising interest rates; recalls that pressure on the budget driven by NGEU borrowing costs was a key factor in cuts to flagship programmes in the MFF revision;

    118.  Underlines that, to date, the Union budget has been required only to repay interest related to NGEU and that, from 2028 onwards, the budget will also have to repay the capital; underscores that, according to the Commission, the total costs for NGEU capital and interest repayments are projected to be around EUR 25-30 billion a year from 2028, equivalent to 15-20 % of payment appropriations in the 2025 budget;

    119.  Acknowledges that, while NGEU borrowing costs will be more stable in the next MFF period as bonds will already have been issued, the precise repayment profile will have an impact on the level of interest and thus on the degree of volatility; insists, therefore, that all costs related to borrowing backed by the Union budget or the budgetary headroom be treated distinctly from appropriations for EU programmes within the MFF architecture;

    120.  Points, in that regard, to the increasing demand for the Union budget to serve as a guarantee for the Union’s vital support through macro-financial assistance and the associated risks; underlines that, in the event of default or the withdrawal of national guarantees, the Union budget ultimately underwrites all macro-financial assistance loans and therefore bears significant and inherently unpredictable contingent liabilities, notably in relation to Ukraine;

    121.  Calls, therefore, on the Commission to design a sound and durable architecture that enables sustainable management of all non-discretionary costs and liabilities, fully preserving Union programmes and the budget’s flexibility and response capacity;

    A long-term budget that is properly resourced and sustainably financed

    122.  Underlines that, as described above, the budgetary needs post-2027 will be significantly higher than the amounts allocated to the 2021-2027 MFF and, in addition, will need to cover borrowing costs and debt repayment; insists, therefore, that the next MFF be endowed with significantly increased resources compared to the 2021-2027 period, moving away from the historically restrictive, self-imposed level of 1 % of GNI, which has prevented the Union from delivering on its ambitions and deprived it of the ability to respond to crises and adapt to emerging needs;

    123.  Considers that all instruments and tools should be explored in order to provide the Union with those resources, in line with its priorities and identified needs; considers, in this respect, that joint borrowing through the issuance of EU bonds presents a viable option to ensure that the Union has sufficient resources to respond to acute Union-wide crises such as the ongoing crisis in the area of security and defence;

    124.  Reiterates the need for sustainable and resilient revenue for the Union budget; points to the legally binding roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources in the IIA, in which Parliament, the Council and the Commission undertook to introduce sufficient new own resources to at least cover the repayment of NGEU debt; underlines that, overall, the basket of new own resources should be fair, linked to broader Union policy aims and agreed on time and with sufficient volume to meet the heightened budgetary needs;

    125.  Recalls its support for the amended Commission proposal on the system of own resources; is deeply concerned by the complete absence of progress on the system of own resources in the Council; calls on the Council to adopt this proposal as a matter of urgency; and urges the Commission to spare no effort in supporting the adoption process;

    126.  Calls furthermore, on the Commission to continue efforts to identify additional innovative and genuine new own resources and other revenue sources beyond those specified in the IIA; stresses that new own resources are essential not only to enable repayment of NGEU borrowing, but to ensure that the Union is equipped to cover its the higher spending needs;

    127.  Calls on the Commission to design a modernised budget with a renewed spending focus, driven by the need for fairness, greater simplification, a reduced administrative burden and more transparency, including on the revenue side; underlines that existing rebates and corrections automatically expire at the end of the current MFF;

    128.  Welcomes the decision, in the recast of the Financial Regulation, to treat as negative revenue any interest or other charge due to a third party relating to amounts of fines, other penalties or sanctions that are cancelled or reduced by the Court of Justice; recalls that this solution comes to an end on 31 December 2027; invites the Commission to propose a definitive solution for the next MFF that achieves the same objective of avoiding any impact on the expenditure side of the budget;

    A long-term budget grounded in close interinstitutional cooperation

    129.  Underlines that Parliament intends to fully exercise its prerogatives as legislator, budgetary authority and discharge authority under the Treaties;

    130.  Recalls that the requirement for close interinstitutional cooperation between the Commission, the Council and Parliament from the early design stages to the final adoption of the MFF is enshrined in the Treaties and further detailed in the IIA;

    131.  Emphasises Parliament’s commitment to play its role fully throughout the process; believes that the design of the MFF should be bottom-up and based on the extensive involvement of stakeholders; underlines, furthermore, the need for a strategic dialogue among the three institutions in the run-up to the MFF proposals;

    132.  Calls on the Commission to put forward practical arrangements for cooperation and genuine negotiations from the outset; points, in particular, to the importance of convening meetings of the three Presidents, as per Article 324 TFEU, wherever they can aid progress, and insists that the Commission follow up when Parliament requests such meetings; reminds the Commission of its obligation to provide information to Parliament on an equal footing with the Council as the two arms of the budgetary authority and as co-legislators on MFF-related basic acts;

    133.  Recalls that the IIA specifically provides for Parliament, the Council and the Commission to ‘seek to determine specific arrangements for cooperation and dialogue’; stresses that the cooperation provisions set out in the IIA, including regular meetings between Parliament and the Council, are a bare minimum and that much more is needed to give effect to the principle in Article 312(5) TFEU of taking ‘any measure necessary to facilitate the adoption of a new MFF’; calls, therefore, on the successive Council presidencies to respect not only the letter, but also the spirit of the Treaties;

    134.  Recalls that the late adoption of the MFF regulation and related legislation for the 2014-2020 and 2021-2027 periods led to significant delays, which hindered the proper implementation of EU programmes; insists, therefore, that every effort be made to ensure timely adoption of the upcoming MFF package;

    135.  Expects the Commission, as part of the package of MFF proposals, to put forward a new IIA in line with the realities of the new budget, including with respect to the management of contingent liabilities; stresses that the changes to the Financial Regulation necessary for alignment with the new MFF should enter into force at the same time as the MFF Regulation;

    o
    o   o

    136.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

    (1) OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 11, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2093/oj.
    (2) OJ L 424, 15.12.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2020/2053/oj.
    (3) OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 28, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_interinstit/2020/1222/oj.
    (4) OJ L 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj.
    (5) OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2092/oj.
    (6) OJ C, C/2024/6751, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6751/oj.
    (7) OJ C, C/2023/1067, 15.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/1067/oj.
    (8) OJ C 177, 17.5.2023, p. 115.
    (9) OJ C 445, 29.10.2021, p. 240.
    (10) OJ C 428, 13.12.2017, p. 10.
    (11) OJ C, C/2025/279, 24.1.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/279/oj.
    (12) Article 9 of Regulation (EU) 2020/852 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2020 on the establishment of a framework to facilitate sustainable investment, and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/2088 (OJ L 198, 22.6.2020, p. 13, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/852/oj).
    (13) Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) (OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj).
    (14) Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act) (OJ L 265, 12.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1925/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Competition policy – annual report 2024 – P10_TA(2025)0104 – Thursday, 8 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular to Articles 101 to 109 thereof,

    –  having regard to the publication of 18 July 2024 by Ursula von der Leyen entitled ‘Europe’s choice – political guidelines for the next European Commission 2024–2029’,

    –  having regard to the report of 9 September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’,

    –  having regard to the report of 18 April 2024 by Enrico Letta entitled ‘Much more than a market’,

    –  having regard to the European Court of Auditors Special Report21/2024 of 23 October 2024 entitled ‘State aid in times of crisis – Swift reaction but shortcomings in the Commission’s monitoring and inconsistencies in the framework to support the EU’s industrial policy objectives’,

    –  having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation)(1),

    –   having regard to Article 11 TFEU, which mandates the integration of environmental protection requirements into the definition and implementation of all EU policies and activities, with a view to promoting sustainable development,

    –  having regard to Article 3 of Decision (EU) 2022/591 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 April 2022 on a General Union Environment Action Programme to 2030(2), which provides that environmentally harmful subsidies, in particular fossil fuel subsidies, should be phased out without delay,

    –  having regard to the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 3 September 2024 in Case C‑611/22 P, Illumina v Commission(3), of 10 September 2024 in Case C‑465/20 P, European Commission v Ireland and Others(4), and of 10 September 2024 in Case C‑48/22 P (Google and Alphabet v Commission)(5),

    –  having regard to the Commission’s report of June 2024 entitled ‘Protecting competition in a changing world – Evidence on the evolution of competition in the EU during the past 25 years’,

    –  having regard to the study entitled ‘The role of commodity traders in shaping agricultural markets’, published by its Policy Department for Structural and Cohesion Policies in November 2024,

    –  having regard to the report of 20 December 2023 by the European Securities and Markets Authority entitled ‘CRA Market Share Report: 2023 edition’,

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0071/2025),

    A.  whereas the current challenging economic, climate and geopolitical contexts, marked by uncertainty and unpredictability, require a renewed approach to European competitiveness and concrete strategies to boost economic growth;

    B.  whereas the proper enforcement of the EU competition policy framework leads to lower prices, higher quality, greater choice for consumers, faster innovation and a fairer and more resilient economy, and protects entry conditions for operators in the internal market, tackling abuses of dominant position, monopolies and practices distortive to the internal market;

    C.  whereas the Draghi report underlines that the EU has a broad and diversified industrial innovation base, with a strong comparative advantage in green technologies, but that sustained efforts are needed in order to retain that advantage; whereas the integration of climate and environmental considerations into competition policy is essential, in that regard; whereas the Letta report maintains that the lack of EU integration in the financial, energy and electronic communications sectors is a primary reason for Europe’s declining competitiveness;

    D.  whereas the EU’s competition policy could contribute to bolstering the resilience of the internal market, as well as achieving the goals of the European Green Deal, the 2030 Digital Compass and the Competitiveness Compass, for which international exchange and cooperation are essential;

    E.  whereas the Commission and the national competition authorities need to act in an impartial and objective way in order to preserve the credibility of the EU’s competition policy; whereas the political independence of national competition authorities is of utmost importance to ensure the impartiality and credibility of competition policy;

    General considerations

    1.  Considers that EU competition law seeks to shield against excessive levels of concentration and accumulation of market power, and reaffirms the role of competition policy in encouraging efficiency, innovation and growth, creating a level playing field and protecting consumers, by assuring that markets remain competitive, efficient, dynamic and innovative, delivering high-quality products and services at fair prices and with a wider range of choice;

    2.  Reiterates that competition policy should contribute to all of the EU’s policies, notably in the fields of sustainability, energy, defence and digitalisation; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to a new State aid framework to accompany the Clean Industrial Deal, so as to ensure competitiveness through mobilising the necessary public support for the energy transition to decarbonise EU industry, while ensuring that this does not hinder innovation, increase prices or reduce competition in the internal market; reiterates that State aid should not distort fair and effective competition;

    3.  Emphasises that the global strength and importance of the EU single market derives not only from its internal and external competitiveness but also from its ability to set common standards and guarantee territorial cohesion; notes that at the same time, policymakers should take due account of international regulatory and market developments and calls on the Commission to strive for continued dialogue and cooperation at international level, including via second-generation cooperation agreements that allow for more effective information exchange between competition authorities, and the development of influence on competition policy, globally; highlights the importance of the European Competition Network (ECN) and calls on the Commission to prioritise sustained constructive dialogue and cooperation, in this regard, at international level; calls for the coordination between national competition authorities to ensure the uniform application of competition rules and underlines the necessity of increasing collaboration between antitrust and other sectoral regulators;

    A competitive Union

    4.  Supports the Commission’s commitment to investing in sustainable competitiveness; welcomes the Draghi report’s emphasis on innovation, investments, market integration, decarbonisation and resilience, and the Letta report’s focus on integration, autonomy and solidarity; encourages policies that promote innovation, competitiveness and sustainable and inclusive growth;

    5.  Underlines the need for coordinated, targeted and truly European industrial policy to boost competitiveness; notes that this must not result in market dominance or abuse thereof, price distortion or economic inefficiencies, and points to the need for effective merger control procedures;

    6.  Considers that any State aid granted should be consistent with EU policy objectives; notes the Commission’s intention to provide guidance on the compatibility of State aid with innovation, climate and economic security considerations, as well as its actions to scale down and phase out fossil fuel subsidies under the Clean Industrial Deal, and encourages the Member States to consider the introduction of further conditions for the receipt of State aid; calls for companies structured through non-EU tax havens to be barred from receiving State aid; invites the Commission to investigate the lack of harmonisation of clawback mechanisms;

    7.  Takes note of the Commission’s report asserting that market concentration, markups and profits have increased over the past 25 years, while industry dynamism has decreased, despite the active enforcement of competition law; also takes note that this increase in markups was found to be driven by market share reallocation towards the largest firms; further notes that weak levels of competition have had significant negative impacts on consumers, purchasing power, and on the competitiveness of EU firms and overall economic growth; recalls that the application of competition law should focus on ensuring open, competitive markets free from anti-competitive practices;

    8.  Points out that State aid is increasingly used to support industrial policy objectives; recalls that such aid, as permitted under Article 107(3)(c) TFEU, must not adversely affect trading conditions or the common interest; notes the divergent fiscal capabilities of the Member States and warns that fragmented State aid creates an uneven playing field; calls on the Commission to monitor these effects and to ensure the integrity of the single market, which can be done through a common financing instrument for a European industrial policy, such as a European Competitiveness Fund, as proposed by Commission President von der Leyen in her political guidelines; calls on the Commission and the Member States not to engage in subsidy competition, which only exacerbates market distortions, notably when financing undertakings that are not efficient; concludes that temporary State aid frameworks have failed to prevent further market fragmentation and notes that only two of the Member States accounted for 77 % of State aid notified; calls for stricter State aid notification monitoring and enhanced State aid reporting and transparency, in line with the recommendations of the European Court of Auditors;

    9.   Underlines the importance of the important projects of common European interest (IPCEIs) for financing projects within the EU with a cross-border dimension; stresses that IPCEIs should have genuine EU added value, which means that they should have a positive impact on more than one Member State; calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure that any such State aid notification is completed within six months at the latest;

    10.  Takes note of the Draghi report’s estimate that, in order to protect our EU competitiveness, an additional EUR 800 billion per year is needed; acknowledges the importance of public and private investment in this context; underlines that the EU budget needs to be properly equipped to that end; regards the completion of the Savings and Investments Union as important for mobilising private investment, addressing the fragmentation of the internal market and supporting the EU’s industrial strategy; acknowledges the urgent need for reforms alongside the effective implementation of the three action areas outlined in the Draghi report: (i) closing the innovation gap with the US and China; (ii) a common plan for decarbonisation and competitiveness to accelerate the energy transition and reduce energy costs; and (iii) enhancing security and reducing dependencies;

    11.  Welcomes the protection of the level playing field of European markets and European companies and their workers granted by anti-dumping measures that correct for distortive foreign State aid; calls on the Commission to make swift use of available trade instruments on procurement and foreign subsidies to prevent unfair competition in the internal market;

    Enforcement priorities

    12.  Observes changes in business practices, highlighting a decline in cartel cases; cautions, however, against new forms of harmful conduct like tacit collusion and algorithmic collusion, and emphasises the need to align enforcement priorities with this evolving landscape;

    13.  Notes the Draghi report’s proposal for a ‘new competition tool’ as a flexible market investigation tool designed to address structural competition problems that do not result from anti-competitive agreements or abuse of dominance, and to impose market-wide, forward-looking structural or behavioural remedies, including by lowering entry barriers for competitors, with the aim of increasing competitiveness, incentivising innovation and protecting vulnerable consumers; invites the Commission to analyse how this tool would complement the existing framework for sector investigations;

    14.  Recalls that under the Treaty, the Commission is empowered to address exploitative abuses;

    15.  Acknowledges the existence of a legal base for structural remedies against the abuse of market dominance; is aware that EU competition rules stipulate that structural remedies should only be used as a last resort if behavioural remedies have proven ineffective, but nonetheless regrets the reluctance of the Commission to address market dominance through structural remedies; reiterates its invitation to make better use of structural remedies and end the primacy given to behavioural remedies, and encourages further efforts to strengthen their application when necessary; calls on the Commission to make better use of the interim measures instrument to stop any practice that would seriously harm competition, particularly in relation to dynamic and rapidly developing markets such as digital markets;

    16.  Welcomes the priority given to housing by the 2024-2029 Commission; calls on the Commission to assess how EU competition principles affect the supply of services of general economic interest (SGEI); calls on the Commission to assess the position of social services of general interest and an SGEI exemption for affordable housing;

    17.  Stresses the importance of State aid as a tool for closing the economic gap between more developed EU regions and island areas, inland areas, outermost regions and economically depressed areas; recalls that allowing State aid in the context of SGEIs remains essential for the survival of these areas, especially in the context of State support dedicated to connectivity and other basic provisions of services for communities residing in isolated, remote or peripheral regions of the EU; calls on the Commission to investigate possibilities of further flexibility in providing funding to these regions;

    18.  Takes note of the recent Court of Justice of the European Union ruling which found that one of the Member States has failed to transpose the ECN+ Directive into national legislation; underlines the importance of transposing the ECN+ Directive fully; calls on all of the Member States to ensure a proper implementation of this Directive;

    Merger and antitrust

    19.  Notes with concern the Court of Justice of the European Union’s interpretation of Article 22 of the EC Merger Regulation in Case C-611/22 P (Illumina v Commission), rescinding the Commission’s approach of accepting referrals of non-notifiable deals; acknowledges that the EC Merger Regulation does not provide the Commission with sufficient tools for dealing with killer acquisitions; strongly believes that the impact of merger decisions on the internal market justifies the inclusion of an internal market legal base in the EC Merger Regulation, so as to fully involve co-legislators, in a manner similar to that of the Digital Markets Act (DMA); calls on the Commission to require Member States that have or can claim the relevant competence to examine potential killer acquisitions in the light of their national merger control laws, and to continue to refer those deals in accordance with Article 22 of the EC Merger Regulation; calls on the Commission to explore the possibility of reviewing the EC Merger Regulation to be able to examine mergers that fall below EU or national thresholds, regardless of the sectors involved;

    20.  Notes that since the 2004 entry into force of the EC Merger Regulation, 0,7 % of notified mergers have been either blocked by the Commission or withdrawn following an investigation;

    21.  Notes that the turnover thresholds in the EC Merger Regulation alone might not be suitable for detecting all cases that should be reviewed by the competition authorities; highlights practices used by dominant firms to avoid formal investigations, such as the growing use of ‘partnerships’ in the AI sector, which further suggests that a review of the EU Merger Regulation is necessary;

    22.  Welcomes the Draghi report’s proposal for an ‘innovation defence’ in cases where a merger increases the ability and incentive to innovate, and invites the Commission to analyse and further develop this concept; furthermore calls for matters of public interest, such as the impact on workers, to be taken into account;

    23.  Asks the Commission to identify the national barriers that may prevent it from considering the EU market as the relevant one in its analyses of mergers; calls on the Commission to present a legislative proposal to remove these impediments; notes that the international environment needs to be carefully analysed when deciding on the definition of the relevant market in competition and merger control cases; calls on the Commission to adopt a forward-looking approach to consolidation in the EU where appropriate, as also proposed by the Draghi and Letta reports, taking into account the strategic importance and pro-competitive impact of scale and favourable investment conditions in certain sectors for driving innovation and long-term competition;

    24.  Calls for merger assessment frameworks to be updated to reflect the realities of the digital economy, where market power can be manifested in ways beyond traditional market share in clearly delineated markets; supports the development of advanced methodologies for analysing data-driven dominance and network effects, emphasising the critical role of consumer choice in selecting digital services and devices; encourages the Commission to enhance mechanisms enabling interoperability across services and devices, fostering innovation and competition in the digital ecosystem; urges the Commission to progress swiftly on the implementation of the existing interoperability obligations for messaging services under the DMA, the existing interoperability obligations for cloud providers under the Data Act and to start work on the review of the DMA for May 2026; urges the Commission to implement existing interoperability obligations under the DMA and look into extending interoperability obligations to online social networking services; supports the Commission in taking more account of the potential harm to competition when assessing mergers where expansion into adjacent markets would have the effect of further strengthening market dominance in the acquiring company’s core market;

    25.  Calls on the Commission to address excessively long antitrust investigations during which companies continue to benefit from their anticompetitive practices; calls on the Commission to set appropriate time limits for antitrust cases and ensure an effective follow-through of decisions taken; calls on the Commission to adopt further interim measures to stop any practice which would seriously harm competition, particularly in relation to dynamic and rapidly developing markets such as digital markets;

    Sectoral policies

    26.  Welcomes the two September 2024 landmark judgments by the Court of Justice confirming the Commission’s assertion that the Irish tax deal with Apple constitutes illegal State aid and that Google abused its dominant position in contravention of the Treaties; acknowledges that the legal framework in Ireland has since changed; encourages the Commission to continue the clamp down on State aid abuses involving the selective granting of tax breaks to companies;

    27.  Notes the detrimental effect of international tax competition; recalls its support for the implementation of Pillar Two of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD); deeply regrets the US presidential Executive Order of 20 January 2025 which asserts that the OECD global tax agreement has ‘no force or effect within the United States’; stresses the importance of multilateralism in ensuring that multinationals pay their fair share of taxation where value is created; takes the view that the EU should fully stand by the OECD’s Pillar Two Directive;

    28.  Emphasises the worrying market concentrations in various digital markets, such as social media, search engines, AI, cloud services, e-commerce, microchips and online advertising; underlines the actual and potential negative impact on EU competitiveness, the resilience of supply chains, media freedom, privacy and data protection, society and democracy; urges the Commission to address issues that are specific to the tech market, including infrastructural power in hardware and cloud computing layers, vertical concentration, algorithmic manipulation of the digital public sphere and market leveraging in digital markets, as demonstrated by the progress made under the DMA; additionally calls for the opening of new investigations into the cloud services sector to further ensure fair competition and innovation, taking into account the degree of market concentration in this sector and anticompetitive practices related to complex and non-transparent licensing terms or forced bundling; furthermore, urges the Commission to address the increasing vertical concentration of dominant players across the advertising value chain, which puts the EU online advertising sector at risk;

    29.  Notes the rapid development of AI services, which has the potential to result in market concentration; calls on the Commission to take an ecosystemic approach towards this sector, including by developing and applying new theories of harm to address the further entrenchment of the dominant players in this sector; highlights that the DMA contains several provisions that must be used to prevent gatekeepers from restricting emerging AI developers, and asks the Commission to act swiftly to address the risk of consumers being forced into using pre-determined AI services on their mobile devices, ensuring that AI systems remain user-selectable and transparent, thereby safeguarding competition and consumer choice; calls on the Commission to explore the possibility of adding generative AI as a new core platform service under the DMA;

    30.  Notes that large digital players use their market power, power over consumers, financial resources and data concentration in one market to leverage their position in another; stresses that small players cannot compete with the aforementioned factors, which makes EU citizens even more dependent on the same small number of non-EU companies and endangers strategic autonomy; calls for increased scrutiny of the leveraging of position by dominant digital sector players into other sectors and the EU’s strategic autonomy, through a revision of the merger guidelines to ensure that market leveraging can be scrutinised more effectively;

    31.  Notes the importance of data and data analytics tools as one of the deterring factors for digital market concentrations and acquisitions in the digital sector; calls for an opinion of the European Data Protection Board in cases of concentrations involving one or more operators in digital sectors on the relevance of datasets for the intended concentration, the personal data the target acquisition processes and the potential impact on the rights to privacy and data protection the intended concentration has;

    32.  Expresses concern regarding the growing use of dynamic pricing mechanisms across the EU; calls on the Commission to explore regulatory measures against highly adaptive and opaque pricing methods;

    33.  Calls on the Commission to vigorously enforce all competition rules, including the Foreign Subsidies Regulation and the DMA, in order to address gatekeeper practices and foster contestable markets and fair competition; stresses that the Commission must have sufficient staff for enforcement, while noting that new tools, as well as scientists and economists stemming from divergent disciplines, can work to improve competition law enforcement; underlines in particular that the DMA should be applied rigorously and independently, without any undermining by external pressures; stresses that the DMA and potential fines must not be used as a bargaining chip in relation to discussions on tariffs, but as a cornerstone of the EU’s efforts to ensure fair and competitive digital markets; notes the six non-compliance procedures launched against some designated gatekeepers; is deeply concerned about potential delays in critical investigations and the capacity of the Commission to respect their ‘best effort’ obligations and to make a decision on non-compliance procedures without undue delay;

    34.  Notes with concern the fragmentation in numerous consumer markets, including financial services, telecoms and household energy, and calls for faster and greater market integration where there are benefits for consumers, and for recognition that this market integration can drive investment and innovation;

    35.  Expresses alarm at the high concentration in the retail, agricultural and automotive sectors in overseas territories whereby excessive prices set by dominant undertakings on essential products and services amplify inequalities, precariousness and territorial disparities; calls on the Commission to launch an investigation into potential abuses of dominant position under Article 102 TFEU;

    36.  Notes with concern the high degree of market concentration in the European financial sector, as well as its sustained over-reliance on a limited number of non-EU service providers; notes that the three largest credit rating agencies still hold a market share of over 90 %; expresses concern about the continued high concentration in the public interest entities (PIE) audit market, with four firms mainly holding the vast majority of EU revenues for PIE audits, limiting choice and risking supervisory capture; invites the Commission to present an impact assessment on options to address these concerns; urges the Commission to carefully assess public tenders for expertise from audit market participants so that potential conflicts of interest are avoided;

    37.  Expresses concern about the food price crisis and notes, in this regard, the high levels of market concentration in food supply chains; reiterates its call for the Commission to urgently conduct a thorough analysis of the extent and effect of buying alliances, thereby devoting special attention to guaranteeing fair competition and greater transparency in supermarket and hypermarket chains’ commercial practices, particularly where such practices affect brand value and product choice or limit innovation or price comparability; recalls, in this light, the market concentration in agri-commodity trading wherein four companies account for the vast majority of the global crop trade; regrets that the Commission nonetheless conditionally approved the 2024 Bunge-Viterra merger (M.11204) despite competition concerns; asks the Commission to address excessive power accumulation in the hands of a few large players in this market, in order to strengthen the bargaining position of farmers and consumers alike; highlights the implementation of the New Competition Tool in this context;

    38.  Notes the high-net profits of EU banks during this inflationary period, mostly driven by the delayed pass-through of the rapid monetary policy tightening to deposit rates;

    39.  Notes with particular concern the dominant position of two international card schemes in the EU payments market, and their engagement in practices that reinforce and extend their dominance of this market, potentially further increasing barriers to entry and hampering long-term innovation(6), as well as leading to higher costs for EU businesses and ultimately consumers; calls on the Commission to take decisive actions, emphasising the need for a review of the Interchange Fee Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2015/751) to tackle the significant increase in card scheme fees charged by international card schemes and to ensure a fair, competitive and transparent market environment;

    Parliamentary involvement

    40.  Stresses that Parliament should be sufficiently involved in shaping competition policy; cautions against the over-reliance on soft-law instruments, such as guidance and temporary frameworks, in which Parliament’s involvement is limited; calls on the Commission to enter into negotiation for an interinstitutional agreement on competition policy to formalise its enforcement priorities to Parliament; calls on the European Council to adopt a decision under Article 48(7) TEU allowing for the adoption of legislative acts in the area of competition policy in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure; stresses that Parliament should be more involved in the activity of working parties and expert groups in the International Competition Network and the OECD as an observer, and also in the High-Level Group on the DMA;

    41.  Calls on the responsible Executive Vice-President, also Commissioner in charge of competition policy to maintain close contact with Parliament’s competent committee and its working group on competition issues;

    o
    o   o

    42.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

    (1) OJ L 024, 29.1.2004, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2004/139/oj.
    (2) OJ L 114, 12.4.2022, p. 22, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2022/591/oj.
    (3) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 3 September 2024, Illumina v Commission, C-611/22 P, ECLI:EU:C:2024:677.
    (4) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 10 September 2024, European Commission v Ireland and Others, C-465/20 P, ECLI:EU:C:2024:724.
    (5) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 10 September 2024, Google and Alphabet v Commission, C-48/22 P, CLI:EU:C:2024:726.
    (6) European Court of Auditors, Special Report: ‘Digital payments in the EU – Progress towards making them safer, faster, and less expensive, despite remaining gaps’, 9 January 2025, https://www.eca.europa.eu/ECAPublications/SR-2025-01/SR-2025-01_EN.pdf.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – 2023 and 2024 reports on Kosovo – P10_TA(2025)0094 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the one part, and Kosovo, of the other part(1), which entered into force on 1 April 2016,

    –  having regard to Kosovo’s application for membership of the European Union of 15 December 2022,

    –  having regard to Kosovo’s application for membership of the Council of Europe of 12 May 2022,

    –  having regard to the framework agreement between the European Union and Kosovo on the general principles for the participation of Kosovo in Union programmes(2), in force since 1 August 2017,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III)(3),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans(4),

    –  having regard to the Presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of 19 and 20 June 2003,

    –  having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans Summits of 17 May 2018 in Sofia, of 6 May 2020 in Zagreb, of 6 October 2021 in Brdo pri Kranju, of 6 December 2022 in Tirana, of 13 December 2023 in Brussels, and of 18 December 2024 in Brussels,

    –  having regard to the Berlin Process launched on 28 August 2014,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2020 entitled ‘Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0057),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Kosovo 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0692),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Kosovo 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0692),

    –  having regard to the general summary and the country assessments by the Commission, dated 31 May 2023 and 13 June 2024, on Kosovo’s economic reform programme,

    –  having regard to the joint conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkans and Türkiye, adopted by the Council on 16 May 2023 and to the joint conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkans Partners, Türkiye, Georgia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, adopted by the Council on 14 May 2024,

    –  having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999, to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion of 22 July 2010 on the accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo, and to UN General Assembly Resolution 64/298 of 9 September 2010, which acknowledged the content of the ICJ opinion and welcomed the EU’s readiness to facilitate dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo,

    –  having regard to the first agreement on principles governing the normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo of 19 April 2013, to the agreements of 25 August 2015, and to the ongoing EU-facilitated dialogue for the normalisation of relations,

    –  having regard to the Brussels Agreement of 27 February 2023 and the Ohrid Agreement of 18 March 2023 and to the implementation annex thereto,

    –  having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1095 of 5 June 2023 amending Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo)(5), which extended the mission’s mandate until 14 June 2025,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/850 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 April 2023 amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement (Kosovo)(6),

    –  having regard to the final report of the European Union Election Observation Mission on the 2021 municipal elections in Kosovo,

    –  having regard to the preliminary report of the European Union Election Observation Mission on the 2025 parliamentary elections in Kosovo,

    –  having regard to the fourth meeting of the Stabilisation and Association Council between the European Union and Kosovo held in Brussels on 7 December 2021,

    –  having regard to its previous resolutions on Kosovo,

    –  having regard to the joint recommendations adopted at the 12th meeting of the EU-Kosovo Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee, held on 9 December 2024,

    –  having regard to the 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International,

    –  having regard to the 2024 World Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders,

    –  having regard to the Democracy Report 2024 of March 2024 by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute,

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0075/2025),

    A.  whereas enlargement policy is one of the most effective EU foreign policy instruments and one of the most successful policies to incentivise and encourage fundamental reforms, and is a strategic geopolitical investment in long-term peace, stability and security throughout the continent;

    B.  whereas democracy, human rights and the rule of law are the fundamental values on which the EU is founded;

    C.  whereas the EU enlargement process is a strategic tool for strengthening stability, democracy and economic development in Europe, and each enlargement country is judged on its own merits and whereas it is the implementation of the necessary reforms and compliance with the set of criteria and common European values that determines the timetable and progress of accession; whereas Kosovo’s path towards EU membership also depends on the normalisation of relations with Serbia;

    D.  whereas the EU is the largest provider of financial support to Kosovo;

    E.  whereas Kosovo has been subjected to foreign interference and disinformation campaigns, particularly from Russia, especially through Serbian nationalist outlets, and China, through soft power, aiming to destabilise its democratic institutions, jeopardise societal cohesion, and incite ethnic violence; whereas the Banjska/Banjskë attack in September 2023 was followed by a massive spread of disinformation that further exacerbated tensions; whereas Kosovo authorities adopted the Law on the Independent Media Commission (IMC) in July 2024; whereas, in May 2024, the Council of Europe published a legal opinion on the draft law on the IMC expressing concerns related to certain aspects of the at-that-time draft law, and providing recommendations on how to address these concerns; whereas the final text of the Law on the IMC did not reflect most of the recommendations made;

    F.  whereas the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, also known as EULEX, is the largest civilian mission ever launched under the common security and defence policy of the European Union;

    G.  whereas in 2018 and 2023, petitions were signed by over 500 people who historically self-identify as Bulgarian;

    Commitment to EU accession

    1.  Commends Kosovo’s commitment to EU accession, which reflects a clear strategic geopolitical choice, and the continued strong support of its citizens for Kosovo’s European path; reiterates that Kosovo has been consistent in its efforts to integrate into the European Union;

    2.  Reiterates its firm belief that Kosovo’s future lies in the EU and that all efforts to bring Kosovo out of the ‘grey zone’ are in the interest of the people of both Kosovo and the EU, especially in the context of the current geopolitical dynamics in the region, rapid major shifts in world politics and growing competition with authoritarian regimes;

    3.  Supports Kosovo’s application for EU membership, which reflects the overwhelming cross-party consensus on EU integration and a clear geopolitical strategic choice; reiterates its call on the Member States in the Council to mandate the Commission to present its questionnaire and to submit its opinion on the merits of the country’s application; calls on the five non-recognising Member States that have not yet recognised Kosovo’s independence to do so without delay and thus allow Kosovo to progress on its EU path on an equal footing with the other candidate countries; recalls the advisory opinion of the ICJ dated 22 July 2010, which states that Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence does not violate general international law;

    4.  Recalls that membership of the European Union is based on a merit-based process, conditional on the rigorous implementation of reforms aligned with the highest European standards, in particular compliance with the Copenhagen criteria and the rule of law, and ensures the effective application of laws in practice; encourages Kosovo to continue its efforts in this regard, by further strengthening its commitment to the values and standards of the Union; stresses that enlargement also implies thorough preparation of potential new members, while respecting the economic stability of the internal market, social and environmental standards and the proper functioning of the European institutions;

    5.  Welcomes the visa liberalisation, adopted in April 2023 and in place since 1 January 2024, as a tangible result of Kosovo’s ever-closer relations with the EU and as evidence of Kosovo’s efforts on the path of European integration; welcomes Kosovo’s decision to unilaterally abolish visa requirements for citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina; welcomes the decision of Spain to recognise ordinary passports issued by Kosovo as valid travel documents as of January 2024;

    6.  Notes the tangible progress in the areas of justice, freedom and security, the fight against organised crime and a functioning market economy; regrets the limited progress and calls for an acceleration of reforms in the area of rule of law; welcomes Kosovo’s ambition to advance the implementation of reforms, which remains the country’s priority; regrets the lack of a decision-making quorum in the Kosovo National Assembly, caused by the boycott of the Assembly work by political parties ahead of parliamentary elections;

    7.  Regrets the politicisation of institutions such as the Central Election Commission and the IMC;

    8.  Commends Kosovo’s ongoing alignment with the EU’s foreign and security policy, in particular its firm condemnation of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and its implementation of the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia and Belarus, aligning with the Union’s foreign policy, and its support through humanitarian aid and military assistance packages to Ukraine, which confirm that Kosovo is a reliable and valuable partner committed to EU integration and confirms its clear geopolitical orientation, firmly anchored in the European and transatlantic alliance;

    9.  Calls for the immediate lifting of the EU measures against Kosovo, which are no longer justified as Kosovo has fulfilled the EU requirements and as the measures also stand in gross contradiction to Kosovo’s demonstrated commitment to European values and alignment with EU policies, limiting the impact of the EU’s partnership with Kosovo and hindering the resumption of the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue in good faith;

    10.  Reiterates its full support for Kosovo’s application for membership of the Council of Europe and for the country’s strategic orientation plan to join the NATO Partnership for Peace programme and its bids to join other international organisations; calls on the relevant organisations and the Member States to proactively support Kosovo’s respective bids; calls on the Commission and the EU Office in Kosovo to step up their efforts in enhancing visibility and promoting the role, efforts and benefits of the closer partnership between the EU and Kosovo;

    11.   Welcomes the fact that Kosovo reduced administrative burden by simplifying procedures through the implementation of the related program for 2022-2027; notes that the strategic framework for public administration is in place, but not efficiently implemented; regrets the fact that delays in public administration reform have left EU funding management weak and that accountability in the public sector is insufficient; calls on Kosovo to improve public administration and the merit-based civil service system by amending and adopting the Law on public officials and the Law on the independent oversight board of civil service;

    12.  Regrets that the Kosovo Constitutional Court ruling on the Law on salaries, which unifies the current system of remuneration for public officials, is not yet functional; calls on the Kosovo Government to revise its legislation on public financial management to meet international standards and to incorporate the public investment methodology into the revised legislation;

    Democracy and the rule of law

    13.  Welcomes the important and positive progress on addressing many of the EU Election Observation Mission’s (EU EOM) long-standing recommendations and on presenting a consensual law on general elections; notes that this provides an adequate basis for the conduct of democratic elections, in line with international and regional standards; notes that in response to an invitation by the president of Kosovo, the European Union deployed an EU EOM, including an observer delegation of Members of the European Parliament, to observe the parliamentary elections in Kosovo on 9 February 2025; welcomes the conclusions of the EU EOM confirming the conduct of peaceful, free and fair elections on 9 February 2025 with the participation of all communities in Kosovo; regrets the harsh rhetoric of the political parties during the campaign; takes note of the technical problems encountered during the counting process and encourages the Kosovo authorities to increase their efforts to improve the organisation of the next elections; notes the lack of genuine political pluralism within the Kosovo Serb community at the parliamentary elections, despite multiple Kosovo Serb electoral lists; is concerned by reports of continuous pressure on voters from the Serbian community exercised by Belgrade; condemns the repeated interference in the electoral campaign by US Special Envoy Richard Grenell;

    14.  Notes with concern the political deadlock caused by the fragmented political landscape and failure so far to elect a speaker of the Parliament, hindering the formation of a government following the legislative elections of 9 February 2025 and delaying the parliamentary reading of several budgetary texts; encourages the political parties to work together to overcome this stalemate as soon as possible;

    15.  Notes with concern that the Law on Local Elections and the Law on General Elections are still not implemented and harmonised with the Law on Gender Equality, which mandates 50 % equal representation of women and men; regrets that women continue to be underrepresented;

    16.  Welcomes the adoption of the law on the Special Prosecution Office and the progress in adjudicating corruption cases; commends the active work of the Special Prosecution Office for solving seven war crime cases; calls for further clarification of the division of jurisdiction between the Special Prosecution Office and the Basic Prosecution in handling investigations and prosecutions; calls on Kosovo to continue strengthening the Special Prosecution Office by enhancing its capacity to investigate and prosecute high-profile organised crime cases; calls on the police and Special Prosecution Office to work closely together to develop strategies for conducting investigations more effectively, with a clear division of responsibility;

    17.  Takes note of the progress in Kosovo’s ranking in the Corruption Perceptions Index, as it has moved upward 10 places since last year, considering it to be a positive development while acknowledging that this is attributable both to decreases in other countries’ scores and, more significantly, to the adoption of qualitative legislation, but that it still remains largely unsatisfactory; emphasises that gaining people’s trust requires not only legislative reforms but also visible results in investigating, prosecuting and convicting cases of corruption at all levels; regrets that Kosovo has lacked an anti-corruption strategy since 2019 and urges for more efforts to finalise it as a matter of priority; reiterates that strong political commitment is necessary to establish a solid track record in fighting high-level corruption; reiterates that strong political commitment is necessary to establish a solid track record in fighting high-level corruption;

    18.  Expresses serious concern about systemic vulnerabilities in Kosovo’s judiciary, particularly regarding the independence of the justice system and respect for separation of powers; reiterates its concern about delays to trials and continued criticism by government officials of judicial decisions in individual cases; welcomes the fact that in December 2024, the government submitted its draft legislation on judicial reforms to the Venice Commission and that the first opinion was issued by the latter on 18 March 2025; calls on Kosovo to ensure that legislation governing the integrity and accountability of the judiciary is consistent with European standards and Venice Commission recommendations; calls on the Government of Kosovo to allocate adequate budget for the judicial system; welcomes the establishment of the Commercial Court, progress in the recruitment of new judges and prosecutors in a merit-based and transparent process, and an overall increase of transparency;

    19.  Welcomes the participation of Kosovo Serbs in the parliamentary elections and encourages their elected representatives to play an active role within the Kosovo legislative framework, in support of Kosovo’s European future; regrets, however, the boycott of parties representing Kosovo Serbs during the local elections in April 2023 and the withdrawal of Kosovo Serbs from Kosovo institutions; expresses concern over Serbia’s interference in the parliamentary elections through Srpska Lista (SL);

    20.  Welcomes the implementation of the 2016 judgement of the Constitutional Court on the Visoki Dečani/Deçani Monastery land ownership by registering the monastery as the owner, in March 2024;

    21.  Welcomes the steady increase in organised crime sentences and the fact that the legal framework on the fight against organised crime is aligned with the EU acquis; emphasises the need for prosecution services and police to strengthen their joint action against criminal groups and networks; expresses concern about the security challenges in the north of Kosovo, particularly following the Banjska/Banjskë attack in September 2023, which demanded significant police resources; emphasises the need to deepen cooperation in the field of combating drug trafficking; calls for further alignment regarding the fight against terrorism;

    22.  Welcomes the adoption of the strategy and action plan on control of small arms light weapons and explosives, as well as the high level of compliance with the rules of the UN Firearms Protocol;

    23.  Remains concerned over the slow implementation of the rule of law strategy and action plan;

    24.  Reaffirms its commitment to maintaining and strengthening its cooperation with the Kosovo Assembly and its members in support of democratic processes related to Kosovo’s European path by using Parliament’s existing democracy support tools and initiatives; believes that this partnership can be revitalised and further reinforced following the democratic elections held on 9 February 2025; encourages the active involvement and collaboration of all elected members of the newly formed Kosovo Assembly;

    25.  Condemns the serious security incidents in the north of Kosovo in late November 2024, the gravest act occurring near the village of Vragë in Zubin Potok, where explosive devices damaged critical infrastructure by targeting the main channel of the Ibër Lepenc system; expresses its support for Kosovo’s institutions in conducting a full investigation of these criminal actions so that the perpetrators will be brought to justice;

    26.  Commends the work of EULEX, which has been assisting Kosovo authorities in establishing sustainable and independent rule of law institutions;

    Fundamental freedoms and human rights

    27.  Notes that Kosovo has the necessary institutional set-up for the promotion and protection of human rights; welcomes the adoption of the strategy for the protection and promotion of the rights of communities; emphasises, however, that human rights protection remains weak owing to the lack of legislative implementation, political will and limited human and financial resources and calls for strengthened enforcement and accountability mechanisms;

    28.  Acknowledges that Kosovo’s constitution is very progressive in terms of protection of minority rights; notes with regret that the petition signed by nearly 500 people who have historically self-identified as Bulgarian, which was registered at the Assembly of Kosovo in January 2023, has still not been considered and recommends that those rights be enshrined in law and ensured in practice; calls on Kosovo to ensure that all minorities recognised under the Law on protection of minority rights and members of their communities, are fully incorporated into the country’s constitution; calls on the Kosovo authorities to step up efforts to protect the rights of all minorities, including national communities, in particular vulnerable national communities, and to provide them equal opportunities and adequate representation in political and cultural life, public media, the administration and the judiciary, as well as prevent their assimilation and promote their integration into Kosovo’s society and strengthen activities to eliminate social and economic challenges of these national minorities;

    29.  Welcomes the increase in funding to shelters for victims of domestic violence and trafficking; notes that domestic violence remains the most common form of gender-based violence; expresses concerns that the system continues to fail in ensuring the effective prevention of domestic violence;

    30.  Regrets that the adoption of the draft Civil Code of Kosovo remains pending; highlights that the draft Civil Code addresses several important issues related to gender equality as a fundamental EU value, including enabling an equal share of joint marital property among women and men spouses; stresses the importance of ensuring rights for all people in Kosovo in the Civil Code to safeguard respect for constitutional rights and opportunities for the LGBTIQ community; expresses concern that women remain under-represented in senior political positions, specifically related to security and the dialogue, and emphasises the urgent need for their involvement in peacemaking and reconciliation processes, in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security; calls for more efforts to be made to improve the place of women in society;

    31.  Notes that the prison system broadly follows UN Standard Minimum Rules and calls for the better protection of the rights of prisoners, particularly female, minority and mentally ill prisoners; remains concerned that discriminatory language against women and LGBTIQ people persists, and calls on the authorities to create and implement a national gender strategy for research fields, such as science, technology, engineering, and mathematics; commends the participation of women in high-quality business and management training programmes, as well as in ICT related domains, facilitated by the instrument for pre-accession assistance funds; regrets that women from minority groups, particularly the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities, face numerous forms of discrimination, particularly in education, employment and access to healthcare; expresses concerns that the central administration does not adequately represent minority communities, and the number of women in senior positions is low;

    32.  Regrets that the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has not yet been adopted; expresses concerns that there is insufficient alignment between Kosovo’s legislation and the EU acquis on the rights of people with disabilities, who face discrimination and barriers to accessing social services;

    33.  Welcomes Kosovo’s consistent improvement in its position in the 2024 Liberal Democracy Index and Electoral Democracy Index, as prepared by the Varieties of Democracy Institute, which measures the rule of law, checks and balances, civil liberties, and free and fair elections;

    34.  Takes note of Kosovo’s pluralistic media environment while awaiting the decision of the Constitutional Court on the main media law and underlines the role of the IMC, whose independence in decision-making needs to be strictly ensured and full functioning restored; regrets, however, the decline in Kosovo’s media freedom, as evidenced by its drop from the 56th to the 75th place in the 2024 World Press Freedom Index; reaffirms that media pluralism and transparency are prerequisites for EU accession; calls for greater transparency on media ownership and financing with a view to enhancing media independence and pluralism; emphasises the need for robust measures to protect journalists from harassment and intimidation, and to ensure the independence of media regulatory bodies; notes the concerns raised by civil society about the allegedly politically motivated election of the Chair of the IMC; urges the Kosovo authorities to further revise the Law on the IMC in order to include the recommendations made by the Council of Europe, thus aligning the national law with EU standards and practices; recommends increased support for independent media outlets and fact-checking organisations in Kosovo, recognising their crucial role in countering disinformation and providing accurate information to the public; encourages the EU to provide technical and financial assistance to these entities; encourages the Kosovo authorities to request tailor-made Technical Assistance and Information Exchange expert missions bodies; calls for the adoption of the law on Radio Television of Kosovo and the law on the protection of journalists’ sources;

    35.  Expresses concern over the recent cyberattack targeting Kosovo’s digital infrastructure; urges the Kosovo Government to reinforce its capacities to combat foreign interference and disinformation, particularly those originating from Serbian nationalist outlets and Russia, aimed at destabilising the region and undermining the European integration of the Western Balkans, by developing comprehensive strategies that include public awareness campaigns also combating disinformation undermining women’s participation in public life, strengthening cybersecurity and related infrastructure, fostering collaboration with international partners, most notably the European Union, to protect its digital economy, public services and national security, and addressing disinformation campaigns and hybrid threats that aim to destabilise the country and undermine its European perspective; encourages the integration of media literacy programs into Kosovo’s educational curriculum to equip citizens with the skills necessary to identify and counteract disinformation;

    36.  Commends the fact that Kosovo provided shelter and asylum to journalists from Ukraine and Afghanistan;

    37.  Expresses serious concern about the significant increase in attacks against journalists and strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPP cases), including by government officials; calls on the authorities to advance their work on anti-SLAPP legislation in line with the new EU Directive 2024/1069(7); calls on Kosovo to work actively to secure the ability of journalists to carry out their work and to ensure full freedom for the media to operate independently; underlines the need to stop all forms of violence;

    38.  Welcomes Kosovo’s vibrant and constructive civil society, which plays a very crucial and positive role in the reform process; encourages the Kosovo Government to enhance its cooperation with civil society, in particular with women’s rights organisations, on decision-making and to make more use of the Government Council for Cooperation with Civil Society for building collaborative relationships and genuinely implicating civil society in a transparent legislative process from an early stage onwards; stresses the importance of increasing accountability and transparency in relation to public funding for civil society organisations; underlines that civil society is vital in fostering democracy and pluralism and promoting good governance and social progress;

    39.  Regrets the lack of a clear plan for engaging Kosovo Serbs in the north and that initiatives to involve the Serb community in Kosovo’s political, social and economic structures remain very limited; reiterates its call to improve the internal dialogue and genuinely and directly engage with the independent civil society organisations of Kosovo Serbs, in particular in the north, with the aim of building trust, facilitating the daily life of Kosovo Serbs and successfully integrating them;

    Reconciliation and good neighbourly relations

    40.  Commends Kosovo’s engagement in a number of regional cooperation initiatives and encourages it to enhance its reconciliation efforts and seek solutions to past disputes; commends Kosovo on its constructive approach and active engagement in regional cooperation and trade facilitation that led to the unblocking of the Central European Free Trade Agreement;

    41.  Calls on Serbia to open all wartime archives and grant access to the former Yugoslav Secret Service (UDBA) and Yugoslav People’s Army Secret Service (KOS) files, ensuring their return to respective governments upon request; emphasises the need to open these archives region-wide to investigate communist-era crimes and strengthen democracy, accountability and institutions in the Western Balkans;

    42.  Reiterates its full support for the EU-facilitated dialogue and welcomes the appointment of Peter Sørensen as the EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue;

    43.  Reiterates the importance of constructive engagement on the part of the authorities of both Kosovo and Serbia in order to achieve a comprehensive legally binding normalisation agreement, based on mutual recognition and in accordance with international law; calls on both Kosovo and Serbia to implement the Brussels and Ohrid Agreements, including the establishment of the Association/Community of Serb-Majority Municipalities, and the lifting of Serbia’s opposition of Kosovo’s membership in regional and international organisations, and to avoid unilateral actions that could undermine the dialogue process;

    44.  Expects Kosovo and Serbia to fully cooperate and take all the necessary measures to apprehend and swiftly bring to justice the perpetrators of the 2023 terrorist attack in Banjska; deplores the fact that Serbia still has not prosecuted the culprits, most notably Milan Radoičić, the Vice-President of Srpska Lista; reiterates that the perpetrators of the terrorist attack in Zubin Potok must also be held accountable and must face justice without delay;

    45.  Calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and on the Commission to take a more proactive role in leading the dialogue process; calls for an enhanced role for the European Parliament in facilitating the dialogue through regular joint parliamentary assembly meetings;

    46.  Condemns all actions that endanger stability and jeopardise the reconciliation process, including the tensions in the north of Kosovo and provocations by Serbian state-sponsored groups and illegal armed formations, and urges the European Union to take a stronger stance against external interference in Kosovo’s internal affairs; emphasises that both sides must fully implement all agreements reached and avoid unilateral actions that could escalate tensions; calls on the Kosovo police to ensure that they fully abide by all rule of law and human rights requirements, and to guarantee that a multi-ethnic and inclusive police force, fully in line with legal requirements, is deployed in the north of Kosovo; recalls the shared responsibility of all political representatives and all communities in Kosovo for upholding peace, security and the rule of law;

    47.  Welcomes the establishment of the Joint Commission on Missing Persons in December 2024 and calls for swift progress in implementing the May 2023 Political Declaration on Missing Persons; calls on both Kosovo and Serbia to refrain from politicising this humanitarian issue and to step up their efforts in implementing the declaration as part of the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue and to establish cooperation between Kosovo and Serbia;

    48.  Welcomes the recent agreements in the framework of the Berlin Process;

    49.  Welcomes Kosovo’s decision to remove restrictions on the entry of Serbian finished products at the Merdare border crossing;

    50.  Welcomes the presence of the Kosovo Force and its role in building and maintaining a safe and secure environment and in developing a stable and peaceful Kosovo on the path towards Euro-Atlantic integration; recalls the importance of the mission for the ongoing development of the Kosovo Security Force through the provision of advice, training and capacity building;

    Socio-economic reforms

    51.  Welcomes Kosovo’s active engagement in the implementation of the new growth plan for the Western Balkans, which aims to deepen EU-related reforms and reduce the socio-economic gap between EU Member States and the Western Balkan countries; welcomes the adoption of Kosovo’s Reform Agenda and recalls that Kosovo (as well as Serbia) needs to show improved commitment to the EU-facilitated Dialogue in order to access the resources;

    52.  Welcomes the progress achieved by Kosovo in developing a functioning market economy and encourages Kosovo to implement the necessary structural reforms to address fiscal challenges, while ensuring adequate labour protection, fair wages, and improved working conditions in line with EU legislation;

    53.  Reiterates its calls on the Commission to develop a regional strategy to address the persistent youth unemployment and brain drain by tackling the skills mismatch between the education system and the labour market, improving the quality of teaching, and ensuring adequate funding for active labour market measures and vocational training schemes, along with adequate childcare and pre-school education facilities;

    54.  Welcomes the fact that Kosovo’s cybercrime legislation is broadly aligned with the EU acquis; notes Kosovo’s limited progress in the digital transformation of public services; emphasises the need for it to align with EU digital legislation as well as with the needs of its people, specifically with the European Electronic Communications Code, the EU Network and Information Security Directive (NIS2)(8), the EU toolbox for 5G security, and the Digital Services Act(9) and the Digital Markets Act(10); notes that Kosovo’s economy remains highly dependent on imports and stresses the need for economic diversification to enhance competitiveness and sustainability, particularly in the context of deeper integration into EU markets;

    55.  Regrets that the draft law on textbooks, presented in 2022, is still pending final adoption in the Kosovo Assembly; calls on Kosovo to finalise the implementation of the new curricular framework for basic education, complete the revision of current textbooks, provide sustainable training to teachers, and systematically apply quality assurance mechanisms at all education levels;

    56.  Urges Kosovo to ensure better access to quality healthcare services; notes that healthcare expenditure remains the second lowest in the region, and calls for a comprehensive healthcare reform to address the needs of all citizens, especially in rural and underserved areas;

    57.  Notes with concern that access to social services, particularly for vulnerable groups, worsened with the government’s closure of the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, which was done without transparent consultation with civil society and other stakeholders and contributed to significant confusion; calls for better, evidence-based budgeting to improve social services, particularly for survivors of gender-based violence in accordance with the new legal framework;

    58.  Calls on Kosovo to provide equal and non-discriminatory state education in minority languages;

    59.  Reiterates the need to reach out to young people from the Serb majority municipalities and to integrate them in the socio-economic structures of the country;

    Energy, environment, sustainable development and connectivity

    60.  Notes that Kosovo has made some progress on the security of energy supply but remains heavily reliant on outdated, highly polluting power plants, posing serious health and environmental risks; notes that Kosovo needs to ensure the time-efficient implementation of its energy programme for 2022-2025 to meet its ambitious targets and reduce its dependence on fossil fuels; calls for the EU to step up and prioritise its efforts to help Kosovo overcome its air pollution problems; notes that Kosovo’s new energy strategy does not promote the construction of hydropower plants due to their harmful environmental impact, in particular because of the water scarcity in the country;

    61.  Highlights the need for comprehensive infrastructure development in Kosovo to facilitate the reduction of emissions from public transport and the expansion of electrified transport; stresses that improving accessibility and ensuring compatibility with the EU transport network must remain a priority;

    62.  Welcomes the agreement at the Tirana Summit on reduced roaming costs; calls, in this respect, on the authorities, private actors and all stakeholders to facilitate reaching the agreed targets to achieve a substantial reduction of data roaming charges and further reductions leading to prices close to domestic prices between the Western Balkans and the EU by 2027; welcomes the entrance into force of the first phase of implementation of the roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU;

    63.  Urges Kosovo to enhance compliance with emission ceilings, improve the integration of environmental considerations into sectoral policies and adopt necessary measures for pollution, soil and water contamination control and waste management, in line with EU and international standards and commitments; urges Kosovo to improve comprehensive environmental impact assessments and to integrate sustainability measures into infrastructure planning; calls on Kosovo to increase the protected areas in the country and to improve instruments and measures for their protection with a view to safeguarding biodiversity, including key habitats of the critically endangered Balkan lynx; encourages Kosovo to intensify and speed up collaborative efforts with its neighbouring countries to designate transboundary protected areas and establish coherent transboundary management plans;

    o
    o   o

    64.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the President, Government and National Assembly of Kosovo.

    (1) OJ L 71, 16.3.2016, p. 3, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2016/342/oj.
    (2) OJ L 195, 27.7.2017, p. 3, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2017/1388/oj.
    (3) OJ L 330, 20.9.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1529/oj.
    (4) OJ L, 2024/1449, 24.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1449/oj.
    (5) OJ L 146, 6.6.2023, p.22, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2023/1095/oj.
    (6) OJ L 110, 25.4.2023, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/850/oj.
    (7) Directive (EU) 2024/1069 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded claims or abusive court proceedings (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’) (OJ L, 2024/1069, 16.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1069/oj).
    (8) Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive) (OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 80, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/oj).
    (9) Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) (OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj).
    (10) Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act) (OJ L 265, 12.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1925/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – 2023 and 2024 reports on Serbia – P10_TA(2025)0093 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States of the one part, and the Republic of Serbia, of the other part(1), which entered into force on 1 September 2013,

    –  having regard to Serbia’s application for membership of the EU of 19 December 2009,

    –  having regard to the Commission opinion of 12 October 2011 on Serbia’s application for membership of the European Union (COM(2011)0668), the European Council’s decision of 1 March 2012 to grant Serbia candidate status and the European Council’s decision of 28 June 2013 to open EU accession negotiations with Serbia,

    –  having regard to the Brussels Agreement of 27 February 2023 and the Ohrid Agreement of 18 March 2023 and the Implementation Annex thereto,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III)(2),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans(3),

    –  having regard to the presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of 19 and 20 June 2003,

    –   having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits of 17 May 2018 in Sofia and of 6 May 2020 in Zagreb,

    –   having regard to its resolutions on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation,

    –  having regard to the Berlin Process, launched on 28 August 2014,

    –  having regard to the first agreement on principles governing the normalisation of relations between the governments of Serbia and Kosovo of 19 April 2013, to the agreements of 25 August 2015, and to the ongoing EU-facilitated dialogue for the normalisation of relations,

    –  having regard to the agreement on free movement between the governments of Serbia and Kosovo of 27 August 2022, to the agreement on licence plates of 23 November 2022, and to the Energy Agreements’ Implementation Roadmap in the EU-facilitated Dialogue of 21 June 2022,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2020 entitled ‘Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0057),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October 2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Serbia 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0695),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Serbia 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0695),

    –  having regard to the European Council conclusions of 9 February 2023 on the EU-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina,

    –  having regard to Article 14 of the Serbian Constitution on the protection of national minorities,

    –  having regard to the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, ratified by Serbia in 2001 and the Council of Europe’s European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, ratified by Serbia in 2006,

    –  having regard to the European Council conclusions of 26 and 27 October 2023 on Kosovo and Serbia,

    –  having regard to the Council conclusions of 17 December 2024 on enlargement,

    –  having regard to the European Court of Human Rights order to Serbia of 29 April 2025 to refrain from using sonic devices for crowd control,

    –  having regard to the final report of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) election observation mission on the early parliamentary and presidential elections of 3 April 2022 in Serbia, published on 19 August 2022,

    –  having regard to the European Council conclusions of December 2006, to the Council conclusions of March 2020 and to the Conclusions of the Presidency of the European Council in Copenhagen of 21-22 June 1993, also known as the Copenhagen criteria,

    –  having regard to the final report of the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission on the early parliamentary elections of 17 December 2023 in Serbia, published on 28 February 2024,

    –  having regard to the memorandum of understanding between the European Union and the Republic of Serbia on a strategic partnership on sustainable raw materials, battery value chains and electric vehicles, signed on 19 July 2024,

    –  having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement(4),

    –  having regard to its previous resolutions on Serbia, in particular that of 19 October 2023 on the recent developments in the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue, including the situation in the northern municipalities in Kosovo(5), and that of 8 February 2024 on the situation in Serbia following the elections(6),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0072/2025),

    A.  whereas enlargement is one of the most successful EU foreign policy instruments and a strategic geopolitical investment in long-term peace, stability and security throughout the continent;

    B.  whereas according to the Copenhagen criteria, candidate countries must adhere to the values of the Union in order to be able to join it;

    C.  whereas democracy and the rule of law are the fundamental values on which the EU is founded;

    D.  whereas in recent years, political rights and civil liberties have been steadily eroded, putting pressure on independent media, the political opposition and civil society organisations;

    E.  whereas the Fourth Opinion on Serbia of the Council of Europe Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention on National Minorities, adopted on 26 June 2019, criticised Serbia’s delays in fully implementing education rights for minorities;

    F.  whereas freedom of religion is a core European value and a fundamental human right and Serbia is therefore obliged to respect and guarantee this freedom for all individuals residing within its territory, in accordance with its international commitments and human rights obligations;

    G.  whereas in line with Chapter 23 of the acquis, Serbia must demonstrate real improvements in the effective exercise of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities;

    H.  whereas each candidate country for enlargement is judged on its own merits, including their respect for and unwavering commitment to shared European rights and values and alignment with the EU’s foreign and security policy;

    I.  whereas Serbia has not imposed sanctions against Russia following the Russian aggression in Ukraine; whereas Serbia’s rate of alignment with the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) has been steadily declining since 2021; whereas Serbia supports the territorial integrity and political independence of Ukraine, and has clearly condemned the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine and voted alongside the EU in the UN, even though it has not imposed sanctions against Russia; whereas Serbia’s rate of alignment with the CFSP dropped from 54 % in 2023 to 51 % in 2024 while other candidate countries in the region – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and North Macedonia – achieved 100 % alignment;

    J.  whereas Serbia remains a critical battleground for foreign disinformation campaigns, notably by Russia and China, which seek to create an anti-Western rhetoric; whereas the final report of the OSCE/ODHIR on the early parliamentary elections held on 17 December 2023 pointed out several procedural deficiencies, as well as the use of harsh rhetoric and the presence of consistent bias in the media that gave an unbalanced advantage to the ruling party; whereas the issues identified in that report need to be assessed thoroughly and promptly; whereas as part of the accession negotiations, Serbia adopted the Strategy for Combating Cybercrime 2019-2023 and the relevant action plans in September 2018; whereas the strategy and the relevant action plans were not renewed after December 2023; whereas Serbia did not align with the EU’s restrictive measures in reaction to cyberattacks in 2023 and 2024;

    K.  whereas the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia is a precondition for the progression of both countries towards EU membership;

    L.  whereas accession to the EU inevitably requires full alignment with the foreign policy objectives of the Union;

    M.  whereas Serbia recognises the territorial integrity of Ukraine, including the Crimean peninsula and the Donbas region;

    N.  whereas the EU is Serbia’s main trading partner, accounting for 59,7 % of Serbia’s total trade;

    O.  whereas Russia is using its influence in Serbia to try to destabilise, interfere in and threaten neighbouring sovereign states and undermine Serbia’s European future; whereas Russian propaganda outlets such as RT (formerly Russia Today) and Sputnik operate freely in Serbia and exert significant influence in shaping anti-EU and anti-democratic narratives; whereas disinformation often originates from a false or misleading statement by a political figure, which is then reported by state-owned media and subsequently amplified on social media, often with an intention to undermine political opponents and democratic principles;

    P.  whereas on 8 June 2024, an ‘All-Serb Assembly’ took place in Belgrade with the participation of political leaders from Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Kosovo under the slogan ‘One people, one assembly’;

    Commitment to EU accession

    1.  Notes Serbia’s stated commitment to EU membership as its strategic goal and its ambition to align fully with the EU acquis by the end of 2026; urges Serbia to deliver quickly and decisively on essential reforms, especially in cluster 1, for this very ambitious commitment to be perceived as realistic, genuine and meaningful; stresses the need for Serbia to seriously and categorically demonstrate that it is strategically oriented towards the EU, by showing strong political will and consistency in the implementation of EU-related reforms and by communicating objectively and unambiguously with its citizens about the EU, Serbia’s European path and the required reforms;

    2.  Reiterates the strategic importance of the Western Balkans in the current geopolitical context and for the security and stability of the EU as a whole; outlines that, owing to its geopolitical position, the country has a direct impact on the overall stability of the region; condemns, therefore, Serbia’s attempts to establish a sphere of influence undermining the sovereignty of neighbouring countries;

    3.  Acknowledges Serbia’s good level of preparation with regard to macroeconomic stability and fiscal discipline and the Commission’s assessment that cluster 3 is technically ready for opening but notes with concern that there has been limited or no overall progress in meeting the benchmarks for EU membership across negotiating chapters, with particular shortcomings in critical areas such as the rule of law, media freedom, public administration reform, and alignment with EU policies, particularly the EU’s foreign policy;

    4.  Regrets the fact that no substantial progress has been made on Chapter 31, as Serbia’s pattern of alignment with EU foreign policy positions has remained largely unchanged, mainly due to Serbia’s close relations with Russia; recalls that Serbia remains a notable exception in the Western Balkans regarding CFSP alignment; calls on Serbia to reverse this trend and to demonstrate positive steps towards full alignment; notes that Serbia’s rate of compliance with EU statements and declarations is increasing but remains at only 61 %; welcomes Serbia’s continued active participation in and positive contribution to EU military crisis management missions and operations;

    5.  Welcomes Serbia’s humanitarian support for Ukraine and takes note of the sale of ammunition to the value of EUR 800 million for use by Ukraine in a mutually beneficial agreement; notes that Serbia has aligned with some of the EU’s positions regarding Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; regrets, however, that Serbia still does not align with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia; calls on the EU to reconsider the extent of the financial assistance provided by the EU to Serbia in the event of continued support for anti-democratic ideologies and non-alignment with the EU’s restrictive measures and the CFSP; calls on Serbia to swiftly align with the EU’s restrictive measures and general policy towards Russia and Belarus, systematically and without delay;

    6.  Stresses the importance of implementing sanctions against Russia for the security of Europe as a whole; deplores Serbia’s continued close relations with Russia, raising concerns about its strategic orientation; reiterates its calls on the Serbian authorities to enhance transparency regarding the role and activities of the so-called Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Center in Nis and to immediately terminate all military cooperation with Russia; notes Serbia’s decision to support the UN resolution condemning Russia’s aggression against Ukraine three years after the full-scale invasion; regrets President Vučić’s immediate verbal retraction of Serbia’s UN vote, calling it a ‘mistake’; considers that maintaining privileged relations with the Kremlin regime undermines not only Serbia’s credibility as a candidate country but also the trust of its European partners and the future of EU-Serbia relations;

    7.  Regrets the continued decline in public support for EU membership in Serbia and the growing support for the Putin regime, which is the result of a long-standing anti-EU and pro-Russian rhetoric from the government-controlled media as well as some government officials; calls on the Serbian authorities to foster a fact-based and open discussion on accession to the EU;

    8.  Deplores the continued spread of disinformation, including about Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; condemns the spillover effects of these actions in other countries in the region; calls on the Serbian authorities to combat disinformation and calls for the EU to enhance cooperation with Serbia to strengthen democratic resilience and counter hybrid threats;

    9.  Notes Serbia’s progress on aligning with EU visa policy and calls for full alignment, in particular with regard to those non-EU countries presenting a security threat to the EU, including the threat of cyberattacks; welcomes the agreement signed on 25 June 2024 between the EU and Serbia on operational cooperation on border management with Frontex, highlighting the need to act in line with fundamental rights and international standards;

    10.  Reiterates that the overall pace of the accession negotiations should depend on tangible progress on the fundamentals, the rule of law and a commitment to the shared European rights and values as well as to the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue, which is to be conducted in good faith so that it results in a legally binding agreement based on mutual recognition, as well as alignment with the EU’s CFSP; reiterates its position that accession negotiations with Serbia should only advance if the country aligns with EU sanctions against Russia and makes significant progress on its EU-related reforms, in particular in the area of the fundamentals;

    11.  Repeats its concern regarding the appeasing approach of the Commission towards Serbia against the backdrop of the country’s year-long rollback on the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights, as well as its destabilising influence on the whole region; urges the Commission to use clearer language, including on the highest level, towards Serbia, consistently addressing significant shortcomings, lack of progress and even backsliding, thus upholding the EU’s fundamental values;

    12.  Calls on the Serbian Government to promote the role and benefits of EU accession and EU-funded projects and reforms among the Serbian population;

    Democracy and the rule of law

    13.  Notes the ongoing challenges in ensuring judicial independence, including undue influence and political pressure on the judiciary; expresses concern about the failure to implement safeguards preventing political interference in judicial appointments and disciplinary actions against judges and prosecutors; calls on Serbia to ensure that the High Judicial Council, the High Prosecutorial Council and the Government and Parliament of Serbia effectively and proactively defend judicial independence and prosecutorial autonomy;

    14.  Stresses the importance of adopting the Law on the Judicial Academy and the Venice Commission opinion and making necessary judicial appointments to reduce existing vacancies and improve the overall effectiveness of the judicial system; notes that the delay in adopting this law has stalled key judicial reforms necessary for alignment with EU standards; calls for the draft law to be amended following transparent consultation with all relevant stakeholders, with a view to ensuring the independence and control mechanisms of the institution in order to contribute to overall judicial independence;

    15.  Notes that limited progress has been made in the fight against corruption despite the adoption of a new anti-corruption strategy for 2024-2028; calls on Serbia to adopt and begin implementing the accompanying anti-corruption action plan and to establish an effective monitoring and coordination mechanism to track progress, in line with international standards; expresses concern that corruption is still prevalent in many areas, particularly related to ‘projects of interests for the Republic of Serbia’, and that strong political will is required to effectively address corruption as well as to mount a robust criminal justice response to high-level corruption; notes that Serbia ranks 105th in the Corruption Perceptions Index 2024, well below the EU average; considers that the level of corruption in Serbia is a significant obstacle to its EU accession process; notes with concern that results have still not been delivered in cases of high public interest, after several years, such as in the long-standing cases of Krušik, Jovanjica, Savamala and Belivuk; calls on Serbia to strengthen the independence of its anti-corruption institutions by ensuring that they are adequately resourced and protected from political interference; calls on the Government of Serbia to sign the Anti-Bribery Convention of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and to fully align its legal framework on police cooperation and organised crime with that of the EU;

    16.  Welcomes the more pluralistic composition of the new parliament, with a broader representation of political parties, including parties of national minorities; notes that the early election and the corresponding break in the functioning of the government and parliament have impeded progress on reforms; notes the frequent pattern of early elections, a permanent campaign mode and long delays in forming governments, as well as the disrupted work of the national parliament, including the absence of government question-time sessions, the lack of discussion on the reports of independent institutions, and the more frequent use of urgent procedures, which lead to a lack of parliamentary legislative oversight and legitimacy and do not contribute to the effective democratic governance of the country;

    17.  Takes note of the resignation of Prime Minister Miloš Vučević on 28 January 2025, which was confirmed by the National Assembly on 19 March 2025, and of the subsequent election of the new government led by Đuro Macut, appointed on 16 April 2025; takes note of the resumption of the work of the National Assembly on 4 March 2025, after a pause of three months, and condemns all the acts of violence that occurred on this occasion;

    18.  Reiterates its readiness to support the National Assembly and the members thereof in the democratic processes related to Serbia’s European path, including the proper functioning of the parliament in accordance with its rules of procedure, by using the European Parliament’s existing democracy support tools and initiatives and by supporting increased parliamentary oversight of the EU accession process and reforms;

    19.  Takes note, with deep concern, of the final report of the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission on the December 2023 elections; notes that in April 2024, the National Assembly formed a working group for the improvement of the election process but that, by the end of the year, it had not agreed on any legal measures to improve the election process; notes that two out of three representatives of civil society left the working group in February 2025; notes that steps were taken in the first months of 2025 on amending the Law on Unified Voter Registry but that there is no consensus among political and civil society actors on the content; calls on all parliamentary groups in the National Assembly to decide on the implementation of ODIHR recommendations, with the agreement of all groups; calls for equal treatment of all members of parliament in the work of the National Assembly, consistent and effective implementation of the parliamentary Code of Conduct and the impartial sanctioning of breaches of parliamentary integrity;

    20.  Is concerned about the increasing role of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) and foreign cyber operations and interference in Serbia’s democratic election processes;

    21.  Stresses the critical importance of ensuring the independence of key institutions, including media regulators such as the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media (REM); regrets the delay in the election of the new members; regrets the irregularities in the nomination process; notes the withdrawal of several candidates from the selection in February 2025, who justified their decision on the basis of these irregularities; deeply regrets the fact that the REM neglected its legal obligations to scrutinise the conduct of the 2023 election campaign in the media in a timely manner, to report on its findings and to sanction media outlets that breached the law, spread hate speech or violated journalistic standards; notes, with concern, the absence of pluralistic political views in the nationwide media; notes that the REM should actively promote media pluralism and transparency regarding the ownership structures of media outlets and independence from foreign actors;

    22.  Notes that the REM awarded four national frequencies to channels that have a history of violating journalistic standards, including using hate speech and misleading the public, not complying with warnings issued by the REM, spreading disinformation and supporting the Kremlin’s narrative on Russia’s war in Ukraine; deeply regrets the fact that REM has not issued the fifth national licence and calls for it to be awarded through a transparent and impartial process without unnecessary delay and in compliance with international media freedom standards as soon as a new REM council is elected; calls for the Serbian Government to scrap and re-start the process of electing new members, in line with Serbian law and international media freedom standards;

    Fundamental freedoms and human rights

    23.  Expresses its sincere condolences to the families of the 16 victims who lost their lives and to those who were injured following the collapse of the canopy of Novi Sad train station on 1 November 2024; calls for full and transparent legal proceedings following the investigation by the authorities, to bring those responsible to justice; underlines the need to examine more broadly to what extent corruption led to the lowering of safety standards and contributed to this tragedy;

    24.  Regrets the delayed response and accountability of the Serbian authorities, the slow investigation process and the lack of transparency in the aftermath of the tragedy, which were partially addressed in the face of escalating public pressure;

    25.  Expresses deep concern about the systemic issues highlighted by the student protests and various other protests in Serbia, such as issues relating to civil liberties, separation of powers, corruption, environmental protection, institutional and financial transparency, especially in relation to infrastructure projects, and accountability; regrets the fact that the government missed the opportunity to meet the demands of the students and of the citizens who support the students in good faith; affirms that the students’ demands align with reforms that Serbia is expected to implement on its European path;

    26.  Underlines the importance of freedom of speech and assembly; calls on the authorities of Serbia to ensure the protection of those participating in the peaceful protests; takes note of the mass protests on 15 March 2025, the largest in the modern history of Serbia; calls for an impartial investigation of the claims that unlawful technology of crowd control was used against the protesters, causing injuries to a number of them;

    27.  Deplores the continuing violence against students, including the recent incident at the Faculty of Sports and Physical Education building in Novi Sad, in which at least five people were injured as a result of the police storming the building accompanied by the Dean, Patrik Drid;

    28.  Condemns, in the strongest terms, the misuse of personal data from public registries to retaliate against peaceful protesters; calls on the prosecution office in Serbia to file charges against all persons who physically attacked and incited violence against the participants of the demonstrations; is deeply concerned about any act of violence; is carefully following developments as regards arrests of protesters and legal proceedings that have been opened against them; is concerned about the reports that the security services were involved in intimidation and surveillance of the protesters; condemns the language used by the Serbian authorities inciting violence against students and other protesters; notes that student activists have faced legal harassment, intimidation and excessive use of force by the authorities; calls for a thorough, impartial and speedy investigation into allegations of violence used against demonstrators and police misconduct during protests; urges the diplomatic missions of the EU and the Member States to continue to monitor closely the ongoing legal cases relating to the protests;

    29.  Is deeply concerned about the increasing political and financial pressure on primary and secondary school teachers, as well as university professors, who were deprived of their salaries for taking part in the collective action to support students’ demands; deplores in this context the unacceptable legal proceedings and media smear campaign against the Rector of the University of Belgrade;

    30.  Is deeply alarmed that the Serbian authorities have engaged in widespread illegal surveillance practices using spyware against activists, journalists and members of civil society, as indicated in the recent reports by Amnesty International and the SHARE Foundation; urges the Government of Serbia to immediately cease the use of advanced surveillance technology against activists, journalists and human rights defenders, and calls on the competent state authorities to conduct a thorough investigation into all existing cases of unlawful surveillance and use of spyware and to initiate appropriate proceedings against those responsible; calls on the European Commission, in the light of this, to follow up on these incidents, address these issues with the Serbian authorities and insist on a thorough investigation into these matters;

    31.  Deplores the alleged illegal wiretapping and detention of five activists from the opposition Movement of Free Citizens (PSG) and a student from the STAV organisation in March 2025, and the arrest warrants issued for other STAV activists; condemns the use of the case by the propaganda media and the unfounded extension of the detention; calls on the Serbian authorities to release Marija Vasić, Lazar Dinić, Mladen Cvijetić, Lado Jovović, Srđan Đurić and Davor Stefanović from detention;

    32.  Rejects allegations that the EU and some of its Member States were involved in organising the student protests with a view to triggering a ‘colour revolution’; strongly condemns, in that context, the unlawful arrests and expulsions of EU citizens and the public disclosure, by convicted war criminals, of the personal data of EU citizens, as well as hate speech against national minorities; expresses concern about the rising number of detention cases involving EU citizens at Serbia’s border; notes that anti-EU narratives are being manifested in decreasing support for EU integration in Serbian society and in a strengthening of the presence of foreign autocratic actors in the country;

    33.  Calls on the Serbian authorities to restore citizens’ confidence in state institutions by granting transparency and accountability; encourages all political and social actors to engage in an inclusive, substantive dialogue aimed at fulfilling EU-related reforms;

    34.  Notes that media freedom in Serbia has deteriorated further, as evidenced by Serbia’s drop to 98th place in the 2024 Reporter Without Borders World Press Freedom Index; urges Serbia to improve and protect media professionalism, diversity and media pluralism, and to promote quality investigative journalism, the highest ethical journalistic standards, through respecting journalistic codes of conduct, and media literacy; recalls the importance of the plurality and transparency of the media, including on aspects related to ownership and state financing, most notably through better involvement of the REM; recalls that the concentration of media ownership can have adverse effects on the freedom of the media and the professionalism of reporting; reaffirms that, as part of the accession negotiations, Serbia needs to align with the EU in matters of strategic importance, such as countering FIMI; calls on Serbia to align with EU policies in countering foreign interference and disinformation campaigns by implementing concrete regulatory measures in line with EU standards, such as the provisions included in the Digital Services Act(7) and Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising(8); encourages cooperation between Serbia, the European External Action Service and the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in tackling disinformation; expects the authorities to investigate and prosecute all instances of hate speech, smear campaigns and strategic lawsuits against journalists;

    35.  Expresses its deep concerns about reported cases of abusive attacks, digital surveillance and harassment against journalists, human rights activists and civil society organisations, most recently a police raid on 25 February 2025 on four leading civil society organisations, ostensibly regarding their misuse of US Agency for International Development funds; strongly condemns persistent smear campaigns and intimidation against civil society in Serbia, including false allegations about plots to overthrow the government with foreign support;

    36.  Expresses concern that civil society organisations in Serbia face increasing challenges, including restrictive conditions, funding constraints, police raids and other forms of intimidation from state authorities; underlines the importance of a framework that enables local, vibrant civil society organisations to operate freely and participate in policymaking, including EU integration processes, in inclusive and meaningful ways; regrets that Serbia currently does not provide a framework that enables its lively and pluralistic civil society organisations, particularly those engaged in democracy support and electoral observation, to operate freely and participate in policymaking in inclusive and meaningful ways; expresses concern about recent raids of the offices of civil society organisations; calls for investigations into all attacks and smear campaigns against civil society organisations and for the improved transparency of public funding;

    37.  Condemns the political pressure exerted on universities and other research institutions through a hasty government decree that interferes with the academic freedom of researchers and cuts their salaries; condemns the vilification of professors, researchers and other academic staff in pro-government media; deplores the increasing use of temporary contracts for teachers and other civil servants as a political tool to exert pressure and control;

    38.  Urges the Serbian authorities to expand the availability of public broadcasting services in all minority languages across the country, ensuring equal access to media for all communities, while drawing on the best practice of the region of Vojvodina;

    39.  Expresses its deep concern about the draft law submitted to the Serbian Parliament on 29 November 2024, which proposes the establishment of a Russian-style foreign agents law; reminds Serbian legislators that civil society organisations and journalists play a key role in a healthy democratic society; reiterates that such legislation is incompatible with the values of the EU; notes that multiple civil society organisations suspended their cooperation with the legislative and executive branches of the government in February 2025;

    40.  Expresses grave concern about the increasing political interference in heritage protection in Serbia, including the removal of protected status from cultural monuments and the disregard for legal procedures governing their preservation, as in the case of the Generalštab Modernist Complex;

    41.  Calls on Serbia to fight disinformation, including manipulative anti-EU narratives and, in particular, to end its own state-sponsored disinformation campaigns; condemns the opening of an RT office in Belgrade, the launch of RT’s online news service in Serbian and the continued operation of the Russian online news service Sputnik Srbija, which is used to propagate pro-Russian narratives and misinformation across the Western Balkans region; urges the Serbian authorities to counter hybrid threats and fully align with the Council’s decision on the suspension of the broadcasting activities of Sputnik and RT; is deeply concerned about the spread of disinformation about the Russian aggression against Ukraine; calls on Serbia and the Commission to bolster infrastructure to fight disinformation and other hybrid threats; condemns the increasing influence of Russian and Chinese state-sponsored disinformation in Serbia, including the dissemination of anti-EU and anti-democratic narratives;

    42.  Takes note of the adoption of the national strategy for equality and the strategy for prevention of and protection against discrimination, and calls for their full implementation and for further alignment with European standards; urges the Serbian authorities to address the recommendations of the Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (GREVIO), with a view to improving compliance with the Istanbul Convention ratified by Serbia; notes with concern the temporary suspension of the implementation of the Law on Gender Equality by the Constitutional Court; expresses concern about the persistent lack of adequate support for organisations promoting women’s rights and gender equality;

    43.  Deeply deplores the demographic decline in Serbia, which is being exacerbated by negative net migration due to economic hardship and political persecution; stresses that it is mainly young, educated and productive people who are being forced to leave the country, as well as those pressured and threatened on account of their political views, including Dijana Hrka, the mother of one of the victims of the Novi Sad railway station tragedy, who fears for her safety after being put under pressure by SNS supporters;

    44.  Stresses that the Serbian authorities must take concrete measures to uphold and strengthen the respect for the rights of the child in the country, including by ratifying the third Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopting a national action plan for the rights of the child, adopting a new strategy on violence against children, given the expiry of the previous framework, and establishing a national framework to protect children from abuse and neglect;

    45.  Welcomes the fact that Belgrade Pride 2024 parade, the biggest in Serbia so far, passed off peacefully, though being protected by a high-profile police presence;

    46.  Highlights the need for strong commitment to safeguarding the rights of national minorities, ensuring their full representation at all levels of government, preserving their cultural identity through the use of their respective languages and by meeting their educational needs, freedom of expression and access to information, and to actively pursuing investigations into hate-motivated crimes as an irreplaceable part of common European values; regrets the fact that almost all national minorities are protected only formally; expresses concerns about the practice of pro forma representation of national minorities who are under government control; calls on Serbia to protect and promote the cultural heritage and traditions of its national minorities, in particular to create a positive atmosphere for education in minority languages, including by providing sufficient numbers of teachers, textbooks and additional materials, and deplores the violation of minority rights in this area; calls on Serbia to refrain from exploiting the national identities of national minorities that create division within these communities, and strongly condemns recorded cases of hate speech against some of them; notes the considerable delay in drafting a new action plan for the realisation of national minority rights and stresses the urgent need for Serbia to finalise and implement it promptly; highlights the need for the new action plan to fully incorporate the findings and recommendations of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities;

    47.  Expresses concerns about the significant decline in the population of certain minority groups, including the Bulgarian minority; calls on Serbia to ensure the right to use names and language specific to minority groups, including women within the Bulgarian community; notes with concern that not all school textbooks have been translated into Bulgarian; calls on the Serbian Government to ensure reciprocal equal rights for the Croatian minority in Serbia as the Serbian minority enjoys in Croatia, in particular with regard to ensuring their reciprocal representation at all levels of government, including regional and local levels; reiterates its concern regarding the restrictive and arbitrary enforcement of the Law on Permanent and Temporary Residence related to the passivation of address of thousands of Albanians in the south of Serbia; emphasises the situation of the Romanian Orthodox Church in Serbia, which is not officially recognised by the state as a traditional church;

    48.  Regrets the attempts by the Serbian authorities to undermine the national identity of communities within the country; expresses concern, in this context, about the promotion of narratives such as that of the ‘Shopi nation’, which seek to erase the existence of the Bulgarian community and deny its historical roots and cultural heritage; regrets the searches carried out by the Serbian authorities at the Bosilegrad Cultural Centre and the initiation of pre-trial proceedings for ‘ethnic hatred’ against activists from non-governmental organisations;

    49.  Calls on Serbia to refrain from distorting historical events, such as the narrative surrounding the so-called Surdulica massacre, which only serve to spread division and hatred against minorities and neighbouring countries, which is incompatible with EU membership;

    Reconciliation and good neighbourly relations

    50.  Reiterates that good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation remain essential elements of the enlargement process; calls on Serbia to stop restrictions on entry for regional civil society activists and artists as such practices undermine regional dialogue and cooperation; reaffirms, furthermore, the importance of the stability of south-eastern European countries and their resilience against foreign interference in internal democratic processes; stresses the importance of Serbia developing good neighbourly relations, implementing bilateral agreements and resolving outstanding bilateral issues with its neighbours; notes Serbia’s participation in regional initiatives and its active involvement in the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans and the Common Regional Market; underlines the fact that respect for national minority rights is an essential condition of Serbia’s advancement along its European path;

    51.  Calls for historical reconciliation and the overcoming of discrimination and prejudices from the past; deplores the recent inflammatory rhetoric by the government, targeting neighbouring states that did not support the opening of cluster 3 for Serbia;

    52.  Reiterates that Serbia must refrain from influencing the domestic politics of its neighbouring Western Balkan countries, including regarding the unconstitutional celebration of Republika Srpska Day in Bosnia and Herzegovina and questioning Bosnia and Herzegovina’s court decisions;

    53.  Urges Serbia to step up its reconciliation efforts and seek solutions to past disputes, in particular when it comes to missing persons, who account for 1 782 people in Croatia, 7 608 people in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 1 595 people in Kosovo; calls on the Serbian authorities to achieve justice for victims by recognising and respecting court verdicts on war crimes, fighting against impunity for wartime crimes, investigating cases of missing persons, investigating grave sites, and supporting domestic prosecutors in bringing perpetrators to justice, which requires the cooperation of other parties too; strongly condemns the widespread public denials of international verdicts for war crimes, including the denial of the Srebrenica genocide;

    54.  Calls on the judicial authorities in Serbia to ensure compliance with the standards of fair trial and satisfaction of justice for victims in all war crime cases; calls for the denial of war crimes and the glorification of war criminals to be included in the Criminal Code, with a view to prosecuting any form of denial of war crimes determined by the verdicts of the International Criminal Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia and the International Court of Justice;

    55.  Reiterates its support for the initiative to establish a regional commission for the establishment of facts about war crimes and other gross human rights violations on the territory of the former Yugoslavia (RECOM);

    56.  Reiterates its position on the importance of opening and publishing wartime archives, and reiterates its call for the former Yugoslav archives to be opened and, in particular, for access to be granted to the files of the former Yugoslav secret service (UDBA) and the Yugoslav People’s Army Counterintelligence Service (KOS), and for the files to be returned to the respective governments if they so request;

    57.  Reiterates its full support for the EU-facilitated dialogue and welcomes the appointment of Peter Sørensen as the EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue;

    58.  Reiterates the importance of constructive engagement on the part of the authorities of both Serbia and Kosovo in order to achieve a comprehensive, legally binding normalisation agreement, based on mutual recognition and in accordance with international law; calls on both Kosovo and Serbia to implement the Brussels and Ohrid Agreements, including the establishment of the Association/Community of Serb-majority municipalities, and the lifting of Serbia’s opposition of Kosovo’s membership in regional and international organisations, and to avoid unilateral actions that could undermine the dialogue process;

    59.  Expects Kosovo and Serbia to fully cooperate and take all the necessary measures to apprehend and swiftly bring to justice the perpetrators of the 2023 terrorist attack in Banjska; deplores the fact that Serbia still has not prosecuted the culprits, most notably Milan Radoičić, the Vice-President of Srpska Lista; reiterates that the perpetrators of the terrorist attack in Zubin Potok must also be held accountable and must face justice without delay;

    60.  Calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and on the Commission to take a more proactive role in leading the dialogue process; calls for an enhanced role for the European Parliament in facilitating the dialogue through regular joint parliamentary assembly meetings;

    Socio-economic reforms

    61.  Welcomes Serbia’s steady progress towards developing a functioning market economy with positive GDP growth and increased foreign investment in some sectors; takes note of that fact that Serbia received its first-ever investment-grade credit rating; underlines the fact that the EU is Serbia’s main trading partner, the largest source of foreign direct investment and by far the largest donor; reiterates that the financial assistance, which is of great benefit to Serbia, is conditional on the strengthening of democratic principles and alignment with the CFSP and other EU policies; reiterates the need for more substantial reforms in the labour market, education and public administration, including to address social inequalities; expresses concern about the scale and scope of intergovernmental contracts awarded that are exempt from the current legislative framework on public procurement; regrets, however, the fact that public debt as a percentage of GDP remains well above the eastern European average;

    62.  Is concerned about the investment in Serbia by Russia and China and their growing influence on the political and economic processes in the region;

    63.  Calls on Serbia to intensify efforts and increase investment in the socio-economic development of its border regions to address depopulation and ensure that the residents have access to essential services, including professional opportunities, healthcare and education; underlines the potential of the IPA III cross-border cooperation programmes as a key tool to promote long-term sustainable regional growth;

    64.  Welcomes Serbia’s active engagement in the implementation of the new Growth Plan for the Western Balkans; takes note of the fact that Serbia adopted its Reform Agenda on 3 October 2024; believes that embracing the opportunities of the growth plan would further enhance the Serbian economy, which over the past three years benefited from more than EUR 586 million in financial and technical assistance under IPA III; believes that the EU funding should better support the democratic reforms of the country; calls, in that context, for the relevant EU funding, including from the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, to be reprogrammed to redirect more funds towards supporting judiciary reforms and anti-corruption measures, as well as towards independent media and civil society organisations, in order to support their critical work, in particular in the vacuum created by the withdrawal of US donors; calls, furthermore, for the EU and the Western Balkan countries to establish a framework for fruitful cooperation between the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and its Western Balkan counterparts in order to ensure that the EPPO can effectively exercise its power on IPA III and Western Balkan Facility funds in the recipient countries; urges the Serbian authorities to step up efforts to communicate clearly to citizens the benefits of the EU funds and to improve their visibility;

    65.  Regrets the lack of public consultation during the adoption of the Serbian Reform Agenda; calls for more effective oversight of the EU funding programmes and projects;

    66.  Advocates increased regional cooperation among Western Balkan countries to share best practice and develop joint strategies in combating disinformation and foreign interference; emphasises the role of the EU in facilitating such collaborative efforts; calls for the continuation and further reinforcement of the IPA regional cybersecurity programme;

    67.  Recognises the important role of Serbia’s business community in advancing economic convergence with the EU, including through the opportunities offered by and in the implementation of the growth plan as a sustainable alternative to Russian and Chinese investment in the country; welcomes the business community’s contribution to advancing socio-economic relations in the Western Balkans;

    68.  Takes note of Serbia’s business community’s efforts in advocating for the accession of the Western Balkans to the EU’s single market as a concrete step towards full EU membership; calls for clear, measurable actions and well-defined roles and responsibilities for the implementation of the Common Regional Market action plan, as a key driver for the region’s successful accession to the EU’s single market;

    Energy, the environment, sustainable development and connectivity

    69.  Calls on Serbia to increase its efforts towards the transposition of relevant environmental and climate acquis and to ensure the proper application of environmental protection standards, including by significantly enhancing its administrative and technical capacities at all levels of government, notably on waste management legislation and the adoption of the Climate Change Adaptation Programme and the National Energy and Climate Plan; urges the Serbian authorities to improve the transparency and environmental impact assessment of all investment, including from China and Russia;

    70.  Reiterates its regret regarding the lack of action on the pollution of the Dragovishtitsa river by mines operating in the region and the detrimental effect on the health of the local people and the environment;

    71.  Calls on Serbia to increase its efforts towards the decarbonisation of its energy system and to enable effective enforcement of pollution reduction regulations related to thermal power plants;

    72.  Emphasises the need for further progress in transboundary cooperation with neighbouring countries, especially with regard to transboundary road infrastructure; urges Serbia to begin implementing the activities outlined in the memorandum of understanding on environmental protection cooperation with Bulgaria;

    73.  Takes note of the EU-Serbia memorandum of understanding launching a strategic partnership on sustainable raw materials, battery value chains and electric vehicles, in view of the European energy transition and in line with the highest environmental standards; recalls that dialogue with the affected populations, the scientific community and civil society should be at the centre of any such strategic partnership;

    74.  Welcomes the agreement reached at the EU-Western Balkans summit in Tirana on reduced roaming costs; calls, in this respect, on the authorities, private actors and all stakeholders to facilitate reaching the agreed targets to achieve a substantial reduction of roaming charges for data and further reductions leading to prices close to the domestic prices between the Western Balkans and the EU by 2027; welcomes the entering into force of the first phase of implementation of the roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU;

    75.  Reiterates that it is important for Serbia to continue diversifying its energy supply, to be able to break away from its dependency on Russia; takes note of the sanctions announced by the United States against Naftna Industrija Srbije (NIS), a subsidiary of the Russian Gazprom; welcomes the completion of the gas interconnector between Serbia and Bulgaria (IBS) in December 2023; regrets the postponement of the launching of the IBS’s commercial operation; calls for the swift finalisation of the permitting process to ensure its full operability in compliance with the energy community acquis; notes that Serbia is taking steps to introduce a carbon tax by 2027 as a step towards aligning with the EU emissions trading system;

    76.  Notes that all chapters in cluster 4 on the green agenda and sustainable connectivity have been opened; notes the adoption of the Law on Environmental Impact Assessment as a positive step towards environmental protection in Serbia, while expressing its regret that the new law fails to align fully with the relevant EU Directive 2014/52/EU(9), since it still leaves the opportunity for significant projects to advance without comprehensive environmental scrutiny; reiterates the need to designate and rigorously manage protected areas, particularly those identified as Important Bird and Biodiversity Areas (IBAs); calls for special attention to be given to critical sites where enforcement against poaching needs to be improved;

    o
    o   o

    77.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the President, Government and National Assembly of Serbia.

    (1) OJ L 278, 18.10.2013, p. 16, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2013/490/oj.
    (2) OJ L 330, 20.9.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1529/oj.
    (3) OJ L, 2024/1449, 24.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1449/oj.
    (4) OJ C, C/2024/6746, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6746/oj.
    (5) OJ C, C/2024/2654, 29.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/2654/oj.
    (6) OJ C, C/2024/6339, 7.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6339/oj.
    (7) Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) (OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj).
    (8) Regulation (EU) 2024/900 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising (OJ L, 2024/900, 20.3.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/900/oj).
    (9) Directive 2014/52/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 amending Directive 2011/92/EU on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment (OJ L 124, 25.4.2014, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/52/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Streamlined process cuts wait times, bringing more U.S. nurses to B.C.

    Source: Government of Canada regional news

    Susie Chant, parliamentary secretary for seniors’ services and long-term care –

    “I thank Minister Osborne for her leadership in strengthening B.C.’s health-care workforce and making it easier and faster for nurses trained in the U.S. to come to our province. As a registered nurse, I know this announcement is great news for our province, patients and for our nurses. To the nurses in the U.S. looking to move here, we welcome you.”

    Louise Aerts, acting registrar and CEO, BC College of Nurses and Midwives –

    “By focusing on the similarities of nursing in Canada and the U.S. and leveraging an existing system, we’ve streamlined the application process for U.S. nurses, while maintaining the safeguards that protect the public. It’s a win for applicants and British Columbians.”

    Angela Wignall, CEO, Nurses and Nurse Practitioners of BC –

    “We applaud the Ministry of Health and the BC College of Nurses and Midwives for working quickly to establish processes that bring more nurses and nurse practitioners to British Columbia. Delivering eligibility to practise within a matter of days is a significant step toward our shared goal of every British Columbian having access to the quality care they need. As the provincial professional nursing association, we stand ready to welcome and support every nurse who chooses to make B.C. home.”

    Leah Hollins, board chair, Island Health –

    “Island Health is pleased to participate in initiatives that make it easier for patients to get the care they need when they need it. Patients benefit from the strength of team-based primary care and the expanded Allied Health Centre allows dedicated health-care providers to further increase access to care for Victoria residents.”

    Dr. Melissa Duff, family physician, board chair, Victoria Division of Family Practice –

    “The expanded Allied Health Centre strengthens team-based, wraparound care and fosters long-term patient-physician relationships that drive better health outcomes. Supporting physicians to offer this level of high-quality care not only attracts them to our community but also helps them stay. It’s transformative. It’s a big win for patients, physicians and clinicians, and the entire community.”

    Dr. Anna Mason, family physician and chair, Victoria Primary Care Network Steering Committee –

    “Working in a team-based care setting has been a game-changer. It enhances patient access to our clinical team and ensures that each concern is handled by the clinician with the most relevant expertise. For instance, when I involve our social worker to help address a patient’s social challenges, I can stay focused on their medical care. Similarly, our primary-care pharmacist can manage medication adjustments between visits, allowing me to see more patients with new concerns. Patients truly value this expanded access, and the upgraded Allied Health Centre is a significant step toward sustaining this model for years to come.”

    Tarah Reece, family nurse practitioner and Lil’Wat Nation member –

    “As an Indigenous nurse practitioner, I am empowered by the shared vision within my primary-care network cohort team to provide culturally safe and responsive care. Together, we stand as a collective, ensuring that the unique health needs of First Nations, Métis and Inuit peoples are met with respect, understanding, and a dedication to improving health and wellness outcomes. The new centre will go a long way to strengthen this joint effort.” 

    Russ Harvey, renal transplant, Victoria Primary Care Network patient partner, and Community Advisory Group co-chair –

    “I’ve been incredibly fortunate to have a care team working alongside my family doctor. Having the right person provide the right care in a timely manner has made all the difference. I wouldn’t be here without it. The expanded centre gives many more patients access to this kind of support. It’s a huge victory for Victoria.”

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Huizenga, Peters Reintroduce Bipartisan Fiscal Commission Act

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Bill Huizenga (MI-02)

    Today, Bipartisan Fiscal Forum (BFF) Co-Chairs Rep. Bill Huizenga (R-MI) and Scott Peters (D-CA) announced the reintroduction of H.R. 3289, the Fiscal Commission Act. Passed by the House Budget Committee in 2024, this bill would finally address our national debt crisis by establishing an equally bipartisan/bicameral Fiscal Commission. The Commission must craft a proposal that fixes our fiscal situation in the medium- and long-term. Then, importantly, the Fiscal Commission Act forces Congress to vote on this proposal without amendment and without delay.

    “Our bipartisan Fiscal Commission Act is the most practical, immediate, and comprehensive action Congress can take right now to end our nation’s deepening fiscal crisis,” said Congressman Bill Huizenga. “If we do not address the unsustainable trajectory of our national debt, Americans who rely on Medicare and Social Security will face mandatory cuts to their benefits. We can protect and preserve these vital programs while improving the fiscal health of our nation by passing the Fiscal Commission Act and finally forcing Congress to act.”

    “When I first introduced this legislation two years ago, we estimated that interest payments on the national debt would exceed defense and Medicaid spending in a decade. Today, we are already at that point,” said Congressman Scott Peters. “Our accelerating fiscal crisis threatens to bankrupt our children’s future. Congress has been too timid or too afraid to act but kicking the can down the road only makes solving this problem more costly and painful. ‘Regular order’ and the status quo have not worked for the last twenty years, we owe it to the American people to do something different.”

    “As I’ve said before, if we don’t get our spending under control, there won’t be a Nation left to pass on to our children and grandchildren,” said Congressman Jack Bergman. “I’m proud to support the Fiscal Commission Act—an important, bipartisan step toward restoring fiscal responsibility. By bringing together lawmakers and experts, this commission will help us have the serious, solutions-focused conversations we need to address our greatest national security threat: the national debt.”

    “Washington cannot keep spending money we don’t have and expecting future generations to foot the bill,” said Congresswoman Erin Houchin. “The Fiscal Commission Act is a serious step toward restoring fiscal responsibility. By bringing lawmakers and private sector experts together, this will help us identify solutions to stabilize the debt, protect critical programs, and secure America’s economic future. It’s time to stop kicking the can down the road.”

    “Our national debt is over $36 trillion, and we owe it to the American people to confront our growing debt problem,” said Congressman David Valadao. “This bipartisan commission is a step toward finding real solutions to balance the budget and improve our long-term fiscal goals, and I’m proud to join my colleagues in charting a stronger path forward.”

    Maya MacGuineas, president of the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, said, “A bipartisan fiscal commission would give the country’s fiscal situation the attention it urgently deserves. Fixing our growing debt will not be easy, but the Fiscal Commission Act would create a venue for serious, cross-party dialogue and help pave the way toward a more sustainable fiscal future. We commend Representatives Huizenga and Peters, co-chairs of the Bipartisan Fiscal Forum, for their leadership in putting forward a thoughtful, serious proposal to confront one of our greatest long-term challenges.”

    In addition to Congressman Peters, the Fiscal Commission Act is cosponsored by an evenly bipartisan group: William Timmons (R-SC), Ed Case (D-HI), Cory Mills (R-FL), Herbert Conaway (D-NJ), Jack Bergman (R-MI), Henry Cuellar (D-TX), Blake Moore (R-UT), Marie Gluesenkamp Perez (D-WA), Adrian Smith (R-NE), Jared Golden (D-ME), Brian Fitzpatrick (R-PA), Adam Gray (D-CA), Dusty Johnson (R-SD), Greg Landsman (D-OH), Glenn Grothman (R-WI), Jared Moskowitz (D-FL), David Schweikert (R-AZ), Mike Quigley (D-IL), John Moolenaar (R-MI), Hillary Scholten (D-MI), David Rouzer (R-NC), Bradley Schneider (D-IL), Erin Houchin (R-IN), Thomas Suozzi (D-NY), David Valadao (R-CA), Jimmy Panetta (D-CA), and Andy Barr (R-KY).

    Details on the Fiscal Commission

    Commission Structure: 16 members. Each of the 4-corners congressional leaders selects 4 members, of which 3 are colleagues from the respective chamber and 1 individual from the private sector. The private sector experts are non-voting members.

    Commission Goals: The Commission will identify policies to improve the fiscal situation in the medium term and to achieve a sustainable debt-to-GDP ratio in the long term. For any recommendations related to federal programs for which a federal trust fund exists, solvency must be improved for a period of at least 75 years.

      • The Commission shall propose recommendations designed to balance the budget at the earliest reasonable date, including at minimum stabilizing the debt-to-GDP ratio at or below 100% within 10 years.
      • The Commission shall propose recommendations that meaningfully improve the long-term fiscal outlook, including changes to address the growth of direct spending and the gap between revenues and expenditures.
      • The Commission is tasked with educating and bringing awareness to the American people.

    How it works:

      • The Commission shall be established and members appointed within 60 days of enactment, and — in the course of its duties putting together recommendations — it must hold at least six public hearings, conduct a public awareness campaign, receive assistance from agencies and congressional committees, and issue an interim report.
      • The Commission shall vote to move its recommendations to Congress during the week after the 2026 election (or no later than April 13, 2027 if the Commission votes to extend its timeline).
        • Moving the recommendations to Congress requires a simple majority vote within the Commission,  provided that the majority is made up of at least 2 members of each party.
      • Expedited vote: The legislation forces each chamber of Congress to vote on the Commission’s final proposal without amendment or delay. The bill includes expedited procedures in both chambers.

    You can read the Fiscal Commission Act legislative text here.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Senators Marshall, Hoeven, and Boozman Lead Effort to Bolster Crop Insurance and Reduce Costs for Farmers

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Kansas Roger Marshall
    Washington – U.S. Senator Roger Marshall, M.D. (R-Kansas) joined U.S. Senators John Hoeven (R-North Dakota), a senior member of the Senate Agriculture Committee and Chairman of the Senate Agriculture Appropriations Committee, and Senate Agriculture Committee Chairman John Boozman (R-Arkansas) in reintroducing the Federal Agriculture Risk Management Enhancement and Resilience (FARMER) Act – legislation that strengthens crop insurance and makes increased levels of coverage more affordable for producers.
    “The FARMER Act is a major step toward ensuring the farm safety net stays intact and up to date for those who work tirelessly to provide us with food and fuel. I hear repeatedly from farmers in Kansas that crop insurance is the top priority in the Farm Bill because it provides a critically needed rapid response when disaster strikes,” said Senator Marshall.“Investing in crop insurance means protecting rural economies and securing our nation’s food supply.”
    “Crop insurance remains the number one risk management tool for our farmers, but it doesn’t provide the kind of affordable coverage options that all producers need. The result has been the repeated need for ad-hoc disaster assistance. Ultimately, producers buying higher levels of coverage will lessen the need for ad-hoc disaster assistance in the future,” said Senator Hoeven. “That means less emergency spending by the federal government, greater certainty for farmers and a more resilient ag economy. Those are wins across the board.”
    “Farmers must have the risk management tools they need to plan for the future. The Farmer Act would make critical improvements to the farm safety net and deliver support to producers across the country who rely on these programs. I appreciate Senator Hoeven for continuing to lead on this issue as we work provide certainty to America’s farm families,” said Senator Boozman.
    The legislation is also cosponsored by Senators Mitch McConnell (R-Kentucky), Joni Ernst (R-Iowa), Cindy Hyde-Smith (R-Mississippi), Jim Justice (R-West Virginia), Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa), Deb Fischer (R-Nebraska), and Jerry Moran (R-Kansas). 
    Specifically, the Federal Agriculture Risk Management Enhancement and Resilience (FARMER) Act would:
    Increase premium support for higher levels of crop insurance coverage, which will enhance affordability and reduce the need for future ad-hoc disaster assistance.
    Improve the Supplemental Coverage Option (SCO) by increasing premium support and expanding the coverage level, providing producers with an additional level of protection.
    Direct the Risk Management Agency (RMA) to conduct a study to improve the effectiveness of SCO in large counties.
    Not require producers to choose between purchasing enhanced crop insurance coverage or participating in Agriculture Risk Coverage (ARC) and Price Loss Coverage (PLC) programs, giving them flexibility to make decisions that work best for their operations. 
    This legislation is supported by the American Farm Bureau Federation, American Soybean Association, American Sugarbeet Growers Association, Crop Insurance and Reinsurance Bureau, Crop Insurance Professionals Association, Farm Credit Council, Midwest Council on Agriculture, National Association of Wheat Growers, National Barley Growers Association, National Corn Growers Association, National Cotton Council, National Sunflower Association, USA Dry Pea and Lentil Council, U.S. Beet Sugar Association, U.S. Canola Association, U.S. Durum Growers Association, and Western Peanut Growers Association.
    The full text of the legislation can be found here.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Video: UN80 Initiative, Gaza, Myanmar & other topics – Daily Press Briefing

    Source: United Nations (Video News)

    Noon briefing by Stephane Dujarric, Spokesperson for the Secretary-General.

    Highlights:
    UN80
    Secretary-General Travels
    Occupied Palestinian Territory
    Gaza
    Lebanon/Israel
    Myanmar
    Sudan
    South Sudan
    India/Pakistan
    Kurdistan Workers’ Party
    Ukraine
    Democratic Republic of the Congo
    State of Climate in Africa
    Haiti
    Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems
    Beyond GDP
    DESA Event
    International Days
    Financial Contribution

    UN80
    The Secretary-General briefed the Member States this morning on his UN80 initiative, telling them that, as the UN celebrates its 80th anniversary, the initiative is anchored in equipping our organization in an era of extraordinary uncertainty.
    He told the Member States that the liquidity crisis we now face is not new, but today’s financial and political situation adds even greater urgency to our efforts.  We must rise to this moment. 
    Mr. Guterres said that the UN80 Initiative is structured around three key workstreams: to rapidly identify efficiencies and improvements under current arrangements; to review the implementation of all mandates given to us by Member States; and to consider the need for structural changes and programme realignment across the UN system.
    He noted that all Secretariat entities in New York and Geneva have been asked to review their functions to determine if any can be performed from existing, lower-cost locations, or may otherwise be reduced or abolished.
    On mandates, he said that we have already completed an identification of all mandates reflected in the programme budget—and will soon do so for the rest of the system. The review has so far identified over 3,600 unique mandates for the Secretariat alone. After this analytical work, relevant entities and departments will be invited to identify opportunities for improvements or consolidation of efforts.
    On structural reforms, the Secretary-General said that we have already got the ball rolling by soliciting the views of a number of UN senior leaders. Their initial submissions –nearly 50 in all– show a high level of ambition and creativity.
    He added that we know that some of these changes will be painful for our UN family. Staff and their representatives are being consulted and heard. Our concern is to be humane and professional in dealing with any aspect of the required restructuring.

    SECRETARY-GENERAL TRAVELS
    This afternoon the Secretary-General will be traveling to Germany to attend the UN Peacekeeping Ministerial that will kick off tomorrow, Tuesday in Berlin.
    He will be joined by Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix, Under-Secretary-General for Operational Support Atul Khare, and Under-Secretary-General for Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance Catherine Pollard.
    During the high-level opening ceremony tomorrow morning, the Secretary-General is scheduled to deliver remarks that will focus on the future of peacekeeping. He will underscore the importance of the work of our Blue Helmets and the sacrifices they make.
    He will touch upon contributions to peacekeeping during these tough times for the financing of our work across the board.
    And just to note that this meeting provides a platform for delegations to announce substantial pledges in support of closing capability gaps and adapting peace operations to better respond to existing challenges and new realities.
    While there, the Secretary-General will hold bilateral meetings with German officials, including the Chancellor of Germany Friedrich Merz, as well as other leaders and officials attending this global event. He will also have media engagements there.
    Following the Ministerial meeting in Germany, the Secretary-General will be heading to Iraq for the League of Arab States Summit, which is taking place in Baghdad on 17 May.
    While in Iraq, the Secretary-General will be holding meetings with Iraqi officials and leaders from the region attending the summit. He will discuss a wide range of topics and issues mainly pertaining to the region, as you can imagine.

    Full Highlights: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/noon-briefing-highlight?date%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=12%20May%202025

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eVQnnyRP4oA

    MIL OSI Video

  • MIL-OSI USA: Attorney General Bonta: Trump Administration Continues to Put Communities at Risk and Threaten Public Safety by Slashing Community Violence Intervention Program Funding

    Source: US State of California

    SACRAMENTO – In response to devastating public safety funding cuts by the Trump Administration, California Attorney General Rob Bonta, GIFFORDS Center for Violence Intervention, Assemblymember Mike Gipson, and Senator Jesse Arreguín today came together to urge the Administration to reverse course and honor federal funding commitments to community violence intervention programs. President Trump and the U.S. Department of Justice, under the direction of U.S. Attorney General Pam Bondi, have terminated $811 million in essential federal grants for victim services and crime prevention across the country. This reduction in funding has severely impacted Community Violence Intervention (CVI) programs, hindering initiatives to address gun violence, stopping the vital support of at-risk youth, and preventing victims from obtaining necessary recovery support. 

    “The Trump Administration is recklessly disregarding the safety of the people it is sworn to serve with the termination of programs that heal and protect survivors of violence,” said Attorney General Rob Bonta. “The Trump Administration’s cuts threaten California’s—and the nation’s—progress against violent crime and make all of us less safe. If the Administration truly cared about public safety, it wouldn’t cut programs that are saving lives today. The cancellation of CVI funding is a profound setback for violence prevention efforts nationwide. We urge the Administration to reinstate these vital grants and for lawmakers to continue to invest in lifesaving violence prevention and victim care.”

    “The Trump Administration is pulling the plug on lifesaving programs across the country, including so many here in California,” said Mike McLively, Policy Director at GIFFORDS Center for Violence Intervention. “These cuts dismantle years of strategic, bipartisan investment in public safety and will cost people their lives. We are incredibly grateful for the leadership of Attorney General Bonta and California legislators who have been at the forefront of the fight to fund community violence intervention work at the state level, but the federal government cannot go back on its promises. These were grants that were already awarded to critical live-saving programs.”

    “The Trump Administration’s Department of Justice decision to cut millions in Community Violence Intervention and Prevention Initiative funding is a reckless and dangerous step backward,” said Assemblymember Mike A. Gipson (D-Carson). “At a time when our communities are working tirelessly to reduce gun violence through proven, community-led strategies, this move undermines years of progress and puts lives at risk. California CVI organizations, which were relying on these funds, are now forced to scale back efforts or shut down programs that save lives every day. Cutting millions for California alone sends a clear message: that community safety is not a priority for this administration. If we are serious about stopping gun violence and healing our neighborhoods, we must invest in—not abandon—the people doing the hardest work on the ground. I stand with California Attorney General Rob Bonta, GIFFORDS, and other longstanding leaders in this space, against this blatantly irresponsible are careless decision by the federal government.”

    CVI programs work to break cycles of violence by employing specialists trained to engage, protect, and heal gunshot victims and others at highest risk. They provide lifesaving services designed to keep victims safe and alive, promote trauma recovery, and support pathways away from retaliatory violence and gang activity. Last year, Attorney General Bonta hosted a series of gun violence prevention roundtables around the state with hundreds of CVI leaders to recognize and uplift these programs’ enormous successes in reducing gun violence in communities across our state. Their work is incredibly important. And at every single roundtable it was expressed that what these programs need most from our leaders is meaningful, stable investment to expand their lifesaving work. 

    Multiple community violence intervention service providers in California have had their federal grants terminated mid-grant cycle and without any warning. Some organizations impacted are:

    •  Advance Peace in Fresno which is a program lauded by the city’s former police commissioner, had a $2 million grant revoked, causing reduced staff
    • Youth ALIVE! In Oakland lost its $2 million grant to support the nation’s first hospital-based violence intervention program
    • Urban Peace Institute in Los Angeles lost its $1.5 million grant to support the training and certification of street outreach workers
    • Centro Cha Inc in Los Angeles lost $1.5 million in funding
    • Fresno County Economic Opportunities Commission lost $2 million in funding
    • The Reverence Project in Los Angeles lost $2 million in funding
    • Providence Health System in Southern California lost nearly $2 million in funding

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Secretary-General’s remarks on the UN80 Initiative [bilingual, as delivered; scroll down for all-English]

    Source: United Nations – English

    r. President, Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen,

    Next month marks the 80th anniversary of the United Nations Charter.

    The Charter is our roadmap to a better world – our owner’s manual setting out purposes and principles – and our practical guide to advancing the three pillars of our work: peace and security, development and human rights.

    Anniversaries are a time to look back and celebrate – but they are even more a time to cast our eyes to the future.

    It is only natural – especially in a period of turbulence and tumult – to look ahead and ask central questions: 

    How can we be the most effective Organization that we can be?

    How can we be more nimble, coordinated and fit to face the challenges of today, the next decade, and indeed the next 80 years?

    The UN80 Initiative is anchored in answering these questions – and equipping our organization in an era of extraordinary uncertainty.

    Yes, these are times of peril.

    But they are also times of profound opportunity and obligation. The mission of the United Nations is more urgent than ever. 

    And it is up to us to intensify our efforts to deliver the Sustainable Development Goals and be laser-focused on implementing the Pact for the Future with its many pathways to strengthen multilateralism.

    Excellences,

    Dès le premier jour de mon mandat, nous avons engagé un programme de réforme ambitieux visant à améliorer nos méthodes de travail – et nos résultats. Le système de développement repensé en est un exemple.

    Notre objectif commun a toujours été de rendre notre Organisation plus efficace, de simplifier les procédures, d’éliminer les doublons et de renforcer la transparence et la responsabilité de chacun.

    La crise de liquidités à laquelle nous sommes confrontés n’est pas nouvelle.

    Mais la conjoncture financière et politique actuelle rend nos efforts encore plus urgents.

    Ce qui est aujourd’hui en question, c’est l’essence même du multilatéralisme : ses valeurs, ses principes, et sa pérennité.

    Mais je perçois également, chez bon nombre d’entre vous, une grande détermination et volonté politique de forger une ONU plus forte que jamais – prête à relever les défis du XXIème siècle.

    Nous devons être à la hauteur de ce moment.

    Excellencies,

    As indicated in my letter of 11 March, the UN80 Initiative is structured around three key workstreams:

    First, we are striving to rapidly identify efficiencies and improvements under current arrangements.

    Second, we are reviewing the implementation of all mandates given to us by Member States.

    And third, we are undertaking consideration of the need for structural changes and programme realignment across the UN system.

    Under the first workstream on efficiencies and improvements, Under-Secretary-General Catherine Pollard is leading a Working Group for the Secretariat that is developing a management strategy to design a new business model for the Organization.

    The Working Group is focused on developing cost-reduction and efficiency-enhancement proposals in management and operations across the UN Secretariat.

    It is reviewing administrative functions to identify redundancies, streamline processes, and design integrated solutions – with cost-benefit analyses and clear implementation roadmaps.

    Priority areas include:
     

    • Functional and structural consolidation;
    • Workforce streamlining;
    • Relocating services from high-cost duty stations;
    • Centralizing IT and support services, and
    • Expanding automation and digital platforms.

    While the Working Group’s immediate focus is on management and operational areas, the rest of the Secretariat will be expected to contribute towards the efficiency agenda. 

    For example, all Secretariat entities in New York and Geneva have been asked to review their functions to determine if any can be performed from existing, lower-cost locations, or may otherwise be reduced or abolished.

    This especially pertains to those functions that do not directly support inter-governmental bodies in New York and Geneva.

    With respect to the broader UN system, in April, the High-Level Committee on Management identified potential system-wide efficiency measures in areas such as human resources management, supply chain management and information and communications technologies.

    Concrete proposals are now being developed, including identifying services that system organizations can provide quicker, at a lower price or through more competitive contracts.

    This brings me to the second workstream: mandate implementation review.

    As stated in my 11 March letter, this workstream is about how the UN system implements mandates entrusted by Member States.

    We will not review the mandates themselves. Those are yours to decide on.

    Our job is to examine and report on how we carry them out, and our goal is to simplify and optimize how we do so. 

    Nearly twenty years ago, in 2006, an analysis of mandates and the “mandate-generation cycle” was carried out by the Secretariat.

    A number of problems were identified, including burdensome reporting requirements, overlap between and within organs, an unwieldy and duplicative architecture for implementation, and gaps between mandates and resources.

    But let’s be frank.

    Most of these problems are not only still with us – they have intensified.

    We must do better. 

    Our review will be conducted holistically – looking at the entire universe of mandates, and at the entirety of their implementation.

    This review, therefore, cannot be limited to the UN Secretariat, but it will start there.

    We have already completed an identification of all mandates reflected in the programme budget – and will soon do so for the rest of the system.

    The review has so far identified over 3,600 unique mandates for the Secretariat alone.

    It is now deepening its examination, clustering these mandates using various analytical lenses.

    After this analytical work, relevant entities and departments will be invited to identify opportunities for improvements and consolidation of efforts.

    This should result in the identification of duplications, redundancies, or opportunities for greater synergy on implementation.

    Naturally, based on this work, Member States may wish to consider the opportunity to conduct themselves a review of the mandates.    

    There can be no doubt that the thousands of mandates in place today – and our machinery to implement them – stretch the capacities of Member States, especially those with smaller missions, and the UN system beyond reason. 

    It is as if we have allowed the formalism and quantity of reports and meetings to become ends in themselves.

    The measure of success is not the volume of reports we generate or the number of meetings we convene.  The measure of success – the value, purpose and aim of our work – is in the real-world difference we make in the lives of people.

    This brings me to the third workstream: structural changes.

    Proposals on structural change and programme realignment are likely to emerge from the mandate implementation review.

    But we have already got the ball rolling by soliciting the views of a number of UN senior leaders.

    Their initial submissions – nearly 50 in all – show a high level of ambition and creativity.

    Last week, we deepened some of our ideas and thinking about structural changes in a dedicated session of the UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination.

    I felt a strong sense of collective determination and responsibility from the leaders of UN entities – a shared resolve to strengthen the system and assume the challenge of change and renewal – and a united commitment to bring to you, our Member States, concrete and ambitious proposals for a renewed United Nations.

    The UN system is highly diverse consisting of organizations with a wide variety of structures and mandates. 

    To advance our three workstreams, I have established seven UN80 clusters – under the coordination of the UN80 Task Force and in close cooperation with the Secretariat Working Group.

    Each of the seven clusters bring together the organizations that contribute to a similar specific global objectives and similar areas of work.

    They will advance efforts in the three UN80 workstreams – identifying efficiencies and improvements, mandate implementation review, and possible structural changes.

    They will be managed at the Principals’ level and will consist of the following:
     

    • Peace and security, coordinated by DPPA, DPO, OCT, and ODA;
    • Development in the Secretariat and in development we have two clusters because the work in the Secretariat is very different from the work in the Agencies, but the two clusters will be working very closely together.  So development in the Secretariat is coordinated by DESA, UNCTAD, ECA, and UNEP;
    • Development (UN System), coordinated by UNDP, UNOPS, UNICEF and DCO;
    • Humanitarian, coordinated by the Emergency Relief Coordinator, WFP, UNICEF, UNHCR, and IOM;
    • Human Rights, coordinated by OHCHR;
    • Training and Research, coordinated by UNU and UNITAR; and finally
    • Specialized Agencies, coordinated by ITU and ILO.

    They will be the locomotive force for concrete proposals. And they will operate at the high level of ambition that our times demand – and that also echo in large measure the calls contained in the Pact for the Future.

    Excellencies,

    In all three workstreams, my objective is to move as quickly as possible.

    Initiatives impacting on the [Proposed] Programme Budget for 2026 prepared under the coordination of the Secretariat Working Group will be included in the revised estimates for the 2026 budget to be presented in September.

    As you know, the budget for 2026, the proposal was already given to ACABQ some time ago and it will be impossible to change it at the present moment.  We will revise our proposals and present the revised version in September on time for the process to take place for the approval of the budget before the end of the year.

    Additional changes that require more detailed analysis will be presented in the proposal for the Proposed Programme Budget for 2027.

    We expect meaningful reductions in the overall budget level.

    For example, let me describe what is under consideration in the peace and security cluster.

    First – resetting DPPA and DPO, merging units, eliminating functional and structural duplications, getting rid of functions that are also exercised in other parts of the system. I believe we’ll be able to eliminate 20% of the posts of the two departments.
     
    Second – a similar exercise of streamlining the civilian part of Peacekeeping.

    Third – The consolidation within OCT of all counterterrorism activities spread in the system.

    Fourth – a review of the present structure of Regional Offices, Special Representatives and Envoys aiming at a consolidation of the system – with increased functionality and meaningful savings.

    The level of reduction of posts that I have outlined for DPPA and DPO must be seen as a reference for the wider UN80 exercise, naturally taking into account the specificities of each area of work.

    There might be immediate, one-off costs involved in relocating staff and providing potential termination packages.

    But by moving posts from high-cost locations, we can reduce our commercial footprint in those cities and reduce our post and non-post costs.

    We have already seen considerable savings in New York by terminating the lease of one building and moving staff into other existing premises – and we expect to close two more buildings when their leases expire in 2027 with considerable savings.

    While the regular budget is our immediate focus, the efficiency efforts will include the entire Secretariat across all funding streams.

    This will entail some difficult decisions as we assess structures and processes and seek meaningful efficiencies.

    The impact on Member State contributions will be visible for years.

    But we cannot achieve the efficiencies required unless we also focus on the programmatic areas of our work. 

    Dedicated outreach with the wider UN system is now underway, and will take profit of the work of the established clusters. 

    Additional proposals resulting from the other workstreams will be submitted to Member States for consideration as appropriate.

    Many changes will require the approval by the General Assembly this year and next.

    I will consult closely and regularly with Member States on progress, seeking guidance on the way forward, and presenting concrete proposals for discussion and decision-making when appropriate.

    We know that some of these changes will be painful for our UN family.

    Staff and their representatives are being consulted and heard. Our concern is to be humane and professional in dealing with any aspect of the required restructuring.

    Excellencies,

    The UN80 Initiative is a significant opportunity to strengthen the UN system and deliver for those who depend on us.

    It is central for implementing the Pact for the Future. 

    It is crucial for advancing the Sustainable Development Goals. 

    The needs of the people we serve must remain our guiding star.

    We must always stick to principles.

    We must never compromise core values. We must forever uphold the purposes and principles of the UN Charter.

    We will advance all this work so that our three pillars – peace and security, development and human rights – are mutually reinforced, and the geographical balance of our workforce and our gender and disability strategies will be preserved.

    And we will be ever mindful of the interests of all Member States – developing countries, in particular.

    Your active engagement and support for the UN80 Initiative is vital to ensure that efforts are inclusive, innovative, and representative of the needs of all Member States.

    The success of the UN80 Initiative depends on all of us living up to our shared and complementary responsibilities.

    Many decisions ultimately are in your hands as Member States.

    Many of you have agreed that this must be the moment to be bold and ambitious.

    That is what our Organization needs – and that is what our times demand.

    Make no mistake – uncomfortable and difficult decisions lie ahead.

    It may be easier – and even tempting – to ignore them or kick the can down the road.

    But that road is a dead end.

    We cannot afford to act in any other way than with the highest level of ambition and common purpose.

    Let us seize this momentum with urgency and determination, and work together to build the strongest and most effective United Nations for today and tomorrow.

    And I thank you.

    ***
    [All-English]

    Mr. President, Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen,

    Next month marks the 80th anniversary of the United Nations Charter.

    The Charter is our roadmap to a better world – our owner’s manual setting out purposes and principles – and our practical guide to advancing the three pillars of our work: peace and security, development and human rights.

    Anniversaries are a time to look back and celebrate – but they are even more a time to cast our eyes to the future.

    It is only natural – especially in a period of turbulence and tumult – to look ahead and ask central questions: 

    How can we be the most effective Organization that we can be?

    How can we be more nimble, coordinated and fit to face the challenges of today, the next decade, and indeed the next 80 years?

    The UN80 Initiative is anchored in answering these questions – and equipping our organization in an era of extraordinary uncertainty.

    Yes, these are times of peril.

    But they are also times of profound opportunity and obligation. The mission of the United Nations is more urgent than ever. 

    And it is up to us to intensify our efforts to deliver the Sustainable Development Goals and be laser-focused on implementing the Pact for the Future with its many pathways to strengthen multilateralism.

    Excellencies, 

    From day one of my mandate, we embarked on an ambitious reform agenda to strengthen how we work and deliver. The reimagined development system is one example. 

    Our shared goal has always been to make our Organization more efficient, to simplify procedures, eliminate overlaps, and enhance transparency and accountability.

    The liquidity crisis we now face is not new. 

    But today’s financial and political situation adds even greater urgency to our efforts. 

    We face real threats to the very fabric, values, principles, and sustainability of multilateralism.  

    But I also sense from many of you a robust determination and political will to ensure the strongest possible United Nations for the 21st century.

    We must rise to this moment. 

    Excellencies,

    As indicated in my letter of 11 March, the UN80 Initiative is structured around three key workstreams:

    First, we are striving to rapidly identify efficiencies and improvements under current arrangements.

    Second, we are reviewing the implementation of all mandates given to us by Member States.

    And third, we are undertaking consideration of the need for structural changes and programme realignment across the UN system.

    Under the first workstream on efficiencies and improvements, Under-Secretary-General Catherine Pollard is leading a Working Group for the Secretariat that is developing a management strategy to design a new business model for the Organization.

    The Working Group is focused on developing cost-reduction and efficiency-enhancement proposals in management and operations across the UN Secretariat.

    It is reviewing administrative functions to identify redundancies, streamline processes, and design integrated solutions – with cost-benefit analyses and clear implementation roadmaps.

    Priority areas include:
     

    • Functional and structural consolidation;
    • Workforce streamlining;
    • Relocating services from high-cost duty stations;
    • Centralizing IT and support services, and
    • Expanding automation and digital platforms.

    While the Working Group’s immediate focus is on management and operational areas, the rest of the Secretariat will be expected to contribute towards the efficiency agenda. 

    For example, all Secretariat entities in New York and Geneva have been asked to review their functions to determine if any can be performed from existing, lower-cost locations, or may otherwise be reduced or abolished.

    This especially pertains to those functions that do not directly support inter-governmental bodies in New York and Geneva.

    With respect to the broader UN system, in April, the High-Level Committee on Management identified potential system-wide efficiency measures in areas such as human resources management, supply chain management and information and communications technologies.

    Concrete proposals are now being developed, including identifying services that system organizations can provide quicker, at a lower price or through more competitive contracts.

    This brings me to the second workstream: mandate implementation review.

    As stated in my 11 March letter, this workstream is about how the UN system implements mandates entrusted by Member States.

    We will not review the mandates themselves. Those are yours to decide on.

    Our job is to examine and report on how we carry them out, and our goal is to simplify and optimize how we do so. 

    Nearly twenty years ago, in 2006, an analysis of mandates and the “mandate-generation cycle” was carried out by the Secretariat.

    A number of problems were identified, including burdensome reporting requirements, overlap between and within organs, an unwieldy and duplicative architecture for implementation, and gaps between mandates and resources.

    But let’s be frank.

    Most of these problems are not only still with us – they have intensified.

    We must do better. 

    Our review will be conducted holistically – looking at the entire universe of mandates, and at the entirety of their implementation.

    This review, therefore, cannot be limited to the UN Secretariat, but it will start there.

    We have already completed an identification of all mandates reflected in the programme budget – and will soon do so for the rest of the system.

    The review has so far identified over 3,600 unique mandates for the Secretariat alone.

    It is now deepening its examination, clustering these mandates using various analytical lenses.

    After this analytical work, relevant entities and departments will be invited to identify opportunities for improvements and consolidation of efforts.

    This should result in the identification of duplications, redundancies, or opportunities for greater synergy on implementation.

    Naturally, based on this work, Member States may wish to consider the opportunity to conduct themselves a review of the mandates.    

    There can be no doubt that the thousands of mandates in place today – and our machinery to implement them – stretch the capacities of Member States, especially those with smaller missions, and the UN system beyond reason. 

    It is as if we have allowed the formalism and quantity of reports and meetings to become ends in themselves.

    The measure of success is not the volume of reports we generate or the number of meetings we convene.  The measure of success – the value, purpose and aim of our work – is in the real-world difference we make in the lives of people.

    This brings me to the third workstream: structural changes.

    Proposals on structural change and programme realignment are likely to emerge from the mandate implementation review.

    But we have already got the ball rolling by soliciting the views of a number of UN senior leaders.

    Their initial submissions – nearly 50 in all – show a high level of ambition and creativity.

    Last week, we deepened some of our ideas and thinking about structural changes in a dedicated session of the UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination.

    I felt a strong sense of collective determination and responsibility from the leaders of UN entities – a shared resolve to strengthen the system and assume the challenge of change and renewal – and a united commitment to bring to you, our Member States, concrete and ambitious proposals for a renewed United Nations.

    The UN system is highly diverse consisting of organizations with a wide variety of structures and mandates. 

    To advance our three workstreams, I have established seven UN80 clusters – under the coordination of the UN80 Task Force and in close cooperation with the Secretariat Working Group.

    Each of the seven clusters bring together the organizations that contribute to a similar specific global objectives and similar areas of work.

    They will advance efforts in the three UN80 workstreams – identifying efficiencies and improvements, mandate implementation review, and possible structural changes.

    They will be managed at the Principals’ level and will consist of the following:
     

    • Peace and security, coordinated by DPPA, DPO, OCT, and ODA;
    • Development in the Secretariat and in development we have two clusters because the work in the Secretariat is very different from the work in the Agencies, but the two clusters will be working very closely together.  So development in the Secretariat is coordinated by DESA, UNCTAD, ECA, and UNEP;
    • Development (UN System), coordinated by UNDP, UNOPS, UNICEF and DCO;
    • Humanitarian, coordinated by the Emergency Relief Coordinator, WFP, UNICEF, UNHCR, and IOM;
    • Human Rights, coordinated by OHCHR;
    • Training and Research, coordinated by UNU and UNITAR; and finally
    • Specialized Agencies, coordinated by ITU and ILO.

    They will be the locomotive force for concrete proposals. And they will operate at the high level of ambition that our times demand – and that also echo in large measure the calls contained in the Pact for the Future.

    Excellencies,

    In all three workstreams, my objective is to move as quickly as possible.

    Initiatives impacting on the [Proposed] Programme Budget for 2026 prepared under the coordination of the Secretariat Working Group will be included in the revised estimates for the 2026 budget to be presented in September.

    As you know, the budget for 2026, the proposal was already given to ACABQ some time ago and it will be impossible to change it at the present moment.  We will revise our proposals and present the revised version in September on time for the process to take place for the approval of the budget before the end of the year.

    Additional changes that require more detailed analysis will be presented in the proposal for the Proposed Programme Budget for 2027.

    We expect meaningful reductions in the overall budget level.

    For example, let me describe what is under consideration in the peace and security cluster.

    First – resetting DPPA and DPO, merging units, eliminating functional and structural duplications, getting rid of functions that are also exercised in other parts of the system. I believe we’ll be able to eliminate 20% of the posts of the two departments.
     
    Second – a similar exercise of streamlining the civilian part of Peacekeeping.

    Third – The consolidation within OCT of all counterterrorism activities spread in the system.

    Fourth – a review of the present structure of Regional Offices, Special Representatives and Envoys aiming at a consolidation of the system – with increased functionality and meaningful savings.

    The level of reduction of posts that I have outlined for DPPA and DPO must be seen as a reference for the wider UN80 exercise, naturally taking into account the specificities of each area of work.

    There might be immediate, one-off costs involved in relocating staff and providing potential termination packages.

    But by moving posts from high-cost locations, we can reduce our commercial footprint in those cities and reduce our post and non-post costs.

    We have already seen considerable savings in New York by terminating the lease of one building and moving staff into other existing premises – and we expect to close two more buildings when their leases expire in 2027 with considerable savings.

    While the regular budget is our immediate focus, the efficiency efforts will include the entire Secretariat across all funding streams.

    This will entail some difficult decisions as we assess structures and processes and seek meaningful efficiencies.

    The impact on Member State contributions will be visible for years.

    But we cannot achieve the efficiencies required unless we also focus on the programmatic areas of our work. 

    Dedicated outreach with the wider UN system is now underway, and will take profit of the work of the established clusters. 

    Additional proposals resulting from the other workstreams will be submitted to Member States for consideration as appropriate.

    Many changes will require the approval by the General Assembly this year and next.

    I will consult closely and regularly with Member States on progress, seeking guidance on the way forward, and presenting concrete proposals for discussion and decision-making when appropriate.

    We know that some of these changes will be painful for our UN family.

    Staff and their representatives are being consulted and heard. Our concern is to be humane and professional in dealing with any aspect of the required restructuring.

    Excellencies,

    The UN80 Initiative is a significant opportunity to strengthen the UN system and deliver for those who depend on us.

    It is central for implementing the Pact for the Future. 

    It is crucial for advancing the Sustainable Development Goals. 

    The needs of the people we serve must remain our guiding star.

    We must always stick to principles.

    We must never compromise core values. We must forever uphold the purposes and principles of the UN Charter.

    We will advance all this work so that our three pillars – peace and security, development and human rights – are mutually reinforced, and the geographical balance of our workforce and our gender and disability strategies will be preserved.

    And we will be ever mindful of the interests of all Member States – developing countries, in particular.

    Your active engagement and support for the UN80 Initiative is vital to ensure that efforts are inclusive, innovative, and representative of the needs of all Member States.

    The success of the UN80 Initiative depends on all of us living up to our shared and complementary responsibilities.

    Many decisions ultimately are in your hands as Member States.

    Many of you have agreed that this must be the moment to be bold and ambitious.

    That is what our Organization needs – and that is what our times demand.

    Make no mistake – uncomfortable and difficult decisions lie ahead.

    It may be easier – and even tempting – to ignore them or kick the can down the road.

    But that road is a dead end.

    We cannot afford to act in any other way than with the highest level of ambition and common purpose.

    Let us seize this momentum with urgency and determination, and work together to build the strongest and most effective United Nations for today and tomorrow.

    And I thank you.

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Minister’s, parliamentary secretary’s statement on National Nursing Week, International Nurses Day

    Source: Government of Canada regional news

    Josie Osborne, Minister of Health, and Susie Chant, parliamentary secretary for seniors’ services and long-term care, have issued the following statement in recognition of National Nursing Week and International Nurses Day:

    “This National Nursing Week and International Nurses Day, we celebrate the hard work and dedication of nurses throughout B.C., Canada and around the world. Nurses provide compassionate care, advocate for patients, ensure safety and are vital to bridging communication between families and physicians. Whether in the community, in the hospital or at a care home, nurses are essential to the strength and resilience of our health-care system.

    “The theme of National Nursing Week this year is the power of nurses to transform health. This theme highlights the incredible impact nurses have in shaping health care, driving innovation and advocating for patient-centred care. The nursing family, which includes licensed practical nurses, registered nurses, registered psychiatric nurses and nurse practitioners, provides an invaluable contribution to not only the acute and specialized health-care system, but also to primary and community care.

    “Our goal is to make B.C. the best place in Canada for nurses to work. We are collaborating with nursing leaders and organizations like the BC Nurses’ Union to establish minimum nurse-to-patient ratios. These help create better working conditions for nurses and enhance the quality of patient care. The Nurses and Nurse Practitioners of British Columbia is connecting more patients to the primary care they need through the Health Connect Registry.

    “As part of our plan to make our health system better for people in B.C., we are actively recruiting registered nurses from countries with comparable credentials. We are also recruiting nurse practitioners to help fill positions in areas such as primary care, community and acute care, as well as in specialized settings. Our current focus is on attracting nurses and nurse practitioners from the U.S. to work in B.C.

    “In collaboration with health authorities, regulatory colleges and other partners, we are launching a marketing campaign in Washington, Oregon and California highlighting job opportunities in areas where nurses are needed most.

    “This marketing campaign builds on recent efforts in the U.K. and Ireland to attract health-care professionals to B.C. and complements our ongoing work to fast-track credential recognition for health professionals from other countries and provinces.

    “Nurses are an integral part of patient care, engaging with patients from the moment they enter the health-care system and throughout their recovery and health-maintenance journeys. Thank you to all the registered nurses, licensed practical nurses, registered psychiatric nurses and nurse practitioners who do so much to support patients by providing accessible, comprehensive and compassionate care throughout B.C.”

    Learn More:

    For information about National Nursing Week, visit: https://www.cna-aiic.ca/en/news-events/national-nursing-week/about-national-nursing-week

    For information about International Nurses Day, visit: https://www.icn.ch/how-we-do-it/campaigns/international-nurses-day

    For information about action to attract doctors and nurses from U.S., visit: https://news.gov.bc.ca/releases/2025HLTH0013-000194

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Murphy To Block Arms Sales To Nations Engaging In Bribery Of The Trump Administration

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Connecticut – Chris Murphy

    May 12, 2025

    WASHINGTON–Following reports of Qatar gifting a $400 million superluxury Boeing 747-8 jumbo jet to President Trump, U.S. Senator Chris Murphy, a member of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on Monday announced that he will seek to block any arms sale to a nation whose government is directly enriching Trump and his family.
    Click HERE to read Murphy’s announcement on X.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Armenian Foreign Minister and Chinese Ambassador Discuss Prospects for Expanding Partnership Between the Two Countries

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Yerevan, May 12 /Xinhua/ — Armenia and China are currently at a stage of significant development of relations, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan said at a meeting with newly appointed Chinese Ambassador Li Xinwei on Monday, the press service of the country’s Foreign Ministry quotes.

    The interlocutors discussed steps and upcoming programs aimed at expanding bilateral partnership.

    “Armenia and China are currently at a stage of significant development of relations both in terms of high-level political dialogue and cooperation in the economic and other spheres. I attach great importance to the maximum implementation of existing opportunities,” the head of the Armenian Foreign Ministry emphasized.

    The issues of cooperation at various international venues were discussed. An exchange of views on international and regional events also took place. The parties emphasized the importance of developing mutually beneficial partnerships. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • Russia Revokes Accreditation of 6 British Diplomats

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (2)

    Russia has revoked the accreditation of six British diplomats in Moscow, accusing them of spying and sabotage. Federal Security Service (FSB) of Russia has accused British diplomats of working to ensure Moscow’s defeat in the conflict with Ukraine.

    The FSB claimed to have documents showing a British foreign office department in London was coordinating what it called, the escalation of the political and military situation and was tasked with ensuring Russia’s strategic defeat against Ukraine.

    Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova said, the activities of the British embassy in Moscow have gone well beyond diplomatic convention and accused it of carrying out deliberate activity designed to harm the Russian people.

  • Infrastructure key force of national economy to build better future: Nepal PM

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (2)

    Prime Minister of Nepal K P Sharma Oli addresses Nepal Infrastructure Summit 2024 in Kathmandu emphasizing infrastructure as the key force of the national economy and the foundation to build a better future. The Nepal Infrastructure Summit is jointly organised by the Ministry of Physical Infrastructure and Transport, the Confederation of Nepalese Industries, and the Investment Board.

     

    PM said that Infrastructure development is the most prioritized area of Nepal, which is vital for fostering economic growth and enhancing social development. He expressed his concern that roads, bridges, and public transit systems were neglected for long, which has resulted in increased traffic congestion, delayed goods and services, and a growing divide between those who have access to reliable infrastructure and those who do not. Moreover, the PM underlined the need to augment clean energy, IT and urban infrastructure to spur the growth process. He shared that the government had set high priority toward infrastructure development.

     

    He reminded the gathering at the summit that infrastructure development is a catalyst for growth. Improved transportation systems enable the efficient movement of goods and services, thus lowering costs and boosting trade. Industrial infrastructure is critical for reversing the trend of deindustrialization and promoting exports.

     

    Moreover, the PM said reliable energy attracts investments and fosters industrialization, while better communication networks connect people, facilitate education, and open doors to new opportunities.

     

    The PM also stressed the guarantee of environmentally sustainable infrastructure building. The private sector’s role is essential to this end. All sides’ initiatives are required to realize the shared vision of Happy Nepali and Prosperous Nepal. DPM and FM Bishnu Paudel said that public finance would be mobilized by maintaining economic and fiscal discipline and financial accountability. The Finance Minister argued that as a landlocked country with a difficult geography, infrastructure building is a challenging job for Nepal.

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Multiple agreements reached in Qatar

    Source: Hong Kong Information Services

    Continuing his visit to Qatar, Chief Executive John Lee today met local government and business leaders there, and witnessed the reaching of 35 agreements or memoranda of understanding among government departments, enterprises and institutions from Hong Kong, the Mainland and Qatar.

     

    In the morning, Mr Lee met Qatar’s Minister of Labour Ali bin Saeed bin Samikh Al Marri to discuss plans for enhancing talent exchanges. Highlighting that Hong Kong is home to five of the world’s top 100 universities and is on a path to become an international hub for post-secondary education, Mr Lee emphasised that the city offers a Belt & Road Scholarship to encourage students from countries or regions in the Belt & Road Initiative to pursue studies in the city. He invited more young people from Qatar to study in Hong Kong and develop careers in the city.

     

    Afterwards, the Chief Executive and members of his delegation attended a roundtable meeting with representatives of the Qatari Businessmen Association and the Qatar Chamber of Commerce & Industry.

     

    Extolling Hong Kong’s robust legal system, resilient financial system and simple and low tax regime, Mr Lee said he welcomed Qatari enterprises to capitalise on the city’s advantages in connecting with both Mainland China and other parts of the world under the “one country, two systems” principle. He added that Qatari enterprises can leverage Hong Kong’s financial, logistics and professional services, and its bridging roles, to tap into the Mainland market.

     

    In the afternoon, Mr Lee attended a business lunch where he spoke of Hong Kong’s development opportunities and business advantages to over 300 local political and business representatives.

     

    He also took the opportunity to announce that Hong Kong and Qatar have substantially concluded negotiations on an Investment Promotion & Protection Agreement, and will begin discussions on mutual recognition arrangements for their respective Authorized Economic Operator Programmes, in order to create a more favourable environment for the flow of capital and goods.

     

    In addition, the Chief Executive revealed that Hong Kong Special Administrative Region passport holders can visit Qatar visa-free for up to 30 days. He said he looks forward to deepening co-operation with Qatar, adding that Hong Kong and Qatar can jointly seize development opportunities brought by the Greater Bay Area and the Belt & Road Initiative.

     

    Government departments, enterprises and institutions from Hong Kong, the Mainland and Qatar also announced 35 memoranda of understanding or agreements covering economic co-operation, investment, technology, legal collaboration, finance, banking, and capital market development.

     

    Besides co-operation between Hong Kong and Qatar, two agreements were signed directly between Mainland and Qatari enterprises to foster co-operation in financial services and high-end manufacturing. A tripartite agreement was also signed among Hong Kong, the Mainland and Qatar to strengthen co-operation in fintech, covering Web3 and artificial intelligence.

     

    After the lunch event, Mr Lee visited Hamad International Airport in Doha to learn about an autonomous vehicle pilot project there.

     

    The project involves participation by UISEE, a Mainland Chinese enterprise which has established its international headquarters in Hong Kong. Having also collaborated with Hong Kong International Airport on autonomous vehicle projects, UISEE has drawn on those experiences to promote its technology to overseas clients.

     

    Mr Lee and the delegation will depart for Kuwait tonight.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Agencies issue host state loan-to-deposit ratios

    Source: US State of New York Federal Reserve

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  • MIL-OSI Global: AI can guess racial categories from heart scans – what it means and why it matters

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Tiarna Lee, Doctoral Candidate, School of Biomedical Engineering & Imaging Sciences, King’s College London

    Radiological imaging/Shutterstock

    Imagine an AI model that can use a heart scan to guess what racial category you’re likely to be put in – even when it hasn’t been told what race is, or what to look for. It sounds like science fiction, but it’s real.

    My recent study, which I conducted with colleagues, found that an AI model could guess whether a patient identified as Black or white from heart images with up to 96% accuracy – despite no explicit information about racial categories being given.

    It’s a striking finding that challenges assumptions about the objectivity of AI and highlights a deeper issue: AI systems don’t just reflect the world – they absorb and reproduce the biases built into it.


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    First, it’s important to be clear: race is not a biological category. Modern genetics shows there is more variation within supposed racial groups than between them.

    Race is a social construct, a set of categories invented by societies to classify people based on perceived physical traits and ancestry. These classifications don’t map cleanly onto biology, but they shape everything from lived experience to access to care.

    Despite this, many AI systems are now learning to detect, and potentially act on, these social labels, because they are built using data shaped by a world that treats race as if it were biological fact.

    AI systems are already transforming healthcare. They can analyse chest X-rays, read heart scans and flag potential issues faster than human doctors – in some cases, in seconds rather than minutes. Hospitals are adopting these tools to improve efficiency, reduce costs and standardise care.

    Bias isn’t a bug – it’s built in

    But no matter how sophisticated, AI systems are not neutral. They are trained on real-world data – and that data reflects real-world inequalities, including those based on race, gender, age, and socioeconomic status. These systems can learn to treat patients differently based on these characteristics, even when no one explicitly programs them to do so.

    One major source of bias is imbalanced training data. If a model learns primarily from lighter skinned patients, for example, it may struggle to detect conditions in people with darker skin.
    Studies in dermatology have already shown this problem.

    Even language models like ChatGPT aren’t immune: one study found evidence that some models still reproduce outdated and false medical beliefs, such as the myth that Black patients have thicker skin than white patients.

    Sometimes AI models appear accurate, but for the wrong reasons – a phenomenon called shortcut learning. Instead of learning the complex features of a disease, a model might rely on irrelevant but easier to spot clues in the data.

    Imagine two hospital wards: one uses scanner A to treat severe COVID-19 patients, another uses scanner B for milder cases. The AI might learn to associate scanner A with severe illness – not because it understands the disease better, but because it’s picking up on image artefacts specific to scanner A.

    Now imagine a seriously ill patient is scanned using scanner B. The model might mistakenly classify them as less sick – not due to a medical error, but because it learned the wrong shortcut.

    This same kind of flawed reasoning could apply to race. If there are differences in disease prevalence between racial groups, the AI could end up learning to identify race instead of the disease – with dangerous consequences.

    In the heart scan study, researchers found that the AI model wasn’t actually focusing on the heart itself, where there were few visible differences linked to racial categories. Instead, it drew information from areas outside the heart, such as subcutaneous fat as well as image artefacts – unwanted distortions like motion blur, noise, or compression that can degrade image quality. These artefacts often come from the scanner and can influence how the AI interprets the scan.

    In this study, Black participants had a higher-than-average BMI, which could mean they had more subcutaneous fat, though this wasn’t directly investigated. Some research has shown that Black individuals tend to have less visceral fat and smaller waist circumference at a given BMI, but more subcutaneous fat. This suggests the AI may have been picking up on these indirect racial signals, rather than anything relevant to the heart itself.

    This matters because when AI models learn race – or rather, social patterns that reflect racial inequality – without understanding context, the risk is that they may reinforce or worsen existing disparities.

    This isn’t just about fairness – it’s about safety.

    Solutions

    But there are solutions:

    Diversify training data: studies have shown that making datasets more representative improves AI performance across groups – without harming accuracy for anyone else.

    Build transparency: many AI systems are considered “black boxes” because we don’t understand how they reach their conclusions. The heart scan study used heat maps to show which parts of an image influenced the AI’s decision, creating a form of explainable AI that helps doctors and patients trust (or question) results – so we can catch when it’s using inappropriate shortcuts.

    Treat race carefully: researchers and developers must recognise that race in data is a social signal, not a biological truth. It requires thoughtful handling to avoid perpetuating harm.

    AI models are capable of spotting patterns that even the most trained human eyes might miss. That’s what makes them so powerful – and potentially so dangerous. It learns from the same flawed world we do. That includes how we treat race: not as a scientific reality, but as a social lens through which health, opportunity and risk are unequally distributed.

    If AI systems learn our shortcuts, they may repeat our mistakes – faster, at scale and with less accountability. And when lives are on the line, that’s a risk we cannot afford.

    Tiarna Lee receives funding from the EPSRC.

    ref. AI can guess racial categories from heart scans – what it means and why it matters – https://theconversation.com/ai-can-guess-racial-categories-from-heart-scans-what-it-means-and-why-it-matters-254416

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Avian Influenza Prevention Zone housing measures lifted

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments 2

    Press release

    Avian Influenza Prevention Zone housing measures lifted

    Mandatory housing measures for poultry and captive birds, which were introduced across various counties to prevent the spread of bird flu, will be lifted from Thursday 15 May, the Chief Veterinary Officer has confirmed today.

    Mandatory housing measures for poultry and captive birds, which were introduced across various counties to prevent the spread of bird flu, will be lifted from Thursday 15 May, the Chief Veterinary Officer has confirmed today.

    The latest risk assessment supported by the best scientific evidence shows that the risk of avian influenza levels in wild birds and poultry has reduced. This means poultry and other captive birds will no longer need to be housed and can now be kept outside.

    The lifting of housing measures applies to all areas unless keepers are in a Protection Zone or Captive Bird Monitoring (Controlled) Zone – these are areas where there has been a recent outbreak.

    Scrupulous biosecurity is the best deterrent to stopping the spread of avian influenza. Birdkeepers are legally required to adhere to the highest biosecurity standards with an Avian Influenza Prevention Zone (AIPZ) mandating strict biosecurity remaining in place in England, Scotland and Wales. This includes measures such as disinfecting footwear, clothing and vehicles and equipment before and after entering premises.

    Bird gatherings, such as fairs and markets, remain banned.

    UK Chief Veterinary Officer, Dr Christine Middlemiss, said:

    Following a sustained period of reduced risk from avian influenza, we are now able to lift the mandatory housing measures in effect in various counties, which is testament to the hard work and vigilance of bird keepers across the country who have all played their part in managing the spread of this disease.

    While the lifting of mandatory housing measures will be welcomed by bird keepers, it is imperative that keepers continue to practice stringent biosecurity and that any suspicions of disease are reported to the Animal and Plant Health agency immediately.

    Those who intend to allow their birds outside are advised to use the upcoming days to prepare their outside areas for the safe release of their birds, as ranges and outdoor areas may still be contaminated with avian influenzas virus. This will include cleansing and disinfection of hard surfaces, fencing off ponds or standing water and reintroduction of wild bird deterrents.

    As birds have been housed for several months, it may be necessary for birds to be acclimatised and gradually released over a period of days to minimise welfare issues.

    Keepers are encouraged to take action to prevent bird flu and stop it spreading. Be vigilant for signs of disease and report it to keep your birds safe.

    Check if you’re in a bird flu disease zone on the map and check details of the restrictions for further advice and information.  

    You must register within one month of keeping poultry or other captive birds at any premises in England or Wales, further information is available.

    Updates to this page

    Published 12 May 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: PM meeting with Prime Minister Kristersson of Sweden: 12 May 2025

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Press release

    PM meeting with Prime Minister Kristersson of Sweden: 12 May 2025

    The Prime Minister welcomed the Prime Minister of Sweden Ulf Kristersson to Downing Street this afternoon. 

    The Prime Minister welcomed the Prime Minister of Sweden Ulf Kristersson to Downing Street this afternoon.

    Following the successful Joint Expeditionary Force meeting in Oslo last week and the Coalition of the Willing call in Kyiv on Saturday, the leaders underlined that now more than ever it is vital to be united on defence and security.

    They agreed to continue support for Ukraine and put the pressure on Putin to accept the ceasefire deal on the table – without conditions. The Prime Minister thanked Prime Minister Kristersson for Sweden’s contribution to Operation Interflex – the training programme for Ukrainians in the UK.

    On trade, defence and civil nuclear, the leaders agreed to closer working.

    They both looked forward to discussing migration, security and defence at the European Political Community meeting later this week.

    Updates to this page

    Published 12 May 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: PM call with Prime Minister Carney of Canada: 12 May 2025

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    News story

    PM call with Prime Minister Carney of Canada: 12 May 2025

    The Prime Minister spoke to the Prime Minister of Canada, Mark Carney, this evening.

    The Prime Minister spoke to the Prime Minister of Canada, Mark Carney, this evening.

    The Prime Minister began by congratulating Prime Minister Carney on his fantastic election win.  

    The leaders reflected on the opportunities to deepen the friendship between the two countries, including through economic cooperation and technology ties to deliver for working people in both the UK and Canada.

    Discussing the Coalition of the Willing call in Kyiv on Saturday, the Prime Minister thanked Prime Minister Carney for joining, and leaders underlined the need to increase pressure on President Putin to agree to an unconditional ceasefire.

    Looking ahead, the Prime Minister said he was looking forward to travelling to Canada for the G7 Summit next month, which would be another important moment to stand in solidarity with Ukraine.

    The leaders agreed to stay in close touch.

    Updates to this page

    Published 12 May 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI USA: Congresswoman Norma Torres Joins Ranking Member Morelle Leads Request to Library of Congress Inspector General into Improper Communications, Potential Unauthorized Transfer of Congressional Data to Trump Administration

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congresswoman Norma Torres (35th District of California)

    May 12, 2025

    WASHINGTON—Today, Rep. Norma Torres (CA-35) joined Rep. Joe Morelle (NY-25), the top Democrat on the Committee on House Administration, in leading a request to the Library of Congress Inspector General Kimberly Benoit seeking an investigation and continued monitoring of potential improper communications between the Library of Congress—a legislative branch agency—and the executive branch, including the possibility of the unauthorized transfer of congressional or Library data to executive branch agencies and personnel.

    The letter was also signed by House Appropriations Committee Ranking Member Rosa DeLauro (CT-03), Appropriations’ Subcommittee on Legislative Branch Ranking Member Adriano Espaillat (NY-13), Congresswomen Terri Sewell (AL-07), and Julie Johnson (TX-32).

    “The abrupt firing of Librarian of Congress Dr. Carla Hayden raises serious concerns that the executive branch is improperly targeting the Library and its employees with adverse employment actions and inappropriate requests for information including, but not limited to, confidential communications between congressional offices and the Library’s various service units,” wrote the lawmakers. “The Library is part of the legislative branch—an independent and coequal branch of government. The executive has no authority to demand or receive confidential legislative branch data, and the Library has no legal basis to supply such information without authorization from Congress.”

    The Members request that the IG’s Office investigates:

    1. whether the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) or other executive branch entities have requested or otherwise attempted to access or review Library data, including but not limited to communications between the Congressional Research Service and congressional offices; 
    2. whether Library staff have received directives from the executive branch to modify access protocols or information sharing practices with entities outside the legislative branch; 
    3. whether executive branch officials have attempted to circumvent existing inter-branch communication pathways; and
    4. any other potentially illegal or inappropriate actions by the executive branch that you discover as part of your investigatory efforts. 

    “Given the time-sensitive nature of this matter and the potential for irreparable harm to one of our most important and inimitable institutions, I request this investigation be prioritized,” concluded the lawmakers.

    Full text of the letter is available here.

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Hawley Op-Ed: Don’t Cut Medicaid

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator Josh Hawley (R-Mo)
    By U.S. Senator Josh Hawley (R-Mo.) | May 12, 2025 | The New York Times
    Polls show Democrats down in the dumps at their lowest approval level in decades, but we Republicans are having an identity crisis of our own, and you can see it in the tug of war over President Trump’s “one big, beautiful bill.” The nub of the conflict: Will Republicans be a majority party of working people, or a permanent minority speaking only for the C suite?
    Mr. Trump has promised working-class tax cuts and protection for working-class social insurance, such as Medicaid. But now a noisy contingent of corporatist Republicans — call it the party’s Wall Street wing — is urging Congress to ignore all that and get back to the old-time religion: corporate giveaways, preferences for capital and deep cuts to social insurance.
    This wing of the party wants Republicans to build our big, beautiful bill around slashing health insurance for the working poor. But that argument is both morally wrong and politically suicidal.
    Let’s begin with the facts of the matter. Medicaid is a federal program that provides health care to low-income Americans in partnership with state governments. Today it serves over 70 million Americans, including well over one million residents of Missouri, the state I represent.
    As for Missouri, it is one of 40 Medicaid expansion states — because our voters wanted it that way. In 2020, the same year Mr. Trump carried the Missouri popular vote by a decisive margin, voters mandated that the state expand Medicaid coverage to working-class individuals unable to afford health care elsewhere. Voters went so far as to inscribe that expansion in our state constitution. Now some 21 percent of Missourians benefit from Medicaid or CHIP, the companion insurance program for lower-income children. And many of our rural hospitals and health providers depend on the funding from these programs to keep their doors open.
    All of which means this: If Congress cuts funding for Medicaid benefits, Missouri workers and their children will lose their health care. And hospitals will close. It’s that simple. And that pattern will replicate in states across the country.
    One of my constituents, a married mother of five, contacted me to explain why Medicaid is vital to her 8-year-old daughter, who depends on a feeding tube to survive. Formula, pump rentals, feeding extensions and other treatments cost $1,500 a month; prescriptions nearly double that cost. These expenses aren’t covered by private insurance. The mother wrote to me, “Without Medicaid, we would lose everything — our home, our vehicles, and eventually, our daughter.”
    Congress should be doing everything possible to aid these working families, to make their health care better and more affordable. We should cap prescription drug costs, as I have recently proposed. We should give every family in America with children a hefty tax cut. What we should not do is eliminate their health care.
    Mr. Trump himself has been crystal clear on this point. Since taking office he has repeatedly rejected calls for Medicaid benefit cuts. Just the other week, he said, “We are doing absolutely nothing to hurt Medicare, Medicaid or Social Security. Nothing at all.” And for good reason. The president understands who his voters are. Recent polling shows that 64 percent of Republicans hold a favorable view of Medicaid. About one in six have personally been on the program. Meanwhile, more than 80 percent of Americans oppose significant cuts to Medicaid and over half — half — have a personal or family connection to the Medicaid program.
    It’s safe to say the Trump coalition was not pulling the lever for Medicaid cuts in November. Mike Johnson, the House speaker, finally woke up to this fact last week, when he withdrew his support from one of the most aggressive reductions to Medicaid on the table. But many of my House and Senate colleagues keep pushing for substantial cuts, and the House will begin to hash out its differences in negotiations this week.
    My colleagues have cited the editorial board of The Wall Street Journal, which has been pushing that line for months, including in a recent editorial that inveighed against my opposition to Medicaid benefit cuts. But following The Journal’s prescriptions would represent the end of any chance of us becoming a working-class party.
    Republicans need to open their eyes: Our voters support social insurance programs. More than that, our voters depend on those programs. And there’s a reason for this that Republicans would do well to ponder. Our economy is increasingly unfriendly to working people and their families.
    For the better part of 50 years, working wages have been flat in real terms. Working people cannot afford to get married when they want to, have the number of children they want to or raise those children as they would like. These days, they can barely afford to put a roof over their kids’ heads, to say nothing of health care.
    Both Democrats and Republicans share the blame for this state of affairs, which is one big reason Mr. Trump got elected. He promised to shake up the status quo. Republicans in Congress should pay attention. Our voters not only want us to protect the social insurance they need to get by; they also want us to fight for a better life — for a better economy with the kinds of jobs and wages that allow working people to get married and start families, to buy homes and have a stake in their towns and neighborhoods.
    That’s the promise of American life. If Republicans want to be a working-class party — if we want to be a majority party — we must ignore calls to cut Medicaid and start delivering on America’s promise for America’s working people.
    Read Senator Hawley’s full op-ed here.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Senator Hawley Leads Missouri Delegation in Supporting Governor’s Request for Disaster Relief

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator Josh Hawley (R-Mo)
    U.S. Senator Josh Hawley (R-Mo.) led members of the Missouri congressional delegation — including Senator Eric Schmitt (R-Mo.) and U.S. House Members Ann Wagner, Robert Onder, Mark Alford, Jason Smith, Sam Graves, and Eric Burlison — in support of Governor Mike Kehoe’s request for President Donald Trump to issue a disaster declaration following devastating storms that hit the southern part of the state March 30 to April 8. These storms left over 50,000 Missourians without power in Springfield alone. “This declaration is critical to ensuring Missouri communities receive the immediate resources, technical assistance, and long-term recovery support they need to repair vital infrastructure, assist displaced families, and rebuild communities in the aftermath of these devastating storm,” the Missouri lawmakers wrote.   “We respectfully request your swift action to ensure that these communities receive the necessary support to respond to the disaster,” they continued.  Senator Hawley has also joined his Missouri colleagues in supporting Governor Kehoe’s request for a disaster declaration following the devastating tornadoes in eastern Missouri earlier this year.  Read the full letter here or below. 
    May 9, 2025 The Honorable Donald J. TrumpPresident of the United StatesThe White House1600 Pennsylvania AvenueWashington, DC 20500 Dear President Trump,  We write in support of Missouri Governor Mike Kehoe’s request to approve a major presidential disaster declaration, as authorized by the Stafford Act, for public assistance in 25 of Missouri’s 114 counties, individual assistance in 20 Missouri counties, and hazard mitigation statewide. This declaration is critical to ensuring Missouri communities receive the immediate resources, technical assistance, and long-term recovery support they need to repair vital infrastructure, assist displaced families, and rebuild communities in the aftermath of these devastating storms. On April 30, 2025, Governor Kehoe requested a major disaster declaration following widespread damage caused by severe storms, tornadoes, and flooding that impacted Missouri from March 30 to April 8. The storms resulted in at least six confirmed deaths. Recovery efforts are ongoing, with many communities still focused on rebuilding infrastructure and restoring normalcy. Federal assistance is crucial to support these efforts. A major presidential disaster declaration would allow qualified individuals and families, local governments, and qualified nonprofits to seek federal assistance for reimbursement of emergency response and recovery costs. Importantly, this declaration would help ensure that Missourians have access to the critical assistance needed to begin rebuilding after these devastating storms. We respectfully request your swift action to ensure that these communities receive the necessary support to respond to the disaster. Along with our fellow Missourians, we appreciate your immediate attention to this request and stand ready to assist.                                               Sincerely, Josh HawleyUnited States Senator
    Eric SchmittUnited States Senator
    Ann WagnerMember of Congress
    Robert OnderMember of Congress
    Jason SmithMember of Congress
    Mark AlfordMember of Congress
    Sam GravesMember of Congress
    Eric BurlisonMember of Congress

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Defending Alberta industry during U.S. tariffs

    Source: Government of Canada regional news (2)

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI Global: For children with a rare form of dementia, music could be a powerful therapy tool

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Rebecca Atkinson, Researcher in Music Therapy, Anglia Ruskin University

    Music therapy may be helpful for children with a rare form of dementia. adriaticfoto/ Shutterstock

    When we hear the word “dementia”, we usually think of memory loss in older adults. But there’s another, much rarer form of the disease that strikes far earlier in life – childhood dementia, also known as Batten disease.

    Batten disease is a rare but serious genetic disorder that affects the brain and nervous system. It is unknown how many children in the UK are living with this heartbreaking condition, but recent estimates show between 150-200 are affected.

    It often appears in early in life – usually between the ages of 12 months to 12 years. The condition can lead to problems with vision, movement and thinking. And, because the condition is genetic, it often means that more than one child in a family can be affected.

    Right now, there’s no cure for Batten disease. Sadly, many children with the condition don’t survive into adulthood. Scientists and doctors are working hard to change that, but there’s still a long way to go.


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    While a promising drug has been shown to slow progression of one type of Batten disease, access to it is now under review in the UK. This leaves many children and families at risk of losing this lifesaving treatment.

    Without a viable cure, treatment for Batten disease mainly focuses on easing symptoms. Children often need physiotherapy, prescription drugs and educational support. But this care has been shown to be fragmented, with services spread across different providers. This lack of coordination makes it challenging for families to access consistent support.

    Families are open to looking for alternative forms of therapy – such as music therapy. Emerging research suggests that music and music therapy can be beneficial for children with Batten disease.

    Music therapy

    Researchers have begun exploring music therapy as a way of managing symptoms and possibly enhancing quality of life for children with Batten disease. Research in this area is still in its early stages. But if proven to be effective, music therapy could offer new opportunities and comfort to patients and their families.

    Music therapy uses music to help with emotional expression, psychological health and functional improvements. A typical music therapy session involves playing instruments, singing, listening to music or song writing to help patients improve psychological wellbeing, and cope with emotional or communication difficulties.

    For children with Batten disease, clinical researchers consider music therapy – when used alongside other standard therapies (such as physiotherapy and speech therapy) – to alleviate pain and anxiety in patients and improve their social interaction and enjoyment.

    In one case study, it was found that weekly music therapy sessions helped one ten-year-old child with Batten disease better express her feelings and memories through writing and singing songs. Not only this, these songs became a lasting legacy, helping loved ones stay connected to her after she passed away.

    An international survey of 182 parents and professionals who support children with Batten disease also found music therapy was beneficial. Around 80% of the people in the study said music helped their children communicate. In some cases, children who could no longer speak were still able to sing. Music also helped the children access memories, and generally improved their quality of life.

    Music therapy may help children with Batten disease to communicate and access memories.
    Da Antipina/ Shutterstock

    One specific strand of music therapy is neurologic music therapy. This approach can help people with neurological conditions manage their symptoms and function better in their everyday life through practical musical exercises. This is done through specific singing or rhythm exercises to help with speech, or targeted movement activities to help with mobility.

    Currently, no research has been conducted on the use of neurologic music therapy for children with Batten disease. But, research on other neurological conditions shows it can be very beneficial.

    For instance, research shows neurologic music therapy can improve speech, language, cognition and movement for some Parkinson’s sufferers and quality of life and well being for adults with dementia.




    Read more:
    Why researchers are turning to music as a possible treatment for stroke, brain injuries and even Parkinson’s


    Studies have also shown the practice can help children with neurological conditions similar to Batten disease, such as cerebral palsy and Rett’s syndrome. When added to standard rehabilitation programmes that target motor, language, movement and psychological goals, neurologic music therapy increased brain plasticity (meaning it strengthened connections in the brain).

    The children who received the therapy became more engaged and focused. These findings indicate that adding music therapy could speed up progress toward rehabilitation goals.

    For children with epilepsy, listening to music has even been shown to reduce the number of seizures over a six month period. Many children with Batten disease experience epileptic seizures which can become more unmanageable as the disease progresses. This suggests that music therapy could potentially be useful for managing seizures in children with Batten disease.

    The uniquely powerful effect of music could be explained by the fact that it activates multiple regions of the brain at once – including those linked to movement, memory, emotion and language.

    This global activation can be especially helpful for children with Batten disease, as it may stimulate areas of the brain that are still functioning. Music may also help with emotional expression and social connection, offering comfort and a sense of identity even as the disease progresses.

    While early findings from this field are promising, larger and more targeted studies are needed to confirm the benefits of music therapy for children with Batten disease and explore how it might be integrated into standard care.

    As Batten disease progresses, families face the heartbreaking reality of their child’s diminishing future. Many turn to supportive therapies and palliative care in their child’s final stages of life.

    Early findings on music therapy suggest that it may help children with Batten disease express themselves, stay connected and hold on to moments of independence for a little longer.

    Rebecca Atkinson is a board member of Chiltern Music Therapy, and has received funding from The Musicians Company to carry out research activities for children with Batten disease.

    ref. For children with a rare form of dementia, music could be a powerful therapy tool – https://theconversation.com/for-children-with-a-rare-form-of-dementia-music-could-be-a-powerful-therapy-tool-171688

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: Syria faces renewed sectarian violence as government fails to deliver inclusivity

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Katya Alkhateeb, Senior Researcher in International Human Rights Law & Humanitarian Law at Essex Law School and Human Rights Centre, University of Essex

    A recent surge in violence against Syria’s Druze religious community has reportedly seen over 100 people killed since the start of May. This is a grim extension of sectarian targeting that began with the massacre of Alawite civilians in March.

    Both crises are grounded in the same religious justifications, revealing problems in Syria’s transition following the end of the Assad family’s 53-year rule.

    Specifically these atrocities are linked by the misuse of nafir aam – a general call to arms or mass mobilisation. It is an Arabic term rooted in classical Islamic jurisprudence, especially in discussions about jihad and collective defence.

    It is declared only when the Muslim community faces an existential threat, such as an invasion or overwhelming danger from an enemy.


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    Recently though, it has been used by extremist groups such as Islamic State and al-Qaeda to summon Muslims to fight supposed enemies of the faith. These enemies have, in most cases, been innocent civilians.

    In March, when gunmen loyal to Syria’s former leader Bashar al-Assad (who is an Alawite) clashed with security forces, the transitional government issued a nafir aam. Loudspeakers in mosques across northern Syria broadcast mobilisation calls, tribal groups pledged support, and recruitment links flooded social media.

    The UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported that close to 1,400 Alawite civilians were subsequently murdered, with the final death toll likely to be much higher.

    A post on the Telegram channel of Syria’s ruling Hayat Tahrir al-Sham organisation reading: ‘General mobilisation now being announced via loudspeakers in Idlib and Aleppo toward the coast. Listen to the important and urgent announcement directly.’
    Telegram

    The same sectarian machinery has now been turned against the Druze. This latest wave of violence was triggered by the unproven allegation that a Druze cleric was responsible for an audio recording containing anti-Islamic remarks. Despite the cleric’s immediate denial, armed groups launched assaults on Druze areas near Syria’s capital, Damascus.

    Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, vowed to protect the Druze and the Israeli military subsequently carried out a series of airstrikes across Syria. These included strikes near the presidential palace. While Netanyahu has positioned these actions as protecting a vulnerable minority, they risk further destabilising Syria’s fragile transition.

    Deeply entrenched sectarianism

    Syria’s transitional government is led by the Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Following its campaign against Assad, HTS has been implementing a new policy of tolerance towards minority groups. The Syrian president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, has vowed to protect minorities and pursue more inclusive policies.

    But HTS is arguably failing to deliver the inclusive governance it promised when seizing control of the country in December 2024. The seven-member committee for the national dialogue conference, which began in February to discuss a new path for the nation, lacked Alawite, Kurdish and Druze representation.

    The resulting constitutional declaration offered no explicit protections for Syria’s religious diversity. It also centralises power in ways that undermine pluralism.

    Article 3 of the constitutional declaration states that the “religion of the president of the republic is Islam” and “Islamic jurisprudence is the principal source of legislation”. Officials have clarified that any future parliament would remain subordinate to Islamic law.

    The ideological basis and policy for sectarian violence in Syria remains deeply entrenched. A 14th-century fatwa (a religious edict) by Sunni Muslim scholar Ibn Taymiyyah branded Alawites as “infidels”. This fatwa continues to circulate in areas under government control.

    At the Brussels donors’ conference on Syria in March, Syrian foreign minister Asaad al-Shibani blamed “54 years of minority rule” for mass displacement and deaths – raising concerns about sectarian narratives. And the integrity of the investigation into the recent massacres have been questioned, notably by the Syrians for Truth and Justice human rights group.

    Criticisms have also been made over the inclusion of controversial figures to the newly formed Civil Peace Committee, which is tasked with healing the sectarian wounds left by Assad family rule. One of these figures, Sheikh Anas Ayrout, was reported 12 years ago to have made inciting comments against Alawites.

    Civil society organisations, including the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, have called on the government to issue protective religious rulings for minority communities. But their appeals have gone unanswered. And violence, particularly against Alawites in Homs and Aleppo, has surged dramatically.

    Five months after Assad’s fall, it seems that Syria is not witnessing the long hoped for fruition of its 2011 revolution, where pro-democracy protests swept through the country, but rather its continuing unravelling.

    The groups now in power had little to do with the revolution’s early democratic hopes. They have emerged from transnational jihadist networks with a radically different vision for Syria’s future.

    In the view of prominent Syrian intellectual Yassin al-Haj Saleh, Syria urgently needs a period of de-escalation and genuine political concessions. He argues for “taking two or three steps back … to move more firmly forward”. Political solutions must precede the creation of public institutions, not the other way around.

    If the cycle of sectarian violence is not broken, Syria risks sliding deeper into communal bloodshed that could permanently fracture the nation’s social fabric.

    The international community must act decisively. It has to apply concrete political pressure that makes the protection of all Syrians – regardless of sect – a non-negotiable foundation for Syria’s path forward.

    The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Syria faces renewed sectarian violence as government fails to deliver inclusivity – https://theconversation.com/syria-faces-renewed-sectarian-violence-as-government-fails-to-deliver-inclusivity-255974

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: How the weather got ‘stuck’ over the UK – and produced an unusually dry and warm spring

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Simon H. Lee, Lecturer in Atmospheric Science, University of St Andrews

    Wildfires have ignited in forests and on moorland across the UK in recent months. LSP EM/Shutterstock

    A “blocking” weather system lingering high above the UK has produced one of the driest, warmest and brightest starts to spring on record.

    April 2025 was the sunniest since records began in 1910. This followed the third-sunniest March, and both months saw temperatures well above average nationwide. On May 1, the temperature reached 29.3°C in Kew Gardens in London – a new record for the date.

    Meteorologists are warning of the potential for a summer drought, as the UK has seen roughly half its usual amount of rainfall for March and April. While farmers fret about this year’s harvest, some water companies are urging customers to help reservoir levels recover by limiting water use.

    Meanwhile, wildfires have engulfed forest and moorland in areas of Scotland, Wales and England.

    Most of the UK has experienced a record-dry spring so far.
    Met Office

    For several weeks, a stubborn area of high pressure over the UK has diverted the usual flow of mild, moist air from the North Atlantic like a boulder in a river. This is known as a blocking weather system.

    Within it, air descends, warms and dries, which is why this weather pattern tends to be linked to heatwaves and drought. Blocking is usually persistent, making it seem like the weather is stuck.

    Here’s how climate change may have played a role in setting up this unusual spring.


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    The human fingerprint

    The warming climate means that unusually warm weather is occurring more often and becoming more intense. At the same time, we can expect more periods of both severe drought and extreme rainfall. Sudden changes from drought to deluge, termed “weather whiplash”, are due to the intensification of the water cycle in a warmer atmosphere that can hold more water vapour.

    However, certain weather patterns are necessary to produce extreme weather. More blocking events in future could increase the chance of heatwaves or drought. But are blocking weather patterns becoming more common?

    It’s difficult to determine how weather patterns will change as a result of the rising concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, which is predominantly caused by the burning of fossil fuels.

    Part of the difficulty arises from the fact that weather patterns vary year to year. Several years in a row with more blocking events than usual could make it seem like blocking is increasing due to climate change, but it could simply be down to chance.

    As a result, it is difficult to detect the fingerprint of human activity from weather observations alone. For example, blocking weather patterns over Greenland during summer have happened more often in recent decades, which can enhance the melting of the ice sheet. But it isn’t clear that this trend is the result of human-induced climate change.

    Climate models do suggest future changes in the occurrence of blocking, however. These computer simulations, consisting of equations that describe the fundamental physics of the atmosphere, are the main tool scientists use to perform experiments that parse how the climate will behave in future.

    The blocking system is visible in the area of high pressure over Britain and Ireland.
    National Centers for Environmental Prediction/National Center for Atmospheric Research/NOAA Physical Sciences Laboratory, CC BY

    When scientists run climate model simulations with increased greenhouse gas concentrations the results consistently show a decrease in blocking events. But blocking generally happens more often in real life than model simulations, which reduces the confidence scientists have in future projections.

    Keeping track of the jet stream

    The movement of weather systems in Earth’s mid-latitudes – including over the UK – is linked to the jet stream, which is a fast-flowing river of air driven by the contrast in temperature between the poles and mid-latitudes.

    Some researchers have suggested that, because the Arctic is warming faster than the tropics, the jet stream may weaken and become more “wavy”, increasing the occurrence of blocking events, contrary to what most climate models show.

    Outside of the scientific community, this idea has become popular. However, the hypothesis remains controversial among scientists, and observational evidence has weakened in recent years.

    In fact, tens of kilometres above the Earth’s surface, near commercial aircraft cruising altitudes, the opposite trends are occurring: the temperature difference between the Arctic and mid-latitudes is increasing, acting to increase the strength of the jet stream.

    There are considerable challenges with understanding how climate change is affecting the large-scale atmospheric patterns which drive the weather we experience. These include large natural variability and imperfect climate models. Models mostly suggest a decline in blocking events with climate change, though this remains relatively uncertain compared with other aspects of the science.

    Overall, we can be confident that climate change is bringing warmer conditions in all seasons. Scientists also have strong evidence to suggest that drought conditions will become more common. These changes are already affecting food production, energy generation and water availability and these impacts will continue to worsen with climate change.


    Don’t have time to read about climate change as much as you’d like?

    Get a weekly roundup in your inbox instead. Every Wednesday, The Conversation’s environment editor writes Imagine, a short email that goes a little deeper into just one climate issue. Join the 45,000+ readers who’ve subscribed so far.


    Simon H. Lee has received funding from the Natural Environment Research Council and the National Science Foundation.

    Matthew Patterson receives funding from the Natural Environment Research Council in the UK via the the National Centre for Atmospheric Science.

    ref. How the weather got ‘stuck’ over the UK – and produced an unusually dry and warm spring – https://theconversation.com/how-the-weather-got-stuck-over-the-uk-and-produced-an-unusually-dry-and-warm-spring-255987

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: AI can guess racial categories from heart scans – they’re detecting bias not biological differences

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Tiarna Lee, Doctoral Candidate, School of Biomedical Engineering & Imaging Sciences, King’s College London

    Radiological imaging/Shutterstock

    Imagine an AI model that can use a heart scan to guess what racial category you’re likely to be put in – even when it hasn’t been told what race is, or what to look for. It sounds like science fiction, but it’s real.

    My recent study, which I conducted with colleagues, found that an AI model could guess whether a patient identified as Black or white from heart images with up to 96% accuracy – despite no explicit information about racial categories being given.

    It’s a striking finding that challenges assumptions about the objectivity of AI and highlights a deeper issue: AI systems don’t just reflect the world – they absorb and reproduce the biases built into it.


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    First, it’s important to be clear: race is not a biological category. Modern genetics shows there is more variation within supposed racial groups than between them.

    Race is a social construct, a set of categories invented by societies to classify people based on perceived physical traits and ancestry. These classifications don’t map cleanly onto biology, but they shape everything from lived experience to access to care.

    Despite this, many AI systems are now learning to detect, and potentially act on, these social labels, because they are built using data shaped by a world that treats race as if it were biological fact.

    AI systems are already transforming healthcare. They can analyse chest X-rays, read heart scans and flag potential issues faster than human doctors – in some cases, in seconds rather than minutes. Hospitals are adopting these tools to improve efficiency, reduce costs and standardise care.

    Bias isn’t a bug – it’s built in

    But no matter how sophisticated, AI systems are not neutral. They are trained on real-world data – and that data reflects real-world inequalities, including those based on race, gender, age, and socioeconomic status. These systems can learn to treat patients differently based on these characteristics, even when no one explicitly programs them to do so.

    One major source of bias is imbalanced training data. If a model learns primarily from lighter skinned patients, for example, it may struggle to detect conditions in people with darker skin.
    Studies in dermatology have already shown this problem.

    Even language models like ChatGPT aren’t immune: one study found evidence that some models still reproduce outdated and false medical beliefs, such as the myth that Black patients have thicker skin than white patients.

    Sometimes AI models appear accurate, but for the wrong reasons – a phenomenon called shortcut learning. Instead of learning the complex features of a disease, a model might rely on irrelevant but easier to spot clues in the data.

    Imagine two hospital wards: one uses scanner A to treat severe COVID-19 patients, another uses scanner B for milder cases. The AI might learn to associate scanner A with severe illness – not because it understands the disease better, but because it’s picking up on image artefacts specific to scanner A.

    Now imagine a seriously ill patient is scanned using scanner B. The model might mistakenly classify them as less sick – not due to a medical error, but because it learned the wrong shortcut.

    This same kind of flawed reasoning could apply to race. If there are differences in disease prevalence between racial groups, the AI could end up learning to identify race instead of the disease – with dangerous consequences.

    In the heart scan study, researchers found that the AI model wasn’t actually focusing on the heart itself, where there were few visible differences linked to racial categories. Instead, it drew information from areas outside the heart, such as subcutaneous fat as well as image artefacts – unwanted distortions like motion blur, noise, or compression that can degrade image quality. These artefacts often come from the scanner and can influence how the AI interprets the scan.

    In this study, Black participants had a higher-than-average BMI, which could mean they had more subcutaneous fat, though this wasn’t directly investigated. Some research has shown that Black individuals tend to have less visceral fat and smaller waist circumference at a given BMI, but more subcutaneous fat. This suggests the AI may have been picking up on these indirect racial signals, rather than anything relevant to the heart itself.

    This matters because when AI models learn race – or rather, social patterns that reflect racial inequality – without understanding context, the risk is that they may reinforce or worsen existing disparities.

    This isn’t just about fairness – it’s about safety.

    Solutions

    But there are solutions:

    Diversify training data: studies have shown that making datasets more representative improves AI performance across groups – without harming accuracy for anyone else.

    Build transparency: many AI systems are considered “black boxes” because we don’t understand how they reach their conclusions. The heart scan study used heat maps to show which parts of an image influenced the AI’s decision, creating a form of explainable AI that helps doctors and patients trust (or question) results – so we can catch when it’s using inappropriate shortcuts.

    Treat race carefully: researchers and developers must recognise that race in data is a social signal, not a biological truth. It requires thoughtful handling to avoid perpetuating harm.

    AI models are capable of spotting patterns that even the most trained human eyes might miss. That’s what makes them so powerful – and potentially so dangerous. It learns from the same flawed world we do. That includes how we treat race: not as a scientific reality, but as a social lens through which health, opportunity and risk are unequally distributed.

    If AI systems learn our shortcuts, they may repeat our mistakes – faster, at scale and with less accountability. And when lives are on the line, that’s a risk we cannot afford.

    Tiarna Lee receives funding from the EPSRC.

    ref. AI can guess racial categories from heart scans – they’re detecting bias not biological differences – https://theconversation.com/ai-can-guess-racial-categories-from-heart-scans-theyre-detecting-bias-not-biological-differences-254416

    MIL OSI – Global Reports