Category: Politics

  • MIL-OSI USA: Two Foreign Nationals Arrested in Serbia for Directing Interstate Stalking and Harassment Scheme Targeting Los Angeles-Based Critic of Chinese President Xi Jinping

    Source: US State of North Dakota

    Yesterday, Serbian law enforcement authorities arrested two foreign nationals, Cui Guanghai, 43, of China, and John Miller, 63, of the United Kingdom, at the request of the United States. Today, the United States unsealed its criminal complaint alleging that Cui and Miller coordinated and directed a conspiracy to harass, intimidate, and threaten a Los Angeles resident (the Victim) who had been publicly critical of President Xi Jinping.

    According to court documents, beginning in October 2023, Cui and Miller enlisted two individuals (Individual 1 and Individual 2) inside the United States to carry out a plot to prevent the Victim from protesting President Xi’s appearance at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in November 2023. The Victim had previously made public statements in opposition to the policies and actions of the PRC government and President Xi.

    Unbeknownst to Cui and Miller, Individual 1 and Individual 2 were affiliated with and acting at the direction of the FBI.

    In the weeks leading up to the APEC summit, Cui and Miller directed and coordinated an interstate scheme to surveil the Victim, to install a tracking device on the Victim’s car, to slash the tires on the Victim’s car, and to purchase and destroy a pair of artistic statutes created by the Victim depicting President Xi and President Xi’s wife.

    A similar scheme took place in the spring of 2025, after the Victim announced that he planned to make public an online video feed depicting two new artistic statutes of President Xi and his wife. In connection with these plots, Cui and Miller paid two other individuals (Individual 3 and Individual 4), approximately $36,500 to convince the Victim to desist from the online display of the statues. Unbeknownst to Cui and Miller, Individual 3 and Individual 4 were also affiliated with and acting at the direction of the FBI.

    If convicted, Cui and Miller face the following maximum penalties: five years for conspiracy and five years for interstate stalking.

    The FBI is investigating the case. The United States thanks the Ministry of Justice of Serbia, the Ministry of Interior of Serbia, and the Republic Public Prosecutor’s Office of Serbia for the assistance in this matter. The United States will seek extradition of Cui and Miller and looks forward to working in partnership with the Republic of Serbia’s Prosecutor’s Office and the Ministry of Justice.

    Assistant U.S. Attorneys David Ryan and Amanda B. Elbogen for the Central District of California, and Trial Attorneys Leslie Esbrook and Menno Goedman of the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section are prosecuting the case, with valuable assistance provided by Assistant U.S. Attorney Benjamin P. Taibleson for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, and Trial Attorney Goran Krnaich of the Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs.

    A criminal complaint is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Two Foreign Nationals Arrested in Serbia for Directing Interstate Stalking and Harassment Scheme Targeting Los Angeles-Based Critic of Chinese President Xi Jinping

    Source: United States Attorneys General 13

    Yesterday, Serbian law enforcement authorities arrested two foreign nationals, Cui Guanghai, 43, of China, and John Miller, 63, of the United Kingdom, at the request of the United States. Today, the United States unsealed its criminal complaint alleging that Cui and Miller coordinated and directed a conspiracy to harass, intimidate, and threaten a Los Angeles resident (the Victim) who had been publicly critical of President Xi Jinping.

    According to court documents, beginning in October 2023, Cui and Miller enlisted two individuals (Individual 1 and Individual 2) inside the United States to carry out a plot to prevent the Victim from protesting President Xi’s appearance at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in November 2023. The Victim had previously made public statements in opposition to the policies and actions of the PRC government and President Xi.

    Unbeknownst to Cui and Miller, Individual 1 and Individual 2 were affiliated with and acting at the direction of the FBI.

    In the weeks leading up to the APEC summit, Cui and Miller directed and coordinated an interstate scheme to surveil the Victim, to install a tracking device on the Victim’s car, to slash the tires on the Victim’s car, and to purchase and destroy a pair of artistic statutes created by the Victim depicting President Xi and President Xi’s wife.

    A similar scheme took place in the spring of 2025, after the Victim announced that he planned to make public an online video feed depicting two new artistic statutes of President Xi and his wife. In connection with these plots, Cui and Miller paid two other individuals (Individual 3 and Individual 4), approximately $36,500 to convince the Victim to desist from the online display of the statues. Unbeknownst to Cui and Miller, Individual 3 and Individual 4 were also affiliated with and acting at the direction of the FBI.

    If convicted, Cui and Miller face the following maximum penalties: five years for conspiracy and five years for interstate stalking.

    The FBI is investigating the case. The United States thanks the Ministry of Justice of Serbia, the Ministry of Interior of Serbia, and the Republic Public Prosecutor’s Office of Serbia for the assistance in this matter. The United States will seek extradition of Cui and Miller and looks forward to working in partnership with the Republic of Serbia’s Prosecutor’s Office and the Ministry of Justice.

    Assistant U.S. Attorneys David Ryan and Amanda B. Elbogen for the Central District of California, and Trial Attorneys Leslie Esbrook and Menno Goedman of the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section are prosecuting the case, with valuable assistance provided by Assistant U.S. Attorney Benjamin P. Taibleson for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, and Trial Attorney Goran Krnaich of the Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs.

    A criminal complaint is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Convicted felon sentenced to over 5 years in prison for firearm possession

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    BILLINGS – A convicted felon from Basin, Wyoming who possessed a firearm illegally was sentenced today to 66 months in prison to be followed by 3 years of supervised release, U.S. Attorney Kurt Alme said.

    Juan Ortiz, 48, pleaded guilty in September 2024 to one count of prohibited person in possession of a firearm and ammunition.

    U.S. District Judge Susan Watters presided.

    The government alleged in court documents that on or about August 29, 2023, Billings police were called to a house on Midland Road in Billings, Montana for a weapons complaint. At the house, police learned the Defendant, Juan Ortiz, was in possession of a firearm and had fled on foot. Police searched the area and located Ortiz. Nearby, police located a pistol that Ortiz had discarded. At the time Ortiz possessed the firearm, he had been, and knew he had been, convicted of multiple felony drug offenses in Montana and Wyoming.

    Assistant U.S. Attorney Kelsey Hendricks prosecuted the case, and the investigation was conducted by the ATF and Billings Police Department.

    This case is part of Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN), a program bringing together all levels of law enforcement and the communities they serve to reduce violent crime and gun violence, and to make our neighborhoods safer for everyone. On May 26, 2021, the Department launched a violent crime reduction strategy strengthening PSN based on these core principles: fostering trust and legitimacy in our communities, supporting community-based organizations that help prevent violence from occurring in the first place, setting focused and strategic enforcement priorities, and measuring the results. For more information about Project Safe Neighborhoods, please visit Justice.gov/PSN.

    XXX

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Former District Employee Sentenced for Extorting Money from Low-Income Individuals to Process Assistance Applications

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    WASHINGTON— Ruth Nivar, 57, a former D.C. Department of Human Services employee, was sentenced today in U.S. District Court to 24 months in federal prison for extorting money from low-income individuals to process applications for public assistance programs, even though it was part of her job responsibilities to do that work free of charge.

    The sentence was announced by U.S. Attorney Edward R. Martin Jr., FBI Special Agent in Charge Sean T. Ryan of the Washington Field Office Criminal and Cyber Division, and the District of Columbia Inspector General Daniel W. Lucas.

    Nivar pleaded guilty on January 13, 2025, to one count of Hobbs Act extortion under color of official right and to one count of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act extortion under color of official right. In addition to the 24-month prison term, Chief Judge James E. Boasberg ordered Nivar to serve 12 months of supervised release.

    According to court documents, beginning at least since 2018 and continuing through at last May 2023, Nivar used the authority of her public office to obtain money from public assistance applicants to which she was not entitled. Nivar preyed on impoverished, largely non-English speaking individuals who lacked the resources to navigate what can be the complicated process of obtaining health care coverage from the government. In 2022, after Nivar understood that law enforcement may have become aware of her scheme, she added an accomplice, a civilian who did not work for the D.C. government, to assist in the extortion scheme.

    Because Nivar worked on public assistance programs for the D.C. government, Nivar was able to provide information to her accomplice about eligibility requirements for applicants – including certain documents that needed to be submitted with applications – as well as information about applicants from the internal DHS database, including historical benefits information, status of benefits, identity verification, and dependent information. The accomplice then created online accounts and submitted application materials for health care coverage on behalf of the individuals they extorted. Nivar told individuals to pay her accomplice, who would then split the monies evenly with Nivar, even though it was Nivar’s duty to provide all these services for the community free of charge.   

    The accomplice, Yessica Moya, pleaded guilty in the same case on January 8, 2025, to one count of aiding and abetting Hobbs Act extortion under color of official right and to one count of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act extortion under color of official right. Her sentencing hearing is pending.

    This case was investigated by the FBI Washington Field Office and D.C. Office of Inspector General. It is being prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorneys Madhu Chugh and Will Hart of the Fraud, Public Corruption, and Civil Rights Section.

    24cr222

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Panel established to review EU duties on battery electric vehicles from China

    Source: World Trade Organization

    DS630: European Union — Definitive Countervailing Duties on New Battery Electric Vehicles from China

    China submitted its second request for the establishment of a dispute panel with respect to the definitive countervailing duties imposed by the European Union on new battery electric vehicles from China. The request also concerns the underlying investigation that led to the imposition of the duties. The EU had said it was not ready to accept China’s first request for the panel at a DSB meeting on 24 March .

    China said it considers the EU measures inconsistent with various WTO provisions. It added that it was open to constructive discussions and remains committed to resolving the dispute within WTO rules.

    The EU said it strongly maintains that its measures are entirely justified. The EU said it is confident it will succeed in this dispute

    The DSB agreed to the establishment of the panel. 

    Australia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, India, Japan, Kazakhstan, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, Norway, the Russian Federation, Singapore, Switzerland, Thailand, Türkiye, the United Kingdom and the United States reserved their third-party rights to participate in the proceedings.

    DS597: United States — Origin Marking Requirement (Hong Kong, China)

    The United States again raised the matter of the panel ruling in DS597, which was circulated on 21 December 2022 and which the US appealed on 26 January 2023. The US said it was raising the matter again as a result of further developments in Hong Kong, China regarding free speech and human rights. The US referred to its previous statements regarding its position on essential security and its reasons for placing this item on the DSB agenda.

    Hong Kong, China said it was disappointed that the United States continues to raise the matter at DSB meetings. It said the panel ruling in DS597 provided an impartial assessment and the interpretation of WTO agreements cannot be unilaterally rewritten by WTO members.

    China reiterated its concern over the item being placed again on the DSB agenda. It said the security exception under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 is not entirely self-judging, as found by the panel in DS597 and six previous panels.

    DS588: India — Tariff Treatment on Certain Goods in the Information and Communications Technology Sector

    India and Chinese Taipei said they sought to continue engagement with each other for a resolution of this dispute. They again requested additional time for the DSB to consider for adoption the panel report circulated on 17 April 2023 in the case initiated by Chinese Taipei regarding India’s tariffs on certain high-tech goods.

    The parties asked that the DSB further delay consideration of the panel report until 24 October 2025. The DSB had agreed to six previous requests from India and Chinese Taipei to delay consideration of the reports.

    The DSB agreed to the latest requests from Chinese Taipei and India.

    Appellate Body appointments

    Colombia, speaking on behalf of 130 members, introduced for the 86th time the group’s proposal to start the selection processes for filling vacancies on the Appellate Body. The extensive number of members submitting the proposal reflects a common interest in the functioning of the Appellate Body and, more generally, in the functioning of the WTO’s dispute settlement system, Colombia said.

    The United States said it does not support the proposed decision and noted its longstanding concerns with WTO dispute settlement that have persisted across US administrations. The US said the panel report in DS597 provided examples of its concerns regarding WTO dispute settlement overreach. The US reiterated that fundamental reform of WTO dispute settlement is needed and that it will reflect on the extent to which it is possible to achieve such a reformed WTO dispute settlement system.

    More than 20 members took the floor to comment, one speaking on behalf of a group of members. Several members urged others to consider joining the Multi-party interim appeal arrangement (MPIA), a contingent measure to safeguard the right to appeal in the absence of a functioning Appellate Body. 

    Colombia, on behalf of the 130 members, said it regretted that for the 86th occasion members have not been able to launch the selection processes. Ongoing conversations about reform of the dispute settlement system should not prevent the Appellate Body from continuing to operate fully, and members shall comply with their obligation under the Dispute Settlement Understanding to fill the vacancies as they arise, Colombia said for the group.

    Surveillance of implementation

    The United States presented status reports with regard to DS184, “US — Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan”,  DS160, “United States — Section 110(5) of US Copyright Act”, DS464, “United States — Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures on Large Residential Washers from Korea”, and DS471, “United States — Certain Methodologies and their Application to Anti-Dumping Proceedings Involving China.”

    The European Union presented a status report with regard to DS291, “EC — Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products.”

    Indonesia presented its status reports in DS477 and DS478, “Indonesia — Importation of Horticultural Products, Animals and Animal Products.” 

    Next meeting

    The next regular DSB meeting will take place on 23 May 2025.

    Share

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Press Briefing Transcript: African Department, Spring Meetings 2025

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    April 25, 2025

    PARTICIPANTS:

    Speaker: ABEBE AEMRO SELASSIE, Director, African Department, IMF

    Moderator: KWABENA AKUAMOAH-BOATENG, Communications Officer, IMF

    *  *  *  *  *

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Good morning, good afternoon, and good evening to all of you here in the room and those joining us online. My name is Kwabena Akuamoah-Boateng.  I am with the Communications Department of the IMF, and

    I will be your moderator for today. 

    Welcome to today’s press briefing on the Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa. I am pleased to introduce Abebe Aemro Selassie, Director of the IMF’s African Department.  Abebe will share key insights from our new report titled Recovery Interrupted

    But before I turn to Abebe, a reminder that we have simultaneous interpretation in French and Portuguese, both online and in the room.  And the materials for this press briefing, the report, are all available online at IMF.org/Africa. Abebe, the floor is yours.

    MR. SELASSIE: Good morning and good afternoon to colleagues joining us from the region and beyond. Thank you for being here today for the release of our April Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa.

    Six months ago, I highlighted our region’s sluggish growth, and the steep political and social hurdles governments had to overcome to push through essential reforms.  Today, that fragile recovery faces a new test: the surge of global policy uncertainty so profound it is reshaping the region’s growth trajectory.

    Just when policy efforts began to bear fruit, with regional growth exceeding expectations in 2024, the region’s hard-won recovery has been overtaken by a sudden realignment of global priorities, casting a shadow over the outlook.  We now expect growth in Sub-Saharan Africa to ease to 3.8 percent in 2025 and 4.2 percent in 2026, marked down from our October projections, and these have been driven largely by difficult external conditions: weaker demand abroad, softer commodity prices, and tighter financial markets.

    Any further increase in trade tensions or tightening of financial conditions in advanced economies could further dampen regional confidence, raise borrowing costs further, and delay investment.  Meanwhile, official development assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa is likely to decline further, placing extra strain on the most vulnerable population.

    These external headwinds come on top of longer-standing vulnerabilities. High debt levels constrain the ability of many countries to finance essential services and development priorities.  While inflationary pressures have moderated at the regional level, quite a few countries are still grappling with elevated inflation, necessitating a tighter monetary stance and careful fiscal policy.

    Against this challenging backdrop, our report underscores the importance of calibrating policies to balance growth, social development, and macroeconomic stability.  Building robust fiscal and external buffers is more important than ever, underpinned by credibility and consistency in policymaking.

    In particular, there is a premium on policies to strengthen resilience: mobilize domestic revenue, improve spending efficiency, and strengthen public finance management and fiscal framework and fiscal frameworks to lower borrowing costs.  Reforms that enhance growth, improve the business climate, and foster regional trade integration are also needed to lay the groundwork for private sector-led growth.  High growth is imperative to engender the millions of jobs our region needs. 

    A strong, stable, and prosperous Sub-Saharan Africa is important for its people but also the world.  It is the region that will be the main source of labor and incremental investment and consumption demand in the decades to come.  External support as the region goes through its demographic transition is of tremendous strategic importance for the future of our planet. 

    The Fund is doing its part to help, having dispersed over $65 billion since 2020 and more than $8 billion just over the last year.  Our policy advice and capacity development efforts support more countries still. 

    Thank you and I’m happy to answer your questions. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Thank you, Abebe. Before we turn to you for your questions, a couple of ground rules, please. If you want to ask a question, raise your hand, and we’ll come to you.  Identify yourself and your organization and please limit it to one question.  For those online, you can use the chat function, or you can also raise your hand, and then we’ll come to you.  I will start from my right. 

    QUESTIONER: Good morning.  Thank you for taking my question.  You mentioned several things in your report.  The recovery that is going on the continent as well as some of the challenges that the continent is facing and the dividends that the continent currently has in its youth.  Leaders on the continent are working — I was at an event yesterday where they are looking at ways to raise funds to develop projects.  So, what is your recommendation for projects?  We’re seeing a need for projects like this as well as revenue mobilization on the continent.  So, is your recommendation to leaders on the continent on how to source these funds that are needed, given that some of the advanced economies are cutting back? 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: All right, any related questions before we go to Abebe?

    QUESTIONER: Abebe, you just made the point that the recovery has been hit by these uncertainties.  Beyond just policy direction, is there any scope to do anything in terms of, for example, maybe you dispense some money though, but maybe a little more to expect — to countries that are coming off defaults and what have you to help in this recovery, even at such a time?  This is also aided by, beyond the fact that some are coming, they have no buffers whatsoever.  And then, coming from defaults, things become very difficult for some of these countries to even have the money to do this.  Could there be any extra funding, even if on a regional level, to back the policy prescriptions that you have proposed? 

    MR. SELASSIE: I think there’s two different points here. The first one is more of a broader meta point, whether financing is the only constraint that is hindering more investment, more robust economic activity, and job creation. Of course, financing plays a role, but it is not the only constraint. It depends on country-to-country circumstances, what sectors we are talking about.  But it really is important to recognize that there are many other things that can be done to engender higher growth to facilitate more investment. 

    One of the issues that we have seen in our region over the years is that a lot of growth has –in many countries– been driven by public spending and public investment for many years.  That, of course, has made a major contribution.  It has facilitated all the investment that we have seen in infrastructure, building schools, building clinics.  So, that has a role to play. But I would say that going forward it will be as important to see if we can find ways in which the private sector is the main engine of growth. So, there are reforms that can be done to facilitate this growth. 

    The second one I am sensing from both your questions is about the circumstance right now where a combination of cuts in aid [and] tighter financing conditions are causing dislocation [and difficulties for governments. We have been, more than anybody else, stressing just what a difficult environment our governments have been facing.  We have been talking about the brutal funding squeeze that countries are under.  It has ebbed a little bit and flowed, you know, like the external market conditions, for example. There have been periods when they have been opened and some of our market access countries have been able to borrow, and then other periods where they have been closed, and we are going through one right now.  And this is on top of the cuts in aid that we have seen and tighter domestic financing conditions.  

    When this more cyclical point is playing out, I think it’s important for countries to be a bit more measured in how they are seeking to tackle their development needs.  So, maybe it means a bit more relying on domestic revenue mobilization, expenditure prioritization when conditions are particularly difficult as they are now, and, as I said earlier, going back to see what can be done to find ways to engender growth over the medium-term.  But it is a difficult period, as we note in our report, and one that is causing quite a bit of dislocation to our countries. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: I will come to the middle. The lady in the front.

    QUESTIONER: My first question is around recovery, of course, your reports are called “interrupted”.  So, with recovery slipping, growth downgraded, debt pressures mountain, is Sub-Saharan Africa at risk of another lost decade?  Because in your report you mentioned that the last four years have been quite turbulent for Africa, and we are trying to get back on track.  What is IMF’s message on bold actions that leaders must take now to avoid being left behind in the global economy and to avoid Africa being in a permanent state of vulnerability?  Because we always hear that we are in a permanent state of vulnerability.  Then for Nigeria, macros are under threat right now.  How can the government — what are your suggestions on how the government can actually push through deep reforms that deliver tangible growth for its people?  Of course, for your report, you did mention the millions and millions of people that you know live below $2.15 a day. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Any more Nigeria questions? I will take the gentleman right here.

    QUESTIONER: In your report you said that debt has stabilized.  And when you look at Nigeria’s debt profile, what insights can you share as to where the borrowings are going to?  Are you seeing more of long-term loans or short-term loans?  So that’s one.  So, what — recently the World Bank expressed concerns about the performance of Nigeria’s statistical body, saying that the institution is performing Sub optimally.  Do you share that sentiment?  Thank you very much. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: I will take one more on Nigeria. The gentleman in the first row.

    QUESTIONER: I [would] like to know in specific terms, Nigeria has already undertaken several reforms, especially removed oil subsidies and floated the naira.  What more specific things do you expect of Nigeria in terms of reform?

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: All right, thank you. Abebe?

    MR. SELASSIE: So, in terms of the reforms that have been going on in Nigeria and the particularities of the challenge, the first thing to note is that we have been really impressed by how much reforms have been undertaken in recent years. Most notably, trying to go to the heart of the cause of the macroeconomic imbalances in Nigeria, which are related to the fact that, oil subsidies were taking up a very large share of the limited tax revenues that the government have and not necessarily being used in the most effective way to help the most vulnerable people. The issues related to the imbalances on the external side with the exchange rate extremely out of line. 

    So it’s been really good to see the government taking these on, head-on, address those, and also beginning to roll out the third component of the reforms that we have been advocating for and of course, the government has been pursuing, which is to expand social protection, to target generalized subsidies to help the most vulnerable.  This has all been very good to see, but more can be done, particularly on the latter front, expanding social protection and enhancing a lot more transparency in the oil sector so that the removal of subsidies does translate into flow of revenue into the government budget.  So, there is still a bit more work to do in these areas. 

    We just had a mission in Nigeria where there was extensive discussions on these and other issues on the macroeconomic area, but also other areas where there is a need to do reforms to engender more private sector investment and also how more resources can be devoted to help Nigeria generate the revenues it so desperately needs to build more schools, more universities, and, of course, more infrastructure.  So, there is a comprehensive set of reforms that Nigeria can pursue that would help engender more growth and help diversify the economy away from reliance on oil.  And this diversification is, of course, all the more important given what we are seeing happening to commodity prices.  So, I think this is an important agenda. 

    Second, as the government is doing this, of course there will be a financing need.  And here what is needed is really a judicious and agile way of dealing with the financing challenges the country faces.  In the long run, the financing gap can only be filled by permanent sources such as revenue mobilization.  But in the interim, carefully looking at all the options the country must borrow in a contained way will be part of that solution.  And I think the government has been going about this prudently and cautiously so far, and we are encouraged by that. 

    And lastly, on data issues in Nigeria we really applaud the effort the government’s making to try and revise and upgrade data quality in Nigeria.  This task is not an easy one in our countries, given the extent of informality there is, given the extent of relative price changes that play out in our economies.  So doing this cautiously is what is needed methodically.  And that is exactly what we see happening.  We welcome, though, the efforts the government is making because without good data, it is difficult to make good policies.  So, we really applaud the effort the government is making to try and upgrade data quality. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: We will take a round of questions online.

    QUESTIONER: There are bills in the UK Parliament and the New York State Assembly that aim to force holdout private creditors to accept debt treatments on comparable terms to other creditors and to limit or stop such litigation.  Are these bills needed, do you think, or is the current international debt architecture sufficient?  So, you know, IMF, DSAs, creditor groups, the common framework, where applicable. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Please go ahead with your question.

    QUESTIONER: Earlier this month, the IMF reached a staff-level agreement with Burkina Faso to complete the Third Review of the country’s program.  So as part of the review, the IMF allowed a greater fiscal flexibility, allowing Burkina Faso to raise its public deficit target to 4 percent, up from the 2 percent cap set by the West African Economic Monetary Union.  So, given that the country’s challenges, such as persistent insecurity, high social demands, are common across the region, wouldn’t it be wiser to consider applying this flexibility more broadly to the West African Economic Monetary Union?  And my second question will be about the downward revision of the growth forecast for 2025 and 2026 in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Does the IMF view this new crisis – I am talking about the global uncertainty and the recent U.S. tariff measures.  Does the IMF view this crisis as potentially more severe and with broader consequences for the region than previous shocks such as COVID and the war in Ukraine? 

    MR. SELASSIE: On the first question on debt workouts and the challenges there, I am not fully informed about the specifics of the bills that Rachel, you are talking about, indeed, we have seen from time to time some private creditor groups holding out, trying to hold out, but I am not sure that a bill is what’s needed, but rather, force of argument to try and bring people to the table. And in recent restructurings, at least I am not aware of this being the main hindrance in advancing discussions.  There have been many other factors, including just the complexity of the current creditor landscape, that have played a role. 

    On Burkina Faso, flexibility under the program or the deficit targets for the WAEMU countries more generally, just it is important to distinguish between particular years’ fiscal deficit targets that the government wants to pursue and we, incorporate in the program and just the more medium-term criteria, convergence criteria that there is for the WAEMU countries. 

    So, the 3 percent target criteria are for the medium- to long-term.  And it has been very clear that when there are shocks or when there are pressing social development needs, countries do have the scope to deviate from that.  In fact, often the constraint on the Sahel countries has been not having enough, sufficient, enough financing to be able to meet these to advance development objectives.  The other constraint of course is that overall, the more you exceed this 3 percent target and add to the overall debt burden, the more you are going to have – you are likely to build up debt vulnerabilities. 

    So, in the work that we do with countries, whether it is Burkina Faso or other WAEMU countries or indeed beyond, what we try and help with is of course to help countries strike this balance between addressing the immediate and pressing needs that they have while avoiding medium-term debt sustainability problems.  I think one is just thinking about how to strike this balance.  And then second, we put resources on the table very cheaply to help countries, avoid, at least in the near term, more difficult financing difficulties.  So, for Burkina and others, it is just about striking this balance.

    And on growth, whether this latest shock is as bad for the region as the previous ones. I think it is really important also to point out that as difficult, I mean the last four or five years have been incredibly difficult time for our countries, a lot of challenges, a lot of dislocation, but there is also been quite a lot of resilience, and I think that is important to stress.  I would note that, even now, it is this year, 11 out of the 20 fastest growing economies in the world are from Sub-Saharan Africa.  So, there are quite a lot of countries that are going to be sustaining significant growth in the region.  So, we should also not lose sight of this resilience. 

    Second, and more broadly, the buildup of uncertainties I think is very negative.  And this is interrupting what we are seeing in terms of a recovery.  But growth is not, we are not projecting growth to collapse.  And our hope is that as things calm down, the region can resume its growth trajectory also.

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: We will take three more questions online, then we will come back to the room.

    QUESTIONER: I wanted to know about Senegal, in terms of whether funds would be repaid after the misreporting of data and if the IMF has learned anything from that?  And also, just if you can, the status of the IMF’s programs and even operations in Sudan and South Sudan? 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Please go ahead.

    QUESTIONER: The IMF is urging countries to focus on domestic revenue mobilization.  But you may have seen that South Africa’s Finance Minister has withdrawn the VAT increase that he had proposed in the budget, in the face of opposition from coalition partners.  Does the IMF see any alternative sources of revenue that are feasible for the South African government as the parties hoped?  And are there any lessons here for other countries trying to mobilize domestic revenue?                                                         

    QUESTIONER: Building on the question that Hilary has asked that the REO does make the case for domestic revenue mobilization, and you made that argument, I believe, in the last two Regional Economic Outlook reports as well.  But poverty is still endemic.  Incomes, as far as I can tell, have not really recovered to pre-pandemic levels.  So other than broadcast to tax exemptions what else can be done to raise tax-to-GDP ratios?  One last question on this.  Has there been any progress that has been made in the Sovereign Debt Roundtable in deciding how debt from Afreximbank, and Trade and Development Bank should be treated, at least under the common framework for countries like Ghana and Zambia?  Now, do they qualify to not have their debt restructured in the same way that the IMF, the World Bank’s credit lines?

    MR. SELASSIE: On Senegal, I was recently in Dakar for discussions building on work that our team has been doing. What we are waiting for is the government to finalize the work that’s ongoing.  Right now, the audits are going on and reconciliation work is going on. 

    On the extent of domestic and external debt.  We have been very clear in welcoming the transparency and really robust and collegial way in which the government has been engaging on the issues that have arisen in the misreporting case and we look forward to the numbers stabilizing, and engaging in discussions on the next steps in terms of bringing the, the findings to our Executive Board and next steps in our engagement with Senegal. 

    On South Sudan, it has just been a difficult period of course for South Sudan.  They have been hosting hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing from the conflict in the north.  The conflict has also interrupted, disrupted heavily their main source of tax revenue, oil exports through the pipeline.  So, it’s been a really wrenching period.  Over the last three, four years we have provided, you know, we have been trying to provide South Sudan with emergency financing and trying to find a way in which we can engage with a more structured longer-term program.  We remain hopeful that we are going to be able to do that.  But first and foremost, I think we need to see what can be done to make sure that the policy making environment is as robust and as strong as it is, and as transparent, so we can come in, step in and support South Sudan.

    On revenue mobilization, I want to just first link this to the point I made earlier that what we have observed and again there is a risk of generalizing, but what we’ve observed over the last 10, 15 years in the region is that governments have made a very significant effort to invest in really important infrastructure needs in building schools, in building health clinics and much else.  And you see very positive outcomes.  Look at the electricity coverage in our region, look at the human development indicators and how much they have moved over the years in the region. 

    But we have also seen that despite a lot of investment, for example, in electricity generation capacity and electricity coverage in our countries, many roads are being built.  The returns of all this investment have not been captured in the tax revenue, which is one of the points, the pressure points where debt levels have gone up and the interest-to-revenue ratio.  So, the interest payment-to-revenue ratio has also been rising.  And this has been one of the key points of vulnerability in many economies and why a few countries have gotten into debt difficulty and needed to restructure. 

    So going forward, I think it’s very clear that to be able to continue investing; to be able to continue expanding economies and the government doing its core function, it has to find more ways other than borrowing to address this. 

    Now, in the past, governments have been quick to cut spending, and that has, we found, again and again, to be very detrimental to development progress and growth outcomes.  I think this, again, at the risk of generalizing, was the approach that was generally pursued in the 1980s and found to be very problematic, very challenging, very depressing to growth.  So, we would very much love for countries to avoid this. When there are pressing spending needs, there’s generally only a couple of ways that you can finance this.  Spending cuts or revenue mobilization.  You can borrow, of course, but as I said, borrowing is not optimal. 

    Now, this doesn’t mean revenue mobilization is easy.  Far, far from it. It requires not only political engagement, but also a lot of communication, a lot of effort to show that the resources the government is trying to generate are going to be going to the right areas to help strengthen the social contract.  So, it’s a deep and engaged process, and we are very, very cognizant of that.  But I do think that this is the most optimal way, the most economically sensible way in which our countries can help address the tremendous development needs that we have.

    Now, specifically on South Africa, ultimately when issues like this arise, these are deeply domestic political issues to be resolved as to what the best way to do the financing is.  So, if a tax rate increase for a particular tax is not possible, then maybe finding ways to expand the tax base, maybe trying different tax angles or if all of those are not possible, then revisiting spending priorities may be one of the ways that countries must handle this.  And this is typically what we see playing out in countries in the region when financing constraints are binding. 

    So, whether it is in Kenya, South Africa, or other countries the issue of revenue mobilization is a live one, but one that is extremely complex.  We are very cognizant of that.  And one that requires quite a lot of consensus building, quite a lot of discussion to be able to advance, and of course, broader societal support.  And we absolutely see countries engaging in this and do what we can to help bring lessons from other countries where we are asked to.

    Then there was a question about the GSDR.  So, this Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable, this is the initiative launched by the Fund and the Bank to try and bring creditors and debtors together around the table to find ways in which debt work[outs] can be easier because you are discussing general principles rather than country-specific debt restructuring issues. And we have seen this making quite a lot of progress. Perhaps the most recent development has been the preparation of a debt work[out] playbook that is a very helpful document that has been put out building on the experience of recent work[outs].  What has worked particularly well.  What kind of information sharing ahead of debt work[outs] have been helpful in terms of accelerating debt processes.  Debt restructurings are one of the most contentious and challenging issues that there are between states, between creditors and debtors, and it requires quite a lot of discussion, and it is not such an easy thing to do, including what the parameter of debt should be.  I think one of the questions that was raised is about the debt parameter.  This is fundamentally an issue for the debtor countries and creditors to resolve, and intra-creditor disputes also have to be done. 

    So, in terms of the principles that generally we see creditors apply when these kinds of disputes arise about what the right parameter should be or not and who gets preferential treatment. I think there’s generally been two rules of thumb. One is that the terms in which new financing is being provided or the financing is provided, whether it’s commercial or concessional has been a factor that most creditors look at in terms of whether a particular credit should be included in the parameter or not, and then also the extent to which new financing is being made available.  So, what differentiates senior creditors like the IMF, the World Bank, of course, is that for most countries we operate providing concessional financing very long-term.  And we are the ones that come in and provide financing consistently through crisis and otherwise. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: We have time for one more round of questions. I will start with the gentleman in the front here. 

    QUESTIONER: The U.S. is your largest shareholder, and we are seeing mixed messages this week from the Treasury Secretary mentioning that he remains committed to the Fund but also calling on you to hold countries accountable to program performance, empower staff to walk away if reform commitment is lacking. 

    So, I wanted to ask you, should we expect the IMF spigot to start closing in response to U.S. pressure?  Or if not, are you changing your approach to countries, what you are telling them and how to deal with their issues?  Are you being a little more stringent in your requirements? 

    You have talked about Senegal, maybe Ghana, Ethiopia, related to that issue of the U.S stepping in.  The CEMAC negotiations this week, we saw American energy companies working with the CEMAC on repatriation of funds dedicated to the rehabilitation of oil sites.  I’m wondering if you have a stance on that, what the IMF position is?  I understand the U.S is trying to get the IMF involved in that.

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: All right, thanks. Gentleman. 

    QUESTIONER: Kenyan authorities here have indicated the need to present a credible fiscal framework as they try and unlock a new program for Kenya.  Would you offer more color into the discussions this week, noting again that the same credibility questions led to the cancellation or the termination of the program at its final review?  

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: We have a question online “what is the IMF’s view on Kenya’s debt position?”

    MR. SELASSIE: So, on the first question, I would like to refer you to Kristalina who gave comprehensive responses to the Secretary’s IMFC Statement. What I want to add though is that in the region, in Sub-Saharan Africa, in terms of programs, the calibration of reforms, incorporation of reforms, I would say that we are always in terms of each program has its particularities and what we always try and do in these programs is make sure that we’re striking a balance of helping countries address the long term challenges and also the cyclical challenges that are often the ones that cause them to come to us.  And I would say that I don’t think there are many countries that think that the adjustment efforts that they’re being asked to make are easy ones.

    On CEMAC.  Just to be very clear there is this dispute that is going on between member states, the BEAC, and oil companies with respect to what are called restitution funds.  The funds under contracts that countries have with oil companies are meant to be available to help restore the sites where oil is extracted back to their pre-extraction standards. 

    What has been a bit frustrating is that we are not privy to the contents of these documents. We have been calling on members and the companies involved to be transparent about this, to publish these documents.  They are after all documents that are about how countries natural resource wealth are used.  And we’ve been on record going seven, eight, nine years pushing for production sharing agreements, the terms of these things to be published so that each side can hold the other accountable.  I think that is the first thing that could be done to bring more transparency and light and understanding to the rest of the world about what is going on in these discussions. 

    Second, we have also made it clear to both parties that given that we do not have full information, it is difficult for us to know what to say.  But in general, any encumbrances in terms of how we look at foreign exchange reserves and these standards are published, any encumbrances like the type that we think there may be in the document, i.e., that is the expectation that these resources will be used for specific purposes means they’re not general use reserves.  So, they would not be classified as part of reserves. 

    On Kenya, we have had a very strong engagement with Kenya over the years and will continue to have such engagement going forward.  As we have noted, government has asked for a follow-on program to try and address the remaining challenges in Kenya, and we are discussing how to do that including in the context of these meetings. 

    It has been good to hear and see that the economy has been performing quite well in some parts.  Particularly the external adjustment front seems to have been proceeding well.  The current account has been narrowing.  So, there are quite a lot of strengths.  But also of course there remain fiscal challenges which were a significant part of the last program’s objectives that need to be advanced.  So, we are going to engage with the government and do everything that we can to be able to help it go forward. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Unfortunately, that is all the time we have. So, if you have any questions that we didn’t get to, please send them to me or to Media at IMF.org and we will try and get back to you as soon as possible.  So, also to mention that the report is now available at IMF.org/Africa.  The Spring Meetings continue.  Later this morning, we have the press briefing for the European Department and later in the afternoon we have the IMFC, and the Western Hemisphere Department press briefings. 

    On behalf of Abebe and the African and Communications Departments, thank you all for coming to this press briefing and see you next time. 

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Kwabena Akuamoah-Boateng

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/04/25/tr-04252025-african-department-press-briefing-transcript

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Press Briefing Transcript: IMFC, Spring Meetings 2025

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    April 25, 2025

    Speaker:

    Kristalina Georgieva, Managing Director, IMF

    Mohammed Aljadaan, IMFC Chair, Minister of Finance, Saudi Arabia

     

    Moderator:

    Julie Kozack, Director, Communications Department, IMF

     

     

    Ms.  Kozack: I am delighted to have with me the Chair of the IMFC, His Excellency Mohammed Aljadaan. He is also the Minister of Finance of Saudi Arabia. And of course, our Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva.

    Minister Aljadaan and the Managing Director will first share some takeaways with you and then when that is concludes we will turn to you for your questions.  Your Excellency, the floor is yours.

    Minister. Aljadaan: Thank you, Julie. Thank you, Kristalina. And thanks to all of you for being here. At the outset, let me highlight an important development that took place the first time in these meetings, which is the IMFC welcoming its 25th member, the third chair of Africa. Obviously, this is an important milestone that strengthens the voice and representation of the African continent in a global economic dialogue. I would like to thank all members who made this possible.  

    On the IMF agenda, going forward, the Fund must continue to focus on its core mandate, including supporting international monetary cooperation, encouraging the expansion of trade and economic growth, and discouraging policies that would harm prosperity.

    In recent days, the IMFC members welcomed steps to further strengthen the effectiveness of the IMF’s three core functions, its surveillance of global economic trends, its lending where we welcome the review of program design conditionality, and its capacity development assistance, which helps ensure growth in so many member countries and within countries.

    Addressing global debt vulnerabilities remains a priority for our members, especially for low‑income and vulnerable countries. They welcome the progress made in debt treatments under the G20 Common Framework. They also express their commitment to addressing global debt vulnerabilities in an effective, comprehensive, and systemic manner.

    Members encouraged the IMF and the World Bank to help advance the implementation of the three‑pillar approach to address debt service pressures. We appreciate the tremendous efforts of the members in shaping the medium‑term direction of the IMF and contributing to the Diriyah Declaration.

    The Diriyah Declaration represents a forward‑looking approach to strengthening the IMFC process and advancing governance reforms and has received full support from the members. Just to clarify, when I say the Diriyah Declaration, this is the Declaration that was prepared by the Deputies in their meetings in Saudi Arabia earlier this month in preparation for this meeting.

    Here we aim to ensure that the Fund remains well‑equipped to meet future challenges in line with its core mandate. Before I hand it over to Kristalina, I have to comment on the topic of the day, which I think a lot of people are talking about, trade tension. Many members have told me how the trade situation has created significant uncertainty. Indeed, the buzz word was uncertainty all over this week, and indeed it also carries with it market volatility, presenting real risks to the global growth and financial stability. But as Kristalina said recently, these threat conflicts have been like forgetting a pot boiling on a stove. Well, now that pot is boiling over. In other words, we should not be surprised that there are trade tensions. And this situation is an opportunity for us all to have constructive conversations about how we will move forward together. This is a challenging time, but I have always been optimist and absolutely make no apologies for that. I will explain to you why. History tells us that the bigger the challenge, the more it requires us to come together to convene and to have an honest conversation. That is exactly what happened this week. That is exactly the power of the IMF to actually be able to convene everybody around the same table in closed rooms and discuss issues in a constructive way.

    I have told colleagues, I arrived in Washington a week ago with a lot of noise in my ears from reading the news and following social media. I have told them, everyone that I met in the early days, please keep your thoughts cool, and we will see where we are going to end. Actually, today we are ending in a lot better position than when we started the week. People understand the consequences and are working together in a constructive manner to resolve tensions.  

    I am also confident that because of the IMF, the IMF is really watching us very closely, following the global situation and is really providing advice to its members in real‑time, offering an assessment of the potential impacts and the best way to proceed.  

    This week we have seen an incredible assurance confirming the position of the IMF and its convening power and contributing to positive development, including in relation to Syria. Gathering together to talk about Syria and building on our meetings in AIUla has given us a new sense of urgency and purpose, to turn a conflict‑affected state, which is Syria, into a stable and economically successful one, benefiting the region and the world. It is not just about the money. It is about the work that the IMF and other partners can deliver on capacity development, quality data, and timely advice.

    Again, I would like to thank Kristalina and the IMF staff. And I can tell you, it was an incredible, unanimous position today to thank the IMF for their incredible, incredible brain cells power, which was able really to produce a very comprehensive report about what is happening in the world in a very short period of time, and it was fantastic. Thank you, Kristalina. Thanks to all the IMF staff and thank you again for being here. The floor is yours.

    Managing Director: Thank you very much, Minister Aljadaan, for your kind words now, but above all for your exemplary leadership of the IMFC. I want to tell everybody here that the way you chaired the meetings brought the members together to speak openly, frankly and as a result to find a path to common understanding that is so necessary in the current environment because, as we all know, our meetings take place against a challenging backdrop. You have seen our World Economic Outlook. It shows that the global economy is facing a significant slowdown and also that risks are on the downside.

    Understandably Ministers and Governors are concerned, but at the same time they have also exhibited a remarkably constructive spirit in these meetings, coming together, showing willingness to take on the challenges facing the global economy. Minister Aljadaan laid out the substance and achievements of our discussions. Let me add just three points. First, Ministers and Governors agreed on the importance of reducing uncertainty and working together to clarify policies.

    Second, importantly, they recognized that they need to seize the moment to put their own houses in order. And I saw very firm resolve to tackle difficult and, in many cases, delayed reforms at home, to strengthen resilience, to remove impediments to productivity and lift up their medium and long‑term growth prospects, and to address underlying domestic imbalances which drive external imbalances. To put it simply, addressing external imbalances starts at home.

    Finally, we discussed how the IMF can help countries successfully navigate this period of change and build resilience. I was very heartened to hear from the membership strong support for our work to promote macroeconomic and financial stability and to do it through robust bilateral, multilateral and regional surveillance, be there for our members when they need to cope with balance of payments problems, finance—finance them, but also finance them with the clear objective that they can strengthen their economies. I can say the words of support for our capacity development, in other words, helping countries have strong institutions, strong policies. That support was overwhelming.

    At this period of complex challenges for the membership, they also gave us homework. I want to emphasize two areas where we will further deepen our work. One, do more work on external imbalances, dig deeper, when they could become a source of concern and provide advise how to address them through policies. Two, continue to scan the financial sector to identify potential sources of instability, especially in the non‑bank sector, and provide advice on how best to enhance resilience.

    Overall, what I can tell you is that what I heard this week was an incredible determination by our members to steer economies through this period of change and uncertainty. And it gave me confidence that we actually can take challenge and make opportunity, that we can have a more resilient, more balanced world economy.

    Like Minister Aljadaan, I started the week more anxious of our capacity as a global community to come together, and I finished the week with more confidence that this is exactly what we will do.

    Ms. Kozack: Thank you very much, Minister, Managing Director. We will now open the floor to your questions, so please raise your hand if you have a question and please identify yourself and your outlet. I will start here in the middle. I am going to go to the gentleman in the kind of White shirt. Yes, right here.

    Question: Thank you, Julie. Question for Minister Aljadaan and Managing Director Georgieva. You both pointed out that we ended a week in a way better position than when we started it. Managing Director, during your Curtain Raiser Speech, you also raised the hope that this week might be an opportunity for everybody to discuss. How do you feel like? Could you elaborate perhaps on how this week dialing down the uncertainty that you talked about and the global tensions when it comes to trade? Thank you very much.

    Managing Director: Finding a path to solutions starts from looking at the problem from a—seeing the problem with the same eye view. Let me start this again. To resolve a problem, you have different parties. To resolve a problem, they need to have information about the problem that allows them to have a meaningful conversation. I can say that I am very, very grateful to the staff of the IMF because what we did was to offer the members information that allows them to see what is ahead of them and expand their horizon. If you look at a problem only from a narrow point of view, it is difficult to have a meaningful conversation to resolve it.

    Secondly, what I saw was a genuine openness to present views in a candid way and to listen to each other.

    Third, and the third is the most important, it is a traction and engagement among members that could then bring a better—faster and better outcome. I do not want to sugarcoat. We still have quite a challenging time. It is challenging not just because of the tariffs and the uncertainty. It is also challenging that there are other transformational forces in play. Because of the overwhelming attention to tariffs, we stopped talking about other things, like artificial intelligence, demographics transition, and I think that that sense that we can have an engagement in a comprehensive way on a complex set of challenges, that came during the meetings quite strongly. Does it mean that everybody agrees with everybody else? No. But do we have an open conversation, engaged conversation with the fair space for everybody to present their views? Yes.

    Minister Aljadaan: Thank you. If I may, Julie, I think just to complement the Managing Director’s views, I think overall what do you need to resolve conflicts like this or tensions like this? A, you need to make sure that you understand the parties’ positions, where they are coming from, why they are taking these positions, and what are they seeking to achieve. Second, make sure that they actually talk. And that is largely what happened this week. So to have everybody who is party to all this trade tensions, which is almost everybody, all the members, around the same table in a candid discussion that is closed even—some of it has been in the restricted sessions—to really be open and talk about what are they doing, why they are doing it, what is their view of what is going to happen in the next even short period of time is very assuring. Sharing that information is very assuring. Understanding the implications of these actions on other nations, including low‑income countries, emerging economies and implications of that is actually very helpful for them to appreciate the consequences of their positions.

    I can tell you without—I cannot disclose some of the discussion that has taken place, but I can tell you there was a very clear, frank discussion, including a projection of a timeline for a resolution of some of these issues. So that is very assuring.

    Managing Director: Can I just add one point, that when people are in the same room, the abstract policies become more human because then we understand these policies are affecting people, and the whole world—the people of the whole world are then present, and that makes the conversation different. No longer it is an academic conversation. It is a very real-life conversation.

    Ms. Kozack: Thank you. I will go to this side. I will go to the second row, gentleman with the blue jacket and the glasses.

    Question: Thank you so much for taking my question. I am from Bangkok. Your Excellency, you have mentioned uncertainty around the world in your opening remarks. So, I want to ask specifically on the consequences for the emerging markets as a whole, and what is your policy advice for the situation and also do you see any short‑term lasting impacts to these countries? Thank you.

    Minister Aljadaan: I will give it a time and then you can complement. First of all, I look forward to our renewal meeting in Thailand next year and seeing the preparations from now, I think a lot of people are excited and waiting for our meetings there. I am sure it will be very constructive in the hospitable country of Thailand and the Kingdom of Thailand.

    Obviously emerging economies, particularly emerging economies with limited fiscal space have little room to maneuver to deal with shocks. And even if these shocks have been resolved, there is some lasting impact. The earlier, the faster that these shocks or trade tensions in this context is resolved, the better for everybody. But we are not in a perfect world and things may take time and countries may get an impact, and that is where the IMF excels. That is where is IMF capacity building, advice comes into actual real play. So, the Managing Director is here and her staff with an incredible talent will be able to actually provide that support to emerging economies.

    Managing Director: As a group, emerging markets by and large are generally highly open. They rely on—many of them rely on exports as an engine for growth. They are quite active in international bond markets, so because they are highly exposed, the impact on emerging markets is quite significant. Some of the emerging markets, especially those that were in a tougher position after the multiple shocks, also face very limited and some of them non‑existing policy space to act.

    We have downgraded growth projections for emerging markets and developing economies to 3.7 percent for 2025. This is a 0.6 percent downgrade. And to 3.9 percent for 2026. What does that mean? It means that some of them would see a significant slowdown in their convergence to higher‑income countries. And they are also seeking ways to overcome the challenges ahead. What works for them is emerging markets have been fantastic in building resilience to shocks. And when I look at the universe of emerging market economies, quite a number of countries have become more agile in their policymaking, are more mature in how they approach their fiscal and monetary policy. That puts them in a better position.

    To use an analogy, it is like they have gone through multiple periods of being tested and they got immune to shocks to a certain degree. They would be seeing possibly somewhat less inflationary pressure. Why? Because when you are on the receiving end of tariffs, what it means is that actually domestically you do not have pressure on prices. We can expect emerging markets to look at their policy tools very carefully. We urge them, be very careful with fiscal measures. Do not rush to provide fiscal support willy‑nilly because you cannot afford to lose fiscal space. Have a medium long‑term framework to rebuild this fiscal space. On the monetary policy side, watch pressures. We are saying inflation is likely to slow down but watch it and watch inflation expectations. Do what is necessary, given the data you have. And very important, allow the exchange rate to be a shock absorber.

    We have the integrated policy framework that offers advice to countries how to approach exchange rate issues with great care. You are an emerging market. Actually, the Minister is not saying that, but one thing emerging markets can do for themselves is, get your own house in order. Pursue reforms relentlessly because this is what makes you stronger.

    Ms. Kozack: We have time for just one last question. So, I am going to go second row, the gentleman in the blue suit.

    Question: Thank you, Ms. Kozack. Mr. Aljadaan, Managing Director Georgieva. I am from Lebanon. My question is addressed to both of you. How will the IMF support Syria and what role will it play in Syria’s reconstruction. Thank you.

    Ms. Kristalina Georgieva: Minister Aljadaan in the opening recognized that Syria has returned to the international community. We had a meeting with Syrian representatives in AIUla during an emerging market conference. We had a meeting on fragile and conflict‑affected states. And at that time, we made the first step to create a coordinating group so different institutions that can support Syria can start working together. We held a meeting here in Washington during the Spring Meetings. It was co‑chaired by Minister Aljadaan, President Banga and myself, with the Finance Minister and the Central Bank Governor of Syria. In this meeting we discussed how we can start rebuilding institutions and policy capacity in Syria and how different institutions can play on their comparative advantage to help. For the Fund specifically, what it means is, of course, cautiously but engage to first define data, what is available, how we can rebuild credible data capability.  

    Second, central bank capacity. How can we rebuild the functioning of Syria’s central bank.

    Third, tax policy and how can the country rebuild capacity to create revenues for its functions.

    We have appointed a Mission Chief for Syria. We have not had Article IV Consultations with Syria for a long, long time. We hope that we can contribute in putting the foundation of knowledge, economic policy knowledge in Syria to get the country back on track. 

    I mean, just imagine, they have been in a Civil War for 14 years. A big part of the population is not in Syria. They are in Lebanon. They are in Iraq. They are in Jordan. The fabric of the Syrian society is deeply wounded. It is going to take a lot of work by the Syrians themselves to rebuild it. This is when international organizations can play a constructive role. Lebanon, you are not asking about Lebanon.

    Question: I heard the meetings went quite well by the end, especially since the Lebanese Parliament voted about the banking sequencing. That is more in line with international standards, so what are you—

    Managing Director: You are not asking because you know. That is very good.

    Ms. Kozack: Minister, would you like to have the last word?

     

    Minister Aljadaan: I have a few things. First of all, I really thank the IMF and the World Bank in stepping up their support to Syria and other states who are emerging from fragility. Syria in particular is a case where we have an opportunity. We have a government that is willing, and we have regional partners who are also providing support and willing really to provide whatever it takes to make sure that we bring back Syria, support its people and make sure that we also move cautiously through that process, recognizing that obviously there are sanctions that we need to deal with and other impediments. But even with that, I think standing with them, providing capacity support and advice and some regional and bilateral, even financial support is very crucial. The Syrian people deserve that support. And that does not stop at Syria. We are talking about Syria as an example, we have Yemen, we have Palestine, we have Sudan, we have other countries that really need the support, including Lebanon. They need to know that the international community, if they put their act together, the international community will stand by them, so we will continue that.

    Ms. Kozack: We are almost five minutes over our time.

    Managing Director: Ask your question short, and we will try to answer.

    Ms. Kozack: And have a very brief answer.

    Managing Director: It is my fault. I am the one that is professorial.

     

    Question: My question is to the MD concerning the global uncertainty on trade tensions shaping sub‑Saharan Africa’s debt risk, servicing costs as well as our fiscal future and its coordination with creditors such as you, so how are Africa also in all of these conversations? Thank you.

     

    Managing Director: As Minister Aljadaan said, Africa was more present this time because we now have three sub‑Saharan African representatives in the IMFC. But beyond that, very much on our minds, quite a number of the Governors of the Fund spoke about the importance to pay attention to countries that are particularly severely affected by this turbulence because they have a high level of debt and that suppresses their ability to cope.

    By the way, countries with high level of debt are not just in sub‑Saharan Africa. We have them all over the world.

    What has been done during these meetings is threefold. First, very strong emphasis on the three‑pillar approach of the IMF and the World Bank for countries that experience liquidity constraints. They are not yet facing debt sustainability problems, but they are on the way to there. And for these countries to concentrate support for domestic resource mobilization, concentrate attention to how to mobilize more international financing and very important, concentrate on how the private sector can play a bigger role in the economy.   

    Second, for countries where debt is not sustainable, how to make debt restructuring faster and more effective. We have issued this week a playbook for debt restructuring that was the outcome of the Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable. What it shows are the steps that need to be taken.

    As you recall under the Common Framework, there was some confusion around how exactly to go about it, what is the timeline, what is the exact sequencing of steps. This is now being clarified. If we follow the playbook, we play by the book, we get debt restructuring in less than 12 months. And the third thing, very important for the Fund, is that our members have put in place a way to expand our capacity to finance low‑income countries through the Poverty Reduction Growth Trust so the Fund can step up financing for countries, so they do not need to—they do not need to go through a super painful adjustment because of this burden of debt. We can ease their path. But, again, we want to see countries act decisively on reforms so they—you do not borrow your way out of debt. You grow your way out of debt. So, when countries have that growth potential enhanced, then they can also reduce debt vulnerability. It was not very short. My apologies.

    Ms. Kozack: Minister, would you like to add?          

    Minister Aljadaan: I am fine. I think the Managing Director did a great job in answering.

    Managing Director: Look, you have to forgive me. I was for 14 years a professor. It kicks in.

     

    Minister Aljadaan: We enjoy it, Kristalina

    Managing Director: Thank you very much, everybody.

    Ms. Kozack: This does bring us to an end, so thank you for joining us. And let me just add that the full transcript of the press briefing will be available online on the IMF website. And, of course, should you have further questions, please do not hesitate to reach out to my colleagues at IMF media.org. Thank you.

     

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Wafa Amr

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/04/25/tr-04252025-imfc-press-briefing-transcript

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Cornyn Op-Ed: I’ve Worked Hand-In-Glove With Pres. Trump to Accomplish His Agenda During His First 100 Days

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Texas John Cornyn
    AUSTIN – Ahead of President Trump’s 100th day in office next week, U.S. Senator John Cornyn (R-TX) authored the following op-ed in the Houston Chronicle highlighting Congress and President Trump’s accomplishments during his second term so far, including swiftly confirming his Cabinet and passing a budget that unlocks the process to extend the Trump tax cuts for Texans and all Americans.
    I’ve worked hand-in-glove with President Trump to accomplish his agenda during his first 100 days
    Senator Cornyn
    Houston Chronicle
    April 24, 2025
    https://www.houstonchronicle.com/opinion/outlook/article/john-cornyn-donald-trump-first-100-days-20287545.php
    On Nov. 5, Americans went to the polls to elect President Donald Trump for a second term by a decisive margin. The message was clear: Americans were ready to turn the page on the last four years of failed policies under Democratic leadership.
    The question then became: could the new Republican majority hit the ground running, deliver on his ambitious agenda, and put the Senate back to work? As we near the end of President Trump’s first 100 days, the answer is a resounding yes. 
    The first step in delivering on this mandate was giving President Trump his team by confirming his Cabinet. The Senate provides an important role in giving advice and consent to the President’s nominees for important positions across the executive branch. So this was the first major hurdle to clear, and an opportunity to deliver the president an early win.
    President Trump selected many eminently qualified nominees for his Cabinet, including several Texans: John Ratcliffe, Scott Turner, and Brooke Rollins. I was proud to help shepherd all three of these impressive Texans through their respective committee hearings.
    While Republicans had secured a clear majority of 53 seats in the Senate, getting 50 members on the same page is never an easy task. Maneuvering in united government is sometimes even harder than in divided government. But on top of this inherent difficulty, Democrats insisted on pulling out all of the stops. They tried everything from exaggerated smear campaigns to all-night grandstanding. Some even demanded that their colleagues, “blow [the Senate] up.”
    Despite the doubts of our critics, Senate Republicans set a new standard for speed. I was proud to vote for every single one of the President’s Cabinet picks, and in just 10 weeks, the Republican-led Senate completed our first task at the fastest pace in a generation. By the end of February, the Senate had confirmed 13 of the President’s nominees, whereas only six were confirmed at that point during Biden’s presidency.
    Senate Republicans’ effectiveness is particularly impressive in comparison to last year’s Senate under failed Democrat leadership. In 2024, the Senate spent only 112 days in session. There were nine Mondays on regular in-session weeks when the Senate flat-out wasn’t working. Compared to the average Texan working five days per week and 260 days annually, this was nothing but a sheer insult to the taxpayer. The inevitable result of Chuck Schumer’s skeleton of a schedule was failure. He failed to pass government funding on-time, failed to renew a farm bill, and only barely passed the annual defense authorization bill that ensures our troops get paid. 
    Senate Republicans have dramatically improved upon this lackluster performance. We have stayed in session and voting for the longest continuous period in 15 years to complete critical pieces of the America First agenda. After we confirmed the president’s Cabinet, we passed a budget that will unlock the process to extend the Trump tax cuts, which will prevent an average $3,000 tax increase on Texas families.
    I’m not new to working hand-in-glove with President Trump to accomplish his goals. During President Trump’s first term, I served as majority whip, or as I like to call it, “chief vote counter.” In this role, I was responsible for ensuring he had the votes to confirm his Cabinet, Supreme Court nominees like Justices Brett Kavanaugh and Neil Gorsuch, and a record number among recent presidents of judicial nominees to district and appeals courts across the nation. We partnered on key pieces of landmark legislation like the Trump Tax Cuts, the first comprehensive tax reform legislation in years, which contributed to the fastest wage growth in close to a decade and the lowest unemployment rate in nearly half a century.
    Suffice it to say, elected Republicans are delivering on the mandate we received from the American people in an historic way, and I’m excited to be a part of what’s to come. I’ve voted for every single nominee in both his first term and his second thus far. I’ve helped the president deliver historic wins for Texans and Americans around the country.
    We’ve accomplished so much in his first 100 days, and together, we’re just getting started.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Rep. Grothman Condemns Milwaukee County Judge for Shielding Violent Illegal Immigrant

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Glenn Grothman (R-Glenbeulah 6th District Wisconsin)

    Congressman Glenn Grothman (R-WI) released the following statement in response to reports that Milwaukee County Circuit Court Judge Hannah Dugan was arrested for obstructing the arrest of an illegal immigrant:

    “It is shameful, though sadly no longer shocking, that a liberal judge would go so far as to obstruct federal law enforcement in order to protect a violent illegal immigrant from arrest,” said Congressman Grothman. “This disgraceful conduct undermines the rule of law, jeopardizes public safety, and sends the message that political ideology comes before justice.”

    “The illegal immigrant Judge Dugan allegedly sought to shield, Eduardo Flores-Ruiz, has a lengthy criminal history that includes charges of strangulation and suffocation, battery, and domestic abuse. Ruiz had already been deported once, illegally re-entered the United States, and again committed violent crimes while unlawfully present in the country.”

    “Americans are growing increasingly frustrated with public officials who use their positions of power to shield individuals who have no legal right to be in this country, especially those who pose a threat to our communities,” Grothman continued. “If these allegations are true, this judge violated the trust of the people she was elected to serve. Far too many public officials today seem either unable or unwilling to understand why our immigration laws must be enforced. We stand firmly behind President Trump as he works to reestablish the rule of law and restore accountability.”

    -30-

    U.S. Rep. Glenn Grothman (R-Glenbeulah) serves the people of Wisconsin’s 6th Congressional District in the U.S. House of Representatives.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Legal conformity of late amendments to the IHR – Interpretation of Article 55(2) – E-001538/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001538/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Gerald Hauser (PfE)

    In its answer to parliamentary question P-000805/2025[1]the Commission writes that all proposals submitted in September 2022 for amendments to the International Health Regulations (IHR) were circulated to the States Parties on 16 November 2022, i.e. 17 months prior to the 77th World Health Assembly (WHA) on 27 May 2024, meaning that the four-month deadline stipulated by Article 55(2) IHR was met.

    Article 55(2) IHR reads as follows:

    ‘The text of any proposed amendment shall be communicated to all States Parties by the Director-General at least four months before the Health Assembly at which it is proposed for consideration.’

    The World Health Organization (WHO) did in fact submit a comprehensively revised amendment text on 17 April 2024, which was further modified until it was adopted on 1 June 2024.

    • 1.Is a fully revised draft tabled shortly before the WHA still regarded as the ‘same’ amendment?
    • 2.If so, where in the WHO statutes is that determined?
    • 3.What is the legal basis for the Commission’s statement that the four-month deadline was met?

    Submitted: 15.4.2025

    • [1] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-10-2025-000805-ASW_EN.html
    Last updated: 25 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Experts of the Committee against Torture Praise Measures to Prevent Torture in Ukraine, Ask about Alleged Torture of Russian Prisoners of War and Reports of Corruption and Torture in Prisons

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Committee against Torture today concluded its consideration of the seventh periodic report of Ukraine, with Committee Experts praising the State’s legislative and policy measures to prevent torture, and raising questions about alleged torture of Russian prisoners of war, as well as reports of torture and corruption in prisons.

    Claude Heller, Committee Chair and Country Co-Rapporteur, said Ukraine had suffered a devastating war since the full-scale invasion by the Russian Federation on 24 February 2022, in flagrant violation of international law and the United Nations Charter.  More than three years of war had led to numerous military and civilian deaths and serious violations of international human rights law, including summary executions, torture and ill-treatment, and arbitrary detentions.

    Mr. Heller said that, over the past decade, Ukraine had made considerable amendments to legislation and ministries, including with respect to the occupied territories.  He welcomed that the national strategy for human rights had been updated to include strategic goals for combatting torture, the appointment of human rights inspectors in places of detention, and the State’s ratification of the Rome Statute in 2024.

    Since February 2022, Mr. Heller said, 240 Russian prisoners of war had reported suffering torture during the armed conflict in Ukrainian detention centres.  What measures had been taken in cases where torture had been confirmed?  The Committee was concerned about reports of illegal detentions by Ukrainian authorities. How many people had been detained illegally?

    Peter Vedel Kessing, Committee Expert and Country Co-Rapporteur, said prisons under Ukrainian control were suffering under the war. Some faced frequent shelling by Russian troops, and were reportedly becoming hotbeds of torture and corruption. Newly arrived prisoners were reportedly routinely beaten, and there was reported overcrowding in prisons.  What steps had been taken to reduce overcrowding and improve prison conditions?

    Introducing the report, Liudmyla Suhak, Deputy Minister of Justice for European Integration of Ukraine and head of the delegation, said Ukraine was systematically implementing measures to prevent and combat torture at the national level. The 2021 strategy for combatting torture in the criminal justice system introduced a system for combatting torture by law enforcement, while the national human rights strategy had been updated to include specific strategic goals for combatting torture.

    Ms. Suhak said that the conditions of detention for Russian prisoners of war complied with international humanitarian law and had been inspected 112 times by the International Committee of the Red Cross between 2018 and 2024.  To ensure that prisoners of war were not tortured during transfers to detainment camps, the delegation added, clear legal procedures had been developed.  Military officials were trained on the rights of prisoners of war.

    The delegation said that the State party had undertaken measures to combat corruption and ill-treatment of inmates in the penitentiary system.  An internal security unit had been created to investigate reports of violations by penitentiary staff and inmates.  In 2024, persons responsible for observing the rights of convicts and preventing torture were also introduced into the staff of 56 penal institutions.

    In closing remarks, Mr. Heller said that the State party’s efforts to engage in the dialogue were commendable in the context of the bloodthirsty war.  The issues discussed were not issues of the past but were ongoing.  Ukraine sought to protect its territorial integrity and the well-being of its population.  The rest of the world was hoping for an end to the war that respected the territorial integrity of Ukraine.  The Committee hoped that its next dialogue with Ukraine would take place in conditions of peace, prosperity and democracy.

    In her concluding remarks, Ms. Suhak said that Ukraine would actively work to implement the Committee’s concluding observations.  Tens of thousands of Ukrainian citizens were being held by Russia, and virtually every Ukrainian citizen who had been returned from Russia had suffered some form of torture.  Ukraine urged Russia to fully comply with its obligations under international law and to end its illegal war.  The Committee’s efforts would help to hold Russia to account.

    The delegation of Ukraine consisted of representatives from the Ministry of Social Policy; Coordination Centre for Legal Aid Provision; Prosecutor General’s Office; Security Service; Ministry of Defence; Ministry of Justice; State Migration Service; State Bureau of Investigation; National Police; Ministry of Health; the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations Office at Geneva; and the European Court of Human Rights.

    The Committee will issue concluding observations on the report of Ukraine at the end of its eighty-second session on 2 May.  Those, and other documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, will be available on the session’s webpage.  Summaries of the public meetings of the Committee can be found here, and webcasts of the public meetings can be found here.

    The Committee will next meet in public on Tuesday, 29 April at 4 p.m. to hear the presentation of reports on follow-up to articles 19 and 22 of the Convention and reprisals.

    Report

    The Committee has before it the seventh periodic report of Ukraine (CAT/C/UKR/7).

    Presentation of Report

    LIUDMYLA SUHAK, Deputy Minister of Justice for European Integration of Ukraine and head of the delegation, said Ukraine was systematically implementing measures to prevent and combat torture at the national level.  The 2021 strategy for combatting torture in the criminal justice system outlined the development of a national system for combatting torture committed by law enforcement personnel.  The national human rights strategy had been updated to include specific strategic goals for combatting torture and ensuring the right to liberty and security of person. The strategy for the reform of the penitentiary system 2021-2026 aimed to address structural problems and create a humanistic system for the execution of criminal penalties.

    During the reporting period, several amendments were made to criminal legislation.  The Criminal Code had been revised to bring the definition of torture into line with the provisions of the Convention, and to introduce criminal liability for the crime of enforced disappearance. Additionally, legislation was revised to guarantee the right of detainees to be held in proper conditions and to facilitate the consideration of complaints about improper detention conditions.  The criminal penalty system now also included probation supervision. 

    In 2024, amendments were made to the Code of Administrative Offences to distinguish between domestic violence, gender-based violence and sexual harassment, to increase administrative liability for such acts.  Several legislative initiatives were currently under consideration by Parliament, including a draft law on the penitentiary system, as well as other draft laws that would introduce a standard for minimum cell space of four square metres per detainee, the right of convicts to short-term visits outside the colony under certain conditions, and revised procedures for detaining persons.

    New internal regulations for the temporary detention centres of the national police adopted in 2023 stipulated that police officers were not allowed to carry out acts of torture or other forms of inhuman treatment on detainees.  In 2018 and 2019, internal regulations for pre-trial detention centres and penitentiary institutions of the State Penitentiary Service were approved.  These rules were regularly updated.  In 2024, the Security Service’s procedure for holding persons in temporary detention facilities was revised. 

    Ukraine provided unhindered access for both national and international monitoring mechanisms. In 2024, the national preventive mechanism of the Ombudsperson conducted 543 visits to penitentiary institutions, and the United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine carried out 44 visits between 2018 and 2024.

    Efforts were being made to develop a child-friendly juvenile justice system.  As a result, over the past five years, there had been a steady reduction in juvenile crime, and over the past seven years, the number of minors registered by probation authorities had dropped three-fold.

    In 2024, a Commissioner for Missing Persons under Special Circumstances was appointed within the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and a specialised unit for combatting torture and other ill-treatment of persons, staffed with 157 investigators, had been launched within the State Bureau of Investigation.  Within the Office of the Prosecutor General, separate specialised units had been established to combat human rights violations in the law enforcement and penitentiary sectors, as well as to combat crimes committed in the context of the armed conflict.  The Ministry of Justice also had a separate Department of Penitentiary Inspections.

    In 2024, persons responsible for observing the rights of convicts and preventing torture were introduced into the staff of 56 penal institutions.  The State had developed the digital infrastructure of both law enforcement agencies and the penitentiary system, launching registers of convicted persons, persons taken into custody, and missing persons under special circumstances.  An automated exchange of information on detained persons between law enforcement agencies and free legal aid centres was being introduced.  In cases of violence or torture against detainees and convicts, they had the right to free legal representation in court.

    State social programmes aimed at preventing and combatting domestic violence, gender-based violence, and human trafficking were being implemented.  Free secondary legal aid was provided to victims of domestic violence and human trafficking.

    In response to Russia’s armed aggression against Ukraine, Ukrainian law enforcement agencies had initiated investigations into 163,700 war crimes and crimes of aggression on Ukrainian territory.  In 2024, the Criminal Code was amended to ensure criminal prosecution for the most serious international crimes, as well as to bring it into line with the Rome Statute, which entered into force for Ukraine in 2025. 

    In 2022, the procedure for the detention of prisoners of war was approved.  It stipulated that the interrogation of prisoners of war should be carried out in a language they understood, without the use of torture or other coercive measures.  The conditions of detention for Russian prisoners of war complied with international humanitarian law and had been inspected 112 times by the International Committee of the Red Cross between 2018 and 2024.  Conversely, Russian authorities continued to deny access to Ukrainian prisoners of war, as well as civilian detainees, held by Russia in violation of international humanitarian law.

    Ukraine had also been taking measures to support victims and those affected by armed aggression. Since 2022, victims of a number of criminal offences, including torture or cruel treatment, had been entitled to free secondary legal aid.  In 2024, the legal status of victims of sexual violence related to Russia’s armed aggression and the legal basis for providing them with urgent interim reparations were determined at the legislative level.  An international compensation mechanism for damages caused by Russia’s aggression was being developed.  In 2024, 40 categories of claims that could be submitted to the International Register of Damages were approved, including some related to torture, deprivation of liberty, and sexual violence.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    CLAUDE HELLER, Committee Chair and Country Co-Rapporteur, welcomed the delegation’s presence, considering that Ukraine had suffered a devastating war since the full-scale invasion by the Russian Federation on 24 February 2022, in flagrant violation of international law and the Charter of the United Nations.  After more than three years of war, hundreds of thousands of military personnel on both sides were estimated to have died, with many more wounded, missing in action and in captivity.  From February 2022 to February 2025, there had been more than 12,800 civilian deaths and more than 30,000 injuries in systematic attacks on civilian towns, cities, and infrastructure, while the number of deaths of Russian civilians was expected to have risen to 360.  These were very conservative elements.

    The war had led to serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, including summary executions; torture and ill-treatment; arbitrary detentions; forced transfer of people, including minors, to the occupying State; and acts of sexual violence. More than 13 million people required humanitarian assistance, more than two million homes had been destroyed in Ukraine, and there were 10.6 million displaced people in Ukraine.

    Over the past decade, Ukraine had made considerable amendments to legislation and ministries, including with respect to the occupied territories.  The national strategy for human rights had been updated to include strategic goals for combatting torture.  The adoption of the strategy to combat torture and the related plan of action and the appointment of human rights inspectors in places of detention would contribute to preventing torture and facilitating investigations.  It was also welcome that in 2024, a commissioner for disappeared persons was appointed within the police force, and that Ukraine had ratified the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.

    The Committee was concerned that not all the elements of the Convention had been incorporated in the Criminal Code, which did not establish the State’s responsibility to hold public officials accountable when they committed acts of torture under orders from superiors.  Why was the number of cases of torture that reached court much smaller than the number of investigations carried out?

    The Ombudsperson carried out independent monitoring of constitutional rights and freedoms.  However, the body lacked financial resources and experts on monitoring.  There was a lack of transparency in the selection of its staff, and a lack of balanced regional representation.  The national preventive mechanism had also been criticised for its lack of experts and funding, delays in its investigations, and its lack of cooperation with civil society. There was a low level of implementation of recommendations made by the Ombudsperson; only one-third of the recommendations made in 2023 were addressed.  Could the delegation comment on these issues?

    State bodies responsible for guaranteeing the rights of detainees appeared to have been ineffective. Victims of torture were allegedly subjected to reprisals by authorities and the Istanbul Protocol was not applied well by the State.  Could the delegation comment on this?

    In 2015, Parliament had adopted a decision to suspend certain obligations stemming from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention of Human Rights and impose martial law until the cessation of the Russian aggression. The Committee was concerned by acts carried out by armed groups in eastern Ukraine from 2014 to 2017. During this period, more than 100 criminal cases were brought against Ukrainian security officials, including related to offences of torture and sexual violence.  Had court proceedings concluded?

    The State party had taken a significant step by ratifying the Rome Statute in 2024.  The implementation law partially harmonised criminal law with the Statute, requiring acts of torture systematically committed against the civilian population to be tried as crimes against humanity.  However, the law did not amend legislation on war crimes to bring it in line with the Statute.  Would the State do this?

    Both Russia and Ukraine had mutually accused each other of acts of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment against civilians.  There were more than 6,000 Ukrainian prisoners under Russian custody, who reportedly lacked access to food and medical support.  There were credible reports that Russian authorities had carried out around 80 executions of Ukrainian forces.  The United Nations Independent Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine had reported widespread torture of civilians in areas under Russian control. Persons arrested in these territories were tried by non-recognised courts and were not granted access to lawyers of their choice.  Information on trials was not provided to families.  Could the State party provide information on the number of such trials carried out?

    Since February 2022, 240 Russian prisoners of war had reported suffering torture during the armed conflict in Ukrainian detention centres.  Could the delegation comment on these accusations?  What measures had been taken in cases where torture had been confirmed, and how was the State party preventing torture?  The Committee was concerned about reports of illegal detentions by Ukrainian authorities.  How many people had been detained illegally?  There had also been allegations of arbitrary detention of civilians suspected of collaborating with Russia after territories were reclaimed.

    The Committee was also concerned about the impact of the conflict on the rule of law.  Several cases of threats and violence against journalists had been reported.  Ukraine introduced a procedure in 2022 to prohibit broadcasts that “could jeopardise the independence and sovereignty of the country”.  Some journalists had been criminalised after working in occupied territories, despite there being no evidence of having committed unlawful acts. Could the delegation comment on this issue?

    More than 2,000 criminal lawsuits had been filed on the glorification of Russian actions.  This had reportedly given rise to 443 guilty verdicts involving non-custodial sentences.  Authorities had imposed security restrictions, including limiting access to information.  A bill before Parliament sought to restrict access to court decisions until the cessation of martial law, and several other bills had sought to limit certain rights for human rights defenders.  There was deep-rooted impunity for crimes against activists.

    There had been an unprecedented increase in gender-based violence in Ukraine.  The number of cases of domestic violence had increased by more than 30 per cent in 2024, with a number of these cases involving men returning from the front. The State was seemingly reluctant to hold members of the armed forces accountable for such crimes.

    A 2017 law amended legislation regarding psychiatric care in response to past violations of patients’ rights. Norms allowing for involuntary sterilisation were eliminated.  However, there were reports of excessive hospitalisation of persons with psychosocial disabilities, including children, and a lack of provision of alternative, community-based care services.  There were allegations of torture and ill-treatment in psychiatric hospitals; could the delegation comment on this?

    PETER VEDEL KESSING, Committee Expert and Country Co-Rapporteur, said that the situation in Ukraine was tragic after three years of war.  Mr. Kessing commended Ukraine’s commitment to its human rights obligations in these difficult times, adopting laws and policies to strengthen human rights protections.  Ukraine had continued to engage with the European Court of Human Rights since 2022, resulting in the closure of 75 cases.

    What steps had been taken to ensure that Ukrainian soldiers and State officials did not engage in torture? What training did these officials receive on the Convention?  Could the delegation confirm that its derogations from international law in the martial law period did not relate to the Convention?  Did Ukraine continue to apply international human rights law in situations of armed conflict?

    The State party needed to prosecute and hold accountable all those who committed torture on occupied territories when it regained control of the territory.  What steps had been taken to document such acts?  How had the State party ensured that Ukrainian citizens who were victims of torture had access to remedies when they returned to Ukraine? Ukraine had developed a draft law on compensation for victims of violent crimes and a related State fund.  Had this law been adopted?

    There had been reports of beatings of men who sought to avoid conscription.  In one case, a man claimed he had been drafted illegally as he had not undergone a medical examination.  Could the delegation provide statistical information on injuries and deaths linked to hazing and investigations into such incidents?  How did the State ensure that conscripts were treated in line with international obligations?

    There had been reports of excessive use of force by Ukrainian police over the reporting period.  Detainees in police detention did not have access to food or drinking water.  What steps had been taken to prevent ill-treatment in police detention? Access to a lawyer was not always provided for arrested persons; how would the State ensure this?  Video recording of interrogation was discretionary. Would the State make recording mandatory and ensure that recorded footage of interrogations was kept?  Were Russian prisoners of war and civilians arrested by Ukrainian forces provided with procedural safeguards?  How many children had been held in pre-trial detention over the last three years?  Were there time limits on the detention of children, and were children separated from adults in detention?

    Prisons under Ukrainian control were suffering under the war; some faced frequent shelling by Russian troops, and were reportedly becoming hotbeds of torture and corruption.  Since winter 2024, there had been increased raids on prisons by special forces.  The Committee commended that human rights observers had been appointed in some prisons. What actions did they carry out and were they now appointed in all prisons? 

    Newly arrived prisoners were reportedly routinely beaten, and special forces used illegal force against inmates. Was it necessary to deploy special forces in prisons?  Would the State abandon this practice?  There was reported overcrowding in prisons, with inmates in one prison forced to alternatively sleep on the floor.  There were also reports of limited access to fresh air, clean drinking water and sunlight in some prisons.  What steps had been taken to reduce overcrowding and improve prison conditions? Some prisoners were appointed as “duty” prisoners and given duties to oversee other prisoners.  Had steps been taken to eliminate this practice and protect all prisoners’ rights?

    Medical staff in prisons reportedly did not document inmates’ injuries.  Could the delegation provide information on the number of deaths in custody over the last three years?  What steps had been taken to strengthen healthcare in prisons?  There were no rules banning force-feeding in prisons; did the Government intend to elaborate such rules?  Did the Ukrainian Ombudsperson have access to all places of detention and could it conduct unannounced visits?  To what extent could non-governmental organizations access places of detention?  Article 391 of the Criminal Code made it an offence to disobey orders by prison staff. This provision was reportedly abused by staff to engage in corrupt practices; would it be revised?

    Other Committee Experts asked questions on measures taken by State authorities to respond to and prevent domestic violence; the status of the draft bill criminalising domestic violence and sexual violence; measures to ensure penalties for domestic and sexual violence were commensurate with the gravity of the crime; the number of investigations and convictions for domestic violence cases over the reporting period; efforts made to establish civil registries to facilitate birth registration and prevent trafficking of children; whether the State party held Ukrainian forces that were returned to the State accountable when they were accused of torture; how the State treated prisoners of war from third countries; and whether the clergy and staff of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church had been provided with support after the banning of the Church.

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the State party provided training on the Convention and other international and European human rights norms for penitentiary staff.  Currently, there were 119 children held in pre-trial detention and 177 children held in juvenile detention facilities, including just one girl. Judges assessed the necessity of detention for children once every three months.

    The State party had undertaken measures to combat corruption and ill-treatment of inmates in the penitentiary system.  An internal security unit had been created to investigate reports of violations by penitentiary staff and inmates and to initiate criminal proceedings against accused persons; the Government was currently recruiting staff for the unit. The State party had recruited 54 out of 56 human rights inspectors for its prisons and adopted a resolution on their scope of activity.  These inspectors reported directly to the State about the problems they witnessed.

    Currently, there were 37,000 inmates in places of deprivation of liberty in Ukraine.  The prison population was declining gradually.  More than 8,000 prisoners had been voluntarily mobilised at the beginning of the war.  The Government had allocated funds to build a new detention facility in Kyiv that could accommodate more than 1,000 detainees and decrease the population of other prisons. Norms on construction had been revised to protect prisons from shelling and improve security.  Despite budget cuts, over 7,500 places had been newly created in detention centres since 2022.

    The State party was fighting the spread of criminal influence and a criminal subculture in prisons.  It sought to proactively prosecute crimes occurring within prisons and to adopt a law on prison labour, which would increase salaries paid to prisoners who engaged in labour and improve conditions for prison labour.

    There had been 432, 376 and 368 deaths in prisons respectively in 2022, 2023 and 2024.  Some 98 per cent of prisoners infected with AIDS and 93 per cent of prisoners with disabilities were held in inclusive settings.  The Ministry of Justice supported the idea of transferring the management of healthcare services in prisons to the Ministry of Health; discussions on this would begin soon.  Rules on force-feeding were adopted two years ago.

    The Ombudsperson had not complained about not being able to access any detention facilities.  Some non-governmental organizations had been granted access to penitentiary facilities.  An anonymous, online complaints system for prisons had been set up; last year, 6,000 complaints had been submitted by prisoners on various topics. A commission was also being created that would handle complaints of improper conditions in prisons. Discussions were underway on the revision of article 391 of the Criminal Code.

    All prisoners of war were kept in common conditions.  Persons with criminal records were separated from those without.  Ukraine fully followed its international obligations under the Geneva Conventions.  It had allowed 400 monitoring missions to visit its detention facilities for prisoners of war.

    Since 2014, the State party had lost 34 penitentiary institutions located in occupied territories, including seven since 2022, in which more than 3,000 inmates were held.  More than 1,000 of these inmates had already served their sentences, but had no money or documents needed to return to Ukraine. The State was working with non-governmental organizations to support their return.  More than 500 persons had thus far returned.

    On 10 October last year, Parliament adopted a law on the ratification of the Rome Statute.  Ukraine had taken on board comments from the International Criminal Court regarding its legislation on crimes against humanity and the responsibility of superiors; the State had amended its Criminal Code in response.

    Certain restrictions could be imposed on rights and freedoms under martial law, but Ukraine had not restricted the right to freedom of religious belief.  The President had last year signed a Presidential Order that banned the activities of the Russian Orthodox Church, which was based on the ideology of the regime of the Russian Federation and condoned Russia’s war crimes.

    Ukraine had not introduced severe restrictions on freedom of expression.  Domestic media faced challenges, including the mobilisation of journalists as soldiers, dwindling resources, and damaged infrastructure caused by the Russian aggression.  The State party sought to bring its media legislation in line with that of the European Union.  Ukraine had risen 18 places in the World Press Freedom Index thanks to the reforms implemented.

    The national police continued to manage custody records, which recorded arrests, pre-trial detention and releases, as well as detainees’ injuries.  These records were kept for 25 years.  There was constant video surveillance of police detention sites and independent monitoring visits were carried out.  The Criminal Procedural Code had been amended to ensure that officials involved in arrests were not responsible for managing detainees’ stay in police detention. Detainees in temporary detention were provided with three hot meals per day.  Standards for detention facilities stipulated that cells needed to have a water supply that detainees could access.

    Since February 2022, 83,000 criminal proceedings had been instigated related to missing civilians and military officers.  Some 9,000 missing persons had been found alive, while many deaths were also identified. Specialised departments for the investigation of crimes committed in the armed conflict had been established in police departments in several regions and a centre for tracing missing persons had been established in Kyiv.

    The police force had recorded 179,000 administrative offences related to domestic violence, registered 19,000 perpetrators for monitoring, and had set up specialised units for tackling domestic violence in more than 60 regions.  In 2024, more than 5,000 officers were trained on combatting domestic and gender-based violence.

    The State constantly looked for crimes of human trafficking and took prompt responses when cases were identified. As of May 2025, 1,500 criminal offences of human trafficking had been investigated.  International organizations supported training for State officials on trafficking in persons.  Ukraine had joined two international taskforces to combat trafficking in persons, through which more than 3,000 Ukrainian victims of trafficking were identified across the world.

    Eleven years since the Maidan revolution, investigators were continuing to investigate crimes related to it. Courts had issued 11 guilty verdicts against 14 people.  The State Bureau of Investigation had suspected 340 people. The former President of Ukraine and other former high-level officials were under suspicion of having facilitated the murders of more than 67 persons between 2013 and 2014.  In this period, police officers were deployed to supress protests, and courts had found activists guilty on spurious grounds.  In some cases, police officers beat activists and even participated in premeditated murders.  In total, there were more than 4,000 cases of criminal activity and more than 2,000 victims.  There was now an opportunity to bring justice for these past crimes. There were three criminal proceedings underway related to armed gangs that had attacked individuals and homes.

    War crimes were investigated by the national security service and the police.  In 2024, 149 Ukrainians had been executed by Russians, and 54 had so far been executed this year.  These were conservative estimates.  Almost every Ukrainian prisoner of war had suffered some form of violence. 

    There were around 20 cases under examination of war crimes committed by Ukrainians.  Doctors who provided medical examinations of prisoners of war were required to document signs of torture.

    According to Ukrainian law, information about persons in detention was immediately communicated to the legal aid centre.  If evidence was gathered while a defence lawyer was absent, there was a high likelihood that courts would not admit it.  The State was providing legal support for prisoners who had been illegally transferred to Russia and supporting them to serve the remainder of their sentences in Ukraine.  Persons with disabilities and older persons could access legal aid if they had low income or were internally displaced.  Legal aid was provided to minors and victims of gender-based violence and trafficking in persons.

    National standards on detention of prisoners of war stipulated that detainees’ human dignity and international law needed to be respected.  No violations of human rights or cases of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment had been found while monitoring visits of places of detention.

    Pre-trial investigations were underway into alleged war crimes against Ukrainian prisoners of war by Russia, including extrajudicial executions and the use of physical, psychological and sexual violence.  These prisoners were systematically subjected to violence over the course of their detention; this had been confirmed by medical examinations.  Some 4,000 prisoners had been returned to Ukraine.

    Since February 2022, some 433 persons were detained for crimes of collaboration with Russia.  The draft law of December 2022 on collaboration included provisions to improve liability for collaboration; it was currently under consideration.  Some 819 investigations were underway on cases of collaboration related to healthcare and education.  The teaching of school subjects based on the standards of the aggressor State did not constitute an offence.  Some teachers deliberately carried out propaganda in educational institutions; this could constitute an offence. 

    Around 22 doctors had been notified of being under suspicion of collaboration.  Criminal liability was excluded for actions carried out while providing healthcare to patients.  Since February 2022, pre-trial investigations on collaboration had been carried out into 97 affiliates of religious organizations, including more than 20 clerics of the Orthodox Church.  The security service had declared 197 minors as suspects in offences such as high treason, sabotage and damage to property.  Many cases involved minors who were recruited by the Russian special services. Training was provided for investigators who interviewed children on the best interests of the child.

    To ensure that prisoners of war were well-treated and not tortured during transfers to detainment camps, clear legal procedures had been developed.  The Chief of Defence had issued orders to ensure that international human rights law was strictly followed in this process. Military officials were trained on capturing enemy combatants and on the rights of prisoners of war.

    To ensure that human rights were followed during mobilisation and conscription, clear legislation had been established.  Persons could apply for deferment of conscription for medical or family reasons. An investigator had been appointed within the Land Force Command to investigate allegations of human rights violations occurring during conscription.

    The Ministry of Health had made changes to ensure that only psychiatric patients who posed a danger to themselves or others were isolated for legally defined periods.  All primary health care providers were obligated to undergo training on identifying mental health issues and referring patients to mental health care services.  These measures would help to decrease the number of patients needing institutionalisation.

    More than 34,000 persons with disabilities and older persons lived in residential institutions.  The Government had developed a strategy to reform these institutions and support community-based care and assisted living. Approximately 7,000 people received day care services.  There were around 4,600 children cared for in institutions.  The Government had approved a strategy to ensure the right of every child in Ukraine to grow up in a family environment by 2028.  A law preventing violence against children had been adopted in 2024 and the State was currently developing a procedure for responding to cases of violence against children.

    In 2024, around 182,000 reports of domestic violence had been received by the State.  A programme for addressing traumatic war experiences had been developed. Measures had been implemented to coordinate policies on domestic violence and protect victims.

    In 2022, Parliament adopted a law on amending the Criminal Code in line with the Convention.  The revised law’s definition of torture addressed the liability of persons who conspired to commit torture.  Discriminatory motives for the crime of torture were considered to be aggravating offences and carried a harsher penalty.  The law also addressed the criminal liability of officials who ordered acts of torture.  Amnesty was not issued to persons who committed torture crimes.

    No derogations had been made from the State party’s obligations under international human rights law during the martial law period.  Martial law foresaw the ability to prohibit peaceful assembly, but in practice, this restriction had not been applied.  The Government took steps to provide compensation for victims of various types of crimes.

    A special draft law had been developed that sought to improve the institutional capacity of the Ombudsperson, including by lowering the age limit for members of the Ombudsperson’s Office and imposing restrictions on reductions to the Office’s budget.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    CLAUDE HELLER, Committee Chair and Country Co-Rapporteur, welcomed information on measures to provide compensation for victims of human rights violations.  Up to mid-February 2025, 159,000 criminal cases had been recorded related to the armed conflict, but it was unclear how many of these cases related to torture.  The justice system had not been prepared to deal with the challenges brought by these cases.  Acts of torture committed in occupied territories, difficulties in verifying evidence, and the internal displacement of victims hindered investigations.  There was a lack of guarantees of a fair trial for trials in absentia, in which 95 per cent of accused persons were sentenced. Articles 27 and 28 of the Criminal Code needed to be amended to protect the victims and witnesses of serious international crimes.

    Crimea was annexed 11 years ago, and the freedom of the media had been called into question under the Russian occupation.  Russian authorities reportedly curtailed the rights to freedom of expression and assembly. Lawyers and human rights defenders had been victims of persecution and had been unable to perform their work. The European Court of Human Rights had recently found that Russia followed a pattern of criminally sentencing persons in Crimea who discredited the Russian forces.  Had there been cases of torture in Crimea?

    PETER VEDEL KESSING, Committee Expert and Country Co-Rapporteur, said it was positive that overcrowding had been reduced, that a new prison facility had been established, that an electronic register had been established, and that measures were taken to remove the prison hierarchy and improve access to health care.  How could prisoners access the internet to make complaints to the Prison Service?  How did the Service respond to complaints?  Did any concern torture?  Human rights monitors in prisons were commendable.  Did these monitors also perform other functions in prisons?  How many complaints had been received from human rights monitors and what follow-up had been conducted?  There was reportedly a risk of reprisals for prisoners who lodged complaints.  What measures were in place to counter reprisals against prisoners?

    Prisoners of war were at a high risk of ill-treatment.  What measures were taken to monitor that Russian prisoners of war were treated in line with requirements under international law?  Did they undergo medical exams and was there video recording of interrogations?  Was there a procedure for releasing prisoners of war who required medical treatment?

    Another Committee Expert asked follow-up questions on the situation of prisoners and prison conditions in Crimea, including on the transfer of prisoners and cases of torture occurring during transfers; the situation in closed psychiatric institutions and steps taken to protect vulnerable groups such as children, and to improve conditions and oversight of these institutions; and measures taken to promote the return of children forcibly transferred from Ukraine to Russia and to ensure accountability for such acts.

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said around 7,000 complaints had been submitted by prisoners, around 1,700 of which were submitted electronically.  Inmates could access specific web pages where they could submit complaints using tablets in a dedicated room.  Human rights inspectors reported suspected cases of torture to the Chief of Police. Their work was supplemented by the internal security unit, which started disciplinary proceedings that could result in criminal investigations.  There had been complaints submitted to the Ombudsperson regarding reprisals against prisoners.  These were under investigation.

    The State party was gathering evidence on war crimes and crimes against humanity occurring in occupied territories. It transferred evidence of such crimes to the International Criminal Court on request.  A working group had been established to improve the implementation of the Rome Statute in Ukraine, including through legal amendments.  Last year, the State had documented over 2,800 Ukrainian civilians and over 4,000 prisoners of war who were victims of torture. Many liberated civilians chose to move to different countries rather than return to Ukraine, making investigations difficult.

    Ukrainian non-governmental organizations had reported that there were at least 4,700 transfers of detainees from Crimea to the territory of the Russian Federation, including 220 female detainees. The Russian Federation had failed to provide information in response to the judgement of the European Court of Human Rights that obliged Russia to return these prisoners to Ukraine.

    The Government had adopted several measures to address the issue of the forcible displacement of Ukrainian children, including a procedure for identifying and returning such children, a register of deported and forcibly displaced children, and an inter-agency commission on the issue.

    Concluding Remarks

    CLAUDE HELLER, Committee Chair, said that, based on the dialogue, the Committee would issue concluding observations, which would include recommendations that the State party could implement within one year, as well as other recommendations that would require more time to implement.  The Committee believed that its recommendations would support the implementation of the Convention in Ukraine.

    The State party’s efforts to engage in the dialogue were commendable in the context of the bloodthirsty war.  The issues discussed were not issues of the past but were ongoing.  The last dialogue with Ukraine happened over 11 years ago and many things had happened since.  Ukraine sought to protect its territorial integrity and the well-being of its population. The rest of the world was looking on, hoping for an end to the war that respected the territorial integrity of Ukraine. The dialogue had been constructive and frank.  The Committee hoped that its next dialogue with Ukraine would take place in conditions of peace, prosperity and democracy.

    LIUDMYLA SUHAK, Deputy Minister of Justice for European Integration and head of the delegation, thanked the Committee for the dialogue and civil society organizations that had submitted alternative reports.  Ukraine would actively work to implement the Committee’s concluding observations.

    Tens of thousands of Ukrainian citizens were being held by Russia.  More than 170 torture chambers had been identified in Russia and virtually every Ukrainian citizen who had been returned from Russia had suffered some form of torture, which was carried out in a systemic, widespread manner by Russian authorities.  The State party was grateful to the Committee for keeping the issue of Russian war crimes on the international agenda.  Ukraine urged Russia to fully comply with its obligations under international law and to end its illegal war of aggression.  The Committee’s efforts would help to hold Russia to account.

    ___________

     

     

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

     

    CAT.007E

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Experts of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Hold Half Day of General Discussion on Reparations for the Injustices from the Transatlantic Trade of Enslaved Africans

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination this afternoon held a half day of general discussion on reparations for the injustices from the transatlantic trade of enslaved Africans, their treatment as chattel, and the ongoing harms to and crimes against people of African descent.  The half-day consisted of opening statements two panel discussions, hearing from Committee members, experts in international law, representative from the diplomatic corps, and political and civil society leaders.

    Speaking in the first panel discussion on “Reparations and International Law: Legal Frameworks, Obligations and Enforcement” were Pela Boker-Wilson, Committee Expert; Joshua Castellino, Executive Dean, College of Arts, Law & Social Sciences, Brunel University of London; Patricia Sellers, former Special Advisor to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court; Britta Redwood, Assistant Professor, Seton Hall School of Diplomacy and Seton Hall Law School; Adejoké Babington-Ashaye, former Investigator at the International Criminal Court; and Bernard Duhaime, Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence.

    Speaking in the second panel discussion on “The Legacy of Chattel Slavery: Structural Racism and Institutional Accountability” were Tendayi Achiume, former Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance; Matthew Anthony Wilson, Permanent Representative of Barbados to the United Nations Office at Geneva; Eric Phillips, Vice-Chairperson of the Caribbean Community’s Reparations Commission; Ibrahima Guissé, Committee Expert; and Dennis O’Brien, Founder of the Repair Campaign.

    The programme of work and other documents related to the session can be found here.  Summaries of the public meetings of the Committee can be found here, while webcasts of the public meetings can be found here.

    The Committee will next meet in public on Monday, 28 April at 3 p.m. to begin its consideration of the combined twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth periodic reports of Mauritius (CERD/C/MUS/24-25).

    Opening Statements

    MICHAL BALCERZAK, Committee Chairperson, welcomed participants to the half-day of general discussion to advance the development of a general recommendation on reparations for the historical injustices rooted in the chattel enslavement of Africans and the enduring harms experienced by people of African descent.  The proposed general recommendation sought to clarify the scope and content of the right to reparations under international human rights law and address the harms caused by the forced capture and transatlantic transport of Africans, their enslavement as chattel, and the lasting consequences of these crimes. 

    To inform this process, the Committee had issued a public call for input on 14 February 2025 and had been encouraged by the engagement, with 56 submissions received from a wide range of stakeholders.  Today’s discussion provided a space to reflect on the submissions received, deepen the collective understanding of applicable international legal standards, and further examine the contemporary legacy of the transatlantic trade in enslaved Africans.  In the coming months, the Committee would prepare a draft text of the general recommendation, which would be made publicly available for input from all stakeholders prior to finalisation. 

    MAHAMANE CISSÉ-GOURO, Director, Human Rights Council and Treaty Mechanisms Division, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, said today’s topic addressed a matter of deep historical significance and urgent contemporary relevance: reparatory justice for the injustices arising from the trade in enslaved Africans, their treatment as chattel, and the continuing harms and crimes suffered by people of African descent.  In 2001, at the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, States adopted by consensus the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, which recognised slavery and the slave trade as a crime against humanity, and among the major sources and manifestations of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance.  Contemporary structures and systems, such as racial profiling, police brutality, unequal access to education and employment, disparities in health and housing, and the denial of political participation and justice were rooted in these enduring harms.

    International human rights law and political commitments by States provided a clear framework for attaining substantive racial justice and equality.  A central element of dismantling systemic racism was addressing the past and redressing its legacies through reparatory justice, to transform the present and secure a just and equitable future.  The High Commissioner had called for reparatory justice to transform structures and systems which were designed and shaped by enslavement, colonialism and successive racially discriminatory policies and systems. States and others that had benefited and continued to benefit from these legacies should make amends for centuries of violence and discrimination through wide-ranging and meaningful initiatives, including through formal apologies, truth-telling processes, and reparations in various forms.  This called for political leadership, and creative, effective and comprehensive responses to legacies of the past.  Since the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, the international community had taken important steps; however, as the Convention commemorated its sixtieth anniversary, it was evident that these commitments and recommendations had not resulted in durable, transformative change. 

    The development of this general recommendation was timely and necessary.  It would clarify the scope and content of the right to reparations for historical injustices under international human rights law and provide States with guidance to fulfil their obligations under the Convention.  Mr. Cissé-Gouro encouraged all participants to engage and emphasised that the Office of the High Commissioner supported the process. 

    GAY MCDOUGALL, Committee Vice-Chairperson, said this year marked the sixtieth anniversary of the Convention, which remained the normative centre of international efforts to end racism. In commemoration of the anniversary year, the Committee had decided to prepare a general recommendation on reparations to clarify and elaborate the legal obligations of States to repair the harms inflicted by the forced capture of Africans, the transatlantic transport of those captives, their enslavement as chattel, and the massive and continuing harms suffered by them and their descendants.  The transatlantic trade in enslaved Africans constituted the largest and most concentrated forced deportation of human beings ever recorded, implicating several regions of the world during more than four centuries. Between 12 to 13 million Africans were violently uprooted from Africa for sale and enslavement. 

    The system of colonial rule had enabled and facilitated the development of the uniquely brutal system of chattel enslavement, and the resulting massive gross abuses of human rights that followed for centuries.  The transatlantic slave trade was inextricably tied to European colonial domination of Africa, the Americas, the Caribbean and parts of Asia.  It was a system that enriched Europe, and the institutions in power, and it existed today in many contemporary forms.  Now it was widely agreed that all forms of slavery were violations of international law and most domestic laws gave rise to the responsibility to ensure reparations.  However, the harms inflicted by these events had never been addressed, including how they negatively impacted the economic, social, political, civic and cultural rights of countries around the world.   The Committee’s proposed general recommendation would provide guidance on the scope and content of the right to reparations under international human rights law. 

    Panel Discussion One on Reparations and International Law: Legal Frameworks, Obligations and Enforcement

    Opening Remarks by the Moderator of the Panel

    PELA BOKER-WILSON, Committee Expert and Panel Moderator, said the chattel enslavement of Africans was a human rights violation, and victims had a right to reparations based on their right to a remedy.  At the same time, today the legacies of chattel enslavement could be seen in daily lives.  Chattel enslavement and its legacies were the foundation on which systematic racism permeated and the history which drove discriminatory laws and policies based on race. Several legal challenges remained which would be discussed during the panel. 

    Summary of Remarks by the Panellists

    Some speakers, among other things, noted that the trade in enslaved Africans began in the fifteenth century, when Portuguese traders established sugar plantations in the Atlantic islands of Madeira, the Azores, and São Tomé.  At the time, the justification for the enslaved status of African labourers was based on the notion that these labourers had been enslaved because they had been taken captive in just wars.  The slave trade was the reduction of a free person to the status of being enslaved, by whatever means, including kidnap, capture, transfer, or sale.  Slave trading comprised not only the initial transatlantic passages, but internal acts of trade in enslaved persons throughout the Americas and the Caribbean.  These two prongs of the slave trade, trans-Atlantic and internal or domestic slave trading, had occurred for centuries. 

    One speaker said the photograph of a South African billionaire of European descent, arm raised in a Nazi salute, was perhaps the most apt icon for that particular civilization.  It epitomised success in generating wealth by extraction, disregarding surroundings in constructing systems where some had an inherent sense of entitlement to everything, even if it devastated others.  Another speaker said an immeasurable toll of sexual, reproductive and gendered practices and institutions had persisted throughout the hundreds of years of slavery and of slave trading in North and South America and in the Caribbean. 

    A speaker underscored that the transatlantic chattel slavery had created and entrenched anti-Black racism. Although slavery had been abolished, the persistence of the social, psychological, and economic harms of racial discrimination persisted until today.  Another speaker noted that the racial hierarchy that was at the root of the slave trade and slavery had no foundation in international law at that time, just as it had no legitimacy under international law today.  One speaker said reparations for people of African descent were not only a matter of justice for the past, but also a foundation for a more equitable and peaceful future.

    Reparations were vital in seeking justice for colonial crimes, but also to eliminate the root cause of historic and continuing colonial existence.  States must ensure that reparations were not merely symbolic, but concrete and enforceable, through judicial rulings as well as administrative or legislative reparation programmes.  These programmes could be supported by national or international funding and must be accessible, gender-sensitive, victim-centred, and rights-based.  In line with established standards, reparations needed to be comprehensive, encompassing restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition.  States should establish robust legal and institutional frameworks and ensure stable financial allocations that were protected from political or economic fluctuations.  Crucially, reparation measures must be proportional to the gravity of the harm and address the full scope of the violations.  It was also important to ensure that victims participated in the reparations process. 

    Successful reparations had stemmed from attempts to seek victim-oriented justice. These included local revolutions achieving regime change and victims’ framing of legal arguments to hold power to account.  The dismissal of reparations as solely pertaining to the past needed to be confronted; reparations appeared to be about the past but they were also about the present.  Redress by reparations required recognition that sexual abuse was omnipresent in the lives of the enslaved.  The quest for reparations needed to be achieved through evidence-based reasoning. They had to be shaped to show how the few, irrespective of race, had benefitted from the exploitation of the many, irrespective of race. 

    The Convention was a power instrument for redress.  Under article 11, States could bring complaints against other States for violations of the Convention.  Article 14 allowed individuals and groups to submit petitions directly to the Committee provided that the respondent State had recognised the Committee’s jurisdiction to receive individual petitions.  The Basic Principles on Reparations, a United Nations resolution from 2005, established five aspects of reparations that must follow a significant human rights violation, including the need to guarantee the non-recurrence of the human rights violation at issue. 

    The Convention and subsequent jurisprudence of the Committee required material compensation and policy changes to address the legacy of transatlantic chattel slavery and the system of racial discrimination that was created to entrench it. 

    Structural discrimination that arose from anti-Black racism was an ongoing human rights violation and needed to be addressed by States parties to the Convention.   The Committee was urged to recognise the gendered injustices intrinsic of the transatlantic slave trade and slavery and to include them as germane to the redress considered in the forthcoming general recommendation on reparations. 

    Discussion 

    Several speakers spoke from the floor. One speaker welcomed the Committee’s initiative to develop a general recommendation on reparations, which was a vital step towards accountability.  Reparations were grounded in international law, carrying legal consequences which could not be erased by time.  Another speaker said that at the minimum, States parties were required to provide reparations for their failure to eliminate the systemic racism and inequality arising from their inadequate remediation of chattel slavery and its legacies.  The Committee was urged to adopt a comprehensive and transformative approach to address both systemic racism and structural economic inequalities arising from chattel slavery and colonialism in the general recommendation.  A speaker said the time had come to move from rhetoric to concrete measures for reparations for historical and cultural monuments destroyed and looted during centuries of colonialism and slavery. One speaker said reparations were not a favour, but were moral and political obligations of States. 

    Panel Discussion Two on the Legacy of Chattel Slavery: Structural Racism and Institutional Accountability

    Summary of Remarks by the Panellists

    Some speakers, among other things, commended the Committee for the draft general recommendation, which dealt with a vital issue and was long overdue.  The Committee should be applauded for its work and the call for input, and those who had answered the call were thanked.  The call for input document prepared by the Committee did an excellent job of highlighting the history, global responses and objectives, while pointing out the milestones along the way. 

    Chattel slavery was the first global regime of State-legalised racial capitalism, speakers said.  The laws that built it had been dismantled in name, but never in consequence.  The transatlantic slave trade was not just a chapter in history, but was a crime against humanity.  Slavery had funded the economic development of colonial countries, particularly the industrial revolution, and put Britain in the wealthy position that it was in today. The European Union and its members, particularly France, Holland and Spain, and other countries like Germany and Denmark had also participated in this genocide as well. 

    Racism was not a relic of the past; it was present, global, systemic and was still taking lives.  Yet Europe had yet to fully confront this issue.  One speaker commented that Black communities across Europe were too often overlooked, marginalised and ignored by those in power; this must change.   

    There was a painful trail of historical legal construction of racial hierarchy that had occurred during chattel slavery.  This included the British Board of Trade that codified economic enslavement through slave codes and land seizure laws; and France’s Code Noir that created racialised personhood in law.  Portugal and Spain had used religious sanction known as Papal Bulls to erase African legal identity, while the Colonial Laws Validity Act of 1865 insulated colonial laws from challenge.  Today, these laws had mutated into many forms of structural, perceptual and institutional racism, including through education exclusion, Afrophobia, epistemicide and religious erasure.  These laws must be named, acknowledged, and formally repudiated by the United Kingdom and France as a first step in reparatory processes.

    Some speakers noted that chattel slavery was not just a legal and economic construct, it was also a social construct.  When the laws had changed and the cost benefit of slavery was eroded, what remained was institutional racism and structural racism – global inequalities caused by historical injustices.  Those who were descendants of the enslaved lived with the emotional scars of a society that kept ancestors as slaves for longer than people had equal rights under the law.  Chattel slaves were still impacted in deep and wide-ranging ways, with effects spanning economic, social, psychological, and cultural dimensions.  The descendants of the slave owners and the perpetrators of slavery should live with generational repentance. 

    One speaker noted that the 2013 Caribbean Community’s Reparations Commission continued to lead the call for reparations.  The Commission recognised that the persistent harm and suffering experienced today by victims of slavery and colonialism was the primary cause of development failure in the Caribbean.  Through its Ten-Point Reparations Plan, it sought to reposition reparations not in terms of a simple transfer of funds, but rather through a plurality of actions such as debt cancellation, education programmes and technology transfer, amongst other elements.

    The call for reparations and restorative justice did not come from a void; it had always been part of decolonisation.  The need for reparations was a pressing and current issue across all parts of the world affected by the African slave trade.  Reparations should be accessible in the form of compensation, addressing the deficits in equity and opportunity.  Reparations were about transforming systems, narratives and institutions, and creating a Europe where black lives were not just tolerated but celebrated and empowered. 

    Some speakers noted that the Convention needed to be more concertedly mobilised as a framework which was central to achieving reparations directly, including through article 6.  The Committee needed to underscore that reparations were required under the Convention.  It was recommended that European governments begin with a sincere formal apology.  However, apologies without material or structural redress were merely symbolic and could never compensate for the wealth extraction, trauma, or the ongoing inequalities faced by African descendants.  Reparations were about reforming entire legal, economic and social structures that still had forms of racism at their core in the present.  It was not just about addressing harms in the past, but also dealing with those in the present.  The Durban Declaration and Programme for Action and its framework provided for combatting racism and should be powerful guidance for the Committee as it prepared the general recommendation. 

    A speaker said the European Union and its Member States should ensure that the European Union’s anti-racism action plan was renewed, with a focus on reparatory justice.  The European Union and the United Kingdom should jointly fund a reparations programme on an intergenerational basis.  This was not a development issue; it was a justice issue. The United Kingdom and the European Union should start engaging with the political leadership of the Caribbean Community to achieve reparatory justice. 

    Discussion

    Several speakers spoke from the floor. One speaker said during the Second International Decade for People of African Descent, the international community should act to acknowledge and rectify longstanding economic and social inequities, which had economically stagnated the region and resulted in protracted inter-generational trauma.  Another speaker reiterated strong support for the general recommendation.  The sixtieth anniversary of the Convention should also be used as an opportunity to acknowledge the victories of civil society led by African people, including the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action. Racism was a disease, and the actions by the Committee to combat all forms of racism were appreciated.  A speaker said that according to research, stakeholders across the region in all 15 Caribbean Community countries had emphasised the connection between the transatlantic slave trade and unequal access to land ownership, which constituted a continuation of historical injustice. 

    Closing Remarks

    VERENE ALBERTHA SHEPHERD, Committee Vice-Chairperson, in closing remarks, thanked everyone for the amazing discussion which was a social justice exercise that would hopefully reset global relations.  Racism and racial discrimination were creatures of colonialism and many States parties to the Convention still suffered from the legacies of colonialism, especially those that suffered the ravages of the transatlantic trafficking in enslaved Africans, chattel enslavement, and socio-economic underdevelopment in the post-slavery period.  The interventions this afternoon had raised awareness on the racialised nature of the transatlantic trade in enslaved Africans and the ways in which, along with chattel enslavement and unjust enrichment, race and racism were attached to people from Africa and skin shade discrimination was further used to deny them rights.

    There had been several key takeaways from the discussion, including that African chattel enslavement was the first global regime of State-legalised racial capitalism.  Chattel enslavement, an invention of Europeans, was an organised and intentional system based on the legal determination that enslaved Africans were non-human.   

    Chattel enslavement was not gender neutral.  Racism was a direct legacy of the institution of transatlantic chattel slavery, and was an ongoing harm to all who experienced it.  Another takeaway issue was that as chattel enslavement ended, new anti-Black institutions were developed to maintain racial hierarchies, creating persistent economic and social disadvantages for Africans and people of African descent that continued to this present day.  Chattel slavery had no foundation in international law at that time, just as it had no legitimacy under international law today.

    However, as some of the legal experts on the panels had shown, there were legal tools which made reparations unavoidable.  The law could now be rightfully and effectively applied to deliver justice for the profound and continuing harms caused by the trafficking in Africans, chattel enslavement, and the colonisation of Africa.

    It was time that such an injustice be reversed by the payment of reparations to the descendants of those harmed, to ensure the development of areas exploited for the development of Europe. This must start with restitution of the ransom extracted from Haiti and the modern equivalent of the 20 million pounds paid by Britain to enslavers.

    Ms. Shepherd thanked all those who had made the discussion possible and pledged her support to the general recommendation. 

    GAY MCDOUGALL, Committee Vice-Chairperson, thanked all those who had been involved in the panel discussions and those who had made the half day of general discussion possible. 

    MICHAL BALCERZAK, Committee Chairperson, thanked everyone who had been involved in the discussion, which would help inform the work of the Committee. 

    ___________

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

     

    CERD25.004E

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI: Park National Corporation reports financial results for first quarter 2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    NEWARK, Ohio, April 25, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Park National Corporation (Park) (NYSE American: PRK) today reported financial results for the first quarter of 2025. Park’s board of directors declared a quarterly cash dividend of $1.07 per common share, payable on June 10, 2025, to common shareholders of record as of May 16, 2025.

    “Our first quarter performance reflects our commitment to providing consistent financial support and a measure of predictability in dynamic market conditions,” said Park Chairman and CEO David Trautman. “In a world buffeted by extremes, our greatest opportunity to serve more is through continuing to build authentic relationships and showing up as a steady, reliable partner.”

    Park’s net income for the first quarter of 2025 was $42.2 million, a 19.8 percent increase from $35.2 million for the first quarter of 2024. First quarter 2025 net income per diluted common share was $2.60, compared to $2.17 for the first quarter of 2024. Park’s total loans increased 0.9 percent (3.5 percent annualized) during the first quarter of 2025. Park’s reported period end deposits increased 0.7 percent (2.9 percent annualized) during the first quarter of 2025, with an increase of 2.3 percent (9.5 percent annualized), including deposits that Park moved off balance sheet as of March 31, 2025. The combination of solid loan growth and steady deposits continue to contribute to Park’s success in 2025.

    “Our bankers’ ability to serve others well is reflected in our first quarter results,” said Park President Matthew Miller. “We’re deeply grateful for the trust our communities, customers and neighbors place in us every day. We look forward to growing these and new relationships, consistently delivering on our promises and expanding our impact.”

    Headquartered in Newark, Ohio, Park National Corporation has $9.9 billion in total assets (as of March 31, 2025). Park’s banking operations are conducted through its subsidiary, The Park National Bank. Other Park subsidiaries are Scope Leasing, Inc. (d.b.a. Scope Aircraft Finance), Guardian Financial Services Company (d.b.a. Guardian Finance Company), Park Investments, Inc. and SE Property Holdings, LLC.

    Complete financial tables are listed below.

    Category: Earnings

    SAFE HARBOR STATEMENT UNDER THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995

    Park cautions that any forward-looking statements contained in this news release or made by management of Park are provided to assist in the understanding of anticipated future financial performance. Forward-looking statements provide current expectations or forecasts of future events and are not guarantees of future performance. The forward-looking statements are based on management’s expectations and are subject to a number of risks and uncertainties, including those described in Park’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2024, as updated by our filings with the SEC. Although management believes that the expectations reflected in such forward-looking statements are reasonable, actual results may differ materially from those expressed or implied in such statements.

    Risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ include, without limitation: (1) the ability to execute our business plan successfully and manage strategic initiatives; (2) the impact of current and future economic and financial market conditions, including unemployment rates, inflation, interest rates, supply-demand imbalances, and geopolitical matters; (3) factors impacting the performance of our loan portfolio, including real estate values, financial health of borrowers, and loan concentrations; (4) the effects of monetary and fiscal policies, including interest rates, money supply, and inflation; (5) changes in federal, state, or local tax laws; (6) the impact of changes in governmental policy and regulatory requirements on our operations; (7) changes in consumer spending, borrowing, and saving habits; (8) changes in the performance and creditworthiness of customers, suppliers, and counterparties; (9) increased credit risk and higher credit losses due to loan concentrations; (10) volatility in mortgage banking income due to interest rates and demand; (11) adequacy of our internal controls and risk management programs; (12) competitive pressures among financial services organizations; (13) uncertainty regarding changes in banking regulations and other regulatory requirements; (14) our ability to meet heightened supervisory requirements and expectations; (15) the impact of changes in accounting policies and practices on our financial condition; (16) the reliability and accuracy of assumptions and estimates used in applying critical accounting estimates; (17) the potential for higher future credit losses due to changes in economic assumptions; (18) the ability to anticipate and respond to technological changes and our reliance on third-party vendors; (19) operational issues related to and capital spending necessitated by the implementation of information technology systems on which we are highly dependent; (20) the ability to secure confidential information and deliver products and services through computer systems and telecommunications networks; (21) the impact of security breaches or failures in operational systems; (22) the impact of geopolitical instability and trade policies on our operations including the imposition of tariffs and retaliatory tariffs; (23) the impact of changes in credit ratings of government debt and financial stability of sovereign governments; (24) the effect of stock market price fluctuations on our asset and wealth management businesses; (25) litigation and regulatory compliance exposure; (26) availability of earnings and excess capital for dividend declarations; (27) the impact of fraud, scams, and schemes on our business; (28) the impact of natural disasters, pandemics, and other emergencies on our operations; (29) potential deterioration of the economy due to financial, political, or other shocks; (30) impact of healthcare laws and potential changes on our costs and operations; (31) the ability to grow deposits and maintain adequate deposit levels, including by mitigating the effect of unexpected deposit outflows on our financial condition; and (32) other risk factors related to the banking industry.

    Park does not undertake, and specifically disclaims any obligation, to publicly release the results of any revisions that may be made to update any forward-looking statement to reflect the events or circumstances after the date on which the forward-looking statement was made, or reflect the occurrence of unanticipated events, except to the extent required by law.

    PARK NATIONAL CORPORATION  
    Financial Highlights  
    As of or for the three months ended March 31, 2025, December 31, 2024 and March 31, 2024              
                     
        2025       2024       2024       Percent change vs.  
    (in thousands, except common share and per common share data and ratios) 1st QTR 4th QTR 1st QTR   4Q ’24   1Q ’24  
    INCOME STATEMENT:                
    Net interest income $ 104,377     $ 103,445     $ 95,623       0.9   % 9.2   %
    Provision for credit losses   756       3,935       2,180       (80.8 ) % (65.3 ) %
    Other income   25,746       31,064       26,200       (17.1 ) % (1.7 ) %
    Other expense   78,164       83,241       77,228       (6.1 ) % 1.2   %
    Income before income taxes $ 51,203     $ 47,333     $ 42,415       8.2   % 20.7   %
    Income taxes   9,046       8,703       7,211       3.9   % 25.4   %
    Net income $ 42,157     $ 38,630     $ 35,204       9.1   % 19.8   %
                     
    MARKET DATA:                
    Earnings per common share – basic (a) $ 2.61     $ 2.39     $ 2.18       9.2   % 19.7   %
    Earnings per common share – diluted (a)   2.60       2.37       2.17       9.7   % 19.8   %
    Quarterly cash dividend declared per common share   1.07       1.06       1.06       0.9   % 0.9   %
    Special cash dividend declared per common share         0.50             N.M.   N.M.  
    Book value per common share at period end   79.00       76.98       71.95       2.6   % 9.8   %
    Market price per common share at period end   151.40       171.43       135.85       (11.7 ) % 11.4   %
    Market capitalization at period end   2,451,370       2,770,134       2,199,556       (11.5 ) % 11.4   %
                     
    Weighted average common shares – basic (b)   16,159,342       16,156,827       16,116,842         % 0.3   %
    Weighted average common shares – diluted (b)   16,238,701       16,283,701       16,191,065       (0.3 ) % 0.3   %
    Common shares outstanding at period end   16,191,347       16,158,982       16,149,523       0.2   % 0.3   %
                     
    PERFORMANCE RATIOS: (annualized)                
    Return on average assets (a)(b)   1.70   %   1.54   %   1.44   %   10.4   % 18.1   %
    Return on average shareholders’ equity (a)(b)   13.46   %   12.32   %   12.23   %   9.3   % 10.1   %
    Yield on loans   6.26   %   6.21   %   5.99   %   0.8   % 4.5   %
    Yield on investment securities   3.25   %   3.46   %   3.90   %   (6.1 ) % (16.7 ) %
    Yield on money market instruments   4.46   %   4.75   %   5.48   %   (6.1 ) % (18.6 ) %
    Yield on interest earning assets   5.85   %   5.82   %   5.66   %   0.5   % 3.4   %
    Cost of interest bearing deposits   1.76   %   1.90   %   1.94   %   (7.4 ) % (9.3 ) %
    Cost of borrowings   3.94   %   3.86   %   4.25   %   2.1   % (7.3 ) %
    Cost of paying interest bearing liabilities   1.86   %   1.99   %   2.08   %   (6.5 ) % (10.6 ) %
    Net interest margin (g)   4.62   %   4.51   %   4.28   %   2.4   % 7.9   %
    Efficiency ratio (g)   59.79   %   61.60   %   63.07   %   (2.9 ) % (5.2 ) %
                     
    OTHER DATA (NON-GAAP) AND BALANCE SHEET INFORMATION:                
    Tangible book value per common share (d) $ 68.94     $ 66.89     $ 61.80       3.1   % 11.6   %
    Average interest earning assets   9,210,385       9,176,540       9,048,204       0.4   % 1.8   %
    Pre-tax, pre-provision net income (j)   51,959       51,268       44,595       1.3   % 16.5   %
                     
    Note: Explanations for footnotes (a) – (k) are included at the end of the financial tables in the “Financial Reconciliations” section.  
       
    PARK NATIONAL CORPORATION  
    Financial Highlights (continued)  
    As of or for the three months ended March 31, 2025, December 31, 2024 and March 31, 2024  
                     
              Percent change vs.  
    (in thousands, except ratios) March 31, 2025 December 31, 2024 March 31, 2024   4Q ’24   1Q ’24  
    BALANCE SHEET:                
    Investment securities $ 1,042,163     $ 1,100,861     $ 1,339,747       (5.3 ) % (22.2 ) %
    Loans   7,883,735       7,817,128       7,525,005       0.9   % 4.8   %
    Allowance for credit losses   88,130       87,966       85,084       0.2   % 3.6   %
    Goodwill and other intangible assets   162,758       163,032       163,927       (0.2 ) % (0.7 ) %
    Other real estate owned (OREO)   119       938       1,674       (87.3 ) % (92.9 ) %
    Total assets   9,886,612       9,805,350       9,881,077       0.8   % 0.1   %
    Total deposits   8,201,695       8,143,526       8,306,032       0.7   % (1.3 ) %
    Borrowings   270,757       280,083       295,130       (3.3 ) % (8.3 ) %
    Total shareholders’ equity   1,279,042       1,243,848       1,161,979       2.8   % 10.1   %
    Tangible equity (d)   1,116,284       1,080,816       998,052       3.3   % 11.8   %
    Total nonperforming loans   63,148       69,932       71,759       (9.7 ) % (12.0 ) %
    Total nonperforming assets   63,267       70,870       73,433       (10.7 ) % (13.8 ) %
                     
    ASSET QUALITY RATIOS:                
    Loans as a % of period end total assets   79.74   %   79.72   %   76.16   %     % 4.7   %
    Total nonperforming loans as a % of period end loans   0.80   %   0.89   %   0.95   %   (10.1 ) % (15.8 ) %
    Total nonperforming assets as a % of period end loans + OREO + other nonperforming assets   0.80   %   0.91   %   0.98   %   (12.1 ) % (18.4 ) %
    Allowance for credit losses as a % of period end loans   1.12   %   1.13   %   1.13   %   (0.9 ) % (0.9 ) %
    Net loan charge-offs $ 592     $ 3,206     $ 841       (81.5 ) % (29.6 ) %
    Annualized net loan charge-offs as a % of average loans (b)   0.03   %   0.16   %   0.05   %   (81.3 ) % (40.0 ) %
                     
    CAPITAL & LIQUIDITY:                
    Total shareholders’ equity / Period end total assets   12.94   %   12.69   %   11.76   %   2.0   % 10.0   %
    Tangible equity (d) / Tangible assets (f)   11.48   %   11.21   %   10.27   %   2.4   % 11.8   %
    Average shareholders’ equity / Average assets (b)   12.64   %   12.47   %   11.74   %   1.4   % 7.7   %
    Average shareholders’ equity / Average loans (b)   16.22   %   16.08   %   15.48   %   0.9   % 4.8   %
    Average loans / Average deposits (b)   93.56   %   93.00   %   91.11   %   0.6   % 2.7   %
                     
    Note: Explanations for footnotes (a) – (k) are included at the end of the financial tables in the “Financial Reconciliations” section.  
       
    PARK NATIONAL CORPORATION
    Consolidated Statements of Income
               
        Three Months Ended  
        March 31  
    (in thousands, except share and per share data)   2025   2024  
               
    Interest income:          
    Interest and fees on loans   $ 120,648   $ 111,211  
    Interest on debt securities:          
    Taxable     7,130     11,899  
    Tax-exempt     1,269     1,410  
    Other interest income     3,153     2,120  
    Total interest income     132,200     126,640  
               
    Interest expense:          
    Interest on deposits:          
    Demand and savings deposits     18,436     19,855  
    Time deposits     6,770     7,338  
    Interest on borrowings     2,617     3,824  
    Total interest expense     27,823     31,017  
               
    Net interest income     104,377     95,623  
               
    Provision for credit losses     756     2,180  
               
    Net interest income after provision for credit losses     103,621     93,443  
               
    Other income     25,746     26,200  
               
    Other expense     78,164     77,228  
               
    Income before income taxes     51,203     42,415  
               
    Income taxes     9,046     7,211  
               
    Net income   $ 42,157   $ 35,204  
               
    Per common share:          
    Net income – basic   $ 2.61   $ 2.18  
    Net income – diluted   $ 2.60   $ 2.17  
               
    Weighted average common shares – basic     16,159,342     16,116,842  
    Weighted average common shares – diluted     16,238,701     16,191,065  
               
    Cash dividends declared:          
      Quarterly dividend   $ 1.07   $ 1.06  
     
    PARK NATIONAL CORPORATION
    Consolidated Balance Sheets
         
    (in thousands, except share data) March 31, 2025 December 31, 2024
         
    Assets    
         
    Cash and due from banks $ 154,536   $ 122,363  
    Money market instruments   83,078     38,203  
    Investment securities   1,042,163     1,100,861  
    Loans   7,883,735     7,817,128  
    Allowance for credit losses   (88,130 )   (87,966 )
    Loans, net   7,795,605     7,729,162  
    Bank premises and equipment, net   66,327     69,522  
    Goodwill and other intangible assets   162,758     163,032  
    Other real estate owned   119     938  
    Other assets   582,026     581,269  
    Total assets $ 9,886,612   $ 9,805,350  
         
    Liabilities and Shareholders’ Equity    
         
    Deposits:    
    Noninterest bearing $ 2,637,577   $ 2,612,708  
    Interest bearing   5,564,118     5,530,818  
    Total deposits   8,201,695     8,143,526  
    Borrowings   270,757     280,083  
    Other liabilities   135,118     137,893  
    Total liabilities $ 8,607,570   $ 8,561,502  
         
         
    Shareholders’ Equity:    
    Preferred shares (200,000 shares authorized; no shares outstanding at March 31, 2025 and December 31, 2024) $   $  
    Common shares (No par value; 20,000,000 shares authorized; 17,623,104 shares issued at March 31, 2025 and December 31, 2024)   459,529     463,706  
    Accumulated other comprehensive loss, net of taxes   (34,659 )   (46,175 )
    Retained earnings   1,002,110     977,599  
    Treasury shares (1,431,757 shares at March 31, 2025 and 1,464,122 shares at December 31, 2024)   (147,938 )   (151,282 )
    Total shareholders’ equity $ 1,279,042   $ 1,243,848  
    Total liabilities and shareholders’ equity $ 9,886,612   $ 9,805,350  
     
    PARK NATIONAL CORPORATION
    Consolidated Average Balance Sheets
           
      Three Months Ended  
      March 31  
    (in thousands)   2025     2024    
           
    Assets      
           
    Cash and due from banks $ 127,229   $ 143,714    
    Money market instruments   287,016     155,511    
    Investment securities   1,069,620     1,368,527    
    Loans   7,833,234     7,482,650    
    Allowance for credit losses   (88,825 )   (84,067 )  
    Loans, net   7,744,409     7,398,583    
    Bank premises and equipment, net   68,992     74,919    
    Goodwill and other intangible assets   162,938     164,137    
    Other real estate owned   918     1,088    
    Other assets   584,485     556,899    
    Total assets $ 10,045,607   $ 9,863,378    
           
           
    Liabilities and Shareholders’ Equity      
           
    Deposits:      
    Noninterest bearing $ 2,578,838   $ 2,569,030    
    Interest bearing   5,793,915     5,644,088    
    Total deposits   8,372,753     8,213,118    
    Borrowings   269,254     361,703    
    Other liabilities   133,341     130,373    
    Total liabilities $ 8,775,348   $ 8,705,194    
           
    Shareholders’ Equity:      
    Preferred shares $   $    
    Common shares   464,046     463,518    
    Accumulated other comprehensive loss, net of taxes   (39,942 )   (67,343 )  
    Retained earnings   997,399     917,645    
    Treasury shares   (151,244 )   (155,636 )  
    Total shareholders’ equity $ 1,270,259   $ 1,158,184    
    Total liabilities and shareholders’ equity $ 10,045,607   $ 9,863,378    
     
    PARK NATIONAL CORPORATION
    Consolidated Statements of Income – Linked Quarters
               
      2025 2024 2024 2024 2024
    (in thousands, except per share data) 1st QTR 4th QTR 3rd QTR 2nd QTR 1st QTR
               
    Interest income:          
    Interest and fees on loans $ 120,648   $ 120,870   $ 120,203   $ 115,318   $ 111,211  
    Interest on debt securities:          
    Taxable   7,130     8,641     10,228     10,950     11,899  
    Tax-exempt   1,269     1,351     1,381     1,382     1,410  
    Other interest income   3,153     2,751     1,996     1,254     2,120  
    Total interest income   132,200     133,613     133,808     128,904     126,640  
               
    Interest expense:          
    Interest on deposits:          
    Demand and savings deposits   18,436     19,802     22,762     20,370     19,855  
    Time deposits   6,770     7,658     7,073     7,525     7,338  
    Interest on borrowings   2,617     2,708     2,859     3,172     3,824  
    Total interest expense   27,823     30,168     32,694     31,067     31,017  
               
    Net interest income   104,377     103,445     101,114     97,837     95,623  
               
    Provision for credit losses   756     3,935     5,315     3,113     2,180  
               
    Net interest income after provision for credit losses   103,621     99,510     95,799     94,724     93,443  
               
    Other income   25,746     31,064     36,530     28,794     26,200  
               
    Other expense   78,164     83,241     85,681     75,189     77,228  
               
    Income before income taxes   51,203     47,333     46,648     48,329     42,415  
               
    Income taxes   9,046     8,703     8,431     8,960     7,211  
               
    Net income $ 42,157   $ 38,630   $ 38,217   $ 39,369   $ 35,204  
               
    Per common share:          
    Net income – basic $ 2.61   $ 2.39   $ 2.37   $ 2.44   $ 2.18  
    Net income – diluted $ 2.60   $ 2.37   $ 2.35   $ 2.42   $ 2.17  
     
    PARK NATIONAL CORPORATION
    Detail of other income and other expense – Linked Quarters
               
        2025     2024     2024     2024     2024  
    (in thousands) 1st QTR 4th QTR 3rd QTR 2nd QTR 1st QTR
               
    Other income:          
    Income from fiduciary activities $ 10,994   $ 11,122   $ 10,615   $ 10,728   $ 10,024  
    Service charges on deposit accounts   2,407     2,319     2,362     2,214     2,106  
    Other service income   2,936     3,277     3,036     2,906     2,524  
    Debit card fee income   6,089     6,511     6,539     6,580     6,243  
    Bank owned life insurance income   1,512     1,519     2,057     1,565     2,629  
    ATM fees   335     415     471     458     496  
    Pension settlement gain       365     5,783          
    (Loss) gain on the sale of OREO, net   (229 )   (74 )   2     (7 )   121  
    Loss on sale of debt securities, net       (128 )           (398 )
    (Loss) gain on equity securities, net   (862 )   1,852     1,557     358     (687 )
    Other components of net periodic benefit income   2,344     2,651     2,204     2,204     2,204  
    Miscellaneous   220     1,235     1,904     1,788     938  
    Total other income $ 25,746   $ 31,064   $ 36,530   $ 28,794   $ 26,200  
               
    Other expense:          
    Salaries $ 36,216   $ 37,254   $ 38,370   $ 35,954   $ 35,733  
    Employee benefits   10,516     10,129     10,162     9,873     11,560  
    Occupancy expense   3,519     2,929     3,731     2,975     3,181  
    Furniture and equipment expense   2,301     2,375     2,571     2,454     2,583  
    Data processing fees   10,529     10,450     11,764     9,542     8,808  
    Professional fees and services   7,307     10,465     7,842     6,022     6,817  
    Marketing   1,528     1,949     1,464     1,164     1,741  
    Insurance   1,686     1,600     1,640     1,777     1,718  
    Communication   1,202     1,104     955     1,002     1,036  
    State tax expense   1,186     1,145     1,116     1,129     1,110  
    Amortization of intangible assets   274     288     287     320     320  
    Foundation contributions           2,000          
    Miscellaneous   1,900     3,553     3,779     2,977     2,621  
    Total other expense $ 78,164   $ 83,241   $ 85,681   $ 75,189   $ 77,228  
               
    PARK NATIONAL CORPORATION
    Asset Quality Information
                   
          Year ended December 31,
    (in thousands, except ratios)   March 31, 2025   2024     2023     2022     2021     2020  
                   
    Allowance for credit losses:              
    Allowance for credit losses, beginning of period   $ 87,966   $ 83,745   $ 85,379   $ 83,197   $ 85,675   $ 56,679  
    Cumulative change in accounting principle; adoption of ASU 2022-02 in 2023 and ASU 2016-13 in 2021           383         6,090      
    Charge-offs     3,605     18,334     10,863     9,133     5,093     10,304  
    Recoveries     3,013     8,012     5,942     6,758     8,441     27,246  
    Net charge-offs (recoveries)     592     10,322     4,921     2,375     (3,348 )   (16,942 )
    Provision for (recovery of) credit losses     756     14,543     2,904     4,557     (11,916 )   12,054  
    Allowance for credit losses, end of period   $ 88,130   $ 87,966   $ 83,745   $ 85,379   $ 83,197   $ 85,675  
                   
    General reserve trends:              
    Allowance for credit losses, end of period   $ 88,130   $ 87,966   $ 83,745   $ 85,379   $ 83,197   $ 85,675  
    Allowance on accruing purchased credit deteriorated (“PCD”) loans (purchased credit impaired (“PCI”) loans for years 2020 and prior)                         167  
    Allowance on purchased loans excluded from collectively evaluated loans (for years 2020 and prior)   N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.   678  
    Specific reserves on individually evaluated loans – accrual                     42     44  
    Specific reserves on individually evaluated loans – nonaccrual     1,044     1,299     4,983     3,566     1,574     5,390  
    General reserves on collectively evaluated loans   $ 87,086   $ 86,667   $ 78,762   $ 81,813   $ 81,581   $ 79,396  
                   
    Total loans   $ 7,883,735   $ 7,817,128   $ 7,476,221   $ 7,141,891   $ 6,871,122   $ 7,177,785  
    Accruing PCD loans (PCI loans for years 2020 and prior)     2,139     2,174     2,835     4,653     7,149     11,153  
    Purchased loans excluded from collectively evaluated loans (for years 2020 and prior)   N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.   360,056  
    Individually evaluated loans – accrual (k)     13,935     15,290         11,477     17,517     8,756  
    Individually evaluated loans – nonaccrual     47,718     53,149     45,215     66,864     56,985     99,651  
    Collectively evaluated loans   $ 7,819,943   $ 7,746,515   $ 7,428,171   $ 7,058,897   $ 6,789,471   $ 6,698,169  
                   
    Asset Quality Ratios:              
    Net charge-offs (recoveries) as a % of average loans     0.03 %   0.14 %   0.07 %   0.03 %   (0.05) %   (0.24) %
    Allowance for credit losses as a % of period end loans     1.12 %   1.13 %   1.12 %   1.20 %   1.21 %   1.19 %
    General reserve as a % of collectively evaluated loans     1.11 %   1.12 %   1.06 %   1.16 %   1.20 %   1.19 %
                   
    Nonperforming assets:              
    Nonaccrual loans   $ 61,929   $ 68,178   $ 60,259   $ 79,696   $ 72,722   $ 117,368  
    Accruing troubled debt restructurings (for years 2022 and prior) (k)   N.A. N.A. N.A.   20,134     28,323     20,788  
    Loans past due 90 days or more     1,219     1,754     859     1,281     1,607     1,458  
    Total nonperforming loans   $ 63,148   $ 69,932   $ 61,118   $ 101,111   $ 102,652   $ 139,614  
    Other real estate owned     119     938     983     1,354     775     1,431  
    Other nonperforming assets                     2,750     3,164  
    Total nonperforming assets   $ 63,267   $ 70,870   $ 62,101   $ 102,465   $ 106,177   $ 144,209  
    Percentage of nonaccrual loans to period end loans     0.79 %   0.87 %   0.81 %   1.12 %   1.06 %   1.64 %
    Percentage of nonperforming loans to period end loans     0.80 %   0.89 %   0.82 %   1.42 %   1.49 %   1.95 %
    Percentage of nonperforming assets to period end loans     0.80 %   0.91 %   0.83 %   1.43 %   1.55 %   2.01 %
    Percentage of nonperforming assets to period end total assets     0.64 %   0.72 %   0.63 %   1.04 %   1.11 %   1.55 %
                   
    Note: Explanations for footnotes (a) – (k) are included at the end of the financial tables in the “Financial Reconciliations” section.
     
    PARK NATIONAL CORPORATION
    Asset Quality Information (continued)
                   
          Year ended December 31,
    (in thousands, except ratios)   March 31, 2025 2024 2023 2022 2021 2020
                   
    New nonaccrual loan information:              
    Nonaccrual loans, beginning of period   $ 68,178 $ 60,259 $ 79,696 $ 72,722 $ 117,368 $ 90,080
    New nonaccrual loans     14,767   65,535   48,280   64,918   38,478   103,386
    Resolved nonaccrual loans     21,016   57,616   67,717   57,944   83,124   76,098
    Nonaccrual loans, end of period   $ 61,929 $ 68,178 $ 60,259 $ 79,696 $ 72,722 $ 117,368
                   
    Individually evaluated nonaccrual commercial loan portfolio information (period end):
    Unpaid principal balance   $ 51,134 $ 58,158 $ 47,564 $ 68,639 $ 57,609 $ 100,306
    Prior charge-offs     3,416   5,009   2,349   1,775   624   655
    Remaining principal balance     47,718   53,149   45,215   66,864   56,985   99,651
    Specific reserves     1,044   1,299   4,983   3,566   1,574   5,390
    Book value, after specific reserves   $ 46,674 $ 51,850 $ 40,232 $ 63,298 $ 55,411 $ 94,261
                   
    Note: Explanations for footnotes (a) – (k) are included at the end of the financial tables in the “Financial Reconciliations” section.
     
    PARK NATIONAL CORPORATION  
    Financial Reconciliations        
    NON-GAAP RECONCILIATIONS        
      THREE MONTHS ENDED  
    (in thousands, except share and per share data) March 31, 2025 December 31, 2024 March 31, 2024  
    Net interest income $ 104,377   $ 103,445   $ 95,623    
    less purchase accounting accretion related to NewDominion and Carolina Alliance acquisitions   175     250     352    
    less interest income on former Vision Bank relationships   1,019     38     2    
    Net interest income – adjusted $ 103,183   $ 103,157   $ 95,269    
             
    Provision for credit losses $ 756   $ 3,935   $ 2,180    
    less recoveries on former Vision Bank relationships   (1,097 )       (953 )  
    Provision for credit losses – adjusted $ 1,853   $ 3,935   $ 3,133    
             
    Other income $ 25,746   $ 31,064   $ 26,200    
    less loss on sale of debt securities, net       (128 )   (398 )  
    less pension settlement gain       365        
    less impact of strategic initiatives   (914 )   117     (155 )  
    less Vision related (loss) gain on the sale of OREO, net   (229 )       121    
    less other service income related to former Vision Bank relationships   3     299     7    
    Other income – adjusted $ 26,886   $ 30,411   $ 26,625    
             
    Other expense $ 78,164   $ 83,241   $ 77,228    
    less core deposit intangible amortization related to NewDominion and Carolina Alliance acquisitions   274     288     320    
    less building demolition costs       44     65    
    less direct expenses related to collection of payments on former Vision Bank loan relationships   276     215        
    Other expense – adjusted $ 77,614   $ 82,694   $ 76,843    
             
    Tax effect of adjustments to net income identified above (i) $ (126 ) $ (83 ) $ (104 )  
             
    Net income – reported $ 42,157   $ 38,630   $ 35,204    
    Net income – adjusted (h) $ 41,682   $ 38,319   $ 34,811    
             
    Diluted earnings per common share $ 2.60   $ 2.37   $ 2.17    
    Diluted earnings per common share, adjusted (h) $ 2.57   $ 2.35   $ 2.15    
             
    Annualized return on average assets (a)(b)   1.70 %   1.54 %   1.44 %  
    Annualized return on average assets, adjusted (a)(b)(h)   1.68 %   1.52 %   1.42 %  
             
    Annualized return on average tangible assets (a)(b)(e)   1.73 %   1.56 %   1.46 %  
    Annualized return on average tangible assets, adjusted (a)(b)(e)(h)   1.71 %   1.55 %   1.44 %  
             
    Annualized return on average shareholders’ equity (a)(b)   13.46 %   12.32 %   12.23 %  
    Annualized return on average shareholders’ equity, adjusted (a)(b)(h)   13.31 %   12.22 %   12.09 %  
             
    Annualized return on average tangible equity (a)(b)(c)   15.44 %   14.17 %   14.24 %  
    Annualized return on average tangible equity, adjusted (a)(b)(c)(h)   15.27 %   14.06 %   14.08 %  
             
    Efficiency ratio (g)   59.79 %   61.60 %   63.07 %  
    Efficiency ratio, adjusted (g)(h)   59.39 %   61.63 %   62.72 %  
             
    Annualized net interest margin (g)   4.62 %   4.51 %   4.28 %  
    Annualized net interest margin, adjusted (g)(h)   4.57 %   4.50 %   4.26 %  
    Note: Explanations for footnotes (a) – (k) are included at the end of the financial tables in the “Financial Reconciliations” section.
     
    PARK NATIONAL CORPORATION  
    Financial Reconciliations (continued)        
             
    (a) Reported measure uses net income
    (b) Averages are for the three months ended March 31, 2025, December 31, 2024, and March 31, 2024, as appropriate
    (c) Net income for each period divided by average tangible equity during the period. Average tangible equity equals average shareholders’ equity during the applicable period less average goodwill and other intangible assets during the applicable period.
             
    RECONCILIATION OF AVERAGE SHAREHOLDERS’ EQUITY TO AVERAGE TANGIBLE EQUITY:  
      THREE MONTHS ENDED  
      March 31, 2025 December 31, 2024 March 31, 2024  
    AVERAGE SHAREHOLDERS’ EQUITY $ 1,270,259 $ 1,247,680 $ 1,158,184  
    Less: Average goodwill and other intangible assets   162,938   163,221   164,137  
    AVERAGE TANGIBLE EQUITY $ 1,107,321 $ 1,084,459 $ 994,047  
             
    (d) Tangible equity divided by common shares outstanding at period end. Tangible equity equals total shareholders’ equity less goodwill and other intangible assets, in each case at the end of the period.
             
    RECONCILIATION OF TOTAL SHAREHOLDERS’ EQUITY TO TANGIBLE EQUITY:
      March 31, 2025 December 31, 2024 March 31, 2024  
    TOTAL SHAREHOLDERS’ EQUITY $ 1,279,042 $ 1,243,848 $ 1,161,979  
    Less: Goodwill and other intangible assets   162,758   163,032   163,927  
    TANGIBLE EQUITY $ 1,116,284 $ 1,080,816 $ 998,052  
             
    (e) Net income for each period divided by average tangible assets during the period. Average tangible assets equal average assets less average goodwill and other intangible assets, in each case during the applicable period.
             
    RECONCILIATION OF AVERAGE ASSETS TO AVERAGE TANGIBLE ASSETS  
      THREE MONTHS ENDED  
      March 31, 2025 December 31, 2024 March 31, 2024  
    AVERAGE ASSETS $ 10,045,607 $ 10,008,328 $ 9,863,378  
    Less: Average goodwill and other intangible assets   162,938   163,221   164,137  
    AVERAGE TANGIBLE ASSETS $ 9,882,669 $ 9,845,107 $ 9,699,241  
             
    (f) Tangible equity divided by tangible assets. Tangible assets equal total assets less goodwill and other intangible assets, in each case at the end of the period.
             
    RECONCILIATION OF TOTAL ASSETS TO TANGIBLE ASSETS:
      March 31, 2025 December 31, 2024 March 31, 2024  
    TOTAL ASSETS $ 9,886,612 $ 9,805,350 $ 9,881,077  
    Less: Goodwill and other intangible assets   162,758   163,032   163,927  
    TANGIBLE ASSETS $ 9,723,854 $ 9,642,318 $ 9,717,150  
             
    (g) Efficiency ratio is calculated by dividing total other expense by the sum of fully taxable equivalent net interest income and other income. Fully taxable equivalent net interest income reconciliation is shown assuming a 21% corporate federal income tax rate. Additionally, net interest margin is calculated on a fully taxable equivalent basis by dividing fully taxable equivalent net interest income by average interest earning assets, in each case during the applicable period.
             
    RECONCILIATION OF FULLY TAXABLE EQUIVALENT NET INTEREST INCOME TO NET INTEREST INCOME
      THREE MONTHS ENDED  
      March 31, 2025 December 31, 2024 March 31, 2024  
    Interest income $ 132,200 $ 133,613 $ 126,640  
    Fully taxable equivalent adjustment   607   617   616  
    Fully taxable equivalent interest income $ 132,807 $ 134,230 $ 127,256  
    Interest expense   27,823   30,168   31,017  
    Fully taxable equivalent net interest income $ 104,984 $ 104,062 $ 96,239  
             
    (h) Adjustments to net income for each period presented are detailed in the non-GAAP reconciliations of net interest income, provision for credit losses, other income, other expense and tax effect of adjustments to net income.
    (i) The tax effect of adjustments to net income was calculated assuming a 21% corporate federal income tax rate.
    (j) Pre-tax, pre-provision (“PTPP”) net income is calculated as net income, plus income taxes, plus the provision for credit losses, in each case during the applicable period. PTPP net income is a common industry metric utilized in capital analysis and review. PTPP is used to assess the operating performance of Park while excluding the impact of the provision for credit losses.
     
    RECONCILIATION OF PRE-TAX, PRE-PROVISION NET INCOME
      THREE MONTHS ENDED
      March 31, 2025 December 31, 2024 March 31, 2024
    Net income $ 42,157 $ 38,630 $ 35,204  
    Plus: Income taxes   9,046   8,703   7,211  
    Plus: Provision for credit losses   756   3,935   2,180  
    Pre-tax, pre-provision net income $ 51,959 $ 51,268 $ 44,595  
             
    (k) Effective January 1, 2023, Park adopted Accounting Standards Update (“ASU”) 2022-02. Among other things, this ASU eliminated the concept of troubled debt restructurings (“TDRs”). As a result of the adoption of this ASU and elimination of the concept of TDRs, total nonperforming loans (“NPLs”) and total nonperforming assets (“NPAs”) each decreased by $20.1 million effective January 1, 2023. Additionally, as a result of the adoption of this ASU, accruing individually evaluated loans decreased by $11.5 million effective January 1, 2023.
     

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Arbor Realty Trust Schedules First Quarter 2025 Earnings Conference Call

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    UNIONDALE, N.Y., April 25, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Arbor Realty Trust, Inc. (NYSE: ABR), today announced that it is scheduled to release first quarter 2025 financial results before the market opens on Friday, May 2, 2025. The Company will host a conference call to review the results at 10:00 a.m. Eastern Time on May 2, 2025.

    A live webcast and replay of the conference call will be available at www.arbor.com in the investor relations section of the Company’s website. Those without web access should access the call telephonically at least ten minutes prior to the conference call. The dial-in numbers are (800) 579-2543 for domestic callers and (785) 424-1789 for international callers. Please use participant passcode ABRQ125 when prompted by the operator.

    A telephonic replay of the call will be available until May 9, 2025. The replay dial-in numbers are (800) 934-2127 for domestic callers and (402) 220-1139 for international callers.

    About Arbor Realty Trust, Inc.

    Arbor Realty Trust, Inc. (NYSE: ABR) is a nationwide real estate investment trust and direct lender, providing loan origination and servicing for multifamily, single-family rental (SFR) portfolios, and other diverse commercial real estate assets. Headquartered in New York, Arbor manages a multibillion-dollar servicing portfolio, specializing in government-sponsored enterprise products. Arbor is a leading Fannie Mae DUS® lender, Freddie Mac Optigo® Seller/Servicer, and an approved FHA Multifamily Accelerated Processing (MAP) lender. Arbor’s product platform also includes bridge, CMBS, mezzanine, and preferred equity loans. Rated by Standard and Poor’s and Fitch Ratings, Arbor is committed to building on its reputation for service, quality, and customized solutions with an unparalleled dedication to providing our clients excellence over the entire life of a loan.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Economics: US tariffs likely to threaten Chinese insurers’ profitability, says GlobalData

    Source: GlobalData

    US tariffs likely to threaten Chinese insurers’ profitability, says GlobalData

    Posted in Insurance

    On April 15, 2025, the US government announced that China would face tariffs of up to 245% on imports to the US as its retaliatory actions. The range of products subject to 245% tariffs includes syringes and needles from China. Additionally, lithium-ion batteries are subject to a 173% tariff, electric vehicles a 148% tariff, car wheels a 73% tariff, and semiconductors a 70% tariff. As a result, Chinese insurers may experience a rise in claim costs across multiple lines of insurance in 2025, which would impact their profitability, says GlobalData, a leading data and analytics company.

    Higher tariffs will affect industries such as semiconductors, medical equipment, manufacturing, aviation, automobiles, and insurance. They are expected to slow economic growth and raise inflation and unemployment, impacting life insurance sales. High tariffs will raise business costs and disrupt supply chains, leading to higher premiums for consumers.

    Manogna Vangari, Insurance Analyst at GlobalData, comments: “Insurers will experience a detrimental impact on their investment income due to the heightened economic uncertainty and volatility in the financial markets, spurred by escalating trade tensions.”

    In response to these external economic pressures, the National Financial Regulatory Administration in China increased the proportion of insurance funds for investment in the stock market. This measure is a component of a wider strategy aimed at infusing institutional capital into equities.

    The general insurance loss ratio, which stood at 68.4% in 2024, is expected to increase in 2025–26 and impact the sector’s profitability. Incurred loss is also expected to expand at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 4.8% over 2025–29. Nevertheless, variations in tariff rates could potentially elevate the actual loss beyond this estimate.

    According to GlobalData’s Global Insurance Database, China’s general insurance industry is expected to grow at a slower rate of 4.6% in 2025 and 4.4% in 2026 compared to 5.4% in 2024 and register a CAGR of 5.4% over 2025–29, from CNY1.7 trillion ($245.8 billion) in 2025 to CNY2.2 trillion ($306.9 billion) in 2029, in terms of direct written premiums.

    Vangari adds: “On April 15, 2025, the US government implemented an export ban on one of its most advanced semiconductor chips, which are used to power artificial intelligence (AI) systems in China. This situation will exert a short-term influence on vehicle production, leading to increased prices for both new and used automobiles. Consequently, this escalation is likely to affect motor insurance premiums and claims.”

    Rising port call rates are also leading to higher fees for vessels linked to China, increasing their marine, aviation, and transit (MAT) insurance premiums. The price of Chinese goods is expected to rise as the US works to lessen China’s control over the Panama Canal, raising MAT insurance costs further.

    Additionally, on April 16, 2025, the government ordered Chinese carriers to halt deliveries of Boeing Company jets and suspend all purchases of aircraft-related equipment and parts from US companies.

    With these orders, the disruptions in the supply chain are expected to result in an increase in claims related to business interruption, marine cargo, trade credit insurance, and political risk insurance. Furthermore, the preventative actions implemented by the Chinese government are anticipated to cause a temporary cessation of exports, which may lead to a reduction in demand for cargo insurance and MAT insurance.

    Vangari concludes: “The effects of tariffs on Chinese insurance firms are multifaceted and intertwined with the broader economic consequences of trade disputes. These tariffs may lead to higher claims costs and a deceleration in premium growth. The response from Chinese regulators and insurers indicates a proactive approach to mitigate the negative impacts and maintain financial stability amidst ongoing trade tensions.”

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Economics: UAE card payments to surpass $150 billion in 2025 amid push for cashless economy, forecasts GlobalData

    Source: GlobalData

    UAE card payments to surpass $150 billion in 2025 amid push for cashless economy, forecasts GlobalData

    Posted in Banking

    The UAE’s card payments market is set to grow by 10.6% in 2025 to AED565.5 billion ($154 billion), reflecting a clear shift towards electronic payments. Driven by rising consumer preference for digital transactions and strong government support for financial inclusion, this trend signals the country’s steady move towards a cashless economy amid broader digital transformation efforts, says GlobalData, a leading data and analytics company.

    GlobalData’s report, “UAE Cards and Payments: Opportunities and Risks to 2028,” reveals that the card payment value in the UAE registered a growth of 13.3% in 2024 to reach AED511.4 billion ($139.3 billion). However, the current global uncertainty because of the latest US tariffs can pose a challenge for the UAE’s overall economic growth, resulting in slowdown of the overall card payments value in 2025.

    Ravi Sharma, Lead Banking and Payments Analyst at GlobalData, comments: “While cash remains the most preferred mode of payment, the dynamic is gradually changing with the rise in card payments. Persistent efforts from the government as well as financial institutions to promote electronic payments via financial inclusion initiatives as well as developing and expanding payment acceptance infrastructure have encouraged consumers to use electronic payments for day-to-day transactions.”

    A key factor contributing to the country’s rising banked population and rise in card penetration is the introduction of the “Wage Protection System,” mandating employers to pay wages electronically via banks and financial institutions authorized by the Central Bank of the UAE (CBUAE). This initiative aims to increase financial inclusion and boost demand for banking and payment products such as bank accounts and cards.

    The UAE is taking several other initiatives to reduce the dependence on cash and promote electronic payments thereby benefiting card payments. In October 2024, the government launched the Dubai Cashless Strategy to achieve 90% cashless transactions in Dubai by 2026. This strategy intends to expand digital payment solutions across government and private sectors through the development of digital payment innovations, including AI and contactless technologies

    The UAE is swiftly moving towards digitalization of payments. Various financial inclusion measures by the government and CBUAE such as the introduction of the Wage Protection System and Financial Infrastructure Transformation (FIT) Program are supporting the cashless infrastructure, which is seen in the expansion of POS terminals and developments in the card and mobile payments space.

    Among POS, mobile POS terminals are emerging as an alternative payment acceptance solution, especially among SMEs (which account for most UAE businesses) due to being comparatively much cheaper than traditional POS terminals.

    Sharma concludes: “The UAE payment card market is expected to continue its upward growth trajectory supported by government initiatives promoting electronic payments, rising consumer preference for digital payments, and improving payment infrastructure. The card payments value is expected to register a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 9.6% between 2025 to 2029 to reach AED 814.7 billion ($221.8 billion) in 2029.”

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Europe’s hydrogen initiatives and renewable energy auctions to accelerate region’s energy transition, says GlobalData

    Source: GlobalData

    Europe’s hydrogen initiatives and renewable energy auctions to accelerate region’s energy transition, says GlobalData

    Posted in Power

    Three years into the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Europe has significantly diminished its reliance on Russia. Even though the EU has been importing liquified natural gas (LNG) primarily from the US, Norway, and Qatar since the onset of hostilities, the continent has decreased its overall consumption of fossil fuels, particularly the power sector has progressively become cleaner. The structural modifications to the permitting process for renewable energy projects and hydrogen initiatives are expected to further accelerate the region’s energy transition, says GlobalData, a leading data and analytics company.

    GlobalData’s latest report, “Europe Renewable Energy Policy Handbook 2025,” reveals that in response to structural changes in permitting, EU countries acted in a united and prompt manner. Merely weeks following Russia’s incursion into Ukraine, the leaders of the 27 EU member states resolved to expedite the EU’s transition away from reliance on Russian fossil fuels by diversifying energy supplies and sources, curtailing the use of fossil fuels, and accelerating the transition to cleaner energy sources. Subsequently, the European Commission introduced the REPowerEU plan—a strategic framework aimed at enhancing the EU’s energy independence and promoting the adoption of clean energy.

    The EU, with its “Fit for 55” package, is committed to reducing greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030, thereby aligning its energy targets with an emphasis on renewable energy. In 2023, the EU, under the revised REPowerEU plan, set a goal for a 42.5% renewable energy share by 2030. Member states are encouraged to contribute through their respective National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs). The EU is promoting clean energy through auctions and hydrogen energy.

    Sudeshna Sarmah, Power Analyst at GlobalData, comments: “The EU is actively pursuing a variety of strategies to broaden the adoption of renewable technologies. The implementation of the Innovation Fund auction and the Renewable Energy Sources Auction platform is anticipated to garner support for renewable hydrogen projects and serve as a catalyst for renewable power auctions, respectively. These initiatives are expected to foster a favorable environment for investment opportunities within the EU.”

    In the Innovation Fund’s 24th auction, which concluded in February 2025, member countries of the European Economic Area (EEA) were given the opportunity to enhance projects with additional national funding through the Auctions as a Service (AaaS) mechanism. Spain, Lithuania, and Austria chose to participate in the IF24 AaaS, collectively committing over EUR 700 million (approximately $740.3 million) in national funds to support renewable hydrogen production projects within their territories.

    Launched in May 2024, the Renewable Energy Sources (RES) Auctions Platform represents a critical component of the European Commission’s Wind Power Action Plan. This platform consolidates vital information from Member States concerning upcoming renewable energy auctions within the European Union. Its purpose is to provide companies with improved visibility of expected deployment volumes, thus aiding the industry in planning their investments more efficiently.

    Sarmah concludes: “The European Hydrogen Strategy sets an ambitious annual consumption target of 20 million tons of hydrogen by the year 2030. Of this total, approximately 10 million tons are expected to be produced within the European Union. To facilitate the domestic manufacture of such significant volumes of green hydrogen, the development of an infrastructure capable of supporting 40 GW of electrolysis capacity will be essential by the decade’s end, indicating a promising trajectory for the growth of green hydrogen in the region.”

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI USA: Congressman Dan Goldman, Councilmember Zhuang, Food Assistance Orgs, Community Leaders, Highlight Rising Grocery Prices and Cost of Living Resulting from Trump’s Chaos

    Source: US Congressman Dan Goldman (NY-10)

    Trump’s Tariffs, Planned SNAP and Medicaid Cuts are Exacerbating City’s Affordability Crisis 

     

    Trump Administration Has Cut Essential Housing, Food, and Child Care Programs for Thousands of NYC Families 

     

    Egg Prices Have Risen 60.4% Since Last Year 

     

    See Pictures and Video from Press Conference Here 

     

     

    New York, NY – Congressman Dan Goldman (NY-10) today joined, NYC Council member Susan Zhuang, and community organizations – including the Chinese-American Planning Council, Parent Child Relationship Association, Homecrest Community Services, UA3, and the Center for Family Life in Sunset Park – as well as impacted constituents to highlight how Trump and the GOP are harming working New York families by driving up grocery prices and the overall cost of living. 

    Since beginning his second term in January, Donald Trump and New York Republicans have made grocery prices skyrocket with reckless tariffs and bad economic policy. Egg prices have risen over 60% since last March, while the average price of groceries has increased by 2.4% since 2024. His administration terminated a $1 billion emergency food assistance grant that New York City organizations depended on to feed New Yorkers in need, and his cuts to the emergency rental assistance program as well as child care programs like Head Start have impacted thousands of New Yorkers’ ability to afford the already high cost of living. To compound the issue, the GOP’s budget proposal would cut SNAP and Medicaid significantly, which over 5 million New Yorkers rely on for nutrition and health care. 

    “Donald Trump and the GOP’s reckless, self-serving agenda is breaking his campaign promises by making it harder than ever for working New Yorkers to put food on the table and provide for their families,” Congressman Dan Goldman said. “Grocery prices are soaring, and families are struggling across the country, all so that Trump and Congressional Republicans can hand out tax breaks to billionaires. After running on a platform to lower costs, Trump has completely abandoned working Americans with reckless and pointless tariffs that have skyrocketed everyday costs while pushing forward with massive cuts to government programs that help New Yorkers get by.  It is long past time that New York’s Republican members of Congress choose their constituents over Trump’s billionaire buddies.” 

    Councilmember Susan Zhuang said, “For years the cost of groceries, utilities, property taxes, and more has increased. Within the last few months, we’re watching those rates sky-rocket. I dedicate my time to make our community affordable because right now it’s difficult to put food on the table. We must pay attention to these rising costs and fight against it at the federal, state, and local levels.” 

    Wai Yee Chan, President & CEO of Homecrest Community Services, said, “As the cost of living continues to rise, our community is feeling the pressure. While tariffs aim to protect local industries and ensure fair trade, they can also contribute to higher prices for everyday goods. When businesses face increased import costs, those expenses are often passed on to consumers. Nearly half of our members shared this week that they are struggling to afford basic necessities like food and rent. At Homecrest Community Services, we are deeply concerned about the growing financial strain on working families. We will continue to keep a close eye on the situation and work with partners at all levels to find fair solutions—ones that help our economy grow without putting too much pressure on everyday New Yorkers.” 

    Nicole Huang, Executive Director of Parent Child Relationship Association, said, “Rising costs are not just numbers — they are daily struggles, especially for our most vulnerable communities.” 

    Congressman Goldman has made supporting working families a centerpiece of his time in office.  

    In February 2025, Congressman Goldman joined Congresswoman DeLauro in introducing the ‘American Family Act,’ which would codify the expired, COVID-19-era expanded monthly Child Tax Credit. Passed temporarily in the Congressional Democrats’ American Rescue Plan, the expanded Child Tax Credit reached more than 61 million children and lifted nearly 4 million out of poverty in 2021 alone. 
    In August 2024, Congressman Goldman cosponsored the ‘SNAP Theft Protection Act,’ which aims to update the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) to allow states to use existing SNAP funding to refund stolen benefits to victims of SNAP-related scams.   
    In July 2024, Congressman Goldman held a Summer Nutrition Town Hall to discuss food insecurity, share information about New York State’s Summer EBT program and its rollout, and provide resources to residents who would like to apply. 

    ### 

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Press Briefing Transcript: African Department, Spring Meetings 2025

    Source: International Monetary Fund

    April 25, 2025

    PARTICIPANTS:

    Speaker: ABEBE AEMRO SELASSIE, Director, African Department, IMF

    Moderator: KWABENA AKUAMOAH-BOATENG, Communications Officer, IMF

    *  *  *  *  *

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Good morning, good afternoon, and good evening to all of you here in the room and those joining us online. My name is Kwabena Akuamoah-Boateng.  I am with the Communications Department of the IMF, and

    I will be your moderator for today. 

    Welcome to today’s press briefing on the Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa. I am pleased to introduce Abebe Aemro Selassie, Director of the IMF’s African Department.  Abebe will share key insights from our new report titled Recovery Interrupted

    But before I turn to Abebe, a reminder that we have simultaneous interpretation in French and Portuguese, both online and in the room.  And the materials for this press briefing, the report, are all available online at IMF.org/Africa. Abebe, the floor is yours.

    MR. SELASSIE: Good morning and good afternoon to colleagues joining us from the region and beyond. Thank you for being here today for the release of our April Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa.

    Six months ago, I highlighted our region’s sluggish growth, and the steep political and social hurdles governments had to overcome to push through essential reforms.  Today, that fragile recovery faces a new test: the surge of global policy uncertainty so profound it is reshaping the region’s growth trajectory.

    Just when policy efforts began to bear fruit, with regional growth exceeding expectations in 2024, the region’s hard-won recovery has been overtaken by a sudden realignment of global priorities, casting a shadow over the outlook.  We now expect growth in Sub-Saharan Africa to ease to 3.8 percent in 2025 and 4.2 percent in 2026, marked down from our October projections, and these have been driven largely by difficult external conditions: weaker demand abroad, softer commodity prices, and tighter financial markets.

    Any further increase in trade tensions or tightening of financial conditions in advanced economies could further dampen regional confidence, raise borrowing costs further, and delay investment.  Meanwhile, official development assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa is likely to decline further, placing extra strain on the most vulnerable population.

    These external headwinds come on top of longer-standing vulnerabilities. High debt levels constrain the ability of many countries to finance essential services and development priorities.  While inflationary pressures have moderated at the regional level, quite a few countries are still grappling with elevated inflation, necessitating a tighter monetary stance and careful fiscal policy.

    Against this challenging backdrop, our report underscores the importance of calibrating policies to balance growth, social development, and macroeconomic stability.  Building robust fiscal and external buffers is more important than ever, underpinned by credibility and consistency in policymaking.

    In particular, there is a premium on policies to strengthen resilience: mobilize domestic revenue, improve spending efficiency, and strengthen public finance management and fiscal framework and fiscal frameworks to lower borrowing costs.  Reforms that enhance growth, improve the business climate, and foster regional trade integration are also needed to lay the groundwork for private sector-led growth.  High growth is imperative to engender the millions of jobs our region needs. 

    A strong, stable, and prosperous Sub-Saharan Africa is important for its people but also the world.  It is the region that will be the main source of labor and incremental investment and consumption demand in the decades to come.  External support as the region goes through its demographic transition is of tremendous strategic importance for the future of our planet. 

    The Fund is doing its part to help, having dispersed over $65 billion since 2020 and more than $8 billion just over the last year.  Our policy advice and capacity development efforts support more countries still. 

    Thank you and I’m happy to answer your questions. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Thank you, Abebe. Before we turn to you for your questions, a couple of ground rules, please. If you want to ask a question, raise your hand, and we’ll come to you.  Identify yourself and your organization and please limit it to one question.  For those online, you can use the chat function, or you can also raise your hand, and then we’ll come to you.  I will start from my right. 

    QUESTIONER: Good morning.  Thank you for taking my question.  You mentioned several things in your report.  The recovery that is going on the continent as well as some of the challenges that the continent is facing and the dividends that the continent currently has in its youth.  Leaders on the continent are working — I was at an event yesterday where they are looking at ways to raise funds to develop projects.  So, what is your recommendation for projects?  We’re seeing a need for projects like this as well as revenue mobilization on the continent.  So, is your recommendation to leaders on the continent on how to source these funds that are needed, given that some of the advanced economies are cutting back? 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: All right, any related questions before we go to Abebe?

    QUESTIONER: Abebe, you just made the point that the recovery has been hit by these uncertainties.  Beyond just policy direction, is there any scope to do anything in terms of, for example, maybe you dispense some money though, but maybe a little more to expect — to countries that are coming off defaults and what have you to help in this recovery, even at such a time?  This is also aided by, beyond the fact that some are coming, they have no buffers whatsoever.  And then, coming from defaults, things become very difficult for some of these countries to even have the money to do this.  Could there be any extra funding, even if on a regional level, to back the policy prescriptions that you have proposed? 

    MR. SELASSIE: I think there’s two different points here. The first one is more of a broader meta point, whether financing is the only constraint that is hindering more investment, more robust economic activity, and job creation. Of course, financing plays a role, but it is not the only constraint. It depends on country-to-country circumstances, what sectors we are talking about.  But it really is important to recognize that there are many other things that can be done to engender higher growth to facilitate more investment. 

    One of the issues that we have seen in our region over the years is that a lot of growth has –in many countries– been driven by public spending and public investment for many years.  That, of course, has made a major contribution.  It has facilitated all the investment that we have seen in infrastructure, building schools, building clinics.  So, that has a role to play. But I would say that going forward it will be as important to see if we can find ways in which the private sector is the main engine of growth. So, there are reforms that can be done to facilitate this growth. 

    The second one I am sensing from both your questions is about the circumstance right now where a combination of cuts in aid [and] tighter financing conditions are causing dislocation [and difficulties for governments. We have been, more than anybody else, stressing just what a difficult environment our governments have been facing.  We have been talking about the brutal funding squeeze that countries are under.  It has ebbed a little bit and flowed, you know, like the external market conditions, for example. There have been periods when they have been opened and some of our market access countries have been able to borrow, and then other periods where they have been closed, and we are going through one right now.  And this is on top of the cuts in aid that we have seen and tighter domestic financing conditions.  

    When this more cyclical point is playing out, I think it’s important for countries to be a bit more measured in how they are seeking to tackle their development needs.  So, maybe it means a bit more relying on domestic revenue mobilization, expenditure prioritization when conditions are particularly difficult as they are now, and, as I said earlier, going back to see what can be done to find ways to engender growth over the medium-term.  But it is a difficult period, as we note in our report, and one that is causing quite a bit of dislocation to our countries. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: I will come to the middle. The lady in the front.

    QUESTIONER: My first question is around recovery, of course, your reports are called “interrupted”.  So, with recovery slipping, growth downgraded, debt pressures mountain, is Sub-Saharan Africa at risk of another lost decade?  Because in your report you mentioned that the last four years have been quite turbulent for Africa, and we are trying to get back on track.  What is IMF’s message on bold actions that leaders must take now to avoid being left behind in the global economy and to avoid Africa being in a permanent state of vulnerability?  Because we always hear that we are in a permanent state of vulnerability.  Then for Nigeria, macros are under threat right now.  How can the government — what are your suggestions on how the government can actually push through deep reforms that deliver tangible growth for its people?  Of course, for your report, you did mention the millions and millions of people that you know live below $2.15 a day. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Any more Nigeria questions? I will take the gentleman right here.

    QUESTIONER: In your report you said that debt has stabilized.  And when you look at Nigeria’s debt profile, what insights can you share as to where the borrowings are going to?  Are you seeing more of long-term loans or short-term loans?  So that’s one.  So, what — recently the World Bank expressed concerns about the performance of Nigeria’s statistical body, saying that the institution is performing Sub optimally.  Do you share that sentiment?  Thank you very much. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: I will take one more on Nigeria. The gentleman in the first row.

    QUESTIONER: I [would] like to know in specific terms, Nigeria has already undertaken several reforms, especially removed oil subsidies and floated the naira.  What more specific things do you expect of Nigeria in terms of reform?

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: All right, thank you. Abebe?

    MR. SELASSIE: So, in terms of the reforms that have been going on in Nigeria and the particularities of the challenge, the first thing to note is that we have been really impressed by how much reforms have been undertaken in recent years. Most notably, trying to go to the heart of the cause of the macroeconomic imbalances in Nigeria, which are related to the fact that, oil subsidies were taking up a very large share of the limited tax revenues that the government have and not necessarily being used in the most effective way to help the most vulnerable people. The issues related to the imbalances on the external side with the exchange rate extremely out of line. 

    So it’s been really good to see the government taking these on, head-on, address those, and also beginning to roll out the third component of the reforms that we have been advocating for and of course, the government has been pursuing, which is to expand social protection, to target generalized subsidies to help the most vulnerable.  This has all been very good to see, but more can be done, particularly on the latter front, expanding social protection and enhancing a lot more transparency in the oil sector so that the removal of subsidies does translate into flow of revenue into the government budget.  So, there is still a bit more work to do in these areas. 

    We just had a mission in Nigeria where there was extensive discussions on these and other issues on the macroeconomic area, but also other areas where there is a need to do reforms to engender more private sector investment and also how more resources can be devoted to help Nigeria generate the revenues it so desperately needs to build more schools, more universities, and, of course, more infrastructure.  So, there is a comprehensive set of reforms that Nigeria can pursue that would help engender more growth and help diversify the economy away from reliance on oil.  And this diversification is, of course, all the more important given what we are seeing happening to commodity prices.  So, I think this is an important agenda. 

    Second, as the government is doing this, of course there will be a financing need.  And here what is needed is really a judicious and agile way of dealing with the financing challenges the country faces.  In the long run, the financing gap can only be filled by permanent sources such as revenue mobilization.  But in the interim, carefully looking at all the options the country must borrow in a contained way will be part of that solution.  And I think the government has been going about this prudently and cautiously so far, and we are encouraged by that. 

    And lastly, on data issues in Nigeria we really applaud the effort the government’s making to try and revise and upgrade data quality in Nigeria.  This task is not an easy one in our countries, given the extent of informality there is, given the extent of relative price changes that play out in our economies.  So doing this cautiously is what is needed methodically.  And that is exactly what we see happening.  We welcome, though, the efforts the government is making because without good data, it is difficult to make good policies.  So, we really applaud the effort the government is making to try and upgrade data quality. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: We will take a round of questions online.

    QUESTIONER: There are bills in the UK Parliament and the New York State Assembly that aim to force holdout private creditors to accept debt treatments on comparable terms to other creditors and to limit or stop such litigation.  Are these bills needed, do you think, or is the current international debt architecture sufficient?  So, you know, IMF, DSAs, creditor groups, the common framework, where applicable. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Please go ahead with your question.

    QUESTIONER: Earlier this month, the IMF reached a staff-level agreement with Burkina Faso to complete the Third Review of the country’s program.  So as part of the review, the IMF allowed a greater fiscal flexibility, allowing Burkina Faso to raise its public deficit target to 4 percent, up from the 2 percent cap set by the West African Economic Monetary Union.  So, given that the country’s challenges, such as persistent insecurity, high social demands, are common across the region, wouldn’t it be wiser to consider applying this flexibility more broadly to the West African Economic Monetary Union?  And my second question will be about the downward revision of the growth forecast for 2025 and 2026 in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Does the IMF view this new crisis – I am talking about the global uncertainty and the recent U.S. tariff measures.  Does the IMF view this crisis as potentially more severe and with broader consequences for the region than previous shocks such as COVID and the war in Ukraine? 

    MR. SELASSIE: On the first question on debt workouts and the challenges there, I am not fully informed about the specifics of the bills that Rachel, you are talking about, indeed, we have seen from time to time some private creditor groups holding out, trying to hold out, but I am not sure that a bill is what’s needed, but rather, force of argument to try and bring people to the table. And in recent restructurings, at least I am not aware of this being the main hindrance in advancing discussions.  There have been many other factors, including just the complexity of the current creditor landscape, that have played a role. 

    On Burkina Faso, flexibility under the program or the deficit targets for the WAEMU countries more generally, just it is important to distinguish between particular years’ fiscal deficit targets that the government wants to pursue and we, incorporate in the program and just the more medium-term criteria, convergence criteria that there is for the WAEMU countries. 

    So, the 3 percent target criteria are for the medium- to long-term.  And it has been very clear that when there are shocks or when there are pressing social development needs, countries do have the scope to deviate from that.  In fact, often the constraint on the Sahel countries has been not having enough, sufficient, enough financing to be able to meet these to advance development objectives.  The other constraint of course is that overall, the more you exceed this 3 percent target and add to the overall debt burden, the more you are going to have – you are likely to build up debt vulnerabilities. 

    So, in the work that we do with countries, whether it is Burkina Faso or other WAEMU countries or indeed beyond, what we try and help with is of course to help countries strike this balance between addressing the immediate and pressing needs that they have while avoiding medium-term debt sustainability problems.  I think one is just thinking about how to strike this balance.  And then second, we put resources on the table very cheaply to help countries, avoid, at least in the near term, more difficult financing difficulties.  So, for Burkina and others, it is just about striking this balance.

    And on growth, whether this latest shock is as bad for the region as the previous ones. I think it is really important also to point out that as difficult, I mean the last four or five years have been incredibly difficult time for our countries, a lot of challenges, a lot of dislocation, but there is also been quite a lot of resilience, and I think that is important to stress.  I would note that, even now, it is this year, 11 out of the 20 fastest growing economies in the world are from Sub-Saharan Africa.  So, there are quite a lot of countries that are going to be sustaining significant growth in the region.  So, we should also not lose sight of this resilience. 

    Second, and more broadly, the buildup of uncertainties I think is very negative.  And this is interrupting what we are seeing in terms of a recovery.  But growth is not, we are not projecting growth to collapse.  And our hope is that as things calm down, the region can resume its growth trajectory also.

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: We will take three more questions online, then we will come back to the room.

    QUESTIONER: I wanted to know about Senegal, in terms of whether funds would be repaid after the misreporting of data and if the IMF has learned anything from that?  And also, just if you can, the status of the IMF’s programs and even operations in Sudan and South Sudan? 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Please go ahead.

    QUESTIONER: The IMF is urging countries to focus on domestic revenue mobilization.  But you may have seen that South Africa’s Finance Minister has withdrawn the VAT increase that he had proposed in the budget, in the face of opposition from coalition partners.  Does the IMF see any alternative sources of revenue that are feasible for the South African government as the parties hoped?  And are there any lessons here for other countries trying to mobilize domestic revenue?                                                         

    QUESTIONER: Building on the question that Hilary has asked that the REO does make the case for domestic revenue mobilization, and you made that argument, I believe, in the last two Regional Economic Outlook reports as well.  But poverty is still endemic.  Incomes, as far as I can tell, have not really recovered to pre-pandemic levels.  So other than broadcast to tax exemptions what else can be done to raise tax-to-GDP ratios?  One last question on this.  Has there been any progress that has been made in the Sovereign Debt Roundtable in deciding how debt from Afreximbank, and Trade and Development Bank should be treated, at least under the common framework for countries like Ghana and Zambia?  Now, do they qualify to not have their debt restructured in the same way that the IMF, the World Bank’s credit lines?

    MR. SELASSIE: On Senegal, I was recently in Dakar for discussions building on work that our team has been doing. What we are waiting for is the government to finalize the work that’s ongoing.  Right now, the audits are going on and reconciliation work is going on. 

    On the extent of domestic and external debt.  We have been very clear in welcoming the transparency and really robust and collegial way in which the government has been engaging on the issues that have arisen in the misreporting case and we look forward to the numbers stabilizing, and engaging in discussions on the next steps in terms of bringing the, the findings to our Executive Board and next steps in our engagement with Senegal. 

    On South Sudan, it has just been a difficult period of course for South Sudan.  They have been hosting hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing from the conflict in the north.  The conflict has also interrupted, disrupted heavily their main source of tax revenue, oil exports through the pipeline.  So, it’s been a really wrenching period.  Over the last three, four years we have provided, you know, we have been trying to provide South Sudan with emergency financing and trying to find a way in which we can engage with a more structured longer-term program.  We remain hopeful that we are going to be able to do that.  But first and foremost, I think we need to see what can be done to make sure that the policy making environment is as robust and as strong as it is, and as transparent, so we can come in, step in and support South Sudan.

    On revenue mobilization, I want to just first link this to the point I made earlier that what we have observed and again there is a risk of generalizing, but what we’ve observed over the last 10, 15 years in the region is that governments have made a very significant effort to invest in really important infrastructure needs in building schools, in building health clinics and much else.  And you see very positive outcomes.  Look at the electricity coverage in our region, look at the human development indicators and how much they have moved over the years in the region. 

    But we have also seen that despite a lot of investment, for example, in electricity generation capacity and electricity coverage in our countries, many roads are being built.  The returns of all this investment have not been captured in the tax revenue, which is one of the points, the pressure points where debt levels have gone up and the interest-to-revenue ratio.  So, the interest payment-to-revenue ratio has also been rising.  And this has been one of the key points of vulnerability in many economies and why a few countries have gotten into debt difficulty and needed to restructure. 

    So going forward, I think it’s very clear that to be able to continue investing; to be able to continue expanding economies and the government doing its core function, it has to find more ways other than borrowing to address this. 

    Now, in the past, governments have been quick to cut spending, and that has, we found, again and again, to be very detrimental to development progress and growth outcomes.  I think this, again, at the risk of generalizing, was the approach that was generally pursued in the 1980s and found to be very problematic, very challenging, very depressing to growth.  So, we would very much love for countries to avoid this. When there are pressing spending needs, there’s generally only a couple of ways that you can finance this.  Spending cuts or revenue mobilization.  You can borrow, of course, but as I said, borrowing is not optimal. 

    Now, this doesn’t mean revenue mobilization is easy.  Far, far from it. It requires not only political engagement, but also a lot of communication, a lot of effort to show that the resources the government is trying to generate are going to be going to the right areas to help strengthen the social contract.  So, it’s a deep and engaged process, and we are very, very cognizant of that.  But I do think that this is the most optimal way, the most economically sensible way in which our countries can help address the tremendous development needs that we have.

    Now, specifically on South Africa, ultimately when issues like this arise, these are deeply domestic political issues to be resolved as to what the best way to do the financing is.  So, if a tax rate increase for a particular tax is not possible, then maybe finding ways to expand the tax base, maybe trying different tax angles or if all of those are not possible, then revisiting spending priorities may be one of the ways that countries must handle this.  And this is typically what we see playing out in countries in the region when financing constraints are binding. 

    So, whether it is in Kenya, South Africa, or other countries the issue of revenue mobilization is a live one, but one that is extremely complex.  We are very cognizant of that.  And one that requires quite a lot of consensus building, quite a lot of discussion to be able to advance, and of course, broader societal support.  And we absolutely see countries engaging in this and do what we can to help bring lessons from other countries where we are asked to.

    Then there was a question about the GSDR.  So, this Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable, this is the initiative launched by the Fund and the Bank to try and bring creditors and debtors together around the table to find ways in which debt work[outs] can be easier because you are discussing general principles rather than country-specific debt restructuring issues. And we have seen this making quite a lot of progress. Perhaps the most recent development has been the preparation of a debt work[out] playbook that is a very helpful document that has been put out building on the experience of recent work[outs].  What has worked particularly well.  What kind of information sharing ahead of debt work[outs] have been helpful in terms of accelerating debt processes.  Debt restructurings are one of the most contentious and challenging issues that there are between states, between creditors and debtors, and it requires quite a lot of discussion, and it is not such an easy thing to do, including what the parameter of debt should be.  I think one of the questions that was raised is about the debt parameter.  This is fundamentally an issue for the debtor countries and creditors to resolve, and intra-creditor disputes also have to be done. 

    So, in terms of the principles that generally we see creditors apply when these kinds of disputes arise about what the right parameter should be or not and who gets preferential treatment. I think there’s generally been two rules of thumb. One is that the terms in which new financing is being provided or the financing is provided, whether it’s commercial or concessional has been a factor that most creditors look at in terms of whether a particular credit should be included in the parameter or not, and then also the extent to which new financing is being made available.  So, what differentiates senior creditors like the IMF, the World Bank, of course, is that for most countries we operate providing concessional financing very long-term.  And we are the ones that come in and provide financing consistently through crisis and otherwise. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: We have time for one more round of questions. I will start with the gentleman in the front here. 

    QUESTIONER: The U.S. is your largest shareholder, and we are seeing mixed messages this week from the Treasury Secretary mentioning that he remains committed to the Fund but also calling on you to hold countries accountable to program performance, empower staff to walk away if reform commitment is lacking. 

    So, I wanted to ask you, should we expect the IMF spigot to start closing in response to U.S. pressure?  Or if not, are you changing your approach to countries, what you are telling them and how to deal with their issues?  Are you being a little more stringent in your requirements? 

    You have talked about Senegal, maybe Ghana, Ethiopia, related to that issue of the U.S stepping in.  The CEMAC negotiations this week, we saw American energy companies working with the CEMAC on repatriation of funds dedicated to the rehabilitation of oil sites.  I’m wondering if you have a stance on that, what the IMF position is?  I understand the U.S is trying to get the IMF involved in that.

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: All right, thanks. Gentleman. 

    QUESTIONER: Kenyan authorities here have indicated the need to present a credible fiscal framework as they try and unlock a new program for Kenya.  Would you offer more color into the discussions this week, noting again that the same credibility questions led to the cancellation or the termination of the program at its final review?  

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: We have a question online “what is the IMF’s view on Kenya’s debt position?”

    MR. SELASSIE: So, on the first question, I would like to refer you to Kristalina who gave comprehensive responses to the Secretary’s IMFC Statement. What I want to add though is that in the region, in Sub-Saharan Africa, in terms of programs, the calibration of reforms, incorporation of reforms, I would say that we are always in terms of each program has its particularities and what we always try and do in these programs is make sure that we’re striking a balance of helping countries address the long term challenges and also the cyclical challenges that are often the ones that cause them to come to us.  And I would say that I don’t think there are many countries that think that the adjustment efforts that they’re being asked to make are easy ones.

    On CEMAC.  Just to be very clear there is this dispute that is going on between member states, the BEAC, and oil companies with respect to what are called restitution funds.  The funds under contracts that countries have with oil companies are meant to be available to help restore the sites where oil is extracted back to their pre-extraction standards. 

    What has been a bit frustrating is that we are not privy to the contents of these documents. We have been calling on members and the companies involved to be transparent about this, to publish these documents.  They are after all documents that are about how countries natural resource wealth are used.  And we’ve been on record going seven, eight, nine years pushing for production sharing agreements, the terms of these things to be published so that each side can hold the other accountable.  I think that is the first thing that could be done to bring more transparency and light and understanding to the rest of the world about what is going on in these discussions. 

    Second, we have also made it clear to both parties that given that we do not have full information, it is difficult for us to know what to say.  But in general, any encumbrances in terms of how we look at foreign exchange reserves and these standards are published, any encumbrances like the type that we think there may be in the document, i.e., that is the expectation that these resources will be used for specific purposes means they’re not general use reserves.  So, they would not be classified as part of reserves. 

    On Kenya, we have had a very strong engagement with Kenya over the years and will continue to have such engagement going forward.  As we have noted, government has asked for a follow-on program to try and address the remaining challenges in Kenya, and we are discussing how to do that including in the context of these meetings. 

    It has been good to hear and see that the economy has been performing quite well in some parts.  Particularly the external adjustment front seems to have been proceeding well.  The current account has been narrowing.  So, there are quite a lot of strengths.  But also of course there remain fiscal challenges which were a significant part of the last program’s objectives that need to be advanced.  So, we are going to engage with the government and do everything that we can to be able to help it go forward. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Unfortunately, that is all the time we have. So, if you have any questions that we didn’t get to, please send them to me or to Media at IMF.org and we will try and get back to you as soon as possible.  So, also to mention that the report is now available at IMF.org/Africa.  The Spring Meetings continue.  Later this morning, we have the press briefing for the European Department and later in the afternoon we have the IMFC, and the Western Hemisphere Department press briefings. 

    On behalf of Abebe and the African and Communications Departments, thank you all for coming to this press briefing and see you next time. 

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Kwabena Akuamoah-Boateng

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Press Briefing Transcript: IMFC, Spring Meetings 2025

    Source: International Monetary Fund

    April 25, 2025

    Speaker:

    Kristalina Georgieva, Managing Director, IMF

    Mohammed Aljadaan, IMFC Chair, Minister of Finance, Saudi Arabia

     

    Moderator:

    Julie Kozack, Director, Communications Department, IMF

     

     

    Ms.  Kozack: I am delighted to have with me the Chair of the IMFC, His Excellency Mohammed Aljadaan. He is also the Minister of Finance of Saudi Arabia. And of course, our Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva.

    Minister Aljadaan and the Managing Director will first share some takeaways with you and then when that is concludes we will turn to you for your questions.  Your Excellency, the floor is yours.

    Minister. Aljadaan: Thank you, Julie. Thank you, Kristalina. And thanks to all of you for being here. At the outset, let me highlight an important development that took place the first time in these meetings, which is the IMFC welcoming its 25th member, the third chair of Africa. Obviously, this is an important milestone that strengthens the voice and representation of the African continent in a global economic dialogue. I would like to thank all members who made this possible.  

    On the IMF agenda, going forward, the Fund must continue to focus on its core mandate, including supporting international monetary cooperation, encouraging the expansion of trade and economic growth, and discouraging policies that would harm prosperity.

    In recent days, the IMFC members welcomed steps to further strengthen the effectiveness of the IMF’s three core functions, its surveillance of global economic trends, its lending where we welcome the review of program design conditionality, and its capacity development assistance, which helps ensure growth in so many member countries and within countries.

    Addressing global debt vulnerabilities remains a priority for our members, especially for low‑income and vulnerable countries. They welcome the progress made in debt treatments under the G20 Common Framework. They also express their commitment to addressing global debt vulnerabilities in an effective, comprehensive, and systemic manner.

    Members encouraged the IMF and the World Bank to help advance the implementation of the three‑pillar approach to address debt service pressures. We appreciate the tremendous efforts of the members in shaping the medium‑term direction of the IMF and contributing to the Diriyah Declaration.

    The Diriyah Declaration represents a forward‑looking approach to strengthening the IMFC process and advancing governance reforms and has received full support from the members. Just to clarify, when I say the Diriyah Declaration, this is the Declaration that was prepared by the Deputies in their meetings in Saudi Arabia earlier this month in preparation for this meeting.

    Here we aim to ensure that the Fund remains well‑equipped to meet future challenges in line with its core mandate. Before I hand it over to Kristalina, I have to comment on the topic of the day, which I think a lot of people are talking about, trade tension. Many members have told me how the trade situation has created significant uncertainty. Indeed, the buzz word was uncertainty all over this week, and indeed it also carries with it market volatility, presenting real risks to the global growth and financial stability. But as Kristalina said recently, these threat conflicts have been like forgetting a pot boiling on a stove. Well, now that pot is boiling over. In other words, we should not be surprised that there are trade tensions. And this situation is an opportunity for us all to have constructive conversations about how we will move forward together. This is a challenging time, but I have always been optimist and absolutely make no apologies for that. I will explain to you why. History tells us that the bigger the challenge, the more it requires us to come together to convene and to have an honest conversation. That is exactly what happened this week. That is exactly the power of the IMF to actually be able to convene everybody around the same table in closed rooms and discuss issues in a constructive way.

    I have told colleagues, I arrived in Washington a week ago with a lot of noise in my ears from reading the news and following social media. I have told them, everyone that I met in the early days, please keep your thoughts cool, and we will see where we are going to end. Actually, today we are ending in a lot better position than when we started the week. People understand the consequences and are working together in a constructive manner to resolve tensions.  

    I am also confident that because of the IMF, the IMF is really watching us very closely, following the global situation and is really providing advice to its members in real‑time, offering an assessment of the potential impacts and the best way to proceed.  

    This week we have seen an incredible assurance confirming the position of the IMF and its convening power and contributing to positive development, including in relation to Syria. Gathering together to talk about Syria and building on our meetings in AIUla has given us a new sense of urgency and purpose, to turn a conflict‑affected state, which is Syria, into a stable and economically successful one, benefiting the region and the world. It is not just about the money. It is about the work that the IMF and other partners can deliver on capacity development, quality data, and timely advice.

    Again, I would like to thank Kristalina and the IMF staff. And I can tell you, it was an incredible, unanimous position today to thank the IMF for their incredible, incredible brain cells power, which was able really to produce a very comprehensive report about what is happening in the world in a very short period of time, and it was fantastic. Thank you, Kristalina. Thanks to all the IMF staff and thank you again for being here. The floor is yours.

    Managing Director: Thank you very much, Minister Aljadaan, for your kind words now, but above all for your exemplary leadership of the IMFC. I want to tell everybody here that the way you chaired the meetings brought the members together to speak openly, frankly and as a result to find a path to common understanding that is so necessary in the current environment because, as we all know, our meetings take place against a challenging backdrop. You have seen our World Economic Outlook. It shows that the global economy is facing a significant slowdown and also that risks are on the downside.

    Understandably Ministers and Governors are concerned, but at the same time they have also exhibited a remarkably constructive spirit in these meetings, coming together, showing willingness to take on the challenges facing the global economy. Minister Aljadaan laid out the substance and achievements of our discussions. Let me add just three points. First, Ministers and Governors agreed on the importance of reducing uncertainty and working together to clarify policies.

    Second, importantly, they recognized that they need to seize the moment to put their own houses in order. And I saw very firm resolve to tackle difficult and, in many cases, delayed reforms at home, to strengthen resilience, to remove impediments to productivity and lift up their medium and long‑term growth prospects, and to address underlying domestic imbalances which drive external imbalances. To put it simply, addressing external imbalances starts at home.

    Finally, we discussed how the IMF can help countries successfully navigate this period of change and build resilience. I was very heartened to hear from the membership strong support for our work to promote macroeconomic and financial stability and to do it through robust bilateral, multilateral and regional surveillance, be there for our members when they need to cope with balance of payments problems, finance—finance them, but also finance them with the clear objective that they can strengthen their economies. I can say the words of support for our capacity development, in other words, helping countries have strong institutions, strong policies. That support was overwhelming.

    At this period of complex challenges for the membership, they also gave us homework. I want to emphasize two areas where we will further deepen our work. One, do more work on external imbalances, dig deeper, when they could become a source of concern and provide advise how to address them through policies. Two, continue to scan the financial sector to identify potential sources of instability, especially in the non‑bank sector, and provide advice on how best to enhance resilience.

    Overall, what I can tell you is that what I heard this week was an incredible determination by our members to steer economies through this period of change and uncertainty. And it gave me confidence that we actually can take challenge and make opportunity, that we can have a more resilient, more balanced world economy.

    Like Minister Aljadaan, I started the week more anxious of our capacity as a global community to come together, and I finished the week with more confidence that this is exactly what we will do.

    Ms. Kozack: Thank you very much, Minister, Managing Director. We will now open the floor to your questions, so please raise your hand if you have a question and please identify yourself and your outlet. I will start here in the middle. I am going to go to the gentleman in the kind of White shirt. Yes, right here.

    Question: Thank you, Julie. Question for Minister Aljadaan and Managing Director Georgieva. You both pointed out that we ended a week in a way better position than when we started it. Managing Director, during your Curtain Raiser Speech, you also raised the hope that this week might be an opportunity for everybody to discuss. How do you feel like? Could you elaborate perhaps on how this week dialing down the uncertainty that you talked about and the global tensions when it comes to trade? Thank you very much.

    Managing Director: Finding a path to solutions starts from looking at the problem from a—seeing the problem with the same eye view. Let me start this again. To resolve a problem, you have different parties. To resolve a problem, they need to have information about the problem that allows them to have a meaningful conversation. I can say that I am very, very grateful to the staff of the IMF because what we did was to offer the members information that allows them to see what is ahead of them and expand their horizon. If you look at a problem only from a narrow point of view, it is difficult to have a meaningful conversation to resolve it.

    Secondly, what I saw was a genuine openness to present views in a candid way and to listen to each other.

    Third, and the third is the most important, it is a traction and engagement among members that could then bring a better—faster and better outcome. I do not want to sugarcoat. We still have quite a challenging time. It is challenging not just because of the tariffs and the uncertainty. It is also challenging that there are other transformational forces in play. Because of the overwhelming attention to tariffs, we stopped talking about other things, like artificial intelligence, demographics transition, and I think that that sense that we can have an engagement in a comprehensive way on a complex set of challenges, that came during the meetings quite strongly. Does it mean that everybody agrees with everybody else? No. But do we have an open conversation, engaged conversation with the fair space for everybody to present their views? Yes.

    Minister Aljadaan: Thank you. If I may, Julie, I think just to complement the Managing Director’s views, I think overall what do you need to resolve conflicts like this or tensions like this? A, you need to make sure that you understand the parties’ positions, where they are coming from, why they are taking these positions, and what are they seeking to achieve. Second, make sure that they actually talk. And that is largely what happened this week. So to have everybody who is party to all this trade tensions, which is almost everybody, all the members, around the same table in a candid discussion that is closed even—some of it has been in the restricted sessions—to really be open and talk about what are they doing, why they are doing it, what is their view of what is going to happen in the next even short period of time is very assuring. Sharing that information is very assuring. Understanding the implications of these actions on other nations, including low‑income countries, emerging economies and implications of that is actually very helpful for them to appreciate the consequences of their positions.

    I can tell you without—I cannot disclose some of the discussion that has taken place, but I can tell you there was a very clear, frank discussion, including a projection of a timeline for a resolution of some of these issues. So that is very assuring.

    Managing Director: Can I just add one point, that when people are in the same room, the abstract policies become more human because then we understand these policies are affecting people, and the whole world—the people of the whole world are then present, and that makes the conversation different. No longer it is an academic conversation. It is a very real-life conversation.

    Ms. Kozack: Thank you. I will go to this side. I will go to the second row, gentleman with the blue jacket and the glasses.

    Question: Thank you so much for taking my question. I am from Bangkok. Your Excellency, you have mentioned uncertainty around the world in your opening remarks. So, I want to ask specifically on the consequences for the emerging markets as a whole, and what is your policy advice for the situation and also do you see any short‑term lasting impacts to these countries? Thank you.

    Minister Aljadaan: I will give it a time and then you can complement. First of all, I look forward to our renewal meeting in Thailand next year and seeing the preparations from now, I think a lot of people are excited and waiting for our meetings there. I am sure it will be very constructive in the hospitable country of Thailand and the Kingdom of Thailand.

    Obviously emerging economies, particularly emerging economies with limited fiscal space have little room to maneuver to deal with shocks. And even if these shocks have been resolved, there is some lasting impact. The earlier, the faster that these shocks or trade tensions in this context is resolved, the better for everybody. But we are not in a perfect world and things may take time and countries may get an impact, and that is where the IMF excels. That is where is IMF capacity building, advice comes into actual real play. So, the Managing Director is here and her staff with an incredible talent will be able to actually provide that support to emerging economies.

    Managing Director: As a group, emerging markets by and large are generally highly open. They rely on—many of them rely on exports as an engine for growth. They are quite active in international bond markets, so because they are highly exposed, the impact on emerging markets is quite significant. Some of the emerging markets, especially those that were in a tougher position after the multiple shocks, also face very limited and some of them non‑existing policy space to act.

    We have downgraded growth projections for emerging markets and developing economies to 3.7 percent for 2025. This is a 0.6 percent downgrade. And to 3.9 percent for 2026. What does that mean? It means that some of them would see a significant slowdown in their convergence to higher‑income countries. And they are also seeking ways to overcome the challenges ahead. What works for them is emerging markets have been fantastic in building resilience to shocks. And when I look at the universe of emerging market economies, quite a number of countries have become more agile in their policymaking, are more mature in how they approach their fiscal and monetary policy. That puts them in a better position.

    To use an analogy, it is like they have gone through multiple periods of being tested and they got immune to shocks to a certain degree. They would be seeing possibly somewhat less inflationary pressure. Why? Because when you are on the receiving end of tariffs, what it means is that actually domestically you do not have pressure on prices. We can expect emerging markets to look at their policy tools very carefully. We urge them, be very careful with fiscal measures. Do not rush to provide fiscal support willy‑nilly because you cannot afford to lose fiscal space. Have a medium long‑term framework to rebuild this fiscal space. On the monetary policy side, watch pressures. We are saying inflation is likely to slow down but watch it and watch inflation expectations. Do what is necessary, given the data you have. And very important, allow the exchange rate to be a shock absorber.

    We have the integrated policy framework that offers advice to countries how to approach exchange rate issues with great care. You are an emerging market. Actually, the Minister is not saying that, but one thing emerging markets can do for themselves is, get your own house in order. Pursue reforms relentlessly because this is what makes you stronger.

    Ms. Kozack: We have time for just one last question. So, I am going to go second row, the gentleman in the blue suit.

    Question: Thank you, Ms. Kozack. Mr. Aljadaan, Managing Director Georgieva. I am from Lebanon. My question is addressed to both of you. How will the IMF support Syria and what role will it play in Syria’s reconstruction. Thank you.

    Ms. Kristalina Georgieva: Minister Aljadaan in the opening recognized that Syria has returned to the international community. We had a meeting with Syrian representatives in AIUla during an emerging market conference. We had a meeting on fragile and conflict‑affected states. And at that time, we made the first step to create a coordinating group so different institutions that can support Syria can start working together. We held a meeting here in Washington during the Spring Meetings. It was co‑chaired by Minister Aljadaan, President Banga and myself, with the Finance Minister and the Central Bank Governor of Syria. In this meeting we discussed how we can start rebuilding institutions and policy capacity in Syria and how different institutions can play on their comparative advantage to help. For the Fund specifically, what it means is, of course, cautiously but engage to first define data, what is available, how we can rebuild credible data capability.  

    Second, central bank capacity. How can we rebuild the functioning of Syria’s central bank.

    Third, tax policy and how can the country rebuild capacity to create revenues for its functions.

    We have appointed a Mission Chief for Syria. We have not had Article IV Consultations with Syria for a long, long time. We hope that we can contribute in putting the foundation of knowledge, economic policy knowledge in Syria to get the country back on track. 

    I mean, just imagine, they have been in a Civil War for 14 years. A big part of the population is not in Syria. They are in Lebanon. They are in Iraq. They are in Jordan. The fabric of the Syrian society is deeply wounded. It is going to take a lot of work by the Syrians themselves to rebuild it. This is when international organizations can play a constructive role. Lebanon, you are not asking about Lebanon.

    Question: I heard the meetings went quite well by the end, especially since the Lebanese Parliament voted about the banking sequencing. That is more in line with international standards, so what are you—

    Managing Director: You are not asking because you know. That is very good.

    Ms. Kozack: Minister, would you like to have the last word?

     

    Minister Aljadaan: I have a few things. First of all, I really thank the IMF and the World Bank in stepping up their support to Syria and other states who are emerging from fragility. Syria in particular is a case where we have an opportunity. We have a government that is willing, and we have regional partners who are also providing support and willing really to provide whatever it takes to make sure that we bring back Syria, support its people and make sure that we also move cautiously through that process, recognizing that obviously there are sanctions that we need to deal with and other impediments. But even with that, I think standing with them, providing capacity support and advice and some regional and bilateral, even financial support is very crucial. The Syrian people deserve that support. And that does not stop at Syria. We are talking about Syria as an example, we have Yemen, we have Palestine, we have Sudan, we have other countries that really need the support, including Lebanon. They need to know that the international community, if they put their act together, the international community will stand by them, so we will continue that.

    Ms. Kozack: We are almost five minutes over our time.

    Managing Director: Ask your question short, and we will try to answer.

    Ms. Kozack: And have a very brief answer.

    Managing Director: It is my fault. I am the one that is professorial.

     

    Question: My question is to the MD concerning the global uncertainty on trade tensions shaping sub‑Saharan Africa’s debt risk, servicing costs as well as our fiscal future and its coordination with creditors such as you, so how are Africa also in all of these conversations? Thank you.

     

    Managing Director: As Minister Aljadaan said, Africa was more present this time because we now have three sub‑Saharan African representatives in the IMFC. But beyond that, very much on our minds, quite a number of the Governors of the Fund spoke about the importance to pay attention to countries that are particularly severely affected by this turbulence because they have a high level of debt and that suppresses their ability to cope.

    By the way, countries with high level of debt are not just in sub‑Saharan Africa. We have them all over the world.

    What has been done during these meetings is threefold. First, very strong emphasis on the three‑pillar approach of the IMF and the World Bank for countries that experience liquidity constraints. They are not yet facing debt sustainability problems, but they are on the way to there. And for these countries to concentrate support for domestic resource mobilization, concentrate attention to how to mobilize more international financing and very important, concentrate on how the private sector can play a bigger role in the economy.   

    Second, for countries where debt is not sustainable, how to make debt restructuring faster and more effective. We have issued this week a playbook for debt restructuring that was the outcome of the Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable. What it shows are the steps that need to be taken.

    As you recall under the Common Framework, there was some confusion around how exactly to go about it, what is the timeline, what is the exact sequencing of steps. This is now being clarified. If we follow the playbook, we play by the book, we get debt restructuring in less than 12 months. And the third thing, very important for the Fund, is that our members have put in place a way to expand our capacity to finance low‑income countries through the Poverty Reduction Growth Trust so the Fund can step up financing for countries, so they do not need to—they do not need to go through a super painful adjustment because of this burden of debt. We can ease their path. But, again, we want to see countries act decisively on reforms so they—you do not borrow your way out of debt. You grow your way out of debt. So, when countries have that growth potential enhanced, then they can also reduce debt vulnerability. It was not very short. My apologies.

    Ms. Kozack: Minister, would you like to add?          

    Minister Aljadaan: I am fine. I think the Managing Director did a great job in answering.

    Managing Director: Look, you have to forgive me. I was for 14 years a professor. It kicks in.

     

    Minister Aljadaan: We enjoy it, Kristalina

    Managing Director: Thank you very much, everybody.

    Ms. Kozack: This does bring us to an end, so thank you for joining us. And let me just add that the full transcript of the press briefing will be available online on the IMF website. And, of course, should you have further questions, please do not hesitate to reach out to my colleagues at IMF media.org. Thank you.

     

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Wafa Amr

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Bouchard (Phoenix pay system) class action: Notice of approval of settlement agreement

    Source: Government of Canada News

    Bouchard (Phoenix pay system) class action: Notice of approval of settlement agreement – Canada.ca

    Please read this notice carefully as it may affect your rights

    Notice of approval of a national settlement agreement in the Bouchard class action concerning the implementation of the Phoenix pay system.

    On this page

    Summary of the Bouchard Class Action

    On April 3, 2018, the Superior Court authorized a class action in connection with the implementation of the Phoenix pay system put in place by the federal government in 2016. The action applies to any person who meets the definition of “Member” below, anywhere in Canada, without having to register as a member of the class action.

    “Member” is as defined in the judgment authorizing the class action without distinguishing between Members of the First Subclass and Second Subclass: “All persons who had an employment relationship with the Government of Canada at any time during the Class Period, excluding those subject to the grievance procedure under Part 2 (sections 206, 208 and 209) of the Public Service Labour Relations Act” (now the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations Act, S.C. 2003, c. 22, s. 2). For greater certainty, former public servants (retired, resigned or otherwise) are Members only to the extent that they are not excluded under this definition.

    Without any admission of liability on the part of the Attorney General of Canada (AGC), the parties negotiated and accepted a national settlement agreement (the Agreement) after their counsel had thoroughly evaluated the facts of this case, having taken into account a variety of factors such as the burden and costs of litigation as well as the risk and uncertainty associated with the litigation.

    On April 15, 2025, the Superior Court of Quebec approved the settlement. If you are eligible, you will need to submit a claim in order to receive compensation.

    Eligibility

    The Agreement applies to you if you are a Member of the Bouchard Class Action; that is, a person:

    1. who was employed by the Government of Canada, in Canada, regardless of your province or territory of residence:
      1. on a casual basis, as a student, on a term basis of less than three months, or on a part-time basis (not ordinarily required to work more than one third of the normal period for persons doing similar work), or appointed by the Governor in Council, under an Act of Parliament, to a position described in that Act
      2. for one or more of the departments and organizations listed, and
      3. for at least one day during one or more of the following fiscal years:
        1. 2016–17 (February 24, 2016, to March 31, 2017),
        2. 2017–18 (April 1, 2017, to March 31, 2018),
        3. 2018–19 (April 1, 2018, to March 31, 2019),
        4. 2019–20 (April 1, 2019, to March 31, 2020), and
    2. who had a pay problem

    This Agreement does not apply to persons locally engaged outside Canada or to members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, who have not been paid using the Phoenix pay system, nor to public servants subject to the grievance procedure provided for in Part 2 of the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations Act, S.C. 2003, c. 22, s. 2.

    Amount of compensation

    The amount of compensation is based on eligibility for each fiscal year as follows:

    • A maximum amount of $350.00 for the 2016–17 fiscal year (February 24, 2016, to March 31, 2017)
    • A maximum amount of $175.00 for the 2017–18 fiscal year (April 1, 2017, to March 31, 2018)
    • A maximum amount of $175.00 for the 2018–19 fiscal year (April 1, 2018, to March 31, 2019)
    • A maximum amount of $175.00 for fiscal year 2019–20 (April 1, 2019, to March 31, 2020)

    Exclusions

    If you have received, or are eligible to receive, compensation from one or more of the following agreements (or one or more of the similar agreements with the separate agencies) for a given fiscal year, you will not be eligible for compensation under the settlement agreement for that same fiscal year:

    In accordance with section 42 of the Act respecting the Fonds d’aide aux actions collectives and section 1 of the Regulation respecting the percentage deducted by the Fonds d’aide aux actions collectives, a deduction of 2% will be taken from the gross amount payable to any Member residing in Quebec.

    The compensation to which a Member may be entitled will be used to reduce any amount owing to the federal government. The compensation will not be deducted from any amount received under programs established by the federal government to compensate for out-of-pocket expenses.

    Compensation will be awarded without admission of liability on the part of the defendant, the Attorney General of Canada (AGC) and does not constitute an admission of fact or law. The allegations made in the class action have not been proven in a court of law and remain disputed by the AGC.

    The AGC will receive a full and final release from all Members.

    Submit a claim

    To claim compensation, a Member must complete an application online or by mail no later than October 24, 2025.

    Start your claim online

    Submit by mail
    Download, print and complete the claim form, then mail to:

    Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat
    Attention: TBS Claims Office
    90 Elgin St
    Ottawa ON K1A 0R5

    • Deadline for submitting a claim

      Claims will only be accepted between April 24, 2025 and no later than October 24, 2025.

      If you are unable to submit your claim via the online portal, or if you need to submit a claim with supporting documents, you can send it to the following address:

      Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat
      Attention: TBS Claims Office
      90 Elgin St
      Ottawa ON K1A 0R5

      Claims submitted by mail must be postmarked by October 24, 2025.

      Do not send original documents, as they cannot be returned to the sender. Certified copies, copies of a document that have been stamped by a Notary Public, are acceptable. Please note that a Member or their representative will not be reimbursed for costs incurred for having a document certified.

    • Incomplete forms

      An incomplete or incorrectly completed claim form shall not constitute grounds for denying compensation to a Member or their representative under the Agreement. Upon receipt of an incomplete or incorrectly completed claim form, the Claims Office will contact the Member or their representative and allow them to correct any errors within 30 days.

      If the claim remains incomplete and more than 30 days have passed since the last communication from the Claims Office, the claim may be rejected.

    • Claim by the representative of a deceased or incapacitated Member

      Claims made on behalf of the estate of a deceased Member or on behalf of an incapacitated Member may be submitted by a legal representative. Copies of documentation attesting to the representative’s eligibility to act on behalf of the Member or estate must be provided in accordance with the applicable laws.

    After you submit a claim

    The Claims Office will begin processing claims within a reasonable time, but no later than October 24, 2025. Compensation will be paid by direct deposit.

    The Claims Office will notify the Member or their representative in writing of any unfavourable decision, with reasons.

    The favourable or unfavourable decision will be posted on the portal for Members who have submitted their claim online or sent by mail for Members who have submitted their claim by mail. Members who have submitted their claim online will be notified by email that the decision has been posted on the portal.

    Denied claims

    Within 30 days of the Claims Office’s written decision denying the claim in whole or in part, the Member or Member’s Representative may request review of this decision by sending a written notice to the Claims Office that they disagree and stating the reasons for requesting a review. The request for review may be sent by email or by mail. The request must be filed with or received by the Claims Office within 30 days of the date of the office’s decision.

    The review will be heard by the Court and will be limited to the interpretation and application of the Agreement by the Claims Office and excludes review of the terms and conditions set forth in the Agreement and approved by the Court.

    Upon receipt, within the allotted time of the request for review, the Claims Office will send a copy of the request to the Plaintiff’s counsel and the Court.

    The Court will hear the dispute on a date to be determined by it. The Court’s decision will be final and not subject to appeal.

    In the event of any conflict between the provisions of this notice and the Agreement, the latter shall prevail.

    Bouchard (Phoenix pay system) class action: Notice of approval of settlement agreement – Canada.ca

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Governments extend AgriStability enrolment deadline for 2025 program year

    Source: Government of Canada News (2)

    April 25, 2025 – Ottawa, Ontario – Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada

    Given the pressures and uncertainties facing the agricultural sector, federal, provincial and territorial governments have agreed to extend the AgriStability enrolment deadline from April 30, 2025, to July 31, 2025, for the 2025 program year.

    AgriStability is a margin-based program designed to help producers manage large income declines. This extension gives producers additional time to consider their needs and manage the impact of challenges faced by many farm operations, such as production loss, increased costs and changing market conditions. Farmers experiencing losses are encouraged to apply for interim payments under AgriStability for more rapid support.

    Producers have access to a comprehensive suite of business risk management (BRM) programs, including AgriStability, to help manage significant risks that threaten the viability of their farms and are beyond their capacity to manage. BRM programs are often the first line of support for producers facing disasters. Farmers are encouraged to make use of these programs to protect their farming operation and contribute to a more resilient Canadian agriculture sector.

    For more information, please visit the AgriStability web page.

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Agristability Enrolment Deadline Extended to July 31, 2025

    Source: Government of Canada regional news

    Released on April 25, 2025

    Today, Saskatchewan Agriculture Minister Daryl Harrison, along with federal, provincial, and territorial governments, announced the AgriStability enrolment deadline for the existing 2025 program year is extended (without penalty) from April 30, 2025, to July 31, 2025. The extension of the deadline is for the status quo program. The proposed changes announced by Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada are still being considered and have not been implemented.

    “Managing risk is crucial for the success of agriculture in our province,” Harrison said. “The uncertainty of current market disruptions and tariffs reinforces the importance of our business risk management programs. Saskatchewan supports extending the enrolment deadline for the existing AgriStability Program. It provides producers with additional time to evaluate their risk management options. I advocated for this change, along with my provincial and territorial counterparts; and I remain committed to furthering this dialogue regarding any potential proposed changes.”

    The nature of the existing AgriStability Program makes it well suited to support producers. As a margin-based program, AgriStability responds when a producer’s whole farm profitability is impacted, including by rising costs and declining market prices. Tariffs have the potential to impact the prices producers receive for sold commodities. Coverage is personalized for each farm operation by using historical information, based on income tax and supplementary information. Farmers experiencing losses are encouraged to apply for interim payments under AgriStability for more rapid support. In the last six program years, Saskatchewan producers received over $565 million in benefit payments.

    Enrolling is easy. Producers can provide all the necessary information over the phone. The Saskatchewan Crop Insurance Corporation (SCIC) is available to assist producers. To request a new participant package, call the SCIC AgriStability Call Centre at 1-866-270-8450 or email agristability@scic.ca.

    AgriStability protects Canadian producers against large declines in farming income for reasons such as production loss, increased costs and market conditions. It is one of the Business Risk Management programs (BRM) under the Sustainable Canadian Agricultural Partnership (Sustainable CAP). Farmers are encouraged to make use of BRM programs, like AgriStability, to protect their farming operation and help make Saskatchewan agriculture strong.

    -30-

    For more information, contact:

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Saskatchewan Community Earns Age-Friendly Status

    Source: Government of Canada regional news

    Released on April 25, 2025

    The community of Moosomin is being recognized today for adopting age-friendly principles throughout the community with advocacy and action.

    “An age-friendly community is designed to help seniors live safely, enjoy good health and stay involved,” Seniors Minister Lori Carr said. “Our government believes the Age-Friendly Communities initiative is important for promoting healthy, accessible and inclusive communities for all. I am pleased to recognize the efforts of the community of Moosomin in this regard.” 

    The award from the Government of Saskatchewan and the Saskatchewan Seniors Mechanism (SSM) is an acknowledgement of promoting activities and programming which are more inclusive of seniors. 

    The SSM has been leading the Age-Friendly Saskatchewan initiative, including providing opportunities for networking and supporting communities that would like to become more age-friendly.

    “Becoming an age-friendly community requires a journey of hard work, dedicated collaboration and sincere commitment to positive aging,” SSM President Shan Landry said. “I am so pleased that Moosomin has walked the walk and recognized that becoming an age-friendly community benefits not just older adults but all their community members. I congratulate their committee for becoming a flourishing age-friendly community working together for all their citizens.” 

    An age-friendly community is designed to enable all residents to live safely, enjoy good health and stay involved and could include:

    • accessible services;
    • buildings with automatic door openers and elevators; and
    • seniors taking part in various community activities, such as arts and cultural activities, taking courses, or volunteering for charities or civic duties.

    For more information on the Age-Friendly Communities Recognition Program, including the application process, refer to the SSM website at www.skseniorsmechanism.ca or the age-friendly Saskatchewan website at www.agefriendlysk.ca.

    -30-

    For more information, contact:

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Ten Defendants Plead Guilty to Drug Trafficking and Money Laundering Charges in Connection with Transnational Criminal Operation

    Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime News

    PITTSBURGH, Pa. – Ten individuals from Arizona, Ohio, Washington, and Mexico—including a member of the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) Cártel de Sinaloa and one person illegally residing in the United States—pleaded guilty in federal court this week to charges of violating federal narcotics and money laundering laws in relation to an international drug trafficking organization (DTO), Acting United States Attorney Troy Rivetti announced today. The defendants were among 35 individuals charged through a Second Superseding Indictment unsealed in January 2024 for their participation in a domestic and international narcotics and money laundering conspiracy involving substantial quantities of fentanyl, methamphetamine, and cocaine (read the Second Superseding Indictment news release here).

    Pleading guilty this week before United States District Judge J. Nicholas Ranjan were:

    Plea Date

    Defendant

    Age

    Residence

    April 21

    Humberto Arredondo-Soto

    25

    Culiacan, Mexico

     

    Jaime Ledesma

    27

    Phoenix, Arizona

     

    Stephanie Ortiz

    26

    Avondale, Arizona

     

     

     

     

    April 22

    Samuel Aguirre

    23

    Phoenix, Arizona

     

    Jesus Lopez

    24

    Phoenix, Arizona

     

    Diego Monarrez

    23

    Phoenix, Arizona

     

    Adrian Lopez Rivera

    24

    Phoenix, Arizona

     

     

     

     

    April 23

    Donnell Collins

    29

    Cleveland, Ohio

     

    Luis Fentanes

    24

    Phoenix, Arizona

     

    Mohamed Kariye

    36

    Kent, Washington

    In connection with the guilty pleas, the Court was advised that, on various dates from in and around August 2021 to in and around June 2023, in the Western District of Pennsylvania and elsewhere, the defendants conspired to possess with intent to distribute and distribute large quantities of cocaine, fentanyl, and/or methamphetamine. Specifically, Arredondo-Soto, Ledesma (who was residing in Phoenix illegally), Ortiz, Aguirre, Lopez, Rivera, and Monarrez each conspired to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl and 500 grams or more of methamphetamine, with all except Monarrez also having conspired to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine. Similarly, from in and around August 2021 to in and around March 2023, Collins and Fentanes conspired to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl and 500 grams or more of cocaine, with Collins also having possessed with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine on March 2, 2023, while Kariye conspired to distribute 40 grams or more of fentanyl. The defendants were intercepted on a federal wiretap obtaining quantities of the drugs that they distributed to others. Further, from in and around April 2022 to in and around March 2023, Aguirre conspired to commit money laundering, packaging drug proceeds and delivering large amounts of U.S. currency to couriers to smuggle into Mexico to pay for re-supplies of drugs.

    Arredondo-Soto, a Mexican national with ties to the Sinaloa Cartel, was the source of supply for the DTO and was responsible for trafficking millions of fentanyl pills and hundreds of pounds of methamphetamine that the DTO distributed. Numerous military-grade firearms were trafficked into Mexico for Arredondo-Soto as payment from members of the DTO for the drugs. In coordination with Homeland Security Investigations, Arredondo-Soto was arrested in Mexico in November 2023 by Mexican law enforcement authorities and extradited to the United States in February 2024.

    Judge Ranjan scheduled sentencings for November 3-5, 2025. The law provides for a maximum total sentence of not less than 10 years and up to life in prison, a fine of up to $10 million, or both, or, for Kariye, not less than five years and up to 40 years in prison, a fine of up to $5 million, or both. Under the federal Sentencing Guidelines, the actual sentence imposed would be based upon the seriousness of the offense(s) and the prior criminal history, if any, of each defendant.

    With this week’s 10 guilty pleas, 19 of the 35 defendants charged in the Second Superseding Indictment have now pleaded guilty in the case, with six defendants having been sentenced thus far. Included among those sentencings is Mark Camacho, 26, of Phoenix, Arizona, who Judge Ranjan sentenced this week to 57 months in prison for his role in the conspiracy.

    Assistant United States Attorneys Arnold P. Bernard Jr. and Tonya S. Goodman are prosecuting this case on behalf of the government.

    The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Laurel Highlands Resident Agency and Homeland Security Investigations conducted the investigation that led to the prosecution of the defendants. Additional agencies participating in this investigation include the Internal Revenue Service – Criminal Investigation, United States Postal Inspection Service, and other local law enforcement agencies.

    The Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs worked with law enforcement partners in Mexico to secure the arrest and extradition from Mexico of Arredondo-Soto.

    This case is part of Operation Take Back America, a nationwide initiative that marshals the full resources of the Department of Justice to achieve the total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations, combat illegal immigration, and protect our communities from the perpetrators of violent crime. Operation Take Back America streamlines efforts and resources from the Department’s Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETFs) and Project Safe Neighborhood (PSN).

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI USA: Warner, Kaine, Colleagues Blast Trump Administration’s Attacks on Head Start, Demand RFK, Jr. Release Funding and Reverse Firings

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Virginia Tim Kaine
    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, U.S. Senators Mark R. Warner and Tim Kaine, a member of the Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee, (both D-VA) joined 40 of their congressional colleagues in a letter to Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. calling out the Trump Administration’s direct attacks on Head Start and highlighting the secretary’s legal obligation to administer the program. In the letter, the lawmakers also demand that HHS immediately release Head Start funding and reverse the mass firing of Head Start staff to ensure high-quality services are available for Americans across the country, including thousands of children and families in Virginia.
    Between January 1 and April 15 in 2024, Virginia Head Start centers received over $16 million in federal funding. During the same period this year, Virginia Head Start centers have received less than $12 million in federal funding—signaling a slow-walking of funds by the Trump Administration that is costing Virginia.
    The senators wrote, “Since day one, this Administration has taken unacceptable actions to withhold and delay funding, fire Head Start staff, and gut high-quality services for children. Already this year, this Administration has withheld almost $1 billion in federal grant funding from Head Start programs, a 37 percent decrease compared to the amount of funding awarded during the same period last year. It is abundantly clear that these actions are part of a broader effort to ultimately eliminate the program altogether, as the Administration reportedly plans to do in its fiscal year 2026 budget proposal.”
    “Head Start provides early childhood education and comprehensive health and social services to nearly 800,000 young children every year in communities across this country, and employs about 250,000 dedicated staff,” the senators continued. “Head Start is a critical source of child care for working families, particularly in rural and Tribal communities, where Head Start programs are often the only option for high-quality child care services. Head Start programs ensure children receive appropriate health and dental care, nutrition support, and referrals to other critical services for parents, such as job training, adult education, nutrition services, and housing support.”
    “You even acknowledged the value of Head Start following a recent visit to a Virginia Head Start center,” the senators wrote, contrasting that statement of support with the Trump Administration’s actions. “However, as a result of your actions to withhold and delay funding and undermine the administration of this vital program, Head Start centers are in serious jeopardy and have already had their day to day operations impacted. Programs are increasingly worried that they will not be able to make payroll, pay rent, and remain open to serve the hundreds of thousands of children and families who depend on their services in communities across the nation.”
    Importantly, the senators noted that without funding that has so far not gone out the door, many programs could be forced to close: “Head Start grantees are still waiting on payments and grant renewals from the Office of Head Start, including programs whose grants end on April 30th, 2025. These notices should have gone out by now, yet we are concerned to hear programs report they have received little to no correspondence regarding their grant renewals… Additionally, because we started fiscal year 2025 under a short-term continuing resolution, as is usual, some grantees have only received partial funding for the first few months of the year. But with a full year funding bill in place, these grantees should have received full funding by now, yet some are reporting that they have not received the full amount of their grants and will run out of funds this month or next.”
    “The Administration has a legal and moral obligation to disburse Head Start funds to programs and to uphold the program’s promise to provide high-quality early education services to low income children and families across this country. There is no justifiable reason for the delay in funding we have seen over the last two months, and you have refused to offer any kind of explanation,” the senators concluded. “[W]e urge you to immediately reinstate fired staff across all Offices of Head Start, and cease all actions to delay the awarding and disbursement of funding to Head Start programs across this country.”
    In February, Kaine and Warner sent a letter to then-Acting HHS Secretary Dorothy A. Fink, M.D., urging the administration to protect Head Start from the government-wide hiring freeze.
    In addition to Warner and Kaine, the letter was led by U.S. Senators Patty Murray (D-WA), Bernie Sanders (I-VT), and Tammy Baldwin (D-WI), the letter was signed by U.S. Senators Jack Reed (D-RI), Mazie K. Hirono (D-HI), Andy Kim (D-NJ), Ben Ray Luján (D-NM), Charles E. Schumer (D-NY), Lisa Blunt Rochester (D-DE), Peter Welch (D-VT), Gary Peters (D-MI), Michael F. Bennet (D-CO), Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), Ruben Gallego (D-AZ), Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), Jacky Rosen (D-NV), Tina Smith (D-MN), John Fetterman (D-PA), Tammy Duckworth (D-IL), Christopher A. Coons (D-DE), Christopher S. Murphy (D-CT), Jeffrey A. Merkley (D-OR), Mark Kelly (D-AZ), Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY), Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI), Dick Durbin (D-IL), Catherine Cortez Masto (D-NV), Alex Padilla (D-CA), Chris Van Hollen (D-MD), Elissa Slotkin (D-MI), Ron Wyden (D-OR), Gov. Raphael Warnock (D-GA), Cory Booker (D-NJ), Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), Edward Markey (D-MA), Angus King (I-ME), Brian Schatz (D-HI), Martin Heinrich (D-NM), and Angela Alsobrooks (D-MD).
    A copy of letter is available here and text is below.
    Dear Secretary Kennedy:
    We write to express our strong opposition to the actions you have taken to directly attack and undermine the federal Head Start program. Since day one, this Administration has taken unacceptable actions to withhold and delay funding, fire Head Start staff, and gut high-quality services for children. Already this year, this Administration has withheld almost $1 billion in federal grant funding from Head Start programs, a 37 percent decrease compared to the amount of funding awarded during the same period last year. It is abundantly clear that these actions are part of a broader effort to ultimately eliminate the program altogether, as the Administration reportedly plans to do in its fiscal year 2026 budget proposal.
    Head Start provides early childhood education and comprehensive health and social services to nearly 800,000 young children every year in communities across this country, and employs about 250,000 dedicated staff. Head Start is a critical source of child care for working families, particularly in rural and Tribal communities, where Head Start programs are often the only option for high-quality child care services. Head Start programs ensure children receive appropriate health and dental care, nutrition support, and referrals to other critical services for parents, such as job training, adult education, nutrition services, and housing support.
    You even acknowledged the value of Head Start following a recent visit to a Virginia Head Start center, where you said, “I had a very inspiring tour. I saw a devoted staff and a lot of happy children. They are getting the kind of education and socialization they need, and they are also getting a couple of meals a day.”
    However, as a result of your actions to withhold and delay funding and undermine the administration of this vital program, Head Start centers are in serious jeopardy and have already had their day to day operations impacted. Programs are increasingly worried that they will not be able to make payroll, pay rent, and remain open to serve the hundreds of thousands of children and families who depend on their services in communities across the nation.
    Since the very start of this Administration, Head Start programs have been under attack. On January 27th, 2025, the Office of Management and Budget issued a memo (M-25-13) that suddenly froze the disbursement of grant funding for federal programs and services government-wide, including Head Start. Despite the Administration’s clarification that Head Start programs would not be the target of the funding freeze, many Head Start programs across the country were unable to draw down their grant funds through the Payment Management System (PMS) for weeks. At one point, the National Head Start Association reported 37 programs serving nearly 15,000 children across the country could not access their federal funding. Head Start programs operate with thin margins and on short-term budgets from HHS, and without any communication from the Administration about the status of funding, programs were forced to temporarily close or to lay off staff. In Wisconsin, the National Centers for Learning Excellence, which serves more than 200 children and their families, shut down for a week and laid off staff due to the funding freeze.
    On April 1st, you abruptly closed five of the ten regional offices that help local grantees administer Head Start programs in 22 states. This left hundreds of programs without dedicated points of contact to address mission critical issues like approving grant renewals and modifications, investigating child health and safety incidents, and providing training and technical assistance to ensure high-quality services for children. While some grantees were assigned a new program specialist, we understand many have not been receiving responses to their inquiries. This is on top of the estimated 97 Office of Head Start central office staff that were terminated due to their probationary status and the recent reduction in force. You promised “radical transparency” as Secretary, yet it is unclear how these actions will improve Head Start programs, and you and your staff refuse to respond to basic inquiries and requests for information.
    On March 14th, 2025, the Office of Head Start (OHS) notified all Head Start programs that “the use of federal funding for any training and technical assistance or other program expenditures that promote or take part in diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives” will not be approved and that any questions should be directed to regional offices. Programs have not received any guidance for what would be considered “DEI” but this policy is potentially in direct conflict with statutory and regulatory program requirements, such as providing culturally and linguistically appropriate instructional services for English learners. Many programs cannot direct questions to regional staff, as half of regional offices were abruptly closed, and as unprecedented actions are being taken to delay and withhold funding, Head Start programs have been intentionally left with little to no guidance.
    Head Start programs are now arbitrarily required to provide justifications for each draw down of funds that is necessary to operate their programs, despite already receiving a federal grant award for these purposes. As of April 14th, Head Start programs have reportedly received correspondence from an email address “defendthespend@hhs.gov” requiring programs to submit a “specific description of why the funds are necessary and why they are aligned to the award” before programs can have funding disbursed. It has been reported that political appointees must sign off on every draw down of funds. This creates an illusion of improving oversight but only serves to add unnecessary red tape by requiring the manual sign off on hundreds of thousands of individual actions annually across the Department based on two to three sentence justifications. Already some grantees have reported delays in receiving funds, and have reported that furloughs or closures are imminent if funds are not released. For an administration that purports to value local autonomy and efficiency in federally funded programs, your actions have achieved the exact opposite.
    Finally, Head Start grantees are still waiting on payments and grant renewals from the Office of Head Start, including programs whose grants end on April 30th, 2025. These notices should have gone out by now, yet we are concerned to hear programs report they have received little to no correspondence regarding their grant renewals. Additionally, because we started fiscal year 2025 under a short-term continuing resolution, as is usual, some grantees have only received partial funding for the first few months of the year. But with a full year funding bill in place, these grantees should have received full funding by now, yet some are reporting that they have not received the full amount of their grants and will run out of funds this month or next. On Wednesday, April 16th, the delays in Head Start funding led to the closure of Head Start centers serving more than 400 children in Sunnyside, Washington.
    The Administration has a legal and moral obligation to disburse Head Start funds to programs and to uphold the program’s promise to provide high-quality early education services to low income children and families across this country. The fiscal year 2025 appropriations act provided $12.3 billion for Head Start, the same as the fiscal year 2024 level. The Head Start Act includes an explicit formula for how appropriated funds should be allocated. There is no justifiable reason for the delay in funding we have seen over the last two months, and you have refused to offer any kind of explanation. However, this week leaked fiscal year 2026 budget documents indicated the Office of Management and Budget was directing the Department, consistent with the Administration’s proposal to eliminate Head Start in fiscal year 2026, to “ensure to the extent allowable FY2025 funds are available to close out the program.” If this explains any of the delay in awarding fiscal year 2025 funding, we want to be clear, no funds were provided in fiscal year 2025 to “close out the program,” and it would be wholly unacceptable and likely illegal if the Department tries to carry out this directive.
    Finally, the leaked budget documents provided a justification, albeit brief, for eliminating Head Start in fiscal year 2026 that makes this Administration’s priorities clear and puts the Department’s actions over the last several months in context. The Administration argues that eliminating Head Start, “is consistent with the Administration’s goals of returning education to the States and increasing parental choice.” It is shocking to see an argument that eliminating a program that provides comprehensive early childhood care and education to 800,000 children and their families would increase parental choice. It is particularly concerning to see that argument in the context of the significant delay in awarding fiscal year 2025 appropriated funds and what that indicates about the intent behind the Department’s actions. We believe it is obvious that eliminating Head Start would be detrimental to hundreds of thousands of children and families. Similarly, we believe it is obvious that delaying funding like we have seen over the last two months, forcing Head Start programs to close, and leaving families to scramble to find quality, affordable alternatives puts the education and well-being of some of the most vulnerable young children in America at risk. In our view, that is unacceptable.
    Therefore, we urge you to immediately reinstate fired staff across all Offices of Head Start, and cease all actions to delay the awarding and disbursement of funding to Head Start programs across this country.
    Please provide us with a written response to the questions below no later than 10 days from receipt: 
    Will you reinstate the staff who administer Head Start programs and reopen the closed regional offices responsible for overseeing Head Start programs in 22 states?
    When is HHS going to share information on the reorganization plan for the consolidation of the regional offices?
    Please provide the contact information for each program specialist designated to the 22 states who lost their regional office. 
    Who is responsible for ensuring there are no delays or lapses in funding, nor any disruptions to Head Start program operations now that these states do not have a regional office?

    How many employees at the Offices of Head Start have been terminated, including the five regional offices and the central office? 
    Which officials at HHS were involved in the staffing reduction decisions for OHS and what planning, if any, was undertaken prior to these reductions? Please describe the events that unfolded and name each office that was involved in the decision. Further, please name the official(s) who approved the staffing reductions.

    Can you confirm that the Administration will distribute all Head Start funds appropriated by Congress to Head Start programs in FY 25, as required by the Head Start Act?
    Please provide a list of all grantees with 5-year Head Start grant renewals that start between now and the end of the fiscal year: May 1st, June 1st, July 1st, August 1st, and September 1st.
    Will any funding be delayed for grantees that are due to receive their annual funding on May 1st or beyond?

    Why are funding awards delayed for grantees that received partial awards during the first continuing resolution for FY25?
    When can HHS guarantee that all funds will be awarded for partially funded Head Start programs?

    What is the “Tier 2” department for review that is delaying drawn down for Head Start programs in the Payment Management System?
    When should programs expect to receive their funds?
    Please provide all communication that went to Head Start grantees on the new review process.

    What guidance and clarifications have been provided to Head Start grantees on DEI expenditures?
    How is HHS evaluating Head Start programs’ expenditures and grant awards for DEI?
    What justifications are being used to prohibit DEI?

    Sincerely,

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Van Hollen, Warren, Kaine Press Hegseth on High Civilian Casualties in Yemen Strikes and Trump Administration’s Dismantling of Safeguards Against Civilian Harm

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Virginia Tim Kaine
    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, U.S. Senators Chris Van Hollen (D-MD), Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), and Tim Kaine (D-VA) wrote to U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, expressing concerns with reports that U.S. strikes against the Houthis at the Ras Isa fuel terminal in Yemen last week killed dozens of civilians as the Trump Administration has rolled back measures and procedures designed to minimize the risk of harm to civilians from U.S. military operations. In their letter, the Senators ask for responses to a series of questions regarding the mitigation measures taken prior to the strikes conducted in Yemen in the past month and the current status of civilian harm mitigation procedures, among others.
    “We write to you concerning reports that U.S. strikes against the Houthis at the Ras Isa fuel terminal in Yemen last week killed dozens of civilians, potentially more than 70. If these reports of civilian casualties are accurate, they should come as no surprise. Using explosive weapons in populated areas – as these intense strikes appear to do – always carries a high risk of civilian harm,” the Senators began.
    “Further, reports suggest that the Trump Administration plans to dismantle civilian harm mitigation policies and procedures at the Pentagon designed to reduce civilian casualties in U.S. operations,” they continued, going on to highlight that the Administration has already taken steps that raise the risk of civilian harm during military operations, such as their dismissal of senior Judge Advocates (JAG) officers and loosening of rules of engagement. “Taken altogether, these moves suggest that the Trump Administration is abandoning the measures necessary to meet its obligations to reducing civilian harm.
    “President Trump has called himself a ‘peacemaker,’ but that claim rings hollow when U.S. military operations kill scores of civilians. The reported high civilian casualty numbers from U.S. strikes in Yemen demonstrate a serious disregard for civilian life, and call into question this Administration’s ability to conduct military operations in accordance with U.S. best practices for civilian harm mitigation and international law,” they stressed.
    “The U.S. military has spent many years working to improve its ability to prevent and mitigate civilian harm without sacrificing lethality. Military leaders agree that ingraining civilian harm mitigation practices within U.S operations leads to better outcomes and that civilian casualties ‘actually undermine the mission that the military has been sent in to do.’ […] Now, we understand that the Administration is considering dismantling these efforts, many of which are congressionally authorized and funded through congressional appropriations, undermining years of hard lessons learned after more than two decades of U.S. wars. We are now seeing the real-life impact of the Administration’s disregard for civilian harm mitigation and international law,” they wrote, going on to list a series of questions for the Administration’s response.
    A copy of the letter, including the questions the Senators ask Secretary Hegseth, is available here and below.
    Dear Secretary Hegseth, 
    We write to you concerning reports that U.S. strikes against the Houthis at the Ras Isa fuel terminal in Yemen last week killed dozens of civilians, potentially more than 70. If these reports of civilian casualties are accurate, they should come as no surprise. Using explosive weapons in populated areas – as these intense strikes appear to do – always carries a high risk of civilian harm. Further, reports suggest that the Trump Administration plans to dismantle civilian harm mitigation policies and procedures at the Pentagon designed to reduce civilian casualties in U.S. operations. And the Trump Administration has already dismissed senior, non-partisan Judge Advocates, or JAG officers, who provide critical legal counsel to U.S. warfighters, especially when it comes to the laws of war and adherence to U.S. civilian harm mitigation policies. The Defense Department also recently loosened the rules of engagement to allow CENTCOM and other combatant commands to conduct strikes without requiring White House sign-off, removing necessary checks and balances on crucial life-and-death decisions. Taken altogether, these moves suggest that the Trump Administration is abandoning the measures necessary to meet its obligations to reducing civilian harm.
    President Trump has called himself a “peacemaker,” but that claim rings hollow when U.S. military operations kill scores of civilians. The reported high civilian casualty numbers from U.S. strikes in Yemen demonstrate a serious disregard for civilian life, and call into question this Administration’s ability to conduct military operations in accordance with U.S. best practices for civilian harm mitigation and international law. 
    On April 17, 2025, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) confirmed the strikes against the Houthis’ fuel supplies located at a Yemeni port in the Hodeida governorate, stating that “the objective of these strikes was to degrade the economic source of power of the Houthis, who continue to exploit and bring great pain upon their fellow countrymen,” and that “this strike was not intended to harm the people of Yemen.” Despite these claims, reports from news organizations and organizations that track civilian harm suggest that U.S. strikes since March 15 have killed more than a hundred civilians. The United Nations Protection Cluster’s Civilian Impact Monitoring Project has also assessed that March 2025 marked the highest monthly casualty count in Yemen in almost two years, tripling the previous month, with a total of 162 civilian casualties.  
    In addition, the strikes have moved beyond targeting Houthi missile launch sites to hitting urban areas. This expansion of target sites, to include civilian infrastructure like ports, exacerbates the risk of civilian harm, all while internal U.S. government assessments suggest that the military campaign against the Houthis has “had limited impact on destroying” the Houthis capabilities.
    The U.S. military has spent many years working to improve its ability to prevent and mitigate civilian harm without sacrificing lethality. Military leaders agree that ingraining civilian harm mitigation practices within U.S operations leads to better outcomes and that civilian casualties “actually undermine the mission that the military has been sent in to do.” This was a lesson the first Trump Administration took to heart, including through the development of the first DoD Instruction on Civilian Harm. These efforts, among others, that started during the first Trump Administration set in motion policies that led to additional civilian harm mitigation policies under the Biden Administration, known as the Civilian Harm Mitigation Response Action Plan (CHMR-AP). Now, we understand that the Administration is considering dismantling these efforts, many of which are congressionally authorized and funded through congressional appropriations, undermining years of hard lessons learned after more than two decades of U.S. wars. We are now seeing the real-life impact of the Administration’s disregard for civilian harm mitigation and international law.
    We request answers to the following questions on the U.S. military campaign in Yemen since March 15, 2025, no later than May 8, 2025:  
    Has the Department of Defense (DoD) assessed the number of noncombatant and combatant casualties in each of its strikes inside Yemen since March 15, 2025? Please provide available data, and if the Department is not making efforts to evaluate these effects of its strikes, please explain why. If any civilian casualty credibility assessment reports have been made, please provide them. 
    What has DoD’s process been for assessing the acceptable civilian casualties for individual strikes inside Yemen, and assessing estimated levels of civilian harm and collateral damage, since March 15, 2025? What steps, if any, were taken to prevent or mitigate anticipated civilian harm?  
    What role have legal advisers, including JAG officers, played in reviewing the legality of U.S. strikes in Yemen since March 15, 2025? What assessment and determination did legal advisers, including JAG officers, make, if any, with regard to the status of the Ras Isa fuel port as a civilian versus a military object prior to its targeting last week? 
    What DoD instructions or orders currently govern Department civilian harm mitigation and response actions? 
    Were the civilian harm mitigation and response experts at CENTCOM and/or at the Civilian Protection Center of Excellence consulted in planning for these strikes?  
    How does the Department plan to engage with the families or communities affected by these strikes, including acknowledging civilian harm and exploring avenues for potential redress? 
    Thank you for your attention to this matter.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Supporting international language instruction | Appuyer l’enseignement des langues étrangères

    Alberta’s International Language Teacher Bursary is awarded annually to teachers who want to develop their skills by taking a language, culture or teaching summer course outside of Canada. This year, bursaries of $4,200 have been awarded to 10 public school teachers. This money will support teachers participating in language and culture programs in Spain, France, Ecuador, Brazil and Mexico.

    “Learning a new language opens doors to new experiences and opportunities for Alberta students and is a rewarding part of any student’s educational journey. This money is helping teachers develop their language skills and cultural knowledge which will translate directly into tremendously rewarding learning experiences for Alberta students. Congratulations to this year’s recipients.”

    Demetrios Nicolaides, Minister of Education

    Alberta’s government established the International Language Teacher Bursary in 2003. The program is funded through the Alberta Heritage Scholarship Fund. An Alberta Education committee chooses the successful applicants based on defined requirements, including a statement of intent from the applicant about how the summer course will help them improve their language instruction skills. 

    “Alberta School Boards Association welcomes this investment in international language education, which supports the efforts of Alberta’s locally elected school boards to offer rich programming that reflects the diversity of our communities. Our member boards are committed to equipping students with the skills they need to succeed in a global society.” 

    Marilyn Dennis, president, Alberta School Boards Association

    This year’s recipients are employed by school boards across the province, including the Calgary Board of Education, Elk Island Public, Lethbridge School Division, Edmonton Public Schools and Red Deer Public Schools. Up to $42,000 was available for the 2025-26 program year.

    Quick facts

    • Ten Albertans received the International Language Teacher Bursary in 2024.
    • In addition to the International Language Teacher Bursary, Alberta Education offers a First Nations, Métis and Inuit Languages Teacher Bursary, which awards bursaries of up to $4,200 and has its own application and selection processes.
    • Certificated French language educators within Alberta can apply for up to $4,000 through the Individual Teacher Bursary to receive funding for eligible courses and professional development within Canada.
    • The Individual Teacher Bursary is funded by the federal government as part of the Canada-Alberta Agreement on Minority-Language Education and Second-Language Instruction.

    Related information

    • International Language Teacher Bursary
    • First Nations, Métis and Inuit Languages Teacher Bursary
    • Individual Teacher Bursary Program

    Alberta Education remet 42 000 dollars en bourses d’études à des enseignants afin qu’ils puissent acquérir des compétences en langues étrangères qui serviront dans les salles de classe de l’Alberta. 

    La bourse albertaine International Language Teacher Bursary est décernée chaque année à des enseignants qui souhaitent se perfectionner en suivant, pendant l’été, un cours de langue, de culture ou de pédagogie à l’extérieur du Canada. Cette année, des bourses de 4 200 dollars ont été attribuées à dix enseignants des écoles publiques. Ce financement permettra aux enseignants de participer à des programmes de perfectionnement linguistique et culturel en Espagne, en France, en Équateur, au Brésil et au Mexique. 

    « L’apprentissage d’une nouvelle langue offre de nouvelles expériences et possibilités aux élèves albertains, en plus d’être une composante motivante du parcours scolaire de tout élève. Ce financement aide les enseignants à améliorer leurs compétences linguistiques et leurs connaissances culturelles, ce qui se traduira directement en des expériences d’apprentissage extrêmement enrichissantes pour les élèves albertains. Félicitations aux boursiers de cette année. »

    Demetrios Nicolaides, ministre de l’Éducation

    Le gouvernement de l’Alberta a créé la bourse International Language Teacher Bursary en 2003. Ce programme est financé par l’Alberta Heritage Scholarship Fund. Un comité d’Alberta Education choisit les boursiers en fonction de critères définis, incluant une déclaration d’intention dans laquelle le candidat décrit la façon dont le cours d’été l’aidera à améliorer ses compétences en enseignement des langues.

    « L’Alberta School Boards Association se réjouit de cet investissement dans l’enseignement des langues étrangères qui vient appuyer les efforts déployés par les conseils scolaires élus localement de l’Alberta pour offrir de riches programmes reflétant la diversité de nos communautés. Les conseils scolaires membres de notre association se sont engagés à doter les élèves des compétences dont ils ont besoin pour réussir dans une société mondiale. »

    Marilyn Dennis, présidente, Alberta School Boards Association 

    Les boursiers de cette année sont employés par des autorités scolaires de partout dans la province, dont le Calgary Board of Education, Elk Island Public, Lethbridge School Division, Edmonton Public Schools et Red Deer Public Schools. Jusqu’à 42 000 dollars en bourses d’études étaient disponibles pour l’année 2025-2026. 

    En bref

    • Dix Albertains et Albertaines ont reçu la bourse International Language Teacher Bursary en 2024.
    • En plus d’offrir la bourse International Language Teacher Bursary, Alberta Education remet des bourses d’une valeur maximale de 4 200 dollars dans le cadre de la First Nations, Métis and Inuit Languages Teacher Bursary (bourse pour les enseignants des langues des Premières Nations, des Métis et des Inuits). Ce programme a ses propres processus de candidature et de sélection.
    • En Alberta, les éducateurs de français qui sont brevetés peuvent obtenir une bourse d’une valeur maximale de 4 000 dollars dans le cadre du Programme de bourse individuelle pour enseignants afin de couvrir les dépenses admissibles associées à des cours et du perfectionnement professionnel offerts au Canada.
    • Le Programme de bourse individuelle pour enseignants est financé par le gouvernement fédéral dans le cadre de l’Entente Canada-Alberta relative à l’enseignement dans la langue de la minorité et à l’enseignement de la langue seconde. 

    Renseignements connexes

    • Programme de bourses pour les enseignants des langues internationales (en anglais seulement)
    • Programme de bourses pour les enseignants des langues des Premières Nations, de Métis et des Inuits (en anglais seulement)
    • Programme de bourse individuelle pour enseignant

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Jayapal Statement on Trump Administration Restoring the Lawful Status of Thousands of Student Visa Holders

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congresswoman Pramila Jayapal (7th District of Washington)

    WASHINGTON, DC — U.S. Representative Pramila Jayapal (WA-07), Ranking Member of the Immigration Integrity, Security, and Enforcement Subcommittee, released the following statement after the Trump administration announced it would reverse course and restore the status of thousands of student visa holders.

    “The Trump Administration’s reversal of unlawful actions to terminate the status of thousands of student visa holders is overdue. While it remains to be seen if all these student visas will be restored, these students should never have had their status terminated to begin with, and the terminations continue to have very serious consequences for students, universities, and the future of our country to attract talent to study here. The terminations have turned university campuses into places of fear rather than learning, and many students are still dealing with the financial and emotional effects of their visa terminations even as they were in the midst of their studies. 

    “Trump’s reversal — in the face of multiple lawsuits and enormous pressure — is a clear admission that these actions against students were never about national security, but rather about using immigration enforcement as a weapon to restrict due process, stifle political dissent, and attack legal immigration. It is also a clear signal that organizing, lawsuits and public pressure are critically important to challenge the Administration’s continuously unlawful actions. It’s time to stop weaponizing enforcement and prioritize the humanity, dignity, and legal rights of all people. That’s both the moral and lawful thing to do, and also what is best for America’s ability to remain a country that attracts talent from all over the world.”

    Issues: Immigration

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Pressley Joins Warren, Massachusetts Lawmakers Sounding Alarm on Trump Cuts to National Endowment for the Humanities Staff, Grants

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congresswoman Ayanna Pressley (MA-07)

    “We write to seek answers about why you are crippling an agency that punches so far above its weight and is essential to enabling access to libraries, museums, archives, historic sites and more for Massachusetts residents and Americans in every state.” 

    Lawmakers highlight Massachusetts impacts, including canceled projects which helped state capture and preserve history and culture, promote learning, make humanities more accessible

    Text of Letter (PDF)

    WASHINGTON – Congresswoman Ayanna Pressley (MA-07) joins Senators Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) and Ed Markey (D-MA), along with Representatives Jake Auchincloss (MA-04), Bill Keating (MA-09), Stephen Lynch (MA-08), Jim McGovern (MA-02), Seth Moulton (MA-06), Richard Neal (MA-01), and Lori Trahan (MA-03), in sending a letter to Michael McDonald, Acting Chairman of the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH), regarding the impacts of recent staffing cuts and attempts to cancel grants in Massachusetts and across the country.

    During the week of April 1, 2025, following the Department of Government Efficiency’s (DOGE) recommendations, a majority of NEH staff were placed on administrative leave and hundreds of grants were canceled. In the following days, state humanities councils and other grant recipients received emails notifying them that their funding would be terminated immediately and that the Trump administration would be “repurposing its funding allocations in a new direction in furtherance of the president’s agenda.”

    “We write to seek answers about why you are crippling an agency that punches so far above its weight and is essential to enabling access to libraries, museums, archives, historic sites and more for Massachusetts residents and Americans in every state,” wrote the lawmakers.

    Congressionally appropriated NEH program funds directly benefit local communities. The NEH was founded by Congress in 1965 to “promote progress and scholarship in the humanities and the arts in the United States,” and the agency enables work in the humanities by funding libraries, museums, archives, historic sites, media outlets, research institutions, educators and independent scholars. These cuts will have devastating impacts on cultural institutions and scholarship in Massachusetts and across the country.

    The Trump administration’s actions put tremendous financial strain on researchers, universities, and institutions. According to one institution in Massachusetts, the termination notices sent to individual recipients of NEH grants included language that the individuals will remain “subject to audit.” Grant recipients now face concerns that they will have to repay their funds to NEH at an undetermined time.

    NEH-funded projects in Massachusetts — including research projects to better understand the impact of war on naval veterans and their families, projects to understand the role of historic textile mills in the American industrial revolution, and programs supporting museums’ efforts to digitize, archive, and modernize the products of Massachusetts art and culture — have enriched the state’s ability to capture and preserve history and culture, promote new knowledge and learning, and make the humanities more accessible.

    “These actions at NEH mark another instance of overreach by the Trump administration, causing more destruction and devastation to research institutions and scholars across the country, but providing little in savings,” wrote the lawmakers.

    A copy of the letter is available here.

    Congresswoman Pressley has been a leading voice in Congress speaking out against Elon Musk and Donald Trump’s unprecedented assault on our democracy and federal agencies, and she has been a steadfast advocate for protecting the essential services that federal workers and agencies provide.

    • On April 14, 2025, Rep. Pressley joined the Massachusetts delegation in sending a letter to HHS Secretary Robert F. Kennedy demanding answers on staff cuts to the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP), a critical home energy program supporting vulnerable households.
    • On April 9, 2025, Rep. Pressley joined the Massachusetts delegation in sending a letter to HHS Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr. demanding answers after the abrupt shuttering of the entire HHS Regional Office in Boston.
    • On April 9, 2025, Rep. Pressley led lawmakers in sending a letter to Trump’s trade official demanding he resign from holding multiple positions with clear conflicts of interest that would further harm federal workers.
    • On March 28, 2025, Rep. Pressley issued a statement slamming Trump’s executive order to end collective bargaining rights for hundreds of thousands of federal employees.
    • On March 21, 2025, Rep. Pressley led Massachusetts lawmakers in a letter to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) sharply criticizing and demanding answers about the impact of the Musk-Trump Administration’s mass firings of federal workers in Massachusetts.
    • On March 11, 2025, Rep. Pressley spoke out against the U.S. Department of Education’s mass layoffs of over 1,300 workers, which effectively guts the agency.
    • On March 11, 2025, Rep. Pressley voted against Republicans’ shameful government budget bill, which would harm vulnerable families and provide a blank check for Elon Musk and Donald Trump to continue their unprecedented assault on our democracy. She later issued a statement condemning its final passage in the Senate.
    • On March 11, 2025, Rep. Pressley joined 13 of her colleagues on a letter to the Department of Homeland Security demanding answers and the immediate release of Columbia student Mahmoud Khalil, whose illegal abduction is an attack on his constitutional right to free speech and due process.
    • On March 4, 2025, Rep. Pressley walked out of the House chamber in protest during Donald Trump’s presidential joint address to Congress.
    • On March 4, 2025, Rep. Pressley welcomed Claire Bergstresser, an Everett constituent, dedicated public servant, AFGE union member, and former HUD worker who was unjustly terminated as part of Musk and Trump’s assault on federal agencies as her guest to the presidential joint address to Congress.
    • On February 28, 2025, Rep. Pressley led 85 lawmakers in a letter urging the Office of Special Counsel to immediate reinstate and expand protections for all unfairly fired federal workers.
    • On February 28, 2025, Rep. Pressley joined over 200 Democrats in filing an amicus brief defending the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau before a U.S. District Court.
    • On February 26, 2025, in a House Oversight Committee hearing, Rep. Pressley discussed what true government efficiency looks like and denounced Elon Musk and Donald Trump for utilizing DOGE to gut the essential services that keep people safe, fed, and housed.
    • On February 25, 2025, in a House Oversight Committee hearing, Rep. Pressley condemned Elon Musk’s abuse of government efficiency through the fraudulent Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE).
    • On February 25, 2025, Rep. Pressley delivered a floor speech in which she railed against Republicans’ cruel budget resolution that would slash Medicaid by nearly $1 trillion.
    • On February 20, 2025, Rep. Pressley and her Haiti Caucus Co-Chairs issued a statement condemning the Trump Administration’s decision to end Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Haiti.
    • On February 13, 2025, in a House Financial Services Committee hearing, Rep. Pressley emphasized the critical role of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) in safeguarding consumers and sharply criticized Donald Trump and Elon Musk for halting the critical work of the agency.
    • On February 10, 2025, Rep. Pressley rallied with Senator Elizabeth Warren, Ranking Member Maxine Waters, and advocates to protest Donald Trump and Elon Musk’s unlawful takeover of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)
    • On February 11, 2025, in a House Financial Services Committee hearing, Rep. Pressley criticized the Trump-Musk administration for halting the critical work of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) with crypto scams on the rise.
    • On February 10, 2025, Rep. Pressley issued a statement slamming the Trump Administration’s harmful cuts to National Institutes of Health (NIH) funding to support hospitals, universities, and research institutions conducting lifesaving research.
    • On February 10, 2025, as Trump and Musk threaten to dismantle the essential work of the U.S. Department of Education, Rep.  Pressley delivered a powerful floor speech to affirm the role of public education in American democracy.
    • On February 6, 2025, in a House Oversight Committee hearing, Rep. Pressley delivered a powerful rebuke of Republicans’ efforts to gut diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) initiatives and eliminate essential services for vulnerable communities.
    • On February 5, 2025, Rep. Pressley rallied outside the U.S. Department of Treasury to protest Elon Musk’s unlawful assault on federal agencies and our democracy.
    • On January 30, 2025, Rep. Pressley slammed Donald Trump for blaming the tragic plane crash at Reagan National Airport, which killed over 60 people, including some families from Massachusetts, on diversity, equity and inclusion initiatives.
    • In January 2025, Rep. Pressley issued a statement slamming Trump’s illegal freeze on federal grants and loans and its harmful impact on vulnerable communities.
    • On January 23, 2025, Rep. Pressley delivered an impassioned floor speech condemning Republicans’ cruel anti-abortion bill that criminalizes providers and denies families care.
    • On January 23, 2025, Rep. Pressley joined her colleagues to reintroduce the Neighbors Not Enemies Act, a bill to repeal an outdated law that has been used to target innocent immigrants without due process rights.
    • On January 22, 2025, Rep. Pressley issued a statement condemning the Trump Administration’s harmful executive actions on diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI).

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News