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Category: Russian Federation

  • MIL-OSI USA: Cornyn, Colleagues Introduce Bill to Mitigate Foreign Influence on U.S. Policymaking

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Texas John Cornyn

    Legislation Would Ban Former Government Employees from Lobbying for Countries of Concern

    WASHINGTON – U.S. Senators John Cornyn (R-TX), Peter Welch (D-VT), Jim Risch (R-ID), and Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI) introduced the Conflict-free Leaving Employment and Activity Restrictions (CLEAR) Path Act, which would mitigate foreign influence on U.S. policymaking by prohibiting former government employees from lobbying on behalf of countries of concern:
    “Foreign adversaries with ill intentions should not wield influence on American policymaking, nor should they exploit our own citizens to intercede on their behalf,” said Sen. Cornyn. “This commonsense legislation would root out attempts of malign foreign interference and permanently ban former U.S. government employees from lobbying for countries of concern like Russia and China.”
    “Public trust in our democratic institutions has been eroding,” said Sen. Welch. “It’s vital we set higher standards against potential conflicts of interest for former government employees, particularly when it involves foreign adversaries that might be working to influence U.S. policy.”
    “It isn’t right for senior government officials to turn their public service experience into a payout from malign foreign governments,” said Sen. Risch. “This bill will help prevent corruption at the highest levels of our government, protect our national security, and ensure that our public servants do not abuse their power for the good of America’s adversaries.”
    “America is engaged in a clash of civilizations against kleptocrats, international criminals, and corrupt foreign nations that provide them safe harbor,” said Sen. Whitehouse. “Our adversaries exploit both secret and overt channels of influence to put their thumb on the scale of American policy.  I’m glad to join this bipartisan effort to prevent senior U.S. government officials from selling their expertise, access, and influence to shadowy foreign interests after they leave their jobs.”
    Background:
    With recent attempts by foreign actors to manipulate the U.S. political and governing processes in recent years, the Clear Path Act would seek to mitigate foreign malign influence in our political system by:
    Permanently banning agency heads, deputies, and Senate-confirmed employees from lobbying the executive and legislative branches on behalf of countries of concern, including China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, Syria, and Cuba;
    And including a mechanism to add or remove countries of concern via a Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Judiciary Committee joint resolution and with the concurrence of the U.S. Secretary of State and U.S. Attorney General.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Gov. Pillen Celebrates Passage of Bill to Protect Against Influence of Foreign Adversaries

    Source: US State of Nebraska

    . Pillen Celebrates Passage of Bill to Protect Against Influence of Foreign Adversaries

     

    LINCOLN, NE – Today, Governor Jim Pillen celebrated passage of LB644, brought on his behalf by Senator Eliot Bostar. During the news conference, the Governor signed ceremonial copies of the bill. He officially signed the legislation into law on June 4.

    LB644 creates two new acts: the Foreign Adversary and Terrorist Agent Registration Act and the Crush Transnational Repression in Nebraska Act. Together, the acts are aimed at knowing who represents foreign adversaries within the state, curbing the information and/or data they may access or distribute, as well as providing protection against tactics that could be utilized by such organizations to cause undue influence or harm. Reporting requirements and penalties for violations are outlined within each Act.

    “Iran, China, Russia, North Korea, Cuba and the Maduro regime in Venezuela are all designated as foreign adversaries by the U.S. Government,” said Gov. Pillen. “They do not have our best interests at heart and as a result, we need to take appropriate steps to make sure that as a state, we are protected.”

    LB644 represents the latest of several executive and legislative actions that Gov. Pillen has authorized since taking office – all aimed at making sure state assets including infrastructure, land, technology and people are protected.

    “In today’s world, the means of getting access, of getting information, and crippling our most critical systems is easier than ever, which is why we are highly focused on addressing these issues,” continued Gov. Pillen.

    Lieutenant Governor Joe Kelly, who serves as the state’s director of homeland security, called attention to several of the executive orders and bills signed by Gov. Pillen over the two previous legislative sessions — including LB683 and LB1301 — both brought Sen. Bostar. Those bills, respectively, address the protection of communications equipment and prohibit companies from adversarial countries bidding on state and local procurement contracts.

    “This year, primarily, the legislation is focused on guarding against foreign adversarial influence operations,” said Bostar. “We have some existing transparency requirements for those who would seek to influence policy in the state of Nebraska, but not enough. It doesn’t prohibit the circumvention of full transparency over interests that would be adversarial to the interests of Nebraskans.”

    Michael Lucci, founder and CEO of State Armor, pointed to Nebraska’s leadership among other states when it comes to addressing national security issues.

    “Resilience is the key topic for states to address — being ready for potential conflict, being ready to counter political warfare — this is a part of resilience,” noted Lucci.

    State Armor works alongside states to identify solutions to global security issues and was founded following the introduction of LB683 in 2023.

    “One of the first things when our organization was founded was to tell states, ‘do what Nebraska did.’  And we have not stopped conveying that message.”  

    Lucci commended Nebraska lawmakers on taking a bipartisan approach to legislation aimed at protecting the state and signaled it was the approach President Trump and other federal officials want to see.  

    Major General Craig Strong, adjutant general for the Nebraska National Guard and director of the Nebraska Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) remarked that in his dual role, homeland security was top of mind.

    “Our adversaries can reach out at us through many different methods, and not just through the traditional, conventional munitions, but by way of cyber-attack, satellite imagery and other vectors that we have to be aware of, such as drones,” said MG Strong. “This bill clearly helps us maintain the level of awareness and readiness that are important elements of our state emergency response plans, particularly as it relates to Nebraska’s homeland defense.

     Also attending today’s news conference and ceremonial bill signing were senators Beau Ballard, Barry DeKay and Brian Hardin.

     Links to executive orders, legislation and letters signed by Gov. Pillen to protect the state against foreign adversaries can be found below.

    https://governor.nebraska.gov/press/gov-pillen-joins-letter-calling-halt-foreign-land-grabs

    https://governor.nebraska.gov/press/governor-pillen-senators-push-back-against-foreign-adversaries

    https://governor.nebraska.gov/press/gov-pillen-senators-and-dept-ag-present-laws-protect-nebraska-foreign-adversaries-during-news

    https://governor.nebraska.gov/gov-pillen-signs-executive-order-banning-more-ccp-tech

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Global: ‘I’m dreading birthing in such a system’: what Indigenous women globally think of birth care and what they’d like to see instead

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Nina Sivertsen, Associate Professor, College of Nursing and Health Sciences, Flinders University

    Pregnancy and having a baby can be a special time. And families want to feel safe and trust their maternity care.

    But when we reviewed the evidence, we found many Indigenous families globally face unfair treatment during pregnancy and birth. This can include racism, neglecting cultural aspects of their care, or using health care poorly designed to accommodate their needs.

    We found similar themes in research involving more than 1,400 Indigenous women, Elders, fathers, family members and health workers from locations including Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the United States, Greenland and Sápmi (parts of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia).

    Many Indigenous families felt disrespected. They said hospital staff often didn’t understand their cultures or give them basic rights during their maternity care, such as being listened to, included in decision-making, or giving informed consent.

    As a result, some families felt hesitant to seek care in mainstream hospitals. As one Indigenous woman told us during recent Australian research submitted for publication:

    I’m dreading birthing in such a system.

    But there are alternatives.

    What can hospitals do?

    There is a clear need to improve birthing services and cultural safety in mainstream hospitals with a focus on respecting the beliefs, practices and traditions of all families, including Indigenous ones.

    For example, many Indigenous families view childbirth as a communal event with extended family support. But hospital policies that limit the number of support people often disregard these important cultural practices.

    Indigenous families also need to get the type of health care they trust and feel comfortable with. Ideally this might involve staff with sound cultural knowledge and who can support families clinically in a culturally safe way.

    Aboriginal patient liaison officers are sometimes available in hospitals or health services. But there are not often enough, they have to service entire facilities, and they provide cultural support not clinical patient care.

    Indigenous families may also want to access a specific type of care. One example is “continuity of care”, where the same midwife or a small team of midwives, supports the family through the whole pregnancy. Ideally, these midwives should be Indigenous or, if not, be trained in supporting Indigenous families with respect and understanding.

    What is ‘birthing on Country’?

    For Indigenous women living in rural and remote areas, being sent away from home to give birth in a city hospital can be really hard.

    Sometimes women and families are evacuated from their home communities and have to stay for weeks or months in temporary accommodation in the city, both before and after birth, or if their baby is born pre-term and needs extra care. This temporary accommodation can be far from the hospital.

    All this takes place in unknown cities and towns, without family support, and sometimes away from their other children cared for by the community back home.

    This makes it harder for mums who need extra support, and can get in the way of starting breastfeeding and bonding with their baby.

    Again, there is an alternative. For many Indigenous families, giving birth is not just about having a baby. It’s also a spiritual and cultural event that strengthens their identity and connection to Country. A “birthing on Country” model of care, which respects Indigenous traditions and knowledge, reinforces that.

    This is midwife-led care designed for and with Indigenous communities. It doesn’t mean you have to birth in rural and remote spaces, but it is a model of care that focuses on culture, and can also be implemented in the city.

    Ideally, families would see the same midwife or team of midwives and use the “birthing on Country” model.

    What else can we do?

    Maternity services can be led by Indigenous people, which many women prefer. But Indigenous staff make up about 3.1% of the Australian health workforce.

    So it is crucial to engage non-Indigenous staff in building relationships and to support Indigenous families in their right to receive culturally safe care.

    This can start with better training for staff, not only to understand and respond to an Indigenous person’s individual needs, but to know when and how to speak up, call out or report racist or disrespectful behaviour.

    This is everyone’s problem

    A health system you can trust should be safe for everyone. If some people feel unsafe or face discrimination when getting care, this not only affects them, it affects everyone.

    For instance, when Indigenous women avoid or delay going to the hospital because of past bad experiences or discrimination, it can lead to health problems that could have been prevented.

    This not only harms the women, it puts more pressure on the public health system, which affects us all.

    By talking about these issues, we hope all Australians begin to care about the safety of all women during pregnancy and birth.

    The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. ‘I’m dreading birthing in such a system’: what Indigenous women globally think of birth care and what they’d like to see instead – https://theconversation.com/im-dreading-birthing-in-such-a-system-what-indigenous-women-globally-think-of-birth-care-and-what-theyd-like-to-see-instead-256877

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Global: ‘I’m dreading birthing in such a system’: what Indigenous women globally think of birth care and what they’d like to see instead

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Nina Sivertsen, Associate Professor, College of Nursing and Health Sciences, Flinders University

    Pregnancy and having a baby can be a special time. And families want to feel safe and trust their maternity care.

    But when we reviewed the evidence, we found many Indigenous families globally face unfair treatment during pregnancy and birth. This can include racism, neglecting cultural aspects of their care, or using health care poorly designed to accommodate their needs.

    We found similar themes in research involving more than 1,400 Indigenous women, Elders, fathers, family members and health workers from locations including Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the United States, Greenland and Sápmi (parts of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia).

    Many Indigenous families felt disrespected. They said hospital staff often didn’t understand their cultures or give them basic rights during their maternity care, such as being listened to, included in decision-making, or giving informed consent.

    As a result, some families felt hesitant to seek care in mainstream hospitals. As one Indigenous woman told us during recent Australian research submitted for publication:

    I’m dreading birthing in such a system.

    But there are alternatives.

    What can hospitals do?

    There is a clear need to improve birthing services and cultural safety in mainstream hospitals with a focus on respecting the beliefs, practices and traditions of all families, including Indigenous ones.

    For example, many Indigenous families view childbirth as a communal event with extended family support. But hospital policies that limit the number of support people often disregard these important cultural practices.

    Indigenous families also need to get the type of health care they trust and feel comfortable with. Ideally this might involve staff with sound cultural knowledge and who can support families clinically in a culturally safe way.

    Aboriginal patient liaison officers are sometimes available in hospitals or health services. But there are not often enough, they have to service entire facilities, and they provide cultural support not clinical patient care.

    Indigenous families may also want to access a specific type of care. One example is “continuity of care”, where the same midwife or a small team of midwives, supports the family through the whole pregnancy. Ideally, these midwives should be Indigenous or, if not, be trained in supporting Indigenous families with respect and understanding.

    What is ‘birthing on Country’?

    For Indigenous women living in rural and remote areas, being sent away from home to give birth in a city hospital can be really hard.

    Sometimes women and families are evacuated from their home communities and have to stay for weeks or months in temporary accommodation in the city, both before and after birth, or if their baby is born pre-term and needs extra care. This temporary accommodation can be far from the hospital.

    All this takes place in unknown cities and towns, without family support, and sometimes away from their other children cared for by the community back home.

    This makes it harder for mums who need extra support, and can get in the way of starting breastfeeding and bonding with their baby.

    Again, there is an alternative. For many Indigenous families, giving birth is not just about having a baby. It’s also a spiritual and cultural event that strengthens their identity and connection to Country. A “birthing on Country” model of care, which respects Indigenous traditions and knowledge, reinforces that.

    This is midwife-led care designed for and with Indigenous communities. It doesn’t mean you have to birth in rural and remote spaces, but it is a model of care that focuses on culture, and can also be implemented in the city.

    Ideally, families would see the same midwife or team of midwives and use the “birthing on Country” model.

    What else can we do?

    Maternity services can be led by Indigenous people, which many women prefer. But Indigenous staff make up about 3.1% of the Australian health workforce.

    So it is crucial to engage non-Indigenous staff in building relationships and to support Indigenous families in their right to receive culturally safe care.

    This can start with better training for staff, not only to understand and respond to an Indigenous person’s individual needs, but to know when and how to speak up, call out or report racist or disrespectful behaviour.

    This is everyone’s problem

    A health system you can trust should be safe for everyone. If some people feel unsafe or face discrimination when getting care, this not only affects them, it affects everyone.

    For instance, when Indigenous women avoid or delay going to the hospital because of past bad experiences or discrimination, it can lead to health problems that could have been prevented.

    This not only harms the women, it puts more pressure on the public health system, which affects us all.

    By talking about these issues, we hope all Australians begin to care about the safety of all women during pregnancy and birth.

    The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. ‘I’m dreading birthing in such a system’: what Indigenous women globally think of birth care and what they’d like to see instead – https://theconversation.com/im-dreading-birthing-in-such-a-system-what-indigenous-women-globally-think-of-birth-care-and-what-theyd-like-to-see-instead-256877

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI China: Zelensky, Trump discuss steps to ceasefire

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said on Wednesday that he discussed steps toward a ceasefire in the Russia-Ukraine conflict during a meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump.

    “We discussed how to achieve a ceasefire and a real peace. We spoke about how to protect our people,” Zelensky said on social media platform X.

    Ukraine appreciates the attention and the readiness of the United States to help bring peace closer, Zelensky said.

    Zelensky and Trump met on the sidelines of the NATO summit in The Hague, Netherlands. 

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-OSI China: Chinese defense minister meets with guests attending SCO Defense Ministers’ Meeting

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun on Wednesday held individual meetings in east China’s Qingdao city with his counterparts from Belarus, Iran, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia.

    They are attending the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Defense Ministers’ Meeting from Wednesday to Thursday.

    Unilateralism and protectionism are surging, while hegemonic, high-handed, and bullying acts severely undermine the international order, making these practices the biggest sources of chaos and harm, Dong said.

    He called for efforts to enhance coordination within multilateral frameworks such as the United Nations and the SCO, defend international fairness and justice, and uphold global strategic stability.

    The attendees commended China’s rotating SCO presidency for enhancing institutional mechanisms and cross-sector cooperation, while expressing strong readiness to consolidate and develop military cooperation.

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-OSI China: 2025 Future Close-Up global youth exchange program gets underway

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Young delegates from 14 countries and regions, including China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Germany, Australia and Brazil, pose for a group photo with organizers of the 2025 Future Close-Up at the youth exchange program’s launch ceremony on June 24. 

    On June 24, the 2025 Future Close-Up global youth exchange and visit program kicked off at the headquarters of Chinese Internet giant Tencent in Shenzhen, Guangdong Province. Themed Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macao: Driving High-Quality Development in the Greater Bay Area (GBA), this year’s event brings together young delegates from 14 countries and regions including China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Germany, Australia and Brazil to explore innovation across the region and China’s approach to regional cooperation, and gain a deeper understanding of the forces driving the country’s high-quality development.

    Future Close-Up was collaboratively launched in 2023 by China International Communications Group (CICG) Center for the Americas (CICG Center for Americas) and Tencent’s Marketing and Public Relations Department.

    From June 23 to 30, the participants will travel to Shenzhen, Dongguan, Hengqin and Guangzhou in Guangdong, as well as Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, for exchange activities.

    Members of this year’s Future Close-Up are influential figures in their fields, including entrepreneurs, scientists, scholars and opinion leaders. This edition of the program will feature a forum on urban innovation and cultural exchange in the GBA, offering international youth a platform to deepen their understanding of the region’s innovation ecosystem and facilitating mutual learning between urban cultures.

    At the launch ceremony, Zhang Jun, General Manager of Tencent’s Marketing and Public Relations Department, said he believes the event can connect people from different regions and cultural backgrounds. “With this vision in mind, we launched the Future Close-Up program, which has brought together over 100 young people from 35 countries and regions over the past three years,” Zhang added.

    “Future Close-Up has always been about opening a window for young people around the world to a more meaningful understanding of China. At the same time, their participation helps us broaden our appreciation for the diversity of global cultures,” said Tao Xing, the Future Close-Up program representative from the CICG Center for Americas, at the ceremony.

    “This year, we have invited international youth to visit the vibrant GBA. We hope you will embrace the journey with open minds, observe with curiosity, reflect on what you encounter and gain a uniquely personal experience of China,” he continued.

    The young delegates also shared their excitement and expectations for their upcoming journey.

    Torry Ko, Senior Strategy Manager for the Asia-Pacific region at Australian tech company MOLOCO, said he was especially interested in learning how leading firms like Tencent are tapping into the strengths of the GBA to fuel their rapid growth. “China’s tech industry is at the forefront globally,” he said.

    “I first came to Shenzhen 16 years ago, when I was studying in China. It’s incredible to see how much the city has changed. I am looking forward to learning more about the innovation driving China’s ongoing reform and development,” Ko added.

    Iuliia Bautdinova, a finance and communications analyst at multinational aerospace corporation Airbus from Russia, said she was drawn to Future Close-Up after hearing strong recommendations from previous participants. “My expectation is to get to know how people live here and what they do when they work with the future,” Bautdinova said. She is eager to take a closer look at the GBA’s renowned electronics and information industry and its ongoing development.

    Hugo Fontanel from France is interested in China’s digital transformation. The omnichannel lead at British multinational pharmaceutical company ViiV Healthcare expects “to learn more about the economic development of China, especially in the tech industry.” He also looks forward to meeting more international youth who share a passion for cross-cultural exchange and adventure.

    After the launch ceremony, the delegates visited Tencent’s digital exhibition hall, where they delved into the company’s innovations in AI, cloud computing and smart city technologies through immersive experiences. They also toured Mindray Bio-Medical Electronics Co. Ltd. to explore its research and development achievements in the medical device field.

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-Evening Report: ‘I’m dreading birthing in such a system’: what Indigenous women globally think of birth care and what they’d like to see instead

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Nina Sivertsen, Associate Professor, College of Nursing and Health Sciences, Flinders University

    Pregnancy and having a baby can be a special time. And families want to feel safe and trust their maternity care.

    But when we reviewed the evidence, we found many Indigenous families globally face unfair treatment during pregnancy and birth. This can include racism, neglecting cultural aspects of their care, or using health care poorly designed to accommodate their needs.

    We found similar themes in research involving more than 1,400 Indigenous women, Elders, fathers, family members and health workers from locations including Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the United States, Greenland and Sápmi (parts of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia).

    Many Indigenous families felt disrespected. They said hospital staff often didn’t understand their cultures or give them basic rights during their maternity care, such as being listened to, included in decision-making, or giving informed consent.

    As a result, some families felt hesitant to seek care in mainstream hospitals. As one Indigenous woman told us during recent Australian research submitted for publication:

    I’m dreading birthing in such a system.

    But there are alternatives.

    What can hospitals do?

    There is a clear need to improve birthing services and cultural safety in mainstream hospitals with a focus on respecting the beliefs, practices and traditions of all families, including Indigenous ones.

    For example, many Indigenous families view childbirth as a communal event with extended family support. But hospital policies that limit the number of support people often disregard these important cultural practices.

    Indigenous families also need to get the type of health care they trust and feel comfortable with. Ideally this might involve staff with sound cultural knowledge and who can support families clinically in a culturally safe way.

    Aboriginal patient liaison officers are sometimes available in hospitals or health services. But there are not often enough, they have to service entire facilities, and they provide cultural support not clinical patient care.

    Indigenous families may also want to access a specific type of care. One example is “continuity of care”, where the same midwife or a small team of midwives, supports the family through the whole pregnancy. Ideally, these midwives should be Indigenous or, if not, be trained in supporting Indigenous families with respect and understanding.

    What is ‘birthing on Country’?

    For Indigenous women living in rural and remote areas, being sent away from home to give birth in a city hospital can be really hard.

    Sometimes women and families are evacuated from their home communities and have to stay for weeks or months in temporary accommodation in the city, both before and after birth, or if their baby is born pre-term and needs extra care. This temporary accommodation can be far from the hospital.

    All this takes place in unknown cities and towns, without family support, and sometimes away from their other children cared for by the community back home.

    This makes it harder for mums who need extra support, and can get in the way of starting breastfeeding and bonding with their baby.

    Again, there is an alternative. For many Indigenous families, giving birth is not just about having a baby. It’s also a spiritual and cultural event that strengthens their identity and connection to Country. A “birthing on Country” model of care, which respects Indigenous traditions and knowledge, reinforces that.

    This is midwife-led care designed for and with Indigenous communities. It doesn’t mean you have to birth in rural and remote spaces, but it is a model of care that focuses on culture, and can also be implemented in the city.

    Ideally, families would see the same midwife or team of midwives and use the “birthing on Country” model.

    What else can we do?

    Maternity services can be led by Indigenous people, which many women prefer. But Indigenous staff make up about 3.1% of the Australian health workforce.

    So it is crucial to engage non-Indigenous staff in building relationships and to support Indigenous families in their right to receive culturally safe care.

    This can start with better training for staff, not only to understand and respond to an Indigenous person’s individual needs, but to know when and how to speak up, call out or report racist or disrespectful behaviour.

    This is everyone’s problem

    A health system you can trust should be safe for everyone. If some people feel unsafe or face discrimination when getting care, this not only affects them, it affects everyone.

    For instance, when Indigenous women avoid or delay going to the hospital because of past bad experiences or discrimination, it can lead to health problems that could have been prevented.

    This not only harms the women, it puts more pressure on the public health system, which affects us all.

    By talking about these issues, we hope all Australians begin to care about the safety of all women during pregnancy and birth.

    The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. ‘I’m dreading birthing in such a system’: what Indigenous women globally think of birth care and what they’d like to see instead – https://theconversation.com/im-dreading-birthing-in-such-a-system-what-indigenous-women-globally-think-of-birth-care-and-what-theyd-like-to-see-instead-256877

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-OSI: Electronic Health Records (EHR) Market Valued at USD 33.45 Billion in 2024, Set to Grow at 4.59% CAGR Through 2032 | AnalystView Market Insights

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    San Francisco, USA, June 25, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — The Electronic Health Records (EHR) market was valued at USD 33,451.20 million in 2024 and is projected to grow at a CAGR of 4.59% from 2025 to 2032. This growth is driven by the global shift toward digital healthcare infrastructure, government mandates for record standardization, and the rising demand for efficient patient data management across hospitals, clinics, and ambulatory care centers. EHR systems are digital versions of a patient’s paper chart, offering real-time, patient-centered records that make information instantly and securely available to authorized users. They are critical for improving coordination between care providers, minimizing medical errors, and enhancing overall clinical outcomes.

    Government initiatives worldwide are playing a key role in promoting EHR adoption. Programs such as the U.S. HITECH Act, the EU’s digital health transformation goals, and India’s Ayushman Bharat Digital Mission are pushing healthcare providers toward digitization. At the same time, the rise of value-based care, telehealth, and mobile health applications has increased the need for interoperable and cloud-based EHR systems. The market is witnessing significant technological advancements, including integration with AI, predictive analytics, and mobile platforms, which enable better clinical decision-making and patient engagement. However, challenges such as high implementation costs, data privacy concerns, and interoperability issues between different systems remain key hurdles, particularly in emerging markets.

    North America dominates the global EHR market, backed by strong digital infrastructure and initiatives like the U.S. HITECH Act, which allocated over $35 billion to promote EHR adoption. Meanwhile, Asia-Pacific is emerging as the fastest-growing region, fueled by rising healthcare investments—India’s health budget rose 13% in 2023—and national digitization drives like China’s “Healthy China 2030.” Supportive policies, growing urbanization, and expanding patient volumes are accelerating EHR integration across the region, attracting global players and investors alike.

    Unlock in-depth insights and forecasts – Get your FREE sample report of the EHR market today: https://analystviewmarketinsights.com/request_sample/AV4020

    Key Players- Detailed Competitive Insights

    • Cerner Corporation
    • GE Healthcare
    • Veradigm LLC
    • Epic Systems Corporation
    • eClinicalWorks
    • Greenway Health, LLC
    • NextGen Healthcare, Inc.
    • Medical Information Technology, Inc.
    • CPSI
    • AdvancedMD, Inc.
    • Allscripts Healthcare Solutions
    • MEDHOST
    • Athenahealth
    • McKesson Corporation
    • Siemens Healthineers
    • Oracle Corporation

    Market Dynamics

    Drivers

    1. Government Mandates and Incentives: Many countries are accelerating Electronic Health Records (EHR) adoption through targeted policies. In the U.S., CMS’s Promoting Interoperability Program ties Medicare reimbursements to EHR usage. Germany’s Hospital Future Act allocated €4.3 billion for digital upgrades, while Australia’s My Health Record achieved over 90% population coverage. India’s Ayushman Bharat Digital Mission aims to create a unified health ID system, promoting seamless data exchange. These initiatives are driving global healthcare digitalization and fostering integrated patient care systems.
    2. Rising Demand for Streamlined Healthcare Delivery: For example, Mayo Clinic uses integrated EHRs to reduce duplication, streamline workflows, and access real-time patient data—cutting documentation time and improving care coordination across departments and specialties. 
    3. Growth in Telehealth and Remote Monitoring: The global shift toward telemedicine post-COVID-19 has increased the need for centralized digital records that can be accessed remotely. This trend is pushing both public and private healthcare providers to invest in cloud-based and interoperable EHR systems.
    4. Data-Driven Decision Making in Healthcare: As data becomes a core asset in personalized medicine and value-based care models, EHRs serve as critical repositories of patient history, lab reports, medications, and imaging data.

    Challenges

    • High Implementation and Maintenance Costs: The cost of deploying EHR software, training staff, and maintaining IT infrastructure can be prohibitive for small healthcare facilities, especially in developing nations.
    • Interoperability and Data Security Concerns: Although EHRs are designed to improve information sharing, achieving true interoperability across different systems remains a challenge. Moreover, the sensitive nature of health data makes security and compliance with data protection regulations (like HIPAA and GDPR) a critical issue.

    Opportunities

    • Integration with AI and analytics in EHRs enables predictive insights—such as Mount Sinai Hospital using AI models within EHRs to identify sepsis risk early, improving response time and patient outcomes. This innovation is driving demand for intelligent, data-driven systems.
    • Mobile and Cloud-Based EHRs: The adoption of mobile health apps and cloud platforms enables real-time access to health data, especially beneficial in rural and underserved regions.

    Regional Insights

    North America

    North America holds 42.50% of the global EHR market, driven by the U.S.’s early adoption and digital health funding. Epic Systems powers major hospital networks like Kaiser Permanente, while Canada’s Infoway initiative accelerates EHR integration, ensuring secure, interoperable data across provinces.

    Europe

    Europe is a mature yet fragmented market for EHRs. Countries like Germany, the UK, and the Netherlands are progressing well in EHR integration, while others lag due to privacy concerns and inconsistent digital policies. The EU’s push toward unified health records under the European Health Data Space initiative could streamline EHR adoption across member states.

    Asia-Pacific

    The Asia-Pacific region is projected to witness the fastest growth during the forecast period. Rapid urbanization, increased healthcare spending, and the digitalization efforts in countries like India, China, and Australia are major contributors. Government-backed programs such as India’s Ayushman Bharat Digital Mission and China’s Smart Healthcare initiative are significantly driving EHR deployment.

    Latin America & Middle East

    Both regions are gradually embracing EHR systems. Brazil, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE have initiated digital health reforms. However, budget constraints and a lack of infrastructure remain key barriers. International partnerships and private investments are expected to unlock growth potential in these markets.

    TABLE OF CONTENT

    1. Electronic Health Records Market Overview
    1.1. Study Scope
    1.2. Market Estimation Years
    2. Executive Summary
    2.1. Market Snippet
    2.1.1. Electronic Health Records Market Snippet By Product
    2.1.2. Electronic Health Records Market Snippet By Type
    2.1.3. Electronic Health Records Market Snippet By Business Model
    2.1.4. Electronic Health Records Market Snippet By Application
    2.1.5. Electronic Health Records Market Snippet By End Use
    2.1.6. Electronic Health Records Market Snippet by Country
    2.1.7. Electronic Health Records Market Snippet by Region
    2.2. Competitive Insights
    3. Electronic Health Records Key Market Trends
    3.1. Electronic Health Records Market Drivers
    3.1.1. Impact Analysis of Market Drivers
    3.2. Electronic Health Records Market Restraints
    3.2.1. Impact Analysis of Market Restraints
    3.3. Electronic Health Records Market Opportunities
    3.4. Electronic Health Records Market Future Trends
    4. Electronic Health Records Industry Study
    4.1. PEST Analysis
    4.2. Porter’s Five Forces Analysis
    4.3. Growth Prospect Mapping
    4.4. Regulatory Framework Analysis
    5. Electronic Health Records Market: Impact of Escalating Geopolitical Tensions
    5.1. Impact of COVID-19 Pandemic
    5.2. Impact of Russia-Ukraine War
    5.3. Impact of Middle East Conflicts
    6. Electronic Health Records Market Landscape
    6.1. Electronic Health Records Market Share Analysis, 2024
    6.2. Breakdown Data, by Key Manufacturer
    6.2.1. Established Players’ Analysis
    6.2.2. Emerging Players’ Analysis
    7. Electronic Health Records Market – By Product
    7.1. Overview
    7.1.1. Segment Share Analysis, By Product, 2024 & 2032 (%)
    7.1.2. On-premises
    7.1.3. Web & Cloud-Based EHR
    8. Electronic Health Records Market – By Type
    8.1. Overview
    8.1.1. Segment Share Analysis, By Type, 2024 & 2032 (%)
    8.1.2. Acute
    8.1.3. Outpatient
    8.1.4. Post Acute
    9. Electronic Health Records Market – By Business Model
    9.1. Overview
    9.1.1. Segment Share Analysis, By Business Model, 2024 & 2032 (%)
    9.1.2. Licensed Software
    9.1.3. Technology Resale
    9.1.4. Subscriptions
    9.1.5. Professional Services
    9.1.6. Others
    10. Electronic Health Records Market – By Application
    10.1. Overview
    10.1.1. Segment Share Analysis, By Application, 2024 & 2032 (%)
    10.1.2. Cardiology
    10.1.3. Neurology
    10.1.4. Radiology ………

    Reasons to Invest in the EHR Market

    1. Essential Role in Modern Healthcare Systems
      EHRs are no longer optional but a fundamental part of modern healthcare. As hospitals strive to improve patient care, safety, and efficiency, EHRs serve as a backbone for digital health ecosystems.
    2. Regulatory Push and Compliance Standards
      Investment in compliant EHR systems helps healthcare providers align with stringent data protection laws while avoiding penalties and securing patient trust.
    3. Increasing Healthcare Expenditure
      Globally, healthcare budgets are expanding. A significant portion is being directed toward digital infrastructure, making EHR vendors prime beneficiaries of government and institutional funding.
    4. Rising Adoption of Cloud and AI Technologies
      EHR vendors integrating cloud capabilities and AI features offer enhanced scalability, analytics, and patient engagement. These smart EHRs are more future-proof and attractive to investors.
    5. Long-Term Cost Benefits for Healthcare Providers
      Despite initial costs, EHR systems lead to long-term savings by reducing administrative workload, avoiding duplication of tests, and minimizing errors.

    Future Outlook

    The Electronic Health Records (EHR) market is poised for a tech-driven evolution, with AI integration, cloud-based platforms, and interoperability leading the way. By 2032, real-time data exchange, as seen in the U.K.’s NHS Federated Data Platform and India’s Ayushman Bharat Digital Mission, will become standard.

    Growing cybersecurity investments and patient-centric innovations are redefining EHR functionality. With global healthcare systems embracing value-based care, the market is set for intelligent, adaptive, and patient-connected growth worldwide.

    Discover the Full Study : https://analystviewmarketinsights.com/reports/report-highlight-electronic-health-records-market

    Explore More Research Titles in the Healthcare Category by AnalystView Market Insights:

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Completes the Fourth Reviews of the EFF/ECF Arrangements and the Third Review of the RSF Arrangement for Côte d’Ivoire

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    June 25, 2025

    • The IMF Executive Board today completed the Fourth Reviews of Côte d’Ivoire’s Extended Fund Facility (EFF) and Extended Credit Facility (ECF) Arrangements and the Third Review of the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) Arrangement. The decision allows for an immediate disbursement of about US$758 million.
    • Program implementation has been strong, with all end-December 2024 performance criteria and structural benchmarks met satisfactorily under the EFF/ECF program, and all climate-financing reform measures completed under the RSF arrangement.
    • The authorities’ ongoing commitment to reforms is expected to support Côte d’Ivoire’s sustainable transformation toward upper middle-income status over the medium term, while strengthening economic resilience to climate-induced shocks and maintaining balance of payments stability.

    Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed the Fourth Reviews of the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) and Extended Credit Facility (ECF) Arrangements and the Third Review of the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) Arrangement for Côte d’Ivoire.

    The EFF/ECF-supported program approved in May 2023 in the amount of SDR2,601.6 million (equivalent to 400 percent of quota or about US$3.6 billion), has substantially reduced imbalances and safeguarded a moderate risk of debt distress rating, while important reforms under RSF arrangement for a total amount of SDR975.6 million (equivalent to 150 percent of quota or about US$1.3 billion) are contributing to prospective balance of payments stability and economic resilience to climate-induced shocks. The authorities’ ongoing commitment to reforms under both programs should support Côte d’Ivoire’s sustainable transformation toward upper middle-income status over the medium-term. Program implementation has been generally strong thus far, with all end-December performance criteria met and implementation of structural benchmarks being satisfactory. Moreover, all reform measures under the RSF arrangement for this review with a focus on climate-financing architecture were implemented. The completion of the reviews allows for an immediate disbursement of about US$758 million under the multi-year Fund arrangements.

    Côte d’Ivoire’s resilient economy has consolidated its role as an anchor of stability in the region against a still difficult global backdrop. Amid a recovery in agricultural production, favorable terms of trade and rising household incomes growth is expected to pick up in the near term. The medium-term outlook also remains favorable as economic fundamentals strengthen further and the hydrocarbon and mining sectors add to broad-based growth. Risks are broadly balanced. For 2025, growth is projected to be 6.3 percent, while average inflation is expected to return to within the 1 to 3 percent WAEMU target range. The 2025 current account deficit is projected to narrow to 3.6 percent of GDP, and the fiscal deficit is expected to meet the WAEMU deficit ceiling of 3 percent of GDP.

    The authorities remain firmly committed to boosting tax revenue in the medium term, and to implementing the medium-term revenue strategy (MTRS) approved in May 2024. Sustained effort is expected by the authorities to increase tax revenue to GDP by 0.5 percent of GDP, each year through 2026 and reach approximately 20 percent of GDP over the medium-term through self-sustaining tax policy and tax administration reforms.

    Important structural reforms continue to focus on improving the business climate and increasing the involvement of the private sector in the country’s development. To this end, enhancements in the transparency and accountability of public enterprises, further strengthening governance and financial integrity (particularly the AML/CFT framework), along with investment in human capital, broader financial inclusion, and climate resilience, to support higher productivity growth will be instrumental.

    Following the Executive Board discussion, Mr. Okamura, Acting Chair and Deputy Managing Director, made the following statement:

    “Côte d’Ivoire’s performance under the Fund-supported programs has been strong, reflecting the authorities’ commitment to entrenching macroeconomic stability. Sustained reform efforts will help safeguard fiscal and debt sustainability and consolidate the country’s role as an anchor of regional stability.

    “Continued fiscal consolidation envisaged in the 2025 budget will be underpinned by high-quality and permanent tax policy measures, as well as tax and customs administration reforms. These measures will support bringing the fiscal deficit to 3 percent of GDP by 2025, in line with the WAEMU ceiling, and help reduce the country’s debt sustainability risks.

    “Sustaining domestic revenue mobilization over the medium-term remains a priority to generate the fiscal space needed to finance social and development spending and support a deeper economic transformation toward upper middle-income status. To this end, implementation of the Medium-term Revenue Mobilization Strategy (MTRS) will continue to require significant engagement with stakeholders to ensure buy-in for the needed overhaul of the tax system and the streamlining of VAT tax exemptions and other tax expenditures.

    “Preserving fiscal space will be aided by the authorities’ commitments to enhance the coverage, transparency, and management of public finances. The authorities’ continued active debt management remains critical in safeguarding debt sustainability. Sustaining structural reform momentum and continuous improvements in safeguarding financial integrity and governance are important for unlocking the private sector’s potential.

    “Addressing identified AML/CFT framework deficiencies, and showcasing an implementation track-record on AML/CFT is critical. Further investments in human capital development, especially amongst youth and women, along with the reduction of informality, will make growth more inclusive. Continuing efforts to strengthen resilience to climate shocks will also be important for a sustainable transformation of Côte d’Ivoire’s economy.”

    Table 1. Côte d’Ivoire: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 2022–26

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Kwabena Akuamoah-Boateng

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/25/pr25220-cote-d-ivoire-fourth-reviews-of-the-eff-ecf-and-third-review-of-the-rsf

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Jordan—IMF Executive Board Completes Third Review of the Extended Fund Facility Arrangement and Approves US$ 700 Million Arrangement under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    June 25, 2025

    • The IMF Executive Board completed the third review under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) Arrangement with Jordan, providing the authorities with immediate access to the equivalent of SDR 97.784 million (about US$134 million), to support the authorities’ economic program.
    • Jordan’s economic program supported by the EFF arrangement remains firmly on track, demonstrating the authorities’ strong commitment to sound macro-economic policies and structural reforms to strengthen Jordan’s resilience and accelerate growth to enhance job creation and provide opportunities for all Jordanians.
    • Thanks to the continued pursuit of sound economic policies, and despite the considerable external headwinds, including the conflicts in the region, Jordan has maintained macro-stability and broad-based economic growth.
    • The Executive Board also approved a new 30-month arrangement under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) with Jordan, with access equivalent to SDR 514.65 million (about US$700 million), to support Jordan’s efforts to address longer-term vulnerabilities in the water and electricity sectors and to enhance their ability to address public health emergencies, including future pandemics.

    Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) today completed the third review of the arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF). Jordan’s four-year EFF arrangement, with access amounting to SDR 926.37 million (about US$1.3 billion, equivalent to 270 percent of Jordan’s quota in the IMF), was approved by the IMF Executive Board on January 10, 2024 (see Press Release No. 24/004). This decision allows for an immediate purchase of an amount equivalent to SDR 97.784 million (around US$134 million), bringing the total purchases under the EFF arrangement to the equivalent of SDR 437.454 million (about $595 million). In addition, the IMF Executive Board approved an arrangement under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) with Jordan, with access equivalent to SDR 514.65 million (about US$ 700 million, equivalent to 150 percent of Jordan’s quota).

    Jordan’s continued economic resilience in a challenging external environment, with continuing conflicts in the region and high uncertainty, is a testament to the authorities’ resolve to pursue sound macroeconomic policies. The authorities’ ownership of the EFF arrangement remains strong, with program targets consistently met. Jordan registered stronger growth in 2024 and so far in 2025 than previously anticipated, demonstrating continued resilience. Growth reached 2.5 percent in 2024. Economic activity is expected to gradually strengthen in the coming years, supported by continued sound macroeconomic policies and accelerated reform implementation.

    Inflation remains stable and low, reflecting the Central Bank of Jordan’s (CBJ) firm commitment to monetary and financial stability and the exchange rate peg. Jordan’s external position remains stable, with the current account deficit projected to remain close to 6 percent of GDP. The CBJ’s gross international reserves increased to over US$20 billion by end-2024, with reserve adequacy exceeding 100 percent of the Fund’s ARA metric. The financial sector remains healthy and well-capitalized. While the spillover effects from regional conflicts have also affected government finances, the authorities continue to make progress with a gradual fiscal consolidation to place public debt on a downward path, while creating room for social assistance and needed public investment. Jordan’s structural reform agenda focuses on fostering inclusive private sector-led growth by enhancing the business environment and improving labor market policies, including to expand opportunities for youth and women.

    The RSF arrangement will support the authorities’ efforts to strengthen Jordan’s longer-term balance of payments stability by promoting economic resilience and sustainability. The RSF arrangement aims to address longer-term vulnerabilities in the water and electricity sectors and enhance the authorities’ ability to address public health emergencies, including future pandemics. Reform measures focus on: (i) enhancing the energy sector’s financial sustainability and energy efficiency; (ii) improving the water sector’s financial sustainability and water management; (iii) strengthening fiscal and financial sector resilience; and (iv) enhancing pandemic preparedness. The arrangement will augment policy space and financial buffers to mitigate risks arising from these challenges.

    Following the Executive Board’s discussion on Jordan, Mr. Kenji Okamura, Deputy Managing Director and Acting Chair, issued the following statement:

    “Jordan continues to maintain macroeconomic stability despite external headwinds from regional conflicts and heightened global economic uncertainty, owing to the authorities’ steadfast pursuit of sound policies and continued strong international support. Growth in 2024 and so far in 2025 ended up stronger than anticipated, inflation is low, and reserve buffers are strong. Against elevated risks in the region, it is important that the authorities stay the course with sound fiscal and monetary policies to safeguard macroeconomic stability.

    “The authorities continue to make progress with a gradual fiscal consolidation and strengthening fiscal sustainability, thanks to fiscal reforms that have improved revenue administration and expenditure efficiency. Looking ahead, efforts should continue to further enhance revenue mobilization and spending efficiency and to take contingency measures as needed to keep public debt on a steady downward path, while protecting priority social and capital spending. Efforts should also continue to improve the efficiency and viability of the public utilities to preserve the sustainability of public finances, while improving service delivery.

    “Monetary policy remains appropriately focused on safeguarding monetary and financial stability and supporting the exchange rate peg that has served Jordan well and helped keeping inflation low. Jordan’s banking sector remains healthy, and the central bank continues to strengthen its systemic risk analysis, financial sector oversight, and crisis management.  

    “Structural reforms should be accelerated to improve the business environment, promote competition, and attract private investment that is crucial to create a dynamic and resilient private sector, foster job-rich growth, and achieve the objectives of Jordan’s Economic Modernization Vision. Strong and timely donor support remains essential to help Jordan navigate the challenging external environment, host the large number of refugees, and meet Jordan’s development objectives.

    “The reforms under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility aim to support the authorities’ efforts to address long-term vulnerabilities in the water and energy sectors and to be better prepared for public health emergencies, including pandemics. These reforms will strengthen Jordan’s balance of payments stability by promoting economic resilience and sustainability and by augmenting policy space and financial buffers to mitigate risks arising from these challenges.”

    Jordan: Selected Economic Indicators, 2023–26

    2023

    2024

    2025

    2026
     

    Proj.

    Proj.

    Output and Prices

    Real GDP growth

    2.9

    2.5

    2.7

    2.9

    GDP deflator

    1.8

    1.9

    2.3

    2.6

    Nominal GDP (JD billions)

    36.3

    37.9

    39.8

    42.0

    Inflation 1/

    2.1

    1.9

    2.2

    2.6

    Unemployment

    22.0

    21.4

    …

    …

    Government Finances (in percent of GDP)

    Central government fiscal operations

    Revenue and grants 2/

    25.2

    24.9

    25.4

    26.0

       Of which: grants

    2.0

    1.9

    1.8

    2.0

    Expenditures 2/

    30.6

    31.4

    31.2

    30.5

    Overall central government balance

    -5.4

    -6.4

    -5.8

    -4.5

    Central government primary balance (exc. grants, NEPCO and WAJ)

    -2.7

    -2.8

    -2.0

    -1.0

    Electricity company (NEPCO) losses

    Combined public sector balance 3/

    -4.5

    -4.5

    -3.6

    -2.4

    Government gross debt 4/

    113.5

    114.7

    115.7

    114.9

    Government gross debt, net of SSC holdings of government debt 4/

    89.0

    90.2

    89.7

    87.5

    Money and Credit

         Broad money (percent change)

    2.3

    6.1

    5.1

    5.6

         Credit to the private sector (percent change)

    1.7

    2.9

    4.6

    6.0

    Balance of payments

    Current account (in percent of GDP)

    -3.6

    -5.9

    -5.5

    -5.9

    FDI (in percent of GDP)

    3.6

    3.0

    3.3

    3.4

    Gross reserves (in months of imports)

    6.9

    7.7

    7.1

    7.1

    In percent of Reserve Adequacy Metric

    101

    110

    105

    105

    Sources: Jordanian authorities; and Fund staff estimates and projections.

    1/ Consumer Price Index (annual average).

    2/ Includes the programmed amount of fiscal measures that are needed to meet fiscal targets.

    3/ Sum of the primary central government balance (exc. grants and net transfers to NEPCO-electricity company and WAJ-water company) and the net loss of NEPCO, WAJ and water sector distribution companies.

    4/ Government’s direct and guaranteed debt (including NEPCO and WAJ debt). SSC stands for Social Security Corporation.
    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Angham Al Shami

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/25/pr25221-jordan-imf-completes-3rd-rev-eff-arrangement-approves-us-700-mill-arrangement-under-rsf

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Hamas says it is committed to working with mediators on a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    GAZA, June 25 (Xinhua) — Palestinian movement Hamas on Wednesday said it remains actively involved in ongoing mediation efforts to reach a ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip.

    In its press release, Hamas said it was committed to engaging with mediators and responding constructively to any serious proposals that could lead to a comprehensive agreement and stop what the movement called “aggression and war of extermination” against the Palestinian people.

    Hamas stressed the need for a lasting ceasefire, a complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Gaza Strip, unimpeded access for humanitarian aid, the beginning of the reconstruction of the Palestinian enclave and a prisoner exchange deal.

    The movement blamed the delay in reaching an agreement on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, accusing the latter of “obstruction and delay” for the sake of “personal political goals” and “reinforcing the illusion of total victory” through military means.

    The announcement came hours after US President Donald Trump announced “significant progress” on a ceasefire agreement in Gaza, Israeli state broadcaster Kan reported without giving details. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: In January-May 2025, Armenia’s foreign trade turnover decreased significantly

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Yerevan, June 25 (Xinhua) — Armenia’s foreign trade turnover decreased by 49 percent in the first five months of this year compared to the same period last year and amounted to about $7.9 billion, the National Statistical Committee of Armenia reported on Wednesday.

    Exports during the reporting period decreased by 57.4 percent year-on-year to about $3.02 billion; imports decreased by 42 percent year-on-year to about $4.8 billion.

    In January-May 2025, the economic activity index in Armenia exceeded the data of the previous year by 5.7%. The growth of construction volume was recorded by 17.1%, services (excluding trade) by 10.1% and domestic trade turnover by 4.2%, while the volume of industrial production decreased by 14.1%. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: In January-May 2025, Armenia’s foreign trade turnover decreased significantly

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Yerevan, June 25 (Xinhua) — Armenia’s foreign trade turnover decreased by 49 percent in the first five months of this year compared to the same period last year and amounted to about $7.9 billion, the National Statistical Committee of Armenia reported on Wednesday.

    Exports during the reporting period decreased by 57.4 percent year-on-year to about $3.02 billion; imports decreased by 42 percent year-on-year to about $4.8 billion.

    In January-May 2025, the economic activity index in Armenia exceeded the data of the previous year by 5.7%. The growth of construction volume was recorded by 17.1%, services (excluding trade) by 10.1% and domestic trade turnover by 4.2%, while the volume of industrial production decreased by 14.1%. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Georgia’s population exceeds 3.9 million people – preliminary census data

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Tbilisi, June 25 (Xinhua) — The country’s population has reached 3,914,000 people, according to preliminary results of the general population census released by the National Statistics Office of Georgia on Wednesday.

    Compared to the results of the 2014 census, when the population was 3,713,804 people, the population growth over the decade exceeded 200 thousand people.

    Currently, the female share of the Georgian population is 2,078,000 people /53%/, the male share is 1,836,000 people /47%/.

    The census was conducted from November 14 to December 31, 2024. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Rep. Dan Goldman Delivers Poignant Address on Corruption, Erosion of Accountability, and a Roadmap for Restoring Public Trust

    Source: US Congressman Dan Goldman (NY-10)

    Rep. Dan Goldman: “Democracy depends on a basic understanding: that we, the people, entrust elected officials with power in exchange for their service for the public good. That trust is not a given—it must be earned. And when those in power use their positions to enrich themselves, to favor allies, or to punish enemies, that contract begins to dissolve.” 

    Goldman: “Restoring faith in our system is going to take more than these specific and tangible legislative objectives. We can’t predict every possible ethics violation or potential corrupt deal. The voters – the people – must have higher expectations of their elected officials, and must hold them accountable.” 

    Watch the Full Address Here: 

    New York, NY – Congressman Dan Goldman (NY-10) delivered the featured speech at New York Law School’s 199th CityLaw Breakfast titled, “Democracy on the Brink: Corruption and the Public Trust.”  

    In a moment of historic political upheaval, Goldman issued a candid assessment of how public corruption and the erosion of guardrails and forms of accountability – on both sides of the political aisle and at every level of government – are threatening the very foundation of American democracy and the willingness of the public to buy into the American social contract.  

    Drawing on recent cases, public opinion data, and a call to action for institutional reform, Congressman Goldman offered both a warning and a roadmap for restoring public confidence in government and the imperative of doing so to preserve liberal democracy. 

    Remarks as prepared are available below: 

    Rep. Dan Goldman

    “We gather here today at a time when the very foundations of our democracy are enduring a stress test. 

    To be sure, we are facing threats abroad from Russia, Iran and China, and partisan gridlock in Washington makes it incredibly difficult to govern as the framers imagined.  

    But I’m not referring to those challenges, which are ones that our great nation has grappled with – and conquered – many times over our 250 year history.  

    I’m instead talking about something far more insidious — something that corrodes from within and is a more significant existential threat to the future of the republic. That threat is naked, unbridled, and brazen corruption at the highest levels of our government.   

    In so many ways, our founding fathers anticipated many potential obstacles and pitfalls in drafting the constitution – including the fundamental concept that the separation of powers among three branches of government would naturally provide the necessary checks and balances to preserve and protect the will of the people.  

    Article One confers to Congress the power of the purse and the power to declare war.  

    Article Two requires the Executive Branch to faithfully execute the laws passed by Congress and to oversee foreign relations. 

    And Article III charges the judiciary with saying what the law is, properly insulated from political pressure by lifetime tenure for judicial appointees. 

    This daring and innovative structure presupposed two assumptions that, if lacking, would crater the entire system:  

    • First, that members of one branch of government would prioritize their own power and authority over pure tribalism;  

    • and second, that the President of the United States would unconditionally believe in the validity and authority of the Constitution in the first place. 

    Sadly, we are witnessing the combination of these two conditions that has our system of government teetering on the brink. No President – not even Nixon – so disregarded the law and the constitution as Donald Trump does. And I can think of no majority in the Congress that has so completely turned over all of its own power and authority to a different branch of government as this Republican Congress has to President Trump.  

    But this inflection point did not come out of nowhere. We can have as many laws and institutions as we want, but if the American people do not have trust that those laws are fairly and equally applied or that those institutions are placing the public good ahead of personal interests, then they aren’t worth the paper they are written on or the dilapidated buildings they reside in. 

    Sadly, trust in elected representatives is at an all-time low. The National Election Study has been tracking public trust in government since 1958, when the percentage of Americans who said they trust the government to do what is right “just about always” or “most of the time” was 73 percent. In 1964 it was 77 percent. 

    Today, that number stands at a horrifying 22 percent. Only 2 percent of respondents say they trust the government to do what is right “just about always.” Two percent. Since 2007, the share of Americans saying they trust the government hasn’t broken 30 percent. 

    And while Donald Trump has taken official corruption to new lows, he is only able to do that because the erosion of the public trust has been well underway for years – by both parties, especially here in New York. 

    As the lead counsel in the first impeachment of Donald Trump for corruptly abusing his official power to try to coerce a foreign government to help his personal campaign, very little that Donald Trump does surprises me.  If there is anything that does, it is not that he is engaged in widespread abuse of his power for personal gain, but rather how openly and brazenly he is doing it.    

    Take just a couple of examples. 

    A few weeks ago, President Trump accepted a reported $400 million luxury jet from the royal family of Qatar without the consent of Congress — a clear violation of the Foreign Emoluments Clause, which requires Congress to consent to any foreign gift, title or emolument. Remember, President Ulysses S. Grant requested consent from Congress to receive the Statue of Liberty from France, and as far as I know it was never going to be used by Grant’s presidential library after he left office. 

    President Trump openly bragged about the plane just a couple of days after he announced a $2 billion financial deal with the UAE in connection to a crypto stablecoin recently issued by his own crypto company, which yielded him hundreds of millions of dollars.  He literally announced this deal on his first official international trip.  

    And he’s grifting at home too. He sold 25 VIP White House tours to the top 25 shareholders of his crypto company – without any known national security vetting – that saw the value of his shares go up by 50%.  

    Yesterday, the Senate voted on stablecoin legislation that very well may make it to the resolute desk for his signature – yes, he might be asked to sign legislation that has a direct impact on his own financial interests.  

    Remember when the public was outraged during his first term when he only ceased day-to-day involvement in the Trump Organization, rather than fully divesting his interests? 

    Now he is soliciting foreign investments in his crypto company and selling White House tours to the largest investor, and there isn’t a hint of an investigation from the Department of Justice nor from the Republican majority in Congress. 

    *************************** 

    Perhaps some of the reasons for such little outrage can be summed up in a statement I hear all the time: “oh, every politician is corrupt.” Too many people simply have come to accept an expectation that elected officials are corrupt and – someway, somehow – every politician is making money from his or her office. 

    As frustrated as I get hearing that over and over, it’s hard to argue with.  
     

    Just look here at our great city and state.  Our current mayor was charged last year for alleged honest services fraud and campaign finance violations tied to foreign money and influence. And while I do think the legal basis for the corruption charge was suspect, I couldn’t help but notice that the most common conversation I had with people about the Indictment began with the question, “is what he did really worthy of a federal indictment?”  

    In other words, expectations are so low for politicians that some degree of corruption is expected and accepted, so much so that federal charges should be saved for only the most egregious conduct.  

    Those who believe that are sadly in very good company: the Supreme Court also seems to believe that is what the law requires.  

    The running joke nowadays is that in order to be convicted of federal corruption charges, the FBI needs to find gold bars in your closet. 

    That of course is what happened to former Democratic Senator Bob Menendez of New Jersey, who was convicted of honest services fraud here in the Southern District of New York after accepting gold bars in exchange for a variety of official actions taken on behalf of the Egyptian government, which gave him the gold bars. 

    We can be frustrated that the Supreme Court has repeatedly narrowed the reach of federal corruption law but it’s not actually a close call in their mind: just about every Supreme Court ruling from the McDonell opinion to the present has been unanimous, 9-0. That includes the Buffalo Billions case and Joe Percoco here in New York, and it caused both State Senate Majority Leader Dean Skelos and Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver to be retried before they were each ultimately convicted.   

    The fact of the matter is that both Democrats and Republicans have repeatedly succumbed to personal greed over the public good.  And while Donald Trump is attacking all forms of political accountability – including weaponizing the Department of Justice to reward his allies and punish his enemies – the stage had long ago been set for a wannabe dictator like Trump to come along and take a battering ram to a rule of law that had been fraying at the edges for some time.   

    The damage to our system goes far beyond any individual tragedy. It goes to the very foundation of our democracy.  

    Democracy depends on a basic understanding: that we, the people, entrust elected officials with power in exchange for their service for the public good. That trust is not a given—it must be earned. And when those in power use their positions to enrich themselves, to favor allies, or to punish enemies, that contract begins to dissolve.  

    That broken trust – that decaying social contract – is, in my view, what paved the way for the resurrection of the current resident of the White House. He has turned suspicion into toxic cynicism. He has turned facts into a partisan debate. He has used distrust of the system to frame himself as that system’s victim. 

    The question asked is no longer whether politicians are true to their oaths of office. It is instead a question of moral relativism – is she as bad as he is? And once the average voter believes that all politicians are corrupt, that no facts can be trusted, that the pursuit of power justifies any means necessary, the foundations of our democracy crumble and we invite a dangerous new normal: where truth is optional, ethics are flexible, and accountability is partisan. 

    There are many things to be concerned about these days.  We are dealing with many threats to the rule of law and our basic democratic values and foundations.

    But I firmly believe that the path towards restoring faith in our government – in this great experiment that we call democracy – must start by addressing public corruption.  And that is not only through revising our criminal statutes but also by altering the structure of our electoral system. 

    ********************** 

    So if you aren’t ready to crawl into a hole after that ever-so-uplifting recitation of the current state of distrust in our system, let me try to propose some ideas and solutions that can restore confidence in our elected officials – and, by extension, our government.  

    First, voters must see a renewed commitment to ethical government from candidates for office. Donald Trump has normalized the once-heretic idea that a President of the United States does not believe in the constitution. That must end, and it must end now. Not just by following the law, but by holding politicians to a higher standard – and by those within the same party.  

    It frustrates me to no end when I hear people say that some alleged misconduct is okay because the official was not criminally charged or convicted.  That is not the standard we should hold each other to.  

    A criminal conviction is an incredibly high standard – 12 unanimous jurors must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the admissible evidence was sufficient to meet every legal element of the charge.  That must not be – it can not be – the standard that elected representatives are held to.  

    Second, we must set an example by setting guardrails for ourselves. 

    Take stock trading by members of Congress.  I’ve been in Congress about two and a half years, and I’m confident that I haven’t received a single piece of confidential information through my official duties that would have helped me play the market.  But it doesn’t matter – because simply the appearance of receiving confidential information is more than enough to raise questions about whether that information was used in connection with trading stocks by members for their personal gain. 

    And that’s simply why members of Congress should not be permitted to buy and sell individual stocks.  

    When I came into Congress, I sold all of my individual stocks and put my money in a blind trust. But that should be the norm, not the exception. We must pass a law prohibiting individual stock trading by members of Congress.  We can set an example for ourselves. 

    There are other actions that we can take to restore trust in our democracy and our elected officials. 

    We must eliminate big money in politics – at a minimum there must be full transparency in campaign finance. No more dark money. Sunlight is the best disinfectant.  

    We must set clear rules and guidelines on gifts and conflicts of interests – and there must be consequences for violating them.  

    Similarly, we can no longer trust that our elected officials – especially our president – will view the plain language of the Constitution as binding. So we must pass legislation that not only creates an enforcement vehicle for the Emoluments Clause, the Hatch Act, and other ethics laws and rules, but imposes consequences as well.    

    I believe we must draft legislation to codify the independence of the Department of Justice from personal influence by the President.  The evisceration of the Public Integrity Section, the firing of so many apolitical and upstanding career prosecutors, Executive Orders by the President directing the FBI to investigate political enemies – all must be addressed and prohibited.  That is the stuff of banana republics, not a constitutional republic.  

    And finally, we need to rewrite federal public corruption law, which I am in the process of working on right now. The Supreme Court has repeatedly urged Congress to revise the corruption statute, and I plan to take them up on their suggestion. Every branch of government – elected officials, prosecutors, and judges – must have a clear understanding of what is – and is not – official corruption. 

    But restoring faith in our system is going to take more than these specific and tangible legislative objectives. We can’t predict every possible ethics violation or potential corrupt deal. The voters – the people – must have higher expectations of their elected officials, and must hold them accountable. 

    I ran for Congress to preserve and protect our democracy and ensure that the rule of law remains our nation’s guiding light. And I believe that if we are honest with the public, accountable in our actions, uncompromising in what we expect of ourselves, and courageous in our convictions, we can restore the trust that has been lost. 

    But that work starts with integrity. It starts with doing the right thing, not the easy thing. It starts with a willingness to look the American public in the eye, to admit the fault of those we share this awesome responsibility with, and to pledge that we can, we must, we will do better. 

    History is watching.” 

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Global: How Israel’s domestic crises and Netanyahu’s aim to project power are reshaping the Middle East

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Spyros A. Sofos, Assistant Professor in Global Humanities, Simon Fraser University

    Israel’s recent strikes on Iranian territory have been widely framed as an act of deterrence or yet another episode in a protracted regional rivalry.

    Such interpretations overlook the deeper motivations behind Israel’s actions.

    As a global humanities scholar who specializes in Middle Eastern politics, I believe the world is watching the convergence of a domestic political crisis and a profound strategic shift as Israel evolves into a more aggressive entity in a fragmented international order.

    Political survival

    At the centre of Israel’s current strategic turn lies Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu — a beleaguered leader fighting for political survival, but also considered a calculating, opportunistic operator with a particular vision of the Middle East.

    At home, Netanyahu, confronting an unprecedented convergence of challenges — multiple corruption indictments, mass protests against what many consider a self-serving judicial overhaul and a fragile governing coalition — has leaned into military escalation as both a defensive reflex and a political instrument. He’s seemingly deploying it to both mute dissent at home and assert control abroad.

    Israelis opposed to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s judicial overhaul plan set up bonfires and block a highway during a protest in March 2023.
    (AP Photo/Ohad Zwigenberg)

    But Netanyahu’s ambitions appear to extend beyond his immediate political survival. He seems to be striving for a legacy-defining “1967 moment” — a transformative reordering of the regional landscape in the Middle East that sidelines the Palestinian issue and entrenches Israeli supremacy.

    This dual imperative — domestic survival and amassing power in the region — likely shapes Netanyahu’s recent actions, including the strike on Iran, the expanded occupation of Syrian territory, the October 2024 attack on Lebanon and the ongoing assaults on Gaza and the West Bank.

    By describing each military campaign as a reluctant necessity — forced upon him by Iran, Hamas or even his coalition hardliners — Netanyahu maintains public support as he consolidates power. His government has used war-time conditions to suppress public protest, push forward its radical constitutional agenda and advance his geopolitical vision.

    The result is a volatile but calculated strategy that is likely to mark Netanyahu’s tenure, though with significant repercussions for regional stability.

    Israel’s grand strategy

    While Netanyahu’s actions could serve his immediate political ends, they also reflect a longer-term shift in Israeli grand strategy. Following the Oct. 7, 2023 Hamas attacks, Israel intensified a long-standing pattern of pre-emptive strikes and campaigns to neutralize its adversaries. This strategy has been pursued at an unprecedented scale in Gaza, but often without a clearly articulated political endgame.

    This pattern echoes a regional policy doctrine Netanyahu laid out in his 1993 book A Place Among the Nations when he asserted “the only peace that will endure in the region is the peace of deterrence.”

    This policy advocates the projection of overwhelming Israeli power, the emasculation of regional challengers and efforts to radically reorder the Middle East.

    Netanyahu’s doctrine, a more aggressive revision of Israel’s earlier pre-emptive security traditions, stands in sharp contrast to the approach pursued by the Oslo Accords-era leadership of the 1990s and 2000s — figures such as Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, and later Ehud Barak.

    They emphasized diplomacy over coercive leverage and perpetual confrontation. They sought genuine political settlements and a negotiated co-existence with Palestinians and neighbouring Arab states. This strategy — rooted in compromise and limited reconciliation — has now been decisively eclipsed by Netanyahu’s highly militarized approach and his vision for achieving strategic power in the Middle East.

    This approach underpins all of Israel’s modern-day actions — from its reoccupation of parts of Lebanon to its growing military footprint in Syrian territory, the obliteration of Gaza, its aggression against Iran and the increasing calls for Iranian regime change from the current Israeli cabinet.

    From buffer to power projection

    Nowhere is this clearer than in Israel’s expanding operations across its northern front. In Syria, Israel seized upon the post-Bashar al-Assad vacuum to entrench military control over at least 12 square kilometres of new terrain, constructing infrastructure and outposts far beyond prior ceasefire lines.

    This had less to do with protecting minority populations or deterring Iranian proxies — as officials claimed — and more with establishing long-term buffer zones and projecting dominance into a fragile post-war Syria.

    A similar pattern is evident in Lebanon. Following months of border escalation, Israel has sought not only to undermine Hezbollah’s capacity but to create no-go zones controlled by the Israeli military along the frontier. These operations reflect older strategic instincts but are now integrated in the ongoing process of Israel’s northern border redesign.

    Finally, Israel’s bombing campaign against Iran reflects a doctrine to move beyond containment toward strategic dismantlement of the Iranian regime’s regional power and to erode its ability to control its own territory.

    The escalation is the outcome of Israel’s pursuit of a favourable regional moment — the weakening of the so-called “Axis of Resistance” following the Abraham Accords of 2020 aimed at establishing diplomatic relations between Israel and several Arab nations — and months of war in Lebanon and Syria.

    From ‘western ally’ to regional challenger

    A constellation of domestic and international changes has enabled Israel’s transformation.

    These include a shift in Israeli political culture encouraged by Netanyahu’s rejection of efforts to pursue some sort of regional co-existence and co-operation; the far right’s growing influence in government; and the ongoing disruption of the international order amid Donald Trump’s second presidency in the United States that gave Israel more room to manoeuvre.

    This constellation has eroded the few constraints the liberal international order had in the past imposed on Israel’s pursuit of its regional policies amid an era of expansionism, permanent conflict and the aggressive management — not resolution — of the Palestinian issue.

    Israel is now heading down the same path as Russia and Turkey, capitalizing on vast disparities in military and intelligence capabilities among regional powers to its advantage, disregarding international norms, undermining diplomacy and preferring transactional alliances instead of long-term peace processes.

    The U.S. has facilitated this transformation. Former president Joe Biden and now Trump have made very little effort to constrain Netanyahu.

    Trump’s “Gaza Riviera” plan, along with his isolationist rhetoric, have effectively left regional decision-making to Israel while he continues to underwrite Israeli military dominance and its use of overwhelming force to reshape its regional environment.



    Read more:
    Why Israel and the U.S. are sure to encounter the limits of air power in Iran

    Netanyahu’s reluctance to accept the current ceasefire as a definitive end to hostilities with Iran reveals his and his cabinet’s regional revisionist reflexes.

    Broader regional destabilization lies ahead as Israel seeks to destroy threats with immense military power without any strategic foresight.

    Spyros A. Sofos does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. How Israel’s domestic crises and Netanyahu’s aim to project power are reshaping the Middle East – https://theconversation.com/how-israels-domestic-crises-and-netanyahus-aim-to-project-power-are-reshaping-the-middle-east-259359

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: In Dialogue with Kazakhstan, Experts of the Human Rights Committee Commend the Abolition of the Death Penalty, Ask about Excessive Use of Force during 2022 Demonstrations and Internet Censorship

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Human Rights Committee today concluded its consideration of the third periodic report of Kazakhstan on how it implements the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, with Committee Experts commending the State’s abolition of the death penalty, and raising issues concerning excessive use of force by law enforcement officials during demonstrations in January 2022 and internet censorship.

    Changrok Soh, Committee Chairperson, and other Committee Experts commended Kazakhstan for its abolition of the death penalty and ratification of the Second Optional Protocol to the Covenant.

    A Committee Expert cited reports of excessive use of force during demonstrations in January 2022 that resulted in the deaths of several peaceful protesters.  Investigations into these incidents were reportedly insufficient. What measures would the State party take to hold perpetrators to account, and provide adequate remedies to victims and their families?

    Another Committee Expert said Kazakhstan had not amended legislation allowing the Prosecutor General to shut down websites without court approval.  Provisions designed to protect children from cyberbullying were reportedly misused to censor and restrict information, as were internet blackouts. Could the delegation comment on these issues?

    Botagoz Zhaxelekova, Vice-Minister of Justice of Kazakhstan and head of the delegation, said that, as part of national action plans, systemic efforts had been made to enhance human rights protections.  These included the ratification of the Second Optional Protocol, aimed at the abolition of the death penalty, without reservations.  Kazakhstan was currently working with countries in Central Asia and Mongolia to make the region the first death penalty-free zone.

    In the ensuing discussion, the delegation said that the 2022 incident was a mass uprising that led to numerous injuries to law enforcement officials.  Investigations had been initiated into the incident, with nine officials sentenced for the excessive use of arms.  Monitoring visits had led to the release of around 400 people who were arbitrarily detained.

    On internet censorship, the delegation said this year, around 1,000 warning letters were issued to website operators calling for illegal content to be removed.  If it was removed, the site was not blocked.  Internet services could only be suspended in emergency situations and when there was an extreme threat to public safety, such as during the January 2022 events.  The 2023 law on online platforms was based on the European Union’s digital services act. It was geared toward the liberalisation of the online sphere.

    Ms. Zhaxelekova, in concluding remarks, thanked the Committee for the constructive dialogue, and all those who had facilitated the dialogue.  The Committee’s recommendations would be considered by the State and incorporated into future human rights action plans, she said.

    In his concluding remarks, Mr. Soh said the delegation had engaged actively in the dialogue, which had addressed judicial independence, the prohibition of torture, and the rights of vulnerable groups, among other topics.  The Committee expressed particular concern regarding the lack of accountability for the January 2022 events and restrictions on civil society and freedom of assembly.  It hoped that the dialogue would translate into increased protection of civil and political rights in Kazakhstan.

    The delegation of Kazakhstan was made up of representatives of the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection of the Population; Ministry of Culture and Information; Ministry of Education; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Internal Affairs; Ministry of Justice; Court Administration; Anti-Corruption Agency; Prosecutor General’s Office; and the Permanent Mission of Kazakhstan to the United Nations Office at Geneva.

    The Human Rights Committee’s one hundred and forty-fourth session is being held from 23 June to 17 July 2025.  All the documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, can be found on the session’s webpage.  Meeting summary releases can be found here.  The webcast of the Committee’s public meetings can be accessed via the UN Web TV webpage.

    The Committee will next meet in public at 3 p.m. on Thursday, 26 June to begin its consideration of the initial report of Guinea Bissau (CCPR/C/GNB/1).

    Report

    The Committee has before it the third periodic report of Kazakhstan (CCPR/C/KAZ/3).

    Presentation of the Report

    BOTAGOZ ZHAXELEKOVA, Vice-Minister of Justice of Kazakhstan and head of the delegation, said international obligations were an integral part of Kazakhstan’s national legal system.  The provisions of the Covenant took precedence over national legislation, and the State’s primary priority was the protection of citizens’ rights.

    During the reporting period, the State made far-reaching reforms aiming to consolidate democracy and build a just Kazakhstan. In 2022, constitutional reforms reinforced human rights protections for all Kazakh citizens, moving the State from a super-Presidential form of Government to a Presidential Republic with a strengthened Parliament.  The President could now serve only a single seven-year term and could not seek re-election. Rural mayors were now directly elected, and regional authorities had been granted greater autonomy. 

    The role of the lower house of Parliament in forming the Government had been strengthened – Parliament’s consent was now required for the appointment of the Prime Minister and other members of the Government.  The lower house was also empowered to hear reports from the Government, including on human rights issues.

    In addition, the registration process for political parties had been simplified; the electoral process had been improved; and the registration threshold had been reduced fourfold, from 20,000 to 5,000 members.  For the first time, six political parties, including opposition parties, were represented in the lower house.  Nearly half of the members of Parliament had been newly elected, including independent candidates.  A 30 per cent quota for women, youth, and persons with disabilities was introduced for the allocation of party list mandates.  The Mazhilis (lower house of Parliament) now included 18 women, six persons with disabilities, and eight individuals under the age of 35.

    The Constitutional Court had been re-established as a key mechanism for protecting rights and freedoms.  All citizens could appeal to it free of charge, and interpretation services were available.  To date, the Court had issued over 500 rulings and 71 final decisions.  In 20 per cent of reviewed cases, legal provisions were found to be unconstitutional.

    Constitutional law had expanded the powers of the Human Rights Commissioner, who could now directly address the President, both chambers of Parliament, and the Government with proposals to improve human rights mechanisms and initiate systemic legislative measures.  The Ombudsman was empowered to file lawsuits to defend the rights of an unlimited number of individuals, access all penal institutions freely, interview any person, and intervene in cases of rights violations. Regional Ombudspersons for the rights of children and for socially vulnerable groups had also been appointed across the country.

    Extensive work had been carried out in the field of lawmaking.  Laws adopted during the reporting period included the law on peaceful assemblies, which introduced a notification-based system for assemblies; a law decriminalising defamation; a law granting citizens and civil society organizations the right to oversee Government and quasi-public entities; a law obliging the Government to respond to petitions that received more than 50,000 signatures; a law expanding journalists’ rights to access and disseminate information; and the Social Code, which guaranteed equality and the inadmissibility of discrimination in all areas of life and increased State social benefits by 15 per cent. 

    Other laws adopted included a law aimed at protecting victims of domestic violence, which led to the annual number of crimes against women decreasing by 2.5 times; legislation increasing penalties for crimes against the sexual integrity of children; a law granting public monitoring commissions and the national preventive mechanism unrestricted access to all closed facilities in the country without prior notice and establishing criminal liability for cruel and inhuman treatment; and a law on combatting human trafficking.

    As a result of preventive measures, the number of registered torture cases had declined each year.  In 2024, the number fell by 40 per cent.  Since 2020, a Compensation Fund for Victims of Torture had been operating, and over the past five years, more than 3,000 compensation payments had been made.

    Kazakhstan was also taking measures to protect its citizens abroad.  From 2019 to 2021, the country carried out special operations repatriating 754 individuals from Syria, including 526 children and citizens of neighbouring countries.  All children received passports and women were supported to return to a normal life.

    As part of national action plans, systemic efforts had been made to enhance human rights protections.  A total of 94 actions had been planned, more than 75 per cent of which had already been implemented.  These included the ratification of the Second Optional Protocol to the Covenant, aimed at the abolition of the death penalty, without reservations.  This commitment was also enshrined in the Constitution.  Kazakhstan was currently working with countries in Central Asia and Mongolia to make the region the first death penalty-free zone.  In 2023, Kazakhstan also ratified two Optional Protocols: one to the Convention on the Rights of the Child and another to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 

    To ensure the effective implementation of decisions and requests from United Nations committees, a working group was established in 2022.  It included representatives from the main State authorities.  Kazakhstan had responded positively to decisions on individual communications by United Nations committees, including through the payment of compensation in the cases of Gerasimov, Bayramov and Malykhin. 

    The State party had also incorporated the recommendations of the United Nations High Commissioner Volker Türk, who visited Kazakhstan in 2023, into a comprehensive action plan on human rights and the rule of law.  The action plan focused on protecting the rights of women, children, and persons with disabilities; combatting domestic violence; strengthening labour rights; and safeguarding freedom of association.

    The Government has been actively engaging with civil society on all major reforms.  One notable example of this engagement was the “Dialogue Platform for the Human Dimension” under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  Since 2013, more than 50 meetings had been held, and their outcomes were reflected in three human rights action plans, including recently adopted laws on combatting human trafficking, the criminalisation of domestic violence, and the fight against torture.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert said the Committee welcomed Kazakhstan’s abolition of the death penalty and its ratification of the Second Optional Protocol in 2022, as well as the strengthening of the Constitutional Court in 2023 and the establishment of several mechanisms and institutions.  The Committee had, in recent years, issued a substantial number of Views concluding violations of the Covenant by the State party, but had received disturbing information that most of these had not been followed up.  Would the State party extend the mandate of the interagency working group, which was tasked with analysing these Views?  What measures had been taken to give full effect to the Committee’s recommendations?  How were members of the judiciary trained on international procedures?

    The adoption of the international treaties act enhanced the role of international treaties in the national legal order. Did the Covenant have direct effect? The Committee welcomed national plans related to human rights.  How effective had implementation of these plans been?  Domestic courts had assessed a substantial number of cases involving the Covenant.  Had these courts directly implemented the Covenant?  Was training on the Covenant for the judiciary compulsory?  How was the public educated on the Committee’s work?

    The Committee welcomed that the Human Rights Commission’s mandate had been expanded but noted that it had “B” status since 2012. Had the State worked to have it accredited with “A” status?  What were the obstacles in this regard?  How did the State party guarantee a transparent and independent procedure for appointing members of the Commission?  How did the Commissioner monitor the implementation of the Covenant?  Could the Commissioner be held accountable for inaction?  The State party had invested in the national preventive mechanism against torture, but this institution depended on the Human Rights Commission to carry out its operations and reportedly needed to announce visits to places of detention in advance.  How would the State party strengthen the mechanism?

    Another Committee Expert welcomed the significant changes to the national framework, including the establishment of the national Anti-Corruption Agency.  There were concerns about the influence of public officials over this institution. What measures were in place to ensure the independence of the Agency?  Media reportedly faced political pressure when reporting on corruption, with some having been imprisoned.  What measures were in place to protect media personnel investigating corruption?

    The law on countering extremism included a vague definition of “extremism” that allowed for arbitrary interpretation.  Would this definition be revised?  Were media personnel pressured to expose colleagues’ actions to reduce sentences against them?  Did the State party plan to remove people convicted of non-violent crimes from the list of people accused of financing terrorism?  Which objective standards were used in courts to define extremist activities?  The Committee called for statistics on persons tried for extremist crimes.

    The Committee welcomed legal safeguards against surgical sterilisation, but was concerned about uneven access to contraception and high rates of teenage pregnancy.  What steps had been taken to expand access to affordable contraceptives and family planning programmes?  The Committee was concerned by reports of forced sterilisation and abortion, particularly targeting persons with disabilities, and gender stereotypes embedded in school curricula.  What measures were in place to address these issues and develop adequate sexual and reproductive health education?

    A Committee Expert said that demonstrations in December 2011 resulted in the deaths and injuries of civilians, and reported torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of individuals put under trial related to these protests.  Investigations into these incidents and many alleged perpetrators of human rights violations were reportedly insufficient.  What measures would the State party take to hold perpetrators to account, and provide adequate remedies to victims and their families?  How many investigations had been carried out thus far and what convictions had been handed down?

    The Committee welcomed measures taken to address the high suicide rate in detention centres, but this high rate reportedly persisted.  What further measures were planned to reduce the suicide rate and to investigate all deaths in custody?

    One Committee Expert said that the State party’s laws on discrimination did not address all forms of discrimination included in the Covenant, despite high levels of discrimination against certain groups in the State party.  Efforts to revise anti-discrimination laws seemed to have stalled.  Was there a plan to revive these?

    The Committee welcomed the State party’s efforts to promote the rights of persons with disabilities.  Would it remove discriminatory language in its laws related to persons with disabilities?

    In 2020, the Dungan community experienced ethnic violence resulting in deaths, injuries, property damage, and the displacement of thousands of community members.  Law enforcement authorities reportedly ignored these incidents, delaying investigations and prosecutions.  What progress had been made in setting up a reconciliation committee and in providing remedies to victims?

    There were credible reports of violence and discrimination targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex individuals. Why had organizations of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons been denied formal registration and the right to peaceful assembly?  The Kazakhstan Union of Parents had submitted a petition seeking to ban “propaganda” related to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons.  How had the Government responded to this petition?  Public funding had been removed from gender reassignment surgery and the minimum age for such procedures had been raised to 21.  How would the Government support persons who sought such surgery?

    Another Committee Expert welcomed that Kazakhstan’s law prohibited gender-based discrimination, but expressed concern that women accounted for only 27 per cent of the Mazhilis, and had limited representation in decision-making positions in public and private bodies.  There was a major salary gap between men and women, and the law did not ensure equal pay for equal work.  What measures had the State party taken to ensure substantive equality between men and women and to address discrimination in access to education, land and property rights?  How did the State party promote women’s representation in decision-making bodies and managerial roles?  What measures were in place to address the gender pay gap?

    The Committee welcomed that the State party had financed gender equality initiatives, but noted that the gender equality strategy had been replaced with the gender and family policy.  The 2009 law on domestic violence was limited to violence by immediate family members.  What legislative and other measures had been taken to combat violence against women and girls?  How had the State party tackled the rise in domestic violence observed during the COVID-19 pandemic?  How was it addressing issues such as forced and early marriages and ensuring a victim-centred approach to investigations and prosecutions? 

    Stigma surrounded reporting of cases of domestic and gender-based violence and police were reportedly reluctant to act on such cases. How did the State party encourage reporting of violence by victims, ensure adequate funding for victim support services, and collect data on complaints, investigations and sentences? What measures were in place to strengthen awareness raising campaigns on violence against women targeting public officials and civil society?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the Covenant was directly applicable in Kazakhstan and took precedence over domestic legislation. Over the past eight years, over 7,000 decisions were handed down by the courts that referenced the Covenant. Training seminars on Covenant rights were held for members of the judiciary.  The Government had made good progress on the human rights action plan, having implemented around 75 action points thus far, including actions promoting gender equality and women’s representation in decision-making bodies, as well as the investigation of torture.

    The Ombudsperson’s status was enshrined in the Constitution.  It did not report to Government bodies and had immunity in carrying out its activities. Its financial independence was guaranteed and it had direct access to all Government bodies.  In 2023, the Ombudsperson representatives carried out more than 700 monitoring visits and issued over 600 recommendations, some 70 per cent of which were implemented.  An assessment of institutional capacity was carried out in 2023 by the Human Rights Commissioner towards its accreditation with “A” status by the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions.

    The independent national preventive mechanism consisted of 126 members, a large percentage of whom were representatives of non-governmental organizations.  They were elected through a transparent process by the coordination council.  The Ombudsperson was working on improving the professional knowledge of the mechanism’s members.  Its annual budget was spent exclusively on its needs.  It had unlimited access to all detention centres in the country and did not need prior permission to conduct visits.

    The Anti-Corruption Agency was independent. It had held several high-level officials accountable for corruption and had seized several millions of dollars in assets from those officials, investing those assets directly in Government programmes such as school construction projects.  The Agency provided free consultations with citizens periodically and worked with citizen volunteers who monitored corruption.

    The State ensured the safety of journalists who investigated corruption, providing all assistance necessary to those journalists. Journalists had broad rights to receive answers to their questions from public officials and to attend public events.

    The concepts of “extremism” and “terrorism” defined in national legislation and the Constitution were in line with those of international law.  The State party welcomed the Committee’s recommendations for improving these laws. All inclusions in the list of organizations linked to terrorism financing were based on the sentences of judges.  Around 1,000 persons had been removed from the list after review, including persons already serving sentences under the Criminal Code and persons found to have given up extremist views.

    Kazakhstan’s Health Code guaranteed the right to reproductive healthcare.  Women had the right not to be subjected to forced abortions or sterilisation and had access to all sexual and reproductive health services.  Gynaecologists determined whether terminations of pregnancy were necessary.  Minors could seek terminations with the written permission of their parents. Family planning and contraception services were provided by the State.  Medical, out-patient and in-patient services had been established in rural areas – 308 medical facilities had been built last year. Events were held that promoted reproductive health and aimed to prevent the spread of sexually transmitted diseases and unwanted pregnancies.  Increased access to maternal health services had led to a reduction in maternal mortality and the number of abortions.

    The Prosecutor’s Office had conducted investigations into the events of December 2011, as had monitoring bodies from the United Nations.  The Government had allowed representatives of non-governmental organizations and the media to attend trials related to these events.  Some 1,100 witness testimonies were conducted as part of investigations, which led to the sentencing of 13 officials.  All persons who had been arrested were now released. Investigations found that there was no evidence of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of arrested persons by public officials.  One official had been charged with granting officers permission to use lethal firearms, which led to the death of 12 persons.  These victims’ families had been granted damages by the courts.

    Discrimination was not allowed on grounds of sex, ethnicity, race, status, property or religion, among other characteristics. The State party had created a committee promoting inter-ethnic harmony, which had developed guidelines on access to legal remedies for victims of discrimination and recommendations for improving legislation on discrimination. 

    All citizens were equal before the law and no person could be subject to discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity.  Members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex community had access to all fundamental rights.  The State party had agreed to conduct research on the impact of propaganda related to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons in response to the petition it had received.  Sex changes were regulated by domestic law; persons aged 21 or over with legal capacity had the right to change their sex.

    Some 87 persons had been convicted for having taking part in mass unrest in 2020 affecting the Dungan community, damaging property and obstructing the actions of the police.  All victims had had their property restored.

    The law on persons with disabilities granted persons with category two disabilities priority access to public housing. National standards were in place that supported access to infrastructure and services for persons with disabilities. The accessibility level of buildings was mapped by the State party, and more than 124,000 buildings had been adapted to promote accessibility.

    In April 2024, a law was adopted that aimed to protect women and girls from violence.  There was criminal liability for battery and bodily harm.  Police were obliged to investigate all suspected cases of domestic violence, even when there was no report.  The punishment for sexual violence had been increased to up to life imprisonment.  Forced marriage was punished with up to 10 years imprisonment.  Measures were in place to ensure that victims could file complaints.  The Government funded a specific unit on combatting domestic violence and provided training to officials on responding to domestic violence.  Courts issued restraining orders and instructions relating to behaviour in domestic violence cases as required.  Mobile units responded in a timely manner to reports of violence; they had worked with more than 100,000 families.

    The share of women in local assemblies was 22.7 per cent. There were three women ministers and eight women vice-ministers, and the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court was a woman.  Some 53 per cent of judges were women.  The State party was working actively to ensure that the quota of 30 per cent female candidates was respected.

    The ideology of the gender equality strategy had not changed.  The State party was working with United Nations agencies to promote gender-sensitive budgeting and establish bodies within ministries with gender-related mandates.

    Around 15 per cent of senior public officials were women. Since 2018, some 7,000 women had served in military operations and 15 Kazakh women had served in United Nations peacekeeping roles.  Equal pay for equal work for men and women was enshrined in the Constitution. Discrimination on any grounds was not allowed.  The Labour Code prohibited discrimination on the grounds of gender.  Women who felt they had been discriminated against could turn to the courts to seek remedies.

    Follow-Up Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert welcomed that the procedure for follow-up on Views had led to legal changes and the payment of compensation to victims.  The Expert also welcomed efforts made by the State party to inform the public about the Committee’s work.  Another Committee Expert welcomed measures promoting access to registration for civil society organizations.  One Committee Expert commended the participation of 15 Kazakh women in United Nations peacekeeping operations, and the increasing number of women in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

    CHANGROK SOH, Committee Chairperson, said he was impressed by the abolition of the death penalty and progress in improving the representation of women, but noted that there were still issues that needed to be addressed.

    Committee Experts asked follow-up questions on how the State party promoted the independence of the Ombudsperson, despite the President’s role in appointing its members; investigations into individual cases of killings and claims of torture occurring during December 2011 protests and reparations provided to victims’ families, and whether an official public apology had been issued for these human rights violations; whether the State party would formally recognise the right of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons to protection from discrimination; details on planned revisions to discrimination legislation; the status of research into propaganda related to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons; whether a law on gender-based harassment would be promulgated soon; and resistance to laws on violence against women from conservative segments of society.

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the national preventive mechanism carried out more than 500 monitoring visits per year.  It had issued more than 16,000 recommendations to institutions as of 2020, of which 44 per cent had been implemented.

    An investigation was carried out into events related to December 2011 protests.  There was no evidence of the acts of torture that were alleged, preventing judicial investigation of those allegations.  The investigations into the murder of 12 individuals and the injury of six determined that arms were used with unlawful intent, inflicting grievous bodily harm, but not necessarily murder.  One official had refused to provide medical care to an injured person and was sentenced to five years imprisonment.

    Issues related to discrimination legislation and the petition on propaganda related to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons would be considered once research into these issues was completed. Civil society was invited to join discussions related to the petition and other Government measures.

    National legislation allowed for liability for various forms of harassment.  Last year, changes were brought to the Criminal Code banning sexual activity with minors under age 16.  The Government was assessing the effectiveness of current legislation on gender-based violence, which would be revised in 2027.

    The 2022 constitutional law on the Human Rights Commissioner expanded the powers of the Ombudsperson and the mandate of the Human Rights Commissioner.  The findings of the visits of the national preventive mechanism were published in its annual report.  As a result of its findings, disciplinary actions had been taken against over 440 officials.  In addition to the national preventive mechanism, members of Parliament, judges, prosecutors and the Commissioner for the Rights of the Child could also visit places of detention without prior authorisation. 

    The Ombudsperson could participate in discussions on national reports for human rights treaty bodies.  They had not exercised their right to appeal to the Constitutional Court, as they had been able to address all complaints they had received through other legal recourses.  This did not indicate a refusal to exercise this authority.

    The Labour Code prohibited discrimination against women and regulated workers’ rights to respect and dignity. Employers were obliged to ensure safe and healthy working conditions.  Workers could submit complaints of workplace harassment to the Workplace Ethics Committee or to the police.

    There were 170 suicides in prisons between 2017 and 2024.  For each case, an investigation was carried out to determine the causes, and around 150 officials had been sanctioned for not fulfilling their care duties. Training was provided to prison guards on identifying at-risk inmates and preventing suicides, and to prisoners on promoting self-confidence and preparing for release.  Several additional measures had been implemented in prisons to prevent suicides.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert said the State party did not have a specific law on the use of force and firearms by officials.  Did it plan to enact such a law that was in line with international standards?  There were allegations of excessive use of force during January 2022 protests, which had led to the death of several peaceful protesters.  Did the State party plan to conduct thorough, independent investigations into these allegations, hold perpetrators to account, and provide adequate remedies for victims?  The mass detention of protesters reportedly led to disappearances, and detainees had been denied access to lawyers and medical care.  What further steps would the State party take to ensure that all detainees were informed of their rights, provided access to a lawyer and medical treatment, and to investigate all allegations of mistreatment of detainees and hold those responsible accountable?

    Peaceful assemblies held without advanced authorisation were typically dispersed by authorities, with demonstrators arrested. How would the State party bring its administrative detention practices in line with international standards? Courts had a high rate of extending pre-trial detention.  How did the State party ensure that pre-trial detention was used only as a last resort, and in line with international standards?

    Another Committee Expert said that the State party had not sufficiently responded to the Committee’s previous recommendation to align legal definitions of torture with those of the Convention against Torture. Despite the high number of torture cases, few effective punishments were imposed on perpetrators, and some persons who reported torture were punished for the crime of reporting false information. What steps had been taken to bring the definition of torture in the Criminal Code in line with international standards and ensure timely investigations?  How many complaints of torture had been filed, legal proceedings launched, and officials punished?

    Kazakhstan had not amended legislation allowing the Prosecutor General to shut down websites without court approval. Provisions designed to protect children from cyberbullying were reportedly misused to censor and restrict information, as were internet blackouts.  Could the delegation comment on these issues?  Laws adopted in 2023 and 2024 expanded State control over free speech, resulting in politically motivated trials against journalists and political opposition figures.  What steps had been taken to fully decriminalise defamation?  Could the State party provide statistics on detentions of journalists and human rights defenders?  What had the working group on the protection of human rights defenders achieved?

    A Committee Expert commended steps to transfer prison health services from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of Health.  How was the State party supporting drug-dependent inmates and working to ensure the availability of sufficient medical equipment in prisons?  Were medical staff trained in detecting torture? Military schools were excluded from the mandate of the national preventive mechanism.  Did the State party intend to address this?

    The Committee was concerned that the right to conscientious objection to military services was not defined in law.  Were there plans to define this in law and establish an alternative to military service?  What steps had been taken to revise religious law to ensure full compliance with the Covenant?  The Committee was concerned by reports that some individuals had been imprisoned for engaging in non-violent religious expression.  How did the State party ensure that persons were not detained solely for expressing religious beliefs?

    What steps had been taken to remove complex registration requirements for non-governmental organizations and trade unions, and to prevent excessive State control of the activities of those organizations?

    Minorities continued to face discrimination and limited access to decision-making positions.  What was the legal and administrative framework covering political parties?  What steps had been taken to promote the effective participation of members of the Roma community in political life?

    One Committee Expert commended the State party for the 2024 law on combatting trafficking in persons and the amendment to article 128 of the Criminal Code.  How did the State party ensure the effective implementation of these reforms? There were reports of a lack of training for labour inspectors on trafficking.  How were inspectors trained to detect trafficking?  How did the State party ensure that the cases of all potential trafficking victims were assessed before deportation, and that all migrant children were properly registered and documented?  The Committee welcomed efforts to enhance trafficking penalties, but was concerned that trafficking offences were often not appropriately classified, leading to lower penalties.  Would this be addressed?

    There was no de facto procedure for processing asylum applications and authorities were reportedly reluctant to grant asylum to persons of Russian or Uzbek nationality.  Reportedly, migrants had been detained without being given access to legal representation.  Was the State party addressing these issues?  How did it ensure protection against refoulement?  Individuals were required to renounce their citizenship to apply for Kazakh nationality.  Would the State revise this law to prevent the risk of statelessness?

    What State services were provided to victims of domestic violence, including children?  Could children obtain these services independently of their parents? The Committee was concerned that the State party had not prohibited all forms of corporal punishment.  Would this be done?  Could children file complaints of mistreatment with the Human Rights Commissioner?  Workers at an orphanage had been caught on video beating children.  How was the State party working to prevent such abuse and promoting the foster family system?  Children born outside of medical institutions to undocumented parents did not receive birth certificates.  Would the State party address this issue?

    Another Committee Expert asked how the State party guaranteed the independence of Supreme Court judge candidates, who were nominated by the President, and of lawyers?  There were reports of corruption throughout the judicial system. How was the State fighting this? Had any judicial officials been found guilty of corruption?  Attorneys were not automatically appointed to suspects, and did not always get access to all case files.  How would this be addressed?  How were suspects made aware of their rights?  How did the State party prevent cases being unduly declared “secret”?  What percentage of court cases were now solely held online?  How did the State ensure proper proceedings in online cases?

    To what extent were spontaneous assemblies possible in Kazakhstan?  How did the State party ensure that notification procedures did not create delays or restrictions preventing assemblies?  Could people appeal restrictions on assemblies?  Foreigners were prohibited from participating in assemblies.  How did the State party ensure that foreigners’ assembly rights were respected?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said that in cases of mass violence, the State had the authority to use force to ensure public security.  The 2022 incident was a mass uprising that led to numerous injuries to law enforcement officials.  Investigations had been initiated into the incident, with nine officials sentenced for the excessive use of arms.  Changing the law on the excessive use of force was unnecessary, as the law functioned effectively.  All persons affected by violence related to this incident were provided with appropriate medical assistance, including detainees. Monitoring visits had led to the release of around 400 people who were arbitrarily detained.  There were 29 minors who had been detained after carrying out serious offences; they had since been released.

    There were 1,500 peaceful assemblies organised legally between 2017 and 2024.  Some 400 planned demonstrations had been cancelled because authorities had responded to complaints before the demonstration was held.  Some 1,000 demonstrations held during the reporting period were deemed unlawful as protesters had failed to respect notification deadlines or to correctly submit notification documents.  The State party continued to inform the public about notification procedures; this had led to a two-fold decrease in the number of illegal assemblies between 2022 and 2024.  Organisers of such assemblies were brought to court only in exceptional circumstances; in most cases, they were issued fines or warnings.  Law enforcement bodies needed to provide alternative proposals if the location for a planned demonstration was already being used by another event.

    As of 2019, exemption from liability for torture was not possible in Kazakhstan, nor were suspended sentences for perpetrators of torture.  There were 40,000 video cameras placed in detention centres to prevent torture. There had been a downward trend in the number of torture cases reported, from around 800 in 2019 to around 100 in 2024. More than 200 officials had been convicted of torture offences, and no officials found guilty of torture had received amnesties.  Housing and compensation payments were provided to the families of victims of torture. The State party intended to increase the amount of compensation provided to victims of torture ten-fold.

    This year, around 1,000 warning letters were issued to website operators calling for illegal content to be removed.  If it was removed, the site was not blocked. Internet services could only be suspended in emergency situations and when there was an extreme threat to public safety, such as during the January 2022 events.  The 2023 law on online platforms was based on the European Union’s digital services act.  It was geared toward the liberalisation of the online sphere.

    Defamation had been downgraded to an administrative offence.  There had been a downward trend in the number of cases of defamation in recent years. In 2024, only four cases of spreading misinformation were registered.  Journalists and activists were not prosecuted for defaming public officials.  Persons could not be charged for defaming public or private institutions.

    All persons who entered prisons were provided with a medical assessment.  Detainees requiring specialised assistance were brought to outpatient clinics, and they were isolated when they showed symptoms of contagious diseases.  Legal amendments were made to allow detainees with serious diseases to serve their sentences in appropriate facilities or to have their sentences commuted.

    Over the past few years, there had been an increase in religious practitioners and missionaries, and a decrease in the number of people fined for religious activities.  In the first quarter of this year, only 46 people had been fined. Kazakhstan recognised the right to practice and disseminate religion.  Only persons who practiced religion for financial or extremist purposes were sanctioned.  Legislation on religion was in line with the Covenant.  Members of religious institutions could be released from the obligation to carry out military service.

    Kazakhstan was a multi-ethnic State.  It had a special quota for members of the Senate who were representatives of different ethnic groups.  There were no limitations on the political participation of ethnic groups.

    The national preventive mechanism operated under the Ombudsperson, but maintained operational independence.  Work was underway to expand the national preventive mechanism’s mandate to include facilities under the aegis of the Ministry of Defence.  A draft law on the national preventive mechanism was currently under discussion with State authorities.

    In 2023, the State adopted a law reducing the number of members needed to form a public association to three.  There were no restrictions on organizations receiving foreign funding.  To date, 543 trade unions had been registered.  Political parties’ activities could be restricted when they threatened public order, but such restrictions were temporary.  Liquidation of political parties could only be forced by a court order.

    A law on combatting trafficking in persons was introduced in 2024, which aimed to bring the State’s mechanisms for combatting trafficking in line with international standards, and to increase identification and support for victims.  New offences had been established linked to trafficking, including related to procuring a minor for prostitution and online trafficking. Some 170 labour inspections had been held thus far this year.  These had led to the identification of trafficking victims and the disbanding of organised crime groups, the members of which were held criminally liable. Over 190 victims had been identified and punishments of up to 20 years imprisonment were issued to perpetrators.

    Legislation on refugees and asylum seekers was in line with international law.  Kazakhstan abided by the principle of non-refoulement.  Refugees had the right to seek medical assistance and education, and could apply for permanent or temporary residence in the State. Kazakhstan did not permit the extradition of individuals whose asylum requests were under consideration. Individuals had the right to appeal extradition requests to the Supreme Court.  Kazakhstan was a party to the Shanghai Convention on Combatting Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism, which included provisions specifying that signatories needed to respect international norms related to non-refoulement.

    Only citizens could participate in demonstrations in Kazakhstan; foreigners and stateless persons could not.  However, they could pursue other means to lodge complaints with the State.  Police did not monitor whether demonstrators were foreigners or not.

    The Judicial Office provided free legal assistance to persons involved in court cases.  Many court cases took place online.  Artificial intelligence helped judges to automate routine cases, allowing for the analysis of millions of cases and for the maintenance of judicial standards.  Court materials were provided in accessible formats.

    The State party had revised the judiciary’s financing model, allowing the judicial administrative body to set the budget. This had led to a large increase in the judicial budget.  There were sanctions imposed for judges who engaged in corrupt practices.  Cases of corruption were assessed by a judicial panel.

    Follow-Up Questions by Committee Experts

    Committee Experts asked follow-up questions on criteria used to determine whether to send warning letters to citizens regarding online content; alternatives to residential care facilities being developed; plans to prohibit corporal punishment; whether spontaneous protests were possible; whether persons who did not respect notification laws were restricted from filing future notifications; how the judiciary ensured that artificial intelligence was used in a safe manner that protected citizens’ rights; whether the Government intended to abolish the registry of organizations with foreign funding sources; and planned reforms to the registration process for non-governmental organizations.

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said there was a specialised structure that monitored the information space and detected violations of Kazakh law.  When violations were detected, warning letters were sent to offending parties, often through social network operators, that explained why the content was illegal and needed to be removed.

    The State paid particular attention to the rights of children.  New legislation discouraged corporal punishment.  The number of beatings of children recorded by the State had been falling year-on-year; last year, there were only 250 cases.  Thorough investigations were carried out into complaints of corporal punishment in residential homes.  Video surveillance tools were installed in schools and kindergartens.  There was a hotline for reporting violence and providing consultations to children.

    There was no plan to amend the registry of organizations funded by foreign sources, which was developed in line with international principles.  The State party did not plan to develop a bill on foreign agents.

    All judicial services that used artificial intelligence had been assessed in terms of their implications on security.  They were implemented by the judiciary independently.  The State party had implemented use of electronic monitoring bracelets in around 1,000 cases as an alternative to pre-trial detention.

    Closing Remarks

    BOTAGOZ ZHAXELEKOVA, Vice-Minister of Justice of Kazakhstan and head of the delegation, expressed gratitude to the Committee for the constructive dialogue, and to all those who had facilitated the dialogue.  The State party welcomed the 22 alternative reports submitted by Kazakh civil society organizations, which it had reviewed carefully.  The Committee’s recommendations would be considered by the State and incorporated into future human rights action plans.  The State party thanked the Committee for its contributions to human rights in Kazakhstan and around the world.

    CHANGROK SOH, Committee Chairperson, expressed sincere gratitude to all those who contributed to the constructive dialogue. The delegation had engaged actively in the dialogue, which had addressed judicial independence, the prohibition of torture, the right to peaceful assembly, and the rights of vulnerable groups, among other topics.  The Committee expressed particular concern regarding the lack of accountability for the January 2022 events and restrictions on civil society and freedom of assembly.  It hoped that the dialogue would translate into increased protection of civil and political rights in Kazakhstan.

    ___________

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

     

     

    CCPR25.010E

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: What Are Asteroids? (Ages 14-18)

    Source: NASA

    Asteroids are rocky objects that orbit the Sun just like planets do. In fact, sometimes asteroids are called “minor planets.” These space rocks were left behind after our solar system formed about 4.6 billion years ago.
    Asteroids are found in a wide range of sizes. For example, one small asteroid, 2015 TC25, has a diameter of about 6 feet – about the size of a small car – while the asteroid Vesta is nearly 330 miles in diameter, almost as wide as the U.S. state of Arizona. Some asteroids even have enough gravity to have one or two small moons of their own.
    There are more than a million known asteroids. Many asteroids are given names. An organization called the International Astronomical Union is responsible for assigning names to objects like asteroids and comets.

    Although all of these celestial bodies orbit the Sun, they are not the same. Unlike asteroids, which are rocky, comets are a mix of dust and ice. Meteors are small space rocks that get pulled close enough to enter Earth’s atmosphere, where they either burn up as a shooting star or land on the ground as a meteorite.

    Different types of asteroids are composed of different mixes of materials. Most of them are made of chondrites, which are combinations of materials such as rocks and clay. These are called “C-type” asteroids. Some, called “S-type,” are made of stony materials, while “M-type” asteroids are composed of metallic elements.

    Asteroids formed around the same time and in the same way as the planets in our solar system. A massive, dense cloud of gas and dust collapsed into a spinning disk, and the gravity in the disk’s center pulled more and more material toward it. Over time, these pieces repeatedly collided with each other, sometimes resulting in smaller fragments and other times clumping together, resulting in much bigger objects.
    Objects with a lot of mass – like planets – produced enough gravity to pull themselves into spheres, but many smaller objects didn’t. These ended up becoming comets, small moons, and, yes, asteroids. Although some asteroids have a spherical shape, most have irregular shapes – sometimes oblong, bumpy, or jagged.

    Most of the asteroids we know about are located in an area called the main asteroid belt, which is found in the space between Mars and Jupiter. But asteroids are found in other parts of the solar system, too.
    Trojan asteroids orbit the Sun on the same orbital path as a planet. They’re found at two specific points on the planetary orbit called Lagrange points. At these points, the gravitational pull of the planet and the Sun are in balance, making these points gravity-neutral and stable. Many planets have been found to have Trojan asteroids, including Earth.
    An asteroid’s location can also be influenced by the gravity of planets it passes and end up pushed or pulled onto a path that brings it close to Earth. When asteroids or comets are on an orbital path that comes within 30 million miles of Earth’s orbit, we call them near-Earth objects.

    Yes! Throughout history, asteroids or pieces of asteroids have collided with Earth, our Moon, and the other planets, too. The effects of some of these impacts are still visible. For example, Chicxulub Crater was created 65 million years ago when a massive asteroid struck Mexico’s Yucatan Peninsula. The resulting cloud of dust and gas released into Earth’s atmosphere blocked sunlight, leading to a mass extinction that included the dinosaurs. More recently, in 2013, people in Chelyabinsk, Russia, witnessed an asteroid almost as wide as a tennis court explode in the atmosphere above them. That event produced a powerful shockwave that caused injuries and damaged structures.
    This is why NASA’s Planetary Defense Coordination Office keeps a watchful eye on near-Earth objects. The Planetary Defense team relies on telescopes and observatories on Earth and in space to detect and monitor objects like these that could stray too close to our planet.
    The agency is working on planetary defense strategies to use if an asteroid is discovered to be heading our way. For example, NASA’s DART (Double Asteroid Redirection Test) mission in 2022 was a first-of-its-kind test: an uncrewed spacecraft with an autonomous targeting system intentionally flew into the asteroid Dimorphos, successfully changing its orbit.

     NASA detects and tracks asteroids using telescopes on the ground and in space, radar observations, and computer modeling. The agency also has launched several robotic explorers to learn more about asteroids. Some missions study asteroids from above, such as the Psyche mission, launched in 2023 to study the asteroid Psyche beginning in 2029. Other missions have actually made physical contact with asteroids. For example, the DART mission mentioned above impacted an asteroid to change its orbit, and the OSIRIS-REx (Origins, Spectral Interpretation, Resource Identification and Security – Regolith Explorer) spacecraft collected a sample of material from the surface of asteroid Bennu and delivered the sample to Earth in 2023 for scientists to study.

    Want a career where you get to study asteroids? Here are some jobs at NASA that do just that:

    Astronomer: These scientists observe and study planets, stars, and galaxies. Astronomers make discoveries that help us understand how the universe works and how it is changing. This job requires a strong educational background in science, math, and computer science.
    Geologist: Asteroids are made of different types of rock, clay, or metallic materials. Geologists study the properties and composition of these materials to learn about the processes that have shaped Earth and other celestial bodies, like planets, moons, and asteroids.

    Asteroid FactsGallery: What’s That Space Rock?Center for Near Earth Object StudiesPlanetary Defense at NASAAsteroid Watch: Keeping an Eye on Near-Earth Objects

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Chairman Mast Exposes Spies, Lies and Mismanagement at the U.S. Agency for Global Media

    Source: US House Committee on Foreign Affairs

    Media Contact 202-321-9747

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Brian Mast delivered opening remarks at a full committee hearing titled, “Spies, Lies, and Mismanagement: Examining the U.S. Agency for Global Media’s Downfall.”

    Watch Here

    -Remarks-

    The purpose of today’s hearing is to examine the efficacy of the US Agency for Global Media, by allowing members the opportunity to discuss the agency’s history of national security concerns, the use of taxpayer dollars, and the Trump administration’s vision for a path forward. And I’m now going to recognize myself for an opening statement. As we meet to discuss the downfall of the US Agency for Global Media, or USAGM as we call it, an independent government agency.

    It’s an agency that can trace its roots back to fighting Nazi propaganda during World War II. But instead of staying true to its mandate of combating our adversaries and advocating for American values, in recent decades USAGM has unfortunately lost its way. Prior to this administration taking office again, the agency was riddled with OIG reports and investigations demonstrating that USAGM had been a cesspool of spies, lies and mismanagement.

    That is not an exaggeration. The agency has promoted the very propaganda that it was created to defeat.

    A case in point is Voice of America, or VOA as it’s known, a media outlet overseen directly by USAGM and funded by the American taxpayer, of course — because of Chinese pressure, Voice of America censored interviews with Chinese dissidents.

    VOA hired an admitted Taliban fighter, a jihadist, to criticize President Trump’s terror travel ban decision — it’s reminiscent of a headline that would be in the Babylon Bee: Terrorist hired to criticize President Trump’s travel ban — while instructing its reporters not to call Hamas terrorists, unless they used air quotes when they did so.

    VOA suppressed negative stories about Iran and its terrorist proxies. And VOA, which peddled the Russian collusion hoax, hired foreign nationals who previously worked for Russian state sponsored news outlets to tell that story.

    USAGM is a government agency tasked with promoting American ideals. But instead, it’s hired foreign adversaries with your tax dollars, who promoted anti-American propaganda, both at home and abroad.

    This is only a partisan issue because President Trump is in the White House. The fact is, Republicans and Democrat administrations alike have exposed USAGM’s hiring, vetting and messaging failures.

    During the Biden era, the State Department Inspector General found that USAGM skirted federal hiring guidelines when doling out jobs to foreign nationals. Many of these foreign nationals were quite literally security risks, yet they were given access to extremely sensitive information. To be specific, what’s known as tier 3 and tier 5, which are the equivalent of secret and top secret information. Everybody should be asking themselves why foreign nationals hired to be journalists need access to top secret information that most foreign militaries don’t get access to.

    This was not just incompetence. It was taxpayer funded self-sabotage. American taxpayers would have been better off if that money had just been lit on fire.

    Before President Trump won his historic second term, USAGM embraced and regurgitated enemy propaganda. It became a mouthpiece for our adversaries paid for, again, by your tax dollars. And we’re here to say that the grift is over.

    It’s not that USAGM has never provided any value. It’s that USAGM had drastically lost their way and allowed themselves to become a source of espionage. However, it’s clear that USAGM cannot continue to operate as it has in recent times. Drastic measures have to be taken to ensure that every taxpayer dollar for where those dollars come from, the American people. Not Xi Jinping. Not Vladimir Putin, not the Ayatollah.

    I want to thank our witness, Kari Lake, for appearing in front of this committee today. I’m looking forward to hearing your testimony. I’m looking forward to a productive and probably a rowdy discussion about the Trump administration’s vision for the future of US broadcasting.

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Members review farm policies, food security, technology transfer and transparency issues

    Source: World Trade Organization

    Updates on agricultural market developments and food security

    Members heard updates from observer international organizations, including the International Grains Council (IGC), the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP). Their contributions encompassed the overarching theme of global food security and related challenges, with a particular focus on the unique difficulties faced by least developed countries (LDCs) and net food-importing developing countries (NFIDCs), along with their continuous efforts to mitigate these challenges.

    The IGC reported that the prospects for the next grain harvest remain broadly favourable, although an unusually dry winter and early spring has reduced yield potential in parts of East Asia. Including upgrades for the Americas, the global crop projection is boosted by 2 million tonnes, to a record 2,375 million. Due to a slightly lower estimate for feed use, the forecast for total grain consumption has been revised down slightly month-on-month, now standing at 2,372 million tonnes.

    With grains and oilseeds markets expected to be comfortably supplied, the IGC emphasized the importance of open trade, noting that global price developments may be strongly influenced by demand-side measures, including trade policies. It also underscored the value of market transparency and drew members’ attention to the Wheat Maritime Trade and Food Security Dashboard, developed jointly with the WTO. This tool supports the monitoring of short-term trends in international wheat maritime trade flows in response to changing market conditions and enables analysis of longer-term developments.

    FAO shared with members the main information contained in The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World (SOFI) 2024. The publication confirmed that global progress towards the goal of ending hunger is not on track, with chronic hunger and food insecurity persisting at elevated levels. After a sharp increase between 2019 and 2021, the prevalence of undernourishment remained well above pre COVID-19 figures, reaching 9.1% in 2023. This means an estimated 713 to 757 million people facing hunger, with a mid-range estimate of 733 million – approximately 152 million more than in 2019.  

    FAO reminded members that the vast majority of people and countries facing acute food insecurity have remained in that situation for several years, underscoring the protracted nature of the crisis and the importance of resilience-building efforts. FAO also noted that it has been closely monitoring the global food security situation and has developed a dedicated web page – FAO Response to Global Food Security Challenges – which provides detailed information on various aspects of food security.

    The WFP stressed that global food insecurity remains alarmingly high, with 295 million people acutely affected. Catastrophic hunger, the most severe form, has surged – rising from 80,000 people in 2018 to 1.9 million in 2024. Conflict remains the primary driver, with 70% of the acutely food insecure living in fragile, violent contexts. Extreme weather, such as droughts and floods, also threatens food security, as do economic factors like inflation, debt and high food prices. Humanitarian operations are further strained by severe funding shortfalls, said the WFP, which in 2025 expects to assist 24 million fewer people than in 2024.

    To address this crisis, increased funding, humanitarian access and robust data systems are urgently needed. The WFP thanked WTO members for the Decision adopted at the 12th Ministerial Conference (MC12) to exempt humanitarian food purchases from export restrictions. The decision has improved access to local and regional production, facilitating international and regional movement of commodities and positively impacting the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of WFP operations

    Nairobi and Bali decisions – transparency

    Regarding the implementation of the Nairobi Decision on Export Competition, the Chair called on members concerned to make all possible efforts to fully conclude this exercise of aligning export subsidy schedules with the obligations under the Nairobi Decision. The next export competition dedicated discussion is scheduled for the Committee meeting in September. Referring to the Committee’s Decision in G/AG/2/Add.2 of December 2024, the Chair reminded members that 2024 is the last implementation year for which the information required under the export competition questionnaire (ECQ) needs to be provided via a response to the questionnaire.

    Starting from the implementation year 2025, members will be required to submit a new annual export competition notification, which consolidates and streamlines existing export competition related notification requirements and formats, including the ECQ. Members were urged to redouble efforts to submit outstanding responses to the ECQ, and to use the ECQ Agriculture Information Management System (AG IMS) on-line facility for this purpose.

    The Chair noted that the second triennial review of the operation of  the Bali Decision on Tariff Rate Quota (TRQ) administration is due in 2025. This topic will remain on the Committee’s agenda all this year. Members shared thoughts on the possible contents and outcomes of this review. The Chair also reminded members of the specific issues raised at the March 2025 Committee meeting and invited them to build on those discussions.

    Issues addressed included the need for better follow-up on the first review’s conclusions , improved transparency and completeness of market access notifications, particularly for TRQs with country-specific allocations in the schedule of commitments, as well as the inclusion of tariff data in TRQ notifications. Members also called for action on TRQ underutilization by addressing barriers, such as unrelated licensing requirements, enhancing notification practices, compiling current challenges and exploring ways to reallocate underused quotas to improve TRQ effectiveness and transparency.

    Technology transfer

    Members expressed interest in advancing discussions on the transfer of technology to developing economies in the food and agricultural sector. Delegations expressed support for continuing discussions on the topic, with calls to shift from educational exchanges to examining how WTO rules could bolster technological development.

    To capitalize on this momentum, the Chair encouraged delegations to turn this interest into concrete, substantive ideas for collective exploration, utilizing the Committee’s nearly three decades of experience with the implementation of the Agreement on Agriculture. Despite encouragement from the previous Chair, Anna Leung of Hong Kong, China, at the March 2025 meeting, no written proposals have been submitted.

    The Chair suggested convening informal discussions and continuing to include this topic on formal agendas to support ongoing reflection and shape collective guidance.

    Agricultural policies review

    A total of 180 questions were raised by members concerning individual notifications and specific implementation matters during the meeting. This peer review process allows members to address issues related to the implementation of commitments outlined in the Agreement on Agriculture. Of these, 14 issues were raised for the first time, while 23 were recurring matters from previous Committee meetings.

    The 14 new items covered a range of topics, including Australia’s livestock industry funds, Brazil’s rural development efforts, Canada’s involvement in farm and dairy support, and the European Union’s emergency agricultural measures and tariff actions on Russian products.

    Other discussions focused on India’s domestic support programmes, sugar policy, and export duties, as well as Indonesia’s agricultural support. Japan’s initiatives to lower carbon emissions and secure fertilizers were also reviewed, along with Paraguay’s rural assistance project, Switzerland’s payments to farmers, Thailand’s debt relief and rice support policies, Türkiye’s tax and pricing systems, the United Kingdom’s schemes to enhance farm productivity, and the United States’ trade programmes, avian flu response, and broad agricultural support measures.

    Since the previous meeting in March 2025, a total of 53 individual notifications have been submitted to the Committee: 24 related to market access, 14 concerning domestic support, 11 regarding export competition, and four related to the implementation of the Marrakesh Decision on LDCs and NFIDCs.

    The Chair urged members to submit timely and complete notifications and to respond to overdue questions, stressing the critical importance of enhanced transparency.

    All questions submitted for the meeting are available in G/AG/W/255. All questions and replies received are available in the WTO’s Agriculture Information Management System.

    Next meeting

    The next meeting of the Committee on Agriculture is scheduled for 25-26 September 2025.

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    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Chinese Foreign Minister Meets with Diplomatic Representatives of EU and Its Member States

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BEIJING, June 25 (Xinhua) — Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi held a collective meeting with diplomatic representatives of the European Union and its member states in Beijing on Wednesday.

    As Wang Yi, also a member of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee, reminded, this year marks the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the EU. As two major constructive forces in the modern world, China and the EU should enhance mutual trust, properly resolve differences, and join forces to elevate the China-EU comprehensive strategic partnership to a new height.

    Wang Yi put forward a three-point proposal for the future development of China-EU relations.

    Firstly, the head of the Chinese Foreign Ministry pointed out, the parties must adhere to mutual respect, in particular, respect each other’s fundamental interests and important concerns in practice.

    China hopes that the EU will continue to strictly adhere to the one-China principle and oppose any form of separatist activity aimed at achieving “Taiwan independence,” the Chinese diplomat stressed.

    Secondly, the parties should adhere to the established positioning of the bilateral partnership. According to Wang Yi, China and the EU are partners, not rivals, and certainly not enemies.

    Third, the two sides should adhere to multilateralism. China firmly upholds the international system with the UN at its core, the international order based on international law, and the fundamental norms of international relations based on the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, Wang said, adding that China consistently advocates peaceful negotiations and rejects the use of force.

    According to the Chinese diplomat, the three global initiatives put forward by Chinese President Xi Jinping, the Belt and Road Initiative and the concept of building a community with a shared future for mankind are the contributions of Chinese wisdom and Chinese solutions to the international community.

    “China and the EU should follow the trend of the times, strengthen mutual understanding, build mutual trust, promote mutual success and brighten the world,” Wang added.

    The head of the EU diplomatic mission and diplomatic representatives of EU member states said that China has always been an important partner for the European Union.

    According to them, the EU is ready to move forward with China, develop constructive and stable relations, jointly confront global challenges, defend multilateralism, and promote peace and security throughout the world. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Chinese Defense Minister Meets with Participants of SCO Defense Ministers’ Meeting

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    QINGDAO, June 25 (Xinhua) — Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun held separate meetings with his counterparts from Belarus, Iran, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia in Qingdao, east China’s Shandong Province, on Wednesday.

    From June 25 to 26, the above-mentioned officials are taking part in a meeting of defense ministers of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) member states.

    Dong Jun stated that the world is currently witnessing a strengthening of the regressive tendencies of unilateralism and protectionism, while manifestations of hegemonism, despotism and bullying are seriously undermining the international order, becoming the biggest sources of chaos and troubles.

    The Chinese minister called for strengthening coordination within multilateral structures such as the UN and the SCO, upholding international fairness and justice, and protecting global strategic stability.

    Dong Jun’s interlocutors highly appreciated China’s active efforts and important contribution as the rotating chair of the SCO aimed at strengthening institutional mechanisms and deepening cooperation in all areas, expressing their firm intention to strengthen and develop cooperation in the military sphere. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: US to hold talks with Iran next week – D. Trump

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    THE HAGUE, June 25 (Xinhua) — U.S. President Donald Trump announced in The Hague, the Netherlands, on Wednesday that the United States will hold talks with Iran next week.

    “We are going to talk to them – to Iran – next week. We can sign an agreement,” D. Trump said at a press conference following the NATO summit.

    Earlier on Wednesday, Trump noted that the ceasefire between Iran and Israel was being observed “very well.” –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Iran says military commander killed in Israeli airstrike

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    TEHRAN, June 25 (Xinhua) — Ali Shadmani, chief of the central staff of Iran’s Khatam al-Anbia Armed Forces, has died from wounds sustained in an Israeli air strike, the headquarters said on Wednesday.

    According to the semi-official Tasnim news agency, A. Shadmani, who recently replaced Gholam Ali Rashid as chief of staff, was seriously wounded during Israeli strikes on Iran last week.

    The Jewish state’s army then announced that it had killed A. Shadmani in a nighttime airstrike on a command center located in central Tehran. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – The Methane Regulation, energy security and competitiveness Does the Commission intend to respond to the Member States’ concerns? – E-002452/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002452/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Piotr Müller (ECR)

    According to media reports, some Member States are calling for a reduction in the methane monitoring and reporting obligations provided for under the already adopted Methane Regulation.

    These proposals are to be considered as part of the announced Omnibus Simplification Package.

    EU climate policy, when pursued without taking into account economic and technological realities, increasingly leads to a decline in competitiveness, destabilisation of the energy market and higher costs for producers. Unreasonable administrative burdens are not conducive to innovation or investment. In this context, there are also worrying signs of possible barriers being imposed on imports of American LNG, which should be unequivocally supported as a strategic alternative to Russian raw materials.

    I would therefore ask the Commission to answer the following questions:

    • 1.How does the Commission intend to respond to the calls from Member States to reduce obligations under the Methane Regulation?
    • 2.Does the Commission plan to adapt the legislation to market realities and technological possibilities?

    Submitted: 18.6.2025

    Last updated: 25 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on media freedom in Georgia, particularly the case of Mzia Amaglobeli – RC-B10-0282/2025/REV1

    Source: European Parliament

    pursuant to Rules 150(5) and 136(4) of the Rules of Procedure
    replacing the following motions:
    B10‑0282/2025 (Verts/ALE)
    B10‑0287/2025 (Renew)
    B10‑0289/2025 (S&D)
    B10‑0290/2025 (PPE)
    B10‑0295/2025 (ECR)

    Sebastião Bugalho, Rasa Juknevičienė, David McAllister, Željana Zovko, Isabel Wiseler‑Lima, Tomas Tobé, Miriam Lexmann, Andrey Kovatchev, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Dariusz Joński, Loránt Vincze, Danuše Nerudová, Mirosława Nykiel, Antonio López‑Istúriz White, Davor Ivo Stier, Luděk Niedermayer, Liudas Mažylis, Inese Vaidere, Loucas Fourlas, Krzysztof Brejza
    on behalf of the PPE Group
    Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Tobias Cremer
    on behalf of the S&D Group
    Adam Bielan, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Rihards Kols, Mariusz Kamiński, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Alexandr Vondra, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Bogdan Rzońca, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Assita Kanko, Marlena Maląg, Waldemar Tomaszewski
    on behalf of the ECR Group
    Urmas Paet, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Engin Eroglu, Svenja Hahn, Karin Karlsbro, Ľubica Karvašová, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Nathalie Loiseau, Jan‑Christoph Oetjen, Marie‑Agnes Strack‑Zimmermann, Eugen Tomac, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar, Dainius Žalimas
    on behalf of the Renew Group
    Lena Schilling, Markéta Gregorová
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
    Hanna Gedin, Jonas Sjöstedt, Per Clausen

    Document selected :  

    RC-B10-0282/2025

    Texts tabled :

    RC-B10-0282/2025

    Texts adopted :

    European Parliament resolution on media freedom in Georgia, particularly the case of Mzia Amaglobeli

    (2025/2752(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to its previous resolutions on Georgia,

    – having regard to Rules 150(5) and 136(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas Mzia Amaglobeli, a journalist and co-founder of Batumelebi and Netgazeti outlets, was arrested during pro-European protests on 12 January 2025 and faces four to seven years in prison for a provoked incident involving a police officer;

    B. whereas the adoption of draconian legislation – such as the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) and amendments to the Law on Broadcasting, Code of Administrative Offences and Law on Grants – constitutes a dangerous acceleration of democratic backsliding and deliberate authoritarian strategy by Georgian Dream to silence critical voices in civil society and independent media and persecute the political opposition;

    C. whereas the authorities have virtually annihilated remaining independent media outlets in the country; whereas the public information space is fully dominated by pro-government media, spreading Russian-style propaganda and anti-European disinformation;

    D. whereas in Mzia Amaglobeli’s case, the authorities ignored procedural safeguards, imposed pre-trial detention without a clear legal basis, contested by the Public Defender, and assigned a presiding judge lacking qualifications in criminal law; whereas she is being punished for exposing corruption and reporting on election fraud during the 2024 elections;

    E. whereas she reportedly suffered inhumane treatment and undertook a 38-day hunger strike;

    F. whereas Estonia and Lithuania have imposed personal sanctions on Georgian judges and police officers linked to Mzia Amaglobeli’s case;

    1. Demands Mzia Amaglobeli’s immediate and unconditional release and the withdrawal of all charges against her, and denounces her politically motivated arrest and prosecution;

    2. Strongly condemns the Georgian Dream regime’s systemic assault on democratic institutions, political opposition, independent media, civil society and judicial independence;

    3. Expresses deep concern over arbitrary detentions and the harassment of, and violence against, journalists in Georgia, including smear campaigns, legal persecution, abuse and gender-based violence in detention; calls for independent investigations and urges the authorities to immediately end intimidation and ensure journalists’ safety and freedom;

    4. Urges the Georgian authorities to release all political prisoners and other illegally detained persons without delay, including activist Mate Devidze, opposition leaders Zurab Japaridze, Nika Melia and Nika Gvaramia, and former President Mikheil Saakashvili, and denounces the violent abduction of UNM Chair Tina Bokuchava’s husband and the reported threats to her children’s safety;

    5. Calls for the immediate repeal of all repressive legislation, the restoration of democracy, and full protection of media freedom and civil liberties;

    6. Calls for the EU to step up support for Georgia’s independent media and civil society following the entry into force of the FARA, and monitor ongoing trials;

    7. Regrets the persistent inaction of the Council, Member States and Commission and reiterates its repeated call on Member States to impose bilateral sanctions against Georgian Dream leaders and officials responsible for democratic backsliding;

    8. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the OSCE, President Zourabichvili, and the self-appointed authorities of Georgia.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the financial activities of the European Investment Bank – annual report 2024 – A10-0112/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the financial activities of the European Investment Bank – annual report 2024

    (2024/2053(INI))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty on European Union,

    – having regard to Articles 15, 126, 174, 175, 177, 208, 209, 271, 308 and 309 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and to Protocol (No 5) on the Statute of the European Investment Bank (EIB),

    – having regard to Articles 41 to 43 of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community,

    – having regard to the EIB Group Activity Report 2024 of 30 January 2025 entitled ‘Priorities for prosperity’,

    – having regard to the EIB Investment Report 2024/2025 of 5 March 2025 entitled ‘Innovation, integration and simplification in Europe’,

    – having regard to the EIB Group 2024-2027 Strategic Roadmap of 21 June 2024,

    – having regard to the EIB Group Operational Plan 2024-2026 of 9 February 2024 and to the EIB Group Operational Plan 2025-2027 of 30 January 2025,

    – having regard to the G20 commissioned review of Multilateral Development Banks’ capital adequacy frameworks (the CAF Review),

    – having regard to Council Decision (EU) 2025/504 of 11 March 2025 amending Protocol No 5 on the Statute of the European Investment Bank[1],

    – having regard to the EIB Board’s decision of 21 March 2025,

    – having regard to the EIB Cohesion Orientation 2021-2027 of 13 October 2021,

    – having regard to the launch of the EIB’s European Tech Champions Initiative (ETCI) on 13 February 2023,

    – having regard to the EIB Group’s third annual report on EIB Group activities in EU cohesion regions of 15 July 2024,

    – having regard to the EIB Environmental and Social Standards of 2 February 2022,

    – having regard to the EIB Group 2023 Climate Bank Roadmap Progress Report of 25 July 2024,

    – having regard to the European Pillar of Social Rights,

    – having regard to the ‘Main outcomes from EIB Group analysis and stakeholder consultation’, presented at the EIB seminar on housing on 18 July 2024,

    – having regard to the EIB press release of 6 March 2025 entitled ‘European Commission and EIB group lay foundations for a new pan-European investment platform for affordable and sustainable housing’,

    – having regard to the letter by EIB President Nadia Calviño to the EU leaders of 4 March 2025,

    – having regard to the EIB Group Security and Defence Industry Action Plan presented at the Economic and Financial Affairs Council meeting in Luxembourg on 12 April 2024,

    – having regard to the EIB’s updated list of eligibility, excluded activities and excluded sectors of 14 July 2022,

    – having regard to the EIB Global Impact Report 2023/2024 of 13 June 2024,

    – having regard to the Tripartite Agreement between the European Commission, the European Court of Auditors and the European Investment Bank, signed on 11 November 2021,

    – having regard to the EIB Group Complaints Mechanism Procedures of 13 November 2018,

    – having regard to the document entitled ‘Diversity, Equity and Inclusion at the EIB Group’ of 14 October 2024,

    – having regard to the study of the European Parliamentary Research Service entitled ‘Increasing European added value in an age of global challenges – Mapping the cost of non-Europe (2022-2032)’, published in February 2023,

    – having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 1 December 2021 entitled ‘The Global Gateway’ (JOIN(2021)0030),

    – having regard to the study by the European Commission published on 11 January 2024 entitled ‘Access to equity financing for European defence SMEs’[2] ,

    – having regard to the report of 17 April 2024 by Enrico Letta entitled ‘Much more than a market’,

    – having regard to the report of 25 April 2024 by Christian Noyer entitled ‘Developing European capital markets to finance the future’,

    – having regard to the report of 9 September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’,

    – having regard to the report of 30 October 2024 by Sauli Niinistö entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2025 entitled ‘A Competitiveness Compass for the EU’ (COM(2025)0030),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 11 February 2025 entitled ‘Commission work programme 2025’ (COM(2025)0045),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 11 February 2025 entitled ‘The road to the next multiannual financial framework’ (COM(2025)0046),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘The Clean Industrial Deal: A joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation’ (COM(2025)0085),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘Action Plan for Affordable Energy: Unlocking the true value of our Energy Union to secure affordable, efficient and clean energy for all Europeans’ (COM(2025)0079),

    – having regard to the press statement by the President of the Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, on the defence package (Rearm Europe plan) of 4 March 2025,

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 19 March 2025 entitled ‘Savings and Investments Union – A Strategy to Foster Citizens’ Wealth and Economic Competitiveness in the EU’ (COM(2025)0124),

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility[3],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/523 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 March 2021 establishing the InvestEU Programme and amending Regulation (EU) 2015/1017[4],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe, amending and repealing Decision No 466/2014/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EU) 2017/1601 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 480/2009[5],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1056 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the Just Transition Fund[6],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1229 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 July 2021 on the public sector loan facility under the Just Transition Mechanism[7],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform[8],

    – having regard to the Commission proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2025 amending Regulations (EU) 2015/1017, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695 and (EU) 2021/1153 as regards increasing the efficiency of the EU guarantee under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 and simplifying reporting requirements (COM(2025)0084),

    – having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2025 on the white paper on the future of European defence[9],

    – having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Budgets,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0112/2025),

    A. whereas the EIB Group includes the EIB and the European Investment Fund (EIF); whereas the EIB, entirely owned by the Member States, is the largest multilateral financial institution in the world, operating in international capital markets and offering competitive terms to clients on favourable conditions in order to contribute to the achievement of the EU’s objectives and support EU  policies and projects both within and outside the EU, in accordance with Article 309 TFEU; whereas the EIF is owned by the EIB (59.8 %), by the EU (29.7 %) and by financial institutions (10.5 %) from the Member States, the United Kingdom and Türkiye;

    B. whereas the EIB Group has a balance sheet of close to EUR 600 billion; whereas the EIB Group states that its total investment reached a record level of EUR 88.8 billion in 2024, of which EUR 50.7 billion related to climate and the environment, EUR 16.2 billion to SMEs and mid-caps, EUR 14.4 billion to digitalisation and technological innovation and EUR 1 billion to enhancing Europe’s security and defence; whereas the EIB’s gearing ratio has been increased to 290 %, providing additional room for the EIB to invest and support the achievement of the EU’s objectives and support EU policies; whereas the EIB Group’s total investment is expected to increase to EUR 95 billion in 2025;

    C. whereas the EIB maintains solid financial fundamentals and has a ‘triple A’ rating, a cornerstone of its financial credibility and lending capacity, which is essential to preserve investor confidence and ensure low borrowing costs;

    D. whereas the EIB supports EU policies and projects and is the main implementing partner to leverage the mandates and guarantees of the EU’s budget and thus to mobilise large-scale public and private investment; whereas the EIB states that approximately 90 % of its annual investment is committed to projects within the EU and 10 % deployed in investments outside the EU;

    E. whereas the EIF, as part of the EIB Group, is an entity specialised in supporting the EU’s policy objectives, including in the areas of entrepreneurship, job creation and economic cohesion, and plays a key role in supporting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) by enhancing their access to financial markets, from venture capital to micro-finance; highlights the fact that the EIB Group supports companies at all stages of development;

    F. whereas as of June 2024, InvestEU is estimated to have mobilised around EUR 280 billion in additional investments, of which EUR 201 billion originated from the private sector; whereas the InvestEU envelope is almost depleted;

    G. whereas the latest reports on the future of the EU call for the EU’s competitiveness and productivity to be strengthened, emphasise the vital role of market integration and underscore the need to accelerate both public and private investment to build a stronger, more secure, autonomous and fair Europe;

    H. whereas the Draghi report on European competitiveness assesses the combined additional investment needs in Europe at EUR 750-800 billion per year by 2030; whereas the EIB Group plays a crucial role in helping bridge the gap both through its own lending capacity and by ‘crowding in’ private capital to finance these investment needs;

    I. whereas according to the Draghi report, EU companies spend less on research and innovation (R&I) than their US counterparts and Europe persistently fails to translate R&I into commercialisation, particularly in sectors like biotech, artificial intelligence and renewable energy, in the context of the EU’s lack of scale and incomplete single market, banking union and capital markets union; whereas the Draghi report highlights a 30 % EU-US productivity gap in 2023 and points to Europe’s missing out on the digital revolution – driven by the internet and the associated productivity gains – as a key factor, noting that only four of the world’s top 50 tech companies are European;

    J. whereas the Letta report estimates that EUR 300 billion of European savings are not invested in Europe, but mainly in the United States, due to the lack of an integrated capital markets union (CMU); whereas the President of the European Central Bank estimates that companies in the EU could raise approximately an additional EUR 470 billion a year in funding from the capital markets if the CMU were completed[10]; whereas the European Parliamentary Research Service estimates the potential benefits of a more fully integrated and more effectively regulated EU financial market of up to EUR 159 billion per year in the long run as well as the benefit of further progress in the integration of the EU banking sector of up to EUR 114 billion per year;

    K. whereas the EIB’s operations should contribute to achieving climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest, in line with the Paris Agreement and the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and support the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights; whereas the EIB has branded itself the EU’s climate bank in view of the investments needed to deliver the fair green transition; whereas the Commission estimates that the EU needs to increase its annual investments in energy, industrial innovation and scale-up, and transport systems by around EUR 480 billion compared to the previous decade[11];

    L. whereas in the light of the current geopolitical context, the development of the European defence technological and industrial base plays an increasingly important role within the internal market; whereas the Commission’s white paper on the future of European defence identifies that an additional EUR 800 billion investment is needed in the defence sector over a four-year period; whereas the EIB announced that it would double its funding for security and defence from EUR 1 billion in 2024 to EUR 2 billion in 2025, while safeguarding its ‘triple A’ credit rating status;

    M. whereas housing prices in the EU rose by an average of 48 % between 2015 and 2023, and the housing crisis affects nearly all of Europe, increasingly impacting the middle class and not just the most vulnerable; whereas EIB data indicates a yearly need to build 1.5 million new homes and renovate five million more, requiring EUR 300-400 billion in annual investment; whereas the housing sector is of general interest but faces reduced public investment, which makes continued EIB investment crucial for this sector; whereas the EIB’s new action plan envisages investment of EUR 10 billion over the next two years;

    N. whereas the EIB Global lending arm, which was launched in 2022, is of key importance in terms of Europe’s position in the world; whereas EIB Global is expected to facilitate at least one third of the EUR 300 billion in investment that the Global Gateway sets out to generate by the end of 2027;

    O. whereas Parliament has repeatedly called for the conclusion of an interinstitutional agreement between Parliament and the EIB; whereas Parliament has signed agreements with various EU bodies; whereas Parliament and the EIB share a long history of intensive cooperation, including (non-)legislative interactions and dialogue;

    General remarks

    1. Appreciates the EIB’s readiness to adapt to changing EU policy requirements, while respecting its long-term objectives; welcomes the EIB Group 2024-2027 Strategic Roadmap, which reflects the EU’s political priorities; points out that the eight priority areas set out in the strategic roadmap are: the EIB’s role as the climate bank, digitalisation and deployment of new technologies, security and defence industry, modern cohesion policy, agriculture and the bioeconomy, Europe’s social infrastructure, high impact investments outside the EU, and the capital markets union;

    2. Highlights the strong call for the EIB to play an even greater role in closing Europe’s investment gap, which Mario Draghi estimated at EUR 800 billion, of which EUR 450 billion is needed for the energy transition alone; calls on the Commission and the EIB to fully leverage the EIB’s potential to provide financial support for the EU’s common priorities and to fulfil its crucial role in driving the necessary investment for fair and inclusive sustainable growth, while maximising innovation gains in key EU policy areas; calls for the EIB Group’s contribution to be further strengthened in the next multiannual financial framework (MFF), particularly through financial instruments and budgetary guarantees that have proven highly effective in advancing key EU policy objectives; urges the Member States to provide sufficient funding for this purpose by assigning mandates to the EIB and through a possible capital increase, thus enabling the EIB to mobilise investments that truly meet pan-European needs and strengthen the EU’s relevance as a global player; recalls that the new Commission has set itself the goal of being an ‘investment Commission’;

    3. Stresses that the EIB’s ‘triple A’ rating is essential and a key asset that must be maintained; urges all relevant actors to protect and guarantee this rating when adapting the EIB’s lending policy and mandate; underlines that the rating is based, among other factors, on its solid capital position, excellent asset quality and performance, the creditworthiness of the Member States as its ultimate guarantors, and the fact that the EIB has been responsive to EU policy objectives; notes that, with a solid ‘triple A’ rating and a strong risk management framework, the EIB Group has the financial strength required to steadily increase its annual investments; highlights the fact that the EIB’s rating and financial position also allow it to ensure favourable financing conditions in funding public interest projects compared to private commercial banks, ensuring certainty and cost effectiveness, and allow it to absorb potential fluctuations in returns, retain investor confidence and contain borrowing costs; underlines that the EIB should further leverage its privileged status to take greater risks in funding European public goods and strategic investments; takes note of the decision of the EIB Board of Governors to increase the EIB’s gearing ratio limit from 250 % to 290 %; stresses that the EIB should adequately calibrate its intervention to ensure that it does not crowd out private investment;

    4. Notes that the EIB investment volume relative to GDP among European countries ranges from 0.1 %[12] to 1.4 % for 2024; calls on the EIB Group to ensure a more balanced geographical distribution of investments aiming to maximise its impact across all EU regions to promote cohesive and inclusive growth throughout the EU, with particular attention on under-represented and less developed areas; calls on the EIB to keep focusing on investment plans aimed at closing the gap between the more developed EU regions and island areas, inland areas, the outermost regions, economically depressed areas and all areas of the EU at a disadvantage owing to natural factors;

    5. Stresses the need to simplify, streamline, optimise and consolidate current and future EIB processes and mandates to enhance synergies, effectiveness and efficiency; suggests the development and introduction of a single rule book, with a uniform set of financial rules, to function as a unified framework across multiple EU programmes and simplify implementation for partners, which will contribute to enhancing the EIB’s operations;

    6. Stresses the importance of reducing the administrative burden and reporting costs as well as simplifying procedures for EIB-financed projects, in particular for SMEs and smaller-scale innovation-driven initiatives; underlines that a more streamlined process could increase the EIB’s impact and responsiveness; welcomes, in this regard, the establishment of one-stop shops to offer coordinated financial support and technical guidance;

    7. Acknowledges the EIB’s commitment to reforms to shorten time-to-market, with a target of a 30 % reduction by the end of 2024 and a 50 % reduction over the 2024-2026 period; notes that the implementation of these reforms is being accelerated to reduce bureaucracy, enhance synergies within the Group, to automate and streamline internal procedures and improve cost efficiency; calls on the Commission and the EIB to further assess how to speed up the EIB’s time-to-market as well as to simplify financing mandates without compromising auditing standards or transparency; calls on the EIB to intensify its efforts in the digitalisation of its operations;

    Closing the investment gap and fostering competitiveness

    8. Emphasises the important role of the EIB Group as a pan-European and international investment body in mobilising both public and private financing for EU priorities and supporting Member States in financing essential and strategic investments and EU policy goals;

    9. Recalls, however, that the EIB’s operations are by nature limited and can only play a supporting role in addressing the significant investment gap; reiterates that a more integrated economic and monetary union and strengthened economic architecture and effective coordination would support the EIB’s operations; calls, therefore, for swift and substantial progress regarding the capital markets union, particularly through concrete steps on the recently launched savings and investments union, the completion of the banking union, as well as, where appropriate, the establishment of EU-level investment instruments and tools designed to minimise the cost for EU taxpayers and maximise efficiency in the provision of European public goods;

    10. Affirms that more integrated capital markets and a deeper single market are also essential foundations for the EIB’s operations; welcomes the EIB’s strategic roadmap, which places the capital markets union high on its agenda; considers that a adequately completed savings and investments union will bring benefits to consumers and SMEs alike by providing high-yield investment opportunities in the real economy, and will ultimately strengthen the venture capital market, which is considered riskier than other forms of investment, by facilitating access to more diversified funding sources; emphasises that relevant European public actors should contribute to the savings and investments union and welcomes the EIB’s willingness to launch pilot projects and other concrete initiatives in this area;

    11. Calls on the Commission and the EIB Group to enhance efforts to deliver on the agenda for the Competitiveness Compass and the savings and investments union by mobilising private capital for productive investments, supporting innovation throughout companies’ life cycles, venture capital financing and more high-risk equity financing for start-ups and scale-ups; underlines that higher-risk instruments such as equity and venture debt must be used with clear risk frameworks and measurable performance indicators; encourages the EIB to expand financing for women-owned businesses;

    12. Recognises the central role of SMEs, as the backbone of the European economy, in driving economic growth, fostering innovation, creating employment and promoting territorial cohesion; recalls, in this regard, that the EU’s 24 million SMEs account for 99 % of all businesses, provide around two-thirds of all jobs and generate over 50 % of the total value added that is produced by EU businesses; underlines that supporting SMEs is a key objective for the EIB Group and that greater access to credit, the creation of tailored financial instruments, and targeted investments in SMEs can have a widespread positive impact by contributing to the Union’s economic resilience, the competitiveness of local production chains, and the digital and sustainable transitions in regional economies;

    13. Encourages the EIB to maintain and strengthen its role in facilitating access to finance for SMEs and start-ups, which frequently encounter obstacles when seeking funding from traditional financial institutions, providing targeted financing to ensure sufficient resources to grow and prosper; points out that SMEs continue to face challenges owing to high interest rates and raw materials and energy costs;

    14. Welcomes the EIF’s role in financing start-ups and scale-ups in Europe, including through its activities in the European venture capital market; stresses that EIF instruments must remain easily accessible for smaller applicants, and calls on the EIF to streamline its application procedures accordingly; calls for an increase in the budget of the EIF dedicated to the EU venture capital ecosystem, in line with the Draghi report recommendation; calls also for the introduction of first-loss guarantees and convertible instruments targeted at start-ups and scale-ups;

    15. Highlights the role of the EIB Group as a major contributor to developing the European venture capital and private equity ecosystem, but notes that further work is needed to support European innovation to provide start-ups with more opportunities to scale up and access funding throughout their life cycle; notes that, although a share of private investment already flows through venture capital funds, it remains insufficient and is unevenly distributed across Member States; underlines that a capital markets union could help address this imbalance and improve access to finance across Member States;

    16. Stresses that de-risking instruments and budgetary guarantees provided by the EU have proven to be powerful tools; considers that de-risking should continue effectively, particularly for investments in innovative and strategic sectors; is concerned that, according to the interim evaluation of the InvestEU programme, envelopes for many financial products may run out by the end of 2025 without budgetary reinforcements; welcomes, in this regard, the Commission’s proposal of 26 February 2025 to provide additional funding to InvestEU; calls for a balanced geographical distribution of financing under InvestEU, particularly with respect to smaller Member States;

    17. Recalls that EU budgetary guarantees are underpinned by taxpayer funds and that defaults on EIB-backed projects could directly impact the EU budget;

    18. Welcomes the continued expansion of the EIB’s network of European promotional banks and other international financial institutions to help to further leverage public and private investment, and to ensure broad geographical and sectoral coverage; recalls that InvestEU is 75 % implemented by the EIB; calls for the financial instrument component of the Competitiveness Fund to make use of the expertise of national promotional banks and institutions (NPBIs), particularly their knowledge of local and regional actors; in that context, calls for the blending of instruments between the EIB and NPBIs to be explored further, ensuring that such instruments do not compromise the funds already dedicated to NPBIs;

    19. Asks the EIB to increase its concessional loans to local and national financial intermediaries, including to credit guarantee consortia, microfinance institutions, ethical banks and collective guarantee structures working to facilitate access to credit for SMEs, with a particular focus on rural areas, inland and island areas, the outermost regions, and areas undergoing economic and environmental transitions;

    Consolidating the EIB’s role as the EU’s climate bank

    20. Acknowledges the EIB’s role as a climate bank and its alignment with the EU sustainable finance framework, including the integration, where applicable, of taxonomy criteria[13], supporting the transition by providing financing in sustainable and clean technologies and backing the Union’s efforts to decarbonise the EU economy; recalls that the EIB’s financial flows must be consistent with the EU’s goal of climate neutrality by 2050 and climate objectives for 2030; notes that all corporate clients of EIB financing are contractually required to publish a credible Paris alignment strategy (‘decarbonisation plans’)[14];

    21. Welcomes the EIB’s climate and environmental investments, which totalled EUR 50.7 billion in 2024, exceeding the target of channelling at least 50 % of total financing into climate action and environmental sustainability; calls on the EIB to uphold its high level of ambition, while emphasising that this commitment enhances the Union’s competitiveness, energy security and industrial resilience;

    22. Recalls that the green transition must be inclusive, fair and competitive, and that green investments must be viable; expects the EIB, therefore, to leverage its lending, financial instruments, technical assistance and advisory services to support citizens and businesses that face socio-economic challenges deriving from their efforts to achieve climate neutrality by 2050; stresses the need to support industrial restructuring, workforce reskilling, and the creation of new employment opportunities in affected regions; invites the EIB to support projects delivering affordable access to renewable energy, housing and public services, community-led initiatives and small projects with a particular focus on fighting energy poverty as a priority;

    23. Welcomes the EIB’s investments in renewable energy, energy efficiency, interconnectors, and electricity grids and storage, including its support for REPowerEU; underlines the importance of focusing on projects with high economic impact and measurable climate benefits; calls on the EIB to play a role in mobilising private capital for grid investments in support of lower energy prices; acknowledges, in particular, the increased investment in emerging technologies for industrial electrification and decarbonisation, recognising their role in supporting the transition to climate neutrality by reducing emissions from hard-to-abate industrial sectors, while expressing concern about their potential impact on the water supply in certain regions;

    24. Stresses the importance of addressing high energy costs in the EU to enhance the competitiveness of European companies; points out that a stable energy supply at competitive prices is one of the foundations of a successful industrial policy; calls on the EIB Group to especially support SMEs facing energy-related cost pressures, including through targeted financing and advisory services to improve energy efficiency and resilience; calls on the EIB to continue to support energy-intensive industries, in order to ensure that this highly strategic sector is in a position to successfully manage the energy transition;

    25. Notes that, in a world full of uncertainty, investments should be focused on the EU’s preparedness to face shocks; stresses the need for increased investment in climate adaptation and resilience; encourages further research and development, including of innovative technologies, for climate preparedness; calls for access to finance for SMEs in innovative green technologies to be enhanced; recalls that clean technology strengthens EU sovereignty and is essential for competitiveness, yet faces even greater funding challenges due to the green premium compared to incumbent technologies; highlights the Draghi report’s call for more public guarantee and counter-guarantee schemes to cover the investment risks of clean technology manufacturing projects;

    26. Recalls that the EIB was the first issuer of green bonds and is now the largest multi-currency issuer of green bonds; welcomes the fact that on 2 April 2025 the EIB issued its first Climate Awareness Bond aligned with the EU Green Bond Standard Regulation[15]; highlights the key role of the EIB in developing the green-bond market, providing financing solutions to sustainable companies; calls on the Commission and the EIB Group to maintain the EU’s leadership in green and digital bonds;

    27. Recalls the EIB’s commitment to the Convention on Biological Diversity and the post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework and supports the EIB’s investments in biodiversity protection and the preservation of natural resources; welcomes the EIB and European Environment Agency agreement to deepen their collaboration on biodiversity and climate actions; emphasises that, in order to achieve the long-term benefits of restoration, conservation and protection of biodiversity and nature, attractive financing schemes should be made available to potential beneficiaries to engage in such practices on a voluntary basis;

    Financing peace, security and defence

    28. Welcomes the EIB’s proactive approach in the area of security and defence; highlights the fact that investment in this sector doubled in 2024 to EUR 1 billion, with the EIB’s 2025 plan set to double it again to a record EUR 2 billion; stresses that greater EIB investment in the defence sector can encourage commercial banks’ investment in the sector; notes, however, that these amounts represent less than 1.1 % of EIB investments for  2024 (EUR 88.8 billion), and 2.2 % of its financing objectives for 2025 (EUR 95 billion) and emphasises that they can only play a complementary role in addressing the estimated EUR 33.6 billion to EUR 48 billion in new financing required by 2030 for defence companies to meet the increase in orders expected under the ReArm Europe / Readiness 2030 plan; stresses that European-level funding is essential to meet the significant funding needs of Member States; underlines that any future structural European defence funding must be designed with clear conditions set and strong oversight, drawing on lessons learned from existing instruments;

    29. Supports the EIB’s continued and strengthened role in bolstering Europe’s security through targeted investments in both defence and civilian infrastructure, and stresses the need to concentrate strategic investments in projects delivering European added value and in dual-use technologies that contribute to both civilian and defence objectives, in line with the EU’s overarching goals of fostering innovation and enhancing the Union’s security and resilience; stresses that effective defence innovation depends on close collaboration between academia, research institutions and private industry, and encourages the EIB to act as a catalyst in structuring long-term public-private partnerships through targeted financial instruments;

    30. Welcomes the EIB’s plan to revise its operational framework, establishing a dedicated transversal public policy goal to enhance Europe’s peace and security, backed by ambitious financial and capital allocation[16]; supports, therefore, the EIB Board decision of 21 March 2025 to integrate the EIB’s 2022 Strategic European Security Initiative (SESI) into a permanent, cross-cutting public policy objective, complementing the existing public policy goals; underlines, however, that any activities in the field of defence must be subject to appropriate financial parameters, regular risk assessment and transparent oversight and must be accompanied by strong risk management procedures;

    31. Welcomes the joint initiative of the Commission and the EIB Group to set up, via its subsidiary EIF, a fund of funds called the Defence Equity Facility, with a budget of EUR 175 million between 2024 and 2027, to support private investment in European SMEs developing innovative dual-use defence technologies, and to help address the equity financing needs of companies in the EU’s defence technological and industrial base, estimated at between EUR 6.8 billion and EUR 20 billion by 2030, to meet the increase in orders anticipated under the ReArm Europe / Readiness 2030 plan;

    32. Acknowledges the EIB Board decision of 21 March 2025 to broaden the EIB Group’s eligibility criteria for security and defence investments, limiting excluded activities, in accordance with the proposals approved by EU leaders at the European Council on 6 March 2025, as well as the approval of the EIB Group Security and Defence Action Plan in May 2024, aimed at enhancing support for the EU’s security and defence industry; notes that, under that plan, the EIB Group provides financing to SMEs and innovative start-ups operating in the security and defence sector in line with the dual-use principle, maintaining the requirement of ‘credible civil use’ while discontinuing the revenue test;

    33. Takes note of the EIB Board decision of 21 March 2025 that there will be no fixed ceiling for security and defence investments, with funding amounts to be determined annually in the EIB Group Operational Plan; asks the EIB to clarify the potential implications of that decision for other policy areas and the overall operations of the EIB;

    34. Suggests that the EIB should continuously reflect on and evaluate its role, as well as the scope of eligible investments, in contributing to Europe’s peace and security as outlined in the Commission’s white paper on the future of European defence, particularly in the light of the pressing need to scale up the European defence sector and ensure long-term security and strategic autonomy; warns that any adjustment to the EIB Group’s eligibility criteria or funding to align with new priorities must safeguard the Group’s financial position and ensure effective financing of other strategic EU priorities;

    Addressing challenges in social infrastructure, cohesion policy and housing

    35. Welcomes the EIB’s core strategic priorities to reinforce Europe’s social infrastructure and a modern cohesion policy for inclusive and sustainable growth across Europe; appreciates that in its Cohesion Orientation 2021-2027, the EIB committed to dedicating at least 40 % of its total financing in the EU between 2022 and 2024 to projects in cohesion regions, and that in 2024, such financing accounted for 48 % of total EU lending; calls on the EIB to continue to support infrastructure development, including investments in railways, healthcare and social infrastructure, which are crucial for social and economic cohesion, resilience and inclusive growth; underlines that, amid the geopolitical and economic uncertainties, the EIB can provide long-term solutions to address the cost of living crisis;

    36. Highlights the crucial role of skills development in driving long-term sustainable growth, employment and competitiveness in the EU; underlines that financing initiatives aimed at boosting human capital not only foster innovation and productivity and address labour market needs, but also strengthen social cohesion and economic resilience; calls on the EIB to step up investments in education, training, upskilling and reskilling, and health, in close coordination and cooperation with Member State initiatives in those areas, aiming to complement and enhance their impact;

    37. Welcomes the EIB’s commitment to addressing the challenge of the double market failure in the housing sector, including the insufficient provision of affordable and energy-efficient housing, as well as the market failure to increase the energy efficiency of the existing housing stock; notes the differences between Member States in both policies and the magnitude of the aforementioned market failures;

    38. Welcomes the EIB’s ‘Action Plan for Affordable and Sustainable Housing’ with planned investments of EUR 10 billion over the next two years; draws attention to the outcome of the EIB Group analysis and stakeholder meeting, which highlighted an estimated annual public and private investment gap of EUR 300 billion to 400 billion needed to build 1.5 million new housing units and to renovate 5 million additional units annually; encourages the EIB to mobilise even more funding for affordable housing projects throughout the Member States; invites the EIB to focus on sustainable urban development by ensuring that the EU’s housing and infrastructure needs are met for a stronger, sustainable, more cohesive and prosperous Europe, including investments in recovering existing infrastructure, with a focus on supporting urban regeneration projects and projects converting old or abandoned buildings into modern social housing;

    39. Calls on the EIB to take into account the differentiated burden of housing costs on different income groups and family structures, especially as some low-income groups are at risk of marginalisation; encourages the EIB to collaborate with other European public investment banks, local public financial institutions, local governments, and cooperative and social housing companies to finance housing solutions for vulnerable and low-income groups; welcomes the EIB’s intention to increase its focus on R&I in the area of housing;

    40. Calls on the EIB to scale up financial support through the deployment of standardised off-the-shelf financial products in energy and building renovation; highlights the fact that the EIB’s ‘originate-to-distribute’ model, channelling the savings of institutional investors, is an innovative model that could contribute to the integration of EU capital markets;

    41. Welcomes the EIB’s intention to expand financial and advisory support for affordable housing, especially for younger generations; encourages close synergy and exchange with the Commission, municipalities and local authorities, cooperative housing providers, housing associations and the construction sector, exchanging best practice and promoting pan-European cooperation; invites the EIB to support projects delivering affordable access to renewable energy, housing and public services, community-led initiatives and small projects with a particular focus on fighting energy poverty;

    42. Welcomes the EIB Group’s inclusion of agriculture and bioeconomy among its key priorities; underlines that agriculture is a key driver of growth and development in rural areas and that enhancing support and fostering innovation for this vital sector play a significant role in ensuring food security; highlights the financial challenges faced by farmers, particularly young farmers, noting that farmers and enterprises in this sector experience lower success rates when applying for financing; calls on the EIB Group to increase its involvement in the agricultural sector by improving access to funding;

    43. Calls on the EIB to intensify its efforts to promote youth employment, particularly by supporting projects and programmes that foster youth entrepreneurship, access to employment, vocational training and innovation, in order to contribute to fairer and more inclusive territorial development and to help curb brain drain, especially in the EU’s island regions and economically disadvantaged areas;

    Promoting the digital transformation and new technologies

    44. Calls on the EIB to strengthen financing for the EU’s open strategic autonomy in the digital field and to promote research, support the development of European digital infrastructure, foster new and disruptive technologies such as AI and quantum computing, and enable the growth of digital start-ups; underlines the importance of bridging digital divides, both within the EU and globally, to ensure inclusive access to digital infrastructure and services; highlights the importance of aligning EIB digital investments with EU strategic priorities such as the Digital Decade targets, including connectivity, digital skills and the digital transformation of businesses;

    45. Supports the EIF’s expansion of the European Tech Champions Initiative (ETCI) to attract private capital to scale up innovative start-ups into successful global leaders, ensuring that European-founded companies and technologies remain in the EU through the late growth stage; highlights the need for the deployment of the current ETCI to be accelerated in order to keep up with the pace of innovation and start-ups; calls, furthermore, for the successful experience of the ETCI to be built on to develop other similar initiatives to continue supporting the digital transition and other strategic sectors, and encourages the EIF to explore setting up a second generation of this initiative as well as to explore the possibility of investing in funds of funds;

    46. Underlines that institutional investors in Europe could play a bigger role in supporting venture capital, especially for scale-ups; urges the EIB Group therefore to create an European Tech Forum, bringing together the venture capital ecosystem, to engage institutional investors following the model of the Tibi initiative[17]; calls on the EIB to offer opportunities for such investors to build their expertise and opt in to co-investment schemes between the EIF and institutional investors, on transparent and pre-agreed terms;

    47. Highlights the fact that the Clean Industrial Deal aims to develop a TechEU programme with the EIB; stresses the importance of ensuring that this fund has a specific allocation target for start-ups and scale-ups;

    48. Calls on the EIB to support the strengthening of cybersecurity capabilities in the EU, in order to make Europe more resilient while enhancing existing cooperation between the Member States and in order to protect critical entities and essential services;

    49. Highlights the fact that the security of supply of critical raw materials (CRMs) is crucial for the green and digital transitions, the defence sector and the EU industrial base in general; recalls the role played by the EIB in the EU Raw Materials Alliance and the Union’s aim of becoming more autonomous as regards the CRM supply; emphasises the importance of a circular economy approach to CRMs, in order to reduce the EU’s dependence on non-EU countries and boost its strategic autonomy; calls, therefore, on the EIB to invest more in the CRM sector to enhance resilience in raw materials with a particular focus on the recycling of secondary raw materials;

    50. Calls on the EIB to support the technological transformation of European companies, as well as the development of digital skills among employees and entrepreneurs;

    EIB neighbourhood and Global Gateway

    51. Welcomes the EIB’s vital support for Ukraine in the light of Russia’s full-scale, unjustified and illegal war of aggression; calls for an increase in EU budget guarantees to allow the EIB to continue to deliver and strengthen public and private sector operations in Ukraine, supporting Ukraine’s immediate economic challenges, but also envisaging the reconstruction of the country over the medium to long term;

    52. Emphasises that, to decrease dependence on non-EU countries, the deployment of resilient European-controlled infrastructure, among others in the domains of satellite communications, energy and logistics, is essential;

    53. Stresses the important role that the EIB plays in supporting Members States and countries outside the EU, particularly candidate countries, in obtaining access to risk capital markets, thus expanding investment opportunities;

    54. Stresses that, as part of the EU’s external action toolbox, the Global Gateway is crucial for Europe’s global position and aims to promote the rules-based multilateral system, sustainable development, democracy, human rights, gender equality and the rule of law; welcomes the EIB’s role, as the EU’s leading development bank, in this regard; recalls the importance of predictable guarantees from the EU budget to enable the EIB to continue delivering operations outside the EU;

    55. Calls for enhanced transparency and disclosure practices in line with other multinational development banks, along with the establishment of an independent complaints mechanism that can effectively address and remedy grievances; underlines the need for effective mechanisms to ensure the participation of, and accountability to, communities affected by EIB-financed projects to ensure that Global Gateway projects are responsive to local needs, are gender-sensitive and deliver meaningful developmental results; emphasises the importance of public participation, in particular in the EIB’s planning, appraisal and monitoring processes for CRMs, including the Free Prior Informed Consent (FPIC) of Indigenous communities, as provided for in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples;

    56. Reiterates its call for EIB Global to focus blending operations on areas where they can add value to the local economy while avoiding the crowding out of private capital and to ensure that blended finance is not used for essential public services, particularly health, education and social protection; recalls that EU development policy goals, and in particular the goal of enhancing affordable access to healthcare, should guide EIB investments in the field, to ensure better health outcomes for all, and in particular for women;

    57. Expects the EIB’s global activities to also respond swiftly to evolving realities and urgent needs; highlights the gap in development aid financing resulting from the US aid freeze and the reduction of funding towards the Global South; calls for concrete initiatives to prevent humanitarian or health crises, to support pan-African trade, infrastructure and regional integration, and strengthen ties with Europe; welcomes EIB Global’s intention to scale up higher-risk operations, enabled by the mandate of the Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI-Global Europe);

    58. Expresses concern over reports that some EU-funded projects outside the EU, including under the Global Gateway, are being built by Chinese companies, with Chinese firms at times winning more EIB-funded contracts than EU firms; urges the Commission to ensure a level playing field by working with the EIB to boost European company participation; recommends procurement practices that prioritise best price/quality ratio over lowest price to promote fair competition and align with EU values;

    59. Welcomes the efforts of the EIB, together with nine other multilateral development banks, to strengthen their collaboration in advancing progress towards the SDGs; calls on the EIB to continue cooperating with other bilateral and multilateral institutions to develop and apply common methodologies for development impact analysis, with a view to ensuring long-term positive impacts and added value;

    60. Welcomes the EIB’s announcement to step up support for sectors such as water supplies, small businesses, renewable energy and energy efficiency, as well as to further reinforce partnerships within Europe and globally, including with private actors, to deliver maximum impact on the ground;

    Governance: accountability and transparency

    61. Stresses that the EIB’s growing role should be accompanied by greater democratic accountability and transparency; including more timely publication of project-related documents; reiterates its call for an interinstitutional agreement between Parliament and the EIB to formalise and enhance their existing cooperation, including through regular structured dialogue, improved Parliament access to EIB documents and data, and the possibility for Parliament to submit questions for written answers to the EIB, as already provided for the European Central Bank; in this context, asks the EIB to provide Parliament with a clear, simplified overview of EU budget contributions to its balance sheet, off-balance sheet, and profit and loss account;

    62. Highlights the importance of the EIB ensuring full transparency and traceability of projects funded, including more detailed information, to enable proper oversight by all relevant stakeholders, including civil society organisations, rather than solely by the ministries responsible; recalls that all recipients of EU funding have a general obligation to acknowledge its origin and ensure the visibility of any EU funding received; calls on the EIB Group to ensure that the final recipients comply with the visibility conditions of the EU’s financial support;

    63. Invites the EIB to boost the participation of European companies in procurement processes launched for projects financed by the EIB; encourages the EIB to advise borrowers to prioritise eligibility of European companies in order to strengthen European competitiveness;

    64. Underlines the importance of the EIB Group’s upholding the highest standards in preventing all forms of fraud, tax evasion, tax avoidance, money laundering and the financing of terrorism; notes that safeguarding the integrity of the EIB Group’s financing is essential to ensure public trust and the effective use of resources; takes note of the inquiries completed by the European Ombudsman and ongoing investigations by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the European Anti-Fraud Office, and expects full clarity and appropriate follow-up, including any necessary consequences;

    65. Reiterates its call for the EIB to consider aligning the division of labour within the Management Committee with recommendations from EU institutions, to help mitigate potential conflicts of interest;

    66. Welcomes the 2024 framework for the recognition of trade unions at the European Investment Bank;

    67. Welcomes the EIB’s principles of diversity, equity and inclusion, including the target of at least 40 % of management positions being held by women by the end of 2026; calls for a geographically balanced representation of EU nationalities among staff;

    68. Highlights the need to strengthen the EIB’s human rights policies, including the establishment of a clear and effective human rights due diligence framework and strategy; stresses that environmental and social impact assessments should be carried out by independent experts, and that independent verification mechanisms should be introduced to oversee the self-monitoring and self-reporting conducted by EIB clients;

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    69. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the European Investment Bank.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Georgia – A10-0110/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Georgia

     

    (2025/2024(INI))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Georgia 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0697),

    – having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part[1],

    – having regard to Article 78 of the Georgian Constitution, which requires that all possible measures be taken to ensure Georgia’s full integration into the EU and NATO,

    – having regard to the final report of 20 December 2024 of the election observation mission of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on the parliamentary elections held in Georgia on 26 October 2024,–  having regard to the Council conclusions of 27 June 2024 on Georgia and of 17 December 2024 on enlargement,

    – having regard to its previous resolutions on Georgia,

    – having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0110/2025),

    A. whereas in December 2023, the European Council granted Georgia candidate status on the understanding that the relevant nine steps set out in the Commission recommendation of 8 November 2023 and primarily relating to reforms in the areas of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights would be taken;

    B. whereas the situation in Georgia has deteriorated significantly since the publication of the 2024 Commission report on the country on 30 October 2024, particularly as a result of the actions of the Georgian Government;

    C. whereas Georgia has been experiencing democratic backsliding in recent years and in particular since the parliamentary elections of 26 October 2024, which failed to meet international democratic standards and comply with Georgia’s OSCE commitments, and resulted in an illegitimate parliament composed of only one political party, Georgian Dream; whereas Russia has systematically interfered in democratic processes in Georgia; whereas the fraudulent elections included voter intimidation, vote buying and harassment of election observers;

    D. whereas on 28 November 2024, Irakli Kobakhidze announced that Georgia would delay initiating accession talks with the EU and reject its financial assistance until the end of 2028, disregarding the country’s constitutional commitment to European integration and effectively undermining Georgia’s sovereign Euro-Atlantic aspirations, which have the strong support of the Georgian people;

    E. whereas concerns over the direction in which the country is heading and the decision to pause the efforts to start accession negotiations sparked large-scale protests across the country, with protesters demanding new, free and fair elections, the return of the country to its European path, an end to political violence and repression, investigations into and accountability for the serious human rights violations committed against protesters by law enforcement agencies, and the release of political prisoners; whereas protests have been taking place every day without interruption since 28 November 2024; whereas pro-EU protests have significantly increased across Georgia in 2025, with tens of thousands of citizens demonstrating against the government’s perceived shift away from EU integration; whereas these self-organised and spontaneous protests involving all segments of Georgian society underscore the Georgian people’s strong commitment to European values and democratic governance;

    F. whereas in response to the peaceful protests, the Georgian authorities began an unprecedented violent crackdown on demonstrations, accompanied by the unlawful use of force, torture and other ill-treatment by the de facto authorities; whereas since November 2024, at least 62 people have been criminally charged in connection with their participation in pro-European protests and 54 remain in pre-trial detention; whereas more than 500 people have been detained under administrative procedures, some 300 of whom have reportedly been subjected to torture or other forms of inhuman and degrading treatment and at least 157 of whom have suffered visible signs of serious physical injury;

     

    G. whereas the de facto Georgian Dream authorities systematically subject civil society and independent media to pressure, legal restrictions and physical violence; whereas at least 138 incidents of media freedom violations have been documented in the context of pro-European protests or related events since November 2024, and a total of 174 media professionals have been the target of state repression; whereas at least 30 reporters have suffered repeated violations, including physical assaults, damage to professional equipment, administrative fines, criminal charges and judicial harassment; whereas journalist Mzia Amaglobeli is currently in pre-trial detention on trumped-up charges;

     

    H. whereas the Georgian authorities have been restructuring or eliminating structures within the Georgian civil service responsible for pro-European reforms and dismissing professionals and civil servants en masse, in particular those who have criticised government policies, expressed pro-European views and condemned violence against peaceful demonstrators;

     

    I. whereas the illegitimate Georgian parliament has established the Temporary Parliamentary Investigative Commission on the Activities of the Regime and Political Figures of 2003-2012, which was the period when President Mikheil Saakashvili was at the helm and paving the way for Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic ambitions; whereas this commission is a tool for the further persecution of political opponents, especially leaders of opposition movements; whereas on 22 May 2025, Zurab ‘Girchi’ Japaridze, the leader of the Girchi – More Freedom party and one of the leaders of the Coalition for Change, was arrested for refusing to appear before this politically motivated commission created and controlled by Georgian Dream, whose long-term ambition is to eradicate political opposition in Georgia; whereas on 29 May 2025, Nika Melia, another leader of the Coalition for Change, was arrested one day before he was due to appear in court for refusing to appear before the Temporary Parliamentary Investigative Commission;

     

    J. whereas, in order to maintain and further increase its grip on power, the ruling Georgian Dream party has unilaterally and without consultation adopted changes to the municipal electoral system for the elections to the city councils in October 2025; whereas the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe has recommended repealing these changes and the leaders of the main opposition parties have announced that their parties will not participate in those elections; whereas reforms to the formation process of the Central Election Commission further compromise election integrity, limit citizen participation and restrict the ability of observers and media to effectively monitor the electoral process;

     

    K. whereas despite progress towards a more equal and inclusive society, deep-rooted inequalities and stereotypes persist, resulting in high levels of gender-based violence, severe restrictions for persons with disabilities and violence and harassment against the LGBTI community; whereas due to insecurity at home, many LGBTI people choose to flee the country; whereas Georgia’s legal definition of rape does not comply with the standards set in the Istanbul Convention;

    Suspension of Georgia’s EU integration

    1. Reiterates its solidarity with the Georgian people and its unwavering support for their legitimate European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations and wish to live in a prosperous and democratic country, as expressed in mass protests that continue despite brutal crackdowns by the authorities; remains ready to assist the Georgian people in achieving these goals; strongly condemns the violent repression, arbitrary and politically motivated detention without sufficient legal grounds and the reported systemic torture of peaceful protesters, civil society actors, political opponents and media representatives; demands that the Georgian authorities refrain from using force, respect the freedoms of assembly and of expression and annul the recently adopted draconian legislation aimed at stifling popular protests, notably through extortionate fines; expresses its particular concern regarding the growing number of political prisoners and reiterates its call for the immediate and unconditional release of all of them; calls for all acts of violence to be effectively and credibly investigated and for those responsible to be held accountable; expresses concern about the lack of independence within the judiciary, with high-placed judges with links to the Georgian Dream overseeing politically motivated court proceedings against peaceful protesters and government critics;

    2. Expresses deep regret over the fact that the ruling Georgian Dream party failed to use the historic opportunity granted to Georgia, as a candidate country, to progress on its European integration path, noting that European integration continues to be supported by an overwhelming majority of the population; recalls that candidate status was granted to Georgia with the benefit of the doubt, despite the already concerning trajectory of the Georgian Dream government’s actions, which were increasingly at odds with European values and democratic principles; underlines that Georgia under Georgian Dream’s rule has not moved forward, and has in fact even regressed, on the key provisions of the nine steps indicated by the Commission, despite the authorities’ claims to the contrary; stresses that Georgia’s EU integration process has effectively been suspended as a result of the continued democratic backsliding in the country and the rigged October 2024 parliamentary elections amounting to a clear turning point towards an authoritarian regime, the ensuing illicit capture of the state institutions and democratic safeguards, and the adoption of a series of anti-democratic legislative acts that run counter to the values and principles upon which the EU is founded; concurs with the European Council’s conclusions of 27 June 2024 that a failure to reverse the current course of action jeopardises Georgia’s EU path and urges the Georgian Dream to return to the course of democratic reforms and Euro-Atlantic integration;

    3. Deplores the dismissal of approximately 700 civil servants since December 2024 due to their participation in or support for pro-European protests; stresses that such retaliation erodes public trust in democratic institutions, violates freedom of expression and association, and contributes to the deepening authoritarian tendencies of the current regime; calls on the Georgian authorities to abide by labour law standards and to allow civil servants to register a trade union in order to protect them from the unjustified restriction of their labour rights; expresses its concern about the growing politicisation of civil service appointments, and calls for a repeal of the amendments to the Law on Public Service adopted in December 2024 that remove the competition rule for the appointment of civil servants and instead grant direct appointment powers to the heads of public institutions; reiterates that these amendments constitute worrying backsliding from the successful public service reform that was implemented by Georgia under the EU-Georgian Association Agreement and calls for their repeal; 4.  Stresses the need for an immediate and comprehensive audit of the EU’s policy towards Georgia given the ongoing democratic backsliding and the increasingly repressive political and legislative environment that constitutes a regression for many of Georgia’s democratic achievements and successful EU reforms, fundamentally weakens democratic institutions and further consolidates power in the hands of the ruling party; calls, in this regard, on the Commission to review the implementation of the EU-Georgia Association Agreement in the light of the blatant breach of Georgia’s obligations regarding the general principles laid down in Article 2, namely respect for democratic principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms; reiterates that non-fulfilment of these obligations may result in the conditional suspension of economic cooperation and the privileges afforded by the Agreement;

    5. Deplores the fact that high-level ruling party officials, members of parliament and government-affiliated media regularly spread manipulative narratives, disinformation and conspiracy theories about the EU, its Member States, leaders and politicians, as well as European integration; stresses that the ruling party’s regime continues its purposefully deceitful and ambiguous discourse, fuelling the false belief among parts of the Georgian public that it remains in favour of European integration; regrets the fact that the media and information environment is being suppressed and dominated by TV and media outlets supported by Georgian Dream, which spread false narratives about EU integration, thereby emulating and playing into Russian-inspired propaganda and facilitating polarisation in society;

     

    6. Underlines the responsibility of Bidzina Ivanishvili and other officials and political leaders, including Irakli Kobakhidze, Shalva Papuashvili, Vakhtang Gomelauri, Mayor of Tbilisi and Georgian Dream Secretary General Kakha Kaladze, and the former Georgian Dream chair Irakli Garibashvili, for the deterioration of the political process in Georgia by enabling democratic backsliding resulting in the autocratic consolidation of power and by acting against the country’s constitutional objective of Euro-Atlantic integration; calls, therefore, for immediate and targeted personal sanctions to be imposed against Bidzina Ivanishvili, his family members and his companies and calls for the EU, in cooperation with other jurisdictions, in particular the United Kingdom, to freeze his financial assets; deplores the obstruction by the Hungarian and Slovak Governments of the Council decisions on the imposition of sanctions against individuals responsible for democratic backsliding in Georgia; condemns the unilateral actions by the Hungarian Government seeking to legitimise Georgian Dream;

     

    Continued backsliding on democracy and the rule of law and the autocratic consolidation of power

     

    7. Reiterates its position that the settlement of the current political and constitutional crisis in Georgia can only be achieved by way of new parliamentary elections, which should be held in the next few months in an improved electoral environment, overseen by an independent and impartial election administration and monitored through diligent international and independent domestic observation to guarantee a genuinely fair, free and transparent process that would reflect the true will of the people;

    8. Stresses that it does not recognise the self-proclaimed authorities established by the Georgian Dream party following the rigged parliamentary elections of 26 October 2024 and that it considers Georgia to be a state captured by the illegitimate Georgian Dream regime; consequentially rejects any decisions taken by the body that has taken control of the country, such as the rushed adoption of amendments to the Code on Administrative Offences, the Criminal Code and the Law on Assemblies and Manifestations; regrets the fact that the parliament of Georgia is a one-party parliament formed on the basis of fraudulent elections, which is incompatible with a pluralistic parliamentary democracy and the standards expected from an EU candidate country; welcomes the rejection of Georgian Dream’s credentials in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, which resulted in the withdrawal of the Georgian delegation;

    9. Deplores the continued attempts by the ruling Georgian Dream party to persecute political opponents, including through their illegal arrest and detention, threats and physical attacks; reiterates its calls for an end to politically motivated hostilities, an improvement to the political environment and the building of trust and cross-party dialogue;

     

    10. Condemns the unlawful prosecution of political opponents by the investigative committee of the de facto Georgian parliament under the leadership of the Georgian Dream party, which disproportionately targets the actions of the government that ended its mandate more than twelve years ago; highlights the political nature of the ‘investigation’, noting that the Georgian Dream party has been in power since 2012 but launched the investigative committee in parallel with its attempts to ban genuine opposition parties; notes with concern the statements by the chair of the investigative committee, Tea Tsulukiani, spreading Russian narratives; strongly condemns the arrest of Zurab ‘Girchi’ Japaridze and Nika Melia, and the threats to arrest  other politicians, and considers these individuals to be political prisoners;

     

    11. Expresses deep concern over recent declarations by leaders of the ruling Georgian Dream party indicating their intention to declare opposition parties – primarily the United National Movement – unconstitutional; recalls that the United National Movement played a pivotal role in initiating and advancing Georgia’s European integration process; notes the parallels between the conduct of the Georgian Dream de facto authorities and the current Kremlin regime, which cemented its rule by outlawing opposition parties; condemns the draft amendment to the Organic Law on Political Associations of Citizens and to the Law on the Constitutional Court adopted on 13 May 2025, which would empower the Constitutional Court to effectively and arbitrarily ban all opposition parties;

     

    12. Strongly reiterates its demand for the immediate release of former President Mikheil Saakashvili on humanitarian grounds for the purpose of seeking the necessary medical treatment abroad; emphasises that the Georgian authorities bear full responsibility for his health and well-being and must be held accountable for any harm that befalls him; calls, furthermore, on the Georgian Dream authorities to ensure that Members of the European Parliament are granted unhindered access to Mikheil Saakashvili;

     

    13. Underlines that the policy of non-recognition of the legitimacy of the one-party parliament and the president appointed by it should continue until there is a tangible change in the political course of Georgia and new free and fair parliamentary elections are held; calls for the EU’s and the Member States’ representatives and members of parliament to refrain from meetings with representatives of the regime, starting with the current de facto president; continues to recognise Salome Zourabichvili as the legitimate President of Georgia and representative of the Georgian people; praises her efforts to peacefully steer the country back towards a democratic and European path of development;

     

    14. Points out that the upcoming municipal elections in autumn 2025 present yet another test for the resilience of Georgia’s democracy and political pluralism; calls on the opposition to seize the opportunity presented by these elections to reflect the unity of the Georgian people in favour of democracy and the rule of law, as already demonstrated in the peaceful protests against the manipulation of the parliamentary elections and repression; calls for the municipal elections to be held in an improved electoral environment, overseen by an independent and impartial election administration and monitored through diligent international observation to guarantee a genuinely fair, free and transparent process;

     

    15. Is deeply concerned, in this context, by the further deterioration of the electoral system and the overall democratic environment ahead of the municipal elections, in particular the fast-tracked adoption of new amendments to Georgia’s Organic Law and to the Election Code in December 2024 that undermine the principle of equal suffrage and aim to solidify the ruling party’s dominance at all levels of governance; recalls that these amendments have been criticised by the Venice Commission and calls for them to be repealed; calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Member States to consider imposing additional individual sanctions against Georgian officials if the upcoming municipal elections fail to meet the criteria for fair and free elections;

     

    16. Strongly condemns the continuing and deliberate destruction of the environment for Georgia’s vibrant civil society, with the adoption of several pieces of restrictive Russian-style legislation, including on the transparency of foreign influence, threats, and stigmatisation by the authorities; strongly denounces the new legislative initiative that requires the registration of all civil society organisation grants with the government and that obliges foreign donors to obtain executive approval to disburse grants to local organisations; regrets the recent decision by the authorities to freeze the bank accounts of crowdfunding initiatives and campaigns in support of political prisoners and their families; calls on the authorities to immediately cease the intimidation, threats, politically motivated prosecutions and physical assaults against civil society representatives, political leaders, civil activists, journalists and media workers in Georgia; condemns the arbitrary and unjustified refusal of several European journalists’ entry to Georgia;

    17. Condemns the recent adoption, without due public consultation, of legislation that enables further political persecution, limits the right of assembly, and further shrinks the space for civil society, independent media and the opposition to operate freely, including the Russian-style foreign agent law, the amendments to the Law on Public Service, the amendments to the Law on Grants, the Foreign Agents Registration Act, as well as new restrictive amendments to the Broadcasting Law; calls for the Georgian authorities to repeal these legislative changes; stresses that Georgian Dream’s political conduct, including its strategic alignment with the Russian Federation and the accelerated adoption of tools characteristic of authoritarian regimes, mirrors such developments within Russia itself;

     

    18. Commends the work of Georgia’s civil society in the past months, providing free legal aid, documenting serious human rights violations and taking the lead on domestic and international litigation to seek justice and accountability against a background of continued attacks, the criminalisation of civic space, and disinformation campaigns against the work of civil society;

     

    19. Stresses the urgent need to support Georgia’s civil society and independent media in the light of the growing repression and the suspension of the activities of the US Agency for International Development (USAID), and therefore asks the Commission to increase financial support and disburse it without any further delay; calls for the EU’s funding mechanisms to be adjusted to take into account the needs that arise in a more hostile and anti-democratic environment and for funds to be reallocated to directly support civil society organisations, independent media and human rights defenders; stresses further, in this regard, that the Member States should be ready to receive and support Georgian civil society organisations and independent media outlets so that they can continue their work in exile;

     

    20. Stresses that beyond Georgian Dream’s rejection of Georgia’s EU integration, it rejects more generally international human rights law and democratic standards, while speedily moving along the negative trajectory previously witnessed in Russia; is deeply concerned, specifically, that this will have further trickle-down effects on the rights and well-being of women, minorities, migrants, persons with disabilities, LGBTI people, people living below the poverty line, and other vulnerable or at-risk groups; strongly condemns the adoption of anti-LGBTI legislation by the Georgian parliament in October 2024, which mirrors authoritarian, Russian-style policies and violates the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and calls for it to be repealed; calls for the reinstatement of gender quotas that were abolished by the parliament of Georgia in April 2024; calls on the EU Member States, when assessing asylum applications, to adequately take into account the fact that Georgia now has one of the most repressive anti-LGBTI laws in Europe; is concerned about the lack of protection of ethnic and religious minorities in Georgia;

     

    21. Reiterates that the measures taken by the EU so far in response to the flagrant democratic backsliding and reneging on previous commitments do not reflect the severity of the situation in Georgia and its consequences across the region; regrets the lack of proactive measures taken and the generally limited and delayed reaction by the Council and the Commission; stresses that the absence of unanimity among the Member States should not prevent those willing to take appropriate and effective measures from doing so; calls on the EU’s leadership to urgently rally like-minded Member States to take coordinated action and thereby surmount the political obstacles to adopting EU-wide sanctions;

    22. Calls for the EU and its Member States to introduce, on a bilateral and coordinated basis, personal sanctions against key Georgian Dream political leaders, officials and the regime’s enablers in the administration, business, media, justice system, law enforcement agencies and the electoral commission who are responsible for democratic backsliding, electoral fraud, human rights violations and the persecution of political opponents and activists; further calls for sanctions to extend to mid- and lower-level public officials responsible for implementing repressive measures against the regime’s opponents and to maintain them until Georgian democracy is adequately restored; welcomes the imposition of bilateral sanctions by Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Czechia, Germany and Poland, as well as by like-minded partners such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Ukraine, and invites other EU Member States to follow suit; calls for the consideration of further restrictive measures, such as SWIFT cut-off or sectoral sanctions, aimed at cutting off the financial flows and sources of income of the Georgian Dream regime;

     

    23. Welcomes the Council’s decision to suspend visa-free travel for Georgian diplomats and officials as a first step in response to the persistent negative developments in Georgia; reiterates its call on the Commission and the Council to review Georgia’s visa-free status, with the possibility of suspending it if the relevant benchmarks and standards on democratic governance and freedoms are not met because of the ruling party’s actions; stresses that Georgian Dream is fully responsible for any consequences stemming from the possible suspension of the visa-free regime for Georgian citizens; stresses the importance of visa-free travel for Georgian civil society actors, human rights activists and journalists, among others, both for travelling to the EU to inform European actors of developments in Georgia, but also for enabling them to quickly leave the country, as many face political persecution by the authorities;

    Alignment on foreign policy matters

    24. Deplores the fact that Georgian Dream is undoing decades of progress towards democracy, the rule of law and Euro-Atlantic integration and is alienating its allies, which had supported it throughout the process; regrets that Georgia has made no progress on implementing the EU’s recommendations on foreign, security and defence policy and that the level of Georgia’s alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP) remains remarkably low, at 49 %, demonstrating its lack of commitment to European integration; emphasises that progress in the EU accession process requires full alignment with the EU’s CFSP, in line with the expectations for all candidate countries; regrets the fact that Georgia does not participate in the EU’s crisis management missions and operations under the common security and defence policy; regrets the fact that misalignment of Georgia’s foreign policy is leading to self-isolation and that Georgian Dream’s repressive regime is worsening the instability in the South Caucasus region and the Black Sea;

    25. Notes that Georgia, under the current government, is moving in a direction that puts it at risk of becoming a Russian vassal state like Belarus; regrets the fact that, at a time when the democratic world is standing in strong support of Ukraine against the Russian Federation’s unprovoked war of aggression, the current Georgian authorities are increasingly aligning themselves with Kremlin policies and rhetoric, thereby contributing to historical revisionism; notes that Georgia has not aligned with the vast majority of sanctions against Russia, Belarus and Iran, but has claimed that it has cooperated with the EU to prevent sanctions circumvention; expresses its concern, however, over reports alleging Georgia’s role in facilitating the evasion of EU sanctions against Russia; calls, therefore, on the Commission to conduct a thorough investigation into such allegations;

     

    26. Notes also with concern the recent strategic turn by the Georgian Dream government towards China and its increasing cooperation with Iran; notes the Georgian Dream’s public support for Chinese geostrategic initiatives and strengthened bilateral economic relations, including the award of the Anaklia deep-sea port construction project to a Chinese-led consortium; emphasises that such a move contradicts Georgia’s stated commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration; underscores that the Anaklia project now risks becoming a vehicle for increasing Chinese political, financial and economic leverage in the region, thereby further distancing Georgia from its strategic partners in the West; calls, in this regard, on the Commission and the Member States to review and, if necessary, suspend or redirect funding for regional connectivity projects; expresses serious concern about Georgia’s increased multifaceted cooperation with Teheran, which can lead to Georgia’s further isolation;

     

    27. Warns that Georgia’s ongoing turn towards authoritarianism and increasing alignment with Russia constitutes a growing threat to European security, particularly in view of Georgia’s strategic location and access to the Black Sea, which is critical to Russia projecting power in the region; underlines that the ruling Georgian Dream party’s strategy may be replicated elsewhere as a playbook for hybrid state capture; is concerned about regional repercussions and warns that the credibility of European action in the wider South Caucasus is at stake, especially in anticipation of the forthcoming EU Black Sea strategy;

     

    28. Is deeply concerned about Georgian Dream’s collaboration, rapprochement and ideological convergence with Russia and other authoritarian regimes, despite Russia’s creeping occupation of Georgia’s territory; denounces Georgian Dream’s promotion of and participation in Russian disinformation and manipulation, including the weaponisation of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine as a propaganda tool, which are at odds with the undiminished and extraordinarily high public support for the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration; regrets the lack of cooperation with the EU in the fight against foreign information manipulation and interference;

    29. Reiterates its strongest condemnation of Russia’s ongoing occupation of Georgia’s regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the continued ‘borderisation’ process, which constitutes a violation of Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; urges the Georgian government to maintain a clear and consistent position on Russian aggression and calls for the EU to remain actively engaged in conflict resolution, human rights monitoring and support for affected communities;

    30. Recommends the reinforcement of the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) with increased resources and a broader mandate to monitor foreign interference and border destabilisation; urges the Member States to ensure adequate funding and personnel for the EUMM to respond to the current political and security crisis;

    31. Notes that support from the European Peace Facility, worth EUR 30 million, was rightfully suspended in 2024 in response to the democratic backsliding in Georgia and that no support is planned for 2025; highlights that this suspension will have detrimental consequences on the national stability and security of Georgia; reiterates that any future financial support can only be authorised with the stipulation that the self-declared Georgian regime step down and fair and impartial elections be held;

     

    °

    ° °

    32. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the President of Georgia Salome Zourabichvili and the self-appointed authorities of Georgia.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT containing a motion for a non-legislative resolution on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part – A10-0111/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT NON-LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

    on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part

    (10724/22 – C10‑0057/2024 – 2022/0184M(NLE))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part (10724/22),

    – having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council on 27 June 2024 in accordance with Articles 207 and 209, in conjunction with Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a), and Article 218(7) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C10‑0057/2024),

    – having regard to the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part[1] (EPCA),

    – having regard to the Joint Roadmap for Deepening Ties between the EU and Central Asia of 23 October 2023,

    – having regard to the joint communication by the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 15 May 2019 entitled ‘The EU and Central Asia: New Opportunities for a Stronger Partnership’ (JOIN(2019)0009),

    – having regard to the Commission’s assessment reports on the EU’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+) with Kyrgyzstan,

    – having regard to the first EU-Central Asia summit on 4 April 2025,

    – having regard to the 11th High-Level Political and Security Dialogue between the European Union and the countries of Central Asia, held in Brussels on 5 June 2024,

    – having regard to the joint press statement of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic, Sadyr Zhaparov, and the then President of the European Council, Charles Michel, published on 3 June 2023,

    – having regard to the 14th Human Rights Dialogue, held in Bishkek on 25 June 2024,

    – having regard to the 19th meeting of the EU-Kyrgyzstan Cooperation Council, held in Brussels on 15 November 2022,

    – having regard to the opinions of the Venice Commission on recent legal amendments abridging the freedom of the press and hampering the work of non-governmental organisations in Kyrgyzstan,

    – having regard to reports on Kyrgyzstan published by human rights organisations, such as the 2022, 2023 and 2024 annual world reports by Human Rights Watch,

     

    – having regard to the International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR) briefing on the protection of fundamental freedoms and civic space in Kyrgyzstan, published in February 2025,

    – having regard to its resolution of 17 January 2024 on the EU strategy on Central Asia[2],

    – having regard to its previous resolutions on Kyrgyzstan, notably that of 19 December 2024 on the human rights situation in Kyrgyzstan, in particular the case of Temirlan Sultanbekov[3],

    – having regard to the visit of the delegation of its Subcommittee on Human Rights to Kyrgyzstan from 25 to27 February 2025,

    – having regard to the statement by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, following his official visit to Kyrgyzstan from 19 to 20 March 2025,

    – having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

    – having regard to its legislative resolution of […] on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part,

    – having regard to Rule 107(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0111/2025),

    A. whereas Kyrgyzstan occupies an important position in Central Asia, a region of increasing geopolitical significance that the EU has recognised as a key partner with which it engaged in structured dialogue at the first EU-Central Asia summit;

    B. whereas the EU and Kyrgyzstan have been partners since the country gained independence in 1991, and have established a comprehensive legal framework for their cooperation through the EU-Kyrgyzstan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, signed in 1999;

    C. whereas the EU and Kyrgyzstan have recently agreed to deepen their partnership by signing an Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EPCA), which represents a modern and ambitious framework for strengthening dialogue and cooperation in key areas such as trade and investment, sustainable development and connectivity, research and innovation, education, the environment and climate change, as well as the rule of law, human rights and civil society;

     

    D. whereas the EPCA could also facilitate stronger cooperation on foreign and security policy, including conflict prevention and crisis management, risk reduction, cybersecurity, regional stability, disarmament, non-proliferation, arms control and arms export control;

     

    E. whereas the EPCA, which enhances the existing Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 1999, was signed on 25 June 2024; whereas the EPCA requires Parliament’s consent for it to enter into force;

    F. whereas Kyrgyzstan has benefited from unilateral and preferential access to the EU market through the Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+) since 2016; whereas Kyrgyzstan has acceded to 27 international conventions related to labour and human rights, environmental and climate protection, and good governance in order to be able to benefit from this scheme;

     

    G. whereas the EU has allocated EUR 98 million to support governance and digital transformation, human development and a green and climate-resilient economy in Kyrgyzstan over the 2021-2027 period, aligning with the National Development Strategy of the Kyrgyz Republic;

     

    H. whereas the EU has allocated EUR 12 million to enhance the quality of legislation and increase the efficiency, independence, professionalism and capacities of the judiciary and services of the justice sector in Kyrgyzstan, thereby signalling its willingness to invest in stable growth that is consistent with the rule of law; whereas concerns over the independence of the judiciary persist, with politically motivated cases that target individuals critical of the government; whereas the 2021 reform of the Criminal Code of the Kyrgyz Republic has reintroduced the heavily criticised 1997 version of the Code, which gives greater power to law enforcement while reducing citizens’ rights;

     

    I. whereas the EPCA stipulates that the EU and Kyrgyzstan shall cooperate to strengthen civil society and its role in the economic, social and political development of an open democratic society;

     

    J. whereas Kyrgyzstan ranks 100th in the 2025 Global Terrorism Index of the Institute for Economics and Peace, and has been classified as a country with ‘no impact’ of terrorism;

     

    K. whereas, despite the Government of Kyrgyzstan repeatedly expressing its commitment to the principles of democracy and respect for human rights and the rule of law, human rights organisations have called attention to democratic backsliding and hardening authoritarian practices and persecution of civil society organisations in Kyrgyzstan in recent years, including during the negotiation of the EPCA and since its signing, with Transparency International and Freedom House finding that Kyrgyzstan has turned from a bastion of democracy with a vibrant civil society to a consolidated authoritarian regime that uses its justice system to target critics and whose authorities further undermine the balance of power and the system of checks and balances;

    L. whereas Kyrgyzstan ranks 146 out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index; whereas, at President Japarov’s initiative, the law on public procurement was amended to allow state-owned enterprises to circumvent tendering procedures; whereas there is no proper oversight of public spending due to a lack of access to such information; whereas state funds and national resources are used by the ruling elites to consolidate their power, silence dissent and resist reform;

     

    M. whereas human rights defender, investigative journalist and founder of the Temirov Live media outlet, Bolot Temirov, has been stripped of his Kyrgyz citizenship and forced to leave the country in retaliation for his work investigating widespread corruption; whereas at least 11 of his colleagues were arrested in January 2024, including Makhabat Tajibek kyzy, Azamat Ishenbekov, Aike Beishekeyeva and Aktilek Kaparov;

     

    N. whereas in March 2025, independent journalist and activist Kanyshai Mamyrkulova was arrested and remains in detention in retaliation for her social media posts critical of the government;

     

    O. whereas Kyrgyz Government propaganda has used false narratives to discredit independent media in the eyes of society and to portray them as ‘enemies of the people’ and ‘slaves of the West’;

     

    P. whereas in recent years, democratic standards and human rights have deteriorated alarmingly in Kyrgyzstan; whereas Kyrgyzstan has fallen from 72nd to 144th place in the Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index; whereas it ranks as the country that has had the sharpest decline in press freedom leading up to 2025;

     

    Q. whereas the Kyrgyz authorities seek to shut down Aprel TV; whereas, as stated by the Committee to Protect Journalists, the prosecutors’ filing indicates that the authorities seek to shut down the media outlet on the basis of allegations that the outlet’s critical reporting portrays the authorities ‘in an unfavourable light’ and ‘undermines the authority of the government’;

     

    R. whereas Parliament expressed its concern about the persecution of opposition parties and independent media in its resolutions of 13 July 2023[4] and of 19 December 2024; whereas the persecution of members of the Social Democrats party (SDK) persists, despite repeated calls to ensure free and fair elections; whereas the leader of the SDK, Temirlan Sultanbekov, and two other members, Irina Karamushkina and Roza Turksever, remain in detention; whereas there is cause for concern about Temirlan Sultanbekov’s medical condition following his prolonged hunger strike;

    S. whereas the Russian-style ‘foreign representatives’ law, adopted by the Kyrgyz Parliament in March 2024, which requires non-profits that receive funding from abroad and engage in broadly defined political activity to register as ‘foreign representatives’, discriminates against and stigmatises journalists, human rights activists and other non-profit workers and subjects them to intrusive oversight, burdensome reporting requirements and excessive fines; whereas this law mimics repressive legislation in other authoritarian regimes and can be considered a precursor to further attempts to suppress independent civil society and media;

    T. whereas the crackdown on human rights has targeted LGBTIQ+ people in particular; whereas Kyrgyzstan’s new legislative landscape, along with the broader political shift and repression, has effectively decimated the work of LGBTIQ+ rights organisations and activists, with key organisations completely shut down; whereas on 14 August 2023, Kyrgyzstan enacted discriminatory provisions against the LGBTIQ+ community under the pretext of protecting minors from ‘harmful information’; whereas the anti-discrimination bill recently considered by the Kyrgyzstan Supreme Council failed to include sexual orientation and gender identity as protected categories;

     

    U. whereas the law adopted on 6 October 2023 giving the President of Kyrgyzstan the power to overturn rulings of the Constitutional Court if they conflict with his own interpretation of ‘moral values’ fundamentally weakens the separation of powers – a foundational element of the rule of law – and constitutes a hollowing out of judicial independence in Kyrgyzstan;

    V. whereas Kyrgyzstan is increasingly investing in the promotion of gender equality and women’s empowerment, particularly through key national frameworks such as the National Strategy on Gender Equality until 2030; whereas Kyrgyzstan still faces high rates of domestic violence, over 20 % of marriages in Kyrgyzstan occur through ‘ala kachuu’ (bride kidnapping) and women hold only 22 % of parliamentary seats despite existing gender quotas; whereas, on average, women earn 25 % less than men, as they are predominantly employed in low-paying sectors such as education, healthcare and social services;

     

    W. whereas the Kyrgyz authorities have engaged in actions that limit freedom of speech in the country and have arrested, put in long pre-trial detention or imprisoned journalists, bloggers, poets and regular social media users for criticising the country’s leadership or the situation in the country, and have also closed down an award-winning investigative media outlet;

     

    X. whereas Kyrgyzstan ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 2014; whereas tentative steps have been taken towards improving accessibility for persons with disabilities and introducing the concept of inclusive education, though challenges remain, in particular concerning the institutionalisation of persons with disabilities;

     

    Y. whereas the law on ‘false information’, enacted on 24 August 2021, has been used to target independent media and individuals critical of the government; whereas on 10 April 2025, the Supreme Council of Kyrgyzstan approved amendments to the law that provide for administrative sanctions for the dissemination of ‘false information’ on social media;

     

    Z. whereas the Supreme Council of Kyrgyzstan is currently considering the re-criminalisation of the possession of ‘extremist’ materials, which has previously been misused against peaceful religious practitioners, and which, on account of the bill’s vague wording, could be used to silence legitimate political speech;

     

    AA. whereas two new laws on freedom of religion came into force on 1 January 2025; whereas these laws maintain the ban on all unregistered exercise of freedom of religion or belief and make it impossible for communities with fewer than 500 adult members to gain legal status;

     

    AB. whereas the negligence of the Kyrgyz law enforcement authorities in response to a campaign of intimidation and harassment has forced journalists and human rights workers to flee the country;

     

    AC. whereas the Kyrgyz authorities have silenced, arrested, detained and extradited refugees fleeing Russia for protesting against the war in Ukraine, contravening Kyrgyzstan’s obligation under the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees not to return people to countries where their life or freedom is under threat on account of their political views, or where there are substantial grounds for believing that they would be in danger of being subjected to serious human rights violations such as torture or other forms of cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment;

     

    AD. whereas the Presidents of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed a border demarcation agreement on 13 March 2025, which legally recognises the borders between the two countries and allows for the development of interstate roads and energy infrastructure, contributing to regional stability and opportunities for enhanced cross-border cooperation on energy, transport and trade; whereas the border agreement itself has not been made public or open to public consultations;

    AE. whereas the leaders of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signed the Khujand Declaration of Eternal Friendship on 31 March 2025;

     

    AF. whereas the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, has drawn attention to the concerning signs of democratic backsliding in Kyrgyzstan in recent years, with particular emphasis on the increasing restrictions on civil society and independent journalism;

     

    AG. whereas Central Asia has yet to create horizontal regional frameworks free from the dominance of external actors pursuing their own geopolitical gains;

     

    AH. whereas Kyrgyzstan has historically close and intertwined relations with Russia, with both being members of the Eurasian Economic Union, the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Commonwealth of Independent States; whereas in October 2023, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov hosted Russian President Vladimir Putin in Bishkek during Putin’s first foreign trip since the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant against him; whereas Kyrgyzstan, along with other Central Asian countries, has become a transit point for circumventing sanctions imposed on Russia for its war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas exports of advanced technology and dual-use items to Kyrgyzstan – which are then exported to Russia – have significantly increased; whereas Kyrgyzstan has either abstained from voting or sided with Russia on votes on numerous UN resolutions on human rights and, in particular, on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

     

    AI. whereas OJSC Keremet Bank, based in Kyrgyzstan, was involved in a sanctions evasion scheme with Russian state-owned defence bank Promsvyazbank Public Joint-Stock Company (PSB), where it facilitated cross-border transfers on behalf of PSB; whereas in 2024, the Kyrgyz Ministry of Finance sold a controlling stake in Keremet Bank to a Russian oligarch with ties to the Russian Government; whereas the United States has imposed sanctions on Keremet Bank;

     

    EU-Kyrgyzstan EPCA

    1. Despite the shared interests in strengthening the EU-Kyrgyzstan important political and trade relations, is concerned by the deteriorating situation of human rights, democracy and the rule of law in Kyrgyzstan, particularly in the context of the completion of negotiations and the signing of the EPCA; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities, in this context, to respect and uphold fundamental freedoms, in particular media freedom and freedom of expression, and to foster an environment of cooperation and involvement of civil society and local communities in public consultations and decision-making processes; underlines the importance of Parliament’s close involvement in monitoring the implementation of all parts of the EPCA; calls for an effective evaluation by both parties to the agreement, to be conducted within three years, of the implementation of its essential elements, with clear human rights benchmarks and time frames; calls on the Commission to present to Parliament the outcome of such evaluations; expects that, given the recent backsliding on these fronts and ahead of the EPCA vote in the European Parliament and its subsequent implementation, the Kyrgyz Government will take some concrete steps towards addressing the pressing concerns outlined in this report, such as releasing political prisoners and repealing recently adopted repressive legislation; considers that a negative assessment of the implementation of these essential elements could lead to Article 316 of the EPCA being triggered;

    EU-Kyrgyzstan relations

    2. Welcomes the long-standing and strategic relations between the EU and Kyrgyzstan, as well as the increasing cooperation and exchanges; recalls that Kyrgyzstan is the EU’s third-largest trading partner in Central Asia; reiterates its commitment to work together with the country and with its partners in Central Asia to ensure peace, security, stability, prosperity, democracy and sustainable development;

    3. Welcomes the outcomes of the first EU-Central Asia summit held in Samarkand on 4 April 2025; welcomes their commitment to regional and global stability, to the promotion and protection of the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to addressing climate action, connectivity and education; notes also the 20th EU-Central Asia Ministerial meeting held in Ashgabat on 27 March 2025;

     

    4. Highlights the need for cooperation in promoting green initiatives based on a sustainable market economy, private sector innovation, and long-term environmental stewardship, early warning systems for natural disasters, low-carbon development and the transition to renewable energy sources; highlights Kyrgyzstan’s initiatives to promote the mountain agenda on global platforms, including the preservation of mountain ecosystems, the protection of the environment  and the development of sustainable tourism and mountain communities; stresses that investments in Kyrgyzstan’s green energy goals would significantly contribute to reducing the country’s regional energy dependence and to tackling environmental challenges; commends the Kyrgyz Republic’s involvement in the Team Europe Initiative on Water, Energy and Climate Change;

    5. Supports Kyrgyzstan’s efforts towards sustainable development, aligning its initiatives with the country’s National Development strategy for 2018-2040, alongside the EU’s Global Gateway strategy and the EU strategy for Central Asia; recalls that the EU-Kyrgyzpartnership prioritises governance and digital transformation in order to enhance transparency and efficiency in public administration;

     

    6. Welcomes Team Europe initiatives seeking to build a green and climate-resilient economy in order to address environmental challenges and promote sustainable growth; highlights the recent signing of the agreement between the Kyrgyz Ministry of Finance and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which will strengthen the Kyrgyz Climate-Resilient Water Services Programme;

     

    7. Calls on the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to continue promoting joint cooperation initiatives in strategic areas such as energy infrastructure, in particular the hydropower sector, sustainable development and culture, while also building on the positive experiences of the Member States already active in the region;

     

    8. Highlights the importance of enhancing cooperation on critical raw materials, which have been identified as strategically important for ensuring secure, sustainable and diversified supply chains; takes note of the endorsement of the EU-Central Asia Joint Declaration of Intent on Critical Raw Materials at the first EU-Central Asia summit, and of Kyrgyzstan’s proposal to establish a partnership with the EU for the development of critical raw materials;

     

    9. Notes that the Erasmus+ programme has been instrumental in facilitating academic exchanges; welcomes the EU’s support for digitalisation and education in the country, and calls for the creation of a programme for the exchange of entrepreneurs in the field of digital transformation and the green transition; stresses the importance of fostering convergence and coordinated reforms in higher education, such as by aligning the Kyrgyz National Qualifications Framework with the European Qualifications Framework; highlights the need to foster academic and cultural exchanges between Kyrgyzstan and the EU Member States and the active involvement of Kyrgyz young people in non-formal education and civil society programmes; underlines the importance of strengthening academic and vocational exchanges, building on the 2024 education agreement;

     

    10. Welcomes the EU’s increased support for young people, gender equality and human rights in Kyrgyzstan, with the aim of empowering youth and women’s organisations, strengthening the country’s Ombudsman’s Office and enhancing the capabilities of its National Centre for the Prevention of Torture; expresses serious concern about attempts to dissolve the National Centre for the Prevention of Torture;

     

    11. Recalls that the EU has already allocated EUR 12 million to support the reform of Kyrgyzstan’s judicial system, confirming the EU’s commitment to the country’s institutional development; stresses the importance of continuing to invest in institution building, transparency and the independence of the judiciary;

     

    12. Expresses its concern, in view of the widespread corruption in Kyrgyzstan, about the transparent and efficient use of the EUR 98 million in EU assistance for the 2021-2027 period; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to publish detailed reports on the use of EU funds and to strengthen cooperation with international anti-fraud bodies, such as the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), in order to uphold global fund management standards and implement robust anti-fraud measures that protect the EU’s financial interests; calls on the Commission and other relevant EU institutions to ensure the highest possible level of oversight of the use of EU funds and to consider allocating additional resources to strengthen the financial and operational capacity of Kyrgyz agencies involved in their management;

     

    13. Stresses the importance of enhanced information exchange on terrorist threats, full compliance with international counterterrorism financing standards and the implementation of robust measures to prevent the acquisition, transfer and use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials for terrorist purposes;

     

    14. Underlines the importance of engaging all relevant stakeholders, facilitating cooperation between competent agencies and bringing national laws in line with international transparency standards in order to investigate financial crimes and promote good corporate governance; urges the Kyrgyz authorities to step up their efforts in eradicating corruption and not to use the fight against it as an excuse for cracking down on civil society and government critics;

     

    15. Calls on the Kyrgyz Republic to review its technical regulations and strengthen collaboration on standards, metrology, market surveillance, accreditation and conformity assessment procedures to facilitate mutual market access, deepen bilateral trade with the EU and ensure fair treatment of investors; urges Kyrgyzstan to avoid restrictive measures that could disadvantage EU investors;

     

    Regional cooperation and global challenges

    16. Considers Central Asia to be a region of strategic interest for the EU in terms of security, connectivity, energy diversification, conflict resolution and the defence of the multilateral, rules-based international order, especially in a historical moment marked by profound geopolitical change; encourages the EU to intensify its engagement with Central Asia on political, economic and security matters in line with the values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law that underpin EU external action; highlights that any further EU cooperation with Central Asian countries cannot be achieved at the expense of these values; emphasises the need for increased dialogue and collaboration on foreign and security policy issues, including cybersecurity, regional stability, crisis management, disarmament and arms control, in line with the principles of international law and the UN Charter;

    17. Underlines that the EU and Central Asia are facing profound global and regional geopolitical shifts and challenges; stresses, in this regard, the need to work towards long-term, structured and mutually beneficial cooperation on matters of common interest; strongly encourages the EU to intensify its engagement with Central Asia, given the region’s geostrategic importance, and to promote a strategic partnership with Central Asian countries by expanding cooperation at political and economic level; welcomes the increased high-level contact between the EU and Central Asia;

    18. Highlights the growing momentous challenges to multilateralism and a rules-based order for both the EU and the Kyrgyz Republic, such as Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine; notes, with concern, the neutral stance of Kyrgyzstan and other countries in the region towards the conflict, and encourages the Kyrgyz authorities to uphold international norms and contribute to regional efforts to safeguard sovereignty and territorial integrity; notes Russia’s influence in the region despite efforts by Central Asian countries to diversify their foreign relations; regrets that Kyrgyzstan has not condemned Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine;

    19. Deplores the active role of Kyrgyz companies and banks, such as Keremet Bank, in helping Russia to evade sanctions and obtain technology and dual-use goods for its war effort against Ukraine; urges the Kyrgyz authorities to take further measures to stop the transit of sanctioned goods to Russia through Kyrgyz territory, such as enforcing stricter licensing requirements and conducting due diligence on companies involved in the trade of dual-use goods; highlights that failure to address the export of dual-use technologies could lead to secondary sanctions; calls on the Commission to assess the current level of sanctions evasion by Russia with the help of actors in Central Asian countries, and to propose concrete solutions for addressing this; recommends the establishment of a working group focused on monitoring and tracking the trade of dual-use goods;

     

    20. Regrets that, despite its stated commitment to respect democratic principles, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, as agreed in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU, Kyrgyzstan does not align its positions with those of democratic countries, in particular the EU Member States, when voting at the UN General Assembly;

     

    21. Deplores the fact that the Turkish Cypriot secessionist entity was granted observer status by the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) and was present at the OTS summit in Bishkek; reiterates that, as part of the Joint Declaration following the first EU-Central Asia summit in Samarkand, the Central Asian states, including the Kyrgyz Republic, are committed to the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions – 541 (1983) and 550 (1984);

     

    22. Recognises the need to strengthen relations to foster deeper, closer and values-based cooperation in facing common threats and achieving shared goals worldwide;

    23. Welcomes initiatives aimed at strengthening the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor and takes note of the Coordination Platform for the Corridor;

    24. Highlights the EU’s role as an important donor of aid to the region; stresses the need to increase the EU’s efforts in its support for development cooperation in Central Asia, in particular in Kyrgyzstan under the newly signed EPCA;

     

    25. Welcomes the border agreement reached between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and its recent ratification; urges both parties to take the necessary steps to implement the agreement, including by triggering consultations with the local populations, and to adopt measures to strengthen cross-border cooperation and support the border communities that have been hit hardest by the recent cross-border conflict; welcomes the EU’s financial support for the construction of facilities in the Sughd region of Tajikistan, which borders Kyrgyzstan; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to investigate the serious crimes, documented by independent observers, that took place during the September 2022 armed conflict and to hold those responsible to account;

    26. Welcomes the first trilateral summit bringing together Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan without mediation by external actors; welcomes Central Asian aspirations to strengthen their regional ties and set up a horizontal cooperation architecture in the region without the assertive involvement of external powers;

     

    Human rights, democracy and the rule of law

    27. Stresses that respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law strengthens stability, sustainable development and security, as they establish legal certainty, predictability and strong institutions; recalls that strong democratic legal frameworks and institutions foster innovation, trade, investments and economic expansion, while ensuring inclusive development and equal access to social and economic rights, and reducing social inequalities, and are indispensable in building resilient societies capable of resisting authoritarian influence and external destabilisation;

    28. Encourages Kyrgyzstan to enact comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation that includes sexual orientation, gender, disability and ethnicity as protected categories; stresses that the protection of minorities in Kyrgyzstan requires a multifaceted strategy that addresses the root causes of discrimination, including existing obstacles in accessing justice;

     

    29. Welcomes the legislative acts to enhance protection against domestic, sexual and gender-based violence; calls on the Kyrgyz Government to ensure that the law is consistently enforced and perpetrators are formally charged with the relevant crimes, and to maintain efforts towards eliminating gender-based and domestic violence;

     

    30. Is concerned about the entry into force of new legislation restricting freedom of religion or belief in Kyrgyzstan, as it increases state surveillance and control over religious groups by creating a state registry for religious entities and buildings, introduces fines for wearing certain religious attire, such as the niqab, in state institutions and public places, and increases oversight of religious education; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to ensure freedom of religion or belief is protected in the country, in line with international human rights standards and commitments under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

     

    31. Encourages the Kyrgyz Government to develop a national action plan for human rights with the involvement of civil society, in line with the recommendations made by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights;

     

    32. Calls on the Kyrgyz Government to unconditionally release all wrongfully imprisoned or detained journalists, bloggers and activists, including Kanyshai Mamyrkulova and those affiliated with Temirov Live, such as Makhabat Tajibek kyzy, and Aike Beishekeyeva and Aktilek Kaparov, and to drop all charges against them, as well as to restore Bolot Temirov’s citizenship and refrain from other unlawful practices; condemns the sentencing in October 2024 of journalists Azamat Ishenbekov and Makhabat Tajibek kyzy, from the Temirov Live platform known for its investigations into corruption, to five and six years in prison respectively; highlights the opinion of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention recognising the detention of Temirov Live’s journalists as arbitrary; welcomes the pardoning of journalist and Temirov Live employee Azamat Ishenbekov, and of activist Zarina Torokulova, who were convicted on charges of ‘inciting mass unrest’;

    33. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to ensure adherence to the principles of free and fair elections by safeguarding the rights to contest and campaign, while maintaining administrative neutrality towards all political parties throughout the current election cycle, in line with international standards; strongly condemns the Kyrgyz Government’s campaign of intimidation and legal persecution against opposition parties, particularly the SDK, which was removed by the Kyrgyz authorities from the November 2024 local elections in Bishkek; notes that discussions on electoral reform have taken place in the Kyrgyz Parliament;

     

     

    34. Strongly deplores the detention of Temirlan Sultanbekov, Irina Karamushkina and Roza Turksever on 13 November 2024, and calls on the Kyrgyz Government to urgently end their politically motivated prosecution by dropping all restrictions imposed on their respective sentences; condemns the fact that the proceedings against them have been marred by dubious practices, a lack of legal protections since the start and the violation of their right to due process; recalls that an audio recording of unknown origin, serving as the primary evidence and lacking judicial authorisation, is what initiated the investigation; laments that their trials have been held in a closed-door format without any audio or video recordings; denounces the fact that the conditions for their release on probation are disproportionate and violate their right to participate in public affairs;

    35. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to refrain from pursuing politically motivated prosecutions or exerting undue pressure on political opposition and dissenting voices, such as the SDK; emphasises that political pluralism is a necessary component of any modern democracy and must be respected to maintain long-term legitimacy and stability;

     

    36. Urges the Kyrgyz authorities to ensure the right to peaceful assembly by lifting the ban on protests in Bishkek city centre, which was initiated in response to a request from the Russian embassy to end anti-war protests outside its premises in 2022;

     

    37. Welcomes the acquittal of Klara Sooronkulova, Gulnara Dzhurabayeva, Asya Sasykbayeva and other members of the Committee for the Protection of the Kempir-Abad Water Reservoir; urges the Kyrgyz Government to drop its appeal of the decision of the court of first instance, and bring the politically motivated prosecution to an end;

    38. Strongly condemns, and urges the Kyrgyz authorities to end, the recent crackdown on civil society and to foster an environment of cooperation, with the involvement of civil society and local communities in public consultations and decision-making processes; deplores, in particular, the politically motivated detention of human rights activist Rita Karasartova, and calls for her urgent release; deplores further the seizure of the house of imprisoned human rights activist Kanyshai Mamyrkulova; expresses its admiration for Kyrgyz civil society and independent media which, despite the persecution and at great personal risk, remains one of the most vibrant civil societies in Central Asia;

     

    39. Calls on the EU Member States and the EU institutions to support Kyrgyz civil society organisations, human rights defenders and lawyers, LGBTIQ+ and environmental activists, independent media and bloggers, to express their grave concern over the deterioration of human rights in the country in all their exchanges with the authorities of Kyrgyzstan, and to reassess the country’s GSP+ benefits and adopt appropriate measures, including sanctions under the EU’s global human rights sanctions regime (‘EU Magnitsky Act’) as a last resort, if Kyrgyzstan continues to disregard its commitments to international conventions;

     

    40. Deplores several recent cases of individuals critical of the Kyrgyz Government living outside of Kyrgyzstan facing the threat of extradition to Kyrgyzstan, where they risk politically motivated arrest, imprisonment and torture in retaliation for their criticism; denounces the case of exiled activist Tilekmat Kurenov who was recently extradited from the United Arab Emirates to Kyrgyzstan, where he had previously been subjected to politically motivated imprisonment, torture and threats because of his activism;

     

    41. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to revoke the Russian-style ‘foreign representatives’ law, which severely impairs the ability of civil society to carry out legitimate public interest work and operate without undue interference and harassment while ensuring a safe working environment, and which contradicts Kyrgyzstan’s international obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its commitments as an EU partner under the EPCA; urges the Commission to ensure that the EU’s programmes and initiatives are not compromised by the proposed laws, which may limit freedom of expression and curtail the activities of non-governmental organisations;

    42. Urges Kyrgyzstan to respect and protect media freedom and pluralism, which are fundamental conditions for democracy, refraining from forcibly closing independent media outlets, as in the case of Kloop, or levelling unsubstantiated allegations against them due to their investigative and critical reporting; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to allow independent media professionals to carry out their work, to guarantee journalists and reporters will not face retaliatory persecution for their professional activities, including investigative journalism, and to provide adequate protection to reporters that might be harassed for their reporting; calls on the Commission and the EU Member States to ensure the continued operation of the Kyrgyz Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty service;

    43. Calls on the EEAS and the EU Delegation in Kyrgyzstan to conduct active public diplomacy and address false narratives spread by the Kyrgyz authorities, in particular those that misrepresent EU values and policies with the aim of discrediting independent media and civil society; urges EU and Member State diplomats in Kyrgyzstan to attend politically motivated trials and to provide support to the unjustly persecuted individuals and their families;

     

    44. Condemns the Kyrgyz authorities’ attempts to shut down Aprel TV by revoking its broadcasting license and terminating its social media operations on the basis of an investigation by Kyrgyzstan’s State Committee for National Security; laments these actions in a context of shuttering media outlets on illegitimate grounds;

     

    45. Expresses concern about the re-criminalisation of libel and insult laws and calls on the Kyrgyz Government not to abuse these provisions to target journalists and legitimate political opposition; invites the authorities to review this legislation in accordance with the Venice Commission’s recommendations;

     

    46. Urges the Kyrgyz authorities to revoke the law on ‘false information’ and the law prohibiting ‘LGBT propaganda’, which contravene Kyrgyzstan’s obligations under international law and have been systematically used to silence critical voices, including journalists and civil society actors; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to ensure that the mass media law is fully in line with international standards and does not result in violations of the freedoms of media or expression;

    47. Calls on the Kyrgyz Government to protect journalists, non-governmental organisation workers and activists from intimidation and harassment, including those facing death threats and other threats to their safety while in prison, and calls on the EU Delegation to closely monitor such threats and report regularly on the situation of at-risk individuals; deplores the government raids, blocking of news sites and prosecution of journalists and bloggers; condemns the court’s closure of the organisation behind the Kloop investigative platform over its alleged ‘negative’ coverage; regrets President Japarov’s call for the Kyrgyz Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty to be shut down, accusing the Kyrgyz service of spreading misinformation;

    48. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to refrain from criminalising the possession of ‘extremist’ materials, as human rights watchdogs have warned that this could lead to the further deterioration of freedom of speech in Kyrgyzstan, given the potential for abuse of the law, and to maintain clear legal safeguards to prevent the misuse of laws that penalise public incitements of extremist activity; urges Kyrgyzstan’s Supreme Council to uphold the right to freedom of expression and recalls that countering ‘false information’ cannot lead to a crackdown on independent media, the opposition and others critical of the government;

    49. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to strengthen the rule of law, separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary in line with international standards, to establish processes to measure judicial performance, improve public oversight and increase transparency within the judiciary, and to enhance the engagement of the judiciary with civil society and other branches of government; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to step up their efforts in guaranteeing equal access to justice, the right to a fair trial and the fulfilment of the right to due process;

     

    50. Is concerned by the high number of pre-trial detention cases, which has been highlighted by the Kyrgyz Ombudsperson Dzhamilia Dzhamanbaeva, and echoes the Ombudsperson’s call on Kyrgyz law enforcement and judiciary bodies to adhere to international standards, including the UN Standard Minimum Rules for Non-Custodial Measures;

     

    51. Notes the penitentiary system reforms carried out in recent years, mainly comprising the development of probation, the digitalisation of different processes and the introduction of alternative preventive measures; regrets, however, cases of mistreatment of prisoners and encourages the Kyrgyz authorities to take all necessary steps to ensure that prisoners do not experience inhuman or degrading treatment or conditions, and receive adequate healthcare in safe and secure conditions;

     

    52. Underlines the need to develop new legislation in the field of administrative law and justice, including the reform of public administration and alternative dispute resolution, and to strengthen the professional capacities of public administration and judiciary representatives, which could be partly achieved by adopting e-governance systems;

     

    53. Asks the Kyrgyz authorities to uphold the independence of the legal profession and ensure that lawyers are not subjected to interference or harassment as a result of fulfilling their professional duties, including the defence of their clients in politically sensitive cases;

     

    54. Commends Kyrgyzstan’s participation in the Central Asia Rule of Law Programme, which supported national efforts to prevent and fight corruption and money laundering, and raised awareness about human rights standards among legal professionals, among other matters;

     

    55. Notes the return of the controversial Land Code to the Kyrgyz Parliament by President Japarov, following public protests against it;

     

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    56. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States and of the Kyrgyz Republic.

    MIL OSI Europe News –