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Category: Russian Federation

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – 2023 and 2024 reports on Montenegro – P10_TA(2025)0130 – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Montenegro, of the other part(1), which entered into force on 1 May 2010,

    –  having regard to Montenegro’s application for membership of the European Union of 15 December 2008,

    –  having regard to the Commission opinion of 9 November 2010 on Montenegro’s application for membership of the European Union (COM(2010)0670), the European Council’s decision of 16-17 December 2010 to grant Montenegro candidate status and the European Council’s decision of 29 June 2012 to open EU accession negotiations with Montenegro,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III)(2),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans(3),

    –  having regard to the Presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of 19-20 June 2003,

    –  having regard to the Sofia Declaration of the EU-Western Balkans summit of 17 May 2018 and the Sofia Priority Agenda annexed thereto,

    –  having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits of 13 December 2023 in Brussels, and of 18 December 2024 in Brussels,

    –  having regard to the Berlin Process launched on 28 August 2014,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October 2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Montenegro 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0694),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2024 entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report’ (COM(2024)0800), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report – The rule of law situation in the European Union: Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Montenegro’ (SWD(2024)0829),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Montenegro 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0694),

    –  having regard to the Commission’s overview and country assessments of 31 May 2023 and of 13 June 2024 of the economic reform programme of Montenegro, and to the joint conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkans and Türkiye adopted by the Council on 16 May 2023 and to the joint conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkans Partners, Türkiye, Georgia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine adopted by the Council on 14 May 2024,

    –  having regard to the EU-Montenegro Intergovernmental Accession Conferences of 22 June 2021, 13 December 2021, 29 January 2024, 26 June 2024 and 16 December 2024,

    –  having regard to the 11th EU-Montenegro Stabilisation and Association Council on 14 July 2022,

    –  having regard to the declaration and recommendations adopted at the 22nd meeting of the EU-Montenegro Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee, held on 31 October and 1 November 2024,

    –  having regard to Montenegro’s accession to NATO on 5 June 2017,

    –  having regard to Special Report 01/2022 of the European Court of Auditors of 10 January 2022 entitled ‘EU support for the rule of law in the Western Balkans: despite efforts, fundamental problems persist’,

    –  having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the Istanbul Convention), ratified by Montenegro in 2013, and to the recommendations of the Commission on gender equality and combating gender-based violence,

    –  having regard to the World Press Freedom Index report published annually by Reporters Without Borders,

    –  having regard to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) data on the Ukraine Refugee Situation as of April 2025,

    –  having regard to its recommendation of 23 November 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning the new EU strategy for enlargement(4),

    –  having regard to its previous resolutions on Montenegro,

    –  having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement(5),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0093/2025),

    A.  whereas enlargement is a key EU foreign policy tool and a strategic geopolitical investment in peace, stability, security and prosperity;

    B.  whereas the new enlargement momentum, sparked by the changing geopolitical reality and the EU membership applications by several Eastern Partnership countries, has prompted the EU to accelerate its efforts towards delivering on its long-overdue commitments to the Western Balkans; whereas the future of the Western Balkan countries lies within the EU;

    C.  whereas each country is judged on its own merits in fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, including full respect for democracy, the rule of law, good governance, fundamental EU values and alignment with EU foreign and security policy; whereas the implementation of necessary reforms in the area of ‘fundamentals’ determines the timetable and progress in the accession process;

    D.  whereas Montenegro has gone furthest in the accession process, with all 33 chapters of the EU acquis open and six provisionally closed, and has significant public support therefor;

    E.  whereas the EU is Montenegro’s largest trading partner, investor and provider of financial assistance;

    F.  whereas Montenegro is exposed to malign foreign influence, disinformation campaigns and other forms of influence, including election meddling, hybrid warfare strategies and unfavourable investments from non-EU actors, particularly Russia and China, which are trying to influence Montenegro’s political, economic and strategic trajectory and threaten democratic processes and media integrity, jeopardising the country’s prospects for EU accession;

    G.  whereas on 8 June 2024, an ‘All-Serb Assembly’ took place in Belgrade with the participation of high-ranking parliamentarians under the slogan ‘One people, one Assembly’;

    Commitment to EU accession

    1.  Recognises Montenegro’s firm commitment to EU accession and reaffirms its full support for the country’s future EU membership; welcomes Montenegro’s leading regional position in the EU accession process as well as the overwhelming support of Montenegro’s citizens and the majority of political actors for joining the EU in 2028;

    2.  Welcomes Montenegro’s positive progress in enacting EU-related reforms and measures, underpinned by an ambitious timeline and calls for collective efforts of political actors, civil society and citizens; commends Montenegro for meeting the interim benchmarks for Chapters 23 and 24, which continue to determine the overall pace of negotiations, and for receiving a positive Interim Benchmark Assessment Report; welcomes the closure of three more negotiating chapters, bringing the total to six;

    3.  Encourages all political actors to stay focused on EU integration and the required reforms; stresses the need for political stability, commitment and constructive engagement in consensus building across party lines in order to move swiftly and more effectively towards closing additional chapters in 2025, so as to achieve the country’s ambitious timeline; stresses that the reforms adopted must be implemented effectively and consistently to ensure genuine progress and full alignment with EU legislation; calls for a strengthening of the functioning of, and coordination between, state institutions in order to achieve political stability and advance the country’s substantial progress in implementing key EU-related reforms, in particular electoral and judicial reforms and the fight against organised crime and corruption;

    4.  Underlines that the credibility of the EU, including its enlargement policy as a whole, would be affected if tangible progress achieved by certain Western Balkan countries does not translate into clear advancements on the EU accession path;

    5.  Welcomes Montenegro’s sustained full alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP), including EU restrictive measures, inter alia, those related to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and those targeted against cyberattacks, as well as its support for the international rules-based order at UN level; encourages Montenegro to strengthen the enforcement of restrictive measures and avoid their circumvention and to seize the assets of those sanctioned; calls on all government representatives to respect and promote CFSP alignment and EU values and refrain from any activities that may threaten Montenegro’s strategic path towards EU membership and its sovereignty; is highly concerned, in this context, by public high officials’ statements in support of the President of the Republika Srpska entity, Milorad Dodik, who is undermining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina; regrets the participation of high-ranking parliamentarians from Montenegro in the ‘All-Serbian Assembly’ in Belgrade as well as their support for the declaration adopted on that occasion undermining the sovereignty of Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo;

    6.  Underlines the strategic importance of Montenegro’s NATO membership and welcomes its active involvement in EU common security and defence policy missions and operations, such as EU Naval Force Operation Atalanta, and in NATO and other international and multilateral missions; welcomes the decision of Montenegro’s Council for Defence and Security to approve the participation of its armed forces in the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine and NATO’s Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine and calls on the Montenegrin Parliament to adopt these decisions, thereby reinforcing the country’s commitment to collective security;

    7.  Commends Montenegro for its humanitarian and material support to Ukraine and for extending the temporary protection mechanism that grants persons fleeing Ukraine the right to stay in Montenegro for one year; recalls that Montenegro is among the Western Balkan countries hosting the largest number of Ukrainian refugees, with over 18 800 refugees from Ukraine registered in Montenegro as of 31 January 2025, according to UNHCR statistics;

    8.  Remains seriously concerned by malign foreign interference, destabilisation efforts, cyberattacks, hybrid threats and disinformation campaigns, including attempts to influence political processes and public opinion, by third-country actors, which discredit the EU and undermine Montenegro’s progress on its accession path; urges Montenegro to adopt countermeasures in stronger cooperation with the EU and NATO and through increased regional cooperation among the Western Balkan countries; notes that religious institutions can be used as a tool for external influence and condemns any undue interference by the Serbian Orthodox Church in this regard; reiterates the importance of building resilience capacity against foreign information manipulation and interference, including through greater oversight of the media landscape, public awareness campaigns and media literacy programmes; recommends that Montenegro establish a dedicated hybrid threat task force;

    9.  Urges the Commission, the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Delegation of the EU to Montenegro and the Montenegrin authorities to boost strategic communication to Montenegrin citizens on the benefits of the enlargement process and EU membership, as well as on the concrete accession criteria that Montenegro still needs to fulfil to align with EU requirements; urges them, furthermore, to improve the EU’s visibility in the country, including as regards EU-funded projects; calls for StratCom monitoring to be expanded in order to concentrate on cross-border disinformation threats in the Western Balkan countries and their neighbours; calls on the Commission to further support the efforts of the EEAS and the Western Balkans Task Force so as to expand outreach activities by increasing visibility in local media, fact-checking reports and partnering with civil society organisations to counter false narratives more effectively;

    10.  Welcomes the Montenegrin Parliament’s renewed engagement in the Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee;

    Democracy and the rule of law

    11.  Recognises the Montenegrin Parliament’s key role in the accession process, notably as regards passing accession-related legislation, and underlines the importance of parliamentary cooperation in this regard; reiterates the European Parliament’s readiness to use its political and technical resources to advance the EU-related reform agenda, including through democracy support activities; notes, with concern, the re-emerging tensions and ethnic polarisation, which are slowing the reform process; calls for constructive dialogue and consensus building across the political spectrum, prioritising legislative quality, and strongly urges that solutions be found through parliamentary dialogue; calls for preventing identity politics from diverting attention from the EU agenda or straining relations with its neighbours, ensuring that Montenegro remains firmly on the EU path; welcomes the agreement between the Montenegrin Prime Minister and opposition leaders to request an opinion from the Venice Commission regarding the termination of the mandate of Constitutional Court judge Dragana Đuranović and for the opposition to return to the parliament;

    12.  Expresses its concern about attempts to amend the law on Montenegrin citizenship in the Montenegrin Parliament, which could have serious and long-term implications for the country’s decision-making processes and identity, while emphasising that any discussions on identity politics must be handled with the utmost sensitivity to avoid further polarisation and should aim for broad societal consensus; encourages the Montenegrin authorities to consult and coordinate with the EU on any possible changes to the law on citizenship and stresses the importance of achieving consensus on any matters relating to this subject of crucial importance for the identity and independence of Montenegro;

    13.  Strongly encourages the Montenegrin Parliament to hold inclusive and transparent public consultations and regular and meaningful engagement with civil society in decision-making from an early stage in the legislative process, notably for key legislation in the EU reform process; encourages a more active role for the Montenegrin Parliamentary Women’s Club;

    14.  Calls on Montenegro to fully align its electoral legal framework with EU standards, notably as regards harmonising electoral legislation, voting and candidacy rights restrictions, transparency, dispute resolution mechanisms, campaign and media oversight, and political party and election campaign financing, and to implement the recommendations of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights(6); urges Montenegro to increase transparency and control of political party spending and prevent the abuse of state resources by bringing the relevant legislation into line with EU standards, as well as enhancing the enforcement of third-party financing rules and strengthening sanctions for violations; highlights the role of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption (APC) in this regard, and calls for increased cooperation between the APC and financial intelligence authorities to detect and prevent foreign influence in political campaigns; calls, furthermore, on Montenegro to implement the recommendations of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) on gender parity on electoral lists;

    15.  Reiterates its call on the Montenegrin authorities to establish a single nationwide municipal election day, as provided for in the Law on Local Self-Government, in order to enhance governance efficiency, reduce political tensions and strengthen the stability and effectiveness of municipal and state institutions; recalls that future disbursement of funds under the Reform and Growth Facility is contingent on the fulfilment of this reform, in line with Montenegro’s commitments in its reform agenda, and should be pursued as a matter of priority; welcomes the fact that, in 2022, elections in 14 municipalities were held on the same day; calls for a robust legislative framework in this regard; is concerned by the misconduct of the electoral process in the municipality of Šavnik;

    16.  Calls on the Montenegrin authorities to adopt the Law on Government that should enable an improved governance framework and the optimisation of public administration;

    17.  Underlines the importance of a professional, merit-based, transparent and depoliticised civil service; calls on Montenegro to amend and implement the relevant legislation to provide a framework for the professionalisation, optimisation and rationalisation of state administration, including procedural safeguards against politically motivated decisions on appointments and dismissals, as well as high standards for managerial positions; regrets the lack of significant progress in adopting and effectively implementing such legislation and highlights that this allows for public service recruitment to remain subject to political influence;

    18.  Welcomes Montenegro’s inclusion in the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report; notes, with concern, the identified deficiencies, including judicial appointments and the independence of the prosecutor’s office;

    19.  Welcomes the progress made in implementing key judicial reforms, adopting a new strategic framework and completing long-outstanding judicial appointments; calls on Montenegro to fill the remaining high-level judicial positions;

    20.  Urges Montenegro to further align its legal framework, including the constitution, in particular on the composition and decision-making process of the Judicial Council, with EU laws and standards on the independence, accountability, impartiality, integrity and professionalism of the judiciary, and to further depoliticise appointments to bolster independence, implement outstanding international recommendations, and determine criteria for the retirement of judges and prosecutors in line with European standards and in full compliance with the Constitution; regrets the pending case backlog and calls on Montenegro to take measures to reduce the duration of legal proceedings, particularly for serious and organised crime cases, notably on money laundering; recommends that Montenegro adopt the amendments to the Constitution in the final stage of the country’s EU accession negotiations;

    21.  Notes the steps taken in the fight against corruption, including new laws and provisions on the protection of whistleblowers, the creation of a new National Council for the fight against corruption and a new anti-corruption strategy for 2024-2028; encourages Montenegro to further align with the EU acquis and EU standards and address recommendations by the Commission, the Venice Commission and the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO); encourages the Montenegrin authorities to continue addressing existing deficiencies in the handling of organised crime cases and the seizure and confiscation of criminal assets;

    22.  Urges Montenegro to step up its criminal justice response to high-level corruption, including by strengthening the effective enforcement of existing criminal legislation and imposing effective and deterrent penalties, and to create conditions for judicial institutions and independent bodies dealing with corruption to function effectively, free from political influence;

    23.  Notes the work of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption and calls for it to be provided with sufficient funding and for it to be depoliticised; expects the Agency to deliver tangible results and act non-selectively to strengthen its integrity and enhance its authority in carrying out its competences effectively; calls for a stronger corruption prevention framework;

    24.  Urges Montenegro to align its weapons legislation with EU law and international standards, particularly as regards technical standards for firearm markings, deactivation procedures and regulations for alarm and signal weapons, as well as to establish a standardised and effective data collection and reporting system for firearms; is appalled by the tragic mass shooting in Cetinje and expresses its condolences to the victims’ families; expresses its concern over the exploitation of this tragedy for disinformation and ethnic polarisation; urges Montenegro to strengthen its crisis communication to counter disinformation and ensure responsible media reporting in the aftermath of violent incidents; calls for systematic actions in the areas of security, mental well-being and institutional transparency, as well as in civic education and public awareness, outreach and educational initiatives, on the dangers and risks of firearms, in line with citizens’ expectations and societal needs;

    25.  Calls on Montenegro to urgently fully align its visa policy with that of the EU, especially as regards countries posing irregular migration or security risks to the EU; expresses its concern that, contrary to expectations, two additional countries have been added to the visa-free regime and that Russian and Belarusian passport holders continue to benefit from a visa-free regime; notes that the harmonisation of the visa policy is also provided for in Montenegro’s reform agenda under the Reform and Growth Facility;

    26.  Welcomes the ongoing cooperation between Montenegro and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), Europol, Eurojust and the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL), and notes the importance of this cooperation in tackling cross-border crime, including the trafficking of weapons, drugs and human beings, and in combating terrorism and extremism; welcomes the entry into force of the upgraded agreement on operational cooperation in border management with Frontex on 1 July 2023 and encourages further cooperation between Montenegro and Frontex to strengthen border management, support asylum procedures, fight smuggling and enhance readmission;

    Fundamental freedoms and human rights

    27.  Regrets that the most vulnerable groups in society still face discrimination; calls on Montenegro to adopt a new anti-discrimination law and relevant strategies, through an inclusive, transparent and meaningful process that actively involves those most affected, to improve vulnerable groups’ access to rights; underlines that respect for the rights of all national minorities is an integral part of the EU acquis; calls for stronger implementation to ensure equal treatment of all ethnic, religious, national and social groups so that they are guaranteed equal rights and opportunities and can fully participate in social, political and economic life;

    28.  Welcomes Montenegro’s multi-ethnic identity and calls for the further promotion of and respect for the languages, cultural heritage and traditions of local communities and national minorities, as this is closely intertwined with Montenegro’s European perspective;

    29.  Underlines the multi-ethnic identity of the Bay of Kotor; stresses that Montenegro’s European perspective is closely intertwined with the protection of minorities and their cultural heritage; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to nurture the multi-ethnic nature of the state, including the traditions and cultural heritage of the Croatian community in the Bay of Kotor;

    30.  Expresses its grave concern over the endangered heritage sites in Montenegro such as the Bay of Kotor and Sveti Stefan; stresses that Sveti Stefan, along with Miločer Park, was listed among the ‘7 Most Endangered heritage sites in Europe’ for 2023;

    31.  Calls on the Montenegrin authorities to address the difficult living conditions of Roma people in Montenegro and the discrimination they face, and calls for more measures to promote intercultural understanding in schools; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to also take measures to improve the climate of societal inclusion for LGBTI persons;

    32.  Welcomes that Montenegro has aligned its legislative and institutional framework with the EU acquis and international human rights standards regarding compliance with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and its optional protocols; urges the authorities to address shortcomings in implementation, namely related to accountability and monitoring;

    33.  Calls for the effective implementation of strategies to uphold the rights of persons with disabilities across all sectors and policies;

    34.  Condemns all hate speech, including online and gender-based hate speech, and hate crimes; welcomes the criminalisation of racism and hate speech;

    35.  Emphasises the need to strengthen institutional mechanisms for gender quality and calls on the Montenegrin authorities to address the gender pay gap, to improve women’s participation in decision-making – in both the public domain, particularly public administration, and judicial and security sectors, and in business – to ensure the increased political participation of women, to introduce gender responsive budgeting, and to combat gender stereotypes and strengthen efforts to combat discrimination against women, particularly in rural areas; welcomes recent efforts aimed at boosting women’s representation in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) and encourages further efforts in technology sectors;

    36.  Is deeply concerned by the high rates of gender-based violence, including domestic violence and femicide; calls on Montenegro to fully align its definitions of gender-based violence and domestic violence with the Istanbul Convention, and with recommendations of international bodies, and to set up effective protection and prevention mechanisms and support centres, and ensure effective judicial follow-up for victims of domestic and sexual violence as well as a more robust penal policy towards perpetrators; calls for the collection of disaggregated data on gender-based violence and gender disparities to improve policy responses;

    37.  Regrets that the draft law on legal gender recognition was not adopted in 2024, despite it being a measure under Montenegro’s EU accession programme; urges Montenegro to adopt the law without delay;

    38.  Welcomes Montenegro’s new media laws and its strategy for media policy aimed at strengthening the legal framework to effectively protect journalists and other media workers; insists on a zero-tolerance policy with regard to pressure on, harassment of, or violence against journalists, particularly by public figures; underlines the need for effective investigations, the prosecution of all instances of hate speech, smear campaigns and strategic lawsuits against journalists, and follow-up of past cases; stresses the need to ensure journalists’ rights to access information and maintain a critical stance; notes a significant improvement in Montenegro’s press freedom, demonstrated by its progress on the World Press Freedom Index;

    39.  Expresses its concern over cases where journalists, academics and civil society organisations have faced pressure for exercising free speech, including instances where the police have initiated misdemeanour proceedings against them; is concerned by the use of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) to target journalists;

    40.  Regrets the prevailing high level of polarisation in the media and its vulnerability to political interests and foreign influence as well as foreign and domestic disinformation campaigns that spread narratives that negatively impact democratic processes in the country and endanger Montenegro’s European perspective; calls on Montenegro to further develop improved media literacy programmes and include them as a core subject in education; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to ensure the editorial, institutional and financial independence of the public service broadcaster RTCG, as well as the legality of the appointment of its management and full respect for court rulings concerning RTCG; recalls that it needs to comply with the law and the highest standards of accountability and integrity; regrets that the independence of public media is being weakened and undermined; calls on all media entities to comply with legal requirements on public funding transparency;

    41.  Welcomes the publication of the 2023 population census results; calls on the authorities to avoid any politicisation of the process; encourages stakeholders to use these results in a non-discriminatory manner;

    42.  Welcomes Montenegro’s vibrant and constructive civil society and underlines its importance in fostering democracy and pluralism and in promoting good governance and social progress; expresses its concern over the shrinking space for civil society organisations with a critical stance, and condemns all smear campaigns, intimidation and attacks against civil society organisations, notably by political figures in the context of proposals for a ‘foreign agent law’; notes that such laws have the potential to undermine fundamental freedoms and the functioning of civil society and are inconsistent with EU values and standards; calls for a supportive legal framework and clear and fair selection criteria in relation to public funding; calls for the Council for Cooperation between the Government and non-governmental organisations to resume work; underlines the importance of building collaborative relationships and genuinely consulting civil society on draft legislation from an early stage onwards;

    Reconciliation, good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation

    43.  Recalls that good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation are essential elements of the enlargement process; commends Montenegro’s active involvement in regional cooperation initiatives; recalls that good neighbourly relations are key for advancing in the accession process;

    44.  Regrets that Chapter 31 could not be closed in December 2024; calls on all engaged parties to find solutions to outstanding bilateral issues in a constructive and neighbourly manner and prioritise the future interests of citizens in the Western Balkans; recalls that using unresolved bilateral and regional disputes to block candidate countries’ accession processes should be avoided; welcomes bilateral consultations between the Republic of Croatia and Montenegro on the status of unresolved bilateral issues; encourages the authorities to continue pursuing confidence-building measures;

    45.  Notes Montenegro’s amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code to address legal and practical obstacles to the effective investigation, prosecution, trial and punishment of war crimes in line with relevant recommendations; calls on Montenegro to apply a proactive approach to handling war crimes cases, in line with international law and standards, to identify, prosecute and punish the perpetrators and the glorification of war crimes and ensure access to, and delivery of justice, redress and reparations for victims, and clarify the fate of missing persons; calls on Montenegro to allocate sufficient resources to specialised prosecutors and courts and proactively investigate all war crime allegations and raise issues of command responsibility, as well as to review past cases that were not prosecuted in line with international or domestic law; calls for regional cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of individuals indicted for war crimes; recognises that addressing these issues and safeguarding court-based facts are an important foundation for trust, democratic values, reconciliation and strengthening bilateral relations with neighbouring countries, and encourages Montenegro to step up these efforts;

    46.  Warns against the dangers of political revisionism, which distorts historical facts for political purposes, undermines accountability and deepens societal divisions; strongly condemns the glorification of war criminals and widespread public denial of international verdicts for war crimes, including by the Montenegrin authorities; considers that President Jakov Milatović’s statement expressing regret over the participation of Montenegrin forces in the bombardment of the city of Dubrovnik was a valuable contribution to regional peace and reconciliation;

    47.  Reiterates its support for the initiative to establish the Regional Commission for the establishment of facts about war crimes and other gross human rights violations on the territory of the former Yugoslavia (RECOM);

    48.  Reiterates its call for the archives that concern the former republics of Yugoslavia to be opened and for access to be granted to the files of the former Yugoslav Secret Service and the Yugoslav People’s Army Secret Service in order to thoroughly research and address communist-era crimes;

    Socio-economic reforms

    49.  Welcomes Montenegro’s inclusion in SEPA payment schemes, lowering costs for citizens and businesses; underlines that this opens up opportunities for business expansion, increased competitiveness, innovation and improved access to foreign direct investments;

    50.  Welcomes the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, which aims to integrate the region into the EU’s single market, promote regional economic cooperation and deepen EU-related reforms, and which includes the EUR 6 billion Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans; welcomes Montenegro’s adoption of a reform agenda and encourages its full implementation; notes that the implementation of the defined reform measures under Montenegro’s reform agenda for the Growth Plan would provide access to over EUR 380 million in grants and favourable loans, subject to successful implementation; stresses the importance of inclusive stakeholder consultations, including local and regional authorities, social partners and civil society, in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation phases;

    51.  Encourages Montenegro to make best use of all EU funding available under the Pre-accession Assistance Instrument (IPA III), the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans, the IPARD programme and the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, to accelerate socio-economic convergence with the EU and further align its legislation with the EU on fraud prevention; recalls the conditionality of EU funding, which may be modulated or suspended in the event of significant regression or persistent lack of progress on fundamentals;

    52.  Calls for the EU and the Western Balkan countries to establish a framework for effective cooperation between the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and the accession countries in order to facilitate close cooperation and the prosecution of the misuse of EU funds, including through the secondment of national liaison officers to the EPPO; encourages Montenegro to fully implement working arrangements with the EPPO; calls for the EU to make the necessary legal and political arrangements to extend the jurisdiction of the EPPO to EU funds devoted to Montenegro as a candidate country;

    53.  Positively notes Montenegro’s economic growth; calls for more steps to reduce the budget deficit and public debt, and to further remove indirect tax exemptions that do not align with the EU acquis; welcomes the efforts to reduce these fiscal vulnerabilities; reiterates the need for increased public investment in the education system for sustainable social and economic development;

    54.  Notes Montenegro’s public debt to foreign financial institutions and companies that can be used as a tool to influence its policy decisions, in particular those related to China and Russia; welcomes the efforts to reduce these vulnerabilities and calls on the authorities to further reduce economic dependence on China and to continue making use of the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans, the EU Global Gateway initiative and the Reform and Growth Facility, with a view to finding greener and more transparent alternatives for financing infrastructure projects; calls on Montenegro to increase transparency in future infrastructure projects, ensure competitive bidding and avoid excessive debt dependence on foreign creditors;

    55.  Calls on the Montenegrin authorities to take measures to counter depopulation and emigration, in particular through investments in education and healthcare, especially in the north of the country, as well as through decentralisation by investing in medium-sized cities;

    56.  Encourages the Montenegrin authorities to boost the digital transformation and pursue evidence-based labour market policies to address the persistently high unemployment rate, in particular among women and young people, while bolstering institutional capacity and enhancing the underlying digital policy framework, and to effectively implement the Youth Guarantee and the new Youth Strategy; urges the authorities to address brain drain as a matter of urgency; encourages the development of targeted preventive measures and incentives to legalise informal businesses and employees, as a large informal sector continues to hinder economic and social development in Montenegro;

    57.  Welcomes the calls for the prompt integration of all Western Balkan countries into the EU’s digital single market before actual EU membership, which would crucially enable the creation of a digitally safe environment;

    58.  Calls for more transparency in public procurement, notably for procedures via intergovernmental agreements, and for full compliance with EU rules and principles; calls on Montenegro to reduce the number of public procurement procedures without notices; expresses its concern over the financial burden and lack of transparency surrounding the construction of the Bar-Boljare motorway financed by a Chinese loan; stresses that the secrecy surrounding loan agreements and construction contracts raises accountability concerns;

    59.  Expresses its concern over any agreements or projects that circumvent public procurement rules, transparency obligations and public consultation requirements, as set out in national legislation and EU standards; calls on the Government of Montenegro to ensure full respect for the principles of transparency, accountability, inclusive decision-making and the rule of law in all public infrastructure and development initiatives;

    Energy, the environment, biodiversity and connectivity

    60.  Urges Montenegro to advance the green transition, with the support of EU funding, improve its institutional and regulatory framework and enhance energy resilience by finally adopting and implementing the long-overdue National Energy and Climate Plan, adopting energy efficiency laws and integrating further with EU energy markets; calls for all new green transition projects to be implemented in line with EU standards on the environment, State aid and concessions;

    61.  Regrets the lack of progress on key sector reforms in the area of transport policy; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to align the country’s transport development with the Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy for the Western Balkans, focusing on railways, multimodality and reducing CO2 emissions and other environmental impacts, and to further implement its Transport Development Strategy and strengthen administrative capacities for the implementation of trans-European transport networks;

    62.  Welcomes the reduction of data roaming charges between the EU and the Western Balkan countries and calls on the authorities, private actors and all stakeholders to take all necessary steps towards the goal of bringing data roaming prices close to domestic prices by 2028; welcomes the entry into force of the first phase of the implementation of the roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU;

    63.  Encourages the adoption of sectoral strategies for waste management, air and water quality, nature protection and climate change, ensuring strategic planning for investments; notes the lack of progress and associated rising costs in building essential waste water treatment plants to prevent sewage pollution in rivers and the sea in seven municipalities;

    o
    o   o

    64.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commissioner for Enlargement, the Commissioner for the Mediterranean, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and to the President, Government and Parliament of Montenegro, and to have it translated and published in Montenegrin.

    (1) OJ L 108, 29.4.2010, p. 3, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2010/224/oj.
    (2) OJ L 330, 20.9.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1529/oj.
    (3) OJ L, 2024/1449, 24.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1449/oj.
    (4) OJ C 167, 11.5.2023, p. 105.
    (5) OJ C, C/2024/6746, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6746/oj.
    (6) https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/montenegro.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Implementation report on the Recovery and Resilience Facility – P10_TA(2025)0128 – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to Article 175 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility(1) (RRF Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2023/435 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 February 2023 amending Regulation (EU) 2021/241 as regards REPowerEU chapters in recovery and resilience plans and amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) 2021/1060 and (EU) 2021/1755, and Directive 2003/87/EC(2) (REPowerEU Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget(3) (Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation),

    –  having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/765 of 29 February 2024 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027(4) (MFF Regulation),

    –  having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources(5) (the IIA),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union(6) (Financial Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP), and amending Directive 2003/87/EC and Regulations (EU) 2021/1058, (EU) 2021/1056, (EU) 2021/1057, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) 2021/1060, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697 and (EU) 2021/241(7),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2024 on the effective coordination of economic policies and on multilateral budgetary surveillance and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97(8),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 23 June 2022 on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility(9),

    –  having regard to the Commission notice of 22 July 2024 entitled ‘Guidance on recovery and resilience plans’(10),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 21 February 2024 on strengthening the EU through ambitious reforms and investments (COM(2024)0082),

    –  having regard to the Commission’s third annual report of 10 October 2024 on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (COM(2024)0474),

    –  having regard to the Court of Auditors’ (ECA) annual report of 10 October 2024 on the implementation of the budget for the 2023 financial year, together with the institutions’ replies,

    –  having regard to special report 13/2024 of the ECA of 2 September 2024 entitled ‘Absorption of funds from the Recovery and Resilience Facility – Progressing with delays and risks remain regarding the completion of measures and therefore the achievement of RRF objectives’, special report 14/2024 of the ECA of 11 September 2024 entitled ‘Green transition – Unclear contribution from the Recovery and Resilience Facility’, and special report 22/2024 of the ECA of 21 October 2024 entitled ‘Double funding from the EU budget – Control systems lack essential elements to mitigate the increased risk resulting from the RRF model of financing not linked to costs’,

    –  having regard to the study of December 2023 supporting the mid-term Evaluation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility,

    –  having regard to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) 2024 annual report published on 3 March 2025,

    –  having regard to the report of September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’ (Draghi report),

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 8 October 2024 entitled ‘Mid-term review of the post-COVID European recovery plan (Recovery and Resilience Facility)’(11),

    –  having regard to the information published on the Recovery and Resilience Scoreboard (RRF Scoreboard),

    –  having regard to the Commission staff working document of 20 November 2024 entitled ‘NGEU Green Bonds Allocation and Impact report 2024’ (SWD(2024)0275),

    –  having regard to its in-house research, in-depth analysis and briefings related to the implementation of the RRF(12),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on the situation in Hungary and frozen EU funds(13),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure, as well as Article 1(1)(e) of, and Annex 3 to, the decision of the Conference of Presidents of 12 December 2002 on the procedure for granting authorisation to draw up own-initiative reports,

    –  having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Budgetary Control, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety and the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    –  having regard to the joint deliberations of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs under Rule 59 of the Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0098/2025),

    A.  whereas the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) was created to make European economies and societies more sustainable, resilient and better prepared in the light of unprecedented crises in 2019 and 2022, by supporting Member States in financing strategic investments and in implementing reforms;

    B.  whereas reforms and investments under the RRF help to make the EU more resilient and less dependent by diversifying key supply chains and thereby strengthening the strategic autonomy of the EU; whereas reforms and investments under the RRF also generate European added value;

    C.  whereas the RRF, as well as other EU funds, such as the European instrument for temporary support to mitigate unemployment risks in an emergency, has helped to protect labour markets from the risk of long-term damage caused by the double economic shock of the pandemic and the energy crisis;

    D.  whereas RRF expenditure falls outside the ceilings of the multiannual financial framework (MFF) and borrowing proceeds constitute external assigned revenue; whereas Parliament regrets that they do not form part of the budgetary procedure; whereas based on the Financial Regulation’s principle of transparency, citizens should know how and for what purpose funds are spent by the EU;

    E.  whereas, due to the lack of progress in introducing new own resources in the EU and the need to ensure the sustainability of the EU’s repayment plan, a clear and reliable long-term funding strategy is essential to meet repayment obligations without forcing difficult trade-offs in the EU budget that could undermine future investments and policy priorities; whereas further discussions and concrete financial solutions will be necessary to secure the long-term viability of the EU’s debt repayment plan;

    F.  whereas the borrowing costs for NextGenerationEU (NGEU) have to be borne by the EU budget and the actual costs exceed the 2020 projections by far as a result of the high interest rates; whereas the total costs for NGEU capital and interest repayments are projected to be around EUR 25 to 30 billion per year from 2028, equivalent to 15-20 % of the 2025 annual budget; whereas Parliament has insisted that the refinancing costs be placed over and above the MFF ceilings; whereas a three-step ‘cascade mechanism’ including a new special EURI instrument was introduced during the 2024 MFF revision to cover the significant cost overruns resulting from NGEU borrowing linked to major changes in the market conditions; whereas an agreement was reached during the 2025 budgetary procedure to follow an annual 50/50 benchmark, namely to finance the overrun costs in equal shares by the special EURI instrument de-commitment compartment and the Flexibility Instrument;

    G.  whereas the bonds issued to finance the RRF are to be repaid in a manner that ensures the steady and predictable reduction of liabilities, by 2058 at the latest; whereas the Council has yet to adopt the adjusted basket of new own resources proposed by the Commission, which raises concerns about the viability of the repayment of the debt undertaken under NGEU;

    H.  whereas the social dimension is a key aspect of the RRF, contributing to upward economic and social convergence, restoring and promoting sustainable growth and fostering the creation of high-quality employment;

    I.  whereas the RRF should contribute to financing measures to strengthen the Member States’ resilience to climate disasters, among other things, and enhance climate adaptation; whereas the Member States should conduct proper impact assessments for measures and should share best practice on the implementation of the ‘do no significant harm’ (DNSH) principle;

    J.  whereas the RRF plays an important role in supporting investments and reforms in sustainable mobility, smart transport infrastructure, alternative fuels and digital mobility solutions, thus enhancing connectivity and efficiency across the EU; whereas it is regrettable that only a few Member States chose to use the RRF to support investments, particularly in high-speed railway and waterway infrastructure, aimed at developing European corridors, despite the encouragement of cross-border and multi-country projects; whereas it is crucial to increase investments in transport infrastructure, particularly in underserved regions, to improve connectivity, support regional cohesion and contribute to the green transition;

    K.  whereas by 31 December 2024, Member States had submitted 95 payment requests and the level of RRF disbursements including pre-financing stood at EUR 197,46 billion in grants (55 % of the total grants envelope) and EUR 108,68 billion in loans (37 % of the total loans envelope); whereas three Member States have already received their fifth payment, while one Member State has not received any RRF funding; whereas all Member States have revised their national recovery and resilience plans (NRRP) at least once; whereas 28 % of milestones and targets have been satisfactorily fulfilled and the Commission has made use of the possibility to partially suspend payments where some milestones and targets linked to a payment request were not found to be satisfactorily fulfilled; whereas delays in the execution of planned reforms and investments, particularly in social infrastructure and public services, could lead to the underutilisation of available resources, thereby reducing the expected impact on economic growth, employment and social cohesion;

    L.  whereas the ECA has revealed various shortcomings of the RRF, in particular in relation to its design, its transparency and reporting, the risk of double funding and the implementation of twin transition measures;

    M.  whereas according to the ECA, performance is a measure of the extent to which an EU-funded action, project or programme has met its objectives and provides value for money; whereas moreover, financing not linked to costs does not, in itself, make an instrument performance-based;

    N.  whereas robust audit and control systems are crucial to protect the financial interests of the EU throughout the life cycle of the RRF; whereas the milestones commonly known as ‘super milestones’, in particular related to the rule of law, had to be fulfilled prior to any RRF disbursements;

    O.  whereas the RRF Regulation refers to the RRF’s ‘performance-based nature’ but does not define ‘performance’; whereas RRF performance should be linked to sound financial management principles and should measure how well an EU-funded action, project or programme has met its objectives and provided value for money;

    P.  whereas effective democratic control and parliamentary scrutiny over the implementation of the RRF require the full involvement of Parliament and the consideration of all its recommendations at all stages;

    Q.  whereas the Commission has to provide an independent ex post evaluation report on the implementation of the RRF by 31 December 2028, consisting of an assessment of the extent to which the objectives have been achieved, of the efficiency of the use of resources and of the European added value, as well as a global assessment of the RRF, and containing information on its impact in the long term;

    R.  whereas the purpose of this report is to monitor the implementation of the RRF, in accordance with Parliament’s role as laid down in the RRF Regulation, by pointing to the benefits and shortcomings of the RRF, while drawing on the lessons learnt during its implementation;

    Strengthening Europe’s social and economic resilience

    1.  Highlights the fact that the RRF is an unprecedented instrument of solidarity in the light of two unprecedented crises and a cornerstone of the NGEU instrument, ending in 2026; emphasises the importance of drawing lessons from its implementation for the upcoming MFF, including as regards transparency, reporting and coherent measurement of deliverables; highlights the stabilising effect of the RRF for Member States at a time of great economic uncertainty, as it mitigates negative economic and social consequences and supports governments by contributing to the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights, by promoting economic recovery and competitiveness, boosting resilience and innovation, and by supporting the green and digital transitions;

    2.  Highlights the important role of the RRF in preventing the fragmentation of the internal market and the further deepening of macroeconomic divergence, in fostering social and territorial cohesion by providing macroeconomic stabilisation, and in offering assurance to the financial markets by improving investor confidence in turbulent times, thereby lowering yield spreads;

    3.  Welcomes the fact that the RRF is a one-off instrument providing additional fiscal space that has contributed to the prevention of considerable economic and social divergences between Member States with diverse fiscal space; highlights the Commission finding that the RRF has led to a sustained increase in investments across the EU and that the Commission expects the RRF to have a lasting impact across the EU beyond 2026, given its synergies with other EU funds; is, however, concerned that the RRF expiration in 2026 poses a significant risk of a substantial decline in public investment in common European priorities;

    4.  Recalls that the MFF and RRF combined amount to almost EUR 2 trillion for the 2021-2027 programming period, but points to the fact that the high inflation rates and the associated increases in the cost of goods and services have decreased the current value of European spending agreed in nominal terms;

    5.  Takes note of the Commission’s projection in 2024 concerning the potential of NGEU’s impact on the EU’s real gross domestic product (GDP) by 2026, which is significantly lower than its simulation in 2020 (1,4 % compared with 2,3 %), due in part to adverse economic and geopolitical conditions, and of the estimation that NGEU could lead to a sizeable, short-run increase in EU employment by up to 0,8 %; notes that the long-term benefits of the RRF on GDP will likely exceed the budgetary commitments undertaken by up to three to six times , depending on the productivity effects of RRF investment and the diligent implementation of reforms and investments;

    6.  Highlights the difficulty of quantifying the precise social and economic impact of the RRF, as it takes time for the impact of reforms and investments to become clear; stresses the need for further independent evaluations to assess the effective impact of reforms and investments and for further improvements of the underlying methodology; notes the Commission’s finding that approximately half of the expected increase in public investment between 2019 and 2025 is related to investment financed by the EU budget, particularly by the RRF, but notes that some investments have not yet delivered measurable impact;

    7.  Notes that the RRF has incentivised the implementation of some reforms included in the country-specific recommendations made in the context of the European Semester through the inclusion of such reforms in the NRRPs; underlines that there has been a qualitative leap forward in terms of monitoring RRF implementation; recalls that the RRF Scoreboard is used to monitor the progress made towards achieving milestones and targets, as well as compliance with horizontal principles, and in particular the six pillars, namely the green transition, the digital transformation, smart, sustainable and inclusive growth (including economic cohesion, jobs, productivity, competitiveness, research, development and innovation, and a well-functioning internal market with strong small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)), social and territorial cohesion, health, economic, social and institutional resilience with the aim of, inter alia, increasing crisis preparedness and crisis response capacity, and policies for the next generation, children and young people, such as education and skills; highlights that the overall uptake of country-specific recommendations made in the context of the European Semester remains low and has even dropped;

    8.  Highlights that in the context of the new economic governance framework, the set of reforms and investments underpinning an extension of the adjustment period should be consistent with the commitments included in the approved NRRPs during the period of operation of the RRF and the Partnership Agreement under the Common Provisions Regulation(14); observes that the five Member States that requested an extension of the adjustment period by 31 December 2024 relied partly on the reforms and investments already approved under the RRF to justify the extension; takes note of the fact that most Member States have included information on whether the reforms and investments listed in the medium-term fiscal-structural plans are linked to the RRF;

    9.  Welcomes the fact that the RRF provides support for both reforms and investments in the Member States, but notes with concern that the short timeframe for the remaining RRF implementation poses challenges to the completion of key reforms and large-scale investments that are to be finalised towards the end of the RRF and to the timely fulfilment of the 70 % of milestones and targets that are still pending;

    10.  Recalls that RRF expenditure should not substitute recurring national budgetary expenditure, unless duly justified, and should respect the principle of additionality of EU funding; insists that the firm, sustainable and verifiable implementation of non-recurrence, together with the targeting of clearly defined European objectives of reforms and investments, is key to ensure additionality and the long-lasting effect of additional European funds; recalls the need to uphold this principle and appeals against the crowding out or replacement of cohesion policy by the RRF or other temporary instruments, as cohesion policy remains essential for long-term sustainable territorial cohesion and convergence;

    11.  Highlights that prioritising RRF implementation, the lack of administrative capacity in many Member States and challenges posed by global supply chains have contributed to the delayed implementation of cohesion policy; calls on the Commission, in this context, to provide a comprehensive assessment of the RRF’s impact on other financial instruments and public investments, technical support, and the administrative and absorption capacities of the Member States;

    12.  Recalls that, in reaction to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the REPowerEU revision contributes to Europe’s energy security by reducing its dependence on fossil fuels, diversifying its energy supplies, investing in European resources and infrastructure, tackling energy poverty and investing in energy savings and efficiency in all sectors, including transport; emphasises that through REPowerEU, an additional EUR 20 billion in grants was made available in 2023, including EUR 8 billion generated from the front-loading of Emissions Trading System allowances and EUR 12 billion from the Innovation Fund; highlights Parliament’s successes in negotiations, in particular on the provisions on replenishing the Innovation Fund, the 30 % funding target for cross-border projects, the focus of investments on tackling energy poverty for vulnerable households, SMEs and micro-enterprises, and the flexible use of unspent cohesion funds from the 2014-2020 MFF and of up to 7,5 % of national allocations under the 2021-2027 MFF;

    13.  Recalls its call to focus RRF interventions on measures with European added value and therefore regrets the shortage of viable cross-border or multi-country measures, including high-speed railway and sustainable mobility infrastructure projects for dual use that are essential for completing the TEN-T network, and the related risk of re-nationalising funding; notes that the broad scope of the RRF objectives has contributed to this by allowing a wide variety of nationally focused projects to fall within its remit;

    14.  Highlights the modification of Article 27 of the RRF Regulation through REPowerEU, which significantly strengthened the cross-border and multi-country dimensions of the RRF by encouraging the Member States to amend their NRRPs to add RepowerEU chapters, including a spending target of at least 30 % for such measures in order to guarantee the EU’s energy autonomy; is concerned by the broad interpretation adopted by the Commission, which allows any reduction in (national) energy demand to make a case for a cross-border and multi-country dimension;

    15.  Welcomes the possibility of using RRF funding to contribute to the objectives of the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP) by supporting investments in critical technologies in the EU in order to boost its industrial competitiveness; notes that no Member State has made use of the possibility to include in its NRRP an additional cash contribution to STEP objectives via the Member State compartment of InvestEU; recalls that Member States can still amend their national plans in that regard; expects the revision processes to be efficient, streamlined and simple, especially considering the final deadline of 2026, the current geopolitical context and the need to invest in European defence capabilities;

    16.  Recalls the application of the DNSH principle for all reforms and investments supported by the RRF, with a targeted derogation under REPowerEU for energy infrastructure and facilities needed to meet immediate security of supply needs; encourages the Commission to assess the feasibility of a more uniform interpretation of the DNSH principle between the RRF and the EU taxonomy for sustainable activities, while taking into account the specificities of the RRF as a public expenditure programme;

    Financial aspects of the RRF

    17.  Stresses that the RRF is the first major performance-based instrument at EU level which is exclusively based on financing not linked to costs (FNLC); recalls that Article 8 of the RRF Regulation stipulates that the RRF must be implemented by the Commission in direct management in accordance with the relevant rules adopted pursuant to Article 322 TFEU, in particular the Financial Regulation and the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation; regrets that the Council did not agree to insert specific rules in the Financial Regulation to address the risks of this delivery model, such as double funding; considers that the rules of the Financial Regulation should be fully applicable to future instruments based on FNLC, including as regards fines, penalties and sanctions;

    18.  Notes that only 13 Member States have requested loans and that EUR 92 billion of the EUR 385,8 billion available will remain unused since this amount was not committed by the deadline of 31 December 2023; takes note of the fact that loans were attractive for Member States that faced higher borrowing costs on the financial markets or that sought to compensate for a reduction in RRF grants; points out that some Member States have made limited use of RRF loans, either due to strong fiscal positions or administrative considerations; calls on the Commission to analyse the reasons for the low uptake in some Member States and to consider these findings when designing future EU financial instruments; notes with concern that national financial instruments to implement the NRRPs have not been sufficiently publicised, leading to limited awareness and uptake by potential beneficiaries; considers that a political discussion is needed on the use of unspent funds in the light of tight public budgets and urgent EU strategic priorities; calls for an assessment of how and under which conditions unused RRF funds could be redirected to boost Europe’s competitiveness, resilience, defence, and social, economic and territorial cohesion, particularly through investments in digital and green technologies aligned with the RRF’s original purpose;

    19.  Recalls the legal obligation to ensure full repayment of NGEU expenditure by 31 December 2058 at the latest; reminds the Council and the Commission of their legal commitment under the interinstitutional agreement concluded in 2020 to ensure a viable path to refinancing NGEU debt, including through sufficient proceeds from new own resources introduced after 2021 without any undue reduction in programme expenditure or investment instruments under the MFF; deplores the lack of progress made in this regard, which raises concerns regarding the viability of the repayment of the debt undertaken under NGEU, and urges the Council to adopt new own resources without delay and as a matter of urgency; urges the Commission, furthermore, to continue efforts to identify additional genuine new own resources beyond the IIA and linked to EU policies, in order to cover the high spending needs associated with the funding of new priorities and the repayment of NGEU debt;

    20.  Notes with concern the Commission’s estimation that the total cost for NGEU capital and interest repayments are projected to be around EUR 25 to 30 billion per year from 2028, equivalent to 15-20 % of the 2025 annual budget ; recalls that recourse to special instruments had to be made in the last three budgetary procedures to cover EURI instrument costs; highlights that the significant increase in financing costs puts pressure on the future EU budget and limits the capacity to respond to future challenges;

    21.  Takes note of the Commission’s target to fund up to 30 % of NGEU costs by issuing greens bonds; notes that by 31 December 2024 the Commission had issued European green bonds amounting to EUR 68.2 billion;

    Design and implementation of NRRPs

    22.  Notes that 47 % of the available RRF funds had been disbursed by 31 December 2024, with grants reaching 55 % and loans 37 %, which has resulted in a high proportion of measures still to be completed in 2025 and 2026; is concerned, however, about the ECA’s finding that only 50 % of disbursed funds had reached final beneficiaries in 15 out of 22 Member States by October 2023; calls on the Commission to take the recommendations of the ECA duly into account in order to improve the functioning of any future performance-based instruments similar to the RRF, in particular in the context of a more targeted MFF;

    23.  Welcomes the fact that all Member States have surpassed the targets for the green (37 %) and the digital transitions (20 %), with average expenditure towards climate and digital objectives of the RRF as a whole standing at 42 % and 26 % respectively; notes that the ECA has cast doubt on how the implementation of RRF measures has contributed to the green transition and has recommended improvements to the methodologies used to estimate the impact of climate-related measures; highlights the fact that the same methodological deficiencies exist across all pillars of the RRF;

    24.  Notes the tangible impact that the RRF could have on social objectives, with Member States planning to spend around EUR 163 billion; underlines that such spending must be result-oriented, ensuring measurable economic and/or social benefits; stresses the need to accelerate investments in the development of rural, peripheral and outermost, isolated and remote areas, and in the fields of affordable housing, social protection and the integration of vulnerable groups, and youth employment, where expenditure is lagging behind; calls for an in-depth evaluation by the Commission, under the RRF Scoreboard, of the projects and reforms related to education and young people implemented by Member States under the RRF; regrets the delayed implementation of health objectives observed in certain Member States, given that the instrument should also improve the accessibility and capacity of health systems, and of key social infrastructure investments, including early childhood education and care facilities; stresses that these delays, in some cases linked to shifting budgetary priorities and revised national implementation timelines, risk undermining the achievement of the RRF’s social cohesion objectives;

    25.  Reiterates its negotiating position to include targets for education (10 %) and for cultural activities (2 %); encourages the Commission’s effort to evaluate these targets as a benchmark in its assessment of education policy in NRRPs, through the RRF Scoreboard;

    26.  Observes that a large majority of NRRPs include a specific section explaining how the plan addresses gender-related concerns and challenges; is concerned, however, that some NRRPs do not include an explanation of how the measures in the NRRP are expected to contribute to gender equality and equal opportunities for all and calls on the Member States concerned to add such explanations without delay;

    27.  Stresses the importance of reforms focusing on labour market fragmentation, fostering quality working conditions, addressing wage level inequalities, ensuring decent living conditions, and strengthening social dialogue, social protection and the social economy;

    28.  Notes the tangible impact that the RRF could have on the digital transformation objective, with EUR 166 billion allocated to corresponding plans; welcomes the contributions made under the smart, sustainable and inclusive growth pillar, in particular to competitiveness and support for SMEs; notes the need for an acceleration of investments in transnational cooperation, support for competitive enterprises leading innovation projects, and regulatory changes for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, which are lagging behind;

    29.  Stresses that the success of EU investments depends on well-functioning capital markets; calls on the Member States to ensure a more effective and timely disbursement of funds, particularly for SMEs and young entrepreneurs, to streamline application procedures with a view to enhancing accessibility and to implement specific measures to provide targeted support to help them play a more prominent role in the process of smart and inclusive growth;

    30.  Is concerned that the achievement of milestones and targets lags behind the indicative timetable provided in the NRRPs, and that the pace of progress is uneven across Member States; regrets the time lag between the fulfilment of milestones and targets and the implementation of projects; highlights that the RRF will only achieve its long-term and short-term potential if the reform and investment components, respectively, are properly implemented; welcomes the fact that, following a slow start, RRF implementation has picked up since the second half of 2023 but significant delays affecting key reforms and investments still persist and have been attributed to various factors, including the revisions linked to the inclusion of REPowerEU, mounting inflation, the insufficient administrative capacity of Member States, in particular the smaller Member States, uncertainties regarding specific RRF implementation rules, high energy costs, supply shortages and an underestimation of the time needed to implement measures; notes that the postponement of key implementation deadlines by some governments to 2026 raises concerns about the capacity of some Member States to fully absorb the allocated funds within the set timeframe of the RRF; stresses the importance of maintaining a realistic and effective implementation schedule to prevent the risk of incomplete projects and missed opportunities for structural improvements; calls on the Commission to ensure that administrative bottlenecks are urgently addressed;

    31.  Recalls the modification of the RRF Regulation through the inclusion of the REPowerEU chapter; stresses the importance of the REPowerEU chapters in NRRPs and calls on the Member States to prioritise mature projects and implement their NRRPs more quickly, both in terms of reforms and investments, and, where necessary, to adjust NRRPs in line with the RRF’s objectives, without undermining the overall balance and level of ambition of the NRRPs, in order to respond to challenges stemming from geopolitical events and to tackle current realities on the ground;

    32.  Highlights the fact that the RRF could have helped to mitigate the effects of the current EU-wide housing crisis; regrets that some Member States did not make use of this opportunity and stresses the importance for the Member States to accelerate investments in availability and affordability of housing;

    33.  Highlights the role of ‘super milestones’ in protecting the EU’s financial interests against rule of law deficiencies and in ensuring the full implementation of the requirements under Article 22 of the RRF Regulation; welcomes the fact that all but one Member State have satisfactorily fulfilled their ‘super milestones’; recalls that the Commission must recover any pre-financing that has not been netted against regular payment requests by the end of the RRF;

    34.  Notes the high administrative burden and complexity brought by the RRF; stresses the considerable efforts required at national level to implement the RRF in parallel with structural funds; notes that between 2021 and 2024 the demand-driven Technical Support Instrument supported more than 500 RRF-related reforms in the Member States, directly or indirectly related to the preparation, amendment, revision and implementation of the NRRPs; takes note of the Commission guidance of July 2024 with simplifications and clarifications to streamline RRF implementation but expects the Commission to act swiftly on its promise to cut the administrative burden by 25 %; urges the Commission to give clear and targeted technical support to the Member States, allowing them to develop efficient administrative capacity to implement the milestones and targets; calls on the Commission to decrease the level of complexity of EU public procurement rules which apply to higher-value contracts;

    35.  Expresses concern over the complexity of application procedures for RRF funding, particularly for SMEs and non-governmental organisations, which require external consultancy services even for small grants; emphasises that such bureaucratic obstacles contradict the original objectives of the RRF, which aimed to provide rapid and direct financial support; calls for an urgent simplification of application and reporting requirements, particularly for smaller beneficiaries, to maximise the absorption and impact of funds and to assist with their contribution to the green and digital transitions;

    36.  Believes that implementation delays underscore the risk that measures for which RRF funding has been paid will not be completed by the 2026 payment deadline; welcomes the Commission’s statement at the Recovery and Resilience Dialogue (RRD) of 16 September 2024 that it will not reimburse non-implemented projects; considers it a shortcoming that RRF funds paid for milestones and targets assessed as fulfilled cannot be recovered if related measures are not eventually completed; encourages the Commission to take into account the ECA’s recommendations related to this and to assess, in cooperation with the Member States, the measures most at risk of not being completed by 31 August 2026; stresses the importance of monitoring these measures, facilitating timely follow-up and working towards solutions to overcome delays;

    37.  Notes with concern that the remaining implementation timeframe of the RRF is too short for the implementation of many innovative projects; further notes that innovative projects, by definition, are more difficult to plan and more likely to encounter obstacles during implementation, making them unsuited to the RRF’s strict deadlines; urges the Commission to create future programmes that are flexible enough to give proper answers in changing circumstances and that at the same time guarantee a certain degree of predictability;

    38.  Notes that some milestones and targets may be no longer achievable because of objective circumstances; stresses that any NRRP revisions should be made in accordance with the RRF Regulation, including the applicable deadlines, and should not entail backtracking on reforms, commitments or lower quality projects but should maintain the overall ambition and the efficiency of public spending;

    39.  Is concerned about the Commission’s uneven assessment of NRRPs, which has led to double standards in the application of the Regulation; is further concerned about the uneven and different definition of milestones and targets from one NRRP to the other, as consistently reported by the ECA;

    40.  Highlights that the duration of the Commission’s assessment of payment requests by Member States differs considerably among the Member States and stresses the need for more transparency from the Commission; urges the Commission to accelerate its assessments and to ensure the equal treatment of the Member States; highlights the need to ensure a level playing field across the EU for measures and indicators that are used to assess all RRF projects;

    41.  Urges the Member States to increase their efforts to address administrative bottlenecks and provide sufficient administrative capacity to accelerate RRF implementation in view of the 2026 deadline and to avoid concentrating RRF projects in more developed regions and capitals by enabling RRF funds to flow into projects in the most vulnerable regions, thereby serving the RRF’s objective to enhance the EU’s social, territorial and economic cohesion; emphasises the importance of fair regional distribution within the NRRPs while ensuring that RRF funds are allocated based on economic and social impact, feasibility and long-term benefits;

    42.   Calls for an 18-month extension of mature RRF projects through an amendment of the RRF Regulation by co-decision, if needed; emphasises that the envisaged extension of projects will be conducted by the Commission based on objective, clear and fair benchmarks; welcomes the possibility of establishing a targeted and performance-based prioritisation and transfer system after the 2026 deadline in order to allow for the finalisation of ongoing projects through other funding schemes, including the European Investment Fund and a possible new European competitiveness fund; urges the Commission to present a strategy to address the huge demand for public investment beyond 2026 without compromising budgetary resources in other critical areas;

    43.  Calls for an evaluation of how this framework could enable targeted investments in EU defence supply chains, strategic stockpiles and defence innovation, ensuring alignment with broader European security objectives;

    44.  Is concerned that some Member States might choose to forego parts of the amounts or entire amounts associated with their last payment request, thus avoiding the fulfilment of the last milestones and targets;

    Transparency, monitoring and control

    45.  Takes note of the fact that the Commission had planned to conduct 112 RRF audits in all Member States in 2024; reminds the Commission of its obligation, in accordance with Article 24(9) of the RRF Regulation, to recover funding in case of incorrect disbursements or reversals of measures;

    46.  Notes that the Commission relies on its own methodologies when calculating partial payments and suspensions of funds; regrets that these methodologies were only developed two years after the start of the RRF implementation and without the consultation of Parliament;

    47.  Welcomes the extensive work of the ECA in relation to the RRF and deems it important to thoroughly assess its findings, in particular its findings that milestones and targets are often rather vague and output-oriented and are therefore not fit to measure results and impacts, and its findings regarding the risks of double funding resulting from overlaps with other policies; notes that the Commission has accepted many but not all of the ECA’s recommendations; stresses that weaknesses in financial controls, as highlighted by the ECA, must be urgently addressed to prevent double funding, cost inefficiencies, and mismanagement of EU funds; calls for enhanced transparency and for the full consideration of the ECA’s recommendations without adding unnecessary administrative burden;

    48.  Notes that the ECA considers that the RRF focuses on progress on implementation rather than performance, particularly because RRF-funded measures focus on outputs rather than results, vary in ambition, sometimes lack clarity and do not always cover a measure’s key implementation stages, including completion;

    49.  Notes that the ECA’s audits revealed several cases in which funding had been disbursed but the requirements related to the fulfilment of corresponding milestones and targets had not been adequately met; further notes that the Commission framework for assessing the ‘satisfactory fulfilment’ of the relevant milestones and targets contains discretionary elements, such as ‘minimal deviation from a requirement’ or ‘proportional delays’, and that the methodology for the determination of partial payments does not provide an explanation for the values chosen as coefficients, thereby leaving room for interpretation; asks the Commission to provide Parliament with further clarification;

    50.  Insists that, as a rule, measures already included in other national plans benefiting from EU funding (e.g. cohesion, agriculture, etc.) should not be included in NRRPs, even if they do not incur any costs; urges the Commission to remain vigilant and proactive in identifying any potential situation of double funding in particular in regard to the different implementation models of the RRF and other EU funding instruments;

    51.  Regrets the lack of a proper RRF audit trail and the persistent lack of transparency despite the bi-annual reporting requirement for Member States on the 100 largest final recipients, which was introduced into REPowerEU upon Parliament’s request; regrets the delays in reporting by some Member States and the limited informative value of the information provided, which ultimately prevents compliance checks by the Commission or the ECA; reiterates its call for the lists of the largest final recipients for each Member State to be regularly updated and published on the RRF Scoreboard and to include information on the economic operators involved, including contractors and sub-contractors, and their beneficial owners, and not simply ministries or other government bodies or state companies; further regrets that the current definition of ‘final recipient’ leaves room for interpretation, resulting in different final beneficiaries for similar measures among Member States; calls on the Commission, in this context, to ensure a common understanding of what constitutes a ‘final recipient’ so that this can be applied consistently;

    52.  Is concerned about persistent weaknesses in national reporting and control mechanisms, due in part to absorption pressure affecting the capacity to detect ineligible expenditure and due to the complexity of the audit and control procedures, which created uncertainty in the Member States and an overload of administrative procedures; calls on the Commission to provide assurance on whether Member States’ control systems function adequately and to check the compliance of RRF-funded investment projects with EU and national rules; calls for payments to be reduced and, where appropriate, amounts to be recovered in accordance with Article 22 of the RRF Regulation, should weaknesses persist in the national control systems; regrets the reliance on manual cross-checks and self-declarations by recipients of EU funds in the absence of interoperable IT tools and harmonised standards, despite the existence of tools such as the Early Detection and Exclusion System and ARACHNE, whose use is currently not mandatory, thereby risking that expenditure is declared twice; recalls, in this regard, the reluctance of the Member States to make progress in developing the relevant IT tools in a timely manner;

    53.  Shares the view of the ECA that the FNLC model does not preclude reporting on actual costs; notes that having clear insights on costs also facilitates the work of control and oversight bodies, as well as the EPPO and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), and enables enhanced public scrutiny;

    54.  Reiterates the role of the RRF Scoreboard in providing information for citizens on the overall progress in the implementation of NRRPs; underlines the importance of the Scoreboard in strengthening transparency and calls on the Commission to increase the level of transparency and data visualisation in the Scoreboard;

    55.  Recalls that the reporting on the progress of implementation in the RRF Scoreboard is based on information provided by the Member States on a bi-annual basis;

    56.  Highlights the important role of the EPPO and OLAF in protecting the EU’s financial interests; welcomes the fact that EPPO investigations into RRF-related fraud and corruption cases have led to several arrests, indictments and seizures of RRF funds; recalls that the EPPO was handling 307 active cases related to the RRF in 2024, corresponding to about 17 % of all expenditure fraud investigations and causing an estimated damage to the EU’s financial interests of EUR 2,8 billion; expects the number of investigations to grow as RRF implementation advances; calls on the Commission to look into the management declarations of the Member States in terms of their reporting of detected fraud and the remedial measures taken;

    Role of the European Parliament

    57.  Reiterates the importance of Parliament’s role in scrutinising and monitoring the implementation of the RRF and in holding the Commission accountable; highlights Parliament’s input provided through various channels, in particular through various plenary debates, parliamentary resolutions, bi-monthly RRD meetings with the responsible Commissioners, over 30 meetings of the standing working group on the scrutiny of the RRF, numerous parliamentary questions, the annual discharge procedure of the Commission and the regular flow of information and ad hoc requests for information from the Commission; regrets that the model of using milestones and targets to trigger disbursement was not accompanied by adequate budgetary control mechanisms, resulting in a diminished role for Parliament compared to its scrutiny of MFF spending;

    58.  Recalls Parliament’s rights as laid down in Article 25 of the RRF Regulation, in particular the right to simultaneously receive from the Commission information that it transmits to the Council or any of its preparatory bodies in the context of the RRF Regulation or its implementation, as well as an overview of its preliminary findings concerning the satisfactory fulfilment of the relevant milestones and targets included in the NRRPs; encourages the sharing of relevant outcomes of discussions held in Council preparatory bodies with the competent parliamentary committees;

    59.  Recalls further the right of Parliament’s competent committees to invite the Commission to provide information on the state of play of the assessment of the NRRPs in the context of the RRD meetings;

    60.  Regrets the fact that Parliament has no role in the design of NRRPs and is not consulted on payment requests; criticises furthermore the fact that Parliament has not been provided with a clear and traceable overview of the implementation status of projects and payments; expects to be informed about the context of NRRP revisions in order to make its own assessment of the revisions and to have an enhanced role in possible future instruments based on the RRF experience;

    Stakeholder involvement

    61.  Regrets the insufficient involvement of local and regional authorities (LRAs), civil society organisations, social partners, national parliaments and other relevant stakeholders in the design, revision or implementation of NRRPs leading to worse policy outcomes, as well as limited ownership; regrets that in the design and implementation of the NRRPs, some Member States have clearly favoured some LRAs or stakeholders to the detriment of others; recalls that the participation of LRAs, national authorities and those responsible for developing these policies is crucial for the success of the RRF, as stated in Article 28 of the RRF Regulation; recalls that Parliament supported a binding provision in the RRF to establish a multilevel dialogue to engage relevant stakeholders and discuss the preparation and implementation of NRRPs with them, with a clear consultation period; calls, therefore, for the maximum possible stakeholder involvement in the implementation of NRRPs, in accordance with the national legal framework and based on clear and transparent principles;

    62.  Reiterates the need for regular interaction between national coordinating authorities and national stakeholders involved in the monitoring of the implementation of the NRRPs, in line with the principle of transparency and accountability; stresses that more regular and public communication from the national coordinating authorities is needed to ensure that updated information about the progress of the implementation of NRRPs is made available;

    63.  Stresses that decisions should be made at the level that is most appropriate; is convinced that the application of the partnership principle and a stronger involvement of LRAs could make project implementation more efficient, reduce disparities within Member States and result in more and better quality measures with a cross-border and multi-country dimension;

    64.  Believes that valuable lessons can be drawn from the RRF to be reflected in the design of performance-based instruments in the next MFF, in particular in the light of the EU’s competitiveness and simplification agendas;

    Lessons for the future

    65.  Believes that the combination of reforms and investments has proved successful but that a clearer link is needed between the two; highlights the importance of aligning any funding with the objectives of the instrument and disbursing it in line with the progress made towards them; insists that the level of ambition of NRRPs should not be lowered but should be commensurate with the RRF timeline to ensure their successful implementation;

    66.  Is convinced, as highlighted by the Draghi report, that boosting EU competitiveness, decarbonising the EU’s economy and making it more circular and resource-efficient, as well as closing the skills gap, creating quality jobs and enhancing the EU’s innovation capacity, will be central priorities beyond 2026; is concerned that a sizeable funding gap will arise after the RRF ceases to operate at the end of 2026, notably for public investment in common European priorities, since financial resources from national budgets vary significantly among Member States; highlights the need to use the lessons learned from the RRF to better leverage public and private investments with a view to addressing the financing gap in European objectives and transitions, which the Draghi report estimates at over EUR 800 billion annually, while ensuring seamless continuity of investments in common European goods;

    67.  Welcomes the enhanced use of financial instruments made possible by the option to channel RRF funds towards the Member States’ compartment of InvestEU;

    68.  Urges the Commission to apply the lessons learned and the ECA’s observations, and to ensure that future performance-based instruments are well-targeted, aligned with the aim of financing European public goods and prioritising the addressing of clearly defined strategic challenges, economic sustainability and competitiveness; calls for it to be ensured that all future instruments are designed to measure not only inputs or short-term outputs and progress but also results in terms of long-term impacts backed by outcomes;

    69.  Notes that, according to the ECA, it is essential that future performance-based instruments are not designed and implemented in a way that is detrimental to accountability and, in particular, that appropriate control systems are in place in the Member States and are checked by the Commission before implementation starts; notes that this would involve setting minimum requirements for the Member States’ controls and the Commission’s checks;

    70.  Calls on the Commission to conduct an independent evaluation and to report on the RRF impact on private investments at aggregate EU level, in particular on its potential crowding-out effect on private investments and its determinants; calls further for objective and clear analyses from the Commission on how the implementation of reforms and investments within the NRRPs affects the economies of the individual Member States, with special regard to smart, sustainable and inclusive growth; urges the Commission to take the lessons learned from these analyses and from the ECA’s observations on the RRF implementation into account when drawing up its proposals for the next programming period;

    71.  Underlines that all EU-funded investments and reforms should be coordinated and coherent with strategic planning at national level and should focus on projects with a clear European added value; underlines the need for a spending target for cross-border and multi-country investments; calls on the Commission to develop a credible methodology to assess the cross-border and multi-country dimensions of EU funded projects;

    72.  Highlights that meaningful social and territorial dialogues with a high level of involvement of LRAs, social partners, civil society organisations and national parliaments within the national legal framework are essential for national ownership, successful implementation and democratic accountability; expresses concern over the insufficient involvement of all relevant stakeholders in the implementation and oversight of RRF-funded initiatives; stresses in particular that regions and city councils cannot be mere recipients of decisions, without being given the opportunity to have a say on reforms and investments that truly transform their territories;

    73.  Believes that it is essential to adopt differentiated strategies that recognise the cultural diversity of the various regions and enhance their economic and social cohesion instead of applying a homogeneous or one-size-fits-all approach that could be to the detriment of the less developed regions; calls, therefore, for dialogues with stakeholders to be strengthened and more diligently employed as they could inspire future initiatives and mechanisms in the EU and its Member States;

    74.  Underlines the requirement of the RRF Regulation to publicly display information about the origin of funding for projects funded by the EU to ensure buy-in from European citizens;

    75.  Highlights that the RRD meetings have been an important tool in enhancing transparency and accountability, which are crucial for the optimal implementation of the RRF;

    76.  Reiterates that further efforts are required to improve the transparency and traceability of the use of EU funds; stresses the need to ensure that data that is relevant for performance measurement is available and that information on performance is presented in a better and more transparent manner; stresses that the feedback mechanism between performance information and programme design or adjustment should be enhanced;

    77.  Considers that better training and capacity-building across all regions and authorities involved, in particular at national level, could have accelerated the RRF’s implementation and enabled the implementing authorities to better adapt to the performance-based nature of the RRF; considers that the Commission could have assisted Member States more at the planning stage and provided earlier implementation guidance, in particular with a view to strengthening their audit and control systems and the cross-border dimension of the RRF;

    78.  Highlights the importance of mitigating the risk of double funding; suggests the deployment of an integrated and interoperable IT and data mining system and the development of clear standards for datasets to be applied across Member States, with a view to allowing comprehensive and automated expenditure tracking; calls for improved coordination mechanisms that define clear responsibilities among the bodies involved in the implementation of the various EU and national programmes, while avoiding unnecessary bureaucratic complexity and ensuring an efficient allocation of funds; encourages the integration of advanced data analytics and AI tools to enhance performance tracking, evaluation and reporting to alleviate manual workload and to streamline reporting processes; underlines that such progress can only happen if there is also operational support to digitalise administrations;

    79.  Strongly urges the Commission and the Member States to ensure that any type of EU FNLC or EU funding that is performance based complies with EU and national rules, ultimately protecting the financial interests of the EU; reiterates the accountability and responsibility of the Commission and the Member States to ensure the legality and the regularity of EU funding, as well as the respect of sound financial management principles;

    80.  Considers that the role of Parliament in the monitoring of the RRF should be further enhanced;

    81.  Calls for future performance-based instruments to have a single audit trail to trace budget contributions to the projects funded; underlines the need for project-level auditing to mitigate reputational risks in the eyes of the general public and to facilitate the recovery of funds in case measures are reversed; underlines the need to reduce administrative bottlenecks and burden;

    82.  Demands that any possible future performance-based programmes make clearer links between the milestones and targets and the actual projects being implemented; stresses that there should be less of a delay between the fulfilment of milestones and the implementation of projects;

    83.  Reiterates its call for an open platform which contains data on all projects, final recipients and the regional distribution of funding, thereby facilitating auditing and democratic oversight;

    84.  Stresses that any possible future budgetary decisions on EU borrowing should respect the unity of the budget and Parliament’s role as part of the budgetary authority; highlights the risks of cost overruns for the repayment of debt, resulting inter alia from volatile interest rates; deems it important to ensure from the outset that sufficient funding is available to cover these costs without presenting a detriment to other programmes or political priorities;

    85.  Invites the Commission and the Member States to closely assess and learn from instruments and tools such as the RRF, in order to maximise the efficiency and impact of EU funding, investments and reforms, streamline policy objectives, improve the collaboration of the institutions and stakeholders at national and European level, and increase national ownership;

    86.  Notes the declared intention of the Commission to draw on the RRF experience when designing its proposals for the post-2027 EU funding programmes, due later this year; acknowledges that the independent ex post evaluation will come too late to feed into the process leading up to the next programming period, but expects the Commission and the co-legislators to take due account of the lessons learned from the RRF and of the recommendations of relevant stakeholders, in particular LRA, civil society organisations and social partners; believes that, as the EU plans for future economic resilience, there is also a need to further mobilise private investment, strengthen capital markets and ensure that public spending remains fiscally responsible and strategically targeted to make the EU more resilient and sovereign in an ever more conflictual geopolitical context;

    o
    o   o

    87.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, and to the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

    (1) OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/241/oj.
    (2) OJ L 63, 28.2.2023, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/435/oj.
    (3) OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2092/oj.
    (4) OJ L, 2024/765, 29.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/765/oj.
    (5) OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 28.
    (6) OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj.
    (7) OJ L, 2024/795, 29.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/795/oj.
    (8) OJ L, 2024/1263, 30.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1263/oj.
    (9) OJ C 32, 27.1.2023, p. 42.
    (10) OJ C, C/2024/4618, 22.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4618/oj.
    (11) OJ C, C/2024/7057, 4.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/7057/oj.
    (12) European Parliament, Think Tank https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/research/advanced-search?textualSearch=RRF&startDate=01%2F07%2F2019&endDate=&sort=RELEVANCE.
    (13) OJ C, C/2024/5742, 17.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5742/oj.
    (14) Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy (OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 159, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1060/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – 2023 and 2024 reports on Moldova – P10_TA(2025)0131 – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Republic of Moldova 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0698),

    –  having regard to the Commission opinion of 17 June 2022 on the application by the Republic of Moldova (hereinafter ‘Moldova’) for membership of the European Union (COM(2022)0406) and the joint staff working document of 6 February 2023 entitled ‘Association Implementation Report on the Republic of Moldova’ (SWD(2023)0041),

    –   having regard to Regulation (EU) 2025/535 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 March 2025 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova(1),

    –  having regard to its previous resolutions on Moldova,

    –  having regard to the Commission analytical report of 1 February 2023 on Moldova’s alignment with the EU acquis (SWD(2023)0032),

    –  having regard to the proposal of 9 October 2024 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova (COM/2024/0469),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 9 October 2024 on the Moldova Growth Plan (COM/2024/0470),

    –  having regard to the Council conclusions of 17 December 2024 on enlargement,

    –  having regard to the visit of the delegation of the Committee on Foreign Affairs to Moldova on 25-27 February 2025,

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0096/2025),

    A.  whereas, following Moldova’s application for EU membership of 3 March 2022, the European Council granted it candidate status on 23 June 2022 and subsequently decided to open accession negotiations on 14 December 2023;

    B.  whereas in June 2024 negotiations on Moldova’s EU accession started;

    C.  whereas Moldova held a referendum on 20 October 2024, the outcome of which confirmed the embedding of EU accession into its Constitution, despite various forms of manipulative interference to destabilise the country, illicit financing of political actors, disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks;

    D.  whereas the Association Agreement(2), which includes a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (AA/DCFTA), remains the basis for political association and economic integration between the EU and Moldova, and a regular political and economic dialogue is ongoing between the two sides;

    Progress with EU accession-related reforms, in particular on the rule of law and governance

    1.  Commends Moldova’s exemplary commitment and steady progress with EU accession-related reforms despite significant internal and external challenges – such as Russia’s full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine – which made it possible for accession negotiations to start in June 2024, half a year after the relevant decision by the European Council on 14 December 2023 and less than two years after the country’s application for EU membership on 3 March 2022;

    2.  Recognises that EU-Moldova relations have entered into a new phase, with intensifying cooperation, gradual alignment across all policy areas of the EU acquis and advancement on the EU integration path; welcomes the progress achieved in the bilateral screening process since it started in July 2024 and the recent closing of screening for cluster 1 (fundamentals) and cluster 2 (internal market); commends and supports the ambition of the Moldovan Government to open negotiations on cluster 1 (fundamentals), cluster 2 (internal market) and cluster 6 (external relations) in the coming months, as well as completing the screening process for all clusters by the end of 2025; calls on the Commission to enhance its support to the Moldovan Government in order to ensure the successful achievement of these key objectives; encourages the Council to take a merit-based approach in its decisions on Moldova’s negotiation process; deplores the bilateralisation and instrumentalisation of the EU accession process, such as the opposition of the Hungarian Government to opening negotiations on clusters 1, 2 and 6, which has led to a delay and serves Russia’s objective of obstructing the European integration of the region;

    3.  Believes that Moldova’s capacity to consolidate its current progress with EU accession-related reforms and sustain the ambitious pace towards EU membership will require the strong and genuine support of a parliamentary majority after the elections in autumn 2025;

    4.  Notes that the outcomes of both the constitutional referendum on EU accession, held on 20 October 2024, and the presidential election, held on 20 October 2024 and 3 November 2024, confirmed the support of a majority of the people of Moldova for the country’s goal of EU membership and the required pro-EU reforms; underlines that this referendum and election were held professionally and with an extraordinary sense of duty and dedication, despite a massive hybrid campaign by Russia and its proxies which used various tools, such as the strategic exploitation of social media, AI-generated content, ‘leaks’ of fake documents, intimidation, which entailed various forms of manipulative interference to destabilise the country, illicit financing of political actors, vote-buying, including by Russia’s instrumentalisation of parts of the clergy from the Metropolis of Chisinau and All Moldova, disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks; recalls that these attacks had four key strategies: divide society, delegitimise institutions, discredit democratic actors and promote Russian influence; welcomes the outcome of the 2024 constitutional referendum which enshrined the commitment to joining the EU in the country’s constitution; strongly condemns the increasing attempts by Russia, pro-Russian oligarchs and Russian-sponsored local proxies to destabilise Moldova, sow divisions within Moldovan society and derail the country’s pro-EU direction through hybrid attacks, the instrumentalisation of energy supplies, disinformation, manipulation and intimidation campaigns targeting civil society organisations and independent media;

    5.  Notes that the upcoming parliamentary elections on 28 September 2025 will be of crucial importance for the continuation of Moldova’s pro-EU trajectory; is concerned about the likely intensification of foreign, in particular Russian, malign interference and hybrid attacks ahead of the elections; calls for the EU to increase its support, including financial and technical support, for the Moldovan Government’s efforts to counter such interference in the country’s democratic process, including through additional sanctions listings, an extension and consolidation of the mandate and resources of the EU Partnership Mission (EUPM) in Moldova and the granting of additional support thereto, and the sharing of expertise in foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), countering hybrid threats and strengthening resilience; calls similarly for an increase in efforts by the Moldovan authorities and the EU in support of independent media and pro-democracy civil society, in order to enable journalists at national and regional level to counter FIMI and to strengthen digital literacy;

    6.  Stresses the importance of strategic communication, debunking and combating false, Russia-promoted narratives about the EU and its policies and of highlighting the concrete short- and long-term benefits of EU accession for the people of all of Moldova, with a special focus on regions such as Gagauzia as well as socio-economically disadvantaged communities in rural areas; calls for the EU to step up its support for Moldova in this regard;

    Socio-economic reforms

    7.  Welcomes the Commission’s Moldova Growth Plan, which is aimed at supporting Moldova’s socio-economic and fundamental reforms and enhancing access to the EU’s single market; welcomes the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova, which underpins the Growth Plan and is worth EUR 2,02 billion, making it the largest EU financial support package for Moldova since its independence; underlines that this facility provides Moldova with EUR 520 million in non-repayable support and a maximum amount of EUR 1,5 billion in loans, with an 18 % pre-financing rate, demonstrating the EU’s recognition of the urgency of supporting Moldova’s reforms and resilience; calls on the Commission to support the Moldovan authorities in implementing the necessary Reform Agenda for the effective absorption of funds from this facility, ensuring that the benefits of this support are promptly felt by Moldova’s citizens; looks forward to the announced impact assessment of the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova in the form of a Commission staff working document within three months of the adoption of the corresponding regulation;

    8.  Calls on the Commission to include adequate dedicated pre-accession funds for Moldova in the EU’s next multiannual financial framework, and to begin preparing Moldova for the efficient use of future pre-accession funds as a newly designated EU candidate country;

    9.  Reiterates that the support of the people of Moldova for European integration can be strengthened with a tangible improvement in their livelihoods, by strengthening state institutions and public administration in order to use project funding effectively and to implement and enforce the EU acquis, ensuring a robust welfare system and fighting corruption and oligarchic influence and ensuring accountability; calls on the Moldovan authorities to continue to ensure the meaningful involvement of civil society organisations, diaspora, vulnerable groups and social partners, including trade unions, in order to strengthen trust in democratic institutions and processes and boost public support for EU accession-related reforms;

    10.  Stresses the importance of civil society organisations in monitoring governance and progress with EU-related reforms, promoting transparency, defending human rights and countering disinformation and external malign influence by anti-reform political actors and Russian proxies;

    11.  Calls for comprehensive social policy reforms to address poverty and persistent large-scale emigration, increase healthcare coverage, strengthen public education, improve working conditions and develop adequate social protection systems; emphasises that economic development must be inclusive and sustainable, with opportunities for small and medium-sized enterprises; stresses the need for targeted social investment in Moldova’s young people and rural areas to reduce regional disparities and safeguard social cohesion;

    12.  Calls for special emphasis on Moldova’s participation in EU social, educational, and cultural programmes in order to promote social convergence, innovation and technological advancement;

    13.  Calls on Moldova to implement the Reform Agenda, which outlines the key socio-economic and fundamental reforms to accelerate the growth and competitiveness of Moldova’s economy and its convergence with the EU on the basis of enhanced implementation of the AA/DCFTA;

    14.  Strongly calls for the acceleration of Moldova’s gradual integration into the EU and the single market by continuing to align its legal and regulatory framework with the EU acquis and associating the country to more EU programmes and initiatives, including through the granting of observer status to Moldovan officials and experts in relevant EU bodies, which would deliver tangible socio-economic benefits even before the country formally joins the EU; congratulates Moldova on its inclusion in the geographical scope of the Single Euro Payments Area payment schemes, facilitating transfers in euro and reducing costs for Moldova’s citizens and businesses; commends the inclusion of roaming liberalisation in the updated EU–Moldova Association Agreement; welcomes Moldova’s recent progress in the transposition of the EU’s roaming and telecommunications acquis and expresses support for a swift decision on the inclusion of Moldova into the EU ‘roam like at home’ area; calls on the service providers to cooperate in good faith with the Moldovan authorities on implementing ‘roam like at home’;

    15.  Welcomes the renewal of the EU’s temporary trade liberalisation measures in July 2024 in order to support Moldova’s economy, substituting the loss of trade caused by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its unfriendly policies towards Moldova; calls for the EU to take swift and significant steps towards the permanent liberalisation of its tariff-rate quotas, in order to ensure predictability and increase the country’s attractiveness to investors;

    16.  Notes that the recent decision of the US administration to suspend support for civil society, independent media, key reforms and infrastructure projects has created additional urgent needs in Moldova, regarding which the EU should step in; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to increase its funding for EU instruments supporting democracy, such as the European Endowment for Democracy, and for other key projects that had until recently been funded by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and other US agencies;

    Human rights

    17.  Notes Moldova’s progress towards achieving gender equality, including its adoption of the Programme for Promoting and Ensuring Equality between Women and Men for the 2023-2027 period, and calls for its continued efforts in this regard, particularly to reduce the gender pay gap, fight against stereotypes, discrimination and gender-based violence, and to increase the representation of women in politics and business;

    18.  Welcomes the efforts by the Moldovan authorities to combat violence against women and improve protection for survivors, in particular the adoption of the National Programme on Preventing and Combatting Violence against Women and Domestic Violence for the 2023-2027 period; notes that the impact of this, however, is still lacking and therefore calls for the establishment of more shelters for survivors of domestic violence, for adequate attention by the justice system to violence against women and for policy changes and increased awareness-raising among men regarding gender-based violence;

    19.  Calls on the Moldovan Government to strengthen its efforts, including the effective implementation of its legislative framework, to combat racial discrimination, marginalisation, racist hate speech and hate crimes targeting members of ethnic minority groups, including the Roma;

    20.  Commends Moldova’s efforts to improve the rights of the LGBTIQ+ community in recent years;

    21.  Calls on the Moldovan Government to fully align its legislation on the rights of persons with disabilities with the EU acquis and to tackle the systemic problem of children with intellectual disabilities being placed in psychiatric institutions;

    Energy, environment and connectivity

    22.  Condemns Russia’s instrumentalisation of energy against Moldova, most recently by halting gas supplies to the Transnistrian region on 1 January 2025, in violation of contractual obligations, and thereby provoking a serious crisis in the region; applauds the Commission’s swift proposal of a Comprehensive Strategy for Energy Independence and Resilience and its support package worth EUR 250 million, which will reduce the energy bills of Moldovan consumers, including in the Transnistrian region, support Moldova’s decoupling from Russia’s energy supplies and integrate Moldova into the EU energy market; emphasises the need for the EU and the Moldovan authorities to effectively communicate about the substantial EU support package aimed at addressing Moldova’s energy crisis;

    23.  Commends the alignment of the Moldovan energy sector with the EU acquis; calls on the Moldovan Government to continue its efforts, with EU support that includes the tools available from the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova, to diversify gas and electricity supply routes, develop connectivity, increase energy efficiency and its internal production and storage capacity, as well as advance its full integration into the EU energy market in order to ensure Moldova’s energy security and resilience; stresses the importance of the completion of the Vulcanesti-Chisinau 400 kV overhead power line by the end of 2025 in order to reduce Moldova’s reliance on energy infrastructure in the Transnistrian region; calls on the EU to mobilise the necessary resources to help compensate for the withdrawal of USAID support for Moldova’s energy sector;

    24.  Commends the Moldovan Government for its progress on decarbonisation, energy efficiency and transitioning to a green economy, including doubling the share of renewable energy to 30 % by 2030; encourages the EU and its Member States to continue to provide financial support and expertise to Moldovan counterparts in this area; welcomes the adoption in 2023 of Moldova’s National Climate Change Adaptation Programme until 2030 and its Action Plan for this purpose; calls on the Moldovan Government to adopt and begin implementing its National Energy and Climate Plan for the 2025-2030 period; notes the importance of implementing the commitments of the Energy Community’s Decarbonisation Roadmap, and implementing the Monitoring, Reporting, Verification and Accreditation package with a view to introducing carbon pricing and aligning with the EU emissions trading system;

    25.  Believes that an extension of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) corridor Baltic Sea-Black Sea-Aegean Sea (Corridor IX) to include the route of Chisinau-Constanta-Varna-Bourgas would be a strategic investment in the region’s transport infrastructure, enhancing connectivity and promoting economic growth, in view of the enlargement of the EU to the east and the potential positive impact of this extension on the region’s security and stability, serving as a key logistics route for NATO and enhancing the EU’s geostrategic autonomy;

    Rule of law and good governance

    26.  Underlines that comprehensive justice reform remains key for the success of Moldova’s democratic and EU accession-related reforms; recognises Moldova’s sustained efforts to build an independent, impartial, accountable and professional judicial system and conclude the vetting process by the end of 2026; calls, therefore, for the EU to continue actively supporting the justice reform and the process of vetting both judges and prosecutors, including the attraction, training and recruitment of qualified judicial personnel and increase in judicial capacity;

    27.  Notes that Moldova has achieved progress in the fight against and prevention of corruption, but stresses the need to continue the fight against money laundering; welcomes the entry into force in February 2024 of Moldova’s National Integrity and Anti-Corruption Programme for 2024-2028; highlights the need to ensure enhanced coordination among all key anti-corruption and justice institutions in order to implement comprehensive reforms and to ensure that they have adequate resources and capacities; stresses that results in terms of prosecution and conviction in corruption cases need to be delivered in order to ensure public trust in the ongoing reforms;

    28.  Recalls the importance of continuing the investigation and bringing to justice those responsible for the 2014 bank fraud; welcomes the fact that, after long efforts by the Moldovan authorities, Interpol has finally added one of the alleged perpetrators, Vladimir Plahotniuc, to its list of internationally wanted persons;

    29.  Welcomes the adoption by Moldova in 2023 of a new national strategy for preventing and combating human trafficking, aligned with the EU acquis, and the cooperation of Moldova with Europol in combating drug trafficking;

    30.  Expresses its readiness to continue supporting the Parliament of Moldova through mutually agreed democracy support activities that respond to the needs of the institution, its elected members and staff; underlines the importance of the Parliament of Moldova in fostering public debate about the country’s European future and achieving a broad consensus over, and democratic legitimacy of, EU accession-related reforms across political parties and among broader society; highlights the decision of 10 March 2025 to open a European Parliament office in Chisinau to further strengthen Parliament’s engagement with the Eastern Partnership region;

    Cooperation in the field of common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and progress on resolving the Transnistrian conflict

    31.  Welcomes Moldova’s consistent cooperation on foreign policy issues and the significantly increased rate, notably from 54 % in 2022 to 86 % in 2024, of its alignment with the EU’s CFSP positions and restrictive measures; invites it to continue to improve this alignment, including on restrictive measures against Russia, and to continue cooperation on preventing the circumvention of sanctions against Russia and Belarus related to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

    32.  Underlines that Moldova is a key contributor to the regional and European security, including through its unwavering support to Ukraine since the start of Russia’s war of aggression, for example by welcoming Ukrainian war refugees, and through its contributions to the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, for example by deploying firefighting teams to tackle severe wildfires in Greece;

    33.  Expresses its support for the EUPM in Moldova and calls on the Member States to contribute the necessary experts and financial resources, in anticipation of a potential intensification of hybrid threats; welcomes the recent extension of the EUPM’s mandate until April 2026; encourages the Moldovan authorities to make full use of the EUPM’s expertise to enhance its preparedness, particularly in view of repeated electoral interference ahead of the parliamentary elections on 28 September 2025; calls for the EU to draw from the experience gained in Moldova in protecting the electoral process and democratic institutions in the EU itself; encourages the European External Action Service and the Commission to use all available EU instruments in the area of countering hybrid threats, in order to continue to support Moldova, including by swiftly deploying a Hybrid Rapid Response Team; welcomes the establishment of Moldova’s Centre for Strategic Communications and Countering Disinformation, as a means of coordinating the fight against foreign interference among the various Moldovan institutions, and of the National Agency for Cyber Security and the National Institute for Cyber Security Innovations; notes that Moldova’s National Security Strategy, adopted in December 2023, highlights EU accession as a key objective and for the first time identifies Russia as the source of major threats to Moldova’s security; stresses the importance of improving information sharing and intelligence cooperation between Moldova and the EU and its Member States on security threats;

    34.  Reiterates its full commitment to Moldova’s territorial integrity and to the peaceful resolution of the conflict, based on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Moldova in its internationally recognised borders;

    35.  Welcomes the Commission’s initiatives to include proactive support for the Transnistrian region in its energy emergency support packages, and exchange of information and practical cooperation between the Moldovan Government and the de facto authorities of the Transnistrian region throughout the energy crisis caused by Russia; welcomes the progress regarding the conditionalities for Tiraspol in light of the recent gas transit agreement and calls for the full implementation of these conditionalities, including the release of all political prisoners by Tiraspol and the dismantling of the remaining illegal checkpoints;

    36.  Welcomes Moldova’s keen interest in contributing to the EU’s common security and defence policy (CSDP) and the fact that Moldova is the first country to sign a security and defence partnership with the EU; welcomes Moldova’s continued active participation in EU missions and operations under the CSDP, namely the EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Operation Althea) and the EU Training Mission in Somalia, its interest in participation in PESCO projects and the ongoing negotiations on a framework agreement with the European Defence Agency; calls on the EU to include Moldova in the EU security and defence programmes and related budget allocations, including the European Defence Industry Programme and Readiness 2030, allowing the country to participate in joint procurement alongside the Member States;

    37.  Welcomes the allocation of EUR 50 million to modernise the defence capacities of the Moldovan Armed Forces in the context of the current security challenges through the European Peace Facility (EPF) for 2024; notes that Moldova is the second-largest EPF beneficiary after Ukraine, with a total of EUR 137 million allocated since 2021; welcomes the announced support of EUR 60 million to be provided to Moldova from the EPF budget in 2025; calls on the Member States to progressively increase the EPF funding for Moldova to further enhance the country’s defence capabilities;

    o
    o   o

    38.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and to the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Moldova.

    (1) OJ L, 2025/535, 21.3.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/535/oj.
    (2) Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Moldova, of the other part (OJ L 260, 30.8.2014, p. 4, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2014/492/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: Only joint actions within such associations as BRICS can ensure forward movement – V. Putin

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    St. Petersburg, June 20 (Xinhua) — Global challenges require a global response; they cannot be resolved alone. Only joint actions within an organization such as BRICS can ensure movement forward, Russian President Vladimir Putin said.

    “The global challenges facing the modern world certainly require a global response. Solving problems alone, especially at someone else’s expense, is simply impossible – it’s an illusion. Only joint actions within the framework of such an organization as BRICS, for example, and some other formats, can ensure the movement of the entire civilization forward,” said V. Putin during the plenary session of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum.

    According to the Russian President, the share of BRICS countries in the global economy has doubled since the beginning of the century and will inevitably grow.

    “If at the beginning of the 21st century, the BRICS countries, for example, made up a fifth of the global economy – only a fifth, today it is already 40 percent of the global economy. And it is obvious that this share will only grow. This is, as they say, a medical fact, this will happen inevitably,” V. Putin is confident.

    Ties within the BRICS group are strengthening and mutual trade is growing, the Russian president noted.

    “We pay special attention to strengthening ties within BRICS. The mutual trade turnover of our countries has already exceeded a trillion dollars and will continue to grow. All of this, in essence, is elements of a global growth platform, and they are built on the key principles of BRICS. And these are consensus, parity, and consideration of each other’s interests,” said V. Putin. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: More than 3,000 people injured in Iran since Israeli attacks began – Health Ministry

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    TEHRAN, June 20 (Xinhua) — More than 3,000 Iranians have been injured since the start of Israeli attacks on Iran, the Iranian Health Ministry announced on Friday.

    According to a statement by the head of the Iranian Ministry of Health’s public relations department, Hossein Kermanpour, on the ministry’s website, 2,800 of the injured were hospitalized, of which 2,000 have already been discharged from medical institutions.

    According to the latest official figures from Iran, the death toll from the Israeli attacks has reached 224.

    On June 13, Israel launched a series of airstrikes against Iran, killing several senior military commanders, nuclear scientists, and civilians. Iran responded with missile and drone strikes against various targets in Israel, causing casualties and significant damage. As of June 20, the conflict continues. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: Azerbaijan approves cooperation plan with China on Belt and Road initiative

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Baku, June 20 /Xinhua/ — Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has approved a cooperation plan with China to jointly advance the Belt and Road initiative, the presidential press service said on Friday.

    According to the signed decree, the document has been officially adopted. The plan provides for the development of cooperation in the field of transport, trade and logistics, aimed at strengthening the interconnectedness and expanding economic ties between the two countries.

    According to the decree, the Ministry of Economy of Azerbaijan will coordinate the implementation of the plan’s provisions, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been instructed to notify the Chinese government after completing all necessary internal procedures.

    The adoption of the plan was a continuation of the agreements reached during I. Aliyev’s state visit to China. On April 23, a signing ceremony of the document was held in Beijing with the participation of Chinese President Xi Jinping and Azerbaijani President I. Aliyev. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: Tanzanian President Inaugurates China-Built Bridge Across Lake Victoria

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Mwanza, Tanzania, June 20 (Xinhua) — Tanzanian President Samia Suluhu Hassan on Thursday inaugurated the China-built Magufuli Bridge, which spans Lake Victoria and is the longest cable-stayed low-pylon bridge in Africa.

    S.S. Hasan called the bridge a transformative infrastructure project, saying it cuts travel time across the lake from two hours to five minutes.

    The Tanzanian leader added that it would also help expand trade with neighboring countries.

    The 4.66-km bridge was built by China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC) and China Railway Construction Corporation 15 Bureaus Ltd., with Tanzanians accounting for about 95 percent of the workforce employed on the project, according to Qin Rong, deputy project manager. He said the project also provided them with skills and valuable experience to support future national infrastructure development.

    Chinese Ambassador to Tanzania Chen Mingjian, in turn, pointed out that the Magufuli Bridge has become a landmark project in the joint construction of the Belt and Road Initiative and a model of cooperation between China and Tanzania, emphasizing its broader significance for the development of China-Africa relations as a whole. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: Hungary: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2025 Article IV Mission

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    June 20, 2025

    A Concluding Statement describes the preliminary findings of IMF staff at the end of an official staff visit (or ‘mission’), in most cases to a member country. Missions are undertaken as part of regular (usually annual) consultations under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, in the context of a request to use IMF resources (borrow from the IMF), as part of discussions of staff monitored programs, or as part of other staff monitoring of economic developments.

    The authorities have consented to the publication of this statement. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF Executive Board for discussion and decision.

    Washington, DC: An International Monetary Fund (IMF) mission, led by Anke Weber and comprising Aleksandra Alferova, Jakree Koosakul, Moheb Malak, Augustus Panton, and Atticus Weller, visited Budapest during June 5-17 to conduct discussions on the 2025 Article IV Consultation with the Hungarian authorities. At the end of the visit, the mission issued the following statement:

    The Hungarian economy is at a challenging juncture. Output has stagnated over the past 3 years, while inflation remains well above the central bank’s 3 percent target. Regulatory measures—such as price, interest and margin caps, along with windfall taxes and subsidized lending schemes—have distorted market signals and added uncertainty. Despite significant fiscal adjustment in recent years, public debt remains elevated given high financing costs. Timely domestic policy reforms are needed to reinforce resilience amid an unsettled external environment. Key to this will be well-designed fiscal measures to strengthen public finances, a continued tight monetary policy to bring down inflation, and structural reforms to raise productivity and safeguard growth against trade tensions and heightened uncertainty.    

     

    Economic Outlook

    High domestic and external uncertainty are expected to continue weighing on the outlook. Modest consumption-driven growth of 0.7 percent is expected in 2025, underpinned by favorable wage dynamics. Growth is projected to increase to 2 percent in 2026—on a recovery in investment and a positive impulse from German fiscal expansion—and to converge to its long-term potential of around 2½ percent by 2030. Inflation is forecast at 4.5 percent in Q4:2025, and to gradually decelerate to the MNB’s 3 percent target by 2027. The current account surplus is expected to fall to around 1¼ percent of GDP in 2025 and to increase gradually over the medium term as battery and electric vehicle production expands. These projections are based on the IMF’s April World Economic Outlook global assumptions.

    Risks to growth remain on the downside. Deepening geoeconomic fragmentation and rising trade tensions would affect Hungary’s exports directly, while indirect effects may be even larger, arising from prolonged trade uncertainty undermining private investment and further weakening global economic activity. Geopolitical tensions could lead to commodity price volatility, intensifying inflationary pressures and negatively impacting fiscal and external balances. On the domestic front, a delay in the needed fiscal adjustment could heighten market concerns about debt sustainability, further increase risk premia, and exacerbate sovereign-bank linkages. A lack of progress on governance reforms being discussed with the EC could further delay or result in cancellation of EU funds with negative consequences for growth and market confidence. Inflation could be more persistent than projected, including from larger-than-anticipated effects of minimum wage hikes necessitating tighter monetary policy for longer.

    Strengthening Fiscal Sustainability for Future Growth

    Staff estimates that currently announced policies fall short of achieving the authorities’ budget targets. The authorities remain committed to reaching their 2025 and 2026 deficit targets of 4.1 and 3.7 percent of GDP, respectively. Their medium-term fiscal structural plan (MTFSP) envisages a further deficit reduction to below 2 percent of GDP by 2028. Under staff’s baseline scenario, which incorporates only legislated or officially endorsed measures, the deficit is projected to decline slightly to 4.8 percent of GDP in 2025 and 4.6 percent of GDP in 2026. In the medium term, the deficit would remain around 4½ percent of GDP, while the debt-to-GDP ratio would rise to about 79 percent in 2030 from 73½ percent in 2024. Debt dynamics have deteriorated since last year, following fiscal slippages and a weaker outlook, and remain sensitive to the real interest and growth path.

    Significant additional fiscal efforts are needed to preserve fiscal space and rebuild buffers. Over the medium term, a surplus of around 1¾ percent of GDP excluding debt servicing and adjusting for economic cycles would appropriately balance debt sustainability and output stabilization objectives. The implied cumulative adjustment of around 2 percent of GDP over 2025-2028 would bring the deficit below 3 percent of GDP by 2027 and reduce the public debt ratio below 70 percent by 2029. Any additional defense spending should be accommodated within staff’s recommended path.

    Measures underpinning the adjustment should be well-designed and growth-friendly.

    • Revenue enhancements: The recent doubling of family tax allowances and expansion of personal income tax exemptions for mothers will significantly reduce revenues. In staff’s view an alternative that would minimize fiscal costs and labor market distortions would be to provide capped tax credits per child for both parents. A more targeted tax regime with fewer exemptions would raise revenue, improve efficiency, and simplify administration. Staff notes that a higher marginal personal income tax rate for high earners would increase revenue and fairness while taxation of corporates could be made more equitable and efficient by rationalizing tax incentives. A reduced reliance on distortionary windfall and financial transactions taxes would be more conducive to investment and growth.
    • Expenditure rationalization: A phaseout of distortive retail energy subsidies and their replacement by targeted cash transfers would free up fiscal resources. A review of procurement and government employment would help the authorities to better target a reduction of administrative expenditures, which are high relative to peers, while a strategy is needed to limit transfers to SOEs and other public organizations. The realized savings from these measures could be used to bolster underfunded areas—health, primary education, and social protection. Public financial management reforms and a strengthened expenditure review process could enhance spending efficiency and support better fiscal governance. Relying on capital spending cuts to achieve targets would weaken growth and should be avoided.

    Further efforts will be needed to reduce long-term spending pressures. Population aging is expected to add roughly 3.5 percent of GDP in additional pension and healthcare costs by 2050. An increase in the retirement age, adjustment of benefit levels, and a limited increase in the social security contribution rate would help to control pension costs in the long term. mproved digitalization and efficient procurement would help to contain health expenditures.  

    Fiscal risk monitoring and mitigation could be improved. A comprehensive, consolidated and regular risk assessment of SOEs would provide early warning of potential vulnerabilities. The issuance of new guarantees should be capped by ceilings, and the stock of guarantees, risk of their activation, and performance of underlying liabilities assessed on an annual basis. Channeling public resources into fund management structures or private equity undermines budgetary transparency, risks resource misallocation and could result in unforeseen contingent liabilities. Finally, to mitigate distortions, it would be beneficial to limit the use of subsidized lending by state-owned banks to addressing market failures.

    Bringing Inflation Durably Back to Target

    The monetary policy stance will need to remain tight into next year to durably return inflation to target. Monetary policy has been appropriately cautious, with the MNB signaling that maintaining tight monetary conditions is warranted. With average inflation expected to remain above the tolerance band in 2025, staff sees limited scope for rate cuts this year. However, the balance of risks to growth and inflation is evolving. Given exceptional uncertainty, the MNB should thus maintain a data-driven approach. The flexible exchange rate regime and adequate reserve coverage can continue to help reduce Hungary’s vulnerability to external shocks. Price, fee, and margin controls are not a sustainable path to lasting disinflation and should be phased out.

    Staff welcomes ongoing efforts to refine the MNB’s focus on the core objectives of price and financial stability. The proposed change to the MNB Act—prohibiting foundations from engaging in asset management activities—is a step in the right direction. In this context, a broader review of the MNB’s non-core functions is warranted, including measures relating to its secondary goal of environmental sustainability. While the MNB should play an active role in climate-risk supervision, prudential regulation should remain risk focused, and all climate-related initiatives be consistent with the MNB’s price and financial stability mandates.

    Safeguarding Financial Sector Stability

    Systemic risks in the financial sector are assessed as broadly contained. Overall, the banking system remains well-capitalized, liquid, profitable, and resilient to external shocks. But emerging pockets of vulnerability merit continued vigilance, including an increase in the share of FX corporate loans, banks’ growing sovereign exposure and significant FX positions, elevated commercial real estate (CRE) vacancies, and buoyant house prices.

    The capital-based macroprudential toolkit is broadly appropriate, though further refinements may be warranted. The planned introduction of a one percent positive neutral countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) in July 2025 amid heightened uncertainty is welcome, as was the reactivation of the systemic risk buffer (SyRB) for banks’ CRE exposures in 2024. While risks arising from banks’ growing sovereign exposures are partially mitigated by their high leverage ratio (capital-to-total exposure), consideration could be given to incorporating appropriate sovereign-bank nexus stress scenarios into regular supervisory stress testing.

    Differentiation in borrower-based macroprudential limits should be introduced only on financial stability grounds. Recent relaxations of loan-to-value (LTV) and debt-service-to-income (DSTI) limits for first-time buyers and green homes appear to be partly driven by housing affordability and energy efficiency concerns. Such considerations should instead be tackled through appropriate structural and fiscal policies. Moreover, DSTI limits of 60 percent for first-time home buyers and for energy-efficient homes appear high relative to the overall limits in some peers. The reintroduction of voluntary APR ceilings for housing loans, while more restricted in scope, distorts risk pricing and should be reversed. Scaling back housing-related fiscal incentives would help contain future price pressures and safeguard financial stability.

    Boosting Productivity Through Reforms

    Boosting productivity growth will require comprehensive reforms that foster firm dynamism. Firm entry and exit rates remain low amid high regulatory barriers and an insolvency framework that impedes the timely exit of non-viable firms. Streamlining licensing and overlapping permits and enabling creditor-initiated and out-of-court restructuring would enhance capital and labor mobility toward more productive business ventures. Public R&D support should be performance-based and policy efforts aimed at promoting entrepreneurship and technology adoption better targeted, especially toward young, high-growth firms.

    Productivity gains from industrial policy interventions remain elusive, underscoring the need for more effective horizontal reforms. Hungary has implemented repeated waves of industrial policies (IP) to boost competitiveness and productivity in targeted sectors. Yet, their impact on sustained productivity growth remains elusive. Given their high fiscal cost, IP should not substitute for broader structural reforms. Where used, such measures must be appropriately targeted to address market failures and be time-bound and transparent. As a small, open economy, Hungary would benefit most from a coordinated approach to state aid and IP at the EU-level.

    Strengthening energy security can enhance competitiveness and facilitate the green transition. Ongoing efforts to diversify energy supply and increase renewable energy generation are commendable. Still, the Hungarian economy remains energy-intensive with high corporate energy prices weighing on cost competitiveness. EU-wide policy measures—including regional electricity market integration—should be complemented with domestic reforms such as targeted phaseout of household fossil fuel subsidies, enhanced energy efficiency standards, and accelerated permitting procedures for renewable energy investment.

    Governance reforms are foundational for fostering a predictable business environment and boosting potential growth. Hungary has taken some important steps, including the 2023 judicial reforms aimed at strengthening the National Judicial Council. Further governance reforms and their effective enforcement—including related to public procurement, scope of the asset declaration system, conflict-of-interest rules, regulatory oversight, and functioning of the Integrity Authority—could unlock EU funds and amplify the growth dividends of other reforms.

    The mission thanks the Hungarian authorities and our other interlocutors in Hungary for the productive collaboration, constructive policy dialogue, and warm hospitality.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Eva-Maria Graf

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    @IMFSpokesperson

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/20/hungary-staff-concluding-statement-of-the-2025-article-iv-mission

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF and South Sudan Reach Staff-Level Agreement on a Nine-Month Staff-Monitored Program

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    June 20, 2025

    Staff-Monitored Programs (SMPs) are informal arrangements between national authorities and IMF staff to monitor the authorities’ economic program. As such, they do not entail endorsement by the IMF Executive Board. SMP Staff reports are issued to the Board for information.

    • IMF staff and the South Sudanese authorities have reached a staff-level agreement on a nine-month Staff-Monitored Program (SMP), which is expected to start in August 2025, pending approval from the IMF’s Management.
    • The SMP aims to support South Sudan in designing and implementing policies and key reforms to strengthen its economic resilience to shocks, enhance macroeconomic stability, restore sustainability, and improve governance and transparency.
    • The South Sudanese economy is projected to start recovering as oil production has resumed from the oil pipeline damaged in February 2024 due to the war in Sudan. This disruption had halted oil exports, fiscal revenues, and foreign exchange (FX) proceeds for over a year, leading to liquidity and financing constraints. The recovery is expected to be gradual and hinges on continued improvement in the security environment and political stability.

    Washington, DC: Upon request from the authorities, an International Monetary Fund (IMF) staff team, led by Ms. Mame Astou Diouf, held meetings in Juba, South Sudan, from June 11 to 20, 2025 to negotiate a Staff-Monitored Program (SMP) in support of the authorities’ economic and financial reform program. This SMP request follows the conclusion of South Sudan’s Staff Monitored Program with Board Involvement (PMB) on November 15, 2024 (See Press Release No. 24/434).

    At the end of the mission, Ms. Diouf issued the following statement:

    “The South Sudanese authorities and the IMF team have reached a staff-level agreement on the economic and structural policies and reforms that will underpin a nine-month SMP, pending approval by the IMF’s Management.

    “Since early 2014, South Sudan has faced severe shocks that have exacerbated the country’s post-conflict fragility and humanitarian situation. Due to the war in Sudan, the country’s main oil pipeline was damaged in February 2024, halting related oil exports, fiscal revenues, and FX proceeds for over a year. The conflict also triggered a large influx of refugees, compounding an already-dire social and humanitarian situation caused by recurrent floodings, agricultural production losses, widespread food insecurity, and large-scale population displacement. The recent steep decline in international aid flows risks exacerbating the humanitarian challenges facing the country.

    “The short- and medium-term economic outlook is moderately favorable and improving, contingent on a continuously improving security environment and political stability. The resumption of oil exports through the main pipeline since April 2025 is promising. While real GDP growth is projected to have contracted during FY2024/25 due to the lower oil production, it is expected to recover in FY2025/2026 as oil exports gradually strengthen. The rebound in oil exports is expected to significantly improve the current account balance, helping rebuild external buffers. The parallel foreign exchange (FX) market premium stood at 30.8 percent on June 11, 2025.

    “While the budget execution of FY2024/2025 has been constrained by the financing constraints, non-oil domestic revenue collection was strong. This has allowed the resumption of government salary payments. However, structural bottlenecks partly hinder the effective distribution of salaries to civil servants due to cash shortages. For FY2025/2026, oil revenue is expected to recover substantially. Non-oil revenue will remain strong, benefiting from the continued implementation of tax policy reforms approved under the FY2024/2025 budget and broader revenue administration improvements. This will gradually ease liquidity constraints and provide some fiscal space for cautious repayment of salary arrears and a gradual increase of priority social spending and debt service repayments, while maintaining prudent fiscal management and cautious investment plans, given the continued risks to the outlook.

    “Inflation has remained high. Average inflation is projected at about 143 percent in FY2024/2025, and expected to slow down in FY2025/26, thanks to ongoing tight monetary policy and a reduction in monetary financing. The debt-to-GDP ratio is forecast at about 58 percent of GDP in FY2024/2025, with large debt vulnerabilities. With the easing liquidity constraints, debt sustainability is projected to strengthen.

    “Against this background, the South Sudanese authorities have requested a nine-month SMP to help strengthen economic resilience to shocks and foster macroeconomic stability through sound and prudent policies conducive to sustained growth. Key priorities under the SMP include:

    “Restoring fiscal and public debt sustainability in the near term and laying the groundwork for positive medium-term prospects through prudent debt management and improved domestic revenue mobilization to increase fiscal space for priority spending, including salary and social programs. Enhancing spending efficiency, including through public financial and investment management reforms, will support public service delivery against the backdrop of high spending needs and limited availability of domestic and external financing.

    “Maintaining a tight monetary policy stance to curb inflationary pressures and exchange rate depreciation. This includes containing monetary financing and continuing liquidity mop-up operations. While the official exchange rate has gradually decreased since August 2024 to narrow the parallel FX market premium, further policy adjustment is required to unify the official and parallel FX markets and increase FX reserves.

    “Steadfast implementation of the governance and accountability reform agenda will be critical to addressing the country’s sources of fragility and creating an environment conducive to strong, diversified, and sustained growth and improved living standards. This includes the governance and transparency of oil-related investment programs.

    “The mission met His Excellency, Dr. Benjamin Bol Mel, Vice President and Chairperson of the Economic Cluster, the Minister of Finance and Planning, Honorable Dr. Marial Dongrin Ater, the Governor of the Bank of South Sudan, Dr. Addis Ababa Othow, and other senior government officials, as well as representatives from civil society, private sector, and development partners.

    “The mission takes the opportunity to thank the authorities and stakeholders for their warm hospitality, strong cooperation, and for open and productive discussions.”

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Wafa Amr

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    @IMFSpokesperson

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/20/pr-25200-south-sudan-imf-and-south-sudan-reach-agreement-on-9-month-staff-monitored-program

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: HSE at SPIEF: Investments in Electric Power, the Role of Women in the Economy, and the “Russian Engineer”

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: State University Higher School of Economics – State University Higher School of Economics –

    © Roman Kitashov / Roscongress Foundation

    Should we increase electricity generation and what should be the role of the state here? What economic effect does involving women in the economy provide? How can we train personnel to ensure technological leadership? HSE representatives, together with other experts, sought answers to these and other questions at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. In addition, HSE signed a number of cooperation agreements.

    Blood for the economy

    Investments in the electric power industry have a significant multiplier effect on the economy, they contribute to the development of regions and related industries, believes Ilya Dolmatov, Director Institute of Economics and Regulation of Infrastructure Industries HSE. However, against the backdrop of increased availability of electricity, the volume of investment in this area has decreased, he noted, speaking at the session “Investments in the Electric Power Industry on the Horizon up to 2050.”

    Meanwhile, today the economy is transforming, many industries are digitalizing and, in fact, deeper electrification is taking place. “In this sense, we can definitely say that if we do not provide investments for the growth of new capacities, we will face the fact that the economy will not grow. We already see that we have to introduce certain restrictions on electricity consumption, connecting new consumers,” says Ilya Dolmatov. At the same time, in the current macroeconomic realities, the expert believes, it is impossible to do without state support, especially in infrastructure. “The state must determine priority projects and, accordingly, measures to support them,” he believes.

    “Russia is currently one of the top four countries in terms of electricity consumption,” said Deputy Minister of Energy of the Russian Federation Petr Konyushenko. The department expects electricity consumption to grow by about a third of the current level by 2050. To cover the projected growth, it is planned to increase generating capacity, and a number of large construction projects in the electric grid economy will be launched in the near future. These are global federal projects to connect the East with Siberia, to build a direct current line that will connect the Novovoronezh nuclear power plant with Moscow, and a power transmission line from Krasnoyarsk Krai to Buryatia.

    The tasks of industry, in turn, are to help power engineers solve their problems, noted Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade Mikhail Ivanov. Over the course of 10 years, demand for power engineering has grown threefold, and the capabilities of our production have grown fourfold, he shared the figures. But it is still necessary to correctly “balance the capabilities of engineering with the modernization of electric power facilities.”

    The head of Yakutia, Aisen Nikolaev, noted that “everyone needs energy, it is like lifeblood for the economy.” But, according to him, companies all unanimously say that without state support, it is simply impossible to implement energy investment projects as desired. “We also need support from development institutions, which are much talked about. This is preferential lending first and foremost, especially in our conditions. These are direct government investments, these are tax breaks, which have already been discussed today. Well, and balanced tariff regulation,” the speaker noted.

    The session was also attended by Pavel Snikkars, CEO of PJSC T Plus, Alexandra Panina, member of the board of PJSC Inter RAO, Kirill Komarov, First Deputy CEO, Director of the Development and International Business Block of Rosatom, Alexey Molsky, member of the board, Deputy CEO for Investments and Capital Construction of PJSC Rosseti, Eldar Muslimov, First Deputy CEO of MKOOO EN HOLDING, and bank representatives.

    Ilya Dolmatov signed an agreement between the HSE and Rosvodokanal at the SPIEF. The parties agreed to develop cooperation in the field of training and retraining of personnel, research and development, and technology implementation activities. On behalf of Rosvodokanal, the signature was made by the company’s CEO Sergey Krzhanovsky.

    International Women’s Cooperation

    Victoria Panova, Vice-Rector of the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Head of BRICS Expert Council – Russia, Russia’s Sherpa in the Women’s Twenty, took part in the session of the Eurasian Women’s Forum “International Cooperation of Women in the Interests of Economic Development” within the framework of the SPIEF.

    According to Victoria Panova, scientific research has shown that more active involvement of women in employment can add about 7 trillion dollars to the global GDP in the coming decades. More active participation of women in the economy and development of female education will also contribute to the growth of labor productivity by 35%. “Women are more likely to reinvest income from entrepreneurial activity in health care, food security and education, which increases the sustainability of the country’s development and ensures stability and overall prosperity,” said Victoria Panova.

    The Vice-Rector also stressed the importance of strengthening expert and scientific interaction among women researchers. She proposed creating a regularly updated depository of measures to expand the legal and economic opportunities of women in the association countries in BRICS.

    Priority is technological leadership

    HSE Vice-Rector Dmitry Zemtsov moderated the session “Training Personnel to Ensure Russia’s Technological Sovereignty” at the Ministry of Education and Science stand.

    Deputy Minister of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation, graduate of the Master’s program “Management in Higher Education» Olga Petrova of the Higher School of Economics spoke about synchronizing personnel training with business demands and solving the problem of achieving technological leadership. One of the key projects was the Advanced Engineering Schools project. “The project has become a powerful tool for synchronizing efforts so that the very “Russian engineer” in the broad sense emerges from the walls of the university,” said Olga Petrova. According to her, another flagship program for personnel training, Priority 2030, of which the HSE is a participant, has been reconfigured for technological leadership.

    The session featured the following speakers: Rector of Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University Andrey Rudskoy, Rector of MEPhI Vladimir Shevchenko and other speakers.

    The topic of what specialists will be in demand on the global market was also discussed at the session “Preparing Personnel for the International Market of the Future.” Its moderator was Irina Karelina, Vice President of the National Research University Higher School of Economics.

    The Russian Ministry of Education and Science stand also hosted a session entitled “The Rights of Young Scientists to Their Developments: How Not to Drown in Bureaucracy?” The director of the Institute for Enterprise and Market Analysis HSE University Anton Kazun. In particular, he spoke about the experience of transforming the results of fundamental research into applied projects (using the example of the recommendation system for selecting lawyers “Zastupnik”) and the possibilities of developing a model of technology transfer centers in various universities of the Russian Federation (based on the experience of HSE University), including regular exchange of experience between universities (for example, within the framework of the “Priority-2030” program). Anton Kazun also took part in the discussion of the proposal to legislatively enshrine the exemption from VAT when implementing the rights to use all types of RIAs, exclusive rights to which are held by universities.

    Dmitry Zemtsov also signed a number of agreements concluded by the HSE within the framework of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum.

    An agreement was reached with the Russian State University for the Humanities on joint scientific research related to historical and cultural identity, traditional values, preservation of cultural heritage, as well as on holding scientific events and student expeditions within the framework of the project “Rediscovering Russia”. In addition, the plans include formulating proposals for socio-economic development that will be included in youth policy programs in Russia. The documents were signed by Rector of the Russian State University for the Humanities Andrey Loginov and Dmitry Zemtsov.

    Cooperation agreements were also signed between the ANO “University of Entrepreneurs” and universities participating in the program, including the National Research University Higher School of Economics. The parties agreed to create and develop entrepreneurial workshops, where more than 350 senior students will begin developing at least 50 business projects as early as 2025.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: China remains committed to expanding market opening: Chinese Foreign Ministry

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BEIJING, June 20 (Xinhua) — China will continue to steadily expand the opening of its market to the world, accumulate new driving forces, provide new opportunities, and bring more benefits to the common development of all countries through its own stable development, giving it stronger momentum, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun said Friday.

    As a recent World Bank report shows, the Chinese economy is still growing at the beginning of 2025, and the Chinese government has taken appropriate monetary and fiscal measures to counteract the uncertainty in global trade. At the same time, international financial institutions such as JPMorgan Chase and Goldman Sachs have also recently raised their growth forecasts for the Chinese economy.

    Answering a relevant question at a press briefing, Guo Jiakun noted that despite the complicated external environment, the Chinese economy has demonstrated sustainable development, maintained stability while moving forward, improved and renewed, and demonstrated strong resilience and development potential. China has become a “stabilizing foundation” for the world economy and a “center of attraction” for sharing development opportunities, the Chinese diplomat noted.

    According to Guo Jiakun, in the first five months of this year, China’s total import and export volumes of goods grew by 2.5 percent year-on-year, while retail sales of consumer goods increased by 5 percent. The growth in foreign consumption in China is particularly noticeable: in the first month of the new exit tax refund policy, the number of such refunds increased by 116 percent compared to the same period last year. In addition, visa-free travel to China is expected to be extremely popular during the summer tourist season, the diplomat added.

    “Facts have proven that the fundamental trend of the long-term sound development of the Chinese economy will not change, the advantages of a super-large domestic market and a complete industrial system will be maintained, and the focus on high-quality development and high-level opening up will remain unchanged,” Guo Jiakun said.

    This is the source of confidence of the international community in China, which encourages them to continue to bet on the Chinese market, to develop it and to take root in the country, the official representative concluded. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: China Launches Zhongxing-9C Satellite

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    XICHANG, June 20 (Xinhua) — China successfully launched a new satellite into space from the Xichang Satellite Launch Center in southwest China’s Sichuan Province on Friday.

    The ChinaSat-9C satellite was launched at 20:37 Beijing time by a Long March-3B carrier rocket. The satellite successfully entered its designated orbit.

    The current launch was the 582nd flight mission for the Long March series of launch vehicles. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: Ilie Bolojan appointed Prime Minister of Romania

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BUCHAREST, June 20 (Xinhua) — Romanian President Nicusor Dan on Friday appointed Senate (upper house of parliament) President Ilie Bolojan as the country’s new prime minister, following weeks of coalition talks among key political parties.

    “I appoint Mr. Ilie Bolojan as Prime Minister,” N. Dan announced at the Cotroceni Palace. “I want to thank the parties that make up the parliamentary majority for these weeks of discussions. It is in Romania’s interest for the government to enjoy the support of an overwhelming majority, and the parties understand this,” the president said.

    Describing I. Bolojan as “the most suitable person to carry out the necessary reforms in the state apparatus,” N. Dan noted his track record in public administration: “He knows how to reduce and optimize costs, and has a vision for development. He will have a partner in me,” said the head of the Romanian state.

    I. Bolojan, for his part, expressed gratitude for the appointment and acknowledged the full burden of responsibility on his shoulders in the context of economic tension.

    The prime minister stressed that his attention will be focused on restoring financial order, ensuring effective public administration and “showing due respect to the Romanian people” as he continues negotiations to finalize the cabinet and his government program.

    According to local media, the new government will be formed by a coalition of the National Liberal Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Save Romania Union and the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: The idea of Russia’s economy as a raw materials economy is outdated – V. Putin

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    St. Petersburg, June 20 (Xinhua) — The idea of Russia’s economy as a raw materials economy is outdated. The contribution of raw materials is no longer decisive. Despite difficult conditions and external pressure, Russia’s GDP has grown at a rate higher than the world average in the past two years. This was stated by Russian President Vladimir Putin on Friday.

    “The contribution of the raw materials component to the economic dynamics of our country is no longer decisive. Thanks to the work of tens of thousands of enterprises and companies, our economy is not just developing confidently, but is becoming more qualitative, complex and multifaceted,” said V. Putin during the plenary session of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum.

    “Despite the difficult external background, Russia’s GDP has increased by more than 4 percent annually over the past two years, meaning it has grown at a rate higher than the global average,” he added.

    In particular, according to the Russian President, the growth of non-oil and gas GDP in 2023 was 7.2 percent, in 2024 – 4.9 percent. Annual inflation in Russia fell to 9.6 percent. The situation with price growth is developing better than expected, which made it possible to soften monetary policy.

    Russia has achieved a record reduction in the poverty level: at the end of last year it was 7.2 percent, noted V. Putin.

    “I will repeat for our guests. In 2000, the poverty level was 29 percent in Russia. And in such, well, let’s say frankly, humiliating situation, we had 42.3 million people,” the Russian president recalled.

    V. Putin stressed that Russia should strive to further reduce poverty to 5 percent. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    June 21, 2025
  • Iran rejects nuclear talks as West Asia conflict enters second week

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    As the war between Israel and Iran enters its eighth day, European foreign ministers are meeting with Iranian officials in Geneva in a last-ditch effort to de-escalate tensions that have already begun to rattle global energy markets and regional stability. The E3 bloc—comprising France, Britain, and Germany—has resumed high-level negotiations with Iran, amid what diplomats are calling the most dangerous security crisis in the region in over a decade.

    Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi, addressing the United Nations in Geneva ahead of the talks, strongly condemned Israel’s recent missile attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities. He labeled the strikes as “serious war crimes” and “an act of betrayal of diplomacy,” revealing that Iran had been on the verge of finalizing a nuclear agreement with the United States, originally scheduled for June 15. According to Araqchi, the Israeli raids derailed what he described as a “very promising agreement,” and he categorically ruled out any further nuclear discussions with Washington while Israeli attacks continue.

    “There is no room for negotiations under the shadow of missiles,” Araqchi declared, asserting that Iran will not return to the table unless Israeli aggression ceases.

    The latest surge in violence began when Iran launched missile strikes into northern, central, and southern Israel, including the port city of Haifa, early Friday morning. The attacks triggered air raid sirens across Israel, prompting widespread panic and sending civilians into bomb shelters. In retaliation, Israeli forces carried out overnight airstrikes on multiple Iranian military installations, including missile production centers and a nuclear warhead development site in Tehran.

    The conflict has rapidly expanded beyond a military confrontation. In Qatar, emergency meetings are being held with major energy companies after Israeli strikes targeted the South Pars/North Dome gas field—the largest known natural gas reserve, jointly shared by Iran and Qatar. The attacks have raised serious alarms over the stability of regional energy infrastructure, with global oil markets on edge over the possibility of further disruption to Gulf energy supplies.

    Qatar now finds itself in a precarious diplomatic position. While it maintains a close strategic partnership with the United States, it also shares vital economic interests with Iran. Balancing these competing pressures will be critical as tensions continue to escalate.

    International responses remain cautious but increasingly urgent. The United States has bolstered its military presence in the region, describing the move as a precautionary measure. A third U.S. Navy destroyer has entered the eastern Mediterranean, and the USS Nimitz carrier strike group is en route to the Arabian Sea.

    Russia has issued a stark warning, stating it would respond “very negatively” if Israel—particularly with U.S. support—attempts any strike against Iran’s supreme leader.

    Inside Iran, mass protests have erupted in Tehran and other cities. Thousands of demonstrators have taken to the streets, condemning Israeli actions and carrying portraits of Iranian commanders killed in the fighting. The protests reflect mounting domestic pressure on Iranian leadership to respond decisively to Israeli attacks.

    The renewed European diplomatic push comes amid growing concern that the conflict could spiral further out of control. The E3 foreign ministers are urging Iran to return to the negotiating table, emphasizing that diplomacy remains the only viable path to de-escalation. However, with both sides entrenched in their positions, the window for diplomatic resolution is narrowing rapidly.

    The timing of the Geneva talks is also shaped by a two-week deadline set by former U.S. President Donald Trump, who remains a key political figure and has called for immediate diplomatic movement or face potential military escalation.

    With war threatening to destabilize not only the wider West Asian region but also international energy markets, the outcome of the current diplomatic effort may prove critical for global stability.

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Shaping a New Platform for Global Growth Discussed at Open Dialogue within SPIEF-2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    MOSCOW, RUSSIA, June 20, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — The session “Shaping a New Platform for Global Growth”, based on the results of the Open Dialogue of the Russia National Centre, opened the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum business program on June 18.

    Recognised international experts from Russia, Cameroon, Spain, Azerbaijan, and Canada, as well as authors of the best essays from the Open Dialogue, participated in the discussion.

    Speakers discussed the changing world order, Africa’s potential, and trends in the future economy, including demographic changes and the implementation of breakthrough technologies.

    “This year, the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum is taking place against turbulent world events. This includes the situation in the Middle East and trade wars. Much time will be devoted to this current agenda at the forum. We must not forget which long-term trends and challenges led to the current situation, which trends are basic and defining. It is important to conduct an open dialogue about how we build the world of the future and how to form a new platform for global growth. In which countries does this global growth occur, on which technologies will it be built, and on which principles and cultural code? Our task is to ensure that forward movement benefits people in all countries that, like Russia, are working on the future. It is through open dialogue that our future and its understanding are built,” emphasised Maxim Oreshkin.

    A speaker from Spain, Juan Antonio de Castro de Arespacochaga, a doctor of economics and professor at Complutense University of Madrid, delivered a report on how the global majority of countries are changing reality.

    “Today, most countries are not just participating in global processes – they are changing reality. We see how an increasingly flexible and multipolar world order is forming. World trade is becoming fragmented, fast, and technological, while the international system is becoming a network of preferential agreements, which distorts the principles laid down in the foundation of GATT and WTO,” noted Juan Antonio de Castro de Arespacochaga.

    One of the main discussion topics was: “Africa – driver of the future economic order.” Chairman of the African Advisory Council Francois Ndengwe noted that demographic growth is transforming Africa into the future cradle of the global workforce.

    “This is not just statistics – this is human capital that can become a new driver of global growth. Those who invest in education today and build universities in Africa will tomorrow shape markets and set the game’s rules together with Africa,” said Francois Ndengwe.

    Sergei Ivanov, Executive Director and Member of the EFKO Group board of Directors, spoke about the business’s new responsibility in the modern world. The expert emphasised that business today is not just a profit generator but an active participant in social transformations.

    “What projects and technologies should we invest in today? Investment criteria are three conditions: qualitatively improving human life, being produced in harmony with nature, and being accessible, at a minimum, having mass potential. But what’s more important is not only what you produce, but also in what culture you do it. In 2012, the president spoke words that I’ve been quoting often lately. He said that the great mission of Russians is to unite, to bind civilisation with culture, language, and universal responsiveness. And so we try to build our culture and our ethics around this very universal responsiveness. To build capitalism with a human face,” said Sergei Ivanov.

    Another session’s focus, “Shaping a New Platform for Global Growth”, was on breakthrough technologies. As noted by Yuri Kozarenko, General Director of “Transport of the Future” LLC, today, automation has reached a level where robots create robots for the production of goods and services for humans.

    “This year has become significant, showing a leap in the technological development of artificial intelligence. Several centres, schools, and institutes have been opened in China to train robots in various specialities. We in Russia, in turn, are opening robot training centres based in the Samara region and Moscow, including the Institute of Unmanned Systems. We teach robots to bring social benefit in an economically efficient way,” emphasised Yuri Kozarenko.

    The expert added that technological innovations today directly affect social spheres, for example, helping to solve the demographic crisis.

    During the session, participants also discussed the report on the results of the Open Dialogue prepared by the Centre for Cross-Industry Expertise “Third Rome.” The conclusions of the session “Shaping a New Platform for Global Growth” became the foundation for the subsequent business program of SPIEF-2025. The session “Shaping a New Platform for Global Growth” recording can be viewed on the Russia National Centre website.

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    The MIL Network –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Shaping a New Platform for Global Growth Discussed at Open Dialogue within SPIEF-2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    MOSCOW, RUSSIA, June 20, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — The session “Shaping a New Platform for Global Growth”, based on the results of the Open Dialogue of the Russia National Centre, opened the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum business program on June 18.

    Recognised international experts from Russia, Cameroon, Spain, Azerbaijan, and Canada, as well as authors of the best essays from the Open Dialogue, participated in the discussion.

    Speakers discussed the changing world order, Africa’s potential, and trends in the future economy, including demographic changes and the implementation of breakthrough technologies.

    “This year, the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum is taking place against turbulent world events. This includes the situation in the Middle East and trade wars. Much time will be devoted to this current agenda at the forum. We must not forget which long-term trends and challenges led to the current situation, which trends are basic and defining. It is important to conduct an open dialogue about how we build the world of the future and how to form a new platform for global growth. In which countries does this global growth occur, on which technologies will it be built, and on which principles and cultural code? Our task is to ensure that forward movement benefits people in all countries that, like Russia, are working on the future. It is through open dialogue that our future and its understanding are built,” emphasised Maxim Oreshkin.

    A speaker from Spain, Juan Antonio de Castro de Arespacochaga, a doctor of economics and professor at Complutense University of Madrid, delivered a report on how the global majority of countries are changing reality.

    “Today, most countries are not just participating in global processes – they are changing reality. We see how an increasingly flexible and multipolar world order is forming. World trade is becoming fragmented, fast, and technological, while the international system is becoming a network of preferential agreements, which distorts the principles laid down in the foundation of GATT and WTO,” noted Juan Antonio de Castro de Arespacochaga.

    One of the main discussion topics was: “Africa – driver of the future economic order.” Chairman of the African Advisory Council Francois Ndengwe noted that demographic growth is transforming Africa into the future cradle of the global workforce.

    “This is not just statistics – this is human capital that can become a new driver of global growth. Those who invest in education today and build universities in Africa will tomorrow shape markets and set the game’s rules together with Africa,” said Francois Ndengwe.

    Sergei Ivanov, Executive Director and Member of the EFKO Group board of Directors, spoke about the business’s new responsibility in the modern world. The expert emphasised that business today is not just a profit generator but an active participant in social transformations.

    “What projects and technologies should we invest in today? Investment criteria are three conditions: qualitatively improving human life, being produced in harmony with nature, and being accessible, at a minimum, having mass potential. But what’s more important is not only what you produce, but also in what culture you do it. In 2012, the president spoke words that I’ve been quoting often lately. He said that the great mission of Russians is to unite, to bind civilisation with culture, language, and universal responsiveness. And so we try to build our culture and our ethics around this very universal responsiveness. To build capitalism with a human face,” said Sergei Ivanov.

    Another session’s focus, “Shaping a New Platform for Global Growth”, was on breakthrough technologies. As noted by Yuri Kozarenko, General Director of “Transport of the Future” LLC, today, automation has reached a level where robots create robots for the production of goods and services for humans.

    “This year has become significant, showing a leap in the technological development of artificial intelligence. Several centres, schools, and institutes have been opened in China to train robots in various specialities. We in Russia, in turn, are opening robot training centres based in the Samara region and Moscow, including the Institute of Unmanned Systems. We teach robots to bring social benefit in an economically efficient way,” emphasised Yuri Kozarenko.

    The expert added that technological innovations today directly affect social spheres, for example, helping to solve the demographic crisis.

    During the session, participants also discussed the report on the results of the Open Dialogue prepared by the Centre for Cross-Industry Expertise “Third Rome.” The conclusions of the session “Shaping a New Platform for Global Growth” became the foundation for the subsequent business program of SPIEF-2025. The session “Shaping a New Platform for Global Growth” recording can be viewed on the Russia National Centre website.

    Social Links

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    The MIL Network –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Analysis: Trump’s first term lies at the heart of escalation between Iran and Israel

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Christian Emery, Associate Professor in International Politics, UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies, UCL

    The US president, Donald Trump, is weighing up whether to join Israel in attacking Iran. The fact he is even contemplating such a move is, in my opinion, a direct consequence of his 2018 decision to tear up the agreement negotiated during Barack Obama’s presidency that limited Iran’s nuclear capabilities in return for sanctions relief.

    Trump not only squandered the opportunity to constrain Iran’s nuclear ambitions severely. He also shut the door on showing Iran that diplomacy and economic development could offer a more promising path than proxy warfare.

    The Obama administration’s core strategic rationale behind the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, or joint comprehensive plan of action (JCPOA), was that amid several devastating regional wars and an American public weary of costly military interventions, a war with Iran would be disastrous. This was especially true given the growing US desire to pivot toward containing China.


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    Obama challenged opponents of the deal to propose a credible alternative. And Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, addressed US Congress to make the case against the JCPOA. He argued that it would not prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons.

    But Obama ultimately succeeded in persuading the American public that the only real alternative to a negotiated agreement with Iran was yet another war in the Middle East.

    Trump believed that exiting the JCPOA and crushing the Iranian economy would either force the regime to accept major restrictions on its nuclear programme and moderate its regional behaviour, or cause the entire theocratic system to collapse.

    What followed instead was a sharp escalation of tensions in the Persian Gulf. Iran exercised greater reliance on its regional proxy network, with attacks on US personnel increasing. It simultaneously increased its stockpile of highly enriched uranium.

    When Trump took office in 2017, the JCPOA had already eliminated 98% of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile. It also capped enrichment at 3.7%, well below the level required for a nuclear bomb.

    The situation has changed since Trump’s withdrawal. Israel’s central justification for launching its attack against Iran on June 15 was the International Atomic Energy Agency’s determination that Iran had now amassed over 408kg of uranium enriched up to 60%. Netanyahu claimed that Iran could be “within a few months” of producing a nuclear weapon.

    However, even with these serious violations, US intelligence has consistently stated that Iran is not actively pursuing such a weapon. It recently assessed that, even if Iran decided to do so, it was up to three years away from being able to produce a nuclear weapon that it could deliver to a target of its choosing.

    Netanyahu may have wanted to attack Iran anyway. He has repeatedly claimed over the past 15 years that immediate military action was needed to stop Iran from obtaining a nuclear bomb.

    But it would have been harder to justify an attack on Iran if it possessed no highly enriched uranium and was verifiably complying with the JCPOA. Iran had stuck to the JCPOA for four years, including one year after the US withdrew, and there is no evidence to suggest it wouldn’t have kept to a deal that Iran clearly saw as being in its interests.

    Maximum pressure campaign

    Iran’s developing nuclear programme may be the immediate pretext for the current escalation. But Iran’s proxy warfare strategy, using regional militant groups to fight Israel and serve as pressure points it can activate when threatened, forms the other essential backdrop.

    This strategy pre-dates the Trump administration. But Trump’s so-called “maximum pressure” campaign clearly escalated tensions in the Middle East, making direct confrontation between Israel and Iran more likely.

    When Trump enacted sanctions aiming to eliminate Iran’s oil and gas exports, Tehran retaliated by using its strategic position in the Strait of Hormuz to harass Gulf shipping. In September 2019, an Iranian drone attack on a Saudi oil processing facility temporarily took out 50% of Saudi oil production.

    Iran would normally have zero interest in disrupting Gulf shipping. This is because its own gas and oil must travel through the Strait of Hormuz. But its strategy was to deter Trump’s economic warfare by showing that it would not be the only one to suffer.

    Tehran unsurprisingly viewed Trump’s policy as an attempt to deliver regime change and responded by doubling down on its “forward defence” strategy. Iran increased its military, financial and political backing of proxy groups in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen. And it also continued development of its ballistic missile programme.

    Before 2018, the US estimated that Iran was sending about US$200 million (£148 million) annually to the Lebanese armed group, Hezbollah. By 2020, it was sending US$700 million.

    Trump’s repudiation of the JCPOA also critically damaged more moderate voices in Iran. In 2017, the success of the JCPOA helped propel reformist president Hassan Rouhani to a second term in office. However, in 2021, the regime prevented key moderate figures from standing.

    Ebrahim Raisi, a hardliner who had lost against Rouhani in 2017 and was already under US sanctions, was elected as Iran’s president. Raisi and his faction demanded tougher terms for any future nuclear deal – more sanctions relief upfront and binding guarantees against another US withdrawal.

    This frustrated attempts to revive the agreement under Joe Biden’s presidency, as only Congress could offer such guarantees. This was an improbable prospect amid escalating tensions with a more hostile, nuclear-advanced Iran that was increasingly aligning with Russia.

    None of this absolves Iran of its own intransigence, support for terrorism or brutalisation of its own citizens. Nor does it free the Islamic Republic of criticism over its decision to abandon the nuclear limits agreed under the JCPOA – even if it was the US that first broke the deal.

    Ultimately, though, the conditions that led to this war would almost certainly not have arisen without Trump’s mishandling of Iran policy in his first administration. It was a precursor to the abysmal leadership he’s demonstrating in this war.

    Christian Emery does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Trump’s first term lies at the heart of escalation between Iran and Israel – https://theconversation.com/trumps-first-term-lies-at-the-heart-of-escalation-between-iran-and-israel-259199

    MIL OSI Analysis –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Concludes 2025 Article IV Consultation with Fiji

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    June 20, 2025

    Washington, DC: On June 17, 2025, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the Article IV consultation[1] with Fiji, and considered and endorsed the staff appraisal without a meeting.

    The economic recovery continued in 2024. Staff estimates aggregate GDP growth in 2024 to have reached 3.7 percent. While employment has recovered to pre-pandemic levels, investment has recently been held back by labor shortages and supply-chain challenges. Inflation decelerated though 2024 as the impact of the 2023 value-added tax increase faded and the nominal exchange rate appreciated. The public debt-to-GDP ratio has continued to decline from the peak reached in 2022, but remains elevated, at 80 percent. Likewise, the current account balance has improved, but the deficit in 2024 is estimated to be around 6.7 percent.

    Monetary and financial conditions remain accommodative, while the fiscal stance has tightened. The Reserve Bank of Fiji (RBF) has maintained the policy rate at 0.25 percent since early 2020. The fiscal stance tightened in FY2024, with the overall deficit declining from 7.2 percent of GDP in FY2023 (August-July) to 3.5 percent of GDP in FY2024, compared to a budgeted deficit of 4.8 percent of GDP.

    Executive Board Assessment

    In concluding the 2025 Article IV consultation with Fiji, Executive Directors endorsed staff’s appraisal, as follows:

    The economy has been recovering from the pandemic but is facing new setbacks. Growth is expected to fall in 2025, to about 2.6 percent, mostly because of slowing external demand, and to take a couple of years to recover to its medium-term potential rate. The baseline projection implies that public debt would remain elevated. In addition, FX reserve coverage would fall, implying that the external position remains moderately weak. Growth would be higher with successful structural reforms, or should the external environment be more favorable than assumed. But the balance of risks appears to be mostly to the downside, both in the near term, if trade tensions were to worsen or their effects be more severe than assumed in the baseline, or over the medium term, mostly given vulnerabilities to natural disasters.

     

    Fiscal and monetary policies should focus on addressing macroeconomic imbalances.

    • Fiscal policy should focus on lowering public debt while continuing with growth-friendly fiscal consolidation, oriented toward capital spending. Significant progress has been achieved in recent years, but additional adjustment measures are needed to put public debt on a clear downward path. Targeted and temporary social protection measures should be used to protect the vulnerable. Fiscal tightening would also contribute to reducing external imbalances.
    • Over the medium term, given potential pressures on the exchange rate peg, monetary conditions should be gradually tightened, raising the policy rate and reducing excess liquidity.
    • Financial policy should be attentive to emerging credit risks and to safeguard against money laundering risks.
    • The authorities should avoid using exchange rate restrictions and CFMs in place of macroeconomic adjustment and focus on a gradual, sequenced capital account liberalization to support high long-run growth objectives.

    Raising potential growth calls for sustained structural reforms.

    • Progress has been achieved in enhancing the business environment and addressing near-term constraints to growth. Immediate concerns include addressing ageing infrastructure in electricity, water, and waste utilities, and improving the transport network and digital connectivity. Ongoing concerns include training and human capital. Successful measures would also encourage more foreign investment, ease external imbalances, and reduce “brain drain.”
    • As for other Pacific states, Fiji faces ongoing challenges from natural disasters and climate change. Increasing resilience adds to the motivation to shift away from current toward capital spending.

    Such issues require sustained political consensus and good governance. The government’s recognition of the importance of institutional reform, commitment to the rule of law, and reducing corruption and bribery is welcome. Recent legislative progress will need to be matched by proper enforcement and addressing capacity constraints in the civil service.

    Fiji: Selected Economic Indicators, 2022–30

    2022

    2023

    2024

    2025

    2026

    2027

    2028

    2029

    2030

    Est.

    Proj.

    Output and prices (percent change)

    Real GDP

    19.8

    7.5

    3.7

    2.6

    2.8

    3.2

    3.2

    3.2

    3.2

    GDP deflator

    2.4

    4.1

    6.3

    3.2

    3.1

    3.2

    3.3

    3.4

    3.5

    Consumer prices (average)

    4.3

    2.3

    4.5

    3.2

    3.1

    3.2

    3.3

    3.4

    3.5

    Consumer prices (end of period)

    3.1

    5.1

    1.3

    3.1

    3.2

    3.3

    3.4

    3.5

    3.5

    Central government budget on fiscal-year basis (percent of GDP)

    Revenue and Grants

    21.4

    23.2

    27.4

    27.1

    27.1

    26.8

    26.8

    26.6

    26.5

    Expenditure

    33.5

    30.3

    31.0

    31.5

    31.2

    31.0

    31.0

    30.9

    30.9

    Overall balance

    -12.1

    -7.2

    -3.5

    -4.4

    -4.2

    -4.2

    -4.2

    -4.3

    -4.4

    Primary balance

    -8.5

    -3.3

    0.5

    -0.3

    -0.3

    -0.6

    -0.6

    -0.7

    -0.8

    Central government debt 

    90.4

    83.3

    79.5

    77.7

    77.7

    77.6

    77.3

    77.0

    76.8

    Central government external debt

    33.3

    30.6

    28.7

    26.5

    26.5

    26.4

    26.1

    25.8

    25.6

    External sector (percent of GDP)

    Current account balance

    -17.3

    -7.7

    -6.7

    -7.0

    -7.7

    -7.5

    -7.2

    -6.9

    -6.9

    Trade balance

    -32.9

    -32.7

    -30.0

    -29.1

    -27.7

    -27.3

    -27.3

    -26.9

    -26.4

    Services balance

    11.8

    20.4

    20.0

    19.9

    18.4

    17.8

    17.3

    17.1

    16.5

    Primary Income balance

    -5.3

    -5.7

    -6.4

    -6.8

    -6.6

    -6.4

    -6.0

    -5.9

    -5.9

    Secondary Income balance

    9.2

    10.3

    9.6

    9.0

    8.2

    8.5

    8.8

    8.9

    9.0

    Capital account balance

    0.1

    0.1

    0.1

    0.1

    0.1

    0.1

    0.1

    0.1

    0.1

    Financial account balance (-= inflows)

    -14.0

    -4.9

    -6.6

    -4.1

    -5.3

    -5.7

    -6.9

    -6.5

    -6.5

    FDI

    -1.8

    -1.1

    -1.6

    -4.5

    -5.4

    -6.1

    -7.3

    -7.1

    -7.2

    Portfolio investment

    0.5

    1.0

    1.7

    1.7

    1.7

    1.7

    1.7

    1.7

    1.7

    Other investment

    -12.7

    -4.8

    -6.7

    -1.3

    -1.5

    -1.3

    -1.3

    -1.1

    -1.0

    Errors and omissions

    5.1

    4.2

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    Change in reserve assets (-=increase)

    -2.1

    0.3

    0.1

    2.9

    2.3

    1.7

    0.3

    0.3

    0.4

    Gross official reserves (in months of prospective imports)

    5.5

    5.3

    5.2

    4.4

    3.7

    3.1

    2.9

    2.6

    …

    Money and credit (percent change)

    Net domestic assets of depository corporations

    4.9

    12.1

    8.0

    6.4

    6.1

    …

    …

    …

    …

    Claims on private sector

    6.7

    7.5

    11.4

    10.0

    8.0

    …

    …

    …

    …

    Broad money (M3)

    5.1

    9.1

    6.6

    4.1

    4.1

    …

    …

    …

    …

    Monetary base

    15.8

    -4.0

    7.5

    3.6

    1.4

    …

    …

    …

    …

    Central Bank Policy rate (end of period)

    0.25

    0.25

    0.25

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    Commercial banks deposits rate (end of period)

    0.4

    0.4

    0.3

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    Commercial banks lending rate (end of period)

    5.2

    4.8

    4.6

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    Memorandum items

    Exchange rate, average (FJD/USD)

    2.2

    2.3

    2.3

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    Real effective exchange rate, average

    108.2

    106.4

    108.3

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    GDP at current market prices (in millions of Fiji dollars)

    10,940

    12,245

    13,494

    14,286

    15,148

    16,130

    17,193

    18,342

    19,594

    GDP at current market prices (in millions of U.S. dollars)

    4,970

    5,442

    5,949

    6,257

    6,564

    6,913

    7,284

    7,674

    8,089

    GDP per capita (in U.S. dollars)

    5,450

    5,933

    6,447

    6,740

    7,030

    7,359

    7,707

    8,072

    8,508

    Sources: Reserve Bank of Fiji; Ministry of Finance; and IMF Staff Estimates and Projections.

    [1] Under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country’s economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Pemba Sherpa

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    @IMFSpokesperson

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/20/pr-25208-fiji-imf-concludes-2025-article-iv-consultation

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: Ukraine and Russia again exchange prisoners within the framework of the Istanbul agreements

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Kyiv, June 20 /Xinhua/ – Ukraine and Russia held a prisoner exchange on Friday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said on Telegram.

    According to him, during this procedure, Kyiv managed to secure the release of a group of Ukrainian servicemen, most of whom had been in Russian captivity for over two years. These are representatives of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the National Guard and the State Border Service.

    The head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, Kirill Budanov, in turn, reported that this was the next stage of the exchange of prisoners within the framework of the agreements reached at the beginning of the month in Istanbul.

    On June 2, peace talks between Ukraine and the Russian Federation took place in Istanbul. The parties agreed to exchange prisoners according to the formula “all for all” for two categories of servicemen – seriously ill and those aged 18 to 25.

    The exact number of released persons will be announced after all stages of the exchange are completed. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: Xinhua Director General Meets with Rossiyskaya Gazeta Director General

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    St. Petersburg, June 20 /Xinhua/ — Director General of China’s Xinhua News Agency Fu Hua, who is visiting Russia, met with Director General of Rossiyskaya Gazeta Pavel Negoitsa on Friday.

    Fu Hua said that Xinhua News Agency treasures the friendly relations with Rossiyskaya Gazeta and attaches great importance to exchanges and cooperation between the two sides. He hopes to further explore opportunities for personnel exchanges, joint reporting and photo exhibitions, strengthen cooperation in disseminating news content, so as to promote high-level development of China-Russia relations.

    P. Negoica highly appreciated the long-term friendly and cooperative relations between the two sides. He noted that Xinhua News Agency has rich experience in using new technologies such as artificial intelligence and big data to expand its editing and news gathering capabilities. Rossiyskaya Gazeta is willing to further deepen technical cooperation, increase personnel exchanges and enrich cooperation models with Xinhua News Agency to jointly promote mutual understanding and friendship between the peoples of Russia and China. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: More than 20 killed in coltan mine collapse in eastern DRC

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    GOMA, June 20 (Xinhua) — More than 20 people were killed in a collapse at a coltan mine in the Rubaya region of eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) on Thursday, local sources said on Friday.

    At least 21 bodies have so far been recovered from the mine, located in Masisi in North Kivu province, according to the Masisi Territory Administration Office.

    In addition, about 100 people were rescued during the ongoing operation.

    “The current death toll remains preliminary as rescue efforts have been ongoing since yesterday. Several people are still trapped under the rubble and emergency teams are working tirelessly at the scene to rescue those who show signs of life,” an official from Rubaya told Xinhua on Friday.

    “We plan to provide an update later this afternoon depending on how the situation develops,” the official said.

    The cause of the tragedy is still unknown. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Global Economic Shifts in Focus as Madrid Professor Addresses SPIEF 2025 Opening Session

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    MOSCOW, RUSSIA, June 20, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — The St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) 2025, held in Russia from June 18 to 21, began with a high-level session titled *”Shaping a New Platform for Global Growth.”* The session marked the presentation of the final report from the International Open Dialogue of the Russia National Centre and featured expert insights into global economic and geopolitical shifts. Among the key speakers was Juan Antonio de Castro de Arespacochaga, a doctor of economics and professor at Complutense University of Madrid, who addressed the evolving role of the global majority in transforming international systems.

    The session was dedicated to the current challenges of modernity: economic and political fragmentation, demographic changes, the consequences of breakthrough technology implementation, and social and technological gaps within and between countries.

    A speaker from Spain, Juan Antonio de Castro de Arespacochaga, a doctor of economics and professor at Complutense University of Madrid, delivered a report on how the global majority of countries are changing reality.

    “Today, most countries are not just participating in global processes—they are changing reality. We see how an increasingly flexible and multipolar world order is forming. World trade is becoming fragmented, fast, and technological, while the international system is becoming a network of preferential agreements, which distorts the principles laid down in the foundation of GATT and WTO,” noted Juan Antonio de Castro de Arespacochaga.

    In his opinion, the world is becoming increasingly fragmented and unpredictable—this applies to politics and economics.

    “The international trade architecture is breaking down into nodes and blocks, which requires new approaches. We must be able to respond to these challenges, understanding that the old rules no longer work in the new dynamics,” emphasised Juan Antonio de Castro de Arespacochaga.

    “It is important to conduct an open dialogue about how we build the world of the future and form a new platform for global growth. In which countries will this global growth occur, on which technologies will it be built, and on which principles and cultural code? Our task is to ensure that forward movement benefits people in all countries that, like Russia, are working on the future. It is through open dialogue that our future and its understanding are built,” noted Maxim Oreshkin.

    At the session organised by the National Centre, speakers discussed, among other things, the report on the results of the Open Dialogue prepared by the Centre for Cross-Industry Expertise “Third Rome.” Key issues included factors shaping the new economic wave, technologies driving economic development, and ways to achieve human well-being.

    The session “Shaping a New Platform for Global Growth” results became the foundation for the subsequent business program of SPIEF-2025. The session recording can be viewed on the Russia National Centre website.

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    The MIL Network –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Global Economic Shifts in Focus as Madrid Professor Addresses SPIEF 2025 Opening Session

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    MOSCOW, RUSSIA, June 20, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — The St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) 2025, held in Russia from June 18 to 21, began with a high-level session titled *”Shaping a New Platform for Global Growth.”* The session marked the presentation of the final report from the International Open Dialogue of the Russia National Centre and featured expert insights into global economic and geopolitical shifts. Among the key speakers was Juan Antonio de Castro de Arespacochaga, a doctor of economics and professor at Complutense University of Madrid, who addressed the evolving role of the global majority in transforming international systems.

    The session was dedicated to the current challenges of modernity: economic and political fragmentation, demographic changes, the consequences of breakthrough technology implementation, and social and technological gaps within and between countries.

    A speaker from Spain, Juan Antonio de Castro de Arespacochaga, a doctor of economics and professor at Complutense University of Madrid, delivered a report on how the global majority of countries are changing reality.

    “Today, most countries are not just participating in global processes—they are changing reality. We see how an increasingly flexible and multipolar world order is forming. World trade is becoming fragmented, fast, and technological, while the international system is becoming a network of preferential agreements, which distorts the principles laid down in the foundation of GATT and WTO,” noted Juan Antonio de Castro de Arespacochaga.

    In his opinion, the world is becoming increasingly fragmented and unpredictable—this applies to politics and economics.

    “The international trade architecture is breaking down into nodes and blocks, which requires new approaches. We must be able to respond to these challenges, understanding that the old rules no longer work in the new dynamics,” emphasised Juan Antonio de Castro de Arespacochaga.

    “It is important to conduct an open dialogue about how we build the world of the future and form a new platform for global growth. In which countries will this global growth occur, on which technologies will it be built, and on which principles and cultural code? Our task is to ensure that forward movement benefits people in all countries that, like Russia, are working on the future. It is through open dialogue that our future and its understanding are built,” noted Maxim Oreshkin.

    At the session organised by the National Centre, speakers discussed, among other things, the report on the results of the Open Dialogue prepared by the Centre for Cross-Industry Expertise “Third Rome.” Key issues included factors shaping the new economic wave, technologies driving economic development, and ways to achieve human well-being.

    The session “Shaping a New Platform for Global Growth” results became the foundation for the subsequent business program of SPIEF-2025. The session recording can be viewed on the Russia National Centre website.

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    The MIL Network –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: NB8++ joint statement on the shadow fleet

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    News story

    NB8++ joint statement on the shadow fleet

    Statement from the Nordic-Baltic 8++ on joint action to further counter Russia’s shadow fleet.

    We, the Foreign Ministers and government representatives of Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom have met today to address the challenge posed by the Russian shadow fleet. We call for further joint and coordinated action to effectively address Russian attempts to circumvent international sanctions.   

    Russia’s destabilising actions have strengthened our resolve to protect maritime security, safety, the marine environment and freedom of navigation in accordance with international law. We are particularly concerned about stateless vessels and falsely flagged vessels. Stateless vessels, including those falsely claiming to fly a flag, do not have a responsible flag state and are not entitled to rights under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), including freedom of navigation. If vessels fail to fly a valid flag in the Baltic Sea and the North Sea, we will take appropriate action within international law.   

    Today, we have agreed to further strengthen our cooperation and ensure a joint and coordinated approach by our national authorities to address Russia’s shadow fleet. We intend to compile a common set of guidelines in line with international law to promote responsible behaviour at sea, strengthen compliance with international law, and ensure transparency across maritime operations.   

    We recall that the risks posed by the shadow fleet, including potential environmental damage as well as risks to maritime safety and security, the integrity of international seaborne trade, critical undersea infrastructure and respect for international maritime rules and standards, extend far beyond the Baltic and North Seas and could have global impact. We call on others to join our efforts.

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    Published 20 June 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: A pink diamond just sold for over US$ 14 million – no wonder, when you look at the mysteries behind their chemistry

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Elton Santos, Reader in Theoretical and Computational Condensed Matter Physics, University of Edinburgh

    Diamonds might be forever but that doesn’t stop them being bought and sold. One stone thought to have once belonged to Marie Antoinette, the last queen of France, has just sold for US$14 million (£10 million) at an auction in New York – about three times the asking price. Set into a platinum ring and weighing a total of 15.5 grams, the clue to the diamond’s uniqueness is in its name: the Marie-Thérèse pink.

    This 10.38 carat pink diamond has been changing hands for generations, and previously sold at an auction in Geneva for an unknown amount. Pink diamonds are very rare and there are many things that scientists still don’t know about them.

    Diamonds are generally formed under intense heat and pressure deep within the Earth’s mantle, roughly 150–200 kilometres below the surface. Most natural diamonds crystallise over billions of years, composed almost entirely of carbon atoms arranged in a tightly packed, cube-like structure.


    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.


    Coloured diamonds are geological anomalies. Variations include pink, blue, orange, yellow, red, green, brown and black, most of which can be explained by impurities in their crystal lattice. Yellow diamonds contain nitrogen, for example, while blue ones contain boron.

    Pink diamonds are not caused by such impurities. Scientists believe that the pink hue arises from a distortion in the diamond’s atomic lattice structure. Intense pressure deep underground creates forces (known as shear forces) that twist and compress atomic layers, which alter how the stone reflects light.

    It’s this “plastic deformation” which results in the pink coloration, reducing the green light in the visible spectrum so that it shifts the overall colour that we see towards pink.

    Only a small fraction of diamonds undergo such extreme and precise pressure and temperature conditions during their formation. These factors make them very difficult to be created and even harder to predict where they will be formed. As a result, pink diamonds are the rarest of all coloured diamonds apart from red ones, which are formed by an even more intense version of the same process.

    Aussie rules

    For decades, the Argyle mine in western Australia was the world’s primary source of pink diamonds (and also red ones), producing over 90% of the global supply. The mine is located at a unique geological area by a so-called lamproite volcanic pipe, as opposed to the more common kimberlite pipes found at most other diamond mines. Without getting too much into the technicalities, lamproite pipes tend to be less explosive and have more unusual minerals like leucite and rich potassium.

    The Argyle mine is located in the Kimberley region, which experienced intense tectonic activity during the Paleoproterozoic era, over 1.6 billion years ago. This meant that the lamproite pipe was formed under extreme pressures and temperatures.

    This is believed to have caused the lattice defects in the diamonds that were pushed to the Earth’s surface, which are responsible for their pink and red colours. The deep mantle depths in the mine were also crucial, since this translates into higher internal pressures and temperatures.

    Even so, less than 0.1% of the diamonds extracted from Argyle were classified as pink (and only 0.00000002% were red, if you calculate the proportion of red carats found). The mine then closed in 2020 after 37 years of production because its reserves were exhausted, making pink diamonds even more scarce and valuable.

    Other known sources include Brazil, India, Russia and South Africa, but these mines yield pink diamonds far less frequently. The rarity of high-quality pink diamonds has made them highly sought-after by collectors and investors alike, as demonstrated by the high sale price of the Marie-Thérèse pink. That diamond was actually pink-purple, with the purple hue caused by hydrogen being absorbed into the atomic structure during the stone’s formation, making it rarer still.

    Advanced techniques involving shining infrared light and X-rays into the stones – respectively known as infrared spectroscopy and high-resolution X-ray diffraction – have provided scientists with insights into the structural changes that cause pink and red diamonds.

    Yet many questions remain unanswered, and the study of pink diamonds continues to be an active area of scientific investigations in mineral physics and crystallography. This has included creating pink diamonds (and other colours such as blues) in the laboratory by replicating the natural processes that form them, but in a more controlled, accelerated way.

    These lab-grown pink diamonds look nearly identical to their natural versions to the human eye, but can yet be differentiated through optical techniques. One method is infrared absorption, which detects how the diamond absorbs light and vibrates at specific frequencies.

    Another clue is the presence of sharp peaks in the visible light spectrum that indicate certain impurities, like hydrogen or nitrogen, which are often found in natural stones. In the same style as a CSI investigation, these techniques provide the last word in whether a pink diamond is from a mine such as Argyle, a lab-grown pink, or a clear natural diamond that has been treated pink artificially.

    Even after years of improving the process for making pink diamonds synthetically, the mechanical distortions responsible for their exotic colour still can’t be replicated precisely under laboratory conditions. Scientists
    don’t understand all the atomic processes involved in their colouring becoming permanent to be able to recreate them perfectly.

    The same is actually also true for other synthetic diamonds, though they are becoming harder and harder to detect as the technology improves. In short, pink diamonds (and red ones) remain among the most remarkable precious stones in the world. Unless and until that changes, we can keep expecting them to change hands for ridiculous amounts of money.

    Elton Santos receives funding from EPSRC, Royal Society, and is affiliated with the Donostia International Physics Center, San Sebastián, Spain.

    – ref. A pink diamond just sold for over US$ 14 million – no wonder, when you look at the mysteries behind their chemistry – https://theconversation.com/a-pink-diamond-just-sold-for-over-us-14-million-no-wonder-when-you-look-at-the-mysteries-behind-their-chemistry-259392

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: Energy panel within the framework of the XXVIII St. Petersburg International Economic Forum

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Rosneft – Rosneft – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    Start: June 21 at 10:00

    The Energy Panel will be broadcast on the SPIEF internal television and the Roscongress information channel.

    Energy consumption and progress have always been interconnected. The higher humanity rose in the developmental stages, the more energy was required for new achievements – from the fires of primitive times to the nuclear power plants of modern times.

    Today, our civilization is at a turning point – the world energy industry is facing a large-scale transformation, and the energy consumption model is changing. Against this background, each country is acutely faced with the need to ensure energy security.

    What will the energy of tomorrow look like and what factors will determine its development? What role will new technologies play in this process? Which country will be the first to ensure the transition to a new type of energy? And what awaits the oil industry against the backdrop of ongoing changes?

    Answers to these and other questions can be heard during the Energy Panel broadcast.

    Keynote speech: ● Igor Ivanovich Sechin, Chief Executive Officer of PJSC NK Rosneft

    Moderator: ● Rick Sanchez, RT anchor

    Department of Information and Advertising of PJSC NK Rosneft June 20, 2025

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: Admissions Campaign 2025: SUM is Ready to Meet Applicants

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: State University of Management – Official website of the State –

    On June 20, 2025, the admission campaign to Russian universities began. In connection with this, the acting rector of the State University of Management Dmitry Bryukhanov and vice-rectors Artem Terpugov and Vitaly Lapshenkov visited the university’s admissions committee.

    “Today is an important day for all universities and applicants in our country – the start of accepting documents. The State University of Management is also waiting for its future students in a wide range of bachelor’s, master’s and postgraduate programs. We are ready to go with the guys the path from yesterday’s school student to employed graduate, so that they receive the necessary knowledge and competencies that will allow them to be confident specialists in their professional activities and take the positions they want, working in the chosen industry,” said Dmitry Yuryevich.

    The vice-rectors talked to the commission staff and representatives of the institutes that provide consultations to applicants, tried out interactive screens in practice, and learned about the mood of the students who help the admissions committee.

    At the end of the visit, Dmitry Bryukhanov congratulated everyone on the start of the admissions campaign, wished them success in their work and reminded them that if any questions or suggestions arise, the rector’s office is always ready to help.

    Want to stay up to date with the main news for applicants? Then subscribe to the channel “Our Applicant Assistant|GUU”, where only the most important information is published.

    We also remind you that a photo contest is taking place in the main groups of the State University of Management in VKontakte and Telegram, and Zen State University of Management helps you keep your finger on the pulse of world news, as well as relax with interesting videos about the lives of students.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: New Horizons of Cooperation: Polytech at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Peter the Great St Petersburg Polytechnic University – Peter the Great St Petersburg Polytechnic University –

    On June 20, Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University continued its work at the XXVIII St. Petersburg International Economic Forum.

    At the forum, the rector of SPbPU, academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences Andrey Rudskoy and the chairman PSB Petr Fradkov signed a partnership agreement aimed at developing and scaling digital twin technology for defense industry enterprises and civilian high-tech industries. The document sets out the creation of a joint ecosystem for technological development that meets the priorities of the Russian Federation in the field of digital transformation and technological leadership:

    Russia’s entry into the top 10 countries in terms of R&D volume; accelerated implementation of technological innovations; formation of long-term demand and supply for high-tech products.

    All joint initiatives of SPbPU and PSB will be focused on the implementation and financial support of “cross-cutting” projects: from technological innovations to the creation and technical support in the operation of promising military and military-technical equipment and dual-use products.

    Polytechnic has been building a world-class ecosystem around key scientific and technological direction— system digital engineering and digital twin technology. PSB support will give our projects strategic and financial acceleration and will allow us to transform our scientific and technological groundwork, created digital platforms, digital test benches and testing grounds not only into a tool for developing high-tech products and implementing R&D, but also into state standards. After all, our common goal is to increase business investment in R&D, to make digital twin technology not only a language of communication between science, production and business, but also a basis for effective cooperation in order to ensure a high level of defense capability and technological leadership of the country, — noted Andrey Rudskoy.

    For systematic work in this direction, PSB will create specialized structures within its framework by the end of the year – the Sovereign Technologies Development Agent and the Innovation Diffusion Accelerator, which will form cooperation chains of qualified customers and qualified performers, developers and manufacturers of high-tech products, and will also develop specialized financial instruments for the implementation of technological innovations using digital twin approaches.

    For PSB, the backbone bank of the military-industrial complex, the role of an agent for the development of sovereign technologies is a responsibility and a growth point. Based on the expertise of the Polytechnic University andCML-Bench® digital platform, we consolidate engineering and financial data in a single digital circuit so that bold scientific and technological ideas quickly become competitive products. Our goal is to create and test a convenient “short route” from development to serial production and ensure the country’s technological leadership, which today is measured, among other things, by the ability to create the future in digital form, said Pyotr Fradkov.

    The most important link that translates the country’s priorities from the highest level into an effective project format should be the Interdepartmental Comprehensive Target Program for the Implementation of Digital Twin Technology, which is being developed on behalf of the President of the Russian Federation by federal executive bodies under the leadership of the Ministry of Industry and Trade of Russia.

    Digital twin technology plays an important role in the development of industry and is aimed primarily at reducing the cost and development time of high-tech products, improving the characteristics of created and modernized models, which will lead to ensuring technological sovereignty and technological leadership. I would like to note that within the framework of the activities of TC 700, RFNC-VNIIEF and SPbPU were the first in the world to develop National standard “Digital twins of products”, which was officially recognized in the PRC and served as the basis for the creation of the standard “Digital Twins of Aircraft Gas Turbine Engines”. In this regard, the signed Agreement on Cooperation between PSB and SPbPU in the field of development and application of digital testing technologies and digital twins at defense industry enterprises will play a major role and will be of great importance in the implementation of the Interdepartmental Comprehensive Target Program for the Implementation of Digital Twin Technology, – commented Kirill Lysogorsky, Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation, Chairman of TC 700 “Mathematical Modeling and High-Performance Computing Technologies”.

    Also at the forum, two agreements on joining the consortium “Russian-African Network University” were signed: with the Saint Petersburg State University of Economics and the Moscow State University of Geodesy and Cartography. The documents were signed by the Chairman of the Presidium of RAFU, Rector of SPbPU Andrey Rudskoy, Rector of SPbGEU Igor Maksimtsev and Rector of MIIGAiK Nadezhda Kamynina.

    The Russian-African Network University is proud to welcome new members to its ranks. This event is of great importance. The main value lies in the professional activities of the University of Economics. The Ministry instructed us to conduct research to assess the economic and cultural damage inflicted on Africa by centuries of colonial rule. Our President rightly noted that Africa is the future of our planet and the most populated continent. Africa has enormous intellectual potential, which in the near future may occupy leading economic and intellectual positions. Our network university should contribute to this process, – noted Andrey Rudskoy.

    The Russian-African Network University consortium was created on the initiative of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation in 2021.

    Its goal is to develop partnerships between Russian and African universities in the field of higher education and research, and to create a unified educational space for training highly qualified personnel. RAFU includes more than 90 Russian educational, scientific organizations and companies, and on the African side – 45 universities and organizations from 15 African countries.

    Andrey Rudskoy also became an expert in the session “Welcome, or No Trespassing: A Challenge for Science” with the participation of the Minister of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation Valery Falkov. The conversation was devoted to the problem of communications in the field of science as an important part of international relations.

    At the forum, the rector of SPbPU held a series of productive meetings where they discussed current tasks for ensuring the country’s technological leadership, as well as the interaction of science, education and business.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: Shenyang to host 2025 SCO People’s Diplomacy and Twin Cities Forum

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BEIJING, June 20 (Xinhua) — The 2025 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Public Diplomacy and Sister Cities Forum will be held from July 3 to 5 in Shenyang, capital of northeast China’s Liaoning Province, local authorities said on social media on Friday.

    The event, titled “Deepening People’s Friendship and Promoting Sustainable Development,” will be attended by nearly 400 guests from more than 20 SCO countries, a press conference organized by the Shenyang City People’s Government Information Office was announced on Friday.

    The forum will include an exhibition of paintings by children from SCO countries, an exhibition of achievements of SCO countries in the field of people’s friendship and exchanges, as well as an exhibition of achievements in scientific and technical innovations and advanced manufacturing.

    The forum’s agenda will also include a sub-forum on exchanges between sister cities and trade and economic cooperation, a sub-forum on scientific and technological innovations and advanced manufacturing among young people, as well as a sub-forum dedicated to the 80th anniversary of the Victory in the Chinese People’s War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression and the Victory in the World Anti-Fascist War.

    The event is expected to see the publication of agreements on actions in the field of sustainable development of people-to-people exchanges between the SCO countries and the Shenyang Initiative following the forum. In addition, a number of agreements or protocols of intent on establishing sister city relations between relevant organizations and cities will be signed.

    The forum will be jointly organized by the SCO China Committee on Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation, the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries and the People’s Government of Liaoning Province. -0-

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    June 21, 2025
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