Translation. Region: Russian Federal

Source: State University Higher School of Economics – State University Higher School of Economics –

Nikita Melnikov, a leading specialist in the history of Soviet tank building, spoke at the HSE Faculty of Economic Sciences. He told how, between the world wars, the USSR proposed producing 100,000 tanks a year, how American and European experience helped Soviet industry, and how, in the end, the Soviet Union built a powerful tank industry that helped turn the tide of the war.

Production of T-34

Press service of Uralvagonzavod

Nikita Nikolaevich Melnikov, PhD in history, senior research fellow at the Center for Political and Sociocultural History of the Institute of History and Archaeology of the Ural Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, gave two lectures on May 13 at the campus on Pokrovsky Boulevard. The first was devoted to the development of Soviet tank building in the interwar and wartime, the second to the modernization of industry during the Great Patriotic War. These are stories not so much about the armored vehicles themselves, but about the entire industrial complex, without studying which it is impossible to understand the logic of economic decisions of those years.

Soviet industry, how it developed and transformed — these are the questions, the answers to which help us understand how we live today. The answers to these questions lie in the past, including the history of the Great Patriotic War. If we want to know and understand the features of modern Russian industry, past experience is important to us. Economists sometimes lack their own tools, and therefore we have to turn to historians in the hope that they will have answers to the questions of interest.

Tank production began in Soviet Russia in 1920–1921. The young republic tried to establish serial production of armored vehicles at the Sormovo plant. It was the “Russian Renault” — a copy of the French FT-17. 15 vehicles were produced, but guns were installed on only 11: there was not enough compact armament. Soviet artillery could not offer a gun of the appropriate size. Production was semi-artisanal. Parts were supplied by the Putilov and Izhora plants.

Already in the late 1920s, the creation of its own industry began. The T-18 that was produced became a modernized copy of the same FT-17. The Bolshevik Plant (formerly Obukhov) itself produced castings and engines. However, many components – bearings, electrical equipment, spark plugs, carburetors – were still imported. The main problem of the era: the lack of civil engineering in the USSR. Parts that were produced in large quantities in Europe for tractors and cars were in short supply in the USSR.

For example, there was only one large bearing plant in the entire Union, GPZ-1, which supplied more than 90% of bearings. But its capacity was insufficient, as was quality production. This is what prompted the creation of a special model. Within each civilian plant, for example, the Kharkov Locomotive Plant or the Kirov Plant, separate sections were created where tanks were manufactured. They were not connected with the main production. These “islands” of armored vehicles existed in parallel with the production of locomotives and tractors.

At the same time, there were ambitious plans to expand tank production within the USSR. Thus, in 1930, the commander of the Leningrad Military District, Mikhail Tukhachevsky, presented a project to modernize the army, in which he proposed producing 100 thousand tanks per year – a fantastic figure. The logic was simple: according to the calculations of engineer Magdesiev from the Bolshevik plant, one tank requires as much effort as two tractors. It was the tractor factories that were considered the foundation of the tank industry. But this idea was not realized.

As a result, in the 1930s, two groups of factories were formed. Specialized (No. 174 and No. 37) produced light and amphibious tanks, and machine-building giants, where tanks were a by-product (KhPZ, Kirov, STZ). Each factory built its own chains, from the production of individual parts to final assembly. There was almost no cooperation between them. This provided autonomy, but slowed down scaling.

In case of war, the USSR planned to build up to 30 thousand tanks. But the industry itself was capable of producing about three thousand vehicles per year. After the start of the Great Patriotic War, the USSR had to seriously restructure its production. The industry was evacuated to the Urals, where a new tank-building cluster was formed.

Production was transferred to civilian factories, which faced a new challenge. Enterprises had to reorganize to produce military products, and new production chains were created for each type of armored vehicle. Work on orders for the civilian sector was stopped, which allowed the production of tanks to be increased in the shortest possible time. And by the end of 1942, the Soviet Union was able to reach a relatively stable level of production of 1,500 medium tanks per month, those same “thirty-fours” that largely became the weapon of victory.

Nikita Melnikov in his lecture spoke in detail about the creation of the Soviet tank industry and the specifics of its formation. He drew attention to many rarely mentioned aspects of the tank industry. Thus, he pointed out that in the conditions of insufficient development of certain branches of mechanical engineering, some components for the production of tanks in the early 1930s were purchased abroad. The prototypes of the most mass-produced models of Soviet tanks T-26 and BT were purchased abroad and then adapted to the conditions of production of the Soviet industry. In addition, during the war, the industry partly switched to the American model of organization, when tanks were produced at large machine-building plants, receiving components from outside. Answering questions from the audience, Nikita Melnikov noted the negative impact of the repressions on tank production, which fell by 2.4 times in 1937 compared to 1936, from 3,800 to 1,600. During the Great Patriotic War, the strain of forces and concentration of resources made it possible to overcome the decline in the production of military equipment and the deterioration of its quality and provide the front with enough tanks.

The second lecture was devoted directly to the restructuring of industry during the war years.

By June 1941, almost half of the USSR’s ferrous metallurgy was concentrated in Ukraine. The loss of the southern regions meant, in essence, an industrial catastrophe. Already in August, the USSR Academy of Sciences Commission began working in Sverdlovsk under the leadership of Academician V.L. Komarov, whose task was to develop projects for mobilizing the Urals’ resources and evacuating industry.

By 1943, a third of all rolled steel in the USSR was used for ammunition, and almost another 10% was used for armored rolled steel. Factories were working at their limits: firebricks needed for steel smelting had to be made with double the intensity, but their durability in wartime was half that of the pre-war period. By the end of 1942, metallurgists and power engineers were faced with equipment wear and tear, the freezing of civilian projects, and total concentration on the needs of the front.

One of the most important systems was energy. Without it, it was impossible to establish industrial production. At the same time, there was a constant energy deficit. The Sverdlovenergo system operated at a reduced frequency of below 49 Hz from October 1941 to March 1943, sometimes even down to 45. Losses during energy transfers over long distances reached 50%. The main industrial facilities consumed up to 77% of all electricity in the region, housing and communal services and the social sphere found themselves in strict isolation. Cement and glass factories received half the required capacity at best. Many worked for several hours a day or stopped completely. The copper industry received half as much energy as before the war.

Against the background of a shortage of electricity, refractory materials and fuel, resources were concentrated on the production of weapons. The volumes of building materials and products for the civilian sector were sharply reduced. Construction was either frozen or transferred to an extremely simplified mode. In the Urals, round timber was used en masse as the most accessible building material.

The industry was forced to rely on women and teenagers. At UZTM in 1945, women accounted for 34.6%, and teenagers under 18 accounted for more than 11%, including girls under 16. It was these efforts of the rear that helped achieve victory at the front.

At the same time, the shortage of production, energy, lack of time and experience led to a decrease in the quality of products. For example, many T-34s produced in 1942 had their gearbox gears completely worn out after several hundred kilometers of running. In 1942, to check the batch, each tank was tested for five kilometers of running before being delivered to the troops. In fact, it was necessary to check whether the tank could start at all, and this was enough to send it to the front. The warranty period for the V-2 engine in 1943 was only 200 engine hours. At the same time, up to 90% of the engine life was depleted by idling the engine at night to warm the tankers in winter. But in war conditions, it was more important to establish mass production, which the USSR successfully managed.

At the same time, after the end of the war, it was necessary to abandon mass military production. However, the established production chains could not be quickly transferred to civilian rails; the factories had been focused only on the production of military goods for several years. This led to a post-war conversion crisis and a revision of plans for the production of armored vehicles.

Nikita Melnikov’s reports aroused keen interest among the audience. Despite the tight program, both students and faculty members came to the lecture. Answering questions from the audience and exchanging opinions took almost as much time as the reports themselves.

Nikita Nikolaevich Melnikov

Candidate of Historical Sciences, Senior Researcher at the Center for Political and Sociocultural History of the Institute of History and Archaeology of the Ural Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences

This experience was extremely valuable and educational for me. For the first time, I gave a lecture to fellow economists, whose questions and comments allowed me to better understand the processes being studied and identify new aspects. The economic model of the USSR’s development is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that requires detailed analysis and systematic study. In this study, I sought to examine the key factors and mechanisms that determined the dynamics and trajectory of the economic development of the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War. I express my sincere gratitude to the Higher School of Economics and Ilya Voskoboinikov for the opportunity to present the results of my research.

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