Category: Russian Federation

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: What is the state of global press freedom in 2025?

    Source: Amnesty International –

    Around the world, journalists are being silenced, jailed, and disappeared – simply for doing their jobs. From Guatemala to the USA, Russia to Pakistan, governments are increasingly resorting to authoritarian practices, weaponizing vague laws, judicial systems, and brute force to suppress press freedom.

    These attacks on the press are not isolated incidents; they are often at the core of deliberate strategies to dismantle the very foundations of human rights. The erosion of press freedom is a warning sign – one that signals a broader slide toward authoritarianism.

    On World Press Freedom Day, we shed light on the state of press freedom around the world, spotlight some worrying trends and explain some of the recent developments that are putting journalists in jeopardy.

    MIL OSI NGO

  • MIL-OSI Global: What is the stupidest thing a recent president has said? It may depend on what your definition of ‘is’ is

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Chris Lamb, Professor of Journalism, Indiana University

    Lots of presidents have said things they regret. Or most of them have. Carol Yepes/Getty Images

    President Donald Trump was asked during a press conference on April 30, 2025, about the possible impact of his tariff policies and trade war with China.

    Trump answered that American children should prepare to make sacrifices at Christmas.

    “Maybe the children will have two dolls instead of 30 dolls, you know,” he said, “and maybe the two dolls will cost a couple of bucks more than they would normally.”

    The New York Times reported that Trump appeared to be telling kids they would have to manage with fewer toys this year for the sake of his economic agenda.

    Jane Mayer, a reporter with The New Yorker, called it “Trump’s Marie Antoinette moment.”

    This was not the first − or last − time Trump said something that left many Americans with mouths open and heads shaking.

    Hours after his Marie Antoinette moment, Trump, whose first 100 days back in office have been characterized as chaotic and damaging to democracy, was asked during a phone interview at a town-hall broadcast on NewsNation what the biggest mistake he’d made thus far in his second presidency.

    “I don’t really believe I’ve made any mistakes,” Trump replied.

    The audience, representing a cross section of Americans, burst out laughing.

    Trump’s gaffes aren’t just part of his presidency; gaffes are part of the storied tradition of the American presidency. Some of those comments have clung to presidents and even affected history.

    Here are examples from each president over the past 50 years or so of statements that at least some of them were embarrassed by or came to regret. Each was made when the president was serving in the White House. The quotes are organized chronologically.

    Donald Trump auditions for Grinch-who-stole-Christmas role.

    Richard Nixon is a law-abiding guy

    On Nov. 17, 1973, President Richard M. Nixon, in the midst of the Watergate scandal that would end his presidency, defended himself against charges of corruption.

    “People have got to know whether or not their president is a crook,” Nixon said. “Well, I’m not a crook. I’ve earned everything I’ve got.”

    Instead of quelling the scandal, as Nixon hoped, his words produced the opposite reaction. He resigned from the presidency nine months later in August 1974.

    Gerald Ford forgets the Cold War

    Gerald Ford, Nixon’s vice president who became president after Nixon’s resignation, subsequently ran for election in 1976.

    During one of his televised debates against Democratic nominee Jimmy Carter, Ford inexplicably claimed the Soviet Union did not control Eastern Europe.

    “There is no Soviet domination of Eastern Europe,” Ford said, “and there never will be under a Ford administration.”

    To which the moderator, New York Times editor May Frankel, said, “I’m sorry, what?”

    Ford’s remark was so outrageously incorrect that it may have contributed to his defeat in the tight presidential election.

    Gerald Ford says it’s really a Warm, not Cold, War.

    Jimmy Carter gets advice from his teen

    Carter defeated Ford and was elected in 1976. He ran for reelection against Republican nominee Ronald Reagan in 1980. During one of their debates, Carter said he sought the advice of his 13-year-old daughter, Amy, on what was the most important issue facing America.

    “She said she thought it was nuclear weaponry,” Carter said, “and the control of nuclear arms.”

    Carter tried to show that arms control was a subject that had great resonance to even 13-year-olds. Instead, it left viewers puzzled why he had inserted his daughter into the debate. A wire service story at the time summarized the response by saying that reporters covering the debate winced and others groaned.

    Jimmy Carter has a smart 13-year-old daughter.

    Ronald Reagan attacks Russia

    Reagan, a former television and movie actor who defeated Carter in the 1980 presidential election, was known as “the Great Communicator” for his eloquence.

    A well-known anti-Communist, Reagan was not always careful about what he said.

    Before a speech on Aug. 11, 1984, Reagan joked during a sound check, “I’ve signed legislation that will outlaw Russia forever. We begin bombing in five minutes.”

    The joke on the open mic, which was not broadcast live but leaked later, resulted in a Soviet red alert − and temporarily moved the U.S. and Soviet Union toward war.

    George H.W. Bush eats word salad

    Reagan’s successor, his vice president, George H.W. Bush, by comparison was no great communicator. His words came out of his mouth and appeared to go in separate ways.

    “I have opinions of my own, strong opinions,” Bush said, “but I don’t always agree with them.”

    Bill Clinton is or isn’t, maybe

    Democrat Bill Clinton defeated George H.W. Bush in the 1992 presidential election.

    Clinton’s presidency was dogged with accusations of unethical behavior and extramarital affairs. Clinton, in testimony before a grand jury investigating his affair with White House intern Monica Lewinsky, was asked whether he was lying when he told aides that “there’s nothing going on” between him and Lewinsky.

    “It depends on what the meaning of the word ‘is’ is,” Clinton responded. “If the − if he − if ‘is’ means is and never has been, that is not − that is one thing.”

    Slate magazine said that this response may have been the “defining moment” of his presidency and, in doing so, captured his contribution to semantics. As Time magazine pointed out,
    “Until then, America hadn’t been sure there was more than one definition of ‘is.’”

    George W. Bush’s shame

    George W. Bush, the son of George H.W. Bush, succeeded Clinton in the White House. Americans learned that Bush had more in common with his father than just the same last name.

    “There’s an old saying in Tennessee − I know it’s in Texas,” Bush said, “probably in Tennessee, that says, fool me once, shame on − shame on you. Fool me − you can’t get fooled again.”

    Barack Obama strikes out

    Barack Obama, like Reagan, was known for his sense of humor. And like Reagan, Obama learned that not everything was a joking matter.

    While appearing on “The Tonight Show” with Jay Leno in 2009, Obama said he had improved his bowling by practicing at the White House bowling alley. He told Leno he had bowled a pedestrian score of 129, provoking a sarcastic response from Leno.

    Obama then made the following joke: “It’s like the Special Olympics or something.”

    Obama quickly apologized to the Special Olympics, the athletic competition for people with intellectual disabilities.

    Obama made a bad joke about the Special Olympics during an interview with Jay Leno; he quickly apologized for it.
    Mandel Ngan / AFP/Getty Images

    Joe Biden’s bad day

    Trump was first elected president in 2016 but was defeated by Joe Biden in the 2020 election. Trump and Biden faced each other again in 2024.

    During a television debate on June 27, 2024, CNN anchor Jake Tapper asked Biden why voters should trust him to solve the immigration crisis. Biden said he changed a law that allowed Trump and his administration to separate immigrant families and put children in cages.

    Biden’s train of thought then jumped the tracks.

    “And I’m going to continue to move until we get the total ban on the − the total initiative relative to what we’re going to do with more Border Patrol and more asylum officers,” Biden said.

    “I really don’t know what he said at the end of that sentence,” Trump said, “and I don’t think he did, either.”

    The same could be said for much of what Biden said during the debate.

    Biden withdrew from the presidential race three weeks after his poor debate performance.

    Chris Lamb does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. What is the stupidest thing a recent president has said? It may depend on what your definition of ‘is’ is – https://theconversation.com/what-is-the-stupidest-thing-a-recent-president-has-said-it-may-depend-on-what-your-definition-of-is-is-255755

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Experts of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Commend Kyrgyzstan on Eradicating Statelessness, Ask about Measures to Prevent Hate Speech and Bride Kidnapping

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination today concluded its consideration of the combined eleventh and twelfth periodic reports of Kyrgyzstan, with Committee Experts commending the State on resolving all known cases of statelessness, and asking about measures to prevent hate speech and the practice of bride kidnapping.

    Mazalo Tebie, Committee Expert and Country Co-Rapporteur, and other Committee Experts commended Kyrgyzstan on having resolved all known cases of statelessness in 2019.  They asked how the State party was bringing its legislation on statelessness in line with international standards.

    Guan Jian, Committee Expert and Country Rapporteur, said conflicts between the country’s various ethnic groups had occurred in recent years.  The State party needed to consider early detection and preventative measures to prevent hate speech.  Could the delegation provide data on crimes motivated by racist hate speech occurring online and in the media?

    Ms. Tebie also said there was a phenomenon in Kyrgyzstan called “ala kachuu” (bride kidnapping), in which young women or girls from marginalised and vulnerable ethnic groups were abducted by men and forced into marriage.  How did the State ensure the effective implementation of laws prohibiting the practice?

    In opening remarks, Marat Tagaev, Deputy Minister of Culture, Information and Youth Policy of Kyrgyzstan and head of the delegation, said Kyrgyzstan fully adhered to its international obligations under the Convention.  The President had approved the national development strategy until 2040, one of the main priorities of which was to ensure interethnic harmony and strengthen the unity of the people.

    In addition, Mr. Tagaev said Kyrgyzstan continued systematic and continuous work on the issues of refugees, internally displaced persons and stateless persons.  In 2019, it became the first country in the world to resolve all known cases of statelessness.  It had also introduced a universal system that ensured 100 per cent registration of births.

    On measures to address hate speech, the delegation said a new bill on the media had been prepared in 2022 which prevented the spread of disinformation online.  In 2025, only 25 complaints related to online hate speech had been received by the State; the State had moved to block websites in response in seven cases.

    The delegation said bridal theft was a form of violence against women.  Persons who abducted women for the purpose of marriage were punished with up to seven years imprisonment, or up to 20 years for the abduction of minors. In 2022, courts found 42 individuals guilty of these crimes.  In all schools, a special subject was taught that addressed kidnapping and abductions, explaining that these actions were crimes.

    In concluding remarks, Michal Balcerzak, Committee Chair, said the dialogue had been very constructive, addressing many issues.  The information provided by the delegation would allow the Committee to develop targeted concluding observations.

    Mr. Guan, in concluding remarks, thanked the State party for its contributions to the dialogue, which had helped to make it a success.

    Mr. Tagaev, in his concluding remarks, said that the Committee’s comments and questions would help the State party to strengthen measures to promote equality and prevent discrimination. Kyrgyzstan would continue to take active steps to prevent racial discrimination and implement the Convention, working in collaboration with civil society.

    The delegation of Kyrgyzstan consisted of representatives of the Supreme Court; General Prosecutor’s Office; Ministry of Internal Affairs; Ministry of Health; Ministry of Labour, Social Security, and Migration; Ministry of Education and Science; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Economy and Commerce; Cabinet of Ministers; State Commission on Religious Affairs; Administration of the President; and the Permanent Mission of Kyrgyzstan to the United Nations Office at Geneva.

    The Committee will issue its concluding observations on the report of Kyrgyzstan after the conclusion of its one hundred and fifteenth session on 9 May.  The programme of work and other documents related to the session can be found here.  Summaries of the public meetings of the Committee can be found here, while webcasts of the public meetings can be found here.

    The Committee will next meet in public on Friday, 9 May at 4 p.m. to close its one hundred and fifteenth session.

    Report

    The Committee has before it the combined eleventh and twelfth periodic reports of Kyrgyzstan (CERD/C/KGZ/11-12).

    Presentation of Report

    MARAT TAGAEV, Deputy Minister of Culture, Information and Youth Policy of Kyrgyzstan and head of the delegation, said that since Kyrgyzstan gained independence, the human rights and freedoms of its citizens, regardless of their racial and ethnic affiliation, had remained absolute and unchanged in the State.  Kyrgyzstan fully adhered to its international obligations under the Convention.  It was a multi-ethnic State with representatives of more than 100 different ethnic groups, including Uzbeks, Russians, Dungans, Uyghurs, Tajiks and other ethnic groups.  The Constitution prohibited discrimination based on race, language, ethnicity, religion, origin, as well as other circumstances.  The commission of a crime based on racial, ethnic, national, religious or interregional enmity was an aggravating circumstance.

    Set up in 2013, the Coordinating Council on Human Rights aimed to improve the mechanisms for ensuring the protection of human and civil rights and freedoms, and the implementation of international obligations in the field of human rights.  The Council included the heads of key State bodies whose activities were related to the protection of human rights, and it was headed by the Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of Kyrgyzstan.

    Kyrgyzstan continued systematic and continuous work on the issues of refugees, internally displaced persons and stateless persons.  In 2019, it became the first country in the world to resolve all known cases of statelessness.  It had also introduced a universal system that ensured 100 per cent registration of births.  Draft laws on Kyrgyzstan’s accession to the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 Reduction of Statelessness Convention had also been submitted for public discussion. 

    The courts of the country applied not only the laws of Kyrgyzstan but also international treaties that had entered into force.  The Convention was thus an integral part of the legal system.  The President had approved the national development strategy until 2040, one of the main priorities of which was to ensure interethnic harmony, strengthen the unity of the people, and protect the rights of citizens, regardless of their ethnicity.

    In November 2020, the President of Kyrgyzstan had approved the plan for the promotion of a civil identity Kyrgyz jarany (Kyrgyz citizen) for the period 2021-2026.  The purpose of the plan was to develop a favourable environment for the promotion of the civic identity of Kyrgyz jarany, including through forming of a conscious understanding of the civil identity of Kyrgyz citizens; strengthening the unity of the people of Kyrgyzstan, increasing tolerance and promoting diversity; developing and promoting the State language and preserving multilingualism; promoting equal access to decision making; and increasing confidence in political institutions and public authorities.  Various national and international stakeholders were involved in developing the plan. 

    The People’s Assembly, which included 30 ethnic associations, played an important role in strengthening interethnic harmony, and preserving languages, culture and traditions of ethnic groups living in Kyrgyzstan.  In April 2025, the National Agency for Religious Affairs and Interethnic Relations was established, which implemented State policy in the field of religious relations, strengthening interethnic harmony, providing early warning, and preventing interethnic conflicts.

    Public reception offices for interethnic relations operated in 23 multiethnic districts, carrying out preventive measures, monitoring work in places where multiethnic communities lived, and promoting effective interaction with the civil sector.  In 2024, these offices carried out more than 1,100 early warning and prevention measures regarding interethnic conflicts, and close to 4,000 measures over the past four years.  As a result of this work, the number of interethnic incidents had decreased four-fold.

    Kyrgyzstan had created a legal framework to prevent discrimination in the courts.  The constitutional principle of equality before the law and the courts was reflected in the Criminal Procedure Code and laws on the status and behaviour of judges, as well as on the Supreme Court and local courts.

    The State party supported members of all ethnic groups in Kyrgyzstan to preserve, study and develop their native languages. In 161 local schools, students had the opportunity to study in Uzbek.  In 22 of them, education took place only in Uzbek.  The State strove to implement a balanced language policy that would foster a new trilingual generation of Kyrgyz citizens who spoke the official languages and one foreign language, while ensuring guarantees for the preservation of the native languages of ethnic communities.  Kyrgyzstan had developed a regulatory framework for its multilingual and multicultural education programmes.

    Questions by a Committee Expert

    GUAN JIAN, Committee Expert and Country Rapporteur, said that the high-level delegation showed the great importance that the State party attached to the dialogue.

    The demographic data that the State party had provided was not sufficiently comprehensive or specific. How did the State party apply the principle of self-identification in data collection on ethnicity, and how would it implement the Committee’s recommendations on data collection as soon as possible?

    Mr. Guan commended the State party’s legislative work.  However, in its previous concluding observations, the Committee expressed concern about the persistent lack of anti-discrimination legislation, calling on the State party to adopt such legislation in line with the Convention, with assistance from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.  Had progress been made in this regard?  How did the Criminal Code of 2019 contribute to combatting racial discrimination?  A draft anti-discrimination law was submitted to Parliament in 2023 but was subsequently removed from its agenda for revision.  Why was this?

    The previous concluding observations also called for compliance with Convention obligations in the judicial field. During the reporting period, law enforcement units initiated 189 criminal cases related to incitement to ethnic, racial, religious or interregional hostility.  Were all these cases brought before the courts?  Did the judicial system have internal guidelines for handling cases involving racial discrimination?  Were there rules and procedures on cooperation between judicial bodies and the Office of the Ombudsperson on such cases?  Were regular training courses on anti-racial discrimination provided for judicial personnel?  Could the delegation provide examples of cases of racial discrimination where the provisions of the Convention had been invoked in, or applied by, domestic courts?

    Mr. Guan expressed appreciation for the State party’s policy efforts related to racial discrimination, including the national action plan on development of the civil identity of Kyrgyz jarany (Kyrgyz citizen) for the period 2021-2026 and the national development strategy for 2018-2040.  What preliminary achievements had been made by these policies, and by the State programme for the security and socioeconomic development of border areas, and what challenges remained?

    The Committee was concerned that the Office of the Ombudsperson was not in compliance with the Paris Principles and that it received a low number of complaints of racial discrimination. What measures had the State party taken to strengthen the mandate of the Office to effectively promote human rights and to independently monitor and evaluate progress in the implementation of the Convention, while ensuring adequate financial and human resources to carry out its mandate?  Had the State adopted a 2017 bill aiming to strengthen the independence of the institution? Why had its head been dismissed in 2023?

    Mr. Guan expressed appreciation for the State party’s endeavours to prohibit and punish racist hate speech and hate crimes, including in the media and over the internet, according to its Constitution, Criminal Code and other laws.  The State party had also reported that there were no recorded cases over the reporting period of racist statements in the media or incitement to hatred by politicians or public figures.  However, conflicts between the country’s various ethnic groups had occurred in recent years, and development gaps and uneven opportunities between different ethnic groups in some regions still existed. 

    The State party needed to consider early detection and preventative measures to prevent hate speech, including awareness raising campaigns, incentives for strengthening self-regulation of media, systematic monitoring of online hate speech, and capacity building for State authorities.  Could the delegation provide data on cases of hate speech and ethnic groups involved in conflict, and rates of completion of trials on such cases?

    The Committee had previously called on the State party to put an end to racial profiling by the police, undertake effective investigations into all allegations of racial profiling, hold those responsible accountable, and provide effective remedies to victims, as well as to develop training programmes for law enforcement officers on identifying, investigating and prosecuting racist incidents.  Mr. Guan welcomed educational seminars and training of citizens as part of the programme on Kyrgyz jarany (Kyrgyz citizen).  What measures were in place to ensure that law enforcement officers did not engage in racial profiling?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said Kyrgyzstan was committed to its obligations under the Convention and took every effort to prevent racial discrimination.  A bill on the rights of minorities had been prepared to strengthen legal mechanisms to prevent racial discrimination.  However, Parliament had called for the revision of this bill to consider different views and proposals; this process was ongoing.

    Kyrgyzstan was a poly-ethnic State. As of January 2025, the State had a population of 7.2 million.  The 2022 census revealed that Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, Russians, Uyghurs and Kazakhs represented the largest ethnic groups.  Citizens had the right to voluntarily report their ethnic identity in the census.  The Constitution enshrined the equality of all citizens regardless of their nationality or ethnicity.

    Discrimination in all forms was prohibited in Kyrgyzstan.  No person could be discriminated against based on race, ethnicity or other characteristics.  The State provided judicial protection from all forms of discrimination.  Courts treated people equally regardless of their ethnicity.  All persons subjected to discrimination could file a complaint with the courts.  The Supreme Court had called on the State party to revise laws that contravened the Constitution.  In cases of serious crimes such as murder and ill-treatment, discriminatory motives based on race, ethnicity, religion, language or other grounds were considered to be aggravating circumstances and could be qualified as crimes against humanity.

    The Ministry of the Interior provided 1,000 hours of training for newly recruited law enforcement officers, which included classes on human rights, international human rights law, and preventing all forms of discrimination.  Disciplinary cases had been brought against 5,400 officials in recent years.  A service had been established for submitting complaints against law enforcement officers. There were 53 cases related to racial discrimination in 2023 and 47 in 2024.  The judicial academy, from 2019, had also trained 429 judges on international human rights standards.  There were judges of Russian, Tartar and Kurd ethnicity in the Supreme Court.

    The Office of the Ombudsperson provided oversight on human rights issues in the State.  A new constitutional law on increasing the independence and powers of the Office and bringing the Office in line with the Paris Principles had been developed.  Recently, the Office’s budget had been increased to allow it to carry out its activities more effectively.

    Follow-Up Questions by Committee Experts

    GUAN JIAN, Committee Expert and Country Rapporteur, asked whether the national statistics committee had a fixed term for carrying out the next census.  How many staff members did the Ombudsperson’s Office have and what were their roles?  What were the sources of its funding and what was its annual budget?  How did it work with courts and law enforcement?  Did the Office have branches in each region of the country?

    A Committee Expert said racist incidents in the country seemed to have increased over the years, but disciplinary measures against the police seemed to be decreasing.  In how many disciplinary cases had police officers been convicted?  What were the outcomes of disciplinary proceedings?

    One Committee Expert congratulated the State party on having completely eradicated statelessness.  Did the State party ensure the independence of the Council of Human Rights, which was under the President’s Office?  What findings had the Council made?  How did it cooperate with civil society?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said that currently, 115 persons worked for the Ombudsperson’s Office, which had branch offices in seven regions.  The Office’s financial resources had increased each year in recent years.  The Office had departments for oversight on human rights and children’s rights, a complaints department, and a department for judicial activities.  The Office monitored the rights and freedoms of citizens during both open and closed judicial proceedings.  It cooperated with law enforcement agencies and monitored the compliance of these agencies with their human rights obligations.

    All law enforcement agents underwent training activities on human rights.  Disciplinary offences for police officers were not administrative or criminal processes; they were internal processes.  Persons could submit complaints against officers via social media and email.  If investigations found that crimes had been committed, cases were transferred to the Prosecutor’s Office.  There had been an increase in complaints recently, which had led to an increase in disciplinary proceedings, but around half of complaints were found to be groundless.

    The Kyrgyz jarany (Kyrgyz citizen) project promoted respect for diversity, social cohesion and statehood. Under the project, some 23 regions had established offices that carried out monitoring and activities to prevent interethnic conflicts, including meetings with ethnic community representatives and training activities.

    The State programme on the development of border areas aimed at improving the living conditions of the population in these areas, strengthening the State border and reducing internal migration.  There were plans to develop infrastructure, agriculture and electrical supply, and reduce natural disasters in these areas.  The comprehensive programme of socio-economic development of regions was also in place, which included policies for the development of mountainous and border regions.

    Questions by a Committee Expert

    MAZALO TEBIE, Committee Expert and Country Co-Rapporteur, said public offices responsible for interethnic issues had received 167 requests in 2022 related to preventing discrimination against ethnic groups.  What follow-up was given to these requests?  Could the delegation provide data on investigations into crimes motivated by racist hate speech and hate crimes occurring online and in the media? How did the State help victims to access legal aid and support services?

    Reportedly, women and girls belonging to ethnic minorities, such as Uzbeks, Tajiks and Dungans, and rural women remained underrepresented in the public and political sphere, and patriarchal norms and socio-economic barriers restricted their access to education and professional opportunities.  How were they encouraged to participate in public and private life?  What measures were in place to prevent gender and ethnic stereotypes?  Were there quotas or mechanisms to ensure fair representation of women from ethnic minorities in decision-making bodies?  How did the State party support access to basic social services for minority women?

    Members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex community had reportedly faced difficulties in accessing health services, and were frequently exposed to blackmail, intimidation, extortion, as well as arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment. What measures were in place to include these persons in awareness raising campaigns, prevent and investigate discrimination and violence against them, and ensure their access to legal protection?

    There were reports of restrictions of rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, association and opinion in the State party.  Human rights defenders and journalists were frequently exposed to threats, stigmatisation, arrests, arbitrary detentions, and sanctions such as fines, expulsions or closures of entities.  Kyrgyzstan had fallen 50 places in the 2023 World Press Freedom Index, to 122nd out of 180 countries.  What was being done to prevent the intimation of human rights defenders, to guarantee freedom of expression and other fundamental freedoms, and to release detained journalists, human rights defenders and non-governmental organization leaders?

    In 2024, the President promulgated a law on “foreign agents”.  How would the State party address concerns related to this law, which seemingly could force some non-governmental organizations to close or self-censor?  What safeguards were in place to ensure that civil society organizations could operate freely, regardless of their foreign funding?  Many non-governmental organizations had reported an increase in negative attitudes to their work by State representatives.  What measures were in place to protect non-governmental organizations from interference and intimidation by public authorities?

    A general ban on public assemblies had been imposed in 2022 to prevent certain peaceful assemblies.  Why was this ban introduced?  How did the State party ensure that citizens could exercise their right to freedom of assembly?  What measures were planned to prevent abuses of this ban by the police? Were there any redress mechanisms for citizens sanctioned under this ban?

    New laws had been implemented that banned wearing of religious clothing, including the niqab, in public spaces, and proselytising outside places of worship.  Why had these new restrictions, which ran the risk of violating the right to freedom of religion, been introduced?  How did the State party protect the right to freedom of religion and prevent religious minorities from being marginalised by these laws?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said non-profit organizations played an important part in life in Kyrgyzstan, helping to solve societal problems.  Amendments were brought to the law on non-commercial organizations in 2024 that aimed to ensure transparency and accountability for these organizations. Inclusion of these organizations in the State register ensured transparency in their finances.

    The State party banned discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons, who were guaranteed equal access to justice.  In one case, it was found that a television station had recorded a member of this community without their permission; the station was issued with a fine in response.

    There were 21,000 civil service employees, of which 35 per cent were women.  There were 340 members of minority groups in the civil service. There were no quotas for employment in the civil service.

    The draft bill on freedom of worship and religious associations sought to bring State legislation on religion in line with international norms.  It included regulations on registration of religious organizations and sites and labour relations in such organizations.  Freedom of worship was a fundamental right enshrined in the Constitution and the legal system.  There was no ban specifically on religious clothing, only a ban on covering one’s face in public institutions.  Religious organizations could not proselytise, but there were no other bans on their activities.

    Under State law, no one had the right to restrict peaceful assemblies.  Laws prevented citizens from being forced to participate in meetings. Public authorities needed to ensure public safety, and could ban public meetings that threatened public order.

    A new bill on the media had been prepared in 2022.  The bill was now under review in the President’s Office.  Representatives of the media fully supported this bill, which prevented the spread of disinformation online.  In 2025, only 25 complaints related to online hate speech had been received by the State; the State had moved to block websites in response in seven cases.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    MAZALO TEBIE, Committee Expert and Country Co-Rapporteur, said that the State party had established several measures to prevent discrimination against minorities.  How did it evaluate the effectiveness of these measures? Could women wear the niqab?  How did the State party ensure freedom of religion?

    There was a phenomenon in Kyrgyzstan called “ala kachuu” (bride kidnapping), in which young women or girls were abducted by men and forced into marriage.  This practice was said to mainly affect women and girls from rural communities, and from marginalised and vulnerable groups.  What actions had been taken to ensure the effective implementation of laws prohibiting the practice, and to raise awareness among rural communities about women’s rights?  What support services were available to abducted women and girls?  Did the State party have up-to-date data on the most affected ethnic groups or regions?

    Another Committee Expert asked whether there was a framework for the participation of minorities in all law-making processes.

    FAITH DIKELEDI PANSY TLAKULA, Committee Expert and Follow-Up Rapporteur, said that the Committee’s previous concluding observations had called on the State party to implement the views of the Human Rights Committee and pardon Azimjan Askarov, considering his poor health.  The Committee deeply regretted that he had passed away five days after the State party had reported that his health was improving.  What measures were in place to protect human rights defenders, journalists and non-governmental organizations working on the rights of ethnic minorities from reprisals?

    A Committee Expert welcomed that there were thousands of civil society organizations in the State party.  Did they take part in meetings preparing for the current dialogue?  How many of these organizations had been banned?

    Another Committee Expert said that in one court case concerning an attack against homosexual persons, the court had sent back the case to the prosecution.  What happened to the case after this?  Was the fine issued to the television station for recording a member of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex community without their permission sufficient?

    GUAN JIAN, Committee Expert and Country Rapporteur, welcomed measures to promote the protection of equal rights for all ethnic groups.  The Committee had previously expressed concern about the low living standards of the Mughat, characterised by high unemployment and school dropout rates; land expropriation, home demolitions and forced evictions, disproportionately affecting Uzbeks from Osh and Jalalabad and frequently carried out in the absence of due process guarantees; discrimination against Uzbeks in access to work; and the absence of remedies for persons arbitrarily dismissed from their posts following the events of 2010.  What measures were implemented to address the Committee’s concerns?

    Parliamentary deputies’ seats had in 2021 been reduced from 120 to 90.  Representatives of minority ethnic communities had held 16 seats in 2021. What impact did the reduction of seats have on the representation of ethnic groups?  As of 2022, some 11 per cent of members of local councils and four per cent of State and municipal administration staff were members of minority ethnic groups, while 3.1 per cent of police officers were from minority groups. What measures were in place to increase minority representation in these bodies and the judiciary?

    Mr. Guan welcomed the State party’s efforts to promote multilingual education.  The law on education stated that educational services could be provided in a foreign language.  Were minority languages considered to be “foreign languages”?  What financing was provided for multilingual education? There were only 2,450 ethnic Uzbeks, 125 ethnic Tajiks, and 417 Dungans studying in their mother tongues in Kyrgyzstan in 2021.  Why were these numbers so low?

    Many institutions had been established by the State party to address interethnic tensions, such as the public advisory councils on interethnic relations; community liaison offices; the monitoring centre of the Ministry of Culture, Information, Sport and Youth Policy; and the interagency commission.  Were these organizations run by the State or non-governmental organizations?  What were each of their tasks, including in implementing the Kyrgyz jarany (citizens of Kyrgyzstan) plan?  What personnel did these institutions have, how were their powers divided, and how did they cooperate with law enforcement?

    Related to June 2010 ethnic violence in the south of the State, among a total of 5,642 criminal cases initiated by law enforcement agencies, proceedings had been suspended in 3,919 cases, a majority of the cases, while inquiries were being conducted.  What data could be provided on these suspended cases?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said bridal theft was a form of violence against women.  This crime was punished under criminal legislation and punishments had recently been strengthened.  Persons who abducted women for the purpose of marriage were punished with up to seven years imprisonment, or up to 20 years for the abduction of minors.  No amnesty was provided to perpetrators.  In 2022, courts found 42 individuals guilty of these crimes.  In all schools, a special subject was taught that addressed kidnapping and abductions, explaining that these actions were crimes.

    Some 97 per cent of children in the State party attended schools.  The State promoted education in native tongues and official languages.  More than 4,000 children were being taught in the Uzbek language, and there were also special schools teaching in other minority ethnic languages such as Tajik.

    Currently, there were around 1,500 members of ethnic minorities serving as civil servants, some 35 per cent of whom were women.  There were three representatives of minority ethnic groups currently serving in Parliament. Uzbeks, Dungans, Russians and Kazakhs were represented in parliamentary deputy seats, five per cent of which were held by women.

    After the events of June 2010, more than 5,300 criminal cases had been launched and more than 300 people had been brought to justice, including one life sentence conviction.  Investigations were based on respect for human rights and ethnicity was not a factor in the consideration of cases.  Kyrgyzstan was committed to carrying out fair trials in line with international standards.  There were some 42 cases involving murder, and several cases involving destruction of public and private property.  Some three billion som in damages were incurred by the State.

    Regarding the death in custody of Azimjan Askarov, the central prison hospital had diagnosed him with pneumonia and had provided him with treatment; however, he had rejected this treatment, leading to his death.  An investigation into the death was ongoing.

    The case of an alleged attack on homosexual people had been dropped after being returned to the prosecution. Regarding the case of a transgender girl recorded by a television station, courts provided financial compensation for moral damage, considering the degree of damage caused and the circumstances of the case.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    GUAN JIAN, Committee Expert and Country Rapporteur, called for more detailed information on public works undertaken in Osh city without the permission of local residents, and the situation of the Mughat community, some members of which were relocated after their lands were flooded.  Were affected people provided with compensation?

    A Committee Expert said that racial discrimination and climate change inhibited access to health for the Mughat community.  How did the State party promote access to health, safe food and drinking water for this community, and access to reproductive health rights for its women and children?

    Another Committee Expert asked whether parents who refused to send their children to school were criminally prosecuted by the Ministry of Justice.

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the State party was implementing a project to digitally register all newborns, which had promoted 100 per cent registration of births in the Mughat community.  Some 95 per cent of the Kyrgyz population had access to drinking water.  The State party was building water pipelines to increase access to drinking water in remote communities, including to the Mughat community.

    Citizens had the inalienable right to healthcare services, regardless of their ethnicity or other characteristics. The programme on State guarantees approved in 2023 aimed to improve access to medical services for vulnerable groups and increase the quality of health services.

    Parents were required to send school age children to school.  They had the right to choose the language of education and between public and private schools or homeschooling.  A bill had been developed that called for fining of parents who refused to send their children to school.

    The State party had identified sites for demolition in Osh in a project to develop public roads.  Some 69 million som had been provided in compensation to persons whose homes or property were affected.  Persons who felt that their property rights had been infringed by State development projects could file complaints in court.

    The Coordinating Council on Human Rights was an advisory council that sought to improve the implementation of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the State party.  Headed by the Deputy Prime Minister and including representatives of State authorities and the Ombudsperson, it coordinated the preparation of reports to international treaty bodies and implementation of these bodies’ recommendations.

    Parliament included representatives of national ethnic groups, who were involved in drafting legislation.  A web portal had also been set up that allowed citizens to make comments on legislative proposals.

    Questions by a Committee Expert

    MAZALO TEBIE, Committee Expert and Country Co-Rapporteur, said the Committee welcomed the State’s initiatives regarding the protection of refugees, including planned accession to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, and the national action plan on migration management for 2022 to 2025. However, there was a high rate of rejection of applications for refugee status, and some refugees reportedly lived in precarious conditions, including in overcrowded temporary shelters with limited access to healthcare, clean water and education.  Uyghur, Uzbek and Chechen refugees and asylum seekers were reportedly extremely vulnerable.  What measures were in place to protect the rights of refugees and asylum seekers and promote access to residence?

    In 2024, protests against migrants had been held, leading to violence against foreigners with legal residence status.  What measures were in place to prevent violence against foreigners, including irregular migrants, and to provide victims with support? Migrants employed in the agricultural and construction sectors often faced precarious working conditions, with limited access to health and support services.  What measures were in place to protect the rights of migrant workers, establish clear standards for the employment of migrants, and promote their integration into society?  Were there institutions that assessed working conditions for migrants? 

    Nearly one in four Kyrgyz citizens migrated to neighbouring countries to work.  These emigrants reportedly struggled to access basic services in host countries.  Why did many women choose to emigrate?  What measures were in place to support them, including in Russia?  There were some Kyrgyz nationals in Syria and Iraq that were reportedly waiting to be repatriated.  How was the State party supporting their return?

    The Committee had received reports of numerous cases of extradition of refugees and asylum seekers, including Uyghurs from China and Uzbeks.  How did the State party prevent refoulement?  How many extradited migrants had been subjected to refoulement?

    The State party had implemented a law that guaranteed the civil registration of all children.  Kyrgyzstan was also the first country in the region to have resolved all known cases of statelessness; this was commendable. However, the Government had proposed amendments in 2023 to the citizenship law that prevented the conferral of Kyrgyz citizenship to the children of foreign parents born in Kyrgyzstan. This could lead to statelessness. How was the State party bringing its legislation on statelessness in line with international standards?

    What measures had been taken to provide continuous training to judges and lawyers on human rights, discrimination and the application of the Convention?  How many judges and lawyers had been trained?

    Responses by the Delegation

     

    The delegation said that in Kyrgyzstan, refugees had the right to health and education services and the right to freedom of movement.  The State assessed each application for refugee status in cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and promoted the integration of refugees into society.  From 2019 to 2024, the State party had received around 300 appeals against decisions to refuse refugee status.  Around 140 of these cases had gone to the cassation court, which had decided to grant refugee status in some cases.

    Kyrgyzstan upheld the principle of non-refoulement.  Extraditions could not be carried out if there was suspicion of the person involved being subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. Kyrgyzstan worked with international partners to assess risks in individual cases.  In 2024, the State party extradited 49 foreign citizens, including seven to the Russian Federation.  None of these persons had requested refugee status.

    Some 37 criminal cases had been initiated in response to violent incidents relating to 2024 protests against migrants.  The State party was carrying out activities to prevent broad-scale violations against foreign nationals, including ongoing informational activities.  Local populations now understood better the rights of foreign nationals.

    State laws regulated the situation of stateless persons in Kyrgyzstan.  Efforts to address statelessness were ongoing.  The State party had devised procedures for providing the children of stateless persons with identification documents, including the 2024 project that ensured 100 per cent issuance of birth certificates to newborns.

    Consular services provided for the protection of Kyrgyz citizens abroad, including migrant workers.  The Ombudsperson’s Office received complaints of rights violations from migrants and implemented response measures. Children of Kyrgyz migrants needed to be able to speak basic Russian to attend school in the Russian Federation; the State party thus provided Russian language courses to these children.

    The State party had trained 429 judges in 2025 on international human rights standards.  The judiciary was committed to promoting diversity and equality.

    In 2021, the State party repatriated more than 400 citizens from Iraq and Syria, including children.  Measures had been implemented to promote the reintegration and rehabilitation of these citizens and prevent their stigmatisation.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    MAZALO TEBIE, Committee Expert and Country Co-Rapporteur, asked whether only foreigners who did not have refugee status could be extradited.  The Committee hoped that the law implementing the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol would be adopted soon.  If foreign women who were married to Kyrgyz men divorced, did their children keep Kyrgyz nationality?  Why did the State party require foreigners to take HIV tests? The State party had developed a “compatriots of foreign nationality” card.  Who were these “compatriots of foreign nationality”?

    A Committee Expert said there had been a reported drop in teaching of the Uzbek language after the 2010 violence. Were nation-wide examinations conducted in the Uzbek language for students learning in that language?

    Another Committee Expert asked if training course for judicial officials addressed the application of the Convention in civil and criminal cases.  Were there examples of judicial decisions where the Convention was applied?

    A Committee Expert congratulated the State party on eradicating statelessness as of 2019, and for developing a statelessness determination procedure.  Kyrgyzstan needed to ratify the statelessness conventions and share its best practices with other nations.

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said that under national legislation, refugees could not be extradited.  The State party waited until processes considering applications for refugee status concluded before considering extradition.  Two draft bills on acceding to the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol were currently under consideration.

    If one parent had Kyrgyz nationality, children could receive Kyrgyz nationality, regardless of the location of their birth.  Children of stateless parents born in Kyrgyzstan were also granted Kyrgyz nationality.  Persons could lose Kyrgyz nationality if they served in the army of a foreign State or if they received citizenship after submitting falsified documents.  Kyrgyz citizens could change their citizenship only once; persons needed to submit documents proving their ethnic identity to change their citizenship.  Divorces were not grounds for changing citizenship.

    To enrol in universities in Kyrgyzstan, students needed to sit the General Republican Exam in either Kyrgyz or Russian.

    Kyrgyzstan did not required foreigners to submit a certificate showing that they were HIV-negative when applying for a visa.  Information related to HIV tests was not made public.  Forced tests were carried out in a confidential manner based on court decisions.

    Courts could apply international conventions directly.  All criminal cases related to the June 2010 events had been closed, but affected persons had the right to appeal cases and seek compensation.

    The children and grandchildren of Kyrgyz citizens who lived overseas had the right to apply for the “compatriots of foreign nationality” card, which allowed them to live and work in Kyrgyzstan without additional residence or work permits.

    Closing Remarks

    MICHAL BALCERZAK, Committee Chair, said the dialogue had been very constructive, addressing many issues.  The information provided by the delegation would allow the Committee to develop targeted concluding observations.

    GUAN JIAN, Committee Expert and Country Rapporteur, thanked the State party for its contributions to the dialogue, which had helped to make it a success.  He expressed hope that the State party would follow-up on remaining unanswered questions and closed by thanking all persons who had contributed to the dialogue.

    MARAT TAGAEV, Deputy Minister of Culture, Information and Youth Policy of Kyrgyzstan and head of the delegation, said that the Committee’s comments and questions would help the State party to strengthen measures to promote equality and prevent discrimination. Kyrgyzstan would continue to take active steps to prevent racial discrimination and implement the Convention, working in collaboration with civil society.  The State party would work to implement the Committee’s recommendations and to build an inclusive and just society.

    __________

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    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

     

    CERD.25.08E

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Committee against Torture Concludes Eighty-Second Session

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Committee against Torture this morning closed its eighty-second session, after adopting concluding observations on the reports of Armenia, France, Mauritius, Monaco, Turkmenistan and Ukraine, which were reviewed during the session. The session was held from 7 April to 2 May.

    Claude Heller, Committee Chairperson, read out a summary of the concluding observations for each country reviewed this session under the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment . The concluding observations will be available on the webpage of the session as of 1 p.m. this afternoon.

    Mr. Heller said that the Committee had still not been informed whether its next two sessions scheduled for 2025 would take place. Sixteen treaty body sessions were at stake, and the Subcommittee on the Prevention of Torture had had to postpone four of its eight visits planned for 2025. As soon as more information became available, the Committee would announce the dates of its upcoming sessions and the country reviews planned for each session.

    Mr. Heller also noted that the sudden cessation of hybrid meetings would continue to negatively impact the work of the Committee members, civil society organizations, national human rights institutions, national preventive mechanisms and other stakeholders.

    In conclusion, he said that the Committee now came to the end of yet another session, held with professionalism, independence, and a constructive spirit to fully adhere to its mandate.

    Peter Vedel Kessing, Committee Rapporteur, presented the annual report, which covered the period from 11 May 2024 to 2 May 2025, including the eightieth session, which was held from 8 to 26 July 2024; the eighty-first session which was held from 28 October to 22 November 2024; and the eighty-second session which was held from 7 April to 2 May 2025.

    Documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties and the concluding observations of the Committee, will be available on the website of the session. Summaries of the public meetings of the Committee can be found here, and webcasts of the public meetings can be found here.

    The dates and details of the next session of the Committee will be communicated at a later date.
     

    Statements

    PETER VEDEL KESSING, Committee Rapporteur, presented the Committee’s annual report, which covered the period from 11 May 2024 to 2 May 2025, including the eightieth session, which was held from 8 to 26 July 2024; the eighty-first session which was held from 28 October to 22 November 2024; and the eighty-second session which was held from 7 April to 2 May 2025.

    As of today, there were 175 States parties to the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Since the adoption of the Committee’s previous annual report, Dominica had acceded to the Convention, on 5 December 2024. The Committee called upon all States that had not ratified the Convention to do so and called upon those that were already parties to accept all the procedures of the Convention in order to enable the Committee to fulfil all aspects of its mandate. As of today, there were 94 States parties to the Optional Protocol to the Convention. 

    The Committee held a joint meeting between the members of the Committee and the Chair of the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture. The Committee adopted a joint statement with the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture, and the Board of Trustees of the United Nations Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture to mark the United Nations International Day in Support of Victims of Torture, which was commemorated on 26 June.

    To mark the fortieth anniversary of the adoption of the Convention, the Committee, jointly with the other United Nations anti‑torture mechanisms held a high-level event in Geneva on 14 November 2024.

    The Committee expressed its appreciation to non-governmental organizations, with special thanks to the World Organization against Torture. The Committee requested that all multilingual hybrid meetings be maintained as a feature of an adequately resourced session and called upon States parties to support this request. 

    Concerning complaints under article 22 of the Convention, as of today, the

    the Committee had registered, since 1989, 1,260 complaints concerning 45 States parties. Of those, 449 complaints had been discontinued and 152 had been declared inadmissible. The Committee had adopted final decisions on the merits in 524 complaints and found violations of the Convention in 220 of them. Considering the adopted communications during the current session, some 133 complaints were pending consideration. All the Committee’s decisions could be found in the updated treaty body case law database, on the website of the Office of the High Commission for Human Rights, and in the Official Document System of the United Nations.

    At its eightieth session, the Committee adopted decisions on the merits in respect of 10 communications. The Committee further found two communications inadmissible and it discontinued the consideration of 19 complaints. At its eighty-first session, the Committee adopted decisions on the merits in respect of six communications. The Committee found three communications inadmissible and discontinued the consideration of 12 communications. At its eighty-second session, the Committee adopted decisions on the merits in 12 communications. It found 2 communications inadmissible and it discontinued the consideration of 12 cases. One communication was postponed.

    CLAUDE HELLER, Committee Chairperson, read out a summary of the concluding observations on the reports of the States parties that were reviewed during the session.

    Armenia

    Concerning Armenia, the Committee commended the State party on the adoption of its new Criminal Code, which established an expanded definition of torture, along with the adoption of a new Criminal Procedure Code, introducing a number of new procedural safeguards against torture and increasing the availability of non-custodial measures. The Committee recommended that Armenia ensure that the penalties for torture were commensurate with the gravity of the crime. It also recommended that the State party train prosecutors and judges on the use of non-custodial measures, provide sufficient material and financial resources for their application, and adopt the necessary regulations to ensure that they may be applied in practice.

    With regard to psychiatric and social care institutions, the Committee recommended that the State party guarantee sufficient legal and procedural safeguards for residents in psychiatric institutions and social care facilities, both in law and in practice. It also recommended that the State party reduce recourse to coercion in psychiatric settings, and ensure that physical or chemical means of restraint were used in accordance with domestic law and international standards. 

    France

    As for France, the Committee expressed its deep concern about the numerous allegations of excessive use of force, including lethal force, and ill-treatment by law enforcement officials, and was seriously concerned that such cases reportedly disproportionately affected members of certain minority groups, in particular persons of African descent, persons of Arab origin or Muslim religion, indigenous peoples and non-nationals. The Committee recommended that the State party ensure that all allegations of excessive use of force and ill-treatment were investigated promptly, thoroughly and impartially by an independent body, that those responsible were held accountable, and that victims or their families obtain adequate redress.

    The Committee recommended that France continue its efforts to improve living conditions in all places of deprivation of liberty and to reduce overcrowding in prisons and other places of detention. It also recommended that the State party ensure that all allegations of ill-treatment were thoroughly investigated, that alleged perpetrators were prosecuted and, if found guilty, sentenced to appropriate penalties, and that victims or their families received redress, including adequate compensation. It recommended that the State party improve the monitoring and control of violence among prisoners. The Committee recommended that the State party take all necessary measures to encourage the reporting of hate crimes motivated by racist, Islamophobic, anti-Semitic, xenophobic or homophobic prejudice, and to ensure that such crimes were thoroughly investigated, that perpetrators were prosecuted and punished, and that victims had access to effective remedies.

    Mauritius

    Concerning Mauritius, the Committee acknowledged the State party’s commitment to develop a code of practice for police officers and to strengthen their training to address those shortcomings. The Committee recommended that Mauritius strengthen its efforts to further ensure that the Independent Police Complaints Commission was properly resourced and equipped to carry out its functions, and guarantee that acts of torture and ill-treatment were promptly, impartially and effectively investigated and prosecuted, as appropriate. The Committee also asked the State party to take all appropriate measures to prevent acts of intimidation and reprisals against alleged victims, their legal representatives, and relatives.

    The Committee recommended that Mauritius ensure that all deaths in custody were promptly and impartially investigated by an independent entity, including through independent forensic examinations, with due regard to the Minnesota Protocol on the Investigation of Potentially Unlawful Death. Where appropriate, the Committee recommended that the corresponding sanctions be applied. It also asked the State party to compile and provide it with detailed information on all incidents of death in all places of detention, the causes, and the outcomes of the investigations.

    Monaco

    As for Monaco, the Committee voiced its concern about reports that the “maison d’arrêt de Monaco” and its facilities were structurally incompatible with their current purpose, as they remained unsuitable for prolonged deprivation of liberty. While it was aware of the State party’s land-use constraints, the Committee encouraged the State party to consider transferring prisoners to a new prison facility that better complied with international standards on deprivation of liberty and the prevention of ill-treatment. Meanwhile, it recommended that the State party continue its efforts to improve living conditions in the “maison d’arrêt de Monaco”, including by ensuring that persons in pretrial detention were allowed visits or telephone calls without specific authorisation from the judicial authorities.

    The Committee expressed its concern about reports of precarious working conditions affecting many migrant domestic workers and undeclared migrant workers, particularly in the construction, hotel and catering sectors, as well as on private yachts. The Committee recommended that the State party strengthen the capacity and resources of the labour inspectorate to enable it to monitor more effectively the situation of migrant workers, in particular domestic workers, including with regard to their recruitment and working conditions. It also recommended the State party to redouble its efforts to inform migrant workers, including undeclared workers, of their rights and the complaint mechanisms available to them, and facilitate their access to those mechanisms.

    Turkmenistan

    With regard to Turkmenistan, the Committee expressed grave concern about the persistent reports of widespread torture and ill-treatment of detainees in the State party. Despite the installation of audio-visual equipment in some detention facilities across the country, such measures appeared insufficient in preventing and curbing abuse. The Committee had further expressed serious concern about the lack of accountability, which reflected a worrying pattern of institutional impunity. The Committee urged the State party to adopt a zero-tolerance policy towards torture, including a clear public statement from the highest levels of Government, and to ensure that all allegations were promptly and independently investigated, perpetrators held accountable, and victims granted full redress.

    The Committee noted and welcomed the adoption of the Ombudsman Act and the recent “B” status accreditation of Turkmenistan’s Ombudsperson by the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions. However, it expressed concern about the reported lack of independence and limited authority of the Ombudsperson’s office, particularly its failure to address serious and systemic human rights violations. The Committee recommended that the State party fully implement the recommendations of the Alliance’s Subcommittee on Accreditation and take all necessary steps to establish an independent national monitoring body capable of conducting unannounced visits to all places of detention, engaging with detainees in private, and responding effectively to allegations of abuse in line with the Paris Principles.

    Ukraine

    Concerning Ukraine, the Committee acknowledged the challenges faced by the State party in fully implementing its obligations under the Convention due to the full-scale invasion by the Russian Federation against it. It recalled, nevertheless, that the Convention was applicable in the State party’s entire territory and Ukraine should therefore take all possible steps to implement it.

    The Committee noted Ukraine’s commitment and measures taken to abide by international humanitarian law and international human rights law in the context of the ongoing armed conflict and occupation, but expressed concerns about reports indicating allegations of torture and ill-treatment, threats, humiliation, and other violations of Russian prisoners of war, allegedly committed by the Ukrainian armed forces and military police, as well as the inadequate recording and reporting of their visible injuries sustained by torture or ill-treatment, among other concerns. The Committee underscored that the prohibition of torture was non-derogable, that no exceptional circumstances whatsoever may be invoked as a justification of torture, and that the obligations stemming from this prohibition were not subject to reciprocity.

    The Committee also recommended that Ukraine ensure that all fundamental legal safeguards were guaranteed in practice for all detained persons from the outset of the deprivation of their liberty, including the right to request and receive a medical examination by an independent doctor, free of charge, or a doctor of their choice, that was conducted out of hearing and sight of police officers, unless the doctor concerned explicitly requested otherwise, as the access to an initial confidential medical examination did not appear to be routinely granted in Ukraine, and if it was granted, it was reportedly performed in the presence of a police officer.

    Other

    Mr. Heller said that during the session, the Committee also adopted lists of issues for Pakistan and Tajikistan and lists of issues prior to reporting for Antigua and Barbuda, Botswana, Iceland, Iraq, Kenya, Montenegro, State of Palestine and Uruguay.

    The Committee had still not been informed whether its next two sessions scheduled for 2025 would take place. Sixteen treaty body sessions were at stake, and the Subcommittee on the Prevention of Torture had had to postpone four of its eight visits planned for 2025. As soon as more information became available, the Committee would announce the dates of its upcoming sessions and the country reviews planned for each session. Mr. Heller noted that the sudden cessation of hybrid meetings would continue to negatively impact the work of the Committee members, civil society organizations, national human rights institutions, national preventive mechanisms and other stakeholders.

    Concerning the individual complaints procedure, he said the Committee this session examined 26 individual complaints. Of the examined cases, two were deemed inadmissible. Additionally, 12 cases were decided on the merits: in one case the Committee found no violations, while in 11 cases the Committee determined there was a violation by the State party. Furthermore, the Committee adopted 12 discontinuance requests. 

    Mr. Heller read out the results of the work of the Committee Rapporteurs on follow-up to concluding observations, individual cases, and reprisals. A summary of the meeting that was held on these results can be found here.

    In conclusion, Mr. Heller said that the Committee now came to the end of yet another session, held with professionalism, independence, and a constructive spirit to fully adhere to its mandate.

    __________

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    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

     

    CAT.009E

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the request for waiver of the immunity of Petr Bystron – A10-0077/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

    on the request for waiver of the immunity of Petr Bystron

    (2024/2047(IMM))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the request for waiver of the immunity of Petr Bystron, received by letter dated 27 August 2024 from the German Federal Ministry of Justice, transmitting a request of 23 July 2024 from the Munich Public Prosecutor, in connection with criminal proceedings underway at the Munich Public Prosecutor’s Office, and announced in plenary on 16 September 2024,

     having heard Petr Bystron on 13 February 2025, in accordance with Rule 9(6) of its Rules of Procedure, and having regard to the documents submitted by him,

     having regard to Articles 8 and 9 of Protocol No 7 on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union and to Article 6(2) of the Act of 20 September 1976 concerning the election of the Members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage,

     having regard to the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 21 October 2008, 19 March 2010, 6 September 2011, 17 January 2013, 19 December 2019 and 5 July 2023[1],

     having regard to Article 46 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany,

     having regard to Rule 5(2), Rule 6(1) and Rule 9 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Legal Affairs (A10-0077/2025),

    A. whereas the Munich Public Prosecutor has requested the waiver of the parliamentary immunity of Petr Bystron, Member of the European Parliament, in connection with the charges brought against him pursuant to Article 108(1), Article 261(1)(2), Article 261(7), Article 263(1) and Article 263(3)(1) of the German Criminal Code, Article 370(1) of the German General Tax Code and Article 53 of the German Criminal Code, concerning alleged offences of at least six counts of passive corruption, money laundering and fraud, and at least five counts of tax evasion;

    B. whereas the request for waiver of immunity states that, from an unspecified time in 2020, Peter Bystron may, inter alia, have received cash payments in person or received cryptocurrency transfers from the operator of the pro-Russian website ‘Voice of Europe’ in return for his commitment to speak and vote, as a member of the national parliament, in the interests of the Russian Government; whereas Peter Bystron reportedly deposited considerable sums in an ATM on 17 and 20 March 2023 into an account belonging to the company of which he is the sole shareholder and manager; whereas on 20 March 2023, he then withdrew the same amount in denominations of EUR 200 from an ATM of the same bank; whereas, in response to a request from the bank, Petr Bystron provided no explanation as to the reason for these suspicious movements; whereas Petr Bystron also deposited several sums in July 2021, April 2022, September 2022, and in June and July 2023 from the alleged bribes he received in cash; whereas Petr Bystron reportedly tried to conceal the origin of the cash; whereas the Public Prosecutor has transaction records of all the accounts of Petr Bystron and the company, of which he is the sole shareholder and manager, from 2020 onwards; whereas this has reportedly made it possible to detect further cash payments and to conclude that bribes that he allegedly received at an earlier point in time did in fact exist;

    C. whereas in several deliberations of the national parliament, of which Petr Bystron was a member at the time of the alleged facts, on Russia-related issues, he has, since 2022, reportedly voted in a manner clearly most favourable to the interests of the Russian Government and has given at least two speeches before the German Bundestag in which he defended a pro-Russian position;

    D. whereas Petr Bystron, who was entitled, under the German Law on Members of Parliament, to a flat-rate allowance intended, inter alia, to recruit staff, is said to have entered into an employment contract with his lawyer in October 2021 and to have also agreed to five amendments to that contract, each altering the weekly working hours and monthly salary of his lawyer; whereas the flat-rate allowance may be used only if the intended purpose or the activities concerned have a sufficient connection with the exercise of the mandate; whereas the work carried out under that contract did not relate to the exercise of the parliamentary mandate or the work expected was not carried out, but remuneration was paid nonetheless as a result of having misled the staff member in charge of authorising the payment; whereas this remuneration is said to have led the Federal Republic of Germany to incur a loss in the amount of EUR 97 400.00;

    E. whereas in the financial years 2017 to 2021, Petr Bystron, through the tax advisor of the company of which he is the sole shareholder and manager, is said to have submitted incorrect VAT returns to the Munich tax authorities, containing private expenditure that has no connection with that company’s commercial activity; whereas, as a result of this incorrect information on the VAT returns, an undue refund of VAT totalling EUR 9 949.17 was reportedly paid;

    F. whereas Petr Bystron was elected to the European Parliament in the European elections in 2024 in Germany and was not a Member of the European Parliament at the time of the alleged offences;

    G. whereas the alleged offences and the subsequent request for waiver of his immunity are not related to an opinion expressed or a vote cast by Petr Bystron in the performance of his duties within the meaning of Article 8 of Protocol No 7 on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union;

    H. whereas Article 9, first paragraph, point (a) of Protocol No 7 on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union provides that Members of the European Parliament enjoy, in the territory of their own State, the immunities accorded to members of their parliament;

    I. whereas Article 46(2), (3) and (4) of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany provides that:

    ‘(2)  A Member may not be called to account or arrested for a punishable offence without permission of the Bundestag unless he is apprehended while committing the offence or in the course of the following day.

    (3)  The permission of the Bundestag shall also be required for any other restriction of a Member’s freedom of the person or for the initiation of proceedings against a Member under Article 18.

    (4)  Any criminal proceedings or any proceedings under Article 18 against a Member and any detention or other restriction of the freedom of his person shall be suspended at the demand of the Bundestag’;

    J. whereas the purpose of parliamentary immunity is to protect Parliament and its Members from legal proceedings in relation to activities that are carried out in the performance of parliamentary duties and that cannot be separated from those duties;

    K. whereas in accordance with Rule 5(2) of the Rules of Procedure, parliamentary immunity is not a personal privilege of the Member but a guarantee of the independence of Parliament as a whole and of its Members;

    L. whereas, in this case, Parliament found no evidence of fumus persecutionis, which is to say factual elements indicating that the intention underlying the legal proceedings in question is to undermine the Member’s political activity in his capacity as a Member of the European Parliament;

    M. whereas Parliament cannot assume the role of a court and whereas, in a waiver of immunity procedure, a Member cannot be regarded as a defendant[2];

    1. Decides to waive the immunity of Petr Bystron;

    2. Instructs its President to forward this decision and the report of its committee responsible immediately to the competent authority of the Federal Republic of Germany and to Petr Bystron.

     

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur declares under her exclusive responsibility that she did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

     

    INFORMATION ON ADOPTION IN COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

    Date adopted

    23.4.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    20

    2

    2

    Members present for the final vote

    Tobiasz Bocheński, José Cepeda, Ton Diepeveen, Mary Khan, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Lukas Mandl, Mario Mantovani, Pascale Piera, René Repasi, Krzysztof Śmiszek, Dominik Tarczyński, Adrián Vázquez Lázara, Axel Voss, Marion Walsmann, Dainius Žalimas

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    David Cormand, Angelika Niebler, Arash Saeidi, Jana Toom

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Andi Cristea, Esther Herranz García, Dariusz Joński, Marit Maij, Jorge Martín Frías

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Draft agenda – Thursday, 22 May 2025 – Brussels

    Source: European Parliament

    11 Amending Regulation (EU) 2023/956 as regards simplifying and strengthening the carbon border adjustment mechanism
    Antonio Decaro
        – Amendments; rejection Wednesday, 14 May 2025, 13:00
    8 Modification of customs duties applicable to imports of certain goods originating in or exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus
    Inese Vaidere
        – (possibly) Amendments; rejection Wednesday, 14 May 2025, 13:00
    19 Research and Training Programme of the European Atomic Energy Community for the period 2026-2027 complementing Horizon Europe – the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation and repealing Council Regulation (Euratom) 2021/765
    Borys Budka (A10-0083/2025) 
        – (if requested) Amendments Wednesday, 14 May 2025, 13:00

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Latest news – 5 May – 9 May: Plenary week

    Source: European Parliament

    In the week of 5 May, Members’ work will be cantered on Parliament’s plenary sitting, and Committees meet only in exceptional cases. During this week, the Subcommittee on Security and Defence will hold an extraordinary meeting with Commissioner Andrius Kubilius to discuss the implementation of the EU Defence Readiness 2030 Agenda and the ReArm Europe Plan. The Committee on Agriculture will meet to vote on the proposed changes to customs duties on imports from Russia and Belarus, and review a legislative proposal to strengthen farmers’ position in the food supply chain. Follow the links below to discover this week’s highlights.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Final draft agenda – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    66 Discharge 2023: EU general budget – Commission, executive agencies and European Development Funds
    Niclas Herbst (A10-0074/2025     – Amendments Wednesday, 30 April 2025, 13:00 68 Discharge 2023: EU general budget – European Council and Council
    Joachim Stanisław Brudziński (A10-0052/2025     – Amendments Wednesday, 30 April 2025, 13:00 69 Discharge 2023: EU general budget – Court of Justice of the European Union
    Cristian Terheş (A10-0050/2025     – Amendments Wednesday, 30 April 2025, 13:00 70 Discharge 2023: EU general budget – Court of Auditors
    Dick Erixon (A10-0047/2025     – Amendments Wednesday, 30 April 2025, 13:00 71 Discharge 2023: EU general budget – European Economic and Social Committee
    Joachim Stanisław Brudziński (A10-0054/2025     – Amendments Wednesday, 30 April 2025, 13:00 72 Discharge 2023: EU general budget – Committee of the Regions
    Joachim Stanisław Brudziński (A10-0046/2025     – Amendments Wednesday, 30 April 2025, 13:00 73 Discharge 2023: EU general budget – European Ombudsman
    Joachim Stanisław Brudziński (A10-0055/2025     – Amendments Wednesday, 30 April 2025, 13:00 74 Discharge 2023: EU general budget – European Data Protection Supervisor
    Joachim Stanisław Brudziński (A10-0053/2025     – Amendments Wednesday, 30 April 2025, 13:00 75 Discharge 2023: EU general budget – European External Action Service
    Joachim Stanisław Brudziński (A10-0069/2025     – Amendments Wednesday, 30 April 2025, 13:00 76 Discharge 2023: European Public Prosecutor’s Office
    Tomáš Zdechovský (A10-0051/2025     – Amendments Wednesday, 30 April 2025, 13:00 77 Discharge 2023: Agencies
    Erik Marquardt (A10-0065/2025     – Amendments Wednesday, 30 April 2025, 13:00 78 Discharge 2023: Joint Undertakings
    Michal Wiezik (A10-0056/2025     – Amendments Wednesday, 30 April 2025, 13:00 20 A revamped long-term budget for the Union in a changing world
    Siegfried Mureşan, Carla Tavares (A10-0076/2025     – Amendments by the rapporteur, 71 MEPs at least; Alternative motions for resolutions Wednesday, 30 April 2025, 13:00     – Joint alternative motions for resolutions Friday, 2 May 2025, 10:00 39 The European Water Resilience Strategy
    Thomas Bajada (A10-0073/2025     – Amendments by the rapporteur, 71 MEPs at least; Alternative motions for resolutions Wednesday, 30 April 2025, 13:00 43 2023 and 2024 reports on Türkiye
    Nacho Sánchez Amor (A10-0067/2025     – Amendments Wednesday, 30 April 2025, 13:00 102 2023 and 2024 reports on Serbia
    Tonino Picula (A10-0072/2025     – Amendments Friday, 2 May 2025, 12:00 104 2023 and 2024 reports on Kosovo
    Riho Terras (A10-0075/2025     – Amendments Friday, 2 May 2025, 12:00 57 Competition policy – annual report 2024
    Lara Wolters (A10-0071/2025     – Amendments Wednesday, 30 April 2025, 13:00 107 The role of gas storage for securing gas supplies ahead of the winter season
    Borys Budka (A10-0079/2025     – Amendments Friday, 2 May 2025, 12:00 21 Banking Union – annual report 2024
    Ralf Seekatz (A10-0044/2025     – Amendments Wednesday, 30 April 2025, 13:00 98 Arrest and risk of execution of Tundu Lissu, Chair of Chadema, the main opposition party in Tanzania     – Motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Monday, 5 May 2025, 20:00     – Amendments to motions for resolutions; joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 7 May 2025, 13:00     – Amendments to joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 7 May 2025, 14:00 99 Return of Ukrainian children forcibly transferred and deported by Russia     – Motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Monday, 5 May 2025, 20:00     – Amendments to motions for resolutions; joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 7 May 2025, 13:00     – Amendments to joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 7 May 2025, 14:00 100 Violations of religious freedom in Tibet     – Motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Monday, 5 May 2025, 20:00     – Amendments to motions for resolutions; joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 7 May 2025, 13:00     – Amendments to joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 7 May 2025, 14:00 Separate votes – Split votes – Roll-call votes Texts put to the vote on Tuesday Friday, 2 May 2025, 12:00 Texts put to the vote on Wednesday Monday, 5 May 2025, 19:00 Texts put to the vote on Thursday Tuesday, 6 May 2025, 19:00 Motions for resolutions concerning debates on cases of breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law (Rule 150) Wednesday, 7 May 2025, 19:00

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Final draft agenda – Thursday, 8 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    110 Old challenges and new commercial practices in the internal market
    (O-000012/2025 – B10-0005/25)      – Motions for resolutions Monday, 5 May 2025, 19:00     – Amendments to motions for resolutions; joint motions for resolutions Tuesday, 6 May 2025, 19:00     – Amendments to joint motions for resolutions Tuesday, 6 May 2025, 20:00     – Requests for “separate”, “split” and “roll-call” votes Wednesday, 7 May 2025, 16:00 98 Arrest and risk of execution of Tundu Lissu, Chair of Chadema, the main opposition party in Tanzania     – Motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Monday, 5 May 2025, 20:00     – Amendments to motions for resolutions; joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 7 May 2025, 13:00     – Amendments to joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 7 May 2025, 14:00 99 Return of Ukrainian children forcibly transferred and deported by Russia     – Motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Monday, 5 May 2025, 20:00     – Amendments to motions for resolutions; joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 7 May 2025, 13:00     – Amendments to joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 7 May 2025, 14:00 100 Violations of religious freedom in Tibet     – Motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Monday, 5 May 2025, 20:00     – Amendments to motions for resolutions; joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 7 May 2025, 13:00     – Amendments to joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 7 May 2025, 14:00 107 The role of gas storage for securing gas supplies ahead of the winter season
    Borys Budka (A10-0079/2025     – Amendments Friday, 2 May 2025, 12:00 109 Screening of foreign investments in the Union
    Raphaël Glucksmann (A10-0061/2025     – Amendments Friday, 2 May 2025, 12:00 108 Suspending certain parts of Regulation (EU) 2015/478 as regards imports of Ukrainian products into the European Union
    Karin Karlsbro (A10-0059/2025     – Amendments Friday, 2 May 2025, 12:00 57 Competition policy – annual report 2024
    Lara Wolters (A10-0071/2025     – Amendments Wednesday, 30 April 2025, 13:00 21 Banking Union – annual report 2024
    Ralf Seekatz (A10-0044/2025     – Amendments Wednesday, 30 April 2025, 13:00 106 Objection pursuant to Rule 115(2) and (3): genetically modified soybean MON 87705 × MON 87708 × MON 89788     – Amendments Friday, 2 May 2025, 12:00 Separate votes – Split votes – Roll-call votes Texts put to the vote on Tuesday Friday, 2 May 2025, 12:00 Texts put to the vote on Wednesday Monday, 5 May 2025, 19:00 Texts put to the vote on Thursday Tuesday, 6 May 2025, 19:00 Motions for resolutions concerning debates on cases of breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law (Rule 150) Wednesday, 7 May 2025, 19:00

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI USA: McConnell Statement on FY26 Budget Request Defense Topline

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Kentucky Mitch McConnell
    LOUISVILLE, KY – U.S. Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY), Chairman, Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, released the following statement on the outlined President’s budget request:
    “It is peculiar how much time the President’s advisors spend talking about restoring peace through strength, given how apparently unwilling they’ve been to invest accordingly in the national defense or in other critical instruments of national power. In March, the Trump Administration missed a tremendous opportunity to answer their predecessors’ chronic underinvestment in the U.S. military with robust, full-year funding for FY25. Now, it appears the Trump Administration’s FY26 defense budget request will double down on the Biden Administration’s material neglect for the glaring national security threats challenges about which they speak with great alarm.
    “Make no mistake: a one-time influx reconciliation spending is not a substitute for full-year appropriations. It’s a supplement. OMB accounting gimmicks may well convince Administration officials and spokesmen that they’re doing enough to counter the growing, coordinated challenges we face from China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and radical terrorists. But they won’t fool Congress. The correct response to the most dangerous threats to U.S. interests in decades is not a fifth straight budget request that proposes a real-dollar cut to the U.S. military.
    “America cannot expect our allies to heed calls for greater annual defense spending if we are unwilling to lead by example. Fortunately, Presidential budget requests are just that: requests. Congress will soon have an opportunity to ensure that American power – and the credibility of our commitments – are appropriately resourced. I hope and expect that my colleagues will join me in placing America’s national security first as we begin the FY26 appropriations process.”

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Completes Review of the Fund’s Income Position for FY 2025 and FY 2026

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    May 2, 2025

    • The Fund’s General Resources Account (GRA) net income is projected to remain strong for FY 2025, and is estimated at about US$3.0 billion (SDR 2.3 billion). The positive net income trend is expected to be maintained in FY 2026.
    • The Executive Board approved the first annual distribution of net income, transferring about US$1.81 billion (SDR 1.38 billion) from the GRA into the Interim Placement Administered Account (IPAA) established in October 2024 as part of a framework to facilitate the generation of Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) subsidy resources.
    • Precautionary balances are expected to remain above the medium-term target of SDR 25 billion and to reach SDR 25.9 billion (US$34.4 billion) by end FY 2025, after the distribution into the IPAA.

    Washington, DC: On April 18, 2025, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed its annual review of the Fund’s income position for the financial year (FY) ending April 30, 2025.

    FY 2025 Income Position and Related Decisions

    GRA net income, before the distribution and related transfer of about US$1.81 billion (SDR 1.38 billion) into the IPAA, is anticipated at about US$3.0 billion (SDR 2.3 billion). Total comprehensive income for FY 2025, including the estimated pension-related remeasurement gain[1] and the estimated retained income in the investment account of about US$1.3 billion (SDR 1.0 billion) in addition to GRA net income, is expected to reach US$4.5 billion (SDR 3.4 billion).

    Given the strong income position, the Fund’s precautionary balances, after the distribution into the IPAA, are expected to increase to US$34.4 billion (SDR 25.9 billion) at the end of FY 2025, above the medium-term target of SDR 25 billion.

    The Executive Board adopted several decisions that are relevant to the Fund’s finances. These included decisions to: (i) reimburse costs to the GRA for the expenses of conducting the business of the SDR Department and for the operational cost of administering the Resilience and Sustainability Trust (RST); (ii) transfer a portion of the income from the Fixed-Income Subaccount and the Endowment Subaccount to the GRA for meeting FY 2025 administrative expenses; (iii) place any pension-related remeasurement gain[2] to the Special Reserve; (iv) distribute US$1.81 billion (SDR 1.38 billion) from net income to facilitate new PRGT subsidy contributions and to place the distribution amount in the IPAA; (v) place residual GRA net income to the Special Reserve; and (iv) transfer currencies equivalent to the increase in the Fund’s reserves from the GRA to the Investment Account.

    Projections of the Fund’s income and precautionary balances remain susceptible to risks stemming from the uncertain global economic environment and financial market volatility. The FY 2025 annual financial statements will update the income position for the impact of changes in key assumptions made at the time of the April projections.

    FY 2026 Income Position and Lending Rate

    GRA net income for FY 2026 is expected to remain strong, with projected annual net income of about US$2.3 billion (SDR 1.7 billion), before any distribution. However, these projections remain susceptible to financial market volatility, intensifying downside risks to global growth, and uncertainties around the global interest rate environment that are expected to impact the performance of the Fund’s investment and retirement plan asset portfolios. The projections are also sensitive to the timing and amounts of disbursements under approved and projected lending arrangements.

    The IMF’s basic lending rate for member countries’ use of GRA credit is the SDR interest rate plus a fixed margin. The Executive Board agreed to keep the margin for the rate of charge at 60 basis points over the SDR interest rate, the level set by the Executive Board in October 2024 for the rest of FY 2025 and FY 2026.

    [1] IAS 19 ‘Employee Benefits’, requires the actuarial remeasurement of post‑employment obligations.

    [2] In case of a remeasurement loss, such loss up to SDR 1,020 million would be charged against the General Reserve and any loss exceeding that amount would be charged against the Special Reserve.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Camila Perez

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/05/02/pr-25128-imf-executive-board-completes-review-of-the-funds-income-position-for-fy-2025-and-fy-2026

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Approves FY2026–FY2028 Medium-Term Budget

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    May 2, 2025

    Washington, DC—On April 18, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved the 2026-28 financial years (FY26-28) medium-term budget. While proving resilient in the post-pandemic period, the global economy is at a pivotal juncture amidst transformations in the economic landscape and shifting policy priorities around the world. Reflecting this complex economic backdrop, member countries continue to look to the IMF for support across the range of its operations.

    While the issues that the Fund has been called on to address have become increasingly complex over the years, the Fund’s budget is roughly the same in real terms as it was two decades ago, reflecting the Fund’s longstanding emphasis on budget discipline. In the current context, budget management remains challenging given elevated demands and high budget execution rates, requiring difficult tradeoffs. In this context, the Board emphasized the importance of continued prudent stewardship of members’ resources and continued reprioritization to ensure that the Fund can keep responding with agility to the needs of its membership.

    The approved net administrative budget for FY26 (May 1, 2025–April 30, 2026) totals US$1,551.7 million, consistent with projected income and the path for the precautionary balances target. The maximum amount of unused budget resources that can be carried forward from previous years will be reduced from 5 to 4 percent in FY26, with this level expected to decline further to 3 percent in FY27.

    The FY26 capital budget is set at US$132.5 million and will support both facilities-related needs and IT-intensive investments, supporting end-of-life facilities replacements, field office support, ongoing IT-intensive modernization and legacy replacements, as well as investment in Artificial Intelligence and in the Fund’s cyber-security posture.

    Additional information can be found in the staff paper on the FY26-28 Medium-Term Budget.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Camila Perez

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/05/02/pr-25127-imf-executive-board-approves-fy2026-fy2028-medium-term-budget

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Perfect storm of tech bros, foreign interference and disinformation is an urgent threat to press freedom

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Tom Felle, Associate Professor of Journalism, University of Galway

    Media freedom has long been essential to healthy democracy. It is the oxygen that fuels informed debate, exposes corruption and holds power to account. But around the world, that freedom is under sustained attack.

    The actions of populist political elites, tech billionaires and foreign disinformation campaigns are reinforcing one another. This is weakening independent journalism and reshaping the global public sphere.

    This convergence was on full display at US president Donald Trump’s 2025 inauguration. The presence of Elon Musk, Jeff Bezos and Mark Zuckerberg signalled that the tech elite are no longer simply disruptors. They are increasingly aligned with populist politics, a project openly hostile to independent journalism and democratic accountability.

    Nowhere is this clearer than on X (formerly Twitter). Musk’s takeover has transformed the platform into a breeding ground for conspiracy theories and misinformation, while systematically undermining the credibility of established media outlets. Meta’s decision to abandon factchecking political content in the US also marks a dangerous retreat from even the minimal efforts once made to curb disinformation.

    At its core, journalism’s role is simple but essential: to inform the public and hold power to account. Independent media – outlets free from government, political, or corporate control – are essential to democracy. They play a critical role in exposing corruption, amplifying marginalised voices, scrutinising government decisions and challenging abuses of power.

    When media organisations are weakened, this essential accountability collapses – allowing governments, politicians and corporations to operate unchecked. Minorities and vulnerable groups suffer most when no one is left to shine a light on abuse or discrimination. Human rights violations go unreported. Misinformation and rumour fill the void.

    That is precisely what is happening, not just in fragile states but in established democracies. Populist leaders have attacked journalists as enemies of the people and smeared media outlets that challenge them.

    Donald Trump infamously branded critical coverage as “fake news”. Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro vilified journalists who investigated corruption and environmental crimes. Hungary’s Viktor Orbán has systematically dismantled media independence. Slovakia’s Robert Fico called journalists “bloodthirsty bastards” and “possessed by the devil”.

    These leaders know that controlling the narrative is key to holding power. Discrediting the media is the first step.

    One of the clearest recent examples is the Trump administration’s shuttering of Voice of America (VOA). This move to silence a broadcaster that had promoted press freedom for over 80 years has been celebrated by authoritarian regimes. China’s state media mocked VOA as “discarded like a dirty rag”.

    Foreign threats

    What makes this moment uniquely dangerous is that these political attacks are now supercharged by technology platforms retreating from accountability, and exploited by hostile foreign powers.

    The latest European External Action Service (EEAS) Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threat Report paints a stark picture of how disinformation is used as a strategic weapon to weaken democracies from within.

    In 2024, the EEAS – the diplomatic service of the European Union – detected
    record levels of foreign manipulation, particularly from Russia and China. The EEAS recorded more than 500 coordinated manipulation campaigns targeting 90 countries.

    These included AI-generated deepfake videos impersonating European politicians, such as a fabricated video of Moldova’s president endorsing a pro-Russian party.

    Bot networks were deployed to amplify false narratives about migration and inflation, distorting online discourse and inflaming social divisions. Impersonation tactics cloning legitimate news websites like Le Monde and German media were used to disseminate pro-Kremlin disinformation. All these efforts were aimed at undermining trust in democratic institutions, inflaming social divisions and creating confusion.


    Want more politics coverage from academic experts? Every week, we bring you informed analysis of developments in government and fact check the claims being made.

    Sign up for our weekly politics newsletter, delivered every Friday.


    Disinformation has become a standard geopolitical weapon, often used as a precursor to military or economic action. In the lead-up to its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia conducted a sustained disinformation campaign. Fabricated videos and false flag operations portrayed Ukraine as the aggressor to justify military action.

    Similarly, during the 2020-21 border clashes with India, China spread disinformation downplaying its military build-up while casting India as the instigator.

    Russia has also used disinformation to pursue economic goals, notably by spreading falsehoods about European renewable energy and gas supply stability, to influence energy policy and sow public doubt about the EU’s energy independence strategy.

    While this happens, platforms like Meta and X are retreating from content moderation and fact-checking. The result is a perfect storm where domestic populism, platform failure and foreign manipulation reinforce one another. Platforms like X have become the key battleground, accounting for 88% of detected disinformation activity.

    What’s at stake – and what must change

    As these threats grow, the traditional media model is collapsing. Advertising revenue – once the lifeblood of newspapers, radio, and television – has shifted almost entirely to digital platforms. Local newsrooms are closing, while investigative journalism is increasingly rare, expensive and risky.

    In the UK, more than 320 local papers have closed since 2009. Titles like the Evening Standard ended daily print in 2024 due to plummeting ad revenues. Across Europe, rising news deserts and newsroom cuts are weakening media’s democratic role.

    In the US, things are even worse – 3,200 newspapers have closed since 2005. More than half of all counties now have little or no local news coverage.

    As social media platforms abandon even basic content moderation, they create vast, ungoverned digital spaces where bad actors dominate the conversation.

    Into this gap flood social media influencers, partisan outlets and state-backed propaganda. The result is a fractured, polarised information ecosystem. Facts struggle to compete with viral misinformation and coordinated disinformation campaigns.

    News consumers must navigate a sea of misinformation and propaganda.
    Olezzo/Shutterstock

    In the end, it is citizens who pay the price, bombarded by propaganda and adrift in a sea of misinformation. This is not just a media problem, it is a fundamental threat to democracy itself. Without independent journalism, there is no one left to ask difficult questions, expose wrongdoing or defend the public interest.

    Protecting media freedom must now be treated as a democratic priority, as essential as free and fair elections or an independent judiciary. Governments need to regulate tech platforms effectively, enforcing transparency over algorithms and bringing in meaningful protections against disinformation.

    Public investment in journalism is critical to ensure the press can survive and hold power to account. Democracies must coordinate efforts to counter foreign information manipulation, and protect journalists facing harassment and threats from authoritarian regimes.

    The future of democratic accountability now depends on whether governments, regulators and the media can reclaim this space before it is lost entirely. Above all, this means recognising that journalism is not a luxury or a relic. It is a vital public good.

    Tom Felle does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Perfect storm of tech bros, foreign interference and disinformation is an urgent threat to press freedom – https://theconversation.com/perfect-storm-of-tech-bros-foreign-interference-and-disinformation-is-an-urgent-threat-to-press-freedom-252986

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Tajikistan: Staff Concluding Statement for the 2025 Article IV Mission

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    May 2, 2025

    A Concluding Statement describes the preliminary findings of IMF staff at the end of an official staff visit (or ‘mission’), in most cases to a member country. Missions are undertaken as part of regular (usually annual) consultations under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, in the context of a request to use IMF resources (borrow from the IMF), as part of discussions of staff monitored programs, or as part of other staff monitoring of economic developments.

    The authorities have consented to the publication of this statement. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF Executive Board for discussion and decision.

    Washington, DC: An International Monetary Fund (IMF) mission led by Mr. Matthew Gaertner held the 2025 Article IV consultation and discussions on the second review under the Policy Coordination Instrument (PCI) with the Tajikistan authorities during April 2-15, 2025, in Dushanbe. At the conclusion of the mission, Mr. Gaertner issued the following statement:

    Economic Developments, Outlook and Risks

    Strong broad-based growth continued in 2024, and the external position remained favorable. Real GDP increased 8.4 percent in 2024, marking the fourth consecutive year of growth above 8 percent, as strong momentum in mining, manufacturing and agriculture was underpinned by public and private investment. Strong financial inflows, including remittances, have also supported domestic demand and liquidity and contributed to a current account surplus of 6.2 percent of GDP in 2024. This alongside the NBT’s purchases of domestic gold production has boosted FX reserves from $3.6 billion at end-2023 to $4.7 billion at the end of February 2025, amounting to 7 months import coverage.

    Inflation remains well contained within the NBT’s target range. Twelve-month inflation stood at 3.7 percent in February, within the NBT’s updated target range of 5 percent (±2 percent) for 2025, reflecting stable prices for imported food and fuel and an appreciation of the somoni against key trading partner currencies. Reserve money growth has moderated since mid-2024 as the NBT stepped up its sterilization efforts but remained strong at 32 percent (y/y) in February, boosted by the NBT’s gold purchases.

    Banks’ asset quality continued to improve in 2024, amid strong growth in consumer lending. Banks’ NPL ratio declined to 7.0 percent in February as they continued to clean up their balance sheets, largely through write-offs of legacy NPLs. Credit to the private sector grew at 29 percent (y/y) in February, boosted by a continued expansion of banks’ deposit base. This has been primarily driven by household loans in local currency, supported by the introduction of new retail lending products.

    The medium-term outlook appears positive. Real GDP is projected to increase by 7 percent in 2025, retaining the current strong momentum. Twelve-month inflation (y/y) is projected to remain close to the mid-point of the NBT’s target range in 2025 and 2026, in line with stable inflation expectations. The current account surplus is expected to narrow in 2025 as financial inflows stabilize, with FX reserves projected to remain at comfortable levels. Financial inflows are expected to normalize over the medium term after the strong inflows experienced since 2022, heightening the importance of continuing to advance structural reforms to strengthen potential growth over the medium-term.

    Risks to the outlook are tilted to the downside, in the context of significant regional and global uncertainty. A pronounced decline in financial inflows due to a less favorable environment for remittances or a slowdown in Tajikistan’s key trading partners would adversely affect growth, fiscal performance, and the banking sector. More frequent and severe natural disasters and heightened security risks can also strain budget resources. On the upside, continued strength in gold prices and rising demand for rare earth metals could attract increased investment in the mining sector.

    Fiscal Policy

    Fiscal performance remained well within the program target in 2024, with a fiscal surplus of 0.3 percent. The favorable fiscal outturn was underpinned by stable revenue growth despite a reduction in the VAT rate from 15 to 14 percent, while externally financed capital spending was lower than planned. Revenue collection reflected continued improvements in tax and customs administration supported by digitalization measures. The 2025 budget envisages a fiscal deficit of up to 2.5 percent of GDP, conditional on available financing. In this context, continuing to expand the domestic debt market is key to diversifying sources of financing. The MOF successfully launched market-based auctions of government securities in 2024; establishing a robust secondary market for these instruments will help to expand the investor base and further deepen the market.

    The fiscal deficit target of 2.5 percent of GDP remains an important anchor to ensure that debt remains on a favorable medium-term trajectory. Prudent fiscal policy coupled with strong GDP growth has contributed to a notable reduction in the public debt ratio over the past few years, with public debt declining to 25 percent of GDP at the end of 2024. Public debt is assessed as sustainable but remains at high risk of distress due to large debt service obligations during 2025-2027; the first semi-annual Eurobond repayment was completed as planned in March. Building fiscal buffers is key to mitigating fiscal risks from potential shocks to revenue and expenditure in the context of the uncertain external environment, with contingency plans for spending reprioritization to protect social assistance and other critical spending.

    Improved revenue mobilization and spending efficiency are key to increasing fiscal space for priority social and development projects. The Medium-Term Revenue Plan (MTRP) aims to raise total revenues by at least 2 percentage points to 26 percent of GDP in 2026 through a combination of tax policy, tax administration and SOE reform measures. In line with the MTRP, the MOF has taken steps to improve revenue mobilization through the expansion of digitalization of payments. Moreover, tax exemptions granted to several large investment projects were discontinued in 2024. A time-bound action plan is essential to anchor a further streamlining of tax exemptions and customs preferences over the medium-term. On the expenditure side, strengthening appraisal, selection and oversight of internally financed capital projects are crucial for enhancing the efficiency of public investment.

    Strong corporate governance and oversight is essential to strengthen SOE efficiency and minimize fiscal risks. Recent reforms include the expansion of the MOF’s financial monitoring coverage from 27 SOEs to 77 entities with state participation, and amendments to the regulations for SOE board composition to ensure that board members are appointed through transparent and competitive procedures in line with best practices. The MOF has also continued to expand the scope of the annual fiscal risk statement, which provides an overview of SOE performance, including profitability, leverage, and budget allocations to SOEs. The publication of an updated SOE list and completion of the ongoing sectorization exercise will also improve monitoring and oversight.

    Greater efforts are needed to improve the financial performance of the electricity sector. Low collection rates for key electricity consumers, together with high technical and commercial losses and end-user tariffs that are below cost recovery levels has led the state electricity generation company Barki Tojik to accumulate sizable arrears to suppliers and creditors. Reducing quasi-fiscal losses in the electricity sector will require sustained efforts to improve collection rates for the largest electricity consumers, as well as implementation of the authorities’ strategy to roll-out smart metering, increase penalties for electricity theft and improve cost controls across the electricity sector. The electricity tariff was increased by about 15 percent in April 2025, and further annual tariff adjustments are envisaged to reach cost recovery by 2027.

    Monetary, Exchange Rate and Financial Sector Policies

    Inflation remains well contained, but strong credit growth warrants continued vigilance. The NBT lowered its inflation target from 6 to 5 percent (±2 percent) for 2025 to reflect well-anchored inflation expectations, and the policy rate was lowered by 25 basis points to 8.75 percent in February 2025 as inflation remains close to the lower bound. Although the real policy rate is still relatively high at about 5 percent (based on realized inflation), monetary policy should remain data-driven and vigilant to potential upward demand pressure on inflation from strong credit growth and robust financial inflows. Proactive liquidity management also remains essential to moderate the impact of the NBT’s gold purchases and FX interventions on the money supply.

    Enhancing exchange rate flexibility is essential to build resilience to external shocks. The NBT has taken several measures to modernize the local FX market, including ending auctions of inward transfers improving the mechanism for executing public sector FX transactions; enhancing the dissemination of information on FX rates; and introducing price-based auctions for FX interventions to facilitate price discovery. The NBT should also aim to limit its FX operations only to avoid disorderly market conditions to facilitate development of the FX market and further support greater exchange rate flexibility.

    Strong macroprudential oversight and banking supervision are key to mitigating external risks to financial stability. The banking system has strengthened its balance sheet following the resolution of two troubled banks but may face possible challenges from the volatile external environment and any reversal of recent inflows. Strong lending to households warrants careful oversight of macroprudential norms to ensure prudent lending standards, and close monitoring of maturity mismatches and funding- and asset-side concentration risk. The planned introduction of macroprudential tools and forward-looking stress tests is essential to manage risks posed by strong credit growth.

    Structural Reforms

    Governance and transparency reforms across economic sectors aim to foster sustainable and inclusive growth. Structural reforms are underway to close existing governance gaps across the public and private sectors through upgrades to the legal and regulatory frameworks. The reforms aim to (i) improve public sector efficiency; (ii) foster financial and private sector development; and (iii) promote an enabling investment climate for private sector-led growth.

    Transparent governance and policy frameworks and robust financial safety nets are key to further strengthen trust in public institutions. Good governance fosters macro-financial stability both directly and indirectly by enhancing the credibility and effectiveness of macroeconomic policies. Transparent corporate ownership is critical to promote an enabling business climate based on the rule of law and prudent AML-CFT standards.

    Timely and comprehensive macroeconomic data is essential to economic policymaking. The authorities have started publishing fiscal statistics in line with GFS standards and broadened the coverage of state-owned enterprises. Compilation of quarterly demand-side GDP data and expanding the use of GFS-based fiscal data would further strengthen data quality.

    Discussions on the policies to complete the second review under the PCI are well advanced and will continue following this mission. The mission would like to thank the Tajik authorities for their hospitality and close collaboration and express its appreciation for the constructive and insightful discussions.

     

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Angham Al Shami

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/05/02/mcs-tajikistan-staff-concluding-statement-for-the-2025-article-iv-mission

    MIL OSI

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  • MIL-OSI USA: Chairman Wicker Releases Statement on the FY26 Budget Proposal

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Mississippi Roger Wicker
    WASHINGTON – U.S. Senator Roger Wicker, R-Miss., the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, today released the following statement after the White House unveiled the FY26 budget proposal outline:
    “President Trump successfully campaigned on a Peace Through Strength agenda, but his advisers at the Office of Management and Budget were apparently not listening. For the defense budget, OMB has requested a fifth year straight of Biden administration funding, leaving military spending flat, which is a cut in real terms. The Big, Beautiful Reconciliation Bill was always meant to change fundamentally the direction of the Pentagon on programs like Golden Dome, border support, and unmanned capabilities – not to paper over OMB’s intent to shred to the bone our military capabilities and our support to service members.
    “OMB is not requesting a trillion-dollar budget. It is requesting a budget of $892.6 billion, which is a cut in real terms. This budget would decrease President Trump’s military options and his negotiating leverage. We face an Axis of Aggressors led by the Chinese Communist Party, who have already started a trade war rather than negotiate in good faith. We need a real Peace Through Strength agenda to ensure Xi Jinping does not launch a military war against us in Asia, beyond his existing military support to the Russians, the Iranians, Hamas, and the Houthis.
    “I have said for months that reconciliation defense spending does not replace the need for real growth in the military’s base budget. That is what I will work to achieve in Congress with President Trump and Secretary Hegseth to implement the President’s Peace Through Strength agenda.”

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: House Passes Bipartisan Legislation to Strengthen Protections Against Foreign Threats to U.S. Networks

    Source: US Representative Tom Kean, Jr. (NJ-07)

    Contact: Riley Pingree

    (May 1, 2025) WASHINGTON, D.C. — This week, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 906, the Foreign Adversary Communications Transparency (FACT) Act.

    Currently, U.S. law does not require public disclosure of companies tied to foreign adversaries operating in our technology and telecommunications markets. Although the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is prohibited from issuing new licenses to entities deemed national security threats, some companies linked to adversarial governments still hold certain approvals.

    This bicameral, bipartisan legislation, introduced by U.S. Representative Robert Wittman (VA-01) and co-led by Congressman Tom Kean, Jr. (NJ-07), would require the FCC to publish a list of companies that both hold FCC authorizations and have any ownership ties to adversarial foreign governments, including China, Russia, Iran, Venezuela, Cuba, and North Korea.

    “This week, Congress voted to protect the security and privacy of every American,” said Congressman Kean. “I am pleased to have co-led this bipartisan effort, which strengthens the FCC’s ability to hold foreign adversaries like China and Russia accountable for exploiting our telecommunications infrastructure. The FACT Act is necessary to securing our networks and ensures Americans are no longer left in the dark about who has access to them. It is important that we work across the aisle to recognize this threat and to reinforce our national security.”

    Congressman Wittman (VA-01) said, “The House’s passage of my bipartisan FACT Act marks real progress in countering foreign threats to our tech infrastructure. The Chinese Communist Party continues to use every tool at its disposal to surveil Americans and infiltrate our telecommunications and technology markets. This legislation is a critical step toward exposing the CCP’s malign influence and preventing foreign adversaries from having unfettered access to our telecommunications infrastructure. I’ll continue advocating for strong, bipartisan action to protect our national security.”

    Congressman Brett Guthrie (KY-02), Chairman of the Committee on Energy and Commerce said, “The enemies of America have made a concerted effort to destabilize and undermine our communications networks. The FACT Act will increase awareness of whether companies with licenses or other authorizations to access our networks have ties to adversaries like China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. I thank Rep. Kean for his work gathering overwhelming bipartisan support for this legislation to secure our infrastructure and improve our national security.”

    Read the full text of the bill here.

    Congressman Kean was the Republican lead of the FACT Act on the Energy and Commerce Committee, making this his first co-led bill and fourth cosponsored bill to pass the House during the 119th Congress. 

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial news: 02.05.2025, 13-46 the values of the lower limit of the repo price corridor, the carry rate and the range of interest rate risk assessment of the BSPB (BSP ao) security were changed.

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Moscow Exchange – Moscow Exchange –

    02.05.2025

    13:46

    In accordance with the Methodology for determining the risk parameters of the stock market and deposit market of Moscow Exchange PJSC by NCO NCC (JSC) on 02.05.2025, 13-46 (Moscow time), the values of the lower limit of the repo price corridor with the settlement code Y0/Y1Dt (up to -88.62%), the transfer rate and the range of interest rate risk assessment (up to -3.313 rubles, equivalent to a rate of 120.28%) of the BSPB (BSP JSC) security were changed.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

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    HTTPS: //VVV. MEEX.K.M.M.

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  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial news: 02.05.2025, 15-03 the values of the lower limit of the repo price corridor, the transfer rate and the range of interest rate risk assessment for the ABIO (iARTGEN ao) security were changed.

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Moscow Exchange – Moscow Exchange –

    02.05.2025

    15:03

    In accordance with the Methodology for determining the risk parameters of the stock market and deposit market of Moscow Exchange PJSC by NCO NCC (JSC), on 02.05.2025, 15-03 (Moscow time), the values of the lower limit of the repo price corridor with the settlement code Y0/Y1Dt (up to -23.66%), the transfer rate and the range of interest rate risk assessment (up to -0.189 rubles, equivalent to a rate of 48.82%) of the ABIO security (iARTGEN ao) were changed.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

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  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial news: 02.05.2025, 15-08 the values of the lower limit of the repo price corridor, the transfer rate and the range of interest rate risk assessment of the WUSH (iВУШХолднг) security were changed.

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Moscow Exchange – Moscow Exchange –

    02.05.2025

    15:08

    In accordance with the Methodology for determining the risk parameters of the stock market and deposit market of Moscow Exchange PJSC by NCO NCC (JSC) on 02.05.2025, 15-08 (Moscow time), the values of the lower limit of the repo price corridor with the settlement code Y0/Y1Dt (up to -75.22%), the transfer rate and the range of interest rate risk assessment (up to -1.21 rubles, equivalent to a rate of 105.54%) of the WUSH (iВУШХоднг) security were changed.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please Note; This Information is Raw Content Directly from the Information Source. It is access to What the Source Is Stating and Does Not Reflect

    HTTPS: //VVV. MEEX.K.M.M.

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  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial news: 02.05.2025, 15-50 the values of the lower limit of the repo price corridor, the transfer rate and the range of interest rate risk assessment for the ABIO (iARTGEN ao) security were changed.

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Moscow Exchange – Moscow Exchange –

    02.05.2025

    15:50

    In accordance with the Methodology for determining the risk parameters of the stock market and deposit market of Moscow Exchange PJSC by NCO NCC (JSC) on 02.05.2025, 15-50 (Moscow time), the values of the lower limit of the repo price corridor with settlement code Y0/Y1Dt (up to -34.4%), the transfer rate and the range of interest rate risk assessment (up to -0.269 rubles, equivalent to a rate of 60.64%) of the ABIO security (iARTGEN ao) were changed.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please Note; This Information is Raw Content Directly from the Information Source. It is access to What the Source Is Stating and Does Not Reflect

    HTTPS: //VVV. MEEX.K.M.M.

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  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial news: 02.05.2025, 15-56 the values of the lower limit of the repo price corridor, the transfer rate and the range of interest rate risk assessment for the ABIO (iARTGEN ao) security were changed.

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Moscow Exchange – Moscow Exchange –

    02.05.2025

    15:56

    In accordance with the Methodology for determining the risk parameters of the stock market and deposit market of Moscow Exchange PJSC by NCO NCC (JSC), on 02.05.2025, 15-56 (Moscow time), the values of the lower limit of the repo price corridor with settlement code Y0/Y1Dt (up to -45.15%), the transfer rate and the range of interest rate risk assessment (up to -0.349 rubles, equivalent to a rate of 72.46%) of the ABIO security (iARTGEN ao) were changed.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please Note; This Information is Raw Content Directly from the Information Source. It is access to What the Source Is Stating and Does Not Reflect

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  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial news: On the placement of additional issue No. 1 of exchange bonds of series BO-001P-08-USD of PJSC MMC Norilsk Nickel from May 5, 2025.

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Moscow Exchange – Moscow Exchange –

    For bidders

    We inform you that in accordance with Part I. General Part of the Rules for Conducting Trading on the Stock Market, Deposit Market and Credit Market of PJSC Moscow Exchange MICEX-RTS, approved by the decision of the Supervisory Board of PJSC Moscow Exchange on February 7, 2025 (Minutes No. 16) and Part II. Stock Market Section of the Rules for Conducting Trading on the Stock Market, Deposit Market and Credit Market of PJSC Moscow Exchange MICEX-RTS, approved by the decision of the Supervisory Board of PJSC Moscow Exchange on February 7, 2025 (Minutes No. 16), the following form, time, term and procedure for the placement of exchange-traded bonds of series BO-001P-08-USD of PJSC MMC Norilsk Nickel (additional issue No. 1) are established:

    Name of the Issuer Public Joint Stock Company “Mining and Metallurgical Company “Norilsk Nickel”
    Name of security exchange-traded interest-bearing non-convertible non-documentary bonds series BO-001P-08-USD (additional issue 1)
    Identification/Registration Number of the Issue 4B02-08-40155-F-001P dated 04/25/2025
    Start date of placement May 05, 2025
    Trading start date May 05, 2025
    Information about the placement (trading mode, placement form) Trading mode “Placement: Addressed orders” by concluding transactions based on addressed orders at a fixed price (yield). (Settlements: Ruble)
    Trade code RU000A10B4K3
    ISIN code RU000A10B4K3
    End date of placement the earlier of the following dates: a) the date of placement of the last Exchange Bond, or b) the 3rd (Third) business day from the Placement Commencement Date (not including this date)
    Placement price 101.10% of the nominal value of the Exchange Bond of Additional Issue No. 1
    Calculation code Z0
    Underwriter Limited Liability Company “Newton Investments” (Bidder Identifier – MC0436800000; Short Name of Bidder – NEWTONINVEST)
    Trading time on the placement start date Trading hours: bid collection period: 10:00 – 13:30; bid execution period: 13:45 – 14:45.

    After the satisfaction period ends:

    period for collecting and processing applications: 15:00 – 18:30.

    At the same time, the submission of applications for concluding transactions is not allowed from 17:29 until information is received from the NCO NCC (JSC) about the completion of processing the report on the consolidated order of the DEPO.

    Trading time for placement during a period other than the placement start date Time for collecting applications and concluding transactions: 10:00 – 18:30.

    At the same time, the submission of applications for concluding transactions is not allowed from 17:29 until information is received from the NCO NCC (JSC) about the completion of processing the report on the consolidated order of the DEPO.

    On the basis of the issue documents, when placing securities, it is not allowed to submit applications and execute transactions at the expense of Trading Participants, as well as at the expense of Clients of Trading Participants, if such persons are associated with a foreign state included in the List of foreign states and territories committing unfriendly acts against the Russian Federation, Russian legal entities and individuals, approved by Order of the Government of the Russian Federation dated 05.03.2022 No. 430-r (as amended on the date of filing the application), or are under the control of the said persons, with the exception of controlled foreign companies in accordance with Decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated 05.03.2022 No. 95 “On the temporary procedure for fulfilling obligations to certain foreign creditors”.

    Contact information for media 7 (495) 363-3232Pr@moex.kom

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

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    HTTPS: //VVV. MOEX.K.M.M.

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: The Atlantic Council hosted French Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs Jean-Noël Barrot on Europe and the new world order.

    Source: France-Diplomatie – Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development

    Frederick Kempe: Good afternoon to those joining us in our headquarters, our relatively new global headquarters here in Washington today. Good evening to those watching online from Europe and the globe, to everyone joining us from throughout the world. My name is Frederick Kempe. I’m President and CEO of the Atlantic Council, and I’m delighted to welcome you to Atlantic Council Front Days. This is our premier platform for global leaders. And it’s an honor to host today the Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, Jean-Noël Barrot. Today’s discussion turns our attention to one of the most enduring and consequential bilateral relationships in U.S. history.

    In the nearly two and a half centuries since France became the first country to formalize diplomatic relations with the newly born United States. Next year, Mr. Minister, is the anniversary of the revolution here. France became the first country to formalize diplomatic relations with the newly born United States. Since that time, this pillar of the transatlantic relationship has seen moments of triumph and moments of trial. From Lafayette and Washington to the beaches of Normandy, the United States, and France have forged partnership unlike any other based on common values in history. However, this relationship goes beyond just sentiment. At each major inflection point in recent history, our countries have stood together, not just because of friendship, but because of shared interests. And now, facing a war on European soil, basing an unfolding trade war, potentially rapidly evolving technological disruptions, and more, the United States and France must consider how to recalibrate and perhaps how to reinvent its partnership and the broader Atlantic alliance with it in order to achieve our common goals of security, prosperity, and freedom.

    As we think through how best to address these challenges, we are delighted to welcome Minister Barrot for today’s event and on the occasion of his first visit to the United States in his current role. The Minister has held numerous positions in the French government, including most recently Minister Delegate for Europe and then Minister Delegate for Digital Affairs, making him well-placed to share the French perspective on the political dynamics at the EU level as well as critical issues of digital and tech policy, and it may help in these times also to be a policy. Minister, welcome to the Atlantic Council. Before we begin let me just say to our audience that we will be taking questions. First, the Minister will make some opening comments Then I will join him on the stage and ask a few questions and then turn to the audience for questions. For those in person, we’ll have a microphone to pass around. For those online, please go to askac.org, askac.org to send your question in virtually. Minister Barrot, it’s always a pleasure to have someone speak at the end of meetings in Washington instead of the beginning of the meetings in Washington. So we look very much forward to your attention.

    Jean-Noël Barrot : Thank you very much, Mr. President. Hello, everyone. One week from now, on May 8th, we mark an important anniversary, the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II in Europe. This was the starting point of an extraordinary endeavor, a formidable building, a building of rule-based international order, a building of multilateralism. Who was the architect of this formidable building? Well, the architect of this building were the United States of America. They did not do this out of charity. They did this as out of enlightened self-interest. They collected substantial dividends from multilateralism throughout the eight decades that have just passed by. The dividends of multilateralism. Think about security. Thanks to the nonproliferation treaty, we collectively have avoided a raise to the nuclear bomb that would have caused so much instability and raised the cost of defense for all our countries.

    NATO has allowed the US, alongside its European partners, to ensure security in the North Atlantic, but also to offer major investment opportunities for its defense industry. Think about trade. WTO has allowed the US economy to grow, has allowed US services to thrive, digital services, financial services around the world. Think about currency. The Bretton Woods framework has made the dollar a global reserve currency. What does it mean to be a global reserve currency? It means that everyone wants to hold it. So that the yields on your treasury bonds are the lowest on earth. And even more than that, when there is a crisis, even when there is a crisis in the US, people rush to buy your treasury bonds, and the cost of borrowing goes down. This exorbitant privilege, as a French president coined it, is part of the dividends of multilateralism that the US brought to the world and that they also benefited from.

    This formidable building, the building of multilateralism, was designed 80 years ago for a unipolar world, where a benevolent hegemon, the United States of America, was the guarantor of rule-based international order. A world in which US leadership was unchallenged, untested. But eight years later, indeed, the world has changed. It has become multipolar, US leadership is challenged, And sometimes multilateralism seems powerless or unfit for power. And therefore, and gradually, a temptation arises for the US to perhaps let go of multilateralism, quit multilateralism, to pull back, to restrain it. This is our choice that belongs to the American people. But this would be a major shift, a major shift for the US, who would not be able to collect the dividends of multilateralism any longer, a major shift for the world, because the multilateralism will survive whether or not the US quits multilateralism. And so someone will fill the void starting with China, which was already getting ready to step up and to become the new hegemon of this new era of multilateralism, in the case where the US would decide to let them play this role.

    Now there is another route, there is an alternative route. Rather than quitting multilateralism, reshaping it, adjusting it, making it fit for the 21st century. The first step, and this is a difficult step, is accepting to share the power. in order not to lose it altogether. This means reforming the UN and its Security Council, reforming the financial infrastructure to make space for big emerging countries and share the burden with them, but also hold them responsible because they have part of the burden to share in handling the global issues and challenges. The second step when building multilateral for a multipolar world is to be ready to build coalitions of the willing to overcome obstruction in multilateral forum like the UN Security Council when they arise. It’s not because something won’t happen at the UN, at the IMF, or the World Bank, that you cannot design a coalition of the willing with willing and able countries in order to overcome this obstruction. This is the new era of multilateralism. This is the route that Europe is willing to take and that Europe is hoping to take alongside the United States of America.

    One week from now, we’ll celebrate another anniversary, not on May 8th, but on May 9th, the 75th anniversary of the birth of Europe. On May 9th of 1950, my distant predecessor, Robert Schuman, woke up in a country, France, that was five years past World War II, where tensions were rising with the neighbor and rival, Germany. Germany was recovering from the war faster than France was. And so what was the tendency in Paris on that day, in that year? Well, the tendency was protectionism, was raising tariffs, raising barriers to prevent Germans from thriving and fully recovered. And so Robert Schuman, as he was heading to the Council of Ministers, he had this crazy idea in mind to put in common steel and coal across France and Germany, swimming against the tide to favor cooperation over confrontation. At the Council of Ministers, he barely mentioned his initiative for his prime minister not to prevent him from announcing it. And at 6 p.m., in a one-minute and 30-second speech, he made this unilateral offer to create the European steel and coal community and make the foundation of a multilateral, cooperative European Union. So you see, when times are hard, and when the tendency is to restrain, pull back, raise barriers, Those visionary men that brought us prosperity and that brought us peace in the European continent, they swung against the tide and offered innovative models for cooperation. So let us find inspiration in the great work of these visionary people. Thank you very much.

    Frederick Kempe : I feel that was a very important statement and I’m gonna start with that. You see by the audience and standing room only that there was a lot of interest in this conversation and what you had to say : 75th anniversary of the birth of Europe, the 80th anniversary of the E.A., all next weekend, we’re calling attention to that. And it seemed really to be a call to your American allies and to the current administration to stay the course on multilateralism and transatlantic engagement, et cetera. So, A, do you intend to do that? And it’s no accident that no one in this audience who’s following the news, everyone knows that there are doubts right now in the transatlantic stream. Not all of them do I share, but I just wonder if you could give us a little bit more of the context of your statement.

    Jean-Noël Barrot : Well, we deeply care about the world-based international model of multilateralism. So I spent two days in New York at the Security Council as we were wrapping up our presence. You know, 15 members of the Security Council, they get one month’s presidency every 15 months. And so we try and make the most of your months-long presence. And to give you a sense of what our commitment is, I am, we are very committed to the three fundamental missions of the United Nations, peace and security, human rights, sustainable development. That’s why we had three bottom security meetings, Ukraine, Middle East, but also non-proliferation, in a closed-door Security Council meeting that was on proliferation. that was first convened in 15 years, or last convened in 15 years, 15 years ago. On human rights, we brought together, mentioning coalitions of the wing, international humanitarian law is under attack, let’s say. And we brought together countries from all around the world, east, south, west, and north, in a coalition of the willing to support politically and better implement in practice the rules of international humanitarian law. And then third, on sustainable development, we took this opportunity to bring together the countries that are the most committed, like we are, to the preservation of oceans, 40 days ahead of the third United Nations Conference on Oceans that will take place in Nice, south of France, and that is aimed to be the equivalent for ocean as what the Paris Accord has been for carbon emissions. So we’re very ambitious with this event as many countries as possible to rally some of the key deliverables of these countries. And so I decided I would spend some time at the UN talking about that.

    So we think this is the right way to go, adjusting multilateralism to make it more efficient in the multi-border world that we’re living in. And I hear that the new leadership in the US is considering what its course of action is going to be. And I think amongst friends that are actually oldest friends, we owe each other an honest discussion on what we see our common interest to be. And I think that was the sense of my introductory remarks. Thank you so much.

    Frederick Kempe : And I think you’ve seen a signal of commitment today, I think, toward the United Nations with the nomination of National Security Advisor Mike Walz to be the UN ambassador, so also an interesting piece of news. Speaking of news, you have had meetings here. We do have media, French, US, other here, and I wonder whether you could tell us your perspective on what do you take away from the conversations, Secretary Rubio, others, anything specific that we can take away from that? And then in that context, as you’re looking at what your greatest challenges are, what were the priorities in your conversations with U.S. leadership?

    Jean-Noël Barrot : Well, I mentioned the 9th of May and 75th anniversary of this declaration by Robert Truman. This year will be Ukraine, because I think a very important, significant chunk of our future, and I’m not talking about the future of Europeans only, depends on how this war of aggression is going to end. So we’ll be with my fellow European ministers of foreign affairs there to express our support to Ukraine and our willingness for this war to end in accordance with the UN Charter international rule. So that was clearly an important topic that I discussed with the US leadership at the State Department as well as Capitol Hill. But we also discussed Middle East, where France and the US have been leading the efforts to put an end to the war that was basically destroying Lebanon eight months ago. We managed to broker a ceasefire five months ago to monitor the ceasefire through a joint mechanism. We managed to bring the conditions for the end of the political crisis with the election of President Joseph Aoun. that then appointed the government, that is now at work trying to implement reforms that are long due in Lebanon. And we want to do the same thing, same food for cooperation in Syria, where this, after overturning the dictatorship of Bashar al-Assad, there is an opportunity to build a strong sovereign country that will be a source of stability rather than instability for the region. I cannot let aside Gaza and the Israel-Palestinian conflict, where again, we converge on the necessity to bring back stability and peace to the region. We have praised the Arab accord logic, and we’re working in the same direction, bringing peace to the region. Muslim and Arabic countries in the region and Israel towards security architecture that would ensure the security of all peace and stability. We also discussed Africa, where the U.S. made a breakthrough in handling or in sort of moving towards a cessation of hostilities in the Great Lakes regions in the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo, where the second worst humanitarian crisis is happening right now. This is good. And after they were received or they were hosted by the Department of State, a few days ago, the DRC and Rwanda gathered in Qatar with France and with the United States. So as you can see, some of the major, major issues, major crises. France and the U.S. are working together in order to find the right solution. Sometimes it isn’t we. Sometimes we don’t start from the same point, but look at Lebanon. It’s because of our complementarity, because of different history in the region, because of the different nature of our partnership, relationship, friendship with the stakeholders of that crisis that we were able.

    Frederick Kempe : Thank you for that answer. Let’s start with Ukraine. News yesterday about critical minerals deal with Ukraine almost more interested in the political side of this than the economic side of this. Talking to Ukrainian officials over the last few months, they’ve been concerned that the U.S. gone more from being an actual partner of Ukraine in trying to counter Russian threat and the Russian attack, and more of an arbitrator, more of a moderator. This critical mineral deal, if you read the language of it, suggests a little bit of a change of direction. And I just wonder, and that is an area where France and the U.S. have not always been entirely singing from the same song sheet. What did you hear during your trip there? How do you assess this new agreement and its political meaning?

    Jean-Noël Barrot : Well, I think it’s a very good agreement. I think it’s a very good agreement for Ukraine and also for the U.S. But I also think that it tells us something very important about what’s happening right now. Let’s go back to the Oval Office when President Zelensky was there. What was the expectation by President Trump with respect to Ukraine? Well, actually, there were two expectations. Ceasefire and sign of a new deal. Since then, on March 9, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, Ukraine accepted a comprehensive ceasefire. And yesterday night, they agreed to a mineral deal with the United States of America. They’ve done their part of the job. They’ve walked their part of the talk. But in the meantime, we haven’t seen Vladimir Putin send any signal, any sign of his willingness to comply with the requests of President Trump, to the very contrary. So let’s face it, right now, the main obstacle to peace is Vladimir Putin. So what I found very interesting in my meetings here in Washington is the efforts, the commendable efforts by Senator Lindsey Graham, who put together a massive package of sanctions that he collected bipartisan support for, with almost 70 senators now signing the bill which is aimed at threatening Russia into accepting a ceasefire, or else those sanctions will apply. And here again, we agree that we will try to coordinate because we, Europeans, are in the process of putting together the 17th sanction package that we are going to try, on substance and timing, to coordinate with Senator Graham’s own package. That was, perhaps, a bit of a long answer. But in summary, it’s good news that this deal was struck. It’s good news that the US, and I heard Secretary Besant express what he had in mind, the US was considering deep economic cooperation with Ukraine. It goes in the right direction. It’s the right course that they should, that should be taken.

    Frederick Kempe : And Secretary Bessent also said this is meant to be a signal to Putin. You see this as well.

    Jean-Noël Barrot : Yeah, put together this deal. The package by Lindsey Graham, who last time I checked is not a political adversary of President Trump, as well as the pressure that Europe is building up on Russia. And you get, the sense of the variant, it’s now basically Putin’s fault if we don’t yet have a ceasefire in the world.

    Frederick Kempe : So in recent discussions with US envoy Steve Witkoff, what divergences existed between France and the United States? And how do you hope to close those divergences? I guess part of this has to do with European troops, American backstop, but it also gets to the conditions behind a peace deal.

    Jean-Noël Barrot : If Ukraine was to capitulate, this would have long-lasting, wide-ranging consequences for the entire world. because it would basically replace rule-based international order by the law of the strongest. It would create massive incentives for countries around the world that that have border issues with their neighbors to consider that they can invade, that they can use military threats or force to obtain territorial concessions. This would be major, and this would be very costly for all of us, at least for responsible powers like the US and France that tend to get involved when there are issues around the world. When we would see issues exploding all around, it would be a major threat. In addition to that, should Ukraine capitulate after Ukraine has agreed to let go of its nuclear weapons in exchange for security guarantees. This will send the signal that the only ultimate security guarantee is the possession of nuclear weapons. And there we have a nuclear proliferation crisis, which again raises global instability at levels that we haven’t seen for the past 80 years, and will increase the cost massively of security in the US, security in Europe. And I think this view is shared between the U.S. and France. But of course, there is one difference between the perspective of the U.S. and the European perspective of this crisis, which is that our own security is at stake because we are neighbors of Russia or because we don’t want to be neighbors of this Russia that is now spending 40% of its budget on its military spending, 10% of its GDP, that just conscribed 160,000 additional soldiers, the largest conscription in 14 years. I’ve heard many, many times Russia say that they don’t want NATO at their borders. Well, we don’t want this Russia at our borders either. And that’s why we are so serious about what’s happening and about how the war will end. And that’s why we’ve been insisting so much about the security guarantees. And I think our message went through. And I think the US are counting on us to build the security arrangements such that when the peace deal is struck, that we can provide those security arrangements in order for the peace to be lasting and durable. But I think it’s well understood, and I’ve heard President Trump, but also officials from the US, clearly saying that of course they want this peace to be lasting, and of course this means that there is security guarantee.

    Frederick Kempe : And can it work without an American backstop where you’re getting closer to a conversation about that? Or, alternatively, is this critical minerals deal a security guarantee in a different form?

    Jean-Noël Barrot : So you should put things in two perspectives. We have been supporters of the Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine. Namely, we said that we were open to extend an invitation, a NATO invitation to Ukraine. We understand that NATO members, not all NATO members, agree with our view, so we have to find an alternative path. The sense of this coalition of the able of the willing that France and the UK has been putting together in order to design those security arrangements. This is ongoing work. This starts with making the Ukrainian army strong enough to be able to deter any further aggression by Russia, but it also very likely means some form of military capacity as a second layer of sanction or guarantee. When those detailed discussions will have been wrapped up, they’re currently ongoing, it will appear whether or not and how much any contribution or backstop by the US is needed. It’s possible that it is needed. Why? Well, because as far as Europeans are concerned, we’ve been working. We’ve been working and planning for our defense. It’s a little bit different for France, the UK, and Poland. But for the rest of European armies, we’ve been working within NATO. So if you’re going to work on a security arrangement outside of NATO framework, then at some point, you might need some kind of NATO-like enablers or make items that are going to make sure that the security arrangements are robust. But that being said, in the same way, do we understand that the US have decided that they will likely reduce their commitment to. We also understand that they are counting on us to bear the burden of providing the security arrangements. But we also need to be honest with them once we’ve done our homework. If there are pieces of these security arrangements that cannot be found outside of US contribution, we’ll just be honest.

    Frederick Kempe : Thank you so much. The one thing you didn’t mention in your opening comments is you didn’t talk about tariffs. You knew I was going to say that. And I wondered if it came up at all in your discussions. And also, I wonder if you could talk a little bit about what this 90-day pause gives a potential for an agreement. What sort of agreement can you imagine, or what is the direction of agreement with the European Union and the United States? How concerned are you about the tariffs driving a more lasting wedge across the Atlantic?

    Jean-Noël Barrot : Well, the good thing when you’re a foreign minister or an FF minister from France is that you’re not in France working tariffs. That being said, you’re allowed to have your own view on things. And indeed, as an economist, I have to say, otherwise I would be a traitor to my profession, that tariffs are not a good idea. President Trump wants to bring jobs back to America, and this is a perfectly legitimate ambition. In fact, we have the same in Europe. We want to bring jobs back to Europe. But tariffs are probably not the best way to achieve this objective. Tariffs are a tax on our economy. It’s a tax on the middle class. And it will make us Europeans, as well as Americans, poor. We do have research on what happened during the last trade war, the 2018 trade war. What happened? Well, the effect on the economy on this side of the Atlantic was limited. It’s basically a $7 billion loss, $7 billion loss on the economy. That’s not big. But it led to a massive transfer from the US consumer, middle class, of $50 billion. So the loss for the US consumer of $50 billion transferred to producers, $9 billion, to the government, $35 billion. And the rest is what’s lost for the US economy. So it’s a mild loss. But it’s a massive transfer from the US consumers to the US government. That’s what happened last time around. And those numbers are small because the trade war at the time was very big. Multiply this by 10. And you’ll get the kind of effects that you’re going to see on European economies, U.S. economies, and so on. So our hope is to reach the same type of outcome that we got the last time around. The U.S. retaliated, we retaliated, and then at some point we suspended those who lifted those tariffs. It was not the same administration that did it, but still, those tariffs were lifted. And I really hope that we get to this objective because, again, we’re very closely intertwined economies, so we have a lot to lose, but we have major rivals, adversaries, competitors that are going to benefit massively from this framework if we sort of choose confrontation over cooperation.

    Frederick Kempe : So let me ask one more follow-up there, and then I’ll go to the audience. On the tariffs, didn’t you raise this issue when you were here, when you are the foreign minister, but it is a political as well as an economic issue. And did you get any indications of what direction ?

    Jean-Noël Barrot : Well, the good thing about being Marco Rubio is that you’re not in charge of terrorists either. But when we met in NATO, I told him that if there was only one positive aspect of those tariffs, is that by lowering GDPs, it would allow us to reach our NATO targets.

    First question from an author and journalist : We see re-entering a phase, a new intensive phase of big power rivalry with the United States retreating from security commitments in Europe, Russian military militarizing its society and having designs on other neighbors besides Ukraine and China seeking economic domination of the world. President Macron has spoken often about the need for Europe to achieve greater strategic autonomy. Do you think Europe should seek to constitute a fourth bloc, even at the risk of putting greater space with its principal ally, the United States? And a quick follow-up, you spoke about the need to share power in a multilateral context. In terms of UN Security Council reform, is France prepared to fold its seat into the European Union presence, or would you also agree to the idea of expanding the Security Council to have 10 to 12 nations? Thank you.

    Jean-Noël Barrot : So you mentioned Russia. You mentioned the four months. That was your first question. I wouldn’t go Russia a block. Russia has a GDP that is 20 times smaller than the EU. I wouldn’t call that a block. Russia is a big country geographically. It is one of the winning nations of the Second World War. So, there are a number of consequences coming with that, including the permanent seat of the Security Council. But I wouldn’t call Russia a block. And we don’t see ourselves, when we speak about strategic autonomy, we don’t see ourselves as entering into a logic of blocks or spheres of influence and stuff like that. We remain committed to multilateralism, rule-based international world order, balance. The only thing is that in a more brutal world, if you want to be heard and be respected, when you’re upholding the values that Europe and the EU upholding, freedom, democracy, free speech and so on, you’re going to need to be much stronger, much less dependent on other regions. And so we see our strategic autonomy as a way to defend the model, which is an open model, which is a balanced model, which is a multilateral model of governance for the world. And we see a lot of appetite for this approach, because since those trade wars started, we cannot count the number of countries that are knocking at EU’s door to strike a trade deal or even to become a candidate. And it’s not only Iceland and Norway that seem to be interested. I heard that on this side of the Atlantic, there are people considering. And you know that there is one geographical criteria. But I just want to mention that even though it’s a very, very, very, very tiny island in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean, no one lives there. I think it’s like 20 meters long. But this island is split between Canada and Denmark, which gives Canada an actual border with the European Union. And the second question is about… I went quickly because I was told that we should not be long in the introduction of those conversations, but I really think that if we want to adjust those institutions, Security Council and so on, To the new era, we need to accept that others have grown over the past 18 years and they need to be represented, but they also need to take their responsibility. Some of them are no longer developing countries. They are actual major economies, major powers. So they should have a seat at the table, but they should also behave as major powers. So what’s our position? Our position is a permanent seat of the Security Council for India, Germany, Japan, Brazil, and two African countries with all associated priorities. This is what we want for the reform of the Security Council. But we also want the same kind of thing to happen with international financial institutions. And this is the spirit of what President Macron has called the Paris Act, or the Act for the People and the Planet, where the ideal is reform. No country in the south should have to choose between fighting against poverty and fighting against climate change. So it should be more balanced, more equal, equitable funding for southern countries. But those emerging countries from the South that are now developed economies should also bear their responsibilities with respect to the least developed countries, the poorest countries. Because right now, some of them are sort of bunching with the least advanced countries sort of take their responsibility with respect to the poor countries. So that’s the spirit in which we’re pushing. And in fact, I had a meeting dedicated to security council reform on Monday in New York with some of the African countries that were working on it.

    Frederick Kempe : Thank you for that good answer. While we’re open, we’ve got a lot of questions now. I saw this gentleman first. and then we’ll go, I’ll figure it out, we’ll figure it out. Anyone here that wants to, there we go, that’s what I’m gonna do next. There we go, please.

    Second question : In context with President Macron’s call to Prime Minister Modi of India in solidarity after the terror attack in Palgakush, India, do you see a justifiable response by India against this attack as another roadblock to ensuring the India-Middle East Corridor gets off the ground. Of course, it was set back after the Israel-Hamas war. And did that conversation come up in your discussion with Secretary Rubio today? And if not, then what do we need to do collectively as the international community to make sure this gets off the ground?

    Jean-Noël Barrot : Thank you, so President Macron has been in touch with Prime Minister Modi, I have been in touch two times with my fellow foreign minister from India. We expressed solidarity. We hope tensions not to escalate and I heard Secretary Rubio call Pakistan to formally recognize the terrorist nature of this attack and to condemn it in the strongest possible way. And I would happily join this call to Pakistan to recognize the terrorist nature of what happened. And we’ll keep in touch with Marco Rubio, but also with my fellow minister David Lamb from Great Britain, UK, and my Indian colleague, in order to ensure or to try and avoid procrastination in the region.

    Third question : Good afternoon, journalist from the French newspaper Le Monde. I have two questions, the first one regarding security guarantees for Ukraine. For months, France supported the idea of the deployment of some international monitoring force in Ukraine, but with a very strong American security guarantees. The Trump administration doesn’t seem to see eye to eye on this. They’re not inclined to offer any sort of serious security guarantees, so what’s the plan B? Have you given up on this two-fold idea or not? And the second question regarding Iran, there are currently very important discussions between the Trump administration directly and indirect with the Iranian representatives. For a very long time, France was in favor of putting on the table as well with Iran the ballistic issue. It doesn’t seem the case at all right now. The Trump administration is basically considering a sort of GCPOA revisited or maybe an interim agreement. So what’s your view exactly on the current discussions? Thank you.

    Jean-Noël Barrot : So on the first question, let me just clarify, because I think it’s important that everyone gets this right. There are two things. First, there is a ceasefire, and a ceasefire needs to be monitored. And the coalition of the able and willing put together by France and the UK have been working on proposals so that at the minute the ceasefire is broken, that the US have in their hands, because there will be that sort of origins of the ceasefire, solutions for this ceasefire to be monitored. And this might involve some European capacity just to check what’s happening in the line of contact and to be able to attribute violations. So that’s one thing. But the ceasefire is only one step towards what’s our end goal, which is a full-fledged peace treaty or peace agreement. This peace agreement that the Ukrainians and Russians will be discussing, but that was President Trump’s intuition, this discussion cannot happen while the war is happening in Ukraine. That’s why he did a ceasefire for the discussion. It will end up with discussions on territories and a discussion on security. And with the same question of the coalition of willing, we’re working on this second piece, which is security guarantee. But security guarantee has nothing to do with monitoring the ceasefire. Security guarantee is deterrence against any further aggression. How do you do that? As I was saying earlier, the first layer is to porcupine the Ukrainian army for it to be deterrent enough for anyone to try and invade. But then you probably have other layers, so military capacity deployed in Ukraine or around Ukraine, and that’s what we’re working on, and when the moment is right, we get to the Americans and ask them or tell them what is it we need for this security guarantee. And we’re working on this, and we’re confident, and again, as I was saying, I’ve heard President Trump in several occasions speak in a way that shows that he understands the importance of the security terms. And then on Iran, a very important topic that I should have mentioned in response to your first question, Mr. President, because this is a topic in which we’ve been coordinating with Marco Rubio from day one. We are supporting, encouraging the discussion that the U.S. opened with Iran. Why? Because Iran is posing a major threat to our security interests. Because we France, Marseille are within reach. And because our partners, close partners, in the region are also within reach. So we are very serious about this question. But we believe that there is no other route, no other path, and a diplomatic path to solve this issue. That there is no military solution to this issue and that any form of military attempt to solve this issue will have very large costs that we would not like to bear. So, in order for this discussion to be as successful as possible, we’ve been coordinating with the US on a substance and timing. substance because our teams have been working for the last few months ahead from the expiration of the GCP area, the nuclear agreement that was struck 10 years ago and that is expiring in the fall. So we were getting ready for this expiration a clear idea of indeed what might be a robust and protected field for us, and this would include indeed some of the ballistic components, but also the regional activities components. And the substance is sort of at the disposal of U.S. negotiators because it’s for free and there is no copyright. But we’re also coordinated on timing because we will not hesitate to reapply all the sanctions that we lifted in 10 years ago when GCPOA was struck. In the case where the IAEA confirms that Iran has violated its obligations under GCPOA, and if it happens that by the summer we will have a protected frontier that is sufficiently protected of our security interests.

    Frederick Kempe : So this has got to be the last question. I really apologize to others, but I saw that gentleman’s hand approach right through the middle. So, no, no. Yes, thank you. Yes. Thank you.

    Last question from a student from Sciences Po : I’d like to know what’s your opinion what’s your take on how france will balance its relationship with the U.S. and at the same time with China in light of the fact that France needs new partners and also in light of the fact that President Trump openly asked European leaders to direct ties with the PRC. Thank you.

    Frederick Kempe : And since this is the last question, let me add to it on the terror front because You know, in your conversations here, and you’ve spoken before about the relationship between the European Union and China on the trade front, does this terror policy drive Europe more into the hands of trade and economic relationships with China? And if you believe that, have you said that to your interlocutors here watching during your visit?

    Jean-Noël Barrot : I mean, it’s obvious, no? Whether you want it or not, look at one and read economic research. The numbers I quoted earlier are from a paper in the Portal Reform of Economics called the Returns to Protection. It’s the last paper on the 2018 trade war, last economic paper, research paper. But anyway, I will tell you that what happened last time is that during the 2018 trade war, it’s not like suddenly factories moved from one country to another. It was a reshuffling of international trade. So you’re going to see a lot of reshuffling. You mentioned, or you recall what I said, on China and filling the void. Listen to Chinese officials’ speeches now. And again, we take all of this with lots of grains of salt, but my colleague, Wang Li, now in all his speeches, he’s saying how much he cares about multilateralism. And I’m sure… No, seriously. And he will, I mean, I’m pretty sure that they will consider filling the void at the World Health Organization. I’m pretty sure that they will, anytime they will see some pullback, they will try to step in. Because they have two, there are two possible strategies. Either the U.S. are there, filling the void, then they will try to build sort of formats outside of the established formats that we’ve seen them do or they will see U.S. pull back and they will try fill the void. Now, what’s our relationship with China? As far as Europe is concerned. Again, we’re lucid. We’re not blind. And so we think there can be a trade agenda with China. So that’s some of the issues that we’ve are sold, which is not quite the case now. We’ve also had our trade war with China these past few years, with us sanctioning Chinese EVs and then sanctioning European cognac and armagnac. So this is dear to our hearts. And of course, it’s going to be difficult to engage into a natural trade agenda until those sort of contentious issues are solved. Then we can. But of course, our discussion cannot only touch upon trade. And when China is supporting Russia’s war on Russia, when China is on the side of DPRK, on the side of Iran, proliferating countries that are threatening this non-proliferation treaty and sort of the global stability, it’s difficult to build trust. If China was to establish a sort of trusted relationship with European countries, it will have to show also that it takes our security interests into account. Otherwise, it might be challenging.

    Frederick Kempe : Thank you. Do you have your answer? Yes, Fred, thank you. So, look, this, Minister Barrot, on behalf of the audience, on behalf of the Atlantic Council, thank you for three things. First of all, for your visit to the United States, a very timely visit, a very crucial moment. Second of all, for taking so much time with us at the Atlantic Council and talking so frankly and clearly in your opening statement and in this fascinating engagement, and then most of all for our enduring alliance. Thank you so much.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Capito Joins Risch, Colleagues in Introducing Bill to Stand Up for Israel at the UN

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for West Virginia Shelley Moore Capito

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – U.S. Senator Shelley Moore Capito (R-W.Va.) joined Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jim Risch (R-Idaho) and a number of her Senate Republican colleagues in introducing the Stand with Israel Act, legislation to cut off U.S. funding to UN agencies that expel, downgrade, suspend, or otherwise restrict the participation of the State of Israel. 

    “The UN and its agencies have increasingly become a platform for anti-Israel forces to target the world’s only Jewish state. At the same time, countries like Iran and Russia have been free to maintain their status while launching ballistic missiles at their neighbors. If this ridiculous project to downgrade the membership of Israel—a free, democratic country and rightful member state—moves forward in the UN, the U.S. has no choice but to finally withdraw all support from a failed institution. I am proud to once again introduce this legislation that stands with one of our greatest allies, Israel,” Senator Capito said.

    BACKGROUND:

    The Stand with Israel Act would cut off U.S. funding to UN agencies that expel, downgrade, suspend, or otherwise restrict the participation of the State of Israel. The bill is modeled after the current prohibition of funding to any UN entities that elevate the status of the Palestinian Authority to a member state. 

    For bill text, click here.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Global: When presidents try to make peace: What Trump could learn from Teddy Roosevelt, Carter, Clinton and his own first term

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Andrew E. Busch, Professor and Associate Director, Institute of American Civics, University of Tennessee

    U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt, center, introduces Russian and Japanese delegates during negotiations at the Portsmouth Peace Conference in Kittery, Maine, in August 1905. Hulton Archive/Getty Images

    Throughout his 2024 campaign for the presidency, Donald Trump made diplomatic resolution of the Ukraine-Russia war a major priority, suggesting that he could bring peace within “24 hours.” Even before Trump resumed office in January 2025, as president-elect he named envoys and held preliminary discussions with a variety of leaders.

    Since Trump returned to the White House, he has talked with Russian leader Vladimir Putin, met twice with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and made frequent public comments on the war.

    How does Trump’s mediation effort stack up historically? I’m a scholar of the presidency, and while we don’t yet know the outcome of the Trump-led negotiations, we do know one thing: He’s not conducting them in the ways presidents – including Trump himself – have conducted them in the past.

    President Donald Trump erupted at Volodymyr Zelenskyy during a meeting on Feb. 28, 2025, angrily sending the Ukrainian leader out of the White House because he was ‘not ready’ for peace with Russia.
    Saul Loeb/AFP via Getty Images

    Some worked, others didn’t

    There are several examples of presidents who attempted to play a mediating role in foreign conflicts.

    Theodore Roosevelt: Roosevelt won a Nobel Peace Prize for his contributions to ending the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese War, fought over control of Manchuria and Sakhalin Island. Roosevelt had been asked to mediate by Japan, and Russia agreed. In many ways, this episode marked the beginning of the role of the U.S. president as a world leader.

    Jimmy Carter: Carter’s greatest presidential success arguably came in the Camp David Accords, the framework for peace negotiated in 1978 between Israel and Egypt after decades of conflict. Carter did not win a Nobel Prize for his accomplishment, but Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin did.

    Bill Clinton: Clinton made two ambitious attempts to broker peace between old adversaries. One ended in success, the other in failure.

    Clinton’s envoy, former U.S. Sen. George Mitchell, mediated an accord between the British government, the Republic of Ireland and the warring factions in Northern Ireland that was signed on Good Friday 1998.

    On the other hand, one of Clinton’s greatest frustrations was a failed attempt to arrange peace between Israel and the Palestinians. Clinton blamed the failure on Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat walking away from a deal in 2000. Instead, peace efforts were supplanted by a Palestinian uprising that killed an estimated 1,053 Israeli civilians by early 2005.

    Dealing with a third situation – the wars set off by the disintegration of Yugoslavia– the Clinton administration also obtained an agreement over Bosnia in the 1995 Dayton Accords when the parties were sufficiently exhausted.

    Donald Trump: In his first presidency, Trump himself brokered the September 2000 Abraham Accords that established formal diplomatic relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco. The accords, brought about largely through negotiations led by Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner, had strategic aims of putting greater pressure for peace on the Palestinians and strengthening a common front against Iran. (The Oct. 7, 2023, attacks on Israel by Hamas may have been an attempt to stop subsequent efforts to extend the Abraham Accords to Saudi Arabia.)

    Although all of these examples involved presidential leadership and involvement, they did not follow a single model.

    How they did it

    Former President Bill Clinton bows as he meets former U.S. Sen. George Mitchell, who spearheaded peace negotiations on behalf of Clinton that led to the end of 30 years of conflict in Northern Ireland.
    Liam McBurney/PA Images via Getty Images

    Roosevelt never attended the peace negotiations over the Russo-Japanese War in Portsmouth, but he actively offered proposals through intermediaries before and during the conference. The final stages of negotiation were held on his yacht, the Mayflower.

    Carter’s breakthrough came when he engaged in intense personal diplomacy at Camp David, where he, Sadat and Begin were sequestered for 13 days. To complete the deal, Carter had to shuffle back and forth between the principals and at one point had to make a frantic appeal to Sadat not to leave.

    Clinton’s unsuccessful efforts to broker an agreement between Arafat and a succession of Israeli prime ministers extended over the duration of his two-term presidency and frequently involved personal meetings and exchanges.

    On the other hand, Clinton’s involvement in the Northern Ireland resolution did not primarily come in the form of personal diplomacy at the end of the process. Rather, he set the conditions for a settlement earlier when he approved a visa for Irish Republican leader Gerry Adams to enter the U.S., against the wishes of Britain and Clinton’s own advisers.

    When Clinton went to Belfast for a Christmas tree lighting in 1995, he brought together Catholic leaders committed to the unification of Ireland and Protestant leaders loyal to Britain. First lady Hillary Clinton also contributed by meeting with Irish women’s organizations on both sides.

    In contrast, in the Dayton process Clinton was later portrayed by chief negotiator Richard Holbrooke as essentially disengaged.

    Not like the others

    Although each mediation effort was unique, there were some commonalities.

    First, where sensitive issues of land possession were involved, many of the negotiations benefited from privacy in the process.

    Second, successful mediations came most often when the U.S. was neutral, such as in the Portsmouth negotiations, or friendly toward both parties to some degree, such as with the Camp David, Good Friday and Abraham negotiations. Dayton was the exception in that the U.S. had become quite hostile toward the Serbs.

    In Ukraine, Trump is attempting to mediate a conflict in which, until now, the U.S. has been firmly and materially supportive of one side against the other. And he is attempting to do it by publicly making, so far, proposals that were destined to be toxic to the Ukrainian public.

    Trump appears to be violating the first rule above – no public negotiations over land – in order to chase compliance with the second, which is no mediation without neutrality. By, among other things, publicly offering proposals that the Ukrainians see as one-sided against them, Trump has largely erased the image of the U.S. as pro-Ukraine.

    This is a highly controversial and risky strategy that has damaged relations with U.S. allies and cost the U.S. moral capital in pursuit of an uncertain peace.

    Whatever success Trump ultimately achieves, it is little surprise that the effort, which has been pursued over a period of six months so far, has been more difficult than he anticipated.

    Andrew E. Busch does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. When presidents try to make peace: What Trump could learn from Teddy Roosevelt, Carter, Clinton and his own first term – https://theconversation.com/when-presidents-try-to-make-peace-what-trump-could-learn-from-teddy-roosevelt-carter-clinton-and-his-own-first-term-255550

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: WFP and EFSD Partner to Improve Food Security by Strengthening Water Management Systems in Armenia

    Source: World Food Programme

    Yerevan, ARMENIA – The United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) and the Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development (EFSD) are joining forces to improve food security in Armenia through better water management. An agreement for the “Capacity Strengthening of Water Users Associations of Armenia” initiative has been signed with the Government of Armenia, represented by the Armenian Territorial Development Fund (ATDF). The initiative aims to strengthen food security, reduce reliance on assistance, and build community resilience in Armenia.

    “At the EFSD, investments in the rehabilitation of basic infrastructure are among our strategic priorities. However, we recognise that ensuring the sustainability of projects in the irrigation sector requires more than physical efforts. To address this, we place a strong emphasis on building the capacity of water user associations and strengthening sector institutions, enabling them to manage water resources more effectively and independently in the long term,” said Garik Arabyan, Head of the Project at the EFSD.

    WFP will work with 15 Water User Associations (WUAs) across Armenia, training over 125 WUA leaders and community water managers in practical water management skills. These include optimizing irrigation schedules, maintaining infrastructure, and adopting efficient practices like drip and sprinkler irrigation. The training will strengthen irrigation systems and support food-insecure communities in managing water more effectively for agriculture.

    This is particularly important in regions facing water scarcity due to aging infrastructure, overuse of groundwater, and climate change – factors that have contributed to low crop yields and food insecurity. Improved irrigation management will reduce water waste, minimize crop failure risks, and ensure better water access during key growing seasons.

    Although 125 individuals will be trained directly, they manage systems serving thousands of smallholder farmers nationwide. More efficient water use is expected to boost yields of water-intensive crops, increase rural incomes, and improve household food access.

    “Improved water management leads to improved food security,” said Nanna Skau, WFP Representative and Country Director in Armenia. “By investing in water systems and building the knowledge of the people who manage them, we’re laying the foundation for stronger food systems and more resilient communities across Armenia.”

    WFP remains committed to supporting food-insecure communities across Armenia and aligning with the priorities of the Government. By investing in water user associations and local communities, the initiative will help farmers and their families improve income levels and gain consistent access to nutritious food.

     

    #               #           #

    About the World Food Programme

    The United Nations World Food Programme is the world’s largest humanitarian organisation saving lives in emergencies and using food assistance to build a pathway to peace, stability and prosperity for people recovering from conflict, disasters and the impact of climate change.

    Follow us on Twitter @WFPArmenia 

                                                                         

    About the EFSD

    The Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development (EFSD) is a regional financing arrangement totalling over US $9 billion, established in 2009 by the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tajikistan. The EFSD aims to promote economic and financial stability in its member states and support their sustainable development.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI: Marex Group plc Announces Pricing of U.S.$500 Million Senior Notes Offering

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    NEW YORK, May 02, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Marex Group plc (Nasdaq: MRX) (“Marex”), the diversified global financial services platform, announced the pricing on May 1, 2025 of a public offering (the “Offering”) of U.S.$500 million aggregate principal amount of its 5.829% Senior Notes due 2028 (the “Notes”). The Notes will be issued at a price to the public equal to 100.000% of the principal amount thereof and will be senior unsecured obligations of Marex.

    The Offering is expected to close on or about May 8, 2025, subject to the satisfaction of customary closing conditions. Marex intends to use the net proceeds from the Offering for working capital, to fund incremental growth and for other general corporate purposes.

    Ian Lowitt, CEO of Marex, commented:

    “This successful debt issuance further diversifies our sources of funding and enables the continued expansion of our business, bolstering our liquidity so we can support our clients. We are pleased to have seen very strong investor interest for these notes, demonstrating continued confidence in our client-driven business model, prudent approach to capital and our liquidity profile.”

    Barclays, Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC and Jefferies are acting as joint book-runners for the Offering.

    The Offering is being made pursuant to Marex’s existing effective shelf registration statement on Form F-3 filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”). The Offering will be made only by means of a preliminary prospectus supplement and its accompanying base prospectus. You may obtain copies of these documents for free by visiting the SEC’s website at www.sec.gov or by calling Barclays Capital Inc. toll-free at (888) 603-5847, Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC toll-free at (866) 471-2526 or Jefferies LLC toll-free at (877) 877-0696.

    This press release does not constitute an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to buy the Notes or any other security, and shall not constitute an offer, solicitation or sale in any jurisdiction in which such offer, solicitation or sale would be unlawful.

    Forward looking statements

    This release contains forward-looking statements within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. All statements contained in this release that do not relate to matters of historical fact should be considered forward-looking statements, including the expected closing date of the Offering. In some cases, these forward-looking statements can be identified by words or phrases such as “may,” “will,” “expect,” “anticipate,” “aim,” “estimate,” “intend,” “plan,” “believe,” “potential,” “continue,” “is/are likely to” or other similar expressions. These forward-looking statements are subject to risks, uncertainties and assumptions, some of which are beyond our control. In addition, these forward-looking statements reflect our current views with respect to future events and are not a guarantee of future performance. Actual outcomes may differ materially from the information contained in the forward-looking statements as a result of a number of factors, including, without limitation: subdued commodity market activity or pricing levels; the effects of geopolitical events, terrorism and wars, such as the effect of Russia’s military action in Ukraine or the on-going conflicts in the Middle East, on market volatility, global macroeconomic conditions and commodity prices; changes in interest rate levels; the risk of our clients and their related financial institutions defaulting on their obligations to us; regulatory, reputational and financial risks as a result of our international operations; software or systems failure, loss or disruption of data or data security failures; an inability to adequately hedge our positions and limitations on our ability to modify contracts and the contractual protections that may be available to us in OTC derivatives transactions; market volatility, reputational risk and regulatory uncertainty related to commodity markets, equities, fixed income, foreign exchange; the impact of climate change and the transition to a lower carbon economy on supply chains and the size of the market for certain of our energy products; the impact of changes in judgments, estimates and assumptions made by management in the application of our accounting policies on our reported financial condition and results of operations; lack of sufficient financial liquidity; if we fail to comply with applicable law and regulation, we may be subject to enforcement or other action, forced to cease providing certain services or obliged to change the scope or nature of our operations; significant costs, including adverse impacts on our business, financial condition and results of operations, and expenses associated with compliance with relevant regulations; and if we fail to remediate the material weaknesses we identified in our internal control over financial reporting or prevent the occurrence of material weaknesses in the future, the accuracy and timing of our financial statements may be impacted, which could result in material misstatements in our financial statements or failure to meet our reporting obligations and subject us to potential delisting, regulatory investments or civil or criminal sanctions, and other risks discussed under the caption “Risk Factors” in our preliminary prospectus supplement for the Offering and its accompanying base prospectus filed with the SEC, and our other reports filed with the SEC.

    The forward-looking statements made in this release relate only to events or information as of the date on which the statements are made in this release. Except as required by law, we undertake no obligation to update or revise publicly any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise, after the date on which the statements are made or to reflect the occurrence of unanticipated events.

    Enquiries please contact:

    Marex:
    Nicola Ratchford / Adam Strachan
    +44 778 654 8889 / +1 914 200 2508 | nratchford@marex.com/ astrachan@marex.com

    FTI Consulting US / UK
    +1 (919) 609-9423 / +44 (0) 7776 111 222 | marex@fticonsulting.com

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI USA: President Trump Finally Ends the Madness of NPR, PBS

    US Senate News:

    Source: The White House
    Last night, President Donald J. Trump signed an executive order ending the taxpayer subsidization of National Public Radio (NPR) and the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) — entities that receive tens of millions of dollars in taxpayer funds each year to spread radical, woke propaganda disguised as “news.”
    Here are some examples of the trash that has passed for “news” at NPR and PBS:
    NPR ran a story titled “Cannibalism: It’s ‘Perfectly Natural,’” in which an author described eating another human’s placenta: “It was really the prep that made it taste good. Granted, the [husband] was a chef and so he knew how to prepare it osso bucco style and used a really nice wine I had brought. It smelled great. It didn’t taste bad.”
    In 2021, NPR declared the Declaration of Independence to be a document with “flaws and deeply ingrained hypocrisies.”
    In 2022, NPR scrapped its decades-long Independence Day tradition of reading the Declaration of Independence on air to instead discuss “equality.”
    NPR subsequently issued an “editor’s note” warning the Declaration of Independence is “a document that contains offensive language.”

    NPR apologized for calling illegal immigrants “illegal.”
    NPR sounded the alarm about young men who abstain from masturbating to pornography.
    NPR featured a Valentine’s Day story centered around “queer animals,” in which it suggested the make-believe clownfish in “Finding Nemo” would’ve been better off as a female, that “banana slugs are hermaphrodites,” and that “some deer are nonbinary.”
    PBS devoted a panel to what it “mean[s] to be woke” and “white privilege.”
    NPR routinely promotes the chemical and surgical mutilation of children as so-called “gender-affirming care” without mentioning the irreversible damage caused by these procedures.
    In 2021, a PBS station aired a “children’s program” that featured a drag queen named “Lil’ Miss Hot Mess.”
    NPR educated the nation on the “whole community of genderqueer dinosaur enthusiasts” and “trans-ceratops.”
    Then-PBS White House Correspondent Yamiche Alcindor characterized President Trump’s patriotic 2020 Mount Rushmore speech as a love letter to “white resentment” that promoted the “myth of America.”
    NPR reported on the “cousin of diet culture” known as “healthism, which is the idea that we have to be healthy” — as if that was a bad thing.
    NPR assigned three reporters to investigate how the thumbs-up emoji is racist.
    NPR suggested doorway sizes are based on “latent fatphobia.”
    PBS produced an entire movie celebrating a transgender teenager’s so-called “changing gender identity.”
    NPR absurdly claimed “limited scientific evidence of physical advantage” exists between male and female athletes.
    NPR lamented that “animals deserve pronouns, too.”
    NPR ran a feature titled “What ‘Queer Ducks’ can teach teenagers about sexuality in the animal kingdom.”
    In 2023, PBS’s Washington Week roundtable covered up Joe Biden’s clear mental decline, with far-left “journalist” Jeffrey Goldberg claiming Biden was actually “quite acute.”
    NPR dedicated an entire segment to the “population of anthropomorphic animal enthusiasts known as ‘furries.’”
    PBS produced a documentary making the case for reparations.
    NPR disparagingly referred to pro-life Americans at the March for Life as “anti-abortion rights activists.”
    NPR explored “the racial origins of fat phobia.”
    NPR management asked its editors to avoid the term “biological sex” when discussing transgender issues.
    PBS show Sesame Street partnered with CNN on a one-sided narrative to “address racism” amid the Black Lives Matter riots.
    NPR and PBS have zero tolerance for non-leftist viewpoints:
    In 2020, NPR refused to cover the explosive Hunter Biden laptop scandal in the runup to the election, baselessly claiming its “assertions don’t amount to much” and writing they “don’t want to waste the listeners’ and readers’ time on stories that are just pure distractions.”
    When a 25-year veteran NPR reporter and editor spoke out about the network’s obsession with liberal causes, they suspended him.
    The editor found that registered Democrats outnumbered Republicans 87 to zero in their newsroom.
    NPR prolifically reported on the Russian collusion hoax, with the editor describing “[Adam] Schiff talking points” as “the drumbeat of NPR news reports.”

    NPR CEO Katherine Maher once called President Trump “racist,” shared a photo of herself wearing a “Biden for President” campaign hat, serves on the board of a Soros-funded activist group, and described “reverence for the truth” as a “distraction.”
    In 2023, a study found that congressional Republicans saw 85% negative coverage while congressional Democrats saw 54% positive coverage on PBS’s flagship news program.
    According to a 2024 study, PBS news staff used 162 variations of the term “far-right,” but only six variations of “far-left.”
    Media bias rating agency AllBias — which surveyed nearly 24,000 readers — found NPR’s bias aligns with “liberal, progressive or left-wing thought and/or policy agendas.”
    NPR repeatedly dismissed the theory that COVID-19 originated in a lab — a conclusion now deemed likely by the FBI, CIA, and Department of Energy.
    April 2020: “Scientists Debunk Lab Accident Theory Of Pandemic Emergence”
    May 2020: “As Trump Pushes Theory Of Virus Origins, Some See Parallels In Lead-Up To Iraq War”
    May 2021: “Many Scientists Still Think The Coronavirus Came From Nature”
    March 2023: “Virologist says COVID origin report could make it harder to study dangerous diseases”
    September 2024: “New research points to raccoon dogs in Wuhan market as pandemic trigger. It’s controversial”

    A 2024 Media Research Center study found that PBS’s coverage of the Republican National Convention was 72% negative, while coverage of the Democratic National Convention was 88% positive.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI China: Xi’s diplomacy injects certainty, stability into turbulent world

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BEIJING, May 2 — Chinese President Xi Jinping has engaged in extensive diplomatic efforts both at home and abroad this spring, cementing a closer bond with neighboring countries, advocating unity and cooperation, and injecting certainty and stability into a turbulent world.

    CLOSER BOND WITH NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES

    In a world grappling with growing uncertainty and instability fueled by protectionism and unilateralism, China has reaffirmed the continuity and stability of its neighborhood diplomacy and its vision for lasting peace and shared development in Asia.

    The first major international event that China hosted in 2025 is the 9th Asian Winter Games from Feb. 7 to 14 in the city of Harbin, capital of northeast China’s Heilongjiang Province. It brought together leaders from many of China’s neighboring countries, including Brunei, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Thailand and the Republic of Korea.

    At a banquet hosted by Xi and his wife, Peng Liyuan, ahead of the opening ceremony of the games, the Chinese leader called on Asia to uphold the common dream of peace and harmony, jointly respond to all sorts of security challenges, and contribute to building an equal and orderly multipolar world.

    Xi’s Southeast Asia visit, his first overseas trip this year, highlighted China’s dedication to deepening traditional ties, expanding practical cooperation, and advancing its vision of building a community with a shared future with its neighbors.

    From April 14 to 18, Xi paid state visits to Vietnam, Malaysia and Cambodia. China signed a record 108 cooperation documents with the three countries in total, which span a wide range of fields, from infrastructure to digital and green economy. A focal point of the tour was high-quality Belt and Road cooperation with the aim of enhancing regional connectivity and creating development opportunities.

    The trip came after a central conference on work related to neighboring countries held in Beijing from April 8 to 9. At the conference, Xi called for building a community with a shared future with neighboring countries and striving to open new ground for the country’s neighborhood work.

    The conference noted China’s relations with its neighboring countries are currently at their best in modern times, and are also entering a critical phase where regional dynamics and global transformations are deeply intertwined.

    A flurry of diplomatic activities show how China, a major country, gets along with its neighbors, international observers said.

    In his talks with Sri Lankan President Anura Kumara Dissanayake on Jan. 15, Xi said China will continue to support Sri Lanka in maintaining its national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

    Extending condolences to Myanmar leader over the massive earthquake in late March, Xi said China is ready to provide assistance, and support efforts to overcome the disaster and rebuild homes at an early date.

    INJECTING CERTAINTY INTO WORLD

    Amid the international trade chaos caused by the so-called “reciprocal tariffs” of the United States, China has taken swift and firm countermeasures not only to safeguard its own legitimate rights and interests, but also to protect the common interests of the international community and defend international fairness and justice.

    On April 11, Xi had a three-hour-long meeting with Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez, who made his third trip to China in three years. Xi called on China and the EU to fulfill their international responsibilities, work together to safeguard economic globalization and the international trade environment, and jointly reject unilateral and bullying actions.

    Noting that China is an important partner of the EU, Sanchez said Spain always supports the stable development of EU-China relations. Facing the complex and challenging international situation, Spain and the EU are willing to strengthen communication and coordination with China to maintain the international trade order, he said.

    Malaysia is ASEAN chair and the Country Coordinator for ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations for 2025. On April 16, during a meeting with the visiting Chinese president, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim said facing the rise of unilateralism, Malaysia is willing to strengthen cooperation with China to jointly address risks and challenges, noting that ASEAN will not endorse any unilaterally imposed tariffs, and will promote collective advancement through cooperation to maintain economic growth.

    On April 24, Xi held talks with Kenyan President William Ruto in Beijing, saying the fundamental purpose of China-Africa cooperation for win-win results and common development will not change, which is a welcome policy statement from a major country in a world full of uncertainty.

    Trade wars undermine the existing international rules and order, and Kenya appreciates China’s role as a stabilizer in the current volatile situation, Ruto said.

    After the talks, the two heads of state witnessed the signing of 20 cooperation documents in areas such as the Belt and Road Initiative, new and high technology, people-to-people and cultural exchanges, economy and trade, and media.

    As certainty and stability increasingly become scarce globally, not only political leaders but also business community turn to China for certainty and stability.

    On March 28, Xi met with more than 40 global chairmen and chief executive officers of foreign businesses as well as representatives of business councils, including leaders from FedEx Corporation, Mercedes-Benz Group AG, Sanofi SA, HSBC Holdings Plc, Hitachi Ltd., SK Hynix Inc and Saudi Aramco.

    A key message Xi sent is that China has been and will remain an ideal, secure, and promising destination for foreign investors, and that investing in China is investing in the future. He pointed out that China offers a vast stage for business development, vast market prospects, stable policy outlook, and a secure environment, making it a favored choice for foreign investment and business operations.

    Having the world’s second-largest consumer market and largest middle-income group, China offers great potential for investment and consumption. China is now a major trading partner with more than 150 countries and regions. China continues to build up industrial strength and foster institutional opening-up, drawing influential foreign investors such as tech giants and automakers into the world’s second-largest economy.

    Aramco is currently investing in projects in China that have a collective and total value of over 240 billion yuan, covering petrochemical projects and equity acquisition deals. Amin H. Nasser, president and CEO of the company, said: “China is becoming an oasis of certainty in an increasingly unpredictable global environment.”

    CALLING FOR SOLIDARITY

    This year marks the 80th anniversary of the victory of the World Anti-Fascist War and the founding of the United Nations. In response to the provocative actions of certain nations inciting great power strategic competition, China emphasizes the roles of major countries, the Global South and the UN in global peace and development.

    Xi talked with Russian President Vladimir Putin via video meeting on Jan. 21 and held a phone conversation with him on Feb. 24, conducting in-depth strategic communication on major international and regional issues and steering China-Russia relations at a critical moment.

    Despite changes in the international situation, China-Russia relations will proceed with ease, which will help each other’s development and revitalization, and inject stability and positive energy into international relations, Xi said.

    To develop relations with China is a strategic choice made by Russia with a long-term perspective, rather than an expedient measure, Putin told Xi, adding that the strategy is not subject to any temporary trend or external interference.

    In his phone conversation with European Council President Antonio Costa on Jan. 14, Xi said there exists no clash of fundamental interests or geopolitical conflicts between China and the EU, making them partners that can contribute to each other’s success.

    Both the EU and China respect the principles of the UN Charter, uphold multilateralism, safeguard free trade, and oppose bloc confrontation, and they should cooperate rather than compete, Costa said, adding that in this era full of challenges, the world needs closer EU-China cooperation to tackle global challenges such as climate change, and to contribute to world peace, stability and development.

    Global South is also a priority in Xi’s diplomatic agenda.

    On April 29, Xi visited the New Development Bank in Shanghai and met with Dilma Rousseff, president of the institution, calling the bank “a pioneering initiative for the unity and self-improvement of the Global South” and noting that the Global South countries have risen collectively into an important force in maintaining world peace, promoting common development and improving global governance.

    His other interactions on the Global South include sending congratulations respectively to the 38th African Union Summit and the 9th summit of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), having in-depth exchanges on regional cooperation with leader of Malaysia, and hosting leaders of Grenada, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Azerbaijan and Kenya.

    As the rotating chair of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), China will host an SCO summit this autumn in the northern city of Tianjin. China will also host the fourth ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC Forum in Beijing.

    Xi delivered a speech via video link at the Leaders Meeting on Climate and the Just Transition on April 23. Calling for adherence to multilateralism, Xi said that all countries should firmly safeguard the UN-centered international system and the international order underpinned by international law, and firmly safeguard international fairness and justice.

    “However the world may change, China will not slow down its climate actions, will not reduce its support for international cooperation, and will not cease its efforts to build a community with a shared future for mankind,” Xi said.

    “In these trying times, the world yearns for steadiness, reliability and purpose. We see this in China’s conduct,” said Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim. “Amid this turbulence, China has been a rational, strong and reliable partner. Malaysia values this consistency,” he said.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: A new thematic train has arrived on the Arbatsko-Pokrovskaya line. We dedicated it to the Moscow ambulance service.

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    The train’s exterior is designed in the style of medical vehicles. Inside, there are many facts about the Moscow ambulance service. Passengers will learn about:

    Equipment of cars, including unique equipment in the world. Contents of the orange suitcase. Digitalization of medicine, thanks to which assistance is provided even faster and more efficiently. Comparison of the principles of ambulance work in Soviet and modern times.

    You’ll also see quotes from a variety of employees, from drivers to intensive care doctors, telling passengers why they love their jobs.

    “The capital’s transport complex supports important city projects on behalf of Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin. For the Day of the Ambulance Worker, we launched a new themed train, which will run along the Arbatsko-Pokrovskaya line for six months. Previously, we issued thematic cards “Troika” dedicated to the capital’s medicine, and launched a branded train with thanks to medical workers. Since last year, for the comfort of ambulance drivers, work has been underway to improve traffic conditions at 19 medical institutions in the capital,” said Maxim Liksutov.

    MIL OSI Russia News