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Category: Russian Federation

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Schoolchildren from the capital will take part in the campaign “Tell us about your hero”

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Moscow Government – Government of Moscow –

    Young Muscovites will take part in the “Tell us about your hero” campaign, dedicated to the 80th anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War. It will be held in all schools and colleges of the capital from April 28 to May 7. This was reported by the press service Department of Education and Science of the City of Moscow.

    On the eve of the holiday, all schools in the capital will replace the usual bells with the melody of the song “Victory Day”. Schoolchildren from the first to the 11th grade and college students will prepare projects dedicated to the heroes of their families, in the format of a short story, presentation or video. The children will present their work at special classes that will be held from April 28 to 30.

    Each participant will be able to show a portrait and tell why this person is dear to the family, what qualities of his are especially admired, what the children would like to tell him today and how they preserve the memory of the exploits of their ancestors during the Great Patriotic War.

    The most proactive pupils and students, together with the media centers of schools and colleges, will also be able to prepare videos about their heroes. These materials will be published on social networks.

    In addition, on the eve of Victory Day, schoolchildren and college students take part in memorial and patronage events. Young Muscovites have tidied up monuments, memorial plaques, memorial signs and graves of participants in the Great Patriotic War. Search teams are working in the city: the children are looking for information about the dead and restoring their graves.

    This year, Russia will celebrate the 80th anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War, one of the most significant events in world history. By decree of Vladimir Putin, 2025 has been declared the Year of the Defender of the Fatherland. The capital’s educational institutions are holding events aimed at preserving historical memory and fostering patriotism. Actions, exhibitions, concerts and other events are planned that will remind children of the feat of the Soviet people and their role in the victory over Nazism.

    Patriotic events for young people correspond to the objectives of the projects “We are together” and “Russia is a country of opportunities” of the national project “Youth and Children”.

    Get the latest news quickly in the official telegram channel the city of Moscow.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please Note; This Information is Raw Content Directly from the Information Source. It is access to What the Source Is Stating and Does Not Reflect

    https: //vv.mos.ru/nevs/ite/153013073/

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    April 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: From physical education to French: the results of the All-Russian school Olympiad in five subjects have been summed up

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Moscow Government – Government of Moscow –

    The results of the All-Russian School Olympiad (VsOSh) have been summed up in five more subjects. The final stages were held in Moscow, Samara, Ulyanovsk, Yakutsk and the federal territory of Sirius. Representatives of the capital’s team won diplomas in competitions in mathematics, ecology, physical education, law and French.

    “The final stage of the All-Russian School Olympiad, the country’s main intellectual competition, is underway. Muscovites received 49 winners’ diplomas and 309 prize winners’ diplomas in five subjects: mathematics, law, ecology, French, and physical education. The diplomas are valid for four years and entitle students to admission without exams to any Russian university in a specialty corresponding to the Olympiad profile, or 100 points on the Unified State Exam in a specialized subject,” the press service of the capital’s

    Department of Education and Science.

    The final competition in mathematics was held at the Sirius educational center and included two written rounds. The Moscow team received 76 diplomas of winners and prize winners, eight more than last year. The students solved problems in algebra, geometry, combinatorics, and probability theory.

    The final round on ecology took place in Ulyanovsk, with Moscow schoolchildren receiving 91 diplomas. This season, the capital’s team has 18 more diplomas than last year. During the theoretical round, the participants thought about how to make the work of nuclear and hydroelectric power plants more environmentally friendly, and also figured out how the living conditions of ancient organisms are related to the history of climate change on Earth. During the practical round, the schoolchildren wrote a paper on one of the proposed quotes and presented their own project.

    Anna Glazkova, a ninth-grader at School No. 1518 and the absolute winner of the All-Russian Olympiad in ecology, participated in the final round for the first time. She had already won the Moscow School Olympiad in ecology three times, but she could not even dream of a diploma from the All-Russian Olympiad – she was counting on the status of a prize winner at most. Anna prepared in any free moment: during breaks, on the way home from school, and her efforts were crowned with success.

    The participant noted that the most important thing for her was not so much the diploma, but the opportunity to meet people like her who strive to make life on Earth better.

    The finalists of the Physical Education Olympiad completed assignments in Yakutsk and won 49 awards, 15 more than last season. In the first round, schoolchildren answered questions about drill exercises and reorganizations, athletes during the Great Patriotic War. The second round, practical, consisted of four parts: gymnastics, sports games, applied physical education, and track and field.

    The final competition in law was held in Moscow at the Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia. Schoolchildren competed in three rounds and received 103 diplomas of winners and prize winners. This is 42 awards more than in the previous final. They completed test assignments on knowledge of forensics, the tax system, studied sales contracts, and calculated the deadlines for filing an appeal in criminal proceedings. In addition, the children had to guess the author and title of a work from an excerpt, as well as present their own oral presentation.

    Erika Chugbar, a ninth-grader at School No. 57 and the absolute winner of the All-Russian Olympiad of Schoolchildren, believes that the secret to success is combining studies and hobbies. This gives her the opportunity to take a break and diversify her activities. She studies cello at a music school, and when she gets tired of one task, Erika starts another. At the closing ceremony, the girl performed the composition “Merry Wind” together with the mother of her teammate. It turned out to be a cello and piano duet.

    This season, the Law Olympiad has undergone changes. The oral round has become more important. The winner believes that it is important for a lawyer not only to be well-read, but also to be able to present their ideas and communicate with the public.

    Experts in French solved the tasks of the Olympiad in Samara. The Moscow team has 39 awards. Young Muscovites repeated the result of last year. Schoolchildren had two rounds of the competition. The children had to cope with tasks on knowledge of vocabulary and grammar, and also prepare an oral presentation.

    Responsible for the preparation of the capital’s team Center for Teaching Excellence Department of Education and Science of the City of Moscow. Classes, which last throughout the school year, are taught by experienced teachers. On the eve of the final stage for each subject, schoolchildren undergo intensive training. They solve assignments from previous years, attend lectures and practical seminars.

    Until the end of May, everyone will be able to try their hand at the All-Russian School Olympiad: the Moscow Electronic School platform is hosting invitational stage. It allows you to get acquainted with the format of the tasks and choose items for participation in the main season.

    Ensuring high-quality preparation of Moscow schoolchildren for the Olympiads corresponds to the objectives of the project “All the best for children” of the national project “Youth and Children”.

    Sergei Sobyanin wished Muscovites victory at the All-Russian School Olympiad

    Get the latest news quicklyofficial telegram channel the city of Moscow.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please Note; This Information is Raw Content Directly from the Information Source. It is access to What the Source Is Stating and Does Not Reflect

    https: //vv.mos.ru/nevs/ite/153020073/

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    April 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: The city has put up for auction sites for the placement of car service stations

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Moscow Government – Government of Moscow –

    The city has put up for auction the right to place three non-capital objects that can be used to organize car washes and car maintenance points. This was reported by the Minister of the Moscow Government, the head of the capital’s Department of City Property Maxim Gaman.

    “Three territories with a total area of over 0.12 hectares, intended for the placement of non-capital facilities, are located in the south, southeast of the capital, and in the Zelenograd administrative district. The sizes of the plots vary from three to almost five hundred square meters. Entrepreneurs will be able to place here facilities with an area of up to 250 square meters each, specializing in car maintenance, such as diagnostic centers or car washes. Such facilities, along with gas stations, are necessary for car owners and increase the level of comfort of life for citizens with personal transport,” said Maxim Gaman.

    The corresponding proposals have already been published on the Moscow investment portal. In Nekrasovka, the non-capital facility will be able to be located on1st Volskaya street opposite property 32. In the Nagatino-Sadovniki area, a vehicle maintenance point is proposed to be opened on the territory at the address: Kashirskoe shosse, building 22a, and in Zelenograd – in the Silino area, opposite house 2, building 2 inProjected passage No. 684.

    “On the Moscow investment portal, entrepreneurs can find commercial properties that match almost any request. The list of real estate put up for auction is regularly updated. Now investors are invited to compete for the right to place non-capital properties. The acceptance of applications for participation in the auction for three lots will end on April 25, and the winners of the auctions will be determined on April 29,” said the head of the Moscow City Department for Competition Policy

    Kirill Purtov.

    The city will enter into contracts with the auction winners for a period of 10 years.

    Information about objects put up for open auctions is published onMoscow investment portal. You can study the lot documentation and rules for conducting auctions in the section “Property from the city”.

    The development of electronic services for entrepreneurs is being implemented within the framework of the national project “Data Economy”.

    Get the latest news quickly in the official telegram channel the city of Moscow.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please Note; This Information is Raw Content Directly from the Information Source. It is access to What the Source Is Stating and Does Not Reflect

    https: //vv.mos.ru/nevs/ite/153002073/

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    April 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: Man and love against fear. Premiere of the play “Ark” at “Sovremennik”

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Moscow Government – Government of Moscow –

    The Moscow Sovremennik Theatre hosted the premiere of the play “The Ark” based on the play by playwright Oleg Antonov, which was created based on the diary of Anne Frank, one of the most famous documents exposing the horrors of Nazism and the Holocaust. “Ark” In the reading of directors Yana Sekste and Alexey Usoltsev, it takes on a new, alarmingly relevant sound, becoming not just another adaptation, but a powerful statement about humanity in an inhuman world.

    The attic is like a small universe

    The spatial solution of the Ark radically changes the audience experience. On the Other Stage of Sovremennik, the audience surrounds the actors from all sides, creating the effect of a tight, closed space. This technique by the artist Sergei Skornetsky turns the audience into silent witnesses of what is happening, makes them feel the claustrophobia caused by life in the attic, which in two years has become an entire world for the forced residents. Special attention should be paid to the lighting solutions, creating the effect of a grid and symbolically emphasizing the imprisonment of the heroes.

    “This venue provides the opportunity for complete immersion,” notes Vladimir Mashkov, artistic director of the Sovremennik Theatre and the Moscow Oleg Tabakov Theatre. The actors admit that they were initially afraid of this format. “When there are spectators around, you feel like you are in this closed space, like in a cage. But this oppressive feeling from all sides helps a lot,” shares her impressions Olga Rodina, who plays the role of Augusta van Daan.

    The directors and playwright did a great deal of research, paying particular attention to recreating the everyday details of life in the shelter: clothing, household items, food – everything was reconstructed based on Anne Frank’s diary entries.

    What the Ark says: Man and love versus fear

    Unlike traditional productions based on Anne Frank’s diary, here the focus is not on a chronicle of events, but on an exploration of feelings and relationships. The central theme is the budding first love between Anne (Maria Shumilova) and Peter (Nikita Tabunshchik) – the very thought of which, according to survivors, warmed them even in the concentration camp.

    The parallel in the title of the play with the biblical story is not accidental and is revealed in the production on different levels. Vladimir Mashkov explains it this way: “We wanted to tell, first of all, the story of love, love even in the most monstrous circumstances. We wanted to follow this life in the attic, in the ark that is heading to Earth. And they are with us, these two young creatures, like a dream, like those two doves that brought the olive branch.”

    The creators abandoned the original title of the play, “Shelter,” because of the depth of the metaphor. “It seems to me that a shelter is where you need to hide. And the ark is where we will go,” adds Vladimir Lvovich. Semantic subtleties give the story a universal resonance: humanity is always in search of salvation, its “promised land.”

    “We are not playing theater – we are looking for the truth on stage.” Sovremennik – 69

    War outside and within the walls

    However, Yana Sekste and Aleksey Usoltsev do not create a cozy world in rosy tones. On the contrary, the production emphasizes the conflicts that corrode the “ark” from within. Quarrels over crumbs of bread, jealousy, attempts to maintain dignity in inhuman conditions – all demonstrate the versatility of human nature. Vladimir Mashkov reflects on this: “Technology, economics, lifestyle have changed – a lot has changed. But man has remained a weak, frightening or strong and heroic man, and has remained a man forever.”

    At the culmination of the play, a prophetic and even shocking phrase is heard: “We are not afraid of the Nazis, we will destroy ourselves!” These words, like a leitmotif, emphasize: the main threat is not outside the walls, but inside. The play, even taking into account the historical basis, becomes not just a reminder of the tragedy of the past, but also a warning about the fragility of humanity in the modern world.

    “After what we experienced in the middle of the 20th century, it is impossible to believe that we could find ourselves on this cycle again. But it happened,” says director Yana Sekste. The play “The Ark” is an important act of preserving collective memory. This idea is confirmed by Vladimir Mashkov: “There is no death if we remember, if we believe and try to live like people.”

    Theatrical unity of individuality

    “The Ark” became a unique project that united the creative forces of three groups – “Sovremennik”, the Theatre and the Oleg Tabakov School. Vladimir Lvovich emphasizes: “This is what we talked about at the very beginning of the season, about the unity of individuals. This is the first work that shows how much people of different ages, different theatres, but united by one idea, can cooperate.”

    “The Elder Son” and other performances. What premieres are being prepared by the Oleg Tabakov Theatre and Sovremennik

    Maria Shumilova, a student at the Oleg Tabakov Theatre School, plays Anna with astonishing sincerity. In her performance, the frightened 13-year-old girl is neither a martyr nor an icon, but a living teenager, with age-related contradictions, dreams and hopes. The actress conveys the transformation of the heroine, who lives a whole life in 25 months in the attic, literally growing up before the audience’s eyes.

    Alexander Khovansky, as the main character’s father, Otto Frank, embodies the image of a steadfast “ship captain” whose inner strength allows the family to hold on to the last. In her diary, Anne Frank, through the prism of her own family’s history, managed to unite millions of broken destinies, and each character in the production creates such a distinctive, yet multifaceted image that viewers see not characters, but living, far from ideal people trying to survive.

    “Don’t Be Sad, Tomorrow the Sun Will Rise”: Hope and Pain in the Finale of “The Ark”

    “The Ark” becomes a kind of test of compassion, of understanding the value of every life. The emotional ending leaves no chance not to be moved – even the actors cannot cope with the lump in their throat. “When portraits of real people are shown, music, they say who died where, I sit and cry – I still can’t do anything with myself,” shares Alexander Khovansky.

    The last phrase of the play: “Don’t be sad, tomorrow the sun will rise again” completely destroys attempts to hold back tears. There is no happy ending, which you want to believe in until the very end, even in the theatrical production, but it is part of the path that everyone must go through. “A person goes to the point where he truly understands that he is a person and that there really are forces that are greater than fear, and that is love,” concludes Vladimir Mashkov.

    “The Ark” is a complex, painful, but necessary theatrical statement. This is a performance about how even the most monstrous circumstances cannot take away a person’s ability to love. And as long as this ability is alive, the person himself is alive.

    “Moscow Culture”: a guide to the capital’s vibrant events 

    Tickets for the performance can be purchased on mos.ru.

    Quickly find out the main news of the capital in official telegram channel the city of Moscow.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please Note; This Information is Raw Content Directly from the Information Source. It is access to What the Source Is Stating and Does Not Reflect

    https: //vv.mos.ru/nevs/ite/153007073/

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    April 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: How Muscovites Help Children with the Million Prizes Loyalty Program

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Moscow Government – Government of Moscow –

    Loyalty program participants “A Million Prizes” can use the points earned for participating in city electronic projects to help children. This is an important contribution to the work of organizations that fight every day for the health, safety, and happy future of young Muscovites. Since this opportunity appeared in 2020, city residents have transferred over 206 million rubles to charitable foundations. They actively participate in the charitable initiative, supporting more than 30 organizations that help children with serious illnesses and facilitate the adaptation of adopted children in new families.

    Recovery from chemotherapy and help with socialization

    Charitable foundations and the Million Prizes program help children get on the road to recovery. The program involves organizations that give hope to seriously ill children by providing them with access to life-saving treatment — they direct funds toward complex surgeries, organ transplants, and expensive medications for young patients with the most severe diagnoses.

    So, fundraising Charity Fund “Rusfond” created a unique model for collecting funds for the treatment of children. On the site you can learn the history of the child and his illness, as well as see a report on the funds donated for his treatment. Charity Foundation “Life Line” provides restorative treatment after chemotherapy and bone marrow transplantation, rehabilitation of children with pathologies of the nervous system and musculoskeletal system, as well as laser treatment of vascular pathologies. Movement is Life Foundation provides comprehensive support to wards with cerebral palsy (CP) and various consequences of damage to the nervous system, paying for treatment in specialized clinics. Every donation to these organizations is a real chance for a child to return to normal life.

    No less important is the support of those who work with children with special needs. Funds “Downside Up”, “Love Syndrome”, “Adele” and others create early intervention and support programs, helping children with various complex diagnoses to learn and socialize. Thanks to the participants of the Million Prizes loyalty program, these children receive the necessary rehabilitation.

    There are also organizations that make the world of the younger generation brighter. For example, the foundation “Illustrated Books for Little Blind Children” creates tactile books for blind and visually impaired children, and an autonomous non-profit organization “School of Heroes”, which provides assistance and support to people with disabilities, and develops the creative and intellectual potential of children with mental disabilities.

    Counseling parents and protecting children’s rights

    A special place is occupied by funds that protect the rights of orphans and help them find a family. Charitable foundation “Find a family” has been training future adoptive parents for over 11 years and helping families who have taken in children from orphanages to cope with various difficulties.

    Fund “Family together” creates free family homes and rooms at children’s hospitals where young patients can stay close to their parents during long-term treatment. National Foundation for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children carries out rehabilitation of children who have experienced severe negative experiences and provides advisory assistance to their parents.

    How to get involved in charity

    To contribute to a good cause, you need to log in to the site “A Million Prizes” by using account on the mos.ru portal, open “Incentives” section and go tocategory “Charity”. Then you need to select a card of a charity organization, specify the number of points and click on the “Place an order” button. In one click, you can transfer from 500 to five thousand city points received for participating in city electronic projects. The number of transfers is not limited. One point is equal to one ruble.

    “A Million Prizes”— a website where Muscovites can use city points to receive goods and services from more than 400 partner organizations. The loyalty program allows you to use accumulated points to receive discounts in stores, cafes and restaurants, purchase tickets to theaters and museums, as well as top up your Troika transport card and your parking account in the Parking of Russia app.

    The project is being developed by the State Institution “New Management Technologies” andDepartment of Information Technology of the City of Moscow.

    The creation, development and operation of the e-government infrastructure, including the provision of mass socially significant services, as well as other services in electronic form, corresponds to the objectives of the national project “Data Economy and Digital Transformation of the State” and the capital’s regional project “Digital Public Administration”.

    Get the latest news quickly official telegram channel the city of Moscow.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please Note; This Information is Raw Content Directly from the Information Source. It is access to What the Source Is Stating and Does Not Reflect

    https: //vv.mos.ru/nevs/ite/152628073/

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    April 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: Water protection zones of the capital are checked for the presence of hazardous trees

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Moscow Government – Government of Moscow –

    Inspectors of the capital Department of Nature Management As part of preventive measures, water protection zones are actively examined, identifying dead and hazardous trees. The work is aimed at preventing possible threats that may arise as a result of their fall.

    Dead and hazardous trees are dangerous for both people and property, especially in adverse weather conditions. Trees subject to sanitary felling are identified and transferred to the balance holders of the territories to take the necessary measures to ensure safety.

    Dead trees are easily identified by the presence of insect holes, peeling or missing bark, and the absence of small branches. Trees with a trunk angle of more than 45 degrees, as well as those affected by diseases, are considered hazardous.

    In case of detection of facts of violation of mandatory requirements for maintenance of green spaces, administrative measures will be applied. Responsibility for failure to comply with the rules for maintenance of green spaces is provided for by Part 2 of Article 4.17 of the Code of Administrative Offenses of the City of Moscow and may entail the imposition of a fine on officials of up to 50 thousand rubles, on legal entities – up to 350 thousand rubles.

    Compliance with environmental legislation is constantly monitored. This guarantees safe conditions for the capital’s residents.

    Get the latest news quicklyofficial telegram channel the city of Moscow.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please Note; This Information is Raw Content Directly from the Information Source. It is access to What the Source Is Stating and Does Not Reflect

    https: //vv.mos.ru/nevs/ite/152980073/

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    April 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: On April 27, the traffic pattern in the center and west of the capital will temporarily change

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Moscow Government – Government of Moscow –

    In connection with the holding Moscow Half Marathon (21.1 kilometers) on the morning of April 27, traffic will be temporarily closed on several embankments in the city center and some streets near them.

    From 00:01 to 12:00, the section of Kosygina Street towards University Square from Vernadsky Avenue to University Square will be closed. From 06:00 to 12:00, Kosygina Street will be closed from Vorobyovskoye Highway to Vernadsky Avenue and from Vernadsky Avenue to Leninsky Avenue. From 07:00 to 13:00, it will be impossible to drive along University Square from University Avenue to Kosygina Street.

    From 07:30 the Luzhniki Bridge and Komsomolsky Prospekt will be closed, from 08:00 — Khamovnichesky Val and Luzhniki streets, Frunzenskaya Embankment and Novokrymsky Proezd. From 08:30 restrictions will be introduced on Luzhnetskaya and Prechistenskaya Embankments, in Soymonovsky Proezd, and from 09:10 — on Ostozhenka Street.

    Parking will be prohibited on all the listed streets and embankments from 00:01 on April 27 until the end of the Moscow Half Marathon.

    Drivers are asked to plan their route in advance. Detailed information is available on the website Traffic Management Center.

    Get the latest news quicklyofficial telegram channel the city of Moscow.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please Note; This Information is Raw Content Directly from the Information Source. It is access to What the Source Is Stating and Does Not Reflect

    https: //vv.mos.ru/nevs/ite/152983073/

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    April 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: Incomparable charisma: how the Pallas’s cat Timofey lives in the Moscow Zoo

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Moscow Government – Government of Moscow –

    Timofey – one of the most charismatic inhabitants Moscow Zoo— all visitors know. He is an Internet star and a favorite of children and adults. Videos with him get thousands of views on the zoo’s social networks, and recently a song was dedicated to him. At the same time, the Pallas’s cat is not only a recognizable animal, but also a rare one. It is listed in the Red Book of Russia and the International Red Book. This small wild cat, on average no larger than a domestic cat, is distinguished by bright yellow eyes, lush sideburns and long white whiskers. The Pallas’s thick fur and short paws give it a squat and heavy appearance.

    On International Pallas’s Cat Day, celebrated on April 23, we tell you how the most famous Moscow cat spends his days and how he surprises visitors.

    House made of natural materials

    You can see a Pallas’s cat already at the entrance to the capital’s zoo. This animal is a living symbol of the Moscow Zoo. It is depicted on the emblem above the main gate.

    “It is no coincidence that the Pallas’s cat appeared on the zoo’s emblem. The fact is that the Moscow Zoo was one of the first in the world to achieve regular breeding of this feline species in captivity. Since 1975, more than 140 cubs have been born here. Since 1987, the Pallas’s cat began to decorate the emblem, then in 2013 the image changed, and in 2019 it returned,” says Mikhail Bragin, head of the Mammals Department of the Moscow Zoo.

    Timofey is not a native Muscovite. He was born in June 2020 at the Novosibirsk Zoo and moved to the capital in 2021. The Pallas’s cat settled near the Bolshoi Presnensky Pond next to pandas and a large eagle – the golden eagle. You can get to him by turning left from the main entrance.

    We stop at a spacious outdoor enclosure with thick glass sides. In the center is a clearing with stumps and logs. A little further away is a play complex – one of the Pallas’s favorite places. On the far wall of the outdoor enclosure are fixed wooden ledges, shelves and ladders. The cat can run, jump and climb on them. Timofey also has a place to hide. Under the ladders, a pipe is built into the wall, imitating a cave.

    “The Pallas’s cat is a sneaking, lurking animal. In the wild, it lives for about five years, in a zoo – up to 12. Such animals live in the steppes and rocky deserts of Central Asia, feed on rodents, small birds and reptiles. To catch prey, they hide and then make dexterous throws. In addition, Pallas’s cats have many enemies. Among them are birds of prey, wolves and even snow leopards. Therefore, Pallas’s cats lead a secretive lifestyle, hiding among stones, in abandoned burrows and crevices. Timofey also likes to hide and spends most of the day where few people see him,” says Mikhail Bragin.

    The Pallas’s cat can be alone in the inner enclosure. This is a room with wooden paneling, hidden from prying eyes. There the Pallas’s cat has a litter box – like a real cat – and several houses. The animal rests and sleeps in them. A massive door leads from the inner enclosure to the street one. From behind it, the large wild cat cautiously watches passers-by.

    “The Pallas’s cat is mostly active in the morning and at dusk. In warm weather, it likes to spend time in the sun. In winter, it is kept warm by its thick fur coat – the fluffiest among cats. Thanks to its grey-black color with red, it also helps the cat camouflage itself well,” adds the mos.ru source.

    Having seen the Pallas’s cat, the zoo visitors come closer to the fence. Timofey moves his ears, pushes off and jumps out from behind the door. He climbs up the ladder and dives into the pipe. The cat moves so quickly that only the most attentive people manage to notice his presence in the outdoor enclosure. It seems as if he is playing hide-and-seek with the guests. But the reason for such activity is different: the Pallas’s cat is getting ready for dinner. The neighboring door opens, and one of the zoo employees enters the enclosure, carrying a paper bag in his hands.

    Jumping, jogging and spring diet

    Keepers, veterinarians and technologists of the capital’s zoo monitor Timofey’s nutrition and health. A special menu and feeding schedule are developed for the Pallas’s cat. The number of portions depends on the time of year.

    “The Pallas’s cat stands out among other cats in a number of ways: it does not make a characteristic meow, has round pupils (which is unusual for small wild cats), and is actively preparing for winter. This process is called fattening, or fattening. To help Timofey gain weight, we feed him twice a day in the fall, and once a day in the spring so that he can lose the weight he has gained. The Pallas’s cat eats whole carcasses of quails and small rodents, and in the summer it can sometimes enjoy grass growing on the lawn,” notes Mikhail Bragin.

    Feeding the Pallas’s cat is an unusual process. The specialists do not simply bring him food, but imitate hunting conditions. The prey is hidden on ledges and ladders, behind stumps and logs, and even hung, creating the impression that it is moving. Timofey’s food is often brought in a craft bag. The rustling of paper and the smell of food do not leave the cat indifferent, and he eagerly begins to unpack. Zoo staff have chosen this method of feeding today.

    The keeper puts the bag on the ground and goes out, closing the door. Having sensed prey, the manul runs from ladder to ladder, hiding behind the ledges. Then he jumps to the very top of the game complex and slowly creeps down, calculating the trajectory of the jump. But the bag is far away – it is standing a little further than the center of the clearing, closer to the group of visitors delighted by such a hunt. The wild cat does not dare to run up to it and again runs away behind the open door of the inner enclosure.

    “The Pallas’s cat does not have a specific feeding time, it is always different, so that it does not wait for food to be brought. It should be unexpected, like in nature. At the same time, we regularly check its health. For example, we monitor its weight. In winter, thanks to fattening, Timofey weighs about six kilograms, and in the warm season – about four. Now he is actively losing weight. We do not conduct training with him for this, he copes well on his own with the help of games and imitation of hunting,” the mos.ru interlocutor emphasizes.

    A healthy wild cat does not require serious care. It sharpens its claws using logs and the wooden paneling of the inner enclosure. In the wild, it can brush off excess fur on rock ledges, and in the zoo, this function is performed by juniper growing in the clearing.

    “Timofey is a cat with character and great charisma. He is completely self-confident: he is not afraid of attention and often demonstrates feline playfulness to visitors. The main thing is to behave calmly and not to frighten the cat with sudden actions or loud sounds. Then he will definitely show up,” adds Mikhail Bragin.

    And so it happens. Without waiting for Timofey to appear, the visitors move on to other enclosures. And a few minutes later, noticing that no one is watching him, the manul looks out from behind the door again.

    You can now see how the main symbol of the capital’s zoo lives online. To do this, visit the mos.ru portal video broadcast available. The live broadcast is hosted byfrom the enclosures of other zoo inhabitants.

    Pandas, Pallas’s cats and capybaras: broadcasts from the Moscow Zoo enclosures have been viewed more than 820 thousand timesMore broadcasts from the Moscow Zoo are now available on mos.ruThe “City of Tasks” project invites you to meet the animals of the Moscow Zoo and get points

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please Note; This Information is Raw Content Directly from the Information Source. It is access to What the Source Is Stating and Does Not Reflect

    https: //vv.mos.ru/nevs/ite/152985073/

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    April 23, 2025
  • MIL-Evening Report: Only a third of Australians support increasing defence spending: new research

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Richard Dunley, Senior Lecturer in History and Maritime Strategy, UNSW Sydney

    National security issues have been a constant feature of this federal election campaign.

    Both major parties have spruiked their national security credentials by promising additional defence spending. The Coalition has pledged to spend 3% of Australia’s GDP on defence within a decade, while Labor is accelerating its own spending increase of $50 billion over the next decade.

    Even the Greens have got in on the act, pledging to “decouple” Australia from the US military.

    Against this backdrop, of course, is the omnipresent figure of US President Donald Trump, with questions about the reliability of the US as an ally and the impact his policy decisions will have on Australian security. The possible deployment of Russian aircraft to Indonesia and the Chinese warships sailing around Australia have made these issues even more salient.

    But what do Australians actually know about defence issues, and what are they comfortable spending on it?

    According to our major new survey of 1,500 Australian adults, only a third of respondents thought the defence budget should be increased.

    The survey was conducted from late February to early March as part of our work at the War Studies Research Group to measure public attitudes towards the Australian Defence Force (ADF).

    Australians know little about the ADF’s role

    More than two-thirds of our respondents said they had a positive opinion of the ADF, and only 8% held a negative opinion. There were significant differences by political affiliation, with 76% of those expecting to vote for the Liberal Party having positive views compared to 72% of Labor supporters. By contrast, only 53% of Greens supporters felt the same way.

    However, when asked how much they actually knew about the ADF and its activities, only a quarter of respondents felt well-informed.

    One reason for this is that only 22% of respondents served in the ADF themselves, or had an immediate family member who had. Similarly, only 35% of respondents knew a veteran.

    But even public knowledge on issues that have received considerable media attention was limited.

    Remarkably, only 56% of respondents were aware of the allegations that Australian Special Forces soldiers committed war crimes in Afghanistan. Less than half had heard of the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide.

    Support for increasing defence spending is mixed

    Successive governments have emphasised the rapidly deteriorating strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific region. This has led to much debate over whether Australia should increase its defence spending – and by how much.

    In this election, both sides have committed more resources to upgrade and expand Australia’s military capabilities.

    However, despite efforts to turn defence spending into a major issue at this election (especially on the right of politics), it is far from clear this has cut through with the wider population.

    Our survey reveals public support for a larger ADF is split. Just over half of respondents thought the ADF was appropriately sized, while 41% considered it too small and 7% thought it too large.

    Notably, when asked whether they thought more money should be spent on defence, the support for growth shrinks further.



    Liberal supporters were the most likely to favour increasing the defence budget. But only 44% of them did, suggesting a majority felt that current spending on the ADF was either appropriate or too large.

    Only 28% of Labor voters supported an increase in the defence budget. And among Greens voters, those supporting cuts to the defence budget outnumbered those in favour of expansion.




    Read more:
    Should Australia increase its defence spending? We asked 5 experts


    Most still support the US, despite Trump

    Ever since the US presidential election in November, many Australians have also questioned the US alliance and the AUKUS agreement, specifically. Recent actions by Trump – most notably his public statements on the Ukraine war – have only reinforced these doubts.

    Given the tone of the public debate, we expected to see lower levels of support in our survey for the US alliance as the bedrock of Australian security.

    However, respondents strongly favoured (75%) the ADF continuing to prioritise working closely with allies and partners, especially the US. Only 2% opposed it. Notably, there was very little variation based on political allegiance.

    However, the idea of deploying the ADF to support our allies and partners overseas, including in the event of a conflict, saw greater division among respondents.

    Two-thirds favoured deploying troops to support our allies overall. Liberal voters largely supported this proposition (75%), while 64% of Labor supporters backed it. Only about half of Greens voters felt the same way.

    Respondents were also asked whether Australia should focus primarily on the defence of our territory rather than supporting our allies and partners in maintaining wider regional security. Just under half (46%) of respondents agreed with this idea, while 38% expressed neutral opinions and only 17% opposed it.

    Overall, the results of this survey suggest that while the Australian public generally holds the ADF in high regard, they don’t know very much about it, nor do they consider additional funding for defence and security to be a real priority.

    Successive governments, intelligence agencies and military analysts have long warned of the growing threats to Australia’s national security. Our survey suggests, however, that this messaging is either not cutting through – or that other concerns, such as housing or cost-of-living pressures, are taking priority.

    Either way, it does not look like this issue will be decisive in the coming election.


    This piece is part of a series on the future of defence in Australia. Read the other stories here.

    The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Only a third of Australians support increasing defence spending: new research – https://theconversation.com/only-a-third-of-australians-support-increasing-defence-spending-new-research-253943

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

    April 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: Global Financial Stability Report Press Briefing

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    April 22, 2025

    GFSR PRESS BRIEFING

    Speakers:

    Tobias Adrian, Financial Counsellor and Director, Monetary and Capital Markets Department, IMF
    Jason Wu, Assistant Director, Monetary and Capital Markets Department, IMF
    Caio Ferreira, Deputy Division Chief, Monetary and Capital Markets Department, IMF

    Moderator: Meera Louis, Communications Officer, IMF

    Ms. LOUIS: Good morning, everyone, and welcome to the GFSR press conference. And thank you for joining us today. I am Meera Louis with the Communications Department at the IMF.

    Joining us here today is Tobias Adrian, Financial Counsellor of the Monetary and Capital Markets Department. Also with us is Jason Wu, Assistant Director, and Caio Ferreira, Deputy Division Chief of the Monetary and Capital Markets Department.

    So, Tobias, before we turn the floor over for questions, I wanted to start by asking you, what were some of the challenges you and your team faced in preparing for this report? We are in uncharted territory now. So how did you come up with a strategy to shape this report?

    Mr. ADRIAN: Thank you so much, Meera. And welcome, everybody, to the International Monetary Fund.

    We are launching the Global Financial Stability Report, and let me give you a couple of headline messages from the report.

    Our baseline assessment for global financial stability is that risks have been increasing, and there are really two main factors here: One is that the overall level of policy uncertainty has increased; and the second factor is that the forecast of economic activity going forward is slightly lower, as Pierre‑Olivier presented at the World Economic Outlook press conference just now. So, it’s a combination of a lower baseline and larger downside risks. Having said that, we do see both downside and upside risks, and we will certainly explain more about the two sides of uncertainty throughout the press conference.

    So let me highlight three vulnerabilities that are driving our assessment.

    The first one is the level of risky asset values. We have certainly seen some adjustment in risky asset values. It’s important to see that in the broader context of where we are coming from. And, in recent years, we saw quite a bit of appreciation—particularly in equity markets and in some sectors, such as technology. So valuations were quite stretched and credit spreads were very tight by historical standards. And we have certainly seen some decline in valuations; but by historical standards, price-earnings ratios in equity markets, for example, continue to be fairly elevated and credit spreads and sovereign spreads have widened to some degree, but they are still fairly contained by historical standards. The stretching of asset valuations continues to be a vulnerability we are watching closely.

    The second vulnerability is about leverage and maturity transformation in the financial system, particularly in the nonbank sector, where we are looking closely at how leverage is evolving. As market volatility has increased, we have seen some degree of deleveraging, but market functioning has been sound so far. With higher volatility, we would expect asset prices to come down, but the functioning of how those asset prices adjusted has been very orderly to date.

    The third vulnerability that we are watching is the overall level of debt globally. In the past decade, and particularly since the pandemic in 2020, sovereign debt levels have been increasing around the world. It’s the backdrop of higher debt that can interact with financial stability and that’s particularly true for emerging markets and frontier economies, where we have certainly seen some widening of sovereign spreads. Issuance year to date has been strong, but, of course, the tightening of financial conditions that we observed in the past three weeks has an outsized impact on those more vulnerable countries.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you, Tobias.

    And now I will open up the floor to questions. If you could please identify yourself and your outlet. You also have the report online, if need be. And you can also join us online via the Webex link. Thank you.

    So, the lady here in the front.

    QUESTION: Hi. My name is Ray. I am with 21st Century Business Herald, Guangdong, China.

    So, my question is that, you’ve highlighted a series of vulnerabilities and risks. So how does the IMF assess the risk of these tensions triggering broader macro‑financial instability, especially in emerging markets with weaker buffers?

    My second question is that during times of global uncertainty, safe haven assets, such as gold and US treasuries, have been very volatile recently. So how does the IMF assess the volatility affecting currency stability? Thank you so much.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Tobias?

    Mr. ADRIAN: Thanks so much.

    So, starting with the second part of your question. We have seen a strong rally in gold prices, which is the sort of usual relationship we see in safe haven flows. When there is a high level of uncertainty, risky assets are selling off, oftentimes gold is viewed as a hedge asset and it has been appreciating.

    Of course, US treasuries remain the baseline reserve asset globally. It’s the largest and most liquid sovereign market. And  we have seen yields move. They have been increasing in the past two weeks, which is somewhat similar to the episode in 2020, when longer‑duration assets had yields increasing, as well. What is somewhat unusual is that the dollar has been falling, to some degree, but it’s important to keep that in the context of the strong dollar rally previously.

    Concerning the emerging markets and frontier economies, yes, the tightening of global financial conditions has an outsized the impact on weaker economies. We have seen a number of weaker emerging markets and frontier economies with high levels of debt. We have seen issuance throughout last year and earlier this year, but tighter financial conditions certainly adversely impact the financing conditions for those countries.

    Mr. WU: Maybe just to quickly add on emerging markets.

    I think it’s important to distinguish the major larger emerging markets versus the frontiers, as Tobias has mentioned. I think so far, we have seen currencies and capital flows being relatively muted in this episode. And I think this speaks to the ongoing theme that we have mentioned for several rounds now, that there’s resilienc among the emerging market economies for a whole host of reasons.

    However, as Tobias has pointed out, the external environment is not favorable and financial conditions are tightening globally. At this time, we need to worry about, countries where they are seeing sovereign spreads increasing, with large debt maturities forthcoming. Policy can be proactive to head off these risks by, for example, making sure that fiscal sustainability is being sent the right message.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you, Jason. The gentleman in the first row, at that end.

    QUESTION: Thank you. Rotus Oddiri with Arise News.

    So theoretically, if the dollar is weakening, isn’t that, to some degree, relatively good for countries with dollar debts?

    And secondly, how are you seeing fund flows to cash? If there’s a lot of volatility, are you seeing more movements to cash? And are there implications there in terms of [M&A] activity and so on and so forth?

    Mr. ADRIAN: So let me take this in three parts.

    The first question is about sort of like the strength of the dollar and the impact for emerging markets. When we look at exchange rates relative to emerging markets, there’s some heterogeneity. The dollar has appreciated against some emerging markets and depreciated against others. But it’s not the only impact on those financing conditions. We certainly have seen a notable widening of financing spreads. And that is probably the more important determinant for external financing conditions in emerging markets.

    Now, having said that, in some of the larger emerging markets with developed local government bond markets, we have seen some inflows into those local markets, but it’s very country‑specific.

    Turning to the question of investment decisions. We think that the first‑order impact here is the overall level of uncertainty. So, generally, investment decisions are easier in an environment with certainty. Given that some uncertainty remains about how policies are going to play out going forward, that can be a temporary headwind to investments or merger activity.

    Mr. WU: Just to quickly respond to your question about cash. I think during periods where markets are volatile, it’s reasonable that market participants and investors demand more liquidity, thereby moving in cash. We have not seen this happening en masse so far during this episode. So, we have seen bank deposits increase a little bit in the United States, but I think the magnitude is significantly smaller compared to previous episodes of stress.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you, Jason. So, the lady here in the second row, with the glasses.

    QUESTION: Hi. Szu Chan from the Telegraph.

    Do you see any parallels between recent moves in the bond market, particularly in US treasuries, with what happened in the wake of the Liz Truss mini budget? And do you think any lasting damage has been done?

    Mr. ADRIAN:

    Just for everybody’s recollection, in October 2022, there was some turbulence in UK gilt markets when the budget announcements were larger than expected and the Bank of England intervened to stabilize markets at that time. Clearly, we haven’t seen interventions by central banks, and the market conditions have been very orderly in recent weeks. There’s a repricing relative to the higher level of uncertainty but as I said at the beginning, there is both upside and downside risk. And we could certainly see upside risk if uncertainty is reduced going forward.

    And market conditions have been quite orderly. The moves are notable in treasuries, in equities, in exchange rates, but they are within movements we have seen in recent years and really reflect the higher level of volatility.

    Mr. Ferreira: I don’t think I have much to add to this, Tobias.

    I think that what we are seeing is some moves that have not been historically deserved in this kind of situation. But these mostly respond to these higher uncertainties and a repricing to the new macro scenario.

    Ms. LOUIS: So, before I go back to the floor, we do have a question on Webex, Pedro da Costa from Market News International. Pedro?

    QUESTION: Thank you so much, Meera. Thank you, guys, for doing this.

    My question is, given the market concerns about the threat to central bank independence, if the threat were exercised in a greater way, what would be the financial stability implications of a potential firing of either the Fed Chair or Fed Governors?

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you, Pedro. Are there any other questions on central bank independence? I don’t see any in the room. So over to you, Tobias 

    Mr. ADRIAN: Thanks so much.

    So, the International Monetary Fund has been advising central banks for many decades. Helping central banks in terms of governance and monetary policy frameworks is really one of the core missions of the IMF. And we have seen time and time again that central bank independence is an important foundation for central banks to achieve their goals, which are primarily price stability and financial stability. We do advise our membership to, have a degree of independence that is aimed at achieving those overarching goals for monetary policy and financial stability policies.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you, Tobias. The gentleman in the first row.

    QUESTION: Thank you so much. My name is Simon Ateba. I am with Today News Africa in Washington, DC.

    I want to ask you about AI. It seems that is the big thing now. First, are you worried about AI? And what type of safeguards is the IMF putting in place to make sure that advanced countries—that AI doesn’t increase risk?

    And maybe, finally, on tariffs. We know that President Trump is imposing tariffs today, removing them tomorrow. China is retaliating. How much will that affect the financial stability of the world? Thank you. 

    Mr. ADRIAN: Thanks so much. Let me start with the question on artificial intelligence, and Jason can complement me.

    We have done quite a bit of work on that. In October, we actually had a chapter specifically focused on the impact of artificial intelligence on capital market activity, but, of course, the impact of AI is broader. And in our view, there are both risks and opportunities. I think the main opportunity is that it’s actually potentially quite inclusive, right?

    Everybody that has access to the internet via a smartphone or a computer or a tablet, in principle, can use those very powerful artificial intelligence tools. And we have seen examples in emerging markets and lower‑income economies where entrepreneurs are actually using these new tools to innovate. That can boost productivity around the world.

    In financial markets, we do quite a bit of outreach to market participants. And financial institutions—including banks and capital market institutions—are very actively exploring avenues to use artificial intelligence productively. There’s a lot of innovation going on. At the moment, we see a lot of that concentrated in back‑office kind of applications, so keeping your house in order in terms of getting processes done. But in trading and in credit decisions, these are also quite promising.

    In terms of risks, our primary concerns are cybersecurity risks. Many financial institutions are already under cyber attack., AI can be used to make defenses more efficient, but it can also be used for malicious purposes and making attacks more powerful. So, there’s really a bit of a power game on both sides. And we certainly advise many of our members to help them get to a more resilient financial system, relative to those cyber threats.

    Mr. WU: Maybe just quickly, to complement.

    I would encourage everybody to read Chapter 3 of the October 2024 GFSR, which addresses the issue of artificial intelligence in financial markets. Tobias is right, that there are benefits and risks on both sides.

    In addition to cybersecurity, I just wanted to highlight a couple more things, which is that, many of the financial institutions that we spoke to are still at their infancy in terms of deploying AI to make decisions—meaning, for trading or for investment allocation, they are at very early stages. But suppose that this trend rapidly gains? What would happen to risks?

    I think I will highlight two. One is concentration. Will it be a situation where the largest firms with the best models tend to win out and, therefore, dominate the marketplace? And then what are the implications for this? The second is that the speed of adjustment in financial markets might be much quicker if everything is based on high‑powered, artificial intelligence-type algorithms.

    With regard to these two risks, I think there’s great scope for supervisors to gather more information and understand who the key players are and what they are doing. International collaboration obviously is a crucial aspect of this. Market conduct needs to be taken into account, the future possibility that markets will be very much faster and more volatile, perhaps.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. The gentleman in the second row, please, in the middle here. Thank you.

    QUESTION: Good morning. I am [Fabrice Nodé‑Langlois] from the French newspaper Le Figaro.

    I have a question on the US public debt. There is a widespread opinion that whatever the level of the public debt—because of the significant role of the dollar, because of the might of the American military and economic power—it’s not a big concern. But under what circumstances, under what financial conditions would the US public debt become a concern for you?

    Mr. ADRIAN: Thanks so much for the question. We are certainly watching sovereign debt around the world, including in the US. I do want to point out that there will be a briefing for the Western Hemisphere region that will specifically focus on the Americas, including the United States.

    When you look at our last Article IV for the United States, we certainly find that the debt situation is sustainable. You know, The U.S. has many ways to adjust its expenditures and revenues. And we think that this makes the debt levels manageable.

    Having said that, as I explained at the beginning, we have seen broadly around the world an increase in debt‑to‑GDP levels, particularly since the start of the pandemic in 2020. And it is an important backdrop in terms of pricing and financial stability. So, we are watching the nexus between sovereign debt and financial intermediaries very carefully.

    Mr. Ferreira: Maybe one issue related with that— I think that we flagged it in the GFSR—is that I think there is an anticipation that—not only in the US but in several countries—there will be a lot of issuance of new debt going forward. Particularly in a moment where several central banks are doing some quantitative tightening, this might bring some challenges in terms of the function of the financial sector.

    Everything that we are seeing now seems to be working very well, even when we have this kind of shock. This is not a major concern. But going forward, we feel that it’s important to continue monitoring market liquidity. There are some flags that have been raised, particularly in terms of broker‑dealers’ capacity to continue intermediating and providing liquidity to public debt. It’s important to keep monitoring this, as central banks keep going in the direction of quantitative tightening.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you, Caio.

    And just to add to Tobias’s point, we will have a lot of regional pressers this week. And the Western Hemisphere presser will be on Friday if you have any US‑specific questions. Thank you.

    The lady here in the front row.

    QUESTION: Thank you. Thank you for taking my question. My name is Nume Ekeghe from This Day newspaper, Nigeria.

    The report mentions Nigeria’s return to Eurobond markets. And we know it was received positively by investors. So how does Nigeria’s return to Eurobond markets signal renewed investor confidence? And what specific macroeconomic reforms or improvements contributed to the shift in sentiments? Thank you.

    Mr. WU: Thank you for that question. Let me make some remarks about Nigeria and then sub‑Saharan Africa, in general.

    In the case of Nigeria, macroeconomic performance has held up,  GDP growth has been fairly consistent, and inflation has been coming down. Earlier this year, we have seen Nigeria’s sovereign credit spreads lowering. I think the reforms that the authorities have done, including the liberalization of exchange rates, has helped in that regard.

    That said, I think I want to go back to the theme that Tobias has mentioned, which is that during a time where global financial markets are volatile and risk appetite, in particular, is wavering, this is when we might see increases in sovereign spreads that will challenge the external picture for Nigeria, as well as other frontier economies. So, for example, Nigeria’s sovereign spread has increased in recent weeks, as stock markets globally have declined.

    The other challenge, of course, is for large commodity exporters, like Nigeria. If trade tensions are going to lead to lower global demand for commodities, this will obviously weigh on the revenue that they will receive. So, I think both of those developments would counsel that authorities remain quite vigilant to these developments and take appropriate policies to counter them.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you, Jason.

    And just before I come back to the floor, we have another question online, from Lu Kang, Sina Finance. The question is, in light of the IMF’s recent GFSR warning about rising debt, volatile capital flows, and diverging monetary policy paths, how should countries, especially emerging markets, balance financial stability with the imperative to finance climate transitions and digital infrastructure?

    Mr. ADRIAN: Thanks so much.

    We do a lot of work on debt management with countries. We are providing technical assistance and we are doing a lot of policy work on debt market developments. I think the two main takeaways are, No. 1, the plumbing matters. Putting into place mechanisms such as primary dealers and clearing systems, and pricing mechanisms in government bond markets. It is important all over the world. That includes the most advanced economies, as well as emerging markets. And we have seen tremendous progress in many countries, particularly the major emerging markets in terms of developing those bond markets.

    The second key aspect, of course, is fiscal sustainability. Here again, we engage very actively with our membership to make sure that fiscal frameworks are in place that keep debt trajectories on a path that is commensurate with the economic prospects of the countries.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you, Tobias. A question here in the front row, please.

    QUESTION: Thank you. Kemi Osukoya with The Africa Bazaar magazine.

    I wanted to follow up on the question that my colleague from Nigeria mentioned, regarding sovereign debts. As you know, African nations, after a period of pause, are just right now returning back to the Eurobond. But at the same time, there is unsustainable high borrowing costs that many of these countries face. So, in your recommendation, what can governments do regarding their bond to use it strategically, as well as to make it sustainable?

    Mr. ADRIAN: Thanks so much for this question. And you know, we are working very closely with many sub‑Saharan African countries to support the countries either via programs or via policy advice and technical assistance to have a macro environment that is conducive for growth. So let me mention three things.

    I think the first one is to recognize that we have been through a period of extraordinarily adverse shocks. Particularly in sub‑Saharan Africa, the pandemic had an outsized impact on many countries. The inflation that ensued was very costly for many countries, particularly for those that are importing commodities. So, the adverse economic shocks have been extraordinary. And I would just note that we have engaged more actively in programs with sub‑Saharan Africa in the past five years than we ever did previously.

    The second point is about the financing costs. And, of course, there are two main components. One is the overall level of financial conditions globally. All countries in the world are part of the global capital markets. And that really depends on overall financing conditions. But more specifically, of course, there are country‑specific conditions—the macroeconomic performance of each country, the buffers in the countries—and the mandate of the Fund is very much focused on macro‑financial stability. So, getting back to a place with buffers, which then can lead to lower financing costs is the main goal. Our work with those countries is very much focused on the kind of catalytic role of the Fund, where we are trying to get growth back and stability back. Let me stop here.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you, Tobias. And a question here in the front row, please. And then I will come back to the middle.

    QUESTION: Thank you very much. My name is [Shuichiro Takaoka]. I am working for Jiji Press.

    Just I would like to make clear the risk of a depreciation of the US dollar. And what are the implications of the recent depreciation of US dollar, especially regarding the global financial stability viewpoint?

    Mr. ADRIAN: As I mentioned earlier, we had seen quite a bit of an appreciation of the dollar earlier in the year and late [next] year. And now we have seen a depreciation that is roughly of commensurate magnitude. The volatility in the exchange rates is reflecting the broader volatility. There are some indications that the exchange rate movements are related to flows to investor reallocations, but the magnitudes of those flows are relatively small, relative to the run‑up of inflows into US assets in recent years. The cumulative inflows into bonds and stocks from around the world have been quite pronounced. So, to what extent these movements in the exchange rate and the associated flows are just a temporary or a more permanent impact remains to be seen. It really depends on how the current uncertainty is going to be resolved. As I said at the beginning, there are various scenarios. For the moment, it’s highly uncertain. As I said earlier, it is notable that the dollar declined, but I would not jump to conclusions in terms of how permanent that move may be.

    Mr. WU: Just to complement. I think when exchange rates are very volatile, one of the key channels for financial stability could be pressures in various funding markets. And this includes in cross currency markets, as well as in repo markets and other secure financing markets. I think this is something that we will be watching very closely. So far, we have not seen any major disruptions in those markets, despite the very volatile exchange rates.

    Mr. ADRIAN: So as a comparison, you can think of last August when there was a risk‑off moment. That was very short, but that did lead to dislocations in those cross‑currency funding markets. And we haven’t really seen that in recent weeks.

    Ms. LOUIS: So just on that line, I think you may have captured it, but I just wanted to get in this question that came in online from Greg Robb from MarketWatch. And it’s, have treasuries and the dollar lost their safe haven status? If not, what accounts for their recent performance?

    Mr. ADRIAN: So, again, it is somewhat unusual to see the dollar decline in the recent two weeks, really, when equity prices traded down with a negative tone and when longer‑term yields increased. But how lasting that is, is really too early to tell.

    US capital markets remain the largest and most liquid capital markets in the world. When you look at US dollars as a reserve asset, that remains over 60 percent among reserve managers. Global stock market capitalizations increased to 55 percent most recently, up from 30 percent in 2010. So, we have seen price movements that are notable; but in the big picture, the depth and size of the markets remain where they have been.

    Ms. LOUIS: And just on the same line, of capital markets. We have another question that came in online, [Anthony Rowley] from the South China Morning Post. And he says, both the EU and ASEAN are seeking more actively to promote capital market integration. Do you see this as reducing global dependence on US capital markets to any significant extent in the short to the medium term?

    Mr. ADRIAN: We are generally of the view that deep capital markets are beneficial everywhere. So, we are helping countries around the world to get to solid regulations and market mechanisms in sovereign bond markets but also, more broadly, in capital markets. And, for emerging markets and advanced economies, deepening capital markets has been a key priority.

    We have seen many firms from around the world come to US markets to issue stocks and bonds. And we think that’s related to the depth of the market and the sophistication of the financial sector in the US markets. So, it does provide a service to corporations and financial institutions around the world. But there are certainly many other markets that are deep, that are developing, and that are providing opportunities for both corporations and governments to issue. So, we have seen that trend continue.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Caio?

    Mr. Ferreira: Maybe just more broadly on the development of capital markets, as Tobias was saying, I think that it’s an important goal. And this has come hand‑in‑hand with the growth of non‑banking financial institutions that we are seeing across the globe. We see this as a potential positive development. You diversify the sources of funding and the credit to the real economy, diversify the risks across a broader set of institutions, this is good for the economy and financial stability.

    There are risks that need to be mitigated. We discuss some of them in the GFSR—leverage, interconnectedness between different kinds of institutions. But overall, there are policies created by the standard setters that, if implemented, can mitigate these risks.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you, Caio and Tobias. 

    Going back to the room. There’s a lady in the second row.

    QUESTION: Hi. Riley Callanan from GZERO Media.

    The IMF downgraded the US, the most of all advanced economies. And I was wondering, is this a short‑term hit that in a year could lead to greater growth and investment in the US? Or is this a long‑term downgrade? Or is it too soon to tell, as you said, with capital markets?

    Mr. ADRIAN: We are really looking more at the financial stability aspects. And I would just note that there has been a readjustment in expectations. Where the US and other economies are going to end up remains to be seen. But I think what is notable is that with the sharp adjustment in asset prices, the increase in uncertainty has been absorbed well in capital markets. And as Caio alluded to, it is the policy framework around the banking system and the non‑banks that is so important to create resilient and deep financial markets that are then facilitating adjustments, relative to new policy developments. And from that vantage point, I think even though we have seen the level of uncertainty increase, markets have been very orderly. And we think that the regulatory and policy framework is key for that achievement.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you, Tobias.

    And if you would like to flesh out any more details on the growth ramifications, we have a conference on Friday. And I can send you the details.

    Another question here, in the second row. I will come back to you.

    QUESTION: Hi. Gabriela Viana from Galapagos Capital in Brazil.

    So, in Brazil, commodities prices play an important role for currency [and] international capital inflows, especially in the stock market. Do you see commodities prices as a main important constraint for markets or the economic policy’s uncertainties or maybe the monetary tightening? Thank you.

    Mr. WU: All these factors are related to each other, obviously. So, I think the commodity prices, if the WEO forecast were to play out, the global economy is going to be slowing. It’s certainly an impact on the revenue side.

    I think for many emerging markets, the silver lining here is that they do have policy room. Many of them do have monetary policy room. Some of them have fiscal room, although only a few of them. So, it seems like this is going to be a challenging period, and uncertainty [and] commodity channels are both going to weigh on economies for emerging markets.

    We have seen broad‑based resilience among emerging markets over the last few years compared to, let’s say, five years before the pandemic. So, I think this speaks to the institutional quality having improved in emerging markets. And hopefully this would continue to buffer emerging markets from these external shocks.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you, Jason.

    And the lady in the middle. And then I will come back to Agence France‑Presse.

    QUESTION: Hi. Thank you for taking my question. I am Stephanie Stacey from the Financial Times.

    I wanted to expand on the previous questions about the dollar and treasuries. And I know you mentioned it’s hard to assess at this point how lasting the impact will be. But I wanted to ask what risks and future factors you think could drive a real shift in their safe haven status.

    Ms. LOUIS: Before we continue, are there any other questions on the dollar and the safe haven status? Yes. There is a question here.

    QUESTION: Hi. Mehreen Khan from The Times. I’m sorry. I will stand up.

    You mentioned the importance of swap lines and central banks cooperating at times of market stress. I mean, how much are we taking this type of cooperation for granted? And how much is the idea of the Fed providing swap lines to other central banks now in question, given the nature of the scrutiny that the institution is under from the Trump administration?

    Mr. ADRIAN: Let me start with the swap lines.

    In previous episodes of distress, such as the COVID-19 shock in 2020 or the global financial crisis in 2008, we have seen that swap lines from the major central banks—including Bank of England, ECB, Bank of Japan, and the Federal Reserve—have played an important role in terms of stabilizing market liquidity. The way to think about that is that the central banks are providing funding to partner central banks in the currency of the foreign assets that those institutions own. So, it’s an important underpinning to provide market functioning and resilience to your own assets in the hands of foreign financial institutions.

    As we mentioned earlier central banks have not intervened for liquidity purposes in recent weeks. And, despite a heightened market volatility, the VIX, for example, went from below 20 to between 40 and 50, which is fairly elevated. We have seen a very, very smooth market functioning across the board.

    Concerning the role of treasuries we are looking at the pricing of longer duration treasuries very carefully. We particularly look at supply factors, demand factors, and technical factors. We have seen volatility in the price moves, but we think that those are within reasonable historical norms.

    Mr. WU: Just to complement, I think in the treasury market, we have seen market functioning held up—meaning that buyers can find sellers and transactions are going through. I think that’s a very important sign.

    One thing that I wanted to mention also is that a year ago in our report, we pointed out that there are leveraged trades in the treasury market. These are trades that have not very much to do with economic fundamentals in the US or elsewhere but, rather, are using leverage to capture arbitrage opportunities in markets. When these trades are unwound, there will be impact in the treasury market. And this is something that we have pointed out before. These include the so‑called treasury cash‑futures basis trade, as well as a swap spread trade, which we have documented before. And I think during this episode, given the very heightened volatility, we have seen evidence of some of these positions being unwound, potentially having an impact on treasury yields as well. So, I just wanted to put this into context. This is not about capital outflows, but it’s about unwinding these trades having amplified the recent price movements in treasury markets.

    Mr. ADRIAN: We are seeing some indication that there’s some lowering in terms of the leverage in these trades, but we haven’t heard of disorderly deleveraging at this point. So, of course, with market volatility increasing, financial institutions naturally reduce their leverage. But we haven’t seen the kind of adverse feedback loop that was common, say, in 2008 or even as recent as the COVID-19 shock initially.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you, Tobias.

    And there’s a question from Agence France‑Presse, in the middle. And then I will come back to you, and you. We are running out of time. So, we will take very, very few questions left.

    QUESTION: Thanks for taking my question. Just a quick question. In your report, you talk about geopolitical risk, including the risk of military conflicts. I just wonder how seriously you think people should take that and where you rate that when it comes to the global financial stability risks you have discussed already.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. And I have just been told we are running out of time. So, we will just clump those questions, if you could be very quick. The gentleman over there and the lady there. And then we will wrap it up. Thank you.

    QUESTION: Hi. [Rafia] from Nigeria. I work on [Arise TV].

    The IMF keeps talking about building resilience to face the global challenge of the state of the economy of the world. How do you build resilience in a world economic climate when one man’s decision can tip the scale? Just one man. He could wake up tomorrow and all our projections falter. One man.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. And then the last question.

    QUESTION: Laura Noonan, Bloomberg News. Thanks for taking the question. It’s actually a related question.

    You spoke in the report about the need for policymakers to try to do what they can to guard against these future financial shocks. Do you have any practical suggestions on what those measures could be? And also, are you expecting people to take measures to make the financial system safer when the overall political mood, as you have seen, has very much been about trying to liberalize things, trying to deregulate, and trying to simplify? Thank you.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Tobias?

    Mr. ADRIAN: Let me address the three sets of questions and then turn to my colleagues as well.

    On geopolitical risk, we do have a chapter that was released last week that is looking at capital market performance relative to geopolitical risks. And the good news is that, generally, when adverse risks realize, there is an asset price adjustment. But on average, relative to recent decades, those risks are absorbed well by the financial system in general. Now, of course, when conflicts directly impact countries, that can have a pronounced impact on their financial systems, and it’s something that we are discussing in more detail in the chapter.

    Secondly, in terms of the exposure of countries to physical risk, we have certainly seen in some countries around the world, a heightened incidence of drought and floods, even those can be macro‑critical. To the extent that these developments impact macro stability, we are certainly there to support countries and help them, either via programs or policy frameworks.

    Thirdly, in terms of the regulation of financial institutions and financial markets. You know, I think the last couple of weeks are very good illustrations for the importance of resilience of financial institutions. I mean, we have seen a tremendous increase in the level of volatility, which reflects the higher level of uncertainty. Last October, our overarching message in the GFSR was that there was this wedge between policy uncertainty and financial market volatility, which at the time was very low. And we have seen financial market volatility catch up with the high level of policy uncertainty. But that has been orderly, and financial institutions have been resilient. That is really the main objective of financial sector regulation—to get to a place where the financial system can do its job in terms of adjusting to unexpected developments. And when you have resilience in banks and in non‑banks, these adjustments are smooth. And that is the point of finance, right? It’s a kind of an insurance mechanism for the global economy and for individual country macro economies. Good regulation leads to good stability. And we have a lot of detail on that in the GFSR.

    Mr. Ferreira: Maybe I could add a little bit on this about how to build resilience.

    I think that as Tobias was saying, trying to anticipate shocks is very hard. And it is very hard to do it. So, I think the way to build the resilience is focusing on vulnerabilities. In the GFSR, we have mentioned some vulnerabilities that we feel are important at this time. So, the valuations issues that makes the risk of repricing more likely, leveraging in some segments of the financial sector and in the interconnectedness with the banks, and also, of course, rising and high debt in several countries.

    How do you build the resilience in the face of these vulnerabilities? We do feel that banks in most countries are actually the cornerstone of the financial sector and so ensuring that they have appropriate levels of capital and liquidity is key. And the international standards do provide the basis for doing that. To address some of the other vulnerabilities, like leveraging an interconnection between different types of institutions, excessive [transformations], maybe.

    Finally, I think that on the issue of rising debt, one common theme that we have been talking about is about the need to credibly rebuild fiscal buffers.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you very much. I know we have covered a lot of ground, and I apologize that we could not get to everybody. If you do have any follow‑ups or any questions, please feel free to reach out to me. You can find the report online, and we can also send it to you bilaterally.

    Again, thank you very much for coming and thank you for your time. Take care.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Meera Louis

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    @IMFSpokesperson

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/04/22/tr-04222024-gfsr-press-briefing

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    April 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Durbin Statement On Secretary of State Rubio Announcing “Sweeping Reorganization” At The State Department

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Illinois Dick Durbin

    April 22, 2025

    CHICAGO – U.S. Senate Democratic Whip Dick Durbin (D-IL) released the following statement after Secretary of State Marco Rubio unveiled a plan to significantly reorganize the State Department, including targeting human rights programs and others focused on war crimes and democracy:

    “The chaos and cruelty of this Administration knows no bounds. After dismantling USAID, the Trump Administration is now going after the State Department—a critical department that executes our foreign policy goals, maintains our alliances around the world, and promotes the long-term security of the United States.

    “As more information becomes available, I will be monitoring these ‘reforms’ closely. I am particularly concerned over reports that the Trump Administration plans to target human rights programs and the monitoring of war crimes and democracy abroad. Secretary Rubio and I worked closely on many of these priorities during his time in the Senate and I know he understand the importance of American leadership on these issues. 

    “With instability continuing in challenging corners of the globe, now, more than ever, we need America’s top diplomats engaged—not ceding our leadership to China and Russia.”   

    In Congress and as Co-Chair of the Senate Ukraine Caucus, Durbin has continuously called out Russia for committing war crimes in Ukraine. Durbin and Senator Chuck Grassley’s (R-IA) bipartisan Justice for Victims of War Crimes Act – which updates the current war crimes statute to enable prosecution of war criminals in the United States regardless of the nationality of the perpetrator or victim – was signed into law by President Biden. 

    -30-

    MIL OSI USA News –

    April 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: L.A. Pawn Shop Owner Indicted for Allegedly Conspiring to Sell Stolen Andy Warhol Trial Proof and Lying to the FBI About Its Sale

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    LOS ANGELES – The owner of a pawn shop in the Mid-City area of Los Angeles was indicted today for allegedly conspiring to sell a stolen Andy Warhol print trial proof, which was shipped from the Beverly Hills office of an auction house to Dallas, then lying about it to federal agents.

    Glenn Steven Bednarsh, 58, of Farmington, Michigan and formerly of Beverly Hills, is charged in a two-count federal grand jury indictment with conspiracy and interstate transportation of stolen goods.

    He is expected to be arraigned in the coming weeks in United States District Court in downtown Los Angeles.

    According to the indictment, in February 2021, Bednarsh knowingly purchased for $6,000 a stolen Warhol trial proof depicting Russian revolutionary and Soviet Union leader Vladimir Lenin, which is worth an estimated $175,000. Bednarsh allegedly asked a co-conspirator, Brian Alec Light, 58, of Hudson, Ohio, and formerly a resident of downtown Los Angeles, to help him sell the stolen Warhol Lenin trial proof. Light then contacted the Beverly Hills of an auction house based in Dallas about selling the Warhol trial proof. 

    In March 2021, Bednarsh transported the trial proof to the Beverly Hills office of the auction house, which then shipped it to Dallas. Light e-signed an auction house consignment agreement and called the auction house to state he had dropped off the trial proof and to ask about receiving a cash advance for it.

    An employee of the auction house in Dallas reached out to the gallery in West Hollywood for its opinion of the piece, according to court documents. The gallery immediately recognized the piece as stolen, then notified the auction house and the FBI.

    Later in March 2021, when FBI agents began inquiring about the stolen Warhol trial proof, Light lied to them by saying he bought it at a Culver City garage sale for $18,000 and provided a fake receipt.

    In August and September of 2021, Bednarsh lied to FBI agents by telling them Light asked him to store the Warhol Lenin trial proof for him and that he agreed to do so out of friendship and not for financial gain. 

    An indictment is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

    Light pleaded guilty in November 2024 to one count of interstate transportation of stolen goods. His sentencing is currently set for May 27, and he faces up to 10 years in federal prison.

    The FBI’s Art Crime Team is investigating this matter.

    Assistant United States Attorneys Erik M. Silber of the Cyber and Intellectual Property Crimes Section and Matthew W. O’Brien of the Environmental Crime and Consumer Protection Section are prosecuting this case.

    MIL Security OSI –

    April 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: First Busey Corporation Announces 2025 First Quarter Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    LEAWOOD, Kan., April 22, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — First Busey Corporation (Nasdaq: BUSE) reports first quarter results.

    Busey completed the transformative acquisition of CrossFirst Bankshares, Inc. on March 1, 2025, significantly impacting first quarter results and resetting the baseline for financial performance for future quarters in a multitude of positive ways.

    Net Income (Loss) Diluted EPS Net Interest Margin1 ROAA1 ROATCE1
    $(30.0) million $(0.44) 3.16% (0.82)% (7.99)%
    $39.9 million (adj)2 $0.57 (adj)2 3.08% (adj)2 1.09% (adj)2 10.64% (adj)2
    MESSAGE FROM OUR CHAIRMAN & CEO

    The transformative partnership between Busey and CrossFirst takes our organization to new heights, combining our growing commercial bank with the power of Busey’s core deposit franchise, wealth management platform, and payment technology solutions at FirsTech, Inc. As we build upon Busey’s forward momentum, we are grateful for the opportunities to consistently earn the business of our customers, based on the contributions of our talented associates and the continued support of our loyal shareholders.

    Van A. Dukeman 
    Chairman and Chief Executive Officer 


    PARTNERSHIP WITH CROSSFIRST

    Effective March 1, 2025, First Busey Corporation (“Busey,” “Company,” “we,” “us,” or “our”), the holding company for Busey Bank, completed its previously announced acquisition (the “Merger”) of CrossFirst Bankshares, Inc. (“CrossFirst”) (NASDAQ: CFB), the holding company for CrossFirst Bank, pursuant to an Agreement and Plan of Merger, dated August 26, 2024, by and between Busey and CrossFirst (the “Merger Agreement”). This partnership creates a premier commercial bank in the Midwest, Southwest, and Florida, with 78 full-service locations across 10 states—Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Missouri, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas. The combined holding company will continue to operate under the First Busey Corporation name. Busey common stock will continue to trade on the Nasdaq under the “BUSE” stock ticker symbol.

    Upon completion of the acquisition, each share of CrossFirst common stock converted to the right to receive 0.6675 of a share of Busey’s common stock, with the result that holders of Busey’s common stock owned approximately 63.5% of the combined company and holders of CrossFirst’s common stock owned approximately 36.5% of the combined company, on a fully-diluted basis. Further, upon completion of the acquisition, each share of CrossFirst preferred stock converted to the right to receive one share of Busey preferred stock.

    CrossFirst Bank’s results of operations were included in Busey’s consolidated results of operations beginning March 1, 2025. Busey will operate CrossFirst Bank as a separate banking subsidiary until it is merged with and into Busey Bank, which is expected to occur on June 20, 2025. At the time of the bank merger, CrossFirst Bank locations will become banking centers of Busey Bank.

    The acquisition was accretive to tangible book value, exceeding initial projections of a six-month earn back period.

    Further details are included with Busey’s Current Report on Form 8‑K announcing completion of the acquisition, which was filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) on March 3, 2025.

    FINANCIAL RESULTS

    CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF INCOME (unaudited)
                 
        Three Months Ended
    (dollars in thousands, except per share amounts)   March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
    Net interest income   $ 103,731     $ 81,578     $ 75,854  
    Provision for credit losses     42,452       1,273       5,038  
    Total noninterest income     21,223       35,221       34,913  
    Total noninterest expense     115,171       78,167       70,769  
    Income (loss) before income taxes     (32,669 )     37,359       34,960  
    Income taxes     (2,679 )     9,254       8,735  
    Net income (loss)   $ (29,990 )   $ 28,105     $ 26,225  
                 
    Basic earnings (loss) per common share   $ (0.44 )   $ 0.49     $ 0.47  
    Diluted earnings (loss) per common share   $ (0.44 )   $ 0.49     $ 0.46  
    Effective income tax rate     8.20 %     24.77 %     24.99 %
     

    Busey’s results of operations for the first quarter of 2025 was a net loss of $(30.0) million, or $(0.44) per diluted common share, compared to net income of $28.1 million, or $0.49 per diluted common share, for the fourth quarter of 2024, and $26.2 million, or $0.46 per diluted common share, for the first quarter of 2024. Annualized return on average assets and annualized return on average tangible common equity2 were (0.82)% and (7.99)%, respectively, for the first quarter of 2025.

    Busey views certain non-operating items, including acquisition-related expenses, restructuring charges, and one-time strategic events, as adjustments to net income reported under U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”). We also adjust for net securities gains and losses to align with industry and research analyst reporting. The objective of our presentation of adjusted earnings and adjusted earnings metrics is to allow investors and analysts to more clearly identify quarterly trends in core earnings performance. Non-operating pre-tax adjustments for acquisition and restructuring expenses2 in the first quarter of 2025 were $26.0 million. Further, $3.1 million other noninterest expense was recorded to establish an initial allowance for Unfunded Commitments2 and $42.4 million provision expense was recorded to establish an initial Allowance for Credit Losses for loans purchased without credit deterioration (“non-PCD” loans) immediately following the close of the acquisition in accordance with Accounting Standards Codification 326-20-30-15. Additionally, net securities losses were $15.8 million, primarily related to the execution of a strategic balance sheet repositioning. Lastly, $4.6 million in one-time deferred tax valuation expense2 was recorded in connection with the CrossFirst acquisition, which is expected to lower our effective blended state tax rate in future periods but created a negative adjustment to the carrying value of our deferred tax asset in the current period. For more information and a reconciliation of these non-GAAP measures (which are identified with the endnote labeled as 2) in tabular form, see “Non-GAAP Financial Information.”

    Adjusted net income2, which excludes the impact of non-GAAP adjustments, was $39.9 million, or $0.57 per diluted common share, for the first quarter of 2025, compared to $30.9 million, or $0.53 per diluted common share, for the fourth quarter of 2024 and $25.7 million or $0.46 per diluted common share for the first quarter of 2024. Annualized adjusted return on average assets2 and annualized adjusted return on average tangible common equity2 were 1.09% and 10.64%, respectively, for the first quarter of 2025.

    Pre-Provision Net Revenue2

    Pre-provision net revenue2 was $25.6 million for the first quarter of 2025, compared to $38.8 million for the fourth quarter of 2024 and $46.4 million for the first quarter of 2024. Pre-provision net revenue to average assets2 was 0.70% for the first quarter of 2025, compared to 1.28% for the fourth quarter of 2024, and 1.55% for the first quarter of 2024.

    Adjusted pre-provision net revenue2 was $54.7 million for the first quarter of 2025, compared to $42.0 million for the fourth quarter of 2024 and $38.6 million for the first quarter of 2024. Adjusted pre-provision net revenue to average assets2 was 1.50% for the first quarter of 2025, compared to 1.38% for the fourth quarter of 2024 and 1.29% for the first quarter of 2024.

    Net Interest Income and Net Interest Margin2

    Net interest income was $103.7 million in the first quarter of 2025, compared to $81.6 million in the fourth quarter of 2024 and $75.9 million in the first quarter of 2024.

    Net interest margin2 was 3.16% for the first quarter of 2025, compared to 2.95% for the fourth quarter of 2024 and 2.79% for the first quarter of 2024. Excluding purchase accounting accretion, adjusted net interest margin2 was 3.08% for the first quarter of 2025, compared to 2.92% in the fourth quarter of 2024 and 2.78% in the first quarter of 2024.

    Components of the 21 basis point increase in net interest margin2 during the first quarter of 2025, which includes approximately +12 basis points contributed by CrossFirst Bank, are as follows:

    • Increased loan portfolio and held for sale loan yields contributed +36 basis points
    • Increased purchase accounting accretion contributed +5 basis points
    • Decreased borrowing expense contributed +3 basis points
    • Decreased expense on rate swaps contributed +2 basis points
    • Increased non-maturity deposit funding costs contributed -17 basis points
    • Decreased cash and securities portfolio yield contributed -8 basis points

    Based on our most recent Asset Liability Management Committee (“ALCO”) model, a +100 basis point parallel rate shock is expected to increase net interest income by 1.8% over the subsequent twelve-month period. Busey continues to evaluate and execute off-balance sheet hedging and balance sheet repositioning strategies as well as embedding rate protection in our asset originations to provide stabilization to net interest income in lower rate environments. Time deposit and savings specials have provided funding flows, and we had excess earning cash during the first quarter of 2025. A portion of the acquired CrossFirst Bank securities portfolio was liquidated when the acquisition was finalized, providing additional excess cash that will allow us to unwind non-core funding. As brokered CDs mature, Busey will continue to deploy excess cash to reduce wholesale funding levels during subsequent quarters. Total deposit cost of funds increased from 1.75% during the fourth quarter of 2024 to 1.91% during the first quarter of 2025. Deposit betas increased with the higher mix of acquired indexed and wholesale deposits and a full quarter of the consolidated Company’s funding base is projected to increase total deposit cost of funds during the second quarter of 2025. With the expectation of Busey paying down non-core funding, the deposit beta will lessen during the year and is expected to normalize in the 45% to 50% beta range. Growth in higher yielding earning assets is expected to offset the increased cost of funds pressure and we project further net interest margin expansion during the second quarter of 2025.

    Noninterest Income

      Three Months Ended
    (dollars in thousands) March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
    NONINTEREST INCOME          
    Wealth management fees $ 17,364     $ 16,786     $ 15,549  
    Fees for customer services   8,128       7,911       7,056  
    Payment technology solutions   5,073       5,094       5,709  
    Mortgage revenue   329       496       746  
    Income on bank owned life insurance   1,446       1,080       1,419  
    Realized net gains (losses) on the sale of mortgage servicing rights   —       —       7,465  
    Net securities gains (losses)   (15,768 )     (196 )     (6,375 )
    Other noninterest income   4,651       4,050       3,344  
    Total noninterest income $ 21,223     $ 35,221     $ 34,913  
       

    Total noninterest income decreased by 39.7% compared to the fourth quarter of 2024 and decreased by 39.2% compared to the first quarter of 2024, primarily due to net securities losses that were recorded in connection with a strategic balance sheet repositioning.

    Excluding the impact of net securities gains and losses and the gains on the sale of mortgage servicing rights, adjusted noninterest income2 increased by 4.4% to $37.0 million, or 26.3% of operating revenue2, during the first quarter of 2025, compared to $35.4 million, or 30.3% of operating revenue2, for the fourth quarter of 2024. Compared to the first quarter of 2024, adjusted noninterest income2 increased by 9.4% from $33.8 million, or 30.8% of operating revenue2.

    Our fee-based businesses continue to add revenue diversification. Wealth management fees, wealth management referral fees included in other noninterest income, and payment technology solutions contributed 61.1% of adjusted noninterest income2 for the first quarter of 2025.

    Noteworthy components of noninterest income are as follows:

    • Wealth management fees increased by 3.4% compared to the fourth quarter of 2024. Compared to the first quarter of 2024 wealth management fees increased by 11.7%. Busey’s Wealth Management division ended the first quarter of 2025 with $13.68 billion in assets under care, compared to $13.83 billion at the end of the fourth quarter of 2024 and $12.76 billion at the end of the first quarter of 2024. Our portfolio management team continues to focus on long-term returns and managing risk in the face of volatile markets and has outperformed its blended benchmark3 over the last three and five years. The Wealth Management segment reported another quarter of record high revenue for the first quarter of 2025.
    • Payment technology solutions revenue decreased slightly compared the fourth quarter of 2024. Compared to the first quarter of 2024, payment technology solutions revenue decreased by 11.1% primarily due to decreases in income from electronic, online, and interactive voice response payments, partially offset by increases in lockbox and merchant services income.
    • Fees for customer services increased by 2.7% compared to the fourth quarter of 2024 primarily due to increases in income from analysis charges and interchange fees, offset by lower non-sufficient funds charges. Compared to the first quarter of 2024, fees for customer services increased by 15.2% primarily due to increases in analysis charges, automated teller machine fees, and interchange fees, offset by lower non-sufficient funds charges. Increases in fees for customer services are primarily attributable to the inclusion of one month of CrossFirst’s income in our first quarter results.
    • Other noninterest income increased by 14.8% compared to the fourth quarter of 2024 and by 39.1% compared to the first quarter of 2024. The increase for both periods was driven by increases in swap origination fee income, commercial loan sales gains, letter of credit fee income, and other real estate owned income, offset by decreases in venture capital income.

    Operating Efficiency

      Three Months Ended
    (dollars in thousands) March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
    NONINTEREST EXPENSE          
    Salaries, wages, and employee benefits $ 67,563   $ 45,458   $ 42,090
    Data processing expense   9,575     6,564     6,550
    Net occupancy expense of premises   5,799     4,794     4,720
    Furniture and equipment expense   1,744     1,650     1,813
    Professional fees   9,511     4,938     2,253
    Amortization of intangible assets   3,083     2,471     2,409
    Interchange expense   1,343     1,305     1,611
    FDIC insurance   2,167     1,330     1,400
    Other noninterest expense   14,386     9,657     7,923
    Total noninterest expense $ 115,171   $ 78,167   $ 70,769
     

    Total noninterest expense increased by 47.3% compared to the fourth quarter of 2024 and increased by 62.7% compared to the first quarter of 2024. Growth in noninterest expense was primarily attributable to one-time acquisition expenses related to the CrossFirst acquisition as well as added costs for operating expenses for two banks during one month of the quarter. Annual pre-tax expense synergy estimates resulting from the CrossFirst acquisition remain on track at $25.0 million. Busey anticipates a 50% rate of synergy realization in 2025 and 100% in 2026.

    Adjusted noninterest expense2, which excludes acquisition and restructuring expenses, amortization of intangible assets, and the provision for unfunded commitments, was $82.9 million in the first quarter of 2025, compared to $72.6 million in the fourth quarter of 2024 and $68.6 million in the first quarter of 2024. As our business grows, Busey remains focused on prudently managing our expense base and operating efficiency.

    Noteworthy components of noninterest expense are as follows:

    • Salaries, wages, and employee benefits expenses increased by $22.1 million compared to the fourth quarter of 2024, and by $25.5 million compared to the first quarter of 2024, of which $15.6 million and $15.8 million, respectively, was attributable to increases in non-operating expenses, with additional severance, retention, and stock-based compensation. Busey has added 501 full time equivalent associates (“FTEs”) over the past year, mostly as a result of acquisitions, including 437 CrossFirst Bank FTEs added in March 2025 and 46 Merchants & Manufacturers Bank FTEs added in April 2024.
    • Data processing expense increased by $3.0 million compared to both the fourth quarter of 2024 and the first quarter of 2024, of which $2.3 million and $2.2 million, respectively, was attributable to increases in non-operating expenses. Busey has continued to make investments in technology enhancements and has also experienced inflation-driven price increases.
    • Professional fees increased by $4.6 million compared to the fourth quarter of 2024, of which $4.3 million was attributable to increases in non-operating expenses. Compared to the first quarter of 2024, professional fees increased by $7.3 million, of which $7.2 million was attributable to increases in non-operating expenses.
    • Amortization of intangible assets increased by $0.6 million compared to the fourth quarter of 2024, and by $0.7 million compared to the first quarter of 2024. The CrossFirst acquisition added an estimated $81.8 million of finite-lived intangible assets, which will be amortized using an accelerated amortization methodology.
    • Other noninterest expense increased by $4.7 million compared to the fourth quarter of 2024, and increased by $6.5 million compared to the first quarter of 2024, of which $0.3 million and $0.5 million, respectively, resulted from increases in non-operating expenses related to acquisition and restructuring expenses. Further, $3.1 million of non-operating expenses was recorded for the Day 2 provision for unfunded commitments. Multiple expense items contributed to the remaining fluctuations in this expense category, including marketing, business development, regulatory expenses, mortgage servicing rights valuation expenses, and other real estate owned.

    Busey’s efficiency ratio2 was 79.3% for the first quarter of 2025, compared to 64.5% for the fourth quarter of 2024 and 58.1% for the first quarter of 2024. Our adjusted efficiency2 ratio was 58.7% for the first quarter of 2025, compared to 61.8% for the fourth quarter of 2024, and 62.3% for the first quarter of 2024.

    Busey’s annualized ratio of adjusted noninterest expense to average assets was 2.27% for the first quarter of 2025, compared to 2.39% for the fourth quarter of 2024 and 2.30% for the first quarter of 2024.

    BALANCE SHEET STRENGTH

    CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS (unaudited)
               
      As of
    (dollars in thousands, except per share amounts) March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
    ASSETS          
    Cash and cash equivalents $ 1,200,292     $ 697,659     $ 591,071  
    Debt securities available for sale   2,273,874       1,810,221       1,898,072  
    Debt securities held to maturity   815,402       826,630       862,218  
    Equity securities   10,828       15,862       9,790  
    Loans held for sale   7,270       3,657       6,827  
    Portfolio loans   13,868,357       7,697,087       7,588,077  
    Allowance for credit losses   (195,210 )     (83,404 )     (91,562 )
    Restricted bank stock   53,518       49,930       6,000  
    Premises and equipment, net   182,003       118,820       121,506  
    Right of use assets   40,594       10,608       10,590  
    Goodwill and other intangible assets, net   496,118       365,975       351,455  
    Other assets   711,206       533,677       533,414  
    Total assets $ 19,464,252     $ 12,046,722     $ 11,887,458  
               
    LIABILITIES & STOCKHOLDERS’ EQUITY          
    Liabilities          
    Total deposits $ 16,459,470     $ 9,982,490     $ 9,960,191  
    Securities sold under agreements to repurchase   137,340       155,610       147,175  
    Short-term borrowings   11,209       —       —  
    Long-term debt   306,509       227,723       223,100  
    Junior subordinated debt owed to unconsolidated trusts   77,117       74,815       72,040  
    Lease liabilities   41,111       11,040       10,896  
    Other liabilities   251,890       211,775       191,405  
    Total liabilities   17,284,646       10,663,453       10,604,807  
               
    Stockholders’ equity          
    Retained earnings   249,484       294,054       248,412  
    Accumulated other comprehensive income (loss)   (172,810 )     (207,039 )     (222,190 )
    Other stockholders’ equity1   2,102,932       1,296,254       1,256,429  
    Total stockholders’ equity   2,179,606       1,383,269       1,282,651  
    Total liabilities & stockholders’ equity $ 19,464,252     $ 12,046,722     $ 11,887,458  
               
    SHARE AND PER SHARE AMOUNTS          
    Book value per common share2 $ 24.13     $ 24.31     $ 23.19  
    Tangible book value per common share2 $ 18.62     $ 17.88     $ 16.84  
    Ending number of common shares outstanding   90,008,178       56,895,981       55,300,008  

    ___________________________________________
    1. Net balance of preferred stock ($0.001 par value), common stock ($0.001 par value), additional paid-in capital, and treasury stock.
    2. See “Non-GAAP Financial Information” for reconciliation.

    AVERAGE BALANCES (unaudited)
               
      Three Months Ended
    (dollars in thousands) March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
    ASSETS          
    Cash and cash equivalents $ 861,021   $ 776,572   $ 594,193
    Investment securities   2,782,435     2,597,309     2,907,144
    Loans held for sale   3,443     6,306     4,833
    Portfolio loans   9,838,337     7,738,772     7,599,316
    Interest-earning assets   13,363,594     11,048,350     11,005,903
    Total assets   14,831,298     12,085,993     12,024,208
               
    LIABILITIES & STOCKHOLDERS’ EQUITY          
    Noninterest-bearing deposits   3,036,127     2,724,344     2,708,586
    Interest-bearing deposits   9,142,781     7,325,662     7,330,105
    Total deposits   12,178,908     10,050,006     10,038,691
    Federal funds purchased and securities sold under agreements to repurchase   144,838     135,728     178,659
    Interest-bearing liabilities   9,627,841     7,763,729     7,831,655
    Total liabilities   12,896,222     10,689,054     10,748,484
    Stockholders’ equity – preferred   2,669     —     —
    Stockholders’ equity – common   1,932,407     1,396,939     1,275,724
    Tangible common equity1   1,521,387     1,029,539     922,710

    ___________________________________________
    1. See “Non-GAAP Financial Information” for reconciliation.

    Busey’s financial strength is built on a long-term conservative operating approach. That focus will not change now or in the future.

    Total assets were $19.46 billion as of March 31, 2025, compared to $12.05 billion as of December 31, 2024, and $11.89 billion as of March 31, 2024. Average interest-earning assets were $13.36 billion for the first quarter of 2025, compared to $11.05 billion for the fourth quarter of 2024, and $11.01 billion for the first quarter of 2024.

    Portfolio Loans

    We remain steadfast in our conservative approach to underwriting and our disciplined approach to pricing, particularly given our outlook for the economy in the coming quarters. Portfolio loans totaled $13.87 billion at March 31, 2025, compared to $7.70 billion at December 31, 2024, and $7.59 billion at March 31, 2024. Busey Bank’s portfolio loans grew by $133.6 million during the first quarter of 2025, with growth centered in the commercial category. In addition, as of March 31, 2024, CrossFirst Bank added $6.04 billion in loans to Busey’s loan portfolio.

    Average portfolio loans were $9.84 billion for the first quarter of 2025, compared to $7.74 billion for the fourth quarter of 2024 and $7.60 billion for the first quarter of 2024.

    Asset Quality

    Asset quality continues to be strong. Busey Bank maintains a well-diversified loan portfolio and, as a matter of policy and practice, limits concentration exposure in any particular loan segment. CrossFirst Bank’s policies are similar in nature to Busey Bank’s policies and Busey is in the process of migrating the legacy CrossFirst portfolio toward Busey Bank’s policies.

    ASSET QUALITY (unaudited)
               
      As of
    (dollars in thousands) March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
    Total assets $ 19,464,252     $ 12,046,722     $ 11,887,458  
    Portfolio loans   13,868,357       7,697,087       7,588,077  
    Loans 30 – 89 days past due   18,554       8,124       7,441  
    Non-performing loans:          
    Non-accrual loans   48,647       22,088       17,465  
    Loans 90+ days past due and still accruing   6,077       1,149       88  
    Non-performing loans   54,724       23,237       17,553  
    Other non-performing assets   4,757       63       65  
    Non-performing assets   59,481       23,300       17,618  
    Substandard (excludes 90+ days past due)   131,078       62,023       87,830  
    Classified assets $ 190,559     $ 85,323     $ 105,448  
               
    Allowance for credit losses $ 195,210     $ 83,404     $ 91,562  
               
    RATIOS          
    Non-performing loans to portfolio loans   0.39 %     0.30 %     0.23 %
    Non-performing assets to total assets   0.31 %     0.19 %     0.15 %
    Non-performing assets to portfolio loans and other non-performing assets   0.43 %     0.30 %     0.23 %
    Allowance for credit losses to portfolio loans   1.41 %     1.08 %     1.21 %
    Coverage ratio of the allowance for credit losses to non-performing loans 3.57 x   3.59 x   5.22 x
    Classified assets to Bank Tier 1 capital1and reserves   8.40 %     5.61 %     7.24 %

    ___________________________________________
    1. Capital amounts for the first quarter of 2025 are not yet finalized and are subject to change.

    Loans 30-89 days past due increased by $10.4 million compared to December 31, 2024, and increased by $11.1 million compared to March 31, 2024. Busey Bank’s loans 30-89 days past due were $6.1 million, a decrease of $2.0 million compared to December 31, 2024. CrossFirst Bank’s loans 30-89 days past due were $12.5 million as of March 31, 2025.

    Non-performing loans increased by $31.5 million compared to December 31, 2024, and increased by $37.2 million compared to March 31, 2024. Busey Bank’s non-performing loans were $6.8 million, a decrease of $16.4 million compared to December 31, 2024. CrossFirst Bank’s non-performing loans were $47.9 million as of March 31, 2025. Continued disciplined credit management resulted in non-performing loans as a percentage of portfolio loans of 0.39% as of March 31, 2025, a 9 basis point increase from December 31, 2024, and a 16 basis point increase from March 31, 2024.

    Non-performing assets increased by $36.2 million compared to December 31, 2024, and increased by $41.9 million compared to March 31, 2024. Busey Bank’s non-performing assets were $7.1 million, a decrease of $16.2 million compared to December 31, 2024. CrossFirst Bank’s non-performing assets were $52.4 million as of March 31, 2025. Non-performing assets represented 0.31% of total assets as of March 31, 2025, a 12 basis point increase from December 31, 2024, and a 16 basis point increase from March 31, 2024.

    Classified assets increased by $105.2 million compared to December 31, 2024, and increased by $85.1 million compared to March 31, 2024. Busey Bank’s classified assets were $81.3 million, a decrease of $4.0 million compared to December 31, 2024. CrossFirst Bank’s classified assets were $109.3 million as of March 31, 2025.

    The allowance for credit losses was $195.2 million as of March 31, 2025, representing 1.41% of total portfolio loans outstanding, and providing coverage of 3.57 times our non-performing loans balance. In connection with the CrossFirst acquisition, the Day 1 allowance recorded for loans that were purchased with credit deterioration (“PCD” loans) was $100.8 million. The Day 1 PCD allowance was recorded as an adjustment to the fair value of the PCD loans.

    NET CHARGE-OFFS (RECOVERIES) AND PROVISION EXPENSE (RELEASE) (unaudited)
               
      Three Months Ended
    (dollars in thousands) March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
    Net charge-offs (recoveries) $ 31,429   $ 2,850   $ 5,216
    Provision expense (release)   42,452     1,273     5,038
                     

    Net charge-offs increased by $28.6 million when compared to the fourth quarter of 2024, and by $26.2 million when compared with the first quarter of 2024. Net charge-offs include $29.6 million related to PCD loans acquired from CrossFirst Bank, which were fully reserved at acquisition and did not require recording additional provision expense.

    Busey’s results for the first quarter of 2025 include $42.5 million provision expense for credit losses, which includes $42.4 million that was recorded to establish an initial allowance for credit losses on non-PCD acquired loans.

    Deposits

    Total deposits were $16.46 billion at March 31, 2025, compared to $9.98 billion at December 31, 2024, and $9.96 billion at March 31, 2024. Average deposits were $12.18 billion for the first quarter of 2025, compared to $10.05 billion for the fourth quarter of 2024 and $10.04 billion for the first quarter of 2024.

    Core deposits2 accounted for 89.7% of total deposits as of March 31, 2025. The quality of our core deposit franchise is a critical value driver of our institution. We estimated that 32% of our deposits were uninsured and uncollateralized4 as of March 31, 2025, and we have sufficient on- and off-balance sheet liquidity to manage deposit fluctuations and the liquidity needs of our customers.

    We have executed various deposit campaigns to attract term funding and savings accounts at a lower rate than our marginal cost of funds. New certificate of deposit production in the first quarter of 2025 had a weighted average term of 7.8 months at a rate of 3.58%, which was 96 basis points below our average marginal wholesale equivalent-term funding cost during the quarter.

    Borrowings

    As of March 31, 2025, Busey Bank held $16.7 million of long-term Federal Home Loan Bank (“FHLB”) borrowings. In comparison, Busey Bank had no short-term or long-term FHLB borrowings as of December 31, 2024, or March 31, 2024. As of March 31, 2025, CrossFirst Bank held $11.2 million of short-term FHLB borrowings and $61.9 million of long-term FHLB borrowings.

    In addition, associated with the CrossFirst acquisition, Busey assumed trust preferred securities with a recorded balance of $2.2 million as of March 31, 2025.

    Liquidity

    As of March 31, 2025, our available sources of on- and off-balance sheet liquidity5 totaled $8.55 billion. Furthermore, our balance sheet liquidity profile continues to be aided by the cash flows we expect from our relatively short-duration securities portfolio. Those cash flows were approximately $119.7 million in the first quarter of 2025. Cash flows from maturing securities within our portfolio are expected to be approximately $302.3 million for the remainder of 2025, with a current book yield of 2.55%, and approximately $308.1 million for 2026, with a current book yield of 2.59%.

    Capital Strength

    The strength of our balance sheet is also reflected in our capital foundation. Although impacted by the strategic deployment of capital for the CrossFirst acquisition, our capital ratios remain strong, and as of March 31, 2025, our regulatory capital ratios continued to provide a buffer of more than $630 million above levels required to be designated well-capitalized. Busey’s Common Equity Tier 1 ratio is estimated6 to be 11.99% at March 31, 2025, compared to 14.10% at December 31, 2024, and 13.45% at March 31, 2024. Our Total Capital to Risk Weighted Assets ratio is estimated6 to be 14.87% at March 31, 2025, compared to 18.53% at December 31, 2024, and 17.95% at March 31, 2024.

    Busey’s tangible common equity2 was $1.68 billion at March 31, 2025, compared to $1.02 billion at December 31, 2024, and $931.2 million at March 31, 2024. Tangible common equity2 represented 8.83% of tangible assets at March 31, 2025, compared to 8.71% at December 31, 2024, and 8.07% at March 31, 2024.

    Busey’s tangible book value per common share2 was $18.62 at March 31, 2025, compared to $17.88 at December 31, 2024, and $16.84 at March 31, 2024, reflecting a 10.6% year-over-year increase. The ratios of tangible common equity to tangible assets2 and tangible book value per common share have been impacted by the fair market valuation adjustment of Busey’s securities portfolio as a result of the current rate environment, which is reflected in the accumulated other comprehensive income (loss) component of shareholder’s equity.

    Busey’s strong capital levels, coupled with its earnings, have allowed the Company to provide a steady return to its stockholders through dividends. During the first quarter of 2025, we paid a dividend of $0.25 per share on Busey’s common stock, which represents a 4.2% increase from the previous quarterly dividend of $0.24 per share. Busey has consistently paid dividends to its common stockholders since the bank holding company was organized in 1980.

    During the first quarter of 2025, Busey resumed making stock repurchases under its stock repurchase plan, purchasing 220,000 shares of its common stock at a weighted average price of $21.98 per share for a total of $4.8 million. As of March 31, 2025, Busey had 1,699,275 shares remaining on its stock repurchase plan available for repurchase.

    FIRST QUARTER EARNINGS INVESTOR PRESENTATION

    For additional information on Busey’s financial condition and operating results, please refer to our Q1 2025 Earnings Investor Presentation furnished via Form 8‑K on April 22, 2025, in connection with this earnings release.

    CORPORATE PROFILE

    As of March 31, 2025, First Busey Corporation (Nasdaq: BUSE) was a $19.46 billion financial holding company headquartered in Leawood, Kansas.

    Busey Bank, a wholly-owned bank subsidiary of First Busey Corporation headquartered in Champaign, Illinois, had total assets of $11.98 billion as of March 31, 2025. Busey Bank currently has 62 banking centers, with 21 in Central Illinois markets, 17 in suburban Chicago markets, 20 in the St. Louis Metropolitan Statistical Area, three in Southwest Florida, and one in Indianapolis. More information about Busey Bank can be found at busey.com.

    CrossFirst Bank, a wholly-owned bank subsidiary of First Busey Corporation headquartered in Leawood, Kansas, had total assets of $7.45 billion as of March 31, 2025. CrossFirst Bank currently has 16 banking centers located across Arizona, Colorado, Kansas, Missouri, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas. More information about CrossFirst Bank can be found at crossfirstbank.com. It is anticipated that CrossFirst Bank will be merged with and into Busey Bank on June 20, 2025.

    Through Busey’s Wealth Management division, the Company provides a full range of asset management, investment, brokerage, fiduciary, philanthropic advisory, tax preparation, and farm management services to individuals, businesses, and foundations. Assets under care totaled $13.68 billion as of March 31, 2025. More information about Busey’s Wealth Management services can be found at busey.com/wealth-management.

    Busey Bank’s wholly-owned subsidiary, FirsTech, specializes in the evolving financial technology needs of small and medium-sized businesses, highly regulated enterprise industries, and financial institutions. FirsTech provides comprehensive and innovative payment technology solutions, including online, mobile, and voice-recognition bill payments; money and data movement; merchant services; direct debit services; lockbox remittance processing for payments made by mail; and walk-in payments at retail agents. Additionally, FirsTech simplifies client workflows through integrations enabling support with billing, reconciliation, bill reminders, and treasury services. More information about FirsTech can be found at firstechpayments.com.

    For the fourth consecutive year, Busey was named among 2025’s America’s Best Banks by Forbes. Ranked 88th overall, Busey was one of seven banks headquartered in Illinois included on this year’s list. Busey was also named among the 2024 Best Banks to Work For by American Banker, the 2024 Best Places to Work in Money Management by Pensions and Investments, the 2024 Best Places to Work in Illinois by Daily Herald Business Ledger, the 2025 Best Places to Work in Indiana by the Indiana Chamber of Commerce, and the 2024 Best Companies to Work For in Florida by Florida Trend magazine. We are honored to be consistently recognized globally, nationally and locally for our engaged culture of integrity and commitment to community development.

    NON-GAAP FINANCIAL INFORMATION

    This earnings release contains certain financial information determined by methods other than GAAP. Management uses these non-GAAP measures, together with the related GAAP measures, in analysis of Busey’s performance and in making business decisions, as well as for comparison to Busey’s peers. Busey believes the adjusted measures are useful for investors and management to understand the effects of certain non-core and non-recurring items and provide additional perspective on Busey’s performance over time.

    The following tables present reconciliations between these non-GAAP measures and what management believes to be the most directly comparable GAAP financial measures.

    These non-GAAP disclosures have inherent limitations and are not audited. They should not be considered in isolation or as a substitute for operating results reported in accordance with GAAP, nor are they necessarily comparable to non-GAAP performance measures that may be presented by other companies. Tax effected numbers included in these non-GAAP disclosures are based on estimated statutory rates, estimated federal income tax rates, or effective tax rates, as noted with the tables below.

    RECONCILIATION OF NON-GAAP FINANCIAL MEASURES (Unaudited)
     
    Pre-Provision Net Revenue and Related Measures
                 
        Three Months Ended
    (dollars in thousands)   March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
    Net interest income (GAAP)   $ 103,731     $ 81,578     $ 75,854  
    Total noninterest income (GAAP)     21,223       35,221       34,913  
    Net security (gains) losses (GAAP)     15,768       196       6,375  
    Total noninterest expense (GAAP)     (115,171 )     (78,167 )     (70,769 )
    Pre-provision net revenue (Non-GAAP) [a]   25,551       38,828       46,373  
    Acquisition and restructuring expenses     26,026       3,585       408  
    Provision for unfunded commitments1     3,141       (455 )     (678 )
    Realized (gain) loss on the sale of mortgage service rights     —       —       (7,465 )
    Adjusted pre-provision net revenue (Non-GAAP) [b] $ 54,718     $ 41,958     $ 38,638  
                 
    Average total assets [c]   14,831,298       12,085,993       12,024,208  
                 
    Pre-provision net revenue to average total assets (Non-GAAP)2 [a÷c]   0.70 %     1.28 %     1.55 %
    Adjusted pre-provision net revenue to average total assets (Non-GAAP)2 [b÷c]   1.50 %     1.38 %     1.29 %

    ___________________________________________

    1. For the three months ended March 31, 2025, the provision for unfunded commitments included Day 2 provision expense of $3.139 million recorded in connection with the CrossFirst acquisition.
    2. Annualized measure.
    Adjusted Net Income, Average Tangible Common Equity, and Related Ratios
                 
        Three Months Ended
    (dollars in thousands, except per share amounts)   March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
    Net income (loss) (GAAP) [a] $ (29,990 )   $ 28,105     $ 26,225  
    Acquisition expenses     26,026       2,469       285  
    Restructuring expenses     —       1,116       123  
    Day 2 provision for credit losses1     42,433       —       —  
    Day 2 provision for unfunded commitments2     3,139       —       —  
    Net securities (gains) losses     15,768       196       6,375  
    Realized net (gains) losses on the sale of mortgage servicing rights     —       —       (7,465 )
    Related tax (benefit) expense3     (22,069 )     (1,014 )     170  
    One-time deferred tax valuation adjustment4     4,591       —       —  
    Adjusted net income (Non-GAAP)5 [b] $ 39,898     $ 30,872     $ 25,713  
                 
    Weighted average number of common shares outstanding, diluted (GAAP) [c]   68,517,647       57,934,812       56,406,500  
    Diluted earnings (loss) per common share (GAAP) [a÷c] $ (0.44 )   $ 0.49     $ 0.46  
                 
    Weighted average number of common shares outstanding, diluted (Non-GAAP)6 [d]   69,502,717       57,934,812       56,406,500  
    Adjusted diluted earnings per common share (Non-GAAP)5,6 [b÷d] $ 0.57     $ 0.53     $ 0.46  
                 
    Average total assets [e] $ 14,831,298     $ 12,085,993     $ 12,024,208  
    Return on average assets (Non-GAAP)7 [a÷e] (0.82 )%     0.93 %     0.88 %
    Adjusted return on average assets (Non-GAAP)5,7 [b÷e]   1.09 %     1.02 %     0.86 %
                 
    Average common equity   $ 1,932,407     $ 1,396,939     $ 1,275,724  
    Average goodwill and other intangible assets, net     (411,020 )     (367,400 )     (353,014 )
    Average tangible common equity (Non-GAAP) [f] $ 1,521,387     $ 1,029,539     $ 922,710  
                 
    Return on average tangible common equity (Non-GAAP)7 [a÷f] (7.99 )%     10.86 %     11.43 %
    Adjusted return on average tangible common equity (Non-GAAP)5,7 [b÷f]   10.64 %     11.93 %     11.21 %

    ___________________________________________

    1. The Day 2 allowance for credit losses was recorded in connection with the CrossFirst acquisition to establish an allowance on non-PCD loans and is reflected within the provision for credit losses line on the Statement of Income.
    2. The Day 2 provision for unfunded commitments was recorded in connection with the CrossFirst acquisition and is reflected within the other noninterest expense line, as a component of total noninterest expense, on the Statement of Income.
    3. Tax benefits were calculated using tax rates of 25.3%, 26.8%, and 24.9% for the three months ended March 31, 2025, December 31, 2024, and March 31, 2024, respectively.
    4. The deferred tax valuation adjustment was recorded in connection with the CrossFirst acquisition and relates to the expansion of Busey’s footprint into new states. The deferred tax valuation adjustment is reflected within the income taxes line on the Statement of Income.
    5. Beginning in 2025, Busey revised its calculation of adjusted net income for all periods presented to include, as applicable, adjustments for net securities gains and losses, realized net gains and losses on the sale of mortgage servicing rights, and one-time deferred tax valuation adjustments. In 2024, these adjusting items were previously presented as further adjustments to adjusted net income.
    6. Dilution includes shares that would have been dilutive if there had been net income during the period.
    7. Annualized measure.
    Tax-Equivalent Net Interest Income, Adjusted Net Interest Income, Net Interest Margin, and Adjusted Net Interest Margin
                 
        Three Months Ended
    (dollars in thousands)   March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
    Net interest income (GAAP)   $ 103,731     $ 81,578     $ 75,854  
    Tax-equivalent adjustment1     537       446       449  
    Tax-equivalent net interest income (Non-GAAP) [a]   104,268       82,024       76,303  
    Purchase accounting accretion related to business combinations     (2,728 )     (812 )     (204 )
    Adjusted net interest income (Non-GAAP) [b] $ 101,540     $ 81,212     $ 76,099  
                 
    Average interest-earning assets (Non-GAAP) [c] $ 13,363,594     $ 11,048,350     $ 11,005,903  
                 
    Net interest margin (Non-GAAP)2 [a÷c]   3.16 %     2.95 %     2.79 %
    Adjusted net interest margin (Non-GAAP)2 [b÷c]   3.08 %     2.92 %     2.78 %

    ___________________________________________

    1. Tax-equivalent adjustments were calculated using an estimated federal income tax rate of 21%, applied to non-taxable interest income on investments and loans.
    2. Annualized measure.
    Adjusted Noninterest Income, Revenue Measures, Adjusted Noninterest Expense, Efficiency Ratios, and Adjusted Noninterest Expense to Average Assets
                 
        Three Months Ended
    (dollars in thousands)   March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
    Net interest income (GAAP) [a] $ 103,731     $ 81,578     $ 75,854  
    Tax-equivalent adjustment1     537       446       449  
    Tax-equivalent net interest income (Non-GAAP) [b]   104,268       82,024       76,303  
                 
    Total noninterest income (GAAP)     21,223       35,221       34,913  
    Net security (gains) losses     15,768       196       6,375  
    Noninterest income excluding net securities gains and losses (Non-GAAP) [c]   36,991       35,417       41,288  
    Realized net (gains) losses on the sale of mortgage servicing rights     —       —       (7,465 )
    Adjusted noninterest income (Non-GAAP) [d] $ 36,991     $ 35,417     $ 33,823  
                 
    Tax-equivalent revenue (Non-GAAP) [e = b+c] $ 141,259     $ 117,441     $ 117,591  
    Adjusted tax-equivalent revenue (Non-GAAP) [f = b+d] $ 141,259     $ 117,441     $ 110,126  
    Operating revenue (Non-GAAP) [g = a+d] $ 140,722     $ 116,995     $ 109,677  
                 
    Adjusted noninterest income to operating revenue (Non-GAAP) [d÷g]   26.29 %     30.27 %     30.84 %
                 
    Total noninterest expense (GAAP)   $ 115,171     $ 78,167     $ 70,769  
    Amortization of intangible assets     (3,083 )     (2,471 )     (2,409 )
    Noninterest expense excluding amortization of intangible assets (Non-GAAP) [h]   112,088       75,696       68,360  
    Acquisition and restructuring expenses     (26,026 )     (3,585 )     (408 )
    Provision for unfunded commitments2     (3,141 )     455       678  
    Adjusted noninterest expense (Non-GAAP)3 [i] $ 82,921     $ 72,566     $ 68,630  
                 
    Efficiency ratio (Non-GAAP) [h÷e]   79.35 %     64.45 %     58.13 %
    Adjusted efficiency ratio (Non-GAAP)3 [i÷f]   58.70 %     61.79 %     62.32 %
                 
    Average total assets [j] $ 14,831,298     $ 12,085,993     $ 12,024,208  
    Adjusted noninterest expense to average assets (Non-GAAP)4 [i÷j]   2.27 %     2.39 %     2.30 %

    ___________________________________________

    1. Tax-equivalent adjustments were calculated using an estimated federal income tax rate of 21%, applied to non-taxable interest income on investments and loans.
    2. For the three months ended March 31, 2025, the provision for unfunded commitments included Day 2 provision expense of $3.139 million recorded in connection with the CrossFirst acquisition.
    3. Beginning in 2025, Busey revised its calculation of adjusted noninterest expense and the adjusted efficiency ratio for all periods presented to include, as applicable, adjustments for the provision for unfunded commitments. In 2024, these adjustments were previously presented as adjustments for adjusted core expense and the adjusted core efficiency ratio.
    4. Annualized measure.
    Tangible Assets, Tangible Common Equity, and Related Measures and Ratio
                 
        As of
    (dollars in thousands, except per share amounts)   March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
    Total assets (GAAP)   $ 19,464,252     $ 12,046,722     $ 11,887,458  
    Goodwill and other intangible assets, net     (496,118 )     (365,975 )     (351,455 )
    Tangible assets (Non-GAAP)1 [a] $ 18,968,134     $ 11,680,747     $ 11,536,003  
                 
    Total stockholders’ equity (GAAP)   $ 2,179,606     $ 1,383,269     $ 1,282,651  
    Preferred stock and additional paid in capital on preferred stock     (7,750 )     —       —  
    Common equity [b]   2,171,856       1,383,269       1,282,651  
    Goodwill and other intangible assets, net     (496,118 )     (365,975 )     (351,455 )
    Tangible common equity (Non-GAAP)1 [c] $ 1,675,738     $ 1,017,294     $ 931,196  
                 
    Tangible common equity to tangible assets (Non-GAAP)1 [c÷a]   8.83 %     8.71 %     8.07 %
                 
    Ending number of common shares outstanding (GAAP) [d]   90,008,178       56,895,981       55,300,008  
    Book value per common share (Non-GAAP) [b÷d] $ 24.13     $ 24.31     $ 23.19  
    Tangible book value per common share (Non-GAAP) [c÷d] $ 18.62     $ 17.88     $ 16.84  

    ___________________________________________

    1. Beginning in 2025, Busey revised its calculation of tangible assets and tangible common equity for all periods presented to exclude any tax adjustment.
    Core Deposits and Related Ratio
                 
        As of
    (dollars in thousands)   March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
    Total deposits (GAAP) [a] $ 16,459,470     $ 9,982,490     $ 9,960,191  
    Brokered deposits, excluding brokered time deposits of $250,000 or more     (722,309 )     (13,090 )     (6,001 )
    Time deposits of $250,000 or more     (967,262 )     (334,503 )     (326,795 )
    Core deposits (Non-GAAP) [b] $ 14,769,899     $ 9,634,897     $ 9,627,395  
                 
    Core deposits to total deposits (Non-GAAP) [b÷a]   89.73 %     96.52 %     96.66 %
     

    FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS

    This press release may contain “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 with respect to Busey’s financial condition, results of operations, plans, objectives, future performance, and business. Forward-looking statements, which may be based upon beliefs, expectations and assumptions of Busey’s management and on information currently available to management, are generally identifiable by the use of words such as “believe,” “expect,” “anticipate,” “plan,” “intend,” “estimate,” “may,” “will,” “would,” “could,” “should,” “position,” or other similar expressions. Additionally, all statements in this document, including forward-looking statements, speak only as of the date they are made, and Busey undertakes no obligation to update any statement in light of new information or future events.

    A number of factors, many of which are beyond Busey’s ability to control or predict, could cause actual results to differ materially from those in any forward-looking statements. These factors include, among others, the following: (1) the strength of the local, state, national, and international economies and financial markets (including effects of inflationary pressures and supply chain constraints); (2) changes in, and the interpretation and prioritization of, local, state, and federal laws, regulations, and governmental policies (including those concerning Busey’s general business); (3) the economic impact of any future terrorist threats or attacks, widespread disease or pandemics, or other adverse external events that could cause economic deterioration or instability in credit markets (including Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the conflict in the Middle East); (4) unexpected results of acquisitions, including the acquisition of CrossFirst, which may include the failure to realize the anticipated benefits of the acquisitions and the possibility that the transaction and integration costs may be greater than anticipated; (5) the imposition of tariffs or other governmental policies impacting the value of products produced by Busey’s commercial borrowers; (6) new or revised accounting policies and practices as may be adopted by state and federal regulatory banking agencies, the Financial Accounting Standards Board, the Securities and Exchange Commission, or the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board; (7) changes in interest rates and prepayment rates of Busey’s assets (including the impact of sustained elevated interest rates); (8) increased competition in the financial services sector (including from non-bank competitors such as credit unions and fintech companies) and the inability to attract new customers; (9) changes in technology and the ability to develop and maintain secure and reliable electronic systems; (10) the loss of key executives or associates, talent shortages, and employee turnover; (11) unexpected outcomes and costs of existing or new litigation, investigations, or other legal proceedings, inquiries, and regulatory actions involving Busey (including with respect to Busey’s Illinois franchise taxes); (12) fluctuations in the value of securities held in Busey’s securities portfolio, including as a result of changes in interest rates; (13) credit risk and risk from concentrations (by type of borrower, geographic area, collateral, and industry), within Busey’s loan portfolio and large loans to certain borrowers (including commercial real estate loans); (14) the concentration of large deposits from certain clients who have balances above current Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation insurance limits and may withdraw deposits to diversify their exposure; (15) the level of non-performing assets on Busey’s balance sheets; (16) interruptions involving information technology and communications systems or third-party servicers; (17) breaches or failures of information security controls or cybersecurity-related incidents; (18) the economic impact on Busey and its customers of climate change, natural disasters, and exceptional weather occurrences such as tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, blizzards, and droughts; (19) the ability to successfully manage liquidity risk, which may increase dependence on non-core funding sources such as brokered deposits, and may negatively impact Busey’s cost of funds; (20) the ability to maintain an adequate level of allowance for credit losses on loans; (21) the effectiveness of Busey’s risk management framework; and (22) the ability of Busey to manage the risks associated with the foregoing. These risks and uncertainties should be considered in evaluating forward-looking statements and undue reliance should not be placed on such statements.

    Additional information concerning Busey and its business, including additional factors that could materially affect Busey’s financial results, is included in Busey’s filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

    END NOTES

    1 Annualized measure.
    2 Represents a non-GAAP financial measure. For a reconciliation to the most directly comparable financial measure calculated and presented in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”), see “Non-GAAP Financial Information.”
    3 The blended benchmark consists of 60% MSCI All Country World Index and 40% Bloomberg Intermediate US Government/Credit Total Return Index.
    4 Estimated uninsured and uncollateralized deposits consist of account balances in excess of the $250 thousand Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation insurance limit, less intercompany accounts, fully collateralized accounts (including preferred deposits), and pass-through accounts where clients have deposit insurance at the correspondent financial institution.
    5 On- and off-balance sheet liquidity is comprised of cash and cash equivalents, debt securities excluding those pledged as collateral, brokered deposits, and Busey’s borrowing capacity through its revolving credit facility, the FHLB, the Federal Reserve Bank, and federal funds purchased lines.
    6 Capital amounts and ratios for the first quarter of 2025 are not yet finalized and are subject to change.

    INVESTOR CONTACT: Scott A. Phillips, Interim Chief Financial Officer | 239-689-7167

    The MIL Network –

    April 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Baker Hughes Company Announces First-Quarter 2025 Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    First-quarter highlights

    • Orders of $6.5 billion, including $3.2 billion of IET orders.
    • RPO of $33.2 billion, including record IET RPO of $30.4 billion.
    • Revenue of $6.4 billion, consistent year-over-year.
    • Attributable net income of $402 million.
    • GAAP diluted EPS of $0.40 and adjusted diluted EPS* of $0.51.
    • Adjusted EBITDA* of $1,037 million, up 10% year-over-year.
    • Cash flows from operating activities of $709 million and free cash flow* of $454 million.
    • Returns to shareholders of $417 million, including $188 million of share repurchases.

    HOUSTON and LONDON, April 22, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Baker Hughes Company (Nasdaq: BKR) (“Baker Hughes” or the “Company”) announced results today for the first quarter of 2025.

    “Baker Hughes started the year strong, building on the positive momentum from 2024 and setting multiple first-quarter records. Our continued transformation initiatives and strong execution continue to drive structural margin improvement across both segments. The operational transformation and streamlining efforts have created a solid foundation to optimize margins and enhance returns, even in a challenging environment,” said Lorenzo Simonelli, Baker Hughes chairman and chief executive officer.

    “In our IET segment, we booked $3.2 billion of orders, including our first data center awards, totaling more than 350 MW of power solutions for this rapidly evolving market. In addition to expanding opportunities for data centers, we have a strong pipeline of LNG, FPSO and gas infrastructure projects that support our order outlook for this year.”

    “In OFSE, EBITDA remained resilient as our margins saw noticeable improvement compared to last year even while segment revenue fell. This is a testament to the team’s hard work in changing the way the business operates.”

    “Although our outlook is tempered by broader macro and trade policy uncertainty, we remain confident in our strategy and the resilience of our portfolio. We believe Baker Hughes is well positioned to navigate near-term challenges and deliver sustainable growth in shareholder value.”

    “I want to thank our employees, whose hard work, dedication and focus have been instrumental to the continued success of Baker Hughes. As we continue to execute our strategy amidst an uncertain macro backdrop, we remain committed to our customers, shareholders and employees,” concluded Simonelli.

    * Non-GAAP measure. See reconciliations in the section titled “Reconciliation of GAAP to non-GAAP Financial Measures.”

      Three Months Ended   Variance
    (in millions except per share amounts) March 31,
    2025
    December 31,
    2024
    March 31,
    2024
      Sequential Year-over-
    year
    Orders $ 6,459 $ 7,496 $ 6,542   (14 %) (1 %)
    Revenue   6,427   7,364   6,418   (13 %) — %
    Net income attributable to Baker Hughes   402   1,179   455   (66 %) (12 %)
    Adjusted net income attributable to Baker Hughes*   509   694   429   (27 %) 19 %
    Adjusted EBITDA*   1,037   1,310   943   (21 %) 10 %
    Diluted earnings per share (EPS)   0.40   1.18   0.45   (66 %) (11 %)
    Adjusted diluted EPS*   0.51   0.70   0.43   (27 %) 19 %
    Cash flow from operating activities   709   1,189   784   (40 %) (10 %)
    Free cash flow*   454   894   502   (49 %) (10 %)

    * Non-GAAP measure. See reconciliations in the section titled “Reconciliation of GAAP to non-GAAP Financial Measures.”

    Certain columns and rows in our tables and financial statements may not sum up due to the use of rounded numbers.

    Quarter Highlights

    Baker Hughes expanded its leadership position in liquefied natural gas (“LNG”) in the first quarter, including a liquefaction train award from Bechtel for a project in North America, where the Company will provide four main refrigerant compressors driven by LM6000+ gas turbines and four expander-compressors. This award builds on the previously announced December 2024 award and further demonstrates the strength of the Company’s collaboration with Bechtel to support North America LNG development.

    During the quarter, Industrial & Energy Technology (“IET”) signed key strategic framework agreements with LNG operators. The Company agreed to provide gas turbines and refrigerant compressor technology, along with maintenance services, for Trains 4 to 8 of NextDecade’s Rio Grande LNG Facility. Baker Hughes also reached an agreement with Argent LNG to provide liquefaction and power solutions and related aftermarket services for its proposed 24 MTPA LNG export facility in Louisiana. The project will employ Baker Hughes’ NMBL™ modularized LNG solution, driven by the LM9000 gas turbine, while also utilizing the Company’s iCenter™ and Cordant™ digital solution, to enhance the plant’s operational efficiency.

    Baker Hughes also demonstrated its continuous commitment to critical gas infrastructure projects with a strategic win in the North America pipeline compression market. The award includes the provision of two gas compression stations for a total of 10 Frame 5/2E gas turbines and 10 centrifugal compressors, anti-surge valves and critical spare parts.

    In the first quarter, Baker Hughes made significant progress in reliable and sustainable power solutions deployment for data centers. In addition to being awarded over 350 MW of NovaLT™ turbines to power data centers with various other customers, the Company partnered with Frontier Infrastructure to accelerate the development of large-scale carbon capture and storage (“CCS”) and power solutions for data centers and industrial customers in the U.S. This partnership will leverage technologies and services across the Baker Hughes enterprise by providing CO₂ compression, NovaLT™ gas turbines, digital monitoring solutions, well construction and completion services.

    In continued demonstration of Gas Technology’s lifecycle offerings in IET, the Company received several aftermarket service awards during the quarter. In Algeria, the Gas Technology Services (“GTS”) team is partnering with SONATRACH to deliver an upgrade solution for the modernization of a key compressor station. In the Middle East, Gas Technology received multiple equipment and services awards to support one of the world’s largest gas processing plants. The scope includes rejuvenation of two existing gas turbines to drive new compressors and the supply of a third compression train to support production expansion.

    IET’s Industrial Solutions gained momentum with its Cordant™ Asset Performance Management (“APM”) solution, securing several contracts with customers across multiple regions. ADNOC Offshore will deploy the full APM suite to enhance production availability and efficiency. In the Americas, a large international oil company will conduct a proof of concept across multiple equipment trains, to support a shift from proactive to predictive maintenance. In Australia, the Company signed agreements to develop asset maintenance strategies for new mine sites supporting truck fleet maintenance.

    Oilfield Services & Equipment (“OFSE”) received a significant award from ExxonMobil Guyana to provide specialty chemicals and related services for its Uaru and Whiptail offshore greenfield developments in the country’s prolific Stabroek Block, highlighting the differentiated capabilities of our Production Solutions offering. For this multi-year contract, the scope will cover topsides, subsea, water injection and utility chemicals to help ExxonMobil Guyana achieve optimal production.

    OFSE continues to leverage the Company’s innovative solutions to help Petrobras unlock Brazil’s vast energy supply. In the quarter and following an open tender, Baker Hughes received a significant, multi-year fully integrated completions systems contract from Petrobras across multiple deepwater fields. A range of Baker Hughes’ technologies, including the new SureCONTROLTM Premium interval control valve, has been specifically tailored to meet the needs of the country’s offshore developments.

    OFSE secured a multi-year contract with Dubai Petroleum Establishment, for and on behalf of Dubai Supply Authority, to provide integrated coiled-tubing drilling services for the Company’s Margham Gas storage project. This follows a third-quarter 2024 IET award for integrated compressor line units for the same project, demonstrating growing commercial synergies across Baker Hughes’ diverse portfolio.

    The Company drove growth in Mature Assets Solutions, signing a multi-year framework agreement with Equinor to help establish a new Center of Excellence for Plug & Abandonment work in the North Sea. Based within OFSE’s operations in Bergen and Stavanger, Norway, this hub will ensure economical, reliable solutions are implemented to responsibly abandon each well, allowing Equinor to maximize value of their assets and allocate more resources to exploration and discovery.

    On the digital front, OFSE received an award from the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (“SOCAR”) to expand deployment of Leucipa™ automated field production solution for all its wells, including those with non-Baker Hughes electric submersible pumps, in the Absheron and Gunseli fields. Leucipa also marked its first deployment in Sub-Saharan Africa through an agreement with the NNPC/FIRST E&P joint venture, which will utilize the platform across its offshore wells in the Niger Delta.

    Consolidated Financial Results

    Revenue for the quarter was $6,427 million, a decrease of 13% sequentially and up $9 million year-over-year. The increase in revenue year-over-year was driven by an increase in IET and partially offset by a decrease in OFSE.

    The Company’s total book-to-bill ratio in the first quarter of 2025 was 1.0; the IET book-to-bill ratio was 1.1.

    Net income as determined in accordance with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States of America (“GAAP”), for the first quarter of 2025 was $402 million. Net income decreased $777 million sequentially and decreased $53 million year-over-year.

    Adjusted net income (a non-GAAP financial measure) for the first quarter of 2025 was $509 million, which excludes adjustments totaling $108 million. A list of the adjusting items and associated reconciliation from GAAP has been provided in Table 1b in the section titled “Reconciliation of GAAP to non-GAAP Financial Measures.” Adjusted net income for the first quarter of 2025 was down 27% sequentially and up 19% year-over-year.

    Depreciation and amortization for the first quarter of 2025 was $285 million.

    Adjusted EBITDA (a non-GAAP financial measure) for the first quarter of 2025 was $1,037 million, which excludes adjustments totaling $140 million. See Table 1a in the section titled “Reconciliation of GAAP to non-GAAP Financial Measures.” Adjusted EBITDA for the first quarter was down 21% sequentially and up 10% year-over-year.

    The sequential decrease in adjusted net income and adjusted EBITDA was primarily driven by lower volume in both segments, partially offset by productivity and structural cost-out initiatives. The year-over-year increase in adjusted net income and adjusted EBITDA was driven by increased volume in IET including higher proportionate growth in Gas Technology Equipment (“GTE”) and productivity, structural cost-out initiatives and higher pricing in both segments, partially offset by decreased volume and business mix in OFSE and cost inflation in both segments.

    Other Financial Items

    Remaining Performance Obligations (“RPO”) in the first quarter of 2025 ended at $33.2 billion, a decrease of $0.1 billion from the fourth quarter of 2024. OFSE RPO was $2.8 billion, down 7% sequentially, while IET RPO was $30.4 billion, up $300 million sequentially. Within IET RPO, GTE RPO was $11.9 billion and GTS RPO was $15.1 billion.

    Income tax expense in the first quarter of 2025 was $152 million.

    Other (income) expense, net in the first quarter of 2025 was $140 million, primarily related to changes in fair value for equity securities of $140 million.

    GAAP diluted earnings per share was $0.40. Adjusted diluted earnings per share (a non-GAAP financial measure) was $0.51. Excluded from adjusted diluted earnings per share were all items listed in Table 1b in the section titled “Reconciliation of GAAP to non-GAAP Financial Measures.”

    Cash flow from operating activities was $709 million for the first quarter of 2025. Free cash flow (a non-GAAP financial measure) for the quarter was $454 million. A reconciliation from GAAP has been provided in Table 1c in the section titled “Reconciliation of GAAP to non-GAAP Financial Measures.”

    Capital expenditures, net of proceeds from disposal of assets, were $255 million for the first quarter of 2025, of which $158 million was for OFSE and $83 million was for IET.

    Results by Reporting Segment

    The following segment discussions and variance explanations are intended to reflect management’s view of the relevant comparisons of financial results on a sequential or year-over-year basis, depending on the business dynamics of the reporting segments.

    Oilfield Services & Equipment

    (in millions) Three Months Ended   Variance
    Segment results March 31,
    2025
    December 31,
    2024
    March 31,
    2024
      Sequential Year-over-
    year
    Orders $ 3,281   $ 3,740   $ 3,624     (12 %) (9 %)
    Revenue $ 3,499   $ 3,871   $ 3,783     (10 %) (8 %)
    EBITDA $ 623   $ 755   $ 644     (18 %) (3 %)
    EBITDA margin   17.8 %   19.5 %   17.0 %   -1.7pts 0.8pts
    (in millions) Three Months Ended   Variance
    Revenue by Product Line March 31,
    2025
    December 31,
    2024
    March 31,
    2024
      Sequential Year-over-
    year
    Well Construction $ 892 $ 943 $ 1,061   (5 %) (16 %)
    Completions, Intervention, and Measurements   925   1,022   1,006   (9 %) (8 %)
    Production Solutions   899   974   945   (8 %) (5 %)
    Subsea & Surface Pressure Systems   782   932   771   (16 %) 1 %
    Total Revenue $ 3,499 $ 3,871 $ 3,783   (10 %) (8 %)
    (in millions) Three Months Ended   Variance
    Revenue by Geographic Region March 31,
    2025
    December 31,
    2024
    March 31,
    2024
      Sequential Year-over-
    year
    North America $ 922 $ 971 $ 990   (5 %) (7 %)
    Latin America   568   661   637   (14 %) (11 %)
    Europe/CIS/Sub-Saharan Africa   580   740   750   (22 %) (23 %)
    Middle East/Asia   1,429   1,499   1,405   (5 %) 2 %
    Total Revenue $ 3,499 $ 3,871 $ 3,783   (10 %) (8 %)
                 
    North America $ 922 $ 971 $ 990   (5 %) (7 %)
    International $ 2,577 $ 2,900 $ 2,793   (11 %) (8 %)

    EBITDA excludes depreciation and amortization of $226 million, $229 million, and $222 million for the three months ended March 31, 2025, December 31, 2024, and March 31, 2024, respectively. EBITDA margin is defined as EBITDA divided by revenue.

    OFSE orders of $3,281 million for the first quarter of 2025 decreased by 12% sequentially. Subsea and Surface Pressure Systems orders were $532 million, down 34% sequentially, and down 16% year-over-year.

    OFSE revenue of $3,499 million for the first quarter of 2025 was down 10% sequentially, and down 8% year-over-year.

    North America revenue was $922 million, down 5% sequentially. International revenue was $2,577 million, down 11% sequentially, with declines across all regions.

    Segment EBITDA for the first quarter of 2025 was $623 million, a decrease of $132 million, or 18% sequentially. The sequential decrease in EBITDA was primarily driven by lower volume, partially mitigated by productivity from structural cost-out initiatives.

    Industrial & Energy Technology

    (in millions) Three Months Ended   Variance
    Segment results March 31,
    2025
    December 31,
    2024
    March 31,
    2024
      Sequential Year-over-
    year
    Orders $ 3,178   $ 3,756   $ 2,918     (15 %) 9 %
    Revenue $ 2,928   $ 3,492   $ 2,634     (16 %) 11 %
    EBITDA $ 501   $ 639   $ 386     (22 %) 30 %
    EBITDA margin   17.1 %   18.3 %   14.7 %   -1.2pts 2.4pts
    (in millions) Three Months Ended   Variance
    Orders by Product Line March 31,
    2025
    December 31,
    2024
    March 31,
    2024
      Sequential Year-over-
    year
    Gas Technology Equipment $ 1,335 $ 1,865 $ 1,230   (28 %) 9 %
    Gas Technology Services   913   902   692   1 % 32 %
    Total Gas Technology   2,248   2,767   1,922   (19 %) 17 %
    Industrial Products   501   515   546   (3 %) (8 %)
    Industrial Solutions   281   320   257   (12 %) 10 %
    Total Industrial Technology   782   835   803   (6 %) (3 %)
    Climate Technology Solutions   148   154   193   (4 %) (23 %)
    Total Orders $ 3,178 $ 3,756 $ 2,918   (15 %) 9 %
    (in millions) Three Months Ended   Variance
    Revenue by Product Line March 31,
    2025
    December 31,
    2024
    March 31,
    2024
      Sequential Year-over-
    year
    Gas Technology Equipment $ 1,456 $ 1,663 $ 1,210   (12 %) 20 %
    Gas Technology Services   592   796   614   (26 %) (4 %)
    Total Gas Technology   2,047   2,459   1,824   (17 %) 12 %
    Industrial Products   445   548   462   (19 %) (4 %)
    Industrial Solutions   258   282   265   (8 %) (2 %)
    Total Industrial Technology   703   830   727   (15 %) (3 %)
    Climate Technology Solutions   178   204   83   (13 %) 114 %
    Total Revenue $ 2,928 $ 3,492 $ 2,634   (16 %) 11 %

    EBITDA excludes depreciation and amortization of $53 million, $56 million, and $56 million for the three months ended March 31, 2025, December 31, 2024, and March 31, 2024, respectively. EBITDA margin is defined as EBITDA divided by revenue.

    IET orders of $3,178 million for the first quarter of 2025 increased by $260 million, or 9% year-over-year. The increase was driven primarily by Gas Technology, up $326 million or 17% year-over-year.

    IET revenue of $2,928 million for the first quarter of 2025 increased $294 million, or 11% year-over-year. The increase was driven by Gas Technology Equipment, up $246 million or 20% year-over-year, and Climate Technology Solutions, up $95 million or 114% year-over-year.

    Segment EBITDA for the quarter was $501 million, an increase of $114 million, or 30% year-over-year. The year-over-year increase in segment EBITDA was driven by productivity, positive pricing and increased volume including higher proportionate growth in GTE, partially offset by cost inflation.

    Reconciliation of GAAP to non-GAAP Financial Measures

    Management provides non-GAAP financial measures because it believes such measures are widely accepted financial indicators used by investors and analysts to analyze and compare companies on the basis of operating performance (including adjusted EBITDA; adjusted net income attributable to Baker Hughes; and adjusted diluted earnings per share) and liquidity (free cash flow) and that these measures may be used by investors to make informed investment decisions. Management believes that the exclusion of certain identified items from several key operating performance measures enables us to evaluate our operations more effectively, to identify underlying trends in the business, and to establish operational goals for certain management compensation purposes. Management also believes that free cash flow is an important supplemental measure of our cash performance but should not be considered as a measure of residual cash flow available for discretionary purposes, or as an alternative to cash flow from operating activities presented in accordance with GAAP.

    Table 1a. Reconciliation of Net Income Attributable to Baker Hughes to Adjusted EBITDA and Segment EBITDA

      Three Months Ended
    (in millions) March 31,
    2025
    December 31,
    2024
    March 31,
    2024
    Net income attributable to Baker Hughes (GAAP) $ 402 $ 1,179   $ 455  
    Net income attributable to noncontrolling interests   7   11     8  
    Provision (benefit) for income taxes   152   (398 )   178  
    Interest expense, net   51   54     41  
    Depreciation & amortization   285   291     283  
    Restructuring   —   258     —  
    Inventory impairment(1)   —   73     —  
    Change in fair value of equity securities(2)   140   (196 )   (52 )
    Other charges and credits(2)   —   38     30  
    Adjusted EBITDA (non-GAAP)   1,037   1,310     943  
    Corporate costs   85   84     88  
    Other income / (expense) not allocated to segments   1   —     —  
    Total Segment EBITDA (non-GAAP) $ 1,124 $ 1,394   $ 1,030  
    OFSE   623   755     644  
    IET   501   639     386  

    (1) Charges for inventory impairments are reported in “Cost of goods sold” in the condensed consolidated statements of income (loss).

    (2) Change in fair value of equity securities and other charges and credits are reported in “Other (income) expense, net” on the condensed consolidated statements of income (loss).

    Table 1a reconciles net income attributable to Baker Hughes, which is the directly comparable financial result determined in accordance with GAAP, to adjusted EBITDA and Segment EBITDA. Adjusted EBITDA and Segment EBITDA exclude the impact of certain identified items.

    Table 1b. Reconciliation of Net Income Attributable to Baker Hughes to Adjusted Net Income Attributable to Baker Hughes

      Three Months Ended
    (in millions, except per share amounts) March 31,
    2025
    December 31,
    2024
    March 31,
    2024
    Net income attributable to Baker Hughes (GAAP) $ 402   $ 1,179   $ 455  
    Restructuring   —     258     —  
    Inventory impairment   —     73     —  
    Change in fair value of equity securities   140     (196 )   (52 )
    Other adjustments   —     30     32  
    Tax adjustments(1)   (32 )   (650 )   (6 )
    Total adjustments, net of income tax   108     (485 )   (26 )
    Less: adjustments attributable to noncontrolling interests   —     —     —  
    Adjustments attributable to Baker Hughes   108     (485 )   (26 )
    Adjusted net income attributable to Baker Hughes (non-GAAP) $ 509   $ 694   $ 429  
           
    Denominator:      
    Weighted-average shares of Class A common stock outstanding diluted   999     999     1,004  
    Adjusted earnings per share – diluted (non-GAAP) $ 0.51   $ 0.70   $ 0.43  

    (1) All periods reflect the tax associated with the other (income) loss adjustments.

    Table 1b reconciles net income attributable to Baker Hughes, which is the directly comparable financial result determined in accordance with GAAP, to adjusted net income attributable to Baker Hughes. Adjusted net income attributable to Baker Hughes excludes the impact of certain identified items.

    Table 1c. Reconciliation of Net Cash Flows From Operating Activities to Free Cash Flow

      Three Months Ended
    (in millions) March 31,
    2025
    December 31,
    2024
    March 31,
    2024
    Net cash flows from operating activities (GAAP) $ 709   $ 1,189   $ 784  
    Add: cash used for capital expenditures, net of proceeds from disposal of assets   (255 )   (295 )   (282 )
    Free cash flow (non-GAAP) $ 454   $ 894   $ 502  

    Table 1c reconciles net cash flows from operating activities, which is the directly comparable financial result determined in accordance with GAAP, to free cash flow. Free cash flow is defined as net cash flows from operating activities less expenditures for capital assets plus proceeds from disposal of assets.

     
    Financial Tables (GAAP)
     
    Condensed Consolidated Statements of Income (Loss)
     
    (Unaudited)
     
      Three Months Ended March 31,
    (In millions, except per share amounts)   2025     2024  
    Revenue $ 6,427   $ 6,418  
    Costs and expenses:    
    Cost of revenue   4,952     4,976  
    Selling, general and administrative   577     618  
    Research and development costs   146     164  
    Other (income) expense, net   140     (22 )
    Interest expense, net   51     41  
    Income before income taxes   561     641  
    Provision for income taxes   (152 )   (178 )
    Net income   409     463  
    Less: Net income attributable to noncontrolling interests   7     8  
    Net income attributable to Baker Hughes Company $ 402   $ 455  
         
    Per share amounts:  
    Basic income per Class A common stock $ 0.41   $ 0.46  
    Diluted income per Class A common stock $ 0.40   $ 0.45  
         
    Weighted average shares:    
    Class A basic   992     998  
    Class A diluted   999     1,004  
         
    Cash dividend per Class A common stock $ 0.23   $ 0.21  
         
    Condensed Consolidated Statements of Financial Position
     
    (Unaudited)
     
    (In millions) March 31, 2025 December 31, 2024
    ASSETS
    Current Assets:    
    Cash and cash equivalents $ 3,277 $ 3,364
    Current receivables, net   6,710   7,122
    Inventories, net   5,161   4,954
    All other current assets   1,693   1,771
    Total current assets   16,841   17,211
    Property, plant and equipment, less accumulated depreciation   5,168   5,127
    Goodwill   6,126   6,078
    Other intangible assets, net   3,927   3,951
    Contract and other deferred assets   1,680   1,730
    All other assets   4,368   4,266
    Total assets $ 38,110 $ 38,363
    LIABILITIES AND EQUITY
    Current Liabilities:    
    Accounts payable $ 4,465 $ 4,542
    Short-term debt   55   53
    Progress collections and deferred income   5,589   5,672
    All other current liabilities   2,485   2,724
    Total current liabilities   12,594   12,991
    Long-term debt   5,969   5,970
    Liabilities for pensions and other postretirement benefits   985   988
    All other liabilities   1,356   1,359
    Equity   17,206   17,055
    Total liabilities and equity $ 38,110 $ 38,363
         
    Outstanding Baker Hughes Company shares:    
    Class A common stock   990   990
    Condensed Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows
     
    (Unaudited)
      Three Months Ended March 31,
    (In millions)   2025     2024  
    Cash flows from operating activities:    
    Net income $ 409   $ 463  
    Adjustments to reconcile net income to net cash flows from operating activities:    
    Depreciation and amortization   285     283  
    Stock-based compensation cost   50     51  
    Change in fair value of equity securities   140     (52 )
    Benefit for deferred income taxes   (53 )   (24 )
    Working capital   218     209  
    Other operating items, net   (340 )   (146 )
    Net cash flows provided by operating activities   709     784  
    Cash flows from investing activities:    
    Expenditures for capital assets   (300 )   (333 )
    Proceeds from disposal of assets   45     51  
    Other investing items, net   (55 )   13  
    Net cash flows used in investing activities   (310 )   (269 )
    Cash flows from financing activities:    
    Dividends paid   (229 )   (210 )
    Repurchase of Class A common stock   (188 )   (158 )
    Other financing items, net   (85 )   (59 )
    Net cash flows used in financing activities   (502 )   (427 )
    Effect of currency exchange rate changes on cash and cash equivalents   16     (17 )
    Increase (decrease) in cash and cash equivalents   (87 )   71  
    Cash and cash equivalents, beginning of period   3,364     2,646  
    Cash and cash equivalents, end of period $ 3,277   $ 2,717  
    Supplemental cash flows disclosures:    
    Income taxes paid, net of refunds $ 207   $ 108  
    Interest paid $ 50   $ 48  

    Supplemental Financial Information

    Supplemental financial information can be found on the Company’s website at: investors.bakerhughes.com in the Financial Information section under Quarterly Results.

    Conference Call and Webcast

    The Company has scheduled an investor conference call to discuss management’s outlook and the results reported in today’s earnings announcement. The call will begin at 9:30 a.m. Eastern time, 8:30 a.m. Central time on Wednesday, April 23, 2025, the content of which is not part of this earnings release. The conference call will be broadcast live via a webcast and can be accessed by visiting the Events and Presentations page on the Company’s website at: investors.bakerhughes.com. An archived version of the webcast will be available on the website for one month following the webcast.

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This news release (and oral statements made regarding the subjects of this release) may contain forward-looking statements within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, (each a “forward-looking statement”). Forward-looking statements concern future circumstances and results and other statements that are not historical facts and are sometimes identified by the words “may,” “will,” “should,” “potential,” “intend,” “expect,” “would,” “seek,” “anticipate,” “estimate,” “overestimate,” “underestimate,” “believe,” “could,” “project,” “predict,” “continue,” “target,” “goal” or other similar words or expressions. There are many risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially from our forward-looking statements. These forward-looking statements are also affected by the risk factors described in the Company’s annual report on Form 10-K for the annual period ended December 31, 2024 and those set forth from time to time in other filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). The documents are available through the Company’s website at: www.investors.bakerhughes.com or through the SEC’s Electronic Data Gathering and Analysis Retrieval system at: www.sec.gov. We undertake no obligation to publicly update or revise any forward-looking statement, except as required by law. Readers are cautioned not to place undue reliance on any of these forward-looking statements.

    Our expectations regarding our business outlook and business plans; the business plans of our customers; oil and natural gas market conditions; cost and availability of resources; economic, legal and regulatory conditions, and other matters are only our forecasts regarding these matters.

    These forward-looking statements, including forecasts, may be substantially different from actual results, which are affected by many risks, along with the following risk factors and the timing of any of these risk factors:

    • Economic and political conditions – the impact of worldwide economic conditions and rising inflation; the impact of tariffs and the potential for significant increases thereto; the impact of global trade policy and the potential for significant changes thereto; the effect that declines in credit availability may have on worldwide economic growth and demand for hydrocarbons; foreign currency exchange fluctuations and changes in the capital markets in locations where we operate; and the impact of government disruptions and sanctions.
    • Orders and RPO – our ability to execute on orders and RPO in accordance with agreed specifications, terms and conditions and convert those orders and RPO to revenue and cash.
    • Oil and gas market conditions – the level of petroleum industry exploration, development and production expenditures; the price of, volatility in pricing of, and the demand for crude oil and natural gas; drilling activity; drilling permits for and regulation of the shelf and the deepwater drilling; excess productive capacity; crude and product inventories; liquefied natural gas supply and demand; seasonal and other adverse weather conditions that affect the demand for energy; severe weather conditions, such as tornadoes and hurricanes, that affect exploration and production activities; Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (“OPEC”) policy and the adherence by OPEC nations to their OPEC production quotas.
    • Terrorism and geopolitical risks – war, military action, terrorist activities or extended periods of international conflict, particularly involving any petroleum-producing or consuming regions, including Russia and Ukraine; and the recent conflict in the Middle East; labor disruptions, civil unrest or security conditions where we operate; potentially burdensome taxation, expropriation of assets by governmental action; cybersecurity risks and cyber incidents or attacks; epidemic outbreaks.

    About Baker Hughes:

    Baker Hughes (Nasdaq: BKR) is an energy technology company that provides solutions to energy and industrial customers worldwide. Built on a century of experience and conducting business in over 120 countries, our innovative technologies and services are taking energy forward – making it safer, cleaner and more efficient for people and the planet. Visit us at bakerhughes.com.

    For more information, please contact:

    Investor Relations

    Chase Mulvehill
    +1 346-297-2561
    investor.relations@bakerhughes.com 

    Media Relations

    Adrienne Lynch
    +1 713-906-8407 
    adrienne.lynch@bakerhughes.com 

    The MIL Network –

    April 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: QCR Holdings, Inc. Announces Net Income of $25.8 Million for the First Quarter of 2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    First Quarter 2025 Highlights

    • Net income of $25.8 million, or $1.52 per diluted share
    • Adjusted net income (non-GAAP) of $26.0 million, or $1.53 per diluted share
    • Adjusted NIM (TEY) (non-GAAP) expanded to 3.41%
    • Robust core deposit growth of 20% annualized
    • Wealth management revenue growth of 14% annualized
    • Tangible book value per share (non-GAAP) grew $1.43, or 11% annualized
    • TCE/TA ratio (non-GAAP) improved 15 basis points to 9.70%

    MOLINE, Ill., April 22, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — QCR Holdings, Inc. (NASDAQ: QCRH) (the “Company”) today announced quarterly net income of $25.8 million and diluted earnings per share (“EPS”) of $1.52 for the first quarter of 2025, compared to net income of $30.2 million and diluted EPS of $1.77 for the fourth quarter of 2024.

    Adjusted net income (non-GAAP) and adjusted diluted EPS for the first quarter of 2025 were $26.0 million and $1.53, respectively. For the fourth quarter of 2024, adjusted net income (non-GAAP) was $32.8 million and adjusted diluted EPS was $1.93. For the first quarter of 2024, adjusted net income (non-GAAP) was $26.9 million, and adjusted diluted EPS was $1.59.

      For the Quarter Ended
      March 31, December 31, March 31,
    $ in millions (except per share data)  2025  2024  2024
    Net Income $ 25.8 $ 30.2 $ 26.7
    Diluted EPS $ 1.52 $ 1.77 $ 1.58
    Adjusted Net Income (non-GAAP)* $ 26.0 $ 32.8 $ 26.9
    Adjusted Diluted EPS (non-GAAP)* $ 1.53 $ 1.93 $ 1.59
                 

    *Adjusted non-GAAP measurements of financial performance exclude non-core and/or nonrecurring income and expense items that management believes are not reflective of the anticipated future operation of the Company’s business. The Company believes these adjusted measurements provide a better comparison for analysis and may provide a better indicator of future performance. See GAAP to non-GAAP reconciliations.

    “Our first quarter results were highlighted by margin expansion, robust deposit growth, and disciplined expense management. We also had another quarter of strong wealth management revenue growth,” said Larry J. Helling, Chief Executive Officer. “Our performance was further bolstered by continued loan growth while maintaining our excellent asset quality, further strengthening our capital levels, and significantly increasing our tangible book value per share.”

    Margin Performance Continues

    Net interest income for the first quarter of 2025 totaled $60.0 million, a decrease of $1.2 million from the fourth quarter of 2024, but increased slightly when adjusted for fewer days in the first quarter.

    Net interest margin (“NIM”) was 2.95% and NIM on a tax-equivalent yield (“TEY”) basis (non-GAAP) was 3.42% for the first quarter, as compared to 2.95% and 3.43% for the prior quarter, respectively. Adjusted NIM TEY (non-GAAP) of 3.41% for the first quarter of 2025 increased one basis point compared to the fourth quarter of 2024.  

    “Our adjusted NIM, on a tax equivalent yield basis, increased one basis point from the fourth quarter of 2024 and was within our guidance range, overpowering the dilution from the impact of expired interest rate caps,” said Todd A. Gipple, President and Chief Financial Officer. “Absent the impact from the interest rate caps, our adjusted NIM TEY expanded by five basis points. Looking ahead, we anticipate continued margin expansion and are guiding to second quarter adjusted NIM TEY in the range from static to an increase of four basis points, assuming no Federal Reserve rate cuts,” added Mr. Gipple.

    Noninterest Income Driven by Capital Markets and Wealth Management Revenue

    Noninterest income for the first quarter of 2025 was influenced by macroeconomic factors, particularly affecting our low-income housing tax credit (“LIHTC”) lending business and its associated capital markets revenue. Noninterest income for the quarter totaled $16.9 million, down from $30.6 million in the fourth quarter of 2024. The Company generated $6.5 million of capital markets revenue during the first quarter, compared to $20.6 million in the prior quarter.

    “Our capital markets business was affected by macroeconomic uncertainty. Despite this, demand for affordable housing remains significant. The lower first quarter results in this sector should lead to a larger pipeline for future transactions. Our capital markets activity for the second quarter is normalizing as clients adjust to the current environment,” said Mr. Helling. “As a result, we continue to expect our capital markets revenue to be in a range of $50 to $60 million over the next four quarters. We believe the long-term demand and our growing backlog for new deals will support the sustainability of our LIHTC lending program,” added Mr. Helling.

    “Additionally, our wealth management business remained strong in the first quarter of 2025, generating annualized revenue growth of 14% for the quarter driven by growth in new client accounts and assets under management. We expect continued strong growth in this business to be fueled by the strategic investments we made in our Southwest Missouri and Central Iowa markets,” said Mr. Gipple.

    Significant Noninterest Expense Reduction

    Noninterest expense for the first quarter of 2025 totaled $46.5 million, a decrease compared to $53.5 million for the fourth quarter and $50.7 million for the first quarter of 2024. The $7.0 million linked-quarter decrease was primarily due to lower salary and employee benefits expenses associated with reduced variable compensation.

    “Our noninterest expense decreased by 13% during the quarter, primarily due to lower capital markets revenue and its impact on our variable compensation. As a result, expenses were well below the guided range of $52 to $55 million highlighting our expense flexibility,” said Mr. Gipple. “The Company’s efficiency ratio was 60.54% in the first quarter. For the second quarter of 2025 we expect noninterest expense to be in the range of $50 to $53 million which assumes both capital markets revenue and loan growth are within our guidance range,” added Mr. Gipple.

    Exceptionally Low Effective Tax Rate

    The effective tax rate for the first quarter of 2025 was 1%, down from 9% in the prior quarter. The linked quarter decline is primarily due to a combination of the tax benefits from equity compensation in the first quarter, new state tax credit investments, and lower pre-tax income from lower capital markets revenue. “These factors decreased the mix of our taxable income relative to our tax-exempt income. Our tax-exempt loan and bond portfolios have consistently helped us maintain our low tax liability benefiting our shareholders,” said Mr. Gipple. “Given a more normalized mix of revenue, we expect our effective tax rate to be in the range of 6% to 8% for the second quarter of 2025,” added Mr. Gipple.

    Robust Deposit Growth

    During the first quarter of 2025, core deposits increased by $332.2 million, or 20% annualized, which allowed the Company to decrease brokered deposits by $56.0 million, and overnight FHLB advances by $140 million. Gross loans and leases held for investment as a percentage of total deposits ratio improved to 92.96% from 96.05% from the prior quarter. “Our deposit growth this quarter reflects our strong execution in expanding market share and deepening relationships with both new and existing clients in our core markets,” added Mr. Helling.

    Continued Loan Growth

    In the first quarter of 2025, the Company’s total loans and leases held for investment grew by $38.9 million to $6.8 billion. “Loan growth was 4% annualized when adding back the impact from the runoff of m2 Equipment Finance loans. First quarter loan activity was influenced by heightened macroeconomic uncertainty and elevated payoffs. We anticipate that the slowdown in our LIHTC business during this period should lead to a larger pipeline of future activity driven by the ongoing significant demand for low-income housing,” stated Mr. Helling.

    “Due to heightened uncertainty, we are suspending our full-year loan growth guidance. Instead, we are providing guidance for the second quarter of 2025, projecting an annualized growth rate of 4% to 6%,” added Mr. Helling.

    Asset Quality Remains Excellent

    The Company’s nonperforming assets (“NPAs”) to total assets ratio was 0.53% on March 31, 2025, up three basis points from the prior quarter. NPAs totaled $48.1 million at the end of the first quarter of 2025, a $2.6 million increase from the prior quarter. The increase in NPAs during the first quarter was primarily due to the addition of three specific loans, partially offset by the payoff of our largest NPA in January.

    The Company’s total criticized loans, a leading indicator of asset quality, declined by $18.2 million on a linked-quarter basis, and the ratio of criticized loans to total loans and leases as of March 31, 2025, improved to 2.06%, as compared to 2.34% as of December 31, 2024. This $18.2 million reduction marks the Company’s lowest criticized loan ratio in five years.

    The Company recorded a total provision for credit losses of $4.2 million during the quarter, representing a decline of $0.9 million from the prior quarter. The reduction in the provision for credit losses during the quarter was primarily due to lower loan growth and a decrease in total criticized balances. Net charge-offs were also $4.2 million during the first quarter of 2025, an increase of $0.8 million from the prior quarter. The allowance for credit losses to total loans held for investment was unchanged from the prior quarter at 1.32%.

    Strong Tangible Book Value and Regulatory Capital Growth

    The Company’s tangible book value per share (non-GAAP) increased by $1.43, or 11% annualized, during the first quarter of 2025 due to the combination of strong earnings, a modest dividend, and negligible changes in accumulated other comprehensive income (“AOCI”).

    As of March 31, 2025, the Company’s tangible common equity to tangible assets ratio (“TCE”) (non-GAAP) increased 15 basis points to 9.70%. The improvement in TCE (non-GAAP) was driven by strong earnings as AOCI remained consistent during the quarter. The total risk-based capital ratio increased to 14.16% and the common equity tier 1 ratio increased to 10.26% due to solid earnings growth and modest loan growth during the quarter. By comparison, these ratios were 9.55%, 14.10%, and 10.03%, respectively, as of December 31, 2024. The Company remains focused on maintaining strong regulatory capital and targeting TCE (non-GAAP) in the top quartile of its peer group.

    Conference Call Details
    The Company will host an earnings call/webcast tomorrow, April 23, 2025, at Central Time. Dial-in information for the call is toll-free: 888-346-9286 (international 412-317-5253). Participants should request to join the QCR Holdings, Inc. call. The event will be available for replay through April 30, 2025. The replay access information is 877-344-7529 (international 412-317-0088); access code 7198237. A webcast of the teleconference can be accessed on the Company’s News and Events page at www.qcrh.com. An archived version of the webcast will be available at the same location shortly after the live event has ended.

    About Us
    QCR Holdings, Inc., headquartered in Moline, Illinois, is a relationship-driven, multi-bank holding company serving the Quad Cities, Cedar Rapids, Cedar Valley, Des Moines/Ankeny and Springfield communities through its wholly owned subsidiary banks. The banks provide full-service commercial and consumer banking and trust and wealth management services. Quad City Bank & Trust Company, based in Bettendorf, Iowa, commenced operations in 1994, Cedar Rapids Bank & Trust Company, based in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, commenced operations in 2001, Community State Bank, based in Ankeny, Iowa, was acquired by the Company in 2016, and Guaranty Bank, based in Springfield, Missouri, was acquired by the Company in 2018. Additionally, the Company serves the Waterloo/Cedar Falls, Iowa community through Community Bank & Trust, a division of Cedar Rapids Bank & Trust Company. The Company has 36 locations in Iowa, Missouri, and Illinois. As of March 31, 2025, the Company had $9.2 billion in assets, $6.8 billion in loans and $7.3 billion in deposits. For additional information, please visit the Company’s website at www.qcrh.com.

    Special Note Concerning Forward-Looking Statements. This document contains, and future oral and written statements of the Company and its management may contain, forward-looking statements within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 with respect to the financial condition, results of operations, plans, objectives, future performance and business of the Company. Forward-looking statements, which may be based upon beliefs, expectations and assumptions of the Company’s management and on information currently available to management, are generally identifiable by the use of words such as “believe,” “expect,” “anticipate,” “bode”, “predict,” “suggest,” “project”, “appear,” “plan,” “intend,” “estimate,” ”annualize,” “may,” “will,” “would,” “could,” “should,” “likely,” “might,” “potential,” “continue,” “annualized,” “target,” “outlook,” as well as the negative forms of those words, or other similar expressions. Additionally, all statements in this document, including forward-looking statements, speak only as of the date they are made, and the Company undertakes no obligation to update any statement in light of new information or future events.

    A number of factors, many of which are beyond the ability of the Company to control or predict, could cause actual results to differ materially from those in its forward-looking statements. These factors include, but are not limited to: (i) the strength of the local, state, national and international economies and financial markets, including effects of inflationary pressures, the threat or implementation of tariffs, trade wars and changes to immigration policy; (ii) changes in, and the interpretation and prioritization of, local, state and federal laws, regulations and governmental policies (including those concerning the Company’s general business); (iii) the economic impact of any future terrorist threats and attacks, widespread disease or pandemics, acts of war or threats thereof (including the Russian invasion of Ukraine and ongoing conflicts in the Middle East), or other adverse events that could cause economic deterioration or instability in credit markets, and the response of the local, state and national governments to any such adverse external events; (iv) new or revised accounting policies and practices, as may be adopted by state and federal regulatory agencies, the FASB, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) or the PCAOB; (v) the imposition of tariffs or other governmental policies impacting the value of products produced by the Company’s commercial borrowers; (vi) increased competition in the financial services sector, including from non-bank competitors such as credit unions and fintech companies, and the inability to attract new customers; (vii) changes in technology and the ability to develop and maintain secure and reliable electronic systems; (viii) unexpected results of acquisitions, including failure to realize the anticipated benefits of the acquisitions and the possibility that transaction and integration costs may be greater than anticipated; (ix) the loss of key executives and employees, talent shortages and employee turnover; (x) changes in consumer spending; (xi) unexpected outcomes and costs of existing or new litigation or other legal proceedings and regulatory actions involving the Company; (xii) the economic impact on the Company and its customers of climate change, natural disasters and exceptional weather occurrences such as tornadoes, floods and blizzards; (xiii) fluctuations in the value of securities held in our securities portfolio, including as a result of changes in interest rates; (xiv) credit risk and risks from concentrations (by type of borrower, geographic area, collateral and industry) within our loan portfolio and large loans to certain borrowers (including CRE loans); (xv) the overall health of the local and national real estate market; (xvi) the ability to maintain an adequate level of allowance for credit losses on loans; (xvii) the concentration of large deposits from certain clients who have balances above current FDIC insurance limits and who may withdraw deposits to diversify their exposure; (xviii) the ability to successfully manage liquidity risk, which may increase dependence on non-core funding sources such as brokered deposits, and may negatively impact the Company’s cost of funds; (xix) the level of non-performing assets on our balance sheet; (xx) interruptions involving our information technology and communications systems or third-party servicers; (xxi) the occurrence of fraudulent activity, breaches or failures of our third-party vendors’ information security controls or cybersecurity-related incidents, including as a result of sophisticated attacks using artificial intelligence and similar tools or as a result of insider fraud; (xxii) changes in the interest rates and repayment rates of the Company’s assets; (xxiii) the effectiveness of the Company’s risk management framework, and (xxiv) the ability of the Company to manage the risks associated with the foregoing. These risks and uncertainties should be considered in evaluating forward-looking statements and undue reliance should not be placed on such statements. Additional information concerning the Company and its business, including additional factors that could materially affect the Company’s financial results, is included in the Company’s filings with the SEC.

    Contact:
    Todd A. Gipple
    President
    Chief Financial Officer
    (309) 743-7745
    tgipple@qcrh.com

      QCR Holding, Inc.
    Consolidated Financial Highlights
    (Unaudited)
                 
        As of
        March 31, December 31, September 30, June 30, March 31,
         2025   2024   2024   2024   2024 
                 
        (dollars in thousands)
                 
      CONDENSED BALANCE SHEET          
                 
      Cash and due from banks $ 98,994   $ 91,732   $ 103,840   $ 92,173   $ 80,988  
      Federal funds sold and interest-bearing deposits   225,716     170,592     159,159     102,262     77,020  
      Securities, net of allowance for credit losses   1,220,717     1,200,435     1,146,046     1,033,199     1,031,861  
      Loans receivable held for sale (1)   2,025     2,143     167,047     246,124     275,344  
      Loans/leases receivable held for investment   6,821,142     6,782,261     6,661,755     6,608,262     6,372,992  
      Allowance for credit losses   (90,354 )   (89,841 )   (86,321 )   (87,706 )   (84,470 )
      Intangibles   10,400     11,061     11,751     12,441     13,131  
      Goodwill   138,595     138,595     138,596     139,027     139,027  
      Derivatives   180,997     186,781     261,913     194,354     183,888  
      Other assets   544,547     532,271     524,779     531,855     509,768  
      Total assets $ 9,152,779   $ 9,026,030   $ 9,088,565   $ 8,871,991   $ 8,599,549  
                 
      Total deposits $ 7,337,390   $ 7,061,187   $ 6,984,633   $ 6,764,667   $ 6,806,775  
      Total borrowings   429,921     569,532     660,344     768,671     489,633  
      Derivatives   206,925     214,823     285,769     221,798     211,677  
      Other liabilities   155,796     183,101     181,199     180,536     184,122  
      Total stockholders’ equity   1,022,747     997,387     976,620     936,319     907,342  
      Total liabilities and stockholders’ equity $ 9,152,779   $ 9,026,030   $ 9,088,565   $ 8,871,991   $ 8,599,549  
                 
      ANALYSIS OF LOAN PORTFOLIO          
      Loan/lease mix: (2)          
      Commercial and industrial – revolving $ 388,479   $ 387,991   $ 387,409   $ 362,115   $ 326,129  
      Commercial and industrial – other   1,231,198     1,295,961     1,321,053     1,370,561     1,374,333  
      Commercial and industrial – other – LIHTC   212,921     218,971     89,028     92,637     96,276  
      Total commercial and industrial   1,832,598     1,902,923     1,797,490     1,825,313     1,796,738  
      Commercial real estate, owner occupied   599,488     605,993     622,072     633,596     621,069  
      Commercial real estate, non-owner occupied   1,040,281     1,077,852     1,103,694     1,082,457     1,055,089  
      Construction and land development   403,001     395,557     342,335     331,454     410,918  
      Construction and land development – LIHTC   1,016,207     917,986     913,841     750,894     738,609  
      Multi-family   289,782     303,662     324,090     329,239     296,245  
      Multi-family – LIHTC   888,517     828,448     973,682     1,148,244     1,007,321  
      Direct financing leases   14,773     17,076     19,241     25,808     28,089  
      1-4 family real estate   592,127     588,179     587,512     583,542     563,358  
      Consumer   146,393     146,728     144,845     143,839     130,900  
      Total loans/leases $ 6,823,167   $ 6,784,404   $ 6,828,802   $ 6,854,386   $ 6,648,336  
      Less allowance for credit losses   90,354     89,841     86,321     87,706     84,470  
      Net loans/leases $ 6,732,813   $ 6,694,563   $ 6,742,481   $ 6,766,680   $ 6,563,866  
                 
                 
      ANALYSIS OF SECURITIES PORTFOLIO          
      Securities mix:          
      U.S. government sponsored agency securities $ 17,487   $ 20,591   $ 18,621   $ 20,101   $ 14,442  
      Municipal securities   1,003,985     971,567     965,810     885,046     884,469  
      Residential mortgage-backed and related securities   43,194     50,042     53,488     54,708     56,071  
      Asset backed securities   7,764     9,224     10,455     12,721     14,285  
      Other securities   66,105     65,745     39,190     38,464     40,539  
      Trading securities (3)   82,445     83,529     58,685     22,362     22,258  
      Total securities $ 1,220,980   $ 1,200,698   $ 1,146,249   $ 1,033,402   $ 1,032,064  
      Less allowance for credit losses   263     263     203     203     203  
      Net securities $ 1,220,717   $ 1,200,435   $ 1,146,046   $ 1,033,199   $ 1,031,861  
                 
      ANALYSIS OF DEPOSITS          
      Deposit mix:          
      Noninterest-bearing demand deposits $ 963,851   $ 921,160   $ 969,348   $ 956,445   $ 955,167  
      Interest-bearing demand deposits   5,119,601     4,828,216     4,715,087     4,644,918     4,714,555  
      Time deposits   951,606     953,496     942,847     859,593     875,491  
      Brokered deposits   302,332     358,315     357,351     303,711     261,562  
      Total deposits $ 7,337,390   $ 7,061,187   $ 6,984,633   $ 6,764,667   $ 6,806,775  
                 
      ANALYSIS OF BORROWINGS          
      Borrowings mix:          
      Term FHLB advances $ 145,383   $ 145,383   $ 145,383   $ 135,000   $ 135,000  
      Overnight FHLB advances   –     140,000     230,000     350,000     70,000  
      Other short-term borrowings   2,050     1,800     2,750     1,600     2,700  
      Subordinated notes   233,595     233,489     233,383     233,276     233,170  
      Junior subordinated debentures   48,893     48,860     48,828     48,795     48,763  
      Total borrowings $ 429,921   $ 569,532   $ 660,344   $ 768,671   $ 489,633  
                 
    (1 ) Loans with a fair value of $0 million, $0 million, $165.9 million, $243.2 million and $274.8 million have been identified for securitization and are included in LHFS at March 31, 2025, December 31, 2024, September 30, 2024, June 30, 2024 and March 31, 2024, respectively.
    (2 ) Loan categories with significant LIHTC loan balances have been broken out separately. Total LIHTC balances within the loan/lease portfolio were $2.2 billion at March 31, 2025.
    (3 ) Trading securities consisted of retained beneficial interests acquired in conjunction with Freddie Mac securitizations completed by the Company.
                 
    QCR Holding, Inc.
    Consolidated Financial Highlights
    (Unaudited)
                 
        For the Quarter Ended
        March 31, December 31, September 30, June 30, March 31,
         2025   2024   2024   2024  2024 
                 
        (dollars in thousands, except per share data)
                 
    INCOME STATEMENT            
    Interest income   $ 116,673   $ 121,642   $ 125,420   $ 119,746 $ 115,049  
    Interest expense     56,687     60,438     65,698     63,583   60,350  
    Net interest income     59,986     61,204     59,722     56,163   54,699  
    Provision for credit losses     4,234     5,149     3,484     5,496   2,969  
    Net interest income after provision for credit losses   $ 55,752   $ 56,055   $ 56,238   $ 50,667 $ 51,730  
                 
                 
    Trust fees (1)   $ 3,686   $ 3,456   $ 3,270   $ 3,103 $ 3,199  
    Investment advisory and management fees (1)     1,254     1,320     1,229     1,214   1,101  
    Deposit service fees     2,183     2,228     2,294     1,986   2,022  
    Gains on sales of residential real estate loans, net     297     734     385     540   382  
    Gains on sales of government guaranteed portions of loans, net     61     49     –     12   24  
    Capital markets revenue     6,516     20,552     16,290     17,758   16,457  
    Earnings on bank-owned life insurance     524     797     814     2,964   868  
    Debit card fees     1,488     1,555     1,575     1,571   1,466  
    Correspondent banking fees     614     560     507     510   512  
    Loan related fee income     898     950     949     962   836  
    Fair value gain (loss) on derivatives and trading securities     (1,007 )   (1,781 )   (886 )   51   (163 )
    Other     378     205     730     218   154  
    Total noninterest income   $ 16,892   $ 30,625   $ 27,157   $ 30,889 $ 26,858  
                 
                 
    Salaries and employee benefits   $ 27,364   $ 33,610   $ 31,637   $ 31,079 $ 31,860  
    Occupancy and equipment expense     6,455     6,354     6,168     6,377   6,514  
    Professional and data processing fees     5,144     5,480     4,457     4,823   4,613  
    Restructuring expense     –     –     1,954     –   –  
    FDIC insurance, other insurance and regulatory fees     1,970     1,934     1,711     1,854   1,945  
    Loan/lease expense     381     513     587     151   378  
    Net cost of (income from) and gains/losses on operations of other real estate     (9 )   23     (42 )   28   (30 )
    Advertising and marketing     1,613     1,886     2,124     1,565   1,483  
    Communication and data connectivity     290     345     333     318   401  
    Supplies     207     252     278     259   275  
    Bank service charges     596     635     603     622   568  
    Correspondent banking expense     329     328     325     363   305  
    Intangibles amortization     661     691     690     690   690  
    Goodwill impairment     –     –     431     –   –  
    Payment card processing     594     516     785     706   646  
    Trust expense     357     381     395     379   425  
    Other     587     551     1,129     674   617  
    Total noninterest expense   $ 46,539   $ 53,499   $ 53,565   $ 49,888 $ 50,690  
                 
    Net income before income taxes   $ 26,105   $ 33,181   $ 29,830   $ 31,668 $ 27,898  
    Federal and state income tax expense     308     2,956     2,045     2,554   1,172  
    Net income   $ 25,797   $ 30,225   $ 27,785   $ 29,114 $ 26,726  
                 
    Basic EPS   $ 1.53   $ 1.80   $ 1.65   $ 1.73 $ 1.59  
    Diluted EPS   $ 1.52   $ 1.77   $ 1.64   $ 1.72 $ 1.58  
                 
                 
    Weighted average common shares outstanding     16,900,785     16,871,652     16,846,200     16,814,814   16,783,348  
    Weighted average common and common equivalent shares outstanding   17,013,992     17,024,481     16,982,400     16,921,854   16,910,675  
                 
    (1) Trust fees and investment advisory and management fees when combined are referred to as wealth management revenue.
      QCR Holding, Inc.
    Consolidated Financial Highlights
    (Unaudited)
                 
        As of and for the Quarter Ended
        March 31, December 31, September 30, June 30, March 31,
         2025   2024   2024   2024   2024 
                 
        (dollars in thousands, except per share data)
                 
      COMMON SHARE DATA          
      Common shares outstanding   16,920,363     16,882,045     16,861,108     16,824,985     16,807,056  
      Book value per common share (1) $ 60.44   $ 59.08   $ 57.92   $ 55.65   $ 53.99  
      Tangible book value per common share (Non-GAAP) (2) $ 51.64   $ 50.21   $ 49.00   $ 46.65   $ 44.93  
      Closing stock price $ 71.32   $ 80.64   $ 74.03   $ 60.00   $ 60.74  
      Market capitalization $ 1,206,760   $ 1,361,368   $ 1,248,228   $ 1,009,499   $ 1,020,861  
      Market price / book value   117.99 %   136.49 %   127.81 %   107.82 %   112.51 %
      Market price / tangible book value   138.11 %   160.59 %   151.07 %   128.62 %   135.18 %
      Earnings per common share (basic) LTM (3) $ 6.71   $ 6.77   $ 6.93   $ 6.78   $ 6.75  
      Price earnings ratio LTM (3) 10.63 x 11.91 x 10.68 x 8.85 x 9.00 x
      TCE / TA (Non-GAAP) (4)   9.70 %   9.55 %   9.24 %   9.00 %   8.94 %
                 
                 
      CONDENSED STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN STOCKHOLDERS’ EQUITY  
      Beginning balance $ 997,387   $ 976,620   $ 936,319   $ 907,342   $ 886,596  
      Net income   25,797     30,225     27,785     29,114     26,726  
      Other comprehensive income (loss), net of tax   404     (9,628 )   12,057     (368 )   (5,373 )
      Common stock cash dividends declared   (1,015 )   (1,013 )   (1,012 )   (1,008 )   (1,008 )
      Other (5)   174     1,183     1,471     1,239     401  
      Ending balance $ 1,022,747   $ 997,387   $ 976,620   $ 936,319   $ 907,342  
                 
                 
      REGULATORY CAPITAL RATIOS (6):          
      Total risk-based capital ratio   14.16 %   14.10 %   13.87 %   14.21 %   14.30 %
      Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio   10.79 %   10.57 %   10.33 %   10.49 %   10.50 %
      Tier 1 leverage capital ratio   11.06 %   10.73 %   10.50 %   10.40 %   10.33 %
      Common equity tier 1 ratio   10.26 %   10.03 %   9.79 %   9.92 %   9.91 %
                 
                 
      KEY PERFORMANCE RATIOS AND OTHER METRICS          
      Return on average assets (annualized)   1.14 %   1.34 %   1.24 %   1.33 %   1.25 %
      Return on average total equity (annualized)   10.14 %   12.15 %   11.55 %   12.63 %   11.83 %
      Net interest margin   2.95 %   2.95 %   2.90 %   2.82 %   2.82 %
      Net interest margin (TEY) (Non-GAAP)(7)   3.42 %   3.43 %   3.37 %   3.27 %   3.25 %
      Efficiency ratio (Non-GAAP) (8)   60.54 %   58.26 %   61.65 %   57.31 %   62.15 %
      Gross loans/leases held for investment / total assets   74.53 %   75.14 %   73.30 %   74.48 %   74.11 %
      Gross loans/leases held for investment / total deposits   92.96 %   96.05 %   95.38 %   97.69 %   93.63 %
      Effective tax rate   1.18 %   8.91 %   6.86 %   8.06 %   4.20 %
      Full-time equivalent employees   972     980     976     988     986  
                 
                 
      AVERAGE BALANCES          
      Assets $ 9,015,439   $ 9,050,280   $ 8,968,653   $ 8,776,002   $ 8,550,855  
      Loans/leases   6,790,312     6,839,153     6,840,527     6,779,075     6,598,614  
      Deposits   7,146,286     7,109,567     6,858,196     6,687,188     6,595,453  
      Total stockholders’ equity   1,017,487     995,012     962,302     921,986     903,371  
                 
                 
    (1 ) Includes accumulated other comprehensive income (loss).    
    (2 ) Includes accumulated other comprehensive income (loss) and excludes intangible assets. See GAAP to Non-GAAP reconciliations.
    (3 ) LTM : Last twelve months.     
    (4 ) TCE / TCA : tangible common equity / total tangible assets. See GAAP to non-GAAP reconciliations.  
    (5 ) Includes mostly common stock issued for options exercised and the employee stock purchase plan, as well as stock-based compensation.
    (6 ) Ratios for the current quarter are subject to change upon final calculation for regulatory filings due after earnings release.
    (7 ) TEY : Tax equivalent yield. See GAAP to Non-GAAP reconciliations.
    (8 ) See GAAP to Non-GAAP reconciliations.     
                 
    QCR Holding, Inc.
    Consolidated Financial Highlights
    (Unaudited)
                               
                               
      ANALYSIS OF NET INTEREST INCOME AND MARGIN                  
                               
          For the Quarter Ended
          March 31, 2025   December 31, 2024   March 31, 2024
          Average
    Balance
    Interest
    Earned or
    Paid
    Average
    Yield or Cost
      Average
    Balance
    Interest
    Earned or
    Paid
    Average
    Yield or Cost
      Average
    Balance
    Interest
    Earned or
    Paid
    Average
    Yield or Cost
                               
          (dollars in thousands)
                               
      Fed funds sold   $ 9,009 $ 99 4.40 %   $ 5,617 $ 67 4.68 %   $ 19,955 $ 269 5.42 %
      Interest-bearing deposits at financial institutions   166,897   1,804 4.38 %     158,151   1,823 4.59 %     91,557   1,200 5.27 %
      Investment securities – taxable   400,779   4,588 4.59 %     375,552   4,230 4.49 %     373,540   4,261 4.55 %
      Investment securities – nontaxable (1)   843,476   11,722 5.57 %     829,544   12,286 5.92 %     685,969   9,349 5.45 %
      Restricted investment securities   30,562   534 6.99 %     33,173   608 7.17 %     38,085   674 7.00 %
      Loans (1)     6,790,312   107,439 6.42 %     6,839,153   112,325 6.53 %     6,598,614   107,673 6.56 %
      Total earning assets (1) $ 8,241,035 $ 126,186 6.20 %   $ 8,241,190 $ 131,339 6.34 %   $ 7,807,720 $ 123,426 6.35 %
                               
      Interest-bearing deposits $ 5,005,853 $ 37,698 3.05 %   $ 4,881,914 $ 39,408 3.21 %   $ 4,529,325 $ 39,072 3.47 %
      Time deposits     1,204,593   12,690 4.27 %     1,248,412   13,868 4.42 %     1,107,622   12,345 4.48 %
      Short-term borrowings   1,839   18 3.97 %     1,862   22 4.67 %     1,763   23 5.16 %
      Federal Home Loan Bank advances   177,883   1,996 4.49 %     236,525   2,802 4.64 %     355,220   4,738 5.28 %
      Subordinated debentures   233,525   3,601 6.17 %     233,419   3,636 6.23 %     233,101   3,480 5.97 %
      Junior subordinated debentures   48,871   684 5.60 %     48,839   701 5.62 %     48,742   692 5.62 %
      Total interest-bearing liabilities $ 6,672,564 $ 56,687 3.44 %   $ 6,650,971 $ 60,437 3.61 %   $ 6,275,773 $ 60,350 3.86 %
                               
      Net interest income (1)   $ 69,499       $ 70,902       $ 63,076  
      Net interest margin (2)     2.95 %       2.95 %       2.82 %
      Net interest margin (TEY) (Non-GAAP) (1) (2) (3)     3.42 %       3.43 %       3.25 %
      Adjusted net interest margin (TEY) (Non-GAAP) (1) (2) (3)     3.41 %       3.40 %       3.24 %
      Cost of funds (4)       3.02 %       3.15 %       3.35 %
                               
                               
    (1 ) Includes nontaxable securities and loans. Interest earned and yields on nontaxable securities and loans are determined on a tax equivalent basis using a 21% effective federal tax rate. 
    (2 ) See “Select Financial Data – Subsidiaries” for a breakdown of amortization/accretion included in net interest margin for each period presented.
    (3 ) TEY : Tax equivalent yield. See GAAP to Non-GAAP reconciliations.
    (4 ) Cost of funds includes the effect of noninterest-bearing deposits.
      QCR Holding, Inc.
    Consolidated Financial Highlights
    (Unaudited)
     
                 
        As of
        March 31, December 31, September 30, June 30, March 31,
         2025   2024   2024   2024   2024 
                 
        (dollars in thousands, except per share data)
                 
      ROLLFORWARD OF ALLOWANCE FOR CREDIT LOSSES ON LOANS/LEASES          
      Beginning balance $ 89,841   $ 86,321   $ 87,706   $ 84,470   $ 87,200  
      Change in ACL for transfer of loans to LHFS   –     93     (1,812 )   498     (3,377 )
      Credit loss expense   4,743     6,832     3,828     4,343     3,736  
      Loans/leases charged off   (4,944 )   (4,787 )   (3,871 )   (1,751 )   (3,560 )
      Recoveries on loans/leases previously charged off   714     1,382     470     146     471  
      Ending balance $ 90,354   $ 89,841   $ 86,321   $ 87,706   $ 84,470  
                 
                 
      NONPERFORMING ASSETS          
      Nonaccrual loans/leases $ 47,259   $ 40,080   $ 33,480   $ 33,546   $ 29,439  
      Accruing loans/leases past due 90 days or more   356     4,270     1,298     87     142  
      Total nonperforming loans/leases   47,615     44,350     34,778     33,633     29,581  
      Other real estate owned   402     661     369     369     784  
      Other repossessed assets   122     543     542     512     962  
      Total nonperforming assets $ 48,139   $ 45,554   $ 35,689   $ 34,514   $ 31,327  
                 
                 
      ASSET QUALITY RATIOS          
      Nonperforming assets / total assets   0.53 %   0.50 %   0.39 %   0.39 %   0.36 %
      ACL for loans and leases / total loans/leases held for investment   1.32 %   1.32 %   1.30 %   1.33 %   1.33 %
      ACL for loans and leases / nonperforming loans/leases   189.76 %   202.57 %   248.21 %   260.77 %   285.55 %
      Net charge-offs as a % of average loans/leases   0.06 %   0.05 %   0.05 %   0.02 %   0.05 %
                 
                 
                 
      INTERNALLY ASSIGNED RISK RATING (1)          
      Special mention $ 55,327   $ 73,636   $ 80,121   $ 85,096   $ 111,729  
      Substandard (2)   85,033     84,930     70,022     80,345     70,841  
      Doubtful (2)   –     –     –     –     –  
      Total Criticized loans (3) $ 140,360   $ 158,566   $ 150,143   $ 165,441   $ 182,570  
                 
      Classified loans as a % of total loans/leases (2)   1.25 %   1.25 %   1.03 %   1.17 %   1.07 %
      Total Criticized loans as a % of total loans/leases (3)   2.06 %   2.34 %   2.20 %   2.41 %   2.75 %
                 
    (1 ) Amounts exclude the government guaranteed portion, if any. The Company assigns internal risk ratings of Pass for the government guaranteed portion.
    (2 ) Classified loans are defined as loans with internally assigned risk ratings of 10 or 11, regardless of performance, and include loans identified as Substandard or Doubtful.
    (3 ) Total Criticized loans are defined as loans with internally assigned risk ratings of 9, 10, or 11 , regardless of performance, and include loans identified as Special Mention, Substandard, or Doubtful.
                                     
    QCR Holding, Inc.
    Consolidated Financial Highlights
    (Unaudited)
                   
                   
          For the Quarter Ended
          March 31,   December 31,   March 31,
      SELECT FINANCIAL DATA – SUBSIDIARIES    2025     2024     2024 
          (dollars in thousands)
                   
      TOTAL ASSETS            
      Quad City Bank and Trust (1)   $ 2,777,634     $ 2,588,587     $ 2,618,727  
      m2 Equipment Finance, LLC     276,096       310,915       350,801  
      Cedar Rapids Bank and Trust     2,617,143       2,614,570       2,423,936  
      Community State Bank     1,583,646       1,531,559       1,445,230  
      Guaranty Bank     2,331,944       2,342,958       2,327,985  
                   
      TOTAL DEPOSITS            
      Quad City Bank and Trust (1)   $ 2,397,047     $ 2,126,566     $ 2,161,515  
      Cedar Rapids Bank and Trust     1,883,952       1,882,487       1,757,353  
      Community State Bank     1,238,307       1,256,938       1,187,926  
      Guaranty Bank     1,840,774       1,824,139       1,743,514  
                   
      TOTAL LOANS & LEASES            
      Quad City Bank and Trust (1)   $ 2,041,181     $ 2,048,926     $ 2,046,038  
      m2 Equipment Finance, LLC     284,983       320,237       354,815  
      Cedar Rapids Bank and Trust     1,790,065       1,761,467       1,680,127  
      Community State Bank     1,197,005       1,159,389       1,113,070  
      Guaranty Bank     1,794,915       1,814,622       1,809,101  
                   
      TOTAL LOANS & LEASES / TOTAL DEPOSITS            
      Quad City Bank and Trust (1)     85 %     96 %     95 %
      Cedar Rapids Bank and Trust     95 %     94 %     96 %
      Community State Bank     97 %     92 %     94 %
      Guaranty Bank     98 %     99 %     104 %
                   
                   
      TOTAL LOANS & LEASES / TOTAL ASSETS            
      Quad City Bank and Trust (1)     73 %     79 %     78 %
      Cedar Rapids Bank and Trust     68 %     67 %     69 %
      Community State Bank     76 %     76 %     77 %
      Guaranty Bank     77 %     77 %     78 %
                   
      ACL ON LOANS/LEASES HELD FOR INVESTMENT AS A PERCENTAGE OF LOANS/LEASES HELD FOR INVESTMENT            
      Quad City Bank and Trust (1)     1.44 %     1.49 %     1.40 %
      m2 Equipment Finance, LLC     4.37 %     4.22 %     3.75 %
      Cedar Rapids Bank and Trust     1.38 %     1.44 %     1.34 %
      Community State Bank     1.08 %     0.98 %     1.12 %
      Guaranty Bank     1.30 %     1.25 %     1.15 %
                   
      RETURN ON AVERAGE ASSETS (ANNUALIZED)            
      Quad City Bank and Trust (1)     1.31 %     1.09 %     0.79 %
      Cedar Rapids Bank and Trust     2.14 %     3.12 %     3.09 %
      Community State Bank     1.07 %     1.30 %     1.25 %
      Guaranty Bank     0.72 %     0.91 %     0.88 %
                   
      NET INTEREST MARGIN PERCENTAGE (2)            
      Quad City Bank and Trust (1)     3.45 %     3.53 %     3.31 %
      Cedar Rapids Bank and Trust     4.00 %     3.95 %     3.77 %
      Community State Bank     3.78 %     3.77 %     3.75 %
      Guaranty Bank (3)     3.05 %     3.18 %     2.98 %
                   
      ACQUISITION-RELATED AMORTIZATION/ACCRETION INCLUDED IN NET        
      INTEREST MARGIN, NET            
      Cedar Rapids Bank and Trust   $ –     $ –     $ –  
      Community State Bank     (1 )     (1 )     (1 )
      Guaranty Bank     218       504       396  
      QCR Holdings, Inc. (4)     (33 )     (32 )     (32 )
                   
    (1 ) Quad City Bank and Trust amounts include m2 Equipment Finance, LLC, as this entity is wholly-owned and consolidated with the Bank. m2 Equipment Finance, LLC is also presented separately for certain (applicable) measurements.
    (2 ) Includes nontaxable securities and loans. Interest earned and yields on nontaxable securities and loans are determined on a tax equivalent basis using a 21% effective federal tax rate.
    (3 ) Guaranty Bank’s net interest margin percentage includes various purchase accounting adjustments. Excluding those adjustments, net interest margin (Non-GAAP) would have been 2.91% for the quarter ended March 31, 2025, 2.97% for the quarter ended December 31, 2024 and 2.91% for the quarter ended March 31, 2024.
    (4 ) Relates to the trust preferred securities acquired as part of the Guaranty Bank acquisition in 2017 and the Community National Bank acquisition in 2013.
         
      QCR Holding, Inc.
    Consolidated Financial Highlights
    (Unaudited)
                           
          As of
          March 31,   December 31,   September 30,   June 30,   March 31,
      GAAP TO NON-GAAP RECONCILIATIONS    2025     2024     2024     2024     2024 
          (dollars in thousands, except per share data)
      TANGIBLE COMMON EQUITY TO TANGIBLE ASSETS RATIO (1)                    
                           
      Stockholders’ equity (GAAP)   $ 1,022,747     $ 997,387     $ 976,620     $ 936,319     $ 907,342  
      Less: Intangible assets     148,995       149,657       150,347       151,468       152,158  
      Tangible common equity (non-GAAP)   $ 873,752     $ 847,730     $ 826,273     $ 784,851     $ 755,184  
                           
      Total assets (GAAP)   $ 9,152,779     $ 9,026,030     $ 9,088,565     $ 8,871,991     $ 8,599,549  
      Less: Intangible assets     148,995       149,657       150,347       151,468       152,158  
      Tangible assets (non-GAAP)   $ 9,003,784     $ 8,876,373     $ 8,938,218     $ 8,720,523     $ 8,447,391  
                           
      Tangible common equity to tangible assets ratio (non-GAAP)   9.70 %     9.55 %     9.24 %     9.00 %     8.94 %
                           
                           
    (1 ) This ratio is a non-GAAP financial measure. The Company’s management believes that this measurement is important to many investors in the marketplace who are interested in changes period-to-period in common equity. In compliance with applicable rules of the SEC, this non-GAAP measure is reconciled to stockholders’ equity and total assets, which are the most directly comparable GAAP financial measures.
      QCR Holding, Inc.
    Consolidated Financial Highlights
    (Unaudited)
                           
      GAAP TO NON-GAAP RECONCILIATIONS   For the Quarter Ended
          March 31,   December 31,   September 30,   June 30,   March 31,
      ADJUSTED NET INCOME (1)    2025     2024     2024     2024     2024 
          (dollars in thousands, except per share data)
                           
      Net income (GAAP)   $ 25,797     $ 30,225     $ 27,785     $ 29,114     $ 26,726  
                           
      Less non-core items (post-tax) (2):                    
      Income:                    
      Fair value loss on derivatives, net     (156 )     (2,594 )     (542 )     (145 )     (144 )
      Total non-core income (non-GAAP)   $ (156 )   $ (2,594 )   $ (542 )   $ (145 )   $ (144 )
                           
      Expense:                    
      Goodwill impairment     –       –       431       –       –  
      Restructuring expense     –       –       1,544       –       –  
      Total non-core expense (non-GAAP)   $ –     $ –     $ 1,975     $ –     $ –  
                           
                           
      Adjusted net income (non-GAAP) (1)   $ 25,953     $ 32,819     $ 30,302     $ 29,259     $ 26,870  
                           
      ADJUSTED EARNINGS PER COMMON SHARE (1)                    
                           
      Adjusted net income (non-GAAP) (from above)   $ 25,953     $ 32,819     $ 30,302     $ 29,259     $ 26,870  
                           
      Weighted average common shares outstanding     16,900,785       16,871,652       16,846,200       16,814,814       16,783,348  
      Weighted average common and common equivalent shares outstanding     17,013,992       17,024,481       16,982,400       16,921,854       16,910,675  
                           
      Adjusted earnings per common share (non-GAAP):                    
      Basic   $ 1.54     $ 1.95     $ 1.80     $ 1.74     $ 1.60  
      Diluted   $ 1.53     $ 1.93     $ 1.78     $ 1.73     $ 1.59  
                           
      ADJUSTED RETURN ON AVERAGE ASSETS AND AVERAGE EQUITY (1)                    
                           
      Adjusted net income (non-GAAP) (from above)   $ 25,953     $ 32,819     $ 30,302     $ 29,259     $ 26,870  
                           
      Average Assets   $ 9,015,439     $ 9,050,280     $ 8,968,653     $ 8,776,002     $ 8,550,855  
                           
      Adjusted return on average assets (annualized) (non-GAAP)     1.15 %     1.45 %     1.35 %     1.33 %     1.26 %
      Adjusted return on average equity (annualized) (non-GAAP)     10.20 %     13.19 %     12.60 %     12.69 %     11.90 %
                           
      NET INTEREST MARGIN (TEY) (3)                    
                           
      Net interest income (GAAP)   $ 59,986     $ 61,204     $ 59,722     $ 56,163     $ 54,699  
      Plus: Tax equivalent adjustment (4)     9,513       9,698       9,544       8,914       8,377  
      Net interest income – tax equivalent (Non-GAAP)   $ 69,499     $ 70,902     $ 69,266     $ 65,077     $ 63,076  
      Less: Acquisition accounting net accretion     184       471       463       268       363  
      Adjusted net interest income   $ 69,315     $ 70,431     $ 68,803     $ 64,809     $ 62,713  
                           
      Average earning assets   $ 8,241,035     $ 8,241,190     $ 8,183,196     $ 7,999,044     $ 7,807,720  
                           
      Net interest margin (GAAP)     2.95 %     2.95 %     2.90 %     2.82 %     2.82 %
      Net interest margin (TEY) (Non-GAAP)     3.42 %     3.43 %     3.37 %     3.27 %     3.25 %
      Adjusted net interest margin (TEY) (Non-GAAP)     3.41 %     3.40 %     3.34 %     3.26 %     3.24 %
                           
      EFFICIENCY RATIO (5)                    
                           
      Noninterest expense (GAAP)   $ 46,539     $ 53,499     $ 53,565     $ 49,888     $ 50,690  
                           
      Net interest income (GAAP)   $ 59,986     $ 61,204     $ 59,722     $ 56,163     $ 54,699  
      Noninterest income (GAAP)     16,892       30,625       27,157       30,889       26,858  
      Total income   $ 76,878     $ 91,829     $ 86,879     $ 87,052     $ 81,557  
                           
      Efficiency ratio (noninterest expense/total income) (Non-GAAP)     60.54 %     58.26 %     61.65 %     57.31 %     62.15 %
      Adjusted efficiency ratio (core noninterest expense/core total income) (Non-GAAP)     60.38 %     56.25 %     58.45 %     57.19 %     62.01 %
                           
    (1 ) Adjusted net income, adjusted earnings per common share, adjusted return on average assets and average equity are non-GAAP financial measures. The Company’s management believes that these measurements are important to investors as they exclude non-core or non-recurring income and expense items, therefore, they provide a more realistic run-rate for future periods. In compliance with applicable rules of the SEC, these non-GAAP measures are reconciled to net income, which is the most directly comparable GAAP financial measure.
    (2 ) Non-core or non-recurring items (post-tax) are calculated using an estimated effective federal tax rate of 21% with the exception of goodwill impairment which is not deductible for tax.
    (3 ) Interest earned and yields on nontaxable securities and loans are determined on a tax equivalent basis using a 21% effective federal tax rate.        
    (4 ) Net interest margin (TEY) is a non-GAAP financial measure. The Company’s management utilizes this measurement to take into account the tax benefit associated with certain loans and securities. It is also standard industry practice to measure net interest margin using tax-equivalent measures. In compliance with applicable rules of the SEC, this non-GAAP measure is reconciled to net interest income, which is the most directly comparable GAAP financial measure. In addition, the Company calculates net interest margin without the impact of acquisition accounting net accretion as this can fluctuate and it’s difficult to provide a more realistic run-rate for future periods.
    (5 ) Efficiency ratio is a non-GAAP measure. The Company’s management utilizes this ratio to compare to industry peers. The ratio is used to calculate overhead as a percentage of revenue. In compliance with the applicable rules of the SEC, this non-GAAP measure is reconciled to noninterest expense, net interest income and noninterest income, which are the most directly comparable GAAP financial measures.

    The MIL Network –

    April 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Weatherford Announces First Quarter 2025 Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    • First quarter revenue of $1,193 million decreased 12% year-over-year
    • First quarter operating income of $142 million decreased 39% year-over-year
    • First quarter net income of $76 million, a 6.4% margin, decreased 32% year-over-year
    • First quarter adjusted EBITDA* of $253 million, a 21.2% margin, decreased 25%, or 354 basis points, year-over-year
    • First quarter cash provided by operating activities of $142 million and adjusted free cash flow* of $66 million
    • Repurchased $34 million of 8.625% Senior Notes due 2030 in the first quarter of 2025
    • Shareholder return of $71 million for the quarter, which included dividend payments of $18 million and share repurchases of $53 million
    • Board approved quarterly cash dividend of $0.25 per share, payable on June 5, 2025, to shareholders of record as of May 6, 2025
    • As part of its portfolio optimization strategy, Weatherford completed the sale of its Pressure Pumping business in Argentina on April 1, 2025
    • Signed a strategic agreement with Abu Dhabi-based AIQ to bring transformative efficiency to energy production, leveraging advanced automation, data-driven insights, and the power of AI technology

    *Non-GAAP – refer to the section titled Non-GAAP Financial Measures Defined and GAAP to Non-GAAP Financial Measures Reconciled

    HOUSTON, April 22, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Weatherford International plc (NASDAQ: WFRD) (“Weatherford” or the “Company”) announced today its results for the first quarter of 2025.

    Revenues for the first quarter of 2025 were $1,193 million, a decrease of 12% year-over-year and 11% sequentially. Operating income was $142 million in the first quarter of 2025, compared to $233 million in the first quarter of 2024 and $198 million in the fourth quarter of 2024. Net income in the first quarter of 2025 was $76 million, with a 6.4% margin, a decrease of 32%, or 188 basis points year-over-year and 32%, or 198 basis points, sequentially. Adjusted EBITDA* was $253 million, a 21.2% margin, a decrease of 25%, or 354 basis points, year-over-year and 22%, or 310 basis points, sequentially. Basic income per share in the first quarter of 2025 was $1.04, compared to $1.54 in the first quarter of 2024 and $1.54 in the fourth quarter of 2024. Diluted income per share in the first quarter of 2025 was $1.03, compared to $1.50 in the first quarter of 2024, and $1.50 in the fourth quarter of 2024.

    First quarter 2025 cash flows provided by operating activities were $142 million, compared to $131 million in the first quarter of 2024, and $249 million in the fourth quarter of 2024. Adjusted free cash flow* was $66 million, a decrease of $16 million year-over-year and $96 million sequentially. Capital expenditures were $77 million in the first quarter of 2025, compared to $59 million in the first quarter of 2024, and $100 million in the fourth quarter of 2024.

    Girish Saligram, President and Chief Executive Officer, commented, “The first quarter was marked by significant market softening across key geographies, especially Mexico, the United Kingdom and North America. This created headwinds for activity levels but the One Weatherford team continued to focus on the controllable elements of the business, driving execution to deliver results inline with expectations.

    Over the past few weeks, the market conditions have skewed more negatively, as we continue to navigate uncertainty on customer activity levels stemming from macroeconomic factors, global trade and geopolitical tensions. However, our actions remain focused on our North Star of driving adjusted free cash flow and we are further accelerating efficiency and optimization programs to ensure that we are well positioned for any scenario that might unfold in the latter part of the year. We believe it to be prudent to scale back our expectations on activity levels through the rest of the year and are focused on minimizing decrementals and improving working capital efficiencies. Nonetheless, even at a significantly reduced level of customer activity, we remain confident in increasing our adjusted free cash flow conversion for the full year 2025, allowing progress on our capital allocation priorities.

    The sale of our Pressure Pumping business in Argentina marks another key milestone in our portfolio optimization strategy to a more capital-efficient model and further builds liquidity to position us well for the upcoming period.”

    *Non-GAAP – refer to the section titled Non-GAAP Financial Measures Defined and GAAP to Non-GAAP Financial Measures Reconciled

    Operational & Commercial Highlights

    • An International Oil Company (IOC) awarded Weatherford an eight-year contract extension to provide a comprehensive suite of services, including Intervention Services & Drilling Tools, Pipe Inspection, Managed Pressure Drilling (MPD), Tubular Running Services (TRS), Well Services, and Pipe Recovery in Kazakhstan.
    • PDO Oman awarded Weatherford a five-year Integrated Completions contract consisting of Completions, Liner Hangers and Cementation Products.
    • ADNOC Onshore awarded Weatherford a three-year contract for Well Services Production enhancement systems in the United Arab Emirates.
    • Eni Oman awarded Weatherford an open contract for onshore MPD services.
    • Petrobras awarded Weatherford a five-year contract for Liner Hangers systems and services in deepwater Brazil and amended its TRS contract, adding two Vero Mechanized Systems.
    • Sierracol Energy Andina LLC awarded Weatherford a six-month contract for Artificial Lift Systems in Colombia.
    • GeoPark Colombia S.A.S. awarded Weatherford a three-year contract for Wireline Open & Cased Hole Services.
    • Jadestone Energy (Malaysia) PTE LTD awarded Weatherford a contract for the Autonomous Inflow Control Device Screens and associated lower Completions equipment and services for the PM323 East Belumut Phase 9 Infill Drilling campaign.
    • Dragon Oil awarded Weatherford a three-year contract for Completions Equipment and Services in offshore Turkmenistan.
    • An IOC awarded Weatherford a one-year contract for Artificial Lift Equipment and Centro® Well Construction Optimization Platform in Argentina.
    • An IOC in Turkey awarded Weatherford a five-year contract for Open Hole Wireline Tools.
    • An IOC awarded Weatherford a three-year contract for Artificial Lift Equipment in Australia.
    • A major integrated energy company awarded Weatherford a three-year, multi-rig contract for Vero® Mechanized Systems in deepwater Gulf of America.
    • A National Oil Company (NOC) awarded Weatherford a two-year contract for Stage Tool Cementing Equipment in the Middle East.
    • An IOC awarded Weatherford a one-year contract for the SCADA Digital Platform in offshore United Arab Emirates.

    Technology Highlights

    • Drilling & Evaluation (“DRE”)
      • In the UK, Weatherford successfully delivered Logging While Drilling and Formation Pressure Services for Shell on a high-pressure, high temperature well. The well was drilled at 175°c and reached a total depth of 21,000 feet.
      • In the Middle East, Weatherford successfully deployed GuideWave® CLEAR in three wells for an NOC, enabling improved formation evaluation and more precise geo-steering.
    • Well Construction and Completions (“WCC”)
      • In deepwater Brazil, Weatherford successfully installed the first OptiROSS® RFID Multi-Cycle Sliding Sleeve Valve for Petrobras. This system enhances acid stimulation efficiency, improving production and boosting the reservoir’s oil recovery factor.
      • In North America, Weatherford successfully completed 17 field trials of its SecureTrac™ technology with one of the largest multinational oil and gas companies. The tool’s more compact design enables a shorter shoe track, maximizing reservoir exposure and enhancing production potential.
      • In the Middle East, Weatherford successfully deployed the first WidePak™ straddle solution for Gupco in Egypt. The well had been shut for 15 years due to a sustained tubing leak. Following Weatherford’s intervention, the well is now back online and delivering significant production.
    • Production and Intervention (“PRI”)
      • In North America, Weatherford successfully deployed the ForeSite® Regenerative Power for KODA, following a two-month pilot. The deployment delivered significant power savings, demonstrating the technology’s efficiency and value in the field.
      • In North America, Weatherford deployed the ForeSite® Power Regenerative variable-speed drive across key customers, following multiple successful pilots. The implementation delivered significant power savings and reduced carbon emissions. Due to its unique ability to recycle, store, and optimize power, this innovative solution helps control operating expenses for customers.

    Shareholder Return

    During the first quarter of 2025, Weatherford paid dividends of $18 million and repurchased shares for approximately $53 million, resulting in a total shareholder return of $71 million.

    On April 17, 2025, our Board declared a cash dividend of $0.25 per share of the Company’s ordinary shares, payable on June 5, 2025, to shareholders of record as of May 6, 2025.

    Results by Reportable Segment

    Drilling and Evaluation (“DRE”)

        Three Months Ended   Variance
    ($ in Millions)   March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
      Seq.   YoY
    Revenue   $ 350     $ 398     $ 422     (12 )%   (17 )%
    Segment Adjusted EBITDA   $ 74     $ 96     $ 130     (23 )%   (43 )%
    Segment Adj EBITDA Margin     21.1 %     24.1 %     30.8 %   (298 )bps   (966 )bps
                                         

    First quarter 2025 DRE revenue of $350 million decreased by $72 million, or 17% year-over-year, primarily from lower Drilling-related services activity in Latin America, Europe/Sub-Sahara Africa/Russia and North America, partly offset by higher Drilling Services activity in Middle East/North Africa/Asia. Sequentially, DRE revenue decreased by $48 million, or 12%, primarily from lower international activity, especially in Latin America, partly offset by higher Wireline activity in North America.

    First quarter 2025 DRE segment adjusted EBITDA of $74 million decreased by $56 million, or 43% year-over-year, primarily from lower activity, partly offset by higher Drilling Services activity in Middle East/North Africa/Asia. Sequentially, DRE segment adjusted EBITDA decreased by $22 million, or 23%, primarily from lower international activity, especially in Latin America, partly offset by higher Wireline activity in North America.

    Well Construction and Completions (“WCC”)

        Three Months Ended   Variance
    ($ in Millions)   March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
      Seq.   YoY
    Revenue   $ 441     $ 505     $ 458     (13 )%   (4 )%
    Segment Adjusted EBITDA   $ 128     $ 148     $ 120     (14 )%   7 %
    Segment Adj EBITDA Margin     29.0 %     29.3 %     26.2 %    (28) bps   282 bps
                                         

    First quarter 2025 WCC revenue of $441 million decreased by $17 million, or 4% year-over-year, primarily from lower activity in North America, Latin America and Europe/Sub-Sahara Africa/Russia, partly offset by higher activity in Middle East/North Africa/Asia. Sequentially, WCC revenues decreased by $64 million, or 13%, primarily from lower activity across all geographies.

    First quarter 2025 WCC segment adjusted EBITDA of $128 million increased by $8 million, or 7% year-over-year, primarily from higher activity and fall through in Middle East/North Africa/Asia, partly offset by lower activity in North America, Latin America and Europe/Sub-Sahara Africa/Russia. Sequentially, WCC segment adjusted EBITDA decreased by $20 million, or 14%, primarily from lower activity across all geographies.

    Production and Intervention (“PRI”)

        Three Months Ended   Variance
    ($ in Millions)   March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
      Seq.   YoY
    Revenue   $ 334     $ 364     $ 348     (8 )%   (4 )%
    Segment Adjusted EBITDA   $ 62     $ 78     $ 73     (21 )%   (15 )%
    Segment Adj EBITDA Margin     18.6 %     21.4 %     21.0 %   (287 )bps   (241 )bps
                                         

    First quarter 2025 PRI revenue of $334 million decreased by $14 million, or 4% year-over-year, as lower international activity was partly offset by higher activity in North America. Sequentially, PRI revenue decreased by $30 million, or 8%, primarily from lower Artificial Lift activity.

    First quarter 2025 PRI segment adjusted EBITDA of $62 million decreased by $11 million, or 15% year-over-year, primarily from lower international activity, partly offset by higher fall through in North America. Sequentially, PRI segment adjusted EBITDA decreased by $16 million, or 21%, primarily from lower Artificial Lift activity, partly offset by higher fall through from Digital Solutions in North America.

    Revenue by Geography

        Three Months Ended   Variance  
    ($ in Millions)   March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
      Seq.   YoY
    North America   $ 250   $ 261   $ 267   (4 )%   (6) %
                           
    International   $ 943   $ 1,080   $ 1,091   (13 )%   (14 )%
    Latin America     241     312     370   (23 )%   (35 )%
    Middle East/North Africa/Asia     503     542     497   (7 )%   1 %
    Europe/Sub-Sahara Africa/Russia     199     226     224   (12 )%   (11 )%
    Total Revenue   $ 1,193   $ 1,341   $ 1,358   (11 )%   (12 )%


    North America

    First quarter 2025 North America revenue of $250 million decreased by $17 million, or 6% year-over-year, primarily from lower activity in DRE and WCC segments, partly offset by higher activity in PRI segment led by Pressure Pumping and Digital Solutions. Sequentially, North America decreased by $11 million, or 4%, primarily from lower US land and US offshore activity, partly offset by higher Wireline activity.

    International

    First quarter 2025 international revenue of $943 million decreased 14% year-over-year and decreased 13% sequentially.

    First quarter 2025 Latin America revenue of $241 million decreased by $129 million, or 35% year-over-year, primarily from lower activity in Mexico, partly offset by MPD and Pressure Pumping activity. Sequentially, Latin America revenue decreased by $71 million, or 23%, primarily from lower activity in Mexico, partly offset by higher MPD and Completions activity.

    First quarter 2025 Middle East/North Africa/Asia revenue of $503 million increased by $6 million, or 1% year-over-year, as higher activity from Completions and Drilling Services were partly offset by lower MPD and Integrated Services & Projects activity. Sequentially, the Middle East/North Africa/Asia revenue decreased by $39 million, or 7%, primarily from lower activity in all the segments, partly offset by higher Integrated Services & Projects and MPD activity.

    First quarter 2025 Europe/Sub-Sahara Africa/Russia revenue of $199 million decreased by $25 million, or 11% year-over-year, primarily from lower activity across all the segments, partly offset by higher Well Services and MPD activity. Sequentially, Europe/Sub-Sahara Africa/Russia revenue decreased by $27 million, or 12%, primarily from lower activity across all the segments, partly offset by higher activity in Drilling Services.

    About Weatherford
    Weatherford delivers innovative energy services that integrate proven technologies with advanced digitalization to create sustainable offerings for maximized value and return on investment. Our world-class experts partner with customers to optimize their resources and realize the full potential of their assets. Operators choose us for strategic solutions that add efficiency, flexibility, and responsibility to any energy operation. The Company conducts business in approximately 75 countries and has approximately 18,000 team members representing more than 110 nationalities and 320 operating locations. Visit weatherford.com for more information and connect with us on social media.

    Conference Call Details

    Weatherford will host a conference call on Wednesday, April 23, 2025, to discuss the Company’s results for the first quarter ended March 31, 2025. The conference call will begin at 8:30 a.m. Eastern Time (7:30 a.m. Central Time).

    Listeners are encouraged to download the accompanying presentation slides which will be available in the investor relations section of the Company’s website.

    Listeners can participate in the conference call via a live webcast at https://www.weatherford.com/investor-relations/investor-news-and-events/events/ or by dialing +1 877-328-5344 (within the U.S.) or +1 412-902-6762 (outside of the U.S.) and asking for the Weatherford conference call. Participants should log in or dial in approximately 10 minutes prior to the start of the call.

    A telephonic replay of the conference call will be available until May 7, 2025, at 5:00 p.m. Eastern Time. To access the replay, please dial +1 877-344-7529 (within the U.S.) or +1 412-317-0088 (outside of the U.S.) and reference conference number 6907941. A replay and transcript of the earnings call will also be available in the investor relations section of the Company’s website.

    Contacts
    For Investors:
    Luke Lemoine
    Senior Vice President, Corporate Development & Investor Relations
    +1 713-836-7777
    investor.relations@weatherford.com

    For Media:
    Kelley Hughes
    Senior Director, Communications & Employee Engagement
    media@weatherford.com

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This news release contains projections and forward-looking statements concerning, among other things, the Company’s quarterly adjusted EBITDA*, adjusted EBITDA margin*, adjusted free cash flow*, net leverage*, shareholder return program, forecasts or expectations regarding business outlook, prospects for its operations, capital expenditures, expectations regarding future financial results, and are also generally identified by the words “believe,” “project,” “expect,” “anticipate,” “estimate,” “outlook,” “budget,” “intend,” “strategy,” “plan,” “guidance,” “may,” “should,” “could,” “will,” “would,” “will be,” “will continue,” “will likely result,” and similar expressions, although not all forward-looking statements contain these identifying words. Such statements are based upon the current beliefs of Weatherford’s management and are subject to significant risks, assumptions, and uncertainties. Should one or more of these risks or uncertainties materialize, or underlying assumptions prove incorrect, actual results may vary materially from those indicated in our forward-looking statements. Readers are cautioned that forward-looking statements are only estimates and may differ materially from actual future events or results, based on factors including but not limited to: global political, economic and market conditions, political disturbances, war or other global conflicts, terrorist attacks, changes in global trade policies, tariffs and sanctions, weak local economic conditions and international currency fluctuations; general global economic repercussions related to U.S. and global inflationary pressures and potential recessionary concerns; various effects from conflicts in the Middle East and the Russia Ukraine conflicts, including, but not limited to, nationalization of assets, extended business interruptions, sanctions, treaties and regulations (including changes in the regulatory environment) imposed by various countries, associated operational and logistical challenges, and impacts to the overall global energy supply; cybersecurity issues; our ability to comply with, and respond to, climate change, environmental, social and governance and other sustainability initiatives and future legislative and regulatory measures both globally and in specific geographic regions; the potential for a resurgence of a pandemic in a given geographic area and related disruptions to our business, employees, customers, suppliers and other partners; the price and price volatility of, and demand for, oil and natural gas; the macroeconomic outlook for the oil and gas industry; our ability to generate cash flow from operations to fund our operations; our ability to effectively and timely adapt our technology portfolio, products and services to remain competitive, and to address and participate in changes to the market demands, including for the transition to alternate sources of energy such as geothermal, carbon capture and responsible abandonment, including our digitalization efforts; our ability to effectively execute our capital allocation framework; our ability to return capital to shareholders, including those related to the timing and amounts (including any plans or commitments in respect thereof) of any dividends and share repurchases; and the realization of additional cost savings and operational efficiencies.

    These risks and uncertainties are more fully described in Weatherford’s reports and registration statements filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, including the risk factors described in the Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K and Quarterly Reports on Form 10-Q. Accordingly, you should not place undue reliance on any of the Company’s forward-looking statements. Any forward-looking statement speaks only as of the date on which such statement is made, and the Company undertakes no obligation to correct or update any forward-looking statement, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise, except as required by applicable law, and we caution you not to rely on them unduly.

    *Non-GAAP – refer to the section titled Non-GAAP Financial Measures Defined and GAAP to Non-GAAP Financial Measures Reconciled

    Weatherford International plc
    Selected Statements of Operations (Unaudited)
                 
        Three Months Ended
    ($ in Millions, Except Per Share Amounts)   March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
    Revenues:            
    DRE Revenues   $ 350     $ 398     $ 422  
    WCC Revenues     441       505       458  
    PRI Revenues     334       364       348  
    All Other     68       74       130  
    Total Revenues     1,193       1,341       1,358  
                 
    Operating Income:            
    DRE Segment Adjusted EBITDA[1]   $ 74     $ 96     $ 130  
    WCC Segment Adjusted EBITDA[1]     128       148       120  
    PRI Segment Adjusted EBITDA[1]     62       78       73  
    All Other[2]     4       11       27  
    Corporate[2]     (15 )     (7 )     (14 )
    Depreciation and Amortization     (62 )     (83 )     (85 )
    Share-based Compensation     (7 )     (10 )     (13 )
    Restructuring Charges     (29 )     (34 )     (3 )
    Other Charges, Net     (13 )     (1 )     (2 )
    Operating Income     142       198       233  
                 
    Other Expense:            
    Interest Expense, Net of Interest Income of $11, $12, and $14     (26 )     (25 )     (29 )
    Other Expense, Net     (20 )     (4 )     (22 )
    Income Before Income Taxes     96       169       182  
    Income Tax Provision     (10 )     (45 )     (59 )
    Net Income     86       124       123  
    Net Income Attributable to Noncontrolling Interests     10       12       11  
    Net Income Attributable to Weatherford   $ 76     $ 112     $ 112  
                 
    Basic Income Per Share   $ 1.04     $ 1.54     $ 1.54  
    Basic Weighted Average Shares Outstanding     73.1       72.6       72.9  
                 
    Diluted Income Per Share   $ 1.03     $ 1.50     $ 1.50  
    Diluted Weighted Average Shares Outstanding     73.4       74.5       74.7  
    [1] Segment adjusted EBITDA is our primary measure of segment profitability under U.S. GAAP ASC 280 “Segment Reporting” and represents segment earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, amortization, share-based compensation, restructuring charges and other adjustments. Research and development expenses are included in segment adjusted EBITDA.
    [2] All Other includes results from non-core business activities (including integrated services and projects), and Corporate includes overhead support and centrally managed or shared facilities costs. All Other and Corporate do not individually meet the criteria for segment reporting.
    Weatherford International plc
    Selected Balance Sheet Data (Unaudited)
           
    ($ in Millions) March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
    Assets:      
    Cash and Cash Equivalents $ 873   $ 916
    Restricted Cash   57     59
    Accounts Receivable, Net   1,175     1,261
    Inventories, Net   889     880
    Property, Plant and Equipment, Net   1,103     1,061
    Intangibles, Net   315     325
           
    Liabilities:      
    Accounts Payable   714     792
    Accrued Salaries and Benefits   249     302
    Current Portion of Long-term Debt   22     17
    Long-term Debt   1,583     1,617
           
    Shareholders’ Equity:      
    Total Shareholders’ Equity   1,360     1,283
    Weatherford International plc
    Selected Cash Flows Information (Unaudited)
                 
        Three Months Ended
    ($ in Millions)   March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
    Cash Flows From Operating Activities:            
    Net Income   $ 86     $ 124     $ 123  
    Adjustments to Reconcile Net Income to Net Cash Provided By Operating Activities:            
    Depreciation and Amortization     62       83       85  
    Foreign Exchange Losses (Gain)     13       (2 )     15  
    Gain on Disposition of Assets     (1 )     (2 )     (7 )
    Deferred Income Tax Provision     7       —       14  
    Share-Based Compensation     7       10       13  
    Changes in Accounts Receivable, Inventory, Accounts Payable and Accrued Salaries and Benefits     (17 )     24       (152 )
    Other Changes, Net     (15 )     12       40  
    Net Cash Provided By Operating Activities     142       249       131  
                 
    Cash Flows From Investing Activities:            
    Capital Expenditures for Property, Plant and Equipment     (77 )     (100 )     (59 )
    Proceeds from Disposition of Assets     1       13       10  
    Business Acquisitions, Net of Cash Acquired     —       —       (36 )
    Proceeds from Sale of Investments     —       —       41  
    Other Investing Activities     (3 )     1       (10 )
    Net Cash Used In Investing Activities     (79 )     (86 )     (54 )
                 
    Cash Flows From Financing Activities:            
    Repayments of Long-term Debt     (39 )     (23 )     (172 )
    Distributions to Noncontrolling Interests     —       (20 )     —  
    Tax Remittance on Equity Awards     (20 )     (22 )     (8 )
    Share Repurchases     (53 )     (49 )     —  
    Dividends Paid     (18 )     (18 )     —  
    Other Financing Activities     (3 )     (1 )     (7 )
    Net Cash Used In Financing Activities   $ (133 )   $ (133 )   $ (187 )
    Weatherford International plc
    Non-GAAP Financial Measures Defined (Unaudited)
     

    We report our financial results in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). However, Weatherford’s management believes that certain non-GAAP financial measures (as defined under the SEC’s Regulation G and Item 10(e) of Regulation S-K) may provide users of this financial information additional meaningful comparisons between current results and results of prior periods and comparisons with peer companies. The non-GAAP amounts shown in the following tables should not be considered as substitutes for results reported in accordance with GAAP but should be viewed in addition to the Company’s reported results prepared in accordance with GAAP.

    Adjusted EBITDA* – Adjusted EBITDA* is a non-GAAP measure and represents consolidated income before interest expense, net, income taxes, depreciation and amortization expense, and excludes, among other items, restructuring charges, share-based compensation expense, as well as other charges and credits. Management believes adjusted EBITDA* is useful to assess and understand normalized operating performance and trends. Adjusted EBITDA* should be considered in addition to, but not as a substitute for consolidated net income and should be viewed in addition to the Company’s reported results prepared in accordance with GAAP.

    Adjusted EBITDA margin* – Adjusted EBITDA margin* is a non-GAAP measure which is calculated by dividing consolidated adjusted EBITDA* by consolidated revenues. Management believes adjusted EBITDA margin* is useful to assess and understand normalized operating performance and trends. Adjusted EBITDA margin* should be considered in addition to, but not as a substitute for consolidated net income margin and should be viewed in addition to the Company’s reported results prepared in accordance with GAAP.

    Adjusted Free Cash Flow* – Adjusted Free Cash Flow* is a non-GAAP measure and represents cash flows provided by (used in) operating activities, less capital expenditures plus proceeds from the disposition of assets. Management believes adjusted free cash flow* is useful to understand our performance at generating cash and demonstrates our discipline around the use of cash. Adjusted free cash flow* should be considered in addition to, but not as a substitute for cash flows provided by operating activities and should be viewed in addition to the Company’s reported results prepared in accordance with GAAP.

    Net Debt* – Net Debt* is a non-GAAP measure that is calculated taking short and long-term debt less cash and cash equivalents and restricted cash. Management believes the net debt* is useful to assess the level of debt in excess of cash and cash and equivalents as we monitor our ability to repay and service our debt. Net debt* should be considered in addition to, but not as a substitute for overall debt and total cash and should be viewed in addition to the Company’s results prepared in accordance with GAAP.​

    Net Leverage* – Net Leverage* is a non-GAAP measure which is calculated by dividing by taking net debt* divided by adjusted EBITDA* for the trailing 12 months. Management believes the net leverage* is useful to understand our ability to repay and service our debt. Net leverage* should be considered in addition to, but not as a substitute for the individual components of above defined net debt* divided by consolidated net income attributable to Weatherford and should be viewed in addition to the Company’s reported results prepared in accordance with GAAP.

    *Non-GAAP – as defined above and reconciled to the GAAP measures in the section titled GAAP to Non-GAAP Financial Measures Reconciled

    Weatherford International plc
    GAAP to Non-GAAP Financial Measures Reconciled (Unaudited)
     
                 
        Three Months Ended
    ($ in Millions, Except Margin in Percentages)   March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
    Revenues   $ 1,193     $ 1,341     $ 1,358  
    Net Income Attributable to Weatherford   $ 76     $ 112     $ 112  
    Net Income Margin     6.4 %     8.4 %     8.2 %
    Adjusted EBITDA*   $ 253     $ 326     $ 336  
    Adjusted EBITDA Margin*     21.2 %     24.3 %     24.7 %
                 
    Net Income Attributable to Weatherford   $ 76     $ 112     $ 112  
    Net Income Attributable to Noncontrolling Interests     10       12       11  
    Income Tax Provision     10       45       59  
    Interest Expense, Net of Interest Income of $11, $12, and $14     26       25       29  
    Other Expense, Net     20       4       22  
    Operating Income     142       198       233  
    Depreciation and Amortization     62       83       85  
    Other Charges, Net[1]     13       1       2  
    Restructuring Charges     29       34       3  
    Share-Based Compensation     7       10       13  
    Adjusted EBITDA*   $ 253     $ 326     $ 336  
                 
    Net Cash Provided By Operating Activities   $ 142     $ 249     $ 131  
    Capital Expenditures for Property, Plant and Equipment     (77 )     (100 )     (59 )
    Proceeds from Disposition of Assets     1       13       10  
    Adjusted Free Cash Flow*   $ 66     $ 162     $ 82  
    [1] Other Charges, Net in the three months ended March 31, 2025 primarily includes fees to third-party financial institutions related to collections of certain receivables from our largest customer in Mexico.
       

    *Non-GAAP – as reconciled to the GAAP measures above and defined in the section titled Non-GAAP Financial Measures Defined

    Weatherford International plc
    GAAP to Non-GAAP Financial Measures Reconciled Continued (Unaudited)
     
                   
         
    ($ in Millions)   March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
     
    Current Portion of Long-term Debt   $ 22   $ 17   $ 101  
    Long-term Debt     1,583     1,617     1,629  
    Total Debt   $ 1,605   $ 1,634   $ 1,730  
                   
    Cash and Cash Equivalents   $ 873   $ 916   $ 824  
    Restricted Cash     57     59     113  
    Total Cash   $ 930   $ 975   $ 937  
                   
    Components of Net Debt              
    Current Portion of Long-term Debt   $ 22   $ 17   $ 101  
    Long-term Debt     1,583     1,617     1,629  
    Less: Cash and Cash Equivalents     873     916     824  
    Less: Restricted Cash     57     59     113  
    Net Debt*   $ 675   $ 659   $ 793  
                   
    Net Income for trailing 12 months   $ 470   $ 506   $ 457  
    Adjusted EBITDA* for trailing 12 months   $ 1,299   $ 1,382   $ 1,253  
                   
    Net Leverage* (Net Debt*/Adjusted EBITDA*)     0.52 x   0.48 x   0.63 x
                         

    *Non-GAAP – as reconciled to the GAAP measures above and defined in the section titled Non-GAAP Financial Measures Defined

    The MIL Network –

    April 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: World Economic Outlook Press Briefing

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    April 22, 2025

    Speakers:

    Pierre‑Olivier Gourinchas, Director, Research Department, IMF
    Petya Koeva Brooks, Deputy Director, Research Department, IMF
    Deniz Igan, Division Chief, Research Department, IMF

    Moderator:
    Jose Luis De Haro, Communications Officer, IMF   

    Mr. De Haro: OK. I think we can start and we have a quorum. So good morning, everyone, and welcome. I want to welcome also those joining us online. I am Jose Luis de Haro with the Communications Department at the IMF and we are gathered here today for the presentation of our latest edition of the World Economic Outlook titled, “A Critical Juncture Amid Policy Shifts.” I hope by this time you all have had access to the document. If not, I am going to encourage you, as always, to go to IMF.org. There, you are going to find the document, the World Economic Outlook, also Pierre‑Olivier’s blog and many other assets, including the underlying data for some of the charts that are published on the World Economic Outlook.

    I also want to plug in that we have a new database portal that I encourage you to use, and what’s best, that to discuss the new outlook that having here with us today, Pierre‑Olivier Gourinchas. He is the Economic Counsellor, the chief economist, and the Director of the Research Department. Next to him are Petya Koeva Brooks, she is the Deputy Director of the Research Department and last, but not least, we also have Deniz Igan, she is the division chief also with the Research Department.

    Pierre‑Olivier, as usual is going to start with some opening remarks, and then we are going to open the floor to your questions. I just want to remind everyone that this press briefing, it’s on the record and that we also have simultaneous translation.

    So let me stop here. Pierre‑Olivier, the floor is yours.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Thank you, Jose. And good morning, everyone. The landscape has changed since our last World Economic Outlook update in January. We are entering a new era as the global economic system that has operated for the last 80 years is being reset. Since late January, many tariff announcements have been made, culminating on April 2, with near universal levies from the United States and counterresponses from some trading partners. The U.S. effective tariff rate has surged past levels reached more than 100 years ago, while tariff rates on the U.S. have also increased.

    Beyond the abrupt increase in tariffs, the surge in policy uncertainty is a major driver of the economic outlook. If sustained, the increasing trade tensions and uncertainty will slow global growth significantly. Reflecting this complexity, our report presents a reference forecast which incorporates policy announcements up to April 4 by the U.S. and trading partners. Under these reference forecasts, global growth will reach 2.8 percent this year and 3 percent next year, a cumulative downgrade of about 0.8 percentage points relative to our January 2025 WEO update. Our report also offers a range of forecasts under different policy assumptions.

    Under an alternative path that excludes the April tariff announcements, global growth would have seen only a modest downgrade to 3.2 percent this year. We will also use a model‑based forecast to incorporate the temporary suspension of most tariffs announced on April 9, together with the increase in bilateral tariffs between China and the U.S. to prohibitive levels. This pause, even if extended permanently, delivers a similar growth outlook as a reference forecast, 2.8 percent, even if some highly tariffed countries could benefit.

    Now, while global growth remains well above recession levels, all regions are negatively impacted this year and next. And the global disinflation process continues, but at a slower pace with inflation revised up by 0.1 percentage point in both years. These trade tensions will greatly impact global trade. We project that global trade growth will be more than cut in half from 3.8 percent last year to 1.7 percent this year. The tariffs will play out differently in different countries. For the United States, the tariffs represent a supply shock that reduces productivity and output permanently and increases price pressures temporarily. This adds to an already weakening outlook and leads us to revise growth down by 0.9 percentage points to 1.8 percent, with a 0.4 percentage point downgrade from the tariffs only. While inflation is revised upwards.

    For trading partners, tariffs act mostly as a negative external demand shock. Weakening activity and prices, even if some countries could benefit from trade diversion. This is why we have lowered our China growth forecast this year to 4 percent, while inflation is revised down by 0.8 percentage points, increasing deflationary pressures. All countries are negatively affected by the surge in trade policy uncertainty, as businesses cut purchases and investment, while financial institutions reassess their borrowers’ exposure. Uncertainty also increases because of the complex sectoral disruptions that tariffs could cause up and down supply chains, as we saw during the pandemic.

    The effect of these shocks on exchange rates is complex. The tariffs could appreciate the US dollar, as in previous episodes. However, greater policy uncertainty, lower U.S. growth prospects, and an adjustment in the global demand for dollar assets are weighing down on the dollar.

    Risks to the global economic have increased and are firmly to the downside.

    First, while we are not projecting a global downturn, the risks it may happen this year have increased substantially, from 17 percent projected back in October to 30 percent now. An escalation of trade tensions would further depress growth. Financial conditions could also tighten, as markets react negatively to diminished growth prospects and increased uncertainty. On the flip side, growth prospects could immediately improve if countries ease from their current trade policy stance and promote a new, clear, and stable trade environment.

    Addressing domestic imbalances can also help raise growth while contributing significantly to closing external imbalances. For Europe, this means spending more on public infrastructure to accelerate productivity growth. For China, it means boosting support for domestic demand. While for the U.S., it means stepping up fiscal consolidation.

    Turning to policies. Our recommendations call for prudence and improved collaboration. Let me outline some key ones. First, an obvious priority is to restore trade policy stability. The global economy needs a clear, stable, and predictable trading environment, one that addresses some of the longstanding gaps in international trading rules. Monetary policy will need to remain agile and respond by tightening where inflation pressures re‑emerge, while easing where weak demand dominates. Monetary policy credibility will be key, especially where inflation expectations might de‑anchor. And central bank independence remains a cornerstone.

    Many fiscal authorities will face new spending needs to bolster defense spending or to offset the trade dislocations, likely to come. Some of the poorest countries also hit with reduced official aid could experience debt distress. Yet debt levels are still elevated and most countries still need to rebuild fiscal space, including by implementing structural reforms. Support, where needed, should remain narrowly targeted and temporary. It is easier to turn on the fiscal tap than to turn it off. Where new spending needs are permanent, as for defense spending in some countries, planning for offsetting cuts elsewhere or new revenues should be made.

    Finally, even if some of the grievances against our trading system have merit, we should all work toward fixing the system so that it can deliver better opportunities to all. Thank you.

    Mr. De Haro: Thank you, Pierre‑Olivier. Before we open the floor to your questions, some ground rules. First of all, if you want to ask a question, raise your hand. If I call on you, please identify yourself and the media outlet you represent. Try to be succinct. Stick to one question. We want to answer as many questions as possible.

    And also, a reminder. We are here to discuss the World Economic Outlook. Those questions regarding country programs, institutional issues are going to be better placed for the regional press briefings that are happening later this week and also the Managing Director’s press briefing this Thursday.

    With that said, I want hands up. OK. So I am going to start here in the center. Then I am going to move the room to my left. Then to my right. I am going to start with the lady with the green jacket there.

    QUESTION: Thank you.. Thanks so much for doing this.

    Pierre‑Olivier, I wonder if you can speak a little bit to the fact that you haven’t called out a recession. And you know, we are hearing lots of economists in the United States and other places‑‑most recently yesterday, the IIF is now also forecasting a small recession in the second half of the year. What we see in the WEO is that the percentage of risk of a recession has increased pretty dramatically. Can you walk us through why you are not at this point calling a recession, for instance, likely in the United States and what it would take to tip it that way? Thanks.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Thank you, Andrea.

    So for the United States, we are projecting a significant slowdown. We are projecting growth will be at 1.8 percent in 2025. And that’s a 0.9 percentage‑point slowdown‑‑revision in our projections from January. But 1.9 percent is obviously not a recession. And the reason for this is is that we have a U.S. economy that, in our view, is coming from a position of strength. We had an economy that was growing very rapidly. We have a labor market that is still very robust. We have seen some signs of weakening and slowdown in the U.S. economy, even before the tariff announcements. So, in fact, the 0.9 percentage point downward revision that I just mentioned, only a part of this‑‑maybe 0.4 percentage points‑‑is coming from the tariffs. Some of that is also coming from weakening momentum. This was an economy that was doing very, very well but was self‑correcting and cooling off a bit on its own. And we were seeing already consumption numbers coming down. We are seeing consumer confidence coming down. So all of that was already factored in. But we are not seeing a recession in our reference forecast.

    As you mentioned, Andrea, we are‑‑when we do our risk assessment, if you want, we are seeing the probability of a recession increasing, from about 25 percent back in October to around 40 percent when we assess it now.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. I am going to move to this side. The lady here in red.

    QUESTION: Good morning.

    Pierre, I wanted to ask you about the downward pressure on the dollar now. To what extent you believe it can provide some relief from the pressure on highly indebted emerging economies with a large share of dollar‑denominated debt? And has this downward pressure on the dollar changed your outlook on all of those emerging economies that are still, you know, under the impact of the high debt‑‑as mentioned by the MD in previous meetings, where this high debt is really one of the impediments to growth? Thanks.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Yes. So we are seeing a weakening of the dollar that is fairly broad‑based over the last few weeks, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, some of that is coming from the weaker growth prospects in the U.S. Some it is coming from the increased uncertainty. And it’s leading to a reassessment of the global demand for dollar assets. When we step back, we also have to realize we are coming from a position where, over the last few years, there have been tremendous capital inflows into U.S. markets, in particular, risk markets. That’s something that, of course, my colleague Tobias Adrian will talk about in the GFSR press conference. So we are seeing some adjustment, some contradiction. The markets are handling it. We don’t see signs of stress, even in currency markets.

    Now, the interesting development is, what does it mean for emerging markets? And you are right to point out that, in the past, when the dollar would strengthen, that would not necessarily be good news for emerging markets because they have dollar‑denominated debts, so that increases their liabilities and the pressure on them to service their debts. And this can lead to some tightening of financial conditions. So we are not seeing that right now. And so that’s a plus. The flip side of this is, of course, the appreciation of some of these emerging markets’ currencies means that they are also losing a little bit on the competitiveness side, so there is maybe something that is a bit easier on the finance conditions, something that is not as easy on the trade side.

    Finally, this is an environment of enormous uncertainty, increased volatility. And that I think is something that will dominate for many of the emerging markets. So when we are looking at our assessment, we are actually downgrading the emerging market economies for 2025 and 2026, most of them. Some of them may, as I mentioned, benefit. But overall, as a group, they are downgraded. While because they are also very plugged into the global supply chains, the uncertainty is leading to a pause in investment and activity, and they are going to suffer from the decline in demand for their products coming from the tariffs.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. I am going to go with the gentleman here with the glasses.

    QUESTION: Thank you. I just have one question. Could you elaborate a little bit on what will happen with the trade flows in your models? I saw that in the basic assumption, the exports from the U.S. are [breaking quite heavily but not that much from China. Why is this so?

    And do I understand it right that this basic model does not yet integrate the additional hikes after ‑‑ happening after basically April 9, so above 100 percent on import tariffs by the U.S.? Thanks.

    Mr. Gourinchas: So we are seeing a large impact on global trade coming from the tariffs and that’s going to be the case under any combination of tariffs where the effective tariff rates remains very elevated. And the reason why when we looked at the different scenarios that I mentioned, whether it’s a reference scenario or our April 9 scenario which includes lower tariffs on many countries but sharply increased tariffs between the U.S. and China. The overall impact on the global economy is not very different because the effective tariff rate is, if anything, even higher under that pause. So global trade is going to be significantly affected. The particular configuration of trade, which bilateral trade flows are going to be affected versus others that will depend on the final landscape in terms of tariffs so we can anticipate that there will be much lower bilateral trade under either the reference scenario or the April 9, between the U.S. and China. And that is weighing down on global trade growth. This is weighing down on global trade generally.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. I am going to turn here to the center. I am going to go to the first row. I am going to go with the lady with the yellow bottle.

    QUESTION: Thank you,

    You have downgraded the U.K.’s growth forecast quite sharply and given the range of explanations, from higher tariff barriers to more domestic issues, like cost‑of‑living pressures. Out of those, so the global challenges versus domestic challenges, which one is weighing more heavily on the U.K.’s growth forecasts?

    Mr. De Haro: OK we are going to open the round of U.K. questions so if you have questions on the U.K., raise your hand. And I will pass the mic to you. I see  two there. Yep.

    QUESTION: Hi.

    In a world where everyone is warning about the impact of tariffs on U.S. inflation and how much it will raise U.S. prices, why do you have the U.K. with the highest inflation rate in the G‑7 this year? And do you believe tariffs will be inflationary or disinflationary for the U.K.?

    Mr. De Haro: OK. Joe here in the first row.

    QUESTION: Yeah. Thank you. Thank you very much. So Joel hills from ITV news. Obviously it’s impacting the tariffs are impacting the U.K. They are impacting most countries. I just wonder this, President Trump did say there would be some disruption. He suggested it would be sort of temporary. Is it possible that President Trump is actually a genius? That he knows something you do not?

    Mr. De Haro: And I think we have a last question on the U.K. and this is going to be the last question on the U.K. There on the back of the room.

    QUESTION: Yeah.

    The U.K. inflation forecast is, you know, much higher than we expected it to be, 0.7 percent higher. Is that going to impact on lowering interest rates in the U.K.? And does that affect the growth rate, which seems to be rather optimistic, compared with some of the other European countries?

    Mr. De Haro: OK. We are going to be done with the U.K. questions and then we will move along. So Pierre‑Olivier.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Thank you. So many questions. Let me address them as best I can. First, on the revision for growth in the U.K. and inflation. So the tariffs are playing a role, as they are in most countries and uncertainty is also playing a role, as it is in all countries. And it’s weighing down on growth in the U.K. But there are some U.K.‑specific factors and I would say that in terms of the zero point 5 percentage point downward revision that we are saying for the U.K., the domestic factors are probably the biggest ones. And in particular, there is a lower carryover from weaker growth in the second half of last year. There is also some tightening of financial conditions, as interest rates have risen, longer‑term interest rates.

    On inflation, the revision in inflation in the U.K. is coming, again, from domestic factors, and in particular some change in regulated energy prices. So that’s expected to be temporary but it’s also very U.K.‑specific. The effect of the tariffs on countries like the U.K., like it is on the EU or China is like a negative demand shock. It’s weakening activity but it’s also lowering price pressures, not increasing them.

    Now, what is the impact of the tariffs in the medium and long term? Not just what’s going to happen this year and next but what’s going to happen longer term? Our assessment is it’s going to be negative. We have a box in our report that looks at the long‑term impact of the tariffs, if they are maintained. And it is negative for all regions, just like the short‑term impact. So we are seeing a negative impact in the short term, in the medium term, in the long term. Again, there are nuances. Some countries might benefit, depending on the particular configuration of tariffs. It might benefit from some trade diversion; but the broad picture is it’s negative for the outlook.

    Now, our ‑‑ and I will end with that. Our forecast for 2025 is slightly higher than OBR’s forecast. Some of this has to do with some of the underlying monetary policy assumptions for the U.K. The bank‑‑

    Our assumption for this year is that there are going to be four cuts through the year. One cut already happened. We expect three more.

    Mr. De Haro: Thank you, Pierre‑Olivier. I am not going to forget about the people that are on WebEx, and I am going to pass a question there. I see Anton from TAS.

    QUESTION: Good morning. Thank you for doing this.

    Given the projected slowdown of Russia’s GDP growth from 4.1 in 2024 to 1.5 in 2025, what are the primary factors driving this sharp decline? And how sustainable is Russia’s growth model going forward? Thank you.

    Mr. De Haro: Go ahead.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Petya, would you like to answer?

    Ms. Koeva Brooks: Sure. We are indeed expecting a slowdown in growth to 1.5 this year, and this, to a large extent is kind of the natural slowing of the economy after growing quite robustly in previous years. And also as a result of policy tightening that we have seen, both on the fiscal as well as on the monetary policy side. It is also due to the lower oil prices that have come about as a result of the‑‑as a response to the round of tariffs, as well as the uncertainty about global growth. So all these factors are behind that lower growth number, although I should point out that it is actually a slight upward revision, relative to what we had back in January. And the reason for that is that, again, we actually had seen upward surprises in 2024, which kind of carried into 2025.

    When it comes to the medium‑term growth outlook, we do expect that to be relatively weak. We are‑‑we have penciled in growth number of about 1.2, which is down from 1.7 which is what we had before the start of the war.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. Let’s continue. I am going to go again in the center and then I am going to go to that side. The lady with the glasses there.

    QUESTION: Hi.

    In Latin America, we received almost every country 10 percent. So I want to know about the impact of the tariffs in Latin America and if the impact is going to be limited, versus other regions, and when we are going to start to feeling this impact. Thank you.

    Mr. De Haro: And before we answer the question, are there any questions on Mexico, Brazil, Argentina? OK. Argentina friends, go ahead.

    QUESTION: Hello.

    You’ve kept 5.5 growth projection that was decided in the latest program that Argentina signed with the IMF. I would like to know why you are not seeing so much impact yet about‑‑of this general context.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. We can go ahead first with the Latin America overview and then we can go to Argentina.

    Mr. Gourinchas: I will just say something briefly and then ask my colleague Petya to come in. So for Latin America, as a whole, we are saying activity that is largely driven by consumption on the back of resilient labor markets while investment remains somewhat sluggish. And the slowdown in our projection reflects the impact of tariffs and the global growth slowdown, of course, which is also affecting countries in the region. Policy uncertainty. And the withdrawal of fiscal stimulus and in some countries monetary policy tightening.

    Ms. Koeva Brooks: I don’t have a lot to add. Just to say that the disinflation process has also slowed a bit, and this is also‑‑also makes the policy trade‑offs a bit more complicated with slow‑‑with growth slowing down and at the same time, you know, having still challenges on the inflation side.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. So we are going to move on. I am going to ask the gentleman in the first row there because‑‑

    Oh, sorry. Sorry. I forgot about Argentina. Please go ahead.

    Ms. Koeva Brooks: We cannot forget about Argentina.

    So the growth forecast for this year‑‑you are right‑‑we still have the upgrade of .5. And this is related to just the positive surprises that we had seen, in spite of a very strong fiscal adjustment, the recovery in confidence I think has definitely played a role in kind of driving us to have this forecast. That said, there are a number of risks related to tighter financial conditions, commodity prices, and a lot of others, which is true for many if not most other countries.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. So now we can move on. I am going to go with the gentleman in the first row.

    QUESTION: Thank you. In the October 2024 outlook you saw a stable but slow growth for Africa. What’s new now? And what kind of initiatives like the African Continental Free Trade Area do for African economies amidst these trade tensions?

    Mr. De Haro: And before we answer, I think‑‑

    QUESTION: Hi. Good morning.

    One of the things that you mentioned in your report is the demographic shift and the rise in the silver economy. Africa, on the other hand, has the reverse of that. So what is your recommendation in the short and medium term on how to deal with some of these challenges pertaining to tariffs, monetary policy, and now currency exchange? Thank you.

    Mr. De Haro: OK.

    Mr. Gourinchas: OK. Thank you. I will just say one word about the outlook in sub‑Saharan Africa and then I will ask my colleague Deniz to come in to add more color and answer also the question on the demographic trends.

    So regional growth in sub‑Saharan Africa improved significantly last year, to 4 percent. And it will ease in 2025. And this is in line with a softer global outlook. So we are seeing the same forces at play in the region, as we are seeing more globally. And a downturn‑‑and a downward revision in our projection that is of a similar magnitude at about 0.4 percentage point. Deniz?

    Ms. Igan: Thank you for the question. So on the demographic shifts, our Chapter 2 basically points out that countries’ age structures are evolving at different rates, as you pointed out as well. We have most western economies, some Asian economies that are aging fast. And you know in a health way some of them. And then we have many sub‑Saharan African countries that have a very young population. And what the chapter shows is actually, there are important medium‑term consequences of that, both for growth, as well as external balances of countries.

    In Africa’s case, basically, what we would see is a demographic dividend coming from having a young population. And the question then becomes how best to leverage that, how best to use that and channel it into growth. And the answer there, first and foremost, depends on the structural reforms, the investment that’s necessary on healthcare, on education, on human capital more generally and also international cooperation because our Chapter 3 looks more carefully into migration flows. And again, there, we see migration policy shifts in destination countries has spillovers for other countries. And this is especially true for emerging market economies and lower income economies. So, again, international cooperation there, making sure that growth dividends are utilized in the best way is what we delve into in the chapter.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. I am going to go to the gentleman with‑‑raise your hand. Yeah. You. No, I am going back. Then I will go‑‑there you go.

    QUESTION: OK. I have a question about China’s growth.

    In your World Economic Outlook, you say China’s growth forecast has been cut to 4 percent for this year, which is a 0.6 percentage drop from an earlier projection. But China’s National Bureau of Statistics a couple of days ago predicted China’s growth GDP growth in the first quarter was 5.4 percent. So my question is, how do you see the disparity in the forecast? Is China more optimistic than you are? Thank you.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Thank you. So, yes, we are revising our growth projections for China down by 0.6 percentage points, as you have noted. I should flag that this number does not incorporate the latest release for Q1. That came after we closed our round of projections. So this is not reflected there. And we will have to see how it affects our projections when we have our next round of WEO updates.

    But let me give you a little bit of perspective on the rationale behind our revision for China. The tariff increase in tariffs especially since China is one of the countries that is facing the most elevated tariffs right now, is going to have a very significant impact in our projections on the Chinese economy. In fact, when we do a decomposition, which I showed during my opening remarks, the impact of the tariffs on the Chinese economy would be a negative 1.3 percentage point revision on growth.

    So why do we only have 0.6? Well, because there are other factors that are helping to support Chinese growth in 2025 and 2026. One of which‑‑which is quite important‑‑is the fiscal support that has been announced since the beginning of the year. And that is adding up, something of the amount of 0.5 percentage points. So the impact of the current trade tensions is very significant. It’s partly offset. We expect it to remain quite significant also in 2026 when we also have a downward revision by about 0.5 percentage points.

    The other side of this, where we are seeing the impact of the tariffs is on inflation, which is revised down. Our headline inflation projection for 2025 is actually at zero. So it’s down from 0.8 percent to zero. So China is facing stronger deflationary forces as a result of these trade tensions.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. I am going to move to this side. The gentleman with the glasses here.

    QUESTION: What impact did the oil price also have in exporting and importing countries in the Middle East? Thank you.

    Mr. De Haro: Go ahead.

    Mr. Gourinchas: So we have seen oil prices declining since our last projections, and the decline in oil prices in our and our interpretation is coming mostly from weaker global demand, so it’s the weakening of global activity that is driving the decline in prices. There has been some increase in supply coming from OPEC Plus countries, but broadly speaking, the decline is mostly coming from weaker demand.

    So that is going to play out in ways you sort of would expect. The commodity exporters are going to face lower export revenues from the decline in oil prices. That’s going to weigh on their fiscal outlook, on their growth.

    For those countries that are oil importers, it’s going to lower inflation pressures because that‑‑lower oil prices is going to feed into lower headline inflation. It’s going to also provide some modest support to economic activity there.

    Deniz, anything to add on oil prices or‑‑or Petya?

    Ms. Koeva Brooks: No, I don’t.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. We are going to move to the center. I am going to get the gentleman with the white shirt there.

    QUESTION: h I am not going to ask another question about the U.K., you will be pleased to know. Over the last week we have seen a number of attacks by the White House on the independence of the Federal Reserve. How destabilizing do you think this might be for financial markets?

    Mr. Gourinchas: So central banks are facing a delicate moment. As I have explained in many countries, the impact of the tariffs is going to be to increase recessionary forces and it is going to lower price pressures. And that will help central banks cut interest rates faster and provide some support to their economies. But in other countries ‑‑ and in our projections, the U.S. is in that category‑‑the tariffs are going to increase price pressures. Price pressures in the U.S. are increasing for other reasons as well. Service prices have been quite‑‑inflation of service prices have been quite strong. And that is something that we are seeing already. But the tariffs are likely to increase price pressures. We are projecting inflation to remain at 3 percent in the U.S. this year, the same level as last year, headline inflation.

    So in that context, if you also think about where we are coming from, we are coming from a period of very elevated inflation. We are just coming off the cost‑of‑living crisis, a surge in inflation rates to double digits that we haven’t seen in more than a generation. So the critical thing is to make sure that inflation expectations remain anchored, that everyone remains convinced that central banks will do what is necessary to bring inflation back to central bank targets in an orderly manner. And central banks have instruments to do this. They have their interest rate instruments. They have various instruments of monetary policy. But one critical aspect of what they do is coming from their credibility. So central banks need to remain credible. And part of that credibility is built upon their central bank independence. And so from that perspective, it’s very important to preserve that.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. We are going to have time for two questions. One of them is going back to WebEx. I see Weier, please. Come in.

    QUESTION: Yes.I have a question.

    You mentioned that the global economic system is being reset. And I am not sure if one of the early signs in the financial markets, as we see that the markets moving from American exceptionalism to the sort of sell the U.S. narrative. So could you assess the implications for the financial markets and the world economy, as a whole?

    Mr. Gourinchas: Yeah, well we have seen some volatility in the markets, of course, whenever there is going to be potentially a significant change in the economic structure of the global economy. I think we are bound to see some reassessment. And investors are going to try to figure out what’s happening, and that’s going to inject volatility. And we are seeing some of that.

    The good news is a lot of that volatility we have seen in the last few weeks has not led to significant market dislocations or market stress to levels that would, for instance, have necessitated the interventions by central banks around the world.

    So whether you are looking at equity markets, whether you are looking at bond markets, whether you are looking at currency markets, what we are saying is a reassessment of the world we are in now and that means that there is a reassessment of valuations of risk assets, of different currencies. But that is happening in an orderly manner. So from that perspective, we are seeing a system that is quite resilient, that remained resilient but, of course, we are watching carefully and there has been some tightening of financial conditions and that’s something to be looking out for. We want to make sure that it doesn’t get to a level where the stress in the financial system would become too extreme.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. The lady here in the first row has been waiting patiently. Please go ahead.

    QUESTION: Thank you, Jose. I want to ask about the trading tensions impact on low‑income countries. You mentioned there are like downgrading for emerging markets but how about like those small countries who have lower income as a group, have you assessed the particular impact on them in these ongoing trade tensions? Thank you.

    Mr. Gourinchas: OK. Well thanks. For low‑income countries as a group, we are also seeing a downgrade in which we report in our report of 0.4 percentage points. We are expecting growth of 4.2 percent in 2025. So the 0.4 is very similar to what we are seeing at the aggregate levels, 0.5. So from that perspective it looks quite the same. However, there are also a lot of differences across countries, and when we look more carefully, you might see some vulnerable countries, especially in sub‑Saharan Africa. But elsewhere as well‑‑who could face very challenging conditions as a result of the tariffs in an environment in which many of the countries, low‑income countries have been facing a funding squeeze for a number of years now, private capital flows to this region have been drying up or have been coming on very expensive terms. We are seeing a drying up also of some official aid flows. So some of these countries have very limited fiscal space. Near a situation where the situation could become more challenging.

    Now, on the flip side, the fact that we are seeing commodity prices coming down for many commodities will help some of them. The commodity importers in that group will hurt the ones who are commodity exporters. And there are a number of countries among the low-income group that are commodity exporters, so that is adding some additional pressure on them.

    Mr. De Haro: I am going to make an exception and just one last question. I am going to go with the gentleman in the white shirt there. He has been waiting patiently, too. And don’t get frustrated. There are going to be many opportunities for you to ask questions.

    QUESTION: Thank you, Jose. AFP.

    I had a quick question about Spain because that’s the only countries among advanced economies where you had an upward revision. It’s going to be way better than the eurozone and even better than other advanced economies. What are the underlying reasons for that? And you formally talked much about tourism but are there any other things that might be pointed out? Thank you.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Yes, indeed. Spain is doing better than its peers. Petya, would you like to talk about it?

    Ms. Koeva Brooks: Sure. Indeed. We are actually having an upgrade for Spain this year, which is a rare occurrence in the many, many downgrades that we have had for many other countries. This is partly because the Spanish economy just had such strong momentum in 2024, coming into 2025. And part of that was due to the very strong services exports as well as the very strong labor accumulation. Part of that related to immigration. But all of that being said, Spain is still being affected indirectly and directly by the tariffs and the uncertainty associated with that. It’s just that, as I said, that underlying [strength is kind of having a bigger impact in the near term. But then again, in 2026, we do project kind of a slowing of growth to about 1.8.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. And on that point, I want to thank you, everyone, on behalf of Pierre‑Olivier, Petya, Deniz, the Research Department, the Communications Department. Some reminders. Next press briefing is going to happen in this same room, Global Financial Stability Report, please stay tuned. Tomorrow you have the Fiscal Monitor, and then later in the week, you have the Managing Director’s press briefing and also all the regional press briefings that we have been talking about. Thank you very much for your time. If you have questions, comments, send them my way to media@imf.org and hopefully you have a great week. I am sure it’s going to be busy.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Jose De Haro

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    @IMFSpokesperson

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/04/22/tr-04222025-weo-press-briefing

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    April 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Economics: World Economic Outlook Press Briefing

    Source: International Monetary Fund

    April 22, 2025

    Speakers:

    Pierre‑Olivier Gourinchas, Director, Research Department, IMF
    Petya Koeva Brooks, Deputy Director, Research Department, IMF
    Deniz Igan, Division Chief, Research Department, IMF

    Moderator:
    Jose Luis De Haro, Communications Officer, IMF   

    Mr. De Haro: OK. I think we can start and we have a quorum. So good morning, everyone, and welcome. I want to welcome also those joining us online. I am Jose Luis de Haro with the Communications Department at the IMF and we are gathered here today for the presentation of our latest edition of the World Economic Outlook titled, “A Critical Juncture Amid Policy Shifts.” I hope by this time you all have had access to the document. If not, I am going to encourage you, as always, to go to IMF.org. There, you are going to find the document, the World Economic Outlook, also Pierre‑Olivier’s blog and many other assets, including the underlying data for some of the charts that are published on the World Economic Outlook.

    I also want to plug in that we have a new database portal that I encourage you to use, and what’s best, that to discuss the new outlook that having here with us today, Pierre‑Olivier Gourinchas. He is the Economic Counsellor, the chief economist, and the Director of the Research Department. Next to him are Petya Koeva Brooks, she is the Deputy Director of the Research Department and last, but not least, we also have Deniz Igan, she is the division chief also with the Research Department.

    Pierre‑Olivier, as usual is going to start with some opening remarks, and then we are going to open the floor to your questions. I just want to remind everyone that this press briefing, it’s on the record and that we also have simultaneous translation.

    So let me stop here. Pierre‑Olivier, the floor is yours.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Thank you, Jose. And good morning, everyone. The landscape has changed since our last World Economic Outlook update in January. We are entering a new era as the global economic system that has operated for the last 80 years is being reset. Since late January, many tariff announcements have been made, culminating on April 2, with near universal levies from the United States and counterresponses from some trading partners. The U.S. effective tariff rate has surged past levels reached more than 100 years ago, while tariff rates on the U.S. have also increased.

    Beyond the abrupt increase in tariffs, the surge in policy uncertainty is a major driver of the economic outlook. If sustained, the increasing trade tensions and uncertainty will slow global growth significantly. Reflecting this complexity, our report presents a reference forecast which incorporates policy announcements up to April 4 by the U.S. and trading partners. Under these reference forecasts, global growth will reach 2.8 percent this year and 3 percent next year, a cumulative downgrade of about 0.8 percentage points relative to our January 2025 WEO update. Our report also offers a range of forecasts under different policy assumptions.

    Under an alternative path that excludes the April tariff announcements, global growth would have seen only a modest downgrade to 3.2 percent this year. We will also use a model‑based forecast to incorporate the temporary suspension of most tariffs announced on April 9, together with the increase in bilateral tariffs between China and the U.S. to prohibitive levels. This pause, even if extended permanently, delivers a similar growth outlook as a reference forecast, 2.8 percent, even if some highly tariffed countries could benefit.

    Now, while global growth remains well above recession levels, all regions are negatively impacted this year and next. And the global disinflation process continues, but at a slower pace with inflation revised up by 0.1 percentage point in both years. These trade tensions will greatly impact global trade. We project that global trade growth will be more than cut in half from 3.8 percent last year to 1.7 percent this year. The tariffs will play out differently in different countries. For the United States, the tariffs represent a supply shock that reduces productivity and output permanently and increases price pressures temporarily. This adds to an already weakening outlook and leads us to revise growth down by 0.9 percentage points to 1.8 percent, with a 0.4 percentage point downgrade from the tariffs only. While inflation is revised upwards.

    For trading partners, tariffs act mostly as a negative external demand shock. Weakening activity and prices, even if some countries could benefit from trade diversion. This is why we have lowered our China growth forecast this year to 4 percent, while inflation is revised down by 0.8 percentage points, increasing deflationary pressures. All countries are negatively affected by the surge in trade policy uncertainty, as businesses cut purchases and investment, while financial institutions reassess their borrowers’ exposure. Uncertainty also increases because of the complex sectoral disruptions that tariffs could cause up and down supply chains, as we saw during the pandemic.

    The effect of these shocks on exchange rates is complex. The tariffs could appreciate the US dollar, as in previous episodes. However, greater policy uncertainty, lower U.S. growth prospects, and an adjustment in the global demand for dollar assets are weighing down on the dollar.

    Risks to the global economic have increased and are firmly to the downside.

    First, while we are not projecting a global downturn, the risks it may happen this year have increased substantially, from 17 percent projected back in October to 30 percent now. An escalation of trade tensions would further depress growth. Financial conditions could also tighten, as markets react negatively to diminished growth prospects and increased uncertainty. On the flip side, growth prospects could immediately improve if countries ease from their current trade policy stance and promote a new, clear, and stable trade environment.

    Addressing domestic imbalances can also help raise growth while contributing significantly to closing external imbalances. For Europe, this means spending more on public infrastructure to accelerate productivity growth. For China, it means boosting support for domestic demand. While for the U.S., it means stepping up fiscal consolidation.

    Turning to policies. Our recommendations call for prudence and improved collaboration. Let me outline some key ones. First, an obvious priority is to restore trade policy stability. The global economy needs a clear, stable, and predictable trading environment, one that addresses some of the longstanding gaps in international trading rules. Monetary policy will need to remain agile and respond by tightening where inflation pressures re‑emerge, while easing where weak demand dominates. Monetary policy credibility will be key, especially where inflation expectations might de‑anchor. And central bank independence remains a cornerstone.

    Many fiscal authorities will face new spending needs to bolster defense spending or to offset the trade dislocations, likely to come. Some of the poorest countries also hit with reduced official aid could experience debt distress. Yet debt levels are still elevated and most countries still need to rebuild fiscal space, including by implementing structural reforms. Support, where needed, should remain narrowly targeted and temporary. It is easier to turn on the fiscal tap than to turn it off. Where new spending needs are permanent, as for defense spending in some countries, planning for offsetting cuts elsewhere or new revenues should be made.

    Finally, even if some of the grievances against our trading system have merit, we should all work toward fixing the system so that it can deliver better opportunities to all. Thank you.

    Mr. De Haro: Thank you, Pierre‑Olivier. Before we open the floor to your questions, some ground rules. First of all, if you want to ask a question, raise your hand. If I call on you, please identify yourself and the media outlet you represent. Try to be succinct. Stick to one question. We want to answer as many questions as possible.

    And also, a reminder. We are here to discuss the World Economic Outlook. Those questions regarding country programs, institutional issues are going to be better placed for the regional press briefings that are happening later this week and also the Managing Director’s press briefing this Thursday.

    With that said, I want hands up. OK. So I am going to start here in the center. Then I am going to move the room to my left. Then to my right. I am going to start with the lady with the green jacket there.

    QUESTION: Thank you.. Thanks so much for doing this.

    Pierre‑Olivier, I wonder if you can speak a little bit to the fact that you haven’t called out a recession. And you know, we are hearing lots of economists in the United States and other places‑‑most recently yesterday, the IIF is now also forecasting a small recession in the second half of the year. What we see in the WEO is that the percentage of risk of a recession has increased pretty dramatically. Can you walk us through why you are not at this point calling a recession, for instance, likely in the United States and what it would take to tip it that way? Thanks.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Thank you, Andrea.

    So for the United States, we are projecting a significant slowdown. We are projecting growth will be at 1.8 percent in 2025. And that’s a 0.9 percentage‑point slowdown‑‑revision in our projections from January. But 1.9 percent is obviously not a recession. And the reason for this is is that we have a U.S. economy that, in our view, is coming from a position of strength. We had an economy that was growing very rapidly. We have a labor market that is still very robust. We have seen some signs of weakening and slowdown in the U.S. economy, even before the tariff announcements. So, in fact, the 0.9 percentage point downward revision that I just mentioned, only a part of this‑‑maybe 0.4 percentage points‑‑is coming from the tariffs. Some of that is also coming from weakening momentum. This was an economy that was doing very, very well but was self‑correcting and cooling off a bit on its own. And we were seeing already consumption numbers coming down. We are seeing consumer confidence coming down. So all of that was already factored in. But we are not seeing a recession in our reference forecast.

    As you mentioned, Andrea, we are‑‑when we do our risk assessment, if you want, we are seeing the probability of a recession increasing, from about 25 percent back in October to around 40 percent when we assess it now.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. I am going to move to this side. The lady here in red.

    QUESTION: Good morning.

    Pierre, I wanted to ask you about the downward pressure on the dollar now. To what extent you believe it can provide some relief from the pressure on highly indebted emerging economies with a large share of dollar‑denominated debt? And has this downward pressure on the dollar changed your outlook on all of those emerging economies that are still, you know, under the impact of the high debt‑‑as mentioned by the MD in previous meetings, where this high debt is really one of the impediments to growth? Thanks.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Yes. So we are seeing a weakening of the dollar that is fairly broad‑based over the last few weeks, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, some of that is coming from the weaker growth prospects in the U.S. Some it is coming from the increased uncertainty. And it’s leading to a reassessment of the global demand for dollar assets. When we step back, we also have to realize we are coming from a position where, over the last few years, there have been tremendous capital inflows into U.S. markets, in particular, risk markets. That’s something that, of course, my colleague Tobias Adrian will talk about in the GFSR press conference. So we are seeing some adjustment, some contradiction. The markets are handling it. We don’t see signs of stress, even in currency markets.

    Now, the interesting development is, what does it mean for emerging markets? And you are right to point out that, in the past, when the dollar would strengthen, that would not necessarily be good news for emerging markets because they have dollar‑denominated debts, so that increases their liabilities and the pressure on them to service their debts. And this can lead to some tightening of financial conditions. So we are not seeing that right now. And so that’s a plus. The flip side of this is, of course, the appreciation of some of these emerging markets’ currencies means that they are also losing a little bit on the competitiveness side, so there is maybe something that is a bit easier on the finance conditions, something that is not as easy on the trade side.

    Finally, this is an environment of enormous uncertainty, increased volatility. And that I think is something that will dominate for many of the emerging markets. So when we are looking at our assessment, we are actually downgrading the emerging market economies for 2025 and 2026, most of them. Some of them may, as I mentioned, benefit. But overall, as a group, they are downgraded. While because they are also very plugged into the global supply chains, the uncertainty is leading to a pause in investment and activity, and they are going to suffer from the decline in demand for their products coming from the tariffs.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. I am going to go with the gentleman here with the glasses.

    QUESTION: Thank you. I just have one question. Could you elaborate a little bit on what will happen with the trade flows in your models? I saw that in the basic assumption, the exports from the U.S. are [breaking quite heavily but not that much from China. Why is this so?

    And do I understand it right that this basic model does not yet integrate the additional hikes after ‑‑ happening after basically April 9, so above 100 percent on import tariffs by the U.S.? Thanks.

    Mr. Gourinchas: So we are seeing a large impact on global trade coming from the tariffs and that’s going to be the case under any combination of tariffs where the effective tariff rates remains very elevated. And the reason why when we looked at the different scenarios that I mentioned, whether it’s a reference scenario or our April 9 scenario which includes lower tariffs on many countries but sharply increased tariffs between the U.S. and China. The overall impact on the global economy is not very different because the effective tariff rate is, if anything, even higher under that pause. So global trade is going to be significantly affected. The particular configuration of trade, which bilateral trade flows are going to be affected versus others that will depend on the final landscape in terms of tariffs so we can anticipate that there will be much lower bilateral trade under either the reference scenario or the April 9, between the U.S. and China. And that is weighing down on global trade growth. This is weighing down on global trade generally.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. I am going to turn here to the center. I am going to go to the first row. I am going to go with the lady with the yellow bottle.

    QUESTION: Thank you,

    You have downgraded the U.K.’s growth forecast quite sharply and given the range of explanations, from higher tariff barriers to more domestic issues, like cost‑of‑living pressures. Out of those, so the global challenges versus domestic challenges, which one is weighing more heavily on the U.K.’s growth forecasts?

    Mr. De Haro: OK we are going to open the round of U.K. questions so if you have questions on the U.K., raise your hand. And I will pass the mic to you. I see  two there. Yep.

    QUESTION: Hi.

    In a world where everyone is warning about the impact of tariffs on U.S. inflation and how much it will raise U.S. prices, why do you have the U.K. with the highest inflation rate in the G‑7 this year? And do you believe tariffs will be inflationary or disinflationary for the U.K.?

    Mr. De Haro: OK. Joe here in the first row.

    QUESTION: Yeah. Thank you. Thank you very much. So Joel hills from ITV news. Obviously it’s impacting the tariffs are impacting the U.K. They are impacting most countries. I just wonder this, President Trump did say there would be some disruption. He suggested it would be sort of temporary. Is it possible that President Trump is actually a genius? That he knows something you do not?

    Mr. De Haro: And I think we have a last question on the U.K. and this is going to be the last question on the U.K. There on the back of the room.

    QUESTION: Yeah.

    The U.K. inflation forecast is, you know, much higher than we expected it to be, 0.7 percent higher. Is that going to impact on lowering interest rates in the U.K.? And does that affect the growth rate, which seems to be rather optimistic, compared with some of the other European countries?

    Mr. De Haro: OK. We are going to be done with the U.K. questions and then we will move along. So Pierre‑Olivier.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Thank you. So many questions. Let me address them as best I can. First, on the revision for growth in the U.K. and inflation. So the tariffs are playing a role, as they are in most countries and uncertainty is also playing a role, as it is in all countries. And it’s weighing down on growth in the U.K. But there are some U.K.‑specific factors and I would say that in terms of the zero point 5 percentage point downward revision that we are saying for the U.K., the domestic factors are probably the biggest ones. And in particular, there is a lower carryover from weaker growth in the second half of last year. There is also some tightening of financial conditions, as interest rates have risen, longer‑term interest rates.

    On inflation, the revision in inflation in the U.K. is coming, again, from domestic factors, and in particular some change in regulated energy prices. So that’s expected to be temporary but it’s also very U.K.‑specific. The effect of the tariffs on countries like the U.K., like it is on the EU or China is like a negative demand shock. It’s weakening activity but it’s also lowering price pressures, not increasing them.

    Now, what is the impact of the tariffs in the medium and long term? Not just what’s going to happen this year and next but what’s going to happen longer term? Our assessment is it’s going to be negative. We have a box in our report that looks at the long‑term impact of the tariffs, if they are maintained. And it is negative for all regions, just like the short‑term impact. So we are seeing a negative impact in the short term, in the medium term, in the long term. Again, there are nuances. Some countries might benefit, depending on the particular configuration of tariffs. It might benefit from some trade diversion; but the broad picture is it’s negative for the outlook.

    Now, our ‑‑ and I will end with that. Our forecast for 2025 is slightly higher than OBR’s forecast. Some of this has to do with some of the underlying monetary policy assumptions for the U.K. The bank‑‑

    Our assumption for this year is that there are going to be four cuts through the year. One cut already happened. We expect three more.

    Mr. De Haro: Thank you, Pierre‑Olivier. I am not going to forget about the people that are on WebEx, and I am going to pass a question there. I see Anton from TAS.

    QUESTION: Good morning. Thank you for doing this.

    Given the projected slowdown of Russia’s GDP growth from 4.1 in 2024 to 1.5 in 2025, what are the primary factors driving this sharp decline? And how sustainable is Russia’s growth model going forward? Thank you.

    Mr. De Haro: Go ahead.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Petya, would you like to answer?

    Ms. Koeva Brooks: Sure. We are indeed expecting a slowdown in growth to 1.5 this year, and this, to a large extent is kind of the natural slowing of the economy after growing quite robustly in previous years. And also as a result of policy tightening that we have seen, both on the fiscal as well as on the monetary policy side. It is also due to the lower oil prices that have come about as a result of the‑‑as a response to the round of tariffs, as well as the uncertainty about global growth. So all these factors are behind that lower growth number, although I should point out that it is actually a slight upward revision, relative to what we had back in January. And the reason for that is that, again, we actually had seen upward surprises in 2024, which kind of carried into 2025.

    When it comes to the medium‑term growth outlook, we do expect that to be relatively weak. We are‑‑we have penciled in growth number of about 1.2, which is down from 1.7 which is what we had before the start of the war.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. Let’s continue. I am going to go again in the center and then I am going to go to that side. The lady with the glasses there.

    QUESTION: Hi.

    In Latin America, we received almost every country 10 percent. So I want to know about the impact of the tariffs in Latin America and if the impact is going to be limited, versus other regions, and when we are going to start to feeling this impact. Thank you.

    Mr. De Haro: And before we answer the question, are there any questions on Mexico, Brazil, Argentina? OK. Argentina friends, go ahead.

    QUESTION: Hello.

    You’ve kept 5.5 growth projection that was decided in the latest program that Argentina signed with the IMF. I would like to know why you are not seeing so much impact yet about‑‑of this general context.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. We can go ahead first with the Latin America overview and then we can go to Argentina.

    Mr. Gourinchas: I will just say something briefly and then ask my colleague Petya to come in. So for Latin America, as a whole, we are saying activity that is largely driven by consumption on the back of resilient labor markets while investment remains somewhat sluggish. And the slowdown in our projection reflects the impact of tariffs and the global growth slowdown, of course, which is also affecting countries in the region. Policy uncertainty. And the withdrawal of fiscal stimulus and in some countries monetary policy tightening.

    Ms. Koeva Brooks: I don’t have a lot to add. Just to say that the disinflation process has also slowed a bit, and this is also‑‑also makes the policy trade‑offs a bit more complicated with slow‑‑with growth slowing down and at the same time, you know, having still challenges on the inflation side.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. So we are going to move on. I am going to ask the gentleman in the first row there because‑‑

    Oh, sorry. Sorry. I forgot about Argentina. Please go ahead.

    Ms. Koeva Brooks: We cannot forget about Argentina.

    So the growth forecast for this year‑‑you are right‑‑we still have the upgrade of .5. And this is related to just the positive surprises that we had seen, in spite of a very strong fiscal adjustment, the recovery in confidence I think has definitely played a role in kind of driving us to have this forecast. That said, there are a number of risks related to tighter financial conditions, commodity prices, and a lot of others, which is true for many if not most other countries.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. So now we can move on. I am going to go with the gentleman in the first row.

    QUESTION: Thank you. In the October 2024 outlook you saw a stable but slow growth for Africa. What’s new now? And what kind of initiatives like the African Continental Free Trade Area do for African economies amidst these trade tensions?

    Mr. De Haro: And before we answer, I think‑‑

    QUESTION: Hi. Good morning.

    One of the things that you mentioned in your report is the demographic shift and the rise in the silver economy. Africa, on the other hand, has the reverse of that. So what is your recommendation in the short and medium term on how to deal with some of these challenges pertaining to tariffs, monetary policy, and now currency exchange? Thank you.

    Mr. De Haro: OK.

    Mr. Gourinchas: OK. Thank you. I will just say one word about the outlook in sub‑Saharan Africa and then I will ask my colleague Deniz to come in to add more color and answer also the question on the demographic trends.

    So regional growth in sub‑Saharan Africa improved significantly last year, to 4 percent. And it will ease in 2025. And this is in line with a softer global outlook. So we are seeing the same forces at play in the region, as we are seeing more globally. And a downturn‑‑and a downward revision in our projection that is of a similar magnitude at about 0.4 percentage point. Deniz?

    Ms. Igan: Thank you for the question. So on the demographic shifts, our Chapter 2 basically points out that countries’ age structures are evolving at different rates, as you pointed out as well. We have most western economies, some Asian economies that are aging fast. And you know in a health way some of them. And then we have many sub‑Saharan African countries that have a very young population. And what the chapter shows is actually, there are important medium‑term consequences of that, both for growth, as well as external balances of countries.

    In Africa’s case, basically, what we would see is a demographic dividend coming from having a young population. And the question then becomes how best to leverage that, how best to use that and channel it into growth. And the answer there, first and foremost, depends on the structural reforms, the investment that’s necessary on healthcare, on education, on human capital more generally and also international cooperation because our Chapter 3 looks more carefully into migration flows. And again, there, we see migration policy shifts in destination countries has spillovers for other countries. And this is especially true for emerging market economies and lower income economies. So, again, international cooperation there, making sure that growth dividends are utilized in the best way is what we delve into in the chapter.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. I am going to go to the gentleman with‑‑raise your hand. Yeah. You. No, I am going back. Then I will go‑‑there you go.

    QUESTION: OK. I have a question about China’s growth.

    In your World Economic Outlook, you say China’s growth forecast has been cut to 4 percent for this year, which is a 0.6 percentage drop from an earlier projection. But China’s National Bureau of Statistics a couple of days ago predicted China’s growth GDP growth in the first quarter was 5.4 percent. So my question is, how do you see the disparity in the forecast? Is China more optimistic than you are? Thank you.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Thank you. So, yes, we are revising our growth projections for China down by 0.6 percentage points, as you have noted. I should flag that this number does not incorporate the latest release for Q1. That came after we closed our round of projections. So this is not reflected there. And we will have to see how it affects our projections when we have our next round of WEO updates.

    But let me give you a little bit of perspective on the rationale behind our revision for China. The tariff increase in tariffs especially since China is one of the countries that is facing the most elevated tariffs right now, is going to have a very significant impact in our projections on the Chinese economy. In fact, when we do a decomposition, which I showed during my opening remarks, the impact of the tariffs on the Chinese economy would be a negative 1.3 percentage point revision on growth.

    So why do we only have 0.6? Well, because there are other factors that are helping to support Chinese growth in 2025 and 2026. One of which‑‑which is quite important‑‑is the fiscal support that has been announced since the beginning of the year. And that is adding up, something of the amount of 0.5 percentage points. So the impact of the current trade tensions is very significant. It’s partly offset. We expect it to remain quite significant also in 2026 when we also have a downward revision by about 0.5 percentage points.

    The other side of this, where we are seeing the impact of the tariffs is on inflation, which is revised down. Our headline inflation projection for 2025 is actually at zero. So it’s down from 0.8 percent to zero. So China is facing stronger deflationary forces as a result of these trade tensions.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. I am going to move to this side. The gentleman with the glasses here.

    QUESTION: What impact did the oil price also have in exporting and importing countries in the Middle East? Thank you.

    Mr. De Haro: Go ahead.

    Mr. Gourinchas: So we have seen oil prices declining since our last projections, and the decline in oil prices in our and our interpretation is coming mostly from weaker global demand, so it’s the weakening of global activity that is driving the decline in prices. There has been some increase in supply coming from OPEC Plus countries, but broadly speaking, the decline is mostly coming from weaker demand.

    So that is going to play out in ways you sort of would expect. The commodity exporters are going to face lower export revenues from the decline in oil prices. That’s going to weigh on their fiscal outlook, on their growth.

    For those countries that are oil importers, it’s going to lower inflation pressures because that‑‑lower oil prices is going to feed into lower headline inflation. It’s going to also provide some modest support to economic activity there.

    Deniz, anything to add on oil prices or‑‑or Petya?

    Ms. Koeva Brooks: No, I don’t.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. We are going to move to the center. I am going to get the gentleman with the white shirt there.

    QUESTION: h I am not going to ask another question about the U.K., you will be pleased to know. Over the last week we have seen a number of attacks by the White House on the independence of the Federal Reserve. How destabilizing do you think this might be for financial markets?

    Mr. Gourinchas: So central banks are facing a delicate moment. As I have explained in many countries, the impact of the tariffs is going to be to increase recessionary forces and it is going to lower price pressures. And that will help central banks cut interest rates faster and provide some support to their economies. But in other countries ‑‑ and in our projections, the U.S. is in that category‑‑the tariffs are going to increase price pressures. Price pressures in the U.S. are increasing for other reasons as well. Service prices have been quite‑‑inflation of service prices have been quite strong. And that is something that we are seeing already. But the tariffs are likely to increase price pressures. We are projecting inflation to remain at 3 percent in the U.S. this year, the same level as last year, headline inflation.

    So in that context, if you also think about where we are coming from, we are coming from a period of very elevated inflation. We are just coming off the cost‑of‑living crisis, a surge in inflation rates to double digits that we haven’t seen in more than a generation. So the critical thing is to make sure that inflation expectations remain anchored, that everyone remains convinced that central banks will do what is necessary to bring inflation back to central bank targets in an orderly manner. And central banks have instruments to do this. They have their interest rate instruments. They have various instruments of monetary policy. But one critical aspect of what they do is coming from their credibility. So central banks need to remain credible. And part of that credibility is built upon their central bank independence. And so from that perspective, it’s very important to preserve that.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. We are going to have time for two questions. One of them is going back to WebEx. I see Weier, please. Come in.

    QUESTION: Yes.I have a question.

    You mentioned that the global economic system is being reset. And I am not sure if one of the early signs in the financial markets, as we see that the markets moving from American exceptionalism to the sort of sell the U.S. narrative. So could you assess the implications for the financial markets and the world economy, as a whole?

    Mr. Gourinchas: Yeah, well we have seen some volatility in the markets, of course, whenever there is going to be potentially a significant change in the economic structure of the global economy. I think we are bound to see some reassessment. And investors are going to try to figure out what’s happening, and that’s going to inject volatility. And we are seeing some of that.

    The good news is a lot of that volatility we have seen in the last few weeks has not led to significant market dislocations or market stress to levels that would, for instance, have necessitated the interventions by central banks around the world.

    So whether you are looking at equity markets, whether you are looking at bond markets, whether you are looking at currency markets, what we are saying is a reassessment of the world we are in now and that means that there is a reassessment of valuations of risk assets, of different currencies. But that is happening in an orderly manner. So from that perspective, we are seeing a system that is quite resilient, that remained resilient but, of course, we are watching carefully and there has been some tightening of financial conditions and that’s something to be looking out for. We want to make sure that it doesn’t get to a level where the stress in the financial system would become too extreme.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. The lady here in the first row has been waiting patiently. Please go ahead.

    QUESTION: Thank you, Jose. I want to ask about the trading tensions impact on low‑income countries. You mentioned there are like downgrading for emerging markets but how about like those small countries who have lower income as a group, have you assessed the particular impact on them in these ongoing trade tensions? Thank you.

    Mr. Gourinchas: OK. Well thanks. For low‑income countries as a group, we are also seeing a downgrade in which we report in our report of 0.4 percentage points. We are expecting growth of 4.2 percent in 2025. So the 0.4 is very similar to what we are seeing at the aggregate levels, 0.5. So from that perspective it looks quite the same. However, there are also a lot of differences across countries, and when we look more carefully, you might see some vulnerable countries, especially in sub‑Saharan Africa. But elsewhere as well‑‑who could face very challenging conditions as a result of the tariffs in an environment in which many of the countries, low‑income countries have been facing a funding squeeze for a number of years now, private capital flows to this region have been drying up or have been coming on very expensive terms. We are seeing a drying up also of some official aid flows. So some of these countries have very limited fiscal space. Near a situation where the situation could become more challenging.

    Now, on the flip side, the fact that we are seeing commodity prices coming down for many commodities will help some of them. The commodity importers in that group will hurt the ones who are commodity exporters. And there are a number of countries among the low-income group that are commodity exporters, so that is adding some additional pressure on them.

    Mr. De Haro: I am going to make an exception and just one last question. I am going to go with the gentleman in the white shirt there. He has been waiting patiently, too. And don’t get frustrated. There are going to be many opportunities for you to ask questions.

    QUESTION: Thank you, Jose. AFP.

    I had a quick question about Spain because that’s the only countries among advanced economies where you had an upward revision. It’s going to be way better than the eurozone and even better than other advanced economies. What are the underlying reasons for that? And you formally talked much about tourism but are there any other things that might be pointed out? Thank you.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Yes, indeed. Spain is doing better than its peers. Petya, would you like to talk about it?

    Ms. Koeva Brooks: Sure. Indeed. We are actually having an upgrade for Spain this year, which is a rare occurrence in the many, many downgrades that we have had for many other countries. This is partly because the Spanish economy just had such strong momentum in 2024, coming into 2025. And part of that was due to the very strong services exports as well as the very strong labor accumulation. Part of that related to immigration. But all of that being said, Spain is still being affected indirectly and directly by the tariffs and the uncertainty associated with that. It’s just that, as I said, that underlying [strength is kind of having a bigger impact in the near term. But then again, in 2026, we do project kind of a slowing of growth to about 1.8.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. And on that point, I want to thank you, everyone, on behalf of Pierre‑Olivier, Petya, Deniz, the Research Department, the Communications Department. Some reminders. Next press briefing is going to happen in this same room, Global Financial Stability Report, please stay tuned. Tomorrow you have the Fiscal Monitor, and then later in the week, you have the Managing Director’s press briefing and also all the regional press briefings that we have been talking about. Thank you very much for your time. If you have questions, comments, send them my way to media@imf.org and hopefully you have a great week. I am sure it’s going to be busy.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Jose De Haro

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    @IMFSpokesperson

    MIL OSI Economics –

    April 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial news: 04/22/2025, 13-01 (Moscow time) the values of the lower boundary of the price corridor and the range of market risk assessment for the security RU000A101PF9 (ALROSA B04) were changed.

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Moscow Exchange – Moscow Exchange –

    04/22/2025

    13:01

    In accordance with the Methodology for determining the risk parameters of the stock market and deposit market of Moscow Exchange PJSC by NCO NCC (JSC) on 22.04.2025, 13-01 (Moscow time), the values of the lower limit of the price corridor (up to 100.19) and the range of market risk assessment (up to 980.45 rubles, equivalent to a rate of 7.5%) of the security RU000A101PF9 (ALROSA B04) were changed.

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    MIL OSI Russia News –

    April 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: Dmytro Patrushev and Kherson Region Governor Volodymyr Saldo Discussed Development of Regional Agriculture

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    Deputy Prime Minister Dmytro Patrushev held a working meeting with the Governor of the Kherson region Volodymyr Saldo. The topics of the meeting were the development of the region’s agro-industrial and fisheries complexes and environmental issues.

    The Vice Prime Minister and the Governor discussed the situation in agriculture. The topic of restoring orchards in the region, in particular fruit and berry orchards, was touched upon. The issue of restoring the irrigation system was also raised. This year, six projects were submitted for the competitive selection in the field of melioration from the Kherson region.

    Dmytro Patrushev drew attention to the importance of high-quality spring field work in the Kherson region. The region should monitor the implementation of the structure of sowing areas, as well as the provision of farmers with financial resources and means of production – seeds, mineral fertilizers, fuels and lubricants, agricultural machinery.

    The development of the regional fisheries complex was also discussed at the meeting. The need was noted not only to increase the volume of catch of aquatic bioresources in the region, but also to expand the range, increase the production of products with high added value. This will allow the creation of highly efficient production and new jobs.

    In addition, Dmitry Patrushev and Volodymyr Saldo discussed the results of the implementation of the national project “Ecology” and the readiness of the Kherson region for the events of the new national project “Ecological Well-being”. The region takes part in four federal projects: “Closed-loop Economy”, “Water of Russia”, “Forest Preservation” and “General Cleaning”. By 2030, the region is planned to be allocated more than 2 billion rubles under these projects.

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    MIL OSI Russia News –

    April 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial news: 04/22/2025, 15:59 (Moscow time) the values of the upper limit of the price corridor and the range of market risk assessment for the security RU000A1009L8 (RZhD 1P-15R) were changed.

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Moscow Exchange – Moscow Exchange –

    04/22/2025

    15:59

    In accordance with the Methodology for determining the risk parameters of the stock market and deposit market of Moscow Exchange PJSC by NCO NCC (JSC) on 22.04.2025, 15-59 (Moscow time), the values of the upper limit of the price corridor (up to 96.91) and the range of market risk assessment (up to 1016.81 rubles, equivalent to a rate of 12.5%) of the security RU000A1009L8 (RZhD 1P-15R) were changed.

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    MIL OSI Russia News –

    April 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial news: On holding auctions on April 23, 2025 to place OFZ issue No. 26238RMFS and issue No. 26245RMFS

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Moscow Exchange – Moscow Exchange –

    For bidders

    We inform you that, based on the letter of the Bank of Russia and in accordance with Part I. General Part and Part II. Stock Market Section of the Rules for Conducting Trading on the Stock Market, Deposit Market and Credit Market of Moscow Exchange PJSC, the order establishes the form, time, term and procedure for holding auctions for the placement and trading of the following federal loan bonds:

    1.

    Name of the Issuer Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation
    Name of security federal loan bonds with constant coupon income
    State registration number of the issue 26238RMFS from 11.06.2021
    Date of the auction April 23, 2025
    Information about the placement (trading mode, placement form) The placement of Bonds will be carried out in the Trading Mode “Placement: Auction” by holding an Auction to determine the placement price. BoardId: PACT (Settlements: Ruble)
    Trade code SE26238RMFS4
    ISIN code RO000A1038V6
    Calculation code B01
    Additional conditions of placement The share of non-competitive bids in relation to the total volume of bids submitted by the Bidder may not exceed 90%.
    Trading time Trading hours: bid collection period: 14:30 – 15:00; bid execution period: 15:30 – 18:00.

    2.

    Name of the Issuer Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation
    Name of security federal loan bonds with constant coupon income
    State registration number of the issue 26245RMFS from 08.05.2024
    Date of the auction April 23, 2025
    Information about the placement (trading mode, placement form) The placement of Bonds will be carried out in the Trading Mode “Placement: Auction” by holding an Auction to determine the placement price. BoardId: PACT (Settlements: Ruble)
    Trade code CO26245RMFS9
    ISIN code RO000A108EG6
    Calculation code B01
    Additional conditions of placement The share of non-competitive bids in relation to the total volume of bids submitted by the Bidder may not exceed 90%.
    Trading time Trading hours: bid collection period: 12:00 – 12:30; bid execution period: 13:00 – 18:00.

    Contact information for media 7 (495) 363-3232Pr@moex.kom

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    MIL OSI Russia News –

    April 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial news: On 23.04.2025, the deposit auction of the PPC “TERRITORIAL DEVELOPMENT FUND” will take place

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Moscow Exchange – Moscow Exchange –

    Parameters: Date of the deposit auction 04/23/2025. Placement currency RUB. Maximum amount of funds placed (in the placement currency) 1,738,000,000.00 Placement term, days 6. Date of depositing funds 04/23/2025. Date of return of funds 04/29/2025. Minimum placement interest rate, % per annum 21.00. Terms of the conclusion, urgent or special (Urgent). Minimum amount of funds placed for one application (in the placement currency) 1,738,000,000.00 Maximum number of applications from one Participant, pcs. 1 Auction form, open or closed (Open).

    The basis of the Agreement is the General Agreement. Schedule (Moscow time). Applications in preliminary mode from 10:30 to 10:40. Applications in competitive mode from 10:40 to 10:45. Setting the cutoff percentage rate or declaring the auction invalid before 10:55.

    Additional terms

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    MIL OSI Russia News –

    April 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial news: 04/22/2025, 18-12 (Moscow time) the values of the upper limit of the price corridor and the range of market risk assessment for the security RU000A107PU5 (RZhD 1P-30R) were changed.

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Moscow Exchange – Moscow Exchange –

    04/22/2025

    18:12

    In accordance with the Methodology for determining the risk parameters of the stock market and deposit market of Moscow Exchange PJSC by NCO NCC (JSC) on 22.04.2025, 18-12 (Moscow time), the values of the upper limit of the price corridor (up to 108.15) and the range of market risk assessment (up to 1209.75 rubles, equivalent to a rate of 25.0%) of the security RU000A107PU5 (RZhD 1P-30R) were changed.

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    MIL OSI Russia News –

    April 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial news: The Federal Treasury deposit auction will take place on 23.04.2025

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Moscow Exchange – Moscow Exchange –

    Application selection parameters. Application selection date 23.04.2025. Unique application selection identifier 22025101. Deposit currency rubles. Type of funds funds of the single treasury account. Maximum amount of funds placed in bank deposits, million monetary units 40,000. Placement period, in days 2. Date of depositing funds 23.04.2025. Date of return of funds 25.04.2025. Interest rate for placement of funds (fixed or floating) FIXED. Minimum fixed interest rate for placement of funds, % per annum 20.05. Basic floating interest rate for placement of funds-Minimum spread, % per annum-Terms of conclusion of the bank deposit agreement (fixed-term, replenishable or special) Fixed-term. Minimum amount of funds placed for one application, million monetary units 1,000. Maximum number of applications from one credit institution, pcs. 5. Application selection form (open or closed)Open.

    Schedule of application selection (Moscow time). Venue of application selection: Moscow Exchange PJSC Application acceptance from 09:30 to 09:40. Applications in preliminary mode from 09:30 to 09:35. Applications in competition mode from 09:35 to 09:40. Formation of a consolidated register of applications: from 09:40 to 09:50. Setting the cutoff interest rate and (or) recognizing the application selection as unsuccessful from 09:40 to 10:00. Sending an offer to credit institutions to conclude a bank deposit agreement from 10:00 to 10:50. Receipt of acceptance of the offer to conclude a bank deposit agreement from credit institutions from 10:00 to 10:50. Deposit transfer time. In accordance with the requirements of paragraph 63 and paragraph 64 of the Order of the Federal Treasury dated April 27, 2023 No. 10n.

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    MIL OSI Russia News –

    April 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Bloody Sunday: massacres in Ukraine and Gaza – P-001544/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Priority question for written answer  P-001544/2025
    to the Council
    Rule 144
    Cecilia Strada (S&D), Camilla Laureti (S&D), Annalisa Corrado (S&D), Sandro Ruotolo (S&D), Giuseppe Lupo (S&D), Marco Tarquinio (S&D), Alessandra Moretti (S&D), Pierfrancesco Maran (S&D)

    On Palm Sunday (13 April 2025), around 30 people, including children, were killed and more than 100 injured by a despicable Russian missile strike that used cluster munitions, which have rightly been condemned as contrary to any fundamental human principle.

    On the same day, having given an evacuation order just twenty minutes before the attack, Israel bombed the Christian Al-Ahli Hospital, putting the last functional medical facility in Gaza City out of use and also killing three people, including a child.

    Both massacres show complete disregard for the principles of international humanitarian law and are part of a series of violations of human rights and human dignity which should constitute a line in the sand for EU action on the international stage, as established in Article 21 TEU, the consistency of which is a prerogative of the Council, among others.

    In the light of these atrocities:

    • 1.Will the Council condemn the use of cluster munitions and any attempt to justify their production, use and deployment as a military deterrent?
    • 2.Will it block the proposal for a decision on the position to be taken on behalf of the EU in the EU-Israel Association Council on the extension of the EU-Israel Action Plan for a further two years?

    Supporters[1]

    Submitted: 15.4.2025

    • [1] This question is supported by Members other than the authors: Dario Nardella (S&D), Brando Benifei (S&D), Alessandro Zan (S&D)
    Last updated: 22 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Concludes 2025 Article IV Consultation with the Republic of Azerbaijan

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    April 22, 2025

    Washington, DC: On March 21, 2025, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the Article IV consultation[1] with Azerbaijan and endorsed the staff appraisal, as well as the 2024 Financial System Stability Assessment.

    Following a slowdown in 2023, growth accelerated, and inflation picked up. Real GDP increased by 4.1 percent in 2024, up from 1.4 percent in 2023, supported by strong growth in construction, communication, transportation, and hospitality sectors. After declining by 2 percent in 2023, hydrocarbon GDP stabilized in 2024, as moderate gas production expansion compensated for the decline in oil output. Inflation picked up in the second half of 2024, partly reflecting adjustment in administered prices, reaching 4.9 percent at the end of the year, still within the CBA target of 4 ±2 percent. The 2024 Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) found the financial sector to be broadly resilient against severe shocks.

    The decline in oil and gas prices reduced the 2024 external surplus, but fiscal consolidation resumed. After recording a surplus of 11.5 percent of GDP in 2023, the current account balance is projected to weaken in 2024. During the first three quarters of 2024, the current account surplus has been about 50 percent lower than in the same period last year. The combined CBA and SOFAZ reserves reached about US$ 71 billion by end-2024, covering 41 months of next year’s imports. After remaining broadly unchanged in 2023, the nonoil primary deficit declined in 2024 to 20.5 percent on nonoil GDP, from 22.1 percent of nonoil GDP in 2023, reflecting strong nonoil tax revenues.   

    Looking ahead, growth is projected to moderate and inflation to remain within the CBA target. Growth is projected to slow down to 3.5 percent in 2025, reflecting a slowdown in investment and flat hydrocarbon production. In the medium term, growth is projected to be 2 ½ percent, in line with potential growth. Assuming broadly stable international food and energy prices, inflation is projected to remain within the CBA target of 4 ±2 percent. External position is projected to weaken in the medium term as hydrocarbon production declines, but FX reserves will remain strong.

    Risks to the outlook remain broadly balanced but external uncertainty is high. Reduced hydrocarbon prices as a result of higher supply or lower demand could adversely affect growth, external position, and fiscal revenues. Conversely, intensification of conflicts could push hydrocarbon prices higher, providing a temporary boost to external and fiscal position. Deepening geoeconomic fragmentation, as well as trade and investment shocks, could affect prospects for development of the nonhydrocarbon sector and economic diversification, and slower global growth could weigh on Azerbaijan’s prospects. On the other side, trade and investment diversion to the region could also provide new opportunities. On the domestic side, pressures to increase budgetary spending could increase inflation, delay fiscal consolidation, and weaken the fiscal position and fiscal rule credibility. The presence of inefficient SOEs could undermine the development of the private sector, which is key to diversifying the economy and boosting growth.

    Executive Board Assessment[2]

    In concluding the AIV consultation with Azerbaijan, Executive Directors endorsed the staff’s appraisal as follows:

    Executive Directors agreed with the thrust of the staff appraisal. They noted that Azerbaijan’s growth has remained resilient, supported by robust non‑oil sector activity, and inflation is contained. Directors concurred that risks to the outlook are broadly balanced but are subject to significant uncertainty. They called for continued prudent policies and reforms to support diversification and sustainable growth over the medium term.

    Directors welcomed the authorities’ adherence to the fiscal targets under the fiscal rule. Cautioning that the expansionary 2025 budget would be procyclical, they broadly called on the authorities to continue with the fiscal adjustment in 2025, including by saving any revenue overperformance or expenditure shortfall to help contain inflationary pressures and reinforce fiscal sustainability. While recognizing Azerbaijan’s investment needs, Directors urged the authorities to pursue fiscal consolidation over the medium term to ensure intergenerational equity, underpinned by revenue and expenditure measures and reforms to strengthen the fiscal rule framework. They noted the benefits of a potential TADAT and PIMA to support these efforts.

    Directors viewed the central bank’s current monetary policy stance as appropriate, with inflation within the central bank target band and the recent increase appearing transitory. They emphasized the need to closely monitor inflation risks and to be prepared to act swiftly if needed. Directors welcomed the enhanced monetary policy transmission and called for continued efforts to improve the monetary policy framework to prepare for a possible transition to a hybrid inflation targeting regime.

    Directors welcomed the 2024 FSAP’s assessment that Azerbaijan’s financial system is broadly resilient, and the banking sector is well‑capitalized. They commended the authorities for the significant progress in reinvigorating the regulatory reform agenda, and bolstering banks’ capital and liquidity buffers to reinforce financial stability. Directors encouraged continued progress in strengthening prudential oversight and the financial safety net and expanding the systemic risk analysis and stress testing frameworks to address remaining vulnerabilities. In this regard, they underscored the importance of fully implementing consolidated supervision, developing early warning indicators and triggers for supervisory actions, reinforcing the resilience of domestic systemically important banks, and strengthening the emergency liquidity assistance framework.

    Directors emphasized the need for private sector development to support economic diversification. They called for continued reforms to strengthen corporate governance in state‑owned enterprises, and to create a level playing field for the private sector. Directors also called on the authorities to continue efforts to improve governance, combat corruption, and further strengthen the AML/CFT framework. They encouraged the authorities to intensify efforts to increase private sector access to finance and contribute to the global climate agenda.

    Azerbaijan: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 2022–30

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

         

    Est.

    Projections

    2022

    2023

    2024

    2025

    2026

    2027

    2028

    2029

    2030

     

    (Annual percentage change, unless otherwise specified)

    National income

                     

       GDP at constant prices

    4.7

    1.4

    4.1

    3.5

    2.5

    2.4

    2.4

    2.5

    2.5

          Of which: Oil sector 1/

    -2.4

    -2.0

    0.3

    0.2

    -0.5

    -0.5

    -0.5

    -0.5

    -0.5

                              Non-oil sector

    9.1

    4.5

    6.2

    4.5

    3.7

    3.5

    3.5

    3.5

    3.5

       Consumer price index (period average)

    13.9

    8.8

    2.2

    5.7

    4.5

    4.0

    4.0

    4.0

    4.0

       Consumer price index (end of period)

    14.4

    2.1

    4.9

    5.2

    4.0

    4.0

    4.0

    4.0

    4.0

    Money and credit

                     

       Domestic credit, net

    29.9

    14.7

    5.0

    9.1

    6.9

    7.0

    6.8

    6.9

    6.9

          Of which: Credit to private sector

    17.4

    14.7

    15.9

    10.0

    8.0

    8.0

    8.0

    8.0

    8.0

       Manat base money

    -2.8

    19.4

    0.4

    9.0

    9.0

    9.0

    9.0

    9.0

    9.0

       Manat broad money

    23.8

    19.6

    9.0

    10.6

    7.9

    8.4

    8.3

    8.4

    8.4

       Total broad money

    23.6

    5.3

    11.9

    9.2

    6.5

    7.0

    7.0

    7.0

    7.0

    External sector

                     

    Exports f.o.b.

    94.6

    -30.8

    -8.8

    10.8

    -10.0

    -9.9

    -8.0

    0.3

    0.3

    Of which: Oil sector

    105.1

    -34.0

    -10.1

    10.8

    -12.0

    -12.5

    -10.7

    -0.9

    -0.9

    Imports f.o.b.

    29.7

    21.4

    2.7

    12.0

    0.9

    3.0

    5.1

    6.5

    6.6

    Of which: Oil sector

    56.3

    12.2

    -6.9

    1.4

    1.5

    1.7

    2.1

    0.0

    0.0

    Real effective exchange rate

    11.8

    8.1

    -1.1

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

     

    (In percent of GDP, unless otherwise specified)

    Gross investment

    12.1

    18.3

    17.8

    18.3

    16.2

    14.6

    13.7

    13.7

    13.7

       Consolidated government

    8.0

    12.2

    11.3

    11.7

    10.0

    8.8

    8.1

    8.1

    8.1

       Private sector

    4.1

    6.1

    6.5

    6.7

    6.2

    5.8

    5.6

    5.6

    5.6

          Of which: Oil sector

    -6.3

    -0.3

    1.1

    1.3

    1.5

    1.6

    1.7

    1.6

    1.6

    Gross national savings

    42.1

    29.8

    25.7

    26.1

    20.4

    15.1

    11.3

    10.4

    9.6

    Consolidated general government finances 2/

                     

       Total revenue and grants

    32.1

    40.6

    37.1

    34.4

    32.8

    31.0

    29.8

    29.5

    29.2

       Total expenditure

    26.2

    32.7

    33.8

    35.6

    34.5

    33.4

    32.5

    31.7

    31.0

      Current expenditure

    18.2

    20.5

    22.5

    23.9

    24.4

    24.6

    24.4

    24.4

    24.0

      Net acquisition of non-financial assets

    8.0

    12.2

    11.3

    11.7

    10.0

    8.8

    8.1

    7.3

    7.0

       Overall fiscal balance

    6.0

    7.9

    3.2

    -1.3

    -1.7

    -2.4

    -2.8

    -2.1

    -1.8

       Non-oil primary balance, in percent of non-oil GDP

    -22.4

    -22.1

    -20.5

    -22.1

    -18.6

    -16.3

    -14.5

    -12.7

    -11.3

       General government debt 3/

    17.3

    21.8

    20.9

    21.0

    22.2

    22.7

    23.1

    23.8

    23.8

       General government and government-guaranteed debt

    26.9

    28.9

    27.6

    27.6

    28.6

    28.9

    29.1

    29.6

    29.4

    External sector

                     

       Current account (- deficit)

    29.8

    11.5

    7.8

    7.8

    4.1

    0.5

    -2.4

    -3.3

    -4.2

       Foreign direct investment (net)

    -6.5

    -2.9

    -0.7

    -0.4

    -0.2

    0.0

    0.2

    0.4

    0.5

    Memorandum items:

                     

       Gross official international reserves (in millions of U.S. dollars)

    8,996

    11,281

    10,960

    10,760

    10,560

    10,360

    10,160

    9,960

    9,760

    in months of next year’s non-oil imports f.o.b.

    5.4

    7.7

    6.6

    6.4

    6.1

    5.7

    5.3

    4.9

    4.6

       Nominal GDP (in millions of manat)

    133,973

    123,128

    126,337

    134,078

    139,182

    145,847

    153,556

    162,135

    171,522

       Nominal non-oil GDP (in millions of manat)

    69,764

    78,990

    85,712

    94,674

    102,595

    110,434

    118,825

    127,903

    137,675

       Nominal GDP (in millions of U.S. dollars)

    78,807

    72,429

    74,316

    78,870

    81,872

    85,792

    90,327

    95,373

    100,895

       Oil Fund Assets (in millions of U.S. dollars)

    49,034

    56,070

    60,031

    60,911

    61,797

    61,864

    61,594

    62,222

    62,949

       Assumed oil price, WEO plus $2-$3 premium (in U.S. dollars per barrel)

    98.4

    82.6

    81.2

    78.6

    73.5

    71.6

    70.6

    72.0

    73.4

       Assumed natural gas price, WEO plus a premium (in U.S. dollars per thousands of cubic meters)

    1340.0

    460.1

    389.0

    517.4

    424.7

    342.2

    290.2

    290.2

    290.2

       Exchange rate (manat/dollar, end of period)

    1.7

    1.7

    1.7

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

       Sources: National authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

       1/ Includes the production and processing of oil and gas.

    2/ Consolidates State Budget, State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ), Nakhchevan Autonomous Region (NAK) and State Social Protection Fund.

    3/ Starting in 2021, includes guarantees issued to Aqrakredit for its acquisition of distressed assets from the IBA.

    [1] Under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country’s economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board.

    [2] At the conclusion of the discussion, the Managing Director, as Chairman of the Board, summarizes the views of Executive Directors, and this summary is transmitted to the country’s authorities. An explanation of any qualifiers used in summings up can be found here: http://www.IMF.org/external/np/sec/misc/qualifiers.htm.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Mayada Ghazala

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    @IMFSpokesperson

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/04/22/pr-25118-azerbaijan-imf-concludes-2025-article-iv-consultation

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    April 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Results of ING’s 2025 Annual General Meeting

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Results of ING’s 2025 Annual General Meeting

    The Annual General Meeting (AGM) of ING Groep N.V. was held today in Amsterdam.

    The AGM adopted all agenda items, including the annual accounts for 2024, discharge of the members of the Executive Board and the Supervisory Board and the dividend for 2024.

    The AGM also approved the reappointment of Steven van Rijswijk and Ljiljana Čortan to the Executive Board. Stuart Graham and Petri Hofsté were appointed to the Supervisory Board and Margarete Haase and Lodewijk Hijmans van den Bergh were reappointed to the Supervisory Board.

    Note for editors
    For further information on ING, please visit www.ing.com. Frequent news updates can be found in the Newsroom or via the @ING_news X feed. Photos of ING operations, buildings and its executives are available for download at Flickr.

    Press enquiries Investor enquiries
    Raymond Vermeulen ING Group Investor Relations
    +31 20 576 6369 +31 20 576 6396
    Raymond.Vermeulen@ing.com Investor.Relations@ing.com

    ING PROFILE
    ING is a global financial institution with a strong European base, offering banking services through its operating company ING Bank. The purpose of ING Bank is: empowering people to stay a step ahead in life and in business. ING Bank’s more than 60,000 employees offer retail and wholesale banking services to customers in over 100 countries.

    ING Group shares are listed on the exchanges of Amsterdam (INGA NA, INGA.AS), Brussels and on the New York Stock Exchange (ADRs: ING US, ING.N).

    ING aims to put sustainability at the heart of what we do. Our policies and actions are assessed by independent research and ratings providers, which give updates on them annually. ING’s ESG rating by MSCI was reconfirmed by MSCI as ‘AA’ in August 2024 for the fifth year. As of December 2023, in Sustainalytics’ view, ING’s management of ESG material risk is ‘Strong’. Our current ESG Risk Rating, is 17.2 (Low Risk). ING Group shares are also included in major sustainability and ESG index products of leading providers. Here are some examples: Euronext, STOXX, Morningstar and FTSE Russell. Society is transitioning to a low-carbon economy. So are our clients, and so is ING. We finance a lot of sustainable activities, but we still finance more that’s not. Follow our progress on ing.com/climate.

    Important legal information
    Elements of this press release contain or may contain information about ING Groep N.V. and/ or ING Bank N.V. within the meaning of Article 7(1) to (4) of EU Regulation No 596/2014 (‘Market Abuse Regulation’).

    ING Group’s annual accounts are prepared in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards as adopted by the European Union (‘IFRS- EU’). In preparing the financial information in this document, except as described otherwise, the same accounting principles are applied as in the 2024 ING Group consolidated annual accounts. All figures in this document are unaudited. Small differences are possible in the tables due to rounding.

    Certain of the statements contained herein are not historical facts, including, without limitation, certain statements made of future expectations and other forward-looking statements that are based on management’s current views and assumptions and involve known and unknown risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results, performance or events to differ materially from those expressed or implied in such statements. Actual results, performance or events may differ materially from those in such statements due to a number of factors, including, without limitation: (1) changes in general economic conditions and customer behaviour, in particular economic conditions in ING’s core markets, including changes affecting currency exchange rates and the regional and global economic impact of the invasion of Russia into Ukraine and related international response measures (2) changes affecting interest rate levels (3) any default of a major market participant and related market disruption (4) changes in performance of financial markets, including in Europe and developing markets (5) fiscal uncertainty in Europe and the United States (6) discontinuation of or changes in ‘benchmark’ indices (7) inflation and deflation in our principal markets (8) changes in conditions in the credit and capital markets generally, including changes in borrower and counterparty creditworthiness (9) failures of banks falling under the scope of state compensation schemes (10) non- compliance with or changes in laws and regulations, including those concerning financial services, financial economic crimes and tax laws, and the interpretation and application thereof (11) geopolitical risks, political instabilities and policies and actions of governmental and regulatory authorities, including in connection with the invasion of Russia into Ukraine and the related international response measures (12) legal and regulatory risks in certain countries with less developed legal and regulatory frameworks (13) prudential supervision and regulations, including in relation to stress tests and regulatory restrictions on dividends and distributions (also among members of the group) (14) ING’s ability to meet minimum capital and other prudential regulatory requirements (15) changes in regulation of US commodities and derivatives businesses of ING and its customers (16) application of bank recovery and resolution regimes, including write down and conversion powers in relation to our securities (17) outcome of current and future litigation, enforcement proceedings, investigations or other regulatory actions, including claims by customers or stakeholders who feel misled or treated unfairly, and other conduct issues (18) changes in tax laws and regulations and risks of non-compliance or investigation in connection with tax laws, including FATCA (19) operational and IT risks, such as system disruptions or failures, breaches of security, cyber-attacks, human error, changes in operational practices or inadequate controls including in respect of third parties with which we do business and including any risks as a result of incomplete, inaccurate, or otherwise flawed outputs from the algorithms and data sets utilized in artificial intelligence (20) risks and challenges related to cybercrime including the effects of cyberattacks and changes in legislation and regulation related to cybersecurity and data privacy, including such risks and challenges as a consequence of the use of emerging technologies, such as advanced forms of artificial intelligence and quantum computing (21) changes in general competitive factors, including ability to increase or maintain market share (22) inability to protect our intellectual property and infringement claims by third parties (23) inability of counterparties to meet financial obligations or ability to enforce rights against such counterparties (24) changes in credit ratings (25) business, operational, regulatory, reputation, transition and other risks and challenges in connection with climate change, diversity, equity and inclusion and other ESG-related matters, including data gathering and reporting and also including managing the conflicting laws and requirements of governments, regulators and authorities with respect to these topics (26) inability to attract and retain key personnel (27) future liabilities under defined benefit retirement plans (28) failure to manage business risks, including in connection with use of models, use of derivatives, or maintaining appropriate policies and guidelines (29) changes in capital and credit markets, including interbank funding, as well as customer deposits, which provide the liquidity and capital required to fund our operations, and (30) the other risks and uncertainties detailed in the most recent annual report of ING Groep N.V. (including the Risk Factors contained therein) and ING’s more recent disclosures, including press releases, which are available on www.ING.com.

    This document may contain ESG-related material that has been prepared by ING on the basis of publicly available information, internally developed data and other third-party sources believed to be reliable. ING has not sought to independently verify information obtained from public and third-party sources and makes no representations or warranties as to accuracy, completeness, reasonableness or reliability of such information.

    Materiality, as used in the context of ESG, is distinct from, and should not be confused with, such term as defined in the Market Abuse Regulation or as defined for Securities and Exchange Commission (‘SEC’) reporting purposes. Any issues identified as material for purposes of ESG in this document are therefore not necessarily material as defined in the Market Abuse Regulation or for SEC reporting purposes. In addition, there is currently no single, globally recognized set of accepted definitions in assessing whether activities are “green” or “sustainable.” Without limiting any of the statements contained herein, we make no representation or warranty as to whether any of our securities constitutes a green or sustainable security or conforms to present or future investor expectations or objectives for green or sustainable investing. For information on characteristics of a security, use of proceeds, a description of applicable project(s) and/or any other relevant information, please reference the offering documents for such security.

    This document may contain inactive textual addresses to internet websites operated by us and third parties. Reference to such websites is made for information purposes only, and information found at such websites is not incorporated by reference into this document. ING does not make any representation or warranty with respect to the accuracy or completeness of, or take any responsibility for, any information found at any websites operated by third parties. ING specifically disclaims any liability with respect to any information found at websites operated by third parties. ING cannot guarantee that websites operated by third parties remain available following the publication of this document, or that any information found at such websites will not change following the filing of this document. Many of those factors are beyond ING’s control.

    Any forward-looking statements made by or on behalf of ING speak only as of the date they are made, and ING assumes no obligation to publicly update or revise any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information or for any other reason.

    This document does not constitute an offer to sell, or a solicitation of an offer to purchase, any securities in the United States or any other jurisdiction.

    Attachment

    • PDF version of press release

    The MIL Network –

    April 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Defence Secretary Statement to the House of Commons

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Oral statement to Parliament

    Defence Secretary Statement to the House of Commons

    Ukraine Update

    Thank you Mr Speaker. Today, HMS Prince of Wales set sail from Portsmouth and I trust the whole House will join me in wishing the entire carrier strike group a safe and successful global deployment.

    Mr Speaker, I wish to make a statement on the ongoing war in Ukraine.

    Today, parliament returns from its Easter break.

    But during the last two weeks Putin’s illegal invasion of Ukraine has continued. Drones strikes. Missile attacks. Fierce fighting on the frontline.

    On Palm Sunday, men, women and children in Sumy, on their way to church were hit by Putin’s deadliest attack on Ukrainian civilians so far this year, killing 35 people – including young children – and injuring over 100 more.

    We are united in condemnation at this brutal attack and Putin’s illegal actions.

    At this critical moment for Ukraine and for European security, we have stepped up the Government’s efforts for Ukraine and we will step up further, both to increase military support for the fight today and to secure peace for tomorrow.

    Mr Speaker, we cannot jeopardise the peace by forgetting about the war.

    So, ten days ago in Brussels, the UK convened and I co-chaired the 27th meeting of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group, alongside my good friend, the German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius.

    51 nations and partners – from Europe from the Indo Pacific, from South America – came together at NATO HQ, including Ukrainian President Zelensky, US Defence Secretary Hegseth and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte.

    We came together to step up our support for Ukraine in the fight. Together we pledged a record 21 billion euros of military support to put Ukraine in strongest possible position and to increase pressure on Putin to negotiate.

    Mr Speaker this year, the UK is providing £4.5 billion in military support to Ukraine, more than ever before.

    And in Brussels, I announced £200 million of support will be surged to the front line, with supplies starting to reach Ukraine’s fighters within the next month including radar systems, anti-tank mines and hundreds of thousands of drones.

    I also announced £160 million worth to help the repair and maintenance essential battlefield vehicles and equipment.

    This support will strengthen Ukrainian troops in the close fight now and strengthen our industrial links with Ukraine to boost UK businesses.

    When President Trump talks about peace through strength, it’s the commitments made through this Contact Group that provide the strength to secure that peace.

    Despite President Putin’s promise of a 30-hour pause in fighting, I can confirm that Defence Intelligence have found, and I quote “no indication that a ceasefire on the frontline was observed over the Easter period”.

    And 10,000 missiles and drones have been fired into Ukraine during this year alone, including from the Black Sea.

    So, while Putin has said he declared an Easter truce – he broke it.

    While Putin says he wants peace – he rejected a full ceasefire.

    And while Putin says he wants to put an end to the fighting – he continues to play for time in negotiations.

    And the military, the Russian military continue to press on a number of fronts.

    Mr Speaker, I can confirm Russian military progress is slowing.

    Putin gained less territory in March then he did in February and less territory in February than he did in January.

    Ukrainian towns which Russia have been targeting since before Christmas have still not been captured.

    Ukrainian troops have still not been ejected from Russian territory in Kursk.

    Whatever ground Putin is taking comes at enormous human cost. Over 940,00 Russians have likely been killed or injured in the war so far – including over 150,000 killed and injured this year alone.

    Last month, the average daily casualty rate on the Russian side was 1,300 – almost double the rate of this time last year.

    While at home, Putin faces crippling interest rates at 21 per cent, inflation running at over 10 per cent and the Russian government is spending nearly 40 per cent of its total budget on this military campaign.

    I have to say Mr Speaker, in the days ahead, it is likely that Russia will keep up attacks on the Sumy oblast to help it fully reclaim nearby contested areas of Kursk.

    In central Donetsk oblast, Russia is targeting urban strongholds such as Toretsk, Povrosk and Chasiv Yar. 

    And in Kharkiv, Russia is continuing to make assaults towards the rail and logistics hub of Kupiansk.

    We do expect more ground to be taken, and more Russian missiles fired into Ukraine.

    And that is why we must remain united for Ukraine across this House, across this country, and across those nations standing alongside Ukraine.

    And we will step up support for Ukraine and pressure on Putin to force him to recognise that now is the time for peace, and continuing the war will prove much worse in the long run for Russia.

    Updates to this page

    Published 22 April 2025

    Invasion of Ukraine

    • UK visa support for Ukrainian nationals
    • Move to the UK if you’re coming from Ukraine
    • Homes for Ukraine: record your interest
    • Find out about the UK’s response

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    April 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: The VIII International Scientific and Practical Conference BIMAC-2025 has started its work at SPbGASU

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Saint Petersburg State University of Architecture and Civil Engineering – Victoria Vinogradova, Evgeny Enokaev, Maxim Nechiporenko, Nikolay Samopal, Valery Uskov and Alexander Grimitlin

    The VIII International Scientific and Practical Conference “Information Modeling in Construction and Architecture Problems” (BIMAC-2025) has begun its work at SPbGASU. The large-scale event was organized as part of the implementation of the Innovative Educational Project “Innovative Methodology for Forming Digital Professional Competencies of Students and Specialists in the Construction Industry”.

    As noted by Denis Nizhegorodtsev, Deputy Director of the Educational Center for Digital Competencies at SPbGASU, the conference will include eight scientific and practical sections, round tables, master classes, and an exhibition area where partners will present their developments. Over the course of four days, representatives of industry companies and educational institutions will discuss current issues related to information modeling technologies in construction and architecture, estimates, the use of artificial intelligence in the construction industry, training of engineering personnel for the digitalization of construction, visual programming, and software development. In addition, they will hear reports from young scientists. Opening the conference, Konstantin Mikhailik, Deputy Minister of Construction and Housing and Communal Services of Russia, in particular, emphasized that the task of the industry is to improve its efficiency by increasing labor productivity and reducing costs using digital technologies.

    “The BIMAC conference allows us to gather the scientific community, government bodies and representatives of specialized companies on one platform, who can openly discuss in order to subsequently develop an effective set of solutions for the development of the industry. The sooner we jointly define the necessary plane for the latest developments, the more high-quality solutions we will receive. Integration of information modeling into construction processes, design and estimate documentation are important tasks that are also submitted for wide discussion at the conference. The quality and timing of construction, and the import substitution process in general, depend on their high-quality implementation and execution,” noted Konstantin Mikhailik.

    Deputy Chairman of the St. Petersburg Construction Committee Valery Uskov emphasized that the construction industry is actively implementing information modeling technologies: the city administration is implementing projects using such technologies. Thus, in 2024, 118 projects were implemented, 20 of which were completed using information modeling technologies. This year, 124 projects are planned, and at the moment, nine of them are already being implemented using these technologies.

    “The relevance of this conference is primarily due to the development of information technologies that are being actively implemented in the construction industry. I have identified three important areas in the work of the conference. The first concerns the implementation of information modeling technology, the integration of sensors in construction projects that allow analyzing the condition of an object, which, in turn, has a positive effect on the operation of the object and leads to a decrease in the costs of its maintenance. The second important area is related to security. Considering that cloud storage and servers are used today, we need to closely monitor this area and actively develop methods for increasing their safety in order to prevent failures. The third area, as a civil servant, I highlight is the improvement of the regulatory framework and its implementation. I am sure that all conference participants will gain good experience, make new contacts, and meet leading specialists in this industry. The industry needs personnel, and this kind of event is one of the steps in solving this issue,” Valery Uskov emphasized.

    The President of the Association “AVOK SEVERO-ZAPAD” Alexander Grimitlin specified that the conference is dedicated to such an important issue as digitalization of the construction industry. Because it is a necessity, without which the movement will simply slow down.

    “I consider the digitalization of the industry in two directions. Firstly, it is the solution of complex engineering problems of information modeling, which allow us to use a huge number of factors. We will not be able to take them into account in other ways. A lot of work is being done in this direction at the university. The second line is standard design. We need to do it in such a way as to exclude errors in construction processes,” noted Alexander Grimitlin.

    First Deputy Chairman of the Leningrad Region Construction Committee Evgeny Enokaev emphasized that information modeling technologies are developing very quickly, and now the construction management system as a whole is changing, so, of course, it is necessary to be aware of the latest developments and emerging experience.

    “The conference is an effective platform for exchanging experience, an opportunity for software manufacturers to demonstrate their latest developments, and for builders to adopt them and talk about their application based on their own practice. This is especially important: after the departure of foreign vendors, a serious niche has formed, and we need to give Russian software developers the opportunity to fill it. I think that this will be possible to do, and in the near future. In addition, partnership with universities allows us to train and attract personnel to the industry,” believes Evgeny Enokaev.

    Advisor to the Minister of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media of Russia, Deputy CEO of Renga Software Maxim Nechiporenko believes that now there is no need to discuss how promising information modeling is – this should have been done earlier. At the moment, it is important to discuss how to interact.

    “The only relevant standard of work in the design and construction industry is working with digital information models. They are the only reliable source of information. This is not a panacea and not a solution to all problems in construction, but you can reduce their number by providing reliable information. One thing remains unchanged – the need and focus of the construction industry on working with reliable information. This contributes to increased transparency in the construction industry,” emphasized Maksym Nechyporenko.

    Deputy General Director for Development of ZAO “WIZARDSOFT” Nikolay Samopal recalled that the company “Wizardsoft” has been cooperating with SPbGASU for many years: they started as software suppliers, and over time, the cooperation expanded. The company takes part in various events, and this year it became the general partner of the conference.

    “Close cooperation between a software developer and an educational institution allows not only to improve digital tools, but also to train specialists who are proficient in modern tools. We provide an opportunity to hone their skills and bring to the market employees who are ready to use modern tools,” concluded Nikolai Samopal.

    Vice-Rector for Continuing Education at SPbGASU Victoria Vinogradova emphasized that the university always keeps up with the times. Today, the construction industry is undergoing a profound transformation under the influence of digital technologies, in which the university is also participating. “Information modeling, process automation, interdisciplinarity have become part of modern design, and not just a prospect. For eight years now, our conference has served as an open platform where government agencies, scientific and educational organizations, and professional communities can exchange best practices. We are working to improve work processes, educational programs, and software functionality,” Victoria Vinogradova said.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    April 23, 2025
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