Category: Russian Federation

  • MIL-OSI USA: Murkowski Cosponsors Bill to Grant Ukrainians Already in the U.S. Temporary Guest Status

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Alaska Lisa Murkowski
    02.27.25
    Washington, DC – Following the third anniversary of Russia’s catastrophic invasion of Ukraine, U.S. Senator Lisa Murkowski (R-AK) announced that she has joined U.S. Senate Democratic Whip Dick Durbin (D-IL) as a cosponsor of his Protecting Our Guests During Hostilities in Ukraine Act, which would provide temporary guest status to Ukrainians and their immediate family members who are already in the United States through the “Uniting for Ukraine” parole process. The bill allows Ukrainians to stay and work in the U.S. until the Secretary of State determines that hostilities in Ukraine have ceased and it is safe for them to return. In addition to Murkowski, U.S. Senators Tammy Duckworth (D-IL), Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), Jacky Rosen (D-NV), Chris Van Hollen (D-MD), Peter Welch (D-VT), Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), Michael Bennet (D-CO), Alex Padilla (D-CA), and Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI) are cosponsors of the legislation.
    “I have had the opportunity to visit with many Ukrainians who fled Russia’s unprovoked war who have found safety and community in Alaska. These families—and the Alaskans and Alaskan businesses who have supported and employed them—have expressed their strong desire to remain and work here,” said Murkowski. “Granting temporary guest status for Ukrainians already in the United States achieves this goal. As the war enters its fourth year, we must continue to provide the Ukrainians who have taken refuge in the U.S. a safe haven to weather the storm.”
    “Three years ago, Putin began his brutal, criminal, full-scale invasion of Ukraine—which remains on the frontlines of democracy and transatlantic security,” said Durbin. “When the war started, Americans across the country opened their hearts and communities to Ukrainians fleeing Russian aggression. Both Republicans and Democrats petitioned President Biden to protect them from deportation. I’m glad Senator Murkowski joined my legislation to ensure Ukrainians lawfully present in the U.S. have temporary guest status until conditions in Ukraine are safe for return. I hope others will follow her lead.”
    The individuals covered by the bill already underwent rigorous vetting to ensure that they present no criminal or public safety risks. The legislation would also allow the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to revoke this temporary status if new information raises such concerns about any individual. Bill text can be found here. 
    The following organizations endorsed the Protecting Our Guests During Hostilities in Ukraine Act: Refugee Council USA; Chin Association of Maryland; HIAS; World Relief; Center for Gender & Refugee Studies; Human Rights First; Church World Service; International Refugee Assistance Project; Global Refuge; Boat People SOS; Center for Victims of Torture; Jesuit Refugee Service; and Veterans for American Ideals.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the European Semester for economic policy coordination: employment and social priorities for 2025 – A10-0023/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the European Semester for economic policy coordination: employment and social priorities for 2025

    (2024/2084(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

      having regard to Articles 9, 121, 148 and 149 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

     having regard to the European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR) proclaimed and signed by the Council, Parliament and the Commission on 17 November 2017,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 4 March 2021 entitled ‘The European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan’ (COM(2021)0102) and its proposed 2030 headline targets on employment, skills and poverty reduction,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 17 December 2024 entitled ‘2025 European Semester – Autumn package’ (COM(2024)0700),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 26 November 2024 entitled ‘2025 European Semester: bringing the new economic governance framework to life’ (COM(2024)0705),

      having regard to the Commission proposal of 17 December 2024 for a joint employment report from the Commission and the Council (COM(2024)0701),

     having regard to the Commission recommendation of 17 December 2024 for a Council recommendation on the economic policy of the euro area (COM(2024)0704),

      having regard to the Commission report of 17 December 2024 entitled ‘Alert Mechanism Report 2025’ (COM(2024)0702),

      having regard to the Commission staff working document of 26 November 2024 entitled ‘Fiscal statistical tables providing relevant background data for the assessment of the 2025 draft budgetary plans’ (SWD(2024)0950),

     having regard to the Commission staff working document of 17 December 2024 on the changes in the scoreboard the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure Scoreboard in the context of the regular review process (SWD(2024)0702),

     having regard to its resolution of 22 October 2024 on the Council position on Draft amending budget No 4/2024 of the European Union for the financial year 2024 – update of revenue (own resources) and adjustments to some decentralised agencies[1],

     having regard to Mario Draghi’s report of 9 September 2024 entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’,

     having regard to Enrico Letta’s report of April 2024 on the future of the single market[2],

     having regard to the La Hulpe Declaration on the Future of the European Pillar of Social Rights signed by Parliament, the Commission, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Council on 16 April 2024,

     having regard to the Regulation (EU) 2023/955 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 2023 establishing a Social Climate Fund and amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1060[3],

     having regard to the Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2024 on the effective coordination of economic policies and on multilateral budgetary surveillance and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97[4], and in particular to Articles 3, 4, 13 and 27 thereof,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 17 January 2023 entitled ‘Harnessing talent in Europe’s regions’ (COM(2023)0032),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2023 entitled ‘Labour and skills shortages in the EU: an action plan’ (COM(2024)0131),

     having regard to the 2020 European Skills Agenda,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 7 September 2022 on the European care strategy (COM(2022)0440),

     having regard to the Council Recommendation on access to affordable, high-quality long-term care[5],

     having regard to the EU Social Scoreboard and its headline and secondary indicators,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 3 March 2021 entitled ‘Union of Equality: Strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2021-2030’ (COM(2021)0101),

     having regard to the Commission report of 19 September 2024 entitled ‘Employment and Social Developments in Europe (ESDE): upward social convergence in the EU and the role of social investment’,

     having regard to the Council Decision on Employment Guidelines, adopted by the Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council on 2 December 2024, which establishes employment and social priorities aligned with the principles of the EPSR,

     having regard to the Tripartite Declaration for a thriving European Social Dialogue and to the forthcoming pact on social dialogue,

     having regard to Directive (EU) 2022/2041 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on adequate minimum wages in the European Union[6] (Minimum Wage Directive),

     having regard to the European Social Charter, referred to in the preamble of the EPSR,

     having regard to the EU Roma strategic framework for equality, inclusion and participation for 2020-2030,

     having regard to the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),

     having regard to the Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025,

     having regard to the EU Anti-Racism Action Plan 2020-2025,

     having regard to the LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025,

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (A10-0023/2025),

    A. whereas progress has been made towards achieving the EU’s employment targets, namely that at least 78 % of people aged 20 to 64 should be in employment by 2030, despite the uncertainty created by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the impact of high inflation; whereas, according to the Commission’s 2025 autumn economic forecast, EU employment has reached a rate of 75.3 %; whereas growth in employment in the EU remained robust in 2023; whereas in two thirds of the Member States, employment growth in 2023 was on track to reach the national 2030 target; whereas significant challenges nevertheless persist, such as high unemployment rates in some Member States, particularly among young people and persons with disabilities, as do significant inequalities between sectors and regions, which can negatively affect social cohesion and the well-being of European citizens in the long term;

    B. whereas the European Semester combines various different instruments in an integrated framework for multilateral coordination and surveillance of economic, employment and social policies within the EU and it must become a key tool for fostering upward social convergence; whereas the Social Convergence Framework is a key tool for assessing social challenges and upward convergence within the European Semester and for monitoring social disparities across Member States, while addressing the challenges identified in the Joint Employment Report (JER);

    C. whereas the Union has adopted the 2030 target of reducing the number of people at risk of poverty and social exclusion by at least 15 million compared to 2019, including at least 5 million children; whereas in nearly half of the Member States the trend is heading in the opposite direction; whereas one child in four in the European Union is still at risk of poverty and social exclusion; and whereas the current trend will not make it possible to meet the 2030 target; whereas public spending on children and youth should not be seen only as social expenditure but as an investment in the future; whereas the promotion of strong, sustainable and inclusive economic growth can succeed only if the next generation can develop their full educational potential in order to be prepared for the changing labour market, whereas to meet the 2030 Barcelona targets for early childhood education and care, the EU should invest an additional EUR 11 billion per year[7];

    D. whereas despite a minimal reduction in the number of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion in the EU in 2023, approximately one in five still faces this challenge, with notable disparities for children, young and older people, persons with disabilities, LGTBI, non-EU born individuals, and Roma communities;

    E. whereas significant disparities are observed among children from ethnic or migrant backgrounds and children with disabilities; whereas 83 % of Roma children live in households at risk of poverty; whereas the EU and national resources currently deployed are in no way sufficient for addressing the challenge of child poverty in the EU and, therefore, a dedicated funding instrument for the European Child Guarantee as well as synergies with other European and national funds are of the utmost importance in both the current multiannual financial framework (MFF) and the next one;

    F. whereas the EPSR must be the compass guiding EU social and economic policies, whereas the Commission should monitor progress on the implementation of the EPSR using the Social Scoreboard and the Social Convergence Framework;

    G. whereas poor quality jobs among the self-employed are disproportionately widespread while the rate of self-employment is declining, including among young people;

    H. whereas there are still 1.4 million people residing in institutions in the EU; whereas residents of institutions are isolated from the broader community and do not have sufficient control over their lives and the decisions that affect them; whereas despite the fact that the European Union has long been committed to the process of deinstitutionalisation, efforts are still needed at both European and national level to enable vulnerable groups to live independently in a community environment;

    I. whereas demographic challenges, including an ageing population, low birth rates and rural depopulation, with young people in particular moving to urban areas, profoundly affect the economic vitality and attractiveness of EU regions, the labour markets, and consequently, the sustainability of welfare systems, and further aggravate the regional disparities in the EU, and hence represent a structural challenge for the EU economy; and whereas, as underlined in the Draghi report, sustainable growth and competitiveness in Europe depend to a large extent on adapting education and training systems to evolving skills needs, prioritising adult learning and vocational education and training, and the inclusion of the active population in the labour market and on a robust welfare system;

    J. whereas, as highlighted in the Draghi report, migrant workers have been an important factor in reducing labour shortages and are more likely to work in occupations with persistent shortages than workers born in the EU;

    K. whereas 70 % of workers in Europe are in good-quality jobs, 30 % are in high-strain jobs where demands are more numerous than resources available to balance them leading to overall poor job quality; whereas in many occupations suffering from persistent labour shortages the share of low-quality jobs is higher than 30 %;

    L. whereas the Letta report states that there is a decline in the birth rate, noting the importance of creating a framework to support all families as part of a strategy of inclusive growth in line with the EPSR; whereas the report notes that the free movement of people remains the least developed of the four freedoms and argues for reducing barriers to intra-EU occupational mobility while addressing the social, economic and political challenges facing the sending Member States and their most disadvantaged regions, as well as safeguarding the right to stay; whereas there is a need to promote family-friendly and work-life balance policies, ensuring accessible and professional care systems as well as public quality education, family-related leave and flexible working arrangements in line with the European Care Strategy;

    M. whereas inflation has increased the economic burden on households, having a particularly negative impact on groups in vulnerable situations, such as single parents, large families, older people or persons with disabilities, whereas housing costs and energy poverty remain major problems; whereas housing is becoming unaffordable for those who live in households where housing costs account for 40 % of total disposable income; whereas investment in social services, housing supply – including social housing – and policies that facilitate the accessibility and affordability of housing play a key role in reducing poverty among vulnerable households;

    N. whereas the EU’s micro, small and medium-sized enterprises face particular challenges such as staying competitive against third-country players, maintaining production levels despite rising energy costs and finding the necessary skills for the green and digital transitions; whereas they need financial and technical support to comply with regulatory requirements and take advantage of the opportunities offered by the twin transitions;

    O. whereas labour and skills shortages remain a problem at all levels, and are reported by companies of all sizes and sectors; whereas these shortages are exacerbated by a lack of candidates to fill critical positions in key sectors such as education, healthcare, transport, science, technology, engineering and construction, especially in areas affected by depopulation; whereas these shortages can result from a number of factors, such as difficult working conditions, unattractive salaries, demand for new skill sets and a shortage of relevant training, the lack of public services, barriers of access to medium and higher education and lack of recognition of skills and education;

    P. whereas the Union has adopted the target that at least 60 % of adults should participate in training every year by 2030; whereas the Member States have committed themselves to national targets in order to achieve this headline goal and whereas the majority of Member States lost ground in the pursuit of these national targets; whereas further efforts are needed to ensure the provision of, and access to, quality training policies that promote lifelong learning; whereas upskilling, reskilling and training programmes must be available for all workers, including those with disabilities, and should also be adapted to workers’ needs and capabilities;

    Q. whereas in 2022, the average Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) score across the OECD on the measures of basic skills (reading, mathematics and science) of 15-year-olds dropped by 10 points compared to the last wave in 2018; whereas underachievement is prevalent among disadvantaged learners, demonstrating a widening of educational inequalities; whereas this worrying deterioration calls for reforms and investments in education and training;

    R. whereas the EU’s capacity to deal with future shocks, crises and ‘polycrises’ while navigating the demographic, digital and green transitions, will depend greatly on the conditions under which critical workers will be able to perform their work; whereas addressing the shortages and retaining all types of talent requires decent working conditions, access to social protection systems, and opportunities for skills development tailored to the needs; and whereas addressing skills shortages is crucial to achieving the digital and green transitions, ensuring inclusive and sustainable growth and boosting the EU’s competitiveness;

    S. whereas it is essential to promote mobility within the EU and consider attracting skilled workers from third countries, while ensuring respect for and enforcement of labour and social rights and channelling third-country nationals entering the EU through legal migration pathways towards occupations experiencing shortages, supported by an effective integration policy, in full complementarity with harnessing talents from within the Union;

    T. whereas gender pay gaps remain considerable in most EU Member States and whereas care responsibilities are an important factor that continue to constrain women into part-time employment or lead to their exclusion from the labour market, resulting in a wider gender employment gap;

    U. whereas the JER highlights the right to disconnect, in particular in the context of telework, acknowledging the critical role of this right in ensuring a work-life balance in a context of increasing digitalisation and remote working;

    V. whereas challenges to several sectors, such as automotive manufacturing and energy intensive industries, became evident in 2024 and a number of companies announced large-scale restructuring;

    W. whereas there are disparities in the coverage of social services, including long-term care, child protection, domestic violence support, and homelessness aid, that need to be addressed through the European Semester;

    X. whereas there is currently no regular EU-wide collection of data on social services investment and coverage; whereas collecting such data is key for an evidence-based analysis of national social policies in the European Semester analysis; whereas this should be addressed through jointly agreed criteria and data collection standards for social services investment and coverage in the Member States; whereas the European Social Network’s Social Services Index is an example of how such data collection can contribute to the European Semester analysis;

    Y. whereas the crisis in generational renewal, demographic changes, and lack of sufficient investment in public services have led to an increased risk of poverty and social exclusion, particularly affecting children and older people, single-parent households and large families, the working poor, persons with disabilities, and people from marginalised backgrounds; whereas an ambitious EU anti-poverty strategy will be essential to reverse this trend and provide responses to the multidimensional phenomenon of poverty;

    Z. whereas Eurofound research shows that suicide rates have been creeping up since 2021, after decreasing for decades; whereas more needs to be done to address causes of mental health problems in working and living conditions (importantly social inclusion), and access to support for people with poor mental health remains a problem;

    AA. whereas there were still over 3 300 fatal accidents and almost 3 million nonfatal accidents in the EU-27 in 2021; whereas over 200 000 workers die each year from work-related illnesses; whereas these data do not include all accidents caused by undeclared work, making it plausible to assume that the true numbers greatly exceed the official statistics; whereas in 2017, according to Eurofound, 20 % of jobs in Europe were of ‘poor quality’ and put workers at increased risk regarding their physical or mental health; whereas 14 % of workers have been exposed to a high level of psychosocial risks; whereas 23 % of European workers believe that their safety or their health is at risk because of their work;

    AB. whereas the results of the April 2024 Eurobarometer survey on social Europe highlight that 88 % of European citizens consider social Europe to be important to them personally; whereas this was confirmed by the EU Post-Electoral Survey 2024, where European citizens cited rising prices and the cost of living (42 %) and the economic situation (41 %) as the main topics that motivated them to vote in the 2024 European elections;

    AC. whereas according to Article 3 TEU, social progress in the EU is one of the aims of a highly competitive social market economy, together with full employment, a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment; whereas Article 3 TEU also states that the EU ‘shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social justice and protection, equality between women and men, solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the child’;

    AD. whereas the new EU economic governance framework entered into force in April 2024 and aims to promote sustainable and inclusive growth and to give more space for social investment and achievement of the objectives of the EPSR; whereas, for the first time, the revision includes a social convergence framework as an integrated part of the European Semester;

    AE. whereas under the new EU economic governance framework, all Member States have to include reforms and investments in their medium-term plans addressing common EU priorities and challenges identified in country-specific recommendations in the context of the European Semester; whereas the common EU priorities include social and economic resilience, including the EPSR;

    AF. whereas European social partners, during Macroeconomic Dialogue, have denounced the lack of involvement of social partners in the drafting of the medium-term fiscal structural plans and ETUC, SMEUnited and SGIEurope have signed a joint statement for a material and factual involvement of social partners in the economic governance and the European Semester;

    AG. whereas public investment is expected to increase in 2025 in almost all Member States, with a significant contribution from NextGenerationEU’s Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) and EU funds and will contribute to social spending, amounting to around 25 % of the total estimated expenditure under the RRF, securing growth and economic resilience[8]; whereas social investments and reforms in key areas can boost employment, social inclusion, competitiveness and economic growth[9]; whereas social partners are essential for designing and implementing policies that promote sustainable and inclusive growth, decent and quality work, and fair transitions and must be involved at all levels of governance in accordance with the TFEU;

    AH. whereas the Member States should implement the Minimum Wage Directive without delay and prepare action plans that increase collective bargaining coverage in line with the directive, where applicable;

    AI. whereas according to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), on average across OECD countries, occupations at highest risk of automation account for about 28 % of employment[10]; whereas social dialogue and collective bargaining are crucial in this context to ensure a participatory approach to managing change driven by technological developments, addressing potential concerns, while fostering workers’ adaptation (including via skills provision); whereas digitalisation, robotisation, automation and artificial intelligence (AI) must benefit workers and society by improving working conditions and quality of life, ensuring a good work-life balance, creating better employment opportunities, and contributing to socio-economic convergence; whereas workers and their trade unions will play a critical role in anticipating and tackling risks emerging from those challenges;

     

    AJ. whereas social dialogue and collective bargaining are essential for the EU’s competitiveness, labour productivity and social cohesion;

    1. Considers that the Commission and the Council should strengthen their efforts to implement the EPSR, in line with the action plan of March 2021 and the La Hulpe Declaration, to achieve the 2030 headline targets; calls on the Commission to ensure that the JER 2026 analyses the implementation of all the principles of the EPSR in line with Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 and includes an analysis of the social dimension of the national medium-term fiscal structural plans related to social resilience, including the EPSR; welcomes, in this regard, the announcement of a new Action Plan on the implementation of the EPSR[11] for 2025 to give a new impetus to social progress; welcomes the fact that almost all Member States are expected to increase public investment in 2025, which is necessary to ensure access to quality public services and achieve the aims of the EPSR; recalls that the Member States can mobilise the RRF within the scope defined by the Regulation (EU) 2021/241[12] until 31 December 2026 on policies for sustainable and inclusive growth and the young;

    2. Stresses the importance of using the Social Scoreboard and the Social Convergence Framework to identify risks to, and to track progress in, reducing inequalities, strengthening social protection systems and promoting decent working conditions and supportive measures for workers to manage the transitions; stresses that in this regard, it is necessary to ensure a sustainable, fair and inclusive Europe where social rights are fully protected and safeguarded at the same level as economic freedoms; recalls that EU citizens identify social Europe as one of their priorities;

    3. Regrets the lack of data on and analysis of wealth inequality and wealth concentration in the EU as this is one of the main determinants of poverty; points out that according to Distributional Wealth Accounts, a dataset developed by the European System of Central Banks, the share of wealth held by the top 10 % stood at 56 % in the fourth quarter of 2023, while the bottom half held just 5 %;

    4. Welcomes the inclusion of analysis on the positive contribution of the SDGs and the European equality strategies in the JER 2025 and calls on the Commission to ensure that the JER 2026 includes both a section analysing the progress towards the SDGs related to employment and social policy, and another on progress towards eliminating social and labour discrimination in line with the Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025, the EU Anti-Racism Action Plan 2020-2025, the EU Roma strategic framework for equality, inclusion and participation 2020-2030, the LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025, and the Strategy for the rights of persons with disabilities 2021-2030;

    5. Calls on the Member States to implement the updated employment guidelines, with an emphasis on education and training for all, new technologies such as AI, and recent policy initiatives on platform work, affordable and decent housing and tackling labour and skills shortages, with a view to strengthening democratic decision-making;

    6. Reiterates the importance of investing in workforce skills development and occupational training and of ensuring quality employment, with an emphasis on the individual right to training and lifelong learning; urges the Member States to develop upskilling and reskilling measures in collaboration with local stakeholders, including educational and training bodies and the social partners, in order to reinforce the link between the education and training systems and the labour market and to anticipate labour market needs; welcomes the fact that employment outcomes for recent graduates from vocational education and training (VET) continue to improve across the EU; is concerned about young people’s declining educational performance, particularly in basic skills; welcomes, in this regard, the announcement of an Action Plan on Basic Skills and a STEM Education Strategic Plan; calls on the Member States to invest in programmes to equip learners with the basic, digital and transversal skills needed for the world of work and its digitisation as well as to help them to contribute meaningfully to society; recalls the important role that the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for displaced workers can play in supporting and reskilling workers who were made redundant as a result of major restructuring events;

    7. Welcomes the announcement of a quality jobs roadmap to ensure a just transition for all; calls on the Commission to include in this roadmap considerations for measures linked to the use of AI and algorithmic management in the world of work so that new technologies are harnessed to improve working conditions and productivity while respecting workers’ rights and work-life balance as recognised in the JER[13]; calls on the Commission to propose a directive on the use of AI in the workplace that ensures that workers’ rights are protected and respected;

    8. Stresses that the response to labour shortages in the European Union also involves improving and facilitating labour mobility within the Union; calls on the Member States to strengthen and facilitate the recognition of skills and qualifications in the Union, including those of third-country nationals; calls on the Commission to analyse the effectiveness of the European Employment Services (EURES) platform with a view to a potential revision of its operation;

    9. Notes that the number of early leavers from education and training, people with lower levels of education, young people not in education, employment or training (NEETs) and among them vulnerable groups, including Roma, women, older people, low- and medium-qualified people, persons with disabilities and people with a migrant or minority background, depending on the country-specific context, remains high in several Member States, despite a downward trend in the European Union; calls on the Member States to reinforce the Youth Guarantee as stated in Principle 4 of the EPSR; in order to support young people in need throughout their personal and professional development; reiterates the pivotal role that VET plays in providing the knowledge, skills and competencies necessary for young people entering the labour market; emphasises the need to invest in the quality and attractiveness of VET through the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+); recalls, therefore, the need to address this situation and develop solutions to keep young people in education, training or employment and the importance of ensuring their access to traineeships and apprenticeships, enabling them to gain their first work experience and facilitating their transition from education to employment as well as to create working conditions that enable an ageing workforce to remain in the labour market;

    10. Considers that, although there has been an improvement, persons with disabilities, especially women with disabilities, still face significant obstacles in the labour market, and that there is therefore a need for vocational and digital training, while promoting the inclusion of persons with disabilities, targeting the inactive labour force and groups with low participation in the labour market, including women, young people, older workers and persons with chronic diseases; calls on the Commission to update the EU Disability Strategy with new flagship initiatives and actions from 2025 onwards, such as a European Disability Employment and Skills Guarantee and the sharing of best practices such as the disability card, in particular to address social inclusion and independent living for people with disabilities, also ensuring their access to quality education, training and employment through guidance on retaining disability allowances;

    11. Expresses concern that Roma continue to face significant barriers to employment, with persistent biases limiting their prospects; notes that the EU Roma strategic framework for equality, inclusion, and participation highlights a lack of progress in employment access and a growing share of Roma youth not in employment, education, or training; emphasises the framework’s goal of halving the employment gap between Roma and the general population and ensuring that at least 60 % of Roma are in paid work by 2030; urges the Member States to adopt an integrated, equality-focused approach and to ensure that public policies and services effectively reach all Roma, including those in remote rural areas;

    12. Stresses the need to pay attention to the social and environmental aspects of competitiveness, emphasising the need for investments in education and training for all to ensure universal access to high-quality public education and professional training programmes, as well as sustainable practices to foster inclusive growth; underlines that social partners should play a key role in identifying and addressing skills needs across the EU;

    13. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to include specific recommendations on housing affordability in the European Semester and to promote housing investment; urges the Member States to ensure that housing investments support long-term quality housing solutions that are actually affordable for low-income and middle-income households, highlighting that investments in social and affordable housing are crucial in order to ensure and improve the quality of life for all; stresses the need for a better use of EU funding, such as through European Investment Bank financial instruments, in particular to support investments to increase the energy efficiency of buildings; calls on the Commission and the Member States to take decisive action to provide an EU regulatory framework for the housing sector, together with an assessment of Union policies, funds and bottlenecks that should facilitate the construction, conversion and renovation of accessible, affordable and energy-efficient housing, including social housing, that meets the needs of young people, people with reduced mobility, low- and middle-income groups, families at risk and people in more vulnerable situations, while protecting homeowners and those seeking access to home ownership from a further reduction in supply;

    14. Welcomes the announced European Affordable Housing Plan to support Member States in addressing the housing crisis and soaring rents; calls on the Commission to assess and publish which potential barriers on State aid rules affect housing accessibility; recalls that the Social Climate Fund aims to provide financial aid to Member States from 2026 to support vulnerable households, in particular with measures and investments intended to increase the energy efficiency of buildings, decarbonisation of heating and cooling of buildings and the integration in buildings of renewable energy generation and storage;

    15. Considers that homelessness is a dramatic social problem in the EU; calls for a single definition of homelessness in the EU, which would enable the systematic comparison and assessment of the extent of homelessness across different EU Member States; calls on the Commission to develop a strategy and work towards ending homelessness in the EU by 2030 by promoting access to affordable and decent housing as well as access to quality social services; urges the Member States to better use the available EU instruments, including the ESF+, in this matter[14];

    16. Calls on the Member States to design national homelessness strategies centred around housing-based solutions; welcomes the intention to deliver a Council recommendation on homelessness[15]; urges the Commission to further increase the ambition of the European Platform on Combating Homelessness, in particular by providing it with a dedicated budget;

    17. Considers that EU action is urgently needed to address the persistently high levels of poverty and social exclusion in the EU, particularly among children, young and older people, persons with disabilities, non-EU born individuals, LGTBI and Roma communities; highlights that access to quality social services should be prioritised, with binding targets to reduce homelessness and ensure energy security for vulnerable households; calls on the Commission to adopt the first-ever EU Anti-Poverty Strategy;

    18. Recalls the Union objective of transitioning from institutional to community or family-based care; calls on the Commission to put forward an action plan on deinstitutionalisation; stresses that this action plan should cover all groups still living in institutions, including children, persons with disabilities, people with mental health issues, people affected by homelessness and older people; calls on the Member States to make full use of the ESF+ funds as well as other relevant European and national funds in order to finalise the deinstitutionalisation process so as to ensure that every EU citizen can live in a family or community environment;

    19. Calls on the Commission to deliver a European action plan for mental health, in line with its recent recommendations[16], and to complement it with a directive on psychosocial risks in the workplace; calls on the Member States to strengthen access to mental health services and emotional support programmes for all, particularly children, young people and older people; requests a better use of the Social Scoreboard indicators to address the impact of precarious living conditions and uncertainty on mental health;

    20. Calls on the Commission to address loneliness by promoting a holistic EU strategy on loneliness and access to professional care; calls also for this EU strategy to address the socio-economic impact of loneliness on productivity and well-being by tackling issues such as rural isolation; urges the Member States to continue implementing the Council recommendation on access to affordable, quality long-term care with a view to ensuring access to quality care while ensuring decent working conditions for workers in the care sector, as well as for informal carers;

    21. Recognises that 44 million Europeans are frequent informal long-term caregivers, the majority of whom are women[17];

    22. Recognises the unique role of carers in society, and while the definition of care workers is not harmonised across the EU, the long-term care sector employs 6.4 million people across the EU;

    23. Is concerned that, in 2023, 94.6 million people in the EU were still at risk of poverty or social exclusion; stresses that without a paradigm shift in the approach to combating poverty, the European Union and its Member States will not achieve their poverty reduction objectives; believes that the announcement of the first-ever EU Anti-Poverty Strategy is a step in the right direction towards reversing the trend, but must provide a comprehensive approach to tackling the multidimensional aspects of poverty and social exclusion with concrete actions, strong implementation and monitoring; calls for this Strategy to encompass everybody experiencing poverty and social exclusion, first and foremost the most disadvantaged, but also specific measures for different groups such as persons experiencing in-work poverty, homeless people, people with disabilities, single-parent families and, above all, children in order to sustainably break the cycle of poverty; stresses that the transposition of the Minimum Wage Directive will be key to preventing and fighting poverty risks among workers, while reinforcing incentives to work, and welcomes the fact that several Member States have amended or plan to amend their minimum wage frameworks; is concerned about the rise of non-standard forms of employment where workers are more likely to face in-work poverty and find themselves without adequate legal protections; stresses that an EU framework directive on adequate minimum income and active inclusion, in compliance with the subsidiarity principle, would contribute to the goals of reducing poverty and fostering the integration of people absent from the labour market;

    24. Reiterates its call on the Commission to carefully monitor implementation of the Child Guarantee in all Member States as part of the European Semester and country-specific recommendations; reiterates its call for an increase in the funding of the European Child Guarantee with a dedicated budget of at least EUR 20 billion and for all Member States to allocate at least 5 % of their allocated ESF+ funds to fighting child poverty and promoting children’s well-being; considers that the country-specific recommendations should reflect Member States’ budgetary compliance with the minimum required allocation for tackling child poverty set out in the ESF+ Regulation[18]; calls on the Commission to provide an ambitious budget for the Child Guarantee in the next MFF in order to respond to the growing challenge of child poverty and social exclusion;

    25. Is concerned about national policies that create gaps in health coverage, increasing inequalities both within and between Member States, such as privatisation of public healthcare systems, co-payments and lack of coverage; highlights that these deepen poverty, erode health and well-being, and increase social inequalities within and across EU countries; warns that this also undermines the implementation of principle 16 of the EPSR and of SDG 3.8 on universal health coverage, as well as the EPSR’s overall objective of promoting upward social convergence in the EU, leaving no one behind; believes that the indicators used in the Social Scoreboard do not provide a comprehensive understanding of healthcare affordability;

    26. Underlines that employers need to foster intergenerational links within companies and intergenerational learning between younger and older workers, and vice versa; underlines that an ageing workforce can help a business develop new products and services to adapt to the needs of an ageing society in a more creative and productive way; calls, furthermore, for the creation of incentives to encourage volunteering and mentoring to induce the transfer of knowledge between generations;

    27. Warns that, according to European Central Bank reports, real wages are still below their pre-pandemic level, while productivity was roughly the same; agrees that this creates some room for a non-inflationary recovery in real wages and warns that if real wages do not recover, this would increase the risk of protracted economic weakness, which could cause scarring effects and would further dent productivity in the euro area relative to other parts of the world; believes that better enforcement of minimum wages and strengthening collective bargaining coverage can have a beneficial effect on levels of wage inequality, especially by helping more vulnerable workers at the bottom of the wage distribution who are increasingly left out;

    28. Calls for the Member States to ensure decent working conditions, comprising among other things decent wages, access to social protection, lifelong learning opportunities, occupational health and safety, a good work-life balance and the right to disconnect, reasonable working time, workers’ representation, democracy at work and collective agreements; urges the Member States to foster democracy at work, social dialogue and collective bargaining and to protect workers’ rights, particularly in the context of the green and digital transitions, and to ensure equal pay for equal work by men and women, enhance pay transparency and address gender-based inequality to close the gender pay gap in the EU;

    29. Recalls the importance of improving access to social protection for the self-employed and calls on the Commission to monitor the Member States’ national plans for the implementation of the Council Recommendation of 8 November 2019 on access to social protection for workers and the self-employed[19] as part of the country-specific recommendations; recalls, in this regard, as the rate of self-employed professionals in the cultural and creative sectors is more than double that in the general population, the 13 initiatives laid down in the Commission’s 21 February 2024 response to the European Parliament resolution of 21 November 2023 on an EU framework for the social and professional situation of artists and workers in the cultural and creative sectors[20] and calls on the Commission to start implementing them in cooperation with the Member States;

    30. Stresses that the role of social dialogue and social partners should be systematically integrated into the design and implementation of employment and social policies, ensuring the involvement of social partners at all levels;

    31. Calls for the implementation of policies that promote work-life balance and the right to disconnect, with the aim of improving the quality of life for all families and workers, for ensuring the implementation of the Work-Life Balance Directive[21] and of the European Care Strategy; calls on the Commission to put forward a legislative proposal to address teleworking and the right to disconnect; as well as a proposal for the creation of a European card for all types of large families and a European action plan for single parents, offering educational and social advantages; calls, ultimately, for initiatives to combat workforce exclusion as a consequence of longer periods of sick leave, to adapt the workplace and to promote flexible working conditions and to develop strategies to support workers’ return after longer periods of absence;

    32. Calls for demographic challenges to be prioritised in the EU’s cohesion policy and for concrete action at EU and national levels; calls on the Commission to prioritise the development of the Commission communication on harnessing talent in Europe’s regions and the ‘Talent Booster Mechanism’ in order to promote social cohesion and to step up funding for rural and outermost areas and regions with a high rate of depopulation, supporting quality job creation, public services, local development projects and basic infrastructure that favour the population’s ‘right to stay’, especially in the case of young people; highlights the importance of introducing specific measures to address regional inequalities in education and training, ensuring equal access to high-quality and affordable education for all;

    33. Is concerned that, despite improvements, several population groups are still significantly under-represented in the EU labour market, including women, older people, low- and medium-qualified people, persons with disabilities and people with a migrant or minority background; warns that  educational inequalities have deepened, further exacerbating the vulnerabilities of students from disadvantaged and migrant backgrounds; points out that, according to the JER, people with migrant or minority backgrounds can significantly benefit from targeted measures in order to address skills mismatches, improve language proficiency, combat discrimination and receive tailored and integrated support services; stresses the importance of strengthening efforts in the implementation of the 2021-27 Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion, which provides a common policy framework to support the Member States in developing national migrant integration policies;

    34. Calls on the Commission and the Council to prioritise reducing administrative burdens with the aim of simplification while respecting labour and social standards; believes that better support for SMEs and actual and potential entrepreneurs will improve the EU’s competitiveness and long-term sustainability, boost innovation and create quality jobs; notes that SMEs and self-employed professionals in all sectors are essential for the EU’s economic growth and thus the financing of social policies; urges the implementation of specific recommendations to improve the single market; takes note of the Commission’s publication of the ‘Competitiveness Compass’ on 29 January 2025[22];

    35. Calls on the Commission to conduct competitiveness checks on every new legislative proposal, taking into account the overall impact of EU legislation on companies, as well as on other EU policies and programmes;

    36. Considers that the social economy is an essential component of the EU’s social market economy and a driver for the implementation of the EPSR and its targets, often providing employment to vulnerable and excluded groups; calls on the Commission and the Member States to strengthen their support for all social economy enterprises but especially non-profit ones, as highlighted in the Social Economy Action Plan 2021 and the Liège Roadmap for the Social Economy, in order to promote quality, decent, inclusive work and the circular economy, to encourage the Member States to facilitate access to funding and to enhance the visibility of social economy actors; calls for the Commission to explore innovative funding mechanisms to support the development of the social economy in Europe[23] and to foster a dynamic and inclusive business environment;

    37. Believes that, in this year of transition, with the implementation of the revised economic governance rules, the Member States should align fiscal responsibility with sustainable and inclusive growth and employment, notes that the involvement of social partners, including in the development of medium-term fiscal structural plans, should be enhanced to contribute to the goals of the new economic governance framework;

    38. Welcomes the fact that the national medium-term fiscal structural plans, under the new economic governance framework, have to include the reforms and investments responding to the main challenges identified in the context of the European Semester and also to ensure debt sustainability while investing strategically in the principles of the EPSR with the aim of fostering upward social convergence;

    39. Is concerned that compliance with the country-specific recommendations (CSRs) remains low; reiterates its call, therefore, for an effective implementation of CSRs by the Member States so as to promote healthcare and sustainable pension systems, in line with principles 15 and 16 of the EPSR, and long-term prosperity for all citizens, taking into account the vulnerability of those workers whose careers are segmented, intermittent and subject to labour transitions; insists that the Commission should reinforce its dialogues with the Member States on the implementation of existing recommendations and of the Employment Guidelines as well as on current or future policy action to address identified challenges;

    40. Welcomes the establishment of a framework to identify risks to social convergence within the European Semester, for which Parliament called strongly; recalls that under this framework, the Commission assesses risks to upward social convergence in Member States and monitors progress on the implementation of the EPSR on the basis of the Social Scoreboard and of the principles of the Social Convergence Framework; welcomes the fact that the 2025 JER delivers country-specific analysis based on the principles of the Social Convergence Framework; calls on the Commission to further develop innovative quantitative and qualitative analysis tools under this new Framework in order to make optimal use of it in the future cycles of the European Semester;

    41. Welcomes the fact that the first analysis based on the principles of the Social Convergence Framework points to upward convergence in the labour market in 2023[24]; notes with concern that employment outcomes of under-represented groups still need to improve and that risks to upward convergence persist at European level in relation to skills development, ranging from early education to lifelong learning, and the social outcomes of at-risk-of-poverty and social exclusion rates; calls on the Commission to further analyse these risks to upward social convergence in the second stage of the analysis and to discuss with the Member States concerned the measures undertaken or envisaged to address these risks;

    42. Recognises the cost of living crisis, which has increased the burden on households, and the rising cost of housing, which, in conjunction with high energy costs, is contributing to high levels of energy poverty across the EU; calls, therefore, on the Commission and Member States to comprehensively address the root causes of this crisis by prioritising policies that promote economic resilience, social cohesion, and sustainable development;

    43. Warns of the social risks stemming from the crisis in the automotive sector, which is facing unprecedented pressure from both external and internal factors; calls on the Commission to pay attention to this sector and enhance social dialogue and the participation of workers in transition processes; stresses the urgent need for a coordinated EU response via an emergency task force of trade unions and employers to respond to the current crisis;

    44. Calls on the Commission to monitor data on restructuring and its impact on employment, such as by using the European Restructuring Monitor, to facilitate measures in support of restructuring and labour market transitions, and to consider highlighting national measures supporting a socially responsible way of restructuring in the European Semester;

    45. Calls on the Commission to monitor the development of minimum wages in the Member States following the transposition of the Minimum Wage Directive to determine whether the goal of ‘adequacy’ of minimum wages is being achieved;

    46. Is concerned about the Commission’s revision of the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) Scoreboard, particularly the reduction in employment and social indicators, which are crucial for assessing the social and labour market situation in the Member States; regrets the fact that youth unemployment is no longer considered as a headline indicator, despite its relevance in identifying and addressing specific labour market challenges and in adopting adequate public policies; stresses that social standards indicators should be given greater consideration in the decision-making process; regrets the fact that the Commission did not duly consult Parliament and reminds the Commission of its obligation to closely cooperate with Parliament, the Council and social partners before drawing up the MIP scoreboard and the set of macroeconomic and macro-financial indicators for Member States; stresses that the implementation of the principles of the EPSR must be part of the MIP scoreboard;

    47. Considers that territorial and social cohesion are essential components of the competitiveness agenda, and legislation such as the European Instrument for Temporary Support to Mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency (SURE) remain a positive example to inspire future EU initiatives;

    48. Considers that the Commission and the Member States should ensure that fiscal policies under the European Semester support investments aligned with the EPSR, particularly in areas such as decent and affordable housing, quality healthcare, education, and social protection systems, as these are critical for social cohesion and long-term economic sustainability and to address the challenges identified through social indicators;

    49. Stresses the need to address key challenges identified in the Social Scoreboard as ‘critical’ and ‘to watch’, including children at risk of poverty or social exclusion, the gender employment gap, housing cost overburden, childcare, and long-term care the disability employment gap, the impact of social transfers on reducing poverty, and basic digital skills[25];

    50. Stresses the negative impacts that the cost of living crisis has had on persons with disabilities;

    51. Urges the Member States to consider robust policies that ensure fair wages and improve working conditions, particularly for low-income and precarious workers;

    52. Calls on the Member States to strengthen social safety nets to provide adequate support to those whose income from employment is insufficient to meet basic living costs;

    53. Stresses the need for timely and harmonised data on social policies to improve evidence-based policymaking and targeted social investments; calls for improvements to be made to the Social Scoreboard in order to cover the 20 EPSR principles with the introduction of relevant indicators reflecting trends and causes of inequality, such as quality employment, wealth distribution, access to public services, adequate pensions, the homelessness rate, mental health and unemployment; recalls that the at-risk-of-poverty-or-social-exclusion (AROPE) indicator fails to reveal the causes of complex inequality; calls on the Commission and the Member States to develop a European data collection framework on social services to monitor the investment in and coverage of social services;

    54. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Russian shadow fleet and the environmental risk for our European waters and coastal communities – need for more action against the shadow fleet in the 16th sanctions package – E-000628/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000628/2025
    to the Council
    Rule 144
    Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy (Renew)

    Over the past year, European ship owners have earned EUR 6 billion by selling old tankers to the Russian shadow fleet. Most of these tankers should have been taken out of operation, because they pose an environmental risk to European waters and European coastal communities. The Baltic countries are now discussing using environmental risk as a means to identify, enter and potentially seize these ships.

    • 1.Does the Council agree that, given the large amount of information that is publicly available about the shadow fleet and its illegal activities and strategies, companies could have suspected what their old oil tankers would be used for when they sold them?
    • 2.Is the Council prepared to sanction European companies who have knowingly sold old tankers to the shadow fleet?
    • 3.Does the Council agree that the next sanctions package against Russia should include a clause to prevent European companies from selling their old ships to any buyer who intends to use them transport to Russian oil, i.e. that this should become a contractual obligation between buyer and seller?

    Submitted: 11.2.2025

    Last updated: 27 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Meeting of 29-30 January 2025

    Source: European Central Bank

    Account of the monetary policy meeting of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank held in Frankfurt am Main on Wednesday and Thursday, 29-30 January 2025

    27 February 2025

    1. Review of financial, economic and monetary developments and policy options

    Financial market developments

    Ms Schnabel noted that the financial market developments observed in the euro area after October 2024 had reversed since the Governing Council’s previous monetary policy meeting on 11-12 December 2024. The US presidential election in November had initially led to lower euro area bond yields and equity prices. Since the December monetary policy meeting, however, both risk-free yields and risk asset prices had moved substantially higher and had more than made up their previous declines. A less gloomy domestic macroeconomic outlook and an increase in the market’s outlook for inflation in the euro area on the back of higher energy prices had led investors to expect the ECB to proceed with a more gradual rate easing path.

    A bounce-back of euro area risk appetite had supported equity and corporate bond prices and had contained sovereign bond spreads. While the euro had also rebounded recently against the US dollar, it remained significantly weaker than before the US election.

    In euro money markets the year-end had been smooth. Money market conditions at the turn of the year had turned out to be more benign than anticipated, with a decline in repo rates and counterparties taking only limited recourse to the ECB’s standard refinancing operations.

    In the run-up to the US election and in its immediate aftermath, ten-year overnight index swap (OIS) rates in the euro area and the United States had decoupled, reflecting expectations of increasing macroeconomic divergence. However, since the Governing Council’s December monetary policy meeting, long-term interest rates had increased markedly in both the euro area and the United States. An assessment of the drivers of euro area long-term rates showed that both domestic and US factors had pushed yields up. But domestic factors – expected tighter ECB policy and a less gloomy euro area macroeconomic outlook – had mattered even more than US spillovers. These factors included a reduction in perceived downside risks to economic growth from tariffs and a stronger than anticipated January flash euro area Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI).

    Taking a longer-term perspective on ten-year rates, since October 2022, when inflation had peaked at 10.6% and policy rates had just returned to positive territory, nominal OIS rates and their real counterparts had been broadly trending sideways. From that perspective, the recent uptick was modest and could be seen as a mean reversion to the new normal.

    A decomposition of the change in ten-year OIS rates since the start of 2022 showed that the dominant driver of persistently higher long-term yields compared with the “low-for-long” interest rate and inflation period had been the sharp rise in real rate expectations. A second major driver had been an increase in real term premia in the context of quantitative tightening. This increase had occurred mainly in 2022. Since 2023, real term premia had broadly trended sideways albeit with some volatility. Hence, the actual reduction of the ECB’s balance sheet had elicited only mild upward pressure on term premia. From a historical perspective, despite their recent increase, term premia in the euro area remained compressed compared with the pre-quantitative easing period.

    Since the December meeting, investors had revised up their expectations for HICP inflation (excluding tobacco) for 2025. Current inflation fixings (swap contracts linked to specific monthly releases in year-on-year euro area HICP inflation excluding tobacco) for this year stood above the 2% target. Higher energy prices had been a key driver of the reassessment of near-term inflation expectations. Evidence from option prices, calculated under the assumption of risk neutrality, suggested that the risk to inflation in financial markets had become broadly balanced, with the indicators across maturities having shifted discernibly upwards. Recent survey evidence suggested that risks of inflation overshooting the ECB’s target of 2% had resurfaced. Respondents generally saw a bigger risk of an inflation overshoot than of an inflation undershoot.

    The combination of a less gloomy macroeconomic outlook and stronger price pressures had led markets to reassess the ECB’s expected monetary policy path. Market pricing suggested expectations of a more gradual easing cycle with a higher terminal rate, pricing out the probability of a cut larger than 25 basis points at any of the next meetings. Overall, the size of expected cuts to the deposit facility rate in 2025 had dropped by around 40 basis points, with the end-year rate currently seen at 2.08%. Market expectations for 2025 stood above median expectations in the Survey of Monetary Analysts. Survey participants continued to expect a faster easing cycle, with cuts of 25 basis points at each of the Governing Council’s next four monetary policy meetings.

    The Federal Funds futures curve had continued to shift upwards, with markets currently expecting between one and two 25 basis point cuts by the end of 2025. The repricing of front-end yields since the Governing Council’s December meeting had been stronger in the euro area than in the United States. This would typically also be reflected in foreign exchange markets. However, the EUR/USD exchange rate had recently decoupled from interest rates, as the euro had initially continued to depreciate despite a narrowing interest rate differential, before recovering more recently. US dollar currency pairs had been affected by the US Administration’s comments, which had put upward pressure on the US dollar relative to trading partners’ currencies.

    Euro area equity markets had outperformed their US counterparts in recent weeks. A model decomposition using a standard dividend discount model for the euro area showed that rising risk-free yields had weighed significantly on euro area equity prices. However, this had been more than offset by higher dividends, and especially a compression of the risk premium, indicating improved investor risk sentiment towards the euro area, as also reflected in other risk asset prices. Corporate bond spreads had fallen across market segments, including high-yield bonds. Sovereign spreads relative to the ten-year German Bund had remained broadly stable or had even declined slightly. Relative to OIS rates, the spreads had also remained broadly stable. The Bund-OIS spread had returned to levels observed before the Eurosystem had started large-scale asset purchases in 2015, suggesting that the scarcity premium in the German government bond market had, by and large, normalised.

    Standard financial condition indices for the euro area had remained broadly stable since the December meeting. The easing impulse from higher equity prices had counterbalanced the tightening impulse stemming from higher short and long-term rates. In spite of the bounce-back in euro area real risk-free interest rates, the yield curve remained broadly within neutral territory.

    The global environment and economic and monetary developments in the euro area

    Starting with inflation in the euro area, Mr Lane noted that headline inflation, as expected, had increased to 2.4% in December, up from 2.2% in November. The increase primarily reflected a rise in energy inflation from -2.0% in November to 0.1% in December, due mainly to upward base effects. Food inflation had edged down to 2.6%. Core inflation was unchanged at 2.7% in December, with a slight decline in goods inflation, which had eased to 0.5%, offset by services inflation rising marginally to 4.0%.

    Developments in most indicators of underlying inflation had been consistent with a sustained return of inflation to the medium-term inflation target. The Persistent and Common Component of Inflation (PCCI), which had the best predictive power of any underlying inflation indicator for future headline inflation, had continued to hover around 2% in December, indicating that headline inflation was set to stabilise around the ECB’s inflation target. Domestic inflation, which closely tracked services inflation, stood at 4.2%, staying well above all the other indicators in December. However, the PCCI for services, which should act as an attractor for services and domestic inflation, had fallen to 2.3%.

    The anticipation of a downward shift in services inflation in the coming months also related to an expected deceleration in wage growth this year. Wages had been adjusting to the past inflation surge with a substantial delay, but the ECB wage tracker and the latest surveys pointed to moderation in wage pressures. According to the latest results of the Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises, firms expected wages to grow by 3.3% on average over the next 12 months, down from 3.5% in the previous survey round and 4.5% in the equivalent survey this time last year. This assessment was shared broadly across the forecasting community. Consensus Economics, for example, foresaw a decline in wage growth of about 1 percentage point between 2024 and 2025.

    Most measures of longer-term inflation expectations continued to stand at around 2%, despite an uptick over shorter horizons. Although, according to the Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises, the inflation expectations of firms had stabilised at 3% across horizons, the expectations of larger firms that were aware of the ECB’s inflation target showed convergence towards 2%. Consumer inflation expectations had edged up recently, especially for the near term. This could be explained at least partly by their higher sensitivity to actual inflation. There had also been an uptick in the near-term inflation expectations of professionals – as captured by the latest vintages of the Survey of Professional Forecasters and the Survey of Monetary Analysts, as well as market-based measures of inflation compensation. Over longer horizons, though, the inflation expectations of professional forecasters remained stable at levels consistent with the medium-term target of 2%.

    Headline inflation should fluctuate around its current level in the near term and then settle sustainably around the target. Easing labour cost pressures and the continuing impact of past monetary policy tightening should support the convergence to the inflation target.

    Turning to the international environment, global economic activity had remained robust around the turn of the year. The global composite PMI had held steady at 53.0 in the fourth quarter of 2024, owing mainly to the continued strength in the services sector that had counterbalanced weak manufacturing activity.

    Since the Governing Council’s previous meeting, the euro had remained broadly stable in nominal effective terms (+0.5%) and against the US dollar (+0.2%). Oil prices had seen a lot of volatility, but the latest price, at USD 78 per barrel, was only around 3½% above the spot oil price at the cut-off date for the December Eurosystem staff projections and 2.6% above the spot price at the time of the last meeting. With respect to gas prices, the spot price stood at €48 per MWh, 2.7% above the level at the cut-off date for the December projections and 6.8% higher than at the time of the last meeting.

    Following a comparatively robust third quarter, euro area GDP growth had likely moderated again in the last quarter of 2024 – confirmed by Eurostat’s preliminary flash estimate released on 30 January at 11:00 CET, with a growth rate of 0% for that quarter, later revised to 0.1%. Based on currently available information, private consumption growth had probably slowed in the fourth quarter amid subdued consumer confidence and heightened uncertainty. Housing investment had not yet picked up and there were no signs of an imminent expansion in business investment. Across sectors, industrial activity had been weak in the summer and had softened further in the last few months of 2024, with average industrial production excluding construction in October and November standing 0.4% below its third quarter level. The persistent weakness in manufacturing partly reflected structural factors, such as sectoral trends, losses in competitiveness and relatively high energy prices. However, manufacturing firms were also especially exposed to heightened uncertainty about global trade policies, regulatory costs and tight financing conditions. Service production had grown in the third quarter, but the expansion had likely moderated in the fourth quarter.

    The labour market was robust, with the unemployment rate falling to a historical low of 6.3% in November – with the figure for December (6.3%) and a revised figure for November (6.2%) released later on the morning of 30 January. However, survey evidence and model estimates suggested that euro area employment growth had probably softened in the fourth quarter.

    The fiscal stance for the euro area was now expected to be balanced in 2025, as opposed to the slight tightening foreseen in the December projections. Nevertheless, the current outlook for the fiscal stance was subject to considerable uncertainty.

    The euro area economy was set to remain subdued in the near term. The flash composite output PMI for January had ticked up to 50.2 driven by an improvement in manufacturing output, as the rate of contraction had eased compared with December. The January release had been 1.7 points above the average for the fourth quarter, but it still meant that the manufacturing sector had been in contractionary territory for nearly two years. The services business activity index had decelerated slightly to 51.4 in January, staying above the average of 50.9 in the fourth quarter of 2024 but still below the figure of 52.1 for the third quarter.

    Even with a subdued near-term outlook, the conditions for a recovery remained in place. Higher incomes should allow spending to rise. More affordable credit should also boost consumption and investment over time. And if trade tensions did not escalate, exports should also support the recovery as global demand rose.

    Turning to the monetary and financial analysis, bond yields, in both the euro area and globally, had increased significantly since the last meeting. At the same time, the ECB’s past interest rate cuts were gradually making it less expensive for firms and households to borrow. Lending rates on bank loans to firms and households for new business had continued to decline in November. In the same period, the cost of borrowing for firms had decreased by 15 basis points to 4.52% and stood 76 basis points below the cyclical peak observed in October 2023. The cost of issuing market-based debt had remained at 3.6% in November 2024. Mortgage rates had fallen by 8 basis points to 3.47% since October, 56 basis points lower than their peak in November 2023. However, the interest rates on existing corporate and household loan books remained high.

    Financing conditions remained tight. Although credit was expanding, lending to firms and households was subdued relative to historical averages. Annual growth in bank lending to firms had risen to 1.5% in December, up from 1% in November, as a result of strong monthly flows. But it remained well below the 4.3% historical average since January 1999. By contrast, growth in corporate debt securities issuance had moderated to 3.2% in annual terms, from 3.6% in November. This suggested that firms had substituted market-based long-term financing for bank-based borrowing amid tightening market conditions and in advance of increasing redemptions of long-term corporate bonds. Mortgage lending had continued to rise gradually but remained muted overall, with an annual growth rate of 1.1% in December after 0.9% in November. This was markedly below the long-term average of 5.1%.

    According to the latest euro area bank lending survey, the demand for loans by firms had increased slightly in the last quarter. At the same time, credit standards for loans to firms had tightened again, having broadly stabilised over the previous four quarters. This renewed tightening of credit standards for firms had been motivated by banks seeing higher risks to the economic outlook and their lower tolerance for taking on credit risk. This finding was consistent with the results of the Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises, in which firms had reported a small decline in the availability of bank loans and tougher non-rate lending conditions. Turning to households, the demand for mortgages had increased strongly as interest rates became more attractive and prospects for the property market improved. Credit standards for housing loans remained unchanged overall.

    Monetary policy considerations and policy options

    In summary, the disinflation process remained well on track. Inflation had continued to develop broadly in line with the staff projections and was set to return to the 2% medium-term target in the course of 2025. Most measures of underlying inflation suggested that inflation would settle around the target on a sustained basis. Domestic inflation remained high, mostly because wages and prices in certain sectors were still adjusting to the past inflation surge with a substantial delay. However, wage growth was expected to moderate and lower profit margins were partially buffering the impact of higher wage costs on inflation. The ECB’s recent interest rate cuts were gradually making new borrowing less expensive for firms and households. At the same time, financing conditions continued to be tight, also because monetary policy remained restrictive and past interest rate hikes were still being transmitted to the stock of credit, with some maturing loans being rolled over at higher rates. The economy was still facing headwinds, but rising real incomes and the gradually fading effects of restrictive monetary policy should support a pick-up in demand over time.

    Concerning the monetary policy decision at this meeting, it was proposed to lower the three key ECB interest rates by 25 basis points. In particular, lowering the deposit facility rate – the rate through which the ECB steered the monetary policy stance – was justified by the updated assessment of the inflation outlook, the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission. The alternative – maintaining the deposit facility rate at the current level of 3.00% – would excessively dampen demand and therefore be inconsistent with the set of rate paths that best ensured inflation stabilised sustainably at the 2% medium-term target.

    Looking to the future, it was prudent to maintain agility, so as to be able to adjust the stance as appropriate on a meeting-by-meeting basis, and not to pre-commit to any particular rate path. In particular, monetary easing might proceed more slowly in the event of upside shocks to the inflation outlook and/or to economic momentum. Equally, in the event of downside shocks to the inflation outlook and/or to economic momentum, monetary easing might proceed more quickly.

    2. Governing Council’s discussion and monetary policy decisions

    Economic, monetary and financial analyses

    As regards the external environment, incoming data since the Governing Council’s previous monetary policy meeting had signalled robust global activity in the fourth quarter of 2024, with divergent paths across economies and an uncertain outlook for global trade. The euro had been broadly stable and energy commodity prices had increased. It was underlined that gas prices were currently over 60% higher than in 2024 because the average temperature during the previous winter had been very mild, whereas this winter was turning out to be considerably colder. This suggested that demand for gas would remain strong, as reserves needed to be replenished ahead of the next heating season, keeping gas prices high for the remainder of the year. In other commodity markets, metal prices were stable – subdued by weak activity in China and the potential negative impact of US tariffs – while food prices had increased.

    Members concurred that the outlook for the international economy remained highly uncertain. The United States was the only advanced economy that was showing sustained growth dynamics. Global trade might be hit hard if the new US Administration were to implement the measures it had announced. The challenges faced by the Chinese economy also remained visible in prices. Chinese inflation had declined further on the back of weak domestic demand. In this context, it was pointed out that, no matter how severe the new US trade measures turned out to be, the euro area would be affected either indirectly by disinflationary pressures or directly, in the event of retaliation, by higher inflation. In particular, if China were to redirect trade away from the United States and towards the euro area, this would make it easier to achieve lower inflation in the euro area but would have a negative impact on domestic activity, owing to greater international competition.

    With regard to economic activity in the euro area, it was widely recognised that incoming data since the last Governing Council meeting had been limited and, ahead of Eurostat’s indicator of GDP for the fourth quarter of 2024, had not brought any major surprises. Accordingly, it was argued that the December staff projections remained the most likely scenario, with the downside risks to growth that had been identified not yet materialising. The euro area economy had seen some encouraging signs in the January flash PMIs, although it had to be recognised that, in these uncertain times, hard data seemed more important than survey results. The outcome for the third quarter had surprised on the upside, showing tentative signs of a pick-up in consumption. Indications from the few national data already available for the fourth quarter pointed to a positive contribution from consumption. Despite all the prevailing uncertainties, it was still seen as plausible that, within a few quarters, there would be a consumption-driven recovery, with inflation back at target, policy rates broadly at neutral levels and continued full employment. Moreover, the latest information on credit flows and lending rates suggested that the gradual removal of monetary restrictiveness was already being transmitted to the economy, although the past tightening measures were still exerting lagged effects.

    The view was also expressed that the economic outlook in the December staff projections had likely been too optimistic and that there were signs of downside risks materialising. The ECB’s mechanical estimates pointed to very weak growth around the turn of the year and, compared with other institutions, the Eurosystem’s December staff projections had been among the most optimistic. Attention was drawn to the dichotomy between the performance of the two largest euro area economies and that of the rest of the euro area, which was largely due to country-specific factors.

    Recent forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters, the Survey of Monetary Analysts and the International Monetary Fund once again suggested a downward revision of euro area economic growth for 2025 and 2026. Given this trend of downward revisions, doubts were expressed about the narrative of a consumption-driven economic recovery in 2025. Moreover, the December staff projections had not directly included the economic impact of possible US tariffs in the baseline, so it was hard to be optimistic about the economic outlook. The outlook for domestic demand had deteriorated, as consumer confidence remained weak and investment was not showing any convincing signs of a pick-up. The contribution from foreign demand, which had been the main driver of growth over the past two years, had also been declining since last spring. Moreover, uncertainty about potential tariffs to be imposed by the new US Administration was weighing further on the outlook. In the meantime, labour demand was losing momentum. The slowdown in economic activity had started to affect temporary employment: these jobs were always the first to disappear as the labour market weakened. At the same time, while the labour market had softened over recent months, it continued to be robust, with the unemployment rate staying low, at 6.3% in December. A solid job market and higher incomes should strengthen consumer confidence and allow spending to rise.

    There continued to be a strong dichotomy between a more dynamic services sector and a weak manufacturing sector. The services sector had remained robust thus far, with the PMI in expansionary territory and firms reporting solid demand. The extent to which the weakness in manufacturing was structural or cyclical was still open to debate, but there was a growing consensus that there was a large structural element, as high energy costs and strict regulation weighed on firms’ competitiveness. This was also reflected in weak export demand, despite the robust growth in global trade. All these factors also had an adverse impact on business investment in the industrial sector. This was seen as important to monitor, as a sustainable economic recovery also depended on a recovery in investment, especially in light of the vast longer-term investment needs of the euro area. Labour markets showed a dichotomy similar to the one observed in the economy more generally. While companies in the manufacturing sector were starting to lay off workers, employment in the services sector was growing. At the same time, concerns were expressed about the number of new vacancies, which had continued to fall. This two-speed economy, with manufacturing struggling and services resilient, was seen as indicating only weak growth ahead, especially in conjunction with the impending geopolitical tensions.

    Against this background, geopolitical and trade policy uncertainty was likely to continue to weigh on the euro area economy and was not expected to recede anytime soon. The point was made that if uncertainty were to remain high for a prolonged period, this would be very different from a shorter spell of uncertainty – and even more detrimental to investment. Therefore the economic recovery was unlikely to receive much support from investment for some time. Indeed, excluding Ireland, euro area business investment had been contracting recently and there were no signs of a turnaround. This would limit investment in physical and human capital further, dragging down potential output in the medium term. However, reference was also made to evidence from psychological studies, which suggested that the impact of higher uncertainty might diminish over time as agents’ perceptions and behaviour adapted.

    In this context, a remark was made on the importance of monetary and fiscal policies for enabling the economy to return to its previous growth path. Economic policies were meant to stabilise the economy and this stabilisation sometimes required a long time. After the pandemic, many economic indicators had returned to their pre-crisis levels, but this had not yet implied a return to pre-crisis growth paths, even though the output gap had closed in the meantime. A question was raised on bankruptcies, which were increasing in the euro area. To the extent that production capacity was being destroyed, the output gap might be closing because potential output growth was declining, and not because actual growth was increasing. However, it was also noted that bankruptcies were rising from an exceptionally low level and developments remained in line with historical regularities.

    Members reiterated that fiscal and structural policies should make the economy more productive, competitive and resilient. They welcomed the European Commission’s Competitiveness Compass, which provided a concrete roadmap for action. It was seen as crucial to follow up, with further concrete and ambitious structural policies, on Mario Draghi’s proposals for enhancing European competitiveness and on Enrico Letta’s proposals for empowering the Single Market. Governments should implement their commitments under the EU’s economic governance framework fully and without delay. This would help bring down budget deficits and debt ratios on a sustained basis, while prioritising growth-enhancing reforms and investment.

    Against this background, members assessed that the risks to economic growth remained tilted to the downside. Greater friction in global trade could weigh on euro area growth by dampening exports and weakening the global economy. Lower confidence could prevent consumption and investment from recovering as fast as expected. This could be amplified by geopolitical risks, such as Russia’s unjustified war against Ukraine and the tragic conflict in the Middle East, which could disrupt energy supplies and further weigh on global trade. Growth could also be lower if the lagged effects of monetary policy tightening lasted longer than expected. It could be higher if easier financing conditions and falling inflation allowed domestic consumption and investment to rebound faster.

    On price developments, members concurred with Mr Lane’s assessment that the incoming data confirmed disinflation was on track and that a return to the target in the course of 2025 was within reach. On the nominal side, there had been no major data surprises since the December Governing Council meeting and inflation expectations remained well anchored. Recent inflation data had been slightly below the December staff projections, but energy prices were on the rise. These two elements by and large offset one another. The inflation baseline from the December staff projections was therefore still a realistic scenario, indicating that inflation was on track to converge towards target in the course of 2025. Nevertheless, it was recalled that, for 2027, the contribution from the new Emissions Trading System (ETS2) assumptions was mechanically pushing the Eurosystem staff inflation projections above 2%. Furthermore, the market fixings for longer horizons suggested that there was a risk of undershooting the inflation target in 2026 and 2027. It was remarked that further downside revisions to the economic outlook would tend to imply a negative impact on the inflation outlook and an undershooting of inflation could not be ruled out.

    At the same time, the view was expressed that the risks to the December inflation projections were now tilted to the upside, so that the return to the 2% inflation target might take longer than previously expected. Although it was acknowledged that the momentum in services inflation had eased in recent months, the outlook for inflation remained heavily dependent on the evolution of services inflation, which accounted for around 75% of headline inflation. Services inflation was therefore widely seen as the key inflation component to monitor during the coming months. Services inflation had been stuck at roughly 4% for more than a year, while core inflation had also proven sluggish after an initial decline, remaining at around 2.7% for nearly a year. This raised the question as to where core inflation would eventually settle: in the past, services inflation and core inflation had typically been closely connected. It was also highlighted that, somewhat worryingly, the inflation rate for “early movers” in services had been trending up since its trough in April 2024 and was now standing well above the “followers” and the “late movers” at around 4.6%. This partly called into question the narrative behind the expected deceleration in services inflation. Moreover, the January flash PMI suggested that non-labour input costs, including energy and shipping costs, had increased significantly. The increase in the services sector had been particularly sharp, which was reflected in rising PMI selling prices for services – probably also fuelled by the tight labour market. As labour hoarding was a more widespread phenomenon in manufacturing, this implied that a potential pick-up in demand and the associated cyclical recovery in labour productivity would not necessarily dampen unit labour costs in the services sector to the same extent as in manufacturing.

    One main driver of the stickiness in services inflation was wage growth. Although wage growth was expected to decelerate in 2025, it would still stand at 4.5% in the second quarter of 2025 according to the ECB wage tracker. The pass-through of wages tended to be particularly strong in the services sector and occurred over an extended period of time, suggesting that the deceleration in wages might take some time to be reflected in lower services inflation. The forward-looking wage tracker was seen as fairly reliable, as it was based on existing contracts, whereas focusing too much on lagging wage data posed the risk of monetary policy falling behind the curve. This was particularly likely if negative growth risks eventually affected the labour market. Furthermore, a question was raised as to the potential implications for wage pressures of more restrictive labour migration policies.

    Overall, looking ahead there seemed reasons to believe that both services inflation and wage growth would slow down in line with the baseline scenario in the December staff projections. From the current quarter onwards, services inflation was expected to decline. However, in the early months of the year a number of services were set to be repriced, for instance in the insurance and tourism sectors, and there were many uncertainties surrounding this repricing. It was therefore seen as important to wait until March, when two more inflation releases and the new projections would be available, to reassess the inflation baseline as contained in the December staff projections.

    As regards longer-term inflation expectations, members took note of the latest developments in market-based measures of inflation compensation and survey-based indicators. The December Consumer Expectations Survey showed another increase in near-term inflation expectations, with inflation expectations 12 months ahead having already gradually picked up from 2.4% in September to 2.8% in December. Density-based expectations were even higher at 3%, with risks tilted to the upside. According to the Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises, firms’ median inflation expectations had also risen to 3%. However it was regarded as important to focus more on the change in inflation expectations than on the level of expectations when interpreting these surveys.

    As regards risks to the inflation outlook, with respect to the market-based measures, the view was expressed that there had been a shift in the balance of risks, pointing to upside risks to the December inflation outlook. In financial markets, inflation fixings for 2025 had shifted above the December short-term projections and inflation expectations had picked up across all tenors. In market surveys, risks of overshooting had resurfaced, with a larger share of respondents in the surveys seeing risks of an overshooting in 2025. Moreover, it was argued that tariffs, their implications for the exchange rate, and energy and food prices posed upside risks to inflation.

    Against this background, members considered that inflation could turn out higher if wages or profits increased by more than expected. Upside risks to inflation also stemmed from the heightened geopolitical tensions, which could push energy prices and freight costs higher in the near term and disrupt global trade. Moreover, extreme weather events, and the unfolding climate crisis more broadly, could drive up food prices by more than expected. By contrast, inflation might surprise on the downside if low confidence and concerns about geopolitical events prevented consumption and investment from recovering as fast as expected, if monetary policy dampened demand by more than expected, or if the economic environment in the rest of the world worsened unexpectedly. Greater friction in global trade would make the euro area inflation outlook more uncertain.

    Turning to the monetary and financial analysis, members broadly agreed with the assessment presented by Ms Schnabel and Mr Lane. It was noted that market interest rates in the euro area had risen since the Governing Council’s December monetary policy meeting, partly mirroring higher rates in global financial markets. Overall, financial conditions had been broadly stable, with higher short and long-term interest rates being counterbalanced by strong risk asset markets and a somewhat weaker exchange rate.

    Long-term interest rates had been rising more substantially than short-term ones, resulting in a steepening of the yield curve globally since last autumn. At the same time, it was underlined that the recent rise in long-term bond yields did not appear to be particularly striking when looking at developments over a longer time period. Over the past two years long-term rates had remained remarkably stable, especially when taking into account the pronounced variation in policy rates.

    The dynamics of market rates since the December Governing Council meeting had been similar on both sides of the Atlantic. This reflected higher term premia as well as a repricing of rate expectations. However, the relative contributions of the underlying drivers differed. In the United States, one factor driving up market interest rates had been an increase in inflation expectations, combined with the persistent strength of the US economy as well as concerns over prospects of higher budget deficits. This had led markets to price out some of the rate cuts that had been factored into the rate expectations prevailing before the Federal Open Market Committee meeting in December 2024. Uncertainty regarding the policies implemented by the new US Administration had also contributed to the sell-off in US government bonds. In Europe, term premia accounted for a significant part of the increase in long-term rates, which could be explained by a combination of factors. These included spillovers from the United States, concerns over the outlook for fiscal policy, and domestic and global policy uncertainty more broadly. Attention was also drawn to the potential impact of tighter monetary policy in Japan, the world’s largest creditor nation, with Japanese investors likely to start shifting their funds away from overseas investments towards domestic bond markets in response to rising yields.

    The passive reduction in the Eurosystem’s balance sheet, as maturing bonds were no longer reinvested, was also seen as exerting gradual upward pressure on term premia over longer horizons, although this had not been playing a significant role – especially not in developments since the last meeting. The reduction had been indicated well in advance and had already been priced in, to a significant extent, at the time the phasing out of reinvestment had been announced. The residual Eurosystem portfolios were still seen to be exerting substantial downside pressure on longer-term sovereign yields as compared with a situation in which asset holdings were absent. It was underlined that, while declining central bank holdings did affect financial conditions, quantitative tightening was operating gradually and smoothly in the background.

    In the context of the discussion on long-term yields, attention was drawn to the possibility that rising yields might also lead to financial stability risks, especially in view of the high level of valuations and leverage in the world economy. A further financial stability risk related to the prospect of a more deregulated financial system in the United States, including in the realm of crypto-assets. This could allow risks to build up in the years to come and sow the seeds of a future financial crisis.

    Turning to financing conditions, past interest rate cuts were gradually making it less expensive for firms and households to borrow. For new business, rates on bank loans to firms and households had continued to decline in November. However, the interest rates on existing loans remained high, and financing conditions remained tight.

    Although credit was expanding, lending to firms and households was subdued relative to historical averages. Growth in bank lending to firms had risen to 1.5% in December in annual terms, up from 1.0% in November. Mortgage lending had continued to rise gradually but remained muted overall, with an annual growth rate of 1.1% in December following 0.9% in November. Nevertheless, the increasing pace of loan growth was encouraging and suggested monetary easing was starting to be transmitted through the bank lending channel. Some comfort could also be taken from the lack of evidence of any negative impact on bank lending conditions from the decline in excess liquidity in the banking system.

    The bank lending survey was providing mixed signals, however. Credit standards for mortgages had been broadly unchanged in the fourth quarter, after easing for a while, and banks expected to tighten them in the next quarter. Banks had reported the third strongest increase in demand for mortgages since the start of the survey in 2003, driven primarily by more attractive interest rates. This indicated a turnaround in the housing market as property prices picked up. At the same time, credit standards for consumer credit had tightened in the fourth quarter, with standards for firms also tightening unexpectedly. The tightening had largely been driven by heightened perceptions of economic risk and reduced risk tolerance among banks.

    Caution was advised on overinterpreting the tightening in credit standards for firms reported in the latest bank lending survey. The vast majority of banks had reported unchanged credit standards, with only a small share tightening standards somewhat and an even smaller share easing them slightly. However, it was recalled that the survey methodology for calculating net percentages, which typically involved subtracting a small percentage of easing banks from a small percentage of tightening banks, was an established feature of the survey. Also, that methodology had not detracted from the good predictive power of the net percentage statistic for future lending developments. Moreover, the information from the bank lending survey had also been corroborated by the Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises, which had pointed to a slight decrease in the availability of funds to firms. The latter survey was now carried out at a quarterly frequency and provided an important cross-check, based on the perspective of firms, of the information received from banks.

    Turning to the demand for loans by firms, although the bank lending survey had shown a slight increase in the fourth quarter it had remained weak overall, in line with subdued investment. It was remarked that the limited increase in firms’ demand for loans might mean they were expecting rates to be cut further and were waiting to borrow at lower rates. This suggested that the transmission of policy rate cuts was likely to be stronger as the end of the rate-cutting cycle approached. At the same time, it was argued that demand for loans to euro area firms was mainly being held back by economic and geopolitical uncertainty rather than the level of interest rates.

    Monetary policy stance and policy considerations

    Turning to the monetary policy stance, members assessed the data that had become available since the last monetary policy meeting in accordance with the three main elements the Governing Council had communicated in 2023 as shaping its reaction function. These comprised (i) the implications of the incoming economic and financial data for the inflation outlook, (ii) the dynamics of underlying inflation, and (iii) the strength of monetary policy transmission.

    Starting with the inflation outlook, members widely agreed that the incoming data were broadly in line with the medium-term inflation trajectory embedded in the December staff projections. Inflation had been slightly lower than expected in both November and December. The outlook remained heavily dependent on the evolution of services inflation, which had remained close to 4% for more than a year. However, the momentum of services inflation had eased in recent months and a further decrease in wage pressures was anticipated, especially in the second half of 2025. Oil and gas prices had been higher than embodied in the December projections and needed to be closely monitored, but up to now they did not suggest a major change to the baseline in the staff projections.

    Risks to the inflation outlook were seen as two-sided: upside risks were posed by the outlook for energy and food prices, a stronger US dollar and the still sticky services inflation, while a downside risk related to the possibility of growth being lower than expected. There was considerable uncertainty about the effect of possible US tariffs, but the estimated impact on euro area inflation was small and its sign was ambiguous, whereas the implications for economic growth were clearly negative. Further uncertainty stemmed from the possible downside pressures emanating from falling Chinese export prices.

    There was some evidence suggesting a shift in the balance of risks to the upside since December, as reflected, for example, in market surveys showing that the risk of inflation overshooting the target outweighed the risk of an undershooting. Although some of the survey-based inflation expectations as well as market-derived inflation compensation had been revised up slightly, members took comfort from the fact that longer-term measures of inflation expectations remained well anchored at 2%.

    Turning to underlying inflation, members concurred that developments in most measures of underlying inflation suggested that inflation would settle at around the target on a sustained basis. Core inflation had been sticky at around 2.7% for nearly a year but had also turned out lower than projected. A number of measures continued to show a certain degree of persistence, with domestic inflation remaining high and exclusion-based measures proving sticky at levels above 2%. In addition, the translation of wage moderation into a slower rise in domestic prices and unit labour costs was subject to lags and predicated on profit margins continuing their buffering role as well as a cyclical rebound in labour productivity. However, a main cause of stickiness in domestic inflation was services inflation, which was strongly influenced by wage growth, and this was expected to decelerate in the course of 2025.

    As regards the transmission of monetary policy, recent credit dynamics showed that monetary policy transmission was working. Both the past tightening and the subsequent gradual removal of restriction were feeding through to financing conditions, including lending rates and credit flows. It was highlighted that not all demand components had been equally responsive, with, in particular, business investment held back by high uncertainty and structural weaknesses. Companies widely cited having their own funds as a reason for not making loan applications, and the reason for not investing these funds was likely linked to the high levels of uncertainty, rather than to the level of interest rates. Hence low investment was not necessarily a sign of a restrictive monetary policy. At the same time, it was unclear how much of the past tightening was still in the pipeline. Similarly, it would take time for the full effect of recent monetary policy easing to reach the economy, with even variable rate loans typically adjusting with a lag, and the same being true for deposits.

    Monetary policy decisions and communication

    Against this background, all members agreed with the proposal by Mr Lane to lower the three key ECB interest rates by 25 basis points. Lowering the deposit facility rate – the rate through which the monetary policy stance was steered – was justified by the updated assessment of the inflation outlook, the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission.

    There was a clear case for a further 25 basis point rate cut at the current meeting, and such a step was supported by the incoming data. Members concurred that the disinflationary process was well on track, while the growth outlook continued to be weak. Although the goal had not yet been achieved and inflation was still expected to remain above target in the near term, confidence in a timely and sustained convergence had increased, as both headline and core inflation had recently come in below the ECB projections. In particular, a return of inflation to the 2% target in the course of 2025 was in line with the December staff baseline projections, which were constructed on the basis of an interest rate path that stood significantly below the present level of the forward curve.

    At the same time, it was underlined that high levels of uncertainty, lingering upside risks to energy and food prices, a strong labour market and high negotiated wage increases, as well as sticky services inflation, called for caution. Upside risks could delay a sustainable return to target, while inflation expectations might be more fragile after a long period of high inflation. Firms had also learned to raise their prices more quickly in response to new inflationary shocks. Moreover, the financial market reactions to heightened geopolitical uncertainty or risk aversion often led to an appreciation of the US dollar and might involve spikes in energy prices, which could be detrimental to the inflation outlook.

    Risks to the growth outlook remained tilted to the downside, which typically also implied downside risks to inflation over longer horizons. The outlook for economic activity was clouded by elevated uncertainty stemming from geopolitical tensions, fiscal policy concerns in the euro area and recent global trade frictions associated with potential future actions by the US Administration that might lead to a global economic slowdown. As long as the disinflation process remained on track, policy rates could be brought further towards a neutral level to avoid unnecessarily holding back the economy. Nevertheless, growth risks had not shifted to a degree that would call for an acceleration in the move towards a neutral stance. Moreover, it was argued that greater caution was needed on the size and pace of further rate cuts when policy rates were approaching neutral territory, in view of prevailing uncertainties.

    Lowering the deposit facility rate to 2.75% at the current meeting was also seen as appropriate from a risk-management perspective. On the one hand, it left sufficient optionality to react to the possible emergence of new price pressures. On the other hand, it addressed the risk of falling behind the curve in dialling back restriction and guarded against inflation falling below target.

    Looking ahead, it was regarded as premature for the Governing Council to discuss a possible landing zone for the key ECB interest rates as inflation converged sustainably to target. It was widely felt that even with the current deposit facility rate, it was relatively safe to make the assessment that monetary policy was still restrictive. This was also consistent with the fact that the economy was relatively weak. At the same time, the view was expressed that the natural or neutral rate was likely to be higher than before the pandemic, as the balance between the global demand for and supply of savings had changed over recent years. The main reasons for this were the high and rising global need for investment to deal with the green and digital transitions, the surge in public debt and increasing geopolitical fragmentation, which was reversing the global savings glut and reducing the supply of savings. A higher neutral rate implied that, with a further reduction in policy rates at the present meeting, rates would plausibly be getting close to neutral rate territory. This meant that the point was approaching where monetary policy might no longer be characterised as restrictive.

    In this context, the remark was made that the public debate about the natural or neutral rate among market analysts and observers was becoming more intense, with markets trying to gauge the Governing Council’s assessment of it as a proxy for the terminal rate in the current rate cycle. This debate was seen as misleading, however. The considerable uncertainty as to the level of the natural or neutral interest rate was recalled. While the natural rate could in theory be a longer-term reference point for assessing the monetary policy stance, it was an unobservable variable. Its practical usefulness in steering policy on a meeting-by-meeting basis was questionable, as estimates were subject to significant model and parameter uncertainty, so confidence bands were too large to give any clear guidance. Moreover, the natural rate was a steady state concept, which was hardly applicable in a rapidly changing environment – as at present – with continuous new shocks.

    Moreover, it was mentioned that a box describing the latest Eurosystem staff estimates of the natural rate would be published in the Economic Bulletin and pre-released on 7 February 2025. The box would emphasise the wide range of point estimates, the properties of the underlying models and the considerable statistical uncertainty surrounding each single point estimate. The view was expressed that there was no alternative to the Governing Council identifying, meeting by meeting, an appropriate policy rate path which was consistent with reaching the target over the medium term. Such an appropriate path could only be identified in real time, taking into account a sufficiently broad set of information.

    Turning to communication aspects, it was widely stressed that maintaining a data-dependent approach with full optionality at every meeting was prudent and continued to be warranted. The present environment of elevated uncertainty further strengthened the case for taking decisions meeting by meeting, with no room for forward guidance. The meeting-by-meeting approach, guided by the three-criteria framework, was serving the Governing Council well and members were comfortable with the way markets were interpreting the ECB’s reaction function. It was also remarked that data-dependence did not imply being backward-looking in calibrating policy. Monetary policy was, by definition, forward-looking, as it affected inflation in the future and the primary objective was defined over the medium term. Data took many forms, and all relevant information had to be considered in a timely manner.

    Taking into account the foregoing discussion among the members, upon a proposal by the President, the Governing Council took the monetary policy decisions as set out in the monetary policy press release. The members of the Governing Council subsequently finalised the monetary policy statement, which the President and the Vice-President would, as usual, deliver at the press conference following the Governing Council meeting.

    Monetary policy statement

    Monetary policy statement for the press conference of 30 January 2025

    Press release

    Monetary policy decisions

    Meeting of the ECB’s Governing Council, 29-30 January 2025

    Members

    • Ms Lagarde, President
    • Mr de Guindos, Vice-President
    • Mr Centeno
    • Mr Cipollone
    • Mr Demarco, temporarily replacing Mr Scicluna
    • Mr Dolenc, Deputy Governor of Banka Slovenije
    • Mr Elderson
    • Mr Escrivá*
    • Mr Holzmann
    • Mr Kālis, Acting Governor of Latvijas Banka
    • Mr Kažimír
    • Mr Knot
    • Mr Lane
    • Mr Makhlouf*
    • Mr Müller
    • Mr Nagel
    • Mr Panetta
    • Mr Patsalides*
    • Mr Rehn
    • Mr Reinesch
    • Ms Schnabel
    • Mr Šimkus
    • Mr Stournaras*
    • Mr Villeroy de Galhau
    • Mr Vujčić*
    • Mr Wunsch

    * Members not holding a voting right in January 2025 under Article 10.2 of the ESCB Statute.

    Other attendees

    • Mr Dombrovskis, Commissioner**
    • Ms Senkovic, Secretary, Director General Secretariat
    • Mr Rostagno, Secretary for monetary policy, Director General Monetary Policy
    • Mr Winkler, Deputy Secretary for monetary policy, Senior Adviser, DG Monetary Policy

    ** In accordance with Article 284 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

    Accompanying persons

    • Mr Arpa
    • Ms Bénassy-Quéré
    • Mr Debrun
    • Mr Gavilán
    • Mr Gilbert
    • Mr Kaasik
    • Mr Koukoularides
    • Mr Lünnemann
    • Mr Madouros
    • Mr Martin
    • Mr Nicoletti Altimari
    • Mr Novo
    • Mr Rutkaste
    • Ms Schembri
    • Mr Šiaudinis
    • Mr Šošić
    • Mr Tavlas
    • Mr Ulbrich
    • Mr Välimäki
    • Ms Žumer Šujica

    Other ECB staff

    • Mr Proissl, Director General Communications
    • Mr Straub, Counsellor to the President
    • Ms Rahmouni-Rousseau, Director General Market Operations
    • Mr Arce, Director General Economics
    • Mr Sousa, Deputy Director General Economics

    Release of the next monetary policy account foreseen on 3 April 2025.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Tatyana Golikova: Family is the main value we have

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    Deputy Prime Minister Tatyana Golikova took part in the fourth ceremony of presenting the educational award “Knowledge.Award”, which took place at the National Center “Russia”.

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    Tatyana Golikova took part in the fourth ceremony of presenting the educational award “Knowledge.Award”

    At the beginning of the ceremony, the Deputy Prime Minister read out a greeting from the President of the Russian Federation. In his address, the head of state noted that the educational movement in our country has a rich history, filled with vivid examples of honest, selfless service to the chosen cause and people. The President emphasized that the project is aimed at honoring people who sincerely devote themselves to mentoring, educating the younger generations based on the high ideals of patriotism and citizenship.

    “I would like to especially note the new nomination of the award for a significant contribution to the preservation and promotion of the values of a large, friendly family in society. After all, it is in the family circle that a person’s personality and worldview are largely formed, and such unshakable moral guidelines as love for the Motherland and a sense of involvement in its fate are laid down,” the address says.

    Tatyana Golikova also presented an award to the winners in the nomination “For Contribution to the Preservation of Family Values.”

    “Today we are starting with a wonderful nomination, which is connected with the most important value that we have – the value of family. Despite the fact that this nomination appeared for the first time, a large number of applications were received. I thank all those who are not indifferent to the most important thing that we have – our children and our family,” said Tatyana Golikova.

    She emphasized that this new nomination is timed to coincide with the Year of the Family, which was declared by the President of the country in 2024. The continuation of the thematic year was the new national project “Family”, launched on January 1, 2025. “Its main and fundamental goal is for us, Russians, to become more numerous. To do this, we must all work together, we must believe in our destiny, we must carry high moral and spiritual ideals, and preserve the traditions of our country,” the Deputy Prime Minister noted.

    The winner of the award in the category “Educator” was the president of the charity foundation “Women for Life”, the presenter of the TV channel “Spas” Natalia Moskvitina, in the category “Project” – the competition “It’s in Our Family” of the platform “Russia – the Country of Opportunities”. Tatyana Golikova presented the winners with cubes made of oak, symbolizing strength, wisdom, stability and durability.

    “Knowledge.Award” is the main educational award of the country, which was established by the Russian Society “Knowledge” in 2021 to recognize the achievements of teachers, lecturers, authors, bloggers, popularizers of science and other educational figures, as well as to recognize educational projects and companies from various fields. In total, 19,523 applications were received in 2024 from 89 regions and 56 countries.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Alexander Novak awarded the winners of the educational prize “Knowledge.Award” in the field of economics, business and law

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    Previous news Next news

    Alexander Novak awarded the winners of the educational prize “Knowledge.Award” in the field of economics, business and law

    Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak took part in the award ceremony for the winners of the educational prize “Knowledge.Award”. At the site of the National Center “Russia”, he presented awards to the winners in the nomination “For Contribution to Education in the Sphere of “Economics, Business and Law”.

    “Education is the key to the future. Today, in the era of rapid development of science and technology, the value of education and knowledge is only growing. Those who become leaders in education become leaders in the economy. Russia is one of the leading countries in the provision of educational services and ranks fourth among the largest economies in the world,” said Alexander Novak, emphasizing the importance of educational work in the field of economics, entrepreneurship and law.

    The winner in the “Educator” nomination was the Governor of the Lipetsk Region Igor Artamonov for master classes and lectures on working with financial instruments, as well as the implementation of the “I Want to Live Here” project. This is an educational platform for more than 20 thousand participants, where through strategic games and political and economic sessions, residents of the region learned how public policy functions, the budget is formed, and how new technologies are changing the future.

    The winner in the Project nomination was the multi-format Lenta.ru project “You Have the Right” – a guide to state benefits and social payments, which explains what kind of assistance from the state a citizen can count on and how to receive it.

    The educational award was established by the Russian Society “Knowledge” in 2021 to recognize the achievements of teachers, lecturers, authors, bloggers, popularizers of science, as well as educational projects. A total of 19,523 applicants from 89 regions of the country applied for the award in 21 nominations. In all nominations, 31 winners were selected by the decision of the honorary jury and the results of the public vote.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Kaine, Shaheen, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Democrats Statement on Trump Administration’s Reckless Termination of U.S. Foreign Assistance Programs

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Virginia Tim Kaine

    WASHINGTON, D.C. —Today, U.S. Senator Tim Kaine (D-VA), joined Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), Ranking Member of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC), and his fellow SFRC colleagues Chris Coons (D-DE), Chris Murphy (D-CT), Jeff Merkley (D-OR), Cory Booker (D-NJ), Brian Schatz (D-HI), Chris Van Hollen (D-MD), Tammy Duckworth (D-IL) and Jacky Rosen (D-NV), issued the following statement on the Trump Administration’s reckless termination of nearly all U.S. foreign assistance programs:

    “It is clear that the Trump Administration’s foreign assistance ‘review’ was not a serious effort or attempt at reform but rather a pretext to dismantle decades of U.S. investment that makes America safer, stronger and more prosperous. There is no indication Secretary Rubio conducted a program-by-program review of the more than 9,000 awards or considered the dire national security implications of these rash actions. Ending programs first and asking questions later only jeopardizes millions of lives and creates a power vacuum for our adversaries like China and Russia to fill.

    “While it’s easy to assume that these cuts will only affect people thousands of miles away, the fact is, the impact will be felt by American farmers who will no longer get top dollar for their crops to feed the hungry, churches who will no longer have the support of the U.S. government in their missions, American families who fall sick when diseases like Zika, Ebola and Malaria once again reach our shores and U.S. biotech companies who will no longer sell their drugs to treat the vulnerable overseas. Secretary Rubio should immediately come before our Committee. We expect him to not only consult with Congress but follow the law.”

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial news: 02/27/2025, 18-10 (Moscow time) the values of the upper limit of the price corridor and the range of market risk assessment for the security RU000A101TD6 (IA DOM15P2) were changed.

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Moscow Exchange – Moscow Exchange –

    02.27.2025

    18:10

    In accordance with the Methodology for determining the risk parameters of the stock market and deposit market of Moscow Exchange PJSC by NCO NCC (JSC) on 27.02.2025, 18-10 (Moscow time), the values of the upper limit of the price corridor (up to 81.34) and the range of market risk assessment (up to 235.98 rubles, equivalent to a rate of 33.75%) of the security RU000A101TD6 (IA DOM15P2) were changed.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please Note; This Information is Raw Content Directly from the Information Source. It is access to What the Source Is Stating and Does Not Reflect

    HTTPS: //VVV. MOEX.K.M.M.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial news: 02/27/2025, 18:55 (Moscow time) the values of the lower boundary of the price corridor and the range of market risk assessment for the PLD/RUB currency pair have been changed.

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Moscow Exchange – Moscow Exchange –

    In accordance with the Methodology for determining the risk parameters of the foreign exchange market and the precious metals market of Moscow Exchange PJSC by the NCC (JSC), on 27.02.2025, 18-55 (Moscow time), the values of the lower limit of the price corridor (up to RUB 2,589.08 in the mode with TOD settlements) and the range of market risk assessment (up to RUB 2,333.4049, equivalent to a rate of 25.92%) of the PLD/RUB currency pair were changed. New values are available Here.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please Note; This Information is Raw Content Directly from the Information Source. It is access to What the Source Is Stating and Does Not Reflect

    HTTPS: //VVV. MOEX.K.M.M.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI USA: ICYMI: Mullin Breaks Down President Trump’s First Month’s Performance on Meet the Press

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator MarkWayne Mullin (R-Oklahoma)

    ICYMI: Mullin Breaks Down President Trump’s First Month’s Performance on Meet the Press

    “What Oklahomans want is to make sure that we get rid of the waste and fraud inside the federal government.”
    Washington, D.C. – On Sunday, U.S. Senator Markwayne Mullin (R-OK) joined NBC’s Kristen Welker on Meet the Press to discuss the Trump administration’s ongoing efforts to end the Russia-Ukraine War, bolster our national defense, and reform the federal workforce to best serve the American people.

    Sen. Mullin’s full interview can be found here.
    On the war that never would have happened if President Trump was in office:
    “President Trump is absolutely correct. If he was in office, this war would have never, ever taken place. What we’re trying to do and what President Trump is trying to do is end the killing. It’s been going on for three years. The Biden administration turned a blind eye to it, and President Trump is the president that can end the war. There, fact – fact and simple…
    “What we’re trying to do here is put President Trump in a good position to negotiate the end of the war. It’s the same way that Reagan worked with Gorbachev by trying to end the Cold War. Trump is the president that’s going to be able to end the killings that should have never taken place and would have never taken place if he would have been in office instead of Joe Biden. The reason why is because President Trump leads peace through strength. What Biden led through is appeasement.”
    On the president’s right to pick his team of U.S. military advisors:
    “We’re a civilian force, and the president gets to choose his closest advisors. And the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is [one of] his closest advisors.”
    On Elon Musk’s efforts to cut waste, fraud, and abuse:
    “What Oklahomans want is to make sure that get rid of the waste and fraud inside the federal government…
    “I would tell you that the majority of the American people want to make sure that their taxpayers are being used correctly. I don’t want anybody to lose their job. That’s the last thing we want. But at the same time, anytime you’re trying to secure this country, which a national security risk we have right now is our national debt, we have to make changes, and we have to make it quickly.”

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI: Lloyds Bank plc: 2024 Form 20-F Filed

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    LONDON, Feb. 27, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Lloyds Bank plc announces that on 27 February 2025 it filed its Annual Report on Form 20-F for the year ended 31 December 2024 with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

    A copy of the Form 20-F is available through the ‘Investors’ section of our website at www.lloydsbankinggroup.com and also online at www.sec.gov

    Shareholders can receive hard copies of the complete audited financial statements free of charge upon request. Printed copies of the 2024 Lloyds Bank plc Annual Report on Form 20-F can be requested from Investor Relations by email to investor.relations@lloydsbanking.com

    -END-

    For further information:  
       
    Investor Relations  
    Douglas Radcliffe  +44 (0)20 7356 1571
    Group Investor Relations Director  
    douglas.radcliffe@lloydsbanking.com  
       
    Corporate Affairs  
    Matt Smith +44 (0)20 7356 3522
    Head of Media Relations  
    matt.smith@lloydsbanking.com  
       

    FORWARD LOOKING STATEMENTS

    This document contains certain forward-looking statements within the meaning of Section 21E of the US Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and section 27A of the US Securities Act of 1933, as amended, with respect to the business, strategy, plans and/or results of Lloyds Bank plc together with its subsidiaries (the Lloyds Bank Group) and its current goals and expectations. Statements that are not historical or current facts, including statements about the Lloyds Bank Group’s or its directors’ and/or management’s beliefs and expectations, are forward looking statements. Words such as, without limitation, ‘believes’, ‘achieves’, ‘anticipates’, ‘estimates’, ‘expects’, ‘targets’, ‘should’, ‘intends’, ‘aims’, ‘projects’, ‘plans’, ‘potential’, ‘will’, ‘would’, ‘could’, ‘considered’, ‘likely’, ‘may’, ‘seek’, ‘estimate’, ‘probability’, ‘goal’, ‘objective’, ‘deliver’, ‘endeavour’, ‘prospects’, ‘optimistic’ and similar expressions or variations on these expressions are intended to identify forward-looking statements. These statements concern or may affect future matters, including but not limited to: projections or expectations of the Lloyds Bank Group’s future financial position, including profit attributable to shareholders, provisions, economic profit, dividends, capital structure, portfolios, net interest margin, capital ratios, liquidity, risk-weighted assets (RWAs), expenditures or any other financial items or ratios; litigation, regulatory and governmental investigations; the Lloyds Bank Group’s future financial performance; the level and extent of future impairments and write-downs; the Lloyds Bank Group’s ESG targets and/or commitments; statements of plans, objectives or goals of the Lloyds Bank Group or its management and other statements that are not historical fact and statements of assumptions underlying such statements. By their nature, forward-looking statements involve risk and uncertainty because they relate to events and depend upon circumstances that will or may occur in the future. Factors that could cause actual business, strategy, targets, plans and/or results (including but not limited to the payment of dividends) to differ materially from forward-looking statements include, but are not limited to: general economic and business conditions in the UK and internationally (including in relation to tariffs); acts of hostility or terrorism and responses to those acts, or other such events; geopolitical unpredictability; the war between Russia and Ukraine; the conflicts in the Middle East; the tensions between China and Taiwan; political instability including as a result of any UK general election; market related risks, trends and developments; changes in client and consumer behaviour and demand; exposure to counterparty risk; the ability to access sufficient sources of capital, liquidity and funding when required; changes to the Lloyds Bank Group’s or Lloyds Banking Group plc’s credit ratings; fluctuations in interest rates, inflation, exchange rates, stock markets and currencies; volatility in credit markets; volatility in the price of the Lloyds Bank Group’s securities; natural pandemic and other disasters; risks concerning borrower and counterparty credit quality; risks affecting defined benefit pension schemes; changes in laws, regulations, practices and accounting standards or taxation; changes to regulatory capital or liquidity requirements and similar contingencies; the policies and actions of governmental or regulatory authorities or courts together with any resulting impact on the future structure of the Lloyds Bank Group; risks associated with the Lloyds Bank Group’s compliance with a wide range of laws and regulations; assessment related to resolution planning requirements; risks related to regulatory actions which may be taken in the event of a bank or Lloyds Bank Group or Lloyds Banking Group failure; exposure to legal, regulatory or competition proceedings, investigations or complaints; failure to comply with anti-money laundering, counter terrorist financing, anti-bribery and sanctions regulations; failure to prevent or detect any illegal or improper activities; operational risks including risks as a result of the failure of third party suppliers; conduct risk; technological changes and risks to the security of IT and operational infrastructure, systems, data and information resulting from increased threat of cyber and other attacks; technological failure; inadequate or failed internal or external processes or systems; risks relating to ESG matters, such as climate change (and achieving climate change ambitions) and decarbonisation, including the Lloyds Bank Group’s or the Lloyds Banking Group’s ability along with the government and other stakeholders to measure, manage and mitigate the impacts of climate change effectively, and human rights issues; the impact of competitive conditions; failure to attract, retain and develop high calibre talent; the ability to achieve strategic objectives; the ability to derive cost savings and other benefits including, but without limitation, as a result of any acquisitions, disposals and other strategic transactions; inability to capture accurately the expected value from acquisitions; and assumptions and estimates that form the basis of the Lloyds Bank Group’s financial statements. A number of these influences and factors are beyond the Lloyds Bank Group’s control. Please refer to the latest Annual Report on Form 20-F filed by Lloyds Bank plc with the US Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC), which is available on the SEC’s website at www.sec.gov, for a discussion of certain factors and risks. Lloyds Bank plc may also make or disclose written and/or oral forward-looking statements in other written materials and in oral statements made by the directors, officers or employees of Lloyds Bank plc to third parties, including financial analysts. Except as required by any applicable law or regulation, the forward-looking statements contained in this document are made as of today’s date, and the Lloyds Bank Group expressly disclaims any obligation or undertaking to release publicly any updates or revisions to any forward-looking statements contained in this document whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise. The information, statements and opinions contained in this document do not constitute a public offer under any applicable law or an offer to sell any securities or financial instruments or any advice or recommendation with respect to such securities or financial instruments.

    This information is provided by RNS, the news service of the London Stock Exchange. RNS is approved by the Financial Conduct Authority to act as a Primary Information Provider in the United Kingdom. Terms and conditions relating to the use and distribution of this information may apply. For further information, please contact rns@lseg.com or visit www.rns.com.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI USA: Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Directs Suspension of Security Clearances and Evaluation of Government Contracts for Involvement in Government Weaponization

    US Senate News:

    Source: The White House
    ADDRESSING THE WEAPONIZATION OF GOVERNMENT: Today, President Donald J. Trump signed a memorandum to suspend security clearances for Covington & Burling LLP employees involved in the weaponization of government, pending a review of their roles and responsibility in the weaponization of the judicial process. This action also initiates a comprehensive review of all Federal contracts with the firm to ensure alignment with the interests of the American people.  
    Security clearances held by Peter Koski and potential other members of Covington & Burling LLP who assisted former Special Counsel Jack Smith will be suspended, pending a review of their roles and responsibility in the weaponization of the judicial process.
    The Federal Government will review and terminate engagement of Covington & Burling LLP by the United States to the maximum extent permitted by law.
    All contracts with Covington & Burling LLP will undergo a detailed evaluation to ensure agency funding decisions align with American citizens’ interests and the priorities of this Administration, as detailed in executive directives.

    PRIORITIZING CITIZENS OVER PARTISAN GAMES: President Trump remains steadfast in his commitment to restoring trust in government by ensuring that public resources and privileges are not exploited for political gain.
    Individuals who hold government-issued security clearances bear a responsibility to uphold impartiality and the national interest. These privileges should not be leveraged to interfere in U.S. elections or advance partisan objectives.
    Covington & Burling LLP provided former Special Counsel Jack Smith with $140,000 in free legal services prior to his resignation from the Department of Justice.
    Jack Smith and his staff spent more than $50 million in taxpayer dollars to target President Trump—an egregious misuse of judicial authority for political ends and part of the prior administration’s unprecedented weaponization of prosecutorial power to upend the democratic process.

    A RETURN TO ACCOUNTABILITY: President Trump is sending a clear message that the Federal Government will no longer tolerate the abuse of power by partisan actors who exploit their positions for political gain.
    President Trump is refocusing government operations to its core mission – serving the citizens of the United States.  
    President Trump revoked security clearances held by dozens of intelligence officials who falsely claimed in a 2020 letter, during the height of the U.S. presidential election season, that Hunter Biden’s laptop was tantamount to Russian disinformation.
    President Trump signed an Executive Order to end the weaponization of the Federal Government on his first day in office after promising to “end forever the weaponization of government and the abuse of law enforcement against political opponents.”

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI: Lloyds Bank plc: 2024 Annual Report and Accounts

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    LLOYDS BANK PLC ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31 DECEMBER 2024

    LONDON, Feb. 27, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Lloyds Bank plc announces that the following document will be submitted today to the National Storage Mechanism and will shortly be available for inspection in unedited full text at https://data.fca.org.uk/#/nsm/nationalstoragemechanism

    • Annual Report and Accounts 2024

    A copy of the document is also available through the ‘Investors’ section of our website www.lloydsbankinggroup.com

    This announcement is made in accordance with DTR 4.1.

    For further information:

    Investor Relations  
    Douglas Radcliffe  +44 (0)20 7356 1571
    Group Investor Relations Director  
    douglas.radcliffe@lloydsbanking.com  
       
    Corporate Affairs  
    Matt Smith +44 (0)20 7356 3522
    Head of Media Relations  
    matt.smith@lloydsbanking.com  

    FORWARD LOOKING STATEMENTS

    This document contains certain forward-looking statements within the meaning of Section 21E of the US Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and section 27A of the US Securities Act of 1933, as amended, with respect to the business, strategy, plans and/or results of Lloyds Bank plc together with its subsidiaries (the Lloyds Bank Group) and its current goals and expectations. Statements that are not historical or current facts, including statements about the Lloyds Bank Group’s or its directors’ and/or management’s beliefs and expectations, are forward-looking statements. Words such as, without limitation, ‘believes’, ‘achieves’, ‘anticipates’, ‘estimates’, ‘expects’, ‘targets’, ‘should’, ‘intends’, ‘aims’, ‘projects’, ‘plans’, ‘potential’, ‘will’, ‘would’, ‘could’, ‘considered’, ‘likely’, ‘may’, ‘seek’, ‘estimate’, ‘probability’, ‘goal’, ‘objective’, ‘deliver’, ‘endeavour’, ‘prospects’, ‘optimistic’ and similar expressions or variations on these expressions are intended to identify forward-looking statements. These statements concern or may affect future matters, including but not limited to: projections or expectations of the Lloyds Bank Group’s future financial position, including profit attributable to shareholders, provisions, economic profit, dividends, capital structure, portfolios, net interest margin, capital ratios, liquidity, risk-weighted assets (RWAs), expenditures or any other financial items or ratios; litigation, regulatory and governmental investigations; the Lloyds Bank Group’s future financial performance; the level and extent of future impairments and write-downs; the Lloyds Bank Group’s ESG targets and/or commitments; statements of plans, objectives or goals of the Lloyds Bank Group or its management and other statements that are not historical fact and statements of assumptions underlying such statements. By their nature, forward-looking statements involve risk and uncertainty because they relate to events and depend upon circumstances that will or may occur in the future. Factors that could cause actual business, strategy, targets, plans and/or results (including but not limited to the payment of dividends) to differ materially from forward-looking statements include, but are not limited to: general economic and business conditions in the UK and internationally (including in relation to tariffs); acts of hostility or terrorism and responses to those acts, or other such events; geopolitical unpredictability; the war between Russia and Ukraine; the conflicts in the Middle East; the tensions between China and Taiwan; political instability including as a result of any UK general election; market related risks, trends and developments; changes in client and consumer behaviour and demand; exposure to counterparty risk; the ability to access sufficient sources of capital, liquidity and funding when required; changes to the Lloyds Bank Group’s or Lloyds Banking Group plc’s credit ratings; fluctuations in interest rates, inflation, exchange rates, stock markets and currencies; volatility in credit markets; volatility in the price of the Lloyds Bank Group’s securities; natural pandemic and other disasters; risks concerning borrower and counterparty credit quality; risks affecting defined benefit pension schemes; changes in laws, regulations, practices and accounting standards or taxation; changes to regulatory capital or liquidity requirements and similar contingencies; the policies and actions of governmental or regulatory authorities or courts together with any resulting impact on the future structure of the Lloyds Bank Group; risks associated with the Lloyds Bank Group’s compliance with a wide range of laws and regulations; assessment related to resolution planning requirements; risks related to regulatory actions which may be taken in the event of a bank or Lloyds Bank Group or Lloyds Banking Group failure; exposure to legal, regulatory or competition proceedings, investigations or complaints; failure to comply with anti-money laundering, counter terrorist financing, anti-bribery and sanctions regulations; failure to prevent or detect any illegal or improper activities; operational risks including risks as a result of the failure of third party suppliers; conduct risk; technological changes and risks to the security of IT and operational infrastructure, systems, data and information resulting from increased threat of cyber and other attacks; technological failure; inadequate or failed internal or external processes or systems; risks relating to ESG matters, such as climate change (and achieving climate change ambitions) and decarbonisation, including the Lloyds Bank Group’s or the Lloyds Banking Group’s ability along with the government and other stakeholders to measure, manage and mitigate the impacts of climate change effectively, and human rights issues; the impact of competitive conditions; failure to attract, retain and develop high calibre talent; the ability to achieve strategic objectives; the ability to derive cost savings and other benefits including, but without limitation, as a result of any acquisitions, disposals and other strategic transactions; inability to capture accurately the expected value from acquisitions; and assumptions and estimates that form the basis of the Lloyds Bank Group’s financial statements. A number of these influences and factors are beyond the Lloyds Bank Group’s control. Please refer to the latest Annual Report on Form 20-F filed by Lloyds Bank plc with the US Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC), which is available on the SEC’s website at www.sec.gov, for a discussion of certain factors and risks. Lloyds Bank plc may also make or disclose written and/or oral forward-looking statements in other written materials and in oral statements made by the directors, officers or employees of Lloyds Bank plc to third parties, including financial analysts. Except as required by any applicable law or regulation, the forward-looking statements contained in this document are made as of today’s date, and the Lloyds Bank Group expressly disclaims any obligation or undertaking to release publicly any updates or revisions to any forward-looking statements contained in this document whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise. The information, statements and opinions contained in this document do not constitute a public offer under any applicable law or an offer to sell any securities or financial instruments or any advice or recommendation with respect to such securities or financial instruments.

    This information is provided by RNS, the news service of the London Stock Exchange. RNS is approved by the Financial Conduct Authority to act as a Primary Information Provider in the United Kingdom. Terms and conditions relating to the use and distribution of this information may apply. For further information, please contact rns@lseg.com or visit www.rns.com.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Extension of the Invitational Stage of the V International Financial Security Olympiad

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: State University of Management – Official website of the State –

    Due to the high interest in participation in the V International Financial Security Olympiad, co-organized by the State University of Management, it was decided to extend the Invitational Stage until March 23, 2025. This will allow even more schoolchildren and students to get acquainted with the format and directions of the Olympiad tasks, test their knowledge and prepare for the start of the Selection Stage.

    The Invitational Stage tasks will be available for completion until 23:59 on March 23, 2025 (Moscow time).

    The Olympiad started on February 1 on the Sodruzhestvo platform and is held in Russian and English. Schoolchildren in grades 8–11 and students from Russia and partner countries are invited to participate.

    To participate in the Invitational Stage, you must register on the Sodruzhestvo platform: https://sodrujestvo.org/ru. Participants who successfully complete the tasks of the stage will receive certificates.

    The International Financial Security Olympiad has been held since 2021 under the patronage of the President of Russia and the Government of the Russian Federation.

    Winners and prize winners of the Olympiad receive advantages when entering leading Russian and foreign universities – participants of the International Network Institute in the field of AML/CFT, as well as the opportunity to complete internships at Rosfinmonitoring, the Bank of Russia, PJSC Promsvyazbank and other financial organizations.

    The International Financial Security Olympiad is aimed at popularizing financial security as a norm of life, as well as at forming a new type of thinking among young people: from the financial security of an individual to the financial security of the state. Winners and prize winners are granted additional rights when entering higher education programs.

    Subscribe to the tg channel “Our State University” Announcement date: 02/27/2025

    V Международной олимпиаде по финансовой безопасности, соорганизатором которой выступает Государственный университет управления,…” data-yashareImage=”https://guu.ru/wp-content/uploads/Международная-олимпиада-по-финбезопасности.jpg” data-yashareLink=”https://guu.ru/%d0%bf%d1%80%d0%be%d0%b4%d0%bb%d0%b5%d0%bd%d0%b8%d0%b5-%d0%bf%d1%80%d0%b8%d0%b3%d0%bb%d0%b0%d1%81%d0%b8%d1%82%d0%b5%d0%bb%d1%8c%d0%bd%d0%be%d0%b3%d0%be-%d1%8d%d1%82%d0%b0%d0%bf%d0%b0-v-%d0%bc%d0%b5/”>

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Trump, Putin and the authoritarian take on constitutionalism

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Stephen Lovell, Professor of Modern History, King’s College London

    When Donald Trump called Volodymyr Zelensky a “dictator” for his failure to hold elections, it was a shocking moment. Even by the topsy-turvy standards of the current US administration, this looked like deliberate ignorance of the facts. Ukrainian law and the electoral code state that elections cannot be held while martial law is in place. That leaves aside the practical impossibility of ensuring fair, free and secure elections during war on the scale Russia is inflicting on Ukraine.

    In making this dangerous intervention, the US president was simply repeating a well-established trope of Russian propaganda. For some time, the Kremlin has been casting aspersions on the legitimacy of Zelensky. Vladimir Putin has been using this as a pretext to allow him to sidestep any direct contact with the (legitimately elected) Ukrainian president.

    It is not the first time that Russia has cited a concern for constitutional propriety in its Ukraine policy. The Kremlin condemned both the orange revolution of 2004 (which forced a rerun of a rigged presidential election) and the Euromaidan protests of 2013-14 (which chased out the Russia-friendly president Viktor Yanukovych) as cases of anti-constitutional mob rule ousting a legitimately elected leader.

    Russia’s defence of constitutional legitimacy has been selective and self-interested. For two decades, it has energetically – and often unconstitutionally – meddled in the political processes of Ukraine and other neighbouring states. Electoral outcomes are sacrosanct only when they confirm pro-Russian candidates in power. No matter if these results were secured by massive fraud and intimidation.

    Meanwhile, when Putin found his own constitution an inconvenience, he had it changed in a referendum which handed him the opportunity to retain power until 2036.

    Making things ‘legal’

    But there is more than pure cynicism to the Russian government’s embrace of constitutional rhetoric. This belief in the need for power to have a legal framework has a long tradition behind it. Russia imposed rapid-fire referendums in Crimea in 2014 and then in four regions of occupied Ukraine in 2022 in an attempt to give a legal basis to its military occupation of these territories.

    There were echoes of the shotgun plebiscites conducted in 1939-41 in eastern Poland, Bessarabia and the Baltic states. Almost immediately after it annexed these territories, the Soviet state forced the population into participating in the Stalinist version of democracy. These were votes with only one candidate on the ballot paper. The Soviet Union was desperately poor, its state apparatus was overstretched and underresourced – but money and personnel were found for these choreographed elections.

    The same logic applied in the Soviet Union “proper”. In 1918, at the very start of the civil war that followed the October revolution, the Bolsheviks adopted a constitution for the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. This was amplified by a Soviet constitution in 1924 that established the elected Congress of Soviets as the supreme organ of state power (even if the Communist Party really pulled the strings).

    Just over a decade later, Stalin found it necessary to update the constitution. He wanted it reflect what he saw as the progress made towards socialism in the first two decades after the revolution. The result, after extensive if largely orchestrated public discussion, was the 1936 constitution. This, among other things, enshrined universal suffrage elections to a national representative body: the Supreme Soviet.

    This was not to be the end of the Soviet constitutional road. A generation later, in the early 1960s, the post-Stalin leadership felt the need to refresh and amplify the 1936 document. It took until 1977 for a new constitution finally to be agreed and adopted, but it was clear that this authoritarian state took “socialist legality” very seriously indeed. Constitutional law might have been considered malleable by the Communist party, but it was important for it to exist and to withstand challenge, whether from internal dissidents or from cold war adversaries.

    Why have a constitution?

    To understand the significance of constitutions and political institutions in the USSR and post-Soviet Russia, it’s worth considering what function constitutions actually perform. Western nations tend to think of them as documents setting out the relationship between different branches of government: executive, legislative, judicial. They contain some limitation on the powers of the executive. Certainly, this is how the US constitution – which is often seen as the archetype of a western state constitution – is most commonly viewed.

    Defining a new country: the US constitution.
    https://pixy.org/1262083/

    But there has long been another way of viewing constitutions: as a symbol of the integrity and robustness of the state. As British historian Linda Colley has shown, between the mid-18th and the early 20th centuries, constitutions became perhaps the main currency of legitimacy for a nation state. To have a constitution was, above all, a way to stake a claim to exist in a dangerous world inhabited by predatory empires.

    For some of those empires, constitutions served as a way of holding together their own large and disparate territories. This tended to work by, for example, conceding a degree of representation to minority groups in the hope of preempting separatist movements. On close inspection, this was also true of the US constitution. It was a document designed to bring and hold the original 13 states together and establish the US as an international power.

    Constitutions and elections have always been as much about power, legitimacy and state integrity as about representation – democratic or otherwise – or limitations on government. For states that are not major powers, the legitimacy needs to be projected externally as much as internally.

    Ukraine now finds the legitimacy of its constitution under threat from both the dominant regional power – Russia – and the world power of the US. It falls on Europe – a region almost defined by its commitment to constitutional democracy – to articulate and defend an alternative vision.

    European leaders – and their electorates – need to act on the belief that democracy and sovereignty are not on separate tracks but belong together. Ukraine deserves to retain its free elections, but it also deserves a state.

    Stephen Lovell is currently at work on a project on the history of voting in the Russian Empire and USSR funded by a Major Research Fellowship from the Leverhulme Trust.

    ref. Trump, Putin and the authoritarian take on constitutionalism – https://theconversation.com/trump-putin-and-the-authoritarian-take-on-constitutionalism-250662

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Staff Concludes Visit to Zambia

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    February 27, 2025

    Lusaka, Zambia: An International Monetary Fund (IMF) staff team, led by Mercedes Vera Martin, visited Zambia during February 19-25, 2025, as part of the Fund’s ongoing engagement with the Zambian authorities and other stakeholders.

    At the conclusion of the visit, Mrs. Vera Martin issued the following statement:

    “The mission team engaged with the Zambian authorities on recent macroeconomic developments and the economic outlook. Encouragingly, the Zambian economy has shown greater resilience than previously anticipated in 2024, supported by stronger-than-projected performance in both the mining and non-mining sectors”.

    “We also took stock of the authorities’ progress in meeting key commitments under the IMF-supported program. These efforts will be formally assessed in the context of the fifth review of the Extended Credit Facility arrangement, which is expected to be initiated with a mission in early May 2025.”

    “During this visit, IMF staff held discussions with Finance Minister Musokotwane, Bank of Zambia Governor Kalyalya, and their teams, as well as representatives from various government agencies and other key stakeholders. The IMF team would like to express its gratitude to the Zambian authorities and all stakeholders for their constructive engagement and support during this mission.”

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Kwabena Akuamoah-Boateng

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/02/27/pr-2549-zambia-imf-staff-concludes-visit

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Delegation of the Ural Optical-Mechanical Plant named after E. S. Yalamov visited the Polytechnic

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Peter the Great St Petersburg Polytechnic University – Peter the Great St Petersburg Polytechnic University –

    A delegation from one of the key enterprises of the Shvabe holding of the Rostec State Corporation, the Ural Optical-Mechanical Plant named after E. S. Yalamov (UOMZ), visited Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University on a working visit.

    General Director of JSC PO UOMZ Anatoly Sludnykh, his deputy for science Alexander Koshelev and acting chief designer for medical equipment at Shvabe Pavel Ignatyev met with the rector of SPbPU Andrey Rudskoy and discussed current and future cooperation.

    The guests were interested in the research and production departments of SPbPU, which have technologies and equipment that can be implemented in production. Heads of the laboratories “Modeling of technological processes and design of power equipment” and “Polymer composite materials” Vladimir Yadykin and Ilya Kobykhno spoke about the organization of production of parts from composites, design and assembly of equipment, developed pilot industrial technology for the manufacture of filaments for 3D printing from continuous carbon fiber based on thermoplastics.

    Representatives of the industrial partner also studied the capabilities of the laboratory of the Russian-Chinese scientific and educational center “Additive technologies”. Its head Kirill Starikov demonstrated the material and technical base created here and the unique parts created here.

    According to Anatoly Sludnykh, the company is interested in using technologies and materials developed by Polytechnic University scientists, as well as in additional training of its technologists and engineers at the university.

    At a meeting with SPbPU Vice-Rector for Science Yuri Fomin and Director of the Center for Technological Projects Alexey Maistro, the progress of one of the joint projects was discussed: the creation of a domestic anesthetic vaporizer. The main objectives of the project are to develop design documentation, increase dosing accuracy, create the ability to automatically maintain the concentration of anesthetic during surgery and reduce its consumption. Unlike foreign analogues, the Russian vaporizer should not be automatic, but electronic.

    Yuri Fomin noted that the university is determined to strengthen ties and expand cooperation with the Ural Optical and Mechanical Plant and other enterprises of the Shvabe holding. And the head of UOMZ Anatoly Sludnykh expressed a desire to work out the existing project as a model for simplifying subsequent interaction on various cooperation tracks. The parties also agreed to organize courses for additional professional education for the company’s employees and create conditions for those of them who want to enroll in graduate school and defend their dissertations at SPbPU.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

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  • MIL-OSI Russia: Marat Khusnullin: The number of land plots with registered boundaries in Russia has increased to 43.5 million since 2020

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    The government continues comprehensive work to improve the quality of data in the Unified State Register of Real Estate (USRRE). Since 2020, the number of land plots without recorded boundaries in Russia has decreased by 9.1 million, Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin reported.

    The entry of information on the boundaries of land plots, as well as on administrative boundaries and boundaries of territorial zones into the Unified State Register is carried out by Rosreestr within the framework of the Complete and Accurate Register project, which has been implemented since 2020 at the direction of the President of Russia on ensuring the reliability of information in state information resources.

    “The efficiency and quality of services in the field of land and real estate, as well as the spatial development of the country, depend on filling the USRN with complete and accurate information. The result of this work primarily depends on activity and involvement in processes at the regional level. In this regard, interaction has been established with the offices of the Plenipotentiary Representatives of the President of Russia in the federal districts and with the heads of the subjects. Today, the USRN contains information on 60.9 million land plots in the country, of which 43.5 million (71.5%) have a coordinate description of the boundaries. Since 2020, the share of plots without clearly defined boundaries has decreased by 9.1 million. As part of the state program “National Spatial Data System”, by the end of 2025 we plan to increase the share of plots with boundaries to 72%, and by the end of 2030 – to 95%,” said Marat Khusnullin.

    According to the Deputy Prime Minister, the largest increase in the number of land plots with coordinate description of boundaries was recorded in ten regions. The leaders include the Republic of Tatarstan, the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol, Moscow, Sverdlovsk regions and Stavropol Krai.

    The increase in the number of land plots with registered boundaries was influenced by the implementation of comprehensive cadastral works. This is one of the effective mechanisms for filling the USRN with complete and accurate data. Thus, over the past five years, such works have been carried out in relation to 4 million real estate objects.

    “A significant increase in the figures for entering boundaries into the Unified State Register of Real Estate was facilitated by the adoption in August 2023 of a law aimed at eliminating the intersections of the boundaries of settlements, territorial zones, forestries with the boundaries of land plots. As part of the implementation of this law, Rosreestr initiated the project “Verification of information in the register of boundaries of the Unified State Register of Real Estate”. In 2024, we processed almost 3 million intersections (96.5%), of which 512 thousand were eliminated. 2.5 million intersections are not subject to adjustment in accordance with the law. The remaining 3.5% will be processed in the first quarter of 2025,” said Oleg Skufinsky, head of Rosreestr.

    The process of entering information on the boundaries of land plots into the Unified State Register of Real Estate will also be accelerated by the entry into force on March 1 of this year of a law that provides mechanisms to stimulate the registration of land plots, buildings and structures by citizens and legal entities. In particular, registration of rights or transactions will be possible only in relation to land plots with precise boundaries.

    Marat Khusnullin also noted that stable dynamics are observed in the inclusion of information on the boundaries of administrative-territorial entities in the real estate register. Since 2020, the share of boundaries between constituent entities of the Russian Federation in the USRN has increased by 53% and amounted to 87%. The share of boundaries of municipalities, information on which is included in the USRN, amounted to 94% – 29% more than in 2020. The share of boundaries of settlements reached 78% – 48% more than in 2020. A significant increase occurred in terms of entering information on the boundaries of territorial zones into the USRN, which is an important criterion for investment attractiveness and further development of regions. This figure was 74%. This is 61% more than at the beginning of 2020 (13.4%).

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Is a united European voice possible in the age of Trump, Putin and far-right politics? Germany’s new leader intends to find out

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Julia Khrebtan-Hörhager, Associate Professor of Critical Cultural & International Studies, Colorado State University

    Could Friedrich Merz be the man to speak for Europe? Sean Gallup/Getty Images

    “Who do I call if I want to speak to Europe?”

    The question was famously attributed to former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and refers to the historical inability of the political entity of Europe to coordinate on a united front in the global arena.

    And despite decades of integration under the European Union, who speaks for Europe – or what the bloc desires to be – is perhaps less clear now than at any point in recent years. Internal cleavages over immigration, right-wing nationalism, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Donald Trump’s return to the White House all challenge the notion of what Europe is and should stand for.

    Friedrich Merz, the expected next chancellor of Germany, offered one continental vision shortly after his conservative party triumphed in the country’s national elections. “My absolute priority will be to strengthen Europe as quickly as possible so that, step by step, we can really achieve independence from the USA,” he said.

    Merz’s apparent desire for a stronger German role could portend a balance shift back to Germany’s preeminent place in the EU, a position it has pulled back from in recent years. But it remains an open question as to what extent Europe can be unified given the continent’s political landmines – or even what kind of Europe it would be.

    Filling Merkel’s shoes

    A German leader has, in living memory, succeeded in providing something approaching a singular European voice that the White House could deal with. Europe was long synonymous with Angela Merkel, Germany’s long-lasting – and only female – chancellor, who was known by affectionate nicknames like “Mutti Merkel,” or “Mommy Merkel,” and, during Trump’s first time in office, was even referred to by some as the de facto leader of the free world.

    Her legacy – Merkel served from 2005 to 2021 – was defined in part by strong commitments to clean energy, welcoming hundreds of thousands of refugees during the 2015 European migrant crisis and championing German leadership of the European Union. In the process, she became something of “Europe’s engine.”

    Merkel collaborated especially well with France’s Emmanuel Macron, a passionate fellow Europeanist, communicating a vision of a united Europe and its core values to the rest of the world. Dubbed “Merkron” by commentators, the pair were seen as the EU’s power couple.

    President Emmanuel Macron of France and German Chancellor Angela Merkel presented a formidable European double act.
    Emmanuele Contini/NurPhoto via Getty Images

    Meanwhile, former U.S. President Barack Obama often described Merkel as his closest ally, praising her humanitarian vision of refugee politics and even decorating her with the Medal of Freedom, the highest honor that the U.S. can award to a foreign national.

    Merkel was visionary, too, especially regarding the former superpowers of the Cold War and their controversial leaders. A child of East Germany, she never trusted Russia’s Vladimir Putin. She also experienced great difficulties collaborating with Trump during his first presidency. Somewhat anticipating Merz’s recent comments, Merkel in 2017 warned that neither Germany nor the EU could rely on the U.S. the way they used to, urging her fellow Europeans to take their fate and their interests in their own hands.

    A déjà vu of ‘the German question’

    But in some ways Merkel was more popular abroad than at home.

    The so-called “German question” – or the inability of the Germans to unify as a nation in its leadership and “Leitkultur,” or “guiding culture” – has been tormenting the country since the 19th century and gained renewed relevance during the years of German reunification following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.

    Years on from the so-called “Miracle of Merkel,” Germany’s increasing internal political divisions – especially pronounced between the country’s West and East – mirror the broader divisions facing the EU at large, including over who should claim the mantle of political leadership and around what vision.

    To regain the gravitas within Europe it had under Merkel, Germany now would need a similar kind of strong and visionary program that resonates with the continent. The country’s political, economic and social challenges in 2025 demand clear national leadership, something that in my opinion neither the unemotional and uncharismatic outgoing Chancellor Olaf Scholz nor the opposition right-wing leader and soon-to-be successor Merz has demonstrated in public over the past couple of years.

    Although Merkel and Merz represent the same political party, the CDU, their visions for Germany and the EU are strikingly different. A wealthy former business lawyer, Merz’s signature book, “Dare More Capitalism,” is a blueprint for a policy agenda that prioritizes reduction of government intervention, less bureaucracy, lower taxes and pro-market reforms. Merz also wants to strengthen German borders with restrictionist immigration politics, a reflection of how the country has moved far to the right on the issue amid the rise of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), with whom Merz has at times flirted.

    Yet in Merz’s relatively different agenda, he similarly advocates for both Europe and NATO, and wishes to refashion Germany into the powerhouse it was in the Merkel years and make it again the envy of Europe.

    German Chancellor Angela Merkel confers with President Donald Trump in 2018.
    Ian Langsdon/AFP via Getty Images

    A changing conception of Europe?

    Given the current “America First” attitude of the Trump administration and the rise of far-right populism across the EU and the world, it is thought-provoking – some would say alarming – that Trump declared the results of an election that saw strong gains for the far right – propelling it into second place – as a “great day for Germany.”

    Whether it is great for Europe depends on what vision of the continent one has in mind. Merz, although more right wing than Merkel, nonetheless has advocated for a strong Europe, led by Germany, that could promote a Europe independent of U.S. influence, appearing to follow in the steps of former French President Charles de Gaulle, who sought to cleave Europe from American dominance.

    During his recent speech at the Munich Security Conference, U.S. Vice President JD Vance warned of a European “threat from within,” disparaging continental governments for their retreat from “fundamental values, values shared with the United States of America,” while defending far-right populism and policies on the continent. Elon Musk subsequently posted on his social platform X: “Make Europe Great Again! MEGA, MEGA, MEGA!”

    Despite the bewilderment and dismay expressed by the European leaders at such statements, today’s tormented and divided Europe can hardly claim it is a problem-free environment, nor that many of the continent’s leaders don’t likewise support such politics.

    The rise of populism and nationalism across Europe poses a huge problem for what could unceremoniously be described as “Old Europe,” especially now, when it is seemingly drifting apart from its former ally and protector, the United States.

    With Russian influence and authoritarian politics growing in Central Europe – especially in Hungary and Slovakia – and ultra-nationalist and far-right ideas likewise strong in Austria, Germany, France and elsewhere, today’s Europe is hardly a unified political, economic and cultural totality.

    In Italy, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s right-wing political chameleonism, combined with her defense and praise of both Musk and Trump, is also a problem for those searching for a Europe unified more toward the political center.

    Don’t keep me hanging, s’ils vous plaît!

    Less than a year ago, France’s Macron, the still-passionate Europeanist, marked a somber note in suggesting: “We must be clear on the fact that our Europe, today, is mortal. … It can die, and that depends entirely on our choices.”

    ‘Would Henry Kissinger bother to even pick up the phone today?’
    Jack Robinson/Condé Nast via Getty Images

    Among other things, what Macron’s warning points to is the unresolved question of what the European bloc desires to be. So long as the answer to that question remains unclear, Kissinger’s question could be rephrased to, “Is there even a Europe to call?”

    And, given the Trump administration’s emerging hostility to a host of EU policies, including on the war in Ukraine, foreign aid, regulation and trade, there is a further worrying interpretation for EU leaders, even if there were “a Europe to call”: Would Washington bother picking up the phone?

    Julia Khrebtan-Hörhager does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Is a united European voice possible in the age of Trump, Putin and far-right politics? Germany’s new leader intends to find out – https://theconversation.com/is-a-united-european-voice-possible-in-the-age-of-trump-putin-and-far-right-politics-germanys-new-leader-intends-to-find-out-249241

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Russia: The Academic Council of the Polytechnic University: results of the winter session and implementation of the NCMU program

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Peter the Great St Petersburg Polytechnic University – Peter the Great St Petersburg Polytechnic University –

    On February 26, the Polytechnic University held a meeting of the Academic Council, where they honored polytechnicians who have achieved high results in various fields, discussed the results of the winter session, tasks for the spring semester, and the implementation of the NCMU program.

    First of all, the rector of SPbPU Andrey Rudskoy introduced the vice-rector for university security Alexander Airapetyan. Then the award ceremony began.

    The official part began with the honoring of the holders of the title “Honorary Worker of SPbPU”. This is a doctor of physical and mathematical sciences, professor of the Department of Physics Vadim Ivanov and candidate of technical sciences, associate professor of the Higher School of Mechanical Engineering, chairman of the Trade Union of Employees Valentin Kobchikov.

    SPbPU Distinction Badge “For Merit” The award was given to member of the Public Chamber of St. Petersburg, advisor to the president of PJSC Rostelecom, and 1978 graduate of the mechanical engineering faculty, Alexey Sergeev.

    Candidate of Economic Sciences diplomas were awarded to the Vice President, Director of the North-West macro-regional branch of PJSC Rostelecom Alexander Loginov (scientific supervisor – Doctor of Economic Sciences, Professor Vladimir Glukhov) and Acting Vice-Rector for Promising Projects Maria Vrublevskaya (scientific supervisor – Doctor of Economic Sciences, Professor Olga Kalinina).

    Certificates of conferring the academic title of associate professor were received by Denis Akhmetov, Anton Barabanov, Evgeny Borisov, Victoria Vilken, Irina Karpovich, Vladimir Kochemirovsky, Irina Russkova. The certificate was also presented to the Deputy Director of the Humanitarian Institute, associate professor of the Higher School of Linguistics and Pedagogy Tatyana Nam, along with a letter of gratitude from the Governor of St. Petersburg Alexander Beglov for initiative and active civic position, significant contribution to the development of volunteer activities.

    Certificates of professional and public accreditation of educational programs were received by the Director of the Institute of Industrial Management, Economics and Trade Vladimir Shchepinin (23 programs), the Director of the Civil Engineering Institute Marina Petrochenko (13 programs) and the Director of the Institute of Computer Science and Cybersecurity Dmitry Zegzhda (one program).

    Advisor to the rector’s office Vitaly Drobchik, head of the department for interaction with the media Evgeny Pleshachkov, as well as specialists of the Public Relations Department Vera Fatova, Ulyana Durova and Alina Melnikova were awarded with gratitude for holding the All-Russian student Olympiad “I am a professional”.

    The leadership of the Federal Security Service Directorate for Perm Krai expressed gratitude for modern forensic scientific developments and fruitful cooperation in joint work to prevent crimes against the security of the Russian Federation to the Director of the Higher School of Jurisprudence and Forensic Science Dmitry Mokhorov and Senior Lecturer Pavel Menshikov.

    A letter of gratitude from the educational foundation “Talent and Success” for fruitful cooperation, professionalism and high quality of organization of educational events – participants of the programs of the educational center “Sirius” was presented to the senior lecturer of the Higher School of Media Communications and Public Relations Evgeniya Tuchkevich.

    Cups and certificates for 2nd place in the absolute team championship of St. Petersburg student competitions in 2024, as well as for 1st place in the team championship were awarded to the director of the Institute of Physical Culture, Sports and Tourism Valery Sushchenko, the director of the sports club “Black Bears – Polytech” Anastasia Akatova and the leading specialist of the club Daria Khadjaridi.

    Senior Lecturer of the Department of Physical Training and Sports received cups and medals for 2nd overall team place at the All-Russian student orienteering competitions Tatyana Bevza, as well as students Ulyana Bryuchko (PhysMech) and Mikhail Belyakov (IFKST).

    For first place in the billiard competition “POOL-8” of the Spartakiad “Health – 2025” among teachers and employees of St. Petersburg universities, awards were given to the Director of the Higher School of Jurisprudence and Forensic Science Dmitry Mokhorov and the Head of the News Portal Department Evgeny Gusev.

    The winners of the 20th All-Russian conference-competition for students and postgraduates “Current Issues of Subsoil Use” were students of the Higher School of Industrial Management of IPMEiT Anastasia Malashchitskaya and Daria Moiseenko, a student of the Civil Engineering Institute Olga Loginova (scientific supervisor – PhD, Associate Professor Vitaly Kudinov), as well as a postgraduate student of the Higher School of Engineering and Economics of PMEiT Olga Bichevaya (scientific supervisor – Svetlana Gutman).

    The first issue on the agenda was summing up the results of the winter session of the 2024-2025 academic year: almost 70% of full-time students successfully passed the exams, which indicates a high level of preparation and a responsible approach to study.

    More than 7,500 students will receive scholarships based on the results of the midterm assessment, which is an important incentive for further improvement and striving for academic achievements. Such positive dynamics emphasize the effectiveness of the educational process and compliance with high standards of educational quality, – said Lyudmila Vladimirovna.

    She presented the positive experience of implementing the pilot program to support talented students “Leaders of Polytechnic”, launched at IMMiT: 94% of students in this program passed the session with “excellent” and “good” grades.

    The program has proven its effectiveness, helping participants to reveal their abilities and achieve outstanding results, and the results serve as a vivid example of how investments in talented youth bring results, contributing not only to the personal growth of students, but also to strengthening the university’s reputation as a center of attraction for gifted and promising specialists. Such high academic performance of the program participants emphasizes the importance of personalized work with each student, taking into account their individual characteristics and needs, – noted Lyudmila Pankova.

    One of the issues was the discussion of the plan for the transition to a new system for assessing learning outcomes based on individual achievements. The individual achievement system (IAS) being developed is a fundamentally new approach to assessing current monitoring of academic performance and midterm assessment. IAS will allow taking into account individual student achievements, including those outside the educational program, thereby increasing their motivation and ensuring an objective assessment of knowledge. For teachers, this is a tool for reducing routine workload, thanks to the automation of assessment processes, accounting, and recording of current control points.

    Vice-Rector for Digital Transformation of SPbPU, Head of the Advanced Engineering School of SPbPU “Digital Engineering” (AES), World-class scientific center of SPbPU “Advanced digital technologies” (NCMU) Alexey Borovkov presented the key results of the implementation of the NCMU program for 2024-2024 and spoke about the scientific and technological groundwork of the strategy and program for the university’s development until 2030 and 2036.

    Alexey Borovkov emphasized that the indicator of extra-budgetary financing of the world-class Scientific Center of SPbPU “Advanced Digital Technologies” is 101.7%, which is three times more than the average indicator for all scientific centers of medicine in Russia.

    Speaking about significant world-class research carried out by the SPbPU NCMU “Advanced Digital Technologies”, Aleksey Ivanovich highlighted the creation of a large-scale scientific and technological reserve in the field of technology for the development and application of digital twins of products, machines, and structuresDigital platform for the development and application of digital twins CML-Bench®. Compared to traditional approaches, the development of products and goods based on digital twin technology reduces time, financial and other resource costs by ten times or more.

    In conclusion, the speaker highlighted the important role of the SPbPU NCMU “Advanced Digital Technologies” in the SPbPU Technological Development Ecosystem, which ensures a balance of activities of different structures and the synergy of the best scientific technological and educational practices to achieve technological leadership, sovereignty and national security of Russia.

    The scientific and technological groundwork formed by the SPbPU NCMU on the CML-Bench® digital platform is the basis for the implementation of six national projects of technological leadership, enshrined in the development strategy of the Polytechnic University until 2030. For example, the promising direction of unmanned aircraft systems directly relies on the groundwork of the SPbPU NCMU “Advanced Digital Technologies” for several projects and developments at once. At the moment, we are actively working on creating a design environment and digital certification of unmanned aircraft systems, – shared Alexey Borovkov.

    In addition, at the meeting, members of the Academic Council voted to award the academic title of associate professor to Polytechnic employees: Maxim Izmailov (IPMET), Vasily Krundyshev (IKNK), Natalia Solodilova (IMMiT), Oleg Shagniev and Ilya Keresten (PISH CI Higher School of Advanced Digital Technologies).

    Academic Secretary Dmitry Karpov presented the work plan of the University Academic Council for the 2nd semester of the 2024-2025 academic year and reported on monitoring the implementation of the Academic Council’s decisions.

    The meeting concluded with a consideration of current issues.

    Photo archive

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Concludes 2024 Article IV Consultation with India

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    February 27, 2025

    Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the Article IV consultation[1] with India.

    Despite recent moderation, India’s economic growth has remained robust, with GDP growth of 6 percent y/y in the first half of 2024/25. Inflation has broadly declined within the tolerance band, though food price fluctuations have created some volatility. The financial sector has remained resilient, with non-performing loans at multi-year lows. Fiscal consolidation has continued, and the current account deficit has remained well contained, supported by strong growth in service exports.

    Real GDP is expected to grow at 6.5 percent in 2024/25 and 2025/26, supported by robust growth in private consumption on the back of sustained macroeconomic and financial stability. Headline inflation is expected to converge to target as food price shocks wane. The current account is expected to widen somewhat but remain moderate at -1.3 percent of GDP in 2025/26. Looking ahead, India’s financial sector health, strengthened corporate balance sheets, and strong foundation in digital public infrastructure underscore India’s potential for sustained medium-term growth and continued social welfare gains.

    Risks to the economic outlook are tilted to the downside. Deepening geoeconomic fragmentation could affect external demand, while deepening regional conflicts could result in oil price volatility, weighing on India’s fiscal position. Domestically, the recovery in private consumption and investment may be weaker than expected if real incomes do not recover sufficiently. Weather shocks could adversely impact agricultural output, lifting food prices and weighing on the recovery in rural consumption. On the upside, deeper implementation of structural reforms could boost private investment and employment, raising potential growth.

    Executive Board Assessment[2]

    Executive Directors commended the authorities’ prudent macroeconomic policies and reforms, which have contributed to making India’s economy resilient and once again the fastest growing major economy. Directors stressed that in the face of headwinds from geoeconomic fragmentation and slower domestic demand, continued appropriate policies remain essential to maintain macroeconomic stability. India’s strong economic performance provides an opportunity to advance critical and challenging structural reforms to realize India’s ambition of becoming an advanced economy by 2047.

    Directors commended the authorities’ commitment to fiscal prudence and welcomed the adoption of a debt target as the medium-term fiscal anchor, which has enhanced transparency and accountability. Given significant development and social needs, Directors recommended continued, well-calibrated fiscal consolidation over the medium term to rebuild buffers, ease debt service, and reduce debt. They suggested a greater focus on domestic revenue mobilization, which together with current expenditure rationalization, such as better targeting of subsidies, can create space for growth-enhancing expenditure on infrastructure and health. Notwithstanding fiscal disparities across states, Directors also broadly agreed that a more holistic fiscal framework that includes state and central government, as well as a more detailed fiscal deficit path with sufficient flexibility, could be used as an operational guide.

    Directors welcomed the Reserve Bank of India’s well-calibrated monetary policy with inflation remaining within the target band. They noted that opportunities could arise to gradually lower the policy rate further, and stressed that monetary policy should remain data-dependent and well communicated. Directors recommended greater exchange rate flexibility as the first line of defense in absorbing external shocks, with foreign exchange interventions limited to addressing disorderly market conditions. A few Directors also saw the need for foreign exchange interventions in other cases noting limitations in the current global financial safety net.

    Directors welcomed the 2024 Financial System Stability Assessment, which points to the overall resilience of India’s financial system, and encouraged the authorities to use the current favorable environment to further strengthen financial resilience. Noting pockets of vulnerability from the interconnectedness among nonbank financial institutions, banks, and markets, as well as from concentrated exposures to the power and infrastructure sectors, Directors recommended further aligning India’s framework of financial sector regulation, supervision, resolution, and safety net with international standards. A number of Directors also suggested greater flexibility in priority sector lending. Directors encouraged the authorities to further improve the AML/CFT framework.

    Directors emphasized that comprehensive structural reforms are crucial to create high-quality jobs, invigorate investment, and unleash higher potential growth. Efforts should focus on implementing labor market reforms, strengthening human capital, and supporting greater participation of women in the labor force. Boosting private investment and FDI is also vital and will require stable policy frameworks, greater ease of doing business, governance reforms, and increased trade integration which should include both tariff and nontariff reduction measures with all parties involved. In this context, Directors welcomed India’s recent tariff reductions, noting that these can enhance competitiveness and foster India’s role in global value chains. Directors commended India’s significant progress in emission intensity reduction and renewable energy deployment and agreed that a balanced climate policy framework, alongside greater access to concessional financing and technology, would be key to achieving net zero emissions by 2070. Directors also welcomed the ongoing capacity development provided to further upgrade the quality, availability, and timeliness of India’s macroeconomic and financial statistics.

    Table 1. India: Selected Social and Economic Indicators, 2020/21-2025/26 1/

    2020/21

    2021/22

    2022/23

    2023/24

    2024/25

    2025/26

    Est.

    Projections

    Growth (in percent)

       Real GDP (at market prices)

    -5.8

    9.7

    7.0

    8.2

    6.5

    6.5

    Prices (percent change, period average)

       Consumer prices – Combined

    6.2

    5.5

    6.7

    5.4

    4.8

    4.3

    Saving and investment (percent of GDP)

       Gross saving 2/

    29.8

    30.9

    31.0

    32.6

    32.7

    32.2

       Gross investment 2/

    28.9

    32.1

    33.0

    33.3

    33.6

    33.5

    Fiscal position (percent of GDP) 3/

      Central government overall balance

    -8.5

    -6.7

    -6.6

    -5.6

    -4.8

    -4.5

      General government overall balance

    -12.9

    -9.4

    -9.0

    -8.1

    -7.4

    -7.0

      General government debt 4/

    88.4

    83.5

    82.0

    82.7

    82.7

    81.4

      Cyclically adjusted balance (% of potential GDP)

    -7.6

    -7.7

    -8.4

    -8.2

    -7.4

    -7.1

      Cyclically adjusted primary balance (% of potential GDP)

    -2.5

    -2.6

    -3.3

    -2.8

    -2.0

    -1.6

    Money and credit (y/y percent change, end-period)

       Broad money

    12.2

    8.8

    9.0

    11.1

    10.0

    10.9

       Domestic Credit

    9.5

    9.0

    13.1

    12.0

    11.2

    11.9

    Financial indicators (percent, end-period)

      91-day treasury bill yield (end-period)

    3.3

    3.8

    6.7

    7.0

      10-year government bond yield (end-period)

    6.3

    6.9

    7.3

    7.1

      Stock market (y/y percent change, end-period)

    68.0

    18.3

    0.7

    24.9

    External trade (on balance of payments basis)

       Merchandise exports (in billions of U.S. dollars)

    296.3

    429.2

    456.1

    441.4

    443.3

    458.7

        (Annual percent change)

    -7.5

    44.8

    6.3

    -3.2

    0.4

    3.5

       Merchandise imports (in billions of U.S. dollars)

    398.5

    618.6

    721.4

    686.3

    728.8

    768.6

        (Annual percent change)

    -16.6

    55.3

    16.6

    -4.9

    6.2

    5.5

      Terms of trade (G&S, annual percent change)

    2.0

    -8.7

    -2.7

    3.2

    -1.3

    0.2

    Balance of payments (in billions of U.S. dollars)

      Current account balance

    24.0

    -38.7

    -67.0

    -26.0

    -34.7

    -53.8

       (In percent of GDP)

    0.9

    -1.2

    -2.0

    -0.7

    -0.9

    -1.3

     Foreign direct investment, net (“-” signifies inflow)

    -44.0

    -38.6

    -28.0

    -10.1

    1.9

    -6.4

     Portfolio investment, net (equity and debt, “-” = inflow)

    -36.1

    16.8

    5.2

    -44.1

    -4.6

    -20.4

     Overall balance (“+” signifies balance of payments surplus)

    87.3

    47.5

    -9.1

    63.7

    2.8

    25.0

    External indicators

       Gross reserves (in billions of U.S. dollars, end-period)

    577.0

    607.3

    578.4

    646.4

    649.2

    674.2

        (In months of next year’s imports (goods and services))

    9.0

    8.1

    8.0

    8.3

    7.9

    7.8

      External debt (in billions of U.S. dollars, end-period)

    573.7

    619.1

    624.1

    668.9

    726.5

    787.3

      External debt (percent of GDP, end-period)

    21.4

    19.5

    18.6

    18.7

    18.9

    18.6

       Of which: Short-term debt

    9.5

    8.5

    8.2

    8.1

    8.3

    8.1

      Ratio of gross reserves to short-term debt (end-period)

    2.3

    2.3

    2.1

    2.2

    2.0

    1.9

      Real effective exchange rate (annual avg. percent change)

    -0.8

    0.3

    -0.3

    0.3

    Memorandum item (in percent of GDP)

      Fiscal balance under authorities’ definition

    -9.2

    -6.7

    -6.5

    -5.6

    -4.8

    -4.4

    Sources: Data provided by the Indian authorities; Haver Analytics; CEIC Data Company Ltd; Bloomberg L.P.; World Bank, World Development Indicators; and IMF staff estimates and projections.                                                                                                 

    1/ Data are for April–March fiscal years.                                                                                                                         

    2/ Differs from official data, calculated with gross investment and current account. Gross investment includes errors and omissions.        

    3/ Divestment and license auction proceeds treated as below-the-line financing.                                                                                                  

    4/ Includes combined domestic liabilities of the center and the states, and external debt at year-end exchange rates.                                                                                                                                    

    [1] Under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country’s economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board.

    [2] At the conclusion of the discussion, the Managing Director, as Chair of the Board, summarizes the views of Executive Directors, and this summary is transmitted to the country’s authorities. An explanation of any qualifiers used in summings up can be found here: http://www.IMF.org/external/np/sec/misc/qualifiers.htm.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Randa Elnagar

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/02/26/pr25045-india-imf-executive-board-concludes-2024-article-iv-consultation-with-india

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI: Wix Announces Board Authorization of $200 Million Share Repurchase Program

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    NEW YORKWix.com Ltd. (NASDAQ: WIX) (“Wix,” the “Company,” “we” or “our”), today announced that its Board of Directors (the “Board”) authorized a program to repurchase the Company’s securities (ordinary shares and/or convertible notes) in an amount up to $200 million.

    This repurchase program demonstrates the Board’s continued confidence in the Company’s ability to drive strong cash flow generation and ongoing commitment to increasing shareholder value.

    Under the Board authorized repurchase program, Company securities may be repurchased from time to time using a variety of methods, which may include open market purchases, privately negotiated transactions or otherwise, all in accordance with U.S. securities laws and regulations, including Rule 10b-18 under the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act“).  The Company may also, from time to time, enter into plans that are compliant with Rule 10b5-1 of the Exchange Act to facilitate repurchases of its securities under this authorization.  The repurchase program does not obligate the Company to acquire any particular amount of securities, and the repurchase program may be suspended or discontinued at any time at the Company’s discretion.  Repurchases under the repurchase program may begin after conclusion of the 30-day period for creditors of the Company to object to the Company’s intent to perform the distribution by way of repurchase in accordance with the Israeli Companies Regulations (Relief for Public Companies Whose Securities are Traded on Stock Exchanges Outside of Israel), 5760-2000 and the Israeli Regulations (Approval of Distribution), 5761–2001.  The actual timing, number and value of securities repurchased depend on a number of factors, including the market price of the Company’s ordinary shares, general market and economic conditions, any objections received by the Company from its creditors, the Company’s financial results and liquidity, and other considerations.  The Company expects to fund repurchases with cash on hand and future cash generated from its operations.

    About Wix.com Ltd.

    Wix is the leading SaaS website builder platform1 to create, manage and grow a digital presence. Founded  in 2006, Wix is a comprehensive platform providing users – self-creators, agencies, enterprises, and more – with industry-leading performance, security, AI capabilities and a reliable infrastructure. Offering a wide range of commerce and business solutions, advanced SEO and marketing tools, the platform enables users to take full ownership of their brand, their data and their relationships with their customers. With a focus on continuous innovation and delivery of new features and products, users can seamlessly build a powerful and high-end digital presence for themselves or their clients. 

    For more about Wix, please visit our Press Room
    Media Relations Contact:  PR@wix.com  

    1 Based on number of active live sites as reported by competitors’ figures, independent third-party data and internal data as of H1 2024.

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This document contains forward-looking statements, within the meaning of the safe harbor provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 that involve risks and uncertainties. Such forward-looking statements may be identified by words like “anticipate,” “assume,” “believe,” “aim,” “forecast,” “indication,” “continue,” “could,” “estimate,” “expect,” “intend,” “may,” “plan,” “potential,” “predict,” “project,” “outlook,” “future,” “will,” “seek,” “confidence,” and similar terms or phrases. The forward-looking statements contained in this document, are based on management’s current expectations, which are subject to uncertainty, risks and changes in circumstances that are difficult to predict and many of which are outside of our control. Important factors that could cause our actual results to differ materially from those indicated in the forward-looking statements include, among others, our expectation that we will be able to attract and retain registered users and partners, and generate new premium subscriptions, in particular as we continuously adjust our marketing strategy and as the macro-economic environment continues to be turbulent; our expectation that we will be able to increase the average revenue we derive per premium subscription, including through our partners; our expectation that new products and developments, as well as third-party products we will offer in the future within our platform, will receive customer acceptance and satisfaction, including the growth in market adoption of our online commerce solutions and our Wix Studio product; our expectations regarding our ability to develop relevant and required products using artificial intelligence (“AI”), the regulatory environment impacting AI and AI-related activities, including privacy and intellectual property, and potential competitive impacts from AI tools; our assumption that historical user behavior can be extrapolated to predict future user behavior, in particular during turbulent macro-economic environments; our prediction of the future revenues and/or bookings generated by our user cohorts and our ability to maintain and increase such revenue growth, as well as our ability to generate and maintain elevated levels of free cash flow and profitability; our expectation to maintain and enhance our brand and reputation; our expectation that we will effectively execute our initiatives to improve our user support function through our Customer Care team, and continue attracting registered users and partners, and increase user retention, user engagement and sales; our ability to successfully localize our products, including by making our product, support and communication channels available in additional languages and to expand our payment infrastructure to transact in additional local currencies and accept additional payment methods; our expectation regarding the impact of fluctuations in foreign currency exchange rates, interest rates, potential illiquidity of banking systems, and other recessionary trends on our business; our expectations relating to the repurchase of our ordinary shares and/or Convertible Notes pursuant to our repurchase program; our expectation that we will effectively manage our infrastructure; our expectation to comply with AI, privacy, and data protection laws and regulations as well as contractual privacy and data protection obligations; our expectations regarding the outcome of any regulatory investigation or litigation, including class actions; our expectations regarding future changes in our cost of revenues and our operating expenses on an absolute basis and as a percentage of our revenues, as well as our ability to achieve and maintain profitability; our expectations regarding changes in the global, national, regional or local economic, business, competitive, market, and regulatory landscape, including as a result of Israel-Hamas war and/or the Israel-Hezbollah hostilities and/or the Ukraine-Russia war and any escalations thereof and potential for wider regional instability and conflict; our planned level of capital expenditures and our belief that our existing cash and cash from operations will be sufficient to fund our operations for at least the next 12 months and for the foreseeable future; our expectations with respect to the integration and performance of acquisitions; our ability to attract and retain qualified employees and key personnel; and our expectations about entering into new markets and attracting new customer demographics, including our ability to successfully attract new partners large enterprise-level users and to grow our activities, including through the adoption of our Wix Studio product, with these customer types as anticipated and other factors discussed under the heading “Risk Factors” in the Company’s annual report on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2023, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on March 22, 2024. The preceding list is not intended to be an exhaustive list of all of our forward-looking statements. Any forward-looking statement made by us in this press release speaks only as of the date hereof. Factors or events that could cause our actual results to differ may emerge from time to time, and it is not possible for us to predict all of them. We undertake no obligation to publicly update any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future developments or otherwise.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: So-called Presidential elections in Georgia’s Abkhazia region on 15 February: joint statement to the OSCE

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Speech

    So-called Presidential elections in Georgia’s Abkhazia region on 15 February: joint statement to the OSCE

    The UK, Canada, Iceland and Norway underline non-recognition of the illegal so-called Presidential elections in Georgia’s Abkhazia region on 15 February 2025.

    2010 to 2015 Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition government“>

    This was published under the 2010 to 2015 Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition government

    Thank you, Mr Chair. I am delivering this statement on behalf of Canada, Iceland, Norway, and my own country the United Kingdom.

    We were concerned to hear of the illegal so-called Presidential elections in Georgia’s Abkhazia region on 15 February 2025.  We do not recognise the legitimacy of these elections.

    We reaffirm our full support for Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders. We continue to call on the Russian Federation to reverse its recognition of the so-called independence of Georgia’s Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions.

    We call upon the Russian Federation to immediately fulfil its obligation under the EU-mediated ceasefire agreement of 12 August 2008 to withdraw its forces to pre-conflict positions, fulfil its commitments to allow unfettered access for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and cease all borderisation tactics.

    Updates to this page

    Published 27 February 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Global: Israel’s bombing of Gaza caused untold environmental damage − recovery will take effort and time

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Lesley Joseph, Research Assistant Professor of Environmental Engineering, University of South Carolina

    Vast areas in Gaza have been reduced to rubble. Majdi Fathi/NurPhoto via Getty Images

    The war in Gaza has come with an awful cost. Tens of thousands of Palestinian civilians have been killed, and thousands more are missing. And while a temporary ceasefire has allowed for increased aid delivery, easing the plight of those facing disease and hunger, experts predict malnutrition and health issues to persist for months or even years.

    Much of the territory’s infrastructure – its schools, hospitals and homes – has been damaged or destroyed. And yet, the tremendous human and societal loss has been augmented by a lesser reported but potentially catastrophic, consequence: environmental devastation.

    In June 2024, the United Nations Environment Programme conducted an environmental impact assessment to evaluate the damage resulting from Israeli military actions in Gaza. It found “unprecedented levels of destruction” from the intensive bombing campaign, along with the complete collapse of water and solid waste systems, and widespread contamination of the soil, water and air. And that was before another six months of bombing caused further damage to Gaza.

    As a scholar of environmental justice, I have thought carefully about the impact that a lack of clean water, access to sanitation facilities, and the absence of basic infrastructure can have on a community, particularly vulnerable and marginalized populations. The current pause in fighting is providing respite for the 2.2 million people in Gaza who have endured more than a year of war. It also provides an opportunity to evaluate the environmental damage to the densely populated enclave in three crucial areas: the water, sanitation and hygiene sector, or WASH; air quality; and waste management.

    Here is what we know so far:

    WASH sector

    According to an interim damage assessment released by the World Bank, U.N. and E.U. in March 2024, an estimated US$502.7 million of damage was inflicted on the WASH sector in Gaza in the initial months of bombing, including damage to approximately 57% of the water infrastructure.

    The United Nations reported that water desalination plants in Gaza, 162 water wells and two of the three water connections with Israel’s national water provider had been severely damaged.

    As a result, the amount of available water in Gaza was at that point reduced to roughly 2-8 liters per person per day – below the World Health Organization emergency daily minimum of 15 liters and far below its standard recommendation of 50-100 liters per day.

    In November 2024, meanwhile, the charity Oxfam reported that all five wastewater treatment plants in Gaza had been forced to shut down, along with the majority of its 65 wastewater pumping stations. This resulted in ongoing discharges of raw, untreated sewage into the environment. As of June 2024, an estimated 15.8 million gallons of wastewater has been discharged into the environment in and around Gaza, according to the U.N. environmental report.

    Meanwhile, sanitation facilities for Palestinians in Gaza are practically nonexistent. Reporting from U.N. Women states that people in Gaza routinely walk long distances and then wait for hours just to use a toilet, and due to the lack of water, these toilets cannot be flushed or cleaned.

    Air quality

    The air quality in Gaza has been drastically impacted by this war. NASA satellite imagery from the first few months of the war found that approximately 165 fires were recorded in Gaza from October 2023 to January 2024.

    With a shortage of electricity, residents have been forced to burn various materials, including plastics and household waste, for cooking and heating. And this has contributed to a dangerous decline in air quality.

    Meanwhile, large amounts of dust, debris and chemical releases have been produced from explosions and the destruction of infrastructure, leading to significant air pollution. In February 2024, the U.N. Mine Action Service estimated that, in the first few months of the war alone, more than 25,000 tons of explosives had been used, equivalent to “two nuclear bombs.”

    Waste management

    In the first six months of bombardment, more than 39 million tons of debris were generated, much of it likely to contain harmful contaminants, including asbestos, residue from explosives and toxic medical waste.

    Human remains are also mixed in with this debris, with estimates that over 10,000 bodies remain under the rubble. Moreover, the three main landfills in the Gaza Strip have been closed and are unable to receive waste or conflict-related debris.

    Substantial damage has been done to five out of six solid waste management facilities, and solid waste continues to accumulate at camps and shelters, with an estimate of 1,100 to 1,200 tons being generated daily.

    The charge of ‘ecocide’

    With such environmental destruction, claims of “ecocide” have been made against the Israeli government by international rights groups.

    Although not presently incorporated into the framework of international law, there have been recent efforts for ecocide to be added as a crime under the Rome Statute, the treaty that established the International Criminal Court. Indeed, a panel of experts in 2021 proposed a working definition of ecocide as “unlawful or wanton acts committed with knowledge that there is a substantial likelihood of severe and either widespread or long-term damage to the environment caused by those acts.”

    To date, 15 countries have criminalized ecocide, and Ukraine is investigating Russia for ecocide for its destruction of the Kakhovka Dam in 2023.

    Various organizations, including the Al Mezan Center for Human Rights, the University of California Global Health Institute and the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, have stated that the level of environmental devastation in Gaza reaches the proposed legal definition of “ecocide.”

    Although the Israeli government has not responded to these accusations, it has consistently stated that it has a right to defend itself and that it seeks to protect civilians as it conducts its military operations.

    Health impacts of environmental harm

    Regardless of whether the charge of ecocide applies to Israel’s bombardment of Gaza, the environmental impact, the spread of disease, and other harmful health impairments will be felt for years to come.

    The United Nations Relief and Works Agency reported an increase in hepatitis A in the enclave, from 85 cases before the current war to 107,000 cases in October 2024. The WHO has reported 500,000 cases of diarrhea and 100,000 cases of lice and scabies, along with the reemergence of polio.

    Polio virus has been found in wastewater, threatening the lives of Palestinian children in Gaza.
    Dawoud Abo Alkas/Anadolu via Getty Images

    The lack of adequate WASH facilities has also disproportionately affected women and girls by interfering with basic menstrual hygiene, harming their mental and physical health.

    Meanwhile, the increased presence of dangerous air pollutants has led to increases in respiratory issues, including nearly 1 million acute respiratory illnesses. Presently, the most common respiratory ailments in Gaza are asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, bronchitis, pneumonia and lung cancer.

    Next steps

    As a licensed environmental engineer, I have never seen the scale of environmental destruction that has occurred in Gaza.

    While the situation is unprecedented, there are concrete steps that the international community can take to help Gaza’s environment recover. The three-stage ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas, which went into effect on Jan. 19, 2025, is a promising first step. This agreement has allowed some Israeli hostages to be released and Palestinian detainees to return to their homes. It also allows for more humanitarian aid to enter Gaza to deal with the current food crisis and health emergency.

    Nevertheless, there are significant challenges ahead for the people of Gaza. First, the ceasefire agreement will need to hold – and already there are signs of difficulty in implementing the agreement in full. Should fighting resume, that will close or delay the opportunity for engineers and surveyors to perform detailed, comprehensive field assessments.

    Meanwhile, the need for a post-conflict plan for Gaza has never been starker.

    Recovering from Gaza’s environmental devastation will require Israel and neighboring countries, as well as influential world powers such as the United States and the European Union, to work together to rebuild critical infrastructure, such as water and wastewater treatment plants and solid waste infrastructure. Moreover, to succeed, any long-term plan for the reconstruction of Gaza will need to prioritize the needs and perspectives of Palestinians themselves.

    Lesley Joseph does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Israel’s bombing of Gaza caused untold environmental damage − recovery will take effort and time – https://theconversation.com/israels-bombing-of-gaza-caused-untold-environmental-damage-recovery-will-take-effort-and-time-245311

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Dmitry Chernyshenko discussed the construction of a school in Bratsk with Sergei Kravtsov and the Governor of the Irkutsk Region Igor Kobzev

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    Dmitry Chernyshenko discussed the construction of a school in Bratsk with Sergei Kravtsov and the Governor of the Irkutsk Region Igor Kobzev

    Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Chernyshenko held a working meeting with Minister of Education Sergei Kravtsov and Governor of the Irkutsk Region Igor Kobzev on the topic of building a school in the 26th microdistrict of Bratsk.

    The issue of continuing the construction of a secondary comprehensive school for 1,275 students, which had been suspended due to a lack of funds, was raised during government hour in the Federation Council chaired by Valentina Matviyenko. To resolve it, Dmitry Chernyshenko met with Sergei Kravtsov and Igor Kobzev.

    “Creating educational infrastructure is one of the priority areas. Situations with suspensions and missed deadlines are unacceptable. I ask the Ministry of Education, together with the region, to find optimal options for solving the issue with the involvement of federal budget funds,” said Dmitry Chernyshenko.

    The Deputy Prime Minister added that the situation with the school will be taken under special control.

    “There is indeed a demand for high-quality educational infrastructure in the region, and our task is to provide comfortable conditions for the education of all children. The Ministry of Education has studied the situation. When building schools, an extremely responsible approach is important on the ground. We will keep the issue of building a school in Bratsk under control,” said Minister of Education Sergey Kravtsov.

    Irkutsk Region Governor Igor Kobzev noted the importance of building a new school in Bratsk. According to him, the central part of the city is growing quite quickly, many children are appearing. Today, more than 1 thousand students in the district study in the second shift.

    “We will do everything to make the new school a real modern center for developing the potential of each child, including children with special needs, the best center for career guidance and self-determination of schoolchildren and, of course, a creative professional environment for teachers. Yes, large construction projects do not always have an easy fate, there are restraining factors, such as the complexity of the designed object, rising prices for construction materials, inflation processes, and the human factor is not excluded in some places. Our task is to complete the construction of a new school in Bratsk through joint efforts,” said Igor Kobzev.

    The Governor of the Irkutsk Region also promised that the school will accept students in September 2027.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Fianna Fail TD displays Putin like attitude on anniversary of the invasion of the Ukraine

    Source: Traditional Unionist Voice – Northern Ireland

    Statement by TUV vice chairman Councillor Allister Kyle:

    “The remarks by Fianna Fail TD Cathal Crowe in which he described the existence of Northern Ireland as “a source of hurt” were deeply ironic, particularly in the context of a debate on the anniversary of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

    “The mindset displayed by Mr Crowe is strikingly similar to that of President Putin who has attacked the right of Ukraine to exist.

    “To talk about respecting “territorial boundaries” in a speech in which he attacks the existence of the Irish Republic’s nearest neighbour shows an irony bypass which is hard to fathom.

    “His remarks should act as a wake up call to Unionists who have bought into the Protocol implementing process. Far from regarding the Belfast Agreement as a settlement, Mr Crowe described it as “only a stepping-stone” to an all-Ireland.

    “It is time that he, his party and indeed the EU showed a little bit of respect for “territorial boundaries”. Perhaps then they could be taken seriously when it comes to Ukraine. Unionism too would do well to reflect on the fact that that the constitutional ambitions of Dublin remain unchanged.”

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Video: Ukraine: The Road Ahead | World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2025

    Source: World Economic Forum (video statements)

    The war against Ukraine has taken new directions including the surprise offensive in Kursk and permission to use ally-supplied weapons on Russian territory. Yet, Western support for Ukraine continues to come under greater pressure, accelerating the prospect of negotiations on a peace deal.

    As the full-scale invasion enters its fourth year, what does the future hold for Ukraine in 2025?

    This session was developed in collaboration with Bloomberg News.

    Speakers: Jean-Noël Barrot, Radoslaw Tomasz Sikorski, Roberta Metsola, Andrii Sybiha, Yuliia Svyrydenko, Edgars Rinkēvičs, Stephanie Flanders

    The 55th Annual Meeting of the World Economic Forum will provide a crucial space to focus on the fundamental principles driving trust, including transparency, consistency and accountability.

    This Annual Meeting will welcome over 100 governments, all major international organizations, 1000 Forum’s Partners, as well as civil society leaders, experts, youth representatives, social entrepreneurs, and news outlets.

    The World Economic Forum is the International Organization for Public-Private Cooperation. The Forum engages the foremost political, business, cultural and other leaders of society to shape global, regional and industry agendas. We believe that progress happens by bringing together people from all walks of life who have the drive and the influence to make positive change.

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    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b0hh4WEcAlY

    MIL OSI Video

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Human Rights in Russia and the deaths of Alexei Navalny and Boris Nemtsov: Joint Statement to the OSCE, February 2025

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Speech

    Human Rights in Russia and the deaths of Alexei Navalny and Boris Nemtsov: Joint Statement to the OSCE, February 2025

    UK and others commemorate Alexei Navalny and Boris Nemtsov and call on Russia to release political prisoners immediately and unconditionally.

    Thank you  Mr Chair.  I am making this statement on behalf of Albania, Canada, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland, Ukraine and my own country the United Kingdom.   

    Following the anniversary of Alexei Navalny’s death, which followed years of arbitrary detention in poor conditions, we extend our condolences to his family and reiterate that the ultimate responsibility for his death lies with the Russian authorities. Today we also commemorate Boris Nemtsov, ten years after his brutal murder.   

    We regret that Russia’s dire human rights record continues to deteriorate. The Russian government crushes peaceful dissent, maintains a climate of fear and undermines the rule of law. This stands in direct contradiction to shared OSCE principles and commitments on inter alia the right to a fair trial, freedom from arbitrary detention, the right to freedom of assembly and association and the prohibition on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.  

    As we reflect on Navalny and Nemtsov’s enduring legacy, our countries continue to stand with civil society and human rights defenders working tirelessly to build a better future for Russia in the face of immense personal risk. 

    In July 2022, 38 participating States invoked the Moscow Mechanism on threats to the fulfilment of the provisions of the Human Dimension posed by human rights violations and abuses in the Russian Federation.  That Moscow Mechanism report determined that:  “a decade of reform legislation in Russia has completely changed the scope of action of Russian civil society, cutting it off from foreign and international partners, suppressing independent initiatives, stifling critical attitudes towards the authorities, silencing the media and suppressing political opposition”.  

    Such internal clampdowns on human rights and fundamental freedoms helped the Russian Federation prepare the ground for its war of aggression against Ukraine. Since February 2022 the Russian authorities have further tightened internal repression in an apparent attempt to silence all opposition voices.  There are now over 800 political prisoners in Russia, including many imprisoned for speaking out against Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine and the brutality shown towards the Ukrainian people.  

    In this context we regret Russia’s lack of response to the Vienna Mechanism of March 2024 on treatment of prisoners.   We also recall the 11 October 2024 report by the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Russian Federation which inter alia examined the widespread and systematic use of torture and ill treatment in the Russian Federation.  

    We reiterate our call to the Russian authorities to immediately and unconditionally release all political opposition activists, human rights defenders, journalists and other media actors.   

    We will continue to hold Russia to account against its international obligations and commitments on human rights and fundamental freedoms, including OSCE principles and commitments to which it signed up willingly. 

    For as we all agreed in Moscow in 1990, respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law constitutes one of the foundations of the international order.  And as we also agreed in Moscow, commitments undertaken in the field of the human dimension are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned.  

    Thank you, Mr Chair.

    Updates to this page

    Published 27 February 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial news: 02/27/2025 will be the deposit auction of the MFI Financing Fund

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Moscow Exchange – Moscow Exchange –

    Date of the deposit auction 02/27/2025. Placement currency RUB. Maximum amount of funds placed (in the placement currency) 40,000,000.00. Placement term, days 31. Date of depositing funds 02/28/2025. Date of return of funds 03/31/2025. Minimum placement interest rate, % per annum 21.50. Terms of the conclusion, urgent or special. Minimum amount of funds placed for one application (in the placement currency) 40,000,000.00. Maximum number of applications from one Participant, pcs. 1. Auction form, open or closed (Open). Basis of the Agreement – General Agreement. Schedule (Moscow time).

    Preliminary bids from 10:00 to 10:10. Competition bids from 10:10 to 10:20. Setting the cutoff percentage or declaring the auction invalid before 10:40.

    Additional terms

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    HTTPS: //VVV. MOEX.K.MO/N78014

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial news: On 27.02.2025, the deposit auction of the PPC “TERRITORIAL DEVELOPMENT FUND” will take place

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Moscow Exchange – Moscow Exchange –

    The date of the deposit auction is 27.02.2025. The placement currency is RUB. The maximum amount of funds placed (in the placement currency) is 1,085,000,000.00. The placement period, days is 7. The date of depositing funds is 27.02.2025. The date of return of funds is 06.03.2025. The minimum placement interest rate, % per annum is 20.50. Terms of the conclusion, urgent or special (Urgent). The minimum amount of funds placed for one application (in the placement currency) is 1,085,000,000.00. The maximum number of applications from one Participant, pcs. 1. Auction form, open or closed (Open). The basis of the Agreement is the General Agreement. Schedule (Moscow time). Applications in preliminary mode from 12:30 to 12:40. Bids in competition mode from 12:40 to 12:45. Setting the cutoff percentage or declaring the auction invalid until 12:55.

    Additional terms

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

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    HTTPS: //VVV. MOEX.K.M.M.

    MIL OSI Russia News