Russian Federation – Page 478

MIL-OSI Europe: Press release – Investigation into missing unaccompanied child migrants wins the 2024 Daphne Caruana Galizia Prize for Journalism

Source: European Parliament 3

Lost in Europe on Wednesday won the 2024 Daphne Caruana Galizia Prize for Journalism for its investigation into the disappearance of over 50 000 unaccompanied child migrants.

The investigation, run by media from Germany, Italy, Greece, the Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland and the UK revealed that at least 51 433 unaccompanied child migrants disappeared after arriving in European countries between 2021 and 2023.

Roberta Metsola, President of the European Parliament, Pina Picierno, Vice-President responsible for the Prize, and representatives of the independent European-wide Jury of the Prize participated in the award ceremony held in the European Parliament’s Daphne Caruana Galizia Press Room in Strasbourg.

President Metsola said: “Daphne Caruana Galizia’s legacy continues through the work of journalists who live to tell the truth and refuse to be silenced. Their fight for justice prevails over the threats that try to undermine their important work. Press freedom is non-negotiable. Seven years after Daphne’s assassination, we continue to honour her memory with a prize that reminds us of this Parliament’s long-standing commitment to these fundamental values”.

Between 3 May and 31 July 2024, hundreds of journalists from the 27 EU countries submitted their stories for consideration. Thirteen of the 318 submissions were shortlisted by the jury before the winner was chosen.

About the Winning Story

Lost in Europe uncovered the staggering reality that, since 2021, on average nearly 47 children have vanished each day after arriving in Europe.

Data collected by Lost in Europe from 31 European countries, including Austria, Germany, and Italy, reveal that tens of thousands of migrant children are missing.

The months-long investigation shows that the number of missing migrant children could be even higher, as inconsistent documentation and the lack of data collection by some countries contribute to significant gaps in reporting.

This latest investigation builds on Lost in Europe’s 2021 research, which revealed that over 18 000 migrant children went missing in Europe between 2018 and 2020.

As Aagje Leven, Secretary General of Missing Children Europe, noted, the findings are likely just the “tip of the iceberg,” as more child migrants continue to disappear at alarming rates in Europe, with many feared to be victims of human trafficking and modern slavery.

The publishing partners for this investigation were De Standaard, (Belgium), Small Stream Media (the Netherlands), RBB (Germany), Knack (Belgium), ANSA (Italy), Domani (Italy), CNN (UK/US), VRT (Belgium), Εfimerida ton Syntakton (Greece), , The Journal (Ireland), Tagesschau (Germany), and NRC (the Netherlands).

About the Prize

The Daphne Caruana Prize was initiated by a decision of the European Parliament’s Bureau in December 2019 as a tribute to Daphne Caruana Galizia, a Maltese anti-corruption investigative journalist and blogger who was killed in a car bomb attack in 2017.

Every year, the Prize rewards (on the anniversary of the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia) outstanding journalism that promotes or defends the core principles and values of the European Union such as human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, rule of law, and human rights.

Professional journalists and teams of professional journalists of any nationality can submit in-depth pieces that have been published or broadcast by media based in one of the European Union’s 27 member states. The aim is to support and highlight the importance of professional journalism in safeguarding freedom, equality and opportunity.

The independent jury is composed of representatives of the press and civil society from the 27 EU member states and a representative of the International Federation of Journalists.

The Prize and the €20 000 in prize money demonstrate the European Parliament’s strong support for investigative journalism and a free press.

Past winners

2021 – “The Pegasus Project”, coordinated by the Forbidden Stories

2022 – Documentary on “The Central African Republic under Russian Influence” by Clément Di Roma and Carol Valade (ARTE/France24/Le Monde)

2023 – Joint investigation on the Pylos migrant boat shipwreck (Solomon, in collaboration with Forensis, StrgF/ARD, and The Guardian)

Who was Daphne Caruana Galizia?

Daphne Caruana Galizia was a Maltese journalist, blogger and anti-corruption activist who reported extensively on corruption, money laundering, organised crime, sale of citizenship and the Maltese government’s links to the Panama Papers. Following harassment and threats, she was murdered in a car bomb explosion on 16 October 2017. The outcry over the authorities’ handling of her murder investigation ultimately prompted the resignation of Prime Minister Joseph Muscat. Critical of failings in the investigation, in December 2019, MEPs called on the European Commission to take action.

MIL OSI Europe News –

January 25, 2025

MIL-OSI USA: Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III On-Camera, On-the-Record Remarks to Traveling Press in Rome, Italy

Source: United States Department of Defense

DEPUTY PRESS SECRETARY SABRINA SINGH:. Thanks, everyone, for joining us for this gaggle. I’m going to let the secretary give some opening remarks and then we’ll start with Rob for questions.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE LLOYD AUSTIN: Yeah. Again, thanks for joining us on a pretty long trip, but I think we accomplished a lot. It was the last NATO defense ministerial for the Biden administration. And again, I think that was a really good engagement with a number of our allies. And following that, we had a G7 ministerial and the first-ever G7 ministerial — defense ministerial, and I think that was very, very productive as well.

You went with us as we went into Kyiv following that. We were able to engage President Zelenskyy and his leadership on a number of important issues. We announced yet another presidential drawdown package. And then finally, today finished up with a visit to the Vatican. So, again, I think it was a good trip overall.

And I’ll stop there and take your questions.

MS. SINGH: Rob?

Q: Mr. Secretary, you just met with the Pope, had an audience with him. Can you share more about what you discussed? And did he talk to you about any of the conflicts in Ukraine or the Middle East?

SECRETARY AUSTIN: Well, it won’t surprise you that the Pope is very much focused on what’s going on in Ukraine and also in the Middle East as well. He’s concerned about humanitarian issues in both areas. And of course, we share a common desire to see these conflicts, you know, scale back in terms of the level of activity and a ceasefire in both cases.

Again, I think he’ll continue to exercise his influence to do the right things, and I’ll continue to do what we’re doing on our end to make sure that, number one, Ukraine can defend itself and its sovereignty. And number two, as we’ve said a number of times, we’re going to continue to support Israel and its efforts to defend itself.

We need to dial down the tension in the Middle East region, and we need to also find a way to transition in Ukraine. Now, as we’ve said all along, we’re going to continue to support Ukraine, and they will determine when the time is to go to the negotiating table. But you’ve heard me say before this conflict will end in some kind of negotiation at some point. Thanks.

MS. SINGH: Phil?

Q: Mr. Secretary, in his nightly video address last night, Ukraine’s President Zelenskyy called on allies not to hide and to respond to evidence of North Korean involvement in Russia’s war in Ukraine. So, I’ll ask you, have you seen any evidence that North Korean troops are in Russia? And if so, what is the intent of this deployment?

SECRETARY AUSTIN: Well, our analysts are — they continue to look at this, and we are seeing evidence that there are North Korean troops that have gone to Africa. And I wouldn’t — excuse me, not Africa but Russia. What exactly they’re doing will have to be seen. These are things that we need to sort out. We’ll have more for you on that later. But, yeah, as we continue to look at this, there is evidence that there are DPRK troops in Russia.

MS. SINGH: Eric?

Q: Just to follow up on that, sir, can you talk a little bit about what you understand the intent of those troops to be? And what does it say about perhaps the desperation of Putin himself to rely on these countries? What role is that? And what is the — what is North Korea getting in return for that? What’s the quid pro quo for that?

SECRETARY AUSTIN: All of the things that we’re trying to trying to gain better fidelity on, Eric, number one, why are the troops there. We’ll continue to pull this thread and see what happens here. If they’re co-belligerents, if their intention is to participate in this war on Russia’s behalf, that is a very, very serious issue.

And it will have impacts not only in Europe. It will also impact things in the Indo-Pacific as well. We’ve seen the Republic of Korea be very focused on this issue as well. So, still a lot of things to be answered, Eric. And our analysts will continue to work this, and we’ll have more for you as we get more fidelity.

Q: And where are the North Koreans’ motivations? Why are they doing this?

SECRETARY AUSTIN: Yeah, unknown. Certainly, there is a strengthened relationship, for lack of a better term, between Russia and DPRK. You’ve seen the DPRK provide arms and munitions Russia, and this is a next step.

But what it means in terms of where Putin is, you know, I’ve — heard me talk about the significant casualties in — that he had experienced over the last two and a half years. This is an indication that he may be even in more trouble than most people realize. But, again, he went tin cupping early on to get additional weapons and materials from the DPRK and then from Iran. And now he’s making a move to get more people, if that is the case, if these troops are designed to be a part of the fight in Ukraine. But we’ll see. These are questions that have yet to be answered.

MS. SINGH: Natasha?

Q: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Two quick questions. As you’re likely aware, there is a DOD official being named and accused on social media of leaking highly classified intelligence about Israel. Is that disinformation? Can you rule out that that individual is being investigated, and has the probe homed in on a suspect?

SECRETARY AUSTIN: There’s no OSD official being named as a part of this investigation. So, that is not true at this point, and I’ve seen no evidence of that or any indication that any OSD official will be implicated as a part of this.

Q: Ok. And secondly, Israel has claimed that Hezbollah has a major bunker underneath Al-Sahel Hospital in southern Beirut. Doctors who work there have denied the allegation. Has the US seen its own evidence of this bunker underneath that hospital?

SECRETARY AUSTIN: We’ve not seen evidence of that at this point. But, you know, we’ll continue to collaborate with our Israeli counterparts to gain better fidelity on exactly what they’re looking at.

Q: Thank you.

MS. SINGH: Lara?

Q: Mr. Secretary, I understand you shared with the Ukrainians your DOD spend plan for the next five months for the Ukraine conflict. As you know, five months is after the inauguration of what will be a new administration. So, if Trump gets elected, will you speed up that plan to ensure Ukraine gets all the money that Congress has allocated? And how will you ensure that all of the equipment actually gets delivered, since you know that takes longer?

SECRETARY AUSTIN: Well, as we commit the funds, Laura, I mean, everything won’t be delivered immediately. So, things that we’re purchasing now, for example, may wind up showing up a couple of months later. And as we laid out the plan on what we’re investing in with both our USAI funds and the drawdown materials that we’re providing, when we can get some of those materials refurbished and into Ukraine, and again, it’s not instantaneous, it may take weeks or in some cases a couple of months. But we laid that plan out for them, and we’re confident that, based upon, you know, what we’ve done and what we are doing that, you know, those things will be delivered on the timeline that we’ve outlined.

Q: But a new administration could change that and could stop those deliveries.

SECRETARY AUSTIN: They would have to de-obligate, you know, the things that we’ve already obligated. So, I think we’re pretty sure that these materials will continue to flow.

Q: Thank you.

MS. SINGH: Chris?

Q: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. While you were in Ukraine, President Zelenskyy’s focused on $800 million the US has pledged towards drone production. What is the purpose and goal of that? And is that just for drones, or could Ukraine use that towards ballistic or cruise missiles?

SECRETARY AUSTIN: Well, we’re going to continue to invest in their long range strike capability. Now, what we’ve seen is that they’ve developed the capability to mass produce drones that are very, very effective and that can go impressive distances. We’ve seen them strike targets that are 400 kilometers beyond the border, and even deeper, with precision. And they can do that at a fraction of a cost of a ballistic missile.

So, it makes sense to invest in that capability, in their ability to continue to scale. And I think that answers, addresses, the needs that they’ll have not only now but long into the future.

Q: Would you say that addresses the long range strike question that we keep bugging you about?

SECRETARY AUSTIN: Well, as we’ve told you so many times, the range of an ATACMS is 300 kilometers. They’re striking targets that are beyond 400 kilometers with precision. So, you know, and they can do that at a fraction of the cost. So, this balances out the the balance sheet here.

And, you know, if they’re going to be able to sustain their efforts, gotta to be able to afford it. And so, it makes sense for them to expand the capacity. It makes sense for us to invest in what they’re doing. It works. It’s effective and it’s precise.

Q: Thank you.

MS. SINGH: And the last one. Missy?

Q: Yep. Thanks so much. In Lebanon, the targets that Israel is striking in the Beirut area have widened beyond military sites. It’s hitting municipal buildings and health clinics. Last night there were intense strikes on apartment buildings. And now Israel’s issuing the warning, as Natasha mentioned, about this hospital, suggesting that could be a target.

And then, on the other hand in northern Gaza, you know, the UN is describing the situation there as beyond catastrophic. The UN says the IDF is, you know, continuing its offensive there, denied permission to rescue people from the rubble. Only a handful of trucks are reaching the north each day. And meanwhile, the Netanyahu government, some of the ministers today were having conversations about resettling Gaza and extending the occupation there.

All of that to say I know you are a strong supporter of Israel’s self-defense, but you’ve also said that how they do it matters. In your view, as someone who has commanded counterinsurgency campaigns extensively, do you think that they’ve gone beyond self-defense on both of these fronts to something that’s more punitive or indiscriminate? And are you worried that Israel’s actions are weakening, not strengthening, its security in the long term?

SECRETARY AUSTIN: Well, Missy, you’ve heard me say on a number of times that — a couple things. Number one, the ability to accomplish your goals militarily in terms of achieving objectives and protecting humans, protecting civilians in the battle space, those two things are— you can do both of those things. They’re not mutually exclusive.

And the other thing that I’ve emphasized throughout, Missy, is the need to protect civilians and provide that humanitarian assistance. And this is something I talk to my counterpart about every time I talk to him, those two things. We’ve got to be more precise in our operations, and we have to make sure that we’re doing what’s necessary to get assistance and aid into the civilians.

Failure to do that will, you know, will create a generation of Palestinians that really will continue to resist cooperating with Israel in the future. So, you’re actually increasing the numbers of insurgents in the space if you fail to do that. It’s a strategic imperative, in my view.

Q: Ok. But just to clarify, in your view, are — the actions that they’re taking on both strips — fronts, have they gone beyond self-defense actions?

SECRETARY AUSTIN: Well, you know, it’s one of the things in both cases that makes it more difficult is that both Hamas and LH use civilians as human shields. They put their stores of weapons in apartment buildings, beneath mosques and churches and in schools and hospitals in order to make it more difficult to strike them.

Because of that complication, you know, that has increased the occurrence of civilian casualties. I think — you know, let’s not kid ourselves. This is a complicated, a very, very difficult battle space. And, you know, so we’re — we need to do everything we can — the Israelis need to do everything they can to be as careful as possible to protect civilians in that battle space. But Hamas and LH make it more complicated.

MS. SINGH: Thank you all. Appreciate your time. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

MIL OSI USA News –

January 25, 2025

MIL-OSI USA: Statement from President Joe Biden on Historic Decision to Leverage Russian Sovereign Assets to Support Ukraine

US Senate News:

Source: The White House
This summer, I led an effort to bring the G7 together to commit $50 billion in Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration loans to Ukraine backed by the profits of immobilized Russian sovereign assets. After Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine, the G7 took bold action to immobilize Russia’s sovereign assets in our jurisdictions, and committed that these assets will remain immobilized until Russia ends its aggression and pays for the damage it has caused to Ukraine—paving the way for Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration loans.
As part of the G7 package, the United States is announcing today that we will provide $20 billion in loans to Ukraine that will be paid back by the interest earned from immobilized Russian sovereign assets. In other words, Ukraine can receive the assistance it needs now, without burdening taxpayers. These loans will support the people of Ukraine as they defend and rebuild their country. And our efforts make it clear: tyrants will be responsible for the damages they cause.
Make no mistake: Russia will not prevail in this conflict. The people of Ukraine will prevail. This is another reminder to Vladimir Putin that the world has rallied behind Ukraine—and the United States and our G7 partners will continue to stand with them every step of the way.

MIL OSI USA News –

January 25, 2025

MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Defence Secretary John Healey opening remarks from Trinity House agreement press conference 23 October 2024

Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

Defence Secretary John Healey delivered opening remarks alongside German defence minister, Boris Pistorius, after signing the Trinity House Agreement

Location:: Trinity House, London
Delivered on:: 23 October 2024 (Transcript of the speech, exactly as it was delivered)

This is a significant day for UK relations and for both our countries. Less than 100 days since I first visited Berlin in July to kick off these negotiations together, we have today signed a landmark defence agreement here at Trinity House in London. First, I want to thank our negotiating teams, they worked at pace, and they have helped us secure a deal which forges closer cooperation between our militaries and our industries, which contains immediate actions and longer term ambitions. Today’s agreement strengthens our security, it will grow our economies.

And you know, when I was Shadow Defence Secretary before the general election, I had conversations with allies and partners and academics that said Britain needed to play a bigger part in NATO. They said European allies needed to take on more responsibility for European security and this, this is the driving force behind our NATO, first UK Defence strategy, behind our reset of UK relations with Europe. We share the same threats, war in Ukraine, conflict in the Middle East, growing Russian aggression. We share the same values, democracy, individual freedom, rule of law.

And in a more dangerous world, allies are our strategic strength, and we must do more together. But I believe then, as I know Boris, you did too, that the UK-Germany defence relationship was underdeveloped. The UK and Germany are currently Europe’s top two defence spenders. We’re currently Europe’s top two supporters of Ukraine in military and economic aid. Yes, there’s 40 years of great cooperation on fast jets between UK and Germany. Yes, both countries have deployed and operated together in Kosovo, in Afghanistan, and to counter IS. But the collaboration has been ad hoc. It has not been systematic, and there is no fully-fledged defence cooperation agreement. And as I started work on this area, with some of you in this room, and I thank you for your contributions. As I started work sometime last year, there were only 28 German military personnel training in the UK. There were only six Brits doing the same in Germany, we only had one bilateral German-UK defence industrial programme. So there was huge potential, which we both wanted to seize. The potential and imperative to respond to increasing threats to strengthen our collective security through NATO, which is the cornerstone for the defence of both our nations.

So today, we have signed this landmark Trinity House Agreement. It secures defence cooperation across all domains, land, sea, air, cyber, space. It will be put on a legal footing in the wider treaty between the UK and Germany. The agreement confirms new lighthouse defence projects between our militaries, and where better to announce these than Trinity house, which is home of England’s official Lighthouse Authority and has been so since 1794. In fact, actually, it goes back longer than that, to Henry the Eighth, when he took the first steps to maritime regulation from this building in 1514. And Admiral Ian Lower, thank you for your hospitality, thank you for hosting us, and thank you to your teams for helping us organise this event.

But in this new agreement, our new cooperation is focused on the now, with our army’s training, exercising, innovating more together on NATO’s eastern flank, on German P8 planes operating out of Lossiemouth to help protect the North Atlantic and on new support for Ukraine through the capability coalitions, and also enabling German seeking helicopters to be equipped with modern missile systems. So cooperation focused on the now, and also cooperation focused on the weapons of the future: developing a new deep strike system together; pursuing new drones that could operate alongside our tanks; our planes and our warships; kick starting work together to protect vital undersea cables in the North Sea; advancing innovation between our armies to shape the future of NATO warfare; driven by AI and emerging technologies. And as well as this, this agreement paves the way for closer industrial cooperation.

So today, Rheinmetall have announced plans to build a new gun barrel factory in Britain, supporting 400 jobs, bringing nearly half a billion pounds of benefit to the UK economy, and reestablishing a critical defence industry for the first time in 10 years, gun barrels built in Britain with British steel for our British armed forces and for our allies. And from artillery to AI, from the weapons of now to the weapons of the future, Helsing have also confirmed today a new investment of 350 million pounds into the UK for the development of AI systems. So this shows today’s agreement gives renewed confidence to investors in the UK defence industrial base. Finally, just to give this a bigger context, our new government was elected in July to deliver change. Before with the election, we promised a new defence agreement with Germany in six months, we’ve signed this landmark agreement in less than four months. This is what turning talk into action looks like. This is what resetting relations with Europe looks like. This is what growing our economy looks like, and this is what a NATO first defence strategy looks like. And today’s agreement also sends a signal to our adversaries. We will deter and we will defend against any aggression together.

Boris, I look forward to working closely with you in putting this agreement into action. Today really is only the start of new, deeper relations between our two nations. And yes, politicians may come and go, but the Trinity house agreement will live on, and it will keep our countries and Europe safely in the years to come. Thank you.

Published 23 October 2024

MIL OSI United Kingdom –

January 25, 2025

MIL-OSI Russia: Financial news: 10/23/2024, 15:36 (Moscow time) the values of the upper limit of the price corridor and the range of market risk assessment for the RU000A102FQ5 security (Sber Sb20R) were changed.

Translation. Region: Russian Federation –

Source: Moscow Exchange – Moscow Exchange –

10/23/2024

15:36

In accordance with the Methodology for determining the risk parameters of the stock market and deposit market of Moscow Exchange PJSC by NCO NCC (JSC), on 10/23/2024, 15:36 (Moscow time), the values of the upper limit of the price corridor (up to 98.21) and the range of market risk assessment (up to 1070.3 rubles, equivalent to a rate of 12.5%) of the RU000A102FQ5 security (Sber Sb20R) were changed.

Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

Please note; This information is raw content directly from the information source. It is accurate to what the source is stating and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

https://www.moex.com/n74239

MIL OSI Russia News –

January 25, 2025

MIL-OSI USA: Beatty & Waters Lead Call for Stronger, More Accountable IFIs

Source: United States House of Representatives – Congresswoman Joyce Beatty (3rd District of Ohio)

WASHINGTON, DC – Today, Congresswoman Joyce Beatty (D-OH), the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on National Security, Illicit Finance, and International Financial Institutions, and Congresswoman Maxine Waters (D-CA), the top Democrat on the House Financial Services Committee announced plans this week to introduce a legislative package aimed at strengthening and reforming the International Financial Institutions. With the Annual Meetings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank Group underway, this bill will help initiate reforms related to transparency, accountability, and institutional management. Specifically, this bill seeks to hold accountable the persons involved in the child sexual abuse scandal at the Bridge Academies project in Kenya, eliminate onerous loan conditions on developing or distressed countries, improve the debt forgiveness efforts of the IFIs, reduce reliance on Russian agriculture, combat corruption, and more.

“Countries around the world continue to face significant social and economic challenges, from corruption and human rights abuses to debt sustainability crises and the disastrous effects of climate change,” said Congresswoman Beatty. “International Financial Institutions (IFIs) have done substantial work to promote financial stability, poverty reduction, and economic development, but they can do more to address systemic inequities and facilitate debt relief for distressed countries. I am proud to join Ranking Member Waters in introducing this package of meaningful reforms to increase transparency and accountability at the IFIs, strengthen support for low-income countries, and establish robust human rights protections.”

“Over the years, our International Financial Institutions (IFI) have played a crucial role in establishing international order and addressing some of the most pressing economic challenges across the globe,” said Congresswoman Waters. “Despite this success, there have been troubling instances of child abuse, corruption, discrimination, and mismanagement that has hindered IFIs from reaching their full potential. I am eager to advance this bill to the President’s desk and look forward to working across the aisle on ways to strengthen the IMF, World Bank and other Development Banks so that they can create a more equitable and prosperous global economy.”

Key provisions in the legislative package include:

Treasury Report on Accountability of the World Bank in Child Sexual Abuse – This provision would mandate that Treasury report to Congress on a quarterly basis on actions completed by the World Bank to compensate survivors of child sexual abuse, including with financial compensation and other relief, and to hold accountable those involved in the Bridge Academies project. The quarterly report to Congress must also include details of reforms adopted by the International Finance Corporation (IFC) to prevent such failures in the future, as well as any steps taken by the IFC to impede Treasury from sharing any information around this report or the Bridge Academies case with Congress.

Anti-corruption measures in lending agreements – This provision states that the US press for the incorporation of anti-corruption measures in lending agreements at the IMF to build sustainable economies. Such measures must include ensuring that governments receiving loans make specific, measurable, and time-bound commitments as part of the loan agreements, with consequences for noncompliance.

Protections for human rights, including LGBTQ+ persons – This provision would mandate that Treasury oppose the World Bank providing financial assistance to countries that engage in the human rights abuses as reported in the State Department’s Annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, including those of people who identify as LGBTQ+.

Loan Conditions – This provision states that the U.S. encourage the reduction or elimination of loan conditions that: limit spending on key social needs such as health, education, or climate action; weaken environmental, labor, public health regulations; or increase taxes or reduce subsidies in such a way that falls regressively on recipient country populations.

Reporting on Human Rights Abuses in For-Profit Healthcare – This provision mandates that Treasury report to Congress on a biannual basis on any known accusations made by community groups, CSOs, media, or other credible actors, of human rights abuses at MDB-funded, for-profit hospitals, included those funded by the IFC, and on actions completed by the MDB private sector arms to investigate and address or respond to these accusations. This provision also mandates that the U.S. advocate for the MDBs to examine their investments in healthcare to determine contribution to universal health coverage, the strengthening of national health systems, and the reduction of health inequities.

Resilience and Sustainability Trust (RST) Financing – This provision would amend the most recent appropriations law so that U.S. money could be used to finance loans to the RST in addition to the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust. This is important because the Republicans cut the RST out from potentially receiving loans.

Quota Increase – This provision would authorize an equiproportional increase in quota at the IMF consistent with the increase Treasury negotiated with the IMF Member countries. If Congress passes this provision the US would retain its veto power and percent of shareholding at the IMF and China’s share would not increase (even though it probably should based on its growth). At the IMF, Member countries’ maximum financial commitments to the Fund are called “quota.” Quota is broadly matched to a Member country’s relative position in the world’s economy, and voting shares at the IMF are in line with how much quota a country pays. This was in President Biden’s most recent budget request.

Read the full bill here.
Read the Section by Section here.

For media inquiries, please contact Cassandra.Johnson@mail.house.gov.

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MIL OSI USA News –

January 25, 2025

MIL-OSI Canada: Deputy Prime Minister to attend G7 and G20 Finance Ministers’ Meetings and Annual Meetings of the IMF and World Bank

Source: Government of Canada News

News release

October 23, 2024 – Ottawa, Canada – Department of Finance Canada

This week, from October 23 to 25, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, the Honourable Chrystia Freeland, will attend the Fall Meetings of G7 and G20 Finance Ministers and the Annual Meetings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank in Washington D.C.

At these meetings, the Deputy Prime Minister will advance work with Canada’s allies to strengthen supply chains with trusted trading partners to create jobs and economic growth that is shared by all Canadians.

While in Washington, the Deputy Prime Minister will discuss with allies further efforts to support Ukraine through to victory and into reconstruction. Canada was an early champion of G7 efforts to make full use of frozen Russian sovereign assets, and provided a CA$5 billion (US$3.7 billion) contribution to the G7’s CA$68 billion (US$50 billion) Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration Loans for Ukraine.

The Deputy Prime Minister will further Canada’s work to build resilient economies and reduce economic inequalities—as demonstrated by the government’s historic investments in early learning and child care, national dental care coverage, and free contraception and diabetes medication. The Deputy Prime Minister will also advance Canada’s work on international tax cooperation.

An itinerary of events will be released in advance of the meetings.

Quotes

“Canada is leading the G7 in cutting interest rates four times this year and reducing inflation to target for all of this year. The wages of Canadian workers have outpaced inflation for 20 months. And, the IMF expects Canada’s economic growth to be the best in the G7 next year. Together, Canada and our allies are working to ensure recent economic gains are not unwound, but rather built upon, so we can create more good-paying jobs, help people get ahead, and build a fairer future for every generation.”

– The Honourable Chrystia Freeland, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance

Quick facts

Canada is leading the G7 in:
- Cutting interest rates; the first to cut rates twice, the first to cut rates a third time, and now the first to cut rates a fourth time;
- Economic growth expectations, with the IMF predicting that Canada’s GDP will be the fastest growing in 2025;
- Maintaining the lowest net debt-to-GDP ratio—by a significant margin—in the G7; and,
- Securing AAA credit ratings from at least two of the world’s three major credit rating agencies, along with only Germany.
Inflation has been within the target range of 1 per cent to 3 per cent for all of 2024, with inflation in Canada falling to 1.6 per cent in September—a 43 month low.
Wages in Canada have outpaced inflation for 20 months in a row, which means Canadian workers today on average have larger pay cheques, even accounting for inflation, than they did before the pandemic.
The Annual Meetings of the IMF and World Bank, which generally take place in October, have customarily been held in Washington for two consecutive years and in another member country in the third year.

Contacts

Media may contact:

Katherine Cuplinskas
Deputy Director of Communications
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance
Katherine.Cuplinskas@fin.gc.ca

Media Relations
Department of Finance Canada
mediare@fin.gc.ca
613-369-4000

General enquiries

Phone: 1-833-712-2292
TTY: 613-369-3230
E-mail: financepublic-financepublique@fin.gc.ca

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MIL OSI Canada News –

January 25, 2025

MIL-OSI Security: Defense News: Truman Strike Group Destroyers Conduct Barents Sea Operations

Source: United States Navy

The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers USS Jason Dunham (DDG 109) and USS Stout (DDG 55), assigned to the Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group (HSTCSG), conducted routine maritime operations in the Barents Sea in international waters, Oct. 21.

The Barents Sea is a marginal sea of the Arctic Ocean, located off the northern coasts of Norway and Russia and bordered by the Kola Peninsula to the south, where extreme weather conditions create a difficult operational environment.

“Our ability to conduct sustained operations in the challenging Arctic region is critical to maintaining an enhanced global presence,” said Rear Adm. Sean Bailey, commander of the HSTCSG. “Stout and Jason Dunham entered the Barents Sea to build the U.S. Navy’s situational awareness in the austere Arctic environment and underscore our commitment to preserving a free and open Arctic.”

U.S. Navy operations in this region are in accordance with international law and are conducted to enhance domain awareness, deter adversaries, and practice campaigning in the Arctic. Climate change is altering the Arctic, where melting ice and warmer temperatures lead to increased human and military activity, including by our competitors.

“The Barents Sea is an exceptionally unique and dynamic environment, and presents a great opportunity for Jason Dunham to reinforce our warfighting readiness in the Arctic,” said Cmdr. Aaron Jefferson III, commanding officer of the USS Jason Dunham (DDG 109). “Our capacity to operate confidently in any conditions across the maritime domain is crucial to our mission and demonstrates the Navy’s resolve to our Allies. The crew of Jason Dunham remains motivated, postured, and ready to respond to threats wherever they should arise.”

In recent years, a surface action group comprised of three Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers and the Royal Navy ship HMS Kent conducted operations in the Barents Sea in 2020.

In July 2024, the Department of Defense released the 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, the fourth iteration for the Department, which outlines the United States’ commitment to preserving the Arctic as a secure and stable region with Allies and partners. Stout’s and Jason Dunham’s

operations are a testament to this commitment, advancing the strategy’s lines of effort to enhance domain awareness and the ability to campaign in the Arctic. The strategy builds upon the 2022 National Security Strategy, the 2022 National Defense Strategy, and the 2022 National Strategy for the Arctic Region.

The HSTCSG continues to support U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa’s maritime operations and theater security cooperation missions, working alongside Allies and partners to maintain maritime safety, security, and stability.

The carrier strike group consists of the flagship USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75); Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 1 with nine embarked aviation squadrons; staffs from CSG-8, CVW-1, and Destroyer Squadron (DESRON) 28; the Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Gettysburg (CG 64); and two Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers, USS Stout (DDG 55) and USS Jason Dunham (DDG 109).

HSTCSG’s mission is to conduct prompt and sustained combat operations at sea and remain the cornerstone of the Navy’s forward presence through sea control and power projection capabilities. You can find them on DVIDS at https://www.dvidshub.net/unit/CVN75.

MIL Security OSI –

January 25, 2025

MIL-OSI Security: Defense News: Secretary Del Toro As-Written Remarks at Future Nuclear-Powered Attack Submarine USS Atlanta (SSN 813) Naming Ceremony

Source: United States Navy

Introduction/Thank You

Good morning, everyone!

It is an honor to be with you this morning in Atlanta.

Dr. Evans, thank you for that kind introduction and for the important work you are doing here at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and Museum.

Mayor Dickens, thank you for welcoming us to Atlanta and for your service to the people of this great city.

Congresswoman Williams, thank you for your presence today, and for your partnership and support of our men and women in uniform.

Mr. Carter, thank you for sharing your family’s stories and carrying on their legacy of service.

Mr. McLaurin, thank you for the work you do, preserving and sharing the rich history of the White House.

I also want to extend a warm welcome to our state and local leadership, including Senator Orrock, Representative Jones, Representative Evans, Representative Miller, Council President Shipman, and Council Member Amos. Thank you for being here with us today.

Superintendent Stuckey, thank you for your work at the Jimmy Carter National Historical Park.

President Cabrera, thank you for your leadership of the students of Georgia Tech and your partnership with the Department of the Navy in moving our Navy and Marine Corps’ technological innovations forward.

Captain Hollenbach, I thank you for all you’ve done as the Virginia-class program manager, ensuring our Navy’s warfighting excellence for years to come.

To all of our service members, distinguished guests and visitors here with us today—welcome and thank you for joining us.

World Today

The world is undeniably complex, and while military power helps advance our national security interests abroad, President Jimmy Carter recognized that diplomacy should always play a leading role in achieving lasting peace.

Our world today looks to the United States as a beacon of hope and freedom around the world.

We face challenges in every corner of the world—from the Indo-Pacific, to Europe, and in the Red Sea.

In Europe, we are approaching the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale and illegal invasion of Ukraine.

For the first time since World War II, we face a comprehensive maritime power in the Indo-Pacific.

The People’s Republic of China continues to exert its excessive maritime claims through their navy, coast guard, and maritime militia.

In the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, we have been working tirelessly alongside our NATO allies and Middle Eastern partners to protect innocent civilian mariners and commercial shipping form Iranian-aligned Houthi attacks.

Following the October 7th attacks in Israel one year ago this month, our Navy and Marine Corps were swiftly deployed to the region, forming an integrated force capable of responding to any threat.

And earlier this month, two of our highly capable destroyers, the USS Cole (DDG 67)—a warship which carries a legacy of standing tall to acts of terrorism—and the USS Bulkeley (DDG 84)—which will always have a special place in my naval carer as her first Commanding Officer—aided our Israeli allies in shooting down Iranian ballistic missiles.

I am incredibly proud of the professionalism, dedication, and resilience shown by our Cole and Bulkeley Sailors.

These brave young men and women illustrate the consistent excellence and effectiveness expected of our United States Navy.

And we mourn the loss of two trailblazing, combat-decorated naval aviators from the Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group who passed away during a training event last week: Lieutenant Commander Lyndsay “Miley” Evans and Lieutenant Serena “Dug” Wileman.

Our thoughts are with their families and friends as they cope with the loss of their loved ones—a loss which serves as a poignant reminder that what we ask of our Sailors and Marines is anything but routine, and in many cases dangerous.

We honor their service and sacrifice by reaffirming our commitment to the ideals that inspire us to serve.

City of Atlanta

The city of Atlanta shares a storied and historic relationship with the United States Navy.

Since the very founding of our Nation, Atlantans from all walks of life have answered the call to service.

The Marine Corps’ first aviator, Lieutenant Colonel Alfred Cunningham, was born in Atlanta in 1882 and pioneered early aviation at a time when there were great risks and little appreciation for the danger involved in flying.

Launched in 1943, Naval Air Station Atlanta trained Navy and Marine Corps squadrons from Reserve Carrier Air Wing 20 and Marine Aircraft Group 42.

While Naval Air Station Atlanta no longer serves the Navy, the airfield continues to serve as the General Lucius D. Clay National Guard Center.

Atlanta is, of course, home to the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and Museum and the Carter Center, named after the former Naval Officer, Senator, Governor, and President, Jimmy Carter.

As a Naval Officer, Lieutenant Carter helped advance our nuclear submarine program alongside Admiral Hymen Rickover, the “Father of the Nuclear Navy.”

While in office, President Carter advocated for a more robust Navy—growing our submarine, aviation, and surface forces.

He also fiercely advocated for the recruitment of Hispanic Americans into the Navy and nominated the first Hispanic American to serve as Secretary of the Navy—Edward Hidalgo.

As Secretary of the Navy, I had the opportunity to rename a building at the Naval Academy after President Carter last year.

Carter Hall will be a place of learning for Midshipmen at the Naval Academy for generations to come.

And the city of Atlanta has had five previous Navy ships named after her legacy.

The first USS Atlanta served the Union Navy throughout the Civil War after being captured from the Confederate Navy.

The second USS Atlanta served in the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico as a barracks ship.

The third USS Atlanta (CL 51) served as the lead ship of the Atlanta-class of light cruisers and was laid down at the start of the Second World War.

Weeks after Japan attacked Pearl Harbor and brought the United States into war, USS Atlanta commissioned at New York Navy Yard and later served as part of Admiral Halsey’s Fleet.

Light cruiser USS Atlanta (CL 104) served in World War II with Fast Carrier Task Force where she conducted shore bombardment missions.

The fifth USS Atlanta (SSN 712) commissioned in 1982, completing multiple deployments and fleet readiness exercises during the Cold War before being decommissioned in 1999.

Ship Naming and Sponsor Announcement

For 25 years, the Navy has been without a ship named after the proud legacy of the city of Atlanta.

And so, it is my honor and privilege to name the next Virginia-class submarine, SSN 813, USS Atlanta.

Our Navy’s submarine force is a lethal combination of one of the most powerful platforms available today manned by our Nation’s best and brightest—people like President Carter.

The Virginia-class Fast Attack Submarines bring tremendous firepower to our Fleet and provide our commanders a valuable asset which strengthens our national security.

And wherever she sails, she will represent not only the legacy of the proud ships who bore the name USS Atlanta before her, but also the thousands of Atlantans who have honorably and faithfully served the United States in uniform, as civil servants, and as activists to better our great Nation.

And I am also proud to announce that the ship sponsor of the future USS Atlanta is former Atlanta Mayor Keisha Lance Bottoms.

The ship’s sponsor fills a vital role throughout the life of a warship, serving as the bond between the ship, her crew, and the nation they serve.

I am honored that Mayor Bottoms accepted the invitation to serve as ship sponsor. As a leader and champion for the people of Atlanta, she represents the best of our Nation, and I thank her for her lifelong commitment to our Navy, to our service men and women, and to the United States of America.

Closing

Our maritime services are indeed the most powerful and capable force this world has ever seen.

Before I close my remarks today, I wanted to draw your attention to the portrait on the stage.

It is Mr. Evan Karanovich’s grandfather’s portrait of USS Atlanta (CL 51), the lead ship of the Atlanta-class of eight light cruisers.

On November 13th, 1942, the third USS Atlanta sank while escorting ships during the war.

The portrait hung in his grandfather’s office for years until Mr. Karanovich received it as a commissioning gift.

And he always wondered why, of all the pictures, he received this one.

His grandfather said that despite the ship being lost in battle—like Atlanta, our Navy, and our Nation—we are resilient.

Atlanta’s motto is “Resurgens,” which means “to rise again.”

What better mantra for us to embrace as we move forward?

Mr. Karanovich, thank you for sharing this beautiful portrait and story with all of us to enjoy.

I thank all of you here for your support of our maritime services—you ensure that America remains the greatest nation in the world.

And now, it is my great pleasure to introduce a leader who was born in this great state.

She currently serves Georgia’s 5th Congressional District and is a member of several caucuses including the Congressional Black Caucus, Democratic Women’s Caucus, Congressional Progressive Caucus, Voting Rights Caucus, LBGTQ+ Equality Caucus, and the HBCU Caucus.

Ladies and Gentlemen, please welcome Congresswoman Nikema Williams.

MIL Security OSI –

January 25, 2025

MIL-OSI USA: Murphy To Cosponsor Legislation To Hold Georgian Officials Accountable For Corruption, Human Rights Abuses, And Anti-Democratic Efforts

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Connecticut – Chris Murphy

October 23, 2024

WASHINGTON–U.S. Senator Chris Murphy (D-Conn.), a member of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on Tuesday announced his intention to join U.S. Senators Jeanne Shaheen (D-N.H.) and Jim Risch (R-Id.) in introducing the Georgian People’s Act, legislation that would hold Georgian government officials and individuals responsible for corruption, human rights abuses, and efforts to advance the foreign influence law or facilitate its passage.
The legislation is cosponsored by U.S. Senators Ben Cardin (D-Md.), Pete Ricketts (R-Neb.), Chris Coons (D-Del.) and Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), and U.S. Senators Thom Tillis (R-N.C.), Mitt Romney (R-Utah), Jeff Merkley (D-Ore.), John Cornyn (R-Texas), Dan Sullivan (R-Ark.), Angus King (I-Maine), Todd Young (R-Ind.), Sheldon Whitehouse (D-R.I.) and George Helmy (D-N.J.) have also requested to join the Senators’ Georgian People’s Act when the Senate reconvenes in November.
“Russia’s use of corruption, propaganda and violence doesn’t just threaten Georgia’s future as a strong, independent nation—it puts the entire international order at risk of collapse,” said Murphy. “As Putin and his cronies try to undermine Georgia’s democracy and impose a government that will do their bidding, this bipartisan legislation makes clear the United States stands firmly with the Georgian people who overwhelmingly support democracy and a future in Europe.”
“I’m pleased that a number of my Senate colleagues recognize the urgency of the situation in Georgia and have agreed to cosponsor the Georgian People’s Act in the U.S. Senate,” said Shaheen. “Together, we’re sending a strong message that there is robust bipartisan support for our legislation and our posture towards Georgia and support for the Georgian people’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations will remain unchanged no matter which party controls Washington.”
“This bill sends a strong message from Congress that the U.S. is united behind the Georgian people as they pursue a future in the transatlantic community,” said Risch. “We recognize the Georgian people’s desire for European integration and are committed to making U.S. policy that supports the opportunity for them achieve it.”
“The Georgian government’s embrace of pro-Russian policies and away from a Euro-Atlantic future is concerning,” said Tillis. “I am proud to co-sponsor this bill to hold the Georgian government officials accountable and reaffirm the U.S. support for the Georgian people.”
“The Georgian government’s shift towards Russia’s authoritarian regime and away from its European partners is alarming,” said Cornyn. “This legislation would hold Georgia’s corrupt leaders accountable and signal to the Georgian people that the U.S. stands with them in their pursuit of a Euro-Atlantic future.”
“While the Georgian people have demonstrated overwhelming support for a democratic future, their government has become increasingly under Russia’s influence—most recently passing a law to restrict civil society and free speech,” said Romney. “Our legislation would hold Georgian government officials responsible for corruption and demonstrate the United States’ commitment to the Georgian people’s fight for democracy and rule of law.”
“A free, secure, sovereign Georgia, aligned with the US and its allies is in the national interest, both of Georgia and the United States,” said Sullivan. “Georgia’s apparent drift back into Russia’s orbit is bad for the stability of the region. No one understands this better than the Georgian people themselves. According to polling from the International Republican Institute, 90% of Georgians want their nation to be part of the Western, free World, not the Russian World.”
“The United States stands with the Georgian people and their pursuit of a Euro-Atlantic future. The Georgian government’s recent efforts to align with Russia reject the desires of Georgians and pose a significant threat. Our bipartisan bill would hold Georgian government officials accountable for corruption and express our support for the transatlantic aspirations of the Georgian people,” said Young.
Full text of the legislation is available HERE.

MIL OSI USA News –

January 25, 2025

MIL-OSI Europe: JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia – RC-B10-0133/2024

Source: European Parliament

Rasa Juknevičienė, François‑Xavier Bellamy, Michael Gahler, Andrzej Halicki, David McAllister, Sebastião Bugalho, Nicolás Pascual De La Parte, Isabel Wiseler‑Lima, Daniel Caspary, Loucas Fourlas, Sandra Kalniete, Łukasz Kohut, Andrey Kovatchev, Andrius Kubilius, Miriam Lexmann, Vangelis Meimarakis, Ana Miguel Pedro, Davor Ivo Stier, Michał Szczerba
on behalf of the PPE Group
Yannis Maniatis, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Raphaël Glucksmann, Udo Bullmann, Matthias Ecke, Francisco Assis
on behalf of the S&D Group
Emmanouil Fragkos, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Assita Kanko, Marion Maréchal, Aurelijus Veryga, Geadis Geadi, Rihards Kols, Bert‑Jan Ruissen, Charlie Weimers
on behalf of the ECR Group
Nathalie Loiseau, Petras Auštrevičius, Helmut Brandstätter, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Bernard Guetta, Karin Karlsbro, Ľubica Karvašová, Moritz Körner, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Marie‑Agnes Strack‑Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar, Dainius Žalimas
on behalf of the Renew Group
Sergey Lagodinsky
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

European Parliament resolution on the situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia

(2024/2890(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Azerbaijan, Armenia and the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh,

– having regard to the relevant documents and international agreements, including but not limited to the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and the Alma-Ata Declaration of 21 December 1991,

– having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950, ratified by Azerbaijan in 2002 and to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,

– having regard to the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict,

– having regard to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 22 April 1996 between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Azerbaijan, of the other part [1],

– having regard to the statements by the European External Action Service spokesperson of 29 May 2024 on the human rights situation in Azerbaijan and of 3 September 2024 on early parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan,

– having regard to Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe resolution 2527 (2024) of 24 January 2024 entitled ‘Challenge, on substantive grounds, of the still unratified credentials of the parliamentary delegation of Azerbaijan’,

– having regard to the Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions of the Election Observation Mission to the Early Presidential Elections held on 7 February 2024 and to the Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions of the International Election Observation Mission to the Early Parliamentary Elections in Azerbaijan held on 1 September 2024,

– having regard to the report of 29 March 2023 by the Council of Europe’s European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Azerbaijan and to the memorandum of 21 October 2021 by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights on the humanitarian and human rights consequences following the 2020 outbreak of hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh,

– having regard to the orders of the International Court of Justice of 22 February 2023, of 6 July 2023 and of 17 November 2023 on the request for the indication of provisional measures for the application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Armenia v Azerbaijan),

– having regard to Rules 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas the choice of Azerbaijan’s capital Baku as the venue for the 29th United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP29), scheduled to take place from 11 to 22 November 2024, has sparked controversy, notably owing to Azerbaijan’s worsening human rights record, as well as recent and blatant violations of international law, including aggressive behaviour towards its neighbour Armenia; whereas respect for fundamental human rights and civil society participation are enshrined in the host country agreement through which the Azerbaijani Government committed to uphold these rights; whereas in the lead-up to this major international conference, the Azerbaijani authorities have intensified their repression of civil society organisations, activists, opposition politicians and the remaining independent media through detentions and judicial harassment; whereas corruption and a lack of judicial independence further undermine governance;

B. whereas civil society organisations list over 300 political prisoners in Azerbaijan, including Gubad Ibadoghlu, Anar Mammadli, Bakhtiyar Hajiyev, Tofig Yagublu, Ilhamiz Guliyev, Aziz Orujov, Bahruz Samadov, Akif Gurbanov and many others; whereas there are credible reports of violations of prisoners’ human rights, including detention in inhumane conditions, torture and refusal of adequate medical care;

C. whereas prominent human rights defender and climate advocate, Anar Mammadli, has been in pre-trial detention since 30 April 2024 on bogus charges of conspiracy to bring illegal foreign currency into the country and his health has deteriorated significantly while in custody; whereas Gubad Ibadoghlu, a political economist, opposition figure and one of the finalists for the 2024 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, was arrested by Azerbaijani authorities in July 2023 and remained in detention until 22 April 2024, when he was transferred to house arrest; whereas his health has deteriorated significantly since his arrest, as a result of torture, inhumane detention conditions and refusal of adequate medical care, thus endangering his life; whereas the health of Gubad Ibadoghlu’s wife, Irada Bayramova, continues to deteriorate as a result of the physical violence she suffered during her detention by the Azerbaijani authorities; whereas on 4 December 2023 human rights activist Ilhamiz Guliyev was arrested on politically motivated charges a few months after he gave an anonymous interview to Abzas Media about the alleged police practice of planting drugs on political activists;

D. whereas for more than a decade and with increasing determination, Azerbaijani authorities have been reducing space for civil society, arbitrarily closing down non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and arresting or forcing into exile civil society representatives; whereas in recent years, the Azerbaijani authorities have imposed increasingly stringent restrictions on civil society organisations; whereas activists, journalists, political opponents and others have been imprisoned on fabricated and politically motivated charges;

E. whereas according to human rights defenders, crackdowns on civil society have occurred around other major international events hosted by Azerbaijan, including Eurovision 2012 and the European Games 2015;

F. whereas the Azerbaijani regime appears to extend its repressive actions beyond its borders; whereas the ongoing crackdown on freedom of expression in Azerbaijan is also reflected in reports of transnational repression and reprisals against family members of detainees; whereas, since 2020, Mahammad Mirzali, an Azerbaijani dissident blogger, has been the target of several assassination attempts in France; whereas, on 29 September 2024, Vidadi Isgandarli, a critic of the Azerbaijani regime living as a political refugee in France, was attacked in his home and succumbed to his injuries two days later; whereas the Azerbaijani authorities have also engaged in politically motivated prosecutions of EU citizens, as seen in the case of Théo Clerc, prompting at least one Member State to formally warn its citizens against travelling to Azerbaijan owing to the risk of arbitrary detention;

G. whereas Azerbaijan has implemented a systematic policy of bribing officials and elected representatives in Europe in order to downplay Azerbaijan’s human rights record and to silence critics, as part of a widely used strategy described as ‘caviar diplomacy’; whereas some cases have been investigated and some of those involved have been prosecuted and convicted by national courts in several EU Member States;

H. whereas a number of European Court of Human Rights decisions have found that Azerbaijan has violated human rights; whereas according to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, more than 320 court judgments against Azerbaijan have not yet been executed or have been only partially implemented, which is the highest number among all state parties to the European Convention on Human Rights;

I. whereas on 3 July 2024, the Council of Europe’s European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) publicly denounced Azerbaijan’s ‘refusal to improve the situation in the light of the Committee’s recommendations’ and the ‘persistent lack of cooperation of the Azerbaijani authorities with the CPT’;

J. whereas the PACE decided in January 2024 not to ratify the credentials of the Azerbaijani delegation, noting its ‘very serious concerns as to …[Azerbaijan’s] respect for human rights’; whereas the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe noted that its Monitoring Committee’s rapporteurs were not allowed to meet with people who had been detained on allegedly politically motivated charges, and that the Azerbaijani delegation refused to allow the rapporteur for the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights to visit the country;

K. whereas according to the Election Observation Mission led by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), the early presidential election held on 7 February 2024 took place in a restrictive environment and was marked by the stifling of critical voices and the absence of political alternatives; whereas Azerbaijan held early parliamentary elections on 1 September 2024 in what the OSCE/ODIHR-led International Election Observation Mission described as a restrictive political and legal environment that did not enable genuine pluralism and resulted in a contest devoid of competition; whereas in the period leading up to the parliamentary elections, several government critics were detained;

L. whereas media legislation in Azerbaijan has become increasingly repressive, with the February 2022 media law effectively legalising censorship; whereas several other laws affecting the media also violate the country’s international obligations with regard to freedom of expression and press freedom; whereas public criticism of the authorities is subject to severe penalties;

M. whereas according to Reporters Without Borders, virtually the entire media sector in Azerbaijan is under official control, with no independent television or radio broadcasts from within the country, and all critical print newspapers shut down; whereas the authorities continue to suppress the last remaining independent media and repress journalists who reject self-censorship; whereas Azerbaijan has intensified its repression against the remaining independent media, such as Abzas Media, Kanal 13 and Toplum TV, through detentions and judicial harassment;

N. whereas the Azerbaijani laws regulating the registration, operation and funding of NGOs are highly restrictive and arbitrarily implemented, thus effectively criminalising unregistered NGO activity; whereas Freedom House’s 2024 index ranks Azerbaijan among the least free countries in the world, below Russia and Belarus;

O. whereas gas contracts between Gazprom and SOCAR for the delivery of one billion cubic metres of gas from Russia to Azerbaijan between November 2022 and March 2023 have raised significant concerns about the re-export of Russian gas to the European market, particularly in the context of the signed memorandum of understanding on the strategic partnership in the field of energy; whereas the EU aims to reduce European dependence on Russian gas, but this agreement could be seen as undermining that goal, as Russian gas would still be flowing into Azerbaijan, thus potentially freeing up Azerbaijani gas for increased re-export to the EU; whereas there are also worrying reports of Russian gas being rebranded as Azerbaijani for sale in the EU;

P. whereas Azerbaijani leaders have engaged in anti-EU and anti-Western rhetoric; whereas Azerbaijan has intensified its disinformation campaigns targeting the EU and its Member States, with a specific focus on France; whereas Azerbaijan has actively interfered in European politics under the guise of ‘anti-colonialism’, notably in overseas countries and territories such as New Caledonia;

Q. whereas in addition, in September 2023, after months of the illegal blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan launched a pre-planned, unjustified military attack on the territory, forcing over 100 000 ethnic Armenians to flee to Armenia, which amounts to ethnic cleansing; whereas as a result, Nagorno-Karabakh has been almost entirely emptied of its Armenian population, who had been living there for centuries; whereas this attack represents a gross violation of human rights and international law, a clear breach of the trilateral ceasefire statement of 9 November 2020 and a failure to uphold commitments made during EU-mediated negotiations;

R. whereas the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh lost their property and belongings while fleeing the Azerbaijani military push in 2023 and have been unable to recover them since; whereas actions amounting to ethnic cleansing have continued since then; whereas the EU has provided humanitarian aid to people displaced from Nagorno-Karabakh; whereas credible reports confirm the organised destruction of Armenian cultural and religious heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh; whereas Azerbaijani leaders and officials repeatedly use hate speech against Armenians;

S. whereas both Azerbaijan and Armenia are bound by international humanitarian law and the Third Geneva Convention protects prisoners of war from all forms of torture and cruel treatment; whereas reports indicate that 23 Armenian prisoners are currently being held in Azerbaijani prisons without adequate legal representation, including eight former leaders of Nagorno-Karabakh, some of whom have received long prison sentences;

T. whereas in February 2023, the EU deployed the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) to observe developments at the international border with Azerbaijan; whereas Azerbaijan has refused to cooperate with EUMA and the mission has been the target of disinformation by Azerbaijani authorities and government-controlled media; whereas the Azerbaijani leadership continues to make irredentist statements with reference to the sovereign territory of Armenia; whereas the Azerbaijani army continues to occupy no less than 170 km2 of the sovereign territory of Armenia;

U. whereas Armenia and Azerbaijan have engaged in negotiations on a peace treaty, the normalisation of their relations and border delimitation, both before and after the 2023 attack on Nagorno-Karabakh; whereas, despite mediation efforts by the EU and others, no peace agreement has been signed between Azerbaijan and Armenia; whereas, although both governments have stated that they are close to an agreement, recent remarks by the Azerbaijani president raise concern about Baku’s willingness to find a compromise to conclude the negotiations;

V. whereas the EU fully supports the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both Azerbaijan and Armenia and actively supports efforts towards a sustainable peace agreement between the two countries, achieved by peaceful means and respecting the rights of the population concerned;

W. whereas since Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, Azerbaijan has deepened its relations with Russia, including political and economic ties, as well as increased cooperation between their intelligence services; whereas Russia has openly backed Azerbaijan in its aggressive behaviour towards Armenia;

1. Strongly condemns the domestic and extraterritorial repression by the Azerbaijani regime against activists, journalists, opposition leaders and others, including EU nationals, which has noticeably intensified ahead of COP29; urges the Azerbaijani authorities to release all persons arbitrarily detained or imprisoned on account of their political views, to drop all politically motivated charges and to cease all forms of repression, both within and beyond Azerbaijan; recalls in this context the names of Tofig Yagublu, Akif Gurbanov, Bakhtiyar Hajiyev, human rights defenders and journalists, including Ulvi Hasanli, Sevinj Vagifgizi, Nargiz Absalamova, Hafiz Babali and Elnara Gasimova, Aziz Orujov, Rufat Muradli, Avaz Zeynalli, Elnur Shukurov, Alasgar Mammadli, Ilhamiz Guliyev and Farid Ismayilov, as well as of civil society activists arrested after March 2024 such as Anar Mammadli, Farid Mehralizade, Igbal Abilov, Bahruz Samadov, Emin Ibrahimov and Famil Khalilov; expresses deep concern about the environment of fear that this has created inside the country, leaving civil society effectively silenced;

2. Reiterates its call for the Azerbaijani authorities to drop all charges against Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu and allow him to travel abroad, unhindered and to the country of his choice, to reunite with his family, to receive the medical care he urgently needs and attend the Sakharov Prize ceremony in Strasbourg in December 2024; calls on Azerbaijan to ensure that he receives an independent medical examination by a doctor of his own choosing and to allow him to receive treatment abroad; calls on all EU representatives and individual Member States to actively support the release from house arrest of Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu and insist on his release in every exchange with the Azerbaijani authorities;

3. Demands that freedom of the press and expression be guaranteed and that media organisations not be restricted; calls, therefore, on the Azerbaijani Government to release journalists working for Abzas Media and Toplum TV, including Ulvi Hasanli, Sevinj Vagifqizi and Alasgar Mammadli;

4. Considers that Azerbaijan’s ongoing human rights abuses are incompatible with its hosting of COP29; urges EU leaders, in particular Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, to use COP29 as an opportunity to remind Azerbaijan of its international obligations and to meaningfully address the country’s human rights record in their interactions with the Azerbaijani authorities, including by calling for the unconditional release of all persons arbitrarily detained or imprisoned on account of their political views and by requesting to meet with political prisoners while in the country; calls for the EU and its Member States to do their utmost to ensure that United Nations Climate Change conferences are not hosted in countries with poor human rights records;

5. Reminds the Azerbaijani authorities of their obligations to respect fundamental freedoms, and calls on them to repeal repressive legislation that drives independent NGOs and media to the margins of the law; calls on the Azerbaijani authorities to repeal repressive legislation on the registration and funding of NGOs to bring them into line with Venice Commission recommendations;

6. Recalls that the 1996 EU-Azerbaijan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which is the legal basis for bilateral relations, is based on respect for democracy and the principles of international law and human rights and that these have been systematically violated in Azerbaijan;

7. Reminds the Azerbaijani Government of its international obligations to safeguard the dignity and rights of detainees, ensuring that they receive adequate medical care, are detained in humane conditions and are protected from any mistreatment; calls on the Azerbaijani Government to swiftly comply with long-standing recommendations of the Council of Europe’s European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment on the subject of the widespread recourse to physical ill treatment – including, on occasion, torture – by the police in Azerbaijan; calls on the Azerbaijani Government to implement all the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights;

8. Reiterates its call for EU sanctions to be imposed under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime on Azerbaijani officials who have committed serious human rights violations; calls on the EU Special Representative for Human Rights to request meetings with political prisoners in Azerbaijan;

9. Insists that any future partnership agreement between the EU and Azerbaijan be made conditional on the release of all political prisoners, the implementation of legal reforms and the overall improvement of the human rights situation in the country, as well as on Azerbaijan demonstrating its genuine readiness to faithfully engage in the negotiation of a peace agreement with Armenia and to respect the rights of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians;

10. Calls for the EU to end its reliance on gas exports from Azerbaijan; calls on the Commission to suspend the 2022 memorandum of understanding on the strategic partnership in the field of energy and to act accordingly;

11. Reaffirms its support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both Azerbaijan and Armenia and strongly supports the normalisation of their relations based on the principles of the mutual recognition of territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders, in accordance with the 1991 Alma-Ata Declaration; reiterates its demand for the withdrawal of Azerbaijan’s troops from the entirety of Armenia’s sovereign territory; calls on Azerbaijan to unequivocally commit to respecting Armenia’s territorial integrity; highlights that Azerbaijan’s connectivity issues with its exclave of Nakhchivan should be resolved with full respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Armenia; reiterates its position that the EU should be ready to impose sanctions on any individuals and entities that threaten the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Armenia;

12. Condemns any military aggression, use of force or hybrid threats against Armenia, as well as foreign interference and attempts to destabilise the political situation in Armenia; welcomes, furthermore, the decision to adopt the first assistance measure under the European Peace Facility in support of Armenian armed forces and calls for the cooperation between Armenia and the EU to be further reinforced in the field of security and defence; welcomes the actions undertaken by several Member States to provide defensive military support to Armenia and urges the Member States to consider similar initiatives; welcomes the new momentum in bilateral relations between the EU and Armenia, which is strongly supported by the authorities in Yerevan; calls on the Commission and the Council to actively support Armenia’s desire for increased cooperation with the EU;

13. Expresses its support for the activities of the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) and underscores the important role it plays; reiterates its concern regarding the repeated smear campaigns originating from Azerbaijan against EUMA; calls on EUMA to continue to closely monitor the evolving security situation on the ground, provide transparent reporting to Parliament and actively contribute to conflict resolution efforts; calls for the EU and its Member States to strengthen EUMA’s mandate, increase its size and extend its duration;

14. Supports all initiatives and activities that could lead to the establishment of peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the signing of a long-awaited peace agreement; calls on Azerbaijan to demonstrate genuine efforts to this end; warns Azerbaijan that any military action against Armenia would be unacceptable and would have serious consequences for the partnership between Azerbaijan and the EU; welcomes the Armenia-Azerbaijan joint statement of 7 December 2023 on confidence-building measures; welcomes the progress made in the framework of the Armenia-Azerbaijan border delimitation process, which has led to an agreement on several sections of the border; encourages both sides to take further steps on the remaining sections; calls for the EU to cease all technical and financial assistance to Azerbaijan that might contribute to strengthening its military or security capabilities; calls on the Member States to freeze exports of all military and security equipment to Azerbaijan;

15. Calls for the full implementation of all orders issued by the International Court of Justice, including the order of 17 November 2023 indicating provisional measures regarding the safe, unimpeded and expeditious return of people who fled Nagorno-Karabakh; recalls that the decision to host COP29 in Baku was made after Azerbaijan failed to comply with the above-mentioned International Court of Justice order as well as those of 7 December 2021 and of 22 February 2023; reiterates its call for independent investigations into the abuses committed by Azerbaijani forces in Nagorno-Karabakh; reiterates its call on the Azerbaijani authorities to allow the safe return of the Armenian population to Nagorno-Karabakh, to genuinely engage in a comprehensive and transparent dialogue with them, to provide robust guarantees for the protection of their rights, including their land and property rights, the protection of their distinct identity and their civic, cultural, social and religious rights, and to refrain from any inflammatory rhetoric that could incite discrimination against Armenians; urges the Azerbaijani authorities to release all 23 Armenian prisoners of war detained following Azerbaijan’s retaking of the Nagorno-Karabakh region;

16. Reiterates its call for the EU institutions and the Member States to continue to offer assistance to Armenia to deal with the refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh; calls for the EU, in this regard, to provide a new package of assistance to Armenia to help the Armenian Government address the humanitarian needs of refugees; welcomes all efforts by the Government of Armenia to provide shelter and aid to the displaced Armenians;

17. Expresses deep concern regarding the preservation of cultural, religious and historical heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh following the massive exodus of its Armenian population; urges Azerbaijan to refrain from further destruction, neglect or alteration of the origins of cultural, religious or historical heritage in the region and calls on it instead to strive to preserve, protect and promote this rich diversity; demands the protection of the Armenian cultural, historical and religious heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh in line with UNESCO standards and Azerbaijan’s international commitments; insists that Azerbaijan allow a UNESCO mission to Nagorno-Karabakh and grant it the necessary access;

18. Deplores steps taken by Azerbaijan towards the secessionist entity in occupied Cyprus, which are against international law and the provisions of UN Security Council Resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984); calls on Azerbaijan to respect the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of states and to not invite the secessionist entity in occupied Cyprus to any meetings of the Organization of Turkic States;

19. Condemns Azerbaijan’s repeated attempts to denigrate and destabilise Member States, including through the so-called Baku Initiative Group; condemns in particular its support for irredentist groups and disinformation operations targeting France, especially in the French departments and territories of New Caledonia, Martinique and Corsica; recalls that these methods were used against Germany in 2013; denounces the smear campaigns targeting Denmark; regrets the smear campaign aimed at damaging France’s reputation by calling into question its capacity to host the 2024 Olympic Games, launched by actors suspected of being close to the Azerbaijani regime;

20. Condemns the arbitrary arrests of EU citizens based on spurious accusations of espionage and their disproportionate sentencing;

21. Strongly condemns the public insults and direct threats made by Azerbaijani diplomatic or government representatives, or members of the Azerbaijani Parliament, targeting elected officials of EU Member States; demands, in this regard, that access to EU institutional buildings be denied to the Azerbaijani officials concerned until further notice;

22. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Armenia, the Director-General of UNESCO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the United Nations and the Council of Europe.

MIL OSI Europe News –

January 25, 2025

MIL-OSI Europe: JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the misinterpretation of UN resolution 2758 by the People’s Republic of China and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan – RC-B10-0134/2024

Source: European Parliament

Michael Gahler, Miriam Lexmann, Sebastião Bugalho, Rasa Juknevičienė, Danuše Nerudová
on behalf of the PPE Group
Yannis Maniatis, Kathleen Van Brempt, Tonino Picula
on behalf of the S&D Group
Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Adam Bielan, Mariusz Kamiński, Charlie Weimers, Michał Dworczyk, Alexandr Vondra, Veronika Vrecionová, Ondřej Krutílek, Rihards Kols, Maciej Wąsik, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Alberico Gambino, Bert‑Jan Ruissen, Carlo Fidanza
on behalf of the ECR Group
Engin Eroglu, Petras Auštrevičius, Helmut Brandstätter, Dan Barna, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, João Cotrim De Figueiredo, Bernard Guetta, Svenja Hahn, Ľubica Karvašová, Karin Karlsbro, Moritz Körner, Nathalie Loiseau, Jan‑Christoph Oetjen, Ana Vasconcelos, Dainius Žalimas
on behalf of the Renew Group
Markéta Gregorová
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

European Parliament resolution on the misinterpretation of UN resolution 2758 by the People’s Republic of China and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan

(2024/2891(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan,

– having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2021 on a new EU-China strategy [1],

– having regard to its recommendation of 21 October 2021 to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on EU-Taiwan political relations and cooperation [2],

– having regard to its resolution of 7 June 2022 on the EU and the security challenges in the Indo-Pacific [3],

– having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on the situation in the Strait of Taiwan [4],

– having regard to its resolution of 13 December 2023 on EU-Taiwan trade and investment relations [5],

– having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, approved by the Council on 21 March 2022,

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 September 2021 entitled ‘The EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific’ (JOIN(2021)0024),

– having regard to the EU’s ‘One China’ policy,

– having regard to the EU-China summit of 7 December 2023,

– having regard to the European Council conclusions on China of 30 June 2023,

– having regard to the visits of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 25 to 27 July 2023 and of the Committee on International Trade of 19 to 21 December 2022 to Taiwan,

– having regard to the statement of 1 September 2024 by the Spokesperson of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the latest dangerous actions in the South China Sea,

– having regard to the statements by the Spokesperson of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on China’s military drills around Taiwan, including the most recent statement of 14 October 2024,

– having regard to the G7 Foreign Ministers’ statements of 18 April 2023 and of 3 August 2022 on preserving peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait,

– having regard to the statement by the Chair of the G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting of 23 September 2024,

– having regard to the joint declaration by the G7 Defence Ministers of 19 October 2024,

– having regard to the urgency motion on Taiwan passed by the Australian Senate on 21 August 2024,

– having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI) of 25 October 1971,

– having regard to the motion on UN Resolution 2758 passed by the Dutch House of Representatives on 12 September 2024,

– having regard to the press statement by the US Department of State of 13 October 2024,

– having regard to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),

– having regard to Article 7 of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), concluded on 9 May 1992,

– having regard to Rule 5 of the Standing Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),

– having regard to Article 4 of the Constitution of the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol),

– having regard to Article 8 and Article 18(h) of the Constitution of the World Health Organization (WHO),

– having regard to Rules 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas UN Resolution 2758 was passed by the UN General Assembly on 25 October 1971 and shifted the official recognition from the Republic of China (Taiwan) to the People’s Republic of China (PRC); whereas today Taiwan, while not being a member of the United Nations, maintains diplomatic relations with 11 of the 193 United Nations member states, as well as with the Holy See;

B. whereas the EU and Taiwan are like-minded partners that share the common values of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law; whereas Taiwan is a vibrant democracy, with a flourishing civil society; whereas Taiwan held peaceful and well-organised elections on 13 January 2024;

C. whereas following the adoption of UN Resolution 2758, Taiwan lost its access to participation in multilateral forums, such as the WHO;

D. whereas Taiwan has never been part of the PRC; whereas the Republic of China was established in 1912 and the PRC in 1949;

E. whereas UN Resolution 2758 addresses the status of the PRC, but does not determine that the PRC enjoys sovereignty over Taiwan, nor does it make any judgement on the future inclusion of Taiwan in the UN or any other international organisation; whereas, however, the PRC continues to misinterpret UN Resolution 2758 to block Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organisations and unilaterally change the status quo; whereas these actions highlight the PRC’s ambition to alter the existing multilateral international order and undermine international law, and can be seen as an expression of systemic rivalry;

F. whereas the EU continues to maintain its own ‘One China’ policy, which is different from the PRC’s ‘One China’ principle; whereas the EU’s long-standing position has been to support the status quo and a peaceful resolution of differences across the Taiwan Strait, while encouraging dialogue and constructive engagement;

G. whereas through their statement of 23 September 2024 the G7 members, among other things, underlined their support for ‘Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations as a member where statehood is not a prerequisite and as an observer or guest where it is’;

H. whereas supporting Taiwan’s participation in international organisations does not undermine the EU’s commitment to its ‘One China’ policy, which remains the political foundation of EU-China relations;

I. whereas over the past decade the PRC has persistently tried to increase its influence over international institutions, using this to sideline Taiwan and prevent Taiwanese passport holders, including journalists, non-governmental organisation workers and political activists, from accessing international institutions; whereas the PRC exercises transnational repression by misusing extradition treaties to target Taiwanese people abroad and therefore put them at risk of arbitrary persecution and human rights abuses;

J. whereas the statutes of most international organisations tasked to address global issues, including the WHO, the UNFCCC, Interpol and the ICAO, provide opportunities for entities such as Taiwan to participate without infringing on the rights of member states;

K. whereas Taiwan has consistently demonstrated a peaceful and cooperative attitude globally, has significantly enhanced global developments and thus could contribute greatly to the work of various international organisations;

L. whereas the PRC is a one-party state that is entirely controlled and ruled by the Chinese Communist Party;

M. whereas in a speech on Taiwan’s national day of 10 October 2024, Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te stated that the PRC has ‘no right to represent Taiwan’ and reiterated that the two sides are ‘not subordinate’ to each other; whereas the PRC has justified its recent military exercise by claiming that President Lai Ching-te is pursuing a separatist strategy;

N. whereas on 14 October 2024 the PRC launched a large-scale military drill, named Joint Sword-2024B, that simulated a blockade of Taiwan; whereas during this exercise a record number of 153 PRC aircraft,18 warships and 17 PRC coastguard ships were detected around Taiwan;

O. whereas during the exercises four formations of the PRC coastguard patrolled the island and briefly entered its restricted waters; whereas the very frequent deployment of the coastguard by the PRC in the Strait in what the PRC considers ‘law enforcement’ missions is putting constant pressure on the Taiwanese authorities and causing a dangerous increase in the risk of collisions, in what is one of the most concrete indications of the PRC’s intention to erode the status quo; whereas the exercises launched on 14 October 2024 were the fourth round of large-scale war games by the PRC in just over two years;

P. whereas these activities were condemned by Taiwan as an ‘unreasonable provocation’ and are the latest in a series of war games conducted by the PRC against Taiwan; whereas these military drills came days after Lai Ching-te, Taiwan’s new president, gave a speech vowing to protect Taiwan’s sovereignty in the face of challenges from the PRC;

Q. whereas the median line, which was set up in a decades-old tacit agreement between both sides of the Taiwan Strait, was designed to reduce the risk of conflict by keeping the military aircraft from both sides of the Strait at a safe distance and thus prevent fatal miscalculations; whereas the PRC’s People’s Liberation Army violated the median line only four times between 1954 and 2020, but now routine incursions reflect Beijing’s intent to irreversibly reset long-standing benchmarks;

R. whereas the press statements by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the US Department of State reaffirm that peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait are of strategic importance for regional and global security and prosperity; whereas the High Representative’s statement recalls the need to preserve the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, opposes any unilateral actions that change the status quo by force or coercion and calls on all parties to exercise restraint and avoid any actions that may further escalate cross-Strait tensions;

S. whereas on 23 May 2024 the PRC launched a military drill called Joint Sword-2024A, just days after the inauguration of Lai Ching-te as the new President of Taiwan;

T. whereas over the past few years the PRC has held similar military drills around Taiwan; whereas these military drills have increased in intensity and have been moved closer and closer to Taiwan’s mainland; whereas during a previous drill in August 2022 the PRC also fired missiles into Japan’s exclusive economic zone;

U. whereas on top of military pressure the PRC has long been pursuing a sophisticated strategy of targeting Taiwan with foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), including hybrid and cyberattacks with the goal of undermining Taiwan’s democratic society;

V. whereas the PRC, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, has said that it will not renounce the use of force to seek unification with Taiwan;

W. whereas the PRC’s 2005 Anti-Secession Law includes the use of non-peaceful means, triggered by ambiguous thresholds, to achieve what the PRC calls ‘unification’ with Taiwan; whereas such military action is a grave threat to the security and stability of the entire region, with potentially dire global consequences; whereas EU and US deterrence is of strategic importance to dissuade the PRC from undertaking any unilateral action against Taiwan;

X. whereas the PRC’s increasingly aggressive behaviour, in particular in its own neighbourhood, such as the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, poses a risk to regional and global security; whereas since 2019 the PRC has violated the Taiwanese air defence identification zone (ADIZ) with increasing regularity; whereas the PRC has been behaving aggressively across vast areas of the Indo-Pacific and exerting varying degrees of military or economic coercion, which has led to disputes with neighbours such as Japan, India, the Philippines and Australia;

Y. whereas the EU has condemned the dangerous actions conducted by Chinese coastguard vessels against lawful Philippine maritime operations in the South China Sea on 31 August 2024; whereas this incident is the latest in a series of actions endangering the safety of life at sea and violating the right to freedom of navigation and overflight in compliance with international law; whereas maritime security and freedom of navigation must be ensured in accordance with international law and, in particular, UNCLOS;

Z. whereas the PRC is supporting Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, in particular through the export of dual-use goods to Russia and the ongoing involvement of PRC-based companies in sanctions evasion and circumvention;

AA. whereas as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the PRC has a responsibility to work for peace and stability in the region, and particularly in the Taiwan Strait;

AB. whereas through its 2021 strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, the EU and its Member States increased their presence in the region, including through a higher military presence of certain Member States and the continued passage of military ships through the Taiwan Strait;

AC. whereas Taiwan is located in a strategic position in terms of trade, notably in high-tech supply chains; whereas the Taiwan Strait is the primary route for ships travelling from China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan towards Europe; whereas Taiwan dominates semiconductor manufacturing markets, as its producers manufacture around 50 % of the world’s semiconductor output; whereas the EU’s strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific argues for increasing trade and investment cooperation with Taiwan;

AD. whereas the EU is Taiwan’s fourth largest trading partner after the PRC, the United States and Japan; whereas in 2022 Taiwan was the EU’s 12th largest trading partner; whereas the EU is the largest source of foreign direct investment in Taiwan; whereas Taiwanese investments in the EU remain below their potential;

AE. whereas members of the Australian Senate and of the Dutch House of Representatives have recently adopted motions concerning the distortion of UN Resolution 2758 by the PRC and called for support for Taiwan’s greater participation in multilateral organisations;

1. Reiterates that Taiwan is a key EU partner and a like-minded democratic friend in the Indo-Pacific region; commends Taiwan and the Taiwanese people for their strong democracy and vibrant civil society, demonstrated once more by the peaceful and well-organised elections of 13 January 2024;

2. Opposes the PRC’s constant distortion of UN Resolution 2758 and its efforts to block Taiwan’s participation in multilateral organisations; calls for the EU and its Member States to support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in relevant international organisations such as the WHO, the ICAO, Interpol and the UNFCCC; further calls on the UN Secretariat to grant Taiwanese nationals and journalists the right to access UN premises for visits, meetings and newsgathering activities;

3. Strongly condemns the PRC’s unwarranted military exercises of 14 October 2024, its continued military provocations against Taiwan and its continued military build-up, which is changing the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, and reiterates its firm rejection of any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait; lauds the restraint and disciplined reaction of the Taiwanese authorities and calls for regular exchanges between the EU and its Taiwanese counterparts on relevant security issues;

4. Reaffirms its strong commitment to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait; underlines that any attempt to unilaterally change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, particularly by means of force or coercion, will not be accepted and will be met with a decisive and firm reaction;

5. Underlines that UN Resolution 2758 takes no position on Taiwan; strongly rejects and refutes the PRC’s attempts to distort history and international rules;

6. Reiterates the EU’s commitment to its ‘One China’ policy as the political foundation of EU-China relations; recalls that the EU’s China strategy emphasises that constructive cross-strait relations are part of promoting peace and security in the whole Asia-Pacific region and that the EU supports initiatives aimed at dialogue and confidence-building;

7. Underlines that in Taiwan it is up to the people to democratically decide how they want to live and that the status quo in the Taiwan Strait must not be unilaterally changed by the use or threat of force;

8. Reiterates its strong condemnation of statements by Chinese President Xi Jinping that the PRC will never renounce the right to use force with respect to Taiwan; underlines that the PRC’s use of force or threats or other highly coercive measures to achieve unification is incompatible with international law; expresses grave concern over the PRC’s use of hostile disinformation to undermine trust in Taiwan’s democracy and governance; reiterates its previous calls for the EU and its Member States to cooperate with international partners in helping to sustain democracy in Taiwan, keeping it free from foreign interference and threats; underlines that only Taiwan’s democratically elected government can represent the Taiwanese people on the international stage;

9. Condemns the PRC’s systematic grey-zone military actions, including cyber and disinformation campaigns against Taiwan, and urges the PRC to halt these activities immediately; calls, in this regard, for cooperation between the EU and Taiwan to be deepened further to enhance structural cooperation on countering disinformation and foreign interference; welcomes the posting of a liaison officer at the European Economic and Trade Office in Taiwan to coordinate joint efforts to tackle disinformation and interference as a first important step towards deeper EU-Taiwan cooperation, and calls for the EU to further deepen cooperation with Taiwan in this key area; praises the courage of the Taiwanese people and the proportionate and dignified reactions of the Taiwanese authorities and institutions in the face of intensifying Chinese threats and activities;

10. Firmly rejects the PRC’s economic coercion against Taiwan and other countries, as well as against EU Member States, and underlines that such practices are not only illegal under World Trade Organization rules, but that they also have a devastating effect on the PRC’s reputation around the world and will lead to a further loss of trust in the PRC as a responsible actor; stresses the independent right of the EU and its Member States to develop relations with Taiwan in line with their interests and shared values of democracy and human rights without foreign interference; calls on EU and Member State missions abroad to address and provide alternatives to malign PRC business practices, especially in the Global South;

11. Is very concerned at the adoption of the so-called guidelines for punishing ‘diehard Taiwan independence separatists’ for committing crimes of secession and the incitement of secession jointly announced by the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, the ministries for public security and state security and the justice ministry in June 2024, which could lead to harsh punishments for the crime of secession, up to and including the death penalty; strongly condemns the sentencing of one Taiwanese activist to nine years in prison in September 2024 after his arrest in the PRC in 2022, as well as the constant harassment of Taiwanese people working and living in the PRC;

12. Is seriously concerned about the situation in the East and South China Seas; recalls the importance of respecting international law, including UNCLOS and, in particular, its provisions on the obligation to settle disputes by peaceful means and on maintaining the freedom of navigation and overflight; calls on all countries that have not done so to swiftly ratify UNCLOS; calls for the EU and its Member States to step up their own maritime capacities in the region; reminds the PRC of its responsibilities, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, to uphold international law and emphasises the obligation to resolve disputes peacefully;

13. Reaffirms its grave concerns about China’s increasing military investments and capabilities; expresses grave concerns about the renewed Chinese and Russian commitment to further strengthen their military ties and condemns the Chinese supply of components and equipment to Moscow’s military industry; welcomes the Council decision to impose sanctions on Chinese companies for supporting Russia’s war against Ukraine; deplores the ‘no limits’ partnership between Russia and the PRC; welcomes the increasing commitment and military presence of the United States in the Indo-Pacific; reiterates its calls for a coordinated approach to deepening EU-US cooperation on security matters, including through transatlantic parliamentary dialogue;

14. Strongly welcomes the close cooperation and alignment of Taiwan with the EU and the United States in responding to Russia’s war against Ukraine and issuing sanctions in response to this blatant violation of international law; recalls Taiwan’s help in addressing the humanitarian crisis caused by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its continuous involvement and support for the Ukrainian government and countries hosting Ukrainian refugees;

15. Highlights that the PRC’s various actions in the field of cognitive and legal warfare are slowly undermining the status quo, as well as intensifying grey-zone activities that are intended to circumvent detection, existing laws and response thresholds; calls for the EU to establish and enforce its redlines through its toolbox of sanctions, including sectoral sanctions, against hybrid activities and cyberthreats, and to coordinate strong diplomatic and economic deterrence measures with liked-minded partners;

16. Expresses its gratitude for Taiwan’s help and assistance during the COVID-19 pandemic;

17. Recognises the importance of Taiwan in securing global supply chains, especially in the high-tech sector where Taiwan is the leading producer of semiconductors, and calls for the EU and its Member States to engage in closer cooperation with Taiwan;

18. Calls on the Commission to launch, without delay, preparatory measures for negotiations on a bilateral investment agreement, or other kinds of agreement, with Taiwan; highlights the potential for cooperation on foreign direct investment screening policy and on tackling economic coercion and retaliation;

19. Applauds the increase in freedom of navigation exercises conducted by several EU countries, including France, the Netherlands and Germany; notes that these activities are in line with international law and calls for more cooperation and coordination with regional partners in order to increase freedom of navigation operations in the region;

20. Welcomes visits by former and current Taiwanese politicians to Europe, including the recent visit of former President Tsai Ing-wen to the European Parliament on 17 October 2024; welcomes, furthermore, continued exchanges of its Members with Taiwan and encourages further visits of official European Parliament delegations to Taiwan; additionally encourages further exchanges between the EU and Taiwan at all levels, including political meetings and people-to-people encounters;

21. Encourages, in this light, increased economic, scientific and cultural interactions and exchanges, focusing, among other areas, on youth, academia, civil society, sports, culture and education, as well as city-to-city and region-to-region partnerships; reiterates its call on the Member States to engage in meaningful and structural technical cooperation with Taiwan’s National Fire Agency and National Police Agency and with local administrations in the field of civil protection and disaster management;

22. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the governments of the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan.

MIL OSI Europe News –

January 25, 2025

MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Prime Minister participates in the 16th BRICS Summit

Source: Government of India

Posted On: 23 OCT 2024 5:42PM by PIB Delhi

Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi participated in the 16th BRICS Summit held under Russia’s Chairship, in Kazan today.

The BRICS leaders had productive discussions including on strengthening multilateralism, countering terrorism, fostering economic growth, pursing sustainable development and bringing spotlight on the concerns of the Global South. The leaders welcomed the 13 new BRICS partner countries.

Prime Minister addressed two sessions of the BRICS Summit. In his address, PM noted that the Summit is happening at a time when the world is undergoing several uncertainties and challenges including conflicts, adverse climatic impacts, and cyber threats, placing greater expectations upon BRICS. PM suggested that the group take a people-centric approach to tackle these challenges. PM also underlined the need for early adoption of a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism at the United Nations to combat the menace of terrorism.

PM called upon BRICS to proactively push for global governance reforms. Recalling the Voice of Global South Summits hosted by India during its G-20 Presidency, he stressed that the group must give primacy to the concerns of the Global South. PM noted that the regional presence of the New Development Bank including in GIFT city, India, has created new values and impacts. Highlighting BRICS’ activities to foster economic growth, he emphasized that its efforts on trade facilitation in agriculture, resilient supply chains, e-commerce and Special Economic Zones have generated new opportunities. He underlined the need to prioritise small and medium scale industries. He expressed that the BRICS Startup Forum initiated by India which is to be launched this year would add significant value to the BRICS economic agenda.

Prime Minister elaborated on the recent green initiatives undertaken by India including the International Solar Alliance, Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure, Mission LIFE and Green Credit initiative announced during COP28. He invited BRICS countries to join these initiatives.

Prime Minister congratulated President Putin for successfully hosting the 16th BRICS Summit and conveyed wishes to Brazil as it takes over the presidency of the group. At the conclusion of the Summit, the leaders adopted the ‘Kazan Declaration’.

Address of PM at the Closed Plenary may be seen here.

Address of PM at the Open Plenary may be seen here.

***

MJPS/SR

(Release ID: 2067386) Visitor Counter : 76

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

January 25, 2025

MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: English Translation of Prime Minister’s Remarks at the Open Plenary of the 16th BRICS Summit

Source: Government of India

Posted On: 23 OCT 2024 5:22PM by PIB Delhi

Your Highness,
Excellencies,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Congratulations to President Putin for the excellent organisation of the 16th BRICS Summit.

And, once again, a warm welcome to all the new friends who have joined BRICS. In its new avatar, BRICS accounts for 40 per cent of the world’s humanity and about 30 per cent of the global economy.

In the last nearly two decades, BRICS has achieved many milestones.I am confident that in the times to come, this organisation will emerge as a more effective medium to face global challenges.

I would also like to convey warm greetings to Her Excellency Dilma Rousseff, President of the New Development Bank.

Friends,

In the last ten years, this bank has emerged as an important option for the development needs of the countries of the Global South.The opening of GIFT or Gujarat International Finance Tech City in India as well as regional centres in Africa and Russia has boosted the activities of this bank. And, development projects worth about USD 35 billion have been sanctioned. NDB should continue to work on the basis of the demand driven principle. And, while expanding the bank, ensuring long-term financial sustainability, healthy credit rating and market access should remain a priority.

Friends,

In its new expanded avatar, BRICS has emerged as an economy of more than USD 30 trillion dollars.The BRICS Business Council and the BRICS Women Business Alliance have played a special role in increasing our economic cooperation.

This year, the consensus reached within BRICS on WTO reforms, trade facilitation in Agriculture, resilient supply chains, e-commerce and Special Economic Zones will strengthen our economic cooperation.Amidst all these initiatives, we should also focus on the interests of small and medium scale industries.

I am pleased that the BRICS Startup Forum proposed during India’s presidency in 2021 will be launched this year. The Railway Research Network initiative taken by India is also playing an important role in increasing logistics and supply chain connectivity among BRICS countries. This year, the consensus reached by BRICS countries, in collaboration with UNIDO, to prepare a skilled work force for Industry 4.0 is quite significant.

The BRICS Vaccine R&D Centre launched in 2022 is helping increase health security in all the countries. We would be happy to share India’s successful experience in Digital Health with BRICS partners.

Friends,

Climate Change has been a subject of our common priority.

The consensus reached for the BRICS Open Carbon Market Partnership under Russia’s presidency is welcome. In India too, special emphasis is being laid on green growth, climate resilient infrastructure and green transition. Indeed, India has taken up several initiatives like the International Solar Alliance, Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure, Mission LiFE i.e. Lifestyle for Environment, Ek Ped Maa Ke Naam or a Tree in the name of mother.

Last year, during COP-28, we started an important initiative called Green Credit.I invite BRICS partners to join these initiatives.

Special emphasis is being laid on the construction of infrastructure in all BRICS countries.

We have established a digital platform called the Gati-Shakti portal to rapidly expand multi-modal connectivity in India. This has helped in integrated infrastructure development planning and implementation and has reduced logistics costs.

We will be happy to share our experiences with all of you.

Friends,

We welcome efforts to increase financial integration among BRICS countries.

Trade in local currencies and smooth cross-border payments will strengthen our economic cooperation. The Unified Payments Interface (UPI) developed by India is a huge success story and has been adopted in many countries.

Last year, together with His Highness Sheikh Mohamed, it was launched in the UAE as well. We can also cooperate with other BRICS countries in this area.

Friends,

India is fully committed to increasing cooperation under BRICS.

Our strong belief in our diversity and multipolarity is our strength. This strength of ours, and our shared belief in humanity, will help in giving a meaningful shape to a prosperous and a bright future for the generations to come.

I thank everyone for today’s very important and valuable discussions.

As the next President of BRICS, I extend my heartfelt best wishes to President Lula. India will give its full support for the success of your BRICS presidency.

Once again, many thanks to President Putin and all the leaders.

DISCLAIMER – This is the approximate translation of Prime Minister’s remarks. Original remarks were delivered

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

January 25, 2025

MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: INDIAN ARMY TO HOST THE SECOND EDITION OF CHANAKYA DEFENCE DIALOGUE: A GLOBAL PLATFORM FOR STRATEGIC INSIGHTS

Source: Government of India (2)

Posted On: 23 OCT 2024 5:19PM by PIB Delhi

The Indian Army is set to host the second edition of its flagship international seminar, the Chanakya Defence Dialogue, on October 24 and 25,^, 2024 at the Manekshaw Centre, New Delhi. Themed “Drivers in Nation Building: Fuelling Growth Through Comprehensive Security,” this high-profile event will facilitate vital discussions on integrating security dynamics within national and international policymaking, and aims to craft visionary strategies for sustainable and inclusive growth.

The two-day event will bring together an exceptional group of policymakers, strategic thinkers, academics, defence personnel, veterans, scientists, and SMEs from India and abroad, with prominent speakers from the United States, Russia, Israel, and Sri Lanka. The dialogue will explore India’s strategic pathways towards Viksit Bharat @2047, focusing on the role of comprehensive security in national development.

Hon’ble Raksha Mantri Shri Rajnath Singh will inaugurate the event as the Chief Guest, where he will also launch the Indian Army’s Green Initiative 1.0 and Digitisation of IA 1.0. He will deliver a keynote address on ‘India’s Vision for Development and Security,’ underscoring the importance of comprehensive security in achieving Viksit Bharat @2047. General Upendra Dwivedi, Chief of the Army Staff, will also address the audience, highlighting the Indian Army’s significant contributions to nation-building, including initiatives aligned with Atmanirbhar Bharat.

The Chanakya Defence Dialogue will consist of six expert-led sessions, each focusing on critical aspects of comprehensive security:

Session 1. Geopolitical Dynamics: Navigating the International Coliseum

This session will delve into the shifting geopolitical landscape and how nations navigate strategic partnerships while balancing national interests and global objectives. The panel will explore the impact of evolving global power structures on India’s strategic positioning, highlighting the growing importance of alliances and multilateral cooperation in an increasingly polarized world.

Moderator: Ms Palki Sharma (Network 18)

Panellists:

Ms. Lisa Curtis (Centre for a New American Security)
Ms. Carice Witte (SIGNAL Group, Israel)
Ambassador Kanwal Sibal (Former Foreign Secretary, Government of India)

The panel will provide insights into geopolitical shifts, focusing on India’s role in the Indo-Pacific, its relations with key global powers, and the opportunities and challenges these present for India’s national security and development goals.

Session 2. Economic Development Strategies & National Security Imperatives

This session will examine how economic development and national security are interconnected, exploring the importance of a resilient economy for maintaining a strong defence posture. Panellists will discuss strategies for integrating economic policies with national security imperatives, and how India can leverage its growing economic strength to enhance its global influence.

Moderator: Ms. Gaurie Dwivedi (NDTV)

Panellists:

Mr. Asanga Abeyagoonasekera (IMF Technical Advisor)
Dr. G S Reddy (Former Scientific Advisor to the Prime Minister)
Dr. Sanjeev Sanyal (Member, PM’s Economic Advisory Council)

Key themes will include leveraging economic reforms, boosting domestic industrial capacities, and aligning economic growth with defence production under the Atmanirbhar Bharat initiative. The session will also explore how economic resilience can act as a deterrent against external threats.

Session 3. Environmental Sustainability: Balancing Growth with Ecological Concerns

With growing global focus on climate change, this session will explore the need to balance economic growth with environmental sustainability. It will discuss how India can achieve development goals while ensuring that ecological concerns are addressed, particularly in the context of national security.

Moderator: Dr. Tara Kartha (Director Research & Academics, CLAWS)

Panellists:

Ms. Elizabeth Threlkeld (Stimson Center, US)
Mr. Rushikesh Chavan (Habitats Trust)
Lt Gen S A Hasnain (Retd)

Panellists will discuss how sustainable development can contribute to long-term security by mitigating resource-driven conflicts, enhancing disaster preparedness, and ensuring the well-being of future generations. The session will emphasize the role of the military in ecological preservation, particularly in high-altitude and environmentally sensitive regions.

Session 4. Social Cohesion and Inclusive Growth: Pillars of a Secure Nation

This session will focus on the importance of social unity and inclusive growth for national security. The panel will examine how internal security can be strengthened by fostering social cohesion, addressing economic disparities, and promoting inclusive development across all sections of society.

Moderator: Mr. RR Swain (Former DGP J&K Police)

Panellists:

Dr. Sudhanshu Trivedi (Member of Parliament)
Ms. Meenakshi Lekhi (Former MP and Lawyer)
Gen V K Singh (Retd) (Former COAS & ex-Minister of State for External Affairs)

The discussion will highlight the role of law enforcement, legal frameworks, and policy initiatives in promoting internal security, with a focus on integrating marginalized communities into the national fabric. The panellists will offer strategies to merge social cohesion initiatives with internal security policies, fostering a shared national identity and promoting peace and stability.

Session 5. Blurring Frontiers: The Convergence of Technology & Security

This session will explore the integration of emerging technologies into national security frameworks. As new technologies such as artificial intelligence, cyber warfare, and unmanned systems revolutionize warfare, the session will discuss how India can stay ahead of the curve while ensuring that technological advancements are deployed ethically and responsibly.

Moderator: Lt Gen Raj Shukla (Retd)

Panellists:

Dr. Chintan Vaishnav (NITI Aayog)
Brig Gen Eran Ortal (SIGNAL Group, Israel)
Mr. Dmitry Stefanovich (IMEMO, Russia)

Panellists will explore the advantages and challenges of integrating AI, robotics, and other emerging technologies into security operations. The session will also address ethical considerations such as privacy, responsible use, and societal alignment, ensuring that technological advances serve national security without compromising civil liberties.

Session 6. Groundbreakers: Shaping Land Warfare, Reflections for the Indian Army

This concluding session will focus on the future of land warfare and how the Indian Army can adopt advanced technologies to enhance battlefield readiness. Panellists will examine lessons from global military practices and how India can foster homegrown defence technologies under the Atmanirbhar Bharat initiative.

Moderator: Vice Admiral A B Singh (Retd)

Panellists:

Dr. Konstantin Bogdanov (IMEMO, Russia)
Prof. Amit Gupta (University of Illinois, US)
Dr. Patrick Bratton (US Army War College)

The discussion will explore the evolving nature of land warfare, emphasizing the need for the Indian Army to develop indigenous technological capabilities while leveraging strategic partnerships with global military and industrial leaders. The panel will debate how to balance innovation with operational effectiveness, creating responsible and sustainable military solutions.

On the second day, Chanakya Defence Dialogue will feature special addresses by Dr. S Somanath, Chairman of ISRO, on the critical significance of India’s expanding space sector, and Ms. Ruchira Kamboj, Former Permanent Representative of India to the UN, who will share insights on India’s evolving position in a multipolar world and the need for strong diplomatic measures to safeguard national interests.

The dialogue will conclude with a closing address by Lt Gen N S Raja Subramani, Vice Chief of the Army Staff, who will summarize the key takeaways from the event, reaffirming the Indian Army’s commitment to ensuring a secure, prosperous, and Viksit Bharat @2047.

Through its comprehensive and diverse discussions, the Chanakya Defence Dialogue 2024 will serve as a landmark platform, fostering collaboration among military leaders, policymakers, strategic thinkers, and security specialists from around the world. This event is set to influence India’s strategic direction on national security and development, helping shape a secure and thriving future for the nation.

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MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

January 25, 2025

MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Fund for the protection and development of the frontier regions of countries bordering Ukraine, Belarus and Russia – E-002090/2024

Source: European Parliament

16.10.2024

Question for written answer E-002090/2024
to the Commission
Rule 144
Marta Wcisło (PPE), Merja Kyllönen (The Left), Dan-Ştefan Motreanu (PPE), Jacek Protas (PPE), Nils Ušakovs (S&D), Krzysztof Śmiszek (S&D), Benoit Cassart (Renew), Ewa Kopacz (PPE), Georgiana Teodorescu (ECR), Krzysztof Hetman (PPE), Roberts Zīle (ECR), Lucia Yar (Renew), Reinis Pozņaks (ECR), Olivier Chastel (Renew), Miriam Lexmann (PPE), Krzysztof Brejza (PPE), Mirosława Nykiel (PPE), Elżbieta Katarzyna Łukacijewska (PPE), Vilis Krištopans (PfE), Adrian-George Axinia (ECR), Kamila Gasiuk-Pihowicz (PPE), Andrzej Buła (PPE), Branislav Ondruš (NI), Rihards Kols (ECR), Andrzej Halicki (PPE), Dariusz Joński (PPE), Bartłomiej Sienkiewicz (PPE), Joanna Scheuring-Wielgus (S&D), Bartosz Arłukowicz (PPE), Magdalena Adamowicz (PPE), Michał Szczerba (PPE), Adam Jarubas (PPE), Jagna Marczułajtis-Walczak (PPE), Janusz Lewandowski (PPE), Michał Wawrykiewicz (PPE), Bogdan Andrzej Zdrojewski (PPE), Borys Budka (PPE)

Europe is facing an unprecedented combination of internal and external threats undermining EU citizens’ security. Military, economic and security challenges are greatest in the EU’s border regions, causing depopulation, investor outflow, business bankruptcies and unemployment rates of up to 16 %. Eastern EU areas have become a buffer zone of the Union. Polish regions such as Lubelskie, Podkarpackie, Podlaskie, and others in countries bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine bear the whole burden of threats while simultaneously protecting all Member States. These frontier regions have become the EU’s poorest areas. The European Union, as a values-based community, must take immediate and targeted action.

1.Following the Political Guidelines for 2024-2029 and the overall political consensus on the need to strengthen European security and resilience, what specific measures does the Commission envisage to help the regions bordering Ukraine, Russia and Belarus that are bearing the greatest burden of war in Europe?
2.Using the example of the Just Transition Fund, and taking the solidarity principle as a basis, is the Commission working to establish a specially dedicated fund to support these regions?
3.Can the Commission undertake a study into the positive effects that the creation of such a protection and development fund could have on economic activities and industrial and infrastructure planning, as well as on the broader safety of the EU’s borders?

Submitted: 16.10.2024

MIL OSI Europe News –

January 25, 2025

MIL-OSI: QCR Holdings, Inc. Announces Net Income of $27.8 Million for the Third Quarter of 2024

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

Third Quarter 2024 Highlights

Net income of $27.8 million, or $1.64 per diluted share
Adjusted net income of $30.3 million or $1.78 per diluted share (non-GAAP) resulting in an adjusted ROAA (non-GAAP) of 1.35%
Significant increase in net interest income of $3.6 million from the prior quarter, or 6%
Net interest margin expanded by 8 basis points to 3.34% adjusted NIM (TEY) (non-GAAP)
Continued strong capital markets revenue of $16.3 million
Tangible book value (non-GAAP) per share grew $2.35, or 20% annualized
TCE/TA ratio (non-GAAP) improved 24 basis points to 9.24%

MOLINE, Ill., Oct. 23, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — QCR Holdings, Inc. (NASDAQ: QCRH) (the “Company”) today announced quarterly net income of $27.8 million and diluted earnings per share (“EPS”) of $1.64 for the third quarter of 2024, compared to net income of $29.1 million and diluted EPS of $1.72 for the second quarter of 2024.

Adjusted net income (non-GAAP) and adjusted diluted EPS (non-GAAP) for the third quarter of 2024 were $30.3 million and $1.78, respectively. For the second quarter of 2024, adjusted net income (non-GAAP) was $29.3 million and adjusted diluted EPS (non-GAAP) was $1.73. For the third quarter of 2023, adjusted net income (non-GAAP) was $25.4 million, and adjusted diluted EPS (non-GAAP) was $1.51.

	For the Quarter Ended
	September 30,		June 30,		September 30,
$ in millions (except per share data)	2024		2024		2023
Net Income	$	27.8	$	29.1	$	25.1
Diluted EPS	$	1.64	$	1.72	$	1.49
Adjusted Net Income (non-GAAP)*	$	30.3	$	29.3	$	25.4
Adjusted Diluted EPS (non-GAAP)*	$	1.78	$	1.73	$	1.51

*Adjusted non-GAAP measurements of financial performance exclude non-core and/or nonrecurring income and expense items that management believes are not reflective of the anticipated future operation of the Company’s business. The Company believes these adjusted measurements provide a better comparison for analysis and may provide a better indicator of future performance. See GAAP to non-GAAP reconciliations.

“We produced exceptional third quarter results, highlighted by our significant growth in net interest income and margin expansion. We also had another quarter of strong capital markets and wealth management revenue,” said Larry J. Helling, Chief Executive Officer. “In addition, we grew core deposits, maintained our excellent asset quality, and significantly increased our tangible book value per share.”

Net Interest Income Grew 6% and Net Interest Margin Expanded 8 Basis Points

Net interest income for the third quarter of 2024 totaled $59.7 million, an increase of $3.6 million from the second quarter of 2024, driven by strong growth in loans and investments combined with margin expansion. Loan yields increased and funding costs were stable. Loan discount accretion was $463 thousand during the third quarter of 2024, an increase of $195 thousand from the prior quarter.

Net interest margin (“NIM”) was 2.90% and NIM on a tax-equivalent yield (“TEY”) basis (non-GAAP) was 3.37% for the third quarter, as compared to 2.82% and 3.27% for the prior quarter, respectively. Adjusted NIM TEY (non-GAAP) of 3.34% for the third quarter of 2024, represented an increase of 8 basis points from 3.26% for the second quarter of 2024.

“Our adjusted NIM, on a tax equivalent yield basis (non-GAAP), expanded by 8 basis points from the second quarter to 3.34% and exceeded the upper end of our guidance range,” said Todd A. Gipple, President and Chief Financial Officer. “We are very pleased with another quarter of NIM expansion. Looking ahead, we anticipate continued growth in net interest income and are guiding to further fourth quarter adjusted NIM TEY (non-GAAP) expansion in a range of between 2 to 7 basis points.”

Strong Noninterest Income Including $16.3 Million of Capital Markets Revenue

Noninterest income for the third quarter of 2024 totaled $27.2 million, a decrease from $30.9 million in the second quarter of 2024. The Company delivered $16.3 million of capital markets revenue in the quarter compared to $17.8 million in the prior quarter. Capital markets revenue was impacted by a $473 thousand loss from the execution of our third securitization during the quarter, a more modest loss than our prior guidance. Wealth management revenue was $4.5 million for the quarter, a 17% annualized increase from the second quarter. Additionally, the Company recorded $2.2 million of income from bank-owned life insurance policy proceeds in the second quarter of 2024 which did not recur during the third quarter of 2024.

“Our capital markets business delivered strong results driven by the swap fees from our low-income housing tax credit (“LIHTC”) lending program. The demand for affordable housing remains strong, which supports the sustainability of our LIHTC lending program,” added Mr. Gipple. “Our LIHTC lending pipelines, and the associated capital markets revenue remain robust. Additionally, our wealth management business continues to grow from new client additions and increased assets under management as we expand our market share.”

During the third quarter, the Company executed a derivative strategy with a notional value of $410 million. These derivatives are designed to safeguard the Company’s regulatory capital ratios against the adverse effects of a significant decline in long-term interest rates. These derivatives are unhedged and are marked-to-market, with gains or losses recorded in noninterest income and reflected as a non-core item. For the quarter, the Company recorded a $414 thousand loss on these derivatives.

Well Controlled Noninterest Expenses of $53.6 Million Impacted by m2 Equipment Finance Decision

Noninterest expense for the third quarter of 2024 totaled $53.6 million, compared to $49.9 million for the second quarter and $51.1 million for the third quarter of 2023. The linked-quarter increase was primarily due to the previously announced one-time restructuring and goodwill impairment charges related to the decision to discontinue offering new loans and leases at m2 Equipment Finance, LLC (“m2”).

“Our core expenses, excluding m2 one-time charges, were $51.2 million, an increase of $1.3 million, and within our guidance range of $49 to $52 million,” said Mr. Gipple. The linked quarter increase in core expenses for the quarter was primarily driven by higher incentive compensation and advertising expenses. Year-to-date core noninterest expenses remain well controlled, having increased only 2% annually. Excluding the one-time charges and other non-core items, the Company’s adjusted efficiency ratio (non-GAAP) was 58.5% in the third quarter.

Strong Core Deposit Growth

During the third quarter of 2024, the Company generated strong deposit growth with core deposits increasing by $166.3 million, or 10.3% annualized, to $6.6 billion. “Year-to-date, core deposits have increased by $398.3 million, which is an annualized growth rate of 8.5%. This is a result of our dedication to expanding market share and building new relationships in our markets,” added Mr. Helling.

Continued Loan Growth

During the third quarter of 2024, the Company’s total loans and leases held for investment increased by $53.5 million to $6.7 billion. At quarter end, the Company held $165.9 million of LIHTC loans held for sale in anticipation of the Company’s next loan securitization.

“Our year-to-date total loan growth excluding the impact of the loans securitized during the third quarter, is 10.5% annualized which was just above our guidance range. Year-to-date loan growth, net of loans securitized, was 5.8% annualized”, added Mr. Helling. “With the continued strength of our markets and healthy pipeline, we are maintaining our loan growth target for the full year 2024 of 8% to 10%, prior to the loan securitizations closed in the third quarter and planned for in the fourth quarter.”

Asset Quality Remains Excellent

The Company’s nonperforming assets (“NPAs”) to total assets ratio was 0.39% on September 30, 2024, unchanged from the prior quarter. NPAs totaled $35.7 million at the end of the third quarter of 2024, a $1.2 million increase from the prior quarter.

The Company’s total criticized loans, a leading indicator of asset quality, declined by $15.3 million on a linked-quarter basis, and the ratio of criticized loans to total loans and leases as of September 30, 2024, improved to 2.20%, as compared to 2.41% as of June 30, 2024. This marks the fourth consecutive quarter of improvement, resulting in a $50 million reduction in total criticized balances.

The Company recorded a total provision for credit losses of $3.5 million during the quarter, representing a decline of $2.0 million from the prior quarter. The reduction in the provision for credit losses during the quarter was primarily due to overall credit quality improvements. Net charge-offs were $3.4 million during the third quarter of 2024, an increase of $1.8 million from the prior quarter. The increase in net charge offs primarily resulted from loans and leases at m2. The allowance for credit losses to total loans held for investment decreased to 1.30% from 1.33% as of the prior quarter.

Continued Strong Capital Levels and Outstanding Tangible Book Value Expansion

As of September 30, 2024, the Company’s tangible common equity to tangible assets ratio (“TCE”) (non-GAAP) increased to 9.24%. The improvement in TCE was driven by strong earnings and an increase in accumulated other comprehensive income (“AOCI”). The total risk-based capital ratio decreased to 13.87% and the common equity tier 1 ratio decreased to 9.79% due to sizable loan and investment growth partially offset by strong earnings. By comparison, these ratios were 9.00%, 14.21%, and 9.92%, respectively, as of June 30, 2024. The Company remains focused on growing its regulatory capital and targeting TCE (non-GAAP) in the top quartile of its peer group.

The Company’s tangible book value per share (non-GAAP) increased significantly by $2.35, or 20% annualized, during the third quarter of 2024. AOCI increased $12.1 million during the third quarter primarily due to declining interest rates. Tangible book value per share (non-GAAP) has grown by $5.19 year-to-date, for an annualized growth rate of nearly 16%. The combination of strong earnings, a modest dividend, and improved AOCI contributed to the improvement in tangible book value per share (non-GAAP).

Conference Call Details
The Company will host an earnings call/webcast tomorrow, October 24, 2024, at 10:00 a.m. Central Time. Dial-in information for the call is toll-free: 888-346-9286 (international 412-317-5253). Participants should request to join the QCR Holdings, Inc. call. The event will be available for replay through October 31, 2024. The replay access information is 877-344-7529 (international 412-317-0088); access code 4892655. A webcast of the teleconference can be accessed on the Company’s News and Events page at www.qcrh.com. An archived version of the webcast will be available at the same location shortly after the live event has ended.

About Us
QCR Holdings, Inc., headquartered in Moline, Illinois, is a relationship-driven, multi-bank holding company serving the Quad Cities, Cedar Rapids, Cedar Valley, Des Moines/Ankeny and Springfield communities through its wholly owned subsidiary banks. The banks provide full-service commercial and consumer banking and trust and wealth management services. Quad City Bank & Trust Company, based in Bettendorf, Iowa, commenced operations in 1994, Cedar Rapids Bank & Trust Company, based in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, commenced operations in 2001, Community State Bank, based in Ankeny, Iowa, was acquired by the Company in 2016, Springfield First Community Bank, based in Springfield, Missouri, was acquired by the Company in 2018, and Guaranty Bank, also based in Springfield, Missouri, was acquired by the Company and merged with Springfield First Community Bank in 2022, with the combined entity operating under the Guaranty Bank name. Additionally, the Company serves the Waterloo/Cedar Falls, Iowa community through Community Bank & Trust, a division of Cedar Rapids Bank & Trust Company. The Company has 36 locations in Iowa, Missouri, Wisconsin and Illinois. As of September 30, 2024, the Company had $9.1 billion in assets, $6.8 billion in loans and $7.0 billion in deposits. For additional information, please visit the Company’s website at www.qcrh.com.

Special Note Concerning Forward-Looking Statements. This document contains, and future oral and written statements of the Company and its management may contain, forward-looking statements within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 with respect to the financial condition, results of operations, plans, objectives, future performance and business of the Company. Forward-looking statements, which may be based upon beliefs, expectations and assumptions of the Company’s management and on information currently available to management, are generally identifiable by the use of words such as “believe,” “expect,” “anticipate,” “bode”, “predict,” “suggest,” “project”, “appear,” “plan,” “intend,” “estimate,” ”annualize,” “may,” “will,” “would,” “could,” “should,” “likely,” “might,” “potential,” “continue,” “annualized,” “target,” “outlook,” as well as the negative forms of those words, or other similar expressions. Additionally, all statements in this document, including forward-looking statements, speak only as of the date they are made, and the Company undertakes no obligation to update any statement in light of new information or future events.

A number of factors, many of which are beyond the ability of the Company to control or predict, could cause actual results to differ materially from those in its forward-looking statements. These factors include, among others, the following: (i) the strength of the local, state, national and international economies (including effects of inflationary pressures and supply chain constraints); (ii) the economic impact of any future terrorist threats and attacks, widespread disease or pandemics, acts of war or other threats thereof (including the ongoing conflict in the Middle East and the Russian invasion of Ukraine), or other adverse external events that could cause economic deterioration or instability in credit markets, and the response of the local, state and national governments to any such adverse external events; (iii) changes in accounting policies and practices, as may be adopted by state and federal regulatory agencies, the Financial Accounting Standards Board or the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board; (iv) changes in local, state and federal laws, regulations and governmental policies concerning the Company’s general business, including as a result of the upcoming 2024 presidential election or any changes in response to failures of other banks; (vi) increased competition in the financial services sector, including from non-bank competitors such as credit unions and “fintech” companies, and the inability to attract new customers; (vii) changes in technology and the ability to develop and maintain secure and reliable electronic systems; (viii) unexpected results of acquisitions, which may include failure to realize the anticipated benefits of acquisitions and the possibility that transaction costs may be greater than anticipated; (ix) the loss of key executives or employees; (x) changes in consumer spending; (xi) unexpected outcomes of existing or new litigation involving the Company; (xii) the economic impact of exceptional weather occurrences such as tornadoes, floods and blizzards; (xiii) fluctuations in the value of securities held in our securities portfolio; (xiv) concentrations within our loan portfolio, large loans to certain borrowers, and large deposits from certain clients; (xv) the concentration of large deposits from certain clients who have balances above current Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation insurance limits and may withdraw deposits to diversity their exposure; (xvi) the level of non-performing assets on our balance sheets; (xvii) interruptions involving our information technology and communications systems or third-party servicers; (xviii) breaches or failures of our information security controls or cybersecurity-related incidents, (xix) changes in the interest rates and prepayment rates of the Company’s assets, and (xx) the ability of the Company to manage the risks associated with the foregoing as well as anticipated. These risks and uncertainties should be considered in evaluating forward-looking statements and undue reliance should not be placed on such statements. Additional information concerning the Company and its business, including additional factors that could materially affect the Company’s financial results, is included in the Company’s filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Contact:
Todd A. Gipple
President
Chief Financial Officer
(309) 743-7745
tgipple@qcrh.com


QCR Holding, Inc. Consolidated Financial Highlights (Unaudited)


	As of
	September 30,			June 30,			March 31,			December 31,			September 30,
	2024			2024			2024			2023			2023

	(dollars in thousands)

CONDENSED BALANCE SHEET

Cash and due from banks	$	103,840		$	92,173		$	80,988		$	97,123		$	104,265
Federal funds sold and interest-bearing deposits		159,159			102,262			77,020			140,369			80,650
Securities, net of allowance for credit losses		1,146,046			1,033,199			1,031,861			1,005,528			896,394
Loans receivable held for sale (1)		167,047			246,124			275,344			2,594			278,893
Loans/leases receivable held for investment		6,661,755			6,608,262			6,372,992			6,540,822			6,327,414
Allowance for credit losses		(86,321	)		(87,706	)		(84,470	)		(87,200	)		(87,669	)
Intangibles		11,751			12,441			13,131			13,821			14,537
Goodwill		138,596			139,027			139,027			139,027			139,027
Derivatives		261,913			194,354			183,888			188,978			291,295
Other assets		524,779			531,855			509,768			497,832			495,251
Total assets	$	9,088,565		$	8,871,991		$	8,599,549		$	8,538,894		$	8,540,057

Total deposits	$	6,984,633		$	6,764,667		$	6,806,775		$	6,514,005		$	6,494,852
Total borrowings		660,344			768,671			489,633			718,295			712,126
Derivatives		285,769			221,798			211,677			214,098			320,220
Other liabilities		181,199			180,536			184,122			205,900			184,476
Total stockholders’ equity		976,620			936,319			907,342			886,596			828,383
Total liabilities and stockholders’ equity	$	9,088,565		$	8,871,991		$	8,599,549		$	8,538,894		$	8,540,057

ANALYSIS OF LOAN PORTFOLIO
Loan/lease mix: (2)
Commercial and industrial – revolving	$	387,409		$	362,115		$	326,129		$	325,243		$	299,588
Commercial and industrial – other		1,321,053			1,370,561			1,374,333			1,390,068			1,381,967
Commercial and industrial – other – LIHTC		89,028			92,637			96,276			91,710			105,601
Total commercial and industrial		1,797,490			1,825,313			1,796,738			1,807,021			1,787,156
Commercial real estate, owner occupied		622,072			633,596			621,069			607,365			610,618
Commercial real estate, non-owner occupied		1,103,694			1,082,457			1,055,089			1,008,892			955,552
Construction and land development		342,335			331,454			410,918			477,424			472,695
Construction and land development – LIHTC		913,841			750,894			738,609			943,101			921,359
Multi-family		324,090			329,239			296,245			284,721			282,541
Multi-family – LIHTC		973,682			1,148,244			1,007,321			711,422			874,439
Direct financing leases		19,241			25,808			28,089			31,164			34,401
1-4 family real estate		587,512			583,542			563,358			544,971			539,931
Consumer		144,845			143,839			130,900			127,335			127,615
Total loans/leases	$	6,828,802		$	6,854,386		$	6,648,336		$	6,543,416		$	6,606,307
Less allowance for credit losses		86,321			87,706			84,470			87,200			87,669
Net loans/leases	$	6,742,481		$	6,766,680		$	6,563,866		$	6,456,216		$	6,518,638

ANALYSIS OF SECURITIES PORTFOLIO
Securities mix:
U.S. government sponsored agency securities	$	18,621		$	20,101		$	14,442		$	14,973		$	16,002
Municipal securities		965,810			885,046			884,469			853,645			764,017
Residential mortgage-backed and related securities		53,488			54,708			56,071			59,196			57,946
Asset backed securities		10,455			12,721			14,285			15,423			16,326
Other securities		39,190			38,464			40,539			41,115			43,272
Trading securities (3)		58,685			22,362			22,258			22,368			–
Total securities	$	1,146,249		$	1,033,402		$	1,032,064		$	1,006,720		$	897,563
Less allowance for credit losses		203			203			203			1,192			1,169
Net securities	$	1,146,046		$	1,033,199		$	1,031,861		$	1,005,528		$	896,394

ANALYSIS OF DEPOSITS
Deposit mix:
Noninterest-bearing demand deposits	$	969,348		$	956,445		$	955,167		$	1,038,689		$	1,027,791
Interest-bearing demand deposits		4,715,087			4,644,918			4,714,555			4,338,390			4,416,725
Time deposits		942,847			859,593			875,491			851,950			788,692
Brokered deposits		357,351			303,711			261,562			284,976			261,644
Total deposits	$	6,984,633		$	6,764,667		$	6,806,775		$	6,514,005		$	6,494,852

ANALYSIS OF BORROWINGS
Borrowings mix:
Term FHLB advances	$	145,383		$	135,000		$	135,000		$	135,000		$	135,000
Overnight FHLB advances		230,000			350,000			70,000			300,000			295,000
Other short-term borrowings		2,750			1,600			2,700			1,500			470
Subordinated notes		233,383			233,276			233,170			233,064			232,958
Junior subordinated debentures		48,828			48,795			48,763			48,731			48,698
Total borrowings	$	660,344		$	768,671		$	489,633		$	718,295		$	712,126

(1) Loans with a fair value of $165.9 million, $243.2 million, $274.8 million and $278.0 million have been identified for securitization and are included in LHFS at September 30, 2024, June 30, 2024, March 31, 2024 and September 30, 2023, respectively.
(2) Loan categories with significant LIHTC loan balances have been broken out separately. Total LIHTC balances within the loan/lease portfolio were $2.0 billion at September 30, 2024.
(3) Trading securities consisted of retained beneficial interests acquired in conjunction with Freddie Mac securitizations completed by the Company.


QCR Holding, Inc. Consolidated Financial Highlights (Unaudited)


	For the Quarter Ended
	September 30,			June 30,		March 31,			December 31,			September 30,
	2024			2024		2024			2023			2023

	(dollars in thousands, except per share data)

INCOME STATEMENT
Interest income	$	125,420		$	119,746	$	115,049		$	112,248		$	108,568
Interest expense		65,698			63,583		60,350			56,512			53,313
Net interest income		59,722			56,163		54,699			55,736			55,255
Provision for credit losses		3,484			5,496		2,969			5,199			3,806
Net interest income after provision for credit losses	$	56,238		$	50,667	$	51,730		$	50,537		$	51,449


Trust fees	$	3,270		$	3,103	$	3,199		$	3,084		$	2,863
Investment advisory and management fees		1,229			1,214		1,101			1,052			947
Deposit service fees		2,294			1,986		2,022			2,008			2,107
Gains on sales of residential real estate loans, net		385			540		382			323			476
Gains on sales of government guaranteed portions of loans, net		–			12		24			24			–
Capital markets revenue		16,290			17,758		16,457			36,956			15,596
Earnings on bank-owned life insurance		814			2,964		868			832			1,807
Debit card fees		1,575			1,571		1,466			1,561			1,584
Correspondent banking fees		507			510		512			465			450
Loan related fee income		949			962		836			845			800
Fair value gain (loss) on derivatives and trading securities		(886	)		51		(163	)		(582	)		(336	)
Other		730			218		154			1,161			299
Total noninterest income	$	27,157		$	30,889	$	26,858		$	47,729		$	26,593


Salaries and employee benefits	$	31,637		$	31,079	$	31,860		$	41,059		$	32,098
Occupancy and equipment expense		6,168			6,377		6,514			6,789			6,228
Professional and data processing fees		4,457			4,823		4,613			4,223			4,456
Restructuring expense		1,954			–		–			–			–
FDIC insurance, other insurance and regulatory fees		1,711			1,854		1,945			2,115			1,721
Loan/lease expense		587			151		378			834			826
Net cost of (income from) and gains/losses on operations of other real estate		(42	)		28		(30	)		38			3
Advertising and marketing		2,124			1,565		1,483			1,641			1,429
Communication and data connectivity		333			318		401			449			478
Supplies		278			259		275			333			335
Bank service charges		603			622		568			761			605
Correspondent banking expense		325			363		305			300			232
Intangibles amortization		690			690		690			716			691
Goodwill impairment		432			–		–			–			–
Payment card processing		785			706		646			836			733
Trust expense		395			379		425			413			432
Other		1,128			674		617			431			814
Total noninterest expense	$	53,565		$	49,888	$	50,690		$	60,938		$	51,081

Net income before income taxes	$	29,830		$	31,668	$	27,898		$	37,328		$	26,961
Federal and state income tax expense		2,045			2,554		1,172			4,473			1,840
Net income	$	27,785		$	29,114	$	26,726		$	32,855		$	25,121

Basic EPS	$	1.65		$	1.73	$	1.59		$	1.96		$	1.50
Diluted EPS	$	1.64		$	1.72	$	1.58		$	1.95		$	1.49


Weighted average common shares outstanding		16,846,200			16,814,814		16,783,348			16,734,080			16,717,303
Weighted average common and common equivalent shares outstanding		16,982,400			16,921,854		16,910,675			16,875,952			16,847,951


QCR Holding, Inc. Consolidated Financial Highlights (Unaudited)


	For the Nine Months Ended
	September 30,			September 30,
	2024			2023

	(dollars in thousands, except per share data)

INCOME STATEMENT
Interest income	$	360,215		$	301,162
Interest expense		189,631			135,892
Net interest income		170,584			165,270
Provision for credit losses		11,949			11,340
Net interest income after provision for credit losses	$	158,635		$	153,930


Trust fees	$	9,572		$	8,613
Investment advisory and management fees		3,544			2,812
Deposit service fees		6,302			6,169
Gains on sales of residential real estate loans, net		1,307			1,288
Gains on sales of government guaranteed portions of loans, net		36			30
Capital markets revenue		50,505			55,109
Securities losses, net		–			(451	)
Earnings on bank-owned life insurance		4,646			3,352
Debit card fees		4,612			4,639
Correspondent banking fees		1,529			1,197
Loan related fee income		2,747			2,221
Fair value loss on derivatives and trading securities		(998	)		(680	)
Other		1,102			656
Total noninterest income	$	84,904		$	84,955


Salaries and employee benefits	$	94,576		$	95,560
Occupancy and equipment expense		19,059			18,242
Professional and data processing fees		13,893			12,048
Post-acquisition compensation, transition and integration costs		–			207
Restructuring expense		1,954			–
FDIC insurance, other insurance and regulatory fees		5,510			5,022
Loan/lease expense		1,116			2,034
Net cost of (income from) and gains/losses on operations of other real estate		(44	)		(64	)
Advertising and marketing		5,172			4,401
Communication and data connectivity		1,052			1,614
Supplies		812			921
Bank service charges		1,793			1,831
Correspondent banking expense		993			663
Intangibles amortization		2,070			2,222
Goodwill impairment		432			–
Payment card processing		2,137			1,820
Trust expense		1,199			983
Other		2,419			2,089
Total noninterest expense	$	154,143		$	149,593

Net income before income taxes	$	89,396		$	89,292
Federal and state income tax expense		5,771			8,589
Net income	$	83,625		$	80,703

Basic EPS	$	4.97		$	4.82
Diluted EPS	$	4.94		$	4.79


Weighted average common shares outstanding		16,814,787			16,731,847
Weighted average common and common equivalent shares outstanding		16,938,309			16,863,203


QCR Holding, Inc. Consolidated Financial Highlights (Unaudited)


	As of and for the Quarter Ended															For the Nine Months Ended
	September 30,			June 30,			March 31,			December 31,			September 30,			September 30,			September 30,
	2024			2024			2024			2023			2023			2024			2023

	(dollars in thousands, except per share data)

COMMON SHARE DATA
Common shares outstanding		16,861,108			16,824,985			16,807,056			16,749,254			16,731,646
Book value per common share (1)	$	57.92		$	55.65		$	53.99		$	52.93		$	49.51
Tangible book value per common share (Non-GAAP) (2)	$	49.00		$	46.65		$	44.93		$	43.81		$	40.33
Closing stock price	$	74.03		$	60.00		$	60.74		$	58.39		$	48.52
Market capitalization	$	1,248,228		$	1,009,499		$	1,020,861		$	977,989		$	811,819
Market price / book value		127.81	%		107.82	%		112.51	%		100.31	%		98.00	%
Market price / tangible book value		151.07	%		128.62	%		135.18	%		133.29	%		120.30	%
Earnings per common share (basic) LTM (3)	$	6.93		$	6.78		$	6.75		$	6.78		$	6.65
Price earnings ratio LTM (3)	10.68 x			8.85 x			9.00 x			8.61 x			7.30 x
TCE / TA (Non-GAAP) (4)		9.24	%		9.00	%		8.94	%		8.75	%		8.05	%


CONDENSED STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN STOCKHOLDERS’ EQUITY
Beginning balance	$	936,319		$	907,342		$	886,596		$	828,383		$	822,689
Net income		27,785			29,114			26,726			32,855			25,121
Other comprehensive income (loss), net of tax		12,057			(368	)		(5,373	)		25,363			(19,415	)
Common stock cash dividends declared		(1,012	)		(1,008	)		(1,008	)		(1,004	)		(1,003	)
Other (5)		1,471			1,239			401			999			991
Ending balance	$	976,620		$	936,319		$	907,342		$	886,596		$	828,383


REGULATORY CAPITAL RATIOS (6):
Total risk-based capital ratio		13.87	%		14.21	%		14.30	%		14.29	%		14.48	%
Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio		10.33	%		10.49	%		10.50	%		10.27	%		10.30	%
Tier 1 leverage capital ratio		10.50	%		10.40	%		10.33	%		10.03	%		9.92	%
Common equity tier 1 ratio		9.79	%		9.92	%		9.91	%		9.67	%		9.68	%


KEY PERFORMANCE RATIOS AND OTHER METRICS
Return on average assets (annualized)		1.24	%		1.33	%		1.25	%		1.54	%		1.21	%		1.27	%		1.34	%
Return on average total equity (annualized)		11.55	%		12.63	%		11.83	%		15.42	%		11.99	%		12.00	%		13.18	%
Net interest margin		2.90	%		2.82	%		2.82	%		2.90	%		2.89	%		2.85	%		3.00	%
Net interest margin (TEY) (Non-GAAP)(7)		3.37	%		3.27	%		3.25	%		3.32	%		3.31	%		3.30	%		3.37	%
Efficiency ratio (Non-GAAP) (8)		61.65	%		57.31	%		62.15	%		58.90	%		62.41	%		60.33	%		59.78	%
Gross loans/leases held for investment / total assets		73.30	%		74.48	%		74.11	%		76.60	%		74.09	%		73.30	%		77.36	%
Gross loans/leases held for investment / total deposits		95.38	%		97.69	%		93.63	%		100.41	%		97.42	%		95.38	%		101.72	%
Effective tax rate		6.86	%		8.06	%		4.20	%		11.98	%		6.82	%		6.46	%		9.62	%
Full-time equivalent employees		976			988			986			996			987			976			987


AVERAGE BALANCES
Assets	$	8,968,653		$	8,776,002		$	8,550,855		$	8,535,732		$	8,287,813		$	8,765,913		$	8,041,141
Loans/leases		6,840,527			6,779,075			6,598,614			6,483,572			6,476,512			6,739,773			6,288,343
Deposits		6,858,196			6,687,188			6,595,453			6,485,154			6,342,339			6,714,251			6,272,083
Total stockholders’ equity		962,302			921,986			903,371			852,163			837,734			929,341			816,591



(1) Includes accumulated other comprehensive income (loss).
(2) Includes accumulated other comprehensive income (loss) and excludes intangible assets. See GAAP to Non-GAAP reconciliations.
(3) LTM : Last twelve months.
(4) TCE / TCA : tangible common equity / total tangible assets. See GAAP to non-GAAP reconciliations.
(5) Includes mostly common stock issued for options exercised and the employee stock purchase plan, as well as stock-based compensation.
(6) Ratios for the current quarter are subject to change upon final calculation for regulatory filings due after earnings release.
(7) TEY : Tax equivalent yield. See GAAP to Non-GAAP reconciliations.
(8) See GAAP to Non-GAAP reconciliations.


QCR Holding, Inc. Consolidated Financial Highlights (Unaudited)



ANALYSIS OF NET INTEREST INCOME AND MARGIN

	For the Quarter Ended
	September 30, 2024						June 30, 2024						September 30, 2023
	Average Balance		Interest Earned or Paid		Average Yield or Cost		Average Balance		Interest Earned or Paid		Average Yield or Cost		Average Balance		Interest Earned or Paid		Average Yield or Cost

	(dollars in thousands)

Fed funds sold	$	12,596	$	173	5.37	%	$	13,065	$	183	5.54	%	$	21,526	$	284	5.23	%
Interest-bearing deposits at financial institutions		145,597		1,915	5.23	%		80,998		1,139	5.66	%		86,807		1,205	5.51	%
Investment securities – taxable		381,285		4,439	4.64	%		377,747		4,286	4.53	%		344,657		3,788	4.38	%
Investment securities – nontaxable (1)		760,645		10,744	5.65	%		704,761		9,462	5.37	%		600,693		6,974	4.64	%
Restricted investment securities		42,546		840	7.73	%		43,398		869	7.92	%		43,590		659	5.91	%
Loans (1)		6,840,527		116,854	6.80	%		6,779,075		112,719	6.69	%		6,476,512		103,428	6.34	%
Total earning assets (1)	$	8,183,196	$	134,965	6.56	%	$	7,999,044	$	128,658	6.46	%	$	7,573,785	$	116,338	6.10	%

Interest-bearing deposits	$	4,739,757	$	42,180	3.54	%	$	4,649,625	$	40,924	3.54	%	$	4,264,208	$	33,563	3.12	%
Time deposits		1,164,560		13,206	4.51	%		1,091,870		12,128	4.47	%		999,488		10,003	3.97	%
Short-term borrowings		2,485		32	5.07	%		1,622		21	5.18	%		1,514		20	5.28	%
Federal Home Loan Bank advances		445,632		5,972	5.24	%		464,231		6,238	5.32	%		425,870		5,724	5.26	%
Subordinated debentures		233,313		3,616	6.20	%		233,207		3,582	6.14	%		232,890		3,307	5.68	%
Junior subordinated debentures		48,806		693	5.56	%		48,774		688	5.58	%		48,678		695	5.59	%
Total interest-bearing liabilities	$	6,634,553	$	65,699	3.93	%	$	6,489,329	$	63,581	3.93	%	$	5,972,648	$	53,312	3.54	%

Net interest income (1)			$	69,266					$	65,077					$	63,026
Net interest margin (2)					2.90	%					2.82	%					2.89	%
Net interest margin (TEY) (Non-GAAP) (1) (2) (3)					3.37	%					3.27	%					3.31	%
Adjusted net interest margin (TEY) (Non-GAAP) (1) (2) (3)					3.34	%					3.26	%					3.28	%


	For the Nine Months Ended
	September 30, 2024						September 30, 2023
	Average Balance		Interest Earned or Paid		Average Yield or Cost		Average Balance		Interest Earned or Paid		Average Yield or Cost

	(dollars in thousands)

Fed funds sold	$	15,196	$	625	5.40	%	$	19,267	$	741	5.14	%
Interest-bearing deposits at financial institutions		106,195		4,254	5.35	%		83,783		3,151	5.03	%
Investment securities – taxable		377,538		12,986	4.57	%		340,140		10,847	4.24	%
Investment securities – nontaxable (1)		717,284		29,557	5.50	%		599,070		19,892	4.43	%
Restricted investment securities		41,348		2,383	7.57	%		38,817		1,677	5.70	%
Loans (1)		6,739,773		337,244	6.68	%		6,288,343		285,136	6.06	%
Total earning assets (1)	$	7,997,334	$	387,049	6.46	%	$	7,369,420	$	321,444	5.83	%

Interest-bearing deposits	$	4,639,937	$	122,207	3.52	%	$	4,099,789	$	84,565	2.76	%
Time deposits		1,121,508		37,679	4.49	%		1,020,421		27,225	3.57	%
Short-term borrowings		1,846		76	5.47	%		3,588		152	5.66	%
Federal Home Loan Bank advances		421,782		16,948	5.28	%		311,740		11,898	5.03	%
Subordinated debentures		233,207		10,678	6.10	%		232,784		9,922	5.68	%
Junior subordinated debentures		48,774		2,074	5.59	%		48,646		2,129	5.77	%
Total interest-bearing liabilities	$	6,467,054	$	189,662	3.91	%	$	5,716,968	$	135,891	3.17	%

Net interest income (1)			$	197,387					$	185,553
Net interest margin (2)					2.85	%					3.00	%
Net interest margin (TEY) (Non-GAAP) (1) (2) (3)					3.30	%					3.37	%
Adjusted net interest margin (TEY) (Non-GAAP) (1) (2) (3)					3.28	%					3.34	%


(1) Includes nontaxable securities and loans. Interest earned and yields on nontaxable securities and loans are determined on a tax equivalent basis using a 21% effective federal tax rate.
(2) See “Select Financial Data – Subsidiaries” for a breakdown of amortization/accretion included in net interest margin for each period presented.
(3) TEY : Tax equivalent yield. See GAAP to Non-GAAP reconciliations.


QCR Holding, Inc. Consolidated Financial Highlights (Unaudited)



	As of
	September 30,			June 30,			March 31,			December 31,			September 30,
	2024			2024			2024			2023			2023

	(dollars in thousands, except per share data)

ROLLFORWARD OF ALLOWANCE FOR CREDIT LOSSES ON LOANS/LEASES
Beginning balance	$	87,706		$	84,470		$	87,200		$	87,669		$	85,797
Change in ACL for transfer of loans to LHFS		(1,812	)		498			(3,377	)		266			175
Credit loss expense		3,828			4,343			3,736			2,519			3,260
Loans/leases charged off		(3,871	)		(1,751	)		(3,560	)		(3,354	)		(1,816	)
Recoveries on loans/leases previously charged off		470			146			471			100			253
Ending balance	$	86,321		$	87,706		$	84,470		$	87,200		$	87,669


NONPERFORMING ASSETS
Nonaccrual loans/leases	$	33,480		$	33,546		$	29,439		$	32,753		$	34,568
Accruing loans/leases past due 90 days or more		1,298			87			142			86			–
Total nonperforming loans/leases		34,778			33,633			29,581			32,839			34,568
Other real estate owned		369			369			784			1,347			120
Other repossessed assets		542			512			962			–			–
Total nonperforming assets	$	35,689		$	34,514		$	31,327		$	34,186		$	34,688


ASSET QUALITY RATIOS
Nonperforming assets / total assets		0.39	%		0.39	%		0.36	%		0.40	%		0.41	%
ACL for loans and leases / total loans/leases held for investment		1.30	%		1.33	%		1.33	%		1.33	%		1.39	%
ACL for loans and leases / nonperforming loans/leases		248.21	%		260.77	%		285.55	%		265.54	%		253.61	%
Net charge-offs as a % of average loans/leases		0.05	%		0.02	%		0.05	%		0.05	%		0.02	%



INTERNALLY ASSIGNED RISK RATING (1) (2)
Special mention	$	80,121		$	85,096		$	111,729		$	125,308		$	128,052
Substandard (3)		70,022			80,345			70,841			70,425			72,550
Doubtful (3)		–			–			–			–			–
Total Criticized loans (4)	$	150,143		$	165,441		$	182,570		$	195,733		$	200,602

Classified loans as a % of total loans/leases (3)		1.03	%		1.17	%		1.07	%		1.08	%		1.10	%
Total Criticized loans as a % of total loans/leases (4)		2.20	%		2.41	%		2.75	%		2.99	%		3.04	%




(1) During the first quarter of 2024, the Company revised the risk rating scale used for credit quality monitoring.
(2) Amounts exclude the government guaranteed portion, if any. The Company assigns internal risk ratings of Pass for the government guaranteed portion.
(3) Classified loans are defined as loans with internally assigned risk ratings of 10 or 11 (7 or 8 prior to January 1, 2024), regardless of performance, and include loans identified as Substandard or Doubtful.
(4) Total Criticized loans are defined as loans with internally assigned risk ratings of 9, 10, or 11 (6, 7, or 8 prior to January 1, 2024), regardless of performance, and include loans identified as Special Mention, Substandard, or Doubtful.


QCR Holding, Inc. Consolidated Financial Highlights (Unaudited)



			For the Quarter Ended									For the Nine Months Ended
			September 30,			June 30,			September 30,			September 30,			September 30,
		SELECT FINANCIAL DATA – SUBSIDIARIES	2024			2024			2023			2024			2023
			(dollars in thousands)

		TOTAL ASSETS
		Quad City Bank and Trust (1)	$	2,552,962		$	2,559,049		$	2,433,084
		m2 Equipment Finance, LLC		349,166			359,012			336,180
		Cedar Rapids Bank and Trust		2,625,943			2,428,267			2,442,263
		Community State Bank		1,519,585			1,531,109			1,417,250
		Guaranty Bank		2,360,301			2,369,754			2,242,638

		TOTAL DEPOSITS
		Quad City Bank and Trust (1)	$	2,205,465		$	2,100,520		$	1,973,989
		Cedar Rapids Bank and Trust		1,765,964			1,721,564			1,722,905
		Community State Bank		1,269,147			1,188,551			1,132,724
		Guaranty Bank		1,778,453			1,791,448			1,722,861

		TOTAL LOANS & LEASES
		Quad City Bank and Trust (1)	$	2,090,856		$	2,107,605		$	2,005,770
		m2 Equipment Finance, LLC		353,259			363,897			341,041
		Cedar Rapids Bank and Trust		1,743,809			1,736,438			1,750,986
		Community State Bank		1,161,805			1,162,686			1,098,479
		Guaranty Bank		1,832,331			1,847,658			1,751,072

		TOTAL LOANS & LEASES / TOTAL DEPOSITS
		Quad City Bank and Trust (1)		95	%		100	%		102	%
		Cedar Rapids Bank and Trust		99	%		101	%		102	%
		Community State Bank		92	%		98	%		97	%
		Guaranty Bank		103	%		103	%		102	%


		TOTAL LOANS & LEASES / TOTAL ASSETS
		Quad City Bank and Trust (1)		82	%		82	%		82	%
		Cedar Rapids Bank and Trust		66	%		72	%		72	%
		Community State Bank		76	%		76	%		78	%
		Guaranty Bank		78	%		78	%		78	%

		ACL ON LOANS/LEASES HELD FOR INVESTMENT AS A PERCENTAGE OF LOANS/LEASES HELD FOR INVESTMENT
		Quad City Bank and Trust (1)		1.49	%		1.49	%		1.50	%
		m2 Equipment Finance, LLC		4.11	%		3.86	%		3.52	%
		Cedar Rapids Bank and Trust		1.38	%		1.44	%		1.47	%
		Community State Bank		1.06	%		1.14	%		1.28	%
		Guaranty Bank		1.14	%		1.16	%		1.24	%

		RETURN ON AVERAGE ASSETS
		Quad City Bank and Trust (1)		0.76	%		0.88	%		0.97	%		0.81	%		1.00	%
		Cedar Rapids Bank and Trust		2.52	%		2.94	%		2.28	%		2.84	%		2.95	%
		Community State Bank		1.46	%		1.26	%		1.38	%		1.33	%		1.43	%
		Guaranty Bank		1.28	%		1.42	%		1.23	%		1.20	%		1.07	%

		NET INTEREST MARGIN PERCENTAGE (2)
		Quad City Bank and Trust (1)		3.50	%		3.39	%		3.37	%		3.40	%		3.36	%
		Cedar Rapids Bank and Trust		3.88	%		3.75	%		3.78	%		3.80	%		3.83	%
		Community State Bank		3.76	%		3.72	%		3.88	%		3.74	%		3.92	%
		Guaranty Bank (3)		3.12	%		2.99	%		3.06	%		3.03	%		3.22	%

		ACQUISITION-RELATED AMORTIZATION/ACCRETION INCLUDED IN NET
		INTEREST MARGIN, NET
		Cedar Rapids Bank and Trust	$	–		$	–		$	–		$	–		$	(8	)
		Community State Bank		(1	)		(1	)		(1	)		(3	)		69
		Guaranty Bank		496			301			572			1,194			1,537
		QCR Holdings, Inc. (4)		(32	)		(32	)		(32	)		(97	)		(97	)

(1	)	Quad City Bank and Trust amounts include m2 Equipment Finance, LLC, as this entity is wholly-owned and consolidated with the Bank. m2 Equipment Finance, LLC is also presented separately for certain (applicable) measurements.
(2	)	Includes nontaxable securities and loans. Interest earned and yields on nontaxable securities and loans are determined on a tax equivalent basis using a 21% effective federal tax rate.
(3	)	Guaranty Bank’s net interest margin percentage includes various purchase accounting adjustments. Excluding those adjustments, net interest margin (Non-GAAP) would have been 2.94% for the quarter ended September 30, 2024, 2.86% for the quarter ended June 30, 2024 and 2.97% for the quarter ended September 30, 2023.
(4	)	Relates to the trust preferred securities acquired as part of the Guaranty Bank acquisition in 2017 and the Community National Bank acquisition in 2013.


QCR Holding, Inc. Consolidated Financial Highlights (Unaudited)


	As of
	September 30,			June 30,			March 31,			December 31,			September 30,
GAAP TO NON-GAAP RECONCILIATIONS	2024			2024			2024			2023			2023
	(dollars in thousands, except per share data)
TANGIBLE COMMON EQUITY TO TANGIBLE ASSETS RATIO (1)

Stockholders’ equity (GAAP)	$	976,620		$	936,319		$	907,342		$	886,596		$	828,383
Less: Intangible assets		150,347			151,468			152,158			152,848			153,564
Tangible common equity (non-GAAP)	$	826,273		$	784,851		$	755,184		$	733,748		$	674,819

Total assets (GAAP)	$	9,088,565		$	8,871,991		$	8,599,549		$	8,538,894		$	8,540,057
Less: Intangible assets		150,347			151,468			152,158			152,848			153,564
Tangible assets (non-GAAP)	$	8,938,218		$	8,720,523		$	8,447,391		$	8,386,046		$	8,386,493

Tangible common equity to tangible assets ratio (non-GAAP)		9.24	%		9.00	%		8.94	%		8.75	%		8.05	%



(1) This ratio is a non-GAAP financial measure. The Company’s management believes that this measurement is important to many investors in the marketplace who are interested in changes period-to-period in common equity. In compliance with applicable rules of the SEC, this non-GAAP measure is reconciled to stockholders’ equity and total assets, which are the most directly comparable GAAP financial measures.


QCR Holding, Inc. Consolidated Financial Highlights (Unaudited)


GAAP TO NON-GAAP RECONCILIATIONS	For the Quarter Ended															For the Nine Months Ended
	September 30,			June 30,			March 31,			December 31,			September 30,			September 30,			September 30,
ADJUSTED NET INCOME (1)	2024			2024			2024			2023			2023			2024			2023
	(dollars in thousands, except per share data)

Net income (GAAP)	$	27,785		$	29,114		$	26,726		$	32,855		$	25,121		$	83,625		$	80,703

Less non-core items (post-tax) (2):
Income:
Securities gains (losses), net		–			–			–			–			–			–			(356	)
Fair value gain (loss) on derivatives, net		(542	)		(145	)		(144	)		(460	)		(265	)		(830	)		(537	)
Total non-core income (non-GAAP)	$	(542	)	$	(145	)	$	(144	)	$	(460	)	$	(265	)	$	(830	)	$	(893	)

Expense:
Goodwill impairment		432			–			–			–			–			432			–
Post-acquisition compensation, transition and integration costs		–			–			–			–			–			–			164
Restructuring expense		1,544			–			–			–			–			1,544
Total non-core expense (non-GAAP)	$	1,976		$	–		$	–		$	–		$	–		$	1,976		$	164

Adjusted net income (non-GAAP) (1)	$	30,303		$	29,259		$	26,870		$	33,315		$	25,386		$	86,431		$	81,760

ADJUSTED EARNINGS PER COMMON SHARE (1)

Adjusted net income (non-GAAP) (from above)	$	30,303		$	29,259		$	26,870		$	33,315		$	25,386		$	86,431		$	81,760

Weighted average common shares outstanding		16,846,200			16,814,814			16,783,348			16,734,080			16,717,303			16,814,787			16,731,847
Weighted average common and common equivalent shares outstanding		16,982,400			16,921,854			16,910,675			16,875,952			16,847,951			16,938,309			16,863,203

Adjusted earnings per common share (non-GAAP):
Basic	$	1.80		$	1.74		$	1.60		$	1.99		$	1.52		$	5.14		$	4.89
Diluted	$	1.78		$	1.73		$	1.59		$	1.97		$	1.51		$	5.10		$	4.85

ADJUSTED RETURN ON AVERAGE ASSETS AND AVERAGE EQUITY (1)

Adjusted net income (non-GAAP) (from above)	$	30,303		$	29,259		$	26,870		$	33,315		$	25,386		$	86,431		$	81,760

Average Assets	$	8,968,653		$	8,776,002		$	8,550,855		$	8,535,732		$	8,287,813		$	8,765,913		$	8,041,141

Adjusted return on average assets (annualized) (non-GAAP)		1.35	%		1.33	%		1.26	%		1.56	%		1.23	%		1.31	%		1.36	%
Adjusted return on average equity (annualized) (non-GAAP)		12.60	%		12.69	%		11.90	%		15.64	%		12.12	%		12.40	%		13.35	%

NET INTEREST MARGIN (TEY) (3)

Net interest income (GAAP)	$	59,722		$	56,163		$	54,699		$	55,736		$	55,255		$	170,584		$	165,270
Plus: Tax equivalent adjustment (4)		9,544			8,914			8,377			7,954			7,771			26,803			20,283
Net interest income – tax equivalent (Non-GAAP)	$	69,266		$	65,077		$	63,076		$	63,690		$	63,026		$	197,387		$	185,553
Less: Acquisition accounting net accretion		463			268			363			673			539			1,094			1,501
Adjusted net interest income	$	68,803		$	64,809		$	62,713		$	63,017		$	62,487		$	196,293		$	184,052

Average earning assets	$	8,183,196		$	7,999,044		$	7,807,720		$	7,631,035		$	7,573,785		$	7,997,334		$	7,369,420

Net interest margin (GAAP)		2.90	%		2.82	%		2.82	%		2.90	%		2.89	%		2.85	%		3.00	%
Net interest margin (TEY) (Non-GAAP)		3.37	%		3.27	%		3.25	%		3.32	%		3.31	%		3.30	%		3.37	%
Adjusted net interest margin (TEY) (Non-GAAP)		3.34	%		3.26	%		3.24	%		3.29	%		3.28	%		3.28	%		3.34	%

EFFICIENCY RATIO (5)

Noninterest expense (GAAP)	$	53,565		$	49,888		$	50,690		$	60,938		$	51,081		$	154,143		$	149,593

Net interest income (GAAP)	$	59,722		$	56,163		$	54,699		$	55,736		$	55,255		$	170,584		$	165,270
Noninterest income (GAAP)		27,157			30,889			26,858			47,729			26,593			84,904			84,955
Total income	$	86,879		$	87,052		$	81,557		$	103,465		$	81,848		$	255,488		$	250,225

Efficiency ratio (noninterest expense/total income) (Non-GAAP)		61.65	%		57.31	%		62.15	%		58.90	%		62.41	%		60.33	%		59.78	%
Adjusted efficiency ratio (core noninterest expense/core total income) (Non-GAAP)		58.45	%		57.19	%		62.01	%		58.57	%		62.15	%		59.16	%		59.43	%




(1) Adjusted net income, adjusted earnings per common share, adjusted return on average assets and average equity are non-GAAP financial measures. The Company’s management believes that these measurements are important to investors as they exclude non-core or non-recurring income and expense items, therefore, they provide a more realistic run-rate for future periods. In compliance with applicable rules of the SEC, these non-GAAP measures are reconciled to net income, which is the most directly comparable GAAP financial measure.
(2) Non-core or non-recurring items (post-tax) are calculated using an estimated effective federal tax rate of 21% with the exception of goodwill impairment which is not deductible for tax.
(3) Interest earned and yields on nontaxable securities and loans are determined on a tax equivalent basis using a 21% effective federal tax rate.
(4) Net interest margin (TEY) is a non-GAAP financial measure. The Company’s management utilizes this measurement to take into account the tax benefit associated with certain loans and securities. It is also standard industry practice to measure net interest margin using tax-equivalent measures. In compliance with applicable rules of the SEC, this non-GAAP measure is reconciled to net interest income, which is the most directly comparable GAAP financial measure. In addition, the Company calculates net interest margin without the impact of acquisition accounting net accretion as this can fluctuate and it’s difficult to provide a more realistic run-rate for future periods.
(5) Efficiency ratio is a non-GAAP measure. The Company’s management utilizes this ratio to compare to industry peers. The ratio is used to calculate overhead as a percentage of revenue. In compliance with the applicable rules of the SEC, this non-GAAP measure is reconciled to noninterest expense, net interest income and noninterest income, which are the most directly comparable GAAP financial measures.

The MIL Network –

January 25, 2025

MIL-OSI Video: Reporters Without Borders What happened to the 4 journalists who disappeared after a Russian roundup in Melitopol?

Source: Reporters Without Borders (RSF) (Video Release)

#UKRAINE: Imprisonment, forced confessions, slavery…What happened to the 4 journalists who disappeared after a Russian roundup in Melitopol? We investigated and managed to find them

20 August 2023 marked a turning point in the occupation of Melitopol. At the crack of dawn, at least four journalists and news content creators were escorted away by men in military uniform, as documented by RSF. Then, for weeks, silence…

In October 2023, their arrest was confirmed by Russian propaganda videos in which the journalists were forced to make false confessions – yet no information on their fate or whereabouts has been released since. Russia is holding these media workers illegally, moving them from prison to prison in conditions that are much closer to enforced disappearance than legitimate detention.

In this video, discover the way RSF retraced the paths of their imprisonment.

#russiaukrainewar #russia #telegram #desinformation #propagande #russie #kremlin #poutine #media #journalisme #freespeech #freepress #journalists #journaliste #condemningabuses #reportersindanger #libertédelapresse #journalismisntacrime #fightfortruth #humanrights #freemedia #violence #justicenow #picoftheday #libertedelapresse #rsf

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FslSNlIlfQ4

MIL OSI Video –

January 25, 2025

MIL-OSI USA: ICYMI—Hagerty Joins Mornings With Maria on Fox Business to Discuss BRICS Summit, Biden-Harris Emboldening China, Stablecoin Bill

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Tennessee Bill Hagerty
NEW YORK CITY—United States Senator Bill Hagerty (R-TN), a member of the Senate Banking and Foreign Relations Committees and former U.S. Ambassador to Japan, yesterday joined Mornings With Maria on Fox Business to discuss yesterday’s BRICS Summit, the Biden-Harris Administration’s weakness towards China, and his stablecoin legislation to establish a clear regulatory framework for the regulation and supervision of stablecoin issuers.

*Click the photo above or here to watch*
Partial Transcript
Hagerty on the BRICS Summit: “Were it not for the tremendous leadership void that exists today because of America’s exit from the international stage, we wouldn’t be seeing this happen. And under President [Donald] Trump, this would have never happened. They’ve expanded BRICS now to 32 nations, as you’ve said. This is all about Vladimir Putin trying to find a way to get around the type of sanctions regime that we will come back and put in place once President Trump is back in office. Interestingly, I noticed that the UN Secretary General Gutierrez is going to be there in Russia for this event. You know, were this event held anywhere else, Gutierrez, I think, would be obligated to enforce the arrest warrant that his own international criminal court has put out for Putin. It’s just shocking to me that these nations would step up and participate in this, and that Gutierrez himself would be involved in a situation where Iran is actually going to be brought into this group. It’s amazing. The only common bond, it seems, is that America’s not part of it, and they want to demonstrate their pushback. And the fact that the UN is engaged in this as well [is] really quite shocking and disturbing to me as it should be to all of us.”
Hagerty on China’s economic leverage against BRICS nations: “You mentioned China; that is another common bond here: China’s economic ties and leverage over these countries with the Belt and Road Initiative and the fact that they’re buying oil from Iran and from Russia. That is another common bond that these guys share. But if you think about how the Harris Administration would respond, look no further than what they did with the spy balloon that they allowed to fly over the entirety of the United States of America. And then send four cabinet members over to kowtow, just to beg them to come to San Francisco for a meeting, I’m very concerned. Americans should be deeply concerned what would happen and should Kamala Harris be put in a position to stand up to Xi. I’ve been with President Trump when he’s met with Xi. Xi respects Trump. President Trump will bring respect and order back to these types of relationships. I cannot imagine how Kamala Harris would stand up to that type of pressure.”
Hagerty on Obama’s former AG suing the Pentagon on behalf of a Chinse company: “This is exactly why President Trump has said we must drain the swamp. This is just another example of the revolving door. And the fact is that the first time this DJI was cited was back in 2017 when President Trump was in office—the Army took them down then—there’s no way that Loretta Lynch would be bringing the suit under the Trump Administration. But again, they’re trying to squeeze everything in that they can in the last days, the waning days of this Administration. You’ve got to ask yourself: who are they working for? Because every one of the foreign policies that Biden and Harris have pursued basically make China the net winner. We’ve got to stop this […] Ever since 2018, that’s been the case, because that’s what the Chinese National Security law says. Chinese companies that collect data anywhere in the world need to and have to expose that data to the Chinese intelligence services when asked. So, of course, that’s what it means. That’s the vulnerability that was seen back in the Trump Administration; that seems to be something that Loretta Lynch wants to undo and make these Chinese companies have access to the most sensitive data that our U.S. military would pick up. It’s unconscionable that she’d do this […] Barack Obama’s top law enforcement officer, the former Attorney General, is the one defending this Chinese company trying to get them off of this list, when she knows the exposure [and] the national security risk that would pose to America. It is just shocking.”
Hagerty on his stablecoin legislation to establish clear regulatory framework: “As you mentioned, this builds upon some excellent work that was done in the House of Representatives. I’ve come in and made some adjustments that I think it’ll make it easier to get through both bodies [in Congress]. The impact of this, though, actually gets back to the beginning of the story that you and I talked about. You think about the efforts that Vladimir Putin and these BRICS nations undertaking to get around the United States as the reserve currency of the world. This will actually strengthen our posture as a reserve currency. It will increase demand, not only for U.S. treasuries, but also the stablecoins will increase demand for U.S. dollars on a global basis. We need the proper regulatory framework in place here in America—we need legal certainty—the Biden and Harris Administration have done everything they can to destroy that sort of legal certainty. This will begin to chip away at the Democrats’ war on cryptocurrency and put us back in the driver’s seat when it comes to maintaining the reserve currency status that the dollar has enjoyed and should continue to enjoy […] The assumption is very clear that this legislation will move through and be ripe for a new Administration.”

MIL OSI USA News –

January 25, 2025

MIL-OSI: Horizon Bancorp, Inc. Reports Third Quarter 2024 Results, Including EPS of $0.41 and Continued Profitability Improvement, as well as Accretive Balance Sheet Initiatives

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

MICHIGAN CITY, Ind., Oct. 23, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — (NASDAQ GS: HBNC) – Horizon Bancorp, Inc. (“Horizon” or the “Company”), the parent company of Horizon Bank (the “Bank”), announced its unaudited financial results for the three and nine months ended September 30, 2024.

Net income for the three months ended September 30, 2024 was $18.2 million, or $0.41 per diluted share, compared to net income of $14.1 million, or $0.32, for the second quarter of 2024 and compared to net income of $16.2 million, or $0.37 per diluted share, for the third quarter of 2023.

Net income for the nine months ended September 30, 2024 was $46.3 million, or $1.05 per diluted share, compared to net income of $53.2 million, or $1.21, for the nine months ended September 30, 2023.

Third Quarter 2024 Highlights

Net interest income increased for the fourth consecutive quarter to $46.9 million, compared to $45.3 million in the linked quarter of 2024. Net interest margin, on a fully taxable equivalent (“FTE”) basis¹, expanded for the fourth consecutive quarter to 2.66%, compared to 2.64% in the linked quarter of 2024.

Total loans held for investment (“HFI”) were $4.8 billion at September 30, 2024, relatively unchanged from June 30, 2024 balances. However, consistent with the Company’s stated growth strategy, the commercial portfolio showed continued organic growth momentum during the quarter, which was offset with planned run-off of lower-yielding indirect auto loans in the consumer loan portfolio.

Positive deposit growth of 1.7% during the quarter, to $5.7 billion at period end. The quarter was highlighted by stable non-interest bearing deposit balances and growth in core relationship consumer and commercial portfolios.

Credit quality remains strong, with annualized net charge offs of 0.03% of average loans during the third quarter. Non-performing assets to total assets of 0.32% remains well within expected ranges, with no material change in the loss outlook. Provision for loan losses of $1.0 million reflects continued positive credit performance.

“Horizon continues to execute well on its key strategic initiatives of consistently improving our operating performance through a more productive balance sheet, growth in non-interest income and continued disciplined in our operating model. As a result, we are optimistic on the positive momentum of the franchise through year-end 2024 and into 2025. During the quarter, our commercial team was able to deliver another quarter of quality loan growth, even coming off a strong end to the second quarter. The strength of Horizon’s core deposit franchise showed solid performance, and our credit metrics remain well managed. These efforts led to a third consecutive quarter of sequential growth in pre-tax pre-provision income,” President and Chief Executive Officer Thomas M. Prame said. “Importantly, we continue our efforts to optimize our business model, and are pleased to announce the repositioning of a portion of our securities portfolio and the intended sale of our mortgage warehouse business during the fourth quarter. These shareholder accretive actions are expected to yield sustainable improvement in the profitability of our business that will be evident in the fourth quarter, and positively impact Horizon’s financial performance in 2025.”

^{_________________________
1} Non-GAAP financial metric. See non-GAAP reconciliation included herein for the most directly comparable GAAP measure.

Accretive Fourth Quarter 2024 Strategic Actions

Horizon announced strategic actions taking place in the fourth quarter of 2024, which are designed to simplify its business, strengthen the balance sheet and improve long-term structural profitability. In October, the Company completed the repositioning of about $325 million of available-for-sale securities. Additionally, the Company has signed a letter of intent to sell its mortgage warehouse business, which is expected to generate a gain-on-sale. Details on these actions, the use of proceeds, and the expected financial impact are available in the Company’s third quarter 2024 investor presentation published at investor.horizonbank.com.


Financial Highlights
(Dollars in Thousands Except Share and Per Share Data and Ratios, Unaudited)
	Three Months Ended
	September 30,			June 30,			March 31,			December 31,			September 30,
	2024			2024			2024			2023			2023
Income statement:
Net interest income	$	46,910		$	45,279		$	43,288		$	42,257		$	42,090
Credit loss expense		1,044			2,369			805			1,274			263
Non-interest income		11,511			10,485			9,929			(20,449	)		11,830
Non-interest expense		39,272			37,522			37,107			39,330			36,168
Income tax expense		(75	)		1,733			1,314			6,419			1,284
Net income	$	18,180		$	14,140		$	13,991		$	(25,215	)	$	16,205

Per share data:
Basic earnings per share	$	0.42		$	0.32		$	0.32		$	(0.58	)	$	0.37
Diluted earnings per share		0.41			0.32			0.32			(0.58	)		0.37
Cash dividends declared per common share		0.16			0.16			0.16			0.16			0.16
Book value per common share		17.27			16.62			16.49			16.47			15.89
Market value – high		16.57			12.74			14.44			14.65			12.68
Market value – low		11.89			11.29			11.75			9.33			9.90
Weighted average shares outstanding – Basic		43,712,059			43,712,059			43,663,610			43,649,585			43,646,609
Weighted average shares outstanding – Diluted		44,112,321			43,987,187			43,874,036			43,649,585			43,796,069
Common shares outstanding (end of period)		43,712,059			43,712,059			43,726,380			43,652,063			43,648,501

Key ratios:
Return on average assets		0.92	%		0.73	%		0.72	%	(1.27) %				0.81	%
Return on average stockholders’ equity		9.80			7.83			7.76			(14.23	)		8.99
Total equity to total assets		9.52			9.18			9.18			9.06			8.71
Total loans to deposit ratio		83.92			85.70			82.78			78.01			76.52
Allowance for credit losses to HFI loans		1.10			1.08			1.09			1.13			1.14
Annualized net charge-offs of average total loans⁽¹⁾		0.03			0.05			0.04			0.07			0.07
Efficiency ratio		67.22			67.29			69.73			180.35			67.08

Key metrics (Non-GAAP)⁽²⁾:
Net FTE interest margin		2.66	%		2.64	%		2.50	%		2.43	%		2.41	%
Return on average tangible common equity		12.65			10.18			10.11			(18.76	)		11.79
Tangible common equity to tangible assets		7.58			7.22			7.20			7.08			6.72
Tangible book value per common share	$	13.46		$	12.80		$	12.65		$	12.60		$	12.00


⁽¹⁾ Average total loans includes loans held for investment and held for sale.
⁽²⁾ Non-GAAP financial metrics. See non-GAAP reconciliation included herein for the most directly comparable GAAP measures.

Income Statement Highlights

Net Interest Income

Net interest income was $46.9 million in the third quarter of 2024, compared to $45.3 million in the second quarter of 2024, driven by net growth in average interest earning assets of $117.5 million and continued net FTE interest margin expansion during the quarter. Horizon’s net FTE interest margin¹ was 2.66% for the third quarter of 2024, compared to 2.64% for the second quarter of 2024, attributable to the favorable mix shift in average interest earning assets toward higher-yielding loans and in the average funding mix toward lower-cost deposit balances. Interest accretion from the fair value of acquired loans did not contribute significantly to the third quarter net interest income, or net FTE interest margin.

Provision for Credit Losses

During the third quarter of 2024, the Company recorded a provision for credit losses of $1.0 million. This compares to a provision for credit losses of $2.4 million during the second quarter of 2024, and $0.3 million during the third quarter of 2023. The decrease in the provision for credit losses during the third quarter of 2024 when compared with the second quarter of 2024 was primarily attributable to less total loan growth in the current quarter relative to the prior quarter.

For the third quarter of 2024, the allowance for credit losses included net charge-offs of $0.4 million, or an annualized 0.03% of average loans outstanding, compared to net charge-offs of $0.6 million, or an annualized 0.05% of average loans outstanding for the second quarter of 2024, and net charge-offs of $0.7 million, or an annualized 0.07% of average loans outstanding, in the third quarter of 2023.

The Company’s allowance for credit losses as a percentage of period-end loans HFI was 1.10% at September 30, 2024, compared to 1.08% at June 30, 2024 and 1.14% at September 30, 2023.

Non-Interest Income

For the Quarter Ended	September 30,		June 30,		March 31,		December 31,			September 30,
(Dollars in Thousands)	2024		2024		2024		2023			2023
Non-interest Income
Service charges on deposit accounts	$	3,320	$	3,130	$	3,214	$	3,092		$	3,086
Wire transfer fees		123		113		101		103			120
Interchange fees		3,511		3,826		3,109		3,224			3,186
Fiduciary activities		1,394		1,372		1,315		1,352			1,206
Gains (losses) on sale of investment securities		—		—		—		(31,572	)		—
Gain on sale of mortgage loans		1,622		896		626		951			1,582
Mortgage servicing income net of impairment		412		450		439		724			631
Increase in cash value of bank owned life insurance		349		318		298		658			1,055
Other income		780		380		827		1,019			964
Total non-interest income	$	11,511	$	10,485	$	9,929	$	(20,449	)	$	11,830

Total non-interest income was $11.5 million in the third quarter of 2024, compared to $10.5 million in the second quarter of 2024, due primarily to higher realized gains on sale of mortgage loans and increased other income.

^{_________________________
1} Non-GAAP financial metric. See non-GAAP reconciliation included herein for the most directly comparable GAAP measure.

Non-Interest Expense

For the Quarter Ended	September 30,		June 30,		March 31,		December 31,		September 30,
(Dollars in Thousands)	2024		2024		2024		2023		2023
Non-interest Expense
Salaries and employee benefits	$	21,829	$	20,583	$	20,268	$	21,877	$	20,058
Net occupancy expenses		3,207		3,192		3,546		3,260		3,283
Data processing		2,977		2,579		2,464		2,942		2,999
Professional fees		676		714		607		772		707
Outside services and consultants		3,677		3,058		3,359		2,394		2,316
Loan expense		1,034		1,038		719		1,345		1,120
FDIC insurance expense		1,204		1,315		1,320		1,200		1,300
Core deposit intangible amortization		844		844		872		903		903
Other losses		297		515		16		508		188
Other expense		3,527		3,684		3,936		4,129		3,294
Total non-interest expense	$	39,272	$	37,522	$	37,107	$	39,330	$	36,168

Total non-interest expense was $39.3 million in the third quarter of 2024, compared with $37.5 million in the second quarter of 2024. The increase in non-interest expense during the third quarter of 2024 was primarily driven by a $1.2 million increase in salaries and employee benefits expense, which is partially attributable to a legacy benefits program expense, and a $0.6 million increase in outside services and consultants expense related to strategic initiatives.

Income Taxes

Horizon’s effective tax rate was -0.4% for the third quarter of 2024, as compared to 10.9% for the second quarter of 2024. The decrease in the effective tax rate during the third quarter was primarily due to an increase in net realizable tax credits for the current year, which reduced the Company’s estimated annual effective tax rate.

Balance Sheet

Total assets increased by $14.9 million, or 0.2%, to $7.93 billion as of September 30, 2024, from $7.91 billion as of June 30, 2024. The increase in total assets is primarily due to increases in federal funds sold of $79.5 million, or 230.6%, to $113.9 million as of September 30, 2024, compared to $34.5 million as of June 30, 2024. The increase in federal funds sold during the period was partially offset by a decrease in other assets of $46.6 million, or 28.1%, to $119.0 million as of September 30, 2024, from $165.7 million as of June 30, 2024.

Total investment securities remained unchanged, at $2.4 billion as of September 30, 2024, compared to June 30, 2024, as the positive market impact to available for sale securities was offset by normal pay-downs and maturities. There were no purchases of investment securities during the third quarter of 2024.

Total loans HFI and loans held for sale were relatively consistent at $4.8 billion as of September 30, 2024 compared to $4.8 billion as of June 30, 2024, as growth in commercial loans of $9.5 million were offset by a decline in consumer loans of $43.3 million.

Total deposit balances increased by $96.9 million, or 1.7%, to $5.7 billion as of September 30, 2024 when compared to balances as of June 30, 2024. Non-interest bearing deposit balances were essentially unchanged during the quarter.

Total borrowings decreased by $86.4 million, or 7.0%, to $1.1 billion as of September 30, 2024, primarily related to the repayment of a portion of Federal Home Loan Bank advances, when compared to balances as of June 30, 2024.

Capital

The following table presents the consolidated regulatory capital ratios of the Company for the previous three quarters:

For the Quarter Ended	September 30,			June 30,			March 31,			December 31,
	2024*			2024			2024**			2023**
Consolidated Capital Ratios
Total capital (to risk-weighted assets)		13.52	%		13.41	%		13.75	%		14.04	%
Tier 1 capital (to risk-weighted assets)		11.70	%		11.59	%		11.89	%		12.13	%
Common equity tier 1 capital (to risk-weighted assets)		10.74	%		10.63	%		10.89	%		11.11	%
Tier 1 capital (to average assets)		9.01	%		9.02	%		8.91	%		8.61	%
*Preliminary estimate – may be subject to change
**Prior periods were previously revised (see disclosure in Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ending June 30, 2024)

As of September 30, 2024, the ratio of total stockholders’ equity to total assets is 9.52%. Book value per common share was $17.27, increasing $0.65 during the third quarter of 2024.

Tangible common equity¹ totaled $588.5 million at September 30, 2024, and the ratio of tangible common equity to tangible assets¹ was 7.58% at September 30, 2024, up from 7.22% at June 30, 2024. Tangible book value, which excludes intangible assets from total equity, per common share¹ was $13.46, increasing $0.66 during the third quarter of 2024.

Credit Quality

As of September 30, 2024, total non-accrual loans increased by $5.3 million, or 29.0%, from June 30, 2024, to 0.49% of total loans HFI. Total non-performing assets increased $5.1 million, or 25.0%, to $25.6 million, compared to $20.5 million as of June 30, 2024. The ratio of non-performing assets to total assets increased to 0.32% compared to 0.26% as of June 30, 2024.

As of September 30, 2024, net charge-offs decreased by $0.2 million to $0.4 million, compared to $0.6 million as of June 30, 2024 and remain just 0.03% annualized of average loans.

^{_________________________
1} Non-GAAP financial metric. See non-GAAP reconciliation included herein for the most directly comparable GAAP measure.

Earnings Conference Call

As previously announced, Horizon will host a conference call to review its third quarter financial results and operating performance.

Participants may access the live conference call on October 24, 2024 at 7:30 a.m. CT (8:30 a.m. ET) by dialing 833-974-2379 from the United States, 866-450-4696 from Canada or 1-412-317-5772 from international locations and requesting the “Horizon Bancorp Call.” Participants are asked to dial in approximately 10 minutes prior to the call.

A telephone replay of the call will be available approximately one hour after the end of the conference through November 1, 2024. The replay may be accessed by dialing 877-344-7529 from the United States, 855-669-9658 from Canada or 1–412–317-0088 from other international locations, and entering the access code 9847279.

About Horizon Bancorp, Inc.

Horizon Bancorp, Inc. (NASDAQ GS: HBNC) is the $7.9 billion-asset commercial bank holding company for Horizon Bank, which serves customers across diverse and economically attractive Midwestern markets through convenient digital and virtual tools, as well as its Indiana and Michigan branches. Horizon’s retail offerings include prime residential and other secured consumer lending to in-market customers, as well as a range of personal banking and wealth management solutions. Horizon also provides a comprehensive array of in-market business banking and treasury management services, as well as equipment financing solutions for customers regionally and nationally, with commercial lending representing over half of total loans. More information on Horizon, headquartered in Northwest Indiana’s Michigan City, is available at horizonbank.com and investor.horizonbank.com.

Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures

Certain information set forth in this press release refers to financial measures determined by methods other than in accordance with GAAP. Specifically, we have included non-GAAP financial measures relating to net income, diluted earnings per share, pre-tax, pre-provision net income, net interest margin, tangible stockholders’ equity and tangible book value per share, efficiency ratio, the return on average assets, the return on average common equity, and return on average tangible equity. In each case, we have identified special circumstances that we consider to be non-recurring and have excluded them. We believe that this shows the impact of such events as acquisition-related purchase accounting adjustments and swap termination fees, among others we have identified in our reconciliations. Horizon believes these non-GAAP financial measures are helpful to investors and provide a greater understanding of our business and financial results without giving effect to the purchase accounting impacts and one-time costs of acquisitions and non–recurring items. These measures are not necessarily comparable to similar measures that may be presented by other companies and should not be considered in isolation or as a substitute for the related GAAP measure. See the tables and other information below and contained elsewhere in this press release for reconciliations of the non-GAAP information identified herein and its most comparable GAAP measures.

Forward Looking Statements

This press release may contain forward–looking statements regarding the financial performance, business prospects, growth and operating strategies of Horizon Bancorp, Inc. and its affiliates (collectively, “Horizon”). For these statements, Horizon claims the protection of the safe harbor for forward-looking statements contained in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Statements in this press release should be considered in conjunction with the other information available about Horizon, including the information in the filings we make with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”). Forward-looking statements provide current expectations or forecasts of future events and are not guarantees of future performance. The forward-looking statements are based on management’s expectations and are subject to a number of risks and uncertainties. We have tried, wherever possible, to identify such statements by using words such as “anticipate,” “estimate,” “project,” “intend,” “plan,” “believe,” “will” and similar expressions in connection with any discussion of future operating or financial performance.

Although management believes that the expectations reflected in such forward-looking statements are reasonable, actual results may differ materially from those expressed or implied in such statements. Risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially include: current financial conditions within the banking industry; changes in the level and volatility of interest rates, changes in spreads on earning assets and changes in interest bearing liabilities; increased interest rate sensitivity; the aggregate effects of elevated inflation levels in recent years; loss of key Horizon personnel; increases in disintermediation; potential loss of fee income, including interchange fees, as new and emerging alternative payment platforms take a greater market share of the payment systems; estimates of fair value of certain of Horizon’s assets and liabilities; changes in prepayment speeds, loan originations, credit losses, market values, collateral securing loans and other assets; changes in sources of liquidity; macroeconomic conditions and their impact on Horizon and its customers; legislative and regulatory actions and reforms; changes in accounting policies or procedures as may be adopted and required by regulatory agencies; litigation, regulatory enforcement, and legal compliance risk and costs; rapid technological developments and changes; cyber terrorism and data security breaches; the rising costs of cybersecurity; the ability of the U.S. federal government to manage federal debt limits; climate change and social justice initiatives; the inability to realize cost savings or revenues or to effectively implement integration plans and other consequences associated with mergers, acquisitions, and divestitures; acts of terrorism, war and global conflicts, such as the Russia and Ukraine conflict and the Israel and Hamas conflict; and supply chain disruptions and delays. These and additional factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those expressed in the forward-looking statements are discussed in Horizon’s reports (such as the Annual Report on Form 10-K, Quarterly Reports on Form 10-Q, and Current Reports on Form 8-K) filed with the SEC and available at the SEC’s website (www.sec.gov). Undue reliance should not be placed on the forward–looking statements, which speak only as of the date hereof. Horizon does not undertake, and specifically disclaims any obligation, to publicly release the result of any revisions that may be made to update any forward-looking statement to reflect the events or circumstances after the date on which the forward–looking statement is made, or reflect the occurrence of unanticipated events, except to the extent required by law.


	Condensed Consolidated Statements of Income
	(Dollars in Thousands Except Per Share Data, Unaudited)
	Three Months Ended												Nine Months Ended
	September 30,			June 30,		March 31,		December 31,			September 30,		September 30,		September 30,
	2024			2024		2024		2023			2023		2024		2023
Interest Income
Loans receivable	$	75,488		$	71,880	$	66,954	$	65,583		$	63,003	$	214,322	$	178,961
Investment securities – taxable		8,133			7,986		7,362		8,157			8,788		23,481		26,253
Investment securities – tax-exempt		6,310			6,377		6,451		6,767			7,002		19,138		21,617
Other		957			738		4,497		3,007			1,332		6,192		1,960
Total interest income		90,888			86,981		85,264		83,514			80,125		263,133		228,791
Interest Expense
Deposits		30,787			28,447		27,990		27,376			24,704		87,224		58,481
Borrowed funds		11,131			11,213		11,930		11,765			11,224		34,274		30,713
Subordinated notes		830			829		831		870			880		2,490		2,641
Junior subordinated debentures issued to capital trusts		1,230			1,213		1,225		1,246			1,227		3,668		3,469
Total interest expense		43,978			41,702		41,976		41,257			38,035		127,656		95,304
Net Interest Income		46,910			45,279		43,288		42,257			42,090		135,477		133,487
Provision for loan losses		1,044			2,369		805		1,274			263		4,218		1,185
Net Interest Income after Provision for Loan Losses		45,866			42,910		42,483		40,983			41,827		131,259		132,302
Non-interest Income
Service charges on deposit accounts		3,320			3,130		3,214		3,092			3,086		9,664		9,135
Wire transfer fees		123			113		101		103			120		337		345
Interchange fees		3,511			3,826		3,109		3,224			3,186		10,446		9,637
Fiduciary activities		1,394			1,372		1,315		1,352			1,206		4,081		3,728
Gains (losses) on sale of investment securities		—			—		—		(31,572	)		—		—		(480	)
Gain on sale of mortgage loans		1,622			896		626		951			1,582		3,144		3,372
Mortgage servicing income net of impairment		412			450		439		724			631		1,301		1,984
Increase in cash value of bank owned life insurance		349			318		298		658			1,055		965		3,051
Other income		780			380		827		1,019			964		1,987		1,675
Total non-interest income		11,511			10,485		9,929		(20,449	)		11,830		31,925		32,447
Non-interest Expense
Salaries and employee benefits		21,829			20,583		20,268		21,877			20,058		62,680		58,932
Net occupancy expenses		3,207			3,192		3,546		3,260			3,283		9,945		10,095
Data processing		2,977			2,579		2,464		2,942			2,999		8,020		8,684
Professional fees		676			714		607		772			707		1,997		1,873
Outside services and consultants		3,677			3,058		3,359		2,394			2,316		10,094		7,548
Loan expense		1,034			1,038		719		1,345			1,120		2,791		3,635
FDIC insurance expense		1,204			1,315		1,320		1,200			1,300		3,839		2,680
Core deposit intangible amortization		844			844		872		903			903		2,560		2,709
Other losses		297			515		16		508			188		828		543
Other expense		3,527			3,684		3,936		4,129			3,294		11,147		10,255
Total non-interest expense		39,272			37,522		37,107		39,330			36,168		113,901		106,954
Income /(Loss) Before Income Taxes		18,105			15,873		15,305		(18,796	)		17,489		49,283		57,795
Income tax expense		(75	)		1,733		1,314		6,419			1,284		2,972		4,599
Net Income /(Loss)	$	18,180		$	14,140	$	13,991	$	(25,215	)	$	16,205	$	46,311	$	53,196
Basic Earnings /(Loss) Per Share	$	0.42		$	0.32	$	0.32	$	(0.58	)	$	0.37	$	1.06	$	1.22
Diluted Earnings/(Loss) Per Share		0.41			0.32		0.32		(0.58	)		0.37		1.05		1.21

	Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheets
	(Dollars in Thousands)
	September 30, 2024			June 30, 2024			March 31, 2024			December 31, 2023			September 30, 2023
Assets
Interest earning assets
Federal funds sold	$	113,912		$	34,453		$	161,704		$	401,672		$	71,576
Interest earning deposits		12,107			4,957			9,178			12,071			4,718
Interest earning time deposits		735			1,715			1,715			2,205			2,207
Federal Home Loan Bank stock		53,826			53,826			53,826			34,509			34,509
Investment securities, available for sale		541,170			527,054			535,319			547,251			865,168
Investment securities, held to maturity		1,888,379			1,904,281			1,925,725			1,945,638			1,966,483
Loans held for sale		2,069			2,440			922			1,418			2,828
Gross loans held for investment (HFI)		4,803,996			4,822,840			4,618,175			4,417,630			4,359,002
Total Interest earning assets		7,416,194			7,351,566			7,306,564			7,362,394			7,306,491
Non-interest earning assets
Allowance for credit losses		(52,881	)		(52,215	)		(50,387	)		(50,029	)		(49,699	)
Cash		108,815			106,691			100,206			112,772			98,843
Cash value of life insurance		37,115			36,773			36,455			36,157			149,212
Other assets		119,026			165,656			160,593			177,061			152,280
Goodwill		155,211			155,211			155,211			155,211			155,211
Other intangible assets		11,067			11,910			12,754			13,626			14,530
Premises and equipment, net		93,544			93,695			94,303			94,583			94,716
Interest receivable		39,366			43,240			40,008			38,710			37,850
Total non-interest earning assets		511,263			560,961			549,143			578,091			652,943
Total assets	$	7,927,457		$	7,912,527		$	7,855,707		$	7,940,485		$	7,959,434
Liabilities
Savings and money market deposits	$	3,420,827		$	3,364,726		$	3,350,673		$	3,369,149		$	3,322,788
Time deposits		1,220,653			1,178,389			1,136,121			1,179,739			1,250,606
Borrowings		1,142,744			1,229,165			1,219,812			1,217,020			1,214,016
Repurchase agreements		122,399			128,169			139,309			136,030			142,494
Subordinated notes		55,703			55,668			55,634			55,543			59,007
Junior subordinated debentures issued to capital trusts		57,423			57,369			57,315			57,258			57,201
Total interest earning liabilities		6,019,749			6,013,486			5,958,864			6,014,739			6,046,112
Non-interest bearing deposits		1,085,535			1,087,040			1,093,076			1,116,005			1,126,703
Interest payable		11,400			11,240			7,853			22,249			16,281
Other liabilities		55,951			74,096			74,664			68,680			76,969
Total liabilities		7,172,635			7,185,862			7,134,457			7,221,673			7,266,065
Stockholders’ Equity
Preferred stock		—			—			—			—			—
Common stock		—			—			—			—			—
Additional paid-in capital		358,453			357,673			356,599			356,400			355,478
Retained earnings		454,050			442,977			435,927			429,021			461,325
Accumulated other comprehensive income (loss)		(57,681	)		(73,985	)		(71,276	)		(66,609	)		(123,434	)
Total stockholders’ equity		754,822			726,665			721,250			718,812			693,369
Total liabilities and stockholders’ equity	$	7,927,457		$	7,912,527		$	7,855,707		$	7,940,485		$	7,959,434

	Loans and Deposits
	(Dollars in Thousands, Unaudited)
	September 30,		June 30,		March 31,		December 31,		September 30,		% Change
	2024		2024		2024		2023		2023		Q3’24 vs Q2’24			Q3’24 vs Q3’23
Commercial:
Commercial real estate	$	2,105,459	$	2,117,772	$	1,984,723	$	1,962,097	$	1,916,056		(1	)%		10	%
Commercial & Industrial		808,600		786,788		765,043		712,863		673,188		3	%		20	%
Total commercial		2,914,059		2,904,560		2,749,766		2,674,960		2,589,244		—	%		13	%
Residential Real estate		801,356		797,956		782,071		681,136		675,399		—	%		19	%
Mortgage warehouse		80,437		68,917		56,548		45,078		65,923		17	%		22	%
Consumer		1,008,144		1,051,407		1,029,790		1,016,456		1,028,436		(4	)%		(2	)%
Total loans held for investment		4,803,996		4,822,840		4,618,175		4,417,630		4,359,002		—	%		10	%
Loans held for sale		2,069		2,440		922		1,418		2,828		(15	)%		(27	)%
Total loans	$	4,806,065	$	4,825,280	$	4,619,097	$	4,419,048	$	4,361,830		—	%		10	%

Deposits:
Interest bearing deposits
Savings and money market deposits	$	3,420,827	$	3,364,726	$	3,350,673	$	3,369,149	$	3,322,788		2	%		3	%
Time deposits		1,220,653		1,178,389		1,136,121		1,179,739		1,250,606		4	%		(2	)%
Total Interest bearing deposits		4,641,480		4,543,115		4,486,794		4,548,888		4,573,394		2	%		1	%
Non-interest bearing deposits
Non-interest bearing deposits		1,085,535		1,087,040		1,093,076		1,116,005		1,126,703		—	%		(4	)%
Total deposits	$	5,727,015	$	5,630,155	$	5,579,870	$	5,664,893	$	5,700,097		2	%		—	%

	Average Balance Sheet
	(Dollars in Thousands, Unaudited)
	Three Months Ended
	September 30, 2024								June 30, 2024								September 30, 2023
	Average Balance			Interest⁽⁴⁾		Average Rate⁽⁴⁾			Average Balance			Interest⁽⁴⁾		Average Rate⁽⁴⁾			Average Balance			Interest⁽⁴⁾		Average Rate⁽⁴⁾
Assets
Interest earning assets
Federal funds sold	$	64,743		$	860		5.28	%	$	47,805		$	645		5.43	%	$	92,305		$	1,247		5.36	%
Interest earning deposits		8,781			97		4.39	%		7,662			93		4.88	%		8,018			85		4.21	%
Federal Home Loan Bank stock		53,826			1,607		11.88	%		53,827			1,521		11.36	%		34,509			618		7.10	%
Investment securities – taxable ⁽¹⁾		1,301,830			6,526		1.99	%		1,309,305			6,465		1.99	%		1,650,081			8,170		1.96	%
Investment securities – non-taxable ⁽¹⁾		1,125,295			7,987		2.82	%		1,132,065			8,072		2.87	%		1,220,998			8,863		2.88	%
Total investment securities		2,427,125			14,513		2.38	%		2,441,370			14,537		2.39	%		2,871,079			17,033		2.35	%
Loans receivable ^{(2) (3)}		4,775,788			75,828		6.32	%		4,662,124			72,208		6.23	%		4,280,700			63,254		5.89	%
Total interest earning assets	$	7,330,263		$	92,905		5.04	%	$	7,212,788		$	89,004		4.96	%	$	7,286,611		$	82,237		4.59	%
Non-interest earning assets
Cash and due from banks	$	108,609							$	108,319							$	100,331
Allowance for credit losses		(52,111	)							(50,334	)							(49,705	)
Other assets		471,259								508,555								587,514
Total average assets	$	7,858,020							$	7,779,328							$	7,924,751

Liabilities and Stockholders’ Equity
Interest bearing liabilities
Interest bearing deposits	$	3,386,177		$	18,185		2.14	%	$	3,334,490		$	16,814		2.03	%	$	3,267,594		$	12,661		1.54	%
Time deposits		1,189,148			12,602		4.22	%		1,134,590			11,633		4.12	%		1,271,104			12,043		3.76	%
Borrowings		1,149,952			10,221		3.54	%		1,184,172			10,278		3.49	%		1,180,452			10,399		3.50	%
Repurchase agreements		123,524			910		2.93	%		125,144			935		3.00	%		136,784			825		2.39	%
Subordinated notes		55,681			830		5.93	%		55,647			829		5.99	%		58,983			880		5.92	%
Junior subordinated debentures issued to capital trusts		57,389			1,230		8.53	%		57,335			1,213		8.51	%		57,166			1,227		8.52	%
Total interest bearing liabilities	$	5,961,871		$	43,978		2.93	%	$	5,891,378		$	41,702		2.85	%	$	5,972,083		$	38,035		2.53	%
Non-interest bearing liabilities
Demand deposits	$	1,083,214							$	1,080,676							$	1,159,241
Accrued interest payable and other liabilities		74,563								80,942								77,942
Stockholders’ equity		738,372								726,332								715,485
Total average liabilities and stockholders’ equity	$	7,858,020							$	7,779,328							$	7,924,751
Net FTE interest income (non-GAAP) ⁽⁵⁾				$	48,927							$	47,302							$	44,202
Less FTE adjustments ⁽⁴⁾					2,017								2,023								2,112
Net Interest Income				$	46,910							$	45,279							$	42,090
Net FTE interest margin (Non-GAAP) ⁽⁴⁾⁽⁵⁾							2.66	%							2.64	%							2.41	%

⁽¹⁾ Securities balances represent daily average balances for the fair value of securities. The average rate is calculated based on the daily average balance for the amortized cost of securities.
⁽²⁾ Includes fees on loans held for sale and held for investment. The inclusion of loan fees does not have a material effect on the average interest rate.
⁽³⁾ Non-accruing loans for the purpose of the computation above are included in the daily average loan amounts outstanding. Loan totals are shown net of unearned income and deferred loan fees.
⁽⁴⁾ Management believes fully taxable equivalent, or FTE, interest income is useful to investors in evaluating the Company’s performance as a comparison of the returns between a tax-free investment and a taxable alternative. The Company adjusts interest income and average rates for tax-exempt loans and securities to an FTE basis utilizing a 21% tax rate
⁽⁵⁾ Non-GAAP financial metric. See non-GAAP reconciliation included herein for the most directly comparable GAAP measure.

	Credit Quality
	(Dollars in Thousands Except Ratios, Unaudited)
	Quarter Ended
	September 30,			June 30,			March 31,			December 31,			September 30,			% Change
	2024			2024			2024			2023			2023			3Q24 vs 2Q24			3Q24 vs 3Q23
Non-accrual loans
Commercial	$	6,830		$	4,321		$	5,493		$	7,362		$	6,919			58	%		(1	)%
Residential Real estate		9,529			8,489			8,725			8,058			7,644			12	%		25	%
Mortgage warehouse		—			—			—			—			—			—	%		—	%
Consumer		7,208			5,453			4,835			4,290			4,493			32	%		60	%
Total non-accrual loans		23,567			18,263			19,053			19,710			19,056			29	%		24	%
90 days and greater delinquent – accruing interest		819			1,039			108			559			392			(21	)%		109	%
Total non-performing loans		24,386			19,302			19,161			20,269			19,448			26	%		25	%

Other real estate owned
Commercial	$	1,158		$	1,111		$	1,124		$	1,124		$	1,287			4	%		(10	)%
Residential Real estate		—			—			—			182			32			—	%		(100	)%
Mortgage warehouse		—			—			—			—			—			—	%		—	%
Consumer		36			57			50			205			72			(37	)%		(50	)%
Total other real estate owned	$	1,194		$	1,168		$	1,174		$	1,511		$	1,391			2	%		(14	)%

Total non-performing assets	$	25,580		$	20,470		$	20,335		$	21,780		$	20,839			25	%		23	%

Loan data:
Accruing 30 to 89 days past due loans	$	18,087		$	19,785		$	15,154		$	16,595		$	13,089			(9	)%		38	%
Substandard loans		59,775			51,221			47,469			49,526			47,563			17	%		26	%
Net charge-offs (recoveries)
Commercial		(55	)		57			(57	)		233			142			(196	)%		(139	)%
Residential Real estate		(9	)		(4	)		(5	)		21			(39	)		(125	)%		77	%
Mortgage warehouse		—			—			—			—			—			—	%		—	%
Consumer		439			534			488			531			619			(18	)%		(29	)%
Total net charge-offs		375			587			426			785			722			(36	)%		(48	)%

Allowance for credit losses
Commercial		32,854			31,941			30,514			29,736			29,472			3	%		11	%
Residential Real estate		2,675			2,588			2,655			2,503			2,794			3	%		(4	)%
Mortgage warehouse		862			736			659			481			714			17	%		21	%
Consumer		16,490			16,950			16,559			17,309			16,719			(3	)%		(1	)%
Total allowance for credit losses	$	52,881		$	52,215		$	50,387		$	50,029		$	49,699			1	%		6	%

Credit quality ratios
Non-accrual loans to HFI loans		0.49	%		0.38	%		0.41	%		0.45	%		0.44	%
Non-performing assets to total assets		0.32	%		0.26	%		0.26	%		0.27	%		0.26	%
Annualized net charge-offs of average total loans		0.03	%		0.05	%		0.04	%		0.07	%		0.07	%
Allowance for credit losses to HFI loans		1.10	%		1.08	%		1.09	%		1.13	%		1.14	%

Non–GAAP Reconciliation of Net Fully-Taxable Equivalent (“FTE”) Interest Margin
(Dollars in Thousands, Unaudited)
		Three Months Ended
		September 30,			June 30,			March 31,			December 31,			September 30,
		2024			2024			2024			2023			2023
Interest income (GAAP)	(A)	$	90,888		$	86,981		$	85,264		$	83,514		$	80,125
Taxable-equivalent adjustment:
Investment securities – tax exempt ⁽¹⁾			1,677			1,695			1,715			1,799			1,861
Loan receivable ⁽²⁾			340			328			353			314			251
Interest income (non-GAAP)	(B)		92,905			89,004			87,332			85,627			82,237
Interest expense (GAAP)	(C)		43,978			41,702			41,976			41,257			38,035
Net interest income (GAAP)	(D) =(A) – (C)		46,910			45,279			43,288			42,257			42,090
Net FTE interest income (non-GAAP)	(E) = (B) – (C)		48,927			47,302			45,356			44,370			44,202
Average interest earning assets	(F)		7,330,263			7,212,788			7,293,559			7,239,034			7,286,611
Net FTE interest margin (non-GAAP)	(G) = (E*) / (F)		2.66	%		2.64	%		2.50	%		2.43	%		2.41	%

⁽¹⁾ The following represents municipal securities interest income for investment securities classified as available-for-sale and held-to-maturity
⁽²⁾ The following represents municipal loan interest income for loan receivables classified as held for sale and held for investment
*Annualized

Non–GAAP Reconciliation of Return on Average Tangible Common Equity
(Dollars in Thousands, Unaudited)
		Three Months Ended
		September 30,			June 30,			March 31,			December 31,			September 30,
		2024			2024			2024			2023			2023

Net income (loss) (GAAP)	(A)	$	18,180		$	14,140		$	13,991		$	(25,215	)	$	16,205

Average stockholders’ equity	(B)		738,372			726,332			725,083			702,793			715,485
Average intangible assets	(C)		166,819			167,659			168,519			169,401			170,301
Average tangible equity (Non-GAAP)	(D) = (B) – (C)	$	571,553		$	558,673		$	556,564		$	533,392		$	545,184
Return on average tangible common equity (“ROACE”) (non-GAAP)	(E) = (A*) / (D)		12.65	%		10.18	%		10.11	%	(18.76		)%		11.79	%
*Annualized

Non–GAAP Reconciliation of Tangible Common Equity to Tangible Assets
(Dollars in Thousands, Unaudited)
		Three Months Ended
		September 30,			June 30,			March 31,			December 31,			September 30,
		2024			2024			2024			2023			2023
Total stockholders’ equity (GAAP)	(A)	$	754,822		$	726,665		$	721,250		$	718,812		$	693,369
Intangible assets (end of period)	(B)		166,278			167,121			167,965			168,837			169,741
Total tangible common equity (non-GAAP)	(C) = (A) – (B)	$	588,544		$	559,544		$	553,285		$	549,975		$	523,628

Total assets (GAAP)	(D)		7,927,457			7,912,527			7,855,707			7,940,485			7,959,434
Intangible assets (end of period)	(B)		166,278			167,121			167,965			168,837			169,741
Total tangible assets (non-GAAP)	(E) = (D) – (B)	$	7,761,179		$	7,745,406		$	7,687,742		$	7,771,648		$	7,789,693

Tangible common equity to tangible assets (Non-GAAP)	(G) = (C) / (E)		7.58	%		7.22	%		7.20	%		7.08	%		6.72	%

Non–GAAP Reconciliation of Tangible Book Value Per Share
(Dollars in Thousands, Unaudited)
		Three Months Ended
		September 30,		June 30,		March 31,		December 31,		September 30,
		2024		2024		2024		2023		2023
Total stockholders’ equity (GAAP)	(A)	$	754,822	$	726,665	$	721,250	$	718,812	$	693,369
Intangible assets (end of period)	(B)		166,278		167,121		167,965		168,837		169,741
Total tangible common equity (non-GAAP)	(C) = (A) – (B)	$	588,544	$	559,544	$	553,285	$	549,975	$	523,628
Common shares outstanding	(D)		43,712,059		43,712,059		43,726,380		43,652,063		43,648,501

Tangible book value per common share (non-GAAP)	(E) = (C) / (D)	$	13.46	$	12.80	$	12.65	$	12.60	$	12.00

Contact:	John R. Stewart, CFA
	EVP, Chief Financial Officer
Phone:	(219) 814–5833
Fax:	(219) 874–9280
Date:	October 23, 2024

The MIL Network –

January 25, 2025

MIL-OSI USA: ICYMI—Hagerty Joins CNN News Central to Discuss Latest Trump Smear Campaign, Biden-Harris Failed Economic and Foreign Policies

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Tennessee Bill Hagerty
‘The American public can see right through it.’
PHILADELPHIA, PA—United States Senator Bill Hagerty (R-TN), former U.S. Ambassador to Japan in the Trump Administration, today joined CNN News Central to discuss the latest outrageous smear campaign against former President Donald Trump and the Biden-Harris Administration’s failures in both the economy and foreign policy.

*Click the photo above or here to watch*
Partial Transcript
Hagerty on his personal experience serving in the Trump Administration: “I’ll say this: I did serve with President Trump as U.S. Ambassador to Japan. We have more U.S. military stations there in Japan than any place else in the world overseas. President Trump came to visit me three times—we always met with our military there—and I never saw anything but the utmost respect, both President Trump’s respect for our military, and their love and respect for him. That’s what I know.”
Hagerty on John Kelly’s slanderous claims against Trump: “It’s wholly inconsistent with my experience with President Trump. I also have reason to doubt it because there’ve been articles published about ‘losers’ and the things that were supposedly said in Normandy. I called the Ambassador right away. Again, these are old stories that are being drug up, of course, within two weeks of the election. But when I called the Ambassador, she said [the claims were] absolutely not true [regarding] what was attributed to John Kelly [in 2020], 20 other staffers said that was the case as well. I think this is being brought up at a time to divert and deflect. Here’s the story: American people right now need to be asking themselves a very basic question: Are they better off today than they were when President Trump was in office? Kamala Harris is claiming all these things that she might be able to do, yet she’s done none of them for the past three and a half years. What we’ve got is a situation where Kamala Harris can’t find any place where she would differ from Joe Biden. Seventy two percent of Americans think that this country is on the wrong track. All they have to do is look back to the time when President Trump was in office; that debunks these claims. President Trump had our economy working. People respected us—nations respected us—we had people better off in every demographic group. And I think that’s why Americans are seeing President Trump’s polls move forward, and I think that’s why we see these desperate things coming out here at the last minute, again, within the last two weeks, citing something from the deep past. It’s irrelevant at this point. Americans need to know: Will [they] be better off? Seventy two percent of Americans say we’re on the wrong track right now; I think they’re ready for change […] Real wages [are] what I think most people care about. Real wages [are] what they care about, and they were better off [under Trump].”
Hagerty on the false claim that Trump doesn’t respect the military: “His record as commander in Chief debunks [these baseless claims] in my mind…Because why? He actually did have us in position where there were no wars. You have [President] Joe Biden as Commander in Chief; what did he do? He and [Vice President] Kamala Harris, the last in the room, made a terrible decision in Afghanistan that led to the death of 13 service members, very personal to me. One of them was Ryan Knauss, a Tennessean. And I had to call Ryan’s parents and tell them what happened. You think about it: Joe Biden is there at the return of the remains at Dover. He doesn’t even have time for them; he’s looking at his watch. And when he’s in debate, he tells the world that no military man or woman died under his watch. He just forgot about the 13 that died on his watch. That’s presidential disrespect; I don’t see that coming up. Instead, you have claims that cannot be verified from someone that obviously doesn’t like President Trump and was fired by President Trump […] President Trump is a patriot. He loves this country.”
Hagerty on Trump’s foreign policies having substantially greater success than Biden-Harris’ policies: “I’ve actually seen Donald Trump in the room with Vladimir Putin and with Xi Jinping, with [Prime Minister Narendra] Modi, with [Former Prime Minister Shinzo] Abe. He’s able to hold his own. I certainly don’t think Kamala Harris could do that. Donald Trump knows how to negotiate. He knows how to deal with world leaders, and he can deal from a position of strength. That’s what Americans need right now. That’s what Americans should be asking themselves this close to the election, is who will represent our nation? Who will put us back in a posture of strength? Donald Trump clearly can do that because he’s done it before. Under his watch, we had no major wars breakout. As soon as Joe Biden and Kamala Harris came back into office, we saw the exact opposite. We’ve got hot wars now in the Middle East—you see what’s happening in Ukraine and Russia…It’s a very bad situation that’s occurred over the past three and a half years. Kamala Harris could have done something about it if she were serious. Obviously, she didn’t, and I think the American public can see right through it.”

MIL OSI USA News –

January 25, 2025

MIL-OSI Russia: Moscow Metro – Virtual Troika, FPS and Biometrics: How the Ticket Sales System in Moscow Changed in 2024

Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

Source: Moscow Metro

Maxim Liksutov reported that digital methods of paying for public transport are gaining popularity. For example, virtual Troika cards have already been used more than 2.5 million times. This year, passengers have issued more than 120,000 such cards.

Moscow metro. Moscow Metro.

Linking bank cards in the Moscow Metro application

The service allows you to pay for previous trips in just a couple of clicks, removing the card from the stop list. You can also view the history of card use in public transport. Passengers have linked about 250,000 bank cards to the application.

Biometric payment on MCD (Moscow Central Diameters)

In 2024, biometric payment became available at the Nakhabino, Kalanchevskaya, Likhobory and Zelenograd-Kryukovo stations. All passengers registered in the system can pay for travel using biometrics on Diameters.

Accelerated Payment System (APS)

This Russian service has been implemented in the Moscow Metro ticket offices and machines. With its help, passengers can buy or top up a Troika or Moskvich card using a smartphone from any manufacturer.

Biometric payment for students

Students have been given the opportunity to pay for travel on the metro and the Moscow Central Circle using biometrics. This convenient payment method is available to more than 550,000 students in Moscow.

Virtual card “Troika”

This service allows you to pay for travel using any smartphone on all types of public transport. With the virtual Troika, passengers spend less than a minute to buy a ticket and confirm their trip.

Online activation of replenishment of the Troika card

Yellow terminals are no longer needed! At the request of passengers, automatic activation of online replenishment of Troika and Moskvich cards has been introduced at the metro and MCC turnstiles. In addition, the service has been implemented in an open beta version on all 3,000 tram validators.

“The city ticket system fully meets the needs of passengers. We offer innovative solutions that have no analogues in the world in terms of scale and convenience. For example, biometric payment. In addition, in 2024, on the instructions of Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin, new digital services were launched in transport, which made travel even more convenient. Next year, we will continue to develop the most advanced domestic solutions for passengers,” said Maxim Liksutov.

MIL OSI Russia News –

January 25, 2025

MIL-OSI Russia: Financial news: 01/24/2025, 16:56 (Moscow time) the values of the upper limit of the price corridor and the range of market risk assessment for the security RU000A105LY0 (sСОПФДОМ4) were changed.

Translation. Region: Russian Federation –

Source: Moscow Exchange – Moscow Exchange –

01.24.2025 16:56

In accordance with the Methodology for determining the risk parameters of the stock market and the deposit market of PJSC Moscow Exchange by NCO NCC (JSC) on 24.01.2025, 16-56 (Moscow time), the values of the upper limit of the price corridor (up to 97.12) and the range of market risk assessment (up to 1052.31 rubles, equivalent to a rate of 17.5%) of the security RU000A105LY0 (sСОПФДОМ4) were changed

Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

Please Note; This Information is Raw Content Directly from the Information Source. It is access to What the Source Is Stating and Does Not Reflect

HTTPS: //VVV. MOEX.K.M.M.

MIL OSI Russia News –

January 25, 2025

MIL-OSI Russia: Financial news: 01/24/2025, 14-42 (Moscow time) the values of the upper limit of the price corridor and the range of market risk assessment for the RU000A0JTZF1 security (DOM.RF26ob) were changed.

Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

Source: Moscow Exchange – Moscow Exchange –

01/24/2025 14:42

In accordance with the Methodology for determining the risk parameters of the stock market and the deposit market of PJSC Moscow Exchange by NCO NCC (JSC) on 24.01.2025, 14-42 (Moscow time), the values of the upper limit of the price corridor (up to 105.93) and the range of market risk assessment (up to 1146.77 rubles, equivalent to a rate of 9.38%) of the security RU000A0JTZF1 (DOM.RF26ob) were changed

Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

Please note; This information is raw content directly from the information source. It is accurate to what the source is stating and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

https://www.moex.com/n77121

MIL OSI Russia News –

January 25, 2025

MIL-OSI New Zealand: Activist News – No humanitarian visas for Palestinians victims of genocide but plenty of rest and recreation for Israeli soldiers involved in genocide – PSNA

Source: Palestine Solidarity Network Aotearoa (PSNA)

Nationwide rallies this weekend will be calling for the government to suspend entry to New Zealand from soldiers in the Israeli Defence Forces.

“New Zealand should not be providing rest and recreation for Israeli soldiers fresh from the genocide in Gaza”, says PSNA National Chair John Minto. “We wouldn’t allow Russian soldiers to come here for rest and recreation from the invasion of Ukraine so why would we accept soldiers from the genocidal, apartheid state of Israel?”

As well as the working holiday visa, since 2019 Israelis can enter New Zealand for three months without needing a visa at all. This visa-waiver is used by Israeli soldiers for “rest and recreation” from the genocide in Gaza.

Israeli Defence Forces actions have resulted in at least 47,000 Palestinians killed – 70% of whom are women and children.

The International Court of Justice has declared Israeli actions a “plausible genocide” Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch have used the terms genocide and extermination which the latest report from United Nations Special Rapporteur, Francesca Albanese, is entitled “Genocide as colonial erasure”.

Meanwhile the International Criminal Court has issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Israeli Defence minister Yoav Gallant for war crimes and crimes against humanity.

All these red flags for genocide have been visible for months but the government is still giving the green light to those involved in war crimes to enter New Zealand.

PSNA has written to the government again in December asking for the suspension of travel to New Zealand for all Israeli soldiers and reservists.

New Zealand has signed the Genocide convention which requires us to prevent and punish the crime of genocide. The government is complicit with its silence.

It’s long past the time for the government to step up.

John Minto

National Chair

Palestine Solidarity Network Aotearoa

MIL OSI New Zealand News –

January 25, 2025

MIL-OSI Russia: Moscow Metro – Virtual Troika, FPS, and Biometrics: How Moscow’s Ticketing System Changed in 2024

Source: Moscow Metro

Maksim Liksutov reported that digital payment methods for public transport are gaining popularity. For example, virtual Troika cards have been used over 2.5 million times already. This year, passengers have issued more than 120,000 such cards.

Moscow Metro.

Linking Bank Cards in the Moscow Metro App

The service allows users to pay for previous trips in just a couple of clicks, removing their card from the stop-list. You can also view the history of your card’s use on public transport. Passengers have linked nearly 250,000 bank cards in the app.

Biometric Payment on the MCD (Moscow Central Diameters)

In 2024, biometric payment became available at the Nakhabino, Kalanchyovskaya, Likhobory, and Zelenograd-Kryukovo stations. All passengers registered in the system can pay for travel using biometrics on the Diameters.

Faster Payments System (FPS)

This Russian service has been implemented in ticket offices and vending machines of the Moscow Metro. Passengers can use it to buy or top up their Troika card or Muscovite card using a smartphone of any manufacturer.

Biometric Payment for Students

Students now have the option to pay for travel on the metro and MCC (Moscow Central Circle) using biometrics. This convenient payment method is available to over 550,000 students in Moscow.

Virtual Troika Card

This service allows you to pay for travel with any smartphone on all types of public transport. With a virtual “Troika,” passengers spend less than a minute from buying a ticket to validating their ride.

Online Top-Up Activation for Troika Cards

Yellow terminals are no longer needed! Based on passenger requests, automatic activation of online top-ups for Troika and Muscovite cards has been implemented at metro and MCC turnstiles. Additionally, the service has been implemented in open beta on all 3,000 tram validators.

“The city’s ticketing system fully meets the needs of passengers. We offer innovative solutions that are unparalleled in the world in terms of scale and convenience. For example, biometric payment. In addition, in 2024, on the instructions of the Mayor of Moscow, Sergey Sobyanin, new digital services were launched in transport, which made trips even more convenient. Next year, we will continue to develop the most advanced domestic solutions for passengers,” — said Maksim Liksutov.

MIL OSI Russia News –

January 25, 2025

MIL-OSI USA: In Senate Floor Speech, Murray Lays Out Case Against Controversial DoD Nominee Pete Hegseth, Slams Him for Refusal to Meet Prior to Confirmation Vote

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Washington State Patty Murray
ICYMI: Murray, Duckworth Lead Senators in Introducing Resolution Recognizing the Service of Women in Combat
ICYMI: Senator Murray Statement on Pete Hegseth Canceling Meeting with Her, Refusal to Meet Ahead of Probable Confirmation Vote
Murray: “Our military uniforms do not say Democrat. They do not say Republican. They just don’t. You cannot be an effective commander if your people don’t trust you. But how are troops supposed to trust you to keep them safe in combat if you think half the nation is the enemy?”
***VIDEO of Senator Murray’s floor speech HERE***
Washington, D.C. – Today, U.S. Senator Patty Murray (D-WA), Vice Chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee, took to the Senate floor to lay out her strong opposition to Pete Hegseth’s nomination to lead the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). Murray articulated the many grave concerns she has with Mr. Hegseth’s qualifications, positions, and his character—and slammed him for refusing to meet with her before his confirmation vote.
On Saturday, Murray called out Hegseth for refusing to meet with her until after his confirmation vote, and today on the Senate floor, she reiterated that every nominee should be willing to meet with senators to answer basic questions about how they would approach their role if confirmed, calling it: “beneath the dignity of the role he aspires to for Mr. Hegseth to refuse to meet one-on-one with most Democrats.”
“I mean, if Mr. Hegseth is afraid of me, how is he going to stand up to China? Meeting with members on both sides isn’t just some formality—if you are confirmed, it is part of the job,” Murray said.
“Let’s be perfectly clear about the stakes here—we are talking about who we will put in command of the most powerful military in the world. There is nothing on Mr. Hegseth’s resume that remotely suggests he has the experience for the role,” Murray continued. “I have a deep appreciation for his service to our country—I do. But let’s not kid ourselves here. I don’t see how being a Fox TV host prepares you to lead three million servicemembers and civilians. I don’t see how bankrupting a veterans’ nonprofit through wasteful spending qualifies you to manage a budget of nearly $900 billion dollars. Moreover, we really truly have no sense of what his understanding of military policy is or what his strategic priorities would be.”
Murray pointed out that, because senators had had to spend so much time at Mr. Hegseth’s confirmation hearing asking him basic questions about his questionable character and fitness—questions Republicans refused to ask—they had little time to ask him about how he would do his job.
“How does he plan to reduce costs and development times for key military capabilities that are critical to our national security? How would he invest in our defense industrial base and public shipyards, like the one in my home state in Washington? How does he view the pacing threat in the Indo-Pacific and how would he work with our partners and allies to prepare for a potential conflict? Does he have any thoughts on that at all?,” Murray asked. “This is just not a serious candidate who has thoughtful positions on the challenges we face.”
“You know what position he is serious about? What he has stated over and over again? ‘I’m straight up just saying we should not have women in combat roles.’ He said that last November,” Murray said on the Senate floor. “He has also made clear he has little regard for the Geneva Conventions. Now maybe this is a bit old fashioned of me, but I think we should have a Secretary of Defense who is firmly against war crimes. Not one who has spoken in favor of torture like water boarding, in favor of people convicted of war crimes, and questioned whether we should follow the Geneva Conventions.”
“And let’s not forget—in addition to having no real qualifications, and many alarming positions, Mr. Hegseth also has many red flags that raise serious concerns about his character and conduct… There is no world where we should have a predator running the Department of Defense that is responsible for the wellbeing of millions of women and men in uniform.”
Murray concluded by saying, there is no world where the person in charge of the U.S. military should see his fellow Americans as the enemy. In Hegseth’s book American Crusade, published in 2020, Hegseth wrote: “The other side, the left, is not our friend. We are not esteemed colleagues, nor mere political opponents. We are foes. Either we win or they win. We agree on nothing else.”“How are troops supposed to trust you to keep them safe in combat if you think half the nation is the enemy? How are Muslim servicemembers supposed to trust you if you think their religion is a threat to the country? How are women servicemembers supposed to trust you if you think they should be at home?,” Murray asked on the Senate floor.
“I don’t have an answer to that. Maybe Mr. Hegseth doesn’t either—maybe that is why he won’t meet with me. And then again, maybe it’s because he thinks I’m his foe because I’m a Democrat, or maybe he doesn’t think I should have a say in the military issues because I’m a woman. But I do have a say—and I say someone like Mr. Hegseth is grossly unqualified to take on one of the most important jobs in the world,” Murray said.
As the top Democrat on the Senate Appropriations Committee, Senator Murray helps author and negotiate defense spending each year. In Fiscal Year 2024, Murray prioritized investments in our servicemembers and military families, including by delivering on a 5.2% pay raise for servicemembers, expanding child care services, increasing funding for sexual assault prevention services, and boosting mental health and suicide prevention resources. Senator Murray also played a leading role in negotiating and delivering on a comprehensive national security supplemental in April of 2024 to extend aid to Ukraine, provide badly needed humanitarian relief, and support key partners in the Indo Pacific while deterring aggression by the Chinese government.
Senator Murray’s full remarks, as delivered on the Senate floor today, are below and video is HERE:
“Mr. President. I realize some Republicans were hoping we would cut this process short, but I have no problem coming to the floor, and having a lengthy discussion about Mr. Hegseth’s nomination to be Defense Secretary.
“I am eager to talk about it. The only person who doesn’t seem to want to talk about the Hegseth nomination is actually Mr. Hegseth himself! Because, Mr. President, I have been trying for weeks to schedule a meeting with Mr. Hegseth prior to his confirmation vote.
“I genuinely want a chance to ask him directly about my concerns with his character and fitness, yes, but also about the serious challenges facing our nation—whether it’s competition with China or aggression from Russia.
“As Vice Chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee, I help write the bill that funds the Defense Department—every year. And that bill only passes with bipartisan support. I don’t think it’s asking a lot to be able to meet with the person nominated to lead that department.
“I’ve had the opportunity to meet with ten of President Trump’s Cabinet nominees, and I look forward to meeting with more before they are confirmed by the Senate. Conducting these meetings is the absolute bare minimum given the role of each Senator and the constituents they represent.
“But Mr. Hegseth refused to meet with me and has refused to meet with many of my Democratic colleagues.
“I think most Americans would agree you shouldn’t get the job if you decide you can just skip the job interview. Every nominee—every nominee—should be willing to meet with Senators, regardless of their party, to answer basic questions about how they would approach their role if confirmed.
“It’s honestly beneath the dignity of the role he aspires to for Mr. Hegseth to refuse to meet one-on-one with most Democrats.
“What is he afraid of? Are the questions we have to ask really that hard? I mean, if Mr. Hegseth is afraid of me, how is he going to stand up to China?
“Meeting with members on both sides isn’t just some formality—if you are confirmed, it is part of the job. So this is a serious concern, and one of many concerns I have with Mr. Hegseth’s qualifications, his positions, and his character.
“Let’s be perfectly clear about the stakes here—we are talking about who we will put in command of the most powerful military in the world. There is nothing on Mr. Hegseth’s resume that remotely suggests he has the experience for that role.
“I have a deep appreciation for his service to our country—I do. But let’s not kid ourselves here.
“I don’t see how being a Fox TV host prepares you to lead three million servicemembers and civilians. I don’t see how bankrupting a veterans’ nonprofit through wasteful spending qualifies you to manage a budget of nearly $900 billion dollars.
“Moreover, we really truly have no sense of what his understanding of military policy is, or what his strategic priorities would be. Now thanks to Senator Duckworth, we know that he is someone who can’t name a single country in ASEAN—I mean, that ignorance is alarming.
“Senators had just seven minutes during his confirmation hearing to ask questions—many asked the questions we knew our Republican colleagues would not, regarding Hegseth’s questionable character and fitness. Important questions, absolutely!
“But because we had to spend so much time understanding if he even could do this job at the most basic level—we had precious little time to ask him about how he would do his job!
“How would Pete Hegseth ensure our servicemembers and their families have the resources they need at home and abroad? How does he plan to reduce costs and development times for key military capabilities that are critical to our national security? How would he invest in our defense industrial base and public shipyards, like the one in my home state of Washington?
“How does he view the pacing threat in the Indo-Pacific, and how would he work with our partners and allies to prepare for a potential conflict? Does he have any thoughts on that at all?
“This is just not a serious candidate who has thoughtful positions on the challenges that we face.
“You know what position he is serious about? What he has stated over and over again?
“And I quote: ‘I’m straight up just saying we should not have women in combat roles.’ He said that last November. Or, ‘we need moms. But not in the military, especially in combat units.’
“Now that is infuriating, and disqualifying—I don’t have to try very hard to imagine how that kind of condescending attitude will go over with our women in uniform.
“And after decades of comments like this denigrating the role of women in the military in ways that simply do not square with reality, Mr. Hegseth’s recent about-face on this topic is just not convincing.
“He has also made clear he has little regard for the Geneva Conventions. Now, maybe this is a bit old fashioned of me, but I think we should have a Secretary of Defense who is firmly against war crimes. Not one who has spoken in favor of torture like waterboarding, in favor of people convicted of war crimes, and questioned whether we should follow the Geneva Conventions.
“And let’s not forget—in addition to having no real qualifications, and many alarming positions, Mr. Hegseth also has many red flags that raise serious concerns about his character and his conduct.
“There is the report that he and his management team pursued women on his staff. There is the report that he took his employees to a strip club and got drunk. There is the report he got drunk in uniform, and had to be carried out of a strip club. There is the report he chanted ‘kill all Muslims’ while he was drunk.
“And beyond reporting, there are the police records backing up the account of a woman who told a nurse she may have been drugged and then raped by Pete Hegseth.
“Now, we couldn’t hear from that woman because Mr. Hegseth reached a financial settlement and he has now threatened to sue her for speaking out. And we almost didn’t hear about that incident at all since he didn’t even disclose it when he was vetted!
“But there are other people we have heard from. We know his mother once wrote to her son, directly criticizing him as an abuser of women. We know his former sister-in-law, in a signed affidavit, has shared she saw Mr. Hegseth drink to excess, and understood his ex-wife feared for her safety with him.
“And we know that same ex-wife told the FBI, ‘he drinks more than he doesn’t.’ That is an awful lot of smoke for us to be ignoring the fire.
“There is absolutely no world where someone who has a history of running up debts at nonprofits should be responsible for overseeing half of our discretionary spending.
“There is no world where someone with a history of failing to address his irresponsible alcohol use should be given one of the most stressful jobs imaginable, and should be making life and death decisions on a daily and an hourly basis.
“There is no world where we should have a predator running the Department of Defense that is responsible for the wellbeing of millions of women and men in uniform. I don’t get how that is complicated.
“Mr. President, let me just end on this: there is no world where the person in charge of our military should see his fellow Americans as the enemy.
“But Mr. Hegseth has made clear that is his view. Regarding Democrats and Republicans, he has written, and this is him: ‘The other side, the left, is not our friend. We are not esteemed colleagues, nor mere political opponents. We are foes. Either we win or they win. We agree on nothing else.’
“That is an especially dark view of our country. Our military uniforms do not say Democrat. They do not say Republican. They just don’t.
“Mr. President, you cannot be an effective commander if your people don’t trust you. But how are troops supposed to trust you to keep them safe in combat if you think half the nation is the enemy?
“How are Muslim servicemembers supposed to trust you if you think their religion is a threat to our country? How are women servicemembers supposed to trust you if you think they should be at home?
“I don’t have an answer to that. Maybe Mr. Hegseth doesn’t either—maybe that’s why he won’t meet with me. And then again, maybe it’s because he thinks I’m his foe because I’m a Democrat. Or maybe he doesn’t think I should have a say in the military issues because I’m a woman.
“But Mr. President, I do have a say—and I say someone like Mr. Hegseth is grossly unqualified to take on one of the most important jobs in the world.
“And I will be voting against him. And I urge my Republican colleagues to seriously consider the message it will send to confirm someone for Secretary of Defense who has failed, time and again, to meet the most basic standards of conduct our women and men in uniform are required to live up to.”

MIL OSI USA News –

January 25, 2025

MIL-OSI Video: Gaza: Children Deserve Security, Education, & Hope – Humanitarian UN Official | United Nations

Source: United Nations (Video News)

The Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Tom Fletcher today (23 Jan) told the Security Council that “the children of Gaza are not collateral damage” and are “as deserving as children everywhere of security, education and hope.”

Before today’s meeting on the situation of children in the occupied Palestinian territory began, Russian Ambassador Vasily Nebenzya asked for the floor. Nebenzya said, “the refusal” of UNICEF’s Head Catherine Russell to brief today’s Council session, was “a flagrant step which deserves our most serious censure.”

The Russian Ambassador said Russell, “during the US presidency of the Security Council, came to brief us at the drop of a hat at a disgraceful, politicized briefing about the so-called children’s aspects of the situation in Ukraine, on the 4th of December of last year.” Adding, “it would appear that for UNICEF, children in Gaza are less important than children in Ukraine.”

United States Ambassador Dorothy Shea also requested the floor and said, “the idea that the United States is responsible for the terrible suffering there is, just unacceptable to us, and we reject it, in its totality.”

Fletcher told the Council that children in Gaza, “have been killed, starved and frozen to death. They have been maimed, orphaned, separated from their family. Conservative estimates indicate that over 17,000 children are without their families in Gaza. Some died before their first breath, perishing with their mothers in childbirth. An estimated 150,000 pregnant women and new mothers are in desperate need of health services. Children have lost their schools and their education.”

He said children in Gaza “tell us that the world was not there for them throughout this war. We must be there for them now.”

Palestinian author Bisan Nateel, who writes children books, told the Council, “we have always been waiting for the moment when the Security Council would announce a ceasefire to end all these massacres and violations against the Palestinians in Gaza. Today, I hope. To live the ceasefire and for all our children to go back to their schools and for us to go back to our normal life when we used to go to our schools, to work, when we used to play, plant, work. The natural act of life, just to live.”

Palestinian Ambassador Riyad Mansour called upon the international community “to enable UNWRA to reopen its schools in the Gaza Strip, and to equip it to welcome thousands of children to resume formal education. And to reach every young boy and girl evenly and safely.”

For his part, Israeli Ambassador Danny Danon said, “it is Hamas, not Israel, that has turned Gaza into a war zone. It is Hamas, not Israel, that uses children as human shields. It is Hamas, not Israel, that places its terror infrastructure in schools, hospitals and civilian neighbourhoods. But time and time again, this Council chooses to ignore these facts.”

The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that large volumes of humanitarian aid continue to enter Gaza through the Erez and Zikim crossings in the north and Kerem Shalom crossing in the south.

Inside Gaza, OCHA says that aid cargo and humanitarian personnel are moving into areas that were previously hard to reach.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gUwQzZluwFM

MIL OSI Video –

January 25, 2025

MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine – P10_TA(2025)0006 – Thursday, 23 January 2025 – Strasbourg

Source: European Parliament

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on historical remembrance,

– having regard to the Charter of the United Nations,

– having regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC),

– having regard to the Geneva Conventions,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas on 24 February 2022, the Russian regime declared the start of a ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine based on false claims that it needed to protect civilians;

B. whereas, in fact, since 24 February 2022 the Russian Federation has been waging an unprovoked, unjustified and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, in continuation of previous aggressions since 2014, and continues to persistently violate the principles of the UN Charter through its aggressive actions against the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine and to blatantly and grossly violate international humanitarian law, as established by the Geneva Conventions of 1949, in particular through the massive use of targeted attacks against the civilian population, residential areas and civilian infrastructure;

C. whereas the UN General Assembly, in its resolution of 2 March 2022, immediately qualified Russia’s war against Ukraine as an act of aggression in violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, and, in its resolution of 14 November 2022, it recognised the need to hold the Russian Federation accountable for its war of aggression, as well as legally and financially responsible for its internationally wrongful acts, and that Russia should pay reparations for the injuries and damage caused;

D. whereas Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is not an isolated act but a continuation of its imperialistic policy, which has included a war against Chechnya and military aggression against Georgia in 2008, and the occupation of Crimea and the start of a war in the Donbas in 2014;

E. whereas the start of Russia’s full-scale war of aggression against neighbouring Ukraine was preceded by several public declarations by the president of the Russian Federation seeking to justify its use of force by means of historical revisionism, false claims and illegitimate demands for the recognition of its exclusive interests in Ukraine and other neighbouring countries;

F. whereas the Russian regime has been making widespread use of disinformation, including based on distorted historical arguments, and foreign information manipulation and interference in an attempt to justify its crime of aggression, to incite the Russian population to support its illegal regime and illegal war of aggression against neighbouring Ukraine, to interfere in the democratic processes of other countries and to reduce support among their populations for continued international assistance and support for Ukraine against Russia’s war of aggression; whereas the Russian regime denies Ukraine’s distinct national identity, falsely claiming it as part of the Russian world (‘Russkiy mir’), a narrative rooted in imperialistic ideology; whereas Russia is demolishing Holodomor memorials and restoring demolished monuments to Lenin in the occupied territories of Ukraine;

G. whereas Russia has not only failed to acknowledge the unforgivable initial role of the Soviet Union in the early stages of World War II, for example through the 1939 Treaty of Non-Aggression between Nazi Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union) and its secrets protocols, commonly referred to as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939, in which both totalitarian regimes conspired to divide Europe into exclusive spheres of influence, and failed to assume its responsibility for the many atrocities and mass crimes committed in territories occupied by the Soviet Union, but the current Russian regime has also instrumentalised history and created a cult of ‘victory’ around World War II to ideologically mobilise citizens and manipulate them into supporting an illegal war of aggression;

H. whereas Russia has developed a growing disinformation campaign of historical revisionism for the purpose of denying Ukraine its national identity, statehood and very existence, and with the aim of justifying its claims to exclusive spheres of influence, which is reminiscent of how the Soviet Union agreed with Nazi Germany to invade and occupy parts of Poland and Romania as well as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Ukraine in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact; whereas today, Russia poses a particular threat to Poland and the Baltic States and their sovereignty through this type of historical revisionism;

I. whereas Victory Day, celebrated annually on 9 May, has been turned by the current Russian regime into a tool of war propaganda in Russia, by exploiting the narrative of the ‘liberation of Europe from Nazism’ and thus ignoring the subsequent Soviet occupation of the Baltic States and the subjugation of central Europe; whereas this narrative of liberation from Nazism is being used today in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

J. whereas in some Member States, communist symbols, as well as the symbols of the ongoing Russian aggression, are prohibited by law; whereas since 2009, 23 August has been commemorated across the EU as the European Day of Remembrance for Victims of all Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes; whereas since 2003, Parliament has held an annual commemoration for the victims of mass Soviet deportations;

1. Reiterates its condemnation, in the strongest possible terms, of Russia’s unprovoked, illegal and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine; calls on Russia to immediately terminate all military activities in Ukraine and to completely and unconditionally withdraw all forces, proxies and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine, to end its forced deportations of Ukrainian civilians and to release all detained and deported Ukrainians, particularly children;

2. Rejects the various claims made by the Russian regime as futile attempts to justify an illegal war of aggression that constitutes a blatant violation of the UN Charter and of the responsibility of the Russian Federation as a permanent member of the UN Security Council to maintain peace and stability and that was immediately recognised as such by the other permanent members of the UN Security Council, along with an overwhelming majority of the UN General Assembly; recalls that no consideration of whatever nature, whether political, economic, military, historic or otherwise, may serve as a justification for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine;

3. Condemns the Russian regime’s systematic falsification and use of distorted historical arguments, such as those related to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, in its attempt to manipulate Russian public opinion into supporting criminal actions such as the illegal war of aggression against neighbouring Ukraine, to undermine international support and assistance for Ukraine and to erase Ukraine’s distinct cultural and historical identity; denounces Russia’s claim that it is entitled to zones of exclusive interest at the expense of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states as incompatible with international law;

4. Condemns the Russian Federation’s failure to establish accountability for Soviet crimes and its deliberate obstruction of historical research by denying access to and closing Soviet archives, as well as the fact that it has enacted legislation criminalising the truthful portrayal of Soviet and Russian crimes and persecuted civil society organisations investigating Soviet crimes, and has glorified Stalinist totalitarianism and re-created its methods; maintains that impunity and the lack of factually accurate historical and public debate and education has contributed to the current Russian regime’s ability to revive imperialist policies and instrumentalise history for its criminal purposes; condemns the persecution of civil society organisations investigating Soviet crimes or the crimes of the current regime, including the liquidation of International Memorial, the Memorial Human Rights Defence Centre, and the Moscow Helsinki Group, as well as the forced closure of the Sakharov Centre;

5. Recalls that the deliberate attacks of the Russian Federation on the civilian population of Ukraine, the destruction of civilian infrastructure, the use of torture, sexual violence and rape as weapons of war, the deportation of thousands of Ukrainian citizens to the territory of the Russian Federation, the forced transfer and adoption of Ukrainian children, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights constitute war crimes for which all perpetrators must be held accountable;

6. Reiterates, therefore, its full support for the ongoing investigation by the Prosecutor of the ICC into the situation in Ukraine based on alleged war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide; welcomes Ukraine’s formal accession to the ICC as of 1 January 2025 as an important contribution to international efforts to establish accountability for serious international crimes; calls for the EU to make further diplomatic efforts to encourage the ratification of the Rome Statute and all its amendments globally;

7. Furthermore also reiterates its call for the establishment of a special tribunal to investigate and prosecute the crime of aggression committed by the leadership of the Russian Federation against Ukraine; reiterates its call on the Commission, the Council and the European External Action Service to provide all political, financial and practical support necessary for the establishment of a special tribunal; expresses its full support for the International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression in Ukraine, based in The Hague and supporting the ongoing efforts of the Joint Investigation Team, as a first concrete step towards the establishment of the special tribunal;

8. Calls strongly for the EU and its Member States to further increase and coordinate their efforts, including with like-minded partners, to promptly and rigorously counter Russian disinformation and foreign information manipulation and interference in order to protect the integrity of their democratic processes and strengthen the resilience of European societies, inter alia by actively promoting media literacy and by supporting quality media and professional journalism, in particular investigative journalism that uncovers Russian propaganda, its methods and networks, and by supporting research into new hybrid influence technologies;

9. Calls for the EU to expand its sanctions against Russian media outlets conducting disinformation and information manipulation campaigns supporting and justifying Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and calls on the Member States to swiftly and thoroughly implement these sanctions and to dedicate sufficient resources to effectively addressing this hybrid warfare; calls for the EU and the Member States to step up their support for the independent Russian media in exile in order to enable diverse voices in the Russian-language media;

10. Expresses deep concern about the recent announcements from social media companies’ leadership concerning relaxing their rules on fact-checking and moderation and how this will further enable Russia’s disinformation campaign around the world; calls on the Commission and the Member States to strictly enforce the Digital Services Act in response to these announcements by Meta and earlier by X, including as an important part of the fight against Russian disinformation;

11. Calls on EU citizens to critically evaluate information by questioning its origins and intentions, particularly when it pertains to narratives linked to Russia, and to crosscheck facts using diverse and reliable sources to resist attempts at manipulation by foreign malign actors;

12. Condemns Moscow’s exploitation of Orthodox religion for geopolitical purposes, notably through the instrumentalisation of the Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) as a tool to influence and exert control over Orthodox populations in Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Serbia and other countries;

13. Responds to the statement of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of 2 May 2023 on the ideology of ‘Ruscism’ by condemning the nationalist imperialist ideology, policy and practices of the current Russian regime; stresses the incompatibility of this ideology and policy and these practices with international law and European values;

14. Believes that Russia’s attempts to misrepresent, revise and distort the history of Ukraine undermine the collective memory and identity of Europe as a whole and represent a threat to historical truth, democratic values and peace in Europe; calls on the Member States, therefore, to invest more in education on and research into the common history of Europe and European remembrance, and to support projects that promote a better understanding of the impact of the division of Europe during the Cold War; expresses its support for the building of a pan-European memorial in Brussels for the victims of the 20th century totalitarian regimes; regrets the continued use of symbols of totalitarian regimes in public spaces and calls for an EU-wide ban on the use of both Nazi and Soviet communist symbols as well as symbols of Russia’s ongoing aggression against Ukraine;

15. Expresses its wish for the EU and its Member States to promote better knowledge and understanding of the human suffering of Europeans inflicted by the Soviet regime during the 20th century; in this respect, calls for remembrance and respect for the victims of Soviet crimes, such as the mass deportations, including of the Crimean Tatar people and from the Baltic countries, the Gulag system, the Holodomor, massacres such as the Katyn massacre, and the Upper Silesian tragedy;

16. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the President, Government and Parliament of Ukraine, and the Russian institutions.

MIL OSI Europe News –

January 25, 2025

MIL-OSI Europe: Briefing – The EU’s new bilateral security and defence partnerships – 24-01-2025

Source: European Parliament

The Strategic Compass, adopted by the 27 EU Member States in March 2022 – only weeks after the onset of Russia’s unjustified and unprovoked aggression on Ukraine –emphasised the need for robust partnerships, for the EU to be able to achieve its objectives in the area of security and defence. Alongside ‘acting’ (operations), ‘securing’ (resilience) and ‘investing’, ‘partnering’ is one of the four main pillars of the Compass. The document itself outlines specific targets and deadlines to measure progress in this area. While the EU has partnered with other security and defence actors (essentially states and international organisations) in the past, a new model of tailored security and defence partnership was launched shortly after the adoption of the Compass, as a reinforced framework for enhanced partnership. To date, the EU has signed six such partnerships – with (by date of signature) Norway, Moldova, South Korea, Japan, Albania and North Macedonia, and more are envisaged. While the partnerships vary in content, depending on the assessed mutual interests of the EU and each individual partner, some ten areas of cooperation are common to all six. The European Parliament has highlighted the significance of the Strategic Compass’s partnership dimension and, in particular, the value of security and defence dialogues with partners from the Western Balkans, the Eastern Partnership, as well as with key partners in strategic maritime areas such as the Southern Neighbourhood and the Indo-Pacific. Parliament has underlined that cooperation with countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Norway, Ukraine, Georgia, the Western Balkans, Japan, Australia and certain African countries serves as a key element of the common security and defence policy. In 2023, it called for deeper military and defence cooperation with Japan and South Korea, and for closer cooperation with partners in Latin America and the Caribbean.

MIL OSI Europe News –

January 25, 2025

Category: Russian Federation

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