Category: Russian Federation

MIL-OSI Russia: Moscow Metro: new Potapovo station opens on Moscow’s oldest Line 1
Source: Moscow Metro

On September 5, the Mayor of Moscow, Sergey Sobyanin, inaugurated a new station on Line 1, named Potapovo. This station marks the ninth metro stop within the New Moscow area, aiming to enhance commuting convenience.

The station’s standout features include being the first heated above-ground metro station and boasting a futuristic design. The introduction of Potapovo station brings several benefits to the area.

Key advantages include:
- Accelerated travel to various social facilities, educational institutions, and the Big Circle Line. For example, travel to the Prospect Vernadskogo station on the Big Circle Line is now 2.5 times faster.
- Daily travel time savings of up to 40 minutes for passengers.
- Improved accessibility for nearby residential complexes, affecting 50,000 Muscovites who now have a metro within walking distance.
- Up to a 25% reduction in congestion at the Buninskaya Alleya, Tepliy Stan, and Novomoskovskaya stations.
- A 10% decrease in traffic on Kaluzhskoe Highway.
With the opening of Potapovo, over 200,000 residents of Kommunarka and surrounding areas now have access to new convenient routes. By 2030, the TiNAO (New Moscow) area is expected to have 27 rail transit stations, including MCD. This development follows Mayor Sobyanin’s efforts to enhance TiNAO’s transport infrastructure, – said Deputy Mayor for Transport Maksim Liksutov.

The city’s first heated above-ground station is located along the Solntsevo-Butovo-Varshavskoe highway corridor, near the intersection with Alexandra Monakhova Street.

The last decade has been transformative for Line 1, the oldest in the Moscow Metro, inaugurated in 1935. While it had only 19 stations before 2014, it now comprises 27 active stations. The extension of the so-called red line into new city territories stands as a significant milestone in Moscow’s metro development program.

Looking ahead, the introduction of the new Stolbovo electric depot is planned, which is expected to double the train frequency on the southern radius of the line.

MIL OSI Russia News –
September 29, 2024
MIL-OSI Germany: Current monetary policy topics | Speech at the Commerzbank AG event “Geldpolitik in Zeiten der Inflation”

Source: Deutsche Bundesbank in English

Check against delivery.
1 Words of welcome
Ladies and gentlemen,
I hope you have recharged your batteries after the summer and a holiday break, despite the eventful days we can look back on. Perhaps you are still relishing the sporting highlights you experienced from the comfort of your own armchair: the thrill of watching the Olympic Games and the Paralympics on TV at home.
A “sports programme” of a somewhat different variety now awaits us: a broad repertoire of topics to cover in a short allotted speaking time. Let’s begin by discussing three questions that are always of crucial importance: Where is economy activity heading? Where is inflation heading? And where is monetary policy heading? These will be followed by three topics specific to monetary policy: balance sheet reduction, the changed operational framework for monetary policy, and monetary and fiscal policy interactions.
2 Economic activity
Let’s kick off with the economic situation as well as the outlook for the economy. German economic output shrank by 0.1% in the second quarter of this year, after expanding slightly at the beginning of the year. The main drags on activity were weak investment and the construction sector, but exports and private consumption contracted somewhat as well.
Increased financing costs continued to squeeze investment activity, thus crimping domestic demand for industrial goods and construction work. Private investment also faced headwinds stemming from the intense uncertainty surrounding economic policy. On top of that, there was a countereffect in construction activity following the mild weather conditions in the first quarter. Moreover, industry in Germany is still feeling the pinch of weak foreign demand. Capacity utilisation in industry is now significantly below average, and that, too, is depressing investment.
All these factors combined mean the domestic economy has been treading water since the start of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine more than two years ago. Stagnation might be more or less on the cards for full-year 2024 as well if the latest forecasts by economic research institutes are anything to go by.
Hopes that industrial activity might pick up in the second half of the year have dimmed considerably according to the sentiment indicators observed in recent months. And consumer restraint is looking more stubborn than our Bundesbank experts were expecting when we published our Forecast for Germany in June. For all this, though, it is still true to say that sharply rising wages, easing inflation and robust labour market developments are opening up more and more scope for spending. Households could leverage that scope to gradually step up their consumption. Looking ahead to next year, the economic research institutes are expecting to see tentative economic growth of between ½ and 1%. The Bundesbank will be publishing its new Forecast for Germany in December.
Ladies and gentlemen, one point I have stressed on multiple occasions in the past is that we should not talk our country down as a business location. That is not to say, of course, that we should not pinpoint weaknesses and resolutely tackle problems. An overly pessimistic mindset can be damaging. But what can also be damaging is viewing a situation through rose-tinted spectacles or blindly trusting that everything will somehow fix itself of its own accord. There is no doubt that Germany is not seeing as much investment as we would like. And industry is struggling with a difficult competitive environment. Barriers need to be dismantled here.
At this point, allow me to make a passing remark in light of recent events: if businesses are to get to grips with – and finance – their future challenges, we will need banks that are strong and robust. In any possible mergers, what matters is that the institution that comes about as a result is one that fits that bill in the best possible way.
As far as the topic of barriers is concerned, I do not wish to go beyond my allotted time. Allow me, then, to run through just some of the initiatives that could boost the attractiveness of a business location: cutting as much red tape as possible, and speeding up administrative procedures like approval processes. As for greening the economy, policymakers should ensure greater planning security. Digital infrastructure and education, in particular, are in need of improvement. In addition, politicians should act to boost the labour supply because staff shortages are bound to worsen further as demographic change makes itself felt.
Headlines claiming that Germany is a millstone around the neck of the euro area[1] make for unpleasant reading. But the simple fact is that when the largest Member State’s economy is weak, the average across the bloc will be depressed as a result. The euro area economy as a whole has gained some traction in the first two quarters of this year (recording quarter-on-quarter growth rates of 0.3% and 0.2%, respectively). In their latest projections, ECB staff are forecasting modest economic growth of 0.8% in full-year 2024, rising slightly to 1.3% next year.
The outlook is uncertain, particularly given what remains a tense geopolitical environment. Neither in Ukraine nor in the Middle East has the situation eased. The outcome of the presidential election in the United States is another source of economic uncertainty. Last week’s TV debate gave us a taste of what is to come.Europe might end up losing out if, say, the United States adopts a more protectionist trade policy, takes government action to support the country as a business location, or turns its back on multilateral cooperation (on issues such as climate action, NATO and the WTO).
There’s good news as well, though: the labour market in the euro area is as robust as ever, as unemployment hit an all-time low of 6.4% in July. Germany’s economy hasn’t recovered yet, so its labour market hasn’t improved, but nor did it deteriorate significantly. Because firms in Germany have largely refrained from scaling back their workforces during the ongoing spell of economic weakness, they see little need overall for new hires. Even if they are certainly finding it difficult to fill vacancies in some areas.
An analysis by the ECB has found that labour hoarding – that is, keeping staff in reserve – is still above pre-pandemic levels in the euro area. Because profit margins were high at times, firms were able to hoard staff to a greater extent or for longer than usual when the situation or outlook deteriorated, the ECB noted.[2]
If profit margins now start to normalise, they will probably reduce the scope for firms to undertake labour hoarding. In addition, labour hoarding suggests that there will be fewer hires than usual as the economy recovers. Instead, productivity is more likely to rise. The new projections include an increase in euro area labour productivity of around 1% in both 2025 and 2026, following stagnation in the current year and a decline of just under 1% last year. Taken in isolation, this would dampen unit labour costs and thus inflation.
3 Inflation
This brings us to question number two concerning the outlook for prices. On this point, the focus is not only on the weak productivity growth observed so far, but also on the strong wage growth at the current juncture. For Germany, the latest wage deals have increased pay levels significantly. And relatively high wage settlements look set to be reached in the forthcoming pay negotiations as well. Understandably, the trade unions are looking to achieve lasting compensation for the real wage losses accumulated over the past three years.
Because inflation compensation bonuses will only be exempt from taxes and social contributions until the end of this year, the trade unions are now stepping up their demands for permanent wage increases. The still high willingness to strike and persistent widespread shortage of labour suggest that wage growth will remain comparatively strong. The longer-term outlook, too, indicates that labour scarcity in Germany wil
l remain a key factor driving robust wage growth and thus high inflation in the domestic economy.
In the euro area, growth in negotiated wages slowed significantly in the second quarter. However, this was due in part to a one-off effect in Germany (owing to inflation compensation bonuses paid out in the previous year but absent this year). The persistent labour market tightness in the euro area means that a quick let-up in wage dynamics is unlikely.
With wage pressures easing only slowly, the disinflation process is proving to be slow and arduous. Right now, inflation is not yet where we on the ECB Governing Council want it to be. Headline euro area inflation stood at 2.2% in August, down from 2.6% one month earlier. That significant decline mainly came about due to energy prices. Whilst it is true that German inflation – as measured by the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices – has reached 2.0%, I’m afraid to say that, for the time being, that level is probably not yet here to stay. Services inflation in the euro area is still worryingly high, coming in at 4.1% at last count. Core inflation has eased only marginally, dropping to 2.8%.
According to the latest ECB staff projections, euro area price inflation will be back at the 2% mark at the end of 2025. The journey there remains uncertain and include a few bends. For instance, inflation rates are expected to edge somewhat higher again towards the end of this year due to energy prices being in decline in the fourth quarter of last year.
Overall, though, we have made huge advances towards safeguarding price stability. As the disinflation process plays out, inflation expectations have also receded the way we want them to, and the risk of higher inflation expectations has diminished in the view of markets and surveyed experts. This would suggest that inflation expectations are well anchored. It is now up to us on the ECB Governing Council to prove our staying power. If we achieve that, we will soon make it over the finishing line.
4 Monetary policy
The third question I asked at the beginning has basically been answered: the phase of steep tightening was followed by nine months of unchanged key interest rates, after which the ECB Governing Council subsequently loosened the reins somewhat in June and now again in September.
We don’t know yet how things will unfold, but it is certain that key interest rates will not go back down as quickly and sharply as they went up! The intervals between the potential moves may vary depending on the incoming data, as monetary policy must remain tight enough for long enough to ensure that the inflation rate returns to the 2% target over the medium term. Assumptions to that effect about key interest rates also form the basis for the ECB’s projections.
Ladies and gentlemen, public opinions on the best time for an interest rate move vary. This is due, not least, to the fact that the risks cannot be clearly quantified and that monetary policy time lags are impossible to measure with certainty. It is important for me to see inflation stable at the 2% target as soon as possible. To get there, we will not pre-commit to any path in our decisions going forward. Instead, we will continue to examine incoming data with an open mind. We are not flying on autopilot when it comes to interest rate policy.
4.1 Reducing the balance sheet
I will now turn to the three topics specific to monetary policy. The key interest rates are the central lever with which to adjust the monetary policy stance. In addition, gradual balance sheet reduction also influences the direction of monetary policy. This is because the length of the balance sheet is ultimately driven by previous accommodative non-standard measures.
Banks’ repayment of loans under the longer-term refinancing operations has thus far been the primary contributory factor towards reducing the Eurosystem’s total assets. Remaining outstanding funds borrowed under targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs) are now only relatively small (around €76 billion). Next week will be the penultimate maturity date, and in December of this year the last repayments of funds borrowed under TLTROs will be made.
Moreover, the Eurosystem’s large bond holdings are gradually declining, by an average of €25 to €30 billion per month (since July 2023), through the discontinuation of reinvestments under the APP, the largest such purchase programme. Since July of this year, reinvestments under the pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP) have been reduced by an average of €7.5 billion per month and will also be fully discontinued at the end of 2024.
The process of significantly shrinking current total assets of just under €6,500 billion is not done just yet. So far, the markets have taken the Eurosystem’s balance sheet reduction (starting from a peak of over €8,800 billion) in their stride. I am confident about the future, too.
On the ECB Governing Council, I am one of those who has been advocating for reducing the Eurosystem’s footprint in financial markets. This process will take time. It is closely linked to how monetary policy is implemented and passed through to the financial markets. That is why I now wish to briefly address, as the second of my three topics specific to monetary policy, the changes to the operational framework for implementing monetary policy adopted in mid-March.
4.2 Changes to the operational framework for implementing monetary policy
You might be thinking: what a dry, hard-to-digest topic, and right after lunch to boot! However, addressing these seemingly annoying details is worth the time and effort. This is because the new operational framework for implementing monetary policy will determine how central bank liquidity is provided to banks in the future and how short-term money market rates will evolve going forward.
With excess liquidity in the banking system declining, but still high for the time being, little will change at first: we will continue to regularly lend central bank liquidity to banks at the quantities demanded and a fixed interest rate, with a wide range of bonds and other claims being eligible collateral for these loans. The reserve ratio for determining banks’ non-remunerated compulsory deposits with the Eurosystem remains unchanged at 1%.
On this very day, the gap between the main refinancing operations rate and the deposit facility rate narrowed from 50 to 15 basis points. This operational adjustment will incentivise bidding in the weekly tenders. Short-term money market rates are therefore likely to continue to evolve in the vicinity of the deposit facility rate, given limited fluctuations. In the process, we will observe the compatibility of our operational framework with market principles.[3]
The ECB Governing Council also agreed to introduce, at a later stage, new structural longer-term refinancing operations and a structural portfolio of securities. These transactions are intended to make a contribution to covering the banking sector’s structural liquidity needs. But that is a way off yet. That’s because, as already mentioned, banks’ excess liquidity and Eurosystem bond holdings are still very sizeable.
We will now gain experience and gather insights. A review of the key parameters of the operational framework is scheduled for 2026. However, adjustments can be made earlier if necessary.
4.3 Monetary and fiscal policy interactions
My third topic specific to monetary policy, monetary and fiscal policy interactions, is a perennial theme. Generally, the combination of the two policy areas determines how accommodative or restrictive the overall effect on the economy is.
In some times of crisis, such as during the coronavirus pandemic, monetary and fiscal policy can work together in the pursuit of their respective objectives. In times of high inflation, however, there may be potential for conflict. At the very least, fiscal policy should not undermine a restrictive monetary policy in the fight against inflation, but rather support it as much as possible.This year and next, the euro area fiscal stance is likely to have a roughly neutral effect, i.e. not generate any additional inflationary pressure. However, the expiry of crisis support measures is the reason why the deficit ratio is expected to decline. Seen from this perspective, fiscal policy is not restrictive.
The ECB projects that the euro area debt ratio will remain close to 90%. In some Member States, government debt is worryingly high, with no signs of a trend reversal happening any time soon. Monetary policy should ignore this. This is because the Member States will have to be able to deal with the interest rate level that is warranted from a monetary policy perspective. Governments ought to brace themselves for higher interest rate levels.
The new EU fiscal rules entered into force at the end of April. However, it is not yet clear what concrete requirements for fiscal consolidation will follow. In July, the existence of excessive deficits was established for seven countries, including the euro area countries France, Italy, Belgium, Slovakia and Malta. It will be crucial to implement the new rules in such a way that high debt ratios actually fall. This would require setting ambitious targets, and governments would then have to comply with them more ambitiously than in the past.
Setting priorities will remain the key fiscal policy challenge at any rate And this will not get any easier if additional expenditure, for example for climate action, defence or in view of demographic pressures, is moved higher on the priority list.
This is true even in Germany, where the debt ratio is no longer far from the 60% limit. In this case, it may indeed make sense to expand the fiscal scope somewhat by means of a moderate reform of the debt brake just as long as Germany complies with the European debt rules. The Bundesbank has put forward proposals to achieve that goal.
5 Concluding remarks
Ladies and gentlemen,
After three questions and three topics, I would like to end with a triad. Democracy, freedom and openness are core values on which our society, our daily coexistence, and our prosperity are based. We are living in challenging times. This is exemplified by the elections in France and three eastern German federal states as well as, this coming November, in the United States. For the future, it remains to be hoped that we can maintain democracy, freedom and openness as a secure basis.
Thank you for your attention.

Footnotes:
Konjunktur: Wirtschaft in Euro-Zone wächst – jedoch nicht in Deutschland (wiwo.de), Wirtschaft in Euro-Zone wächst trotz Bremsklotz Deutschland 0,2 Prozent (msn.com)
European Central Bank, Higher profit margins have helped firms hoard labour, Economic Bulletin, Issue 4/2024, pp. 54‑58.
See Nagel, J., Reflections on the Eurosystem’s new operational framework | Deutsche Bundesbank, speech at the Konstanz Seminar on Monetary Theory and Monetary Policy, 16 May 2024.

MIL OSI

MIL OSI German News –

September 29, 2024
MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Concludes the 2024 Article IV Consultation with Uganda

Source: IMF – News in Russian

September 9, 2024

Uganda has navigated the post pandemic recovery well due to sound macroeconomic policies. The economic recovery is strengthening with low inflation, favorable agricultural production, and strong industrial and services activity.

Uganda should continue its efforts to create fiscal space through revenue mobilization and better expenditure discipline, vigilant monetary policy, and exchange rate flexibility, using future oil revenue to address growth impediments and improve social development while advancing governance reform and financial inclusion.

Washington DC: On September 6, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the 2024 Article IV Consultation^{^[1]} with Uganda.

Uganda has navigated the post-pandemic recovery well due to sound macroeconomic policies. The economic recovery is strengthening with low inflation, favorable agricultural production, and strong industrial and services activity. Growth is estimated at 6 percent in FY23/24, up from 5.3 percent in FY22/23. Headline inflation has increased to 3.9 percent by June 2024, driven by rising energy prices and core inflation, though the latter remains below the Bank of Uganda’s (BoU) target of 5 percent.

Elevated current account deficit and limited capital inflows have weighed on Uganda’s international reserves. Despite strong coffee and gold exports, the current deficit remains high due to rising oil project-related imports. Tight global financial conditions and reduced external project and budget support have driven down gross international reserves, covering only 2.9 months of imports at the end of 2024 (excluding oil-project related imports).

The overall fiscal deficit continued to decline in FY23/24 but was less than planned due to revenue underperformance and higher current spending, while development spending fell short of expectations, worsening expenditure composition.

Looking ahead, growth is expected to strengthen, boosted by the start of oil production, which will make lasting improvement in the fiscal and current account balances. Inflation is expected to rise near the BoU’s target of 5 percent in FY24/25. Risks are mostly on the downside, including continued fallout from the Anti-Homosexuality Act, which complicates the already tight external financing conditions, potential delays in oil production, and climate-related shocks. Upside risks to inflation come from commodity price volatility, weather conditions, and exchange rate depreciation pressures stemming from limited capital inflows.

The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the Article IV consultation with Uganda:

“Executive Directors agreed with the thrust of the staff appraisal. They welcomed Uganda’s robust post‑pandemic recovery underpinned by sound macroeconomic policies and the favorable medium‑term outlook due to the anticipated start of oil production. At the same time, they noted pressures on international reserves amid tight global financial conditions, as well as the elevated debt servicing costs accompanied by a shortfall in the country’s development spending. Directors also highlighted the significant downside risks, including from the continued fallout from the “Anti‑Homosexuality Act”, which could exacerbate already tight external financing conditions, potential delays in oil production, sluggish reform implementation, and climate‑related shocks. Against this background, they encouraged continued reforms, including those envisaged under the expired ECF arrangement, to rebuild fiscal and external buffers and boost inclusive and sustainable growth, supported by technical assistance from the Fund and other partners as needed.

“Directors encouraged strong efforts to create durable fiscal space, emphasizing the need to address significant spending demands in human capital, infrastructure, and climate resilience. They recommended continued revenue‑based fiscal consolidation, improved expenditure discipline, and a prudent fiscal management framework to ensure effective use of oil revenues once production begins.

“Directors commended the Bank of Uganda’s commitment to price stability and agreed with its tight monetary policy stance to anchor inflation expectations. They advised keeping monetary policy data dependent and emphasized the importance of continued exchange rate flexibility to help build up buffers and improve competitiveness. Directors called for continued efforts to enhance monetary transmission and central bank independence, including through full implementation of the 2021 Safeguards Assessment recommendations.

“While recognizing the resilience of Uganda’s financial system, Directors called for vigilant monitoring of the rapid increase in the sovereign‑bank nexus and significant cross‑border exposure of the nonfinancial corporate sector, alongside multifaceted efforts to enhance financial inclusion.

“Directors stressed that accelerating structural reforms is crucial for achieving inclusive, sustainable, and private sector‑led growth. They supported further efforts to strengthen enforcement of the anti‑corruption framework, address remaining shortcomings in AML/CFT, enhance fiscal transparency, introduce regulatory reforms to support businesses, and implement an ambitious climate resilience agenda drawing on the recommendations of the C‑PIMA.

The next Article IV consultation with Uganda will be held on the standard 12‑month cycle.”

[1] Under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country’s economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board.

IMF Communications Department

MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Tatiana Mossot

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

@IMFSpokesperson

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/09/09/pr24322-Uganda-imf-exec-board-concludes-2024-aiv-consult

MIL OSI

MIL OSI Russia News –

September 29, 2024
MIL-OSI Russia: The building of the S.V. Obraztsov Puppet Theatre will be decorated with architectural and artistic lighting

MIL OSI Translation. Region: Russian Federation –

Source: Moscow Government – Government of Moscow –

Specialists from the city services complex will decorate the building of the State Academic Central Puppet Theater named after S.V. Obraztsov, located in the Tverskoy District, with architectural and artistic lighting. This was reported by the Deputy Mayor of Moscow for Housing and Public Utilities and Improvement Petr Biryukov.

“We have developed a special project for organizing the lighting of the building of the State Academic Central Puppet Theater named after S.V. Obraztsov on Sadovaya-Samotechnaya Street. The main task is to emphasize the architectural features of the building, which was built in the 1970s in the form of an avant-garde cube. The work has already begun and will be completed by the end of this year,” noted Petr Biryukov.

Power engineers from JSC “OEK” will install more than 130 modern lighting fixtures with energy-efficient lamps on the upper part of the theater’s perimeter. This will highlight the main entrance and windows. In addition, the lighting in the famous clock with doll figures, which is the dominant feature of the facade and is currently under reconstruction, will be restored.

All lamps have a warm or neutral white shade. Moderate illumination will not only highlight the details and elements of the structure, but also create a single light space in the city.

Over the past 13 years, the level of illumination in the capital has doubled. The number of buildings equipped with architectural and artistic lighting has increased fourfold. Moscow is illuminated by more than a million lamps, while energy consumption is reduced thanks to the use of energy-efficient LEDs.

Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

Please note; This information is raw content directly from the information source. It is accurate to what the source is stating and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

https://vvv.mos.ru/nevs/item/144393073/

EDITOR’S NOTE: This article is a translation. Apologies should the grammar and or sentence structure not be perfect.

MIL OSI Russia News –

September 29, 2024

MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Concludes 2024 Article IV Consultation with Dominican Republic

Source: IMF – News in Russian

September 10, 2024

Washington, DC: On September 10, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the Article IV consultation[1] with the Dominican Republic and considered and endorsed the staff appraisal without a meeting.[2]

A track record of sound policies and institutional policy frameworks has helped the Dominican Republic achieve robust and resilient economic growth and low inflation over the last two decades. Effective policies contributed to a growth moderation that appropriately supported inflation’s rapid and sustained return to its target last year and then aided the recovery, while close monitoring of the financial sector supported macro-financial stability. Planned enhancements to policy frameworks and deepening structural reforms—in particular, comprehensive fiscal and electricity reforms—have the potential to further support stability, competitiveness, and inclusive growth.

Following a strong post-pandemic recovery, economic growth slowed to 2.4 percent in 2023 due to tighter global and domestic financial conditions, weak export demand, and transient domestic factors, largely climate related. The growth slowdown, alongside lower commodity prices, drove inflation’s faster-than-expected convergence to its target range (4±1 percent). In response, the Central Bank of The Dominican Republic (BCRD) cautiously and appropriately reduced its key policy rate, allowing for greater exchange rate flexibility while increasing foreign exchange interventions to smooth daily exchange volatility. Fiscal policy was also prudently adjusted to support the economy. The current account deficit in 2023 narrowed markedly to 3.6 percent of GDP and was fully financed by foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. The financial sector weathered the period of tight monetary policy and slower growth and is adequately capitalized and profitable.

Supported by sound policies and macroeconomic fundamentals, the outlook is favorable despite elevated, mostly global, uncertainty. For 2024 and over the medium term, real GDP growth is projected around its long-term trend of 5 percent, with inflation around its 4 percent target. The current account deficit is projected to gradually narrow to less than 3 percent of GDP and continue being fully financed by FDI. Near-term risks to the outlook—including tighter global financial conditions, geopolitical tensions, and volatile commodity prices—have moderated since last year but remain elevated and tilted to the downside. Over the medium-term risks are more balanced and include upside risks if key domestic reforms are implemented successfully.

Executive Board Assessment

In concluding the 2024 Article IV Consultation with the Dominican Republic, Executive Directors endorsed staff’s appraisal, as follows:

A track record of sound policies and institutional policy frameworks has helped the Dominican Republic achieve robust and resilient economic growth and low inflation over the last two decades. Effective policies contributed to a growth moderation that appropriately supported inflation’s rapid and sustained return to its target in 2023. The authorities provided timely policy support to aid the recovery while monitoring closely the financial sector. The external position improved significantly in 2023 and was broadly in line with fundamentals and desirable policies.

The outlook is favorable despite elevated—mostly global—uncertainty. Real GDP growth is projected around its long-term trend of 5 percent in 2024 and thereafter, with inflation around its (4±1 percent) target. The current account deficit, expected to be fully financed by FDI, is projected to gradually narrow over the medium term. Downside risks dominate in the near‑term term—including tighter for longer monetary policy in the U.S., intensification of regional conflicts, or extreme local weather events—but are broadly balanced over the medium term, including upside risks if reforms are successfully implemented. Existing buffers, further contingency planning, and agile sound policy making can help face adverse shocks.

In the near term, policy priorities should remain focused on maintaining macroeconomic and financial stability, including further flexibility of the exchange rate. Monetary policy normalization can continue, given remaining economic slack and that inflation is firmly within the target range. Efforts to expedite the recapitalization of the central bank to reinforce its autonomy should remain a priority. Endeavors should continue to deepen the FX market, expand the use of hedging mechanisms and limit FXIs to large shocks that lead to destabilizing changes in hedging and financing premia to support further exchange rate flexibility, and therefore further enhance the effectiveness of the inflation targeting framework. While international reserves are broadly adequate based on traditional metrics, further reserve accumulation is necessary to increase buffers to deal with future shocks.

Fiscal policy should remain focused on rebuilding buffers and critical spending needs. The fiscal responsibility law and its planned implementation are welcomed and are important steps to better anchor medium-term policies and further secure debt sustainability. The authorities’ planned gradual fiscal consolidation, consistent with this law, is appropriate to place debt on a firmly downward path and build fiscal buffers. An integral fiscal reform that durably raises revenues—through elimination of tax exemptions and expansion of the tax base—and improves spending efficiency—especially by reducing electricity sector subsidies and untargeted transfers—is imperative. This can provide space for needed development spending (including disaster-resilient infrastructure) to promote inclusive growth.

The financial sector remains resilient and well capitalized, and efforts to bring the regulatory framework up to the latest international standards should continue. The sector weathered well the period of high interest rates and slower growth in 2023. Stress tests show that the banking sector can absorb a range of shocks. Continued close monitoring to contain any build‑up of vulnerabilities remains warranted amid higher for longer interest rates and past increases to credit growth. The modernization of the financial and prudential regulatory framework, alongside the expansion of the macroprudential toolkit, and closing regulatory/supervisory gaps (including for savings and loans cooperatives) will further increase financial sector resilience.

Ongoing efforts to improve public institutions and the business climate are essential to maintaining the strong investment and growth trajectory. The fiscal policy framework, and spending and revenue efficiency can be further enhanced by continued improvements to public financial management and further strengthening of revenue administration. Reforms to education and the labor market, alongside further improvements to social outcomes and implementation of climate adaptation and mitigation policies will be critical to support inclusive and resilient growth and continue to reduce vulnerabilities. The authorities should continue in their efforts to fully implement the Electricity Pact.

Dominican Republic: Selected Economic Indicators

Population (millions, 2023)                                                     10.7

GDP per capita (2023, U.S. dollars)                         11,372

Quota                                     477.4 million SDRs / 0.10% of total

Poverty (2021, share of population)                            23.9

Main exports                                             tourism, gold, tobacco

Unemployment rate (2023, percent)                             5.3

Key export markets                                          U.S., Canada, Haiti

Adult literacy rate (percent, 2022)                               95.5

Projection

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

2025

Output

(Annual percentage change, unless otherwise stated)

Real GDP

5.1

-6.7

12.3

4.9

2.4

5.1

5.0

Nominal GDP (RD$ billion)

4,562

4,457

5,393

6,261

6,820

7,453

8,149

Nominal GDP (US$ billion)

89.0

78.9

94.5

113.9

121.8

…

…

Output gap (in percent of potential output)

-0.5

-6.3

-1.9

-0.8

-1.7

-0.8

-0.5

Prices

Consumer price inflation (end of period)

3.7

5.6

8.5

7.8

3.6

3.7

4.0

Exchange Rate

Exchange rate (RD$/US$ – period average) 1/

51.2

56.5

57.1

55.0

56.0

…

…

Exchange rate (RD$/US$ – eop) 1/

52.9

58.2

57.3

56.2

58.0

…

…

Real effective exchange rate (eop, – depreciation) 1/

-3.2

-8.1

6.5

6.3

-1.9

-2.9

0.0

Government Finances

(In percent of GDP)

Consolidated public sector debt 2/

53.3

71.1

62.2

58.8

59.3

58.4

57.4

Consolidated public sector overall balance 2/

-3.3

-9.0

-3.7

-3.6

-4.0

-4.0

-3.8

Consolidated public sector primary balance

0.5

-4.2

0.7

0.0

0.4

0.7

0.7

NFPS balance

-2.3

-7.6

-2.5

-2.7

-3.1

-3.1

-3.1

Central government balance

-3.5

-7.9

-2.9

-3.2

-3.3

-3.1

-3.1

Revenues and grants

14.4

14.2

15.6

15.3

15.7

16.3

15.2

Primary spending

15.1

18.9

15.4

15.7

15.8

15.9

14.8

Interest expenditure

2.7

3.2

3.1

2.8

3.1

3.4

3.5

Rest of NFPS

1.1

0.3

0.4

0.6

0.2

0.0

0.0

Financial Sector

(Annual percentage change; unless otherwise stated)

Broad money (M3)

11.7

21.2

13.4

6.3

14.3

11.5

10.7

Credit to the private sector

11.8

5.3

11.6

16.6

19.6

15.8

11.5

Net domestic assets of the banking system

8.6

2.5

11.5

9.7

13.1

13.5

10.1

Policy interest rate (in percent) 1/

4.5

3.0

3.5

8.5

7.0

…

…

    Average bank deposit rate (1-year; in percent) 1/

6.7

3.1

2.3

9.9

8.6

…

…

    Average bank lending rate (1-year; in percent) 1/

12.4

9.9

9.2

13.5

13.6

…

…

Balance of Payments

(In percent of GDP)

Current account

-1.3

-1.7

-2.8

-5.8

-3.6

-3.4

-3.4

Goods, net

-10.2

-8.6

-12.5

-15.1

-13.0

-12.9

-12.7

Services, net

5.7

1.8

3.9

4.8

6.0

6.6

6.5

Income, net

3.2

5.2

5.7

4.5

3.5

2.9

2.7

Capital account

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

Financial account 3/

3.6

5.3

5.7

6.7

5.1

3.5

4.3

Foreign direct investment, net

3.4

3.2

3.4

3.6

3.6

3.5

3.5

Portfolio investment, net

2.4

7.1

2.2

2.9

2.0

1.5

1.3

Financial derivatives, net

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

Other investment, net

-2.3

-5.1

0.1

0.2

-0.5

-1.5

-0.5

Change in reserves (-increase)

-1.3

-2.5

-2.4

-1.3

-0.9

-0.2

-0.9

GIR (in millions of US dollars)

8,782

10,752

12,943

14,441

15,464

15,660

16,883

Total external debt (in percent of GDP)

41.9

56.3

48.6

40.5

43.3

43.5

42.5

of which: Consolidated public sector

27.3

40.3

35.6

33.2

33.9

32.9

32.2

Sources: National authorities; World Bank; and IMF staff calculations.

1/ Latest available.

2/ The consolidated public sector includes the budgetary central government (CG); the rest of the Non-Financial Public Sector, i.e., extra-budgetary central government institutions (decentralized and autonomous institutions), social security funds, local governments and non-financial public companies; and the quasi-fiscal central bank debt. With the dissolution of the state electricity holding company (CDEEE) in 2022, the deficit of CDEEE from 2019 was transferred to the CG.

3/ Excluding reserves.

[1] Under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country’s economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board.

[2] The Executive Board takes decisions under its lapse-of-time procedure when the Board agrees that a proposal can be considered without convening formal discussions.

IMF Communications Department

MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Meera Louis

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

@IMFSpokesperson

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/09/10/pr24323-dominican-republic-imf-exec-board-concludes-2024-aiv-consult

MIL OSI

MIL OSI Russia News –

September 29, 2024

MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Concludes 2024 Article IV Consultation with Botswana

Source: IMF – News in Russian

September 10, 2024

Botswana’s economic growth is expected to slow to 1 percent in 2024 primarily because of a diamond market contraction, before picking up next year. Inflation has declined sharply since the peak of mid-2022 and returned to the central bank’s medium-term objective range of 3–6 percent, where it is expected to remain in the medium term.

The government plans a fiscal expansion in FY2024 followed by two years of substantial fiscal adjustment. Public debt is low (20 percent of GDP), but government deposits at the central bank have significantly reduced over the past decade.

The financial sector is sound, stable, and resilient.

Washington, DC: On August 28, 2024, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the Article IV consultation[1] with Botswana and endorsed the staff appraisal without a meeting on a lapse-of-time basis.[2]

Botswana’s economic growth decelerated from 5.5 percent in 2022 to 2.7 percent in 2023, below the long-run potential growth of 4 percent. A sharp decline in diamond trading and mining activities was the main contributor to the slowdown, as global demand for rough diamonds decreased. Inflation has remained below the ceiling of the central bank’s medium-term objective range since July 2023. Despite lower diamond exports, FX reserves increased in 2023 supported by higher customs union receipts. The financial sector is broadly sound, stable, and resilient.

Botswana’s economy is expected to decelerate further this year, with growth projected at
1 percent. The continued slowdown is mainly due to a fall in diamond production, partly offset by construction projects financed by the fiscal expansion. Growth is forecast to rebound – averaging 5 percent over the next two years – due to higher prices and quantities of diamonds produced. Inflation is projected to remain within the central bank’s objective range of
3–6 percent.

The fiscal deficit is projected to widen further to 6 percent of GDP in FY2024, reflecting a further decline in mineral revenues and higher capital expenditure. The government plans a substantial fiscal adjustment in the following two years to reach a fiscal surplus. The external position should soften over the medium term (with FX reserves decreasing to 5 months of imports) due to weak growth in customs revenues and higher government foreign debt repayments. Risks to the outlook remain elevated due to the emergence of cheaper lab-grown diamonds, and uncertainty over the recovery of major export markets.

Executive Board Assessment

In concluding the 2024 Article IV consultation with Botswana, Executive Directors endorsed staff’s appraisal, as follows:

Botswana is facing a severe slowdown from a diamond market contraction in 2023 and 2024. Growth is expected to fall to 1.0 percent this year, from 2.7 percent in 2023 and 5.5 percent in 2022. This reflects weaker global demand for diamonds and a sharp increase in inventories.

Real GDP growth should rebound next year, although risks to the outlook remain elevated. A strong recovery is projected in 2025, driven by the rebound in diamond production and trade. But the economic outlook is highly uncertain, with the emergence of cheaper lab-grown diamonds, and the announced sale of De Beers by its UK parent company.

In the near term, the fall in diamond revenues could be accommodated by a mix of higher fiscal deficit and reprioritization of capital expenditure. Some fiscal relaxation is warranted in light of the widening of the output gap, but staff encourages the authorities to reprioritize capital projects to limit the increase in the deficit and ensure that they achieve the highest value for money.

Over the medium term, the authorities’ planned fiscal consolidation is critical to put a stop to the depletion of government’s financial buffers, build resilience against shocks, and preserve fiscal sustainability. Staff assesses that targeting a 1 percent of GDP fiscal surplus would generate sufficient savings to protect the budget against major economic shocks. While the authorities’ adjustment plan focuses mostly on expenditure restraint, there is also scope to increase revenues. The medium-term adjustment should be supported by institutional reforms, including a fiscal rule, more credible medium-term budgeting, and possibly a well-designed SWF.

The monetary policy stance is appropriate. Inflation has declined since August 2022 and is projected to remain within the central bank’s objective range in the medium term. Underlying pressures, as measured by core inflation indicators, seem contained, while inflation expectations are well anchored. The 2023 external position is assessed to be broadly in line with fundamentals and desirable policies.

The authorities’ plans to strengthen financial sector oversight, deepening, and inclusion are welcomed. The financial sector is broadly sound and stable despite the economic slowdown. Faster implementation of the 2023 FSAP recommendations will further reduce financial risks. These include moving to implement Basel III liquidity standards, enhancing risk-based supervision of banks, reinforcing the crisis management framework (ELA, bank resolution), and deploying macroprudential tools to address household debt risk.

Accelerating growth and job creation requires a fundamental shift towards greater private sector participation, a more diversified export base, and a more efficient public sector. The authorities should prioritize SOE modernization, improved infrastructure for doing business (internet, energy, logistics), trade facilitation measures, more efficient social protection, and financial inclusion reforms that support small entrepreneurs. These goals could be enshrined in the new NDP, supported by time-bound and well-prioritized action plans.

Botswana: Selected Economic and Social Indicators, 2020-2029¹

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

2025

2026

2027

2028

2029

Projection

(Annual percent change, unless otherwise indicated)

National Income and Prices

Real GDP

-8.7

11.9

5.5

2.7

1.0

5.2

4.8

4.0

4.0

4.0

Nonmineral

-3.5

7.9

4.9

2.6

5.1

4.1

4.4

4.4

4.4

4.5

GDP per capita (US dollars)

5,863

7,244

7,726

7,250

7,341

8,003

8,602

9,146

9,726

10,437

GNI per capita (US dollars)²

5,872

7,174

7,220

6,963

7,150

7,733

8,290

8,798

9,344

10,027

Consumer prices (average)

1.9

6.7

12.2

5.1

3.8

4.5

4.5

4.5

4.5

4.5

Diamond production (millions of carats)

16.9

22.7

24.5

25.1

21.1

23.3

25.0

25.5

26.0

26.4

Money and Banking

Monetary Base

-3.8

-8.8

-5.3

33.1

8.7

9.7

9.3

9.2

9.3

9.3

Broad money (M2)

5.9

5.0

6.8

9.3

8.7

9.7

9.3

9.2

9.3

9.3

Credit to the private sector

5.3

5.4

4.7

5.6

8.5

11.0

11.0

11.0

11.0

11.0

(Percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

Investment and Savings

Gross investment (including change in inventories)

32.8

27.4

25.0

30.3

35.4

34.1

35.0

35.5

36.7

37.5

Public

6.5

5.5

5.4

7.1

8.4

7.0

6.2

6.0

5.5

5.2

Private

26.3

21.9

19.6

23.2

26.9

27.1

28.8

29.5

31.2

32.3

Gross savings

26.6

28.1

24.9

29.9

33.4

35.6

36.2

36.8

37.3

37.7

Public

-4.3

0.7

4.0

3.0

2.4

4.2

5.4

6.1

5.9

5.5

Private

30.8

27.5

20.8

26.9

31.0

31.4

30.9

30.7

31.4

32.2

Central Government Finances³

Total revenue and grants

25.6

29.0

29.1

28.4

28.2

28.8

28.6

28.8

27.6

26.7

SACU receipts

9.1

6.5

5.5

9.1

9.6

7.0

6.4

6.6

6.3

5.9

Mineral revenue

5.3

10.6

13.3

7.4

5.8

9.5

9.9

9.8

8.9

8.4

Total expenditure and net lending

36.5

31.4

29.1

33.1

34.2

30.6

29.1

28.3

27.1

26.2

Overall balance (deficit –)

-10.9

-2.4

0.0

-4.7

-6.0

-1.7

-0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

Non-mineral non-SACU balance⁴

-25.3

-19.5

-18.8

-21.3

-21.3

-18.2

-16.7

-15.9

-14.7

-13.8

Net Debt

15.3

12.8

12.6

16.9

22.2

21.6

20.2

18.2

16.2

14.6

Total central government debt⁵

18.7

18.7

18.1

20.1

22.6

22.1

20.7

20.1

20.0

20.0

Government deposits with the BoB⁶

3.4

5.9

5.5

3.3

0.4

0.4

0.6

1.9

3.8

5.5

External Sector

Trade balance

-13.2

-3.5

2.7

-2.4

-6.9

-0.9

0.2

0.3

0.0

0.0

Current account balance

-10.3

-1.7

-1.2

-0.6

-2.0

1.5

1.2

1.2

0.6

0.2

Overall Balance

-11.7

-1.4

1.8

0.6

-0.9

1.3

1.3

1.5

0.9

0.5

Nominal effective exchange rate (2018=100)⁷

94.0

94.1

90.8

86.4

–

–

–

–

–

–

Real effective exchange rate (2018=100)⁷

94.4

97.7

99.1

94.7

–

–

–

–

–

–

Terms of trade (2005=100)

140.5

178.9

161.3

152.7

125.9

162.2

171.4

176.6

181.6

186.6

External central government debt⁵

7.8

8.4

7.5

8.9

8.3

6.7

5.6

4.8

3.9

3.5

Gross official reserves (end of period, millions of USD)

4,944

4,806

4,281

4,757

4,587

4,879

5,198

5,600

5,852

6,014

Months of imports of goods and services⁸

6.4

6.6

7.1

7.3

6.3

6.0

5.8

5.6

5.4

5.1

Months of non-diamond imports⁸

9.3

8.7

8.2

8.8

7.9

7.8

7.6

7.5

7.2

7.1

Percent of GDP

31.2

27.1

21.8

24.2

23.3

22.3

21.5

21.7

20.8

19.6

Sources: Botswana authorities and IMF staff estimates and projections.

¹ This table is based on calendar years unless otherwise indicated.

² Based on Atlas method from the World Bank.

³ Fiscal variables are based on fiscal years (starting on April 1).

⁴ The non-mineral non-SACU balance is computed as the difference between non-mineral non-SACU revenue and total expenditure.

⁵Excludes guarantees. Debt data measured at end of fiscal year.

⁶Government deposits with the BoB include Government Investment Account as well as other accounts. Deposits data measured at end of fiscal year.

⁷ For 2020-2023, both effective exchange rates are from IMF INS database.

⁸ Based on imports of goods and services for the following year.

[1] Under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country’s economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board.

[2] The Executive Board takes decisions under its lapse-of-time procedure when the Board agrees that a proposal can be considered without convening formal discussions.

IMF Communications Department

MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Pavis Devahasadin

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

@IMFSpokesperson

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/09/09/pr-24321-botswana-imf-executive-board-concludes-2024-article-iv-consultation

MIL OSI

MIL OSI Russia News –

September 29, 2024

MIL-OSI Russia: IMF and Ukrainian Authorities Reach Staff Level Agreement on the Fifth Review of the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) Arrangement– Ukraine

Source: IMF – News in Russian

September 10, 2024

International Monetary Fund (IMF) staff and the Ukrainian authorities have reached staff-level agreement (SLA) on the Fifth Review of the 4-year Extended Fund Facility (EFF) Arrangement. Subject to approval by the IMF Executive Board, Ukraine would have access to about US$ 1.1 billion (SDR 834.8 million).

Program performance remains strong. The authorities met all end-June quantitative performance criteria (QPCs) and the structural benchmark for the review. Understandings were also reached on policy settings and reforms to sustain macroeconomic stability as the war continues.

The economy remained resilient in the first half of 2024, but headwinds are intensifying and the outlook remains exceptionally uncertain. The continuing war will entail fresh financing needs, requiring determined policy efforts by the authorities and large-scale support from donors.

Kyiv, Ukraine – September 10, 2024: An International Monetary Fund (IMF) team led by Mr. Gavin Gray held discussions in Kyiv with the Ukrainian authorities, during September 4-10, 2024, on the Fifth Review of the country’s 4-year EFF Arrangement. Upon the conclusion of the discussions, Mr. Gray issued the following statement:

“IMF staff and the Ukrainian authorities have reached staff-level agreement on the Fifth Review of the EFF. The agreement is subject to approval by the IMF Executive Board, with Board consideration expected in the coming weeks.

“Ukraine’s four-year EFF Arrangement with the IMF, continues to provide a strong anchor for the authorities’ economic program in times of exceptionally high uncertainty. Performance under the program has remained strong despite the war, with all quantitative performance criteria for end-June met, as well as the structural benchmark due for this review.

“Russia’s war in Ukraine continues to have a devastating impact on the country and its people. Skillful policymaking, the adaptability of households and firms, and robust external financing has helped support macroeconomic and financial stability. Real GDP grew by 6.5 percent y/y in the first quarter of 2024, inflation has remained low at 5.4 percent y/y in July, and gross international reserves were adequate at US$42.3 billion as of September 1.

“However, an economic slowdown is expected in 2024H2 due to repeated attacks on energy infrastructure and the impact of the war on labor markets and confidence; growth is expected at 3 percent for 2024. Addressing the energy deficit ahead of the winter is critical, requiring coordinated efforts, including with international partners. With the war is expected to continue through 2025, real GDP growth is projected to be between 2.5-3.5 percent. Inflation is expected to rise to around 9 percent by end-2024. Risks to the outlook remain exceptionally high.

“The 2025 Budget needs to respect financing constraints and debt sustainability objectives, and determined domestic revenue mobilization efforts are critical. Timely and predictable external financial support, on terms consistent with debt sustainability, remains indispensable for maintaining economic stability.

“Tax revenues need to increase in 2025 and beyond to create space for critical spending, to preserve essential buffers and restore fiscal sustainability. Achieving this will require the implementation of permanent tax policy measures and relentless efforts to close existing opportunities for tax evasion, improve compliance, and combat the shadow economy, in line with the National Revenue Strategy (NRS). Legislation to reform the Customs code should confirm the central role of the Finance Ministry in overseeing customs, while robust processes should be established for selecting a permanent head of customs as well as other key leadership roles.

“The successful treatment of Ukraine’s Eurobonds will deliver substantial debt relief, freeing up resources for priority spending areas. Attention is now shifting to the remaining external commercial claims in the restructuring perimeter, including the GDP warrants, which should be treated in line with the program’s strategy to restore debt sustainability.

“Upside risks to inflation have reduced the scope for further easing through the end of the year, and the monetary policy stance remains appropriate and consistent with achieving the inflation target over the medium term. The exchange rate should continue to act as a shock absorber and adjust to market fundamentals, thereby helping to safeguard external stability. Appropriate monetary policy combined with the framework of managed exchange rate flexibility should help prevent excessive exchange rate volatility and the de-anchoring of FX and inflation expectations. A judicious and staged approach to FX liberalization should continue in line with the National Bank of Ukraine’s (NBU) strategy, and consistent with the overall policy mix.

“Effective governance frameworks are critical for durable growth, levelling the playing field, and pursuing the path to EU accession. In this regard, the independence, competence, and credibility of anti-corruption and judicial institutions should continue to be enhanced. In particular, strengthening the criminal procedural code, establishing a new high administrative court, and reforming the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine are key. The inaugural external audit of the National Anti-corruption Bureau is a short-term priority. The full supervisory board of Ukrenergo should be re-established by end-December.

“The financial sector is stable and liquid, with reforms continuing apace despite challenges under Martial Law. To preserve financial stability and enhance preparedness for potential shocks, priorities include strengthening the bank rehabilitation framework, contingency planning, and bank governance.

“The mission met with Finance Minister Marchenko, National Bank of Ukraine Governor Pyshnyy, other government ministers, public officials and civil society. The mission thanks them and their technical staff for their close collaboration and constructive discussions.”

IMF Communications Department

MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Camila Perez

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

@IMFSpokesperson

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/09/11/pr24326-IMF-and-Ukrainian-Authorities-Reach-Staff-Level-Agreement-Fifth-Review-EFF

MIL OSI

MIL OSI Russia News –

September 29, 2024
MIL-OSI Russia: IMF statement on Honduras

Source: IMF – News in Russian

September 10, 2024

Washington, DC: An International Monetary Fund (IMF) mission led by Mr. Ricardo Llaudes issued a statement following in person and virtual discussions with the Honduran authorities on policies to support the authorities’ economic program:

“The Fund team welcomes the adoption by the Council of Ministers of Honduras of the 2025 draft Budget Bill. The draft Budget is in line with the authorities’ economic program supported by the IMF, providing space for critical social and infrastructure spending.

“In addition, productive discussions, both virtual and in person, have taken place over the past months on economic policies to safeguard Honduras’ domestic and external stability, paving the way for a program review mission planned for the first half of October.”

IMF Communications Department

MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Rosa A Hernandez

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

@IMFSpokesperson

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/09/10/pr24325-imf-statement-on-honduras

MIL OSI

MIL OSI Russia News –

September 29, 2024
MIL-OSI Russia: Harnessing the Power of Integration: A Path to Prosperity in Central Asia

Source: IMF – News in Russian

September 11, 2024

Distinguished guests, I am delighted to be here in Bishkek on my first visit to the Kyrgyz Republic, in the heart of Central Asia.

This region has been at the crossroads of civilizations for millennia. It is a mosaic of a rich cultural heritage, diverse peoples, and natural endowments that include spectacular mountains, lakes, rivers, and a rich biodiversity. It is also located very favorably at the crossroads of Asia and Europe. Needless to say, it is quite truly a unique region!

As we gather here today to discuss the economic possibilities for the Caucasus and Central Asia (CCA) region, we all recognize that the world is changing rapidly, and this is a pivotal moment.

It reminds me of another time of momentous opportunity, when the region gained independence in the 1990s. Since then, the CCA countries have made remarkable progress by unleashing their first wave of market- oriented reforms, generating higher growth and improving living standards.

But new and unprecedented challenges have emerged. The Covid-19 pandemic and its aftermath are only just in our rear-view mirrors, as the region confronts emerging challenges from climate change to regional conflicts. The global economy has also shifted with geoeconomic fragmentation emerging as a key risk.

The theme of my remarks today is simple: in this changing world, raising living standards in the CCA region requires bold, concerted action.

We must strengthen stability and resilience, promote regional integration, and launch a new wave of reforms. This is how we can unleash the full economic potential of the region and its vibrant young populations, accelerate growth, create jobs and open-up opportunities for generations to come.

Building on Macroeconomic Stability

It is important to remind ourselves of the global context as we consider what is needed to propel the region to the next level of economic growth and prosperity.

The world economy has shown remarkable resilience in the face of the pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and an inflation surge. Global growth bottomed out at 2.3 percent in 2022 and is expected to rebound to 3.2 percent in 2024 and 3.3 percent in 2025. Initial fears of recession and uncontrolled wage-price spirals fortunately did not materialize and there is less economic scarring from the pandemic than anticipated.

However, medium-term growth projections remain below historical averages. Persistence of inflation in parts of the world, geopolitical conflicts, and the gaps in structural reforms needed to promote efficient resource allocation remain critical challenges. Global inflation is projected to decline to 5.9 percent in 2024 and 4.5 percent in 2025, with advanced economies returning to inflation targets before emerging market and developing economies.

The risks to the outlook are still considerable. Notably, geopolitical tensions and regional conflicts pose downside risks, potentially causing new price spikes. Other risks include rising trade protectionism, increasing inequality, and financial market volatility. At the same time, the fact that this year saw the hottest day on record for the planet serves as a stark reminder of daunting challenges due to climate change.

Policymakers in the CCA region deserve full credit for navigating their economies through these turbulent times and maintaining macroeconomic stability. Rapid COVID virus containment, decisive policy actions, and robust international support have led to a swift recovery, with the region growing at 4.9 percent in 2023.

Inflation fell in most CCA countries, including in the Kyrgyz Republic, amid exchange rate appreciations and a decline in commodity prices. Inflation remained more persistent in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan due to strong domestic demand, elevated inflation expectations, and energy price reforms in Kazakhstan.

In the April Regional Economic Outlook, we projected a growth slowdown to 3.9 percent in 2024, but inflows of income, capital, and migrants from Russia, and rerouting of trade though the region have again boosted growth to impressive high single digits so far this year in oil importing CCA economies, including the Kyrgyz Republic. In Kazakhstan, on the other hand, growth is expected to slow to 3.1 percent in 2024 before picking up to 5.6 percent in 2025 as production increases from the Tengiz oil fields.

Over the medium term, growth in the region is expected to moderate to under 4 percent and inflation stabilize in mid-single digits. Escalation of the war in Ukraine and the Gaza conflict, however, could cause commodity price volatility and a reversal of the recent trade patterns.

Achieving macroeconomic stability is just a beginning. It is not sufficient to meet the aspirations of current and future generations.

Now is the time for us to come together and take bold steps to unleash a new wave of reforms that will durably raise growth, create more jobs, and improve living standards. This requires reforms to increase productivity, strengthen resilience to shocks, and expand markets.

While this is ambitious, it is within our reach as long as there is consensus to move ahead on this path. The current favorable macroeconomic conditions offer a promising window of opportunity because, as our research shows, structural reforms yield greater growth dividends during economic expansions.

From Stability to Prosperity

Historically, this region has been a vital link between Europe and Asia, serving as a conduit for trade, culture, and innovation.

Today, regional integration can once again harness this potential. It can facilitate the freer movement of goods, services, capital, and people, increase market size and economic efficiency, and promote inclusive prosperity.

Moreover, deepening ties within the region and global markets can foster stability and peace. Regional integration is therefore not just an opportunity, but an economic necessity.

Reducing nontariff trade barriers, boosting infrastructure investment, and enhancing regulatory quality could increase trade by up to 17 percent on average in the CCA region, as our research shows. They can also improve market access and foster diversification.

Transportation networks, such as roads, railways, and ports are essential to facilitate cross-border trade. The planned construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway is an illustration of cross-country cooperation to improve connectivity between the East and the West, supporting the region’s ambition to regain its historical role.

You have abundant renewable energy resources in the region, including hydro, solar and wind power. Enhanced energy cooperation will help develop regional energy markets, ensure security, and create export opportunities. Collaborative projects, such as Kambarata-1, can help diversify the energy mix and reduce dependency on fossil fuels. Critically, it can also improve water availability for neighboring countries.

Both of these investments—the railway and Kambarata-1—hold enormous potential for regional development and connectivity. Collective effort in mobilizing expertise and financing is essential for full realization of this potential while sustaining macroeconomic stability that has been a hallmark of the region’s recent achievements.

This brings me to the importance of regional cooperation in addressing the risks of climate change, which requires immediate and resolute actions from all of us.

A Path to a Low-Carbon Future

The CCA region is highly vulnerable to climate change. Temperatures are rising fast, and droughts and floods have become more frequent and severe, causing immense damage to crops, infrastructure and livelihoods. We estimate that unabated climate change could cause a loss of annual output of nearly 6.5 percent in the region by 2060.

The good news is that these losses could be substantially reduced by joint actions to cut emissions, adapt to climate change, and manage the risks of transition to a low-carbon economy.

The region must collaborate to promote green technologies, improve energy efficiency, and manage natural resources sustainably. Scaling back energy subsidies and introducing carbon-pricing mechanisms can contribute to global mitigation efforts. In this respect, the Kyrgyz Republic’s commitment to raising electricity tariffs and gradually eliminating energy subsidies is a shining example.

Such decisive measures can enhance resilience to climate change and create higher-paying jobs–green jobs that pay 7 percent more on average.

Reforms for Enhanced Growth and Stability

To fully realize the benefits of regional integration, structural reforms are essential. Our research finds that such reforms could lift output by 5-7 percent in the next 4 to 6 years.

Let me highlight a few key areas where structural reforms can help achieve this boost:

A vibrant private sector is the engine of growth. Strengthening governance, property rights and the rule of law, and reducing the state footprint in the economy by simplifying regulations, fostering competition, and combating corruption will build confidence and attract private investment.

Importantly, we find that governance reforms yield the highest growth dividends and amplify the positive impacts of other reforms. The implication is clear: governance reforms should be prioritized and accompanied by other reforms.

Prudent management of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is also critical. While some SOEs serve essential public-policy objectives and should remain in public hands, it is crucial that they operate efficiently and do not crowd out the private sector.

In most cases, however, the private sector is more efficient in delivering goods and services and creating jobs. Therefore, privatization of non-essential SOEs can lead to more dynamic and competitive markets, enhancing growth and resilience.

Investments in education, health, and digital infrastructure are vital to boost productivity. The full potential of the region’s young and dynamic population can only be unleashed through high quality education and healthcare.

Enhancing digital infrastructure also offers vast opportunities for productivity growth, especially in a region with young people eager to embrace new technologies.

As the CCA starts to reap the benefits of these reforms, it is equally important to ensure that growth benefits all segments of society, and the vulnerable are shielded from the impacts of energy subsidy reforms and climate change. Well-targeted social assistance is essential for reducing poverty and inequality.

Benefits work best when they incentivize work and are targeted and timely to support adversely affected households during economic downturns but scale back when the recovery takes hold. Empowering women and promoting gender equality can unlock significant economic potential and contribute to more inclusive growth.

IMF’s Commitment to CCA Stability and Growth

The IMF has been a steadfast partner of the CCA region since its initial days of independence. We provide policy advice, financing, and technical assistance to help our members in the region stabilize their economies, develop sustainable growth, and reduce poverty.

The IMF stands by all its member countries in both prosperous and challenging times. For example, our assistance during the COVID-19 pandemic helped our membership weather the crisis and lay the groundwork for recovery.

To better support our member in the CCA, the IMF established the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Mongolia Regional Capacity Development Center. This center provides technical assistance and training to help countries in the region build stronger institutions and implement sound economic policies. It also represents our long-term commitment to the region’s development.

Conclusion

Let me conclude. Since its early days of independence, the CCA region has shown tremendous perseverance in laying the foundation of a prosperous, peaceful society.

Today, you are confronting new global challenges that test the resilience and adaptability of your economies. Embracing continued market-oriented reforms is the most effective strategy to strengthen your economies. Now is the time to forge ahead with bold spirits.

The IMF will continue to support your efforts, working in partnership for the benefit of all people in this region and beyond.

Thank you.

IMF Communications Department

MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Angham Al Shami

Phone: +1 202 623-7100 Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

@IMFSpokesperson

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/09/11/sp09112024-harnessing-power-integration-path-prosperity-central-asia-dmd-bo-li

MIL OSI

MIL OSI Russia News –

September 29, 2024

MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Concludes 2024 Article IV Consultation with Denmark

Source: IMF – News in Russian

September 13, 2024

Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the Article IV consultation[1] with Denmark.

The Danish economy has continued to expand at a robust pace, driven by an exceptional surge in the pharmaceutical. In contrast, the rest of the economy has remained relatively subdued, aside from the maritime and information and communication technology industries, reflecting sluggish demand. Meanwhile, with a decline in global energy prices and lackluster domestic demand, inflationary pressures have largely dissipated in recent months.

Growth is anticipated to gradually moderate in the near term but become more balanced across industries. Output growth is projected to moderate from 2.5 percent in 2023 to 1.9 percent in 2024 and to 1.6 percent in 2025. The growth of pharmaceutical and maritime exports will taper off, while that of the rest of the economy will be bolstered by a pickup in external demand, improved consumer purchasing power, and further easing of financial conditions. The reopening of the Tyra natural gas will also contribute to growth in 2024 and 2025. Inflation might temporarily edge up in the coming months due to the lagged effect of last year’s wage collective bargaining agreement before stabilizing at around 2 percent during the second half of 2025. The balance of risks to growth is skewed to the downside, with primary downside risks including a global slowdown, the possible escalation of the conflict in Gaza and Israel and Russia’s war in Ukraine, and deepening geoeconomic fragmentation.

Executive Board Assessment[2]

In concluding the 2024 Article IV consultation with Denmark, Executive Directors endorsed staff’s appraisal, as follows:

Executive Directors agreed with the thrust of the staff appraisal. They commended Denmark’s remarkable resilience amidst multiple shocks, underpinned by sound policies, strong governance, and robust institutions. Noting a positive outlook with more balanced growth and stabilizing inflation, Directors cautioned that risks—including from a global growth slowdown, geoeconomic fragmentation, and demographic pressures—are tilted to the downside. To navigate these challenges and maintain Denmark’s welfare state, they emphasized the importance of continued sound macroeconomic management, supported by structural reforms to boost productivity, and lift long‑term growth.

Directors commended Denmark’s robust public finances. They concurred that fiscal policy should consider cyclical conditions and long‑term spending needs. In this regard, Directors agreed that fiscal policy should avoid adding to capacity pressures in the short term. They supported the slight easing of the fiscal stance for 2025 and beyond to accommodate the increases in costs related to health, climate, and defense. To safeguard long‑term fiscal sustainability, Directors encouraged the authorities to closely monitor fiscal pressures and take additional adjustment measures if necessary.

While noting that the financial system remains sound, Directors recommended that the authorities continue to closely monitor risks, in particular, related to the commercial real estate sector. They welcomed the recent tightening of macroprudential policies and suggested considering additional borrower‑based measures to address pockets of vulnerabilities. Continued collaboration on the Nordic‑wide bank stress tests would also be important. Directors encouraged the authorities to further strengthen AML/CFT and cybersecurity frameworks.

Directors agreed that systemic risks arising from nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs) warrant closer monitoring and enhanced customer protection. They encouraged the authorities to develop a systemic risk assessment encompassing banks and NBFIs and to finalize a supervisory order to enhance customer protection.

Directors emphasized the importance of continued reform efforts to increase the labor supply, address skills mismatches, and better integrate migrants. They were encouraged by the authorities’ strong commitment to further enhance digitalization, innovation, and business dynamism to boost productivity growth. Directors welcomed Denmark’s commitment to transparent free‑trade policies within the multilateral and rules‑based trading system.

Directors commended the authorities’ ambitious climate change mitigation targets and the agreement to reduce emissions in the agriculture sector. They encouraged updating the estimates of the investment needs for climate adaptation.

Denmark: Selected Economic Indicators

2023

2024

2025

proj.

Output

Real GDP growth (%)

2.5

1.9

1.6

Employment

Unemployment rate (%)

2.8

2.9

3.0

Prices

Inflation (%, average)

3.4

1.8

2.2

General Government Finances

Revenue (% GDP)

50.1

49.6

48.8

Expenditures (% GDP)

46.8

47.8

48.0

Fiscal balance (% GDP)

3.3

1.8

0.9

Public debt (% GDP)

29.7

28.2

27.3

Money and Credit

Domestic credit growth (%)

3.2

…

…

3-month interbank interest rate (%)

3.4

…

…

10-year government bond yield (%)

2.4

…

…

Balance of Payments

Current account (% GDP)

9.8

9.0

9.3

International reserves (% change)

1.3

…

…

Exchange Rate

ULC-based REER (% change)

-0.4

…

…

Sources: Statistics Denmark; OECD; and IMF staff calculations.

[1] Under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country’s economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board.

[2] At the conclusion of the discussion, the Managing Director, as Chairman of the Board, summarizes the views of Executive Directors, and this summary is transmitted to the country’s authorities. An explanation of any qualifiers used in summings up can be found here: http://www.IMF.org/external/np/sec/misc/qualifiers.htm.

IMF Communications Department

MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Boris Balabanov

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

@IMFSpokesperson

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/09/12/pr-24327-denmark-imf-executive-board-concludes-2024-article-iv-consultation

MIL OSI

MIL OSI Russia News –

September 29, 2024

MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Concludes 2024 Article IV Consultation with Kingdom of Lesotho

Source: IMF – News in Russian

September 11, 2024

Lesotho’s GDP growth has improved modestly, picking up to 2.2 percent in the fiscal year ending in March 2024. Inflation increased in the second half of 2023, peaking at 8.2 percent in January 2024. But upward pressures have eased, and inflation has since fallen to 6.5 percent in June.

The outlook for Lesotho’s fiscal and external balances has improved significantly owing to windfall transfers from the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and renegotiated water royalties.

In this context, and amid Lesotho’s sizable development needs, a key challenge for the authorities will be to ensure that this revenue is saved wisely and spent strategically.

Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the Article IV consultation[1] with the Kingdom of Lesotho.

GDP growth picked up modestly to 2.2 percent in 12-month period ending March 2024, compared with 1.6 percent a year earlier. This largely reflects accelerated construction from the Lesotho Highlands Water Project. Nonetheless, unemployment remains high, diamond and textile exports have been sluggish, and an exceptional dry season increased food-security concerns across the country.

Headline inflation reached 6.5 percent in June, up from 4.5 percent in July 2023, though down from a peak of 8.2 percent in January 2024. The increase in inflation was largely due to exogenous factors that will most likely fade going forward.

Lesotho registered a sizable fiscal surplus of 6.1 percent of GDP in during the fiscal year ending March 2024. In a change from past practice, transitory SACU transfers
(10.4 percent of GDP higher than in FY22/23) were not accompanied by a parallel increase of the public wage bill. Instead, the authorities used the SACU proceeds to reduce arrears and rebuild deposits at the Central Bank.

In support of the Loti’s peg to the Rand, the Central Bank of Lesotho has kept the policy rate steady at 7.75 percent since May 2023, in line with policy rates in South Africa.

Financial conditions remain stable—private sector credit growth picked up to 12.5 percent in FY23/24, mainly due to construction, while the nonperforming loans have eased to
3.8 percent of total loans as of 2023 Q4.

Growth is projected to peak in the fiscal year ending in March 2025 (at 2.7 percent), while inflation is expected to ease slowly. Another year of windfall SACU transfers (6 percentage points of GDP above the 10-year average) will again bolster fiscal and external balances in FY24/25. These transfers are projected to fall sharply starting in FY25/26, though higher water royalties will help fill the gap. As a result, the fiscal balance is projected at a surplus of around 1 percent of GDP over the medium term, with the current account deficit at a modest
2.6 percent.

The authorities are encouraged to continue their prudent fiscal approach, ensuring that additional revenues are saved wisely and spent strategically, while also pushing ahead with reforms to support private sector-led growth.

Executive Board Assessment[2]

Directors agreed with the thrust of the staff appraisal. They welcomed the recent pickup in growth but concurred that Lesotho’s economy faces substantial challenges, including high unemployment, widespread poverty, and sluggish growth. They also noted the risks posed by global growth shocks, extreme weather events, uncertain transfers from the South African Customs Union (SACU), and commodity price volatility. Against this background, Directors welcomed the authorities’ commitment to strengthening policy frameworks, supported by Fund capacity development as needed.

Directors emphasized the need for continued fiscal prudence to strengthen foreign exchange reserve coverage, safeguard the peg, and preserve medium-term debt sustainability. They agreed that containing the public wage bill, increasing spending efficiency, and prioritizing social spending on the most vulnerable remain critical. Given increased water royalties, Directors encouraged the authorities to establish a well-governed savings framework anchored by a credible fiscal rule to build buffers and support Lesotho’s long-term development objectives.

Directors agreed that public financial management (PFM) should be strengthened. They encouraged passage of PFM-related legislation, and improved budget processes, strengthened internal controls, and enhanced financial reporting. Directors also underscored the importance of boosting public investment efficiency, through a prioritized capital project pipeline with enhanced project management capacity.

Directors concurred that monetary policy should focus on price stability and safeguarding the exchange rate peg. They noted the slowdown in inflation, but urged the authorities to monitor price dynamics closely and stand ready to adjust monetary policy if inflationary pressures reemerge. Directors encouraged the authorities to improve central bank governance and coordinate closely across institutions on fiscal and monetary policies.

Directors noted that the financial sector remains stable and encouraged continued monitoring of risks, including from the nonbank financial sector. They concurred that an updated national financial inclusion strategy would be key to improving financial intermediation and supporting private sector growth. They welcomed the progress made in strengthening legal and regulatory frameworks for financial stability and AML/CFT.

Directors strongly encouraged the authorities to implement much-needed structural reforms to catalyze job-rich inclusive growth, including by improving the business environment, strengthening governance, and reducing corruption risks. They lauded the authorities’ commitment to improving data quality and timeliness to support policymaking.

Lesotho: Selected Economic Indicators, 2020/21–2029/30¹

2020/21

2021/22

2022/23

2023/24

2024/25

2025/26

2026/27

2027/28

2028/29

2029/30

Act.

Act.

Act.

Est.

Projections

(12-month percent change, unless otherwise indicated)

National Account and Prices

GDP at constant prices (including LHWP-II)

-5.3

1.7

1.6

2.2

2.7

2.4

1.9

2.1

2.1

2.1

GDP at constant prices (excluding LHWP-II)

-3.0

4.4

1.4

1.5

1.6

1.7

1.8

1.9

1.9

2.0

GDP at market prices (Maloti billions)

34.2

36.0

38.5

41.5

45.2

48.8

52.4

56.1

60.0

64.4

GDP at market prices (US$ billions)

2.1

2.4

2.3

2.2

2.3

2.4

2.5

2.7

2.8

2.9

Consumer prices (average)

5.4

6.5

8.2

6.5

6.7

5.8

5.6

5.3

5.1

5.1

Consumer prices (eop)

6.5

7.2

6.8

7.4

6.0

5.5

5.4

5.3

5.0

5.0

GDP deflator

5.2

3.5

5.3

5.4

6.0

5.4

5.3

4.9

4.9

5.1

External Sector

Terms of trade (“–” = deterioration)

3.5

-1.6

-3.2

-5.9

-2.7

0.6

0.1

-0.6

0.1

0.1

Average exchange rate

(Local currency per US$)

16.4

14.9

17.0

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

Nominal effective exchange rate change (– depreciation)²

-8.7

6.3

-3.0

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

Real effective exchange rate (– depreciation)²

-6.0

8.7

-1.9

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

Current account balance (percent of GDP)

-5.7

-9.0

-13.8

-0.2

-0.7

-2.3

-2.3

-3.2

-2.9

-2.5

(excluding LHWP-II imports, percent of GDP)

-2.3

-6.5

-9.6

6.4

3.6

1.7

0.1

-1.5

-1.9

-1.6

Gross international reserves

(Months of imports)

4.1

4.3

4.0

4.3

4.9

5.7

6.2

6.3

6.4

6.5

(excluding imports for LHWP-II, months of imports)

4.2

4.5

4.3

4.5

5.0

5.9

6.3

6.4

6.4

6.5

Money and Credit

Net international reserves

(US$ millions)

718

846

671

755

916

1,121

1,258

1,343

1,417

1,513

(Percent of M1 Plus)

109

127

111

114

137

163

179

185

190

197

(US$ millions, CBL calculation)

777

843

698

755

843

…

…

…

…

…

(Percent of M1 Plus, CBL calculation)

118

127

116

114

126

…

…

…

…

…

Domestic credit to the private sector

-3.0

6.7

8.7

12.5

9.0

8.1

8.0

8.3

7.4

7.7

Reserve money

16.5

1.0

24.5

24.0

1.9

1.2

1.6

1.6

2.1

2.3

Broad money

12.2

0.0

8.7

15.2

3.9

5.0

5.1

5.4

5.1

5.4

Interest rate (percent)³

3.8

3.5

3.5

4.7

…

…

…

…

…

…

(Percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

Public Debt

54.7

58.4

64.5

61.5

59.9

59.7

59.8

59.8

59.5

59.5

External public debt

42.9

42.3

47.2

47.8

46.6

46.4

46.2

46.2

46.0

46.0

Domestic public debt

11.7

16.1

17.3

13.7

13.3

13.3

13.5

13.5

13.5

13.5

Central Government Fiscal Operations

Revenue

54.4

48.8

44.6

56.5

63.4

61.1

57.8

55.6

55.6

54.8

Domestic revenue (excluding SACU transfers and grants)

25.1

27.2

27.6

29.3

31.0

36.6

34.9

33.7

33.7

33.7

SACU transfers

26.2

16.7

14.0

24.5

25.6

19.3

18.5

17.5

17.5

17.5

Grants

3.1

4.9

3.0

2.8

6.9

5.2

4.3

4.3

4.3

3.6

Recurrent expenditure

43.0

38.6

40.5

40.8

42.0

40.9

40.9

40.8

40.8

40.8

Of which: wages, including social contributions

17.6

17.0

18.0

17.1

16.8

16.7

16.6

16.4

16.4

16.4

Capital expenditure

11.4

15.5

9.6

9.6

16.3

14.3

13.9

14.0

14.1

13.5

Additional fiscal measures

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

Overall balance

0.0

-5.4

-5.5

6.1

5.1

5.8

3.0

0.8

0.6

0.5

(excluding SACU transfers and grants)

-29.3

-27.0

-22.5

-21.1

-27.3

-18.6

-19.8

-21.1

-21.3

-20.6

Operating balance

0.0

-5.4

-5.5

6.1

5.1

5.8

3.0

0.8

0.6

0.5

Primary balance

1.6

-4.0

-3.6

8.1

6.7

7.5

4.8

2.7

2.6

2.6

(excluding SACU transfers and grants)

-27.7

-25.6

-20.6

-19.2

-25.7

-17.0

-18.0

-19.2

-19.3

-18.6

Statistical discrepancy

-0.6

0.6

2.2

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

Sources: Lesotho authorities, World Bank, and IMF staff calculations.

¹ The fiscal year runs from April 1 to March 31.

² IMF Information Notice System trade-weighted; end of period.

³ 12-month time deposits rate.

[1] Under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country’s economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board.

[2] At the conclusion of the discussion, the Managing Director, as Chairman of the Board, summarizes the views of Executive Directors, and this summary is transmitted to the country’s authorities. An explanation of any qualifiers used in summings up can be found here: http://www.IMF.org/external/np/sec/misc/qualifiers.htm.

IMF Communications Department

MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Julie Ziegler

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

@IMFSpokesperson

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/09/10/pr-24324-lesotho-imf-executive-board-concludes-2024-article-iv-consultation

MIL OSI

MIL OSI Russia News –

September 29, 2024

MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Staff Concludes Visit to Kenya

Source: IMF – News in Russian

September 17, 2024

Washington, DC: An International Monetary Fund (IMF) team, led by Haimanot Teferra, visited Nairobi during September 11-16 and held discussions with Kenyan authorities on recent developments and their policies to manage the emerging challenges.

At the conclusion of the visit, Ms. Teferra issued the following statement:

“The Kenyan authorities and IMF staff had productive discussions on the authorities’ policies and reforms to address the evolving economic and fiscal challenges.

“We remain fully committed to support the authorities on their efforts to identify a set of policies that could support the completion of the reviews under the ongoing program as soon as feasible. The authorities expressed commitment to advancing economic and governance reforms which are crucial for fostering sustainable and inclusive growth that benefits all Kenyans. We will continue our discussions with the authorities.”

IMF Communications Department

MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Pavis Devahasadin

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

@IMFSpokesperson

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/09/17/pr-24332-kenya-imf-staff-concludes-visit

MIL OSI

MIL OSI Russia News –

September 29, 2024

MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Concludes 2024 Article IV Consultation Discussions with the Kingdom of the Netherlands—Curaçao and Sint Maarten

Source: IMF – News in Russian

September 17, 2024

Washington, DC: On September 10, 2024, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the Article IV consultation discussions[1] with the Kingdom of the Netherlands—Curaçao and Sint Maarten and endorsed the staff appraisal without a meeting on a lapse-of-time basis[2]. These consultation discussions form part of the Article IV consultation with the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Context. Curaçao and Sint Maarten have continued to experience a vigorous post-pandemic recovery underpinned by strong stayover tourism, which is outperforming Caribbean peers. Headline inflation has declined rapidly led by international oil price developments, notwithstanding a recent uptick, while core inflation remains elevated. In both countries, current account deficits improved markedly from pandemic years but remain high. Fiscal positions remained strong and in compliance with the fiscal rule. The landspakket, the structural reform package agreed with the Netherlands in 2020, continues to guide both countries’ reform agenda.

Curaçao outlook. Growth is expected to accelerate in 2024 before gradually converging to its potential over the medium term. Stayover tourism supported by fiscal expansion is projected to drive economic growth at a robust 4.5 percent in 2024 due to new airlifts and further expansion in hotel capacity. Growth is then expected to moderate to reach 1.5 percent over the medium term, given subpar investment and productivity growth coupled with sustained population decline and beginning saturation in tourism flows, assuming no further reforms and diversification. Headline inflation is projected to decline mildly to 3.2 percent in 2024 from 3.5 percent in 2023, but to continue falling towards its steady state of around 2 percent by 2027 reflecting international price developments. Fiscal balances would be guided by the fiscal rule and debt would continue to decline, while surpluses narrow as investments return and social spending pressures mount. The current account deficit is expected to improve in the medium term but would remain elevated.

Sint Maarten outlook. Growth is expected to moderate in the medium term as tourism recovery and the reconstruction taper off. Growth is expected to be 2.7 percent in 2024 and 3 percent in 2025, supported by a delayed recovery in cruise passengers towards pre-pandemic levels. However, the near-term outlook is threatened by the electricity load shedding (since June) and political instability. From 2026 onwards, growth is expected to gradually converge towards 1.8 percent as the stimulus from the reconstruction peters out, and tourism growth becomes constrained by the island’s carrying capacity and ailing infrastructure. Inflation is expected to remain broadly contained while remaining vulnerable to international price developments. Over the medium term, the government will continue to comply with the golden fiscal rule and capacity constraints will continue to weigh on public investment.

Monetary Union. Monetary policy is appropriately targeted towards maintaining the peg. Efforts to absorb excess liquidity should continue while closely monitoring developments in core inflation driven by tourism-related services. The financial sector is sound and risks to financial stability have substantially diminished as the CBCS advances its reform agenda. Banks are highly liquid and adequately capitalized and systemic risks are contained. Building on the CBCS’s strong progress in strengthening supervisory and regulatory capacity, and the recent resolution agreement for ENNIA, staff welcomes CBCS’s continued efforts in its reform agenda, including financial stability and crisis management.

Executive Board Assessment[3]

Curaçao

Curaçao’s economy successfully embraced the pivot towards tourism-led growth, giving rise to a strong near-term outlook. After losing key traditional industries, Curaçao quickly and successfully leveraged its tourism potential to grow, attract new hotels, and create jobs. While this is serving the economy well in the near term – growth is projected to accelerate to 4½ in 2024 – structural shifts have started to emerge, including a low-skilled, informal recovery of the labor market amidst low investment in non-tourist sectors. Growth is expected to moderate over the medium term given saturation in tourism flows, sustained population decline, and subpar investment. Notwithstanding the economy’s recent overperformance, inflation declined significantly and only reversed some of its gains recently on the back of higher international oil prices and unfavorable base effects. Inflation is expected to gradually converge towards its steady state rate of around 2 percent. Fiscal policy remains guided by the fiscal rule, albeit past surpluses are expected to unwind, allowing for the reversal of pandemic wage cuts and a return of public investments. The current account markedly improved thanks to lower oil prices but the deficit remains elevated.

Risks to the outlook are broadly balanced. Growth slowdown in major economies could negatively impact tourism receipts, while positive surprises could boost foreign demand. Domestically, a successful expansion of renewable energy and faster-than-expected development of hotel capacity and yachting marinas would boost growth, while delays in public investment and more persistent core inflation could dent tourist experience and competitiveness.

Efforts to safeguard recently created fiscal space are welcome. Overall surpluses in 2022 and 2023 helped reduce debt and granted access to favorable financing terms from the Netherlands. Safeguarding this space and avoiding procyclical impetus is warranted, including through more gradual unwinding of pandemic wage cuts in 2024, prudent liquidity management to repay a bullet loan in 2025, and general efforts to strengthen tax administration, review procurement and domestic arrears management, and streamline transfers to public entities. Ensuing room for maneuver could be used for priority investments, including for climate adaptation, guided by a medium-term fiscal framework steering towards the island’s debt anchor.

Healthcare and pension reforms are needed to lock in a sustainable expenditure path and mitigate medium-term fiscal risks. Growing health and old-age pension deficits, exacerbated by an aging population, pose risks to the sustainability of public finances. Recent initiatives to incentivize the use of generics and raise the pension age are commendable, and more needs to be done to put the system on a sustainable path. Staff sees a broad range of efficiency gains in health spending, including lowering pharmaceuticals and laboratory costs and enhancing primary care’s gatekeeping role. Reforms on the revenue side, including broadening the contributor base and increasing co-payments, are politically more difficult.

Sustaining the positive growth momentum in the medium term requires investments in capital and labor and resolving existing growth bottlenecks. First, moving up the value chain with high-end resorts and complementary recreational activities would help sustain valuable income growth from tourism but requires scaling up investments in infrastructure and deregulating the transportation sector. Second, further investments in electricity grid and energy storage, as well as a revised pricing strategy, are needed to accompany the ongoing energy transition and reap its vast benefits, including lower fuel imports, emissions, and electricity prices. The envisaged floating offshore wind park for hydrogen production would be a game changer for the island. Boosting public investment to achieve these objectives, however, requires ramping up capacity in planning and execution. Third, to further stimulate growth and offset the sustained population decline, formal labor markets and skills would need to be strengthened. And fourth, continued improvements in the business climate in line with the landspakket’s economic reform pillar could help overcome decade-low productivity growth.

Important strides in reducing ML/FT vulnerabilities are welcome and could be built upon. The draft online gaming law, implementation of risk-based supervision, and a new law to address EU grey listing and enable automatic information exchange represent important strides in enhancing Curaçao’s defenses against ML/FT and related reputational risks. Curaçao can further improve upon these important accomplishments, including by passing and implementing the aforementioned legislations in a timely manner and enhancing coordination and monitoring across relevant agencies.

Sint Maarten

Near-term growth is strongly anchored but preserving the positive momentum hinges on investments to revamp an ailing infrastructure and improve tourism’s value added. The economic recovery is well underway, underpinned by tourism recovery and the reconstruction. GDP is expected to surpass its pre-Irma level in 2025. However, without investments to upgrade an ailing infrastructure, growth will falter as the island approaches its maximum carrying capacity. Strategies should continue to focus on enhancing tourist’s experience, differentiating from other Caribbean destinations, and improving tourism’s value added.

A comprehensive strategy is required to durably resolve the electricity crisis. Mobile electricity generators have been leased and efforts to replace old engines are underway. Once the immediate crisis is resolved, efforts should be devoted towards developing a detailed masterplan for the energy transition with targets, projects, costing, timeline, and a comprehensive assessment of ancillary investments. The Trust Fund could receive a new mandate, beyond 2028, to operate as a public investment agency in charge of planning, securing the financing, and implementing plans for the energy transition.

Revenue mobilization efforts are essential to ensure fiscal sustainability. Plans to lower tax rates, to make the country more competitive with neighboring islands, should be avoided as this would reduce government’s revenues and endanger fiscal sustainability. Instead, additional revenues are required to satisfy the fiscal rule, service loans with the Netherlands, raise public wages to attract and retain talent, increase transfers to cover public health costs, and clear public arrears with the SZV. Envisaged reforms to enhance the tax administration and to digitize and interface government systems should be complemented with plans to i) tax casinos’ profits, turnover, and winnings; ii) enforce the lodging tax on short-term rentals, and income and profit tax on the proceeds from such rentals; iii) update the price of land leases; and iv) institute a tourist levy at the airport.

Without reforms, the healthcare and pensions funds are unsustainable. Health premiums and government transfers are insufficient to cover health costs, which are being cross-financed with pension savings. With unchanged policies, given population aging and rising administrative costs, both health and pensions funds will run deficits by 2027, and the SZV would deplete its liquid assets by 2027. By 2030, the government would need to transfer about 4 percent of GDP per year to sustain the system. Reforms are urgently needed to contain health costs including: i) introducing the General Health Insurance, ii) rationalizing benefits, iii) extending the use of generics, iv) optimizing referrals, v) strengthening preventing care, and vi) adopting out-of-pocket payments. Given the rapid pace of population aging, additional measures such as increasing the contribution rates and linking the retirement age to life expectancy, should also be considered.

Strengthening the implementation of AML/CFT measures is necessary to increase effectiveness of the AML/CFT regime. Laws for an effective AML/CFT framework were approved but their implementation is lagging. UBO registration is yet to begin, while the investigation and prosecution of suspicious activities is lacking. Granting the FIU full independence to investigate and prosecute cases, and increasing its budget for recruitment and operations could strengthen the AML/CFT framework.

The Monetary Union of Curaçao and Sint Maarten

The current account deficit is expected to improve in the medium term but would remain elevated, while international reserves are expected to remain broadly stable. Large CADs in both countries are expected to improve and remain well-financed, leading to a stable and broadly adequate level of international reserves over the medium term. Curaçao’s external position is assessed to be weaker than implied by fundamentals and desired policy settings due to an elevated CAD and sustained appreciation of the real effective exchange rate, while that of Sint Maarten is considered in line with fundamentals and desired policy settings.

Monetary policy is appropriately targeted towards maintaining the peg. In line with global monetary policy tightening, the CBCS increased its benchmark rate during 2022-23 and has kept it unchanged since September 2023. Efforts to absorb excess liquidity should continue while closely monitoring developments in core inflation driven by tourism-related services. Even though credit growth declined further and reached negative territory in real terms amidst monetary tightening, the transmission mechanism of monetary policy remains weak. Structural factors include the absence of interbank and government securities markets. The continued increase in mortgages, the only credit component to display growth, was accompanied by a broadly stable loan-to-value ratio on aggregate, albeit more granular data is needed to monitor potential vulnerabilities. Further acceleration in mortgage credit could warrant introducing a macro prudential limit below the currently by banks self-imposed ratio.

The financial sector is sound and risks to financial stability have substantially diminished as the CBCS advances its reform agenda. Banks are highly liquid and adequately capitalized and systemic risks are contained. Near-term risks to financial stability have substantially diminished with the agreement for a controlled wind-down of ENNIA and the start of the restructuring process, as well as the CBCS’s continued improvements in supervision, regulation, and governance. Staff welcomes CBCS’s initiatives to establish a financial stability committee, further refine stress-testing, and enhance crisis management capacities, including lender of last resort and a deposit insurance scheme.

Table 1. Curaçao: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 2020–25

(Percent of GDP unless otherwise indicated)

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

2025

Prel.

Prel.

Prel.

Prel.

Proj.

Real Economy

Real GDP (percent change)

-18.0

4.2

7.9

4.2

4.5

3.5

CPI (12-month average, percent change)

2.2

3.8

7.4

3.5

3.2

2.4

CPI (end of period, percent change)

2.2

4.8

8.4

3.1

3.2

2.4

GDP deflator (percent change)

2.2

3.8

4.0

3.5

3.2

2.4

Unemployment rate (percent) 1/

13.1

13.5

7.2

7.0

6.9

6.6

Central Government Finances 2/

Net operating (current) balance

-15.0

-10.6

0.7

0.6

0.0

0.5

Primary balance

-13.2

-8.8

2.0

2.5

2.0

1.9

Overall balance

-14.5

-10.0

1.0

1.3

0.1

0.5

Central government debt 3/

87.1

90.3

81.6

70.8

65.4

61.1

General Government Finances 2, 4/

Overall balance

-15.7

-10.4

0.3

0.9

-0.3

-0.1

Balance of Payments

Current account

-27.2

-18.6

-26.8

-19.7

-17.9

-16.5

Goods trade balance

-37.0

-41.6

-47.9

-38.3

-40.4

-39.9

   Exports of goods

10.7

12.5

18.0

16.9

16.5

16.2

   Imports of goods

47.7

54.1

65.9

55.2

56.9

56.1

Service balance

9.6

21.7

20.5

18.4

22.6

23.7

   Exports of services

29.3

37.2

48.6

46.6

50.3

51.3

   Imports of services

19.7

15.6

28.1

28.2

27.7

27.6

External debt

197.3

194.8

180.9

177.1

169.1

164.0

Memorandum Items

Nominal GDP (millions of U.S. dollars)

2,534

2,740

3,075

3,318

3,578

3,789

Per capita GDP (U.S. dollars)

16,492

18,135

20,648

22,160

23,775

25,065

Credit to non-government sectors (percent change)

0.1

-9.7

3.2

2.5

…

…

Sources: The Curaçao authorities and IMF staff estimates and projections.

1/ Staff understands that the unemployment rate of 7.0 percent published in the 2023 Census data is not comparable to the historically published unemployment rates from the labor force survey by the Curacao Bureau of Statistics. As such, staff estimated the unemployment rate and overall labor force for the period of 2012 to 2022. Staff understands that the Curacao Bureau of Statistics intends to revise the historical series in the near future.

2/ Defined as balance sheet liabilities of the central government except equities. Includes central government liabilities to the social security funds.

3/ Budgetary central government consolidated with the social security fund (SVB).

4/ The latest available datapoint is as of 2018. Values for 2019-2023 are IMF staff estimates based on BOP flow data.

Table 2. Sint Maarten: Selected Economic Indicators 2020–25

(Percent of GDP unless otherwise indicated)

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

2025

Est.

Est.

Est.

Est.

Proj.

Real Economy

Real GDP (percent change) 1/

-20.4

7.1

13.9

3.5

2.7

3.0

CPI (12-month average, percent change)

0.7

2.8

3.6

2.1

2.5

2.3

Unemployment rate (percent) 2/

16.9

10.8

9.9

8.6

8.5

8.2

Government Finances

Primary balance excl. Trust Fund operations 3/

-8.7

-5.4

-0.6

1.5

0.9

0.9

Current balance (Authorities’ definition) 4/

-9.6

-6.3

-1.5

0.5

-0.1

0.0

Overall balance excl. TF operations

-9.3

-5.9

-1.1

1.0

0.2

0.2

Central government debt 5/

56.1

55.3

49.3

49.0

46.2

44.1

Balance of Payments

Current account

-25.5

-24.6

-3.9

-7.5

-7.8

-3.0

Goods trade balance

-40.7

-49.8

-59.2

-59.3

-62.4

-60.5

   Exports of goods

11.8

11.4

14.1

14.8

13.1

11.2

   Imports of goods

52.4

61.2

73.2

74.1

75.5

71.7

Service balance

20.2

33.1

62.8

60.3

62.6

65.2

   Exports of services

34.4

51.0

78.7

81.4

81.5

83.9

   Imports of services

14.3

17.9

15.9

21.1

18.9

18.7

External debt 6/

274.3

253.7

213.6

206.3

200.8

194.0

Memorandum Items

Nominal GDP (millions of U.S. dollars)

1,141

1,268

1,479

1,563

1,645

1,733

Per capita GDP (U.S. dollars)

26,796

29,646

34,437

36,088

37,570

39,160

Credit to non-gov. sectors (percent change)

2.4

1.3

4.5

1.0

…

…

   Sources:

   1/ Central Bank of Curacao and Sint Maarten and IMF staff estimates.

   2/ The size of the 2022 labor force reported by the 2023 Census was adjusted to ensure consistency with the reported total population.

   3/ Excludes Trust Fund (TF) grants and TF-financed special projects.

   4/ Revenue excl. grants minus interest income, current expenditure and depreciation of fixed assets.

   5/ The stock of debt in 2018 is based on financial statements. Values in subsequent years are staff’s estimates and are higher than the values under authorities’ definition in quarterly fiscal reports.

   6/ The latest available datapoint is as of 2018. Values for 2019-2022 are IMF staff estimates based on BOP flow data.

[1] Under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country’s economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board.

[2] The Executive Board takes decisions under its lapse-of-time-procedure when the Board agrees that a proposal can be considered without convening formal discussions.

[3] At the conclusion of the discussion, the Managing Director, as Chairman of the Board, summarizes the views of Executive Directors, and this summary is transmitted to the country’s authorities. An explanation of any qualifiers used in summings up can be found here: http://www.IMF.org/external/np/sec/misc/qualifiers.htm.

IMF Communications Department

MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Reah Sy

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

@IMFSpokesperson

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/09/17/pr-24330-curacao-and-sint-maarten-imf-board-concludes-2024-article-iv-consultation-discussions

MIL OSI

MIL OSI Russia News –

September 29, 2024

MIL-OSI Russia: Maksim Liksutov: the first carriages of the latest Russian train “White Gyrfalcon” (Bely Krechet) will depart for Saint Petersburg on the HSR by 2028

Source: Moscow Metro

Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin presented a model of the latest domestic train “White Gyrfalcon” (Bely Krechet) for the high-speed rail line Moscow — Saint Petersburg, a project initiated by Russian President Vladimir Putin, at the “Manezh Station: Moscow Transport 2030” exhibition. The train will reach speeds of up to 400 km/h.

Latest domestic train “White Gyrfalcon”. Moscow Metro.

During the presentation at Manezh, an agreement was signed for the delivery of 41 Russian trains for the high-speed rail line HSR-1 “Moscow – Tver – Veliky Novgorod – Saint Petersburg.”

The ceremony saw attendance from Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin, Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Vitaly Saveliev, Deputy Transport Minister Alexey Shilo, Deputy Mayor of Moscow for Transport Maksim Liksutov, General Director of Russian Railways JSC (RZD) Oleg Belozerov, First Deputy Chairman of the Board of Sberbank Alexander Vedyakhin, General Director of HSR Two Capitals LLC Oleg Toni, General Director of GTLK JSC Evgeny Ditrikh, General Director of Sinara Group JSC Viktor Lesh, and Anatoly Gavrilenko, General Director of Leader CJSC – the company organizing the financing for the project through non-state pension funds.

Inside the latest domestic train “White Gyrfalcon”. Moscow Metro.

The innovative Russian rolling stock meets the highest safety and comfort standards. All key components are manufactured in Russia, with assembly and commissioning taking place at the Ural Locomotives plant in Sverdlovsk Oblast.

According to Deputy Mayor of Moscow for Transport Maksim Liksutov, the domestic trains are both safe and comfortable. Each train consists of 8 carriages with several service classes. The train ride to Saint Petersburg will be nearly twice as fast as the Sapsan, taking only 2 hours and 15 minutes. The first carriages will depart for Saint Petersburg in 2028.

Travel time between Moscow and Tver will be 39 minutes, between Saint Petersburg and Veliky Novgorod — 29 minutes. From Zelenograd to central Moscow, the journey will take just 14 minutes.

The latest domestic train “White Gyrfalcon”. Moscow Metro.

“On behalf of Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin, we have presented a unique transportation exhibit at the Manezh Central Exhibition Hall. A part of the exhibition is dedicated to President Vladimir Putin’s project — HSR-1. The first carriages of the latest ‘White Gyrfalcon’ train will depart for Saint Petersburg on the HSR in 2028. The main design solutions for creating Russia’s first high-speed train HSR-1 were developed in Moscow. Some components for the high-speed trains will be produced by Moscow enterprises. The lifespan of the trains is 30 years, during which the manufacturer will be responsible under a life cycle contract,” said Maksim Liksutov.

Along with the HSR train model, visitors at Manezh Square can see the newest “Ivolga 4.0” trains, the “Moscow-2024” metro carriage, and the updated “Kamaz” electric bus. The internal exhibition features a multimedia HSR train where visitors can take a virtual journey along the high-speed rail route and explore the landmarks of the cities along the way.

The “Manezh Station: Moscow Transport 2030” exhibition, where the model is featured, is part of the forum-festival “Future Territory: Moscow 2030” and has become the most visited in Manezh’s history. Admission is free, and the exhibition runs until September 8 at the Manezh Central Exhibition Hall.

MIL OSI Russia News –

September 29, 2024
MIL-OSI Russia: Paid Inactivity – PayPal Introduces Fees on Inactive Accounts of Russians

MIL OSI Translation. Region: Russian Federation –

Source: Mainfin Bank –

When will PayPal charge users a fee?

PayPal’s updated user agreement will go into effect on October 7th – the platform will charge fees to inactive accounts according to the following terms:

there have been no withdrawal transactions on the wallet in the last year; the account balance is positive – the amount and currency do not matter; the commission will be 3.5 thousand rubles per year or the total balance, if the amount on the balance is less; the commission will be withheld for the extension of service; if the user does not agree with the updated terms, the wallet must be closed before October 7.

Inactive clients of the platform, from whom a commission will be withheld, also include persons who have not entered their profile for a year – the new rules will affect not only Russians, but also users from other countries.

Why did PayPal suspend work with Russian clients?

PayPal’s departure from the Russian Federation became known in early March 2022 – then, against the backdrop of the beginning of the Cold War and the sanctions imposed by the United States, the company suspended operations in the country, promising users time to withdraw funds. Now, registration of new clients from Russia is unavailable on the platform, and services for receiving and sending payments are closed for compatriots.

“The departure of PayPal from Russia was a blow to freelancers and small businesses working with foreign partners. Russians also lost the ability to pay for purchases in a number of foreign stores, such as Steam and PS Store,” the expert noted.

Although PayPal promised Russians the ability to withdraw funds from wallets, access to the payment system’s website was closed immediately after the announcement of its withdrawal from the country – no instructions on how to withdraw money from the balance were provided either. The service continues to operate in more than 200 countries around the world, serving over 300 million active clients.

12:00 09/24/2024

Source:

Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

Please note; This information is raw content directly from the information source. It is accurate to what the source is stating and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

http://mainfin.ru/news/paid-inactivity-paypal-introduces-commissions-on-inactive-accounts-of-Russians

EDITOR’S NOTE: This article is a translation. Apologies should the grammar and or sentence structure not be perfect.

MIL OSI Russia News –

September 29, 2024
MIL-OSI Russia: Treats, performances and sports games: how the festival “Summer in Moscow. Everyone out on the street!” went

MIL OSI Translation. Region: Russian Federation –

Source: Moscow Government – Government of Moscow –

In the capital ended festival “Summer in Moscow. Everyone out on the street!”. 600 entertainment venues were organized for city residents and tourists, including at the festival sites of “Moscow Seasons”. Visitors bought 35 thousand portions of various treats and 16 thousand liters of soft drinks. During the festival, souvenir shops and shopping chalets sold about 11 thousand memorable gifts, jewelry and decorative items. This was reported by the capital’s Department of Trade and Services.

Guests especially loved craft chocolate, hand-made ice cream and pine cone jam. At each site, you could try meat and fish dishes cooked on the grill, and national culinary delicacies from vendors from all over the country.

From the world of gadgets to reality

In the summer, Muscovites attended concerts and theatrical performances by groups from all over Russia. Thousands of master classes were held at the venues of the festival “Summer in Moscow. Everyone out on the street!”, where adults and children made home decor, toys, jewelry and fashion accessories, as well as culinary masterpieces with the help of experienced chefs. Young guests attended programming, English and archeology classes, and drawing lessons with professional teachers. Plein airs were very popular.

More than 20 Moscow Seasons venues hosted fun starts, sports and board games, training sessions, as well as dance lessons, Zumba, yoga and stretching classes. In addition, Muscovites took part in transformation games that helped them return from the world of gadgets to reality, understand their goals and find ways to achieve them.

Dancing to the gramophone and games from childhood

At the creative evenings, visitors listened to poems and songs, discussed the works of classics, legendary plays and books, watched performances by contemporary artists. Lectures and creative classes with representatives of the fashion industry, writers and theater community were held at the Moscow Seasons venues.

On Nikitsky Boulevard, an open-air exhibition and art market were held for 100 days. An exhibition of paintings by young artists from the Moscow Exhibition Halls association was organized for city residents and tourists, and master classes on painting techniques and handicrafts were held.

The guests of the festival remembered the “Summer in Moscow. Everyone out on the street!” theme nights with gramophone music at the vintage market on Chistye Prudy, as well as the championship of the childhood game “Rock, Paper, Scissors”, in which residents of all Moscow districts took part.

More information about the activities of the Department of Trade and Services is available in the official telegram channel.

Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

Please note; This information is raw content directly from the information source. It is accurate to what the source is stating and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

http://vvv.mos.ru/nevs/item/144354073/

EDITOR’S NOTE: This article is a translation. Apologies should the grammar and or sentence structure not be perfect.

MIL OSI Russia News –

September 29, 2024
MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Completes Seventh Review Under the Extended Fund Facility Arrangement for Suriname

Source: IMF – News in Russian

September 18, 2024

The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund completed the seventh review under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) arrangement for Suriname, allowing for an immediate purchase equivalent to SDR 46.7 million (about USD 63 million) of which SDR 19.1 million or about USD 25.8 million would be for budget support.

The authorities’ commitment to maintaining prudent macroeconomic policies and implementing difficult reforms are yielding positive results: the economy is growing, inflation is coming down, international bond spreads are at record lows, and investor confidence is returning.

Building on the progress made thus far under the program, the authorities should entrench fiscal discipline, particularly in the run up to the elections while protecting the poor and vulnerable. Persevering with structural reforms to strengthen institutions and address governance weaknesses is also critical.

Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed the seventh review under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) arrangement for Suriname. The completion of the review allows the authorities to draw the equivalent of SDR 46.7 million (about USD 63 million), bringing total program disbursement to SDR 337.1 million (about USD 455 million). In completing the review, the Executive Board approved the authorities’ request for a waiver of non-observance of the end-June 2024 performance criteria on the central government primary balance based on the corrective actions the authorities have already taken.

Suriname is implementing an ambitious economic reform agenda to restore macroeconomic stability and debt sustainability, while laying the foundations for strong and more inclusive growth. The program includes policies to restore fiscal and debt sustainability, protect the poor and vulnerable, upgrade the monetary and exchange rate policy framework, address banking sector vulnerabilities, and advance the anti-corruption and governance reform agenda. These policies are supported by the EFF arrangement, which was approved by the Executive Board on December 22, 2021 (see Press Release No. 21/400), in an amount equivalent to SDR 472.8 million (366.8 percent of quota).

Following the Executive Board discussion on Suriname, Mr. Kenji Okamura, Deputy Managing Director, and Acting Chair, issued the following statement:

“The authorities’ reforms under the EFF-supported program are being increasingly reflected in macroeconomic stability and improving investor confidence. The economy is growing, inflation is declining, international bond spreads have reached historic lows, and donor support is increasing.

“The near-term priority is to reinforce the planned fiscal consolidation and protect the vulnerable from the burden of the adjustment. Phasing out electricity subsidies and strengthening tax administration will help create fiscal space for higher social assistance and infrastructure spending. Fully implementing the recently finalized social assistance reform plan will make social programs more efficient and effective. Strengthening commitment controls and addressing weaknesses in cash management will contain public spending and prevent accumulation of supplier arrears.

“The debt restructuring process is nearing completion. Bilateral agreements with all official creditors and most commercial creditors have been achieved. Domestic debt arrears have been cleared.

“A tight monetary policy is supporting disinflation. Implementing the recently-finalized plan for central bank recapitalization will strengthen the central bank’s operational and financial autonomy. The authorities’ demonstrated commitment to a flexible, market-determined exchange rate is supporting international reserve accumulation. Timely implementation of recapitalization plans for commercial banks that do not meet regulatory capital requirements will bolster financial sector resilience.

“The authorities should persevere with their ambitious structural reform agenda to strengthen institutions, address governance weaknesses, build climate resilience, and improve data quality. This important work will continue to be supported by capacity development from the Fund and other development partners.”

IMF Communications Department

MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Meera Louis

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

@IMFSpokesperson

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/09/18/pr-24334-suriname-imf-completes-seventh-review-under-the-eff-arrangement

MIL OSI

MIL OSI Russia News –

September 29, 2024
MIL-OSI Russia: Navigating Through Financial Turbulences with Preparedness, Competence, and Confidence

Source: IMF – News in Russian

OeNB | SUERF | Joint Vienna Institute | Yale Program on Financial Stability Conference on Building Resilience and Managing Financial Crises
Vienna, Austria
Tobias Adrian, IMF Financial Counsellor and Director of the Monetary and Capital Markets Department

September 18, 2024

It is a great pleasure to speak to you today on a policy area at the forefront of our work at the IMF in helping our members prepare for, and deal with, financial instability. I will provide a snapshot of the progress that has been made and what remains to be done to deal effectively with bank runs and bank failures. I will also explain what we are doing at the IMF to help our membership make further progress in this critical area.

The bank failures in 2023 in the US and Switzerland presented the most significant test since the global financial crisis of the reforms taken collectively to end “too-big-to-fail.” It’s not often that policymakers get to field test plans for dealing with failing systemic banks, let alone one for a global systemically important bank (G-SIB).

In our view, the failures of Credit Suisse in Switzerland and SVB, Signature, and First Republic in the US, showed that while significant progress has been made, further progress is still required to deliver on the too-big-to-fail reform agenda and reduce the risk that taxpayers bail out shareholders and creditors when banks fail.

On the one hand, the actions the authorities took last year successfully avoided deeper financial turmoil. In addition, unlike many of the failures during the global financial crisis, significant losses were shared with the shareholders and some creditors of the failed banks. However, taxpayers were once again on the hook as extensive public support was used to protect more than just the insured depositors of failed banks.

In Switzerland, amid a massive creditor run, the Credit Suisse acquisition was backed by a government guarantee and liquidity facilities nearly equal to a quarter of Swiss economic output. While the public support was ultimately recovered, it entailed very significant contingent fiscal risk, and created a larger, more systemic bank. Indeed, UBS now has the largest ratio of assets to home country GDP of any individual G-SIB.

The use of standing resolution powers to transfer ownership of Credit Suisse, after bailing in shareholders and creditors, rather than relying on emergency legislation to effect a merger, would have fully wiped out the equity of Credit Suisse shareholders and limited the need for public support.

What lessons have we learnt?

Domestic and international authorities have published extensively on the lessons learnt and we share many of the conclusions. The key points I would highlight include:

The importance of intrusive supervision and early intervention. Credit Suisse depositors lost confidence after prolonged governance and risk management failures. The banks which failed in the US pursued risky business strategies and very rapid growth with inadequate risk management. Supervisors in both jurisdictions should have acted faster and been more assertive and conclusive. Policymakers need to empower supervisors with both the ability and the will to act.

Even relatively small banks can prove systemic. A lesson from many past crises, including the US bank failures in 2023, is that you can’t always judge in advance which banking problems will become systemic. In many countries, including the US and Switzerland, we think authorities should do more to be ready for crises affecting their medium-sized banks. Banking supervisory and resolution authorities should ensure that sufficient recovery and resolution planning takes place across the banking sector as a whole. This should include, on a proportional basis, banks that may not be systemic in all circumstances, but that could certainly be systemic in some.

Central banks should be prepared to provide extensive liquidity support during a crisis. Banks should be familiar with the central bank’s operations and facilities and be ready to use them at short notice. Who can access central bank lending is also an important question as liquidity risks have partially moved away from the usual central bank counterparties. While widening the counterparty list could help central banks intervene more broadly in a crisis, it runs the risk of rewarding regulatory arbitrage, giving raise to difficult trade-offs and requiring careful assessment. Central banks may well have to lend against illiquid collateral in a crisis. In that context, prepositioning would help to ensure operational preparedness especially to ascertain the legal claim on the collateral and to calibrate appropriate haircuts. An open question is whether the prepositioning should be voluntary or required, and how much counterparties should preposition if required. The benefits of enhanced lending “fire power” would have to be compared with the cost that prepositioning entails for the banks and the costs to the central bank, including risks to its balance sheet. If propositioning is directly linked with risk (e.g., a percentage of uninsured deposit), the impact on intermediation and the interaction with other prudential regulation would need to be carefully assessed.

Resolution plans and regimes need sufficient flexibility. We very much support the conclusion of the Financial Stability Board’s lessons learned report that resolution authorities need to “better operationalize a range of resolution options for different circumstances.” Every bank failure presents different challenges and resolution authorities need to be flexible enough to deal with the actual crisis that presents itself, balancing risks to financial stability with those to taxpayers. Authorities should make sure that they carefully balance rules versus discretion and detailed planning versus optionality in designing their resolution regimes. The rapid sale of Credit Suisse should prompt us to think about what would be needed for the successful sale in resolution of even the largest banking groups, at least in some circumstances.

Strikingly, every one of the cases I mentioned from Spring 2023, involved the transfer of the failing bank’s business lines to an acquiring bank, even where this had not been the focus of prior resolution planning. Two of the US cases also involved the intermediate step of transfer to bridge banks. So, we have timely and high-profile reminders that transfer powers should be a core part of the resolution toolkit and should be duly planned for and readily implementable, including at short notice.

Cooperation and effective implementation of resolution powers across borders is imperative. One notable feature of last year’s bank failures was the degree of international cooperation between regulators and resolution authorities in their handling of these cases. The Swiss authorities worked intensively with international counterparts to prepare for a resolution of Credit Suisse, which would have needed supportive actions from the supervisors and resolution authorities responsible for Credit Suisse’s main foreign operations, including in the US, UK, and EU. SVB’s UK subsidiary was resolved by the Bank of England, ultimately being sold to HSBC, and the FSB report highlights that the UK relied on the deep relationships built over the years with their US counterparts to help implement this. This cooperation seems to have begun earlier and worked a lot better than in similar cases during the global financial crisis, such as the failure of Lehman Brothers.

That experience highlights how global financial stability depends on authorities being able to work together across borders and to build in peacetime the routine contacts and good understanding ex ante of what each authority would be likely to do to make that possible. However, there was a wrinkle in this otherwise positive experience, as highlighted in the Financial Stability Board’s report on the bank failures, which relates to the importance of the US securities markets to most major foreign banks. Credit Suisse and most other major banks have debt securities issued in US dollars and/or under New York law, the holders of which may incur losses in a resolution. As a recent report of the Financial Stability Board highlighted, there remain significant open questions about how disclosure and other US securities legal requirements would be applied in the circumstances where securities issued in the US are envisaged to be converted in a short period, for example, over a resolution weekend. This is an important issue where further work is needed and this is being taken forward by the Financial Stability Board, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and others.

Finally, effective deposit insurance regimes are crucial. Banks typically fail when creditors lose confidence, even before their balance sheet reflects potential losses. Authorities in many countries need to strengthen deposit insurance regimes. New technology like 24/7 payments, mobile banking, and social media have accelerated deposit runs. Last year’s failures followed rapid deposit withdrawals, and deposit insurers and other authorities should be ready and able to act more quickly than many currently can.

IMF staff are working actively to support efforts in member countries to strengthen their supervision, resolution, liquidity assistance, and deposit insurance frameworks including through FSAPs and technical assistance. In the US, we have seen lessons learned reports and policy proposals from many of the US banking authorities, several of which pick up on issues and recommendations that were discussed in the IMF’s assessment of the US financial sector (“FSAP”) in 2020. Our next FSAPs for Switzerland and the Euro Area will be published next year, and as we start work on that we will be taking a close look at the authorities’ and the FSB’s findings and will likely reiterate many of our previous findings, including on strengthening deposit insurance regimes. We are also contributing to policy formulation at the international level, including a recently announced review of the international deposit insurance standard, and by earlier this year hosting with the Financial Stability Board a workshop for policymakers on the use of transfer powers in resolution.

The bottom line is that progress has been made, but there is still further to go in putting an end to too-big-to-fail. Most of the areas where further progress is needed are already well known; last year’s bank failures should provide the impetus for policymakers to cover the remaining ground.

IMF Communications Department

MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER:

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

@IMFSpokesperson

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/09/16/sp091824-navigating-through-financial-turbulences-with-preparedness-competence-and-confidence

MIL OSI

MIL OSI Russia News –

September 29, 2024

MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Concludes 2024 Article IV Consultation with Bhutan

Source: IMF – News in Russian

September 19, 2024

Washington, DC: On September 9, 2024, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the Article IV consultation with Bhutan[1].

During the past decade Bhutan adeptly balanced economic growth and poverty reduction with environmental sustainability. Sustained growth increased incomes, lifting living conditions and eliminating extreme monetary poverty by 2022. Bhutan has a long history of leading environmental conservation and climate change action and is committed to remaining carbon neutral. While the pandemic hindered economic development, strong policies limited its health impact.

Growth remained subdued during 2023. Large-scale emigration and policies to curb imports hindered a more robust recovery. Inflation accelerated in the second half of 2023, driven by wage increases in the public sector. The current account deficit (CAD) widened to around 30 percent of GDP driven by a large investment in crypto assets mining and the slow recovery in tourism. The fiscal deficit narrowed but remained high and non-hydro debt nearly doubled from pre-pandemic levels.

Boosted by hydro-power projects and grant-financed capital investment, growth is projected to accelerate over the medium term, averaging 6.3 percent of GDP, but to remain volatile. A gradual easing of inflation towards 4 percent is expected as the impact of wage increase subside. The CAD is expected to narrow, supported by higher electricity exports due to the commissioning of new hydropower plants, a continued recovery in tourism, and crypto assets exports. Securing diverse sources of growth that provide quality employment opportunities while preserving Bhutan’s commitment to environmental sustainability remains a key medium‑term challenge.

Uncertainty remains elevated with the balance of risks tilted to the downside. Domestic risks include slippages on implementation of the goods and services tax, delays in hydropower projects, and fiscal risks from the materialization of contingent liabilities in the financial sector. External risks include volatile commodity prices—particularly of fuel—and a global slowdown that could hinder non-hydro exports. Bhutan is vulnerable to climate change, given the importance of hydroelectricity and agriculture. Crypto mining entails significant upside and downside risks given their price volatility. Overall, the large external debt and persistent CADs—while supporting growth-enhancing investments and financed by development partners—are nonetheless a source of vulnerability. On the upside, the pursuit of stronger‑than-envisaged fiscal consolidation would accelerate the pace at which fiscal and external buffers are rebuilt.

Executive Board Assessment[2]

Executive Directors agreed with the thrust of the staff appraisal. They commended Bhutan’s significant reduction in poverty and inequality during the last decade. Directors welcomed that growth is expected to accelerate over the medium term, boosted by a large hydroproject, higher capital spending, and the slowdown of emigration. Noting downside risks to the outlook, they underscored that tighter fiscal and monetary policies are needed to support the peg, reduce domestic and external imbalances, and rebuild buffers; while carefully managing potential risks stemming from crypto assets operations is also needed. Directors called for structural reforms to foster high-quality jobs in the private sector and diversify the economy, and commended the authorities’ commitment to ecological conservation and climate change action. They noted that continued support from the Fund’s capacity development is important.

Directors stressed that a gradual and sustained fiscal consolidation, based on revenue mobilization and spending restraint, is essential to rebuild buffers and preserve debt sustainability. They welcomed the authorities’ commitment to a timely implementation of the Goods and Services Tax and to undertaking additional tax and revenue administration measures to achieve the planned fiscal consolidation. Directors recommended strengthening public financial management, public investment management, and domestic debt management.

Directors underscored that monetary policy needs to be tightened in tandem with fiscal policy to ease balance-of-payment pressures and rebuild reserves. They stressed the need for a well-functioning domestic liquidity management framework to support the monetary policy operation function. Directors encouraged the authorities to phase out existing exchange restrictions once conditions allow. They noted the need to address remaining financial sector vulnerabilities, particularly given the expiration of COVID-related support measures. In this context, they welcomed the new guidelines and regulations to address credit quality and the progress in moving toward risk-based supervision. Directors recommended further enhancing the AML/CFT framework.

Directors called for structural reforms to diversify the economy and foster the creation of private sector jobs for high-skilled workers. They recommended improving the business environment, strengthening human capital accumulation, and improving active labor market policies. Directors welcomed efforts toward a new FDI policy, which relaxes some restrictions, including access to foreign currency, local employment requirements, and caps on foreign ownership. They also welcomed the improvements in data quality and called for further progress in this area.

Directors stressed the need to further strengthen public sector governance, including the Royal Monetary Authority’s (RMA) governance framework and independence as well as the transparency in the operations of state-owned enterprises. Noting the need to mitigate the potential risks stemming from crypto asset operations, they welcomed RMA’s efforts to strengthen its reserve management strategy and the forthcoming audited financial statements of crypto-mining operations.

Bhutan: Selected Economic Indicators, 2018/19-2028/29

2018/19

2019/20

2020/21

2021/22

2022/23

2023/24

2024/25

2025/26

2026/27

2027/28

2028/29

Act.

Act.

Act.

Act.

Projections

(In percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

National Accounts

Nominal GDP (in millions of ngultrums) 1/

184,660

187,378

193,386

216,239

237,322

261,026

292,837

325,812

357,677

393,607

438,906

Real GDP growth (percent change) 1/

4.6

-2.5

-3.3

4.8

5.0

5.2

7.2

6.4

5.2

5.6

7.2

Prices

Consumer prices (EoP; percent change)

2.8

4.5

7.4

6.5

3.9

4.8

4.7

4.4

4.0

4.0

4.0

Consumer prices (avg; percent change)

2.8

3.0

8.2

5.9

4.6

4.6

4.7

4.5

4.2

4.0

4.0

GDP deflator (percent change)

2.2

4.0

6.7

6.7

4.5

4.6

4.6

4.6

4.4

4.2

4.1

General Government Accounts

Total revenue and grants

22.8

29.1

30.9

25.1

24.2

24.2

28.1

31.5

30.1

28.2

27.3

Domestic revenue

18.8

19.3

18.5

18.1

18.9

20.3

19.3

20.7

20.7

20.8

22.4

Tax revenue

14.7

12.2

10.7

12.0

13.3

13.4

14.0

14.4

14.8

14.8

15.2

Non-tax revenue

4.1

7.2

7.9

6.1

5.6

6.9

5.4

6.3

5.9

6.0

7.3

Foreign grants

5.5

8.5

7.5

6.2

6.0

3.9

8.8

10.8

9.4

7.4

4.9

Internal and other receipts

-1.6

1.3

4.9

0.9

-0.7

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

Total expenditure 2/

24.2

30.9

36.6

32.1

29.0

28.8

32.5

34.2

33.4

32.1

32.2

Current expenditure

15.0

19.0

22.5

15.9

14.9

17.1

17.0

17.8

18.7

18.8

19.4

Capital expenditure

8.8

11.8

14.3

16.1

14.2

11.8

15.5

16.4

14.8

13.3

12.8

Primary expenditure 2/

23.4

30.5

35.7

30.6

27.3

27.2

30.5

31.4

29.9

28.3

27.7

Primary balance

-0.6

-1.4

-4.8

-5.5

-3.1

-3.0

-2.4

0.1

0.2

-0.1

-0.4

Overall balance

-1.5

-1.8

-5.8

-7.0

-4.8

-4.6

-4.4

-2.7

-3.3

-3.9

-4.8

General government debt 3/

100

115

123

117

116

114

109

123

122

119

130

Domestic

3

1

9

11

13

14

15

12

11

13

13

External

97

114

114

106

103

100

94

111

111

106

117

Monetary Sector

Broad money (M2) growth (percent change)

5.6

19.3

24.4

9.4

9.8

12.6

13.2

12.3

13.0

12.2

11.5

Private credit growth (percent change)

20.5

13.3

6.5

10.8

19.3

9.1

11.2

11.1

11.5

10.0

10.2

Balance of Payments

Current account balance

-19.2

-14.8

-11.2

-28.1

-34.4

-17.7

-32.1

-20.5

-12.5

-17.1

-14.1

Goods balance

-15.3

-12.1

-6.4

-21.1

-25.7

-12.9

-26.9

-15.0

-6.1

-10.1

-8.8

Hydropower exports

6.0

12.1

13.5

11.0

8.7

6.3

8.2

9.5

9.1

10.4

11.9

Non-hydropower exports

17.3

13.0

13.9

15.8

14.9

15.7

15.9

15.8

17.1

18.1

18.8

Imports of goods

38.6

37.1

33.9

47.9

49.2

40.2

55.6

52.4

45.6

42.1

42.2

Services balance

-1.9

-3.5

-4.4

-6.5

-6.7

-3.7

-2.8

-3.6

-3.8

-3.6

-3.0

Primary balance

-8.4

-5.7

-5.7

-5.5

-5.0

-5.6

-4.5

-4.2

-4.6

-4.9

-4.8

Secondary balance

6.5

6.6

5.4

5.1

2.9

4.5

2.1

2.2

2.0

1.6

2.5

Capital account balance

8.0

7.1

3.8

3.6

4.1

3.1

8.2

9.8

8.6

6.6

2.9

Financial account balance

-4.5

-15.1

-9.1

-8.2

-10.7

-15.9

-24.0

-20.2

-19.2

-13.6

-13.6

Net errors and emissions

10.4

5.4

-4.8

1.2

11.8

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

Overall balance

3.7

12.9

-3.0

-15.1

-7.8

1.2

0.1

9.4

15.3

3.2

2.5

Gross official reserves (in USD millions)

1065

1344

1332

840

574

606

604

969

1616.3

1758.9

1878.7

(In months of imports)

12.4

17.5

17.9

7.6

4.8

5.8

3.7

5.7

10.0

10.8

10.3

(In months of goods and services imports)

10.1

14.2

15.6

6.6

3.9

4.6

3.2

4.8

8.1

8.6

8.4

Memorandum Items

Hydropower exports growth rate 4/

-1.2

105.6

15.8

-9.4

-13.2

-20.7

46.2

30.4

4.5

26.1

27.3

Non-hydropower exports growth rate 4/

13.7

-24.1

11.0

26.8

3.2

16.2

13.5

10.7

18.8

16.5

16.0

Hydropower good imports 4/

-15.3

-3.5

-21.2

-11.6

14.9

50.8

18.4

61.1

14.0

3.3

-19.1

Non-hydropower good imports 4/

10.3

-2.3

-4.3

63.8

12.7

-13.0

58.1

1.5

-6.1

1.4

15.2

Population in million (eop)

0.7

0.7

0.8

0.8

0.8

0.8

0.8

0.8

0.8

0.8

0.8

External financing gap in US million

…

…

…

…

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

[1] Under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country’s economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board.

[2] At the conclusion of the discussion, the Managing Director, as Chairman of the Board, summarizes the

views of Executive Directors, and this summary is transmitted to the country’s authorities. An explanation

of any qualifiers used in summing up can be found here: http://www.IMF.org/external/np/sec/misc/qualifiers.htm.

IMF Communications Department

MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Pemba Sherpa

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

@IMFSpokesperson

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/09/19/pr-24336-bhutan-imf-concludes-2024-article-iv-consultation

MIL OSI

MIL OSI Russia News –

September 29, 2024

MIL-OSI Russia: Moscow Metro Embraces Innovation: QR Code Payment Now Available at Turnstiles

Source: Moscow Metro

Moscow’s transportation system is taking a leap forward with the launch of QR code payment via the Faster Payment’s System (FPS) at Metro and Moscow Central Circle (MCC) turnstiles. This innovative service, powered by the Bank of Russia, is also being implemented at 1,700 ticket vending machines across the city.

Moscow Metro QR code-ready.

The FPS is already integrated into all regular river transport turnstiles and ground transport validators. This is a convenient and modern service. Now, this innovative payment method is available at ticket booths and vending machines, – said Maksim Liksutov, Moscow’s Deputy Mayor for Transport and Industry.

To utilize QR code payment, passengers need to generate a QR code in the Moscow Metro app and hold their smartphone screen up to the scanner at the turnstile. The phone should be held 20-25 cm away from the scanner, at a 45-degree angle, with the active QR code facing the scanner. A green signal will appear on the turnstile when the payment is successful.

Additionally, passengers registered in the mobile app and loyalty program are eligible for a special promotion. They will receive cashback for each payment made through the FPS, credited to their account within one minute.

This new payment option offers Moscow residents a convenient, modern, and secure way to pay for their transportation needs.

The FPS was first launched in June 2023 in the ticket offices of all open stations of the Big Circle Line (BCL).

The Moscow Transport news channel https://t.me/DTRoadEn

MIL OSI Russia News –

September 29, 2024
MIL-OSI Russia: Moscow is ready for the new heating season

MIL OSI Translation. Region: Russian Federation –

Source: Moscow Government – Government of Moscow –

All utility systems, residential buildings, municipal facilities, equipment and machinery are ready for the autumn-winter period. The Moscow Government has considered the issue of the readiness of the capital’s housing stock and housing and communal facilities for the autumn-winter season of 2024/2025.

Preparations for the heating season for 74 thousand buildings, including 34.6 thousand residential buildings, 8.4 thousand social facilities and 30.8 thousand economic facilities, were carried out from May to August.

City services carried out preventive inspections and necessary repairs of engineering systems and equipment of boiler houses, central heating stations, large energy facilities, engineering networks of heat, gas, water and electricity supply.

The existing power reserves allow for a stable and uninterrupted supply of energy resources to consumers, as well as to meet the needs of promising city programs and infrastructure projects.

In case of possible failures and damage to utility networks, 1,093 emergency teams, 1,229 units of specialized equipment, as well as backup sources of electricity and heat supply have been prepared.

The required amount of road cleaning, engineering and other specialized equipment, as well as small mechanization tools, will be used to maintain urban areas and facilities. Snow will be disposed of at 51 stationary snow melting points.

Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

Please note; This information is raw content directly from the information source. It is accurate to what the source is stating and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

https://vvv.mos.ru/major/themes/11819050/

EDITOR’S NOTE: This article is a translation. Apologies should the grammar and or sentence structure not be perfect.

MIL OSI Russia News –

September 29, 2024
MIL-OSI Germany: „We’ve ridden out the big wave of inflation” | Interview with F.A.Z.

Source: Deutsche Bundesbank in English

The interview was conducted by Christian Siedenbiedel.Translation: Deutsche Bundesbank
Mr Nagel, is this terrible wave of inflation finally over?
Yes, I believe this wave of inflation is coming to an end. In its initial phase, it was very challenging, or, as you put it, “terrible”. However, we in the euro area are now well on the way to sustainably achieving our inflation target of 2 %. Based on the Eurosystem projection from June, we should hit this target at the end of 2025. In Germany, the inflation rate of 2 % in August, as measured by the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices, was a little deceptive, if only for purely technical reasons: the year-on-year rate, that is, compared with August 2023, was more favourable than in other months. We’ll be seeing somewhat higher rates again soon. But I think that we’re past the worst of it: we’ve ridden out the big wave.
Is it still possible that inflation could get out of hand?
I wouldn’t say so. Provided that we don’t see any more unexpected major shocks, like Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, for example, then inflation should continue to trend towards 2 %. Nevertheless, we shouldn’t celebrate prematurely and start patting ourselves on the back. We haven’t quite hit our target yet. We must remain vigilant and be wary of the risks on the way back to stable prices – that is our job as a central bank.
How seriously should we be taking the repeated upside surprises to services inflation?
We are taking the higher inflation for services seriously. After all, services make up nearly half of the basket of consumer goods – that’s a lot. In Germany, the prices for services are still rising by around 4 % each year. Strong growth in wages is especially contributing to this. And we are expecting wage settlements in Germany to remain relatively high over the remaining course of 2024 as well. In annual terms, negotiated wages are likely to rise by around 6 %. While there is some fluctuation in the monthly figures, wage pressures in Germany will remain high overall for the time being.
Given this state of affairs, do you think the ECB should risk lowering interest rates for a second time in September?
On the ECB Governing Council, we have stressed that we will not pre-commit to any particular path of interest rates and that we will follow a data-dependent approach to our decisions. Following the interest rate reduction in June, it was a wise move to then wait and see in July and not cut rates any further. For this reason, I will really only be making up my mind at next week’s ECB Governing Council meeting, when I will have a full overview of all the data. As before, we are not flying on autopilot. But I’ll say one thing: I think inflation is making good progress.
When interest rates were first cut in June, only the Governor of the Oesterreichische Nationalbank, Robert Holzmann, voted against the reduction. After all, the ECB had just been forced to adjust its inflation projections upward. Did you not have any concerns in cutting interest rates?
No, I had no concerns in June. From my perspective, the interest rate step was justified by the data. They did not cast any doubt on the general direction of travel, that is, the decline in the inflation rate over a longer period of time. And our monetary policy is still tight, even after the cut in interest rates. However, I do, of course, respect the decision of my colleague Robert Holzmann.
During his time as President, your predecessor Jens Weidmann was often the one who took on the role of the most hawkish member of the ECB Governing Council, the most strident advocate of tight monetary policy. How do you view your role on the Governing Council?
Comparing two completely different situations is always difficult, and it should be up to others to evaluate my work. Our decisions on the Governing Council are reached as a team – one that strives to make responsible monetary policy for the euro area. I wish to seek out solutions together with my colleagues on the ECB Governing Council, which is why I focus more on the team as a whole than on individuals. I think we have done well on this score over the past two years: we have succeeded in bringing inflation down in a challenging environment.
There are economists who fear that inflation could settle at a level noticeably above the ECB’s target of 2 % in the medium term. Do you think that the risk of there being structurally higher inflation in future can be completely ruled out?
In this context, we must clearly distinguish between two things. First, there is the question of whether we are going to see stronger price pressures in the future. That’s something I can’t rule out. We are keeping close tabs on how certain developments are impacting on inflation – these include geopolitical developments, the green transformation and demographic developments. Some academics expect these developments to lead to pressure towards higher inflation rates. A different question altogether is whether inflation will be higher over the long term because of this. And I will be quite clear on this matter: that’s something monetary policymakers hold sway over. Our mandate is price stability.
Would you then say that the ECB is partly to blame for inflation getting out of hand in recent years?
I wouldn’t use the word blame in this context – I consider that to be the wrong category. Hindsight is always 20/20. What is certainly true is that at the end of 2021 – before I joined the ECB Governing Council – it was already foreseeable that the inflation rate would rise, and the ECB continued its asset purchases. In January 2022, prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, we already had an inflation rate of 5 %, which was probably due in part to the coronavirus pandemic. As part of the ECB strategy review that has just begun, we will have to examine the role monetary policy measures, such as asset purchases, played during the low inflation period.
Was it a sticking point that the ECB had committed to tapering asset purchases first before starting to raise interest rates? The economist Markus Brunnermeier mentioned this recently in a discussion with you. As a result, the central bank was unable to respond quickly enough with the interest rate hikes that inflation would have required …
Back then, it was important to gradually ready financial markets for this reversal. This happened through a series of announcements starting from December 2021. If you look at developments in financial markets, then I’d say that the markets understood this communication and were prepared. The ECB thus succeeded in keeping the negative side effects often associated with changes in monetary policy relatively manageable.
In your role as Bundesbank President, how do you view the economic situation in Germany at present. Is it being talked down?
We are navigating an economic situation characterised by strong headwinds. Recent business communications make it clear that certain sectors are under pressure and need to take countermeasures. But I am very much against talking the situation down, because that stimulates exactly those developments that are being lamented.
What do you mean by headwinds?
As a large export economy, Germany is particularly hard hit by the geoeconomic changes happening at the moment. Let me give an example: we export especially large amounts to China, meaning that any slowdown in the economy there impacts us particularly hard. The uncertainty that we are seeing among consumers and firms is a factor as well. As a result, investment in machinery, equipment and vehicles fell by 4.1 % between the first and second quarter. Overall, economic output contracted by 0.1 % in the second quarter. That should serve as a wake-up call. We need to put growth front and centre, and that means investment needs to become a more attractive option again.
So where might impetus to boost growth come from?
I think the Federal Government’s growth initiative is on the right
track: getting rid of bracket creep for taxpayers, cutting bureaucratic red tape, making improvements to depreciation on investments, but also bringing in measures to strengthen incentives to work. These are all sound steps. But, with the summer break over now, they actually need to be put into practice. Words have to be followed up with deeds. It is particularly important that politicians give a clear indication of where things are headed. If there is a dependable setting, firms will start investing more again. The debt brake could also stand to undergo moderate reform, in my view. The Bundesbank has put forward some proposals that would create a little more leeway, provided that Germany keeps to the EU’s rules on debt. But now it’s up to politicians to take action.
How concerned are you by what has happened in Thuringia and Saxony?
I find it very unsettling. Democracy, freedom, openness, including to people from other countries – these are core values. When these are being called into question, we at the Bundesbank cannot just look on dispassionately, either; we need to take a clear stand. A central bank also has a responsibility to society in this regard. And, as you know, we at the Bundesbank have just had renowned historians probe the history of central banking in Germany between 1924 and 1970. I worry when I read about calls for Germany to exit the European Union or leave the monetary union. That sort of thing jeopardises Germany’s position as a business location; it undermines European cohesion. And it’s harmful to our prosperity.
The Bundesbank itself is in the midst of profound change. The plan for the new Central Office in Frankfurt was pared back, there are to be no new high-rises, and eight out of 31 branches are set to be closed. Where do things stand – is more on the way?
Well, that’s already a fair amount that we have planned. This is about making the Bundesbank fit for the future. But it’s also about the Bundesbank’s duty to uphold cost-efficiency. Together with our staff representation committees, we have agreed to let staff work up to 60 % of their hours from home. That has allowed us to significantly downsize our construction plans for Frankfurt. In terms of office space, we can even do without new builds entirely. And we will be designing our future open-plan workspaces in a manner befitting a modern institution. We need to reduce the number of branches because of the trend decline in the use of cash. But the closures will be planned with a long lead time and carried out in a socially responsible way. And we will make sure that the cash supply throughout Germany remains fully intact at all times in future.
So what do the Bundesbank’s staff have to say when they find out they will no longer have their own office in future under these plans?
When the employees first set eyes on their new office environment, there’s bound to be plenty who say it is really great. Despite the success of working from home, it has also taught us how important it is to engage with others. This is tremendously helpful in fulfilling the Bundesbank’s tasks, and that often works better in open-plan workspaces than behind closed doors. It will of course still be possible to go into a quiet space for a while when concentrated individual work is required.
You have also announced your intention to use AI to a greater extent, for example in inflation forecasts. Have there been any successes yet in this regard?
Yes, we are already trialling quite a few things on this front, for example in the area of short-term inflation forecasting. For very complex problems, in particular – which we at the Bundesbank are often confronted with – AI delivers an initial assessment very quickly. We are also already using it to prepare for our meetings. However, for us it is important that AI remains just a tool. People continue to bear responsibility. We remain in the driving seat.
The ECB is currently reviewing its monetary policy strategy again. What would you consider to be important here?
One thing we need to do is to reflect on the past: what was good about the non-standard monetary policy measures, and what was bad? A critical look in the rear-view mirror is important in order to check our use of instruments going forward. Are we well equipped in this context? What topics will be relevant in future?
Would you also want to talk about the inflation target of 2 %?
A review of the inflation target is not on our agenda. We have fared very well with our inflation target of 2 %, also of late. I see no reason to change the target in the current situation.
There was much debate at the time – especially in Germany – about the ECB’s multi-trillion euro asset purchases. Some central bank staff even resigned over the matter. What is your view of this now, after a few years of experience and the realisation of high operating losses at the Bundesbank?
Obviously I would also rather announce profits, and indeed we did have profits over many years. Now, however, we will have to deal with a few years of losses – and we will manage. This is, incidentally, a topic that we communicated at a very early stage. After all, when monetary policymakers purchase assets on a large scale, it is clear that rising interest rates will impact the central bank balance sheet. And this is indeed what has happened. We had to raise interest rates sharply. As the largest central bank in the Eurosystem, the Bundesbank has to shoulder the greatest burden. In the current year, we could potentially see a magnitude similar to that of 2023. Since we have virtually exhausted our risk provisions, we will have to make use of loss carryforwards in the coming years. Nevertheless, an important aspect for me is that the Bundesbank will return to profitability in future. The Bundesbank’s balance sheet is sound as we have large revaluation reserves. For this reason, there is no need for anyone to worry – the Bundesbank does not need any additional capital.
And what’s your takeaway for the asset purchases? Should this instrument be abolished?
One should certainly exercise caution with regard to substantial asset purchases at the zero lower bound. When it comes to safeguarding price stability, it should remain an exceptional instrument for exceptional circumstances. I hope that such exceptional circumstances do not occur again in the foreseeable future. I at least don’t see any signs of this happening. The substantial monetary policy asset purchases were associated with numerous side effects in financial markets. In the strategy review I am calling for a clear delineation of asset purchases at the zero lower bound – we mustn’t overuse this instrument.
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MIL OSI

MIL OSI German News –

September 29, 2024
MIL-OSI Russia: A new season of paired exhibitions of “teachers and students” from the HSE School of Design is starting at the HSE ART GALLERY

MIL OSI Translation. Region: Russian Federation –

Source: State University Higher School of Economics – State University Higher School of Economics –

The first project of the new season at the HSE ART GALLERY on Pionerka will continue the cycle of paired solo exhibitions of “teachers and students” of the HSE School of Design. This time, the main characters will be the head of the profile “Modern Painting” and its graduates – Vladimir Potapov and Sasha Podgorodskaya.

The format of double solo exhibitions allows, firstly, to present a cross-section of the most significant works of young authors created during their years of study, and secondly, to compare the perspectives of students and their teachers.

The title of Vladimir Potapov’s project, “The Duration of Decay,” refers to the artist’s personal exhibition, “The Moment of Decay,” in the Art Ru Agency space in 2011. For him, this was not only his first solo project in Moscow, but also his first attempt to go beyond the classical painting convention of “canvas and oil.” The exhibition allowed him to chart a path and showed prospects for finding practical answers to the question, “Is painting alive today?”

The various stages of this journey are reflected in the exhibition at HSE ART GALLERY. The works on display belong to different series created by Potapov from 2012 to 2022. This range allows us to cover the author’s wide range of tools and radically different methods that have developed over the course of a decade.

Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

Please note; This information is raw content directly from the information source. It is accurate to what the source is stating and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

http://art.hse.ru/gallery/potavov-and-podgorodskaya?roistat_visit=1833079

EDITOR’S NOTE: This article is a translation. Apologies should the grammar and or sentence structure not be perfect.

MIL OSI Russia News –

September 29, 2024
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: G7 foreign ministers’ statement in New York, September 2024

Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

Following the G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting at the High-Level Week of the UN General Assembly, the following statement was made by Chair Antonio Tajani.

1. Introduction

In today’s meeting in New York, in the wake of the Summit of the Future, the G7 Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States and the High Representative of the European Union reiterated their commitment to upholding the rule of law, humanitarian principles and international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, and to protecting human rights and dignity for all individuals.

They re-emphasized their determination to foster collective action in order to preserve peace and stability to address global challenges, such as the climate crisis and to advance the achievement of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

In doing so, the G7 members renewed their commitment to the promotion of free societies and democratic principles, where all persons can freely exercise their rights and freedoms.

2. Summit for the Future

In the spirit of the renewed determination to strengthen the multilateral system based on the UN Charter’s principles, as reflected in the Pact for the Future adopted at the Summit of the Future by world Leaders, the G7 members committed to continue working with countries and all relevant stakeholders within the UN system through dialogue, mutual understanding and respect in the pursuit of common solutions, with the aim of upholding and reforming the multilateral system so that it better reflects today’s world and is fit to respond to the complex global challenges of the future. They reaffirmed their commitment to work with all UN member states to strengthen the roles of the UNSG as well as the UNGA. They also recommitted to the reform of the UNSC.

3. Steadfast Support to Ukraine

The G7 members reaffirmed their unwavering support to Ukraine as it defends its freedom, sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity, against Russia’s brutal and unjustifiable war of aggression. The G7 members strongly condemned Russia’s blatant breach of international law, including the UN Charter, and of the basic principles that underpin the international order. They strongly condemned the serious violations of international humanitarian law perpetrated by Russia’s forces in Ukraine, which have caused a devastating impact on the civilian population. Violence against civilians, including women, children, and prisoners of war is unacceptable.

They expressed their outrage at Russia’s repeated attacks against critical infrastructure and they condemned in the strongest possible terms any targeting of civilian buildings and even hospitals. Ensuring the protection and resilience of Ukraine’s energy grid and its power generation capacity remains a fundamental and urgent priority as winter approaches. They welcomed the international conference on energy security held on August 22. .as well as the ongoing coordination of the G7 energy group. They reiterated their commitment to help Ukraine meet its urgent short-term financing needs, as well as support its long-term recovery and reconstruction priorities.

Russia must end its war of aggression and pay for the damage it has caused to Ukraine. The G7 members reiterated their commitment to explore and use all possible lawful avenues by which Russia is made to meet those obligations.

The launch of the Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) Loans for Ukraine, as mandated by G7 leaders, will make available approximately USD 50 billion in additional funding to Ukraine that will be serviced and repaid by future flows of extraordinary revenues stemming from the immobilization of Russian sovereign assets held in the European Union and other relevant jurisdictions.

The G7 Foreign Ministers and the High Representative are working, together with Finance Ministers, to operationalize the G7 Leaders’ commitment by the end of the year. They will maintain solidarity in this commitment to providing this support to Ukraine. The G7 members confirmed that, consistent with all applicable laws and their respective legal systems, Russia’s sovereign assets in their jurisdictions will remain immobilized until Russia ends its aggression and pays for the damage it has caused to Ukraine.

They also committed to strengthening the Ukraine Donor Platform to help coordinate the disbursal of funds and ensure they align with Ukraine’s highest priority needs at a pace it can effectively absorb. This will play a key role in advancing Ukraine’s reforms in line with its European path and in contributing to a successful Ukraine Recovery Conference to be held in Italy in 2025.

Any use of nuclear weapons by Russia in the context of its war of aggression against Ukraine would be inadmissible. They therefore condemned in the strongest possible terms Russia’s irresponsible and threatening nuclear rhetoric, as well as its posture of strategic intimidation. They also expressed their deepest concern about the reported use of chemical weapons as well as riot control agents as a method of warfare by Russia in Ukraine.

The G7 members remained committed to holding those responsible accountable for atrocities in Ukraine, in line with international law. They also condemned the seizures of foreign companies and called on Russia to reverse these measures and seek acceptable solutions with the companies targeted by them.

They condemned Russia’s seizure and continued control and militarization of Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, which poses severe risks for nuclear safety and security, potentially affecting the entire international community. They reiterated their support to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s efforts directed at mitigating such risks.

They underlined once again their support for Ukraine’s right of self-defense and reiterated their commitment to Ukraine’s long-term security, recalling the launch of the Ukraine Compact in Washington on 11 July 2024. They re-affirmed the intention to increasing industrial production and delivery capabilities to assist Ukraine’s self-defense. They highlighted their support to Ukraine in its efforts to modernize its armed forces and strengthen its own defense industry. They expressed their resolve to bolster Ukraine’s air defense capabilities to save lives and protect critical infrastructure.

They remained committed to raising the costs of Russia’s war of aggression by building on the comprehensive package of sanctions and economic measures already in place. Though existing measures have had a significant impact on Russia’s war machine and ability to fund its invasion, its military is still posing a threat not just to Ukraine but also to international security.

The G7 members expressed the intention to continue taking appropriate measures, consistent with their legal systems, against actors in China and in third countries that materially support Russia’s war machine, including financial institutions, and other entities that facilitate Russia’s acquisition of items for its defense industrial base.

They expressed their intention to continue to apply significant pressure on Russian revenues from energy and other commodities. This will include improving the efficacy of the oil price cap policy by taking further steps to tighten compliance and enforcement, including against Russia’s shadow fleet, while working to maintain market stability.

They especially emphasized the urgency to support Ukraine’s energy security, including by coordinating international assistance through the G7+Ukraine Energy Coordination Group. They underscored the importance to continue working with the Ukrainian authorities and International Financial Institutions through the Ukraine Donor Platform, and by mobilizing private investments and fostering participation of civil society.

They highlighted the reality of millions of internally displaced Ukrainians and the importance of an inclusive rights-based, gender-responsive recovery, including the reintegration of veterans and civilians with disabilities, and to address the needs of women, children as well as other population groups who have been disproportionately affected by Russia’s war of aggression. They reiterated their condemnation of Russia’s unlawful deportation of Ukrainian children and welcomed coordinated efforts to secure their safe return. They called on Russia to release all persons it has unjustly detained and safely return all civilians it has illegally transferred or deported, starting with children. They welcomed the Ministerial Conference on the Human Dimension of Ukraine’s 10 point peace formula that will be hosted by Canada on October 30-31.

They reiterated the need to support Ukraine’s agriculture sector, which is critical for global food supply, particularly for the most vulnerable nations, and called for unimpeded exports of grain, foodstuffs, fertilizers and inputs from Ukraine.

They acknowledged the importance to involve the private sector in the sustainable economic recovery of Ukraine. They welcomed and underscored the significance of Ukraine itself continuing to implement domestic reform efforts, especially in the fields of anti-corruption, justice system reform, decentralization, and promotion of the rule of law. These endeavors are in line with the Euro-Atlantic path Ukraine has embraced. The G7 members were unanimous on the need to continue to support efforts of the Ukrainian government and people in these endeavors.

They resolutely condemned Russia’s holding of illegitimate ‘elections’ in the occupied Ukrainian Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol. Russia’s actions once again demonstrate its blatant disregard for Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, and the UN Charter. They called on all members of the international community to refrain from recognizing Russia’s illegitimate actions.

They welcomed the Summit on Peace in Ukraine that took place in Switzerland on June 15-16 and its focus on the key priorities needed to achieve a framework for peace based on international law, including the UN Charter and its principles, and respect for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. They remained committed to follow up on the Conference through constructive engagement with all international partners to reach a comprehensive, just and lasting peace.

The G7 members acknowledged that Russia continues to expand its campaigns of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI). They condemned Russia’s use of FIMI to support its war of aggression against Ukraine. They reiterated their determination to bolster the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism by developing a collective response framework to counter foreign threats to democracies.

4. Situation in the Middle East

The G7 members reiterated their condemnation of Hamas’ horrendous attacks on October 7, 2023. 101 hostages are still in the hands of Hamas. They noted with deep concern the trend of escalatory violence in the Middle East and its repercussions on regional stability and on the lives of civilians shattered by this conflict, from the Gaza Strip to the Israeli-Lebanese Blue Line. Actions and counter-reactions risk magnifying this dangerous spiral of violence and dragging the entire Middle East into a broader regional conflict with unimaginable consequences. They called for a stop to the current destructive cycle, while emphasizing that no country stands to gain from a further escalation in the Middle East.

They expressed their deep concern about the situation along the Blue Line. They recognized the essential stabilizing role played by the Lebanese Armed Forces and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon in mitigating that risk. They demanded the full implementation of UNSCR 1701 (2006) and urged that all relevant actors implement immediate measures towards de-escalation.

The G7 members reaffirmed their strong support for the ongoing mediation efforts undertaken by the United States, Egypt and Qatar to reach a resolution between the parties to the conflict in Gaza. They reiterated their full commitment for the implementation of the UNSC Resolution 2735 (2024) and the comprehensive deal outlined by President Biden in May that would lead to an immediate ceasefire in Gaza, the release of all hostages, a significant and sustained increase in the flow of humanitarian assistance throughout Gaza, and an enduring end to the crisis, to secure a pathway to a two-state solution with a safe Israel alongside a sovereign Palestinian state. They urged the parties to the conflict to unequivocally accept the ceasefire proposal, stressing the need for countries in a position to directly influence the parties to cooperate in strengthening mediation efforts. They called for the full implementation of the terms of the ceasefire proposal without delay and without conditions.

They called on all parties to fully comply with international law, including international humanitarian law. They expressed their deep alarm for the heavy toll this conflict has taken on civilians, deploring all losses of civilian lives equally and noting with great concern that, after nearly a year of hostilities and regional instability, it is mostly civilians, including women and children, who are paying the highest price. Protection of civilians must be an absolute priority for all parties at all times.

The G7 members expressed concern at the unprecedented level of food insecurity affecting most of the population in the Gaza Strip. Securing full, rapid, safe, and unhindered humanitarian access in all its forms and through all relevant crossing points remains an absolute priority. They urged all parties to allow the unimpeded delivery of aid and ensure protection of humanitarian workers by properly implementing de-confliction measures. They recognized the crucial role played by UN agencies and other humanitarian actors in delivering assistance especially health care for the most vulnerable persons, including the polio vaccination campaign. They expressed their support for UNRWA to effectively uphold its mandate, emphasizing the vital role that the UN Agency plays.

The G7 members reaffirmed their unwavering commitment, through reinvigorated efforts in the Middle East Peace Process, to the vision of a two-state solution where two democratic states, Israel and Palestine, live side by side in peace within secure and recognized borders, consistent with international law and relevant UN resolutions, and in this regard stress the importance of unifying the Gaza strip with the West Bank under Palestinian Authority. We note that mutual recognition, to include the recognition of a Palestinian state, at the appropriate time, would be a crucial component of that political process. They expressed their concern about the risk of weakening the Palestinian Authority and underlined the importance of maintaining economic stability in the West Bank. They welcomed the EU’s 400 million Euro emergency package for the Palestinian Authority. All parties must refrain from unilateral actions and from divisive statements that may undermine the prospect of a two-state solution, including the Israeli expansion of settlements and the “legalization” of settlement outposts. They condemned the rise in extremist settler violence committed against Palestinians, which undermines security and stability in the West Bank and threatens prospects for a lasting peace. They expressed their deep concern regarding the deteriorating security situation in the West Bank.

They reiterated their commitment to working together – and with other international partners – to closely coordinate and institutionalize their support for civil society peacebuilding efforts, ensuring that they are part of a larger strategy to build the foundation necessary for a negotiated and lasting Israeli-Palestinian peace. The G7 members called on Iran to contribute to de-escalation of tensions in the region. They demanded that Iran cease its destabilizing actions in the Middle East. They underlined that they stand ready to adopt further sanctions or take other measures in response to further destabilizing initiatives.

They reiterated their determination that Iran must never develop or acquire a nuclear weapon and that the G7 will continue working together, and with other international partners, to address Iran’s nuclear escalation. A diplomatic solution remains the best way to resolve this issue. As the IAEA remains unable to verify that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively peaceful, they urged Iran’s leadership to cease and reverse nuclear activities that have no credible civilian justification and to cooperate with the IAEA without further delay to fully implement their legally binding safeguards agreement and their commitments under UNSCR 2231(2015).

They condemned in the strongest possible terms Iran’s export and Russia’s procurement of Iranian ballistic missiles. Evidence that Iran has continued to transfer weaponry to Russia despite repeated international calls to stop represents a further escalation of Iran’s military support to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Russia has used Iranian weaponry such as UAVs to kill Ukrainian civilians and strike their critical infrastructure.

They reiterated that Iran must immediately cease all support to Russia’s illegal and unjustifiable war against Ukraine and halt such transfers of ballistic missiles, UAVs and related technology, which constitute a direct threat to the Ukrainian people as well as European and international security more broadly.

They reaffirmed their steadfast commitment to hold Iran to account for its unacceptable support for Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine that further undermines global security. In line with their previous statements on the matter, they underscored that they are already responding with new and significant measures.

They also reiterated their deep concern about Iran’s human rights violations, especially against women and minority groups. They reiterated their call on Iran to allow access to the country to relevant UN Human Rights Council Special Procedures mandate holders.

De-escalation efforts in the region must also include the immediate and unconditional termination of any attack by the Houthis against international and commercial vessels transiting the Gulf of Aden, the Bab al-Mandeb Strait and the Red Sea. The G7 members reiterated their strong condemnation of these attacks and the right of countries to defend their vessels from attacks. They called for the immediate release by the Houthis of the Galaxy Leader and its crew. They expressed their strong concern about the August 21 attack on the merchant vessel Sounion and the ongoing risk of an environmental catastrophe as salvage operations continue. They welcomed the efforts by the EU maritime operation Aspides and by the US-led Operation Prosperity Guardian to protect vital sea lanes. They appreciated the efforts of those countries that are committed to protect freedom of navigation and trade, as well as maritime security, in line with UNSCR 2722 (2024) and in accordance with international law.

5. Fostering partnerships with African Countries

The G7 members reaffirmed their commitment to support African nations in the pursuit of sustainable development as well as the creation of jobs and growth. The focus remains on fostering fair partnerships, built on shared principles, democratic values, local leadership, and practical initiatives.

They reiterated their intention to align actions with the African Union’s Agenda 2063 and the specific needs of African countries, including plans to improve local and regional food security, infrastructure, trade, and agricultural productivity. They expressed their support for the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area, a crucial factor for Africa’s growth in the next decade.

The G7 members emphasized the need to strengthen mutually beneficial cooperation with African countries and regional organizations. In addition to maintaining financial support for African nations, they expressed their determination to improve the coordination and effectiveness of G7 resources, mobilizing domestic resources and encouraging increased private investments.

They welcomed the African Union’s permanent membership in the G20, and the creation of an additional Chair for Sub-Saharan Africa on the IMF Executive Board in November.

They reaffirmed their commitment to the G20 Compact with Africa, a tool aimed at enhancing private investment, driving structural reforms, supporting local entrepreneurship, and fostering cooperation, particularly in the energy sector. The G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), and initiatives like the EU’s Global Gateway can contribute to promote sustainable, resilient, and economically viable infrastructure in Africa, ensuring transparency in project selection, procurement, and financing. In this framework, they welcomed Italy’s Mattei Plan for Africa.

They recognized that sustainable development, peace and security and democracy go hand in hand, reaffirming their commitment to help African governments in strengthening democratic governance and respect for human rights, while addressing conditions conducive to terrorism, violent extremism, and instability.

They expressed their deep concern about the destabilizing activities of the Kremlin-backed Wagner Group and other Russia-supported entities. They called for accountability for all those responsible for human rights violations and abuses.

6. Indo-Pacific

The G7 members reiterated their commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific, based on the rule of law, which is inclusive, prosperous and secure, grounded on sovereignty, territorial integrity, peaceful resolution of disputes, fundamental freedoms and human rights. They reaffirmed the importance of working together with regional partners and organizations, notably the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). They reaffirmed their thorough support for ASEAN centrality and unity. They reaffirmed their intention to work to support Pacific Island Countries’ priorities, as articulated through the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent.

As they seek constructive and stable relations with China, they recognized the importance of direct and candid engagement to express concerns and manage differences. They reaffirmed their readiness to cooperate with China to address global challenges. They expressed their deep concern at the China’s support to Russia. They called on China to step up efforts to promote international peace and security, and to press Russia to stop its military aggression and immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw its troops from Ukraine. They encouraged China to support a comprehensive, just and lasting peace based on territorial integrity and the principles and purposes of the UN Charter, including through its direct dialogue with Ukraine. They also expressed their deep concern at China’s ongoing support for Russia’s defense industrial base, which is enabling Russia to maintain its illegal war in Ukraine and has significant and broad-based security implications. They called on China to cease the transfer of dual-use materials, including weapons components and equipment, that are inputs for Russia’s defense sector.

They recognized the importance of China in global trade. However, they expressed their concerns about China’s persistent industrial targeting and comprehensive non-market policies and practices that are leading to global spillovers, market distortions and harmful overcapacity in a growing range of sectors, undermining our workers, industries and economic resilience and security, as well as impacting on currencies. The G7 members are not decoupling or turning inwards. They are de-risking and diversifying supply chains where necessary and appropriate and fostering resilience to economic coercion. They called on China to refrain from adopting export control measures, particularly on critical minerals, that could lead to significant supply chain disruptions. Together with partners, the G7 members will invest in building their respective industrial capacities, promote diversified and resilient supply chains, and reduce critical dependencies and vulnerabilities.

They remained seriously concerned about the situation in the East and South China Seas and reiterated their strong opposition to any unilateral attempt to change the status quo by force or coercion. They reaffirmed that there is no legal basis for China’s expansive maritime claims in the South China Sea, and they reiterated their opposition to China’s militarization and coercive and intimidation activities in the South China Sea. They re-emphasized the universal and unified character of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and reaffirmed UNCLOS’s important role in setting out the legal framework that governs all activities in the oceans and the seas. They reiterated that the award rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal on 12 July 2016 is a significant milestone, which is legally binding upon the parties to those proceedings and a useful basis for peacefully resolving disputes between the parties. They reiterated their strong opposition to China’s dangerous use of coast guard and maritime militia in the South China Sea and its repeated obstruction of countries’ high seas freedom of navigation. They expressed deep concern about the dangerous and obstructive maneuvers, including water cannons and ramming, by the China Coast Guard and maritime militia against Philippines vessels.

The G7 members reaffirmed that maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait is indispensable to international security and prosperity, and called for the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues. There is no change in the basic position of the G7 members on Taiwan, including stated One-China policies. They supported Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations as a member where statehood is not a prerequisite and as an observer or guest where it is.

They remained concerned by the human rights situation in China, including in Xinjiang and Tibet. They are also worried about the crackdown on Hong Kong’s autonomy and independent institutions, and ongoing erosion of rights and freedoms. They urged China and the Hong Kong authorities to act in accordance with their international commitments and applicable legal obligations.

The G7 members strongly condemned North Korea’s continuing expansion of its unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile programs in violation of multiple UNSC resolutions and its continuous destabilizing activities. They reiterated their call for the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and demanded that North Korea abandons all its nuclear weapons, existing nuclear programs, and any other WMD and ballistic missile programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, in accordance with all relevant UNSC resolutions. They called on North Korea to return to dialogue to promote peace and stability in the Korean peninsula. They urged all UN Member States to fully implement all relevant UN Security Council resolutions. They reiterated their deep disappointment with Russia’s veto last March on the mandate renewal of the UNSC 1718 Committee Panel of Experts.

They condemned in the strongest possible terms the increasing military cooperation between North Korea and Russia, including North Korea’s export and Russia’s procurement of North Korean ballistic missiles and munitions in direct violation of relevant UNSCRs, as well as Russia’s use of these missiles and munitions against Ukraine. They are also deeply concerned about the potential for any transfer of nuclear or ballistic missiles-related technology to North Korea, in violation of the relevant UNSCRs. They urged Russia and North Korea to immediately cease all such activities and abide by relevant UNSCRs. They urged North Korea to respect human rights, facilitate access for international humanitarian organizations, and resolve the abductions issue immediately.

They called on China not to conduct or condone activities aimed at undermining the security and safety of our communities and the integrity of our democratic institutions, and to act in strict accordance with its obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.

7. Regional Issues

Venezuela

The G7 members reiterated their deep concern about the situation in Venezuela, following the vote on July 28.

They emphasized that the announced victory of Maduro lacks credibility and democratic legitimacy, as indicated by reports of the UN Panel of Experts and independent international observers as well as data published by the opposition. They underscored that it is essential for electoral results to be complete and independently verified to ensure respect for the will of the Venezuelan people.

They expressed their outrage for the arrest warrant and constant threats to the security of Edmundo Gonzalez Urrutia, who decided to seek refuge in Spain. According to the above-mentioned independent reports, Edmundo Gonzalez Urrutia appears to have won the most votes.

They urged Venezuelan representatives to cease all human rights violations and abuses, arbitrary detentions and widespread restrictions on fundamental freedoms, particularly affecting the political opposition, human rights defenders, and representatives of independent media and civil society. They called for the release of all political prisoners and for a path to freedom and democracy for the people of Venezuela.

They urged the international community to keep Venezuela high on the diplomatic agenda and they expressed their support for efforts by regional partners to facilitate the Venezuelan-led democratic and peaceful transition that the people of Venezuela have clearly chosen in the polls.

Haiti

The G7 members expressed their determination to continue supporting Haitian institutions – including the Transitional Presidential Council (CPT) and the Government of Prime Minister Conille – in their commitment to create the necessary conditions of general security and stability for the convening, by February 2026, of free and fair elections. The expression of popular will would set the foundation for the full restoration of democracy and the rule of law in Haiti.

They also expressed full support to the Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission, which is providing critical support to the Haitian National Police as they counter criminal gangs engaged in illicit trafficking and inflicting brutal violence upon the population.

The G7 members emphasized the importance of continued support to the MSS mission through financial contributions to the UN Trust Fund as well as contributions in kind. They expressed their strong appreciation for the commitment of the Government of Kenya – which has already deployed 380 personnel on the ground – to support the Haitian National Police in restoring peace and security.

They called on all countries that have committed to deploy their contingents to the MSS mission to do so as soon as possible, to consolidate the mission and its fundamental role in the Country. They called on Haiti’s partners to continue their humanitarian assistance to the Haitian people and to expedite their financial and in-kind contributions to the MSS mission to help ensure that the mission is resourced for success.

They called also on the United Nations Security Council to consider a UN Peace Operation to maintain the security gains of the Haiti National Police and the MSS mission for holding free and fair elections and called on the Secretary-General accordingly to provide support.

The G7 members welcomed the work of the G7 Working Group on Haiti in monitoring institutional, political, social and security developments in Haiti, with a view to supporting the stabilization of the country and the restoration of full democratic governance.

Libya

The G7 members reiterated their unwavering commitment to Libyan stability, sovereignty, independence and unity. They expressed deep concern about recent developments in the country, in particular those involving the leadership of the Central Bank of Libya and the High Council of State, which show the fragility and unsustainability of the present status quo. They urged relevant Libyan parties to rapidly reach the necessary compromises to begin to restore the institutional integrity of the Central Bank of Libya and its standing with the international financial community. They called on Libyan political actors to refrain from taking harmful unilateral actions that create further political tension and fragmentation and make the country vulnerable to harmful foreign interference.

They noted advances made in the organization of local elections and they called for a free, fair and inclusive participation of all Libyans. It is now imperative to relaunch a Libyan-led and Libyan-owned political process facilitated by the UN towards free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections.

They expressed their support and commended the efforts made by UNSMIL officer in charge Stephanie Koury in support of the stabilization of Libya. They called on the Secretary General to appoint a new Special Representative without delay.

Sudan

The G7 members reiterated their grave concern over the ongoing fighting, mass-displacement and famine in Sudan.

They condemned the serious human rights violations and abuses against the civilian population, including widespread sexual and gender-based violence, as well as international humanitarian law violations by both sides to the conflict. They called for an immediate end to the escalating violence, which is creating further displacement, and urged the warring parties to ensure the protection of civilians. They reiterated their commitment to holding accountable all those responsible for violations of international law in Sudan.

They condemned the emergence of famine in Sudan as a direct consequence of efforts to restrict access of humanitarian actors. They noted recent progress in relation to the re-opening of the Chad-Sudan Adre border crossing, in the wake of the Paris Conference and of the Geneva talks. They called for full, rapid, safe, and unhindered humanitarian access both into Sudan and across lines of conflict so aid can reach all those in need.

They urged all parties to cease hostilities immediately and to engage in serious negotiations aimed at achieving a lasting ceasefire, humanitarian access and protection of civilians without pre-conditions.

They called on external actors to refrain from fueling the conflict, to respect the UN arms embargo on Darfur, and to play a responsible role in resolving the crisis.

They welcomed mediation efforts by regional and international actors and organizations to facilitate a durable peace for the country.

Inclusive, national dialogue, aimed at restoring democracy, re-establishing and strengthening the civilian and representative institutions after the end of the conflict, is a prerequisite for lasting peace. The G7 Members emphasized that it is necessary for representatives of Sudanese civil society, including women, to be fully engaged in the reflection on the political future of the country.

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Published 24 September 2024

MIL OSI United Kingdom –

September 29, 2024
MIL-OSI USA News: FACT SHEET: Biden-⁠ Harris Administration Accomplishments at the United Nations

Source: The White House

Since his first day in office, President Biden has been committed to restoring American leadership at the United Nations. Our world today faces many challenges that no one country can or should confront alone. But when the United States shows up and leads at the UN, we can rally global action to tackle problems that affect us all. That is why the Biden-Harris Administration has worked tirelessly at the UN to advance American values, safeguard human rights for all, and address conflict and instability. Alongside our allies and partners from around the world, we have worked with UN agencies to tackle the climate crisis, shape our digital future, and fight poverty and disease.

At a time of increasing geopolitical challenges and growing global needs, strong and effective American leadership at the UN is more critical than ever. The Biden-Harris Administration has worked to strengthen American leverage at the United Nations, uphold the UN Charter, and keep human rights at the core of the organization. Without robust American engagement, our competitor nations would gain leverage to advance their interests and values at our expense.

The Biden-Harris Administration has also been committed to reforming and adapting the UN to the needs of the 21^st century. For example, President Biden announced a new U.S. openness to expanding the membership of the UN Security Council, including permanent seats for Africa and Latin America. The UN is not a perfect organization, but given the scale of today’s challenges, the world needs global institutions that are more inclusive and effective.

Over nearly four years, the Biden-Harris Administration’s leadership at the UN has delivered results for the American people. At the UN, we have:

Responded to Threats to International Peace and Security

After Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, we worked at the UN to build support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and hold Russia to account. We rallied 141 countries in the UN General Assembly to condemn Russia’s violations of international law. We used UN Security Council debates to shine a spotlight on Russia’s illegal war and atrocities. We pressed the UN General Assembly to kick Russia off the UN Human Rights Council. We isolated Russia by denying it senior UN appointments and preventing its election to UN bodies.

Responding to the security situation in Haiti, we partnered with Ecuador to obtain UN Security Council authorization of a new Kenyan-led Multinational Security Support mission.

Working with African partners, we secured a UN Security Council decision to create in December 2023 a new mechanism to largely fund future African Union-led Peace Support Operations from the UN-assessed budget.

Following the horrific October 7 Hamas terrorist attacks on Israel, we defended at the UN Security Council Israel’s right to defend itself and demanded the release of hostages. Also in the Security Council, we called for increased humanitarian assistance to Gaza and established a new UN mechanism to improve aid coordination. In July 2024, we secured Security Council endorsement of President Biden’s plan for a ceasefire and hostage release deal.

As the Sudan conflict worsened, we mobilized action in the UN Security Council, including the adoption of a resolution in June 2024 demanding an end to the siege of El Fasher.

Responding to concerns that Russia intended to deploy nuclear weapons in space, we and Japan proposed a UN Security Council resolution calling on countries not to develop such weapons.

In 2022, we partnered with Ireland at the UN Security Council to reform, expand and strengthen humanitarian exemptions for UN sanctions.

Working with the United Kingdom, we secured adoption of the first-ever UN Security Council resolution condemning the February 2021 military coup in Burma.

Protected and Upheld Universal Human Rights

We rejoined the UN Human Rights Council in 2021, enabling the United States to once again lead multilateral efforts to hold accountable human rights violators worldwide.

We issued a standing invitation to all UN thematic human rights monitors to visit the United States and assess our human rights record at home. In contrast to authoritarian governments, this invitation showed that a confident democracy is willing to have its record scrutinized and receive advice on strengthening rights protections for its citizens.

We pressed for the release of a landmark report from the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on human rights violations against Uighurs in China.

We worked in the UN Human Rights Council to establish a new Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Russia to examine Moscow’s crackdown on dissent at home and a Commission of Inquiry on violations and abuses in Russia’s war against Ukraine.

We restored American leadership at the UN in defending the human rights of LGBTQI+ individuals around the world. This included participating in high-level meetings of the Core Group of countries advocating for LGBTQI+ rights, including a September 23 meeting where the First Lady represented the United States. We also secured the renewal of the mandate of the UN’s Independent Expert on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity and urged the UN to release its first-ever organization-wide strategy on LGBTQI+ rights, co-sponsoring the first-ever Human Rights Council resolution on the rights of intersex persons, and convening the second-ever informal UN Security Council meeting on the rights of LGBTQI+ individuals.

We spotlighted egregious human rights violations by North Korea, including by organizing the first briefing of the UN Security Council on North Korea human rights since 2017.

We helped establish mechanisms through the UN Human Rights Council to investigate human rights violations and abuses in Ethiopia, Sudan, and Nicaragua.

We worked at the UN to advance the global fight against antisemitism, including to ensure 36 countries and four multilateral organizations joined the U.S.-led Global Guidelines for Countering Antisemitism. In 2023, we convened a UN meeting on antisemitism with Second Gentleman Doug Emhoff and, in 2022, a roundtable at UNESCO.

We advanced the UN’s work to promote racial equality, including by championing the inaugural session of the Permanent Forum on People of African Descent. We co-sponsored a UN General Assembly resolution designating July 25 as International Day of Women and Girls of African Descent.

We engaged seriously with the human rights treaty body process, including through periodic reports about our domestic human rights record to the Human Rights Committee and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.

Reaffirming support for the UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, we pressed for enhanced participation of Indigenous Peoples throughout the UN system. In 2022, Ambassador (ret.) Keith Harper, the first-ever Senate confirmed U.S. ambassador from a federally-recognized tribe, was elected to the UN’s Permanent Forum on Indigenous issues.

We supported efforts in the UN General Assembly to advance discussion of a proposed convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against humanity.

After assuming the presidency of the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), we hosted the UNCAC conference in Atlanta, Georgia in 2023, with approximately 2,600 delegates, including an unprecedented 1,000 from civil society.

Advanced Gender Equity and Equality

We restored American leadership in pressing at the UN for the rights of women and girls, advancing their inclusion in societies, and supporting strong language in UN resolutions and at the Commission on the Status of Women on sexual and reproductive rights.

The January 2021 Presidential Memorandum on Protecting Women’s Health at Home and Abroad restored life-saving funding to the UN Population Fund (UNFPA).

We announced that the United States will contribute for the first time to the UNICEF–UNFPA Global Program to End Child Marriage.

Following the Iranian regime’s killing of Mahsa Amini and crackdown on protestors, we helped establish a new UN Fact-Finding Mission to investigate human rights abuses. We spearheaded efforts to remove Iran from the Commission on the Status of Women.

In 2024, we reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development Program of Action.

We launched the Global Partnership for Action on Gender-Based Online Harassment and Abuse, which included actions at the UN to address online safety for women and girls.

Shaped Our Digital Future, Promoted Labor Rights, and Tackled Synthetic Drugs

We sponsored the first-ever UN General Assembly resolution outlining principles for the responsible use of artificial intelligence (AI). This landmark resolution helped define a global consensus on safe, secure and trustworthy AI systems for advancing sustainable development.

We hosted events at the UN on misuses of new technologies, such as countries using commercial spyware to surveil dissidents and journalists.

We worked at the International Labor Organization (ILO) to empower workers worldwide and joined the ILO’s Equal Pay International Coalition to share best practices to close the gender wage gap.

At the first Summit for Democracy in 2021, we announced the Multilateral Partnership for Organizing, Worker Empowerment and Rights (M-POWER), an initiative working with governments, trade unions, labor support, civil society organizations, and philanthropy to uphold and promote workers’ trade union rights around the world.

In coordination with the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), we launched and hosted at the UN high-level meetings of the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats and secured adoption of a UN General Assembly resolution to enhance international action to fight such drugs.

Strengthened Global Health Cooperation, Advanced Sustainable Development, and Bolstered Climate Action

We redoubled efforts to support implementation of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals, launching a U.S. Strategy on Global Development to accelerate progress and mobilizing $150 billion of U.S. funding and billions more from the private sector, philanthropic, and other donor resources.

In 2021, we reversed the previous administration’s decision to withdraw from the World Health Organization (WHO), enabling the United States to shape the WHO’s work on global health and reform. With the WHO, we led the global response to the COVID-19 pandemic by launching the COVID-19 Global Action Plan and donating nearly 700 million vaccine doses to 117 countries.

We hosted the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria’s 7th Replenishment in 2022, resulting in more than 75 governments, foundations, and corporations delivering pledges totaling a record $15.67 billion.

We worked at the UN to advance universal health coverage, continue the fight against tuberculosis and mpox, and combat global antimicrobial resistance (AMR), including to push countries for commitments on AMR that are bold, aspirational, and implementable.

We focused attention at the UN on addressing global food insecurity, repeatedly using the U.S. presidency of the UN Security Council to focus on the nexus between food security and conflict. We hosted at the UN ministerial-level meetings to generate new commitments to expand agricultural capacity and respond to famine with over 100 partner countries.

U.S. Representative to the UN Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield and Secretary of the Interior Deb Haaland co-led the U.S. delegation to the 2023 UN Water Conference, where they announced more than $49 billion towards water security both at home and abroad.

In 2024, Secretary Haaland co-led the U.S. delegation to the Fourth International Conference on Small Island Developing States (SIDS4), where we announced new efforts to enhance our partnerships with SIDS.

After rejoining the Paris Agreement, we galvanized efforts at the UN to combat climate change, raising global climate ambition through countries’ enhanced national contributions, accelerated action to reduce pollution and greenhouse gas emissions, forward-leaning decisions at annual UN Climate Change Conferences, and major initiatives for ocean-climate action catalyzed by the annual Our Ocean Conference.

Former Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry and Senior Advisor for International Climate Policy John Podesta have helped lead an all-out effort, including critical agreements at the UN Climate Change Conference COPs 26 and 28 to partner with countries to accelerate climate efforts worldwide and reduce global emissions sufficiently to limit warming to 1.5° Celsius.

We advanced efforts within the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Maritime Organization, and other multilateral organizations to reduce greenhouse gas pollution from the aviation, shipping, and other sectors.

Strengthened American Presence at the United Nations

After a five-year absence, we rejoined the UN Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). This allowed us to partner with UNESCO to combat the scourge of antisemitism, support global Holocaust education, promote journalist safety, safeguard Ukrainian cultural heritage, bolster ethical uses of AI, and advance science education for girls in Africa.

We led robust campaigns resulting in the election of U.S. citizens to key UN positions, including Doreen Bogdan-Martin as Secretary-General of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), Amy Pope as Director-General of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and Sarah Cleveland as Judge on the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

We supported the appointments of highly qualified Americans to lead UN agencies, such as Ambassador Cathy Russell as Executive Director of UNICEF, Ambassador Cindy McCain as Executive Director of the World Food Program, and Ian Saunders as Secretary-General of the World Customs Organization.

Co-chairing the UN Accessibility Steering Committee, we worked to make UN headquarters in New York more accessible for all delegates, including construction of a 24/7 entrance for wheelchair users and the installation of a lift so everyone can address the General Assembly from behind the official rostrum.

###

MIL OSI USA News –

September 29, 2024
MIL-OSI Europe: Draft agenda – Tuesday, 8 October 2024 – Strasbourg

Source: European Parliament 2
18 Mobilisation of the European Union Solidarity Fund: assistance to Italy, Slovenia, Austria, Greece and France further to natural disasters occurred in 2023
Georgios Aftias – (if requested) Amendments Wednesday, 2 October 2024, 13:00 25 Strengthening Moldova’s resilience against Russian interference ahead of the upcoming presidential elections – Motion for a resolution Wednesday, 2 October 2024, 13:00 – Amendments to motions for resolutions; joint motions for resolutions Monday, 7 October 2024, 19:00 – Amendments to joint motions for resolutions Monday, 7 October 2024, 20:00 – Requests for “separate”, “split” and “roll-call” votes Tuesday, 8 October 2024, 19:00 24 The democratic backsliding and threats to political pluralism in Georgia – Motion for a resolution Wednesday, 2 October 2024, 13:00 – Amendments to motions for resolutions; joint motions for resolutions Monday, 7 October 2024, 19:00 – Amendments to joint motions for resolutions Monday, 7 October 2024, 20:00 – Requests for “separate”, “split” and “roll-call” votes Tuesday, 8 October 2024, 19:00 Separate votes – Split votes – Roll-call votes Texts put to the vote on Tuesday Friday, 4 October 2024, 12:00 Texts put to the vote on Wednesday Monday, 7 October 2024, 19:00 Texts put to the vote on Thursday Tuesday, 8 October 2024, 19:00 Motions for resolutions concerning debates on cases of breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law (Rule 150) Wednesday, 9 October 2024, 19:00

MIL OSI Europe News –

September 29, 2024
MIL-OSI: As Fentanyl Crisis Escalates, Abuse-Deterrent Formulations to Zero in on the Rising Epidemic of Opiate Abuse

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

PALM BEACH, Fla., Sept. 24, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — FN Media Group News Commentary – Abuse-deterrent transdermal technology can be used to prevent the misuse of drugs with abuse potential, such as fentanyl, by incorporating aversive agents into transdermal patches. Abuse-deterrent opioid formulations (ADFs) are designed to make it more difficult to abuse opioids by making them less attractive or rewarding, or by increasing the difficulty of manipulating them. ADFs can help reduce the risk of adverse effects associated with snorting or injecting opioids, and may also help prevent medication errors. Active companies in the industry include: Nutriband Inc. (NASDAQ: NTRB), Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. (NYSE: TEVA), Eli Lilly and Company (NYSE: LLY), Novartis AG (NYSE: NVS), Amneal Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (NASDAQ: AMRX).

Some benefits of ADFs include:

Reduced risk of abuse: ADFs can help reduce the risk of abuse, addiction, and substance use disorder.

Reduced risk of overdose: ADFs can help reduce the risk of opioid overdose and poisoning.

Reduced risk of medication errors: ADFs can help prevent medication errors, such as when a caregiver crushes an extended-release opioid to mix into applesauce.

According to OXFORD Academic: “The misuse and abuse of prescription opioids constitute a growing public health problem, which is described in detail in The Burden of the Nonmedical Use of Prescription Opioid Analgesics. Recent efforts to decrease abuse of opioids through formulation engineering have focused on creating broader impediments to abuse, such as incorporating physical barriers, combining agonists with antagonists, including components that cause aversion, and formulating opioid prodrugs, with the goal of reducing abuse by oral and intranasal, as well as, routes. Several of these newer formulations are in late-stage clinical testing and, if approved, may reach the US market later this year. The true “abuse-resistance” or “abuse-deterrence” of these products will be established only when epidemiologic data on their impact confirming such effects are available.” As reported by the U.S. Food & Drug Administration: “The FDA is encouraging the development of prescription opioids with abuse-deterrent formulations (ADFs) to help combat the opioid crisis. The agency recognizes that abuse-deterrent opioids are not abuse- or addiction-proof but are a step toward products that may help reduce abuse.”

Nutriband Inc. (NASDAQ: NTRB) RECEIVES CHINA PATENT NOTICE OF ALLOWANCE FOR ITS AVERSA™ ABUSE DETERRENT TRANSDERMAL TECHNOLOGY

Notice of Allowance received from Chinese National Intellectual Property Administration (CNIPA) for a patent application covering its Nutriband AVERSA™ abuse deterrent transdermal technology

Nutriband abuse-deterrent transdermal technology consists of a proprietary aversive agent coating that employs taste aversion to deter the oral abuse of and accidental exposure to transdermal opioid and stimulant patch products

Nutriband Inc. (NASDAQ:NTRB) (NASDAQ:NTRBW), a company engaged in the development of prescription transdermal pharmaceutical products, today announced that it has received a Notice of Allowance from the Chinese National Intellectual Property Administration (CNIPA) for patent application entitled, “Abuse and Misuse Deterrent Transdermal Systems,” which protects its AVERSA™ abuse deterrent transdermal technology.

The Aversa™ abuse deterrent technology is now covered by a broad international intellectual property portfolio with patents issued in 46 countries including the United States, Europe, Japan, Korea, Russia, Mexico, Canada, Australia, and China.

Nutriband’s AVERSA™ abuse-deterrent technology incorporates aversive agents into transdermal patches to prevent the abuse, diversion, misuse, and accidental exposure of drugs with abuse potential including opioids and stimulants. The AVERSA™ abuse-deterrent technology has the potential to improve the safety profile of transdermal drugs susceptible to abuse while making sure that these drugs remain accessible to those patients who really need them.

Nutriband abuse-deterrent transdermal technology consists of a proprietary aversive agent coating that employs taste aversion to deter the oral abuse of and accidental exposure to transdermal opioid and stimulant patch products. Preliminary studies have shown that the coating is very difficult to scrape off and the technology has a patented immediate and extended-release profile which presents an additional layer of deterrence to prevent the aversive layer from easily being washed off in an attempt to separate the drug from the aversive agents.

Nutriband is currently working with its partner Kindeva Drug Delivery, a leading global contract development and manufacturing organization focused on drug-device combination products, to develop its lead product, AVERSA™ Fentanyl, which incorporates Nutriband’s AVERSA™ abuse-deterrent transdermal technology into Kindeva’s FDA-approved transdermal fentanyl patch system.

AVERSA Fentanyl has the potential to be the world’s first abuse-deterrent opioid patch designed to deter the abuse and misuse and reduce the risk of accidental exposure of transdermal fentanyl patches. AVERSA Fentanyl has the potential to reach peak annual US sales of $80 million to $200 million. (Health Advances Aversa Fentanyl market analysis report 2022). CONTINUED… Read this full press release and more news for NTRB at: https://www.financialnewsmedia.com/news-ntrb

Other recent developments in the industry of note include:

Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. (NYSE: TEVA) announced recently that a new analysis from the European cohort of the RIM-TD open-label extension (OLE) study revealed that deutetrabenazine treatment of patients with Tardive Dyskinesia (TD) was associated with long term improvement of TD symptoms. The improvement in symptoms was sustained throughout the three-year study, and deutetrabenazine was well tolerated. The data were presented at the European College of Neuropsychopharmacology (ECNP) annual congress in Milan.

TD is a stigmatising and debilitating involuntary movement disorder characterised by repetitive movements of the tongue, lower face, jaw, and limbs, which develops in around 15%-25% of patients receiving antipsychotic medications for conditions such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and major depressive disorder.

As part of the Lilly 30×30 pipeline efforts, Eli Lilly and Company (NYSE: LLY) is collaborating with NIDA through a Screening Agreement to explore the potential of some early-phase therapies that might be repurposed for the treatment of opioid use disorder (OUD).

OUD is the chronic use of opioids that causes clinically significant distress or impairment. More than 9.5 million people over age 12 in the U.S. alone misused opioids in the past year. Opioid and other addictive disorders disproportionately affect people with limited resources. Nearly half of non-elderly adults with OUD in the United States have low incomes and almost a quarter live in poverty. Although there are three drugs approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration for the treatment of opioid dependence, misuse of opioids remains a significant public health concern, and there is a high unmet need to develop new and effective treatments for opioid and other addictive disorders.

Sandoz Inc., a Novartis AG (NYSE: NVS) division, and Pear Therapeutics, Inc., in 2019 announced the US commercial launch of reSET-O(TM) for patients with Opioid Use Disorder (OUD). reSET-O, cleared by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in December, is immediately available.

The reSET-O prescription digital therapeutic (PDT) is a 12-week cognitive behavioral therapy intended to be used in addition to outpatient treatment. It includes transmucosal buprenorphine, a commonly used medication to treat opioid addiction, and contingency management designed to provide incentives to reinforce positive behaviors. reSET-O is available by prescription only for patients 18 years or older under the care of a clinician.

“The launch of reSET-O provides an important technology-based treatment option for patients with Opioid Use Disorder and may fundamentally change how they interact with their therapies,” said Richard Francis, CEO, Sandoz. “At Sandoz, we are proud and excited to push the frontiers of medical innovation.”

Amneal Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (NASDAQ: AMRX) earlier this year announced the availability of Over the Counter (“OTC”) Naloxone Hydrochloride (Naloxone HCI) Nasal Spray, USP, 4mg, following Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”) approval from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”). Amneal’s Naloxone HCI Nasal Spray, manufactured in the U.S., is a generic equivalent to OTC NARCAN® HCI Nasal Spray, a medication that is widely used to help treat drug overdose from opioids, including heroin, fentanyl and prescription opioid medications.

“With today’s launch, Amneal is proud to help address this public health emergency by providing naloxone nasal spray at an affordable price and without a prescription. Our business is deeply rooted in a commitment to helping others. By enhancing access to naloxone nasal spray, we hope to get this affordable emergency treatment into the hands of even more people who could potentially save countless families and communities from further heartache and loss,” said Chirag and Chintu Patel, Co-Chief Executive Officers.

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The MIL Network –

September 29, 2024
MIL-OSI Europe: Address by Jean-Noël Barrot, Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs (23.09.24)

Source: Republic of France in English
The Republic of France has issued the following statement:

President of the General Assembly,

Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations,

Heads of State and Government,

Ministers,

Ambassadors,

Colleagues,

We are gathered here today to reaffirm our commitment to an ambitious, effective and representative multilateralism to face the challenges of tomorrow. Many of you want to advance our multilateral system, a system founded on respect for the rule of law and clear principles established following the Second World War and on respect for the Charter of the United Nations, a system based on cooperation between nations, sustainable development for all and solidarity between countries.

Today, that system needs reform. For global governance must be both more representative and, collectively, more effective. Everyone needs to contribute, everyone needs to shoulder their responsibilities.

I would like to thank the Secretary-General for enabling us to move forward on this essential project for future generations, which France is supporting with strength and conviction.

This Summit of the Future, Secretary-General, should enable the achievement of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals in good time. We need to step up our efforts to address climate challenges.

True to its historical commitment within the United Nations, France has worked to ensure the Pact for the Future meets the expectations of the Member States when it comes to Security Council reform. We are advocating an expansion in both categories of members and a greater African presence, including among permanent members. In the same vein, we promote a joint initiative with Mexico to regulate the use of vetoes in the event of mass atrocities, which is already supported by 106 States from all world regions.

France has also been innovative in its proposals to reform the international financial architecture, in the spirit of the Paris Pact for Peoples and the Planet that the French President launched at the June 2023 Paris Summit.

The New Agenda for Peace should help modernize United Nations tools for international peace and security. We need to ensure that peace operations, which have evolved considerably, are suited to addressing new challenges. I would like to seize this opportunity to commend the work of the blue helmets who foster global peace and security every day. I have in mind the men and women of UNIFIL in Lebanon, including its French contingent. The Lebanese people are also in my thoughts right now: Israeli strikes have just killed hundreds of civilians, including dozens of children. These strikes, made from both sides of the Blue Line and more widely in the region, must cease immediately. France once again calls on the parties and their supporters to de-escalate and avoid a regional conflagration that would be devastating for everyone, starting with civilian populations. That is why I have called for an emergency Security Council meeting this week to discuss Lebanon.

In Lebanon and elsewhere, France will remain totally committed to resolving the major crises that shake the international order. It will take initiatives. It will continue to condemn Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine unreservedly, and to demand peace and compliance with the law. It will continue to demand the release of all hostages, respect for international humanitarian law and a ceasefire in Gaza. France considers all human lives to be equal in dignity. France will not look away from any armed conflict. It will therefore continue its initiatives to support Sudan, alongside its partners.

Deputy Secretary-General, you want us to look together towards the future. That future will be marked by great progress in digital technologies, starting with artificial intelligence. The Global Digital Compact enshrines the commitment of the international community as a whole to coordinate on these new challenges. The digital revolution must not further widen the digital gap and must serve the Sustainable Development Goals. This will be a central priority at the AI Action Summit that will be held in France on 10 and 11 February 2025.

The fight against climate change and for the protection of the environment is not an issue for the future but a challenge for the present. The climate threat is devastating. Inaction and lack of ambition are culpable. We owe our people determined, tangible, immediate and effective action. It is in this spirit that the Presidents of France and Kazakhstan and the President of the World Bank are jointly organizing the One Water Summit this year.

Thank you.

MIL OSI Europe News –

September 29, 2024
MIL-OSI USA: Congresswoman Sylvia Garcia Joins Letter Calling on President Biden to Expedite Review of LNG Projects for Ukraine and Eastern European Allies

Source: United States House of Representatives – Congresswoman Sylvia Garcia (TX-29)

Washington, D.C. – Today, Congresswoman Sylvia R. Garcia (D-TX-29) joined her colleagues in a letter to President Biden requesting that the Department of Energy (DOE) prioritize and expedite the review of projects that will supply liquified natural gas (LNG) to Ukrainian and Eastern European allies as it recommences the processing of applications for authorization to export LNG to countries where the U.S. does not have existing free trade agreements (non-FTA nations). This request was made with a focus on maintaining both U.S. national security and energy security for European allies.

“We must ensure that new exports do not impact energy prices for American consumers and businesses. However, the public interest also requires consideration of the extent to which LNG exports promote geopolitical stability and serve our national security interests. Russia’s increasingly aggressive actions towards Ukrainian infrastructure, including electricity and gas storage facilities, highlight the urgent need to assist Ukraine in recovering and rebuilding and for Ukraine to diversify and secure its energy supply,” said the Members.

The letter was led by Congresswoman Marcy Kaptur (OH-09), Co-Chair and Co-Founder of the Congressional Ukraine Caucus. Other signers include Representatives Lou Correa (CA-46), Jim Costa (CA-21), Don Davis (NC-01), Chris Deluzio (PA-17), Vicente Gonzalez (TX-15), Chrissy Houlahan (PA-06), Mary Peltola (AK-AL), Marie Gluesenkamp Perez (WA-03), Marc Veasey (TX-33), and Susan Wild (PA-07).

A full copy of the letter can be found by clicking here, or reading below:

Dear President Biden:

As members of Congress, we write to request that the Department of Energy (DOE) prioritize and expedite review of projects that will supply liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Ukrainian and Eastern European allies as it recommences the processing of applications for authorization to export LNG to countries where the US does not have existing free trade agreements (non-FTA nations). This request is made with a focus on maintaining both US national security and energy security for our European allies.

DOE performs a critical function when it reviews applications for new LNG exports to non-FTA nations for consistency with the public interest. We must ensure that new exports do not impact energy prices for American consumers and businesses. However, the public interest also requires consideration of the extent to which LNG exports promote geopolitical stability and serve our national security interests. Russia’s increasingly aggressive actions towards Ukrainian infrastructure, including electricity and gas storage facilities, highlight the urgent need to assist Ukraine in recovering and rebuilding and for Ukraine to diversify and secure its energy supply. The Administration’s recent announcement of over $800 Million towards emergency energy needs in Ukraine to help “repair energy infrastructure damaged in the war, expand power generation, encourage private sector investment and protect energy infrastructure” will be vital to helping Ukraine recover and rebuild.

Equally important will be allowing Ukraine the ability to replace its natural gas supply when its contract with Gazprom expires at the end of this year. We believe that reducing Ukraine’s dependence on Russian energy will strengthen Ukraine’s energy security and align with the broader strategic goals of diminishing Russia’s influence in the region and reducing the leverage that hostile actors like Russia have over our allies.

Any delays to providing additional supplies of LNG to Ukraine and our Eastern European allies could jeopardize European energy security and market stability in the long-term. Typical gas offtake contracts are measured in years, not months, and are underpinned by certainty. We should not send mixed signals to our allies who want to eliminate their reliance on Vladimir Putin for good. We believe that the United States must demonstrate its commitment to supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty and resilience amidst ongoing threats by prioritizing and expediting review of projects that will supply LNG to Ukraine and Eastern Europe.

Additionally, American LNG is produced with some of the strongest environmental protections globally.1 Rigorous regulations and oversight ensure that our LNG exports are reliable and adhere to high environmental standards. We believe that these environmental standards, in combination with assistance made available through Inflation Reduction Act programs, such as the GHG Reporting and the Methane Emissions Reduction Programs, will ensure industry and this Administration work to continue reducing emissions from natural gas. By prioritizing and expediting review of LNG projects that will supply LNG to vulnerable nations, we believe DOE would enable our allies to benefit from cleaner LNG sources that have been shown to reduce emissions compared to foreign supplies and coal,2 thus supporting their transition to more sustainable energy systems.

The United States has already shown a strong commitment to supporting Ukraine. Extending and expanding support to the energy sector is a natural and necessary step. We must continue to lead by example, showing that we can balance our environmental commitments with the need to provide reliable energy to our European allies. We believe that, if US LNG producers adhere to increasingly stringent environmental standards, then this balance is maintained, promoting both energy security and environmental stewardship.

In conclusion, we believe that prioritizing and expediting review of LNG projects that will supply Ukraine and Eastern Europe will support geopolitical stability and advance the national security interests of the United States. Thank you in advance for your consideration of this request.

MIL OSI USA News –

September 29, 2024
MIL-OSI Russia: Dmitry Chernyshenko: More than 550 finalists from 36 countries will take part in the final of the International Financial Security Olympiad

MIL OSI Translation. Region: Russian Federation –

Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

Dmitry Chernyshenko held a meeting of the organizing committee for the preparation and holding of the International Financial Security Olympiad

September 24, 2024

Dmitry Chernyshenko held a meeting of the organizing committee for the preparation and holding of the International Financial Security Olympiad

September 24, 2024

Dmitry Chernyshenko held a meeting of the organizing committee for the preparation and holding of the International Financial Security Olympiad

September 24, 2024

Previous news Next news

Dmitry Chernyshenko held a meeting of the organizing committee for the preparation and holding of the International Financial Security Olympiad

A meeting of the organizing committee for the preparation and holding of the International Financial Security Olympiad was held under the chairmanship of Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Chernyshenko.

The Director of the Federal Service for Financial Monitoring, Yuri Chikhanchin, also took part in it.

At the meeting, the program for the final stage of the fourth Olympiad, which will take place from September 30 to October 4 in the federal territory of Sirius, was approved, as well as the composition of the jury and the appeal committee.

In his opening remarks, Dmitry Chernyshenko noted the expansion of the geography of the participants of the International Financial Security Olympiad. This year, more than 550 finalists from 36 countries will come to the final in the hospitable federal territory of Sirius.

“Despite the current international situation, we have managed not only to maintain, but also to expand the level of organization and holding of the Olympiad. This year, more than 550 children from 36 countries will come to Sirius; last year, there were 19 countries. I consider it important that the Olympiad participants will not only win, but also receive opportunities to enter the country’s leading universities and employment prospects,” the Deputy Prime Minister emphasized.

He also recalled that on September 17, a founding conference was held at the site of the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation and the launch of the International Movement for Financial Security was launched, which united representatives from 36 countries.

According to Rosfinmonitoring Director Yuri Chikhanchin, schoolchildren, students, representatives of financial intelligence agencies, the business community, and the scientific and educational sphere will meet at the Sirius venues. The final stage program includes more than 40 educational events for schoolchildren and students, including meetings with future employers and career guidance events.

“The events of the final week of the Olympiad are aimed at achieving educational results, professional development of participants, creating conditions for the formation of a cultural and moral environment based on traditional civilizational values, as well as involving participants in the sports movement. As part of the educational direction, schoolchildren and students will be able not only to demonstrate their knowledge, but also to acquire new competencies in master classes, panel discussions and interactive workshops,” said the director of Rosfinmonitoring.

Deputy Minister of Science and Higher Education Dmitry Afanasyev shared details of the final stage of the Olympiad and reported on the results of the qualifying stages of the fourth Olympiad, noting that in 2024 the number of participants in the final has increased.

The program of the final stage of the fourth Olympiad includes a meeting of the Council of the International Network Institute in the field of AML/CFT, the international forum on financial security “Sirius-2024”, “Conversations on equal terms”, a phygital basketball tournament, master classes, panel discussions and a number of other events of educational, professional, cultural and sports orientation.

The meeting was also attended by Deputy Minister of Education Olga Koludarova, State Secretary – Deputy Head of Rospotrebnadzor Mikhail Orlov, Head of the educational foundation “Talent and Success” Elena Shmeleva, First Deputy Governor of Krasnodar Krai Igor Galas, General Director of ANO “National Priorities” Sofia Malyavina, representatives of the Executive Office of the Government of the Russian Federation, the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation, the Bank of Russia, the International Training and Methodological Center for Financial Monitoring (ITMCFM), PJSC Promsvyazbank and universities of the International Network Institute in the Sphere of AML/CFT.

Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

Please note; This information is raw content directly from the information source. It is accurate to what the source is stating and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

http://government.ru/nevs/52784/

EDITOR’S NOTE: This article is a translation. Apologies should the grammar and or sentence structure not be perfect.

MIL OSI Russia News –

September 29, 2024

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Botswana: Selected Economic and Social Indicators, 2020-2029¹
	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029
					Projection

(Annual percent change, unless otherwise indicated)
National Income and Prices
Real GDP	-8.7	11.9	5.5	2.7	1.0	5.2	4.8	4.0	4.0	4.0
Nonmineral	-3.5	7.9	4.9	2.6	5.1	4.1	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.5
GDP per capita (US dollars)	5,863	7,244	7,726	7,250	7,341	8,003	8,602	9,146	9,726	10,437
GNI per capita (US dollars)²	5,872	7,174	7,220	6,963	7,150	7,733	8,290	8,798	9,344	10,027
Consumer prices (average)	1.9	6.7	12.2	5.1	3.8	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5
Diamond production (millions of carats)	16.9	22.7	24.5	25.1	21.1	23.3	25.0	25.5	26.0	26.4

Money and Banking
Monetary Base	-3.8	-8.8	-5.3	33.1	8.7	9.7	9.3	9.2	9.3	9.3
Broad money (M2)	5.9	5.0	6.8	9.3	8.7	9.7	9.3	9.2	9.3	9.3
Credit to the private sector	5.3	5.4	4.7	5.6	8.5	11.0	11.0	11.0	11.0	11.0

(Percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)
Investment and Savings
Gross investment (including change in inventories)	32.8	27.4	25.0	30.3	35.4	34.1	35.0	35.5	36.7	37.5
Public	6.5	5.5	5.4	7.1	8.4	7.0	6.2	6.0	5.5	5.2
Private	26.3	21.9	19.6	23.2	26.9	27.1	28.8	29.5	31.2	32.3
Gross savings	26.6	28.1	24.9	29.9	33.4	35.6	36.2	36.8	37.3	37.7
Public	-4.3	0.7	4.0	3.0	2.4	4.2	5.4	6.1	5.9	5.5
Private	30.8	27.5	20.8	26.9	31.0	31.4	30.9	30.7	31.4	32.2

Central Government Finances³
Total revenue and grants	25.6	29.0	29.1	28.4	28.2	28.8	28.6	28.8	27.6	26.7
SACU receipts	9.1	6.5	5.5	9.1	9.6	7.0	6.4	6.6	6.3	5.9
Mineral revenue	5.3	10.6	13.3	7.4	5.8	9.5	9.9	9.8	8.9	8.4
Total expenditure and net lending	36.5	31.4	29.1	33.1	34.2	30.6	29.1	28.3	27.1	26.2
Overall balance (deficit –)	-10.9	-2.4	0.0	-4.7	-6.0	-1.7	-0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Non-mineral non-SACU balance⁴	-25.3	-19.5	-18.8	-21.3	-21.3	-18.2	-16.7	-15.9	-14.7	-13.8
Net Debt	15.3	12.8	12.6	16.9	22.2	21.6	20.2	18.2	16.2	14.6
Total central government debt⁵	18.7	18.7	18.1	20.1	22.6	22.1	20.7	20.1	20.0	20.0
Government deposits with the BoB⁶	3.4	5.9	5.5	3.3	0.4	0.4	0.6	1.9	3.8	5.5

External Sector
Trade balance	-13.2	-3.5	2.7	-2.4	-6.9	-0.9	0.2	0.3	0.0	0.0
Current account balance	-10.3	-1.7	-1.2	-0.6	-2.0	1.5	1.2	1.2	0.6	0.2
Overall Balance	-11.7	-1.4	1.8	0.6	-0.9	1.3	1.3	1.5	0.9	0.5
Nominal effective exchange rate (2018=100)⁷	94.0	94.1	90.8	86.4	–	–	–	–	–	–
Real effective exchange rate (2018=100)⁷	94.4	97.7	99.1	94.7	–	–	–	–	–	–
Terms of trade (2005=100)	140.5	178.9	161.3	152.7	125.9	162.2	171.4	176.6	181.6	186.6
External central government debt⁵	7.8	8.4	7.5	8.9	8.3	6.7	5.6	4.8	3.9	3.5
Gross official reserves (end of period, millions of USD)	4,944	4,806	4,281	4,757	4,587	4,879	5,198	5,600	5,852	6,014
Months of imports of goods and services⁸	6.4	6.6	7.1	7.3	6.3	6.0	5.8	5.6	5.4	5.1
Months of non-diamond imports⁸	9.3	8.7	8.2	8.8	7.9	7.8	7.6	7.5	7.2	7.1
Percent of GDP	31.2	27.1	21.8	24.2	23.3	22.3	21.5	21.7	20.8	19.6

Sources: Botswana authorities and IMF staff estimates and projections.
¹ This table is based on calendar years unless otherwise indicated.
² Based on Atlas method from the World Bank.
³ Fiscal variables are based on fiscal years (starting on April 1).
⁴ The non-mineral non-SACU balance is computed as the difference between non-mineral non-SACU revenue and total expenditure.
⁵Excludes guarantees. Debt data measured at end of fiscal year.
⁶Government deposits with the BoB include Government Investment Account as well as other accounts. Deposits data measured at end of fiscal year.
⁷ For 2020-2023, both effective exchange rates are from IMF INS database.
⁸ Based on imports of goods and services for the following year.

Lesotho: Selected Economic Indicators, 2020/21–2029/30¹
	2020/21	2021/22	2022/23	2023/24	2024/25	2025/26	2026/27	2027/28	2028/29	2029/30
	Act.	Act.	Act.	Est.	Projections
	(12-month percent change, unless otherwise indicated)
National Account and Prices
GDP at constant prices (including LHWP-II)	-5.3	1.7	1.6	2.2	2.7	2.4	1.9	2.1	2.1	2.1
GDP at constant prices (excluding LHWP-II)	-3.0	4.4	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.9	1.9	2.0
GDP at market prices (Maloti billions)	34.2	36.0	38.5	41.5	45.2	48.8	52.4	56.1	60.0	64.4
GDP at market prices (US$ billions)	2.1	2.4	2.3	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.7	2.8	2.9
Consumer prices (average)	5.4	6.5	8.2	6.5	6.7	5.8	5.6	5.3	5.1	5.1
Consumer prices (eop)	6.5	7.2	6.8	7.4	6.0	5.5	5.4	5.3	5.0	5.0
GDP deflator	5.2	3.5	5.3	5.4	6.0	5.4	5.3	4.9	4.9	5.1
External Sector
Terms of trade (“–” = deterioration)	3.5	-1.6	-3.2	-5.9	-2.7	0.6	0.1	-0.6	0.1	0.1
Average exchange rate
(Local currency per US$)	16.4	14.9	17.0	…	…	…	…	…	…	…
Nominal effective exchange rate change (– depreciation)²	-8.7	6.3	-3.0	…	…	…	…	…	…	…
Real effective exchange rate (– depreciation)²	-6.0	8.7	-1.9	…	…	…	…	…	…	…
Current account balance (percent of GDP)	-5.7	-9.0	-13.8	-0.2	-0.7	-2.3	-2.3	-3.2	-2.9	-2.5
(excluding LHWP-II imports, percent of GDP)	-2.3	-6.5	-9.6	6.4	3.6	1.7	0.1	-1.5	-1.9	-1.6
Gross international reserves
(Months of imports)	4.1	4.3	4.0	4.3	4.9	5.7	6.2	6.3	6.4	6.5
(excluding imports for LHWP-II, months of imports)	4.2	4.5	4.3	4.5	5.0	5.9	6.3	6.4	6.4	6.5
Money and Credit
Net international reserves
(US$ millions)	718	846	671	755	916	1,121	1,258	1,343	1,417	1,513
(Percent of M1 Plus)	109	127	111	114	137	163	179	185	190	197
(US$ millions, CBL calculation)	777	843	698	755	843	…	…	…	…	…
(Percent of M1 Plus, CBL calculation)	118	127	116	114	126	…	…	…	…	…
Domestic credit to the private sector	-3.0	6.7	8.7	12.5	9.0	8.1	8.0	8.3	7.4	7.7
Reserve money	16.5	1.0	24.5	24.0	1.9	1.2	1.6	1.6	2.1	2.3
Broad money	12.2	0.0	8.7	15.2	3.9	5.0	5.1	5.4	5.1	5.4
Interest rate (percent)³	3.8	3.5	3.5	4.7	…	…	…	…	…	…
	(Percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)
Public Debt	54.7	58.4	64.5	61.5	59.9	59.7	59.8	59.8	59.5	59.5
External public debt	42.9	42.3	47.2	47.8	46.6	46.4	46.2	46.2	46.0	46.0
Domestic public debt	11.7	16.1	17.3	13.7	13.3	13.3	13.5	13.5	13.5	13.5
Central Government Fiscal Operations
Revenue	54.4	48.8	44.6	56.5	63.4	61.1	57.8	55.6	55.6	54.8
Domestic revenue (excluding SACU transfers and grants)	25.1	27.2	27.6	29.3	31.0	36.6	34.9	33.7	33.7	33.7
SACU transfers	26.2	16.7	14.0	24.5	25.6	19.3	18.5	17.5	17.5	17.5
Grants	3.1	4.9	3.0	2.8	6.9	5.2	4.3	4.3	4.3	3.6
Recurrent expenditure	43.0	38.6	40.5	40.8	42.0	40.9	40.9	40.8	40.8	40.8
Of which: wages, including social contributions	17.6	17.0	18.0	17.1	16.8	16.7	16.6	16.4	16.4	16.4
Capital expenditure	11.4	15.5	9.6	9.6	16.3	14.3	13.9	14.0	14.1	13.5
Additional fiscal measures	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Overall balance	0.0	-5.4	-5.5	6.1	5.1	5.8	3.0	0.8	0.6	0.5
(excluding SACU transfers and grants)	-29.3	-27.0	-22.5	-21.1	-27.3	-18.6	-19.8	-21.1	-21.3	-20.6
Operating balance	0.0	-5.4	-5.5	6.1	5.1	5.8	3.0	0.8	0.6	0.5
Primary balance	1.6	-4.0	-3.6	8.1	6.7	7.5	4.8	2.7	2.6	2.6
(excluding SACU transfers and grants)	-27.7	-25.6	-20.6	-19.2	-25.7	-17.0	-18.0	-19.2	-19.3	-18.6
Statistical discrepancy	-0.6	0.6	2.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Sources: Lesotho authorities, World Bank, and IMF staff calculations.
¹ The fiscal year runs from April 1 to March 31.
² IMF Information Notice System trade-weighted; end of period.
³ 12-month time deposits rate.

Table 1. Curaçao: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 2020–25
(Percent of GDP unless otherwise indicated)

	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
	Prel.	Prel.	Prel.	Prel.	Proj.

Real Economy
Real GDP (percent change)	-18.0	4.2	7.9	4.2	4.5	3.5
CPI (12-month average, percent change)	2.2	3.8	7.4	3.5	3.2	2.4
CPI (end of period, percent change)	2.2	4.8	8.4	3.1	3.2	2.4
GDP deflator (percent change)	2.2	3.8	4.0	3.5	3.2	2.4
Unemployment rate (percent) 1/	13.1	13.5	7.2	7.0	6.9	6.6

Central Government Finances 2/
Net operating (current) balance	-15.0	-10.6	0.7	0.6	0.0	0.5
Primary balance	-13.2	-8.8	2.0	2.5	2.0	1.9
Overall balance	-14.5	-10.0	1.0	1.3	0.1	0.5
Central government debt 3/	87.1	90.3	81.6	70.8	65.4	61.1
General Government Finances 2, 4/
Overall balance	-15.7	-10.4	0.3	0.9	-0.3	-0.1

Balance of Payments
Current account	-27.2	-18.6	-26.8	-19.7	-17.9	-16.5
Goods trade balance	-37.0	-41.6	-47.9	-38.3	-40.4	-39.9
Exports of goods	10.7	12.5	18.0	16.9	16.5	16.2
Imports of goods	47.7	54.1	65.9	55.2	56.9	56.1
Service balance	9.6	21.7	20.5	18.4	22.6	23.7
Exports of services	29.3	37.2	48.6	46.6	50.3	51.3
Imports of services	19.7	15.6	28.1	28.2	27.7	27.6
External debt	197.3	194.8	180.9	177.1	169.1	164.0

Memorandum Items
Nominal GDP (millions of U.S. dollars)	2,534	2,740	3,075	3,318	3,578	3,789
Per capita GDP (U.S. dollars)	16,492	18,135	20,648	22,160	23,775	25,065
Credit to non-government sectors (percent change)	0.1	-9.7	3.2	2.5	…	…

Sources: The Curaçao authorities and IMF staff estimates and projections.
1/ Staff understands that the unemployment rate of 7.0 percent published in the 2023 Census data is not comparable to the historically published unemployment rates from the labor force survey by the Curacao Bureau of Statistics. As such, staff estimated the unemployment rate and overall labor force for the period of 2012 to 2022. Staff understands that the Curacao Bureau of Statistics intends to revise the historical series in the near future.
2/ Defined as balance sheet liabilities of the central government except equities. Includes central government liabilities to the social security funds.
3/ Budgetary central government consolidated with the social security fund (SVB).
4/ The latest available datapoint is as of 2018. Values for 2019-2023 are IMF staff estimates based on BOP flow data.

Table 2. Sint Maarten: Selected Economic Indicators 2020–25
(Percent of GDP unless otherwise indicated)

	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
	Est.	Est.	Est.	Est.	Proj.
Real Economy
Real GDP (percent change) 1/	-20.4	7.1	13.9	3.5	2.7	3.0
CPI (12-month average, percent change)	0.7	2.8	3.6	2.1	2.5	2.3
Unemployment rate (percent) 2/	16.9	10.8	9.9	8.6	8.5	8.2

Government Finances
Primary balance excl. Trust Fund operations 3/	-8.7	-5.4	-0.6	1.5	0.9	0.9
Current balance (Authorities’ definition) 4/	-9.6	-6.3	-1.5	0.5	-0.1	0.0
Overall balance excl. TF operations	-9.3	-5.9	-1.1	1.0	0.2	0.2
Central government debt 5/	56.1	55.3	49.3	49.0	46.2	44.1

Balance of Payments
Current account	-25.5	-24.6	-3.9	-7.5	-7.8	-3.0
Goods trade balance	-40.7	-49.8	-59.2	-59.3	-62.4	-60.5
Exports of goods	11.8	11.4	14.1	14.8	13.1	11.2
Imports of goods	52.4	61.2	73.2	74.1	75.5	71.7
Service balance	20.2	33.1	62.8	60.3	62.6	65.2
Exports of services	34.4	51.0	78.7	81.4	81.5	83.9
Imports of services	14.3	17.9	15.9	21.1	18.9	18.7
External debt 6/	274.3	253.7	213.6	206.3	200.8	194.0

Memorandum Items
Nominal GDP (millions of U.S. dollars)	1,141	1,268	1,479	1,563	1,645	1,733
Per capita GDP (U.S. dollars)	26,796	29,646	34,437	36,088	37,570	39,160
Credit to non-gov. sectors (percent change)	2.4	1.3	4.5	1.0	…	…


Sources:
1/ Central Bank of Curacao and Sint Maarten and IMF staff estimates.
2/ The size of the 2022 labor force reported by the 2023 Census was adjusted to ensure consistency with the reported total population.
3/ Excludes Trust Fund (TF) grants and TF-financed special projects.
4/ Revenue excl. grants minus interest income, current expenditure and depreciation of fixed assets.
5/ The stock of debt in 2018 is based on financial statements. Values in subsequent years are staff’s estimates and are higher than the values under authorities’ definition in quarterly fiscal reports.
6/ The latest available datapoint is as of 2018. Values for 2019-2022 are IMF staff estimates based on BOP flow data.

2018/19	2019/20	2020/21		2021/22		2022/23		2023/24		2024/25		2025/26		2026/27		2027/28		2028/29
	Act.	Act.	Act.		Act.		Projections

	(In percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)
*National Accounts*
Nominal GDP (in millions of ngultrums) 1/	184,660	187,378	193,386		216,239		237,322		261,026		292,837		325,812		357,677		393,607		438,906
Real GDP growth (percent change) 1/	4.6	-2.5	-3.3		4.8		5.0		5.2		7.2		6.4		5.2		5.6		7.2

*Prices*
Consumer prices (EoP; percent change)	2.8	4.5	7.4		6.5		3.9		4.8		4.7		4.4		4.0		4.0		4.0
Consumer prices (avg; percent change)	2.8	3.0	8.2		5.9		4.6		4.6		4.7		4.5		4.2		4.0		4.0
GDP deflator (percent change)	2.2	4.0	6.7		6.7		4.5		4.6		4.6		4.6		4.4		4.2		4.1

General Government Accounts
Total revenue and grants	22.8	29.1	30.9		25.1		24.2		24.2		28.1		31.5		30.1		28.2		27.3
Domestic revenue	18.8	19.3	18.5		18.1		18.9		20.3		19.3		20.7		20.7		20.8		22.4
Tax revenue	14.7	12.2	10.7		12.0		13.3		13.4		14.0		14.4		14.8		14.8		15.2
Non-tax revenue	4.1	7.2	7.9		6.1		5.6		6.9		5.4		6.3		5.9		6.0		7.3
Foreign grants	5.5	8.5	7.5		6.2		6.0		3.9		8.8		10.8		9.4		7.4		4.9
Internal and other receipts	-1.6	1.3	4.9		0.9		-0.7		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0
Total expenditure 2/	24.2	30.9	36.6		32.1		29.0		28.8		32.5		34.2		33.4		32.1		32.2
Current expenditure	15.0	19.0	22.5		15.9		14.9		17.1		17.0		17.8		18.7		18.8		19.4
Capital expenditure	8.8	11.8	14.3		16.1		14.2		11.8		15.5		16.4		14.8		13.3		12.8
Primary expenditure 2/	23.4	30.5	35.7		30.6		27.3		27.2		30.5		31.4		29.9		28.3		27.7
Primary balance	-0.6	-1.4	-4.8		-5.5		-3.1		-3.0		-2.4		0.1		0.2		-0.1		-0.4
Overall balance	-1.5	-1.8	-5.8		-7.0		-4.8		-4.6		-4.4		-2.7		-3.3		-3.9		-4.8
General government debt 3/	100	115	123		117		116		114		109		123		122		119		130
Domestic	3	1	9		11		13		14		15		12		11		13		13
External	97	114	114		106		103		100		94		111		111		106		117

*Monetary Sector*
Broad money (M2) growth (percent change)	5.6	19.3	24.4		9.4		9.8		12.6		13.2		12.3		13.0		12.2		11.5
Private credit growth (percent change)	20.5	13.3	6.5		10.8		19.3		9.1		11.2		11.1		11.5		10.0		10.2

*Balance of Payments*
Current account balance	-19.2	-14.8	-11.2		-28.1		-34.4		-17.7		-32.1		-20.5		-12.5		-17.1		-14.1
Goods balance	-15.3	-12.1	-6.4		-21.1		-25.7		-12.9		-26.9		-15.0		-6.1		-10.1		-8.8
Hydropower exports	6.0	12.1	13.5		11.0		8.7		6.3		8.2		9.5		9.1		10.4		11.9
Non-hydropower exports	17.3	13.0	13.9		15.8		14.9		15.7		15.9		15.8		17.1		18.1		18.8
Imports of goods	38.6	37.1	33.9		47.9		49.2		40.2		55.6		52.4		45.6		42.1		42.2
Services balance	-1.9	-3.5	-4.4		-6.5		-6.7		-3.7		-2.8		-3.6		-3.8		-3.6		-3.0
Primary balance	-8.4	-5.7	-5.7		-5.5		-5.0		-5.6		-4.5		-4.2		-4.6		-4.9		-4.8
Secondary balance	6.5	6.6	5.4		5.1		2.9		4.5		2.1		2.2		2.0		1.6		2.5
Capital account balance	8.0	7.1	3.8		3.6		4.1		3.1		8.2		9.8		8.6		6.6		2.9
Financial account balance	-4.5	-15.1	-9.1		-8.2		-10.7		-15.9		-24.0		-20.2		-19.2		-13.6		-13.6
Net errors and emissions	10.4	5.4	-4.8		1.2		11.8		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0
Overall balance	3.7	12.9	-3.0		-15.1		-7.8		1.2		0.1		9.4		15.3		3.2		2.5
Gross official reserves (in USD millions)	1065	1344	1332		840		574		606		604		969		1616.3		1758.9		1878.7
(In months of imports)	12.4	17.5	17.9		7.6		4.8		5.8		3.7		5.7		10.0		10.8		10.3
(In months of goods and services imports)	10.1	14.2	15.6		6.6		3.9		4.6		3.2		4.8		8.1		8.6		8.4

*Memorandum Items*
Hydropower exports growth rate 4/	-1.2	105.6	15.8		-9.4		-13.2		-20.7		46.2		30.4		4.5		26.1		27.3
Non-hydropower exports growth rate 4/	13.7	-24.1	11.0		26.8		3.2		16.2		13.5		10.7		18.8		16.5		16.0
Hydropower good imports 4/	-15.3	-3.5	-21.2		-11.6		14.9		50.8		18.4		61.1		14.0		3.3		-19.1
Non-hydropower good imports 4/	10.3	-2.3	-4.3		63.8		12.7		-13.0		58.1		1.5		-6.1		1.4		15.2
Population in million (eop)	0.7	0.7	0.8		0.8		0.8		0.8		0.8		0.8		0.8		0.8		0.8
External financing gap in US million	…	…	…		…		0		0		0		0		0		0		0

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Dmitry Chernyshenko held a meeting of the organizing committee for the preparation and holding of the International Financial Security Olympiad

Dmitry Chernyshenko held a meeting of the organizing committee for the preparation and holding of the International Financial Security Olympiad

Dmitry Chernyshenko held a meeting of the organizing committee for the preparation and holding of the International Financial Security Olympiad