Category: Scandinavia

  • MIL-OSI: Euronext publishes Q1 2025 results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Euronext publishes Q1 2025 results

    Strong start of the year with growth of non-volume-related revenue, record FICC trading volumes and exceptional market volatility.

    Amsterdam, Brussels, Dublin, Lisbon, Milan, Oslo and Paris – 14 May 2025 – Euronext, the leading European capital market infrastructure, today publishes its results for the first quarter 2025 using the new, simplified reporting framework1.

    • Q1 2025 revenue and income was up +14.1% at €458.5 million:

    Non-volume-related revenue and income represented 57% of total revenue and income and covered 158% of underlying operating expenses, excluding D&A2:

    • Securities Services revenues grew to €83.4 million (+6.8%), driven by double-digit growth in custody and settlement revenue;
    • Capital Markets and Data Solutions revenue grew to €157.4 million (+6.6%), driven by the continued commercial expansion of Euronext Corporate and Investor Solutions and Technology Services and the strong performance of Advanced Data Solutions, supported by the acquisition of GRSS and by retail participation;
    • Net treasury income was €18.6 million (+58.8%), demonstrating the benefits of the Euronext Clearing expansion and the internalisation of net treasury income following the derivatives clearing migration in Q3 2024.

    Volume-related revenue was driven by high market volatility in Q1 2025:

    • FICC3Markets reported €90.7 million of revenue (+25.1%), driven by record performance in fixed income trading and clearing, commodities trading and clearing and FX trading;
    • Equity Markets revenue grew to €108.4 million (+18.0%), reflecting high volatility.
    • Underlying operating expenses excluding D&A were at €164.5 million (+9.1%). The increase compared to Q1 2024 reflects investments in growth and the impact of acquisitions performed in 2024, combined with strong costs discipline, in line with the ramp-up of growth investments set out as part of Euronext’s underlying cost guidance of €670 million for the full year 2025.
    • Adjusted EBITDA was €294.1 million (+17.0%) and adjusted EBITDA margin was 64.1% (+1.6pts).
    • Adjusted net income was €183.5 million (+11.8%) and adjusted EPS was €1.80 (+13.9%).
    • Reported net income was €164.8 million (+17.9%) and reported EPS was €1.62 (+20.0%).
    • Net debt to EBITDA4was at 1.4x at the end of March 2025, within Euronext’s target range of the “Innovate for Growth 2027” strategic plan. On 22 April 2025, Euronext had successfully redeemed the €500 million bond issued in connection with the acquisition of Euronext Dublin in April 2018.

    Key figures for the first quarter of 2025:

    In €m, unless stated otherwise Q1 2025 Q1 2024 % var % var l-f-l3F5
    Revenue and income 458.5 401.9 +14.1% +12.9%
    Underlying operational expenses excluding D&A2 (164.5) (150.7) +9.1% +7.2%
    Adjusted EBITDA 294.1 251.3 +17.0% +16.4%
    Adjusted EBITDA margin 64.1% 62.5% +1.6pts +1.9pts
    Net income, share of the parent company shareholders 164.8 139.7 +17.9%  
    Adjusted net income, share of the parent company shareholders 183.5 164.2 +11.8%  
    Adjusted EPS (basic, in €) 1.80 1.58 +13.9%  
    Reported EPS (basic, in €) 1.62 1.35 +20.0%  
    Adjusted EPS (diluted, in €) 1.80 1.58 +13.9%  
    Reported EPS (diluted, in €) 1.61 1.34 +20.1%  

    Stéphane Boujnah, Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Managing Board of Euronext, said:

    “In the first quarter of 2025, Euronext has delivered a remarkable performance. We achieved record revenue and income of €458.5 million, driven by initial successes of the strategic initiatives, growth of non-volume-related revenue and exceptional volatility across trading and clearing activities, especially in cash equity, fixed income, FX, power and commodities. Our diversified business model has allowed us to invest in growth and reach an adjusted EBITDA of €294.1 million, marking a significant +17.0% increase compared to Q1 2024. In Q1 2025, we reached record adjusted EPS (basic) of €1.80 per share. Our reported EPS (basic) grew by an impressive +20.0% compared to Q1 2024, to €1.62 per share.

    We have launched significant initiatives of our ‘Innovate for Growth 2027’ strategic plan to reinforce Euronext as a leader in the European financial markets. The upcoming consolidation of settlement for Amsterdam, Brussels and Paris equity trades in Euronext Securities represents a significant optimisation of the European post-trade landscape. With this strategic move, we foster the integration and competitiveness of European capital markets at an unprecedented speed.

    The launch late April 2025 of a European Common Prospectus6in English will pursue this ambition. This new initiative facilitates access to European capital markets and addresses the need for a competitive, integrated Savings and Investment Union. In addition, we are proud to launch a comprehensive set of measures to support the financing needs of companies that contribute to Europe’s strategic autonomy7.

    The acquisition in May 2025 of Admincontrol8, leader in the governance SaaS space, accelerates the development of Euronext Corporate Solutions in the Nordics, and reinforces Euronext’s subscription-based revenue.

    With this strong first quarter of 2025, we demonstrate our capacity to innovate ahead of the curve, leading the way to a stronger, more innovative and more competitive European capital market.”

    Q1 2025 business highlights

    • Q1 2025 revenue and income
      Q1 2025 Q1 2024 % var % var l-f-l
    Revenue and income (in €m) 458.5 401.9 +14.1% +12.9%
    Securities Services 83.4 78.1 +6.8% +4.8%
    Capital Markets and Data Solutions 157.4 147.6 +6.6% +4.5%
    Net treasury income 18.6 11.7 +58.8% +58.8%
    FICC Markets 90.7 72.5 +25.1% +25.2%
    Equity Markets 108.4 91.9 +18.0% +18.0%
    Other income 0.1 0.2 N/A N/A
    • Non-volume-related revenue
      • Securities Services
      Q1 2025 Q1 2024 % var % var l-f-l
    Revenue (in €m) 83.4 78.1 +6.8% +4.8%
    Custody and Settlement 75.8 67.9 +11.6% +9.4%
    Other Post Trade 7.6 10.2 -25.3% -25.3%

    Revenue from Custody and Settlement this quarter was at €75.8 million, +11.6% compared to Q1 2024. This strong performance was driven by growing Assets under Custody, dynamic settlement instructions and continued double-digit growth in services, supported by the acquisition of Acupay. At the end of the quarter, Assets under Custody amounted to €7.1 trillion, up +3.8% compared to end of Q1 2024. Over 39.3 million instructions were settled via Euronext Securities during the first quarter of 2025, up +9.3% compared to the first quarter of 2024.

    Other Post Trade revenue, which includes membership fees and other non-volume-related clearing fees, was €7.6 million in Q1 2025. The -25.3% decrease compared to Q1 2024 stems from the internalisation of the net treasury income related to Euronext derivatives flows in September 2024, which are now integrated in the net treasury income line.

    • Capital Markets and Data Solutions
      Q1 2025 Q1 2024 % var % var l-f-l
    Revenue (in €m) 157.4                147.6                  +6.6% +4.5%
    Primary Markets 46.3 45.5 +1.8% +2.1%
    Advanced Data Solutions 65.1 60.2 +8.1% +3.7%
    Corporate and Investor Solutions and Technology Services 45.9 41.8 +9.8% +8.1%

    Primary Markets revenue was €46.3 million in Q1 2025, an increase of +1.8% compared to Q1 2024. The first quarter recorded slower equity listing performance explained by a volatile environment. Euronext sustained its leading position for equity listing with 8 new listings.

    Advanced Data Solutions revenue was €65.1 million in Q1 2025, up +8.1% compared to Q1 2024. This dynamic performance reflects the contribution of GRSS, strong appetite from retail and growing monetisation of diversified datasets.

    Corporate and Investor Solutions and Technology Services revenue grew by +9.8% in Q1 2025 to €45.9 million. This strong performance reflects the continued commercial expansion of the governance SaaS offering, the increased use of colocation and microwave connectivity, and double-digit growth of investor solutions, supported by the acquisition of Substantive Research.

    Following the completion of the acquisition of Admincontrol on 13 May 2025, Admincontrol’s revenue will be integrated with Corporate and Investor Solutions and Technology Services revenue from Q2 2025.

    • Net treasury income

    Net treasury income was at €18.6 million (+58.8%). This reflect the benefit from the Euronext Clearing expansion and the internalisation of treasury income from LCH SA following the completion of the derivatives clearing migration, as well as higher cash collateral posted to the CCP due to the elevated market volatility.

    • Volume-related revenue
      • FICC Markets
      Q1 2025 Q1 2024 % var % var
    l-f-l
    Revenue (in €m) 90.7 72.5 +25.1% +25.2%
    Fixed income trading and clearing 51.8 39.1 +32.4% +32.4%
    Commodities9 trading and clearing 29.6 26.3 +12.8% +13.9%
    FX trading 9.2 7.1 +30.4% +26.5%

    Fixed income trading and clearing revenue reached €51.8 million in Q1 2025, up +32.4% compared to Q1 2024, driven by record fixed income trading activity supported by favourable market conditions.

    Commodities trading and clearing revenue reached €29.6 million in Q1 2025, up +12.8% compared to Q1 2024, reflecting record intraday power trading volumes and dynamic agricultural commodity trading and clearing.

    FX trading revenue was up +30.4%, at €9.2 million in Q1 2025, reflecting record trading volumes, and a positively geared volume mix.

    • Equity Markets
      Q1 2025 Q1 2024 % var % var
    l-f-l
    Revenue (in €m) 108.4 91.9 +18.0% +18.0%
    Cash equity trading and clearing 94.0 76.8 +22.5% +22.5%
    Financial derivatives trading and clearing 14.4 15.1 -4.8% -4.8%

    Cash equity trading and clearing revenue was €94.0 million in Q1 2025, up +22.5% driven by exceptional market volatility. Euronext recorded average daily cash trading volumes of €13.8 billion, up +31.8% compared to Q1 2024. Revenue capture on cash trading averaged 0.50 bps for the first quarter of 2025, impacted by higher volumes, stronger intraday volatility and larger average order size. Euronext market share on cash equity trading averaged 64.1% in Q1 2025.

    Financial derivatives trading and clearing revenue was €14.4 million in Q1 2025, -4.8% compared to Q1 2024. This decrease is mostly linked to the decrease of the average clearing fees, as following the clearing migration certain clearing fees are now reported in the line Other Post Trade revenues, and as such not fully comparable with Q1 2024.

    Q1 2025 financial performance

    In €m, unless stated otherwise Q1 2025 Q1 2024 % var % var
    l-f-l
    Revenue and income 458.5 401.9 +14.1% +12.9%
    Underlying operational expenses exc. D&A (164.5) (150.7) +9.1% +7.2%
    Adjusted EBITDA 294.1 251.3 +17.0% +16.4%
    Adjusted EBITDA margin 64.1% 62.5% +1.6pts +1.9pts
    Operating expenses exc. D&A (164.3) (159.4) +3.1% +1.2%
    EBITDA 294.2 242.6 +21.3% +20.6%
    Depreciation & Amortisation (48.3) (44.0) +9.8% +10.6%
    Total Expenses (inc. D&A) (212.6) (203.4) +4.6% +2.9%
    Adjusted operating profit 272.6 232.3 +17.4% +16.8%
    Operating Profit 245.9 198.6 +23.8%  
    Net financing income / (expense) (1.5) 4.7 N/A  
    Profit before income tax 244.4 203.3 +20.2%  
    Income tax expense (67.8) (54.7) +24.0%  
    Share of non-controlling interests (11.9) (8.9) +33.6%  
    Net income, share of the parent company shareholders 164.8 139.7 +17.9%  
    Adjusted Net income, share of the parent company shareholders10 183.5 164.2 +11.8%  
    Adjusted EPS (basic, in €) 1.80 1.58 +13.9%  
    Reported EPS (basic, in €) 1.62 1.35 +20.0%  
    Adjusted EPS (diluted, in €) 1.80 1.58 +13.9%  
    Reported EPS (diluted, in €) 1.61 1.34 +20.1%  
    • Q1 2025 adjusted EBITDA

    Underlying operating expenses excluding D&A1 were at €164.5 million (+9.1%). The increase compared to Q1 2024 reflects investments in growth and the impact of acquisitions performed in 2024, partially offset by cost discipline. In addition, Q1 2024 expenses were positively impacted by one-off releases.

    Driven by the double digit growth in revenue, adjusted EBITDA for the quarter reached €294.1 million, up +17.0% compared to Q1 2024. This represents an adjusted EBITDA margin of 64.1%, up 1.6pts vs. Q1 2024. On a like-for-like basis at constant currencies, adjusted EBITDA grew by +16.4% compared to Q1 2024.

    Q1 2025 non-underlying expenses profited from a one-off release of accruals. As a consequence, reported EBITDA was at €294.2 million, up +21.3% compared to Q1 2024.

    • Q1 2025 net income, share of the parent company shareholders

    Depreciation and amortisation accounted for €48.3 million in Q1 2025, +9.8% more than Q1 2024. PPA related to acquired businesses accounted for €20.4 million.

    Adjusted operating profit was €272.6 million, up +17.4% compared to Q1 2024.

    Euronext reported a net financing expense of €1.5 million in Q1 2025, compared to €4.7 million net financing income in Q1 2024. The variation reflects short-term FX movements and decreasing interest rates.

    Income tax for Q1 2025 was €67.8 million. This translated into an effective tax rate of 27.7% for the quarter, compared to 26.9% in Q1 2024.

    Share of non-controlling interests amounted to €11.9 million, correlated with the strong performance of MTS and Nord Pool.

    As a result, the reported net income, share of the parent company shareholders, increased by +17.9% for Q1 2025 compared to Q1 2024, to €164.8 million. This represents a reported EPS of €1.62 basic and €1.61 diluted. Adjusted net income, share of the parent company shareholders, was up +11.8% to €183.5 million. Adjusted EPS (basic) was €1.80. This increase reflects higher profit and a lower number of outstanding shares over the first quarter of 2025 compared to Q1 2024.

    The weighted number of shares used over the first quarter of 2025 was 101,695,588 for the basic calculation and 102,166,786 for the diluted calculation, compared to 103,640,164 and 104,040,256 respectively over the first quarter of 2024. The difference is due to the share repurchase programme executed by Euronext.

    In Q1 2025, Euronext reported a net cash flow from operating activities of €190.6 million, compared to €184.6 million in Q1 2024, reflecting higher profit before tax and higher income tax paid in Q1 2025. Excluding the impact on working capital from Euronext Clearing and Nord Pool CCP activities, net cash flow from operating activities accounted for 88.1% of EBITDA in Q1 2025.

    Q1 2025 corporate highlights since publication of the fourth quarter 2024 results on 13 February 2025

    • Euronext consolidates settlement on its markets to improve the competitiveness of European capital markets

    On 12 March 2025, Euronext has announced that from September 2026, Euronext Amsterdam, Brussels, and Paris will designate Euronext Securities as the central securities depository (CSD) for equity trade settlements. This aligns with Euronext’s “Innovate for Growth 2027” strategic plan and aims to enhance the competitiveness of European capital markets by addressing post-trade fragmentation. Currently, equity trade settlement in Europe is fragmented across over 30 CSDs. This initiative allows clients to consolidate settlement and custody activities across multiple markets into a single CSD, streamlining operations and enhancing liquidity. It also aids them adapting to regulatory changes, such as the move to T+1 settlement in October 2027. Additionally, Euronext has moved its own shares to Euronext Securities, showcasing the benefits of this consolidation for equity issuers.

    • Dividend payment schedule for 2025

    The Managing Board, upon the approval of the Supervisory Board, has decided to propose for approval at the Annual General Meeting the payment of a dividend of €2.90 per ordinary share (based on the total number of eligible shares). The dividend would be distributed evenly (pro rata the number of shares held) to holders of ordinary shares on the dividend record date set on 27 May 2025 (ex-dividend date is set on 26 May 2025 and payment date is set on 28 May 2025). This dividend represents a pay-out ratio of 50% of the reported net income, in line with Euronext’s current dividend policy.

    Corporate highlights since 1 April 2025

    • Euronext completes the acquisition of Admincontrol

    On 13 May 2025, Euronext announced the completion of the acquisition of 100% of the shares of Admincontrol for an enterprise value of NOK 4,650 million. This transaction complies with Euronext’s capital allocation policy, with a ROCE expected to exceed the WACC within three to five years post-closing11. Admincontrol will be part of Euronext Corporate Solutions, strengthening the development of the franchise in the Nordics and the UK. This acquisition supports Euronext’s strategy to expand its software-as-a-service (SaaS) offering and increases Euronext’s share of subscription-based revenue. Admincontrol has experienced double-digit growth over the past five years, with NOK 452 million in revenue and NOK 200 million in EBITDA in 202412. From the second quarter of 2025, Admincontrol’s revenue will be integrated into Euronext’s revenue line Corporate and Investor Solutions and Technology Services.

    • Launch of European Common Prospectus to accelerate capital market integration and boost IPO activity across the EU

    On 25 April 2025, Euronext has launched the European Common Prospectus, a standardised template for equity issuances, with the aim to integrate European capital markets more deeply. This initiative seeks to reduce regulatory fragmentation, enhance transparency, and promote cross-border investment. The prospectus, developed since November 2024, aligns with existing EU regulations and simplifies the listing process by reducing the required sections from 21 to 11. It uses English as the preferred language, facilitating cross-border access to capital. This new format benefits issuers by streamlining the listing process, and investors by providing consistency and comparability across EU jurisdictions. The full implementation of the Listing Act is expected by June 2026; but this prospectus addresses the immediate need to boost IPO activity in Europe in the meantime.

    • Euronext strengthens its support for European strategic autonomy

    On 6 May 2025, Euronext announced the implementation of a full set of initiatives to support investments in European strategic autonomy. This includes the creation of a new series of thematic indices covering companies that contribute to Europe’s strategic autonomy, tailored solutions to enhance equity financing of European aerospace and defence companies and facilitated issuance of European defence bonds13.

    • Euronext volumes for April 2025

    In April 2025, the average daily transaction value on the Euronext cash order book stood at €16.0 billion, up +44.1% compared to the same period last year. The overall average daily volume on Euronext derivatives stood at 712,389 lots, up +6.4% compared to April 2024, and the open interest was 25,388,147 contracts at the end of April 2025, up +6.4% compared to April 2024. The average daily volume on Euronext FX’s spot foreign exchange market stood at $38.2 billion, up +33.1% compared to the same period last year. Average daily day-ahead power traded was 2.7TWh, down -3.5% compared to the same period last year, and average daily intraday power traded was 0.5TWh, up +37.4% compared to April 2024. MTS Cash average daily volumes were up +55.4% to €55.8 billion in April 2025, MTS Repo term adjusted average daily volume stood at €723.1 billion, up +50.1% compared to the same period last year. Euronext Clearing cleared 32,206,770 shares in April 2025, +58.2% compared to April 2024. €2,752 billion of wholesale bonds were cleared in April 2025 (double counted), up +19.7% compared to the same period in 2024. 1,098,474 bond retail contracts were cleared in April 2025 (double counted), down -18.0% compared to April 2024. The number of derivatives contracts cleared was 14,247,781, up +934.7% compared to April 2024 (single counted). Euronext Securities reported 12,506,259 settlement instructions in April 2025, up +14.0% compared to the same period last year. The total Assets Under Custody reached over €7.0 trillion in April 2025, up +3.0% compared to the same period last year.

    Results Webcast

    A webcast will be held on Thursday, 15 May 2025, at 09:00 CEST (Paris time) / 08:O0 BST (London time):

    Live webcast:

    For the live webcast go to: Webcast

    The webcast will be available for replay after the call at the webcast link and on the Euronext Investor Relations webpage.
    Contacts

    ANALYSTS & INVESTORS – ir@euronext.com

    Investor Relations        Aurélie Cohen                 

    Judith Stein        +33 6 15 23 91 97          

    MEDIA – mediateam@euronext.com 

    Europe        Aurélie Cohen         +33 1 70 48 24 45   

    Andrea Monzani         +39 02 72 42 62 13 

    Belgium        Marianne Aalders         +32 26 20 15 01                 

    France, Corporate        Flavio Bornancin-Tomasella        +33 1 70 48 24 45                 

    Ireland        Andrea Monzani         +39 02 72 42 62 13                 

    Italy         Ester Russom         +39 02 72 42 67 56                 

    The Netherlands        Marianne Aalders         +31 20 721 41 33                 

    Norway         Cathrine Lorvik Segerlund        +47 41 69 59 10                 

    Portugal         Sandra Machado        +351 91 777 68 97                

    Corporate Solutions        Andrea Monzani         +39 02 72 42 62 13                          

    About Euronext  

    Euronext is the leading European capital market infrastructure, covering the entire capital markets value chain, from listing, trading, clearing, settlement and custody, to solutions for issuers and investors. Euronext runs MTS, one of Europe’s leading electronic fixed income trading markets, and Nord Pool, the European power market. Euronext also provides clearing and settlement services through Euronext Clearing and its Euronext Securities CSDs in Denmark, Italy, Norway and Portugal.

    As of March 2025, Euronext’s regulated exchanges in Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and Portugal host nearly 1,800 listed issuers with €6.3 trillion in market capitalisation, a strong blue-chip franchise and the largest global centre for debt and fund listings. With a diverse domestic and international client base, Euronext handles 25% of European lit equity trading. Its products include equities, FX, ETFs, bonds, derivatives, commodities and indices.

    For the latest news, go to euronext.com or follow us on X and LinkedIn.

    Disclaimer

    This press release is for information purposes only: it is not a recommendation to engage in investment activities and is provided “as is”, without representation or warranty of any kind. The figures in this document have not been audited or reviewed by our external auditor. While all reasonable care has been taken to ensure the accuracy of the content, Euronext does not guarantee its accuracy or completeness. Euronext will not be held liable for any loss or damages of any nature ensuing from using, trusting or acting on information provided. No information set out or referred to in this publication may be regarded as creating any right or obligation. The creation of rights and obligations in respect of financial products that are traded on the exchanges operated by Euronext’s subsidiaries shall depend solely on the applicable rules of the market operator. All proprietary rights and interest in or connected with this publication shall vest in Euronext. This press release speaks only as of this date. Euronext refers to Euronext N.V. and its affiliates. Information regarding trademarks and intellectual property rights of Euronext is available at www.euronext.com/terms-use.

    © 2025, Euronext N.V. – All rights reserved. 

    The Euronext Group processes your personal data in order to provide you with information about Euronext (the “Purpose”). With regard to the processing of this personal data, Euronext will comply with its obligations under Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and Council of 27 April 2016 (General Data Protection Regulation, “GDPR”), and any applicable national laws, rules and regulations implementing the GDPR, as provided in its privacy statement available at: www.euronext.com/privacy-policy. In accordance with the applicable legislation you have rights with regard to the processing of your personal data: for more information on your rights, please refer to: www.euronext.com/data_subjects_rights_request_information. To make a request regarding the processing of your data or to unsubscribe from this press release service, please use our data subject request form at connect2.euronext.com/form/data-subjects-rights-request or email our Data Protection Officer at dpo@euronext.com.

    Appendix

    The figures in this Appendix have not been audited or reviewed by our external auditor.

    Non-IFRS financial measures

    For comparative purposes, the company provides unaudited non-IFRS measures including:

    • Operational expenses excluding depreciation and amortisation, underlying operational expenses excluding depreciation and amortisation;
    • EBITDA, EBITDA margin, adjusted EBITDA, adjusted EBITDA margin.

    Non-IFRS measures are defined as follows:

    • Operational expenses excluding depreciation and amortisation as the total of salary and employee benefits, and other operational expenses;
    • Underlying operational expenses excluding depreciation and amortisation as the total of salary and employee benefits, and other operational expenses, excluding non-recurring costs;
    • Underlying revenue and income as the total of revenue and income, excluding non-recurring revenue and income;
    • Non-underlying items as items of revenue, income and expense that are material by their size and/or that are infrequent and unusual by their nature or incidence are not considered to be recurring in the normal course of business and are classified as non-underlying items on the face of the income statement within their relevant category in order to provide further understanding of the ongoing sustainable performance of the Group. These items can include:
      • integration or double run costs of significant projects, restructuring costs and costs related to acquisitions that change the perimeter of the Group;
      • one-off finance costs, gains or losses on sale of subsidiaries and impairments of investments:
      • amortisation and impairment of intangible assets which are recognised as a result of acquisitions and mostly comprising customer relationships, brand names and software that were identified during purchase price allocation (PPA);
      • tax related to non-underlying items.
    • Adjusted operating profit as the operating profit adjusted for any non-underlying revenue and income and non-underlying costs, including PPA of acquired businesses;
    • EBITDA as the operating profit before depreciation and amortisation;
    • Adjusted EBITDA as the adjusted operating profit before depreciation and amortisation adjusted for any non-underlying operational expenses excluding depreciation and amortisation;
    • EBITDA margin as EBITDA divided by total revenue and income;
    • Adjusted EBITDA margin as adjusted EBITDA, divided by total revenue and income;
    • Adjusted net income, as the net income, share of the parent company shareholders, adjusted for any non-underlying items and related tax impact.

    Non-IFRS financial measures are not meant to be considered in isolation or as a substitute for comparable IFRS measures and should be read only in conjunction with the consolidated financial statements.

    Consolidated income statement

      Q1 2025 Q1 2024
    in €m, unless stated otherwise Underlying Non-underlying Reported Underlying Non-underlying Reported
    Revenue and income 458.5 458.5 401.9 401.9
    Securities Services 83.4 83.4 78.1 78.1
    Custody and Settlement 75.8 75.8 67.9 67.9
    Other Post Trade 7.6 7.6 10.2 10.2
    Capital Markets and Data Solutions 157.4 157.4 147.6 147.6
    Primary Markets 46.3 46.3 45.5 45.5
    Advanced data solutions 65.1 65.1 60.2 60.2
    Corporate and Investor Solutions and Technology Services 45.9 45.9 41.8 41.8
    Net treasury income 18.6 18.6 11.7 11.7
    FICC Markets 90.7 90.7 72.5 72.5
    Fixed income trading and clearing 51.8 51.8 39.1 39.1
    Commodities income trading and clearing 29.6 29.6 26.3 26.3
    FX trading 9.2 9.2 7.1 7.1
    Equity Markets 108.4 108.4 91.9 91.9
    Cash equity trading and clearing 94.0 94.0 76.8 76.8
    Financial derivatives trading and clearing 14.4 14.4 15.1 15.1
    Other income 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2
    Operating expenses excluding D&A (164.5) 0.1 (164.3) (150.7) (8.7) (159.4)
    Salaries and employee benefits (86.9) (0.5) (87.3) (80.7) (4.4) (85.1)
    Other operational expenses, of which (77.6) 0.6 (77.0) (70.0) (4.3) (74.3)
    System & communication (25.9) (0.1) (26.0) (24.6) (1.4) (26.0)
    Professional services (18.1) 1.0 (17.1) (11.9) (1.9) (13.8)
    Clearing expense (0.2) (0.2) (9.1) (9.1)
    Accommodation (4.6) (0.2) (4.8) (3.8) (0.3) (4.1)
    Other operational expenses (28.8) (28.8) (20.6) (0.7) (21.3)
    EBITDA 294.1 0.1 294.2 251.3 (8.7) 242.6
    EBITDA margin 64.1%   64.2% 62.5%   60.4%
    Depreciation & amortisation (21.5) (26.8) (48.3) (19.0) (25.0) (44.0)
    Total expenses (185.9) (26.7) (212.6) (169.7) (33.7) (203.4)
    Operating profit 272.6 (26.7) 245.9 232.3 (33.7) 198.6
    Net financing income / (expense) (1.5) (1.5) 4.7 (0.0) 4.7
    Profit before income tax 271.1 (26.7) 244.4 237.0 (33.7) 203.3
    Income tax expense (74.9) 7.1 (67.8) (63.4) 8.7 (54.7)
    Non-controlling interests (12.7) 0.9 (11.9) (9.3) 0.4 (8.9)
    Net income, share of the parent company shareholders 183.5 (18.8) 164.8 164.2 (24.5) 139.7
    EPS (basic, in €) 1.80   1.62 1.58   1.35
    EPS (diluted, in €) 1.80   1.61 1.58   1.34

    Adjusted EPS definition

      Q1 2025 Q1 2024
    Net income reported 164.8 139.7
    EPS reported 1.62 1.35
    Adjustments for non-underlying items included in:    
    Operating expenses exc. D&A                                       0.1 (8.7)
    Depreciation and amortisation                                   (26.8) (25.0)
    Minority interest 0.9 0.4
    Tax related to adjustments 7.1 8.7
    Adjusted net income 183.5 164.2
    Adjusted EPS 1.80 1.58

    Consolidated comprehensive income statement

      Q1 2025 Q1 2024
    Profit for the period 176.6 148.6
         
    Other comprehensive income    
    Items that may be reclassified to profit or loss:    
    – Exchange differences on translation of foreign operations 16.9 (26.3)
    – Income tax impact on exchange differences on translation of foreign operations (1.1) 2.6
    – Gains and losses on cash flow hedges 2.2
    – Change in value of debt investments at fair value through other comprehensive income 0.2
    – Income tax impact on change in value of debt investments at fair value through
    other comprehensive income
    (0.1)
         
    Items that will not be reclassified to profit or loss:    
    – Remeasurements of post-employment benefit obligations (2.5) (0.3)
    Other comprehensive income for the period, net of tax 15.5 (23.8)
    Total comprehensive income for the period 192.1 124.8
         
    Comprehensive income attributable to:    
    – Owners of the parent 179.9 116.6
    – Non-controlling interests 12.2 8.2

    Consolidated statement of financial position

    in €m 31 March 2025 31 December 2024
    Non-current assets    
    Property, plant and equipment 107.4 106.2
    Right-of-use assets 88.2 57.5
    Goodwill and other intangible assets                                6,096.5                           6,096.2
    Deferred income tax assets 29.1 30.4
    Investments in associates and joint ventures                                          0.8                                    0.8
    Financial assets at fair value through OCI                                     357.0                               357.0
    Other non-current assets 3.4 3.5
    Total non-current assets 6,682.4 6,651.6
         
    Current assets    
    Trade and other receivables 574.2 412.9
    Income tax receivable 17.5 11.4
    Derivative financial instruments 2.2
    CCP clearing business assets 341,647.6 270,288.7
    Other current financial assets 59.5 63.8
    Cash & cash equivalents 1,642.3 1,673.5
    Total current assets 343,943.3                272,450.3
         
    Total assets 350,625.7 279,101.8
         
    Equity    
    Shareholders’ equity 4,224.6 4,245.2
    Non-controlling interests 161.7 156.8
    Total Equity 4,386.3 4,402.0
         
    Non-current liabilities    
    Borrowings 2,537.5 2,537.0
    Lease liabilities 71.7 46.2
    Other non-current financial liabilities 3.5 3.5
    Deferred income tax liabilities 495.1 496.8
    Post-employment benefits 23.0 21.0
    Contract liabilities 54.2 56.4
    Other provisions 7.0 7.2
    Total Non-current liabilities 3,192.1 3,168.2
         
    Current liabilities    
    Borrowings 524.0 516.5
    Lease liabilities 21.9 15.8
    Derivative financial instruments                                         0.1
    CCP clearing business liabilities 341,695.3 270,357.9
    Income tax payable 99.3 91.1
    Trade and other payables 526.5 464.3
    Contract liabilities 176.2 80.1
    Other provisions 4.1 5.9
    Total Current liabilities 343,047.3 271,531.7
         
    Total equity and liabilities 350,625.7 279,101.8

    *The comparative figures for CCP clearing business assets and liabilities were both adjusted upwards by €69,713.3 million in the Universal Registration Document 2024 as published on 28 March 2025 due to an adjustment in the recognition of clearing business assets and clearing business liabilities, when compared to the positions in the press release dated 13 February 2025.

    Consolidated statement of cash flows

    in €m Q1 2025 Q1 2024
    Profit before tax 244.4 203.3
    Adjustments for:    
    – Depreciation and amortisation 48.3 44.0
               – Share based payments 3.9 3.9
    – Changes in working capital (37.4) (36.6)
    Cash flow from operating activities 259.2 214.7
    Income tax paid (68.6) (30.0)
    Net cash flows from operating activities 190.6 184.6
         
    Cash flow from investing activities    
    Purchase of current financial assets                                     (0.7) (21.7)
    Redemption of current financial assets                                      5.7 18.6
    Purchase of property, plant and equipment                                    (6.8) 0.1
    Purchase of intangible assets (23.0) (16.4)
    Interest received 10.3 10.4
    Proceeds from sale of property, plant, equipment and intangible assets                                         – 0.1
    Net cash flow from investing activities (14.6) (8.9)
         
    Cash flow from financing activities    
    Interest paid (0.8) (0.2)
    Payment of lease liabilities (5.5) (5.5)
    Transactions in own shares (204.5) (2.1)
    Dividends paid to non-controlling interests (0.3)
    Net cash flow from financing activities (210.8) (8.2)
         
    Total cash flow over the period (34.8) 167.6
    Cash and cash equivalents – Beginning of period 1,673.5 1,448.8
    Non-cash exchange gains/(losses) on cash and cash equivalents 3.6 (6.8)
    Cash and cash equivalents – End of period 1,642.3 1,609.6

    Volumes for the first quarter of 2025

    • Securities Services
    Euronext Securities activity Q1 2025 Q1 2024 % var
    Number of settlement instructions over the period 39,317,842 35,963,785 +9.3%
    Assets under Custody (in €bn), end of period 7,132 6,871 +3.8%
    • Capital Markets
      Q1 2025 Q1 2024 % var
    Number of trading days 63 63
    Listings      
    Number of Issuers on Equities      
    Euronext 1,786 1,860 -4.0%
    SMEs 1,397 1,463 -5.0%
    Number of Listed Securities      
    Funds 2,163 2,392 -10.0%
    ETFs 4,158 3,861 +8.0%
    Bonds 55,645 56,862 -2.0%
    Capital raised on primary and secondary market      
    Total Euronext, (€ million)      
    Number of new equity listings 8 10  
    Money Raised – New equity listings (including over-allotment) 237 156 +52.0%
    Money Raised – Follow-ons on equities 2,850 8,012 -64.0%
    Money Raised – Bonds 316,716 380,183 -17.0%
    Total Money Raised 319,803 388,352 -18.0%
    of which SMEs      
    Number of new equity listings 8 9  
    Money Raised – New equity listings (including over-allotment) 237 156 +52.0%
    Money Raised – Follow-ons on equities 1,278 4,957 -74.0%
    Money Raised – Bonds 396 478 -17.0%
    Total Money Raised 1,911 5,591 -66.0%
    • FICC Markets

    Fixed income trading

      Q1 2025 Q1 2024 % var
    Transaction value (€ million, single counted)      
    MTS      
    ADV MTS Cash 56,791 34,658 +64.0%
    TAADV MTS Repo 508,929 491,789 +3.0%
    Other fixed income      
    ADV Fixed income 1,932 1,744 +11.0%

    Fixed income clearing

    Number of transactions and lots cleared Q1 2025 Q1 2024 % var
    Bonds – Wholesale (nominal value in €bn – double counted) 8,160 7,392 +10.0%
    Bonds – Retail (number of contracts – double counted) 4,175,846 3,800,084 +10.0%

    Commodities markets

      Q1 2025 Q1 2024 % var
    Number of trading days              90 91 -1.1%
    Power volume (in TWh)      
    ADV Day-ahead Power Market          3.28 3.32 -1.2%
    ADV Intraday Power Market          0.43 0.29 +47.3%
      Q1 2025 Q1 2024 % var
    Number of trading days 63 63
    Derivatives Volume (in lots)      
    Commodity 7,886,335 7,193,909 +9.6%
    Futures 7,570,868 6,756,390 12.1%
    Options 315,467 437,519 -27.9%
    Derivatives ADV (in lots)      
    Commodity 125,180 114,189 9.6%
    Futures 120,173 107,244 12.1%
    Options 5,007 6,945 -27.9%
      31 March 2025 31 March 2024 % var
    Open interest (in lots)      
           
    Commodity 1,043,370 923,004 +13.0%
    Futures 841,449 584,361 +44.0%
    Options 201,921 338,643 -40.4%

    FX Markets

      Q1 2025 Q1 2024 % var
    Number of trading days 63 63
    FX volume ($m, single counted)      
    Total Euronext FX 1,856,742 1,583,472 +17.3%
    ADV Euronext FX 29,472 24,742 +19.1%
    • Equity Markets

    Cash trading

      Q1 2025 Q1 2024 % var
    Number of trading days 63 63
    Number of transactions (buy and sell)      
    Total Cash Market 188,721,610 152,340,714 +24.0%
    ADV Cash Market 2,995,581 2,418,107 +24.0%
    Transaction value (€ million, single counted)      
    Total Cash Market 867,015 657,688 +31.8%
    ADV Cash Market 13,762 10,439 +31.8%

    Cash clearing

    Number of transactions and lots cleared Q1 2025 Q1 2024 % var
    Shares (number of contracts – single counted) 76,849,676 58,446,470 +31.0%
    Derivatives (number of contracts – single counted) 42,112,910 5,823,089 +623.0%

    Financial derivatives markets

      Q1 2025 Q1 2024 % var
    Number of trading days 63 63
    Derivatives Volume (in lots)      
    Equity 34,226,575 32,815,066 +4.3%
    Index 11,889,419 12,477,980 -4.7%
    Futures 6,946,746 7,240,666 -4.1%
    Options 4,942,673 5,237,314 -5.6%
    Individual Equity 22,337,156 20,337,086 +9.8%
    Futures 489,757 574,911 -14.8%
    Options 21,847,399 19,762,175 +10.6%
           
    Derivatives ADV (in lots)      
    Equity 543,279 520,874 +4.3%
    Index 188,721 198,063 -4.7%
    Futures 110,266 114,931 -4.1%
    Options 78,455 83,132 -5.6%
    Individual Equity 354,558 322,811 +9.8%
    Futures 7,774 9,126 -14.8%
    Options 346,784 313,685 +10.6%
           
    Open interest (in lots) 31 March 2025 31 March 2024 % var
    Equity 23,589,360 21,831,754 +8.1%
    Index 1,052,853 878,571 +19.8%
    Futures 477,425 638,777 -25.3%
    Options 575,428 239,794 +140.0%
    Individual Equity 22,536,507 20,953,183 +7.6%
    Futures 165,404 564,408 -70.7%
    Options 22,371,103 20,388,775 +9.7%

    1www.euronext.com/en/media/13322/download
    2 Definition in Appendix – adjusted for non-underlying operating expenses excluding D&A and non-underlying revenue and income.
    3   Fixed income, commodities and currencies
    4 Last twelve months reported and adjusted EBITDA
    5 Like-for-like basis at constant currency
    6www.euronext.com/en/about/media/euronext-press-releases/euronext-launches-european-common-prospectus-accelerate-capital
    7www.euronext.com/en/about/media/euronext-press-releases/euronext-strengthens-its-support-for-european-strategic
    8www.euronext.com/en/about/media/euronext-press-releases/euronext-completes-acquisition-admincontrol
    9 Including revenue from power trading and clearing
    10 For the total adjustments performed please refer to the Appendix of this press release
    11 The cashflow related to the transaction will be communicated as part of Q2 2025 results
    12 Unaudited figures
    13www.euronext.com/en/about/media/euronext-press-releases/euronext-strengthens-its-support-for-european-strategic

    Attachment

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Global: Bitter Honey by Lola Akinmade Åkerström explores how mothers carry their histories into their daughters’ lives

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Olumayokun Ogunde, PhD Candidate in English, City St George’s, University of London

    In Bitter Honey, novelist Lola Akinmade Åkerström explores the emotional undercurrents of motherhood and daughterhood. The novel reflects on how the past bears down on the present. How mothers carry their histories into their daughters’ lives – often uninvited, sometimes unrecognised.

    My research is concerned with narratives that crack open the heart of African motherhood, stories that strive not only to expose pain, but to understand it. Bitter Honey gestures towards this emotional terrain.

    One particular line is emblematic of this exploration: “‘When I was your age, I moved to Sweden without my mother. With nobody.’ Tina has heard this story a million times.” It captures both the weariness of inherited trauma and the fragility of the desire for understanding that threads through the novel.

    Bitter Honey begins with the promise of protagonist Tina’s rising stardom. Alone in a dressing room, navigating fame and the sudden reappearance of her absentee father, Tina’s story has all the markings of a Bildungsroman (a coming-of-age novel shaped by psychological and moral growth). But the novel’s emotional nucleus is not fame, nor even fatherhood – it’s Tina’s mother, Nancy. Or at least, it wants to be.


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    Nancy’s story is one of deep and curdled regret. Akinmade crafts a portrait of a woman who once stood at the cusp of a glamorous new world, having fallen in love with Malik, an ambassador’s son who offers her access to elite circles, state dinners and the Swedish prime minister. But it is Lars, her white Swedish professor, who slowly unpicks the seams of her life.

    The novel promises a sense of romantic tension, inviting the reader to feel torn between Malik’s genuine warmth and Lars’s sophistication. But no such ambivalence materialises.

    Lars is not charming. He is jealous, controlling and ultimately predatory. Akinmade’s portrayal of Lars makes it clear: he is not a romantic dilemma, he is a colonising force. Nancy’s life with him is one of slow suffocation, and her daughter Tina is born of that rupture.

    Throughout the novel, there are subtle allusions and at times more overt depictions of Tina’s struggle with her mixed heritage. However, these moments feel overwritten, particularly in lines such as Tina’s desire to “fully wear her mixed skin”.

    While the phrasing may aim for poetic resonance, for me, it comes across as reductive. The metaphor inadvertently simplifies a complex and embodied experience, raising uneasy questions. Can identity be worn? Is it something that can be adorned, removed or chosen at will?

    Akinmade appears to be engaging with the constructedness of race and the illusion of agency within African diasporic identity. But Tina’s exploration of these themes lacks depth. There remains a striking incongruity between how she understands herself and how the world perceives her.

    At times her lack of critical self-awareness is jarring. Particularly when set against the more richly developed and emotionally layered portrayal of Nancy.

    Love and regret

    Where Akinmade excels is in her rendering of Nancy. Her character is more vividly drawn, more emotionally accessible than Tina’s. We see her consumed by grief and fear, mothering from a place of survival rather than nurture.

    “She would have resisted him. Even if it meant Tobias and Tina vanishing into thin air, never existing.” This is the agonising truth of Nancy’s lifetime: that her children are reminders of her own loss of agency. Her love is knotted with regret.

    There’s an urgent question running through Bitter Honey. What does it mean to parent when your life has been violently derailed by structures beyond your control?

    This legacy of cultural dislocation is a theme Akinmade touches on but stops short of fully exploring. Nancy, as an immigrant mother, carries a kind of preemptive grief. Her decisions are shaped not just by personal trauma but by a constant anticipation of harm. The immigrant mother often exists in survival mode, where care is expressed not through softness, but vigilance.

    “You figured I have no agency without him?” A line Tina delivers in a moment of confrontation typifies the novel’s uneven dialogue. Akinmade at times stumbles into phrasing that feels stilted or overwrought, reducing what could be moments of real emotional depth into awkward exchanges. Yet her broader ambition, to map generational wounds and diasporic complexity, is clear.

    The novel’s scope is wide. We move between Sweden and the United States, from the 70s to 2006, witnessing how each locale produces different shades of diasporic identity.

    Akinmade is particularly attuned to how Gambian communities shift across contexts – Gambians in Sweden are not like those in London or in New York. This specificity highlights that place informs not only experience but the perception of self.

    Ultimately, Bitter Honey is at its most compelling when it slows down, when it allows Nancy’s grief to speak plainly. One of the novel’s most poignant lines arrives when Nancy warns Tina before she signs with an American label that brands her the “Swedish siren”.

    “The world gives you your heart’s desires, then violently rips it away from your hands when you’re most vulnerable. Please stay vigilant.” Here, Akinmade captures the cruel irony of diasporic ambition, the way success can echo colonial exploitation, offering visibility at the cost of safety.

    Through Tina, the reader is kept at a remove from the raw reality of Nancy. The moments where we begin to glimpse the true texture of her life, her regret, her protectiveness, her survival, are all too fleeting.

    What would their lives look like without this fear? This is the novel’s quiet, unanswered question. Are these maternal guardrails protection or shackles? Bitter Honey doesn’t offer a resolution. But in asking, it reveals the aching legacy that mothers like Nancy pass down: not just trauma, but the impossible task of surviving without softness.

    Olumayokun Ogunde does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Bitter Honey by Lola Akinmade Åkerström explores how mothers carry their histories into their daughters’ lives – https://theconversation.com/bitter-honey-by-lola-akinmade-akerstrom-explores-how-mothers-carry-their-histories-into-their-daughters-lives-254527

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: From boomers to Gen Z: How to solve the public sector succession crisis

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By W. Dominika Wranik, Professor, Faculty of Management, Dalhousie University

    Public servants are the backbone of Canadian government. Canadians expect them to act in the best interest of society, to uphold Canadian democratic institutions, to steward public monies and to deliver programs and services.

    But as retirements surge, how can governments attract young people to work for them? It’s difficult when governments suffer from poor reputations, low public trust and offer working conditions that may not appeal to young people.

    What do young Canadians want from their careers, and what will it take for public service to win them over?

    This issue, among others concerning Canadian public servants, are currently being studied at the Professional Motivations Research Lab at Dalhousie University. The lab is led by the lead author of this piece, Dominika Wranik, whose work focuses on measuring and explaining the motivations of professionals in the public service.

    The lab’s insights shed light on the factors that influence how young people make decisions about whether to work for the public sector.

    Looming labour shortage

    In 1966, there were 7.7 working-age individuals for every senior in Canada. But in 2022, the ratio dropped to 3.4 and is projected to drop further over the next decade.

    A labour shortage will create increased competition for top talent between the public and private sector, an issue for governments as research has shown a growing disinterest among youth in pursuing civil service careers.

    Recruitment to the public service is further complicated by declining perceptions of competence and trust in Canadian public institutions. With studies demonstrating that applicants’ perceptions of an organization’s competence affect their attraction to working there, Canadian governments also run the risk of losing potential applicants who don’t view Canada’s public institutions as being competent or trustworthy.

    These challenges come as young Canadians enter the workforce with more career options than ever before, and different expectations from previous generations.

    Salary not the sole motivator

    Young Canadians are not solely interested in high incomes, but also in workplaces that provide a healthy work/life balance and align with their values.

    Data collected in 2024, for example, shows that 87 per cent of British Columbians between the ages of 18 and 34 prefer employers that are socially and environmentally responsible, with 61 per cent stating they would only work for such companies.

    This means Canadian governments are currently finding themselves in a perilous situation, where rising suspicion about their trustworthiness and competence, paired with growing disinterest in the public sector as a whole, means they’re not positioned well to navigate an impending labour shortage.

    Strengthening their capacity to attract and recruit the next generation of workers is therefore imperative, not only for upholding public institutions, but also for rebuilding trust in government.

    In the effort to resolve this issue and enhance recruitment to the public service, Canadian government officials must pore over existing research into the factors that determine why youth and those just entering the labour market — people between the ages of 13 to 27, known as Gen Z — pursue or refrain from pursing public service jobs.

    Some research suggests the three variables that potentially predict whether a member of Gen Z is inclined to pursue a career in the public sector are:

    Perceptions

    In terms of perceptions of the public sector, a recent study found that when choosing between the public and private sectors, university students in Norway and Poland were most influenced by their views of the public sector.

    The more positive the outlook — for example, that public sector work is considered less bureaucratic and less inefficient — the higher the preference to work in the public sector, and vice versa.

    This finding was echoed by racialized minorities in the United States. A 2022 study found that Black, Asian and Latinx young adults between the ages of 18-36 were largely turned off by government work due to perceptions that they weren’t represented or well-served by their “largely white, male and wealthy” local, state or federal government representatives.

    In Canada, a study led by the Public Policy Forum discovered that perceptions of the nature of government work also had a significant impact on a student’s decision to pursue a career in the public sector. Students who chose to enter the public service cited “opportunities to examine a wide range of complex challenges and help create policy solutions that can have a positive impact on many communities.”

    Motivations

    In terms of having public service motivation (PSM) — which refers to an individual’s inclination to serve the public interest — studies have found that members of Gen Z are more likely to be drawn to the public sector if they are high in PSM.

    Specifically, a study of Gen Z students in criminal justice programs found that those who identified with PSM tenets — such as “meaningful public service is very important to me” and “making a difference in society means more to me than personal achievements” — had a significantly higher likelihood of choosing the public sector over the private sector.

    Similarly, an interdisciplinary sample of undergraduate students with higher levels of PSM — and who therefore identified with the PSM dimensions of self-sacrifice, compassion and commitment to public values — were more likely to have a preference for the public sector.

    Job attributes

    Preferred job attributes also influence the employment choices of members of Gen Z. The aforementioned research on Norwegian and Polish youth and another 2017 study by Canada’s Public Policy Forum (2017) find that when Gen Z students are interested in public sector work, it’s due to the semblance of financial and job security.

    Given the growing disinterest among the Canadian population in pursuing employment in the public sector, new insights about what attracts Gen Z workers to the public sector should be required reading by governments across Canada.




    Read more:
    Public service reflections: Why the role of civil servants must evolve to ensure public trust


    Understanding Gen Z’s misgiving about public sector work will help better position governments to compete with the private sector to recruit the next generation of employees.

    With perceptions of government competence and trustworthiness continuing to fall, it is imperative that Canadian public policymakers take significant steps to engage with Gen Z students and workers to create employment conditions that are attractive and aligned with their values.

    The next generation of government leaders in Canada are currently in high school, college or university classrooms across the country, meaning that research centred in educational institutions is uniquely positioned to uncover valuable regarding how public sector employment is perceived.

    Therefore, government-led engagement that is conducted through town halls, workshops and focus groups can help strengthen trust in government while familiarizing Gen Z students with government careers.

    W. Dominika Wranik receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council. In the past, she has held funding from the Canadian Institutes of Health Research, Mitacs, Research Nova Scotia, and the EU Horizon 2020, as well as short-term funding from several provincial and federal government departments. Dr. Wranik serves as an expert consultant for Canada’s Drug Agency (CDA-AMC).

    Alec Brooks and Payton Nicol do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. From boomers to Gen Z: How to solve the public sector succession crisis – https://theconversation.com/from-boomers-to-gen-z-how-to-solve-the-public-sector-succession-crisis-255077

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Europe: OSCE helps Central Asian practitioners tackle youth crime at its roots

    Source: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe – OSCE

    Headline: OSCE helps Central Asian practitioners tackle youth crime at its roots

    Participants at a regional training course on multi-stakeholder co-operation in youth crime prevention for law enforcement and social services professionals, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, 14 May 2025. (OSCE) Photo details

    As part of efforts to help prevent young people from becoming criminals, the OSCE Transnational Threats Department and the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities held a regional training course on multi-stakeholder co-operation in youth crime prevention for law enforcement and social services professionals from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in Tashkent, Uzbekistan on 13 and 14 May.
    The 28 participants were law enforcement and social services sector representatives who work with and for youth. They took part in interactive sessions, group work, and expert-led discussion to strengthen their knowledge and skills in identifying and prioritizing youth crime cases, and addressing root causes such as social vulnerability, exposure to criminal recruitment and lack of access to support services.
    The course participants also explored how international models can be adapted to address local and regional challenges. They placed particular emphasis on the German “Kurve Kriegen” youth crime prevention initiative as an example of a good practice.
    Looking at the future, participants discussed next steps and national follow-up activities, including potential pilot youth crime prevention practices inspired by international good practices. They concluded the event by committing to turning their ideas into concrete action and strengthening early prevention efforts across Central Asia.
    The training course was part of the OSCE-wide multi-year extrabudgetary project “Enhancing youth crime and drug use prevention through education on legality and awareness campaigns addressing threats of organized crime and corruption”, funded by Germany with additional support from Andorra, Finland, Italy, Norway, Poland and Thailand.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Challenges to high-performance computing threaten US innovation

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Jack Dongarra, Emeritus Professor of Computer Science, University of Tennessee

    Oak Ridge National Laboratory’s Frontier supercomputer is one of the world’s fastest. Oak Ridge Leadership Computing Facility, CC BY

    High-performance computing, or HPC for short, might sound like something only scientists use in secret labs, but it’s actually one of the most important technologies in the world today. From predicting the weather to finding new medicines and even training artificial intelligence, high-performance computing systems help solve problems that are too hard or too big for regular computers.

    This technology has helped make huge discoveries in science and engineering over the past 40 years. But now, high-performance computing is at a turning point, and the choices the government, researchers and the technology industry make today could affect the future of innovation, national security and global leadership.

    High-performance computing systems are basically superpowerful computers made up of thousands or even millions of processors working together at the same time. They also use advanced memory and storage systems to move and save huge amounts of data quickly.

    With all this power, high-performance computing systems can run extremely detailed simulations and calculations. For example, they can simulate how a new drug interacts with the human body, or how a hurricane might move across the ocean. They’re also used in fields such as automotive design, energy production and space exploration.

    Lately, high-performance computing has become even more important because of artificial intelligence. AI models, especially the ones used for things such as voice recognition and self-driving cars, require enormous amounts of computing power to train. High-performance computing systems are well suited for this job. As a result, AI and high-performance computing are now working closely together, pushing each other forward.

    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s supercomputer El Capitan is currently the world’s fastest.

    I’m a computer scientist with a long career working in high-performance computing. I’ve observed that high-performance computing systems are under more pressure than ever, with higher demands on the systems for speed, data and energy. At the same time, I see that high-performance computing faces some serious technical problems.

    Technical challenges

    One big challenge for high-performance computing is the gap between how fast processors are and how well memory systems can keep up with the processors’ output. Imagine having a superfast car but being stuck in traffic – it doesn’t help to have speed if the road can’t handle it. In the same way, high-performance computing processors often have to wait around because memory systems can’t send data quickly enough. This makes the whole system less efficient.

    Another problem is energy use. Today’s supercomputers use a huge amount of electricity, sometimes as much as a small town. That’s expensive and not very good for the environment. In the past, as computer parts got smaller, they also used less power. But that trend, called Dennard scaling, stopped in the mid-2000s. Now, making computers more powerful usually means they use more energy too. To fix this, researchers are looking for new ways to design both the hardware and the software of high-performance computing systems.

    There’s also a problem with the kinds of chips being made. The chip industry is mainly focused on AI, which works fine with lower-precision math like 16-bit or 8-bit numbers. But many scientific applications still need 64-bit precision to be accurate. The greater the bit count, the more digits to the right of the decimal point a chip can process, hence the greater precision. If chip companies stop making the parts that scientists need, then it could become harder to do important research.

    This report discusses how trends in semiconductor manufacturing and commercial priorities may diverge from the needs of the scientific computing community, and how a lack of tailored hardware could hinder progress in research.

    One solution might be to build custom chips for high-performance computing, but that’s expensive and complicated. Still, researchers are exploring new designs, including chiplets – small chips that can be combined like Lego bricks – to make high-precision processors more affordable.

    A global race

    Globally, many countries are investing heavily in high-performance computing. Europe has the EuroHPC program, which is building supercomputers in places such as Finland and Italy. Their goal is to reduce dependence on foreign technology and take the lead in areas such as climate modeling and personalized medicine. Japan built the Fugaku supercomputer, which supports both academic research and industrial work. China has also made major advances, using homegrown technology to build some of the world’s fastest computers. All of these countries’ governments understand that high-performance computing is key to their national security, economic strength and scientific leadership.

    The U.S.-China supercomputer rivalry explained.

    The United States, which has been a leader in high-performance computing for decades, recently completed the Department of Energy’s Exascale Computing Project. This project created computers that can perform a billion billion operations per second. That’s an incredible achievement. But even with that success, the U.S. still doesn’t have a clear, long-term plan for what comes next. Other countries are moving quickly, and without a national strategy, the U.S. risks falling behind.

    I believe that a U.S. national strategy should include funding new machines and training for people to use them. It would also include partnerships with universities, national labs and private companies. Most importantly, the plan would focus not just on hardware but also on the software and algorithms that make high-performance computing useful.

    Hopeful signs

    One exciting area for the future is quantum computing. This is a completely new way of doing computation based on the laws of physics at the atomic level. Quantum computers could someday solve problems that are impossible for regular computers. But they are still in the early stages and are likely to complement rather than replace traditional high-performance computing systems. That’s why it’s important to keep investing in both kinds of computing.

    The good news is that some steps have already been taken. The CHIPS and Science Act, passed in 2022, provides funding to expand chip manufacturing in the U.S. It also created an office to help turn scientific research into real-world products. The task force Vision for American Science and Technology, launched on Feb. 25, 2025, and led by American Association for the Advancement of Science CEO Sudip Parikh, aims to marshal nonprofits, academia and industry to help guide the government’s decisions. Private companies are also spending billions of dollars on data centers and AI infrastructure.

    All of these are positive signs, but they don’t fully solve the problem of how to support high-performance computing in the long run. In addition to short-term funding and infrastructure investments, this means:

    • Long-term federal investment in high-performance computing R&D, including advanced hardware, software and energy-efficient architectures.
    • Procurement and deployment of leadership-class computing systems at national labs and universities.
    • Workforce development, including training in parallel programming, numerical methods and AI-HPC integration.
    • Hardware road map alignment, ensuring commercial chip development remains compatible with the needs of scientific and engineering applications.
    • Sustainable funding models that prevent boom-and-bust cycles tied to one-off milestones or geopolitical urgency.
    • Public-private collaboration to bridge gaps between academic research, industry innovation and national security needs.

    High-performance computing is more than just fast computers. It’s the foundation of scientific discovery, economic growth and national security. With other countries pushing forward, the U.S. is under pressure to come up with a clear, coordinated plan. That means investing in new hardware, developing smarter software, training a skilled workforce and building partnerships between government, industry and academia. If the U.S. does that, the country can make sure high-performance computing continues to power innovation for decades to come.

    Jack Dongarra receives funding from the NSF and the DOE.

    ref. Challenges to high-performance computing threaten US innovation – https://theconversation.com/challenges-to-high-performance-computing-threaten-us-innovation-255188

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI: Global-e Reports First Quarter 2025 Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    PETAH-TIKVA, Israel, May 14, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Global-e Online Ltd. (Nasdaq: GLBE) the platform powering global direct-to-consumer e-commerce, today reported financial results for the first quarter of 2025.

    “We had another quarter of strong results, demonstrating our ability to grow fast even within macroeconomic turbulent times with Q1 results coming in at or above the midpoints across our guidance. While the market remains volatile with a higher level of uncertainty given the on-going global duty tariff dynamics, our pipeline is very active and we see increased interest in our services.”

    We are also excited about the long term extension of our strategic partnership agreement with Shopify, which will allow us to take this partnership to the next level,” said Amir Schlachet, Founder and CEO of Global-e.”

    Q1 2025 Financial Results

    • GMV1 in the first quarter of 2025 was $1,243 million, an increase of 34% year over year
    • Revenue in the first quarter of 2025 was $189.9 million, an increase of 30% year over year, of which service fees revenue was $84.0 million and fulfillment services revenue was $105.9 million
    • Non-GAAP gross profit2 in the first quarter of 2025 was $86.3 million, an increase of 31% year over year. GAAP gross profit in the first quarter of 2025 was $84.1 million
    • Non-GAAP gross margin2 in the first quarter of 2025 was 45.4%, compared to 45.3% in the first quarter of 2024. GAAP gross margin in the first quarter of 2025 was 44.3%
    • Adjusted EBITDA3 in the first quarter of 2025 was $31.6 million compared to $21.3 million in the first quarter of 2024
    • Net loss in the first quarter of 2025 was $17.9 million compared to $32.1 million in the first quarter of 2024

    Recent Business Highlights

    • Announced a new 3-year strategic partnership agreement with Shopify, renewing the companies’ long-standing relationship for both 1P (i.e. Shopify Managed Markets) and 3P solutions
    • Launched our 3B2C offering allowing merchants to partially mitigate unnecessary price hikes in key destination markets, while avoiding the costs and effort involved in creating a full multi-local setup for specific markets
    • Revamped our Merchant Portal, adding two important Self-Service BI tools for merchants – a real time sales dashboard and a funnel analysis dashboard, and providing easier access to frequently used areas
    • Continued growing with brands across geographies and verticals, including:
      • Europe: Launched Subdued out of Italy and VIBAe footwear, Global-e’s first large merchant based in Finland
      • Sports clubs: Launched with Atletico Madrid in Spain
      • APAC: Multiple merchant launches including Threetimes and Samo Ondoh in Korea, T2Tea and Scarlet & Sam in Australia, Bandai-Namco, United Arrows Tabaya and Sacai in Japan, and many more
      • Expanded with a number of merchants including the launch of Adidas Hong Kong

    Q2 2025 and Full Year Outlook

    Global-e is introducing second quarter guidance and is maintaining the full year guidance as follows:

    Q2 2025 and Full Year Outlook

    Global-e is introducing second quarter guidance and is maintaining the full year guidance as follows:

      Q2 2025   FY 2025   Previous FY 2025
    (in millions)
    GMV (1) $1,387 – $1,427   $6,190 – $6,490   $6,190 – $6,490
    Revenue $204 – $211   $917 – $967   $917 – $967
    Adjusted EBITDA (3) $35 – $39   $179 – $199   $179 – $199

    1 Gross Merchandise Value (GMV) is a key operating metric. See “Non-GAAP Financial Measures and Key Operating Metrics” for additional information regarding this metric.

    2 Non-GAAP Gross profit and Non-GAAP gross margin are non-GAAP financial measures. See “Non-GAAP Financial Measures and Key Operating Metrics” for additional information regarding this metric.

    3 Adjusted EBITDA is a non-GAAP financial measure. See “Non-GAAP Financial Measures” for additional information regarding this metric, including the reconciliations to Operating Profit (Loss), its most directly comparable GAAP financial measure. The Company is unable to provide a reconciliation of Adjusted EBITDA to Operating Profit (Loss), its most directly comparable GAAP financial measure, on a forward-looking basis without unreasonable effort because items that impact this GAAP financial measure are not within the Company’s control and/or cannot be reasonably predicted. These items may include, but are not limited to, share-based compensation expenses. Such information may have a significant, and potentially unpredictable impact on the Company’s future financial results.

    Conference Call Information:

    Global-e will host a conference call at 8:00 a.m. ET on Wednesday, May 14, 2025.
    The call will be available, live, to interested parties by dialing:

    United States/Canada Toll Free: 1-800-717-1738
    International Toll: 1-646-307-1865
       

    A live webcast will also be available in the Investor Relations section of Global-E’s website at: https://investors.global-e.com/news-events/events-presentations

    Approximately two hours after completion of the live call, an archived version of the webcast will be available on the Investor Relations section of the Company’s web site and will remain available for approximately 30 calendar days.

    The press release with the financial results will be accessible on the Company’s Investor Relations website prior to the conference call.

    Non-GAAP Financial Measures and Key Operating Metrics

    To supplement Global-e’s financial information presented in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles in the United States of America, or GAAP, Global-e considers certain financial measures and key performance metrics that are not prepared in accordance with GAAP including:

    • Non-GAAP gross profit, which Global-e defines as gross profit adjusted for amortization of acquired intangibles. Non-GAAP gross margin is calculated as Non-GAAP gross profit divided by revenues
    • Adjusted EBITDA, which Global-e defines as net profit (loss) adjusted for income tax (benefit) expenses, financial expenses (income) net, stock based compensation expenses, depreciation and amortization, commercial agreements amortization, amortization of acquired intangibles, merger related contingent consideration, and acquisition related expenses.
    • Free Cash Flow, which Global-e defines as net cash provided by operating activities less the purchase of property and equipment.

    Global-e also uses Gross Merchandise Value (GMV) as a key operating metric. Gross Merchandise Value or GMV is defined as the combined amount we collect from the shopper and the merchant for all components of a given transaction, including products, duties and taxes and shipping.

    The aforementioned key performance indicators and non-GAAP financial measures are used, in conjunction with GAAP measures, by management and our board of directors to assess our performance, including the preparation of Global-e’s annual operating budget and quarterly forecasts, for financial and operational decision-making, to evaluate the effectiveness of Global-e’s business strategies, and as a means to evaluate period-to-period comparisons. These measures are frequently used by analysts, investors and other interested parties to evaluate companies in our industry. We believe that these non-GAAP financial measures are appropriate measures of operating performance because they remove the impact of certain items that we believe do not directly reflect our core operations, and permit investors to view performance using the same tools that we use to budget, forecast, make operating and strategic decisions, and evaluate historical performance.

    Global-e’s definition of Non-GAAP measures may differ from the definition used by other companies and therefore comparability may be limited. In addition, other companies may not publish these metrics or similar metrics. Furthermore, these metrics have certain limitations in that they do not include the impact of certain expenses that are reflected in our consolidated statement of operations that are necessary to run our business. Thus, Non-GAAP measures should be considered in addition to, not as substitutes for, or in isolation from, measures prepared in accordance with GAAP.

    For more information on the non-GAAP financial measures, please see the reconciliation tables provided below. The accompanying reconciliation tables have more details on the GAAP financial measures that are most directly comparable to non-GAAP financial measures and the related reconciliations between these financial measures.

    Cautionary Note Regarding Forward Looking Statements

    This press release contains estimates and forward-looking statements within the meaning of the U.S. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. We intend such forward-looking statements to be covered by the safe harbor provisions for forward-looking statements as contained in Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”). All statements contained in this press release other than statements of historical fact, including, without limitation, statements regarding our future strategy and projected revenue, GMV, Adjusted EBITDA and other future financial and operational results, growth strategy and plans and objectives of management for future operations, including, among others, expansion in new and existing markets, the launch of large enterprise merchants, and our ongoing partnership with Shopify, are forward-looking statements. As the words “may,” “might,” “will,” “could,” “would,” “should,” “expect,” “plan,” “anticipate,” “intend,” “target,” “seek,” “believe,” “estimate,” “predict,” “potential,” “continue,” “contemplate,” “possible” or the negative of these terms or other similar expressions are intended to identify forward-looking statements, though not all forward-looking statements use these words or expressions. Forward-looking statements are predictions, projections and other statements about future events that are based on current expectations and assumptions and, as a result, are subject to risks and uncertainties. Global-e believes there is a reasonable basis for its expectations and beliefs, but they are inherently uncertain. Many factors could cause actual future events to differ materially from the forward-looking statements in this announcement, including but not limited to, our rapid growth and growth rates in recent periods may not be indicative of future growth; our ability to retain existing merchants and to attract new merchants; our ability to anticipate merchant needs or develop or integrate new functionality or enhance our existing platforms to meet those needs; the impact of imposed tariffs or other trade regulations on our business and financial results; our ability to implement and use artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies successfully; our ability to compete in our industry; our reliance on third-parties, including our ability to realize the benefits of any strategic alliances, joint ventures, or partnership arrangements and to integrate our platforms with third-party platforms; our ability to adapt our platform and services for the Shopify platforms; our ability to develop or maintain the functionality of our platforms, including real or perceived errors, failures, vulnerabilities, or bugs in our platforms; our history of net losses; our ability to manage our growth and manage expansion into additional markets and the introduction of new platforms and offerings; our ability to accommodate increased volumes during peak seasons and events; our ability to effectively expand our marketing and sales capabilities; our expectations regarding our revenue, expenses and operations; our ability to operate internationally; our reliance on third-party services, including third-party providers of cross-docking services and third-party data centers, in our platforms and services and harm to our reputation by our merchants’ or third-party service providers’ unethical business practices; our operation as a merchant of record for sales conducted using our platform; regulatory requirements and additional fees related to payment transactions through our e-commerce platforms could be costly and difficult to comply with; compliance and third-party risks related to anti-money laundering, anti-corruption, anti-bribery, regulations, economic sanctions and export control laws and import regulations and restrictions; our business’s reliance on the personal importation model; our ability to securely store personal information of merchants and shoppers; increases in shipping rates; fluctuations in the exchange rate of foreign currencies has impacted and could continue to impact our results of operations; our ability to offer high quality support; our ability to expand the number of merchants using our platforms and increase our GMV and to enhance our reputation and awareness of our platforms; our ability to adapt to emerging or evolving regulatory developments, changing laws, regulations, standards and technological changes related to privacy, data protection, data security and machine learning technology and generative artificial intelligence evolves; our role in the fulfilment chain of the merchants, which may cause third parties to confuse us with the merchants; our ability to establish and protect intellectual property rights; and our use of open-source software which may pose particular risks to our proprietary software technologies; our dependency on our executive officers and other key employees and our ability to hire and retain skilled key personnel, including our ability to enforce non-compete agreements we enter into with our employees; litigation for a variety of claims which we may be subject to; the adoption by merchants of a D2C model; our anticipated cash needs and our estimates regarding our capital requirements and our needs for additional financing; our ability to maintain our corporate culture; our ability to maintain an effective system of disclosure controls and internal control over financial reporting; our ability to accurately estimate judgments relating to our critical accounting policies; changes in tax laws or regulations to which we are subject, including the enactment of legislation implementing changes in taxation of international business activities and the adoption of other corporate tax reform policies; requirements to collect sales or other taxes relating to the use of our platforms and services in jurisdictions where we have not historically done so; global events or conditions in individual markets such as financial and credit market fluctuations, war, climate change, and macroeconomic events; risks relating to our ordinary shares, including our share price, the concentration of our share ownership with insiders, our status as a foreign private issuer, provisions of Israeli law and our amended and restated articles of association and actions of activist shareholders; risks related to our incorporation and location in Israel, including risks related to the ongoing war and related hostilities; and the other risks and uncertainties described in Global-e’s Annual Report on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2024, filed with the SEC on March 27, 2025 and other documents filed with or furnished by Global-e from time to time with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”). The foregoing list of factors is not exhaustive. You should carefully consider the foregoing factors. These filings identify and address other important risks and uncertainties that could cause actual events and results to differ materially from those contained in the forward-looking statements. These statements reflect management’s current expectations regarding future events and operating performance and speak only as of the date of this press release. Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date they are made. Readers are cautioned not to put undue reliance on forward-looking statements Although we believe that the expectations reflected in the forward-looking statements are reasonable, we cannot guarantee that future results, levels of activity, performance and events and circumstances reflected in the forward-looking statements will be achieved or will occur. We undertake no obligation to update any forward-looking statements made in this press release to reflect events or circumstances after the date of this press release or to reflect new information or the occurrence of unanticipated events, except as required by law. We may not actually achieve the plans, intentions or expectations disclosed in our forward-looking statements, and you should not place undue reliance on our forward-looking statements.

    About Global-E Online Ltd.

    Global-e (Nasdaq: GLBE) is the world’s leading platform enabling and accelerating global, Direct-To-Consumer e-commerce. The chosen partner of over 1,400 brands and retailers across the North America, EMEA and APAC, Global-e makes selling internationally as simple as selling domestically. The company enables merchants to increase the conversion of international traffic into sales by offering online shoppers in over 200 destinations worldwide a seamless, localized shopping experience. Global-e’s end-to-end e-commerce solutions combine best-in-class localization capabilities, big-data best-practice business intelligence models, streamlined international logistics and vast global e-commerce experience, enabling international shoppers to buy seamlessly online and retailers to sell to, and from, anywhere in the world. For more information, please visit: www.global-e.com.

    Investor Contact:
    Alan Katz
    Vice President, Investor Relations
    IR@global-e.com

    Press Contact:
    Sarah Schloss
    Headline Media
    Globale@headline.media 
    +1 786-233-7684

    Global-E Online Ltd.
    CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS
    (In thousands)
     
        Period Ended
         December 31,     March 31, 
         2024     2025 
          (Audited)        (Unaudited)  
    Assets                
    Current assets:                
    Cash and cash equivalents   $ 254,620     $ 207,716  
    Short-term deposits     183,475       183,229  
    Accounts receivable, net     41,171       34,700  
    Prepaid expenses and other current assets     84,613       116,967  
    Marketable securities     36,345       53,888  
    Funds receivable, including cash in banks     122,984       87,484  
    Total current assets     723,208       683,984  
    Property and equipment, net     10,440       10,453  
    Operating lease right-of-use assets     24,429       23,365  
    Deferred contract acquisition and fulfillment costs, noncurrent     3,787       3,836  
    Long-term investments and other long-term assets     8,313       8,213  
    Commercial agreement asset     66,527        29,510  
    Goodwill     367,566        367,566  
    Intangible assets, net     59,212        54,810  
    Total long-term assets     540,274       497,753  
    Total assets   $ 1,263,482     $ 1,181,737  
    Liabilities and Shareholders’ Equity                
    Current liabilities:                
    Accounts payable   $ 79,559     $ 67,184  
    Accrued expenses and other current liabilities     141,551       117,852  
    Funds payable to Customers     122,984       87,484  
    Short term operating lease liabilities     4,347       4,366  
    Total current liabilities     348,441       276,886  
    Long-term liabilities:                
    Long term operating lease liabilities     20,510       19,508  
    Other long-term liabilities     1,098       1,088  
    Total liabilities   $ 370,049     $ 297,482  
                     
    Shareholders’ equity:                
    Share capital and additional paid-in capital     1,425,317       1,434,341  
    Accumulated comprehensive income (loss)     515       169  
    Accumulated deficit     (532,399 )     (550,255 )
    Total shareholders’ equity     893,433       884,255  
    Total liabilities and shareholders’ equity   $ 1,263,482     $ 1,181,737  
                     
    Global-E Online Ltd.
    CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS
    (In thousands, except share and per share data)
     
        Three Months Ended  
        March 31,  
        2024     2025  
        (Unaudited)  
    Revenue   $ 145,873     $ 189,882  
    Cost of revenue     82,587       105,798  
    Gross profit     63,286       84,084  
                     
    Operating expenses:                
    Research and development     23,538       28,138  
    Sales and marketing     56,955       63,938  
    General and administrative     12,054       11,193  
    Total operating expenses     92,547       103,269  
    Operating profit (loss)     (29,261 )     (19,185 )
    Financial expenses (income), net     3,510       (1,870 )
    Loss before income taxes     (32,771 )     (17,315 )
    Income taxes     (720 )     541  
    Net earnings (loss) attributable to ordinary shareholders   $ (32,051 )   $ (17,856 )
    Basic and diluted net loss per share attributable to ordinary shareholders   $ (0.19 )     (0.11 )
    Basic and diluted weighted average ordinary shares     166,187,424       169,346,771  
    Global-E Online Ltd.
    CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF CASH FLOWS
    (In thousands)
     
        Three Months Ended  
        March 31,  
        2024   2025
        (Unaudited)  
    Operating activities                
    Net loss   $ (32,051 )   $ (17,856 )
    Adjustments to reconcile net loss to net cash provided by operating activities:                
    Depreciation and amortization     512       536  
    Share-based compensation expense     8,711       8,793  
    Commercial agreement asset amortization     36,296       37,017  
    Intangible assets amortization     5,002       4,402  
    Changes in accrued interest and exchange rate on short-term deposits     369       (842 )
    Unrealized loss (gain) on foreign currency     2,726       (1,477 )
    Accounts receivable     8,418       6,471  
    Prepaid expenses and other assets     2,685       (28,405 )
    Funds receivable     (7,688 )     (9,182 )
    Long-term receivables     708       101  
    Funds payable to customers     (30,857 )     (35,500 )
    Operating lease ROU assets     817       1,064  
    Deferred contract acquisition and fulfillment costs     (268 )     (101 )
    Accounts payable     (17,049 )     (12,375 )
    Accrued expenses and other liabilities     (30,228 )     (23,710 )
    Deferred tax liabilities     (1,424 )      
    Operating lease liabilities     (944 )     (983 )
    Net cash (used in) provided by operating activities     (54,265 )     (72,047 )
    Investing activities                
    Investment in marketable securities     (1,042 )     (17,768 )
    Proceeds from marketable securities     1,012       999  
    Investment in short-term investments and deposits     (56,949 )     (70,972 )
    Proceeds from short-term investments     58,000       67,059  
    Investment in long-term deposits     (31 )      
    Purchases of property and equipment     (882 )     (548 )
    Net cash (used in) provided by investing activities     108       (21,230 )
    Financing activities                
    Proceeds from exercise of share options     120       210  
    Net cash provided by financing activities     120       210  
    Exchange rate differences on balances of cash, cash equivalents and restricted cash     (2,726 )     1,477  
    Net increase (decrease) in cash, cash equivalents, and restricted cash     (56,763 )     (91,590 )
    Cash and cash equivalents and restricted cash—beginning of period     268,597       331,682  
    Cash and cash equivalents and restricted cash—end of period   $ 211,834     $ 240,092  
    Global-E Online Ltd.
    SELECTED OTHER DATA
    (In thousands)
     
        Three Months Ended  
        March 31,  
        2024
      2025  
        (Unaudited)  
    Key performance metrics      
    Gross Merchandise Value     929,510               1,242,514            
    Adjusted EBITDA (a)     21,260               31,563            
                                       
    Revenue by Category                                  
    Service fees     68,258       47 %     83,983       44 %  
    Fulfillment services     77,615       53 %     105,899       56 %  
    Total revenue   $ 145,873       100 %   $ 189,882       100 %  
                                       
    Revenue by merchant outbound region                                  
    United States     72,112       49 %     100,554       53 %  
    United Kingdom     41,276       28 %     41,747       22 %  
    European Union     26,343       18 %     33,530       18 %  
    Israel     316       0 %     401       0 %  
    Other     5,826       4 %     13,650       7 %  
    Total revenue   $ 145,873       100 %   $ 189,882       100 %  

    (a) See reconciliation to adjusted EBITDA table

    Global-E Online Ltd.
    RECONCILIATION TO Non-GAAP GROSS PROFIT
    (In thousands)
     
        Three Months Ended  
        March 31,  
          2024       2025  
        (Unaudited)  
    Gross profit     63,286       84,084  
                     
    Amortization of acquired intangibles included in cost of revenue     2,796       2,198  
    Non-GAAP gross profit     66,082       86,282  
    Global-E Online Ltd.
    RECONCILIATION TO ADJUSTED EBITDA
    (In thousands)
     
        Three Months Ended  
        March 31,  
        2024
      2025
        (Unaudited)  
    Net profit (loss)     (32,051 )     (17,856 )
    Income tax (benefit) expenses     (720 )     541  
    Financial expenses (income), net     3,510       (1,870 )
    Stock-based compensation:                
    Cost of revenue     180       267  
    Research and development     3,468       3,625  
    Selling and marketing     1,282       1,438  
    General and administrative     3,781       3,463  
    Total stock-based compensation     8,711       8,793  
                     
    Depreciation and amortization     512       536  
                     
    Commercial agreement asset amortization     36,296       37,017  
                     
    Amortization of acquired intangibles     5,002       4,402  
    Adjusted EBITDA     21,260       31,563  
    Global-E Online Ltd.
    RECONCILIATION TO Free Cash Flow
    (In thousands)
     
        Three Months Ended  
        March 31,  
          2024       2025  
        (Unaudited)  
    Net cash (used in) provided by operating activities     (54,265 )     (72,047 )
    Purchase of property and equipment     (882 )     (548 )
    Free Cash Flow     (55,147 )     (72,595 )

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Survey of market expectations 5-7 May 2025

    Source: Central Bank of Iceland

    The Central Bank of Iceland conducted a survey of market agents’ expectations over the period from 5 through 7 May 2025. A total of 39 agents in the bond market, including banks, pension funds, mutual and investment funds, securities brokers, licensed asset management firms, and insurance firms were invited to participate. Responses were received from 25 market participants, giving a response ratio of 64%.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Alternative Budget – Green’s Budget Gets Thumbs Up from Tax Reform Group

    Source: Better Taxes for a Better Future Campaign

    The Better Taxes for a Better Future Campaign welcomes the Green Party’s alternative budget released today, for recognising the need to grow revenue and ensuring that those who can afford it get to contribute more.

    “The Green Budget recognises that we face enormous challenges as a country and we need to fund government better in order to respond to them,” says Glenn Barclay, spokesperson for the Better Taxes Campaign.

    “They also promote a range of new taxes that will help ensure that we all contribute according to our ability to pay.”

    “When compared to other countries like Denmark, Germany, Austria and France we are a low tax country. At the same time we face growing inequality, an enormous infrastructure deficit, the challenges of climate change, health services that are in crisis and public services that are struggling to cope. The need to increase government revenue is urgent,” says Glenn Barclay.

    The Green’s proposals include a wealth tax, a more progressive income tax (including a tax free threshold), reversing interest deductibility for rental properties, and raising the tax on corporations.  The Green Budget stops short of introducing a full capital gains tax but restores the Bright Line Test for taxing the capital gains on housing to 10 years.

    “These changes are important steps towards a more progressive tax system. They would help address the sources of inequality in our tax system while raising more revenue,” says Glenn Barclay.

    “The lack of a full capital gains tax is interesting and we would like to better understand the rationale for this, but we do welcome the restoration of the Bright Line Test as a step in the right direction.”

    “In many ways we are outliers when you look at countries we like to compare ourselves to and most of these initiatives will just bring us into line with them”.

    “We would also encourage all parties to consider tax system reforms to ensure that multinational companies operating in New Zealand are not escaping paying tax and improve tax transparency for more effective and efficient revenue gathering.”

    The Better taxes for a Better Future Campaign was launched in June 2023 with the support of 21 partner organisations. It is seeking a tax system that:

    Is fully transparent.
    Ensures people who have more to contribute make that contribution: that we gather more revenue from wealth, gains from wealth, all forms of income, and corporates.
    Makes greater use of fair taxes to promote good health and environmental health.
    Addresses the tax impact on the least well-off in our society.
    Raises more revenue to enable us to address the social, economic and environmental challenges we face.

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI: Com4 selects Nokia 5G Standalone Core to power global IoT services

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Press Release
    Com4 selects Nokia 5G Standalone Core to power global IoT services

    • Com4 selects Nokia 5G Standalone Core to power global IoT services with a secure, flexible IoT architecture that enables Com4 to meet the growing global demand for connected devices.
    • Nokia 5G Standalone Core’s automation and security accelerate new service delivery.

    14 May 2025
    Oslo, Norway – Com4, a full MVNO and part of the Wireless Logic Group, has selected Nokia as the main supplier for its new 5G Standalone Core. The new core enables Com4 to deliver secure, scalable IoT services globally and meet rising demand for low-latency, high-bandwidth connectivity.

    Nokia’s 5G Core solution supports all radio access technologies (2G to 5G SA), ensuring backward compatibility while enabling next-generation capabilities. It also supports fixed wireless access (FWA) and satellite-based broadband, making it a future-ready platform for IoT growth.

    Com4 serves a wide range of industries—including energy, transport, health, and security—where secure, reliable connectivity is critical. Nokia’s flexible architecture allows Com4 to deploy advanced features such as:

    • Support for LPWA technologies: LTE-M, NB-IoT, and RedCap.
    • SIM-level service control and multi-IMSI functionality for network redundancy and global customization.
    • Appliance-based edge gateways for localized deployment and compliance with data sovereignty rules.
    • Advanced MPLS support for scalable IP/MPLS integration.
    • A robust platform for secure VPNs, cloud interconnects, and full-stack service management.
    • Full API support for automation and orchestration of advanced B2B services.

    Nokia’s full-stack Core includes Packet Core, Policy Control, Charging, Subscriber Data Management, and the Nokia Cloud Platform , which integrates Red Hat OpenShift*, the industry’s leading hybrid cloud application platform powered by Kubernetes.

    “Enterprise IoT demands more than connectivity. It requires flexibility and security built-in,” says Martin Nord, CTO and CPO at Com4. “With this core, we can customize services per device, control deployments globally, and respond faster to new market needs.”

    “IoT service providers are becoming a major part of mobile core growth with unique requirements. Nokia’s 5G Core provides strong and cost-effective capabilities tailored to IoT – from new capabilities to enable global IoT device roaming to onboarding millions of devices. These features help providers like Com4 shape and scale their services with greater accuracy and less complexity,” said Erez Sverdlov, Vice President, Cloud and Network Services’ Market Leader for Europe at Nokia.

    This deployment strengthens Com4’s ability to serve enterprise customers while reinforcing Nokia’s role as a key technology partner in the evolution of IoT connectivity.

    *Red Hat and OpenShift are trademarks or registered trademarks of Red Hat, Inc. or its subsidiaries in the U.S. and other countries.

    Multimedia, technical information and related news

    Web Page: Nokia Cloud Packet Core (CPC)

    About Nokia
    At Nokia, we create technology that helps the world act together.

    As a B2B technology innovation leader, we are pioneering networks that sense, think and act by leveraging our work across mobile, fixed and cloud networks. In addition, we create value with intellectual property and long-term research, led by the award-winning Nokia Bell Labs, which is celebrating 100 years of innovation.

    With truly open architectures that seamlessly integrate into any ecosystem, our high-performance networks create new opportunities for monetization and scale. Service providers, enterprises and partners worldwide trust Nokia to deliver secure, reliable and sustainable networks today – and work with us to create the digital services and applications of the future.

    About Com4
    Com4, part of the Wireless Logic Group, is a leading provider of IoT connectivity solutions, dedicated to helping customers succeed through the power of IoT connectivity. With a focus on delivering cutting-edge solutions, Com4 offers full-stack global IoT connectivity tailored to match each customer’s unique goals. The company’s highly competent IoT specialists provide personalized advice and insights, ensuring customers receive the most fitting solutions with Nordic quality and reliability standards, European customer-centricity, and global reach.

    Media inquiries
    Nokia Press Office
    Email: Press.Services@nokia.com

    Stein Andre Larner, CEO, Com4
    Email: stein.andre.larner@com4.no
    Phone: +47 47 90 07 77

    Martin Nord, CTO & CPO, Com4
    Email: martin.nord@com4.no
    Phone: +47 94049404

    Follow Nokia on social media
    LinkedIn X Instagram Facebook YouTube

    Follow Com4 on social media
    LinkedIn X YouTube

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Australia: New generation of skin substitutes give hope to severe burns patients

    Source:

    14 May 2025

    A dermal matrix – one of the latest advancements to regenerate skin after severe burns.

    Severe burns remain one of the most challenging injuries to treat, causing high disease and death rates worldwide, but Australian researchers have flagged some promising new approaches that could save lives and dramatically improve patient recovery.

    In a comprehensive review published in Advanced Therapeutics, researchers from the University of South Australia (UniSA), University of Adelaide and Royal Adelaide Hospital (RAH) explore the latest advancements in dermal substitutes – biochemicals used to replace damaged skin – with a particular focus on combating infection and enhancing tissue regeneration following catastrophic burns.

    The researchers say that despite decades of progress, traditional treatments such as skin grafting often fail to provide adequate healing and infection control, leading to prolonged hospital stays and soaring healthcare costs.

    According to the lead authors Dr Zlatko Kopecki and Dr Bronwyn Dearman, the urgency to develop safer, more effective solutions has never been greater.

    “Infections are a major cause of complications and mortality in burn patients,” says Dr Kopecki, a Research Fellow at UniSA’s Future Industries Institute.

    “We must innovate beyond conventional methods and develop therapies that regenerate tissue while actively preventing infections.”

    Each year, approximately 2423 Australians are admitted to hospital with burn-related injuries, 74% of whom require surgery, including a skin graft. Globally, 180,000 people die from burns each year, and approximately 10 million are hospitalised, costing healthcare systems $112 billion worldwide.

    The review highlights that while many commercial skin substitutes exist, very few offer integrated antimicrobial protection – a critical factor given the vulnerability of burn wounds to bacterial invasion and sepsis.

    The paper discusses emerging technologies such as Kerecis, a novel fish skin graft with inherent antimicrobial properties, and NovoSorb BTM, a synthetic biodegradable matrix that resists bacterial colonisation without relying on antibiotics.

    Both products represent a new generation of dermal substitutes with enhanced potential to protect and heal complex burns.

    Kerecis comes from wild Atlantic cod, caught from a sustainable fish stock in pristine Icelandic waters and processed using renewable energy. It stands out for retaining natural omega-3 fatty acids, which have strong antimicrobial effects and promote wound healing.

    Meanwhile, NovoSorb BTM’s unique polyurethane matrix offers structural resilience even in infected wounds, providing a vital scaffold for tissue regeneration.

    “These materials demonstrate a shift towards multifunctional therapies that combine structural support with infection resistance,” says Dr Dearman, Principal Medical Scientist for the Skin Engineering Laboratory at the RAH and an Adjunct Lecturer at the University of Adelaide.

    “Such innovations are crucial, particularly as antibiotic-resistant infections continue to rise globally,” she says.

    The review calls for the next wave of research to integrate active antimicrobial agents directly into 3D dermal scaffolds that support cell growth, reducing the reliance on antibiotics and temporary dressings.

    Beyond infection control, the research points to scarless healing as the future frontier of burn care.

    By combining smart biomaterials with cell-based therapies, scientists aim to regenerate skin that restores its full function – an outcome that could revolutionise the recovery for millions of burn survivors worldwide.

    The research team includes experts from the Future Industries Institute at UniSA, the Adult Burn Service at the Royal Adelaide Hospital, and the Faculty of Health and Medical Sciences at the University of Adelaide.

    …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

    Contact for interview: Dr Zlatko Kopecki E: zlatko.kopecki@unisa.edu.au
    Media contact: Candy Gibson M: +61 434 605 142 E: candy.gibson@unisa.edu.au

    Other articles you may be interested in

    MIL OSI News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Government increases support for sexual and reproductive health and rights by SEK 75 million

    Source: Government of Sweden

    Growing political opposition around the world to sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR), especially abortion, risks having extremely serious consequences for women and girls. The Government has therefore approved an additional SEK 75 million to the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: New Government assignment to focus on increasing professional and geographical labour mobility

    Source: Government of Sweden

    Although unemployment is high in Sweden, employers all over the country are looking for new employees with the right skills. For this reason, both the professional and geographical labour mobility of jobseekers need to increase. The Government has now tasked Arbetsförmedlingen (the Swedish Public Employment) Service to further develop the control of this.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – 2023 and 2024 reports on Türkiye – P10_TA(2025)0092 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the European Council conclusions of 17 and 18 April 2024, 30 June 2023, 23 June 2022, 24 June 2021 and 12 December 2019, and to all relevant previous Council and European Council conclusions,

    –  having regard to Türkiye’s membership of the Council of Europe and NATO,

    –  having regard to the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey on the readmission of persons residing without authorisation(1) (EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement),

    –  having regard to the statement of the members of the European Council of 25 March 2021 on Türkiye,

    –  having regard to the ‘EU-Turkey statements’ of 18 March 2016 and 29 November 2015,

    –  having regard to the ‘Turkey Negotiating Framework’ of 3 October 2005,

    –  having regard to the declaration issued by the European Community and its Member States on 21 September 2005 following the declaration made by Turkey upon its signature of the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement on 29 July 2005,

    –  having regard to the Council conclusions of December 2006 and March 2020, and to the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council in Copenhagen of 21-22 June 1993, also known as the Copenhagen Criteria,

    –  having regard to the Council conclusions on Enlargement of 17 December 2024 and of 12 December 2023,

    –  having regard to the International Law of the Sea and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 on EU enlargement policy (COM(2024)0690) and to the accompanying Türkiye 2024 Report (SWD(2024)0696),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 on EU enlargement policy (COM(2023)0690) and to the accompanying Türkiye 2023 Report (SWD(2023)0696),

    –  having regard to Special report 06/2024 of the European Court of Auditors of 24 April 2024 entitled ‘The Facility for Refugees in Turkey – Beneficial for refugees and host communities, but impact and sustainability not yet ensured’,

    –  having regard to the joint communications from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Council of 29 November 2023 (JOIN(2023)0050) and of 22 March 2021 (JOIN(2021)0008) on the state of play of EU-Türkiye political, economic and trade relations,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 19 December 2024 entitled ‘Eighth Annual Report of the Facility for Refugees in Türkiye’ (COM(2024)0593),

    –  having regard to the fundamental principles of international law and to the Charter of the United Nations, the 1977 and the 1979 High-Level Agreements between the leaders of the two communities, and the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council on Cyprus, including Resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964, which reaffirms the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, Resolution 550 (1984) of 11 May 1984 on secessionist actions in Cyprus, Resolution 789 (1992) of 25 November 1992, and Resolution 2537 (2020) on the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP),

    –  having regard to Article 46 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which states that the contracting parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in any case to which they are parties, and to the ensuing obligation of Türkiye to implement all judgments of the ECtHR,

    –  having regard to the relevant resolutions of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe,

    –  having regard to the 2025 Freedom in the World report published by Freedom House,

    –  having regard to the 2024 World Press Freedom Index published by Reporters Without Borders,

    –  having regard to the January 2025 prison statistics report published by the Civil Society in the Penal System Association (CISST) and to the 2024 country profile for Türkiye published by Prison Insider,

    –  having regard to the Global Gender Gap Report 2024 published by the World Economic Forum,

    –  having regard to recent reports of the We Will Stop Femicide Platform (Kadın Cinayetlerini Durduracağız Platformu),

    –  having regard to the UNESCO statement on Hagia Sophia of 10 July 2020, and to the relevant UNESCO World Heritage Committee decisions 44 COM 7B.58 (2021) and 45 COM 7B.58 (2023), adopted in its 44th and 45th sessions respectively,

    –  having regard to its previous resolutions on Türkiye, in particular those of 13 September 2023 on the 2022 Commission Report on Türkiye(2), of 7 June 2022 on the 2021 Commission Report on Turkey(3), and of 26 November 2020 on escalating tensions in Varosha following the illegal actions by Türkiye and the urgent need for the resumption of talks(4),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement(5),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 15 April 2015 on the centenary of the Armenian Genocide(6),

    –  having regard to its resolutions of 5 May 2022 on the case of Osman Kavala in Turkey(7), of 10 October 2024 on the case of Bülent Mumay in Türkiye(8) and of 13 February 2025 on recent dismissals and arrests of mayors in Türkiye(9),

    –  having regard to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s visit to Ankara in December 2024,

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0067/2025),

    A.  whereas Türkiye remains a candidate for EU accession, and EU membership remains the repeatedly declared political goal of the Turkish Government, although the gap with the values and interests of the EU is growing; whereas EU accession negotiations have effectively been at a standstill since 2018, owing to the deterioration of the rule of law and democracy in Türkiye;

    B.  whereas any accession country is expected to respect democratic values, the rule of law and human rights, and to abide by EU law; whereas Türkiye needs to credibly demonstrate its commitment to closer relations and alignment with the European Union in order to reinvigorate its European perspective; whereas being a candidate country presumes a willingness to progressively approach and align with the EU in all aspects, including values, interests, standards and policies, inter alia with its common foreign and security policy, to respect and uphold the Copenhagen criteria, and to pursue and maintain good neighbourly relations with the EU and all of its Member States without discrimination; whereas the tensions between the EU and Türkiye in relation to the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean have de-escalated but not ceased; whereas Türkiye has repeatedly been asked to refrain from all actions which violate the sovereignty and sovereign rights of all EU Member States and are in breach of international and EU law;

    C.  whereas the 2023 Commission progress report on Türkiye painted a picture of continued backsliding, while its latest progress report of 2024 appears to present a slightly more positive overall picture of progress on enlargement-related reforms in Türkiye, such as in the area of economic and monetary policies; whereas this cannot, however, be applied to the core matters related to democracy and fundamental rights, which have deteriorated even further since the release of the Commission’s latest report; whereas the gap between Türkiye and the EU’s values and normative framework has therefore remained unaddressed during the recent period with the persistent use of laws and measures aimed at curtailing the rule of law and human rights, fundamental freedoms and civil liberties;

    D.  whereas the joint communication on the state of play of EU-Türkiye relations of 29 November 2023 struck a more positive note, putting forward a set of recommendations on cooperating in areas of joint interest in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner and based on the established conditionalities; whereas only a few concrete steps in line with the commitments therein have been taken so far; whereas the April 2024 European Council mandated Coreper to advance in the implementation of this joint communication; whereas nevertheless this joint communication has not yet received a clear political endorsement by the Council;

    E.  whereas Türkiye is a member of the Council of Europe and is therefore bound by the judgments of the ECtHR; whereas owing to its failure to apply landmark ECtHR rulings, Türkiye is currently facing historical infringement proceedings; whereas Türkiye consistently ranks among the countries most frequently found in violation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms protected by the European Convention on Human Rights; whereas as of late November 2024, Türkiye had the highest number of pending cases before the ECtHR, with 22 450 applications, representing 36,7 % of the Court’s total caseload of 61 250 applications;

    F.  whereas Türkiye is classified as ‘not free’ by Freedom House and has experienced one of the worst declines in the level of freedom in the world in the past 10 years; whereas Türkiye ranks 158th out of 180 countries in the 2024 World Press Freedom Index; whereas the Turkish Government has closed dozens of media outlets, routinely blocks online articles, is reported to control 85 % of national media and uses its state agency Anadolu as an organ of propaganda;

    G.  whereas the Turkish constitution provides for sufficient protection of fundamental rights, but the practice of the institutions and the critical state of the judiciary, including the lack of respect for Constitutional Court rulings, are the main reasons for the dire situation of the rule of law and human rights in the country, issues repeatedly described in the reports of the EU, the Council of Europe and international organisations;

    H.  whereas Türkiye has the highest incarceration rate and the largest prison population of all Council of Europe Member States, with an overcrowded prison population that has grown by 439 % between 2005 and 2023 and currently represents more than a third of all inmates of Council of Europe countries;

    I.  whereas Türkiye is ranked 127th out of 146 countries in the 2024 Global Gender Gap Index, underscoring severe gender inequality and systemic failures in protecting women’s rights; whereas according to the 2024 report of the We Will Stop Femicide Platform (Kadın Cinayetlerini Durduracağız Platformu), 394 women were murdered by men and 259 women were found dead in suspicious circumstances in Türkiye in 2024, the highest number recorded since the civil society group started collecting data in 2010; whereas in its 2023 report, the platform noted that 315 women were killed by men, and 248 women were found dead in suspicious circumstances;

    J.  whereas in recent months, Türkiye has taken steps towards the resumption of a process for a peaceful resolution of the Kurdish question; whereas on 27 February 2025 jailed militant leader Abdullah Öcalan called on his Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to disarm and disband, providing a historic opportunity to end the Turkish-Kurdish conflict; whereas these efforts have been accompanied by increasing repression and the curtailment of the powers of democratic local governments, including the dismissal of elected Kurdish and other opposition mayors;

    K.  whereas, alongside being a candidate for EU accession, Türkiye is a NATO ally and a key partner in the areas of trade, economic relations, security, the fight against terrorism, and migration; whereas Türkiye continues to play a key role in the region, acts as a bridge between Europe and Asia, and remains a key partner for the stability of the wider East Mediterranean region; whereas Türkiye continues to play a significant role in the Syrian conflict and maintains a military presence in northern Syria;

    L.  whereas Türkiye has not aligned with EU sanctions against Russia; whereas trade between Türkiye and Russia has nearly doubled since the EU’s imposition of sanctions against Russia; whereas despite some steps taken, Türkiye has not prevented its territory from being used to circumvent EU sanctions against Russia;

    M.  whereas the 2024 Commission progress report on Türkiye states that, as at 30 September 2024, the country maintained a very low alignment rate of 5 % with relevant statements of the High Representative on behalf of the EU and with relevant Council decisions, compared to 9 % in 2023;

    N.  whereas Türkiye is the EU’s fifth largest trade partner, and the EU is Türkiye’s largest trading partner by far, as well as its primary source of foreign direct investment;

    O.  whereas in the past year, the level of engagement between the EU and Türkiye has increased in terms of both technical and high-level meetings in sectoral areas;

    P.  whereas Türkiye has applied for membership of BRICS+ and shown interest in joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO);

    Q.  whereas following a period of unorthodox economic policy, Türkiye has implemented a tighter monetary policy over the past year leading to a reduction in external imbalances and a moderation of inflationary pressures;

    R.  whereas in March 2025 the Turkish Government spent at least USD 10 billion of its currency reserves to counteract the collapse of its financial markets and the devaluation of the lira caused by its decision to arrest and detain Mayor of Istanbul and prominent opposition politician Ekrem İmamoğlu; whereas the Turkish Government’s undermining of Turkish democracy and the rule of law creates an unfavourable environment for foreign direct investment and hence weakens the Turkish economy, with grave consequences for the socio-economic situation of Turkish citizens;

    S.  whereas Türkiye hosts the largest refugee population in the world, with around 3,1 million registered refugees, mainly from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan; whereas since 2011 the EU has directed more than EUR 10 billion to assisting refugees and host communities in Türkiye; whereas according to a credible investigative report by Lighthouse Reports and eight media partners, the EU is funding removal centres in Türkiye implicated in the detention, abuse and forced deportations of refugees under the guise of voluntary return;

    T.  whereas in addition to the emergency assistance coordinated via the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, with an estimated financial value of EUR 38 million, the EU provided EUR 78,2 million in humanitarian aid for the earthquake response in 2023, and EUR 26 million in humanitarian aid in 2024; whereas the EU signed an additional EUR 400 million in assistance under the EU Solidarity Fund to finance recovery operations following the devastating earthquake;

    U.  whereas Türkiye has systematically misused counterterrorism laws to target elected officials, opposition politicians, journalists and human rights defenders, among others;

    Commitment to EU accession

    1.  Recognises the long-standing aspirations of Turkish civil society regarding accession to the European Union; welcomes the Turkish Government’s recent statements reiterating its commitment to EU membership as a strategic goal amid an effort to revitalise EU-Türkiye relations in line with relevant European Council conclusions in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner; recognises the EU’s commitment to fostering this engagement through enhanced dialogue and cooperation but encourages it to review its expectations for engagement in the foreseeable future, in light of the deterioration of democratic standards that has been pushing the country towards an authoritarian model over the past decade, accelerating recently with the politically motivated arrest of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s main political opponent, Mayor of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality Ekrem İmamoğlu;

    2.  Stresses that EU membership is contingent on fulfilling the accession (Copenhagen) criteria, which require stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and the protection of minorities, good neighbourly relations, respect for international law and alignment with the EU CFSP; further notes that these are absolute criteria, not issues subject to transactional strategic considerations and negotiations; stresses that recognition of all Member States is a necessary component of the accession process;

    3.  Regrets, in this regard, that the aforementioned positive statements have not been accompanied by any concrete actions by the Turkish authorities to close the persistent and vast gap between Türkiye and the EU on values and standards, particularly with regard to the fundamentals of the accession process; reiterates its previously adopted conclusion that the Turkish Government continues to show, as it has done for the past few years, a clear lack of political will to carry out the necessary reforms to reactivate the accession process and continues to pursue a deeply entrenched authoritarian understanding of the presidential system;

    4.  Acknowledges the strategic and geopolitical importance of Türkiye, and its increasing presence and influence in areas critical to international security, such as the Black Sea region, including Ukraine, and the Middle East; reiterates that Türkiye is a strategic partner and NATO ally, and a country with which the EU has close relations in the areas of security, trade, economy and migration; welcomes closer cooperation between Türkiye and the EU, to which the Turkish Government has made frequent reference, but stresses that this cannot in any way be a substitute for the necessary real progress which Türkiye, as a candidate country, needs to make with regard to meeting the fundamental requirements for accession; highlights, in this regard, that there are no shortcuts in the accession process and that no argument can be put forward to avoid discussing the democratic principles which are at the core of the accession process;

    5.  Notes that the Commission’s Türkiye report 2024 paints a more positive picture of reform implementation in the context of Türkiye’s accession process than the Türkiye report 2023, shifting from further deterioration to ‘no progress’ with regard to the rule of law and human rights issues; is of the opinion, however, that at least in key areas such as democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights, this is due to the fact that a very low point had already been reached and this situation has remained unchanged;

    6.  Further takes note of a nuanced shift in focus of the Türkiye report 2024, by contrast with the 2023 report, away from the accession process towards a strategic partnership between the European Union und Türkiye; is of the opinion that the critical state of the accession process is driving the Commission and the Council to focus merely on the partnership dimension of the EU’s relations with Türkiye, as is also reflected in the joint communication on the state of play of EU-Türkiye relations of 29 November 2023, and of 22 March 2021; highlights the increasing shift towards a different framework for the relationship, which might come at the expense of the accession process;

    The core of the accession process: democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights

    7.  Considers that, in terms of human rights and the rule of law, Parliament’s recent resolutions on the matter remain valid in light of the continued dire human rights situation and democratic backsliding in Türkiye over the last year; fully endorses the latest resolutions of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the related report by its Monitoring Committee, as well as the resolutions adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which depict in detail the wide range of serious shortfalls in human rights constantly reported by locally and internationally renowned human rights organisations;

    8.  Notes the Turkish Government’s stated commitment to judicial reform and the introduction of measures of an organisational nature; highlights, however, the need to introduce structural measures ensuring judicial independence; deeply regrets that, despite a reform strategy with nine judicial reform packages, the state of independence of the judiciary in Türkiye remains desolate following systematic government interference in and political instrumentalisation of the judicial system; deplores, in this regard, the weakening of remaining constitutional review mechanisms, particularly individual applications, and the frequent violations of due process;

    9.  Is dismayed by the persecution of legal professionals, including most recently the lawsuit filed by the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office that resulted in the removal of the leadership of the Istanbul Bar Association on charges of ‘making propaganda for a terrorist organization’ and ‘publicly disseminating misleading information’ for having asked for an investigation into the murders of two Kurdish journalists in Syria, and in the imprisonment of one of the members of the Istanbul Bar Association’s executive board following his trip to Strasbourg to hold meetings with Council of Europe institutions;

    10.  Is alarmed by the blatant lack of implementation of decisions by the Constitutional Court, including in the case of MP Can Atalay, which has turned into a serious judicial crisis, with the Court of Cassation filing a criminal complaint against nine judges of the Constitutional Court; is worried by the recent decision of the Court of Cassation to overturn the sentences of and release the terrorists involved in the ISIS attack at Istanbul’s Atatürk Airport, which claimed 45 lives in 2016;

    11.  Calls on Türkiye to strengthen its commitment to democratic governance, especially through reforms that ensure an independent judiciary; takes notes of the recent announcement of the Fourth Judicial Reform Strategy, spanning 2025-2029; calls on the Turkish Government to move from the superficial changes made so far through the recurrent reform packages and action plans to a profound and long overdue reform that will address, through real political will, the serious and structural shortcomings of Türkiye’s judiciary; stresses that putting an end to political interference in the judiciary requires no strategy or reform package but merely the political will to do so;

    12.  Remains deeply concerned by the continued deterioration of democratic standards and relentless crackdown by the Turkish authorities on any critical voices by means of a growing battery of repressive laws, the regular misuse of counterterrorism laws, including their application in relation to minors (as in the ‘Kız Çocukları Davası’ trial), the disproportionate use of the crime of insulting a public official, the extensive use of secret witnesses and dormant cases in flawed judicial proceedings, and the recurrent practice of exaggerated night arrests and home raids to portray targeted persons as extremely dangerous;

    13.  Welcomes the withdrawal in November 2024 of the draft amendment to Türkiye’s espionage laws, known as the ‘agent of influence’ law; urges the Turkish authorities to refrain from reintroducing a similar overly broad and vague law in the future, given the serious risk that it would be used as a tool to further criminalise the legitimate activities of civil society organisations within the country; calls on the Turkish authorities to ensure that the recently approved cybersecurity bill will serve its legitimate purpose of protecting data privacy and national security without giving way to potential infringements of fundamental rights or becoming another tool for further repression; stresses that the judicial apparatus remains heavily restrictive, with a complex web of legislation serving as a tool to systematically control and silence any critical voice, such as the 2020 social media law, the 2021 anti-money laundering law and the 2022 disinformation law;

    14.  Is concerned by the recent approval of legal provisions granting extraordinary powers to the State Supervisory Council (DDK) and the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF), including the possibility for the former to dismiss public officials of all types and levels and appoint trustees, which could be used in an arbitrary manner;

    15.  Urges the Turkish authorities to put an end to the current serious restrictions on fundamental freedoms, in particular of expression, of assembly and of association, and to the constant attacks on the fundamental rights of members of the opposition, human rights defenders, lawyers, trade unionists, members of minorities, journalists, academics, artists and civil society activists, among others; strongly condemns the recent waves of mass arrest and imprisonment on politically motivated charges, and on the grounds of suspected terror links, affecting political figures, academics and journalists, including the arrests of Elif Akgül, independent journalist, Yıldız Tar, editor in chief of LGBT+ news site Kaos GL, Ender İmrek, columnist of Evrensel daily, and Joakim Medin, Swedish journalist for ETC, all well known for their work on human rights issues;

    16.  Strongly condemns the recent arrest and detention of the Swedish journalist Joakim Medin; reiterates that freedom of the press is a fundamental right and core EU value; strongly condemns the accusations made against Joakim Medin, which are solely based on his journalistic work and therefore demands his immediate and unconditional release and that of other journalists imprisoned for exercising their freedom of speech;

    17.  Deplores the continued prosecution, censorship and harassment of journalists and independent media, denying them the freedom to carry out their professional duties and inform the public, which is essential to a functioning democratic society; calls on the Turkish authorities to refrain from further attacks on independent media and to uphold fundamental rights and civil liberties such as freedom of speech and of the press; remains deeply concerned by the existing legislation that prevents an open and free internet, with lengthy prison sentences imposed for social media posts, scores of access blocks and content removal orders, and by the continued use of the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) to crack down on media criticism and even on outlets deemed to spread ‘pessimism’ instead of positive news;

    18.  Acknowledges the positive developments in relation to the partial lifting by the minister of the interior of restrictions on the weekly vigils of the Saturday Mothers, Cumartesi Anneleri, in Istanbul’s Galatasaray Square, and the recent acquittal of all 46 people prosecuted for more than 6 years in the case surrounding the organisation’s 700th gathering in August 2018; calls for the complete removal of all restrictions on their peaceful protest, in full compliance with the relevant Constitutional Court ruling, and for an end to the ongoing judicial case against several of its members and sympathisers; is concerned by the ongoing trial against prominent human rights defender Nimet Tanrıkulu, who was released on 4 March 2025 after spending 94 days in pre-trial detention; urges the Turkish authorities to ensure the immediate release of all individuals detained for exercising their fundamental freedoms;

    19.  Continues to be appalled by the Turkish authorities’, in particular the Turkish judiciary’s, continuous disregard for and failure to apply landmark ECtHR rulings; reiterates its condemnation of Türkiye’s blatant misuse of the judicial system and the refusal to release from detention human rights defender Osman Kavala and opposition politicians Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ,for which Türkiye is facing historical infringement proceedings in the Council of Europe, with long-awaited consequences yet to be determined; is appalled by the recent filing and acceptance of a new indictment against Selahattin Demirtaş in which the Diyarbakır Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office asks for up to 15 years of imprisonment and a ban on his political activities on the basis of several speeches he made in 2016; calls on Türkiye to fully comply with the ECtHR judgements related to missing persons and properties (inter alia in the Fokas case) in Cyprus; deplores the politically motivated nature of these prosecutions, which form part of a broader pattern of judicial harassment; calls on Türkiye to fully implement all judgments of the ECtHR in line with Article 46 of the ECHR and in line with the unconditional obligations derived from Article 90 of the Turkish constitution; calls on the European Commission and Member States to use all diplomatic channels to urge Türkiye to implement relevant ECtHR rulings and consider implementing relevant funding conditionality in relation to compliance with ECtHR rulings;

    20.  Calls on Türkiye to respect the European Court of Human Rights decision of 24 January 2008, which found Türkiye guilty of breaching Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, due to its failure to locate and prosecute those responsible in the case of the murders of Tassos Isaak and Solomos Solomou, which were committed in Cyprus in 1996; calls on the Turkish authorities to enforce the international arrest warrants against the murder suspects, and hand them over to the Republic of Cyprus;

    21.  Expresses its deep concern about the dire situation in Turkish prisons owing to severe overcrowding and poor living conditions, with reports, including by the Council of Europe, of torture and ill-treatment being widespread, and access to basic needs such as hygiene and information being severely limited; is particularly worried by the conditions of imprisonment of elderly and seriously ill prisoners, such as the case of Soydan Akay, who is being unjustly kept imprisoned; calls for his immediate release on humanitarian and health grounds; is concerned by the continued use of humiliating strip searches in prisons and other places of detention and by the persisting harassment of MP Ömer Faruk Gergerlioğlu, who is currently facing six proceedings for the removal of his parliamentary seat and immunity, among other reasons for his having denounced this very practice;

    22.  Strongly condemns the Turkish Government’s decision to dismiss, following the March 2024 local elections, the democratically elected mayors of at least 13 municipalities and districts (Hakkari, Mardin, Batman, Halfeti, Tunceli, Bahçesaray, Akdeniz, Siirt, Van and Kağızman, won by the DEM Party; and Esenyurt Ovacık and Şişli, won by CHP Party) and to replace them with government trustees appointed by the interior ministry; regards this long-standing practice of appointing trustees as a blatant attack on the most basic principles of local democracy; urges the Turkish authorities to immediately cease and reverse repression of political opposition and to respect the rights of voters to elect their chosen representatives in line with the recommendations of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe and the Venice Commission; reiterates its call on the VP/HR to consider restrictive measures under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime against Turkish officials assuming the role of trustee and those appointing them; denounces the severe repression of protests against the removal of elected mayors, including the arbitrary arrest of hundreds of protesters, some of whom were minors; regards the decision of the Turkish Government to return to this practice after the last local elections of March 2024 as a clear sign of its lack of commitment to addressing the democratic shortcomings within the country and in clear contradiction to the declared willingness to revitalise the accession process, as such actions undermine the prospects for a stronger, more comprehensive partnership with the EU and are detrimental to long-term progress towards closer cooperation;

    23.  Deplores the permanent targeting of political parties and members of the opposition, who continue to suffer increasing pressure; condemns in the strongest terms the recent arrest and removal from office of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality CHP Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, along with the mayors of Şişli and Beylikdüzü, in the framework of two separate investigations on alleged corruption and terrorist-related charges involving a total of 106 suspects; highlights that these last cases, which are part of a long list of 42 administrative and 51 judicial investigations since İmamoğlu’s election in 2019, were launched just a few days before the internal party election to nominate him presidential candidate and the day after the controverted decision by Istanbul University to revoke his diploma, a requisite for his eligibility to be President; is appalled by the decision to temporarily ban all demonstrations in Istanbul and other provinces across the country, and the slowdown on social media; condemns the Turkish authorities’ harsh crackdown on the peaceful mass protests, including the detention of nearly 2000 people, many of them students, and the prosecution of hundreds of them through hasty mass trials with a lack of any evidence of criminal wrongdoing; expresses its deep concern over the unlawful arrest of Esila Ayık, a Ghent-based photography student detained on 8 April 2025 during protests in Istanbul, particularly owing to her untreated heart and kidney conditions; calls for the immediate release of all those still in detention and the acquittal of all those prosecuted for exercising their fundamental rights; deplores the arrests, detentions and deportations of local and international journalists covering the protests, in violation of the freedom of the press; urges the Turkish authorities to promptly and effectively investigate all allegations of harassment and excessive use of force against protesters and to uphold the freedom of assembly and protest; considers that the attacks against İmamoğlu constitute a politically motivated move aimed at preventing a legitimate challenger from standing in the upcoming elections and that with these actions the current Turkish authorities are further pushing the country towards a fully authoritarian model; regrets the EU’s lack of a strong, unified response to these alarming developments;

    24.  Further expresses its concern about the recent separate cases against Istanbul’s Beşiktaş district CHP Mayor Rıza Akpolat, Istanbul’s Beykoz district CHP Mayor Alaattin Köseler, CHP Youth Branch Chair Cem Aydın, and Zafer Party Chair Ümit Özdag; is appalled by the brutal and relentless crackdown on any kind of criticism to which all sectors of Turkish society have recently been subjected by the Turkish authorities, as illustrated, among others, by the case of Ayşe Barım, a well-known talent manager imprisoned since 27 January 2025 for alleged involvement in the Gezi Park protest 12 years ago, the investigation launched against Orhan Turan and Ömer Aras, the president and an executive of TÜSIAD, the country’s main business group, and the indictment, with the aim of imposing hefty prison sentences, of Halk TV Editor-in-Chief Suat Toktaş and journalists Seda Selek, Barış Pehlivan, Serhan Asker and Kürşad Oğuz, who have been provisionally acquitted; is concerned by the involvement in these and other cases of recently appointed Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor Akın Gürlek, who has a long record of involvement, in different positions, in high-profile cases against political figures, and which may give grounds for considering the application of restrictive measures under the EU Human Rights sanction regime; is also concerned by the growing financial pressure on opposition municipalities and controversial announcements, such as that made in relation to day-care centres run by opposition municipalities;

    25.  Expresses its deep concern at the deterioration in women’s rights, at gender-based violence and at the increase in the incidence of femicide in Türkiye in 2024, which has been the highest since 2010, the year before the signing of the Istanbul Convention; reiterates its strong condemnation of Türkiye’s withdrawal, by presidential decree, from this international agreement and reiterates its call to reverse this decision; urges the Turkish authorities to improve the legislative framework and its implementation, including by fully applying Protection Law no. 6284, in order to effectively tackle all forms of violence against women and the practice of so-called ‘honour killings’, end the persistent policy of impunity by holding abusers to account, and advance towards gender equality, particularly with regard to the participation of women in decision-making and policymaking processes; warns against further encroachments on women’s rights, as exemplified by Türkiye’s recent ban on elective caesarean sections at private medical centres without medical justification, which constitutes an unacceptable infringement on women’s bodily autonomy;

    26.  Strongly condemns the ongoing violations and lack of protection of the fundamental rights of LGBTI+ persons in Türkiye, including the increased incidence of hate speech, hate crimes and discriminatory rhetoric, as well as continued media stereotyping based on sexual orientation and gender identity; deplores the fact that this continued discrimination is often sanctioned by the authorities, as evidenced by the mass arrests made during the Pride March in 2023 and the banning of the march in 2024, while anti-LGBTI+ marches were permitted; urges the Turkish authorities to stop banning activities against homophobia, including Pride marches, with immediate effect;

    27.  Welcomes the increased dialogue with Christian minorities, but stresses that no significant progress has been registered with regard to the protection of the rights of ethnic and religious minorities, in particular as regards their legal personality, including those of the Greek Orthodox population of the islands of Gökçeada (Imvros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos); calls for Türkiye to implement the Venice Commission recommendations and all relevant ECtHR rulings in this regard; notes with concern that representatives of different confessions, including non-Muslim and Alevi communities, continue to face bureaucratic obstacles when attempting to register places of worship; highlights that this is a violation of the right to freedom of religion and belief; calls on Türkiye to adopt the long-awaited regulation on the election of board members in non-Muslim minority foundations controlling community hospitals; reiterates its call on Türkiye to respect the role of the Ecumenical Patriarchate for Orthodox Christians all over the world and to recognise its legal personality and the public use of the ecclesiastical title of Ecumenical Patriarch; calls on Türkiye to fully respect and protect the outstanding universal value of Hagia Sophia and the Chora museum, which are inscribed on UNESCO’s World Heritage List; notes with concern that Türkiye has still not implemented two decisions of the UNESCO World Heritage Committee of 2021 and 2023 regarding its obligations to undertake special measures to protect these monuments; deplores the lack of protection of Panagia Soumela Monastery, which has been put forward for inclusion in the UNESCO World Heritage Monuments list; stresses the need to eliminate restrictions on the training, appointment and succession of clergy; welcomes the envisaged reopening of the Halki Seminary and calls for the lifting of all obstacles to its proper functioning; calls on the Turkish authorities to effectively investigate and prosecute people responsible for any hate crimes, including hate speech, committed against minorities; condemns the antisemitic statements made in the media and by high-level officials following the Hamas terrorist attacks against Israel on 7 October 2023; notes that all of these practices against any religious minority are incompatible with EU values;

    28.  Welcomes Abdullah Öcalan’s recent call on the PKK to lay down arms and dissolve, and to engage in a peace process, as a historic and long-awaited step that could help end a period of 40 years of violence that has caused more than 40 000 deaths; praises the efforts made by all stakeholders involved to facilitate these developments, including the constructive approach of different political leaders that was started by MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli, the visits to Imrali prison granted to a delegation of the DEM Party, and the broad consultations that this party has led with other political parties; underlines that this represents a significant opportunity and must be followed by an inclusive political process, with a prominent role for the Turkish Parliament, aimed at the peaceful and sustainable resolution of the Kurdish issue in its political, social, democratic and security-related aspects; stresses the need to uphold human rights, political pluralism, and civil rights for all citizens, including Kurds; regrets the continued political repression, judicial harassment and restrictions on cultural and linguistic rights faced by Kurdish citizens, which undermine democratic principles and social cohesion;

    Regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations

    29.  Continues to commend Türkiye for hosting around 3,1 million refugees, including 2,9 million Syrians under temporary protection in 2024, down from 3,2 million in 2023; reiterates the importance of Türkiye’s collaboration for the effective and orderly management of migration flows; further welcomes the fact that since 2011 the EU has contributed close to EUR 10 billion to assist Türkiye in hosting refugees; notes that some EU funding has been allocated to strengthening Turkish border control and containment capabilities; welcomes the EU’s decision to allocate an additional EUR 1 billion in December 2024 to further support the healthcare, education, and integration of refugees in Türkiye since the fall of the Assad regime; at the same time, notes that these funds had already been pledged in May 2024, and therefore do not constitute new funds; calls on the Commission to ensure utmost transparency and accuracy in the allocation of funds and that EU-funded projects, particularly those related to removal centres and border control, comply with all relevant human rights standards; is alarmed by credible reports uncovering grave human rights violations at EU-funded removal centres in Türkiye and calls on the Commission to launch a transparent and independent review into the matter; notes with concern that a continuing increase in asylum applications has been registered in the Republic of Cyprus over recent years; recalls Türkiye’s obligation to take all necessary measures to halt the existing illegal migration routes and prevent the creation of new sea or land routes for illegal migration from Türkiye to the EU, particularly to Greece and the Republic of Cyprus; points out the risks related to any possible instrumentalisation of migrants by the Turkish Government; underlines the need to ensure the protection of all refugees’ and migrants’ rights and freedoms; calls on Türkiye to ensure the full and non-discriminatory implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement of 2016 and the EU-Türkiye Readmission Agreement vis-à-vis all Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus; expresses cautious hope that developments in Syria will gradually allow an increasing number of refugees to return home; reiterates that returns should only be carried out on a voluntary basis and under conditions of safety and dignity; condemns repeated violent attacks against refugees and migrants fuelled by xenophobic rhetoric among politicians and host communities; calls on the European Commission and the EU Member States to increase their efforts to preserve humanitarian and protection space for Syrian refugees in Türkiye and to uphold the principle of non-refoulement as a cornerstone of EU policies;

    30.  Reiterates its strong interest in stability and security in the Eastern Mediterranean; welcomes the continued de-escalation and positive momentum in the region and the recent climate of re-engagement between Türkiye and Greece, albeit that unresolved issues continue to affect bilateral relations; deplores the fact that Türkiye continues to violate the sovereignty and sovereign rights of EU Member States, such as Greece and the Republic of Cyprus, including through the promotion of the Blue Homeland doctrine; underlines that, although Turkish violations of Greek airspace have drastically decreased, violations of Greek territorial waters have risen compared to 2023, and systematic illegal fishing activities have been conducted by Turkish vessels within Greek territorial waters; expresses its deep concern that Türkiye continues to uphold a formal threat of war against Greece (casus belli), should the latter exercise its lawful right to extend its territorial waters up to 12 nautical miles into the Aegean Sea, in accordance with Article 3 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; calls on Türkiye to fully respect the sovereignty of all EU Member States over their territorial sea and airspace, and their other sovereign rights, including the right to explore and exploit natural resources in accordance with EU and international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which is part of the EU acquis; reiterates its view that the memorandum of understanding between Türkiye and Libya on delimitation of the maritime jurisdiction areas in the Mediterranean infringes upon the sovereign rights of third States, does not comply with the Law of the Sea and cannot produce any legal consequences for third States;

    31.  Regrets the fact that the Cyprus problem remains unresolved, and calls for serious reengagement and the political will of all parties involved to bring about peaceful UN-led negotiations, with a view to achieving real progress in the Cyprus settlement talks; welcomes the resumption of informal talks under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General on 18 and 19 March 2025, which were held in a constructive atmosphere in which both sides showed a clear commitment to making progress and continuing dialogue; welcomes the agreement between both sides on opening four crossing points, demining, establishing a youth affairs committee and launching environmental and solar energy projects, as part of a new set of confidence-building measures; encourages all sides to use this momentum to move towards the resumption of negotiations;

    32.  Strongly reaffirms its view that the only solution to the Cyprus problem is a fair, comprehensive, viable and democratic settlement, including of its external aspects, within the agreed UN framework, on the basis of a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation with a single international legal personality, single sovereignty, single citizenship and political equality, as set out in the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, the agreed areas of convergence and the Framework of the UN Secretary General, as well as in accordance with international law and the principles and values on which the Union is founded; strongly condemns Türkiye’s attempts to upgrade the secessionist entity’s status in occupied Cyprus, including via the Organisation of Turkic States, and calls on all states to respect Cyprus’ sovereignty according to UNSC resolutions; calls, as a matter of urgency, for the resumption of negotiations on the reunification of Cyprus under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General as soon as possible, from the point at which they were interrupted in Crans-Montana in 2017; calls on Türkiye to abandon the unacceptable proposal for a two-state solution in Cyprus and to return to the agreed basis for a solution and the UN framework; further calls on Türkiye to withdraw its troops from Cyprus and refrain from any unilateral action which would entrench the permanent division of the island and from action altering the demographic balance;

    33.  Calls on Türkiye to respect the status of the buffer zone and the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP); reiterates its call for cooperation among the Republic of Cyprus, Türkiye, the United Kingdom and the UN to implement concrete measures for a demilitarisation of the buffer zone, and to improve security on the island; urges Türkiye and the Turkish Cypriot leadership to reverse all unilateral actions and violations within and in the vicinity of the buffer zone and refrain from any further such actions and provocations; condemns the ongoing ‘opening’ of Varosha by Türkiye, as this negatively alters the situation on the ground, undermines mutual trust and negatively impacts the prospects for the resumption of direct talks on the comprehensive solution of the Cyprus problem; calls on Türkiye to reverse its illegal actions in violation of UN Security Council resolutions 550(1984) and 789(1992) on Varosha, which call on Türkiye to transfer the area of Varosha to its lawful inhabitants under the temporary administration of the UN, and to withdraw from Strovilia and facilitate the full implementation of the Pyla Understanding;

    34.  Reiterates its deep concern regarding all unilateral actions which aim at entrenching on the ground the permanent division of Cyprus as opposed to its reunification; condemns, in this context, the recent illegal visit of President Erdoğan to the occupied areas of the Republic of Cyprus, as well as his provocative statements, which jeopardise the efforts of the UN, the EU, the international community at large and other parties involved for the resumption of substantial negotiations in the agreed framework; regrets that such unilateral actions are tantamount to a direct illegitimate intervention against the interests of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities;

    35.  Reiterates its call on Türkiye to give the Turkish Cypriot community the necessary space to act in accordance with its role as a legitimate community of the island, which is a right guaranteed by the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus; reiterates its call on the Commission to step up its efforts to engage with the Turkish Cypriot community, with a view to facilitating the resolution of the Cyprus problem and recalling that its place is in the European Union; calls for all parties involved to demonstrate a more courageous approach to bringing the communities together; stresses the need for the EU body of law to be implemented across the entire island following a comprehensive resolution of the Cyprus problem;

    36.  Takes note of the significant work of the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus (CMP) and calls for improved access to occupied military zones by the Turkish army, access to its military archives and information as to the relocation of remains from former to subsequent burial sites; remains deeply concerned about the education and religious restrictions and impediments faced by the enclaved Greek Cypriots; calls on Türkiye to step up its cooperation with the Council of Europe and its relevant bodies and institutions, to address their key recommendations, to fully implement the European Convention of Human Rights with regard to respecting the freedom of religion and the freedom of opinion and expression, and the right to access and enjoy cultural heritage, and to stop the deliberate destruction of cultural and religious heritage; condemns the repeated attempts by Türkiye to intimidate and silence Turkish Cypriot journalists, trade unionists, human rights defenders and progressive citizens in the Turkish Cypriot community, thus violating their right to freedom of opinion and expression; calls on Türkiye to halt its proclaimed aggressive policy of the sale and exploitation of Greek Cypriot properties, a policy designed to create irreversible effects on the ground and which completely disregards the European Code of Human Rights ruling on this issue;

    37.  Regrets Türkiye’s continuing refusal to comply with aviation law and establish a channel of communication between air traffic control centres in Türkiye and the Republic of Cyprus, the absence of which entails real safety risks and dangers as identified by the European Union Aviation Safety Agency and the International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations; regrets, too, its denial of access to vessels under the flag of one Member State to the Straits of Bosporus and the Dardanelles; takes the view that these could be areas where Türkiye can prove its commitment to confidence building measures and calls on Türkiye to collaborate by fully implementing EU aviation law; regrets that Türkiye has continued its attempts to impede the implementation of the Great Sea Interconnector, an EU project of common interest, and has persisted in its plans for an illegal electricity interconnector with the occupied area of Cyprus;

    38.  Regrets that for 20 years Türkiye has refused to implement the obligations assumed towards the EU, including those in relation to Cyprus, as per the Negotiating Framework of October 2005; stresses that recognition of all Member States is a necessary component of the accession process; reiterates its call on Türkiye to fulfil its obligation of full, non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement in relation to all Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus; further calls on Türkiye to ensure that the human and political rights of all Cypriots are fully respected and that compliance with the fundamental principles of the European Union and the European acquis is guaranteed;

    39.  Affirms its support for a free, secure and stable future for Syria and its citizens and highlights the need for an inclusive and peaceful political transition process that is Syrian-led and Syrian- owned, including the protection and inclusion of religious and ethnic communities; expresses its commitment to constructive cooperation between the EU and Türkiye to that end, on humanitarian aid, promoting a sustainable political solution in Syria, and the fight against DAESH, given that Türkiye has a key role in promoting stability in the region; recalls that Syria’s sovereignty must be restored; acknowledges the importance of rebuilding Syria’s economy as a pillar of long-term stability and prosperity for the region; calls on Türkiye to respect Syria’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and immediately cease all attacks and incursions on and occupation of Syrian territory in full compliance with international law; condemns the attacks carried out in recent weeks, taking advantage of the collapse of the Assad regime, by Turkish-backed militias against Syrian Kurdish forces in the north of Syria; expresses deep concern, as these attacks increase the number of internally displaced persons but also threaten the efficiency and continuity of the fight against Daesh; notes that its ongoing presence risks further destabilising and undermining efforts towards a sustainable political resolution in Syria; further notes that, citing security concerns, Türkiye also illegally occupies areas in Iraq; reiterates that civilian populations should never be the victim of military self-defence; calls for the necessary investigation into the cases in which there have been civilian casualties and to stop the crackdown on journalists working in the area; calls on Türkiye to support the process of implementing the agreement between the Syrian transitional government and the Kurdish-led SDF and refrain from any interference in Syria’s internal processes;

    40.  Supports the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Türkiye in the interests of reconciliation, good neighbourly relations, regional stability and security and socio-economic development, and welcomes the progress achieved so far; welcomes the continued efforts to restore links between the two countries; urges Türkiye to ensure the speedy implementation of agreements reached by the Turkish and Armenian Governments’ special representatives, such as the opening of the airspace and the border between the two countries for the third country nationals, and, subsequently, for holders of diplomatic passports; welcomes the temporary opening of the Margara-Alican border crossing between Armenia and Türkiye to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid to Syria; expresses the hope that these developments may give impetus to the normalisation of relations in the South Caucasus region, also in terms of security and socio-economic development, and stresses the EU’s interest in supporting this process; encourages Türkiye to play a constructive role in promoting regional stability by facilitating the swift conclusion of the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, inter alia by exerting its influence on Azerbaijan and by deterring Azerbaijan from any further military action against Armenian sovereignty; encourages Türkiye once again to acknowledge the Armenian genocide in order to pave the way for genuine reconciliation between the Turkish and Armenian peoples and to fully respect its obligations to protect Armenian cultural heritage;

    41.  Notes that Türkiye’s stance in relation to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine continues to affect EU-Türkiye relations, as Türkiye attempts to maintain ties with both the West and Russia simultaneously; notes Türkiye’s diplomatic attempts to mediate between Russia and Ukraine, particularly regarding the Black Sea Grain Initiative, as well as its continued support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine, including its vote in favour of UN General Assembly resolutions condemning the Russian aggression against Ukraine; regrets that, on the other hand, trade between Türkiye and Russia has risen sharply since the start of the war in Ukraine, making Türkiye Russia’s second largest trading partner despite EU sanctions against Russia, and that Türkiye is the only NATO member state not having imposed any sanctions on Russia; further notes that the European Union’s anti-fraud office, OLAF, has initiated an investigation into a loophole that enables countries like Türkiye to rebrand sanctioned Russian oil and export it to the EU; welcomes, however, positive steps such as Türkiye’s blocking of exports to Russia for certain dual use goods, as well as products originating in the United States and the United Kingdom that are of benefit to Russian military action; reiterates its call on the Turkish Government to halt its plans for the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant, which will be built, operated and owned by Russia’s state atomic energy corporation, Rosatom; expresses concern at Türkiye’s ongoing discussions with Russia to establish a gas-trading hub in Istanbul, scheduled to begin operations in 2025;

    42.  Welcomes Türkiye’s participation in various crisis management missions and operations (within the framework of the common security and defence policy); regrets, however, the further deterioration in the level of alignment on common foreign and security policy positions, including on sanctions and countering the circumvention of sanctions, which has fallen to a historically low rate of 5 %, the lowest rate for any accession country; recalls that EU candidate countries are required to progressively align with the common foreign and security policy of the European Union and comply with international law; regrets that Türkiye has not undertaken any steps in this regard, notably by failing to align with EU sanctions against Russia, and that in many areas of mutual interest the foreign policies of the EU and Türkiye are worryingly divergent; urges Türkiye to align with and fully implement the EU sanctions against Russia, including on anti-circumvention measures and to cooperate closely with the EU’s Sanctions Envoy;

    43.  Stresses the importance of reinforcing EU-Türkiye cooperation in global security matters, particularly in light of the changing geopolitical landscape and potential shifts in US foreign policy; expresses cautious hope that recent informal engagement, such as the participation of the Turkish Foreign Minister in the informal meeting of EU foreign affairs ministers in 2024, may provide an impetus towards better relations; acknowledges Türkiye’s key role as an ally in NATO and welcomes the Turkish Parliament’s decision to ratify Sweden’s NATO accession in January 2024; recalls, in this regard, that Türkiye has a key responsibility to foster stability at both regional and global levels and is expected to act in line with its NATO obligations, especially given the current geopolitical upheavals; encourages constructive engagement in a more structured and frequent political dialogue on foreign, security and defence policy to seek collaboration on convergent interests while working to reduce divergences, particularly with regard to removing persistent obstacles to the enhancement of a genuine relationship between the EU and NATO, including the acquisition from Russia of the S-400 air defence system; remains duly concerned that Türkiye continues to exclude a Member State from cooperation with NATO;

    44.  Welcomes Türkiye’s long-standing position in favour of a two-state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, its calls for a ceasefire in the Israel-Hamas war, and its ongoing efforts to supply humanitarian aid to Gaza throughout the conflict; deeply regrets, at the same time, the Turkish authorities’, including the President’s, active support for the EU-listed terror group Hamas and their stance on the attack against Israel on 7 October 2023, which the Turkish Government failed to condemn; points out that Türkiye’s open support for Hamas and its refusal to designate it a terrorist organisation is not compatible with the EU’s foreign and security policy; calls, therefore, for a revision of this position;

    45.  Notes with concern that Türkiye has asked to be a member of BRICS+ and been offered ‘partner country’ status, and is considering the same for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), where it holds the status of a dialogue partner; expresses serious concern over Türkiye’s increasing interest in an alternative partnership framework, which is fundamentally incompatible with the EU accession process; insists that Türkiye’s new status as a BRICS partner country must not affect Türkiye’s responsibilities within NATO; notes that Türkiye has been cultivating cooperation formats, partnerships and regional alliances beyond the EU; is concerned by Türkiye’s tendency to use this multi-vector approach to advance its interests without committing to a full-fledged cooperation with any of these alliances;

    46.  Remains concerned by the Turkish Government’s use of the Turkish diaspora as an instrument for occasional meddling in EU Member States’ domestic policies;

    Socio-economic and sustainability reforms

    47.  Welcomes Türkiye’s return to a more conventional economic and monetary policy, while maintaining robust growth and a moderate budget deficit; regrets, however, that the cost of this is yet again being borne by citizens in the form of higher interest rates; highlights that social vulnerabilities have increased, particularly among children and older people, primarily due to the absence of a comprehensive poverty reduction strategy and income inequalities; underlines the necessity for the Turkish authorities to implement comprehensive social protection measures, strengthen collective bargaining rights and ensure that economic reforms prioritise reducing inequality and creating decent work opportunities;

    48.  Regrets the fact that despite the progress observed in economic and monetary policies, other actions by the Turkish Government affecting the rule of law continue to undermine basic principles such as legal certainty, which impacts negatively on Türkiye’s potential capacity to receive investments; welcomes the removal of Türkiye from the grey list of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in June 2024, following significant progress in improving its anti-money laundering regime and combating the financing of terrorism;

    49.  Welcomes Türkiye’s increased investment activity in the green energy sector and calls on Türkiye to continue improving the compatibility of its energy policy with the EU acquis, exploiting Türkiye’s enormous potential in renewable energy; expresses concern about the lack of any significant progress on climate action, in particular owing to the absence of a comprehensive climate law, a domestic emissions trading system, and a long-term low-emission development strategy, which undermines its 2053 climate neutrality target; highlights the need for a robust legal framework and stricter enforcement mechanisms to safeguard environmental and natural resources; urges Türkiye to align its environmental policies with the EU acquis, including respecting natural habitats when conducting mining projects, and underlines the importance of Türkiye’s adherence to the Aarhus Convention; commends the work of environmental rights defenders in Türkiye and warns against the dire environmental impact of extensive government projects, such as the expansion of its copper mining activities in Mount Ida (Kaz Daglari);

    50.  Highlights the fact that Türkiye has taken steps to diversify energy supplies and increase its renewable energy share; notes that the country is the seventh largest LNG market and highlights its potential as a regional energy hub; takes note that Türkiye has subscribed to the global goals on energy efficiency and renewable energy capacity by 2030; calls on the Commission to take into account Türkiye’s potential as a regional energy hub in initiatives to increase the installed renewable capacity in the Mediterranean region and in the development of the New Pact for the Mediterranean, and calls for energy cooperation to be part of the common agenda;

    51.  Observes some improvements in labour market conditions and points out a number of pending critical challenges, such as informal employment, the gender gap, and income inequality; is worried about the low coverage of collective bargaining and the lack of recognition of trade union rights for certain public sector employees; believes that more efforts are needed to enhance social dialogue mechanisms and address emerging occupational safety challenges; recalls that trade union freedom and social dialogue are crucial to the development and prosperity of a pluralistic society; deplores, in this regard, the recent detentions of trade unionists including Remzi Çalişkan, vice-president of the DISK confederation, and president of Genel-Iş, who was released after a month in prison, Kemal Göksoy, President of the Mersin Branch of Genel-İş, who remains in prison, and Mehmet Türkmen, chair of the textile sector union BİRTEK SEN, who was detained on 14 February 2025;

    Wider EU-Türkiye relations

    52.  Reiterates its firm conviction that, beyond the currently frozen accession process, Türkiye is a country of strategic relevance, a key partner for the stability of the wider region and plays an important role in addressing security challenges, migration management, counterterrorism, and energy security; stresses the importance of maintaining constructive dialogue and deepening cooperation in areas of mutual strategic interest; points towards a number of policy areas for future engagement, whether it be the green transition, trade, energy, a modernised customs union and visa liberalisation, among others; recalls, however, that democratic backsliding and non-alignment with the CFSP are not conducive to significant progress being made in that regard; reaffirms that the EU is committed to pursuing the best possible relations with Türkiye, based on dialogue, respect and mutual trust, in line with international law and good neighbourly relations;

    53.  Stresses the importance of encouraging deeper partnership in all economic sectors, to the benefit of the EU and all of its Member States and Türkiye; notes in particular the importance of cooperation in the fields of energy, innovation, artificial intelligence, health, security and migration management, among others; in this regard, notes that various high-level dialogues (HLDs) were held recently, including the HLD on trade and the HLD on economy, as steps towards pragmatic forms of cooperation in areas of mutual importance; calls again for the resumption of all relevant HLDs and for the establishment of structured HLDs on sectoral cooperation, to address common challenges and explore opportunities, on the condition that such cooperation must go hand-in-hand with clear and consistent conditionality grounded in respect for democratic principles, the rule of law and fundamental rights, as previously underlined in this resolution;

    54.  Stands ready to support an upgraded customs union with a broader, mutually beneficial scope, which could encompass a wide range of areas of common interest, including digitalisation, Green Deal alignment for green energy policies, public procurement, sustainable development commitments, and due diligence, contributing to the economic security of both sides; supports accompanying this upgraded customs union with an efficient and effective dispute settlement mechanism; underlines the fact that for Parliament to give its consent at the end of the process, such a modernisation would need to be based on strong conditionality related to human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for international law and good neighbourly relations, including Türkiye’s full implementation of the Additional Protocol on extending the Ankara Agreement to all Member States without exception and in a non-discriminatory fashion;

    55.  Notes with deep regret that no progress has been made by Türkiye towards meeting the required benchmarks for visa liberalisation; reiterates its willingness to start the visa liberalisation process as soon as the Turkish authorities fully fulfil the six clearly outstanding benchmarks in a non-discriminatory manner vis-à-vis all EU Member states while aligning with EU visa policy; regrets that Turkish citizens are facing problems with visa requests/applications to EU Member States owing to a marked increase in demand and fears of abuse of the system; recognises, however, the political commitment to improving access to visas and calls for intensified efforts on both sides to address the remaining technical and administrative barriers; calls on the EU Member States to increase the resources allocated to this matter; supports measures on visa facilitation, particularly with regard to business activities and Erasmus students; deeply regrets the constant attempts by the Turkish authorities to blame the EU for not making progress on this dossier, while not taking any necessary steps to comply with the remaining benchmarks; reminds Türkiye that the lack of tangible and cumulative progress on the pending conditions has a direct impact on business activities and Erasmus students; appreciates the invaluable contribution of Erasmus+ exchanges in providing rich cross-cultural educational opportunities; regrets, however, the poor oversight on the part of the Commission, exemplified by the Erasmus partnership with Gaziantep Islam Science and Technology University, whose leadership publicly expressed support for terrorist acts; calls on the Commission to ensure that partner universities respect the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights by conducting ex ante verifications and regular controls;

    The way forward for EU-Türkiye relations

    56.  Considers, in view of the above, that the Turkish Government has failed to take the necessary steps to address the existing fundamental democratic shortcomings within the country and therefore reiterates its view that Türkiye’s EU accession process cannot be resumed in the current circumstances, despite the democratic and pro-European aspirations of a large part of Turkish society; recalls that, as in the case of any other candidate, the accession process is contingent on full compliance with the Copenhagen criteria and on the normalisation of relations with all EU Member States;

    57.  Urges the Turkish Government and the EU institutions and Member States to continue working, beyond the currently frozen accession process, on the basis of the relevant Council and European Council conclusions and the established conditionality, towards a closer, more dynamic and strategic partnership with particular emphasis on climate action, energy security, counter-terrorism cooperation and regional stability; insists on the need to begin a process of reflection on how this new constructive and progressive framework for EU-Türkiye relations can encompass the interests of all parties involved, for example by modernising and enhancing the current Association Agreement; underlines that such a positive process must be based on and matched by tangible progress in Türkiye as regards CFSP alignment, democracy, the rule of law and respect for fundamental values;

    58.  Considers the joint communication of 29 November 2023 on the state of play of EU-Türkiye relations a good basis on which to move forward in the overall relations between the EU and Türkiye; regrets the lack of a clear political endorsement of this joint communication so far by the Council; reiterates that recognition of all EU Member States is a necessary component of any agreement between the EU and Türkiye; stresses that Türkiye’s constructive engagement, including in relation to the Cyprus problem, remains key to advancing closer cooperation between the EU and Türkiye;

    59.  Warns, nevertheless, that a further drift towards authoritarianism by the Turkish authorities, such as we have been witnessing recently, will ultimately have a severe impact on all dimensions of EU-Türkiye relations, including trade and security cooperation, as it prevents the trust and reliability needed between partners and antagonises both sides in the current geopolitical scene;

    60.  Continues to acknowledge and commend the democratic and pro-European aspirations of the majority of Turkish society (particularly among Turkish youth), whom the EU will not forsake; regards these aspirations as a major reason for keeping Türkiye’s accession process alive; calls therefore on the Commission to uphold and increase its political and financial support to the vibrant and pro-democratic civil society in Türkiye, whose efforts can contribute to generating the political will necessary for deepening EU-Türkiye relations; highlights, nevertheless, that the resumption of the accession process depends on the unwavering political will of Türkiye’s authorities and society to become a full-fledged democracy, which cannot be forced upon it by the EU;

    61.  Reiterates its call to strengthen and deepen mutual knowledge and understanding between our societies, promoting cultural growth, socio-cultural exchanges and combating all manifestations of social, religious, ethnic or cultural prejudice; encourages Türkiye and the EU to promote shared values, particularly by supporting young people; reiterates its utmost commitment to sustaining and increasing support for Türkiye’s independent civil society;

    o
    o   o

    62.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Council and the Commission; asks that this resolution be translated into Turkish and forwarded to the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Türkiye.

    (1) OJ L 134, 7.5.2014, p. 3, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2014/252/oj.
    (2) OJ C, C/2024/1760, 22.3.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/1760/oj.
    (3) OJ C 493, 27.12.2022, p. 2.
    (4) OJ C 425, 20.10.2021, p. 143.
    (5) OJ C, C/2024/6746, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6746/oj.
    (6) OJ C 328, 6.9.2016, p. 2.
    (7) OJ C 465, 6.12.2022, p. 112.
    (8) OJ C, C/2025/206, 14.1.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/206/oj.
    (9) Texts adopted, P10_TA(2025)0016.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: EIB takes part in World Circular Economy Forum 2025 in Brazil to foster competitiveness and sustainable growth

    Source: European Investment Bank

    • EIB to participate in more than 10 sessions at WCEF 2025 from 13-16 May 2025 to discuss circular economy advances
    • EIB financing for circular economy grows to record €1.4 billion in 2024
    • EIB lending to circular economy projects amounts to €5.1 billion over the past five years

    The European Investment Bank (EIB) is participating in the World Circular Economy Forum 2025 (WCEF 2025) from 13-16 May 2025 in São Paulo, Brazil, and online around the globe. The annual WCEF, an initiative of Finland and the Finnish Innovation Fund (Sitra), is one of the world’s leading events on the circular economy, which aims to make production and consumption more sustainable by extending the life cycle of resources, materials and goods.

    The WCEF provides a platform for sharing knowledge and expertise, building networks and advancing the transition to a circular economy. This year’s edition will shed light on the bottlenecks to sustainable growth and the root causes that urgently require circular solutions.

    The EIB, one of the biggest multilateral providers of climate and environment finance, will present to conference participants its array of financing and advisory products to develop and support the circular economy. The EIB will also discuss the role of the circular economy in securing the supply of strategic materials and the benefits of pursuing projects across entire value chains.

    “We are stepping up our support for the circular economy in line with the European Union’s objectives that put circularity at the core of our decarbonisation strategy,” said EIB Vice-President Ambroise Fayolle. “In the past five years, we provided more than €5 billion to co-finance 153 circular economy projects in a variety of sectors. Circularity is key to conserve limited and strategic materials, enhance resilience and competitiveness and reduce our impact on the climate and the environment.”

    EIB lending to circular economy projects has consistently increased over the years, amounting to €5.1 billion in 2020-2024, with a record level of €1.4 billion last year alone. Recently financed projects include a €17 million loan to Europe’s largest iPhone refurbisher Swappie, venture debt financing of €25 million to Fairmat, a French company pioneering the recycling of carbon fibre composite materials, and a €75 million loan to improve solid waste management in Benin.

    Earlier this year, the EIB’s Board of Directors also approved an action plan to step up support for critical raw materials (CRM) with the aim of doubling annual financing for such projects – including circular solutions – to €2 billion. The plan also includes a new CRM Task Force and a dedicated one-stop shop to build and manage a pipeline of CRM operations and advisory activities and increased technical expertise and partnerships

    Join the EIB at WCEF 202

    Vice-President Fayolle is leading the EIB’s participation, starting with a panel at the opening plenary on 13 May. In total, EIB experts will take part in more than 10 sessions. The full list of sessions with EIB speakers is available here.

    People on site can meet staff of the EIB at its stand at the OCA in the Ibirapuera park in São Paulo on 13-14 May.

    For interview requests, please reach out to the press contact below.

    For more information about the EIB’s support to the circular economy visit: Circular economy (eib.org)

    Background information  

    EIB 

    The European Investment Bank (ElB) is the long-term lending institution of the European Union, owned by its Member States. Built around eight core priorities, we finance investments that contribute to EU policy objectives by bolstering climate action and the environment, digitalisation and technological innovation, security and defence, cohesion, agriculture and bioeconomy, social infrastructure, high-impact investments outside the European Union, and the capital markets union.  

    The EIB Group, which also includes the European Investment Fund (EIF), signed nearly €89 billion in new financing for over 900 high-impact projects in 2024, boosting Europe’s competitiveness and security.  

    All projects financed by the EIB Group are in line with the Paris Climate Agreement, as pledged in our Climate Bank Roadmap. Almost 60% of the EIB Group’s annual financing supports projects directly contributing to climate change mitigation, adaptation, and a healthier environment.  

    Fostering market integration and mobilising investment, the Group supported a record of over €100 billion in new investment for Europe’s energy security in 2024 and mobilised €110 billion in growth capital for startups, scale-ups and European pioneers. Approximately half of the EIB’s financing within the European Union is directed towards cohesion regions, where per capita income is lower than the EU average.

    High-quality, up-to-date photos of our headquarters for media use are available here.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: The UK calls on Israel to lift its block on aid: UK statement at the UN Security Council

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Speech

    The UK calls on Israel to lift its block on aid: UK statement at the UN Security Council

    Statement by Ambassador Barbara Woodward, UK Permanent Representative to the UN, at the UN Security Council meeting on the humanitarian situation in Gaza.

    The UK called this meeting alongside Denmark, France, Greece and Slovenia in response to the alarming warnings that the humanitarian situation in Gaza is worse than it has ever been.

    So we are calling for three urgent things.

    First, the UK calls on Israel to lift its block on aid.

    The World Food Programme warned us over a week ago that they have no food left. 

    And IPC data released yesterday shows that the whole of Gaza is at the risk of famine. 

    Meanwhile, tonnes of food are currently sitting rotting at the border, blocked from reaching people who are starving. 

    This is cruel and it is inexcusable. 

    And it risks further deaths that should be avoidable. 

    Second, the UK will not support any aid mechanism that seeks to deliver political or military objectives or puts vulnerable civilians at risk. 

    We call on Israel to urgently engage with the UN to ensure a return to delivery of aid in line with humanitarian principles. 

    International law requires Israel to allow the rapid and unimpeded provision of humanitarian aid to all civilians.

    Third, the UK reiterates our outrage at the killing of Palestinian Red Crescent workers and the strikes on a UNOPS compound in March. 

    We are disappointed that Israel has not yet released the final findings of its investigation into the UNOPS incident or taken concrete action to ensure these incidents can never happen again.

    President, the release of Edan Alexander yesterday after 17 months of cruel Hamas captivity offers a rare moment of hope. 

    We must never forget the suffering of those hostages that remain in Gaza and those families awaiting the return of their loved ones’ remains.

    It is ceasefire deals that have delivered the release of over 180 hostages and allowed a massive scale-up of aid for desperate Palestinians. 

    This shows what is possible with political will. 

    This is why we strongly oppose an expansion of this conflict, as do many hostages’ families.

    And it is a ceasefire deal that now offers the best hope of ending the agony of the hostages and their families, alleviating the suffering of civilians in Gaza, ending Hamas’ control of Gaza and achieving a pathway to a two-state solution.

    Updates to this page

    Published 13 May 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Experts of the Committee on the Rights of the Child Commend Norway on Child Welfare Act, Raise Questions on Proposed Increased Use of Force in Schools and Data on Children with Disabilities

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Committee on the Rights of the Child today concluded its review of the seventh periodic report of Norway, with Committee Experts commending the State on the new child welfare act, while raising questions about the proposed increased use of force in schools and the lack of data on children with disabilities. 

    Bragi Gudbrandsson, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, commended Norway for the child welfare act which was a wonderful piece of legislation. 

     

    Mr. Gudbrandsson said the Committee was concerned that Norway planned to use stronger force and constraints.  How had the country reached this situation?

    Faith Marshall Harris, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, also emphasised her concern, stating that instead of teachers being trained to de-escalate violence, they were given the power to use more force than police officers.  It seemed that the Government had responded in a knee-jerk reaction to media pressure; however, the situation was more about training teachers to deal with these situations in a non-violent way.  Norway was encouraged to rethink this approach. 

    Thuwayba Al Barwani, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, said Norway had excellent data but when it came to disability, there was no disaggregated data to better understand the situation of children with disabilities in the country.  How many of these children lived with their families? How many lived in residential care? How many were receiving support services?  What awareness raising campaigns were in place to remove stigma and educate about disability? 

    What measures were in place to provide quality psychological care for children with mental health disabilities in all municipalities?   

    The delegation said the new education act introduced a broader scope for exercising force and restraint.  Employees could now intervene against pupils when necessary.  Norway shared the Committee’s concerns and had tried to state explicitly in the provision that this was a last resort, with strict measures for physical restriction to take place.  The Government and municipalities focused on the competence of the staff to put pre-emptive measures in place so that physical interventions were a last resort and only used when necessary. 

    The delegation said the Norwegian strategy for equality for all ran until 2030, with an important competence to increase the visibility of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in all municipalities.  In 2025, the Government allocated 280 million kroner for grants for people with disabilities.  Norway could not definitively say how many people with disabilities were living in the country.  A recent report by Statistic Norway, focused on the different definitions of disability, which would hopefully assist the State in future.

    Introducing the report, Lene Vågslid, Minister of Children and Families of Norway and head of the delegation, said since the last dialogue with the Committee in 2018, Norway had taken significant steps to further strengthen children’s rights. 

    Last month, the Government presented a proposal for a new children’s act to Parliament, which included a new provision on the child’s right to privacy, and the parents’ responsibility in this regard.  Norway had introduced a range of measures in recent years to develop and improve the child welfare sector, including the new child welfare act, which entered into force in 2023, placing greater emphasis on prevention and helping children and parents as early as possible.  For the first time, a white paper on “Safe digital upbringing” would soon be presented to Parliament to develop policies that empowered and protected children in their digital lives. 

    In closing remarks, Mr. Gudbrandsson said it was clear Norway was on an exciting journey in revisiting the fundamental principles of the Convention, which was reflected in the new legislation, guidelines and action plans; the Committee was very impressed and appreciated these efforts. 

    In her closing remarks, Ms. Vågslid thanked the Committee for the important questions and the dialogue.  Norway aimed to highlight that all sectors were working towards the best possible outcomes for children. 

    The delegation of Norway was comprised of representatives from the Ministry of Children and Families; the Ministry of Culture and Equality; the Ministry of Education and Research; the Ministry of Justice and Public Security; the Ministry of Health Services; the Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion; and the Permanent Mission of Norway to the United Nations Office at Geneva. 

    Summaries of the public meetings of the Committee can be found here, while webcasts of the public meetings can be found here. The programme of work of the Committee’s ninety-ninth session and other documents related to the session can be found here.

    The Committee will next meet in public at 3. pm on Wednesday, 14 May to begin its consideration of the combined fifth and sixth periodic reports of Indonesia (CRC/C/IDN/5-6).

    Report

    The Committee has before it the seventh periodic report of Norway (CRC/C/NOR/7).

    Presentation of Report

    LENE VÅGSLID, Minister of Children and Families of Norway and head of the delegation, said since the last dialogue with the Committee in 2018, Norway had taken significant steps to further strengthen children’s rights.  Fundamental children’s rights were included in the Norwegian Constitution, including that the best interests of the child must be a key consideration, and that children had a right to be heard regarding issues affecting them.  Moreover, the Convention was implemented through the human rights act, meaning it was applied as Norwegian law and prevailed if in conflict with other legislation. 

    Last month, the Government presented a proposal for a new children’s act to Parliament, which included a new provision on the child’s right to privacy, and the parents’ responsibility in this regard.  There were also several amendments to strengthen children’s rights when parents separated, including mandatory mediation for the parents and children. Additionally, the new education act of 2023 applied to all public primary and secondary education and contained general provisions stating that the best interests of pupils should be a fundamental consideration in actions and decisions concerning them. 

    Norway had introduced a range of measures in recent years to develop and improve the child welfare sector, including the new child welfare act, which entered into force in 2023, placing greater emphasis on prevention and helping children and parents as early as possible.  Last month, the Government launched the Quality Improvement Initiative, to give children relying on child welfare services greater predictability and stability. 

    It was only in exceptional cases, and as a matter of last resort, that the best interest of the child could lead to children being separated from their parents.  From 2023, children in health institutions had the right to be accompanied by a parent or guardian throughout their stay.  Families who had a child with a serious illness, injury or disability now had a right to a coordinator.  The Government also recently decided to incorporate the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities into the human rights act. 

    Since 2022, Norway had offered collective protection to around 90,000 refugees from Ukraine, many of them children.  The State had also increased the earmarked budget line for strengthened child expertise in asylum reception centres, and the County Governor’s supervision of unaccompanied minors was increased.  A national strategy for children in low-income families (2020-2023) was put forward in 2020 and renewed in 2024, aiming to strengthen the economy of low-income families and reduce economic barriers to kindergartens and after-school programmes. 

    In 2023, the Government introduced a “youth guarantee” which ensured young people close follow-up and individual support.  Since 2022, a cross-sector initiative called the Core Group for Vulnerable Children and Youth coordinated efforts across eight ministries and 14 agencies to address the needs of at-risk children.  Two weeks ago, Norway launched a national mission on the inclusion of children in education, work and societal life, with the key goal of reducing exclusion among children by 2035. 

    For the first time, a white paper on “Safe digital upbringing” would soon be presented to Parliament to develop policies that empowered and protected children in their digital lives.  Norway had also, for the first time, established a Ministry of Digitalisation, working closely together on children’s behalf.  Norway had high ambitions for all its children and was committed to advancing their well-being.  Ms. Vågslid concluded by commending the important role played by the United Nations treaty bodies in improving States’ implementation of human rights. 

    TORMOD C. ENDRESEN, Permanent Representative of Norway to the United Nations Office at Geneva, said Norway was looking forward to doing a deep dive with the Committee on the Rights of the Child in the country.  He then introduced the Norwegian delegation. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    BRAGI GUDBRANDSSON, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, said the Committee was aware of Norway’s exemplary record in children’s rights, being the first country to incorporate the Convention into domestic legislation, and the first in the world to establish the position of Ombudsman for children.  For this reason, the Committee would do its best to give Norway a critical appraisal. 

    The Government of Norway had been criticised in the law-making process, including the lack of a child rights assessment impact, and that children’s views were not included in the process of lawmaking.  It was understood that steps had been taken to address this; could the delegation share these with the Committee?  Could some examples be provided?  How was it ensured that the public administration act contributed to strong policies for children?  It was interesting that Norway had not yet formulated a comprehensive implementation plan for the Convention on a national, regional or sectoral basis. Could the delegation comment on this? 

    Norway was commended for collaboration between the Ministries and the Core Group for Vulnerable People.  Had it addressed the discrepancies in resources between the different municipalities? Had a strategy been devised in this regard?  Were children regularly consulted by the Core Group?  Norway currently did not collect disaggregated data which was of concern to the Committee.  Could the State use a safeguard strategy, rather than simply not collecting the statistics?  How did the State address the concerns of unaccompanied minors in reception centres? What was the status of amendments to the legal aid act?  To what extent were local politicians aware of the Committee’s observations since 2018? What was being done to improve this situation?  How were the concluding observations applied in the Government? 

    Mr. Gudbrandsson commended Norway for the child welfare act which was a wonderful piece of legislation.  The lack of participation of children in Norway was of concern, with many pieces of legislation being implemented without children having a chance to provide their views.  Were steps being taken to follow-up the child welfare act to ensure children were heard? Was there a possibility to accommodate the views of the children during child abuse cases through the Barnahus model? Would the State consider the age limit for accessing Barnahus services to 18?  It was important to provide young offenders with inappropriate sexual behaviour with good therapy, and Norway was commended for thinking about this.  The Committee welcomed the State’s action plan to address violence against children.  Had an evaluation of the previous plans been conducted?  How had this impacted the new plan? 

    The Committee was concerned that Norway planned to use stronger force and constraints.  How had the country reached this situation? Would Norway ban child marriages completely without any exceptions?  There was a lack of specific prohibition of the sale and sexual exploitation of children; could this be explained? 

    MARY BELOFF, Committee Vice-Chair and Taskforce Member, said Norway’s high-level delegation present before the Committee highlighted the country’s commitment to human rights.  Norway was an exemplary country in so many ways.  Why did discrimination still persist in such an egalitarian community, particularly when it came to Sami, migrant, asylum and refugee children? Where did the root causes lie? Were there any plans to diminish the levels of discrimination seen against children? 

    All State practices in Norway kept the best interests of the child in mind.  However, there were certain cases where questions arose. Was there an instrument for local and national authorities for this purpose?  How could the best interest of the child be reconciled with chemical restraints or practices of confinement?  How was it assessed whether the best interests of the children involved were satisfied? 

    If a child needed to be removed from their family, was there a protocol in place to ensure that the best interests of the child were still respected?  How was the situation of brothers and sisters assessed and the impact on children’s mental health?  Was there sufficient information to provide a solution to deportation or family reunification as it pertained to refugees?  How did “extended detention” reconcile with the best interests of the child?

    Responses by the Delegation 

    The delegation said the proposed children’s act strengthened the rights of all children in Norway and put their safety first, with the best interests of the child always considered most important.  The act aimed to facilitate the child’s contact with both parents and reduce conflict in situations of separation of parents.  The new act also included special provisions for cases of abuse of children.

    Norway placed a great emphasis on human rights and had implemented human rights conventions in the national law; in case of conflict, the conventions would prevail.  Norway’s Parliament had considered the ratification of the third Optional Protocol on several occasions, most recently in 2022, but given several reservations expressed, had voted not to implement it by an 80 per cent majority.  Given that recent decision, the Government was currently not considering ratifying the third Optional Protocol.  The Government remained adamant to develop a national complaints procedure and had taken steps in this regard.  A child-friendly website had been designed, allowing children to access the complaints procedure more easily. 

    The participation of children was becoming an increasingly valued part of Norway’s decision-making process.  The right to be heard was enshrined in the Constitution, and there were now established youth councils and mandated conversations with the Government and youth-oriented non-governmental organizations.  In March this year, the Government developed and clarified the role of the Norwegian Directorate for Children, Youth and Family which would now oversee all aspects pertaining to children and participation, and provide guidance to the public sector in this regard. 

    There were many national complaints bodies in Norway which had the competence to handle complaints concerning children.  Several measures had been taken to strengthen children’s right to complain. Politicians at all levels were responsible for following Norwegian law in all their decisions, and the Convention was part of Norwegian law.  Politicians received a copy of the Convention on the first day of work and an informative poster.  All general comments made by the Committee were published on the Government’s website in Norwegian and English. 

    The Norwegian Human Rights Institution had created a guide on children’s rights which was available online.  Since 2018, it was forbidden to enter a marriage with someone under 18 in Norway, and from this year, foreign marriages of a person under the age of 18 were not recognised. 

    In April, a bill was submitted to parliament for a new administrative procedural act.  The legal aid act stipulated the right to free legal aid for natural citizens, including minors.  The Norwegian Barnahus model was evaluated in 2021, with the system seeming to work well and in accordance with international conventions.  The Government aimed to strengthen the legal protection of child suspects, including around interrogation of minors. The evaluation of the Barnahus model did not delve further into the proposal to raise the age for access to services to 18. 

    Residents in asylum reception centres took part in an information programme about the Norwegian society and its fundamental values.  The objective was to help residents take care of their own living situations and also inform them of their rights.  In cases of expulsion, an extended right to free legal aid was granted. 

    In recent years, Norway had taken significant steps to strengthen the child welfare services through policies, research, and financial commitments.  The child welfare services aimed to do everything within their power to allow children to live at home.  The municipalities were vital in this regard.  In Norway, around 54,000 children and adolescents received help from child welfare services annually.  The new child welfare act entered into force in 2023, and children were provided with additional rights, including speaking to child welfare authorities without parental consent.  The new participation regulation came into force in 2024 and clarified the duty of the child welfare services to provide child participation in cases.  Norway was working to improve the system, including through evaluating the new rules, developing more child friendly processes, and ensuring access to qualified legal representation to children, among other measures.   

    Norway had been working hard on foster homes; nine out of 10 children living in alternative care lived in foster homes.  Several measures had been launched to improve the situation of foster parents, including for them to be given clearer decision-making authority.  Children who had lived in a foster home for at least two years could be proposed a permanent residence in the home, if the aim of reunification had been abandoned.  The State was currently investing in models for foster homes for siblings. 

    The responsibility of the treatment and follow-up of intersex children was assigned to two hospitals, and necessary medical treatment was initiated when relevant. Treatment practices in Norway were aligned with the rest of the Nordic countries.    Norway did not collect any data or statistics based on the ethnicity of the population.  The Government was strengthening and renewing its efforts to combat hate and discrimination based on ethnicity and religion, and had delivered four action plans, including against anti-Semitism and anti-Muslim racism and hate speech, as well as discrimination against the Sami.  A study showed that a high number of children with ethnic backgrounds had experienced racism. 

    The kindergarten act and education act stated that children had the right to an education free from discrimination.  The new education act introduced a broader scope for exercising force and restraint. Employees could now intervene against pupils when necessary.  Norway shared the Committee’s concerns and had tried to state explicitly in the provision that this was a last resort, with strict measures for physical restriction to take place.   

    Several guidelines had been produced by the immigration service and the appeals board on how to hear children in the case-handling process.   

    Questions by Committee Experts

    THUWAYBA AL BARWANI, Committee Vice-Chair and Taskforce Member, acknowledged the hard work Norway had put into the strategy of equality for persons with disabilities 2020 to 2030.  How had the strategy helped mitigate the discrimination of vulnerable children? What interventions were envisaged to address access to services for children with disabilities to ensure their rights were upheld?  The Committee had heard reports of abuse of children with psychosocial disabilities, particularly girls.  What measures had been taken to address this problem?  To what extent did these children know their rights?  Was the State party making efforts to give them opportunities to be heard and their views taken into account? 

    There had been violations found in 76 per cent of respite homes; how was the Government planning to regulate these homes?  Were there efforts to reduce and phase out these institutions and replace them with more community-based care? 

    Norway had excellent data but when it came to disability, there was no disaggregated data to better understand the situation of children with disabilities in the country. How many of these children lived with their families?  How many lived in residential care?  How many were receiving support services?  What awareness raising campaigns were in place to remove stigma and educate about disability? 

    What measures were in place to provide quality psychological care for children with mental health disabilities in all municipalities?   

    The Committee had received reports that children without resident permits could not be seen by a general practitioner, and could only receive emergency health care, which was of concern.  Was the Government planning to change this practice?  The Committee welcomed Norway’s commitment to protect intersex children from violence; however, it was concerned that unnecessary irreversible surgeries had been performed on intersex children without their informed consent.  Was this the case?  Had data been collected on these practices?  Had there been redress for these children?  How was the Government planning to protect children from these practices?  What measures did the Government have to combat family poverty?  What additional measures were in place to improve the living conditions of children in municipal housing? 

    FAITH MARSHALL HARRIS, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, said Norway had been the envy of the world in terms of the environment and had an incredible record. Why was the State now granting more licenses for gas and extraction and exports?  The Committee was concerned about this change of direction.  Why was the State turning its back on the commitments made in the Paris Agreement?  Why was Norway undermining its incredible heritage in this direction?  Given the fact that this was so important to the lives of children, was there a mechanism in place for consulting them on these major decisions?

    Children with disabilities in Svalbard could not receive special education and had to move with their parents to the mainland; could more information be provided on this? The use of force by teachers in the classroom against disruptive pupils was concerning and seemed to escalate violence. Instead of teachers being trained to de-escalate violence, they were given the power to use more force than police officers.  It seemed that the Government had responded in a knee-jerk reaction to media pressure; however, the situation was more about training teachers to deal with these situations in a non-violent way.  Norway was encouraged to rethink this approach. 

    Could Norway provide more information about programmes and strategies for the Sami people?  Had Norway developed a national referral mechanism for trafficking?  Was legal representation available to children from the very start of an investigation?  How were children who had come out of warzones being rehabilitated? 

    BRAGI GUDBRANDSSON, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, asked what services children with challenging behaviours were entitled to by law? 

    MARY BELOFF, Committee Vice-Chair and Taskforce Member, asked how children were heard in cases where the State legally granted a sex change?  Had a legal definition of statelessness been adopted? What mechanisms existed to protect children who had been exposed on the internet?  Did children deprived of liberty receive information on their rights?

    A Committee Expert said Norway did not participate in the ministerial conference on ending violence against children; was there a specific reason for this? 

    Another Expert asked about the Norwegian children’s act.  When would this be finished?  How much were children involved in that act? 

    An Expert asked what was being done to prevent violence against children, including risks in the digital environment?  How was the birth declaration of refugee or stateless individuals conducted?  What was being done to support those parents?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said children’s rights would always be work in progress; it was important to evolve and improve.  Children in Norway were among the highest users of screens, social media and digital technology globally.  How could the State protect them in their everyday life?  This was a difficult problem to solve. 

    The work with the Core Group for Vulnerable Children and Youth started in 2021.  There was a need for a better cross-sectoral collaboration to ensure children, youth and their families received the necessary support and follow-up.  The Core Group was comprised of representatives from seven ministries. Last year, the Core Group was evaluated, with conclusions finding that it was well established.  The Core Group did not consult children directly in its work. 

    To combat complex forms of discrimination, it was important to apply a cross-sectional approach when developing legislation.  The action plan to combat hate speech and discrimination against the Sami was launched in January this year, and included 32 measures under headings such as dialogue, democracy, safety and security, among others.  Many valuable inputs from those concerned had been received, including from young people, as well as the Sami Parliament, which was actively involved in the development of the plan.

    The Norwegian strategy for equality for all ran until 2030, with an important competence to increase the visibility of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in all municipalities.  In 2025, the Government allocated 280 million kroner for grants for persons with disabilities.  Norway could not definitively say how many persons with disabilities were living in the country.  A recent report by Statistic Norway focused on the different definitions of disability, which would hopefully assist the State in the future.

    Every year, the Government submitted a forward-looking white paper to the Sami Parliament.  The Government aimed to get more qualified teachers in Sami schools and kindergartens.  The lack of Sami language competence was the biggest challenge to provide good services to the Sami population.  The Government had financed a school programme to assist students with a Roma background to complete primary and secondary education.  The unique framework of the Svalbard community determined what services could be provided.  It was not possible to ensure all needs could be met in the archipelago as on the mainland, including the educational offering, particularly special education, which required a tailored, individual approach.  Any additional needs needed to be met on the mainland. 

    The education act and the private school act that clarified employees to use physical interventions, included an obligation to prevent physical intervention from occurring. The Government and municipalities focused on the competence of the staff to put pre-emptive measures in place so that physical interventions were a last resort and only used when necessary. Schools should have an environment where all students thrived and benefited from education, including those who exhibited disruptive behaviours.  The solutions for these students needed to be adapted to each individual pupil.  This year, the Norwegian Government had allocated money to municipalities to address these issues.   

    Minors who came to Norway alone were a particularly vulnerable group and given high priority. In 2022, an independent evaluation of minors in asylum reception centres was conducted to ensure they received the necessary care, and violations were detected in several centres.  In 2025, the Government increased the funding of independent supervision and funding in several reception centres.  Norway worked systematically to improve the care provided to children in reception centres.  It was mandatory for reception centres to have routines in place to handle violence against children, with staff required to report any violent behaviour to relevant authorities.  The Norwegian Directorate of Immigration had instructed follow-up procedures for minor asylum seekers who may be victims of human trafficking, violence or child marriage. The Directorate of Immigration had developed specific action cards for the reception centres, for each of these specific issues.

    The Directorate of Immigration required that cooperation resident councils were established within asylum centres to ensure residents could express their views on the operation of the centre.  When applying for protection, all unaccompanied asylum-seeking minors were offered an asylum interview, either in person or online.  Clear child-friendly guidelines had been prepared on interviewing children which needed to be followed by police units.  The Immigration Appeal Board heard children orally if deemed necessary.  It was rare for children to be involved in the Board meetings.  Child hearings were conducted orally by the local police in Norway. The police had received guidance on how to hear children in a child-friendly manner. 

    A person charged with a criminal offence who was under the age of 18 at the time of the offense would only be sentenced to preventive detention in extraordinary circumstances. Unfortunately, there were cases where the court had found there were no alternative ways to safeguard public security. In light of the recommendation from the Committee, the Norwegian Government was monitoring this situation. 

    Human trafficking was a grave violation of human rights and a crime with serious consequences. The level of trafficking was low in Norway.  The Government had decided to release a strategy on trafficking in human beings which would be presented in 2025.  Training to detect victims of torture and trafficking was of utmost importance; a national guideline was published in this regard in 2023.  There were several provisions in the criminal procedure act which granted the right to a publicly appointed defence council, which was an unconditional right if the individual was a minor at the time of the offence. 

    More than 89 per cent of children in Norway participated in kindergartens.  The Government’s strategy to 2030 aimed to ensure all children could participate in high quality kindergartens, regardless of where they lived and their financial situation.  The Government had taken steps in 2024 to reduce the price of kindergarten places, significantly lowering barriers for families to enrol their children in kindergartens.  Children of minority backgrounds had lower levels of enrolment.  Children in asylum reception centres were not entitled to a place in kindergarten, but grants were provided to assist them in this regard. 

    Municipalities were strengthening formal competence in education.  School absenteeism could have many different courses and the severity of cases varied.  Absenteeism early in the school year could have significant consequences for pupils. The Government was strengthening efforts to prevent students from developing school absenteeism.

    The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ project was an important measure to ensure the Convention was implemented throughout the whole country. A guide had been created to help the municipalities understand and implement the Convention, and films and other materials had been made to increase the understanding of using the Convention in practice. 

    Children and young people would have to live with the climate, and the decisions made today would affect their future.  It was crucial to limit the global temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius. Norway was contributing to this effort by striving to complete its own climate goals and it collaborated with the European Union in this regard.  The Government involved children and young people in the development of the climate policy.  An agreement had been reached which safeguarded the rights of reindeer herders. The State had taken a responsibility to ensure that reindeer herders could utilise additional land for winter grazing.  Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the supply of gas from Norway to Europe had helped free Europe from Russian gas.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    FAITH MARSHALL HARRIS, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, congratulated Norway on the outcome for the reindeer herders.  The issues of violence and bullying in schools was an increasing worldwide phenomenon which had reached even Norway.  Did Norway consider that the socialisation in schools needed to increase?  What would be done about this?  Was the issue of displacement among indigenous peoples being addressed?  Was their free, prior and informed consent being obtained for development activities? 

    A Committee Expert asked if the Immigration Appeals Board had an administrative and judicial competency?  What kind of appeals did it hear?  Were there age assessment appeals before this Board?  How was the right of children to be heard guaranteed if the Board did not hear children directly?  Did the Board hear appeals from detention conditions?  Was there mandatory reporting with regards to the best interest of the child?  Did permanency only apply to children in residential care or those in all care settings?

    Another Expert said developing countries were most vulnerable to the impact of greenhouse gases. What was Norway doing for those countries? 

    A Committee Expert asked if children in Norway had been consulted regarding the ratification of the third Optional Protocol?  Norway should be commended regarding its commitment to the landmine treaty, as landmines were some of the worst arms affecting children.  Did the State plan to take a stronger stance?

    Another Committee Expert asked if there were positive parenting programmes in place in Norway? How was artificial intelligence used in Norway and how did the State protect children from its threats? 

    MARY BELOFF, Committee Vice-Chair and Taskforce Member, asked why Norway did not feel the need to have a differentiated response between the ages of 15 to 18? 

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said three quarters of the country’s child and adolescent mental health services had implemented cognitive behaviour therapies to address trauma.  The Norwegian Board of Health Supervision conducted nationwide inspections of children in respite homes between 2022 and 2023, and had provided several recommendations, with follow-up measures now initiated.  Since 1991, Norway had implemented a reform for the care of people with developmental disabilities, with the goal to phase out institutional care.  Data showed that almost 20,000 children had received one or more municipal care services. 

    Children with disabilities should be treated equally and protected against discrimination. The Ombudsman for Children played an important role in raising awareness about children’s rights.  Illegal substance use among children and young people in Norway was relatively low.  However, there had been a concerning increase in cocaine use among young men and boys.  The Government was particularly focused on preventing substance use among children and young people.  Most children and young people in Norway reported a good quality of life and satisfaction; however, there had been an increase of poor self-mental health diagnosis among young people in Norway, particularly after the COVID-19 pandemic. The Government aimed to ensure that everyone had access to good quality, low-threshold mental health services, and municipal capacities had been developed in this regard.

    Combatting violence against children was a high priority for the Norwegian Government and a national action plan had been developed.  A whitepaper on safe digital upbringing would soon be submitted to Parliament.  The development of social media was being debated, and Norway was assessing an age limit for social media services.  Most social media services were not developed with children’s wellbeing in mind. Children of any age could refuse a parent sharing videos or photos of them on social media.

    In cases of separation, parents should have shared daily authority as a general rule, to safeguard the child’s right to family life and reduce conflict.  Norway had a free and low threshold counselling service for families to prevent disputes.  The Norwegian Directorate of Children and Youth offered a wealth of online resources for parents to help them navigate different aspects of parenting. 

    The Government had proposed legislative amendments to ensure foster parents could be given direct authority to make decisions on behalf of the child.  Foster parents were given the right to appeal the decision to move a child.  The child welfare act regulated follow-up between parents and monitored the child’s development. 

    Children could be placed in child welfare institutions if they had serious behavioural problems; this was the case for approximately 20 per cent of children residing in these institutions.  The State had a duty to ensure these children received the necessary care and help required. 

    Norway’s housing allowance had been strengthened in 2024 and 2025 to help those struggling in the housing market.  The Government had strengthened the grants scheme for the inclusion of children and youth. Policies targeted newly arrived refugees and immigrants who had lived in Norway for years, to increase their access to the labour market.   

    The Government had initiated a series of measures to improve the school environment and was further strengthening this effort.  Studies showed that pupils who did not use their phones in school hours experienced less bullying, and for this reason there was a directive for schools to keep school-hours mobile free.  Schools and kindergartens had an obligation to act if a child was experiencing bullying.

    An age assessment was considered during the asylum decision.  It was not the case that the Immigration Appeal Board never heard the child. When it was assessed that the case was sufficiently informed, the Board could decide on the case without a hearing. Usually, it was assessed that the case was sufficiently informed, as the child had previously been heard through an asylum-seeking interview.  The detention of children was only used to carry out an immediate pending return. Minors above 16 years old could be granted a resident permit if they reached the age of 18.  This was important to reduce the number of asylum-seeking minors embarking on dangerous journeys to Norway and Europe.  There were special penal sentences in place for juvenile offenders.

    Norway regretted the decision of some countries to withdraw from the mine ban treaty and had no plans to withdraw. 

    Gender affirming treatment was not provided to intersex children based on this diagnosis alone; it was only after a diagnosis of gender dysmorphia where treatment could be received, following years of monitoring.  Surgeries were not performed on the psychosocial indications of intersex children.  The last time this occurred was several decades ago. 

    When giving birth in Norway, most births took place in a hospital, where the birth was then registered.  If the birth took place at home without a doctor or midwife present, it was up to the mother to report the birth within one month. 

    Closing Remarks

    BRAGI GUDBRANDSSON, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, appreciated the rich, comprehensive information shared by the delegation.  It was clear Norway was on an exciting journey in revisiting the fundamental principles of the Convention, which was reflected in the new legislation, guidelines and action plans; the Committee was very impressed and appreciated these efforts.  The proposal to expand the use of force in schools and residential care was of concern to the Committee and it was hoped this would be carefully considered before being enacted. 

    LENE VÅGSLID, Minister of Children and Families of Norway and head of the delegation, thanked the Committee for the important questions and the dialogue.  Norway had seen a rise in the exclusion of children which it wished to turn around.  The proposed children’s act aimed to secure the child’s right to family life, provided it was in their best interest.  Norway aimed to highlight that all sectors were working towards the best possible outcomes for children.  Norway looked forward to receiving the Committee’s concluding observations.

    SOPIO KILADZE, Committee Chair, thanked Norway for the dialogue and for acknowledging the challenges faced by the country.  The concluding observations would contain recommendations to make Norway a better place for children.  Ms. Kiladze extended warm regards on behalf of the Committee to the children of Norway.

    ___________

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

    CRC25.010E

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI Video: Peacekeeping, Palestine & other topics – Daily Press Briefing (13 May 2025) | United Nations

    Source: United Nations (Video News)

    Noon Briefing by Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesperson for the Secretary-General.

    Highlights:
    Secretary-General/UN Peacekeeping
    Occupied Palestinian Territory
    Sudan
    South Sudan
    Libya
    UN Women
    Financial Contribution

    SECRETARY-GENERAL/UN PEACEKEEPING
    Earlier today, the Secretary-General spoke at the Opening Ceremony of the UN Peacekeeping Ministerial Meeting taking place in Berlin. He reasserted that in trouble spots around the world, our Blue Helmets can mean the difference between life and death, adding that they are a clear demonstration of the power of multilateral action to maintain, to achieve and to sustain peace.
    Mr. Guterres spoke about the challenges that we are now facing, including having the highest number of conflicts since the foundation of this organization. On top of that, we face dramatic financial constraints across the board.
    During his speech, and in honour of the 4,400 peacekeepers who have died in the line of duty since the start of UN Peacekeeping, Mr. Guterres asked the attendees of the meeting to join him in a moment of silence.
    Also, in Berlin, the Secretary-General met separately with Germany’s Ministers of Foreign Affairs – Johann Wadephul – as well as the Minister of Defence, Boris Pistorius. Among other topics, they discussed the importance of Germany’s role in peacekeeping. And I just to flag, as a sign of the importance of this meeting, we have more than 130 delegations in Berlin at this Peacekeeping conference.
    On the sidelines of the Ministerial Meeting, the Secretary-General also held bilateral meetings with Ministers and officials of other countries, including Italy, Finland and China.
    He is ending the day with a visit to an exhibit on UN Peacekeeping in action which has been held at the German Ministry of Defense in Berlin. The event features display on mine action, women in peacekeeping, renewable energy and the United Nations Police.
    Tomorrow, he will meet with Friedrich Merz, the Federal Chancellor of Germany, and he will also have a couple of press engagements.

    OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY  
    The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) warns that no aid or commercial supplies have entered Gaza now for more than 70 days. The ongoing, full-scale blockade of the Strip is taking a disastrous toll on the population.  
    Meanwhile, hospitals continue to come under attack. Today, in Khan Younis, Israeli forces hit the surgical department of Nasser Medical Complex, and several casualties were reported. The complex is one of only eight public hospitals that are still partially operating across Gaza.  
    Following the attack, the Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator for Gaza, Suzanna Tkalec – together with an OCHA team – visited the hospital, where she spoke with staff and a team of international doctors that are there. She said she was appalled by yet another attack on this hospital, which is the fourth since the beginning of this conflict.
    Ms. Tkalec stressed that these attacks are unacceptable and must stop, adding that healthcare facilities and those serving them must always be protected.  
    UN humanitarian partners on the ground report that only five hospitals across the Gaza Strip are still providing maternity care. Midwives lack medical supplies, they lack equipment, with our partners reporting that some 17,000 pregnant and breastfeeding mothers are suffering from malnutrition and need urgent support.  
    OCHA reports that the Israeli authorities continue to deny and impede attempts by humanitarians to carry out critical missions in Gaza. Today, out of 11 requests by the United Nations for coordinated humanitarian movements, five were denied outright, including one planned mission to retrieve fuel from Rafah to supply hospitals, ambulances and water, sanitation and hygiene facilities. The other six missions, which included the rotation of staff, were facilitated.
    With both supplies and time running out, OCHA says that principled humanitarian assistance and other essential supplies must be allowed into Gaza to save lives – and humanitarians’ work to reach people across the Strip must be facilitated. Israel, as the occupying power, must abide by international humanitarian law and facilitate aid for people in need, wherever they are.  
    And at 3:00 p.m. this afternoon, the Security Council will hold an open meeting on Gaza. Tom Fletcher, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, will brief.

    Full Highlights: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/noon-briefing-highlight?date%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=13%20May%202025

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=imRKMtBjfEg

    MIL OSI Video

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Briefing – Addressing menstrual poverty in the EU – 13-05-2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Menstrual poverty, defined as insufficient access to menstrual hygiene products and facilities, affects an estimated 10 % of the half of the EU population who menstruate, with a higher prevalence among people with a low income, refugees, young people, and people with disabilities. Studies from Belgium, France, Germany, and Spain highlight the economic burden menstruation imposes, particularly on vulnerable persons. The COVID 19 pandemic exacerbated this issue by disrupting supply chains and intensifying financial strains. To address menstrual poverty, the European Union has facilitated access to menstrual hygiene products primarily through fiscal reform. The revision of the EU VAT Directive introduced greater flexibility for Member States to apply reduced or zero VAT rates to female sanitary products, shifting their classification from luxury to essential goods. Practices remain quite divergent, with some Member States, such as Ireland, Cyprus and Malta, adopting a zero rate, while others, such as Hungary, Sweden and Denmark, maintain standard rates. EU funding programmes such as Erasmus+ and ESF+ have indirectly supported menstrual health initiatives through education, social inclusion, and material assistance projects. Partnerships with non-governmental organisations, such as the Red Cross, have helped distribute products to marginalised groups. Likewise, numerous local initiatives in Member States increasingly provide free menstrual products in schools, universities, and public spaces. The European Parliament recognises menstrual poverty as a gender equality issue and calls for greater access to free menstrual products. Members continue to urge Member States and the European Commission to introduce concrete initiatives to combat period poverty.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Discharge 2023: EU general budget – Commission, executive agencies and European Development Funds – P10_TA(2025)0077 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section III – Commission,

    –  having regard to its decisions on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budgets of the executive agencies for the financial year 2023,

    –  having regard to Rule 101 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Development, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on the Environment, the Committee on Transport and Tourism, the Committee on Regional Development, the Committee on Culture and Education, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality,

    –  having regard to the letter from the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0074/2025),

    A.  whereas the eleventh EDF has reached its final stage as its sunset clause came into effect on 31 December 2020; whereas, however, specific contracts for existing financing agreements were signed until 31 December 2023, and the implementation of the ongoing projects funded by the EDF will continue until their final completion;

    B.  whereas the ninth, tenth and eleventh(1) EDFs were not incorporated into the Union general budget and continue to be implemented and reported on separately until their closure;

    C.  whereas, for the 2021-2027 MFF, development cooperation aid to ACP countries is integrated in the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (‘NDICI-Global Europe’) as part of the EU general budget, and development cooperation aid to OCTs, including Greenland, has been incorporated into the Decision on the Overseas Association;

    D.  whereas the EDFs are managed almost entirely by the Commission’s DG INTPA with a small proportion (7 %) of the 2023 EDF expenditure being managed by DG NEAR;

    Political priorities

    1.  Underlines its strong commitment to the Union’s fundamental values and principles which are enshrined in the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU); in the framework of the discharge process, stresses especially the principles of sound financial management as set out in Article 317 TFEU and the combatting of fraud and protection of the financial interests of the Union as set out in Article 325 TFEU;

    2.  Underlines the importance of the principle of separation of powers in the Union and recalls that according to the Treaty, the institutions shall practice mutual sincere cooperation; believes that under no circumstances the actions of one Union institution should affect the independence of another institution; urges all other institutions to respect the role of the Parliament as the sole Union institution directly elected by the citizens and to refrain from any undue, direct or indirect interference in its legislative processes, thereby ensuring that Parliament’s decision making-process remains free and independent from other Union institutions or any other entities;

    3.  Highlights the importance of the Union budget for achieving the Union’s political priorities, as well as its role in assisting Member States in unforeseen situations such as international conflicts or crises and their consequences; points out in this regard the continuing relevance of investments and support from the Union budget for reducing disparities between Member States and regions, for promoting economic growth and employment, for combating poverty and social exclusion, and thus for improving the daily life of European citizens;

    4.  Notes that the Court of Auditors (the Court) for the financial year 2023 has issued a clean opinion concerning the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of revenue; at the same time, regrets that the Court has had to issue for the 5th consecutive year an adverse opinion on the legality and regularity of Union budget expenditure and a qualified opinion on the legality and regularity of expenditure under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF);

    5.  Expresses its deep concerns that the overall error rate estimated by the Court has been on a rising trend since the financial year 2020 and has reached 5,6 % for the financial year 2023; notes that there are significant differences in the error rates between headings which range from spending areas with error rates below the materiality threshold of 2 % up to an error rate of 9,3 % in the case of cohesion policy; further notes that discharge is a political process where all issues related to a specific financial year may be taken into consideration and that the decision on whether to grant or refuse discharge should remain factual and anchored in the Union acquis, and that it is taken for the budget as a whole; urges the Commission, finally, to take into account the Court’s recommendations and to reduce the overall error rate over the coming years; further asks the Commission to present an Action Plan within the four months on reducing the error rate;

    6.  Is concerned that the Commission and the Court have different interpretations of what the “error rate” represents, thus generating confusion; expresses its support for a common audit approach and methodology and strongly calls on both institutions to find a solution to the divergent approaches before the 2024 discharge; is concerned that the Commission is systematically underestimating the existing error level and that this could lead to an ineffective protection of the financial interests of the Union;

    7.  Expresses again its deep its concern that the accumulated outstanding commitments (RAL – reste à liquider) have reached a record level of EUR 543 billion, equivalent to 3,2 % of the total GDP of the Union at the end of 2023 and representing more than double the Union annual budget for 2023; underlines that such a record high level of outstanding commitments risks creating challenges for the future smooth implementation of extraordinary high levels of payments and/or leading to significant decommitments to the detriment of the implementation of Union policy objectives;

    8.  Further expresses its concern that the outstanding debt from borrowing has reached EUR 458,5 billion, equivalent to 2,7 % of the total GDP of the Union at the end of 2023; notes that the increase in outstanding debt during 2023, equivalent to EUR 110,5 billion, has made the Union one of the largest debt issuers in Europe; further notes that the amount of outstanding debt is projected to increase further during the coming years, especially due to increased borrowing linked to the RRF and financial assistance to a number of countries including Ukraine which is the victim of a war of aggression by Russia; reiterates its deep concerns that the increase in debt makes the Union budget more vulnerable to increases in interest rates since a part of the debt will have to be serviced and repaid by the Union budget;

    9.  Recalls the importance of a strict application of the financial rules of the Union in all programmes and on all beneficiaries, in order to avoid all forms of fraud, conflicts of interest, corruption, double funding and money laundering;

    10.  Underlines the importance of the rule of law as one of the fundamental values of the Union and stresses that the Rule of Law Conditionality Mechanism is crucial in order to ensure that Member States continue to respect the principles of the rule of law; reiterates its deep concerns about the deteriorating rule of law situation in certain Member States including attacks or restrictions to the activities of civil society organisations, which not only poses a significant threat to democratic values but also leads to an increased risk of financial losses for the Union budget; calls for the provision of adequate support to civil society organisations active in the field; acknowledges the emergence of new forms of rule of law violations by national governments and calls on the Commission to address these evolving challenges; calls on the Commission to ensure strict and fast implementation of all elements of the mechanism when Member States breach the principles of the rule of law where such breaches affect, or risk affecting, the financial interests of the Union; at the same time, underlines the need for complete and timely information on decisions related to the implementation of the Rule of Law Conditionality Mechanism; encourages the Commission to explicitly assess when shortcomings in the rule of law are of a systemic nature; calls for a stronger emphasis on the implementation of country-specific recommendations, coupled with effective follow-up mechanisms and measurable benchmarks; proposes the establishment of a comprehensive rule of law monitoring framework involving all Union institutions, Member States, and candidate countries, aimed at ensuring coherence and uniformity across the Union, while at the same time ensuring a fair and impartial application; calls on the Commission to propose measures to ensure the protection of final beneficiaries in cases of breaches of the rule of law by national governments without undermining the application and effectiveness of the regulation;

    11.  Takes note of the innovative nature of the RRF and its contribution to supporting Member States in recovering from the economic and social consequences of the pandemic and creating a more resilient European economy; is of the opinion that any shift to a performance-based approach based on the RRF as a model requires addressing the many issues identified in its implementation, as well as assessing data on its full impact, before using such a model; recalls the many problems identified in the implementation of the RRF which would need to be addressed, including, but not limited to: the lack of adequate consultation of the regional and local authorities and other relevant stakeholders, such as social partners and civil society organisations and the lack of their involvement in the implementation; the weak cross border dimension, which may hint to a reduced EU added value in that respect; the lack of a clear definition of the milestones and targets and their satisfactorily fulfilment; the insufficient flexibility; the common debt with long-term debt payment as a consequence; the serious transparency, audit and control problems of the program which make it impossible for the citizens to be informed about the final beneficiaries of actions funded by the Union and pushes Member States to use RRF funds to cover projects very similar to those financed by Cohesion funds but with a much more limited capacity of control; reiterates the concern about the interpretation of the Commission and Member States on what a “final recipient” of RRF funding represents, which is not in line with the agreement of the REPowerEU negotiations and maintains that ministries, public authorities or other contracting authorities cannot be listed as final recipients of RRF funding; further expresses concern about the findings of the Court in relation to the risk of double funding and financing of recurring budgetary expenditure which are not in line with the RRF legal basis;

    12.  Notes that the set-up of the NGEU mechanism implies that the repayment of NGEU loans must start before the end of 2027 and be completed by 2058 at the latest; is concerned that the increase in interest rates over the last years has increased the borrowing costs under the NGEU significantly compared with original estimates; reiterates the need to fully respect the timeline of the legally binding roadmap for the introduction of new own resources and underlines that swift progress on new own resources is essential to repay NGEU and safeguard the current and future MFFs;

    13.  Stresses the urgent need for significant de-bureaucratisation, streamlining and simplification of all Union policies and their funding in line with the recommendations in the Draghi report(2) in order to ease the burdens for European businesses and increase European competitiveness, while ensuring the protection of the financial interests of the Union; underlines that simplification will also have a positive effect on error rates in the implementation of policies because many errors happen because of overcomplicated rules which are difficult to navigate, especially for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), new applicants, spin-offs and start-ups;

    14.  Reiterates the need to balance the further simplification of rules and procedures with much more systematic use of digitalised reporting, better and more robust controls and adequate ex post checks on the most repeated areas of irregular spending that do not add excessive bureaucratic complexity for beneficiaries, develop training sessions and practical information for applicants, in particular new applicants, and improve the assistance and guidelines for SMEs, spin-offs, start-ups, administration and payment agencies and all other relevant stakeholders; reminds that a robust control system under the responsibility of the Commission is particularly needed for the RRF;

    15.  Stresses the need and highlights the importance of the NDICI programme for the support to global challenges, the promotion of human rights, freedoms and democracy; underlines the importance of reinforcing the Eastern Neighbourhood line in order to support political, economic and social reforms in this challenged region;

    16.  Underlines that it is imperative for the credibility of the Union that the Commission ensures that no Union funds are allocated to individuals or organisations linked to any kind of terrorist movements or any other movement expressing extremist views, inciting violence and/or hatred, that are directly in opposition to the European Union’s fundamental values, including Islamist anti-Semitic, anti-Christian and anti-Islamic movements; in this context, recalls that there have been allegations that 19 of 13 000 UNRWA employees in Gaza were involved in the despicable terrorist attacks by Hamas against Israel on 7 October; recalls that in 9 cases their employment was formally terminated in the interests of UNRWA; takes note of the results of the investigation launched by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS); underlines that the Commission should also establish better controls ensuring that no such funding happens indirectly through third parties and organise better traceability of Union funds to final beneficiaries;

    17.  Reiterates deep concerns about the increase in the exploitation of Union funds against Union principles and values, especially when the use of funds and transfers to other organisations are not entirely traceable; warns of the danger of Union funds ultimately being used within corrupt circles and being subject to fraud and irregularities, foreign interference or entrism; emphasises the importance of ‘final beneficiary transparency’ for Union funds;

    18.  Emphasises the importance of maintaining institutional integrity and preventing potential foreign interference; condemns any improper attempt to influence the legislative activities of the European Parliament; insists on the responsibility of OLAF to conduct all necessary in-depth investigations; stresses the importance of the work carried out by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) in protecting the European Union’s financial interests; insists to provide to the EPPO adequate financial and human resources; recalls the Agreement establishing an interinstitutional body for ethical standards for members of institutions and advisory bodies referred to in Article 13 of the Treaty on European Union, and insist on its swift implementation in all EU institutions;

    19.  Recalls the crucial role of civil society organisations (CSOs), including NGOs, in upholding democratic values to support a vibrant and lively democratic society, ensuring a sound basis for broad coverage of all relevant views in different debates and highlights that CSOs may receive support from Union funds to exercise these functions, as provided in Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union;

    20.  Notes that there have been allegations from some Members of the Budgetary Control committee that grant agreements, concluded by the Commission included detailed lobbying activities which could be interpreted as potentially interfering with internal decision making in the Union Institutions; notes that the Commission took a series of measures to address the allegations by adopting guidance on funding for activities related to the development, implementation, monitoring and enforcement of Union legislation and policy, stating that while such grant agreements did not breach the EU legal framework, they could potentially entail a reputational risk for the Union; notes that all grant agreements include a disclaimer stating that ‘views of the beneficiary do not in any way represent views of the EU and that granting authority cannot be held responsible for them’; notes that such a disclaimer was further added in the 2024 call for proposals for operation grants;

    21.  Notes that a screening of grant agreements in all portfolios to verify their alignment with the new guidance is ongoing and that, so far, the Commission has not communicated to the Parliament the full results of the screening nor other measures that the Commission might take, if necessary; calls the Commission to keep the discharge authority informed at all times; emphasises that transparency in stakeholder meetings is fundamental to democratic integrity and should apply equally to all entities engaging with Union institutions; stresses that clear documentation and disclosure of such interactions strengthens public trust and democratic accountability;

    22.  Recalls that EU funding requires stringent accountability and transparency standards; in line with the ECA recommendations in the Special Report 05/2024(3) and the recent special Report 11/2025(4), urges the Commission to ensure that the information disclosed in the Financial Transparency System is frequently updated, reliable, comparable and useful; stresses the need to allocate additional resources to the EUTR Secretariat to enable a systematic and thorough monitoring of the Transparency Register; this should include allocating resources towards AI implementation to develop an AI based search mechanism; recalls the need to proactively check that all entities beneficiaries of EU funds respect EU values;

    23.  Welcomes the reply of Commissioner Serafin to the written question(5), once again confirming EU funding was granted and used by NGOs in full respect of EU Treaties and LIFE Regulation(6); takes further note of the recent ECA Special Report on transparency of EU funding granted to NGOs(7), which, while stating that the use of EU funding for NGO advocacy is legal, also confirms it is in line with EU’s legal transparency requirements as laid down in the EU Financial Regulation; at the same time ECA SR 11/2025 points to the fact that more should be done to improve transparency of EU funding received by all beneficiaries; calls in this regard on the Commission to implement ECA recommendations regarding screening of self-declarations in the EU’s Financial Transparency System, as well as proactive monitoring of the respect to EU fundamental values and principles by the beneficiaries;

    24.  Welcomes the entry into force of the recast of the Financial Regulation; welcomes, in particular, the enhancements related to tracking Union funds through digital tools and interoperability that will bolster the protection of the Union Financial Interests, the targeted extension of the Early Detection and Exclusion System (EDES) to shared management following MFF 2027, the reference to the Rule of Law conditionality mechanism and the introduction of a conditionality based on Union values as enshrined in Article 2 TEU, as well as the opportunity to streamline SMEs and individual applicants with the introduction of very low-value grants;

    CHAPTER 1 – Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF)

    The European Court of Auditors’ statement of assurance and budgetary and financial management

    Reliability of the accounts

    25.  Welcomes the Court’s conclusion in its annual report on the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023(8), that the consolidated accounts of the European Union for that year are reliable; notes that the Court has issued a clean opinion on the reliability of the accounts every year since 2007;

    26.  Notes that on 31 December 2023, total liabilities amounted to EUR 679,9 billion, and total assets amounted to EUR 467,7 billion; notes that the difference of EUR 212,2 billion represents the negative net assets, comprising debt and the portion of expenses already incurred by the Union up to 31 December 2023 that must be funded by future budgets;

    27.  Notes that at the end of 2023, the estimated value of incurred but not yet claimed eligible expenses due to beneficiaries, recorded as accrued expenses, was EUR 155,2 billion (2021: EUR 148,7 billion), of which EUR 7,4 billion is related to accrued RRF expenditure;

    28.  Welcomes the Court’s conclusion that the assets, liabilities, revenue and expenses, including those related to NextGenerationEU (NGEU), the estimate related to the UK’s withdrawal process, and the impact of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, are presented fairly in the consolidated annual accounts;

    Legality and regularity of Union revenue

    29.  Notes the Court’s conclusion that the Union’s revenue is free from material error and that the managing systems examined by the Court were generally effective;

    Legality and regularity of Union expenditure

    30.  Strongly regrets the adverse opinion on the legality and regularity of the Union budget expenditure issued by the Court for the fifth year in a row; considers this increasingly problematic, as the Commission seems unable, or unwilling, to identify the cause and address the underlying issues; regrets the Commission is not accepting some recommendations of the Court of Auditors; notes in particular the importance of reinforcement of financial management of the Commission and Member States, that is considered as not reliable by the Court and therefore compromises the reliability of the Annual Management and Performance Report; calls on the Commission to present a clear action plan on reducing the error rate within the following four months; stresses that Parliament shall duly scrutinise such an action plan;

    31.  Is seriously concerned by the Court’s estimation of the error level of 5,6 % in 2023 expenditure; notes that this is an accelerated deterioration compared to the previous two years (4,2 % in 2022 and 3.0 % in 2021); notes with concern that the Court continues to detect substantial issues in reimbursement-based expenditure where the estimated level of error is 7,9 %; notes that the effect of the errors found by the Court is estimated to be both material and pervasive; calls for the Commission’s financial management to be tightened up, in accordance with the recommendations made by the Court in its Annual Reports and Special Reports, in order to resolutely tackle the high error rate over the next few years; underlines the Court’s warning that the increasing European debt is placing growing pressure on the Union budget;

    32.  Notes that the Commission in its Annual Management and Performance Report categorises the expenditure into higher, medium and lower risk categories, in order to focus action on high-risk areas; while the Court uses only two risk categories in order to produce an opinion on the legality and regularity of the expenditures; is worried that the Court’s work revealed limitations in the Commission’s ex-post work, which, taken together, affect the robustness of the Commission’s risk assessment; notes with concern that one of the areas most impacted was ‘Cohesion, resilience and values’, where the Court assessed the majority of the spending to be high risk, while the Commission classified only a minority in this way;

    33.  Reiterates the concerns about the Court observation that the Commission’s risk assessment is likely to underestimate the level of risk in several areas; is also worried by recurrent weaknesses identified by the Court in Member States’ management and control systems, which are still not still preventing or detecting irregularities in heading 2, thus limiting the reliance that can be placed on their work, while the Commission’s error rates do still rely on these national systems, which do not work effectively;

    34.  Notes that the increase is primarily caused by the estimated level of error under MFF heading 2 – cohesion, resilience and values, where the Court found 9,3 % of expenditure to be in breach of Union rules and regulations; recalls the underlying issues that are reported by the Court and that have been known for several years;

    35.  Underlines that the estimated level of error in the Union’s expenditure, as presented in the Court’s statement of assurance, is an estimate of the money that should not have been paid out because it was not used in accordance with the applicable rules and regulations; considers that, though not an indicator of fraud or corruption, the estimated level of error represents expenditure where corrective actions are necessary, and thus shows a wasteful use of resources; regrets that, while being a problem in itself, this will also give a negative impression to citizens, and may even call into question the Commission’s ability to effectively protect the Union’s financial interests;

    36.  Notes with concern that the Commission´s own estimate of the risk at payment is only 1,9 % for 2023 and has been at that level since 2020; notes that the Commission estimates its capacity to correct and recover irregular expenditure during implementation of the associated programmes at 1,0 %, resulting in a risk at closure of 0,9 %; is concerned that again for this year the Commission’s risk at payment is not only below the Court estimated level of error of 5,6 % but also below the Court range, which is between 4,4 % and 6,8 %; highlights that the divergence between the Court’s overall error rate and the Commission’s risk at payment is also evident in some of the specific spending areas, in particular in heading 2, even more than in the past; welcomes the Court’s estimate of the level of error as an important indicator for the existing risks;

    37.  Notes the multi-annual perspective of the Commission’s risk at closure, as corrections and recoveries after year-end are not reflected in the Court’s estimate of the level of error; regrets, however, the confusion caused by the Commission’s presentation of the risk at payment;

    38.  Recalls the positions expressed in the 2022 discharge resolution and the exchanges of views in the discharge hearings for the financial year 2023 on the diverging methodologies and estimates between the Court and the Commission of errors made in Union expenditure; notes in particular that the Court’s error rate is based on a statistical sample, whereas the Commission’s risk at payment is to a large extent compiled from the error rates reported by national auditing authorities in Member States and calculated only after corrections and repayments; reminds that the Court’s error rate includes the errors that remained undetected by the Member States and the Commission, which demonstrates that the Commission’s error rates are an underestimation; notes with concern an even wider gap between the Court’s and Commission’s estimates; further notes that the Commission and the Court are organising joint workshops on this issue; notes that the Court recently aligned its methodology on procurement in the decentralised agencies with the methodology of the Commission; reiterates its support for the independent audit approach and methodology of the Court and invites the Commission to cooperate with the Court with a view to increasing harmonisation and providing for more comparable estimates of the level of error;

    39.  Recalls that the discharge authority needs a statement of assurance, provided by the Court, on the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions at year-end for its decision on discharge for that year; notes that Union spending programmes are multiannual and that their management and control systems cover multiple years, allowing for corrections and recoveries after year-end;

    40.  Recalls that the Commission is responsible for preventing and detecting fraud; notes that the Court, in the exercise of its mandate, is obliged to report any cases of irregularity; notes that the Court forwards to the EPPO suspicions of criminal offences falling under its competences and to OLAF suspicions of fraud, corruption or other illegal activity affecting the Union’s financial interests; notes that, in 2023, the Court reported 20 cases of suspected fraud to OLAF, and in parallel reported 12 of these cases to the EPPO, resulting so far in four OLAF investigations and nine EPPO investigations; commends the Court for its reporting of cases of irregularity to OLAF and the EPPO, as information resulting from audit engagements usually has a high degree of reliability; reminds in this framework of the key role played by the whole Union’s anti-fraud architecture and expresses some concerns about the refusal of some Member States to cooperate with one of its elements, the EPPO;

    Budgetary and financial management

    41.  Notes that in 2023, 98,9 % of the available commitment appropriations were used (EUR 184,4 billion out of EUR 186,5 billion); notes that the available appropriations were higher than the MFF ceiling of EUR 182,7 billion due to the use of special instruments for new or unforeseen events; notes that 90,0 % of payment appropriations were used (EUR 162,0 billion of EUR 165,2 billion available);

    42.  Notes with concern that the total outstanding commitments, which represent future debts if not decommitted, reached an all-time high of EUR 543 billion (2022: EUR 450 billion); notes that the Commission foresees a decrease from 2025 to 2029 when committed amounts for both NGEU and the 2021-2027 programming period should be paid out; notes however that the actual amounts for 2023 (EUR 543 billion) are much higher than the forecasted amount (EUR 490 billion), calling the Commission’s estimates into question;

    43.  Recalls that the time available for implementing shared management funds under the 2021-2027 MFF is shorter than under previous MFFs because of the n+2 for the last year, which, coupled with the high RAL, will raise the risk of decommitments; notes the Court’s observation that the Commission has increased its forecasted amount of decommitments from EUR 7,6 billion for 2023-2027, to EUR 8,1 billion for 2024-2027 to EUR 8,8 billion for 2025-2027, a 15 % increase in 2 years; underlines with concern that the Commission has underestimated its projections for the RAL in the last two years, and that the Commission therefore likely underestimates the amount of decommitments that will be made until 2027; notes the introduction of the “cascade mechanism” following the mid-term review of the MFF 2021-2027 and the incentive to use decommitted amounts to cover increased interest costs for amounts borrowed by the Commission for NGEU;

    44.   Notes that the latest long-term payment forecast produced by the Commission foresees substantial decommitments as of 2027 unless Member States undertake additional efforts and implement at a much faster pace than in the period 2014-2020; notes that for the CF, ERDF, and ESF+ cohesion policy funds, the Commission forecast total decommitments for 2024-2027 at EUR 2,2 billion, more than five times its 2022 forecast of EUR 0,4 billion; warns that for the Just Transition Fund (JTF), the low implementation in 2023 puts important amounts at risk from 2025 onwards; calls on the Commission and on the Member States to use all of the available possibilities to avoid decommitments;

    45.  Notes with concern that Union debt increased from EUR 344,3 billion in 2022 to EUR 458,5 billion in 2023, 60 % of which is related to NGEU; notes that only for the debt issued for NGEU, associated interest costs need to be paid directly from the Union Budget and that, due to increased interest rates, these costs for the current MFF (until the end of 2027) are estimated to be between EUR 17 billion and EUR 27 billion higher than the initially forecasted EUR 14,9 billion;

    46.  Notes with concern that the total exposure of the Union budget because of guarantees and contingent liabilities for loans rose to EUR 298,0 billion; notes that assumptions on capital-market interest should be made conservatively, both for existing debt and new debt and that for both categories a viable plan for its repayment is necessary; notes that the Court received information from the Commission that indicates that the exposure will steadily increase in the coming years, putting additional pressure on the headroom of the budget and further reducing the flexibility of the Union budget; supports the Court recommendations to the Commission to act more proactively to ensure that its mitigating tools (such as the Common Provisioning Fund) have sufficient capacity as well as to provide more transparent reporting on total annual budget exposure, making its estimate public;

    47.  Notes with concern that the Court in its Special Report 07/2024(9) observed that a significant share of recovery orders issued between 2014 and 2022 were still outstanding at the time of their audit; further notes that the Commission, in its replies to the Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control’s (CONT Committee) written questions for the 2023 discharge, mentioned that there are 1 357 overdue recovery orders for a total outstanding amount of approximately EUR 335 million for the period 2014-2023; calls on the Commission to prioritise collecting monies under overdue recovery orders and to keep the Committee on Budgetary Control informed about progress made;

    48.  Highlights that equality is a founding value of the Union and is enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; recalls the commitment of the Union to gender mainstreaming in its policy-making and implementation of Union funds, including gender budgeting; encourages the Commission to continue the efforts made in gender budgeting and in tracking the impact of the Union budget to foster gender equality; recalls the obligation of the Commission to accompany all legislative proposals with an impact assessment when they are projected to have a significant economic, social, and environmental impact in order to guarantee, among other things, fair distribution of funds;

    49.  Notes that the review of the Interinstitutional Agreement on the Transparency Register is due by July 2025; calls on the Commission to ensure that the process is as open as possible, to align financial reporting requirements across all categories of registrants (including funding sources and lobbying budgets), addressing also the risk identified in the Court’s Special Report on the EU Transparency Register (SR 05/2024) regarding self-declarations on the category of interest representation; believes that, in order to address the recommendations of the Court, the resources of the secretariat of the Transparency Register should be increased;

    50.  Recalls the following findings of the Court of Auditors’ Special Report 11/2025: (i) that the identification and registration of entities as NGOs are not always consistent and reliable; (ii) that despite a more streamlined granting process, issues with the completeness and accuracy of data remain; (iii) that the lack of a reliable overview of Union spending on NGOs hampers useful analysis; (iv) that the calls for proposals in the Court’s sample were transparent; (v) that respect for Union values is not pro-actively verified; and (vi) that transparency practices vary widely in the Court’s sample, with larger NGOs performing better. calls on the Commission to fully implement the recommendations in the Court’s Special Report;

    Recommendations

    51.  Strongly supports the recommendations of the Court in its annual report on the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (annual report for the 2023 financial year)(10) as well as in related special reports; calls on the Commission to implement them without delay and to keep the discharge authority informed on the progress of the implementation;

    52.  Calls on the Court to look for ways, together with the Commission, to align their methodologies for the general budget, as in the case of procurement for the decentralised agencies, while respecting the different roles;

    53.  Calls on the Commission, in particular, to:

       (i) continue to engage with the Court in order to increase understanding, convergence and comparability of the two approaches to the diverging estimates of errors in Union expenditure;
       (ii) qualify the impact of corrective measures on the overall level of error;
       (iii) look for ways, together with the Court, to align their methodologies as regards the evaluation of procurement errors, and the estimation of the level of error for the general budget, as in the case of procurement for the decentralised agencies, while respecting the different roles;
       (iv) present the discharge authority with a strategy to strengthen the use of funds for their intended purpose, increase absorption and prevent decommitments in order to maximise the EU-added value of the Union Budget;
       (v) increase the reliability of the forecast of the outstanding commitments with a more realistic estimate of the absorption of Union funds to give the discharge authority a better forecast of the development of the RAL over the years and better protect the Union budget;
       (vi) report on, and provide sufficient measures to, protecting the Union budget from the different risks identified beyond the RAL, such as decommitments in cohesion policy, the increasing debt, increased budget exposure and the impact of increasing inflation;
       (vii) provide more transparent reporting on total annual budget exposure by presenting, in the Annual Management and Performance Report, a multi-annual outlook on the exposure of the Union Budget to budgetary guarantees;
       (viii) substantially simplify rules and procedures and improve the assistance to, and ensure consistent and user-friendly guidelines for SMEs, new applicants, spin-offs, start-ups, administration and payment agencies, CSOs and all other relevant stakeholders, without compromising the quality of the controls;
       (ix) make sure that the mitigation tools in place have sufficient capacity to effectively face the exposure risks of the Union budget;
       (x) boost efforts to improve transparency in the use of funds, including as regards information on final beneficiaries, including on the funds that are allocated for the preparation of policy and legislative proposals;
       (xi) put in place all necessary means for ensuring that all interest representatives that approach Union institutions are registered in the Transparency Register; further asks the Commission to set up an effective mechanism to ensure that entities funded by the Union in the Transparency Register are aligned with Union values and demand full transparency on their financing, providing a deeper insight into the financing of all entities registered and which should be the condition to approach all Union institutions, bodies and agencies;
       (xii) together with Parliament and Council, guarantee adequate resources for the secretariat of the Transparency Register in order to ensure that the entries on the lobbying activities of all interest representatives can be checked for accuracy and that lobbying become more transparent as requested in the Court in Special Report 05/2024 on the EU Transparency Register; calls on the Commission to allocate adequate resources to identify irregularities to guarantee a wide range of search capabilities;
       (xiii) require interest representatives in the Transparency Register to list their financial supporters by self-declaring that they are only representing their interests or the collective interests of their members and to propose an amendment to Annex II to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 20 May 2021 to require them to list their financial supporters in the EU Transparency Register, even if they state in that register that they are only representing the interests of their own members; urges entities already registered that have not listed their financial resources by self-declaration to declare them voluntarily before the interinstitutional agreement is amended;
       (xiv) continue to support Member States in improving both the quality and the quantity of checks and to share best practices in the fight against fraud and corruption;
       (xv) address the situation regarding late recovery orders and to take all necessary measures to recover the majority of the amount outstanding for the period 2014-2023, including implementation of corporate escalation mechanisms, and keep the discharge authority informed on the progress made in recovering the sums;
       (xvi) reinforce the capacity of the Anti-fraud Architecture of the Union, including the provision of sufficient financial and human resources, and facilitate the cooperation between them;

    Revenue

    54.  Welcomes that for 2023, the Court is also able to issue a clean opinion on the legality and regularity of revenue; at the same time, stresses that the problems with customs duties not being declared or being incorrectly declared (a customs gap) leading to a shortfall in collected import duties has been a persistent problem for many years and could potentially entail a loss of traditional own resources for the Union and for the Member States;

    55.  Notes with serious concern that the Court has examined the implementation of the Commission’s Customs Action Plan, which has the potential to lead to a significant reduction of the customs gap, and has again identified insufficient progress in the implementation of some actions from this plan; notes that the Commission, as part of this plan, proposed a customs reform in May 2023(11), including the establishment of the EU Customs Authority and EU Customs Data Hub;

    56.  Recalls that the Court has highlighted the risks to the EU’s financial interests from inadequate or ineffective customs controls of imported goods; commends the efforts made by OLAF on the fight against Fraud linked to customs duties and VAT; underlines the rise of the ecommerce and the online platforms risks due to potential security and safety threats and risk of non-compliance with EU taxation and customs rules, product standards, intellectual property rights, prohibitions and restrictions;

    57.  Notes with concern that the Court revealed that the Commission did not charge late interest payments for six cases related to late corrections to GNI data by Member States where the Commission has expressed reservations; agrees with the Court that the Commission, as a matter of principle, ought to charge late interest payments in such cases in order to create an incentive for Member States to address the reservations within the deadlines;

    58.  Notes with satisfaction that the new own resource based on non-recycled plastic packaging waste generated by Member States in 2023 amounted to EUR 7,2 billion, equivalent to 4,0 % of the EU’s total revenue; further notes that the Court identified(12) some problems related to the reliability and comparability of data; stresses that it provides an excellent example of a new own resource, as it creates positive incentives for Member States to reduce the volume of non-recycled plastic packaging while at the same time generating a new revenue stream for the Union;

    59.  Stresses that the Commission’s proposals concerning new own resources from 2021 comprising three elements, the first based on revenues from emissions trading (ETS), the second drawing on the resources generated by the Union’s carbon border adjustment mechanism, and the third based on the share of residual profits from multinationals that will be re-allocated to Member States under the OECD/G20 agreement on a re-allocation of taxing rights (“Pillar One”) are obvious candidates for such new resources; at the same time, points out that other sources might also be considered if they should prove to be easier for Member States to approve; welcomes other initiatives that may lead to new own resources for the Union budget;

    60.  Calls on the Commission, in particular, to:

       (i) increase focus and pressure on the implementation of the Customs Action Plan and not least the proposal for a significant customs reform from May 2023, including the establishment of the EU Customs Authority and EU Customs Data Hub; ensure that Member States implement effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties for non-compliance with reporting obligations; initiate infringement proceedings in those cases where there is sufficient evidence that Member States are implementing a manifestly inadequate penalty system for breaches of the Directive on Administrative Cooperation 6(13) (DAC 6);
       (ii) insist on the importance of intensifying and diversifying the International customs cooperation with trade partners and stresses the need to strengthen the fight against cross-border tax and customs fraud in the context of the expansion of e-commerce;
       (iii) create incentives for Member States to address reservations related to corrections of GNI data by Member States within the deadlines by charging late interest payments;
       (iv) continue work towards the introduction of additional new own resources;

    Single market, Innovation and Digital

    61.  Notes that the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 1 ‘Single Market, Innovation and Digital’ was EUR 25,3 billion (13,2 % of the Union budget) distributed as follows: EUR 15,3 billion (60,5 %) for Research, EUR 4,1 billion (16,1 %) for Transport, Energy and Digital, EUR 2,3 billion (9,1 %) for the InvestEU Programme, EUR 2,2 billion (8,7 %) for Space, and EUR 1,4 billion (5,6 %) for other areas;

    62.  Notes that the Court has examined 127 transactions covering the full range of spending under this MFF heading, notably the Horizon 2020 programme (90 transactions), Horizon Europe (7 transactions), the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), space programmes and financial instruments, and also that it has reviewed the European Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency’s (CINEA) ex ante control system for CEF grants in the transport and energy sectors and the regularity information given in the annual activity reports of the Directorate-General for Research and Innovation (DG RTD) and the European Health and Digital Executive Agency (HaDEA);

    63.  Notes that the Court estimates that the level of error in spending on ‘Single Market, Innovation and Digital’ in 2023 was material at 3,3 %; notes the Court’s observation that research and innovation expenditure is most affected by error, particularly in the area of personnel costs; further notes that the Commission estimates the risk at payment as 1,4 % for this heading, which is in the lower half of the range of the Court’s estimate; is concerned by the Court’s conclusion that the Commission’s risk at payment for this heading remains an underestimate, because of weaknesses identified by the Court in the Commission’s ex post audits in this area since the financial year 2019(14);

    64.  Notes with concern that 39 (31 %) of the 127 transactions that the Court examined contained errors; is deeply concerned that for seven cases of quantifiable errors made by beneficiaries, the Commission (or the auditors contracted by the beneficiaries) had sufficient information to prevent, or to detect and correct the error before accepting the expenditure, and thus, had the Commission made proper use of all the information at their disposal, the estimated level of error for this chapter would have been 1,4 percentage points lower; highlights that this points to weaknesses in the Commission’s controls;

    Research and innovation

    65.  Highlights the importance of Union research and innovation (R&I) funding programmes for the scientific, societal, economic and technological development of the Union, reducing inequalities, achieving the green and digital transitions and decreasing the Union’s energy dependency on Russia; recalls that Horizon Europe is the most significant research and innovation programme in Europe, with a total budget of EUR 95,5 billion for 2021-2027, including EUR 5,4 billion from the NGEU instrument; notes that the RRF has allocated around EUR 48 billion in investments to R&I; underlines that in order to enhance the Union’s competitiveness and close the innovation gap, additional funding for R&I is needed, taking into account the Draghi report’s pertinent recommendations; highlights, in particular, the need to increase defence-related R&I spending due to the current geopolitical conditions, which could serve as an important component of the innovation policy strategy;

    66.  Notes that its predecessor, Horizon 2020, with a budget of EUR 75,6 billion funded more than 35 000 projects between 2014 and 2020 and its calls attracted over a million individual applications from 177 countries; further notes that in her hearing for the 2023 discharge, Commissioner Ivanova underlined the EU added value of EU R&I funding programmes, explaining that the final evaluation of Horizon 2020 estimated that, for each euro of costs linked to the programme five euros worth of benefits would be generated for society by 2040; deeply regrets that 74 % of proposals assessed as high quality by independent experts could not be funded due to budget constraints; notes that an additional EUR 159 billion would have been needed to fund all high-quality proposals; stresses the importance of ensuring sufficient funding for Union research and innovation, not the least to increase the Union’s competitiveness and prosperity, in line with the Union’s strategic agenda for 2024-2029;

    67.  Notes the late adoption of the Horizon Europe legal bases in 2021 and welcomes that the Commission managed to reach close to 100 % budget implementation in 2023; notes that the number of grant agreements signed by the end of 2023 was 10 674 and a further two framework agreements were signed;

    68.  Notes with concern that the Court found errors relating to ineligible costs in 30 of the 97 research and innovation transactions in its sample, and that these errors represent 71 % of the Court’s estimated level of error for this heading in 2023; reiterates its concern that after 9 years of implementation of the Horizon 2020 programme, the calculation of personnel costs remains a major source of errors, as 22 of the 30 research transactions with quantifiable errors in the Court’s sample (around 73 %) are affected by the incorrect application of the methodology for calculating personnel costs; acknowledges both the Commission’s and the Court’s continued efforts to remedy this situation; welcomes that the Commission has accepted the Court’s recommendations to enhance beneficiaries’ compliance with the daily-rate rules and to ensure clarity concerning daily-rate rules in Horizon Europe documents;

    69.  Underlines the importance of simplifying the rules and procedures governing Union R&I funding; notes that in 2023 the Commission has continued the roll out of simplified cost options such as lump sums and unit costs in Horizon Europe; further notes the remarks made by the Director-General for Research and Innovation in the exchange of views with the CONT Committee that the Commission intends to increase the disbursement of Horizon Europe funds through lump sums to 50 % by 2027; welcomes that the Commission, taking the Court’s recommendations issued in its annual reports for 2022 into account, will further specify the requirements defining the proper implementation of lump sum grants, including the elements of each work package triggering payment, and will also provide detailed guidance to those involved in assessing the implementation of projects; further notes that, as described in the Commission’s assessment of Lump Sum Funding in Horizon 2020 and Horizon Europe 2018-2024, beneficiaries would welcome more clarity on how lump sum grants would be audited; is concerned that the ex post audit strategy for Horizon Europe is not yet developed;

    70.  Stresses the crucial role of the private sector in addressing the innovation gap in the Union and improving the Union’s competitiveness and prosperity; believes, in particular, that it is imperative to continue to promote and facilitate as much as possible the participation of SMEs in Union R&I funding programmes; notes the Court’s conclusion that SMEs and newcomers are more prone to making errors than other beneficiaries since they lack the experience and resources to administer the funds; welcomes the efforts made by the Commission to support SMEs specifically, for example through information campaigns, contacts with the system of National Contact Points and the dedicated helpdesk of the Research Enquiry Service; considers that the simplification of rules and procedures is the major driver for increased participation of SMEs;

    Energy, Transport and Digital

    71.  Highlights the importance of Union investments in the development of high performing, sustainable and efficiently interconnected trans-European networks in the fields of transport, energy and digital services and notes that the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), with EUR 4,1 billion of expenditure in 2023, is a key Union instrument in delivering these objectives;

    72.  Draws attention to the need to simplify the application procedures under the Connecting Europe Facility for Transport (CEF-T) in order to enable greater participation of smaller entities and local initiatives in the development of European transport infrastructure; regrets that the CEF-T budget does not cover all the needs for sustainable transport investments and that most of the CEF-T budget has already been allocated, leaving a funding gap until 2027;

    73.  Recalls that the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and the resulting sanctions imposed on Russia continued to adversely impact the Union’s transport sector in 2023, leading to traffic shortages, supply chain bottlenecks, and the necessity to bypass traditional routes, thereby extending journey times and increasing costs; points out that the Eastern border regions, especially in the Baltic states, Finland, Poland, and Romania, have been particularly affected by economic losses and a halt of cross-border mobility as a consequence of the Russian aggression; calls on the Commission to introduce targeted measures, including in the next MFF, to facilitate recovery of the affected regions;

    74.  Calls on the Commission to conduct a comprehensive review of the funding allocated to the cross-border and multi-country infrastructure projects, facing significant implementation challenges, financial difficulties, or delays, such as Rail Baltica; points out that this review should address inefficiencies in planning and management as well as escalating construction costs that threaten project timelines and objectives; reiterates that greater transparency in the management of public funds increases citizens’ trust in the Union institutions;

    75.  Notes with concern that the Court found two errors in CEF projects in its 2023 sample, and that one of these relates to a serious breach of the Union’s public procurement rules, and has led to the contract being awarded to a consortium that did not fulfil the selection criteria and that this error contributed 28 % to the estimated error rate for heading 1;

    76.  Is deeply concerned by the Court’s findings in relation to the European Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency’s (CINEA)ex ante control system for CEF grants in the transport and energy sectors, in particular the Court’s conclusion that while the strategies for both CEF1 (2014-2020) and CEF2 (2021-2027) are based on a sound analysis of risks and past irregularities, the guidelines for ex-ante checks on procurement were not detailed enough; fully supports the Court’s recommendation that the Commission should further develop these guidelines;

    Recommendations

    77.  Calls on the Commission to:

       (i) secure the provision of adequate resources to support high-quality research and innovation project proposals with an EU added value in the short-term through the 2026 draft budget and in the medium-term through the Commission’s proposal for the next Multiannual Financial Framework;
       (ii) continue to simplify rules and procedures in line with the new financial regulation, to support training sessions and user-friendly, consistent and practical information for applicants in Member States, in particular for SMEs, new applicants, spin-offs, start-ups, CSOs or local action groups and to encourage applications from beneficiaries in Member States with more limited participation, as well as from smaller entities;
       (iii) continue to apply simplified rules and procedures, digitalisation measures and simplified cost options (SCOs) while addressing, in particular, the risk of irregularities and fraud and the costs of controls, and finalising the ex post audit strategy for Horizon Europe as soon as possible;
       (iv) further specify the requirements for defining proper implementation of lump sum grants, taking into account the Court’s pertinent recommendations from its 2022 Annual Report, and verify the actual implementation of projects using lump sums;
       (v) undertake a thorough analysis of procurement errors found and further develop the guidelines describing the extent of the checks to be performed for ex ante controls on procurement for CEF projects, as recommended by the Court;

    Cohesion, Resilience and Values

    78.  Stresses the importance of Union cohesion policy for economic and territorial convergence and development in the regions of the Union, as well as for supporting the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights; notes that the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 2 ‘Cohesion, resilience and values’ was EUR 73,3 billion (38,4 % of the Union budget) distributed as follows: 47,8 % for the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and other regional operations, 18,9 % for the European Social Fund (ESF), 9,8 % for the Cohesion Fund (CF), 3,8 % for Erasmus+, 2,1 % for CEF Transport, and 3,8 % for other areas;

    79.  Notes that the Court has examined a sample of 238 transactions covering the full range of spending under MFF Heading 2; notes with concern that the Court’s estimated overall level of error in expenditure under this heading in 2023 increased to 9,3 %, which is significantly above the materiality threshold; draws attention to the marked increase in the overall level of error estimated by the Court in 2023 compared to previous years (6,4 % in 2022, 3,6 % in 2021);

    80.  Is concerned about the Court’s observation that the significant additional resources made available under the Recovery Assistance for Cohesion and the Territories of Europe (REACT-EU), the approaching end of the eligibility period for 2014-2020 programmes (31 December 2023), and parallel implementation of the NGEU programme have put additional pressure on Member State’s administrations, increasing the risk of errors; is in particular concerned by the practice of reducing Member States’ co-funding, as is the case under REACT-EU, the Coronavirus Investment Initiative (CRII) and CRII+, which reduces the ownership and associated incentives for properly overseeing expenditure; notes from the Commission replies the acknowledgement that some authorities may have carried out less effective controls and verifications due to the heavy overload and increasing pressure of parallel implementation of 2014-2020 programmes and of additional funding under NGEU;

    81.  Notes the Court’s analysis of transactions with additional funding through REACT-EU and flexibility through CRII+ and Cohesion’s Action for Refugees (CARE) and their contribution to the estimated levels of error; notes in particular the conclusion that errors found in 100 % EU-funded priorities contributed 5,0 % to the total estimated level of error of 9,3 %; is concerned that increasing flexibilities, without either decreasing requirements or increasing preventive checks and controls at the same time, contributed to the high error rate;

    82.  Notes the Court’s Review 03/2024 “An overview of the assurance framework and the key factors contributing to errors in 2014-2020 cohesion spending” that provides a multi-annual overview covering six years of audit results, including an assessment of management and control issues, aiming to strengthen the assurance model; is concerned by the Court’s conclusion that, although the assurance framework for cohesion policy has helped to reduce the level of error, it has not been effective in bringing the overall level of error below the materiality threshold of 2 %; is worried that the Commission can rely only to a limited degree on the work of the national audit authorities, because of the systematic weaknesses; supports the Court’s recommendation to the Commission to strengthen the implementation of the assurance framework for the 2021-2027 cohesion spending; reminds the Commission of the discharge authority’s call to work closely with the Member States to improve the management and control system for Union expenditure to reduce the high error rate to below the 2 % materiality threshold;

    83.  Notes the Court’s observation in its review on the reliability of the work of key actors in the control system for cohesion policy; is concerned by the Court’s finding that during a 6-year period managing authorities, the first line of defence for detection and prevention of errors, are not sufficiently effective in mitigating the inherent high risk of error in cohesion policy; considers it even more worrying that the Court found that the second line of defence, the Member States’ audit authorities, are not able to determine the correct error rate for the packages of expenditure they audit and provide assurance on, since the Court detected additional errors in at least 39 % of these packages; notes that these errors have been detected and reported by the Court annually for more than 6 years and that there is therefore a systemic issue;

    84.  Notes the Court’s categorisation of errors found in cohesion expenditure, with ineligible projects accounting for 29 %, ineligible costs for 26 % and serious non-compliance in public procurement procedures accounting for 21 % of errors and ERDF and CF related expenditure accounting for the largest share of errors (80 %); notes that expenditure under the ESF+, YEI and FEAD are proportionally less affected by error, as they together account for 16 % of errors, while they together account for around 20 % of the budget under this heading;

    85.  Notes the study commissioned by the Committee on Budgetary Control on ‘Lessons learned from the implementation of crisis response tools’ that shows that absorption of uncommitted cohesion resources was supported by the flexibilities introduced under CRII and CRII+; is concerned by the finding of the researchers that quality of fast-tracked projects might not have reached the same level as investments before the pandemic; is further concerned by the researchers’ observation that the risk of low-quality projects is entirely borne by the Union Budget, because of 100 % EU-funding in CRII, CRII+ and REACT-EU; considers that 100 % EU-funding might help absorption, but that absorption is not a goal in itself;

    86.  Stresses that, in its most recent discharge opinions, the Committee on Regional Development called for additional advisory support from the Commission to national, local and regional authorities to avoid a situation of administrative overload; recognises the Commission’s efforts but, observes that, regrettably, these have not been sufficient to mitigate the risk of error; warns that a similar administrative overload might occur at the end of the RRF eligibility period and the final years of the MFF; underlines the need to address the insufficient administrative capacity of national, local and regional authorities as a matter of urgency; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to provide them with clear guidance, and to increase its support for administrative capacity building, including through staff training, best practice sharing, peer-to-peer reviews and technical assistance to ensure effective fund management;

    87.  Notes the public discussions on the post-2027 multiannual financial framework that may indicate a shift towards a performance-based model, coupling investments and reforms, and a desire to simplify rules and procedures; calls on the Commission to prioritise the financial responses to the current threats resulting from the geopolitical situation; warns that any decision on the future design of spending programmes must not be to the detriment of oversight and control of Union expenditure in terms of transparency and information at Union level about non-compliance with rules and regulations; considers that the errors identified by the Court and the way the Commission handles those errors are also an indication of a properly functioning management and control system and notes that both institutions stated their commitment to improve the system and bring down the error rate;

    88.  Notes, as in previous years, the Court’s observation that the Commission’s desk reviews, to review and assess the work of audit authorities, are aimed at checking only consistency of regularity information, and that they are therefore too limited to confirm the residual error rate reported by the national authorities in their assurance packages; notes the Commission’s reply that it complements its desk review with on-the-spot audit work covering the programmes and assurance packages, which enables it to establish a reasonable and fair estimate of the error rates for each programme; considers that the Court’s observation is about the scope of the desk reviews and the fact that they are only aimed at consistency and therefore too limited to provide the Commission with information that is sufficiently reliable;

    89.  Is concerned about the persistent shortcomings observed by the Court in the work of national audit authorities as visible in the weaknesses identified in the assurance packages, with a residual error rate above the materiality threshold for more than 60 % of the value of assurance packages audited in 2023; stresses with concern that managing authorities consistently do not effectively succeed in preventing or detecting irregularities in expenditure declared by beneficiaries and that this reduces the extent to which the Commission can rely on their work;

    90.  Reminds that in shared management, it is the Commission’s responsibility to make sure that Member States set up management and control systems that function effectively during the implementation of programmes; is worried that both the Commission and the Court have identified that not all Member States’ management and control systems function effectively, thus negatively effecting the reliability of the Commission error rates, as they rely on these national systems, which do not work effectively; calls into question the possibility for the Commission to continue to rely on national systems;

    91.  Considers that for the single audit approach to work well, and in order to achieve reduced administrative burden for beneficiaries and managing authorities, adherence to audit standards at all levels of control and audit is of essential importance; is therefore worried by the Court’s finding in its annual report that essential supporting documents about compliance with eligibility conditions were not presented by programme authorities and beneficiaries, and also by the finding by the Court presented in its review that insufficient documentation of audit work from audit authorities limits the reliance that can be placed on audit work of national audit authorities;

    92.  Recalls that following Article 15 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council(15) (CPR) for the programming period 2021-2027, Member States need to comply with horizontal and thematic enabling conditions, which need to remain fulfilled and respected throughout the implementation period of the funds; recalls that when enabling conditions are not fulfilled at the time of submission of a payment application to the Commission for the specific objective concerned, the related expenditure will not be reimbursed from the Union budget until the Commission is satisfied that the enabling condition has been fulfilled; recalls the strong regrets of the discharge authority in relation to the Commission decision of 13 December 2023(16) considering that Hungary fulfilled the horizontal enabling condition related to judicial independence that enabled the Hungarian authorities to submit reimbursement claims of up to EUR 10,2 billion; notes with concern that since the release of these funds, the Hungarian government has not taken steps to reinstate the independence of the judiciary but on the contrary; reiterates its worries about the lack of adequate control mechanisms or unreliable public procurement procedures to guarantee sound financial management and the protection of the Union budget; believes that this decision politically contradicts the prolongation of the measures adopted under Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092(17) (the ‘Conditionality Regulation’);

    93.  Expresses deep concern over the findings in the 2023 Rule of Law Report regarding the rule of law situation in Hungary, particularly the persistent and systemic challenges in the judiciary and the media sectors; notes with alarm the increasing pressure on judicial independence, including concerns over the selection and promotion of judges, and recent reports of intimidation and interference in judicial decisions, as exemplified by the resignations of judges in protest against political influence; notes with concern in the same vein that the head of the Hungarian Integrity Authority, a key institution established as a condition set by the Commission for the release of Union funds under the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation, is facing increasing pressure from the Hungarian government; calls on the Commission to ensure a coordinated and holistic approach across all relevant Union funds and legislative tools, emphasizing that Union funds must not be allocated to activities undermining democracy or reinforcing authoritarianism;

    94.  Recalls that the Conditionality Regulation establishes a mechanism and measures to protect the Union Budget from breaches of the rule of law when other procedures set out in Union legislation would not protect the budget more efficiently; recalls that this mechanism was activated on 15 December 2022 in the case of Hungary over concerns related to its system of public procurement, resulting in a temporary suspension of 55 % of budgetary commitments for three cohesion policy programmes; recalls that the same regulation, in line with Article 6 of Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093(18) (the ‘MFF Regulation’), stipulates that suspended commitments of 2022 (year n), may not be re-entered into the budget beyond 2024 (year n+2) and that therefore 55 % of commitments from 2022, around EUR 1 billion, were decommitted in December 2024; notes that no other procedures under the Conditionality Regulation are ongoing;

    95.  Notes that the Commission allocated an equivalent of five full-time staff members to the implementation of the Conditionality Regulation and reiterates the European Court of Auditor’s concerns raised in its Special Report 03/2024 that current staff numbers appear to be insufficient to ensure a strict and coherent application of the Regulation;

    96.  Reiterates the need to treat as a single, integral package all the measures required for the release of Union funding under the Conditionality Regulation, the CPR and Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council(19) (the ‘RRF Regulation’); stresses the importance of the protection of the Union financial interests also for disbursement of pre-financing;

    97.  Notes that some investments which would have been eligible for financing under cohesion are included in the National Recovery and Resilience Plans; recalls that the general objective of the RRF enshrined in Article 4 of the RRF Regulation is to promote the Union’s economic, social and territorial cohesion, and that one of its six pillars is specifically dedicated to this purpose; acknowledges that the wide scope of the RRF results in limited overlap with other Union funding programmes, as intended by the co-legislators when establishing the Article 9 of the RRF Regulation, which establishes additionality and complementarity funding as key principles; draws attention, however, to the risks of double funding emerging from such situations;

    98.  Expresses its preoccupation about the visible delays in implementation of cohesion policy in Member States and the lack of capacity of national administrations to deal in parallel with different spending programmes (e.g. cohesion programmes and RRF programmes) covering complementary or even similar objectives; calls on the Commission to ensure that sufficient technical assistance is provided to Member States facing difficulties in order to address existing delays in the implementation of cohesion programmes;

    99.  Recognises the disproportionate impact of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine on eastern regions of the Union bordering Russia and Belarus; draws attention to the costs borne by these regions and Member States as a result of their shared border with hostile neighbouring countries, notably their need to increasingly direct public funding into security, defence and preparedness, while facing dramatically reduced resources due to a disruption in economic activities, cross-border trade and other exchanges, and in cohesion programmes, particularly Interreg programmes; notes the measures taken by the European Commission to support these regions, notably through flexibilities provided under cohesion policy; welcomes that providing support to eastern border regions most affected by Russia’s aggression is included in the mission letter of the Executive Vice President for Cohesion and Reforms; calls on the Commission to ensure the provision of adequate support for eastern regions of the Union bordering Russia and Belarus to cope with the disproportionate consequences of the Russian war of aggression, both in the short-term through the 2026 draft budget and in the medium-term through the Commission’s proposal for the next MFF;

    100.  Stresses the importance of ESF+ which aims to achieve high employment, fair social protection, a skilled and resilient workforce, and inclusive/cohesive societies as key in eradicating poverty; expresses the need to provide it with the continued financial and political support of the Union, national and regional institutions in the delivery of its objectives and targets in the years to come; underlines the importance of closely involving regional actors, in particular civil society organisations and social partners working on the ground in the implementation of ESF+ funded activities;

    101.  Welcomes the frontloading of EUR 100 million from the 2027 budget of Erasmus+ to the 2023 budget of Erasmus+, which enabled continued support to pupils, students, teachers and qualified staff fleeing from Ukraine, and the extra EUR 20 million awarded to Erasmus+ in 2023 as a result of Parliament’s insistence; stresses that frontloading must remain an exception to rapid response to unforeseen acute crisis situations; underlines that any frontloading of Erasmus+ cannot result in cuts for the programme at the end of current MFF; emphasises that every effort must be made to respond to such situations preferentially with additional funding;

    102.  Emphasises the need for strict oversight of the allocation of funds to prevent misuse within the Erasmus programme; asks the Commission to gather evidence to investigate any case of fraudulent or suspicious recipients, in accordance with its duties outlined in the Financial Regulation and Erasmus+ grant agreements; calls for adequate safeguarding of the programme from abuse by organizations whose activities are not aligned with the fundamental values of the Union (human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, rule of law, human rights); recalls that the Commission is legally bound to ensure that programme beneficiaries commit to and ensure the respect of these values and do not commit professional misconduct;

    103.  Notes that in 2023, the budget of the EU4Health programme, the main financial instrument to support Union health initiatives, was EUR 735 million, mainly managed by Directorate-General for Health and Food Safety and the Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA) and implemented through the European Health and Digital Executive Agency; acknowledges the progress of initiatives funded under this programme, notably in the areas of health emergency preparedness, the Beating Cancer Plan, the Pharmaceutical Strategy for Europe and in the implementation of Union health legislation;

    Recommendations

    104.  Calls on the Commission to:

       (i) re-consider the practice of 100 % Union funding in Union crisis response instruments, where increasing pre-financing might provide faster availability of funds, while maintaining a shared financial budgetary control responsibility in implementation of the funds by maintaining financial involvement from both national and Union level;
       (ii) ensure selection of qualitatively good projects with cohesion policy funds by favouring long-term investments, and duly justifying 100 % Union funding while limiting its application;
       (iii) address the systemic issue of non-detection of errors at Member State level in cohesion policy spending with an action plan, aimed at reporting an accurate error rate in assurance packages, and detection of errors at the first lines of defence by making available more, and/or better targeting existing resources and increase detection capacity at Member State and Commission level;
       (iv) calculate and report to the discharge authority the cost of control for all expenditure handled by national authorities concerning cohesion policy funds, and NGEU, and compare these figures with the cost of control when only Cohesion policy funds were handled by the same authorities;
       (v) address the recurrent issue of insufficient documentation at beneficiary, programme authority and audit authority level, not only through checks, awareness raising and information on requirements, but also through increased digitalisation and where possible, through financial incentives to penalise non-respect of the requirements for sound financial management;
       (vi) expand the scope of its desk review of assurance packages to review more quality criteria in addition to consistency to make a reliable estimate of the residual error rate for the assurance package under review, as well as of the risk at payment as a whole;
       (vii) step up its monitoring of the horizontal and thematic enabling conditions in all Member States to identify potential threats for the protection of the Union Budget and ensure enhanced transparency and stakeholder participation in the application of this tool;
       (viii) closely align the rule of law report with the Conditionality Regulation and report in more detail on the breaches of the principles of the rule of law that can be used as input to trigger the Conditionality Regulation;
       (ix) continuously monitor the implementation by the Hungarian Government of measures foreseen in Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022; assess to what extent the situation has improved or worsened, including in relation to the challenges faced by the Hungarian Integrity Authority, and take all necessary actions in accordance with the Conditionality Regulation;
       (x) provide Member States with increased technical assistance in order to address delays in the implementation of national programmes in order to increase the absorption rate;
       (xi) closely monitor and mitigate the increasing risk of double funding between Cohesion programmes and RRF funding and address any such occurrences without delay;
       (xii) further enhance simplification in the implementation of cohesion programmes and work closely with Member States to identify best practices regarding the digitalisation of practices and procedures;
       (xiii) take all necessary measures to bring down the error rate in close cooperation with the Court of Auditors;
       (xiv) ensure the provision of adequate support for eastern regions of the Union bordering Russia and Belarus to cope with the disproportionate consequences of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, both in the short-term and in the medium-term;

    Natural resources

    105.  Notes that the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 3 ‘Natural resources’ was EUR 59,5 billion (31,1 % of the Union budget) distributed as follows: 65,0 % for direct payments under the European Agricultural Guarantee fund (EAGF), 27,6 % for the Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), 4,2 % for market-related expenditure under the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF), 1,9 % for Maritime and Fisheries, 0,9 % for Environment and Climate (LIFE), and 0,4 % for other areas;

    106.  Notes that the Court has examined a sample of 218 transactions covering the full range of spending under this MFF heading; notes that the Court also examined the regularity information given in the annual activity reports of the Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development (DG AGRI) and the Directorate-General for Climate Action (DG CLIMA), as well as selected systems in 20 Member States and the United Kingdom; notes that the Court estimates the level of error for ‘Natural Resources’ to be 2,2 % (2,2 % in 2022) and that the majority of the errors found affected rural development transactions;

    107.  Points out, however, that this is partly due to the complexity of environmental schemes in rural development programmes and the recognized negative issue of “gold plating” at national level;

    108.  Notes, in this context, the lower-than-expected implementation rate of EAFRD funding for the period 2023-2027, with an absorption rate of only 1 % at the end of 2023, with payments amounting to EUR 0,7 billion, and expects the absorption rate to increase significantly in the course of the next reporting period;

    109.  Notes that the Court found 16 quantifiable errors in rural development, 15 in direct payments, three in expenditure related to market measures, and three in non-CAP expenditure; is reassured by the Commission’s assessment that most errors concern clerical mistakes and by the actions taken by the Commission to prevent errors in the future;

    110.  Notes the categorisation of errors by the Court, with ineligible claims accounting for 35 % of the errors, and administrative errors and inaccurate information on areas or animals for 21 % and 20 % respectively; notes with concern, that as in previous years, that the Court found in several cases that the Member State authorities and the Commission had sufficient information to prevent, or to detect and correct the error before accepting the expenditure and that, had the Member State authorities and the Commission made proper use of all the information at their disposal, the estimated level of error for this chapter would have been 1.0 percentage point lower;

    111.  Notes that 2023 was the first year of the CAP 2023-2027 new delivery model, which integrates performance elements, agreed with the Member States in Strategic Plans, as basis for payments; notes that 2023 was a modest start of the new delivery model, EUR 63,65 million declared on the basis of generated outputs and therefore subject to a ‘performance clearance’ by DG AGRI out of EUR 215,52 million declared under the CAP Strategic plans under sectoral interventions and rural development; notes that in 2024 payments under the new delivery model will have increased substantially; notes the Court’s observations as regards processing performance data for the Annual Performance Reports where Member States are in the process of setting-up systems and procedures and at times manually aggregate data, with associated risks for the reliability of data;

    112.  Recalls the farmers’ protests across Europe towards the end of 2023 and early 2024 and the Commission’s response aimed at simplification, in particular for small farmers, and increasing discretionary powers for Member States; stresses that simplification should go hand in hand with sound financial management and take into account the Union’s climate commitments; welcomes the Commission’s targeted approach, especially concerning the distinction between farm size in terms of agricultural land and number of farms; cautions that discretion given to Member States should also be accompanied by thorough oversight by the Commission;

    113.  Recalls that both the Commission and Member States are responsible for addressing fraud in CAP spending; welcomes in that regard the work done in terms of anti-fraud risk assessments and the update of its anti-fraud strategy by DG AGRI;

    114.  Notes the Court’s Special Report 07/2024 on the Commission’s systems for recovering irregular expenditure, and the Commission’s reply; notes the Court’s observation that recoveries concerning agricultural expenditure have been relatively successful, attributed in part to the so-called 50-50 rule that incentivised Member States to recover funds; notes that this rule has not been retained in the 2023-2027 CAP and the Court’s warning that this might lead to a deterioration of the rate of recovery for agricultural expenditure;

    115.  Notes the Court’s Special Report 20/2024 on Common Agriculture Policy Plans and the Commission’s reply; stresses the importance of ensuring that all key elements for assessing performance are provided; considers that plans need to account for specific situations in specific Member States and that therefore a certain level of divergence is even desirable, is however worried that divergence in ambitions may mean that there is no level playing field for farmers across Member States; is further disappointed by the Court’s finding that although the new monitoring framework has been simplified, the CAP objectives lack clarity and indicators focus on outputs rather than results, and that important result indicators are missing; notes that the Court recommends the Commission to promote exchange of best practices in the plans and strengthening the future CAP monitoring framework;

    116.  Notes the Court’s Special Report 19/2024 on Organic farming in the EU, and the Commission’s reply; is once more worried by the Court’s finding that a weak strategic framework and data constraints prevent the measurement of the impact of the policy; considers that the increased focus on performance and definition of targets and indicators, and the related monitoring of results across Union policies needs to be supported by an equal increase of the Commission’s capacity to define performance frameworks and monitor performance;

    117.  Welcomes the increased competitiveness achieved through market measures in the wine sector and encourages the Commission and Member States to persevere in their efforts to replicate this success in other sectors;

    118.  Recalls that democracy and pluralism are fundamental values of the Union enshrined in Article 2 TEU; further recalls that, in line with Article 11 TEU, Union institutions shall give citizens and representative associations the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views in all areas of Union action in order to maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue; underlines that separation of powers between the institutions as laid down in Article 13 TEU must always be respected and that Union institutions shall practice mutual sincere cooperation;

    119.  Recognises the importance of the LIFE programme; recalls the provisions of the LIFE+ Regulation, including those related to operating grants, the eligibility conditions, the award criteria, the overall allocation for 2021-2027 and the distribution of funds within the programme;

    120.  Notes that some members of the Budgetary Control committee requested access to a series of grant agreements under the LIFE programme, as well as other Union funding programmes, and after scrutinising them expressed concerns on the content of several of the programmes in February 2024; notes that the Commission, including the Internal Audit Service (IAS), was initially not aware of any issue, but adopted a series of measures with the aim of addressing the concerns; recalls the discharge written questions and hearings with the Secretary-General of the Commission on 5 November 2024, the responsible Commissioners for MFF Heading 3 on 12 November, and the Commissioner responsible for Budget and administration on 9 December 2024 where the concerns and the Commission’s response were discussed;

    121.  Notes the concerns expressed by some members of the Budgetary Control Committee that certain grant agreements between the European Union Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency (CINEA) and beneficiaries, such as CSOs and private companies, under the LIFE Programme include ‘work plans’ containing detailed advocacy actions towards Union institutions or their representatives, as well as other actions directed towards certain trade agreements which the Union was negotiating, or litigation measures to be pursued by the respective entities; acknowledges that this could be potentially interpreted as interfering with internal decision making in Union institutions; notes that the Commission has performed a legal analysis of the grant agreements that raised concerns of some Members of the CONT Committee, which concluded that there was no evidence that the entities concerned had breached their contractual or code of conduct obligations, yet the Commission asked some beneficiaries to make amendments to the grant agreements that contained the specific provisions that potentially entailed a reputational risk; further notes that all grant agreements include a disclaimer stating that ‘views of the beneficiary do not in any way represent views of the EU and that granting authority cannot be held responsible for them’;

    122.  Underlines that Union financing should not contribute to undermining the rule of law, nor the values on which the Union is founded; recalls the provisions of Article 163 of the Financial Regulation; considers it crucial that there should be no funding without traceability of funds;

    123.  Notes the actions taken by the Commission to address the allegations which included the issuance of guidance for Commission services on funding activities related to the development, implementation, monitoring and enforcement of Union legislation and policy and screening of their contract portfolios to determine which agreements were not in line with the guidance; takes note of the measures adopted so far by the Commission while awaiting the results of the screening of the grant agreements with all the beneficiaries, which was requested by the Commission’s Corporate Management Board;

    124.  Notes the decision-making structure, including the evaluation board within CINEA, for deciding on contracts between the Commission and beneficiaries; urges the Commission to ensure that the decision-making structure of CINEA for deciding on contracts to be awarded features clear accountability, clear responsibilities and a practical structure;

    125.  Notes that the executive agency conducts annual bottom-up risk management exercises and that these bottom-up risk management exercises did not identify any critical risks; notes that irrespective of the financing programme, evaluation procedures should be constantly reviewed and adapted if needed;

    126.  Notes reports in the media that the President of the Commission hired a paid special adviser to deliver a report on the “Strategic Dialogue on the Future of EU Agriculture” who received a salary equal to a Director-General in the Commission; is concerned by the remuneration of all the special advisers and the discretion the Commission has in deciding their remuneration, which creates arbitrary inequalities;

    Recommendations

    127.  Calls on the Commission to:

       (i) closely monitor the Member States’ progress as regards the processing of performance data and the aggregation of data for the annual performance report and keep the discharge authority informed about issues with reliability of performance data, in particular where it concerns manually aggregated data;
       (ii) inform the discharge authority why the Court concludes that for several years several errors could have been prevented, had the Commission and Member States used all information at their disposal and why the Commission and Member States do not manage to address this issue appropriately;
       (iii) apply the lessons learned as regards the reduction of the administrative burden from its response to the farmers’ protests in future policy initiatives, while taking due account of the risk of abuse of funds where control measures are reduced, or risk of too much divergence between Member States when discretionary powers are used without proper oversight;
       (iv) keep the discharge authority informed about the recovery rates of agricultural expenditure, in particular if the rate deteriorates in comparison to the recovery rate under the previous CAP and swiftly mitigate the causes for the deterioration, including considering the introduction of new incentives for Member State authorities to recover funds;
       (v) assess the differences in ambition of strategic plans and inform the discharge authority whether there is divergence between Member States, threatening the level-playing field for farmers, and assess how the Commission addresses those differences;
       (vi) make better use of its capacity for setting-up performance frameworks, for defining objectives and indicators and holding those contributing to the achievements, be they Member States or beneficiaries, accountable for their contributions;
       (vii) update the Commission’s anti-fraud strategy to devote attention to advocating for and upholding a clear separation of executive and legislative power in the Union;
       (viii) have a clear and comprehensive strategy at Commission level as to how to better protect the financial interests of the Union and ensure that Union funds are spent for their intended purposes and diligently apply the Financial Regulation provisions, including by ensuring that grant agreements can be suspended or terminated when beneficiaries violate the Union’s legislation;
       (ix) ensure a fair distribution of Union funds to CSOs to contribute to a pluralistic and vibrant society;
       (x) ensure that the Commission’s guidance adopted in 2024 is applied by all authorising officers and, if necessary, further develop guidance to fully align grant agreements with Treaty provisions and existing legislation;
       (xi) make the results of the screening of grant agreements available to the discharge authority in order to allow an assessment of the extent to which the Commission may be exposed to a reputational risk;
       (xii) adequately address issues such as revolving doors, transparency in financing and donations, the fight against money laundering, limiting foreign interference, independence from political and economic influence, whistleblowing and transparent governance structures, in respect of all entities receiving Union funds;
       (xiii) review the template for MoUs between the Commission and executive agencies to ensure clearer division of responsibilities;
       (xiv) instruct the audit structure to review contracts with beneficiaries and to flag in case they identify contracts that are not in line with applicable financial rules;
       (xv) have the IAS review contracts between the Commission and grantees, specifically to search for content that is not in line with applicable financial rules within work packages;
       (xvi) evaluate the decision-making structure in the areas of the awarding of contracts and instruct Commission services and executive agencies to perform better checks on the content of contracts at all stages, including by ensuring that work packages and key performance indicators as listed by applicants align with the objectives of respective funding programmes;
       (xvii) adopt more precise categorisation of entities listed in the Financial Transparency System;
       (xviii) review its rules for special advisers to remove the arbitrary selection and remuneration;
       (xix) further enhance simplification in the implementation of programmes and work closely with Member States to identify best practices regarding the digitalisation of practices and procedures;
       (xx) improve the quality of dialogue with farmers from all Member States;
       (xxi) react more quickly when serious concerns of the discharge authority are flagged to the Commission;
       (xxii) perform adequate checks of entities listed in the Transparency Register, in order to ensure that they comprehensively list their activities in the Register;
       (xxiii) draw clearer lines of responsibility when implementing collaborative platforms;
       (xxiv) instruct the Corporate Management Board to submit consolidated information on the list of critical risks to the internal audit service and ensure executive agencies address potential risks and ensure a transparent selection of independent evaluators to prevent conflict of interest and guarantee their independence;
       (xxv) instruct all DGs and executive agencies to review the distribution of funds dedicated to auditing in order to ensure sufficient resources;
       (xxvi) ensure that proposals for Multiannual Work Programmes of any Union funding instrument have clear guidelines on the activities eligible for funding, clearer rules on screening of applications and on admissible content as well as clearer requirements for transparency and traceability of the use of Union funds, including in relation to the disclosure requirements under the EU Transparency Register;
       (xxvii) ensure that all grant agreements respect the necessary requirements related to transparency, traceability and visibility of funds;

    Migration and Border management

    128.  Notes that in 2023 the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 4 ‘Migration and Border Management’ was EUR 2,7 billion (1,4 % of the Union budget spending) distributed as follows: 1,2 billion (46,5 %) for three decentralised agencies, the European Boarder Coast Agency (FRONTEX), the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) and the European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (EU- LISA); 1 billion (38,6 %) for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF), and 0,4 billion (14,9 %) for the Integrated Border Management Fund (IBMF);

    129.  Notes that in 2023 a significant portion of the spending under MFF heading 4 still concerned the completion of projects remaining from the 2014-2020 MFF; notes that 18 % of AMIF national programmes for 2014-2020 remained undeclared at the end of 2023 and that the last annual accounts and the request for payment of the final balance for these funds will be provided by the Member States as part of the closure package by 31 December 2024 at the latest;

    130.  Notes that the Court examined a sample of 23 transactions, which is not large enough to be representative of the spending under MFF headings 4 and 5 and, thus, it cannot provide a separate estimate of the error rate for these headings; further notes that the Court’s audit results show that the expenditure under MFF headings 4 and 5 is affected by eligibility and procurement issues and that it is a high-risk area (7 out of 23 transactions audited, i.e. 30,4 %, were affected by errors); is concerned that the Court detected four quantifiable errors which had a financial impact on the amounts charged to the Union budget and that it also found further ten cases of non-compliance with legal and financial provisions (which had no direct financial impact on the Union budget); therefore, invites the Court to provide a clear estimate of the error rate for heading 4; notes that the Commission concludes that the risk at payment in 2023 is 1,1 % for the expenditure on migration and border management;

    131.  Notes that the Commission has accepted the Court’s recommendation made in its annual report for 2023 to provide further guidance on applicable rules to the Member State authorities responsible for implementing DG HOME funding via shared management; regrets that the Commission has not yet fully implemented the Court’s previous recommendations that were due to be addressed by the end of 2023; notes that DG HOME is undertaking a reassessment of its ex-ante methodology to ensure the respect of the rules applicable to post-2021 generation of grants, and that this reassessment will also address the Court’s relevant recommendations and those of the IAS audit on the preparedness for closing actions and programmes funded under the Internal Security Fund (ISF) and the AMIF 2014-2020 through direct and shared management;

    132.  Notes with concern that two reservations on the declaration of assurance were issued in DG HOME’s Annual Activity Report for 2023 and that one reservation concerns the implementation of AMIF and ISF 2014-2020 in several Member States and the other reservation concerns the implementation of Border Management and Visa Instrument (BMVI) 2021-2027 in one Member State; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to take remedial measures for the underlying issues that necessitated the reservations;

    133.  Welcomes the progress identified by the Court in its review of the preparatory work done by five member state audit authorities in managing the transition of the AMIF, BMVI and ISF funds to the CPR of the 2021-2027 MFF; observes that these audit authorities reported to the Court that the support and guidance DG HOME provided to them was satisfactory; notes with concern that at the time of the Court’s audit four out of five Member State audit authorities had not finalised their audit strategies;

    134.  Takes note of the adoption of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum; welcomes that the mid-term revision of the MFF 2021-2027 allocated an additional EUR 2 billion to migration and border management for 2024-2027 to address the growing challenges in migration and border management resulting from the current geopolitical context; notes, however, that additional funds might be needed with a view to ensuring the full implementation of the Pact; calls for the quick implementation of the Pact in the Member States;

    135.  Stresses that securing the Union’s external borders is a pillar of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum; notes with concern that the Commission reported that the number of irregular border crossings in the Union increased in 2023 to 380 000, compared to 330 000 in 2022; observes that the BMVI can support frontline Member States to ensure they have the resources for infrastructure, facilities and installations necessary to secure the external borders of the Union, including electronic border security enhancements and other tools for border surveillance as provided for in annex III of the BMVI regulation; notes the European Council conclusions of 9 February 2023 that the Union will step up its action to prevent irregular departures and loss of life, to reduce pressure on the borders of the Union and on reception capacities, to fight against smugglers and to increase returns; underlines the need to better protect vulnerable people from smuggling and trafficking networks and address the negative effects of the instrumentalisation of migrants as part of hybrid attacks, notably by pro-Russian forces, as well as by the Belarusian regime;

    136.  Recalls that, according to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, Member States and the Commission must ensure respect for fundamental rights and compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in the implementation of Union funds;

    137.  Notes the Court’s conclusion that the AMIF 2014-2020 was performing below expectations in terms of facilitating returns of migrants: also takes note of the fact that the Court and the Commission agree that progress in this area was particularly affected by COVID-19-related travel restrictions; further notes that in 2023 return measures were supported with EUR 29,8 million from the AMIF; considers that the Commission must provide stronger efforts to assist Member States in addressing irregular border crossing and in successfully implementing returns of third-country nationals, as well as the integration of legal migrants; looks forward to receiving consolidated information in 2025 on progress in this regard through the ex-post evaluation AMIF 2014-2020; highlights that the Commission should continue to take action on migration and asylum within the framework of external action, including the ‘Team Europe’ approach while also increasing the transparency of the programming and implementation of the Union home affairs funds in third countries and safeguarding the role of the Parliament;

    Recommendations

    138.  Calls on the Commission to:

       (i) address the Court’s recommendations in a thorough and timely manner and share DG HOME’s revised ex-ante methodology, once completed, with the discharge authority;
       (ii) continue to support the Member State managing and audit authorities in the timely finalisation of their audit strategies for MFF 2021-2027 funds, paying particular attention to eligibility and procurement issues, as well as all other recurrent findings of the Court;
       (iii) take action to improve the performance of actions funded by the Union in terms of effective returns and combatting irregular migration, while ensuring the full respect of Union legislation and the fundamental values of the Union;
       (iv) take action to increase the efficiency of Union spending on the protection and management of the European Union’s external borders;
       (v) monitor, assist in and scrutinise the timely progress of the administrative, operational and legal steps required by Member States and Union agencies for the full implementation of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum by 2026;
       (vi) increase the transparency of the programming and implementation of the Union home affairs funds in third countries, while safeguarding the role of Parliament in ensuring the democratic scrutiny of Union spending;
       (vii) continuously assess, in the implementation of the Union Budget, compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Union values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, in accordance with Article 6 of the Financial Regulation;

    Security and Defence

    139.  Notes that in 2023 the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 5 ‘Security and Defence’ was EUR 1,4 billion (0,7 % of the Union budget spending) distributed as follows: 500 million (38,4 %) for the European Defence Fund (EDF), 300 million (19 %) for military mobility, 200 million (17,1 %) for decentralised agencies, namely the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), Europol and European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL), 200 million (13,1 %) for the ISF, and 200 million (12,4 %) for nuclear safety, decommissioning and other areas;

    140.  Notes that in 2023 a significant portion of the spending under MFF heading 5 still concerned the completion of projects remaining from the 2014-2020 MFF; notes that 25 % of ISF national programmes for 2014-2020 remained undeclared at the end of 2023 and that the last annual accounts and the request for payment of the final balance for these funds will be provided by the Member States as part of the closure package by 31 December 2024 at the latest;

    141.  Notes with concern that, for the reasons explained in the section on migration and border management, the Court cannot provide a separate estimate of the error rate for MFF heading 5 ‘Security and Defence’ and that, based on its audit results, the Court considers expenditure from this heading to be high-risk; therefore, invites the Court to provide an estimate of the error rate for this heading as well; notes that the Commission concludes that in 2023 the risk at payment was 0,5 % for the expenditure on security and defence;

    142.  Observes that the Commission has not accepted the Court’s recommendation to carefully check and document the technical aspects of military mobility grant applications to the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) during the grant award procedure and that the Commission considers that its current processes already ensure a check on whether dual-use infrastructure projects meet the eligibility conditions;

    143.  Recalls the highly unstable geopolitical situation in the Union’s neighbourhood giving rise to greater security and defence challenges, including hybrid threats, and thereby to greater investment needs in security, defence and preparedness, since the beginning of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; draws attention to the fact that MFF heading 5, dedicated to security and defence, is the smallest of all MFF headings and regrets that the Union’s current budget for ensuring the security and defence of its citizens is not equal to the challenges to be met either in the short or the long term; notes that in 2023 Union funding in support of the defence industry came exclusively from the EDF; recalls the role played by the EDF in supporting European technological expertise in emerging and disruptive technologies; welcomes that submissions to the 2023 EDF calls increased by 72 % compared to the previous year, demonstrating the strong and constantly growing interest of European defence industry actors and research organisations in the EDF and the high demand for funding in this sector; notes that under the 2023 calls, the Union committed EUR 1,15 billion for 61 defence R&D projects, benefiting 581 legal entities from 26 Member States and Norway; notes that on average 17 entities from eight different Member States and Norway participate in each project; underlines the importance of a level playing field in supporting cross-border defence R&D cooperation;

    144.  Welcomes the Commission’s actions to enhance support for SMEs in the defence sector, in particular appreciates that the EU Defence Innovation Scheme (EUDIS), which provides a diverse range of instruments tailored to support SMEs within the defence ecosystem, became fully operational in 2023, with EUR 224 million allocated to it from the EDF budget; appreciates, further, the role of the SME bonus under the EDF in facilitating the access of smaller actors and innovators in defence supply chains; notes that in the 2023 EDF calls, 42 % of the entities selected for funding were SMEs, an increased share compared to 2022 (38,2 %), and that 18 % of the total funding available through the EDF calls is allocated to SMEs;

    145.  Recalls that the Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR) was a precursor programme of the EDF with a budget of EUR 90 million that funded 18 research projects selected following calls for proposals in the years 2017 to 2019; further recalls that the Court, in its Special Report 10/2023 ‘The Preparatory action on defence research’, has observed that the Union still lacked a long-term strategy for the projects under the EDF, particularly in terms of impact, additional research, development, manufacturing and procurement; welcomes that the Commission has accepted all of the Court’s recommendations and has confirmed that their implementation is ongoing; welcomes, in this regard, the Commission’s adoption of a European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) and legislative proposal establishing the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) as well as its commitment to build up the EDF; nevertheless, in view of the geopolitical realities the Union faces, is concerned that the full implementation of the Court’s recommendations is expected only in 2026;

    146.  Recalls the Court’s observations in its Special Report 10/2023 regarding the limited availability of human resources at the Commission and the subsequent risk for the EDF; notes that the growing number of proposals to evaluate and projects to manage puts considerable pressure on human resources; further notes the large share of seconded national experts (17 %) among DG DEFIS staff in 2023 and DG DEFIS’s intention to reinforce staff by the selection of officials through specialised EPSO competitions in the field of space and defence, for which the reserve lists were finalised in November 2023;

    147.  Notes that the implementation of ‘Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0’ is ongoing, with EUR 1,74 billion allocated for dual-use transport infrastructure projects under the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) between 2021-2027; notes that so far the Union has co-funded 95 military mobility projects in 21 Member States and that 94 of these projects are still ongoing and most of them are expected to be finalised between 2026 and 2027; notes with concern that following three calls for proposals organised in 2021, 2022 and 2023, the entirety of the military mobility envelope under the CEF for the current programming period has thereby already been exhausted; considers that although making the budget quickly available by frontloading amounts into the 2022 and 2023 calls responded to the need to take into account the evolution of the security situation in Europe following Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, it simultaneously led to Union funding being unstable and unpredictable by leaving a gap of more than four years with no more Union funds available for military mobility calls to finance dual-use infrastructure projects until the post-2027 MFF; recalls the Court’s conclusions in its Special Report 04/2025 that the Action Plan was not built on sufficiently solid foundations and that progress towards its objective, namely ensuring swift and seamless movement of personnel, materiel and assets at short notice and on a large scale, has been variable due to design weaknesses and remaining obstacles to implementation; notes that the Commission considers that more action is needed to strengthen dual-use transport infrastructure corridors, including on regulatory issues such as cross-border movement permission procedures; notes the Court’s observation that the Commission had not carried out a robust assessment of the overall funding required to make its objectives and targets achievable; regrets that only EUR 300 million was spent on military mobility in 2023 and is concerned that calls for proposals under the military mobility envelope faced a four-time oversubscription rate, demonstrating the increased interest among Member States and project beneficiaries;

    148.  Expresses deep concern over the Commission’s decision to proceed with the adoption of the “Rearm EU” initiative without prior consultation of the European Parliament; regrets that such a decision bypasses the principle of institutional balance and undermines Parliament’s role as co-legislator in shaping strategic and budgetary priorities; urges the Commission to refrain from initiating substantial policy instruments that impact the Union’s financial and strategic architecture without ensuring full respect for the prerogatives of the Parliament;

    149.  Notes that the European Parliament has called on the Union and its Member States to put in place a legal framework enabling Russia to be classified as a State sponsor of terrorism;

    Recommendations

    150.  Calls on the Commission to:

       (i) develop a longer-term strategy for the EDF, building on the experience with Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR) and the Court’s recommendations, as soon as possible;
       (ii) secure the provision of adequate resources to enhance Union defence cooperation, in the short-term through the 2026 draft budget and the timely recruitment of expert staff, and in the medium-term through the Commission’s proposal for the next MFF;
       (iii) further strengthen military mobility in the Union by substantially increasing the funding available to improve dual-use transport infrastructure corridors and by taking action to eliminate administrative, procedural and regulatory barriers to cross-border military movements, while prioritising Union funding to projects that best respond to the current European threat landscape; taking into account the Court’s findings and recommendations in special report 04/2025;
       (iv) take action to ensure due diligence in relation to project criteria for dual-use military mobility infrastructure projects, in line with the Court’s recommendation;

    Neighbourhood and the world

    151.  Notes that the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 6 ‘Neighbourhood and the world’ was EUR 15,2 billion (7,4 % of the Union budget) distributed as follows: 63,4 % for the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI-Global Europe), 16,4 % for Humanitarian Aid (HUMA), 16 % for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III) and 4.2 % for other actions and programmes; notes that in total, payments for ‘Neighbourhood and the world’ reached 15,2 billion in 2023, representing approximatively 8 % of the overall Union expenditure excluding RRF;

    152.  Notes that the Court examined a sample of 72 transactions, which is not adequately representative of the spending under this MFF heading and, therefore, cannot provide an estimate of the error rate; considering that the Court’s audit results show that this is a high-risk area (of 37 out of 72 transactions audited, i.e. 51.4 %, were affected by errors), invites the Court to provide a clear estimate of the error rate for this chapter; notes that the Court found 31 errors that had a financial impact on the Union budget, relating to ineligible beneficiaries, ineligible costs, expenditure not incurred, and breaches of public procurement rules, areas that could point to risks of unreliable functioning of control mechanisms;

    153.  Notes, additionally, that the Court detected 19 cases of non-compliance with legal and financial provisions, none of which had direct financial impact on the Union budget, and which included issues such as ambiguous cost allocations, non-compliance with visibility rules, and inadequate documentation;

    154.  Is concerned that the Court found a significant non-compliance with visibility rules in an EU-funded project under indirect management by DG NEAR, which concerned a contribution agreement worth EUR 21,2 million signed with an international organisation in a project where the aim was to support Eastern partnership countries in tackling COVID-19; notes that the Court found that most donation certificates it checked did not contain any acknowledgment that the medical equipment donated was funded by the Union; recalls that beneficiaries of Union funds are required to clearly publicise the fact that the Union has financed or co-financed the action they are implementing; notes the Commission’s replies that it is discussing new communication and visibility guidelines with the United Nations to reduce the risks of errors on compliance with visibility rules;

    155.  Expresses concern that the Court, in its IT audit on the information system OPSYS’ component for managing user access and rights, found three shortcomings including (i) that the Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA) had not formalised a procedure for granting and removing access rights for system administrators and to standard users; (ii) four cases in which standard users had more access rights than they needed for their jobs, which is not in line with the Commission’s IT standards; and that (iii) DG INTPA did not manage all administrator accounts belonging to staff of other directorates-general; is concerned that these weaknesses increase the risks of both inappropriate access to the system and non-compliance with the rules and procedures for implementing external action projects, and also undermine the integrity of system processes and data;

    156.  Notes that the Commission intensified communication with international organisations in order to raise awareness of the need to ensure that the Court’s auditors obtain full access to documents when auditing projects funded by the Union, and that the Commission has supported initiatives to find permanent solutions to the issues of access to and retention of documents; notes, however, the Commission’s acknowledgment that despite efforts, some constraints regarding access to documents persist due to the existing legal frameworks of the implementing partners, which are not expected to change in the near future;

    157.  Urges the Commission to enhance the rule of law conditionality-based approach of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) III funding in order for the instrument to serve its purpose of effectively preparing accession countries to fulfil the conditions of becoming Member States of the Union; reiterates its calls on the Commission to implement the recommendations of the Court’s Special Report 01/2022 in order to ensure an effective impact of Union financial assistance in support for the rule of law in the Western Balkans, in particular by developing guidelines on the application of the provisions on modulation and conditionality under IPA III;

    158.  Stresses that Union aid should under no circumstances – directly or indirectly – be financing terrorism, hence it should not support any entity connected to Hamas or any other terrorist or extremist organisation; notes to this end, it is legitimate and necessary to be able to clearly know and identify all the final beneficiaries of European aid in third countries; emphasises the need for strict control over the distribution and use of aid to ensure no misuse of funds;

    159.  Notes with regret that the European Commission financed the Gaziantep Islamic Science and Technology University, which has proven ties to terrorist organisation of Hamas; calls on the Commission to cancel all ties to this university and other universities with ties to terrorist organisations;

    160.  Urges the Commission, in the context of delivering enhanced support and humanitarian aid to the Palestinian population, to also make full use of trusted partners, such as the WHO, WFP UNICEF or different Red Crescent organisations; recalls the importance for the Commission to guarantee independent controls of UNRWA by external experts, the Court and experienced international partners;

    161.  Notes that the Commission has been working in the last months with UNRWA, to enhance the neutrality processes and control systems in the Agency, in line with findings of the investigations by the UN OIOS on the allegations of involvement of 19 of its staff in the 7th October 2023 attack, and to monitor the application of the action plan presented by UNRWA on the implementation of the recommendations of the Independent Review Group led by former French Minister of Foreign Affairs Colonna to strengthen control and oversight; notes that the Commission has reassessed the Union’s 2024 funding decision for UNRWA and that, through an exchange of letters between Commissioner Várhelyi and UNRWA Commissioner General Lazzarini in April 2024, the Union reached an agreement about the Union’s conditional assistance for UNRWA, linked to a number of milestones in relation to three work streams, including the screening of UNRWA staff, an audit by the Union, as well as the reinforcement of the Department of Internal Investigations and Ethics office; notes that Union assistance was resumed;

    162.  Recalls the necessity for the Palestinian Authority to remove all educational materials and content that fail to adhere to UNESCO standards by the next school year, in particular those that contain antisemitism as defined by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance classification endorsed by the Union, incitement to violence, hate speech, and glorification of terrorism; recalls the provisions of previous discharge resolutions; stresses that financial support from the Union for the Palestinian Authority in the area of education should be provided on the condition that textbook content is aligned with UNESCO standards, that all anti-Semitic references are deleted, and that examples which incite to hatred and violence are removed, as repeatedly requested in the resolutions accompanying the discharge decisions; recalls the findings of the Georg Eckert Institute’s report funded by the Union, which revealed a complex picture on the textbooks; notes that the Union does not fund the Palestinian textbooks, and that neither are they the responsibility of UNRWA, which nevertheless reviews all issued textbooks to address any problematic content;); notes that the Commission will carry out close scrutiny to ensure that no Union funds are allocated, directly or indirectly, to the drafting, teaching, or exposure of such educational materials to Palestinian children, including those provided by UN organisations;

    163.  Notes DG NEAR’s acknowledgement in its AAR 2023 that projects in Kyiv received regular visits but security constraints limited on-site monitoring and project visits in other Ukrainian regions; further notes that the constraints on adequately monitoring projects in Ukraine led to a renewed reservation in the 2023 AAR of DG NEAR and that corrective actions are being implemented, such as monitoring progress on project implementation through desk reviews, remote solutions and using a service provider;

    164.  Welcomes that OLAF provides targeted anti-fraud assistance to authorities and supports the accession of Ukraine to the Union Anti-Fraud Programme; notes that the Framework Agreement for the Ukraine Facility, which entered into force in June 2024, provides for legally binding arrangements for the management, control, supervision, monitoring, evaluation, reporting and audit of funds under the Facility, as well as measures to prevent, investigate and correct irregularities, fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest, and provisions on the roles of OLAF and EPPO; welcomes, in addition, that, pursuant to article 36 of the Ukraine Facility Regulation, the Commission established in June 2024 an Audit Board, with the mission of assisting the Commission in assessing the effectiveness of Ukraine’s management and control systems regarding the funds provided under the Facility and in fighting mismanagement of Union funding under the Ukraine Facility; calls on the Commission to keep the European Parliament regularly informed about the activities and findings of the Audit Board in order to ensure proper parliamentary oversight;

    165.  Notes with concern the recent reports on the findings of a draft audit report paid for by the Commission on the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS) Secretariat which allege to suspected fraud, unpaid salaries and further liabilities; notes that as reported the Commission has contributed EUR 3,7 million to the Secretariat in 2023 and is trying to recover EUR 3,6 million as of March 2024; asks the Commission to ensure full transparency and accountability, grant access to the audit report and inform the members of Parliament on the concrete steps taken;

    166.  Calls on the Commission in line with the Court’s recommendations in its opinion 03/2024 to integrate into the new MFF legislative proposal the recommendations of the External Action Guarantee complementing the Commission’s evaluation, including increased use of blending (grants) in LDCs, fragile or conflict-affected countries and engaged coordination with stakeholders such as civil society;

    167.  Is concerned about the allocation of EFSD+ under the new flexible ‘Support to Investments’ envelope in favour of benefiting countries where the Global Gateway investments are easier to implement at the expense of prioritising LDCs, and fragile and conflict-affected countries; calls for reporting on the volume of EFSD+ amounts allocated and contractualised in these countries and for transparency on how the quota of allocations to LDCs within country MIPs is respected within allocations of the regional MIPs;

    168.  While recognising the Global Gateway strategy as a concerted Union response to global challenges, reiterates that actions bringing together public and private investment must always be guided by the legal framework as provided by the NDICI Regulation, the Agenda 2030, and the needs of partner countries, as communicated by way of an honest dialogue at eye level; is concerned about inconsistencies surrounding Global Gateway programmes; calls, therefore, for improved transparency, democratic accountability, robust monitoring and evaluation mechanisms in Global Gateway and Team Europe initiatives; calls for a centralised, publicly accessible platform, regularly updated, to detail Global Gateway projects, including their objectives, funding sources, implementing partners, and expected outcomes;

    European Development Fund (EDF)

    169.  Notes that to audit the regularity of transactions, the Court examined a sample of 140 transactions, representing the full range of spending from the EDFs; notes, furthermore, that this comprised 31 transactions related to the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, 87 transactions authorised by 14 EU delegations(20) and 19 payments approved by Commission headquarters;

    170.  Notes with concern that, out of the 140 transactions examined, 62 (44,3 %) contained errors, compared to 57 (40,7 %) in 2022 for the same number of transactions; stresses, moreover, that the Court quantified 52 errors (48 in 2022), on the basis of which it estimated the level of error for the financial year 2023 to be 8,9 % (7,1 % in 2022);

    171.  Highlights with concern that the three most common types of errors in the financial year 2023 related to expenditure not incurred at 45 % (51 % in 2022), to absence of essential supporting documents at 31 % (7 % in 2022) and to ineligible expenditure at 23 % (24 % in 2022);

    172.  Notes the Commission’s replies to written questions to Commissioners Jutta Urpilainen and Oliver Varhelyi that in 2023 approximately 45 % of the total errors are due to excess clearing, a practice where expenditure not incurred is included in the accounts as expenditure incurred, and that therefore such errors are temporary, since they will no longer exist after the final clearings; notes furthermore that, to reduce these temporary errors, the Commission has requested its partners to review their reporting templates to allow for easier identification of incurred expenditure, and that DG INTPA launched a special working group to screen the compliance of relevant organisations through a risk management framework; also notes that DG INTPA is currently reviewing its control strategy, which aims also to identify how ex-ante controls can be strengthened and to improve the reporting of the pillar-assessed organisations to the Commission; calls on the Commission to report to the discharge authority on the effects of these actions;

    173.  Notes that the expected outcomes of DG INTPA’s ongoing review of its control strategy include the reinforcement of guidance on financial reporting and also on enhanced ex-ante controls so as to prevent errors including on excess clearing; calls on the Commission to report to the discharge authority on the remedial measures taken upon finalisation of this review;

    174.  Is concerned that, as in previous years, some international organisations provided only limited access to documents (e.g., in read-only format), which hindered the planning, execution and quality control of the Court’s audit and led to delays; notes that audit and control issues were discussed with UN entities on several occasions, including in the context of joint technical reference group meetings and the relevant EU-UN Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement (FAFA) working group; notes furthermore that the Commission is working with the International Organisations concerned and has intensified communication with them on the Court’s access to documents; encourages, as in previous years, the Commission to increase these efforts;

    175.  Stresses that, according to Court’s assessment, the Residual Error Rate (RER) study does not constitute an assurance engagement or an audit and is based on the RER methodology and manual provided by DG INTPA; notes that DG INTPA clarifies that the RER study is meant to be a key indicator for the estimated financial impact of residual errors, i.e., it measures the proper functioning of the internal control system and thus, demonstrates the Commission’s corrective capacity; stresses that, as in previous years, the Court has found limitations in the study; notes, furthermore, the Court’s opinion, as in previous years, that the RER methodology allows the contractor to rely entirely on the results of DG INTPA´s controls, and that relying on the work of other auditors is contrary to the purpose of an RER study; highlights the Court’s finding that in cases where these previous checks were carried out under the FAFA between the European Commission and the United Nations, the contractor is not always able to carry out additional substantive testing as the FAFA limits the Commission’s verification rights; highlights the Commission’s reply which recognised the limitations in terms of controls set in the FAFA; urges the Commission to look for workable solutions to resolve this issue;

    176.  Recalls that two EUTFs were created under the EDFs; recalls that EUTF for Africa has mobilised over EUR 5 billion, with 88 % of contributions (EUR 4,4 billion) coming from the EDF and the Union budget; deplores that, despite several requests from Parliament, the process of managing and allocating these funds still lacks transparency; is concerned by the Court’s findings in its Special report 17/2024 “The EU trust fund for Africa Despite new approaches, support remained unfocused; notes that, despite an innovative approach to identifying human rights risks in a difficult environment, these risks were not comprehensively addressed and that the Court found that the assessment of potential risks to human rights was not comprehensive; recalls that the Commission is unable to identify and report on the most efficient and effective approaches to reducing irregular migration and forced displacements in Africa according to the Court; regrets that the new monitoring system aggregates information from all EUTF projects, but suffers from issues of data accuracy; notes that the Union’s Africa trust fund is set to be phased out in 2025;

    Recommendations

    177.  Calls on the Commission to act on the Court’s recommendations:

       (i) as regards the OPSYS application system, formalise and enhance the procedure for granting and removing access rights for system administrators and to standard users, enhance the quality of the new software, and allocate resources needed to enhance its maturity and robustness;
       (ii) strengthen guidance and controls to ensure that organisations implementing contracts under indirect management, including international organisations, international financial institutions and state agencies, comply with visibility rules;
       (iii) continue to intensify its communication with international organisations in order to provide the Court with complete, unlimited and timely access to documents necessary to carry out its task in accordance with the TFEU, and not just in read-only format;
       (iv) put in place adequate ex ante and ex post control measures in unstable or conflict zones to ensure the proper control of spending of Union funds and ways to recover the Union funds;
       (v) take measures to improve controls systems for the clearing of pre-financing paid to international organisations;
       (vi) strengthen ex ante controls before accepting expenditure;

    178.  Furthermore, calls on the Commission to:

       (i) strictly monitor through all available mechanisms and work with UNRWA to ensure the implementation of all agreed actions to guarantee that UNRWA works in full compliance with humanitarian principles and neutrality, including in the forthcoming EU-UNRWA joint declaration and the upcoming financing decisions for conditional Union assistance;
       (ii) ensure that all contracts involving Union funds fully respect applicable Union legislation, including accountability, transparency, and sound financial management, and that this includes verifying that there are no subcontractors, natural persons, participants in workshops and/or trainings or recipients of financial support made to third parties subject to Union restrictive measures or involved in the financing of terrorism or acts of terrorism as well as other acts of hatred and incitement to hatred;
       (iii) increase evidence-based targeting of geographical areas and beneficiaries, and improve the accuracy of reported achievements of future development action, including through the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe;

    European public Administration

    179.  Notes that the Commission is directly responsible for the implementation of 59,1 % of the overall administrative budget of the Union, equivalent to EUR 7,2 billion; further notes that 70 % of the administrative expenditure relates to human resources including pensions while the remaining primarily covers expenditure related to buildings, equipment, energy, communications and IT; notes with satisfaction that also for 2023 the Court concludes that the spending area is low risk;

    180.  Notes that during 2023, 2152 civil servants left the Commission primarily due to retirement, resignation or the end of their contracts; notes that this represents a relatively high turnover, which should give the Commission ample possibilities to address persistent imbalances in geographical representation throughout the services;

    181.  Encourages the Commission together with EPSO to ensure that necessary technical systems are put in place as quickly as possible and that processes are accelerated in order for the Commission and other Union institutions to be able to rely on EPSO for the selection of highly qualified and motivated candidates for all types of jobs in the institutions;

    182.  Appreciates that female representation in management positions increased from 46,1 % in December 2022 to 47,8 % in December 2023; encourages the Commission to continue to focus on ensuring and maintaining gender balance on all levels of management;

    183.  Notes with satisfaction that the Commission has implemented policies to enhance work-life balance and staff well-being, including the right to disconnect; at the same time commends that a new decision on the prevention and fight against harassment was adopted which establishes the position of a Chief Confidential Counsellor as key figure in the fight against harassment; stresses the need to provide this position with the appropriate resources to effectively carry out multiple challenging tasks;

    184.  Acknowledges the progress of the Commission with regard to the internalisation of crèche staff;

    185.  Notes with satisfaction that the Commission issued updated versions of the guidelines on ethical standards for participation of the Members of the European Commission in the election campaign to the European Parliament and guidelines for the participation of Members of the Commission in election campaigns at Member State level; further commends that in March 2023, the Commission adopted much needed strengthened rules on missions and costs paid by third parties;

    186.  Stresses the need to ensure that all the Union Institutions in Luxembourg can attract staff to all types of jobs and careers; notes that especially for servants in lower pay grades Luxembourg can be a less attractive option due to the costs of living; notes that with the agreement on the budget for 2025 the first step has been taken by establishing a special housing allowance for staff in lower grades working in Union institutions in Luxembourg;

    187.  Notes that the Commission has an ambitious goal of reducing the overall office space of the Commission by 25 % and the number of buildings by 50 % by 2030 compared to 2020; notes that the total reduction in overall space reached a little over 83 000 m2 in 2023, equal to a reduction of 11 %; welcomes that this goal is an important element in the Commission achieving carbon neutrality and reducing administrative costs; stresses that it is important that the reduction in the number of building and office space and the resulting roll-out of collaborative work spaces and other significant administrative changes happens in close cooperation with staff;

    188.  Is concerned about the severe delays, including delays of up to 6 months, faced by civil servants across the institutions when receiving the reimbursements of healthcare costs under the institutions’ sickness insurance scheme; is also concerned about the inadequate treatment of civil servants and MEPs with autoimmune diseases, neurological disorders, COPD (obstructive pulmonary disease), long COVID, undiagnosed and rare diseases by the sickness insurance scheme of the institutions; notes that patients with these symptoms are often not reimbursed for their diagnostic tests;

    189.  Notes that, in 2023, the Ombudsman launched 398 inquiries concerning the Commission; further notes that during 2023 the Commission received 187 closing decisions without remarks and 17 decisions of maladministration; notes with concern that the Ombudsman receives many citizens’ complaints about extreme delays in gaining access to requested documents from the Commission and encourages the Commission to strive to speed up the processing of such requests and further reduce the number of decisions of maladministration and establish clear rules concerning access to all types of written texts whether on paper, email, text messages or any other form of communication, which is part of an administrative process related to Commission policies or decisions; notes that out of the nine investigations related to the Commission concluded by OLAF in 2023, seven were closed with recommendations; calls on the Commission to ensure transparency and accountability in the follow-up to these cases;

    190.  Expresses deep concern that there has been allegations of corruption linked to the Commission; at the same time deplores that there has been allegations about officials from the Commission that allegedly accepted gifts from a country that the Union was negotiating an agreement with; stresses the need for a clear and systematic approach to ensure that all OLAF cases involving relevant potential criminal offences are promptly referred to the EPPO and the competent national authorities; calls on the Commission to reinforce relevant rules and procedures in order to ensure that all cases are handled in a strict, correct and efficient way;

    191.  Notes that only very few cases of psychological and sexual harassment have been recognised as such in the past years and expresses concern that this may point to institutional blind spots in the Commission, given the significant number of employees of the institution;

    192.  Expresses deep concern regarding reports of an ongoing investigation involving the former Commissioner for Justice, who is alleged to have been engaged, during his time in office, in money laundering activities involving funds of unknown origin; calls on the Commission to fully cooperate with the Belgian authorities and to urgently clarify whether these activities were in any way connected to his official duties within the Commission;

    193.  Calls on the Commission to prioritise permanent staff over external consultants and contractual staff, in order to guarantee high quality working conditions and to prevent knowledge and experience from being lost; calls for flexibility for DGs with a high proportion of seconded national experts (SNE) in the establishment plan to convert SNE posts into temporary agent posts with the aim of ensuring better expertise retention, operational functionality and business continuity; further insists on avoiding the externalisation of tasks to consultancies when available know-how can be found in-house;

    194.  Notes that, in recent years, the Commission has increasingly outsourced impact assessments to external companies, raising concerns about potential conflicts of interest; calls on the Commission to strengthen provisions to prevent possible conflicts of interest and to provide better guidance to staff handling public procurement procedures for policy-related service contracts;

    195.  Regrets the alleged espionage organised by the Hungarian Government against OLAF staff during an investigative mission; calls for the swift establishment of robust protection measures to safeguard Union institutional staff on mission in Member States and to prevent any violations;

    196.  Welcomes the entry into force of Regulation (EU) 2023/2841(21); takes note of cybersecurity investments, including EUR 30 million allocated to enhancing digital security in the Commission; calls on the Commission to spare no effort in further developing a cybersecurity culture, promoting training and awareness within the Union institution; stresses the importance of continued adequate investments in cybersecurity towards the longer term indicative target in the order of at least 10 % of total IT spending;

    197.  Reiterates its concern that the significant risks to the security and protection of the registry and operating mechanism of the Union system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading against cyberattacks have still not been adequately addressed; points out that this issue has been highlighted in the Annual Activity Reports (AARs) since 2010, with reservations raised in each report; notes that this concern is once again emphasised in the Directorate-General for Climate Action’s 2023 AAR, further underscoring the persistent failure to prioritise the security of the system;

    European Schools

    198.  Notes that the European Schools’ overall budget for 2023 was EUR 417,5 million primarily funded by the Commission, other Union institutions, Member States and fees from parents; further notes that almost 80 % of the budget was spent on staff costs;

    199.  Notes with satisfaction that the Court is able to conclude that nothing has come to their attention that causes them to believe that the consolidated accounts for 2023 are not prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with the International Public Sector Accounting Standards;

    200.  Observes that the Court found some systematic or recurrent weaknesses in payments and related human resources (HR) and procurement procedures including insufficient verification of supporting evidence affecting the regularity of some HR procedures and payments;

    201.  Calls on the Commission, in particular, to:

       (i) ensure that Union Institutions can rely on EPSO to efficiently organise and complete selection procedures and other staff related procedures in order to provide Union Institutions with sufficient highly qualified and motivated candidates for open positions;
       (ii) explore all possibilities to correct significant geographical and gender imbalances in different categories of the staff;
       (iii) continue work on measures that will ensure that Union Institutions based in Luxembourg can continue to attract highly qualified staff for all types of job profiles;
       (iv) ensure that the roll-out of collaborative work spaces and other significant administrative changes happens in close cooperation with staff;
       (v) make more staff available for processing of reimbursement requests for the sickness insurance scheme, to improve staff training and to have better IT software available to process requests more quickly;
       (vi) act as a role model, particularly for diseases that do not fall into classical fields and rare diseases; urges the Commission to expand their technical knowledge and handling of these cases; urges the Commission to expand the catalogue of tests eligible for reimbursement to include a wider bandwidth for laboratory tests and other diagnostic procedures and exams as well as treatments; urges the Commission to do this promptly;
       (vii) ensure the rapid introduction of strong protective mechanisms for Union institutional staff on mission in Member States and third countries, safeguarding their rights;
       (viii) support the European Schools in their implementation, as soon as possible, of recommendations by the Court from previous years and the recommendation from the report concerning the financial year 2023 which asks the schools to perform systematic checks of supporting evidence on allowances paid to seconded staff;
       (ix) prepare a report analysing the reasons why the vast majority of harassment complaints (requests for assistance) in the Commission are dismissed, most of them without even opening an administrative inquiry, and recommending how such dysfunctionality of the formal procedure can be addressed;
       (x) ensure that as of 2025, requests for assistance in harassment cases are followed up with a proper administrative inquiry by the Investigation and Disciplinary Office (IDOC) or OLAF so as to ensure that harassers are held accountable and sanctioned proportionately to their wrongdoing;

    CHAPTER II – Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF)

    General remarks

    202.  Notes that in 2023, 27 recovery and resilience plans (RRPs) were revised, and that these revisions had an impact on the pace of implementation of the existing plans, causing delays; notes at the same time that the political priorities in Member States can change; notes that increased energy prices, high inflation and supply chain disruptions caused by Russia’s unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine, and, in some cases, natural disasters, contributed to the revision of the RRPs; underlines that the delays caused by the revisions of the RRPs came in addition to existing ones, as shown by the significant differences between the foreseen calendar of payments requests and the actual transmission of these requests by the Member States to the Commission; remains concerned by the risk of under-implementation and of failure to reach the milestones and targets (M&Ts) as agreed in the RRPs; emphasises the need for enhanced monitoring mechanisms to ensure that delays do not disproportionately impact key projects;

    203.  Notes that there should be a clear thematic link between reforms and investments and that there may be, in certain cases, a long delay between the creation of the national recovery plans and the completion of milestones and targets; regrets that the RRF design does not allow for sufficient flexibility to respond to emerging crises in a prompt manner;

    204.  Draws attention with utmost concern to the statement of the President of the Court, arguing that approximately half of the RRF disbursements had not reached the real economy, and questions if the other half may have been used either to substitute recurring budgetary expenditure or generate profit to Member States from the increased interest rates;

    205.  Recalls that the RRF is a temporary recovery instrument based on performance, i.e. that payments are linked to the satisfactory fulfilment of M&Ts related to reforms and investments included in the national RRPs; stresses that the effectiveness of the RRF must be assessed, not only in terms of disbursement, but also in terms of its ability to generate tangible, long-term improvements of the consequences of the pandemic; recalls that there is no definition in the RRF Regulation of the “satisfactory fulfilment of M&Ts”; recalls that each national plan should effectively address all or a significant subset of challenges identified in the European Semester, particularly the country- specific recommendations (CSRs) adopted by the Council; notes the fact that, thanks to the RRF, the percentage of CSRs with progress has increased by 17 % between 2021 and 2023;

    206.  Notes that in 2023, the Commission disbursed a total of EUR 75 billion, and additional pre-financing payments of EUR 7,1 billion, which brought the total disbursements by the end of 2023 to EUR 220,8 billion, divided into EUR 141,6 billion in grants (40 % of the total EUR 357 billion for grants under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) envelope) and EUR 79,2 billion in loans (27 % of the total EUR 291 billion for loans under the RRF envelope); mandates detailed reporting requirements on how Member States allocate funds, preventing substitution of recurring budgetary expenditures, and ensuring funds reach intended beneficiaries;

    Court’s observations

    207.  Notes that the Court issued a qualified opinion on the legality and regularity of the RRF expenditure in 2023; is concerned that the Court concluded that seven out of 23 RRF payments made in 2023 were affected by quantitative findings and that six of these payments were affected by material error; notes that in the Court’s opinion, except for those matters, the RRF expenditure accepted in the accounts for the year 2023 is legal and regular in all material respects; notes that the nature of the RRF spending model relies on the assessments of milestones and targets (M&Ts) to be made by the Commission; notes that in 2023, the Court checked 452 M&Ts included in 23 grant payments and that it does not provide an error rate due to the nature of the RRF’s spending model but estimates the minimum financial impact of its findings to be above the materiality threshold; is convinced that Member States should also bear responsibility for errors detected in post-disbursement;

    208.  Expresses deep concern that the Court was unable to verify the actual financial impact of erroneous or ineligible RRF payments due to the inherent limitations of the milestone and target-based assessment model; calls on the Commission to develop a more transparent error-tracking methodology to prevent misallocation and inefficiency;

    209.  Notes that the Court audited 325 out of 542 milestones and 127 out of 135 targets included in 2023 payment requests for grants; regrets that the Court considers that 16 of them were affected by regularity issues (2.4 % of the total); is concerned by the fact that the Court considers that the requirements had not been satisfactorily fulfilled for seven M&Ts in six payments and that the Commission had still made the corresponding payments; notes that the Court’s conclusions are based on extensive audit work and regrets that the Commission contests some of the Court’s conclusions; notes that all of the RRF payments must be assessed against the framework communicated and applied by the Commission, which must take into consideration for each payment the opinion of the Economic and Financial Committee and the scrutiny by Member State experts under the comitology procedure; requests the Commission to ensure that all disputed payments related to unsatisfactorily fulfilled M&Ts undergo independent external review to strengthen public trust in the process; recommends an introduction of real-time tracking systems for disbursements and expenditures to prevent misallocations under the RRF and the MFF;

    210.  Notes with particular concern that the Court has identified nine potential cases of ineligible M&Ts linked to the continuation of a pre-existing project that either started before the eligibility period, or that were a substitution of recurring national budgetary expenditure; regrets the lack of clarity in the RRF Regulation, and does not share the Commission’s interpretation that the eligibility period concerns only the date of start of works on a specific project rather than the beginning of the preparatory or projection phase; regrets that such a view led to measures which were planned before the RRF eligibility period being included in the RRPs, and acknowledges that any measure must respect the scope, objectives and eligibility conditions set by the RRF Regulation; calls on the Commission to implement stricter verification mechanisms to prevent the inclusion of pre-existing projects that do not provide added value under the RRF framework;

    211.  Recalls that RRF funds shall not be used to replace recurring budgetary expenditure, unless in duly justified case; and is preoccupied by the Court’s findings that some M&Ts that were a substitution of recurring national budgetary expenditure were not adequately justified in the RRPs;

    212.  Notes with concern the Court’s finding that NGEU borrowing may more than double by 2026 while the bulk of repayment is deferred to future MFFs; recalls that the repayment of NGEU borrowing must start before the end of 2027, if unused appropriations remain available in the budget line to cover NGEU financing costs, and be completed by 2058 at the latest; notes that the Union budget exposure at the end of 2023 is expected to rise in 2024 and 2025, mainly due to RRF loans; is concerned that potential changes in market conditions might result in higher borrowing costs which, for the NGEU debt relating to grants, will have to be borne by the Union budget; is concerned that there is to date still no repayment plan for the NGEU common debt, and that the Union’s debt continues to rise, with a large share of this increase attributed to the temporary recovery instrument, NGEU; is concerned that the increased debt and the associated higher interest costs will have long-term consequences for the Union’s fiscal stability, potentially leading to greater financial strain and a reduced capacity to respond to future challenges or invest in key strategic areas;

    213.  Notes the Court’s finding that payments from RRF were lower than expected in 2023; emphasises that the Court has criticised the slow disbursement and absorption of RRF funds; is concerned by the Court’s findings in Special Report 13/2024 that absorption of RRF funds has progressed with some delays, that Member States may not be able to complete all measures at the end of the RRF’s implementation period for which a significant proportion of funds have already been paid out, and that the second half of the RRF’s implementation period is more challenging with an increase in number of M&Ts, a shift from reforms to investments and more advanced stage of implementation, and a high proportion of measures to be completed in the last year;

    214.  Notes, conversely, that according to the Commission the achievement of M&Ts is broadly on track, as by 31 August 2024, over 40 % of the available RRF funds had been disbursed to Member States, with the disbursement of grants reaching 48 % and loans slightly exceeding 30 %; notes that the pace of payment requests has also accelerated since the second half of 2023 with the revision of the RRPs linked to the introduction of the REPowerEU chapters was finalised in 2023;

    215.  Notes the Court’s findings in Special Report 13/2024 that additional reasons for slow absorption included measures not being suited to the RRF’s timeframe and underestimation of the time needed to implement them (due to public procurement and state aid rules); as well as uncertainties on implementing rules and how they should be applied including lacking guidance on the ‘do no significant harm’ principle (DNSH) and how to ascribe to it;

    216.  Expresses strong concerns about the Court’s observation that point to persistent weaknesses in the implementation of Member States control systems as this poses a risk to the availability of complete and accurate data underlying payment requests, access to those requests for control purposes, and the effective functioning of Member State control systems to protect the Union’s financial interests; recalls that, according to the RRF Regulation, Member State control systems have a key role to play in ensuring that the financial interests of the Union are protected effectively; urges the Commission to take decisive and swift action whenever necessary, including imposing financial corrections, and to make full use of the provisions of the RRF Regulation if deficiencies persist in the control systems of Member States;

    217.  Expresses concern about the Court’s findings in Special Report N°22/2024 on ‘Double funding from the EU budget: Control systems lack essential elements to mitigate the increased risk resulting from the RRF model of financing not linked to cost’; highlights that Member States can propose so-called ‘zero cost measures’, i.e. measures estimated to have no costs to be financed by the RRF, and for which there is no check at all for double-funding, as the Commission considers that measures which receive no RRF funds are free of risk from that perspective; also notes with concern the Court’s findings that from Member States’ perspective, the many layers of governance involved including national, regional or municipality level, make coordination and oversight very challenging; is concerned that when checks are performed, (i) they suffer from a very complicated environment with different IT tools used often not interoperable and data recorded in an often non-standardised way, leaving manual cross-checks across databases as the only possible tool to check for double funding, and (ii) Member States’ control systems rely to a large extent on self-declarations by recipients of Union funds; notes, however, that the Court did not find any case of double funding;

    218.  Notes the Commission’s observation that, according to the RRF Regulation, double funding is explicitly linked to budgetary costs and thus, there can be no double funding if the Member State has not submitted any cost estimate linked to a specific measure as part of its national plan; notes that the Commission underlines that no-cost reforms do not increase the financial envelope but are nevertheless essential criteria for the Commission’s positive assessment of RRPs, as well as their full implementation for the relevant payments; points out that the Commission, shortly after the Court audit field work, acknowledged it had identified the first two potential cases of double funding;

    219.  Recalls that Article 9 of the RRF Regulation establishes additionality and complementarity between Union programmes and instruments funding as key principles; believes that, to respect these principles but avoid the risk of double financing, the same measures already included in other national plans benefiting from Union funding (e.g. cohesion, agriculture, etc.) should either not be included in RRPs or more thoroughly described, even if they do not incur any costs, in order to avoid double funding; underlines that due to the different model of implementation, double funding between RRF and other Union financing instruments might be more difficult to identify, and urges the Commission to remain vigilant and pro-active in identifying any potential situation of double funding;

    220.  Regrets the lack of adequate safeguards to prevent double funding of projects under both the RRF and other Union financial instruments; calls for an automated cross-checking system between RRF and cohesion Funds, the Common Agricultural Policy, and other Union funding programmes to detect and eliminate duplicate claims;

    221.  Expresses concern about the Court’s finding in its Review 01/2023: ‘EU financing through cohesion policy and the RRF: A comparative analysis’ that reporting of fraud involving RRF expenditure still lacks a standardised approach with strong coordination and cooperation between Member States, which are obliged to report on cases of suspected fraud not in an integrated IT system, but in the management declaration accompanying every payment request, although Member States have also reported cases outside of the management declarations; regrets that there are no clear guidelines about exactly when a case of suspected fraud should be reported, whether there is a reporting threshold, and what standard information should be reported for each case and about the remedial measures taken; furthermore supports the request made by the Court to the Commission in the same review 01/2023 to obtain sufficient assurance from the Member States on the effectiveness of national systems to prevent, detect and correct fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest;

    222.  Expresses concerns that in 2023 the Commission had to introduce 10 additional control milestones for seven Members States to address the weaknesses identified in their control systems; reminds and supports the Court’s evaluation that the fact control milestones were introduced, which means that Member states systems were not fully functional when the plans started to be implemented, posing a serious risk to the regularity of the of the RRF expenditure and to the protection of financial interests;

    223.  Regrets the findings of the Court’s Special Report No 26/2023 that several policy areas in the RRF’s pillar containing health policies lack a corresponding common indicator to measure progress; is concerned that this impedes the proper monitoring and understanding of progress made towards achieving milestones and targets linked to health policies;

    224.  Welcomes that, in 2023, the Commission made progress in eliminating any possibility of misinterpretation of figures of the Recovery and Resilience Scoreboard and that the Scoreboard further addressed the related recommendation of the Court to improve the presentation of data displayed on the Scoreboard and to improve explanations with regard to its limitations, in particular by better explaining the underlying methodologies and explicitly stating, where applicable, that the data is estimated;

    Audit and control

    225.  Welcomes that, based on the Court’s recommendations and the experience gained, the Commission, in 2023, published three methodological notes to clarify the application of the RRF Regulation, including its framework for (i) assessing the satisfactory fulfilment of M&Ts, upon conducting an assessment, and (ii) the application of the provisions related to the reversal of M&Ts, as well as a methodology to determine the amount to be suspended if a milestone or target is not satisfactorily fulfilled; takes note of the updated Guidance on RRPs, adopted on 19 July 2024, which provides additional guidance to ensure the continued adequacy of controls to identify and avoid any risk of double funding as well as the methodology for reductions and recoveries under the RRF in accordance with Article 24(8) of the RRF Regulation;

    226.  Calls on the Commission to increase the number of ex-post audits and on-the-ground inspections for RRF-funded projects, particularly in high-risk sectors such as digital infrastructure, energy where previous Union funding programmes have identified significant irregularities;

    227.  Warns that the inclusion of pre-existing projects and the substitution of recurring budgetary expenditures within the RRF framework undermines the additionality principle, effectively converting the instrument into a backdoor financing mechanism for Member States’ regular budgets, rather than fostering genuine post-crisis recovery and resilience; calls for an urgent review to prevent further dilution of the RRF’s purpose;

    228.  Advocates more decisiveness on the part of both the Commission and Member States in order to detect irregularities in the spending of RRF funds and to recover undue payments;

    229.  Is concerned with the Court’s counter-reply to the Commission’s replies on the existence of an assurance gap at Union level regarding compliance with Union and national rules on public procurement and State aid; notes that the Commission argues that the assurance provided by DG ECFIN covers the effectiveness of Member States’ controls on compliance with public procurement and state aid rules. however, stresses that while DG ECFIN’s AAR refers to Commission assessments of the existence and effectiveness of Member States’ controls, there is no conclusion regarding their effectiveness; expresses concern that, according to the Court, this represents an important limitation of the scope of the Commission’s declaration of assurance, meaning that the Commission still does not provide full assurance as to whether RRF expenditure – which the Commission manages directly – complies with the rules;

    230.  Stresses that delays in disbursement and absorption of RRF funds not only slow down economic recovery but also create substantial risks of last-minute, low-quality spending towards the end of the RRF period; calls on the Commission to introduce stricter interim evaluations to prevent a ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ rush that could lead to waste and misallocation;

    231.  Notes with serious concern that Member States may strategically forego their final payment requests to avoid fulfilling politically sensitive milestones and targets, thereby evading necessary but unpopular reforms; calls on the Commission to introduce financial penalties for incomplete RRF implementation to prevent manipulation of the payment structure;

    232.  Notes that the Commission’s replies that it extended the scope of its audit work beyond that required by the RRF Regulation to verify that the control procedures put in place in the Member States give the necessary assurance that Member States regularly and effectively verify compliance with public procurement and State aid rules and eligibility for RRF measures, but disagrees with the Commission’s opinion that the conclusions of DG ECFIN’s Annual activity report cover this;

    233.  Notes with concern that, as stated by the Commission in its mid-term evaluation of the RRF of 21 February 2024, a majority of Member States consider that the payment suspension methodology remains unclear when it comes to reforms because of the discretion given to the Commission in applying the methodology; urges the Commission to revise this methodology in order to avoid any double standards in its application;

    234.  Notes that the Commission’s IAS, in its audit on ex-ante controls of the RRF payment requests carried out in 2023, identified a very important issue according to which DG ECFIN, in cooperation with the Recovery and Resilience Task Force, should further develop and formalise the existing guidance for the cases where DG ECFIN requests that Member States make additional commitments concerning action stemming from audit and control milestones, in particular that the guidance should define (i) how DG ECFIN should follow up the fulfilment of the formal confirmation on the Member State’s commitment, (ii) the criteria for determining the deadlines for the Member States to fulfil the commitments, and (iii) the relations between the ‘commitment framework’, the ‘framework for assessing M&Ts under the RRF Regulation’ and the ‘Reversal of M&Ts under the Facility’;

    235.  Notes that the Commission checks during its “Protection of the Financial Interest of the Union” audits that Member States have a clear and codified process for transmitting cases of fraud, corruption, conflict of interest and double funding to all competent authorities, including the EPPO where relevant;

    236.  Is concerned by the Court reporting in its annual reports that by the end of 2023, the EPPO had 206 active investigations related to funds used to implement RRF measures and estimated potential damages of over EUR 1,8 billion (concerning both national and Union funding); notes that the 206 open investigations concern ten Member States, with around 75 % of these cases coming from one country; is worried that at the end of 2023 the Member States’ management declarations had not reported a single case of detected suspected fraud, meaning that none of the EPPO open cases were reported by Member States themselves, casting doubts on Member States’ ability to detect and fight frauds; stresses that, while no investigation has yet been completed, the figures presented by the EPPO confirm that the risk of fraud is present in the RRF, and that they call into question the reliability of Member State management declarations in terms of reporting detected fraud and the remedial measures taken; calls for urgent reinforcement of fraud detection mechanisms, including a mandatory fraud risk assessment for all large-scale RRF projects; calls on the Commission to ensure that the EPPO has adequate resources to investigate cases of fraud related to RRF expenditure, given the increasing number of investigations and high estimated damages;

    237.  Warns that Member States’ self-reported fraud cases under RRF remain significantly underreported, creating a misleading picture of financial integrity;

    238.  Strongly regrets the lack of transparency in reporting fraud linked to RRF funds and insists that all Member States comply with standardised reporting obligations and use the Irregularity Management System (IMS);

    239.  Recalls that the Financial Regulation recast in force since 30 September 2024 (‘FR recast’) provides for the extension of its scope of the Early Detection and Exclusion System (EDES) to shared management and direct management in cases where the budget is implemented with Member States, for programmes adopted or financed as from 1 January 2028; calls on the Commission to act on the most serious grounds for exclusion in order to better protect the financial interests of the Union;

    240.  Notes that, with a view to reducing the margin between the Commission and the Court, for different interpretations of M&Ts, the Commission has published its approach to the concepts of the start date of a measure and the concept of ‘substitution of recurring national budgetary expenditure’ as Annex II and Annex III of its 2024 Annual Report on the implementation of the RRF; re-iterate its calls on the Commission to keep working with the Court in order to bring the interpretation of M&Ts as close together as possible;

    Implementation and impact

    241.  Urges the Commission to minimise risks that Member States might chose not to receive parts or the entire amounts of the last payment request, thus avoiding the fulfilment of the last M&Ts and jeopardising the overall implementation of the RRPs; is extremely concerned about the additional risks of measures being reversed after the RRF lifetime, and urges the Commission, when making the final payments, to ensure that such situations will not occur;

    242.  Emphasises that, according to the Commission’s mid-term evaluation of the RRF of 21 February 2024, Member States highlighted the need to mobilise more resources than initially planned to revise the RRPs, and that the efficiency of the performance-based approach is reduced by the ‘excessively complex procedures’ for the plan modifications, which do not distinguish between major or minor amendments and require Council approval for any modification;

    243.  Stresses that for control and audits in the RRF, Member States should put in place arrangements to prevent, detect and correct corruption, fraud and conflicts of interests, and that the Commission performs ex-post and system audits on M&Ts; stresses that some confusion persists with respect to the role of the Court, which has developed a strategy (2021-2025 Strategy) for carrying out its responsibilities for the NGEU programme and the RRF, which some Member States perceive as an unnecessary overlap and administrative burden; is concerned that the Commission, both in its mid-term evaluation of the RRF of 21 February 2024 and its RRF Annual Report of 10 October 2024, acknowledged that Member States’ authorities at all levels found the audit and control procedures to be too complex, and that Member States complained about overlapping audits by national authorities, the Commission and the Court; fully supports the Court work on the RRF; welcomes that the Commission has admitted and accepted that the Court has a full audit mandate on RRF, which is one of the foundation for the Parliament discharge on the RRF funds; recommends to the Member States to cooperate with the European Court of Auditors;

    244.  Is concerned that the Commission Annual Report of 10 October 2024 on the RRF implementation highlighted the entry costs for Member States’ administrations, with room for further simplification; notes, according to this Commission’s Annual Report, that concerning the design of the instrument, in the mid-term evaluation Member States referred to the combined obligations linked to (i) the evidence needed to prove fulfilment of M&Ts, (ii) demanding reporting requirements, for example the common indicators and the bi-annual data; and (iii) the audit and control framework; recalls that Member States see room for simplifying control and audit procedures, ensuring better coordination among the actors involved and avoiding multiple checks; also notes, again according to the Commission RRF Annual Report 2024, that some national authorities also pointed to inflexibility in the Commission’s assessment of milestones and targets and the rigid and resource-intensive procedures to revise RRPs;

    245.  Notes that one of the objectives of the RRF is to help Member States to implement ambitious reforms and investments that make their economies and societies more sustainable, resilient and prepared for the green and digital transitions; highlights with concerns the finding of the Court in its Special Report 15/2024 underlining the lack of relevance, quality and comparability of data submitted by the Member States, with data insufficient to evaluate progress on climate adaptation in the Member States, and thus paving the way for possible greenwashing; expresses concern that the RRF could become a financial vehicle for superficial rebranding of conventional expenditures as ‘green’; encourages the Commission to introduce a mechanism within the RRF framework to track the environmental impact of investments and ensure alignment with the Union’s climate objectives;

    246.  Highlights the RRF impact on the Union business and SMEs; notes that RRF has provided EUR 78 billion in direct support to SMEs, representing 12 % of total RRF expenditure, and that broader measures benefiting businesses amount to EUR 152 billion (23 % of total RRF spending); notes that EUR 2,75 million SMEs, approximately 11 % of all active SMEs in the Union, have received support through the RRF; underlines that nearly 600 000 businesses have benefited from digitalisation initiatives, while EUR 5,2 billion have been allocated to green transition projects, including renewable energy and hydrogen;

    247.  Highlights with concern that the facilitation of cross-border projects has not worked out; deplores that, despite the inclusion in the RRPs of several measures linked to Important Projects of Common Interest (‘IPCEIs’) and cross-border measures in the REPowerEU chapters, the national governance of the Facility has not sufficiently promoted cross-border cooperation; strongly insists that Union financing should be better linked with the achievement of common Union objectives and should generate EU added value;

    248.  Emphasises that the Commission Annual Report of 10 October 2024 on the RRF implementation acknowledged the insufficient involvement of Member States of regional and local authorities, civil society organisations, social partners, and other relevant stakeholders in the preparation and the implementation of the national RRPs; calls for their close involvement in the implementation of the national RRPs on the ground;

    249.  Urges the Commission not to approve any revision of RRPs, which may lead to a re-packaging of planned reforms or investments into the RRPs if they don’t respect the conditions of the RRF Regulation; notes that any revision should always aim to create added value and increase synergies;

    Transparency

    250.  Recalls that, while Member States are not required to publish all data on final recipients, Regulation (EU) 2023/435 of the European Parliament and of the Council(22) amending the RRF Regulation requires Member States to publish information on the 100 final recipients receiving the highest amount of funding under the RRF; welcomes that on 10 October 2024, the Commission published, as part of the RRF Annual Report 2024, a dedicated Annex to provide further clarity on the concept of final recipients under the RRF Regulation and the scope of the publication of data on the largest 100 final recipients; expresses deep concern over the interpretation of the Commission of the concept of “final recipient” under the RRF, as often they are listed only at the ministry level, and that the descriptions are vague, with many examples available in almost all lists provided by Member States; reiterates its demand that the list of 100 largest final recipients provides the factual natural person or entity that is the last in a chain of money transfers to be made available in a publicly accessible database to enhance accountability and enable independent oversight, while respecting the legal framework of Union data protection; is concerned that otherwise it will be problematic to measure the impact and guarantee visibility of the RRF funds to the citizens, although also takes into account the RRF Scoreboard and the project map; stresses that, should the Commission continue to refuse to ensure full transparency, Parliament must consider all available measures to enforce compliance, to prevent a similar interpretation from being applied to the transparency provisions in other financial regulations;

    251.  Reminds the Commission that the letter and spirit of the RRF Regulation must be strictly followed, and that the adoption of guidelines or other internal documents must be fully in line with the results of the negotiations between the co-legislators; is convinced that this has not been the case when the Commission adopted the provisions related to the interpretation of what a “final recipient” is in its Guidance on RRPs in the context of REPowerEU;

    252.  Notes that not being able to ascertain final recipients of RRF funding poses a severe risk to the transparency and traceability of Union funds and thus to the protection of the financial interests of the Union;

    253.  Recalls that a robust IT infrastructure is essential for data collection, programme monitoring and evaluation, and that managing authorities and beneficiaries are critical of the level of information required and duplication with other domestic systems; notes that, in contrast to the Cohesion Policy, the Court under the RRF pointed to the different structures and approaches used by national monitoring authorities, which could be perceived as less reliable by providing non-homogeneous information and leaving room for a potentially high number of errors; stresses that, in this respect, centralised interoperable systems facilitate efficient data collection and reporting, while fragmented systems underscore the need for streamlined approaches;

    254.  Welcomes that the ‘FR recast’ establishes horizontal measures for a centralised website (Financial Transparency System) at Union level, covering all recipients of Union funding, and notes that this website is due to overcome the current fragmentation, enhance transparency, and facilitate public scrutiny of recipients; notes that the Commission, as from the next MFF (i.e. post 2027) will be required to use the relevant data stored in the data mining and risk-scoring tool, Arachne, to feed the centralised website for transparency purposes, and that, in line with data protection rules, the website will include only public data, e.g. relevant data on recipients, contractors, subcontractors, and beneficiaries; further stresses that all Member States will have an obligation to provide the Commission with access to this data, to be fed into Arachne by automated means; regrets that the use of Arachne by Member States is not compulsory;

    255.  Notes that the final M&T of the national RRPs must be completed by 31 August 2026 according to Articles 18(4) and 20(5) of the Regulation; recalls the need for the Commission to work closely with every Member State to speed up implementation on the ground including through providing regular guidance and, upon request, technical assistance to help the implementation of the plans; re-iterates its concerns about the possibility of the reversal of M&Ts after the lifetime of the RRF, and urges the Commission to prevent such situations;

    256.  Calls on the Commission to reject any request of revision of RRPs which would lower the overall ambition of the plan or would eliminate important structural reforms from the RRPs, and to prioritise the completion of measures related to CSRs in RRPs; further calls on the Commission to step up its technical assistance to Member States lagging behind in the RRF implementation;

    Recommendations

    257.  Calls on the Commission to act on the Court’s recommendations from its Annual Report as well as those of its related special reports, and welcomes that the Commission accepts the vast majority of them; calls on the Commission to implement them and to keep the discharge authority informed on the progress of the implementation;

    258.  Calls on the Commission to grant full access to the Court to the new reporting tool on the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), FENIX as soon as possible;

    259.  Furthermore, calls on the Commission to:

       (i) carefully balance auditing and control requirements with the administrative burden imposed on Member States and beneficiaries of future performance-based instruments, while maintaining a sufficient level of control and audit that would grant a solid protection of the Union financial interests;
       (ii) closely monitor the continued fulfilment of M&Ts, in particular those related to audit, monitoring and control and ensure an adequate monitoring of any potential reversal of previously completed M&Ts;
       (iii) use the results of its checks on Member States control systems to express a clear conclusion on their effectiveness and take all appropriate measures;
       (iv) establish one single contact point for Member States on the Statement of Assurance at the Commission to which the Court can have access without further burdening Member States with requests for additional proofs;
       (v) record and monitor systematically all irregularities and all frauds affecting RRF funds;
       (vi) consistently and accurately apply the provisions related to the “final recipients”, of the RRF Regulation, by revising its Guidance on RRPs in the context of REPowerEU, and to communicate with Member States on the correct application of the definition of “final recipients”; calls on the Commission to come forward with proposals requiring Member States to publish details of all final recipients;
       (vii) streamline its control on the M&Ts through the implementation of a Single Audit approach, which would allow reduction of the administrative burden, the consolidation of audit responsibilities between the Commission and the Court, the coordination of audit timelines and requirements to avoid duplication and overlapping controls and audits, but at the same time ensuring the full protection of the Union financial interests;
       (viii) support Member States in making IT systems truly interoperable, so as to facilitate efficient data collection, reporting and exchange between various government departments and agencies to allow the minimisation of the risks of double funding, actively cross-check between relevant databases, and communicate with Member States about their administrative capacities to ensure double funding does not occur; notes in this regard, the positive examples provided at the Court Conference on Transparency and Traceability of EU Recovery and Resilience Funding in October 2024;
       (ix) work closely with Member States to ensure that M&Ts, in particular those of a structural nature or linked with CSRs, are fully and diligently implemented, and that no revision of RRPs will be approved in cases where ambition has been lowered or important measures have been weakened; avoid, to the extent possible, the revision of plans that would represent a “re-packaging” of planned measures into the RRPs if they don’t respect the conditions of the RRF Regulation;
       (x) strictly apply the provisions of the RRF Regulation, including those regarding suspension of payments or recoveries of amounts, in particular if the protection of the financial interests of the Union is not ensured;
       (xi) apply very strictly the methodology on partial payments, including as regards structural measures and measures linked to the implementation of CSRs;
       (xii) develop a methodology based on quality and comparability of data to evaluate progress on green and digital transitions, as well as the tangible benefits, in the Member States;
       (xiii) ensure that Member States diligently apply the visibility provisions of the RRF, making sure that measures implemented through the Facility are adequately flagged as funded by the Union;
       (xiv) provide technical assistance, administrative support and advice to Member States to strengthen their administrative capacity, including through the organisation of regular meetings of the Informal Expert Group on the implementation of the RRF to discuss technical aspects and encourage the exchange of good practices amongst national authorities;
       (xv) perform, whenever a revision of the RRPs is proposed, a comprehensive analysis of new and existing measures and whether they would substitute recurring budgetary expenditure or would be in breach of other eligibility conditions of the RRPs;
       (xvi) provide training and support to Member States to increase administrative capacities including training on specialised skills, knowledge and providing examples of best practices;
       (xvii) keep working with the Court in order to bring the interpretation of M&Ts as close together as possible;
       (xviii) use the recommendations of the Court from its work on the RRF and the experience gained in the implementation for the design of the next multiannual financial framework architecture including the implementation of future Union performance-based instruments;
       (xix) strengthen the design of future performance-based instruments by ensuring a closer link between disbursements and progress in implementation;
       (xx) ensure that any future revision, as well as the overall implementation, of RRPs is done in close cooperation with and consultation of local and regional authorities, and other relevant stakeholders in order to maximise the RRP’s impact;
       (xxi) analyse the weaknesses present in performance-based instruments, and address these weaknesses when designing new programmes in the future;
       (xxii) build, in the next MFF, on a high-level of interoperability and data exchange between various government departments and agencies to facilitate efficient data sharing and real-time updates across multiple platforms in order to allow to track overlapping projects, minimising the risks of double counting and double funding.
    (1) The 11th EDF covers the 2021-2027 MFF.
    (2) ‘The future of European competitiveness’, 9 September 2024.
    (3) Special report 05/2024: EU Transparency Register – provides useful but limited information on lobbying activities.
    (4) Special Report 11/2025 Transparency of EU funding granted to NGOs – despite progress, the overview is still not reliable.
    (5) https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-10-2025-000595-ASW_EN.pdf.
    (6) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32021R0783.
    (7) https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-10-2025-000595-ASW_EN.pdf.
    (8) OJ C, C/2024/5882, 9.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5882/oj.
    (9) ECA Special Report 07/2024: The Commission’s systems for recovering irregular EU expenditure – Potential to recover more and faster.
    (10) OJ C, C/2024/5882, 9.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5882/oj.
    (11) COM(2023) 258.
    (12) ECA Special Report 16/2024: EU revenue based on non‑recycled plastic packaging waste – A challenging start hindered by data that is not sufficiently comparable or reliable.
    (13) Council Directive (EU) 2018/822 of 25 May 2018 amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation in relation to reportable cross-border arrangements (OJ L 139, 5.6.2018, p. 1; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2018/822/oj).
    (14) ECA 2023 Annual Report para 1.35.
    (15) Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy (OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 159; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1060/oj).
    (16) Commission Decision of 13.12.2023 on the reassessment, on the Commission’s initiative, of the fulfilment of the conditions under Article 4 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 following Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022 regarding Hungary, C(2023)8999.
    (17) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget (OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 1; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2092/oj).
    (18) Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027 (OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 11; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2093/oj).
    (19) Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility (OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/241/oj).
    (20) Angola, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Fiji, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, The Gambia, Togo and Uganda.
    (21) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2023/2841 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2023 laying down measures for a high common level of cybersecurity at the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union (OJ L, 2023/2841, 18.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2841/oj).
    (22) Regulation (EU) 2023/435 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 February 2023 amending Regulation (EU) 2021/241 as regards REPowerEU chapters in recovery and resilience plans and amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) 2021/1060 and (EU) 2021/1755, and Directive 2003/87/EC (OJ L 63, 28.2.2023, p. 1; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/435/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Humanitarian aid must never be used as a political tool or military tactic: Joint statement on the humanitarian situation in Gaza

    Source: United Kingdom – Government Statements

    Speech

    Humanitarian aid must never be used as a political tool or military tactic: Joint statement on the humanitarian situation in Gaza

    Joint statement delivered by Ambassador Barbara Woodward, UK Permanent Representative to the UN, on behalf of Denmark, France, Greece, Slovenia and the United Kingdom.

    We, the UK, Denmark, France, Greece and Slovenia, called for today’s urgent meeting of the Security Council on the situation in Gaza.

    First, we first want to welcome the release of Edan Alexander yesterday and reiterate our call for all of the remaining hostages who have been cruelly held by Hamas for over 18 months to be released immediately.

    Their suffering must end. The Security Council has been consistent and clear on this since the brutal terror attack on 7 October.  

    Hamas must have no future role in Gaza or be in a position to threaten Israel.

    Israel has now fully blocked aid entering Gaza for over two months. 

    Blocking aid as a “pressure lever” is unacceptable. 

    And last week, the Israeli Security Cabinet approved plans to expand its military operations in Gaza.

    We strongly oppose both these actions, which will add to Palestinian suffering, while doing nothing to serve the long-term interests of peace and security in the region, nor to secure the safe return of the hostages.

    Any attempt by Israel to annex land in Gaza would be unacceptable and violate international law.

    Palestinian territory must not be reduced nor subjected to any demographic change.

    On the humanitarian situation, the World Food Programme have told us they already have no food left. Palestinian civilians, including children, face starvation as a result. 

    Just yesterday, the IPC released a report warning that Gaza’s entire population is already at critical risk of famine. 

    Without an urgent lifting of the aid block, more Palestinians are at risk of dying. Deaths that could easily be avoided.

    Humanitarian aid must never be used as a political tool or a military tactic.

    We are also deeply concerned at proposals to establish a new mechanism for the delivery of aid, which the UN has said would not meet humanitarian principles.

    International law requires Israel to allow and facilitate the safe, rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian aid and ensure that basic services are provided for all Gazan civilians.

    This applies to all armed conflicts around the world.

    Gaza is not an exception.

    We have two clear messages for the Government of Israel: lift the block on aid entering Gaza now and enable the UN and all humanitarians to save lives.

    Any model for distributing humanitarian aid must be independent, impartial and neutral, and in line with international humanitarian law and principles. 

    We cannot support any model that places political or military objectives above the needs of civilians. Or that undermines the UN and other partners’ ability to operate independently.

    We are also outraged by the killing of Palestinian Red Crescent workers and the hit on a UN compound on 19 March. Humanitarian aid workers and UN premises must be protected.

    We call on Israel to complete and release the findings of its investigation into the UN compound incident and take concrete action to ensure this can never happen again.

    At least 418 aid workers have been killed in Gaza since the conflict began.

    That is at least 418 too many.

    We urge Israel to investigate all incidents transparently, to be clear on the steps taken to hold those responsible to account and reinstate an effective deconfliction system.

    The only way to end the suffering of both Palestinians and Israelis is for an immediate return to a ceasefire, the release of all the hostages, and to urgently advance efforts to achieve a two-state solution. 

    This is the only way to achieve long-term peace and security for both Palestinians and Israelis, and we welcome France and Saudi Arabia’s leadership in chairing an international conference on the two-state solution here in New York in June.

    Updates to this page

    Published 13 May 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI: EMGS reports first quarter 2025 results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Electromagnetic Geoservices ASA’s (“EMGS” or the “Company”) financial report and market presentation for the first quarter of 2025 are attached.

    Summary:

    * The Company recorded revenues of USD 10.0 million, up from USD 0.2 million in the first quarter of 2024 and up from USD 9.7 million in the fourth quarter of 2024.

    * Adjusted EBITDA (including capitalised multi-client expenses and vessel and office lease expenses) of USD 2.0 million, up from negative USD 3.8 million in the first quarter of 2024.

    * Free cash decreased with USD 3.1 million during the quarter, to USD 6.0 million.

    * During the quarter, the Atlantic Guardian completed the first of two proprietary acquisitions in India and commenced mobilisation for the second proprietary acquisition.

    * Subsequent to the end of the quarter, on 6 May 2025, EMGS announced the establishment of a new business platform within offshore subsea construction through the acquisition of the OSCV Siem Day.

    A pre-recorded presentation will be available over the internet from 20:00 (local time Norway) today. To access the presentation, please go to the Company’s homepage (www.emgs.com) and follow the link.

    Contact
    Anders Eimstad, Chief Financial Officer, +47 94 82 58 36

    About EMGS
    EMGS, the marine EM market leader, uses its proprietary electromagnetic (EM) technology to support oil and gas companies in their search for offshore hydrocarbons. EMGS supports each stage in the workflow, from survey design and data acquisition to processing and interpretation. The Company’s services enable the integration of EM data with seismic and other geophysical and geological information to give explorationists a clearer and more complete understanding of the subsurface. This improves exploration efficiency and reduces risks and the finding costs per barrel. CSEM technology can also be used to detect the presence of marine mineral deposits (primarily Seabed Massive Sulphides) and EMGS believes that the technology can also be used to estimate the mineral content of such deposits. The Company is undertaking early-stage initiatives to position itself in this future market.

    This information is subject of the disclosure requirements pursuant to section 5-12 of the Norwegian Securities Trading Act.

    Attachments

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Global: What to look out for from the music of the 2025 Eurovision Song Contest

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Samuel Murray, Lecturer in Music Management, University of Leeds

    I’m in Basel, Switzerland – host city of this year’s Eurovision Song Contest – to present research about treatment of songwriters in the contest. While I’m here, I’ll be conducting field research and attending one of the shows. Here’s what I’ll be looking out for during this year’s competition.

    One of the joys of Eurovision is hearing songs in different languages and different musical styles. Of the 37 entries in this year’s contest, 23 songs include languages other than English (13% more than in 2024), and 17 of those are entirely sung in languages other than English (14% more than in 2024).

    With more than half of the entries now featuring languages other than English, the chances of a non-English song winning have increased. Among these entries, there are some particularly interesting language choices.


    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.


    One of the biggest controversies regarding language this year has been the Maltese entry Serving, performed by Miriana Conte. The song was originally titled Serving Kant. Kant is the Maltese word for singing but is pronounced in the same way as the English swear word “cunt”.

    It is a knowing reference to the phrase “serving cunt”. Drawn from black queer ballroom culture, popularised through shows like Rupaul’s Drag Race, it means to do something in a powerfully feminine manner.




    Read more:
    They’re serving what?! How the c-word went from camp to internet mainstream


    Despite therefore provocatively sounding as though it includes a word many viewers will find offensive, the Maltese broadcaster PBS has robustly defended Conte’s right to sing in her native Maltese.

    This was deemed within the rules, but then the BBC complained that it couldn’t broadcast the song. Subsequently the European Broadcasting Union have made Malta change the lyrics – although don’t be surprised if you hear fans in audience fill in the missing word.

    The controversy around the song has provided it with priceless PR and firmly placed it in contention for the win. I rather suspect this may have been the plan all along.

    Another interesting linguistic choice has been this year’s entry from The Netherlands. C’est La Vie, sung by Claude Kiambe, is in the French language, not Dutch, as a tribute to his Congolese roots.

    C’est La Vie by Claude.

    In an interview for the official Eurovision website Kiambe explained: “C’est La Vie is a tribute to a parent and for me that’s my mother. As a little boy and throughout my youth, she taught me to see the positive in the things you experience in life, even when you experience setbacks.”

    French allows Kiambe to authentically express his identity and personal story. This song is significant as it becomes the first from The Netherlands to be sung in French.

    Unusual song topics

    It wouldn’t be Eurovision without songs that cover unusual subject matters. The current favourite to win the contest is the Swedish entry Bara Bada Bastu, or Let’s Just Sauna, by the group KAJ. KAJ are from Finland where sauna is a core fundamental of culture.

    Bara Bada Bastu by KAJ.

    Ireland’s entry Laika Party, meanwhile, takes the unusual approach of creative lyrical speculative fiction. The song ponders what would happen if Laika, the first dog in space, was still alive and partying above Earth.

    Another unusual offering is Tommy Cash’s Espresso Macchiato, representing Estonia. Some viewers have interpreted the song as mocking Italian culture. It has attracted criticism from Italian politicians including senator Gian Marco Sentinaio who produced a flyer in response with the message: “Whoever insults Italy must stay out of Eurovision.”

    The songwriters

    Quite often in Eurovision, songwriters are overlooked for their role in the contest. As you read this article, many writers are already locked away at songwriting camps working away on entries for next year. In fact the Norwegian songwriting camp has already taken place for next year’s Eurovision.

    This year 134 songwriters are behind the 37 songs performed across the contest.

    In popular music songwriting it is now quite commonplace for writers to work in large groups, with each team member making contributions to creating the melody, harmony or the production of the track. This year the Armenian song Survivor, performed by Parg, has the most writers. Ten people were involved in its creation, including Parg himself. The UK comes a close second with seven writers contributing to the entry What the Hell Just Happened?, performed by Remember Monday.

    Survivor by Parg has ten songwriters.

    Another notable statistic this year is that in 30 out of 37 songs, the singer has a songwriting credit. This makes it very likely that we will see a songwriter lift the Eurovision trophy. This year many artists share personal stories in their songs, including France’s Louane who pays tribute to her mother with Maman and Italy’s Luca Corsi, who reflects on his childhood in Volevo Essere un Duro.

    Many of this year’s songwriters have competed in the contest before. Swedish songwriters Peter Boström and Thomas G:Son, who are no strangers to Eurovision having won the contest twice writing Loreen’s entries Euphoria (2012) and Tattoo (2023), are back once again, this time co-writing Survivor for Armenia.

    Another winning Swedish songwriter returning is Linnea Deb. She wrote Sweden’s winning song Heroes in 2015. This time she has co-written Hallucination for Denmark. Alongside the returning Swedes are fellow serial contest writers Dimitris Kontopoulos and Darko Dimitrov, who between them have over 20 contest entries under their belt but are yet to have a victory.

    There will also be a return to the contest for Teodora Špirić, better known a Teya, who alongside Salena, performed Who the Hell is Edgar? for Austria in 2023. This year she is the songwriter for Austrian entry Wasted Love performed by JJ. It’s currently the bookies favourite.

    There are also many new British writers in the contest to keep an eye on, including Emma Gale who has co-written the Croatian entry Poison Cake.

    This year’s contest brings a diversity of languages, subject matter and songwriters together to present 37 unique offerings from which the juries and voters of Europe will choose a winner. While the bookies and fans may have favourites, at this stage a clear winner is not a given – all can change when the songs are performed live.

    Samuel Murray is affiliated with the Musicians’ Union and a writer member of PRS for Music.

    ref. What to look out for from the music of the 2025 Eurovision Song Contest – https://theconversation.com/what-to-look-out-for-from-the-music-of-the-2025-eurovision-song-contest-256388

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI USA: McConnell Remarks at CSIS Global Security Forum on Defense Innovation

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Kentucky Mitch McConnell

    Washington, D.C.U.S. Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY), Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, addressed the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) Global Security Forum today in Washington, D.C. Below are the Senator’s remarks as prepared for delivery:

    “If I told you that the West’s greatest strategic adversary was outpacing America in critical sectors like shipbuilding, hypersonic weapons, and unmanned systems…

    “If I told you this adversary was helping the largest state sponsor of terrorism skirt sanctions and pour more resources into the proxies who sow chaos across the Middle East, target U.S. personnel, and shut down a major artery of global trade…

    “If I told you that both of them – along with an erratic, nuclear-armed hermit kingdom – were helping a neo-Soviet imperialist wage an unprovoked war in the backyard of America’s closest allies and trading partners…

    “And if I told you that this has been going on for years…You might expect to see a greater sense of urgency in Washington.

    “Instead, the chasm between the threats we face and what we’re doing to meet them is wide. And it ought to terrify us.

    “A Chinese authoritarian calls American hegemony the product of ‘fascist forces.’ A Russian despot calls the former a ‘dear friend.’ And yet, as our adversaries drew closer together, influential members of both parties have chosen to pick fights with our allies and partners or consoled themselves with the naïve fantasy that we can retreat to Fortress America while spending a historically tiny fraction of our GDP on defense.

    “Now that I have your attention… I’m grateful for the opportunity to be with all of you today. There’s a great deal to discuss. We’re here, in particular, to talk about innovation. That’s time well spent.

    “America won the Cold War thanks in part to the way we exploited our technological military and economic advantage over the Soviet Union. Back then, we recognized that investing in technological superiority to deter conflict was less costly than fighting one. As a share of GDP, defense spending hit 37% at the height of World War II, 13.8% during Korea, and 9.1% during Vietnam. The Reagan buildup hit 6%. All told, the Cold War drove an annual average of 7.5%. That level of spending didn’t just keep the peace; it ushered in an unprecedented period of prosperity for the United States and the free world. It was worth it.

    “Today, we’re spending less than half of what we did during the Reagan build-up – 3% — and we’re getting less for it. Every year, a smaller and smaller percentage goes to buy actual military capabilities.

    “In and out of government, talented people are still thinking about what tomorrow’s battlefield will look like, and what it will require of America’s military and of our allies. And there are conversations worth having about harnessing these talents more effectively. About keeping American and Western technologies at the cutting edge. About making sure that future capabilities don’t die on the vine (or in the Valley of Death).

    “The bureaucracies and processes that slow the development, acquisition, and integration of new weapons systems are in desperate need of reform. But advanced, autonomous systems have not supplanted the traditional ways of war. Presence, personnel, logistics, and mass still matter. And neglect for the fundamental realities of hard power has left us playing from behind in some important ways.

    “Today, we must do multiple things at once. First, our approach to innovation across industry must be: yes, and we should continue to encourage new entrants into the defense ecosystem. But we shouldn’t be blind to their challenges of fielding novel combat-capable systems at scale.

    “Of course, many technologies don’t pan out. Many startups fail. They are worth the investment and the risk. Legacy defense manufacturers are also still critical, and it’s naïve to pretend otherwise. But that doesn’t mean glossing over the need for the primes to pick up the pace.

    “We need talented engineers, patriotic developers, and highly-skilled employees on the job across the defense enterprise. It’s yes, and. If we pretend otherwise, the only ones who stand to gain are America’s adversaries.

    “A lot of ink has been spilled about the technologies and concepts transforming modern war…about unmanned and autonomous systems, artificial intelligence, disinformation, and the gray zone. But the experience of modern war in eastern Europe and the Middle East reminds us that the depth of our magazines remains as decisive as any single cutting-edge capability. Quantity has a quality all its own.

    “One of the greatest strategic challenges we’re facing today is the prospect of high-end conflict or simultaneous conflicts in different theatres that would strain the depth of our arsenal and the resilience of our supply lines. Victory would depend on delivering at scale and in time. Our magazines aren’t deep enough to fight such a war. And if we don’t make overdue investments in expanding our production capacity, we may not have the time to manufacture it.

    “So, when we talk about innovation, let’s talk about innovating our mass and our speed. Let’s talk about our supply chains. The only capabilities that can make a difference on the battlefield are the ones that can get there at the speed and scale of relevance. This, of course, is not hypothetical. Just look at Ukraine. Necessity is the mother of invention, and our friends have developed what arguably the world’s foremost drone innovation sector. But even more remarkable is the sustained speed with which Ukrainian producers are honing and refining unmanned systems in real time. As Russian countermeasures emerge and render previous capabilities obsolete, they’re producing new iterations to stay on the cutting edge.

    “American manufacturers – whether new startups or legacy primes – should ask themselves if they could keep up with such a pace. On the shortcomings of our defense industrial base, there’s plenty of blame to go around. Congress has a clear constitutional role in which we are all too often delinquent. Regular order appropriations are what give industry and the department the certainty they need to plan for the future. And we haven’t been holding up that end of the bargain. But the department has more authorities than it sometimes cares to acknowledge – middle-tier acquisition pathways, Other Transaction Authority, and the Defense Production Act, to name a few. And when these tools aren’t used the way they were designed, it’s unreasonable to expect improved outcomes on acquisitions and procurement of actual military capabilities.

    “Our industry partners, for their part, are right that inconsistent demand signals make their work harder. Services for too long have short-changed purchases of critical munitions.

    “I don’t know of an example where the Senate defense appropriations subcommittee has rejected a request for multi-year procurement authority for munitions. On the other hand, the services have – for reasons of their own – downplayed the munitions requirements of combatant commanders.

    “To be fair, under perennial budgetary constraints from above, it’s not surprising that the services have made tough decisions to protect their core modernization and acquisition programs.

    “Since Russia’s 2022 escalation of its war against Ukraine, the global demand for essential capabilities like long-range munitions and missile defense interceptors has only gone up – even if upward trends in annual defense budgets have lagged. And producers of these capabilities do bear responsibility of their own for not having planned sooner to meet the inevitable demand.

    “But let’s be absolutely clear: nothing undermines the prospects of innovation and reform like anemic topline spending. Nothing signals more unmistakably that America is unserious than asking allies to double their investments in hard power while we propose to cut our own.

    “If the administration recognizes – as it says it does – the grave stakes of major-power competition, OMB’s budget proposal for the coming year fails to show it. And no amount of budgetary sleight of hand will be able to prove otherwise. That said, this administration can still avoid the self-inflicted crises of credibility that dogged its predecessor. Our adversaries and allies alike are still watching closely for real signs of political will and measurable shifts in the balance of hard power.

    “American politicians have criticized partners who used special funds to mask shortcomings in annual defense spending. Well, we should be careful not to mistake our budget reconciliation for long-term commitment, either.

    “I support the use of reconciliation to make a significant, one-time investment in defense. But pretending that this procedure – or, for that matter, a year spent under a continuing resolution – can make up for failures on predictable, full-year appropriations is as dangerous as it is profoundly unserious. Reconciliation spending may fund short-term operations or investments, but without sustained annual growth, it risks creating massive cliffs in sustainment, personnel, and procurement costs.

    “We’re all familiar with the headwinds of rising mandatory costs and inflation, the real drivers of our budget deficit. This is also true at the Defense Department, where such costs eat up a larger and larger share of the defense budget, crowding out procurement, readiness, and modernization costs. Making urgent, nimble, innovative discretionary investments won’t get any easier if we cut the topline in real terms or force the defense enterprise to innovate for today’s challenges with yesterday’s dollars. But you know as well as I do that the consequences of missing opportunities for innovation here at home aren’t limited to here at home. Coming up short on America’s topline commitment to the national defense sends an unmistakable signal to the allies and partners who, for decades, have bet big on American technologies and American leadership.

    “We should not be surprised to see our friends rethinking their integration with American-made platforms… or, for that matter, American-led security architecture. Least of all, I must say, when we pick fights with them over trading balances. This is particularly true in Europe, where we seem to be punishing NATO allies even though they’ve finally made exactly the kind of defense investments President Trump demanded in 2018.

    “In response to Putin’s aggression, European allies are becoming the stronger, more capable partners the President had urged them to become. NATO allies are sharing more of the burden of collective security. And in the near term, that’s meant a gusher of foreign investment in American-made capabilities. By the tens of billions of dollars, allies have flocked to buy American – an endorsement of American leadership.

    “Even as our allies develop more high-end technologies of their own, close partnership is as essential as ever. I was proud to support the expansion of the trans-Atlantic alliance to include Sweden and Finland – not as hungry customers for American technologies but as highly-capable industrial economies that recognize the value of interoperability and coproduction.

    “There’s little question that our adversaries are working hard to split American and its European allies. If we’re making their job easier, we’re doing something wrong. As history begs us to recall, we don’t get to pick and choose which conflicts will threaten our interests and for how long they will last. And we will rely on friends to help us deter and contain aggression in the coming years, from the Indo-Pacific to Eastern Europe. Going it alone will only increase costs for taxpayers and risks to our warfighters. We should be working more closely with allies worldwide to protect our economies and supply chains from the PRC. If we push these friends away, we shouldn’t expect them to keep buying American.

    “Our allies’ desire for interoperability is a tremendous asset. Take the CH-47 Chinook helicopter – an aging airframe in need of a major update. More than a decade ago, the Canadian government, which has long been delinquent on defense spending, footed the development costs for a new variant, saving U.S. taxpayer dollars and putting an important, updated platform on the apron for the U.S. Army.

    “But let’s be clear: if we let the single most important metric of America’s will to fight and win wane further, we should not expect many allies and partners to make major investments of their own like this…certainly not like the hundred-plus billion in orders under contract right now with U.S. defense producers from our friends in Europe and the Indo-Pacific.

    “Our friends understand, as our own leaders once did, that the threats to our shared interests are not contained neatly within continents. Just as Asian allies feel threatened by Russia’s war in Ukraine, Baltic and Nordic allies are guarding against China’s meddling in northern waters. As Russia and China deepen their strategic cooperation, France and the United Kingdom are projecting power into the Indo-Pacific.

    “We should welcome, not discourage, our allies’ contributions to global security.

    “If America chooses to deny unmistakable ties – between the threats we face and between the West’s interests – we will live in a lonely state of denial. The time to signal our enduring commitment is right now.

    “I ought to close on an uplifting note. We have no shortage of bright minds thinking about how to deter and defeat threats to America and to the systems we lead that underpin our peace and prosperity. And for decades now, one of the best has been behind the wheel here at CSIS. I’d like to add my name to the well-deserved chorus of praise for Dr. John Hamre and his leadership – both in and out of government. When the time comes to hand off the reins of this proud institution, he’ll be able to do so with great pride and with confidence that while the challenges we face are urgent and grave, we have the talent and capacity to meet them – much of it right here in this room.

    “Thank you all.”

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Security: The United Kingdom takes the lead of NATO’s Transatlantic Quantum Community

    Source: NATO

    On Tuesday (13 May), the United Kingdom succeeded Denmark as the annual Chair of NATO’s Transatlantic Quantum Community (TQC).

    Established in 2024, the Community brings together quantum experts from national governments, industry, academia, funding bodies, and research institutions from 22 Allies. 
     
    Addressing the Community at a meeting at NATO Headquarters on 12 May, NATO’s Deputy Secretary General Radmila Shekerinska thanked Denmark for its leading role as TQC inaugural Chair and wished the United Kingdom a successful year in this position. She stressed that TQC provides a unique platform for collaboration between quantum and defence industry and NATO end-users. 
     
    Representatives from Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korean and the EU also took part in this week’s discussions. “This is what this Transatlantic Quantum Community is all about”, the Deputy Secretary General said. Such collaboration will help “harness the opportunities and mitigate the risks that these game-changing technologies present” and make sure that we “stay ahead – and stay safe” she concluded.
     
    The Transatlantic Quantum Community is the first deliverable of NATO’s quantum strategy approved in 2023.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI: Euronext completes the acquisition of Admincontrol

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Euronext completes the acquisition of Admincontrol

    The integration of Admincontrol accelerates Euronext Corporate Solutions development in the Nordics and scales up Euronext’s SaaS offering.

    Amsterdam, Brussels, Dublin, Lisbon, Milan, Oslo and Paris – 13 May 2025 – Euronext, the leading European capital market infrastructure, today announces that it has completed the acquisition of 100% of the shares of Admincontrol for an enterprise value of NOK 4,650 million. The transaction complies with Euronext’s capital allocation policy, with a ROCE expected to exceed WACC between years three to five after closing1.

    Admincontrol will be part of Euronext Corporate Solutions, strengthening the development of the franchise in the Nordics and the UK. The acquisition accelerates Euronext’s strategic ambition to scale up its SaaS offering and increases Euronext’s share of subscription-based revenue. It more than doubles the size of the Euronext governance offering and broadens capabilities with state-of-the-art solutions addressing mission-critical workflows.

    Admincontrol has seen double-digit annual growth over the last five years and recorded NOK 452 million of revenues and NOK 200 million of EBITDA and 44% EBITDA margin in 20242. From the second quarter of 2025, Admincontrol’s revenue will be integrated into Euronext’s revenue line Corporate and Investor Solutions and Technology Services, which represented €170.8 million in 20243.

    Stéphane Boujnah, CEO of Euronext, said: “The acquisition of Admincontrol positions Euronext Corporate Solutions as a leader in the governance SaaS space and expands our access to new clients in the Nordics where we have already expanded our presence over the years with promising growth prospects. Admincontrol will benefit from Euronext Corporate Solutions’ unique network and expertise across Europe to boost the growth of its state-of-the-art governance solutions. We look forward to welcoming Admincontrol’s talented teams to further accelerate the deployment of its strategy in Europe.”

    Møyfrid Øygard, CEO of Admincontrol, said: “Joining Euronext is a significant milestone in Admincontrol’s growth journey. Excellent governance is critical for the Euronext network of issuers and customers, and we are excited to bring our complementary product offering to market, supporting Euronext Corporate Solutions’ business and its position in the Nordics.”

    CONTACTS  

    ANALYSTS & INVESTORS ir@euronext.com

    Investor Relations        Aurélie Cohen                 

            Judith Stein        +33 6 15 23 91 97          

    MEDIA – mediateam@euronext.com 

    Europe        Aurélie Cohen         +33 1 70 48 24 45   

            Andrea Monzani         +39 02 72 42 62 13 

    Belgium        Marianne Aalders         +32 26 20 15 01                 

    France, Corporate        Flavio Bornancin-Tomasella        +33 1 70 48 24 45                 

    Ireland        Andrea Monzani         +39 02 72 42 62 13                 

    Italy         Ester Russom         +39 02 72 42 67 56                 

    The Netherlands        Marianne Aalders         +31 20 721 41 33                 

    Norway         Cathrine Lorvik Segerlund        +47 41 69 59 10                 

    Portugal         Sandra Machado        +351 91 777 68 97                

    Corporate Solutions        Andrea Monzani         +39 02 72 42 62 13                          

    About Euronext  

    Euronext is the leading European capital market infrastructure, covering the entire capital markets value chain, from listing, trading, clearing, settlement and custody, to solutions for issuers and investors. Euronext runs MTS, one of Europe’s leading electronic fixed income trading markets, and Nord Pool, the European power market. Euronext also provides clearing and settlement services through Euronext Clearing and its Euronext Securities CSDs in Denmark, Italy, Norway and Portugal.

    As of March 2025, Euronext’s regulated exchanges in Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and Portugal host nearly 1,800 listed issuers with €6.3 trillion in market capitalisation, a strong blue-chip franchise and the largest global centre for debt and fund listings. With a diverse domestic and international client base, Euronext handles 25% of European lit equity trading. Its products include equities, FX, ETFs, bonds, derivatives, commodities and indices.

    For the latest news, go to euronext.com or follow us on X and LinkedIn.

    Disclaimer

    This press release is for information purposes only: it is not a recommendation to engage in investment activities and is provided “as is”, without representation or warranty of any kind. While all reasonable care has been taken to ensure the accuracy of the content, Euronext does not guarantee its accuracy or completeness. Euronext will not be held liable for any loss or damages of any nature ensuing from using, trusting or acting on information provided. No information set out or referred to in this publication may be regarded as creating any right or obligation. The creation of rights and obligations in respect of financial products that are traded on the exchanges operated by Euronext’s subsidiaries shall depend solely on the applicable rules of the market operator. All proprietary rights and interest in or connected with this publication shall vest in Euronext. This press release speaks only as of this date. Euronext refers to Euronext N.V. and its affiliates. Information regarding trademarks and intellectual property rights of Euronext is available at www.euronext.com/terms-use.

    © 2025, Euronext N.V. – All rights reserved. 

    The Euronext Group processes your personal data in order to provide you with information about Euronext (the “Purpose”). With regard to the processing of this personal data, Euronext will comply with its obligations under Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and Council of 27 April 2016 (General Data Protection Regulation, “GDPR”), and any applicable national laws, rules and regulations implementing the GDPR, as provided in its privacy statement available at: www.euronext.com/privacy-policy. In accordance with the applicable legislation you have rights with regard to the processing of your personal data: for more information on your rights, please refer to: www.euronext.com/data_subjects_rights_request_information. To make a request regarding the processing of your data or to unsubscribe from this press release service, please use our data subject request form at connect2.euronext.com/form/data-subjects-rights-request or email our Data Protection Officer at dpo@euronext.com.


    1 The cashflow related to the transaction will be communicated as part of Q2 2025 results
    2 Based on unaudited figures
    3 Based on Euronext’s new reporting framework: http://www.euronext.com/en/media/13322/download

    Attachment

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Nokia selected by CoreSite for routing-based network edge solution to support data-intensive, mission-critical applications

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Press Release

    Nokia selected by CoreSite for routing-based network edge solution to support data-intensive, mission-critical applications

    • CoreSite deploys Nokia IP routing portfolio across 30 data centers in 11 U.S. markets as enterprise customers ramp up data-intensive AI and mission-critical requirements.
    • Nokia solution’s massive scale, reliability and power/cooling efficiency are the foundation of low-latency service delivery and superior interconnectivity.

    13 May 2025
    Espoo, Finland – Nokia today announced that it has been selected by CoreSite, an American Tower company (NYSE: AMT) empowering critical business and AI workloads that impact everyday life through interconnected data center solutions, to deliver an IP routing-based edge and core network solution across 30 data centers in 11 U.S. markets. Delivering massive scale, performance and efficiency, the Nokia portfolio will accommodate the intensifying cloud connectivity and interconnection needs of resource-intensive artificial intelligence (AI) and high-performance computing workloads for CoreSite’s nearly 40,000 customer interconnections.

    As CoreSite enterprise, cloud provider and network carrier customers ramp up data-intensive services, the data center infrastructure must deliver high performance and scalable networking to ensure service availability adheres to stringent industry standards. At the same time, a data center space with advanced cooling and ultra high-density power is a must for supporting growth efficiency.

    “Our customers expect best-in-class performance and reliability at every level of the network. By deploying Nokia’s advanced IP routing portfolio across our data center campuses, we ensure that our network edge infrastructure stays ahead of market demands, providing customers with a seamless experience and faster access to mission-critical applications,” said Chris Malayter, Vice President Network and Interconnection at CoreSite.

    The Nokia 7250 Interconnect Router (IXR-s) will provide advanced routing capabilities, carrier-grade reliability and high-capacity throughput as enterprises leverage CoreSite’s colocation centers for data storage and processing, new product and service development and other business operations. The Nokia 7750 Service Router (SR) provides the massive scale, performance and reliability for IP interconnectivity within the data center campuses. In addition, Nokia FP5 silicon supports high throughput and reliability for uninterrupted data flows, and scales traffic with zero deterioration in performance.

    The seamless integration of the Nokia Service Router Operating System (SR OS) with CoreSite’s existing environment will accelerate roll-out times and dramatically reduce operation costs.  

    ”Collaborating with CoreSite has enabled us to drive the performance and scale of its multicloud connectivity and routing core. The integration of the Nokia 7250 IXR-s and 7750 Service Router allows CoreSite to adeptly manage increased traffic demands while ensuring low latency and reliable interconnection services that are essential to the modern digital economy,” said Vach Kompella, Senior Vice President and General Manager, IP Networks at Nokia.

    Resources and additional information
    Product page: Nokia 7250 Interconnect Routers
    Product page: Nokia 7750 Service Router
    Web Page: Noka Data Center Networks

    About Nokia
    At Nokia, we create technology that helps the world act together.

    As a B2B technology innovation leader, we are pioneering networks that sense, think and act by leveraging our work across mobile, fixed and cloud networks. In addition, we create value with intellectual property and long-term research, led by the award-winning Nokia Bell Labs, which is celebrating 100 years of innovation.

    With truly open architectures that seamlessly integrate into any ecosystem, our high-performance networks create new opportunities for monetization and scale. Service providers, enterprises and partners worldwide trust Nokia to deliver secure, reliable and sustainable networks today – and work with us to create the digital services and applications of the future.

    About CoreSite
    CoreSite, an American Tower company (NYSE: AMT), is a leading interconnection data center platform that empowers businesses to future-proof their digital transformation initiatives. For more than 20 years, CoreSite’s purpose-built, highly interconnected data center campuses and team of experts have delivered the cloud-enabled, resilient, and flexible digital ecosystems required for customers to quickly scale and interoperate their businesses to support the increasing demands of critical workloads, like AI and high-density applications. For more information, visit CoreSite.com and follow CoreSite on our Connect[ED] blog, LinkedIn and YouTube channels.

    Media inquiries
    Nokia Press Office
    Email: Press.Services@nokia.com

    CoreSite
    Megan Ruszkowski, Vice President of Marketing and Sales Development 
    Phone: 720-446-2014 
    Email: press@CoreSite.com

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    FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS
    Certain statements herein that are not historical facts are forward-looking statements. These forward-looking statements reflect Nokia’s current expectations and views of future developments and include statements regarding: A) expectations, plans, benefits or outlook related to our strategies, product launches, growth management, licenses, sustainability and other ESG targets, operational key performance indicators and decisions on market exits; B) expectations, plans or benefits related to future performance of our businesses (including the expected impact, timing and duration of potential global pandemics and the general or regional macroeconomic conditions on our businesses, our supply chain and our customers’ businesses) and any future dividends and other distributions of profit; C) expectations and targets regarding financial performance and results of operations, including market share, prices, net sales, income, margins, cash flows, cost savings, the timing of receivables, operating expenses, provisions, impairments, taxes, currency exchange rates, hedging, investment funds, inflation, product cost reductions, competitiveness, revenue generation in any specific region, and licensing income and payments; D) ability to execute, expectations, plans or benefits related to changes in organizational structure and operating model; E) impact on revenue with respect to litigation/renewal discussions; and F) any statements preceded by or including “continue”, “believe”, “commit”, “estimate”, “expect”, “aim”, “influence”, “will”, “target”, “likely”, “intend”, “may”, “could”, “would” or similar expressions. These forward-looking statements are subject to a number of risks and uncertainties, many of which are beyond our control, which could cause our actual results to differ materially from such statements. These statements are based on management’s best assumptions and beliefs in light of the information currently available to them. These forward-looking statements are only predictions based upon our current expectations and views of future events and developments and are subject to risks and uncertainties that are difficult to predict because they relate to events and depend on circumstances that will occur in the future. Factors, including risks and uncertainties that could cause these differences, include those risks and uncertainties identified in the Risk Factors above.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Q1 2025 for the BANK of Greenland

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Q1 2025 for the BANK of Greenland

    With a profit before tax of DKK 39.1 million for Q1, the BANK of Greenland made a sound start to 2025. As expected, the result is affected by the declining level of interest rates, and is also below the profit of DKK 61.8 million for the same period of 2024.

    The profit before value adjustments and write-downs amounts to DKK 45.3 million, compared to DKK 61.7 million for the previous year and DKK 49.9 mill. in Q4 2024.

    Lending has increased by DKK 94 million since the end of 2024, amounting to DKK 5,125 million at the end of March 2025. It was expected that Greenland’s economic development would result in positive, but more subdued growth in the Bank’s lending in 2025. Guarantees decreased by DKK 35 million from DKK 1,423 million at the end of 2024 to DKK 1,388 million at the end of March 2025.

    Net interest and fee income decreased by DKK 11.7 million to DKK 108.0 million in the first three months of 2025, compared to the same period in 2024. The decrease is mainly due to the development in the level of interest rates.

    Total expenses including depreciation amount to DKK 64.4 million at the end of Q1 2025, compared to DKK 59.2 million for the same period of 2024. The increase concerns staff expenses as a consequence of an increase due to collective agreement-based adjustments and continued investment in more employees, as well as other ad-ministration expenses, where the increase can be attributed primarily to IT expenses and further training of employees.

    At the end of March 2025, value adjustments show a capital gain of DKK 7.2 million, compared to a capital gain of DKK 5.4 million for the same period of 2024. The new interest rate trends resulted in positive development in the Bank’s bond holdings. The Bank’s sectoral equities portfolio gave a return at the level of the previous year.

    Impairment write-downs of loans and guarantees amounted to DKK 13.4 million in Q1 2025, compared to DKK 5.3 million in the same period of 2024. Despite the increase, the Bank sees continued satisfactory creditworthiness in the loan portfolio. In addition to the Bank’s individual impairment models, a management supplement of DKK 38.4 million has been allocated.

    Solvency ratio of 25.5 and a capital requirement of 10.6 per cent.

    In the stock exchange announcement of 11 December 2024, the forecast profit before tax for 2025 was stated as a range of DKK 150-185 million, which remains unchanged.

    Attachments

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: 2025 Eurovision ‘a record-breaking moment for linguistic diversity’, says researcher The endurance of the European Song Contest and its place in the hearts of so many countries provides the ‘ideal lens for analysing cultural identities, memory, and heritage’, says Dr BárbaraBarreiro León.

    Source: University of Aberdeen

    Dr Bárbara Barreiro LeónThe endurance of the European Song Contest and its place in the hearts of so many countries provides the ‘ideal lens for analysing cultural identities, memory, and heritage’, says Dr BárbaraBarreiro León.
    The lecturer in Lecturer in Film & Visual Culture at the University of Aberdeen is currently writing a book exploring how identities are represented through film, music and other contemporary arts, including Eurovision.
    She says each year of the content – which has been running since 1956 – offers ‘a truly inexhaustible source of research’ and she will attend the 2025 event as part of the press group and will present at an academic conference being held at the University of Basel.
    “Comparing different years, countries, performances, and styles of hosting significantly enriches my research focus on memory, cultural heritage, and identity within Eurovision,” Dr León added.
    “When I last attended in 2023, the UK hosted on behalf of Ukraine—a moment filled with symbolic weight. This year, Switzerland takes on the role, bringing the contest full circle as the country that hosted the very first Eurovision in 1956. Being behind the scenes in these contexts offers a unique form of fieldwork—one that is immersive, dynamic, and unlike any other.”
    She said that the 2025 Eurovision Song Contest stands out as ‘a record-breaking moment for linguistic diversity in the competition’.
    Dr León said: “Out of 37 entries, 24 feature lyrics in languages other than English. Some countries are embracing their native tongues for the first time in years—or even decades—like Germany.
    “Others are showcasing regional dialects, such as Sweden’s entry, which is performed in Vörå, a unique blend of Finnish and Swedish. In a surprising twist, some nations are even singing in the native languages of other countries, with Estonia, for example, presenting a song in Italian.”
    [embedded content]
    Dr León’s previous work has focused primarily on Ukraine but she has expanded this focus to encompass themes such as European belonging, diaspora and migration, and the visual politics of flag representation.
    “It is a competition which may not always be taken seriously here but which has very different meanings across the countries taking part,” she added.
    “It is still the biggest musical event in the world and was founded to bring Europe back together following the Second World War.
    “There is nothing comparable which has run for so many years and which has such an enormous fan base crossing a huge number of national borders.
    “From that perspective it is the ideal vehicle to look at more than seven decades of change in our societies and culture with each edition of the contest bringing fresh examples that continuously enrich and deepen the broader conversation.”
    Further details of the conference at the University of Basel can be found at https://www.eurovisions.eu/programme-2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Denmark: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2025 Article IV Mission

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    May 13, 2025

    A Concluding Statement describes the preliminary findings of IMF staff at the end of an official staff visit (or ‘mission’), in most cases to a member country. Missions are undertaken as part of regular (usually annual) consultations under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, in the context of a request to use IMF resources (borrow from the IMF), as part of discussions of staff monitored programs, or as part of other staff monitoring of economic developments.

    The authorities have consented to the publication of this statement. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF Executive Board for discussion and decision.

    Copenhagen, Denmark:

    Denmark’s strong growth has continued, primarily driven by pharmaceutical exports, while domestic demand has remained relatively sluggish. Staff expects output growth to moderate in the near term as external demand weakens. Direct impacts from U.S. tariffs are expected to be limited, but heightened trade tensions and trade policy uncertainty pose risks to the outlook. Denmark’s robust institutions, competitive and relatively diversified economic structure, strong fiscal position, and highly educated workforce all reinforce its resilience to external shocks. In this context, the policy priorities are as follows.

    • Uphold fiscal sustainability amid rising defense and aging-related expenditures.
    • Ensure financial stability by vigilantly monitoring risks, maintaining a prudent capital-based macroprudential policy setting, and tightening borrower-based measures.
    • Further intensify structural reforms to support high levels of income and sustain the welfare state.

    Economic outlook and risks

    1. Staff anticipates a gradual moderation in GDP growth. Output growth is projected to decline from 3.7 percent in 2024 to 2.9 percent in 2025 and further to 1.8 percent in 2026. Export growth, including pharmaceutical exports, is expected to slow, while the full reopening of the Tyra natural gas and oil field will provide a temporary uplift. The U.S. is a key trading partner; however, exports produced in Denmark passing through customs account for only 3 percent of total exports, limiting the direct impact of U.S. tariffs on the Danish economy. Domestic demand is expected to gradually strengthen, driven by increased public expenditures and a modest recovery in private consumption due to improved consumer purchasing power. Beyond 2026, medium-term growth is projected at around 1.5 percent, reflecting a maturing pharmaceutical sector and a declining working-age population. Labor market pressures have eased, with inflation anticipated to stay around 2 percent.
    2. Risks to growth are on the downside. External risks dominate the outlook. A reversal of globalization, including higher trade barriers and deepening geoeconomic fragmentation, would put the Danish economy at risk. Global uncertainty, including the intensification of regional conflicts, would dampen consumer and business confidence, weighing on domestic demand. Upside risks to growth include a faster-than-expected resolution of trade and geopolitical tensions, as well as stronger pharmaceutical exports.

    Maintaining fiscal sustainability amid rising defense and aging-related spending

    1. The fiscal surplus is expected to decline significantly. In February, the authorities announced a temporary rise in defense spending from 2¼ percent of GDP in 2024 to 3¼ percent in 2025 and 2026, returning to 2¼ percent by 2033. This increase adds to already planned personal income tax cuts and increased expenditures related to health, long-term care, and climate. As a result, staff projects the overall surplus to fall from 4½ percent of GDP in 2024 to 1¼ percent in 2025 and further to ½ percent of GDP in 2026. Although labor market pressures have eased, and fiscal multipliers for the planned measures are likely to be low, the resulting fiscal stimulus could be stronger than warranted by macroeconomic circumstances. Given these risks, the authorities should continue to exercise robust spending controls and save any revenue above budget forecasts for the remainder of 2025.
    2. Given Denmark’s robust fiscal position, the announced temporary increase in defense spending is manageable from a public finance sustainability perspective. Denmark has long anticipated rising spending pressures from an aging population and has successfully reduced its debt-to-GDP ratio to below 30 percent, down from nearly 50 percent a decade ago. Furthermore, a significantly higher-than-expected fiscal surplus in 2024 provides additional room to accommodate the increased defense spending. In the staff’s baseline scenario, the structural balance is expected to remain above the -1 percent of GDP floor over the medium term, consistent with Denmark’s fiscal rules and a stable debt-to-GDP ratio.
    3. However, significantly higher and more persistent increases in defense spending would require adjustment measures to ensure long-term fiscal sustainability. These adjustment measures should be growth-friendly while ensuring fairness to preserve the welfare state. Specifically:
    • While both expenditure and revenue measures should be explored, given the already high tax burden, priority should be given to spending measures. To this end, an in-depth assessment of expenditures should be conducted to identify low-priority or inefficient spending, as well as the opportunity to enhance public administration efficiency by leveraging digitalization and AI.
    • Structural reform programs should be vigorously pursued to boost labor supply and enhance productivity. In this context, further raising the retirement age in line with improved life expectancy is vital to ensure fiscal sustainability.
    • The structural balance floor of -1 percent of GDP under current national fiscal rules should be respected.

    Safeguarding financial stability

    1. Although systemic risks have been contained, heightened global risks warrant continued vigilance in monitoring financial sector risks. Banks are well-capitalized, with strong profitability, asset quality, and liquidity. To further strengthen the resilience of the financial system, the authorities should (i) ensure that banks maintain robust provisioning practices for credit risks, including a thorough examination of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 9 modeling practices; (ii) complete the ongoing review of internal ratings-based models promptly, followed by supervisory actions based on the results, and implement the EU’s CRR III/CRD VI as planned; (iii) continue efforts to enhance resilience against cyberattacks; and (iv) ensure that the Financial Supervisory Authority is adequately staffed across a full range of skills and experiences to deliver its mandates.
    2. Capital-based macroprudential policy is broadly appropriate, but borrower-based measures should be tightened to address pockets of vulnerabilities. Given heightened global risks and the fragile commercial real estate (CRE) sector, the 2.5 percent countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) and the 7 percent sector-specific systemic risk buffer, introduced in June 2024 to mitigate risks in the CRE sector, should remain in place for now. To address pockets of vulnerabilities in mortgages, the authorities should consider lowering the maximum loan-to-value ratio below the current 95 percent. In addition, incentives for bigger mortgages should be reduced by lowering the tax deductibility of mortgage interest expenses.
    3. The risks posed by non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) should be closely monitored and assessed. The authorities have increased their focus on the NBFI sector in financial stability assessments. Given the considerable size and extensive interconnectedness of NBFIs within the financial system, as well as their susceptibility to market vulnerabilities, the authorities should continue strengthening the oversight framework for NBFIs. Key priorities include: (i) finalizing the supervisory order on the stress-testing framework for insurance and pension firms; (ii) developing a framework for systemic risk assessment that covers both banks and NBFIs; and (iii) ensuring that insurance and pension companies provide clear advice to clients about financial and longevity risks when selling non-guaranteed products.
    4. Addressing outstanding recommendations in the 2020 Financial Stability Assessment Program would further strengthen financial sector oversight and crisis management. The authorities have made significant strides in implementing numerous recommendations, especially in bank and insurance supervision and systemic liquidity. Important outstanding recommendations relate to systemic risk oversight and the governance of the resolution authorities.

    Pursuing structural reforms

    1. Structural reforms should be further intensified to sustain high levels of income, preserve fiscal space, and sustain the welfare state. Over the past several decades, Denmark has benefited significantly from globalization, including reduced trade barriers and expanded global value chains. However, these conditions may shift due to rising geopolitical and trade tensions. An aging population would also weigh on potential growth. All these concerns underscore the pressing need for Denmark to reinforce structural reform efforts. Specifically,
    • Strengthening policies to support entrepreneurship while harnessing the benefits of digitalization and Artificial Intelligence (AI). Staff welcomes the progress made in implementing a new entrepreneurship strategy launched in June 2024 to support start-ups and scale-ups. Denmark excels in digitalization and is well-positioned to leverage the benefits of AI. In this regard, the authorities should continue reviewing the legal and technical barriers to AI adoption while ensuring sound ethical principles. While Denmark’s flexicurity model is well-suited to facilitate possible labor reallocation across sectors, the implications of digital technologies on labor markets, including job displacement, should be closely monitored.
    • Continuing efforts to ensure a sufficient labor supply with the right skills, such as IT, health, and long-term care professionals. The authorities’ ongoing focus on labor market reforms is appropriate, including recent initiatives to (i) reform education curricula to equip students with digitalization skills; (ii) enhance vocational education and training; and (iii) make the active labor market policy framework more cost-effective while maintaining the strengths of the Danish flexicurity model. Other policy priorities include: (i) aligning the foreign worker recruitment schemes, especially the salary requirement limit and the positive list, with labor market needs; and (ii) ensuring the effectiveness of integration programs to help foreign workers and families successfully integrate into Danish society.
    1. A deeper EU single market could boost Denmark’s business dynamism and potential growth. The EU single market, Denmark’s most important trade area, is fragmented. Deepening EU integration will enhance the benefits of economies of scale and network effects, thus expanding the market for Danish businesses. Simultaneously, the authorities should make efforts to reduce domestic regulatory burdens on businesses (e.g., reporting requirements) while balancing the costs and benefits of these regulations. Denmark’s commitment to supporting multilateral and transparent trade policies that promote mutually beneficial cooperation in global trade, knowledge, and investment flows is commendable.
    2. Strengthening climate adaptation will support sustainable growth. Due to its coastal location and flat topography, Denmark is particularly vulnerable to sea level rise, storm surges, and coastal erosion, necessitating a well-designed long-term adaptation plan. The government is developing National Climate Adaptation Plan II, which focuses on enhanced coastal and groundwater protection, urban flood management, and the assessment of infrastructure needs, including financing responsibilities among central and local governments and the private sector. Simultaneously, the authorities are encouraged to reform the property insurance scheme (“Storm Surge Scheme”) to make insurance premiums risk-based.

    The mission thanks the authorities and private sector counterparts for their accommodative flexibility, warm hospitality, and candid and high-quality discussions. The IMF team is especially grateful to the Danmarks Nationalbank for its assistance with meeting and logistical arrangements.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Boris Balabanov

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/05/12/mcs-denmark-staff-concluding-statement-of-the-2025-article-iv-mission

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: 6 May 2025 Strengthening alcohol control and road safety policies

    Source: World Health Organisation

    The African Region has one of the highest burdens of alcohol-related deaths globally – averaging 70 deaths per 100,000 people – second only to Europe. In some countries, this rises to 84 deaths per 100,000. With rapid population growth, even more people are expected to be affected unless stronger policies are implemented. Yet across much of the continent, comprehensive alcohol policies remain scarce, outdated or poorly enforced, leaving countries ill-equipped to tackle the rising harm from alcohol consumption.

    In April, 60 representatives from 15 countries across the World Health Organization’s (WHO) African Region gathered in Accra, Ghana for a landmark SAFER inter-country learning workshop aimed at strengthening collaboration and accelerating implementation of alcohol control and road safety policies. The workshop was jointly hosted and supported by WHO, the WHO-led SAFER Initiative, and the Bloomberg Philanthropies Initiative for Global Road Safety (BIGRS), with financial support from Bloomberg Philanthropies and the Government of Norway.

    The synergy between the SAFER Initiative and Bloomberg Initiative for Global Road Safety (BIGRS) is critical, as both initiatives share a common goal of reducing alcohol-related harm and improving road safety. Let us seize this opportunity to work together for a safer, healthier Ghana and Africa.

    Hon. Kwabena Mintah Akandoh, Minister for Health, Ghana

    The 15 country teams included representatives from the ministries of health, transport, finance, and justice, as well as from the offices of the attorneys general, to accelerate the implementation of high-impact alcohol control and road safety policies.

    Multisectoral collaboration is essential – not optional – for achieving lasting public health outcomes. Today’s complex health challenges demand coordinated action across government sectors, civil society, and the private sector, all working together with communities. Only through shared responsibility and joint efforts can we ensure sustainable improvements in population health and wellbeing.

    Dr Adelheid Onyango, Director of Healthier Populations Cluster, WHO Regional Office for Africa (AFRO).

     

    Participants came from Angola, Burkina Faso, Congo, Gabon, Ghana, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Seychelles, and Uganda.

    This event built on two WHO-led workshops in 2023:

    • The SAFER inter-country learning workshop held in October 2023 in Addis Ababa, which focused on alcohol policy development in seven countries.
    • The BIGRS workshop held in May 2023 in Kampala, which addressed alcohol-related road safety and legislative change in four countries.

    The Accra workshop brought together countries continuing SAFER and BIGRS implementation with 8 newly engaged countries, creating a regional platform for peer learning and collaboration.

    “We have acquired more knowledge on the SAFER package and learned from other countries which started earlier.”  Participant feedback.

    A strategic and evidence-informed approach

    The workshop was grounded in key WHO global and regional strategies, including the Global Alcohol Action Plan 2022–2030, which sets out a roadmap for reducing harmful alcohol use through national leadership, cross-sectoral coordination, and evidence-based interventions.Regionally, it built on the WHO African Region’s Multisectoral Strategy to Promote Health and Wellbeing (2023–2030) and the Regional Framework for Alcohol Control, both of which call for  integrated approaches and policy coherence for alcohol control within public health systems.

    “This workshop helped us break down our national action plan into implementable strategies.” Participant feedback.

    In line with these frameworks, the workshop followed a structured and evidence-informed approach to support policy progress:

    • Pre-work included virtual orientation sessions and bilateral meetings to review country status and update plans
    • During the in-person sessions in Accra, teams engaged in landscape assessments, delivery plan development, and peer-to-peer support
    • Expert panels with remote participation from Vital Strategies, Movendi International and University of Sterling, explored issues like alcohol industry interference and monitoring and evaluation
    • Countries used the WHO Global Survey on Alcohol and Health to guide planning

    “Policy integrity must be protected from alcohol industry interference,”  Dr. Frank John Lule, WHO Ghana Representative

    Multilingual participation

    The workshop was conducted in four working languages English, French, Portuguese, and Spanish – to accommodate the diversity of countries involved. While this presented logistical challenges, it also created a dynamic, inclusive atmosphere where participants engaged across language and regional boundaries. The investment in multilingual participation paid off, encouraging deeper exchange and regional solidarity.

    “It helped us understand how our strategies are faring compared to our neighbours, even when we speak different languages.” Participant feedback.

    Opportunities for strategic exchange

    One of the most engaging moments of the workshop was the gallery walk – a participatory session where country teams set up “stations” to present their group work and delivery plans. Other delegations walked from station to station, discussing strategies, offering feedback, and exchanging ideas with their peers.

    “The gallery walk was a huge opportunity for knowledge exchange and helped us sharpen our thinking.” Participant feedback.

    This format sparked spontaneous discussions on barriers, solutions, and opportunities. It fostered a sense of ownership and reflection and was widely seen as a powerful tool for strategic thinking and applied learning.

    Workshop outcomes and commitments

    This workshop marks a pivotal moment in shifting from planning to coordinated action. With renewed commitment, shared purpose, and regional momentum, countries are better equipped than ever to reduce alcohol-related harm and improve public health.

    As a result of the workshop:

    • 15 countries finalized or revised SAFER delivery plans
    • 8 new countries presented landscape assessments and implementation strategies
    • Country teams shared commitment statements
    • WHO and partners identified case studies for future dissemination
    • Clear next steps were agreed on for monitoring, technical support, and cross-country exchange

    Country teams identified 2 to 3 priority measures from among the high-impact SAFER interventions to accelerate national action and reduce the substantial harm caused by alcohol consumption. These priority actions reflect growing momentum for evidence-based policy change and examples include: raising excise taxes on alcoholic beverages to reduce affordability and curb consumption; establishing a national minimum legal age for purchasing and consuming alcohol; regulating the density and location of alcohol retail outlets; tightening drink-driving laws by lowering legal blood alcohol concentration (BAC) limits to ≤ 0.5 g/dl in line with international best practice; and integrating alcohol screening, brief interventions, and treatment for alcohol use disorders into mental health and primary care through the WHO Mental Health Gap Action Programme (mhGAP).

    Looking ahead, WHO will continue to support countries in implementing their delivery plans, provide tailored technical assistance, foster cross-country learning and regional collaboration and track progress through global surveys and country follow-up.

    Evaluation

    Post-workshop feedback indicated high levels of satisfaction and provided valuable suggestions for improving future events. All respondents reported being satisfied with the workshop, with over half “very satisfied” and one in five “extremely satisfied.”  Participants valued the interactive format – combining group work, peer learning, and facilitator-led sessions – and praised the facilitators’ expertise and responsiveness. Many noted that the workshop strengthened cross-sector collaboration and provided a clearer sense of direction, renewed motivation, and practical next steps to advance national SAFER alcohol control plans. Comments such as “we are not alone in this struggle” and it “enhanced my knowledge and triggered my commitment” reflected both solidarity and strengthened resolve among participants.

    About SAFER and BIGRS:

    The SAFER Initiative supports countries with five key interventions:

    • Restricting availability of alcohol
    • Enforcing drink-driving countermeasures
    • Expanding access to brief interventions and treatment
    • Banning alcohol marketing and sponsorship
    • Raising alcohol prices through fiscal measures

    The BIGRS Initiative complements SAFER by strengthening road safety legislation, especially for drink-driving and other key risk factors. The Accra workshop demonstrated the value of integrating these initiatives into a shared platform for action.

    The workshop was also the result of collaboration across all three levels of the WHO – headquarters, regional offices, and country offices – demonstrating the multidisciplinary and coordinated approach needed to address the harms of alcohol consumption.

    MIL OSI United Nations News