Category: Science

  • MIL-Evening Report: American science is in crisis. It’s a great opportunity for Australia to snap up top scientists

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Kylie Walker, Visiting Fellow, National Centre for the Public Awareness of Science, Australian National University

    Stellalevi / Getty Images

    Science in the United States in in trouble. The National Science Foundation, a key research funding agency, has suffered devastating funding cuts under the current administration. Critics say the cuts risk losing an entire generation of young scientists.

    In addition, about 280,000 scientists and engineers have been affected by US federal workforce cuts. Billions of dollars in further cuts have been proposed to US hospitals, universities and research institutions.

    The US has long been the global destination for science. But perhaps no longer. The rest of the world, including Australia, is looking to lure scientists from the US.

    And many of those scientists are looking to move. In March, a Nature survey suggested more than 75% of US researchers were considering leaving the country.

    What moves are under way to capitalise on this American brain drain? Where does Australia sit – and, importantly, are we doing enough?

    What are other countries doing?

    In May, the European Commission announced a two-year, €500 million package to woo scientists and researchers called Choose Europe. The announcement of the package highlighted how “academic and scientific freedom is increasingly under threat”, and offers researchers higher allowances, longer contracts and reduced regulatory barriers to innovation.

    Canada also has active efforts. The Toronto-based University Hospital Network, for example, aims to raise C$30 million to attract and recruit clinician scientists and medical talent.

    China, too, is actively seeking US scientists with dedicated recruitment programs and large salaries. This is accelerating the existing trend of Chinese-born scientists leaving the US.

    Programs such as the EU’s and Canada’s ostensibly aim to attract and recruit top talent from “around the world”. Given the timing, however, it’s no secret which country’s scientists they have their eyes on.

    What about Australia?

    In Australia, the scientific community is understandably concerned about events in the US and their impact on Australian research. The US is Australia’s largest research partner, with a conservatively estimated A$386 million in funding for Australian research organisations coming from the US government.

    At the same time, the US cuts represent an opportunity for Australia as for other countries. The Australian Academy of Science recently launched its Global Talent Attraction Program to take advantage of “a rare opportunity to strengthen our nation by attracting world-leading researchers to our shores”. The program will offer relocation packages for selected researchers, together with research funding, access to Australian infrastructure and family relocation support.

    As well as attracting US talent, it may also be an opportunity to reverse the brain drain and bring back talented Australians who may have moved to the US for what were once better career prospects.

    The global picture

    Attracting, recruiting and retaining US researchers and innovators at all levels is the right thing for Australia to pursue right now. But broader international relationships are also worth some effort, including with countries in our region such as Japan, South Korea and Singapore, as well as in Europe.

    These can be facilitated through existing initiatives such as the strategic arm of the Global Science and Technology Diplomacy Fund. Backed by the Australian government and delivered by the Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering (where I am the CEO) and the Australian Academy of Science, the fund brings together innovators and research initiatives in priority partner countries and Australia. Areas of interest include advanced manufacturing, artificial intelligence and hydrogen production.

    With the US pulling out of international collaborations, there is a chance for Australia to establish itself as a science and technology hub within our region.

    Australia has much to offer the world. We can provide insights into the behaviour and management of bushfires, floods and droughts. We bring a sophisticated understanding of extreme weather modelling, and are a global gateway to exceptional oceans and atmospheric research.

    We have huge clout in renewable energy and battery technologies. Australian-invented solar panels represent the majority of household solar around the world and Australian batteries technology is among the best.

    Australian researchers, policymakers and citizens are right to be concerned by what’s happening in the US. But we don’t need to wait anxiously. We have an extremely rare opportunity to foster talent in Australia on our terms.

    Kylie Walker is CEO of the Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering and previously worked for the Australian Academy of Science (2011–2016).

    ref. American science is in crisis. It’s a great opportunity for Australia to snap up top scientists – https://theconversation.com/american-science-is-in-crisis-its-a-great-opportunity-for-australia-to-snap-up-top-scientists-260593

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI USA: Helio Highlights: May 2025

    Source: NASA

    The Sun is 93 million miles away from Earth, on average. Even though it’s far away, we can still see and feel its effects here. One of the most beautiful effects are the auroras – colorful lights that dance across the sky near the North and South Poles. These are also called the Northern and Southern Lights. They happen when tiny particles from the Sun hit gas molecules in our atmosphere and give off energy.
    Sometimes the Sun becomes very active and sends out a lot more energy than normal. When this happens, we can see auroras in places much farther from the poles than normal. In May 2024, around Mother’s Day, the Sun sent powerful solar storms in the direction of Earth. These storms were also called the Gannon Storms, named after Jennifer Gannon, a scientist who studied space weather. The Northern Lights could be seen as far south as Puerto Rico, Hawaii, Mexico, Jamaica, and the Bahamas. The Southern Lights were also visible as far north as South Africa and New Zealand.

    Scientists who study the Sun and its effects on our solar system work in a field called heliophysics. Their studies of the Sun have shown that it goes through cycles of being more active and less active. Each one of these cycles lasts about 11 years, but can be anywhere from 8 to 14 years long. This is called the Solar Cycle.
    The middle of each cycle is called Solar Maximum. During this time, the Sun has more dark spots (called sunspots) and creates more space weather events. The big storms in May 2024 happened during the Solar Maximum for Solar Cycle 25.
    On May 8 and 9, 2024, an active area on the Sun called AR3664 shot out powerful solar flares and several huge bursts of energy called coronal mass ejections (CMEs). These CMEs headed straight for Earth. The first CME pushed aside the normal solar wind, making a clear path for the others to reach us faster. When all this energy hit our atmosphere, it created auroras much farther from the poles than usual. It was like the Sun gave the auroras a huge power boost!

    Auroras are beautiful to watch, but the space weather that creates them can also cause problems. Space weather can mess up radio signals, power grids, GPS systems, and satellites. During the May 2024 storms, GPS systems used by farmers were disrupted. Many farmers use GPS to guide their self-driving tractors. Since this happened during peak planting season, it may have cost billions of dollars in lost profit.
    Because space weather can cause so many problems, scientists at NASA and around the world watch the Sun closely to predict when these events will happen. You can help too! Join local science projects at schools, teach others about the Sun, and help make observations in your area. All of this helps us to learn more about the Sun and how it affects our planet.
    Here are some resources to connect you to the Sun and auroras

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Genetic modification in the context of the ‘dire wolf’ project – E-001687/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The placing on the market and releasing in the environment of genetically modified (GM) animals in the EU is subject to the GM Organisms (GMO) legislation[1], regardless of where the genetic alteration is carried out. The legislation does not preclude modifications to feature traits of extinct animals.

    Any GMO (including GM animals) can only be released after authorisation, following a comprehensive risk assessment concluding that there are no risks for health or the environment, and in conformity with any conditions required. This assessment routinely includes, among others, animal welfare and potential implications for animals and nature.

    In addition, specifically for protected habitats and species in the EU, the effects of any deliberate release into the environment of GMOs must also be considered in relation to the EU law requirement to maintain or restore the favourable conservation status of the protected species and habitats[2].

    In the event of the deliberate release of a GM animal without authorisation, or instances of migration of such animals into their territory, Member States must take the necessary remedial action, and inform its public, the Commission, and other Member States.

    The GMO legislation recognises that Member States may take into consideration ethical aspects in this context[3]. It also allows consultation of relevant committees on ethics, such as the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies, on the ethical implications of biotechnology, either on the Commission’s own initiative or at the request of the European Parliament, the Council or a Member State.

    Based on the above, the Commission considers that the current EU legislation is adequate to handle cases such as the one described by the Honourable Member.

    • [1] Directive 2001/18/EC — http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2001/18/oj.
    • [2] Article 22(b) of Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, OJ L 206, 22.7.1992, p. 7-50.
    • [3] Recital 9 of Directive 2001/18/EC.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Regional coordinator, Santiago network (Asia-Pacific)

    Source: UNISDR Disaster Risk Reduction

    Background information – job-specific

    Santiago network The Santiago network was established in December 2019 at COP25, as part of the Warsaw International Mechanism, for averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, to catalyze the technical assistance of relevant organizations, bodies, networks and experts, for the implementation of suitable relevant approaches at the local, national and regional level, in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. (decision 2/CMA.2, para 43, noted by 2/CP.25). 

    The Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change Convention and the Paris Agreement subsequently decided on the functions of the Santiago network at COP26 and on the institutional arrangements to enable its full operationalization. Parties agreed the structure would comprise: 

    A hosted Secretariat that will facilitate its work, to be known as the Santiago network Secretariat; An Advisory Board, to provide guidance and oversight to the Santiago network Secretariat on the effective implementation of the functions of the network; and A network of organizations, bodies, networks and experts (OBNEs) covering a wide range of topics relevant to averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage. 

    At COP28 in 2023, Parties selected the consortium of UNOPS and the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) as co-hosts of the Santiago network Secretariat for an initial term of five years, with five-year renewal periods. 

    While UNOPS provides the necessary administrative and operational support for the effective functioning of the Secretariat, UNDRR provides the Secretariat with technical backstopping and expertise in the domain of averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage consistent with the guidelines for preventing potential and addressing actual and perceived conflicts of interest in relation to the Santiago network. 

    Relevant COP/CMA decisions on the Santiago network can be consulted here. Documents and reports from meetings of the Santiago network Advisory Board are available here

    The United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) is an operational arm of the United Nations, supporting the successful implementation of its partners’ peacebuilding, humanitarian and development projects around the world. Mandated as a central resource of the United Nations, UNOPS provides sustainable project management, procurement and infrastructure services to a wide range of governments, donors and United Nations organisations. With over 6,000 personnel spread across 80 countries, UNOPS offers its partners the logistical, technical and management knowledge they need, where they need it. By implementing around 1,000 projects for our partners at any given time, UNOPS makes significant contributions to results on the ground, often in the most challenging environments. 

    Regional Coordinator, Santiago network 

    Under the supervision of the Director of the Santiago network Secretariat, with support by the Senior Programme Manager, the Regional Coordinator drives and supervises provision of catalyzed technical assistance and membership matters in the respective region, as well as provision of related services, ensuring effective and timely support for developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. 

    The Regional Coordinator leads the technical work of the Santiago network Secretariat, in the respective region, including programme delivery, and outreach, in consultation with UNDRR designated technical experts, and acts as key focal point for regional and national partners and technical agencies.

    The Regional Coordinator also leads the development and implementation of capacity building strategies and plans of the Santiago network in the respective region, including through strategic and actionable knowledge management.

    Functional responsibilities

    1. Setting up processes and systems
    2. Catalyzing technical assistance/Management of OBNEs
    3. Programme implementation and monitoring
    4. Partner and stakeholder engagement
    5. Knowledge management and innovation
    6. Corporate functions and team building

    1. Setting up processes and systems

    • Lead the implementation of the guidelines for responding to requests for technical assistance, the guidelines for the designation of members to the Santiago network, and relevant operational documents at the regional level.
    • Contribute to the creation of an enabling environment for demand-driven technical assistance, including support in identifying regional needs and in preparing requests for technical assistance.

    2. Catalyzing technical assistance/Management of OBNEs

    • Lead the implementation technical assistance (TA) cycle in the relevant region, in coordination with central functions and with Desk Officers for LDCs and SIDS as applicable, including submission, review, matchmaking, delivery, monitoring and knowledge sharing.
    • Coordinate the effective engagement with developing countries, communities and other stakeholders in relevant region in identifying their capacity gaps and developing requests for TA, where needed, including through regional scoping workshops and consultative processes.
    • Coordinate with the OBNE Engagement Specialist in building and managing a network of suitable OBNEs in the respective region for the provision of TA to support developing countries in averting, minimizing, and addressing loss and damage associated with climate change impacts in response to their needs.
    • Lead on the development and implementation of regionalTA and capacity building strategies and plans in order to support the achievement of the Santiago network strategy.

    3. Programme implementation and monitoring

    • Lead the implementation of regional results-based monitoring and evaluation activities, in coordination with central functions, to assess the timeliness, appropriateness and outcomes of assistance provided under the Santiago network.
    • Oversee the implementation and delivery of results of technical assistance relevant region , under the Monitoring and Evaluation for Learning and Accountability (MEAL) Framework.
    • Identify, assess and manage risks and issues that may impact the effective delivery of technical assistance in the relevant region, in coordination with corporate functions.
    • Provide inputs on regional operations to inform Santiago network regular reporting to the Advisory Board and inputs to the Annual Report to the governing body or bodies.

    4. Partner and stakeholder engagement

    • Develop and implement regional, national, subnational and community-based strategies for the engagement of relevant stakeholders, aiming to facilitate demand-driven technical assistance.
    • Develop strategies for engaging and maintaining partnerships in the region , including collaborative projects, joint events, and resource sharing.
    • Establish communication channels and platforms for effective networking and information exchange among Members in the region, in coordination with central functions.
    • Lead capacity building of partners and stakeholders for strategic regional partnership development and engagement.
    • Contribute to the development of regional advocacy campaigns, policy briefs, and other materials to support the Santiago network’s regional advocacy efforts, in coordination with the Communications Manager.

    5. Knowledge management and innovation

    • Facilitate the development, provision and dissemination of knowledge and information in the relevant region, on a wide range of topics relevant for loss and damage.
    • Champion knowledge on averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage, relevant for technical assistance delivery in the respective region.
    • Promote and raise awareness of the Santiago network in the relevant region.
    • Foster innovation and best practices in knowledge management, contributing to the development of feedback loops informed by operational experience.

    6. Corporate functions and team building

    • Uphold and model team values, fostering a respectful, inclusive and supportive, work environment, fostering collaboration between regional and global functions.
    • Contribute to the development and implementation of the Santiago network’s strategic, policy, and operational frameworks, ensuring alignment with its mandate and evolving needs.
    • Support the implementation of a resource mobilization strategy for the Santiago network to secure funds for technical assistance for developing countries.
    • Represent the Santiago network in international fora and high-level meetings in the respective, contributing to advance the delivery of its mandate and objectives.
    • Others, as required by the supervisor.

    Education/experience/language requirements

    Education

    • An advanced university degree (Masters or equivalent), preferably in development studies, international relations, political science, environmental sciences and climate change, economics, social sciences, or related areas, is required.
    • A first-level university degree in combination with two (2) additional years of qualifying experience may be accepted in lieu of an advanced university degree.

    Experience

    • A minimum of seven (7) years of relevant experience in the fields of programme development in developing countries, particularly in the areas of loss and damage, disaster risk reduction, climate change adaptation, development, or other related climate change and development areas, is required.
    • Of those seven (7) years, a minimum of at least five (5) years of demonstrated experience in the region in one of the relevant areas as listed above, is required.
    • Strong coordination, communication, and technical skills are desirable.
    • Familiarity with UNFCCC processes and the loss and damage agenda is highly desirable.

    Language

    • Fluency in oral and written English is required.
    • Fluency in oral and written Spanish is required.
    • Knowledge of another UN official language is an advantage.

    Contract type, level and duration

    Contract type: Staff – FTA Contract level: P4 (ICS-11) Contract duration: One year initially, renewable subject to satisfactory performance and funding availability.

    For more details about United Nations staff contracts, please follow this link: https://www.unops.org/english/Opportunities/job-opportunities/what-we-offer/Pages/UN-Staff-Contracts.aspx

    Competencies

    Develops and implements sustainable business strategies, thinks long term and externally in order to positively shape the organization. Anticipates and perceives the impact and implications of future decisions and activities on other parts of the organization.(for levels IICA-2, IICA-3, LICA Specialist- 10, LICA Specialist-11, NOC, NOD, P3, P4 and above)

    Treats all individuals with respect; responds sensitively to differences and encourages others to do the same. Upholds organizational and ethical norms. Maintains high standards of trustworthiness. Role model for diversity and inclusion.

    Acts as a positive role model contributing to the team spirit. Collaborates and supports the development of others. For people managers only: Acts as positive leadership role model, motivates, directs and inspires others to succeed, utilizing appropriate leadership styles.

    Demonstrates understanding of the impact of own role on all partners and always puts the end beneficiary first. Builds and maintains strong external relationships and is a competent partner for others (if relevant to the role).

    Efficiently establishes an appropriate course of action for self and/or others to accomplish a goal. Actions lead to total task accomplishment through concern for quality in all areas. Sees opportunities and takes the initiative to act on them. Understands that responsible use of resources maximizes our impact on our beneficiaries.

    Evaluates data and courses of action to reach logical, pragmatic decisions. Takes an unbiased, rational approach with calculated risks. Applies innovation and creativity to problem-solving.

    Expresses ideas or facts in a clear, concise and open manner. Communication indicates a consideration for the feelings and needs of others. Actively listens and proactively shares knowledge. Handles conflict effectively, by overcoming differences of opinion and finding common ground.

    Additional information

    • Please note that UNOPS does not accept unsolicited resumes.
    • Applications received after the closing date will not be considered.
    • Please note that only shortlisted candidates will be contacted and advance to the next stage of the selection process, which involves various assessments.
    • UNOPS embraces diversity and is committed to equal employment opportunity. Our workforce consists of many diverse nationalities, cultures, languages, races, gender identities, sexual orientations, and abilities. UNOPS seeks to sustain and strengthen this diversity to ensure equal opportunities as well as an inclusive working environment for its entire workforce.
    • Qualified women and candidates from groups which are underrepresented in the UNOPS workforce are encouraged to apply. These include in particular candidates from racialized and/or indigenous groups, members of minority gender identities and sexual orientations, and people with disabilities.
    • We would like to ensure all candidates perform at their best during the assessment process. If you are shortlisted and require additional assistance to complete any assessment, including reasonable accommodation, please inform our human resources team when you receive an invitation.

    Terms and conditions

    • For staff positions only, UNOPS reserves the right to appoint a candidate at a lower level than the advertised level of the post.
    • For retainer contracts, you must complete a few mandatory courses ( they take around 4 hours to complete) in your own time, before providing services to UNOPS. Refreshers or new mandatory courses may be required during your contract. Please note that you will not receive any compensation for taking courses and refreshers. For more information on a retainer contract here.
    • All UNOPS personnel are responsible for performing their duties in accordance with the UN Charter and UNOPS Policies and Instructions, as well as other relevant accountability frameworks. In addition, all personnel must demonstrate an understanding of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in a manner consistent with UN core values and the UN Common Agenda.
    • It is the policy of UNOPS to conduct background checks on all potential personnel. Recruitment in UNOPS is contingent on the results of such checks.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Regional coordinator, Santiago network (Latin America and the Caribbean)

    Source: UNISDR Disaster Risk Reduction

    Background information – job-specific

    Santiago network The Santiago network was established in December 2019 at COP25, as part of the Warsaw International Mechanism, for averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, to catalyze the technical assistance of relevant organizations, bodies, networks and experts, for the implementation of suitable relevant approaches at the local, national and regional level, in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. (decision 2/CMA.2, para 43, noted by 2/CP.25). 

    The Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change Convention and the Paris Agreement subsequently decided on the functions of the Santiago network at COP26 and on the institutional arrangements to enable its full operationalization. Parties agreed the structure would comprise: 

    A hosted Secretariat that will facilitate its work, to be known as the Santiago network Secretariat; An Advisory Board, to provide guidance and oversight to the Santiago network Secretariat on the effective implementation of the functions of the network; and A network of organizations, bodies, networks and experts (OBNEs) covering a wide range of topics relevant to averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage. 

    At COP28 in 2023, Parties selected the consortium of UNOPS and the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) as co-hosts of the Santiago network Secretariat for an initial term of five years, with five-year renewal periods. 

    While UNOPS provides the necessary administrative and operational support for the effective functioning of the Secretariat, UNDRR provides the Secretariat with technical backstopping and expertise in the domain of averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage consistent with the guidelines for preventing potential and addressing actual and perceived conflicts of interest in relation to the Santiago network. 

    Relevant COP/CMA decisions on the Santiago network can be consulted here. Documents and reports from meetings of the Santiago network Advisory Board are available here

    The United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) is an operational arm of the United Nations, supporting the successful implementation of its partners’ peacebuilding, humanitarian and development projects around the world. Mandated as a central resource of the United Nations, UNOPS provides sustainable project management, procurement and infrastructure services to a wide range of governments, donors and United Nations organisations. With over 6,000 personnel spread across 80 countries, UNOPS offers its partners the logistical, technical and management knowledge they need, where they need it. By implementing around 1,000 projects for our partners at any given time, UNOPS makes significant contributions to results on the ground, often in the most challenging environments. 

    Regional Coordinator, Santiago network 

    Under the supervision of the Director of the Santiago network Secretariat, with support by the Senior Programme Manager, the Regional Coordinator drives and supervises provision of catalyzed technical assistance and membership matters in the respective region, as well as provision of related services, ensuring effective and timely support for developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. 

    The Regional Coordinator leads the technical work of the Santiago network Secretariat, in the respective region, including programme delivery, and outreach, in consultation with UNDRR designated technical experts, and acts as key focal point for regional and national partners and technical agencies.

    The Regional Coordinator also leads the development and implementation of capacity building strategies and plans of the Santiago network in the respective region, including through strategic and actionable knowledge management.

    Functional responsibilities

    1. Setting up processes and systems
    2. Catalyzing technical assistance/Management of OBNEs
    3. Programme implementation and monitoring
    4. Partner and stakeholder engagement
    5. Knowledge management and innovation
    6. Corporate functions and team building

    1. Setting up processes and systems

    • Lead the implementation of the guidelines for responding to requests for technical assistance, the guidelines for the designation of members to the Santiago network, and relevant operational documents at the regional level.
    • Contribute to the creation of an enabling environment for demand-driven technical assistance, including support in identifying regional needs and in preparing requests for technical assistance.

    2. Catalyzing technical assistance/Management of OBNEs

    • Lead the implementation technical assistance (TA) cycle in the relevant region, in coordination with central functions and with Desk Officers for LDCs and SIDS as applicable, including submission, review, matchmaking, delivery, monitoring and knowledge sharing.
    • Coordinate the effective engagement with developing countries, communities and other stakeholders in relevant region in identifying their capacity gaps and developing requests for TA, where needed, including through regional scoping workshops and consultative processes.
    • Coordinate with the OBNE Engagement Specialist in building and managing a network of suitable OBNEs in the respective region for the provision of TA to support developing countries in averting, minimizing, and addressing loss and damage associated with climate change impacts in response to their needs.
    • Lead on the development and implementation of regionalTA and capacity building strategies and plans in order to support the achievement of the Santiago network strategy.

    3. Programme implementation and monitoring

    • Lead the implementation of regional results-based monitoring and evaluation activities, in coordination with central functions, to assess the timeliness, appropriateness and outcomes of assistance provided under the Santiago network.
    • Oversee the implementation and delivery of results of technical assistance relevant region , under the Monitoring and Evaluation for Learning and Accountability (MEAL) Framework.
    • Identify, assess and manage risks and issues that may impact the effective delivery of technical assistance in the relevant region, in coordination with corporate functions.
    • Provide inputs on regional operations to inform Santiago network regular reporting to the Advisory Board and inputs to the Annual Report to the governing body or bodies.

    4. Partner and stakeholder engagement

    • Develop and implement regional, national, subnational and community-based strategies for the engagement of relevant stakeholders, aiming to facilitate demand-driven technical assistance.
    • Develop strategies for engaging and maintaining partnerships in the region , including collaborative projects, joint events, and resource sharing.
    • Establish communication channels and platforms for effective networking and information exchange among Members in the region, in coordination with central functions.
    • Lead capacity building of partners and stakeholders for strategic regional partnership development and engagement.
    • Contribute to the development of regional advocacy campaigns, policy briefs, and other materials to support the Santiago network’s regional advocacy efforts, in coordination with the Communications Manager.

    5. Knowledge management and innovation

    • Facilitate the development, provision and dissemination of knowledge and information in the relevant region, on a wide range of topics relevant for loss and damage.
    • Champion knowledge on averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage, relevant for technical assistance delivery in the respective region.
    • Promote and raise awareness of the Santiago network in the relevant region.
    • Foster innovation and best practices in knowledge management, contributing to the development of feedback loops informed by operational experience.

    6. Corporate functions and team building

    • Uphold and model team values, fostering a respectful, inclusive and supportive, work environment, fostering collaboration between regional and global functions.
    • Contribute to the development and implementation of the Santiago network’s strategic, policy, and operational frameworks, ensuring alignment with its mandate and evolving needs.
    • Support the implementation of a resource mobilization strategy for the Santiago network to secure funds for technical assistance for developing countries.
    • Represent the Santiago network in international fora and high-level meetings in the respective, contributing to advance the delivery of its mandate and objectives.
    • Others, as required by the supervisor.

    Education/experience/language requirements

    Education

    • An advanced university degree (Masters or equivalent), preferably in development studies, international relations, political science, environmental sciences and climate change, economics, social sciences, or related areas, is required.
    • A first-level university degree in combination with two (2) additional years of qualifying experience may be accepted in lieu of an advanced university degree.

    Experience

    • A minimum of seven (7) years of relevant experience in the fields of programme development in developing countries, particularly in the areas of loss and damage, disaster risk reduction, climate change adaptation, development, or other related climate change and development areas, is required.
    • Of those seven (7) years, a minimum of at least five (5) years of demonstrated experience in the region in one of the relevant areas as listed above, is required.
    • Strong coordination, communication, and technical skills are desirable.
    • Familiarity with UNFCCC processes and the loss and damage agenda is highly desirable.

    Language

    • Fluency in oral and written English is required.
    • Fluency in oral and written Spanish is required.
    • Knowledge of another UN official language is an advantage.

    Contract type, level and duration

    Contract type: Staff – FTA Contract level: P4 (ICS-11) Contract duration: One year initially, renewable subject to satisfactory performance and funding availability.

    For more details about United Nations staff contracts, please follow this link: https://www.unops.org/english/Opportunities/job-opportunities/what-we-offer/Pages/UN-Staff-Contracts.aspx

    Competencies

    Develops and implements sustainable business strategies, thinks long term and externally in order to positively shape the organization. Anticipates and perceives the impact and implications of future decisions and activities on other parts of the organization.(for levels IICA-2, IICA-3, LICA Specialist- 10, LICA Specialist-11, NOC, NOD, P3, P4 and above)

    Treats all individuals with respect; responds sensitively to differences and encourages others to do the same. Upholds organizational and ethical norms. Maintains high standards of trustworthiness. Role model for diversity and inclusion.

    Acts as a positive role model contributing to the team spirit. Collaborates and supports the development of others. For people managers only: Acts as positive leadership role model, motivates, directs and inspires others to succeed, utilizing appropriate leadership styles.

    Demonstrates understanding of the impact of own role on all partners and always puts the end beneficiary first. Builds and maintains strong external relationships and is a competent partner for others (if relevant to the role).

    Efficiently establishes an appropriate course of action for self and/or others to accomplish a goal. Actions lead to total task accomplishment through concern for quality in all areas. Sees opportunities and takes the initiative to act on them. Understands that responsible use of resources maximizes our impact on our beneficiaries.

    Evaluates data and courses of action to reach logical, pragmatic decisions. Takes an unbiased, rational approach with calculated risks. Applies innovation and creativity to problem-solving.

    Expresses ideas or facts in a clear, concise and open manner. Communication indicates a consideration for the feelings and needs of others. Actively listens and proactively shares knowledge. Handles conflict effectively, by overcoming differences of opinion and finding common ground.

    Additional information

    • Please note that UNOPS does not accept unsolicited resumes.
    • Applications received after the closing date will not be considered.
    • Please note that only shortlisted candidates will be contacted and advance to the next stage of the selection process, which involves various assessments.
    • UNOPS embraces diversity and is committed to equal employment opportunity. Our workforce consists of many diverse nationalities, cultures, languages, races, gender identities, sexual orientations, and abilities. UNOPS seeks to sustain and strengthen this diversity to ensure equal opportunities as well as an inclusive working environment for its entire workforce.
    • Qualified women and candidates from groups which are underrepresented in the UNOPS workforce are encouraged to apply. These include in particular candidates from racialized and/or indigenous groups, members of minority gender identities and sexual orientations, and people with disabilities.
    • We would like to ensure all candidates perform at their best during the assessment process. If you are shortlisted and require additional assistance to complete any assessment, including reasonable accommodation, please inform our human resources team when you receive an invitation.

    Terms and conditions

    • For staff positions only, UNOPS reserves the right to appoint a candidate at a lower level than the advertised level of the post.
    • For retainer contracts, you must complete a few mandatory courses ( they take around 4 hours to complete) in your own time, before providing services to UNOPS. Refreshers or new mandatory courses may be required during your contract. Please note that you will not receive any compensation for taking courses and refreshers. For more information on a retainer contract here.
    • All UNOPS personnel are responsible for performing their duties in accordance with the UN Charter and UNOPS Policies and Instructions, as well as other relevant accountability frameworks. In addition, all personnel must demonstrate an understanding of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in a manner consistent with UN core values and the UN Common Agenda.
    • It is the policy of UNOPS to conduct background checks on all potential personnel. Recruitment in UNOPS is contingent on the results of such checks.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Regional coordinator, Santiago network (Asia-Pacific)

    Source: UNISDR Disaster Risk Reduction

    Background information – job-specific

    Santiago network The Santiago network was established in December 2019 at COP25, as part of the Warsaw International Mechanism, for averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, to catalyze the technical assistance of relevant organizations, bodies, networks and experts, for the implementation of suitable relevant approaches at the local, national and regional level, in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. (decision 2/CMA.2, para 43, noted by 2/CP.25). 

    The Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change Convention and the Paris Agreement subsequently decided on the functions of the Santiago network at COP26 and on the institutional arrangements to enable its full operationalization. Parties agreed the structure would comprise: 

    A hosted Secretariat that will facilitate its work, to be known as the Santiago network Secretariat; An Advisory Board, to provide guidance and oversight to the Santiago network Secretariat on the effective implementation of the functions of the network; and A network of organizations, bodies, networks and experts (OBNEs) covering a wide range of topics relevant to averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage. 

    At COP28 in 2023, Parties selected the consortium of UNOPS and the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) as co-hosts of the Santiago network Secretariat for an initial term of five years, with five-year renewal periods. 

    While UNOPS provides the necessary administrative and operational support for the effective functioning of the Secretariat, UNDRR provides the Secretariat with technical backstopping and expertise in the domain of averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage consistent with the guidelines for preventing potential and addressing actual and perceived conflicts of interest in relation to the Santiago network. 

    Relevant COP/CMA decisions on the Santiago network can be consulted here. Documents and reports from meetings of the Santiago network Advisory Board are available here

    The United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) is an operational arm of the United Nations, supporting the successful implementation of its partners’ peacebuilding, humanitarian and development projects around the world. Mandated as a central resource of the United Nations, UNOPS provides sustainable project management, procurement and infrastructure services to a wide range of governments, donors and United Nations organisations. With over 6,000 personnel spread across 80 countries, UNOPS offers its partners the logistical, technical and management knowledge they need, where they need it. By implementing around 1,000 projects for our partners at any given time, UNOPS makes significant contributions to results on the ground, often in the most challenging environments. 

    Regional Coordinator, Santiago network 

    Under the supervision of the Director of the Santiago network Secretariat, with support by the Senior Programme Manager, the Regional Coordinator drives and supervises provision of catalyzed technical assistance and membership matters in the respective region, as well as provision of related services, ensuring effective and timely support for developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. 

    The Regional Coordinator leads the technical work of the Santiago network Secretariat, in the respective region, including programme delivery, and outreach, in consultation with UNDRR designated technical experts, and acts as key focal point for regional and national partners and technical agencies.

    The Regional Coordinator also leads the development and implementation of capacity building strategies and plans of the Santiago network in the respective region, including through strategic and actionable knowledge management.

    Functional responsibilities

    1. Setting up processes and systems
    2. Catalyzing technical assistance/Management of OBNEs
    3. Programme implementation and monitoring
    4. Partner and stakeholder engagement
    5. Knowledge management and innovation
    6. Corporate functions and team building

    1. Setting up processes and systems

    • Lead the implementation of the guidelines for responding to requests for technical assistance, the guidelines for the designation of members to the Santiago network, and relevant operational documents at the regional level.
    • Contribute to the creation of an enabling environment for demand-driven technical assistance, including support in identifying regional needs and in preparing requests for technical assistance.

    2. Catalyzing technical assistance/Management of OBNEs

    • Lead the implementation technical assistance (TA) cycle in the relevant region, in coordination with central functions and with Desk Officers for LDCs and SIDS as applicable, including submission, review, matchmaking, delivery, monitoring and knowledge sharing.
    • Coordinate the effective engagement with developing countries, communities and other stakeholders in relevant region in identifying their capacity gaps and developing requests for TA, where needed, including through regional scoping workshops and consultative processes.
    • Coordinate with the OBNE Engagement Specialist in building and managing a network of suitable OBNEs in the respective region for the provision of TA to support developing countries in averting, minimizing, and addressing loss and damage associated with climate change impacts in response to their needs.
    • Lead on the development and implementation of regionalTA and capacity building strategies and plans in order to support the achievement of the Santiago network strategy.

    3. Programme implementation and monitoring

    • Lead the implementation of regional results-based monitoring and evaluation activities, in coordination with central functions, to assess the timeliness, appropriateness and outcomes of assistance provided under the Santiago network.
    • Oversee the implementation and delivery of results of technical assistance relevant region , under the Monitoring and Evaluation for Learning and Accountability (MEAL) Framework.
    • Identify, assess and manage risks and issues that may impact the effective delivery of technical assistance in the relevant region, in coordination with corporate functions.
    • Provide inputs on regional operations to inform Santiago network regular reporting to the Advisory Board and inputs to the Annual Report to the governing body or bodies.

    4. Partner and stakeholder engagement

    • Develop and implement regional, national, subnational and community-based strategies for the engagement of relevant stakeholders, aiming to facilitate demand-driven technical assistance.
    • Develop strategies for engaging and maintaining partnerships in the region , including collaborative projects, joint events, and resource sharing.
    • Establish communication channels and platforms for effective networking and information exchange among Members in the region, in coordination with central functions.
    • Lead capacity building of partners and stakeholders for strategic regional partnership development and engagement.
    • Contribute to the development of regional advocacy campaigns, policy briefs, and other materials to support the Santiago network’s regional advocacy efforts, in coordination with the Communications Manager.

    5. Knowledge management and innovation

    • Facilitate the development, provision and dissemination of knowledge and information in the relevant region, on a wide range of topics relevant for loss and damage.
    • Champion knowledge on averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage, relevant for technical assistance delivery in the respective region.
    • Promote and raise awareness of the Santiago network in the relevant region.
    • Foster innovation and best practices in knowledge management, contributing to the development of feedback loops informed by operational experience.

    6. Corporate functions and team building

    • Uphold and model team values, fostering a respectful, inclusive and supportive, work environment, fostering collaboration between regional and global functions.
    • Contribute to the development and implementation of the Santiago network’s strategic, policy, and operational frameworks, ensuring alignment with its mandate and evolving needs.
    • Support the implementation of a resource mobilization strategy for the Santiago network to secure funds for technical assistance for developing countries.
    • Represent the Santiago network in international fora and high-level meetings in the respective, contributing to advance the delivery of its mandate and objectives.
    • Others, as required by the supervisor.

    Education/experience/language requirements

    Education

    • An advanced university degree (Masters or equivalent), preferably in development studies, international relations, political science, environmental sciences and climate change, economics, social sciences, or related areas, is required.
    • A first-level university degree in combination with two (2) additional years of qualifying experience may be accepted in lieu of an advanced university degree.

    Experience

    • A minimum of seven (7) years of relevant experience in the fields of programme development in developing countries, particularly in the areas of loss and damage, disaster risk reduction, climate change adaptation, development, or other related climate change and development areas, is required.
    • Of those seven (7) years, a minimum of at least five (5) years of demonstrated experience in the region in one of the relevant areas as listed above, is required.
    • Strong coordination, communication, and technical skills are desirable.
    • Familiarity with UNFCCC processes and the loss and damage agenda is highly desirable.

    Language

    • Fluency in oral and written English is required.
    • Fluency in oral and written Spanish is required.
    • Knowledge of another UN official language is an advantage.

    Contract type, level and duration

    Contract type: Staff – FTA Contract level: P4 (ICS-11) Contract duration: One year initially, renewable subject to satisfactory performance and funding availability.

    For more details about United Nations staff contracts, please follow this link: https://www.unops.org/english/Opportunities/job-opportunities/what-we-offer/Pages/UN-Staff-Contracts.aspx

    Competencies

    Develops and implements sustainable business strategies, thinks long term and externally in order to positively shape the organization. Anticipates and perceives the impact and implications of future decisions and activities on other parts of the organization.(for levels IICA-2, IICA-3, LICA Specialist- 10, LICA Specialist-11, NOC, NOD, P3, P4 and above)

    Treats all individuals with respect; responds sensitively to differences and encourages others to do the same. Upholds organizational and ethical norms. Maintains high standards of trustworthiness. Role model for diversity and inclusion.

    Acts as a positive role model contributing to the team spirit. Collaborates and supports the development of others. For people managers only: Acts as positive leadership role model, motivates, directs and inspires others to succeed, utilizing appropriate leadership styles.

    Demonstrates understanding of the impact of own role on all partners and always puts the end beneficiary first. Builds and maintains strong external relationships and is a competent partner for others (if relevant to the role).

    Efficiently establishes an appropriate course of action for self and/or others to accomplish a goal. Actions lead to total task accomplishment through concern for quality in all areas. Sees opportunities and takes the initiative to act on them. Understands that responsible use of resources maximizes our impact on our beneficiaries.

    Evaluates data and courses of action to reach logical, pragmatic decisions. Takes an unbiased, rational approach with calculated risks. Applies innovation and creativity to problem-solving.

    Expresses ideas or facts in a clear, concise and open manner. Communication indicates a consideration for the feelings and needs of others. Actively listens and proactively shares knowledge. Handles conflict effectively, by overcoming differences of opinion and finding common ground.

    Additional information

    • Please note that UNOPS does not accept unsolicited resumes.
    • Applications received after the closing date will not be considered.
    • Please note that only shortlisted candidates will be contacted and advance to the next stage of the selection process, which involves various assessments.
    • UNOPS embraces diversity and is committed to equal employment opportunity. Our workforce consists of many diverse nationalities, cultures, languages, races, gender identities, sexual orientations, and abilities. UNOPS seeks to sustain and strengthen this diversity to ensure equal opportunities as well as an inclusive working environment for its entire workforce.
    • Qualified women and candidates from groups which are underrepresented in the UNOPS workforce are encouraged to apply. These include in particular candidates from racialized and/or indigenous groups, members of minority gender identities and sexual orientations, and people with disabilities.
    • We would like to ensure all candidates perform at their best during the assessment process. If you are shortlisted and require additional assistance to complete any assessment, including reasonable accommodation, please inform our human resources team when you receive an invitation.

    Terms and conditions

    • For staff positions only, UNOPS reserves the right to appoint a candidate at a lower level than the advertised level of the post.
    • For retainer contracts, you must complete a few mandatory courses ( they take around 4 hours to complete) in your own time, before providing services to UNOPS. Refreshers or new mandatory courses may be required during your contract. Please note that you will not receive any compensation for taking courses and refreshers. For more information on a retainer contract here.
    • All UNOPS personnel are responsible for performing their duties in accordance with the UN Charter and UNOPS Policies and Instructions, as well as other relevant accountability frameworks. In addition, all personnel must demonstrate an understanding of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in a manner consistent with UN core values and the UN Common Agenda.
    • It is the policy of UNOPS to conduct background checks on all potential personnel. Recruitment in UNOPS is contingent on the results of such checks.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: New Permanent Representative of Australia Presents Credentials to the Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    Clare Monica Walsh, the new Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations Office at Geneva, today presented her credentials to Tatiana Valovaya, the Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva.

    Prior to her appointment to Geneva, Ms. Walsh held the position of Chief Operating Officer and Deputy Secretary, Enabling Services Group, at the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia, since 2022.  Earlier in her career, she held multiple other posts at the Department and posted abroad, including as Chief Operating Officer, Finance (2020–2022); Deputy Secretary, Global Cooperation, Development and Partnerships Group (2018–2020); Deputy Head of Mission, Australian Embassy in Japan (2016–2018); and as First Assistant Secretary, International Policy and Partnerships Division (AusAID) and Multilateral Development and Policy Division (2012–2015).  Ms. Walsh also held several positions in the Department of Climate Change and Energy between 2007 and 2012.

    Ms. Walsh holds degrees from three Australian universities, including a Master of Management from the Australian National University (2006); a Graduate Diploma in Environmental Sciences from Murdoch University (1992); and a Bachelor of Arts from Curtin University (1989).

    __________

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

    CR.25.024E

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Regional coordinator, Santiago network (Latin America and the Caribbean)

    Source: UNISDR Disaster Risk Reduction

    Background information – job-specific

    Santiago network The Santiago network was established in December 2019 at COP25, as part of the Warsaw International Mechanism, for averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, to catalyze the technical assistance of relevant organizations, bodies, networks and experts, for the implementation of suitable relevant approaches at the local, national and regional level, in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. (decision 2/CMA.2, para 43, noted by 2/CP.25). 

    The Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change Convention and the Paris Agreement subsequently decided on the functions of the Santiago network at COP26 and on the institutional arrangements to enable its full operationalization. Parties agreed the structure would comprise: 

    A hosted Secretariat that will facilitate its work, to be known as the Santiago network Secretariat; An Advisory Board, to provide guidance and oversight to the Santiago network Secretariat on the effective implementation of the functions of the network; and A network of organizations, bodies, networks and experts (OBNEs) covering a wide range of topics relevant to averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage. 

    At COP28 in 2023, Parties selected the consortium of UNOPS and the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) as co-hosts of the Santiago network Secretariat for an initial term of five years, with five-year renewal periods. 

    While UNOPS provides the necessary administrative and operational support for the effective functioning of the Secretariat, UNDRR provides the Secretariat with technical backstopping and expertise in the domain of averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage consistent with the guidelines for preventing potential and addressing actual and perceived conflicts of interest in relation to the Santiago network. 

    Relevant COP/CMA decisions on the Santiago network can be consulted here. Documents and reports from meetings of the Santiago network Advisory Board are available here

    The United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) is an operational arm of the United Nations, supporting the successful implementation of its partners’ peacebuilding, humanitarian and development projects around the world. Mandated as a central resource of the United Nations, UNOPS provides sustainable project management, procurement and infrastructure services to a wide range of governments, donors and United Nations organisations. With over 6,000 personnel spread across 80 countries, UNOPS offers its partners the logistical, technical and management knowledge they need, where they need it. By implementing around 1,000 projects for our partners at any given time, UNOPS makes significant contributions to results on the ground, often in the most challenging environments. 

    Regional Coordinator, Santiago network 

    Under the supervision of the Director of the Santiago network Secretariat, with support by the Senior Programme Manager, the Regional Coordinator drives and supervises provision of catalyzed technical assistance and membership matters in the respective region, as well as provision of related services, ensuring effective and timely support for developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. 

    The Regional Coordinator leads the technical work of the Santiago network Secretariat, in the respective region, including programme delivery, and outreach, in consultation with UNDRR designated technical experts, and acts as key focal point for regional and national partners and technical agencies.

    The Regional Coordinator also leads the development and implementation of capacity building strategies and plans of the Santiago network in the respective region, including through strategic and actionable knowledge management.

    Functional responsibilities

    1. Setting up processes and systems
    2. Catalyzing technical assistance/Management of OBNEs
    3. Programme implementation and monitoring
    4. Partner and stakeholder engagement
    5. Knowledge management and innovation
    6. Corporate functions and team building

    1. Setting up processes and systems

    • Lead the implementation of the guidelines for responding to requests for technical assistance, the guidelines for the designation of members to the Santiago network, and relevant operational documents at the regional level.
    • Contribute to the creation of an enabling environment for demand-driven technical assistance, including support in identifying regional needs and in preparing requests for technical assistance.

    2. Catalyzing technical assistance/Management of OBNEs

    • Lead the implementation technical assistance (TA) cycle in the relevant region, in coordination with central functions and with Desk Officers for LDCs and SIDS as applicable, including submission, review, matchmaking, delivery, monitoring and knowledge sharing.
    • Coordinate the effective engagement with developing countries, communities and other stakeholders in relevant region in identifying their capacity gaps and developing requests for TA, where needed, including through regional scoping workshops and consultative processes.
    • Coordinate with the OBNE Engagement Specialist in building and managing a network of suitable OBNEs in the respective region for the provision of TA to support developing countries in averting, minimizing, and addressing loss and damage associated with climate change impacts in response to their needs.
    • Lead on the development and implementation of regionalTA and capacity building strategies and plans in order to support the achievement of the Santiago network strategy.

    3. Programme implementation and monitoring

    • Lead the implementation of regional results-based monitoring and evaluation activities, in coordination with central functions, to assess the timeliness, appropriateness and outcomes of assistance provided under the Santiago network.
    • Oversee the implementation and delivery of results of technical assistance relevant region , under the Monitoring and Evaluation for Learning and Accountability (MEAL) Framework.
    • Identify, assess and manage risks and issues that may impact the effective delivery of technical assistance in the relevant region, in coordination with corporate functions.
    • Provide inputs on regional operations to inform Santiago network regular reporting to the Advisory Board and inputs to the Annual Report to the governing body or bodies.

    4. Partner and stakeholder engagement

    • Develop and implement regional, national, subnational and community-based strategies for the engagement of relevant stakeholders, aiming to facilitate demand-driven technical assistance.
    • Develop strategies for engaging and maintaining partnerships in the region , including collaborative projects, joint events, and resource sharing.
    • Establish communication channels and platforms for effective networking and information exchange among Members in the region, in coordination with central functions.
    • Lead capacity building of partners and stakeholders for strategic regional partnership development and engagement.
    • Contribute to the development of regional advocacy campaigns, policy briefs, and other materials to support the Santiago network’s regional advocacy efforts, in coordination with the Communications Manager.

    5. Knowledge management and innovation

    • Facilitate the development, provision and dissemination of knowledge and information in the relevant region, on a wide range of topics relevant for loss and damage.
    • Champion knowledge on averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage, relevant for technical assistance delivery in the respective region.
    • Promote and raise awareness of the Santiago network in the relevant region.
    • Foster innovation and best practices in knowledge management, contributing to the development of feedback loops informed by operational experience.

    6. Corporate functions and team building

    • Uphold and model team values, fostering a respectful, inclusive and supportive, work environment, fostering collaboration between regional and global functions.
    • Contribute to the development and implementation of the Santiago network’s strategic, policy, and operational frameworks, ensuring alignment with its mandate and evolving needs.
    • Support the implementation of a resource mobilization strategy for the Santiago network to secure funds for technical assistance for developing countries.
    • Represent the Santiago network in international fora and high-level meetings in the respective, contributing to advance the delivery of its mandate and objectives.
    • Others, as required by the supervisor.

    Education/experience/language requirements

    Education

    • An advanced university degree (Masters or equivalent), preferably in development studies, international relations, political science, environmental sciences and climate change, economics, social sciences, or related areas, is required.
    • A first-level university degree in combination with two (2) additional years of qualifying experience may be accepted in lieu of an advanced university degree.

    Experience

    • A minimum of seven (7) years of relevant experience in the fields of programme development in developing countries, particularly in the areas of loss and damage, disaster risk reduction, climate change adaptation, development, or other related climate change and development areas, is required.
    • Of those seven (7) years, a minimum of at least five (5) years of demonstrated experience in the region in one of the relevant areas as listed above, is required.
    • Strong coordination, communication, and technical skills are desirable.
    • Familiarity with UNFCCC processes and the loss and damage agenda is highly desirable.

    Language

    • Fluency in oral and written English is required.
    • Fluency in oral and written Spanish is required.
    • Knowledge of another UN official language is an advantage.

    Contract type, level and duration

    Contract type: Staff – FTA Contract level: P4 (ICS-11) Contract duration: One year initially, renewable subject to satisfactory performance and funding availability.

    For more details about United Nations staff contracts, please follow this link: https://www.unops.org/english/Opportunities/job-opportunities/what-we-offer/Pages/UN-Staff-Contracts.aspx

    Competencies

    Develops and implements sustainable business strategies, thinks long term and externally in order to positively shape the organization. Anticipates and perceives the impact and implications of future decisions and activities on other parts of the organization.(for levels IICA-2, IICA-3, LICA Specialist- 10, LICA Specialist-11, NOC, NOD, P3, P4 and above)

    Treats all individuals with respect; responds sensitively to differences and encourages others to do the same. Upholds organizational and ethical norms. Maintains high standards of trustworthiness. Role model for diversity and inclusion.

    Acts as a positive role model contributing to the team spirit. Collaborates and supports the development of others. For people managers only: Acts as positive leadership role model, motivates, directs and inspires others to succeed, utilizing appropriate leadership styles.

    Demonstrates understanding of the impact of own role on all partners and always puts the end beneficiary first. Builds and maintains strong external relationships and is a competent partner for others (if relevant to the role).

    Efficiently establishes an appropriate course of action for self and/or others to accomplish a goal. Actions lead to total task accomplishment through concern for quality in all areas. Sees opportunities and takes the initiative to act on them. Understands that responsible use of resources maximizes our impact on our beneficiaries.

    Evaluates data and courses of action to reach logical, pragmatic decisions. Takes an unbiased, rational approach with calculated risks. Applies innovation and creativity to problem-solving.

    Expresses ideas or facts in a clear, concise and open manner. Communication indicates a consideration for the feelings and needs of others. Actively listens and proactively shares knowledge. Handles conflict effectively, by overcoming differences of opinion and finding common ground.

    Additional information

    • Please note that UNOPS does not accept unsolicited resumes.
    • Applications received after the closing date will not be considered.
    • Please note that only shortlisted candidates will be contacted and advance to the next stage of the selection process, which involves various assessments.
    • UNOPS embraces diversity and is committed to equal employment opportunity. Our workforce consists of many diverse nationalities, cultures, languages, races, gender identities, sexual orientations, and abilities. UNOPS seeks to sustain and strengthen this diversity to ensure equal opportunities as well as an inclusive working environment for its entire workforce.
    • Qualified women and candidates from groups which are underrepresented in the UNOPS workforce are encouraged to apply. These include in particular candidates from racialized and/or indigenous groups, members of minority gender identities and sexual orientations, and people with disabilities.
    • We would like to ensure all candidates perform at their best during the assessment process. If you are shortlisted and require additional assistance to complete any assessment, including reasonable accommodation, please inform our human resources team when you receive an invitation.

    Terms and conditions

    • For staff positions only, UNOPS reserves the right to appoint a candidate at a lower level than the advertised level of the post.
    • For retainer contracts, you must complete a few mandatory courses ( they take around 4 hours to complete) in your own time, before providing services to UNOPS. Refreshers or new mandatory courses may be required during your contract. Please note that you will not receive any compensation for taking courses and refreshers. For more information on a retainer contract here.
    • All UNOPS personnel are responsible for performing their duties in accordance with the UN Charter and UNOPS Policies and Instructions, as well as other relevant accountability frameworks. In addition, all personnel must demonstrate an understanding of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in a manner consistent with UN core values and the UN Common Agenda.
    • It is the policy of UNOPS to conduct background checks on all potential personnel. Recruitment in UNOPS is contingent on the results of such checks.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: New Permanent Representative of Australia Presents Credentials to the Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    Clare Monica Walsh, the new Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations Office at Geneva, today presented her credentials to Tatiana Valovaya, the Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva.

    Prior to her appointment to Geneva, Ms. Walsh held the position of Chief Operating Officer and Deputy Secretary, Enabling Services Group, at the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia, since 2022.  Earlier in her career, she held multiple other posts at the Department and posted abroad, including as Chief Operating Officer, Finance (2020–2022); Deputy Secretary, Global Cooperation, Development and Partnerships Group (2018–2020); Deputy Head of Mission, Australian Embassy in Japan (2016–2018); and as First Assistant Secretary, International Policy and Partnerships Division (AusAID) and Multilateral Development and Policy Division (2012–2015).  Ms. Walsh also held several positions in the Department of Climate Change and Energy between 2007 and 2012.

    Ms. Walsh holds degrees from three Australian universities, including a Master of Management from the Australian National University (2006); a Graduate Diploma in Environmental Sciences from Murdoch University (1992); and a Bachelor of Arts from Curtin University (1989).

    __________

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

    CR.25.024E

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: In Dialogue with Viet Nam, Experts of the Human Rights Committee Commend the Strengthened Human Rights Framework, Raise Issues Concerning Discrimination and Reports of Media Repression

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Human Rights Committee today concluded its consideration of the fourth periodic report of Viet Nam on how it implements the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  Committee Experts commended steps Viet Nam had taken to strengthen its legal and institutional framework for human rights, and raised issues concerning discrimination in various areas of public life and reports of a repressive media landscape.

    A Committee Expert praised the important steps Viet Nam had taken to strengthen its legal and institutional framework for human rights, saying they reflected a clear commitment to international cooperation and legal reform. They welcomed the recent decision to reduce the number of capital offenses from 18 to 10, a significant step toward limiting the scope of application of the death penalty.

    However, Viet Nam lacked a law developing the principle of non-discrimination in areas such as employment, health, education, politics and justice, another Expert noted, asking for further information on the number of complaints of acts of discrimination.

    The Committee also expressed concern about reports of a repressive media landscape in Viet Nam, where journalists, bloggers and human rights activists were often intimidated into silence.  One Expert asked for comments on allegations of targeted surveillance arbitrarily conducted on political activists, journalists, and human rights defenders.

    Thanh Tịnh Nguyễn, Deputy Minister of Justice and head of the delegation, said Viet Nam had consistently devoted special attention, strong efforts, and firm commitment to promoting and ensuring the effective implementation of human rights and citizens’ rights, including civil and political rights.  Legal, administrative, and judicial reforms in Viet Nam, as well as law enforcement practices, were all anchored in a people-centred approach.

    In the ensuing discussion, the delegation, in response to these questions and others, said human rights had been upheld and promoted in Viet Nam over the past forty years and the State’s legal system was sufficiently comprehensive to fully implement the Covenant.

    The law was very comprehensive to prevent any discrimination in civil and personal life, the delegation said.  Everybody was equal before the law, including in the labour sector, where the law prohibited discrimination, including salary discrimination between men and women and against guest workers.  Discrimination was also forbidden in education.

    The right of freedom of expression could not, the delegation said, be used to violate the rights of others or of organisations or harm social order.  The policy of Viet Nam safeguarded the freedom of expression and of the press, but needed to be in line with international law.  Viet Nam strictly dealt with efforts to defame the State and cause division among the different parts of society, in line with international agreements.

    In concluding remarks, Mr. Nguyễn said the protection and promotion of human rights were the objective and result of a long struggle by many generations of Vietnamese people. Viet Nam worked to ensure the happiness of the people, which was the ultimate goal of its policies, and had worked to improve its legal system to ensure that people would be the beneficiaries of its policies.

    Changrok Soh, Committee Chairperson, in concluding remarks, said the dialogue had addressed key elements of the implementation of the Covenant.  The adoption of certain institutional safeguards to combat discrimination and domestic violence was positive, but there were several remaining concerns requiring attention, including regarding severe restrictions on fundamental freedoms related to assembly, speech, and religion.  There were also credible allegations of torture and ill-treatment, and persistent challenges for vulnerable groups, he concluded.

    The delegation of Viet Nam was made up of representatives of the Ministry of Justice; the Office of the Government; the Supreme People’s Procuracy; the Ministry of Public Security; the Ministry of Home Affairs; the Supreme People’s Court; the Ministry of Culture, Sport and Tourism; the Ministry of Ethnic Minorities and Religions; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and the Permanent Mission of Viet Nam to the United Nations Office at Geneva.

    The Human Rights Committee’s one hundred and forty-fourth session is being held from 23 June to 17 July 2025.  All the documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, can be found on the session’s webpage.  Meeting summary releases can be found here.  The webcast of the Committee’s public meetings can be accessed via the UN Web TV webpage.

    The Committee will next meet in public at 10 a.m., Thursday 10 July to hold an informal meeting with States.

    Report

    The Committee has before it the fourth periodic report of Viet Nam (CCPR/C/VNM/4).

    Presentation of the Report

    THANH TỊNH NGUYỄN, Deputy Minister of Justice and head of the delegation, said, guided by the principle of placing people at the centre — as both the goal and the driving force of development, Viet Nam had consistently devoted special attention, strong efforts, and firm commitment to promoting and ensuring the effective implementation of human rights and citizens’ rights, including civil and political rights.  Legal, administrative, and judicial reforms in Viet Nam, as well as law enforcement practices, were all anchored in a people-centred approach, whereby the people were regarded as the primary beneficiaries of the system.  These efforts aimed to implement effective measures to protect and ensure human rights and citizens’ rights in accordance with the law.  Immediately following the constructive dialogue with the Committee in 2019, the Government of Viet Nam adopted a national action plan to implement the Covenant and the Committee’s recommendations, with the aim of clearly identifying areas in need of improvement and undertaking necessary institutional and practical measures to ensure substantive progress.

    With regard to institutional and legal reform, since the submission of the fourth national report, Viet Nam had amended, supplemented, or enacted over 150 laws and resolutions of the National Assembly, many of which were directly related to the lives of the people and aimed at advancing civil and political rights.  Most recently, Viet Nam adopted the amended Criminal Code, which narrowed the scope of application of the death penalty by abolishing capital punishment for eight offences, and had recently adopted Resolution 66 on reforming the legislative process.  Viet Nam was also vigorously advancing a comprehensive reform of the State administrative apparatus.

    Viet Nam had undertaken a range of measures to enhance transparency, openness, and efficiency in the implementation of laws and policies.  Human rights education had been integrated into the national curriculum.  Viet Nam had issued and effectively implemented a range of policies that directly promoted and protected civil and political rights.  In the area of social security policy, Viet Nam remained firmly committed to ensuring social welfare, public safety, and the well-being of its people, under the guiding principle of “leaving no one behind.”  Viet Nam had also taken proactive measures to respond to climate change and to support the people in the context of disaster relief efforts. It had further placed strong emphasis on investing in infrastructure and enabling conditions to ensure public access to information, and was currently recognised as one of the countries with the most affordable internet access.  Rapid developments had significantly contributed to the realisation of the rights to freedom of the press, freedom of expression, and access to information.

    In the process of ensuring, protecting, and promoting the realisation of human rights, Viet Nam continued to face various difficulties and challenges arising from multiple factors that affect the implementation of the Covenant. These included limited resources; instances where the enforcement of laws had not met expectations; and the growing impact of global issues and non-traditional security threats in the context of Viet Nam’s  international integration.

    Viet Nam was in the process of building and perfecting a socialist rule-of-law State for the people, in order to build a high-quality legal system that effectively ensured and protected human rights and citizens’ rights, in a manner consistent with national realities and international standards.  In this process, Viet Nam would continue to seriously fulfil its international human rights commitments, and further promote dialogue and cooperation in this important area.  At the same time, Viet Nam would implement comprehensive measures to better promote, protect, and ensure the enjoyment of civil and political rights, and to improve resilience to climate change — particularly for vulnerable groups — through appropriate steps in the time to come.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert said the Committee acknowledged the important steps Viet Nam had taken to strengthen its legal and institutional framework for human rights.  These developments reflected a clear commitment to international cooperation and legal reform.  The Committee commended Viet Nam for its recent decision to reduce the number of capital offenses from 18 to 10, which marked a significant step toward limiting the scope of application of the death penalty.

    Given reports that Directive 24 broadly defined international integration as a national security threat, leading to systemic restrictions on freedoms of expression, association, and movement, how did Viet Nam reconcile this directive with the Covenant’s articles 19, 21, and 22, an Expert asked.  Regarding disaster response and recovery efforts, as well as campaigns to eliminate temporary housing, the report did not address the adoption of a precautionary approach or specific measures to protect the most vulnerable from the negative impacts of climate change and natural disasters, and the Expert asked what specific measures Viet Nam had adopted to implement a precautionary approach to environmental and climate risks, and how vulnerable groups were identified and protected in these policies.

    Regarding the death penalty, an Expert asked about the criteria used to select offences to be removed from the scope of the death penalty; the reasons that led Viet Nam to stop short of full abolition; and considerations that had prevented the country from following the path toward complete abolition of the death penalty.  What measures were in place to ensure full respect for due process guarantees in death penalty cases, and to prevent the imposition of the death penalty as a result of forced confessions?  On enforced disappearances, the Expert asked whether Vietnamese law defined and criminalised all acts of enforced disappearance in accordance with international standards, and about measures in place to ensure prompt, thorough, and impartial investigations into allegations of enforced disappearance and transnational repression.

    Another Expert asked for an update on progress made towards the establishment of the national human rights institution, and for more detailed and concrete information on the status of the legislative review and the reasons for the continued delays in establishing the body.  What measures did the State party plan to take to ensure that all allegations of torture and ill-treatment, solitary confinement, incommunicado detention and forced commitment to psychiatric facilities were promptly and thoroughly investigated by an independent body and that perpetrators were prosecuted and sanctioned with appropriate penalties, and to investigate all reported instances of deaths of prisoners while detained?  What measures would the State party take to ensure that national legislation protecting the rights of detainees was implemented in practice, in particular the right to medical care?

    An Expert commended the State party for its continued efforts to combat corruption, but noted that further efforts were needed to strengthen anti-corruption initiatives.  He expressed particular concern relating to allegations of corruption involving high-level public officials, judges, prosecutors, and law enforcement officers, and asked for information on any actions taken in response to such cases.  He noted reports indicating persistent concerns that the enforcement of anti-corruption laws was perceived as selective and politically driven.  The Expert asked for further details on the mandates, composition, appointment procedures, and safeguards in place to ensure the independence of the three types of agencies involved in anti-corruption efforts.  He also asked whether the draft Law on the State of Emergency was fully compatible with article four of the Covenant, including its substantive and procedural requirements.

    Viet Nam lacked a law developing the principle of non-discrimination in areas such as employment, health, education, politics and justice, an Expert noted, asking for further information on the number of complaints of acts of discrimination, and on investigations, sanctions and reparations for victims; about employees with disabilities in the public and private sectors; and on the existence of other protection mechanisms.  Regarding women’s rights, the Expert asked about progress that had been made over the last ten years, including regarding non-discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender, noting that women’s rights had been violated by these forms of discrimination.  Was the State going to work towards the legalisation of same-sex marriage or civil partnership?  Had measures been taken to address the issue of stigmatisation, harassment, violence and discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons?

    An Expert expressed concern for the realities of Khmer Krom women, who were highly vulnerable to various human rights violations due to their gender, facing a high risk of systematic inequalities and abuse.  Other areas of concern included the wide salary gap between men and women, as well as continuing differentiation of retirement ages between men and women, the participation of women in political life, and that there still needed to be evidence of a minimum degree of physical injury for an act to be legally recognised as rape.  In view of these, the Expert asked what measures had been taken to increase women’s participation, specifically ethnic minority women and women in rural areas, in all private and public sectors, as well as high-level decision-making positions and political life.

    The Expert also expressed concern about the situation of drug users confined to drug rehabilitation centres, asking for more information on measures taken to ensure that all legislation concerning drug detoxification and rehabilitation centres, particularly the provisions retaining compulsory drug treatment, including for children between 12 and 18, were in line with the Covenant.

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said human rights had been upheld and promoted in Viet Nam over the past forty years and its legal system was sufficiently comprehensive to fully implement the Covenant.  There was a separate chapter in the Constitution on human rights that was in line with the Covenant.  Human rights could only be suspended for reasons of national security, public safety, and public health.  Only the National Assembly could suspend human rights, in line with the Constitution. As part of the law-making process in Viet Nam, there needed to be a consultation with stakeholders, including those affected by the law.  Human rights topics were now included in the national educational curriculum.  The State conducted many campaigns on human rights, and information on human rights was translated into various national minority languages and made available, including online.  Viet Nam had adopted various national measures to ensure national security and the safe and productive life of its people.

    Viet Nam was implementing the Covenant in various ways, including through its law and education.  According to the law, the Covenant needed to be prioritised if there were differences between it and the law.  If any discrepancies were identified, the Covenant took precedence.  There were training courses for judges and lawyers and other legal professionals on the provisions of the Covenant.

    Viet Nam was one of the countries seriously affected by climate change, which caused many socio-economic challenges.  The Government attached great importance to those whose rights had been affected by the phenomenon, and ensured that sustainable and green development and the climate change strategy of Viet Nam were prioritised in all policies.  Many important activities had been adopted for ethnic minorities, including access to adequate, clean water, and the development of a medical network that focused on climate change-related diseases.  The Government had also developed a plan to review infrastructure in climate change-prone areas, including water infrastructure.  The climate change strategy had many implications on the enjoyment of the human rights of the people.  Viet Nam promoted international cooperation to ensure that all could fight climate change issues, whilst cooperating with all international agencies.

    On discrimination against the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex community, anti-discrimination was a part of the legal framework, and over the past years Viet Nam had taken many steps to better protect the members of the community, to ensure that none would be discriminated against on the basis of their gender or sexual identity.  The provision in the law criminalising same-sex marriage had been removed more than 10 years ago, although there was no law legalising same-sex marriage.  The new Criminal Code, since 2015, contained provisions regarding sexual offences which protected lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons.  In 2022, the Ministry of Health introduced a guideline giving direction to local authorities, which ensured that these persons could not be subject to discrimination. On oversight of activities in the medical sector, so far, no complaints had been received, meaning that there were no violations of the guidelines.  Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons had access to services to support them, and could change their legal identity, ensuring that they were not discriminated against.

    On anti-corruption efforts, Viet Nam had implemented many activities aiming to perfect the legal framework, including the adoption of the Anti-Corruption Law within the Criminal Code and related preventive measures.  It had also strengthened its monitoring activities, streamlined the administrative apparatus to better support the functions of the State, and was working to enhance efficiency.  Anti-corruption courses were available for legal practitioners, including at the local level.  Capacity building was one of the strongest commitments made by the Government.  There were specialised agencies working to prevent corruption, including a department on police in the Ministry of Security, and a department specialised on investigations and prosecutions of corruption cases within the Ministry of Justice.  Viet Nam had made significant efforts over the last few years to combat corruption and had recently made significant achievements, which it would strive to continue.

    The law was very comprehensive to prevent any discrimination in civil and personal life.  Everybody was equal before the law, including in the labour sector, where the law prohibited discrimination, including salary discrimination between men and women and against guest workers.  Discrimination was also forbidden in education.  The law provided a significant number of sanctions to reduce gender inequality.  Efforts had been strengthened to ensure the equal representation of women in political life — women were provided with more opportunities for leadership positions and were given training to gain the necessary skills to participate in political life.  There was an action plan in the Ministry of Labour to ensure equal access of men and women to business, investment capital, and health services.  The gap between retirement age between men and women was being reviewed by the Government; the current discrepancy was not discriminatory but reflected the situation of the population.  Many different policies and programmes were being implemented for persons with disabilities, including those providing employment opportunities.

    On the establishment of the national human rights institution, much work had been done in this regard.  This was an important long-term goal that required serious consideration to ensure that the institution would be in line with international commitments and Viet Nam’s needs and specificities.  There were currently other mechanisms in place, including the equivalent of an Ombudsman, and a National Committee on Women and Children, which fulfilled the same role, promoting the rights of the people of Viet Nam.  Viet Nam was still reviewing the situation in order to be able to establish a model national human rights institution.

    According to Vietnamese law, prisoners had the right to access medical care, including medical check-ups and access to hospital services for regular treatment if their care could not be provided in the prison.  On transfers to psychiatric facilities, if a person showed any signs of psychiatric illness, they would be sent for forensic examination, and if the examination indicated it was required, they would be transferred to psychiatric facilities, where they were entitled to medical treatment.

    Human rights, including the right to life, could only be restricted in certain circumstances provided for in the Constitution.  Depriving others of their right to life was a criminal affair which needed to be prosecuted.  Viet Nam implemented various measures recommended by international bodies during the COVID-19 pandemic to lower the rate of transmission in accordance with the law, on the basis of public health and in order to safeguard the health of the people. There was a free vaccination campaign, with no discrimination.  At the end of the pandemic, Viet Nam brought the restrictions to an end.

    Juveniles were not subject to the death penalty, the delegation said, and Viet Nam was getting closer to international standards, moving forward to a phase in which it would review the Criminal Code.  It also had a road map to move forward in making it ever more difficult to condemn a person to death.  Work had also been done to ensure that there was no overlap with torture in the application of the death penalty.  There was an oversight mechanism and strong and stringent sanctions to be applied to the perpetrators of torture.

    One law included specific regulation of detention conditions, including the minimum space per detainee, access to food and drinkable water, and women-specific products.  All prisoners were entitled to medical support and treatment.  There was compulsory drug rehabilitation and detoxification, aiming to help persons end their addiction.  There was a strict procedure for this, which included a passage in front of a court.

    Follow-Up Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert said the situation of women still raised questions.  Misconceptions about sexual violence, the wish to preserve the harmony of the family, mediation according to the law of 2022, and the fear of rehabilitation were all obstacles before women, making them reluctant to report acts of violence committed against them in different spheres, including domestic violence and harassment in the workplace.  The legal definition of rape remained of concern to the Committee.  What were the activities carried out under the national communication programme on gender equality and the National Strategy on Gender Equality?  What measures were taken to identify the factors that prevented women victims from reporting abuse, and to align the legal definition of rape with the Covenant and other international standards?  What remedies had been offered to victims and what was the number of cases that had been referred to alternative dispute resolution processes?

    Another Expert asked about the oversight mechanisms that existed to examine cases of torture and their findings.  Had there been any cases of torture, and if there were any, had the perpetrators been prosecuted?  One Expert said the results of corruption investigations could vary depending on who initiated and drove the process.  In certain cases, political manoeuvring could influence investigations; statistical data would help clarify the nature of the cases.  Viet Nam had not submitted any notification under article four, paragraph three of the Covenant — did this mean it did not consider itself to ever have been under a situation of public emergency?

    Another Expert raised the issue of a comprehensive law on non-discrimination and the potential detention of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons in separate facilities apart from the general population, asking if this was being done according to human rights principles.  According to the Adoption Law of 2010, adoption could only be done by people with opposite-sex partners, or by a single person.  The Expert asked about the extent to which a homosexual person could adopt.  On discrimination against persons with disabilities in the world of work, he asked for specific, concrete data regarding the number of persons employed under programmes to end discrimination in the labour market.

    An Expert asked whether there was a legal procedure that enabled individuals sentenced to death to seek a review of their convictions based on newly discovered evidence of their innocence, and what remedies were provided for persons who were shown to have been wrongly convicted?  Again on the death penalty, another Expert asked how many executions had taken place, and how many persons were on death row?  Was there an offence related to kidnapping for financial gain, as this could be assimilated to enforced disappearance?

    In Viet Nam, the international human rights treaties did hold precedence, and nothing stopped the courts from applying them.  Why, to date, had no court invoked the Covenant with regard to the rights and provisions enshrined within it?

    Regarding the plan of action against climate change, the Expert was pleased to recognise that minorities in occupied territories who were particularly vulnerable to climate change were included; he asked whether these minorities were consulted during the drafting of the plans and whether they were respecting traditional farming methods and techniques?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the law of Viet Nam mentioned the hierarchy of international legislation and domestic law; priority was given to the international commitments and agreements.  The definition of rape in the Criminal Code was divided into two categories, including one for those over 13 and one for those under 13, for whom the law did not require any evidence of force or circumstances such as alcoholic consumption to elicit sexual activities.  The law did not distinguish between married and unmarried rape.

    On domestic violence, the delegation said even though much effort had been made to combat this violence, the detection and handling of such cases had not yet been satisfactory.  The Government had issued a decree on domestic violence.  Data would be provided more comprehensively later. There were opportunities for the victim to express themselves.  There were also local supportive networks for the victims of violence, and there were psychological and medical services provided for such victims.  There were media and communication events held on domestic violence, and campaigns to raise awareness, providing information for victims so that they would be more willing to raise their voice.

    Regarding torture and the death penalty, there were eight crimes which could be punished by the penalty, including treason, murder, rape, terrorism, crimes against humanity, crimes of war, illegal production of narcotics, and drug trafficking. Keeping the data regarding executions private was often due to national security and defence reasons, and also for the protection of the privacy of the family and victims of the perpetrator.  There was a procedure for review of judgements — at any point, a complaint could be made and an appeal made on the basis of wrongful conviction.  In the case of a wrongful conviction, there was a law on State compensation.  If there was any violation or wrongful conviction identified, then the State would provide compensation, including a public apology.  The law was very comprehensive when it came to illegal detention of others.  There was a hierarchy of oversight mechanisms which applied to cases of torture.

    Regarding detention, Viet Nam did not use the method of transferring prisoners away from their residential addresses as a punishment.  Prisoners were kept close to their families.  Pregnant women, foreigners and juveniles were given particular consideration.  However, very violent or dangerous criminals were kept separate from other members of the same criminal network in prison, for reasons of security.  Viet Nam was making great efforts to improve conditions for prisoners, and was amending the law on custody and detention to ensure there could be no violation of human rights.

    Only certain persons were subject to compulsory detoxification and addiction treatment, and such decisions needed to be made by the local authority and reviewed by the court to ensure that they were valid.  There were no cases of forced labour at the compulsory detoxification centres, but there was therapeutic labour, which aimed to help inmates to learn to take care of themselves.  Inmates were allowed to enjoy sports and other leisure activities.

    There were several pilot programmes to respond to climate change, with engagement from the local to the central level, and communication campaigns for the ethnic and mountain areas.  There were a wide range of collaborative events, including with non-governmental organizations, and inputs from partners were carefully considered by the authorities when they developed strategies to mitigate climate change.

    There was fertile ground for the growth of a national human rights institution, but to achieve this, legal amendments, including of the Constitution, were needed, making it a time-consuming process.  Viet Nam was paying more attention to streamlining the governmental structure.  In the future, it would carefully consider the Paris Principles when establishing such an institution.  However, great efforts were being made to safeguard, protect and promote human rights already.  There was a mechanism already in place to deal with corruption, which dealt with reports and allegations of corruption from individuals.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert said the Criminal Procedure Code provided that Government prosecutors could hold suspects accused of national security crimes in detention for an unlimited period without trial or judicial review.  Prosecutors could restrict access to legal counsel in cases related to suspects accused of “national security” crimes until the conclusion of the investigation and with no time limits.  What concrete measures would be taken to ensure that any deprivation of liberty was lawful and that detained persons were afforded legal safeguards from the outset of their detention?  How would the State ensure that pre-trial detention was used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest period, following a proper, individualised assessment and for reasons expressly provided by law and in line with international human rights standard and the Covenant?

    Reports before the Committee indicated that trafficking in persons continued to be a serious concern.  There was a lack of a clear framework for the protection of non-Vietnamese nationals trafficked to Viet Nam, or transited through Viet Nam to a third country.  There had been no substantive changes in Government policies and efforts to combat labour trafficking in the State-run labour export programme.  What measures were being taken to strengthen international legal cooperation and national law enforcement capacities to investigate and respond to the linkages between cybercrime, human trafficking and migrant smuggling, and to strengthen international cooperation to ensure cross-border access to supporting services?

    Another Expert said the Committee remained concerned about directives on international travel that closely managed officials, party members and Vietnamese citizens who went abroad, and by the fact that the law allowed authorities to postpone the departure of any person on various broad grounds.  What new measures had been taken to guarantee freedom of movement, and what were the legal grounds for decisions to restrict international travel on Vietnamese citizens and legal grounds for such bans?  The Expert also asked for comment on reports asserting that members of ethnic and religious minorities and indigenous people had been prevented from leaving Viet Nam to seek asylum; and that human rights defenders and religious activists were routinely subject to discriminatory restrictions on their freedom of movement.

    Significant progress had been made in juvenile justice, thanks to an increased awareness of the importance of legal institutional reforms.  However, these improvements were reportedly neither systematic nor comprehensive, and detention of children in conflict with the law was still common.  What efforts had been made to amend the legislation to address the protection gaps for children aged 16 and 17 years and the definition of a child to cover persons up to 18 years of age?  What measures had been taken to strengthen the juvenile justice system by setting up additional specialised courts with trained judges, improving community-based diversion, and ensuring children were not deprived of liberty?

    The Committee was concerned about reports of a repressive media landscape in Viet Nam, where journalists, bloggers and human rights activists were often intimidated into silence, another Expert said, asking for comments on allegations of targeted surveillance arbitrarily conducted on political activists, journalists, and human rights defenders.

    Regarding judicial independence, another Expert asked what specific measures were in place to guarantee the presumption of innocence, access to a lawyer of one’s choice, and a trial within a reasonable time for journalists, human rights defenders, political activists, and individuals accused of national security crimes.  What concrete steps had the State party taken to prevent and punish threats, intimidation, or harassment against lawyers for their work on sensitive cases?  Had any independent mechanisms for judicial oversight over legislative and executive actions been established or implemented? On participation in public affairs, the same Expert asked what measures had been taken to encourage and promote political pluralism.  What steps had been taken to eliminate proxy voting in practice, and had an independent electoral monitoring body been established?

    On the freedom of association, despite the constitutional proclamation of the right of association, an Expert expressed concern that there was no framework law regulating this right in a coherent and protective manner.  There had also been reports of systematic repression of religious minorities practising their faith outside the control of State-recognised religious organisations.  What measures had Viet Nam taken to ensure that the right of association, including the right to establish and register independent religious or social associations, could be exercised without interference?  What guarantees existed to prevent the use of the Penal Code against minority religious communities that did not wish to integrate into State-controlled structures?  Further, he asked for detailed information on the rules applicable to associations receiving foreign funding and on the differences in legal treatment between national associations, foreign associations and those receiving international funding.  What steps had Viet Nam taken to ensure that tax and criminal laws were not used in a disproportionate or discriminatory manner against human rights defenders?

    The Committee welcomed the programmes implemented by the State party for the economic and social development of minorities.  However, there had been multiple reports of persistent discrimination against these minority groups, in particular against the Khmer Krom and Montagnards.  What concrete actions had Viet Nam taken to eradicate systematic discrimination against these communities in education, employment and public services?

    On freedom of conscience and religious belief, what was the procedure for registration or recognition for religious groups, an Expert asked, inquiring how long the process typically took from initiation to decision?  Was the applicant allowed an opportunity to respond or appeal during the review process? What were the reasons for denying registration to certain organizations?  How did the State party justify the non-registration of relatively large religious groups such as Cao Dai and Hoa Hao?  What measures were in place to ensure that individuals were free to choose their religion without coercion?

    Regarding freedom of expression, what amendments was the State party considering to the Press Law, the Expert asked.  What legal safeguards existed to ensure that measures affecting online freedom of expression were strictly necessary and proportionate, and in compliance with the Covenant?  What mechanisms were in place to prevent and address harassment and intimidation of individuals, including journalists and online activists, who expressed views critical of the Government?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said ethnic minorities in Viet Nam were entitled to all human rights and citizen rights, and equal access to public services.  Many regulations prohibited discrimination on ethnic grounds.  The Government was implementing a socio-economic plan to ensure development of ethnic affairs.  Ethnic minorities were given the full opportunity to participate in economic and social life, and to stand for election: 70 per cent of the National Assembly were members of ethnic minorities.  Ethnic minorities could participate in many political activities. There were policies encouraging their equal participation in public service and their culture and cultural identity.  Ethnic minority groups had the right to equality of employment, including equal pay. There was vocational training for ethnic minorities, which was regulated by the law.

    Authorities ensured the freedom of religion by citizens.  The State checked the implementation of the law on freedom of religion and belief.  There were favourable conditions that ensured detainees or persons in custody could exercise their religion.  The State did not require registration for religious collectives and religious activities could take place without registration if they were not against the law.

    There had been changes to the law on the People’s Court, regarding the appointment of judges, to further guarantee their independence.  There was a stringent procedure for their appointment.  Interference with judicial activities was prohibited by law, and there was a mechanism to oversee the activities of judges to ensure that they complied with the law.  Regarding corruption, several cases had been prosecuted against high-ranking persons, and the results of these were publicised.  The victims of corruption were protected, as provided for in the Criminal Code.  Activities that hindered the judicial procedure could also be punished according to the law.

    On juvenile justice, there was a new Juvenile Justice Law since November 2024, which entered into effect in 2025, which was consistent with international standards on juvenile justice and provided new regulations to better protect juvenile perpetrators and victims, with diverse measures that could be applied to offenders.  The law also introduced family-friendly measures to ensure that the procedure would be more victim-friendly.  Penalties against juvenile offenders could include non-custodial punishments, and juvenile offenders below a certain age who were detained were kept separately, under the oversight of trained officers.  There were 38 juvenile courts at the provincial level.  Much attention was paid to training and capacity-building of the judges of these courts.

    A high percentage of Viet Nam’s population had access to the Internet, with good technology and infrastructure, the delegation said, but there was a need for a better mechanism to ensure confidentiality and privacy.  The State had issued a decree to strengthen cyber security to ensure that information was only collected in line with international standards and with the commitments Viet Nam had made, without hindering data flow.  The National Assembly of Viet Nam had adopted a law on protection of personal data, which was a strong commitment to the protection of privacy in line with international standards.  It also guaranteed the right to complain if such privacy was violated. Viet Nam’s efforts had been recognised by the international community.

    The right of freedom of expression could not, however, be used to violate the rights of others or of organisations and did not harm social order.  The policy of Viet Nam safeguarded the freedom of expression and of the press, but this needed to be in line with international law.  Cyber security in Viet Nam was not against these commitments and principles, which restrictions were aligned with.

    On the freedom of association, the delegation said this right was one of the most basic rights and was clearly provided for by the law and several Government decrees.  Viet Nam had more than 70,000 associations, many of which operated nationwide.  There were an increasing number of associations, operating in various sectors in order to cover the needs of the people, and operating in a way that contributed to the socio-economic development of the country.  The requirement of registration and reporting on financial resources was a popular regulation adopted to prevent any violation of the law by an association, such as conducting terrorism or money laundering. These regulations aimed at administrative management only, and were not based on discrimination.  The freedom of religion and belief was safeguarded through the Constitution and other legislation.

    To ensure transparency in elections, the National Assembly had established the National Election Council, which would make decisions on dismissing any false elections and rehosting them, and applying a penalty on those who had perpetrated fraud.  The 2021 election had the greatest number of electors ever.  There were no cases of serious violation of electoral regulations.  Viet Nam encouraged voters to select the candidates that satisfied the requirements for the position.  Elections were well-organised in Viet Nam.  Many regulations and provisions had been introduced on standing for election for members of the National Assembly to ensure the right of freedom to stand for election.

    On prevention of human trafficking in the labour sector, the law introduced a number of provisions to better protect Vietnamese workers working abroad.  The employment fee had been eliminated; only a brokerage fee could be charged. After a worker finalised a contract, they currently paid a limited fee, but Viet Nam was moving towards a model where the employer would pay this fee.  Campaigns were being held to ensure workers were aware of the risks of being trafficked when working abroad, and to give them more information about reliable channels for migrating, and of the risks of migrating outside of these channels.

    On civic space in Viet Nam, civil society organizations had the freedom to operate and could make contributions to the socio-economic development of the country, as long as they acted in line with the law.  Members of civil society organisations, including human rights defenders, would only be arrested if they violated the law, and the organisations needed to comply with the law and fulfil their obligations, including regarding tax regulations.  Arrests, detention and prosecution of such persons were only done in line with the law.

    Viet Nam adopted a revised version of its anti-trafficking law in January 2025 that was consistent with international standards and included a revised definition of human trafficking. The Criminal Code would be revised to ensure that it complied with the anti-trafficking law.  Anyone who reported to the authorities complaining of being a victim of trafficking would be protected and supported.  The law also contained provisions on rescue and identification of victims.  Viet Nam worked with the border and police of neighbouring countries to fight against human trafficking and to protect and defend victims, providing them with shelter and medical attention to cover their needs.

    Regarding freedom of movement, Viet Nam respected this fully with regard to its citizens, ensuring that they were protected and promoting their freedom of residence.  The law contained a list of prohibited activities.  Anybody leaving or entering the country needed to respect the relevant laws.  Freedom of movement could be restricted based on national security, public health, and public defence.  There was no single case of restriction of freedom of movement in Viet Nam for ethnic or religious reasons; all cases were because laws had been violated.

    Viet Nam supported the right of freedom of expression, but strictly dealt with violations of those rights, particularly in efforts to defame the State and cause division among the different parts of society, and this was in line with international agreements. 

    The Penal Code provided for detention only under clear and specific conditions, and also provided for other forms of detention.  Detention was only imposed if it was deemed necessary.  Detainees had the full right to family visits and to communicate with others, with the right to access legal counsel.  Limitations to legal counsel were in line with international standards, and only applied in severe cases of necessity, including those affecting national security.  Suspects could also be detained in these cases to ensure that the investigation would be sufficient.  Since 2019 to date, there had been no cases of abuse of this power.

    Follow-Up Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert said he was not fully satisfied with responses on a few issues, including regarding who was responsible for the disciplinary procedure for judges, and how their independence from the Government was ensured. How was the presumption of innocence and access to a lawyer guaranteed, and how were lawyers protected in sensitive cases from facing threats of reprisal?  How was the independence of the National Electoral Council ensured?

    On the freedom of expression, an Expert noted that this was not an absolute right but said that concerns lay in the breadth of the restrictions allowed for by the State party.  Restrictions needed to be as narrowly defined as possible.  The Committee did not take exception to detention for violation of laws, but it took exception to excessive lengths of detention and forms of harassment perpetrated on the accused.  The State party recognised the importance of religious freedom, but at the same time referred to a need for registration, which was a limitation of this freedom.

    Another Expert addressed the situation of those arrested for national security reasons, noting that this was a broad concept, and that sometimes national security laws were applied to prisoners of conscience and persons with certain religious beliefs.  The Expert said he was unsure how this was relevant to national security.  The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention had found cases of arbitrary detention where there had been restriction of freedom of religion, restrictions on access to legal counsel, and other inappropriate restrictions, and he asked for a comment on this.

    Regarding the right to freedom of association, an Expert asked whether any of the restrictions to this right could be removed, and whether the Government was envisaging any law on the freedom of association.  According to information received, persons who spoke minority languages and other minorities were not allowed to participate in international fora, which was a matter of concern.  On the rights of indigenous peoples and minorities, had any of the rights that had been developed globally been recognised in Viet Nam, where there appeared to be a resistance to recognising indigenous peoples.  Did they benefit from the core rights existing in international law? 

    Further clarification was requested on the conditions under which the Government interfered with the right to privacy by cutting telephone lines, interrupting cell phones and Internet services for political activists and their families.  Did the Government consider abolishing or amending relevant legislation, or providing more solid grounds for the registering of media users using real names and phone numbers, including those outside Viet Nam?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the Criminal Code included a provision on the presumption of innocence, so defendants were considered to be innocent until found guilty by a legal decision by a court of Viet Nam.  Only the courts had the authority to declare somebody guilty, and there needed to be sufficient access to legal counsel.  If there was lack of evidence, then the court needed to declare a person innocent.  There were many mechanisms to oversee and monitor judges’ performance, and there were inspections of local and central courts, investigations of denunciations or allegations of violations, and disciplinary actions provided for in case these were substantiated.

    Regarding elections, independent candidates needed to prepare a dossier and send their application to the local authorities, who would review it to make sure that it respected the law, after which they would send the dossier to the standing committee and the provincial election committee, as well as the National Election Council.  There was a stringent procedure for considering the application for election by independent candidates.  On restriction of the freedom of association, a recent decree had been enacted that created favourable conditions for associations without discrimination. There were no plans to introduce any other new laws, as the current legislation satisfied requirements.

    On privacy, cybersecurity and freedom of expression and speech, Viet Nam’s policy was to have a healthy cyberspace that did not infringe upon the enjoyment of rights.  The cybersecurity of Viet Nam aimed to promote the use of the Internet whilst striking a balance between the rise of the country and the needs of the people, and had been developed on the basis of learning from experiences of other countries, in consultation with public and private bodies.  The cybersecurity law provided precise conditions in which there could be restrictions of access to the Internet, but this law did not hinder human rights and only related to cases where individuals violated the law. Cybersecurity did not hinder the use of the Internet unless it was to defend the Government.

    The freedom of expression and of the press was not an absolute right and needed to be exercised in line with the law.  Registration was used to this end to protect the legitimate rights of all people and to develop a healthy Internet space.  The right to freedom and belief had been effectively supported over previous years, thanks to the implementation of a new law from 2018, the delegation said.

    Given the characteristics of the people in question, Viet Nam did not use the term “indigenous people”, using instead the terms “ethnic minority” or “small minority”, the delegation said.  The guarantee of rights for ethnic minorities was a significant achievement, given the geographical structure of Viet Nam.  These people were facilitated in their access to their human and citizenship rights.

    On arbitrary detention, the right to access to defence counsel was never limited for detainees.  Only the Prosecutor General had the power to make the decision to limit such access, but no cases of this were recorded.  On tax evasion, there were regulations on this all over the world, and penalties were imposed, and this could not be considered a punitive measure.

    Closing Statements

    THANH TỊNH NGUYỄN, Deputy Minister of Justice and head of the delegation, said Viet Nam appreciated the dialogue.  The delegation had engaged openly and sincerely, and aimed to provide all answers. Protection and promotion of human rights were the objective and result of a long struggle by many generations of Vietnamese people.  Human rights were a universal and global value, and their protection was a goal for all countries, but each country had a different mechanism to ensure these rights for citizens in line with its socio-economic situation.  Viet Nam worked to ensure the happiness of the people, which was the ultimate goal of its policies, and it had worked to this end to improve its legal system to ensure that people would be the beneficiaries of its policies.  Viet Nam remained steadfast in its aim to build a democratic, equitable and harmonious society, implementing sustainable social policies based on human rights for the people, who were placed at the heart of State policies.  Good laws also needed to be enforced and implemented to ensure positive results, and this was also the policy of the Government.  Viet Nam’s Government was committed to implementing the Covenant.

    CHANGROK SOH, Committee Chairperson, expressed sincere gratitude to all those who had contributed to the dialogue.  Over the past two days, the dialogue had addressed key elements of the implementation of the Covenant.  The adoption of certain institutional safeguards to combat discrimination and to combat domestic violence was positive, but there were a number of remaining concerns requiring attention, including severe restriction on fundamental freedoms related to assembly, speech, and religion.  There were also credible allegations of torture and ill-treatment, and persistent challenges for vulnerable groups, including women and children, ethnic minorities, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons.

    ___________

    This document is produced by the United Nations Information Service at Geneva and is intended for public information; it is not an official document.
    The English and French versions of our news releases are different because they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

    CCPR25.016E

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: In Dialogue with Viet Nam, Experts of the Human Rights Committee Commend the Strengthened Human Rights Framework, Raise Issues Concerning Discrimination and Reports of Media Repression

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Human Rights Committee today concluded its consideration of the fourth periodic report of Viet Nam on how it implements the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  Committee Experts commended steps Viet Nam had taken to strengthen its legal and institutional framework for human rights, and raised issues concerning discrimination in various areas of public life and reports of a repressive media landscape.

    A Committee Expert praised the important steps Viet Nam had taken to strengthen its legal and institutional framework for human rights, saying they reflected a clear commitment to international cooperation and legal reform. They welcomed the recent decision to reduce the number of capital offenses from 18 to 10, a significant step toward limiting the scope of application of the death penalty.

    However, Viet Nam lacked a law developing the principle of non-discrimination in areas such as employment, health, education, politics and justice, another Expert noted, asking for further information on the number of complaints of acts of discrimination.

    The Committee also expressed concern about reports of a repressive media landscape in Viet Nam, where journalists, bloggers and human rights activists were often intimidated into silence.  One Expert asked for comments on allegations of targeted surveillance arbitrarily conducted on political activists, journalists, and human rights defenders.

    Thanh Tịnh Nguyễn, Deputy Minister of Justice and head of the delegation, said Viet Nam had consistently devoted special attention, strong efforts, and firm commitment to promoting and ensuring the effective implementation of human rights and citizens’ rights, including civil and political rights.  Legal, administrative, and judicial reforms in Viet Nam, as well as law enforcement practices, were all anchored in a people-centred approach.

    In the ensuing discussion, the delegation, in response to these questions and others, said human rights had been upheld and promoted in Viet Nam over the past forty years and the State’s legal system was sufficiently comprehensive to fully implement the Covenant.

    The law was very comprehensive to prevent any discrimination in civil and personal life, the delegation said.  Everybody was equal before the law, including in the labour sector, where the law prohibited discrimination, including salary discrimination between men and women and against guest workers.  Discrimination was also forbidden in education.

    The right of freedom of expression could not, the delegation said, be used to violate the rights of others or of organisations or harm social order.  The policy of Viet Nam safeguarded the freedom of expression and of the press, but needed to be in line with international law.  Viet Nam strictly dealt with efforts to defame the State and cause division among the different parts of society, in line with international agreements.

    In concluding remarks, Mr. Nguyễn said the protection and promotion of human rights were the objective and result of a long struggle by many generations of Vietnamese people. Viet Nam worked to ensure the happiness of the people, which was the ultimate goal of its policies, and had worked to improve its legal system to ensure that people would be the beneficiaries of its policies.

    Changrok Soh, Committee Chairperson, in concluding remarks, said the dialogue had addressed key elements of the implementation of the Covenant.  The adoption of certain institutional safeguards to combat discrimination and domestic violence was positive, but there were several remaining concerns requiring attention, including regarding severe restrictions on fundamental freedoms related to assembly, speech, and religion.  There were also credible allegations of torture and ill-treatment, and persistent challenges for vulnerable groups, he concluded.

    The delegation of Viet Nam was made up of representatives of the Ministry of Justice; the Office of the Government; the Supreme People’s Procuracy; the Ministry of Public Security; the Ministry of Home Affairs; the Supreme People’s Court; the Ministry of Culture, Sport and Tourism; the Ministry of Ethnic Minorities and Religions; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and the Permanent Mission of Viet Nam to the United Nations Office at Geneva.

    The Human Rights Committee’s one hundred and forty-fourth session is being held from 23 June to 17 July 2025.  All the documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, can be found on the session’s webpage.  Meeting summary releases can be found here.  The webcast of the Committee’s public meetings can be accessed via the UN Web TV webpage.

    The Committee will next meet in public at 10 a.m., Thursday 10 July to hold an informal meeting with States.

    Report

    The Committee has before it the fourth periodic report of Viet Nam (CCPR/C/VNM/4).

    Presentation of the Report

    THANH TỊNH NGUYỄN, Deputy Minister of Justice and head of the delegation, said, guided by the principle of placing people at the centre — as both the goal and the driving force of development, Viet Nam had consistently devoted special attention, strong efforts, and firm commitment to promoting and ensuring the effective implementation of human rights and citizens’ rights, including civil and political rights.  Legal, administrative, and judicial reforms in Viet Nam, as well as law enforcement practices, were all anchored in a people-centred approach, whereby the people were regarded as the primary beneficiaries of the system.  These efforts aimed to implement effective measures to protect and ensure human rights and citizens’ rights in accordance with the law.  Immediately following the constructive dialogue with the Committee in 2019, the Government of Viet Nam adopted a national action plan to implement the Covenant and the Committee’s recommendations, with the aim of clearly identifying areas in need of improvement and undertaking necessary institutional and practical measures to ensure substantive progress.

    With regard to institutional and legal reform, since the submission of the fourth national report, Viet Nam had amended, supplemented, or enacted over 150 laws and resolutions of the National Assembly, many of which were directly related to the lives of the people and aimed at advancing civil and political rights.  Most recently, Viet Nam adopted the amended Criminal Code, which narrowed the scope of application of the death penalty by abolishing capital punishment for eight offences, and had recently adopted Resolution 66 on reforming the legislative process.  Viet Nam was also vigorously advancing a comprehensive reform of the State administrative apparatus.

    Viet Nam had undertaken a range of measures to enhance transparency, openness, and efficiency in the implementation of laws and policies.  Human rights education had been integrated into the national curriculum.  Viet Nam had issued and effectively implemented a range of policies that directly promoted and protected civil and political rights.  In the area of social security policy, Viet Nam remained firmly committed to ensuring social welfare, public safety, and the well-being of its people, under the guiding principle of “leaving no one behind.”  Viet Nam had also taken proactive measures to respond to climate change and to support the people in the context of disaster relief efforts. It had further placed strong emphasis on investing in infrastructure and enabling conditions to ensure public access to information, and was currently recognised as one of the countries with the most affordable internet access.  Rapid developments had significantly contributed to the realisation of the rights to freedom of the press, freedom of expression, and access to information.

    In the process of ensuring, protecting, and promoting the realisation of human rights, Viet Nam continued to face various difficulties and challenges arising from multiple factors that affect the implementation of the Covenant. These included limited resources; instances where the enforcement of laws had not met expectations; and the growing impact of global issues and non-traditional security threats in the context of Viet Nam’s  international integration.

    Viet Nam was in the process of building and perfecting a socialist rule-of-law State for the people, in order to build a high-quality legal system that effectively ensured and protected human rights and citizens’ rights, in a manner consistent with national realities and international standards.  In this process, Viet Nam would continue to seriously fulfil its international human rights commitments, and further promote dialogue and cooperation in this important area.  At the same time, Viet Nam would implement comprehensive measures to better promote, protect, and ensure the enjoyment of civil and political rights, and to improve resilience to climate change — particularly for vulnerable groups — through appropriate steps in the time to come.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert said the Committee acknowledged the important steps Viet Nam had taken to strengthen its legal and institutional framework for human rights.  These developments reflected a clear commitment to international cooperation and legal reform.  The Committee commended Viet Nam for its recent decision to reduce the number of capital offenses from 18 to 10, which marked a significant step toward limiting the scope of application of the death penalty.

    Given reports that Directive 24 broadly defined international integration as a national security threat, leading to systemic restrictions on freedoms of expression, association, and movement, how did Viet Nam reconcile this directive with the Covenant’s articles 19, 21, and 22, an Expert asked.  Regarding disaster response and recovery efforts, as well as campaigns to eliminate temporary housing, the report did not address the adoption of a precautionary approach or specific measures to protect the most vulnerable from the negative impacts of climate change and natural disasters, and the Expert asked what specific measures Viet Nam had adopted to implement a precautionary approach to environmental and climate risks, and how vulnerable groups were identified and protected in these policies.

    Regarding the death penalty, an Expert asked about the criteria used to select offences to be removed from the scope of the death penalty; the reasons that led Viet Nam to stop short of full abolition; and considerations that had prevented the country from following the path toward complete abolition of the death penalty.  What measures were in place to ensure full respect for due process guarantees in death penalty cases, and to prevent the imposition of the death penalty as a result of forced confessions?  On enforced disappearances, the Expert asked whether Vietnamese law defined and criminalised all acts of enforced disappearance in accordance with international standards, and about measures in place to ensure prompt, thorough, and impartial investigations into allegations of enforced disappearance and transnational repression.

    Another Expert asked for an update on progress made towards the establishment of the national human rights institution, and for more detailed and concrete information on the status of the legislative review and the reasons for the continued delays in establishing the body.  What measures did the State party plan to take to ensure that all allegations of torture and ill-treatment, solitary confinement, incommunicado detention and forced commitment to psychiatric facilities were promptly and thoroughly investigated by an independent body and that perpetrators were prosecuted and sanctioned with appropriate penalties, and to investigate all reported instances of deaths of prisoners while detained?  What measures would the State party take to ensure that national legislation protecting the rights of detainees was implemented in practice, in particular the right to medical care?

    An Expert commended the State party for its continued efforts to combat corruption, but noted that further efforts were needed to strengthen anti-corruption initiatives.  He expressed particular concern relating to allegations of corruption involving high-level public officials, judges, prosecutors, and law enforcement officers, and asked for information on any actions taken in response to such cases.  He noted reports indicating persistent concerns that the enforcement of anti-corruption laws was perceived as selective and politically driven.  The Expert asked for further details on the mandates, composition, appointment procedures, and safeguards in place to ensure the independence of the three types of agencies involved in anti-corruption efforts.  He also asked whether the draft Law on the State of Emergency was fully compatible with article four of the Covenant, including its substantive and procedural requirements.

    Viet Nam lacked a law developing the principle of non-discrimination in areas such as employment, health, education, politics and justice, an Expert noted, asking for further information on the number of complaints of acts of discrimination, and on investigations, sanctions and reparations for victims; about employees with disabilities in the public and private sectors; and on the existence of other protection mechanisms.  Regarding women’s rights, the Expert asked about progress that had been made over the last ten years, including regarding non-discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender, noting that women’s rights had been violated by these forms of discrimination.  Was the State going to work towards the legalisation of same-sex marriage or civil partnership?  Had measures been taken to address the issue of stigmatisation, harassment, violence and discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons?

    An Expert expressed concern for the realities of Khmer Krom women, who were highly vulnerable to various human rights violations due to their gender, facing a high risk of systematic inequalities and abuse.  Other areas of concern included the wide salary gap between men and women, as well as continuing differentiation of retirement ages between men and women, the participation of women in political life, and that there still needed to be evidence of a minimum degree of physical injury for an act to be legally recognised as rape.  In view of these, the Expert asked what measures had been taken to increase women’s participation, specifically ethnic minority women and women in rural areas, in all private and public sectors, as well as high-level decision-making positions and political life.

    The Expert also expressed concern about the situation of drug users confined to drug rehabilitation centres, asking for more information on measures taken to ensure that all legislation concerning drug detoxification and rehabilitation centres, particularly the provisions retaining compulsory drug treatment, including for children between 12 and 18, were in line with the Covenant.

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said human rights had been upheld and promoted in Viet Nam over the past forty years and its legal system was sufficiently comprehensive to fully implement the Covenant.  There was a separate chapter in the Constitution on human rights that was in line with the Covenant.  Human rights could only be suspended for reasons of national security, public safety, and public health.  Only the National Assembly could suspend human rights, in line with the Constitution. As part of the law-making process in Viet Nam, there needed to be a consultation with stakeholders, including those affected by the law.  Human rights topics were now included in the national educational curriculum.  The State conducted many campaigns on human rights, and information on human rights was translated into various national minority languages and made available, including online.  Viet Nam had adopted various national measures to ensure national security and the safe and productive life of its people.

    Viet Nam was implementing the Covenant in various ways, including through its law and education.  According to the law, the Covenant needed to be prioritised if there were differences between it and the law.  If any discrepancies were identified, the Covenant took precedence.  There were training courses for judges and lawyers and other legal professionals on the provisions of the Covenant.

    Viet Nam was one of the countries seriously affected by climate change, which caused many socio-economic challenges.  The Government attached great importance to those whose rights had been affected by the phenomenon, and ensured that sustainable and green development and the climate change strategy of Viet Nam were prioritised in all policies.  Many important activities had been adopted for ethnic minorities, including access to adequate, clean water, and the development of a medical network that focused on climate change-related diseases.  The Government had also developed a plan to review infrastructure in climate change-prone areas, including water infrastructure.  The climate change strategy had many implications on the enjoyment of the human rights of the people.  Viet Nam promoted international cooperation to ensure that all could fight climate change issues, whilst cooperating with all international agencies.

    On discrimination against the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex community, anti-discrimination was a part of the legal framework, and over the past years Viet Nam had taken many steps to better protect the members of the community, to ensure that none would be discriminated against on the basis of their gender or sexual identity.  The provision in the law criminalising same-sex marriage had been removed more than 10 years ago, although there was no law legalising same-sex marriage.  The new Criminal Code, since 2015, contained provisions regarding sexual offences which protected lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons.  In 2022, the Ministry of Health introduced a guideline giving direction to local authorities, which ensured that these persons could not be subject to discrimination. On oversight of activities in the medical sector, so far, no complaints had been received, meaning that there were no violations of the guidelines.  Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons had access to services to support them, and could change their legal identity, ensuring that they were not discriminated against.

    On anti-corruption efforts, Viet Nam had implemented many activities aiming to perfect the legal framework, including the adoption of the Anti-Corruption Law within the Criminal Code and related preventive measures.  It had also strengthened its monitoring activities, streamlined the administrative apparatus to better support the functions of the State, and was working to enhance efficiency.  Anti-corruption courses were available for legal practitioners, including at the local level.  Capacity building was one of the strongest commitments made by the Government.  There were specialised agencies working to prevent corruption, including a department on police in the Ministry of Security, and a department specialised on investigations and prosecutions of corruption cases within the Ministry of Justice.  Viet Nam had made significant efforts over the last few years to combat corruption and had recently made significant achievements, which it would strive to continue.

    The law was very comprehensive to prevent any discrimination in civil and personal life.  Everybody was equal before the law, including in the labour sector, where the law prohibited discrimination, including salary discrimination between men and women and against guest workers.  Discrimination was also forbidden in education.  The law provided a significant number of sanctions to reduce gender inequality.  Efforts had been strengthened to ensure the equal representation of women in political life — women were provided with more opportunities for leadership positions and were given training to gain the necessary skills to participate in political life.  There was an action plan in the Ministry of Labour to ensure equal access of men and women to business, investment capital, and health services.  The gap between retirement age between men and women was being reviewed by the Government; the current discrepancy was not discriminatory but reflected the situation of the population.  Many different policies and programmes were being implemented for persons with disabilities, including those providing employment opportunities.

    On the establishment of the national human rights institution, much work had been done in this regard.  This was an important long-term goal that required serious consideration to ensure that the institution would be in line with international commitments and Viet Nam’s needs and specificities.  There were currently other mechanisms in place, including the equivalent of an Ombudsman, and a National Committee on Women and Children, which fulfilled the same role, promoting the rights of the people of Viet Nam.  Viet Nam was still reviewing the situation in order to be able to establish a model national human rights institution.

    According to Vietnamese law, prisoners had the right to access medical care, including medical check-ups and access to hospital services for regular treatment if their care could not be provided in the prison.  On transfers to psychiatric facilities, if a person showed any signs of psychiatric illness, they would be sent for forensic examination, and if the examination indicated it was required, they would be transferred to psychiatric facilities, where they were entitled to medical treatment.

    Human rights, including the right to life, could only be restricted in certain circumstances provided for in the Constitution.  Depriving others of their right to life was a criminal affair which needed to be prosecuted.  Viet Nam implemented various measures recommended by international bodies during the COVID-19 pandemic to lower the rate of transmission in accordance with the law, on the basis of public health and in order to safeguard the health of the people. There was a free vaccination campaign, with no discrimination.  At the end of the pandemic, Viet Nam brought the restrictions to an end.

    Juveniles were not subject to the death penalty, the delegation said, and Viet Nam was getting closer to international standards, moving forward to a phase in which it would review the Criminal Code.  It also had a road map to move forward in making it ever more difficult to condemn a person to death.  Work had also been done to ensure that there was no overlap with torture in the application of the death penalty.  There was an oversight mechanism and strong and stringent sanctions to be applied to the perpetrators of torture.

    One law included specific regulation of detention conditions, including the minimum space per detainee, access to food and drinkable water, and women-specific products.  All prisoners were entitled to medical support and treatment.  There was compulsory drug rehabilitation and detoxification, aiming to help persons end their addiction.  There was a strict procedure for this, which included a passage in front of a court.

    Follow-Up Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert said the situation of women still raised questions.  Misconceptions about sexual violence, the wish to preserve the harmony of the family, mediation according to the law of 2022, and the fear of rehabilitation were all obstacles before women, making them reluctant to report acts of violence committed against them in different spheres, including domestic violence and harassment in the workplace.  The legal definition of rape remained of concern to the Committee.  What were the activities carried out under the national communication programme on gender equality and the National Strategy on Gender Equality?  What measures were taken to identify the factors that prevented women victims from reporting abuse, and to align the legal definition of rape with the Covenant and other international standards?  What remedies had been offered to victims and what was the number of cases that had been referred to alternative dispute resolution processes?

    Another Expert asked about the oversight mechanisms that existed to examine cases of torture and their findings.  Had there been any cases of torture, and if there were any, had the perpetrators been prosecuted?  One Expert said the results of corruption investigations could vary depending on who initiated and drove the process.  In certain cases, political manoeuvring could influence investigations; statistical data would help clarify the nature of the cases.  Viet Nam had not submitted any notification under article four, paragraph three of the Covenant — did this mean it did not consider itself to ever have been under a situation of public emergency?

    Another Expert raised the issue of a comprehensive law on non-discrimination and the potential detention of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons in separate facilities apart from the general population, asking if this was being done according to human rights principles.  According to the Adoption Law of 2010, adoption could only be done by people with opposite-sex partners, or by a single person.  The Expert asked about the extent to which a homosexual person could adopt.  On discrimination against persons with disabilities in the world of work, he asked for specific, concrete data regarding the number of persons employed under programmes to end discrimination in the labour market.

    An Expert asked whether there was a legal procedure that enabled individuals sentenced to death to seek a review of their convictions based on newly discovered evidence of their innocence, and what remedies were provided for persons who were shown to have been wrongly convicted?  Again on the death penalty, another Expert asked how many executions had taken place, and how many persons were on death row?  Was there an offence related to kidnapping for financial gain, as this could be assimilated to enforced disappearance?

    In Viet Nam, the international human rights treaties did hold precedence, and nothing stopped the courts from applying them.  Why, to date, had no court invoked the Covenant with regard to the rights and provisions enshrined within it?

    Regarding the plan of action against climate change, the Expert was pleased to recognise that minorities in occupied territories who were particularly vulnerable to climate change were included; he asked whether these minorities were consulted during the drafting of the plans and whether they were respecting traditional farming methods and techniques?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the law of Viet Nam mentioned the hierarchy of international legislation and domestic law; priority was given to the international commitments and agreements.  The definition of rape in the Criminal Code was divided into two categories, including one for those over 13 and one for those under 13, for whom the law did not require any evidence of force or circumstances such as alcoholic consumption to elicit sexual activities.  The law did not distinguish between married and unmarried rape.

    On domestic violence, the delegation said even though much effort had been made to combat this violence, the detection and handling of such cases had not yet been satisfactory.  The Government had issued a decree on domestic violence.  Data would be provided more comprehensively later. There were opportunities for the victim to express themselves.  There were also local supportive networks for the victims of violence, and there were psychological and medical services provided for such victims.  There were media and communication events held on domestic violence, and campaigns to raise awareness, providing information for victims so that they would be more willing to raise their voice.

    Regarding torture and the death penalty, there were eight crimes which could be punished by the penalty, including treason, murder, rape, terrorism, crimes against humanity, crimes of war, illegal production of narcotics, and drug trafficking. Keeping the data regarding executions private was often due to national security and defence reasons, and also for the protection of the privacy of the family and victims of the perpetrator.  There was a procedure for review of judgements — at any point, a complaint could be made and an appeal made on the basis of wrongful conviction.  In the case of a wrongful conviction, there was a law on State compensation.  If there was any violation or wrongful conviction identified, then the State would provide compensation, including a public apology.  The law was very comprehensive when it came to illegal detention of others.  There was a hierarchy of oversight mechanisms which applied to cases of torture.

    Regarding detention, Viet Nam did not use the method of transferring prisoners away from their residential addresses as a punishment.  Prisoners were kept close to their families.  Pregnant women, foreigners and juveniles were given particular consideration.  However, very violent or dangerous criminals were kept separate from other members of the same criminal network in prison, for reasons of security.  Viet Nam was making great efforts to improve conditions for prisoners, and was amending the law on custody and detention to ensure there could be no violation of human rights.

    Only certain persons were subject to compulsory detoxification and addiction treatment, and such decisions needed to be made by the local authority and reviewed by the court to ensure that they were valid.  There were no cases of forced labour at the compulsory detoxification centres, but there was therapeutic labour, which aimed to help inmates to learn to take care of themselves.  Inmates were allowed to enjoy sports and other leisure activities.

    There were several pilot programmes to respond to climate change, with engagement from the local to the central level, and communication campaigns for the ethnic and mountain areas.  There were a wide range of collaborative events, including with non-governmental organizations, and inputs from partners were carefully considered by the authorities when they developed strategies to mitigate climate change.

    There was fertile ground for the growth of a national human rights institution, but to achieve this, legal amendments, including of the Constitution, were needed, making it a time-consuming process.  Viet Nam was paying more attention to streamlining the governmental structure.  In the future, it would carefully consider the Paris Principles when establishing such an institution.  However, great efforts were being made to safeguard, protect and promote human rights already.  There was a mechanism already in place to deal with corruption, which dealt with reports and allegations of corruption from individuals.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert said the Criminal Procedure Code provided that Government prosecutors could hold suspects accused of national security crimes in detention for an unlimited period without trial or judicial review.  Prosecutors could restrict access to legal counsel in cases related to suspects accused of “national security” crimes until the conclusion of the investigation and with no time limits.  What concrete measures would be taken to ensure that any deprivation of liberty was lawful and that detained persons were afforded legal safeguards from the outset of their detention?  How would the State ensure that pre-trial detention was used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest period, following a proper, individualised assessment and for reasons expressly provided by law and in line with international human rights standard and the Covenant?

    Reports before the Committee indicated that trafficking in persons continued to be a serious concern.  There was a lack of a clear framework for the protection of non-Vietnamese nationals trafficked to Viet Nam, or transited through Viet Nam to a third country.  There had been no substantive changes in Government policies and efforts to combat labour trafficking in the State-run labour export programme.  What measures were being taken to strengthen international legal cooperation and national law enforcement capacities to investigate and respond to the linkages between cybercrime, human trafficking and migrant smuggling, and to strengthen international cooperation to ensure cross-border access to supporting services?

    Another Expert said the Committee remained concerned about directives on international travel that closely managed officials, party members and Vietnamese citizens who went abroad, and by the fact that the law allowed authorities to postpone the departure of any person on various broad grounds.  What new measures had been taken to guarantee freedom of movement, and what were the legal grounds for decisions to restrict international travel on Vietnamese citizens and legal grounds for such bans?  The Expert also asked for comment on reports asserting that members of ethnic and religious minorities and indigenous people had been prevented from leaving Viet Nam to seek asylum; and that human rights defenders and religious activists were routinely subject to discriminatory restrictions on their freedom of movement.

    Significant progress had been made in juvenile justice, thanks to an increased awareness of the importance of legal institutional reforms.  However, these improvements were reportedly neither systematic nor comprehensive, and detention of children in conflict with the law was still common.  What efforts had been made to amend the legislation to address the protection gaps for children aged 16 and 17 years and the definition of a child to cover persons up to 18 years of age?  What measures had been taken to strengthen the juvenile justice system by setting up additional specialised courts with trained judges, improving community-based diversion, and ensuring children were not deprived of liberty?

    The Committee was concerned about reports of a repressive media landscape in Viet Nam, where journalists, bloggers and human rights activists were often intimidated into silence, another Expert said, asking for comments on allegations of targeted surveillance arbitrarily conducted on political activists, journalists, and human rights defenders.

    Regarding judicial independence, another Expert asked what specific measures were in place to guarantee the presumption of innocence, access to a lawyer of one’s choice, and a trial within a reasonable time for journalists, human rights defenders, political activists, and individuals accused of national security crimes.  What concrete steps had the State party taken to prevent and punish threats, intimidation, or harassment against lawyers for their work on sensitive cases?  Had any independent mechanisms for judicial oversight over legislative and executive actions been established or implemented? On participation in public affairs, the same Expert asked what measures had been taken to encourage and promote political pluralism.  What steps had been taken to eliminate proxy voting in practice, and had an independent electoral monitoring body been established?

    On the freedom of association, despite the constitutional proclamation of the right of association, an Expert expressed concern that there was no framework law regulating this right in a coherent and protective manner.  There had also been reports of systematic repression of religious minorities practising their faith outside the control of State-recognised religious organisations.  What measures had Viet Nam taken to ensure that the right of association, including the right to establish and register independent religious or social associations, could be exercised without interference?  What guarantees existed to prevent the use of the Penal Code against minority religious communities that did not wish to integrate into State-controlled structures?  Further, he asked for detailed information on the rules applicable to associations receiving foreign funding and on the differences in legal treatment between national associations, foreign associations and those receiving international funding.  What steps had Viet Nam taken to ensure that tax and criminal laws were not used in a disproportionate or discriminatory manner against human rights defenders?

    The Committee welcomed the programmes implemented by the State party for the economic and social development of minorities.  However, there had been multiple reports of persistent discrimination against these minority groups, in particular against the Khmer Krom and Montagnards.  What concrete actions had Viet Nam taken to eradicate systematic discrimination against these communities in education, employment and public services?

    On freedom of conscience and religious belief, what was the procedure for registration or recognition for religious groups, an Expert asked, inquiring how long the process typically took from initiation to decision?  Was the applicant allowed an opportunity to respond or appeal during the review process? What were the reasons for denying registration to certain organizations?  How did the State party justify the non-registration of relatively large religious groups such as Cao Dai and Hoa Hao?  What measures were in place to ensure that individuals were free to choose their religion without coercion?

    Regarding freedom of expression, what amendments was the State party considering to the Press Law, the Expert asked.  What legal safeguards existed to ensure that measures affecting online freedom of expression were strictly necessary and proportionate, and in compliance with the Covenant?  What mechanisms were in place to prevent and address harassment and intimidation of individuals, including journalists and online activists, who expressed views critical of the Government?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said ethnic minorities in Viet Nam were entitled to all human rights and citizen rights, and equal access to public services.  Many regulations prohibited discrimination on ethnic grounds.  The Government was implementing a socio-economic plan to ensure development of ethnic affairs.  Ethnic minorities were given the full opportunity to participate in economic and social life, and to stand for election: 70 per cent of the National Assembly were members of ethnic minorities.  Ethnic minorities could participate in many political activities. There were policies encouraging their equal participation in public service and their culture and cultural identity.  Ethnic minority groups had the right to equality of employment, including equal pay. There was vocational training for ethnic minorities, which was regulated by the law.

    Authorities ensured the freedom of religion by citizens.  The State checked the implementation of the law on freedom of religion and belief.  There were favourable conditions that ensured detainees or persons in custody could exercise their religion.  The State did not require registration for religious collectives and religious activities could take place without registration if they were not against the law.

    There had been changes to the law on the People’s Court, regarding the appointment of judges, to further guarantee their independence.  There was a stringent procedure for their appointment.  Interference with judicial activities was prohibited by law, and there was a mechanism to oversee the activities of judges to ensure that they complied with the law.  Regarding corruption, several cases had been prosecuted against high-ranking persons, and the results of these were publicised.  The victims of corruption were protected, as provided for in the Criminal Code.  Activities that hindered the judicial procedure could also be punished according to the law.

    On juvenile justice, there was a new Juvenile Justice Law since November 2024, which entered into effect in 2025, which was consistent with international standards on juvenile justice and provided new regulations to better protect juvenile perpetrators and victims, with diverse measures that could be applied to offenders.  The law also introduced family-friendly measures to ensure that the procedure would be more victim-friendly.  Penalties against juvenile offenders could include non-custodial punishments, and juvenile offenders below a certain age who were detained were kept separately, under the oversight of trained officers.  There were 38 juvenile courts at the provincial level.  Much attention was paid to training and capacity-building of the judges of these courts.

    A high percentage of Viet Nam’s population had access to the Internet, with good technology and infrastructure, the delegation said, but there was a need for a better mechanism to ensure confidentiality and privacy.  The State had issued a decree to strengthen cyber security to ensure that information was only collected in line with international standards and with the commitments Viet Nam had made, without hindering data flow.  The National Assembly of Viet Nam had adopted a law on protection of personal data, which was a strong commitment to the protection of privacy in line with international standards.  It also guaranteed the right to complain if such privacy was violated. Viet Nam’s efforts had been recognised by the international community.

    The right of freedom of expression could not, however, be used to violate the rights of others or of organisations and did not harm social order.  The policy of Viet Nam safeguarded the freedom of expression and of the press, but this needed to be in line with international law.  Cyber security in Viet Nam was not against these commitments and principles, which restrictions were aligned with.

    On the freedom of association, the delegation said this right was one of the most basic rights and was clearly provided for by the law and several Government decrees.  Viet Nam had more than 70,000 associations, many of which operated nationwide.  There were an increasing number of associations, operating in various sectors in order to cover the needs of the people, and operating in a way that contributed to the socio-economic development of the country.  The requirement of registration and reporting on financial resources was a popular regulation adopted to prevent any violation of the law by an association, such as conducting terrorism or money laundering. These regulations aimed at administrative management only, and were not based on discrimination.  The freedom of religion and belief was safeguarded through the Constitution and other legislation.

    To ensure transparency in elections, the National Assembly had established the National Election Council, which would make decisions on dismissing any false elections and rehosting them, and applying a penalty on those who had perpetrated fraud.  The 2021 election had the greatest number of electors ever.  There were no cases of serious violation of electoral regulations.  Viet Nam encouraged voters to select the candidates that satisfied the requirements for the position.  Elections were well-organised in Viet Nam.  Many regulations and provisions had been introduced on standing for election for members of the National Assembly to ensure the right of freedom to stand for election.

    On prevention of human trafficking in the labour sector, the law introduced a number of provisions to better protect Vietnamese workers working abroad.  The employment fee had been eliminated; only a brokerage fee could be charged. After a worker finalised a contract, they currently paid a limited fee, but Viet Nam was moving towards a model where the employer would pay this fee.  Campaigns were being held to ensure workers were aware of the risks of being trafficked when working abroad, and to give them more information about reliable channels for migrating, and of the risks of migrating outside of these channels.

    On civic space in Viet Nam, civil society organizations had the freedom to operate and could make contributions to the socio-economic development of the country, as long as they acted in line with the law.  Members of civil society organisations, including human rights defenders, would only be arrested if they violated the law, and the organisations needed to comply with the law and fulfil their obligations, including regarding tax regulations.  Arrests, detention and prosecution of such persons were only done in line with the law.

    Viet Nam adopted a revised version of its anti-trafficking law in January 2025 that was consistent with international standards and included a revised definition of human trafficking. The Criminal Code would be revised to ensure that it complied with the anti-trafficking law.  Anyone who reported to the authorities complaining of being a victim of trafficking would be protected and supported.  The law also contained provisions on rescue and identification of victims.  Viet Nam worked with the border and police of neighbouring countries to fight against human trafficking and to protect and defend victims, providing them with shelter and medical attention to cover their needs.

    Regarding freedom of movement, Viet Nam respected this fully with regard to its citizens, ensuring that they were protected and promoting their freedom of residence.  The law contained a list of prohibited activities.  Anybody leaving or entering the country needed to respect the relevant laws.  Freedom of movement could be restricted based on national security, public health, and public defence.  There was no single case of restriction of freedom of movement in Viet Nam for ethnic or religious reasons; all cases were because laws had been violated.

    Viet Nam supported the right of freedom of expression, but strictly dealt with violations of those rights, particularly in efforts to defame the State and cause division among the different parts of society, and this was in line with international agreements. 

    The Penal Code provided for detention only under clear and specific conditions, and also provided for other forms of detention.  Detention was only imposed if it was deemed necessary.  Detainees had the full right to family visits and to communicate with others, with the right to access legal counsel.  Limitations to legal counsel were in line with international standards, and only applied in severe cases of necessity, including those affecting national security.  Suspects could also be detained in these cases to ensure that the investigation would be sufficient.  Since 2019 to date, there had been no cases of abuse of this power.

    Follow-Up Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert said he was not fully satisfied with responses on a few issues, including regarding who was responsible for the disciplinary procedure for judges, and how their independence from the Government was ensured. How was the presumption of innocence and access to a lawyer guaranteed, and how were lawyers protected in sensitive cases from facing threats of reprisal?  How was the independence of the National Electoral Council ensured?

    On the freedom of expression, an Expert noted that this was not an absolute right but said that concerns lay in the breadth of the restrictions allowed for by the State party.  Restrictions needed to be as narrowly defined as possible.  The Committee did not take exception to detention for violation of laws, but it took exception to excessive lengths of detention and forms of harassment perpetrated on the accused.  The State party recognised the importance of religious freedom, but at the same time referred to a need for registration, which was a limitation of this freedom.

    Another Expert addressed the situation of those arrested for national security reasons, noting that this was a broad concept, and that sometimes national security laws were applied to prisoners of conscience and persons with certain religious beliefs.  The Expert said he was unsure how this was relevant to national security.  The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention had found cases of arbitrary detention where there had been restriction of freedom of religion, restrictions on access to legal counsel, and other inappropriate restrictions, and he asked for a comment on this.

    Regarding the right to freedom of association, an Expert asked whether any of the restrictions to this right could be removed, and whether the Government was envisaging any law on the freedom of association.  According to information received, persons who spoke minority languages and other minorities were not allowed to participate in international fora, which was a matter of concern.  On the rights of indigenous peoples and minorities, had any of the rights that had been developed globally been recognised in Viet Nam, where there appeared to be a resistance to recognising indigenous peoples.  Did they benefit from the core rights existing in international law? 

    Further clarification was requested on the conditions under which the Government interfered with the right to privacy by cutting telephone lines, interrupting cell phones and Internet services for political activists and their families.  Did the Government consider abolishing or amending relevant legislation, or providing more solid grounds for the registering of media users using real names and phone numbers, including those outside Viet Nam?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the Criminal Code included a provision on the presumption of innocence, so defendants were considered to be innocent until found guilty by a legal decision by a court of Viet Nam.  Only the courts had the authority to declare somebody guilty, and there needed to be sufficient access to legal counsel.  If there was lack of evidence, then the court needed to declare a person innocent.  There were many mechanisms to oversee and monitor judges’ performance, and there were inspections of local and central courts, investigations of denunciations or allegations of violations, and disciplinary actions provided for in case these were substantiated.

    Regarding elections, independent candidates needed to prepare a dossier and send their application to the local authorities, who would review it to make sure that it respected the law, after which they would send the dossier to the standing committee and the provincial election committee, as well as the National Election Council.  There was a stringent procedure for considering the application for election by independent candidates.  On restriction of the freedom of association, a recent decree had been enacted that created favourable conditions for associations without discrimination. There were no plans to introduce any other new laws, as the current legislation satisfied requirements.

    On privacy, cybersecurity and freedom of expression and speech, Viet Nam’s policy was to have a healthy cyberspace that did not infringe upon the enjoyment of rights.  The cybersecurity of Viet Nam aimed to promote the use of the Internet whilst striking a balance between the rise of the country and the needs of the people, and had been developed on the basis of learning from experiences of other countries, in consultation with public and private bodies.  The cybersecurity law provided precise conditions in which there could be restrictions of access to the Internet, but this law did not hinder human rights and only related to cases where individuals violated the law. Cybersecurity did not hinder the use of the Internet unless it was to defend the Government.

    The freedom of expression and of the press was not an absolute right and needed to be exercised in line with the law.  Registration was used to this end to protect the legitimate rights of all people and to develop a healthy Internet space.  The right to freedom and belief had been effectively supported over previous years, thanks to the implementation of a new law from 2018, the delegation said.

    Given the characteristics of the people in question, Viet Nam did not use the term “indigenous people”, using instead the terms “ethnic minority” or “small minority”, the delegation said.  The guarantee of rights for ethnic minorities was a significant achievement, given the geographical structure of Viet Nam.  These people were facilitated in their access to their human and citizenship rights.

    On arbitrary detention, the right to access to defence counsel was never limited for detainees.  Only the Prosecutor General had the power to make the decision to limit such access, but no cases of this were recorded.  On tax evasion, there were regulations on this all over the world, and penalties were imposed, and this could not be considered a punitive measure.

    Closing Statements

    THANH TỊNH NGUYỄN, Deputy Minister of Justice and head of the delegation, said Viet Nam appreciated the dialogue.  The delegation had engaged openly and sincerely, and aimed to provide all answers. Protection and promotion of human rights were the objective and result of a long struggle by many generations of Vietnamese people.  Human rights were a universal and global value, and their protection was a goal for all countries, but each country had a different mechanism to ensure these rights for citizens in line with its socio-economic situation.  Viet Nam worked to ensure the happiness of the people, which was the ultimate goal of its policies, and it had worked to this end to improve its legal system to ensure that people would be the beneficiaries of its policies.  Viet Nam remained steadfast in its aim to build a democratic, equitable and harmonious society, implementing sustainable social policies based on human rights for the people, who were placed at the heart of State policies.  Good laws also needed to be enforced and implemented to ensure positive results, and this was also the policy of the Government.  Viet Nam’s Government was committed to implementing the Covenant.

    CHANGROK SOH, Committee Chairperson, expressed sincere gratitude to all those who had contributed to the dialogue.  Over the past two days, the dialogue had addressed key elements of the implementation of the Covenant.  The adoption of certain institutional safeguards to combat discrimination and to combat domestic violence was positive, but there were a number of remaining concerns requiring attention, including severe restriction on fundamental freedoms related to assembly, speech, and religion.  There were also credible allegations of torture and ill-treatment, and persistent challenges for vulnerable groups, including women and children, ethnic minorities, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons.

    ___________

    This document is produced by the United Nations Information Service at Geneva and is intended for public information; it is not an official document.
    The English and French versions of our news releases are different because they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

    CCPR25.016E

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-Evening Report: AI is driving down the price of knowledge – universities have to rethink what they offer

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Patrick Dodd, Professional Teaching Fellow, Business School, University of Auckland, Waipapa Taumata Rau

    For a long time, universities worked off a simple idea: knowledge was scarce. You paid for tuition, showed up to lectures, completed assignments and eventually earned a credential.

    That process did two things: it gave you access to knowledge that was hard to find elsewhere, and it signalled to employers you had invested time and effort to master that knowledge.

    The model worked because the supply curve for high-quality information sat far to the left, meaning knowledge was scarce and the price – tuition and wage premiums – stayed high.

    Now the curve has shifted right, as the graph below illustrates. When supply moves right – that is, something becomes more accessible – the new intersection with demand sits lower on the price axis. This is why tuition premiums and graduate wage advantages are now under pressure.



    According to global consultancy McKinsey, generative AI could add between US$2.6 trillion and $4.4 trillion in annual global productivity. Why? Because AI drives the marginal cost of producing and organising information toward zero.

    Large language models no longer just retrieve facts; they explain, translate, summarise and draft almost instantly. When supply explodes like that, basic economics says price falls. The “knowledge premium” universities have long sold is deflating as a result.

    Employers have already made their move

    Markets react faster than curriculums. Since ChatGPT launched, entry-level job listings in the United Kingdom have fallen by about a third. In the United States, several states are removing degree requirements from public-sector roles.

    In Maryland, for instance, the share of state-government job ads requiring a degree slid from roughly 68% to 53% between 2022 and 2024.

    In economic terms, employers are repricing labour because AI is now a substitute for many routine, codifiable tasks that graduates once performed. If a chatbot can complete the work at near-zero marginal cost, the wage premium paid to a junior analyst shrinks.

    But the value of knowledge is not falling at the same speed everywhere. Economists such as David Autor and Daron Acemoglu point out that technology substitutes for some tasks while complementing others:

    • codifiable knowledge – structured, rule-based material such as tax codes or contract templates – faces rapid substitution by AI

    • tacit knowledge – contextual skills such as leading a team through conflict – acts as a complement, so its value can even rise.

    Data backs this up. Labour market analytics company Lightcast notes that one-third of the skills employers want have changed between 2021 and 2024. The American Enterprise Institute warns that mid-level knowledge workers, whose jobs depend on repeatable expertise, are most at risk of wage pressure.

    So yes, baseline knowledge still matters. You need it to prompt AI, judge its output and make good decisions. But the equilibrium wage premium – meaning the extra pay employers offer once supply and demand for that knowledge settle – is sliding down the demand curve fast.

    What’s scarce now?

    Herbert Simon, the Nobel Prize–winning economist and cognitive scientist, put it neatly decades ago: “A wealth of information creates a poverty of attention.” When facts become cheap and plentiful, our limited capacity to filter, judge and apply them turns into the real bottleneck.

    That is why scarce resources shift from information itself to what machines still struggle to copy: focused attention, sound judgement, strong ethics, creativity and collaboration.

    I group these human complements under what I call the C.R.E.A.T.E.R. framework:

    • critical thinking – asking smart questions and spotting weak arguments

    • resilience and adaptability – staying steady when everything changes

    • emotional intelligence – understanding people and leading with empathy

    • accountability and ethics – taking responsibility for difficult calls

    • teamwork and collaboration – working well with people who think differently

    • entrepreneurial creativity – seeing gaps and building new solutions

    • reflection and lifelong learning – staying curious and ready to grow.

    These capabilities are the genuine scarcity in today’s market. They are complements to AI, not substitutes, which is why their wage returns hold or climb.

    What universities can do right now

    1. Audit courses: if ChatGPT can already score highly on an exam, the marginal value of teaching that content is near zero. Pivot the assessment toward judgement and synthesis.

    2. Reinvest in the learning experience: push resources into coached projects, messy real-world simulations, and ethical decision labs where AI is a tool, not the performer.

    3. Credential what matters: create micro-credentials for skills such as collaboration, initiative and ethical reasoning. These signal AI complements, not substitutes, and employers notice.

    4. Work with industry but keep it collaborative: invite employers to co-design assessments, not dictate them. A good partnership works like a design studio rather than a boardroom order sheet. Academics bring teaching expertise and rigour, employers supply real-world use cases, and students help test and refine the ideas.

    Universities can no longer rely on scarcity setting the price for the curated and credentialed form of information that used to be hard to obtain.

    The comparative advantage now lies in cultivating human skills that act as complements to AI. If universities do not adapt, the market – students and employers alike – will move on without them.

    The opportunity is clear. Shift the product from content delivery to judgement formation. Teach students how to think with, not against, intelligent machines. Because the old model, the one that priced knowledge as a scarce good, is already slipping below its economic break-even point.

    Patrick Dodd does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. AI is driving down the price of knowledge – universities have to rethink what they offer – https://theconversation.com/ai-is-driving-down-the-price-of-knowledge-universities-have-to-rethink-what-they-offer-260493

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI USA: NIH to crack down on excessive publisher fees for publicly funded research

    Source: US Department of Health and Human Services – 2

    Tuesday, July 8, 2025

    As part of its ongoing commitment to scientific transparency and responsible stewardship of taxpayer dollars, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) today announced plans to implement a new policy that will cap how much publishers can charge NIH-supported scientists to make their research findings publicly accessible. This initiative reflects a broader effort to restore public trust in public health by promoting open, honest, and transparent scientific communication.
    “Creating an open, honest, and transparent research atmosphere is a key part of restoring public trust in public health,” said NIH Director Dr. Jay Bhattacharya. “This reform will make science accessible not only to the public but also to the broader scientific community, while ending perverse incentives that don’t benefit taxpayers.”
    The current landscape of scholarly publishing presents growing challenges. Some major publishers charge as much as $13,000 per article for immediate open access, while also collecting substantial subscription fees from government agencies. For example, one publishing group reportedly receives more than $2 million annually in subscription fees from NIH, in addition to tens of millions more through exclusive article processing charges (APCs). These costs ultimately burden taxpayers who have already funded the underlying research.
    To address this imbalance, NIH will introduce a cap on allowable publication costs starting in Fiscal Year (FY) 2026, ensuring that publication fees remain reasonable across the research ecosystem. The policy aims to curb excessive APCs and ensure the broad dissemination of research findings without unnecessary financial barriers.
    This reform builds on NIH’s long-standing commitment to open science and public access, as demonstrated by initiatives such as:

    The NIH Public Access Policy, which ensures that peer-reviewed publications resulting from NIH funding are made freely available to the public without embargo.
    The NIH Data Management and Sharing Policy, which promotes the timely sharing of scientific data regardless of publication status.
    The NIH Research Portfolio Online Reporting Tools (RePORT), which provide public insight into NIH-funded research activities, expenditures, and results.
    The NIH Intramural Access Policy, which encourages broader use of NIH-developed technologies through licensing strategies that enhance patient and public access.

    “This policy marks a critical step in protecting the integrity of the scientific publishing system while ensuring that public investments in research deliver maximum public benefit,” Dr. Bhattacharya said.
    About the National Institutes of Health (NIH): NIH, the nation’s medical research agency, includes 27 Institutes and Centers and is a component of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. NIH is the primary federal agency conducting and supporting basic, clinical, and translational medical research, and is investigating the causes, treatments, and cures for both common and rare diseases. For more information about NIH and its programs, visit www.nih.gov.
    NIH…Turning Discovery Into Health®

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    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Collaboration Reveals How Light Unlocks Chemistry of Nickel Catalyst

    Source: US National Renewable Energy Laboratory


    Max Kudisch works in the Ultrafast Spectroscopy of Photoconversion Processes Lab at NREL, where he performed experiments to investigate the role of light in activating the nickel pre-catalyst. Photo by Justin Johnson, NREL

    A team of scientists across several U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) national laboratories has unraveled how light and a previously unknown form of certain nickel-based catalysts together unlock and preserve reactivity.

    This research, described in the journal Nature Communications, could potentially advance the use of abundant nickel in place of more expensive palladium in industrial chemistry.

    The collaborative research effort was spearheaded by NREL and involved scientists from DOE’s SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, and Argonne National Laboratory, among other institutions.

    Nickel catalysts have emerged as promising replacements for palladium catalysts in industrial-scale chemical reactions, as nickel is both more readily available and cheaper. Nickel has other advantages: its reactivity can be driven by light instead of the high heat required for palladium, resulting in milder overall reaction conditions, which expands the variety of reactions that can be done. Nickel catalysts can also facilitate reactions that are new and have not been demonstrated with palladium, but key questions regarding how these light-activated nickel catalysts operate have remained unanswered until now.

    The newly published paper explains how light activates the catalyst to enable it to join two fragments of simple molecules to make a more complex molecule. Along the way, the researchers discovered a new intermediate form of the nickel catalyst that keeps the catalyst from degrading.

    “Pharmaceuticals is the only area that has commercialized light-driven nickel catalysis so far, but nickel-based catalysts can also potentially replace palladium catalysts for a variety of other industrial processes, including in the agricultural industry and the manufacture of electronics,” said Max Kudisch, first author of the paper and a postdoctoral researcher at NREL. “There are some very large-volume chemicals that are produced there where these sorts of methods could be applicable.”

    The price difference between the two elements is vast. An ounce of nickel costs approximately 50 cents, while an ounce of palladium approaches $1,000.

    “Nickel has often been used in tandem with an iridium photosensitizer,” said Matthew Bird, a chemist at Brookhaven and a co-author of the paper. “But as we start to understand exactly how it works, we could then see ways of getting rid of the iridium, a rare element like palladium, and just having the nickel. That adds to the potential value.”

    The researchers experimented with nickel dihalides, compounds where nickel is bonded to two halide ions such as chloride, which are the predominant source of nickel used in these types of reactions. Exposure to light causes a bond between the nickel and chloride to break, which lowers the oxidation state of nickel and suddenly makes it reactive. But the freed chloride ion, now a chlorine “radical” due to the broken bond, does not sit idly by. In the reaction the team studied, they first hypothesized and then confirmed that it interacts with the solvent. This creates an activated form of the solvent that in turn can react with the activated nickel.

    That turns out to be a crucial and previously unknown step because it forms a stable nickel intermediate that prevents the activated nickel atoms from interacting directly with one another.

    “Controlling the amount of the nickel in the lower oxidation state in the reaction is essential to prevent the catalyst from getting deactivated,” Kudisch said.

    If the intermediate did not exist, the lower oxidation state form of nickel would build up and bind with itself, forming a nickel compound that can no longer catalyze the reaction.

    Instead, the solvent-bound intermediate can react further to complete the joining of molecules to achieve the desired chemistry.

    Justin D. Earley prepares nickel/iridium solutions for time-resolved X-ray absorption measurements at the Advanced Photon Source, beamline 11ID-D, at Argonne National Laboratory. Photo by Obadiah Reid, NREL

    The researchers used a range of techniques to follow the chemistry step by step, showing how light drives the chemistry.

    One of these tools was the Laser Electron Accelerator Facility (LEAF) within Brookhaven Lab’s Chemistry Division, which combines very short pulses of electrons with various spectroscopic detection methods to produce and examine transient molecular and atomic species with high time resolution. 

    “Pulse radiolysis lets us generate reactive intermediates to recreate a particular step in a proposed reaction mechanism to see if that step does or does not actually happen,” Bird said.

    Lakshmy Kannadi Valloli, a Brookhaven Lab postdoc working with Bird, used LEAF to generate the reactive “radical” form of the solvent. “Then we watched that radical react with the nickel and saw what species it made,” Kannadi Valloli said.

    The spectroscopic signature matched what Kudisch had seen when he shone light on the solution. This helped to confirm the hypothesis of how light activates the catalyst, and how the subsequent reactions generate the protective nickel intermediate.

    Scientists at SLAC further characterized the intermediate using powerful X-rays at the Stanford Synchrotron Radiation Light Source (SSRL), a DOE Office of Science user facility, to understand its atomic-scale structure.

    “Max made it by shining light on it. We made it by pulse radiolysis. And then our colleagues at SLAC looked at it with X-rays,” Bird said.

    “With those techniques all combined, we know the exact molecular structure of this intermediate form of the nickel catalyst and the pathway through which it is formed,” Kudisch concluded.

    This mechanistic understanding could lead to new strategies to prevent catalyst degradation and control the amount of activated nickel catalyst present during the reaction to advance the use of light-driven nickel catalysts.

    In addition to the four national laboratories, researchers who contributed to the project are with Northeastern University and the University of Colorado Boulder. Other NREL personnel listed as co-authors are Justin Earley, Anna Zieleniewska, Rebecca Smaha, Garry Rumbles, and Obadiah Reid.

    The research was funded by DOE’s Bio-Inspired Light-Escalated Chemistry Energy Frontier Research Center via the DOE Office of Science.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Senator Dr. Rasha Kelej congratulates the Winners of Merck Foundation Media Awards- 125 Winners from 36 Countries announced

    Source: APO

    • Merck Foundation CEO announced call for application of 2025 Merck Foundation Media Recognition Awards in partnership with African First Ladies – apply now at submit@merck-foundation.com

    Merck Foundation (www.Merck-Foundation.com), the philanthropic arm of Merck KGaA Germany, in partnership with the First Ladies of Africa, proudly announced the Winners of their Merck Foundation Africa Media Recognition Awards 2024 under the categories “More Than a Mother” and “Diabetes and Hypertension”.

    The Awards Ceremony was conducted virtually to honor and celebrate the outstanding contributions of all the winning media professionals. The winners were warmly acknowledged by Senator Dr. Rasha Kelej, CEO of Merck Foundation and President of the “More Than a Mother” campaign.

    Senator, Dr. Rasha Kelej expressed, “I am truly happy to announce the winners of our Media Awards, together with my dear sisters, The First Ladies of Africa, who are also the Ambassadors of the Merck Foundation ‘More Than a Mother’ Campaign. This year, we are delighted to celebrate 125 outstanding winners from 36 countries. It brings me joy to see such impressive participation not only from across Africa but also from several Asian and Latin American countries. Congratulations to all our incredible winners!

    It is a true pleasure to welcome you all as Merck Foundation Alumni. Let’s continue to work together to raise awareness about critical social and health challenges, be the voice of the voiceless, and create culture shift in our communities.”

    Merck Foundation Media Awards launched in 2017, are announced annually, with over 640 Winners from 52 countries celebrated to date.

    The theme of the “More Than a Mother” Media Awards is to raise awareness about important social issues like: Breaking Infertility Stigma, Supporting Girl Education, Women Empowerment, Ending Child Marriage, Ending Female Genital Mutilation and/or Stopping Gender-Based Violence. The theme of the “Diabetes and Hypertension” Media Awards is to Promote a Healthy Lifestyle and raise awareness about prevention and early detection of Diabetes and Hypertension.

    The Merck Foundation CEO also launched the Call for Applications for the 2025 Media Awards. “I am pleased to invite entries for the Merck Foundation Media Recognition Awards 2025“More Than a Mother” & “Diabetes and Hypertension”, in partnership with the African First Ladies. I look forward to receiving another outstanding round of impactful entries this year as well.” Said Senator Dr. Rasha Kelej.

    Winners of Merck Foundation “More Than a Mother” Media Recognition Awards 2024

    Here are the winners from West African Countries in partnership with The First Lady of the Republic of The Gambia, H.E. Mrs. FATOUMATTA BAH-BARROW; and The First Lady of the Republic of Sierra Leone, H.E. Dr. FATIMA MAADA BIO:

    PRINT CATEGORY WINNER

    • Jennifer Ambolley, The Chronicle, Ghana (First Position)
    • Mackie Muctarr Jalloh, News Times Daily, Sierra Leone (Second position)
    • Alao Abiodun, The Nation, Nigeria (Second position)

    ONLINE CATEGORY WINNERS

    • Dzifa Tetteh Tay, The Spectator, Ghana (First Position)
    • Laudia Sawer, Ghana News Agency, Ghana (First Position)
    • Nyima Sillah, The Voice, The Gambia (Second Position)
    • Isatou Ceesay, The Gambia Point, The Gambia (Third Position)
    • Abigail Arthur, Citi Newsroom, Ghana (Third Position)
    • Odimegwu Onwumere, The Nigerian Voice, Nigeria (Third Position)

    RADIO CATEGORY WINNER

    • Mavis Offei Acheampong, GBC Radio, Ghana (First Position)
    • Joyce Kantam Kolamong, GBC Radio, Ghana(Second Position)
    • Zainab Sunkary Koroma, Star Radio, Sierra Leone (Third Position)

    MULTIMEDIA CATEGORY WINNERS

    • Tolulope Adeleru-Balogun, News Central TV, Nigeria (First Position)
    • Alieu Ceesay, QTV, The Gambia (Second Position)
    • Mona Lisa Frimpong, Joy News, Ghana (Third Position)

    Here are the Winners from Southern African Countries in partnership with The First Lady of the Republic of Malawi, H.E. Mrs. MONICA CHAKWERA; The First Lady of the Republic of Zimbabwe, H.E. Amai Dr. AUXILLIA MNANGAGWA:

    PRINT CATEGORY WINNERS

    • Precious Kumbani, The Nation, Malawi (First Position)
    • Gresham Ngwira, Freelancer, Malawi (Second Position)
    • Simon Muntemba, Daily Nation, Zambia (Second Position)
    • Charlotte Nambadja, The Namibian, Namibia (Third Position)
    • Silence Mugadzaweta, The Standard, Zimbabwe (Third Position)

    ONLINE CATEGORY WINNERS

    • Alain Kabinda, Daily News Agency, Zambia (First Position)
    • Catherine Murombedzi, Freelancer, Zimbabwe (First Position)
    • Alick Ponje, The Times, Malawi (second Position)
    • Wallace Mawire, Pan African Visions, Zimbabwe (Second Position)
    • Hamu Madzedze, 365 Health Diaries, Zimbabwe (Third Position)
    • Kundai Michael Magoronga, Chronicle, Zimbabwe (Third Position)
    • Mlondi Mkhize, Briefly News, South Africa (Third Position)

    RADIO CATEGORY WINNERS

    • Glendah Fadzai Takachicha, Capitalk FM, Zimbabwe (First Position)
    • Tina Nyirenda, Smooth FM, Zambia (Second Position)
    • Sylviah Chisi, Trans World Radio, Malawi (Second Position)
    • Nyasha Mandimutsira, Capitalk FM, Zimbabwe (Third Position)
    • Perina N. Wahara, PL FM, Malawi (Third Position)

    MULTIMEDIA CATEGORY WINNERS

    • Keneilwe Pono, YTV, Botswana (First Position)
    • Taati Niilenge, The Namibian, Namibia (Second Position)
    • Lame Lucas, YTV, Botswana (Third Position)

    Here are the winners from East African Countries:

    PRINT CATEGORY WINNERS

    • Elizabeth Angira, People Daily, Kenya (First Position)
    • Marco Maduhu, Nipashe, Tanzania (Second Position)
    • Margaret Maina, Nation Media, Kenya (Second Position)
    • Beatrice Philemon Mukocho, The Guardian, Tanzania (Third Position)
    • Vitus Audax, The Guardian, Tanzania (Third Position)

    ONLINE CATEGORY WINNERS

    • Kamau Maichuhie, Nation Online, Kenya (First Position)
    • Isabella Maua Chemosit, Freelancer, Kenya (Second Position)
    • Anne Robi, Daily News, Tanzania (Second Position)
    • Nteza Michael, UG Standard, Uganda (Third Position)
    • Benjamin Takpiny, Anadolu Agency, South Sudan (Third Position)
    • Ayele Addis Ambelu, Ethiopian Mass Media Action News, Ethiopia (Third Position)

    RADIO CATEGORY WINNERS

    • Caren Waraba Sisya, Radio Citizen, Kenya (First Position)
    • Mamer Abraham Kuot, Voice of America, South Sudan, (Second Position)
    • Mwanaisha Makumbuli, Highlands FM, Tanzania (Second Position)
    • Fatuma Mustapha Mtemangani, Pambazuko FM, Tanzania (Third Position)
    • Daniel Byiringiro, Flash FM, Rwanda (Third Position)

    MULTIMEDIA CATEGORY WINNER

    • Rose Wangui, NTV Kenya, Kenya (First Position)
    • Andrew Juma, TV47, Kenya (Second Position)
    • Leonard Kigozi  and Isabel Nakirya, CGTN Africa, Uganda (Third Position)
    • Mackriner Siyovelwa, Crown Media, Tanzania (Third Position)

    Here are the winners from French Speaking African Countries in partnership with The First Lady of the Republic of Burundi, H.E. Madam ANGELINE NDAYISHIMIYE; The First Lady of Democratic Republic of the Congo, H.E. Madam DENISE NYAKERU TSHISEKEDI:

    PRINT CATEGORY WINNER

    • Issa Moussa, Niger Times, Niger (First Position)
    • Koami Agbetiafa, Niger Inter Press Group, Niger (Second Position)

    ONLINE CATEGORY WINNERS

    • AZODODASSI Mêmèdé Ambroisine, Savoir News, Togo (First Position)
    • Julio Gada, Global News, Benin (Second Position)
    • Boris Esono Nwenfor, Pan African Visions, Cameroon (Third Position)
    • Bakari Guèye, Initiatives News, Mauritania (Third Position)
    • Frimo Koukou Djipro, Lelus, Côte d’Ivoire (Third Position)

    RADIO CATEGORY WINNERS

    • Remy RUKUNDO, Radio TV Buntu, Burundi (First Position)
    • Magnus MFURANZIMA, ISÔKO FM, Burundi (First Position)
    • Mame Mbagnick DIOUF, Radio Oxyjeunes, Senegal (Second Position)
    • Tanko Worou, Radio SU TII DERA, Benin (Second Position)
    • Moussa KONE, Radio Channel 2, Mali (Third Position)

    MULTIMEDIA CATEGORY WINNERS

    • Matthias KABUYA TSHILUMBA, RTDK, DRC (First Position)

    Here are the winners from Portuguese Speaking African Countries in partnership with The First Lady of the Republic of Cabo Verde, H.E. Dr. DÉBORA KATISA CARVALHO:

    ONLINE CATEGORY WINNERS

    • Edisângela Tavares, Expresso das Ilhas, Cabo Verde (First Position)
    • Sheilla Ribeiro, Sociedade, Cabo Verde (Second Position)

    RADIO CATEGORY WINNERS

    • Teresa Monteiro Pinto, Rádio Televisão de Cabo Verde, Cabo Verde (First Position)

    MULTIMEDIA CATEGORY WINNERS

    • Ângelo Semedo, Deutsche Welle, Cabo Verde (First Position)

    Merck Foundation “Diabetes & Hypertension” Media Recognition Awards 2024

    Here are the winners from West African Countries in partnership with The First Lady of the Republic of The Gambia, H.E. Mrs. FATOUMATTA BAH-BARROW; and The First Lady of the Republic of Sierra Leone, H.E. Dr. FATIMA MAADA BIO:

    PRINT CATEGORY WINNER

    • Agnes Opoku Saprong, Ghanaian Times, Ghana (First Position)
    • Patience Ivie Ihejirika, Leadership Newspaper, Nigeria (Second Position)

    ONLINE CATEGORY WINNERS

    • Muhammed Lamin Touray, Freelancer, The Gambia (First Position)
    • Prince Owusu Asiedu, Adom Online, Ghana (Second Position)
    • Lara Adejoro, The Punch, Nigeria (Third Position)

    RADIO CATEGORY WINNERS

    • Godwin Awuni Anafo, Odadee Radio, Ghana (First Position)

    MULTIMEDIA CATEGORY WINNER

    • Emmanuel Dzivenu Seyram Abla De-Souza, Joy TV, Ghana (First Position)
    • Ezedimbu Karen Ogomegbunem, Africa Independent Television, Nigeria, (Second Position)
    • Lois Abba Sambo, Abuja Broadcasting Corporation, Nigeria (Third Position)
    • Akua Oforiwa Darko, TV3, Ghana (Third Position)

    Here are the Winners from Southern African Countries in partnership with The First Lady of the Republic of Malawi, H.E. Mrs. MONICA CHAKWERA; The First Lady of the Republic of Zambia, H.E. Mrs. MUTINTA HICHILEMA; The First Lady of the Republic of Zimbabwe, H.E. Amai Dr. AUXILLIA MNANGAGWA:

    PRINT CATEGORY WINNER

    • Nancy Kefilwe Ramokhua, The Patriot, Botswana (First Position)
    • Matilda Chimwaza Majawa, Times Group, Malawi (Second Position)

    ONLINE CATEGORY WINNERS

    • June Shimuoshili, Unwrap Online, Namibia (First Position)
    • Tendai Chisiri, Sport Way News Net, Zimbabwe (Second Position)
    • Shireen van Wyk, Shay Blogger, Namibia (Third Position)
    • Prince Kurupati, Pan African Visions, Zimbabwe (Third Position)

    RADIO CATEGORY WINNERS

    • Elvis Howahowa, Times Radio, Malawi (First Position)
    • Stella Mlotha, Trans World Radio, Malawi (Second Position)

    Here are the winners from East African Countries:

    PRINT CATEGORY WINNER

    • Lucy Johnbosco, Mwananchi, Tanzania (First Position)
    • Christina Mwakangale, Nipashe, Tanzania (Second Position)

    ONLINE CATEGORY WINNERS

    • Joan Mbabazi, The New Times, Rwanda (First Position)
    • Leon Lidigu, Nation Online, Kenya (Second Position)
    • Namwalo Daniel Absalom, Kenya News Agency, Kenya (Third Position)
    • Angela Kezengwa, Citizen Digital, Kenya (Third Position)
    • Veronica Mrema, M24 Tanzania, Tanzania (Third Position)

    RADIO CATEGORY WINNERS

    • Kintu Khalid, Radio Simba, Uganda (First Position)
    • Asha Bekidusa, Bahari FM, Kenya (Second Position)

    MULTIMEDIA CATEGORY WINNER

    • Walter Mwesigye, NTV, Uganda (First Position)
    • Edvesta Tarimo, Tumaini Media, Tanzania (Second Position)

    Here are the winners from French Speaking African Countries in partnership with The First Lady of the Republic of Burundi, H.E. Madam ANGELINE NDAYISHIMIYE; and The First Lady of Democratic Republic of the Congo, H.E. Madam DENISE NYAKERU TSHISEKEDI:

    PRINT CATEGORY WINNERS

    • Konan N’Guessan Attoumgbre Joseph, La Retraite Active, Côte d’Ivoire (First Position)
    • Nkurunziza Moise, Le Renouveau, Burundi (Second Position)

    ONLINE CATEGORY WINNERS

    • Bahwa Ferdinand, Le Journal Africa, Burundi (First Position)
    • Abdoulaye Ouédraogo, Queen Mafa, Burkina Faso (Second Position)
    • Richard Manirakiza, l’Agence Burundaise de Presse, Burundi (Second Position)
    • Mapote Gaye, Infomedia27, Senegal (Second Position)
    • Atha Menssan Woffa Assan, Focus Infos, Togo (Third Position)
    • Catherine Aimée Biloa, Échos Santé, Cameroon (Third Position)
    • Nadège Omoladé SANNY, SRTB Online, Benin (Third Position)

    RADIO CATEGORY WINNERS

    • MVUYEKURE Jean Claude, Radio TV Buntu, Burundi (First Position)
    • Abdoul Razak Sani Oumarou, Radio Saraounia Maradi, Niger (Second Position)
    • Kabamba Ngalamulume Fabrice, Radio Télévision de l’éducation (RTEDUC), DRC (Third Position)

    MULTIMEDIA CATEGORY WINNER

    • Chris IRAMBONA, Radio Television Buntu, Burundi (First Position)

    Here are the winners from ASIAN Countries:

    PRINT CATEGORY WINNER

    • Parikshit Nirbhay, Amar Ujala, India (First Position)
    • Revathi Murugappan, Star Health, Malaysia (Second Position)
    • Pooja Biraia, The Week, India (Third Position)

    ONLINE CATEGORY WINNERS

    • Rashe Zoe Sophia B Piquero, Cebu Daily News, Philippines (First Position)
    • Roshan Bhandari, Medicoliterature, Nepal (Second Position)
    • Crystal Chow, Undark Magazine, China (Third Position)

    Here are the winners from LATIN AMERICA Countries:

    ONLINE CATEGORY WINNERS

    • Adriana Becerra, Agencia Brunch, Mexico (First Position)
    • Rafaela Polo, UOL, Brazil (Second Position)

    MULTIMEDIA CATEGORY WINNER

    • Roxana Fabiola Lopresti, Channel 9 Televida, Argentina (First Position)
    • Ana Paula Pedrosa, R7, Brazil (Second Position)

    Details of Merck Foundation Media Awards 2025:

    1. Merck Foundation Africa Media Recognition “More Than a Mother” Awards 2025

    Theme for the awards: Breaking Infertility Stigma, Supporting Girl Education, Women Empowerment, Ending Child Marriage, Ending FGM, and/or Stopping GBV at all levels.

    Who can apply: Journalists from Print, Radio, Online, and Multimedia platforms from the following groups:

    1. Southern African Countries
    2. West African Countries
    3. East African Countries
    4. French Speaking African Countries
    5. Portuguese Speaking African Countries

    Submission deadline: 30th September 2025.

    2. Merck Foundation Media Recognition “Diabetes & Hypertension” Awards 2025

    Theme for the awards: Promoting a healthy lifestyle and raising awareness about prevention and early detection of Diabetes and Hypertension.

    Who can apply: Journalists from Print, Radio, Online, and Multimedia platforms from the following groups:

    1. Southern African Countries
    2. West African Countries
    3. East African Countries
    4. French Speaking African Countries
    5. Portuguese Speaking African Countries
    6. Latin American Countries
    7. Asian Countries

    Submission deadline: 30th October 2025.

    All entries are to be submitted to submit@merck-foundation.com.

    Distributed by APO Group on behalf of Merck Foundation.

    Contact:
    Mehak Handa
    Community Awareness Program Manager 
    Phone: +91 9310087613/ +91 9319606669
    Email: mehak.handa@external.merckgroup.com

    Join the conversation on our social media platforms below and let your voice be heard:
    Facebook: https://apo-opa.co/4lh6O9Q
    X: https://apo-opa.co/4nUxlf9
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    Website: www.Merck-Foundation.com
    Download Merck Foundation App: https://apo-opa.co/3U1RIZQ

    About Merck Foundation:
    The Merck Foundation, established in 2017, is the philanthropic arm of Merck KGaA Germany, aims to improve the health and wellbeing of people and advance their lives through science and technology. Our efforts are primarily focused on improving access to quality & equitable healthcare solutions in underserved communities, building healthcare & scientific research capacity, empowering girls in education and empowering people in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) with a special focus on women and youth. All Merck Foundation press releases are distributed by e-mail at the same time they become available on the Merck Foundation Website. Please visit www.Merck-Foundation.com to read more. Follow the social media of Merck Foundation: Facebook (https://apo-opa.co/4lh6O9Q), X (https://apo-opa.co/4nUxlf9), Instagram (https://apo-opa.co/3Ge6Ikj), YouTube (https://apo-opa.co/460DFew), Threads (https://apo-opa.co/3U0B8JS) and Flickr (https://apo-opa.co/40uz8xp).

    The Merck Foundation is dedicated to improving social and health outcomes for communities in need. While it collaborates with various partners, including governments to achieve its humanitarian goals, the foundation remains strictly neutral in political matters. It does not engage in or support any political activities, elections, or regimes, focusing solely on its mission to elevate humanity and enhance well-being while maintaining a strict non-political stance in all of its endeavors.

    Media files

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    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Analysis: Golden eagles were reintroduced to Ireland, but without prey they’re now struggling to thrive

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Fiona McAuliffe, Lecturer of Ecology, Scotland’s Rural College

    Dennis Jacobsen/Shutterstock

    In the early 2000s, golden eagles soared once again over the hills of Donegal in northwest Ireland, for the first time in nearly a century. Their return was celebrated as a landmark in Irish conservation, a hopeful sign that one of the island’s most iconic predators was back.

    But two decades on, the reality is sobering. The population remains small with just five territorial pairs and an estimated total population of just 20-25 birds. Breeding success is poor, and the golden eagle’s future in Ireland is uncertain. So what went wrong?

    Our research published in the Irish Naturalists’ Journal suggests the problem isn’t with the eagles themselves – it’s with the landscape they were released into. On paper, Donegal’s uplands looked ideal: open terrain, low human disturbance and ample wild prey. But over time, key parts of that ecosystem have quietly unravelled.

    Golden eagles rely on a steady supply of prey to thrive and raise chicks – notably red grouse and Irish hares. Yet, during our recent surveys along transects (predetermined lines through an area) and footage from camera traps in and around Glenveagh national park, the uplands seemed eerily quiet. Not just quiet of eagles, but of the smaller animals they prey on for food. The landscape looked wild, but had lost some of its vital living components.

    When comparing the available prey biomass, that’s the combined weight of grouse and hares per unit area, Donegal had 74-83% less prey than equivalent areas in the Scottish Highlands where golden eagles are thriving. That’s an enormous shortfall. Without enough food, adult eagles must travel further to hunt and spend more energy – and so are less likely to raise chicks successfully. A few lean years can tip a small population like this into crisis.

    Why is prey so scarce? One of the main culprits is overgrazing. Red deer numbers have exploded across Ireland in recent decades. In places such as Donegal, their constant browsing and grazing has severely degraded upland habitats. This damages the heather moorlands that grouse and hares depend on, leaving them with less cover and fewer food sources.

    Red deer were the most common species recorded during camera trap surveys.
    Queen’s University Belfast

    Add to this the growing pressure from medium-sized predators, including foxes and badgers. Without apex predators such as wolves or lynx to keep them in check, these “mesopredators” flourish. This well-documented phenomenon is known as mesopredator release where populations of mid-sized predators increase after the loss of top predators, often leading to greater pressure on prey species, such as ground-nesting birds and young hares, compounding the challenges for these struggling prey species.

    And while Ireland’s conservation laws look strong on paper, implementation often lags behind. Some protected areas remain heavily grazed, burned or unmanaged. Management plans are either missing, unenforced or outdated. This weakens the very protections meant to sustain wildlife.

    A lesson for rewilding

    The reintroduction of golden eagles was based on the best available knowledge at the time. But ecosystems aren’t static. What may have been viable habitat in the 1990s no longer meets the needs of a breeding eagle population today.

    Reintroducing a species isn’t enough. The systems that sustain it also need to be restored. The clichéd paradigm that nature-is-good and humans-are-bad isn’t helpful. Instead modern landscapes are often so degraded that they can’t recover if left alone.

    Upland areas within Glenveagh national park are overgrazed, leading to exposed peat and erosion.
    Fiona McAuliffe

    Conservation can facilitate active recovery. Real rewilding is about more than simply “putting animals back” and “letting nature take its course”. It is about putting systems back: predators, prey, plants and the processes that connect them.

    Despite the challenges, the golden eagle population has not failed in Ireland – not yet at least. To turn the tide, conservation efforts must go beyond charismatic species and focus on landscape restoration. That means reducing overgrazing, supporting prey recovery, rebalancing predator dynamics and making sure protected areas are actually protected.

    Encouragingly, Glenveagh national park has begun some of this work, by reducing deer overgrazing and regenerating native woodlands. If this landscape restoration is sustained and expanded, golden eagles could still thrive in a more balanced, functioning upland ecosystem.

    These birds are more than just a symbol of wildness. They are a litmus test of ecosystem health. Right now, they’re telling us something important. Something those calling for the reintroduction of other top predators, including wolves, would do well to consider.


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    The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Golden eagles were reintroduced to Ireland, but without prey they’re now struggling to thrive – https://theconversation.com/golden-eagles-were-reintroduced-to-ireland-but-without-prey-theyre-now-struggling-to-thrive-258832

    MIL OSI Analysis

  • MIL-OSI Analysis: Norman Tebbit, Conservative minister known as Thatcher’s enforcer, dies at 94

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Martin Farr, Senior Lecturer in Contemporary British History, Newcastle University

    No man more embodied Thatcherism in the eyes of the public in the 1980s than Norman Tebbit, who died on July 7, aged 94.

    Though certainly no yuppie, Lord Tebbit entitled his memoirs Upwardly Mobile. Margaret’s Thatcher’s triumph was also his. She saw in the Essex MP just the uncompromising approach to transforming Britain to which she too was committed.

    Both had been disgusted by the Conservative government of Edward Heath blinking when it sought to face down trade unions in the early 1970s. The experience was elemental to their plan for government.

    Others were more important to the New Right/neoliberal project elected in 1979: Conservative minister Keith Joseph, and Thatcher’s two chancellors, Geoffrey Howe and Nigel Lawson.

    But Tebbit provided something no one else in Thatcher’s cabinet could: an innate connection with white, working-class voters, who may once have been Labour – Tebbit lauded Clement Attlee and Ernest Bevin – but whose values were held to have been washed away in the postwar tide of union militancy, social permissiveness, European integration, and mass immigration.


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    He became a Conservative almost because, rather than in spite, of his background. “Essex man” was a presiding personification of the period.

    Unlike almost all of Thatcher’s ministers, Tebbit did not go to university, but left school at 16 to encounter the “closed shop”: that one had to be a member of a particular union to work in a particular workplace. He became determined at that moment to end this practice, and with it so much else of postwar social democracy.

    Thirty years later he did, as Thatcher’s secretary of state for employment. Tebbit’s 1982 Employment Act avenged the unions’ defeat of Heath. Union rights were weakened, never to be restored, and those of employers emboldened. It was a significant contribution to Thatcherism’s ledger.

    As secretary of state for trade and industry, Tebbit pursued privatisation – the return (as its proponents, simply, put it) of nationalised industries to the private sector – with passion. The postwar settlement in Britain was being upended.

    Public image

    In an age before the televising of parliament (much less 24-hour news and social media), Tebbit cut through in a way few politicians did.

    At at a time of inner-city violence, the public knew Tebbit’s unemployed father, decades earlier, didn’t riot but “got on his bike and looked for work”. No one else could have been called – in the words of Labour’s Michael Foot – a “semi-house-trained polecat”. TV’s puppet satire Spitting Image portrayed him as the “Chingford Strangler”, dressed in biker leathers.

    Tebbit felt no need for his contempt for socialism to be leavened by charm or humour. There was invariably a slight sense of menace. He had no interest in ingratiating or propitiating. And so he was as loved by Conservative party members as he was hated by the left. He welcomed their hatred.

    Tebbit in particular despised the swinging 60s – fittingly, he entered parliament in the election in which Harold Wilson’s government was unexpectedly ejected – and its legacy of “insufferable, smug, sanctimonious, naive, guilt-ridden, wet, pink orthodoxy”. Thus his trenchancy on immigration, overseas aid (a “sink of iniquity, corruption and violence”), sexuality (he was one of the few still to use the word “sodomite”) and Europe (he was a Eurosceptic before Euroscepticism).

    In 1990 Tebbit asked of British-born people of Asian heritage: “Which side do they cheer for? Are you still harking back to where you came from or where you are?”. Tebbit’s “cricket test” is second only to Enoch Powell’s “rivers of blood” speech in the annals of inflammatory – they and their supporters would say candid – rhetoric relating to immigration. Neither would mind the association.




    Read more:
    Tory humiliation down to campaign length and cult of May – Norman Tebbit Q&A


    What silenced most – if not quite all – of his critics, was Tebbit at his most vulnerable. Following the IRA bombing of the Grand Hotel Brighton in 1984, live television footage of him, only partially clad in his pyjamas, covered in dust, being stretchered out of the rubble, became the defining image of the atrocity.

    The following year Thatcher moved him from trade and industry to, less happily, chairman of the Conservative party. It was a job that required a lighter touch than Tebbit’s.

    Nevertheless, as chairman, he delivered the Conservatives’ third election victory, of 1987 – ensuring the permanence of the transformation – only to immediately retire to the backbenches. Margaret, his wife, had been paralysed by the bomb, and he devoted himself to her care for more than 30 years until her death.

    As warranted as his departure from government may have been, Thatcher “bitterly regretted” losing him, a feeling she felt for few. Her defenestration in November 1990 is much harder to imagine had Tebbit still been in the cabinet.

    Norman Tebbit’s conservatism and nationalism harked back to an earlier age, yet presaged the populism of the 2020s. In his remarks following the news of Tebbit’s death, Nigel Farage said he thought him “a great man”.

    Tebbit’s values endure in public discourse, in more ways than he might have expected even a few years ago. But in his last months he was either unable, or unwilling, to say whether those values were those of the Conservatives, the traditional party of the right, or of another project. That may be a final Tebbit “test”.

    Martin Farr does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Norman Tebbit, Conservative minister known as Thatcher’s enforcer, dies at 94 – https://theconversation.com/norman-tebbit-conservative-minister-known-as-thatchers-enforcer-dies-at-94-260716

    MIL OSI Analysis

  • MIL-OSI Analysis: Norman Tebbit, Conservative minister known as Thatcher’s enforcer, dies at 94

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Martin Farr, Senior Lecturer in Contemporary British History, Newcastle University

    No man more embodied Thatcherism in the eyes of the public in the 1980s than Norman Tebbit, who died on July 7, aged 94.

    Though certainly no yuppie, Lord Tebbit entitled his memoirs Upwardly Mobile. Margaret’s Thatcher’s triumph was also his. She saw in the Essex MP just the uncompromising approach to transforming Britain to which she too was committed.

    Both had been disgusted by the Conservative government of Edward Heath blinking when it sought to face down trade unions in the early 1970s. The experience was elemental to their plan for government.

    Others were more important to the New Right/neoliberal project elected in 1979: Conservative minister Keith Joseph, and Thatcher’s two chancellors, Geoffrey Howe and Nigel Lawson.

    But Tebbit provided something no one else in Thatcher’s cabinet could: an innate connection with white, working-class voters, who may once have been Labour – Tebbit lauded Clement Attlee and Ernest Bevin – but whose values were held to have been washed away in the postwar tide of union militancy, social permissiveness, European integration, and mass immigration.


    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.


    He became a Conservative almost because, rather than in spite, of his background. “Essex man” was a presiding personification of the period.

    Unlike almost all of Thatcher’s ministers, Tebbit did not go to university, but left school at 16 to encounter the “closed shop”: that one had to be a member of a particular union to work in a particular workplace. He became determined at that moment to end this practice, and with it so much else of postwar social democracy.

    Thirty years later he did, as Thatcher’s secretary of state for employment. Tebbit’s 1982 Employment Act avenged the unions’ defeat of Heath. Union rights were weakened, never to be restored, and those of employers emboldened. It was a significant contribution to Thatcherism’s ledger.

    As secretary of state for trade and industry, Tebbit pursued privatisation – the return (as its proponents, simply, put it) of nationalised industries to the private sector – with passion. The postwar settlement in Britain was being upended.

    Public image

    In an age before the televising of parliament (much less 24-hour news and social media), Tebbit cut through in a way few politicians did.

    At at a time of inner-city violence, the public knew Tebbit’s unemployed father, decades earlier, didn’t riot but “got on his bike and looked for work”. No one else could have been called – in the words of Labour’s Michael Foot – a “semi-house-trained polecat”. TV’s puppet satire Spitting Image portrayed him as the “Chingford Strangler”, dressed in biker leathers.

    Tebbit felt no need for his contempt for socialism to be leavened by charm or humour. There was invariably a slight sense of menace. He had no interest in ingratiating or propitiating. And so he was as loved by Conservative party members as he was hated by the left. He welcomed their hatred.

    Tebbit in particular despised the swinging 60s – fittingly, he entered parliament in the election in which Harold Wilson’s government was unexpectedly ejected – and its legacy of “insufferable, smug, sanctimonious, naive, guilt-ridden, wet, pink orthodoxy”. Thus his trenchancy on immigration, overseas aid (a “sink of iniquity, corruption and violence”), sexuality (he was one of the few still to use the word “sodomite”) and Europe (he was a Eurosceptic before Euroscepticism).

    In 1990 Tebbit asked of British-born people of Asian heritage: “Which side do they cheer for? Are you still harking back to where you came from or where you are?”. Tebbit’s “cricket test” is second only to Enoch Powell’s “rivers of blood” speech in the annals of inflammatory – they and their supporters would say candid – rhetoric relating to immigration. Neither would mind the association.




    Read more:
    Tory humiliation down to campaign length and cult of May – Norman Tebbit Q&A


    What silenced most – if not quite all – of his critics, was Tebbit at his most vulnerable. Following the IRA bombing of the Grand Hotel Brighton in 1984, live television footage of him, only partially clad in his pyjamas, covered in dust, being stretchered out of the rubble, became the defining image of the atrocity.

    The following year Thatcher moved him from trade and industry to, less happily, chairman of the Conservative party. It was a job that required a lighter touch than Tebbit’s.

    Nevertheless, as chairman, he delivered the Conservatives’ third election victory, of 1987 – ensuring the permanence of the transformation – only to immediately retire to the backbenches. Margaret, his wife, had been paralysed by the bomb, and he devoted himself to her care for more than 30 years until her death.

    As warranted as his departure from government may have been, Thatcher “bitterly regretted” losing him, a feeling she felt for few. Her defenestration in November 1990 is much harder to imagine had Tebbit still been in the cabinet.

    Norman Tebbit’s conservatism and nationalism harked back to an earlier age, yet presaged the populism of the 2020s. In his remarks following the news of Tebbit’s death, Nigel Farage said he thought him “a great man”.

    Tebbit’s values endure in public discourse, in more ways than he might have expected even a few years ago. But in his last months he was either unable, or unwilling, to say whether those values were those of the Conservatives, the traditional party of the right, or of another project. That may be a final Tebbit “test”.

    Martin Farr does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Norman Tebbit, Conservative minister known as Thatcher’s enforcer, dies at 94 – https://theconversation.com/norman-tebbit-conservative-minister-known-as-thatchers-enforcer-dies-at-94-260716

    MIL OSI Analysis

  • MIL-OSI Analysis: I rode the Tour de France to study its impact on the human body – here’s what I learned

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Steve Faulkner, Senior Lecturer in Exercise Physiology, Nottingham Trent University

    The Tour de France is often called the world’s biggest annual sporting event. Each July up to 12 million people line the roadside, while the cumulative TV audience tops 3 billion viewers across 190 countries.

    In 2025, 184 riders will compete in teams of eight, racing a punishing 3,500 km route with nearly 50,000 metres of climbing – roughly the height of Mount Everest six times over. Across 21 stages riders tackle time trials, flat sprints and brutal mountain passes through the Alps, Pyrenees and Massif Central.

    Professional cyclists possess extraordinary endurance and are capable of generating high power outputs day after day. Yet, despite having far less training and support, in recent years a number of amateur cyclists have begun riding the Tour route just days before the pros. The Tour 21 is one such effort and offers cyclists a chance to follow in the tyre tracks of the elite while raising money for a good cause.

    In 2021 I joined 19 others to ride the full route in support of Cure Leukaemia, with a shared goal of raising £1 million for blood cancer research. As a blood cancer survivor diagnosed at 16, this challenge combined my love of cycling, my background in science and my deep desire to give back to the community that helped save my life. It was also a unique opportunity to study how amateur cyclists cope with one of the most demanding endurance events in the world.

    The research findings were published in the Journal of Science and Cycling, to coincide with 2025’s Grand Départ (the official start of the race) in Lille.

    Training for the impossible

    Originally, the study planned to include lab-based physiological assessments of the amateur cyclists undertaking the Tour de France route, but the COVID-19 pandemic forced us to adapt and rely instead on data from training diaries. These gave us insight into how much (or little) training had been done leading up to the ride, and how riders managed the physical and mental strain during the event itself.

    While professional cyclists typically train 20–25 hours a week – often at altitude, with tailored coaching and racing schedules – our group of amateurs had full-time jobs, were typically 15–20 years older than the pros and trained around seven to ten hours a week.

    Our preparation was far from ideal, averaging just 47km per ride and 350 metres of climbing; a fraction of what the Tour demands. In fact, this amounted to less than 10% of the required climbing during the mountain stages.

    Once the ride began, the contrast between training and reality was stark. The group averaged nearly seven hours of riding a day, a 300% increase from their usual routine. Within four days signs of overtraining began to emerge: riders were no longer able to elevate their heart rates, a classic marker of central nervous system fatigue and excessive physical stress.

    As the days progressed, performance metrics continued to decline: heart rates dropped, power outputs fell and mood scores deteriorated. The cumulative fatigue was undeniable.

    Surprisingly, when we compared our amateur data to metrics from professional riders, we found that although pros ride at much higher power outputs, amateurs were subject to greater relative stress. On some days they spent almost double the time in the saddle, which meant they operated closer to their physical limits, with far less time for recovery – and often suboptimal sleep and nutrition.

    By the final week many of the riders could no longer produce the same power they had in the first few days. In some cases, heart rates wouldn’t rise above 100 beats per minute – a clear sign of accumulated fatigue and physiological overload.

    How to prepare for an ultra-endurance challenge

    If you’re planning to take on a major endurance event – whether it’s cycling, running, or hiking – here are some lessons from the road:

    1. Train specifically for the event

    Your training should mirror the challenge ahead. For the Tour, this meant preparing for long, back-to-back days with significant climbing. Mimic the intensity, volume and terrain as closely as possible.

    2. Understand how quickly fatigue builds

    Over multiple days, fatigue doesn’t just accumulate – it compounds. Listen to your body, adapt your plan and include plenty of recovery time.

    3. Prioritise nutrition and recovery

    These two factors can make or break your performance. You’ll need to consume enough energy to fuel the effort, but avoid excessive intake that leads to unnecessary weight gain. Recovery – through sleep, rest and refuelling – is equally vital.

    4. Work with an experienced coach

    More than fancy bikes or high-tech gear, a good coach is your best investment. They can help tailor your training plan, track your progress and adapt strategies as needed. Don’t underestimate this support.

    A ride to remember

    Completing the Tour de France route is a monumental achievement for any cyclist — amateur or pro. In 2021, our team not only rode the full route, but also raised over £1 million for Cure Leukaemia. For me, it marked a deeply personal milestone in my cancer journey.

    Throughout those 21 days, I thought often of the physical and emotional battles I faced during treatment; moments when I didn’t know if I’d survive, let alone ride across France. That experience gave me the resilience to keep going, even when my body was screaming to stop.

    Riding the Tour taught me that we’re capable of far more than we realise, especially when we ride with purpose.

    Steve Faulkner does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. I rode the Tour de France to study its impact on the human body – here’s what I learned – https://theconversation.com/i-rode-the-tour-de-france-to-study-its-impact-on-the-human-body-heres-what-i-learned-260524

    MIL OSI Analysis

  • MIL-OSI Analysis: Four reasons why many of us feel the global economy is not on our side

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Cahal Moran, Visiting Fellow in the Department of Psychological and Behavioural Science, London School of Economics and Political Science

    During my adult life, I have never experienced what it’s like to live in a “good” economy. Starting with the global financial crash in 2008, which hit just as I began studying economics, the world seems to have lurched from crisis to crisis and the UK economy even more so.

    Some of those crises, like the crash and COVID, are sudden shocks. Others have been more gradual, such as increasingly unaffordable housing or the rising dominance of the world’s ultra rich.

    As I explore in my new book, Why We’re Getting Poorer, the result of these crises is an economic system which works for some much more than it does for others. Here are four reasons why you may be feeling let down.

    1. Grasping for growth

    Like many of his fellow leaders across the world, the British prime minister, Keir Starmer, is aiming to make economic growth the primary mission of his government. And understandably so.

    A growing economy puts more money in people’s pockets and brings other benefits such as low unemployment. But economic growth is not easy (in the UK it has been poor for a long time).

    That’s because there’s no GDP dial that a prime minister or president can simply turn up. Research shows that economic growth is an amorphous and difficult goal which depends on many factors – geopolitical, demographic, technological – outside any single country’s control.

    One option is to focus on achievable goals around investment, like the public investments of £113 billion on homes, transport and energy planned in the UK. But big projects can take a long time to build and develop, so even if they do boost growth, it can take a while for households to feel the benefits.

    2. Inherent inequality

    Against the backdrop of low growth in the UK has been high inequality, under Conservative and Labour governments. And again, inequality is an international issue.

    The wealth of the richest people in the world skyrocketed over COVID, buoyed in many cases by the increased importance of the tech sector during lockdowns. Even before the pandemic, wealth inequality was a problem across the globe.

    This imbalance has given the very richest opportunities to buy up commercial competitors, indulge in space travel and control large parts of the media, exerting extreme economic, social and political power. Needless to say, their economic priorities are not the same as everyone else’s.

    Meanwhile, communities and regions may be left behind, with declining physical and social infrastructure. People living in hollowed out areas where incomes and opportunities are limited are unlikely to feel that the economic system is working for them.

    3. Globalisation

    Globalisation has made a lot of people – in places like China, India and Brazil – better off. But it is not a system which ensures economic benefits for everyone.

    With global competition, big businesses are often under pressure to reduce costs. Free trade deals have often failed to enforce labour standards or redistribute gains to poorly paid workers, and in many cases simply made the rich richer.

    Such a distorted form of economic governance, where large sections of society end up feeling left behind was bound to provoke a response. Some would link it to recent political events like Brexit and the presidencies of Donald Trump, whose international tariffs are a clear attempt to reverse the rise of globalisation.

    Sporadic supply chains.
    Corona Borealis Studio/Shutterstock

    Since the pandemic, more fault-lines have been exposed. The global economy has become too dependent on certain regions, epitomised by Taiwanese dominance in the manufacturing of semiconductors, or European reliance on Russia for gas and oil.

    Recent years have also seen supply chain bottlenecks, leading to shortages of goods including cars, phones and even salad ingredients. Inflexible global systems have been ineffective, and internationally agreed fixes are hard to achieve.

    4. Climate change

    World news at the start of 2020 was dominated by the massive wildfires raging across Australia. At the start of 2025, Los Angeles burned.

    As the global climate shifts and lurches, extreme weather events are becoming more common. Floods, hurricanes and extreme temperatures look to be the likely outcome.

    When sea levels rise, countless coastal cities will experience flooding, and many Pacific islands may disappear altogether. The UN’s climate science advisory group, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) suggests that humanity will struggle with food production, disease and massive migration.

    This will all result in huge economic costs, impeding growth and disrupting livelihoods across the world. According to the IPCC, the impacts could range from extreme weather events disrupting infrastructure to changing weather reducing yields in agriculture, forestry and fishing.

    Yet many countries appear to be backtracking on their commitment to reducing emissions. It seems they would prefer to deal with the fallout of climate change rather than invest in potential solutions like carbon taxes, walkable cities or alternative fuels. But such acts of self-harm are not a sound basis for a prosperous economy, society or planet.

    Cahal Moran does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Four reasons why many of us feel the global economy is not on our side – https://theconversation.com/four-reasons-why-many-of-us-feel-the-global-economy-is-not-on-our-side-252220

    MIL OSI Analysis

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Norman Tebbit, Conservative minister known as Thatcher’s enforcer, dies at 94

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Martin Farr, Senior Lecturer in Contemporary British History, Newcastle University

    No man more embodied Thatcherism in the eyes of the public in the 1980s than Norman Tebbit, who died on July 7, aged 94.

    Though certainly no yuppie, Lord Tebbit entitled his memoirs Upwardly Mobile. Margaret’s Thatcher’s triumph was also his. She saw in the Essex MP just the uncompromising approach to transforming Britain to which she too was committed.

    Both had been disgusted by the Conservative government of Edward Heath blinking when it sought to face down trade unions in the early 1970s. The experience was elemental to their plan for government.

    Others were more important to the New Right/neoliberal project elected in 1979: Conservative minister Keith Joseph, and Thatcher’s two chancellors, Geoffrey Howe and Nigel Lawson.

    But Tebbit provided something no one else in Thatcher’s cabinet could: an innate connection with white, working-class voters, who may once have been Labour – Tebbit lauded Clement Attlee and Ernest Bevin – but whose values were held to have been washed away in the postwar tide of union militancy, social permissiveness, European integration, and mass immigration.


    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.


    He became a Conservative almost because, rather than in spite, of his background. “Essex man” was a presiding personification of the period.

    Unlike almost all of Thatcher’s ministers, Tebbit did not go to university, but left school at 16 to encounter the “closed shop”: that one had to be a member of a particular union to work in a particular workplace. He became determined at that moment to end this practice, and with it so much else of postwar social democracy.

    Thirty years later he did, as Thatcher’s secretary of state for employment. Tebbit’s 1982 Employment Act avenged the unions’ defeat of Heath. Union rights were weakened, never to be restored, and those of employers emboldened. It was a significant contribution to Thatcherism’s ledger.

    As secretary of state for trade and industry, Tebbit pursued privatisation – the return (as its proponents, simply, put it) of nationalised industries to the private sector – with passion. The postwar settlement in Britain was being upended.

    Public image

    In an age before the televising of parliament (much less 24-hour news and social media), Tebbit cut through in a way few politicians did.

    At at a time of inner-city violence, the public knew Tebbit’s unemployed father, decades earlier, didn’t riot but “got on his bike and looked for work”. No one else could have been called – in the words of Labour’s Michael Foot – a “semi-house-trained polecat”. TV’s puppet satire Spitting Image portrayed him as the “Chingford Strangler”, dressed in biker leathers.

    Tebbit felt no need for his contempt for socialism to be leavened by charm or humour. There was invariably a slight sense of menace. He had no interest in ingratiating or propitiating. And so he was as loved by Conservative party members as he was hated by the left. He welcomed their hatred.

    Tebbit in particular despised the swinging 60s – fittingly, he entered parliament in the election in which Harold Wilson’s government was unexpectedly ejected – and its legacy of “insufferable, smug, sanctimonious, naive, guilt-ridden, wet, pink orthodoxy”. Thus his trenchancy on immigration, overseas aid (a “sink of iniquity, corruption and violence”), sexuality (he was one of the few still to use the word “sodomite”) and Europe (he was a Eurosceptic before Euroscepticism).

    In 1990 Tebbit asked of British-born people of Asian heritage: “Which side do they cheer for? Are you still harking back to where you came from or where you are?”. Tebbit’s “cricket test” is second only to Enoch Powell’s “rivers of blood” speech in the annals of inflammatory – they and their supporters would say candid – rhetoric relating to immigration. Neither would mind the association.




    Read more:
    Tory humiliation down to campaign length and cult of May – Norman Tebbit Q&A


    What silenced most – if not quite all – of his critics, was Tebbit at his most vulnerable. Following the IRA bombing of the Grand Hotel Brighton in 1984, live television footage of him, only partially clad in his pyjamas, covered in dust, being stretchered out of the rubble, became the defining image of the atrocity.

    The following year Thatcher moved him from trade and industry to, less happily, chairman of the Conservative party. It was a job that required a lighter touch than Tebbit’s.

    Nevertheless, as chairman, he delivered the Conservatives’ third election victory, of 1987 – ensuring the permanence of the transformation – only to immediately retire to the backbenches. Margaret, his wife, had been paralysed by the bomb, and he devoted himself to her care for more than 30 years until her death.

    As warranted as his departure from government may have been, Thatcher “bitterly regretted” losing him, a feeling she felt for few. Her defenestration in November 1990 is much harder to imagine had Tebbit still been in the cabinet.

    Norman Tebbit’s conservatism and nationalism harked back to an earlier age, yet presaged the populism of the 2020s. In his remarks following the news of Tebbit’s death, Nigel Farage said he thought him “a great man”.

    Tebbit’s values endure in public discourse, in more ways than he might have expected even a few years ago. But in his last months he was either unable, or unwilling, to say whether those values were those of the Conservatives, the traditional party of the right, or of another project. That may be a final Tebbit “test”.

    Martin Farr does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Norman Tebbit, Conservative minister known as Thatcher’s enforcer, dies at 94 – https://theconversation.com/norman-tebbit-conservative-minister-known-as-thatchers-enforcer-dies-at-94-260716

    MIL OSI

  • MIL-OSI Analysis: Brics is sliding towards irrelevance – the Rio summit made that clear

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Amalendu Misra, Professor of International Politics, Lancaster University

    The Brics group of nations has just concluded its 17th annual summit in the Brazilian city of Rio de Janeiro. But, despite member states adopting a long list of commitments covering global governance, finance, health, AI and climate change, the summit was a lacklustre affair.

    The two most prominent leaders from the group’s founding members – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – were conspicuously absent. Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, only attended virtually due to an outstanding arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court over his role in the war in Ukraine.

    China’s Xi Jinping avoided the summit altogether for unknown reasons, sending his prime minister, Li Qiang, instead. This was Xi’s first no-show at a Brics summit, with the snub prompting suggestions that Beijing’s enthusiasm for the group as part of an emerging new world order is in decline.

    Perhaps the most notable takeaway from the summit was a statement that came not from the Brics nations but the US. As Brics leaders gathered in Rio, the US president, Donald Trump, warned on social media: “Any Country aligning themselves with the Anti-American policies of BRICS, will be charged an ADDITIONAL 10% Tariff. There will be no exceptions to this policy.”


    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.


    Trump has long been critical of Brics. This is largely because the group has consistently floated the idea of adopting a common currency to challenge the dominance of the US dollar in international trade.

    Such a move makes sense if we focus on trade figures. In 2024, the value of trade among the Brics nations was around US$5 trillion, accounting for approximately 22% of global exports. Member nations have always felt their economic potential could be fully realised if they were not reliant upon the US dollar as their common currency of trade.

    During their 2024 summit, which was held in the Russian city of Kazan, the Brics nations entered into serious discussions around creating a gold-backed currency. At a time when the Trump administration is waging a global trade war, the emergence of an alternative to the US dollar would be a very serious pushback against US economic hegemony.




    Read more:
    Why Donald Trump’s election could hasten the end of US dollar dominance


    But the freshly concluded Brics summit did not present any concrete move towards achieving that objective. In fact, the 31-page Rio de Janeiro joint declaration even contained some reassurances about the global importance of the US dollar.

    There are two key obstacles hindering Brics from translating its vision of a common currency into reality. First is that some founding member nations are uncomfortable with adopting such an economic model, in large part due to internal rivalries within Brics itself.

    India, currently the fourth-largest economy in the world, has a history of periodic confrontation and strategic competition with China. It is reticent about adopting an alternative to the US dollar, concerned that this could make China more powerful and undercut India’s long-term interests.

    Second is that the Brics member nations are dependent on their bilateral trade with the US. Simply put, embracing an alternative currency is counterproductive when it comes to the current economic interests of individual countries. Brazil, China and India, for example, all export more to the US than they import from it.

    In December 2024, following his election as US president, Trump said: “We require a commitment from these countries that they will neither create a new Brics currency nor back any other currency to replace the mighty US dollar or they will face 100% tariffs and should expect to say goodbye to selling into the wonderful US economy”. This blunt message all but killed any enthusiasm that was there for this grand economic model.

    Caught in contradiction

    The Brics group is a behemoth. Its full 11 members account for 40% of the world’s population and economy. But the bloc is desperately short of providing any cohesive alternative global leadership.

    While Brazil used its position as host to highlight Brics as a truly multilateral forum capable of providing leadership in a new world order, such ambitions are thwarted by the many contradictions plaguing this bloc.

    Among these are tensions between founding members China and India, which have been running high for decades.

    There are other contradictions, too. In their joint Rio declaration, the group’s members decried the recent Israeli and US attacks on Iran. Brazil’s president, Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva, also used his position as summit host to criticise the Israeli offensive in Gaza.

    But this moral high ground appears hollow when you consider that the Russian Federation, a key member of Brics, is on a mission to destroy Ukraine. And rather than condemning Russia, Brics leaders used the Rio summit to criticise recent Ukrainian attacks on Russia’s railway infrastructure.

    Brics declared intention to address the issue of climate change is also problematic. The Rio declaration conveyed the group’s support for multilateralism and unity to achieve the goals of the Paris agreement. But, despite China making significant advances in its green energy sector, Brics contains some of the world’s biggest emitters of greenhouse gases as well as several of the largest oil and gas producers.

    Brics can only stay relevant and provide credible leadership in a fast-changing international order when it addresses its many inner contradictions.

    Amalendu Misra is a recipient of British Academy and Nuffield Foundation Fellowships.

    ref. Brics is sliding towards irrelevance – the Rio summit made that clear – https://theconversation.com/brics-is-sliding-towards-irrelevance-the-rio-summit-made-that-clear-260653

    MIL OSI Analysis

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: I rode the Tour de France to study its impact on the human body – here’s what I learned

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Steve Faulkner, Senior Lecturer in Exercise Physiology, Nottingham Trent University

    The Tour de France is often called the world’s biggest annual sporting event. Each July up to 12 million people line the roadside, while the cumulative TV audience tops 3 billion viewers across 190 countries.

    In 2025, 184 riders will compete in teams of eight, racing a punishing 3,500 km route with nearly 50,000 metres of climbing – roughly the height of Mount Everest six times over. Across 21 stages riders tackle time trials, flat sprints and brutal mountain passes through the Alps, Pyrenees and Massif Central.

    Professional cyclists possess extraordinary endurance and are capable of generating high power outputs day after day. Yet, despite having far less training and support, in recent years a number of amateur cyclists have begun riding the Tour route just days before the pros. The Tour 21 is one such effort and offers cyclists a chance to follow in the tyre tracks of the elite while raising money for a good cause.

    In 2021 I joined 19 others to ride the full route in support of Cure Leukaemia, with a shared goal of raising £1 million for blood cancer research. As a blood cancer survivor diagnosed at 16, this challenge combined my love of cycling, my background in science and my deep desire to give back to the community that helped save my life. It was also a unique opportunity to study how amateur cyclists cope with one of the most demanding endurance events in the world.

    The research findings were published in the Journal of Science and Cycling, to coincide with 2025’s Grand Départ (the official start of the race) in Lille.

    Training for the impossible

    Originally, the study planned to include lab-based physiological assessments of the amateur cyclists undertaking the Tour de France route, but the COVID-19 pandemic forced us to adapt and rely instead on data from training diaries. These gave us insight into how much (or little) training had been done leading up to the ride, and how riders managed the physical and mental strain during the event itself.

    While professional cyclists typically train 20–25 hours a week – often at altitude, with tailored coaching and racing schedules – our group of amateurs had full-time jobs, were typically 15–20 years older than the pros and trained around seven to ten hours a week.

    Our preparation was far from ideal, averaging just 47km per ride and 350 metres of climbing; a fraction of what the Tour demands. In fact, this amounted to less than 10% of the required climbing during the mountain stages.

    Once the ride began, the contrast between training and reality was stark. The group averaged nearly seven hours of riding a day, a 300% increase from their usual routine. Within four days signs of overtraining began to emerge: riders were no longer able to elevate their heart rates, a classic marker of central nervous system fatigue and excessive physical stress.

    As the days progressed, performance metrics continued to decline: heart rates dropped, power outputs fell and mood scores deteriorated. The cumulative fatigue was undeniable.

    Surprisingly, when we compared our amateur data to metrics from professional riders, we found that although pros ride at much higher power outputs, amateurs were subject to greater relative stress. On some days they spent almost double the time in the saddle, which meant they operated closer to their physical limits, with far less time for recovery – and often suboptimal sleep and nutrition.

    By the final week many of the riders could no longer produce the same power they had in the first few days. In some cases, heart rates wouldn’t rise above 100 beats per minute – a clear sign of accumulated fatigue and physiological overload.

    How to prepare for an ultra-endurance challenge

    If you’re planning to take on a major endurance event – whether it’s cycling, running, or hiking – here are some lessons from the road:

    1. Train specifically for the event

    Your training should mirror the challenge ahead. For the Tour, this meant preparing for long, back-to-back days with significant climbing. Mimic the intensity, volume and terrain as closely as possible.

    2. Understand how quickly fatigue builds

    Over multiple days, fatigue doesn’t just accumulate – it compounds. Listen to your body, adapt your plan and include plenty of recovery time.

    3. Prioritise nutrition and recovery

    These two factors can make or break your performance. You’ll need to consume enough energy to fuel the effort, but avoid excessive intake that leads to unnecessary weight gain. Recovery – through sleep, rest and refuelling – is equally vital.

    4. Work with an experienced coach

    More than fancy bikes or high-tech gear, a good coach is your best investment. They can help tailor your training plan, track your progress and adapt strategies as needed. Don’t underestimate this support.

    A ride to remember

    Completing the Tour de France route is a monumental achievement for any cyclist — amateur or pro. In 2021, our team not only rode the full route, but also raised over £1 million for Cure Leukaemia. For me, it marked a deeply personal milestone in my cancer journey.

    Throughout those 21 days, I thought often of the physical and emotional battles I faced during treatment; moments when I didn’t know if I’d survive, let alone ride across France. That experience gave me the resilience to keep going, even when my body was screaming to stop.

    Riding the Tour taught me that we’re capable of far more than we realise, especially when we ride with purpose.

    Steve Faulkner does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. I rode the Tour de France to study its impact on the human body – here’s what I learned – https://theconversation.com/i-rode-the-tour-de-france-to-study-its-impact-on-the-human-body-heres-what-i-learned-260524

    MIL OSI

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Four reasons why many of us feel the global economy is not on our side

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Cahal Moran, Visiting Fellow in the Department of Psychological and Behavioural Science, London School of Economics and Political Science

    During my adult life, I have never experienced what it’s like to live in a “good” economy. Starting with the global financial crash in 2008, which hit just as I began studying economics, the world seems to have lurched from crisis to crisis and the UK economy even more so.

    Some of those crises, like the crash and COVID, are sudden shocks. Others have been more gradual, such as increasingly unaffordable housing or the rising dominance of the world’s ultra rich.

    As I explore in my new book, Why We’re Getting Poorer, the result of these crises is an economic system which works for some much more than it does for others. Here are four reasons why you may be feeling let down.

    1. Grasping for growth

    Like many of his fellow leaders across the world, the British prime minister, Keir Starmer, is aiming to make economic growth the primary mission of his government. And understandably so.

    A growing economy puts more money in people’s pockets and brings other benefits such as low unemployment. But economic growth is not easy (in the UK it has been poor for a long time).

    That’s because there’s no GDP dial that a prime minister or president can simply turn up. Research shows that economic growth is an amorphous and difficult goal which depends on many factors – geopolitical, demographic, technological – outside any single country’s control.

    One option is to focus on achievable goals around investment, like the public investments of £113 billion on homes, transport and energy planned in the UK. But big projects can take a long time to build and develop, so even if they do boost growth, it can take a while for households to feel the benefits.

    2. Inherent inequality

    Against the backdrop of low growth in the UK has been high inequality, under Conservative and Labour governments. And again, inequality is an international issue.

    The wealth of the richest people in the world skyrocketed over COVID, buoyed in many cases by the increased importance of the tech sector during lockdowns. Even before the pandemic, wealth inequality was a problem across the globe.

    This imbalance has given the very richest opportunities to buy up commercial competitors, indulge in space travel and control large parts of the media, exerting extreme economic, social and political power. Needless to say, their economic priorities are not the same as everyone else’s.

    Meanwhile, communities and regions may be left behind, with declining physical and social infrastructure. People living in hollowed out areas where incomes and opportunities are limited are unlikely to feel that the economic system is working for them.

    3. Globalisation

    Globalisation has made a lot of people – in places like China, India and Brazil – better off. But it is not a system which ensures economic benefits for everyone.

    With global competition, big businesses are often under pressure to reduce costs. Free trade deals have often failed to enforce labour standards or redistribute gains to poorly paid workers, and in many cases simply made the rich richer.

    Such a distorted form of economic governance, where large sections of society end up feeling left behind was bound to provoke a response. Some would link it to recent political events like Brexit and the presidencies of Donald Trump, whose international tariffs are a clear attempt to reverse the rise of globalisation.

    Sporadic supply chains.
    Corona Borealis Studio/Shutterstock

    Since the pandemic, more fault-lines have been exposed. The global economy has become too dependent on certain regions, epitomised by Taiwanese dominance in the manufacturing of semiconductors, or European reliance on Russia for gas and oil.

    Recent years have also seen supply chain bottlenecks, leading to shortages of goods including cars, phones and even salad ingredients. Inflexible global systems have been ineffective, and internationally agreed fixes are hard to achieve.

    4. Climate change

    World news at the start of 2020 was dominated by the massive wildfires raging across Australia. At the start of 2025, Los Angeles burned.

    As the global climate shifts and lurches, extreme weather events are becoming more common. Floods, hurricanes and extreme temperatures look to be the likely outcome.

    When sea levels rise, countless coastal cities will experience flooding, and many Pacific islands may disappear altogether. The UN’s climate science advisory group, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) suggests that humanity will struggle with food production, disease and massive migration.

    This will all result in huge economic costs, impeding growth and disrupting livelihoods across the world. According to the IPCC, the impacts could range from extreme weather events disrupting infrastructure to changing weather reducing yields in agriculture, forestry and fishing.

    Yet many countries appear to be backtracking on their commitment to reducing emissions. It seems they would prefer to deal with the fallout of climate change rather than invest in potential solutions like carbon taxes, walkable cities or alternative fuels. But such acts of self-harm are not a sound basis for a prosperous economy, society or planet.

    Cahal Moran does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Four reasons why many of us feel the global economy is not on our side – https://theconversation.com/four-reasons-why-many-of-us-feel-the-global-economy-is-not-on-our-side-252220

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  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Brics is sliding towards irrelevance – the Rio summit made that clear

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Amalendu Misra, Professor of International Politics, Lancaster University

    The Brics group of nations has just concluded its 17th annual summit in the Brazilian city of Rio de Janeiro. But, despite member states adopting a long list of commitments covering global governance, finance, health, AI and climate change, the summit was a lacklustre affair.

    The two most prominent leaders from the group’s founding members – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – were conspicuously absent. Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, only attended virtually due to an outstanding arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court over his role in the war in Ukraine.

    China’s Xi Jinping avoided the summit altogether for unknown reasons, sending his prime minister, Li Qiang, instead. This was Xi’s first no-show at a Brics summit, with the snub prompting suggestions that Beijing’s enthusiasm for the group as part of an emerging new world order is in decline.

    Perhaps the most notable takeaway from the summit was a statement that came not from the Brics nations but the US. As Brics leaders gathered in Rio, the US president, Donald Trump, warned on social media: “Any Country aligning themselves with the Anti-American policies of BRICS, will be charged an ADDITIONAL 10% Tariff. There will be no exceptions to this policy.”


    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.


    Trump has long been critical of Brics. This is largely because the group has consistently floated the idea of adopting a common currency to challenge the dominance of the US dollar in international trade.

    Such a move makes sense if we focus on trade figures. In 2024, the value of trade among the Brics nations was around US$5 trillion, accounting for approximately 22% of global exports. Member nations have always felt their economic potential could be fully realised if they were not reliant upon the US dollar as their common currency of trade.

    During their 2024 summit, which was held in the Russian city of Kazan, the Brics nations entered into serious discussions around creating a gold-backed currency. At a time when the Trump administration is waging a global trade war, the emergence of an alternative to the US dollar would be a very serious pushback against US economic hegemony.




    Read more:
    Why Donald Trump’s election could hasten the end of US dollar dominance


    But the freshly concluded Brics summit did not present any concrete move towards achieving that objective. In fact, the 31-page Rio de Janeiro joint declaration even contained some reassurances about the global importance of the US dollar.

    There are two key obstacles hindering Brics from translating its vision of a common currency into reality. First is that some founding member nations are uncomfortable with adopting such an economic model, in large part due to internal rivalries within Brics itself.

    India, currently the fourth-largest economy in the world, has a history of periodic confrontation and strategic competition with China. It is reticent about adopting an alternative to the US dollar, concerned that this could make China more powerful and undercut India’s long-term interests.

    Second is that the Brics member nations are dependent on their bilateral trade with the US. Simply put, embracing an alternative currency is counterproductive when it comes to the current economic interests of individual countries. Brazil, China and India, for example, all export more to the US than they import from it.

    In December 2024, following his election as US president, Trump said: “We require a commitment from these countries that they will neither create a new Brics currency nor back any other currency to replace the mighty US dollar or they will face 100% tariffs and should expect to say goodbye to selling into the wonderful US economy”. This blunt message all but killed any enthusiasm that was there for this grand economic model.

    Caught in contradiction

    The Brics group is a behemoth. Its full 11 members account for 40% of the world’s population and economy. But the bloc is desperately short of providing any cohesive alternative global leadership.

    While Brazil used its position as host to highlight Brics as a truly multilateral forum capable of providing leadership in a new world order, such ambitions are thwarted by the many contradictions plaguing this bloc.

    Among these are tensions between founding members China and India, which have been running high for decades.

    There are other contradictions, too. In their joint Rio declaration, the group’s members decried the recent Israeli and US attacks on Iran. Brazil’s president, Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva, also used his position as summit host to criticise the Israeli offensive in Gaza.

    But this moral high ground appears hollow when you consider that the Russian Federation, a key member of Brics, is on a mission to destroy Ukraine. And rather than condemning Russia, Brics leaders used the Rio summit to criticise recent Ukrainian attacks on Russia’s railway infrastructure.

    Brics declared intention to address the issue of climate change is also problematic. The Rio declaration conveyed the group’s support for multilateralism and unity to achieve the goals of the Paris agreement. But, despite China making significant advances in its green energy sector, Brics contains some of the world’s biggest emitters of greenhouse gases as well as several of the largest oil and gas producers.

    Brics can only stay relevant and provide credible leadership in a fast-changing international order when it addresses its many inner contradictions.

    Amalendu Misra is a recipient of British Academy and Nuffield Foundation Fellowships.

    ref. Brics is sliding towards irrelevance – the Rio summit made that clear – https://theconversation.com/brics-is-sliding-towards-irrelevance-the-rio-summit-made-that-clear-260653

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  • MIL-OSI Russia: Exclusive: BRICS strives for equality and stable coexistence in the interests of all humanity – Director of IKS RAS

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Moscow, July 8 /Xinhua/ — BRICS does not seek to defeat the West, but seeks equality and stable coexistence in the interests of all mankind, Director of the Institute of China and Modern Asia of the Russian Academy of Sciences /ICSA RAS/ Kirill Babayev said in an interview with Xinhua recently.

    The 17th meeting of the BRICS leaders has just ended in the Brazilian city of Rio de Janeiro. K. Babayev noted that the international influence of BRICS, which already accounts for more than 45% of the world’s GDP, is currently increasing. At the same time, as the expert emphasized, BRICS does not seek to defeat the West, but seeks equality and stable coexistence in the interests of all mankind.

    He also drew attention to Russian-Chinese cooperation within the BRICS framework. “Russia and China are the two main pillars of BRICS, the most active participants in the association. Using the example of our bilateral relations, we show the whole world how to build trusting, friendly, mutually beneficial relations in the new era,” the director of the ICA RAS said.

    If BRICS, continued K. Babayev, covers the entire world with a network of economic ties, then the Shanghai Cooperation Organization /SCO/ focuses on security issues and on preventing threats on the Eurasian continent.

    “The SCO is the main stabilizing force in Eurasia. The organization’s activities are aimed primarily at strengthening stability, creating trusting relationships and the general security of a united Greater Eurasia. This organization, through its activities, prevents the threats of terrorism, extremism, and ensures the security of large and small countries and peoples,” said K. Babayev, answering a question from a Xinhua correspondent about the upcoming SCO summit in September in the Chinese city of Tianjin.

    The expert believes that Russia and China play a very important role in both of these international formats. Today, it depends on them “what Eurasia will be like tomorrow, whether we will be able to build a unified partnership here on new, fair principles,” K. Babayev emphasized.

    He added that the economies of the two countries successfully complement each other. “Trade between our countries is growing at an accelerated pace. But today our governments are already looking further — toward closer production cooperation, technological partnership,” K. Babayev stated. –0–

    Please note: This information is raw content obtained directly from the source of the information. It is an accurate report of what the source claims and does not necessarily reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    .

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Rep. Clyde Announces Launch of 2025 Congressional App Challenge

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Representative Andrew S. Clyde (R-GA)

    Rep. Clyde Announces Launch of 2025 Congressional App Challenge

    Gainesville, July 8, 2025

     

    GAINESVILLE, GA — Today, Congressman Andrew Clyde (GA-09) invited middle and high school students in Georgia’s Ninth District to participate in the 2025 Congressional App Challenge, a nationwide competition that encourages young Americans to showcase their creativity and coding skills by designing original apps. The submission portal is now open, and students can register and submit their apps through October 30th, 2025.

     

    “The Congressional App Challenge provides an incredible opportunity for students of all backgrounds to learn valuable skills and display their creativity on the national stage,” said Clyde. “I encourage middle and high school students throughout the Ninth District to take part in this competition to explore and excel in coding, tech, and innovation.”

     

    Background:

     

    First launched in 2014, the Congressional App Challenge is the official computer science competition of the U.S. House of Representatives. The competition encourages students to create and submit their own app for the opportunity to receive national recognition.

     

    Students may participate as individuals or in teams of up to four. Congressional App Challenge winners may be eligible to have their app featured on a display in the U.S. Capitol and put on the U.S. House of Representatives’ website. Additionally, winners will receive an invitation to the #HouseOfCode celebration on Capitol Hill.

     

    Rules and guidelines are available HERE. For more information, please visit Rep. Clyde’s website and the Congressional App Challenge’s website.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Rep. Clyde Announces Launch of 2025 Congressional App Challenge

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Representative Andrew S. Clyde (R-GA)

    Rep. Clyde Announces Launch of 2025 Congressional App Challenge

    Gainesville, July 8, 2025

     

    GAINESVILLE, GA — Today, Congressman Andrew Clyde (GA-09) invited middle and high school students in Georgia’s Ninth District to participate in the 2025 Congressional App Challenge, a nationwide competition that encourages young Americans to showcase their creativity and coding skills by designing original apps. The submission portal is now open, and students can register and submit their apps through October 30th, 2025.

     

    “The Congressional App Challenge provides an incredible opportunity for students of all backgrounds to learn valuable skills and display their creativity on the national stage,” said Clyde. “I encourage middle and high school students throughout the Ninth District to take part in this competition to explore and excel in coding, tech, and innovation.”

     

    Background:

     

    First launched in 2014, the Congressional App Challenge is the official computer science competition of the U.S. House of Representatives. The competition encourages students to create and submit their own app for the opportunity to receive national recognition.

     

    Students may participate as individuals or in teams of up to four. Congressional App Challenge winners may be eligible to have their app featured on a display in the U.S. Capitol and put on the U.S. House of Representatives’ website. Additionally, winners will receive an invitation to the #HouseOfCode celebration on Capitol Hill.

     

    Rules and guidelines are available HERE. For more information, please visit Rep. Clyde’s website and the Congressional App Challenge’s website.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Rep. Clyde Announces Launch of 2025 Congressional App Challenge

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Representative Andrew S. Clyde (R-GA)

    Rep. Clyde Announces Launch of 2025 Congressional App Challenge

    Gainesville, July 8, 2025

     

    GAINESVILLE, GA — Today, Congressman Andrew Clyde (GA-09) invited middle and high school students in Georgia’s Ninth District to participate in the 2025 Congressional App Challenge, a nationwide competition that encourages young Americans to showcase their creativity and coding skills by designing original apps. The submission portal is now open, and students can register and submit their apps through October 30th, 2025.

     

    “The Congressional App Challenge provides an incredible opportunity for students of all backgrounds to learn valuable skills and display their creativity on the national stage,” said Clyde. “I encourage middle and high school students throughout the Ninth District to take part in this competition to explore and excel in coding, tech, and innovation.”

     

    Background:

     

    First launched in 2014, the Congressional App Challenge is the official computer science competition of the U.S. House of Representatives. The competition encourages students to create and submit their own app for the opportunity to receive national recognition.

     

    Students may participate as individuals or in teams of up to four. Congressional App Challenge winners may be eligible to have their app featured on a display in the U.S. Capitol and put on the U.S. House of Representatives’ website. Additionally, winners will receive an invitation to the #HouseOfCode celebration on Capitol Hill.

     

    Rules and guidelines are available HERE. For more information, please visit Rep. Clyde’s website and the Congressional App Challenge’s website.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Boozman Recognized for Support of Medical Education and Research

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Arkansas – John Boozman

    WASHINGTON—U.S. Senator John Boozman (R-AR) was recognized with the 2025 Champion of Academic Medicine Award from the Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) for demonstrating extraordinary leadership advancing priorities that benefit patients, medical educators, academic institutions and the broader health care system. 

    “I’m proud to champion the vital work of our nation’s academic medical centers, medical schools and the future physicians they train. Strengthening our health care workforce, especially in rural and underserved communities, is critical to improve access to care and support the next generation of providers in Arkansas and across the country for years to come. I look forward to further advocating key policies that protect and enhance medical education,” Boozman said.

    AAMC President and CEO Dr. David Skorton, along with Founding Dean and CEO of Alice L. Walton Medical School Dr. Sharmila Makhija and University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences outgoing Chancellor Dr. Cam Patterson, presented Boozman with the award in his Washington office.

    “We applaud Sen. Boozman for his tireless efforts to highlight and support the critical work of the nation’s academic health systems and teaching hospitals in driving innovation and improving patient care,” Skorton said. “His strong support and steadfast leadership has paved the way for lawmakers to better understand what’s at stake –– a growing nationwide physician shortage, a dire need for the United States to remain competitive in health care innovation and economic growth, and an urgent need to invest in the advancements that save patient lives.” 

    In March, Boozman introduced the Physicians for Underserved Areas Act and the Resident Education Deferred Interest (REDI) Act to increase available medical residency spots, prioritize placement in rural and underserved areas and ease financial burdens on medical professionals completing their medical training. 

    Boozman has also been at the forefront of a bipartisan push to lift the 25-year freeze on Medicare-supported graduate medical education positions, including helping to secure more than 1,000 new residency slots.

    MIL OSI USA News