Category: Security

  • MIL-OSI USA: Bennet, Hickenlooper Welcome $23 Million from Bipartisan Infrastructure Law for Denver, Colorado Springs Airports

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Colorado Michael Bennet
    Denver — Colorado U.S. Senators Michael Bennet and John Hickenlooper welcomed $23 million from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to improve airport infrastructure in Denver and Colorado Springs. This funding comes through the Airport Terminals Program, made possible by the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law.
    “I’m grateful the FAA is supporting Colorado’s airports as they improve and modernize to meet our state’s changing needs,” said Bennet. “These dollars will help ensure our airports can continue to fuel our economy and better connect communities across our state.”
    “Our Bipartisan Infrastructure Law keeps investing in Colorado and creating good-paying jobs. This time by improving travelers’ experiences at both Denver International Airport and the Colorado Springs Airport,” said Hickenlooper. “Giddy up!” 
    Specifically, this funding includes:
    $15 million for Denver International Airport to increase the efficiency and capacity of its baggage handling system; and
    $8 million for Colorado Springs Airport to improve energy efficiency and accessibility, and modernize gate areas.
    Just this year, Bennet and Hickenlooper have welcomed nearly $140 million from the FAA for Colorado’s airports.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Rosen, Cortez Masto Announce $10 Million to Improve Marlette Lake Dam’s Infrastructure and Resiliency

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator Jacky Rosen (D-NV)

    CARSON CITY, NV – Today, U.S. Senators Jacky Rosen (D-NV) and Catherine Cortez Masto (D-NV) announced the State of Nevada will receive a $10 million grant from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to enhance the safety and functionality of the Marlette Lake Dam, reducing the risk of a dam breach during an earthquake.
    “When we invest in Nevada’s infrastructure, we are investing in the safety of our local communities and helping create good-paying jobs,” said Senator Rosen. “I’m proud to announce that $10 million in federal funding is coming to Northern Nevada to upgrade the Marlette Lake Dam and help make it more resilient against future earthquakes. I’ll continue fighting to ensure Nevada gets its fair share of resources to keep our communities safe.”
    “I am proud to see these federal funds come into our state to make essential improvements to the Marlette Lake Dam and better resist an earthquake,” said Senator Cortez Masto. “These funds will help protect our water supply in Storey County and Carson City while keeping Nevadans safe and healthy. I’ll keep working with Senator Rosen to continue modernizing Nevada’s infrastructure and ensuring Nevadans have the resources they need to recover from natural disasters.”
    Senators Rosen and Cortez Masto worked to pass the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law to create good-paying jobs and upgrade Nevada’s infrastructure. They are committed to ensuring Nevadans have access to resources in the face of natural disasters. Both Senators successfully pushed President Biden to issue a Major Disaster Declaration for numerous counties in Nevada in the wake of unprecedented winter storms. Senators Rosen and Cortez Masto also joined their  colleagues in asking the White House for federal funds to help Nevada fight wildfires and extreme drought.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Security: River Bennett — Victoria County District RCMP investigates fatal crash in River Bennett

    Source: Royal Canadian Mounted Police

    Victoria County District RCMP is investigating a fatal crash that occurred in River Bennett.

    On October 22, at approximately 6:08 p.m., Victoria County District RCMP and fire services responded to a report of a single-vehicle crash in the 46000 block of the Cabot Trail. RCMP officers learned that a Nissan Frontier had left the roadway and rolled, coming to rest in the ditch.

    The driver and sole occupant of the Frontier, a 22-year-old woman from Englishtown, was located deceased at the scene.

    An RCMP collision reconstructionist attended the scene and the investigation is ongoing. The Cabot Trail was partially closed for several hours but has since fully reopened.

    Our thoughts are with the victim’s loved ones at this difficult time.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Defense News: Truman Strike Group Destroyers Conduct Barents Sea Operations

    Source: United States Navy

    The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers USS Jason Dunham (DDG 109) and USS Stout (DDG 55), assigned to the Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group (HSTCSG), conducted routine maritime operations in the Barents Sea in international waters, Oct. 21.

    The Barents Sea is a marginal sea of the Arctic Ocean, located off the northern coasts of Norway and Russia and bordered by the Kola Peninsula to the south, where extreme weather conditions create a difficult operational environment.

    “Our ability to conduct sustained operations in the challenging Arctic region is critical to maintaining an enhanced global presence,” said Rear Adm. Sean Bailey, commander of the HSTCSG. “Stout and Jason Dunham entered the Barents Sea to build the U.S. Navy’s situational awareness in the austere Arctic environment and underscore our commitment to preserving a free and open Arctic.”

    U.S. Navy operations in this region are in accordance with international law and are conducted to enhance domain awareness, deter adversaries, and practice campaigning in the Arctic. Climate change is altering the Arctic, where melting ice and warmer temperatures lead to increased human and military activity, including by our competitors.

    “The Barents Sea is an exceptionally unique and dynamic environment, and presents a great opportunity for Jason Dunham to reinforce our warfighting readiness in the Arctic,” said Cmdr. Aaron Jefferson III, commanding officer of the USS Jason Dunham (DDG 109). “Our capacity to operate confidently in any conditions across the maritime domain is crucial to our mission and demonstrates the Navy’s resolve to our Allies. The crew of Jason Dunham remains motivated, postured, and ready to respond to threats wherever they should arise.”

    In recent years, a surface action group comprised of three Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers and the Royal Navy ship HMS Kent conducted operations in the Barents Sea in 2020.

    In July 2024, the Department of Defense released the 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, the fourth iteration for the Department, which outlines the United States’ commitment to preserving the Arctic as a secure and stable region with Allies and partners. Stout’s and Jason Dunham’s

    operations are a testament to this commitment, advancing the strategy’s lines of effort to enhance domain awareness and the ability to campaign in the Arctic. The strategy builds upon the 2022 National Security Strategy, the 2022 National Defense Strategy, and the 2022 National Strategy for the Arctic Region.

    The HSTCSG continues to support U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa’s maritime operations and theater security cooperation missions, working alongside Allies and partners to maintain maritime safety, security, and stability.

    The carrier strike group consists of the flagship USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75); Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 1 with nine embarked aviation squadrons; staffs from CSG-8, CVW-1, and Destroyer Squadron (DESRON) 28; the Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Gettysburg (CG 64); and two Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers, USS Stout (DDG 55) and USS Jason Dunham (DDG 109).

    HSTCSG’s mission is to conduct prompt and sustained combat operations at sea and remain the cornerstone of the Navy’s forward presence through sea control and power projection capabilities. You can find them on DVIDS at https://www.dvidshub.net/unit/CVN75.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Defense News: SECNAV Del Toro Names Future Nuclear-Powered Attack Submarine USS Atlanta (SSN 813)

    Source: United States Navy

    ATLANTA (Oct 23, 2024) – Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro announced that the future Virginia-class Nuclear-Powered Attack Submarine SSN 813 will be named USS Atlanta. Del Toro made the announcement during a ship naming ceremony at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and Museum, in Atlanta, on Oct. 23.

    The future USS Atlanta honors the city of Atlanta, and the crews of the five previous Navy vessels named Atlanta.

    The naming selection of the future USS Atlanta (SSN 813) continues the trend of naming Virginia-class submarines after cities. Secretary Del Toro previously named USS Long Island (SSN 809), USS San Francisco (SSN 810), USS Miami (SSN 811), and USS Baltimore (SSN 812).

    “The city of Atlanta shares a storied and historic relationship with our Navy. Since the founding of our great nation, Atlantans from all walks of life have answered the call to service, including President Jimmy Carter, who helped advance our nuclear submarine program alongside Admiral Rickover, “the Father of the Nuclear Navy,” said Del Toro. “It has been 25 years since the Navy has had a ship named after the proud legacy of the city of Atlanta. Today, it is my honor and privilege to name the next Virginia-class submarine, SSN 813, USS Atlanta.”

    Congresswoman Nikema Williams, from Georgia’s 5th Congressional District joined Secretary Del Toro for the ceremony honoring Atlanta.

    “The naming of this ship is a testament to Atlanta’s history as the cradle of the civil rights movement,” said Williams. “As this vessel sails across the globe, it will carry with it the legacy of civil and human rights leaders like Congressman John Lewis and President Jimmy Carter, embodying Atlanta’s unbreakable spirit and the fight for justice that continues today.”

    Atlanta Mayor Andre Dickens also served as a guest in the official party and highlighted the honor and meaning behind the naming of the Navy’s newest submarine.  

     “Thank you, Secretary Del Toro for allowing Atlanta to take its place among the great American cities with namesake vessels,” said Dickens. “We envision the future USS Atlanta sailing and submerging as a testament to some of the same values that this city holds…protecting this nation with courage and strength.

    Secretary Del Toro also named the ship sponsor at the ceremony, former Atlanta Mayor Keisha Lance Bottoms.

     The ship’s sponsor fills a vital role throughout the life of a warship, serving as the bond between the ship, her crew, and the nation they serve,” said Del Toro. “I am honored that Mayor Bottoms accepted the invitation to serve as ship sponsor. As a leader and champion for the people of Atlanta, she represents the best of our nation, and I thank her for her lifelong commitment to our Navy, to our service men and women, and to the United States of America.”

    The city of Atlanta has strong ties to American history. Founded in 1836, the city (originally named Terminus) was incorporated as Atlanta in 1847. Following its destruction in the Civil War, Atlanta rapidly rebuilt, became the state capital in 1868, and is now an important center of industry, finance, and transportation. The greater Atlanta region was home to Naval Air Station Atlanta (1943-2009) and hosted squadrons from Reserve Carrier Air Wing 20, and Marine Aircraft Group 42.

    The first Atlanta, a screw gunboat (1858-1859) was renamed Sumpter after commissioning. The second, a protected cruiser (1886-1912) primarily served in the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico and as a barracks ship. The third Atlanta (CL-51), a light cruiser (1941-1942), screened Task Force 16 carriers Enterprise and Hornet during the Battle of Midway, supported the Guadalcanal campaign in July and August, and defended Enterprise at the Battle of the Eastern Solomons on 24 August 1942. From 12-13 November 1942, Atlanta took part in the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, during which she helped sink the Japanese destroy Akatsuki, and later received the Presidential Unit Citation and the embarked Flag Officer, Rear Admiral Norman Scott, was awarded a posthumous Medal of Honor. Suffering extensive torpedo damage, she was scuttled. The fourth Atlanta (CL-104), a light cruiser (1944-1970) served off Japan with the Fast Carrier Task Force where she conducted shore bombardment missions. The fifth Atlanta (SSN-712), a nuclear fast attack submarine (1982-1999), homeported in Norfolk, VA, completed multiple deployments and fleet readiness exercises during the Cold War before being decommissioned.

    Attack submarines are designed to seek and destroy enemy submarines and surface ships; project power ashore with Tomahawk cruise missiles and Special Operation Forces (SOF); carry out Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions; support battle group operations; and engage in mine warfare.

    More information on attack submarines can be found here

    Read Secretary Del Toro’s full remarks here.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI USA: Rep. Cuellar Celebrates Ribbon Cutting for the Rio Grande City Public Safety Building

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Henry Cuellar (TX-28)

    RIO GRANDE CITY, TX – Today, Congressman Henry Cuellar, Ph.D. (TX-28) celebrated the ribbon cutting for the Rio Grande City Public Safety Building. 

    “I was pleased to secure $2.5 million in federal funding to support the new RGC Public Safety Building. This building will provide critical help to our local law enforcement officials and boost public safety for the community,” said Dr. Cuellar, a senior member of the House Appropriations Committee. “Moving forward, I will continue to support our local law enforcement. I want to thank the city commissioners, Rio Grande City Mayor Gilberto Falcon, City Manager Gilberto Milan, RGC Fire Chief Manuel Muniz, and RGC Police Chief Noe Castillo for their leadership and work on this project.” 

    Congressman Cuellar celebrated the ribbon cutting for the RGC Public Safety Building, which he supported through $2,509,264 in federal funding for the building’s equipment and operations. He discussed the project, including its new features, and its significance for public safety in Rio Grande City.  

    The new public safety building will enhance the capabilities of both the Police and Fire department by updating their equipment, including sprinkler systems, video surveillance systems, lockers and benches, an elevator, doors, furniture, a 550kW diesel generator, new radio systems, for the fire department, fire extinguishers, electric heaters, an armory kit, a storage rack, and 13 new vehicles. 

    Rep. Cuellar secured funds for this project through community project funding in 2023, with a cost share of $551,448 provided by the city. 

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Security: U.S. Coast Guard, Korea Coast Guard strengthen partnership through shared training and cultural exchange in Guam

    Source: United States INDO PACIFIC COMMAND

    U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) Team Guam and Korea Coast Guard (KCG) crews completed a successful week-long visit to Guam from Oct. 7 to 11, 2024, marked by shared exercises, subject matter expert (SME) exchanges, and a cultural “sports day” aimed at enhancing collaboration and fostering camaraderie between the two forces.

    The visit, which involved the training ship KCG 3011 Badaro (바다로호) and its crew making their second-ever visit to Guam, focused on strengthening the long-standing partnership between the USCG and KCG in maritime safety and security across the Pacific region. It builds on the trilateral letter of intent signed by representatives from the U.S. Coast Guard, Japan Coast Guard, and Korea Coast Guard in May 2024 to bolster maritime cooperation.

    “The collaboration this week reflects our shared dedication to maritime safety and security,” said Capt. Jessica Worst, commander of U.S. Coast Guard Forces Micronesia/Sector Guam. “We’ve sharpened our operational skills through bilateral training and built lasting relationships that will strengthen our cooperation in the future.”

    One of the visit’s highlights was a Search and Rescue Exercise (SAREX), where the crews simulated a man overboard scenario. The exercise demonstrated seamless coordination between the two forces, deploying small boat crews and executing proper search patterns while adjusting to real-time environmental factors. Officials from both sides, including Superintendent General Han Sang Chul, Korea Coast Guard Academy president, and Battalion Chief Roderick Meno from the Guam Fire Department (GFD), observed the exercise from a dedicated platform and discussed near-shore search and rescue dynamics. GFD’s involvement highlighted the importance of local partnerships in responding to emergencies in Guam’s waters.

    The week also featured a series of SME exchanges, with a particularly well-received session on search and rescue (SAR). The SAR exchange included a 30-minute question-and-answer session in which KCG personnel compared their systems and capabilities with those of the USCG. The session was a testament to the mutual learning that takes place in such exchanges, aligning closely with the KCG’s mission and providing valuable takeaways for future collaboration.

    Complementing the formal exchanges, the two forces participated in a ‘sports day,’ referred to by the KCG as a ‘friendly affair.’ The event was not just about competition, but also about building friendships and fostering goodwill. The event featured spirited competitions in basketball, racquetball, and tug of war, leading to new friendships and exchanges of contacts and social media handles.

    Senior Superintendent Ha Tae Young, Director of the Academy Affairs Division, expressed his gratitude at the closing ceremony, stating, “We are now emotionally connected, and we look forward to continuing this relationship.”

    As the Badaro departed Guam, the USCG and KCG reflected on the week’s successes, leaving with enhanced operational capabilities and deeper bonds of friendship.

    “Our relationship between the U.S. Coast Guard and the Korea Coast Guard is multifaceted, involving cooperative agreements, operational exercises, and collaborative efforts to enforce international sanctions,” said Worst. “This partnership enhances maritime security and strengthens diplomatic ties among the nations involved, contributing to stability in the Pacific region. We look forward to future engagements with our Korean partners.”

    -USCG-

    The Korea Coast Guard
    The KCG transformed significantly since its establishment in 1953. It became an independent agency under the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries in 2017 after being restructured in 2014. The KCG is responsible for various maritime law enforcement duties, including search and rescue operations and maintaining maritime safety off South Korea’s coast. The 295-foot (120 meter) training ship KCG 3011 Badaro (바다로호) has a crew complement of 150 and homeports in Busan, South Korea, where the Korea Coast Guard Academy is also located.

    About U.S. Coast Guard Team Guam
    U.S. Coast Guard Team Guam, comprising over 350 members across Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, focused on maritime safety, security, and stewardship in Oceania. The team includes U.S. Coast Guard Forces Micronesia/Sector Guam, U.S. Coast Guard Base Guam, and their sub-units, staffed by dedicated active-duty, reserve, and civilian personnel. With a significant presence in Guam, Saipan, and the Micronesia sub-region, this integrated team focuses on operations and logistics to support maritime safety, security, and stewardship in Oceania and maintains close ties with local communities.

    For more information about U.S. Coast Guard actions, please get in touch with CWO Sara Muir, public affairs officer, at sara.g.muir@uscg.mil or uscgforcesmicronesia@gmail.com.
    You can also see more in this special video from the KCG Team! https://youtu.be/ojrH3s9DDqg?si=c2VgAUN51kVjq3If

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI USA: Gov. Justice congratulates North Central West Virginia Airport for near completion of $54 million terminal expansion

    Source: US State of West Virginia

    This major enhancement project at North Central West Virginia Airport would not have been possible without the Governor’s support.

    In August 2019, Gov. Justice visited the airport to announce that he had requested $10 million from the West Virginia Infrastructure Jobs Development Council and an additional $10 million in the form of a loan from the West Virginia Economic Development Administration to jump-start the project. Both loans were approved. 

    In addition to the funding secured by the Governor, additional funds for the project were provided by Harrison County, Marion County, the City of Bridgeport, and the Benedum Airport Authority.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Security: RM of Tache — St. Pierre-Jolys RCMP respond to fatal collision

    Source: Royal Canadian Mounted Police

    On October 23, 2024, at approximately 12:30 am, St. Pierre-Jolys received a report of a collision on Highway 1 and Provincial Road 206. When officers arrived on scene, one vehicle was in the south ditch and two vehicles were on the highway.

    Investigation determined a car and a SUV were travelling eastbound on Highway 1 and were side-by-side when the passenger tire of the car, with the control arm and other mechanical parts, came off and struck the SUV, which was travelling in the south lane. This caused the car to come to rest on the roadway and immediately catch fire. The 25-year-old male driver from Calgary was able to exit the vehicle. He was transported to local hospital with non-life threatening injuries.

    After the SUV was struck by the tire and parts from the car, the SUV entered the ditch and rolled. The 59-year-old male driver, from Steinbach, was pronounced deceased on scene. The 45-year-old male passenger, from the RM of Hanover, was transported to local hospital with non-life threatening injuries.

    A third vehicle was travelling close behind the collision and struck the tire component of the car, which was left on the highway after the collision, making the vehicle inoperable. The 28-year-old female driver, from Kenora, Ontario, was transported to hospital with minor physical injuries.

    A RCMP Forensic Collision Reconstructionist is assisting with the ongoing investigation.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Postal Employee Arrested For COVID Relief Fraud

    Source: United States Department of Justice (National Center for Disaster Fraud)

     Ocala, Florida – United States Attorney Roger B. Handberg announces the arrest of Marina Tusca Brooks Stewart (61, Groveland) on an indictment charging her with one count of wire fraud related to COVID relief. If convicted, Brooks Stewart faces up to 20 years in federal prison. In addition, she faces a forfeiture order of $10,000, which represents the alleged proceeds she obtained through this offense. 

    According to court documents, during the COVID pandemic, the United States Small Business Administration (SBA) offered Targeted Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) Advances that did not need to be repaid. The advances were for small businesses that were in low-income communities and received a reduction in revenue of more than 30% during an eight-week period. Between June 28 and 30, 2020, Brooks Stewart devised a scheme to defraud the SBA by electronically applying for an EIDL advance and providing false representations in her application. Afterwards, she fraudulently received a $10,000 EIDL advance.

    An indictment is merely an allegation that a defendant has committed a federal criminal offense. Every defendant is presumed innocent unless, and until, proven guilty. 

    This case is being investigated by the United States Postal Service – Office of Inspector General. It is being prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorney Hannah Nowalk.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Defense News: Secretary Del Toro As-Written Remarks at Future Nuclear-Powered Attack Submarine USS Atlanta (SSN 813) Naming Ceremony

    Source: United States Navy

    Introduction/Thank You

    Good morning, everyone!

    It is an honor to be with you this morning in Atlanta.

    Dr. Evans, thank you for that kind introduction and for the important work you are doing here at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and Museum.

    Mayor Dickens, thank you for welcoming us to Atlanta and for your service to the people of this great city.

    Congresswoman Williams, thank you for your presence today, and for your partnership and support of our men and women in uniform.

    Mr. Carter, thank you for sharing your family’s stories and carrying on their legacy of service.

    Mr. McLaurin, thank you for the work you do, preserving and sharing the rich history of the White House.

    I also want to extend a warm welcome to our state and local leadership, including Senator Orrock, Representative Jones, Representative Evans, Representative Miller, Council President Shipman, and Council Member Amos. Thank you for being here with us today.

    Superintendent Stuckey, thank you for your work at the Jimmy Carter National Historical Park.

    President Cabrera, thank you for your leadership of the students of Georgia Tech and your partnership with the Department of the Navy in moving our Navy and Marine Corps’ technological innovations forward.

    Captain Hollenbach, I thank you for all you’ve done as the Virginia-class program manager, ensuring our Navy’s warfighting excellence for years to come.

    To all of our service members, distinguished guests and visitors here with us today—welcome and thank you for joining us.

    World Today

    The world is undeniably complex, and while military power helps advance our national security interests abroad, President Jimmy Carter recognized that diplomacy should always play a leading role in achieving lasting peace.

    Our world today looks to the United States as a beacon of hope and freedom around the world.

    We face challenges in every corner of the world—from the Indo-Pacific, to Europe, and in the Red Sea.

    In Europe, we are approaching the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale and illegal invasion of Ukraine.

    For the first time since World War II, we face a comprehensive maritime power in the Indo-Pacific.

    The People’s Republic of China continues to exert its excessive maritime claims through their navy, coast guard, and maritime militia.

    In the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, we have been working tirelessly alongside our NATO allies and Middle Eastern partners to protect innocent civilian mariners and commercial shipping form Iranian-aligned Houthi attacks.

    Following the October 7th attacks in Israel one year ago this month, our Navy and Marine Corps were swiftly deployed to the region, forming an integrated force capable of responding to any threat.

    And earlier this month, two of our highly capable destroyers, the USS Cole (DDG 67)—a warship which carries a legacy of standing tall to acts of terrorism—and the USS Bulkeley (DDG 84)—which will always have a special place in my naval carer as her first Commanding Officer—aided our Israeli allies in shooting down Iranian ballistic missiles. 

    I am incredibly proud of the professionalism, dedication, and resilience shown by our Cole and Bulkeley Sailors.

    These brave young men and women illustrate the consistent excellence and effectiveness expected of our United States Navy.

    And we mourn the loss of two trailblazing, combat-decorated naval aviators from the Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group who passed away during a training event last week: Lieutenant Commander Lyndsay “Miley” Evans and Lieutenant Serena “Dug” Wileman.

    Our thoughts are with their families and friends as they cope with the loss of their loved ones—a loss which serves as a poignant reminder that what we ask of our Sailors and Marines is anything but routine, and in many cases dangerous.

    We honor their service and sacrifice by reaffirming our commitment to the ideals that inspire us to serve.

    City of Atlanta

    The city of Atlanta shares a storied and historic relationship with the United States Navy.

    Since the very founding of our Nation, Atlantans from all walks of life have answered the call to service.

    The Marine Corps’ first aviator, Lieutenant Colonel Alfred Cunningham, was born in Atlanta in 1882 and pioneered early aviation at a time when there were great risks and little appreciation for the danger involved in flying.

    Launched in 1943, Naval Air Station Atlanta trained Navy and Marine Corps squadrons from Reserve Carrier Air Wing 20 and Marine Aircraft Group 42.

    While Naval Air Station Atlanta no longer serves the Navy, the airfield continues to serve as the General Lucius D. Clay National Guard Center.

    Atlanta is, of course, home to the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and Museum and the Carter Center, named after the former Naval Officer, Senator, Governor, and President, Jimmy Carter.

    As a Naval Officer, Lieutenant Carter helped advance our nuclear submarine program alongside Admiral Hymen Rickover, the “Father of the Nuclear Navy.”

    While in office, President Carter advocated for a more robust Navy—growing our submarine, aviation, and surface forces.

    He also fiercely advocated for the recruitment of Hispanic Americans into the Navy and nominated the first Hispanic American to serve as Secretary of the Navy—Edward Hidalgo.

    As Secretary of the Navy, I had the opportunity to rename a building at the Naval Academy after President Carter last year.

    Carter Hall will be a place of learning for Midshipmen at the Naval Academy for generations to come.

    And the city of Atlanta has had five previous Navy ships named after her legacy.

    The first USS Atlanta served the Union Navy throughout the Civil War after being captured from the Confederate Navy.

    The second USS Atlanta served in the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico as a barracks ship.

    The third USS Atlanta (CL 51) served as the lead ship of the Atlanta-class of light cruisers and was laid down at the start of the Second World War.

    Weeks after Japan attacked Pearl Harbor and brought the United States into war, USS Atlanta commissioned at New York Navy Yard and later served as part of Admiral Halsey’s Fleet.

    Light cruiser USS Atlanta (CL 104) served in World War II with Fast Carrier Task Force where she conducted shore bombardment missions.

    The fifth USS Atlanta (SSN 712) commissioned in 1982, completing multiple deployments and fleet readiness exercises during the Cold War before being decommissioned in 1999.

    Ship Naming and Sponsor Announcement

    For 25 years, the Navy has been without a ship named after the proud legacy of the city of Atlanta.

    And so, it is my honor and privilege to name the next Virginia-class submarine, SSN 813, USS Atlanta.

    Our Navy’s submarine force is a lethal combination of one of the most powerful platforms available today manned by our Nation’s best and brightest—people like President Carter.

    The Virginia-class Fast Attack Submarines bring tremendous firepower to our Fleet and provide our commanders a valuable asset which strengthens our national security.

    And wherever she sails, she will represent not only the legacy of the proud ships who bore the name USS Atlanta before her, but also the thousands of Atlantans who have honorably and faithfully served the United States in uniform, as civil servants, and as activists to better our great Nation.

    And I am also proud to announce that the ship sponsor of the future USS Atlanta is former Atlanta Mayor Keisha Lance Bottoms.

    The ship’s sponsor fills a vital role throughout the life of a warship, serving as the bond between the ship, her crew, and the nation they serve.

    I am honored that Mayor Bottoms accepted the invitation to serve as ship sponsor. As a leader and champion for the people of Atlanta, she represents the best of our Nation, and I thank her for her lifelong commitment to our Navy, to our service men and women, and to the United States of America.

    Closing

    Our maritime services are indeed the most powerful and capable force this world has ever seen.

    Before I close my remarks today, I wanted to draw your attention to the portrait on the stage.

    It is Mr. Evan Karanovich’s grandfather’s portrait of USS Atlanta (CL 51), the lead ship of the Atlanta-class of eight light cruisers.

    On November 13th, 1942, the third USS Atlanta sank while escorting ships during the war.

    The portrait hung in his grandfather’s office for years until Mr. Karanovich received it as a commissioning gift.

    And he always wondered why, of all the pictures, he received this one.

    His grandfather said that despite the ship being lost in battle—like Atlanta, our Navy, and our Nation—we are resilient.

    Atlanta’s motto is “Resurgens,” which means “to rise again.”

    What better mantra for us to embrace as we move forward?

    Mr. Karanovich, thank you for sharing this beautiful portrait and story with all of us to enjoy.

    I thank all of you here for your support of our maritime services—you ensure that America remains the greatest nation in the world.

    And now, it is my great pleasure to introduce a leader who was born in this great state.

    She currently serves Georgia’s 5th Congressional District and is a member of several caucuses including the Congressional Black Caucus, Democratic Women’s Caucus, Congressional Progressive Caucus, Voting Rights Caucus, LBGTQ+ Equality Caucus, and the HBCU Caucus.

    Ladies and Gentlemen, please welcome Congresswoman Nikema Williams.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Media advisory: Onehunga bus attack

    Source: New Zealand Police (District News)

    Police will hold a stand up this morning in relation to the bus attack in Onehunga yesterday afternoon.

    Auckland City Relieving District Crime Manager, Acting Detective Inspector Alisse Robertson will speak to media at College Hill Police Station at 10.30am.

    Media is asked to gather outside the station by 10.15am.

    Please RSVP to media@police.govt.nz by 10am to confirm your attendance.

    ENDS.

    Holly McKay/NZ Police 

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-Evening Report: Netflix’s Territory is a Succession-like drama packed with family rivalry and betrayal, set in Australia’s outback

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Alexa Scarlata, Research Fellow, Media & Communication, RMIT University

    Netflix

    The Australian commissioning team at Netflix has had a pretty good run over the past 12 months. In January, the adaptation of Trent Dalton’s novel Boy Swallows Universe proved to be the most successful Australian-made show to that point, scoring 7.6 million views globally in its first two weeks.

    A few months later, the second season of the streamer’s Heartbreak High reboot debuted at number one in Australia, and stayed on the Global Top 10 English TV Series list for three consecutive weeks.

    Will Netflix’s latest Australian series – one without any ties to a familiar book or TV show – be as well received? Luckily for the streamer, its new six-part outback western, Territory, has already been described as “epic”, “unforgettable” and “rollicking TV”.

    Robert Taylor plays patriarch Colin Lawson.
    Netflix

    Premium bush family drama

    The series takes place in the Northern Territory, on the “world’s largest cattle station”. The fictional Marianne Station is about the size of Belgium.

    The once-great dynasty of its owners, the Lawson family, is thrown into doubt when their heir apparent dies in the first episode. The Top End’s most powerful players – billionaire miners, rival cattle barons, desert gangsters and Indigenous elders – immediately start circling.

    While this is an original concept by creators Timothy Lee and Ben Davies, you’d be forgiven for feeling a sense of déjà vu, as Territory has been described as equal parts Succession and Yellowstone. I can imagine Netflix executives running the numbers on the returns from those two hits and saying, “let’s throw some money into this”. And boy, did they.

    The show could double as a sophisticated Tourism Australia ad.
    Netflix

    No expenses spared on hats and helicopters

    Territory was directed by Wolf Creek heavyweight Greg McLean. According to him, it’s the

    biggest South Australian TV production ever. Possibly one of the biggest TV productions in Australia just in terms of the amount of crew (and) the incredible support that we had to put in place to go to the locations we went to.

    As Netflix put it, Bondi Beach this is not. While the interiors were filmed in South Australia, half of the series was filmed in stunning remote locations across the NT.

    As a result, the show looks like the most ambitious and sophisticated Tourism Australia ad you’ve ever seen. The wildlife! The panoramic drone shots! The hat budget! The rest of the world could go from thinking we ride kangaroos to work, to assuming we’ve all got our own helicopters.

    Overseas viewers watching would be forgiven for thinking the lot of us have our own helicopters.
    Netflix

    The show looks as expensive as it sounds, but is still kind of soapy. The irony in this story is that everyone’s dirty, but no one ever sweats.

    Territory was originally announced as “Desert King”. Changing the name was wise. The landscape is, for the most part, pretty lush – and not in a “look at this oasis we’ve stumbled upon” kind of way. I counted one fly.

    Desert queens

    What’s more, while the male characters are brilliant sources of humour and violence, it’s the ladies in Territory that bring the heart.

    Anna Torv leads the series as Emily Lawson. Emily is the wife to the next-in-line but perpetually drunk Graham (Michael Dorman). She’s also the girl from the property next door, belonging to the rival Hodge family – a slightly shifty bunch who’ve been known to steal the Lawson’s cattle.

    Anna Torv plays Emily Lawson with a keen sense of cunning.
    Netflix

    Torv was the perfect choice to embody Emily as the long-suffering wife, disdained daughter-in-law, loving sister and exasperated mother. Her poker face kept me guessing. She may not be a Lawson by blood, but her cunning makes her a great fit in this powerful family.

    Kylah Day plays Sharnie Kennedy, a young kid kicking (and fooling) around with a couple of Top End bandits. It was fun – if a little frustrating – to watch her figure out her loyalties and her limits.

    Finally, Sara Wiseman plays Sandra Kirby, a disgustingly wealthy and ruthless land developer who doubles as the quintessential villain. Sandra plays everyone – even her own son. Her merciless manipulation of aspiring Indigenous cattle baron Nolan Brannock (Clarence Ryan) stings, even as it feels quite heavy-handed.

    Clarence Ryan is impressive in his role as Indigenous station owner Nolan Brannock (left), who gets caught up in the drama.
    Netflix

    Whose land and whose legacy?

    Territory does a great job of establishing a simmering tension between the traditional owners of the land and the families and businesses that have taken possession of it.

    But for a show that’s so centred on the battle for power in the Top End, the plotlines that deal with the issue of dispossession move at a frustratingly slow pace.

    Perhaps this is to cater to a global audience, which will likely lack the context that local viewers have. And maybe, for Australian viewers, the enduring subordination and struggle of the original landowners is the intended takeaway.

    Ultimately, Territory is an ambitious and attractive series. It was wonderful to see so many resources poured into a new concept, filmed and set in a part of Australia that rarely sees the kind of spotlight it deserves.

    Sam Delich and Kylah Day play petty thieves Rich Petrakis and Sharnie Kennedy.
    Netflix

    Territory is streaming on Netflix from today.

    Alexa Scarlata does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Netflix’s Territory is a Succession-like drama packed with family rivalry and betrayal, set in Australia’s outback – https://theconversation.com/netflixs-territory-is-a-succession-like-drama-packed-with-family-rivalry-and-betrayal-set-in-australias-outback-241896

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI USA: Ernst Prevents Tax Dollars from Funding Anti-Second Amendment Groups

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator Joni Ernst (R-IA)
    WASHINGTON – To combat discrimination against gun owners, U.S. Senator Joni Ernst (R-Iowa) is supporting theFirearm Industry Non-Discrimination (FIND) Act to stop the federal government from entering into contracts with entities that promote anti-Second Amendment policies.
    Because of her tireless commitment to protecting the rights of law-abiding gun owners, Senator Ernst recentlyearned an “A+” rating from the National Shooting Sports Foundation (NSSF). 
    This summer, Ernst crushed some clays at Ingawanis Adventure Base in Bremer County.
    “Taxpayers should not be funding groups that are actively working to erode and eliminate their God-given right to protect themselves and their families,” said Ernst. “The Second Amendment is foundational to this country and under no circumstance should the federal government be doing businesses with those looking to infringe upon the Constitution. I will always stand up for gun owners and protect their rights from gun grabbers in Washington.”
    “We’re thankful for Senator Ernst’s focus on protecting the rights of lawful citizens practicing their Second Amendment. Her support of the FIND Act will halt discriminatory practices against the firearm industry in their tracks. We look forward to continuing our work with Senator Ernst to expose and correct the infringement of our Constitutional rights,” said John B. McLaughlin, Iowa Firearms Coalition Chairman.
    “Under the Firearm Industry Non-Discrimination (FIND) Act, ‘woke’ corporations that choose to use their financial might to deny essential services to members of the firearm industry would no longer benefit from taxpayer-funded federal contracts. We thank Senator Ernst for supporting the FIND Act and for her commitment to preserving and protecting the Second Amendment rights of her constituents and the industry that makes the exercise of those rights possible. It is because of her efforts that Senator Ernst earned an A+ on the 2024 NSSF Congressional Report Card, which is a comprehensive analysis of our elected representatives’ positions on firearm and ammunition industry priorities in the 118th Congress,” said Lawrence G. Keane, NSSF Senior Vice President and General Counsel.
    “It’s been a joy to work with Sen. Ernst and her office to protect the 2nd Amendment and to know that we woman have such a strong supporter in her,” said Jeanelle Westrom, Iowa Director of Women for Gun Rights.
    Click here to read the bill.
    Background:
    Senator Ernst has fought back against numerous attempts by the Biden-Harris administration to infringe upon the Second Amendment.
    She led the FIREARM Act to protect gun dealers’ Second Amendment rights in the face of the Biden Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives’ (ATF) “zero tolerance” crackdown.
    Ernst worked to hold the ATF accountable by standing up against ATF agents knocking on the doors of private residences, where many law-abiding gun owners live, and asking them to display a recently purchased firearm.
    She has also exposed the ATF’s routine misclassification of administrative positions as law enforcement jobs, improperly costing the federal agency millions in pay and enhanced benefits over a five-year span.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Protecting Albertans’ rights and freedoms

    Source: Government of Canada regional news (2)

    In response to increasing concerns that regulated professional bodies may be going too far in limiting individual freedom of expression and imposing compulsory training beyond the scope of their professional practice, Alberta’s government is launching an engagement this fall that will include hearing directly from affected members.

    As part of the province’s commitment to protecting the civil liberties of all Albertans, the government is considering legislative changes to clarify that professional regulatory bodies are limited to regulating members’ professional competence and behaviour. The engagement will ensure that professional regulatory bodies uphold the rights and freedoms of their members, and that Albertans can share their experiences and opinions. 

    “Freedom of expression is a bedrock in a democratic society. We’re committed to standing up for Albertans’ freedom and that includes ensuring Albertans are not coerced into self-censorship because of threats from their professional regulated bodies. Organizations that regulate professionals must strike a balance that upholds competence and ethics without restricting members’ rights and freedoms and we are working to ensure that balance is met.”

    Danielle Smith, Premier

    “We have heard from professionals receiving complaints from regulators, and in some cases facing actual disciplinary action for expressing personal beliefs and opinions unrelated to their professional competencies. This situation could result in self-censorship and infringe on their ability to speak and express opinions freely. We are initiating this review to ensure members’ rights and freedoms are protected.”

    Mickey Amery, Minister of Justice and Attorney General

    Eleven ministries with regulated professions in scope for this review will collect information and engage with professional regulatory bodies and other relevant groups as needed to inform policy decision-making.

    The review will be informed by input from professional regulatory bodies, regulated professionals and other organizations, associations or experts. These groups will be invited to share their views on whether regulatory oversight goes beyond professional competence and ethics in areas such as freedom of expression and opinion, training not related to professional competence, vexatious and bad faith complaints, third-party complaints and protection for those holding other roles in addition to their role as a regulated professional.

    Quick facts

    • Professional regulatory bodies protect the public interest by setting standards of competence and conduct for their members and disciplining those who fail to meet them.
    • The right to freedom of expression is protected under Section 2(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
    • The review will include 118 regulated professional bodies under the mandates of 11 ministries.
      • These 118 professions and trades are governed by 67 different regulatory bodies. This number includes some provincial government ministries that directly regulate professions.
    • Each ministry did an inventory of the regulated professions under their mandates and determined which should be included in the review. Professions may be excluded from the review if:
      • They are not self-regulating.
      • Regulation for the profession is not yet in force.
      • There is no regulatory body or means to handle public complaints or disciplinary action against any member.
      • There is little or no regulatory role beyond certification.

    Related information

    • Regulated Professions Engagement

    Multimedia

    • Video with Premier Danielle Smith and Justice Minister Mickey Amery

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Congressman DeSaulnier to Present Federal Funding to Benefit Transit in Livermore and Community Safety in Dublin on Tuesday, October 29th

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Mark DeSaulnier Representing the 11th District of California

    Walnut Creek, C.A. – Today, Congressman Mark DeSaulnier (CA-10) announced he will present federal funding to improve transit in Livermore and public safety in Dublin on Tuesday, October 29th. This funding was part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024 (H.R. 4366), which included a total of $15.2 million in federal funding Congressman DeSaulnier secured for 15 projects across Contra Costa County and Alameda County.

    These events are open to press and photographers. Media interested in attending the event should RSVP to Mairead Glowacki at (202) 760-1365 or mairead.glowacki@mail.house.gov.

    First Event (Transit)
    TIME: 
    11:00 a.m. – 11:30 a.m. PT
    WHERE: 875 Atlantis St., Livermore, CA 94551
    WHAT: Congressman DeSaulnier will present funding he and Congressman Eric Swalwell (CA-14) secured for the Livermore Amador Valley Transit Authority (LAVTA) to add an extra hydrogen fueling tank to support their entire fleet of zero-emission buses.

    WHO:

    U.S. Congressman Mark DeSaulnier

    LAVTA Executive Director, Christy Wegener

    LAVTA Board of Directors Chair, Evan Branning (City of Livermore) 

    Alameda County Supervisor, District 1, David Haubert

    Mayor of Dublin, Michael McCorriston

    Mayor of Pleasanton, Karla Brown

    Second Event (Public Safety)
    TIME:
    12:00 p.m. – 12:30 p.m. PT

    WHERE:
    Dublin City Hall – 100 Civic Plaza, Dublin, CA 94568

    WHAT: Congressman DeSaulnier will present funding he secured to the City of Dublin to increase community safety through purchase and installation of situational awareness cameras near public parks and schools.

    WHO:

    U.S. Congressman Mark DeSaulnier

    Mayor of Dublin, Michael McCorriston

    Vice Mayor of Dublin, Sherry Hu

    Dublin Councilmember, Jean Josey

    Dublin Councilmember, Kashef Qaadri

    Dublin Councilmember, Janine Thalblum

    Dublin Police Chief, Nat Schmidt

    Dublin City Manager, Colleen Tribby

    Superintendent of Dublin Unified School District, Chris Funk

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Australia: UPDATE: Fatal crash at Meadows

    Source: South Australia Police

    A woman has died following a crash at Meadows yesterday.

    Just after 3.30 pm, Wednesday 23 October, emergency services were called to Dashwood Gully Road after reports of a crash between a Suzuki sedan and Hyundai sedan.

    The 76-year-old driver of the Suzuki was taken to hospital for treatment of life-threatening injuries but sadly, she died yesterday (Wednesday 23 October).

    The 68-year-old driver of the Hyundai was taken to hospital with minor injuries.

    Dashwood Gully Road was closed between Brookman Road and Ellis Road for a period of time however has since re-opened.

    Major Crash Investigators attended the scene to investigate the circumstances surrounding the crash.

    The woman’s death is the 70th life lost on SA roads.

    MIL OSI News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Threats to media freedom in Poland: concerns over PiS Party plans for TVN and Hungarian involvement – E-002081/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    15.10.2024

    Question for written answer  E-002081/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Łukasz Kohut (PPE), Krzysztof Brejza (PPE)

    Media reports indicate that the Law and Justice (PiS) Party intends to take control of the private broadcaster TVN in Poland. According to information disseminated by the media, this action may involve Hungarian entrepreneurs associated with Orbán’s regime, and it is suggested that this plan could be carried out by former Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki.

    TVN plays a crucial role in Polish public discourse. It is essential to emphasise that the impartiality of this media outlet has led to several persistent attempts by PiS to undermine it, including the drafting of the ‘Lex TVN’ law and the deliberate withholding of its broadcasting licence.

    In the light of the fact that media freedom and pluralism are enshrined in Article 11 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, is the Commission monitoring the situation regarding media freedom? Will it respond promptly and employ all available tools to prevent violations of media freedom by Orbán’s regime?

    Submitted: 15.10.2024

    Last updated: 23 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia – RC-B10-0133/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    Rasa Juknevičienė, François‑Xavier Bellamy, Michael Gahler, Andrzej Halicki, David McAllister, Sebastião Bugalho, Nicolás Pascual De La Parte, Isabel Wiseler‑Lima, Daniel Caspary, Loucas Fourlas, Sandra Kalniete, Łukasz Kohut, Andrey Kovatchev, Andrius Kubilius, Miriam Lexmann, Vangelis Meimarakis, Ana Miguel Pedro, Davor Ivo Stier, Michał Szczerba
    on behalf of the PPE Group
    Yannis Maniatis, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Raphaël Glucksmann, Udo Bullmann, Matthias Ecke, Francisco Assis
    on behalf of the S&D Group
    Emmanouil Fragkos, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Assita Kanko, Marion Maréchal, Aurelijus Veryga, Geadis Geadi, Rihards Kols, Bert‑Jan Ruissen, Charlie Weimers
    on behalf of the ECR Group
    Nathalie Loiseau, Petras Auštrevičius, Helmut Brandstätter, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Bernard Guetta, Karin Karlsbro, Ľubica Karvašová, Moritz Körner, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Marie‑Agnes Strack‑Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar, Dainius Žalimas
    on behalf of the Renew Group
    Sergey Lagodinsky
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

    European Parliament resolution on the situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia

    (2024/2890(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to its previous resolutions on Azerbaijan, Armenia and the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh,

     having regard to the relevant documents and international agreements, including but not limited to the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and the Alma-Ata Declaration of 21 December 1991,

     having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950, ratified by Azerbaijan in 2002 and to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,

     having regard to the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict,

     having regard to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 22 April 1996 between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Azerbaijan, of the other part[1],

     having regard to the statements by the European External Action Service spokesperson of 29 May 2024 on the human rights situation in Azerbaijan and of 3 September 2024 on early parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan,

     having regard to Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe resolution 2527 (2024) of 24 January 2024 entitled ‘Challenge, on substantive grounds, of the still unratified credentials of the parliamentary delegation of Azerbaijan’,

     having regard to the Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions of the Election Observation Mission to the Early Presidential Elections held on 7 February 2024 and to the Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions of the International Election Observation Mission to the Early Parliamentary Elections in Azerbaijan held on 1 September 2024,

     having regard to the report of 29 March 2023 by the Council of Europe’s European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Azerbaijan and to the memorandum of 21 October 2021 by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights on the humanitarian and human rights consequences following the 2020 outbreak of hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh,

     having regard to the orders of the International Court of Justice of 22 February 2023, of 6 July 2023 and of 17 November 2023 on the request for the indication of provisional measures for the application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Armenia v Azerbaijan),

     having regard to Rules 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas the choice of Azerbaijan’s capital Baku as the venue for the 29th United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP29), scheduled to take place from 11 to 22 November 2024, has sparked controversy, notably owing to Azerbaijan’s worsening human rights record, as well as recent and blatant violations of international law, including aggressive behaviour towards its neighbour Armenia; whereas respect for fundamental human rights and civil society participation are enshrined in the host country agreement through which the Azerbaijani Government committed to uphold these rights; whereas in the lead-up to this major international conference, the Azerbaijani authorities have intensified their repression of civil society organisations, activists, opposition politicians and the remaining independent media through detentions and judicial harassment; whereas corruption and a lack of judicial independence further undermine governance;

    B. whereas civil society organisations list over 300 political prisoners in Azerbaijan, including Gubad Ibadoghlu, Anar Mammadli, Bakhtiyar Hajiyev, Tofig Yagublu, Ilhamiz Guliyev, Aziz Orujov, Bahruz Samadov, Akif Gurbanov and many others; whereas there are credible reports of violations of prisoners’ human rights, including detention in inhumane conditions, torture and refusal of adequate medical care;

    C. whereas prominent human rights defender and climate advocate, Anar Mammadli, has been in pre-trial detention since 30 April 2024 on bogus charges of conspiracy to bring illegal foreign currency into the country and his health has deteriorated significantly while in custody; whereas Gubad Ibadoghlu, a political economist, opposition figure and one of the finalists for the 2024 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, was arrested by Azerbaijani authorities in July 2023 and remained in detention until 22 April 2024, when he was transferred to house arrest; whereas his health has deteriorated significantly since his arrest, as a result of torture, inhumane detention conditions and refusal of adequate medical care, thus endangering his life; whereas the health of Gubad Ibadoghlu’s wife, Irada Bayramova, continues to deteriorate as a result of the physical violence she suffered during her detention by the Azerbaijani authorities; whereas on 4 December 2023 human rights activist Ilhamiz Guliyev was arrested on politically motivated charges a few months after he gave an anonymous interview to Abzas Media about the alleged police practice of planting drugs on political activists;

    D. whereas for more than a decade and with increasing determination, Azerbaijani authorities have been reducing space for civil society, arbitrarily closing down non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and arresting or forcing into exile civil society representatives; whereas in recent years, the Azerbaijani authorities have imposed increasingly stringent restrictions on civil society organisations; whereas activists, journalists, political opponents and others have been imprisoned on fabricated and politically motivated charges;

    E. whereas according to human rights defenders, crackdowns on civil society have occurred around other major international events hosted by Azerbaijan, including Eurovision 2012 and the European Games 2015;

    F. whereas the Azerbaijani regime appears to extend its repressive actions beyond its borders; whereas the ongoing crackdown on freedom of expression in Azerbaijan is also reflected in reports of transnational repression and reprisals against family members of detainees; whereas, since 2020, Mahammad Mirzali, an Azerbaijani dissident blogger, has been the target of several assassination attempts in France; whereas, on 29 September 2024, Vidadi Isgandarli, a critic of the Azerbaijani regime living as a political refugee in France, was attacked in his home and succumbed to his injuries two days later; whereas the Azerbaijani authorities have also engaged in politically motivated prosecutions of EU citizens, as seen in the case of Théo Clerc, prompting at least one Member State to formally warn its citizens against travelling to Azerbaijan owing to the risk of arbitrary detention;

    G. whereas Azerbaijan has implemented a systematic policy of bribing officials and elected representatives in Europe in order to downplay Azerbaijan’s human rights record and to silence critics, as part of a widely used strategy described as ‘caviar diplomacy’; whereas some cases have been investigated and some of those involved have been prosecuted and convicted by national courts in several EU Member States;

    H. whereas a number of European Court of Human Rights decisions have found that Azerbaijan has violated human rights; whereas according to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, more than 320 court judgments against Azerbaijan have not yet been executed or have been only partially implemented, which is the highest number among all state parties to the European Convention on Human Rights;

    I. whereas on 3 July 2024, the Council of Europe’s European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) publicly denounced Azerbaijan’s ‘refusal to improve the situation in the light of the Committee’s recommendations’ and the ‘persistent lack of cooperation of the Azerbaijani authorities with the CPT’;

    J. whereas the PACE decided in January 2024 not to ratify the credentials of the Azerbaijani delegation, noting its ‘very serious concerns as to …[Azerbaijan’s] respect for human rights’; whereas the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe noted that its Monitoring Committee’s rapporteurs were not allowed to meet with people who had been detained on allegedly politically motivated charges, and that the Azerbaijani delegation refused to allow the rapporteur for the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights to visit the country;

    K. whereas according to the Election Observation Mission led by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), the early presidential election held on 7 February 2024 took place in a restrictive environment and was marked by the stifling of critical voices and the absence of political alternatives; whereas Azerbaijan held early parliamentary elections on 1 September 2024 in what the OSCE/ODIHR-led International Election Observation Mission described as a restrictive political and legal environment that did not enable genuine pluralism and resulted in a contest devoid of competition; whereas in the period leading up to the parliamentary elections, several government critics were detained;

    L. whereas media legislation in Azerbaijan has become increasingly repressive, with the February 2022 media law effectively legalising censorship; whereas several other laws affecting the media also violate the country’s international obligations with regard to freedom of expression and press freedom; whereas public criticism of the authorities is subject to severe penalties;

    M. whereas according to Reporters Without Borders, virtually the entire media sector in Azerbaijan is under official control, with no independent television or radio broadcasts from within the country, and all critical print newspapers shut down; whereas the authorities continue to suppress the last remaining independent media and repress journalists who reject self-censorship; whereas Azerbaijan has intensified its repression against the remaining independent media, such as Abzas Media, Kanal 13 and Toplum TV, through detentions and judicial harassment;

    N. whereas the Azerbaijani laws regulating the registration, operation and funding of NGOs are highly restrictive and arbitrarily implemented, thus effectively criminalising unregistered NGO activity; whereas Freedom House’s 2024 index ranks Azerbaijan among the least free countries in the world, below Russia and Belarus;

    O. whereas gas contracts between Gazprom and SOCAR for the delivery of one billion cubic metres of gas from Russia to Azerbaijan between November 2022 and March 2023 have raised significant concerns about the re-export of Russian gas to the European market, particularly in the context of the signed memorandum of understanding on the strategic partnership in the field of energy; whereas the EU aims to reduce European dependence on Russian gas, but this agreement could be seen as undermining that goal, as Russian gas would still be flowing into Azerbaijan, thus potentially freeing up Azerbaijani gas for increased re-export to the EU; whereas there are also worrying reports of Russian gas being rebranded as Azerbaijani for sale in the EU;

    P. whereas Azerbaijani leaders have engaged in anti-EU and anti-Western rhetoric; whereas Azerbaijan has intensified its disinformation campaigns targeting the EU and its Member States, with a specific focus on France; whereas Azerbaijan has actively interfered in European politics under the guise of ‘anti-colonialism’, notably in overseas countries and territories such as New Caledonia;

    Q. whereas in addition, in September 2023, after months of the illegal blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan launched a pre-planned, unjustified military attack on the territory, forcing over 100 000 ethnic Armenians to flee to Armenia, which amounts to ethnic cleansing; whereas as a result, Nagorno-Karabakh has been almost entirely emptied of its Armenian population, who had been living there for centuries; whereas this attack represents a gross violation of human rights and international law, a clear breach of the trilateral ceasefire statement of 9 November 2020 and a failure to uphold commitments made during EU-mediated negotiations;

    R. whereas the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh lost their property and belongings while fleeing the Azerbaijani military push in 2023 and have been unable to recover them since; whereas actions amounting to ethnic cleansing have continued since then; whereas the EU has provided humanitarian aid to people displaced from Nagorno-Karabakh; whereas credible reports confirm the organised destruction of Armenian cultural and religious heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh; whereas Azerbaijani leaders and officials repeatedly use hate speech against Armenians;

    S. whereas both Azerbaijan and Armenia are bound by international humanitarian law and the Third Geneva Convention protects prisoners of war from all forms of torture and cruel treatment; whereas reports indicate that 23 Armenian prisoners are currently being held in Azerbaijani prisons without adequate legal representation, including eight former leaders of Nagorno-Karabakh, some of whom have received long prison sentences;

    T. whereas in February 2023, the EU deployed the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) to observe developments at the international border with Azerbaijan; whereas Azerbaijan has refused to cooperate with EUMA and the mission has been the target of disinformation by Azerbaijani authorities and government-controlled media; whereas the Azerbaijani leadership continues to make irredentist statements with reference to the sovereign territory of Armenia; whereas the Azerbaijani army continues to occupy no less than 170 km2 of the sovereign territory of Armenia;

    U. whereas Armenia and Azerbaijan have engaged in negotiations on a peace treaty, the normalisation of their relations and border delimitation, both before and after the 2023 attack on Nagorno-Karabakh; whereas, despite mediation efforts by the EU and others, no peace agreement has been signed between Azerbaijan and Armenia; whereas, although both governments have stated that they are close to an agreement, recent remarks by the Azerbaijani president raise concern about Baku’s willingness to find a compromise to conclude the negotiations;

    V. whereas the EU fully supports the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both Azerbaijan and Armenia and actively supports efforts towards a sustainable peace agreement between the two countries, achieved by peaceful means and respecting the rights of the population concerned;

    W. whereas since Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, Azerbaijan has deepened its relations with Russia, including political and economic ties, as well as increased cooperation between their intelligence services; whereas Russia has openly backed Azerbaijan in its aggressive behaviour towards Armenia;

    1. Strongly condemns the domestic and extraterritorial repression by the Azerbaijani regime against activists, journalists, opposition leaders and others, including EU nationals, which has noticeably intensified ahead of COP29; urges the Azerbaijani authorities to release all persons arbitrarily detained or imprisoned on account of their political views, to drop all politically motivated charges and to cease all forms of repression, both within and beyond Azerbaijan; recalls in this context the names of Tofig Yagublu, Akif Gurbanov, Bakhtiyar Hajiyev, human rights defenders and journalists, including Ulvi Hasanli, Sevinj Vagifgizi, Nargiz Absalamova, Hafiz Babali and Elnara Gasimova, Aziz Orujov, Rufat Muradli, Avaz Zeynalli, Elnur Shukurov, Alasgar Mammadli, Ilhamiz Guliyev and Farid Ismayilov, as well as of civil society activists arrested after March 2024 such as Anar Mammadli, Farid Mehralizade, Igbal Abilov, Bahruz Samadov, Emin Ibrahimov and Famil Khalilov; expresses deep concern about the environment of fear that this has created inside the country, leaving civil society effectively silenced;

    2. Reiterates its call for the Azerbaijani authorities to drop all charges against Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu and allow him to travel abroad, unhindered and to the country of his choice, to reunite with his family, to receive the medical care he urgently needs and attend the Sakharov Prize ceremony in Strasbourg in December 2024; calls on Azerbaijan to ensure that he receives an independent medical examination by a doctor of his own choosing and to allow him to receive treatment abroad; calls on all EU representatives and individual Member States to actively support the release from house arrest of Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu and insist on his release in every exchange with the Azerbaijani authorities;

    3. Demands that freedom of the press and expression be guaranteed and that media organisations not be restricted; calls, therefore, on the Azerbaijani Government to release journalists working for Abzas Media and Toplum TV, including Ulvi Hasanli, Sevinj Vagifqizi and Alasgar Mammadli;

    4. Considers that Azerbaijan’s ongoing human rights abuses are incompatible with its hosting of COP29; urges EU leaders, in particular Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, to use COP29 as an opportunity to remind Azerbaijan of its international obligations and to meaningfully address the country’s human rights record in their interactions with the Azerbaijani authorities, including by calling for the unconditional release of all persons arbitrarily detained or imprisoned on account of their political views and by requesting to meet with political prisoners while in the country; calls for the EU and its Member States to do their utmost to ensure that United Nations Climate Change conferences are not hosted in countries with poor human rights records;

    5. Reminds the Azerbaijani authorities of their obligations to respect fundamental freedoms, and calls on them to repeal repressive legislation that drives independent NGOs and media to the margins of the law; calls on the Azerbaijani authorities to repeal repressive legislation on the registration and funding of NGOs to bring them into line with Venice Commission recommendations;

    6. Recalls that the 1996 EU-Azerbaijan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which is the legal basis for bilateral relations, is based on respect for democracy and the principles of international law and human rights and that these have been systematically violated in Azerbaijan;

    7. Reminds the Azerbaijani Government of its international obligations to safeguard the dignity and rights of detainees, ensuring that they receive adequate medical care, are detained in humane conditions and are protected from any mistreatment; calls on the Azerbaijani Government to swiftly comply with long-standing recommendations of the Council of Europe’s European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment on the subject of the widespread recourse to physical ill treatment – including, on occasion, torture – by the police in Azerbaijan; calls on the Azerbaijani Government to implement all the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights;

    8. Reiterates its call for EU sanctions to be imposed under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime on Azerbaijani officials who have committed serious human rights violations; calls on the EU Special Representative for Human Rights to request meetings with political prisoners in Azerbaijan;

    9. Insists that any future partnership agreement between the EU and Azerbaijan be made conditional on the release of all political prisoners, the implementation of legal reforms and the overall improvement of the human rights situation in the country, as well as on Azerbaijan demonstrating its genuine readiness to faithfully engage in the negotiation of a peace agreement with Armenia and to respect the rights of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians;

    10. Calls for the EU to end its reliance on gas exports from Azerbaijan; calls on the Commission to suspend the 2022 memorandum of understanding on the strategic partnership in the field of energy and to act accordingly;

    11. Reaffirms its support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both Azerbaijan and Armenia and strongly supports the normalisation of their relations based on the principles of the mutual recognition of territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders, in accordance with the 1991 Alma-Ata Declaration; reiterates its demand for the withdrawal of Azerbaijan’s troops from the entirety of Armenia’s sovereign territory; calls on Azerbaijan to unequivocally commit to respecting Armenia’s territorial integrity; highlights that Azerbaijan’s connectivity issues with its exclave of Nakhchivan should be resolved with full respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Armenia; reiterates its position that the EU should be ready to impose sanctions on any individuals and entities that threaten the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Armenia;

    12. Condemns any military aggression, use of force or hybrid threats against Armenia, as well as foreign interference and attempts to destabilise the political situation in Armenia; welcomes, furthermore, the decision to adopt the first assistance measure under the European Peace Facility in support of Armenian armed forces and calls for the cooperation between Armenia and the EU to be further reinforced in the field of security and defence; welcomes the actions undertaken by several Member States to provide defensive military support to Armenia and urges the Member States to consider similar initiatives; welcomes the new momentum in bilateral relations between the EU and Armenia, which is strongly supported by the authorities in Yerevan; calls on the Commission and the Council to actively support Armenia’s desire for increased cooperation with the EU;

    13. Expresses its support for the activities of the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) and underscores the important role it plays; reiterates its concern regarding the repeated smear campaigns originating from Azerbaijan against EUMA; calls on EUMA to continue to closely monitor the evolving security situation on the ground, provide transparent reporting to Parliament and actively contribute to conflict resolution efforts; calls for the EU and its Member States to strengthen EUMA’s mandate, increase its size and extend its duration;

    14. Supports all initiatives and activities that could lead to the establishment of peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the signing of a long-awaited peace agreement; calls on Azerbaijan to demonstrate genuine efforts to this end; warns Azerbaijan that any military action against Armenia would be unacceptable and would have serious consequences for the partnership between Azerbaijan and the EU; welcomes the Armenia-Azerbaijan joint statement of 7 December 2023 on confidence-building measures; welcomes the progress made in the framework of the Armenia-Azerbaijan border delimitation process, which has led to an agreement on several sections of the border; encourages both sides to take further steps on the remaining sections; calls for the EU to cease all technical and financial assistance to Azerbaijan that might contribute to strengthening its military or security capabilities; calls on the Member States to freeze exports of all military and security equipment to Azerbaijan;

    15. Calls for the full implementation of all orders issued by the International Court of Justice, including the order of 17 November 2023 indicating provisional measures regarding the safe, unimpeded and expeditious return of people who fled Nagorno-Karabakh; recalls that the decision to host COP29 in Baku was made after Azerbaijan failed to comply with the above-mentioned International Court of Justice order as well as those of 7 December 2021 and of 22 February 2023; reiterates its call for independent investigations into the abuses committed by Azerbaijani forces in Nagorno-Karabakh; reiterates its call on the Azerbaijani authorities to allow the safe return of the Armenian population to Nagorno-Karabakh, to genuinely engage in a comprehensive and transparent dialogue with them, to provide robust guarantees for the protection of their rights, including their land and property rights, the protection of their distinct identity and their civic, cultural, social and religious rights, and to refrain from any inflammatory rhetoric that could incite discrimination against Armenians; urges the Azerbaijani authorities to release all 23 Armenian prisoners of war detained following Azerbaijan’s retaking of the Nagorno-Karabakh region;

    16. Reiterates its call for the EU institutions and the Member States to continue to offer assistance to Armenia to deal with the refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh; calls for the EU, in this regard, to provide a new package of assistance to Armenia to help the Armenian Government address the humanitarian needs of refugees; welcomes all efforts by the Government of Armenia to provide shelter and aid to the displaced Armenians;

    17. Expresses deep concern regarding the preservation of cultural, religious and historical heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh following the massive exodus of its Armenian population; urges Azerbaijan to refrain from further destruction, neglect or alteration of the origins of cultural, religious or historical heritage in the region and calls on it instead to strive to preserve, protect and promote this rich diversity; demands the protection of the Armenian cultural, historical and religious heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh in line with UNESCO standards and Azerbaijan’s international commitments; insists that Azerbaijan allow a UNESCO mission to Nagorno-Karabakh and grant it the necessary access;

    18. Deplores steps taken by Azerbaijan towards the secessionist entity in occupied Cyprus, which are against international law and the provisions of UN Security Council Resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984); calls on Azerbaijan to respect the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of states and to not invite the secessionist entity in occupied Cyprus to any meetings of the Organization of Turkic States;

    19. Condemns Azerbaijan’s repeated attempts to denigrate and destabilise Member States, including through the so-called Baku Initiative Group; condemns in particular its support for irredentist groups and disinformation operations targeting France, especially in the French departments and territories of New Caledonia, Martinique and Corsica; recalls that these methods were used against Germany in 2013; denounces the smear campaigns targeting Denmark; regrets the smear campaign aimed at damaging France’s reputation by calling into question its capacity to host the 2024 Olympic Games, launched by actors suspected of being close to the Azerbaijani regime;

    20. Condemns the arbitrary arrests of EU citizens based on spurious accusations of espionage and their disproportionate sentencing;

    21. Strongly condemns the public insults and direct threats made by Azerbaijani diplomatic or government representatives, or members of the Azerbaijani Parliament, targeting elected officials of EU Member States; demands, in this regard, that access to EU institutional buildings be denied to the Azerbaijani officials concerned until further notice;

    22. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Armenia, the Director-General of UNESCO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the United Nations and the Council of Europe.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the misinterpretation of UN resolution 2758 by the People’s Republic of China and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan – RC-B10-0134/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    Michael Gahler, Miriam Lexmann, Sebastião Bugalho, Rasa Juknevičienė, Danuše Nerudová
    on behalf of the PPE Group
    Yannis Maniatis, Kathleen Van Brempt, Tonino Picula
    on behalf of the S&D Group
    Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Adam Bielan, Mariusz Kamiński, Charlie Weimers, Michał Dworczyk, Alexandr Vondra, Veronika Vrecionová, Ondřej Krutílek, Rihards Kols, Maciej Wąsik, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Alberico Gambino, Bert‑Jan Ruissen, Carlo Fidanza
    on behalf of the ECR Group
    Engin Eroglu, Petras Auštrevičius, Helmut Brandstätter, Dan Barna, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, João Cotrim De Figueiredo, Bernard Guetta, Svenja Hahn, Ľubica Karvašová, Karin Karlsbro, Moritz Körner, Nathalie Loiseau, Jan‑Christoph Oetjen, Ana Vasconcelos, Dainius Žalimas
    on behalf of the Renew Group
    Markéta Gregorová
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

    European Parliament resolution on the misinterpretation of UN resolution 2758 by the People’s Republic of China and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan

    (2024/2891(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to its previous resolutions on the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan,

     having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2021 on a new EU-China strategy[1],

     having regard to its recommendation of 21 October 2021 to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on EU-Taiwan political relations and cooperation[2],

     having regard to its resolution of 7 June 2022 on the EU and the security challenges in the Indo-Pacific[3],

     having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on the situation in the Strait of Taiwan[4],

     having regard to its resolution of 13 December 2023 on EU-Taiwan trade and investment relations[5],

     having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, approved by the Council on 21 March 2022,

     having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 September 2021 entitled ‘The EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific’ (JOIN(2021)0024),

     having regard to the EU’s ‘One China’ policy,

     having regard to the EU-China summit of 7 December 2023,

     having regard to the European Council conclusions on China of 30 June 2023,

     having regard to the visits of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 25 to 27 July 2023 and of the Committee on International Trade of 19 to 21 December 2022 to Taiwan,

     having regard to the statement of 1 September 2024 by the Spokesperson of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the latest dangerous actions in the South China Sea,

     having regard to the statements by the Spokesperson of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on China’s military drills around Taiwan, including the most recent statement of 14 October 2024,

     having regard to the G7 Foreign Ministers’ statements of 18 April 2023 and of 3 August 2022 on preserving peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait,

     having regard to the statement by the Chair of the G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting of 23 September 2024,

     having regard to the joint declaration by the G7 Defence Ministers of 19 October 2024,

     having regard to the urgency motion on Taiwan passed by the Australian Senate on 21 August 2024,

     having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI) of 25 October 1971,

     having regard to the motion on UN Resolution 2758 passed by the Dutch House of Representatives on 12 September 2024,

     having regard to the press statement by the US Department of State of 13 October 2024,

     having regard to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),

     having regard to Article 7 of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), concluded on 9 May 1992,

     having regard to Rule 5 of the Standing Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),

     having regard to Article 4 of the Constitution of the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol),

     having regard to Article 8 and Article 18(h) of the Constitution of the World Health Organization (WHO),

     having regard to Rules 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas UN Resolution 2758 was passed by the UN General Assembly on 25 October 1971 and shifted the official recognition from the Republic of China (Taiwan) to the People’s Republic of China (PRC); whereas today Taiwan, while not being a member of the United Nations, maintains diplomatic relations with 11 of the 193 United Nations member states, as well as with the Holy See;

    B. whereas the EU and Taiwan are like-minded partners that share the common values of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law; whereas Taiwan is a vibrant democracy, with a flourishing civil society; whereas Taiwan held peaceful and well-organised elections on 13 January 2024;

    C. whereas following the adoption of UN Resolution 2758, Taiwan lost its access to participation in multilateral forums, such as the WHO;

    D. whereas Taiwan has never been part of the PRC; whereas the Republic of China was established in 1912 and the PRC in 1949;

    E. whereas UN Resolution 2758 addresses the status of the PRC, but does not determine that the PRC enjoys sovereignty over Taiwan, nor does it make any judgement on the future inclusion of Taiwan in the UN or any other international organisation; whereas, however, the PRC continues to misinterpret UN Resolution 2758 to block Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organisations and unilaterally change the status quo; whereas these actions highlight the PRC’s ambition to alter the existing multilateral international order and undermine international law, and can be seen as an expression of systemic rivalry;

    F. whereas the EU continues to maintain its own ‘One China’ policy, which is different from the PRC’s ‘One China’ principle; whereas the EU’s long-standing position has been to support the status quo and a peaceful resolution of differences across the Taiwan Strait, while encouraging dialogue and constructive engagement;

    G. whereas through their statement of 23 September 2024 the G7 members, among other things, underlined their support for ‘Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations as a member where statehood is not a prerequisite and as an observer or guest where it is’;

    H. whereas supporting Taiwan’s participation in international organisations does not undermine the EU’s commitment to its ‘One China’ policy, which remains the political foundation of EU-China relations;

    I. whereas over the past decade the PRC has persistently tried to increase its influence over international institutions, using this to sideline Taiwan and prevent Taiwanese passport holders, including journalists, non-governmental organisation workers and political activists, from accessing international institutions; whereas the PRC exercises transnational repression by misusing extradition treaties to target Taiwanese people abroad and therefore put them at risk of arbitrary persecution and human rights abuses;

    J. whereas the statutes of most international organisations tasked to address global issues, including the WHO, the UNFCCC, Interpol and the ICAO, provide opportunities for entities such as Taiwan to participate without infringing on the rights of member states;

    K. whereas Taiwan has consistently demonstrated a peaceful and cooperative attitude globally, has significantly enhanced global developments and thus could contribute greatly to the work of various international organisations;

    L. whereas the PRC is a one-party state that is entirely controlled and ruled by the Chinese Communist Party;

    M. whereas in a speech on Taiwan’s national day of 10 October 2024, Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te stated that the PRC has ‘no right to represent Taiwan’ and reiterated that the two sides are ‘not subordinate’ to each other; whereas the PRC has justified its recent military exercise by claiming that President Lai Ching-te is pursuing a separatist strategy;

    N. whereas on 14 October 2024 the PRC launched a large-scale military drill, named Joint Sword-2024B, that simulated a blockade of Taiwan; whereas during this exercise a record number of 153 PRC aircraft,18 warships and 17 PRC coastguard ships were detected around Taiwan;

    O. whereas during the exercises four formations of the PRC coastguard patrolled the island and briefly entered its restricted waters; whereas the very frequent deployment of the coastguard by the PRC in the Strait in what the PRC considers ‘law enforcement’ missions is putting constant pressure on the Taiwanese authorities and causing a dangerous increase in the risk of collisions, in what is one of the most concrete indications of the PRC’s intention to erode the status quo; whereas the exercises launched on 14 October 2024 were the fourth round of large-scale war games by the PRC in just over two years;

    P. whereas these activities were condemned by Taiwan as an ‘unreasonable provocation’ and are the latest in a series of war games conducted by the PRC against Taiwan; whereas these military drills came days after Lai Ching-te, Taiwan’s new president, gave a speech vowing to protect Taiwan’s sovereignty in the face of challenges from the PRC;

    Q. whereas the median line, which was set up in a decades-old tacit agreement between both sides of the Taiwan Strait, was designed to reduce the risk of conflict by keeping the military aircraft from both sides of the Strait at a safe distance and thus prevent fatal miscalculations; whereas the PRC’s People’s Liberation Army violated the median line only four times between 1954 and 2020, but now routine incursions reflect Beijing’s intent to irreversibly reset long-standing benchmarks;

    R. whereas the press statements by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the US Department of State reaffirm that peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait are of strategic importance for regional and global security and prosperity; whereas the High Representative’s statement recalls the need to preserve the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, opposes any unilateral actions that change the status quo by force or coercion and calls on all parties to exercise restraint and avoid any actions that may further escalate cross-Strait tensions;

    S. whereas on 23 May 2024 the PRC launched a military drill called Joint Sword-2024A, just days after the inauguration of Lai Ching-te as the new President of Taiwan;

    T. whereas over the past few years the PRC has held similar military drills around Taiwan; whereas these military drills have increased in intensity and have been moved closer and closer to Taiwan’s mainland; whereas during a previous drill in August 2022 the PRC also fired missiles into Japan’s exclusive economic zone;

    U. whereas on top of military pressure the PRC has long been pursuing a sophisticated strategy of targeting Taiwan with foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), including hybrid and cyberattacks with the goal of undermining Taiwan’s democratic society;

    V. whereas the PRC, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, has said that it will not renounce the use of force to seek unification with Taiwan;

    W. whereas the PRC’s 2005 Anti-Secession Law includes the use of non-peaceful means, triggered by ambiguous thresholds, to achieve what the PRC calls ‘unification’ with Taiwan; whereas such military action is a grave threat to the security and stability of the entire region, with potentially dire global consequences; whereas EU and US deterrence is of strategic importance to dissuade the PRC from undertaking any unilateral action against Taiwan;

    X. whereas the PRC’s increasingly aggressive behaviour, in particular in its own neighbourhood, such as the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, poses a risk to regional and global security; whereas since 2019 the PRC has violated the Taiwanese air defence identification zone (ADIZ) with increasing regularity; whereas the PRC has been behaving aggressively across vast areas of the Indo-Pacific and exerting varying degrees of military or economic coercion, which has led to disputes with neighbours such as Japan, India, the Philippines and Australia;

    Y. whereas the EU has condemned the dangerous actions conducted by Chinese coastguard vessels against lawful Philippine maritime operations in the South China Sea on 31 August 2024; whereas this incident is the latest in a series of actions endangering the safety of life at sea and violating the right to freedom of navigation and overflight in compliance with international law; whereas maritime security and freedom of navigation must be ensured in accordance with international law and, in particular, UNCLOS;

    Z. whereas the PRC is supporting Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, in particular through the export of dual-use goods to Russia and the ongoing involvement of PRC-based companies in sanctions evasion and circumvention;

    AA. whereas as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the PRC has a responsibility to work for peace and stability in the region, and particularly in the Taiwan Strait;

    AB. whereas through its 2021 strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, the EU and its Member States increased their presence in the region, including through a higher military presence of certain Member States and the continued passage of military ships through the Taiwan Strait;

    AC. whereas Taiwan is located in a strategic position in terms of trade, notably in high-tech supply chains; whereas the Taiwan Strait is the primary route for ships travelling from China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan towards Europe; whereas Taiwan dominates semiconductor manufacturing markets, as its producers manufacture around 50 % of the world’s semiconductor output; whereas the EU’s strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific argues for increasing trade and investment cooperation with Taiwan;

    AD. whereas the EU is Taiwan’s fourth largest trading partner after the PRC, the United States and Japan; whereas in 2022 Taiwan was the EU’s 12th largest trading partner; whereas the EU is the largest source of foreign direct investment in Taiwan; whereas Taiwanese investments in the EU remain below their potential;

    AE. whereas members of the Australian Senate and of the Dutch House of Representatives have recently adopted motions concerning the distortion of UN Resolution 2758 by the PRC and called for support for Taiwan’s greater participation in multilateral organisations;

    1. Reiterates that Taiwan is a key EU partner and a like-minded democratic friend in the Indo-Pacific region; commends Taiwan and the Taiwanese people for their strong democracy and vibrant civil society, demonstrated once more by the peaceful and well-organised elections of 13 January 2024;

    2. Opposes the PRC’s constant distortion of UN Resolution 2758 and its efforts to block Taiwan’s participation in multilateral organisations; calls for the EU and its Member States to support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in relevant international organisations such as the WHO, the ICAO, Interpol and the UNFCCC; further calls on the UN Secretariat to grant Taiwanese nationals and journalists the right to access UN premises for visits, meetings and newsgathering activities;

    3. Strongly condemns the PRC’s unwarranted military exercises of 14 October 2024, its continued military provocations against Taiwan and its continued military build-up, which is changing the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, and reiterates its firm rejection of any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait; lauds the restraint and disciplined reaction of the Taiwanese authorities and calls for regular exchanges between the EU and its Taiwanese counterparts on relevant security issues;

    4. Reaffirms its strong commitment to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait; underlines that any attempt to unilaterally change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, particularly by means of force or coercion, will not be accepted and will be met with a decisive and firm reaction;

    5. Underlines that UN Resolution 2758 takes no position on Taiwan; strongly rejects and refutes the PRC’s attempts to distort history and international rules;

    6. Reiterates the EU’s commitment to its ‘One China’ policy as the political foundation of EU-China relations; recalls that the EU’s China strategy emphasises that constructive cross-strait relations are part of promoting peace and security in the whole Asia-Pacific region and that the EU supports initiatives aimed at dialogue and confidence-building;

    7. Underlines that in Taiwan it is up to the people to democratically decide how they want to live and that the status quo in the Taiwan Strait must not be unilaterally changed by the use or threat of force;

    8. Reiterates its strong condemnation of statements by Chinese President Xi Jinping that the PRC will never renounce the right to use force with respect to Taiwan; underlines that the PRC’s use of force or threats or other highly coercive measures to achieve unification is incompatible with international law; expresses grave concern over the PRC’s use of hostile disinformation to undermine trust in Taiwan’s democracy and governance; reiterates its previous calls for the EU and its Member States to cooperate with international partners in helping to sustain democracy in Taiwan, keeping it free from foreign interference and threats; underlines that only Taiwan’s democratically elected government can represent the Taiwanese people on the international stage;

    9. Condemns the PRC’s systematic grey-zone military actions, including cyber and disinformation campaigns against Taiwan, and urges the PRC to halt these activities immediately; calls, in this regard, for cooperation between the EU and Taiwan to be deepened further to enhance structural cooperation on countering disinformation and foreign interference; welcomes the posting of a liaison officer at the European Economic and Trade Office in Taiwan to coordinate joint efforts to tackle disinformation and interference as a first important step towards deeper EU-Taiwan cooperation, and calls for the EU to further deepen cooperation with Taiwan in this key area; praises the courage of the Taiwanese people and the proportionate and dignified reactions of the Taiwanese authorities and institutions in the face of intensifying Chinese threats and activities;

    10. Firmly rejects the PRC’s economic coercion against Taiwan and other countries, as well as against EU Member States, and underlines that such practices are not only illegal under World Trade Organization rules, but that they also have a devastating effect on the PRC’s reputation around the world and will lead to a further loss of trust in the PRC as a responsible actor; stresses the independent right of the EU and its Member States to develop relations with Taiwan in line with their interests and shared values of democracy and human rights without foreign interference; calls on EU and Member State missions abroad to address and provide alternatives to malign PRC business practices, especially in the Global South;

    11. Is very concerned at the adoption of the so-called guidelines for punishing ‘diehard Taiwan independence separatists’ for committing crimes of secession and the incitement of secession jointly announced by the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, the ministries for public security and state security and the justice ministry in June 2024, which could lead to harsh punishments for the crime of secession, up to and including the death penalty; strongly condemns the sentencing of one Taiwanese activist to nine years in prison in September 2024 after his arrest in the PRC in 2022, as well as the constant harassment of Taiwanese people working and living in the PRC;

    12. Is seriously concerned about the situation in the East and South China Seas; recalls the importance of respecting international law, including UNCLOS and, in particular, its provisions on the obligation to settle disputes by peaceful means and on maintaining the freedom of navigation and overflight; calls on all countries that have not done so to swiftly ratify UNCLOS; calls for the EU and its Member States to step up their own maritime capacities in the region; reminds the PRC of its responsibilities, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, to uphold international law and emphasises the obligation to resolve disputes peacefully;

    13. Reaffirms its grave concerns about China’s increasing military investments and capabilities; expresses grave concerns about the renewed Chinese and Russian commitment to further strengthen their military ties and condemns the Chinese supply of components and equipment to Moscow’s military industry; welcomes the Council decision to impose sanctions on Chinese companies for supporting Russia’s war against Ukraine; deplores the ‘no limits’ partnership between Russia and the PRC; welcomes the increasing commitment and military presence of the United States in the Indo-Pacific; reiterates its calls for a coordinated approach to deepening EU-US cooperation on security matters, including through transatlantic parliamentary dialogue;

    14. Strongly welcomes the close cooperation and alignment of Taiwan with the EU and the United States in responding to Russia’s war against Ukraine and issuing sanctions in response to this blatant violation of international law; recalls Taiwan’s help in addressing the humanitarian crisis caused by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its continuous involvement and support for the Ukrainian government and countries hosting Ukrainian refugees;

    15. Highlights that the PRC’s various actions in the field of cognitive and legal warfare are slowly undermining the status quo, as well as intensifying grey-zone activities that are intended to circumvent detection, existing laws and response thresholds; calls for the EU to establish and enforce its redlines through its toolbox of sanctions, including sectoral sanctions, against hybrid activities and cyberthreats, and to coordinate strong diplomatic and economic deterrence measures with liked-minded partners;

    16. Expresses its gratitude for Taiwan’s help and assistance during the COVID-19 pandemic;

    17. Recognises the importance of Taiwan in securing global supply chains, especially in the high-tech sector where Taiwan is the leading producer of semiconductors, and calls for the EU and its Member States to engage in closer cooperation with Taiwan;

    18. Calls on the Commission to launch, without delay, preparatory measures for negotiations on a bilateral investment agreement, or other kinds of agreement, with Taiwan; highlights the potential for cooperation on foreign direct investment screening policy and on tackling economic coercion and retaliation;

    19. Applauds the increase in freedom of navigation exercises conducted by several EU countries, including France, the Netherlands and Germany; notes that these activities are in line with international law and calls for more cooperation and coordination with regional partners in order to increase freedom of navigation operations in the region;

    20. Welcomes visits by former and current Taiwanese politicians to Europe, including the recent visit of former President Tsai Ing-wen to the European Parliament on 17 October 2024; welcomes, furthermore, continued exchanges of its Members with Taiwan and encourages further visits of official European Parliament delegations to Taiwan; additionally encourages further exchanges between the EU and Taiwan at all levels, including political meetings and people-to-people encounters;

    21. Encourages, in this light, increased economic, scientific and cultural interactions and exchanges, focusing, among other areas, on youth, academia, civil society, sports, culture and education, as well as city-to-city and region-to-region partnerships; reiterates its call on the Member States to engage in meaningful and structural technical cooperation with Taiwan’s National Fire Agency and National Police Agency and with local administrations in the field of civil protection and disaster management;

    22. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the governments of the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan.

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Usurpation or unlawful involvement of EU citizens with properties in the occupied territory of the Republic of Cyprus – E-002080/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    15.10.2024

    Question for written answer  E-002080/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Costas Mavrides (S&D)

    EU citizens are among those facing criminal charges of usurpation or unlawful business involvement with properties in the occupied territory of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC), mainly for acting as intermediaries for construction companies operating in the occupied territory, promoting or selling luxury accommodation built on illegally seized property owned by Greek Cypriots. So far, citizens of Germany, Italy, Hungary, Czechia and Portugal have been arrested and/or charged in the RoC for illegal involvement and activities.

    Such incidents represent a clear violation of rulings by the Court of Justice of the EU and of the rule of law. They deserve special attention as EU citizens are at the centre of the violations.

    Moreover, these violations are part of the blatant, cynical policy of the occupying Turkish regime to gain legitimacy by establishing economic ties with the EU via lucrative though illegal property and development deals, using EU citizens as buyers, promoters or middlemen.

    • 1.Is the Commission aware that EU citizens are involved in such illegal property dealings in the occupied territory of Cyprus?
    • 2.What measures does it intend to take aimed at preventing similar cases in the future, safeguarding the rule of law in the EU and protecting EU citizens’ rights?

    Submitted: 15.10.2024

    Last updated: 23 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: MoUs signed between NIEPVD Dehradun and Six Institutions for the welfare of Divyangjan

    Source: Government of India (2)

    Posted On: 23 OCT 2024 8:20PM by PIB Delhi

    The National Institute for Empowerment of Persons with Visual Disabilities (NIEPVD), Dehradun (under D/o Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities – DEPwD, M/o Social Justice and Empowerment), signed important Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) with six institutions, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs) dedicated to the empowerment of Divyangjan.

     

    On this occasion, Secretary (DEPwD) Shri Rajesh Aggarwal said, “Today marks a significant milestone, and we are confident that the positive impact of these collaborations will be evident in the lives of Divyangjan in the near future.” This partnership is a crucial step towards enhancing the capabilities and welfare of Divyangjan by ensuring access to essential resources and support.

    The MoUs, with institutions including Uttarakhand Open University (Haldwani), National Institute of Electronics & Information Technology (NIELIT) Haridwar, Max Hospital Dehradun, NGOs Pratham (Mumbai), National Association for the Blind (NAB) Delhi and Torchit Pvt. Ltd. (Ahmedabad), aim to promote the welfare and upliftment of Divyangjan.

    The partnership would focus on areas such as modern technology, artificial intelligence, psychological support, protection against online fraud, ease of access to technology, utilization of modern teaching-learning materials, and technical training for teachers working in special education.

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  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Union Minister Shri Jayant Chaudhary to felicitate WorldSkills 2024 winners tomorrow

    Source: Government of India

    Posted On: 23 OCT 2024 5:45PM by PIB Delhi

    Minister of State (I/C), Ministry of Skill Development and Entrepreneurship (MSDE) and MoS, Ministry of Education Shri Jayant Chaudhary to honor the outstanding achievements of the Indian delegation at the WorldSkills 2024 competition during a  Felicitation Ceremony in New Delhi tomorrow.

    India has made a remarkable mark on the global stage at WorldSkills 2024 at Lyon in France, by winning four Bronze medals in different categories. These are: Ashwitha Police in Patisserie and confectionery; Dhrumil Kumar Dhirendra Kumar Gandhi and Sathyajith Balakrishnan in Industry 4.0; Joethir Adithya Krishnapriya Ravikumar in Hotel Reception and Amaresh Kumar Sahu in Renewable Energy category.

    In addition, the Indian delegation earned 12 Medallions of Excellence, a testament to their exceptional skills and consistent performance across various trades. India’s performance at WorldSkills 2024 was a strong showing on the global stage, with the country competing against other global giants like China, Japan, Germany, and the USA.

    The event will also be graced by Shri Atul Kumar Tiwari, Secretary, MSDE, and Shri Ved Mani Tiwari, CEO, NSDC, Sector Skill Council Experts and Industry/Academia Partners for WorldSkills 2024.

    WorldSkills Lyon 2024 saw more than 1,400 participants from over 70 countries competing in diverse skill categories, and the Indian competitors stood its ground among the best in the world, showcasing their talent and innovation in front of an international audience. India competed in 52 skills against countries like China, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Germany, Brazil, Australia, Columbia, Denmark, France, UK, South Africa, Switzerland, USA, etc.

    The Indian contingent’s success at WorldSkills 2024 is a significant milestone in the country’s journey toward becoming a global skills leader. Winning the Bronze medal in Patisserie and Confectionery in France, the global epicenter of fine pastry and baking, is an extraordinary achievement. It signifies India’s rising prowess in culinary arts, proving that Indian talent can stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the best in a country renowned for its mastery in this craft.

    India’s 12 Medallions of Excellence at WorldSkills 2024 highlight the nation’s prowess across a range of traditional and emerging skills, from Mechatronics and Cyber Security to Jewellery and Beauty Therapy. These achievements underscore India’s leadership in both innovation-driven fields like Additive Manufacturing and Web Technology, as well as craftsmanship in areas like Cabinet Making and Cooking.

    The success of the Indian competitors at WorldSkills 2024 is a testament to the rigorous preparation and industry support they received throughout their journey. Each participant underwent extensive training, supported by industry experts, mentors, and the best-in-class infrastructure provided by organizations across various sectors.

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  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment to host a mega cultural event – ‘Aradhana’ – Celebrating Graceful Ageing and the Richness of Indian Traditions

    Source: Government of India

    Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment to host a mega cultural event – ‘Aradhana’ – Celebrating Graceful Ageing and the Richness of Indian Traditions

    The event to honour and celebrate senior citizens through a series of captivating cultural performances by artists aged over 60 years

    Posted On: 23 OCT 2024 5:23PM by PIB Delhi

    The Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment (MoSJE) is set to host the mega cultural event ‘Aradhana’, with the theme, ‘Celebrating Graceful Ageing – Life Begins at 60’, on 24th October 2024, at Dr. Ambedkar International Centre (DAIC), New Delhi. Union Minister of State for Social Justice and Empowerment, Shri B. L. Verma would preside over the event as the Chief Guest. Other dignitaries in attendance would include Dr. Aabha Chaudhary, Chairperson, NGO Anugraha and senior officials of the Ministry.

    The event would be focusing on the Ministry’s commitment to the well-being of senior citizens and the promotion of active ageing in India. It would highlight the role that elders play in preserving and passing down the country’s rich artistic heritage. The event would honour and celebrate senior citizens through a series of captivating cultural performances by artists aged 60 years and above.

    Event Highlights:

    • A mesmerizing Odissi dance performance by Guru Ranjana Gauhar, an iconic figure in Indian classical dance.
    • A vocal recital by Pt. Sajan Mishra, one of India’s most respected classical vocalists, known for his soulful renditions.
    • An ensemble of folk-dance performances, showcasing the vibrant and diverse cultural traditions of India.

    ‘Aradhana’ would emphasize the traditional Indian values of the Guru Shishya Parampara, inter-generational solidarity, and the respect and care that senior citizens receive in Indian society. Through this celebration, the Ministry aims to foster a greater understanding of the cultural significance of ageing gracefully and the vital contributions that older adults make in preserving the traditions of art and culture.

    The event would serve as a platform to highlight the critical importance of inter-generational relationships, with a strong emphasis on preserving India’s cultural legacy. Through the performances, the event will promote respect, care, and appreciation for senior citizens as they continue to contribute to society in meaningful ways.

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  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: INDIAN ARMY TO HOST THE SECOND EDITION OF CHANAKYA DEFENCE DIALOGUE: A GLOBAL PLATFORM FOR STRATEGIC INSIGHTS

    Source: Government of India (2)

    Posted On: 23 OCT 2024 5:19PM by PIB Delhi

    The Indian Army is set to host the second edition of its flagship international seminar, the Chanakya Defence Dialogue, on October 24 and 25,, 2024  at the Manekshaw Centre, New Delhi. Themed “Drivers in Nation Building: Fuelling Growth Through Comprehensive Security,” this high-profile event will facilitate vital discussions on integrating security dynamics within national and international policymaking, and aims to craft visionary strategies for sustainable and inclusive growth.

    The two-day event will bring together an exceptional group of policymakers, strategic thinkers, academics, defence personnel, veterans, scientists, and SMEs from India and abroad, with prominent speakers from the United States, Russia, Israel, and Sri Lanka. The dialogue will explore India’s strategic pathways towards Viksit Bharat @2047, focusing on the role of comprehensive security in national development.

    Hon’ble Raksha Mantri Shri Rajnath Singh will inaugurate the event as the Chief Guest, where he will also launch the Indian Army’s Green Initiative 1.0 and Digitisation of IA 1.0. He will deliver a keynote address on ‘India’s Vision for Development and Security,’ underscoring the importance of comprehensive security in achieving Viksit Bharat @2047. General Upendra Dwivedi, Chief of the Army Staff, will also address the audience, highlighting the Indian Army’s significant contributions to nation-building, including initiatives aligned with Atmanirbhar Bharat.

    The Chanakya Defence Dialogue will consist of six expert-led sessions, each focusing on critical aspects of comprehensive security:

    Session 1. Geopolitical Dynamics: Navigating the International Coliseum

    This session will delve into the shifting geopolitical landscape and how nations navigate strategic partnerships while balancing national interests and global objectives. The panel will explore the impact of evolving global power structures on India’s strategic positioning, highlighting the growing importance of alliances and multilateral cooperation in an increasingly polarized world.

    Moderator: Ms Palki Sharma (Network 18)

    Panellists:

    • Ms. Lisa Curtis (Centre for a New American Security)
    • Ms. Carice Witte (SIGNAL Group, Israel)
    • Ambassador Kanwal Sibal (Former Foreign Secretary, Government of India)

    The panel will provide insights into geopolitical shifts, focusing on India’s role in the Indo-Pacific, its relations with key global powers, and the opportunities and challenges these present for India’s national security and development goals.

    Session 2. Economic Development Strategies & National Security Imperatives

    This session will examine how economic development and national security are interconnected, exploring the importance of a resilient economy for maintaining a strong defence posture. Panellists will discuss strategies for integrating economic policies with national security imperatives, and how India can leverage its growing economic strength to enhance its global influence.

    Moderator: Ms. Gaurie Dwivedi (NDTV)

    Panellists:

    • Mr. Asanga Abeyagoonasekera (IMF Technical Advisor)
    • Dr. G S Reddy (Former Scientific Advisor to the Prime Minister)
    • Dr. Sanjeev Sanyal (Member, PM’s Economic Advisory Council)

    Key themes will include leveraging economic reforms, boosting domestic industrial capacities, and aligning economic growth with defence production under the Atmanirbhar Bharat initiative. The session will also explore how economic resilience can act as a deterrent against external threats.

    Session 3. Environmental Sustainability: Balancing Growth with Ecological Concerns

    With growing global focus on climate change, this session will explore the need to balance economic growth with environmental sustainability. It will discuss how India can achieve development goals while ensuring that ecological concerns are addressed, particularly in the context of national security.

    Moderator: Dr. Tara Kartha (Director Research & Academics, CLAWS)

    Panellists:

    • Ms. Elizabeth Threlkeld (Stimson Center, US)
    • Mr. Rushikesh Chavan (Habitats Trust)
    • Lt Gen S A Hasnain (Retd)

    Panellists will discuss how sustainable development can contribute to long-term security by mitigating resource-driven conflicts, enhancing disaster preparedness, and ensuring the well-being of future generations. The session will emphasize the role of the military in ecological preservation, particularly in high-altitude and environmentally sensitive regions.

    Session 4. Social Cohesion and Inclusive Growth: Pillars of a Secure Nation

    This session will focus on the importance of social unity and inclusive growth for national security. The panel will examine how internal security can be strengthened by fostering social cohesion, addressing economic disparities, and promoting inclusive development across all sections of society.

    Moderator: Mr. RR Swain (Former DGP J&K Police)

    Panellists:

    • Dr. Sudhanshu Trivedi (Member of Parliament)
    • Ms. Meenakshi Lekhi (Former MP and Lawyer)
    • Gen V K Singh (Retd) (Former COAS & ex-Minister of State for External Affairs)

    The discussion will highlight the role of law enforcement, legal frameworks, and policy initiatives in promoting internal security, with a focus on integrating marginalized communities into the national fabric. The panellists will offer strategies to merge social cohesion initiatives with internal security policies, fostering a shared national identity and promoting peace and stability.

    Session 5. Blurring Frontiers: The Convergence of Technology & Security

    This session will explore the integration of emerging technologies into national security frameworks. As new technologies such as artificial intelligence, cyber warfare, and unmanned systems revolutionize warfare, the session will discuss how India can stay ahead of the curve while ensuring that technological advancements are deployed ethically and responsibly.

    Moderator: Lt Gen Raj Shukla (Retd)

    Panellists:

    • Dr. Chintan Vaishnav (NITI Aayog)
    • Brig Gen Eran Ortal (SIGNAL Group, Israel)
    • Mr. Dmitry Stefanovich (IMEMO, Russia)

    Panellists will explore the advantages and challenges of integrating AI, robotics, and other emerging technologies into security operations. The session will also address ethical considerations such as privacy, responsible use, and societal alignment, ensuring that technological advances serve national security without compromising civil liberties.

    Session 6. Groundbreakers: Shaping Land Warfare, Reflections for the Indian Army

    This concluding session will focus on the future of land warfare and how the Indian Army can adopt advanced technologies to enhance battlefield readiness. Panellists will examine lessons from global military practices and how India can foster homegrown defence technologies under the Atmanirbhar Bharat initiative.

    Moderator: Vice Admiral A B Singh (Retd)

    Panellists:

    • Dr. Konstantin Bogdanov (IMEMO, Russia)
    • Prof. Amit Gupta (University of Illinois, US)
    • Dr. Patrick Bratton (US Army War College)

    The discussion will explore the evolving nature of land warfare, emphasizing the need for the Indian Army to develop indigenous technological capabilities while leveraging strategic partnerships with global military and industrial leaders. The panel will debate how to balance innovation with operational effectiveness, creating responsible and sustainable military solutions.

    On the second day, Chanakya Defence Dialogue will feature special addresses by Dr. S Somanath, Chairman of ISRO, on the critical significance of India’s expanding space sector, and Ms. Ruchira Kamboj, Former Permanent Representative of India to the UN, who will share insights on India’s evolving position in a multipolar world and the need for strong diplomatic measures to safeguard national interests.

    The dialogue will conclude with a closing address by Lt Gen N S Raja Subramani, Vice Chief of the Army Staff, who will summarize the key takeaways from the event, reaffirming the Indian Army’s commitment to ensuring a secure, prosperous, and Viksit Bharat @2047.

    Through its comprehensive and diverse discussions, the Chanakya Defence Dialogue 2024 will serve as a landmark platform, fostering collaboration among military leaders, policymakers, strategic thinkers, and security specialists from around the world. This event is set to influence India’s strategic direction on national security and development, helping shape a secure and thriving future for the nation.

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  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: PM Young Achievers’ Scholarship Award Scheme for Vibrant India (PM YASASVI)

    Source: Government of India (2)

    Posted On: 23 OCT 2024 5:17PM by PIB Delhi

    Background/Introduction

    With a vision of “Sabka Sath, Sabka Vikas”, the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment has implemented the PM Young Achievers Scholarship Award Scheme for Vibrant India (PM-YASASVI). This comprehensive umbrella scheme is aimed at uplifting students from Other Backward Classes (OBC), Economically Backward Classes (EBC), and Denotified Tribes (DNT) by providing them with access to quality education during their formative years.

    The PM YASASVI scheme consolidates and enhances several earlier initiatives, including the Dr. Ambedkar Post-Matric Scholarship Scheme for EBCs and the Dr. Ambedkar Pre-Matric and Post-Matric Scholarship Scheme for DNTs, which were subsumed under this program starting from 2021-22. By integrating these schemes, PM YASASVI aims to ensure a more streamlined and impactful approach to supporting the educational needs of socially and economically disadvantaged students.

     

    Objective

    The overarching goal of the scheme is to promote educational empowerment among these vulnerable groups, helping them overcome financial barriers and complete their education. This initiative not only fosters individual academic growth but also contributes to the broader vision of creating a more inclusive and equitable society.

    Under this Scheme students can avail Pre-Matric Scholarship from Class 9 to 10 and Post Matric Scholarship for their higher studies at post-matriculation or post-secondary stage. Students who excel in their studies also get an opportunity of Scholarship to study in Top Class Schools and Colleges under the Scheme of ‘Top Class School Education’ and ‘Top Class College Education’. Hostel facilities are also provided to OBC students under the ‘Scheme of Construction of Hostels for OBC boys and girls.’

    PM –YASASVI for OBC, EBC and DNT students has been formulated having following five sub-schemes:

    • Pre-Matric Scholarship for OBC, EBC and DNT Students
    • Post-Matric Scholarship for OBC, EBC and DNT Students
    • Top Class School Education for OBC, EBC and DNT Students
    • Top Class College Education for OBC, EBC and DNT Students
    • Construction of Hostel for OBC Boys and Girls

    Scope

    The Pre-Matric Scholarship is designed for students in classes IX and X attending government schools, offering an annual academic allowance of Rs. 4,000 to families with an income below Rs. 2.5 lakh. For the 2023-24 academic year, Rs. 32.44 crore has been allocated to states and Union Territories for its implementation. The Post-Matric Scholarship supports students pursuing post-secondary education, providing academic allowances ranging from Rs. 5,000 to Rs. 20,000 based on the category of the course. For this scheme, Rs. 387.27 crore has been released for the current year.

    Additionally, the Top Class School and College Education schemes are designed to support meritorious students from OBC, EBC, and DNT categories. These programs cover tuition fees, hostel expenses, and other academic costs, with school students (Class 9-12) eligible for funding up to Rs. 1.25 lakh annually. College students at top institutions receive full financial support, including tuition, living expenses, and educational materials. To further enhance access to education, Rs. 12.75 crore has been allocated in 2023-24 under the ‘Construction of Hostels for OBC Boys and Girls’ scheme, which aims to provide accommodation for socially and educationally backward students near government schools and institutions, ensuring they have better access to quality education.

    Benefits

    The PM YASASVI aligns with the government’s broader vision of fostering inclusivity, equity, and societal upliftment. By offering comprehensive support to students from OBC, EBC, and DNT categories, it directly addresses the systemic barriers that prevent many from accessing quality education. This initiative not only ensures financial assistance but also promotes educational empowerment for some of the most vulnerable sections of society, thereby creating opportunities for upward mobility and self-reliance.

    The scheme’s focus on supporting students at both school and college levels helps to nurture talent from an early age and carry it through to higher education, laying a strong foundation for personal and professional growth. Moreover, by integrating earlier scholarship initiatives into a single, streamlined program, PM YASASVI enhances the impact of these efforts, contributing to the creation of a more inclusive and equitable education system. PM-YASASVI is ensuring that no student is left behind in the pursuit of academic and social progress. This scheme is playing a crucial role in the welfare and upliftment of marginalized communities, enabling them to contribute meaningfully to the vision of Viksit Bharat @ 2047.

    Impact

    The PM YASASVI (Young Achievers Scholarship Award Scheme for Vibrant India) scheme has made significant strides in providing financial assistance to students from Other Backward Classes (OBC), Economically Backward Classes (EBC), and De-Notified Tribes (DNT). In Financial Year 2023-24, a substantial sum of ₹ 193.83 cr. was allocated for the Pre-Matric Scholarship, benefiting 19.86 lakh students during 2023-24, with further beneficiaries for 2023-24 expected. Similarly, under the Post-Matric Scholarship scheme, ₹988.05 cr. was released, benefiting 27.97 lakh students in 2023-24. These scholarships aim to empower underprivileged students by alleviating financial burdens, thereby promoting education across marginalized communities.

    Additionally, the government has invested in other educational support initiatives. ₹14.30 cr. has been released for the construction of hostels, accommodating 1146 students in 2023-24. Top-class education programs and overseas study interest subsidies have also seen significant funding, reaching thousands of students. For example, ₹ 111.18 cr. was allocated to support 4762 students in top Class education in college scheme and Rs. 6.55 Cr. Was allocated to support 2602 students in Top Class education in Schools for OBC, EBC & DNT Students and ₹ 56.24 Cr. was granted as interest subsidies to 2789 students pursuing overseas education. These efforts reflect the growing impact of the PM YASASVI scheme, which is transforming the educational landscape for disadvantaged students, enabling them to achieve their academic potential and contributing to overall societal upliftment.

    *Any additional documents specified in the application form

     

    Key Points

    • Selection Process: The YASASVI Entrance Test (YET) 2023 is the basis for candidate selection, conducted by the National Testing Agency (NTA) under the direction of the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment (MSJ&E), Government of India.
    • Eligibility: Open to OBC, EBC, and DNT students with a total annual family income of up to ₹2.50 lakhs. Additional eligibility criteria may apply, depending on the specific scholarship scheme.
    • Where to Apply: Eligible students can apply online at the National Scholarship Portal: scholarships.gov.in.

    Conclusion

    By offering a comprehensive array of scholarships and support programs, PM-YASASVI is addressing the financial constraints that often hinder access to education for marginalized communities. The integration of various earlier schemes into one streamlined initiative ensures that students are supported from their school years through to higher education, creating pathways for personal and professional growth. With the government’s ongoing commitment to expanding access to quality education, the PM YASASVI Scheme is making a tangible impact on the lives of thousands of students, helping to create a more inclusive and prosperous India.

    References:

    https://www.myscheme.gov.in/schemes/pm-yasasvitcceobcebcdnts

    https://socialjustice.gov.in/public/ckeditor/upload/65661651839791.pdf

    https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1999638

    https://pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1847840

    https://pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetailm.aspx?PRID=1844993&reg=3&lang=1

    https://pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetail.aspx?PRID=1913930&reg=3&lang=1

    https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1808243

    https://yet.nta.ac.in/

    Click here to see in PDF:

    Santosh Kumar/ Sarla Meena/ Kajal Sumal

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  • MIL-OSI Video: Human rights defenders help realize the Sustainable Development Goals | United Nations

    Source: United Nations (Video News)

    Human rights defenders are central to realizing the Sustainable Development Goals, a United Nations independent expert says. UN Special Rapporteur Mary Lawlor speaks alongside two defenders who champion rights at great cost. Wellington Gabriel de Jesus dos Santos, from the Pitanga dos Palmares Quilombola community in Brazil, lost his father, who was shot dead outside in 2017, and his grandmother, who in 2023 was also brutally killed in response to her human rights work. Emily Donovan, a co-founder of Clean Cape Fear, a grassroots community action group in North Carolina, works to restore and protect air, soil, water and food supply from contamination from PFAS substances known as forever chemicals. Both took their causes to the United Nations, where the Special Rapporteur urged protections for human rights defenders around the world.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bm2RWOQTcuM

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  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Experts of the Human Rights Committee Welcome France’s Efforts to Combat Homophobia, Raise Questions on Violence in New Caledonia and Rules Governing Identity Checks

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Human Rights Committee today concluded its consideration of the sixth periodic report of France on how it implements the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, with Committee Experts welcoming France’s national plan combatting hatred against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons and plans to combat homophobia, while raising questions on violence in New Caledonia and rules governing identity checks. 

    One Committee Expert said the Committee welcomed the national plan for equality and against hatred and discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons (2020-2026) and the government plan (2023-2026) to combat homophobia and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. 

    Another Expert said it appeared that the current violence in the non-self-governing territory of New Caledonia was linked to reforms of the Nouméa Accord and a lack of progress in the decolonisation process.  What was the progress made on the issue of self-determination of the non-self-governing territory of New Caledonia as well as that of French Polynesia, and the participation and consultation processes put in place with the indigenous peoples living in these territories to obtain their free and informed consent and access to independence? 

    Another Expert asked if the State party could indicate whether mandatory training on racial and ethnic discrimination and profiling was systematically offered to law enforcement officials, both in metropolitan France and in the overseas territories?  Did the State party systematically collect data to monitor the use of identity checks, both in metropolitan France and in the overseas territories?  Would the State party be prepared to implement a template for all individuals subject to an identity check?  Would it be willing to introduce a centralised record of all identity checks to have an overview of how they were used, with whom and where?

    The delegation said France supported the recognition of indigenous peoples.  New Caledonia was one of the most advanced examples of the French Government recognising the rights of indigenous peoples.  Since the Nouméa Accord, an institutional framework had been put into place allowing for shared governance between the communities, representing the customs of the Kanak people.  On 1 October, the Prime Minister announced the postponement of elections in 2025, which was unanimously agreed by Parliament.  Since 1998, France had been cooperating with the decolonisation committee and the work had been fruitful.

    The delegation said all French citizens were equal before the law. The code of ethics for the police and national gendarmerie prohibited discriminatory identity checks.  When the law authorised an identity check, the police should not rely on any physical trait, unless there were specific grounds. Any act of discrimination could be reported by someone who believed they were a victim of discriminatory profiling. There were several ways to do this, including through the various controlling and monitoring authorities and the judiciary.

    Introducing the report, Isabelle Rome, Ambassador for Human Rights of France and head of the delegation, said human rights were a priority for France.  In December 2023, the President of the Republic announced that a House of Human Rights would be created in Paris to support civil society organizations. France had strengthened its public policies on the judiciary, democracy and the law enforcement agencies since 2022, paying particular attention to conditions for the use of force, and compliance with the rules of ethics during all police operations.  Ms. Rome concluded by saying that France believed in its democratic model, in liberty, equality and fraternity, as illustrated this summer by the Olympic and Paralympic Games.

    In concluding remarks, Ms. Rome thanked the Committee for the dialogue.  France was deeply attached to the rule of law and the Committee’s recommendations would be scrupulously considered.  The country was committed to renewing dialogue with the territory of New Caledonia and its inhabitants. 

    Tania María Abdo Rocholl, Committee Chairperson, thanked the delegation for the dialogue, which had covered a wide range of subjects under the Covenant.   The Committee aimed to ensure the highest level of implementation of the Covenant in France. 

    The delegation of France was made up of representatives of the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs; the Ministry of the Interior and Overseas; the Ministry of Justice; the State Council; the Interministerial delegation to the fight against racism, anti-Semitism, and hatred; the French office for the protection of refugees and stateless persons; and the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations Office at Geneva.

    The Human Rights Committee’s one hundred and forty-second session is being held from 14 October to 7 November 2024.  All the documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, can be found on the session’s webpage.  Meeting summary releases can be found here.  The webcast of the Committee’s public meetings can be accessed via the UN Web TV webpage.

    The Committee will next meet in public at 3 p.m. on Wednesday, 23 October, to begin its consideration of the second periodic report of Türkiye (CCPR/C/TUR/2).

    Report

    The Committee has before it the sixth periodic report of France (CCPR/C/FRA/6).

    Presentation of Report

    ISABELLE ROME, Ambassador for Human Rights of France and head of the delegation, said human rights were a priority for France.  In December 2023, the President of the Republic announced that a House of Human Rights would be created in Paris to support civil society organizations.  Launched in 2021, the Marianne initiative for human rights defenders aimed to encourage the activities of human rights defenders, both in their country of origin, and by welcoming them in France.  The fight against the death penalty was also a priority for France.  France would host the ninth World Congress against the Death Penalty in Paris in 2026.  France was also contributing to the organization of the first World Congress on Enforced Disappearances in Geneva on 15 and 16 January 2025. 

    The State’s new feminist diplomacy strategy would be published by the end of 2024.  France was proud that the Paris 2024 Olympic and Paralympic Games were the first gender-balanced games in history.  Through its diplomatic and consular network, France supported projects of democratic governance, respect for the rule of law, the fight against impunity, access to justice, and mechanisms to monitor the effective exercise of civil and political rights.  In 2019, France launched the Partnership for Information and Democracy, which was joined by 54 States from all regions, to guarantee freedom of expression.  In May 2024, the President of the French Republic and the Prime Minister of New Zealand announced the creation of a new non-governmental organization, the Christchurch Call Foundation, to coordinate the work of the Christchurch Call to eliminate terrorist and violent extremist content online. 

    France had strengthened its public policies on the judiciary, democracy and the law enforcement agencies since 2022, paying particular attention to conditions for the use of force, and compliance with the rules of ethics during all police operations.  The national law enforcement plan published in 2021 provided for an adaptation of the employment strategies of the republican security companies and the mobile gendarmerie squadrons during public demonstrations.  The right to demonstrate was guaranteed by the Constitution in France.  By getting in touch with the prefects and police units involved in public demonstrations, journalists could be added to communication channels, allowing them to receive live information and ask questions. 

    Between 2020 and 2024, the Ministry of Justice’s budget increased by 33 per cent, from €7.6 billion in 2020 to €10.1 billion in 2024. In five years, the French Ministry of Justice would have recruited as many magistrates as in the last 20 years. To combat prison overcrowding, the Ministry of Justice was implementing a proactive prison regulation policy, based on the development of alternatives to incarceration, the strengthening of early release mechanisms, and an ambitious prison real estate programme creating 15,000 net prison places.  An Interministerial Committee for Overseas Territories was set up in July 2023.  France had mobilised authorities to enable and guarantee the return to calm and security of people in New Caledonia. Emergency measures were deployed last June.  The mediation and work mission continued its work, with the aim of renewing political dialogue. 

    France had been implementing a new interministerial plan for gender equality 2023-2027, which contained 161 measures divided into four priority areas: the fight against violence against women; the global approach to women’s health; professional and economic equality; and the dissemination and transmission of a culture of equality.  The law of July 2023 aimed at strengthening women’s access to responsibilities in the public service.  It increased the mandatory quota of first-time female appointments to senior and management positions to 50 per cent.  On 8 March 2024, France became the first country in the world to enshrine the freedom to have access to voluntary termination of pregnancy in its Constitution. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert welcomed that France’s report was prepared in consultation with the National Consultative Commission on Human Rights, whose role was to monitor France’s international commitments and the implementation of recommendations issued by international and regional bodies.  In May 2024, despite the provisions of the Nouméa Accord which provided for a process of gradual transfer of power from France to New Caledonia, the National Assembly voted in favour of expanding the electorate of New Caledonia.  Thousands of Kanak demonstrators mobilised to denounce these reforms, which were allegedly passed without adequate consultation or free, prior and informed consent.  In the absence of sufficient dialogue on the part of the authorities, a violent conflict had been raging since that date. 

    The French Government had deployed considerable military resources to restore order, but at the cost of numerous allegations of excessive use of force that led to several deaths among Kanak protesters and security forces, as well as injuries.  According to information received by the Committee, at least 11 people were shot dead and 169 others were injured; 2658 demonstrators were arrested, many of whom were arbitrarily arrested and detained, dozens of them were also transferred to metropolitan France. 

    It appeared that the current violence in the non-self-governing territory of New Caledonia was linked to reforms of the Nouméa Accord and a lack of progress in the decolonisation process.  What was the progress made on the issue of self-determination of the non-self-governing territory of New Caledonia as well as that of French Polynesia, and the participation and consultation processes put in place with the indigenous peoples living in these territories to obtain their free and informed consent and access to independence?

    There had been several prominent court cases regarding the removal of headscarves in France.  In the opinion of the French State, should the Committee’s Views be followed only in the case where the Committee considered a complaint to be inadmissible or agreed with the arguments presented by the French Government? Were there intentions to lift reservations to the Covenant?  Who currently appointed the magistrates of the courts?  What was the current state of the constitutional reform initiated with a view to making the Prosecutor’s Office independent of the executive?  How could the full independence of judges and prosecutors be guaranteed?

    Since 2015, France had put in place measures to combat terrorism, which had been seen over the years to be increasingly detrimental to people’s rights and freedoms.

    Was the new legislation accompanied by sufficient guarantees against the risk of arbitrary and discriminatory implementation of these measures?  What independent and impartial expertise did public authorities have to assess the impact of new technologies on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by the Covenant? 

    It was understood that mass surveillance technology was used during the Olympic and Paralympic Games.  How did the State party ensure that it did not lead to profiling that disproportionately affected racial, ethnic and religious minorities?  How did the State party ensure that continuous surveillance by algorithm-based systems did not violate the right to privacy and respected the requirements of proportionality and necessity?  For how long could the data collected in this way be kept? 

    What were the current conditions for the communication of information to the intelligence services, particularly in the area of sensitive data? What information could be transmitted and what traceability requirements were in place?  Under what conditions could information provided by the intelligence services be made available to the judicial authority and the Public Prosecutor’s Office?  What means of access was available to defendants and those accused of acts of terrorism?

    Another Expert said the Committee was informed that people of colour were subjected to identity checks by the police about 20 times more often than other citizens.  They also faced discriminatory treatment during police stops and searches, including direct fines, often without objective suspicion and without being informed of the reasons.  What could be done to ensure that the use of identity checks and fines was not left to the discretion of law enforcement agencies, and was based only on objective and individualised conditions, and not on racial origins?  Did the State party have explicit guidelines for law enforcement agencies that clearly prohibited racial profiling in police operations as well as discriminatory identity checks? 

    Could the State party indicate whether mandatory training on racial and ethnic discrimination and profiling was systematically offered to law enforcement officials, both in metropolitan France and in the overseas territories?  Did the State party systematically collect data to monitor the use of identity checks, both in metropolitan France and in the overseas territories?  Would the State party be prepared to implement a template for all individuals subject to an identity check?  Would it be willing to introduce a centralised record of all identity checks to have an overview of how they were used, with whom and where?

    The Committee had received extensive information that showed the persistent problem of systemic racial discrimination, as well as the use of negative stereotypes against minorities.  What measures had the State party taken to effectively combat all forms of hate speech and hate crimes against racial, ethnic and religious minorities? What training was provided to law enforcement officers, judges and prosecutors, and what awareness campaigns were organised to prevent and combat hate crime and hate speech?  Would France develop data collection and research in compliance with data protection rules, to effectively identify cases of racial or ethnic profiling and offences in metropolitan France and overseas?

    The Committee welcomed the national plan for equality and against hatred and discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons (2020-2026) and the government plan (2023-2026) to combat homophobia and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity.  How would the State party ensure adequate resources and the active participation of civil society in the implementation of these plans?  Did these programmes sufficiently take into account minorities within minorities, such as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex asylum seekers? 

    The Committee was informed that some of the measures granting extensive powers to the administrative authorities, developed in the context of the state of emergency, had been granted permanent status.  What measures had the State party taken to ensure that initial emergency measures were in conformity with the Covenant in terms of necessity and proportionality?  How did the State party promote the accessibility of judicial procedures and ensure that they were effective?

    How would France ensure that anti-terrorism legislation did not disproportionately target Muslims and that actions were based on alleged criminal behaviour rather than religious practices?  How did the State party ensure that house searches and dissolution of organizations were conducted by the courts?  What was the percentage of terrorist offences in relation to criminal offences committed in the last five years?  The Committee was informed of the law establishing a new security regime, which subjected the accused to certain obligations, with a view of ensuring their reintegration.  How did France ensure that this monitoring system, which was based on the rather vague notion of “dangerousness”, was not arbitrary and did not disproportionately infringe on the rights of persons who had served their sentences?

    One Committee Expert said the Committee particularly welcomed the State party’s commitment of significant financial resources to address the needs of vulnerable groups during the health crisis of COVID-19. What was the impact of the measures described in the State party’s report, to ensure that the COVID-19 pandemic did not exacerbate inequalities, discrimination and exclusion, including among vulnerable groups?  Specifically, regarding domestic violence against women, which was said to have increased during the pandemic, what was the assessment of the effectiveness and impact of the measures taken? 

    While noting the information provided by the State party, including on the judicial review of the restrictions imposed, could the proportionality of the measures imposed to address COVID-19 be explained, including the ban on any gathering of more than 10 people imposed for a certain period? What assessment did the State party make of this experience for a better consideration of human rights in future crises?      

    Another Expert said the State party had reported on humanitarian repatriations from Syria of women and children of French nationality.  With regard to returns, according to public reports, there was still a significant number of women and children detained or held in camps and rehabilitation centres in Syria.  What was the number, the current situation, and the measures taken by the State party to ensure the full repatriation of all French women and children still in detention camps and rehabilitation centres for minors in Syria? 

    What was the estimated number of detained men and women in Syria who participated as Islamic State fighters?  Had measures been taken to ensure that due process standards were strictly respected in the trials before the Syrian national courts? According to information, in May and June 2019, 11 French nationals had been sentenced to death in Iraq for their involvement as Islamic State fighters.  Could the delegation provide an update on that information and indicate what steps the State party had taken to prevent the continued imposition of death sentences on its nationals in that country?  What other penalties had been applied to these French nationals in lieu of the death penalty?

    The Committee had requested information related to the Arms Trade Treaty, in order to know whether the State party carried out an evaluation for the granting of export licenses aimed at determining that the recipient country used the weapons included in the respective license within the framework of respect for the right to life.  Did the evaluation of an arms export take this into account?  Had any measures been taken to ensure a total ban on arms sales to countries where there was a clear risk that such weapons could be used to violate international human rights law?  Was it possible to access information on arms exports so that civil society could carry out oversight?  What measures had been taken to prevent the negative effects on the right to life of the operations of French companies abroad, especially in the province of Cabo Delgado in Mozambique? 

    A Committee Expert said the Committee was informed that there had been a rise in police violence in recent years, with multiple incidents resulting in fatal outcomes, some of them young boys.   Could more information be provided on trainings on racism for police officers?  Had improvements been made, bearing in mind previous incidents?  The Committee was informed that investigations and legal procedures of unlawful killings by law enforcement officials were not expeditious, sometimes even leading to de facto police impunity, or that sentences were not commensurate with the gravity of the crime. 

    Had there been plans to amend legal norms and review legal conditions for the use of firearms by the police and the gendarmerie, aiming to reduce the risks of disproportionate use of lethal force, and to strike a better balance with the principles of absolute necessity and strict proportionality?  What was the status of investigations of fatalities and injuries, including those related to alleged excessive use of force, which emerged during conflicts that started in May 2024 in New Caledonia? Had trainings been undertaken for those operating in France’s overseas territories? 

    The Committee welcomed the reported introduction of the new right to appeal introduced by article 803-8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as a step forward.  However, Experts had been informed that there were several challenges preventing its full use and benefits.  Since the right to a judicial remedy against undignified conditions of detention was introduced in 2021, what were the steps taken by the State party to disseminate it within the incarcerated population?  Was the information on the creation of a new legal tool easily reachable in all penitentiaries under the jurisdiction of the State party?  Had legal aid been introduced to those incarcerated persons who could not afford a lawyer or judicial taxes?  Were there plans to introduce wider use of alternatives to detention or a more restricted use of detention as a last resort?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said France supported the recognition of indigenous peoples.  New Caledonia was one of the most advanced examples of the French Government recognising the rights of indigenous peoples.  Since the Nouméa Accord, an institutional framework had been put into place allowing for shared governance between the communities, representing the customs of the Kanak people.  On 1 October, the Prime Minister announced the postponement of elections in 2025, which was unanimously agreed by Parliament.  Since 1998, France had been cooperating with the decolonisation committee and the work had been fruitful.

    Since 2015, the technical intelligence community had been working on a specific legal framework.  The law included respect for the private lives of citizens and had a strict principle of proportionality.  The law set forth the procedures to be respected when it came to implementing intelligence techniques, including prior authorisation by the Prime Minister.  There were restrictions on how long the data could be held.  The enhanced video surveillance was enacted in advance of the Olympics and Paralympics Games.  France chose to engage in a rigorous oversight mechanism regarding this surveillance.  This was a tool for detecting events without having to resort to facial recognition. 

    All French citizens were equal before the law.  The code of ethics for the police and national gendarmerie prohibited discriminatory identity checks.  When the law authorised an identity check, the police should not rely on any physical trait, unless there were specific grounds.  Any act of discrimination could be reported by someone who believed they were a victim of discriminatory profiling.  There were several ways to do this, including through the various controlling and monitoring authorities and the judiciary.

    At the end of the state of emergency, which followed the attacks carried out on France in 2015, the Government acknowledged the need to keep these tools in place due to the possibility of other attacks.  Four new measures had then been created.  These laws were only for preventing terrorism and were accompanied with significant guarantees for citizens.  The law of 30 July 2021 on preventing acts of terrorism gave these measures permanency.  The Constitutional Council believed this was a balanced approach that ensured achieving the goal of preventing terrorism while respecting private life.  House searches could not be instigated unless there was prior authorisation from a judge; 1,447 remedies were presented for the state of emergency.  The law of 2021 applied to people who had been sentenced to acts of terrorism. Sentences for terrorist activities represented around 0.04 per cent of all criminal activities. 

    A plan had been developed to prepare the plan on combatting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex hatred, involving members of civil society.  The plan contained 16 key measures, including a ten-million-euro fund by 2027 to improve the host centres for these individuals.  The goal was to have two centres per region in France.  For hate speech, the legislation provision had recently been strengthened.  In 2021, there was a vote to govern the digital space and that law had a set of provisions on combatting online hate speech to better regulate illegal behaviour. There had been significant progress made in this area, given that a bill had been introduced in the European Parliament to regulate heinous content online. 

    In France, 2020 was the year that the State had the lowest rate of femicide.  This meant that the measures set up were effective, and that the police and justice systems were able to act swiftly to combat family violence.  There were also provisions which allowed complaints to be raised. 

    Measures adopted during the pandemic were considered to be proportional.  The measures taken to address the pandemic did not overturn other measures in place. During COVID-19, the number of calls to victim support groups for violence had increased.  The accelerated measures implemented by France to support victims included electronic bracelets to ensure restraining orders were complied with.   In 2021, emergency plans were implemented to ensure people were protected.  At the end of the pandemic, the State provided hotlines 24/7 and reception centres in shopping malls.  More specialised support was also provided in courts. 

    International commitments by France to human rights did not involve a repatriation of citizens in an area where France had no control.  Authorities responded systematically to requests for repatriation made by French citizens.  Since 2019, repatriation efforts for minors had been organised.  France exported weapons to countries that wished to strengthen their armies, only with strict national oversight. 

    Force was only used when necessary in cases set forth by law and in a manner which was proportional to the threat.  A police or member of the gendarmerie would only use force if it was essential in their work, such as in cases of self-defence.  Police had additional guidelines on the use of weapons.  There should never be doubt regarding the reasons of an arrest warrant. 

    France had a law which allowed for all inmates to request guarantees for their detention conditions, ensuring they were dignified. A provision was in place which allowed individuals to benefit from jurisdictional support, in place since 2023. Template forms for this purpose were provided to all detainees upon their detention. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert said the problem with the New Caledonia information was the outcome of the projects which arose in France in 1984. The idea of postponing elections to 2025 was a positive sign as this would allow for mediation between the local and French authorities.  Over recent years, there had been a considerable strengthening of anti-terrorist measures.  However, the majority of terrorist threats were foiled by international cooperation efforts.  Were the measures justified by the threats the State faced?  How could this be transmitted between different intelligence branches?  How long was intelligence data stored and what measures were provided to keep the information secure? 

    Another Expert asked for disaggregated data on what law enforcement officials had been charged with?  Were inmates allowed to apply to a collective appeal so that others could benefit? 

    An Expert said there were laws which prohibited discrimination in identification checks; how was it ensured that this legislation was implemented?

    Another Committee Expert asked for the delegation to bear in mind the matter of redress granted to victims of violence. 

    One Expert asked for a more specific response to the measures adopted to comply with the rulings of the European courts against certain cases against France?  How did the State party ensure effective judicial control and parliamentary oversight in weapon exportation? 

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the French overseas territories met all international criteria under the law.  France had completed the decolonisation process and no longer administered non-self-governing territories.  As for French Polynesia, in 2023, France decided to speak before the General Assembly, illustrating ongoing dialogue between the State and French Polynesia. France supported the development of French Polynesia. 

    The French Government followed the individual communications procedure before the Committee.  Any communications were the subject of broad consultations among many ministries and institutions. 

    When France ended the state of emergency of 2015 to 2017, the risk of terrorism in the country was still high.  While this risk had come down, threats still persisted; 45 attacks had been foiled between 2017 and now. 

    In 2022, over 700 people brought cases to court regarding acts of violence committed by people in public authority.  Over 200 of these led to convictions. 

    The Ministry of Education and Youth was currently creating a programme to consider the new kinds of racism and anti-Semitism which had cropped up in recent years. 

    The French law enforcement force represented the population and was diverse.  Inmates could ask for specific improvements to detention conditions which impacted their dignity.  Improvements had been carried out in several penitentiaries as a result of this. Several inmates could present these complaints together.   

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert said since the end of the state of health emergency on 10 July 2020, the situation of exiled people in Calais had deteriorated.  The nearly 1,200 homeless men, women and children in Calais had seen their living conditions deteriorated due to the brutal “evacuations” of several large camps, and the dramatic reduction in vital services such as food distributions, and lack of access to showers and water points.  Additionally, around 100 unaccompanied minors had settled in tents in Jules Ferry Square to highlight that they had been abandoned by the State. Could the State party comment on this?

    According to information received, journalists and media organizations were reportedly facing increasing challenges in carrying out their duties, including restrictions on reporting, potential abuses of power, and other pressures that undermined press freedom.  Reporters without Borders reported that police reportedly assaulted several “clearly identifiable” journalists.  There were several cases cited to support these allegations, including journalists in New Caledonia who stated they were constantly harassed for their coverage of the riots.  Could the delegation comment on these allegations?  What measures did the State party intend to take to better protect journalists and human rights defenders in the exercise of their work? Had the perpetrators of the mentioned cases been prosecuted and what was the outcome, including convictions and reparations?

    Another Expert noted the numerous allegations of prison overcrowding in the State party and the serious health risks during the most critical period of the COVID-19 pandemic, asking what were the reasons for providing, through decree-law 2020-303, for the full continuation of pre-trial detention, which even affected minors?  What were the conditions for the application of the measure of full maintenance of pre-trial detention to children and how many children were affected by this measure? How did law no. 2021-646 of 25 May 2021 on global security preserving freedoms effectively guarantee respect for privacy, especially in the use of portable cameras by law enforcement officers and cameras installed on unmanned aerial vehicles?  Did it include the principles of proportionality and necessity? In the case of the use of surveillance devices in public demonstrations by law enforcement officers, were there safeguards or limitations to prevent their use from affecting the right to peaceful assembly and freedom of expression? 

    It was alleged that four former national secretaries of the General Confederation of Labour were being investigated for defamation and public slander following a complaint filed against them by the Directorate of the National School of Prison Administration.  Could information on this be provided?  The Committee would also like information on the processes followed against various union, political and community leaders for the crime of glorifying terrorism after the Hamas attacks of 7 October 2023.  It was reported that during the recent Olympic Games, there were many cases of systematic Islamophobia that mainly affected Muslim athletes and communities, a situation exacerbated by the security measures adopted. Could the delegation comment on this? What measures had the State party taken to combat hate speech against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons?

    One Expert said the Committee had unfortunately been informed that the situation of migrants in Calais and Grande-Synthe was still very worrying, with authorities continuing to apply the “zero point of fixation” policy, under which temporary shelters were systematically dismantled, sometimes with excessive use of force, every 48 hours.  How were migrants informed of the 48 hour rule and the possible dismantling of their temporary shelters?  Could the State consider the use of more humane and proportionate alternatives to dismantling these shelters, including increasing the capacity of reception centres?  What measures had been adopted to facilitate reporting on police abuses? 

    The Committee was concerned by reports that migrants had been detained at the French-Italian border without having obtained legal documents explaining their detention.  How did France ensure that such detentions were not arbitrary and that all migrants were informed of their procedural rights?  The Committee was also informed that the immigration law of 2 January 2024 expanded the criteria for expulsion to include minor offences, and allowed authorities to place a foreign person in administrative detention for reasons related to a potential threat to public order without justification, as well as allowing detention to be extended and reducing procedural rights.  How was it ensured that these measures were compatible with the provisions of the Covenant? 

    The Committee had received information that the State party continued to issue expulsion notices for the return of persons to countries where they were at risk of serious violations of their rights.  How did the State party ensure respect for the principle of non-refoulement in all cases of expulsion?  Regarding the internal borders of the Schengen area, in particular the issue of rapid refoulement at the border between France and Italy, the Committee noted with appreciation the State party’s follow-up to the conclusion of the Court of Justice of the European Union.  The Committee welcomed the annulment by the Council of State, in February, of certain parts of the Code on the Entry and Residence of Foreigners and the Right of Asylum. 

    However, information had been received that foreign nationals continued to be forcibly returned to Italy without having had access to a proper asylum procedure.  How did France ensure the individualised examination of all applications and effective access to asylum procedures?  Did the State intend to end the use of bone tests in law and in practice?  What was the objective of the January 2024 law to establish files to identify unaccompanied minors suspected of a criminal offence?  Who controlled these files and who kept them?  What measures had been taken to ensure adequate temporary accommodation and emergency accommodation for unaccompanied minors?

    One Committee Expert said France had adopted the third national action plan against human trafficking (2024-2027) at the beginning of 2024.  Could the evaluation of achievements from the second action plan be provided and what goals were set for the third plan?  What were the measures developed to combat trafficking?  Could victims receive compensation within the criminal procedure, or did they have to undergo civil suits for compensation?  What safeguards were in place to protect victims themselves from criminal accountability?  What methods had been developed for victims’ identification?  Had trainings been organised for prosecutors, judges and lawyers on human trafficking? 

    The Committee was concerned by numerous reports that the ban on manifestation of religious beliefs by means of clothing, headgear or other religious symbols was a source of tension in French society and was seen by some as disrespect for multiculturism, fuelling the sense of discrimination, racism, anti-Semitism, and Islamophobia.  What measures were being taken to ensure that the ban on expressing religion by means of religious clothing, headgear or symbols did not have a discriminatory effect in practice?  How was it ensured that all visible religious symbols were treated equally? What criteria was used to decide what symbol should be treated as conspicuous and thus be banned, while others were treated as discrete and allowed?  How did the State party avoid that the ban on manifestation of religious beliefs by means of clothing affected predominantly Muslim girls and women? 

    What safeguards were in place to ensure that provisions on the dissolution of association would not be broadly interpreted and end in violating the right to freedom of assembly?  There had been examples of associations, such as Uprisings of the Earth, labelled as eco-terrorists.  Could the delegation provide its views on this?  The Committee was concerned at the expansion of police powers to stop and check persons in the vicinity of protests, and the effect that this could have on the effective enjoyment of the right of peaceful assembly.  A significant number of protesters had been arrested and detained and a small percentage of the protesters arrested had been charged.  What was the position of the State party on these allegations?  How were personal dignity and respect understood by the courts?

    Another Expert said the year 2023 was marked by a succession of bans on demonstrations, particularly related to the mobilisation against the pension reform, or those carried out in support of the Palestinian people.  In October 2023, the Minister of the Interior issued a memo calling on local authorities to pre-emptively ban all demonstrations of solidarity with the Palestine people.  The ban was challenged before the Council of State, which determined that local authorities had to judge on a case-by-case basis the risks to public order and thus avoid repression by invoking public order, excessive force or arbitrary arrest.  This had had repercussions, even in the area of the right to information, which was concerning.

    Did the National Law Enforcement Scheme adopted in September 2020 mention the path of “de-escalation”, as a strategic principle for policing political manifestations in Europe, supported by the European Union?  The Committee had expressed concern about allegations of ill treatment, excessive use of force, and disproportionate use of intermediate force weapons, in particular during arrests, forced evacuations, and law enforcement operations.  A 2017 law (the Cazeneuve law) created a common framework for the use of weapons, allowing police to use armed force in five different cases.  However, the number of deaths had increased fivefold after the 2017 law, causing France to become the country in the European Union with the largest numbers of people killed or injured by shots fired by police. 

    Could the delegation explain the extent to which law enforcement agencies followed the applicable protocols in practice, with supporting statistics, and respected the principles of necessity, proportionality, precaution, non-discrimination and self-defence in the use of weapons?  What measures, in terms of training for law enforcement agencies, were envisaged?  Would the State party be willing to review the legal framework on the use of weapons and limit the use of firearms within the Security Code?  What follow-up had been given to decision 2020-131 of the Defender of Rights on general recommendations on law enforcement practices with regard to the rules of ethics? 

    According to a decision by the Ombudsman, France was the only country in Europe to use stun grenades to keep demonstrators at bay. Would grenades continue to be used despite the serious mutilations and injuries they caused?  Could the delegation provide updated information on the number of persons who had died as a result of police operations during arrests, including through the excessive use of force, and on the outcome of investigations into such deaths, sanctions imposed, and reparations provided to victims and their families?  Could statistics be provided on the number of proposals for sanctions presented by the Defender of Rights and what became of them, in particular the number of prosecutions? 

    Would the Brigades for the Repression of Motorised Violent Actions be dissolved?  The State party’s report provided information on complaints and investigations initiated concerning members of the security forces.  What measures would be taken to make the relevant statistical data more reliable, disaggregated and complete?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the evacuations of camps in Calais which took place were done through either a legal or an administrative decision. These decisions were carried out with proper supervision and were overseen by the Government and social organizations.  Unaccompanied minors were housed in emergency shelter systems when possible and the same for adults when possible. 

    France guaranteed the right to protest and freedom of collective speech and expression of ideas.  The French State allowed journalists free circulation.  France was seeking to strike a balance because there were now many journalists without press identification who ran risks, placing themselves between protesters and law enforcement officials.  Law enforcement officers were called on to show professional behaviour at all times, including in situations where protests were violent. 

    Videos in public spaces were used to call attention to pre-determined actions; they did not have any impact on the right to protest. France supported the European plan for protecting journalists against violence.  This had allowed for additional guarantees to be provided in certain cases. 

    French authorities were mobilised to support efforts against hate speech, and there were efforts to address this phenomenon within the Ministry of Justice.  When cases were thrown out, they could be appealed before the appeals court.  Investigations into allegations of hate speech were underway. 

    The administrative police were evacuating camps, which were aimed at putting an end to illegal occupation and squatting of lands.  These operations on the ground involved parameters being established.  Regarding expulsions in Calais, 36 operations had taken place.  They were based on the same legal foundations; the anti-squat laws had been utilised to proceed with the evacuation.  Minors were always supported.  The State was aware of the situation of unaccompanied minors in Calais. Systems had been put in place to address these realities and identify the unaccompanied minors.  Work was being done with associations on the ground in Calais, including Doctors without Borders.  The shelters were only 20 minutes from Calais and allowed for daily operations and support.  This distance was far enough to protect unaccompanied minors from traffickers found in these camps. 

    When foreigners were not eligible for asylum seeking procedures, they could then be placed under administrative detention in administrative detention centres.  These decisions were subjected to oversight by judges.  During the detention period, foreigners benefitted from health care support and legal counsel.  Voluntary returnees received financial support.  Some countries were not considered to be safe, and therefore returns were only on a voluntary basis.  Since October 2022, the Government was active in Mayotte, allowing active participation in the asylum-seeking process. 

    There were 2,100 victims of trafficking and exploitation in 2023, a six per cent increase compared to 2022.  Around 882 people had been sentenced for exploitation and trafficking.  France thanked civil society for helping contribute to the National Action Plan against Trafficking.  Training was an important part of the strategy to combat trafficking; there was a training course on human trafficking with a focus on modern slavery. Training was provided to 150 different professionals.  To care for the victims of human trafficking, several mechanisms were in place, including an early detection mechanism.

    France guaranteed the rights of citizens at the highest level, and any restrictions applied to all religions equally.  There was freedom for an individual to display religious signs, but this needed to be assessed on a case-by-case basis.  Any restriction on a religious symbol was only imposed if they were identified as a risk to the public service. 

    Freedom of expression was guaranteed in France, but this could result in some groups promoting racist and hate speech.  The law of 2021 amended the list of cases where a dissolution could take place, broadening the list of discriminatory measures which could lead to a dissolution. 

    The Public Ministry could carry out prosecutions.  Sometimes the Prosecutor could enact educational measures instead, which was used in some cases of minors.  The judges of France were required to argue for their decisions, given that there were no automatic sentences in the State.  This was also true for those found guilty of threatening public order. 

    France was one of the first countries to call for a ceasefire in Gaza.  There had been a significant increase in anti-Semitic acts since October 2023. Freedom to demonstrate was a fundamental right protected by the Constitution and protests were not subjected to authorisation.  There should be a notification to law enforcement around 15 days before to protect the safety of those participating and those living in the area.  The prohibition of protests was only carried out if it was believed they were a threat to public order, and this was done with the oversight of a judge.  Exceptionally, some protests had been prohibited due to the risk they posed to public order. 

    The use of firearms in France was regulated by the Criminal Code. This allowed a gradual response to respect necessity and proportionality to the violence and the threat.  The goal was to reduce the risk of threatening life and the integrity of people.  The police and gendarmerie were trained on how to use these weapons.  Regarding the brigades, several changes in the practices of demonstrators, including the increase in use of social media, had meant that for three years, the strategy had changed.  On average, there were two to three protests every day in Paris.  To meet this challenge, the brigades were developed and had been used to break up certain disruptive groups.  Since October 2023, the Ministry of Justice had circulated a document on combatting offences related to terrorist activities. 

    The fight against Islamophobia was a strong State policy. The strong Muslim community in France should be able to live with their beliefs peacefully to enjoy their religion. Any law which might be seen as a restriction did not target any specific population or any specific religion. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert asked if minors in Mayotte could be afforded the same protections as in metropolitan France? 

    Another Expert said hate speech online affected artists and activists in the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex community. What had been done to prevent this? 

    An Expert said there had been a significant increase in those killed or wounded during protests or police operations.  Were grenades and defensive bullets still used?  What happened when police used these weapons? Was there a compulsory inquiry? Was there oversight regarding each use of weapons? 

    Responses by the Delegation

    Minors were subjected to an age evaluation before they were recorded as minors.  If recorded as a minor, they should not undergo another evaluation.  The dismantling of camps was based on public legal rulings.  The individuals were informed, and efforts were made to help them find shelters or to change their immigration status.  Readmission into the Schengen space was a complex issue. 

    There was a doctrine for the use of medium weapons which allowed gradual and proportionate use.  Recent changes allowed France to address the risk of wounds with these weapons.  Law enforcement officers needed to be clearly trained on each type of weapon on a regular basis.  There was a proposal to replace grenades with non-lethal “flash-bangs”. Random visits were undertaken to police and gendarmerie stations as a form of auditing.  Efforts were made to identify the amount of time weapons were used. 

    Closing Remarks

    ISABELLE ROME, Ambassador for Human Rights of France and head of the delegation, thanked the Committee for the dialogue.  France was deeply attached to the rule of law and was a living democracy; the Committee’s recommendations would be scrupulously considered.  France would continue to progress with an open-minded spirit, in partnership with civil society and the national human rights institution.  The country was committed to renewing dialogue with the territory of New Caledonia and its inhabitants. 

    TANIA MARÍA ABDO ROCHOLL, Committee Chairperson, thanked the delegation for the dialogue, which had covered a wide range of subjects under the Covenant.  The Committee aimed to ensure the highest level of implementation of the Covenant in France. 

    __________

    CCPR.24.024E

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    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Fort Myers Felon Pleads Guilty To Unlawfully Possessing Stolen Firearm And Silencer

    Source: United States Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF)

    Fort Myers, Florida – United States Attorney Roger B. Handberg announces that Trequille Donte Rodreguez, Sr. (31, Fort Myers) today pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon and possessing an unregistered firearm silencer. He faces a maximum penalty of 25 years in federal prison. A sentencing date has not yet been set.

    According to court records, while executing a search warrant at the residence of Rodreguez on July 2, 2024, officers from the Fort Myers Police Department located a Ruger firearm and a firearm silencer inside a bag in one of the bedrooms.  Both the firearm and the suppressor had been reported stolen in a car burglary approximately one month earlier in Hendry County. Two latent fingerprints were lifted from the silencer. Both were later identified as belonging to Rodreguez. As a convicted felon who previously served time in Florida state prison for firearms and burglary offenses, Rodreguez is prohibited from possessing firearms or ammunition under federal law.    

    This case was investigated by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, the Fort Myers Police Department, and the Hendry County Sheriff’s Office. It is being prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorney Simon R. Eth.

    This case is part of Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN), a program bringing together all levels of law enforcement and the communities they serve to reduce violent crime and gun violence, and to make our neighborhoods safer for everyone. On May 26, 2021, the Department launched a violent crime reduction strategy strengthening PSN based on these core principles: fostering trust and legitimacy in our communities, supporting community-based organizations that help prevent violence from occurring in the first place, setting focused and strategic enforcement priorities, and measuring the results.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Member Of Anti-Government Militia Pleads Guilty To Unlawful Possession Of Machinegun Conversion Devices And A Silencer

    Source: United States Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF)

    Ocala, FL – United States Attorney Roger B. Handberg announces that Joshua Fries (30, Ocala) has pleaded guilty to two counts of unlawful possession of unregistered National Firearms Act (NFA) weapons: a silencer (Count One) and machinegun conversion devices (Count Two). Fries faces up to 10 years in federal prison on each count. A sentencing date has not yet been set. 

    According to court documents, Fries provided a confidential informant with two auto sears (machinegun conversion devices) and a silencer, all of which he made himself. During their conversations, Fries disclosed to the informant that he was part of a local anti-government militia group and that he made silencers, auto sears, and other weapons for the militia. Contrary to federal law, none of these devices were registered to Fries in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record—a database maintained by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives.   

    This case was investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. It is being prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorney Belkis H. Callaos.

    This case is part of Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN), a program bringing together all levels of law enforcement and the communities they serve to reduce violent crime and gun violence, and to make our neighborhoods safer for everyone. On May 26, 2021, the department launched a violent crime reduction strategy strengthening PSN based on these core principles: fostering trust and legitimacy in our communities, supporting community-based organizations that help prevent violence from occurring in the first place, setting focused and strategic enforcement priorities, and measuring the results.

    MIL Security OSI