Category: Security

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Competition policy – annual report 2024 – P10_TA(2025)0104 – Thursday, 8 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular to Articles 101 to 109 thereof,

    –  having regard to the publication of 18 July 2024 by Ursula von der Leyen entitled ‘Europe’s choice – political guidelines for the next European Commission 2024–2029’,

    –  having regard to the report of 9 September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’,

    –  having regard to the report of 18 April 2024 by Enrico Letta entitled ‘Much more than a market’,

    –  having regard to the European Court of Auditors Special Report21/2024 of 23 October 2024 entitled ‘State aid in times of crisis – Swift reaction but shortcomings in the Commission’s monitoring and inconsistencies in the framework to support the EU’s industrial policy objectives’,

    –  having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation)(1),

    –   having regard to Article 11 TFEU, which mandates the integration of environmental protection requirements into the definition and implementation of all EU policies and activities, with a view to promoting sustainable development,

    –  having regard to Article 3 of Decision (EU) 2022/591 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 April 2022 on a General Union Environment Action Programme to 2030(2), which provides that environmentally harmful subsidies, in particular fossil fuel subsidies, should be phased out without delay,

    –  having regard to the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 3 September 2024 in Case C‑611/22 P, Illumina v Commission(3), of 10 September 2024 in Case C‑465/20 P, European Commission v Ireland and Others(4), and of 10 September 2024 in Case C‑48/22 P (Google and Alphabet v Commission)(5),

    –  having regard to the Commission’s report of June 2024 entitled ‘Protecting competition in a changing world – Evidence on the evolution of competition in the EU during the past 25 years’,

    –  having regard to the study entitled ‘The role of commodity traders in shaping agricultural markets’, published by its Policy Department for Structural and Cohesion Policies in November 2024,

    –  having regard to the report of 20 December 2023 by the European Securities and Markets Authority entitled ‘CRA Market Share Report: 2023 edition’,

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0071/2025),

    A.  whereas the current challenging economic, climate and geopolitical contexts, marked by uncertainty and unpredictability, require a renewed approach to European competitiveness and concrete strategies to boost economic growth;

    B.  whereas the proper enforcement of the EU competition policy framework leads to lower prices, higher quality, greater choice for consumers, faster innovation and a fairer and more resilient economy, and protects entry conditions for operators in the internal market, tackling abuses of dominant position, monopolies and practices distortive to the internal market;

    C.  whereas the Draghi report underlines that the EU has a broad and diversified industrial innovation base, with a strong comparative advantage in green technologies, but that sustained efforts are needed in order to retain that advantage; whereas the integration of climate and environmental considerations into competition policy is essential, in that regard; whereas the Letta report maintains that the lack of EU integration in the financial, energy and electronic communications sectors is a primary reason for Europe’s declining competitiveness;

    D.  whereas the EU’s competition policy could contribute to bolstering the resilience of the internal market, as well as achieving the goals of the European Green Deal, the 2030 Digital Compass and the Competitiveness Compass, for which international exchange and cooperation are essential;

    E.  whereas the Commission and the national competition authorities need to act in an impartial and objective way in order to preserve the credibility of the EU’s competition policy; whereas the political independence of national competition authorities is of utmost importance to ensure the impartiality and credibility of competition policy;

    General considerations

    1.  Considers that EU competition law seeks to shield against excessive levels of concentration and accumulation of market power, and reaffirms the role of competition policy in encouraging efficiency, innovation and growth, creating a level playing field and protecting consumers, by assuring that markets remain competitive, efficient, dynamic and innovative, delivering high-quality products and services at fair prices and with a wider range of choice;

    2.  Reiterates that competition policy should contribute to all of the EU’s policies, notably in the fields of sustainability, energy, defence and digitalisation; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to a new State aid framework to accompany the Clean Industrial Deal, so as to ensure competitiveness through mobilising the necessary public support for the energy transition to decarbonise EU industry, while ensuring that this does not hinder innovation, increase prices or reduce competition in the internal market; reiterates that State aid should not distort fair and effective competition;

    3.  Emphasises that the global strength and importance of the EU single market derives not only from its internal and external competitiveness but also from its ability to set common standards and guarantee territorial cohesion; notes that at the same time, policymakers should take due account of international regulatory and market developments and calls on the Commission to strive for continued dialogue and cooperation at international level, including via second-generation cooperation agreements that allow for more effective information exchange between competition authorities, and the development of influence on competition policy, globally; highlights the importance of the European Competition Network (ECN) and calls on the Commission to prioritise sustained constructive dialogue and cooperation, in this regard, at international level; calls for the coordination between national competition authorities to ensure the uniform application of competition rules and underlines the necessity of increasing collaboration between antitrust and other sectoral regulators;

    A competitive Union

    4.  Supports the Commission’s commitment to investing in sustainable competitiveness; welcomes the Draghi report’s emphasis on innovation, investments, market integration, decarbonisation and resilience, and the Letta report’s focus on integration, autonomy and solidarity; encourages policies that promote innovation, competitiveness and sustainable and inclusive growth;

    5.  Underlines the need for coordinated, targeted and truly European industrial policy to boost competitiveness; notes that this must not result in market dominance or abuse thereof, price distortion or economic inefficiencies, and points to the need for effective merger control procedures;

    6.  Considers that any State aid granted should be consistent with EU policy objectives; notes the Commission’s intention to provide guidance on the compatibility of State aid with innovation, climate and economic security considerations, as well as its actions to scale down and phase out fossil fuel subsidies under the Clean Industrial Deal, and encourages the Member States to consider the introduction of further conditions for the receipt of State aid; calls for companies structured through non-EU tax havens to be barred from receiving State aid; invites the Commission to investigate the lack of harmonisation of clawback mechanisms;

    7.  Takes note of the Commission’s report asserting that market concentration, markups and profits have increased over the past 25 years, while industry dynamism has decreased, despite the active enforcement of competition law; also takes note that this increase in markups was found to be driven by market share reallocation towards the largest firms; further notes that weak levels of competition have had significant negative impacts on consumers, purchasing power, and on the competitiveness of EU firms and overall economic growth; recalls that the application of competition law should focus on ensuring open, competitive markets free from anti-competitive practices;

    8.  Points out that State aid is increasingly used to support industrial policy objectives; recalls that such aid, as permitted under Article 107(3)(c) TFEU, must not adversely affect trading conditions or the common interest; notes the divergent fiscal capabilities of the Member States and warns that fragmented State aid creates an uneven playing field; calls on the Commission to monitor these effects and to ensure the integrity of the single market, which can be done through a common financing instrument for a European industrial policy, such as a European Competitiveness Fund, as proposed by Commission President von der Leyen in her political guidelines; calls on the Commission and the Member States not to engage in subsidy competition, which only exacerbates market distortions, notably when financing undertakings that are not efficient; concludes that temporary State aid frameworks have failed to prevent further market fragmentation and notes that only two of the Member States accounted for 77 % of State aid notified; calls for stricter State aid notification monitoring and enhanced State aid reporting and transparency, in line with the recommendations of the European Court of Auditors;

    9.   Underlines the importance of the important projects of common European interest (IPCEIs) for financing projects within the EU with a cross-border dimension; stresses that IPCEIs should have genuine EU added value, which means that they should have a positive impact on more than one Member State; calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure that any such State aid notification is completed within six months at the latest;

    10.  Takes note of the Draghi report’s estimate that, in order to protect our EU competitiveness, an additional EUR 800 billion per year is needed; acknowledges the importance of public and private investment in this context; underlines that the EU budget needs to be properly equipped to that end; regards the completion of the Savings and Investments Union as important for mobilising private investment, addressing the fragmentation of the internal market and supporting the EU’s industrial strategy; acknowledges the urgent need for reforms alongside the effective implementation of the three action areas outlined in the Draghi report: (i) closing the innovation gap with the US and China; (ii) a common plan for decarbonisation and competitiveness to accelerate the energy transition and reduce energy costs; and (iii) enhancing security and reducing dependencies;

    11.  Welcomes the protection of the level playing field of European markets and European companies and their workers granted by anti-dumping measures that correct for distortive foreign State aid; calls on the Commission to make swift use of available trade instruments on procurement and foreign subsidies to prevent unfair competition in the internal market;

    Enforcement priorities

    12.  Observes changes in business practices, highlighting a decline in cartel cases; cautions, however, against new forms of harmful conduct like tacit collusion and algorithmic collusion, and emphasises the need to align enforcement priorities with this evolving landscape;

    13.  Notes the Draghi report’s proposal for a ‘new competition tool’ as a flexible market investigation tool designed to address structural competition problems that do not result from anti-competitive agreements or abuse of dominance, and to impose market-wide, forward-looking structural or behavioural remedies, including by lowering entry barriers for competitors, with the aim of increasing competitiveness, incentivising innovation and protecting vulnerable consumers; invites the Commission to analyse how this tool would complement the existing framework for sector investigations;

    14.  Recalls that under the Treaty, the Commission is empowered to address exploitative abuses;

    15.  Acknowledges the existence of a legal base for structural remedies against the abuse of market dominance; is aware that EU competition rules stipulate that structural remedies should only be used as a last resort if behavioural remedies have proven ineffective, but nonetheless regrets the reluctance of the Commission to address market dominance through structural remedies; reiterates its invitation to make better use of structural remedies and end the primacy given to behavioural remedies, and encourages further efforts to strengthen their application when necessary; calls on the Commission to make better use of the interim measures instrument to stop any practice that would seriously harm competition, particularly in relation to dynamic and rapidly developing markets such as digital markets;

    16.  Welcomes the priority given to housing by the 2024-2029 Commission; calls on the Commission to assess how EU competition principles affect the supply of services of general economic interest (SGEI); calls on the Commission to assess the position of social services of general interest and an SGEI exemption for affordable housing;

    17.  Stresses the importance of State aid as a tool for closing the economic gap between more developed EU regions and island areas, inland areas, outermost regions and economically depressed areas; recalls that allowing State aid in the context of SGEIs remains essential for the survival of these areas, especially in the context of State support dedicated to connectivity and other basic provisions of services for communities residing in isolated, remote or peripheral regions of the EU; calls on the Commission to investigate possibilities of further flexibility in providing funding to these regions;

    18.  Takes note of the recent Court of Justice of the European Union ruling which found that one of the Member States has failed to transpose the ECN+ Directive into national legislation; underlines the importance of transposing the ECN+ Directive fully; calls on all of the Member States to ensure a proper implementation of this Directive;

    Merger and antitrust

    19.  Notes with concern the Court of Justice of the European Union’s interpretation of Article 22 of the EC Merger Regulation in Case C-611/22 P (Illumina v Commission), rescinding the Commission’s approach of accepting referrals of non-notifiable deals; acknowledges that the EC Merger Regulation does not provide the Commission with sufficient tools for dealing with killer acquisitions; strongly believes that the impact of merger decisions on the internal market justifies the inclusion of an internal market legal base in the EC Merger Regulation, so as to fully involve co-legislators, in a manner similar to that of the Digital Markets Act (DMA); calls on the Commission to require Member States that have or can claim the relevant competence to examine potential killer acquisitions in the light of their national merger control laws, and to continue to refer those deals in accordance with Article 22 of the EC Merger Regulation; calls on the Commission to explore the possibility of reviewing the EC Merger Regulation to be able to examine mergers that fall below EU or national thresholds, regardless of the sectors involved;

    20.  Notes that since the 2004 entry into force of the EC Merger Regulation, 0,7 % of notified mergers have been either blocked by the Commission or withdrawn following an investigation;

    21.  Notes that the turnover thresholds in the EC Merger Regulation alone might not be suitable for detecting all cases that should be reviewed by the competition authorities; highlights practices used by dominant firms to avoid formal investigations, such as the growing use of ‘partnerships’ in the AI sector, which further suggests that a review of the EU Merger Regulation is necessary;

    22.  Welcomes the Draghi report’s proposal for an ‘innovation defence’ in cases where a merger increases the ability and incentive to innovate, and invites the Commission to analyse and further develop this concept; furthermore calls for matters of public interest, such as the impact on workers, to be taken into account;

    23.  Asks the Commission to identify the national barriers that may prevent it from considering the EU market as the relevant one in its analyses of mergers; calls on the Commission to present a legislative proposal to remove these impediments; notes that the international environment needs to be carefully analysed when deciding on the definition of the relevant market in competition and merger control cases; calls on the Commission to adopt a forward-looking approach to consolidation in the EU where appropriate, as also proposed by the Draghi and Letta reports, taking into account the strategic importance and pro-competitive impact of scale and favourable investment conditions in certain sectors for driving innovation and long-term competition;

    24.  Calls for merger assessment frameworks to be updated to reflect the realities of the digital economy, where market power can be manifested in ways beyond traditional market share in clearly delineated markets; supports the development of advanced methodologies for analysing data-driven dominance and network effects, emphasising the critical role of consumer choice in selecting digital services and devices; encourages the Commission to enhance mechanisms enabling interoperability across services and devices, fostering innovation and competition in the digital ecosystem; urges the Commission to progress swiftly on the implementation of the existing interoperability obligations for messaging services under the DMA, the existing interoperability obligations for cloud providers under the Data Act and to start work on the review of the DMA for May 2026; urges the Commission to implement existing interoperability obligations under the DMA and look into extending interoperability obligations to online social networking services; supports the Commission in taking more account of the potential harm to competition when assessing mergers where expansion into adjacent markets would have the effect of further strengthening market dominance in the acquiring company’s core market;

    25.  Calls on the Commission to address excessively long antitrust investigations during which companies continue to benefit from their anticompetitive practices; calls on the Commission to set appropriate time limits for antitrust cases and ensure an effective follow-through of decisions taken; calls on the Commission to adopt further interim measures to stop any practice which would seriously harm competition, particularly in relation to dynamic and rapidly developing markets such as digital markets;

    Sectoral policies

    26.  Welcomes the two September 2024 landmark judgments by the Court of Justice confirming the Commission’s assertion that the Irish tax deal with Apple constitutes illegal State aid and that Google abused its dominant position in contravention of the Treaties; acknowledges that the legal framework in Ireland has since changed; encourages the Commission to continue the clamp down on State aid abuses involving the selective granting of tax breaks to companies;

    27.  Notes the detrimental effect of international tax competition; recalls its support for the implementation of Pillar Two of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD); deeply regrets the US presidential Executive Order of 20 January 2025 which asserts that the OECD global tax agreement has ‘no force or effect within the United States’; stresses the importance of multilateralism in ensuring that multinationals pay their fair share of taxation where value is created; takes the view that the EU should fully stand by the OECD’s Pillar Two Directive;

    28.  Emphasises the worrying market concentrations in various digital markets, such as social media, search engines, AI, cloud services, e-commerce, microchips and online advertising; underlines the actual and potential negative impact on EU competitiveness, the resilience of supply chains, media freedom, privacy and data protection, society and democracy; urges the Commission to address issues that are specific to the tech market, including infrastructural power in hardware and cloud computing layers, vertical concentration, algorithmic manipulation of the digital public sphere and market leveraging in digital markets, as demonstrated by the progress made under the DMA; additionally calls for the opening of new investigations into the cloud services sector to further ensure fair competition and innovation, taking into account the degree of market concentration in this sector and anticompetitive practices related to complex and non-transparent licensing terms or forced bundling; furthermore, urges the Commission to address the increasing vertical concentration of dominant players across the advertising value chain, which puts the EU online advertising sector at risk;

    29.  Notes the rapid development of AI services, which has the potential to result in market concentration; calls on the Commission to take an ecosystemic approach towards this sector, including by developing and applying new theories of harm to address the further entrenchment of the dominant players in this sector; highlights that the DMA contains several provisions that must be used to prevent gatekeepers from restricting emerging AI developers, and asks the Commission to act swiftly to address the risk of consumers being forced into using pre-determined AI services on their mobile devices, ensuring that AI systems remain user-selectable and transparent, thereby safeguarding competition and consumer choice; calls on the Commission to explore the possibility of adding generative AI as a new core platform service under the DMA;

    30.  Notes that large digital players use their market power, power over consumers, financial resources and data concentration in one market to leverage their position in another; stresses that small players cannot compete with the aforementioned factors, which makes EU citizens even more dependent on the same small number of non-EU companies and endangers strategic autonomy; calls for increased scrutiny of the leveraging of position by dominant digital sector players into other sectors and the EU’s strategic autonomy, through a revision of the merger guidelines to ensure that market leveraging can be scrutinised more effectively;

    31.  Notes the importance of data and data analytics tools as one of the deterring factors for digital market concentrations and acquisitions in the digital sector; calls for an opinion of the European Data Protection Board in cases of concentrations involving one or more operators in digital sectors on the relevance of datasets for the intended concentration, the personal data the target acquisition processes and the potential impact on the rights to privacy and data protection the intended concentration has;

    32.  Expresses concern regarding the growing use of dynamic pricing mechanisms across the EU; calls on the Commission to explore regulatory measures against highly adaptive and opaque pricing methods;

    33.  Calls on the Commission to vigorously enforce all competition rules, including the Foreign Subsidies Regulation and the DMA, in order to address gatekeeper practices and foster contestable markets and fair competition; stresses that the Commission must have sufficient staff for enforcement, while noting that new tools, as well as scientists and economists stemming from divergent disciplines, can work to improve competition law enforcement; underlines in particular that the DMA should be applied rigorously and independently, without any undermining by external pressures; stresses that the DMA and potential fines must not be used as a bargaining chip in relation to discussions on tariffs, but as a cornerstone of the EU’s efforts to ensure fair and competitive digital markets; notes the six non-compliance procedures launched against some designated gatekeepers; is deeply concerned about potential delays in critical investigations and the capacity of the Commission to respect their ‘best effort’ obligations and to make a decision on non-compliance procedures without undue delay;

    34.  Notes with concern the fragmentation in numerous consumer markets, including financial services, telecoms and household energy, and calls for faster and greater market integration where there are benefits for consumers, and for recognition that this market integration can drive investment and innovation;

    35.  Expresses alarm at the high concentration in the retail, agricultural and automotive sectors in overseas territories whereby excessive prices set by dominant undertakings on essential products and services amplify inequalities, precariousness and territorial disparities; calls on the Commission to launch an investigation into potential abuses of dominant position under Article 102 TFEU;

    36.  Notes with concern the high degree of market concentration in the European financial sector, as well as its sustained over-reliance on a limited number of non-EU service providers; notes that the three largest credit rating agencies still hold a market share of over 90 %; expresses concern about the continued high concentration in the public interest entities (PIE) audit market, with four firms mainly holding the vast majority of EU revenues for PIE audits, limiting choice and risking supervisory capture; invites the Commission to present an impact assessment on options to address these concerns; urges the Commission to carefully assess public tenders for expertise from audit market participants so that potential conflicts of interest are avoided;

    37.  Expresses concern about the food price crisis and notes, in this regard, the high levels of market concentration in food supply chains; reiterates its call for the Commission to urgently conduct a thorough analysis of the extent and effect of buying alliances, thereby devoting special attention to guaranteeing fair competition and greater transparency in supermarket and hypermarket chains’ commercial practices, particularly where such practices affect brand value and product choice or limit innovation or price comparability; recalls, in this light, the market concentration in agri-commodity trading wherein four companies account for the vast majority of the global crop trade; regrets that the Commission nonetheless conditionally approved the 2024 Bunge-Viterra merger (M.11204) despite competition concerns; asks the Commission to address excessive power accumulation in the hands of a few large players in this market, in order to strengthen the bargaining position of farmers and consumers alike; highlights the implementation of the New Competition Tool in this context;

    38.  Notes the high-net profits of EU banks during this inflationary period, mostly driven by the delayed pass-through of the rapid monetary policy tightening to deposit rates;

    39.  Notes with particular concern the dominant position of two international card schemes in the EU payments market, and their engagement in practices that reinforce and extend their dominance of this market, potentially further increasing barriers to entry and hampering long-term innovation(6), as well as leading to higher costs for EU businesses and ultimately consumers; calls on the Commission to take decisive actions, emphasising the need for a review of the Interchange Fee Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2015/751) to tackle the significant increase in card scheme fees charged by international card schemes and to ensure a fair, competitive and transparent market environment;

    Parliamentary involvement

    40.  Stresses that Parliament should be sufficiently involved in shaping competition policy; cautions against the over-reliance on soft-law instruments, such as guidance and temporary frameworks, in which Parliament’s involvement is limited; calls on the Commission to enter into negotiation for an interinstitutional agreement on competition policy to formalise its enforcement priorities to Parliament; calls on the European Council to adopt a decision under Article 48(7) TEU allowing for the adoption of legislative acts in the area of competition policy in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure; stresses that Parliament should be more involved in the activity of working parties and expert groups in the International Competition Network and the OECD as an observer, and also in the High-Level Group on the DMA;

    41.  Calls on the responsible Executive Vice-President, also Commissioner in charge of competition policy to maintain close contact with Parliament’s competent committee and its working group on competition issues;

    o
    o   o

    42.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

    (1) OJ L 024, 29.1.2004, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2004/139/oj.
    (2) OJ L 114, 12.4.2022, p. 22, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2022/591/oj.
    (3) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 3 September 2024, Illumina v Commission, C-611/22 P, ECLI:EU:C:2024:677.
    (4) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 10 September 2024, European Commission v Ireland and Others, C-465/20 P, ECLI:EU:C:2024:724.
    (5) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 10 September 2024, Google and Alphabet v Commission, C-48/22 P, CLI:EU:C:2024:726.
    (6) European Court of Auditors, Special Report: ‘Digital payments in the EU – Progress towards making them safer, faster, and less expensive, despite remaining gaps’, 9 January 2025, https://www.eca.europa.eu/ECAPublications/SR-2025-01/SR-2025-01_EN.pdf.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – 2023 and 2024 reports on Kosovo – P10_TA(2025)0094 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the one part, and Kosovo, of the other part(1), which entered into force on 1 April 2016,

    –  having regard to Kosovo’s application for membership of the European Union of 15 December 2022,

    –  having regard to Kosovo’s application for membership of the Council of Europe of 12 May 2022,

    –  having regard to the framework agreement between the European Union and Kosovo on the general principles for the participation of Kosovo in Union programmes(2), in force since 1 August 2017,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III)(3),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans(4),

    –  having regard to the Presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of 19 and 20 June 2003,

    –  having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans Summits of 17 May 2018 in Sofia, of 6 May 2020 in Zagreb, of 6 October 2021 in Brdo pri Kranju, of 6 December 2022 in Tirana, of 13 December 2023 in Brussels, and of 18 December 2024 in Brussels,

    –  having regard to the Berlin Process launched on 28 August 2014,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2020 entitled ‘Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0057),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Kosovo 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0692),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Kosovo 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0692),

    –  having regard to the general summary and the country assessments by the Commission, dated 31 May 2023 and 13 June 2024, on Kosovo’s economic reform programme,

    –  having regard to the joint conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkans and Türkiye, adopted by the Council on 16 May 2023 and to the joint conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkans Partners, Türkiye, Georgia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, adopted by the Council on 14 May 2024,

    –  having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999, to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion of 22 July 2010 on the accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo, and to UN General Assembly Resolution 64/298 of 9 September 2010, which acknowledged the content of the ICJ opinion and welcomed the EU’s readiness to facilitate dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo,

    –  having regard to the first agreement on principles governing the normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo of 19 April 2013, to the agreements of 25 August 2015, and to the ongoing EU-facilitated dialogue for the normalisation of relations,

    –  having regard to the Brussels Agreement of 27 February 2023 and the Ohrid Agreement of 18 March 2023 and to the implementation annex thereto,

    –  having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1095 of 5 June 2023 amending Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo)(5), which extended the mission’s mandate until 14 June 2025,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/850 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 April 2023 amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement (Kosovo)(6),

    –  having regard to the final report of the European Union Election Observation Mission on the 2021 municipal elections in Kosovo,

    –  having regard to the preliminary report of the European Union Election Observation Mission on the 2025 parliamentary elections in Kosovo,

    –  having regard to the fourth meeting of the Stabilisation and Association Council between the European Union and Kosovo held in Brussels on 7 December 2021,

    –  having regard to its previous resolutions on Kosovo,

    –  having regard to the joint recommendations adopted at the 12th meeting of the EU-Kosovo Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee, held on 9 December 2024,

    –  having regard to the 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International,

    –  having regard to the 2024 World Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders,

    –  having regard to the Democracy Report 2024 of March 2024 by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute,

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0075/2025),

    A.  whereas enlargement policy is one of the most effective EU foreign policy instruments and one of the most successful policies to incentivise and encourage fundamental reforms, and is a strategic geopolitical investment in long-term peace, stability and security throughout the continent;

    B.  whereas democracy, human rights and the rule of law are the fundamental values on which the EU is founded;

    C.  whereas the EU enlargement process is a strategic tool for strengthening stability, democracy and economic development in Europe, and each enlargement country is judged on its own merits and whereas it is the implementation of the necessary reforms and compliance with the set of criteria and common European values that determines the timetable and progress of accession; whereas Kosovo’s path towards EU membership also depends on the normalisation of relations with Serbia;

    D.  whereas the EU is the largest provider of financial support to Kosovo;

    E.  whereas Kosovo has been subjected to foreign interference and disinformation campaigns, particularly from Russia, especially through Serbian nationalist outlets, and China, through soft power, aiming to destabilise its democratic institutions, jeopardise societal cohesion, and incite ethnic violence; whereas the Banjska/Banjskë attack in September 2023 was followed by a massive spread of disinformation that further exacerbated tensions; whereas Kosovo authorities adopted the Law on the Independent Media Commission (IMC) in July 2024; whereas, in May 2024, the Council of Europe published a legal opinion on the draft law on the IMC expressing concerns related to certain aspects of the at-that-time draft law, and providing recommendations on how to address these concerns; whereas the final text of the Law on the IMC did not reflect most of the recommendations made;

    F.  whereas the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, also known as EULEX, is the largest civilian mission ever launched under the common security and defence policy of the European Union;

    G.  whereas in 2018 and 2023, petitions were signed by over 500 people who historically self-identify as Bulgarian;

    Commitment to EU accession

    1.  Commends Kosovo’s commitment to EU accession, which reflects a clear strategic geopolitical choice, and the continued strong support of its citizens for Kosovo’s European path; reiterates that Kosovo has been consistent in its efforts to integrate into the European Union;

    2.  Reiterates its firm belief that Kosovo’s future lies in the EU and that all efforts to bring Kosovo out of the ‘grey zone’ are in the interest of the people of both Kosovo and the EU, especially in the context of the current geopolitical dynamics in the region, rapid major shifts in world politics and growing competition with authoritarian regimes;

    3.  Supports Kosovo’s application for EU membership, which reflects the overwhelming cross-party consensus on EU integration and a clear geopolitical strategic choice; reiterates its call on the Member States in the Council to mandate the Commission to present its questionnaire and to submit its opinion on the merits of the country’s application; calls on the five non-recognising Member States that have not yet recognised Kosovo’s independence to do so without delay and thus allow Kosovo to progress on its EU path on an equal footing with the other candidate countries; recalls the advisory opinion of the ICJ dated 22 July 2010, which states that Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence does not violate general international law;

    4.  Recalls that membership of the European Union is based on a merit-based process, conditional on the rigorous implementation of reforms aligned with the highest European standards, in particular compliance with the Copenhagen criteria and the rule of law, and ensures the effective application of laws in practice; encourages Kosovo to continue its efforts in this regard, by further strengthening its commitment to the values and standards of the Union; stresses that enlargement also implies thorough preparation of potential new members, while respecting the economic stability of the internal market, social and environmental standards and the proper functioning of the European institutions;

    5.  Welcomes the visa liberalisation, adopted in April 2023 and in place since 1 January 2024, as a tangible result of Kosovo’s ever-closer relations with the EU and as evidence of Kosovo’s efforts on the path of European integration; welcomes Kosovo’s decision to unilaterally abolish visa requirements for citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina; welcomes the decision of Spain to recognise ordinary passports issued by Kosovo as valid travel documents as of January 2024;

    6.  Notes the tangible progress in the areas of justice, freedom and security, the fight against organised crime and a functioning market economy; regrets the limited progress and calls for an acceleration of reforms in the area of rule of law; welcomes Kosovo’s ambition to advance the implementation of reforms, which remains the country’s priority; regrets the lack of a decision-making quorum in the Kosovo National Assembly, caused by the boycott of the Assembly work by political parties ahead of parliamentary elections;

    7.  Regrets the politicisation of institutions such as the Central Election Commission and the IMC;

    8.  Commends Kosovo’s ongoing alignment with the EU’s foreign and security policy, in particular its firm condemnation of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and its implementation of the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia and Belarus, aligning with the Union’s foreign policy, and its support through humanitarian aid and military assistance packages to Ukraine, which confirm that Kosovo is a reliable and valuable partner committed to EU integration and confirms its clear geopolitical orientation, firmly anchored in the European and transatlantic alliance;

    9.  Calls for the immediate lifting of the EU measures against Kosovo, which are no longer justified as Kosovo has fulfilled the EU requirements and as the measures also stand in gross contradiction to Kosovo’s demonstrated commitment to European values and alignment with EU policies, limiting the impact of the EU’s partnership with Kosovo and hindering the resumption of the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue in good faith;

    10.  Reiterates its full support for Kosovo’s application for membership of the Council of Europe and for the country’s strategic orientation plan to join the NATO Partnership for Peace programme and its bids to join other international organisations; calls on the relevant organisations and the Member States to proactively support Kosovo’s respective bids; calls on the Commission and the EU Office in Kosovo to step up their efforts in enhancing visibility and promoting the role, efforts and benefits of the closer partnership between the EU and Kosovo;

    11.   Welcomes the fact that Kosovo reduced administrative burden by simplifying procedures through the implementation of the related program for 2022-2027; notes that the strategic framework for public administration is in place, but not efficiently implemented; regrets the fact that delays in public administration reform have left EU funding management weak and that accountability in the public sector is insufficient; calls on Kosovo to improve public administration and the merit-based civil service system by amending and adopting the Law on public officials and the Law on the independent oversight board of civil service;

    12.  Regrets that the Kosovo Constitutional Court ruling on the Law on salaries, which unifies the current system of remuneration for public officials, is not yet functional; calls on the Kosovo Government to revise its legislation on public financial management to meet international standards and to incorporate the public investment methodology into the revised legislation;

    Democracy and the rule of law

    13.  Welcomes the important and positive progress on addressing many of the EU Election Observation Mission’s (EU EOM) long-standing recommendations and on presenting a consensual law on general elections; notes that this provides an adequate basis for the conduct of democratic elections, in line with international and regional standards; notes that in response to an invitation by the president of Kosovo, the European Union deployed an EU EOM, including an observer delegation of Members of the European Parliament, to observe the parliamentary elections in Kosovo on 9 February 2025; welcomes the conclusions of the EU EOM confirming the conduct of peaceful, free and fair elections on 9 February 2025 with the participation of all communities in Kosovo; regrets the harsh rhetoric of the political parties during the campaign; takes note of the technical problems encountered during the counting process and encourages the Kosovo authorities to increase their efforts to improve the organisation of the next elections; notes the lack of genuine political pluralism within the Kosovo Serb community at the parliamentary elections, despite multiple Kosovo Serb electoral lists; is concerned by reports of continuous pressure on voters from the Serbian community exercised by Belgrade; condemns the repeated interference in the electoral campaign by US Special Envoy Richard Grenell;

    14.  Notes with concern the political deadlock caused by the fragmented political landscape and failure so far to elect a speaker of the Parliament, hindering the formation of a government following the legislative elections of 9 February 2025 and delaying the parliamentary reading of several budgetary texts; encourages the political parties to work together to overcome this stalemate as soon as possible;

    15.  Notes with concern that the Law on Local Elections and the Law on General Elections are still not implemented and harmonised with the Law on Gender Equality, which mandates 50 % equal representation of women and men; regrets that women continue to be underrepresented;

    16.  Welcomes the adoption of the law on the Special Prosecution Office and the progress in adjudicating corruption cases; commends the active work of the Special Prosecution Office for solving seven war crime cases; calls for further clarification of the division of jurisdiction between the Special Prosecution Office and the Basic Prosecution in handling investigations and prosecutions; calls on Kosovo to continue strengthening the Special Prosecution Office by enhancing its capacity to investigate and prosecute high-profile organised crime cases; calls on the police and Special Prosecution Office to work closely together to develop strategies for conducting investigations more effectively, with a clear division of responsibility;

    17.  Takes note of the progress in Kosovo’s ranking in the Corruption Perceptions Index, as it has moved upward 10 places since last year, considering it to be a positive development while acknowledging that this is attributable both to decreases in other countries’ scores and, more significantly, to the adoption of qualitative legislation, but that it still remains largely unsatisfactory; emphasises that gaining people’s trust requires not only legislative reforms but also visible results in investigating, prosecuting and convicting cases of corruption at all levels; regrets that Kosovo has lacked an anti-corruption strategy since 2019 and urges for more efforts to finalise it as a matter of priority; reiterates that strong political commitment is necessary to establish a solid track record in fighting high-level corruption; reiterates that strong political commitment is necessary to establish a solid track record in fighting high-level corruption;

    18.  Expresses serious concern about systemic vulnerabilities in Kosovo’s judiciary, particularly regarding the independence of the justice system and respect for separation of powers; reiterates its concern about delays to trials and continued criticism by government officials of judicial decisions in individual cases; welcomes the fact that in December 2024, the government submitted its draft legislation on judicial reforms to the Venice Commission and that the first opinion was issued by the latter on 18 March 2025; calls on Kosovo to ensure that legislation governing the integrity and accountability of the judiciary is consistent with European standards and Venice Commission recommendations; calls on the Government of Kosovo to allocate adequate budget for the judicial system; welcomes the establishment of the Commercial Court, progress in the recruitment of new judges and prosecutors in a merit-based and transparent process, and an overall increase of transparency;

    19.  Welcomes the participation of Kosovo Serbs in the parliamentary elections and encourages their elected representatives to play an active role within the Kosovo legislative framework, in support of Kosovo’s European future; regrets, however, the boycott of parties representing Kosovo Serbs during the local elections in April 2023 and the withdrawal of Kosovo Serbs from Kosovo institutions; expresses concern over Serbia’s interference in the parliamentary elections through Srpska Lista (SL);

    20.  Welcomes the implementation of the 2016 judgement of the Constitutional Court on the Visoki Dečani/Deçani Monastery land ownership by registering the monastery as the owner, in March 2024;

    21.  Welcomes the steady increase in organised crime sentences and the fact that the legal framework on the fight against organised crime is aligned with the EU acquis; emphasises the need for prosecution services and police to strengthen their joint action against criminal groups and networks; expresses concern about the security challenges in the north of Kosovo, particularly following the Banjska/Banjskë attack in September 2023, which demanded significant police resources; emphasises the need to deepen cooperation in the field of combating drug trafficking; calls for further alignment regarding the fight against terrorism;

    22.  Welcomes the adoption of the strategy and action plan on control of small arms light weapons and explosives, as well as the high level of compliance with the rules of the UN Firearms Protocol;

    23.  Remains concerned over the slow implementation of the rule of law strategy and action plan;

    24.  Reaffirms its commitment to maintaining and strengthening its cooperation with the Kosovo Assembly and its members in support of democratic processes related to Kosovo’s European path by using Parliament’s existing democracy support tools and initiatives; believes that this partnership can be revitalised and further reinforced following the democratic elections held on 9 February 2025; encourages the active involvement and collaboration of all elected members of the newly formed Kosovo Assembly;

    25.  Condemns the serious security incidents in the north of Kosovo in late November 2024, the gravest act occurring near the village of Vragë in Zubin Potok, where explosive devices damaged critical infrastructure by targeting the main channel of the Ibër Lepenc system; expresses its support for Kosovo’s institutions in conducting a full investigation of these criminal actions so that the perpetrators will be brought to justice;

    26.  Commends the work of EULEX, which has been assisting Kosovo authorities in establishing sustainable and independent rule of law institutions;

    Fundamental freedoms and human rights

    27.  Notes that Kosovo has the necessary institutional set-up for the promotion and protection of human rights; welcomes the adoption of the strategy for the protection and promotion of the rights of communities; emphasises, however, that human rights protection remains weak owing to the lack of legislative implementation, political will and limited human and financial resources and calls for strengthened enforcement and accountability mechanisms;

    28.  Acknowledges that Kosovo’s constitution is very progressive in terms of protection of minority rights; notes with regret that the petition signed by nearly 500 people who have historically self-identified as Bulgarian, which was registered at the Assembly of Kosovo in January 2023, has still not been considered and recommends that those rights be enshrined in law and ensured in practice; calls on Kosovo to ensure that all minorities recognised under the Law on protection of minority rights and members of their communities, are fully incorporated into the country’s constitution; calls on the Kosovo authorities to step up efforts to protect the rights of all minorities, including national communities, in particular vulnerable national communities, and to provide them equal opportunities and adequate representation in political and cultural life, public media, the administration and the judiciary, as well as prevent their assimilation and promote their integration into Kosovo’s society and strengthen activities to eliminate social and economic challenges of these national minorities;

    29.  Welcomes the increase in funding to shelters for victims of domestic violence and trafficking; notes that domestic violence remains the most common form of gender-based violence; expresses concerns that the system continues to fail in ensuring the effective prevention of domestic violence;

    30.  Regrets that the adoption of the draft Civil Code of Kosovo remains pending; highlights that the draft Civil Code addresses several important issues related to gender equality as a fundamental EU value, including enabling an equal share of joint marital property among women and men spouses; stresses the importance of ensuring rights for all people in Kosovo in the Civil Code to safeguard respect for constitutional rights and opportunities for the LGBTIQ community; expresses concern that women remain under-represented in senior political positions, specifically related to security and the dialogue, and emphasises the urgent need for their involvement in peacemaking and reconciliation processes, in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security; calls for more efforts to be made to improve the place of women in society;

    31.  Notes that the prison system broadly follows UN Standard Minimum Rules and calls for the better protection of the rights of prisoners, particularly female, minority and mentally ill prisoners; remains concerned that discriminatory language against women and LGBTIQ people persists, and calls on the authorities to create and implement a national gender strategy for research fields, such as science, technology, engineering, and mathematics; commends the participation of women in high-quality business and management training programmes, as well as in ICT related domains, facilitated by the instrument for pre-accession assistance funds; regrets that women from minority groups, particularly the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities, face numerous forms of discrimination, particularly in education, employment and access to healthcare; expresses concerns that the central administration does not adequately represent minority communities, and the number of women in senior positions is low;

    32.  Regrets that the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has not yet been adopted; expresses concerns that there is insufficient alignment between Kosovo’s legislation and the EU acquis on the rights of people with disabilities, who face discrimination and barriers to accessing social services;

    33.  Welcomes Kosovo’s consistent improvement in its position in the 2024 Liberal Democracy Index and Electoral Democracy Index, as prepared by the Varieties of Democracy Institute, which measures the rule of law, checks and balances, civil liberties, and free and fair elections;

    34.  Takes note of Kosovo’s pluralistic media environment while awaiting the decision of the Constitutional Court on the main media law and underlines the role of the IMC, whose independence in decision-making needs to be strictly ensured and full functioning restored; regrets, however, the decline in Kosovo’s media freedom, as evidenced by its drop from the 56th to the 75th place in the 2024 World Press Freedom Index; reaffirms that media pluralism and transparency are prerequisites for EU accession; calls for greater transparency on media ownership and financing with a view to enhancing media independence and pluralism; emphasises the need for robust measures to protect journalists from harassment and intimidation, and to ensure the independence of media regulatory bodies; notes the concerns raised by civil society about the allegedly politically motivated election of the Chair of the IMC; urges the Kosovo authorities to further revise the Law on the IMC in order to include the recommendations made by the Council of Europe, thus aligning the national law with EU standards and practices; recommends increased support for independent media outlets and fact-checking organisations in Kosovo, recognising their crucial role in countering disinformation and providing accurate information to the public; encourages the EU to provide technical and financial assistance to these entities; encourages the Kosovo authorities to request tailor-made Technical Assistance and Information Exchange expert missions bodies; calls for the adoption of the law on Radio Television of Kosovo and the law on the protection of journalists’ sources;

    35.  Expresses concern over the recent cyberattack targeting Kosovo’s digital infrastructure; urges the Kosovo Government to reinforce its capacities to combat foreign interference and disinformation, particularly those originating from Serbian nationalist outlets and Russia, aimed at destabilising the region and undermining the European integration of the Western Balkans, by developing comprehensive strategies that include public awareness campaigns also combating disinformation undermining women’s participation in public life, strengthening cybersecurity and related infrastructure, fostering collaboration with international partners, most notably the European Union, to protect its digital economy, public services and national security, and addressing disinformation campaigns and hybrid threats that aim to destabilise the country and undermine its European perspective; encourages the integration of media literacy programs into Kosovo’s educational curriculum to equip citizens with the skills necessary to identify and counteract disinformation;

    36.  Commends the fact that Kosovo provided shelter and asylum to journalists from Ukraine and Afghanistan;

    37.  Expresses serious concern about the significant increase in attacks against journalists and strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPP cases), including by government officials; calls on the authorities to advance their work on anti-SLAPP legislation in line with the new EU Directive 2024/1069(7); calls on Kosovo to work actively to secure the ability of journalists to carry out their work and to ensure full freedom for the media to operate independently; underlines the need to stop all forms of violence;

    38.  Welcomes Kosovo’s vibrant and constructive civil society, which plays a very crucial and positive role in the reform process; encourages the Kosovo Government to enhance its cooperation with civil society, in particular with women’s rights organisations, on decision-making and to make more use of the Government Council for Cooperation with Civil Society for building collaborative relationships and genuinely implicating civil society in a transparent legislative process from an early stage onwards; stresses the importance of increasing accountability and transparency in relation to public funding for civil society organisations; underlines that civil society is vital in fostering democracy and pluralism and promoting good governance and social progress;

    39.  Regrets the lack of a clear plan for engaging Kosovo Serbs in the north and that initiatives to involve the Serb community in Kosovo’s political, social and economic structures remain very limited; reiterates its call to improve the internal dialogue and genuinely and directly engage with the independent civil society organisations of Kosovo Serbs, in particular in the north, with the aim of building trust, facilitating the daily life of Kosovo Serbs and successfully integrating them;

    Reconciliation and good neighbourly relations

    40.  Commends Kosovo’s engagement in a number of regional cooperation initiatives and encourages it to enhance its reconciliation efforts and seek solutions to past disputes; commends Kosovo on its constructive approach and active engagement in regional cooperation and trade facilitation that led to the unblocking of the Central European Free Trade Agreement;

    41.  Calls on Serbia to open all wartime archives and grant access to the former Yugoslav Secret Service (UDBA) and Yugoslav People’s Army Secret Service (KOS) files, ensuring their return to respective governments upon request; emphasises the need to open these archives region-wide to investigate communist-era crimes and strengthen democracy, accountability and institutions in the Western Balkans;

    42.  Reiterates its full support for the EU-facilitated dialogue and welcomes the appointment of Peter Sørensen as the EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue;

    43.  Reiterates the importance of constructive engagement on the part of the authorities of both Kosovo and Serbia in order to achieve a comprehensive legally binding normalisation agreement, based on mutual recognition and in accordance with international law; calls on both Kosovo and Serbia to implement the Brussels and Ohrid Agreements, including the establishment of the Association/Community of Serb-Majority Municipalities, and the lifting of Serbia’s opposition of Kosovo’s membership in regional and international organisations, and to avoid unilateral actions that could undermine the dialogue process;

    44.  Expects Kosovo and Serbia to fully cooperate and take all the necessary measures to apprehend and swiftly bring to justice the perpetrators of the 2023 terrorist attack in Banjska; deplores the fact that Serbia still has not prosecuted the culprits, most notably Milan Radoičić, the Vice-President of Srpska Lista; reiterates that the perpetrators of the terrorist attack in Zubin Potok must also be held accountable and must face justice without delay;

    45.  Calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and on the Commission to take a more proactive role in leading the dialogue process; calls for an enhanced role for the European Parliament in facilitating the dialogue through regular joint parliamentary assembly meetings;

    46.  Condemns all actions that endanger stability and jeopardise the reconciliation process, including the tensions in the north of Kosovo and provocations by Serbian state-sponsored groups and illegal armed formations, and urges the European Union to take a stronger stance against external interference in Kosovo’s internal affairs; emphasises that both sides must fully implement all agreements reached and avoid unilateral actions that could escalate tensions; calls on the Kosovo police to ensure that they fully abide by all rule of law and human rights requirements, and to guarantee that a multi-ethnic and inclusive police force, fully in line with legal requirements, is deployed in the north of Kosovo; recalls the shared responsibility of all political representatives and all communities in Kosovo for upholding peace, security and the rule of law;

    47.  Welcomes the establishment of the Joint Commission on Missing Persons in December 2024 and calls for swift progress in implementing the May 2023 Political Declaration on Missing Persons; calls on both Kosovo and Serbia to refrain from politicising this humanitarian issue and to step up their efforts in implementing the declaration as part of the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue and to establish cooperation between Kosovo and Serbia;

    48.  Welcomes the recent agreements in the framework of the Berlin Process;

    49.  Welcomes Kosovo’s decision to remove restrictions on the entry of Serbian finished products at the Merdare border crossing;

    50.  Welcomes the presence of the Kosovo Force and its role in building and maintaining a safe and secure environment and in developing a stable and peaceful Kosovo on the path towards Euro-Atlantic integration; recalls the importance of the mission for the ongoing development of the Kosovo Security Force through the provision of advice, training and capacity building;

    Socio-economic reforms

    51.  Welcomes Kosovo’s active engagement in the implementation of the new growth plan for the Western Balkans, which aims to deepen EU-related reforms and reduce the socio-economic gap between EU Member States and the Western Balkan countries; welcomes the adoption of Kosovo’s Reform Agenda and recalls that Kosovo (as well as Serbia) needs to show improved commitment to the EU-facilitated Dialogue in order to access the resources;

    52.  Welcomes the progress achieved by Kosovo in developing a functioning market economy and encourages Kosovo to implement the necessary structural reforms to address fiscal challenges, while ensuring adequate labour protection, fair wages, and improved working conditions in line with EU legislation;

    53.  Reiterates its calls on the Commission to develop a regional strategy to address the persistent youth unemployment and brain drain by tackling the skills mismatch between the education system and the labour market, improving the quality of teaching, and ensuring adequate funding for active labour market measures and vocational training schemes, along with adequate childcare and pre-school education facilities;

    54.  Welcomes the fact that Kosovo’s cybercrime legislation is broadly aligned with the EU acquis; notes Kosovo’s limited progress in the digital transformation of public services; emphasises the need for it to align with EU digital legislation as well as with the needs of its people, specifically with the European Electronic Communications Code, the EU Network and Information Security Directive (NIS2)(8), the EU toolbox for 5G security, and the Digital Services Act(9) and the Digital Markets Act(10); notes that Kosovo’s economy remains highly dependent on imports and stresses the need for economic diversification to enhance competitiveness and sustainability, particularly in the context of deeper integration into EU markets;

    55.  Regrets that the draft law on textbooks, presented in 2022, is still pending final adoption in the Kosovo Assembly; calls on Kosovo to finalise the implementation of the new curricular framework for basic education, complete the revision of current textbooks, provide sustainable training to teachers, and systematically apply quality assurance mechanisms at all education levels;

    56.  Urges Kosovo to ensure better access to quality healthcare services; notes that healthcare expenditure remains the second lowest in the region, and calls for a comprehensive healthcare reform to address the needs of all citizens, especially in rural and underserved areas;

    57.  Notes with concern that access to social services, particularly for vulnerable groups, worsened with the government’s closure of the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, which was done without transparent consultation with civil society and other stakeholders and contributed to significant confusion; calls for better, evidence-based budgeting to improve social services, particularly for survivors of gender-based violence in accordance with the new legal framework;

    58.  Calls on Kosovo to provide equal and non-discriminatory state education in minority languages;

    59.  Reiterates the need to reach out to young people from the Serb majority municipalities and to integrate them in the socio-economic structures of the country;

    Energy, environment, sustainable development and connectivity

    60.  Notes that Kosovo has made some progress on the security of energy supply but remains heavily reliant on outdated, highly polluting power plants, posing serious health and environmental risks; notes that Kosovo needs to ensure the time-efficient implementation of its energy programme for 2022-2025 to meet its ambitious targets and reduce its dependence on fossil fuels; calls for the EU to step up and prioritise its efforts to help Kosovo overcome its air pollution problems; notes that Kosovo’s new energy strategy does not promote the construction of hydropower plants due to their harmful environmental impact, in particular because of the water scarcity in the country;

    61.  Highlights the need for comprehensive infrastructure development in Kosovo to facilitate the reduction of emissions from public transport and the expansion of electrified transport; stresses that improving accessibility and ensuring compatibility with the EU transport network must remain a priority;

    62.  Welcomes the agreement at the Tirana Summit on reduced roaming costs; calls, in this respect, on the authorities, private actors and all stakeholders to facilitate reaching the agreed targets to achieve a substantial reduction of data roaming charges and further reductions leading to prices close to domestic prices between the Western Balkans and the EU by 2027; welcomes the entrance into force of the first phase of implementation of the roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU;

    63.  Urges Kosovo to enhance compliance with emission ceilings, improve the integration of environmental considerations into sectoral policies and adopt necessary measures for pollution, soil and water contamination control and waste management, in line with EU and international standards and commitments; urges Kosovo to improve comprehensive environmental impact assessments and to integrate sustainability measures into infrastructure planning; calls on Kosovo to increase the protected areas in the country and to improve instruments and measures for their protection with a view to safeguarding biodiversity, including key habitats of the critically endangered Balkan lynx; encourages Kosovo to intensify and speed up collaborative efforts with its neighbouring countries to designate transboundary protected areas and establish coherent transboundary management plans;

    o
    o   o

    64.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the President, Government and National Assembly of Kosovo.

    (1) OJ L 71, 16.3.2016, p. 3, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2016/342/oj.
    (2) OJ L 195, 27.7.2017, p. 3, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2017/1388/oj.
    (3) OJ L 330, 20.9.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1529/oj.
    (4) OJ L, 2024/1449, 24.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1449/oj.
    (5) OJ L 146, 6.6.2023, p.22, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2023/1095/oj.
    (6) OJ L 110, 25.4.2023, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/850/oj.
    (7) Directive (EU) 2024/1069 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded claims or abusive court proceedings (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’) (OJ L, 2024/1069, 16.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1069/oj).
    (8) Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive) (OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 80, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/oj).
    (9) Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) (OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj).
    (10) Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act) (OJ L 265, 12.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1925/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – 2023 and 2024 reports on Serbia – P10_TA(2025)0093 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States of the one part, and the Republic of Serbia, of the other part(1), which entered into force on 1 September 2013,

    –  having regard to Serbia’s application for membership of the EU of 19 December 2009,

    –  having regard to the Commission opinion of 12 October 2011 on Serbia’s application for membership of the European Union (COM(2011)0668), the European Council’s decision of 1 March 2012 to grant Serbia candidate status and the European Council’s decision of 28 June 2013 to open EU accession negotiations with Serbia,

    –  having regard to the Brussels Agreement of 27 February 2023 and the Ohrid Agreement of 18 March 2023 and the Implementation Annex thereto,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III)(2),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans(3),

    –  having regard to the presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of 19 and 20 June 2003,

    –   having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits of 17 May 2018 in Sofia and of 6 May 2020 in Zagreb,

    –   having regard to its resolutions on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation,

    –  having regard to the Berlin Process, launched on 28 August 2014,

    –  having regard to the first agreement on principles governing the normalisation of relations between the governments of Serbia and Kosovo of 19 April 2013, to the agreements of 25 August 2015, and to the ongoing EU-facilitated dialogue for the normalisation of relations,

    –  having regard to the agreement on free movement between the governments of Serbia and Kosovo of 27 August 2022, to the agreement on licence plates of 23 November 2022, and to the Energy Agreements’ Implementation Roadmap in the EU-facilitated Dialogue of 21 June 2022,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2020 entitled ‘Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0057),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October 2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Serbia 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0695),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Serbia 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0695),

    –  having regard to the European Council conclusions of 9 February 2023 on the EU-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina,

    –  having regard to Article 14 of the Serbian Constitution on the protection of national minorities,

    –  having regard to the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, ratified by Serbia in 2001 and the Council of Europe’s European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, ratified by Serbia in 2006,

    –  having regard to the European Council conclusions of 26 and 27 October 2023 on Kosovo and Serbia,

    –  having regard to the Council conclusions of 17 December 2024 on enlargement,

    –  having regard to the European Court of Human Rights order to Serbia of 29 April 2025 to refrain from using sonic devices for crowd control,

    –  having regard to the final report of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) election observation mission on the early parliamentary and presidential elections of 3 April 2022 in Serbia, published on 19 August 2022,

    –  having regard to the European Council conclusions of December 2006, to the Council conclusions of March 2020 and to the Conclusions of the Presidency of the European Council in Copenhagen of 21-22 June 1993, also known as the Copenhagen criteria,

    –  having regard to the final report of the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission on the early parliamentary elections of 17 December 2023 in Serbia, published on 28 February 2024,

    –  having regard to the memorandum of understanding between the European Union and the Republic of Serbia on a strategic partnership on sustainable raw materials, battery value chains and electric vehicles, signed on 19 July 2024,

    –  having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement(4),

    –  having regard to its previous resolutions on Serbia, in particular that of 19 October 2023 on the recent developments in the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue, including the situation in the northern municipalities in Kosovo(5), and that of 8 February 2024 on the situation in Serbia following the elections(6),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0072/2025),

    A.  whereas enlargement is one of the most successful EU foreign policy instruments and a strategic geopolitical investment in long-term peace, stability and security throughout the continent;

    B.  whereas according to the Copenhagen criteria, candidate countries must adhere to the values of the Union in order to be able to join it;

    C.  whereas democracy and the rule of law are the fundamental values on which the EU is founded;

    D.  whereas in recent years, political rights and civil liberties have been steadily eroded, putting pressure on independent media, the political opposition and civil society organisations;

    E.  whereas the Fourth Opinion on Serbia of the Council of Europe Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention on National Minorities, adopted on 26 June 2019, criticised Serbia’s delays in fully implementing education rights for minorities;

    F.  whereas freedom of religion is a core European value and a fundamental human right and Serbia is therefore obliged to respect and guarantee this freedom for all individuals residing within its territory, in accordance with its international commitments and human rights obligations;

    G.  whereas in line with Chapter 23 of the acquis, Serbia must demonstrate real improvements in the effective exercise of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities;

    H.  whereas each candidate country for enlargement is judged on its own merits, including their respect for and unwavering commitment to shared European rights and values and alignment with the EU’s foreign and security policy;

    I.  whereas Serbia has not imposed sanctions against Russia following the Russian aggression in Ukraine; whereas Serbia’s rate of alignment with the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) has been steadily declining since 2021; whereas Serbia supports the territorial integrity and political independence of Ukraine, and has clearly condemned the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine and voted alongside the EU in the UN, even though it has not imposed sanctions against Russia; whereas Serbia’s rate of alignment with the CFSP dropped from 54 % in 2023 to 51 % in 2024 while other candidate countries in the region – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and North Macedonia – achieved 100 % alignment;

    J.  whereas Serbia remains a critical battleground for foreign disinformation campaigns, notably by Russia and China, which seek to create an anti-Western rhetoric; whereas the final report of the OSCE/ODHIR on the early parliamentary elections held on 17 December 2023 pointed out several procedural deficiencies, as well as the use of harsh rhetoric and the presence of consistent bias in the media that gave an unbalanced advantage to the ruling party; whereas the issues identified in that report need to be assessed thoroughly and promptly; whereas as part of the accession negotiations, Serbia adopted the Strategy for Combating Cybercrime 2019-2023 and the relevant action plans in September 2018; whereas the strategy and the relevant action plans were not renewed after December 2023; whereas Serbia did not align with the EU’s restrictive measures in reaction to cyberattacks in 2023 and 2024;

    K.  whereas the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia is a precondition for the progression of both countries towards EU membership;

    L.  whereas accession to the EU inevitably requires full alignment with the foreign policy objectives of the Union;

    M.  whereas Serbia recognises the territorial integrity of Ukraine, including the Crimean peninsula and the Donbas region;

    N.  whereas the EU is Serbia’s main trading partner, accounting for 59,7 % of Serbia’s total trade;

    O.  whereas Russia is using its influence in Serbia to try to destabilise, interfere in and threaten neighbouring sovereign states and undermine Serbia’s European future; whereas Russian propaganda outlets such as RT (formerly Russia Today) and Sputnik operate freely in Serbia and exert significant influence in shaping anti-EU and anti-democratic narratives; whereas disinformation often originates from a false or misleading statement by a political figure, which is then reported by state-owned media and subsequently amplified on social media, often with an intention to undermine political opponents and democratic principles;

    P.  whereas on 8 June 2024, an ‘All-Serb Assembly’ took place in Belgrade with the participation of political leaders from Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Kosovo under the slogan ‘One people, one assembly’;

    Commitment to EU accession

    1.  Notes Serbia’s stated commitment to EU membership as its strategic goal and its ambition to align fully with the EU acquis by the end of 2026; urges Serbia to deliver quickly and decisively on essential reforms, especially in cluster 1, for this very ambitious commitment to be perceived as realistic, genuine and meaningful; stresses the need for Serbia to seriously and categorically demonstrate that it is strategically oriented towards the EU, by showing strong political will and consistency in the implementation of EU-related reforms and by communicating objectively and unambiguously with its citizens about the EU, Serbia’s European path and the required reforms;

    2.  Reiterates the strategic importance of the Western Balkans in the current geopolitical context and for the security and stability of the EU as a whole; outlines that, owing to its geopolitical position, the country has a direct impact on the overall stability of the region; condemns, therefore, Serbia’s attempts to establish a sphere of influence undermining the sovereignty of neighbouring countries;

    3.  Acknowledges Serbia’s good level of preparation with regard to macroeconomic stability and fiscal discipline and the Commission’s assessment that cluster 3 is technically ready for opening but notes with concern that there has been limited or no overall progress in meeting the benchmarks for EU membership across negotiating chapters, with particular shortcomings in critical areas such as the rule of law, media freedom, public administration reform, and alignment with EU policies, particularly the EU’s foreign policy;

    4.  Regrets the fact that no substantial progress has been made on Chapter 31, as Serbia’s pattern of alignment with EU foreign policy positions has remained largely unchanged, mainly due to Serbia’s close relations with Russia; recalls that Serbia remains a notable exception in the Western Balkans regarding CFSP alignment; calls on Serbia to reverse this trend and to demonstrate positive steps towards full alignment; notes that Serbia’s rate of compliance with EU statements and declarations is increasing but remains at only 61 %; welcomes Serbia’s continued active participation in and positive contribution to EU military crisis management missions and operations;

    5.  Welcomes Serbia’s humanitarian support for Ukraine and takes note of the sale of ammunition to the value of EUR 800 million for use by Ukraine in a mutually beneficial agreement; notes that Serbia has aligned with some of the EU’s positions regarding Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; regrets, however, that Serbia still does not align with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia; calls on the EU to reconsider the extent of the financial assistance provided by the EU to Serbia in the event of continued support for anti-democratic ideologies and non-alignment with the EU’s restrictive measures and the CFSP; calls on Serbia to swiftly align with the EU’s restrictive measures and general policy towards Russia and Belarus, systematically and without delay;

    6.  Stresses the importance of implementing sanctions against Russia for the security of Europe as a whole; deplores Serbia’s continued close relations with Russia, raising concerns about its strategic orientation; reiterates its calls on the Serbian authorities to enhance transparency regarding the role and activities of the so-called Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Center in Nis and to immediately terminate all military cooperation with Russia; notes Serbia’s decision to support the UN resolution condemning Russia’s aggression against Ukraine three years after the full-scale invasion; regrets President Vučić’s immediate verbal retraction of Serbia’s UN vote, calling it a ‘mistake’; considers that maintaining privileged relations with the Kremlin regime undermines not only Serbia’s credibility as a candidate country but also the trust of its European partners and the future of EU-Serbia relations;

    7.  Regrets the continued decline in public support for EU membership in Serbia and the growing support for the Putin regime, which is the result of a long-standing anti-EU and pro-Russian rhetoric from the government-controlled media as well as some government officials; calls on the Serbian authorities to foster a fact-based and open discussion on accession to the EU;

    8.  Deplores the continued spread of disinformation, including about Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; condemns the spillover effects of these actions in other countries in the region; calls on the Serbian authorities to combat disinformation and calls for the EU to enhance cooperation with Serbia to strengthen democratic resilience and counter hybrid threats;

    9.  Notes Serbia’s progress on aligning with EU visa policy and calls for full alignment, in particular with regard to those non-EU countries presenting a security threat to the EU, including the threat of cyberattacks; welcomes the agreement signed on 25 June 2024 between the EU and Serbia on operational cooperation on border management with Frontex, highlighting the need to act in line with fundamental rights and international standards;

    10.  Reiterates that the overall pace of the accession negotiations should depend on tangible progress on the fundamentals, the rule of law and a commitment to the shared European rights and values as well as to the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue, which is to be conducted in good faith so that it results in a legally binding agreement based on mutual recognition, as well as alignment with the EU’s CFSP; reiterates its position that accession negotiations with Serbia should only advance if the country aligns with EU sanctions against Russia and makes significant progress on its EU-related reforms, in particular in the area of the fundamentals;

    11.  Repeats its concern regarding the appeasing approach of the Commission towards Serbia against the backdrop of the country’s year-long rollback on the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights, as well as its destabilising influence on the whole region; urges the Commission to use clearer language, including on the highest level, towards Serbia, consistently addressing significant shortcomings, lack of progress and even backsliding, thus upholding the EU’s fundamental values;

    12.  Calls on the Serbian Government to promote the role and benefits of EU accession and EU-funded projects and reforms among the Serbian population;

    Democracy and the rule of law

    13.  Notes the ongoing challenges in ensuring judicial independence, including undue influence and political pressure on the judiciary; expresses concern about the failure to implement safeguards preventing political interference in judicial appointments and disciplinary actions against judges and prosecutors; calls on Serbia to ensure that the High Judicial Council, the High Prosecutorial Council and the Government and Parliament of Serbia effectively and proactively defend judicial independence and prosecutorial autonomy;

    14.  Stresses the importance of adopting the Law on the Judicial Academy and the Venice Commission opinion and making necessary judicial appointments to reduce existing vacancies and improve the overall effectiveness of the judicial system; notes that the delay in adopting this law has stalled key judicial reforms necessary for alignment with EU standards; calls for the draft law to be amended following transparent consultation with all relevant stakeholders, with a view to ensuring the independence and control mechanisms of the institution in order to contribute to overall judicial independence;

    15.  Notes that limited progress has been made in the fight against corruption despite the adoption of a new anti-corruption strategy for 2024-2028; calls on Serbia to adopt and begin implementing the accompanying anti-corruption action plan and to establish an effective monitoring and coordination mechanism to track progress, in line with international standards; expresses concern that corruption is still prevalent in many areas, particularly related to ‘projects of interests for the Republic of Serbia’, and that strong political will is required to effectively address corruption as well as to mount a robust criminal justice response to high-level corruption; notes that Serbia ranks 105th in the Corruption Perceptions Index 2024, well below the EU average; considers that the level of corruption in Serbia is a significant obstacle to its EU accession process; notes with concern that results have still not been delivered in cases of high public interest, after several years, such as in the long-standing cases of Krušik, Jovanjica, Savamala and Belivuk; calls on Serbia to strengthen the independence of its anti-corruption institutions by ensuring that they are adequately resourced and protected from political interference; calls on the Government of Serbia to sign the Anti-Bribery Convention of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and to fully align its legal framework on police cooperation and organised crime with that of the EU;

    16.  Welcomes the more pluralistic composition of the new parliament, with a broader representation of political parties, including parties of national minorities; notes that the early election and the corresponding break in the functioning of the government and parliament have impeded progress on reforms; notes the frequent pattern of early elections, a permanent campaign mode and long delays in forming governments, as well as the disrupted work of the national parliament, including the absence of government question-time sessions, the lack of discussion on the reports of independent institutions, and the more frequent use of urgent procedures, which lead to a lack of parliamentary legislative oversight and legitimacy and do not contribute to the effective democratic governance of the country;

    17.  Takes note of the resignation of Prime Minister Miloš Vučević on 28 January 2025, which was confirmed by the National Assembly on 19 March 2025, and of the subsequent election of the new government led by Đuro Macut, appointed on 16 April 2025; takes note of the resumption of the work of the National Assembly on 4 March 2025, after a pause of three months, and condemns all the acts of violence that occurred on this occasion;

    18.  Reiterates its readiness to support the National Assembly and the members thereof in the democratic processes related to Serbia’s European path, including the proper functioning of the parliament in accordance with its rules of procedure, by using the European Parliament’s existing democracy support tools and initiatives and by supporting increased parliamentary oversight of the EU accession process and reforms;

    19.  Takes note, with deep concern, of the final report of the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission on the December 2023 elections; notes that in April 2024, the National Assembly formed a working group for the improvement of the election process but that, by the end of the year, it had not agreed on any legal measures to improve the election process; notes that two out of three representatives of civil society left the working group in February 2025; notes that steps were taken in the first months of 2025 on amending the Law on Unified Voter Registry but that there is no consensus among political and civil society actors on the content; calls on all parliamentary groups in the National Assembly to decide on the implementation of ODIHR recommendations, with the agreement of all groups; calls for equal treatment of all members of parliament in the work of the National Assembly, consistent and effective implementation of the parliamentary Code of Conduct and the impartial sanctioning of breaches of parliamentary integrity;

    20.  Is concerned about the increasing role of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) and foreign cyber operations and interference in Serbia’s democratic election processes;

    21.  Stresses the critical importance of ensuring the independence of key institutions, including media regulators such as the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media (REM); regrets the delay in the election of the new members; regrets the irregularities in the nomination process; notes the withdrawal of several candidates from the selection in February 2025, who justified their decision on the basis of these irregularities; deeply regrets the fact that the REM neglected its legal obligations to scrutinise the conduct of the 2023 election campaign in the media in a timely manner, to report on its findings and to sanction media outlets that breached the law, spread hate speech or violated journalistic standards; notes, with concern, the absence of pluralistic political views in the nationwide media; notes that the REM should actively promote media pluralism and transparency regarding the ownership structures of media outlets and independence from foreign actors;

    22.  Notes that the REM awarded four national frequencies to channels that have a history of violating journalistic standards, including using hate speech and misleading the public, not complying with warnings issued by the REM, spreading disinformation and supporting the Kremlin’s narrative on Russia’s war in Ukraine; deeply regrets the fact that REM has not issued the fifth national licence and calls for it to be awarded through a transparent and impartial process without unnecessary delay and in compliance with international media freedom standards as soon as a new REM council is elected; calls for the Serbian Government to scrap and re-start the process of electing new members, in line with Serbian law and international media freedom standards;

    Fundamental freedoms and human rights

    23.  Expresses its sincere condolences to the families of the 16 victims who lost their lives and to those who were injured following the collapse of the canopy of Novi Sad train station on 1 November 2024; calls for full and transparent legal proceedings following the investigation by the authorities, to bring those responsible to justice; underlines the need to examine more broadly to what extent corruption led to the lowering of safety standards and contributed to this tragedy;

    24.  Regrets the delayed response and accountability of the Serbian authorities, the slow investigation process and the lack of transparency in the aftermath of the tragedy, which were partially addressed in the face of escalating public pressure;

    25.  Expresses deep concern about the systemic issues highlighted by the student protests and various other protests in Serbia, such as issues relating to civil liberties, separation of powers, corruption, environmental protection, institutional and financial transparency, especially in relation to infrastructure projects, and accountability; regrets the fact that the government missed the opportunity to meet the demands of the students and of the citizens who support the students in good faith; affirms that the students’ demands align with reforms that Serbia is expected to implement on its European path;

    26.  Underlines the importance of freedom of speech and assembly; calls on the authorities of Serbia to ensure the protection of those participating in the peaceful protests; takes note of the mass protests on 15 March 2025, the largest in the modern history of Serbia; calls for an impartial investigation of the claims that unlawful technology of crowd control was used against the protesters, causing injuries to a number of them;

    27.  Deplores the continuing violence against students, including the recent incident at the Faculty of Sports and Physical Education building in Novi Sad, in which at least five people were injured as a result of the police storming the building accompanied by the Dean, Patrik Drid;

    28.  Condemns, in the strongest terms, the misuse of personal data from public registries to retaliate against peaceful protesters; calls on the prosecution office in Serbia to file charges against all persons who physically attacked and incited violence against the participants of the demonstrations; is deeply concerned about any act of violence; is carefully following developments as regards arrests of protesters and legal proceedings that have been opened against them; is concerned about the reports that the security services were involved in intimidation and surveillance of the protesters; condemns the language used by the Serbian authorities inciting violence against students and other protesters; notes that student activists have faced legal harassment, intimidation and excessive use of force by the authorities; calls for a thorough, impartial and speedy investigation into allegations of violence used against demonstrators and police misconduct during protests; urges the diplomatic missions of the EU and the Member States to continue to monitor closely the ongoing legal cases relating to the protests;

    29.  Is deeply concerned about the increasing political and financial pressure on primary and secondary school teachers, as well as university professors, who were deprived of their salaries for taking part in the collective action to support students’ demands; deplores in this context the unacceptable legal proceedings and media smear campaign against the Rector of the University of Belgrade;

    30.  Is deeply alarmed that the Serbian authorities have engaged in widespread illegal surveillance practices using spyware against activists, journalists and members of civil society, as indicated in the recent reports by Amnesty International and the SHARE Foundation; urges the Government of Serbia to immediately cease the use of advanced surveillance technology against activists, journalists and human rights defenders, and calls on the competent state authorities to conduct a thorough investigation into all existing cases of unlawful surveillance and use of spyware and to initiate appropriate proceedings against those responsible; calls on the European Commission, in the light of this, to follow up on these incidents, address these issues with the Serbian authorities and insist on a thorough investigation into these matters;

    31.  Deplores the alleged illegal wiretapping and detention of five activists from the opposition Movement of Free Citizens (PSG) and a student from the STAV organisation in March 2025, and the arrest warrants issued for other STAV activists; condemns the use of the case by the propaganda media and the unfounded extension of the detention; calls on the Serbian authorities to release Marija Vasić, Lazar Dinić, Mladen Cvijetić, Lado Jovović, Srđan Đurić and Davor Stefanović from detention;

    32.  Rejects allegations that the EU and some of its Member States were involved in organising the student protests with a view to triggering a ‘colour revolution’; strongly condemns, in that context, the unlawful arrests and expulsions of EU citizens and the public disclosure, by convicted war criminals, of the personal data of EU citizens, as well as hate speech against national minorities; expresses concern about the rising number of detention cases involving EU citizens at Serbia’s border; notes that anti-EU narratives are being manifested in decreasing support for EU integration in Serbian society and in a strengthening of the presence of foreign autocratic actors in the country;

    33.  Calls on the Serbian authorities to restore citizens’ confidence in state institutions by granting transparency and accountability; encourages all political and social actors to engage in an inclusive, substantive dialogue aimed at fulfilling EU-related reforms;

    34.  Notes that media freedom in Serbia has deteriorated further, as evidenced by Serbia’s drop to 98th place in the 2024 Reporter Without Borders World Press Freedom Index; urges Serbia to improve and protect media professionalism, diversity and media pluralism, and to promote quality investigative journalism, the highest ethical journalistic standards, through respecting journalistic codes of conduct, and media literacy; recalls the importance of the plurality and transparency of the media, including on aspects related to ownership and state financing, most notably through better involvement of the REM; recalls that the concentration of media ownership can have adverse effects on the freedom of the media and the professionalism of reporting; reaffirms that, as part of the accession negotiations, Serbia needs to align with the EU in matters of strategic importance, such as countering FIMI; calls on Serbia to align with EU policies in countering foreign interference and disinformation campaigns by implementing concrete regulatory measures in line with EU standards, such as the provisions included in the Digital Services Act(7) and Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising(8); encourages cooperation between Serbia, the European External Action Service and the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in tackling disinformation; expects the authorities to investigate and prosecute all instances of hate speech, smear campaigns and strategic lawsuits against journalists;

    35.  Expresses its deep concerns about reported cases of abusive attacks, digital surveillance and harassment against journalists, human rights activists and civil society organisations, most recently a police raid on 25 February 2025 on four leading civil society organisations, ostensibly regarding their misuse of US Agency for International Development funds; strongly condemns persistent smear campaigns and intimidation against civil society in Serbia, including false allegations about plots to overthrow the government with foreign support;

    36.  Expresses concern that civil society organisations in Serbia face increasing challenges, including restrictive conditions, funding constraints, police raids and other forms of intimidation from state authorities; underlines the importance of a framework that enables local, vibrant civil society organisations to operate freely and participate in policymaking, including EU integration processes, in inclusive and meaningful ways; regrets that Serbia currently does not provide a framework that enables its lively and pluralistic civil society organisations, particularly those engaged in democracy support and electoral observation, to operate freely and participate in policymaking in inclusive and meaningful ways; expresses concern about recent raids of the offices of civil society organisations; calls for investigations into all attacks and smear campaigns against civil society organisations and for the improved transparency of public funding;

    37.  Condemns the political pressure exerted on universities and other research institutions through a hasty government decree that interferes with the academic freedom of researchers and cuts their salaries; condemns the vilification of professors, researchers and other academic staff in pro-government media; deplores the increasing use of temporary contracts for teachers and other civil servants as a political tool to exert pressure and control;

    38.  Urges the Serbian authorities to expand the availability of public broadcasting services in all minority languages across the country, ensuring equal access to media for all communities, while drawing on the best practice of the region of Vojvodina;

    39.  Expresses its deep concern about the draft law submitted to the Serbian Parliament on 29 November 2024, which proposes the establishment of a Russian-style foreign agents law; reminds Serbian legislators that civil society organisations and journalists play a key role in a healthy democratic society; reiterates that such legislation is incompatible with the values of the EU; notes that multiple civil society organisations suspended their cooperation with the legislative and executive branches of the government in February 2025;

    40.  Expresses grave concern about the increasing political interference in heritage protection in Serbia, including the removal of protected status from cultural monuments and the disregard for legal procedures governing their preservation, as in the case of the Generalštab Modernist Complex;

    41.  Calls on Serbia to fight disinformation, including manipulative anti-EU narratives and, in particular, to end its own state-sponsored disinformation campaigns; condemns the opening of an RT office in Belgrade, the launch of RT’s online news service in Serbian and the continued operation of the Russian online news service Sputnik Srbija, which is used to propagate pro-Russian narratives and misinformation across the Western Balkans region; urges the Serbian authorities to counter hybrid threats and fully align with the Council’s decision on the suspension of the broadcasting activities of Sputnik and RT; is deeply concerned about the spread of disinformation about the Russian aggression against Ukraine; calls on Serbia and the Commission to bolster infrastructure to fight disinformation and other hybrid threats; condemns the increasing influence of Russian and Chinese state-sponsored disinformation in Serbia, including the dissemination of anti-EU and anti-democratic narratives;

    42.  Takes note of the adoption of the national strategy for equality and the strategy for prevention of and protection against discrimination, and calls for their full implementation and for further alignment with European standards; urges the Serbian authorities to address the recommendations of the Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (GREVIO), with a view to improving compliance with the Istanbul Convention ratified by Serbia; notes with concern the temporary suspension of the implementation of the Law on Gender Equality by the Constitutional Court; expresses concern about the persistent lack of adequate support for organisations promoting women’s rights and gender equality;

    43.  Deeply deplores the demographic decline in Serbia, which is being exacerbated by negative net migration due to economic hardship and political persecution; stresses that it is mainly young, educated and productive people who are being forced to leave the country, as well as those pressured and threatened on account of their political views, including Dijana Hrka, the mother of one of the victims of the Novi Sad railway station tragedy, who fears for her safety after being put under pressure by SNS supporters;

    44.  Stresses that the Serbian authorities must take concrete measures to uphold and strengthen the respect for the rights of the child in the country, including by ratifying the third Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopting a national action plan for the rights of the child, adopting a new strategy on violence against children, given the expiry of the previous framework, and establishing a national framework to protect children from abuse and neglect;

    45.  Welcomes the fact that Belgrade Pride 2024 parade, the biggest in Serbia so far, passed off peacefully, though being protected by a high-profile police presence;

    46.  Highlights the need for strong commitment to safeguarding the rights of national minorities, ensuring their full representation at all levels of government, preserving their cultural identity through the use of their respective languages and by meeting their educational needs, freedom of expression and access to information, and to actively pursuing investigations into hate-motivated crimes as an irreplaceable part of common European values; regrets the fact that almost all national minorities are protected only formally; expresses concerns about the practice of pro forma representation of national minorities who are under government control; calls on Serbia to protect and promote the cultural heritage and traditions of its national minorities, in particular to create a positive atmosphere for education in minority languages, including by providing sufficient numbers of teachers, textbooks and additional materials, and deplores the violation of minority rights in this area; calls on Serbia to refrain from exploiting the national identities of national minorities that create division within these communities, and strongly condemns recorded cases of hate speech against some of them; notes the considerable delay in drafting a new action plan for the realisation of national minority rights and stresses the urgent need for Serbia to finalise and implement it promptly; highlights the need for the new action plan to fully incorporate the findings and recommendations of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities;

    47.  Expresses concerns about the significant decline in the population of certain minority groups, including the Bulgarian minority; calls on Serbia to ensure the right to use names and language specific to minority groups, including women within the Bulgarian community; notes with concern that not all school textbooks have been translated into Bulgarian; calls on the Serbian Government to ensure reciprocal equal rights for the Croatian minority in Serbia as the Serbian minority enjoys in Croatia, in particular with regard to ensuring their reciprocal representation at all levels of government, including regional and local levels; reiterates its concern regarding the restrictive and arbitrary enforcement of the Law on Permanent and Temporary Residence related to the passivation of address of thousands of Albanians in the south of Serbia; emphasises the situation of the Romanian Orthodox Church in Serbia, which is not officially recognised by the state as a traditional church;

    48.  Regrets the attempts by the Serbian authorities to undermine the national identity of communities within the country; expresses concern, in this context, about the promotion of narratives such as that of the ‘Shopi nation’, which seek to erase the existence of the Bulgarian community and deny its historical roots and cultural heritage; regrets the searches carried out by the Serbian authorities at the Bosilegrad Cultural Centre and the initiation of pre-trial proceedings for ‘ethnic hatred’ against activists from non-governmental organisations;

    49.  Calls on Serbia to refrain from distorting historical events, such as the narrative surrounding the so-called Surdulica massacre, which only serve to spread division and hatred against minorities and neighbouring countries, which is incompatible with EU membership;

    Reconciliation and good neighbourly relations

    50.  Reiterates that good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation remain essential elements of the enlargement process; calls on Serbia to stop restrictions on entry for regional civil society activists and artists as such practices undermine regional dialogue and cooperation; reaffirms, furthermore, the importance of the stability of south-eastern European countries and their resilience against foreign interference in internal democratic processes; stresses the importance of Serbia developing good neighbourly relations, implementing bilateral agreements and resolving outstanding bilateral issues with its neighbours; notes Serbia’s participation in regional initiatives and its active involvement in the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans and the Common Regional Market; underlines the fact that respect for national minority rights is an essential condition of Serbia’s advancement along its European path;

    51.  Calls for historical reconciliation and the overcoming of discrimination and prejudices from the past; deplores the recent inflammatory rhetoric by the government, targeting neighbouring states that did not support the opening of cluster 3 for Serbia;

    52.  Reiterates that Serbia must refrain from influencing the domestic politics of its neighbouring Western Balkan countries, including regarding the unconstitutional celebration of Republika Srpska Day in Bosnia and Herzegovina and questioning Bosnia and Herzegovina’s court decisions;

    53.  Urges Serbia to step up its reconciliation efforts and seek solutions to past disputes, in particular when it comes to missing persons, who account for 1 782 people in Croatia, 7 608 people in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 1 595 people in Kosovo; calls on the Serbian authorities to achieve justice for victims by recognising and respecting court verdicts on war crimes, fighting against impunity for wartime crimes, investigating cases of missing persons, investigating grave sites, and supporting domestic prosecutors in bringing perpetrators to justice, which requires the cooperation of other parties too; strongly condemns the widespread public denials of international verdicts for war crimes, including the denial of the Srebrenica genocide;

    54.  Calls on the judicial authorities in Serbia to ensure compliance with the standards of fair trial and satisfaction of justice for victims in all war crime cases; calls for the denial of war crimes and the glorification of war criminals to be included in the Criminal Code, with a view to prosecuting any form of denial of war crimes determined by the verdicts of the International Criminal Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia and the International Court of Justice;

    55.  Reiterates its support for the initiative to establish a regional commission for the establishment of facts about war crimes and other gross human rights violations on the territory of the former Yugoslavia (RECOM);

    56.  Reiterates its position on the importance of opening and publishing wartime archives, and reiterates its call for the former Yugoslav archives to be opened and, in particular, for access to be granted to the files of the former Yugoslav secret service (UDBA) and the Yugoslav People’s Army Counterintelligence Service (KOS), and for the files to be returned to the respective governments if they so request;

    57.  Reiterates its full support for the EU-facilitated dialogue and welcomes the appointment of Peter Sørensen as the EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue;

    58.  Reiterates the importance of constructive engagement on the part of the authorities of both Serbia and Kosovo in order to achieve a comprehensive, legally binding normalisation agreement, based on mutual recognition and in accordance with international law; calls on both Kosovo and Serbia to implement the Brussels and Ohrid Agreements, including the establishment of the Association/Community of Serb-majority municipalities, and the lifting of Serbia’s opposition of Kosovo’s membership in regional and international organisations, and to avoid unilateral actions that could undermine the dialogue process;

    59.  Expects Kosovo and Serbia to fully cooperate and take all the necessary measures to apprehend and swiftly bring to justice the perpetrators of the 2023 terrorist attack in Banjska; deplores the fact that Serbia still has not prosecuted the culprits, most notably Milan Radoičić, the Vice-President of Srpska Lista; reiterates that the perpetrators of the terrorist attack in Zubin Potok must also be held accountable and must face justice without delay;

    60.  Calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and on the Commission to take a more proactive role in leading the dialogue process; calls for an enhanced role for the European Parliament in facilitating the dialogue through regular joint parliamentary assembly meetings;

    Socio-economic reforms

    61.  Welcomes Serbia’s steady progress towards developing a functioning market economy with positive GDP growth and increased foreign investment in some sectors; takes note of that fact that Serbia received its first-ever investment-grade credit rating; underlines the fact that the EU is Serbia’s main trading partner, the largest source of foreign direct investment and by far the largest donor; reiterates that the financial assistance, which is of great benefit to Serbia, is conditional on the strengthening of democratic principles and alignment with the CFSP and other EU policies; reiterates the need for more substantial reforms in the labour market, education and public administration, including to address social inequalities; expresses concern about the scale and scope of intergovernmental contracts awarded that are exempt from the current legislative framework on public procurement; regrets, however, the fact that public debt as a percentage of GDP remains well above the eastern European average;

    62.  Is concerned about the investment in Serbia by Russia and China and their growing influence on the political and economic processes in the region;

    63.  Calls on Serbia to intensify efforts and increase investment in the socio-economic development of its border regions to address depopulation and ensure that the residents have access to essential services, including professional opportunities, healthcare and education; underlines the potential of the IPA III cross-border cooperation programmes as a key tool to promote long-term sustainable regional growth;

    64.  Welcomes Serbia’s active engagement in the implementation of the new Growth Plan for the Western Balkans; takes note of the fact that Serbia adopted its Reform Agenda on 3 October 2024; believes that embracing the opportunities of the growth plan would further enhance the Serbian economy, which over the past three years benefited from more than EUR 586 million in financial and technical assistance under IPA III; believes that the EU funding should better support the democratic reforms of the country; calls, in that context, for the relevant EU funding, including from the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, to be reprogrammed to redirect more funds towards supporting judiciary reforms and anti-corruption measures, as well as towards independent media and civil society organisations, in order to support their critical work, in particular in the vacuum created by the withdrawal of US donors; calls, furthermore, for the EU and the Western Balkan countries to establish a framework for fruitful cooperation between the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and its Western Balkan counterparts in order to ensure that the EPPO can effectively exercise its power on IPA III and Western Balkan Facility funds in the recipient countries; urges the Serbian authorities to step up efforts to communicate clearly to citizens the benefits of the EU funds and to improve their visibility;

    65.  Regrets the lack of public consultation during the adoption of the Serbian Reform Agenda; calls for more effective oversight of the EU funding programmes and projects;

    66.  Advocates increased regional cooperation among Western Balkan countries to share best practice and develop joint strategies in combating disinformation and foreign interference; emphasises the role of the EU in facilitating such collaborative efforts; calls for the continuation and further reinforcement of the IPA regional cybersecurity programme;

    67.  Recognises the important role of Serbia’s business community in advancing economic convergence with the EU, including through the opportunities offered by and in the implementation of the growth plan as a sustainable alternative to Russian and Chinese investment in the country; welcomes the business community’s contribution to advancing socio-economic relations in the Western Balkans;

    68.  Takes note of Serbia’s business community’s efforts in advocating for the accession of the Western Balkans to the EU’s single market as a concrete step towards full EU membership; calls for clear, measurable actions and well-defined roles and responsibilities for the implementation of the Common Regional Market action plan, as a key driver for the region’s successful accession to the EU’s single market;

    Energy, the environment, sustainable development and connectivity

    69.  Calls on Serbia to increase its efforts towards the transposition of relevant environmental and climate acquis and to ensure the proper application of environmental protection standards, including by significantly enhancing its administrative and technical capacities at all levels of government, notably on waste management legislation and the adoption of the Climate Change Adaptation Programme and the National Energy and Climate Plan; urges the Serbian authorities to improve the transparency and environmental impact assessment of all investment, including from China and Russia;

    70.  Reiterates its regret regarding the lack of action on the pollution of the Dragovishtitsa river by mines operating in the region and the detrimental effect on the health of the local people and the environment;

    71.  Calls on Serbia to increase its efforts towards the decarbonisation of its energy system and to enable effective enforcement of pollution reduction regulations related to thermal power plants;

    72.  Emphasises the need for further progress in transboundary cooperation with neighbouring countries, especially with regard to transboundary road infrastructure; urges Serbia to begin implementing the activities outlined in the memorandum of understanding on environmental protection cooperation with Bulgaria;

    73.  Takes note of the EU-Serbia memorandum of understanding launching a strategic partnership on sustainable raw materials, battery value chains and electric vehicles, in view of the European energy transition and in line with the highest environmental standards; recalls that dialogue with the affected populations, the scientific community and civil society should be at the centre of any such strategic partnership;

    74.  Welcomes the agreement reached at the EU-Western Balkans summit in Tirana on reduced roaming costs; calls, in this respect, on the authorities, private actors and all stakeholders to facilitate reaching the agreed targets to achieve a substantial reduction of roaming charges for data and further reductions leading to prices close to the domestic prices between the Western Balkans and the EU by 2027; welcomes the entering into force of the first phase of implementation of the roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU;

    75.  Reiterates that it is important for Serbia to continue diversifying its energy supply, to be able to break away from its dependency on Russia; takes note of the sanctions announced by the United States against Naftna Industrija Srbije (NIS), a subsidiary of the Russian Gazprom; welcomes the completion of the gas interconnector between Serbia and Bulgaria (IBS) in December 2023; regrets the postponement of the launching of the IBS’s commercial operation; calls for the swift finalisation of the permitting process to ensure its full operability in compliance with the energy community acquis; notes that Serbia is taking steps to introduce a carbon tax by 2027 as a step towards aligning with the EU emissions trading system;

    76.  Notes that all chapters in cluster 4 on the green agenda and sustainable connectivity have been opened; notes the adoption of the Law on Environmental Impact Assessment as a positive step towards environmental protection in Serbia, while expressing its regret that the new law fails to align fully with the relevant EU Directive 2014/52/EU(9), since it still leaves the opportunity for significant projects to advance without comprehensive environmental scrutiny; reiterates the need to designate and rigorously manage protected areas, particularly those identified as Important Bird and Biodiversity Areas (IBAs); calls for special attention to be given to critical sites where enforcement against poaching needs to be improved;

    o
    o   o

    77.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the President, Government and National Assembly of Serbia.

    (1) OJ L 278, 18.10.2013, p. 16, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2013/490/oj.
    (2) OJ L 330, 20.9.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1529/oj.
    (3) OJ L, 2024/1449, 24.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1449/oj.
    (4) OJ C, C/2024/6746, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6746/oj.
    (5) OJ C, C/2024/2654, 29.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/2654/oj.
    (6) OJ C, C/2024/6339, 7.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6339/oj.
    (7) Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) (OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj).
    (8) Regulation (EU) 2024/900 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising (OJ L, 2024/900, 20.3.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/900/oj).
    (9) Directive 2014/52/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 amending Directive 2011/92/EU on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment (OJ L 124, 25.4.2014, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/52/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Bay Roberts — Bay Roberts RCMP investigates theft of vehicle, seeks public’s assistance

    Source: Royal Canadian Mounted Police

    Bay Roberts RCMP is investigating the theft of a vehicle that occurred in Bay Roberts sometime between May 9 and May 11, 2025.

    The vehicle, a 2016 silver Hyundai Tucson with NL licence plate JEF 737, was stolen from a parking lot near L.T. Stick Drive. A stock image of the vehicle is attached.

    The investigation is continuing.

    Anyone having information about this crime or the current location of the vehicle is asked to contact Bay Roberts RCMP at 709-786-2118. To remain anonymous, contact Crime Stoppers: #SayItHere 1-800-222-TIPS (8477), visit www.nlcrimestoppers.com or use the P3Tips app.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI USA: Senators Marshall, Hoeven, and Boozman Lead Effort to Bolster Crop Insurance and Reduce Costs for Farmers

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Kansas Roger Marshall
    Washington – U.S. Senator Roger Marshall, M.D. (R-Kansas) joined U.S. Senators John Hoeven (R-North Dakota), a senior member of the Senate Agriculture Committee and Chairman of the Senate Agriculture Appropriations Committee, and Senate Agriculture Committee Chairman John Boozman (R-Arkansas) in reintroducing the Federal Agriculture Risk Management Enhancement and Resilience (FARMER) Act – legislation that strengthens crop insurance and makes increased levels of coverage more affordable for producers.
    “The FARMER Act is a major step toward ensuring the farm safety net stays intact and up to date for those who work tirelessly to provide us with food and fuel. I hear repeatedly from farmers in Kansas that crop insurance is the top priority in the Farm Bill because it provides a critically needed rapid response when disaster strikes,” said Senator Marshall.“Investing in crop insurance means protecting rural economies and securing our nation’s food supply.”
    “Crop insurance remains the number one risk management tool for our farmers, but it doesn’t provide the kind of affordable coverage options that all producers need. The result has been the repeated need for ad-hoc disaster assistance. Ultimately, producers buying higher levels of coverage will lessen the need for ad-hoc disaster assistance in the future,” said Senator Hoeven. “That means less emergency spending by the federal government, greater certainty for farmers and a more resilient ag economy. Those are wins across the board.”
    “Farmers must have the risk management tools they need to plan for the future. The Farmer Act would make critical improvements to the farm safety net and deliver support to producers across the country who rely on these programs. I appreciate Senator Hoeven for continuing to lead on this issue as we work provide certainty to America’s farm families,” said Senator Boozman.
    The legislation is also cosponsored by Senators Mitch McConnell (R-Kentucky), Joni Ernst (R-Iowa), Cindy Hyde-Smith (R-Mississippi), Jim Justice (R-West Virginia), Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa), Deb Fischer (R-Nebraska), and Jerry Moran (R-Kansas). 
    Specifically, the Federal Agriculture Risk Management Enhancement and Resilience (FARMER) Act would:
    Increase premium support for higher levels of crop insurance coverage, which will enhance affordability and reduce the need for future ad-hoc disaster assistance.
    Improve the Supplemental Coverage Option (SCO) by increasing premium support and expanding the coverage level, providing producers with an additional level of protection.
    Direct the Risk Management Agency (RMA) to conduct a study to improve the effectiveness of SCO in large counties.
    Not require producers to choose between purchasing enhanced crop insurance coverage or participating in Agriculture Risk Coverage (ARC) and Price Loss Coverage (PLC) programs, giving them flexibility to make decisions that work best for their operations. 
    This legislation is supported by the American Farm Bureau Federation, American Soybean Association, American Sugarbeet Growers Association, Crop Insurance and Reinsurance Bureau, Crop Insurance Professionals Association, Farm Credit Council, Midwest Council on Agriculture, National Association of Wheat Growers, National Barley Growers Association, National Corn Growers Association, National Cotton Council, National Sunflower Association, USA Dry Pea and Lentil Council, U.S. Beet Sugar Association, U.S. Canola Association, U.S. Durum Growers Association, and Western Peanut Growers Association.
    The full text of the legislation can be found here.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Congressman Sorensen Leads Bipartisan Bill to Increase Resources for Disabled Veterans

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Eric Sorensen (IL-17)

    Congressman Eric Sorensen (IL-17), Congresswoman Nicole Malliotakis (NY-11), and House Veterans Affairs Committee Ranking Member Mark Takano (CA-39) reintroduced the Autonomy for All Disabled Veterans Act, which will provide veterans with additional federal funding to make accessibility improvements to their homes. 

    Senators John Boozman (R-AR) and Catherine Cortez Masto (D-NV) introduced similar companion legislation in the Senate. 

    “The last thing a veteran should worry about is red tape that prevents them from living the life they deserve,” said Congressman Eric Sorensen. “It’s time to finally increase the federal funding available to help disabled veterans make accessibility improvements to their homes with this bipartisan legislation.” 

    “Every veteran deserves to live in a home that works for them. But right now, VA’s HISA program is not meeting the needs of disabled veterans struggling with higher costs,” said Ranking Member Mark Takano. “That’s why Congressman Sorensen and I are reintroducing the Autonomy for All Disabled Veterans Act—to raise the amount of help veterans can get and make sure more of them can live safely and independently. If we ask people to serve our country, we owe it to them to take care of them when they come home.” 

    “I’m proud to join my colleagues in introducing this bipartisan legislation to increase the funding available for veterans through the VA’s Home Improvements and Structural Alterations (HISA) program,” said Congresswoman Nicole Malliotakis. “This critical program helps disabled veterans make essential home modifications such as ramps, widened doorways, and accessible bathrooms and by raising the grant cap to $10,000, we’re ensuring that more veterans can live safely and independently in their homes after having served our nation.” 

    “Arkansas veterans have sacrificed tremendously in service to our nation,” said Senator John Boozman. “One of the most important ways we can support our former servicemembers is to ensure those living with a disability feel safer in an accessible home with a greater sense of independence and quality of life. I am pleased to champion commonsense improvements that will better serve those who have worn our nation’s uniform.” 

    “After making countless sacrifices in service to our country, disabled veterans deserve to live in their own home with more freedom and dignity,” said Senator Catherine Cortez Masto. “That’s why I’m proud to work alongside my colleagues to provide them the resources they need to make improvements to their homes for accessibility and safety. I will continue working across the aisle to stand up for Nevada veterans and their families.” 

    “VA’s Home Improvements and Structural Alterations grant program provides medically necessary improvements and structural changes to a veteran or service member’s home,” said Heather Ansley, Chief Policy Officer of Paralyzed Veterans of America. “Unfortunately, grant rates haven’t been increased since 2010, despite rising construction costs, minimizing the purchase power of this important program. We are grateful to Representative Sorensen, Representative Takano, and Representative Malliotakis for introducing this important legislation which will not only increase the grant amount but also tie the grant to an inflation formula to allow it to keep up with rising costs.” 

    “The quality and self-governing of one’s life means having the freedom to make one’s own decisions and act independently,” said Gary Hall, Service Officer at American Legion Post #2. “This is what every veteran wants in life and when you have a condition that limits an individual’s ability to perform physical tasks or functions, impacting mobility, dexterity or stamina. Veterans with physical disabilities resulting from their military service should be thanked for their service by helping them cope with the physical and emotional challenges that come with living with what has happen to them because of serving their country.” 

    “The Home Improvement and Structural Alterations (HISA) Grant is one of the most important grant programs for veterans with disabilities that the Veterans Health Administration administers,” said Dan Smith, Veterans Service Office at the Peoria County Veterans Assistance Commission. “It allows disabled veterans to make improvements to their homes in areas that present obstacles to their ability to live independently. The Autonomy for All Disabled Veterans Act is vital to offsetting the overwhelming cost increases in the construction industry over the past years, which directly reduce the necessary improvements these Disabled Veterans can make to their homes.” 

    “During my tenure of being a member of a couple of Military Veteran Organizations I have come across several veteran comrades that have physical disabilities,” said Gary Holmes, Col. Thomas G. Lawler VFW Post 342 Commander. “Some of these veterans mention that they have issues in their current living quarters that don’t meet their needs or provide a better quality of life. With the passage of this bill, it will help them reside in their homes and improve their current home situation.” 

    “There is no bad time to increase the grant ceiling to help veterans improve their homes and implement structural alterations. The best time, however, is to do so when the demand for needed support is at its highest. That time is now,” said Eric Willard, Secretary/Treasurer of Chapter 984 of Vietnam Veterans of America. “For the past several years our team of veterans has been helping disabled and other veterans with home improvements that accommodate their needs for adaptive and assistive living in their own homes and apartments. I see the greatest needs of the past decade happening today. Our volunteers and non-profits continue to provide free labor, but we have no funds to purchase the items and supplies to help our disabled peers. The proposed House bill will provide the funds needed by veterans to pay for the ramps, grab bars, and dozens of other accommodations that will make them more independent than otherwise possible. We stand ready to do the work, but our veterans need the money to make it happen.” 

    The Department of Veteran Affairs Home Improvements and Structural Alterations program (HISA) offers funds to help eligible disabled veterans alter their homes to better accommodate their needs. This bipartisan bill will increase the amount available under this program to up to $10,000 for veterans with both service-connected and non-service-connected conditions. This raises the current ceiling offered from $6,800 for those with service-connected conditions and $2,000 to those with non-service-connected conditions. 

    The Autonomy for All Disabled Veterans Act is supported by the Paralyzed Veterans of America (PVA), the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW), and AMVETS. 

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Attorney General Bonta: Trump Administration Continues to Put Communities at Risk and Threaten Public Safety by Slashing Community Violence Intervention Program Funding

    Source: US State of California

    SACRAMENTO – In response to devastating public safety funding cuts by the Trump Administration, California Attorney General Rob Bonta, GIFFORDS Center for Violence Intervention, Assemblymember Mike Gipson, and Senator Jesse Arreguín today came together to urge the Administration to reverse course and honor federal funding commitments to community violence intervention programs. President Trump and the U.S. Department of Justice, under the direction of U.S. Attorney General Pam Bondi, have terminated $811 million in essential federal grants for victim services and crime prevention across the country. This reduction in funding has severely impacted Community Violence Intervention (CVI) programs, hindering initiatives to address gun violence, stopping the vital support of at-risk youth, and preventing victims from obtaining necessary recovery support. 

    “The Trump Administration is recklessly disregarding the safety of the people it is sworn to serve with the termination of programs that heal and protect survivors of violence,” said Attorney General Rob Bonta. “The Trump Administration’s cuts threaten California’s—and the nation’s—progress against violent crime and make all of us less safe. If the Administration truly cared about public safety, it wouldn’t cut programs that are saving lives today. The cancellation of CVI funding is a profound setback for violence prevention efforts nationwide. We urge the Administration to reinstate these vital grants and for lawmakers to continue to invest in lifesaving violence prevention and victim care.”

    “The Trump Administration is pulling the plug on lifesaving programs across the country, including so many here in California,” said Mike McLively, Policy Director at GIFFORDS Center for Violence Intervention. “These cuts dismantle years of strategic, bipartisan investment in public safety and will cost people their lives. We are incredibly grateful for the leadership of Attorney General Bonta and California legislators who have been at the forefront of the fight to fund community violence intervention work at the state level, but the federal government cannot go back on its promises. These were grants that were already awarded to critical live-saving programs.”

    “The Trump Administration’s Department of Justice decision to cut millions in Community Violence Intervention and Prevention Initiative funding is a reckless and dangerous step backward,” said Assemblymember Mike A. Gipson (D-Carson). “At a time when our communities are working tirelessly to reduce gun violence through proven, community-led strategies, this move undermines years of progress and puts lives at risk. California CVI organizations, which were relying on these funds, are now forced to scale back efforts or shut down programs that save lives every day. Cutting millions for California alone sends a clear message: that community safety is not a priority for this administration. If we are serious about stopping gun violence and healing our neighborhoods, we must invest in—not abandon—the people doing the hardest work on the ground. I stand with California Attorney General Rob Bonta, GIFFORDS, and other longstanding leaders in this space, against this blatantly irresponsible are careless decision by the federal government.”

    CVI programs work to break cycles of violence by employing specialists trained to engage, protect, and heal gunshot victims and others at highest risk. They provide lifesaving services designed to keep victims safe and alive, promote trauma recovery, and support pathways away from retaliatory violence and gang activity. Last year, Attorney General Bonta hosted a series of gun violence prevention roundtables around the state with hundreds of CVI leaders to recognize and uplift these programs’ enormous successes in reducing gun violence in communities across our state. Their work is incredibly important. And at every single roundtable it was expressed that what these programs need most from our leaders is meaningful, stable investment to expand their lifesaving work. 

    Multiple community violence intervention service providers in California have had their federal grants terminated mid-grant cycle and without any warning. Some organizations impacted are:

    •  Advance Peace in Fresno which is a program lauded by the city’s former police commissioner, had a $2 million grant revoked, causing reduced staff
    • Youth ALIVE! In Oakland lost its $2 million grant to support the nation’s first hospital-based violence intervention program
    • Urban Peace Institute in Los Angeles lost its $1.5 million grant to support the training and certification of street outreach workers
    • Centro Cha Inc in Los Angeles lost $1.5 million in funding
    • Fresno County Economic Opportunities Commission lost $2 million in funding
    • The Reverence Project in Los Angeles lost $2 million in funding
    • Providence Health System in Southern California lost nearly $2 million in funding

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Homeland Security Awards $86.1 Million in Disaster Assistance

    Source: US Department of Homeland Security

    WASHINGTON – Today, the Department of Homeland Security announced that it awarded over $86 million in financial assistance to Tennessee, Texas, and California to support relief and recovery efforts following a series of natural disasters.

    Our job is to get federal disaster management back on track after years of mismanagement. Disaster relief has been so inadequate there are still open applications that were submitted after Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Under President Trump’s leadership, Secretary Noem is fixing that. These grants are a direct product of the Secretary’s efforts to ensure that states are getting the grants they need in a timely, efficient manner to lead disaster relief efforts from the local level up.” – DHS Spokesperson

    The awards are as follows:

    • Tennessee: $36.9M for permanent repairs from severe storms, tornadoes, straight-line winds, and flooding which resulted in an F-3 tornado that destroyed the Grace Baptist Church and Academy of Hamilton County buildings. The church and academy provide primary and secondary educational services to approximately 600 students in Chattanooga, TN.
    • CA: $14.2M to CA Cross Creek Flood Control District for emergency protective measures following severe winter storms, straight-line winds, flooding, landslides, and mudslides.
    • TX: $35M to the Texas Department of State Health Services (DSHS) for management costs as a result of the COVID-19 Pandemic.

    These awards come as the Department is undertaking a thorough review of grant funding to ensure that all taxpayer dollars are properly allocated to focus on disaster relief and recovery efforts.

    ###

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: ICE Arrests ‘Worst of the Worst’ Criminal Aliens in Hawaii

    Source: US Department of Homeland Security

    Targets of the operation in Hawaii included criminal illegal aliens charged with kidnapping, assault, firearms offenses, drug offenses and theft. 

    WASHINGTON – The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has successfully detained and removed criminal illegal aliens across the U.S. including from the Hawaiian Islands.  

    Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) agents in Kona have conducted search warrants, unaccompanied minor welfare checks, and a number of targeted enforcement actions.   

    “Our brave ICE agents are conducting operations in Hawaii to protect communities from violent criminals who shouldn’t be in our country. The targets of the operation in Hawaii include criminal illegal aliens charged with kidnapping, assault, distribution of deadly drugs, domestic abuse, and theft,” said Assistant Secretary Tricia McLaughlin. “In the first 100 days under President Trump and Secretary Noem, 75% of arrests ICE made were of criminal illegal aliens. DHS is continuing to go after the worst of the worst.”  

    Below are examples of the illegal aliens ICE has removed from American communities:  

    On January 23, 2025, HSI Honolulu administratively arrested Rescue Suda, a citizen of the Marshall Islands. The Circuit Court of Hawaii County, Hawaii previously convicted Suda of Felony Assault. Suda was also arrested for kidnapping and terroristic threatening.   

    On February 25, 2025, HSI Honolulu arrested Navor Salas-Cruz, 52, a citizen of Mexico. Salas-Cruz was identified as being present in the United States after a prior order of removal. Salas-Cruz has multiple immigration encounters starting in 1996 including 2 prior removals and has a lengthy state criminal history ranging from assault, DWI, forgery, driving without a license, criminal contempt of court, family abuse. Federal charges include 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and 18 U.S.C § 922(g)(l) for one count of reentry of removed alien and one count of felon in possession of firearms and ammunition.  

    On January 25, 2025, HSI Honolulu arrested RJ Marsolo, a citizen of the Federated States of Micronesia.  The State of Hawaii, Circuit Court of the First Circuit, previously convicted Marsolo of assault in the first degree and assault in the third degree and sentenced him to a total of 10 years imprisonment.   

    On January 25, 2025, HSI Honolulu arrested Herman Faamausili, A citizen of Samoa.  The United States District Court, District of Hawaii, previously convicted Faamausili of distribution and possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine and sentenced him to 70 months imprisonment.  The immigration judge ordered Faamausili’s previous removal from the United States on September 15, 2021.   

    On January 26, 2025, HSI Honolulu arrested Heine a citizen of the Federated States of Micronesia. The Superior Court of Guam convicted JAI of theft by receiving, sentencing him to 5 years in prison, and assault, sentencing him to 1 year in prison.  The immigration judge previously ordered JAI’s removal from the United States on April 16, 2020. 

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI: Funded Ventures Launches Terrace Wealth in Partnership with Industry Veteran Ryan Bowman to Offer Tailored Wealth Management Solutions

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Clayton, Missouri, May 12, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Funded Ventures, in partnership with industry veteran Ryan Bowman, is proud to announce the launch of Terrace Wealth, a new wealth management firm focused on delivering personalized, fee-only financial solutions. Led by Ryan, Terrace Wealth will provide individuals, families, and institutions with customized strategies for investment management and wealth building.

    Ryan is a seasoned CERTIFIED FINANCIAL PLANNER™ with over a decade of experience as a wealth advisor. Ryan was previously a partner at a Denver-based wealth management firm, where he spearheaded the successful transition from Raymond James to an independent, fee-only Registered Investment Advisor (RIA). Ryan has an MBA from Washington University in St. Louis and previously served four years in the United States Army as a combat Infantryman, earning the rank of Sergeant and was awarded the Combat Infantryman Badge. Ryan joined Funded Ventures in 2024 as an Operating Partner to launch Terrace Wealth, bringing his passion for transparent, client-focused financial strategies to the Midwest.

    Brian Wolfe founded Funded Ventures in 2017 to buy and build small businesses. Funded Ventures previously co-led the acquisition of three businesses in the SEO SaaS vertical with sale to private equity. Brian is a retired partner at Kirkland & Ellis, where he practiced for 17 years, and teaches courses on entrepreneurship through acquisition and private equity at Washington University in St. Louis, UNC Kenan-Flagler Business School and Northwestern Pritzker School of Law. Brian also serves on the board of many civic organizations including the Skandalaris Center at Washington University in St. Louis and is a member of the Young Presidents’ Organization.

    “We are excited to launch Terrace Wealth,” said Ryan. “Our goal is to provide a client-focused, holistic approach to wealth management free of conflicts of interest, combining years of experience with a deep understanding of each client’s financial needs.”

    Brian added, “Trust and transparency are essential in building long-term financial relationships. We’re committed to working closely with our clients to create tailored strategies that align with their personal and institutional goals. We’re excited to bring cutting-edge wealth management solutions to the Midwest.”

    Terrace Wealth will offer a range of services, including retirement and goal planning, cash and money management, tax optimization, estate planning, and risk management. The firm is dedicated to serving individuals, families, and institutional clients across the Midwest, providing personalized, forward-thinking financial strategies that align with their long-term objectives.

    The firm plans to grow organically and via strategic acquisition partnerships, positioning itself for long-term success in the wealth management industry. The ideal acquisition partners are fee-only planning-focused firms offering investment management. Terrace also welcomes partnerships with single-owner practices where the advisor wants (or needs) to pull back from the practice to some degree or to realize a gradual exit that retains value, income, and a more ideal day-to-day.

    For more information about Terrace Wealth and services offered, please visit www.terracewealth.com or contact Ryan Bowman at ryan@terracewealth.com or (314) 810-4012.

    About Terrace Wealth

    Terrace Wealth is a fee-only wealth management firm based in Clayton, Missouri, that provides personalized financial strategies, offering services such as retirement and goal planning, cash and money management and estate planning. Terrace Wealth aims to help clients build and manage wealth by tailoring solutions to meet their unique financial goals. 

    About Funded Ventures

    Funded Ventures was founded in 2017 to acquire and grow small businesses. The firm previously co-led the acquisition of three companies in the SEO SaaS sector, culminating in a successful sale to private equity. Funded Ventures is currently building in the home services, legal services, and home health industries. Visit www.fundedventures.com to learn more.


    Press inquiries

    Terrace Wealth
    https://www.terracewealth.com
    Brian Wolfe
    wolfebd@gmail.com

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI USA: Chairman Lawler and Chairman Hill Applaud the Release of American-Israeli Hostage Edan Alexander

    Source: US Congressman Mike Lawler (R, NY-17)

    Pearl River, NY – 5/12/2025… Today, Congressman Mike Lawler (NY-17), Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee, and Congressman French Hill (AR-2), Chairman of the House Hostage Task Force, praised the return of Edan Alexander, an American-Israeli hostage held by Hamas since the October 7th terrorist attack. 

    On Friday, Reps. Lawler and Hill led a letter with a bipartisan coalition of lawmakers urging the Trump Administration to exert maximum diplomatic pressure in order to return all of the hostages still being held in Gaza. 

    “I’m thrilled by the news that Edan Alexander has returned home. I applaud President Trump for his tireless diplomatic work in securing the release of these hostages. As we continue forward in securing the release of Americans being held hostage abroad, I remain steadfast in my commitment to bring them all home. God be with the families who are still awaiting the release of their loved ones. I stand with you and will not relent until every American abroad is returned home,” stated Chairman Lawler. 

    “I am overjoyed to hear that Edan Alexander is finally coming home after enduring nearly 600 days of unimaginable hardship and suffering. His release is a moment of great relief and joy for his family and for all Americans who have kept him in their prayers. We are deeply grateful to all those whose tireless efforts made this homecoming possible. As Co-Chair of the Hostage Task Force in the House, I know that while we celebrate Edan’s release, we must continue our work to secure the freedom of every American held abroad and to bring home the remains of every American who died at the hands of Hamas,” concluded Chairman Hill. 

    Congressman Lawler is one of the most bipartisan members of Congress and represents New York’s 17th Congressional District, which is just north of New York City and contains all or parts of Rockland, Putnam, Dutchess, and Westchester Counties. He was rated the most effective freshman lawmaker in the 118th Congress, 8th overall, surpassing dozens of committee chairs.

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: SCHUMER – WITH CAPITAL REGION RELIGIOUS LEADERS, FOOD BANKS & FARMERS – SOUNDS ALARM THAT UNDER GOP PLAN TO CUT SNAP – AMERICA’S LARGEST ANTI-HUNGER PROGRAM – THOUSANDS OF KIDS, SENIORS, & FAMILIES…

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for New York Charles E Schumer

    Already 27 Tractor Trailers, Nearly 1 Million Pounds Of Food, For The Regional Food Bank Of Northeastern NY Has Been Canceled Due To Trump’s Cruel USDA Cuts – Now GOP Wants To Steal Up To $230 Billion From SNAP To Fund Trump’s Tax Breaks For Corporations & Billionaires

    Schumer, With Church Leaders & Advocates, Say This Double Whammy Could Hurtle Families To A Hunger Crisis, Impacting 112,000+ In Capital Region, Millions Nationwide; Demands GOP Block Cruel Cut To SNAP And Protect Anti-Hunger Programs

    Schumer: No Child Should Go To Bed Hungry. This Is Not A Partisan Issue; This Is A Moral Issue

    As Congressional Republicans look to advance the largest potential cut to the anti-hunger program SNAP in American history this week, U.S. Senator Chuck Schumer stood with Capital Region religious leaders, food banks, & farmers to issue a stark warning and demand action against the devastating proposed $230 billion SNAP cut to fund Trump’s tax cuts for corporations & billionaires, that would leave thousands of seniors, families and children hungry. The senator joined with church leaders and hunger advocates to say how this is a moral issue that we should all unite to stop, and Schumer called on the administration to reverse its hunger program cuts and for the NY House Republicans to stand against stealing from SNAP, which over 112,000 in the Capital Region rely on for food.

    “No child should ever go to bed hungry. But Trump’s slashing of anti-hunger programs at the USDA has already cancelled 27 tractor trailers, nearly 1 million pounds of food, for the Regional Food Bank of Northeastern NY. Now, House Republicans are trying to rush through the budget process and make the largest cut to SNAP in history. With food insecurity on the rise, this is a double whammy that could hurtle families to a hunger crisis,” said Senator Schumer. “Stealing from SNAP to pay for Trump’s tax breaks for corporations & billionaires is as backwards as it gets, and will result in thousands of kids, seniors, and families going hungry. It is not a partisan issue, it is a moral issue. That is why I am here to show what these cuts mean for the nuns, priests, and food banks on the frontlines of fighting against hunger. Together we are demanding a stop to this all-out assault on our federal anti-hunger programs and to protect SNAP for our children, veterans, seniors, and families.”

    Sister Betsy Van Deusen, CEO of Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany said, “SNAP is a lifeline for so many people in our communities and across the country. Working people who are trying to feed their families depend on this critical resource. The vast and draconian cuts that have been discussed will send children to bed hungry, our elders without basic nutrition and our veterans without dignity. the lives of wealthiest people in our country will not be substantially changed by another tax cut, but the millions on whose backs those cuts come, will be devastated.”

    Schumer added, “It only takes a few NY House Republicans to join us to stop this cruel cut to SNAP. We need NY Republicans to show us which side they are on with their actions. For feeding corporate & billionaires’ greed or for feeding hungry families here in the Capital Region. We need them to join us in demanding the USDA reverse all of Trump’s cuts to our farmers, food banks, and anti-hunger programs and keep their hands off SNAP to fund Trump’s tax breaks.”

    Schumer explained how Trump’s USDA has already cruelly canceled $1 billion in food assistance, hurting the Capital Region’s Food Bank of Northeastern NY, and if these SNAP cuts move forward it would be a double whammy, hurtling us to a hunger crisis. The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) is a lifeline for nearly 3 million NY seniors, veterans and families who rely on the critical funding to purchase groceries. Schumer said that we should be investing more not less in anti-hunger programs, but under the Republican proposal, the average family would be reduced to just $5.00 per day per person. A breakdown of SNAP recipients in the Capital Region from the Center for American Progress can be found below:

    County

    SNAP Recipients

    % of County on SNAP

    SNAP Retailers

    Albany

    34,556

    10.9%

    281

    Columbia

    5,546

    9.1%

    82

    Greene

    4,504

    9.5%

    54

    Rensselaer

    15,022

    9.4%

    148

    Saratoga

    13,847

    5.8%

    163

    Schenectady

    22,196

    13.9%

    166

    Schoharie

    3,671

    12.2%

    34

    Warren

    6,726

    10.3%

    75

    Washington

    6,556

    10.8%

    61

    TOTAL

    112,624

     

    1,064

    Schumer explained the Republican proposal to cut up to $230 billion from SNAP would inevitably mean costs of feeding families shift to states, who simply do not have the capacity to absorb this massive increase in expenses, risking families going hungry. According to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, mandating New York State to cover even a modest share of SNAP benefits would shift astronomical costs to the state with even just 5% increasing New York State’s costs by nearly $3.5 billion from FY2026 to FY2034. The senator said it is impossible to cut this much from federal SNAP funding without ripping food away from hungry children, seniors, veterans, people with disabilities, and more.

    These agonizing decisions would be amplified even further at the local level, with non-profits, many of whom have already had their funding cut, unable to fill in the gap. Counties could even be forced to shoulder the burden of increased costs in SNAP, using more local dollars to provide coverage because less federal funding will be coming in.

    According to New York’s Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, in New York’s 20th Congressional District – which represents all of Albany, Saratoga, and Schenectady counties, and portions of Montgomery and Rensselaer counties – nearly 45,000 households receive an estimated $185 million in annual benefits. 34% of SNAP recipients are children, 15% are elderly, and 12% are people with disabilities. In New York’s 21st Congressional District – which represents all of Clinton, Franklin, St. Lawrence, Lewis, Hamilton, Essex, Warren, Washington, Fulton, Herkimer, Montgomery, and Schoharie counties, and portions of Jefferson, Oneida, and Saratoga counties – more than 52,000 households receive as estimated$194 million in annual benefits. 30% of SNAP recipients are children, 18% are elderly, and 14% are people with disabilities.

    Schumer said, “SNAP is a lifeline that helps uplift everyone, from the NY farms who get direct assistance from the program to the Capital Region families’ kitchen tables. NY Republicans are tying themselves in knots to try to justify these SNAP cuts, but the math shows you cannot make the massive cuts the House’s tax bill proposes without risking the food security for thousands of families. I’m all for reducing any waste or fraud to make the program more efficient, but rushing to pass these massive damaging cuts with no plan while they slash our food banks is a recipe for disaster.”

    The proposed SNAP cuts would be a blow to Capital Region food banks which have already been hit hard by Trump’s funding freezes and canceled payments. Earlier this year, the USDA canceled $1 billion in food assistance for organizations to purchase locally grown food. USDA programs provide food banks, schools, and other organizations with federal support to purchase local food products from NY farms.

    The Regional Food Bank of Northeastern New York has already had 27 tractor-trailers of food canceled, which is nearly 1 million pounds meant to feed Capital Region families. That’s nearly 800,000 meals, and the food bank expects to lose over 200 tractor-trailers over the next year. 80% of this food goes to pantries and soup kitchens like CONSERNS-U in Rensselaer. The food bank also works with religious leaders like Catholic Charities to distribute food to those who need it most.

    Schumer said these proposed cuts will limit food banks’ ability to keep shelves stocked as more people have been forced to rely on food banks to feed their families. Food bank workers and religious leaders across Upstate New York are concerned about the impact of potential cuts to SNAP on the people they serve, and farmers are worried there will be nowhere to sell their food if SNAP funding levels drop.

    “No matter which way you slice it, this Congressional Republican plan will screw Capital Region families, food banks and farmers from farm to table. We need everyone to stand up to these cuts that would take away food from our neighbors in need,” added Schumer.

    “When federal nutrition programs are cut, it’s not just a single plate that goes empty — it’s millions,” said Tom Nardacci, CEO of the Regional Food Bank. “Without federal support, community organizations simply can’t fill the growing gap. Slashing SNAP or canceling USDA food deliveries doesn’t just reduce access — it clears the table entirely for seniors, children, veterans, and families in every community in this country. We appreciate Senator Schumer fighting to save these important programs.”

    “Cutting or reducing budgets for food safety net programs is the exact opposite of what is needed to ensure New Yorkers don’t go hungry,” said Natasha Pernicka, Executive Director for The Food Pantries for the Capital District. “Any reductions to current SNAP will continue to exacerbate the growing strain on our food pantry system. We should be doing much more to help our food-insecure communities, not less.”

    Proposed rollbacks to the country’s most widely utilized nutrition assistance program would strain budgets for Capital Region families. Schumer said decimating funding for SNAP right as costs at grocery stores across the country are skyrocketing will hit the Capital Region hard. According to the New York State Community Action Association, more than 12% of people in Rensselaer County live in poverty, including nearly 20% of children. According to No Kid Hungry, over half of New Yorkers reported going into debt in the past year due to rising food costs, with over 60% of families with children.

    SNAP not only supplements families’ food budgets, it has also generated great economic benefits for New York State and NY-20 specifically. According to the National Grocers Association, grocery stores across New York State sold over $2.1 billion in groceries to people using SNAP benefits, including $99.3 million in NY-20. This created more than 18,500 New York jobs in the grocery industry, including 876 in NY-20, and generated more than $820.8 million in grocery industry wages, including $38.7 million in NY-20.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Canada: New lien rules support B.C. service providers

    Source: Government of Canada regional news

    New rules will make it easier for businesses to collect debts for services they provide to repair, store or transport goods.

    The new Commercial Liens Act comes into force on June 30, 2025, creating one clear set of lien rules for anyone who repairs, stores or transports goods. It replaces a patchwork of outdated laws, which created different rules for different services.

    The change reduces risks and costs, meaning service providers will be less likely to lose their liens and the payment that liens secure. Updated rules and processes that are easier to understand benefit businesses and their customers.

    Once in force, the act gives service providers flexibility by allowing them to keep possession of goods or to register the lien in B.C.’s Personal Property Registry. This allows owners to keep using their vehicle or equipment to make money and pay off the debt. It means that liens can be registered on big items that cannot be easily moved or stored.

    The Personal Property Registry, an online system that tracks legal claims on personal property, will be updated on June 30 to so that commercial liens can be registered.

    The changes will also make it easier to enforce liens without going to court, which helps businesses get paid and cuts legal costs.

    The act replaces the Repairers Lien Act, Warehouse Lien Act and Livestock Lien Act. Any existing liens under those acts will continue as commercial liens.

    The changes respond to the B.C. Law Institute’s recommendation to follow Saskatchewan’s lead in adopting the Uniform Liens Act. It uses similar rules used by secured lenders across Canada to collect on loans against personal property.

    This brings B.C. closer to the goal of having one set of lien rules across Canada so businesses that provide services in different provinces do not have to keep track of different rules.

    Learn More:

    For more information about B.C.’s Personal Property Registry, visit: https://www.bcregistry.gov.bc.ca/en-CA/ppr-marketing

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Warren, Booker, Nadler Press Pepsi on Potentially Illegal Price Discrimination Against Small, Independently-Owned Grocery Stores

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Massachusetts – Elizabeth Warren
    May 12, 2025
    “Charging discriminatory, high prices to smaller, independent retailers harms those retailers’ ability to compete, and often forces consumers to endure unfair price increases.”
    “American families across the country continue to struggle to afford groceries, and enforcement of the [Robinson-Patman Act] is part of the solution to help promote competition throughout the food supply chain and ease their financial burden.”
    Text of Letter (PDF)
    Washington, D.C. — U.S. Senators Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) and Cory Booker (D-N.J.), along with Representative Jerry Nadler (D-N.Y.) wrote to Ramon Laguarta, CEO of PepsiCo, Inc. (Pepsi) demanding an explanation for the company’s potentially illegal price discrimination against small and independent grocery stores. The lawmakers are the top Democrats on the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Consumer Rights, and House Judiciary Subcommittee on the Administrate State, Regulatory Reform, and Antitrust, respectively. 
    Representatives Becca Balint (D-Vt.), Andre Carson (D-Ind.), Maggie Goodlander (D-N.H.), Pramila Jayapal (D-Wash.), Summer Lee (D-Pa.), Rashida Tlaib (D-Mich.), and Nikema Williams (D-Ga.) joined in signing the letter. 
    In recent months, Pepsi has faced legal action from convenience stores and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), a regulator charged with enforcing federal consumer protection laws and antitrust laws. In January 2025, the FTC sued Pepsi, accusing it of violating the Robinson-Patman Act (RPA), which prohibits sellers from engaging in anticompetitive price discrimination. The FTC claimed that for years, Pepsi has disadvantaged retailers – including local convenience stores – by consistently giving benefits and advantages, such as promotional payments, to a big-box store, while denying those same benefits to the store’s competitors.
    In February 2025, two small, family-owned convenience stores accused Pepsi and its subsidiary Frito-Lay of violating the RPA, claiming the corporation charged independent retailers more “for identical bags of snack chips” compared to what it charged chain stores. The plaintiffs claimed they were charged as much as 50 percent more for those goods, and that the “discriminatory pricing” forced them to pass on the higher costs to consumers. 
    “The Robinson-Patman Act is an important tool for the FTC to combat illegal price discrimination and concentration, and to provide a level playing field to all businesses…Charging discriminatory, high prices to smaller, independent retailers harms those retailers’ ability to compete, and often forces consumers to endure unfair price increases,” wrote the lawmakers. 
    The RPA forbids sellers from charging competing buyers different prices for the same goods when the price discrimination may lessen or harm competition. The law also prohibits special promotional payments, discounts, rebates, allowances, or services to one buyer unless they are made available to all competing buyers.
    “As food prices remain sky-high, the FTC should continue to enforce the RPA to promote fair competition in the food industry,” urged the lawmakers. 
    The bicameral coalition asked Pepsi to explain, by May 25, 2025, its pricing strategies, any discrepancies between what it charges chain retailers and small, independent retailers, how these price discrepancies affect shopping options for consumers, and the company’s lobbying efforts to refute price discrimination allegations.  
    As a champion for American consumers and a secure and healthy economy, Senator Warren has engaged in oversight of corporations for unfairly increasing prices for consumers. She has also been calling for more competition and stronger enforcement of antitrust laws to bring down prices for families: 
    In May 2025, Senators Elizabeth Warren and Jim Banks (R-Ind.) applauded the Department of Justice’s ongoing investigation into potential anticompetitive practices by major egg producers and urged the agency to continue its thorough investigation as egg prices continue to rise.
    In January 2025, Senator Elizabeth Warren and Representative Jim McGovern (D-Mass.) led 19 of their colleagues, writing to President Donald Trump, pushing him to take meaningful steps to lower the prices of eggs and other groceries—a problem he largely ignored during his entire first week in office.
    In November 2024, Senator Elizabeth Warren and Congressman Adam Schiff (D-Calif.) led their colleagues in writing to Chair of the Federal Trade Commission, Lina Khan, and Secretary of the Department of Agriculture, Thomas Vilsack, urging them to investigate Albertsons and other major grocery chains for predatory practices that could have violated federal laws.
    In October 2024, Senators Elizabeth Warren led a letter to President and Chief Executive Officer of McDonald’s, Chris Kempczinski, pushing for more information on McDonald’s pricing decisions as fast food prices continue to increase, outpacing inflation and squeezing customers.
    In October 2024, Senators Elizabeth Warren and Ed Markey, along with Representatives Jim McGovern and Ayanna Pressley, sent a letter to Frans Muller, CEO of Ahold Delhaize—parent company of Stop & Shop—demanding an explanation for its potential use of pricing algorithms is leading to price gouging, resulting in higher prices in minority and working class communities in Massachusetts.
    On May 3, 2024, during a hearing of the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, Senator Warren called out food industry price gouging and urged action to combat unfair pricing practices.
    On March 28, 2024, Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) and Representative Mary Gay Scanlon (D-Penn.) led a group of 14 lawmakers in a letter to FTC Chair Lina Khan urging the agency to revive enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act (RPA), a critical tool to promote fair competition in the food industry. 
    On February 28, 2024, Senator Warren joined Senator Bob Casey (D-Pa.) in introducing the Shrinkflation Prevention Act to crack down on corporations that deceive consumers by selling smaller sizes of their products without lowering prices.
    On February 15, 2024, Senators Warren, Baldwin, Casey, and U.S. Representative Jan Schakowsky (D-Ill.) reintroduced the Price Gouging Prevention Act of 2024, which would protect consumers and prohibit corporate price gouging by authorizing the FTC and state attorneys general to enforce a federal ban against grossly excessive price increases.
    In December 2023, Senator Warren urged the FTC to block the Kroger-Albertsons merger, which would give the five largest food retail companies control of 55 percent of all grocery sales, allowing them to further control and ultimately raise consumer prices, while also reducing job competition, decreasing wages, and decreasing the bargaining power of organized labor.
    In November 2023, Senator Warren called out TransDigm for its refusal to provide cost and pricing information needed to prevent price gouging of taxpayers and the Department of Defense.
    Senator Warren repeatedly urged the Biden administration to closely scrutinize other potentially anticompetitive mergers that could lead to higher prices for consumers and accelerate industry consolidation. She has led letters about the proposed mergers of Frontier and Spirit airlines, JetBlue and Spirit Airlines, Sanderson-Wayne, WarnerMedia-Discovery, and Amazon-MGM.
    In March 2022, Senator Warren introduced the Prohibiting Anticompetitive Mergers Act to help stomp out rampant industry consolidation that allows companies to raise consumer prices and mistreat workers. The bill would ban the biggest, most anticompetitive mergers and give the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission the teeth to reject deals in the first instance without court orders and to break up harmful mergers.
    In February 2022, at a hearing, Senator Warren called out corporations for abusing their market power to raise consumer prices and boost profits.
    That same month, Senator Warren requested the Department of Justice to take aggressive action against corporations violating antitrust laws to hike prices for consumers.
    In January 2022, Senator Warren questioned Federal Reserve nominee Lael Brainard about market concentration and price gouging driving inflation.
    At a January 2022 hearing, Senator Warren pressed Fed Chair Jerome Powell on the role of corporate concentration in driving up prices for consumers during his renomination hearing to be Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
    In a New York Times op-ed published in April 2020, Senator Warren urged Congress to focus on cracking down on price gouging in its ongoing effort to address the impact of the coronavirus pandemic.
    In March 2020, Senator Warren joined her colleagues in urging the FTC to use its full authority to prevent abusive price gouging on consumer health products during the COVID-19 pandemic. 

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Falmouth — Update: RCMP seeking information about fatal collision in Falmouth

    Source: Royal Canadian Mounted Police

    On May 10, RCMP officers, fire services, and EHS responded to a fatal two-vehicle collision on Highway 101 between Hantsport and Falmouth.

    At this time, based on physical evidence gathered at the scene, investigators believe that the Honda Civic was travelling in the opposite direction of traffic in the eastbound lanes when it collided with the Nissan Sentra approximately 1.5 kms from Exit 7 in Falmouth.

    Through the investigation, it’s been determined that Kings District RCMP responded to a possible impaired driver involving the same Civic at 7:20 p.m. The vehicle was last seen at a restaurant on Hwy. 1 near the 11600 block in Grand Pre. An extensive search for the vehicle, led by multiple officers in Kings and West Hants counties, was unsuccessful.

    Investigators are seeking information from the public to establish the whereabouts of the blue 2014 Honda Civic prior to 7:20 p.m. and prior to the collision, which occurred at approximately 11:12 p.m. The vehicle was bearing Nova Scotia licence plate HLF590.

    The investigation is ongoing.

    Anyone with information about this incident or dashcam footage of the area prior to the collision is asked to call West Hants District RCMP at 902-798-2207. To remain anonymous, contact Nova Scotia Crime Stoppers, toll-free, at 1-800-222-TIPS (8477), submit a secure web tip at www.crimestoppers.ns.ca, or use the P3 Tips app.

    Our thoughts continue to be with the victims’ loved ones at this difficult time.

    File #: 2025-632421, 2025-631333

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Global: Syria faces renewed sectarian violence as government fails to deliver inclusivity

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Katya Alkhateeb, Senior Researcher in International Human Rights Law & Humanitarian Law at Essex Law School and Human Rights Centre, University of Essex

    A recent surge in violence against Syria’s Druze religious community has reportedly seen over 100 people killed since the start of May. This is a grim extension of sectarian targeting that began with the massacre of Alawite civilians in March.

    Both crises are grounded in the same religious justifications, revealing problems in Syria’s transition following the end of the Assad family’s 53-year rule.

    Specifically these atrocities are linked by the misuse of nafir aam – a general call to arms or mass mobilisation. It is an Arabic term rooted in classical Islamic jurisprudence, especially in discussions about jihad and collective defence.

    It is declared only when the Muslim community faces an existential threat, such as an invasion or overwhelming danger from an enemy.


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    Recently though, it has been used by extremist groups such as Islamic State and al-Qaeda to summon Muslims to fight supposed enemies of the faith. These enemies have, in most cases, been innocent civilians.

    In March, when gunmen loyal to Syria’s former leader Bashar al-Assad (who is an Alawite) clashed with security forces, the transitional government issued a nafir aam. Loudspeakers in mosques across northern Syria broadcast mobilisation calls, tribal groups pledged support, and recruitment links flooded social media.

    The UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported that close to 1,400 Alawite civilians were subsequently murdered, with the final death toll likely to be much higher.

    A post on the Telegram channel of Syria’s ruling Hayat Tahrir al-Sham organisation reading: ‘General mobilisation now being announced via loudspeakers in Idlib and Aleppo toward the coast. Listen to the important and urgent announcement directly.’
    Telegram

    The same sectarian machinery has now been turned against the Druze. This latest wave of violence was triggered by the unproven allegation that a Druze cleric was responsible for an audio recording containing anti-Islamic remarks. Despite the cleric’s immediate denial, armed groups launched assaults on Druze areas near Syria’s capital, Damascus.

    Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, vowed to protect the Druze and the Israeli military subsequently carried out a series of airstrikes across Syria. These included strikes near the presidential palace. While Netanyahu has positioned these actions as protecting a vulnerable minority, they risk further destabilising Syria’s fragile transition.

    Deeply entrenched sectarianism

    Syria’s transitional government is led by the Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Following its campaign against Assad, HTS has been implementing a new policy of tolerance towards minority groups. The Syrian president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, has vowed to protect minorities and pursue more inclusive policies.

    But HTS is arguably failing to deliver the inclusive governance it promised when seizing control of the country in December 2024. The seven-member committee for the national dialogue conference, which began in February to discuss a new path for the nation, lacked Alawite, Kurdish and Druze representation.

    The resulting constitutional declaration offered no explicit protections for Syria’s religious diversity. It also centralises power in ways that undermine pluralism.

    Article 3 of the constitutional declaration states that the “religion of the president of the republic is Islam” and “Islamic jurisprudence is the principal source of legislation”. Officials have clarified that any future parliament would remain subordinate to Islamic law.

    The ideological basis and policy for sectarian violence in Syria remains deeply entrenched. A 14th-century fatwa (a religious edict) by Sunni Muslim scholar Ibn Taymiyyah branded Alawites as “infidels”. This fatwa continues to circulate in areas under government control.

    At the Brussels donors’ conference on Syria in March, Syrian foreign minister Asaad al-Shibani blamed “54 years of minority rule” for mass displacement and deaths – raising concerns about sectarian narratives. And the integrity of the investigation into the recent massacres have been questioned, notably by the Syrians for Truth and Justice human rights group.

    Criticisms have also been made over the inclusion of controversial figures to the newly formed Civil Peace Committee, which is tasked with healing the sectarian wounds left by Assad family rule. One of these figures, Sheikh Anas Ayrout, was reported 12 years ago to have made inciting comments against Alawites.

    Civil society organisations, including the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, have called on the government to issue protective religious rulings for minority communities. But their appeals have gone unanswered. And violence, particularly against Alawites in Homs and Aleppo, has surged dramatically.

    Five months after Assad’s fall, it seems that Syria is not witnessing the long hoped for fruition of its 2011 revolution, where pro-democracy protests swept through the country, but rather its continuing unravelling.

    The groups now in power had little to do with the revolution’s early democratic hopes. They have emerged from transnational jihadist networks with a radically different vision for Syria’s future.

    In the view of prominent Syrian intellectual Yassin al-Haj Saleh, Syria urgently needs a period of de-escalation and genuine political concessions. He argues for “taking two or three steps back … to move more firmly forward”. Political solutions must precede the creation of public institutions, not the other way around.

    If the cycle of sectarian violence is not broken, Syria risks sliding deeper into communal bloodshed that could permanently fracture the nation’s social fabric.

    The international community must act decisively. It has to apply concrete political pressure that makes the protection of all Syrians – regardless of sect – a non-negotiable foundation for Syria’s path forward.

    The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Syria faces renewed sectarian violence as government fails to deliver inclusivity – https://theconversation.com/syria-faces-renewed-sectarian-violence-as-government-fails-to-deliver-inclusivity-255974

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: Medetomidine: what you need to know about the animal sedative turning up in opioid deaths

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Paul Chazot, Professor of Pharmacology, Durham University

    Michael O’Keene/Shutterstock.com

    The opioid crisis, increasingly driven by synthetic opioids, continues to claim tens of thousands of lives annually in the US alone. Similar crises have arisen all over the western world.

    The crisis has become more complex as powerful synthetic opioids like fentanyl, nitazenes and oxycodone are now being “cut” (mixed) with other drugs that slow brain activity, including animal tranquillisers.

    The emergence of medetomidine as a new contaminant in the US illicit drug market signals a worrying development in this escalating crisis. When public health officials in Philadelphia first began testing for the drug in May last year, medetomidine was found in 29% of fentanyl samples analysed. Six months later, the drug was found in 87% of fentanyl samples.

    Medetomidine, a drug approved only for veterinary use as a sedative and painkiller, has increasingly been implicated in illicit fentanyl-related overdoses.


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    Like xylazine – another veterinary tranquilliser recently detected in street drugs – it is believed that medetomidine is added to fentanyl to boost its euphoric effects and hence make it more appealing to users. However, medetomidine is even more potent and longer-lasting than xylazine.

    An overdose of medetomidine can cause extreme sleepiness, very low blood pressure, slow heart rate, trouble breathing (respiratory failure), and even coma or death. This is because medetomidine rapidly depresses the central nervous system and slows the heart rate significantly.

    When medetomidine is used with opioids, the risk is even greater because both drugs can slow breathing, and together they can make it much worse.

    Overdose-reversing drugs

    Police and paramedics use naloxone to reverse fentanyl overdoses. But if the drug is mixed with medetomidine, naloxone won’t work because medetomidine affects the body in a different way.

    Naloxone won’t reverse the effects of animal tranquillisers.
    oasisamuel / Shutterstock.com

    Atipamezole can reverse the effects of medetomidine – such as sedation, slowed breathing and slowed heart rate – but it’s only been tested in dogs. The US Food and Drug Administration has not approved the drug for human use.

    Overdoses from fentanyl and high-potency nitazenes are also common in the UK and across Europe. The spread of medetomidine in street drugs in other parts of the world needs urgent attention.

    The first death in the UK involving xylazine was reported by the National Programme on Substance Abuse Deaths in December 2022. Between April 2023 and January 2024, 17 cases were reported in the UK, in a range of opioid tablets and powders, including codeine, tramadol and heroin.

    So far, no confirmed cases involving medetomidine have been reported in the UK. If trends in the US are reliable indicators, the UK may face similar challenges soon.

    Paul Chazot does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Medetomidine: what you need to know about the animal sedative turning up in opioid deaths – https://theconversation.com/medetomidine-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-animal-sedative-turning-up-in-opioid-deaths-256015

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Victim Services Volunteers Recognized During Victims and Survivors of Crime Week

    Source: Government of Canada regional news

    Released on May 12, 2025

    The Government of Saskatchewan has proclaimed May 11-17, 2025, as Victims and Survivors of Crime Week in the province. 

    The week is a chance to raise awareness about matters facing victims and survivors of crime and to highlight the services and supports available to aid them on their path to healing. It is also a chance to acknowledge the contributions of Saskatchewan’s volunteer victim support workers, staff and community board members. 

    Saskatchewan’s long-term volunteers, staff and board members were recognized at the Legislative Building today for their contributions to police-based victim services programs and the strength of their collaboration within the Saskatchewan justice system. 

    “The dedication and compassion of our Saskatchewan volunteer victim support workers is instrumental to creating and maintaining safe, healthy communities across our province,” Justice Minister and Attorney General Tim McLeod, K.C., said. “I would like to sincerely thank them for helping victims and survivors of crime overcome tragic situations, ensuring they are not alone and for the collaborative role they play in helping people navigate the criminal justice system.”

    Currently, there are 150 volunteer victim support workers working with police-based victim services programs in Saskatchewan. In 2023-24, more than 13,000 victims of crime were supported through their efforts. 

    Fourteen police-based victim services programs operate throughout Saskatchewan. Of these, four are part of municipal police services, while the other 10 are overseen by a board of directors, including 80 volunteer community board members. 

    For more information on Victims and Survivors of Crime Week, volunteer victim support worker opportunities and services or supports that are available for victims and survivors, contact a police-based victim services program through your local RCMP detachment or municipal police service. You can also contact the Victims Services Branch at 306-787-3500 or visit:
    www.saskatchewan.ca/victimsservices.

    -30-

    For more information, contact:

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI USA: LEADER JEFFRIES STATEMENT ON RELEASE OF EDAN ALEXANDER

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Hakeem Jeffries (8th District of New York)

    Know Your Immigration Rights

    If you or a loved one encounter immigration enforcement officials, it is essential that you know your rights and have prepared your household for all possible outcomes.

    Ask for a warrant: The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects you from unreasonable search and seizure. You do not have to open your door until you see a valid warrant to enter your home or search your belongings.

    Your right to remain silent: The Fifth Amendment protects your right to remain silent and not incriminate yourself. You are not required to share any personal information such as your place of birth, immigration status or criminal history.

    Always consult an attorney: You have a right to speak with an attorney. You do not have to sign anything or hand officials any documents without speaking to an attorney. Try to identify and consult one in advance.

    The New York City Office of Civil Justice and the Mayor’s Office of Immigrant Affairs (MOIA) support a variety of free immigration legal services through local nonprofit legal organizations. To access these resources, dial 311 and say “Action NYC,” call the MOIA Immigration Legal Support Hotline at 800-354-0365 Monday through Friday from 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. or visit MOIA’s website.

    Learn more here: KNOW YOUR IMMIGRATION RIGHTS  – Congressman Hakeem Jeffries

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Keir Starmer’s immigration plans: research shows you don’t beat the far right by becoming them

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Katy Brown, Research Fellow in Language and Social Justice, Manchester Metropolitan University

    Keir Starmer gives press conference on migration Flickr/Number 10, CC BY-NC-ND

    As British prime minister Keir Starmer vowed to “finally take back control of our borders” in a landmark speech on immigration on May 12, it felt a little like déjà vu.

    Some nine years earlier, we had heard those exact words repeated over and over in the build-up to the Brexit referendum from former prime minister Boris Johnson and the Leave campaign. It was a refrain also used by Nigel Farage and UKIP.

    Of course, this direct reference was the point. Starmer used it to claim that the Labour government’s white paper on immigration was finally going to deliver on what had been promised and desired for many years.

    In these opening lines, the tone was set. And as the speech went on, there were echoes of far-right language and ideas reverberating throughout. Starmer lamented the “squalid” state of contemporary politics, the “forces” pulling the country apart, and the previous government’s so-called “experiment in open borders”.

    This speech and the white paper that it unveiled are but the latest indication of the rightward direction of travel within UK politics, led by mainstream and far-right parties alike – as exemplified in recent months by the footage released of immigration raids and deportations.

    Some will argue this is Labour’s response to the rising threat of Reform UK, with results in the recent local elections seen as evidence of the far right’s growing popularity. So the story goes, Labour is proving that they can be tough on immigration, showing would-be Reform defectors that they can be trusted after all.

    This familiar narrative seems to follow a prevailing wisdom which is parroted in political, media and public debates – that appeasing the far right is the way to defeat it. Rather than beating the far right at their own game, however, research shows that these techniques simply legitimise their key talking points and further normalise exclusionary politics.

    Starmer’s speech is a case in point. In using “take back control” from the outset, there was no hiding the intended audience or message. Starmer claimed that this project would “close the book on a squalid chapter for our politics, our economy, and our country”, implying that excessive immigration has directly caused these problems and that stopping it solves them. This chimes with classic far-right narratives where migration is framed as the root of all societal ills.

    When these kinds of ideas are pushed by those in government, with great authority and influence, they are given greater credence and weight. A strikingly clear example of this came in the summer of 2024 when participants in racist riots waved posters containing the slogan “stop the boats” (a phrase popularised by the previous Tory government).

    Another component of the speech that was reminiscent of far-right tropes was the idea that increased immigration was a deliberate tactic by the previous government. Starmer suggested that the Conservatives were actively pursuing a “one-nation experiment in open borders” while deceiving the British public of their intentions.

    Far-right conspiracies are often premised on the idea that elites are deliberately encouraging mass immigration. It’s not hard to see how Starmer’s words could act as a dog whistle in this scenario.

    These claims are especially damaging when we think about the draconian measures introduced under former Conservative governments, such as the Rwanda policy. Labour is now indicating that these proposals didn’t go far enough.

    To justify bringing far stricter immigration rules, Starmer stated that “for the vast majority of people in this country, that is what they have long wanted to see”. As far-right parties so often do, Labour suggests that they are delivering on “people’s priorities”. Yet are they really a priority for people, or are we told that they are a priority which then makes them more of a priority?

    Research by Aurelien Mondon, senior lecturer in politics at the University of Bath, illustrates how people’s personal and national priorities differ dramatically. When people in the UK were asked to name the two most important issues facing them personally, immigration didn’t even make it into the top ten.

    However, when asked the same question about the issues facing their country, immigration topped the list. How can something that doesn’t affect you in your day-to-day life suddenly become a top priority for your country? We need to challenge the narrative that the government is simply acting on people’s wishes and acknowledge its own capacity to set the agenda.

    Other priorities

    Some will say that harsher anti-immigration policies are a necessary evil to defeat the far right. However, if people’s personal priorities are really the cost of living, housing and education, why is the government not focusing more of its energy on these things rather than scapegoating migrants?

    What’s more, research shows that even based on these terms, these strategies are ineffective and can actually boost the success of the far right electorally. After all, its ideas are being repeatedly normalised.

    In all this tactical talk, we lose sight of the fact that people are living the consequences of this rhetoric and policies right now. Rather than focus on Reform’s potential performance in a general election that is probably years away, we should recognise the immediate consequences of the rhetoric that has accompanied this white paper. Even if this did put a dent in Reform’s prospects, what is the meaning of defeating them if the policies they promote become part of the mainstream in the process?

    The bottom line is that you do not beat the far right by becoming them. It doesn’t work electorally or ideologically, and even if it did, minoritised communities suffer the consequences regardless. The far right is not some threat lying waiting in the future – its normalisation is happening now.

    Katy Brown has received funding from UK Research and Innovation and the Irish Research Council. She is affiliated with the Reactionary Politics Research Network and Manchester Centre for Research in Linguistics.

    ref. Keir Starmer’s immigration plans: research shows you don’t beat the far right by becoming them – https://theconversation.com/keir-starmers-immigration-plans-research-shows-you-dont-beat-the-far-right-by-becoming-them-256499

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI USA: Attorney General James Delivers Over $13,500 Worth of Baby Formula to Rochester Families

    Source: US State of New York

    EW YORK – New York Attorney General Letitia James today announced that her office secured more than $13,500 worth of baby formula from baby formula supplier Paragon USA & Co., LLC (Paragon) for families in Rochester. The donation is the result of an investigation conducted by the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) into Paragon for price gouging during the national baby formula shortage in 2022. As part of a settlement with OAG, Paragon has paid a $10,000 penalty and must pay an additional $35,000 in donated baby formula or cash. Today’s donation will be distributed to families in need across Rochester by Foodlink, a community organization that serves the Greater Rochester and Finger Lakes regions.

    “During a nationwide baby formula shortage, Paragon took advantage of New York families, illegally raising the price on formula to squeeze extra profits,” said Attorney General James. “My office made sure Paragon was held responsible for their illegal action and guaranteed that hard-working families in New York received relief. I thank Foodlink and all its partner organizations for distributing this baby formula to help Rochester families in need.”

    “We are thankful to Attorney General James for once again providing Foodlink and our new Health & Wellness initiative with additional baby formula,” said Julia Tedesco, President & CEO of Foodlink. “Our partners have highlighted a growing need for baby products and other essential items, especially as grocery prices remain historically high. This generous contribution will greatly benefit our members and their clients who are in urgent need of formula.”

    In 2022, Abbott Laboratories closed one of its baby formula manufacturing plants and recalled formula produced there, creating significant hardship for families throughout New York and the nation as formula supplies dwindled and prices rose. Abbott produces over 40 percent of the infant formula sold in the United States, and the plant it closed was responsible for approximately one fifth of total U.S. production.

    New York’s price gouging laws prohibit vendors from unconscionably increasing prices on goods that are vital to consumers’ health, safety, or welfare during market disruptions such as the 2022 formula shortage. In May 2022, Attorney General James issued warnings to more than 30 retailers across the state to stop overcharging for baby formula after consumers reported unreasonably high prices.

    The OAG’s investigation found that Paragon, which supplies formula to retailers in New York, generated tens of thousands of dollars in additional revenue by raising prices more than 20 percent after Abbott announced its recall.

    As a result of a settlement with OAG, Paragon must pay penalties and make formula donations with a combined value of $45,000. This includes a $10,000 penalty to the state that Paragon has already paid and an additional $35,000 that can be paid in the form of donated formula or cash that must be delivered by June 10, 2025.

    Today’s donation is the third secured by Attorney General James as part of the settlement with Paragon. In February, Attorney General James secured the donation of $1,500 worth of baby formula to families in Westchester, and in March, $6,300 worth of baby formula to families in Brooklyn. To date, Attorney General James has donated more than $21,400 worth of baby formula as a result of the settlement with Paragon.

    “No parent should be forced to choose between paying their bills or feeding their child,” said Senator Jeremy Cooney. “When businesses illegally jack up prices for goods like baby formula, they must be held accountable. I applaud Attorney General James for once again protecting consumers and ensuring Rochester families get the relief they deserve.”

    “Families are struggling to make ends meet with inflation and an economy on the brink of a recession, so this donation goes such a long way for Rochester children, who are already amongst the neediest in the nation,” said Assemblymember Jen Lunsford. “I am grateful to Attorney General James for doggedly pursuing these bad corporate actors and holding them accountable for their opportunistic money grab.”

    Attorney General James is a leader in the fight to protect New York consumers and guard against price gouging. As part of a $675,000 settlement with formula suppliers Marine Park and Formula Depot, Attorney General James secured the donation of over $344,000 worth of baby formula to families in the Bronx in March 2025 and $140,000 worth of formula to families in Rochester in December 2024. In October 2024, Attorney General James led a multistate coalition urging Congressional leaders to support a national ban on price gouging. In March and April 2024, Attorney General James distributed over 9,500 cans of baby formula in Buffalo and New York City from a settlement with Walgreens for price gouging during the formula shortage. In May 2023, Attorney General James secured a $100,000 settlement with Quality King Distributors, Inc. due to unconscionable price increases for Lysol products during the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic. In April 2021, Attorney General James delivered 1.2 million eggs to food pantries throughout the state which were secured as part of an agreement with the nation’s largest egg producers for price gouging in the early months of the pandemic.

    New Yorkers should report potential concerns about price gouging to the OAG by filing a complaint online or calling 800-771-7755.

    This matter was handled by Assistant Attorney General Benjamin C. Fishman, under the supervision of Bureau Chief Jane M. Azia and Deputy Bureau Chief Laura J. Levine, all of the Consumer Frauds and Protection Bureau. Former Data Scientist Jasmine McAllister also assisted in this matter, under the supervision of Director of Research and Analytics Victoria Khan, Deputy Director Gautam Sisodia, and former Director Megan Thorsfeldt. The Consumer Frauds and Protection Bureau is a part of the Division for Economic Justice, which is led by Chief Deputy Attorney General Chris D’Angelo and is overseen by First Deputy Attorney General Jennifer Levy.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Security: FBI Releases Officers Killed and Assaulted in the Line of Duty, 2024 Special Report and Law Enforcement Employee Counts

    Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI Crime News (b)

    On Monday, May 12, 2025, the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program released the “Officers Killed and Assaulted in the Line of Duty, 2024 Special Report” and data from the Law Enforcement Employee Counts on the FBI’s Crime Data Explorer (CDE) at cde.ucr.cjis.gov.

    “Officers Killed and Assaulted in the Line of Duty, 2024 Special Report”, provides preliminary counts of law enforcement officers killed and assaulted in 2024, as well as an in-depth analysis of law enforcement officers who were killed or assaulted from 2015 through 2024, based on the data voluntarily provided by law enforcement agencies to the FBI’s UCR Program.

    In 2024, 64 officers were feloniously killed in the line of duty. That is consistent with the number of officers feloniously killed the previous two years; however, the rate of assaults against officers increased from 2022 to 2024. Firearms were the most reported weapon used in fatal incidents.

    Information about offenders of officer felonious killings in 2024 show there were 61 offenders reported for the felonious deaths. Of these offenders, 95.9% were male, 57.9% were white, and 32 offenders were reported to have a prior criminal record.

    For each of the 10 years under consideration, the South region had the most line-of-duty deaths. There was a 45% increase in the deaths in that region in 2024 (29 deaths) compared to 2023 (20 deaths).

    Agencies reported 85,730 officer assaults in 2024 indicating a rate of 13.5 assaults per 100 officers, marking the highest officer assault rate in the past 10 years.

    The number of officers assaulted and injured by firearms has climbed over the years, reaching a 10-year high in 2023 with approximately 500 officers assaulted and injured by firearms. In 2024, the number of officers assaulted and injured by firearms dropped to approximately 457 officers.

    Most accidental deaths of law enforcement officers from 2020 to 2024 can be attributed to motor vehicle accidents.

    Also released today was the 2024 information from the Law Enforcement Employee Counts Data Collection. Law enforcement agencies provide these counts to the FBI annually and account for all full-time sworn law enforcement officers and civilian employees. This information may be used by city, county, state, and federal law enforcement agencies to establish manpower needs, and to provide effective enforcement and protection.

    The full report may be found in the Special Reports section on the FBI’s CDE.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: International Day of Plant Health: Suppressing Fruit Flies in Africa

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

    Sharing Sterile Insect Technique Experiences

    To leverage this new infrastructure, a workshop on using the SIT for integrated pest management was held in Agadir, Morocco at the end of April under an IAEA technical cooperation project aimed at enhancing agricultural productivity to improve food security in Africa.

    Experts from 16 African countries gathered to discuss and share experiences on implementing surveillance and suppression of fruit flies by integrating the SIT with other control methods. The workshop included lectures, visits to the Mediterranean fruit fly mass-rearing facility, the irradiation and the fly emergence and release facilities, and a visit to field operations where surveillance and SIT field activities are being implemented.

    Minimizing Pesticides

    Using SIT alongside other control methods provides the citrus industry with sustainable  methods that minimize pesticide residues in fruit and preserve the agricultural landscape. The SIT both reduces pest infestations and enables farmers to improve the quality of citrus fruits planned for export to existing and new international markets.

    Tephritid fruit flies are considered among the world’s most notorious pests of horticultural crops, causing extensive direct and indirect damage. Due to the intensification of international fruit trade, the African continent is also highly vulnerable to alien invasive fruit fly species such as Bactrocera dorsalis which bring significant damage to mangoes — up to 90 per cent of the harvest can be lost depending on the location, cultivar and season.

    “Most African Member States now face an enormous challenge due to the introduction of Bactrocera dorsalis in Africa in 2003, which closed many international markets and increased damage to fruit,” said Rui Cardoso Pereira, entomologist at the Joint FAO/IAEA Centre of Nuclear Techniques in Food and Agriculture.

    Strengthening Agricultural Systems in Africa

    Citrus production areas where  sterile Mediterranean fruit flies are released (Photo: R. Cardoso Pereira/FAO/IAEA)

    One critical aspect of the IAEA support with SIT is managing pests that affect economically important crops. The countries participating in the workshop reported on pest surveillance and control activities, including SIT application, in their respective countries and explored how these techniques are harmonized using guidelines produced by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and IAEA. This includes guidelines on adult and larval surveillance, quality control of mass-produced insects as well as the International Standards on Phytosanitary Measures.

    The IAEA is helping countries boost food security with its Atoms4Food initiative. The IAEA has joined forces with the FAO to help provide countries with ground-breaking solutions, such as SIT, to tackle growing hunger around the world.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: ACLU-Supported Lawsuit Over False Claims that ICE Deported U.S. Citizens Is Dropped

    Source: US Department of Homeland Security

    ACLU falsely accused DHS of deporting a U.S. Citizen despite the child’s mother choosing to bring the child with her when she was removed.

    WASHINGTON – The Department of Homeland Security announced that a lawsuit supported by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), which was baseless lawfare against Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the Department, has been dropped. This lawsuit claimed DHS deported a U.S. citizen. 

    “This ACLU-backed lawsuit was based on the false claims that DHS deported a U.S. citizen,” said Assistant Secretary Tricia McLaughlin. “The truth is, and has always been, that the mother—who was in the country illegally—chose to bring her 2-year-old with her to Honduras when she was removed. The narrative that DHS is deporting American children is false and irresponsible.”

    The parent, Jenny Carolina Lopez-Villela, made the decision to take her child to Honduras. ICE asks parents if they want to be removed with their children or if they would like to place a child with someone the parent designates. In this case, the parent stated they wanted to be removed with their child.

    Jenny Carolina Lopez-Villela illegally entered this country three times in September 2019, March of 2021, and August 2021. She and her older daughter were deemed inadmissible to the United States the first time she entered the country and both her and her daughter were given final orders of removal in March 2020. When she was taken into ICE custody in April 2025, she chose to bring her younger daughter, who is an American Citizen, with her to Honduras and presented a valid United States passport.

    DHS takes its responsibility to protect children seriously and will continue to work with federal law enforcement to ensure that children are safe and protected. Parents, who are here illegally, can take control of their departure. The CBP Home app gives parents illegally in the country a chance to take full control of their departure and self-deport, with the potential ability to return the legal, right way and come back to live the American dream. It is free and available for all mobile devices.

    ###

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: DHS Terminating Temporary Protected Status for Afghanistan

    Source: US Department of Homeland Security

    WASHINGTON – Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem today announced the termination of Temporary Protected Status for Afghanistan. The TPS designation for the country expires on May 20, 2025, and the termination will be effective on July 12, 2025.

    At least 60 days before a TPS designation expires, the Secretary, after consultation with appropriate U.S. government agencies, is required to review the conditions in a country designated for TPS to determine whether the conditions supporting the designation continue to be met, and if so, how long to extend the designation.

    This administration is returning TPS to its original temporary intent,said Secretary Kristi Noem.We’ve reviewed the conditions in Afghanistan with our interagency partners, and they do not meet the requirements for a TPS designation. Afghanistan has had an improved security situation, and its stabilizing economy no longer prevent them from returning to their home country. Additionally, the termination furthers the national interest as DHS records indicate that there are recipients who have been under investigation for fraud and threatening our public safety and national security. Reviewing TPS designations is a key part of restoring integrity in our immigration system.

    After consultation with interagency partners, Secretary Noem determined that conditions in Afghanistan no longer meet the statutory requirements. The Secretary’s decision was based on a U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services review of the country conditions and in consultation with the Department of State. The Secretary determined that, overall, there are notable improvements in the security and economic situation such that requiring the return of Afghan nationals to Afghanistan does not pose a threat to their personal safety due to ongoing-armed conflict or extraordinary and temporary conditions. She further determined that permitting Afghan nationals to remain temporarily in the United States is contrary to the national interest of the United States.

    Additional information is available in the Federal Register Notice.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Cyber Exercise Southern Defender 2025 Bolsters Partner Nation Defense Capabilities

    Source: United States SOUTHERN COMMAND

    U.S. and Partner nation forces concluded participation in Southern Defender (SD) 2025 May 9. SD25 is a defensive cyber operations exercise designed to enhance cybersecurity capabilities across the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) area of responsibility. Approximately 320 participants from 20 Latin American and Caribbean countries engaged in intensive training and practical exercises across 15 locations focused on mitigating cyber threats.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Canada: National Police Week: Minister Ellis

    “National Police Week is an opportunity to honour the heroes who keep our communities safe every day. Across Alberta, police officers work with courage and compassion to serve Albertans – often in complex, high-pressure situations that demand the very best of them. This week is a solemn reminder of their sacrifices and the vital role they play in maintaining public safety.

    “Each day, members of Alberta’s law enforcement community demonstrate exceptional courage, professionalism and service. Whether responding to emergencies, investigating crime, or supporting community wellness, they show up 24-7 – ready to protect and serve Albertans in every corner of this province.

    “This year’s theme, Committed to Serve Together, reflects a reality we see every day: effective public safety depends on collaboration. It’s not the work of one agency or level of government alone. It takes collaboration between police services, first responders, health and social organizations and the communities they serve. Regardless of uniforms or jurisdictions, the mission is the same – to protect and serve.

    “Alberta’s government stands shoulder-to-shoulder with our law enforcement partners. We’re investing in the tools, training and staffing needed to meet growing public safety demands – especially in our cities, where urban crime has risen, and in rural communities, where stretched resources continue to create gaps. That’s why Alberta’s government is investing in a more responsive and resilient policing model that prioritizes community connection, fairness and frontline support.

    “For example, Alberta’s government is providing $13.9 million over three years to help build or expand three police buildings serving seven different First Nations, empowering Indigenous communities to keep their people safe. The new and expanded buildings will allow police services for the Blood Tribe, Tsuut’ina Nation and five different First Nations surrounding Lesser Slave Lake to continue growing alongside their communities.

    “Through Budget 2025, Alberta’s government is also investing $55.7 million in Alberta Law Enforcement Response Teams to address organized crime, exploitation of children, human trafficking, gun violence and drug trafficking. Furthermore, we are continuing to provide $19.5 million to fund 100 new officers in Calgary and Edmonton, making our biggest urban centres safer for residents and visitors alike.

    “We are proud of the work underway in Alberta to build stronger, safer communities. But that work is only possible because of the officers who rise to the challenge each and every day. They are our neighbours, our family members and our front-line protectors. This week, we recognize their service with gratitude and reaffirm our commitment to support their efforts to build safer, stronger communities everywhere.

    “To all law enforcement officers across Alberta: thank you for your continued commitment to serve together. Alberta is safer because of you.”  

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Congressman Luttrell Introduces the Justice for Victims of Illegal Alien Murders Act

    Source:

    WASHINGTON – Congressman Morgan Luttrell (R-TX) introduced the Justice for Victims of Illegal Alien Murders Act, legislation that will allow the federal government to prosecute illegal aliens who commit murder in the United States. If convicted of first-degree murder under this statute, offenders could face the death penalty or life in prison.

    Under current law, federal jurisdiction over murder cases is limited and often depends on where the crime takes place or whether it involves federal officials or facilities. The Justice for Victims of Illegal Alien Murders Act creates a new federal offense for non-citizens who are inadmissible or deportable and commit murder, giving federal prosecutors the clear authority to bring charges regardless of the location of the crime.

    “In America, we are a nation of laws, and that means justice has to be non-negotiable,” said Congressman Luttrell. “If you’re in this country illegally and you murder an innocent American, you will be held fully accountable no matter where the crime happens. This bill gives us the authority to deliver justice when local prosecutors simply don’t have the tools, manpower, or funding to take on a high-profile death penalty case. Too many American families have suffered unbearable loss at the hands of individuals who never should have been in this country in the first place.”

    “I am proud to support Congressman Luttrell’s Justice for Victims of Illegal Alien Murders Act to make sure illegal alien murderers are brought to justice,” said Congressman Pfluger. “This legislation would ensure that the federal government has the authority to prosecute ANY illegal alien who has committed murder inside the jurisdiction of the United States, despite what a local or state liberal activist judge might decide. No one is above the law. Violent criminals who commit the most heinous act of all, murder of an innocent victim, will be prosecuted, and their families will get the justice they deserve.”

    “If you’re in our country illegally and you kill a U.S. citizen, expect us to come after you with the full extent of the law. If I had it my way, Laken Riley’s killer and every illegal who has taken an American life would be hung from the Southern border wall,” said Rep. Mike Collins. “I’m proud to support Rep. Luttrell’s Justice for Victims of Illegal Alien Murders Act to provide more resources to hold these illegal criminals accountable for their crimes.”

    “When an American life is taken by someone who should not have been in this country to begin with, justice must be swift, certain, and uncompromising. The Justice for Victims of Illegal Alien Murders Act ensures that these horrific crimes are treated with the full weight of federal law—especially in states where soft-on-crime policies deny families true justice. No sanctuary policy or so-called ‘restorative justice’ program should shield convicted murderers from the consequences of their actions. This bill sends a clear message: if you murder an American citizen while unlawfully in this country, the federal government will pursue the harshest penalties available,” said Congressman Bergman.

    “When Biden opened our borders, he opened our country to a world of crime previously thought unimaginable on American soil. The families of Laken Riley, Edwin Jackson, Jeffrey Monroe, and more would not be mourning today if illegal aliens were restricted from entering our country. Unfortunately, this legislation is needed in America today because Biden and his handlers cared more about their reckless open border beliefs than the lives of Americans,” said Congressman Stutzman.

    American families deserve to know that justice will be served—no matter where a crime takes place. If someone is in this country illegally and commits murder, the federal government should have the authority to prosecute them to the fullest extent of the law. This bill sends a clear message: if you take an innocent life on American soil, you will be held accountable,” said Congressman Ezell.

    “Thank you to Rep. Luttrell for leading the Justice for Victims of Illegal Alien Murders Act. This bill ensures that illegal aliens who commit the most heinous crime of all, murder, are fully prosecuted without placing a burden on local communities. Justice must be swift, certain, and uncompromising for those who take innocent lives,” said Congressman Babin.

    “Due to the failures of the Biden Administration, American citizens have lost their lives at the hands of illegal aliens,” said Congressman Nehls. “I am proud to cosponsor my Texas colleague, Congressman Luttrell’s bill to hold illegal alien murderers fully accountable with death penalty eligibility or to spend the rest of their lives in prison.”

    The bill intends to close a dangerous loophole and ensure that those who are unlawfully in the U.S. and commit heinous crimes do not slip through the cracks of the legal system due to jurisdictional challenges.

    Additionally, President Donald Trump signed an Executive Order calling for the mandatory death penalty for illegal immigrants convicted of murdering American citizens or law enforcement officers. 

    This bill is cosponsored by Representatives August Pfluger (R-TX), Jack Bergman (R-MN), Troy Nehls (R-TX), Mike Collins (R-GA), Brian Babin (R-TX), Mike Ezell (R-MS), and Marlin Stutzman (R-IN).

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: ICYMI: Rep. Pfluger’s ACES Act Passed the House

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman August Pfluger (TX-11)

    The passage of Rep. Pfluger’s legislation was celebrated by several veteran organizations and advocacy groups, who released the following statements:

    Vince Alcazar, COL, USAF, ret., MACH Coalition Founder & Director, said, “The Military Aviator Coalition for Health (MACH) celebrates the passage of H.R. 530, the Aviator Cancer Examination Study (ACES) Act. With three major Department of Defense studies in the last four confirming and quantifying significantly elevated cancer rates among U.S. military flyers, the ACES Act goes the next step. This bill would ask the National Academy of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine to apply their extensive Veteran health study capacity to determine what in the operating environments of military aviation is likely causing cancer. This study is essential. Without the ACES Act, military medicine will have no practical way of mitigating risk, and Veteran flyers will have no basis to correlate their service to potential cancer. This day was five years in the making. We recognize and praise the leadership of Congressman August Pfluger in leading this bill through three Congresses to today. Congressman Pfluger is an amazing champion of this work.”

    Jose Ramos, Vice President of Government and Community Relations, Wounded Warrior Project, said, “Wounded Warrior Project is grateful to Rep. Pfluger and his fellow Members of Congress for passing the ACES Act in the House of Representatives by an overwhelming majority. This legislation represents a critical step toward safeguarding the long-term health and well-being of military aviators and support personnel. These groups are routinely exposed to unique occupational hazards, and collaborative research across the federal government will help inform cancer prevention and veteran health strategies.We urge the Senate to take up this legislation as soon as possible.”

    Rye Barcott, Co-Founder & CEO of With Honor Action, said, “With Honor Action congratulates Reps. August Pfluger and Jimmy Panetta in securing House passage of the ACES Act—comprehensive legislation that will advance research into potential links between aviator service and increased cancer rates,” said Rye Barcott, Co-Founder & CEO of With Honor Action. “As members of the For Country Caucus, Reps. Pfluger and Panetta built strong bipartisan support among their fellow veteran lawmakers that led to a full caucus endorsement. We look forward to seeing this critical legislation become law.”

    Theo Lawson, Assistant Director, Legislative Programs, Fleet Reserve Association, said, “The Fleet Reserve Association (FRA) wholeheartedly celebrates the passage of the ACES Act in the House and extends our sincere congratulations to Congressman August Pfluger, his staff, and the bill’s cosponsors for their incredible dedication in advancing this vital legislation. Understanding cancer is the first step to defeating it, and this bill brings us closer to uncovering the critical links between aircrew service and cancer risks. Their leadership ensures our sea service aviators and all aircrew members are better equipped to identify and combat this silent enemy. We look forward to continuing the fight alongside them until the ACES Act becomes law–honoring the sacrifices of our servicemembers and safeguarding future generations.”

    Mario Marquez, Executive Director of Government Affairs, The American Legion, said, “On behalf of the 1.5 million veterans nationwide, The American Legion proudly supports the ACES Act. Research is critical to our understanding of the impacts of toxic exposures, from Agent Orange to harmful chemicals on aircraft. We applaud Representative Pfluger for prioritizing this critical issue and thank the House of Representatives for passing the ACES Act with resounding support. The American Legion urges the Senate to vote on this bill and continue to invest in research surrounding the impacts of toxic exposures.”

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Group of six convicted of spying for Russia jailed for total of 50 years

    Source: United Kingdom London Metropolitan Police

    A group of six Bulgarians living in the UK have been jailed for a combined total of more than 50 years for being part of a spying operation across Europe on behalf of Russia.

    Following a three-month trial at the Old Bailey, two women and a man were found guilty of conspiring to obtain information intended to be directly or indirectly useful to Russia.

    Three other men pleaded guilty to Official Secrets Act charges before the trial started.

    Commander Dominic Murphy, head of the Met’s Counter Terrorism Command, said: “The strength of the investigation into the group’s surveillance operations left the ringleaders – Orlin Roussev and Bizer Dzhambazov – with no option but to plead guilty to the charges they faced.

    “As shown in footage from his initial interviews, Roussev firmly denied carrying out any espionage activity for Russia. However, before he was due to stand trial, he admitted that he had been part of the conspiracy to spy.

    “This was in large part due to the detailed analysis of more than 200,000 digital messages and hundreds of items seized from Roussev’s home address.

    “The investigation team worked incredibly hard to piece together a complex and wide-ranging conspiracy that I would describe as espionage on an industrial scale.

    “The significant jail sentences handed to the group reflect the serious threat they posed to the safety and interests of the UK, as well as targets across Europe.

    “This case is a clear example of the increasing amount of state threat casework we are dealing with in the UK. It also highlights a relatively new phenomenon whereby espionage is being ‘outsourced’ by certain states.

    “Regardless of the form the threat takes, this investigation shows that we will take action to identify and disrupt any such activity that puts UK national security and the safety of the public at risk.”

    The court heard that detectives from the Met’s Counter terrorism Command seized hundreds of items after a co-ordinated series of raids and arrests were carried out on 8 February 2023.

    In particular, a 33-room former hotel belonging to Roussev was found to contain items including sophisticated spying equipment such as listening devices, concealed cameras and a fake ID card printer.

    Through their investigation, detectives identified that Roussev, who was leading the group, was in direct contact with Jan Marsalek – an Austrian national who, in turn, was identified as working with the Russian intelligence services.

    The investigation team identified six core spying ‘plots’ the group were involved in. This included activity that targeted two investigative journalists who were seen as reporting stories contrary to the interests of the Russian state.

    A former senior Kazakh politician who lived in the UK was also targeted, and the group planned to stage protests at the Kazakhstan embassy in London. Both operations were part of an elaborate plan to help the Russia state gain favour with Kazakhstan.

    The group also carried out surveillance at a US military site in Germany, where they believed Ukrainian soldiers were being trained.

    Another man who was designated as a ‘foreign agent’ by Russia was also targeted by the group during surveillance operations in Montenegro.

    Sifting through thousands of messages, and then matching these up with physical travel, financial statements and surveillance reports and footage, meant detectives were able to build up a compelling picture of the group’s activity, as well as identify those involved and their roles within the group.

    The six members of the group, who were all sentenced at the Old Bailey on Monday, 12 May, were:

    – Orlin Roussev, 46 (06.02.1978) of Great Yarmouth, Norfolk, sentenced to 10 years’ and eight months imprisonment.
    – Bizer Maksimov Dzhambazov, 43 (21.04.1981), of Harrow, north London, sentenced to 10 years and two months’ imprisonment.
    – Katrin Nikolayeva Ivanova, 33 (01.07.1991) of Harrow, north London, sentenced to nine years and eight months’ imprisonment.
    – Ivan Iliev Stoyanov, 33 (22.12.1991) of Greenford, west London, sentenced to five years and three weeks’ imprisonment
    – Vanya Nikolaveva Gaberova, 30 (10.08.1994) of Euston, north London, sentenced to six years, eight months and three weeks’ imprisonment.
    – Tihomir Ivanov Ivanchev, 39 (31.07.85) of Acton, west London, sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment.

    Officers found that Roussev was directing the group’s activity, and was receiving tasks through his contact with Marsalak. Dzhambazov was effectively the second in command.

    The other four were involved in the execution of various espionage and surveillance activities across the UK and Europe in relation to the six plots identified by detectives.

    Ivanova, Gaberova and Ivanchev were all found guilty on 7 March of conspiracy to spy, contrary to Section 1 of the Criminal Law Act 1977.

    Roussev and Dzhambazov pleaded guilty before the trial started to the same offence.

    Stoyanov pleaded guilty before the trial to spying, contrary to section 1(1)(c) of the Official Secrets Act 1911.

    MIL Security OSI