Category: Security

  • MIL-OSI Security: St. Charles Parish Man Guilty of Being Felon with Firearm

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA – Acting U.S. Attorney Michael M. Simpson announced that on February 27, 2025, DARRYL DAVIS (“DAVIS”), age 30, a resident of St. Charles Parish, pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 922(g)(1).

    According to court documents, after reviewing DAVIS’s social media postings about firearms,  Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) agents began an investigation which revealed that DAVIS had been twice previously convicted of felonies and knew  he was prohibited from possessing a firearm.  DAVIS was arrested on August 14, 2024 and found in possession of a Glock Model 43X, nine- millimeter semi-automatic pistol and ammunition.

    DAVIS faces up to 15 years imprisonment, a fine of up to $250,000.00, up to 3 years of supervised released, and a $100 mandatory special assessment fee.  He is scheduled for sentencing on May 27, 2025.

    This case is part of Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN), a program bringing together all levels of law enforcement and the communities they serve to reduce violent crime and gun violence, and to make our neighborhoods safer for everyone.  On May 26, 2021, the Department launched a violent crime reduction strategy strengthening PSN based on these core principles: fostering trust and legitimacy in our communities, supporting community-based organizations that help prevent violence from occurring in the first place, setting focused and strategic enforcement priorities, and measuring the results.

    The case was investigated by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives and the St. Charles Parish Sheriff’s Office. It is being prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorney Greg Kennedy of the Violent Crime Unit.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: New Hampshire Man Sentenced for Conspiring to Sell Stolen Government Property

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    Christopher Hagan, formerly of North Berwick, received items from an employee of a national defense contractor and employees of the Defense Logistics Agency

    PORTLAND, Maine:  A New Hampshire man was sentenced today in U.S. District Court in Portland for conspiring to transport stolen property in interstate commerce and conspiring to sell stolen government property. 

    U.S. District Judge John A. Woodcock, Jr. sentenced Christopher Hagan, 33, to 12 months plus one day in prison to be followed by three years of supervised release. He was also fined $10,000, ordered to forfeit $150,000, and will be required to refile his tax returns for five years. Hagan pleaded guilty on May 13, 2024.

    According to court records, between October 2017 and September 2021, Hagan obtained stolen government items which he resold on online forums. One of Hagan’s coconspirators, Jonathan Chaisson, 34, of New Hampshire was employed by a national defense contractor based in New Hampshire and received used and/or broken Advance Target Pointer Illuminator Aiming Laser (ATPIAL) devices designated for military and law enforcement use. Chaisson stole or converted new and used parts and components to repair the ATPIALs and provided Hagan with the repaired devices to sell.

    Hagan also conspired with Wade Walker, 45, and Michael Humphrey, 46, both of Texas, to steal and sell military equipment from the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), an agency of the United States Department of Defense. Both Walker and Humphrey were employed by the DLA Red River Army Depot facility in Texarkana, Texas. On multiple dates in 2019 and in 2020, Humphrey transferred stolen government property to Walker for resale, and Walker provided the stolen property to Hagan for further resale. Through the investigation, agents determined that Hagan had at least one customer in China.

    On July 24, 2023, Chaisson pleaded guilty to conspiring to transport stolen property in interstate commerce and was sentenced to probation for two years. On October 31, 2023, Humphrey pleaded guilty to conspiring to sell stolen government property and was sentenced to probation for two years. On January 8, 2024, Walker pleaded guilty to conspiring to sell stolen government property and was sentenced to probation for three years.

    The United States Department of Commerce – Office of Export Enforcement and the Defense Criminal Investigative Service investigated the case with assistance from Homeland Security Investigations (HSI).

    “That Mr. Hagan and his conspirators would exploit their connections to the defense industry to put their own financial gain ahead of the nation’s security is unconscionable,” said Acting U.S. Attorney Craig M. Wolff. “The U.S. Attorney’s Office commends the remarkable interagency cooperation that underpinned this complex and important investigation.”

    “The Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), the law enforcement arm of the Department of Defense (DoD) Office of Inspector General, is fully committed to protecting the integrity of the DoD supply chain,” said Patrick J. Hegarty, Special Agent in Charge of the DCIS Northeast Field Office. “Profiting from the sale of stolen DoD property undermines the mission of the Defense Logistics Agency and negatively impacts our military members. This investigation demonstrates DCIS’ commitment to work with our law enforcement partners and the Department of Justice to hold accountable those who harm the DoD.”

    “By stealing sensitive military technology and selling it to China, Christopher Hagan along with those he conspired with, prioritized greed and personal gain over U.S. national security,” said Special Agent in Charge James Guanci, U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Export Enforcement, Boston Field Office. “This case serves as a strong reminder that those who betray the trust of the American people will be held accountable.”

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    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Indictment Charges District Woman with Failure to Pay Approximately $930,000 in Federal Income and Employment Taxes for Marijuana Dispensary

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

               WASHINGTON – Jennifer Brunenkant, 68, of Washington, DC, was charged today in a 19-count indictment unsealed in U.S. District Court with evading and failing to pay federal income and employment taxes associated with her business Herbal Alternatives II, LLC, which at all relevant times operated a marijuana dispensary that was licensed in the District of Columbia.  The indictment was announced by U.S. Attorney Edward R. Martin Jr., and Executive Special Agent in Charge Kareem Carter of the Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigation’s Washington D.C. Office.

               According to the indictment, Brunenkant owned and operated Herbal Alternatives in the District from at least 2013 to 2021.  During that time, Herbal Alternatives generated millions of dollars in revenue. The indictment alleges that because Herbal Alternatives was a sole proprietorship with Brunenkant as the sole owner, the income that Brunenkant earned from Herbal Alternatives should have been reported on her annual IRS Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, that was used by United States taxpayers to file individual income tax returns.  It is alleged that instead of filing her federal income tax returns, from at least tax years 2018 to 2021, Brunenkant failed to make an income tax return and to pay income tax to the IRS, and in fact willfully attempted to evade and defeat the income tax due and owing by her to the United States. During those years, Brunenkant failed to pay approximately $800,000 in federal income taxes.

              The indictment further alleges that Brunenkant employed dozens of employees at Herbal Alternatives.  Under federal tax laws, Brunenkant was required to collect, account for, and pay over to the IRS on behalf of Herbal Alternatives the employment taxes imposed on its employees by the Internal Revenue Code.  According to the indictment, Brunenkant failed to pay over to the IRS approximately $130,000 in such employment taxes that were owed during the charged tax years.

               Tax evasion and failure to pay over employment taxes each carry a statutory maximum sentence of five years in prison.  The charges also carry potential financial penalties.  The maximum statutory sentence for federal offenses is prescribed by Congress and is provided here for informational purposes. The sentencing will be determined by the court based on the advisory Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

               The case is being investigated by IRS Criminal Investigation.  Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia Brian Kelly is prosecuting the case.

               An indictment is merely an allegation, and all defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law

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    25-cr-056 

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Tax refund scheme leads to convictions for Hampton Roads fraudsters

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    NEWPORT NEWS, Va. – A Hampton Roads duo pled guilty to their roles in a refund scheme involving pandemic relief tax credits.

    According to court documents, between Oct. 11, 2022, and May 24, 2023, Kendra Michelle Eley, 36, of Norfolk, filed with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) eight Forms 941, Employer’s Quarterly Federal Tax Returns, for Kreative Designs by Kendra, LLC, (KDK) using the Employer Identification Number assigned to Kendra Cleans Maid Service.  These eight forms covered four tax periods in 2020 and four tax periods in 2021.

    Eley falsely reported wages paid and federal tax withholdings for eighteen purported employees on each of the forms, knowing there were no such employees.  For the four forms filed for 2021, Eley claimed false Sick and Family Leave Credits and Employee Retention Credit (ERC) through the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, totaling approximately $713,000 and $252,000 respectively, with total refunds claimed of over $900,000.

    Based on Eley’s filings, on December 9, 2022, and on December 13, 2022, the IRS issued two U.S. Treasury refund checks made payable to ‘‘Kendra M. Eley, Kendra Cleans Maid Services” totaling $649,050.

    On Dec. 23, 2022, Eley and Rejohn Isaiah Whitehead, 28, of Portsmouth, opened a business checking account in the name of Kendra Cleans Maid Services LLC (KCMS), and the signatories on the account were Eley and Whitehead. To open the business account, Eley and Whitehead falsely represented the nature and extent of KCMS as a business, including that KCMS had sixteen employees and that the average pay rate of each employee was $2,000. Eley funded the account by depositing one of the refund checks in the amount of $389,640. On Jan. 9, 2023, Eley wrote Whitehead a check from the KCMS account for $20,000. Eley wrote Whitehead another check from the account for $40,000 on Jan. 21, 2023.

    On Feb. 13, Whitehead pled guilty to engaging in monetary transactions in criminally derived property. He is scheduled to be sentenced on June 26 and faces up to 10 years in prison.

    Eley pled guilty today to one count each of false claims and engaging in monetary transactions in criminally derived property. She is scheduled to be sentenced on July 9 and faces up to 10 years in prison.

    Actual sentences for federal crimes are typically less than the maximum penalties. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

    Erik S. Siebert, U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, and Kareem A. Carter, IRS Criminal Investigation Special Agent in Charge of the Washington D.C. Field Office, made the announcement after Senior U.S. District Judge Raymond A. Jackson accepted the plea.

    Assistant U.S. Attorneys Therese O’Brien and Mack Coleman are prosecuting the case.

    A copy of this press release is located on the website of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Virginia. Related court documents and information are located on the website of the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia or on PACER by searching for Case No. 4:24-cr-77.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Suburban Chicago Investment Advisor Charged With Swindling Clients

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    CHICAGO — A suburban Chicago investment advisor has been indicted on federal fraud charges for allegedly swindling clients by soliciting them to invest in nonexistent business opportunities.

    RALPH ROGERS III, also known as “Tres Rogers,” 62, of Batavia, Ill., is charged with six counts of wire fraud in an indictment returned Tuesday in U.S. District Court in Chicago.  Each count is punishable by up to 20 years in federal prison.  Arraignment in federal court has not yet been scheduled.

    According to the indictment, Rogers held himself out as an entrepreneur and investment advisor.  From 2021 to 2023, Rogers fraudulently obtained funds from multiple individuals by falsely promising that he would use his professional connections to invest their money in valuable business opportunities, including fiber optic cable installation, copper piping, a physical fitness recovery studio, and materials used to manufacture auto parts, the indictment states.  Instead of investing the funds as he had promised, Rogers used the money for his own personal benefit, including for travel, hotel rooms, jewelry, apparel, and gym fees, the indictment states.

    The indictment was announced by Morris Pasqual, Acting United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, and Douglas S. DePodesta, Special Agent-in-Charge of the Chicago Field Office of the FBI.  The government is represented by Assistant U.S. Attorney Kristin Pinkston.

    The public is reminded that an indictment is not evidence of guilt.  The defendant is presumed innocent and entitled to a fair trial at which the government has the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Recidivist Possessor of Child Sexual Abuse Material Sentenced to Prison

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    Defendant was on Supervised Release for Possessing CSAM at Time of New CSAM Offense

    MACON, Ga. – A Bryon, Georgia, resident who was serving federal supervised release for possessing child sexual abuse material (CSAM) when GBI agents caught him online downloading sexually explicit images of children less than a year after he was released from prison was sentenced for his crime and violating his federal supervision.

    Clarence L. Brown, II, 46, of Byron, Georgia, was sentenced to serve 120 months in prison to be followed by ten years of supervised release by U.S. District Judge Marc T. Treadwell on March 5, after he previously pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography on Dec. 19, 2024. In addition, Brown’s supervised release was revoked in Case No. 5:22-CR-27-001 in which Brown pleaded guilty and was sentenced for one count of receipt of child pornography and one count of possession of child pornography in the Middle District of Florida. As a result, Brown was sentenced to serve ten months in prison consecutively to the above sentence to be followed by ten years of supervised release concurrently to the above sentence. Brown will have to register as a sex offender upon release from prison. There is no parole in the federal system.

    “Viewing and sharing explicit images of children being sexually abused is a federal crime that our office will prosecute to the fullest extent of the law,” said Acting U.S. Attorney C. Shanelle Booker. “Holding online child predators accountable for their crimes—and in this case, their repeated crimes against children—is a high priority for our federal prosecutors and the local, state and federal law enforcement partners dedicated to protecting children.”

    “Clarence L. Brown’s actions are a tragic reminder of the persistence of individuals who prey on children, despite previous consequences,” said GBI Director Chris Hosey. “The GBI remains committed to investigating and bringing to justice those who possess and distribute child sexual abuse material. We will continue to work alongside our state, federal and local law enforcement partners to protect children from these heinous crimes and hold offenders accountable.”

    According to court documents and statements referenced in court, on June 8, 2021, a Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI) Child Exploitation and Computer Crimes Unit (CECCU) agent conducted an undercover online investigation to identify individuals downloading child sexual abuse material (CSAM, also called child pornography). That same day, task force agents identified two video files downloaded by Brown depicting CSAM involving prepubescent girls and adult males. Search warrants were executed at Brown’s residences in Byron, Georgia, on Nov. 4, 2021. Several devices were seized at the residence and underwent forensic examination. In total, agents found at least nine video files depicting the sexual abuse and exploitation of children, many of whom were younger than 12 years old. Of note, one CSAM video file had a total run time of ten minutes, and the other CSAM video file was almost 24 minutes long.

    Brown was convicted for receipt of child pornography and possession of child pornography in the Middle District of Florida on July 24, 2017 (listed as Case No. 5:22-CR-27-001 in the Middle District of Georgia). Brown began his term of supervised release in that case on Nov. 25, 2020. Less than one year later, Brown was found to be in possession of child pornography in the Middle District of Georgia.

    These cases were brought as part of Project Safe Childhood, a nationwide initiative to combat the growing epidemic of child sexual exploitation and abuse, launched in May 2006 by the Department of Justice. Led by the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices and the DOJ’s Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section, Project Safe Childhood marshals federal, state and local resources to locate, apprehend and prosecute individuals who exploit children, as well as identify and rescue victims. For more information about Project Safe Childhood, please visit www.projectsafechildhood.gov.

    The case was investigated by the Georgia Bureau of Investigation’s Child Exploitation and Computer Crimes Unit (GBI CEACCU) with assistance from the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC)

    Assistant U.S. Attorney Monica Daniels is prosecuting the case for the Government. 

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Federal Grand Jury in Louisville Indicts Illegal Alien For Methamphetamine Trafficking and Firearms Offenses

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    Louisville, KY – A federal grand jury in Louisville, Kentucky, returned an indictment on March 4, 2025, charging an illegal alien with federal drug and gun crimes.  

    U.S. Attorney Michael A. Bennett of the Western District of Kentucky, Acting Special Agent in Charge A.J. Gibes of the ATF Louisville Field Division, Special Agent in Charge Rana Saoud of Homeland Security Investigations, Sam Olson, Field Office Director for Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) Chicago, U.S. Immigration Customs, and Chief Paul Humphrey of the Louisville Metro Police Department made the announcement.

    According to the indictment, Edi Diaz-Lopez, a/k/a Edy Diaz-Lopez, age 30, a citizen of Mexico, was charged with possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking.  On January 3, 2025, Diaz-Lopez possessed a Phoenix, .25 caliber pistol, and a Bryco, model 59, 9-millimeter pistol. Diaz-Lopez was prohibited from possessing firearms because he was an alien illegally and unlawfully in the United States.

    Diaz-Lopez made his initial appearance before a United States Magistrate Judge for the Western District of Kentucky on March 6, 2025. He was ordered detained pending trial. If convicted, Diaz-Lopez faces a maximum sentence of 40 years in prison. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the sentencing guidelines and other statutory factors.

    There is no parole in the federal system.

    This case is being investigated by ATF, HSI, ICE/ERO, and LMPD.

    Assistant U.S. Attorney Frank Dahl is prosecuting this case.

    An indictment is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

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    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Michigan Man Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy in $14.5 Million PPP Loan Fraud

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    PITTSBURGH, Pa.- A resident of Detroit, Michigan, pleaded guilty in federal court to a charge of fraud conspiracy, Acting United States Attorney Troy Rivetti announced today.

    Marc Andrew Martin, 46, pleaded guilty to one count before United States District Judge W. Scott Hardy.

    In connection with the guilty plea, the Court was advised that, between March 2020 and August 2021, Martin and others—including Matthew Parker—conspired to defraud lenders of over $14 million in Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) COVID-19 relief loans. Parker, a licensed CPA from Detroit, Michigan, recruited hundreds of small businesses in Pittsburgh and Detroit and falsified PPP loan applications. The Small Business Administration approved 226 of those applications, resulting in loans totaling approximately $14.5 million to businesses, the largest known PPP fraud in the Western District of Pennsylvania. Martin referred approximately $1,900,000 in fraudulent loan packages to Parker. Parker pleaded guilty to fraud conspiracy in May 2024.

    Judge Hardy scheduled sentencing for July 10, 2025. The law provides for a total sentence of up to 30 years in prison, a fine of up to $1 million, or both. Under the federal Sentencing Guidelines, the actual sentence imposed is based upon the seriousness of the offense and the prior criminal history, if any, of the defendant.

    Assistant United States Attorney Gregory C. Melucci is prosecuting this case on behalf of the government.

    The Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted the investigation that led to the prosecution of Martin.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Louisville Man Sentenced to 20 Years in Federal Prison for Methamphetamine and Firearms Charges

    Source: United States Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF)

    Louisville, KY – A Louisville, Kentucky, man was sentenced yesterday to 20 years in federal prison for engaging in a conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, distributing methamphetamine, possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking crimes, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.   

    U.S. Attorney Michael A. Bennett of the Western District of Kentucky, Acting Special Agent in Charge A.J. Gibes of the ATF Louisville Field Division, and Chief Paul Humphrey of the Louisville Metro Police Department made the announcement.

    According to court documents, Dominique Lewis, 24, was sentenced to 20 years in prison, followed by 5 years of supervised release, for conspiring to distribute methamphetamine, distributing methamphetamine, possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking crimes, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Lewis distributed methamphetamine on 12 occasions and conspired to distribute methamphetamine from October 17, 2022, through April 27, 2023. On 2 occasions Lewis possessed of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and on 5 occasions he illegally possessed a firearm because he was a convicted felon. Lewis was prohibited from possessing a firearm because he had previously been convicted of the following felony offenses.

    On August 3, 2020, in Shelby County Circuit Court, Lewis was convicted of two counts of theft by unlawful taking and two counts of criminal mischief in the first degree.

    On August 3, 2021, in Jefferson County Circuit Court, Lewis was convicted of receiving stolen property, two counts of criminal mischief in the first degree, wanton endangerment in the first degree, and fleeing or evading police in the first degree.

    On March 10, 2022, in Jefferson County Circuit Court, Lewis was convicted of theft by unlawful taking.

    There is no parole in the federal system.

    This case was investigated by the ATF and the Louisville Metro Police Department.

    Assistant U.S. Attorney Josh Porter prosecuted the case with the assistance of paralegal Aaron Cooper.

    This effort is part of an Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) operation. OCDETF identifies, disrupts, and dismantles the highest-level criminal organizations that threaten the United States using a prosecutor-led, intelligence-driven, multi-agency approach. Additional information about the OCDETF Program can be found at www.justice.gov/OCDETF .

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    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI: Diamondback Energy Prices Offering of Senior Notes

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    MIDLAND, Texas, March 06, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Diamondback Energy, Inc. (NASDAQ: FANG) (“Diamondback”) announced today that it has priced an offering (the “Notes Offering”) of $1,200,000,000 in aggregate principal amount of 5.550% senior notes that will mature on April 1, 2035 (the “Notes”). The price to the public is 99.937% of the principal amount of the Notes.

    Diamondback intends to use the net proceeds from the Notes Offering for general corporate purposes, including, without limitation, paying a portion of the cash consideration for the pending acquisition of certain subsidiaries of Double Eagle IV Midco, LLC and paying fees, costs and expenses related thereto.   The Notes Offering is expected to close on March 20, 2025, subject to customary closing conditions.

    The Notes will be sold in a registered offering pursuant to an effective shelf registration statement on Form S-3ASR that was previously filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, a prospectus supplement and related base prospectus for the Notes Offering.

    BofA Securities, Inc., Barclays Capital Inc., PNC Capital Markets LLC and TD Securities (USA) LLC have served as joint book-running managers for the Notes Offering. When available, copies of the prospectus supplement and related base prospectus for the Notes Offering may be obtained from BofA Securities, Inc. at NC1-022-02-25, 201 North Tryon Street, Charlotte, North Carolina 28255-0001, Attn: Prospectus Department, by email to dg.prospectus_requests@bofa.com and toll free at 1-800-294-1322; Barclays Capital Inc. at c/o Broadridge Financial Solutions, 1155 Long Island Avenue, Edgewood, NY 11717, by email to barclaysprospectus@broadridge.com and toll free at 1-888-603-5847; PNC Capital Markets LLC at 300 Fifth Avenue, 10th Floor, Pittsburgh, PA 15222, by email to pnccmprospectus@pnc.com and toll free at 1-855-881-0697 and TD Securities (USA) LLC at 1 Vanderbilt Avenue, 11th Floor, New York, NY 10017 and toll free at 1-855-495-9846. Electronic copies of the prospectus supplement and related base prospectus for the Notes Offering will also be available on the website of the Securities and Exchange Commission at www.sec.gov.

    This press release is neither an offer to sell nor a solicitation of an offer to buy any of these securities and shall not constitute an offer, solicitation or sale in any jurisdiction in which such offer, solicitation or sale is unlawful. The Notes Offering may only be made by means of a prospectus supplement and related base prospectus.

    About Diamondback Energy, Inc.

    Diamondback is an independent oil and natural gas company headquartered in Midland, Texas focused on the acquisition, development, exploration and exploitation of unconventional, onshore oil and natural gas reserves in the Permian Basin in West Texas.

    Forward Looking Statements

    This press release contains forward-looking statements within the meaning of the federal securities laws, including those relating to the expected timing of the closing of the Notes Offering. All statements, other than historical facts, that address activities that Diamondback assumes, plans, expects, believes, intends or anticipates (and other similar expressions) will, should or may occur in the future are forward-looking statements. The forward-looking statements are based on management’s current beliefs, based on currently available information, as to the outcome and timing of future events. These forward-looking statements involve certain risks and uncertainties that could cause the results to differ materially from those expected by the management of Diamondback. Information concerning these risks and other factors can be found in Diamondback’s filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission, including its Forms 10-K, 10-Q, 8-K, the preliminary prospectus supplement filed by Diamondback for the Notes Offering and any amendments or supplements thereto, which can be obtained free of charge on the Securities and Exchange Commission’s web site at http://www.sec.gov. Diamondback undertakes no obligation to update or revise any forward-looking statement.

    Investor Contact:
    Adam Lawlis
    +1 432.221.7467
    alawlis@diamondbackenergy.com

    Source: Diamondback Energy, Inc.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI USA: Senator Markey, Leader Schumer, Senators Whitehouse and Van Hollen Call for Answers from Citibank on Climate Bank Funding Freeze

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Massachusetts Ed Markey
       Letter Text (PDF)
    Washington (March 6, 2025) – Senator Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.), a member of the Environment and Public Works Committee and co-author of the original National Climate Bank Act with Senator Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.), a member of the Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee, together with Democratic Leader Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.) and Senator Sheldon Whitehouse (D-R.I.), Ranking Member of the Environment and Public Works Committee, today called for answers from Jane Fraser, CEO of Citigroup, and Sunil Garg, CEO of Citibank North America (N.A.), on the reported freeze of federal investments made under the National Clean Investment Fund (NCIF) and Clean Communities Investment Accelerator (CCIA)—programs that are part of the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund (GGRF) and held in Citibank N.A accounts. The affected accounts contain legally obligated federal funds appropriated in the Inflation Reduction Act aimed at powering domestic investment in low-cost clean energy and energy efficiency. The freeze appears to relate to U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator Lee Zeldin’s desire to claw back these grants. Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.), Ranking Member of the Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee, and Senator Jeff Merkley (D-Ore.), Ranking Member of the Senate Budget Committee, also signed the letter.
    In the letter the lawmakers write, “If public reporting and information obtained by Senate Environment and Public Works Committee Democrats is accurate, the federal funds in these accounts have been frozen for more than two weeks without explanation from either Citibank or the EPA. Without access to these funds, grantees will be hard pressed to cover basic operating expenses, such as payroll or rent, much less satisfy their mission of delivering cost-saving investments in underserved communities across the country. According to recent reporting, a prolonged account freeze may drive many of the nonprofit grantees to bankruptcy or default.”
    The lawmakers continued, “These reports suggest that Trump DOJ and EPA officials are trying to rescind the legally obligated funding at issue by fabricating claims of financial mismanagement and launching sham investigations.”
    The lawmakers request responses by March 15, 2025, to questions that include:
    What NCIF, CCIA, or GGRF grantee accounts have been paused, frozen, or closed by Citibank? When did Citibank pause, freeze, or close these accounts?
    Why did Citibank pause, freeze, or close grantee accounts? 
    If Citibank has paused, frozen, closed, or otherwise limited access to grantee accounts, what is the legal authority for doing so?
    Does Citibank have plans to resume grantees’ access to, or use of, their accounts and to the federal monies contained therein? 
    On February 24, 2025, Senator Markey joined Senator Whitehouse and all Democratic members of the Environment and Public Works Committee in a letter to EPA demanding answers about Administrator Lee Zeldin’s illegal efforts to claw back these federal investments in the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund. On February 19, 2025, Senator Markey led a letter with Senators Van Hollen, Whitehouse, and Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) to the Department of Justice regarding the forced resignation of the head of the criminal division at the U.S. Attorney’s office in the District of Columbia, Denise Cheung, after she declined to pursue an unwarranted criminal investigation that would have frozen accounts with federal funds held at Citibank.
    Senator Markey secured numerous provisions in the Inflation Reduction Act, including the creation of a $27 billion national climate financing network based on his National Climate Bank Act. Following the passage of the Inflation Reduction Act in 2022, Senators Markey and Van Hollen and Congresswoman Debbie Dingell (MI-06), the House lead on the climate financing legislation, welcomed the launch of the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund in April 2023.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Employee at Multinational DVD Company Charged with Stealing, Selling Pre-Release Commercial DVDs for Blockbuster Films

    Source: US Justice – Antitrust Division

    Headline: Employee at Multinational DVD Company Charged with Stealing, Selling Pre-Release Commercial DVDs for Blockbuster Films

    A worker at a DVD and Blu-ray manufacturing and distribution company used by major movie studios was arrested today in Memphis, Tennessee, for allegedly stealing DVDs and Blu-rays of blockbuster movies from the company and selling them before their official scheduled release dates. A digital copy of at least one of the stolen Blu-rays was illegally distributed tens of millions of times over the internet, causing the copyright owner tens of millions of dollars in losses.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Cramer, Coons Introduce Bipartisan Bill to Increase Affordable Housing

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator Kevin Cramer (R-ND)
    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Recent declines in the number of landlords participating in the Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) program, also known as Section 8 vouchers, have made it more difficult for renters to find housing.  
    U.S. Senators Kevin Cramer, member of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Development, and Chris Coons (D-DE), introduced their Choice in Affordable Housing Act today to help expand the HCV program. U.S. Representatives Emanuel Cleaver (D-MO-05) and Mike Lawler (R-NY-17) introduced the bill in the House of Representatives.
    The bill includes funding to create the Herschel Lashkowitz Housing Partnership Fund, named after the former state senator, Fargo mayor, and affordable housing advocate, Herschel Lashkowitz. It will improve the federal government’s largest rental assistance program by attracting and retaining participating landlords. Additionally, it increases funding to the Tribal Department of Housing and Urban Development Veterans Affairs Supportive Housing program, uses neighborhood-specific data to set rents fairly, reduces inspection delays, and refocuses HUD’s evaluation of housing agencies. Together, these changes reduce barriers to low-income housing. 
    “Increases in housing costs mean millions of renters struggle to find affordable places to live,” said Cramer. “The success of the Housing Choice Voucher program is contingent on landlords providing adequate housing options. Herschel Lashkowitz’s legacy of affordable housing advocacy lives on through this commonsense bill by boosting the supply of options for renters to use their vouchers.”
    “As County Executive and County Council President, I saw firsthand the life-changing impact that a safe, affordable home had for Delawareans families,” said Coons. “Families in the first state and across the nation need better options when they are looking for a home, and landlords need support to be able to bring their properties into the Section 8 market. This bill is a huge step forward towards those goals so more Americans in every corner of our country can feel at home.”
    This bill is endorsed by National Affordable Housing Management Association, National Low Income Housing Coalition, National Housing Law Project, Habitat for Humanity International, National Association of Realtors, National Association of Home Builders, Enterprise Community Partners, National Association of Residential Property Managers, National Leased Housing Association, Institute of Real Estate Management, National Rental Home Council, the Poverty & Race Research Action Council, RESULTS Education Fund, the Bipartisan Policy Center, the National Multifamily Housing Council, the National Apartment Association, the Council for Affordable and Rural Housing, and the Building Owners and Managers Association.
    Cosponsors of the bill include U.S. Senators John Curtis (R-UT), Martin Heinrich (D-NM), Jerry Moran (R-KS), Tina Smith (D-MN), Raphael Warnock (D-GA).
    Click here for bill text.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Money laundering plays a key role in every part of the illegal drugs industry – here’s how it works

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Mark Berry, Lecturer In Criminology, Bournemouth University

    R Mendoza/Shutterstock

    The global illicit drugs trade is estimated to be worth at least half a trillion US dollars each year. Drugs such as cocaine, methamphetamine and heroin generate large revenues all along their supply chains, from where the products (and precursor materials) are grown or made – principally Colombia and Bolivia, China, Afghanistan, and the “golden triangle” of Myanmar, Laos and Thailand – to wherever the finished drugs are consumed.

    Earnings in the illicit drug trade are variable. Few people will make the kind of money that once put the Mexican former cartel boss Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán on the Forbes list of global billionaires. But while drug “kingpins” are the industry’s biggest individual earners, they do not hold the majority of the drug money that is generated throughout the global supply chain.

    Despite their frequent glamorisation in film and TV portrayals, drug cartels are basically international logistics companies. They work with distributors in different countries who deliver the drugs to regional wholesalers, who in turn supply the local retailers (dealers) who sell drugs to individuals.

    Everyone along the supply chain takes their cut, with most people making much more modest incomes than the millionaire drug traffickers of narcocorrido lore. In our interviews with illicit drug entrepreneurs in the US and UK, we routinely spoke to sellers whose incomes ranged from pocket money to providing a moderately comfortable life.



    Illicit drug use is damaging large parts of the world socially, politically and environmentally. Patterns of supply and demand are changing rapidly. In our longform series Addicted, leading experts bring you the latest insights on drug use and production as we ask: is it time to declare a planetary emergency?


    Around 70% to 80% of the overall revenue generated by illicit drugs is shared among the many wholesale and street-level dealers in destination countries such as the UK and US, where the price per gram is at its highest. How this money moves and is used to sustain the illicit drug trade should be an important part of any worthwhile counter-narcotics strategy. But it rarely is.

    Professional money launderers

    The people and organisations responsible for laundering drug revenues – that is, transforming them into untraceable money that can easily be spent, or into assets that can be held or sold – often exist under the radar of law enforcement and the media.

    Yet the ways illicit drug money is laundered are hardly a mystery. Techniques include wire transfers to offshore bank accounts, investments in shell companies or deposits in cash businesses, and buying foreign currencies or (to a small extent) cryptocurrencies. In addition, the straightforward physical transportation of cash across national borders is an often-used method known as a “bulk cash transfer”.

    The largest players in the illicit drugs industry, such as international cartels, national distributors and large-scale wholesalers, often use professional money launderers – some of whom have seemingly reputable jobs in the financial sector. In one recent case, US financial regulators fined TD Bank US$3 billion (£2.4 billion) – a record penalty for a bank – for facilitating the laundering of millions of dollars of drug cartel money.

    Over six years, more than 90% of the bank’s transactions went unmonitored, enabling “three money laundering networks to collectively transfer more than US$670 million through TD Bank accounts”. Then-US attorney general Merrick Garland commented: “By making its services convenient for criminals, [TD Bank] became one.”

    Video: CBC News.

    Some money laundering networks are as global as the drug supply chains they service. In June 2024, the US Department of Justice’s (DoJ) multi-year “Operation Fortune Runner” investigation saw LA-based associates of Mexico’s Sinaloa drug cartel charged with conspiring with money-laundering groups linked to a Chinese underground banking network. According to the IRS’s head of criminal investigation, Guy Ficco:

    Drug traffickers generate immense amounts of cash through their illicit operations. This case is a prime example of Chinese money launderers working hand-in-hand with drug traffickers to try to legitimise profits generated by drug activities.

    According to the DoJ, “many wealthy Chinese nationals” barred from transferring large amounts to the US by the Chinese government’s capital flight restrictions seek informal alternatives to the conventional banking system – including via schemes to launder illicit drug money. The DoJ explained how this works:

    The China-based investor contacts an individual who has US dollars available to sell in the United States. This seller of US dollars provides identifying information for a bank account in China, with instructions for the investor to deposit Chinese currency (renminbi) in that account. Once the owner of the account sees the deposit, an equivalent amount of US dollars is released to the buyer in the United States.

    These arrangements are not unique to Chinese actors. Similar arrangements occur throughout the world, including schemes to leverage the black market peso exchange and the Hawala international money transfer system.

    Professional launderers are both creating and exploiting vulnerabilities in the global financial system. Such corruption allows suspicious transactions to occur without proper checks or oversight. This not only reduces transparency in the financial system but erodes public trust in it.

    How cartels launder their money

    International drug cartels and national wholesalers have a smaller markup on their transactions, compared with retailers. But because they are responsible for moving enormous quantities of illicit drugs, they still generate millions of dollars worth of revenue.

    The most prolific known drug distributors in US history, Margarito Flores Jr and his twin brother Pedro, delivered billions of dollars worth of cocaine, heroin and methamphetamines to their US and Canadian wholesale clients between 1998 and 2009. They were working for Guzmán and Ismeal “El Mayo” Zambada García, then leaders of the Sinaloa cartel, as well as the Mexican Beltrán Leyva brothers whose cartel bore their surname.

    Today, Margarito Flores Jr trains law enforcement across the US in the methods he and his brother used to traffic drugs and run their business. In January 2015, both men were sentenced to 14 years for drug trafficking – Margarito Flores Jr would later reach out to one of this article’s authors (R.V. Gundur) after reading his book, Trying to Make It: The Enterprises, Gangs, and People of the American Drug Trade, which includes a comprehensive account of the Flores crew’s activities.

    In a subsequent interview, he told us: “My brother and I estimate that, if we added up all of the money we sent back to Mexico over the decade we sold drugs, it was probably more than US$3.5 billion.”

    The billions they remitted to Mexico were used by Guzmán, Zambada and the Beltrán Levya brothers not only to expand their drug businesses, but to corrupt powerful figures such as Mexico’s former secretary of public security, Genaro García Luna.

    García Luna, who was Mexico’s highest-ranking law enforcement official from 2006 to 2012, was sentenced to nearly 40 years in prison in October 2024 after being found guilty of taking millions of dollars in bribes from the Sinaloa cartel, as well as enabling the trafficking of more than a million kilograms of cocaine into the US. Flores explained to us:

    It’s important to understand that corruption impacts people at all levels of government. Our payoffs included local police and other people in the community, up to higher-positioned people in government. Lots of that money ended up funding the violent conflicts between cartels.

    While there has been widespread coverage of cartel drug money being laundered through high-profile businesses and banks such as Wachovia and HSBC, Flores suggested that “the money involved in the drug trade is a lot more than anybody really can understand”. The reason for this, he said, is that it’s very hard to track the flow of hard cash via lorries, boats, planes and even drones. Flores told us:

    It’s a misconception that everyone who makes a lot of money in drugs or other illegal business makes an effort to launder their money. My brother and I held much of what we earned in cash. We knew the government could eventually take everything [else].

    The twins were right: in time, that’s exactly what the US government did.

    ‘Everyday’ money laundering

    In our study of money laundering strategies used by people involved in the illicit drug trade in the UK and US, we found that street dealers do not typically undertake sophisticated laundering processes. Rather, they spend their cash on food and other routine living expenses. One independent UK drug dealer, whose experience was typical of many, used the money earned from his cocaine sales to buy groceries and pay bills for himself and his daughter.

    Spending money, even small amounts, gained through illegal activities is a money laundering offence – albeit one that is seldom prosecuted. As a result, these everyday activities that return illicit drug money to the legal economy are not well accounted for – even though the street value of drugs drives global market value estimates.

    Business-savvy street dealers can earn gross revenues that approach the earnings of high-paid white-collar workers. But they must disguise their earnings’ origins before they can spend them, of course, and various tactics are used to do this.

    Some dealers solicit close friends or family members to act as “strawmen”. These are people willing to put assets paid for by illicit drug money – such as cars, properties or even businesses – in their names on behalf of the dealer. Idris Elba’s character Stringer Bell in HBO’s The Wire was an accurate portrayal of someone investing in legal enterprises using illicit drug money.

    A guide to Stringer Bell’s character in The Wire. Video: Just an Observation.

    These strategies occur wherever illegal enterprise exists, and have done for well over a century. In the US, we interviewed wholesalers who had used family members to own houses and other properties on their behalf. This is done to mitigate against the risk of asset forfeiture should they be convicted of a crime. If an illicit enterprise can create a plausible beneficial owner who is not involved in crime, then the asset is harder to seize. This is why the Donald Trump administration’s recent suspension of beneficial owner oversight is problematic from a drug enforcement perspective.

    In liberal democracies, governments cannot investigate someone’s finances simply because they are related to criminals. The dirty money that is put into their accounts can also be disguised as legitimate income making it difficult to identify, although thorough investigations may uncover it.

    In the UK, we also talked to successful drug retailers who had set up local businesses in their own names. The EU’s law enforcement agency, Europol, has reported similar activities throughout Europe.

    Legal businesses are a common – and often hard-to-detect – vehicle to launder drug money. Bars, clubs, gyms, and hair, nail and tanning salons can be readily set up with drug money, as large cash infusions to establish a business are often not well scrutinised. These businesses are comparatively easy to run with significant cash flows, providing suitable cover for dirty money.

    For example, a beauty salon, especially one that offers high-value boutique services, could easily incorporate drug revenue into its financial accounts by reporting sales that do not occur. Tanning salons can be set up with little expense since they require only sunbeds and the rental of a property.

    Along with bars, clubs and salons, construction companies and restaurants stand out as other cash-intensive businesses with high volumes of transactions – characteristics that make good fronts for laundering money.

    It’s hard to spot a ‘dirty’ business

    There is no surefire way to tell whether a business is a laundering front. While some may look like enterprises struggling to stay afloat, others develop into viable operations that eventually no longer need dirty money to sustain them.

    Some drug dealers incorporate laundering practices within their legitimate jobs. Tradespeople such as electricians or plumbers, for example, can launder money by generating invoices for fake jobs, then reporting the income on their tax returns.

    In both the UK and US, tax authorities are not charged with evaluating the veracity of the funds reported, and are generally satisfied once tax is paid. In other words, they generally trust declared income as proof of legal business activity. Moreover, they, along with the police, lack the resources to investigate these businesses for money laundering.

    Through their legal businesses, many drug dealers pay significant taxes on their illegal revenue, and thus contribute to the economy.

    Paying income tax effectively renders this income laundered. It can be invested and used to set up other businesses, or to purchase cars and properties without suspicion. It can also bolster credit ratings, and improve access to legal financial services such as bank loans.

    Many small-time drug dealers start legal businesses in order to exit the illicit drug trade. We interviewed one cocaine dealer who had used his drug money to set up a retail electronics store; once it was successful, he stopped dealing. Similarly, the person behind a semi-legitimate nitrous oxide enterprise used his proceeds to set up a legitimate alcohol delivery service.

    Through self-laundering, these modest drug dealers transform their proceeds of crime into spendable cash – and may eventually leave criminality behind altogether.

    The (losing) battle against laundered money

    Across the world, anti-money laundering efforts against organised criminal gangs are notoriously ineffective.

    The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) – an intergovernmental organisation formed in 1999 to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism – assesses financial regulators’ anti-money laundering controls all over the world. Countries designated as a risk that require monitoring are placed on the task force’s “grey list”, while severe, high-risk countries go on its “black list”. Being put on these lists can result in a withdrawal of international investment and implementation of sanctions by other countries.

    Although developing countries have often scored badly in their assessments, there has been some progress. While Kenya remained on the grey list in 2024, for example, it was found to have strengthened its measures to tackle both money laundering and terrorist financing. In the same year, though, Lebanon was added to the grey list over concerns on both counts.

    The FATF’s evaluation processes are designed to provide an objective assessment of whether a country has implemented its anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing recommendations. However, the success of the FATF’s anti-money laundering controls remains unclear.

    Video: The Financial Action Task Force.

    Often lost in the criminal financing narrative is the role of bulk cash transfers. Even in a world that is moving to cashless transactions, cash generally remains the primary currency of both the illicit drug trade and corruption.

    The biggest and most successful drug traffickers have significant cash reserves which are used to pay workers, replace drugs that are lost or seized, accrue assets, and bribe key officials.

    Reflecting on his former illicit enterprise, Margarito Flores observed: “For every kilo of cocaine or heroin or methamphetamine we sold in the US, at least a kilo of cash went back to Mexico.” For deals in Europe, Flores said: “Given the markup the further away you trade, the amount of cash sent back could be even higher – I would estimate it to be a kilo and a half.”

    Flores described the ineptitude of law enforcement in policing cash that was leaving the US:

    No matter how careful we were, my brother and I lost a handful of loads of drugs heading north [from Mexico into the US]. Heading south was different: we just had the money put on tractor trailers and had it driven it across the border. We never lost a dollar. That’s where politicians don’t pay enough attention. That cash lets traffickers keep doing business.

    Focus on the money as well as the drugs

    So long as demand for illicit drugs exists, the industry will continue – and the revenue it generates will be laundered.

    We believe that to curb the drugs trade, enforcement strategies need to go beyond simply capturing drugs and focus much more on capturing the money. Governments should go after reserves held not only by drug cartels but high-level distributors, such as those who replaced the Flores twins, and also wholesalers. People like these – comparatively high earners in destination countries – are the backbone of the illicit drugs trade.

    Transnational law enforcement should prioritise detecting and seizing bulk cash transfers. These high-volume proceeds underwrite the wellbeing of drug trafficking organisations. Digital tools, such as machine learning and artificial intelligence, can be developed to create new techniques to track and trace suspicious transactions, although they alone won’t solve all laundering problems.

    Corruption of officials also remains a problem. Governments need to ensure their officials are well paid and sufficiently monitored in their roles – be they working in government, border control, banks, police departments or prisons. Unfortunately, the US has shirked its leadership in global anti-corruption efforts with the recent halting of the enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which bans the bribing of foreign officials.




    Read more:
    Mexico’s drug corruption has more to do with US demand than crooked politicians


    Anti-money laundering efforts need to be consistently supported and required. Lamentably, the US has undermined its anti-money laundering toolkit by suspending the enforcement of beneficial ownership information reporting requirements. Establishing beneficial ownership helps financial institutions to identify parties that are hiding their financial interests, which can be an indication of money laundering or other criminal activity.

    Similarly, foreign investment in producer countries can strengthen their capacity to counter laundering by supporting intelligence infrastructure and improved training. Recent cuts to USAid and the reduction of US State Department efforts in these areas is another indication that the US will no longer lead in these domains.

    As cash businesses provide an easy mechanism for cleaning money, moving to a cashless society that uses digital transactions may help ensure that money is traceable. At the same time, cryptomarkets provide a minor, but potentially increasing, pathway to hiding dirty money digitally.

    Ultimately, we should recognise the decades-long “war on drugs” for what it is: a policy costing trillions of dollars that combined mass incarceration with insufficient public health investment, and which has harmed the very communities the illicit drug trade affects the most. It is a difficult balance, but the pathway forward needs to reorient the objectives regarding drugs: invest in people, then go after the money that keeps the cartels, distributors and wholesalers afloat.


    For you: more from our Insights series:

    To hear about new Insights articles, join the hundreds of thousands of people who value The Conversation’s evidence-based news. Subscribe to our newsletter.

    Mark Berry received funding from the Dawes Trust for a prestigious PhD scholarship to undertake work that informs the contents of this article.

    R.V. Gundur received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council to undertake work that informs the contents of this article. He is also a professional member of the International Compliance Association.

    The authors wish to thank Margarito Flores Jr (kingpintoeducator.com) for his help with this article.

    ref. Money laundering plays a key role in every part of the illegal drugs industry – here’s how it works – https://theconversation.com/money-laundering-plays-a-key-role-in-every-part-of-the-illegal-drugs-industry-heres-how-it-works-251288

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Security: Employee at Multinational DVD Company Charged with Stealing, Selling Pre-Release Commercial DVDs for Blockbuster Films

    Source: United States Attorneys General

    A worker at a DVD and Blu-ray manufacturing and distribution company used by major movie studios was arrested today in Memphis, Tennessee, for allegedly stealing DVDs and Blu-rays of blockbuster movies from the company and selling them before their official scheduled release dates. A digital copy of at least one of the stolen Blu-rays was illegally distributed tens of millions of times over the internet, causing the copyright owner tens of millions of dollars in losses.

    According to court documents, Steven R. Hale, 37, of Memphis, worked for a multinational company that, among other things, manufactured and distributed DVDs and Blu-rays of movies. From approximately February 2021 to March 2022, Hale allegedly stole numerous “pre-release” DVDs and Blu-rays, that is, discs being prepared for commercial distribution in the United States and not available for sale to the public. These included DVDs and Blu-rays for such popular films as “F9: The Fast Saga,” “Venom: Let There Be Carnage,” “Godzilla v. Kong,” “Shang-Chi and the Legend of the Ten Rings,” “Dune,” and “Black Widow.” Hale allegedly sold the DVDs and Blu-rays through e-commerce sites. At least one pre-release Blu-ray that Hale allegedly stole and sold, “Spider-Man: No Way Home,” was “ripped” — that is, extracted from the Blu-ray by bypassing the encryption that prevents unauthorized copying — and copied. That digital copy was then illegally made available over the internet more than a month before the Blu-ray’s official scheduled release date. Copies of “Spider-Man: No Way Home” were downloaded tens of millions of times, with an estimated loss to the copyright owner of tens of millions of dollars.

    The indictment, unsealed today, charges Hale with two counts of criminal copyright infringement and one count of interstate transportation of stolen goods. If convicted, he faces a maximum penalty of five years in prison on each criminal copyright infringement count and 10 years in prison on the interstate transportation of stolen goods count. A federal district judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

    Supervisory Official Antoinette T. Bacon of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division, Acting U.S. Attorney Reagan Fondren for the Western District of Tennessee, and Special Agent in Charge Joseph E. Carrico of the FBI Nashville Field Office made the announcement.

    The FBI is investigating the case.

    Senior Counsel Matthew A. Lamberti and Trial Attorney Debra Ireland of the Criminal Division’s Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section and Assistant U.S. Attorney Raney Irwin for the Western District of Tennessee are prosecuting the case.

    An indictment is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI USA: Michigan Businessman Found Guilty of Employment Tax Crimes

    Source: US State of Vermont

    A federal jury convicted a Michigan businessman yesterday for not paying employment taxes and not filing his own individual income tax returns.

    According to court documents and evidence presented at trial, Dale Thrush, of Farwell, owned and operated several automotive repair service locations and a gas station. Thrush was responsible for withholding Social Security, Medicare and income taxes from his employees’ wages and paying those funds over to the IRS on behalf of his employees. From October 2014 through December 2016, Thrush withheld those funds from his employees’ wages but did not pay over the full amount of the withheld taxes to the IRS. Instead, Thrush used some of those funds to pay personal expenses, including the remodeling and construction costs for his wife’s business.

    In addition, Thrush did not file his own individual income tax returns for 2013 through 2016 despite being legally obligated to do so.

    Thrush was convicted of three counts of willful failure to pay payroll taxes and four counts of willful failure to file individual income tax returns. He was acquitted of seven counts of willful failure to pay payroll taxes.

    Thrush is scheduled to be sentenced on July 17. He faces a maximum penalty of five years in prison for each count of not paying employment taxes and a maximum penalty of one year in prison for each count of not filing his individual income tax returns. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

    Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General Karen E. Kelly of the Justice Department’s Tax Division made the announcement.

    IRS Criminal Investigation is investigating the case.

    Trial Attorneys Mark McDonald and Evan Mulbry of the Tax Division are prosecuting the case.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Michigan Businessman Found Guilty of Employment Tax Crimes

    Source: United States Attorneys General

    A federal jury convicted a Michigan businessman yesterday for not paying employment taxes and not filing his own individual income tax returns.

    According to court documents and evidence presented at trial, Dale Thrush, of Farwell, owned and operated several automotive repair service locations and a gas station. Thrush was responsible for withholding Social Security, Medicare and income taxes from his employees’ wages and paying those funds over to the IRS on behalf of his employees. From October 2014 through December 2016, Thrush withheld those funds from his employees’ wages but did not pay over the full amount of the withheld taxes to the IRS. Instead, Thrush used some of those funds to pay personal expenses, including the remodeling and construction costs for his wife’s business.

    In addition, Thrush did not file his own individual income tax returns for 2013 through 2016 despite being legally obligated to do so.

    Thrush was convicted of three counts of willful failure to pay payroll taxes and four counts of willful failure to file individual income tax returns. He was acquitted of seven counts of willful failure to pay payroll taxes.

    Thrush is scheduled to be sentenced on July 17. He faces a maximum penalty of five years in prison for each count of not paying employment taxes and a maximum penalty of one year in prison for each count of not filing his individual income tax returns. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

    Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General Karen E. Kelly of the Justice Department’s Tax Division made the announcement.

    IRS Criminal Investigation is investigating the case.

    Trial Attorneys Mark McDonald and Evan Mulbry of the Tax Division are prosecuting the case.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: Senegal: Authorities must deliver justice to victims of violent repression of protests since 2021 

    Source: Amnesty International –

    The Senegalese authorities must deliver justice, truth and reparation to the thousands of victims of the violent crackdown on protests between 2021 and 2024, said Amnesty International on the first anniversary of a law granting an amnesty to security forces.  

    The amnesty law, passed on 6 March 2024, covers all acts likely to be classified as crimes or offences relating to ‘demonstrations or politically motivated events’, which took place between 1 February 2021 and 25 February 2024. During this period, during protests triggered by the arrest of then opposition leader Ousmane Sonko, security forces routinely deployed excessive and lethal use of force against protesters. According to figures gathered by Amnesty International and other civil society organizations, at least 65 people were killed, the majority by firearms, with at least 1,000 wounded. A further 2,000 people were arrested.  

    “Justice, truth and reparation require that security forces allegedly responsible for excessive and illegal use of force during protests be prosecuted. The amnesty law constitutes an obstacle that must be removed by the current Senegalese authorities, as they pledged to do,” said Marceau Sivieude, Amnesty International’s interim regional director for West and Central Africa. 

    Justice, truth and reparation require that security forces allegedly responsible for excessive and illegal use of force during protests be prosecuted.

    Marceau Sivieude, Amnesty International Interim Regional Director for West and Central Africa

    “The financial assistance paid in 2024 to some of the victims of detentions and announced in 2025 to families of people killed during protests is a first step. However, it does not meet their need for justice, nor does it constitute a guarantee that such events will not be repeated. Senegalese authorities must repeal the amnesty law and provide justice to all victims of human rights violations during protests,” said Seydi Gassama, executive director of Amnesty International Senegal.    

    MIL OSI NGO

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: In Dialogue with Burkina Faso, Experts of the Human Rights Committee Commend Electoral Quotas for Women, Raise Issues Concerning Alleged Human Rights Violations by Homeland Defence Volunteers and Potential Reinstatement of the Death Penalty

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Human Rights Committee today concluded its consideration of the second periodic report of Burkina Faso on how it implements the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, with Committee Experts commending electoral quotas promoting women’s representation, while raising issues concerning impunity for alleged human rights violations committed by the Homeland Defence Volunteers, and the potential reinstatement of the death penalty.

    A Committee Expert welcomed the 2009 law on electoral quotas, which increased the quota for the representation of women in legislative and municipal elections from 30 to 50 per cent.  However, a 2020 law retained a 30 per cent quota; were there plans to amend it?

    A Committee Expert said there seemed to be impunity for violations committed by the special forces and Homeland Defence Volunteers.  How was the State party pursuing accountability?  Another Expert said State legislation granted self-defence militia a role in overseeing security and questioning suspects.  How was the State party preventing self-defence militia from carrying out law enforcement activities?

    One Expert said the Committee was deeply concerned by reported plans to reintroduce the death penalty in Burkina Faso.  Could the delegation clarify whether Burkina Faso was committed to abolishing the death penalty?  How was the potential reinstatement of the death penalty aligned with the State’s Covenant obligations?

    Responding to questions, the delegation said a law was implemented in 2020 that regulated quotas for women’s representation in elections, but it had since been revised.  Some 23 per cent of Government staff were women and there were five women ministers out of 23, while 27 per cent of Governors and 33 per cent of embassy staff and ambassadors were women.

    The State party did not agree with the Committee’s use of the term “self-defence militia”, the delegation said, which was not in line with reality.  Burkina Faso was facing an extraordinary security situation; security forces were reacting to neutralise terrorists.  There were no militias, only Homeland Defence Volunteers, who were under the aegis of the security forces.  State officials were not involved in the disappearances of persons; only terrorists were.  Persons who committed violations were brought before the justice system.

    The delegation said Burkina Faso had a sovereign right to decide on the imposition of the death penalty.  As the country most affected by terrorism worldwide, the State was most concerned with restoring peace and defending citizens’ rights. The death penalty existed in State legislation, such as in the military code, but there was a de facto moratorium on it.  There were plans to restore the death penalty to deter crimes of terrorism.

    Edasso Rodrigue Bayala, Minister of Justice and Human Rights, Keeper of the Seals and head of the delegation, said Burkina Faso was determined to implement civil and political rights, despite the terrorist attacks faced by the country.  The State had undertaken several institutional and legislative reforms to ensure citizens could better enjoy their rights, strengthening public institutions and structures responsible for promoting human rights.

    In concluding remarks, Mr. Bayala thanked the Committee for the high-quality dialogue.  The Government remained deeply committed to the respect of human rights and would closely heed any recommendations made by the Committee. The stabilisation undertaken by Burkina Faso was essential to bringing about lasting peace and development, and international partners were called on to support these efforts.

    Changrok Soh, Committee Chairperson, in concluding remarks, expressed appreciation for the constructive dialogue, and thanked all those who had contributed.  The discussions had covered a range of topics related to the Covenant, he said.

    The delegation of Burkina Faso was made up of representatives of the Presidency of Burkina Faso; Ministry of Justice and Human Rights; Ministry of Humanitarian Action and National Solidarity; Ministry of Defence and Veterans Affairs; Ministry of Security; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Regional Cooperation and Burkinabe Abroad; and the Permanent Mission of Burkina Faso to the United Nations Office at Geneva.

    The Human Rights Committee’s one hundred and forty-third session is being held from 3 to 28 March 2025.  All the documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, can be found on the session’s webpage.  Meeting summary releases can be found here.  The webcast of the Committee’s public meetings can be accessed via the UN Web TV webpage.

    The Committee will next meet in public at 3 p.m. this afternoon, Thursday 6 March to begin its consideration of the second periodic report of Zimbabwe (CCPR/C/ZWE/2).

    Report

    The Committee has before it the second periodic report of Burkina Faso (CCPR/C/BFA/2).

    Presentation of the Report

    SABINE BAKYONO KANZIE, Permanent Representative of Burkina Faso to the United Nations Office at Geneva, said through the dialogue with the Committee, Burkina Faso sought to renew its commitments to the rules and principles embodied in the Covenant.  The delegation would tackle key issues, focusing on what the Government had done to strengthen the institutional and regulatory framework.

    EDASSO RODRIGUE BAYALA, Minister of Justice and Human Rights, Keeper of the Seals and head of the delegation, said Burkina Faso was determined to implement civil and political rights, despite the terrorist attacks faced by the country.  The State had undertaken several institutional and legislative reforms to ensure citizens could better enjoy their rights.  Over the reporting period, the normative framework for the protection of civil and political rights had evolved, with the adoption of laws on the functioning of the High Council for Communication, the conditions of entry and residence of foreigners on national territory, the administration of community service, and the Homeland Defence Volunteers, as well as the 2024 amendment to the Constitution.

    The Government had strengthened public institutions and structures responsible for promoting and protecting human rights. The staff and budget of the National Human Rights Commission had been strengthened, and the National Mechanism for the Prevention of Torture was operationalised.  In 2023, the Government created a framework for consultation, monitoring and early warning of cases of alleged human rights violations and abuses, relating to the fight against terrorism, and an interministerial working group to implement the framework.  Judicial units specialised in economic and financial crimes and organised crime were created within the Ouaga 1 and Bobo Dioulasso High Courts, and a unit specialised in terrorism cases was created within the Ouaga II High Court.

    Burkina Faso attached great importance to the contribution of civil society organizations.  It adopted Law No. 039 on the protection of human rights defenders in 2017, which guaranteed the right of individuals and associations to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms.  More than 500 young human rights defenders from areas affected by the security crisis were trained between 2020 and 2022. 

    After the report was tabled, the State party had trained 627 supervisors and trainers of the Homeland Defence Volunteers, and sensitised more than 32,000 volunteers and armed force members on the protection of human rights in the fight against terrorism.  It had also held trials of terrorism cases in 2023 and 2024, in which 151 people were convicted and 95 acquitted, and held empty case files operations in January 2025, which made it possible to adjudicate 4,200 cases that had been pending for several years.

    To effectively combat terrorism, major legislative, institutional and operational reforms of the armed forces had been carried out.  Legal advisers had been established within each armed forces unit.  To guarantee the protection of the population and their property against the terrorist threat, the Government established a “state of ready alert” for a period of 12 months in April 2023, duly notifying the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

    A trial to establish responsibility regarding the death of former President Thomas Sankara was concluded in 2022 with the conviction of 14 people and  compensation for the beneficiaries.  Regarding the Norbert Zongo case, the Government had implemented the judgment of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights on reparations to family members and others, providing 233,135,409 CFA francs in compensation.

    To combat prison overcrowding, several measures had been adopted, including a 2024 law on community service, and the revision of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to improve the efficiency of the Burkinabe justice system.

    Regarding the fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorism, Burkina Faso had developed a new strategy with an action plan for 2021-2025.  Structures such as the Supreme Authority for State Control and the Fight against Corruption had strengthened awareness-raising on corruption and internal controls of public structures.  From 2022 to 2024, the Supreme Authority had sent 141 cases to the Public Prosecutor’s Office, 31 of which had already been tried.

    The Government had undertaken a review of the Code of Persons and the Family, aiming to harmonising the minimum legal age of marriage for men and women.  The draft Code had been transmitted to the Transitional Legislative Assembly for adoption.

    Burkina Faso was committed to freedom of the press and of opinion, freedom of assembly and the right to information.  However, these freedoms were not absolute and needed to be exercised in compliance with the law.  Restrictions could be imposed by the Government on the exercise of these freedoms in accordance with international commitments.  To enable journalists and media outlets to adapt to the security context, the Government was providing training, information and awareness-raising activities on crisis-sensitive journalism.

    Despite the progress made, the security and humanitarian challenges that Burkina Faso had been facing for several years were a major concern.  Citizens were fighting with bravery and dignity for the total eradication of terrorism. The State was calling for more solidarity and support from the international community.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert noted the State party’s substantial legislative and institutional machinery, set up despite the challenges faced in the State.  What measures were in place to ensure respect for the State’s human rights commitments and implementation of the Committee’s recommendations?  Since the last review, the security and humanitarian situation had deteriorated considerably in the State party.  According to the 2024 Global Terrorism Index report, “for the first time, Burkina Faso had become the country most affected by terrorism globally”.

    The Committee noted with satisfaction that the Constitution conferred on international treaties and agreements that the State party had ratified or approved a binding nature and supra-legislative authority.  Efforts had been made by the Government to disseminate the provisions of the Covenant. Could the State party provide examples of cases where national courts had invoked the provisions of the Covenant? What legislation had been harmonised with the Covenant and relevant recommendations in the previous concluding observations?  Did Constitutional revisions strengthen civil and political rights?

    A trial had been held regarding the death of former President Thomas Sankara.  Could the State party provide information on this trial and the designation of an official burial site?

    Why had the national preventive mechanism against torture been included within the National Human Rights Commission?  What were the outcomes of its activities? Could data be provided on complaints received by the Commission?  What sanctions were issued to the perpetrators of violations?  What had the Commission done to ensure proper implementation of the law on the protection of human rights defenders?  What measures had the State party taken to ensure that the Commission could recover its accreditation with the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions?

    Another Committee Expert requested more information on measures taken to ensure accountability for all persons who committed violations against former President Thomas Sankara and Norbert Zongo. Why had the High Council for Reconciliation and National Unity, which had investigated historic human rights violations occurring since the 1960s, been disestablished?  Had all its investigations been closed and did they lead to criminal sanctions?

    There had been an upsurge in human rights violations committed in the State since 2019 by different actors, including terrorist groups, non-State and military actors.  What measures were in place to raise awareness of human rights and international humanitarian law?  There seemed to be impunity for violations committed by the special forces and the Homeland Defence Volunteers.  How was the State party pursuing accountability?  What transitional justice measures and human rights education measures were in place?

    The State party had not withdrawn or renewed the state of emergency established in 2019.  Such states of emergency needed to respect basic rights; the right to individual freedoms could not be subject to exemptions.  Serious violations had occurred in the context of the fight against terrorism, including extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearance and torture. How could the derogatory legal framework in place today be reconciled with the Covenant?  When would the state of emergency be ended?

    Martial rape was prohibited in the State party. Were there any awareness raising campaigns in place to inform the public of the prohibition, and to prevent patriarchal stereotypes and violence against women?  There was an environment of impunity for violence against women in the State party.  What investigations had been carried out into violence against women, including sexual violence against displaced women?

    One Committee Expert said Burkina Faso had acceded to the United Nations Convention on Corruption in 2006, and to the African Union Convention on Corruption in 2005.  In 2017, the State adopted a law on the prevention of corruption.  Despite the efforts of the State party, however, Burkina Faso had high rankings on global corruption indices.  What measures were in place to investigate and prevent corruption?  What support did the State provide to the national committee monitoring corruption, which was reportedly encountering financial difficulties?

    The Expert welcomed the 2009 law on electoral quotas, which increased the quota for the representation of women in legislative and municipal elections from 30 to 50 per cent.  However, a 2020 law retained a 30 per cent quota; were there plans to amend it?  What measures were in place to increase the representation of women in leadership positions in public and private institutions?  There were customary practices that were discriminatory to women in Burkina Faso.  How did legislation prevent these practices?

    Parliament was reportedly yet to adopt draft legislation that would establish the legal minimum age for marriage of men and women at 18 years, and to prohibit polygamy.  When would this be adopted?  What measures were in place to prevent polygamy and raise awareness of its harms? The Committee was concerned by the continued prevalence of female genital mutilation, despite its prohibition in 1996.  What measures were in place to implement the prohibition and to combat stigmatisation and violence against women who were accused of witchcraft?

    State legislation granted self-defence militia a role in overseeing security and questioning suspects.  How was the State party strengthening the presence of security forces across the country and preventing self-defence militia from carrying out law enforcement activities?  Was the State party investigating violations by these militia?

    Another Committee Expert said that the Committee welcomed that the State party had adopted legislation prohibiting discrimination, but certain vulnerable groups were not offered protection.  Was the State party planning to adopt a comprehensive legal framework that clearly defined direct and indirect discrimination, and discrimination based on sexual orientation, gender identity and disability? What measures were in place to provide reparations for victims of discrimination, sanction discriminatory speech in the online space, and prevent discrimination against persons with albinism? Could the delegation provide information on reforms to the law on the family and their impact on lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons?

    One Committee Expert welcomed recent amendments to the Criminal Code, which allowed for abortion up to 14 weeks of pregnancy, in cases of rape or incest.  However, social and cultural attitudes stigmatised women who sought abortions and there were barriers to obtaining legal abortions, pushing women to seek unsafe, clandestine abortions.  How was the State party addressing these issues?  The Expert welcomed the marked increase in free family planning services and contraception, but noted that cultural and other barriers continued to prevent access to contraception and family planning services.  How would these issues be addressed?

    The Committee was deeply concerned by reported plans to reintroduce the death penalty in Burkina Faso.  Could the delegation clarify whether Burkina Faso was committed to abolishing the death penalty?  The State party had not taken substantial steps to ratify the Second Optional Protocol to the Covenant.  What was the status of the ratification process?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the State party did not agree with the Committee’s use of the terms “armed non-State groups” and “self-defence militia”, which were not in line with reality.  Burkina Faso was facing an extraordinary security situation. There were no non-State armed groups, only terrorist groups.  There were also no militias, only Homeland Defence Volunteers, who were under the aegis of the security forces.  State officials were not involved in the disappearances of persons; only terrorists were.  Security forces were reacting to neutralise terrorists.  In some cases, persons reported as having been disappeared were in fact terrorists.  Persons who committed violations were brought before the justice system.

    The death penalty existed in State legislation, such as in the military code, but there was a de facto moratorium on it. There were plans to restore the death penalty to deter crimes of terrorism.

    Reform of the Constitution had been stalled due to the security situation, with work to resume when the security situation had improved.

    The Government had strengthened protection against human rights violations in 2023.  Victims of such violations had the right to report them to competent State bodies and the National Human Rights Commission.  Legislation adopted in 2016 and 2017 defined the Commission’s mandate. Since 2022, the Commission had had its own budget, and its staff had recently been increased.  It was aligned with the Paris Principles. 

    Legal amendments in 2021 appointed the National Human Rights Commission as the national preventive mechanism for torture; it was currently operational and conducting activities across the country. The mechanism had been conducting awareness raising campaigns and workshops on preventing torture and had held commemorations for the victims of torture.

    The State party planned to raise the legal age of marriage to 18 years for men and women.  All citizens were equal before the law in Burkina Faso.  The State party had conducted awareness raising activities to boost social cohesion and prevent discrimination.

    In 2023, the State party submitted a letter to the United Nations Secretary-General notifying him of the state of emergency. The state of emergency provided for no exemptions to basic individual freedoms.  The Constitution stated that all citizens could invoke all international treaties ratified by Burkina Faso before the courts.  Several members of the judiciary had received training on international treaties ratified by the State party, including the Covenant.

    The remains of former President Thomas Sankara and his murdered colleagues had been buried and these persons had been given the status of “national heroes”.  Compensation had been granted related to the case of Norbert Zongo, although this case was still before the courts.

    All forms of discrimination were prohibited under State law and victims of discrimination could plead their cases with the competent authorities.  The Penal Code stipulated that discrimination based on specific characteristics was prohibited, when it aimed to infringe on rights.  Public speech inciting violence or hatred against a person or group on any grounds could be punished with up to three years imprisonment.  There were legal provisions prohibiting discrimination by employers in relation to hiring and dismissals, and defamation against any group by the press.  There was also legislation protecting persons with disabilities from discrimination. Employers could not reject applications from persons with disabilities on the grounds of their disability.

    A law was implemented in 2020 that regulated quotas for women’s representation in elections, but it had since been revised. Some 23 per cent of Government staff were women, while 33 per cent of embassy staff were women, and 27 per cent of Governors were women.

    Burkina Faso had comprehensive care shelters for women victims of violence in three locations.  The Penal Code issued penalties of imprisonment and fines for persons who accused women of witchcraft.  The State party had assisted around 30 women accused of witchcraft to return to their family environment in 2024.  There was a national strategy and action plan for eliminating female genital mutilation; close to 250 persons had been prosecuted for the crime of female genital mutilation in recent years.  Various projects had been financed throughout the country to promote women’s access to land; these had helped to increase the share of land held by women.

    Burkina Faso provided food aid, shelter and psychosocial support for internally displaced persons.  The State had established a plan spanning 2023 to 2027 for supporting internally displaced persons.

    Abortions could be carried out by authorised doctors if there was a threat to the life of the mother.  The State party had established a national action plan on family planning, which sought to increase access to contraception.

    The High Council for Reconciliation and National Unity had been abolished and another body had been established to continue its mission.

    Volunteer forces were military personnel, and therefore needed to abide by State legislation and all international treaties to which Burkina Faso was a party.  They did not enjoy impunity.  When they committed violations, they could be expelled from the security forces.  Legal texts regulated the mobilisation of volunteer forces, which were helping to recover land nationwide and put an end to terrorist attacks.  Reforms were being implemented to promote better coverage of the territory by security forces.  The State could not overcome terrorism without the help of citizens.  From 2016 to 2024, over 285 members of self-defence forces were prosecuted and issued with sanctions.

    There were State bodies that were working to prevent corruption and investigate complaints of corruption, including corruption within the security forces.  Legislation on money laundering, financing terrorism and proliferating weapons of mass destruction had been implemented.  In 2024, 81 cases of violations under this legislation had been investigated.

    The state of emergency was not in force as of October 2023, demonstrating that the security situation in the country had improved. The state of emergency had been implemented to combat the upsurge in terrorist acts and to bring back peace in the country.

    Burkina Faso attached great importance to the contributions of human rights defenders and had implemented several initiatives to create an enabling environment for them.  The law on human rights defenders mandated the State to set up a protection mechanism for human rights defenders and their family members; this was now operational.

    The Government was committed to freedom of the press.  However, hate speech and incitement to violence was not acceptable and some members of the press had been sanctioned for such activities.

    Persons with albinism had preferential access to State health and educational services.

    Burkina Faso was committed to combatting and ending female genital mutilation both within and outside its territory.  In the Human Rights Council, the State promoted resolution 50/16, which addressed female genital mutilation internationally.

    The State party was waging a complex battle against terrorists and their accomplices, who sometimes sought to hijack human rights issues. These persons could have given the Committee unreliable information.

    Follow-Up Questions by Committee Experts

    One Committee Expert called on the State party to prove that the information submitted by civil society lacked substantiation.  The Expert said that the only official notification received by the Secretary-General related to the state of emergency dated back to 2019.  Had a letter been sent concerning the most recent state of emergency?  The powers granted to the military in this state of emergency seemed to still be in force; was this the case?

    Other Committee Experts asked follow-up questions on the membership of the national preventive mechanism against torture, the resources available to it, and its powers to visit places of depravation of liberty; measures to ensure that existing laws were consistent with the Covenant; how human rights defenders were involved in the drafting of treaty body reports and whether there was a dedicated mechanism for the drafting of reports.

    Questions were also asked on measures to ensure that informal counter-terrorism actors did not abuse their powers; how the State party implemented anti-discrimination legislation to protect the rights of vulnerable persons; how the State party would guarantee access to justice for persons with disabilities and other vulnerable groups who were discriminated against; the number of discrimination complaints investigated by the State party; the State party’s legal stance on same-sex relations; measures to prevent marital rape; how the potential reinstatement of the death penalty aligned with the State’s Covenant obligations; and plans to remove administrative barriers to accessing abortions.

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said it could not provide information about issues that did not exist, such as self-defence militias. The Homeland Defence Volunteers had a legal basis, and volunteers were recruited according to specific moral criteria. They were overseen by the military police and other defence forces.

    Burkina Faso had a sovereign right to decide on the imposition of the death penalty, which could act as a deterrent to terrorism crimes.  Burkina Faso had a duty to uphold the Covenant but was facing an existential crisis. It was the country most affected by terrorism worldwide.  The State was most concerned with escaping this situation, restoring peace and defending citizens’ rights.  It had eliminated the death penalty within common law.

    The Constitutional Court had invoked the Covenant in two cases.  The national preventive mechanism against torture was established in 2014 but had faced financial difficulties.  In 2021, the decision was made to incorporate the mechanism within the National Human Rights Commission to ensure its access to financing.  It worked separately from the Commission, overseeing prisons, police holding facilities and other places of detention.  It had also held workshops throughout the country to inform the public about its activities.

    The state of emergency was no longer in force, but the State party still needed to ensure security across the country.  Thus, following advice from the Constitutional Court, the State party had declared a “state of ready alert”, which gave the State the power to control the supply of resources and restrict certain rights, pursuant to the law.

    There was a plan of action in place for the promotion of human rights education and civic duty.  A study had been conducted into the alignment of the State’s legislation with Covenant provisions; the recommendations of this study were currently being implemented.  There was a specialised body established within the State party to draft reports for the treaty bodies and oversee implementation of their recommendations.

    In cases of rape or incest, if public prosecutors granted permission, women could conduct abortions within the first 14 weeks of pregnancy.  In cases of repeated marital rape, fines were imposed on the perpetrator.  The Government was conducting an awareness raising campaign on preventing marital rape.

    In March 2020, a decree was adopted for an action plan up to 2024 for human rights education within school syllabuses and educational training centres.  This action plan made it possible to provide training, awareness raising and information session to the public, civil society organisations and defence forces. Some 232 courses in human rights were organised.  An action plan for 2025-2029 was currently being developed to continue this work. 

    Burkina Faso had established traditional dispute mechanisms, including mediation.  There had been more than 4,000 complaints of violence against women in 2023 and more than 5,000 in 2024.  Access to justice was guaranteed for everybody, including those with disabilities.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert asked how the mechanism for the prevention of torture worked in practice.  Could it visit places of deprivation of liberty unannounced and meet detainees without the presence of a police officer or guard?  Were requests from the authorities followed up?  Was the Human Rights Commission’s annual report widely disseminated to the authorities concerned?  Torture was prohibited, as was the use of confessions under torture, however accused officials had told the courts that confessions had been extracted from them by police.  Could the delegation provide examples of cases in which the rule of exclusion of evidence obtained under torture had been applied by the courts?

    The judicial reforms of 2023 and 2024 had significant effects on the functioning of the justice system, some of which were potentially problematic, even dangerous, including the modification of the High Council of the Judiciary to increase the share of non-magistrate members to 50 per cent, and the submission of the Public Prosecutor’s Office to the authority of the Minister of Justice.  It appeared that it was up to the Minister, in practice, to appoint, assign and sanction judges, which risked undermining the independence of judges.  There also seemed to be significant judicial backlogs and unexecuted decisions.  What strategy was envisaged to reduce those backlogs and strengthen the implementation of court decisions?  Were the reforms compatible with the impartiality and independence of justice, as enshrined in the Covenant?  What measures had been taken to strengthen the capacity of the judiciary?  How was the selection of judges organised?

    The Committee was concerned that certain magistrates who had issued decisions unfavourable to Homeland Defence Volunteers or the Executive had been forcibly conscripted.  Information had also been received regarding an instruction note from the Prosecutor General in October 2024, which reportedly gave an injunction to all prosecutors not to prosecute certain persons until they had received his prior authorisation.  Could the delegation comment on this information?  Were the Homeland Defence Volunteers subject to civilian courts when they committed crimes, or did they fall under the jurisdiction of military courts?

    Another Committee Expert asked about the steps taken to finalise the investigations relating to alleged violations committed during the 2014-2015 period of unrest , in particular regarding excessive use of force resulting in bodily harm, death and obstruction of peaceful assemblies? If State officers were found guilty, would the State party ensure that the penalties issued were proportionate to the seriousness of the crime?  Could the Committee be updated on developments relating to the National Observatory for the Prevention of Torture, with regard to its mandate, composition, financing, and data collection system, and the choice of its members?

    Another Expert said that while the Committee took note of efforts made by the State party to improve the conditions of detention, information received indicated several shortcomings in this area.  For example, the Ouagadougou prison had just one nurse.  In 2021, the State party adopted a strategic plan for the development of the prison administration with a view to humanising the conditions of detention in prisons; how had implementation of the plan been assessed?  What were the outcomes and impacts of the visits of the judicial authorities, the competent inspection bodies and non-governmental organizations to places of deprivation of liberty on the conditions of detainees?

    Burkina Faso had asserted that there were no minority groups within its population, and that the Peuhl and Tuareg communities were not minorities.  Could more information on this be provided?  According to information received over the past five years, members of the indigenous Fulani community had reported cases of being stigmatised, treated inhumanely and accused of terrorism based on their ethnicity.  What measures were being taken to ensure that the rights of all citizens were respected without discrimination?  Did the State party plan to open secure corridors to allow the population to withdraw from dangerous areas and secure their property?  The national human rights institution had made recommendations for the State party to strengthen actions to combat hate speech and incitement to violence; could the State party comment on this?

    A Committee Expert said the Committee acknowledged the progress made in the 2019 Code of Criminal Procedure, which guaranteed the right to a medical examination and legal assistance from the beginning of police custody.  However, it was concerning that these guarantees were not automatic or unconditional. Did the State intend to amend its regulations to ensure that all detained persons had immediate and automatic access to a medical examination without the need for prior authorisation or a 72-hour waiting period?  What measures had been taken to ensure that these examinations were carried out by independent doctors, guaranteeing their impartiality and confidentiality?  Would the State consider reducing the maximum period of detention without judicial control to 48 hours? 

    The Committee was aware of the enormous challenge facing Burkina Faso in the face of one of the largest humanitarian crises in its history, with more than 1.5 million internally displaced persons due to insecurity and armed violence.  In addition, the country had welcomed a significant number of refugees, mainly from Mali, who faced difficulties in accessing protection, legal documentation and basic services.  The Committee took note of Act No. 042-2008/AN on the Status of Refugees, which recognised the principle of non-refoulement and granted rights to refugees and asylum-seekers but was concerned about its implementation.  The absence of a clear procedure for determining stateless status remained a challenge, particularly affecting children born in refugee camps, despite the State’s efforts to improve birth registration and the issuance of identity documents.

    Regarding internally displaced persons, the Committee recognised the State’s efforts in humanitarian assistance, including access to food, health, education, and economic support.  However, concerns remained about camp security, gender-based violence, child exploitation and the lack of durable solutions that allowed access to sustainable livelihoods. 

    What measures had the State taken to ensure the effective application of the principle of non-refoulement and to prevent undue expulsions?  Could updated data on the number of asylum applications lodged and granted in recent years be provided?  What actions were being implemented to strengthen refugees’ and asylum seekers’ access to basic services?  Did the State intend to revise the Nationality and Civil Status Act to address gaps and establish a clear procedure for determining statelessness?  What efforts had been made to ensure timely birth registration and the free issuance of birth certificates, especially in camps for refugees and internally displaced children?  What strategies had the State implemented to guarantee the safety of internally displaced persons, in the face of risks of gender-based violence and child exploitation?

    The Committee took note of Burkina Faso’s legal framework guaranteeing freedom of peaceful assembly and association, but concerns remained about restrictions in practice, including allegations of obstruction of demonstrations by security forces and sanctions against protesters. What measures had the State taken to ensure that the intervention of security forces in demonstrations was governed by the principles of necessity and proportionality?  What independent monitoring mechanisms existed to investigate allegations of excessive use of force?  What provisions were in place to authorise or restrict demonstrations? How was it ensured that they were compatible with international standards?  What measures had been put in place to enable human rights organizations to register and operate without obstacles?  How was the safety of journalists and human rights defenders covering demonstrations guaranteed?

    The Committee noted the 2018 revision of the Electoral Code, however, concerns remained about restrictions on the exercise of the right to vote, particularly for certain groups.  What had been done to increase the political participation of women and marginalised groups in the country?  How was the independence of the institutions responsible for monitoring the electoral process guaranteed?  When would the next elections be held?

    Another Expert said the State Party had undertaken several positive initiatives to combat trafficking, including the national action plan against trafficking for 2023 to 2026, however challenges remained in implementation.  What progress had been made in implementing the national action plan?  Were there mechanisms to access its effectiveness? What measures were being taken to improve data collection?  A significant proportion of convicted traffickers continued to receive fully or partially suspended sentences, raising concerns about the deterrent effect of the legislation.  Could updated figures be provided on trafficking cases investigated, prosecutions initiated, and convictions secured?  What concrete steps were being taken to ensure that anti-trafficking laws were enforced rigorously?  How did the State Party ensure that law enforcement agencies and judicial officials received adequate training on victim-centred approaches in handling trafficking cases?  What actions was the State Party taking to address deficiencies in victim support, including limited shelter capacities and support services?

    Reports indicated that a significant number of children remained engaged in dangerous labour, particularly in small-scale gold mining and agricultural fields.  Could the delegation provide updated statistics on the number of children identified and removed from hazardous work, as well as data on their reintegration in society?  What was the anticipated timeline for adoption of the draft child protection code? Wha steps were being taken to improve the long-term reintegration of child victims of forced labour?  What measures were in place to expand shelter capacity, improve service quality, and ensure sustainable funding for victim support programmes?

    The Committee noted with concern that a review of legislation that imposed content-based restrictions to safeguard defence and security forces had not been envisaged, despite potential limitations on freedom of expression.  How did the State Party ensure that the law did not restrict freedom of expression? Had consultations on this issue been held with civil society and media representatives?  What safeguards were in place to prevent the misuse of digital restrictions?

    The Expert was also concerned by reports of escalating repression against journalists and human rights defenders, including threats, intimidation, arbitrary arrests, physical assaults, enforced disappearances, and forced conscription into security forces.  What steps had the State Party taken to investigate attacks on journalists, including the case of Atiana Serge Oulon?  How many cases of threats, arbitrary detention, and disappearances had been investigated, and what were the outcomes?  Had State agents been held accountable?  What independent mechanisms existed to prevent the abuse of security laws and conscription orders to silence dissent?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the national prevention mechanism had three commissioners from the national human rights institution. The mechanism had carried out 12 monitoring missions to places of deprivation of liberty.  It could either inform authorities of a visit or carry out a visit unannounced.  Its report was sent to the highest authorities, including the head of State.

    A demonstration was lawful when the organisers notified the competent authorities within the conditions provided for. Media suspension occurred when the journalism ethics code had been breached.  The Government had decided to close the cases of certain journalists in the national interest. These journalists had chosen to proliferate misinformation, which would not be tolerated.

    Burkina Faso had a mix of ethnic groups.  In the fight against terrorism, terrorists, rather than ethnic groups, were targeted.  There could not be stigmatisation of any ethnic group, as all ethnic groups were represented within the armed forces.  The Supreme Council had organised an awareness raising campaign on hate speech, which was launched nationwide.  If confessions were extracted under duress, judges reserved the right to discard this evidence.  There was no category of persons whose civic rights were restricted, including the right to vote, unless they had been convicted in court and denied their voting rights.

    The State had increased magistrate, prison and notary staff significantly in the past few years.  To combat corruption in the judiciary, activities were taken as part of the disciplinary council, including the anti-corruption commission. The independence of the judiciary was expressly enshrined in the Constitution.  A specific law set up in 2024 to remove the High Council of the Judiciary from the Presidency and make it an independent body.  As a guarantee of impartiality, judges could be removed during a procedure if there was any suspicion that they were connected to the parties in a case.  The Minister of Justice did not interfere in the appointment procedure.  The State needed to ensure there was better implementation of the justice policy.

    Internally displaced persons were dealt with in an inclusive manner, with no discrimination on any grounds.  More than two million people had been returned to their places of origin.  Health centres had been opened at schools and basic services had been supplied.  The Penal Code sanctioned trafficking, including exploitation and the worst forms of child labour.  In 2022, 125 cases of child abduction were prosecuted, and eight for trafficking.  A plan had been adopted to tackle child labour, resulting in more than one million stakeholders, including 41,300 children, being made aware of the worst forms of child labour and being withdrawn from these practices.  More than 26,000 children had been reintegrated into society.

    There was a plan on trafficking up to 2021 and the State had been able to intersect trafficking networks.  A code for children was currently in the process of being adopted.

    Following the 2014 popular uprise, the prosecution service and the High Court began an investigation, and judicial proceedings were initiated.  A commission of inquiry had been put in place to identify those responsible for the violations committed during this time.  The investigation was still underway.  Some 84 persons had appeared before the military court, and 145 persons overall who had been wounded had received compensation.

    Atiana Serge Oulon had not been subjected to an enforced disappearance but had been held under state of ready alert measures. As per the Constitution, any citizen had the duty to contribute to the defence and maintaining of Burkina Faso’s integrity.  Homeland Defence Volunteers were considered auxiliaries of the defence forces and were subject to military court provisions.  When they committed offences, they fell within the scope of military jurisdiction.

    Meetings and public demonstrations could freely be held in Burkina Faso, pursuant to the law.  Freedom to demonstrate was subject to prior notification to the civilian administration.  Demonstrations could only be restricted when there was an attack against public order.

    There were no longer any obstacles for Burkina Faso nationals abroad exercising their right to vote.  The prison administration had a 2021-2025 strategic plan and plan of action, and implementation of this plan was being assessed.  Under the strategy, personnel had been trained, new prisons had been constructed, significantly reducing overcrowding, and 22 prisons had benefitted from refurbishment.

    The law on asylum application ensured all applications were dealt with in a fair manner, and all protections were offered to the applicant during the procedure.  As of August 2024, there were more than 38,000 refugees and 2,000 asylum seekers.

    The Code for the Family contained a special chapter on statelessness, dealing with conditions for determining statelessness. The Government had made significant efforts to improve birth registration and provide free birth certificates.  Campaigns had been rolled out, with more than 50,000 birth certificates being issued. Sessions had been held to provide free birth certificates, which had benefitted thousands of women and internally displaced persons.

    Detained persons had the right to request a medical examination after 72 hours of their detention.  The current length of police custody for cases linked to terrorism was 15 days maximum, with the possibility to expand for an additional 10 days. Detained people had the right to receive assistance from a lawyer, and those who could not afford to pay a lawyer were entitled to judicial assistance from the State.

    The penitentiary administration had a strategic plan for 2021 to 2025.  A steering committee had been created to assess the implementation of the plan.

    The terms “militia” or “enforced disappearances” in the context of countering terrorism were totally inappropriate.  A report had been submitted to the Committee on Enforced Disappearances in this regard.  A terrorist carried no identification card.  Their strength was to blend within the public.  While security did not prevail, rights could not be enjoyed.  It was often hard to differentiate between a terrorist and civilian, and this needed to be considered.  Burkina Faso was making many efforts to promote and protect human rights. Homeland Defense Volunteers should not be referred to as militia.

    Burkina Faso’s judiciary was still independent. The reforms which were implemented were designed to make the justice system more accessible and credible. There were 384 media organizations in the country, with over 80 per cent being privately owned.  Burkina Faso did not accept apologism for acts of terrorism; if the media contributed to propagating acts of terrorism, they were failing in their ethic duty.  The State allowed for associations to be created freely if their purpose was not contrary to public order.

    If the security situation allowed the State to organise elections, this would be done straight away.  Before elections could be organised, it needed to be ensured that all candidates and members of the public could exercise their right to vote. The State needed to be given assurances that if they organised elections, they would be safe.  All terrorists would be targeted by the State regardless of what ethnic group they belonged to.

    Follow-Up Questions by Committee Experts

    Committee Experts asked follow-up questions on topics including on the status of investigations into cases of torture; the difference between the national observatory on torture and the national preventive mechanism; the financial and logistical means available to the national preventive mechanism, its reports, and its ability to carry out announced and unannounced visits; efforts being made to reconcile combatting terrorism and respecting human rights; judges’ right to consider evidence obtained under duress, and what consequence this had on trials; the independence of the judiciary; denials of demonstrations; the involvement of women in different sectors, and how their political participation was being organised; when the next elections would be held and the proceedings put in place to ensure citizens’ participation in the elections; support services for victims of trafficking; and revisions of the Penal Code to implement the death penalty for crimes such as terrorism.

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the decision to reintroduce the death penalty had been taken due to the fight against terrorism. Terrorists were increasingly recruiting children, who were then forced to become combatants.  The more regions affected, the more people did not have access to basic rights.  The priority for Burkina Faso was to put an end to terrorism as soon as possible and restore security throughout the whole country, before meeting international obligations.  There was no death penalty for homosexuality.

    Elections were organised in November 2015, and just after these there was a terrorist attack in January 2016.  The situation had continued to get worse, despite the elections.  Elections had been organised twice in 2015 and 2020 and the situation had not changed; the State needed to find an alternative solution.

    Prosecutors had always been subject to the hierarchy of the prosecuting magistracy.  Judges remained entirely independent.

    The national preventive mechanism used the resources provided to the National Human Rights Commission.  It was up to the discretion of the mechanism to decide on whether visits were announced or unannounced.  State authorities and civil society carried out visits to places of detention. 

    Typically, evidence obtained under duress could not be admitted in court, however if such an act was key to a trial, then the evidence could be admitted.  Public officials responsible for acts of torture could be criminally prosecuted and victims could ask for reparations for damage suffered.

    No human rights organisation had been refused registration or accreditation.  They often received technical and material support from the State.  Women were fully involved in public affairs and held many decision-making positions.  Within the Government, there were five women ministers out of 23, and 33 per cent of ambassadors were women.

    Preventing a demonstration was an exception in the country; this was only done in exceptional circumstances.  If the competent authorities prohibited demonstrations, there was always a reason provided.

    Burkina Faso was trying to find a balance between combatting terrorism and protecting human rights to achieve results.  There were specialised judicial systems to combat terrorism.

    Closing Statements

    EDASSO RODRIGUE BAYALA, Minister of Justice and Human Rights, Keeper of the Seals and head of the delegation, thanked the Committee for the high-quality dialogue.  The Committee should be commended for its commitment to civil and political rights.  Mr. Bayala thanked all those who had made the dialogue a success.  The Government remained deeply committed to the respect of human rights and would closely heed any recommendations made by the Committee. Burkina Faso renewed its commitment to consolidate with the Committee in the context of the fight against terrorism. The stabilisation undertaken by Burkina Faso was essential to bringing about lasting peace and development, and international partners were called on to support these efforts.

     

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

     

     

    CCPR25.003E

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Markus Pieper’s appointment to newly created position of EU SME Envoy – P-000671/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    1. The individual assessments of candidates in a selection procedure are confidential and covered both by the secrecy of panel deliberations, as recognised by the case-law of the EU courts[1], and by data protection rules. For any selection procedure that involves several stages, the results obtained by a candidate who is successful in one stage of the process do not prejudge the outcome of the subsequent stages. The preselection panel and the consultative committee on appointments (CCA) identified the candidates with the necessary qualifications and competences to proceed to the subsequent stage. There was no ranking between the candidates shortlisted by the CCA when they were proposed for interviews by the competent Commissioners. The shortlist was based on the previous stages that identified the best qualified candidates following the results of the preselection panel and the external assessment reports summarising the strengths and areas for development of the candidates. For the specific selection procedure, both the President and the Commissioner in charge of internal market are considered as ‘portfolio Commissioners’, since, according to the ‘Small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) Relief Package Communication’, the EU SME Envoy ‘shall report directly to the President, while also reporting to the Commissioner for Internal Market on all SME-related activities conducted in conjunction with the services of the Directorate General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs’[2].

    2. As set out in the policy on senior officials, ‘merit is the dominant criterion in decisions on senior official appointments[3]. Geographical or gender balance are general policy considerations. Appointments of senior officials fall within the institutional autonomy of each institution and each institution has a margin of discretion when deciding among different qualified candidates. The Commission took the appointment decision based on the vast experience and track record of Mr Pieper in the field of SMEs.

    3. The Commission does not comment on assertions made by third parties and maintains that the selection procedure was run in accordance with the established rules and principles, which are publicly available and easily accessible.

    For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that Mr Pieper decided not to take up his post as EU SME Envoy on 16 April 2024 as planned.

    • [1] See the judgment of the Court of Justice of the EU of 4 July 1996, Parliament v Innamorati, EU:C:1996:276, paras. 24-30 and, more recently, in the context of a selection procedure for a post in the Regulatory Scrutiny Board, the judgment of the General Court of 21 December 2022, OM v Commission, T-118/22, EU:T:2022:849, para. 24 and the case-law cited.
    • [2] See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, SME Relief Package, Strasbourg, 12.9.2023 COM(2023) 535 final, p. 5.
    • [3] https://commission.europa.eu/jobs-european-commission/job-opportunities/managers-european-commission_en
    Last updated: 6 March 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the white paper on the future of European defence – B10-0145/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    B10‑0145/2025

    European Parliament resolution on the white paper on the future of European defence

    (2025/2565(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to Articles 24(1), 42, 43 and 45 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

     having regard to the national security strategies of the Member States,

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/1525 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 July 2023 on supporting ammunition production (ASAP)[1],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/2418 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 October 2023 on establishing an instrument for the reinforcement of the European defence industry through common procurement (EDIRPA)[2],

     having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence,

     having regard to Commission Recommendation (EU) 2023/2113 of 3 October 2023 on critical technology areas for the EU’s economic security for further risk assessment with Member States[3],

     having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 March 2023 entitled ‘European Union Space Strategy for Security and Defence’ (JOIN(2023)0009),

     having regard to the report by Sauli Niinistö of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

     having regard to the report by Mario Draghi of 9 September 2024 entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’,

     having regard to Special Report 04/2025 of the European Court of Auditors of 5 February 2025 entitled ‘EU military mobility: Full speed not reached due to design weaknesses and obstacles en route’,

     having regard to the three Joint Declarations on EU-NATO cooperation signed on 8 July 2016, 10 July 2018 and 10 January 2023,

     having regard to the Madrid Summit Declaration adopted by the NATO heads of state and government at the North Atlantic Council meeting in Madrid on 29 June 2022,

     having regard to the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept and the 2023 NATO Summit in Vilnius,

     having regard to the opening remarks made by US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth in Brussels at the Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting of 12 February 2025,

     having regard to the talks held in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on 18 February 2025 between US and Russian negotiators,

     having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas the Commission announced the release of a white paper on the future of European defence, co-authored by Commissioner for Defence and Space Andrius Kubilius and Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas, by 19 March 2025; whereas this document will be the first of its kind produced by the EU and emulates similar documents published by Member States;

    B. whereas the white paper must respect the limits set by the TEU in terms of foreign policy and defence and it must take note of the international context and the strategic environment in order to provide a perspective and proposals that will enable the strengthening of Europe’s security;

    C. whereas the white paper on the future of European defence will provide the framework for future defence projects and regulations and will be a key point of reference for incoming negotiations on the next multiannual financial framework;

    D. whereas the international order is profoundly destabilised and is restructuring; whereas the international rules and organisations that emerged from the Second World War and then from the end of the Cold War are in crisis; whereas international relations are increasingly characterised by uncertainty, and the tendency to resort to armed force to resolve international disagreements is growing;

    E. whereas Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has profoundly destabilised the security order in Europe; whereas this unilateral aggression has accelerated the integration of Sweden and Finland into NATO; whereas this war has considerably deteriorated relations and exchanges between Russia and the countries of Europe;

    F. whereas the war in Ukraine has highlighted the chronic underinvestment by Member States in their armed forces; whereas the stocks of arms and ammunition in Europe are largely insufficient; whereas certain critical military capabilities are not possessed by any European military; whereas the infrastructure that is essential for the security and proper functioning of European societies and economies is vulnerable; whereas some Member States have encountered significant difficulties in deploying and transporting military resources within the EU itself;

    G. whereas the relations between the United States and China will structure, to a large extent, the future of international relations in the 21st century; whereas the United States no longer has the will to maintain the same level of military involvement in Europe; whereas the US Secretary of Defence has expressly spoken of a ‘division of labour’ between allies, with the Americans prioritising the Pacific region, while emphasising that Europeans must be responsible for the defence of Europe and must increase their capabilities accordingly;

    H. whereas the European Union is composed of 27 sovereign states, with each having the sovereign right to determine its own foreign and defence policy;

    I. whereas it is in the interest of the Member States to adopt a common policy on matters of common interest to them; whereas enhanced cooperation on defence matters is mutually beneficial if it improves the security of the Member States against any direct aggression or if it increases their capacity to respond to any threat to their territorial integrity, sovereignty or prosperity;

    J. whereas the European defence market is too fragmented; whereas for a single armament type, there can be several or even dozens of different varieties of equipment in the EU, representing a collective loss of resources because of duplication, and preventing economies of scale;

    K. whereas Article 24(1) TEU stipulates that decisions related to the common foreign and security policy and the common security and defence policy are taken unanimously by the Council; whereas Article 24(1) TEU also stipulates that the EU cannot adopt legislative acts on foreign affairs and defence; whereas Article 36 TEU stipulates that Parliament has a consultative role;

    L. whereas, on 30 January 2025, 19 EU countries sent a letter to the European Investment Bank calling for it ‘to play an even stronger role in providing investment funding and leveraging private funding for the security and defence sector’;

    1. Stresses that diplomatic and defence policy issues are primarily the prerogative of the Member States, which remain the most relevant and the only legitimate political units in the international order; respects the right of every Member State to determine its own foreign and security policy; insists on the importance of maintaining the principle of unanimity in the Council for all decisions related to the common foreign and security policy and the common security and defence policy;

    2. Underlines that strengthening the Member States’ militaries, based on threats, is necessary to compensate for the security deficit caused by decades of underinvestment and the gradual disengagement of the United States; emphasises that this rearmament policy led by the Member States must not aim to escalate tensions in Europe, but rather aim to reach a level that will deter any hostile actions, establish a continental balance and maintain peace;

    3. Notes that the United States remains the EU’s main military ally and is an essential member of NATO; insists that, irrespective of the political orientation of the White House, US foreign policy will continue to make the Asia-Pacific region a geostrategic priority and to perceive Europe as a secondary theatre; stresses that Member States must no longer subcontract their security and defence to other powers;

    4. Underlines that NATO is a crucial partner in the collective defence architecture in Europe; takes note of the ambition of building a European pillar within NATO; considers that a greater contribution from European states within the alliance must, for the sake of consistency, result in a more balanced distribution of command posts in favour of European military personnel; stresses that stepping up the defence capabilities of European states can go hand in hand with the deepening of EU-NATO cooperation with due respect for the neutrality of the EU Member States that are not part of the NATO alliance;

    5. Highlights the need to overcome the fragmentation of the EU’s internal market for defence products through greater cooperation between Member States and to collectively work on the interoperability of military capabilities; calls on the Member States to encourage cross-border defence procurement in order to strengthen intra-European industrial cooperation and achieve the objective of European strategic autonomy;

    6. Stresses that greater cooperation in the defence sector must actively involve defence SMEs, not only large defence actors, and serve as a platform for SME development, providing greater opportunities for them to contribute to the EU’s technological base and enhance European strategic autonomy;

    7. Notes, however, that the strengthening of the European defence industry must not result in the attribution of new competences to the Commission, which would be in breach of the Treaties and would undermine the sovereignty of Member States without increasing efficacy; reiterates, therefore, that decision-making regarding military requirements, the prioritisation of capability development and the purchase of defence products should remain within the remit of Member States; underlines that, despite the need for increased cooperation in the field of defence, such as on joint procurement and joint production, the Member States must retain full sovereignty over their arms export policies;

    8. Calls for the co-legislators to establish the principle of a European preference in future European defence regulations, including in the European defence industrial plan, so that European funds benefit European companies on European soil, which will enhance our industrial defence capabilities and will reduce our dependences on non-EU countries; recalls that this regulation must in no way restrict the freedom of the Member States to determine their own arms procurement and import/export policy;

    9. Calls on the NATO-affiliated Member States to cooperate in order to identify and fill critical capability gaps by building on and complementing NATO’s Defence Planning Process targets, which are required for sustained full-spectrum operations, including space systems and launchers, long-range missiles, integrated air and missile defence systems, ammunition production, artificial intelligence (AI), maritime drone capability, command and control capability, electronic warfare systems and air-to-air refuelling capacity;

    10. Calls on non-neutral Member States to adequately invest in their infrastructure to guarantee optimal military mobility across Europe in line with their respective military agreements and alliances;

    11. Emphasises the importance for European states to have the capacity and a framework to act independently within the NATO framework where possible and outside of the NATO framework if necessary; points out that the Rapid Deployment Capacity, an inter-state initiative under the control of the Member States, only comprised of 5 000 troops, does not allow for the possibility of engagement in a context of intense combat; reaffirms that it is in the Member States’ interest to strengthen their ability to fight together by conducting joint training and exercises that enhance the interoperability of the various national instruments;

    12. Expresses the need to consider European defence in all its dimensions, including land, air, naval, space and cybernetic; notes that contemporary strategic issues have a growing naval dimension and that the powers challenging the international order are deploying naval capabilities at regional level; stresses the importance of European cooperation at sea and welcomes the current progress of Operation Aspides, the lessons from which must be put to good use; stresses that European strategic autonomy has a maritime and naval dimension, and that European navies should cooperate more closely to ensure the protection of their maritime areas, as well as their underwater or surface infrastructure; stresses that the principle of freedom of navigation must be protected and calls, therefore, for an increase in surveillance and the ability to react quickly in the event of threats arising in European seas;

    13. Notes that space will increasingly become a key aspect of power and sovereignty; underlines that the Member States must maintain and guarantee their independent access to space; welcomes the launch of Ariane 6, but is concerned by the accumulated delays; draws attention to the need for the space sector to be industrialised to increase the number of rockets launched to put European satellites into orbit; welcomes the launch of the European satellite constellation IRIS², which should enable secure communications solutions for sovereign and military issues by 2030; emphasises the need for the future EU space law not to hamper the competitiveness of European companies and to apply constraints on non-EU players; notes the importance of Galileo, Europe’s global navigation satellite system;

    14. Underlines that, unlike the United States (Buy America Act) and China (Government Procurement Law), the European space industry is not shielded from international competition and does not benefit from a European preference; calls on the Member States and the Commission to implement a European preference in space industry procurement and promote innovation, research and development; stresses that the European Space Agency’s principle of geographical return hampers innovative European SMEs and start-ups from receiving adequate funding and contributes to the fragmentation of the European space industry; calls on the European Space Agency to abolish the principle of geographical return and adopt an innovative and efficiency-based approach to space procurement rather than a geographically driven one;

    15. Underlines that the strengthening of European defence capabilities will require significant financing; calls on banks, pension funds, insurance companies and other actors in the Member States to simplify and significantly increase the financing of projects and companies operating in the field of defence; insists that in the context of the urgent need to increase defence spending, financial institutions should not consider investments in the field of defence to be damaging for their reputation; rejects, however, the idea of issuing joint debt, such as defence Eurobonds, to support defence spending;

    16. Notes the growing importance of AI in warfare, particularly in the development of drones and autonomous weapons; recognises the indigenous AI advances in warfare made by Ukraine and Israel, demonstrating that the Member States are equally capable of developing similar capabilities; highlights that recent breakthroughs, such as the one made by the Chinese AI computing start-up DeepSeek, demonstrate the feasibility of cost-competitive AI systems; calls on the Member States to accelerate the development of AI capabilities; underlines that the AI Act[4], set to be implemented in 2025, creates uncertainty regarding the production and development of dual-use AI systems, an ambiguity that could hinder the development of essential defence industry products; calls for this issue to be clarified to ensure that the European defence industry is not disadvantaged compared to its American and Chinese counterparts;

    17. Stresses that a strong civilian manufacturing industry, particularly in the steelmaking, automotive, aerospace and shipbuilding sectors, is essential for deterrence and for maintaining long-term military and industrial capabilities in the event of conflict; notes the decline of these industries since the 1990s, especially in western Europe; calls on the Commission and the Council to safeguard the manufacturing industries that are vital to national security, including through the use of tariffs; urges the Commission to revise the Green Deal and revoke the net-neutrality goal, since it destroys manufacturing competitiveness and is responsible for the deindustrialisation of key industries in the Member States; stresses that the relocation of essential manufacturing industries to non-EU countries is counterproductive both in terms of global environmental impact and national security;

    18. Expresses concern over the growing dependence of the European defence industry on foreign components, particularly rare earths and semiconductors, which are essential for advanced military technologies; calls on the Member States to intensify efforts to develop domestic rare earth mining and semiconductor manufacturing capabilities to safeguard the autonomy of the European defence industry in the event of conflicts or severe supply chain disruptions;

    19. Welcomes the Dutch Government’s decision to tighten export control rules on advanced lithography systems, which are essential for semiconductor production; stresses that EU technological transfers to non-EU countries have significantly contributed to the rise of foreign competition and the deindustrialisation of Europe; encourages the Member States to impose stricter export controls on critical dual-use technologies and manufacturing products;

    20. Notes that 80 % of EU data is stored and managed in the United States and other non-EU countries, where it may be subject to extraterritorial intervention under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the CLOUD Act, or China’s Data Security Law; stresses that protecting critical industrial and government data is essential to ensuring national security; welcomes the Swiss Government Cloud programme as a step toward cloud sovereignty and encourages the Member States to implement similar initiatives; encourages the Member States to strengthen regulations on telecommunications service providers, which are predominantly based outside Europe, creating a significant dependence on external actors;

    21. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to Commissioner for Defence and Space Andrius Kubilius, Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas, the Commission, the European Council and the parliaments and governments of the Member States.

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the white paper on the future of European defence – B10-0144/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    B10‑0144/2025

    European Parliament resolution on the white paper on the future of European defence

    (2025/2565(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the common security and defence policy (CSDP) and the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) of the EU,

     having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 42 thereof,

     having regard to Title III, Article 3 of the Protocol on the concerns of the Irish people on the Treaty of Lisbon,

     having regard to the announced publication of the white paper on the future of European defence on 19 March 2025,

     having regard to the Helsinki Accords,

     having regard to the various European defence projects of recent years,

     having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas, in line with the Treaties, the CSDP is part of the CFSP and is considered a policy framework through which Member States can develop a European strategic culture of security and defence, address conflicts and crises together, protect the Union and its citizens and strengthen international peace and security;

    B. whereas Article 42(2) TEU states that the Union’s CSDP must be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty;

    C. whereas NATO is largely dominated by the United States, and NATO membership entails a mandatory complementarity and compatibility of European weapons systems with US systems, hence impeding the strategic and operational autonomy of Member States and other European countries;

    D. whereas at the NATO Summit in Bucharest in 2008, the US Government pushed for Ukrainian NATO membership against the opinion of several Member States; whereas following the Russian invasion, the United States pushed EU Member States to systematically increase the quantity and quality of arms deliveries to Ukraine;

    E. whereas different Member States have different military and security policies, including policies of military neutrality;

    F. whereas the United States saw windfall benefits from the Ukraine war through an increase of US shale gas exports to the European Union; whereas the US Government now unjustly wishes to control Ukrainian mineral resources and negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine with Putin, without involving Ukraine and the European Union;

    G. whereas unlike nuclear weapon states such as India and the People’s Republic of China, NATO and Russia refuse to commit to a ‘no first use’ policy, whereby they would formally refrain from using nuclear weapons, except in retaliation to an attack by an enemy power using weapons of mass destruction;

    H. whereas the US Government has launched a high number of wars and military operations that violated international law and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; whereas, in light of 2024 advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice, the United States’ ongoing military support for Israel might make it complicit in genocide and illegal occupation; whereas the participation of EU Member States in violations of international law, including in wars of aggression and military invasions contrary to international law against countries such as the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, have undermined global adherence to the principles of international law;

    I. whereas the United States has forwardly deployed new B61-12 gravity bombs on the territory of EU Member States, increasing the risk that these Member States will fall victim to preventive or retaliatory strikes related to US foreign policy;

    J. whereas Russia’s repeated acts of war and aggression, starting with the war against Georgia in 2008, the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the ongoing illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as an increasing number of acts of sabotage on critical infrastructure, have been factors in creating and exacerbating tensions;

    K. whereas Article 41(2) TEU prohibits charging expenditure arising from operations with military or defence implications to the Union budget;

    L. whereas the Commission has nevertheless launched several European defence projects over the last few years, including the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP), the Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR), the European Defence Fund (EDF), the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through common Procurement Act (EDIRPA), the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) and, most recently, the European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) and the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP);

    M. whereas according to 2023 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute figures, EU Member States, together with the United Kingdom, already spend more nominally on defence than all other countries in the world combined, with the exception of the United States;

    N. whereas in April 2021, the Commission estimated that increased cooperation between Member States in the field of security and defence could save between EUR 25 billion and EUR 100 billion every year;

    O. whereas the Commission’s Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA) is planning to shut down more than four out of five of its hubs worldwide, reducing its diplomatic presence from around 100 delegations to 18 hubs;

    P. whereas in 2024, EU leaders agreed to cut EUR 2 billion from the EU’s external action budget in the multiannual financial framework for 2021-2027; whereas several Member States, such as France and Belgium, have also made cuts and reforms to their diplomacy services;

    Q. whereas Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has proposed a new common instrument to boost military spending across the EU to unlock up to EUR 800 billion of additional defence spending over the coming years;

    R. whereas even the military spending of the United States, which maintains over 700 military installations in over 70 countries, does not exceed 3.46 % of its GDP;

    S. whereas, nevertheless, the US Government, certain Member States and NATO and Commission officials are pushing for a further massive increase in defence expenditure, from an average of 1.9 % of GDP to 5 %;

    T. whereas even the military-oriented Niinisto Report, entitled ‘Safer Together –Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’ highlights the fact that threats to the security of European citizens, including increasingly frequent and intense extreme weather events, such as megadroughts, floods and heatwaves, and the risk of new pandemics, would require massive investment in public services;

    U. whereas while the Draghi report on the future of European competitiveness highlights the need for massive investment in a variety of sectors, including energy, pharmaceuticals and transport, the Commission has placed seven Member States under an excessive deficit procedure, pushing for harsh austerity and structural reforms in social and public expenses;

    V. whereas a further massive increase in military expenditure will instead lead to cuts in public services, and in social, climate and environmental spending throughout Europe, endangering the social and human security of European citizens;

    W. whereas the Commission is nonetheless considering the suspension of economic governance rules for military expenses;

    X. whereas the Commission has failed to present a fully autonomous assessment of European defence needs and priorities, relying instead on NATO assessments of critical gaps in defence capability;

    Y. whereas Türkiye, a NATO member, illegally occupies 37 % of Cyprus, an EU Member State;

    Z. whereas in international relations theory the ‘security dilemma’ refers to a phenomenon whereby actions, such as arms procurement, taken by a state actor to increase its own security provokes reactions from other states, such as increased arms procurement or preventive attacks, that ultimately lead to a decrease rather than an increase in the original state’s security;

    AA. whereas the 1975 Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, concluded in Helsinki between the United States, Canada, the Soviet Union and all of the countries of Europe, except Albania, played an important role in easing tensions between East and West during the Cold War;

    AB. whereas the Cold War collective security acquis has been systematically undermined by the United States’ withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and the Open Skies Treaty, systematically followed by Russian withdrawals, and by the Russian withdrawal from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and from the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty;

    AC. whereas a new European security architecture will have to apply the principles of peaceful coexistence between countries with different political systems and offer security guarantees to all parties in order to avoid Europe being divided once again into two diametrically opposed blocs;

    Towards a European collective security architecture

    1. Recalls that the Treaties consider the CSDP part of the CFSP; asks, therefore, that any defence initiative at EU level be subordinated to a clear foreign and security policy and strategy for peace on the European continent;

    2. Rejects the militarisation of the EU and any belligerent objectives of the CSDP;

    3. Notes with great concern the diminishing respect for international and humanitarian law by parties all around the world, with Israel, Russia and the United States being flagrant examples; reiterates the need for European independence in shaping foreign and defence policy;

    4. Considers that in light of the United States’ past and ongoing violations of international law and the negative impact of US military interventions on neighbouring regions, the foreign, security and defence policy of the Union and Member States can no longer be aligned with the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO); calls, therefore, on the European Council to start the process of revising the EU Treaties to remove this requirement from the TEU;

    5. Recalls that NATO and the EU are distinct organisations which serve very different purposes and whose membership is not even identical; regrets the conflation of NATO, a military alliance, with the EU;

    6. Is extremely worried by the fact that there are still more than 13 000 nuclear weapons scattered around the world, many of which can be deployed within minutes and could cause the end of humankind; notes with concern that despite a stated commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, NATO’s nuclear member states invested USD 271 billion in nuclear weapons modernisation and maintenance between 2019 and 2023, while in 2023 China and Russia were the second and third largest spenders, with budgets of USD 11.9 billion and USD 8.3 billion respectively;

    7. Believes that NATO’s refusal to commit to a ‘no first use’ policy on nuclear weapons and the forward deployment of US nuclear weapons in Europe increases the risk of Europe becoming a target of nuclear strikes; demands, therefore, the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from the territory of Member States; is deeply concerned about nuclear threats to European security, including veiled warnings about the use of tactical nuclear weapons and Russia’s lowering of its threshold for using nuclear weapons;

    8. Urges the Member States to work on a new long-term collective security architecture for Europe inspired by the principles of the Helsinki process and including the concept of mutual security guarantees; notes that a fundamental aspect of such an approach is respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations and a commitment to international law;

    9. Insists that a new European security architecture apply the principles of peaceful coexistence between countries with different political systems, and offer security guarantees to all parties;

    10. Calls on the Commission, in light of multiple threats ranging from climate-related catastrophes to pandemics, to abandon a narrow focus on military security and develop a policy centred on human security as defined in United Nations General Assembly resolution 66/290, which states that ‘human security is an approach to assist Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people’ and calls for ‘people-centred, comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented responses that strengthen the protection and empowerment of all people’;

    11. Calls on the Commission and Member States to seek inspiration from Austria, which has enshrined neutrality in its constitution, committing not to join military alliances and not to permit the establishment of any foreign military bases on its territory;

    12. Calls on the Commission and Member States to also look to the example set by Ireland, with its tradition of military neutrality; recalls that this tradition includes an active approach towards peace support operations and crisis management, contributions to conflict resolution and peacebuilding, work for human rights and development, and efforts to promote disarmament and the elimination of weapons of mass destruction;

    13. Regrets the attacks on Irish neutrality and recalls that the people of Ireland were guaranteed continued military neutrality, underpinned by a commitment to only undertake operations with a United Nations mandate, ahead of their ratification of the Lisbon Treaty;

    14. Reiterates its call on Türkiye, a NATO member, to withdraw its troops from Cyprus, an EU Member State, and to work constructively towards finding a viable and peaceful solution based on the relevant UN resolutions;

    15. Calls for unanimity voting on defence issues to be maintained within the Council to promote consensus-based solutions that foster much-needed unity;

    Diplomacy as the cornerstone of European security

    16. Believes that diplomacy should remain a cornerstone of EU foreign policy;

    17. Recalls that conflict prevention is paramount to any security and defence strategy; underlines the fact that diplomacy prevents and ends wars, and that every euro invested in conflict prevention saves around EUR 16 later on;

    18. Believes that, given the deteriorating security situation on several fronts and increasing geopolitical tensions, preventive diplomacy requires sustained and enhanced attention; calls, therefore, on the Commission and Member States to immediately reverse the cutbacks made to diplomatic representations;

    19. Believes that its systematic alignment with US foreign policy, most recently with regard to Israeli war crimes, ethnic cleansing and genocidal practices against Palestinians, has dramatically reduced the EU’s global diplomatic credibility and therefore worsened its security situation;

    20. Recalls that the participation of EU Member States in illegal military operations and the support for violations of international law abroad gravely endangers the security of EU citizens; urges the Commission and Member States to explore a non-aligned foreign and security policy stance based on the principles of the UN Charter, including peaceful conflict resolution, diplomacy and multilateralism;

    21. Believes that Europe has much to gain from diversifying its relations and maintaining diplomatic connections with as many countries as possible around the world;

    Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation

    22. Is deeply concerned that world military expenditure continues to rise to new record levels; highlights the fact that an arms race will not create security for European citizens, but instead, in line with the security dilemma, heighten the risk of violent conflict; calls on the Commission to actively promote new arms control treaties;

    23. Recalls that the EU strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction made non-proliferation a central goal of the EU’s CFSP, stating that ‘our objective is to prevent, deter, halt and, where possible, eliminate proliferation of concern worldwide’; calls, therefore, on Member States to sign and ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons;

    24. Notes that arms exports, also of small and light weapons, can fuel conflict and global terrorism and destabilise entire regions, states and societies, thereby thwarting sustainable development and crisis management efforts; calls on the Commission and Member States to strictly apply Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment in order to avoid a worsening of the security situation in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood;

    25. Calls for the creation of a Directorate-General for Disarmament and Arms Control at the Commission;

    26. Demands an immediate arms embargo against Israel and any other country directly or indirectly involved in armed conflict, except in the case of those that are the victim of invasion by others, in order to stop EU complicity in war crimes, ethnic cleansing and genocidal practices, whether perpetrated by Israel or any other country; calls on the Commission and Member States to base their foreign and security policy on the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law;

    Defence expenditure

    27. Urges the Commission and Member States to offer full transparency and a critical audit of the current defence expenditure within the Union, detailing why it estimates that European countries would be unable to defend themselves with budgets already vastly superior to those of most of the world’s countries;

    28. Notes with concern that the Commission has presented a new EUR 150 billion common defence fund; believes that an increase in defence spending is not the solution to finding a lasting peace and that cuts in the EU structural funds should not be used for this purpose, given how vital these funds are to the development of local communities across the EU;

    29. Notes that the share of GDP is not an adequate measure for the efficiency and impact of defence expenditure; calls on the Commission and Member States not to enter an arms race through a massive increase in defence budgets at the expense of both human and social security;

    30. Regards the NATO demand for complementarity and compatibility of European weapons systems with US systems as incompatible with European strategic autonomy; regrets that the Commission and the Council have failed to present a detailed assessment of European critical defence capability gaps; calls on both institutions to present such an assessment, including specific priorities, before considering increased defence expenditure; recalls that these should focus on defensive tasks, not on building capacities for military intervention all over the world;

    31. Recalls Commission estimates that increased cooperation between Member States in the field of security and defence could save up to EUR 100 billion every year; calls, in this regard, for inspiration to be drawn from existing intra-European cooperation structures, such as BACA, the Belgian-Dutch Naval cooperation BeNeSam and the Nordic Defence Cooperation, including Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, which have increased the efficiency of the participating nations’ national defence, and to explore common synergies and facilitate efficient common solutions;

    32. Considers that the military cooperation commitments that may be assumed in collective security organisations should be considered in light of strict respect for the UN Charter;

    33. Rejects the allocation of appropriations on the EU budget to the EU’s militarisation; calls for the reallocation of EU budget funds earmarked for the ongoing militarisation of the EU and its programmes to respond to the social and economic needs of citizens and promote cohesion between Member States;

    34. Highlights the fact that there can be neither autonomy nor security without digital sovereignty; calls on the Commission to prioritise the development of a democratic, public-led digital stack that includes digital infrastructure as a service, and universal platforms, such as search engines and foundation AI models, governed by new public institutions with public and civil society representation;

    35. Calls for heightened cooperation between Member States on sectoral issues of critical infrastructure protection, such as submarine cables;

    Defence industry

    36. Recalls that over the past three years, the EU has adopted a number of new initiatives on defence, and that the new Commissioner for Defence and Space believes that an additional investment of EUR 500 billion is needed in the coming decade, though other sources speak of EUR 700 billion;

    37. Recalls that the previous EU programmes have been implemented with a lack of transparency with regard to the application of EU ethical guidelines, and that decision-making is extremely opaque and heavily influenced by arms industry lobbyists;

    38. States that without ethics in investment choices, the EU will contribute to the creation of a more dangerous and lawless world order, where imperialist powers can disregard international law without facing consequences, while countries of the global south are exploited for their resources;

    39. Calls, in addition, for the EU to adopt a policy of transparent, mission-oriented military spending, with more conscious spending at the service of a defined foreign policy to ensure greater efficiency;

    40. Recalls that under Article 41(2) TEU expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications may not be charged to the EU budget; calls for a strict application of this article; demands a retroactive review of corresponding defence funds and budget lines and for their termination where needed;

    41. Expresses deep concern about the increased subsidies and public support for the military-industrial complex amid record total global military expenditure of USD 2 443 billion in 2023, making 2023 the ninth consecutive year in which military expenditure increased;

    42. Demands that European public money go to European companies and emphasises that public European companies should, by definition, remain in Europe, while private companies can relocate their activities if they so wish;

    43. Observes that leading arms companies have benefited shamelessly from the war in Ukraine; notes that Lockheed Martin alone distributed USD 6.8 billion of cash to shareholders in dividends and share repurchases in 2024; demands that windfall profits be taxed to finance climate adaptation, public health and housing, which are also components of a broader understanding of security;

    44. Considers that the use of public money should systematically correspond to a proportional public return on investment and not finance corporate profit;

    45. Stresses that focusing our resources, notably research and development spending, on the military sector will also slow down the development of other strategic industries with civilian purposes, such as renewable energy or pharmaceuticals;

    46. Adds that military spending does not address any of the major social or environmental challenges, and that, worse still, it reinforces polluting and energy-consuming industrial models, thus increasing pressure on resources and the climate, particularly critical materials;

    47. Believes that a massive increase in purchases of US-made goods would not only be detrimental to the European economy but would equally prolong Europe’s military dependence on the United States, while creating new industrial and technological constraints;

    48. Demands that the defence industry continue to be excluded from qualifying for the sustainability criteria with regard to investment;

    49. Calls for EIB financing to be strictly limited to civilian projects, excluding dual-use items;

    Reprioritising public services and social spending

    50. Is deeply concerned that militarisation, and specifically the ReArm Europe plan, is being used to further attack public services across the EU, which are already facing the suffocating effects of austerity measures imposed by the Commission;

    51. Is appalled by the fact that the Commission is willing to bend fiscal rules such as the Stability and Growth Pact to finance military spending, but considers it impossible to raise spending to fund crumbling public services and support social and economic upward convergence in Member States;

    52. Firmly insists that health, education, green mobility, climate adaptation, climate mitigation, biodiversity, food security and digital transition are elements of human security and should be considered priorities that require investments rather than budgetary cuts;

    53. Calls, in line with the concept of human security, for a reprioritisation of public services and social welfare spending, as well as for investments in fighting climate change, as imperative prerequisites for guaranteeing that people live in a safe and secure environment;

    °

    ° °

    54. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European External Action Service.

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Durbin, Senate Judiciary Democrats File Misconduct Complaint Against Interim U.S. Attorney Ed Martin With D.C. Bar

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Illinois Dick Durbin
    March 06, 2025
    Requesting a disciplinary investigation into Martin, SJC Dems cite multiple abuses of power by Martin
    WASHINGTON – U.S. Senate Democratic Whip Dick Durbin (D-IL), Ranking Member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, led all Senate Judiciary Democrats in filing a professional misconduct complaint against Interim U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia Ed Martin with the D.C. Bar.
    In a letter to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel at the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which handles complaints against lawyers who are barred in D.C., the Senators cite multiple abuses of power by Martin, including dismissing charges against his own client and using the threat of prosecution to intimidate government employees and chill the speech of private citizens.
    The Senators begin by articulating lapses in judgment involving failures to recuse from cases involving previous clients involved in the January 6th insurrection, writing: “While in private practice, Mr. Martin appeared as defense counsel in cases related to the January 6, 2021 attack on the U.S. Capitol.  On January 21, 2025, Mr. Martin personally submitted a motion to dismiss the eight felony counts and two misdemeanors against Joseph Padilla, who had already been convicted and sentenced for these charges… Similarly, Mr. Martin appeared as defense counsel for January 6 defendant William Chrestman… Mr. Martin only moved to withdraw from his representation of Mr. Chrestman on February 4, 2025… There is also evidence indicating that Mr. Martin, since his appointment as Interim U.S. Attorney, has communicated directly with January 6 defendants who were not his clients.”
    The Senators continue by citing multiple threats of prosecution to intimidate government employees and chill the speech of private citizens, writing: “Since assuming the duties of Interim U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, Mr. Martin has also engaged in additional, repeated conduct that appears to violate Rule 8.4(d), as well as Rule 3.8’s special responsibilities for prosecutors. Specifically, Mr. Martin has made numerous extrajudicial statements that threaten prosecution with the apparent intent of intimidating government employees and chilling the speech of private citizens.”
    The Senators conclude with a request for a professional misconduct investigation into Martin, writing: “Mr. Martin’s conduct not only speaks to his fitness as a lawyer; his activities are part of a broader course of conduct by President Trump and his allies to undermine the traditional independence of Department of Justice investigations and prosecutions and the rule of law.  When a government lawyer, particularly one entrusted with a leadership role in the nation’s foremost law enforcement agency, commits serious violations of professional conduct, it undermines the integrity of our justice system and erodes public confidence in it. Public confidence would be further eroded if such serious misconduct is met with no consequences. Therefore, we submit this letter of complaint to respectfully request that the Office of the Disciplinary Counsel initiate an investigation and take appropriate disciplinary proceedings pursuant to Rule XI of the Rules Governing the District of Columbia Bar.”
    In addition to Durbin, the letter is signed by U.S. Senators Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI), Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), Chris Coons (D-DE), Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), Mazie Hirono (D-HI), Cory Booker (D-NJ), Alex Padilla (D-CA), Peter Welch (D-VT), and Adam Schiff (D-CA).
    For a PDF copy of the complaint against Interim U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia Ed Martin, click here.
    -30-

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Security: US Senate Confirms Troy Edgar as Deputy Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security

    Source: US Department of Homeland Security

    WASHINGTON – Today, the United States Senate voted to confirm Troy Edgar as the Deputy Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security by a bipartisan vote of 53-43.

    “Congratulations to Deputy Secretary Edgar on his bipartisan confirmation today. He will be a key player in making America safe again,” said Secretary Kristi Noem. “I look forward to working alongside Troy to ensure that the United States, once again, is a beacon of freedom, safety, and security for generations to come.”

    “I want to thank President Trump and the United States Senate for their trust in me. It is an honor to return to the Department,” said Deputy Secretary Troy Edgar. “I look forward to working alongside Secretary Noem and the dedicated men and women of DHS in our critical mission to keep Americans safe.”

    Troy Edgar previously served during President Trump’s first term as Chief Financial Officer and Associate Deputy Under Secretary for Management at the Department of Homeland Security. In that role, he oversaw financial policy, modernization efforts, and the Department’s $90 billion budget, ensuring funding for critical immigration policies and border wall construction.

    Most recently a Fortune 500 executive, Edgar brings over 30 years of leadership experience in the public and private sectors across finance, supply chain transformation, and technology.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Defense News: Amphibious Transport Dock – LPD

    Source: United States Navy

    Description Amphibious transport dock ships are warships that embark, transport and land elements of a landing force for a variety of expeditionary warfare missions.
     
    Features LPDs are used to transport and land Marines, their equipment, and supplies by embarked Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) or conventional landing craft and amphibious assault vehicles (AAV) augmented by helicopters or vertical take-off and landing aircraft (MV 22). These ships support amphibious assault, special operations, or expeditionary warfare missions and serve as secondary aviation platforms for amphibious operations.
     
    Background The LPD 17 San Antonio class is the functional replacement for over 41 ships including the LPD 4 Austin class, LSD 36 Anchorage class, LKA 113 Charleston class, and LST 1179 Newport class amphibious ships. The newly designated LPD Flight II ships (formerly LX(R)) will be the functional replacement for the LSD 41/49 Whidbey Island Class. The San Antonio class provides the Navy and Marine Corps with modern, sea-based platforms that are networked, survivable, and built to operate in the 21st century, with the MV-22 Osprey, the upgraded Amphibious Assault Vehicle, and future means by which Marines are delivered ashore. Construction on USS San Antonio (LPD 17), the first ship of the class, commenced in June 2000 and was delivered to the Navy in July 2005. USS New York (LPD 21) was the first of three LPD 17class ships built in honor of the victims of the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The ship’s bow stem was cast using 7.5 tons of steel salvaged from the World Trade Center. The Navy named the eighth and ninth ships of the class Arlington and Somerset, in honor of the victims of the attacks on the Pentagon and United Flight 93, respectively. Materials from those sites were also incorporated into the construction of each ship. USS Portland (LPD 27), the eleventh ship of the class, delivered in 2017. LPDs 28 and 29 are currently under construction at Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII) on the Gulf Coast. As the 12th and 13th San Antonio class ships, LPDs 28 and 29 will perform the same missions as the previous 11 ships of the class while incorporating technically feasible cost reduction initiatives and class lessons learned. In 2018, the Navy made the decision to transition the LX(R) effort to a second flight of the LPD 17 design. LPD 30 will be the first of 13 planned LPD Flight II ships, for a total complement of 26 ships in the LPD 17 class.
     
    General Characteristics, San Antonio Class LPD Flights I and II
    Builder: Huntington Ingalls Industries
    Propulsion: Four sequentially turbocharged marine Colt-Pielstick Diesels, two shafts, 41,600 shaft horsepower
    Length: 684 feet
    Beam: 105 feet
    Displacement: Approximately 24,900 long tons (25,300 metric tons) full load
    Draft: 23 feet
    Speed: In excess of 22 knots (24.2 mph, 38.7 kph)
    Crew: Ship’s Company: 383 Sailors and 3 Marines. Embarked Landing Force: Flight I: 699 with surge capacity of 800; LPD 28/29:650; Flight II: 631.
    Armament: Two Mk 46 30 mm Close in Guns, fore and aft; two Rolling Airframe Missile launchers, fore and aft: ten .50 caliber machine guns
    Aircraft: Launch or land two CH-53E Super Stallion helicopters or two MV-22 Osprey tilt rotor aircraft or up to four AH-1Z or UH-1Y or MH-60 helicopters
    Landing/Attack Craft: Two LCACs or one LCU; and 14 Amphibious Assault Vehicles
     
    Ships:
    USS San Antonio (LPD 17), Norfolk, Virginia
    USS New Orleans (LPD 18), Sasebo, Japan
    USS Mesa Verde (LPD 19), Norfolk, Virginia
    USS Green Bay (LPD 20), Sasebo, Japan
    USS New York (LPD 21), Mayport, Florida
    USS San Diego (LPD 22), San Diego, California
    USS Anchorage (LPD 23), San Diego, California
    USS Arlington (LPD 24), Norfolk, Virginia
    USS Somerset (LPD 25), San Diego, California
    USS John P. Murtha (LPD 26), San Diego, California
    USS Portland (LPD 27), San Diego, California
    Fort Lauderdale (LPD 28) – Under construction
    Richard M. McCool (LPD 29) – Under construction
    Harrisburg (LPD 30) – Under construction
    Pittsburgh (LPD 31)

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: HKPF holds 2025 Bank Staff Recognition Ceremony to commend banking industry for combatting deception (with photos)

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

         The Hong Kong Police Force held the 2025 Bank Staff Recognition Ceremony today (March 6) to commend the banking industry for their exceptional contributions to combatting deception cases. Eighteen banks and nine bank staff received corporate awards and the Spotlight Award respectively. In addition, a total of 368 bank staff were honored with certification for assisting Police in identifying and preventing 425 scam cases in 2024.     Addressing the ceremony, the Commissioner of Police, Mr Siu Chak-yee, highlighted that global losses due to deception cases exceeded US$2 trillion over the past two years. In Hong Kong, 44 480 deception cases were recorded in 2024, marking an 11.7 per cent increase compared to 2023. This growth rate was significantly lower than the 40 per cent surge seen in previous years. Meanwhile, the total losses slightly decreased by HK$30 million, reflecting the preliminary success of the anti-deception initiatives and multi-stakeholder measures implemented over the past three years.       He pointed out that since the establishment of the Anti-Deception Coordination Centre (ADCC) in 2017, the Police and the banking sector have jointly prevented 1 340 deception cases, arrested 818 scammers and recovered over HK$14 billion in crime proceeds up to December 2024. He added that citizens who fall victim to scams not only lose money but also suffer enduring psychological trauma. He called for continued cross-sector collaboration to combat deception at its origin.     Key initiatives implemented in 2024 in cooperation between the Police and the banking industry include:  (1) Faster Payment System (FPS) High Risk Alert has been extended from the FPS to online banking, counters and automated teller machines, covering major transaction channels. Over 600 000 risk alerts were issued throughout the year.  (2) The “Upstream Scam Intervention” initiative has prevented losses exceeding HK$199 million. The programme, now covering 28 retail banks, proactively engaged potential victims and successfully halted 3 051 deception cases.  (3) In a collaborative effort to combat cross-border money laundering syndicates, the ADCC joined with ten banks to launch an arrest operation codenamed “DEEPATTACK”. It dismantled money laundering syndicates operating in Hong Kong and the Mainland, resulting in 14 arrests, thwarting 103 ongoing deception cases and preventing an additional HK$24 million in losses.(4) The Financial Intelligence Evaluation Sharing Tool (FINEST) platform, introduced by the Police and the banking industry in June 2023, enables real-time sharing of suspicious transaction data and enhances efficiency in detecting fraud and money laundering. With participating banks expanded from five to 10, FINEST has processed over 580 intelligence reports and disrupted cross-border criminal networks and stooge accounts.       Mr Siu emphasised that, Police will continue to work in close collaboration with the banking sector to fortify anti-deception measures, safeguard public assets and uphold Hong Kong’s status as an international financial hub. Gratitude was also expressed to the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA), the Hong Kong Association of Banks (HKAB) and industry partners for their unwavering support.       In the ceremony, 11 corporate awards were presented, including Anti-Scam Excellence Award (Gold, Silver, Bronze), Exemplary Efforts in Upstream Scam Intervention Award, Award for Frontline Bank Staff Scam Intervention, Effective Collaboration with Police “Scam Response Team” Award, Effective Publicity and Education Award, Effective Regtech Application Award, and the newly introduced awards: Anti-Money Laundering Excellence Award, Outstanding STR Case Award, Award for Real Time Monitoring, Award for no. of Stooge Account Decrease and Anti-Scam Excellence Award for Digital Banks (Gold, Silver, Bronze), in recognition of banks which assisted Police in the prevention and proactive detection of deception cases (the awardees are listed in the Annex).     The officiating guests also included the Deputy Commissioner of Police (Operations), Mr Chow Yat-ming; the Director of Crime and Security, Mr Yip Wan-lung; the Assistant Commissioner of Police (Crime), Ms Chung Wing-man; the Executive Director of the HKMA, Mr Raymond Chan, and the representative of the HKAB, Mr Stanley Wu. 

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: India’s AI Revolution

    Source: Government of India (2)

    India’s AI Revolution

    A Roadmap to Viksit Bharat

    Posted On: 06 MAR 2025 4:09PM by PIB Delhi

    Introduction

    India is undergoing a remarkable transformation in Artificial Intelligence, driven by the visionary leadership of PM Modi. For the first time in India’s history, the government is actively shaping an AI ecosystem where computing power, GPUs, and research opportunities are accessible at an affordable cost.

    Unlike in the past, AI in India is no longer confined to a privileged few or dominated by global tech giants. Through forward-looking policies, the Modi government is empowering students, startups, and innovators with world-class AI infrastructure, fostering a truly level playing field. Initiatives such as the IndiaAI Mission and the establishment of Centres of Excellence for AI are strengthening the country’s AI ecosystem, paving the way for innovation and self-reliance in this critical sector.

    These efforts align with the vision of Viksit Bharat by 2047, where India aspires to become a global AI powerhouse, leveraging cutting-edge technology for economic growth, governance, and societal progress.

    AI Compute and Semiconductor Infrastructure

    India is rapidly building a strong AI computing and semiconductor infrastructure to support its growing digital economy. With the approval of the IndiaAI Mission in 2024, the government allocated ₹10,300 crore over five years to strengthen AI capabilities. A key focus of this mission is the development of a high-end common computing facility equipped with 18,693 Graphics Processing Units (GPUs), making it one of the most extensive AI compute infrastructures globally. This capacity is nearly nine times that of the open-source AI model DeepSeek and about two-thirds of what ChatGPT operates on.

    Here are the key developments:

    • Scaling AI Compute Infrastructure: The initial phase of the mission has already made 10,000 GPUs available, with the remaining units to be added soon. This will enable the creation of indigenous AI solutions tailored to Indian languages and contexts.
    • Opening Access to High-Performance Computing: India has also pioneered the launch of an open GPU marketplace, making high-performance computing accessible to startups, researchers, and students. Unlike many countries where AI infrastructure is controlled by large corporations, this initiative ensures that small players have an opportunity to innovate.
    • Robust GPU Supply Chain: The government has selected 10 companies to supply the GPUs, ensuring a robust and diversified supply chain.
    • Indigenous GPU Capabilities: To further strengthen domestic capabilities, India aims to develop its own GPU within the next three to five years, reducing reliance on imported technology.
    • Affordable Compute Access: A new common compute facility will soon be launched, allowing researchers and startups to access GPU power at a highly subsidised rate of ₹100 per hour, compared to the global cost of $2.5 to $3 per hour.
    • Strengthening Semiconductor Manufacturing: In parallel, India is advancing semiconductor manufacturing, with five semiconductor plants under construction. These developments will not only support AI innovation but also reinforce India’s position in the global electronics sector.

     

    Advancing AI with Open Data and Centres of Excellence (CoE)

    Recognising the importance of data in AI development, the Modi government has launched the IndiaAI Dataset Platform to provide seamless access to high-quality, non-personal datasets. This platform will house the largest collection of anonymised data, empowering Indian startups and researchers to develop advanced AI applications. By ensuring diverse and abundant datasets, this initiative will drive AI-driven solutions across key sectors, enhancing innovation and accuracy.

    • IndiaAI Dataset Platform for Open Data Access: The platform will enable Indian startups and researchers to access a unified repository of high-quality, anonymised datasets, reducing barriers to AI innovation.
    • Boosting AI Model Accuracy with Diverse Data: By providing large-scale, non-personal datasets, the initiative will help reduce biases and improve the reliability of AI applications across domains such as agriculture, weather forecasting, and traffic management.
    • Centres of Excellence: The government has established three AI Centres of Excellence (CoE) in Healthcare, Agriculture, and Sustainable Cities in New Delhi. The Budget 2025 further announced a new CoE for AI in education with an outlay of ₹500 crore, making it the fourth such centre.
    • Skilling for AI-Driven Industries: Plans are in place for five National Centres of Excellence for Skilling, which will equip youth with industry-relevant expertise. These centres will be set up in collaboration with global partners to support the ‘Make for India, Make for the World’ vision in manufacturing and AI innovation.

     

    India’s AI Models & Language Technologies

    The government is facilitating the development of India’s own foundational models, including Large Language Models (LLMs) and problem-specific AI solutions tailored to Indian needs. To foster AI research, multiple Centres of Excellence have also been set up.

    • India’s Foundational Large Language Models: IndiaAI has launched an initiative to develop indigenous foundational AI models, including LLMs and Small Language Models (SLMs), through a call for proposals.
    • Digital India BHASHINI: An AI-led language translation platform designed to enable easy access to the internet and digital services in Indian languages, including voice-based access, and support content creation in Indian languages.
    • BharatGen: The world’s first government-funded multimodal LLM initiative, BharatGen was launched in 2024 in Delhi. It aims to enhance public service delivery and citizen engagement through foundational models in language, speech, and computer vision. BharatGen involves a consortium of AI researchers from premier academic institutions in India.
    • Sarvam-1 AI Model: A large language model optimised for Indian languages, Sarvam-1 has 2 billion parameters and supports ten major Indian languages. It is designed for applications such as language translation, text summarisation, and content generation.
    • Chitralekha: An open-source video transcreation platform developed by AI4Bhārat, Chitralekha enables users to generate and edit audio transcripts in various Indic languages.
    • Hanooman’s Everest 1.0: A multilingual AI system developed by SML, Everest 1.0 supports 35 Indian languages, with plans to expand to 90.

     

    AI Integration with Digital Public Infrastructure

    India’s Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) has redefined digital innovation by combining public funding with private sector-led innovation. Platforms like Aadhaar, UPI, and DigiLocker serve as the foundation, while private entities build application-specific solutions on top of them. This model is now being enhanced with AI, integrating intelligent solutions into financial and governance platforms. The global appeal of India’s DPI was evident at the G20 Summit, where several countries expressed interest in adopting similar frameworks. Japan’s patent grant to India’s UPI payment system further underscores its scalability.

    For Mahakumbh 2025, AI-driven DPI solutions played a crucial role in managing the world’s largest human gathering. AI-powered tools monitored real-time railway passenger movement to optimise crowd dispersal in Prayagraj. The Bhashini-powered Kumbh Sah’AI’yak Chatbot enabled voice-based lost-and-found services, real-time translation, and multilingual assistance. Its integration with Indian Railways and UP Police streamlined communication, ensuring swift issue resolution. By leveraging AI with DPI, Mahakumbh 2025 set a global benchmark for tech-enabled, inclusive, and efficient event management.

    AI Talent & Workforce Development

    India’s workforce is at the heart of its digital revolution. The country is adding one Global Capability Center (GCC) every week, reinforcing its status as a preferred destination for global R&D and technological development. However, sustaining this growth will require continuous investment in education and skill development. The government is addressing this challenge by revamping university curricula to include AI, 5G, and semiconductor design, aligning with the National Education Policy (NEP) 2020. This ensures that graduates acquire job-ready skills, reducing the transition time between education and employment.

    • AI Talent Pipeline & AI Education: Under the IndiaAI Future Skills initiative, AI education is being expanded across undergraduate, postgraduate, and Ph.D. programs. Fellowships are being provided to full-time Ph.D. scholars researching AI in the top 50 NIRF-ranked institutes. To enhance accessibility, Data and AI Labs are being established in Tier 2 and Tier 3 cities, with a model IndiaAI Data Lab already set up at NIELIT Delhi.
    • India Ranks 1st in Global AI Skill Penetration: According to the Stanford AI Index 2024, India ranks first globally in AI skill penetration with a score of 2.8, ahead of the US (2.2) and Germany (1.9). AI talent concentration in India has grown by 263% since 2016, positioning the country as a major AI hub. India also leads in AI Skill Penetration for Women, with a score of 1.7, surpassing the US (1.2) and Israel (0.9).
    • AI Innovation: India has emerged as the fastest-growing developer population globally and ranks second in public generative AI projects on GitHub. The country is home to 16% of the world’s AI talent, showcasing its growing influence in AI innovation and adoption.
    • AI Talent Hubs: The India Skills Report 2024 by Wheebox forecasts that India’s AI industry will reach USD 28.8 billion by 2025, with a CAGR of 45%. The AI-skilled workforce has seen a 14-fold increase from 2016 to 2023, making India one of the top five fastest-growing AI talent hubs, alongside Singapore, Finland, Ireland, and Canada. The demand for AI professionals in India is projected to reach 1 million by 2026.

    AI Adoption & Industry Growth

    India’s Generative AI (GenAI) ecosystem has seen remarkable growth, even amid a global downturn. The country’s AI landscape is evolving from experimental use cases to scalable, production-ready solutions, reflecting its growing maturity.

    • Businesses Prioritising AI Investments: According to BCG, 80% of Indian companies consider AI a core strategic priority, surpassing the global average of 75%. Additionally, 69% plan to increase their tech investments in 2025, with one-third allocating over USD 25 million to AI initiatives.
    • GenAI Startup Funding: According to a November 2024 report by National Association of Software and Service Companies (NASSCOM), Indian GenAI startup funding surged over six times quarter-on-quarter, reaching USD 51 million in Q2FY2025, driven by B2B and agentic AI startups.
    • AI Transforming Workplaces: The Randstad AI & Equity Report 2024 states that seven in 10 Indian employees used AI at work in 2024, up from five in 10 a year earlier, showcasing AI’s rapid integration into workplaces.
    • AI Empowering Small & Medium Businesses (SMBs): AI-driven technologies, such as autonomous agents, are helping SMBs scale efficiently, personalise customer experiences, and optimise operations. According to Salesforce, 78% of Indian SMBs using AI reported revenue growth, while 93% stated AI has contributed to increased revenues.
    • Rapid Expansion of India’s AI Economy: As per the BCG-NASSCOM Report 2024, India’s AI market is projected to grow at a CAGR of 25-35%, reinforcing its potential for innovation and job creation. While AI automates routine tasks, it is simultaneously generating new opportunities in data science, machine learning, and AI-driven applications.
    • AI Startup Support Ecosystem: India hosts 520+ tech incubators and accelerators, ranking third globally in active programs. 42% of these were established in the past five years, catering to the evolving needs of Indian startups. AI-focused accelerators like T-Hub MATH provide crucial mentorship in product development, business strategy, and scaling. In early 2024, MATH supported over 60 startups, with five actively discussing funding, highlighting India’s growing AI startup landscape.

     

    A Pragmatic AI Regulation Approach

    India’s pragmatic AI regulation balances innovation and accountability, steering clear of overregulation that could stifle growth and unchecked market-driven governance that may create monopolies. Instead of relying solely on legislation, India is investing in AI-driven safeguards, funding top universities and IITs to develop solutions for deep fakes, privacy risks, and cybersecurity threats. This techno-legal approach ensures AI remains a force for inclusive growth, fostering an ecosystem where innovation thrives while ethical concerns are proactively addressed.

    Conclusion

    India’s rapid advancements in artificial intelligence, underpinned by strategic government initiatives, have positioned the country as a global AI powerhouse. By expanding AI compute infrastructure, fostering indigenous AI models, enhancing digital public infrastructure, and investing in talent development, India is creating an inclusive and innovation-driven ecosystem. The emphasis on open data, affordable access to high-performance computing, and AI-driven solutions tailored to local needs ensures that the benefits of AI reach businesses, researchers, and citizens alike. As AI adoption accelerates across industries, India’s proactive approach is not only strengthening its digital economy but also paving the way for self-reliance in critical technologies. With a clear vision for the future, India is set to become a leader in AI innovation, shaping the global AI landscape in the years to come.

    Source: Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology

    Click to see in PDF

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    Santosh Kumar/ Ritu Kataria/ Saurabh Kalia

    (Release ID: 2108810) Visitor Counter : 108

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: London ETO greets Year of Snake in Norway (with photos)

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    London ETO greets Year of Snake in Norway (with photos)
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    The Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office, London (London ETO) and the Norway-Hong Kong Chamber of Commerce hosted a Year of the Snake reception in Oslo, Norway, on March 5 (Oslo time).     The Director-General of the London ETO, Mr Gilford Law, delivered a virtual welcome speech at the reception. He highlighted that Hong Kong is an unparalleled destination for businesses and investors, thanks to its free and open investment environment, as well as its simple and low tax system. Mr Law said, “The number of companies in Hong Kong with overseas or Mainland parent companies rose to 9 960 in 2024, while the number of start-ups in Hong Kong increased to 4 694, both reaching record highs. These figures demonstrate that Hong Kong is becoming increasingly attractive to businesses and remains an ideal place for Mainland and overseas enterprises to set up or expand their operations. ”      Mr Law added, “On top of attracting businesses, Hong Kong is also attracting tourists with its dynamic calendar of world-class events. In 2024, Hong Kong welcomed close to 45 million international visitors, a 31 per cent increase from 2023. Stepping into 2025, Hong Kong, as the ‘Events Capital of Asia’, is set to host an array of high-profile business, sports, arts, and cultural events.”     The reception was well attended by over 80 guests in Norway from the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the business, academic and cultural sectors. The London ETO will continue to celebrate the Year of the Snake among the countries under its purview.

    Ends/Thursday, March 6, 2025Issued at HKT 23:33

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    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI USA: ICE investigation leads to Nevada man’s 11-year sentence for sex trafficking a minor

    Source: US Immigration and Customs Enforcement

    PHOENIX, Ariz. – Tyree Eugene Rideaux, 31, of Henderson, Nevada, was sentenced, Feb. 25, to 132 months in prison, followed by 15 years of supervised release, and subject to registering as lifetime sex offender due to an investigation conducted by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Homeland Security Investigations with significant assistance provided by the Mesa Police Department.

    Rideaux pleaded guilty to Sex Trafficking of a Minor on Sept. 16, 2024.  

    “As law enforcement officers, we are used to handling difficult encounters, but few can prepare us for working on human trafficking investigations involving vulnerable children,” said ICE Homeland Security Investigations Arizona Special Agent in Charge Francisco B. Burrola.

    Rideaux met the 16-year-old minor, Jane Doe, at a party in Phoenix a short time before Aug. 15, 2021. Jane Doe traveled with Rideaux and two other females to Inglewood, California. Rideaux told Jane Doe to pretend that she was 18 years old. Once in California, Rideaux placed Jane Doe on the “blade,” an area in a city known for high rates of prostitution. Rideaux assigned a fictitious name to Jane Doe and posted commercial sex advertisements of her online for sex buyers. Jane Doe gave the money she earned to Rideaux, as he directed her to do. On August 15, 2021, Jane Doe convinced a sex buyer to take her to a hospital where she could notify police and family, who returned her home.

    “Predators who traffic in teenagers and force them into prostitution to support the trafficker’s own lifestyle are deserving of the harshest sentences,” stated Rachel C. Hernandez, Acting United States Attorney. “I’m pleased with the excellent results in this case that came about through the diligent efforts of our law enforcement partners and our prosecutors.”

    “HSI is committed to ensuring sex traffickers face the fullest extent of the law by putting them behind bars for years – significant prison time rightly awaits this trafficker,” Burrola concluded.

    ICE HSI conducted the investigation in this case. The United States Attorney’s Office, District of Arizona, Phoenix, handled the prosecutions.

    Report suspicious criminal activity to the ICE Tip Line 24 hours a day, 7 days a week 866-DHS-2-ICE (866-347-2423).

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: 2024 AA Awards for Technology and Innovation (Group)

    Source: NASA

    * Denotes Team Lead
    NASA Ames Research CenterJohn Lawson
    NASA Glenn Research CenterSteven M. ArnoldAaron B. BristerRobert W. CarterRobert H. EarpTimothy P. GabbChristopher J. GiuffrePaul R. GradlJason M. HannaBryan J. HarderAmy B. HiltabidelDale A. HopkinsChristopher A. KantzosMichael J. KulisGeoffrey S. MinterBrian T. NewbacherCallista M. PuchmeyerRichard W. RauserHarvey L. SchabesTimothy M. Smith*Aaron C. ThompsonMary F. WadelAustin J. WhittLaura G. Wilson
    NASA’s Marshall Space Flight CenterPaul Gradl
    HX5, LLCChristopher J. GiuffreAaron C. ThompsonAustin J. Whitt
    University of ToledoRichard W. Rauser

    2024 AA Award Honorees
    2024 AA Award Honorees PDF
    ARMD Associate Administrator Awards

    MIL OSI USA News