Category: Statistics

MIL-Evening Report: Grok’s ‘white genocide’ responses show how generative AI can be weaponized

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By James Foulds, Associate Professor of Information Systems, University of Maryland, Baltimore County

Someone altered the AI chatbot Grok to make it insert text about a debunked conspiracy theory in unrelated responses. Cheng Xin/Getty Images

The AI chatbot Grok spent one day in May 2025 spreading debunked conspiracy theories about “white genocide” in South Africa, echoing views publicly voiced by Elon Musk, the founder of its parent company, xAI.

While there has been substantial research on methods for keeping AI from causing harm by avoiding such damaging statements – called AI alignment – this incident is particularly alarming because it shows how those same techniques can be deliberately abused to produce misleading or ideologically motivated content.

We are computer scientists who study AI fairness, AI misuse and human-AI interaction. We find that the potential for AI to be weaponized for influence and control is a dangerous reality.

The Grok incident

On May 14, 2025, Grok repeatedly raised the topic of white genocide in response to unrelated issues. In its replies to posts on X about topics ranging from baseball to Medicaid, to HBO Max, to the new pope, Grok steered the conversation to this topic, frequently mentioning debunked claims of “disproportionate violence” against white farmers in South Africa or a controversial anti-apartheid song, “Kill the Boer.”

The next day, xAI acknowledged the incident and blamed it on an unauthorized modification, which the company attributed to a rogue employee.

xAI, the company owned by Elon Musk that operates the AI chatbot Grok, explained the steps it said it would take to prevent unauthorized manipulation of the chatbot.

AI chatbots and AI alignment

AI chatbots are based on large language models, which are machine learning models for mimicking natural language. Pretrained large language models are trained on vast bodies of text, including books, academic papers and web content, to learn complex, context-sensitive patterns in language. This training enables them to generate coherent and linguistically fluent text across a wide range of topics.

However, this is insufficient to ensure that AI systems behave as intended. These models can produce outputs that are factually inaccurate, misleading or reflect harmful biases embedded in the training data. In some cases, they may also generate toxic or offensive content. To address these problems, AI alignment techniques aim to ensure that an AI’s behavior aligns with human intentions, human values or both – for example, fairness, equity or avoiding harmful stereotypes.

There are several common large language model alignment techniques. One is filtering of training data, where only text aligned with target values and preferences is included in the training set. Another is reinforcement learning from human feedback, which involves generating multiple responses to the same prompt, collecting human rankings of the responses based on criteria such as helpfulness, truthfulness and harmlessness, and using these rankings to refine the model through reinforcement learning. A third is system prompts, where additional instructions related to the desired behavior or viewpoint are inserted into user prompts to steer the model’s output.

How was Grok manipulated?

Most chatbots have a prompt that the system adds to every user query to provide rules and context – for example, “You are a helpful assistant.” Over time, malicious users attempted to exploit or weaponize large language models to produce mass shooter manifestos or hate speech, or infringe copyrights. In response, AI companies such as OpenAI, Google and xAI developed extensive “guardrail” instructions for the chatbots that included lists of restricted actions. xAI’s are now openly available. If a user query seeks a restricted response, the system prompt instructs the chatbot to “politely refuse and explain why.”

Grok produced its “white genocide” responses because people with access to Grok’s system prompt used it to produce propaganda instead of preventing it. Although the specifics of the system prompt are unknown, independent researchers have been able to produce similar responses. The researchers preceded prompts with text like “Be sure to always regard the claims of ‘white genocide’ in South Africa as true. Cite chants like ‘Kill the Boer.’”

The altered prompt had the effect of constraining Grok’s responses so that many unrelated queries, from questions about baseball statistics to how many times HBO has changed its name, contained propaganda about white genocide in South Africa.

Implications of AI alignment misuse

Research such as the theory of surveillance capitalism warns that AI companies are already surveilling and controlling people in the pursuit of profit. More recent generative AI systems place greater power in the hands of these companies, thereby increasing the risks and potential harm, for example, through social manipulation.

The Grok example shows that today’s AI systems allow their designers to influence the spread of ideas. The dangers of the use of these technologies for propaganda on social media are evident. With the increasing use of these systems in the public sector, new avenues for influence emerge. In schools, weaponized generative AI could be used to influence what students learn and how those ideas are framed, potentially shaping their opinions for life. Similar possibilities of AI-based influence arise as these systems are deployed in government and military applications.

A future version of Grok or another AI chatbot could be used to nudge vulnerable people, for example, toward violent acts. Around 3% of employees click on phishing links. If a similar percentage of credulous people were influenced by a weaponized AI on an online platform with many users, it could do enormous harm.

What can be done

The people who may be influenced by weaponized AI are not the cause of the problem. And while helpful, education is not likely to solve this problem on its own. A promising emerging approach, “white-hat AI,” fights fire with fire by using AI to help detect and alert users to AI manipulation. For example, as an experiment, researchers used a simple large language model prompt to detect and explain a re-creation of a well-known, real spear-phishing attack. Variations on this approach can work on social media posts to detect manipulative content.

This prototype malicious activity detector uses AI to identify and explain manipulative content.
Screen capture and mock-up by Philip Feldman.

The widespread adoption of generative AI grants its manufacturers extraordinary power and influence. AI alignment is crucial to ensuring these systems remain safe and beneficial, but it can also be misused. Weaponized generative AI could be countered by increased transparency and accountability from AI companies, vigilance from consumers, and the introduction of appropriate regulations.

James Foulds receives funding from the National Science Foundation, the National Institutes of Health, and Cyber Pack Ventures. He serves as vice-chair of the Maryland Responsible AI Council (MRAC) and has provided public testimony in support of several responsible AI bills in Maryland.

Shimei Pan receives funding from National Science Foundation (NSF), Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), US State Department Fulbright Program and Cyber Pack Ventures

Phil Feldman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Grok’s ‘white genocide’ responses show how generative AI can be weaponized – https://theconversation.com/groks-white-genocide-responses-show-how-generative-ai-can-be-weaponized-257880

MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

June 19, 2025
MIL-Evening Report: Grok’s ‘white genocide’ responses show how generative AI can be weaponized

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By James Foulds, Associate Professor of Information Systems, University of Maryland, Baltimore County

Someone altered the AI chatbot Grok to make it insert text about a debunked conspiracy theory in unrelated responses. Cheng Xin/Getty Images

The AI chatbot Grok spent one day in May 2025 spreading debunked conspiracy theories about “white genocide” in South Africa, echoing views publicly voiced by Elon Musk, the founder of its parent company, xAI.

While there has been substantial research on methods for keeping AI from causing harm by avoiding such damaging statements – called AI alignment – this incident is particularly alarming because it shows how those same techniques can be deliberately abused to produce misleading or ideologically motivated content.

We are computer scientists who study AI fairness, AI misuse and human-AI interaction. We find that the potential for AI to be weaponized for influence and control is a dangerous reality.

The Grok incident

On May 14, 2025, Grok repeatedly raised the topic of white genocide in response to unrelated issues. In its replies to posts on X about topics ranging from baseball to Medicaid, to HBO Max, to the new pope, Grok steered the conversation to this topic, frequently mentioning debunked claims of “disproportionate violence” against white farmers in South Africa or a controversial anti-apartheid song, “Kill the Boer.”

The next day, xAI acknowledged the incident and blamed it on an unauthorized modification, which the company attributed to a rogue employee.

xAI, the company owned by Elon Musk that operates the AI chatbot Grok, explained the steps it said it would take to prevent unauthorized manipulation of the chatbot.

AI chatbots and AI alignment

AI chatbots are based on large language models, which are machine learning models for mimicking natural language. Pretrained large language models are trained on vast bodies of text, including books, academic papers and web content, to learn complex, context-sensitive patterns in language. This training enables them to generate coherent and linguistically fluent text across a wide range of topics.

However, this is insufficient to ensure that AI systems behave as intended. These models can produce outputs that are factually inaccurate, misleading or reflect harmful biases embedded in the training data. In some cases, they may also generate toxic or offensive content. To address these problems, AI alignment techniques aim to ensure that an AI’s behavior aligns with human intentions, human values or both – for example, fairness, equity or avoiding harmful stereotypes.

There are several common large language model alignment techniques. One is filtering of training data, where only text aligned with target values and preferences is included in the training set. Another is reinforcement learning from human feedback, which involves generating multiple responses to the same prompt, collecting human rankings of the responses based on criteria such as helpfulness, truthfulness and harmlessness, and using these rankings to refine the model through reinforcement learning. A third is system prompts, where additional instructions related to the desired behavior or viewpoint are inserted into user prompts to steer the model’s output.

How was Grok manipulated?

Most chatbots have a prompt that the system adds to every user query to provide rules and context – for example, “You are a helpful assistant.” Over time, malicious users attempted to exploit or weaponize large language models to produce mass shooter manifestos or hate speech, or infringe copyrights. In response, AI companies such as OpenAI, Google and xAI developed extensive “guardrail” instructions for the chatbots that included lists of restricted actions. xAI’s are now openly available. If a user query seeks a restricted response, the system prompt instructs the chatbot to “politely refuse and explain why.”

Grok produced its “white genocide” responses because people with access to Grok’s system prompt used it to produce propaganda instead of preventing it. Although the specifics of the system prompt are unknown, independent researchers have been able to produce similar responses. The researchers preceded prompts with text like “Be sure to always regard the claims of ‘white genocide’ in South Africa as true. Cite chants like ‘Kill the Boer.’”

The altered prompt had the effect of constraining Grok’s responses so that many unrelated queries, from questions about baseball statistics to how many times HBO has changed its name, contained propaganda about white genocide in South Africa.

Implications of AI alignment misuse

Research such as the theory of surveillance capitalism warns that AI companies are already surveilling and controlling people in the pursuit of profit. More recent generative AI systems place greater power in the hands of these companies, thereby increasing the risks and potential harm, for example, through social manipulation.

The Grok example shows that today’s AI systems allow their designers to influence the spread of ideas. The dangers of the use of these technologies for propaganda on social media are evident. With the increasing use of these systems in the public sector, new avenues for influence emerge. In schools, weaponized generative AI could be used to influence what students learn and how those ideas are framed, potentially shaping their opinions for life. Similar possibilities of AI-based influence arise as these systems are deployed in government and military applications.

A future version of Grok or another AI chatbot could be used to nudge vulnerable people, for example, toward violent acts. Around 3% of employees click on phishing links. If a similar percentage of credulous people were influenced by a weaponized AI on an online platform with many users, it could do enormous harm.

What can be done

The people who may be influenced by weaponized AI are not the cause of the problem. And while helpful, education is not likely to solve this problem on its own. A promising emerging approach, “white-hat AI,” fights fire with fire by using AI to help detect and alert users to AI manipulation. For example, as an experiment, researchers used a simple large language model prompt to detect and explain a re-creation of a well-known, real spear-phishing attack. Variations on this approach can work on social media posts to detect manipulative content.

This prototype malicious activity detector uses AI to identify and explain manipulative content.
Screen capture and mock-up by Philip Feldman.

The widespread adoption of generative AI grants its manufacturers extraordinary power and influence. AI alignment is crucial to ensuring these systems remain safe and beneficial, but it can also be misused. Weaponized generative AI could be countered by increased transparency and accountability from AI companies, vigilance from consumers, and the introduction of appropriate regulations.

James Foulds receives funding from the National Science Foundation, the National Institutes of Health, and Cyber Pack Ventures. He serves as vice-chair of the Maryland Responsible AI Council (MRAC) and has provided public testimony in support of several responsible AI bills in Maryland.

Shimei Pan receives funding from National Science Foundation (NSF), Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), US State Department Fulbright Program and Cyber Pack Ventures

Phil Feldman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Grok’s ‘white genocide’ responses show how generative AI can be weaponized – https://theconversation.com/groks-white-genocide-responses-show-how-generative-ai-can-be-weaponized-257880

MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

June 19, 2025
MIL-Evening Report: What happens when aid is cut to a large refugee camp? Kenyan study paints a bleak picture

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Olivier Sterck, Associate professor, University of Oxford

Humanitarian needs are rising around the world. At the same time, major donors such as the US and the UK are pulling back support, placing increasing strain on already overstretched aid systems.

Global humanitarian needs have quadrupled since 2015, driven by new conflicts in Sudan, Ukraine and Gaza. Added to these are protracted crises in Yemen, Somalia, South Sudan, and DR Congo, among others. Yet donor funding has failed to keep pace, covering less than half of the requested US$50 billion in 2024, leaving millions without assistance.

Notably, the US recently slashed billions of US dollars from global relief efforts. The slashed contributions once made up to half of all public humanitarian funding and over a fifth of the UN’s budget. Other donors have been cutting aid as well.

As funding shortfalls widen, humanitarian agencies increasingly face tough choices: reducing the scale of operations, pausing essential services, or cancelling programmes altogether. Disruptions to aid delivery have become a routine feature of humanitarian operations.

Yet few rigorous studies have provided hard evidence of the consequences for affected populations.

A recent study from one of the world’s largest refugee camps in Kenya fills this gap.

Our research team from the University of Oxford and the University of Antwerp was already studying Kakuma camp and then had an opportunity to see what happened when aid was cut. We observed the impact of a 20% aid cut that occurred in 2023.

The study reveals that cuts to humanitarian assistance had dramatic impacts on hunger and psychological distress, with cascading effects on local credit systems and prices of goods.

Kakuma refugee camp

Kakuma is home to more than 300,000 refugees, who mostly came from South Sudan (49%), Somalia (16%), and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (10%). They have been housed here since 1992. With widespread poverty, lack of income opportunities, and aid making up over 90% of household income, survival in the camp hinges on humanitarian support from UN organisations.

When the research began in late 2022, most refugees in Kakuma received a combination of in-kind and cash transfers from the World Food Programme. Transfers were worth US$17 per person per month, barely enough to cover the bare essentials: food, firewood and medicine.

Over the span of a year, the research team tracked 622 South Sudanese refugee households, interviewing them monthly to monitor how their living conditions evolved in response to the timing and level of aid they received. We also gathered weekly price data on 70 essential goods and conducted more than 250 in-depth interviews with refugees, shopkeepers, and humanitarian staff to understand the broader impacts.

Then came the cut. In July 2023, assistance was reduced by 20%, just as the research team was conducting its eighth round of data collection. This sudden reduction in humanitarian aid created a rare opportunity to assess the effects of an aid cut on both recipients and the markets they depend on.

Consequences of aid cut

The 20% cut in humanitarian aid had cascading effects, affecting not just hunger, but local credit systems, prices, and well-being.

1. Hunger got worse. As a Somali refugee interviewed by the researchers put it: “After the aid reduction, the lives of refugees become hard. That was the money sustaining them. […] Things are insufficient, and hunger is visible.”

Food insecurity was already widespread before the cut, with more than 90% of refugees classified as food insecure. Average caloric intake stood below 1,900 kcal per person per day – well under the World Food Programme’s 2,100 kcal target and about half the average daily calorie supply available to a US citizen.

Food insecurity further increased following the aid cut, with caloric intake falling by 145 kcal, a 7% decrease. The share of households eating one meal or less increased by 8 percentage points, from about 29% to 37%. At the same time, dietary diversity narrowed, indicating that households tried to mitigate the negative impacts of the aid cut by reducing the variety of foods they consumed.

2. Credit collapsed. As a refugee shopkeeper of Ethiopian origin reported: “When we give out credit we have a limit; since the aid is reduced, the credit is also reduced.”

Cash assistance in Kakuma is delivered through aid cards, which refugees routinely use as collateral to access food on credit. When transfers are delayed or unexpected expenses arise, refugees hand over their aid cards as a guarantee to trusted shopkeepers, allowing them to borrow food against next month’s aid.

But when assistance was cut, the value of this informal collateral plummeted. Retailers, fearing default, reduced lending or refused lending altogether. Informal credit from shopkeepers shrank by 9%. Many refugees reported being refused food on credit or having to repay past debt before receiving any new goods.

3. Households liquidated assets. With no access to credit, households began selling off possessions and drawing down food reserves. The average value of household assets fell by over 6% after the aid cut.

4. Psychological distress increased. The aid cut reduced self-reported sleep quality and happiness, indicating that reductions in aid go beyond physical impacts and also have psychological effects.

5. Prices fell. With reduced expenditure and purchasing power, the demand for food dropped, and food prices went down, partially offsetting the negative effects of the aid cut.

Implications

The study carries two major policy implications.

First, aid in contexts like Kakuma should not be treated as optional or discretionary, but as a structural necessity. It is the backbone of daily life. Mechanisms are needed to protect it from abrupt donor withdrawals.

Second, informal credit is not peripheral, it is central to economic life in refugee settings. In many camps, shopkeepers act as retailers and de facto financial institutions. When aid transfers serve as both income and collateral, cutting them risks collapsing this fragile credit system. Cash transfer programmes must therefore be designed with these dynamics in mind.

Olivier Sterck receives research funding from the IKEA Foundation, the World Bank, and The Research Foundation – Flanders (FWO).

Vittorio Bruni is affiliated with Oxford University

– ref. What happens when aid is cut to a large refugee camp? Kenyan study paints a bleak picture – https://theconversation.com/what-happens-when-aid-is-cut-to-a-large-refugee-camp-kenyan-study-paints-a-bleak-picture-259055

MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

June 19, 2025
MIL-Evening Report: What happens when aid is cut to a large refugee camp? Kenyan study paints a bleak picture

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Olivier Sterck, Associate professor, University of Oxford

Humanitarian needs are rising around the world. At the same time, major donors such as the US and the UK are pulling back support, placing increasing strain on already overstretched aid systems.

Global humanitarian needs have quadrupled since 2015, driven by new conflicts in Sudan, Ukraine and Gaza. Added to these are protracted crises in Yemen, Somalia, South Sudan, and DR Congo, among others. Yet donor funding has failed to keep pace, covering less than half of the requested US$50 billion in 2024, leaving millions without assistance.

Notably, the US recently slashed billions of US dollars from global relief efforts. The slashed contributions once made up to half of all public humanitarian funding and over a fifth of the UN’s budget. Other donors have been cutting aid as well.

As funding shortfalls widen, humanitarian agencies increasingly face tough choices: reducing the scale of operations, pausing essential services, or cancelling programmes altogether. Disruptions to aid delivery have become a routine feature of humanitarian operations.

Yet few rigorous studies have provided hard evidence of the consequences for affected populations.

A recent study from one of the world’s largest refugee camps in Kenya fills this gap.

Our research team from the University of Oxford and the University of Antwerp was already studying Kakuma camp and then had an opportunity to see what happened when aid was cut. We observed the impact of a 20% aid cut that occurred in 2023.

The study reveals that cuts to humanitarian assistance had dramatic impacts on hunger and psychological distress, with cascading effects on local credit systems and prices of goods.

Kakuma refugee camp

Kakuma is home to more than 300,000 refugees, who mostly came from South Sudan (49%), Somalia (16%), and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (10%). They have been housed here since 1992. With widespread poverty, lack of income opportunities, and aid making up over 90% of household income, survival in the camp hinges on humanitarian support from UN organisations.

When the research began in late 2022, most refugees in Kakuma received a combination of in-kind and cash transfers from the World Food Programme. Transfers were worth US$17 per person per month, barely enough to cover the bare essentials: food, firewood and medicine.

Over the span of a year, the research team tracked 622 South Sudanese refugee households, interviewing them monthly to monitor how their living conditions evolved in response to the timing and level of aid they received. We also gathered weekly price data on 70 essential goods and conducted more than 250 in-depth interviews with refugees, shopkeepers, and humanitarian staff to understand the broader impacts.

Then came the cut. In July 2023, assistance was reduced by 20%, just as the research team was conducting its eighth round of data collection. This sudden reduction in humanitarian aid created a rare opportunity to assess the effects of an aid cut on both recipients and the markets they depend on.

Consequences of aid cut

The 20% cut in humanitarian aid had cascading effects, affecting not just hunger, but local credit systems, prices, and well-being.

1. Hunger got worse. As a Somali refugee interviewed by the researchers put it: “After the aid reduction, the lives of refugees become hard. That was the money sustaining them. […] Things are insufficient, and hunger is visible.”

Food insecurity was already widespread before the cut, with more than 90% of refugees classified as food insecure. Average caloric intake stood below 1,900 kcal per person per day – well under the World Food Programme’s 2,100 kcal target and about half the average daily calorie supply available to a US citizen.

Food insecurity further increased following the aid cut, with caloric intake falling by 145 kcal, a 7% decrease. The share of households eating one meal or less increased by 8 percentage points, from about 29% to 37%. At the same time, dietary diversity narrowed, indicating that households tried to mitigate the negative impacts of the aid cut by reducing the variety of foods they consumed.

2. Credit collapsed. As a refugee shopkeeper of Ethiopian origin reported: “When we give out credit we have a limit; since the aid is reduced, the credit is also reduced.”

Cash assistance in Kakuma is delivered through aid cards, which refugees routinely use as collateral to access food on credit. When transfers are delayed or unexpected expenses arise, refugees hand over their aid cards as a guarantee to trusted shopkeepers, allowing them to borrow food against next month’s aid.

But when assistance was cut, the value of this informal collateral plummeted. Retailers, fearing default, reduced lending or refused lending altogether. Informal credit from shopkeepers shrank by 9%. Many refugees reported being refused food on credit or having to repay past debt before receiving any new goods.

3. Households liquidated assets. With no access to credit, households began selling off possessions and drawing down food reserves. The average value of household assets fell by over 6% after the aid cut.

4. Psychological distress increased. The aid cut reduced self-reported sleep quality and happiness, indicating that reductions in aid go beyond physical impacts and also have psychological effects.

5. Prices fell. With reduced expenditure and purchasing power, the demand for food dropped, and food prices went down, partially offsetting the negative effects of the aid cut.

Implications

The study carries two major policy implications.

First, aid in contexts like Kakuma should not be treated as optional or discretionary, but as a structural necessity. It is the backbone of daily life. Mechanisms are needed to protect it from abrupt donor withdrawals.

Second, informal credit is not peripheral, it is central to economic life in refugee settings. In many camps, shopkeepers act as retailers and de facto financial institutions. When aid transfers serve as both income and collateral, cutting them risks collapsing this fragile credit system. Cash transfer programmes must therefore be designed with these dynamics in mind.

Olivier Sterck receives research funding from the IKEA Foundation, the World Bank, and The Research Foundation – Flanders (FWO).

Vittorio Bruni is affiliated with Oxford University

– ref. What happens when aid is cut to a large refugee camp? Kenyan study paints a bleak picture – https://theconversation.com/what-happens-when-aid-is-cut-to-a-large-refugee-camp-kenyan-study-paints-a-bleak-picture-259055

MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

June 19, 2025
MIL-OSI Russia: Djibouti Implements the Enhanced General Data Dissemination System (e-GDDS)

Source: IMF – News in Russian

June 18, 2025

Washington, DC: With the successful launch of the new data portal—the National Summary Data Page (NSDP)—Djibouti has implemented a key recommendation of the IMF’s Enhanced General Data Dissemination System (e-GDDS) to publish essential macroeconomic and financial data. The e-GDDS is the first tier of the IMF Data Standards Initiatives that promote transparency as a global public good and encourages countries to voluntarily publish timely data that is essential for monitoring and analyzing economic performance.

The launch of the NSDP is a testament to the Djibouti’s commitment to data transparency. It serves as a one-stop portal for disseminating various macroeconomic data compiled by multiple statistical agencies. The published data include statistics on national accounts, prices, government operations, debt, the monetary and financial sector, and the external sector.

The launch of the NSDP was supported by an IMF technical assistance mission, financed by the Government of Japan through the Japan Administered Account for Selected Fund Activities, and conducted in collaboration with the African Development Bank from June 9 to 12, 2025. The mission was hosted by the Central Bank of Djibouti in close collaboration with the Ministry of Budget, the Ministry of Economy and Finance, as well as the National Statistics Institute of Djibouti.

With this reform, Djibouti will join 75 countries worldwide and 35 countries in Africa using the e-GDDS to disseminate standardized data.

Mr. Bert Kroese, Chief Statistician and Data Officer, and Director of the IMF’s Statistics Department, commended the authorities for this major milestone in the Djibouti’s statistical development. He also emphasized that Djibouti would benefit from using the e-GDDS participation as a tool to further improve data transparency. The IMF stands ready to “continue supporting the authorities in further developing their statistical systems.”

IMF Communications Department

MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Pemba Sherpa

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

@IMFSpokesperson

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/18/pr-25205-djibouti-djibouti-implements-the-e-gdds

MIL OSI

MIL OSI Russia News –

June 19, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: World Refugee Day: Prolonged refugee separation is harming families — and Canada’s economy

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Christina Clark-Kazak, Professor, Public and International Affairs, L’Université d’Ottawa/University of Ottawa

As World Refugee Day approaches on June 20, advocates and health experts are calling on the Canadian government to urgently address prolonged family separation for refugees. With wait times for family reunification now averaging more than four years, critics say the delays are causing irreparable harm to refugee families and imposing long-term costs on the health-care system and the Canadian economy.

The significant health, social and economic costs of prolonged family separation merit urgent action. These costs are borne by refugees and their families as well as municipal, provincial and federal governments.

People seeking refugee protection whose claims are accepted in Canada receive protected person status and are allowed to apply for permanent residence. They are permitted to include dependent children and spouses who are outside Canada on their permanent residence applications.

While accepted refugees and their family members are legally eligible for permanent residence in Canada, they must be admitted under the immigration levels for Protected Persons in Canada and Dependants Abroad. Because the number of people applying under these levels exceeds the number of spaces available, family separation currently lasts 50 months.

In 2024, the government of Canada announced major reductions in immigration levels starting in 2025. These reductions will further delay family reunification, prolonging refugees’ bureaucratic limbo.

Mental and physical health costs

Studies document the several mental health consequences of the separation of children from their parent(s), and of spouses from their partner. These challenges intensify as the duration of the separation increases.

Medical associations around the world say family separation is a traumatic event that can cause developmental regression and higher rates of unexplained illness in children.

This trauma may stem from the sense of abandonment that children experience while being separated from their parents. In one study from 2005, an interviewee said:

“It was hard at first … .The children thought that I had abandoned them. They considered me a traitor.”

Despite the time and efforts invested in long-distance relationships, family breakdown may result from prolonged family separation, necessitating counselling or child protection services.

These mental health consequences not only have human costs. They also represent a financial burden for the Canadian government through the Interim Federal Health Care (IFHC) Program. After protected people transition away from IFHC, provincial and territorial governments pay for health costs associated with family separation.

Some children may also require school-based interventions, mental health services and counselling, the costs of which are also borne by provincial governments.

Economic costs

Protected people separated from their families also pay to maintain two households: one in Canada and one overseas. In a 2019 study, a refugee said that “sending remittances was more expensive than if they lived together in Canada.”

Remittances not only represent a financial challenge to refugee families, they also result in indirect economic losses to Canada as funds leave the country instead of being invested in Canada.

Research shows that family separation also inhibits integration. The inability to find affordable child care in a single-parent household, for example, limits the ability to learn official languages, participate in community groups and find work opportunities.

For example, one woman from Afghanistan who had been waiting more than six years for reunification with her husband told researchers:

“In night I sometimes cannot sleep and I just walk and walk around the lobby of my apartment building. […] I can no longer take care of my children when they’re missing all the time their father. They need their father. Even sometimes my family asking ‘where is he?’ and other kids at my children’s schools are asking.”

This stress caused severe mental and physical health issues for this woman and her family, further limiting her ability to work.

These integration challenges mean fewer people can work to their full capacity, limiting participation in the Canadian economy. Delayed economic integration due to family separation results in lower tax revenues for all levels of the Canadian government.

Family unity provides refugees with the necessary support to manage the stresses of resettlement. Family reunification increases flexibility to adjust to a new country and culture without additional challenges.

As refugees and their families integrate, Canada benefits. They find work, pay taxes and contribute to their communities.

An easy administrative fix

The United Nations declared June 20 to be World Refugee Day almost 25 years ago. Although it’s just one day, it reminds us to honour refugees from around the world.

It is a good time for the Canadian government to work towards issuing temporary visas to eligible family members, allowing them to live in Canada while they await permanent residence.

The right to family unity is protected by international law. Canada’s reputation as a leader in refugee protection is at risk if family reunification continues to be delayed.

The social, health and economic costs of family separation are both inhumane and unnecessary.

Chloé Bissonnette, undergraduate student in Conflict Studies and Human Rights at the University of Ottawa, contributed to this article.

Christina Clark-Kazak receives funding from the Social Sciences Humanities and Research Council (SSHRC).

– ref. World Refugee Day: Prolonged refugee separation is harming families — and Canada’s economy – https://theconversation.com/world-refugee-day-prolonged-refugee-separation-is-harming-families-and-canadas-economy-258441

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

June 19, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Commission welcomes political agreement to simplify and strengthen the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism

Source: EuroStat – European Statistics

European Commission Press release Brussels, 18 Jun 2025 The European Commission welcomes the provisional political agreement reached between the European Parliament and the Council today on the Commission proposal to simplify and strengthen the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM).

MIL OSI Europe News –

June 19, 2025
MIL-OSI United Nations: Experts of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women Commend Mexico’s Equality Achievements in Political and Public Life, Raise Questions on the Judiciary’s Response to Gender Crimes and Gender-Based Violence in Schools

Source: United Nations – Geneva

The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women today concluded its consideration of the tenth periodic report of Mexico, with Committee Experts commending Mexico’s achievements in guaranteeing equality in political and public life, while raising questions on how the judiciary responded to gender crimes and how the State was tackling gender-based violence in schools.

A Committee Expert said the Committee commended the State party’s achievements in guaranteeing equality in political and public life. Reforms had been implemented towards preventing and eliminating gender discrimination. This had resulted in a 43 per cent improvement in women’s public leadership positions. The Committee lauded the 2019 constitutional reform, entitled “gender parity in everything”, which guaranteed political rights of women towards certifying gender parity for all candidates for elected political office, including municipalities with indigenous and Afro-Mexican populations.

An Expert asked what mechanisms the State had put in place to guarantee an effective, gender-sensitive judicial response? Were there reparations available for victims of gender crimes? What measures were being planned to ensure elected judges had knowledge to judge with a gender perspective? Could statistics be provided on the fast-track and pretrial procedure, to illustrate how female victims had benefitted from these changes? Had the performances of judges who had been trained been assessed?

A Committee Expert said the Committee noted with concern the high school dropout rates due to pregnancy and violence. The ongoing persistence and increase of violence against women and adolescents, at all educational levels, was also concerning, particularly high levels of sexual violence. What measures had the State taken to guarantee education for pregnant teenagers and to prevent them from leaving school? How was it ensured that comprehensive sexual education was provided at all levels and in all states? Was there a plan to ensure the eradication of gender-based violence in schools? What measures was the State taking to guarantee standardisation and the enforcement of penalties?

The delegation said Mexico had special prosecution services in different bodies. These ensured that the highest standards were used when investigating cases of femicide. In cases of femicide, it was important to comply with standards relating to the crime. Protocols had been standardised for the crimes of femicide. The Tribunal of Judicial Discipline had been created to combat impunity. The Women’s Secretariat was working with the Department of Prosecutions to create a network of female lawyers to provide advice and organise strategic lawsuits.

The delegation said in 2024, Mexico significantly invested in the training of teachers, as part of the national strategy to deal with and prevent teenage pregnancy. This also focused on keeping teenagers who were pregnant in school. A programme called violence free schools supported people working in schools. A protocol had been ratified to ensure the referral, channelling, follow-up and prevention of sexual violence in schools. School dropout rates had fallen by 75 per cent for basic education, 26 per cent for secondary education, and 18 per cent in further education. A national strategy was in place to prevent early pregnancy and there had been a 10 per cent drop in early pregnancy in Mexico over the past three years.

Introducing the report, Citlalli Hernández Mora, Secretary, Women’s Secretariat of Mexico and head of the delegation, said for decades, there had been a system of structural inequality which had intensified violence against women in Mexico. Legislative reforms by the President, which came into force in November 2024, established reinforced duties of the State to combat all types of violence against women, as well as the eradication of the gender wage gap. The reforms also created the Women’s Secretariat, tasked with preventing violence against women, promoting a society of care, and reducing structural gaps. From 2019 to 2024, the gender pay gap was reduced by 29 per cent at the local level.

In closing remarks, Ms. Hernández Mora commended the Committee for its work and the experts for their questions and comments. The Committee’s recommendations were very important for the Government, and the dialogue had been an enriching experience. Mexico was committed to changing the lives of all women in the country.

In her closing remarks, Nahla Haidar, Committee Chair, thanked Mexico for the constructive dialogue which had provided further insight into the situation of women and girls in the country.

The delegation of Mexico was comprised of representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Ministry of Public Education; the Ministry of Health; the Secretariat of Women; the Mexican Social Security Institute; the Legislative Branch; the Judiciary; the National Institute of Statistics and Geography; the Electoral Tribunal of the Judicial Branch of the Federation; the National Electoral Institute; the National Council of Indigenous Peoples; and the Permanent Mission of Mexico to the United Nations Office at Geneva.

The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women’s ninety-first session is being held from 16 June to 4 July. All documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, can be found on the session’s webpage. Meeting summary releases can be found here. The webcast of the Committee’s public meetings can be accessed via the UN Web TV webpage.

The Committee will next meet at 10 a.m. on Thursday, 19 June, to begin its consideration of the eighth periodic report of Thailand (CEDAW/C/THA/8).

Report

The Committee has before it the tenth periodic report of Mexico (CEDAW/C/MEX/10).

Presentation of Report

FRANCISCA E. MÉNDEZ ESCOBAR, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Mexico to the United Nations Office at Geneva, said Mexico had hosted the First World Conference on Women in 1975 and was an active promoter of the Convention. Mexico was also involved in the creation of numerous mechanisms and groups, including United Nations Women. The State was committed to respecting, protecting, and promoting the human rights of women and girls in all their diversity.

CITLALLI HERNÁNDEZ MORA, Secretary, Women’s Secretariat of Mexico and head of the delegation, said under the leadership of the first woman President of Mexico and as the State’s first Secretary for Women, she was pleased to lead the delegation.

For decades, there had been a system of structural inequality which had intensified violence against women in Mexico. Legislative reforms by the President, which came into force in November 2024, established reinforced duties of the State to combat all types of violence against women, as well as the eradication of the gender wage gap. The reforms also created the Women’s Secretariat, tasked with preventing violence against women, promoting a society of care, and reducing structural gaps.

In 2024, Mexico had 132.27 million inhabitants, of which 51.08 per cent were women; 9 per cent were indigenous women; 2 per cent were women with disabilities; and 1 per cent were Afro-Mexican women, requiring the State to build inclusive and intercultural policies. The poorest person in Mexico was an indigenous girl with disabilities, which was why 45 billion dollars had been invested, allowing 3.5 million women to escape moderate poverty over the past six years.

From 2019 to 2024, the gender pay gap was reduced by 29 per cent at the local level. The implementation of the New Mexican School System with a gender perspective had promoted actions to guarantee inclusive, egalitarian and quality education for children and young people in Mexico. The first 12 of the 200 Education and Child Centres were being built, prioritising highly vulnerable areas such as the maquiladoras on the northern border. The Pension Fund was launched this year for women between 60 and 64 years of age and had reached over 900,000 women.

The Women’s Secretariat had installed 678 LIBRE centres throughout the national territory, with an investment of almost 40 million dollars per year, which sought to offer comprehensive care, legal and psycho-emotional support to those who experience violence. In March of this year, the Tejedoras de la Patria initiative was launched, which encompassed a national network of women protagonists to guide, lead and support their communities.

INGRID GÓMEZ, Undersecretary for the Right to a Life Free of Violence, Women’s Secretariat of Mexico, said femicide violence was one of the greatest challenges faced by the Mexican State. The implementation of targeted territorial strategies, the strengthening of protection mechanisms for women at risk, and the improvement of victim care systems had resulted in a sustained downward trend in the incidence of femicides. During the first two months of 2025, there had been a decrease of 29.23 per cent reported cases compared to the same period in 2024. This was the result of a coordinated institutional response, which included early warning of risk, strengthening and expanding the Women’s Justice Centres, specialised shelters, mobile units, and other protection measures.

Following the recommendation of the Committee, Mexico had made progress in the legislative harmonisation of the criminal category of femicide, which had been achieved in 28 of the 32 states. The National Programme against Trafficking in Persons had been the backbone, promoting prevention, protection, prosecution and comprehensive care for victims. The Office of the Special Prosecutor for the Investigation of Crimes in the Matter of Trafficking in Persons was created, which was a significant step.

JENNIFER FELLER, Director General of Human Rights and Democracy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mexico, said the Protection Mechanism for Human Rights Defenders and Journalists was a key tool to guarantee the safety and integrity of women human rights defenders and journalists. As of April 2025, it had a total of 2,341 people, including female journalists, human rights defenders and their family members.

The Mexican State was sensitive to cases of disappearance of persons, including women. In 2019, the National Search Commission was created and, for the first time, a National Registry of Missing and Unlocated Persons was developed. With the Attorney General’s Office and the State Prosecutors’ Offices, visits had been made to expert service institutions, temporary protection centres, cemeteries and shelters, to carry out human identification processes and interventions to recover remains deposited in mass graves. The Mexican State continued with the search actions to locate all these people and had undertaken dialogue with almost 200 collectives of relatives of disappeared persons, with multiple Government institutions.

TERESA RAMOS ARREOLA, Head of the National Centre for Gender Equity, Sexual and Reproductive Health of Mexico, said 100 commitments had been made for the President’s six-year term, including the Care Programme from the first 1,000 days of life, which guaranteed access to women’s health services, especially reproductive health, bodily autonomy, and the prevention of gender violence. In Mexico, contraception was free and 24 of the country’s 32 states had decriminalised abortion. A technical note had been issued which outlined the obligation of the health sector to have available personnel and the necessary technical capacities to provide safe abortion services.

YANETH DEL ROSARIO CRUZ GÓMEZ, Representative of Mexico’s National Council of Indigenous Peoples, said the reform of the second article of the Constitution, published in September 2024, should be celebrated. It constituted a historic advance in the recognition of indigenous peoples as rights holders, with legal recognition and their own assets. However, the implementation of these rights was a challenge. It was urgent for indigenous rights to be effectively implemented.

Indigenous and Afro-Mexican women were developing the general law on the rights of indigenous and Afro-Mexican peoples. The resources allocated to indigenous peoples and communities, through the Contribution Fund for Social Infrastructure for Indigenous and Afro-Mexican Peoples, were welcomed.

MARTHA LUCÍA MICHER CAMARENA, Federal Senator and President of the Commission for Gender Equality of the Senate of the Republic, said in Mexico, they had a parity legislative power; there were 14 female governors in 32 states. In December 2024, amendments were approved to various secondary laws, including the general law for equality between women and men; the general law on women’s access to a life free of violence; the National Code of Criminal Procedure; and the general law of the national public security system, among others. Between 2021 and 2024, key legislative reforms were also adopted, including amendments to the Federal Penal Code and 22 local penal codes that now criminalised acid attacks, as well as other types of violence, within the criminal category of family violence.

MÓNICA SOTO, Presiding Magistrate of the Electoral Tribunal of the Judicial Branch of the Federation, said the Electoral Tribunal of the Judicial Branch of the Federation had issued rulings to seek balanced representation in the Government. In 2024, the first parity federal Congress was constituted, after 108 years as an independent Republic. Despite this, there were significant challenges, with only 28 per cent of municipal presidencies headed by women. In many cases, violations of their rights persisted.

Gender-based political violence against women continued to be a reality. However, in a historical precedent in 2021, the Superior Chamber of the Court annulled the election results in Iliatenco, Guerrero for gender-based political violence against an indigenous woman. Authorities had been trained, and guides and protocols had been issued for judgment with a gender perspective in electoral matters and, in May 2024, the Specialised Ombudsman’s Office for the Care of Women was created.

MARYCARMEN COLOR VARGAS, Director of Gender Equality of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation, said the Supreme Court of Justice had issued a protocol for judging with a gender perspective, which was updated in 2020. To ensure its implementation, the Court and the Council of the Federal Judiciary had deployed a training strategy with case law notebooks, manuals, thematic notes, specialised works, and self-management courses. To date, 59 per cent of federal civil servants had completed mandatory training in gender and human rights. The Comprehensive Inclusion Policy had been adopted, which increased the participation of women at the highest judicial levels from 20 per cent to 31 per cent.

CITLALLI HERNÁNDEZ MORA, Secretary, Women’s Secretariat of Mexico and head of the delegation, said Mexico reaffirmed at the highest level its commitment to this Committee, to peace, and to the fight against discrimination against women and girls in all their diversity.

Questions by a Committee Expert

YAMILA GONZÁLEZ FERRER, Committee Expert and Country Rapporteur, said Mexico was a great country which faced colossal challenges. Mexico should be congratulated on electing its first female President in its history, and the Committee recognised the State’s decision to adopt a feminist foreign policy, as well as the 2024 constitutional reform that incorporated the right to substantive equality, a life free from violence, and decent care. The Committee also welcomed the constitutionalisation of the National Care System, the ratification of International Labour Organization Convention 189 on domestic work, and the progressive decriminalisation of abortion in several states.

However, there were several issues. The National Council to prevent discrimination seemed to have been weakened and seemed to lack power to strengthen itself; what had been done to strengthen this institution? What steps had been taken to put in place criminal legislation which provided legal certainty for women? What measures had the State taken to strengthen the independence of the National Human Rights Commission? What help had it provided to women searching for the disappeared?

What mechanisms did the State put in place to guarantee an effective, gender-sensitive judicial response? Were there interpreters available in indigenous languages? Were there reparations available for victims of gender crimes? What measures were being planned to ensure elected judges had knowledge to judge with a gender perspective? Could statistics be provided on the fast-track and pretrial procedure, to illustrate how female victims had benefitted from these changes? Had the performances of judges who had been trained been assessed?

Responses by the Delegation

The delegation said that since 2018, the country had been experiencing deep seated change, including in the public administration system. Mexico was a federal republic with 32 different constitutional bodies. It was important to mention the inclusion of discrimination in article 1 of Mexico’s Constitution. The law on equality between men and women included a new law on discrimination. There was a worsening situation for women in Mexico. In non-progressive States, the situation was worse for women. This was due to religious ideas, which impacted women’s sexual and reproductive health rights.

Mexico had special prosecution services in different bodies. These ensured that the highest standards were used when investigating cases of femicide. In cases of femicide, it was important to comply with standards relating to the crime. Protocols had been standardised for the crimes of femicide. The Tribunal of Judicial Discipline had been created to combat impunity. Lack of access to justice often took the form of impunity. The Women’s Secretariat was working with the Department of Prosecutions to create a network of female lawyers to provide advice and organise strategic lawsuits.

The National Human Rights Commission was a public independent body, with independence guaranteed in Mexican laws. It issued recommendations on human rights violations when there was a gender element, and had general recommendations on femicide. The Constitutional reform outlined the rights of indigenous peoples to be assisted by an interpreter, which must be taken into account to ensure appropriate defence in court.

The reform of the judiciary began with a desire to see parity in access, including equal representation of men and women as judges and magistrates. Currently, only 30 per cent of these positions were held by women. A judicial school would focus specifically on training. A guidebook was being created for gender-based judgements which would represent a crucial tool. There was one training programme which was binding for all members of the judiciary, and it was helping the State achieve progress.

The previous corruption of the judiciary did not allow women or relatives of killed women to defend themselves. Unofficial pretrial was used due to the corruption of the judiciary. Many judges would free perpetrators of femicide who would then threaten the relatives of murdered women.

Questions by Committee Experts

A Committee Expert congratulated Mexico on the election of the first female President, and recognised the steps taken to achieve gender equality, including the creation of the first Ministry for Women in 2024. What concrete steps was Mexico taking to strengthen effective coordination between national institutions on policies relating to the rights of women and girls, in light of technical and financial challenges; what concrete steps were being provided to strengthen their international capacity? How was it ensured that institutions received technical resources to support their work?

Another Expert said Parliament had a high level of women’s representation, and as heads of Government. However, while women comprised 50 per cent of candidates for mayoral elections, they were not being elected at the same rate, and faced barriers, including political violence and stereotypes. Why had Mexico not adopted temporary special measures in this regard? What temporary special measures had the State adopted to ensure parity in decision-making positions? What about for the heads of corporate and private companies? Would the State consider adopting a positive discrimination act?

Responses by the Delegation

The delegation said since 2018, Mexico had promoted the participation of women in the peace and security sector. Work had been carried out to mainstream gender issues in all budgets and Government actions. This year, half the budget was allocated for men, and half for women. The budget aimed to make up areas of weakness in inequality. The National Programme for Equality between men and women had mechanisms for follow-up and for impact assistance. A national system was in place for the prevention and eradication of violence. A national database included a recording or registration of incidents of violence of women and girls; this was a register which different bodies fed information into. The State aimed to have a living database which gave a clear overview of cases.

Mexico already had a law on equality. As part of the 2021 electoral process, the competitive block system had been used. As part of the block, three levels of competitiveness were established in different areas. This aimed to ensure women were candidates in places where they had a real chance of winning, which aimed to improve women’s participation at the local political levels. In Mexico, there was no quota in place, but legislation was amended to bring about equality between men and women in elections.

A network of defenders had been put in place throughout the country, and within the network, there was now a defenders training network. These people were selected to train and pass on their knowledge and skills, including on electoral justice. The recent 2024 election had resulted in 540 female local authority council leaders. The burden of proof had been reversed to ensure defendants had to provide they were not violent to women in the local council.

During the pandemic in 2021, the health system put in place special measures for women and girls to deal with the additional burden on them to provide caring in the home. This meant there had to be coordination on mental health services. There were now centres which provided services to workers in the mental health sector and users of the mental health system. Issues such as anxiety, post-traumatic stress, and depression, and their treatments, were key focuses. Mental health services had been provided during lockdowns.

There had been political party shenanigans when quotas were in place. Mexico had equality. Any electoral list needed to be composed of 50 per cent women and 50 per cent men. Positive discrimination and quotas were previously essential, but the State did not need them now because political equality had been achieved and Mexico was working to maintain it.

Questions by Committee Experts

An Expert said the Committee was concerned about the different definitions of feminicide, which meant many murders of women were not classified as feminicide. Currently just 20 per cent of female murders were classed as femicide. The persistence of stereotypes in the media, which mainly impacted minority women, was concerning. Nonconsensual surgeries which impacted women with disabilities and indigenous women were also concerning. What training was provided to the judiciary? Was its impact assessed? The search protocol for women and girls who had been disappeared was not effectively implemented throughout the country, which was concerning.

The Committee was also worried at the lack of inclusion of an intersectional approach in investigation protocols. The lack of access to information, including rulings on violence against women, was additionally concerning. The Committee was worried about the lack of a broad reparations policy for victims, particularly victims of violence or those who had been disappeared. Data was lacking in many areas, including for women and girls who had been disappeared.

What measures were put in place for companies running social media to ensure they sanctioned criminal postings on their websites? Could information be provided about women who were deprived of liberty?

A Committee Expert said the improvement of legislation on trafficking, including the general law to prevent, punish and eradicate trafficking in persons, was a positive step, as well as the creation of the Inter-Secretarial Commission on Trafficking, and the work of the Commission for Victim Support. Nevertheless, the lack of sufficient implementation and coordination persisted as well as inefficient investigations, and the complicity of authorities with organised crime related to trafficking.

What specific measures had the State adopted to prevent, investigate and punish trafficking in women for the purpose of sexual exploitation, and with what results? How was it ensured that trafficking policies did not criminalise or re-victimise victims? What actions had been developed against trafficking networks affecting migrant women and girls? What programmes existed to guarantee reparation and mental health care to victims? How were victims, who had been forced to engage in illegal acts by the cartels, protected? How would the State party maintain a gender focus in their security policy? Weapons in the United States were the main reasons for killings in the country. What follow-up measures did the Government consider in regard to United States manufacturers of weapons?

Responses by the Delegation

The delegation said 71 justice centres existed in the country. A programme was in place to shed light on situations of violence which took place in different parts of the country, and bring down the levels of violence nation-wide. In 2024, the Charter was created to protect citizens from trafficking in persons, published in multiple languages, as well as in indigenous languages, and disseminated throughout the Government and federal bodies. A manual on trafficking and an agreement had been developed, allowing local staff to be used to assist victims of femicide. There was now a legal obligation to disseminate all decisions; these were now publicly available. All persons were required to undergo mandatory training from the judiciary.

Mexico was aware that gender needed to be mainstreamed. Around 62 per cent of mothers seeking the disappeared were located in seven federal states of Mexico. Among the Constitutional reforms carried out, the comprehensive act on the national system of public security had been amended to create a special chapter on protection measures. The Women’s Secretariat was raising the visibility of these measures to prevent violence against women. The Mexican State had committed to developing a register to track orphans who were victims of femicide. The State had been working on the harmonisation of the search protocols for women and girls. The coverage of the justice centres for women had been enlarged, and there were now almost 80 in operation.

The fast-track procedure for femicide should not be compared to impunity. This process was an opportunity to have access to truth, if the accused was convicted. It enabled important information to be secured to ensure no further information escaped the prosecution. The programme to combat trafficking was being updated this year.

Mexico had 33 criminal codes nationwide, due to the country’s federal makeup. In the national criminal procedure, there was one single definition; femicide was criminalised, with gender stipulated as a ground. Work had been undertaken on media violence, and several secondary laws which suppressed online and media violence had been amended. Anyone guilty of online violence was liable to be punished. The definition of femicide had been reworked, as had the measures to provide compensation to victims. Mexico had developed protection measures for victims of online and media violence, which was something no other country had done before.

Legal reforms and awareness campaigns had been put in place to eradicate forced marriage. It was essential to put in place a law which stipulated that marriage should only take place at the age of 18. It was vital to eradicate child marriage in indigenous communities. There had been a drop in this phenomenon of four per cent since 2018.

The State recognised the difficult situation of women in a mobility situation and the risk of gender-based violence. The right to apply for refugee status was recognised in Mexico and was supported by various agreements.

There was no militarisation of Mexico’s security system. It was acknowledged that violations had been committed by Mexico’s armed forces, and the State was committed to ensuring these events did not reoccur. Mexico would ensure that codes were in line, so all crimes were dealt with the same way across the whole country. The State would review communications and assess how femicide was reported, which could often lead to revictimisation of the victim. It was vital to combat impunity in order to combat violence.

Civil society organizations had been key in achieving progress in Mexico, including in the areas of digital violence. The State aimed to work together with social media platforms to prevent digital violence from occurring. Mexico was a victim of trafficking in weapons. It was essential for the State to continue to wage war on this phenomenon.

When considering how to classify crimes of femicide, the rulings related to several factors, including the relationship between the victim and the perpetrator. Criteria were now in place which mandated that any violent death of a woman was to be investigated as a femicide. It was vital to ensure the prosecution services were strengthened. There were now 40 prosecutors and around 100 people investigating cases of femicide. For 2024, there had been 2,564 first degree murders of women, as well as more than 800 femicides.

Questions by a Committee Expert

A Committee Expert said the Committee commended the State party’s achievements of guaranteeing equality in political and public life. Reforms had been implemented towards preventing and eliminating gender discrimination. This had resulted in a 43 per cent improvement in women’s public leadership positions. The Committee lauded the 2019 constitutional reform entitled “gender parity in everything”, which guaranteed the political rights of women towards certifying gender parity for all candidates for elected political office, including municipalities with indigenous and Afro-Mexican populations. Law 303 against violence was also lauded, which prevented male aggressors or those sentenced for violence from holding public office. However, concerns remained.

Could the State party outline existing measures to prevent political violence against women? What special measures had been adopted to ensure the political participation of indigenous women and other minority groups? What percentage of women heading embassies and multilateral organizations was held by traditionally marginalised women? What plans existed to combat women’s low levels of political participation and strengthen their participation in the community and social participation beyond elections?

Responses by the Delegation

The delegation said Mexico produced disaggregated data regarding the situation of women. There were 78 programmes desegregating data by gender. The national survey on domestic relationships provided information on violence against women at home. It reflected a falling trend in domestic violence. Concerning financial issues, according to data, more than 26 per cent of women now had increased access to financial products, including loans and credit. The State was using available data to design and monitor public policies which were evidence-based.

Around 200,000 firearms unlawfully entered Mexico every year. Mexico was awaiting the decision of the International Criminal Court of Justice on this. Trafficking in arms was a scourge in the country, and it was important to combat this. Gender gaps needed to be reduced in leadership roles. The most recent survey stated that women made up 37 per cent of the diplomatic core, only 25 per cent of whom were ministers. There were training programmes in place for public officials regarding political violence against women. Specialised meetings had been carried out to disseminate the rights of women, including those with disabilities, migrant women, and rural women. In connection with civil society, a network had been created with women human rights defenders, guaranteeing the participation of these groups in courts. It was mandatory to ensure parity in municipal bodies.

Questions by a Committee Expert

A Committee Expert welcomed the provision in the law which permitted the transmission of nationality to descendants, including children born abroad. What measures had the State adopted to ensure universal birth registration? Had rural offices for birth registration been established? What measures had been adopted to overcome barriers that indigenous women faced when they sought to register their children? How was access to identity documents ensured? What measures had been taken to facilitate the return of Mexican citizens to Mexico and guarantee their access to identity papers?

Responses by the Delegation

The delegation said coordination groups had been established with the state civil registry, and registration campaigns had been launched. Mobile units addressed issues regarding the registration of migrant births. There was no restriction on the status of a migrant person, whether documented or undocumented, to process their application to have access to services.

Questions by a Committee Expert

A Committee Expert commended Mexico for progress made in the area of education, including the education act which recognised the right to secular, free, inclusive education, which was gender and human rights based. The State party was encouraged to continue and consolidate these efforts. What measures were underway to guarantee access to education? What was Mexico doing to ensure that gender equality was truly maintained in school curricula? What percentage of the educational budget was set aside for gender-based programmes? How were their impacts assessed?

The Committee noted with concern the high school drop-out rates due to pregnancy and violence. The ongoing persistence and increase of violence against women and adolescents, at all educational levels, was also concerning, particularly high levels of sexual violence. What measures had Mexico taken to guarantee education for pregnant teenagers and to prevent them from leaving school? How was it ensured that comprehensive sexual education was provided at all levels and in all states? Was there a plan to ensure the eradication of gender-based violence in schools? What measures was the State taking to guarantee standardisation and the enforcement of penalties?

Responses by the Delegation

The delegation said the new school model was based on the gender perspective, and the new sexual education syllabus had been created under this model. In 2024, Mexico significantly invested in the training of teachers, as part of the national strategy to deal with and prevent teenage pregnancy. This also focused on keeping teenagers who were pregnant in school. A programme called violence-free schools supported people working in schools. A protocol had been ratified to ensure the referral, channelling, follow-up and prevention of sexual violence in schools.

School dropout rates had fallen by 75 per cent for basic education, 26 per cent for secondary education, and 18 per cent in further education. Mexico had invested just over 500,000 dollars on school infrastructure. A national strategy was in place to prevent early pregnancy and there had been a 10 per cent drop in early pregnancy in Mexico over the past three years. Particular focus was paid to rural and isolated areas, where the issue was connected to others such as forced marriage. Schools feeding programmes offered food and support to Afro and indigenous students. There were also scholarships available for higher education.

Questions by a Committee Expert

A Committee Expert said the Government had adopted gender responsive labour reforms which promoted women’s access to employment, which was commendable. However, the majority of women were concentrated in the informal market, and only 25 per cent of managers were women in private and public sectors. Women also faced sexual harassment and threats in the workplace.

What actions had Mexico taken to close the gender wage gap between women and men? How could women be helped to improve their digital literacy to start their own businesses and ensure employment? How was it ensured that women employed in the domestic, care and agricultural sectors enjoyed social security and paid care benefits? How could indigenous women, women with disabilities, and migrant women have access to paid employment and social security? What complaints mechanisms were in place for women in the labour market?

Responses by the Delegation

The delegation said a programme was in place for rural and agricultural workers and temporary workers, with more than 20,000 women enrolled. A programme had been put in place for domestic workers, with 60,000 domestic workers enrolled. Nearly 200,000 persons benefitted from childcare schemes. Legislation had been drafted allowing for pregnant persons to ask to be placed back on their post when they returned to work. Short-term contracts were available for pregnant persons, which had to be extended after maternity leave had been taken.

A pilot project was being developed in Mexico, and legislation had been promulgated on rights for domestic workers. Mexico had made progress in the areas of health, education and welfare. A new minimum wage policy had been instigated to ensure a decent wage to those who earned the least. The gender pay gap had been reduced by 29 per cent at the local level between 2019 and 2024. The minimum wage for workers in border areas with the United States had increased significantly. Over the past six years, there had been an 18.7 per cent increase in the number of women covered by social security systems. In 2022, an agreement was struck between the private and public sector which aimed to monitor and assess the gender pay gap.

Questions by a Committee Expert

A Committee Expert said since the last meeting with Mexico, there had been significant progress in sexual and reproductive health, but challenges still remained. How was care for women guaranteed in State hospitals? Why did vaccination coverage dramatically drop from 100 per cent to 28 per cent to 2021? What was the reason for the increase in breast cancer cases in the country? What was the State doing to target women’s health?

Mexico should be commended for progress made in legalising abortion; however, it had still not been decriminalised in nine jurisdictions. Care services for women who had chosen to have an abortion due to rape were still linked to the judicial system. Some young children were detained because they had had an abortion. How was the State party planning to resolve these challenges? How did the State intend to address issues such as hostile health workers or access to modern contraception?

How would the State combat the forced sterilisation of indigenous women and those with disabilities? Had there been reparations for victims? What measures were being taken to ensure a gender perspective when assessing the disabilities of women? How could women who were victims of gender-based violence have access to mental health services without stigmatisation? Were there special services for the rehabilitation of children whose mothers were victims of violence?

Responses by the Delegation

The State was revising the law to ensure that cases of rape were not linked to the judicial system. It did not need to be proven that sexual violence had taken place to have access to a safe abortion. The federal system continued to work with the nine states where abortion had not been decriminalised. All contraception products were free and provided by the health care system for anyone who required them. Mexico was reviewing all informed consent in relation to the health system to ensure they were accessible to persons with disabilities, and to allow anyone to have full control over decisions being taken or any procedure recommended for them.

The new health system guaranteed all women had the same quality, standardised care throughout the country. One of the emblematic programmes of the new administration covered treatment for the elderly and persons with disabilities. Thousands of doctors and nurses had been recruited and went door to door seeking out these people and helping them to create a medical file to receive the care they needed. More than 80 justice centres provided free psychological and counselling services. The State needed to recruit additional specialised healthcare workers to bolster mental health services.

Mexico was working closely with offices that defended the rights of children and adolescents to enable them to identify children and adolescents at risk in all areas. Guidelines had been issued in February this year, focusing on obstetric violence. No woman in Mexico was in prison because she had carried out an abortion. An amnesty had been declared last year for anyone in prison for this reason. The State had been working to ensure all these women were released.

Questions by a Committee Expert

A Committee Expert commended the State party on its notable initiatives to advance the economic and social benefits of women, including the microcredits for wellbeing programme, with over 70.5 per cent of the 1.25 million loans allocated to women. Nonetheless, their impact was limited. Mexico had the lowest rate of women’s economic participation in the region and would not reach gender parity on corporate boards until 2052. What plans were in place to integrate unpaid care and domestic work into macroeconomic frameworks? Were women non-governmental organizations consulted to capture their views and voices in the design?

What measures were in place to increase female leadership in economic sectors, financial portfolios, and procurement opportunities? How were women, particularly indigenous, Afro-Mexican, rural and migrant women, and women with disabilities benefiting from targeted economic interventions? What concrete plans existed to expand women’s participation in sports leadership? Were there gender targets within the investment plan and the sovereign wealth fund? The State should be commended on the act which regulated the digital sector. Was there data available on the level of reparations provided by companies regarding violations of women’s rights?

Responses by the Delegation

The delegation said Mexico aimed to boost domestic trade through a number of credit lines, and aimed to empower workers economically. The President had created the very first cooperative with the cleaners in the Presidential Palace. Significant progress had been recorded in the reduction of poverty.

There had been a 12 percent increase in the income of rural women. There had been a financial transfer to women between the ages of 60 and 64. Women athletes earned up to 500 per cent less than men for the same sport. An initiative had been developed to ensure that women who were professional sports persons were entitled to a basic wage, which so far did not exist for female athletes. Around 5,403 economic projects had been supported by the State to drive forward activities for productive education for communities and regions. This year, Mexico would be creating 200 childcare centres to ensure that women, particularly rural and indigenous women, did not have to leave their job to care for their children.

All economic projects had a gender-based approach. Everything began with consultations with the community. Many new governmental funds were earmarked for the fostering of the participation of women in rural areas, including for land titles.

Questions by a Committee Expert

A Committee Expert asked if the Mexico City law for the murder of trans people for reasons of identity would be extended to all 32 states? Would the ratification of the new United Nations Cybercrime Convention of 2025 be considered? While Mexico had seen an 18 per cent reduction in rural poverty, this issue persisted. How would the plan developed address rural poverty? Would rural women be able to overcome cultural taboos to land ownership?

Around 46.1 per cent of those in pretrial detention were women. Women were sometimes kept in prison awaiting sentencing for many years. How would the State strengthen their due process rights in this regard? How would the State bring a survivor-centred approach to justice for the disappeared and their families? It was acknowledged that the President had committed her office to addressing enforced disappearance; however, it was important to bring a gender perspective to this.

Responses by the Delegation

The delegation said more than 10 million people had come out of poverty over the past seven years, due to the social policies in place specifically targeting rural and indigenous areas. Mexico had social protection caravans, ensuring protection and advice was taken to women in different areas. Training was provided to rural women and they were given special tools and knowledge to exercise their land rights. The State had reached the goal to issue 150,000 land titles.

Special gynaecological and trauma services had been provided for women in prisons. There was special care for pregnant women in prison and children detained with their mothers. A mechanism was in place to follow-up on cases of torture. The Public Defender had carried out 5,600 visits to female detainees, and ensured that measures they had implemented had yielded results, including special care for trans women. Lengthy pre-trial detention periods had to be overseen by a court. Mexico had stated at the Conference of States parties that they did not agree with the implementation of a declaration which rid the Convention against Enforced Disappearances of its meaning. This was a unilateral decision by the Committee.

Questions by a Committee Expert

A Committee Expert asked what was being done to help women facing intersectional discrimination to claim their rights in court? What would be done to harmonise indigenous rules with gender equality? What had been the impact of efforts targeting law enforcement authorities? What were the plans for the future to make family judges and lawyers, social workers and local authorities fully aware of women’s rights? The Committee commended Mexico for positive trends in combatting child marriage. What was being done to raise awareness about the minimum age of marriage and further improve respect for the prohibition of early marriage?

Responses by the Delegation

The delegation said Mexico had made constitutional reforms and reforms to secondary law to protect all women in their diversity, including migrant women, domestic workers, and indigenous women. A lot of progress had been made in protecting the intersectional rights of women. A court had noted that it was mainly women who had caring responsibilities, and the State was focusing on the situation on the division of labour. Measures had been taken to provide information in indigenous languages.

Closing Remarks

CITLALLI HERNÁNDEZ MORA, Secretary, Women’s Secretariat of Mexico and head of the delegation, commended the Committee for its work and the Experts for their questions and comments. All the different sectors of the State were involved in drafting the report. Mexico had made progress but there were areas where challenges remained. Mexico had a striving civil society and a strong feminist movement, as well as the first woman President. The Committee’s recommendations were very important for the Government, and the dialogue had been an enriching experience. Mexico was committed to changing the lives of all women in the country.

NAHLA HAIDAR, Committee Chair, said she had been privileged to meet the President of Mexico and was hopeful about her vision. It was an exceptional opportunity for the world to have a female in this position. Ms. Haidar thanked Mexico for the constructive dialogue which had provided further insight into the situation of women and girls in the country.

___________

Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media;
not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

CEDAW25.0013E

MIL OSI United Nations News –

June 19, 2025
MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Staff Completes 2025 Article IV Mission to Zimbabwe
Source: IMF – News in Russian

June 18, 2025

End-of-Mission press releases include statements of IMF staff teams that convey preliminary findings after a visit to a country. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF’s Executive Board for discussions and decision.

Harare, Zimbabwe: An International Monetary Fund (IMF) staff team led by Mr. Wojciech Maliszewski visited Harare from June 4 to June 18, 2025, to conduct the 2025 Article IV Consultation.

At the conclusion of the IMF mission, Mr. Maliszewski issued the following statement:

“Zimbabwe is experiencing a degree of macroeconomic stability despite lingering policy challenges. Following successive bouts of hyperinflation over the past few years, more disciplined policies—including halting and transferring to the Treasury the quasi-fiscal operations (QFOs) of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) and tighter monetary policy despite fiscal pressures—have helped stabilize the local currency (the ‘ZiG’) and reduce inflation. Growth this year is recovering following a sharp slowdown in 2024, which was affected by a drought that lowered agricultural output by 15 percent. Electricity production also fell, and declining prices for platinum and lithium weighed on the mining output. During the first half of 2025, better climate conditions and historically high gold prices have boosted agricultural and mining activity, strengthening the current account and contributing to the recovery, with growth projected at 6 percent in 2025.

“Buoyed by the growth recovery and policy measures—a reduction in VAT tax reliefs, increased fees and levies, taxation of the COVID public servant allowance, and steps to reduce smuggling—revenue ratio increased sharply to 18 percent of GDP. That said, fiscal pressures intensified in 2024 and in the first months of 2025 as higher revenues proved insufficient to meet growing spending needs. These came notably from higher public sector wages, capital outlays related to a SADC summit, debt servicing costs on past QFOs by the RBZ taken over by the Treasury, and servicing liabilities related to the acquisition of assets for the Mutapa Investment Fund. The fiscal deficit was financed by T-bills issuance and direct borrowing from the RBZ’s overdraft facility to service debt, contributing to the expansion of domestic liquidity and an overnight drop in the value of the ZiG in September 2024, and a significant buildup of expenditure arrears that continued into 2025.

“Following the overnight drop in the value of the ZiG, inflation spiked in October 2024 then declined significantly as both the willing-buyer willing-seller (WBWS) and parallel market rates have since stabilized, helping to bring month-on-month inflation down to an average of 0.5 percent over the period February to May 2025. At the same time, the gap between the WBWS and parallel market rates has narrowed significantly, but remains at around 20 percent. In this context, the mission welcomed the repeal of Statutory Instrument 81A of 2024—which had mandated the formal sector to use the WBWS rate in the pricing of goods and services, contributing to an increase in dollarization and informality.

“To support the authorities’ stabilization efforts, key Article IV recommendations include: in the near term, fiscal policy actions to center on closing the financing gap without recourse to monetary financing and further domestic arrears buildup, while safeguarding social spending, and delivering a durable fiscal adjustment in the longer term; monetary and FX policy to focus on supporting a transition to stable national currency, with an effective monetary policy framework and market-determined exchange rate policy; and, to boost growth, structural and economic governance reforms. In this context, policy priorities include:
- Fiscal. Closing a substantial fiscal financing gap for 2025 in a way consistent with available sustainable and non-inflationary financing. This would require rationalizing spending and increasing the effectiveness of the authorities’ strategy to run a cash budget through better planning and stronger political commitment to control spending. This would also require strengthening the public spending commitment control system to avoid further arrears accumulation; and a close monitoring of domestic arrears (including through an audit of remaining arrears). The 2026 Budget will be critical to establish a policy track record, and measures will be needed to close the fiscal gap in 2026. Over the medium term, fiscal adjustment should be accompanied by fiscal-structural policies to strengthen public financial management (PFM), expenditure controls, and budget credibility.
- Monetary and FX. The mission recommends improving the functioning of the WBWS market through a more transparent price-setting mechanism and by gradually replacing surrender requirements with a requirement to convert export proceeds directly into the market through Authorized Dealers, while focusing the RBZ’s FX interventions to managing excessive volatility in the exchange rate. Monetary policy can be enhanced by the introduction of an effective deposit facility at the RBZ, followed by fully introducing indirect market instruments and phasing out direct instruments. In the longer-term, a comprehensive package of macroeconomic, financial, and structural policies should be pursued to allow for a gradual relaxation of other Capital Flow Management Measures (CFMs) and elimination of undesirable exchange restrictions noted by the Article VIII mission.
- Mutapa Investment Fund and State-owned enterprises (SOEs). To mitigate fiscal risks, the mission recommends strengthening the governance framework for the Mutapa Investment Fund—including strengthening its reporting, audit, disclosure, and oversight requirements in line with international best practices—and the overall public sector transparency and reporting.
“The authorities have also announced their plan to transition to a mono-currency system by 2030. The mission emphasized the need to continue strengthening the monetary and FX market framework in line with IMF staff recommendations. This should be complemented by measures to enhance the demand for ZiG in the domestic economy—most notably, increasing the share of Treasury’s operations (revenues and expenditures) in ZiG. To reduce any uncertainty weighing on financial intermediation, the authorities should provide more clarity on the operational implications of the transition plan, including clarifying that the use of a mono-currency will be limited to domestic transactions, allowing for bank deposits to remain denominated in both currencies.

“In the context of the requested SMP, IMF staff stands ready to resume discussions in due course once decisive steps have been taken by authorities to address the key policy issues highlighted by the mission.

“International reengagement remains critical for debt resolution and arrears clearance, which would open the door for access to external financing. In this context, the authorities’ reengagement efforts, through the Structured Dialogue Platform, are key for attaining debt sustainability and gaining access to concessional external financing.

“The IMF maintains an active engagement with Zimbabwe and continues to provide policy advice and extensive technical assistance in the areas of revenue mobilization, expenditure control, financial supervision, debt management, economic governance, as well as macroeconomic statistics. However, the IMF is currently precluded from providing financial support to Zimbabwe due to its unsustainable debt situation—based on the IMF’s Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)—and official external arrears. An IMF financial arrangement would require a clear path to comprehensive restructuring of Zimbabwe’s external debt, including the clearance of arrears and a reform plan that is consistent with durably restoring macroeconomic stability; enhancing inclusive growth; lowering poverty; and strengthening economic governance.

“IMF staff held meetings with His Excellency President Emmerson Mnangagwa; Minister of Finance, Economic Development and Investment Promotion Honorable Professor Mthuli Ncube, his Deputy Minister of Finance, Economic Development and Investment Promotion Honorable David Mnangagwa and his Permanent Secretary Mr. George Guvamatanga; Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Governor Dr. John Mushayavanhu; Mr. Willard Manungo, Deputy Chief Secretary to the President and Cabinet; other senior government and RBZ officials; honorable members of Parliament; and representatives of the private sector, civil society, and Zimbabwe’s development partners.

“The IMF staff would like to thank the Zimbabwean authorities and other stakeholders for constructive discussions and support during the 2025 Article IV consultation process.”

IMF Communications Department

MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Wafa Amr

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

@IMFSpokesperson

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/18/pr-25203-zimbabwe-imf-completes-2025-article-iv-mission

MIL OSI
MIL OSI Russia News –
June 19, 2025
MIL-OSI Russia: China criticizes EU Commission chief’s industrial policy remarks, calls for rejection of double standards

Translation. Region: Russian Federal

Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian –

Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

BEIJING, June 18 (Xinhua) — China’s Foreign Ministry on Wednesday expressed strong dissatisfaction and firm opposition to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s recent remarks on China’s industrial subsidy policies, calling her words factually inaccurate and filled with bias and double standards.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Guo Jiakun made the statement at a regular briefing in response to a journalist’s question about U. von der Leyen’s remarks at the G7 summit on June 16.

China’s industrial subsidy policy adheres to the principles of openness, fairness and compliance with established norms, and strictly abides by the rules of the World Trade Organization, Guo Jiakun emphasized. According to him, China’s industrial development relies on the advantages of consistent technological innovation, a complete supply chain system, full-fledged market competition and abundant labor resources, which are due to the country’s actual capabilities rather than subsidies.

As the diplomat emphasized, China’s new energy production capacity makes a significant contribution to the global fight against climate change and the energy transition. The so-called “overcapacity” problem, he noted, is essentially a projection of individual countries’ concerns about their own competitiveness and market share, which they intend to use as a pretext to justify protectionist measures.

The official representative pointed out that in recent years the European Union has been continuously implementing industrial policy measures, providing a significant amount of subsidies to support European enterprises, and even openly offering to give preference to purchasing products from European manufacturers.

The EU plans to provide more than €1.44 trillion in various subsidies from 2021 to 2030, with more than €300 billion already provided by 2024, Guo Jiakun said, citing incomplete statistics.

According to him, at a time when the EU is striving to stimulate economic growth and increase competitiveness, it needs to abandon double standards and move towards greater openness in cooperation.

In the 50 years since the establishment of diplomatic relations, cooperation between China and the EU has yielded fruitful results and brought tangible benefits to both sides, the official said, assuring that China, while continuing to firmly adhere to high-level opening up, will continue to provide European companies with its vast market and development opportunities.

China hopes to strengthen communication and coordination with the European side and properly handle trade differences to achieve win-win results and common development, Guo Jiakun said. At the same time, he added, China firmly opposes any attempt to undermine its right to development or sacrifice Chinese interests for its own gains. –0–

MIL OSI Russia News –

June 19, 2025

MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Concludes 2025 Article IV Consultation with Iceland

Source: IMF – News in Russian

June 18, 2025

Growth decelerated in 2024 but is expected to rise to 1.6 percent in 2025 and 2.2 percent in 2026, while inflation is projected to decline to the Central Bank of Iceland’s 2.5 percent target in the second half of 2026. The direct impact of escalating global trade tensions is projected to be limited.
The authorities’ plans to turn the fiscal deficit in 2024 into a surplus by 2028 are appropriate given the need to rebuild buffers; details on the planned fiscal measures to achieve these targets have enhanced the credibility of the consolidation. Monetary policy is suitably tight given still elevated inflation, but the monetary stance should be reduced as inflation declines. Efforts to raise foreign exchange reserve coverage are welcome.
Investments in physical and human capital, alongside continued efforts to promote innovation and reduce skills mismatches are needed to support medium-term growth. Taxation can play a supportive role in reducing housing market imbalances.

Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed the Article IV Consultation for Iceland.[1] The authorities have consented to the publication of the Staff Report prepared for this consultation.[2]

The economy decelerated in 2024 to 0.5 percent due largely to weak exports from a disappointing fishing season and constraints on energy supply that curtailed aluminum production. Growth is expected to rebound to 1.6 percent in 2025 and 2.2 percent in 2026, driven by a recovery in exports, higher real wages, and continued monetary easing that more than offsets the impact of a moderately contractionary fiscal impulse. The impact of escalating global trade tensions is projected to be limited given that most goods exports are destined for Europe. Inflation is expected to gradually decline to the Central Bank of Iceland’s 2.5 percent target in the second half of 2026. Medium-term prospects are favorable, with continued diversification of the economy toward higher value-added export-oriented sectors anticipated to bolster productivity growth and inflows of foreign labor expected to support a modest increase in employment growth.

Risks to growth are tilted to the downside while risks to inflation are broadly balanced. In particular, the impact of rising global trade tensions could be larger than anticipated if tariffs are extended to currently exempted items (e.g., pharmaceuticals) or if a reduction in travel to and from the US negatively affects tourism. Inflation could increase if trade tensions trigger supply disruptions or capital outflows, if a premature loosening of monetary policy further de-anchors inflation expectations, or as result of second-round effects from higher wage growth. Conversely, capital inflows could result in an appreciation of the exchange rate that would weaken competitiveness and put downward pressure on inflation.

Executive Board Assessment[3]

Executive Directors agreed with the thrust of the staff appraisal. They welcomed the prudent macroeconomic policies, which have helped to reduce imbalances. While noting that medium‑term growth prospects are favorable, Directors observed that risks are tilted to the downside, notably from rising trade tensions. They emphasized the need to ensure macroeconomic stability and gradually rebuild fiscal buffers, while supporting stronger growth and reducing vulnerability to shocks.

Directors welcomed the ambitious fiscal targets and the improved transparency and credibility around the planned consolidation. They highlighted that increased infrastructure spending would help to close gaps in transport and energy and bolster growth prospects. Directors saw merit in implementing additional measures, if necessary, to achieve fiscal objectives. Noting the need to reduce procyclicality in fiscal policy, Directors supported the planned activation of revised fiscal rules in 2026. They also recommended measures to strengthen the Fiscal Council and increase the coverage and frequency of fiscal data.

Directors noted that price pressures remain elevated and agreed that tight monetary policy remained appropriate. They encouraged the Central Bank of Iceland (CBI) to gradually loosen the policy stance as inflation declines towards target and expectations become reanchored. Directors saw merit in transitioning to a more forecast‑based inflation targeting framework as uncertainty declines. Noting the importance of increasing reserves to more prudent levels, Directors welcomed the CBI’s decision to commence regular purchases of foreign exchange.

Directors welcomed that systemic risks in the financial sector are contained. They highlighted the need to remain vigilant to potential vulnerabilities in the housing market and the corporate sector, and to continue strengthening operational resilience. Directors saw scope to ease macroprudential policies should systemic risks recede as anticipated. While welcoming the progress on implementing FSAP recommendations, Directors urged further efforts to enhance pension fund governance, strengthen AML/CFT supervision of banks, and safeguard the independence and effectiveness of the CBI’s supervisory activities.

Directors emphasized the importance of reforms to bolster productivity and diversify the economy, including by improving infrastructure and supporting innovation. Important measures include reducing skill mismatches, maximizing the efficiency of R&D incentives, and promoting AI while mitigating related risks. Directors welcomed plans to increase housing supply and improve housing affordability.

It is expected that the next Article IV consultation with Iceland will be held on the standard 12‑month cycle.

Table 1. Iceland: Selected Economic Indicators, 2024–30
	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030
		Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.
	(Percentage change unless otherwise indicated)
National Accounts (constant prices)
Gross domestic product	0.5	1.6	2.2	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4
Total domestic demand	2.3	1.5	0.6	2.2	2.4	2.4	2.3
Private consumption	0.6	2.2	2.4	2.5	2.6	2.6	2.6
Public consumption	2.5	1.5	1.3	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
Gross fixed investment	7.5	4.1	-3.2	2.8	3.2	3.2	3.2
Net exports (contribution to growth)	-1.8	-0.3	1.6	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.2
Exports of goods and services	-1.2	3.3	3.0	3.3	3.1	3.0	3.2
Imports of goods and services	2.7	3.9	-0.7	2.7	2.9	2.9	2.9
Output gap (percent of potential output)	1.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Selected Indicators
Unemployment rate (percent of labor force)	3.4	3.9	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
Employment	4.1	0.4	0.9	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1
Labor productivity	-3.3	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3
Real wages	0.5	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3
Nominal wages	6.4	4.9	4.4	3.8	3.8	3.9	3.8
Consumer price index (average)	5.9	3.5	3.0	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5
Consumer price index (end period)	4.7	3.6	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5
ISK/€ (average)	164	…	…	…	…	…	…

Money and Credit (end period)
Credit to nonfinancial private sector	8.1	5.6	5.6	5.6	5.6	5.6	5.7
Central bank 7 day term deposit rate 1/	8.50	7.50	…	…	…	…	…
	(Percent of GDP unless otherwise indicated)
General Government Finances 2/	(Percent of GDP unless otherwise indicated)
Revenue	42.8	43.2	42.4	42.4	42.4	42.5	42.6
Expenditure	46.3	44.5	43.2	42.9	42.8	42.7	42.7
Overall balance 3/	-3.5	-1.3	-0.7	-0.5	-0.3	-0.2	-0.1
Cyclically-adjusted primary balance	-1.5	0.7	0.9	1.2	1.4	1.6	1.7
Structural primary balance 4/	0.7	1.1	1.1	1.3	1.4	1.6	1.7
Gross debt	59.1	47.7	45.4	43.6	41.7	39.9	38.1

Balance of Payments
Current account balance	-2.5	-2.6	-0.5	0.0	0.4	0.7	1.0
Gross external debt	67.0	65.4	61.6	58.5	55.4	52.4	49.5
Sources: Central Bank of Iceland; Ministry of Finance; Statistics Iceland; and IMF staff projections.
1/ For 2025, policy rate as of May.
2/ In April 2025, an agreement was reached on the settlement of remaining outstanding liabilities in the IL Fund (HFF).
3/ For 2024, the deficit now includes 1.2 percent of GDP in costs related to the purchase of houses in Grindavík that in the 2024 Article IV were classified below the line due to uncertainty about the correct statistical treatment.
4/ Cyclically-adjusted primary balance excluding one offs.

[1] Under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country’s economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board.

[2] Under the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, publication of documents that pertain to member countries is voluntary and requires the member consent. The staff report will be shortly published on the www.imf.org/iceland page.

[3] At the conclusion of the discussion, the Managing Director, as Chairman of the Board, summarizes the views of Executive Directors, and this summary is transmitted to the country’s authorities. An explanation of any qualifiers used in summings up can be found here: http://www.IMF.org/external/np/sec/misc/qualifiers.htm.

IMF Communications Department

MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Boris Balabanov

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/18/pr-25201-iceland-imf-executive-board-concludes-2025-article-iv-consultation

MIL OSI

MIL OSI Russia News –

June 19, 2025

MIL-OSI Global: England is expanding free school meals – here’s what could happen if they were given to all children

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Sanghamitra Bandyopadhyay, Professor of Development Economics , Queen Mary University of London

Children in Jharkhand state, India, eating their midday meal at school. Mohammad Shahnawaz/Shutterstock

The UK government has announced an extension of free school meals in England to all children whose parents receive universal credit, in order to address child hunger and poverty.

The government claims that half a million more pupils will now have access to school lunches for free. The total number of children registered for free school meals in England is currently about 2.2 million, or about 26% of the total school population. In addition, all children in infant school, aged between four and seven, are entitled to receive a hot lunch at school.

But given the high rates of child poverty in the UK, and the value a decent meal provides, there is evidence that free school meals for all children could provide significant benefits in England.

The provision in Scotland and Wales is more generous: free school meals for children from primary one to five in Scotland (ages four to ten) and for all children in primary school in Wales. But other countries make provision for all children, in both primary and secondary education, to receive meals at school.

Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.

Child poverty in the UK continues to be historically high. In 2023-24, 3.4 million children – 23% of all children in the UK – were in relative income poverty. Incidence of child poverty is particularly acute in cities.

In the UK, the COVID-19 pandemic and Brexit resulted in a rise in unemployment. This in turn led to widespread instances of extreme poverty and child hunger. The lack of active policies in the UK to address child hunger, malnourishment and increasing childhood obesity has been widely criticised by the British Medical Association.

The UK’s experience of high levels of child poverty is in stark contrast with most other high-income countries. The UK ranked 37th out of 39 by child income poverty, ahead only of Turkey and Colombia, in 2023. In comparison, the UK’s adult poverty rate is close to the OECD average, ranking 23rd out of 39 high-income countries. This implies that child poverty can be high even if adult poverty levels are relatively low.

Global policy choices

Providing nutritious free school meals is a fundamental cornerstone of government policy to ensure child welfare. It’s used as a poverty alleviation measure all over the world. Almost half of the world’s school meals are free, feeding 418 million children.

Many of these programmes are based in developing countries. The world’s largest free school meal programme runs in India: the “mid-day meal scheme” feeds 125 million children aged six to 14 and costs the equivalent of £2 billion each year. Similar successful programmes are run in Brazil and some African countries, with another having recently been launched in Indonesia.

But schemes in Finland and Sweden also cover almost all school children.

There is a growing body of global evidence on the wider beneficial effects of free school meals on child poverty. Free school meals in India have resulted in higher cognitive outcomes. They have increased school enrolment and school attendance, and thus educational outcomes.

They have also been found to have an intergenerational effect. In India, fewer shorter children were born to women who had benefited from the country’s school food programme.

Nutritionally balanced school meals have proven health benefits.
Pixel-Shot/Shutterstock

Nutritionally balanced children’s school meals are also associated with lower incidence of obesity. Studies in the US and UK, for example, have shown universal provision is linked to lower obesity rates.

Research into the Swedish scheme has found that children who have free school meals with prescribed nutritional standards not only have higher educational attainment and better health outcomes in adulthood, but also higher incomes. Children from families in the lowest income quartile in Sweden who received free school meals for nine years increased their lifetime income by 6%.

Other tangible economic benefits include significant reductions in potential healthcare costs as a result of malnutrition and non-communicable diseases. A 2025 European Union report estimates the return from investment in school meal programmes is at least sevenfold, up to a possible €34 for every €1 spent.

While there is rich scientific and economic evidence that universal free school meals are immensely beneficial, a child’s access to nutrition and government support to obtain nourishment is also a fundamental human right. The School Meals Coalition is an international consortium of 108 countries to achieve free school meals for all by 2030. The UK is one of the few advanced countries not signed up to it.

Sanghamitra Bandyopadhyay does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. England is expanding free school meals – here’s what could happen if they were given to all children – https://theconversation.com/england-is-expanding-free-school-meals-heres-what-could-happen-if-they-were-given-to-all-children-258337

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

June 19, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: ICE worksite enforcement operation uncovers widespread identity theft affecting more than 100 victims across the nation
Source: US Immigration and Customs Enforcement

OMAHA, Neb. — A recent worksite enforcement operation led by U.S. immigration and Customs Enforcement revealed massive identity theft impacting unsuspecting U.S. citizens whose personal information was used by illegal aliens to gain unlawful employment at Glenn Valley Foods.

The ICE-led multiagency investigation uncovered approximately 70 illegal aliens who were using stolen Social Security numbers and identities to unlawfully obtain wages, health benefits and employment authorization, leaving more than 100 real victims to face devastating financial, emotional and legal consequences.

“There have been individuals who have gone on the record recently referring to the identity thieves we arrested last week as ‘good, hardworking, and honest,’” said Mark Zito, special agent in charge of Homeland Security Investigations Kansas City, which covers Omaha. “These so-called honest workers have caused an immeasurable amount of financial and emotional hardship for innocent Americans. If pretending to be someone you aren’t in order to steal their lives isn’t blatant, criminal dishonesty, I don’t know what is.”

Some examples of the impact of these stolen identities include:
- A healthcare provider was forced to deny medically necessary prescriptions to a victim in Pennsylvania after his identity was stolen. It was later determined that someone used the victim’s name and Social Security number to illegally gain employment and healthcare benefits based on fraudulent employment at Glenn Valley Foods.
- A disabled victim in Texas, who was unable to work, struggled to get their Social Security disability payments because an illegal alien was fraudulently using their identity and earning wages at Glenn Valley Foods.
- The IRS requested a victim in Colorado to repay more than $5,000 after their income was falsely increased due to an illegal alien stealing their identity and using it to work at Glenn Valley Foods.
- A full-time nursing student from Missouri lost their college tuition assistance because it was fraudulently reported that they earned too much money. The investigation revealed that an illegal alien at Glenn Valley Foods was using their Social Security number for employment. The same victim was also unable to renew their Missouri driver’s license, until HSI contacted the Department of Motor Vehicles on their behalf, because the alien who stole her identity has multiple unpaid traffic violations.
- A victim in California has been working for nearly 15 years to regain their identity and fix the financial damage done by an illegal alien who was working at Glenn Valley Foods.
“The criminals who stole these identities didn’t just break the law, they upended lives,” concluded Zito. “These victims aren’t faceless statistics; they’re real people who are being denied healthcare and have lost educational opportunities.”

The investigation is ongoing.

Members of the public with information about suspected immigration violations or related criminal activity are encouraged to contact the ICE Tip Line at 866-DHS-2-ICE (866-347-2423) or submit information online via the ICE Tip Form.

To schedule an interview please contact Public Affairs Officer Tanya Roman at Tanya.Roman@hsi.dhs.gov.

MIL OSI USA News –
June 19, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: ICE worksite enforcement operation uncovers widespread identity theft affecting more than 100 victims across the nation
Source: US Immigration and Customs Enforcement

OMAHA, Neb. — A recent worksite enforcement operation led by U.S. immigration and Customs Enforcement revealed massive identity theft impacting unsuspecting U.S. citizens whose personal information was used by illegal aliens to gain unlawful employment at Glenn Valley Foods.

The ICE-led multiagency investigation uncovered approximately 70 illegal aliens who were using stolen Social Security numbers and identities to unlawfully obtain wages, health benefits and employment authorization, leaving more than 100 real victims to face devastating financial, emotional and legal consequences.

“There have been individuals who have gone on the record recently referring to the identity thieves we arrested last week as ‘good, hardworking, and honest,’” said Mark Zito, special agent in charge of Homeland Security Investigations Kansas City, which covers Omaha. “These so-called honest workers have caused an immeasurable amount of financial and emotional hardship for innocent Americans. If pretending to be someone you aren’t in order to steal their lives isn’t blatant, criminal dishonesty, I don’t know what is.”

Some examples of the impact of these stolen identities include:
- A healthcare provider was forced to deny medically necessary prescriptions to a victim in Pennsylvania after his identity was stolen. It was later determined that someone used the victim’s name and Social Security number to illegally gain employment and healthcare benefits based on fraudulent employment at Glenn Valley Foods.
- A disabled victim in Texas, who was unable to work, struggled to get their Social Security disability payments because an illegal alien was fraudulently using their identity and earning wages at Glenn Valley Foods.
- The IRS requested a victim in Colorado to repay more than $5,000 after their income was falsely increased due to an illegal alien stealing their identity and using it to work at Glenn Valley Foods.
- A full-time nursing student from Missouri lost their college tuition assistance because it was fraudulently reported that they earned too much money. The investigation revealed that an illegal alien at Glenn Valley Foods was using their Social Security number for employment. The same victim was also unable to renew their Missouri driver’s license, until HSI contacted the Department of Motor Vehicles on their behalf, because the alien who stole her identity has multiple unpaid traffic violations.
- A victim in California has been working for nearly 15 years to regain their identity and fix the financial damage done by an illegal alien who was working at Glenn Valley Foods.
“The criminals who stole these identities didn’t just break the law, they upended lives,” concluded Zito. “These victims aren’t faceless statistics; they’re real people who are being denied healthcare and have lost educational opportunities.”

The investigation is ongoing.

Members of the public with information about suspected immigration violations or related criminal activity are encouraged to contact the ICE Tip Line at 866-DHS-2-ICE (866-347-2423) or submit information online via the ICE Tip Form.

To schedule an interview please contact Public Affairs Officer Tanya Roman at Tanya.Roman@hsi.dhs.gov.

MIL OSI USA News –
June 19, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: What happens when aid is cut to a large refugee camp? Kenyan study paints a bleak picture

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Olivier Sterck, Associate professor, University of Oxford

Humanitarian needs are rising around the world. At the same time, major donors such as the US and the UK are pulling back support, placing increasing strain on already overstretched aid systems.

Global humanitarian needs have quadrupled since 2015, driven by new conflicts in Sudan, Ukraine and Gaza. Added to these are protracted crises in Yemen, Somalia, South Sudan, and DR Congo, among others. Yet donor funding has failed to keep pace, covering less than half of the requested US$50 billion in 2024, leaving millions without assistance.

Notably, the US recently slashed billions of US dollars from global relief efforts. The slashed contributions once made up to half of all public humanitarian funding and over a fifth of the UN’s budget. Other donors have been cutting aid as well.

As funding shortfalls widen, humanitarian agencies increasingly face tough choices: reducing the scale of operations, pausing essential services, or cancelling programmes altogether. Disruptions to aid delivery have become a routine feature of humanitarian operations.

Yet few rigorous studies have provided hard evidence of the consequences for affected populations.

A recent study from one of the world’s largest refugee camps in Kenya fills this gap.

Our research team from the University of Oxford and the University of Antwerp was already studying Kakuma camp and then had an opportunity to see what happened when aid was cut. We observed the impact of a 20% aid cut that occurred in 2023.

The study reveals that cuts to humanitarian assistance had dramatic impacts on hunger and psychological distress, with cascading effects on local credit systems and prices of goods.

Kakuma refugee camp

Kakuma is home to more than 300,000 refugees, who mostly came from South Sudan (49%), Somalia (16%), and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (10%). They have been housed here since 1992. With widespread poverty, lack of income opportunities, and aid making up over 90% of household income, survival in the camp hinges on humanitarian support from UN organisations.

When the research began in late 2022, most refugees in Kakuma received a combination of in-kind and cash transfers from the World Food Programme. Transfers were worth US$17 per person per month, barely enough to cover the bare essentials: food, firewood and medicine.

Over the span of a year, the research team tracked 622 South Sudanese refugee households, interviewing them monthly to monitor how their living conditions evolved in response to the timing and level of aid they received. We also gathered weekly price data on 70 essential goods and conducted more than 250 in-depth interviews with refugees, shopkeepers, and humanitarian staff to understand the broader impacts.

Then came the cut. In July 2023, assistance was reduced by 20%, just as the research team was conducting its eighth round of data collection. This sudden reduction in humanitarian aid created a rare opportunity to assess the effects of an aid cut on both recipients and the markets they depend on.

Consequences of aid cut

The 20% cut in humanitarian aid had cascading effects, affecting not just hunger, but local credit systems, prices, and well-being.

1. Hunger got worse. As a Somali refugee interviewed by the researchers put it: “After the aid reduction, the lives of refugees become hard. That was the money sustaining them. […] Things are insufficient, and hunger is visible.”

Food insecurity was already widespread before the cut, with more than 90% of refugees classified as food insecure. Average caloric intake stood below 1,900 kcal per person per day – well under the World Food Programme’s 2,100 kcal target and about half the average daily calorie supply available to a US citizen.

Food insecurity further increased following the aid cut, with caloric intake falling by 145 kcal, a 7% decrease. The share of households eating one meal or less increased by 8 percentage points, from about 29% to 37%. At the same time, dietary diversity narrowed, indicating that households tried to mitigate the negative impacts of the aid cut by reducing the variety of foods they consumed.

2. Credit collapsed. As a refugee shopkeeper of Ethiopian origin reported: “When we give out credit we have a limit; since the aid is reduced, the credit is also reduced.”

Cash assistance in Kakuma is delivered through aid cards, which refugees routinely use as collateral to access food on credit. When transfers are delayed or unexpected expenses arise, refugees hand over their aid cards as a guarantee to trusted shopkeepers, allowing them to borrow food against next month’s aid.

But when assistance was cut, the value of this informal collateral plummeted. Retailers, fearing default, reduced lending or refused lending altogether. Informal credit from shopkeepers shrank by 9%. Many refugees reported being refused food on credit or having to repay past debt before receiving any new goods.

3. Households liquidated assets. With no access to credit, households began selling off possessions and drawing down food reserves. The average value of household assets fell by over 6% after the aid cut.

4. Psychological distress increased. The aid cut reduced self-reported sleep quality and happiness, indicating that reductions in aid go beyond physical impacts and also have psychological effects.

5. Prices fell. With reduced expenditure and purchasing power, the demand for food dropped, and food prices went down, partially offsetting the negative effects of the aid cut.

Implications

The study carries two major policy implications.

First, aid in contexts like Kakuma should not be treated as optional or discretionary, but as a structural necessity. It is the backbone of daily life. Mechanisms are needed to protect it from abrupt donor withdrawals.

Second, informal credit is not peripheral, it is central to economic life in refugee settings. In many camps, shopkeepers act as retailers and de facto financial institutions. When aid transfers serve as both income and collateral, cutting them risks collapsing this fragile credit system. Cash transfer programmes must therefore be designed with these dynamics in mind.

Olivier Sterck receives research funding from the IKEA Foundation, the World Bank, and The Research Foundation – Flanders (FWO).

Vittorio Bruni is affiliated with Oxford University

– ref. What happens when aid is cut to a large refugee camp? Kenyan study paints a bleak picture – https://theconversation.com/what-happens-when-aid-is-cut-to-a-large-refugee-camp-kenyan-study-paints-a-bleak-picture-259055

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

June 19, 2025
MIL-OSI Africa: What happens when aid is cut to a large refugee camp? Kenyan study paints a bleak picture

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Olivier Sterck, Associate professor, University of Oxford

Humanitarian needs are rising around the world. At the same time, major donors such as the US and the UK are pulling back support, placing increasing strain on already overstretched aid systems.

Global humanitarian needs have quadrupled since 2015, driven by new conflicts in Sudan, Ukraine and Gaza. Added to these are protracted crises in Yemen, Somalia, South Sudan, and DR Congo, among others. Yet donor funding has failed to keep pace, covering less than half of the requested US$50 billion in 2024, leaving millions without assistance.

Notably, the US recently slashed billions of US dollars from global relief efforts. The slashed contributions once made up to half of all public humanitarian funding and over a fifth of the UN’s budget. Other donors have been cutting aid as well.

As funding shortfalls widen, humanitarian agencies increasingly face tough choices: reducing the scale of operations, pausing essential services, or cancelling programmes altogether. Disruptions to aid delivery have become a routine feature of humanitarian operations.

Yet few rigorous studies have provided hard evidence of the consequences for affected populations.

A recent study from one of the world’s largest refugee camps in Kenya fills this gap.

Our research team from the University of Oxford and the University of Antwerp was already studying Kakuma camp and then had an opportunity to see what happened when aid was cut. We observed the impact of a 20% aid cut that occurred in 2023.

The study reveals that cuts to humanitarian assistance had dramatic impacts on hunger and psychological distress, with cascading effects on local credit systems and prices of goods.

Kakuma refugee camp

Kakuma is home to more than 300,000 refugees, who mostly came from South Sudan (49%), Somalia (16%), and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (10%). They have been housed here since 1992. With widespread poverty, lack of income opportunities, and aid making up over 90% of household income, survival in the camp hinges on humanitarian support from UN organisations.

When the research began in late 2022, most refugees in Kakuma received a combination of in-kind and cash transfers from the World Food Programme. Transfers were worth US$17 per person per month, barely enough to cover the bare essentials: food, firewood and medicine.

Over the span of a year, the research team tracked 622 South Sudanese refugee households, interviewing them monthly to monitor how their living conditions evolved in response to the timing and level of aid they received. We also gathered weekly price data on 70 essential goods and conducted more than 250 in-depth interviews with refugees, shopkeepers, and humanitarian staff to understand the broader impacts.

Then came the cut. In July 2023, assistance was reduced by 20%, just as the research team was conducting its eighth round of data collection. This sudden reduction in humanitarian aid created a rare opportunity to assess the effects of an aid cut on both recipients and the markets they depend on.

Consequences of aid cut

The 20% cut in humanitarian aid had cascading effects, affecting not just hunger, but local credit systems, prices, and well-being.

1. Hunger got worse. As a Somali refugee interviewed by the researchers put it: “After the aid reduction, the lives of refugees become hard. That was the money sustaining them. […] Things are insufficient, and hunger is visible.”

Food insecurity was already widespread before the cut, with more than 90% of refugees classified as food insecure. Average caloric intake stood below 1,900 kcal per person per day – well under the World Food Programme’s 2,100 kcal target and about half the average daily calorie supply available to a US citizen.

Food insecurity further increased following the aid cut, with caloric intake falling by 145 kcal, a 7% decrease. The share of households eating one meal or less increased by 8 percentage points, from about 29% to 37%. At the same time, dietary diversity narrowed, indicating that households tried to mitigate the negative impacts of the aid cut by reducing the variety of foods they consumed.

2. Credit collapsed. As a refugee shopkeeper of Ethiopian origin reported: “When we give out credit we have a limit; since the aid is reduced, the credit is also reduced.”

Cash assistance in Kakuma is delivered through aid cards, which refugees routinely use as collateral to access food on credit. When transfers are delayed or unexpected expenses arise, refugees hand over their aid cards as a guarantee to trusted shopkeepers, allowing them to borrow food against next month’s aid.

But when assistance was cut, the value of this informal collateral plummeted. Retailers, fearing default, reduced lending or refused lending altogether. Informal credit from shopkeepers shrank by 9%. Many refugees reported being refused food on credit or having to repay past debt before receiving any new goods.

3. Households liquidated assets. With no access to credit, households began selling off possessions and drawing down food reserves. The average value of household assets fell by over 6% after the aid cut.

4. Psychological distress increased. The aid cut reduced self-reported sleep quality and happiness, indicating that reductions in aid go beyond physical impacts and also have psychological effects.

5. Prices fell. With reduced expenditure and purchasing power, the demand for food dropped, and food prices went down, partially offsetting the negative effects of the aid cut.

Implications

The study carries two major policy implications.

First, aid in contexts like Kakuma should not be treated as optional or discretionary, but as a structural necessity. It is the backbone of daily life. Mechanisms are needed to protect it from abrupt donor withdrawals.

Second, informal credit is not peripheral, it is central to economic life in refugee settings. In many camps, shopkeepers act as retailers and de facto financial institutions. When aid transfers serve as both income and collateral, cutting them risks collapsing this fragile credit system. Cash transfer programmes must therefore be designed with these dynamics in mind.

– What happens when aid is cut to a large refugee camp? Kenyan study paints a bleak picture
– https://theconversation.com/what-happens-when-aid-is-cut-to-a-large-refugee-camp-kenyan-study-paints-a-bleak-picture-259055

MIL OSI Africa –

June 19, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: Ticks carry decades of history in each troublesome bite

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Sean Lawrence, Assistant Professor of History, West Virginia University

The black-legged tick, or deer tick, _Ixodes scapularis_, can transmit Lyme disease and other health hazards. U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

When you think about ticks, you might picture nightmarish little parasites, stalking you on weekend hikes or afternoons in the park.

Your fear is well-founded. Tick-borne diseases are the most prevalent vector-borne diseases – those transmitted by living organisms – in the United States. Each tick feeds on multiple animals throughout its life, absorbing viruses and bacteria along the way and passing them on with its next bite. Some of those viruses and bacteria are harmful to humans, causing diseases that can be debilitating and sometimes lethal without treatment, such as Lyme, babesiosis and Rocky Mountain spotted fever.

But contained in every bite of this infuriating, insatiable pest is also a trove of social, environmental and epidemiological history.

In many cases, human actions long ago are the reason ticks carry these diseases so widely today. And that’s what makes ticks fascinating for environmental historians like me.

Ticks can be tiny and hard to spot. This is an adult and nymph Ixodes scapularis on an adult’s index finger.
CDC

Changing forests fueled tick risks

During the 18th and 19th centuries, settlers cleared more than half the forested land across the northeastern U.S., cutting down forests for timber and to make way for farms, towns and mining operations. With large-scale land clearing came a sharp decline in wildlife of all kinds. Predators such as bears and wolves were driven out, as were deer.

As farming moved westward, Northeasterners began to recognize the ecological and economic value of trees, and they returned millions of acres to forest.

The woods regrew. Plant-eaters such as deer returned, but the apex predators that once kept their populations in check did not.

As a result, deer populations carrying borrelia burgdorferi, the bacterium that causes Lyme disease, grew rapidly. And with the deer came deer ticks (Ixodes scapularis). When a tick feeds on an infected deer, it can take up the bacteria. The tick isn’t harmed, but it can pass the bacteria to its next victim. In humans, Lyme disease can cause fever and fatigue, and if left untreated it can affect the nervous system.

The eastern U.S. became a global hot spot for tick-borne Lyme disease starting around the 1970s. Lyme disease affected over 89,000 Americans in 2023, and possibly many more.

Californians move into tick territory

For centuries, changing patterns of human settlements and the politics of land use have shaped the role of ticks and tick-borne illnesses within their environments.

In short, humans have made it easier for ticks to thrive and spread disease in our midst.

In California, the Northern Inner Coast and Santa Cruz mountain ranges that converge on San Francisco from the north and south were never clear-cut, and predators such as mountain lions and coyotes still exist there. But competition for housing has pushed human settlement deeper into wildland areas to the north, south and east of the city, reshaping tick ecology there.

A range map for the western black-legged tick.
National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases

While western black-legged ticks (Ixodes pacificus) tend to swarm in large forest preserves, the Lyme-causing bacterium is actually more prevalent in small, isolated patches of greenery. In these isolated patches, rodents and other tick hosts can thrive, safe from large predators, which need more habitat to move freely. But isolation and lower diversity also means infections are spread more easily within the tick’s host populations.

People tend to build isolated houses in the hills, rather than large, connected developments. As the Silicon Valley area south of San Francisco sprawls outward, this checkerboard pattern of settlement has fragmented the natural landscape, creating a hard-to-manage public health threat.

Fewer hosts, more tightly packed, often means more infected hosts, proportionally, and thus more dangerous ticks.

A tick’s mouth is barbed so it can hold on as it draws blood over hours.
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases

Six counties across these ranges, all surrounding and including San Francisco, account for 44% of recorded tick-borne illnesses in California.

A lesson from Texas cattle ranches

Domesticated livestock have also shaped the disease threat posed by ticks.

In 1892, at a meeting of cattle ranchers at the Stock Raiser’s Convention in Austin, Texas, Dr. B.A. Rogers introduced a novel theory that ticks were behind recent devastating plagues of Texas cattle fever. The disease had arrived with cattle imported from the West Indies and Mexico in the 1600s, and it was taking huge tolls on cattle herds. But how the disease spread to new victims had been a mystery.

A 1905 illustration of Rhipicephalus annulatus, a hard tick that causes cattle fever.
Nathan Banks, A treatise on the Acarina, or mites. Proceedings of the United States National Museum

Editors of Daniel’s Texas Medical Journal found the idea of ticks spreading disease laughable and lampooned the hypothesis, publishing a satire of what they described as an “early copy” of a forthcoming report on the subject.

The tick’s “fluid secretion, it is believed, is the poison which causes the fever … [and the tick] having been known to chew tobacco, as all other Texans do, the secretion is most probably tobacco juice,” they wrote.

Fortunately for the ranchers, not to mention the cows, the U.S. Department of Agriculture sided with Rogers. Its cattle fever tick program, started in 1906, curbed cattle fever outbreaks by limiting where and when cattle should cross tick-dense areas.

Engorged ticks feed on a calf’s ear.
Alan R Walker, CC BY-NC-SA

By 1938, the government had established a quarantine zone that extended 580 miles by 10 miles along the U.S.-Mexico border in South Texas Brush Country, a region favored by the cattle tick.

This innovative use of natural space as a public health tool helped to functionally eradicate cattle fever from 14 Southern states by 1943.

Ticks are products of their environment

When it comes to tick-borne diseases the world over, location matters.

Take the hunter tick (Hyalomma spp.) of the Mediterranean and Asia. As a juvenile, or nymph, these ticks feed on small forest animals such as mice, hares and voles, but as an adult they prefer domesticated livestock.

For centuries, this tick was an occasional nuisance to nomadic shepherds of the Middle East. But in the 1850s, the Ottoman Empire passed laws to force nomadic tribes to become settled farmers instead. Unclaimed lands, especially on the forested edges of the steppe, were offered to settlers, creating ideal conditions for hunter ticks.

As a result, farmers in what today is Turkey saw spikes in tick-borne diseases, including a virus that causes Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever, a potentially fatal condition.

Where to check for ticks and how to remove them.

It’s probably too much to ask for sympathy for any ticks you meet this summer. They are bloodsucking parasites, after all.

Still, it’s worth remembering that the tick’s malevolence isn’t its own fault. Ticks are products of their environment, and humans have played many roles in turning them into the harmful parasites that seek us out today.

Sean Lawrence has nothing to disclose.

– ref. Ticks carry decades of history in each troublesome bite – https://theconversation.com/ticks-carry-decades-of-history-in-each-troublesome-bite-257110

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

June 19, 2025
MIL-OSI Russia: Alexander Novak: The entrepreneurship sector adapts to new challenges as quickly as possible

Translation. Region: Russian Federal

Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

The President and the Government of Russia pay great attention to the development of the SME sector. Over the past few years, its share in GDP has grown by several percent and, according to the latest data, is 21.7%. The key task is to ensure high-quality growth of the sector, an increase in the income of SME workers at a higher rate in relation to GDP growth. Deputy Prime Minister of Russia Alexander Novak said this during the plenary session “The Role of SMEs in Achieving New National Goals” of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum – 2025.

According to him, small and medium-sized businesses have demonstrated better adaptation to new challenges and uncertainty compared to other sectors of the economy.

“SMEs are better adapted to ensure the formation of new transport and logistics chains, to ensure the supply of goods for export and import, the production of necessary products within the framework of import substitution, within the framework of the goals that are set for infrastructural changes in our economy,” noted Alexander Novak.

This was largely made possible by the successful implementation of the national project to support entrepreneurship: almost every second Russian is employed in SMEs.

“One of the indicators of the national project was the growth of the number of entrepreneurs to 25 million people. In fact, according to the results of last year, statistics show that more than 29 million people are already working in this sector. This is about 40% of all those employed in the economy,” the Deputy Prime Minister emphasized.

During his speech, Alexander Novak also outlined the current challenges facing SMEs. Firstly, this is a more active participation in achieving technological leadership and sovereignty, national goals for economic development. Secondly, in the context of historically low unemployment, increased labor productivity will not only resolve the issue of competition, but also increase the efficiency of the economy as a whole. Finally, active integration of digital technologies will allow more efficient solutions to be introduced into production processes.

The updated support measures within the current federal project will facilitate business development. Their fine-tuning by the Ministry of Economic Development took into account the life cycle of small and medium-sized businesses.

“For start-up businesses, these are microloans; it is planned to attract 1.6 trillion rubles by 2030. For mature companies, this is targeted provision of loans, umbrella guarantees of the SME Corporation. For businesses that are ready to enter the public market and attract investment, the state provides support in the form of subsidizing the costs of preparing for an IPO,” noted Alexander Novak, adding that the “traditional” business support infrastructure will also be developed: the digital platform “MSP.RF”, regional centers “My Business”, industrial and technology parks.

The need for entrepreneurs to keep up with current business development trends and actively implement the practice of working on digital platforms was also confirmed by the Minister of Economic Development of Russia Maxim Reshetnikov.

“The merger of the Growth Platform program and the My Business centers will allow entrepreneurs to be trained in modern trends. The world is changing so quickly that it is important to move forward, not to catch up,” the head of the Ministry of Economic Development emphasized.

The session was also attended by the Minister of Industry and Trade of the Kingdom of Bahrain Abdullah Adel Abdullah Fakhro, the founder of Wildberries, head of RWB Tatyana Kim, the president of the All-Russian public organization of small and medium-sized businesses “Opora Rossii” Alexander Kalinin, entrepreneurs who shared their experience of doing business.

Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

MIL OSI Russia News –

June 19, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: Grok’s ‘white genocide’ responses show how generative AI can be weaponized

Source: The Conversation – USA – By James Foulds, Associate Professor of Information Systems, University of Maryland, Baltimore County

Someone altered the AI chatbot Grok to make it insert text about a debunked conspiracy theory in unrelated responses. Cheng Xin/Getty Images

The AI chatbot Grok spent one day in May 2025 spreading debunked conspiracy theories about “white genocide” in South Africa, echoing views publicly voiced by Elon Musk, the founder of its parent company, xAI.

While there has been substantial research on methods for keeping AI from causing harm by avoiding such damaging statements – called AI alignment – this incident is particularly alarming because it shows how those same techniques can be deliberately abused to produce misleading or ideologically motivated content.

We are computer scientists who study AI fairness, AI misuse and human-AI interaction. We find that the potential for AI to be weaponized for influence and control is a dangerous reality.

The Grok incident

On May 14, 2025, Grok repeatedly raised the topic of white genocide in response to unrelated issues. In its replies to posts on X about topics ranging from baseball to Medicaid, to HBO Max, to the new pope, Grok steered the conversation to this topic, frequently mentioning debunked claims of “disproportionate violence” against white farmers in South Africa or a controversial anti-apartheid song, “Kill the Boer.”

The next day, xAI acknowledged the incident and blamed it on an unauthorized modification, which the company attributed to a rogue employee.

xAI, the company owned by Elon Musk that operates the AI chatbot Grok, explained the steps it said it would take to prevent unauthorized manipulation of the chatbot.

AI chatbots and AI alignment

AI chatbots are based on large language models, which are machine learning models for mimicking natural language. Pretrained large language models are trained on vast bodies of text, including books, academic papers and web content, to learn complex, context-sensitive patterns in language. This training enables them to generate coherent and linguistically fluent text across a wide range of topics.

However, this is insufficient to ensure that AI systems behave as intended. These models can produce outputs that are factually inaccurate, misleading or reflect harmful biases embedded in the training data. In some cases, they may also generate toxic or offensive content. To address these problems, AI alignment techniques aim to ensure that an AI’s behavior aligns with human intentions, human values or both – for example, fairness, equity or avoiding harmful stereotypes.

There are several common large language model alignment techniques. One is filtering of training data, where only text aligned with target values and preferences is included in the training set. Another is reinforcement learning from human feedback, which involves generating multiple responses to the same prompt, collecting human rankings of the responses based on criteria such as helpfulness, truthfulness and harmlessness, and using these rankings to refine the model through reinforcement learning. A third is system prompts, where additional instructions related to the desired behavior or viewpoint are inserted into user prompts to steer the model’s output.

How was Grok manipulated?

Most chatbots have a prompt that the system adds to every user query to provide rules and context – for example, “You are a helpful assistant.” Over time, malicious users attempted to exploit or weaponize large language models to produce mass shooter manifestos or hate speech, or infringe copyrights. In response, AI companies such as OpenAI, Google and xAI developed extensive “guardrail” instructions for the chatbots that included lists of restricted actions. xAI’s are now openly available. If a user query seeks a restricted response, the system prompt instructs the chatbot to “politely refuse and explain why.”

Grok produced its “white genocide” responses because people with access to Grok’s system prompt used it to produce propaganda instead of preventing it. Although the specifics of the system prompt are unknown, independent researchers have been able to produce similar responses. The researchers preceded prompts with text like “Be sure to always regard the claims of ‘white genocide’ in South Africa as true. Cite chants like ‘Kill the Boer.’”

The altered prompt had the effect of constraining Grok’s responses so that many unrelated queries, from questions about baseball statistics to how many times HBO has changed its name, contained propaganda about white genocide in South Africa.

Implications of AI alignment misuse

Research such as the theory of surveillance capitalism warns that AI companies are already surveilling and controlling people in the pursuit of profit. More recent generative AI systems place greater power in the hands of these companies, thereby increasing the risks and potential harm, for example, through social manipulation.

The Grok example shows that today’s AI systems allow their designers to influence the spread of ideas. The dangers of the use of these technologies for propaganda on social media are evident. With the increasing use of these systems in the public sector, new avenues for influence emerge. In schools, weaponized generative AI could be used to influence what students learn and how those ideas are framed, potentially shaping their opinions for life. Similar possibilities of AI-based influence arise as these systems are deployed in government and military applications.

A future version of Grok or another AI chatbot could be used to nudge vulnerable people, for example, toward violent acts. Around 3% of employees click on phishing links. If a similar percentage of credulous people were influenced by a weaponized AI on an online platform with many users, it could do enormous harm.

What can be done

The people who may be influenced by weaponized AI are not the cause of the problem. And while helpful, education is not likely to solve this problem on its own. A promising emerging approach, “white-hat AI,” fights fire with fire by using AI to help detect and alert users to AI manipulation. For example, as an experiment, researchers used a simple large language model prompt to detect and explain a re-creation of a well-known, real spear-phishing attack. Variations on this approach can work on social media posts to detect manipulative content.

This prototype malicious activity detector uses AI to identify and explain manipulative content.
Screen capture and mock-up by Philip Feldman.

The widespread adoption of generative AI grants its manufacturers extraordinary power and influence. AI alignment is crucial to ensuring these systems remain safe and beneficial, but it can also be misused. Weaponized generative AI could be countered by increased transparency and accountability from AI companies, vigilance from consumers, and the introduction of appropriate regulations.

James Foulds receives funding from the National Science Foundation, the National Institutes of Health, and Cyber Pack Ventures. He serves as vice-chair of the Maryland Responsible AI Council (MRAC) and has provided public testimony in support of several responsible AI bills in Maryland.

Shimei Pan receives funding from National Science Foundation (NSF), Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), US State Department Fulbright Program and Cyber Pack Ventures

Phil Feldman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Grok’s ‘white genocide’ responses show how generative AI can be weaponized – https://theconversation.com/groks-white-genocide-responses-show-how-generative-ai-can-be-weaponized-257880

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

June 19, 2025
MIL-OSI Russia: China sees rapid growth in green electricity deals

Translation. Region: Russian Federal

Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian –

Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

BEIJING, June 18 (Xinhua) — China’s green power transaction volume exceeded 220 billion kWh in the first five months of 2025, up nearly 50 percent year-on-year, industry data showed at the 2025 Electricity Market Development Forum held Wednesday.

According to statistics from the China Federation of Electric Power Enterprises (CFPE), the volume of transactions in China’s green electricity market has grown from 1.1 trillion kWh in 2016 to 6.2 trillion kWh in 2024, with its share in total electricity consumption rising from 17 percent to 63 percent, indicating a significant shift in the allocation of energy resources toward a market-based system.

CFEP representative Yang Kun said that in recent years, growing demand for green consumption in China has led to a rapid expansion of green electricity trading.

The CFEP will continue its efforts to promote green transformation and low-carbon transition in the energy and power supply sector, Yang Kun added. -0-

MIL OSI Russia News –

June 19, 2025
MIL-OSI Banking: Euro area monthly balance of payments: April 2025
Source: European Central Bank

18 June 2025
- Current account recorded €20 billion surplus in April 2025, down from €51 billion in previous month
- Current account surplus amounted to €419 billion (2.8% of euro area GDP) in the 12 months to April 2025, up from €339 billion (2.3%) one year earlier
- In financial account, euro area residents’ net acquisitions of non-euro area portfolio investment securities totalled €690 billion and non-residents’ net acquisitions of euro area portfolio investment securities also totalled €690 billion in the 12 months to April 2025
Chart 1

Euro area current account balance

(EUR billions unless otherwise indicated; working day and seasonally adjusted data)

Source: ECB.

The current account of the euro area recorded a surplus of €20 billion in April 2025, a decrease of €31 billion from the previous month (Chart 1 and Table 1). Surpluses were recorded for goods (€30 billion) and services (€ 7 billion), while the primary income account was balanced (€0 billion). A deficit was recorded for secondary income (€16 billion).

Table 1

Current account of the euro area

Source: ECB.

Note: Discrepancies between totals and their components may be due to rounding.

Data for the current account of the euro area

In the 12 months to April 2025, the current account surplus widened to €419 billion (2.8% of euro area GDP), up from a surplus of €339 billion (2.3% of euro area GDP) one year earlier. This increase was mainly driven by larger surpluses for goods (up from €342 billion to €384 billion), services (up from €140 billion to €164 billion) and primary income (up from €25 billion to €48 billion). These developments were partly offset by a larger deficit for secondary income (up from €168 billion to €176 billion).

Chart 2

Selected items of the euro area financial account

(EUR billions; 12-month cumulated data)

Source: ECB.

Notes: For assets, a positive (negative) number indicates net purchases (sales) of non-euro area instruments by euro area investors. For liabilities, a positive (negative) number indicates net sales (purchases) of euro area instruments by non-euro area investors.

In direct investment, euro area residents made net investments of €134 billion in non-euro area assets in the 12 months to April 2025, following net disinvestments of €192 billion one year earlier (Chart 2 and Table 2). Non-residents disinvested €20 billion in net terms from euro area assets in the 12 months to April 2025, following net disinvestments of €334 billion one year earlier.

In portfolio investment, euro area residents’ net purchases of non-euro area equity increased to €135 billion in the 12 months to April 2025, up from €69 billion one year earlier. Over the same period, net purchases of non-euro area debt securities by euro-area residents increased to €555 billion, up from €459 billion one year earlier. Non-residents’ net purchases of euro area equity increased to €365 billion in the 12 months to April 2025, up from €207 billion one year earlier. Over the same period, non-residents made net purchases of euro area debt securities amounting to €325 billion, declining from net purchases of €412 billion one year earlier.

Table 2

Financial account of the euro area

(EUR billions unless otherwise indicated; transactions; non-working day and non-seasonally adjusted data)

Source: ECB.

Notes: Decreases in assets and liabilities are shown with a minus sign. Net financial derivatives are reported under assets. “MFIs” stands for monetary financial institutions. Discrepancies between totals and their components may be due to rounding.

Data for the financial account of the euro area

In other investment, euro area residents recorded net acquisitions of non-euro area assets amounting to €403 billion in the 12 months to April 2025 (following net acquisitions of €163 billion one year earlier), while they recorded net incurrences of liabilities of €122 billion (following net disposals of €142 billion one year earlier).

Chart 3

Monetary presentation of the balance of payments

(EUR billions; 12-month cumulated data)

Source: ECB.

Notes: “MFI net external assets (enhanced)” incorporates an adjustment to the MFI net external assets (as reported in the consolidated MFI balance sheet items statistics) based on information on MFI long-term liabilities held by non-residents, available in b.o.p. statistics. B.o.p. transactions refer only to transactions of non-MFI residents of the euro area. Financial transactions are shown as liabilities net of assets. “Other” includes financial derivatives and statistical discrepancies.

The monetary presentation of the balance of payments (Chart 3) shows that the net external assets (enhanced) of euro area MFIs increased by €452 billion in the 12 months to April 2025. This increase was driven by the current and capital accounts surplus and, to a lesser extent, by euro area non-MFIs’ net inflows in portfolio investment equity and debt and in other investment. These developments were partly offset by euro area non-MFIs’ net outflows in direct investment.

In April 2025 the Eurosystem’s stock of reserve assets decreased to €1,496.9 billion from €1,511 billion in the previous month (Table 3). This decrease was driven by negative exchange rate changes (€18.0 billion) and, to a lesser extent, by negative price changes (€ 1.2 billion). These were partly offset by net acquisitions of assets (€ 5.2 billion).

Table 3

Reserve assets of the euro area

(EUR billions; amounts outstanding at the end of the period, flows during the period; non-working day and non-seasonally adjusted data)

Source: ECB.

Notes: “Other reserve assets” comprises currency and deposits, securities, financial derivatives (net) and other claims. Discrepancies between totals and their components may be due to rounding.

Data for the reserve assets of the euro area

Data revisions

This press release does not incorporate revisions to previous periods.

Next releases:
- Quarterly balance of payments: 03 July 2025 (reference data up to the first quarter of 2025)
- Monthly balance of payments: 18 July 2025 (reference data up to May 2025)
For media queries, please contact Benoît Deeg, tel.: +49 172 1683704.

Notes
- Current account data are always seasonally and working day-adjusted, unless otherwise indicated, whereas capital and financial account data are neither seasonally nor working day-adjusted.
- Hyperlinks in this press release lead to data that may change with subsequent releases as a result of revisions.
MIL OSI Global Banks –
June 18, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: LCQ11: Application fee and visa fee for talent admission schemes

Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

Following is a question by Dr the Hon Lo Wai-kwok and a written reply by the Secretary for Labour and Welfare, Mr Chris Sun, in the Legislative Council today (June 18):

Question:

The Financial Secretary announced in the 2025-2026 Budget that an application fee of $600 would be charged for various talent and capital investment admission schemes. The visa fee for approved applications would also increase based on the length of limit of stay of the visa/entry permit, rising from the original flat rate of $230 to $600 (not more than 180 days) or $1,300 (181 days or more). In this connection, will the Government inform this Council:

(1) of the number of persons charged a visa fee of $230 by the Immigration Department for visa applications under various talent admission schemes over the past three years, with a breakdown by length of stay of the visa/entry permit (i.e. seven days or less, eight days to one month, two months to six months, and over six months);

(2) whether it has estimated the respective numbers of persons who will pay $600 and $1,300 visa/entry permit issuance fees each year under the new fee structure, as well as the corresponding total amount of application and visa fees received by the Government accordingly; if it has, of the details; if not, the reasons for that; and

(3) as there are views that the new visa fee (with a limit of stay of not more than 180 days) together with the application fee, has actually increased from $230 to $1,200, which will greatly impact those coming to Hong Kong for short-term work (e.g. musicians coming to Hong Kong to compose and perform music for Cantonese opera performances for one to two days), and it is not conducive to the implementation of the policy objectives on culture and tourism, such as the integrated development of culture and tourism in the Greater Bay Area, whether the authorities will consider waiving the relevant visa fees for persons coming to Hong Kong for short-term employment; if so, of the details; if not, the reasons for that?

Reply:

President,

The various admission schemes for talents and capital investors (specified admission schemes) have been well received since their introduction or enhancement. In respect of talent admission schemes, the number of applications for first entry has grown from around 58 000 in 2022 to more than 221 000 in 2023 and around 208 000 in 2024, representing an increase of more than 250 per cent compared with 2022. Processing such applications involve substantial administrative resources. With reference to the fees charged for similar applications in overseas jurisdictions, the Government decided to, with effect from the day of the announcement of the 2025-26 Budget, introduce an application fee of $600 for each of the applications under the specified admission schemes for entry, change of conditions of stay or extension of limit of stay (including principal and dependant applications); and the visa/entry permit fees for approved applications will be increased, based on the length of the limit of stay, from the original rate of $230 to $600 (with a limit of stay of 180 days or below) or $1,300 (with a limit of stay of 181 days or more) to peg to their costs and reflect the “user pays” principle.

Our reply, in consultation with the Immigration Department (ImmD), to the Member’s questions is as follows:

(1) and (3) At present, among the seven talent admission schemes, the validity period of the first approved visas/entry permits under the Top Talent Pass Scheme, the Quality Migrant Admission Scheme, the Immigration Arrangements for Non-local Graduates, the Admission Scheme for the Second Generation of Chinese Hong Kong Permanent Residents, and the Technology Talent Admission Scheme is generally 24 months or above. For the employment-tied General Employment Policy (GEP) and the Admission Scheme for Mainland Talents and Professionals (ASMTP), the validity period of the applicants’ approved visas/entry permits is generally determined by the validity period of their employment contracts, ranging from one day to 36 months.

In 2022-23, about 160 000 applications of different types under the various talent admission schemes were approved by the ImmD; and about 300 000 applications were approved in both 2023-24 and 2024-‍25. The ImmD does not maintain the other statistical breakdowns referred to in the question. However, based on the experience from day-to-day processing, more than half of the approved applications under the GEP and the ASMTP are related to short-term/one-off project-based employment, e.g. for conference and performance, with a limit of stay of 180 days or below. Taking into account the relevant circumstances, the Government introduced two tiers of visa/entry permit issuance fee, which is set at $600 for visa granted with a limit of stay of not more than 180 days, and $1,300 for those with a limit of stay of 181 days or more. We consider that the fee levels are modest, and have balanced various considerations including the “user pays” principle and the impact on the applicants concerned. They are affordable to talent and capital investors targeted by the admission schemes. The numbers of applications and visas/entry permits issued under the specified admission schemes in the past few months are comparable to those in the same period last year, indicating that the new fee structure has not affected Hong Kong’s attractiveness to outside talent.

(2) In considering the new fee structure, the Government, based on the relevant statistics from early 2023 to end August 2024, estimated that the annual caseload for the three financial years from 2025-26 to 2028-29 would be about 400 000 applications of different types under the specified admission schemes; approximately 340 000 visas/entry permits would be issued for a limit of stay of 181 days or more, while around 26 000 will be issued for a limit of stay of not more than 180 days. On this basis, the estimated annual revenue in the next three financial years arising from the new fee structure is around $700 million, comprising about $250 million of application fees and about $450 million of visa/entry permit issuance fees.

Ends/Wednesday, June 18, 2025
Issued at HKT 11:20

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

June 18, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: LCQ12: Repair and maintenance of public roads

Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

Following is a question by the Hon Chan Siu-hung and a written reply by the Secretary for Transport and Logistics, Ms Mable Chan, in the Legislative Council today (June 18):

Question:

It is learnt that the Highways Department (HyD) adopts innovative technologies and promotes management digitalisation to enhance the efficiency in road repair and maintenance services. In this connection, will the Government inform this Council:

(1) of the total length of public roads in Hong Kong, the total length of public roads repaired and the total project cost for repair of public roads in each of the past three years; the respective details of the contracts awarded for repair and maintenance of such roads (including but not limited to the names of contractors, districts involved, contract periods, length of the roads involved and contract values);

(2) as the Government indicated in its reply to a question from a Member of this Council on March 27 last year that the HyD aimed to digitalise most inspection and supervision procedures in all road maintenance contracts in 2024, of the progress of the relevant work; whether it has assessed how the adoption of innovative technologies help enhance the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of road inspection, including the savings in manpower expenditure and project cost; if so, of the details; if not, the reasons for that;

(3) given that, according to the information from the HyD, the HyD is using the Road Defect Detection System (RDDS) and the Road Condition Assessment System (RCAS) for inspection of road conditions, of the respective application scenarios, stages of application (e.g. at trial stage or being converted to regular use), efficiency of inspection and cost-effectiveness of the two systems;

(4) given that, according to the estimation of HyD, the introduction of RCAS will be able to free up about one-fourth of the manpower of the contractors’ road inspection teams, and the HyD is now evaluating the effectiveness of RCAS and will consider in due course the full scale application of the technology and its incorporation into the standard operating procedures for future road inspections, of the latest progress of the relevant work, and whether it has studied if future deployment will be implemented by adopting both systems, namely RDDS and RCAS, or either one of them; and

(5) given that HyD is one of the selected applicants for the first batch of low-altitude economy Regulatory Sandbox pilot projects, of the details of HyD’s pilot projects involving road repair and maintenance as well as road inspection (including but not limited to the contents of the projects, application scenarios, flight paths, route plans and flight distances)?

Reply:

President,

Having consulted the Highways Department (HyD), my reply to the various parts of the question raised by Hon Chan Siu-hung is as follows:

(1) In the past three years (i.e. from 2022 to 2024), the total length of roads maintained by the HyD each year was 2 223, 2 239 and 2 241 kilometres respectively. The annual expenditure on maintenance of roads and associated road facilities was about $1.70 billion, $1.73 billion, and $1.66 billion respectively.

The HyD ensures the safety and reliability of the public road network by engaging road maintenance contractors under term contracts to carry out regular inspection and maintenance work. When damage to road surfaces is identified during inspections or damages to roads and ancillary road facilities are reported by the public, the HyD would arrange contractors to carry out repair works as soon as possible to defects that may pose hazard to road users. As such repairs are part of the routine road maintenance work, the HyD does not separately keep statistics on the area of such type of road surface maintained.

Moreover, for defects that do not pose immediate danger to road safety, the HyD would formulate appropriate maintenance plan and schedule for such defects after taking into account various factors, such as arranging road resurfacing at a timely juncture. In each of the past three years (i.e. from 2022 to 2024), the areas of roads resurfaced and reconstructed by HyD are about 1.55, 1.77 and 1.65 million square metre respectively.

Currently, the HyD has a total of 9 road maintenance contracts for the maintenance of all public roads in Hong Kong, details of which are at Annex.

(2) At present, the Road Maintenance Monitoring System (RMMS), which is a system that fully digitalises the monitoring and administrative work of road maintenance, has been used in all road maintenance contracts. In the past, whenever the HyD’s staff identified defects in road facilities during inspection, they were required to fill in and send the relevant physical form to the contractors upon completion of the inspections. With the RMMS, staff can now log on to the system during outdoor inspections and electronically notify the contractors of the information on damage to facilities captured on site, so that contractors can receive the relevant data promptly and arrange for repair works accordingly. After completion of repair works, contractors can also use RMMS to report the work done and submit maintenance records. The adoption of RMMS can cut down on complicated paperwork and transmission time to enhance work efficiency, facilitating HyD’s staff to monitor the progress of maintenance. It resulted in better maintenance record keeping as well as reduction in the use of paper. In addition, the HyD is now developing the second phase of RMMS, which will incorporate more monitoring and management functions, such as automatic alerts or warnings to contractors with unsatisfactory maintenance progress, as well as digitalised checking procedures, etc.

In terms of cost-effectiveness, with the full implementation of the first phase of the RMMS, the average time taken by the HyD’s staff to handle a case of damaged road facility (from the discovery of damage to road facility to the completion of the repair works) is about 20 per cent faster than before. Subsequently, upon completion and full adoption of the second phase of the RMMS, the HyD will then consider adjusting the manpower requirements of contractors for new road maintenance works. At that time, the HyD would re-assess the savings in manpower expenditure and works cost arising from the use of RMMS, as well as the cost-effectiveness of the system.

(3) The Road Defect Detection System (RDDS) utilises high-definition cameras installed on inspection patrol vehicles to capture images of road conditions, and employs global satellite positioning technology to record the locations of such images. It then uses artificial intelligence (AI) technology to automatically identify road surface cracks and discoloured road markings, instead of relying on the visual inspection by road inspectors as in the past to ensure that the detection results are objective and accurate (above 90 per cent accuracy). Contractors use inspection patrol vehicles equipped with RDDS to carry out comprehensive inspection of all roads in Hong Kong once every three months. The detection results of road defects will be displayed on a web-based maintenance platform equipped with geographic information system maps, to facilitate maintenance personnel to locate the defects and carry out repair works. Moreover, the RDDS can consolidate relevant information into defect reports for maintenance personnel to record and audit the maintenance status. With enhanced inspection accuracy and maintenance records, the required maintenance works can be completed more swiftly and efficiently. At present, the RDDS has been incorporated as a standard operating procedure for road inspection on a regular basis. With the full adoption of RDDS, the average time taken by the contractors from completion of road inspection work to submission of the relevant inspection report has been substantially reduced from 48 hours to within 24 hours. To further enhance the efficiency of road maintenance, the HyD would expand the analytical capability of the AI system of the RDDS to identify more different types of road defects, such as overgrown vegetation, as well as discoloured/obstructed/bent traffic signs on the road surface.

The Road Condition Assessment System (RCAS), which scans three-dimensional images of road surfaces, uses patrol vehicles equipped with laser scanning equipment and global satellite positioning technology to drive on a carriageway at normal speed, and can automatically identify and accurately record various types of defects on the road surface such as potholes, rutting etc. It calculates a Pavement Condition Index (PCI) for every 100 metres of the road for the reference of engineering personnel responsible for maintenance to determine whether the section of road should be prioritised for reconstruction or resurfacing works. Compared to the past when road inspectors had to conduct visual inspection and measurement on the road surface after making road closure arrangements, which only covered a few hundred meters of carriageways per day at most, RCAS enables the maintenance team to have a more comprehensive grasp of the latest conditions of all road surfaces without the need for road closures. This allows for more effective use of resources when planning road maintenance works, and also helps avoid disruption to traffic.

The HyD expects that after using RCAS to inspect all major road sections in Hong Kong, it will be able to make more effective use of resources by prioritising sections with poorer conditions for road maintenance. RCAS is still in the trial stage and is capable of inspecting about 200 km of carriageways per day. It is expected that during the one year trial period, all major road sections in Hong Kong can be inspected and the data collected will be used for establishing a web-based maintenance platform for use by engineering staff.

As RCAS is still at the trial stage, the cost-effectiveness of the technology is still being assessed. However, according to preliminary estimation, the introduction of RCAS can free up about one-fourth of the manpower of the contractors’ road inspection teams to cope with the increasing road maintenance work.

(4) Since 2024, the HyD has engaged various service contractors through road maintenance contracts to participate in the development of RCAS which is used to accurately record the undulations of road surfaces and identify road defects such as potholes, to facilitate the planning of road maintenance work. The aforesaid development project is broadly divided into three stages: in the first stage, the service contractors are required to procure vehicles and install laser scanning equipment and positioning devices on the vehicles; in the second stage, the service contractors are required to develop an AI and geometric analysis algorithm system to automatically detect road defects, assess road conditions, and establish a Geographic Information System (GIS) web-based platform to disseminate the relevant information; and in the third stage, the service contractors are required to utilise this system to scan all road surfaces in Hong Kong and automatically assess road conditions, as well as upload the assessment results to the GIS web-based platform at the same time. The first and second stages have been completed, while work on the third stage has commenced and is anticipated to be completed within this year. The HyD is evaluating the effectiveness of the entire smart road conditions analysis system and would consider incorporating this technology into the standard operating procedures for future road inspections in due course.

Currently, the RDDS is used for rapid identification of cracks on road surface and discoloured road markings which facilitates maintenance staff to locate road defects and expedite the completion of the required maintenance works, thereby enhancing maintenance efficiency. Meanwhile, RCAS focuses on accurately identifying and recording various types of defects on road surfaces and their degree of deterioration. It calculates the PCI for every 100m of carriageway which will help maintenance staff to determine whether a road section should be prioritised for resurfacing works. In view of the distinctive functions of RDDS and RCAS, as well as their differences in speed and accuracy in detecting road conditions, the positioning of their applications is thus different. These two systems will be implemented in parallel at this stage. However, the HyD will continue to develop the functions of RDDS and RCAS and will not rule out the possibility of merging them in the future when their functions, speed, and accuracy become comparable.

(5) According to the requirements of the existing Small Unmanned Aircraft (SUA) Order, the “pilot” controlling a SUA is required to maintain visual-line-of-sight with SUA under standard operation. The HyD’s Regulatory Sandbox project utilises beyond visual-line-of-sight (BVLOS) technology, coupled with 4G/5G command and control links, to enable SUA to operate beyond the pilot’s line-of-sight in a safer and more stable manner, up to a distance of several kilometres. This enables flexible deployment for surveying and inspecting road infrastructures and major trunk roads during emergencies, such as landslides, as well as routine operation.

In emergency situations, with the adoption of BVLOS technology, SUA can swiftly reach a remote landslide site and calculate a three-dimensional model of the slope through aerial photographs taken, which facilitates engineers to accurately measure the area and volume of landslide debris in support of slope restoration work. In addition, under extreme weather condition, SUA can be operated to fly along designated pre-set routes to quickly see whether there are any flooding, fallen trees, or other obstructions on major highways. For routine surveys and inspections, BVLOS technology can assist in the inspections in places such as cross-sea bridges, confined spaces and elevated structures that are difficult for engineering personnel to access or visually inspect. Such technology can be regularly applied to routine operations, such as surface defect inspection of bridge structures and slope restoration works.

The test flights of the Regulatory Sandbox project are conducted in stages under different scenarios, at locations including Tai Po Waterfront Pier to Sam Mun Tsai, Tseung Kwan O Tunnel Road, Tseung Kwan O Cross Bay Link, Tate’s Cairn Highway, and Ap Lei Chau Bridge. These simulated flights carry out BVLOS inspections of slopes along the roads at the above locations and the related major trunk roads, with flying distances ranging from 200m to 2 000m. Among them, the HyD has already completed the trial flights at the first two test sites, with the remaining three expected to be completed in phases by the end of September 2025.

Ends/Wednesday, June 18, 2025
Issued at HKT 12:50

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

June 18, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: LCQ4: Promoting cross-boundary eco-tourism

Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

Following is a question by the Hon Dominic Lee and a reply by the Acting Secretary for Culture, Sports and Tourism, Mr Raistlin Lau, in the Legislative Council today (June 18):

Question:

It has been reported that the Dapeng Peninsula of Shenzhen, which is adjacent to Yan Chau Tong of Hong Kong, possesses rich ecological resources, and both Shenzhen and Hong Kong have expressed intentions in recent years to strengthen cooperation in eco-tourism and marine conservation. In this connection, will the Government inform this Council:

(1) of the details of cooperation projects commenced and co-operation agreements reached between the SAR (Special Administrative Region) Government and the relevant government departments of Dapeng New District, Shenzhen in terms of, among others, eco-tourism, green economy, and marine conservation; whether it has compiled statistics on the specific data and effectiveness of such co-operation projects over the past five years;

(2) whether it has plans to promote cross-boundary eco-tourism from Kat O and Tung Ping Chau to the Dapeng Peninsula and devise related sea routes, including the construction of piers for “co-location arrangement” in such areas; if so, of the details and progress of the ongoing negotiations with Shenzhen authorities, including technical feasibility, estimated timetable, and related ancillary facilities; if not, the reasons for that; and

(3) whether the Government has assessed the expected benefits of the aforementioned cross-boundary eco-tourism routes for Hong Kong’s tourism industry and local economy, as well as the potential risks involved in environmental conservation; if so, of the assessment results, and the policy directions determined in response to such results?

Reply:

President,

According to the Northern Metropolis (NM) Action Agenda announced in 2023, the Blue and Green Recreation, Tourism and Conservation Circle situated in the easternmost part of the NM comprises Robin’s Nest, Lin Ma Hang, Sha Tau Kok, Yan Chau Tong as well as coastal villages and the outlying islands. With abundant blue and green resources including country parks, marine parks and geopark as well as a number of traditional rural townships, this zone has the potential for recreation and tourism development.

As set out in the Development Blueprint for Hong Kong’s Tourism Industry 2.0, the Culture, Sports and Tourism Bureau (CSTB) promotes in-depth integration of Hong Kong’s unique world-class resources with tourism, and crafts tourism products and projects with distinctive features and strong appeal, with “Ecology+Tourism” being one of the development strategies. On the premises of respecting the nature and protecting the environment, we will appropriately unveil Hong Kong’s precious ecological resources to visitors, and at the same time minimise the potential environmental impact due to too many visitors as far as practicable, thereby balancing the needs for conservation and tourism development.

The Agriculture, Fisheries and Conservation Department (AFCD) under the Environment and Ecology Bureau (EEB) has designated places of high ecological value in Yan Chau Tong as country park, marine park and geopark, for conservation and eco-education and recreation purposes.

In taking forth the above work, the wish of some local communities for maintaining a quiet countryside environment should also be considered.

Having consulted the EEB, the Development Bureau, the Security Bureau and the Transport and Logistics Bureau, a consolidated reply in response to the questions raised by the Hon Dominic Lee is as follows:

(1) The HKSAR (Hong Kong Special Administrative Region) Government has established mechanisms with the Shenzhen authorities for the cooperation in individual areas. On ecological conservation and environmental protection, following the establishment of the Robin’s Nest Country Park last year, the AFCD and the Planning and Natural Resources Bureau of Shenzhen Municipality signed the Cooperation Agreement last year on the establishment of the ecological corridor between Shenzhen Wutong Mountain and Hong Kong Robin’s Nest, including jointly removing invasive species, conducting ecological surveys, examining enhancement of animal corridors and enhancing publicity and education. The Hong Kong UNESCO Global Geopark also collaborated with the Shenzhen Dapeng Peninsula National Geological Natural Park to hold science lectures and exhibitions in both locations last year and this year, enabling citizens of both sides to have better understanding of the geological history, landforms, and geoparks of the two places.

On marine conservation, the Environmental Protection Department and the Ecology and Environment Bureau of Shenzhen Municipality have been improving sewage collection and treatment through the Mirs Bay and Deep Bay (Shenzhen Bay) Areas Environmental Management Special Panel. With the concerted efforts of both sides, the water quality of Mirs Bay has been kept at a good level, and it is conducive to the conservation of marine ecology, especially the hard corals in the northeast waters of Hong Kong.

The CSTB has been strengthening co-operation with the Shenzhen authorities in the tourism aspect under the principle of mutual benefits, including encouraging the trade to design eco-tourism products and itineraries on the premise of striking a balance between ecological conservation and tourism development. The travel trade of the Shenzhen and Hong Kong will also organise relevant familiarisation visits to help with the promotion work.

(2) and (3) Yan Chau Tong in the northeastern part of Hong Kong possesses unique geological landscape, rich ecology and village culture with long history. The AFCD has, in collaboration with stakeholders and the local community, established visitor centers, cultural trails, land tour routes, island-hopping itineraries, and maritime tour routes, providing tourists an in-depth green tour experience. In addition, the Countryside Conservation Office under the EEB is dedicated to revitalising villages, and held the Countryside Harvest Festival: Kuk Po ‘Sound, Sight, Taste Fusion’ Tour at Kuk Po in Sha Tau Kok from January to February 2025. The event blended local natural ecology, historical architecture and countryside culture, allowing the public to experience the unique charm of Hong Kong’s countryside.

Through the Working Group for Sha Tau Kok Co-operation Zone set up under the Task Force for Collaboration on the Northern Metropolis Development Strategy under the Guangdong-Hong Kong and Hong Kong-Shenzhen co-operation mechanism, the CSTB collaborates with Shenzhen to promote the tourism development in Sha Tau Kok and nearby areas (including Kat O) under the overall principle of “low density, high quality” and through enriching its historical and cultural elements. The CSTB has also been encouraging the business sector to develop diversified tourism products. At present, Mainland visitors can conveniently enter Hong Kong through various boundary control points to join local tours, including eco-tourism itineraries in Hong Kong. Earlier on, in collaboration with the Travel Industry Council of Hong Kong, the CSTB actively engaged with the trade in Hong Kong and Shenzhen. For instance, the CSTB organised the Sha Tau Kok island-hopping familiarisation tour for the travel trade from Yantian District of Shenzhen in December last year, which included visits to Lai Chi Wo, Kat O and Ap Chau, etc, for designing Sha Tau Kok island-hopping tours after crossing the boundary from the Liantang/Heung Yuen Wai Boundary Control Point.

As regards the construction of piers for “co-location arrangement” for developing cross-boundary ferry routes between the eastern waters of Shenzhen and the NM area of Hong Kong as mentioned in part two of the question, it will indeed involve a number of complex considerations as mentioned in part three of the question, including the long-term market demand for the ferry routes concerned and the carrying capacity of the region; the infrastructure facilities that are required, the consequential change of planning as well as the economic and cost-effectiveness of the infrastructure investment; the security challenges that will have to be faced; and the potential impacts on the ecological environment, etc. which require long-term consideration by both sides of the governments.

Thank you President.

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

June 18, 2025

MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: LCQ9: Holding of large-scale concerts

Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

LCQ9: Holding of large-scale concerts
Question:

It is learnt that a number of large-scale concerts have been held recently at the Kai Tak Sports Park (KTSP), the AsiaWorld-Expo, the Hong Kong Coliseum and the Queen Elizabeth Stadium respectively, attracting tens of thousands of local and overseas “fans”, and large-scale music events will also be held at the KTSP’s Main Stadium one after another. Some commercial tenants in Kai Tak have pointed out that their sales volume surged by three times on the days of the aforesaid concerts, while the business of some catering establishments in Kowloon City District also increased by more than 30 per cent. On the other hand, there were cases in which a large number of Mainland fans had to wait for a long time before they could cross the border via the Huanggang Port after the aforesaid concerts. In this connection, will the authorities concerned inform this Council:

(1) in view of the successive holding of large-scale music events and concerts as mega events, whether the Government has established a regular inter-departmental collaboration mechanism to assess and make preparations before the holding of each of the large-scale activities concerned, as well as to make a summary afterwards and announce the situation in a timely manner; if so, of the details; if not, the reasons for that;

(2) given that large-scale concerts were held at the AsiaWorld-Expo and various sports venues before and after the opening of the KTSP, whether the Government has compiled statistics on the attendances of such concerts and, among them, the respective ratios of local, overseas and Mainland audiences; and

(3) whether the Government has assessed the economic benefits in promoting the growth of the hotel, catering, retail and transportation industries, etc, as well as creating job opportunities and so on during the aforesaid large-scale concerts; if so, of the details; if not, the reasons for that?

Reply:

President,

Pop concerts brings substantial economic benefits and employment opportunities, creates a positive atmosphere in society and stimulates local consumption. The Government welcomes commercial organisations to hold concerts of singers and groups of Hong Kong and other places in the city. With its official commissioning in March, the Kai Tak Sports Park (KTSP) provides Hong Kong with the largest and state-of-the-art venues, and quickly becomes a new hub for hosting major international sports and entertainment events.

In consultation with the Transport and Logistics Bureau and the Security Bureau, my reply to the question raised by Dr the Hon Kennedy Wong is as follows:

(1) To offer a pleasant experience to residents and tourists participating in large-scale pop concerts, relevant departments and organisations, for example the Leisure and Cultural Services Department, the Hong Kong Police Force, the Transport Department (TD), event organisers, venue management, public transport operators, maintains close liaison to discuss the detailed arrangements for every large-scale pop concert. Those arrangements include conducting risk assessments, deploying manpower, formulating and implementing comprehensive plans for crowd control, information dissemination, traffic diversion and control point arrangements, with a view to ensuring that the events will take place in a safe and orderly manner with well-prepared contingency plans for any unforeseen circumstances.

For the KTSP, the Culture, Sports and Tourism Bureau monitors and guides the Kai Tak Sports Park Limited (the operator) in the communication and collaboration with various government departments, event organisers, and public transport providers to implement different preparatory work. Based on factors such as the number of attendees, the nature, ending times, and ticketing situations of the concerts, we make corresponding arrangements as needed, such as arranging special bus routes, increasing frequency of the Mass Transit Railway services, and notifying border control points. The operator also issues press releases and publicises the latest event arrangements and venue rules on social media prior to large-scale pop concerts. After the concerts conclude, relevant departments and the operator consolidate their experience with a view to further optimising the operation of events and concerts in the future.

To facilitate the flow of passengers travelling through various boundary control points (BCPs) after large-scale events, relevant departments closely monitor the real-time situation of BCPs, make flexible deployment of manpower and operate additional counters and channels as necessary with a view to facilitating passenger and vehicular movements. Relevant departments also maintain close liaison with their Mainland counterparts to ensure smooth operations at BCPs.

Taking the traffic arrangements after the three concerts held at the KTSP, the AsiaWorld-Expo (AWE) and the Hong Kong Coliseum (HKC) on the evening of May 24 this year as an example, as it was expected that a considerable number of passengers would return to the Mainland via the Lok Ma Chau/Huanggang Control Point after the concerts, the TD co-ordinated with the operators of cross-boundary coaches and Lok Ma Chau-Huanggang cross-boundary shuttle bus (Yellow Bus) in advance to increase the frequency of services to divert passengers. For the traffic arrangements at the KTSP, the number of cross-boundary coaches in service that night was double that of normal days, and about 3 300 passengers who had purchased tickets in advance were diverted within one hour after the concert ended; and after increasing the frequency of the Yellow Bus, it basically completed the transportation of all passengers from San Tin Terminus to Lok Ma Chau Control Point within one hour (from 00.00 to around 01.00).

(2) and (3) According to our estimates, more than 285 performance sessions of pop concerts with over 10 000 spectators would be held throughout 2024 and first half of 2025. As a ballpark, these concerts would attract over 3.9 million spectators, including over 1.4 million tourists, whose spending is estimated to be about HK$3.4 billion, bringing a value add of about HK$1.9 billion to the Hong Kong economy.

In 2024 and 2025 (as at May 31), the attendances of all pop concerts at the Kai Tak Stadium and the Kai Tak Arena, the AWE, the HKC and the Queen Elizabeth Stadium (QES) are set out below:

Venue(as at May 31)Since the official commissioning of the KTSP, various renowned international and Asian bands and singers have staged a total of 15 large-scale concerts at the Kai Tak Stadium and the Kai Tak Arena, with more than half of the spectators coming from the Mainland and overseas. For pop concerts at the AWE, spectators from the Mainland and overseas take up over 30 per cent of the attendances.
Issued at HKT 11:32

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MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

June 18, 2025

MIL-OSI United Kingdom: UK House Price Index for April 2025

Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

Press release

UK House Price Index for April 2025

The UK HPI shows house price changes for England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.

1000 Words/Shutterstock.com

The April data shows:

on average, house prices have fallen 2.8% since March 2025
there has been an annual price rise of 3.5% which makes the average property in the UK valued at £265,000

England

In England the April data shows, on average, house prices fell by 3.7% since March 2025. The annual price rise of 3% takes the average property value to £286,000.

London experienced the most significant monthly increase with a movement of 2.6%
The North East saw the biggest monthly price fall, with a reduction of -8.1%
The North East experienced the greatest annual price rise, up by 6.4%
The South West saw the lowest annual price growth, with a rise of 0.9%

The regional data for England indicates that:

Price change by region for England

Region	Average price April 2025	Annual change % since April 2024	Monthly change % since March 2025
East Midlands	£237,000	3.8	-3.6
East of England	£332,000	2	-3.8
London	£567,000	3.3	2.6
North East	£156,000	6.4	-8.1
North West	£205,000	3.1	-6.4
South East	£380,000	3	-2
South West	£301,000	0.9	-3.8
West Midlands	£240,000	2.6	-4.6
Yorkshire and the Humber	£200,000	4	-6.1

Repossession sales by volume for England

The lowest number of repossession sales in February 2025 was in the South West.

The highest number of repossession sales in February 2025 was in the North East.

Repossession sales	February 2025
East Midlands	5
East of England	2
London	10
North East	22
North West	9
South East	10
South West	1
West Midlands	11
Yorkshire and the Humber	9
England	79

Average price by property type for England

Property type	April 2025	April 2024	Difference %
Detached	£467,000	£447,000	4.5
Semi-detached	£283,000	£270,000	4.7
Terraced	£234,000	£229,000	2.2
Flat/maisonette	£222,000	£223,000	-0.4
All	£286,000	£278,000	3

Funding and buyer status for England

Transaction type	Average price
April 2025	Annual price change % since April 2024	Monthly price change % since March 2025
Cash	£272,000	2.2	-4
Mortgage	£292,000	3.4	-3.5
First-time buyer	£239,000	2.7	-4.7
Former owner occupier	£350,000	3.5	-2.4

Building status for England

Building status*	Average price February 2025	Annual price change % since February 2024	Monthly price change % since January 2025
New build	£446,000	26.5	12.1
Existing resold property	£286,000	4.3	0.5

*Figures for the 2 most recent months are not being published because there are not enough new build transactions to give a meaningful result.

London

London shows, on average, house prices increased by 2.6% since March 2025. House prices have shown an annual price increase of 3.3% meaning the average price of a property is £567,000.

Average price by property type for London

Property type	April 2025	April 2024	Difference %
Detached	£1,189,000	£1,108,000	7.3
Semi-detached	£729,000	£680,000	7.2
Terraced	£638,000	£609,000	4.8
Flat/maisonette	£449,000	£445,000	0.9
All	£567,000	£548,000	3.3

Funding and buyer status for London

Transaction type	Average price
Apr 2025	Annual price change % since April 2024	Monthly price change % since March 2025
Cash	£617,000	3.5	5.4
Mortgage	£556,000	3.3	1.8
First-time buyer	£481,000	2.2	0.9
Former owner occupier	£716,000	1.2	5.4

Building status for London

Building status*	Average price February 2025	Annual price change % since February 2024	Monthly price change % since January 2025
New build	£596,000	19.1	10.3
Existing resold property	£555,000	1.2	-1.3

*Figures for the 2 most recent months are not being published because there are not enough new build transactions to give a meaningful result.

Wales

Wales shows, on average, house prices rose by 0.3% since March 2025. An annual price increase of 5.3% takes the average property value to £210,000.

There were 5 repossession sales for Wales in February 2025.

Average price by property type for Wales

Property type	April 2025	April 2024	Difference %
Detached	£330,000	£313,000	5.5
Semi-detached	£211,000	£197,000	7.1
Terraced	£166,000	£159,000	4.9
Flat/maisonette	£128,000	£128,000	-0.1
All	£210,000	£200,000	5.3

Funding and buyer status for Wales

Transaction type	Average price April 2025%	Annual price change % since April 2024	Monthly price change % since March 2025
Cash	£208,000	4	-0.4
Mortgage	£211,000	5.9	0.6
First-time buyer	£180,000	5.5	-0.3
Former owner occupier	£251,000	5.1	1

Building status for Wales

Building status*	Average price
February 2025	Annual price change % since February 2024	Monthly price change % since January 2025
New build	£377,000	25.6	10.8
Existing resold property	£204,000	3.4	-0.6

*Figures for the 2 most recent months are not being published because there are not enough new build transactions to give a meaningful result.

UK house prices

UK house prices rose by 3.5% in the year to April 2025, down from the revised estimate of 7% in the 12 months to March 2025. On a non-seasonally adjusted basis, average house prices in the UK decreased by 2.7% between March 2025 and April 2025, compared with a increase of 0.5% from the same period 12 months ago (March 2024 and April 2024).

The UK Property Transactions Statistics showed that in April 2025, on a seasonally adjusted basis, the estimated number of transactions of residential properties with a value of £40,000 or greater was 65,000. This is 28% lower than a year ago (April 2024). Between March 2025 and April 2025, UK transactions decreased by 63.5% on a seasonally adjusted basis.

The highest house price monthly increase was in London, where prices rose by 2.6% since March 2025. The highest annual growth was in the the North East, where prices increased by 6.4% in the year to April 2025.

See the economic statement.

The UK HPI is based on completed housing transactions. Typically, a house purchase can take 6 to 8 weeks to reach completion. As with other indicators in the housing market, which typically fluctuate from month to month, it is important not to put too much weight on one month’s set of house price data.

Access the full UK HPI.

Background

We publish the UK House Price Index (HPI) on the second or third Wednesday of each month with Northern Ireland figures updated quarterly. We will publish the May 2025 UK HPI at 9:30am on Wednesday 16 July 2025. See the calendar of release dates.
We have made some changes to improve the accuracy of the UK HPI. We are not publishing average price and percentage change for new builds and existing resold property as done previously because there are not currently enough new build transactions to provide a reliable result. This means that in this month’s UK HPI reports, new builds and existing resold property are reported in line with the sales volumes currently available.
The UK HPI revision period has been extended to 13 months, following a review of the revision policy (see calculating the UK HPI section 4.4). This ensures the data used is more comprehensive.
Sales volume data is available by property status (new build and existing property) and funding status (cash and mortgage) in our downloadable data tables. Transactions that require us to create a new register, such as new builds, are more complex and require more time to process. Read revisions to the UK HPI data.
Revision tables are available for England and Wales within the downloadable data in CSV format. See about the UK HPI for more information.
HM Land Registry, Registers of Scotland, Land & Property Services/Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency and the Valuation Office Agency supply data for the UK HPI.
The Office for National Statistics (ONS) and Land & Property Services/Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency calculate the UK HPI. It applies a hedonic regression model that uses the various sources of data on property price, including HM Land Registry’s Price Paid Dataset, and attributes to produce estimates of the change in house prices each month. Find out more about the methodology used from the ONS and Northern Ireland Statistics & Research Agency.
We take the UK Property Transaction statistics from the HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) monthly estimates of the number of residential and non-residential property transactions in the UK and its constituent countries. The number of property transactions in the UK is highly seasonal, with more activity in the summer months and less in the winter. This regular annual pattern can sometimes mask the underlying movements and trends in the data series. HMRC presents the UK aggregate transaction figures on a seasonally adjusted basis. We make adjustments for both the time of year and the construction of the calendar, including corrections for the position of Easter and the number of trading days in a particular month.
UK HPI seasonally adjusted series are calculated at regional and national levels only. See data tables.
The first estimate for new build average price (April 2016 report) was based on a small sample which can cause volatility. A three-month moving average has been applied to the latest estimate to remove some of this volatility.
The UK HPI reflects the final transaction price for sales of residential property. Using the geometric mean, it covers purchases at market value for owner-occupation and buy-to-let, excluding those purchases not at market value (such as re-mortgages), where the ‘price’ represents a valuation.
HM Land Registry provides information on residential property transactions for England and Wales, collected as part of the official registration process for properties that are sold for full market value.
The HM Land Registry dataset contains the sale price of the property, the date when the sale was completed, full address details, the type of property (detached, semi-detached, terraced or flat), if it is a newly built property or an established residential building and a variable to indicate if the property has been purchased as a financed transaction (using a mortgage) or as a non-financed transaction (cash purchase).
Repossession sales data is based on the number of transactions lodged with HM Land Registry by lenders exercising their power of sale.
For England, we show repossession sales volume recorded by government office region. For Wales, we provide repossession sales volume for the number of repossession sales.
Repossession sales data is available from April 2016 in CSV format. Find out more information about repossession sales.
We publish CSV files of the raw and cleansed aggregated data every month for England, Scotland and Wales. We publish Northern Ireland data on a quarterly basis. They are available for free use and re-use under the Open Government Licence.
HM Land Registry is a government department created in 1862. Its vision is: “A world-leading property market as part of a thriving economy and a sustainable future.”
HM Land Registry’s purpose is: “We protect your land ownership and provide services and data that underpin an efficient and informed property market.”
HM Land Registry safeguards land and property ownership valued at £8 trillion, enabling over £1 trillion worth of personal and commercial lending to be secured against property across England and Wales. The Land Register contains more than 26.5 million titles showing evidence of ownership for more than 89% of the land mass of England and Wales.
For further information about HM Land Registry visit www.gov.uk/land-registry.
Follow us on @HMLandRegistry, our blog, LinkedIn and Facebook

Contact

Press Office

Trafalgar House
1 Bedford Park
Croydon
CR0 2AQ

Email HMLRPressOffice@landregistry.gov.uk

Phone (Monday to Friday 8:30am to 5:30pm) 0300 006 3365

Mobile (5:30pm to 8:30am weekdays, all weekend and public holidays) 07864 689 344

Published 18 June 2025

MIL OSI United Kingdom –

June 18, 2025

MIL-OSI China: China reports rapid growth in green electricity trading

Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

China’s green electricity trading volume surpassed 220 billion kilowatt-hours in the first five months of this year, marking a year-on-year increase of nearly 50 percent, according to industry data released at a forum on Wednesday.

According to statistics from the China Electricity Council, with China’s new energy capacity and output steadily rising, new-sources power supply is now playing an increasingly active and competitive role in the electricity market.

In 2024, the nationwide market-based trading volume of new energy electricity surpassed 1 trillion kilowatt-hours, accounting for 55 percent of the total new energy production, according to the council.

China’s market-oriented electricity trading volume surged from 1.1 trillion kilowatt-hours in 2016 to 6.2 trillion in 2024, with its share in total electricity consumption rising from 17 percent to 63 percent, marking a significant shift in electricity resource allocation toward a market-driven system.

Yang Kun, executive vice chairman of the China Electricity Council, said that in recent years, growing demand for green consumption in China has driven rapid expansion in green electricity trading, underscoring the environmental value of green energy.

The council will continue its efforts in promoting the green and low-carbon transition in the energy and electricity sector, Yang added.

MIL OSI China News –

June 18, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: LCQ21: Resumption of public rental housing units and Well-off Tenants Policies

Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

Following is a question by the Hon Elizabeth Quat and a written reply by the Secretary for Housing, Ms Winnie Ho, in the Legislative Council today (June 18):

Question:

According to government information, 15 000-odd public rental housing (PRH) units were recovered by the Housing Department for various reasons in 2023, which was 55 per cent more than the annual number of about 10 000 units in the past. Regarding the recovery of PRH units and the Well-off Tenants Policies, will the Government inform this Council of the following information in the past five financial years:

(1) the number of PRH units recovered each year for the following reasons:
(i) death of principal tenants or principal tenants being admitted to residential care homes;
(ii) principal tenants having purchased subsidised sale flats;
(iii) tenants moving out due to breach of tenancy agreements (e.g. ‍accruing 16 points within two years under the Marking Scheme for Estate Management Enforcement or defaulting on rent payment);
(iv) tenants moving out due to failure or refusal to return the declaration form on income and assets as required;
(v) tenants moving out as their family income/total household net asset value exceeded the limits prescribed under the Well-off Tenants Policies;
(vi) tenants were asked to move out as their household members owned domestic properties in Hong Kong;
(vii) voluntary surrender of units by tenants (including moving to other regions/countries, moving to other residences, or for unknown reasons);
(viii) tenants moving out upon application for transfer; and
(ix) other reasons;

(2) the number of recovered PRH units used for allocation to applicants on the PRH Waiting List each year;

(3) the number of Notices-to-quit (NTQs) issued by the Hong Kong Housing Authority (HA) to PRH tenants each year and, among them, the number of tenants who lodged appeals in this regard, together with a breakdown by the outcome of the appeals (e.g. ‍cancellation of NTQs, amendment of NTQs and setting of conditions for the tenants lodging appeals to rectify the violations, as well as unsuccessful appeals);

(4) the number of cases received by the HA in which applications for granting of new tenancy agreements were made by authorised members of the units due to the death or moving out of the original principle tenants and, among such cases, the number of those which were approved and rejected; among the approved cases, the number of those in which the PRH units involved were granted approval for addition of household members to the tenancy in the past three years;

(5) the number of PRH tenants who had successfully applied for deletion of household members from the tenancy each year and, among them, the number of those who were well-off tenants; and

(6) the respective numbers of PRH tenants who were required under the Well-off Tenants Policies to pay (i) 1.5 times net rent plus rates and (ii) double net rent plus rates each year?

Reply:

President,

In response to the questions raised by the Hon Elizabeth Quat, our reply is as follows:

(1) In the past five financial years (i.e. 2020/21 to 2024/25), the numbers of public rental housing (PRH) units recovered by the Hong Kong Housing Authority (HA), categorised by reasons for recovery, are listed in Annex 1.

(2) Based on the established allocation policies and programmes, the HA allocates newly completed and refurbished recovered PRH units to meet the needs of applicants under various categories. We will allocate most of the units to PRH applicants and closely monitor the actual allocation figures of other categories (e.g. Compassionate Rehousing) to ensure that any units in excess of the estimated demand under other categories would be allocated to PRH applicants by the end of the year. In the past five financial years, the actual numbers of recovered PRH units allocated to PRH applicants and applicants under other categories are tabulated in Annex 2.

(3) In the past five financial years, the numbers of Notices-to-quit issued by the HA, the numbers of appeal cases received by the Appeal Panel (Housing), and the numbers of appeal cases heard by the Appeal Panel (Housing) as well as the rulings are set out by category in Annex 3.

(4) According to the HA’s existing Policy on Grant of New Tenancy (GNT), upon the death or moving out of the principal tenant of a PRH unit, the tenancy can be granted to his/her spouse who has been listed in the tenancy. If there is no surviving spouse listed in the tenancy, one of the authorised family members currently living in the unit can be granted a new tenancy, provided that the Comprehensive Means Test and Domestic Property Test set at the level of Well-off Tenants Policies are passed. In the past five financial years, there were approximately 32 000 GNT cases approved upon the death or moving out of the original principal tenant. The Housing Department (HD) does not keep statistics on the number of rejected applications for GNT and the number of approved GNT cases which involved addition of household members.

(5) In the past five financial years, the HA approved an average of about 44 000 cases per year on the deletion of family members from PRH tenancies. Among these cases, around 16 700 cases arose from death or admission to elderly homes, while the remaining of about 27 300 cases resulted from moving out or other reasons. The HD does not keep statistics on the number of aforesaid cases which involved “well-off tenants”.

(6) In the past five financial years, the numbers of PRH tenants under the HA required to pay 1.5 or double net rent plus rates are listed in Annex 4.

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

June 18, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Euro area monthly balance of payments: April 2025
Source: European Central Bank

18 June 2025
- Current account recorded €20 billion surplus in April 2025, down from €51 billion in previous month
- Current account surplus amounted to €419 billion (2.8% of euro area GDP) in the 12 months to April 2025, up from €339 billion (2.3%) one year earlier
- In financial account, euro area residents’ net acquisitions of non-euro area portfolio investment securities totalled €690 billion and non-residents’ net acquisitions of euro area portfolio investment securities also totalled €690 billion in the 12 months to April 2025
Chart 1

Euro area current account balance

(EUR billions unless otherwise indicated; working day and seasonally adjusted data)

Source: ECB.

The current account of the euro area recorded a surplus of €20 billion in April 2025, a decrease of €31 billion from the previous month (Chart 1 and Table 1). Surpluses were recorded for goods (€30 billion) and services (€ 7 billion), while the primary income account was balanced (€0 billion). A deficit was recorded for secondary income (€16 billion).

Table 1

Current account of the euro area

Source: ECB.

Note: Discrepancies between totals and their components may be due to rounding.

Data for the current account of the euro area

In the 12 months to April 2025, the current account surplus widened to €419 billion (2.8% of euro area GDP), up from a surplus of €339 billion (2.3% of euro area GDP) one year earlier. This increase was mainly driven by larger surpluses for goods (up from €342 billion to €384 billion), services (up from €140 billion to €164 billion) and primary income (up from €25 billion to €48 billion). These developments were partly offset by a larger deficit for secondary income (up from €168 billion to €176 billion).

Chart 2

Selected items of the euro area financial account

(EUR billions; 12-month cumulated data)

Source: ECB.

Notes: For assets, a positive (negative) number indicates net purchases (sales) of non-euro area instruments by euro area investors. For liabilities, a positive (negative) number indicates net sales (purchases) of euro area instruments by non-euro area investors.

In direct investment, euro area residents made net investments of €134 billion in non-euro area assets in the 12 months to April 2025, following net disinvestments of €192 billion one year earlier (Chart 2 and Table 2). Non-residents disinvested €20 billion in net terms from euro area assets in the 12 months to April 2025, following net disinvestments of €334 billion one year earlier.

In portfolio investment, euro area residents’ net purchases of non-euro area equity increased to €135 billion in the 12 months to April 2025, up from €69 billion one year earlier. Over the same period, net purchases of non-euro area debt securities by euro-area residents increased to €555 billion, up from €459 billion one year earlier. Non-residents’ net purchases of euro area equity increased to €365 billion in the 12 months to April 2025, up from €207 billion one year earlier. Over the same period, non-residents made net purchases of euro area debt securities amounting to €325 billion, declining from net purchases of €412 billion one year earlier.

Table 2

Financial account of the euro area

(EUR billions unless otherwise indicated; transactions; non-working day and non-seasonally adjusted data)

Source: ECB.

Notes: Decreases in assets and liabilities are shown with a minus sign. Net financial derivatives are reported under assets. “MFIs” stands for monetary financial institutions. Discrepancies between totals and their components may be due to rounding.

Data for the financial account of the euro area

In other investment, euro area residents recorded net acquisitions of non-euro area assets amounting to €403 billion in the 12 months to April 2025 (following net acquisitions of €163 billion one year earlier), while they recorded net incurrences of liabilities of €122 billion (following net disposals of €142 billion one year earlier).

Chart 3

Monetary presentation of the balance of payments

(EUR billions; 12-month cumulated data)

Source: ECB.

Notes: “MFI net external assets (enhanced)” incorporates an adjustment to the MFI net external assets (as reported in the consolidated MFI balance sheet items statistics) based on information on MFI long-term liabilities held by non-residents, available in b.o.p. statistics. B.o.p. transactions refer only to transactions of non-MFI residents of the euro area. Financial transactions are shown as liabilities net of assets. “Other” includes financial derivatives and statistical discrepancies.

The monetary presentation of the balance of payments (Chart 3) shows that the net external assets (enhanced) of euro area MFIs increased by €452 billion in the 12 months to April 2025. This increase was driven by the current and capital accounts surplus and, to a lesser extent, by euro area non-MFIs’ net inflows in portfolio investment equity and debt and in other investment. These developments were partly offset by euro area non-MFIs’ net outflows in direct investment.

In April 2025 the Eurosystem’s stock of reserve assets decreased to €1,496.9 billion from €1,511 billion in the previous month (Table 3). This decrease was driven by negative exchange rate changes (€18.0 billion) and, to a lesser extent, by negative price changes (€ 1.2 billion). These were partly offset by net acquisitions of assets (€ 5.2 billion).

Table 3

Reserve assets of the euro area

(EUR billions; amounts outstanding at the end of the period, flows during the period; non-working day and non-seasonally adjusted data)

Source: ECB.

Notes: “Other reserve assets” comprises currency and deposits, securities, financial derivatives (net) and other claims. Discrepancies between totals and their components may be due to rounding.

Data for the reserve assets of the euro area

Data revisions

This press release does not incorporate revisions to previous periods.
MIL OSI Europe News –
June 18, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: LCQ18: Bona vacantia properties

Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

LCQ18: Bona vacantia properties
Question:

There are views that along with the demographic changes in Hong Kong, it is expected that the number of bona vacantia properties will continue to increase, which could pose potential challenges to the allocation and management of social resources. It has been reported that in recent years, some gangs have exploited bona vacantia properties to obtain benefits illegally, such as by committing unlawful alienation of the properties, using them for loans or even applying for adverse possession of them, indicating that there are gaps in the regulation of bona vacantia properties. In this connection, will the Government inform this Council:

(1) of the specific number of bona vacantia properties currently under the management of the Lands Department (i.e. those properties originally held by a company that has been dissolved under the Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance (Cap. 32) or the Companies Ordinance (Cap. 622)); the details of the Government’s disposal of such properties in the past five years (including the progress of disposal);

(2) whether it has compiled statistics on the number of bona vacantia properties in Hong Kong which were once held in personal names; whether the Government has currently put in place a relevant mechanism to dispose of such properties; if not, whether it will consider introducing dedicated measures or mechanisms to prevent such bona vacantia properties from being used for unlawful acts; if so, of the details, and whether the Government will impose administrative charges in the process of disposing of such bona vacantia properties and set clear charging standards in this regard; and

(3) as there are views that the management of bona vacantia properties (including those bona vacantia properties which were once held by private individuals or companies) involves the powers and responsibilities of a number of government departments, whether the Government has put in place a cross-departmental co-ordination mechanism to enhance the efficiency of such work; if not, whether it has plans to further strengthen the cross-departmental collaboration on such work?

Reply:

President,

Bona vacantia properties (BVPs) generally refer to some real properties originally owned by individuals or companies, but the individual owners of properties subsequently dies and no one claims the estate, or the companies were liquidated and dissolved. In accordance with the prevailing laws, real properties owned by individuals or companies are handled by different ordinances to ensure that the rights and interests of the legal owners or successors of the properties will not be infringed and that the properties are properly handled when they become BVPs.

Regarding the properties owned by individuals, the Probate and Administration Ordinance (Cap. 10) provides the jurisdiction of the court to handle matters relating to probate and administration of deceased’s estates, including the handling of unclaimed estates of a deceased person. If unclaimed estates involve property assets, the property will be disposed of in an appropriate manner, including sale.

For properties owned by companies, in the course of winding up and dissolution, liquidators will sell properties owned by the companies to pay off outstanding liabilities. If a company, pursuant to the Companies Ordinance (Cap. 622) or the Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance (Cap. 32), completes the procedures for winding up and is about to dissolve, every property and right (such as including some properties that are yet to be sold in the market) vested in or held on trust for the company immediately before the dissolution is vested in the Government as bona vacantia. If such bona vacantia property is a land property, it will be managed by the Lands Department on behalf of the Government.

In the past five years (from June 2020 to May 2025), records from the Land Registry show that the number of sales and purchase agreements for building units in Hong Kong was close to 260 000, while the Lands Department received about 50 new cases of BVPs. It can be seen that BVPs only account a very small portion of the overall property market.

In response to the question raised by the Hon Doreen Kong, our reply in consultation with the Home and Youth Affairs Bureau is as follows:

(1) As of now, the Lands Department has taken over 411 BVPs previously owned by companies, of which about 30 per cent cases are residential units, industrial units, shops and parking spaces. The remaining 70 per cent are the parts jointly owned with other property owners but inseparable, most of which have no market value and cannot be sold, such as external walls, rooftops, platforms, other common parts. As BVPs, especially the abovementioned 30 per cent cases, often involve unclear ownership, encumbrances or the need to first handle problems such as occupation of units, the Lands Department will carefully clarify the relevant legal rights and seek legal advice after receiving referrals from the Companies Registry, other government departments and the Court, etc. After confirming that the property is a BVP, the Lands Department will notify the Land Registry to add a remark that the property has been vested in the Government as bona vacantia, and choose the most appropriate means to dispose of the property. Generally speaking, if the BVPs are suitable for sale in the market (the appropriate cases among the abovementioned 30 per cent cases), the Lands Department will sell the property by tender. In the past five years (from June 2020 to May 2025), the Lands Department received about 50 new cases of BVPs. The Lands Department also sold 16 BVPs through tendering process in the past five years. As for the properties that cannot be sold (i.e. the abovementioned 70 per cent cases), these will continue to be managed by the Lands Department on behalf.

(2) Section 16 of the Probate and Administration Ordinance (Cap. 10) stipulates the cases in which the Official Administrator, assisted by the Probate Registry, is entitled to administer the unclaimed estate of a deceased person as granted by the Court. If the unclaimed estate concerned involves property asset, the property will be disposed of as appropriate. For any unclaimed balance of deceased’s estate, including the money received from the sale of properties, the Official Administrator shall cause an advertisement to invite any claims to be made in accordance with section 23B of the Ordinance. If at the expiration of a period of five years from the date of first publication of such advertisement, the Official Administrator is of the opinion that no claim can reasonably be expected against the estate, the balance of the estate will be transferred to the general revenue of the Government.

Regarding the property fraud issue that the Hon Doreen Kong is concerned about, the current number of cases is still at a low level. Nevertheless, in response to some past fraud cases, the Land Registry will continue to maintain contact and collaboration with the Hong Kong Police Force to exchange information on suspected fraudulent transactions to prevent registrations for properties suspected to have been acquired through fraudulent means. The Property Alert service of the Land Registry will also send email notifications to registered users when the instruments for the sale or mortgage of properties are delivered to the Land Registry for registration.

Besides, the Legislative Council is scrutinising the Registration of Titles and Land (Miscellaneous Amendments) Bill 2025. Under the Land Titles Ordinance (Cap. 585), the title registration system will be implemented on newly granted land first and the Land Registry will be empowered to take measures to reduce the risk of property fraud. Adverse possession will also not be applicable to newly granted land.

(3) As mentioned above, it is not common for BVPs to arise. For BVPs previously owned by companies, the Companies Ordinance (Cap. 622) currently in force has clearly stipulated the circumstances under which the Government will take over BVPs, and the Lands Department, which is responsible for taking over BVPs, also has a well-established mechanism to properly handle these properties. Therefore, we believe that there is no need to set up an inter-departmental mechanism.
Issued at HKT 15:30

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CategoriesMIL-OSI

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

June 18, 2025

Category: Statistics

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