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Category: Statistics

  • MIL-OSI Global: As Trump’s ratings slide, polling data reveals the scale of Fox News’s influence on US politics

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Paul Whiteley, Professor, Department of Government, University of Essex

    Donald Trump’s ratings continue to slide on most issues. Recent Economist/YouGov polling across the US, completed on May 9-12, shows 51% think the country is on the wrong track, while only 45% have a favourable impression of his job as president. On inflation and prices in the shops, only 35% approve of his handling of this policy.

    Trump seems to be scoring particularly badly with young voters. Around 62% of young people (18 to 29s) have an unfavourable opinion of the president, compared with 53% of the over-65s.

    Meanwhile, the Trump administration continues to pursue an agenda to close down, or shackle, much of the media it considers not on his side.

    Funding for national public service radio NPR and television PBS, as well as the global news service Voice of America, is under threat. Some national news outlets are under investigation by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) for their coverage.


    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.


    In a speech in March, Trump said broadcasters CNN and MSNBC, and some newspapers he didn’t name “literally write 97.6% bad about me”. He added: “It has to stop. It has to be illegal.”

    The Trump team clearly see the role of the media as important to establishing and retaining support, and have taken steps to shake up White House coverage – including by changing who can attend the White House press pool.

    About seven in ten members of the American public say they are following the news for updates on the Trump administration. It is interesting, therefore, to consider the role of the media in influencing Trump’s popularity, and insights can be found in the massive US Cooperative Election Study, conducted during the presidential contest last year.

    That survey showed 57% of Americans had watched TV news in the previous 24 hours. Around 81% had used social media during the same period, but only 20% had used it to comment on politics.

    There is a lot of attention being paid to fake news on the internet, which is helping to cause polarisation in the US. But when it comes to news about politics, TV coverage is still very important for most Americans.

    The survey asked respondents about the TV news channels they watched, and Fox News came out on top with 47% of the viewers. ABC came second with 37%, and CBS and CNN tied on 35%. Fox News is Trump’s favourite TV station, with its rightwing populist agenda and regular output of Trump-friendly news.

    Relationship between Trump voters and Fox News’s audience in 2024 US presidential election:


    Source: Author graph based on Cooperative Election Study 2024, CC BY

    The Cooperative Election Study had 60,000 respondents, which provides reasonably sized samples in each of the 50 states. The Trump vote varied quite a lot across states, with only 34% of voters in Maryland supporting him, compared with 72% in Wyoming. The electoral college formally decides the results of presidential elections, and this is based on states – so, looking at voting in this way can be quite revealing.

    The connection between watching Fox News and Trump’s vote share can be seen in the chart above. It varies from 21% who watched the channel in Vermont to 60% in West Virginia.

    Vermont is represented in Congress by Senator Bernie Sanders, a self-described socialist from a radical political tradition, and only 32% voted for Trump there. In contrast, West Virginia is part of the rust belt of impoverished states hit by deindustrialisation and the decline of the coal mining industry, and 71% voted for Trump there.

    We can use a regression model (which looks at the relationship between variables) to predict support for Trump using key measures that drive the vote share for Trump in each state. The model uses three variables to predict the results with 95% accuracy, which means while not perfect, it gives a very accurate prediction of Trump’s vote.

    Not surprisingly, partisanship – that is, the percentage of registered Republicans in each state – is one of the key metrics. In addition, ideology – the percentage of respondents who say they are conservatives – is another.

    Perhaps more surprisingly, the third important predictor is viewership of Fox News. The relationship between watching the channel and voting for Trump is very strong at the state level. Also, the more time people spend watching the channel, the more likely they are to have voted for Trump.

    Impact of key factors on Trump voting in 2024 US election:


    Source: Author based on Cooperative Election Study , CC BY

    This chart calculates the relationship between watching Fox News and other factors and the strength of a state’s support for Trump in 2024. If a variable is a perfect predictor of Trump voting, it would score 1.0 on the scale. If it is a perfect non-predictor, it would score 0.

    So, the most important predictor of being a Trump voter was the presence of conservatives in a state, followed by the percentage of registered Republicans, and the third was watching Fox News. A high score on all three meant greater support for Trump.

    To illustrate this, 45% of Texans considered themselves conservatives, 33% were registered Republicans, and 51% watched Fox News. Using these measures, the model predicts that 57% would vote for Trump. In fact, 56% voted for him in that state in 2024. So, while the prediction was not perfect, it was very close.

    A similar predictive model can be used to forecast former Democratic presidential candidate Kamala Harris’s vote shares by state. In her case, we need four variables to predict the results with 95% accuracy – the percentage of registered Democrats, liberals and moderates in a state, and also Fox News viewership.

    Not surprisingly in Harris’s case, the relationship between Fox News viewing and voting is strongly negative (correlation = -0.64). When viewership was high, the Harris vote was low.

    Years ago, the “fairness doctrine” used to mandate US broadcasters to fairly reflect different viewpoints on controversial issues in their coverage. Candidates for public office were entitled to equal air time.

    But this rule was removed by the FCC in 1987, and has led to an era of some broadcasters becoming far more partisan. The FCC decision followed a period of debate and challenges to the fairness doctrine. This led to its abolition under Ronald Reagan, the Republican president who inspired Project 2025 – the document that in turn appears to be inspiring the Trump government’s policy agenda.

    When the Trump era is over, incumbent Democrats are going to have to repair US institutions that this administration has damaged. If they want to do something about the polarisation of US politics, they may also need to restore the fairness doctrine.

    Had it not been removed in the first place, it is possible that Harris would have won the 2024 presidential election, since Fox News would not exist in its present form. Whatever happens next, the US media is likely to play an important role.

    Paul Whiteley has received funding from the British Academy and the ESRC.

    – ref. As Trump’s ratings slide, polling data reveals the scale of Fox News’s influence on US politics – https://theconversation.com/as-trumps-ratings-slide-polling-data-reveals-the-scale-of-fox-newss-influence-on-us-politics-256274

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: More than 18,000 foreign-invested companies were established in China in January-April 2025

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BEIJING, May 23 (Xinhua) — A total of 18,832 new foreign-funded companies were established on the Chinese mainland in the first four months of 2025, up 12.1 percent year on year, the Ministry of Commerce said Friday.

    As noted by the department, from January to April, the volume of actually used foreign direct investment (FDI) in mainland China amounted to 320.78 billion yuan (about 44.6 billion US dollars), which is 10.9 percent less year-on-year.

    At the same time, the volume of actually used FDI in the manufacturing sector during the reporting period reached 84.06 billion yuan, and another 231.25 billion yuan went to the service sector.

    The actual FDI in high-tech industries rose to 96.71 billion yuan, with FDI in the e-commerce services sector increasing by 137 percent, in the aerospace equipment manufacturing sector by 86.2 percent, in the chemical and pharmaceutical industry by 57.8 percent, and in the medical instruments and equipment manufacturing sector by 4.9 percent.

    According to statistics from China’s Ministry of Commerce, investment from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) increased by 42.9 percent year-on-year during the period, while investment from Japan increased by 74.2 percent. Investment from Switzerland increased by 68.4 percent, from the United Kingdom by 54.6 percent, from the Republic of Korea by 22.3 percent, and from Germany by 12.3 percent. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Esophagogastric Tube Recall: BD Issues Correction for Esophagogastric Balloon Tamponade Tubes due to Challenges Removing Plastic Plugs from Rubber Lumen

    Source: US Department of Health and Human Services – 3

    This recall involves updating the Instructions for using these devices and does not involve removing them from where they are used or sold. The FDA has identified this recall as the most serious type. This device may cause serious injury or death if you continue to use it without following the updated instructions.
    Affected Product 

    The FDA is aware that BD and their subsidiary C.R. Bard Urology and Critical Care have issued a letter to affected customers that all lots of certain esophagogastric balloon tamponade tubes have updated use instructions:

    Device Name

    Model Number

    UDI-DI

    Bard Minnesota Four Lumen Esophagogastric Tamponade Tube
    0092220
    00801741076824

    Bard Blakemore Esophageal Nasogastric Tube 
    0092100 
    00801741076800

    Bard Blakemore Esophageal Nasogastric Tube (Child)
    0092110
    00801741076817

    Bard Blakemore Esophageal Nasogastric Tube (Intermediate)
    0092300 
    00801741076831

    Bard Single Intragastric Linton Balloon Tube
    0092740
    00801741076848

    What to Do
    These devices are used in critical and emergency situations. Users should review and follow the updated instructions for removal of the plastic plugs provided below prior to continued use. 

    On April 17, BD sent all affected customers a letter with recommended actions. On May 19, 2025, a follow-up letter was sent with more detailed instructions:

    Follow the Plastic Plug Removal Instructions: 

    Before use with patients, prepare the device by removing the plastic plugs and set them aside to remain with the device.  
    To aid in plug removal, fully open the 5” Straight Smooth Jaw Hemostats and insert one hemostat jaw between the plug and the rubber lumen. While the hemostat jaw is inserted, rotate the jaw around the plug’s circumference as seen in the image below. Remove the hemostat, then the plug.
    Following removal of the plastic plugs, test the balloons for evidence of air leaks prior to proceeding with the remaining steps required for placement as described in the original instructions for use (IFU).

    Check all inventory locations within your institution for the affected product. Post the provided notice where the devices are stored. 
    Store 5” Straight Smooth Jaw Hemostat with the affected devices for immediate availability to be used for plastic plug removal.  
    Have secondary balloon tamponade devices available for immediate replacement if the first device is damaged during plastic plug removal. 
    Share the provided notice with any users of the product within your facilities or with any interfacility users where product was transferred, to ensure they are also aware of this Medical Device Correction. 

    Check this web page for updates. The FDA is currently reviewing information about this potentially high-risk device issue and will keep the public informed as significant new information becomes available.

    Reason for Updated Use Instructions
    BD has become aware that users are sometimes unable, or find it difficult, to remove the plastic plugs from the rubber lumen in order to inflate the gastric and/or esophageal balloons. In some cases, the devices may become damaged during removal of the plastic plugs in which a replacement device will be needed. 
    Potential health consequences include delay in diagnosis or delay in treatment which may result in the onset or prolongation of hypotension and its potential short and long-term complications, up to and including death. This issue may also result in additional and unexpected diagnostic and medical/surgical interventions to manage the patient’s bleeding.
    BD has reported two serious injuries and one death associated with this issue.
    Device Use
    Esophagogastric balloon tamponade tubes are devices made of flexible tubing used to help identify and control bleeding from enlarged veins in the esophagus and stomach. The tubes use pressure from balloons to compress an area to help control bleeding, and suction ports to remove fluids from the esophagus and stomach.
    Contact Information
    Customers in the U.S. with adverse reactions, quality problems, or questions about this recall should contact BD at productcomplaints@bd.com or 1-844-823-5433 and say “product complaints” when prompted.
    Unique Device Identifier (UDI)
    The unique device identifier (UDI) helps identify individual medical devices sold in the United States from distribution to use. The UDI allows for more accurate reporting, reviewing, and analyzing of adverse event reports so that devices can be identified more quickly, and as a result, problems potentially resolved more quickly.

    How do I report a problem?
    Health care professionals and consumers may report adverse reactions or quality problems they experienced using these devices to MedWatch: The FDA Safety Information and Adverse Event Reporting Program. 

    Content current as of:
    05/23/2025

    MIL OSI USA News –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Canada: Retail Trade Growth Continues Upward Trend in Saskatchewan

    Source: Government of Canada regional news

    Released on May 23, 2025

    Province Ranks Second in Canada for Retail Trade Growth

    Saskatchewan’s retail sector continues to show strong performance, with a 8.2 per cent year-over-year increase in retail trade sales from March 2024 to March 2025 (seasonally adjusted). This places Saskatchewan second in the nation.

    “These statistics speak to the stability of Saskatchewan’s economy and the strength of our business community,” Trade and Export Development Minister Warren Kaeding said. “Every new purchase made here helps drive opportunity by supporting jobs, encouraging investment and reinforcing confidence in our province’s business friendly environment.”

    The total value of Saskatchewan’s retail trade reached 2.2 billion in March 2025.

    The Monthly Retail Trade Survey compiles data on sales, including e-commerce sales, and the amount of retail locations by province, territory and selected census metropolitan areas from a sample of retailers.

    Retail sales is a measure of total receipts at stores, or establishments, that sell goods and services to final consumers.

    Statistics Canada’s latest Gross Domestic Product (GDP) numbers indicate that Saskatchewan’s real GDP at basic prices reached an all-time high of $80.5 billion in 2024, increasing by $2.6 billion, or 3.4 per cent. This places Saskatchewan second in the nation for real GDP growth and above the national average of 1.6 per cent.

    Private capital investment in Saskatchewan increased last year by 17.3 per cent to $14.7 billion, ranking first among provinces. Private capital investment is projected to reach $16.2 billion in 2025, an increase of 10.1 per cent over 2024. This is the second highest anticipated percentage increase among the provinces.

    Last year, the Government of Saskatchewan unveiled its new Securing the Next Decade of Growth – Saskatchewan’s Investment Attraction Strategy. This strategy, combined with Saskatchewan’s trade and investment website, InvestSK.ca, contains helpful information for potential markets and solidifies the province as the best place to do business in Canada. 

    For more information visit: InvestSK.ca.

    -30-

    For more information, contact:

    MIL OSI Canada News –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Experts of the Committee on the Rights of the Child Commend Brazil’s Programmes to Improve the Situation of Children in Alternative Care, Raise Questions on Combatting Racism in Schools and Child Food Insecurity

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Committee on the Rights of the Child today concluded its review of the combined fifth to seventh periodic reports of Brazil under the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and its initial report under the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography. Committee Experts commended the State on programmes developed to improve the situation of children in alternative care, while raising questions on how Brazil was combatting racism in schools and addressing the high levels of food insecurity in the country, particularly for children. 

    Bragi Gudbrandsson, Committee Expert and Country Taskforce Member, said there were three public comprehensive polices or programmes which had recently been introduced in Brazil to strengthen the family and improve the situation of children placed in alternative care.  These were wonderful programmes; were they coordinated in terms of implementation at the federal, state and municipal levels?

    Faith Marshall-Harris, Committee Expert and County Taskforce Coordinator, said the federal law 10639/2003 was very impressive as it sought to change a culture of racism and teach Afro-Brazilian history in schools.  However, 71 per cent of municipalities had failed to comply with this. What means did the State have to ensure compliance?  Cephas Lumina, Committee Vice Chair and Country Taskforce Member, said there was information that education in Brazil was not fully inclusive; what steps were being taken to enforce the law which mandated the teaching of Afro-Brazilian culture in primary education?

    Hynd Ayoubi Idrissi, Committee Expert and Country Taskforce Member, said 33 million Brazilians were believed to be living in food insecurity.  What was being done to reduce social inequality, guarantee access to decent housing, and combat food insecurity?  Did the State party have a multidimensional measure on child poverty? Ms. Marshall Harris also said Brazil had become the leading donor in the Global South.  However, it was concerning that charity was not starting at home, as there were many children that were hungry.  These children needed to be looked after first.   

    The delegation said the State was committed to implementing the law 10639/2023.  In the first year of functioning, 97.3 percent of municipalities had committed to participating, which did not reflect the 24 per cent suggested.  Public schools aimed to promote Afro-Brazilian teachings and Quilombola culture throughout the school curriculum.  It was ensured that these topics were reflected in teaching materials and throughout the school programme.  In August this year, 150,000 basic educational professionals would be trained in ethnic and racial relations. 

    The delegation said Brazil understood the importance of addressing the situation of hunger affecting children.  According to data from the United Nations Children’s Fund in 2023, the number of those suffering from hunger dropped to around five per cent compared to around seven per cent in 2018.  Policies such as the Bolsa Familia programme had been improved and were used as a key tool to identify and reach the most vulnerable families.  Brazil had been investing in data systems for years and used this information to flag the levels of vulnerability in families and maximise the allocation of resources, ensuring it reached those who needed it most. 

    Introducing the report, Macaé Maria Evaristo Dos Santos, Minister of Human Rights and Citizenship of Brazil and head of the delegation, reiterated the Government’s commitment to the protection and promotion of the rights of children and adolescents in Brazil, which was the duty of the country.  In 2025, Brazil was commemorating the thirty-fifth anniversary of the Statute of the Child and Adolescent.  Since 2023, under President Lula, essential public policies, which had been dismantled, were put back in place, giving priority to human rights in public policies, and guaranteeing broad social participation, respect for diversity, and implementation of efforts to overcome inequality on the basis of class, gender, religion and other factors. 

    In closing remarks, Ms. Marshall Harris said Brazil’s star was on the rise and the country was fast becoming a world leader in many areas, including agriculture, technology, and research.  However, if the State continued to disengage, disinherit and decimate children of African descent and other ethnic groups, there would be nothing left for anyone to inherit.  Brazil needed to urgently invest resources in nurturing all children in the country, not just some of the children.  The Committee was confident this could be done. 

     

    In her closing remarks, Ms. Evaristo dos Santos said Brazil was proud of recently adopted public policies and believed that these would help young Black people and other marginalised groups to achieve their dreams.  Inequality remained the main challenge in Brazil, and it was important to ensure that State policies addressed the most vulnerable.  The country was determined to build on the progress presented over the past two days. 

     

    The delegation of Brazil was comprised of representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Ministry of Human Rights and Citizenship; the Ministry of Culture; the Ministry of Education; the Ministry of Health; the Ministry of Racial Equality; the Ministry of Social Assistance and Development, Family and Hunger Relief; the Ministry of Women; the National Council of Justice; the National Data Protection Authority; and the Permanent Mission of Brazil to the United Nations Office at Geneva. 

    Summaries of the public meetings of the Committee can be found here, while webcasts of the public meetings can be found here. The programme of work of the Committee’s ninety-ninth session and other documents related to the session can be found here.

    The Committee will next meet in public at 5 p.m. on Friday, 30 May to close its ninety-ninth session. 

    Reports

    The Committee has before it the combined fifth to seventh periodic reports of Brazil (CRC/C/BRA/5-7), and its initial report under the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography (CRC/C/OPSC/BRA/1). 

    Presentation of Reports

    MACAÉ MARIA EVARISTO DOS SANTOS, Minister of Human Rights and Citizenship of Brazil and head of the delegation, reiterated the Government’s commitment to the protection and promotion of the rights of children and adolescents in Brazil, which was the duty of the country.  Brazil did this through the Constitution, laws, plans, initiatives and programmes. In 2025, Brazil was commemorating the thirty-fifth anniversary of the Statute of the Child and Adolescent. 

    The census of 2022 showed there were 52 million children and adolescents in the country, making up 25.4 per cent of the population.  The indigenous and Quilombola populations had a bigger percentage of children and adolescents, 35 per cent for the indigenous population and 29 per cent for the Quilombola population.  In 2022, there were 80,000 complaints made, with 41 per cent of them affecting children and adolescents. 

    Since 2023, under President Lula, essential public policies, which had been dismantled, were put back in place, giving priority to human rights in public policies, and guaranteeing broad social participation, respect for diversity, and implementation of efforts to overcome inequality on the basis of class, gender, religion and other factors. 

    In 2022, the National Council for the Rights of Adolescents was established, and the twelfth national conference on the rights of the child and adolescent was implemented in 2024.  Democratic policies, with direct participation of children and adolescents, had resumed through the participatory committee for adolescents.  The comprehensive protection of children was a key factor in all State policies in a decentralised manner.  A comprehensive agenda for children and adolescents had been created up to 2027, with 109 relevant actions.  These efforts had been designed to ensure the right to food and minimum income.  The income transfer programme had contributed to decent living standards, giving access to health, education, social assistance and poverty eradication. 

    The social assistance system had different areas of action for vulnerable families and established social centres, which were refuges providing social assistance for street dwellers.  A national care policy had been established in 2024, focused on children with disabilities, older persons and women.  As for food security, there was a national school food programme which supported over 38 million school children.  Assistance was provided regarding basic education to vulnerable students, with the goal to achieve another four million enrolments by 2026. 

    The child literacy programme, present in 29 states, sought to increase the child literary rate from 36 per cent in 2021 to 56 per cent, recovering to pre-COVID-19 levels. A programme was in place to support children in middle school with monthly bursaries, assisting four million young people in low-income families in 2024.  The implementation of the national equity policy for education for children, including the Quilombola and indigenous education programme, sought to invest by 2027 in these populations.

    Brazil had a comprehensive public health system which provided primary care to the vast majority of the population.  The State sought to reduce child mortality, promote breastfeeding, and ensure early childhood development, including ensuring vaccination and combatting disinformation.  As a result, Brazil was no longer on the World Health Organization list of countries with least vaccination rates.  Brazil also sought to reduce maternal mortality, particularly among black women, and organise and ensure effective pregnancy, birth and post-partum care. 

    A digital health book for children had been created to ensure childhood development.  There had been investment in the healthcare of indigenous children in 2024 through vaccinations, treatment from malaria, and the construction of new health facilities.  As for children with disabilities, in 2024, a new plan was implemented with measures to create specialised rehabilitation centres and a plan for special and inclusive education.  A ministerial working group was established for children diagnosed with autism.  The State was investing heavily in services for children with disabilities. 

    In 2025, the fourth national action plan to prevent and eradicate child labour would be published, and the State would create a national unit to support children involved in child labour.  This year, the State celebrated 25 years of combatting the abuse and sexual exploitation of children and adolescents.  The notification of cases of sexual violence had increased and there was a greater awareness of this phenomenon.  Over 500 units and 30,000 professionals were trained to address this, including educators, judges, police officers, and volunteers in child rights centres, among others.  This was part of efforts to prevent violations of child rights.  In 2017, the law on protection was adopted and response centres had been established, including in the Amazon, which provided safe care to victims of violence.  The centres provided psychological assistance, medical evaluations, health care and access to the justice system.   

    The Black Youth Alive Programme covered several ministries seeking to protect this vulnerable population group.  Strong action was being taken to protect lives and promote cultural rights among young people.  A national judicial policy had been created for young children, which sought to broaden access to justice and promote collective actions.  Brazil was committed to overcome the obstacles that still affected the full enjoyment of the rights of all children in the country. 

    Questions by Committee Experts under the Convention 

    FAITH MARSHALL-HARRIS, Committee Expert and County Taskforce Coordinator, said she had great respect for the plans outlined by Brazil, which were well drafted and creative. Additionally, the Statute of the Child and Adolescent was one of the earliest documents of its time but also one of the most advanced.  However, its implementation was lagging behind the goals that the country had set out, which was a shame.  What was the reason for this lag?  Was it because of State resistance or due to a lack of resources?  Where was the gap? 

    The federal law 10639/2003 was very impressive as it sought to change a culture of racism and teach Afro-Brazilian history in schools.  However, 71 per cent of municipalities had failed to comply with this. What means did the State have to ensure compliance?  The size and complexity of Brazil was difficult.  However, not enough strides had been made concerning what the State had set out to do and what had been done. 

    The multi-year plan to 2027 included children but was not specifically about children.  Would this be revised to target children specifically?  What efforts were being made to coordinate civil society to achieve outcomes for children? To what extent were civil society members engaged by the Government?  It was concerning that investment in education seemed to be decreasing, according to reports.  Could this be explained?  The school feeding programme was very admirable; however, why were so many children still hungry in the country?  It was concerning that the data being received was not disaggregated.  The State was urged to do more in the way of data collection. 

    HYND AYOUBI IDRISSI, Committee Expert and Country Taskforce Member, thanked the Minister for the introduction.  Discrimination was everywhere, affecting many groups, including indigenous children, children of African descent, and those who were economically vulnerable.  What measures were being taken to ensure there was a comprehensive law which prohibited all forms of discrimination? Were there measures being taken to implement mechanisms for appeals and reparations?  What was being done in terms of prevention?  What assessment was conducted on the best interest of the child? What was being done in terms of the participation of children below the age of 12? 

    Progress had been made to combat child and infant mortality since 2016, but there was still a persistence in deaths, particularly of indigenous children under four, due to respiratory diseases from deforestation.  Violence was very present and was a worrying phenomenon.  Between 2021 and 2023, there had been more than 15,000 murders of those under 19 years old, with 17 per cent of deaths due to the actions of law enforcement agencies, with most victims being black teenagers. What was being done to tangibly remedy this situation?  How were these deaths being prevented?  How could the State put an end to the disproportionate use of force?  Had any independent enquiries been carried out? If so, what were the results?  Had any reparations been provided? 

    There had been a rise in deaths of children aged zero to four and between the ages of five and nine due to domestic violence.  What was being done to tangibly combat this?  Each hour, 13 children and adolescents were affected by violence in Brazil; what measures were being taken to implement the relevant legislation? What measures were being taken to end child marriage?  What measures were being taken to prevent sexual violence?  How was it ensured that the reporting mechanism would be accessible for children and adolescents?  What was there in terms of rehabilitation? Was there statistical information on the number of prosecutions?  What reparations were being taken regarding these children? 

    CEPHAS LUMINA, Committee Vice Chair and Country Taskforce Member, said data from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics showed a notable rise in birth registration for indigenous children.  However, the region in the north still lagged behind the national average. What steps was the Government taking to strengthen efforts to achieve national birth registration?  The preliminary ban on data for the use of artificial intelligence systems was welcomed.  What efforts was the Government taking to strengthen regulations around data for children?  What steps was the Government taking to ensure that regulations in the digital environment safeguarded children from harmful materials?  Were there any established procedures and mechanisms for prosecuting instances where children’s rights were violated?  Were there any avenues for seeking redress in this regard? 

    BRAGI GUDBRANDSSON, Committee Expert and Country Taskforce Member, said there were three public comprehensive polices or programmes which had recently been introduced in Brazil to strengthen the family and improve the situation of children placed in alternative care.  These were wonderful programmes; were they coordinated in terms of implementation at the federal, state and municipal levels?  If so, how was this managed?  Were these programmes evaluated regularly?  Did they address the systematic racism across sectors?  How was it ensured that they equally benefitted all children in all states and municipalities in Brazil. 

    It seemed there were around 46,000 children in institutions in Brazil and 4,000 foster parents; were these figures correct?  Would the State work to improve data on out of home placements?  How were municipalities supported in recruiting foster families, particularly in rural areas?  Was there support, training and counselling for foster parents?  Were there quality standards for residential care institutions?  Were the monitoring reports systematically established and published?  Did children have safe spaces to report abuses in the institutions?  Had there been awareness campaigns to promote domestic adoption for children permanently denied of parental care? 

    The law which allowed incarcerated mothers to care for young children under house arrest was often not applied correctly; was there a monitoring mechanism for this law?  Did legislation provide for psychosocial assistance for children whose parents were incarcerated? 

    Responses by the Delegation 

    The delegation said Brazil was a federated republic and was dealing with states and municipalities, which was why there were some difficulties in implementing policies. The Federal Government co-financed activities which were priorities, including on early education.  In Brazil, there was a fund which financed basic education and it had resources drawn from taxation.  Co-financing was a key element in reducing inequalities. 

    There needed to be huge efforts made to implement legislation.  The Black and indigenous populations had been exploited over hundreds of years, and progress had only begun to be made this century.  Brazil was now playing an important role in reaffirming the value of democracy and multilateralism and promoting a society free from racism.  There had been efforts made to set up the Ministry for Women and the Racial Equality Ministry, which had made major strides for the Quilombola population. The children living in these areas often suffered from violence. 

    The Human Rights and Citizenship Ministry had been destroyed under the previous administration and a number of agendas were now being rebuilt.  For the first time in the country, there was now a Ministry for Indigenous Peoples which was a major step forward.  It was important to recognise the crucial role played by indigenous populations in defending the land and protecting nature.  Brazilian and transnational companies sought to move into the disputed lands.  It was vital to protect these traditional lands and communities. 

    The plan on violence and sexual exploitation, the plan on the care for young children, and the plan on addressing child labour were currently being implemented among all federal states.  Civil society participated in building public policies.  The cross-cutting agenda to 2027 brought five agendas in all public policies.  There had also been a twelfth national conference on the rights of children and young people in April, which discussed COVID-19 and needs for reparations and health, among other topics.  There were a lot of proposals adopted and 47 young people participated in the conference.

    The unified social assistance programme was decentralised and worked as a system of protection.  There were around 9,000 centres of reference which worked with vulnerable families carrying out prevention campaigns on sexual abuse.  In 2024, care was provided to 58,000 adolescents and children who were victims of violence, as well as 35,000 victims of sexual violence. 

    There were many children involved in the deinstitutionalisation process.  The State was aiming to have more children in foster care.  There had been a 405 per cent increase in the number of services.  A joint recommendation had been made, aimed at increasing the number of foster care places. 

    Research had been conducted to understand what was happening with co-funding.  It was determined that this was not a well-known area. A guide for fostering had been introduced, with more than 35,000 copies disseminated.  National and regional seminars had been held to inform people, along with online courses.  This would ensure that the more far-flung regions of the country could be reached.  The aim was to have 25 per cent of children in foster homes; however, much remained to be done in this regard.  All institutions were monitored at the federal level and municipal councils were also responsible for monitoring.  It was important to hear from the children and teenagers themselves to determine if any violations had taken place. 

    The National Council for Justice was a public institution which aimed to perfect the judiciary’s work in Brazil.  A range of judicial decisions had been adopted to protect children and adolescents. Resolution 299/2018 established specific methods for specialised listening of the testimony of children who were witnesses or victims of crime.  It aimed to ensure children’s testimonies were only heard once, so the child was not revictimised.  In Brazil, there were 187 minor courts which were exclusively for crimes against children and adolescents; 817 new rooms had been implemented for children to make testimonies. 

    It was important to incorporate a racial dimension to legal sentences.  A protocol was developed to combat racism within the judiciary, aimed at strengthening equitable practices within the justice system. It also highlighted the need to address the specific vulnerabilities of children and adolescents in judicial cases. The National Council had a campaign regarding registration, aiming to increase access to documents for the most vulnerable.  Psychosocial care could be provided to children or adolescents if their parents were incarcerated.  The National Council always conducted its operations with the best interests of the child in mind. 

    The national education system was a key tool to secure the rights of children, ensuring all children in all territories had access to quality, public education.  The school census of 2024 found that there were 47 million enrolments in 179,000 primary schools.  Programmes had been designed to ensure comprehensive child education, including one which aimed to have a million new registration enrolments every year. School attendance was a condition of receiving the cash transfer.  A programme had been created for an allowance, which could only be withdrawn when a child had finished middle school.   

    A law was introduced this year which prohibited the use of smartphones in schools, even in breaks, except in exceptional circumstances.  This initiative had meant there was more social interaction and led to better mental health for students.  The connective schools programme provided resources to ensure that connectivity in all schools was prioritised, and that all pupils had access to different technologies.  Efforts had been made to train teachers through continued education. 

    A statement had been published stating that any data processing should seek the best interest of the child.  A regulation was being drawn up with an article regarding the processing of data on children.  The biometric data regulation applied to facial recognition and was used often in schools for monitoring security.  A guide was being provided for high-risk data processing and other instruments.  The data protection law guaranteed citizens’ rights, including children, to have clear information on the processing of their personal data. 

    Questions by Committee Experts under the Convention 

    BRAGI GUDBRANDSSON, Committee Expert and Country Taskforce Member, said there were two significant plans regarding the rights of persons with disabilities.  It was understood that there had been issues in implementing these plans; could more information be provided?  What was the State doing to overcome these challenges? Did the Government have plans to address inadequacies in funding in the healthcare sector?  The family health service was a fundamental measure that ensured family health care access.  However, only 60 per cent of the population enjoyed these services; what measures were being undertaken to expand and strengthen the service?  Were there plans to address the issue of child mortality? Was the State party aware of shortcomings in the mental health services?  Was there a strategy to address these?

    It was concerning that there was a rise in the numbers of suicides and self-mutilation; what were the explanations for this and how were these issues being addressed?  It was noted that hormone blockers were now banned and treatments for transgender children was being delayed from 16 to 18. It was clear that the current situation for many was a life-threatening situation.  Did the Government have plans to support the trans children and adolescent community by ensuring access to support?  How was it ensured that children received comprehensive reproductive materials?  Access to abortion was not ensured across the State and other services were extremely lacking, which needed to be addressed; was the State aware of this?  Could pregnant girls rely on support from the authorities if consent for abortion could not be obtained from their parents? Were there any plans to prohibit non-consensual therapies against intersex children? 

    HYND AYOUBI IDRISSI, Committee Expert and Country Taskforce Member, said 33 million Brazilians were believed to be living in food insecurity.  What was being done to reduce social inequality, guarantee access to decent housing, and combat food insecurity?  Did the State party have a multidimensional measure on child poverty? 

    CEPHAS LUMINA, Committee Vice Chair and Country Taskforce Member, said the Committee was concerned about the issue of environmental degradation, particularly deforestation in the Amazon.  Children in rural communities were disproportionately affected by climate change. The insufficient participation of children in climate policy was also a concern.  What steps was the Government taking to combat environmental degradation? How were children’s needs and views considered in the development of climate change programmes?  What measures was the Government implementing to tackle the issue of toxic pesticides? 

    What steps was the Government taking to address the disparities in education quality between public and private schools, and ensure that private schools were fully integrated into the national education system?  There was information that education in Brazil was not fully inclusive; what steps were being taken to enforce the law which mandated the teaching of Afro-Brazilian culture in primary education? 

    How did the State plan to address the disparities in access to educational opportunities between Black students and their peers?  The Committee was concerned about the dropout rates of girls; how was the Government tackling this issue? 

    FAITH MARSHALL-HARRIS, Committee Expert and County Taskforce Coordinator, said the State had previously welcomed a large amount of Venezuelan and Haitian children, but this had recently been halted.  In terms of immigration, there needed to be a reform, so that children did not end up trafficked or on the street.  How many children were being denied their ancestral rights, including to inherit the lands their parents grew up on?  Were the lands still being sprayed by pesticides?  It was concerning that children were drinking contaminated water due to the extractive industries.  It was hoped the State would address this. 

    The access to justice for indigenous children seemed limited; how was the State party teaching them their rights?  There needed to be official statistics for street children; what was the State doing for these children?  Child labour was too high in Brazil.  Were labour inspections undertaken?  Domestic servitude of Black girls was worrying and needed to be addressed. What had happened to the Black Youth Alive strategy?  Was the State as concerned as the Committee about what was happening to Black youth, including shootings of Black youth in the favela areas by police.  It seemed that Brazil did not have an age of criminal responsibility. 

    Questions by Committee Experts under the Optional Protocol 

    BRAGI GUDBRANDSSON, Committee Expert and Country Taskforce Member, said the first national strategy to protect children from violence, crimes and drugs had been launched; did this include issues covered by the Optional Protocol?  Did it target children in the most vulnerable situations? How was awareness raising of the Optional Protocol conducted?  The Committee was concerned about rising cases of children trafficked for illegal adoptions, often facilitated through digital platforms.  Was the State aware of these concerns?  What measures had been taken to address them?  The tourist law was a wonderful law; however, there were concerns that child exploitation continued to occur in tourist areas.  Had measures been taken to identify child victims of sexual tourism?  Some 87 per cent of parents believed that companies were not doing enough to protect children online; how was the State addressing this concern? 

    ROSARIA CORREA PULICE, Committee Expert and Country Taskforce Member, asked how Brazil was specifically criminalising cybercrimes?  What were the specific penalties and sanctions regarding the production and distribution of child sexual material, used to extort children? What would be the specific penalty in this regard?  Regarding child sex abuse in sport, there was not much data in this regard, leading to underreporting.  The highway police had identified 9,000 areas along the federal highways where there could be child sexual exploitation; however, there was no further information as to the outcome of this programme.  What cases had been heard?  What cases had been prosecuted?  How many convictions had there been?  There had been an operation which led to the detention of 470 adults and the rescuing of 80 minors; what had happened with this operation?  Where did it lead to?  Had there been studies conducted on the victim profile?  The tourist law regulated other forms of abuse, including applications like AirBnB.  How was this regulated? 

    Questions by a Committee Expert under the Convention 

    FAITH MARSHALL-HARRIS, Committee Expert and County Taskforce Coordinator, said Brazil had ratified nearly every human rights treaty, but it was shocking that it had not established a national human rights institution.  When would the country do this?  Brazil had become the leading donor in the Global South.  However, it was concerning that charity was not starting at home, as there were many children that were hungry.  These children needed to be looked after first. With the business sector, it was important to establish regimes to eliminate child labour, and to establish impact assessments for industries harmful to children like the extractive industries.  The State should carefully examine access to justice in terms of the marginalised communities.  Were all professionals working with children trained in the area of child rights? 

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said Brazil understood the importance of addressing the situation of hunger affecting children.  According to data from the United Nations Children’s Fund, in 2023, the number of those suffering from hunger dropped to around five per cent compared to around seven per cent in 2018.  The State recognised there were still challenges and was targeting specific efforts for people of African descent, but there was a positive downward trend. 

    Policies such as the Bolsa Familia programme had been improved and were used as a key tool to identify and reach the most vulnerable families.  Brazil had been investing in data systems for years and used this information to flag the levels of vulnerability in families and maximise the allocation of resources, ensuring it reached those who needed it most.  The Food and Agricultural Organization had noted a drop in overall food insecurity in 2023.  Brazil shared its technical knowledge with other countries who were facing similar issues of food insecurity.

    There were more than 300 ethnicities of indigenous peoples all across Brazil.  Significant work was being done to train indigenous teachers, who organised their own schools with their own languages, using their own educational process.  It was important to respect the self-determination of these populations. The position of President Lula was to defend indigenous territories and their populations. 

    The right to health was ensured through the universal health care system.  The family health care units consolidated and rolled out public health care in Brazil, and the number of teams caring for vulnerable populations had significantly increased.  Investment in primary health care had been increased to 2.82 billion dollars in 2024.  The national comprehensive childcare policy aimed to promote and check the health of children.  Deaths of children under the age of five had dropped from 16 per 1,000 live births, to 12.6 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2023.  Brazil still faced many challenges, including regional disparities. 

    The State was increasing funding to the neonatal units and human milk banks, and was setting up proper day clinics to assist Black mothers.  A national movement for vaccination had been launched to combat disinformation.  A National Committee on Breastfeeding had been established.  Around 325 centres in the country were authorised for the rehabilitation of persons with disabilities.  A national action plan had been developed which outlined more centres to be developed and care to be increased. 

    A health booklet for young people and adolescents was available digitally.  Health professionals were trained to prevent teen pregnancy, with a national week established in this regard, promoting long-term campaigns focused on reproductive health.  As a result, there had been a reduction in teen pregnancies to 12 per cent in 2023.  However, teen pregnancies among girls between the ages of 10 and 13 years in Brazil were still a real concern. 

    “Sinan” was the notification system used to monitor and prevent violence.  It had information disaggregated by race, colour, gender identity, sexual identity and other details, including the place where the violence occurred and the type of violence.  In 2023 in Brazil, there were 37,000 cases reported of sexual violence against children and adolescents.  In seven per cent of cases, these were adolescents and children with disabilities. 

    The Health Ministry recognised underreporting of violence in the health system.  In 2023, there were 419 deaths at the hands of law enforcement.  Efforts had been made to improve the registration of deaths by external cause, through the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Justice.  There had been a rise in the number of suicides recorded in recent decades, which was a complex and multifaceted phenomenon. Brazil reaffirmed its commitment to addressing violence affecting young people in the country and recognised that this was a serious issue affecting public health.

    Brazil had a psychosocial care network within the health system, which provided decentralised care in psychosocial care centres and residential care centres.  There were more than 3,000 psychosocial care centres, with more than 300 which were just for young people.  These centres promoted comprehensive mental health care with a focus on deinstitutionalisation and strengthening family links.

    It was not possible to confer that 24 per cent of schools were not upholding the law to teach Afro-Brazilian history.  The State was committed to implementing the law 10639/2023.  In the first year of functioning, 97.3 per cent of municipalities had committed to participating, which did not reflect the 24 per cent suggested.  Public schools aimed to promote Afro-Brazilian teachings and Quilombola culture throughout the school curriculum.  It was ensured that these topics were reflected in teaching materials and throughout the school programme. 

    In August this year, 150,000 basic educational professionals would be trained in ethnic and racial relations.  The indigenous and Quilombola schools were still a challenge for the Federal Government. Since 2012, there had been national guidelines on human rights education, designed for basic and higher education. 

    Poverty and equality were among the key challenging issues in Brazil.  The Bolsa Familia programme was the biggest cash transfer programme which had lifted millions of families out of poverty.  The new design launched in 2023 had brought significant results in combatting hunger.  The programme prioritised women and children and aimed to strengthen the access of families to basic rights such as social assistance.  There were conditionalities to accessing the programme, such as children being required to attend school.

    Brazil had a law which considered the dual vulnerability of teenagers and girls. The State was proud of this law which was popular and well understood throughout the country.  It prevented domestic and family violence against women, aiming to eradicate and punish this scourge.  Brazil had been investing in ongoing training of those who took calls to hotlines, to provide humane treatment and recognise the different kinds of sexual and family violence against girls and women.  Work was being done to monitor misogyny in the online space. 

    Many initiatives had been developed to combat hunger and poverty, with a focus on gender and race. Many of the recipients of the Bolsa Familia programme were headed by women.  The national care policy recognised care as something which needed to be provided by the State, not just women, and recognised care as a fundamental right. 

    Questions by Committee Experts under the Convention 

    FAITH MARSHALL-HARRIS, Committee Expert and County Taskforce Coordinator, said it was concerning that there were reports of a high rate of suicide and alienation of indigenous children, and a significant amount of poverty.  Could the work of the National Foundation of Indigenous Persons be clarified?  Was it working for indigenous populations?  Was there a national Ombudsman for children? 

    It was concerning that there were no definitive statistics on how many children were in detention.  The age of criminal responsibility in the State seemed to be from around 10 to 12 years, as children could be sentenced to some form of detention.  This was concerning, as this was not keeping in line with the recommendations of the Committee.  The Committee would recommend that the State ensure the age of criminal responsibility was from the age of 14 and upwards.  Were children who were recruited by criminal gangs assisted and offered rehabilitation support?

    HYND AYOUBI IDRISSI, Committee Expert and Country Taskforce Member, said there were several questions, including on deaths of children, teen unions, and allegations of degrading treatment which had not been answered.  The Committee had read substantial information on social educational centres, where there were many allegations of cruel and degrading treatment. Could the delegation comment on these allegations?  What was being done to support intersex children?

    BRAGI GUDBRANDSSON, Committee Expert and Country Taskforce Member, asked if a Black 13-year-old girl became pregnant, did the social protection system automatically become involved?  Did the different agencies responsible collaborate on these cases?  The child interview suites were a positive initiative; did they prevent the revictimisation of child sexual abuse victims? Did the children still have to go to court?  How did these suites work in practice?

    ROSARIA CORREA PULICE, Committee Expert and Country Taskforce Member, said impunity was a major concern.  What happened when complaints were lodged?  Were teen pregnancies under the age of 14 investigated?  There were many issues, including around human trafficking, sexual exploitation in sport, and offences related to extradition, which needed to be clarified.  Were reparations really provided?  If a victim could not be identified in the first place, how could they access services? Was there specialised defence when it came to cases of organised crime? 

    CEPHAS LUMINA, Committee Vice Chair and Country Taskforce Member, said he had heard that a bill had gone through the National Congress this week concerning environmental licensing.  This would represent a reversal, and it was hoped that the Executive would do all it could to ensure that such a bill was not enacted.  What plans did the Government have to translate commitments into tangible outcomes for children? 

    A Committee Expert said Brazil was grappling with how to protect children in the digital environment. A bill was drafted in 2024 mandating companies to provide parental controls.  Was there a definitive date for the enactment of this legislation? What current measures was the Brazilian State taking to ensure children were protected from child labour, gambling and harmful impacts of artificial intelligence?   

    Another Expert expressed concern at the high level of pregnancies of Black teenagers up to the age of 14 years.  Were there measures being taken to reduce this?  Was there a national prevention strategy?  Were there measures being taken to train teachers to ensure access to comprehensive sexual education?  Could teenagers access emergency contraception?  What was stopping teenagers from having access to sexual and reproductive health information?

    A Committee Expert asked what happened to young people who were not imprisoned or institutionalised; there were gaps in the data. 

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said all teenagers in Brazil had access to the Primary Healthcare Unit.  The State was trying to invest in sexual and reproductive health education.  Brazil had made significant progress in combatting the issue of sexual exploitation of children.  Integrated care centres offered humanised and multidisciplinary care for victims.  A programme launched this week addressed sexual violence online.  The Secretariat for Media had released a guide on digital devices, based on best international practice.  This highlighted a collective commitment to address sexual exploitation and abuse. It was expected that by 2026, there would be a national policy to address sexual violence. 

    Combatting child labour was a priority for the Federal Government, and a programme and national commission were in place in this regard.  About 40 million children and adolescents in Brazil were exposed to multiple climate and environmental risks.  Guidelines had been established to consider the social and environmental rights of children.  The national plan for climate adaptation would include a specific plan for children, adolescents and young people.  Brazil would host the national conference for children, youth and the environment, which involved 20 million people, with dialogue and meetings, based on critical, participatory and transformative environmental education.  It aimed to ensure that schools could become educational spaces which were resilient.

    Brazilian legislation did not allow for the detention of children under 12; this would be completely unacceptable.  These children were not arrested, but socio-educational measures were applied. There were no cases of overcrowding in prisons.

    The Office of the Public Prosecutor had special offices for children, ensuring they received the care required.  Hearings were regularly held which assessed the deprivation of liberty measures throughout the national territory, ensuring that the views of incarcerated teenagers were upheld.  The presence of an interpreter was obligatory.  Protection measures had been established, including to protect victims from aggressors in the home.

    Rates of illegal adoption were relatively low in Brazil.  The justice system had undertaken a child-friendly paradigm, acting for and with children and teenagers.  The best interests of children were considered a Constitutional priority in Brazil.  A programme had been rolled out to integrate youth and prevent the adverse use of alcohol and drugs, and violence and crime in the context of drug policy.  It provided prevention methodologies in families, schools and communities and allowed studies on organised crime groups and children and adolescents. 

    The Mappia programme of the highway police was created in 2025.  It identified areas where children were at risk of sexual exploitation and planned preventive actions.  The safe paths programme had saved almost 100 children and young people from sexual exploitation.  In 2024, the Federal Police carried out more than 1,000 activities to combat sexual abuse and exploitation on the internet.  A strategy had been developed to strengthen the safety of children and adolescents online, by strengthening the national policy, implementing the national compact on protection, and strengthening police cooperation and protocols to support victims. 

    The Black Youth Alive programme created in 2024 sought to reduce the inequalities and violence experienced by young Black people.  This had 217 activities and was developed through a participatory approach involving around 6,000 young people.  Addressing police violence against Black youth was a priority in public policy. 

    The national and socio-economic data bank had launched the public tender of 26 million dollars to restore indigenous land in the Amazon; this was the biggest land restoration project in the country.  The largest culture budget in history had been granted in Brazil, and signified the State’s commitment to promoting cultural diversity for historically invisible groups.  The Living Culture programme strengthened cultural networks and had a network of over 7,000 cultural focal points, including in indigenous communities. 

    A resolution was published which protected the rights of children and adolescents in the digital environment.

    Closing Remarks

    FAITH MARSHALL-HARRIS, Committee Expert and County Taskforce Coordinator, said Brazil’s star was on the rise and the country was fast becoming a world leader in many areas, including agriculture, technology, and research.  However, if the State continued to disengage, disinherit and decimate children of African descent and other ethnic groups, there would be nothing left for anyone to inherit.  Many Black children could not grow up with dignity; they needed rescue and redress in the present.  Brazil needed to urgently invest resources in nurturing all children in the country, not just some of the children.  The Committee was confident this could be done. 

    BRAGI GUDBRANDSSON, Committee Expert and Country Taskforce Member, thanked Brazil for the dialogue and the engagement of the country’s civil society organizations with the Committee.  Brazil had challenges and it was hoped these could be overcome.   

    MACAÉ MARIA EVARISTO DOS SANTOS, Minister of Human Rights and Citizenship of Brazil and head of the delegation, said there were 186 investigations underway regarding cases of trafficking.  In the last 10 years, the State had been attentive to the rights of domestic workers, including children.  There were many children being rescued from slavery and domestic servitude.  Brazil was committed to human rights law and policies which placed human dignity at the centre. 

    Ms. Evaristo dos Santos thanked the Committee, her delegation and everyone else who had made the dialogue possible.  Brazil was proud of its recently adopted public policies and believed that these would help young Black people and other marginalised groups achieve their dreams. Measures including the Happy Child programme sought to uphold the rights of young children.  The Government had made efforts to strengthen the health system, the social assistance system, and to combat multi-dimensional poverty.  Inequality remained the main challenge in Brazil, and it was important to ensure that the State’s policies addressed the most vulnerable. The country was determined to build on the progress presented over the past two days.  Children and adolescents needed to be at the heart of the country’s efforts.   

    SOPHIE KILADZE, Committee Chair, thanked the delegation for the dialogue and recognised the political will of Brazil.  The Committee would consider all the points made and do its best to formulate the best recommendations possible.

    ___________

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

     

    CRC25.015E

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA News: Restoring Gold Standard Science

    Source: The White House

    By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including section 7301 of title 5, United States Code, it is hereby ordered:
    Section 1.  Policy and Purpose.  Over the last 5 years, confidence that scientists act in the best interests of the public has fallen significantly.  A majority of researchers in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics believe science is facing a reproducibility crisis.  The falsification of data by leading researchers has led to high-profile retractions of federally funded research.  
    Unfortunately, the Federal Government has contributed to this loss of trust.  In several notable cases, executive departments and agencies (agencies) have used or promoted scientific information in a highly misleading manner.  For example, under the prior Administration, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention issued COVID-19 guidance on reopening schools that incorporated edits by the American Federation of Teachers and was understood to discourage in-person learning.  This guidance’s restrictive and burdensome reopening conditions led many schools to remain at least partially closed, resulting in substantial negative effects on educational outcomes — even though the best available scientific evidence showed that children were unlikely to transmit or suffer serious illness or death from the virus, and that opening schools with reasonable mitigation measures would have only minor effects on transmission.  
    The National Marine Fisheries Service justified a biological opinion by adopting an admitted “worst-case scenario” projection of the North Atlantic right whale population that it believed was “very likely” wrong.  The agency’s proposed actions could have destroyed the historic Maine lobster fishery.  The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently overturned that opinion because the agency’s decision to seek out the worst-case scenario skewed its approach to the evidence.  
    Similarly, agencies have used Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP) scenario 8.5 to assess the potential effects of climate change in a “higher” warming scenario.  RCP 8.5 is a worst-case scenario based on highly unlikely assumptions like end-of-century coal use exceeding estimates of recoverable coal reserves.  Scientists have warned that presenting RCP 8.5 as a likely outcome is misleading.
    Actions taken by the prior Administration further politicized science, for example, by encouraging agencies to incorporate diversity, equity, and inclusion considerations into all aspects of science planning, execution, and communication.  Scientific integrity in the production and use of science by the Federal Government is critical to maintaining the trust of the American people and ensuring confidence in government decisions informed by science.
    My Administration is committed to restoring a gold standard for science to ensure that federally funded research is transparent, rigorous, and impactful, and that Federal decisions are informed by the most credible, reliable, and impartial scientific evidence available.  We must restore the American people’s faith in the scientific enterprise and institutions that create and apply scientific knowledge in service of the public good.  Reproducibility, rigor, and unbiased peer review must be maintained.  This order restores the scientific integrity policies of my first Administration and ensures that agencies practice data transparency, acknowledge relevant scientific uncertainties, are transparent about the assumptions and likelihood of scenarios used, approach scientific findings objectively, and communicate scientific data accurately.  Agency use of Gold Standard Science, as set forth in this order, will spur innovation, translate discovery to success, and ensure continued American strength and global leadership in technology.

    Sec. 2.  Definitions.  For the purposes of this order:
    (a)  “Employee” has the meaning given that term in 5 U.S.C. 2105.
    (b)  “Scientific information” means factual inputs, data, models, analyses, technical information, or scientific assessments related to such disciplines as the behavioral and social sciences, public health and medical sciences, life and earth sciences, engineering, physical sciences, or probability and statistics.  This includes any communication or representation of knowledge such as facts or data, in any medium or form, including textual, numerical, graphic, cartographic, narrative, or audiovisual forms.
    (c)  “Scientific misconduct” means fabrication, falsification, or plagiarism in proposing, performing, reviewing, or reporting the results of scientific research, but does not include honest error or differences of opinion.  For the purposes of this definition;
    (i)    “fabrication” is making up data or results and recording or reporting them;
    (ii)   “falsification” is manipulating research materials, equipment, or processes, or changing or omitting data or results such that the research is not accurately represented in the research record; and
    (iii)  “plagiarism” is the appropriation of another person’s ideas, processes, results, or words without giving appropriate credit.
    (d)  “Senior appointee” means an individual appointed by the President (or an individual performing the functions and duties of an individual appointed by the President) or a non-career member of the Senior Executive Service.
    (e)  “Weight of scientific evidence” means an approach to scientific evaluation in which each piece of relevant information is considered based on its quality and relevance, and then transparently integrated with other relevant information to inform the scientific evaluation prior to making a judgment about the scientific evaluation.  Quality and relevance determinations, at a minimum, should include consideration of study design, fitness for purpose, replicability, peer review, and transparency and reliability of data.

    Sec. 3.  Restoring Gold Standard Science.  (a)  Within 30 days of the date of this order, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP Director) shall, in consultation with the heads of relevant agencies, issue guidance for agencies on implementation of “Gold Standard Science” in the conduct and management of their respective scientific activities.  For the purposes of this order, Gold Standard Science means science conducted in a manner that is:
    (i)     reproducible;
    (ii)    transparent;
    (iii)   communicative of error and uncertainty;
    (iv)    collaborative and interdisciplinary;
    (v)     skeptical of its findings and assumptions;
    (vi)    structured for falsifiability of hypotheses;
    (vii)   subject to unbiased peer review;
    (viii)  accepting of negative results as positive outcomes; and
    (ix)    without conflicts of interest.
    (b)  Upon publication of the guidance prescribed in subsection (a), each agency head, as necessary and appropriate and in consultation with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB Director) and the OSTP Director, shall promptly update applicable agency policies governing the production and use of scientific information, including scientific integrity policies, to implement the OSTP Director’s guidance on Gold Standard Science and ensure that agency scientific activities are conducted in accordance with this order.
    (c)  Each agency head shall, to the extent practicable, incorporate the OSTP Director’s guidance on Gold Standard Science and the requirements of this order into the processes by which their agency conducts, manages, interprets, communicates, and uses scientific or technological information prior to the finalization of the updated policies under this section.
    (d)  Within 60 days of the publication of the guidance prescribed in section 3(a), agency heads shall report to the OSTP Director on the actions taken to implement Gold Standard Science at their agency.

     Sec. 4.  Improving the Use, Interpretation, and Communication of Scientific Data.  No later than 30 days after the date of this order, agency heads and employees shall adhere to the following rules governing the use, interpretation, and communication of scientific data, unless otherwise provided by law:
    (a)  Employees shall not engage in scientific misconduct nor knowingly rely on information resulting from scientific misconduct.
    (b)  Except as prohibited by law, and consistent with relevant policies that protect national security or sensitive personal or confidential business information, agency heads shall in a timely manner and, to the extent practicable and within the agency’s authority:
    (i)  subject to paragraph (ii), make publicly available the following information within the agency’s possession:
    (A)  the data, analyses, and conclusions associated with scientific and technological information produced or used by the agency that the agency reasonably assesses will have a clear and substantial effect on important public policies or important private sector decisions (influential scientific information), including data cited in peer-reviewed literature; and
    (B)  the models and analyses (including, as applicable, the source code for such models) the agency used to generate such influential scientific information.  Employees may not invoke exemption 5 to the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5)) to prevent disclosure of such models unless authorized in writing to do so by the agency head following prior notice to the OSTP Director.
    (ii)  risk models used to guide agency enforcement actions or select enforcement targets are not information that must be disclosed under this subsection.
    (c)  When using scientific information in agency decision-making, employees shall transparently acknowledge and document uncertainties, including how uncertainty propagates throughout any models used in the analysis.
    (d) Where employees produce or use scientific information to inform policy or legal determinations they must use science that comports with the legal standards applicable to those determinations, including when agencies evaluate the realistic or reasonably foreseeable effects of an action.
    (e)  Employees shall be transparent about the likelihood of the assumptions and scenarios used.  Highly unlikely and overly precautionary assumptions and scenarios should only be relied upon in agency decision-making where required by law or otherwise pertinent to the agency’s action.
    (f)  When scientific or technological information is used to inform agency evaluations and subsequent decision-making, employees shall apply a “weight of scientific evidence” approach.
    (g)  Employees’ communication of scientific information shall be consistent with the results of the relevant analysis and evaluation and, to the extent that uncertainty is present, the degree of uncertainty should be communicated.  Communications involving a scientific model or information derived from a scientific model should include reference to any material assumptions that inform the model’s outputs.
    (h)  Once the guidance on Gold Standard Science is established and promulgated pursuant to section 3 of this order, it shall, among other things, form the basis for employees’ evaluation of all scientific and technological information called for in this order except where otherwise required by law.

    Sec. 5.  Interim Scientific Integrity Policies.  (a)  Until the issuance of updated agency scientific integrity policies pursuant to section 3 of this order, and except where required by law:
    (i)    scientific integrity policies in each agency shall be governed by the scientific integrity policies that existed within the executive branch on January 19, 2021, except that in the event of a conflict between such policies and the policies and requirements of this order, the policies and requirements of this order control; and
    (ii)   agency heads shall take all necessary actions to reevaluate and, where necessary, revise or rescind scientific integrity policies or procedures, or amendments to such policies or procedures, issued between January 20, 2021, and January 20, 2025.
    (iii)  each agency head shall promptly revoke any organizational or operational changes, designations, or documents that were issued or enacted pursuant to the Presidential Memorandum of January 27, 2021 (Restoring Trust in Government Through Scientific Integrity and Evidence-Based Policymaking), which was revoked pursuant to Executive Order 14154 and shall conduct applicable agency operations in the manner and revert applicable agency organization to the same form as would have existed in the absence of such changes, designations, or documents.
    (b)  In updating applicable scientific integrity policies pursuant to section 3 of this order, agencies should ensure they:
    (i)    encourage the open exchange of ideas;
    (ii)   provide for consideration of different or dissenting viewpoints; and
    (iii)  protect employees from efforts to prevent or deter consideration of alternative scientific opinions.
    (c)  Agencies, unless prohibited by law, shall review agency actions taken between January 20, 2021, and January 20, 2025, including regulations, guidance documents, policies, and scientific evaluations and take all appropriate steps, consistent with law, to ensure alignment with the policies and requirements of this order.

    Sec. 6.  Scope and Applicability.  (a)  The policies and rules set forth in this order apply to all employees involved in the generation, use, interpretation, or communication of scientific information, regardless of job classification, and to all agency decision-making, except where precluded by law.
    (b)  Agency heads and employees shall, to the extent practicable and consistent with applicable law, require agency contractors to adhere to these policies and rules as though they were agency employees.  
    (c)  The policies and rules set forth in this order govern the use of science that informs agency decisions but they are not applicable to non-scientific aspects of agency decision-making.

    Sec. 7.  Enforcement and Oversight.  (a)  Each agency head shall establish internal processes to evaluate alleged violations of the requirements of this order and other applicable agency policies governing the generation, use, interpretation, and communication of scientific information.  Such processes shall be the responsibility, and administered under the direction, of a senior appointee designated by the agency head and shall provide for taking appropriate measures to correct scientific information in response to violations, consistent with the requirements and procedures of section 515 of the statute commonly known as the Information Quality Act, Public Law 106-554, appendix C (114 Stat. 2763A-153).  The designated senior appointee may also forward potential violations to the relevant human resources officials for discipline to the extent the potential violation also violates applicable agency policies and procedures.  The designated senior appointee may consult appropriate officials with scientific expertise when establishing such processes.  
    (b)  The processes created under this section are, unless otherwise required by applicable law, the sole and exclusive means of evaluating and, as applicable, addressing alleged violations of this order and other agency policies governing the use, interpretation, and communication of scientific information.

    Sec. 8.  Waivers.  (a)  An agency head may request in writing that the OMB Director, in consultation with the OSTP Director, waive any of the requirements of this order for good cause shown.  Such request must explain how the requested waiver is consistent with the policies and purposes of this order.
    (b)  Notwithstanding any other provision of this order, the policies and requirements of this order shall apply to agency actions that pertain to foreign or military affairs, or to a national security or homeland security function of the United States, only to the extent that the applicable agency head, in his or her sole and exclusive discretion, determines they should apply.

    Sec. 9.  General Provisions.  (a)  Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
    (i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or
    (ii)  the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
    (b)  This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
    (c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
    (d)   The Office of Management and Budget shall provide funding for publication of this order in the Federal Register.

                                   DONALD J. TRUMP

    THE WHITE HOUSE,
        May 23, 2025.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Lummis, Daines Introduce the Protecting Veteran Community Care Act to Protect, Expand, Veterans’ Access to Community Care

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Wyoming Cynthia Lummis
    Washington, D.C.— Senator Cynthia Lummis (R-WY) and Senator Steve Daines (R-MT) introduced legislation today that would ensure Wyoming veterans’ access to mental healthcare in their local communities.
    “Providing for those who’ve defended our nation is the VA’s core purpose,” said Lummis. “This means Wyoming’s courageous veterans deserve top-tier healthcare services regardless of their geographic location. I remain committed to ensuring veterans throughout our state can access the medical care they’ve earned in their local communities.”
    “Our nation’s veterans have put their lives on the line to protect our freedoms, and the last thing they should have to worry about is mismanagement and delays at the VA. I’m proud to work with my colleagues on this bill to strengthen the availability of community based mental health programs and ensure that our veterans have access to the care and resources that they deserve,” said Daines.  
    “No veteran should face unnecessary delays in accessing mental health care,” said Tim Sheppard, Executive Director of the Wyoming Veterans Commission. “This bill guarantees that those who served are prioritized, not left waiting.”
    Background:
    The Protecting Veteran Community Care Act strengthens the existing community care program, limits the VA’s ability to restrict access to care in the community, and requires the VA to track relevant community care data and provide those statistics to Congress.
    Specifically, this legislation would:
    Amend the MISSION Act to specifically include inpatient mental health standards.
    Add clarity to veteran eligibility for care in the community. 
    Require the VA to track and present to Congress data on how veterans are requesting and using community care, along with what services community care funds are paying for.
    Require passage of a Joint Resolution in both chambers of Congress to modify community care eligibility.
    The 2018 VA MISSION Act was a landmark piece of legislation that overhauled the VA Choice Program to provide veterans with improved access to healthcare. Unfortunately, the VA has failed to live up to its obligation to provide timely care. Veterans are still facing unacceptably long waiting periods and frequently rescheduled appointments. The VA continues to fall short on the complete and proper implementation of the MISSION Act. This has resulted in the need for Congress to strengthen existing authorities to ensure that the VA isn’t restricting care in the community for veterans who need it most.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: FBI Honors Fallen During 2022 Police Week Events

    Source: US FBI

    As the nation recognizes Police Week, FBI Director Christopher Wray expressed his gratitude to law enforcement officers nationwide and voiced his concern over the growing dangers faced by those who work to keep our communities safe.

    On Monday, the FBI released its annual statistics on law enforcement officers killed in the line of duty. Those numbers show 129 officers were killed in line-of-duty incidents in 2021. Seventy-three of those deaths were felonious.

    “Each and every story is heartbreaking,” Wray said in a video address. “A 30-year Florida deputy murdered one shift shy of retirement. An officer ambushed on his first day on the job, leaving behind a wife and an infant son. A combat veteran and his police dog killed while serving together.”

    Police Week is observed every May and provides an opportunity for law enforcement officers to gather for fellowship events and honor those they lost.

    MIL Security OSI –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Ferocity, fitness and fast bowling: how Virat Kohli revolutionised Indian cricket

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Vaughan Cruickshank, Senior Lecturer in Health and Physical Education, University of Tasmania

    Virat Kohli announced his retirement from Test cricket on Monday.

    While his Instagram message just said this was the “right time”, his poor recent Test form, mental fatigue and desire to spend more time with his family, charity foundation and expanding business empire have been suggested as other influential factors.

    During his 14-year Test career “King Kohli” has been the backbone of the Indian batting line-up, and his absence is a huge blow as the Indians prepare to tour England next month.

    The megastar scored 9,230 runs in 123 Tests at an average of 46.85, including 30 centuries.

    These numbers put him in the top five Indian test batsmen of all time, but his legacy extends far beyond his batting achievements.

    Kohli, 36, quit Twenty20 Internationals last year (after India won its second world title). He may continue to play one-day internationals.

    Rising to the top of Test cricket

    Kohli has been the greatest Indian batsman of his generation.

    He made his Test debut in 2011 against the West Indies and played his final match against Australia in January.

    He scored centuries against every country he played against, with more than half of these coming overseas.

    His seven Test centuries in Australia is the second most by an overseas batsman.

    He was at his peak between 2014 and 2019, when he averaged more than 60 in Test cricket and became one of the “fab four” (the world’s best Test batsmen) alongside Steve Smith, Kane Williamson and Joe Root.




    Read more:
    Is Steve Smith set to become the best? What data says about Test cricket’s elite 10,000+ run club


    This period also included six double-hundreds in 18 months, and 13 months as the number one ranked Test batsman in the world.

    Kohli the leader

    Kohli is India’s greatest ever Test captain.

    His tenure from 2014 to 2022 was a golden age for Indian Test cricket.

    India won 40 of 68 Tests (59%) in this period and did not lose a Test series at home. India was the number one ranked Test team in the world from 2016–20 and won its first Test series in Australia in 2018–19.

    These statistics make Kohli one of the most successful Test captains of all time.

    Beyond these numbers, he was a charismatic and aggressive captain who redefined India’s approach to Test cricket by bringing a more competitive edge to the team.

    He drove higher expectations around fitness, training intensity and fast bowling that continue to shape Indian cricket.

    Mandatory fitness testing and improved dieting and recovery practices, which redefined the team’s standards, are attributed to Kohli’s leadership.

    Similarly, Indian success was strongly contributed to by Kohli encouraging the development of a world-class pace bowling attack, which marked a significant shift from the spin-heavy approach of Indian cricket.

    Controversies

    While Kohli’s energy, passion and intensity contributed to his success as batsman and captain, they also led to numerous confrontations with opposition players, which some believed to be disrespectful and arrogant.

    His intense celebrations and assertive body language also drew criticism from conservative cricketing audiences.

    Kohli’s collision with Sam Konstas during the Boxing Day Test versus Australia.

    Many of these controversies have occurred in Australia, where Kohli enjoyed a love-hate relationship with Australian players and crowds.

    Examples include flipping the bird to the crowd, making sandpaper gestures (in reference to the 2018 Australian ball tampering scandal, also known as Sandpapergate) and shoulder-barging young Australian batsman Sam Konstas.

    What will his Test legacy be?

    For more than a decade, Kohli has been the heartbeat of the Indian Test team, and his retirement marks the end of an era.

    He reshaped the mindset of Indian cricket and cultivated a faster, fitter, fiercer, more successful team.

    Kohli was also one of the greatest ambassadors of Test cricket, and has played a significant role in ensuring the game remains relevant in an era increasingly dominated by T20 cricket.

    He made Test cricket aspirational again because he wanted it to thrive. He knew India needed to dominate the hardest format to be respected.

    His social media reach (272 million followers on Instagram and 67.8 million on X) is more than Tiger Woods, LeBron James and Tom Brady combined, and was even referred to by LA2028 Olympics organisers when they announced cricket’s entry into the games.

    In recent days, Kohli has been described as “a modern-day giant”, a “provocateur in chief”, and “his generation’s most profound figure”.

    Love him or hate him, he elevated the spectacle of Test cricket. His electric energy brought the best out of India and its opponents and made him impossible to ignore when batting or fielding.

    As respected cricket writer Peter Lalor noted recently:

    Nobody is irreplaceable, but nobody can replace Virat.

    The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Ferocity, fitness and fast bowling: how Virat Kohli revolutionised Indian cricket – https://theconversation.com/ferocity-fitness-and-fast-bowling-how-virat-kohli-revolutionised-indian-cricket-256560

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Do shorter prison sentences make society less safe? What the evidence says

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Daniel Alge, Senior Lecturer in Criminology & Criminal Justice, Brunel University of London

    The final report of the Independent Sentencing Review has proposed the most significant reform of sentencing and punishment in England and Wales since the 1990s.

    The review, chaired by former Conservative justice secretary David Gauke, calls for a number of changes to address the crisis of overcrowding in prisons. These include using fewer and shorter prison sentences, enhanced opportunities for early release based on good behaviour, and more use of community sentences.

    The government has already accepted most of the recommendations in principle, though many will require legislation to bring them into effect. The justice secretary, Shabana Mahmood, has said that the most serious offenders should not be eligible for an earlier release under the proposals.

    Prisons in England and Wales have been at or near capacity for a number of years, and frequently exceed their safe capacity. Official data shows that the current adult prison population is estimated to be around 87,700, compared with a maximum operational capacity of around 88,800. However, maximum capacity figures are only recorded annually, and the poor conditions of the prison estate mean the usable maximum may often be lower at any given time.

    Without reforms to sentencing, the prison population is projected to increase to up to 105,000 by 2029.


    Want more politics coverage from academic experts? Every week, we bring you informed analysis of developments in government and fact check the claims being made.

    Sign up for our weekly politics newsletter, delivered every Friday.


    In September 2024, prison overcrowding resulted in the emergency early release of around 1,700 prisoners serving sentences of less than five years who had served 40% of their sentence. They would ordinarily have not been eligible for early release until they had served 50% of their sentences.

    The Gauke review was commissioned to create a more sustainable solution to prevent further emergency measures. However, both the review and the emergency measures have come under criticism, namely that dangerous offenders will be released and communities and victims will be at risk. The shadow home secretary, Robert Jenrick, has claimed that the most recent proposals will “spark a crime wave”.

    So, will shorter sentences make communities less safe?

    What does the evidence say?

    A core recommendation is that custody should be used only as last resort. It calls for sentences of less than 12 months to only be given in exceptional circumstances, for example, where the offender is known to pose a high level of risk to a specific victim despite being sentenced for a less serious offence.

    The research on short-term imprisonment consistently shows that it is ineffective for a number of reasons. Short prison sentences are disproportionately expensive, especially when compared with community sentences. The offenders serving them have committed relatively minor offences, so pose a low risk other than in exceptional cases.

    Perhaps the most significant finding is the fact that the shorter the sentence, the higher the reoffending rate. Reoffending is around 55% for prisoners sentenced to less than 12 months, compared with an overall rate of 27.5%. If reoffending can be reduced by using more effective sentences, communities will be safer.




    Read more:
    How a doubling of sentence lengths helped pack England’s prisons to the rafters


    Another key proposal is the “earned progression model”. Under this, most prisoners (except those sentenced for specified serious sexual or violent offences) would be eligible for release after serving one-third of their sentence. They must have engaged constructively with the prison regime.

    They would then be supervised intensively in the community by probation services until they had served two-thirds of their sentence. After this, they would not be actively supervised.

    Prisoners who fail to engage constructively would not be eligible for release until the halfway point of their sentence. Under the early release policy introduced by the government in September 2024, these prisoners would be released after serving just 40% of their sentences.

    There is a sound evidence base for incentivising good behaviour in prison, rather than simply punishing bad behaviour. It is shown to help prisoners develop a sense of autonomy and accountability for their actions. This can help them abstain from reoffending once released.

    A focus on effective rehabilitation, rather than punishment alone, runs through the review. For example, recommendations for improved and targeted substance abuse and mental health treatment.

    There is widespread evidence across jurisdictions which suggests that a focus on rehabilitation, and not longer prisons sentences, is what reduces overall crime levels and makes communities safer. It also makes economic sense.

    The chief inspector of prisons, Charlie Taylor, made clear in his most recent annual report in September 2024 that a fundamental reorientation of prisons towards rehabilitation is needed in order to reduce overall crime levels.

    The Howard League for Penal Reform has also welcomed the proposals in the sentencing review.

    Concerns

    Victims groups have raised concerns about the risk of sex offenders or domestic abusers being released early, even under the current regime. The review recommends strengthening protections for victims, for example by expanding specialist domestic abuse courts and tagging for all perpetrators of violence against women and girls.

    More controversially, it recommends increasing trials into the use of voluntary chemical castration for serious sex offenders. The justice secretary is reported to be considering the use of mandatory chemical castration.

    Other questions remain around the implementation of the reforms, not least how they would be funded in the current economic climate. The chief inspector of probation, Martin Jones, has warned that without better funding and other reforms in the probation service, the proposals in the Gauke review would be “catastrophic”. The review recommends investing in the strained probation service, and bringing in third-sector organisations to support it.




    Read more:
    How to stop released prisoners reoffending: what the evidence says


    These are ambitious reforms that would require a considerable investment in the probation service, prisons, community rehabilitation and technology. There are also emerging human rights concerns about the adoption of advanced AI by probation services, as is recommended by the review.

    Ultimately, there is little evidence to suggest that fewer prisoners and shorter sentences will make communities less safe. It is ineffective rehabilitation leading to reoffending which comes at a considerable social and economic cost.

    Daniel Alge does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Do shorter prison sentences make society less safe? What the evidence says – https://theconversation.com/do-shorter-prison-sentences-make-society-less-safe-what-the-evidence-says-257279

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: China begins building new nuclear power units in southern port city

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    NANNING, May 23 (Xinhua) — Construction of two new nuclear power plant units using domestically developed third-generation Hualong-1 reactor technology started in the port city of Fangchenggang, south China’s Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, on Friday, marking a major step in expanding the country’s key nuclear energy base.

    According to Guangxi Fangchenggang Nuclear Power Co., Ltd., the capacity of each of the power units No. 5 and No. 6 of the Fangchenggang NPP will exceed 1.2 million kW. Once put into operation, their combined annual electricity generation will amount to 20 billion kWh.

    The Fangchenggang NPP project in the GCA envisages the commissioning of six power units. The first two were launched in 2016, and units 3 and 4 with Hualong-1 reactors were connected to the grid in 2023 and 2024, respectively.

    As of the end of March 2025, the plant’s four operating power units generated more than 160 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity. This is equivalent to saving over 48 million tons of conventional coal and reducing carbon dioxide emissions by approximately 131 million tons.

    After the project is fully completed, the installed capacity of the Fangchenggang NPP will reach 6.9 million kW, and the annual electricity generation will reach 53 billion kWh.

    Experts emphasize that the expansion of the station will make a significant contribution to the energy transformation and high-quality economic development of the GCR.

    According to statistics, by the end of 2024, China’s nuclear power plants generated 450.9 billion kilowatt-hours (an increase of 3.7 percent), accounting for 4.5 percent of the country’s total electricity production. This reduced coal consumption by 140 million tons and carbon dioxide emissions by 370 million tons. -0-

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: FBI Cleveland Seeking Candidates to Fill Two Mission Critical Positions for Its Downtown Cleveland Location

    Source: US FBI

    CLEVELAND, OH—FBI Cleveland announced it is seeking candidates to fill two positions during a mission-critical hiring campaign for its downtown Cleveland field office:

    Data Analyst

    This on-site role is well suited for the candidate with coding, mathematics, statistics, data analysis, and data visualization experience. Candidates must have the following education or combination of education and work experience, including a bachelor’s degree from a U.S.-accredited college or university in:

    • Computer Science
    • Engineering
    • Information Science
    • Information Systems Management
    • Mathematics
    • Operations Research
    • Statistics – Technology Management

    or, a combination of education and experience, to include 24 course hours in one or more of the fields above. Starting at $44k – range to $123,584

    Digital Operations Specialist

    This role is ideal for the technical expert who will serve on our investigative teams and specialize in criminals’ use of technology. The incumbent will be skilled in computer science and familiarity with different operating systems, physical computer components and architectures, virtual machines, and scripting. Additionally, have knowledge of networking and routing protocols, network securities methodologies, and operations of various communications media, and knowledge of common computer and network methods of infection, and attack methods and techniques.

    Candidates must have a combination of education and work experience, including a bachelor’s degree from a U.S.-accredited college in a related discipline. Starting at $55k – range to $90k.

    The FBI offers a full suite of benefits, including annual leave, 11 federal holidays, sick leave starting at 13 days, Military and Parental leave, wellness hours, and free on-site parking. For a complete listing of benefits and FBI employment eligibility requirements, visit FBIjobs.gov.

    Interested candidates for these positions can send their resumes directly to the hiring manager at Applicants.cv@fbi.gov with the name of the position in the subject line. No phone calls, please.

    The FBI is the nation’s premier law enforcement agency with a worldwide presence and 56 field offices across the United States and serves to uphold the U.S. Constitution and protect the American Public. FBI Cleveland covers the 40 northern-most counties of the state encompassing close to 6 million people and is home to over 300 Special Agents and professional staff among its downtown Cleveland headquarters and eight resident agencies.

    MIL Security OSI –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Minister Burke announces establishment of Small Business Unit

    Source: Government of Ireland – Department of Jobs Enterprise and Innovation

    23rd May 2025

    Unit will ensure the needs and issues of small businesses have a dedicated focus within the Department and across Government

    The Minister for Enterprise, Tourism and Employment, Peter Burke, TD, has announced the establishment of a dedicated Small Business Unit, based in the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment.

    Welcoming the establishment of the Unit, Minister Burke said:

    “Since my appointment as Minister I have put small businesses front and centre of my priorities.

    “The Programme for Government sets out clearly how the needs of small businesses must have a dedicated focus and are recognised and acknowledged across Government. 

    “The Small Business Unit will focus on rigorously implementing the SME Test, to ensure the perspectives of small businesses are considered across Government before new legislation or regulation is introduced. The Unit will oversee the simplification of information and access to grants and supports for businesses though the National Enterprise Hub.  It will also ensure the Local Enterprise Offices are properly resourced to help small businesses. 

    “Small businesses employ two thirds of our population and keep our local communities and economies vibrant and strong.  Government must recognise this, and ensure we are providing the support that SMEs need to run their businesses successfully and continue to provide vital employment and economic benefit across the country”.  

    The move was noted by Government on Tuesday 20th May and fulfils a key commitment in the Programme for Government

    The establishment of the Small Business Unit comes in addition to the Government agreeing, in April, to expedite the development of the Action Plan for Competitiveness and Productivi as well as adopting a series of short-term measures to address the competitiveness challenges facing Ireland.

    Notes

    Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (

    Source: Small and Medium Enterprises Business in Ireland 2021 – Detailed Results – Central Statistics Office

    ENDS

    Back to Department News

    Back to Top

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: Urumqi Tianshan Airport Records Significant Increase in Foreign Passenger Arrivals to China

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    URUMQI, May 23 (Xinhua) — The number of foreign passengers arriving in China via Tianshan Airport in Urumqi, capital of northwest China’s Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, has increased significantly since early May, according to the Urumqi Border Checkpoint.

    According to statistics, from May 1 to 21, the total number of Chinese border crossings in both directions through the checkpoint at Tianshan Airport was 61,530 people-times, 749 international flights were processed, which is 82.7 percent and 134.7 percent more compared to the same period last year, respectively. The incoming foreign passenger flow of the airport during the reporting period increased by 75.7 percent year-on-year and exceeded 8,900 people-times, accounting for about 14.47 percent of the country’s total. Broken down by country, the largest share was among citizens of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Russia, Tajikistan and other countries.

    Urumqi Tianshan Airport is the closest airport to the countries of Central and East Asia and Europe that have joined the Belt and Road Initiative, with 24-hour service. It is a key transportation hub in northwest China, ensuring smooth international traffic. -0-

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: NSU students win student track of National Technological Olympiad

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Novosibirsk State University – Novosibirsk State University –

    Students had to propose their own solution to a case on creating a water consumption management system in a residential area of a “smart city”, taking into account the elimination of drinking water losses during its transportation to the consumer.

    The Novosibirsk team, consisting of two NSU and two NSTU students, beat students from Tomsk Polytechnic University, Skoltech, Moscow Aviation Institute, Moscow Engineering Physics Institute, Bauman Moscow State Technical University, Higher School of Economics, Innopolis University, and Izhevsk State Technical University named after M.T. Kalashnikov in the final competition.

    Team composition:

    — Daria Kolomnikova, 1st year master’s student Faculty of Mechanics and Mathematics of NSU,

    — Ilya Merzlyakov, 1st year master’s student Faculty of Information Technology NSU,

    — Igor Uchanov, Novosibirsk State Technical University,

    — Maxim Nerlikh, Novosibirsk State Technical University.

    — Our team has been participating in the NTO finals in the Smart City profile for many years, since school days. For many participating teams, this has already become a tradition, so the competition for first place has always been very serious. And now, after several years of winning prizes, we finally achieved our goal and took first place. We experienced a storm of emotions: joy for the victory, sadness that we might not return as participants, respect for our rivals who became our friends, and enormous gratitude to the profile organizers.

    I was especially pleased that the organizers paid attention to the problem of insufficient involvement of female students in the Olympiad movement in the field of IT, and presented me with an award for “courage” to participate not for the first time in an all-male team of six teams, – shared her impressions Daria Kolomnikova.

    The Smart City profile implies the concept of integrating information and communication technologies and the Internet of Things to improve the quality of life and well-being of the city’s population. This is the digitalization of all services, measurement and control of parameters in the city infrastructure, predictive diagnostics and management based on data analytics.

    — Every year, the organizers come up with new tasks related to the automation of the city infrastructure. This year was no exception, and we solved the problem of modeling and automating water consumption and water supply. In the water consumption task, it was important to make a full-fledged service where the user can get all the statistics on consumption, payment and leaks in his apartment. At the same time, the statistics were based on real data obtained from our model. In addition, the smart city concept pays much attention to saving resources and conscious consumption, so it was necessary to implement a limitation of water supply depending on user consumption, — added Daria.

    In this way, the finalists contribute to the construction of the digital city of the future with their projects.

    — The algorithms developed by the finalists in the urban water supply management systems can be modified and scaled for operation in a real urban environment. This will not only allow you to monitor your water consumption in real time, but also significantly save water resources and your own finances, — said Alexander Zarnitsyn, profile developer, senior lecturer in the electronic engineering department of the TPU School of Non-Destructive Testing and Safety.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: Press Briefing Transcript: Julie Kozack, Director, Communications Department, May 22, 2025

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    May 22, 2025

    SPEAKER:  Ms. Julie Kozack, Director of the Communications Department, IMF

    MS. KOZACK: Good morning, everyone and welcome to this IMF Press Briefing.  It is wonderful to see you all today on this rainy Washington morning, especially those of you here in person and of course also those of you joining us online.  My name is Julie Kozak.  I’m the Director of Communications at the IMF.  As usual, this press briefing will be embargoed until 11:00 a.m. Eastern Time in the United States.  And as usual, I will start with a few announcements and then I’ll take your questions in person on WebEx and via the Press Center.  

    So first, our Managing Director, Kristalina Georgieva, and our First Deputy Managing Director, Gita Gopinath, are currently attending the G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors meeting taking place in Canada right now.  Second, on May 29th through 30th, the Managing Director will travel to Dubrovnik, Croatia to attend a joint IMF Croatia National Bank Conference focused on promoting growth and resilience in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe.  The Managing Director will participate in the opening panel and will hold meetings with regional counterparts.  

    On June 2nd, the Managing Director will travel to Sofia, Bulgaria to attend the 30th Anniversary celebration of the National Trust Ecofund.  During her visit, she will also hold several bilateral meetings with the Bulgarian authorities.  

    Our Deputy Managing Director, Nigel Clarke, will travel to Paraguay, Brazil, and the Netherlands next month.  On June 6th, he will launch the IMF’s new regional training program for South America and Mexico, which will be hosted in Asuncion by the Central Bank of Paraguay.  From there, he will travel to Brasilia to deliver a keynote speech on June 10th during the Annual Meeting of the Caribbean Development Bank.  He will also then travel to the Netherlands on June 12th to 13th to participate in the 2025 Consultative Group to Assist the Poor Symposium and to meet with the Dutch authorities.  

    Our Deputy Managing Director, Kenji Okamura, will be in Japan from June 11th to 12th for the 10th Tokyo Fiscal Forum to discuss fiscal frameworks and GovTech in the Asia Pacific region.  

    And finally, on a kind of housekeeping or scheduling issue, the Article IV Consultation for the United States will be undertaken on a later timetable this year, with discussions to be held in November.  

    And with those rather extensive announcements, I will now open the floor to your questions.  For those connecting virtually, please turn on both your camera and microphone when speaking.  All right, let’s open up.  Daniel.

     

    QUESTIONER: Thanks for taking my question.  I just wonder if the IMF has any reaction to the passage of last night in the House of Representatives of the One Big, Beautiful bill.  And a related question, how concerned are you by the increase in yields on long-dated U.S. treasuries?  What do you think it says about the market’s view of U.S. debt going into the future and sort of any possible spillovers for IMF borrowers as well?  MS. KOZACK: On the first question, what I can say is we take note of the passing of the legislation in the House of Representatives earlier this morning.  What we will do is we will look to assess a final bill once it has passed through the Senate and also once it’s been enacted.  And, of course, we will have opportunities to share our assessment over time in the various products where we normally would convey our fulsome views.  

    On your second question, which was on the bond market.   What I can say there is that we know that the U.S. government bonds are a safe haven asset, and the U.S. dollar, of course, plays a key role as the world’s reserve currency.  The U.S. bond market plays a critical role, of course, in finance and in safe assets.  And this is underpinned by the liquidity and depth of the U.S. market and also the sound institutions in the U.S.  We don’t see any changes in those functions.  And, of course, what we can also say is that although there has been some volatility in markets, market functioning, including in the U.S. Treasury market, has so far been orderly.  

     

    QUESTIONER: My question is about Ukraine.  Two topics particularly.  So, the first one, when is the next review of the Ukraine’s EFF is going to be completed, and what amount of money would be disbursed to Kyiv?  And could you please outline the total sum that is remaining within the current program?  And the second part, it’s about debt level.  What is the IMF assessment of current Ukraine’s government debt level?  Is it stable?  Do you see any vulnerabilities and any risks for Ukraine?  Thank you.  

    MS. KOZACK: Any other questions on Ukraine?  Does anyone online want to come in on Ukraine?  Okay, I don’t see anyone.  

    What I can say on Ukraine is that just two days ago, our Staff team started policy discussions with the Ukrainian authorities on the eighth review under the eff.  So, the team is on the ground now.  The discussions are taking place in Kiev and the team will provide an update on the progress at the end of the mission.

    In terms of the potential disbursement, I’m just looking here; that’s the seventh disbursement.  We will come back to you on the size of the disbursement, but it should show in the Staff report for the Seventh Review what would be expected for the Eighth Review.  And it would also show the remaining size of the program.  But we’ll come back to you bilaterally with those exact answers.  

    And what I can then say on the debt side is at the time of the Seventh Review under the program, we assessed debt, Ukraine’s debt to be sustainable on a forward-looking basis and as with every review that the team of course, will update its assessment as part of the eighth review discussion.  We’ll have more to say on the debt as the eighth review continues.  

     

    QUESTIONER: Just one more thing on Ukraine.  Does it make sense for them to consider using the euro as a defense currency for their currency, given the shifting geopolitical sense and what we are seeing with the dollar? MS. KOZACK: So right now, under the program, Ukraine has an inflation targeting regime, and that is where what the program is focused on, our program with Ukraine. So, they have an inflation targeting regime.  They are very much focused on ensuring the stability of that monetary policy regime that Ukraine has.  And, of course, that involves a floating exchange rate.  And I don’t have anything beyond that to say on the currency market.

     

    QUESTIONER: The agreement with the IMF established a target for the Central Bank Reserve to meet by June.  According to the technical projection, does the IMF believe Argentina will meet this target?  And if it’s not met, is it possible that we will grant a waiver in the future?

    MS. KOZACK: anything else on Argentina?  

    QUESTIONER: About Argentina, what is your assessment of the progress of the program agreed with Argentina more than a month after its announcement in last April?  

     

    QUESTIONER: The government is about to announce a measure to gain access to voluntarily, of course, but to the dollars that are “under the mattress”, as we call them, undeclared funds to probably meet these targets that Roman was asking about.  I was wondering if this measure has been discussed with the IMF.  And also, you mentioned Georgieva visiting Paraguay and Brazil, if you there’s any plan to visit Argentina as well?  

    QUESTIONER: President Milei is about to announce, you know, Minister Caputo, in a few minutes that there is a measure to use similar to attacks Amnesty.  Is the IMF concerned that this could violate its regulations against illicit financial flows? 

    MS. KOZACK: So, with respect to Argentina, on April 11th, I think, as you know, our Executive Board approved a new four-year EFF arrangement for Argentina.  It was for $20 billion.  It contained an initial disbursement of $12 billion.  And that the aim of that program is to support Argentina’s transition to the next phase of its stabilization program and reforms.  

    President Milei’s administration’s policies continued to deliver impressive results.  These include the rollout of the new FX regime, which has been smooth, a decline in monthly inflation to 2.8 percent in April, another fiscal surplus in April, and reaching a cumulative fiscal surplus of 0.6 percent of GDP for the year, and efforts to continue to open up the economy.  At the same time, the economy is now expanding, real wages are recovering, and poverty continues to fall in Argentina.  

    The Fund continues to support the authorities in their efforts to create a more stable and prosperous Argentina.  Our close engagement continues, including in the context of the upcoming discussions for the First Review of the program.  This First Review will allow us to assess progress and to consider policies to build on the strong momentum and to secure lasting stability and growth in Argentina.  And in this regard, there is a shared recognition with the authorities about the importance of strengthening external buffers and securing a timely re-access to international capital markets.  

    What I can say on the question about the announcements on that — the question on the undeclared assets.  All I can say right now is that we’re following developments very closely on this, and of course, the team will be ready to provide an assessment in due course.  

    On the second part of that question, I do want to also note, and this is included in our Staff report, that the authorities have committed to strengthening financial transparency and also to aligning Argentina’s AML CFT, the Anti-Money Laundering framework, with international standards, as well as to deregulating the economy to encourage its formalization.  So, any new measures, including those that may be aimed at encouraging the use of undeclared assets, should be, of course, consistent with these important commitments.  

    And on your question about Paraguay and Brazil, I just want to clarify that it is our Deputy Managing Director, Nigel Clarke, who will be traveling to Brazil and Paraguay, not the Managing Director.  

     

    QUESTIONER: Two questions on Syria.  With the U.S. and EU announcing the lifting of sanctions recently, how does this affect any sort of timeline with providing economic assistance?  And secondly, the Managing Director has said that the Fund has to first define data.  Can you just walk through what that entails?  

    MS. KOZACK: Can you just repeat what you said?  The Managing Director has said?

     

    QUESTIONER: The need to define data.  Just sort of a similar question.  I’m just wondering, following the World Bank statement last week about, you know, Syria now being eligible to borrow from the bank, what sort of discussions the Fund has had with the Syrian authorities since the end of the Spring Meetings and, you know, any update you can give us around possible discussions around an Article IV.  

     

    QUESTIONER: About the relationship and if there’s any missed planned virtual or on the ground? 

    MS. KOZACK: Let me step back and give a little bit of an overview on Syria. So, first, you know, we’re, of course, monitoring developments in Syria very closely.  Our Staff are preparing to support the international community’s efforts to help with Syria’s economic rehabilitation as conditions allow.  We have had useful discussions with the new Economic Team who took office in late March, including during the Spring Meetings.  And, of course, you will perhaps have seen the press release regarding the roundtable that was held during the Spring Meetings.  IMF Staff have already started to work to rebuild its understanding of the Syrian economy.  We’ve been doing this through interactions with the authorities and also through coordination with other IFIs. And just to remind everyone, our last Article IV with Syria was in 2009.  So, it’s been quite some time since we have had a substantive engagement with Syria.  Syria will need significant assistance to rebuild its economic institutions.  We stand ready to provide advice and targeted and well-prioritized technical assistance in our areas of expertise. I think this goes a little bit to your question on, like, what do we mean by defining data.  I think what the Managing Director was really referring to there is since it has been such a long time since we have had a substantive engagement with Syria, the last Article IV, as I said, was in 2009.  I think there, what she’s really referring to is the need to really work with the Syrian authorities to rebuild basic economic institutions, including the ability to produce economic statistics, right, so that we — so that we and the authorities and the international community of course, can conduct the necessary economic analysis so that we can best support the reconstruction and recovery efforts.  

    With respect to the lifting of sanctions, what I can say there is that, of course, the lifting of sanctions and the lifting of sanctions are a matter between member states of the IMF.  What we can say in serious cases that the lifting of sanctions could support Syria’s efforts to overcome its economic challenges and help advance its reconstruction and economic development.  Syria, of course, is an IMF member, and as we’ve just said, you know, we are, of course, engaged closely with the Syrians to explore how, within our mandate, we can best support them.  

     

    QUESTIONER: My question is on Russia.  In what ways is the IMF monitoring Russia’s economy under the current sanctions and conflict conditions, and have regular Article IV Consultations or other surveillance activities with Russia resumed to track its economic developments?  

    MS. KOZACK: What I can say with respect to Russia is that we are, our Staff, are analyzing data and economic indicators that are reported by the Russian authorities.  We are also looking at counterparty data that is provided to us by other countries, and this is particularly true for cross-border transactions, as well as data from third-party sources. So, this data collection using official and other sources does allow us to put together a picture of the Russian economy.  

    We did provide an assessment in the 2025 April WEO, the one that we just released about a month ago.  In this WEO, we assess Russia’s growth at — we expect Russia to grow at 1.5 percent in 2025, 0.9 percent in 2026, and we expect inflation to come down to 8.2 percent in 2025 and 4.4 percent in 2026.  And I don’t have a timetable for the Article IV at this time.  

     

    QUESTIONER: I’d like to ask about Deputy Management Director Okamura’s visits to Japan.  So, my question is, what economic topics will be on the agenda during his stay?  Could you tell me a bit more in detail?  

    MS. KOZACK: Deputy Managing Director Okamura will travel to Japan, as I said, from June 11th to 12th, and he will be attending the Tokyo Fiscal Forum.  So, this will be the 10th Tokyo Fiscal Forum.  It’s an annual conference that we co-host in Japan every year and the focus is on issues of fiscal policy. In this particular one, Deputy Managing Director Okamura will be discussing fiscal frameworks. It’s very important for all countries to have sound fiscal frameworks so they can implement sound fiscal policy.  He will also be discussing GovTech not only in Japan but in the Asia Pacific region.  And of course, GovTech is very important for countries because it’s a way of modernizing and making government both provision of services in some cases but also potentially collection of revenue more effective and more efficient.  So, those will be the focus of his discussions in Tokyo.  

     

    QUESTIONER: I have a question on the recent bailout package by IMF to Pakistan.  The Indian government has expressed a lot of displeasure with Pakistan planning to use this package to build — rebuild — areas that allegedly support cross-border terrorism.  Does the IMF have any assessment of this?  Secondly, I also have another question.  Could you please provide information on the majority vote that was received in approving this bailout package for Pakistan on May 9th?  If you can disclose the information.  

    MS. KOZACK: Any other questions on Pakistan?  

     

    QUESTIONER: Just adding to that, do you have an update on the implications of the escalation of facilities in that border between Pakistan and India on both economies.  

     

    QUESTIONER: Thanks a lot.  I guess the only spin I would put on is generally what safeguards does the IMF have that its funds won’t be used for military or in support of military actions, not only there but as a general matter.  And I also, if you’re able to, there was some controversy about the termination of India’s Executive Director of the IMF, K.V. Subramanian.  Do you have any insight into–there are reports there–what it was about but what do you say it’s about?  Thanks a lot.  

    MS. KOZACK: With respect to the Indian Executive Director who had been at the Fund, all I can say on this is that the appointment of Executive Directors is a member for the — is a matter for the member country.  It’s not a matter for the Fund, and it’s completely up to the country authorities to determine who represents them at the Fund.  

    With respect to Pakistan and the conflict with India, I want to start here by first expressing our regrets and sympathies for the loss of life and for the human toll from the recent conflict.  We do hope for a peaceful resolution of the conflict.  

    Now, turning to some of the specific questions about the Board approval of Pakistan’s program, I’m going to step back a minute and provide a little bit of the chronology and timeframe.  The IMF Executive Board approved Pakistan’s EFF program in September of 2024.  And the First review at that time was planned for the first quarter of 2025.  And consistent with that timeline, on March 25th of 2025, the IMF Staff and the Pakistani authorities reached a Staff-Level Agreement on the First Review for the EFF.  That agreement, that Staff-Level Agreement, was then presented to our Executive Board, and our Executive Board completed the review on May 9th.  As a result of the completion of that review, Pakistan received the disbursement at that time.  

    What I want to emphasize here is that it is part of a standard procedure under programs that our Executive Board conducts periodic reviews of lending programs to assess their progress.  And they particularly look at whether the program is on track, whether the conditions under the program have been met, and whether any policy changes are needed to bring the program back on track.  And in the case of Pakistan, our Board found that Pakistan had indeed met all of the targets.  It had made progress on some of the reforms, and for that reason, the Board went ahead and approved the program.  

    With respect to the voting or the decision-making at our Board, we do not disclose that publicly.  In general, Fund Board decisions are taken by consensus, and in this case, there was a sufficient consensus at the Board to allow us to move forward or for the Board to decide to move forward and complete Pakistan’s review.  

    And with respect to the question on safeguards, I do want to make three points here.  The first is that IMF financing is provided to members for the purpose of resolving balance of payments problems.  

    In the case of Pakistan, and this is my second point, the EFF disbursements, all of the disbursements received under the EFF, are allocated to the reserves of the central bank.  So, those disbursements are at the central bank, and under the program, those resources are not part of budget financing.  They are not transferred to the government to support the budget. 

    And the third point is that the program provides additional safeguards through our conditionality.  And these include, for example, targets on the accumulation of international reserves.  It includes a zero target, meaning no lending from the central bank to the government.  And the program also includes substantial structural conditionality around improving fiscal management.  And these conditions are all available in the program documents if you wanted to do a deeper dive.  And, of course, any deviation from the established program conditions would impact future reviews under the Pakistan program.  

     

    QUESTIONER: I have a question on Egypt.  There is a mission in Egypt for the First Review of the EFF loan program.  So, can you please update us on the ongoing discussions, especially since the Prime Minister of Egypt announced yesterday that the program could be concluded in 2027 rather than 2026?  

    MS. KOZACK: Any other questions on Egypt?  I have a question from the Press Center on Egypt, which I will read aloud.  The question is when will the Fifth Review currently underway with the Egyptian government be concluded, and when will the Executive Board approve this review?  And how much money will Egypt receive once the review is approved?  

    So, here’s what I can share on Egypt.  First, let me start here.  So first, I just want to say that the Fund remains committed to supporting Egypt in building its economic resilience and fostering higher private sector-led growth.  Egypt has made clear progress on its macroeconomic reform program, with notable improvements in inflation and foreign exchange reserves.  For the past few weeks, IMF Staff has had productive discussions with the Egyptian authorities on economic performance and policies under the EFF.  As Egypt’s macroeconomic stabilization is taking hold, efforts must now focus on accelerating and deepening reforms that will reduce the footprint of the state in the Egyptian economy, level the playing field, and improve the business environment.  Discussions will continue between the IMF and the Egyptian authorities on the remaining policies and reforms that could support the completion of the Fifth Review.  

     

    QUESTIONER: My question is about Sri Lanka.  Sri Lanka’s program is subject to IMF Board approval.  The review is subject to IMF Board approval, but we still haven’t got any word on when that would be.  Is there any delay in this?  And is this delay attributed to the pending electricity adjustments, tariff adjustments, that the Sri Lankan government has committed to?  

    MS. KOZACK: So just stepping back for a minute.  On April 25th, IMF Staff and the Sri Lankan authorities reached Staff-Level Agreement on the Fourth Review of Sri Lanka’s program under the EFF.  And once the review is approved by our Executive Board, Sri Lanka will have access to about $344 million in financing.  Completion of the review is subject to approval by the Executive Board, and we expect that Board meeting to take place in the coming weeks.  

    The precise timing of the Board meeting is contingent on two things.  The first is implementation of prior actions, and the main prior actions are relating to restoring electricity, cost recovery pricing and ensuring proper function of the automatic electricity price adjustment mechanism.  And the second contingency is completion of the Financing Assurances Review, which will focus on confirming multilateral partners, committed financing contributions to Sri Lanka and whether adequate progress has been made in debt restructuring.  So, in a nutshell, completion of the review is subject to approval by the Executive Board.  We expect the Board meeting to take place in the coming weeks.  And it’s contingent on the two matters that I just mentioned.  

     

    QUESTIONER: Thank you for having my questions on Ecuador.  Since the IMF is still completing the second review under the EFF program for Ecuador, do you think it’s going to be time to change the program, the goals, or maybe the amount of the program?  Because Ecuador is now facing different challenges compared to 2024.  The oil prices are falling, so that is going to affect the fiscal situation for Ecuador.  And also, I would like to know if Ecuador is still looking for a new program under the RSF.  And the last one, I would like to know if, do you think that Ecuador is going to need to make some important changes this year on oil subsidies and a tax reform?  I think, as I said, Ecuador now is facing some important challenges in the fiscal situation, so do you think it’s going to be possible because of, you know, all the social protests and all that kind of stuff?  Do you think it’s going to be possible to do that in Ecuador?  

     

    QUESTIONER: Is there a request, an official request, in place to modify the program?  And if there is, of course, details of the new one, you can share.  

    MS. KOZACK: And then I have one question online from the Press Center regarding Ecuador.  Is the sovereign negotiating new targets, given their fiscal position deteriorated compared to last year?  Our understanding is that $410 million was not dispersed under the First Review.?

    So let me share what I can on Ecuador.  So, right now, representatives from the IMF, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank are in Quito this week to meet with the authorities and discuss the strengthening of financial and technical support to the country.  As part of this tripartite visit, we have a new IMF Mission Chief who is participating, and she is also using that opportunity to have courtesy meetings with the authorities and to continue discussions and advance toward a Second Review under Ecuador’s EFF.  

    What else I can add, just as background, is that the Executive Board in December approved the First Review of Ecuador’s 48-month EFF.  About $500 million was disbursed after the approval of that Frist Review.  And at that time, the Executive Board also concluded the Article IV Consultation.

    I can also say that the authorities have made excellent progress in the implementation of their economic program under the EFF.  And regarding the precise timing of the Second Review, we will provide an update on the next steps in due course and when we’re able to do so.  

     

    QUESTIONER: Just a quick question on tariffs.  I’m just wondering if the IMF has a response to the U.S.-China deal that was struck in Geneva earlier this month.  You know, if the deal holds, I appreciate it’s a 90-day pause, but if the deal holds, how would you foresee that changing the Fund’s current economic forecast for the U.S. and China and for the global economy?  Thanks.  

    MS. KOZACK: As you noted, earlier in May, China and the U.S. announced a 90-day rollback of most of the bilateral tariffs imposed since April 2nd, and they established a mechanism to discuss economic and trade relations.  The two sides reduced their tariff from peak levels, leaving in place 10 percent additional tariffs.  So, the additional tariffs before this agreement were 125 percent.  Now, the additional tariff has agreed to be 10 percent, you know, for the 90 days.  This is obviously a positive step for the world’s two largest economies.

    What I can also add is that for the U.S., you may recall, during the Spring Meetings, we talked a lot about the overall effective tariff rate for the U.S.  At that time, we assessed it at 25.5 percent.  This announcement and the reduction in tariffs will bring the U.S. effective tariff rate down to a bit over 14 percent.  

    Now, with respect to the impact, what I can say is that the reduction in tariffs and the easing of tensions does provide some upside risk to our global growth forecast.  We will be updating that global growth forecast as part of our July WEO.  And so that will give us an opportunity to provide a full assessment.  All of this said, of course, the outlook, the global outlook in general does remain one of high uncertainty.  And so that uncertainty is still with us.  

     

    QUESTIONER: I have a broad question regarding the following – at the IMF World Bank Spring Meeting, the recent one,  the Treasury Secretary Bessent called for the IMF and the World Bank to refocus on their core mission on macroeconomic stability and development.  Did the IMF start any discussion on this topic with the U.S. administration?  And my second question, do you foresee any changes to your lending programs to take into account the views of the Trump Administration regarding issues like climate change and international development?  Thank you.  

    MS. KOZACK: What I can say on this is the U.S. is our largest shareholder, and we greatly value the voice of the United States.  We have a constructive engagement with the U.S. authorities, and we very much appreciate Secretary Bessent’s reiteration of the United States’ commitment to the Fund and to our role.  The IMF has a clearly defined mandate to support economic and financial stability globally.  Our Management Team and our entire Staff are focused exactly on this mandate, helping our 191 members tackle their economic challenges and their balance of payments risks.  

    What I can also add is that at the most recent Spring Meetings, the ones we just had in April, our membership identified two areas where they’ve asked the IMF to deepen our work.  And the first is on external imbalances, and the second is on our monitoring of the financial sector.  So they’re looking for us to really deepen our work in these two areas.  

    As far as taking that work forward, we will continue working with our Executive Board on these areas, as well as to carry out some important policy reviews.  And I think the Managing Director referred to these during the Spring Meetings.  The first is the Comprehensive Surveillance Review, which will set out our surveillance priorities for the next five years.  And the second is the review of program design and conditionality.  And that will carefully consider how our lending can best help countries address low growth challenges and durably resolve their balance of payments weaknesses.  

    I have a slight update for you on Ukraine, which says — so the eighth — so if we look at the documents that were published at the time of the Seventh Review program, the one that was approved by the Executive Board a little while ago, based on that, the Eighth Review disbursement would be about $520 million.  And, the discussions of the Eighth Review are ongoing, and any disbursement, as always, is subject to approval by our Executive Board. 

    And with that, I will bring this press briefing to a close.  So first, let me thank you all for your participation today.  As a reminder, the briefing is embargoed until 11:00 a.m. Eastern Time in the United States.  As always, a transcript will be made available later on IMF.org.  In case of any clarifications or additional queries, please do not hesitate to reach out to my colleagues at media@imf.org.  This concludes our press briefing, and I wish everyone a wonderful day.  I look forward to seeing you next time.  Thanks very much.

     

      

    *  *  *  *  *

     

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

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    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/05/22/tr-05222025-com-regular-press-briefing-may-22-2025

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Economics: Meeting of 16-17 April 2025

    Source: European Central Bank

    Account of the monetary policy meeting of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank held in Frankfurt am Main on Wednesday and Thursday, 16-17 April 2025

    22 May 2025

    1. Review of financial, economic and monetary developments and policy options

    Financial market developments

    Ms Schnabel recalled that President Trump’s announcement on 2 April 2025 of unexpectedly high tariffs had sparked a sharp sell-off in global equity markets and in US bond markets, leading to a surge in financial market volatility. The severity of the tariffs and the manner in which they had been introduced had led to a breakdown of standard cross-market correlations, with a sell-off of US equities occurring at the same time as a sell-off of Treasuries in the context of a marked depreciation of the US dollar against major currencies.

    Movements in euro area risk-free rates reflected the opposing impacts of the historic German fiscal package and the global trade conflict. At the long end of the yield curve, the expected positive growth impulse from fiscal policy, as well as expectations of tighter monetary policy in the future, had been the dominant factors, pulling up nominal and real interest rates. At the short end of the yield curve, the decline in inflation compensation, driven mainly by falling inflation risk premia, had been larger than the rise in real yields, leading to a decline in nominal rates. These developments reflected both the negative fallout from tariffs and lower commodity prices. Investors expected the ECB to react to the evolving situation by lowering rates more than had previously been anticipated, but to start raising them again in the coming year. Amid the market turbulence, euro area bond markets had continued to function smoothly, and the bond supply had been absorbed well in the context of strong investor demand and well-functioning dealer intermediation. On the back of the sharp correction in stock prices and the marked appreciation of the euro exchange rate, financial conditions in the euro area had tightened, despite lower nominal short-term rates.

    Turning to market developments since the previous Governing Council meeting, President Trump’s announcement on 2 April 2025 had led the VIX volatility index to temporarily reach levels not seen since the COVID-19 pandemic. Within a few days the S&P 500 index had dropped by 12%, triggering sharp corrections in stock markets around the world, including in the euro area. Despite a rebound after the pausing of “reciprocal” tariffs on 9 April 2025, the US benchmark equity index had lost 8% in the year to date while euro area stock markets were almost back to the levels seen at the start of the year. Stocks in trade-sensitive US sectors had been hit much harder than other stocks, and they had also dropped by much more than their euro area counterparts.

    The market turbulence had spilled over to government bond markets, but the reaction had differed markedly between the euro area and the United States. US government bond yields had risen at the same time as the US equity sell-off, which was highly unusual because Treasury bonds normally benefited from safe-haven flows. US ten-year asset swap spreads had likewise risen sharply, which was also unusual. Meanwhile, Bund yields had declined and the spread between the Bund and overnight index swap (OIS) rates had narrowed substantially as German government bonds had continued to perform their role as a safe-haven asset.

    The risk-off sentiment had also affected the dynamics of the US dollar exchange rate, but this too had reacted differently from what would normally have been expected. In January 2025 the EUR/USD exchange rate had hit a low of 1.02, but the euro’s downward trend had been reversed around the time of the announcement in early March 2025 of the reform of the German debt brake, with a positive growth narrative for Europe emerging in light of higher defence and infrastructure spending. The euro exchange rate had received a second major boost after the 2 April tariff announcement in the United States. This strong upward move had not been driven, as was usually the case, by changes in the yield differential, which had moved in the opposite direction, but by US dollar weakness as investors had revised down their US growth expectations. Over recent weeks the US dollar had thus not benefited from the widespread risk-off mood.

    Recent developments had been reflected in global portfolio flows. The March 2025 round of the Bank of America Fund Manager Survey had recorded the strongest shift out of US equities on record, with 45% of managers reporting that they had reduced their positions. At the same time, a significant share of fund managers had reported that they had changed their positioning in favour of euro area equities. This marked a significant shift of perspectives away from US exceptionalism towards Europe being seen as the bright spot among major economies, given the expected fiscal boost in Germany and the pick-up in European defence spending.

    Dynamics in risk-free bond markets illustrated the opposing impacts of the German fiscal package and the tariff announcements over recent weeks. In the euro area, the overall increase in longer-term nominal interest rates had been driven by a rise in real rates, indicating that market participants viewed the German fiscal package as fostering long-term growth. Real rates had kept rising during the tariff tensions, as investors had continued to expect, on balance, an improved growth outlook for the euro area. By contrast, inflation compensation had decreased across the yield curve after increasing only briefly in response to the German fiscal package.

    Ms Schnabel then turned to the drivers of developments in euro area inflation compensation. On the one hand, bond market investors were pricing in higher inflation compensation owing to the expansionary German fiscal measures to be implemented over the next decade. On the other hand, concerns about the trade war had pulled inflation compensation lower, more than compensating for the impact of the German fiscal package on short to medium-term maturities. One important driver of the downward revision had been the sharp drop in oil prices in the wake of the tariff announcements and rising fears of a global recession.

    Market participants currently expected the ECB to implement a faster and deeper easing cycle towards a terminal rate of around 1.7% in May 2026. However, the ECB was expected to start raising rates again in 2026 in a J-curve pattern, with rate expectations picking up notably over longer horizons.

    In corporate bond markets, credit spreads had increased globally in response to the risk-off sentiment and the sharp sell-off in risk asset markets. However, the surge in US investment-grade corporate bond spreads had been more pronounced compared with developments in their euro area counterparts.

    Sovereign spreads had remained resilient over the past few weeks. The marked rise in the Bund yield after the announcement of the German fiscal package in March 2025 had not translated into an increase in sovereign spreads, which had even declined slightly at that time. The benign reaction of euro area government bond markets over recent weeks could be explained by expectations of positive economic spillovers from Germany to the rest of the euro area, possible prospects of increased European unity and, in the case of Italy, positive rating action.

    Government bond issuance in the euro area had continued to be absorbed well as investor demand had remained robust, with primary and secondary markets continuing to function smoothly. Higher volatility in government bond markets had not led to a meaningful deterioration in liquidity conditions, unlike in previous stress episodes. Hence, the turbulence in US Treasury markets had not had repercussions for the functioning of euro area sovereign bond markets.

    Ms Schnabel concluded by considering the implications of recent market developments for overall financial conditions. Since the March monetary policy meeting financial conditions had tightened, mainly owing to lower equity prices and a stronger nominal effective exchange rate of the euro, which had more than compensated for the easing impulse stemming from lower nominal short-term interest rates. Real rates had gradually shifted up across the yield curve. Overall, recent market developments might not only be a reflection of short-term market disturbances but also of a broader shift in global financial markets, with the euro area being one potential beneficiary.

    The global environment and economic and monetary developments in the euro area

    Starting with inflation in the euro area, Mr Lane stated that the disinflation process was well on track. Inflation had continued to develop as expected, with both headline inflation in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) and core inflation (HICP inflation excluding energy and food) declining in March. Headline inflation had declined to 2.2% in March, from 2.3% in February. Energy inflation had decreased to -1.0%, in part owing to a sharper than expected decline in oil prices, while food inflation had increased to 2.9% on the back of higher unprocessed food prices. Core inflation had declined to 2.4% in March, from 2.6% in February. While goods inflation remained stable at 0.6%, there had been a marked downward adjustment in services inflation, which had dropped to 3.5% in March from 3.7% in February, confirming the more muted repricing momentum in some services that had been expected.

    Most exclusion-based measures of underlying inflation had eased further in March. The Persistent and Common Component of Inflation (PCCI), which had the best predictive power for future headline inflation, had decreased to 2.2% in March from 2.3% in February. Domestic inflation was unchanged in March after declining to 3.9% in February, down from 4.0% in January. The differential between domestic inflation and services inflation reflected the significant deceleration of inflation in the traded services segment seen in the recent data.

    Wage growth was moderating. The annual growth rate of compensation per employee had declined to 4.1% in the fourth quarter of 2024, down from 4.5% in the third quarter and below the March 2025 projection of 4.3%. Negotiated wage growth had also come in at 4.1% in the fourth quarter of 2024. According to the April round of the Corporate Telephone Survey, leading non-financial corporations in the euro area had reduced their wage growth expectations for 2025 to 3.0%, down from 3.6% in the previous survey round. Respondents to the Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises had marked down their wage growth expectations for the next 12 months to 3.0%, from 3.3% in the last survey round. Looking ahead, the ECB wage tracker also pointed to a substantial decrease in annual growth of negotiated wages between 2024 and 2025, with one-off payments becoming a less dominant component of salary increases. Wage expectations reported in the Survey of Professional Forecasters and the Consensus Economics survey also signalled an easing of labour cost growth in 2025 compared with last year (between 0.7 and 1.0 percentage point), which was broadly in line with the March projections.

    Looking ahead, inflation was expected to hover close to the inflation target of 2% for the remainder of the year. Core inflation, and in particular services inflation, was expected to decline until mid-2025 as the effects from lagged repricing faded out, wage pressures receded, and past monetary policy tightening continued to feed through. Surveys confirmed this overall picture, while longer-term inflation expectations had remained well anchored around the 2% target. At the same time, market participants had markedly revised down their expectations for inflation over shorter horizons, with the one-year forward inflation-linked swap rates one year ahead, two years ahead and four years ahead declining by around 20 basis points to 1.6%, 1.7% and 1.9% respectively.

    Global growth was expected to have maintained its momentum in the first quarter of the year, with the global composite output Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) released on 3 April averaging 52.0. The manufacturing PMI had been recovering and stood above the threshold indicating expansion, while the services PMI had lost some momentum in advanced economies. However, global growth was likely to be negatively affected by the US-initiated increases in tariffs and the resulting financial market turmoil, which had come against the backdrop of already elevated geopolitical tensions.

    Triggered by concerns about global demand, oil and gas prices, along with other commodity prices, had declined sharply since 2 April. Compared with the assumption for the March projections, Brent crude oil prices were now approximately 10% lower in US dollar terms and 18.3% lower in euro terms. Gas prices stood 37% below the value embedded in the March projections. The euro had strengthened over recent weeks as investor sentiment had proven more resilient towards the euro area than towards other economies, with the EUR/USD exchange rate up 9.6% and the nominal effective exchange rate up 5.5% compared with the assumptions for the March projections.

    Euro area economic growth had slowed to 0.2%, quarter on quarter, in the fourth quarter of 2024, down from 0.4% in the third quarter. This figure was 0.1 percentage points higher than had been foreseen in the March projections. As projected, growth had been entirely driven by domestic demand. The economy was also likely to have grown in the first quarter of the year, and manufacturing had shown signs of stabilisation. The initial tariff announcements by the United States in early 2025 had so far seemed not to have materially dampened economic sentiment and might even have led to some frontloading of trade. However, some more recent surveys indicated a decline in sentiment. These included the latest Consumer Expectations Survey, the ZEW Indicator of Economic Sentiment and the Sentix Economic index.

    The labour market remained resilient. The unemployment rate had edged down to 6.1% in February. At the same time, labour demand was cooling. The job vacancy rate had remained unchanged at 2.5% in the fourth quarter of 2024 and now stood 0.8 percentage points below its peak in the second quarter of 2022. Total job postings and new postings were 16% and 26% lower respectively compared with a year ago. Additionally, fewer firms had reported that labour was a limiting factor for production. The employment PMI had remained broadly neutral in March at 50.4, pointing to stable employment conditions in the first quarter of 2025.

    Fiscal policies were identified as another potential source of resilience. Newly announced government measures were expected to have a relatively limited impact on the fiscal stance of the euro area compared with the assessment included in the March projections. But the scope for infrastructure investment and climate transition investment, as well as spending on defence in the largest euro area economy, had been substantially increased as a result of the loosening of the German debt brake, together with enhanced flexibility for greater spending on defence across euro area countries as a result of EU initiatives.

    The economic outlook was clouded by exceptional uncertainty, however. Downside risks to economic growth had increased. The major escalation in global trade tensions and the associated uncertainty were likely to lower euro area growth by dampening exports and investment. Deteriorating financial market sentiment could lead to tighter financing conditions and increased risk aversion, and could make firms and households less willing to invest and consume. Geopolitical tensions, such as Russia’s unjustified war against Ukraine and the tragic conflict in the Middle East, also remained a major source of uncertainty. At the same time, an increase in defence and infrastructure spending would add to growth.

    Increasing global trade disruptions were adding more uncertainty to the outlook for euro area inflation. Falling global energy prices and the appreciation of the euro could put further downward pressure on inflation. This could be reinforced by lower demand for euro area exports owing to higher tariffs and by a re-routing of exports into the euro area from countries with overcapacity. Adverse financial market reactions to the trade tensions could weigh on domestic demand and thereby also lead to lower inflation. By contrast, a fragmentation of global supply chains could raise inflation by pushing up import prices. A boost in defence and infrastructure spending could also raise inflation over the medium term. Extreme weather events, and the unfolding climate crisis more broadly, could drive up food prices by more than expected.

    Turning to the monetary and financial analysis, risk-free interest rates had declined in response to the escalating trade tensions. However, the risk-free ten-year OIS rate was about 20 basis points higher than at the cut-off date for the March projections. Bank bond spreads had increased by nearly 30 basis points. Credit spreads had increased by 23 basis points for investment-grade corporate bonds and by as much as 95 basis points for the high-yield segment. The Eurostoxx index had fallen by around 4.8% since the cut-off date for the March projections, while indicators of market volatility had increased.

    The latest information on the availability and cost of credit for the broader economy predated the market tensions but continued to indicate a gradual normalisation in credit conditions, though with some mixed evidence. The interest rate on new loans to firms had declined by 15 basis points in February, to 4.1%, which was about 120 basis points below its October 2023 peak. However, interest rates on new mortgages had increased by 8 basis points in February, to 3.3%, which was around 70 basis points below their November 2023 peak. Loan growth was picking up at a moderate pace. Annual growth in bank lending to firms had increased to 2.2% in February, from 2.0% in January, amid marked month-on-month volatility. Corporate debt issuance had been weak in February, but the annual growth rate had stabilised at 3.2%. Lending to households had edged up further to 1.5% on an annual basis in February, from 1.3% in January, led by mortgages. According to the latest bank lending survey for the euro area, which had been conducted between 10 and 25 March 2025, credit standards had tightened slightly further for loans to firms and consumer credit in the first quarter, while there had been an easing of credit standards for mortgages. This evidence resonated with the results of the Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises, which also showed almost unchanged availability of bank loans to firms in the first quarter, owing to concerns about the economic outlook and borrower creditworthiness, compounded by high uncertainty.

    Monetary policy considerations and policy options

    In summary, the incoming data confirmed that the disinflation process remained well on track. Both headline and core inflation in March had come in as expected. In particular, the projected drop in services inflation in March had been confirmed in the data and underpinned confidence in the underlying downward trajectory. The more forward-looking indicators of underlying inflation remained consistent with inflation settling at around the target in a sustained manner, with domestic inflation also coming down on the back of lower labour cost growth, which was decelerating somewhat faster than had been expected. The euro area economy had been building up some resilience against global shocks, but the outlook for growth had deteriorated materially owing to rising trade tensions. Increased uncertainty was likely to reduce confidence among households and firms, and the adverse and volatile market response to the recent trade tensions was likely to have a tightening impact on financing conditions and thereby further weigh on the euro area economic outlook.

    Based on this assessment, Mr Lane proposed lowering the three key ECB interest rates by 25 basis points. In particular, lowering the deposit facility rate – the rate through which the Governing Council steered the monetary policy stance – was rooted in its updated assessment of the inflation outlook, the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission. A further cut at the present meeting was important in ensuring that inflation stabilised at the target in a sustainable manner, while also avoiding the possibility that external adverse shocks to the economic outlook could be exacerbated by too high a level of the policy rate.

    Looking ahead, it remained more important than ever to maintain agility in adjusting the stance as appropriate on a meeting-by-meeting basis and to not pre-commit to any particular rate path.

    2. Governing Council’s discussion and monetary policy decisions

    Economic, monetary and financial analyses

    Regarding global conditions, members stressed that the outlook for global growth was highly uncertain. In reaction to the frequent – and often contradictory – tariff announcements and retaliation over the last few weeks, the International Monetary Fund was currently revising its World Economic Outlook. Since the Governing Council’s last monetary policy meeting the euro had appreciated by 4.2% in nominal effective terms and by 6.4% against the US dollar, driven by market expectations of a narrowing growth differential between the euro area and the United States and possibly by a broad-based investor reassessment of the risk attached to exposures to the United States. Energy and food commodity prices had also declined sharply owing to growth concerns as the trade war intensified. The combined effect of a weakening dollar and declining oil and gas prices meant that, in euro terms, oil prices had fallen by 18.3% and gas prices by 37% since the March Governing Council meeting. Macroeconomic data did not yet reflect fully the ongoing trade war, which would only show through more clearly in the data during the second quarter of 2025. The composite output PMI for global activity excluding the euro area had remained broadly stable in March.

    Global trade was expected to slow significantly. This reflected lower imports primarily from the United States, China, Mexico and Canada – all countries with sizeable reciprocal trade relations. In the first quarter trade had still been strong owing to a rebound at the beginning of the year, in part driven by a frontloading of imports in anticipation of future tariffs. However, high-frequency and more timely data (based on vessel movements) had already started weakening, in particular for US imports. Private sector forecasts for US growth in 2025 had started trending down in the run-up to the 2 April tariff announcement. However, that event, together with the deterioration in financial conditions that followed, had led to a further downward revision to US GDP growth prospects for this year, as the high uncertainty around US policies was expected to hold back investment and economic activity. In this context the impact of the confidence channel was regarded as particularly important. While most economists had assumed that with higher tariffs and a trade war the US dollar would appreciate, the latest developments pointed to adverse confidence effects and the self-defeating nature of tariffs weakening the dollar. Private sector forecasts for Chinese growth in 2025 had also been revised down since early April, as the contribution from net exports – a key source of support for Chinese growth in 2024 – was expected to decline significantly this year. The Chinese Government’s announcement of additional fiscal support to boost consumption was seen as likely to only partially offset the loss of international trade.

    In general, protectionism and policy unpredictability were seen as the ultimate sources of distress. This raised the question of whether the impact of these factors could unwind when the policy approach that had generated them might reverse. Indeed, the view was expressed that mutually beneficial trade agreements could be reached, leading to a much more benign outcome. At the same time, it was argued that, first, a complete unwinding of the 2 April tariff policy announcement was unlikely and, second, even in the event of a complete policy turnaround, it was questionable whether the world economy could return to its previous status quo.

    The recent strong appreciation of the euro was largely explained by portfolio rebalancing due to growing concerns among investors about US economic policies and the risks that these posed to large exposures to the United States. Overall, the current state of the world economy was not regarded as being at an equilibrium, and it might take several years before the global economy reached a new equilibrium. For a long time the world had been in a configuration centred on the United States running large current account deficits, with optimistic consumers, high private sector investment rates and a large fiscal deficit.

    Looking ahead, two polar scenarios could be seen. One was a stabilisation of the situation, whereby the US current account deficit was structural and largely financed by capital inflows. In this situation, the ongoing portfolio rebalancing across currencies would eventually reverse in favour of the United States, leading to a renewed real appreciation of the US dollar, partly driven by relative price adjustments. However, recent events had eroded trust in the US system, and it was challenging to envisage how it might be restored.

    The other possible direction that the global order could take was a continuation of current rebalancing trends. Such a situation could lead temporarily to much higher US inflation as a result of the combined effects of tariffs and a potentially weaker exchange rate. More generally, the new equilibrium could entail high tariffs, an increase in home bias – for trade balance or security reasons – and a more fragmented world. This more fragmented environment was likely to be characterised by stronger inflationary pressures. In addition, the move to a new equilibrium would involve costly adjustment dynamics, as firms, households and governments would have to re-optimise in light of the new constellation, but also owing to the high levels of uncertainty in the transition period. In the meantime, the erosion of confidence in the US economy and in the global order of international trade and finance was expected to result in a higher global cost structure arising from protectionist policies and a higher risk premium arising from unpredictability. An intermediate scenario was also possible, in which the euro would become increasingly attractive, thus expanding its international role as a reserve currency.

    Overall, even if it was known with certainty where the new equilibrium lay, there would still be major adjustment dynamics along the way. In addition, as global supply chains had been shaped over the years to best adapt to the old equilibrium, they would need to adjust to the new one, with a likely loss of market value for those firms that had been most engaged in the old global order. Throughout this process there would be path dependence in the dynamics of the economy.

    With regard to economic activity in the euro area, members concurred that the economic outlook was clouded by exceptional uncertainty. Euro area exporters faced new barriers to trade, although the scope and nature of those barriers remained unclear. Disruptions to international commerce, financial market tensions and geopolitical uncertainty were weighing on business investment. As consumers became more cautious about the future, they might hold back from spending, thus delaying further the more robust consumption-led recovery that the staff projections had been foreseeing for a number of projection rounds.

    At the same time, the euro area economy had been building up some resilience against the global shocks. Domestic demand had contributed significantly to euro area growth in the fourth quarter of 2024, with business investment and private consumption growing robustly in spite of the already high uncertainty. The manufacturing output PMI had risen above 50 in March for the first time in two years, while the services business activity PMI had remained in expansionary territory, with relatively solid industrial production numbers confirming information from the soft indicators. While the trade conflict was a significant drag on foreign demand, the expected fiscal spending would counter some of those effects. The economy was likely to have grown in the first quarter of the year, and manufacturing had shown signs of stabilisation. Unemployment had fallen to 6.1% in February, its lowest level since the launch of the euro. Looking ahead, a strong labour market, higher real incomes and the impact of an easier monetary policy stance should underpin spending.

    For the near term, it was argued that the likely slump in trade and the surge in uncertainty were hitting the euro area at a critical juncture, when the recovery was still weak and fragile. It was seen as becoming increasingly clear that the impact of the trade shock might be very strong in terms of activity in the United States, with potentially substantial spillovers to the euro area. Even with the additional spending on defence and infrastructure, it was likely that, on balance, euro area growth would be worse in 2025 than previously expected. Incorporating the impact from the most recent escalation of trade tensions, potential retaliatory measures from the EU and the financial market turbulence of recent weeks could weaken activity in 2025 significantly. As a result, it was suggested that the probability of a recession over the next four quarters in the euro area and the United States had increased measurably.

    However, it was also argued that, while complicated, the situation still had upside potential. First, the strong market reaction might impose some discipline on the US Administration. Second, there was room for mutually beneficial trade agreements which would de-escalate the severity of the tariff increase threatened in the 2 April announcement. Regarding the fallout for growth, the ultimate effects of the new trade frictions would crucially depend on the substitutability of items imported by the United States. The bulk of exports from the euro area to the United States comprised pharmaceuticals, machinery, vehicles and chemicals, and these were highly differentiated products which were difficult to substitute away from in the short run. This rigidity would limit the drag on the euro area’s foreign demand. Moreover, the almost prohibitive tariffs between China and the United States were seen as likely to redirect demand towards euro area firms.

    A further factor that could attenuate the repercussions of trade frictions and uncertainty was the announcement of the German fiscal package and the step-up in European defence spending, which would raise domestic demand. This new factor was seen as unmitigated good news, as it would help to revive the European growth narrative and foster confidence in the euro area. What mattered was not only the direct effects of fiscal spending on demand and activity, but also the expected crowding-in of private investment in anticipation of the future fiscal stimulus. In the Corporate Telephone Survey, firms were already reporting that they were planning to enhance capacity in view of the defence and infrastructure initiatives. The Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises also pointed to greater optimism among firms on investment. Construction was set to recover further. It was therefore argued that the negative impact of tariffs could be seen as more or less the same size as the positive impact coming from the fiscal expansion in Germany. Of course, the time profiles of the impacts of the two major shocks – tariff increases and fiscal stimulus – were different. In the short term the negative effects on demand would dominate, as additional investment in defence and infrastructure would take time to come on stream and support growth.

    At the same time, the view was expressed that even in the medium term defence spending would not be a clear game changer, because it would not only materialise with a delay, but would likely lift euro area GDP growth by at most a couple of tenths of a percentage point. In any case, the fiscal stimulus was still uncertain in terms of its scale and modalities of implementation. In this context, it was noted that the reaction of the markets to the fiscal announcement from Germany suggested that the euro area economy was likely to respond to the new fiscal impulse with an increase in GDP and only a very mild increase in inflation. This demonstrated that the euro area economy was not seen as constrained by structural problems.

    Overall, members assessed that downside risks to economic growth had increased. The major escalation in global trade tensions and associated uncertainties would likely lower euro area growth by dampening exports, and it might drag down investment and consumption. Deteriorating financial market sentiment could lead to tighter financing conditions, increase risk aversion and make firms and households less willing to invest and consume. Geopolitical tensions, such as Russia’s unjustified war against Ukraine and the tragic conflict in the Middle East, also remained a major source of uncertainty. At the same time, an increase in defence and infrastructure spending would add to growth.

    In view of all the uncertainties surrounding the outlook, the view was expressed that for the coming meetings of the Governing Council it was important to develop alternative scenarios. These should factor in the prevailing very high level of uncertainty and assist in identifying the relevant channels and quantifying the impact on growth, jobs and inflation. In addition to scenario analysis, it was important to use high-frequency and unconventional sources of information to better understand the direction the economy was taking. There was also a need to broaden the set of indicators to be monitored, given the challenges in interpreting some of the standard statistics which were influenced and distorted by special factors such as the frontloading of orders and the associated build-up of inventories.

    A silver lining in the turbulent situation that Europe was facing was a strong impetus for European policymakers to swiftly implement the structural reforms set out in the reports by Mario Draghi and Enrico Letta. If effective, such concrete action had the potential to become a major tailwind for the euro area economy in the future, amplifying the stimulating effect of the additional fiscal spending that was planned in Germany. At the same time, it was cautioned that, to reap all the benefits from reform, Europe had to act quickly and on an ambitious scale.

    The important policy initiatives that had been launched at the national and EU levels to increase defence spending and infrastructure investment could be expected to bolster manufacturing, which was also reflected in recent surveys. In the present geopolitical environment, it was even more urgent for fiscal and structural policies to make the euro area economy more productive, competitive and resilient. The European Commission’s Competitiveness Compass provided a concrete roadmap for action, and its proposals, including on simplification, should be swiftly adopted. This included completing the savings and investment union, following a clear and ambitious timetable, which should help savers benefit from more opportunities to invest and improve firms’ access to finance, especially risk capital. It was also important to rapidly establish the legislative framework to prepare the ground for the potential introduction of a digital euro. Governments should ensure sustainable public finances in line with the EU’s economic governance framework and prioritise essential growth-enhancing structural reforms and strategic investment.

    With regard to price developments, members concurred with the assessment presented by Mr Lane. In spite of all remaining uncertainties, the recent inflation data releases had been broadly in line with the March ECB staff projections, with respect to both headline and core inflation. This suggested that inflation was on course for the 2% target, with long-term inflation expectations also remaining well anchored. Taking the February and March inflation data together, there was now much more confidence that the baseline scenario for inflation in the March projections was materialising. This held even without the appreciation of the euro or the decline in oil prices and commodity prices that had taken place since the finalisation of the projections.

    Looking ahead, it was argued that inflation would likely be lower in 2025 than foreseen in the March projections if the exchange rate and energy prices remained around their current levels. Recent market-based measures of inflation expectations also indicated that inflation might be falling faster than previously assumed. Inflation fixings now implied that investors expected inflation (excluding tobacco) to remain just below 2% in 2025 and to decline to around 1.2% in early 2026, before returning to around 1.6% by mid-2026. This signalled that risks to price stability might now be tilted to the downside, especially in the near term. The latest information also suggested that wage growth was moderating at a slightly faster pace than previously expected. Over a longer horizon, the tighter financial conditions, including the appreciation of the euro, the sharp drop in oil and gas prices and the headwinds from weaker economic activity, were seen as important new factors dampening inflation. There was now a risk that inflation could fall well below 2% at least over the remainder of the current year. Trade diversion and price concessions by Chinese exporters could also compound the ongoing depreciation of the renminbi and exert further downward effects on inflation, if not countered by measures by the European Commission. If there were to be retaliation against the tariffs imposed on US imports from the euro area, the direct inflationary impact could be counterbalanced by other factors, including the exchange rate, weaker raw material prices or possibly tighter financial conditions. Over the short term, the countervailing effects from increased fiscal spending were, moreover, unlikely to offset the further disinflationary pressures emanating from the international environment.

    At the same time, it was underlined that upside risks had not vanished. The rising momentum that had been detected in the PCCI indicators of underlying inflation warranted monitoring to confirm whether this increase was temporary and related to repricing early in the year in line with previous seasonal patterns. Although market-based measures of inflation compensation had fallen significantly, owing to lower inflation risk premia, genuine inflation expectations had been revised to a much lesser extent, and analysts’ inflation expectations were mostly well above inflation fixings. It also had to be considered that the likely re-flattening of the Phillips curve, which reflected among other things less frequent price adjustments, implied that meaningful downward deviations of inflation from target were unlikely in the absence of a deep and protracted recession. But such an event had a low probability in light of the expected fiscal impulse. In addition, the precise impact of the stronger euro was uncertain, especially given that one of the reasons behind the appreciation was a positive confidence shock as Europe offered stability in turbulent times. Moreover, successful trade negotiations and the resolution of trade disputes could give a boost to energy prices, changing the inflation picture very quickly. Finally, while the newly announced fiscal stimulus was unlikely to cause inflationary pressure over the short term in view of the underutilised capacities, the economy was likely to bump up against capacity constraints over the medium term, especially in the labour market. Indeed, inflation expectations reported in the Consumer Expectations Survey, the Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises and the Survey of Professional Forecasters remained tilted to the upside over longer horizons. It was argued that, taken as a whole, the current environment posed some downside risks to inflation over the short run, but notable upside risks over the medium term. If retaliation against US tariffs affected products that were hard to substitute, such as intermediate goods, the inflationary impact could be sizeable and persistent as higher input costs from tariffs would be gradually passed on to consumers. This could more than offset the disinflationary pressure from reduced foreign demand. The closely interconnected global trade system implied that tariffs might be passed along entire supply chains. The need to absorb tariffs in profit margins at a time when these were already squeezed because of high wage growth would increase the probability and strength of the pass-through. Upside risks to inflation over the medium term were seen to hold especially in a scenario in which the trade war led to a permanently more fragmented global economy, owing to a less efficient allocation of resources, more fragile supply chains and less elastic global supply.

    Overall, increasing global trade disruptions were adding more uncertainty to the outlook for euro area inflation. Falling global energy prices and an appreciation of the euro could put further downward pressure on inflation. This could be reinforced by lower demand for euro area exports owing to higher tariffs and by a re-routing of exports into the euro area from countries with overcapacity. Adverse financial market reactions to the trade tensions could weigh on domestic demand and thereby also lead to lower inflation. By contrast, a fragmentation of global supply chains could increase inflation by pushing up import prices. A boost in defence and infrastructure spending could also lift inflation over the medium term. Extreme weather events, and the unfolding climate crisis more broadly, could drive up food prices by more than expected.

    Turning to the monetary and financial analysis, members highlighted that the period since the 5-6 March meeting had been characterised by exceptional financial market volatility. This had led to some financial data indicating sizeable daily moves that were several standard deviations away from their mean. Risk-free interest rates had declined since the March meeting in response to the escalating trade tensions, although long-term risk-free rates were still higher than at the cut-off date for the March staff projections. Equity prices had fallen amid high volatility and corporate bond spreads had widened around the globe. Partly in response to the turmoil, financial markets were now fully pricing in the expectation of a 25 basis point rate cut at the current meeting.

    The euro had strengthened considerably over recent weeks as investor sentiment proved more resilient towards the euro area than towards other economies. While the appreciation of the euro had been sizeable, since the inception of the euro the bilateral EUR/USD exchange rate had fluctuated in a relatively wide band, with the rate currently somewhere in the middle of the range. The recent adjustment across asset prices was atypical, as the financial market turbulence had come together with a rebalancing of international portfolios away from US assets towards exposures to other regions, such as the euro area. One explanation, which was supported by the coincidental weakening of the US dollar and by some initial market intelligence, was that domestic and foreign investors had moved out of US assets, possibly reflecting a loss of confidence in US fiscal and trade policies.

    Turning to broader financing conditions, the latest official statistics on corporate borrowing, which predated the market tensions, continued to indicate that past interest rate cuts had made it less expensive for firms to borrow. The average interest rate on new loans to firms had declined to 4.1% in February, from 4.3% in January. The cost to firms of issuing market-based debt had declined to 3.5% in February but there had been some upward pressure more recently. Moreover, growth in lending to firms had picked up again in February, to 2.2%, while debt securities issuance by firms had grown at an unchanged rate of 3.2%. At the same time, credit standards for business loans had tightened slightly again in the first quarter of 2025, as reported in the April round of the bank lending survey. This was mainly because banks were becoming more concerned about the economic risks faced by their customers. Demand for loans to firms had decreased slightly in the first quarter, after a modest recovery in previous quarters.

    The average rate on new mortgages, at 3.3% in February, had risen on the back of earlier increases in longer-term market rates. Mortgage lending had continued to strengthen in February, albeit at a still subdued annual rate of 1.5%, as banks had eased their credit standards and households’ demand for loans had continued to increase strongly.

    Monetary policy stance and policy considerations

    Turning to the monetary policy stance, members assessed the data that had become available since the last monetary policy meeting in accordance with the three main elements that the Governing Council had communicated in 2023 as shaping its reaction function. These comprised (i) the implications of the incoming economic and financial data for the inflation outlook, (ii) the dynamics of underlying inflation, and (iii) the strength of monetary policy transmission.

    Starting with the inflation outlook, members widely agreed that the latest data, including the HICP inflation figures for February and March and recent outturns for services inflation, provided further evidence that the disinflationary process was well on track. They thus expressed increased confidence that inflation would return to target in line with the March baseline projections.

    However, the March baseline projections had not incorporated the latest US policy announcements, which had increased downside risks to growth and inflation over the short term. The most recent forces at play, such as the negative demand shock linked to the tariff proposals and the related pervasive uncertainty, the appreciation of the euro and the decline in oil and gas prices, would further dampen the inflation outlook in the near term.

    Over the medium term the picture for inflation remained more mixed, as the effects of fiscal spending, retaliatory tariffs and the disruption of value chains might point in different directions, with each shock having an impact on growth and inflation with a different time profile. It was pointed out that the inflationary effects of tariffs might outweigh the disinflationary pressure from reduced foreign demand over the medium term, especially if the European Union retaliated by imposing tariffs on products that were not easily substitutable, such as intermediate goods. As a result, firms might suffer from rising input costs that would, over time, be passed on to consumers as the erosion of profit margins made cost absorption difficult. If this occurred at the same time as the support to economic activity from fiscal policy kicked in, there would be a significant risk of higher inflation. Overall, it was too early to draw firm conclusions at a time when many trade policy options were still on the table.

    Turning to underlying inflation, members concurred that most indicators were pointing to a sustained return of inflation to the 2% medium-term target. Wage growth had been slowing further – slightly faster than expected. In view of the high uncertainty, companies were also likely to be cautious about accepting high wage demands. Domestic inflation had remained unchanged, after falling slightly in February. This suggested that inflation had been quite stubborn despite the marked decline in services inflation, although progress had also been seen in this indicator when looking back over the past six months. The PCCI, which had the best leading indicator properties for inflation and still showed rising momentum, warranted further monitoring.

    Finally, incoming data confirmed that the transmission of monetary tightening remained largely as intended. Bank credit growth was overall on a gradual, slow recovery path, although from quite subdued levels. Nevertheless, it was increasing somewhat more strongly than had previously been expected for both non-financial corporations and households. There had been an easing of credit standards and strong demand for housing loans, which could foreshadow a pick-up in construction activity. At the same time, market-based indicators pointed to a tightening of financial conditions and, despite recent interest rate cuts, the latest round of the bank lending survey pointed to tighter credit standards for both firms and consumer credit. This was due to anticipated higher default risks against a background of weaker growth. Moreover, uncertainty had been very high and, in the presence of high uncertainty, the response of intermediaries to lower risk-free rates and, more generally, the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, were seen as more sluggish.

    Monetary policy decisions and communication

    Against this background, all members agreed with the proposal by Mr Lane to lower the three key ECB interest rates by 25 basis points. In particular, lowering the deposit facility rate – the rate through which the Governing Council steered the monetary policy stance – was justified by the updated assessment of the inflation outlook, the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission. Members expressed increased confidence that inflation would return to target over the medium term and that the fight against the inflation shock was nearly over.

    Some members indicated that, before the US tariff announcement on 2 April, they had considered a pause to rate cuts at the current meeting to be appropriate, preferring to wait for the next round of projections for greater clarity on the medium-term inflation outlook. These members attached a higher probability to the possibility that the trade shock would be inflationary beyond the short term, in view of the destructive effects of breaking up global value chains. While the inflationary effects of the proposed tariffs might differ for the United States and Europe, the pandemic experience had shown that, despite different weights attached to demand versus supply factors, in the end inflation developments in the two economies had been quite synchronous, and the same might occur again this time. Overall, this pointed to upside risks to inflation in the medium to long term that counterbalanced the downside risks stemming from weaker economic activity. However, recent events had convinced these members that cutting interest rates at the current meeting provided some insurance against negative outcomes and avoided contributing to additional uncertainty in times of financial market volatility. In addition, a cut at the present meeting could be seen as frontloading a possible cut at the June meeting, which underlined the need to retain full optionality for the upcoming meetings.

    At the same time, it was felt that the tariff tensions did not seem to come with the inflationary effects that many members had previously associated with such an event, at least not over the short to medium-term horizons. In part, this was because the euro was seemingly turning into more of a safe-haven currency and was subject to revaluation pressures. Disinflationary forces were thus likely to dominate in the short term. In addition, the growth outlook had weakened, with tariffs, related uncertainty and geopolitical tensions acting as a drag. In this regard, it was argued that a 25 basis point rate cut would lean against the substantial risks to growth in the short term and the tightening of financial conditions that had resulted from the tariff events, without the risk of fuelling inflation further down the line.

    In these turbulent times, members stressed the need to be a beacon of stability, thus instilling confidence and not causing more surprises in an already volatile environment, which might amplify market turbulence. This spoke in favour of a 25 basis point cut.

    A standard 25 basis point rate reduction was seen as consistent with the fact that, while very uncertain, the range of potential outcomes from the current situation still entailed some upside risks to inflation for the euro area economy. On the one hand, countervailing forces that would bring the US Administration to change course could eventually emerge. One such force had been the observed outflows from the US Treasuries market, which might have contributed to the 90-day pause applied to most US tariffs. On the other hand, there had been – and could be further – mitigating factors in the euro area. These included a more growth-supportive fiscal outlook as well as an opportunity to make swift progress on other European policy initiatives. Another factor potentially protecting against more adverse scenarios could be a stronger commitment by the Chinese Government to domestic demand-led growth in China. In addition, a possible structural increase in international demand for the euro, while entailing downside risks to inflation, was also a symptom of a largely positive development, namely a shift into European assets. A portfolio shift could lower long-term interest rates in the euro area and lead to cheaper financing for planned investment projects. Finally, the appreciation of the euro would further reduce the price of energy imports in euro terms, which could counterbalance some of the negative effects of the tariffs and the exchange rate on energy-intensive exporters.

    These arguments notwithstanding, a few members noted that they could have felt comfortable with a 50 basis point rate cut. These members attached more weight to the change in the balance of risks since the Governing Council’s March meeting, pointing out that downside risks to growth had increased and, even in the event of a relatively mild trade conflict, uncertainty was already discouraging consumption and investment. In this context, they emphasised that downside risks to inflation had clearly increased. The same members also argued that a larger interest rate cut could have offset more of the recent tightening of financial conditions, including higher corporate bond spreads and lower equity prices, which had weakened the transmission of past monetary policy decisions. In this respect it was argued that surprising the markets should not be excluded, and it was recalled that there had been previous cases in which the Governing Council had not shied away from surprises when appropriate.

    At the same time, it was argued that the optimal monetary policy response depended on the outcome of tariff negotiations, including the scope of the tariffs and the extent of potential retaliation, and on how tariffs fed through global supply chains. The view was also expressed that a forward-looking central bank should only act forcefully to the tariff shock if it expected a sharp deterioration in labour market conditions or an unanchoring of inflation expectations to the downside. However, the initial conditions, featuring a still resilient labour market and elevated momentum in underlying inflation and services inflation, made such a scenario unlikely. Moreover, the economy was coming out of a high-inflation period with consumers’ and firms’ inflation expectations one year ahead still standing at almost 3%. In such a situation, an unanchoring of inflation expectations to the downside was highly unlikely, while the higher than expected food and services inflation in March and rising momentum in services underlined the continued need to monitor inflation developments. If the decline in economic activity turned out to be short-lived, an accommodative response of monetary policy might, given transmission lags, exert its peak impact when the economy was already recovering and inflation was rising, and would therefore be misguided. It could also coincide with when fiscal policy was starting to boost domestic demand, although anticipation channels could lead to some of the impact of infrastructure and defence spending on inflation being smoothed out and dampened in the medium term. Finally, it was argued that cutting interest rates further could no longer be justified by the intention to return to neutral territory since, by various measures, monetary policy was no longer restrictive. Bank lending was recovering, domestic demand was expanding and the level of interest rates was contributing measurably to demand for all types of loan, as shown in the most recent bank lending survey.

    Looking ahead, members stressed that maintaining a data-dependent approach with full optionality at every meeting was warranted more than ever in view of the high uncertainty. Keeping a cautious approach and a firm commitment to price stability had contributed to the success so far, with inflation back on track despite unprecedented challenges. However, agility might be required in the present environment, with the need for the Governing Council to be ready to react quickly if necessary.

    Turning to communication aspects, members noted that it was time to remove the phrase “our monetary policy is becoming meaningfully less restrictive” from the monetary policy statement. Reference to a restrictive policy stance, in various formulations, had proven useful over past phases in which inflation had still been high, providing a clear message that monetary policy was contributing to disinflation. Such a signal was no longer needed. In the present conditions, dropping the sentence avoided the perception that the neutral level of interest rates was the end point of the current cycle, which was not necessarily the case. However, dropping the sentence did not imply that monetary policy had necessarily left restrictive territory. At the current juncture, there was no need to take a stand on whether monetary policy was still restrictive, already neutral or even moving into accommodative territory. Such a categorisation, especially in the current turbulent context, was very hard to provide. Instead, the change in wording was seen as consistent with an approach that was not guided by interest rate benchmarks but by the need to always determine the policy stance that was appropriate. In other words, policy would be set so as to provide the strongest assurance that inflation would be anchored sustainably at the medium-term target, given the set of initial conditions and the shocks that the Governing Council had to tackle at any given time.

    Members reiterated that the Governing Council remained determined to ensure that inflation would stabilise sustainably at its 2% medium-term target. Its interest rate decisions would continue to be based on its assessment of the inflation outlook in light of the incoming economic and financial data, the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission. While noting that markets were functioning in an orderly manner, it was seen as helpful to reiterate that the Governing Council stood ready to adjust all instruments within the ECB’s mandate to ensure that inflation stabilised sustainably at the medium-term target and to preserve the smooth functioning of monetary policy transmission.

    Taking into account the foregoing discussion among the members, upon a proposal by the President, the Governing Council took the monetary policy decisions as set out in the monetary policy press release. The members of the Governing Council subsequently finalised the monetary policy statement, which the President and the Vice-President would, as usual, deliver at the press conference following the Governing Council meeting.

    Monetary policy statement

    Monetary policy statement for the press conference of 17 April 2025

    Press release

    Monetary policy decisions

    Meeting of the ECB’s Governing Council, 16-17 April 2025

    Members

    • Ms Lagarde, President
    • Mr de Guindos, Vice-President
    • Mr Centeno*
    • Mr Cipollone
    • Mr Demarco, temporarily replacing Mr Scicluna*
    • Mr Dolenc, Deputy Governor of Banka Slovenije
    • Mr Elderson
    • Mr Escrivá
    • Mr Holzmann*
    • Mr Kazāks
    • Mr Kažimír
    • Mr Knot*
    • Mr Lane
    • Mr Makhlouf
    • Mr Müller
    • Mr Nagel
    • Mr Panetta
    • Mr Patsalides
    • Mr Rehn
    • Mr Reinesch*
    • Ms Schnabel
    • Mr Šimkus
    • Mr Stournaras
    • Mr Villeroy de Galhau
    • Mr Vujčić
    • Mr Wunsch

    * Members not holding a voting right in April 2025 under Article 10.2 of the ESCB Statute.

    Other attendees

    • Mr Dombrovskis, Commissioner**
    • Ms Senkovic, Secretary, Director General Secretariat
    • Mr Rostagno, Secretary for monetary policy, Director General Monetary Policy
    • Mr Winkler, Deputy Secretary for monetary policy, Senior Adviser, DG Monetary Policy

    ** In accordance with Article 284 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

    Accompanying persons

    • Mr Arpa
    • Ms Bénassy-Quéré
    • Mr Debrun
    • Mr Gavilán
    • Mr Kaasik
    • Mr Kelly
    • Mr Koukoularides
    • Mr Kroes
    • Mr Lünnemann
    • Ms Mauderer
    • Mr Martin
    • Mr Nicoletti Altimari
    • Mr Novo
    • Mr Rutkaste
    • Ms Schembri
    • Mr Šiaudinis
    • Mr Šošić
    • Mr Välimäki
    • Ms Žumer Šujica

    Other ECB staff

    • Mr Proissl, Director General Communications
    • Mr Straub, Counsellor to the President
    • Ms Rahmouni-Rousseau, Director General Market Operations
    • Mr Arce, Director General Economics
    • Mr Sousa, Deputy Director General Economics

    Release of the next monetary policy account foreseen on 3 July 2025.

    MIL OSI Economics –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Economics: Frank Elderson: Nature’s bell tolls for thee, economy!

    Source: European Central Bank

    Keynote speech by Frank Elderson, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB and Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board of the ECB, at the Naturalis Biodiversity Center

    Leiden, 22 May 2025

    Thank you for inviting me to speak at this annual biodiversity dinner. The wide range of speakers here this evening – on international biodiversity day – is testament to the relevance of biodiversity across disciplines.

    Nature isn’t just the roots and shoots of biologists, macroecologists and natural scientists. Beyond its intrinsic value, nature provides vital services that are relevant for all of us – for entrepreneurs, workers, policymakers and bankers, but also for central bankers and financial supervisors.

    A thriving natural environment provides vital benefits that sustain our well-being and serve as a crucial driving force for the global economy. Think of fertile soils, pollination, timber, fishing stocks, clean water and clean air.

    But we are well aware of the daunting facts that confirm the dire state of ecosystem services. Intensive land use, the climate crisis, pollution, overexploitation and other human pressures are rapidly and severely damaging our natural resources.

    75% of land surface ecosystems and 66% of ocean ecosystems have been damaged, degraded or modified.

    We are using natural resources 1.7 times faster than ecosystems can regenerate them. Consequently, the contribution that nature can make to our economies – and our way of life – is steadily diminishing every day.

    These fateful facts and figures confront us as vividly as Edvard Munch’s iconic scream. Yet, accounting for nature and the services it provides is challenging. What nature provides to the economy is typically not measured directly in statistics like GDP.

    We price portfolios instead of pollinators, we monitor markets instead of mangroves and we watch wages instead of water supplies. However, the reality is that while our economies are heavily reliant on ecosystem services, the economic value of those pollinators, mangroves and water supplies is not sufficiently taken into account.

    Nature is too often still wrongly seen as a free good, readily available and abundant in supply, without opportunity costs. For such a good, there is no market – and therefore no price.

    So, why can’t governments intervene by pricing and creating a market for nature as has been done for emissions?

    Unlike for the climate crisis – which can be quantified through carbon emissions and their direct links to rising temperatures – there is no single metric that can be used to quantify the wide range of ecosystem services.

    What is the common denominator of clean air, fertile soils and coasts protected by mangrove forests? Nature is beautifully complex, but this complexity makes it harder to establish a market for nature than a market for climate, such as the carbon markets created through emissions trading systems.

    For central banks to effectively fulfil their mandates, we need to enhance our capacity to measure the vital services that nature provides to our economy and identify the financial risks caused by the degradation of these services. And while this is admittedly not an easy task, it is encouraging that multiple stakeholders are making progress, including academia, firms and also the ECB. We are enhancing our tools, methodologies and data to assess the economic implications of ecosystems and their degradation. And I am pleased to be able to share some of our latest insights this evening.

    I will argue that while nature services may appear to be freely available, they are in fact not abundant at all and there are substantial costs to using and losing them. Costs that we currently overlook when headlines report on GDP growth.

    Accounting for nature in monetary policy and banking supervision

    Nature being of vital importance for the economy and the financial system is hardly a novel insight. Besides scientists, a number of central banks and prudential supervisors have also been highlighting their interlinkages for several years now.[1] And while the climate crisis has received most of the attention, it is encouraging that work on nature-related risks has also significantly evolved.

    Moreover, the ECB has taken significant steps to account for nature-related risks in the pursuit of its mandate. For instance, we take into account the effects nature degradation can have on banks’ balance sheets. The degradation of nature could damage companies’ production processes and consequently weaken their creditworthiness, which might in turn impair loans granted by banks. In our role as the supervisor of Europe’s largest banks, we therefore aim to ensure that the banks we supervise adequately manage both climate-related and nature-related risks.[2] Encouragingly, we are seeing a growing set of good practices among the banks we supervise in terms of identifying, quantifying and managing nature-related risks.

    But are we fully aware of – and sufficiently alert to – how nature degradation could eventually hit balance sheets?

    Advancing our understanding does not mean that economists and supervisors should start studying ants in Aragon, ladybirds in Lombardy or honeybees in Holland (although it is very important that entomologists do!).

    Instead, central banks and supervisors need to gain a better understanding of just how vulnerable the economy and the financial system are to nature degradation.[3]

    Capturing the risks related to ecosystem degradation

    An ECB study in 2023 found that nearly 75% of banks’ corporate lending goes to firms that are highly dependent on at least one ecosystem service.[4] This finding underscores just how interconnected nature, the economy and the financial system really are.[5] But that study does not tell us exactly how much of our economic activity is at risk, or which economic sectors and regions will be most affected.

    To better understand this impact, the ECB has teamed up with the Resilient Planet Finance Lab at the University of Oxford.

    The interdisciplinary team has developed systemic risk indicators that move beyond dependency analysis to a comprehensive assessment of nature-related financial risks. In essence, this indicator assesses the economic implications of the deteriorating state of ecosystems. It shows how much of the economic value added by a particular industry– what economists call “gross value added” – is at risk when ecosystem services degrade. Tomorrow we will publish a blog post showing some of the preliminary results of our work, but I can already share some findings with you this evening.

    Water – the natural currency underwriting purchases, investments and trades

    Our preliminary findings indicate two things. First, water – too little, too much or too dirty water that is –has been identified as posing the most significant risk to the euro area economy. Losses related to water scarcity, poor water quality and flood protection emerge as the most critical from a value added perspective. Concretely, surface water scarcity alone puts almost 15% of the euro area’s economic output at risk. This is not surprising because water is not just any resource – it is one of the most essential natural resources we possess. Second, agriculture is the most exposed sector, as it would suffer the largest proportional output losses due to a decline in surface water. But other sectors are also likely to be significantly affected.

    Chart 1

    Proportion of national gross value added (GVA) at risk due to surface water scarcity in Europe and globally (supply chain risks)

    Water is, for instance, an indispensable resource in industry. In the Netherlands, industry alone uses over 2.6 trillion litres of fresh water a year.[6] This water usage is more than three times the total annual water consumption of all households in the Netherlands. Water is also essential for energy production, not only in hydropower plants but also in thermal power plants – including nuclear – where it is used for cooling and steam generation. It is consumed in vast quantities for mining and mineral processing, which are crucial for the energy transition, as well as in the construction sector for producing concrete, to name just a few examples.

    The risk posed by water scarcity is not hypothetical, we are already experiencing the impact today. I am sure that many of you remember when the summers of 2018, 2019 and 2020 brought severe droughts and heatwaves even to the Netherlands. In 2018 alone, economic losses in the Netherlands were up to €1.9 billion for agriculture and €155 million for shipping, with widespread but hard-to-quantify damage to ecosystems. This year’s drought is especially alarming: spring 2025 is on track to become the driest ever recorded in the Netherlands, likely surpassing the previous record set nearly 50 years ago. And droughts are only projected to increase further as the climate crisis continues to develop. Worryingly, in the driest scenario an average summer in the 2040s will be about as dry as an extremely dry summer now.

    Effective water management will thus be crucial for sustaining production. However, the risk persists that during periods of drought, production might need to be scaled down. Some industrial processes may become economically unviable and might need to relocate.

    For example, some have even gone as far as to point at a risk that more frequent droughts could render traditional tulip-growing regions such as the Bollenstreek unsuitable for bulb cultivation.[7] This may compel growers to explore better-positioned locations where water is more reliably available to safeguard the iconic Dutch tulip industry.

    Hence, as a consequence of water scarcity, our economies could produce less, and production costs are likely to rise during any inevitable transition phase.

    Let me also point out that biodiversity is a critical – and often underestimated – factor in ensuring the availability and quality of fresh water. Ecosystems such as forests and wetlands regulate the quantity, timing and purity of water flows by stabilising soils and filtering pollutants. Maintaining healthy and diverse ecosystems will be crucial for resilient water provisioning as climate change intensifies, particularly in regions facing growing water stress.

    Beyond these macroeconomic impacts, ecosystem degradation can significantly affect financial stability, for example through the loans that banks grant to households and firms. In essence, the greater the impact on firms, the higher the risk of defaults and the higher the risk on banks’ balance sheets.

    For example, in our research with the University of Oxford we found that more than 34% of banks’ total outstanding nominal amount – over €1.3 trillion – is currently extended to sectors exposed to high water scarcity risk.

    As the next step in our research, we will examine changes in the probability of default in the sectors most affected by dwindling ecosystems. Think about it as stress-testing the resilience of banks’ credit portfolios to nature degradation. We plan to publish these results later this year, complete with a more in-depth analysis on the topic, so stay tuned.

    Multiple stakeholders are taking action

    Encouragingly, our work with the University of Oxford is not an isolated case. We are in fact seeing a wide range of stakeholders taking action to better account for ecosystem services.

    For instance, I hear that our host this evening – the Naturalis Biodiversity Center – has teamed up with banks to combine insights from science and finance to further develop indicators quantifying ecosystem services.

    We are also seeing a growing set of good practices among the banks we supervise in terms of identifying, quantifying and managing nature-related risks. Banks typically conduct materiality assessments to understand where they are most affected. And banks also grapple with the challenge that nature-related risks are difficult to express in a single metric. Once they know where they are exposed, they then typically conduct deep dives on specific topics.

    One bank, for example, has conducted a quantitative scenario analysis to understand how the profitability of its customers could be affected if a water pollution tax were to be implemented.

    Other banks design customer scorecards and engage with the most vulnerable counterparties, sometimes offering small discounts or other incentives when customers meet key performance indicators that increase their resilience.

    It is also encouraging that progress is being made at the international level. The Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS) – a network of 145 central banks and supervisors from around the world – has developed a conceptual framework offering central banks and supervisors a common understanding of nature-related financial risks and a principle-based risk assessment approach.[8][9] And the Financial Stability Board recently took stock of supervisory and regulatory initiatives among its members, finding that a growing number of financial authorities are considering the potential implications of nature-related risks for the financial sector.[10]

    So scientists, banks, policymakers and supervisors are in fact taking action. That’s good news. Given the high level of uncertainty regarding impacts, non-linearities, tipping points and irreversibility, continuous scientific input and engagement are essential to determine the transmission channels from nature to our economies.

    Reliable and comparable data are key to managing risks and identifying opportunities

    Before I conclude, let me stress a vital enabler to better measure ecosystem services: data. Closer cooperation with natural scientists can help us better understand the data they have available on the status of nature and the ecosystem services it provides. The National Hub for Biodiversity Information provided by our host tonight is an excellent example.[11]

    Moreover, continuous engagement with the scientific community can also help improve our understanding of non-linearities, tipping points and the irreversibility of the biodiversity crisis.

    Similarly, the availability of reliable and comparable data from companies is essential for us to know where the risks are hiding and where opportunities can be found. Such data can, for example, provide insights into companies’ reliance on fresh water for their production processes. In this context, the reporting requirements in the EU’s sustainable finance framework are not merely a “nice to have”, they are providing indispensable information about financial risks and are a solution to the patchwork of different reporting criteria.

    Does that mean that there is no room for simplification? Does it mean that there is no room to ease the reporting burden on smaller firms?

    Of course not.

    As the ECB noted in its recent opinion[And they do!
    Send not to know
    For whom the bell tolls.
    It tolls for thee, ECOnomy!

    Thank you for your attention.

    MIL OSI Economics –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI NGOs: UK: Immigration stats reveal Government substituting ‘one form of unfairness for another’

    Source: Amnesty International –

    22 May 2025, 01:41pm

    Responding to the Government’s latest immigration figures released today (22 May), Steve Valdez-Symonds, Amnesty International UK’s Refugee and Migrant Rights Director, said:

    “Today’s figures make clear that the Home Office asylum backlog is not going away. The Government continues to refuse asylum to thousands of people seeking safety – including Afghans, Iranians and Eritreans – despite the real and ongoing dangers they face.

    “Deciding people’s claims but not doing this safely simply replaces one form of unfairness and inefficiency with another. Instead of resolving the backlog, the Government is shifting it, leaving many people still in limbo only moved to the appeals process.

    “Leadership requires accepting responsibilities, not passing these on – whether to other parts of the system or onto other countries.

    “We urge the Government to focus on making the asylum system fair and efficient – one that assesses each claim on its true merit – rather than wrongly denying asylum to some in the cruel hope this may deter others from seeking it.”

    Rates of asylum being granted to people coming from Afghanistan, Iran and Eritrea fell despite there being no real improvement in these countries. According to the immigration figures released today for year ending March 2025, only 44% of Afghans were granted asylum down from 98%; 58% Iranians down from 84% and 86% Eritreans down from 99% compared to a year ago.

    View latest press releases

    MIL OSI NGO –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Economics: Press Briefing Transcript: Julie Kozack, Director, Communications Department, May 22, 2025

    Source: International Monetary Fund

    May 22, 2025

    SPEAKER:  Ms. Julie Kozack, Director of the Communications Department, IMF

    MS. KOZACK: Good morning, everyone and welcome to this IMF Press Briefing.  It is wonderful to see you all today on this rainy Washington morning, especially those of you here in person and of course also those of you joining us online.  My name is Julie Kozak.  I’m the Director of Communications at the IMF.  As usual, this press briefing will be embargoed until 11:00 a.m. Eastern Time in the United States.  And as usual, I will start with a few announcements and then I’ll take your questions in person on WebEx and via the Press Center.  

    So first, our Managing Director, Kristalina Georgieva, and our First Deputy Managing Director, Gita Gopinath, are currently attending the G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors meeting taking place in Canada right now.  Second, on May 29th through 30th, the Managing Director will travel to Dubrovnik, Croatia to attend a joint IMF Croatia National Bank Conference focused on promoting growth and resilience in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe.  The Managing Director will participate in the opening panel and will hold meetings with regional counterparts.  

    On June 2nd, the Managing Director will travel to Sofia, Bulgaria to attend the 30th Anniversary celebration of the National Trust Ecofund.  During her visit, she will also hold several bilateral meetings with the Bulgarian authorities.  

    Our Deputy Managing Director, Nigel Clarke, will travel to Paraguay, Brazil, and the Netherlands next month.  On June 6th, he will launch the IMF’s new regional training program for South America and Mexico, which will be hosted in Asuncion by the Central Bank of Paraguay.  From there, he will travel to Brasilia to deliver a keynote speech on June 10th during the Annual Meeting of the Caribbean Development Bank.  He will also then travel to the Netherlands on June 12th to 13th to participate in the 2025 Consultative Group to Assist the Poor Symposium and to meet with the Dutch authorities.  

    Our Deputy Managing Director, Kenji Okamura, will be in Japan from June 11th to 12th for the 10th Tokyo Fiscal Forum to discuss fiscal frameworks and GovTech in the Asia Pacific region.  

    And finally, on a kind of housekeeping or scheduling issue, the Article IV Consultation for the United States will be undertaken on a later timetable this year, with discussions to be held in November.  

    And with those rather extensive announcements, I will now open the floor to your questions.  For those connecting virtually, please turn on both your camera and microphone when speaking.  All right, let’s open up.  Daniel.

     

    QUESTIONER: Thanks for taking my question.  I just wonder if the IMF has any reaction to the passage of last night in the House of Representatives of the One Big, Beautiful bill.  And a related question, how concerned are you by the increase in yields on long-dated U.S. treasuries?  What do you think it says about the market’s view of U.S. debt going into the future and sort of any possible spillovers for IMF borrowers as well?  MS. KOZACK: On the first question, what I can say is we take note of the passing of the legislation in the House of Representatives earlier this morning.  What we will do is we will look to assess a final bill once it has passed through the Senate and also once it’s been enacted.  And, of course, we will have opportunities to share our assessment over time in the various products where we normally would convey our fulsome views.  

    On your second question, which was on the bond market.   What I can say there is that we know that the U.S. government bonds are a safe haven asset, and the U.S. dollar, of course, plays a key role as the world’s reserve currency.  The U.S. bond market plays a critical role, of course, in finance and in safe assets.  And this is underpinned by the liquidity and depth of the U.S. market and also the sound institutions in the U.S.  We don’t see any changes in those functions.  And, of course, what we can also say is that although there has been some volatility in markets, market functioning, including in the U.S. Treasury market, has so far been orderly.  

     

    QUESTIONER: My question is about Ukraine.  Two topics particularly.  So, the first one, when is the next review of the Ukraine’s EFF is going to be completed, and what amount of money would be disbursed to Kyiv?  And could you please outline the total sum that is remaining within the current program?  And the second part, it’s about debt level.  What is the IMF assessment of current Ukraine’s government debt level?  Is it stable?  Do you see any vulnerabilities and any risks for Ukraine?  Thank you.  

    MS. KOZACK: Any other questions on Ukraine?  Does anyone online want to come in on Ukraine?  Okay, I don’t see anyone.  

    What I can say on Ukraine is that just two days ago, our Staff team started policy discussions with the Ukrainian authorities on the eighth review under the eff.  So, the team is on the ground now.  The discussions are taking place in Kiev and the team will provide an update on the progress at the end of the mission.

    In terms of the potential disbursement, I’m just looking here; that’s the seventh disbursement.  We will come back to you on the size of the disbursement, but it should show in the Staff report for the Seventh Review what would be expected for the Eighth Review.  And it would also show the remaining size of the program.  But we’ll come back to you bilaterally with those exact answers.  

    And what I can then say on the debt side is at the time of the Seventh Review under the program, we assessed debt, Ukraine’s debt to be sustainable on a forward-looking basis and as with every review that the team of course, will update its assessment as part of the eighth review discussion.  We’ll have more to say on the debt as the eighth review continues.  

     

    QUESTIONER: Just one more thing on Ukraine.  Does it make sense for them to consider using the euro as a defense currency for their currency, given the shifting geopolitical sense and what we are seeing with the dollar? MS. KOZACK: So right now, under the program, Ukraine has an inflation targeting regime, and that is where what the program is focused on, our program with Ukraine. So, they have an inflation targeting regime.  They are very much focused on ensuring the stability of that monetary policy regime that Ukraine has.  And, of course, that involves a floating exchange rate.  And I don’t have anything beyond that to say on the currency market.

     

    QUESTIONER: The agreement with the IMF established a target for the Central Bank Reserve to meet by June.  According to the technical projection, does the IMF believe Argentina will meet this target?  And if it’s not met, is it possible that we will grant a waiver in the future?

    MS. KOZACK: anything else on Argentina?  

    QUESTIONER: About Argentina, what is your assessment of the progress of the program agreed with Argentina more than a month after its announcement in last April?  

     

    QUESTIONER: The government is about to announce a measure to gain access to voluntarily, of course, but to the dollars that are “under the mattress”, as we call them, undeclared funds to probably meet these targets that Roman was asking about.  I was wondering if this measure has been discussed with the IMF.  And also, you mentioned Georgieva visiting Paraguay and Brazil, if you there’s any plan to visit Argentina as well?  

    QUESTIONER: President Milei is about to announce, you know, Minister Caputo, in a few minutes that there is a measure to use similar to attacks Amnesty.  Is the IMF concerned that this could violate its regulations against illicit financial flows? 

    MS. KOZACK: So, with respect to Argentina, on April 11th, I think, as you know, our Executive Board approved a new four-year EFF arrangement for Argentina.  It was for $20 billion.  It contained an initial disbursement of $12 billion.  And that the aim of that program is to support Argentina’s transition to the next phase of its stabilization program and reforms.  

    President Milei’s administration’s policies continued to deliver impressive results.  These include the rollout of the new FX regime, which has been smooth, a decline in monthly inflation to 2.8 percent in April, another fiscal surplus in April, and reaching a cumulative fiscal surplus of 0.6 percent of GDP for the year, and efforts to continue to open up the economy.  At the same time, the economy is now expanding, real wages are recovering, and poverty continues to fall in Argentina.  

    The Fund continues to support the authorities in their efforts to create a more stable and prosperous Argentina.  Our close engagement continues, including in the context of the upcoming discussions for the First Review of the program.  This First Review will allow us to assess progress and to consider policies to build on the strong momentum and to secure lasting stability and growth in Argentina.  And in this regard, there is a shared recognition with the authorities about the importance of strengthening external buffers and securing a timely re-access to international capital markets.  

    What I can say on the question about the announcements on that — the question on the undeclared assets.  All I can say right now is that we’re following developments very closely on this, and of course, the team will be ready to provide an assessment in due course.  

    On the second part of that question, I do want to also note, and this is included in our Staff report, that the authorities have committed to strengthening financial transparency and also to aligning Argentina’s AML CFT, the Anti-Money Laundering framework, with international standards, as well as to deregulating the economy to encourage its formalization.  So, any new measures, including those that may be aimed at encouraging the use of undeclared assets, should be, of course, consistent with these important commitments.  

    And on your question about Paraguay and Brazil, I just want to clarify that it is our Deputy Managing Director, Nigel Clarke, who will be traveling to Brazil and Paraguay, not the Managing Director.  

     

    QUESTIONER: Two questions on Syria.  With the U.S. and EU announcing the lifting of sanctions recently, how does this affect any sort of timeline with providing economic assistance?  And secondly, the Managing Director has said that the Fund has to first define data.  Can you just walk through what that entails?  

    MS. KOZACK: Can you just repeat what you said?  The Managing Director has said?

     

    QUESTIONER: The need to define data.  Just sort of a similar question.  I’m just wondering, following the World Bank statement last week about, you know, Syria now being eligible to borrow from the bank, what sort of discussions the Fund has had with the Syrian authorities since the end of the Spring Meetings and, you know, any update you can give us around possible discussions around an Article IV.  

     

    QUESTIONER: About the relationship and if there’s any missed planned virtual or on the ground? 

    MS. KOZACK: Let me step back and give a little bit of an overview on Syria. So, first, you know, we’re, of course, monitoring developments in Syria very closely.  Our Staff are preparing to support the international community’s efforts to help with Syria’s economic rehabilitation as conditions allow.  We have had useful discussions with the new Economic Team who took office in late March, including during the Spring Meetings.  And, of course, you will perhaps have seen the press release regarding the roundtable that was held during the Spring Meetings.  IMF Staff have already started to work to rebuild its understanding of the Syrian economy.  We’ve been doing this through interactions with the authorities and also through coordination with other IFIs. And just to remind everyone, our last Article IV with Syria was in 2009.  So, it’s been quite some time since we have had a substantive engagement with Syria.  Syria will need significant assistance to rebuild its economic institutions.  We stand ready to provide advice and targeted and well-prioritized technical assistance in our areas of expertise. I think this goes a little bit to your question on, like, what do we mean by defining data.  I think what the Managing Director was really referring to there is since it has been such a long time since we have had a substantive engagement with Syria, the last Article IV, as I said, was in 2009.  I think there, what she’s really referring to is the need to really work with the Syrian authorities to rebuild basic economic institutions, including the ability to produce economic statistics, right, so that we — so that we and the authorities and the international community of course, can conduct the necessary economic analysis so that we can best support the reconstruction and recovery efforts.  

    With respect to the lifting of sanctions, what I can say there is that, of course, the lifting of sanctions and the lifting of sanctions are a matter between member states of the IMF.  What we can say in serious cases that the lifting of sanctions could support Syria’s efforts to overcome its economic challenges and help advance its reconstruction and economic development.  Syria, of course, is an IMF member, and as we’ve just said, you know, we are, of course, engaged closely with the Syrians to explore how, within our mandate, we can best support them.  

     

    QUESTIONER: My question is on Russia.  In what ways is the IMF monitoring Russia’s economy under the current sanctions and conflict conditions, and have regular Article IV Consultations or other surveillance activities with Russia resumed to track its economic developments?  

    MS. KOZACK: What I can say with respect to Russia is that we are, our Staff, are analyzing data and economic indicators that are reported by the Russian authorities.  We are also looking at counterparty data that is provided to us by other countries, and this is particularly true for cross-border transactions, as well as data from third-party sources. So, this data collection using official and other sources does allow us to put together a picture of the Russian economy.  

    We did provide an assessment in the 2025 April WEO, the one that we just released about a month ago.  In this WEO, we assess Russia’s growth at — we expect Russia to grow at 1.5 percent in 2025, 0.9 percent in 2026, and we expect inflation to come down to 8.2 percent in 2025 and 4.4 percent in 2026.  And I don’t have a timetable for the Article IV at this time.  

     

    QUESTIONER: I’d like to ask about Deputy Management Director Okamura’s visits to Japan.  So, my question is, what economic topics will be on the agenda during his stay?  Could you tell me a bit more in detail?  

    MS. KOZACK: Deputy Managing Director Okamura will travel to Japan, as I said, from June 11th to 12th, and he will be attending the Tokyo Fiscal Forum.  So, this will be the 10th Tokyo Fiscal Forum.  It’s an annual conference that we co-host in Japan every year and the focus is on issues of fiscal policy. In this particular one, Deputy Managing Director Okamura will be discussing fiscal frameworks. It’s very important for all countries to have sound fiscal frameworks so they can implement sound fiscal policy.  He will also be discussing GovTech not only in Japan but in the Asia Pacific region.  And of course, GovTech is very important for countries because it’s a way of modernizing and making government both provision of services in some cases but also potentially collection of revenue more effective and more efficient.  So, those will be the focus of his discussions in Tokyo.  

     

    QUESTIONER: I have a question on the recent bailout package by IMF to Pakistan.  The Indian government has expressed a lot of displeasure with Pakistan planning to use this package to build — rebuild — areas that allegedly support cross-border terrorism.  Does the IMF have any assessment of this?  Secondly, I also have another question.  Could you please provide information on the majority vote that was received in approving this bailout package for Pakistan on May 9th?  If you can disclose the information.  

    MS. KOZACK: Any other questions on Pakistan?  

     

    QUESTIONER: Just adding to that, do you have an update on the implications of the escalation of facilities in that border between Pakistan and India on both economies.  

     

    QUESTIONER: Thanks a lot.  I guess the only spin I would put on is generally what safeguards does the IMF have that its funds won’t be used for military or in support of military actions, not only there but as a general matter.  And I also, if you’re able to, there was some controversy about the termination of India’s Executive Director of the IMF, K.V. Subramanian.  Do you have any insight into–there are reports there–what it was about but what do you say it’s about?  Thanks a lot.  

    MS. KOZACK: With respect to the Indian Executive Director who had been at the Fund, all I can say on this is that the appointment of Executive Directors is a member for the — is a matter for the member country.  It’s not a matter for the Fund, and it’s completely up to the country authorities to determine who represents them at the Fund.  

    With respect to Pakistan and the conflict with India, I want to start here by first expressing our regrets and sympathies for the loss of life and for the human toll from the recent conflict.  We do hope for a peaceful resolution of the conflict.  

    Now, turning to some of the specific questions about the Board approval of Pakistan’s program, I’m going to step back a minute and provide a little bit of the chronology and timeframe.  The IMF Executive Board approved Pakistan’s EFF program in September of 2024.  And the First review at that time was planned for the first quarter of 2025.  And consistent with that timeline, on March 25th of 2025, the IMF Staff and the Pakistani authorities reached a Staff-Level Agreement on the First Review for the EFF.  That agreement, that Staff-Level Agreement, was then presented to our Executive Board, and our Executive Board completed the review on May 9th.  As a result of the completion of that review, Pakistan received the disbursement at that time.  

    What I want to emphasize here is that it is part of a standard procedure under programs that our Executive Board conducts periodic reviews of lending programs to assess their progress.  And they particularly look at whether the program is on track, whether the conditions under the program have been met, and whether any policy changes are needed to bring the program back on track.  And in the case of Pakistan, our Board found that Pakistan had indeed met all of the targets.  It had made progress on some of the reforms, and for that reason, the Board went ahead and approved the program.  

    With respect to the voting or the decision-making at our Board, we do not disclose that publicly.  In general, Fund Board decisions are taken by consensus, and in this case, there was a sufficient consensus at the Board to allow us to move forward or for the Board to decide to move forward and complete Pakistan’s review.  

    And with respect to the question on safeguards, I do want to make three points here.  The first is that IMF financing is provided to members for the purpose of resolving balance of payments problems.  

    In the case of Pakistan, and this is my second point, the EFF disbursements, all of the disbursements received under the EFF, are allocated to the reserves of the central bank.  So, those disbursements are at the central bank, and under the program, those resources are not part of budget financing.  They are not transferred to the government to support the budget. 

    And the third point is that the program provides additional safeguards through our conditionality.  And these include, for example, targets on the accumulation of international reserves.  It includes a zero target, meaning no lending from the central bank to the government.  And the program also includes substantial structural conditionality around improving fiscal management.  And these conditions are all available in the program documents if you wanted to do a deeper dive.  And, of course, any deviation from the established program conditions would impact future reviews under the Pakistan program.  

     

    QUESTIONER: I have a question on Egypt.  There is a mission in Egypt for the First Review of the EFF loan program.  So, can you please update us on the ongoing discussions, especially since the Prime Minister of Egypt announced yesterday that the program could be concluded in 2027 rather than 2026?  

    MS. KOZACK: Any other questions on Egypt?  I have a question from the Press Center on Egypt, which I will read aloud.  The question is when will the Fifth Review currently underway with the Egyptian government be concluded, and when will the Executive Board approve this review?  And how much money will Egypt receive once the review is approved?  

    So, here’s what I can share on Egypt.  First, let me start here.  So first, I just want to say that the Fund remains committed to supporting Egypt in building its economic resilience and fostering higher private sector-led growth.  Egypt has made clear progress on its macroeconomic reform program, with notable improvements in inflation and foreign exchange reserves.  For the past few weeks, IMF Staff has had productive discussions with the Egyptian authorities on economic performance and policies under the EFF.  As Egypt’s macroeconomic stabilization is taking hold, efforts must now focus on accelerating and deepening reforms that will reduce the footprint of the state in the Egyptian economy, level the playing field, and improve the business environment.  Discussions will continue between the IMF and the Egyptian authorities on the remaining policies and reforms that could support the completion of the Fifth Review.  

     

    QUESTIONER: My question is about Sri Lanka.  Sri Lanka’s program is subject to IMF Board approval.  The review is subject to IMF Board approval, but we still haven’t got any word on when that would be.  Is there any delay in this?  And is this delay attributed to the pending electricity adjustments, tariff adjustments, that the Sri Lankan government has committed to?  

    MS. KOZACK: So just stepping back for a minute.  On April 25th, IMF Staff and the Sri Lankan authorities reached Staff-Level Agreement on the Fourth Review of Sri Lanka’s program under the EFF.  And once the review is approved by our Executive Board, Sri Lanka will have access to about $344 million in financing.  Completion of the review is subject to approval by the Executive Board, and we expect that Board meeting to take place in the coming weeks.  

    The precise timing of the Board meeting is contingent on two things.  The first is implementation of prior actions, and the main prior actions are relating to restoring electricity, cost recovery pricing and ensuring proper function of the automatic electricity price adjustment mechanism.  And the second contingency is completion of the Financing Assurances Review, which will focus on confirming multilateral partners, committed financing contributions to Sri Lanka and whether adequate progress has been made in debt restructuring.  So, in a nutshell, completion of the review is subject to approval by the Executive Board.  We expect the Board meeting to take place in the coming weeks.  And it’s contingent on the two matters that I just mentioned.  

     

    QUESTIONER: Thank you for having my questions on Ecuador.  Since the IMF is still completing the second review under the EFF program for Ecuador, do you think it’s going to be time to change the program, the goals, or maybe the amount of the program?  Because Ecuador is now facing different challenges compared to 2024.  The oil prices are falling, so that is going to affect the fiscal situation for Ecuador.  And also, I would like to know if Ecuador is still looking for a new program under the RSF.  And the last one, I would like to know if, do you think that Ecuador is going to need to make some important changes this year on oil subsidies and a tax reform?  I think, as I said, Ecuador now is facing some important challenges in the fiscal situation, so do you think it’s going to be possible because of, you know, all the social protests and all that kind of stuff?  Do you think it’s going to be possible to do that in Ecuador?  

     

    QUESTIONER: Is there a request, an official request, in place to modify the program?  And if there is, of course, details of the new one, you can share.  

    MS. KOZACK: And then I have one question online from the Press Center regarding Ecuador.  Is the sovereign negotiating new targets, given their fiscal position deteriorated compared to last year?  Our understanding is that $410 million was not dispersed under the First Review.?

    So let me share what I can on Ecuador.  So, right now, representatives from the IMF, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank are in Quito this week to meet with the authorities and discuss the strengthening of financial and technical support to the country.  As part of this tripartite visit, we have a new IMF Mission Chief who is participating, and she is also using that opportunity to have courtesy meetings with the authorities and to continue discussions and advance toward a Second Review under Ecuador’s EFF.  

    What else I can add, just as background, is that the Executive Board in December approved the First Review of Ecuador’s 48-month EFF.  About $500 million was disbursed after the approval of that Frist Review.  And at that time, the Executive Board also concluded the Article IV Consultation.

    I can also say that the authorities have made excellent progress in the implementation of their economic program under the EFF.  And regarding the precise timing of the Second Review, we will provide an update on the next steps in due course and when we’re able to do so.  

     

    QUESTIONER: Just a quick question on tariffs.  I’m just wondering if the IMF has a response to the U.S.-China deal that was struck in Geneva earlier this month.  You know, if the deal holds, I appreciate it’s a 90-day pause, but if the deal holds, how would you foresee that changing the Fund’s current economic forecast for the U.S. and China and for the global economy?  Thanks.  

    MS. KOZACK: As you noted, earlier in May, China and the U.S. announced a 90-day rollback of most of the bilateral tariffs imposed since April 2nd, and they established a mechanism to discuss economic and trade relations.  The two sides reduced their tariff from peak levels, leaving in place 10 percent additional tariffs.  So, the additional tariffs before this agreement were 125 percent.  Now, the additional tariff has agreed to be 10 percent, you know, for the 90 days.  This is obviously a positive step for the world’s two largest economies.

    What I can also add is that for the U.S., you may recall, during the Spring Meetings, we talked a lot about the overall effective tariff rate for the U.S.  At that time, we assessed it at 25.5 percent.  This announcement and the reduction in tariffs will bring the U.S. effective tariff rate down to a bit over 14 percent.  

    Now, with respect to the impact, what I can say is that the reduction in tariffs and the easing of tensions does provide some upside risk to our global growth forecast.  We will be updating that global growth forecast as part of our July WEO.  And so that will give us an opportunity to provide a full assessment.  All of this said, of course, the outlook, the global outlook in general does remain one of high uncertainty.  And so that uncertainty is still with us.  

     

    QUESTIONER: I have a broad question regarding the following – at the IMF World Bank Spring Meeting, the recent one,  the Treasury Secretary Bessent called for the IMF and the World Bank to refocus on their core mission on macroeconomic stability and development.  Did the IMF start any discussion on this topic with the U.S. administration?  And my second question, do you foresee any changes to your lending programs to take into account the views of the Trump Administration regarding issues like climate change and international development?  Thank you.  

    MS. KOZACK: What I can say on this is the U.S. is our largest shareholder, and we greatly value the voice of the United States.  We have a constructive engagement with the U.S. authorities, and we very much appreciate Secretary Bessent’s reiteration of the United States’ commitment to the Fund and to our role.  The IMF has a clearly defined mandate to support economic and financial stability globally.  Our Management Team and our entire Staff are focused exactly on this mandate, helping our 191 members tackle their economic challenges and their balance of payments risks.  

    What I can also add is that at the most recent Spring Meetings, the ones we just had in April, our membership identified two areas where they’ve asked the IMF to deepen our work.  And the first is on external imbalances, and the second is on our monitoring of the financial sector.  So they’re looking for us to really deepen our work in these two areas.  

    As far as taking that work forward, we will continue working with our Executive Board on these areas, as well as to carry out some important policy reviews.  And I think the Managing Director referred to these during the Spring Meetings.  The first is the Comprehensive Surveillance Review, which will set out our surveillance priorities for the next five years.  And the second is the review of program design and conditionality.  And that will carefully consider how our lending can best help countries address low growth challenges and durably resolve their balance of payments weaknesses.  

    I have a slight update for you on Ukraine, which says — so the eighth — so if we look at the documents that were published at the time of the Seventh Review program, the one that was approved by the Executive Board a little while ago, based on that, the Eighth Review disbursement would be about $520 million.  And, the discussions of the Eighth Review are ongoing, and any disbursement, as always, is subject to approval by our Executive Board. 

    And with that, I will bring this press briefing to a close.  So first, let me thank you all for your participation today.  As a reminder, the briefing is embargoed until 11:00 a.m. Eastern Time in the United States.  As always, a transcript will be made available later on IMF.org.  In case of any clarifications or additional queries, please do not hesitate to reach out to my colleagues at media@imf.org.  This concludes our press briefing, and I wish everyone a wonderful day.  I look forward to seeing you next time.  Thanks very much.

     

      

    *  *  *  *  *

     

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Meera Louis

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    @IMFSpokesperson

    MIL OSI Economics –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-Evening Report: Australian roads are getting deadlier – pedestrians and males are among those at greater risk

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Milad Haghani, Associate Professor & Principal Fellow in Urban Risk & Resilience, The University of Melbourne

    At least ten people died in fatal crashes earlier this month in a single 48-hour period on Victorian roads. It was the latest tragic demonstration of the mounting road trauma in Australia.

    In the decade up to 2020, the national road toll was gradually declining, albeit with some fluctuations. But the trend has since reversed, with fatalities rising steadily year after year.

    According to the latest official data, 1,296 people died on Australian roads in the year to April. 108 lives were lost last month alone, almost 15% more than the average for April over the previous five years.

    While our population has increased by about 6% over this five-year period, our road deaths have gone up by 18.5%.

    Road fatalities rarely follow evenly distributed averages. They sometimes spike, as they have in Victoria. And while we must never lose sight of the fact that these are people, and not just data, there is value in interrogating clusters when they occur.

    Victoria breakdown

    In the 12 months to May 20 this year, 118 lives were lost on Victorian roads, up 8.3% on the previous year and well above the five-year average of 100 annual deaths.

    The sharpest increases by transport mode have been among pedestrians (up 24%), one of the most vulnerable road-user groups. And a new threat has emerged with the first publicly reported case in Australia of a pedestrian dying after being struck by an electric bike.

    At least one pattern stands out from the recent cluster: five of the eight crashes occurred outside metropolitan Melbourne. This reflects the longstanding reality that fatal collisions remain disproportionately common in regional and remote areas. Over the 12 months, country road deaths have risen by 11%, compared to a 2% increase in metropolitan Melbourne.

    A large share of road deaths continue to occur in the country.
    Inge Blessas/Shutterstock

    Another striking detail is the gender distribution. Male deaths are up 22% on the previous period and now comprise nearly 80% of all fatalities. In contrast, female deaths have declined by 33%.

    Another trend that stands out is the rising toll among older road users. In the last 12 months, 40 people aged 60 and over have died on Victorian roads – a 25% increase on the previous period.

    4 National trends

    The national road fatality data tells us some of these trends are not exclusive to Victoria. They reflect what is happening across the country.

    1. Vulnerable road users: Nationally, pedestrians and motorcyclists have experienced sustained increases in lives lost for at least four years in a row. The share of pedestrians in total road deaths has risen from 11% in 2021 to 14% in the latest period. Despite the growing number, motorcyclist fatalities have remained relatively stable at about 20% of all deaths.

    2. Gender disparity: Men continue to be disproportionately represented in the national road toll, accounting for approximately 75% of all road deaths in Australia.

    3. Older age groups: In the 12 months to April 2025, deaths among individuals aged 75 and over increased by nearly 19% to 185.

    4. Regional and remote areas: in the 12 months to April 2024, there were roughly 818 deaths on country roads, compared to 400 in metropolitan areas.

    What do the trends tell us?

    There are several key points in the data.

    First, the persistent over-representation of men in fatalities remains a defining feature of the road toll. This gender imbalance is not specific to Australia.

    But put simply, we still know very little about what’s driving this pattern. Known behavioural and physiological sex-based differences don’t fully explain the scale of the disparity.

    The rise in fatalities among older Australians does not appear to be particularly abnormal when tracked with demographic changes. From 2020 to 2024, the number of Australians aged 75 and over increased by nearly 31%. In comparison, fatalities in this age group rose by around 25% over the same period. This suggests that the relative risk for older Australians has not necessarily increased.

    As for rural and regional areas, approximately two-thirds of road deaths occur in these areas, while only one-third of Australians reside there. Despite years of acknowledgment, this urban–rural divide in road safety remains wide and unresolved.

    SUVs a menace?

    While vehicles have become safer for their occupants, they have become more dangerous for other road users, especially pedestrians.

    One contributing factor could be the fast growing dominance of SUVs and light trucks in Australia.

    A recent international review that pooled the findings of 24 studies found SUVs were associated with significantly higher fatality rates in crashes involving vulnerable road users, compared to smaller cars. The effect was particularly pronounced for children.

    Heavier vehicles, such as SUVs, pose a higher road risk to pedestrians.
    King Ropes Access/Shutterstock

    The dangers are not limited to pedestrians. In two-vehicle collisions, increasing the striking vehicle’s weight by around 450 kilograms raises the probability of a fatality in the other vehicle by 40–50%.

    New targets

    Australian governments have adopted a Vision Zero goal of no road deaths or serious injuries by 2050.

    The complete elimination of fatalities should remain our moral benchmark. But the current data suggests intermediate targets are urgently needed.

    A more achievable near-term priority may be to first reverse the rising national toll by focusing on where the greatest preventable harms persist: vulnerable road users, especially pedestrians, males and non-urban roads.

    Milad Haghani receives funding from The Australian Government.

    Iman Taheri Sarteshnizi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Australian roads are getting deadlier – pedestrians and males are among those at greater risk – https://theconversation.com/australian-roads-are-getting-deadlier-pedestrians-and-males-are-among-those-at-greater-risk-256994

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Thousands of young people set to benefit from new support into work and training

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Press release

    Thousands of young people set to benefit from new support into work and training

    Thousands of young people across England will receive targeted support into work, under a new £45 million scheme launched by the Work and Pensions Secretary.

    • Landmark programme to support thousands of 18 to 21 year olds into education, work and training officially launches in Liverpool.
    • Marks major win in the Government’s Youth Guarantee to ensure all young people have the chance to upskill, earn or learn.
    • Comes as part of the Government’s Plan for Change to drive growth and break down barriers to opportunity by helping people into work.

    Thousands of young people across England will receive targeted support into work, under a new £45 million scheme launched by the Work and Pensions Secretary.

    The Youth Guarantee trailblazers will match young people to job or training opportunities and will provide all-important foundations for the national roll-out of the programme, ensuring all 18 to 21 year olds in England can access help to find work – breaking down barriers to opportunity as part of the Plan for Change.

    The trailblazers will play a key role in helping the government understand which local structures are most effective and in identifying the organisations best placed to deliver targeted support.

    They will also develop innovative ways to identify, engage and sustain contact with young people most at risk of falling out of education, employment or training.

    It comes as new ONS figures published today (Friday 23 May 2025) will reveal the number of young people not in education, employment or training, with the current figure standing at 987,000.

    Liverpool City Region is one of eight areas across England set to receive a £5 million investment into work with 18 to 21 year olds most at risk of falling out of education or employment.

    In its first year, the City Region aims to support tens of thousands of young people. Within this, the trailblazer will focus on vulnerable young people often facing the most complex barriers, including care leavers, nearly 40% of whom are not in employment, education or training.

    They will receive a range of support including work and training opportunities, free travel passes, mental health support and money advice.

    Work and Pensions Secretary Liz Kendall said:

    Young people are our future – and yet for too long they have been denied access to the opportunities and support they need.

    At Liverpool FC, the home of champions, we are championing young people to get the skills, education and jobs they require to achieve their ambitions.

    We are investing £45 million – including almost £5m here in Liverpool – to deliver our Youth Guarantee, so every young person across England gets the chance to earn or learn, as we boost living standards and get Britain working under the Plan for Change.

    Further to this, Liverpool will work with over 600 employers to develop tailored roles and placements, and through the region’s BeMore portal which brings career and skills advice straight into your pocket. A panel made up of young people to ensure they are at the heart of decision making will also be set up.

    The city has already had success in tailoring support to meet the needs of young people, including:

    • Ethan who has cerebral palsy and had just finished university with no work experience. With the help of Liverpool, including support with housing, mental health and navigating familial challenges, Ethan gained part-time experience as a youth support worker and has since been offered a job with the Civil Service.
    • Luke who felt he was in a black hole searching for jobs but not being successful. He has since received an apprenticeship levy from Liverpool which meant he was able to do his Level 4 Marketing apprenticeship and now works in Product & Operations Market at Liverpool Football Club.
    • Ellie who decided to explore new career paths following mental health challenges. Through engaging with Liverpool, she was provided with a laptop in order to join the Movement to Work programme and has since been offered a job at the DWP.

    Mayor of the Liverpool City Region Steve Rotheram said:

    When I travel across our region, I feel fortunate to meet some of the best and brightest young people in the country. But for too long, too many of them have been held back from getting on in life, not because of a lack of talent, but by a lack of opportunity – and I have made it my mission to put that right.

    It’s because of the investments we’ve made, through initiatives like my Young Person’s Guarantee and BeMore, that we’ve been able to connect tens of thousands of people in our area with jobs and training opportunities. Now, backed by the government’s Plan for Change, we can go even further, giving even more young people the best possible start in life.

    Education Secretary Bridget Phillipson said:

    Through our Plan for Change we are breaking down barriers to opportunity so every young person can get on in life, regardless of their background.

    The Youth Guarantee is a genuine game changer for young people in England. I’m delighted Liverpool is leading the way as one of our trailblazers – ensuring every young person has support to develop essential skills for work and life at the critical early stage of their careers.

    Every young person deserves the best life chances — and we won’t stop until everyone has a level playing field to succeed.

    Liz Kendall and Mayor Steve Rotheram unveiled the landmark programme at a careers fair in partnership with key Youth Guarantee partner, the Premier League.

    Hosted at the iconic Anfield Stadium, three days before the champions lift the Premier League Trophy, around one thousand 18 to 21 year olds attended with opportunities on offer from around 40 employers – including Liverpool FC Foundation, Everton in the Community, John Lewis, and Google.

    Clare Sumner, Chief Policy and Social Impact Officer at the Premier League, said:

    The Premier League and our clubs continue to support young people across the country with a range of positive opportunities that help them build self-confidence and fulfil their potential.

    The jobs fair at Anfield is the latest initiative supporting those who need it most in clubs’ local communities, and we will continue to work with Government to deliver similar events as part of the Youth Guarantee.

    The programme comes alongside an unprecedented £1 billion investment to support disabled people and those with long-term health conditions back into work, as well as major reforms to Jobcentres to better align their services with the needs of employers.

    Two youth trailblazers have already launched in London with more beginning to start work in the West of England, Tees Valley, Cambridgeshire and Peterborough, West Midlands, and East Midlands

    As well as this, nine inactivity trailblazers backed by £125 million have been rolled out across England and Wales. These programmes will help areas with the highest levels of economic inactivity by connecting work, health and skills offers.

    Richard Rigby, Head of UK Government Affairs at The King’s Trust said:

    With almost one million young people across the UK waking up today with no job, no training, and no education to go to, the prominence being given to developing a Youth Guarantee is not only very welcome, but absolutely vital.

    Young people’s futures are worth fighting for. By getting behind them, we can all help to make the UK a healthier, wealthier, more positive, more cohesive place. The King’s Trust looks forward to working with local areas, including Liverpool City Region, to understand how we can help to deliver the Guarantee.

    Laura-Jane Rawlings MBE, Founder and CEO of Youth Employment UK, said:

    It is great to see the Youth Guarantee launch in Liverpool. The focus on providing young people with the tools that they need to transition into education, employment or training is critical.

    Young people, particularly those who are care experienced or care leavers face multiple barriers to accessing employment so I am pleased to see those barriers be recognised and tailored support put in place.

    Young people when in good quality employment not only add huge value to an employer but they are also much more like to feel fulfilled and happier.

    Susannah Hardyman MBE, CEO of Impetus, said:

    The Youth Guarantee Trailblazers are a vital step toward ensuring every young person – regardless of background – has the opportunity to thrive in employment. Targeted interventions are critical to reaching the young people furthest from the labour market.

    Our research shows that factors like socioeconomic disadvantage, lower educational qualifications, and geographic location can combine to make a young person nearly three times more likely to be not in education, employment, or training than average – but this is not inevitable.

    By connecting these young people with the right support and resources, we can spur economic growth, deliver on the Government’s opportunity mission, and transform lives.

    Sarah Yong, Director of Policy and External Affairs at the Youth Futures Foundation said:

    The launch of the eight trailblazers represents a positive first step in Government’s plans for its Youth Guarantee; we will await the learnings from these place-based approaches from this pilot year with interest.

    The voices and experiences of young people alongside high-quality evidence of what works will be crucial for the Government in further developing the Guarantee for national rollout.

    This comes as the government has, for the first time, linked immigration policy to our plan to deliver a higher skilled economy that backs British workers.

    Alongside boosting the National Living Wage, we are also creating more secure jobs through the Employment Rights Bill and overhauling Jobcentres as we Get Britain Working as part of the Plan for Change.

    Additional information:

    • The latest ONS young people not in education, employment or training statistics will be published on Friday 23 May at 9.30 here: Young people not in education, employment or training (NEET), UK: May 2025 – Office for National Statistics
    • The eight youth trailblazers will be in: Liverpool, West Midlands, Tees Valley, East Midlands, West of England, and Cambridgeshire & Peterborough and two in London
    • Employment support measures are fully transferred to Northern Ireland. Jobcentre Plus services is reserved in both Scotland and Wales, but the Scottish Government and the Welsh Government also deliver other forms of employment support. The funding announced in the Pathways to Work Green Paper is UK wide, the share of funding for devolved Governments will be calculated in the usual way.
    • The Youth Guarantee is an England only initiative, and trailblazer locations will reflect this since Skills, Education and Employment support are devolved in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.
    • We will work closely with the devolved governments to share experiences and lessons learned.
    • Additionally, Wales have developed their own Young Persons Guarantee and Scotland also had one until recently (now a comprehensive offer for all age-groups)
    • The UK Government also plans to establish new governance arrangements with the Scottish and Welsh Governments to help frame discussions around the reform of Jobcentres and agree how best to work in partnership on shared employment ambition across devolved and reserved provision.
    • Movement to Work is a voluntary collaboration of leading employers in the UK, including the Department for Work and Pensions to help support young people into employment by providing vocational employment and work placement opportunities.

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    Updates to this page

    Published 23 May 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Retail activity up in the March 2025 quarter – Stats NZ media and information release: Retail trade survey: March 2025 quarter

    Source: Statistics New Zealand

    Retail activity up in the March 2025 quarter – 23 May 2025 – The total volume of retail sales in New Zealand increased by 0.8 percent in the March 2025 quarter compared with the December 2024 quarter, according to figures released by Stats NZ today. Figures are adjusted for price inflation and seasonal effects.

    “Growth in retail activity was modest in the March quarter, with the majority of industries contributing positively,” economic indicators spokesperson Michelle Feyen said.

    “Motor vehicle retailing, and pharmaceutical and other store-based retailing saw the largest increases this quarter.”

    Ten of the 15 retail industries had higher retail sales volumes in the March 2025 quarter, compared with the December 2024 quarter, after adjusting for price and seasonal effects.

    Files:

    • Retail activity up in the March 2025 quarter
    • Retail trade survey: March 2025 quarter
    • CSV files for download

    MIL OSI –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Retail activity up in the March 2025 quarter – Stats NZ media and information release: Retail trade survey: March 2025 quarter

    Source: Statistics New Zealand

    Retail activity up in the March 2025 quarter – 23 May 2025 – The total volume of retail sales in New Zealand increased by 0.8 percent in the March 2025 quarter compared with the December 2024 quarter, according to figures released by Stats NZ today. Figures are adjusted for price inflation and seasonal effects.

    “Growth in retail activity was modest in the March quarter, with the majority of industries contributing positively,” economic indicators spokesperson Michelle Feyen said.

    “Motor vehicle retailing, and pharmaceutical and other store-based retailing saw the largest increases this quarter.”

    Ten of the 15 retail industries had higher retail sales volumes in the March 2025 quarter, compared with the December 2024 quarter, after adjusting for price and seasonal effects.

    Files:

    MIL OSI New Zealand News –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-Evening Report: NZ Budget 2025: funding growth at the expense of pay equity for women could cost National in the long run

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Jennifer Curtin, Professor of Politics and Policy, University of Auckland, Waipapa Taumata Rau

    Pay equity protest outside parliament on budget day, May 22 2025. Getty Images

    In 1936, when the National Party was created through a merger of the United and Reform parties, there was a recognition among the power brokers that attracting women’s votes was crucial.

    National’s women’s organisations were integral to mobilising support. Throughout the 1940s, the party’s publicity material promised the women of New Zealand a happy family life. This was a consistent approach over the next 20 years, and National was rewarded with the women’s vote.

    Intermittent research on gender differences in vote choice between 1963 and 1993 indicate women made up between 45% and 51% of National’s support compared to 36% and 43% of Labour’s support.

    After 1996, this trend became less consistent. The New Zealand Election Study indicates a decreasing share of the women’s vote going to National, and fluctuations in vote choice among both women and men.

    Given the advent of proportional representation, some volatility may be expected. But there are also some constants. There is evidence women are more likely than men to support government spending on social policy, and they are significantly less likely than men to vote for National’s coalition partners NZ First and ACT.

    Now, with Budget 2025 – in particular its reliance on funds that would otherwise have gone towards settling pay equity claims – National’s historical success at attracting the women’s vote may be under threat.

    Growth before pay equity

    The budget represents a ruthless determination to deliver economic growth, including through its centrepiece “Investment Boost” tax breaks for businesses investing in productive assets.

    There is additional funding for health, defence, education and disability services, and the establishment of a social investment fund, and the budget left national superannuation untouched (for the remainder of this coalition government’s term, at least).

    It focused instead on KiwiSaver. Contributions from employers and employees will increase from 3% to 4%, while the government contribution will be halved for those earning under NZ$180,000 and cancelled for those earning over this amount.

    In summary, the new operational spend comes to $6.7 billion while savings, reprioritised spending and revenue-raising initiatives totalled $5.3 billion. As a result, the government has produced the lowest operational allowance in a decade ($1.3 billion) and promised $4 billion in new capital expenditure.

    But it was the radical restructuring and cancellation of pay equity for a range of undervalued female-dominated occupations that funded this budget. Almost half of the $12 billion recouped will be spent on the business tax incentives.

    The government expects the initiative will increase GDP and wages by 1% to 1.5% over the next 20 years. But given the gender-segregated structure of New Zealand’s labour market, it may take some time for women to benefit from the Investment Boost.

    Pay equity peril: Finance Minister Nicola Willis delivers the budget while Prime Minister Christopher Luxon looks on.
    Getty Images

    The gender gap and economic growth

    Applying a systematic and evidence-based gender analysis as part of the budget preparation process would have revealed more inclusive ways of delivering economic growth.

    For example, OECD modelling demonstrates the historical importance of increases in women’s labour market participation for economic growth, but notes that persistent gender gaps remain in productive capcity and hours of employment.

    Closing these gaps could potentially add a 0.1 percentage point of additional economic growth per year, culminating in a 3.9% boost to GDP in the next 35 years.

    Moreover, increasing women’s labour force participation may be a valuable mechanism to limit declines in the size of the labour force, given the rapidly ageing population.

    Such an outcome would require increased government investment in childcare and early childhood education for under twos, ideally for more than 20 hours per week.

    This would be a significant investment, given OECD data shows the net cost of childcare in New Zealand is as much as 38% of a two-earner couple’s average earnings (after accounting for government subsidies or benefits). This is considerably more expensive than most OECD member states.

    Potential cost to National

    Income and spending averages often mask more extreme impacts for different groups of women and men. For example, traditional economic models value labour used in the production of goods and services in the “market economy” but exclude the production of goods and services for their own use.

    For wāhine Māori, non-market work includes care for whānau, community and land, as well as upholding the mana of the marae, and the intergenerational transfer of knowledge.

    Finally, implementing pay equity, recognising the economic value of the unpaid care economy, and providing increased financial support for childcare, would also contribute to closing the gender pension gap.

    Westpac data shows men have an average KiwiSaver balance 16% higher than women’s, most likely attributable to gender wage gaps and parenting career breaks.

    Therefore the reduction in government contributions to KiwiSaver, and National’s desire to lift the retirement age, matter more to women because statistically they have a longer retirement to fund.

    Budget 2025 came at a cost to many women in New Zealand, and it may yet come at a cost for National.

    The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. NZ Budget 2025: funding growth at the expense of pay equity for women could cost National in the long run – https://theconversation.com/nz-budget-2025-funding-growth-at-the-expense-of-pay-equity-for-women-could-cost-national-in-the-long-run-257225

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Grassley, Daines, Lummis Introduce Bill to Protect Health Care for Veterans

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Iowa Chuck Grassley

    WASHINGTON – Sen. Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa) joined Sens. Steve Daines (R-Mont.) and Cynthia Lummis (R-Wyo.) in introducing the Protecting Veteran Community Care Act. The legislation would strengthen the Department of Veterans Affairs’ (VA) existing Community Care program and bolster veterans’ access to mental health services. It would also hold the VA accountable to Congress for the full implementation of the VA MISSION Act.

    “Thousands of veterans call Iowa home, and each one deserves high-quality, accessible health care, including mental health care. Our legislation would strengthen the VA MISSION Act to ensure veterans can access quality care, close to home, in a timely manner,” Grassley said.

    “Our nation’s veterans have put their lives on the line to protect our freedoms, and the last thing they should have to worry about is mismanagement and delays at the VA. I’m proud to work with my colleagues on this bill to strengthen the availability of community based mental health programs and ensure that our veterans have access to the care and resources that they deserve,” Daines said.

    “Providing for those who’ve defended our nation is the VA’s core purpose. This means Wyoming’s courageous veterans deserve top-tier healthcare services regardless of their geographic location. I remain committed to ensuring veterans throughout our state can access the medical care they’ve earned in their local communities,” Lummis said.

    Specifically, the Protecting Veteran Community Care Act would: 

    • Amend the VA MISSION Act to specifically include inpatient mental health standards
    • Establish minimum standards for community residential programs 
    • Address the VA’s subversion of Community Care access standards 
    • Require the VA to track relevant community care data and provide those statistics to Congress

    Full text of the legislation can be found HERE.

    Background:

    The Veterans Community Care Program (VCCP) allows veterans to receive care in their local communities when they cannot receive it at a VA facility. When veterans use community care, the VA will pay for the veteran’s health care.

    Last Congress, Grassley and Daines, along with Sens. Marsha Blackburn (R-Tenn.) and Thom Tillis (R-N.C.), sent a letter scrutinizing a VA report suggesting the agency was unethically limiting veterans’ access to community care networks. In a letter to then-VA Secretary Denis McDonough, the senators demanded to know how the VA is protecting health care options for veterans. These efforts echo concerns Grassley raised in 2022, when he requested information on the VA’s progress towards implementing community care standards.

    -30-

    MIL OSI USA News –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-Evening Report: Air New Zealand to resume Auckland-Nouméa flights from November

    By Patrick Decloitre, RNZ Pacific correspondent French Pacific desk

    Air New Zealand has announced it plans to resume its Auckland-Nouméa flights from November, almost one and a half years after deadly civil unrest broke out in the French Pacific territory.

    “Air New Zealand is resuming its Auckland-Nouméa service starting 1 November 2025. Initially, flights will operate once a week on a Saturday. This follows the New Zealand Government’s decision to update its safe travel advisory level for New Caledonia”, the company stated in its latest update yesterday.

    “The resumption of services reflects our commitment to reconnecting New Zealand and New Caledonia, ensuring that travel is safe and reliable for our customers. We will continue to monitor this route closely.

    “Passengers are encouraged to check the latest travel advisories and Air New Zealand’s official channels for updates on flight schedules”, said Air New Zealand general manager short haul Lucy Hall.

    In its updated advisory regarding New Caledonia, the New Zealand government still recommends “Exercise increased caution” (Level 2 of 4).

    It said this was “due to the ongoing risk of civil unrest”.

    In some specific areas (the Loyalty Islands, the Isle of Pines (Iles de Pins), and inland of the coastal strip between Mont Dore and Koné), it is still recommended to “avoid non-essential travel (Level 3 of 4).”

    Warning over ‘civil unrest’
    The advisory also recalls that “there was a prolonged period of civil unrest in New Caledonia in 2024. Political tensions and civil unrest may increase at short notice”.

    “Avoid all demonstrations, protests, and rallies as they have the potential to turn violent with little warning”.

    Air New Zealand ceased flights between Auckland and the French territory’s capital, Nouméa on 15 June 2024, at the height of violent civil unrest.

    Since then, it has maintained its no-show for the French Pacific territory, one of its closest neighbours.

    Air New Zealand’s general manager international Jeremy O’Brien said at the time this was due to “pockets of unrest” remaining in New Caledonia and “safety is priority”.

    New Caledonia’s international carrier Air Calédonie International (Aircalin) is also operating two weekly flights to Auckland from the Nouméa-La Tontouta international airport.

    The riots that broke out on 13 May 2024 resulted in 14 deaths and more than 2.2 billion euros (NZ$4.1 billion) in damages, bringing New Caledonia’s economy to its knees, with thousands of businesses and jobs destroyed.

    Tourism from its main regional source markets, namely Australia and New Zealand, also came to a standstill.

    Specifically regarding New Zealand, local statistics show that between the first quarters of 2024 and 2025, visitor numbers collapsed by 90 percent (from 1731 to 186).

    New Caledonia’s tourism stakeholders have welcomed the resumption of the service to and from New Zealand, saying this will allow the industry to relaunch targeted promotional campaigns in the New Zealand market.

    This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI China: China explores, advances harmonious human-nature coexistence

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Deep in a red pine forest, where towering ancient trees cast dappled shadows and the air was thick with the scent of resin, a resounding song, known as the “forest shanty,” drew a circle of curious visitors.

    This song was sung by 45-year-old Cui Jianhua, who stood beneath a centuries-old pine tree, pouring his heart into the melody at the Wuying Red Pine Forest Sea Scenic Area in the city of Yichun, northeast China’s Heilongjiang Province.

    “Originally, these shanties were chanted by forestry workers while felling giant trees,” said Cui. “Today, we perform them as songs of welcome, a symbol of the thriving, harmonious life we now share with the forest.”

    Thursday marked the 2025 International Day for Biological Diversity, themed “Harmony with nature and sustainable development.”

    The idea of harmonious coexistence between humans and nature has long been embedded in the daily lives of Cui and many other forest dwellers in Yichun.

    Over the past decade, they have transitioned from logging-based livelihoods to engaging in eco-friendly industries, witnessing a transformation where both people and the forest thrive together.

    Nestled in the heart of the Lesser Khingan Mountains, Yichun was once a major timber production hub in China. With over 270 million cubic meters of wood harvested, it earned the nickname “Forest City.”

    But decades of industrial logging stripped its lush slopes bare and displaced much of its native wildlife — resulting in a mounting ecological crisis.

    In 2013, Yichun brought all commercial logging of natural forests to a halt. Since then, more than 100,000 forestry workers have laid down their axes and saws, embarking on a new journey toward harmonious coexistence with the forest.

    Cui began his career as a forest ranger. During his early years on the job, the grueling work of reforestation often left him questioning his purpose. But whenever he felt disheartened, his father, a forest police officer, would offer words of encouragement.

    “Felling trees was for building the nation. Protecting them is for securing its future,” according to Cui’s father.

    Those words inspired Cui and sparked his imagination about what the mountains might look like once they turned green again.

    Now, Cui’s vision has become reality. Thanks to Yichun’s unwavering commitment to ecological restoration — forest coverage has climbed to 83.8 percent, and forest stock increased by over 10 million cubic meters each year.

    Beyond reforestation, the city has established 23 nature reserves covering 670,000 hectares to revive biodiversity. Species long unseen, such as lynx and sables, have returned to roam the woods, while iconic creatures like the Amur tiger are also making frequent appearances.

    The forest has become a vast “natural oxygen bar,” offering fresh, invigorating air. In major scenic locations, the negative oxygen ion level soars to 3,000 per cubic centimeter — far exceeding those in urban areas.

    This transformation has turned Yichun into a magnet for tourists, heralding more opportunities for Cui and his community.

    Statistics from the city government show that in 2024, tourist arrivals and tourism revenue had increased by 53 percent and 76.2 percent year on year, respectively, while the number of overseas visitors during the winter season soared by 382 percent.

    Also benefiting from the city’s tourism boom is Liu Yangshun, who lives near the Xishui National Forest Park. Formerly a lumber truck driver, Liu started his homestay after retiring in 2016.

    “My homestay has 18 tables and operates from May to August, bringing in over 100,000 yuan (about 13,907 U.S. dollars) during the season,” he said.

    Liu also noted that more residents have turned to running homestays in recent years. Today, more than 40 such homestays are clustered around the forest park.

    Dong Wenqin, Party secretary of Yichun, said that the city has developed mountain hiking, study tour and other niche tours, drawing visitors from across the country.

    Yichun’s transformation serves as a vivid example of China’s broader commitment to both biodiversity conservation and harmonious coexistence between humanity and nature.

    From a growing number of gibbons swinging through rainforest in south China’s Hainan Province and the thousands of egrets nesting freely at Qingshan Lake in east China’s Jiangxi Province, to the rescued Asian elephants roaming in Xishuangbanna, southwest China’s Yunnan Province, it is evident that China is on a remarkable journey of ecological transformation.

    Official data from the National Forestry and Grassland Administration showed that populations of rare and endangered wild species have steadily increased in China as the country’s biodiversity conservation efforts continued to yield notable results.

    The total number of overwintering waterbirds recorded in China reached nearly 5.06 million last year — a record high since nationwide monitoring began.

    Huang Runqiu, minister of ecology and environment, said at the International Day for Biological Diversity Event 2025 held in Yichun that as the presidency of the 15th meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (COP15), China is actively advancing the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework and has established the 1.5-billion-yuan Kunming Biodiversity Fund, with nine pilot projects already underway.

    “Around the world, biodiversity is in decline,” said Beate Trankmann, resident representative of the United Nations Development Programme in China. “Within this context, the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, negotiated under China’s COP15 presidency, sets out a pathway to safeguard the planet and promote coexistence with nature.”

    MIL OSI China News –

    May 27, 2025
  • Trump administration blocks Harvard from enrolling international students, threatens broader crackdown

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration revoked Harvard University’s ability to enroll international students on Thursday, and is forcing current foreign students to transfer to other schools or lose their legal status, while also threatening to expand the crackdown to other colleges.

    Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem ordered the department to terminate Harvard University’s Student and Exchange Visitor Program certification effective for the 2025-2026 school year, the department said in a statement.

    Noem accused the university of “fostering violence, antisemitism, and coordinating with the Chinese Communist Party.”

    Harvard said the move by the Trump administration – which affects thousands of students – was illegal and amounted to retaliation.

    The decision marked a significant escalation of the Trump administration’s campaign against the elite Ivy League university in Cambridge, Massachusetts, which has emerged as one of Trump’s most prominent institutional targets. The move came after Harvard refused to provide information that Noem demanded about some foreign student visa holders at Harvard, the department said.

    Harvard enrolled nearly 6,800 international students in the 2024-2025 school year, amounting to 27% of its total enrollment, according to university statistics.

    In 2022, Chinese nationals were the biggest group of foreign students at 1,016, university figures showed. After that were students from Canada, India, South Korea, Britain, Germany, Australia, Singapore and Japan.

    The Chinese Embassy in Washington did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

    “It is a privilege, not a right, for universities to enroll foreign students and benefit from their higher tuition payments to help pad their multibillion-dollar endowments,” Noem said in a statement.

    In a letter to the university, Noem gave Harvard “the opportunity” to regain its certification by turning over within 72 hours a raft of records about foreign students, including any video or audio of their protest activity in the past five years.

    Harvard called the government’s action “unlawful” and said it was “fully committed” to educating foreign students.

    “This retaliatory action threatens serious harm to the Harvard community and our country, and undermines Harvard’s academic and research mission,” the university said in a statement.

    Congressional Democrats denounced the revocation, with U.S. Representative Jaime Raskin calling it an “intolerable attack on Harvard’s independence and academic freedom” and saying it was government retaliation for Harvard’s previous resistance to Trump.

    Trump has already frozen some $3 billion in federal grants to Harvard in recent weeks, leading the university to sue to restore the funding.

    In a separate lawsuit related to Trump’s efforts to terminate the legal status of hundreds of foreign students across the U.S., a federal judge ruled on Thursday that the administration could not end their status without following proper regulatory procedures. It was not immediately clear how that ruling would affect the action against Harvard.

    During an interview with Fox News’ “The Story with Martha MacCallum,” Noem was asked if she was considering similar moves at other universities, including Columbia University in New York.

    “Absolutely, we are,” Noem said. “This should be a warning to every other university to get your act together.”

    TRUMP TARGETS UNIVERSITIES

    Trump, a Republican, took office in January pledging a wide-ranging immigration crackdown. His administration has tried to revoke student visas and green cards of foreign students who participated in pro-Palestinian protests.

    He has undertaken an extraordinary effort to revamp private colleges and schools across the U.S., claiming they foster anti-American, Marxist and “radical left” ideologies. He has criticized Harvard for hiring prominent Democrats for teaching or leadership positions.

    The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services said on Monday that it was terminating a further $60 million in federal grants to Harvard because it failed to address antisemitic harassment and ethnic discrimination.

    In a legal complaint filed earlier this month, Harvard said it was committed to combating antisemitism and had taken steps to ensure its campus is safe and welcoming to Jewish and Israeli students.

    Aaron Reichlin-Melnick, a senior fellow with the American Immigration Council, a pro-immigration advocacy group, said the action against Harvard’s student visa program “needlessly punishes thousands of innocent students.”

    “None of them have done anything wrong, they’re just collateral damage to Trump,” he said on the social media site Bluesky.

    (Reuters)

    May 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: FBI Philadelphia Recognizes National Senior Fraud Awareness Day

    Source: US FBI

    National Senior Fraud Awareness Day is May 15, and FBI Philadelphia wants to remind families, friends, and caregivers, of the fraud schemes that target older Americans.

    In April, the FBI released the annual Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) Elder Fraud report. This annual publication provides statistics about incidents of elder fraud—or fraud that explicitly targets older Americans’ money or cryptocurrency—that are reported to IC3. The goal of this report is to inform the public of the scams impacting the country and prevent future and repeat incidents.

    In 2024, those over the age of 60 filed over 147,000 complaints to the IC3, with over $4.8 billion in reported losses, a 43% increase in losses from 2023. Across the nation, phishing and spoofing schemes were the most reported scams impacting older Americans, with over 23,000 complaints. Investment fraud resulted in the most reported victim losses, with about $1.8 billion in losses.

    “Criminals continue to launch calculated and deliberate attacks against a uniquely vulnerable population, our senior citizens. Threat actors systematically prey on their savings, their identity, and their sense of security,” said FBI Philadelphia Assistant Special Agent in Charge Nicole Sinegar. “National Senior Fraud Awareness Day is a critical reminder of the growing threat that financial scams and frauds pose to our older citizens. We urge families, friends, and caregivers to have an open and continuous dialogue about the scams threatening older Americans and empower them to report suspected schemes to law enforcement.”

    Ways to protect yourself include:

    • Recognize scam attempts and end all communication with the perpetrator.
    • Search online for the contact information (name, email, phone number, addresses) and the proposed offer. Other people have likely posted information online about individuals and businesses trying to run scams.
    • Resist the pressure to act quickly. Scammers create a sense of urgency to produce fear and lure victims into immediate action. Call the police immediately if you feel there is a danger to yourself or a loved one.
    • Be cautious of unsolicited phone calls, mailings, and door-to-door service offers.
    • Never give or send any personally identifiable information, money, jewelry, gift cards, checks, or wire information to unverified people or businesses.
    • Make sure all computer anti-virus and security software and malware protections are up to date. Use reputable anti-virus software and firewalls.
    • Be careful what you download. Never open an email attachment from someone you don’t know, and be wary of email attachments forwarded to you.

    If you or someone you know may have been a victim of elder fraud, contact FBI Philadelphia at (215) 418-4000, or submit a tip online at tips.fbi.gov. If the suspected fraud was Internet-facilitated, you can also file a complaint with the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center at ic3.gov.

    To find additional elder fraud resources, visit: https://www.fbi.gov/how-we-can-help-you/scams-and-safety/common-scams-and-crimes/elder-fraud

    MIL Security OSI –

    May 27, 2025
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