Category: terrorism

MIL-OSI Russia: Government meeting (2025, No. 10)

Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

1. On the draft federal law “On Amendments to the Federal Law “On Assistance to the Development and Improvement of Management Efficiency in the Housing Sphere and on Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation” and Article 2 of the Housing Code of the Russian Federation”

The bill is aimed at creating a single register of citizens entitled to receive state and municipal support for the purpose of improving their housing conditions.

2. On amendments to the Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation of November 18, 2013 No. 1038 (in terms of amendments to the Regulation on the Ministry of Construction and Housing and Communal Services of the Russian Federation)

The draft resolution proposes to grant the Russian Ministry of Construction the authority to adopt, among other things, standard additional professional programs in the field of construction and housing and public utilities.

3. On amending the Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation of March 16, 2009 No. 228 (in terms of amending the Regulation on the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media)

The draft act provides for amendments to include in the scope of Roskomnadzor’s powers the area related to counteracting the financing of extremist activities.

4. On Amendments to Certain Acts of the Government of the Russian Federation (in terms of amendments to the Regulation on the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media)

The draft act is aimed at bringing the Regulation on the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media and the Regulation on the Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media of the Russian Federation into line with the provisions of Federal Law No. 158-FZ of June 22, 2024 “On Amendments to the Federal Law “On Information, Information Technology and Information Protection” and Articles 11 and 15 of the Federal Law “On the Activities of Foreign Persons in the Information and Telecommunications Network “Internet” on the Territory of the Russian Federation”.

5. On the draft federal law “On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation”

The bill is aimed at introducing changes to the legislation of the Russian Federation that will allow widows (widowers) of participants in a special military operation to continue to use vehicles owned by their spouses during the period before the inheritance is accepted.

6. On the draft federal law “On Amendments to the Federal Law “On Limited Liability Companies””

The adoption of the bill will facilitate the expansion of the principle of discretion for participants in entrepreneurial activity, and will also allow for the optimization of the economic activity of companies in terms of determining the actual value of a participant’s share in the company, bypassing possible legal proceedings.

7. On the draft federal law “On Amendments to the Federal Law “On Combating the Legalization (Laundering) of Criminally Obtained Incomes and the Financing of Terrorism” and the Federal Law “On Special Economic Measures and Coercive Measures”

The bill is aimed at improving the system of freezing (blocking) funds or other property as one of the elements of the state system of countering terrorism and the application of special economic measures.

8. On amendments to the Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation of June 19, 2012 No. 610 (in terms of amendments to the Regulation on the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of the Russian Federation)

The draft act is aimed at bringing the situation into line with current legislation.

9. On amending the Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation of November 11, 2015 No. 1219 (in terms of amending the Regulation on the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment of the Russian Federation)

The draft act is aimed at granting the Ministry of Natural Resources of Russia the authority to approve risk indicators for violation of mandatory requirements applied by Rosprirodnadzor in the implementation of federal state land control (supervision).

10. On amending the Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation of November 7, 2016 No. 1140 (in terms of suspending the effect of certain clauses of the Regulation on the Ministry of Agriculture of the Russian Federation and the Regulation on the Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance)

The draft act is aimed at bringing the Rules for the creation, development and operation of the Federal State Information System in the field of veterinary medicine into line with the Federal Law of December 26, 2024 No. 496-FZ “On Amendments to the Law of the Russian Federation “On Veterinary Medicine” and Article 2 of the Federal Law “On Amendments to Article 14 of the Law of the Russian Federation “On Veterinary Medicine””, as well as suspending the effect of certain provisions of Government acts.

Moscow, March 26, 2025

The content of the press releases of the Department of Press Service and References is a presentation of materials submitted by federal executive bodies for discussion at a meeting of the Government of the Russian Federation.

Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

MIL OSI Russia News –

March 28, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: United States Files Civil Forfeiture Complaint for $47 Million in Proceeds From the Sale of Iranian Oil

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime Alerts (b)

           WASHINGTON – A civil forfeiture complaint was filed today in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia alleging that $47 million in proceeds from the sale of nearly one million barrels of Iranian petroleum is forfeitable as property of, or affording a person a source of influence over, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) or its Qods Force (IRGC-QF), designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO).

           The forfeiture was announced by U.S. Attorney Edward R. Martin, Jr., Sue J. Bai, head of the Justice Department’s National Security Division, FBI Special Agent in Charge Alvin M. Winston, Sr. of the Minneapolis Field Office, and Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) Acting Special Agent in Charge Michael Alfonso of the New York Office.

           The forfeiture complaint alleges a scheme between 2022 and 2024 to facilitate the shipment, storage, and sale of Iranian petroleum product for the benefit of the IRGC and IRGC-QF. The facilitators used deceptive practices to masquerade the Iranian oil as Malaysian, including by manipulating the tanker’s automatic identification system (AIS) to conceal that it onboarded the oil from a port in Iran. The facilitators presented falsified documents to the Croatian storage facility and port authority, claiming that the oil was Malaysian. The facilitators paid for storage fees associated with the oil’s storage at the Croatian facility in U.S. dollars, transactions that were conducted through U.S. financial institutions that would have refused the transactions had they known they were associated with Iranian oil. The petroleum product was sold in 2024, and the United States seized $47 million in proceeds from that sale.

           The civil forfeiture complaint further alleges that the petroleum product constitutes the property of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), which has perpetuated a federal crime of terrorism by providing material support to the IRGC and IRGC-QF. As alleged, profits from petroleum product sales support the IRGC’s full range of malign activities, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, support for terrorism, and both domestic and international human rights abuses.

           “We will aggressively enforce U.S. sanctions against Iran, in furtherance of President Trump’s maximum pressure campaign,” said U.S. Attorney Martin. “With the continued seizures of Iranian oil and U.S. dollar profits, we are sending a clear message to Iran that bypassing the sanctions put in place by the U.S. Government is not as easy as playing a shell game with tankers filled with oil. We remain committed to thwarting Iran’s devious attempts, and to deprive its terrorists of the funding they desire.”

           “The FBI will not allow hostile regimes to evade U.S. sanctions or exploit our financial systems to fund designated terrorist organizations,” said FBI Special Agent in Charge Winston. “The FBI, alongside our partners, will relentlessly enforce U.S. sanctions against Iran and safeguard U.S. national security by disrupting illicit networks that seek to profit from sanctioned oil sales.”

           “Through the work of HSI’s Counterproliferation Investigations group, alongside the FBI, the U.S. government has seized $47 million worth of funds allegedly meant for terrorist groups intent on causing catastrophic harm,” said HSI Acting Special Agent in Charge Alfonso. “The expertise of HSI personnel, coupled with federal law enforcement’s whole-of-government approach, ensures the wellbeing of the United States and our innocent foreign counterparts, alike. We are relentlessly utilizing every tool at our disposal in pursuit of any and all security threats.”

           Funds successfully forfeited with a connection to a state sponsor of terrorism may in whole or in part be directed to the U.S. Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund.

           FBI Minneapolis Field Office and Homeland Security Investigations New York are investigating the case.

           Assistant U.S. Attorneys Karen P. Seifert, Maeghan O. Mikorski, and Brian Hudak for the District of Columbia and Trial Attorney Adam Small of the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section are litigating the case. They received assistance from former Paralegal Specialist Brian Rickers and the Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs.

           A civil forfeiture complaint is merely an allegation. The burden to prove forfeitability in a civil forfeiture proceeding is upon the government.

MIL Security OSI –

March 28, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Justice Department Disrupts Hamas Terrorist Financing Scheme Through Seizure of Cryptocurrency

Source: US State of Vermont

The Court-Authorized Seizure Interdicts Cryptocurrency Valued at Approximately $200,000 Intended to Support the Terrorist Activities of Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya (Hamas)

The Justice Department announced the disruption of an ongoing terrorist financing scheme through the seizure of approximately $201,400 in cryptocurrency held in wallets and accounts intended to benefit Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya (Hamas). The seized funds were traced from fundraising addresses purportedly controlled by Hamas that were used to launder more than $1.5 million in virtual currency since October 2024.

“At Attorney General Pam Bondi’s direction, the Department of Justice is committed to dismantling Hamas using every tool at our disposal,” said Sue J. Bai, head of the Justice Department’s National Security Division.

“These seizures show that this office will search high and low for every cent of money going to fund Hamas, wherever it is found, and in whatever form of currency,” said U.S. Attorney Edward R. Martin Jr. for the District of Columbia. “Hamas is responsible for the death of many U.S. and Israeli nationals, and we will stop at nothing to stop their campaign of terror and murder.”

“Hamas raised and laundered more than a million dollars to support its terrorist operation, but through our investigation, the FBI traced and seized these funds,” said Assistant Director David J. Scott of the FBI Counterterrorism Division. “Disrupting funding mechanisms and seizing cryptocurrency from Hamas is one of the FBI’s many tools that we use in the fight against terrorism. The FBI will work with our partners to dismantle this terrorist group and protect the American people from their violent and horrific acts.”

“Countering terrorism remains the FBI’s number one priority. By successfully disrupting access to funds, we weaken their ability to function,” said Special Agent in Charge Raul Bujanda of the FBI Albuquerque Field Office. “This success demonstrates that financial warfare is a critical component to fight terrorism. We will continue to do everything in our power to protect the American people and pursue justice by depriving terrorist organizations of the resources they need to continue their illicit activity.”

As alleged in court documents, a group chat claiming association with Hamas on an encrypted communications platform provided Hamas supporters worldwide with a changing set of at least 17 cryptocurrency addresses. Supporters were encouraged to donate money to those addresses. Those funds were sent into an operational wallet and laundered through a series of virtual currency exchanges and transactions by leveraging suspected financiers and over-the-counter brokers. More than a million dollars was raised and laundered using the laundering system and the virtual currency accounts described in the affidavit.

Included among the assets seized were cryptocurrency addresses valued at approximately $89,900 and three additional accounts containing cryptocurrency valued at approximately $111,500. These accounts were registered in the names of Palestinian individuals living in Turkey and elsewhere.

The FBI Albuquerque Field Office is investigating the case, in coordination with the FBI Counterterrorism Division and Cyber Division.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Tejpal Chawla for the District of Columbia, Trial Attorney Jacques Singer-Emery for the National Security Division’s National Security Cyber Section, and Trial Attorney Jessica Joyce of the National Security Division’s Counterterrorism Section are prosecuting the case.

MIL OSI USA News –

March 28, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Justice Department Disrupts Hamas Terrorist Financing Scheme Through Seizure of Cryptocurrency

Source: United States Attorneys General 1

The Court-Authorized Seizure Interdicts Cryptocurrency Valued at Approximately $200,000 Intended to Support the Terrorist Activities of Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya (Hamas)

The Justice Department announced the disruption of an ongoing terrorist financing scheme through the seizure of approximately $201,400 in cryptocurrency held in wallets and accounts intended to benefit Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya (Hamas). The seized funds were traced from fundraising addresses purportedly controlled by Hamas that were used to launder more than $1.5 million in virtual currency since October 2024.

“At Attorney General Pam Bondi’s direction, the Department of Justice is committed to dismantling Hamas using every tool at our disposal,” said Sue J. Bai, head of the Justice Department’s National Security Division.

“These seizures show that this office will search high and low for every cent of money going to fund Hamas, wherever it is found, and in whatever form of currency,” said U.S. Attorney Edward R. Martin Jr. for the District of Columbia. “Hamas is responsible for the death of many U.S. and Israeli nationals, and we will stop at nothing to stop their campaign of terror and murder.”

“Hamas raised and laundered more than a million dollars to support its terrorist operation, but through our investigation, the FBI traced and seized these funds,” said Assistant Director David J. Scott of the FBI Counterterrorism Division. “Disrupting funding mechanisms and seizing cryptocurrency from Hamas is one of the FBI’s many tools that we use in the fight against terrorism. The FBI will work with our partners to dismantle this terrorist group and protect the American people from their violent and horrific acts.”

“Countering terrorism remains the FBI’s number one priority. By successfully disrupting access to funds, we weaken their ability to function,” said Special Agent in Charge Raul Bujanda of the FBI Albuquerque Field Office. “This success demonstrates that financial warfare is a critical component to fight terrorism. We will continue to do everything in our power to protect the American people and pursue justice by depriving terrorist organizations of the resources they need to continue their illicit activity.”

As alleged in court documents, a group chat claiming association with Hamas on an encrypted communications platform provided Hamas supporters worldwide with a changing set of at least 17 cryptocurrency addresses. Supporters were encouraged to donate money to those addresses. Those funds were sent into an operational wallet and laundered through a series of virtual currency exchanges and transactions by leveraging suspected financiers and over-the-counter brokers. More than a million dollars was raised and laundered using the laundering system and the virtual currency accounts described in the affidavit.

Included among the assets seized were cryptocurrency addresses valued at approximately $89,900 and three additional accounts containing cryptocurrency valued at approximately $111,500. These accounts were registered in the names of Palestinian individuals living in Turkey and elsewhere.

The FBI Albuquerque Field Office is investigating the case, in coordination with the FBI Counterterrorism Division and Cyber Division.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Tejpal Chawla for the District of Columbia, Trial Attorney Jacques Singer-Emery for the National Security Division’s National Security Cyber Section, and Trial Attorney Jessica Joyce of the National Security Division’s Counterterrorism Section are prosecuting the case.

MIL Security OSI –

March 28, 2025
MIL-OSI Australia: Azerbaijan

Source:

We’ve reviewed our advice for Azerbaijan and continue to advise exercise a high degree of caution due to the threat of terrorism. Higher levels apply in some areas. Be alert to possible threats, especially in public places. Terrorists may target tourist areas and attractions or other places frequented by foreigners. Take official warnings seriously (see “Safety”).

MIL OSI News –

March 27, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: United States Files Civil Forfeiture Complaint for $47 Million in Proceeds from the Sale of 1 Million Barrels of Iranian Oil

Source: US State Government of Utah

A civil forfeiture complaint was filed today in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia alleging that $47 million in proceeds from the sale of nearly one million barrels of Iranian petroleum is forfeitable as property of, or affording a person a source of influence over, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) or its Qods Force (IRGC-QF), designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs).

The forfeiture complaint alleges a scheme between 2022 and 2024 to facilitate the shipment, storage, and sale of Iranian petroleum product for the benefit of the IRGC and IRGC-QF. The facilitators used deceptive practices to masquerade the Iranian oil as Malaysian, including by manipulating the tanker’s automatic identification system (AIS) to conceal that it onboarded the oil from a port in Iran. The facilitators presented falsified documents to the Croatian storage and port facility, claiming that the oil was Malaysian. The facilitators paid for storage fees associated with the oil’s storage in Croatia in U.S. dollars, transactions that were conducted through U.S. financial institutions that would have refused the transactions had they known they were associated with Iranian oil. The petroleum product was sold in 2024, and the United States seized $47 million in proceeds from that sale.

The civil forfeiture complaint further alleges that the petroleum product constitutes the property of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), which has perpetuated a federal crime of terrorism by providing material support to the IRGC and IRGC-QF. As alleged, profits from petroleum product sales support the IRGC’s full range of malign activities, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, support for terrorism, and both domestic and international human rights abuses.

Funds successfully forfeited with a connection to a state sponsor of terrorism may in whole or in part be directed to the U.S. Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund.

FBI Minneapolis Field Office and Homeland Security Investigations New York are investigating the case.

Assistant U.S. Attorneys Karen P. Seifert, Maeghan O. Mikorski, and Brian Hudak for the District of Columbia and Trial Attorney Adam Small of the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section are litigating the case. They received assistance from former Paralegal Specialist Brian Rickers and the Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs.

A civil forfeiture complaint is merely an allegation. The burden to prove forfeitability in a civil forfeiture proceeding is upon the government.

MIL OSI USA News –

March 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: United States Files Civil Forfeiture Complaint for $47 Million in Proceeds from the Sale of 1 Million Barrels of Iranian Oil

Source: United States Attorneys General 1

A civil forfeiture complaint was filed today in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia alleging that $47 million in proceeds from the sale of nearly one million barrels of Iranian petroleum is forfeitable as property of, or affording a person a source of influence over, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) or its Qods Force (IRGC-QF), designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs).

The forfeiture complaint alleges a scheme between 2022 and 2024 to facilitate the shipment, storage, and sale of Iranian petroleum product for the benefit of the IRGC and IRGC-QF. The facilitators used deceptive practices to masquerade the Iranian oil as Malaysian, including by manipulating the tanker’s automatic identification system (AIS) to conceal that it onboarded the oil from a port in Iran. The facilitators presented falsified documents to the Croatian storage and port facility, claiming that the oil was Malaysian. The facilitators paid for storage fees associated with the oil’s storage in Croatia in U.S. dollars, transactions that were conducted through U.S. financial institutions that would have refused the transactions had they known they were associated with Iranian oil. The petroleum product was sold in 2024, and the United States seized $47 million in proceeds from that sale.

The civil forfeiture complaint further alleges that the petroleum product constitutes the property of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), which has perpetuated a federal crime of terrorism by providing material support to the IRGC and IRGC-QF. As alleged, profits from petroleum product sales support the IRGC’s full range of malign activities, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, support for terrorism, and both domestic and international human rights abuses.

Funds successfully forfeited with a connection to a state sponsor of terrorism may in whole or in part be directed to the U.S. Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund.

FBI Minneapolis Field Office and Homeland Security Investigations New York are investigating the case.

Assistant U.S. Attorneys Karen P. Seifert, Maeghan O. Mikorski, and Brian Hudak for the District of Columbia and Trial Attorney Adam Small of the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section are litigating the case. They received assistance from former Paralegal Specialist Brian Rickers and the Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs.

A civil forfeiture complaint is merely an allegation. The burden to prove forfeitability in a civil forfeiture proceeding is upon the government.

MIL Security OSI –

March 27, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Security Minister observes counter-terrorism exercise in Wales
Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

News story

Security Minister observes counter-terrorism exercise in Wales

Meeting emergency responders at a counter-terrorism training exercise in Wales, the Security Minister praised their collaboration to keep the public safe.
The Security Minister re-emphasised the need for close working between national and devolved emergency services and responders to minimise the impact of a terrorist attack in Wales, during a visit to Swansea to observe a multi-agency counter-terrorism exercise on Wednesday (26 April).

At the exercise at Swansea.com Stadium, he was able to watch emergency responders in Wales, including the police, fire and rescue, ambulance and other responder organisations, test their preparedness for a large-scale attack and ensure they work effectively together to keep the public safe.

Thanking all those taking part in the exercise for their unwavering commitment to protecting the public, the Security Minister gave a speech to participants, to say that responding to an incident with mass fatalities successfully depends on trust, close working and collaboration between multiple agencies.

Security Minister Dan Jarvis said:

It was an immense privilege to witness the dedicated work of the emergency services and responder organisations and their unwavering commitment to keeping the people of Wales safe.

National security is the foundation of our Plan for Change. This essential training ensures we are prepared for every eventuality and in the best position to save lives and protect our communities.

It comes after the Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill completed its final parliamentary stage this week ahead of Royal Assent. This new legislation will ensure venues across the UK – which will include premises such as sports stadiums – consider the security of the public and take steps to protect them from harm.

The new law is better known as Martyn’s Law in memory of Martyn Hett, who tragically lost his life alongside 21 others in the 2017 Manchester Arena terrorist attack.

Wednesday’s exercise also sought to test the stadium’s internal contingency response plans. Under the Bill, qualifying premises like Swansea.com Stadium will be required to plan how best to respond to a terrorist attack.

The exercise was part of a routine training exercise between the police, including Counter Terrorism Policing Wales and South Wales Police; and other services, such as the South Wales Fire and Rescue service, health and social care, and the Welsh Government; which work together in partnership to respond to and mitigate the impacts of incidents of this nature.

The various agencies taking part were able to practice the application of the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (JESIP) which are widely acknowledged as critical to the success of a response to an incident and are the adopted principles for multi-agency working across the UK.

The Security Minister also visited the Senedd in Cardiff where he met with the First Minister of Wales to discuss strengthening national security in Wales and remaining prepared for terrorist attacks.

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Published 26 March 2025
MIL OSI United Kingdom –
March 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Video: How the Coast Guard Seizes 45,000 lbs of Cocaine at Sea

Source: US Coast Guard (video statements)

INSIDE THE U.S. COAST GUARD’S COCAINE SEIZURE AT SEA

The U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Stone has offloaded over 45,600 pounds of cocaine worth $517.5 million at Port Everglades following 14 high-stakes drug interdictions in international waters. These operations, spanning from the Eastern Pacific Ocean to the waters off Mexico, Ecuador, Colombia, and Costa Rica, resulted in the apprehension of 35 suspected smugglers—a major blow to transnational drug cartels, including Sinaloa and Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación.

Highlights from the CGC Stone’s Deployment
Interdicted four go-fast vessels in just 15 minutes—seizing 11,000 pounds of cocaine
HITRON aircrews deployed airborne use-of-force tactics to stop non-compliant drug runners
Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS drones) assisted in locating traffickers hundreds of miles offshore
Seizures took place hundreds of miles off Mexico, Ecuador, Colombia, and Costa Rica

“The fight against drug trafficking starts far from U.S. shores,” said Cmdr. David Ratner, underscoring the Coast Guard’s relentless mission to stop narco-terrorism before it reaches America.

Featured Coast Guard Assets & Teams
USCGC Stone (WMSL 758) & USCGC Mohawk (WMEC 913)
Helicopter Interdiction Tactical Squadron (HITRON)
Tactical Law Enforcement Team-Pacific (PAC-TACLET)
Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATFS)
Eleventh Coast Guard District

Subscribe for more real-life Coast Guard missions, maritime law enforcement, and drug interdiction operations! #CoastGuard #DrugBust #CocaineSeizure #USCG #MaritimeSecurity #HITRON #DrugInterdiction #NarcoTerrorism #BorderSecurity

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1Gbo_B2wHbs

MIL OSI Video –

March 27, 2025
MIL-OSI NGOs: Yemen faces economic freefall and devastating aid crisis after a decade of conflict – Oxfam

Source: Oxfam –

A decade after a Saudi-led coalition intervened to restore the internationally recognized government of Yemen to power, the country remains deeply divided, facing economic freefall and a devastating humanitarian crisis, Oxfam said today.

Competing financial policies in the North and the South have caused economic collapse. Violations of human rights, the detention of humanitarian workers, and unacceptable conditions on aid imposed by the authorities in Sana’a have exacerbated suffering.

In the South, despite strong international support, the internationally recognized government has failed to provide basic services or stabilise the currency. Over the last 10 years, the Yemeni rial has depreciated by more than 90 per cent in government-controlled areas – pushing basics like food, water, and health care out of reach for most Yemenis. This inflation is only worsening – the rial lost 30 per cent of its value in February alone.

In the North, the Houthis have made it increasingly difficult and dangerous for the humanitarian community to operate and provide vital food, cash and other assistance. Their arbitrary and unlawful detention of Yemeni humanitarian workers and members of civil society has worsened the already difficult operating environment. Authorities should release all unlawfully held detainees, including Oxfam staff.

The environment of restriction and fear imposed by the Houthis, coupled with the US government’s freeze of foreign assistance funding and imposition of heightened legal risks, have caused many humanitarian organisations to wind down their operations, leaving millions of people without the means to survive and without access to education and health services. Families are facing higher prices and reduced humanitarian assistance.

“The last decade has been devastating for Yemenis, and we’ll only see these deadly consequences compounded without urgent action from authorities and the international community to allow the economy and the aid community to operate.”

Pauline Chetcuti, Head of Humanitarian Advocacy and Campaigns

Oxfam International

Pauline Chetcuti, Oxfam International’s Head of Humanitarian Advocacy and Campaigns said:

“Yemenis deserve – and have the right – to live in safety, have access to food, water, health care and to lead on a path towards a peaceful future.

“The last decade has been devastating for Yemenis, and we’ll only see these deadly consequences compounded without urgent action from authorities and the international community to allow the economy and the aid community to operate.”

Education and healthcare services have been decimated, leaving millions without critically needed support, and civil servants without salaries. Health facilities across the country have been significantly impacted by the conflict; just 40 per cent are now only partially functioning or completely out of service due to shortages of staff, funds, electricity, medicines, and equipment.

The war has destroyed much of Yemen’s critical infrastructure – the roads, bridges, markets, hospitals, schools, and private factories that powered Yemen’s economy. Though the frontlines have largely been frozen since the ceasefire in April 2022, competing monetary policies and the absence of a full political settlement have left more than 17 million people – nearly half of Yemen’s population – food insecure.

Yemeni families are facing higher prices and reduced humanitarian assistance stemming from the US government’s designation of the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. The designation creates significant obstacles to life-saving humanitarian assistance and commercial imports of food and medicine. It also adds a barrier to the vital flow of remittances from Yemenis abroad to their families, which account for approximately a fifth of Yemen’s GDP; a vital part of Yemen’s social safety net. Yemenis need to see an end to the Houthis’ rights violations and international attacks, but this designation is unlikely to make that happen. Governments should support international accountability mechanisms for all parties to the conflict – and not penalise Yemeni families by cutting off lifesaving aid.

The decade of conflict has killed over 19,000 people and displaced nearly five million people, disproportionately women and children. These figures will only grow as more legal and security barriers are placed on the economy and the aid community.

Chetcuti said: “Regional and global powers should collaborate to support a genuine peace instead of supporting aligned factions and furthering their narrow political interests. Only through a Yemeni-led political process that includes women, youth, and civil society can Yemenis emerge from crisis and enjoy basic peace and security.”

MIL OSI NGO –

March 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: U.S. Forces Conduct Significant Series of Kinetic Strikes Targeting ISIS- Somalia

Source: United States AFRICOM

In coordination with the Federal Government of Somalia, U.S. Africa Command conducted multiple airstrikes against ISIS-Somalia on March 25, 2025.

The airstrikes occurred in the vicinity of the Golis Mountains, Somalia

The command’s initial assessment is that multiple ISIS-Somalia operatives were killed and no civilians were harmed.

ISIS-Somalia has proved both its will and capability to attack U.S. and partner forces. This group’s malicious efforts threaten U.S. security interests.

U.S. Africa Command, alongside the Federal Government of Somalia and Somali Armed Forces, continues to take action to degrade ISIS-Somalia’s ability to plan and conduct attacks that threaten the U.S. homeland, our forces, and our civilians abroad.

Specific details about the operation will not be released in order to ensure continued operations security.

MIL Security OSI –

March 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Banking: Sanjay Malhotra: Address – Private Sector Collaborative Forum of the Financial Action Task Force

Source: Bank for International Settlements

It is a pleasure to be here at the Private Sector Collaborative Forum (PSCF) 2025 of the Financial Action Task Force. I am happy to note that this is the first time that the forum is being held in India. I thank FATF for giving us this opportunity. In my previous role as the Secretary in the Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance, Government of India, I had the opportunity of being closely associated with the FATF during our mutual evaluation last year.

About FATF

Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the standard setting body for illicit financing has come a long way since its establishment in 1989. Over the years, it has evolved from an organisation with only 16 members to a global forum with 40 members. Through the FATF-styled regional bodies¹, its reach is even wider. The standards developed by FATF are used by over 200 jurisdictions to combat money laundering (ML), terrorism financing (TF) and proliferation financing. The implementation of the standards has played an important role in strengthening the global financial system and making the world a safer place.

India’s Mutual Evaluation by FATF

India accords immense importance to Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (CFT). Last year, India underwent the mutual evaluation by the FATF. India was placed in the ‘regular follow-up’ category, a distinction shared by only a few other G20 countries². This is a recognition of our effective AML and CFT framework. It demonstrates our commitment to AML and CFT. This is a result of many years of building and continuously improving and strengthening the financial system of our country.

This was possible due to the collaborative efforts of all stakeholders, led by the Government of India including financial entities and designated non-financial businesses and professions in the private and public sector, regulators, and the state governments. The private sector plays a vital role in keeping the financial systems secure. Their role in implementing due diligence procedures, conducting robust risk assessments, monitoring transactions, and reporting suspicious activities is critical for preventing the abuse of the financial system. They identify suspicious activities and help government agencies in destroying illicit financial networks.

Strong public-private partnerships form the bedrock for safeguarding the integrity of the financial system. In India, we recognize the importance of close cooperation between public and private sector stakeholders in achieving these goals. Reserve Bank of India, as the regulator and supervisor of a large segment of the financial system in India has diligently and consistently worked towards building and ensuring implementation of a strong AML and CFT framework in this segment of the financial system, in line with FATF recommendations. The Reserve Bank has taken several initiatives to enhance cooperation and coordination with various stakeholders. Similarly, the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU)-India has also set up FPAC³, a public-private cooperation forum for facilitating closer interaction and collaboration. It has also supported the setting up of ARIFAC⁴ – a cross sectoral forum for the private sector reporting entities to collaborate among themselves.

It is a result of these collaborative efforts that we have been able to build and demonstrate a robust and resilient AML and CFT framework. I compliment all the stakeholders, especially, the regulated entities in the financial sector as well as the designated non-financial businesses and professions for the successful mutual evaluation.

However, as all of you are aware, the threats from money laundering and terror financing to the national and global financial systems are continuously evolving and becoming more sophisticated. This is primarily due to technological advancements. In order to effectively counter these threats, we need to continue the close cooperation among various stakeholders – government agencies, financial entities in both the public and private sectors, civil society, and others.

The mutual evaluation process was rigorous and detailed. While providing us with valuable insights into our strengths, it has highlighted some areas of improvement in our AML-CFT framework. We are determined to further strengthen our financial system to deter and combat illicit financial activities taking into consideration the recommendations made during the evaluation. We will continue to strive for continuous improvement in this regard.

Some thoughts on the Agenda for PSCF 2025

I am told that yesterday’s sessions were very engaging and produced lively discussions. Looking at the agenda for today and tomorrow, I am confident that the deliberations on contemporary topics such as evolving AML-CFT landscape, financial inclusion & humanitarian channels, risk-based approach to supervision, digitalization & information sharing, beneficial ownership and countering of proliferation financing, will also be exciting. Let me outline some of my thoughts for the forum on these areas.

First, while we all continue to make our financial systems safe and secure against money laundering and terror financing, we as policy makers need to be mindful that our measures are not over-zealous and do not stifle legitimate activities and investments. You would appreciate that multiple laws and rules, each with their own level of granularity cast a high level of burden of compliance on the regulated financial service providers. This is relevant in the context of AML-CFT too. Therefore, we need to have laws and regulations which, with surgical precision, target only the illegitimate and illicit, rather than use them as blunt tools which unintentionally hurt even the honest.

Similarly, even while implementing the legal framework and regulations, we need to keep in mind the impact on persons and businesses. Risk-based approach is recommended in this regard. But let us keep in mind that this is only a step forward in reducing compliance burden. Let us appreciate that it is not the ultimate solution, as any risk-based approach is not perfect; it would have false positives and false negatives. We need to continuously refine and improve our risk assessment models to make them robust.

To make these improvements, we need to improve the quality of our data and harness emerging technologies. This will help improve screening of transactions and detection of suspicious activities thereby reducing false positives and false negatives. Considering the evolving landscape in the area of money laundering resulting from changing customer behaviour and evolving products and services, we need to continuously augment AML risk assessment framework and make appropriate system enhancements on a regular basis after assessing the impact of ML and other risks. The focus has to also be on understanding the latest trends and developments in the financial world that can be exploited by criminals and accordingly develop tools and enabling frameworks that will allow us to detect suspicious transactions and activities early and take pre-emptive action. With the adoption of new technological tools and models, I am sure that AML-CFT risk assessments can be further fine-tuned. I would urge you all to discuss and share best practices in identification, mitigation and supervision of AML-CFT risks. This will not only help to reduce compliance burden on the Regulated Entities but also result in optimal allocation of supervisory resources.

While India has made remarkable progress in financial inclusion, we need to ensure that we continue to widen and deepen it. The discussions on FATF standards to promote financial inclusion need to find answers to the challenge of aligning financial inclusion and financial integrity, especially for the developing economies. It must be ensured that regulations do not create unintended barriers to financial inclusion. We need to be mindful of customer rights and convenience while fulfilling the due diligence requirements. I am happy to note that the amendments to Recommendation 1 and its interpretive note under the Mexican presidency intend to foster and promote financial inclusion without compromising on financial integrity. Similar approach is needed to extend access of financial channels for supporting humanitarian aid.

In recent years, digitalisation has been increasingly applied to customer onboarding and customer due diligence (CDD) processes. India has made huge strides in this regard too. The digital KYC and video KYC are shining examples of this. The Central KYC Records Registry (CKYCR) with more than one billion records is another example, which has the potential of ushering in a new era of customer onboarding by making it easier and seamless not only for customers but also for regulated entities to perform customer identification and due diligence. I am told there is a separate session to deliberate on the state of play of technical solutions in customer due diligence area. The discussions could be helpful in further enhancing the capability and utility of CKYCR manifold.

Further, during the process of CDD, reporting entities collect a large amount of data from the customers. Moreover, there are requirements of sharing of information with Financial Intelligence Units, law enforcement agencies and data registries leading to concerns regarding data protection and sharing of information without consent. India has recently enacted a law for Digital Personal Data Protection. Exchange of experiences from different jurisdictions will help us in better implementing the law in our country.

Another important area which needs discussion is the travel rule. In today’s world, fast payment systems are revolutionizing financial access and deepening financial inclusion. Developing countries like India have made huge progress in making digital payments accessible, affordable, and convenient. While card networks have helped developed economies in improving payment systems, fast payment systems have assisted Emerging Market and Developing Economies (EMDEs) leapfrog in this area. We have also enabled cross border payments using fast payment systems with a few countries. We will continue to work towards fulfilling our commitment to the effective implementation of the next phase of G20 roadmap towards inclusive cross-border payments by 2027. In this context, the ongoing discussions on FATF Recommendation 16 (R.16), known as the travel rule, assume importance. To meet the G20 objective of making cross-border payments faster, cheaper, more transparent and more inclusive, while maintaining their safety and security, it would be desirable to make the travel rule technology-neutral.

Lastly, discussions regarding combating proliferation financing and sanctions evasion need to answer questions related to identification of products and services which are most vulnerable to exploitation and the mitigation of the risks related to such products. This forum can discuss the best practices as well as challenges in this regard.

Conclusion

To conclude, I would like to stress that through our collaborative efforts, we can safeguard the trust that underpins the global financial framework. Together, let us continue to collaborate and innovate in building a financial ecosystem that is not only safe and secure but also fast, convenient, accessible and affordable. Let us build financial systems that not only thwart the attempts of money laundering, terror financing and proliferation financing, but also support financial inclusion, encourage innovation, and facilitate economic growth. In the end, I wish the forum very fruitful and productive deliberations.

Thank you.

MIL OSI Global Banks –

March 27, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: MEDIA ADVISORY: HFAC Full Committee Hearing on Countering the Iranian Regime’s Malign Activities

Source: US House Committee on Foreign Affairs

Media Contact 202-321-9747

WASHINGTON, D.C. – The House Foreign Affairs Committee will hold a public hearing titled, “A Return to Maximum Pressure: Comprehensively Countering the Iranian Regime’s Malign Activities” on Tuesday, April 1, 2025.

Date: Tuesday, April 1, 2025

Time: 2:00 p.m. ET

Location: Rayburn 2172

Subject: A Return to Maximum Pressure: Comprehensively Countering the Iranian Regime’s Malign Activities

Witnesses:

Norman T. Roule

Non-resident Senior Advisor

Warfare, Irregular Threats, and Terrorism Program

The Center for Strategic and International Studies

Claire Jungman

Chief of Staff

United Against Nuclear Iran

***Check here for updates. The hearing will be webcast live here and open to the public and press. Members of the media who would like to attend in-person should RSVP with Joe Clark at joseph.clark@mail.house.gov by 5 p.m. Monday, March 31, 2025. ***

MIL OSI USA News –

March 26, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Justice Department Announces Anticipated Distribution of at Least $2B to Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism in 2026

Source: US State of California

Today, Special Master Mary Patrice Brown announced that she will authorize sixth-round payments for all eligible claims in the United States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund (the Fund) by Jan. 1, 2026. The Fund, which continues to collect deposits, anticipates that the sixth distribution will be at least $2 billion. The amounts available for this distribution come from qualifying federal enforcement actions and the termination of the Beirut barracks / Khobar Tower reserve fund.

“It is a privilege for the Criminal Division to administer the United States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund, which has provided more than $7 billion to victims of state sponsored terrorism since its founding,” said Matthew R. Galeotti, Head of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division. “Today’s announcement of a distribution of at least $2 billion to victims in 2026 is the largest general distribution in the Fund’s history and will make a significant difference in victims’ lives. Victims are at the heart of everything we do at the Criminal Division, and we are proud to support them through our administration of the Fund.”

The Fund was established by Congress and is administered by the Criminal Division’s Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section (MLARS), under the leadership of the Fund’s Special Master. To date, the Fund has paid more than $7 billion to thousands of victims of state sponsored terrorism and their families in five rounds of distributions and two rounds of lump-sum catch-up payments. The anticipated distribution announced today is in addition to these prior distributions. Apart from an initial appropriation of approximately $1 billion from Congress and additional congressional appropriations for lump-sum catch-up payments, funds available for distribution come from certain Justice Department prosecutions and cases and other United States government enforcement actions.

The Fund continues to accept applications from potential new claimants. As the Special Master announced, the deadline for new claimants to submit applications to be considered for sixth-round payments is June 1. Claimants who were eligible for payments in prior rounds remain eligible for the sixth distribution and should not complete new applications.

More information about the Fund’s compensation to victims of state sponsored terrorism is available on the Fund’s website at www.usvsst.com, including application materials, frequently asked questions, and publications.

MIL OSI USA News –

March 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Justice Department Announces Anticipated Distribution of at Least $2B to Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism in 2026

Source: United States Attorneys General 11

Today, Special Master Mary Patrice Brown announced that she will authorize sixth-round payments for all eligible claims in the United States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund (the Fund) by Jan. 1, 2026. The Fund, which continues to collect deposits, anticipates that the sixth distribution will be at least $2 billion. The amounts available for this distribution come from qualifying federal enforcement actions and the termination of the Beirut barracks / Khobar Tower reserve fund.

“It is a privilege for the Criminal Division to administer the United States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund, which has provided more than $7 billion to victims of state sponsored terrorism since its founding,” said Matthew R. Galeotti, Head of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division. “Today’s announcement of a distribution of at least $2 billion to victims in 2026 is the largest general distribution in the Fund’s history and will make a significant difference in victims’ lives. Victims are at the heart of everything we do at the Criminal Division, and we are proud to support them through our administration of the Fund.”

The Fund was established by Congress and is administered by the Criminal Division’s Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section (MLARS), under the leadership of the Fund’s Special Master. To date, the Fund has paid more than $7 billion to thousands of victims of state sponsored terrorism and their families in five rounds of distributions and two rounds of lump-sum catch-up payments. The anticipated distribution announced today is in addition to these prior distributions. Apart from an initial appropriation of approximately $1 billion from Congress and additional congressional appropriations for lump-sum catch-up payments, funds available for distribution come from certain Justice Department prosecutions and cases and other United States government enforcement actions.

The Fund continues to accept applications from potential new claimants. As the Special Master announced, the deadline for new claimants to submit applications to be considered for sixth-round payments is June 1. Claimants who were eligible for payments in prior rounds remain eligible for the sixth distribution and should not complete new applications.

More information about the Fund’s compensation to victims of state sponsored terrorism is available on the Fund’s website at www.usvsst.com, including application materials, frequently asked questions, and publications.

MIL Security OSI –

March 26, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Ricketts, Schiff Introduce Bipartisan Bill to Sanction Gaza Terrorist Group Responsible for Attacks Against Americans and Israelis

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator Pete Ricketts (Nebraska)
WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, U.S. Senators Pete Ricketts (R-NE) and Adam Schiff (D-CA) introducedthe Accountability for Terrorist Perpetrators of October 7th Act. The bipartisan, bicameral bill wouldsanction the Popular Resistance Committees (PRC), which is the third-largest terror group in Gaza. The PRC has claimed responsibility for over 100 terror attacks against Americans and Israelis. PRC members joined Hamas in murdering Americans and Israelis on October 7, 2023. U.S. Representatives David Kustoff (R-TN-08) and Brad Sherman (D-CA-32) lead companion legislation in the House.
“The Popular Resistance Committees (PRC) is the third-largest terrorist organization in Gaza and another puppet of Iran,” said Senator Ricketts. “Despite decades of attacks against Americans and Israelis, including on October 7th, the PRC has yet to be properly sanctioned for its barbarism. This bill will help hold accountable every terrorist that participated in the October 7th attacks.”
“For years, the Popular Resistance Committees have carried out terrorist attacks against Israelis, Americans, and Palestinians,” said Senator Schiff. “They were willing and cruel participants with Hamas during the horrific October 7th massacre, killing innocent Israelis and taking and holding hostages after that terrible attack. Any organization engaging in this level of violence should be sanctioned under U.S. law and officially designated as a terrorist group. The United States stands with Israel, and this is an important step to holding those responsible for October 7th accountable.”
“The terrorists responsible for the barbaric October 7th attack on Israel must be held accountable for their abhorrent actions against innocent men, women, and children,” said Representative Kustoff.“For years now, the Popular Resistance Committees, the third largest terror group in the Gaza strip, have terrorized Israelis and Americans in the region. Enough is enough. I am pleased to join Rep. Sherman to introduce this crucial legislation that will sanction the PRC.”
“Every day that we fail to sanction the terrorist Popular Resistance Committees – which have murdered Americans and Israelis for decades, and participated in the barbaric October 7th massacre including by taking hostages – is another day that we fail to secure justice for their victims,” said Representative Sherman. “It is long overdue that the Popular Resistance Committees are designated as a terrorist organization and sanctioned, alongside Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. I’m proud to reintroduce my legislation to finally hold these monsters accountable for the terror they have wreaked on innocents in the region.”
Bill text can be found here.
BACKGROUND:
The two largest terrorist groups in Gaza are Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), which have long been sanctioned. Despite its record of terror, the PRC is not currently a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization. It is past time that the PRC, whose ranks include former operatives from Hamas and PIJ, join them on the U.S.’s list of designated terrorist groups.
The Popular Resistance Committees participated in Hamas’s horrific October 7th massacre, which resulted in the deaths of 1,200 Israelis, Americans, and others, as well as widespread torture and sexual violence as well as the abduction of some 250 hostages. The PRC proudly boasted about their involvement on their social media channels, issuing a statement on October 7th claiming joint responsibility for the massacre. The PRC’s posts stated that the PRC killed and captured IDF soldiers; the posts shared photos of items taken from their victims.
The Popular Resistance Committees have a long history of carrying out terror attacks across Israel and the Palestinian territories. In 2003, the PRC bombed a United States diplomatic convoy which injured a U.S. diplomat and killed 3 American security guards. In 2004, PRC terrorists murdered pregnant Israeli woman Tali Hatuel and her 4 daughters, 11-year-old Hila, 9-year-old Hadar, 7-year-old Roni, and baby Meirav who was only 2 years old. The PRC has also targeted Palestinians in terror attacks, including the 2005 assassination of Palestinian Security Services chief Moussa Arafat.
Despite multiple State Department reports identifying terror attacks committed by the Popular Resistance Committees, the group has never faced U.S. sanctions. This legislation would finally hold the PRC accountable for its long history of heinous terror attacks by applying long-overdue sanctions on the group.
Specifically, the bipartisan bill:
Designates the PRC as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) organization;
Places financial asset-blocking sanctions on the PRC and its members, preventing them from accessing the U.S. financial system;
Places visa-blocking sanctions on the PRC and its members.

MIL OSI USA News –

March 26, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Media Advisory: Secretary Noem Announces Trip to El Salvador, Colombia, and Mexico

Source: US Federal Emergency Management Agency

Headline: Media Advisory: Secretary Noem Announces Trip to El Salvador, Colombia, and Mexico

ASHINGTON, DC – This week, the Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem will travel to El Salvador, Colombia, and Mexico

Below are more details on the Secretary’s trip


Travel Pool:
Print: The Wall Street Journal, Michelle Hackman
Photo: AP, Alex Brandon
TV: Fox News, Krista Garvin, Ali Rad, and Mahreon Johnson

DAILY GUIDANCE AND PRESS SCHEDULE
Wednesday, March 26th: El Salvador
Secretary Noem tours Terrorist Confinement Center CECOT with the Minister of Justice Gustavo Villatoro
Secretary Noem meets with President Nayib Bukele
Thursday, March 27th: Colombia
Secretary Noem meets with Foreign Minister Laura Sarabia, Defense Minister Pedro Sanchez, National Police General Carlos Fernando Triana, and Migration Director Nigeria Renteria
Secretary Noem meets with President Gustavo Petro
Friday March 28th: Mexico
Secretary Noem meets with President Sheinbaum and Foreign Minister Juan Ramon De La Fuente

MIL OSI USA News –

March 26, 2025
MIL-OSI NGOs: Unlawful Expulsions to El Salvador Endanger Lives Amid Ongoing State of Emergency

Source: Amnesty International –

In response to the recent unlawful expulsion of 238 Venezuelan nationals from the United States to El Salvador under the allegation that they belong to the criminal group Tren de Aragua, despite a court order barring their removal, Ana Piquer, Americas director at Amnesty International, said the following:

“The expulsion of 238 individuals from the United States to El Salvador, despite a court order explicitly barring their removal, represents not only a flagrant disregard of the United States’ human rights obligations, but also a dangerous step toward authoritarian practices as the Trump administration ignored and is now calling for the firing of a federal judge of the United States Judiciary. This is also a dangerous endorsement of President Bukele’s punitive security agenda.

The expulsion of 238 individuals from the United States to El Salvador, despite a court order explicitly barring their removal represents not only a flagrant disregard of the United States’ human rights obligations, but also a dangerous step toward authoritarian practices as the Trump administration ignored and is now calling for the firing of a federal judge of the United States Judiciary. This is also a dangerous endorsement of President Bukele’s punitive security agenda

-Ana Piquer, Americas director at Amnesty International

“According to available public information, the people expelled include individuals who were in the midst of ongoing court processes, were arrested while complying with their immigration obligations, were already granted protections in the United States including under the Convention Against Torture, and were labeled as gang members for their tattoos or connection to the Venezuelan state of Aragua with no other evidence. In fact, even U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials have since admitted “many” had no criminal record at all and some were removed because of a perception they may commit crimes in the future. Importantly, these expulsions are not deportations, a legal process defined in U.S. law. They were expelled without removal orders, seemingly to serve an indefinite prison sentence under a system where fundamental human rights are routinely ignored.

El Salvador under President Bukele has become emblematic of an alarming trend in the Americas—where mass incarceration, unchecked executive power, and the criminalization of marginalized communities are being touted as solutions to crime. Amnesty International has extensively documented the inhumane conditions within detentions centers in El Salvador, including the Centro de Confinamiento del Terrorismo (CECOT), where those removed are now being held. Reports indicate extreme overcrowding, lack of access to adequate medical care, and widespread ill-treatment amounting to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. Additionally, Salvadoran organizations have reported more than 300 deaths of individuals while in state custody, some of them showing clear signs of violence. No individual should be subjected to such conditions.

There is a clear and troubling connection between President Bukele’s so-called “security” model in El Salvador and recent actions taken by the United States regarding migrants and people seeking safety. Both rely on a lack of due process and the criminalization of individuals based on discriminatory criteria (…) These policies are deeply unjust and violate international human rights standards

-Ana Piquer, Americas director at Amnesty International

There is a clear and troubling connection between President Bukele’s so-called “security” model in El Salvador and recent actions taken by the United States regarding migrants and people seeking safety. Both rely on a lack of due process and the criminalization of individuals based on discriminatory criteria. In El Salvador, this discrimination targets people living in impoverished communities, those with precarious jobs, limited education, or visible tattoos. Similarly, in the United States, Venezuelans fleeing hardship and seeking safety are branded as criminals based upon tattoos, their connection to the State of Aragua in Venezuela, and racist lies about associations with transnational criminal groups originating in their home country. These policies are deeply unjust and violate international human rights standards.

The principle of non-refoulement, a cornerstone of international human rights law, unequivocally prohibits states from returning, removing, or transferring individuals to any country where they would face a real risk of serious human rights violations, including arbitrary detention, torture, or ill-treatment. By removing individuals to El Salvador under these circumstances, the United States has placed them in grave danger and failed to uphold its obligations its legal obligations. Meanwhile, El Salvador must be held accountable for facilitating policies that violate the rights of migrants and people seeking safety. Any subsequent removal of the individuals from El Salvador to Venezuela would also violate the principle of non-refoulement. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has called on States to ensure that Venezuelans are not deported, expelled or forced to return to Venezuela. Amnesty International has called for an absolute ban on all deportations of individuals to Venezuela given that the country is experiencing a situation of massive human rights violations.

On 27 March 2025, El Salvador will reach its third consecutive year under a state of emergency, a regime that has institutionalized patterns of abuse that are now being echoed beyond its borders, further eroding the international human rights framework (…) Rather than condemning these practices, other governments, such as the United States, appear to be emulating them

-Ana Piquer, Americas director at Amnesty International

What is particularly concerning is that the erosion of due process in El Salvador is now being normalized—both domestically and internationally. Rather than condemning these practices, other governments, such as the United States, appear to be emulating them. This is the dangerous consequence of authoritarian practices becoming systematic and recurring: they evolve from isolated abuses into official state policy. On 27 March 2025, El Salvador will reach its third consecutive year under a state of emergency, a regime that has institutionalized patterns of abuse that are now being echoed beyond its borders, further eroding the international human rights framework.

Amnesty International urges the government of El Salvador, and all countries throughout the Americas, to resist participation in unjust deportation and removal schemes.

Amnesty International urges the government of El Salvador, and all countries throughout the Americas, to resist participation in unjust deportation and removal schemes

-Ana Piquer, Americas director at Amnesty International

Salvadoran authorities must urgently restore due process throughout the country and guarantee the human rights, safety, and dignity of all individuals currently detained, including the more than 84,000 people arrested under the ongoing state of emergency. The Salvadoran government must ensure its policies and practices do not facilitate further human rights abuses or place vulnerable individuals at risk.

We also call on the US government to immediately return those that were illegally removed to El Salvador and halt any subsequent expulsions under this executive order, comply with the decisions of the US Judiciary, and immediately halt all plans for mass detentions and deportations, and reestablish the right to asylum at the United States’ southern border.

Amnesty International stands in solidarity with those impacted by this unjust policy and will continue to advocate for the protection of human rights in the Americas and beyond.”

MIL OSI NGO –

March 26, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Sen. Warner Speaks at Senate Intelligence Committee Hearing

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Commonwealth of Virginia Mark R Warner

BROADCAST-QUALITY VIDEO OF SEN. WARNER’S OPENING REMARKS IS AVAILABLE HERE

WASHINGTON – Today, Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA) delivered opening remarks at the Intelligence Committee’s annual Worldwide Threats Assessment hearing.

Sen. Warner’s opening remarks as delivered are below:

Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning, everybody, and I want to thank all the witnesses for being here.

I got to say, I’ve been on the committee now for 14 years, and this year’s assessment is clearly one of the most complicated and challenging in my tenure on the committee.

And I want to get into that in a moment, but I want to, first of all, address the recent story that broke in the news.

Yesterday, we stunningly learned that senior members of this administration and according to reports, two of our witnesses here today, were members of a group chat that discussed highly sensitive and likely classified information that supposedly even included ‘weapons packages, targets and timing,’ and included the name of an active CIA agent.

Putting aside for a moment that classified information should never be discussed over an unclassified system, it’s also just mind boggling to me that all these senior folks were on this line and nobody bothered to even check, security hygiene 101…

Who are all the names? Who are they?

Well, it apparently includes a journalist.

And no matter how much the Secretary of Defense or others want to disparage him, this journalist had at least the ethics to not report everything he heard.

The question I raise is: everybody on this committee gets briefed on security protocols. They’re told you don’t make calls outside of SCIFs of this kind of classified nature.

Director Gabbard is the executive in charge of all keeping our secrets safe. Were these government devices? Or were they personal devices? Have the devices been collected to make sure there’s no malware?

There’s plenty of declassified information that shows that our adversaries, China and Russia, are trying to break in to encrypted systems like Signal.

I can just say this. If this was the case of a military officer, or an intelligence officer, and they had this kind of behavior, they would be fired. I think this is one more example of the kind of sloppy, careless, incompetent behavior, particularly towards classified information, that this is not a one off or a first time error.

Let me take a couple of minutes and review some of the other reckless choices that this administration has made regarding our national security. We all recall it seems like it wasn’t that long ago, but less than two months ago, in the first two weeks, the administration canceled all U.S. foreign assistance.

Now, some may say, how can that how bad can that be, its foreign assistance?

Well, U.S. foreign assistance paid for the units in Ukraine to provide air defense to civilian cities being attacked by Russia.

Foreign assistance paid for guarding camps in Syria, where ISIS fighters are to be detained.

Foreign assistance paid for programs abroad that ensure that diseases like Ebola don’t come home.

And until recently, it paid for the construction of a railway in Africa that would have help given the United States much needed access to critical minerals in Congo.

Now that project… China is going to try to finance it as well.

In the first two weeks, the administration fired several of our most experienced FBI agents, including the head of the criminal Investigative submission, the head of the intelligence division, the head of the Counterterrorism division, the heads of the New York, Washington and Miami field office, all individuals who were distinctly and directly responsible for helping to keep America safe.

The irony a little bit, was the recently dismissed head of the counterterrorism division was involved in disrupting the ISIS attacks planned for Oklahoma City and Philadelphia and helped lead the effort to bring to justice the key planner of the Abbey Gate bombing in Afghanistan, who killed 13 U.S. servicemen and 150 civilians.

That very Abbey Gate effort was actually praised by the president in his state of the Union address.

The administration’s response to these agents’ good works and years of service was to force these folks out.

It’s hard to imagine how that makes our country safer.

Nor can I understand how Americans are made more secure by firing more than 300 staff at the National Nuclear Security Administration, including those responsible for overseeing the security and safety of the nuclear stockpile, or by ousting 130 employees at CSA.

The agency directly responsible for trying to take on China’s salt typhoon attack again. After Salt Typhoon, I would have thought folks on that group chat might have thought twice.

Or how are we made safer by sacking a thousand employees at the CDC and NIH. We’re actually directly working on trying to keep our country safe from disease by pushing out hundreds of intelligence officers.

The amazing thing is our intelligence officers, they’re not interchangeable like a Twitter coder. Our country makes $20,000 to $40,000 of an investment just in getting a security clearance.

It literally goes into six figures when you take the training involved. Can anyone tell how firing probationary individuals without any consideration for merit or expertise is an efficient use of taxpayer dollars?

And just to make clear that yesterday’s story in the Atlantic was not this rookie one-off, it’s a pattern.

I want to acknowledge Director Ratcliffe was not here in his position with this took place.

But again, earlier in the administration, when a new unclassified network was used, thereby exposing literally hundreds of CIA officers’ identities.

Those folks can’t go into the field now.

How does that make our government more efficient?

You know, again, this pattern of an amazing, cavalier attitude towards classified information is reckless and sloppy.

And perhaps what troubles me most is the way the administration has decided that we can take on all of our problems by ourselves without any need for friends or allies.

I agree that we’ve got to put America’s priorities first, but American first cannot mean America alone.

The intelligence we gather to keep Americans safe depends on a lot of allies around the world who have access to sources that we don’t have.

That’s sharing of information saves lives. And it’s not hypothetical.

We all remember (because it was declassified) last year when Austria worked with our community to make sure to expose a plot against Taylor Swift in Vienna that could have killed literally hundreds of individuals.

However, these relationships are not built in stone. They’re not dictated by law. Things like the Five Eyes are based on trust built on decades, but so often that trust is now breaking literally overnight.

Yet suddenly, for no reason that I can understand, the United States is starting to act like our adversaries are our friends. Voting in the UN with Russia, Belarus and North Korea. It’s a rogues gallery if ever heard one.

Treating our allies like adversaries, whether it’s threats to take over Greenland or over the Panama Canal, a destructive trade war with Canada, or literally threatening to kick Canada out of the Five Eyes, I feel our credibility is being enormously undermined with our allies, who I believe, and I think most of us on this committee, regardless of party believes, makes our country safer and stronger.

But how can our allies ever trust us as the kind of partner we used to be when we, without consultation or notice, for example, stop sharing information to Ukraine in its war for survival against Russia. Or how can our allies not only not trust our government, but potentially not our businesses with such arbitrary political decision?

Let me give you a few examples. You know, as a result of a lot of work from this committee and others in Congress, we made sure America’s commercial space industry is second to none from space to launch to commercial sensing and communications.

The United States has taken a lead. Yet overnight, this administration called into question the reliability of American commercial tech industry.

When maps are and other commercial space companies were directed to stop sharing intelligence with Ukraine.

I’m going to tell you… I’m a business guy. Can’t say longer than being an elected official, but pretty close. That shockwave across all of commercial space and frankly, not just commercial space. I’ve heard it from some of our hyperscalers, in the tech community, has sent an enormous chill.

Who’s going to hire an American commercial space company, government or foreign business with the ability to have that taken down so arbitrarily?

It’s not just in the case of commercial space.

We’ve seen that Canada, Germany, Portugal have all been saying they’re rethinking buying F-35s.

I’ve heard from Microsoft and Google directly, and Amazon that they’re having questions about whether they can still sell their services.

We’ve also seen foreign adversaries and friends take advantage of this RIF in our national security areas, and our scientists.

Germany has already put out ads trying to attract some of our best scientists who’ve been RIFed and the Chinese intelligence agencies are posting on social media sites in the hopes of luring individuals with that national security clearance who’ve been pushed out, perhaps arbitrarily, to come into their service.

So, no, the signal fiasco is not a one off. It is, unfortunately, a pattern we’re seeing too often repeated.

I fear that we feel the erosion of trust from our workplace, from our companies, and from our allies and partners can’t be put back in the bottle overnight. Make no mistake, these actions make America less safe.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MIL OSI USA News –

March 26, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Imposes Tariffs on Countries Importing Venezuelan Oil

US Senate News:

Source: The White House
PROTECTING UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY: Yesterday, President Donald J. Trump signed an Executive Order imposing tariffs on countries that import Venezuelan oil.
President Trump is levying a 25% tariff on all goods from any country that imports Venezuelan oil, whether directly from Venezuela or indirectly through third parties.
The tariffs will lapse one year after a country ceases importing Venezuelan oil—or sooner if officials deem it appropriate.
If tariffs are imposed on China, they will also apply to Hong Kong and Macau to prevent transshipment and evasion.
These tariffs aim to sever the financial lifelines of Nicolás Maduro’s corrupt regime and curb its destabilizing influence across the Western Hemisphere.
This action targets transnational criminal threats, such as the Tren de Aragua gang, and addresses the humanitarian crises fueled by Venezuela’s actions.
ADDRESSING AN EMERGENCY SITUATION: The Maduro regime poses an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.
The Maduro regime systemically undermines democratic institutions by suppressing free and fair elections and consolidating power illegitimately.
Venezuela’s endemic corruption and mismanagement under Maduro have crushed its people and triggered a regional humanitarian and public health crisis.
Millions of Venezuelans have fled Maduro’s oppressive rule, imposing significant burdens on neighboring countries and destabilizing the Western Hemisphere.
The Maduro regime has aided and facilitated the infiltration of the Tren de Aragua gang—a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization—into the United States by failing to secure its borders, allowing the gang to flourish within Venezuela, and refusing to take action against its members.
These dangerous criminals exploited the previous administration’s open-border policies, establishing a foothold in U.S. communities and preying on American citizens through violent acts, including kidnapping, assault, and murder.

USING OUR LEVERAGE TO SAFEGUARD OUR INTERESTS: President Trump is using America’s economic might to safeguard our interests and punish those who support Maduro’s regime.
Tariffs are a powerful, proven source of leverage for protecting the national interest.
President Trump is sending a clear message that access to our economy is a privilege, not a right, and countries importing Venezuelan oil will face consequences.
As President Trump said in the Presidential Memorandum on American First Trade Policy, trade policy is a critical component in national security.
President Trump has successfully used tariffs in the past to advance America’s interests and address urgent national security threats and is doing so again today.

MIL OSI USA News –

March 26, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Trump Administration’s Actions Made Houthi Terrorists Pay

US Senate News:

Source: The White House
Democrats and their media allies have seemingly forgotten that President Donald J. Trump and his National Security team successfully killed terrorists who have targeted U.S. troops and disrupted one of the most consequential shipping routes in the world. This is a coordinated effort to distract from the successful actions taken by President Trump and his administration to make America’s enemies pay and keep Americans safe.
The Biden Administration sat back as a band of pirates — with precision-guided, Iran-provided weaponry — exacted a toll system in one of the most important shipping lanes in the world.
In fact, since 2023, Houthi terrorists attacked U.S. Navy warships 174 times and attacked commercial shipping vessels 145 times — and as a result, 75% of U.S.-flagged shipping has been forced to navigate the southern coast of Africa rather than through the Suez Canal.Biden’s weakness invited these unacceptable attacks — while President Trump put these terrorists on notice:
BIDEN: Removed the Houthis from the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations.
TRUMP: Immediately re-designated the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.
BIDEN: Allowed the Houthis to attack U.S. Navy ships and shut down commercial traffic through the Red Sea — responding in feckless, pinprick “attacks.”
TRUMP: Launched successful, large-scale strikes against the Houthis, eliminating senior terrorists within the organization and putting the world on notice.
The Trump Administration’s actions to hold the Houthis accountable has been a massive success — and nothing can distract from that unrelenting action to keep Americans safe.

MIL OSI USA News –

March 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Police update on investigation into fire at Hayes electricity sub-station

Source: United Kingdom London Metropolitan Police

The Met’s Counter Terrorism Command has been working with partners to establish the cause of the fire at the electricity sub-station in Hayes last week (21 March).

Following enquiries to date, officers have found no evidence to suggest that the incident was suspicious in nature. As such, we are no longer treating this as a potentially criminal matter, although we continue to support other partners, including colleagues from National Grid, London Fire Brigade and SSEN, with whom we remain in close contact.

Should any relevant new information or evidence come to light it will be looked at and considered as appropriate.

MIL Security OSI –

March 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Human rights violations in Guatemala – E-001050/2025
Source: European Parliament
Question for written answer E-001050/2025
to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
Rule 144
Pernando Barrena Arza (The Left), Rima Hassan (The Left), Anthony Smith (The Left), Leila Chaibi (The Left), Catarina Vieira (Verts/ALE), Hanna Gedin (The Left), Jonas Sjöstedt (The Left), Robert Biedroń (S&D), Merja Kyllönen (The Left), Jaume Asens Llodrà (Verts/ALE), Damien Carême (The Left), Elena Kountoura (The Left), Catarina Martins (The Left), Mimmo Lucano (The Left), Kathleen Funchion (The Left), Francisco Assis (S&D), Isabel Serra Sánchez (The Left)

In Guatemala, the judiciary is persecuting, criminalising and arbitrarily detaining human rights activists or forcing them into exile in retaliation for their legitimate work. They are doing this in collusion with the Foundation against Terrorism, an exponent of the anti-human rights movement in Guatemala. The activists being persecuted include: Virginia Laparra, former anti-corruption prosecutor, arbitrarily detained for two years and now in exile; Estuardo Campo and Eduardo Masaya, both arbitrarily detained at present; Claudia Gonzalez, lawyer; and Ramón Cadena, lawyer and university lecturer.

In view of the above:

1.In what way will the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy continue to apply pressure to prevent the unjust use of Guatemala’s judicial system to persecute activists?

2.Is the EU Delegation available to observe the activists’ hearings, and will it visit the two imprisoned activists?

3.What is the EU doing to demonstrate that the erosion of the rule of law will have consequences for EU-Guatemala relations, and how will it apply the human rights clauses of the Association Agreement with the region?

Submitted: 11.3.2025
Last updated: 25 March 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
March 26, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Peters and Slotkin Lead Bipartisan, Bicameral Resolution Commemorating 108th Anniversary of Selfridge Air National Guard Base

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Michigan Gary Peters

WASHINGTON, DC – U.S. Senators Gary Peters (MI) and Elissa Slotkin (MI) introduced a bipartisan resolution honoring the 108^th anniversary of Selfridge Air National Guard Base and commending the thousands of men and women who have worked and trained at Selfridge since its inception. The resolution recognizes the base’s significant contributions to U.S. national security, such as leading security operations to protect the Northern Border after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The resolution also reinforces the commitment of our Armed Forces to ensure Selfridge remains a key component to U.S. national defense. U.S. Representative John James (MI-10) introduced a companion resolution in the House.

“Since World War I, Selfridge Air National Guard Base has been a critical asset to our Armed Forces,” said Senator Peters, a member of the Armed Services Committee and former Lieutenant Commander in the U.S. Navy Reserve. “This resolution recognizes the remarkable contributions of generations of men and women who have served at Selfridge and helped strengthen our nation’s security. Selfridge plays a key role in keeping Michigan strong, and I’ll continue fighting to support the base for years to come.”

“On July 8, 1917, the first flight took off from what was then known as the Selfridge Field, marking the beginning of the Selfridge Air National Guard Base,” said Senator Slotkin. “Now, 108 years later, the base continues to play a vital role in defending our country. It remains one of the oldest continuously operating military airfields in the nation – and I’m proud to have it right here in Michigan. This resolution honors the fighter mission and the countless men and women who have put their lives on the line to keep us safe and strengthen our national security. Here’s to another 108 years of Michigan’s very own, Selfridge Air National Guard Base, leading the way!”

Selfridge Air National Guard Base was first commissioned by the U.S. Army on July 1, 1917 in Harrison Township and named after Army 1^st Lieutenant Thomas E. Selfridge. Today, the base hosts more than 30 tenant units representing every branch of the Armed Forces. This resolution highlights the numerous historical achievements by Selfridge servicemembers over the last 108 years. Of note, it honors the 332^ndfighter group of the famed Tuskegee Airmen that moved to Selfridge on March 29, 1943, where Colonel Benjamin O. Davis became the first African American commander on October 8, 1943. In 2015, the 127^th Attack Wing based at Selfridge deployed approximately 500 airmen in support of Operation Inherent Resolve, the mission to eliminate ISIS.

Additionally, last year, the Air Force selected Selfridge to receive twelve KC-46A Pegasus tanker aircraft. This announcement came shortly after Peters led a bipartisan, bicameral group of Michigan delegation members in urging U.S. Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall to select Selfridge for a new squadron of these next-generation tankers, which will be deployed by the U.S. Air Force for the next 50 years. The resolution codifies this decision and reiterates that Selfridge was selected for these aircraft by the Air Force as a result of its strategic location for northern border security and homeland defense.

To view the text of the resolution, click here.

MIL OSI USA News –

March 25, 2025
MIL-Evening Report: PNG ‘test ban’ blocks Facebook – governor Bird warns of tyranny risk

By Scott Waide, RNZ Pacific PNG correspondent

The Papua New Guinea government has admitted to using a technology that it says was “successfully tested” to block social media platforms, particularly Facebook, for much of the day yesterday.

Police Minister Peter Tsiamalili Jr said the “test” was done under the framework of the Anti-Terrorism Act 2024, and sought to address the growing concerns over hate speech, misinformation, and other harmful content online.

Tsiamalili did not specify what kind of tech was used, but said it was carried out in collaboration with the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC), the National Information and Communications Technology Authority (NICTA), and various internet service providers.

“We are not attempting to suppress free speech or restrict our citizens from expressing their viewpoints,” Tsiamalili said.

“However, the unchecked proliferation of fake news, hate speech, pornography, child exploitation, and incitement to violence on platforms such as Facebook is unacceptable.

“These challenges increasingly threaten the safety, dignity, and well-being of our populace.”

However, government agencies responsible for communications and ICT, including NICTA, said they were not aware.

‘Confidence relies on transparency’
“Public confidence in our digital governance relies on transparency and consistency in how we approach online regulation,” NICTA chief executive Kilakupa Gulo-Vui said.

“It is essential that all key stakeholders, including NICTA, law enforcement, telecommunications providers, and government agencies, collaborate closely to ensure that any actions taken are well-understood and properly executed.”

He said that while maintaining national security was a priority, the balance between safety and digital freedom must be carefully managed.

Gulo-Vui said NICTA would be addressing this matter with the Minister for ICT to ensure NICTA’s role continued to align with the government’s broader policy objectives, while fostering a cohesive and united approach to digital regulation.

The Department of Information Communication and Technology (DICT) Secretary, Steven Matainaho, also stated his department was not aware of the test but added that the police have powers under the new domestic terrorism laws.

Papua New Guinea’s recently introduced anti-terror laws are aimed at curbing both internal and external security threats.

Critics warn of dictatorial control
However, critics of the move say the test borders on dictatorial control.

An observer of Monday’s events, Lucas Kiap, said the goal of combating hate speech and exploitation was commendable, but the approach risks paving way for authoritarian overreach.

“Where is PNG headed? If the government continues down this path, it risks trading democracy for control,” he said.

Many social media users, however, appeared to outdo the government, with many downloading and sharing Virtual Area Network (VPN) apps and continuing to post on Facebook.

“Hello from Poland,” one user said.

East Sepik Governor Allan Bird said today that the country’s anti-terrorism law could target anyone because “the definition of a terrorist is left to the Police Minister to decide”.

‘Designed to take away our freedoms’
“During the debate on the anti-terrorism bill in Parliament, I pointed out that the law was too broad and it could be used against innocent people,” he wrote on Facebook.

He said government MPs laughed at him and used their numbers to pass the bill.

“Yesterday, the Police Minister used the Anti-terrorism Act to shut down Facebook. That was just a test, that was step one,” Governor Bird said.

“There is no limit to the powers the Minister of Police can exercise under this new law. It is draconian law designed to take away our freedoms.

“We are now heading into dangerous territory and everyone is powerless to stop this tyranny,” he added.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

March 25, 2025
MIL-OSI USA News: IMPOSING TARIFFS ON COUNTRIES IMPORTING VENEZUELAN OIL

Source: The White House

class=”has-text-align-left”>By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, and in view of the national emergency declared with respect to Venezuela in Executive Order 13692 of March 8, 2015 (Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Venezuela), as continued most recently in the notice of February 27, 2025 (Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to Venezuela), I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of America, find that the actions and policies of the regime of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States. The activities of the Tren de Aragua gang, a transnational criminal organization originating in Venezuela and designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist organization, have intensified this threat, as highlighted in Proclamation 10903 of March 14, 2025 (Invocation of the Alien Enemies Act Regarding the Invasion of the United States by Tren De Aragua). Furthermore, Venezuela’s ongoing destabilizing actions, including its support for illicit activities, necessitate further economic measures to protect United States interests.

In light of these circumstances, and to address the continued national emergency with respect to Venezuela that forms the basis for Executive Order 13692 and subsequent orders, I hereby order:

Section 1. Findings. (a) The Tren de Aragua gang, a transnational criminal organization with origins in Venezuela, has been designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the United States due to its extensive involvement in terrorist activities such as kidnapping and violent attacks, including the assassination of a Venezuelan opposition figure, that destabilize communities across the Western Hemisphere. The prior administration’s open-borders policies facilitated the infiltration of the United States by members of Tren de Aragua, allowing these dangerous criminals to establish a foothold within United States cities and prey upon American citizens. The Maduro regime aided and facilitated the influx of Tren de Aragua members into the United States during the prior administration by failing to control its borders, permitting the gang’s operations to flourish within Venezuela, and refusing to take action against its members, thereby exacerbating the illegal immigration crisis.

(b) Existing sanctions on Venezuela, including those imposed in Executive Order 13692, Executive Order 13808 of August 24, 2017 (Imposing Additional Sanctions with Respect to the Situation in Venezuela), Executive Order 13850 of November 1, 2018 (Blocking Property of Additional Persons Contributing to the Situation in Venezuela), and Executive Order 13884 of August 5, 2019 (Blocking Property of the Government of Venezuela), remain in effect. The actions and policies of the Maduro regime that were the basis for those orders continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States. These actions include:

(i)    The systematic undermining of democratic institutions through the suppression of free and fair elections and the illegitimate consolidation of power by the regime of Nicolás Maduro;

(ii)   Endemic economic mismanagement and public corruption at the expense of the Venezuelan people and their prosperity;

(iii) The regime’s responsibility for the deepening humanitarian and public health crisis in Venezuela; and

(iv)   The destabilization of the Western Hemisphere through the forced migration of millions of Venezuelans, imposing significant burdens on neighboring countries.

Sec. 2. Imposition of Tariffs. (a) On or after April 2, 2025, a tariff of 25 percent may be imposed on all goods imported into the United States from any country that imports Venezuelan oil, whether directly from Venezuela or indirectly through third parties. Duties imposed by this order will be supplemental to duties on imports already imposed pursuant to IEEPA, section 232 of the Trade Expansion of 1962, section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, or any other authority.

(b) The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the United States Trade Representative, is hereby authorized to determine in his discretion whether the tariff of 25 percent will be imposed on goods from any country that imports Venezuelan oil, directly or indirectly, on or after April 2, 2025.

(c) Once imposed on a country at the Secretary of State’s discretion, the tariff of 25 percent shall expire 1 year after the last date on which the country imported Venezuelan oil, or at an earlier date if the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the United States Trade Representative, so determines at his discretion.

Sec. 3. Administration and Enforcement. (a) The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the United States Trade Representative, is hereby authorized to impose the tariffs established by this order.

(b) The Secretary of Commerce, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, is hereby authorized to:

(i)    Determine whether a country has imported Venezuelan oil, directly or indirectly;

(ii)   Issue regulations, guidance, and determinations as necessary to implement this order;

(iii) Coordinate with the heads of other executive departments and agencies to ensure compliance; and

(iv)   Take any additional actions consistent with applicable law to carry out the purposes of this order.

(c) Any prior Presidential Proclamation, Executive Order, or other Presidential directive or guidance that is inconsistent with the direction in this order is hereby terminated, suspended, or modified to the extent necessary to give full effect to this order.

(d) Any other Presidential Proclamation, Executive Order, or other Presidential directive or guidance that applies to Venezuela or a country subject to a tariff under section 2 of this order remains in full effect, except to the extent specified in subsection (c) of this section.

(e) If the Secretary of State, at his discretion, decides to impose a tariff under section 2 of this order on China, that tariff shall also apply to both the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the Macau Special Administrative Region, as a measure to reduce the risk of transshipment and evasion.

Sec. 4. Reporting and Review. The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce shall submit periodic reports to the President, within 180 days of the date of this order and no less than every 180 days thereafter, assessing the effectiveness of the tariffs described in this order and the ongoing conduct of the Maduro regime.

Sec. 5. Definitions. For the purposes of this order:

(a) The term “Venezuelan oil” means crude oil or petroleum products extracted, refined, or exported from Venezuela, regardless of the nationality of the entity involved in the production or sale of such crude oil or petroleum products.

(b) The term “indirectly” includes purchases of Venezuelan oil through intermediaries or third countries where the origin of the oil can reasonably be traced to Venezuela, as determined by the Secretary of Commerce.

Sec. 6. Effective Date. This order is effective at 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on April 2, 2025.

Sec. 7. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

(i) The authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or

(ii) The functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.

(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

                              DONALD J. TRUMP

THE WHITE HOUSE,

    March 24, 2025.

MIL OSI USA News –

March 25, 2025

MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on providing macro-financial assistance to the Arab Republic of Egypt – A10-0037/2025

Source: European Parliament

DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on providing macro-financial assistance to the Arab Republic of Egypt

(COM(2024)0461 – C10‑0009/2024 – 2024/0071(COD))

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2024)0461),

– having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 212 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C10‑0009/2024),

– having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to the budgetary assessment by the Committee on Budgets,

– having regard to Rule 60 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on International Trade (A10-0037/2025),

1. Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;

2. Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal;

3. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

Amendment 1

Proposal for a decision

Recital 1 a (new)


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
	(1a) This Decision has implications for the Union budget. Accordingly, the European Parliament’s Committee on Budgets adopted a budgetary assessment, which forms an integral part of Parliament’s mandate for negotiations.

Amendment 2

Proposal for a decision

Recital 2 a (new)


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
	(2a) On 17 March 2024, Egypt and the European Union jointly decided to upgrade their relations to a strategic and comprehensive partnership, based on the values of equity and mutual respect and trust in order to strengthen their common stability, peace and prosperity.

Amendment 3

Proposal for a decision

Recital 3


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
(3) In line with the Partnership Priorities, the EU and Egypt are committed to ensuring accountability, the rule of law, the full respect of human rights, fundamental freedoms, promoting democracy, gender equality and equal opportunities as constitutional rights of all their citizens. These commitments contribute to the advancement of the partnership and to Egypt’s sustainable development and stability. The increased and constructive engagement between the EU and Egypt in the last period has opened the path to more meaningful dialogue on human rights related issues. The subcommittee on Political Matters, Human Rights and Democracy, International and Regional issues of December 2022 and the Association Committee of May 2023 provided the institutional platforms to exchange on an array of human rights issues, which the EU would like to continue and build on. The improvement of the human rights situation in Egypt will have a positive impact on EU-Egypt relations.	(3) In line with the Partnership Priorities, the EU and Egypt are committed to ensuring accountability, the rule of law, the full respect of human rights, fundamental freedoms, promoting democracy, gender equality and equal opportunities as constitutional rights of all their citizens. These commitments contribute to the advancement of the partnership and to Egypt’s sustainable development, good governance and socio-economic stability. The increased and constructive engagement between the EU and Egypt in the last period has opened the path to more meaningful dialogue on human rights related issues. The subcommittee on Political Matters, Human Rights and Democracy, International and Regional issues of December 2022 and the Association Committee of May 2023 provided the institutional platforms to exchange on an array of human rights issues, which the EU would like to continue and build on. The steady improvement of the human rights situation and women’s rights and fundamental freedoms due to an active, coherent and proactive policy in that area in Egypt will have a positive impact on EU-Egypt relations.

Amendment 4

Proposal for a decision

Recital 3 a (new)


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
	(3a) Egypt’s economic and financial situation has been marked by several macroeconomic adjustment programmes implemented under the aegis of the IMF in exchange for credit facilities (USD 12 billion from 2016 to 2019 and USD 3 billion in 2022, rising to USD 8 billion in March 2024);

Amendment 5

Proposal for a decision

Recital 5


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
(5) The EU recognises Egypt’s key role for regional security and stability. Terrorism, organised crime and conflicts are common threats against our security and the social fabric of nations across both sides of the Mediterranean. Therefore, the EU and Egypt have a common interest in strengthening cooperation highlighted in the Partnership Priorities, in full compliance with international law, including human rights and international humanitarian law.	(5) The EU recognises Egypt’s key role for regional security and stability. Terrorism, organised crime, such as human trafficking, irregular migration, and conflicts, are common threats against our security and the social fabric of nations across both sides of the Mediterranean. Similarly, energy is also one of the most pressing challenges facing countries on both sides of the Mediterranean. The Energy Cooperation between the Union and Egypt in the Eastern Mediterranean could not only offer a source of economic prosperity for the region but also strengthen energy security for the Union by diversifying energy supplies and encouraging regional collaboration. In that respect, the East Mediterranean Gas Forum serves as a platform of positive regional cooperation. Therefore, the EU and Egypt have a common interest in strengthening cooperation highlighted in the Partnership Priorities, in full compliance with international law, including the International Law of the Sea, human rights and international humanitarian law.

Amendment 6

Proposal for a decision

Recital 6


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
(6) Recalling the geo-political challenges, such as the consequences of Hamas terrorist attacks across Israel on 7 October 2023 as well as the conflict in Sudan, and the strategic importance of Egypt as the largest country in the region and a pillar of stability for the whole Middle East, the Union is embarking on concluding a Strategic and Comprehensive partnership with Egypt as outlined in the Joint Declaration.	(6) Recalling the global and regional geo-political challenges, such as the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, resulting from the aftermath of the Hamas terrorist attacks across Israel on 7 October 2023, the escalating tensions in the Horn of Africa and the safety of navigation in the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, as well as migratory pressure from the conflict in Sudan, uncertainties in Syria, the instability in Libya, Egypt’s responsibilities as a host to large numbers of refugees and migrants and the strategic importance of Egypt as the largest country in the region and a pillar of stability for the whole Middle East, the Union has embarked on a Strategic and Comprehensive partnership with Egypt as outlined in the Joint Declaration.

Amendment 7

Proposal for a decision

Recital 7


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
(7) The objective of the Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership with Egypt is to elevate the EU-Egypt political relations to a strategic partnership and enable Egypt to fulfil its key role of providing stability in the region. The partnership aims to contribute to support Egypt’s macroeconomic resilience and enable the implementation of ambitious socio-economic reforms in a manner that complements and reinforces the reform process foreseen under the IMF programme for Egypt. As outlined in the Joint Declaration, the partnership will address a wide set of policy measures clustered across six pillars of intervention, namely: political relations; economic stability; investment and trade; migration; security and law enforcement cooperation; demography and human capital.	(7) The objective of the Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership with Egypt is to elevate the EU-Egypt political relations to a strategic partnership and enable Egypt to fulfil its key role of providing stability in the region, the Middle East and North Africa. The partnership aims to contribute to support Egypt’s macroeconomic resilience and enable the implementation of ambitious socio-economic reforms in a manner that complements and reinforces the reform process foreseen under the IMF programme for Egypt. As outlined in the Joint Declaration, the partnership will address a wide set of policy measures clustered across six pillars of intervention, namely: political relations; economic stability; investment and trade; irregular migration and mobility in respect of human rights; security and law enforcement cooperation; demography and human capital. Such Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership should be developed in line with initiatives at Union and Member State level such as the Global Gateway and the Mattei Plan for Africa.

Amendment 8

Proposal for a decision

Recital 8


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
(8) Underpinning the partnership will be a financial package of EUR 7.4 billion consisting of short- and longer-term support for the necessary macro-fiscal and socio-economic reform agenda, as well as increased amounts available to support investments in Egypt and targeted support for the implementation of the different strategic priorities. Part of the support package is the EU MFA package of up to EUR 5 billion in loans, composed of two MFA operations, one short-term for up to EUR 1 billion and a regular, more medium-term one for up to EUR 4 billion, financial instruments, such as guarantees and blending instruments, aimed at mobilising public and private investments with the objective of generating substantial new investments. This will be complemented by programmes to support specific priorities under the Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership through individual projects and technical assistance implemented under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument2 .	(8) Underpinning the partnership is a financial package of EUR 7.4 billion consisting of short- and longer-term support for the necessary macro-fiscal and socio-economic reform agenda, as well as increased amounts available to support investments in Egypt and targeted support for the implementation of the different strategic priorities, particularly in terms of irregular migration and renewable energy. Part of the support package is the EU MFA package of up to EUR 5 billion in concessional loans, composed of two MFA operations, one short-term for up to EUR 1 billion and a regular, more medium-term one for up to EUR 4 billion, financial instruments, such as guarantees and blending instruments, aimed at mobilising public and private investments that benefit the majority of Egyptians with the objective of generating substantial new investments. This will be complemented by programmes to support specific priorities under the Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership through individual projects and technical assistance implemented under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument2.
__________________	__________________
2 Established by Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe, amending and repealing Decision No 466/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU) 2017/1601 and Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 480/2009 (OJ L 209, 14.6.2021, p. 1)	2 Established by Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe, amending and repealing Decision No 466/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU) 2017/1601 and Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 480/2009 (OJ L 209, 14.6.2021, p. 1)

Amendment 9

Proposal for a decision

Recital 9


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
(9) Egypt’s macro-fiscal situation has faced significant challenges and deteriorated substantially over recent months, as external pressures have intensified and public debt has increased further, with substantial downside risks to the economic outlook persisting. The repercussions of Russia’s war on Ukraine and of Hamas terrorist attacks against Israel have led to protracted capital outflows and lower foreign currency receipts, notably due to sharply falling income from tourism and Suez Canal proceeds. This is particularly challenging amid Egypt’s difficult fiscal situation, which is characterised by constant fiscal deficits and high and growing debt to GDP ratios.	(9) Egypt’s macro-fiscal situation has faced significant challenges and deteriorated substantially over recent months, as external pressures have intensified and public debt has increased further, with substantial downside risks to the economic outlook persisting. The repercussions of Russia’s war on Ukraine and the geopolitical tensions and conflicts in the Middle East have led to protracted capital outflows and lower foreign currency receipts, notably due to sharply falling income from tourism, Suez Canal proceeds and gas production and loss of confidence among foreign investors. This is particularly challenging amid Egypt’s difficult fiscal situation, which is characterised by constant fiscal deficits and high and growing debt to GDP ratios. Despite that difficult external context, in 2024 Egypt was able to implement reforms, such as the unification of exchange rates and making progress in tightening monetary policy, to help preserve macroeconomic stability.

Amendment 10

Proposal for a decision

Recital 12


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
(12) Egypt re-engaged with the IMF in early 2024 and reached a staff-level agreement on 6 March 2024 on a revamped Extended Fund Facility programme scaled up to USD 8 billion. The new programme is expected to be adopted by IMF Executive Board decision in March 2024 and aims to address the areas of 1) credible exchange rate flexibility, 2) sustainable tightening of monetary policy, 3) fiscal consolidation to preserve debt sustainability, 4) a new framework to rein in infrastructure spending, 5) providing adequate levels of social spending to protect vulnerable groups, and 6) implementation of the State Ownership Policy and reforms to level the playing field. Together with the staff level agreement’s signature, Egypt also enacted a flexibilisation of the exchange rate, and raised the central bank’s key policy rate by a sizeable 600 basis points, in line with the IMF programme’s priorities.	(12) Egypt re-engaged with the IMF in early 2024 and reached a staff-level agreement on 6 March 2024 on a revamped Extended Fund Facility programme scaled up to USD 8 billion. Negotiations at expert level on the fourth revision of Egypt’s economic reform programme were concluded in December 2024. The new programme aims to address the areas of 1) credible exchange rate flexibility, 2) sustainable tightening of monetary policy, 3) fiscal consolidation to preserve debt sustainability, 4) a new framework to rein in infrastructure spending, 5) providing adequate levels of social spending to protect vulnerable groups from the cost of living and energy price rises, and 6) implementation of the State Ownership Policy and reforms to level the playing field by promoting the development of the private sector in the economy. Together with the staff level agreement’s signature, Egypt also enacted a flexibilisation of the exchange rate, and raised the central bank’s key policy rate by a sizeable 600 basis points, in line with the IMF programme’s priorities.

Amendment 11

Proposal for a decision

Recital 16


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
(16) Given that there is still a significant residual external financing gap in Egypt’s balance of payments over and above the resources provided by the IMF and other multilateral institutions, the Union macro-financial assistance to be provided to Egypt is, under the current exceptional circumstances, considered to be an appropriate response to Egypt’s request for support to the economic stabilisation, in conjunction with the IMF programme. The Union’s macro-financial assistance package, including the MFA of up to EUR 4 billion under this proposal, would support the economic stabilisation and the structural reform agenda of Egypt, supplementing resources made available under the IMF’s financial arrangement.	(16) Given that there is still a significant residual external financing gap in Egypt’s balance of payments over and above the resources provided by the IMF and other multilateral institutions and regional partners, the Union macro-financial assistance to be provided to Egypt is, under the current exceptional circumstances, considered to be an appropriate response to Egypt’s request for support to the economic stabilisation, in conjunction with the IMF programme. The Union’s macro-financial assistance package, including the MFA of up to EUR 4 billion under this proposal, would support the economic stabilisation and the structural reform agenda of Egypt, supplementing resources made available under the IMF’s financial arrangement.

Amendment 12

Proposal for a decision

Recital 19


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
(19) The Commission should ensure that the Union’s macro-financial assistance is legally and substantially in line with the key principles, objectives and measures taken within the different areas of external action and with other relevant Union policies.	(19) The Commission should ensure that the Union’s macro-financial assistance is legally and substantially in line with the key principles, objectives and measures taken within the different areas of external action and with other relevant Union policies, including those relating to democracy, human rights and rule of law, in line with Article 2 of the EU-Egypt Association Agreement.

Amendment 13

Proposal for a decision

Recital 22


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
(22) A pre-condition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Egypt should be that the country continues to make concrete and credible steps towards respecting effective democratic mechanisms – including a multi-party parliamentary system – and the rule of law, and guarantees respect for human rights. In addition, the specific objectives of the Union’s macro-financial assistance should strengthen the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems, the governance and supervision of the financial sector in Egypt and promote structural reforms aimed at supporting sustainable and inclusive growth, decent employment creation and fiscal consolidation. The fulfillment of the pre-condition and the achievement of the specific objectives should be regularly monitored by the Commission services and the European External Action Service.	(22) Macro-financial assistance should remain an economic instrument. However, a pre-condition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Egypt should be that the country continues to make concrete, credible and tangible steps towards respecting and strengthening effective democratic mechanisms – including a multi-party parliamentary system – and the rule of law, and guaranteeing respect for human rights. In addition, the specific objectives of the Union’s macro-financial assistance should strengthen the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems, the governance and supervision of the financial sector in Egypt and promote structural reforms aimed at supporting sustainable and inclusive growth, decent employment creation and fiscal consolidation. The fulfillment of the pre-condition and the achievement of the specific objectives should be regularly monitored by the Commission services and the European External Action Service.

Amendment 14

Proposal for a decision

Recital 23


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
(23) In order to ensure that the Union’s financial interests linked to the Union’s macro-financial assistance are protected efficiently, Egypt should take appropriate measures relating to the prevention of, and fight against, fraud, corruption and any other irregularities linked to the assistance. In addition, a loan agreement to be concluded between the Commission and the Egyptian authorities should contain provisions authorising European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) to carry out investigations, including on-the-spot checks and inspections, in accordance with the provisions and procedures laid down in Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council3 and Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/964 , the Commission and the Court of Auditors to carry out audits and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office to exercise its competences with regard to the provision of the Union’s macro-financial assistance during and after its availability period.	(23) It is essential to underline that Egypt has to meet the necessary economic pre-condition for eligibility. Egypt has demonstrated its solvency and financial stability, which have been verified by the Commission. However, in order to ensure that the Union’s financial interests linked to the Union’s macro-financial assistance are protected efficiently. Egypt should take appropriate measures relating to the prevention of, and fight against, fraud, corruption and any other irregularities linked to the assistance. In addition, a loan agreement to be concluded between the Commission and the Egyptian authorities should contain provisions authorising European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) to carry out investigations, including on-the-spot checks and inspections, in accordance with the provisions and procedures laid down in Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council3 and Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/964 , the Commission and the Court of Auditors to carry out audits and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office to exercise its competences with regard to the provision of the Union’s macro-financial assistance during and after its availability period.
__________________	__________________
3 Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 September 2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (Euratom) No 1074/1999 (OJ L 248, 18.9.2013, p. 1).	3 Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 September 2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (Euratom) No 1074/1999 (OJ L 248, 18.9.2013, p. 1).
4 Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96 of 11 November 1996 concerning on-the-spot checks and inspections carried out by the Commission in order to protect the European Communities’ financial interests against fraud and other irregularities (OJ L 292, 15.11.1996, p. 2).	4 Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96 of 11 November 1996 concerning on-the-spot checks and inspections carried out by the Commission in order to protect the European Communities’ financial interests against fraud and other irregularities (OJ L 292, 15.11.1996, p. 2).

Amendment 15

Proposal for a decision

Recital 26


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
(26) The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be managed by the Commission. In order to ensure that the European Parliament and the Council are able to follow the implementation of this Decision, the Commission should regularly inform them of developments relating to the assistance and provide them with relevant documents.	(26) The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be managed by the Commission. In order to ensure that the European Parliament and the Council are able to follow the implementation of this Decision, the Commission should regularly inform them with an annual report of developments relating to the assistance and on respect for effective democratic mechanisms, as per the pre-conditions referred to in this Decision, and provide them with relevant documents.

Amendment 16

Proposal for a decision

Recital 28


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
(28) The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be subject to economic policy conditions, to be laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding. In order to ensure uniform conditions of implementation and for reasons of efficiency, the Commission should be empowered to negotiate such conditions with the Egyptian authorities under the supervision of the committee of representatives of the Member States in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. Under that Regulation, the advisory procedure should, as a general rule, apply in all cases other than as provided for in that Regulation. Considering the potentially important impact of assistance of more than EUR 90 million, it is appropriate that the examination procedure be used for operations above that threshold. Considering the amount of the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Egypt, the examination procedure should apply to the adoption of the Memorandum of Understanding, and to any reduction, suspension or cancellation of the assistance.	(28) The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be subject to sustainable economic policy reforms, to be laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding. In order to ensure uniform conditions of implementation and for reasons of efficiency, the Commission should be empowered to negotiate such conditions with the Egyptian authorities under the supervision of the committee of representatives of the Member States in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. Under that Regulation, the advisory procedure should, as a general rule, apply in all cases other than as provided for in that Regulation. Considering the potentially important impact of assistance of more than EUR 90 million, it is appropriate that the examination procedure be used for operations above that threshold. Considering the amount of the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Egypt, the examination procedure should apply to the adoption of the Memorandum of Understanding, and to any reduction, suspension or cancellation of the assistance.

Amendment 17

Proposal for a decision

Article 1 – paragraph 1


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
1. The Union shall make macro-financial assistance of a maximum amount of up to EUR 4 billion available to Egypt (“the Union’s macro-financial assistance”), with a view to supporting Egypt’s economic stabilisation and a substantive reform agenda. The release of the Union’s macro-financial assistance is subject to the approval of the Union budget for the relevant year by the European Parliament and the Council. The assistance shall contribute to covering Egypt’s balance of payments needs as identified in the IMF programme.	1. The Union shall make macro-financial assistance in the form of concessional loans of a maximum amount of up to EUR 4 billion available to Egypt (“the Union’s macro-financial assistance”), with a view to supporting Egypt’s socio-economic stabilisation and a substantive structural reform agenda, as well as its responsibility to mitigate the effects of irregular migration and managing migratory flows. The release of the Union’s macro-financial assistance is subject to the approval of the Union budget for the relevant year by the European Parliament and the Council. The assistance shall contribute to covering Egypt’s balance of payments needs as identified in the IMF programme.

Amendment 18

Proposal for a decision

Article 1 – paragraph 3 a (new)


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
	3a. Macro-financial assistance may, as far as possible, contribute to the Union’s growth and economic resilience.

Amendment 19

Proposal for a decision

Article 2 – paragraph 1


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
1. A pre-condition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be that Egypt continues to make concrete and credible steps towards respecting effective democratic mechanisms – including a multi-party parliamentary system – and the rule of law, and guarantees respect for human rights.	1. A pre-condition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be that Egypt continues to make concrete and credible steps towards respecting and strengthening effective democratic mechanisms – including a multi-party parliamentary system – and the rule of law, and continues to make efforts in order to guarantee respect for human rights.

Amendment 20

Proposal for a decision

Article 2 – paragraph 2


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
2. The Commission services and the European External Action Service shall monitor the fulfilment of this pre-condition throughout the life-cycle of the Union’s macro-financial assistance.	2. The Commission services and the European External Action Service shall monitor the fulfilment of this pre-condition throughout the life-cycle of the Union’s macro-financial assistance and report, regularly and in writing, to the European Parliament and the Council on the fulfilment of the economic policy and financial conditions set out in the Memorandum of Understanding.

Amendment 21

Proposal for a decision

Article 3 – paragraph 1


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
1. The Commission, in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 7(2), shall agree with the Egyptian authorities on clearly defined economic policy and financial conditions, focusing on structural reforms and sound public finances, to which the Union’s macro-financial assistance is to be subject, to be laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding (“the Memorandum of Understanding”) which shall include a timeframe for the achievement of those reforms. The economic policy and financial conditions set out in the Memorandum of Understanding shall be consistent with the agreements or understandings referred to in Article 1(3), including the macroeconomic adjustment and structural reform programmes implemented by Egypt with the support of the IMF.	1. The Commission, in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 7(2), shall agree with the Egyptian authorities on clearly defined economic policy and financial conditions, focusing on structural reforms, such as the new criminal procedure reform, and sound public finances, to which the Union’s macro-financial assistance is to be subject, to be laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding (“the Memorandum of Understanding”) which shall include a timeframe for the achievement of those reforms. The economic policy and financial conditions set out in the Memorandum of Understanding shall be consistent with the agreements or understandings referred to in Article 1(3), including the macroeconomic adjustment and structural reform programmes implemented by Egypt with the support of the IMF.

Amendment 22

Proposal for a decision

Article 3 – paragraph 2


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
2. The conditions referred to in paragraph 1 shall aim, in particular, at enhancing the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems in Egypt, including for the use of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. Progress in mutual market opening, the development of rules-based and fair trade, and other priorities in the context of the Union’s external policy shall also be duly taken into account when designing the policy measures. Progress in attaining those objectives shall be regularly monitored by the Commission.	2. The economic policy and financial conditions referred to in paragraph 1 shall aim, in particular, at enhancing the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems in Egypt, including for the use of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. Progress in mutual market opening, including for SMEs, the development of rules-based and fair trade, sustainable development, good governance and other priorities in the context of the Union’s external policy shall also be duly taken into account when designing the policy measures. Progress in attaining those objectives shall be regularly monitored by the Commission.

Amendment 23

Proposal for a decision

Article 4 – paragraph 4


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
4. Where the conditions in paragraph 3 are not met, the Commission shall temporarily suspend or cancel the disbursement of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. In such cases, it shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of the reasons for that suspension or cancellation.	4. Where the conditions in paragraph 3 are not met, the Commission shall temporarily suspend or cancel the disbursement of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. In such cases, it shall inform the European Parliament and the Council without delay of the reasons for that suspension or cancellation.

Amendment 24

Proposal for a decision

Article 5 – paragraph 1


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
(1) In order to finance the support under the macro-financial assistance in the form of loans, the Commission shall be empowered, on behalf of the Union, to borrow the necessary funds on the capital markets or from financial institutions in accordance with Article 220a of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046.	1. In order to finance the support under the macro-financial assistance in the form of loans, the Commission shall be empowered, on behalf of the Union, to borrow the necessary funds on the capital markets or from financial institutions in accordance with Article 223 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509.

Amendment 25

Proposal for a decision

Article 5 – paragraph 2


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
(2) The Commission shall enter into a loan agreement with Egypt in respect of the amount referred to in Article 1. The detailed terms of the support under the MFA in the form of loans shall be laid down in a loan agreement in accordance with Article 220 of the Financial Regulation, to be concluded between the Commission and the Egyptian authorities. The loan agreement shall lay down the availability period and the detailed terms of the support under the macro-financial assistance in the form of loans, including in relation to the internal control systems. The loans shall be granted at terms that allow Egypt to repay the loan over a long period, including a possible grace period. The maximum duration of the loans shall be 35 years. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of developments in the operations referred to in paragraph 3.	2. The Commission shall enter into a loan agreement with Egypt in respect of the amount referred to in Article 1. The detailed terms of the support under the MFA in the form of loans shall be laid down in a loan agreement in accordance with Article 223 of the Financial Regulation, to be concluded between the Commission and the Egyptian authorities. The loan agreement shall lay down the availability period and the detailed terms of the support under the macro-financial assistance in the form of loans, including in relation to the internal control systems. Egypt shall reimburse the loan, which shall be granted at terms that allow its repayment over a long period, including, after a formal notification to the European Parliament and the Council, a possible grace period. The maximum duration of the loans shall be 35 years. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of developments in the operations referred to in paragraph 3.

Amendment 26

Proposal for a decision

Article 6 – paragraph 1


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
1. The Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be implemented in accordance with Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council7.	1. The Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be implemented in accordance with Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council7.
_________________	_________________
7 Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 966/2012 (OJ L 193, 30.07.2018, p. 1).	7 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj).

Amendment 27

Proposal for a decision

Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point b


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
(b) assess the economic situation and prospects of Egypt, as well as progress made in implementing the policy measures referred to in Article 3(1);	(b) assess the economic situation and prospects of Egypt, as well as progress made in implementing the policy measures referred to in Article 2 and Article 3(1);

Amendment 28

Proposal for a decision

Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point c


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
(c) indicate the connection between the economic policy reform measures laid down in the Memorandum of Understanding, Egypt’s on-going economic and fiscal performance and the Commission’s decisions to release the instalments of the Union’s macro-financial assistance.	(c) indicate the connection between Egypt’s economic policy reforms under the Memorandum of Understanding, its fiscal performance, and the release of Union macro-financial assistance, while outlining steps taken towards democratic mechanisms, the rule of law and human rights.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

Political dialogue between Egypt and the EU was suspended after the revolution in 2011, and remained frozen through 2015. However, following Sisi’s election as president in May 2014, a rapprochement between Europe and Egypt gradually began to take place. The stability of the country became defining characteristics of European policy towards the Egypt. In 2024 the European Union (‘EU’) and Egypt have agreed to deepen their relationship and develop a strategic and comprehensive partnership for shared prosperity, stability and security, based on joint interest and mutual trust and building on the already existing positive agenda in EU-Egypt relations. The Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership covers specific areas of cooperation outlined in the Joint Declaration, clustered across six pillars of intervention, namely: political relations; economic stability; investment and trade; migration; security and law enforcement cooperation; demography and human capital.

The partnership is based on a financial package consisting of short- and longer-term support for the necessary macro-fiscal and socio-economic reform agenda, as well as increased amounts available to support investments in Egypt and targeted support for the implementation of the different strategic priorities.

Given Egypt’s critical economic and financial situation and Egypt’s role as an important stabilising factor amid geopolitical tensions in an increasingly volatile region, the Commission proposed on 15 March 2024 to support Egypt with macro-financial assistance (‘MFA’) of up to EUR 5 billion in loans as part of the EUR 7.4 billion financial package, divided into a short-term MFA operation of up to EUR 1 billion to be disbursed in one instalment, and a regular MFA operation of up to EUR 4 billion to be disbursed in three instalments.

The short-term MFA was agreed without involvement of the European Parliament for urgency reasons. The rapporteur highlights that this can only be an exception and European Parliament should not be bypassed in the future.

The amount of the proposed two new MFA operations corresponds to 56.7% of the estimated residual financing gap for the period FY24/25-FY26/27. This is consistent with standard practices on burden-sharing for MFA operations (for a country with an Association Agreement, the upper limit would be 60% according to the Council conclusions of 8 October 2002), taking into account the assistance pledged to Egypt by other bilateral and multilateral donors.

The rapporteur would like to point out that the EU’s cooperation with Egypt does not begin with this MFA which is just a piece of the puzzle and in fact consequence of a longstanding cooperation with Egypt on human rights and security highlighted by the Association Agreement/Euro-Mediterranean Agreement (2004), the EU’s new Agenda for the Mediterranean (2021), the Partnership Priorities (2022) and the Joint Declaration launching a new Strategic and Comprehensive partnership (2024). Moreover, Egypt is a strategic, economic, military and geopolitical partner of the EU and the EU is the leading investor in Egypt.

Given the instability in the region, Egypt remains a stable partner that engages in constructive dialogue with its partners. The EU need allies like that in the Middle East, and we need to emphasise their importance.

But Egypt is also hit by a series of external shocks.

A migratory shock first and foremost, with almost 10 million migrants and 800 000 registered refugees. Egypt is also committed to providing access to education for children, access to health services, help in finding housing and help in finding employment, with the support of NGOs. These commitments, if they are to be carried out properly, come at a cost.

A geopolitical shock with the uncertainty of developments in Israel / Palestine and Syria.

An economic shock, because Egypt, like many other countries, is seeing the cost of debt repayment and civil service salaries rise, thus limiting investment capacity.

This MFA is based on strict pre-conditions requiring Egypt to continue to make concrete and credible steps towards democratic mechanism, rule of law and human rights. The rapporteur believes that those pre-conditions embedded in the long-term cooperation with Egypt will lead to reforms and long-term improvements in the country.

Moreover, it is important to underline that Egypt already made big improvements in several areas.

Firstly, on human rights, with a major plan launched in 2021 underlining the country’s commitment to this path. Some may feel that things are not moving fast enough, but it is hard to deny that the country is on the right track.

Then there is the question of the place of women in society, which is very often a thermometer of democracy in a country. Wearing the veil is not compulsory. Women have access to public jobs and elected office (27% of women elected to the House, 13% to the Senate). Although Egyptian society is seen as patriarchal, the position of women has changed considerably in recent years.

This is a financial instrument designed to support our partner in the face of the challenges it faces, but also to help it pursue change. The European Parliament will be closely monitoring progress and the rapporteur is asking the Commission to keep the European Parliament duly informed at all stages of the process. After all, the MFA is a loan and the grants are subject to reimbursement.

To conclude the rapporteur would like to highlight that the MFA is an emergency instrument that has to be granted as soon as possible. The rapporteur is convinced that the MFA will be an effective incentive for – political and financial reforms in the country that will ensure a sustainable partnership between the EU and Egypt.

ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that she received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the report, prior to the adoption thereof in committee:

Entity and/or person

European Commission – DG ECFIN

European Commission – DG NEAR

EEAS

Embassy of Egypt

Members of the Egyptian Parliament

Amnesty International

Human Rights Watch

The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that she has submitted to the concerned natural persons the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

MINORITY POSITION

Pursuant to Rule 56(4) of the Rules of Procedure

Vicent Marzà Ibáñez (Greens/EFA)

On behalf of the Greens/EFA group, I would like to express our opposition to the fact that the European Commission has treated Egypt differently from other countries that receive Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) from the EU.

Following an agreement between the Council and Parliament, all MFAs should, as a pre-condition, respect human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. However, the Commission chose not to adhere to this policy when EC President Ursula von der Leyen announced a package of €7.4 billion in support for Egypt in March 2024, including €5 billion in Macro-Financial Assistance in the form of loans.

We support providing Egypt with macro-financial assistance as a means to improve the living conditions of the Egyptian people, to reduce poverty and inequalities as well as to promote human rights. Our group has previously supported providing macro-financial assistance to alleviate financial burdens for countries in difficulty, while also promoting democratic values and human rights worldwide. However, the Commission must respect the agreements made by Parliament and the Council and act in line with the principles enshrined in the EU Treaties regarding external action.

BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON BUDGETS (29.1.2025)

for the Committee on International Trade

on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on providing macro-financial assistance to the Arab Republic of Egypt

(COM(2024)0461 – C10‑0009/2024 – 2024/0071(COD))

Rapporteur for budgetary assessment: Matjaž Nemec

The Committee on Budgets has carried out a budgetary assessment of the proposal under Rule 58 of the Rules of Procedure and has reached the following conclusions:

– having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union [1] (Financial Regulation),

– having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027 [2],

– having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission (IIA) on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources [3],

A. whereas Egypt continues to face sizeable and unmet financing needs, with an external financing gap estimated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) programme at around USD 17.7 billion for 2024-2027, requiring substantial international support to maintain economic stability and implement crucial reforms;

B. whereas recently, Egypt’s macro-fiscal situation has deteriorated noticeably, with intensified external pressures and increased debt, reflecting both domestic challenges and external shocks, including the repercussions of Russia’s war against Ukraine and regional instability;

C. whereas the destructive and ongoing conflict in Gaza and the attacks in the Red Sea have severely impacted Egypt’s key sources of foreign currency earnings, particularly tourism revenues and Suez Canal proceeds, while persistent capital outflows and lower services exports have further strained the country’s external position; whereas Egypt’s socio-economic situation, including poverty rates and the Human Development Index, are also expected to be negatively impacted [4];

D. whereas the severe deterioration of external accounts and the strategic importance of regional stability conditionally justify this comprehensive support package, while stressing the need for the EU to work towards a lasting long-term peace solution in the Middle East, which will help alleviate the reasons behind Egypt’s financial struggles;

E. whereas Egypt’s public debt burden had increased substantially to 95.9 % of GDP at the end of the 2022/2023 fiscal year, up from 88.5 % the previous fiscal year, reaching its highest level since 2017 and raising concerns about long-term debt sustainability;

F. whereas Egypt’s real GDP growth declined to 2.4 % in the 2023/2024 fiscal year due to inflation and external pressures, with food price inflation remaining a strain, especially on vulnerable households;

G. whereas all major rating agencies have downgraded Egypt’s sovereign credit ratings to below-investment grade following the outbreak of the conflict in Gaza, reflecting increased regional risks and deteriorating humanitarian and economic conditions; whereas this has further complicated the country’s access to international financial markets;

H. whereas the proposed macro-financial assistance (MFA) of up to EUR 4 billion would help Egypt address its external financing needs while supporting the implementation of structural reforms aimed at improving the macroeconomic situation, strengthening economic governance and transparency, and enhancing conditions for sustainable and inclusive growth;

I. whereas on 12 April 2024, the Council adopted Decision (EU) 2024/1144 providing EUR 1 billion in short-term macro-financial assistance to the Arab Republic of Egypt [5], pursuant to the urgency procedure provided under Article 213 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), bypassing Parliament entirely; whereas the Commission adopted a decision on 20 December 2024 to release this single instalment to Egypt;

J. whereas the IMF has confirmed Egypt’s implementation of key reforms that have contributed to preserving macroeconomic stability despite the challenging environment;

K. whereas the short-term macro-financial assistance was subject to conditions set out in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) agreed on and signed by the Commission and the Egyptian authorities on 29 June 2024, including the implementation of economic reforms, concrete and credible steps towards respecting democratic principles, and an on-track IMF programme; whereas the Commission and the European External Action Service undertook a review mission to Cairo in October 2024 and subsequently evaluated the Egyptian authorities’ written compliance reporting, with an overall positive assessment of Egypt’s progress in fulfilling these conditions;

L. whereas Parliament, as one arm of the EU’s budgetary authority, was not involved in the negotiation and drafting of the MoU, which sets out the structural reform measures associated with the proposed MFA operation, including aspects of timing and sequencing for the disbursement of the initial assistance of EUR 1 billion;

M. whereas the MoU to be concluded with the Egyptian authorities for the remainder of the MFA is an essential part of the assistance itself; whereas Parliament’s lack of involvement in this process severely hinders its budgetary scrutiny; whereas it is necessary to find an appropriate way to involve Parliament when such memorandums with non-EU countries are negotiated by the Commission;

N. whereas the MoU should crucially provide the Commission with a mechanism to monitor progress as regards the implementation of structural reforms, notably the specific conditions for disbursement of the assistance;

1. Recalls that while MFA is meant to be an exceptional crisis response instrument and should not serve as a substitute for structural development aid, its increasing use to address structural economic challenges in partner countries risks diluting its emergency nature;

2. Highlights the importance of MFA in urgently addressing the situation in Egypt, taking into account Egypt’s critical economic and financial situation and its role as an important stabilising actor in an increasingly volatile region;

3. Regrets the fact that the first proposal of this package bypassed the co-decision rights of Parliament and undermined its democratic oversight role by using Article 213 TFEU instead of Article 212 TFEU; insists that this should not set a precedent and that Parliament’s rights and role should be respected in future proposals; emphasises that MFA is an instrument requiring proper parliamentary and budgetary scrutiny;

4. Notes that the Commission proposal of EUR 4 billion in MFA requires EUR 360 million in provisioning under the External Action Guarantee from the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe, which represents a significant allocation of limited resources;

5. Recalls its previous concerns about the effectiveness of MFA in driving sustainable reforms; acknowledges, however, that linking this assistance to the broader strategic partnership framework can, when properly implemented, provide stronger leverage for implementing the agreed reform agenda; recalls that the partnership priorities cover three broad areas, namely sustainable modern economy and social development, partnering in foreign policy, and enhancing stability;

6. Takes note of Egypt’s overall compliance with reform implementation under the previous MFA; reiterates its calls for transparent and timely reporting of assistance implementation; calls for adequate monitoring mechanisms with clear benchmarks and outcomes to be established in the MoU, and for regular reporting to the budgetary authority on developments related to the assistance, given the unprecedented size of this MFA package;

7. Notes that while the MFA loan structure spreads repayments over a longer period, this creates extended contingent liabilities for the EU budget that require careful monitoring over multiple financial frameworks;

8. Emphasises that the MFA constitutes a general budgetary support instrument for the benefit of Egypt and that the EU has no control over how the funds are actually spent; nevertheless encourages the Egyptian authorities and counterparties to disclose information on spending at the Commission’s request;

9. Recalls that Article 6 of the Financial Regulation establishes the obligation for the Commission to ensure compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and to respect the values enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union when implementing the EU budget; stresses that such a budgetary principle constitutes a core legal requirement for any form of EU financial assistance; underscores, therefore, the fact that the proposal lacks sufficient safeguards and clear benchmarks to measure progress towards compliance, particularly regarding respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities and freedom of belief, in order to protect the EU’s financial interests and ensure the MFA’s implementation in accordance with the Regulation;

10. Recalls that a pre-condition for granting MFA involves respecting effective democratic mechanisms, including a multiparty parliamentary system and the rule of law, and guaranteeing respect for human rights; highlights that, in this case, Egypt should continue to make concrete and credible steps towards respecting these criteria; emphasises the need to ensure their robust implementation;

11. Emphasises that strict adherence to democratic principles, the rule of law and fundamental freedoms should remain non-negotiable prerequisites for accessing EU financial support; calls on the Commission to withhold disbursements in the absence of credible progress on these fronts; notes that the Commission’s decision to disburse the short-term macro-financial assistance reflects Egypt’s progress in implementing reforms and the EU’s commitment to supporting Egypt’s economic stabilisation and reform agenda under the strategic and comprehensive partnership, while noting that human rights challenges in Egypt remain significant; stresses, in this respect, the importance of Egypt’s stability and its crucial role in the region, particularly in the current geopolitical context;

12. Regrets Parliament’s lack of involvement in and scrutiny of the MoU concluded between the Commission and the Egyptian authorities, which, among other things, includes important budgetary provisions that fall within the remit of Parliament, will determine clearly defined economic policy and financial conditions, focusing on structural reforms and sound public finances, and will include a time frame for achieving those reforms, which are linked to loan disbursement;

13. Concludes that the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on providing macro-financial assistance to the Arab Republic of Egypt is compatible with the elements referred to in Rule 58(3) of the Rules of Procedure.

As part of its budgetary assessment, the Committee on Budgets also submits the following amendments to the proposal:

Amendment 1

Proposal for a decision

Recital 1 a (new)


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
	(1a) This Decision has implications for the Union budget. Accordingly, the European Parliament’s Committee on Budgets adopted a budgetary assessment, which forms an integral part of Parliament’s mandate for negotiations.

Amendment 38

Proposal for a decision

Article 5 – paragraph 1


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
(1) In order to finance the support under the macro-financial assistance in the form of loans, the Commission shall be empowered, on behalf of the Union, to borrow the necessary funds on the capital markets or from financial institutions in accordance with Article 220a of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046.	(1) In order to finance the support under the macro-financial assistance in the form of loans, the Commission shall be empowered, on behalf of the Union, to borrow the necessary funds on the capital markets or from financial institutions in accordance with Article 223 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509.

Amendment 39

Proposal for a decision

Article 5 – paragraph 2


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
(2) The Commission shall enter into a loan agreement with Egypt in respect of the amount referred to in Article 1. The detailed terms of the support under the MFA in the form of loans shall be laid down in a loan agreement in accordance with Article 220 of the Financial Regulation, to be concluded between the Commission and the Egyptian authorities. The loan agreement shall lay down the availability period and the detailed terms of the support under the macro-financial assistance in the form of loans, including in relation to the internal control systems. The loans shall be granted at terms that allow Egypt to repay the loan over a long period, including a possible grace period. The maximum duration of the loans shall be 35 years. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of developments in the operations referred to in paragraph 3.	(2) The Commission shall enter into a loan agreement with Egypt in respect of the amount referred to in Article 1. The detailed terms of the support under the MFA in the form of loans shall be laid down in a loan agreement in accordance with Article 223 of the Financial Regulation, to be concluded between the Commission and the Egyptian authorities. The loan agreement shall lay down the availability period and the detailed terms of the support under the macro-financial assistance in the form of loans, including in relation to the internal control systems. The loans shall be granted at terms that allow Egypt to repay the loan over a long period, including a possible grace period. The maximum duration of the loans shall be 35 years. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of developments in the operations referred to in paragraph 3.

Amendment 40

Proposal for a decision

Article 6 – paragraph 1


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
(1) The Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be implemented in accordance with Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council7.	(1) The Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be implemented in accordance with Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council7.
_________________	_________________
7 Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 966/2012 (OJ L 193, 30.07.2018, p. 1).	7 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast) (OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj).

Amendment 41

Proposal for a decision

Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point b


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
(b) assess the economic situation and prospects of Egypt, as well as progress made in implementing the policy measures referred to in Article 3(1);	(b) assess the economic situation and prospects of Egypt, as well as progress made in implementing the policy measures referred to in Articles 2 and 3(1);

ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR FOR BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT HAS RECEIVED INPUT

Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur for budgetary assessment declares that he received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the budgetary assessment, prior to the adoption thereof in committee:

Entity and/or person

European Commission

Ambassador of Egypt to the EU

Head of delegation of the European Union to Egypt

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of Egypt

The list is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur for budgetary assessment.

Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur for budgetary assessment declares that he has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE ASKED FOR BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT

Title	Macro-financial assistance to the Arab Republic of Egypt
References	COM(2024)0461 – C10-0009/2024 – 2024/0071(COD)
Committee(s) responsible	INTA
Date announced in plenary	BUDG 13.11.2024
Rapporteur for budgetary assessment Date appointed	Matjaž Nemec 24.10.2024
Discussed in committee	16.1.2025
Date adopted	29.1.2025
Result of final vote	+: –: 0:	32 5 1
Members present for the final vote	Georgios Aftias, Rasmus Andresen, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, Tobiasz Bocheński, Olivier Chastel, Tamás Deutsch, Angéline Furet, Jens Geier, Thomas Geisel, Jean-Marc Germain, Sandra Gómez López, Monika Hohlmeier, Alexander Jungbluth, Janusz Lewandowski, Giuseppe Lupo, Siegfried Mureşan, Matjaž Nemec, Danuše Nerudová, João Oliveira, Ruggero Razza, Karlo Ressler, Julien Sanchez, Hélder Sousa Silva, Joachim Streit, Carla Tavares, Nils Ušakovs, Lucia Yar, Auke Zijlstra
Substitutes present for the final vote	Damian Boeselager, Michalis Hadjipantela, Moritz Körner, Tiago Moreira de Sá, Rasmus Nordqvist, Michele Picaro, Jacek Protas, Beata Szydło
Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote	Thierry Mariani, Aodhán Ó Ríordáin

FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL
IN COMMITTEE ASKED FOR BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT

32	+
ECR	Tobiasz Bocheński, Michele Picaro, Ruggero Razza, Beata Szydło
NI	Thomas Geisel
PPE	Georgios Aftias, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, Michalis Hadjipantela, Monika Hohlmeier, Janusz Lewandowski, Siegfried Mureşan, Danuše Nerudová, Jacek Protas, Karlo Ressler, Hélder Sousa Silva
PfE	Tamás Deutsch, Angéline Furet, Thierry Mariani, Tiago Moreira de Sá, Julien Sanchez
Renew	Olivier Chastel, Moritz Körner, Joachim Streit, Lucia Yar
S&D	Jens Geier, Jean-Marc Germain, Sandra Gómez López, Giuseppe Lupo, Matjaž Nemec, Aodhán Ó Ríordáin, Carla Tavares, Nils Ušakovs

5	–
PfE	Auke Zijlstra
The Left	João Oliveira
Verts/ALE	Rasmus Andresen, Damian Boeselager, Rasmus Nordqvist

1	0
ESN	Alexander Jungbluth

Key to symbols:

+ : in favour

– : against

0 : abstention

OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS (30.1.2025)

for the Committee on International Trade

on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on providing macro-financial assistance to the Arab Republic of Egypt

(COM(2024)0461 – C10‑0009/2024 – 2024/0071(COD))

Rapporteur for opinion: Tineke Strik

SHORT JUSTIFICATION

As enshrined in the Treaties, the EU is required to uphold and promote the principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law in its external action. While acknowledging the importance of the EU-Egypt strategic partnership and the need for MFA-support to Egypt in light of the economic impact of, among others, the current geopolitical situation, this opinion aims to integrate human rights, democracy and the rule of law as core parts of the MFA and to strengthen provisions related to parliamentary scrutiny and transparency. The Rapporteur is pleased that the Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET) confirmed that these founding principles of the EU should form the basis of EU-Egypt relations, and concrete improvement from Egypt in this regard is a precondition for the disbursement of the MFA. Moreover, the vote confirmed that the AFET Committee is convinced that Commission services and the European External Action Service have the responsibility to integrate this approach into the Memorandum of Understanding to be negotiated with Egypt, and report on progress on the specific conditions to the European Parliament and Council. Payment of each instalment should be subject to concrete improvements on human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The Rapporteur has full trust that the competences of the AFET Committee will be integrated into the report of the Committee on International Trade, and will engage with the respective Rapporteur to that end.

AMENDMENTS

The Committee on Foreign Affairs submits the following to the Committee on International Trade, as the committee responsible:

Amendment 1

Proposal for a decision

Recital 3


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
(3) In line with the Partnership Priorities, the EU and Egypt are committed to ensuring accountability, the rule of law, the full respect of human rights, fundamental freedoms, promoting democracy, gender equality and equal opportunities as constitutional rights of all their citizens. These commitments contribute to the advancement of the partnership and to Egypt’s sustainable development and stability. The increased and constructive engagement between the EU and Egypt in the last period has opened the path to more meaningful dialogue on human rights related issues. The subcommittee on Political Matters, Human Rights and Democracy, International and Regional issues of December 2022 and the Association Committee of May 2023 provided the institutional platforms to exchange on an array of human rights issues, which the EU would like to continue and build on. The improvement of the human rights situation in Egypt will have a positive impact on EU-Egypt relations.	(3) In line with the Partnership Priorities, the EU and Egypt are committed to ensuring accountability, the rule of law, the full respect of human rights, fundamental freedoms, promoting democracy, gender equality and equal opportunities as constitutional rights of all their citizens. These commitments contribute to the advancement of the partnership and to Egypt’s sustainable social and economic development and stability. The increased and constructive engagement between the EU and Egypt in the last period has opened the path to more meaningful dialogue on human rights related issues. The subcommittee on Political Matters, Human Rights and Democracy, International and Regional issues of December 2022 and the Association Committee of May 2023 provided the institutional platforms to exchange on an array of human rights issues, which the EU would like to continue and build on. A future improvement of the human rights situation in Egypt, such as improving the rights to freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly, introducing a moratorium on death penalty, combating torture and enforced disappearances, and improving the conditions of prisons, will have a positive impact on EU-Egypt relations.

Amendment 2

Proposal for a decision

Recital 5


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
(5) The EU recognises Egypt’s key role for regional security and stability. Terrorism, organised crime and conflicts are common threats against our security and the social fabric of nations across both sides of the Mediterranean. Therefore, the EU and Egypt have a common interest in strengthening cooperation highlighted in the Partnership Priorities, in full compliance with international law, including human rights and international humanitarian law.	(5) The EU recognises Egypt’s key role for regional security and stability, and has a strong interest in preventing short-term economic instability in that country that could have broader consequences as well as benefit geopolitical rivals. Terrorism, organised crime, disinformation, conflicts and persecution of religious and ethnic minorities are common threats against our security and the social fabric of nations across both sides of the Mediterranean. Therefore, the EU and Egypt have a common interest in strengthening cooperation highlighted in the Partnership Priorities, in full compliance with international law, including human rights and international humanitarian law, as well as in promoting joint interests and addressing common challenges.

Amendment 3

Proposal for a decision

Recital 6


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
(6) Recalling the geo-political challenges, such as the consequences of Hamas terrorist attacks across Israel on 7 October 2023 as well as the conflict in Sudan, and the strategic importance of Egypt as the largest country in the region and a pillar of stability for the whole Middle East, the Union is embarking on concluding a Strategic and Comprehensive partnership with Egypt as outlined in the Joint Declaration.	(6) Recalling the geo-political challenges, such as the broader consequences of the situation in the Middle East following the Hamas terrorist attacks of 7 October 2023, as well as the armed conflict in Sudan and instability in Syria, and the strategic importance of Egypt as the largest country in the region and a pillar of stability and security for the whole Middle East, the Union is embarking on concluding a Strategic and Comprehensive partnership with Egypt as outlined in the Joint Declaration.

Amendment 4

Proposal for a decision

Recital 9


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
(9) Egypt’s macro-fiscal situation has faced significant challenges and deteriorated substantially over recent months, as external pressures have intensified and public debt has increased further, with substantial downside risks to the economic outlook persisting. The repercussions of Russia’s war on Ukraine and of Hamas terrorist attacks against Israel have led to protracted capital outflows and lower foreign currency receipts, notably due to sharply falling income from tourism and Suez Canal proceeds. This is particularly challenging amid Egypt’s difficult fiscal situation, which is characterised by constant fiscal deficits and high and growing debt to GDP ratios.	(9) Egypt’s macro-fiscal situation has faced significant challenges and deteriorated substantially over recent months, as external pressures have intensified and public debt has increased further, with substantial downside risks to the economic outlook persisting. The repercussions of Russia’s war on Ukraine and of the situation in the Middle East have led to protracted capital outflows and lower foreign currency receipts, notably due to sharply falling income from tourism and Suez Canal proceeds. This is particularly challenging amid Egypt’s difficult fiscal situation, which is characterised by constant fiscal deficits and high and growing debt to GDP ratios. Moreover, instability and uncertainty in Syria would further exacerbate the already existing macro-financial issues for Egypt.

Amendment 5

Proposal for a decision

Recital 19


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
(19) The Commission should ensure that the Union’s macro-financial assistance is legally and substantially in line with the key principles, objectives and measures taken within the different areas of external action and with other relevant Union policies.	(19) As enshrined in Article 212 TFEU, the Commission should ensure that the Union’s macro-financial assistance is legally and substantially in line with the key principles, objectives and measures taken within the different areas of external action, and in particular with Article 2 of the EU-Egypt Association Agreement of 2004 concerning the respect of democratic principles and fundamental human rights and with other relevant Union policies.

Amendment 6

Proposal for a decision

Recital 22


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
(22) A pre-condition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Egypt should be that the country continues to make concrete and credible steps towards respecting effective democratic mechanisms – including a multi-party parliamentary system – and the rule of law, and guarantees respect for human rights. In addition, the specific objectives of the Union’s macro-financial assistance should strengthen the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems, the governance and supervision of the financial sector in Egypt and promote structural reforms aimed at supporting sustainable and inclusive growth, decent employment creation and fiscal consolidation. The fulfillment of the pre-condition and the achievement of the specific objectives should be regularly monitored by the Commission services and the European External Action Service.	(22) A pre-condition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Egypt should be that the country takes concrete and credible steps towards respecting and enhancing effective democratic mechanisms – including a multi-party parliamentary system – and the rule of law, and guarantees respect for human rights, In addition, the specific objectives of the Union’s macro-financial assistance should strengthen the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems, the governance and supervision of the financial sector in Egypt and promote structural reforms aimed at supporting sustainable and inclusive growth, decent employment creation and fiscal consolidation. The fulfillment of the pre-condition and the achievement of the specific objectives should be regularly monitored by the Commission services and the European External Action Service.

Amendment 7

Proposal for a decision

Recital 26


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
(26) The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be managed by the Commission. In order to ensure that the European Parliament and the Council are able to follow the implementation of this Decision, the Commission should regularly inform them of developments relating to the assistance and provide them with relevant documents.	(26) The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be managed by the Commission. In order to ensure that the European Parliament and the Council are able to follow the implementation of this Decision, the Commission should regularly inform them with an annual report of developments relating to the assistance and on the respect of effective democratic mechanisms, as per the pre-conditions referred to in this Decision and, provide them with relevant documents.

Amendment 8

Proposal for a decision

Recital 28


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
(28) The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be subject to economic policy conditions, to be laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding. In order to ensure uniform conditions of implementation and for reasons of efficiency, the Commission should be empowered to negotiate such conditions with the Egyptian authorities under the supervision of the committee of representatives of the Member States in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. Under that Regulation, the advisory procedure should, as a general rule, apply in all cases other than as provided for in that Regulation. Considering the potentially important impact of assistance of more than EUR 90 million, it is appropriate that the examination procedure be used for operations above that threshold. Considering the amount of the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Egypt, the examination procedure should apply to the adoption of the Memorandum of Understanding, and to any reduction, suspension or cancellation of the assistance.	(28) The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be subject to economic policy and democracy, rule of law and human rights conditions, to be laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding. In order to ensure uniform conditions of implementation and for reasons of efficiency, the Commission should be empowered to negotiate such conditions with the Egyptian authorities under the supervision of the committee of representatives of the Member States in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. Under that Regulation, the advisory procedure should, as a general rule, apply in all cases other than as provided for in that Regulation. Considering the potentially important impact of assistance of more than EUR 90 million, it is appropriate that the examination procedure be used for operations above that threshold. Considering the amount of the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Egypt, the examination procedure should apply to the adoption of the Memorandum of Understanding, and to any reduction, suspension or cancellation of the assistance.

Amendment 9

Proposal for a decision

Article 1 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
The release of the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be managed by the Commission in a manner consistent with the agreements or understandings reached between the IMF and Egypt, and with the key principles and objectives of economic reforms set out in the EU-Egypt Association Agreement.	The release of the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be managed by the Commission in a manner consistent with the agreements or understandings reached between the IMF and Egypt, and with the key principles and objectives set out in the EU-Egypt Association Agreement.

Amendment 10

Proposal for a decision

Article 1 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
The Commission shall regularly inform the European Parliament and the Council of developments regarding the Union’s macro-financial assistance, including disbursements thereof, and shall provide those institutions with the relevant documents in due time.	The Commission shall regularly inform the European Parliament and the Council of developments regarding the Union’s macro-financial assistance, including disbursements thereof, as well as on the progress made relating to economic and democratic reforms in Egypt, and shall provide those institutions with the relevant documents, including third-party independent assessments, in due time.

Amendment 11

Proposal for a decision

Article 1 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2 a (new)


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
	The transparent management of funds allocated under this macro-financial assistance is essential in order to ensure that resources are used wisely, in accordance with the set objectives. The Union shall ensure that effective and independent control and audit mechanisms are put in place to prevent any misappropriation.

Amendment 12

Proposal for a decision

Article 2 – paragraph 1


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
1. A pre-condition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be that Egypt continues to make concrete and credible steps towards respecting effective democratic mechanisms – including a multi-party parliamentary system – and the rule of law, and guarantees respect for human rights.	1. A pre-condition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be that Egypt takes concrete and credible steps towards respecting effective democratic mechanisms – including a multi-party parliamentary system – and the rule of law, and made a quantitative and substantial improvement in the respect for human rights, since the signing in June 2024 of the Memorandum of Understanding linked to the EUR 1 billion macro-financial assistance package, and that it continues to make concrete and credible improvements in those areas throughout the period covered by this Decision.

Amendment 13

Proposal for a decision

Article 2 – paragraph 2


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
2. The Commission services and the European External Action Service shall monitor the fulfilment of this pre-condition throughout the life-cycle of the Union’s macro-financial assistance.	2. The Commission services and the European External Action Service shall monitor the fulfilment of this pre-condition throughout the life-cycle of the Union’s macro-financial assistance in a transparent process in which civil society and international entities such as UN organisations are able to contribute, and report, regularly and in writing, to the European Parliament on the conditions referred to in Article 2 (1).

Amendment 14

Proposal for a decision

Article 3 – paragraph 1


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
1. The Commission, in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 7(2), shall agree with the Egyptian authorities on clearly defined economic policy and financial conditions, focusing on structural reforms and sound public finances, to which the Union’s macro-financial assistance is to be subject, to be laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding (“the Memorandum of Understanding”) which shall include a timeframe for the achievement of those reforms. The economic policy and financial conditions set out in the Memorandum of Understanding shall be consistent with the agreements or understandings referred to in Article 1(3), including the macroeconomic adjustment and structural reform programmes implemented by Egypt with the support of the IMF.	1. The Commission, in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 7(2), shall agree with the Egyptian authorities on clearly defined economic policy and financial conditions, focusing on structural reforms and sound public finances, as well as on democracy, rule of law and human rights conditions, to which the Union’s macro-financial assistance and the release of each separate instalment is to be subject, to be laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding (“the Memorandum of Understanding”) which shall include a timeframe for the achievement of those reforms. The economic policy and financial conditions set out in the Memorandum of Understanding shall be consistent with the agreements or understandings referred to in Article 1(3), including the macroeconomic adjustment and structural reform programmes implemented by Egypt with the support of the IMF.

Amendment 15

Proposal for a decision

Article 3 – paragraph 2


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
2. The conditions referred to in paragraph 1 shall aim, in particular, at enhancing the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems in Egypt, including for the use of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. Progress in mutual market opening, the development of rules-based and fair trade, and other priorities in the context of the Union’s external policy shall also be duly taken into account when designing the policy measures. Progress in attaining those objectives shall be regularly monitored by the Commission.	2. The conditions referred to in paragraph 1 shall aim, in particular, at introducing reforms towards respecting effective democratic mechanisms – including a multi-party parliamentary system – and the rule of law, and ensuring respect for human rights, enhancing the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems in Egypt, including for the use of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. Progress in mutual market opening, poverty reduction, good governance, the fight against corruption, the development of rules-based and fair trade, and other priorities in the context of the Union’s external policy, including those relating to democracy, rule of law and human rights, shall also be duly taken into account when designing the policy measures. Progress in attaining those objectives shall be regularly monitored by the Commission.

Amendment 16

Proposal for a decision

Article 4 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 – point c


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
(c) the satisfactory implementation of the economic policy conditions and financial conditions agreed in the Memorandum of Understanding.	(c) the satisfactory implementation of the economic policy conditions, financial conditions, and democracy, rule of law and human rights conditions, agreed in the Memorandum of Understanding.

Amendment 17

Proposal for a decision

Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point c a (new)


Text proposed by the Commission	Amendment
	(ca) outline the concrete and credible steps Egypt has taken towards respecting effective democratic mechanisms, including a multi-party parliamentary system, and the rule of law, and towards ensuring respect for human rights.

ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur for the opinion received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the opinion:

Entity and/or person

European Commission – DG ECFIN

EEAS

Various Egyptian authorities on multiple occassion

Amnesty International

Euromed Rights

CIHRS

Egyptian Front for Human Rights

Committee to Protect Journalists

Various Members of the Egyptian Parliament

UNHCR

Save the Children

Frontex

Various diplomats of EU Member States in Caïro

Various local civil society organisations in Egypt

Third country diplomat in Egypt

The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur for the opinion.

Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur for the opinion declares that she has submitted to the concerned natural persons the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

Title	Macro-financial assistance to the Arab Republic of Egypt
References	COM(2024)0461 – C10-0009/2024 – 2024/0071(COD)
Committee(s) responsible	INTA
Opinion by Date announced in plenary	AFET 13.11.2024
Rapporteur for the opinion Date appointed	Tineke Strik 14.10.2024
Discussed in committee	3.12.2024
Date adopted	30.1.2025
Result of final vote	+: –: 0:	59 6 7
Members present for the final vote	Mika Aaltola, Lucia Annunziata, Petras Auštrevičius, Jordan Bardella, Dan Barna, Wouter Beke, Robert Biedroń, Ioan-Rareş Bogdan, Marc Botenga, Grzegorz Braun, Sebastião Bugalho, Danilo Della Valle, Özlem Demirel, Elio Di Rupo, Michael Gahler, Geadis Geadi, Giorgos Georgiou, Raphaël Glucksmann, Bernard Guetta, Rima Hassan, Rasa Juknevičienė, Sandra Kalniete, Łukasz Kohut, Rihards Kols, Andrey Kovatchev, Vilis Krištopans, Nathalie Loiseau, Claudiu Manda, David McAllister, Sven Mikser, Francisco José Millán Mon, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Leoluca Orlando, Kostas Papadakis, Tonino Picula, Thijs Reuten, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Andreas Schieder, Alexander Sell, Villy Søvndal, Davor Ivo Stier, Sebastiaan Stöteler, Stanislav Stoyanov, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Michał Szczerba, António Tânger Corrêa, Marta Temido, Cristian Terheş, Riho Terras, Hermann Tertsch, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Reinier Van Lanschot, Roberto Vannacci, Hilde Vautmans, Harald Vilimsky, Željana Zovko
Substitutes present for the final vote	Jaume Asens Llodrà, Malik Azmani, Engin Eroglu, Sandra Gómez López, Evin Incir, András László, Ana Catarina Mendes, Hans Neuhoff, Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Chloé Ridel, Tineke Strik, Şerban Dimitrie Sturdza, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Matej Tonin, Ivaylo Valchev, Isabel Wiseler-Lima
Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote	Catarina Vieira

FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL IN COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

59	+
ECR	Geadis Geadi, Rihards Kols, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Şerban Dimitrie Sturdza, Cristian Terheş, Ivaylo Valchev
PPE	Mika Aaltola, Wouter Beke, Ioan-Rareş Bogdan, Sebastião Bugalho, Michael Gahler, Rasa Juknevičienė, Sandra Kalniete, Łukasz Kohut, Andrey Kovatchev, David McAllister, Francisco José Millán Mon, Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Davor Ivo Stier, Michał Szczerba, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Riho Terras, Matej Tonin, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Željana Zovko
PfE	András László, António Tânger Corrêa, Hermann Tertsch, Roberto Vannacci
Renew	Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Engin Eroglu, Bernard Guetta, Nathalie Loiseau, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans
S&D	Lucia Annunziata, Robert Biedroń, Elio Di Rupo, Raphaël Glucksmann, Sandra Gómez López, Evin Incir, Claudiu Manda, Ana Catarina Mendes, Sven Mikser, Tonino Picula, Thijs Reuten, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Andreas Schieder, Marta Temido
The Left	Özlem Demirel, Rima Hassan
Verts/ALE	Jaume Asens Llodrà, Leoluca Orlando, Villy Søvndal, Tineke Strik, Reinier Van Lanschot, Catarina Vieira

6	–
NI	Grzegorz Braun, Kostas Papadakis
PfE	Jordan Bardella, Sebastiaan Stöteler, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Harald Vilimsky

7	0
ECR	Sebastian Tynkkynen
ESN	Hans Neuhoff, Alexander Sell, Stanislav Stoyanov
The Left	Marc Botenga, Danilo Della Valle, Giorgos Georgiou

Key to symbols:

+ : in favour

– : against

0 : abstention

PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

Title	Macro-financial assistance to the Arab Republic of Egypt
References	COM(2024)0461 – C10-0009/2024 – 2024/0071(COD)
Date submitted to Parliament	15.3.2024
Committee(s) responsible	INTA
Committees asked for opinions Date announced in plenary	AFET 13.11.2024
Rapporteurs Date appointed	Céline Imart 30.9.2024
Discussed in committee	14.10.2024	30.1.2025
Date adopted	20.3.2025
	BUDG 29.1.2025
Result of final vote	+: –: 0:	28 7 5
Members present for the final vote	Christophe Bay, Brando Benifei, Anna Bryłka, Udo Bullmann, Benoit Cassart, Markéta Gregorová, Bart Groothuis, Céline Imart, Karin Karlsbro, Bernd Lange, Ilia Lazarov, Thierry Mariani, Javier Moreno Sánchez, Ştefan Muşoiu, Daniele Polato, Majdouline Sbai, Lukas Sieper, Dominik Tarczyński, Francesco Torselli, Kathleen Van Brempt, Jörgen Warborn, Iuliu Winkler, Bogdan Andrzej Zdrojewski, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez
Substitutes present for the final vote	Mika Aaltola, Nicolas Bay, Markus Buchheit, João Cotrim De Figueiredo, Danilo Della Valle, Borja Giménez Larraz, Vicent Marzà Ibáñez, Marina Mesure, Martin Schirdewan, Kris Van Dijck
Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote	Hildegard Bentele, Mélanie Disdier, Niels Geuking, Chloé Ridel, Romana Tomc, Matthieu Valet
Date tabled	24.3.2025

FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

28	+
ECR	Nicolas Bay, Daniele Polato, Dominik Tarczyński, Francesco Torselli, Kris Van Dijck
ESN	Markus Buchheit
NI	Lukas Sieper
PPE	Mika Aaltola, Hildegard Bentele, Niels Geuking, Borja Giménez Larraz, Céline Imart, Ilia Lazarov, Romana Tomc, Jörgen Warborn, Iuliu Winkler, Bogdan Andrzej Zdrojewski, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez
PfE	Christophe Bay, Anna Bryłka, Mélanie Disdier, Thierry Mariani, Matthieu Valet
Renew	Benoit Cassart, João Cotrim De Figueiredo, Bart Groothuis, Karin Karlsbro
S&D	Javier Moreno Sánchez

7	–
S&D	Udo Bullmann
The Left	Danilo Della Valle, Marina Mesure, Martin Schirdewan
Verts/ALE	Markéta Gregorová, Vicent Marzà Ibáñez, Majdouline Sbai

5	0
S&D	Brando Benifei, Bernd Lange, Ştefan Muşoiu, Chloé Ridel, Kathleen Van Brempt

Key to symbols:

+ : in favour

– : against

0 : abstention

MIL OSI Europe News –

March 25, 2025

MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: India to host 3-day FATF Private Sector Collaborative Forum 2025 (PSCF 2025) from 25th -27th March, 2025, in Mumbai

Source: Government of India (2)

India to host 3-day FATF Private Sector Collaborative Forum 2025 (PSCF 2025) from 25th -27th March, 2025, in Mumbai

FATF President Ms. Elisa de Anda Madrazo to formally inaugurate PSCF 2025 on 26th March, 2025, with RBI Governor Shri Sanjay Malhotra presiding over the event

The PSCF 2025 agenda reflects global priorities, including payment transparency, financial inclusion, and digital transformation of financial systems

Posted On: 24 MAR 2025 5:05PM by PIB Delhi

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Private Sector Collaborative Forum (PSCF) 2025 will be held from 25^th -27^th March, 2025, in Mumbai. The forum is being hosted by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and the Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance, Government of India, reaffirming India’s responsible leadership in global efforts to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.

FATF President Ms. Elisa de Anda Madrazo will formally inaugurate the PSCF 2025 on 26^th March, 2025, with Reserve Bank of India (RBI) Governor Shri Sanjay Malhotra presiding over the event. The Indian delegation to PSCF is a multi-disciplinary team led by Shri Vivek Aggarwal, Additional Secretary (Revenue), Ministry of Finance.

India’s Leadership in AML/CFT Efforts

India’s participation in FATF initiatives has been widely recognised. India is a member of steering group of FATF and also co-chairs a working group on Risks, Trends and Methodologies work group. In November 2024, India hosted the plenary of Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (EAG) in Indore. In June 2024, India’s FATF Mutual Evaluation Report was tabled at the FATF Plenary in Singapore and subsequently released in September 2024. India achieved the best possible outcome by being placed in ‘regular follow-up,’ a status that only a few countries have attained in their Mutual Evaluations.

The report commended India’s exemplary efforts in curbing money laundering and terrorist financing, highlighting the country’s advanced fintech ecosystem, innovations like the Unified Payments Interface (UPI) and Aadhaar-enabled digital identity verification, and proactive inter-agency coordination. India’s approach has set a global benchmark for integrating technology with financial security.

PCSF 2025

The upcoming PCSF event is another milestone in India’s journey in its efforts in curbing money laundering and terrorist financing. The PSCF is an annual event that provides a critical platform for dialogue between FATF member countries, international organisations, and private sector stakeholders. It aims to enhance the implementation of FATF’s Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing (AML/CFT) standards by fostering collaboration, exchanging best practices, and addressing emerging global challenges.

This year’s forum will see participation from countries across FATF’s Global Network, along with representatives from financial institutions, designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs), virtual asset service providers (VASPs), international organisations, and academia.

Key Highlights and Agenda Focus Areas

The PSCF 2025 agenda reflects global priorities, including payment transparency, financial inclusion, and digital transformation of financial systems. With financial crimes evolving due to technological advancements — such as cryptocurrency-related laundering — India’s expertise in leveraging technology and fostering a risk-based approach offers valuable insights for the international community. By hosting this significant event, India reinforces its commitment to FATF’s global standards.

Over the next three days, discussions at the forum will revolve around several critical issues shaping the global AML/CFT landscape. Participants will explore how FATF can continue to address evolving threats while promoting financial inclusion through robust, risk-based supervision of regulated entities. The dialogue will also focus on enhancing transparency in beneficial ownership and leveraging digital tools to strengthen AML/CFT compliance mechanisms.

Information-sharing practices within the private sector will be evaluated to identify ways to better address emerging financial crime threats. Furthermore, the forum will engage in deliberations on emerging terrorist financing and proliferation financing risks, emphasising the need for measures that reinforce global resilience against these challenges.

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NB/KMN

(Release ID: 2114453) Visitor Counter : 28

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

March 25, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Army collaborates with ride-share companies to improve transportation

Source: United States Army

WASHINGTON – The U.S. Army launched a pilot ride-share access program to improve installation access for over 600,000 military members, their families, retirees and civilians living at six Army installations. Over the next two months, ride-share access will be re-envisioned at Fort Bliss, Texas; Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington; Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; Fort Shafter, Hawaii; and Tripler Army Medical Center, Hawaii.

“This program demonstrates our commitment to addressing the challenges faced by our military communities,” said Dan Driscoll, Secretary of the Army. “Through collaboration with the ride-share industry, we’re able to provide our Soldiers and their families with safe, reliable and convenient transportation options that support their unique needs and enhance their overall quality of life.”

The ride-share access pilot will standardize access procedures and requirements to safely increase ridership and promote additional transportation options. If successful, the Army plans to expand the program to additional installations across the country.

In accordance with the Army’s strict security standards, all visitors, including taxi and ride-sharing vehicle drivers, will undergo identity proofing and vetting through the FBI’s National Crime Information Center and Terrorist Screening Database. In addition to this credential vetting, drivers will also be required to establish their purpose for each visit by showing the ride-sharing hail on their smartphones and/or identifying the person and building for the pickup.

“This pilot is our response to see if we can safely collaborate with the ride-share industry to simplify transportation options for everyone living on, working on or even visiting our camps, posts and installations,” said Sgt. Maj. of the Army Michael Weimer. “We heard you and agree, it shouldn’t be so hard to coordinate transportation onto our installations, but also in and around some of our larger ones.”

For more information, please contact U.S. Army Public Affairs at usarmy.pentagon.hqda-ocpa.mbx.mrd-press-desk@army.mil.

MIL OSI USA News –

March 25, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: A steadfast bond: Celebrating a decade of the Massachusetts-Kenya State Partnership Program

Source: United States Army

U.S. Soldiers assigned to Chosen Company, 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment, 173rd Airborne Brigade; join 1st Battalion, 182nd Infantry Regiment, 51st Troop Command, 27th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, Massachusetts National Guard; the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF); Somalia Danab; Tanzania People’s Defence Forces; and 3rd Rifles, 11th Infantry Brigade, 1st (United Kingdom) Division, pose for a group photo while a KDF F5, assigned to the 15th Fighter Wing flies over at the Counter Insurgency Terrorism and Stability Operations center during Justified Accord 2025 (JA25) in Nanyuki, Kenya, Feb. 20, 2025. JA25 is the premier U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) exercise in East Africa, designed to enhance multinational combat readiness, strengthen crisis response capabilities and empower allies and partners in the region. Led by U.S. Army Southern European Task Force, Africa (SETAF-AF) and hosted by Kenya, Djibouti and Tanzania, JA25 integrates high-intensity training scenarios that sharpen warfighting skills, increase operational reach and enhance the ability to execute complex joint and multinational operations. The exercise runs from Feb. 10–21, 2025. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Kylejian Francia) (Photo Credit: Sgt. Kylejian Francia) VIEW ORIGINAL

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U.S. Army Southern European Task Force, Africa

NAIROBI, Kenya – 2025 marks the 10th anniversary of the enduring partnership between the Massachusetts Army National Guard (MANG) and the Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) under the auspices of the State Partnership Program (SPP). Established in 2015, this collaboration exemplifies the power of sustained military-to-military engagement in fostering global security, stability and combined warfighting capacity.

The SPP, overseen by the National Guard Bureau, strategically pairs American states with partner nations worldwide, facilitating a tailored approach to capacity building and strengthened lethality. For Massachusetts and Kenya, this has translated into a dynamic exchange of knowledge, skills and experience across a diverse range of military and civilian domains. These include, but are not limited to, cybersecurity, aviation, disaster response, medical readiness and counterterrorism strategies.

Kenya Defence Force (KDF) medics joined the medics with 8th Medical Brigade and 1st Battalion 182nd Infantry Regiment, Massachusetts National Guard, to conduct a casualty evacuation rehearsal during exercise Justified Accord 2025 (JA25) at the Counter Insurgency Terrorism and Stability Operations Center in Nanyuki, Kenya, Feb. 12, 2025. JA25 is the premier U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) exercise in East Africa, designed to enhance multinational combat readiness, strengthen crisis response capabilities and empower allies and partners in the region. Led by U.S. Army Southern European Task Force, Africa (SETAF-AF) and hosted by Kenya, Djibouti and Tanzania, JA25 integrates high-intensity training scenarios that sharpen warfighting skills, increase operational reach and enhance the ability to execute complex joint and multinational operations. The exercise runs from Feb. 10–21, 2025. (Photo Credit: Sgt. 1st Class Jeremy Brown) VIEW ORIGINAL

“Anytime you can create relationships with other countries, you are making integration easier when you need to deploy together,” said U.S. Army Sgt. Eamon Beach, a squad leader assigned to Bravo Company, 1st. Battalion, 182nd Infantry Regiment (Americal), MANG.

This was Beach’s first time in Kenya, taking part in Justified Accord 2025 (JA25).

The cornerstone of this partnership lies in its collaborative training exercises, often conducted within the framework of larger multinational initiatives like JA25, a U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)-directed, U.S. Army Southern European Task Force, Africa (SETAF-AF)-managed exercise.

These exercises provide invaluable opportunities for both MANG and KDF Soldiers to enhance interoperability, refine tactical skills and build camaraderie in simulated scenarios.

Beach also noted that training side-by-side in Kenya allowed both MANG and KDF Soldiers to learn several similarities in the way they train on specific tasks. From urban operations training and room clearance procedures, tactics were shared and honed together throughout the exercise.

U.S. Army Spc. Sonny Farfan, an infantryman assigned to 1st Battalion, 182nd Infantry Regiment, 51st Troop Command, 27th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, Massachusetts National Guard, fires an M4 carbine behind a barrier at the Counter Insurgency Terrorism and Stability Operations center during exercise Justified Accord 2025 (JA25) in Nanyuki, Kenya, Feb. 18, 2025. JA25 is the premier U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) exercise in East Africa, designed to enhance multinational combat readiness, strengthen crisis response capabilities and empower allies and partners in the region. Led by U.S. Army Southern European Task Force, Africa (SETAF-AF) and hosted by Kenya, Djibouti and Tanzania, JA25 integrates high-intensity training scenarios that sharpen warfighting skills, increase operational reach and enhance the ability to execute complex joint and multinational operations. The exercise runs from Feb. 10–21, 2025. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Kylejian Francia) (Photo Credit: Sgt. Kylejian Francia) VIEW ORIGINAL

Along with JA25, the SPP fosters enduring personal relationships between Soldiers, transcending cultural differences, building mutual understanding and trust. These personal connections prove critical to facilitating seamless communication and cooperation, highlighting the adaptability and agility of both forces.

The impact of the Massachusetts-Kenya partnership extends beyond the military sphere. Collaborative efforts in disaster preparedness and response have been particularly noteworthy. In previous exchanges, MANG provided much-needed assistance to Kenya in the wake of natural disasters, leveraging its experience and resources to support relief efforts and strengthen resilience.

1 / 2 Show Caption + Hide Caption – U.S. Army Staff Sgt. Franklin Tejada, an infantryman assigned to 1st Battalion, 182nd Infantry Regiment, 51st Troop Command, 27th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, Massachusetts National Guard, fires an M4 carbine at the Counter Insurgency Terrorism and Stability Operations center during Justified Accord 2025 (JA25) in Nanyuki, Kenya, Feb. 18, 2025. JA25 is the premier U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) exercise in East Africa, designed to enhance multinational combat readiness, strengthen crisis response capabilities and empower allies and partners in the region. Led by U.S. Army Southern European Task Force, Africa (SETAF-AF) and hosted by Kenya, Djibouti and Tanzania, JA25 integrates high-intensity training scenarios that sharpen warfighting skills, increase operational reach and enhance the ability to execute complex joint and multinational operations. The exercise runs from Feb. 10–21, 2025. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Kylejian Francia) (Photo Credit: Sgt. Kylejian Francia) VIEW ORIGINAL

2 / 2 Show Caption + Hide Caption – U.S. Army Spc. Sonny Farfan, an infantryman assigned to 1st Battalion, 182nd Infantry Regiment, 51st Troop Command, 27th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, Massachusetts National Guard, fires an M4 carbine at the Counter Insurgency Terrorism and Stability Operations center during Justified Accord 2025 (JA25) in Nanyuki, Kenya, Feb. 18, 2025. JA25 is the premier U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) exercise in East Africa, designed to enhance multinational combat readiness, strengthen crisis response capabilities and empower allies and partners in the region. Led by U.S. Army Southern European Task Force, Africa (SETAF-AF) and hosted by Kenya, Djibouti and Tanzania, JA25 integrates high-intensity training scenarios that sharpen warfighting skills, increase operational reach and enhance the ability to execute complex joint and multinational operations. The exercise runs from Feb. 10–21, 2025. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Kylejian Francia) (Photo Credit: Sgt. Kylejian Francia) VIEW ORIGINAL

As the Massachusetts-Kenya partnership celebrates its 10th anniversary, it stands as a testament to the enduring power of collaboration and shared commitment to a safer and more secure world. The conclusion of the exercise highlighted this fact.

JA25’s culminating event saw combined forces working together to defeat a violent extremist organization (VEO) which had taken over a simulated village. The multinational contingent put their newly refined urban tactics and lethality on full display.

“The Massachusetts-Kenya partnership builds capacity, strengthens the alliance, supports regional stability and exercises our expeditionary capabilities,” said U.S. Army Lt. Col. David Dicrescenzo, commander of Task Force Minuteman and senior responsible officer for MANG forces in Kenya at JA25. “That’s the significance of this exercise and partnership.”

As the global security landscape continues to evolve, multinational partnerships will likely become even more important. The enduring bond between the MANG and KDF, forged over a decade of collaboration and shared experiences, serves as an example of what partnership can mean for shared lethality, strength and stability.

About SETAF-AF

SETAF-AF provides U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Army Europe and Africa a dedicated headquarters to synchronize Army activities in Africa and scalable crisis-response options in Africa and Europe.

Follow SETAF-AF: Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, LinkedIn & DVIDS

MIL OSI USA News –

March 25, 2025

Category: terrorism

Security Minister observes counter-terrorism exercise in Wales

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Updates to this page

About FATF

India’s Mutual Evaluation by FATF

Some thoughts on the Agenda for PSCF 2025

Conclusion

DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

MINORITY POSITION

BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON BUDGETS (29.1.2025)

OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS (30.1.2025)

PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

India to host 3-day FATF Private Sector Collaborative Forum 2025 (PSCF 2025) from 25th -27th March, 2025, in MumbaiFATF President Ms. Elisa de Anda Madrazo to formally inaugurate PSCF 2025 on 26th March, 2025, with RBI Governor Shri Sanjay Malhotra presiding over the event

India to host 3-day FATF Private Sector Collaborative Forum 2025 (PSCF 2025) from 25th -27th March, 2025, in Mumbai

FATF President Ms. Elisa de Anda Madrazo to formally inaugurate PSCF 2025 on 26th March, 2025, with RBI Governor Shri Sanjay Malhotra presiding over the event