Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Jason Smith (8th District of Missouri)
WASHINGTON – Ways and Means Committee Chairman Jason Smith (Mo.) issued the following statement after President Trump signed an executive order directing his administration to examine the use of reciprocal tariffs on imports from any country that currently applies tariffs or other unfair barriers on similar exports from the United States:
“President Trump understands that American workers and manufacturers can outcompete those of any other nation, but for far too long they have been held back by a lack of reciprocity because other countries impose much higher tariffs and other barriers than the United States imposes on imports. We must look at every avenue – including reciprocity – to ensure that U.S. interests are treated fairly. This new initiative by the Trump Administration follows a steady stream of bold actions to secure commitments from key trading partners to help safeguard our communities, halt China’s attempts to skirt U.S. tariffs, and initiate a wholesale review of America’s trade policies to thwart unfair practices by other nations and bring in additional revenues to our country. President Trump and congressional Republicans will continue working tirelessly to restore American leadership by standing up for working families, farmers, and small businesses here at home and in markets around the world.”
READ: Trump Administration Closes the Door on China Skirting U.S. Tariffs Through De Minimis Shipments
READ: Smith: President Trump’s Tariffs Show He Is Keeping His Promise to Protect America’s Communities
READ: Smith Applauds President Trump’s Early Action to Protect American Workers and Businesses from Unfair Trade Practices
US President Donald Trump singled out Australia’s beef trade for special mention in his announcement that the United States would impose a 10% global tariff as well as “reciprocal tariffs” on many countries.
In a long speech in the White House Rose Garden, Trump said: “Australia bans – and they’re wonderful people and wonderful everything – but they ban American beef.
“Yet we imported US$3 billion of Australian beef from them just last year alone.
“They won’t take any of our beef. They don’t want it because they don’t want it to affect their farmers and you know, I don’t blame them but we’re doing the same thing right now starting at midnight tonight, I would say.”
Australia bans US fresh beef imports because of biosecurity concerns. The US just-released Foreign Trade Barriers report says, “the United States continues to seek full market access for fresh US beef and beef products”.
Trump announced a “minimum baseline tariff” of 10%, which would apply to Australia as well as to all other countries.
Initially, given Trump’s language, there was confusion about what will happen with beef but later it was clarified it would face the basic 10% general tariff, and nothing more.
Prime Minister Anthony Albanese condemned the new US trade regime and said Australia would continue to try to get exemptions for Australia.
The trade decision was “not unexpected” but had “no basis in logic” and “was not the act of a friend”.
Albanese announced a response package, but flagged the government did not want to take the US to the World Trade Organisation. The package includes:
strenghening anti-dumping provisions
providing A$50 million to affected sectors to secure and pursue new markets
sending five missions abroad to develop other markets
setting up a new resilience program, involving $1 billion in loans to capitalise on new investment opportunities
putting Australian businesses at “the front of the queue” in a “buy Australian” policy in government procurement
setting up a strategic reserve for Australian critical minerals.
Albanese re-emphasised Australia would make no changes to the country’s biosecurity rules.
Under Trump’s announcement, varying “reciprocal” rates are being imposed on individual countries according to the barriers they impose on American items.
The president described this as “one of the most important days in American history”, saying it represented a “declaration of economic independence”.
China will face a 34% tariff, while there will be a 25% global tariff on cars imported into the US. Imports from the European Union will have a 20% tariff imposed.
There will be 25% on imports from South Korea, as well as 24% on imports from Japan and 32% on those from Taiwan.
Trump’s message to countries seeking special treatment could not have been blunter.
“To all of the foreign presidents, prime ministers, kings, queens, ambassadors, and everyone else, who will soon be calling to ask for exemptions from these tariffs, I say, terminate your own tariffs, drop your barriers, don’t manipulate here your currencies – they manipulate their currencies, like, nobody can even believe, when it’s a bad, bad thing, and very devastating to us.
“And start buying tens of billions of dollars of American goods.
“Tariffs give us protection against those looking to do us economic harm.”
He said the new US trade regime would raise trillions of dollars that would reduce American taxes and pay down its debt.
Opposition campaign spokesman James Paterson described the announcement as “disappointing”, He said Australia should work “calmly and directly” with the US administration to get a better deal.
Nationals leader David Littleproud said action against beef would mean the price of Big Mac burgers would go up for American consumers. Australian beef exported to the US is especially for burgers.
Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Source: The White House
class=”has-text-align-left”>By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), section 604 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (19 U.S.C. 2483), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, it is hereby ordered:
Section 1. Purpose. Many shippers based in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) hide illicit substances and conceal the true contents of shipments sent to the United States through deceptive shipping practices. These shippers often avoid detection due to administration of the de minimis exemption under section 321(a)(2)(C) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (19 U.S.C. 1321(a)(2)(C)).
As noted in Executive Order 14195 of February 1, 2025 (Imposing Duties to Address the Synthetic Opioid Supply Chain in the People’s Republic of China), as amended by Executive Order 14228 of March 3, 2025 (Further Amendment to Duties Addressing the Synthetic Opioid Supply Chain in the People’s Republic of China), these exports play a significant role in the synthetic opioid crisis in the United States. In Executive Order 14200 of February 5, 2025 (Amendment to Duties Addressing the Synthetic Opioid Supply Chain in the People’s Republic of China), I suspended the elimination of duty-free de minimis treatment on articles described in section 2(a) of Executive Order 14195. The Secretary of Commerce has notified me that adequate systems are now in place to process and collect tariff revenue for covered goods from the PRC otherwise eligible for duty-free de minimis treatment under 19 U.S.C. 1321(a)(2)(C). Accordingly, duty-free de minimis treatment under 19 U.S.C. 1321(a)(2)(C) shall no longer be available for products of the PRC (which include products of Hong Kong) described in section 2(a) of Executive Order 14195, as amended by Executive Order 14228, including international postal packages sent to the United States through the international postal network from the PRC or Hong Kong, that are entered for consumption, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after 12:01 am eastern daylight time on May 2, 2025. Additional duties for such imported merchandise shall be collected at the rates described in this order.
Sec. 2. Assessment of Duties on Low-Value Products of the PRC. (a) Other than articles sent to the United States through the international postal network (for which a duty is separately provided as described in subsections (b) and (c) of this section), all shipments of articles described in section 2(a) of Executive Order 14195, as amended by Executive Order 14228, that are products of the PRC or Hong Kong; that are sent to the United States; that are valued at or under 800 dollars and that would otherwise qualify for the de minimis exemption authorized in 19 U.S.C. 1321(a)(2)(C); and that are entered for consumption, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after 12:01 am eastern daylight time on May 2, 2025, shall be entered by a party qualified to make entry under another appropriate entry type in the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) operated by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) of the Department of Homeland Security, with all applicable duties, including those imposed by section 2(a) of Executive Order 14195, as amended by Executive Order 14228, and paid in accordance with the applicable entry and payment procedures. Executive departments and agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security, through CBP, shall take all necessary actions to effectuate the objectives of this order, consistent with applicable law, including through temporary suspension or amendment of regulations or notices in the Federal Register. The United States International Trade Commission shall continue to act ministerially by modifying the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS), as needed, to reflect the actions set out in this order.
(b) Imposition of Duty.
(i) All postal items containing goods described in section 2(a) of Executive Order 14195 and sent to the United States through the international postal network from the PRC or Hong Kong and transported by carriers that are valued at or under 800 dollars and that would otherwise qualify for the de minimis exemption authorized in 19 U.S.C. 1321(a)(2)(C) shall be subject to the duties described in subsection (c) of this section. In order to address the threat of the PRC’s failure to act to blunt the sustained influx of synthetic opioids into the United States, while allowing for the orderly flow of legitimate international mail, the duties imposed in subsection (c) of this section, except as required by applicable law, are imposed in lieu of any other duties that the shipments would otherwise be subject to, including the 20 percent ad valorem duty established in Executive Order 14195, as amended by Executive Order 14228; most-favored nation rates embodied in the HTSUS; and duties imposed pursuant to section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.
(ii) CBP is authorized to require the carrier transporting the international postal package into the United States to remit payment of the duty described in subsection (c) of this section to CBP monthly or on such other periodic time frame as CBP determines appropriate, and CBP may issue regulations and guidance as necessary or appropriate to implement and enforce this requirement.
(iii) All carriers that transport international postal packages from the PRC or Hong Kong to the United States as part of or on behalf of the international postal network must report to CBP the total number of postal items containing goods and, if electing the duty rate specified in subsection (c)(i) of this section, the value of each postal item containing goods, transported per conveyance, in a timeframe and manner prescribed by CBP. CBP may require submission of documentation and information from the carrier to verify the total number and value of individual postal items containing goods to be electronically transmitted through the ACE.
(c) Duty Rates. Transportation carriers delivering shipments to the United States from the PRC or Hong Kong sent through the international postal network must collect and remit duties to CBP under the approach outlined in either subsection (c)(i) or subsection (c)(ii) of this section. Transportation carriers must apply the same duty collection methodology to all shipments; however, transportation carriers may change their collection methodology once a month or on such other periodic timeframe as CBP determines appropriate, upon providing 24-hour notice to CBP.
(i) Ad Valorem Duty. 30 percent of the value of the postal item containing goods for merchandise entered for consumption on or after 12:01 am eastern daylight time on May 2, 2025.
(ii) Specific Duty. 25 dollars per postal item containing goods for merchandise entered for consumption on or after 12:01 am eastern daylight time on May 2, 2025, and before 12:01 am eastern daylight time on June 1, 2025, and 50 dollars per postal item containing goods for merchandise entered for consumption on or after 12:01 am eastern daylight time on June 1, 2025.
(d) Bond Requirement. Any carrier that transports international postal items containing goods from the PRC or Hong Kong to the United States, by any mode of transportation, must have an international carrier bond to ensure payment of the duty described in subsections (b) and (c) of this section. CBP is authorized to ensure that the international carrier bonds required by this subsection are sufficient to account for the duty described in subsections (b) and (c) of this section.
(e) Discretion to Require Formal Entry. CBP may require formal entry, in accordance with existing regulations, for any international postal package that may otherwise be subject to the duty described in subsections (b) and (c) of this section. An international postal package for which CBP requires formal entry will not be subject to the duty described in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, and instead will be subject to all applicable duties, taxes, and fees in accordance with all applicable laws.
Sec. 3. Implementation of Duty. The Secretary of Homeland Security is directed to take all necessary actions to implement this order. Consistent with section 4 of Executive Order 14195, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of Commerce, is authorized to take such actions, including adopting rules and regulations, and to employ all powers granted to the President by IEEPA as may be necessary to implement this order.
Sec. 4. Homeland Security Authorities. Nothing in this order limits the ability of the Department of Homeland Security to use any available legal authorities granted to ensure compliance with the provisions of this order.
Sec. 5. Monitoring. Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the United States Trade Representative, shall submit a report to the President regarding the impact of this order on American industries, consumers, and supply chains and making recommendations for further action as he deems necessary, including a recommendation on whether extending de minimis ineligibility to packages from Macau is necessary to prevent circumvention of this order.
Sec. 6. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department, agency, or the head thereof; or
(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
DONALD J. TRUMP
THE WHITE HOUSE, April 2, 2025.
US President Donald Trump singled out Australia’s beef trade for special mention in his announcement that the United States would impose a 10% global tariff as well as “reciprocal tariffs” on many countries.
In a long speech in the White House Rose Garden, Trump said: “Australia bans – and they’re wonderful people and wonderful everything – but they ban American beef.
“Yet we imported US$3 billion of Australian beef from them just last year alone.
“They won’t take any of our beef. They don’t want it because they don’t want it to affect their farmers and you know, I don’t blame them but we’re doing the same thing right now starting at midnight tonight, I would say.”
Australia bans US fresh beef imports because of biosecurity concerns. The US just-released Foreign Trade Barriers report says, “the United States continues to seek full market access for fresh US beef and beef products”.
Trump announced a “minimum baseline tariff” of 10%, which would apply to Australia as well as to all other countries.
Initially, given Trump’s language, there was confusion about what will happen with beef but later it was clarified it would face the basic 10% general tariff, and nothing more.
Prime Minister Anthony Albanese condemned the new US trade regime and said Australia would continue to try to get exemptions for Australia.
The trade decision was “not unexpected” but had “no basis in logic” and “was not the act of a friend”.
Albanese announced a response package, but flagged the government did not want to take the US to the World Trade Organisation. The package includes:
strenghening anti-dumping provisions
providing A$50 million to affected sectors to secure and pursue new markets
sending five missions abroad to develop other markets
setting up a new resilience program, involving $1 billion in loans to capitalise on new investment opportunities
putting Australian businesses at “the front of the queue” in a “buy Australian” policy in government procurement
setting up a strategic reserve for Australian critical minerals.
Albanese re-emphasised Australia would make no changes to the country’s biosecurity rules.
Under Trump’s announcement, varying “reciprocal” rates are being imposed on individual countries according to the barriers they impose on American items.
The president described this as “one of the most important days in American history”, saying it represented a “declaration of economic independence”.
China will face a 34% tariff, while there will be a 25% global tariff on cars imported into the US. Imports from the European Union will have a 20% tariff imposed.
There will be 25% on imports from South Korea, as well as 24% on imports from Japan and 32% on those from Taiwan.
Trump’s message to countries seeking special treatment could not have been blunter.
“To all of the foreign presidents, prime ministers, kings, queens, ambassadors, and everyone else, who will soon be calling to ask for exemptions from these tariffs, I say, terminate your own tariffs, drop your barriers, don’t manipulate here your currencies – they manipulate their currencies, like, nobody can even believe, when it’s a bad, bad thing, and very devastating to us.
“And start buying tens of billions of dollars of American goods.
“Tariffs give us protection against those looking to do us economic harm.”
He said the new US trade regime would raise trillions of dollars that would reduce American taxes and pay down its debt.
Opposition campaign spokesman James Paterson described the announcement as “disappointing”, He said Australia should work “calmly and directly” with the US administration to get a better deal.
Nationals leader David Littleproud said action against beef would mean the price of Big Mac burgers would go up for American consumers. Australian beef exported to the US is especially for burgers.
Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Source: United States Senator for New Hampshire Jeanne Shaheen
(Washington, DC) – U.S. Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH) released the following statement in response to President Trump imposing 10 percent tariffs on all imported goods, with far higher taxes on many more countries:
“President Trump’s extreme, sweeping tariffs amount to a national sales tax—which may be the largest tax increase during peacetime in U.S. history—that will indeed punish Granite State families, consumers and small businesses the most. Instead of focusing on how to lower costs for families who are struggling to make ends meet, the President is insistent on starting an unnecessary trade war.
“Make no mistake: hardworking Americans—not foreign nations—will be forced to pick up the tab. And in the President’s own words, he ‘couldn’t care less’ if prices go up.
“If the impact here at home wasn’t enough, the President’s reckless tariffs will harm our global standing – weakening our national security and fueling China’s growth. To punish families with higher prices while driving our trading partners towards one of our top adversaries is simply putting America Last.
“Families will foot the bill so that the administration can pay for tax cuts for billionaires. The President must immediately reverse course before he isolates America further and runs our economy into the ground.”
Economists and business leaders alike have said broad tariffs could stoke further inflation, worsen the risk of a recession and raise prices on consumers.
In recent weeks, Senator Shaheen has traveled across the Granite State to hear from multiple small business owners—including C&J, DCI Furniture, Mount Cabot Maple and American Calan Inc.—about how President Trump’s threat of sweeping tariffs has already harmed their ability to maintain current operations, let alone grow and compete.
Last month, Shaheen invited Rebecca Hamilton, the co-owner and co-CEO of Badger in Gilsum, New Hampshire, to be her guest for President Trump’s Joint Address to Congress. Badger is one of many New Hampshire small businesses that will be badly hit by today’s tariffs. A day prior, Shaheen took to the Senate floor to call for unanimous consent to pass her legislation—the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes on Imported Goods Act. If Republicans had not blocked passage, Shaheen’s bill would have shielded American consumers and businesses from rising prices and higher taxes caused by President Trump’s tariffs on Canada and Mexico.
US President Donald Trump singled out Australia’s beef trade for special mention in his announcement that the United States would impose a 10% global tariff as well as “reciprocal tariffs” on many countries.
In a long speech in the White House Rose Garden, Trump said: “Australia bans – and they’re wonderful people and wonderful everything – but they ban American beef.
“Yet we imported US$3 billion of Australian beef from them just last year alone.
“They won’t take any of our beef. They don’t want it because they don’t want it to affect their farmers and you know, I don’t blame them but we’re doing the same thing right now starting at midnight tonight, I would say.”
Australia bans US beef imports because of biosecurity concerns. The US just-released Foreign Trade Barriers report says, “the United States continues to seek full market access for fresh US beef and beef products”.
While exactly what will happen with beef is unclear, Trump announced a “minimum baseline tariff” of 10%, which would apply to Australia as well as to all other countries.
Prime Minister Anthony Albanese condemned the new US trade regime, and said Australia would continue to try to get exemptions for Australia.
The trade decision was “not unexpected” but had “no basis in logic” and “was not the act of a friend”.
Albanese announced a response package, but
flagged the government did not want to take the US to the World Trade Organisation. The package includes:
strenghening anti-dumping provisions
providing A$50 million to affected sectors to secure and pursue new markets
sending five missions abroad to develop other markets
setting up a new resilience program, involving $1 billion in loans to capitalise on new investment opportunities
putting Australian businesses at “the front of the queue” in a “buy Australian” policy in government procurement
setting up a strategic reserve for Australian critical minerals.
Albanese re-emphasised Australia would make no changes to the country’s biosecurity rules.
Under Trump’s announcement, varying “reciprocal” rates are being imposed on individual countries according to the barriers they impose on American items.
The president described this as “one of the most important days in American history”, saying it represented a “declaration of economic independence”.
China will face a 34% tariff, while there will be a 25% global tariff on cars imported into the US. Imports from the European Union will have a 20% tariff imposed.
There will be 25% on imports from South Korea, as well as 24% on imports from Japan and 32% on those from Taiwan.
Trump’s message to countries seeking special treatment could not have been blunter.
“To all of the foreign presidents, prime ministers, kings, queens, ambassadors, and everyone else, who will soon be calling to ask for exemptions from these tariffs, I say, terminate your own tariffs, drop your barriers, don’t manipulate here your currencies – they manipulate their currencies, like, nobody can even believe, when it’s a bad, bad thing, and very devastating to us.
“And start buying tens of billions of dollars of American goods.
“Tariffs give us protection against those looking to do us economic harm.”
He said the new US trade regime would raise trillions of dollars that would reduce American taxes and pay down its debt.
Opposition campaign spokesman James Paterson described the announcement as “disappointing”, He said Australia should work “calmly and directly” with the US administration to get a better deal.
Nationals leader David Littleproud said action against beef would mean the price of Big Mac burgers would go up for American consumers. Australian beef exported to the US is especially for burgers.
Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Source: United States Senator Peter Welch (D-Vermont)
Welch slams Trump’s trade war on the Senate Floor: “These tariffs will be a dagger in the heart of the Vermont economy.”
WASHINGTON, D.C. – Tonight, U.S. Senator Peter Welch (D-Vt.), a member of the Senate Finance and Senate Agriculture Committees, voted to end President Trump’s reckless tariffs on Canadian imports—a tax on Vermont businesses and manufactures, farmers, and families. The vote comes on the same day President Trump imposed new global tariffs, throwing the economy into chaos.
“These tariffs on Canada are terrible for Vermont’s economy, arbitrary, and frankly—really stupid. President Trump’s trade war has raised prices for working families across the country and eroded trust between our neighbor and best ally in trade. I voted to end these reckless tariffs and reassert Congress’s power over trade policy,” said Senator Peter Welch after the vote.
Before voting, Senator Welch took to the Senate Floor to denounce President Trump’s announcement of new, blanket tariffs, which will devastate Vermont and the global economy. The Senator’s remarks followed a press conference earlier today where Senator Welch described President Trump’s trade policy as “Totally bad. Totally wrong. Doomed.”
“I want to talk about how these tariffs will be a dagger in the heart of the Vermont economy. The question for this institution is will we, as the United States Senate, accept the responsibility that each and every one of us, as Senators, has to stand up for the independent authority and responsibility of this institution?” asked Senator Welch from the Senate Floor.
“…What I’m seeing is a lawless rampage on the part of the Executive, being accommodated by an appeasing Congress, not standing up for its authority in many different areas…A couple decades ago this Congress gave, and delegated, some authority to the President in a national emergency to impose tariffs. That authority was given with the expectation, and rightly so in a mutually respectful civil society, that a President would use it for the intended purpose and with restraint. Whether it was Republican or Democrat…” Welch continued. “What President Trump has done is run roughshod over that, showing no restraint and using that delegation of authority, not for a national emergency, but for whatever his latest policy idea is and whatever leverage he wants to extract. We cannot allow that to happen and maintain the separation of powers that is so fundamental to the long-term well-being of our country. Senator Kaine is absolutely right. This is not a partisan question, it’s an institutional question: Do we see our role—do we see our responsibility—for maintaining that system of checks and balances? I do. That’s the heart of this matter.”
In his remarks from the Senate Floor, Senator Welch shared the concerns of impacted Vermonters, including farmers, food banks, manufactures, construction companies and homebuilders, maple sugar makers, and more.
Watch his full remarks here:
Earlier today, Senator Welch joined Democratic Leader Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.), Senator Tim Kaine (D-Va.) and Senator Angela Alsobrooks (D-Md.) to slam the Administration’s trade war:
“Nobody supports tariffs economically. Economists have looked at this and they don’t work, and they do a lot of hurt…. We have an affordability crisis in this country. Working families are struggling to pay their bills. And just in Vermont—to make it very concrete—we get a lot of our electricity from Canada. We get a lot of our gasoline—on the northern part of Vermont—from Canada. We get our home heating fuel from Canada. And those bills for folks are going to go up immediately,” Senator Welch said.
“Canada is our friend. It’s not China. And along the border, where we have decades and decades of mutual respect, that’s starting to change—into distrust. And a confident country treats its allies with respect, and these tariffs are going to do direct and immediate economic harm to everyday Vermont families and farmers, maple sugar producers. But it’s also going to start eroding the trust that is the benefit of good relations over time…Totally bad. Totally wrong. Doomed. And the only question is: How much pain will he inflict on everyday Vermonters before he comes to his senses and withdraws this tariff policy?” Senator Welch concluded.
View the livestream here:
Background on S.J.Res. 37 and the Trade War:
The bipartisan joint resolution of disapproval, cosponsored by Welch and led by Sen. Tim Kaine (D-Va.), would terminate President Trump’s February 1st emergency declaration used to launch the trade war with Canada and eliminate the tariffs on Canadian imports. President Trump’s order cites the International Economic Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA), an unprecedented use of IEEPA in its nearly half-century history.
Senator Welch has blasted Trump’s tariffs and trade war and shared stories from constituents about how President Trump’s economic policies have impacted their businesses, farms, and communities. Recently, Senator Welch hosted a roundtable in Newport with Vermont and Canadian business leaders to discuss President Trump’s Trade War. He has also held events in St. Albans and virtually to hear directly from impacted Vermonters.
Canada is the largest trading partner for 34 U.S. states, including Vermont. In 2024 alone, trade with Canada accounted for 35% of Vermont’s exports, 67% of imports, and 56% of its total trade. One in four businesses in Vermont relies on trade with Canada.
In many cases, Vermont manufacturers buy imports from Canada to manufacture products. Tariffs on Canada threaten business closures and job layoffs, higher homebuilding costs, increased grain costs for farmers, and more expensive equipment for maple producers—among other costs that will get passed on to working families.
A new poll from AP-NORC found that a majority of voters—60%—disapprove of the president’s handling of trade negotiations, and 58% disapprove of his handling of the economy.
CITES is the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, monitoring and regulating the international movement of items made from protected species. CITES ensures the long-term survival of these species is not threatened.
Mark Ryan, DOC’s Border Operations Team Lead, says the recently compiled CITES statistics show the level of seizures and surrenders is returning to pre-COVID levels, with around 6,337 CITES-listed items seized or surrendered at the border in 2024 (up from 6,278 for 2023, and 3,060 surrenders and seizures in 2022).
“We are seeing seizures and surrenders begin to increase again, although we’ve not yet reached the pre-COVID levels – in 2019 for example, we had more than 8,700 CITES items seized or surrendered,” says Mark.
“Although corals, clams, and medicine still dominate the CITES items coming in, 2024 saw an array of exotic food items and leather goods carried by in-bound passengers or shipped by importers.”
Among the 1,144 food items seized or surrendered was a large volume of crocodile jerky – much of it from Australian crocodile farms – and a few cans of whale and bear meat with elaborate label art. Shark and turtle meat were also among the items seized or surrendered in 2024.
“Although the packaging of the bear meat suggests it may have been legal to purchase it in the country of origin, the importer still needed the correct CITES permits to bring it into New Zealand,” says Mark.
Fashion products made from the leather of protected species also feature in the 2024 CITES seizures and surrenders, including handbags, purses, and footwear made from python or crocodile skin.
Although some items may be worth hundreds of dollars and legally purchased overseas, this does not exempt them from needing a CITES permit when coming into New Zealand. Mark says CITES works at the level of species, and is not determined by the value of an item.
“We appreciate these types of fashion items and accessories are treasured by their owners, but anyone planning on bringing them into New Zealand should check the CITES rules and ensure they have the correct permit.”
Other unusual items seized or surrendered since the start of 2024 include dried sea horses, hippopotamus teeth, and the skull and tail of a lynx. CITES also covers items such as elephant ivory carvings, some insect species, and more than 34,000 plants.
More information
The main CITES seizure/surrender events in 2024 involved:
Coral (raw) – 1,678 seizures/surrenders
Medicine – 1,254 seizures/surrenders
Shells – 1,253 seizures/surrenders
Meats – 1,144 seizures/surrenders (most of these are crocodile jerky)
DOC has an entire section of its website dedicated to CITES, and anyone planning on travelling overseas is urged to familiarise themselves with the CITES rules.
DOC carries out a range of outreach activities, education, and publicity work to support its CITES responsibilities.
New Zealand has the highest proportion of threatened native species compared to anywhere else in the world – more than 4,000 are threatened or at risk of extinction.
It’s not just a few unique species – 72% of our birds, 84% of our plants, 88% of our fish, and 100% of our reptiles are only found in Aotearoa New Zealand. Trade represents a threat for some of these species.
Source: United States Senator Reverend Raphael Warnock – Georgia
Senator Reverend Warnock Issues Statement on Potential Harm President Trump’s Reckless Tariffs Will put on Price of Groceries, Everyday Goods
Today, President Trump announced the rollout of a sweeping set of tariffs that will raise the cost of everyday goods for ordinary Georgians
The tariffs willincrease costs on many consumer purchases, including cars and groceries, and risk the loss of Georgia manufacturing jobs
Today’s announcement will directly harm Georgia’s agriculture and manufacturing sectors
Senator Reverend Warnock is the Ranking Member of the Senate Finance Subcommittee on International Trade, Customs, and Global Competitiveness
Senator Reverend Warnock: “Today’s tariffs announcement won’t make Georgians’ lives easier or more affordable, but instead will make life more expensive”
Washington, D.C. – Today, U.S. Senator Reverend Raphael Warnock (D-GA), ranking member of the Senate Finance Subcommittee on International Trade, Customs, and Global Competitiveness, issued the following statement after President Trump rolled out a sweeping set of tariffs that raise the prices of everyday goods, like groceries.
“I was sent to the Senate to advocate on behalf of Georgians from across the state, to help bring down their everyday costs,to fight to protect their jobs, and to help more people afford things like a car and a home.”
“Today’s tariffs announcement won’t make Georgians’ lives easier or more affordable, but instead will make life more expensive.”
“The chaos of these tariffs will raise the prices of cars, groceries, housing, and so much more, allwhile putting American farmers, the backbone of our state’s economy, in the middle of an international trade war that will only lead to reduced access to foreign markets and even shuttered farms.”
“Tariffs can be a good tool to protect American jobs and force other nations to play by the rules. But when they are imposed in such an unpredictable, chaotic, and sweeping manner, it is the average American who will bear the brunt in the fallout of these actions.”
“I will continue to fight back on any actions that put Georgia and American families in overwhelmingly burdensome financial situations. These tariffs won’t help anybody and will wreck our economy.”
Source: United States House of Representatives – Congresswoman Linda Sanchez (38th District of CA)
WASHINGTON – Ways and Means Trade Subcommittee Ranking Member Linda T. Sánchez (D-Calif.) today introduced the Closing the De Minimis Loophole Act, the most comprehensive bill to close a loophole that has harmed American consumers and families and gutted U.S. manufacturing by allowing illicit goods—like fentanyl, counterfeit products, and items made with forced labor—to enter the United States through relaxed import requirements for low-value packages.
Foreign bad actors are exploiting a customs process known as “de minimis” entry, which allows packages valued under $800 to enter the country without tariffs and through a simplified process. As the number of these shipments has surged in recent years, Customs and Border Protection has struggled to identify and block packages containing illicit drugs, counterfeit goods, items produced with forced labor and other illegal products.
“Closing the de minimis loophole is essential to protecting American manufacturing and shielding families from fentanyl and other dangerous products,” said Ranking Member Sánchez. “Countries like China are exploiting this loophole to bypass our trade laws and ship harmful or low-quality goods directly to homes. By closing the loophole, we can level the playing field for American workers, keep families safe from fentanyl, and prevent other dangerous products from entering our communities undetected.”
TheClosing the De Minimis Loophole Actis endorsed by the National Council of Textile Organizations, the National Association of Police Organizations, Facing Fentanyl and the United Steelworkers.
“On behalf of the U.S. textile industry, I want to sincerely thank Congresswoman Sánchez for her leadership in introducing critical legislation today aimed at permanently closing the destructive de minimis loophole to commercial shipments from China and notably all countries,” said Anderson Warlick, chairman and CEO of Parkdale Mills. “Over 4 million de minimis packages valued at $800 or less are now entering the United States every day with virtually no scrutiny or inspection – half are estimated to be textile and apparel products. De minimis is a black-market duty-free superhighway of goods hiding forced labor and illegal products and putting our essential industry out of business. Congresswoman Sánchez’s bill would finally stop the abuse of this loophole. This legislation would also help restore a level playing field for the U.S. textile industry, which has lost 27 plants in the past 20 months. We believe the congresswoman’s bill is the strongest, most comprehensive legislation to date that will counter global predatory trade practices and address the de minimis crisis we are all facing. This bill has our strongest support, and we will do all we can to get this bill over the finish line.”
“Facing Fentanyl strongly supports Congresswoman Sánchez’sClosing the De Minimis Loophole Act,” said Andrea Thomas, founder, Facing Fentanyl. “This critical piece of legislation takes a significant step toward closing the dangerous loophole that has allowed deadly fentanyl and other illicit substances to enter the United States undetected, putting our communities and families at grave risk.
“As an organization representing over 200 fentanyl awareness groups and thousands of families who have lost loved ones to fentanyl poisoning, Facing Fentanyl knows firsthand the devastating impact of this epidemic. This bill is a necessary and urgent measure to protect future generations from the same tragic fate. We thank Congresswoman Sanchez for her leadership and urge Congress to act quickly to pass this bill and bring an end to the flow of fentanyl into our communities.”
“Law enforcement is battling the trafficking of illegal narcotics on multiple fronts, including the international mail system. The de minimis loophole is severely exacerbating the opioid crisis by allowing fentanyl and other illegal opioids to enter our country largely uninspected. The closure of this trade loophole is vital to removing significant fentanyl trafficking routes into this country and is essential to any national strategy to end the fentanyl crisis,” said Bill Johnson, executive director of the National Association of Police Organizations. “NAPO supports theClosing the De Minimis Loophole Actand the efforts of Congresswoman Sánchez to ensure the de minimis trade exemption will no longer be a gateway for illicit drugs and goods to cross our borders.”
“As a member of the bicycle industry I strongly support the efforts of Congresswomen Sanchez to close the de minimis loophole,” said Patrick Cunnane, Stoker Strategies, bicycle industry consultant and advisor to Hyper Bicycles. “I learned while CEO of the largest specialty retailer of bicycle products how harmful the de minimis loophole was to my business. Today’s bill levels the playing field for USA based retailers while protecting consumers from counterfeit and unsafe products. At the same time generating revenue by collecting tariffs that all USA based companies must pay.”
TheClosing the De Minimis Loophole Act:
Immediately ends de minimis treatment for packages from China and phases out de minimis for all other countries after a four-month transition period.
Directs the Treasury Secretary to oversee a rulemaking process during the four-month transition, ensuring that U.S. Customs and Border Protection has the necessary tools and procedures to implement the termination of de minimis for all countries smoothly and efficiently.
Directs the Treasury Secretary to consult with the Postmaster General to establish appropriate fees and entry procedures, aiming for consistency between postal and other shipments wherever feasible.
Ranking Member Sánchez was joined by supporters of the bill at a press conference earlier today. That press conference can be viewed HERE.
Source: United States House of Representatives – Congresswoman Linda Sanchez (38th District of CA)
WASHINGTON – Ways and Means Trade Subcommittee Democrats released the following joint statement in response to President Trump’s 25 percent tariffs against Canada and Mexico that went into effect today:
“President Trump is threatening our economy with these damaging, unnecessary tariffs. He is on the verge of sparking several trade wars that will be fought on multiple fronts, including against some of our closest friends and allies, upending the international trading system the United States worked to create.
“The consequences will be devastating – costs will increase on everything from gas to groceries, making it even harder for American families to make ends meet. At the same time, that he’s raising prices at the supermarket, President Trump is jeopardizing hundreds of thousands of American jobs. President Trump is starting a trade war and American families are caught in the cross-fire.
“Americans simply cannot afford to be caught in endless trade wars. Democrats on the Trade Subcommittee are united in rejecting these irresponsible tariffs designed to increase revenue for more tax cuts for the ultra-wealthy. We also call on our Republican colleagues to work with us to reassert Congress’ role in setting strategic, stable trade policies and to invest in the American economy, instead of abdicating their responsibilities to President Trump and Elon Musk.”
PURSUING RECIPROCITY TO REBUILD THE ECONOMY AND RESTORE NATIONAL AND ECONOMIC SECURITY: Today, President Donald J. Trump declared that foreign trade and economic practices have created a national emergency, and his order imposes responsive tariffs to strengthen the international economic position of the United States and protect American workers.
Large and persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits have led to the hollowing out of our manufacturing base; resulted in a lack of incentive to increase advanced domestic manufacturing capacity; undermined critical supply chains; and rendered our defense-industrial base dependent on foreign adversaries.
President Trump is invoking his authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA) to address the national emergency posed by the large and persistent trade deficit that is driven by the absence of reciprocity in our trade relationships and other harmful policies like currency manipulation and exorbitant value-added taxes (VAT) perpetuated by other countries.
Using his IEEPA authority, President Trump will impose a 10% tariff on all countries.
This will take effect April 5, 2025 at 12:01 a.m. EDT.
President Trump will impose an individualized reciprocal higher tariff on the countries with which the United States has the largest trade deficits. All other countries will continue to be subject to the original 10% tariff baseline.
This will take effect April 9, 2025 at 12:01 a.m. EDT.
These tariffs will remain in effect until such a time as President Trump determines that the threat posed by the trade deficit and underlying nonreciprocal treatment is satisfied, resolved, or mitigated.
Today’s IEEPA Order also contains modification authority, allowing President Trump to increase the tariff if trading partners retaliate or decrease the tariffs if trading partners take significant steps to remedy non-reciprocal trade arrangements and align with the United States on economic and national security matters.
Some goods will not be subject to the Reciprocal Tariff. These include: (1) articles subject to 50 USC 1702(b); (2) steel/aluminum articles and autos/auto parts already subject to Section 232 tariffs; (3) copper, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, and lumber articles; (4) all articles that may become subject to future Section 232 tariffs; (5) bullion; and (6) energy and other certain minerals that are not available in the United States.
For Canada and Mexico, the existing fentanyl/migration IEEPA orders remain in effect, and are unaffected by this order. This means USMCA compliant goods will continue to see a 0% tariff, non-USMCA compliant goods will see a 25% tariff, and non-USMCA compliant energy and potash will see a 10% tariff. In the event the existing fentanyl/migration IEEPA orders are terminated, USMCA compliant goods would continue to receive preferential treatment, while non-USMCA compliant goods would be subject to a 12% reciprocal tariff.
TAKING BACK OUR ECONOMIC SOVEREIGNTY: President Trump refuses to let the United States be taken advantage of and believes that tariffs are necessary to ensure fair trade, protect American workers, and reduce the trade deficit—this is an emergency.
He is the first President in modern history to stand strong for hardworking Americans by asking other countries to follow the golden rule on trade: Treat us like we treat you.
Pernicious economic policies and practices of our trading partners undermine our ability to produce essential goods for the public and the military, threatening national security.
U.S. companies, according to internal estimates, pay over $200 billion per year in value-added taxes (VAT) to foreign governments—a “double-whammy” on U.S. companies who pay the tax at the European border, while European companies don’t pay tax to the United States on the income from their exports to the U.S.
The annual cost to the U.S. economy of counterfeit goods, pirated software, and theft of trade secrets is between $225 billion and $600 billion. Counterfeit products not only pose a significant risk to U.S. competitiveness, but also threaten the security, health, and safety of Americans, with the global trade in counterfeit pharmaceuticals estimated at $4.4 billion and linked to the distribution of deadly fentanyl-laced drugs.
This imbalance has fueled a large and persistent trade deficit in both industrial and agricultural goods, led to offshoring of our manufacturing base, empowered non-market economies like China, and hurt America’s middle class and small towns.
President Biden squandered the agricultural trade surplus inherited from President Trump’s first term, turning it into a projected all-time high deficit of $49 billion.
The current global trading order allows those using unfair trade practices to get ahead, while those playing by the rules get left behind.
In 2024, our trade deficit in goods exceeded $1.2 trillion—an unsustainable crisis ignored by prior leadership.
“Made in America” is not just a tagline—it’s an economic and national security priority of this Administration. The President’s reciprocal trade agenda means better-paying American jobs making beautiful American-made cars, appliances, and other goods.
These tariffs seek to address the injustices of global trade, re-shore manufacturing, and drive economic growth for the American people.
Reciprocal trade is America First trade because it increases our competitive edge, protects our sovereignty, and strengthens our national and economic security.
These tariffs adjust for the unfairness of ongoing international trade practices, balance our chronic goods trade deficit, provide an incentive for re-shoring production to the United States, and provide our foreign trading partners with an opportunity to rebalance their trade relationships with the United States.
REPRIORITIZING U.S. MANUFACTURING: President Trump recognizes that increasing domestic manufacturing is critical to U.S. national security.
In 2023, U.S. manufacturing output as a share of global manufacturing output was 17.4%, down from 28.4% in 2001.
The decline in manufacturing output has reduced U.S. manufacturing capacity.
The need to maintain a resilient domestic manufacturing capacity is particularly acute in advanced sectors like autos, shipbuilding, pharmaceuticals, transport equipment, technology products, machine tools, and basic and fabricated metals, where loss of capacity could permanently weaken U.S. competitiveness.
U.S. stockpiles of military goods are too low to be compatible with U.S. national defense interests.
If the U.S. wishes to maintain an effective security umbrella to defend its citizens and homeland, as well as allies and partners, it needs to have a large upstream manufacturing and goods-producing ecosystem.
This includes developing new manufacturing technologies in critical sectors like bio-manufacturing, batteries, and microelectronics to support defense needs.
Increased reliance on foreign producers for goods has left the U.S. supply chain vulnerable to geopolitical disruption and supply shocks.
This vulnerability was exposed during the COVID-19 pandemic, and later with Houthi attacks on Middle East shipping.
From 1997 to 2024, the U.S. lost around 5 million manufacturing jobs and experienced one of the largest drops in manufacturing employment in history.
ADDRESSING TRADE IMBALANCES: President Trump is working to level the playing field for American businesses and workers by confronting the unfair tariff disparities and non-tariff barriers imposed by other countries.
For generations, countries have taken advantage of the United States, tariffing us at higher rates. For example:
The United States imposes a 2.5% tariff on passenger vehicle imports (with internal combustion engines), while the European Union (10%) and India (70%) impose much higher duties on the same product.
For networking switches and routers, the United States imposes a 0% tariff, but India (10-20%) levies higher rates.
Brazil (18%) and Indonesia (30%) impose a higher tariff on ethanol than does the United States (2.5%).
For rice in the husk, the U.S. imposes a tariff of 2.7%, while India (80%), Malaysia (40%), and Turkey (31%) impose higher rates.
Apples enter the United States duty-free, but not so in Turkey (60.3%) and India (50%).
The United States has one of the lowest simple average most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff rates in the world at 3.3%, while many of our key trading partners like Brazil (11.2%), China (7.5%), the European Union (5%), India (17%), and Vietnam (9.4%) have simple average MFN tariff rates that are significantly higher.
Similarly, non-tariff barriers—meant to limit the quantity of imports/exports and protect domestic industries—also deprive U.S. manufacturers of reciprocal access to markets around the world. For example:
China’s non-market policies and practices have given China global dominance in key manufacturing industries, decimating U.S. industry. Between 2001 and 2018, these practices contributed to the loss of 3.7 million U.S. jobs due to the growth of the U.S.-China trade deficit, displacing workers and undermining American competitiveness while threatening U.S. economic and national security by increasing our reliance on foreign-controlled supply chains for critical industries as well as everyday goods.
India imposes their own uniquely burdensome and/or duplicative testing and certification requirements in sectors such as chemicals, telecom products, and medical devices that make it difficult or costly for American companies to sell their products in India. If these barriers were removed, it is estimated that U.S. exports would increase by at least $5.3 billion annually.
Countries including China, Germany, Japan, and South Korea have pursued policies that suppress the domestic consumption power of their own citizens to artificially boost the competitiveness of their export products. Such policies include regressive tax systems, low or unenforced penalties for environmental degradation, and policies intended to suppress worker wages relative to productivity.
Certain countries, like Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and Vietnam, restrict or prohibit the importation of remanufactured goods, restricting market access for U.S. exporters while also stifling efforts to promote sustainability by discouraging trade in like-new and resource-efficient products. If these barriers were removed, it is estimated that U.S. exports would increase by at least $18 billion annually.
The UK maintains non-science-based standards that severely restrict U.S. exports of safe, high-quality beef and poultry products.
Indonesia maintains local content requirements across a broad range of sectors, complex import licensing regimes, and, starting this year, will require natural resource firms to onshore all export revenue for transactions worth $250,000 or more.
Argentina has banned imports of U.S. live cattle since 2002 due to unsubstantiated concerns regarding bovine spongiform encephalopathy. The United States has a $223 million trade deficit with Argentina in beef and beef products.
For decades, South Africa has imposed animal health restrictions that are not scientifically justified on U.S. pork products, permitting a very limited list of U.S. pork exports to enter South Africa. South Africa also heavily restricts U.S. poultry exports through high tariffs, anti-dumping duties, and unjustified animal health restrictions. These barriers have contributed to a 78% decline in U.S. poultry exports to South Africa, from $89 million in 2019 to $19 million 2024.
U.S. automakers face a variety of non-tariff barriers that impede access to the Japanese and Korean automotive markets, including non-acceptance of certain U.S. standards, duplicative testing and certification requirements, and transparency issues. Due to these non-reciprocal practices, the U.S. automotive industry loses out on an additional $13.5 billion in annual exports to Japan and access to a larger import market share in Korea—all while the U.S. trade deficit with Korea more than tripled from 2019 to 2024.
Monetary tariffs and non-monetary tariffs are two distinct types of trade barriers that governments use to regulate imports and exports. President Trump is countering both through reciprocal tariffs to protect American workers and industries from these unfair practices.
THE GOLDEN RULE FOR OUR GOLDEN AGE: Today’s action simply asks other countries to treat us like we treat them. It’s the Golden Rule for Our Golden Age.
Access to the American market is a privilege, not a right.
The United States will no longer put itself last on matters of international trade in exchange for empty promises.
Reciprocal tariffs are a big part of why Americans voted for President Trump—it was a cornerstone of his campaign from the start.
Everyone knew he’d push for them once he got back in office; it’s exactly what he promised, and it’s a key reason he won the election.
These tariffs are central to President Trump’s plan to reverse the economic damage left by President Biden and put America on a path to a new golden age.
This builds on his broader economic agenda of energy competitiveness, tax cuts, no tax on tips, no tax on Social Security benefits, and deregulation to boost American prosperity.
TARIFFS WORK: Studies have repeatedly shown that tariffs can be an effective tool for reducing or eliminating threats that impair U.S. national security and achieving economic and strategic objectives.
A 2024 study on the effects of President Trump’s tariffs in his first term found that they “strengthened the U.S. economy” and “led to significant reshoring” in industries like manufacturing and steel production.
A 2023 report by the U.S. International Trade Commission that analyzed the effects of Section 232 and 301 tariffs on more than $300 billion of U.S. imports found that the tariffs reduced imports from China and effectively stimulated more U.S. production of the tariffed goods, with very minor effects on prices.
According to the Economic Policy Institute, the tariffs implemented by President Trump during his first term “clearly show[ed] no correlation with inflation” and only had a temporary effect on overall price levels.
An analysis from the Atlantic Council found that “tariffs would create new incentives for US consumers to buy US-made products.”
Former Biden Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen affirmed last year that tariffs do not raise prices: “I don’t believe that American consumers will see any meaningful increase in the prices that they face.”
A 2024 economic analysis found that a global tariff of 10% would grow the economy by $728 billion, create 2.8 million jobs, and increase real household incomes by 5.7%.
class=”has-text-align-left”>By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)(IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.)(NEA), section 604 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (19 U.S.C. 2483), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code,
I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of America, find that underlying conditions, including a lack of reciprocity in our bilateral trade relationships, disparate tariff rates and non-tariff barriers, and U.S. trading partners’ economic policies that suppress domestic wages and consumption, as indicated by large and persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits, constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and economy of the United States. That threat has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States in the domestic economic policies of key trading partners and structural imbalances in the global trading system. I hereby declare a national emergency with respect to this threat.
On January 20, 2025, I signed the America First Trade Policy Presidential Memorandum directing my Administration to investigate the causes of our country’s large and persistent annual trade deficits in goods, including the economic and national security implications and risks resulting from such deficits, and to undertake a review of, and identify, any unfair trade practices by other countries. On February 13, 2025, I signed a Presidential Memorandum entitled “Reciprocal Trade and Tariffs,” that directed further review of our trading partners’ non-reciprocal trading practices, and noted the relationship between non-reciprocal practices and the trade deficit. On April 1, 2025, I received the final results of those investigations, and I am taking action today based on those results.
Large and persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits have led to the hollowing out of our manufacturing base; inhibited our ability to scale advanced domestic manufacturing capacity; undermined critical supply chains; and rendered our defense-industrial base dependent on foreign adversaries. Large and persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits are caused in substantial part by a lack of reciprocity in our bilateral trade relationships. This situation is evidenced by disparate tariff rates and non-tariff barriers that make it harder for U.S. manufacturers to sell their products in foreign markets. It is also evidenced by the economic policies of key U.S. trading partners insofar as they suppress domestic wages and consumption, and thereby demand for U.S. exports, while artificially increasing the competitiveness of their goods in global markets. These conditions have given rise to the national emergency that this order is intended to abate and resolve.
For decades starting in 1934, U.S. trade policy has been organized around the principle of reciprocity. The Congress directed the President to secure reduced reciprocal tariff rates from key trading partners first through bilateral trade agreements and later under the auspices of the global trading system. Between 1934 and 1945, the executive branch negotiated and signed 32 bilateral reciprocal trade agreements designed to lower tariff rates on a reciprocal basis. After 1947 through 1994, participating countries engaged in eight rounds of negotiation, which resulted in the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and seven subsequent tariff reduction rounds.
However, despite a commitment to the principle of reciprocity, the trading relationship between the United States and its trading partners has become highly unbalanced, particularly in recent years. The post-war international economic system was based upon three incorrect assumptions: first, that if the United States led the world in liberalizing tariff and non-tariff barriers the rest of the world would follow; second, that such liberalization would ultimately result in more economic convergence and increased domestic consumption among U.S. trading partners converging towards the share in the United States; and third, that as a result, the United States would not accrue large and persistent goods trade deficits.
This framework set in motion events, agreements, and commitments that did not result in reciprocity or generally increase domestic consumption in foreign economies relative to domestic consumption in the United States. Those events, in turn, created large and persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits as a feature of the global trading system.
Put simply, while World Trade Organization (WTO) Members agreed to bind their tariff rates on a most-favored-nation (MFN) basis, and thereby provide their best tariff rates to all WTO Members, they did not agree to bind their tariff rates at similarly low levels or to apply tariff rates on a reciprocal basis. Consequently, according to the WTO, the United States has among the lowest simple average MFN tariff rates in the world at 3.3 percent, while many of our key trading partners like Brazil (11.2 percent), China (7.5 percent), the European Union (EU) (5 percent), India (17 percent), and Vietnam (9.4 percent) have simple average MFN tariff rates that are significantly higher.
Moreover, these average MFN tariff rates conceal much larger discrepancies across economies in tariff rates applied to particular products. For example, the United States imposes a 2.5 percent tariff on passenger vehicle imports (with internal combustion engines), while the European Union (10 percent), India (70 percent), and China (15 percent) impose much higher duties on the same product. For network switches and routers, the United States imposes a 0 percent tariff, but for similar products, India (10 percent) levies a higher rate. Brazil (18 percent) and Indonesia (30 percent) impose a higher tariff on ethanol than does the United States (2.5 percent). For rice in the husk, the U.S. MFN tariff is 2.7 percent (ad valorem equivalent), while India (80 percent), Malaysia (40 percent), and Turkey (an average of 31 percent) impose higher rates. Apples enter the United States duty-free, but not so in Turkey (60.3 percent) and India (50 percent).
Similarly, non-tariff barriers also deprive U.S. manufacturers of reciprocal access to markets around the world. The 2025 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers (NTE) details a great number of non-tariff barriers to U.S. exports around the world on a trading-partner by trading-partner basis. These barriers include import barriers and licensing restrictions; customs barriers and shortcomings in trade facilitation; technical barriers to trade (e.g., unnecessarily trade restrictive standards, conformity assessment procedures, or technical regulations); sanitary and phytosanitary measures that unnecessarily restrict trade without furthering safety objectives; inadequate patent, copyright, trade secret, and trademark regimes and inadequate enforcement of intellectual property rights; discriminatory licensing requirements or regulatory standards; barriers to cross-border data flows and discriminatory practices affecting trade in digital products; investment barriers; subsidies; anticompetitive practices; discrimination in favor of domestic state-owned enterprises, and failures by governments in protecting labor and environment standards; bribery; and corruption.
Moreover, non-tariff barriers include the domestic economic policies and practices of our trading partners, including currency practices and value-added taxes, and their associated market distortions, that suppress domestic consumption and boost exports to the United States. This lack of reciprocity is apparent in the fact that the share of consumption to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the United States is about 68 percent, but it is much lower in others like Ireland (27 percent), Singapore (31 percent), China (39 percent), South Korea (49 percent), and Germany (50 percent).
At the same time, efforts by the United States to address these imbalances have stalled. Trading partners have repeatedly blocked multilateral and plurilateral solutions, including in the context of new rounds of tariff negotiations and efforts to discipline non-tariff barriers. At the same time, with the U.S. economy disproportionately open to imports, U.S. trading partners have had few incentives to provide reciprocal treatment to U.S. exports in the context of bilateral trade negotiations.
These structural asymmetries have driven the large and persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficit. Even for countries with which the United States may enjoy an occasional bilateral trade surplus, the accumulation of tariff and non-tariff barriers on U.S. exports may make that surplus smaller than it would have been without such barriers. Permitting these asymmetries to continue is not sustainable in today’s economic and geopolitical environment because of the effect they have on U.S. domestic production. A nation’s ability to produce domestically is the bedrock of its national and economic security.
Both my first Administration in 2017, and the Biden Administration in 2022, recognized that increasing domestic manufacturing is critical to U.S. national security. According to 2023 United Nations data, U.S. manufacturing output as a share of global manufacturing output was 17.4 percent, down from a peak in 2001 of 28.4 percent.
Over time, the persistent decline in U.S. manufacturing output has reduced U.S. manufacturing capacity. The need to maintain robust and resilient domestic manufacturing capacity is particularly acute in certain advanced industrial sectors like automobiles, shipbuilding, pharmaceuticals, technology products, machine tools, and basic and fabricated metals, because once competitors gain sufficient global market share in these sectors, U.S. production could be permanently weakened. It is also critical to scale manufacturing capacity in the defense-industrial sector so that we can manufacture the defense materiel and equipment necessary to protect American interests at home and abroad.
In fact, because the United States has supplied so much military equipment to other countries, U.S. stockpiles of military goods are too low to be compatible with U.S. national defense interests. Furthermore, U.S. defense companies must develop new, advanced manufacturing technologies across a range of critical sectors including bio-manufacturing, batteries, and microelectronics. If the United States wishes to maintain an effective security umbrella to defend its citizens and homeland, as well as for its allies and partners, it needs to have a large upstream manufacturing and goods-producing ecosystem to manufacture these products without undue reliance on imports for key inputs.
Increased reliance on foreign producers for goods also has compromised U.S. economic security by rendering U.S. supply chains vulnerable to geopolitical disruption and supply shocks. In recent years, the vulnerability of the U.S. economy in this respect was exposed both during the COVID-19 pandemic, when Americans had difficulty accessing essential products, as well as when the Houthi rebels later began attacking cargo ships in the Middle East.
The decline of U.S. manufacturing capacity threatens the U.S. economy in other ways, including through the loss of manufacturing jobs. From 1997 to 2024, the United States lost around 5 million manufacturing jobs and experienced one of the largest drops in manufacturing employment in history. Furthermore, many manufacturing job losses were concentrated in specific geographical areas. In these areas, the loss of manufacturing jobs contributed to the decline in rates of family formation and to the rise of other social trends, like the abuse of opioids, that have imposed profound costs on the U.S. economy.
The future of American competitiveness depends on reversing these trends. Today, manufacturing represents just 11 percent of U.S. gross domestic product, yet it accounts for 35 percent of American productivity growth and 60 percent of our exports. Importantly, U.S. manufacturing is the main engine of innovation in the United States, responsible for 55 percent of all patents and 70 percent of all research and development (R&D) spending. The fact that R&D expenditures by U.S. multinational enterprises in China grew at an average rate of 13.6 percent a year between 2003 and 2017, while their R&D expenditures in the United States grew by an average of just 5 percent per year during the same time period, is evidence of the strong link between manufacturing and innovation. Furthermore, every manufacturing job spurs 7 to 12 new jobs in other related industries, helping to build and sustain our economy.
Just as a nation that does not produce manufactured products cannot maintain the industrial base it needs for national security, neither can a nation long survive if it cannot produce its own food. Presidential Policy Directive 21 of February 12, 2013 (Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience), designates food and agriculture as a “critical infrastructure sector” because it is one of the sectors considered “so vital to the United States that [its] incapacity or destruction . . . would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.” Furthermore, when I left office, the United States had a trade surplus in agricultural products, but today, that surplus has vanished. Eviscerated by a slew of new non-tariff barriers imposed by our trading partners, it has been replaced by a projected $49 billion annual agricultural trade deficit. For these reasons, I hereby declare and order:
Section1. National Emergency. As President of the United States, my highest duty is ensuring the national and economic security of the country and its citizens.
I have declared a national emergency arising from conditions reflected in large and persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits, which have grown by over 40 percent in the past 5 years alone, reaching $1.2 trillion in 2024. This trade deficit reflects asymmetries in trade relationships that have contributed to the atrophy of domestic production capacity, especially that of the U.S. manufacturing and defense-industrial base. These asymmetries also impact U.S. producers’ ability to export and, consequentially, their incentive to produce. Specifically, such asymmetry includes not only non-reciprocal differences in tariff rates among foreign trading partners, but also extensive use of non-tariff barriers by foreign trading partners, which reduce the competitiveness of U.S. exports while artificially enhancing the competitiveness of their own goods. These non-tariff barriers include technical barriers to trade; non-scientific sanitary and phytosanitary rules; inadequate intellectual property protections; suppressed domestic consumption (e.g., wage suppression); weak labor, environmental, and other regulatory standards and protections; and corruption. These non-tariff barriers give rise to significant imbalances even when the United States and a trading partner have comparable tariff rates.
The cumulative effect of these imbalances has been the transfer of resources from domestic producers to foreign firms, reducing opportunities for domestic manufacturers to expand and, in turn, leading to lost manufacturing jobs, diminished manufacturing capacity, and an atrophied industrial base, including in the defense-industrial sector. At the same time, foreign firms are better positioned to scale production, reinvest in innovation, and compete in the global economy, to the detriment of U.S. economic and national security. The absence of sufficient domestic manufacturing capacity in certain critical and advanced industrial sectors — another outcome of the large and persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits — also compromises U.S. economic and national security by rendering the U.S. economy less resilient to supply chain disruption. Finally, the large, persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits, and the concomitant loss of industrial capacity, have compromised military readiness; this vulnerability can only be redressed through swift corrective action to rebalance the flow of imports into the United States. Such impact upon military readiness and our national security posture is especially acute with the recent rise in armed conflicts abroad. I call upon the public and private sector to make the efforts necessary to strengthen the international economic position of the United States.
Sec. 2. Reciprocal Tariff Policy. It is the policy of the United States to rebalance global trade flows by imposing an additional ad valorem duty on all imports from all trading partners except as otherwise provided herein. The additional ad valorem duty on all imports from all trading partners shall start at 10 percent and shortly thereafter, the additional ad valorem duty shall increase for trading partners enumerated in Annex I to this order at the rates set forth in Annex I to this order. These additional ad valorem duties shall apply until such time as I determine that the underlying conditions described above are satisfied, resolved, or mitigated.
Sec. 3. Implementation. (a) Except as otherwise provided in this order, all articles imported into the customs territory of the United States shall be, consistent with law, subject to an additional ad valorem rate of duty of 10 percent. Such rates of duty shall apply with respect to goods entered for consumption, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on April 5, 2025, except that goods loaded onto a vessel at the port of loading and in transit on the final mode of transit before 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on April 5, 2025, and entered for consumption or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption after 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on April 5, 2025, shall not be subject to such additional duty.
Furthermore, except as otherwise provided in this order, at 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on April 9, 2025, all articles from trading partners enumerated in Annex I to this order imported into the customs territory of the United States shall be, consistent with law, subject to the country-specific ad valorem rates of duty specified in Annex I to this order. Such rates of duty shall apply with respect to goods entered for consumption, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on April 9, 2025, except that goods loaded onto a vessel at the port of loading and in transit on the final mode of transit before 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on April 9, 2025, and entered for consumption or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption after 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on April 9, 2025, shall not be subject to these country-specific ad valorem rates of duty set forth in Annex I to this order. These country-specific ad valorem rates of duty shall apply to all articles imported pursuant to the terms of all existing U.S. trade agreements, except as provided below.
(b) The following goods as set forth in Annex II to this order, consistent with law, shall not be subject to the ad valorem rates of duty under this order: (i) all articles that are encompassed by 50 U.S.C. 1702(b); (ii) all articles and derivatives of steel and aluminum subject to the duties imposed pursuant to section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and proclaimed in Proclamation 9704 of March 8, 2018 (Adjusting Imports of Aluminum Into the United States), as amended, Proclamation 9705 of March 8, 2018 (Adjusting Imports of Steel Into the United States), as amended, and Proclamation 9980 of January 24, 2020 (Adjusting Imports of Derivative Aluminum Articles and Derivative Steel Articles Into the United States), as amended, Proclamation 10895 of February 10, 2025 (Adjusting Imports of Aluminum Into the United States), and Proclamation 10896 of February 10, 2025 (Adjusting Imports of Steel into the United States); (iii) all automobiles and automotive parts subject to the additional duties imposed pursuant to section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, and proclaimed in Proclamation 10908 of March 26, 2025 (Adjusting Imports of Automobiles and Automobile Parts Into the United States); (iv) other products enumerated in Annex II to this order, including copper, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, lumber articles, certain critical minerals, and energy and energy products; (v) all articles from a trading partner subject to the rates set forth in Column 2 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS); and (vi) all articles that may become subject to duties pursuant to future actions under section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.
(c) The rates of duty established by this order are in addition to any other duties, fees, taxes, exactions, or charges applicable to such imported articles, except as provided in subsections (d) and (e) of this section below.
(d) With respect to articles from Canada, I have imposed additional duties on certain goods to address a national emergency resulting from the flow of illicit drugs across our northern border pursuant to Executive Order 14193 of February 1, 2025 (Imposing Duties To Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs Across Our Northern Border), as amended by Executive Order 14197 of February 3, 2025 (Progress on the Situation at Our Northern Border), and Executive Order 14231 of March 2, 2025 (Amendment to Duties To Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs Across Our Northern Border). With respect to articles from Mexico, I have imposed additional duties on certain goods to address a national emergency resulting from the flow of illicit drugs and illegal migration across our southern border pursuant to Executive Order 14194 of February 1, 2025 (Imposing Duties To Address the Situation at Our Southern Border), as amended by Executive Order 14198 of February 3, 2025 (Progress on the Situation at Our Southern Border), and Executive Order 14227 of March 2, 2025 (Amendment to Duties To Address the Situation at Our Southern Border). As a result of these border emergency tariff actions, all goods of Canada or Mexico under the terms of general note 11 to the HTSUS, including any treatment set forth in subchapter XXIII of chapter 98 and subchapter XXII of chapter 99 of the HTSUS, as related to the Agreement between the United States of America, United Mexican States, and Canada (USMCA), continue to be eligible to enter the U.S. market under these preferential terms. However, all goods of Canada or Mexico that do not qualify as originating under USMCA are presently subject to additional ad valorem duties of 25 percent, with energy or energy resources and potash imported from Canada and not qualifying as originating under USMCA presently subject to the lower additional ad valorem duty of 10 percent.
(e) Any ad valorem rate of duty on articles imported from Canada or Mexico under the terms of this order shall not apply in addition to the ad valorem rate of duty specified by the existing orders described in subsection (d) of this section. If such orders identified in subsection (d) of this section are terminated or suspended, all items of Canada and Mexico that qualify as originating under USMCA shall not be subject to an additional ad valorem rate of duty, while articles not qualifying as originating under USMCA shall be subject to an ad valorem rate of duty of 12 percent. However, these ad valorem rates of duty on articles imported from Canada and Mexico shall not apply to energy or energy resources, to potash, or to an article eligible for duty-free treatment under USMCA that is a part or component of an article substantially finished in the United States.
(f) More generally, the ad valorem rates of duty set forth in this order shall apply only to the non-U.S. content of a subject article, provided at least 20 percent of the value of the subject article is U.S. originating. For the purposes of this subsection, “U.S. content” refers to the value of an article attributable to the components produced entirely, or substantially transformed in, the United States. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), to the extent permitted by law, is authorized to require the collection of such information and documentation regarding an imported article, including with the entry filing, as is necessary to enable CBP to ascertain and verify the value of the U.S. content of the article, as well as to ascertain and verify whether an article is substantially finished in the United States.
(g) Subject articles, except those eligible for admission under “domestic status” as defined in 19 CFR 146.43, which are subject to the duty specified in section 2 of this order and are admitted into a foreign trade zone on or after 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on April 9, 2025, must be admitted as “privileged foreign status” as defined in 19 CFR 146.41.
(h) Duty-free de minimis treatment under 19 U.S.C. 1321(a)(2)(A)-(B) shall remain available for the articles described in subsection (a) of this section. Duty-free de minimis treatment under 19 U.S.C. 1321(a)(2)(C) shall remain available for the articles described in subsection (a) of this section until notification by the Secretary of Commerce to the President that adequate systems are in place to fully and expeditiously process and collect duty revenue applicable pursuant to this subsection for articles otherwise eligible for de minimis treatment. After such notification, duty-free de minimis treatment under 19 U.S.C. 1321(a)(2)(C) shall not be available for the articles described in subsection (a) of this section.
(i) The Executive Order of April 2, 2025 (Further Amendment to Duties Addressing the Synthetic Opioid Supply Chain in the People’s Republic of China as Applied to Low-Value Imports), regarding low-value imports from China is not affected by this order, and all duties and fees with respect to covered articles shall be collected as required and detailed therein.
(j) To reduce the risk of transshipment and evasion, all ad valorem rates of duty imposed by this order or any successor orders with respect to articles of China shall apply equally to articles of both the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the Macau Special Administrative Region.
(k) In order to establish the duty rates described in this order, the HTSUS is modified as set forth in the Annexes to this order. These modifications shall enter into effect on the dates set forth in the Annexes to this order.
(l) Unless specifically noted herein, any prior Presidential Proclamation, Executive Order, or other Presidential directive or guidance related to trade with foreign trading partners that is inconsistent with the direction in this order is hereby terminated, suspended, or modified to the extent necessary to give full effect to this order.
Sec. 4. Modification Authority. (a) The Secretary of Commerce and the United States Trade Representative, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, the Senior Counselor for Trade and Manufacturing, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, shall recommend to me additional action, if necessary, if this action is not effective in resolving the emergency conditions described above, including the increase in the overall trade deficit or the recent expansion of non-reciprocal trade arrangements by U.S. trading partners in a manner that threatens the economic and national security interests of the United States.
(b) Should any trading partner retaliate against the United States in response to this action through import duties on U.S. exports or other measures, I may further modify the HTSUS to increase or expand in scope the duties imposed under this order to ensure the efficacy of this action.
(c) Should any trading partner take significant steps to remedy non-reciprocal trade arrangements and align sufficiently with the United States on economic and national security matters, I may further modify the HTSUS to decrease or limit in scope the duties imposed under this order.
(d) Should U.S. manufacturing capacity and output continue to worsen, I may further modify the HTSUS to increase duties under this order.
Sec. 5. Implementation Authority. The Secretary of Commerce and the United States Trade Representative, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, the Senior Counselor for Trade and Manufacturing, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the Chair of the International Trade Commission are hereby authorized to employ all powers granted to the President by IEEPA as may be necessary to implement this order. Each executive department and agency shall take all appropriate measures within its authority to implement this order.
Sec. 6. Reporting Requirements. The United States Trade Representative, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, the Senior Counselor for Trade and Manufacturing, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, is hereby authorized to submit recurring and final reports to the Congress on the national emergency declared in this order, consistent with section 401(c) of the NEA (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)) and section 204(c) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1703(c)).
Sec. 7. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department, agency, or the head thereof; or
(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
CLOSING LOOPHOLES IN THE TARIFF SYSTEM: Today, President Donald J. Trump signed an Executive Order eliminating duty-free de minimis treatment for low-value imports from China, a critical step in countering the ongoing health emergency posed by the illicit flow of synthetic opioids into the U.S.
Following the Secretary of Commerce’s notification that adequate systems are in place to collect tariff revenue, President Trump is ending duty-free de minimis treatment for covered goods from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Hong Kong starting May 2, 2025 at 12:01 a.m. EDT.
Imported goods sent through means other than the international postal network that are valued at or under $800 and that would otherwise qualify for the de minimis exemption will be subject to all applicable duties, which shall be paid in accordance with applicable entry and payment procedures.
All relevant postal items containing goods that are sent through the international postal network that are valued at or under $800 and that would otherwise qualify for the de minimis exemption are subject to a duty rate of either 30% of their value or $25 per item (increasing to $50 per item after June 1, 2025). This is in lieu of any other duties, including those imposed by prior Orders.
Carriers transporting these postal items must report shipment details to U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), maintain an international carrier bond to ensure duty payment, and remit duties to CBP on a set schedule.
CBP may require formal entry for any postal package instead of the specified duties.
The Secretary of Commerce will submit a report within 90 days assessing the Order’s impact and considering whether to extend these rules to packages from Macau.
COMBATING CHINA’S ROLE IN THE OPIOID CRISIS: President Trump is targeting deceptive shipping practices by Chinese-based shippers, many of whom hide illicit substances, including synthetic opioids, in low-value packages to exploit the de minimis exemption.
On average, CBP processes over 4 million de minimis shipments into the U.S. each day.
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which exerts ultimate control over the government and enterprises of the PRC, has subsidized and otherwise incentivized PRC chemical companies to export fentanyl and related precursor chemicals that are used to produce synthetic opioids sold illicitly in the United States.
Many PRC-based chemical companies hide illicit substances in the flow of legitimate commerce, including through false invoices, fraudulent postage, and deceptive packaging.
While the U.S. previously offered a generous de minimis exemption, China enforces strict import restrictions and tightly limits de minimis exemptions, showing no similar leniency toward U.S. shipments.
Last fiscal year, CBP apprehended more than 21,000 pounds of fentanyl at our borders, enough fentanyl to kill more than 4 billion people.
It is estimated that federal officials are only able to seize a fraction of the fentanyl smuggled across the southern border.
These drugs kill tens of thousands of Americans each year, including 75,000 deaths per year attributed to fentanyl alone.
More Americans are dying from fentanyl overdoses each year than the number of American lives lost in the entirety of the Vietnam War.
KEEPING HIS PROMISE TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE: When voters overwhelmingly elected Donald J. Trump as President, they gave him a mandate to seal the border and stop the influx of deadly drugs. That is exactly what he is doing.
On the campaign trail, President Trump promised “We will not rest until we have ended the drug addiction crisis.”
Upon returning to office, President Trump immediately took action to seal the border and crack down on drug trafficking.
President Trump implemented 20% tariffs on China to address the threat of the sustained influx of synthetic opioids, including fentanyl, flowing from China into the United States.
WASHINGTON, D.C. — The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Acting Chairman Caroline D. Pham today announced Rahul Varma will serve as the Acting Director of the Division of Market Oversight. “Rahul has ably served the CFTC for more than a decade and brings a wealth of knowledge and experience to this new role,” Pham said. “I thank Rahul for his continued leadership in DMO.” Varma joined the CFTC in 2013 as an Associate Director for Market Surveillance in DMO, with responsibility for energy, metals, agricultural, and softs markets. In 2017, he helped start the Market Intelligence Branch in DMO and served as its Acting Deputy Director. In 2024, he took on the role of Deputy Director for the combined Market Intelligence and Product Review branches. Prior to joining CFTC, Varma held risk management and consulting roles in the private sector. He also worked at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in the Office of Market Oversight and Investigations (predecessor of Office of Enforcement). Varma has a BTech from IIT Delhi, a master’s degree from Case Western Reserve University, and an MBA from George Washington University.
This time around, Trump is replying on outdated tools — tariffs, small government, territorial expansion and nationalism — to solve modern problems of globalization, wealth disparities, the decline of manufacturing jobs and exploitative capitalism.
On April 2, he announced a baseline tariff of 10 per cent on all countries that import goods to the U.S., including Canada. Canada has also been hit with a 25 per cent levy on Canadian-made automobiles.
The Trump administration’s current use of 19th-century tools to solve 20th-century problems that are wholly inappropriate for the 21st century threatens to take America back to the 19th century. This is an incredibly dangerous road for the U.S to take.
The rise of the nation state
The 19th century was marked by the rise of the nation-state — a single political entity united by geography, culture and language.
The prevailing belief at the time was that nation-states should use tariffs, adopt isolationist policies to cut off the outside world and seize territory where possible. These measures, it was thought, would foster national unity and allow capitalism to thrive by letting the “invisible hand” of the marketplace work its magic.
Protective tariffs promised to grow domestic industries, but the economic benefits were not evenly distributed. Wealth disparities grew wider as millions of immigrants arrived on North American shores, only to find deplorable living conditions in the cities and hardscrabble farmland out in the country.
Some newcomers prospered, of course, but they tended to be those who arrived with money already in their pockets. And they fast learned how to exploit the lack of state-directed regulation, patches of corruption amid rapid western expansion and growing nativism and poverty to their own benefit.
Many of the 20th century’s problems flowed from these 19th-century trends.
The economic fallout of tariffs
Following the financial Panic of 1873 and its ensuing economic depression in both Europe and North America, nation-states unleashed tariffs to protect their domestic economies. It was the wrong strategy to pursue, as it slowed trade even more by limiting the free flow of goods and capital. Money, as is now well-known, needs to move to grow.
Western North American farmers were furious that tariffs forced them to buy on protected markets while selling on unprotected ones subject to international market prices. They organized, too, by forming farmer co-operatives and backing movements like the Granger movement, populism and progressivism to protect their interests.
Nation-states, warmed by rising nationalist fires, formed military-defence alliances across Europe and its colonial and former colonial holdings, including Canada. In 1914, these alliances led to the First World War, a global and industrial war the likes of which the world had never seen.
The Great Depression
By the 1930s, unrestricted and largely unregulated capitalism, together with astonishing wealth disparities and monopolistic tendencies, plunged the world into the decade-long Great Depression.
Many governments’ initial response was to impose tariffs once again, and just as in 1873, they only made the problem worse. The simultaneous rise of fascism, which was largely nationalism run amok, brought the world to war again at the end of the decade, to devastating consequence.
The post-war years saw a concerted international effort at using the nation-state to regulate domestic economies by investing in social services and programs and to rein in runaway capital when its excesses threatened stability.
International bodies like the World Bank, the United Nations and the International Court of Justice were created to promote peace and stability. This new approach wasn’t always successful in its goals, but so far the world hasn’t seen any global hot wars or massive economic depressions.
The end of history
In 1992, historian Frances Fukuyama infamously declared that the world had reached “the end of history.”
He didn’t mean that time stopped, of course. Instead, he was arguing that the liberal nation-state represented “the end-point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.”
In his view, the western industrialized world had reached the pinnacle of successful governance and unlimited prosperity.
Yet, even as western liberal democracy was congratulating itself on its own success, these same nation-states, in conjunction with large corporations, were seeking out lower labour costs and greater profit in the developing world.
This is where the Trump administration re-enters the story — tapping into the frustration and disillusionment of frustrated Americans by promising to restore a “golden age” that never was.
Trump’s 19th-century playbook
Despite his promises, Trump’s tariffs are unlikely to bring manufacturing jobs back to the U.S. As history has shown, tariffs do not revive industries that are already gone; instead, they will only make Americans pay more for the things they need.
Trump’s rhetoric about territorial expansion, including threats to annex Greenland and Canada, won’t make the U.S. more secure. It will just exacerbate the sort of international tensions the world saw in 1914 and 1939.
And with limited resources left to exploit, it’s becoming harder for capital to sustain itself, even as it seeks to wrest whatever is left from our planet, the realities of environmental catastrophe be damned.
Nationalism, meanwhile, won’t foster a sense of national unity. It will only deepen existing divisions based on race and class. And if history is any guide, the consequences could be even more dire this time around, even pushing the world toward a global conflict unlike anything seen before.
Eric Strikwerda does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
PUEBLO – Today, the Colorado Office of Economic Development and International Trade (OEDIT) and Southern Colorado Economic Development District (SCEDD) hosted a Regional Talent Summit at the Pueblo Convention Center to convene industry and community leaders, discuss much needed career pathway solutions and begin developing tactical workforce plans to ensure that Colorado workers develop the skills employers need.
“As Colorado’s economy grows, we’re making sure local workforces are ready to support the industries driving Colorado’s future. These important regional conversations are helping to ensure Coloradans are equipped to thrive in good-paying jobs and businesses have the skills needed to succeed in our state,” said Gov. Polis.
Today’s summit focused on the advanced manufacturing, construction, and technology industries in Baca, Bent, Chaffee, Crowley, Custer, Fremont, Huerfano, Kiowa, Lake, Las Animas, Otero, Prowers and Pueblo counties. The roundtable discussions and industry breakout sessions will inform the creation of tactical plans to develop industry-specific career pathways that connect Coloradans to good-paying jobs, meet the needs of the region’s employers and support broadband expansion within the region.
“As a state, we are doubling down on workforce development to connect Coloradans to good-paying jobs while supporting regional economic development goals. Today’s Regional Talent Summit will result in a tactical action plan developed by community and business leaders from Pueblo and across Southern Colorado to meet the region’s unique goals and needs,” said Eve Lieberman, OEDIT Executive Director.
“Economic development is a team sport. It takes everybody—public, private, and nonprofit sectors—working together to create opportunities for businesses, workers, and residents. A common refrain I’ve heard from all sectors is the need for a trained and dependable workforce throughout our region,” said Leslie Mastroianni, SCEDD Executive Director. “This need became apparent through the development of the region’s Comprehensive Economic Development Strategy (CEDS) and more recently since SCEDD was awarded over $28 million in broadband funds. Today’s conversations will contribute to local workforce solutions and provide valuable input as we work on a grant application to provide training and job placement for unemployed and underemployed people in our region.”
Today’s event was the third of seven Regional Talent Summits taking place across the state. Established by HB24-1365, these summits build on the impact of the Opportunity Now grant program which has, to date, distributed nearly $90 million to 89 grant recipients to launch and expand innovative talent development programs across the state. Within the 13-county region represented at today’s Regional Talent Summit, notable grant recipients include:
Colorado State University-Pueblo (CSU-Pueblo) – $1.4 million to collaborate with Southern Colorado Partners Leading Advancement in Nursing Track (PLANT) to train nurses to work in local communities. Serving 15 counties in Southern Colorado, CSU-Pueblo’s goal is to reduce the infant mortality rate and improve the quality of care for Coloradans over the age of 65 who are most in-need of services.
Emergent Campus – Trinidad – $3.5 million to broaden economic opportunities in tech, with a special focus on rural Colorado. This funding is expected to support the growth of more than 155 tech jobs and over 50 paid internships in Fremont County, with an anticipated annual economic impact of more than $25 million. In collaboration with Trinidad State College, these on-the-job and work-based learning opportunities are intended to support business relocation and expansion.
Servicios de la Raza – Pueblo – $900,000 to work with education and industry partners to address talent shortages in transportation, infrastructure, warehousing, construction and skilled trades. Focusing on credentialing and skill development, Servicios de la Raza offers training and ongoing wraparound support to place hundreds of Coloradans into jobs.
Grant recipients from CSU-Pueblo, Emergent Campus, Servicios de la Raza and Skill Distillery participated in today’s summit.
“The Regional Talent Summit held today is an important milestone for workforce development in Pueblo and southern Colorado. We have an opportunity to help working Coloradans develop and maintain skill sets that are in demand through the entire duration of their careers, and I look forward to working alongside regional partners to implement the resulting action plan,” said Senate Majority Whip, Nick Hinrichsen.
“Pueblo and southern Colorado are home to hardworking families ready to take on new jobs, contribute to a strong economy and maintain our tightknit communities. Today’s summit is just one way state and local leaders are working together to ensure more Coloradans in our region develop the skills to access today’s and tomorrow’s new jobs,” said Sen. Rod Pelton.
“Access to quality education in southern Colorado is a necessity to ensure our residents have the skills they need for good paying jobs. When both business and community leaders collaborate to ensure our region has the education opportunities for individuals to support their families, this is what continues to make headway for work force development in House District 47,” said House Assistant Minority Leader, Ty Winter.
“Today’s regional workforce summit and the resulting action plan will help ensure that hardworking Coloradans in Pueblo and the region have the skills to access good-paying jobs in advanced manufacturing, construction, and technology, while improving broadband. That’s a win for our regional economy and our communities,” said Rep. Tisha Mauro
Four more summits will take place across the state between now and June 2025, and each region’s tactical workforce plans will be published in the 2025 Colorado Talent Pipeline report, with annual progress reports being published through 2030. The next summits will take place May 12 in Grand Junction, focusing on construction, early childhood education and healthcare; and May 16 in Durango, with a focus on construction, early childhood education and healthcare.
About the Colorado Office of Economic Development and International Trade
The Colorado Office of Economic Development and International Trade (OEDIT) works to empower all to thrive in Colorado’s economy. Under the leadership of the Governor and in collaboration with economic development partners across the state, we foster a thriving business environment through funding and financial programs, training, consulting and informational resources across industries and regions. We promote economic growth and long-term job creation by recruiting, retaining, and expanding Colorado businesses and providing programs that support entrepreneurs and businesses of all sizes at every stage of growth. Our goal is to protect what makes our state a great place to live, work, start a business, raise a family, visit and retire—and make it accessible to everyone. Learn more about OEDIT.
Headline: Leader of Export Control Evasion Scheme Sentenced to 70 Months in Prison
Oleg Sergeyevhich Patsulya, a Russian national, was sentenced today to 70 months, or nearly six years, in prison for his role in a conspiracy to export controlled aviation technology to Russia and to launder money in connection with the illegal export scheme.
Defendant and Co-Conspirator Both Sentenced to Prison for Conspiring to Send Controlled Aircraft Components to Russia
Oleg Sergeyevhich Patsulya, a Russian national, was sentenced today to 70 months, or nearly six years, in prison for his role in a conspiracy to export controlled aviation technology to Russia and to launder money in connection with the illegal export scheme. In December 2024, Patsulya’s co-conspirator, Russian national Vasilii Sergeyevich Besedin, was sentenced to two years in prison for his role in the scheme.
In April 2024, Patsulya, 46, of Miami-Dade County, Florida, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to export items from the United States without a license in violation of the Export Control Reform Act and conspiracy to commit international money laundering. At today’s sentencing hearing, U.S. District Court Judge Dominic W. Lanza for the District of Arizona. found that Patsulya was an organizer and leader of the conspiracy and that the money laundering scheme – which employed numerous shell companies, offshore accounts, and multi-layered transactions – was sophisticated in nature, which led to the application of sentencing enhancements.
In handing down Patsulya’s 70-month sentence, Judge Lanza emphasized the seriousness of the offense, Patsulya’s leadership role in planning and carrying it out, and the fact that Patsulya committed these crimes not long after being granted the privilege of a visa to enter the United States. “It’s hard to imagine a bigger betrayal of the United States than what you did,” Judge Lanza said. The proceedings also established that Patsulya currently lacks legal status to be present in the United States.
According to court documents, beginning in or about May 2022, Patsulya and Besedin conspired with each other and several others to obtain orders for various aircraft parts and components from Russian buyers – primarily commercial airline companies – and then fulfill those requests by acquiring the parts from the U.S. suppliers and unlawfully exporting the parts to Russia. The defendants admitted to knowing the items were controlled and required a license from the Department of Commerce to export.
As part of the scheme, the defendants conspired to export multiple shipments of a carbon disc brake system used on Boeing 737 aircraft. When they contacted various U.S. suppliers in efforts to obtain the brake system, Besedin and Patsulya provided false information that the parts were intended for countries other than Russia. The United States was able to detain, prior to export, multiple shipments made by the defendants containing units of the brake assembly technology.
As part of their guilty pleas, Besedin and Patsulya admitted that they attempted to conceal the illegal exports and avoid detection by law enforcement, including by making false representations about the identities of their true customers and using straw buyer-companies located overseas to obscure the origin of revenue. For example, on Sept. 8, 2022, Besedin and Patsulya traveled to Arizona to close a deal with a U.S. company, in which the defendants sought to purchase units of the brake assembly technology. During their discussions with the company, the defendants misrepresented that the aircraft parts were going to be exported to Turkey, when they were in fact destined for Russia. The defendants made false statements to the company both orally and in signed export compliance forms. In connection with this transaction, the defendants received money from a Russian airline company to make the purchase. The funds were transferred to Patsulya’s American bank account from a Turkish bank account that had previously received the money from Russia.
In total, throughout the conspiracy, American bank accounts associated with MIC P&I LLC, Patsulya’s company, received at least $4,582,288.51 sent from Russian airline companies through Turkish bank accounts to purchase aircraft parts and components intended for unlawful export. As part of his plea and sentence, Patsulya is required to forfeit assets, including a luxury car and personal boat, in the amount of $4,582,288.51.
Sue Bai, head of the Justice Department’s National Security Division, U.S. Attorney Timothy Courchaine for the District of Arizona, Assistant Director Roman Rozhavsky of the FBI’s Counterintelligence Division, and Special Agent in Charge Richard Fitzpatrick of the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Phoenix Field Office made the announcement.
The BIS Phoenix Field Office and the FBI Phoenix Field Office investigated the case, with valuable assistance provided by the BIS Boston Field Office, the FBI Miami Field Office, Homeland Security Investigations Phoenix Field Office, Customs and Border Protection-Phoenix Field Office, and the U.S. Marshals Office in Miami.
Trial Attorney Christopher M. Rigali of the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section and Assistant U.S. Attorney William G. Voit for the District of Arizona prosecuted the case.
This case was coordinated through the Disruptive Technology Strike Force, an interagency law enforcement strike force co-led by the Departments of Justice and Commerce designed to target illicit actors, protect supply chains, and prevent critical technology from being acquired by authoritarian regimes and hostile nation-states. The Strike Force leverages tools and authorities across the U.S. government to enhance the criminal and administrative enforcement of export control laws.
Thank you, Alan, and thank you to the Griswold and Julis-Rabinowitz Centers for the opportunity to speak to you today.1 As someone who has worked in both the public sector and academia, I applaud the common purpose of both centers in connecting researchers, policymakers, and the private sector to pursue policy ideas that serve the public good.
To that end, I can think of few individuals who have done more—as a teacher, researcher, government official, and public figure—than Alan Blinder. That includes educating the public about economic policymaking. In the spring of 2022, as many wondered whether Russia’s war on Ukraine would add to the factors then driving up inflation, Professor Blinder wrote in the Wall Street Journal that a more important factor would probably be the public’s expectations of future inflation.2 As I will relate in these remarks, he was, of course, absolutely correct. As in the past, inflation expectations have played a crucial role in the course of inflation since the spring of 2022, and I expect they will be important in the Federal Reserve’s ongoing effort to achieve sustained inflation of 2 percent. For that reason, I would like to focus on inflation expectations today, before discussing my outlook for the U.S. economy and the implications for appropriate monetary policy. First, I will describe inflation expectations within the conceptual framework that many economists use to connect inflation to broader economic activity, known as the Phillips curve. Second, I will discuss the central importance of the stability of these expectations, which we have come to call the “anchoring” of inflation expectations. Third, I will explain how firms and households form their inflation expectations and how these expectations affect their economic decisionmaking. Throughout, I will make some references to historical experiences with inflation but focus on the period since the pandemic. Economists have long recognized the connection between inflation and overall macroeconomic conditions, but it was in trying to explain this empirical relationship and measure it with some precision that the importance of inflation expectations was revealed. The foundation of this work was laid by New Zealand economist A.W. Phillips, a fascinating figure who was, among other things, a mechanical genius who built an early economic model operated by hydraulics rather than electronics. In contemplating the mechanics of the economy, in 1958 Phillips set about to explain why nominal wage growth was slower when unemployment was high and faster when unemployment was low. His and other subsequent research showed that a crucial factor was the utilization of resources, such as labor and capital.3 Generally, when firms use labor and capital very intensively, production costs tend to rise, and firms have more scope to pass those cost increases along in the form of higher prices for their products and services, which, in turn, may push up inflation across the economy. In contrast, when that level of utilization is low, costs tend to rise more slowly (or even fall), and firms have less scope for raising prices, thus pushing down inflation. This tradeoff has been called the Phillips curve. In this simple form, this tradeoff implies that governments can achieve and maintain very low unemployment only if they allow inflation to rise to a certain level. In the latter 1960s, Milton Friedman and Edmund Phelps asserted that this orderly tradeoff was only temporary and would ultimately break down because of the role of expectations and, in particular, inflation expectations.4 To use an example, while current production costs are important to a factory owner setting prices, that owner will also consider future production costs, future levels of demand, and expectations for inflation throughout the economy. Likewise, workers will factor expectations of future economic conditions into their pay demands, and banks will consider future inflation in deciding loan rates. Consumers, whose purchases constitute some two-thirds of economic activity, make decisions about whether to purchase something today with an idea of what it will cost in the future. All these decisions are influenced by expectations, and this is the way in which expectations may shape inflation now. In turn, when we think about the Phillips curve and its tradeoff nowadays, we account for the important role of expectations of different individuals throughout the economy. There are different measures of inflation expectations, some from surveys polling business owners, others asking consumers, and yet others estimating expectations among bond investors based on the differences in yields between nominal and inflation-indexed securities. While most of my points apply broadly to all measures of expectations, my examples come mostly from surveys of consumers and businesses. While there are questions, which I will address, about how well these surveys measure inflation expectations, I closely monitor them because they complement market-based indicators of future inflation that are affected by dynamics intrinsic to financial markets, such as changes in risk premiums. Let me note that, in addition to the way expectations of future inflation influence prices in the near term, there are economic mechanisms that link current inflation with past inflation, such as those that set wages and the terms of rental contracts. In these cases, adjustments in these terms are often benchmarked on past inflation, as, for instance, when workers and landlords aim to recoup losses from increases in general prices. To cite one example, as the economy reopened after the pandemic, workers sought higher wages to compensate for the early wave of inflation in food and core goods, thus further pushing up inflation, especially in the services sector, where labor accounts for the largest share of this sector’s costs.5 And, because rental agreements typically last for 12 months or more, landlords faced a lag in adjusting rents to reflect the escalation of inflation after the pandemic and sought to recoup those losses when renewing leases. By looking at price changes this way, in a rearview mirror, some decisionmakers in the economy end up making inflation more persistent. That is important to me as an economic policymaker who must pay attention to both expectations of future inflation and the persistence of current inflation. When we speak of expectations of future inflation, it is crucial to define the time horizon, and different surveys conducted by the Federal Reserve and others ask about inflation from 1 year to as many as 10 years in the future. Surveys with a shorter horizon, such as the University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers’ question on inflation 1 year ahead, shown in figure 1, are heavily influenced by current inflation. Near-term inflation expectations tend to be more volatile, moving up when, for example, energy prices increase, or down when energy or some other volatile set of prices decreases. These expectations are important because many economic decisions, such as major consumer purchases and hiring and investment for firms, focus on horizons of only a few years ahead. By contrast, inflation expectations over longer horizons, such as the Michigan survey’s question on inflation during the next 5 to 10 years (the red line in figure 1), say less about current conditions than about the trend for inflation for some time in the future. You can think about these longer-term expectations as much less affected by the forces that push inflation up or down in the short term, what economists call “shocks.” Longer-term inflation expectations tend to be less volatile, affected less, for example, by what oil or food prices have done lately than by the stability of inflation over years or decades. I mention these different time horizons because they matter in my job as a central banker. Expectations a year from now reflect short-term shocks to the economy, as well as ongoing efforts from monetary policymakers to bring the economy back to its longer-run state. Thus, while short-term expectations may indicate whether inflation is expected to move toward its target, they are not the best gauge of monetary policy credibility. Longer-term inflation expectations, however, should be much less influenced by short-term shocks to the economy, and a change in those expectations has implications for the Federal Reserve’s prospects for meeting its price-stability goal. When these longer-term expectations are reasonably low and unresponsive to shorter-term developments, we say they are “anchored.” It is not clear who first defined the term, but Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke in 2007 gave a speech on inflation expectations in which he described “anchored” expectations as “relatively insensitive to incoming data.”6 So how should we think about the process of anchoring and de-anchoring of inflation expectations? The dynamics of short- and long-term inflation expectations shed light on this issue. If the public experiences a spell of inflation higher than their shorter-run expectations, they will revise up these shorter-term expectations to ensure that their near-term plans account for the change in the economic environment. That’s what happened after the pandemic, when inflation based on personal consumption expenditures (PCE) rose to a peak of 7.2 percent and one-year expectations rose to more than 5 percent. But longer-term inflation expectations remained anchored, with values within the range seen since 1995. I would contrast this experience with the United States’ previous bout of high inflation from the 1970s to the early 1980s. Among other issues, such as high energy prices and accommodative monetary policy, rising inflation and inflation expectations fed a cycle of escalating inflationary pressures.7 Inflation was high and very volatile over this period, and that is reflected in shorter and longer-term inflation expectations that were high and volatile, too. Another important difference between these two episodes has to do with the performance of the Federal Reserve. As opposed to the late 1960s and most of the 1970s, most recently the Fed acted aggressively to tighten monetary policy, raising the federal funds rate more rapidly than in previous tightenings and lowering inflation more quickly than ever before. This came after 30 years of success in keeping inflation in check, and the credibility earned by the Fed’s inflation discipline surely helped keep longer-term expectations stable. This shows that an important role of the central bank is to convince the public, through actions and communications, about its intention to shape economic conditions and to use its policy tools to bring inflation to its target.8 By committing to keep inflation low in the future, central banks seek to influence expectations of future inflation, which, in turn, influence conditions now and over time. The Fed’s credibility in keeping inflation low and stable, won over decades, kept longer-term inflation expectations stable, and that contributed significantly to the Fed’s success in reducing inflation while keeping the labor market strong. Those are some of the basics about inflation expectations and how they influence the economy and the conduct of monetary policy. Next, I want to note some of the patterns we see in survey measures of inflation expectations, what influences expectations, and how inflation expectations are used by the public in their decisionmaking. Fortunately, there is a rich body of economic research that has shed light on these questions, and I will focus on the evidence for households and firms.9 We can then take some lessons from these empirical patterns for monetary policymaking. One important observation is that both short- and long-term inflation expectations are often notably higher than actual inflation, even after a period of very low inflation. There is evidence that survey respondents often believe the inflation they have experienced is higher than it is. Another pattern is that there is a wide dispersion of views about both shorter and longer-term inflation expectations, reflecting, at least in part, the dispersion of inflation in the consumer baskets of goods and services purchased by different people. Research also finds that some groups, such as women and lower-income households, tend to have systematically higher inflation expectations. In addition to this variation in expectations, there is high uncertainty in forecasts of future inflation. When people are asked to assign probabilities to different forecasts for inflation, surveys report wide distributions in the likelihood of one outcome or another. Finally, short-term inflation expectations tend to be correlated with both recently realized inflation and perceptions about recent inflation.10 These patterns tell policymakers that inflation expectations of households and firms are diffuse and likely harder to influence through monetary policy relative to financial market participants and professional forecasters who follow the news more closely. Still, expectations from business owners and workers ultimately inform firms’ pricing decisions and costs and, thus, may even be more relevant for inflation outcomes; therefore, it is important for policymakers to communicate clearly with the public our intentions to bring inflation back to our target.11 So, because inflation expectations are diffuse and heavily influenced by recent experience, let’s consider the reasons for the dispersion in these expectations. Unsurprisingly, it starts with the considerable variation in the sources that the public uses to collect information about inflation. Households report that their main source of information is their own shopping experiences, making regular purchases such as groceries and gasoline, and the price changes in those goods and services are what affect inflation expectations the most.12 Also, it seems that inflation expectations of homeowners tend to respond to changes in mortgage rates because homeowners have more of an incentive to track changes in rates that might affect, for example, their prospects for loan refinancing.13 Another important source of information is energy bills, with evidence also pointing to households’ inflation expectations being more sensitive to energy prices when inflation is higher.14 More generally, consumers and firms seem to pay more attention to news related to inflation when inflation is high, and this has been found for many countries.15 While the unique experiences of survey respondents matter, this evidence points to inflation expectations being dependent on the state of the economy. Thus, we policymakers should account for different economic conditions when assessing the risks of a de-anchoring of inflation expectations. For instance, with fresh memories of the post-pandemic inflation and with recent surges in prices of some food items regularly purchased, inflation expectations of workers and firms may now be more sensitive to anticipated future price increases relative to the pre-pandemic period. Let me now turn to how households and businesses employ their inflation expectations in their economic decisionmaking, with much of the evidence consistent with what one would expect based on long-standing economic theory. Starting with households, in addition to any influence on wages from past inflation, expectations of future inflation help shape demands for pay raises. Workers care about their inflation-adjusted wages, rather than nominal wages, and (as shown in figure 2) we see a positive correlation between inflation expectations from consumers and wage growth, with a close co-movement during the recent inflationary bout. A complementary decision for the worker is to look for a new job that pays more, especially if the person envisions a low probability of getting a raise in the current job or if the raise will likely not fully cover losses in real incomes from inflation. Indeed, measures of general wage growth are more sluggish relative to those of job switchers. Moreover, researchers also find evidence of higher job-to-job transitions for workers who have higher inflation expectations.16 So inflation expectations of workers are an important influence on nominal wage growth and an important indicator of inflationary pressures for us policymakers. Now let’s consider how these expectations influence firms’ decisions. As I discussed in the context of the Phillips curve, firms with higher inflation expectations would be expected to increase prices more, and, indeed, researchers find causal evidence for this.17 During the recent period of high inflation, the fact that business owners’ short-term expectations about costs or input prices rose only modestly and soon returned to levels close to 2 percent just suggests that firms’ inflation expectations were not a strong source of inflationary pressures (as seen in figure 3). Still, researchers at the Richmond Fed also found that during this period, business leaders incorporated more information about aggregate inflation measures in their own pricing decisions compared with times before the pandemic inflation surge.18 While researchers also find that business leaders paid less attention to inflation as it came down, this evidence points to the inflation expectations of businesses being sensitive to underlying inflationary dynamics, and monetary policymakers should remain attentive to this. Now let me turn to the recent developments in inflation expectations, the current U.S. economic outlook, and the implications for monetary policy. In recent months, we have seen several measures of inflation expectations increase, with both consumers and businesses reporting new and proposed tariffs as an important reason. Among surveys looking one year ahead, there have been notable increases for surveys by the University of Michigan, the Conference Board survey of consumers, the Atlanta Fed’s survey of businesses, the Philadelphia Fed’s Survey of Professional Forecasters, and the New York Fed’s consumer survey. For instance, last Friday’s release of longer-term inflation expectations from the Michigan survey was the highest since February 1993. Additionally, the recent spike in short-term inflation expectations appears to be mostly “anticipatory,” as one can infer from the divergence between falling inflation perceptions—what consumers think price increases have been in the past year—and climbing short-run inflation expectations, both data from the Michigan survey. This anticipatory nature of the recent increase in short-run expectations may allow for price pressures through a second channel: Businesses may feel a greater ability to pass along higher costs to consumers when they come from external factors out of the control of these businesses. Indeed, firms are already reporting not only higher costs, but also expectations of higher costs, according to some surveys, such as the one conducted by the Atlanta Fed, along with other manufacturing surveys. For now, I take some comfort from the much smaller increases in longer-term expectations as measured by the Philadelphia Fed’s Survey of Professional Forecasters, as well as the stability of longer-term measures of what we call inflation compensation, which is based on yields from nominal and inflation-indexed Treasury securities. As in past episodes when inflation expectations increased, uncertainty about future inflation seems to have also gone up, as measured by the disagreement between the 75th and 25th percentiles of the distribution of individual respondents to the Michigan survey. Simultaneously, in recent months, we have also seen measures of economic policy uncertainty increase (seen in figure 4), and there is evidence that policy uncertainty and inflation uncertainty correlate over time.19 One possibility is that policy uncertainty may be contributing to a rise in inflation expectations as well as to uncertainty about future inflation. Still, it is hard to say at this point, and I will keep monitoring these developments. Let me turn from developments on expected inflation to realized inflation. After the substantial decline in inflation from its peak in 2022, recent disinflation has been slower, and the latest data indicate that progress toward the Federal Open Market Committee’s (FOMC) 2 percent goal may have stalled. Core PCE inflation was 2.8 percent in the 12 months ended in February, which puts us back at the same level seen in the last quarter of 2024. The best news for February comes from housing services inflation, which has come down steadily for at least a year to a 12‑month rate of 4.3 percent, even if it is still above the pre-pandemic level of 2.5 percent. For the rest of the inflation categories, the news was less positive. Core goods inflation, which had been negative for a large share of 2024, increased to 0.4 percent relative to a year before. February likely also marked an upward shift in market-based services inflation. While I do not discount price pressures in nonmarket services, which remain elevated, the acceleration in market-based services in February from an estimated 3.1 percent to 3.5 percent is also not welcome, given that this category often provides a better signal of inflationary pressures across all services. On the other side of the FOMC’s dual mandate, employment continues to grow at a moderate pace, and the overall labor market has remained resilient through February. The net 151,000 jobs added last month was not too far from the 177,000 average of the previous six months. The unemployment rate ticked up to 4.1 percent, and labor force participation moved down to 62.4 percent. Other labor market indicators suggest continued moderation in the labor market but not significant weakening. Given the recent lack of progress on inflation, recent increases in inflation expectations, and upside risks associated with announced and prospective policy changes, I strongly supported the FOMC’s decision at our March meeting to maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 4-1/4 to 4-1/2 percent. I will support maintaining the current policy rate for as long as these upside risks to inflation continue, while economic activity and employment remain stable. Going forward, I will carefully assess incoming data, the evolving outlook, and changes in the balance of risks. Thank you.
1. The views expressed here are my own and are not necessarily those of my colleagues on the Federal Reserve Board or the Federal Open Market Committee. Return to text 2. See Alan S. Blinder (2022), “Wish the Fed Luck as It Seeks a Soft Landing on Inflation,” Wall Street Journal, April 6. Return to text 3. For a literature review on the relationship between inflation and resource utilization, also called the slope of the Phillips curve, see Francesco Furlanetto and Antoine Lepetit (2024), “The Slope of the Phillips Curve (PDF),” Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2024-043 (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, May). Return to text 4. See Milton Friedman (1968), “The Role of Monetary Policy,” American Economic Review, vol. 58 (March), pp. 1–17; and Edmund S. Phelps (1967), “Phillips Curves, Expectations of Inflation and Optimal Unemployment over Time,” Economica, vol. 34 (135), pp. 254–81. Return to text 5. For a discussion about the timing of the inflation waves of different categories, see Adriana D. Kugler (2025), “Navigating Inflation Waves: A Phillips Curve Perspective,” speech delivered at the Whittington Lecture, McCourt School of Public Policy, Georgetown University, Washington, February 20. Return to text 6. See Ben S. Bernanke (2007), “Inflation Expectations and Inflation Forecasting,” speech delivered at the Monetary Economics Workshop of the National Bureau of Economic Research Summer Institute, Cambridge, Mass., July 10, quoted text in paragraph 7. Return to text 7. For evidence on how longer-run inflation expectations may be driven by short-run inflation surprises, see Carlos Carvalho, Stefano Eusepi, Emanuel Moench, and Bruce Preston (2023), “Anchored Inflation Expectations,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, vol. 15 (January), pp. 1–47. Return to text 8. For a survey on how central banks communicate with the general public and the effectiveness of such communications, see Alan S. Blinder, Michael Ehrmann, Jakob de Haan, and David-Jan Jansen (2024), “Central Bank Communication with the General Public: Promise or False Hope?” Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 62 (June), pp. 425–57. Return to text 9. For a literature review on this topic, see Michael Weber, Francesco D’Acunto, Yuriy Gorodnichenko, and Olivier Coibion (2022), “The Subjective Inflation Expectations of Households and Firms: Measurement, Determinants, and Implications,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 36 (Summer), pp. 157–84. Return to text 10. See David Lebow and Ekaterina Peneva (2024), “Inflation Perceptions during the Covid Pandemic and Recovery,” FEDS Notes (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, January 19). Return to text 11. See Ricardo Reis (2023), “Four Mistakes in the Use of Measures of Expected Inflation,” AEA Papers and Proceedings, vol. 113 (May), pp. 47–51. Return to text 12. See Francesco D’Acunto, Ulrike Malmendier, Juan Ospina, and Michael Weber (2021), “Exposure to Grocery Prices and Inflation Expectations,” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 129 (May), pp. 1615–39. Return to text 13. See Hie Joo Ahn, Shihan Xie, and Choongryul Yang (2024). “Effects of Monetary Policy on Household Expectations: The Role of Homeownership,” Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 147 (October), 103599. Return to text 14. See Francesco D’Acunto and Michael Weber (2024), “Why Survey-Based Subjective Expectations Are Meaningful and Important,” Annual Review of Economics, vol. 16 (August), pp. 329–57. For evidence on the higher sensitivity of inflation expectations when inflation is higher, see Paula Patzelt and Ricardo Reis (2024), “Estimating the Rise in Expected Inflation from Higher Energy Prices,” CEPR Discussion Paper 18907 (Paris: Centre for Economic Policy Research, March). Return to text 15. See, for instance, Anat Bracha and Jenny Tang (2024), “Inflation Levels and (In)Attention,” Review of Economic Studies; and Michael Weber, Bernardo Candia, Hassan Afrouzi, Tiziano Ropele, Rodrigo Lluberas, Serafin Frache, Brent Meyer, Saten Kumar, Yuriy Gorodnichenko, Dimitris Georgarakos, Olivier Coibion, Geoff Kenny, and Jorge Ponce (2025), “Tell Me Something I Don’t Already Know: Learning in Low‐ and High‐Inflation Settings,” Econometrica, vol. 93 (January), pp. 229–64. Return to text 16. See Ina Hajdini, Edward S. Knotek II, John Leer, Mathieu Pedemonte, Robert W. Rich, and Raphael S. Schoenle (2022), “Low Passthrough from Inflation Expectations to Income Growth Expectations: Why People Dislike Inflation,” Working Paper Series 22-21 (Cleveland: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, June); and Laura Pilossoph and Jane M. Ryngaert (2024), “Job Search, Wages, and Inflation,” NBER Working Paper Series 33042 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, October). Return to text 17. For the relationship between inflation expectations and pricing decisions, see Olivier Coibion, Yuriy Gorodnichenko, and Tiziano Ropele (2020), “Inflation Expectations and Firm Decisions: New Causal Evidence,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 135 (February), pp. 165–219. Return to text 18. For evidence on the recent inflationary episode, see Felipe F. Schwartzman and Sonya Ravindranath Waddell (2024), “Inflation Expectations and Price Setting among Fifth District Firms,” Economic Brief 24‑03 (Richmond: Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, January). Return to text 19. For evidence on how policy uncertainty and inflation uncertainty correlate over time, see Carola C. Binder (2017), “Measuring Uncertainty Based on Rounding: New Method and Application to Inflation Expectations,” Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 90 (October), pp. 1–12. The measure of economic policy uncertainty is from Scott R. Baker, Nicholas Bloom, and Steven J. Davis (2016), “Measuring Economic Policy Uncertainty,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 131 (November), pp. 1593–1636. The measure of trade policy uncertainty is from Dario Caldara, Matteo Iacoviello, Patrick Molligo, Andrea Prestipino, and Andrea Raffo (2020), “The Economic Effects of Trade Policy Uncertainty,” Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 109 (January), pp. 38–59. Return to text
Source: United States Senator Kevin Cramer (R-ND)
WASHINGTON – Senators John Hoeven and Kevin Cramer today announced that Heather Ranck is being reinstated as the Director of the National Rural Export Center. The senators have worked with the new administration at the Department of Commerce to accelerate the important work of the National Rural Export Center by bringing back Ranck to the position, citing her experience and leadership in founding the center, which specializes in conducting customized market research designed to guide rural U.S. companies toward the most opportune exporting markets.
“Heather has dedicated her career to helping support farmers, ranchers and manufacturers in North Dakota and across the country as they navigate global markets,” said Hoeven. “With 20 years of experience at the Department of Commerce, she has the experience and skillset necessary to help our producers find and expand markets for their products. Given her breadth of knowledge, it only made sense that the Department of Commerce bring her back to lead the National Rural Export Center.”
“Heather’s reinstatement sends a strong message that President Trump values rural exporters and companies looking to sell their goods and services beyond our borders. The Rural Export Center is a critical asset in finding new market opportunities for small, medium size and large companies throughout rural America, and Heather has been the driving force in its success from the beginning. I look forward to working with Heather, Senator Hoeven and the business community we represent, in building on the center’s success and taking rural exporters to even greater economic opportunity,” said Cramer.
“As Chairman of the North Dakota District Export Council (DEC), we are extremely pleased and appreciative that we have Heather Ranck back as Director of the National Rural Export Center. Heather is a proven leader and has served the Rural Export Center as its director in the past with great outcomes and great care for the export communities, and it is great to have her back in leadership. The ND and Northern MN District Export Councils look forward to working with her again. I want to thank Senator Hoeven and Senator Cramer for their leadership in Heathers’ reinstatement, and their insight and belief in the value of exports from North Dakota to the global market,” said Perrie Schafer, Chairman of the North Dakota District Export Council.
Nokia Corporation Stock Exchange Release 2 April 2025 at 22:30 EEST
Nokia Corporation: Repurchase of own shares on 02.04.2025
Espoo, Finland – On 2 April 2025 Nokia Corporation (LEI: 549300A0JPRWG1KI7U06) has acquired its own shares (ISIN FI0009000681) as follows:
Trading venue (MIC Code)
Number of shares
Weighted average price / share, EUR*
XHEL
1,729,256
4.94
CEUX
1,007,408
4.93
BATE
–
–
AQEU
140,853
4.93
TQEX
129,103
4.93
Total
3,006,620
4.93
* Rounded to two decimals
On 22 November 2024, Nokia announced that its Board of Directors is initiating a share buyback program to offset the dilutive effect of new Nokia shares issued to the shareholders of Infinera Corporation and certain Infinera Corporation share-based incentives. The repurchases in compliance with the Market Abuse Regulation (EU) 596/2014 (MAR), the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1052 and under the authorization granted by Nokia’s Annual General Meeting on 3 April 2024 started on 25 November 2024 and end by 31 December 2025 and target to repurchase 150 million shares for a maximum aggregate purchase price of EUR 900 million.
Total cost of transactions executed on 2 April 2025 was EUR 14,834,663. After the disclosed transactions, Nokia Corporation holds 220,509,131 treasury shares.
Details of transactions are included as an appendix to this announcement.
On behalf of Nokia Corporation
BofA Securities Europe SA
About Nokia At Nokia, we create technology that helps the world act together.
As a B2B technology innovation leader, we are pioneering networks that sense, think and act by leveraging our work across mobile, fixed and cloud networks. In addition, we create value with intellectual property and long-term research, led by the award-winning Nokia Bell Labs which is celebrating 100 years of innovation.
With truly open architectures that seamlessly integrate into any ecosystem, our high-performance networks create new opportunities for monetization and scale. Service providers, enterprises and partners worldwide trust Nokia to deliver secure, reliable and sustainable networks today – and work with us to create the digital services and applications of the future.
Inquiries:
Nokia Communications Phone: +358 10 448 4900 Email: press.services@nokia.com Maria Vaismaa, Global Head of External Communications
More than 500 million people around the world live with osteoarthritis. The knee is affected more often than any other joint, with symptoms (such as pain, stiffness and reduced movement) affecting work, sleep, sport and daily activities.
Knee osteoarthritis is often thought of as thinning of the protective layer of cartilage within the joint. But we now understand it affects all the structures of the joint, including the bones, muscles and nerve endings.
While there are things that can be done to manage the symptoms of knee osteoarthritis, there is no cure, and many people experience persistent pain. As a result, an opportunity exists for as yet unproven treatments to enter the market, often before regulatory safeguards can be put in place.
Stem cell injections are one such treatment. A new review my colleagues and I published this week finds that evidence of their benefits and harms remains elusive.
Stem cell treatments
Stem cells are already established as treatments for some diseases – mostly disorders of the blood, bone marrow or immune system – which has led to suggestions they could be used for a much wider array of conditions.
Stem cells have been touted as promising treatments for osteoarthritis because they have special properties which allow them to replicate and develop into the mature healthy cells that make up our body’s organs and other tissues, including cartilage.
Stem cell treatments for osteoarthritis generally involve taking a sample of tissue from a site that is rich in stem cells (such as bone marrow or fat), treating it to increase the number of stem cells, then injecting it into the joint.
The hope is that if the right type of stem cells can be introduced into an osteoarthritic joint in the right way and at the right time, they may help to repair damaged structures in the joint, or have other effects such as reducing inflammation.
But no matter how convincing the theory, we need good evidence for effectiveness and safety before a new therapy is adopted into practice.
Stem cells have been touted as promising treatments for osteoarthritis. But what does the evidence say? crystal light/Shutterstock
Stem cell injections have not been approved by Australia’s Therapeutic Goods Administration for the treatment of osteoarthritis. Nonetheless, some clinics in Australia and around the world still offer them.
Because of the regulatory restrictions, we don’t have reliable numbers on how many procedures are being done.
They’re not covered by Medicare, so the procedure can cost the consumer thousands of dollars.
And, as with any invasive procedure, both the harvest of stem cells and the joint injection procedure may carry the potential for harm, such as infection.
What we found
Our new review, published by the independent, international group the Cochrane Collaboration, looks at all 25 randomised trials of stem cell injections for knee osteoarthritis that have been conducted worldwide to date. Collectively, these studies involved 1,341 participants.
We found stem cell injections may slightly improve pain and function compared with a placebo injection, but the size of the improvement may be too small for the patient to notice.
The evidence isn’t strong enough to determine whether there is any improvement in quality of life following a stem cell injection, whether cartilage regrows, or to estimate the risk of harm.
This means we can’t confidently say yet whether any improvement that might follow a stem cell injection is worth the risk (or the cost).
It’s not surprising we invest hope in finding a transformative treatment for such a common and disabling condition. Belief in the benefits of stem cells is widespread – more than three-quarters of Americans believe stem cells can relieve arthritis pain and more than half believe this treatment to be curative.
But what happens if a new treatment is introduced to practice before it has been clearly proven to be safe and effective?
The use of an unproven, invasive therapy is not just associated with the risks of the intervention itself. Even if the treatment were harmless, there is the risk of unnecessary cost, inconvenience, and a missed opportunity for the patient to use existing therapies that are known to be effective.
What’s more, if we need to play catch-up to try to establish an evidence base for a treatment that’s already in practice, we risk diverting scarce research resources towards a therapy that may not prove to be effective, simply because the genie is out of the bottle.
Several more large clinical trials are currently underway, and should increase our understanding of whether stem cell injections are safe and effective for knee osteoarthritis.
Our review incorporates “living evidence”. This means we will continue to add the results of new trials as soon as they’re published, so the review is always up to date, and offers a comprehensive and trustworthy summary to help people with osteoarthritis and their health-care providers to make informed decisions.
In the meantime, there are a number of evidence-based treatment options. Non-drug treatments such as physiotherapy, regular exercise, maintaining a healthy weight, and cognitive behavioural therapy can be more effective than you think. Anti-inflammatory and pain medications can also play a supporting role.
Importantly, it’s not inevitable that osteoarthritic joints get worse with time. So, even though joint replacement surgery is often highly effective, it’s the last resort and fortunately, many people never need to take this step.
Samuel Whittle is supported by an Australia and New Zealand Musculoskeletal (ANZMUSC) Clinical Trial Network Practitioner Fellowship and by a grant from The Hospital Research Foundation Group. Dr Whittle currently serves as President of the Australian Rheumatology Association.
Speech by Christine Lagarde, President of the ECB, on the occasion of the conferral of the Sutherland Leadership Award in Dublin, Ireland
Dublin, 2 April 2025
It is an honour to receive the Sutherland Leadership Award.
There are moments in history when things that were once set in stone become fluid. Institutions, norms and alliances that seemed timeless can suddenly be remade.
These moments typically come only once in a generation. Peter Sutherland faced such a juncture when the Cold War ended. The collapse of the Soviet Union could have ushered in a period of global instability and turmoil.
But Peter demonstrated skilful leadership to leverage the defining geopolitical event of his time. As head of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, he successfully led the world’s largest trade negotiation, involving over 120 countries, which ushered in an era of unprecedented global cooperation and prosperity.[1]
Compared with Peter’s era, however, the geopolitical landscape we face today has been turned upside down. We can see this inverted world playing out in different ways.
After the Cold War, the global economy was generally one of openness, integration and certainty. Everyone benefited from a hegemon, the United States, that was committed to a multilateral, rules-based order. This allowed trade and investment to flourish.
But today we must contend with closure, fragmentation and uncertainty.
Geopolitical rivalries are spurring protectionism and upending global supply chains. The international institutions that Peter helped to build are facing increasing challenges. And one index of trade policy uncertainty now stands at more than eight times its average value since 2021.[2]
This landscape poses a serious challenge for Europe on two fronts.
Economically, it risks compounding existing issues like sluggish productivity growth and weak competitiveness. Europe’s reliance on external trade – its trade-to-GDP ratio is about twice that of the United States – makes it vulnerable to trade headwinds. On top of this, pronounced uncertainty may hold back the investment necessary for Europe’s recovery.
Strategically, this new environment could also heighten our security vulnerabilities. We can no longer fully count on the security arrangements that have stood in place since the Second World War. If a security vacuum should arise, it may encourage opportunism by hostile actors on Europe’s doorstep.
Yet despite this challenging landscape, I see a tremendous opportunity for Europe.
Just as in Peter’s time, the structures that once seemed permanent are now becoming fluid again. And just as he did, we can harness the momentum created by geopolitical events to drive positive change.
So how can we – as Europeans – rise to the moment?
We can do so by embracing a simple idea that, at first glance, seems contradictory, but which in an inverted world makes perfect sense: we must cooperate to compete. And in doing so, we must also leverage our competitive advantage.
On the economic front, we need to work together to simplify and scale up our economy so that we can hold our own in a world dominated by economic giants. If we do so, we can attract talent and investment.
That means integrating our capital markets, allowing Europe’s ample savings to fund our much-needed investments. And following the powerful example set by Peter during his time as European Commissioner in the 1980s, it means removing internal barriers that stand in the way of our Single Market, allowing our firms to scale more easily and compete more effectively.[3]
There is clear momentum on this front. The reports by Enrico Letta and Mario Draghi have opened the way. And with its Competitiveness Compass, the European Commission has put forward a concrete roadmap with milestones that should be urgently implemented.
But we cannot stop halfway and we are pressed for time. As we scale up our economy, we need to scale up our decision-making to match it – and thereby stand tall and be heard.
At a time when major economies are adopting cohesive strategic agendas – using tariffs, for example, to extract concessions on other strategic goals – Europe cannot afford to be disunited. If we cannot take decisions in a European way, then others will use that against us.
To stand our ground, we need to be able to act as a single entity across several key areas. And that means we need to structurally change how we make decisions.
We know what stands in our way: a historical tradition whereby a single veto can scupper the collective interest of 26 other countries. But given the geopolitical shift at hand, I am convinced that national and European interests have never been so aligned. In this inverted world, more qualified majority voting would therefore be inherently more democratic.
I have no doubt that we can unleash a “European moment” – if leaders are willing to seize it.
If it sounds like I am confident about Europe’s future, it is because I am. But I am in good company here tonight. A recent survey finds that of all the Member States, the Irish are the most optimistic about the EU’s future, and they are among the strongest supporters of the euro.[4]
This sense of optimism is perhaps rooted in Ireland’s extraordinary transformation in recent decades. And here I am reminded of the words of Oscar Wilde, who once wrote, “Success is a science; if you have the conditions, you get the result.”[5]
Ireland put those conditions in place during the most challenging of times, and has reaped the rewards. It is now incumbent on Europe to do the same.
Disinfectant Wipes/Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
Trials
United States v. Don M. Rynn
No. 2:24-CR-00653 (District of South Carolina)
AUSA Winston Holliday
AUSA Amy Bower
On March 20, 2025, a jury convicted Don M. Rynn of making false statements to federal agents and falsifying fishing records (18 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1519).
Rynn managed several commercial fishing vessels in the McClellanville area, including the Maximum Retriever and the Crystal C. The vessels docked at Carolina Seafood, a federally licensed dealer.
On March 21, 2023, the Maximum Retriever embarked on a commercial fishing trip captained by the defendant’s son, who Rynn instructed to catch as many fish as he could (ignoring federally imposed quotas). Rynn told his son he would “take care of things” when he returned.
The Maximum Retriever returned to McClellanville shortly after midnight on March 27, 2023, with almost three times the legal limit of snowy grouper on board, and one and a half times the allowable number of grey tilefish. Rynn was waiting for the boat to arrive. Once the Maximum Retriever was in place, the Crystal C was maneuvered so that the two boats were side-by-side.
Rynn then directed deckhands to move fish from the ice hold of the Maximum Retriever to the Crystal C. They removed additional fish from the Maximum Retriever to Rynn’s truck to take to another seafood dealer in Georgetown.
In the mandatory trip report filed shortly thereafter, Rynn reported his catch only up to the limit, hiding the fact that the Maximum Retriever had vastly overfished. He attributed a substantial portion of the catch to the Crystal C, which had remained moored at the dock.
On March 27, 2023, law enforcement officers received an anonymous tip alerting them to the excessive catch. The Georgetown seafood dealer that had received some of the overage initially lied to cover for Rynn. When he realized the agents were closing in, the dealer threw the fish in the river to get rid of them.
In October 2023, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association (NOAA) agents interviewed Rynn about the incidents in March. Rynn lied, saying the snowy grouper and tilefish had been contaminated by a fuel spill while at sea, and that he had disposed of them in a dumpster. Rynn further implied that a U.S. Coast Guard report addressing an unlawful discharge into Jeremy Creek was inaccurate and should have been attributed to the Crystal C, which would have bolstered his fuel spill story.
In total, the Maximum Retriever caught approximately 560 pounds of snowy grouper and 450 pounds of tilefish. The legal limit for grouper is 200 pounds and 300 for tilefish.
NOAA, the U. S. Coast Guard, the South Carolina Department of Natural Resources and the South Carolina Department of Natural Resources Saltwater Team conducted the investigation.
Photo from dock surveillance camera showing Rynn on back of boat directing two individuals to carry a tote of federally protected fish to his truck.
On March 14, 2025, a court unsealed a complaint charging the chief executive officer of a Georgia-based heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) company with illegally importing 500 cylinders of potent greenhouse gases known as hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) into the United States from Peru.
William Randolph Hires is charged with violating the American Innovation and Manufacturing Act (AIM Act) by unlawfully importing 500 cylinders of HFCs (42 U.S.C. §§ 7675, 7413).
In April 2022, on behalf of his company, Hires purchased 500 cylinders of HFCs in Peru. Over the next several months, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) officials explained to Hires’s employees that, under the AIM Act and its implementing regulations, Hires’s company could not lawfully import the HFCs into the United States because it did not have the required EPA-issued allowances. In a July 22, 2022, email to one of Hires’s employees, an EPA official stated “it is not possible to import bulk HFCs without consumption allowances.”
Hires’s employees conveyed this information from the EPA to Hires on several occasions. On one occasion, an employee forwarded an email to Hires that the employee had received from an EPA official which stated, “[t]he HFC you listed (R-410A) is a regulated substance. So, if you do not have allowances, you cannot import those bulk HFC refrigerants.” In another email exchange between Hires and an employee, the employee informed Hires that, based on a video conference the employee had with EPA officials, shipping without the necessary allowances would violate import laws so “[i]t is out of our hands.”
Hires nevertheless instructed his employees to illegally import the HFCs into the United States. In a July 28, 2022 email, Hires stated to his employees: “[y]eah you have to be careful what agencies you’re reaching out to because the EPA . . . can create a hassle and they can hold our stuff up in customs there[.]” In a subsequent email, Hires instructed his employees to “get [the HFCs] on the ship and get it out to sea . . . don’t care what it takes[.]” Hires later instructed his employees via email: “Do not call the EPA please do not.”
The EPA Criminal Investigation Division, Homeland Security Investigations, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection conducted the investigation.
United States v. Leshon E. Johnson
No. 6:25-CR-00012 (Eastern District of Oklahoma)
ECS Senior Trial Attorney Ethan Eddy
ECS Trial Attorney Sarah Brown
AUSA Jordan Howantiz
ECS Law Clerk Amanda Backer
On March 20, 2025, Leshon E. Johnson was arraigned on an indictment charging him with violating the Animal Welfare Act (7 U.S.C. § 2156(b) & 18 U.S.C. § 49). Specifically, Johnson possessed 190 pit bull-type dogs for the purpose of having the dogs participate in an animal fighting venture, and for selling, transporting, and delivering a dog for use in an animal fighting venture. Federal authorities seized the 190 dogs from Johnson in October 2024 as authorized under the Animal Welfare Act. This is believed to be the largest number of dogs ever seized from a single person in a federal dog fighting case.
Johnson ran a dog fighting operation known as “Mal Kant Kennels” in both Broken Arrow and Haskell, Oklahoma. He previously ran “Krazyside Kennels,” also out of Oklahoma, which led to his guilty plea on state animal fighting charges in 2004. Johnson selectively bred “champion” and “grand champion” fighting dogs — dogs that have respectively won three or five fights — to produce offspring with fighting traits and abilities desired by him and others for use in dog fights. Johnson marketed and sold stud rights and offspring from winning fighting dogs to other dog fighters looking to incorporate the Mal Kant Kennels “bloodline” into their own dog fighting operations. His trafficking of fighting dogs to other dog fighters across the country contributed to the growth of the dog fighting industry and allowed Johnson to profit financially. Trial is scheduled to begin on May 5, 2025.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted the investigation.
Guilty Pleas
United States v. Terrell Williams
No. 4:23-CR-00692 (Eastern District of Missouri)
AUSA Jillian Anderson
On March 7, 2025, Terrell Williams pleaded guilty to an Animal Fighting Venture violation for hosting dog fights in his home and training dogs to fight (7 U.S.C. § 2156(a)-(c); 18 U.S.C. § 49(a)). Sentencing is scheduled for June 6, 2025.
Between September 2020 through May 2022, Williams hosted fights in a wooden “box” setup in the basement of his home in Riverview, Missouri. He also owned and bred bull terriers and terrier mixes that were used for fights. On June 22, 2022, FBI agents executed a search warrant at Williams’s home and seized eight bull terrier mixes and three Yorkshire terriers. The dogs bore scars consistent with fighting. Agents also removed equipment used to train and condition dogs, including weighted vests and a canine treadmill.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted the investigation.
Dog rescued from defendant’s home during execution of search warrant. Photo included with detention motion filed with the court.
On March 11, 2025, Nicholas Dryden pleaded guilty to creating and distributing videos depicting the torture of monkeys (known as animal “crush” videos) (18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 48(a)(3)). Co-defendant Giancarlo Morelli entered a similar plea in December 2024.
Dryden commissioned videos from a 17-year-old in Indonesia who was willing to commit specified acts of torture on video in exchange for payment. Dryden utilized Telegram, a cross-platform messaging app that includes encrypted group messaging and private chats, to advertise the animal crush videos and solicit funding for additional videos. Within these private groups, Dryden shared snippets of videos that he commissioned and advertised that the full content was for sale. Co-defendants Morelli and Philip Colt Moss each sent money to Dryden more than a dozen times in exchange for monkey torture videos.
Thereafter, they frequently gave feedback on the videos and Morelli sometimes suggested torturous acts he’d like to see in future videos.
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Office of Law Enforcement and the Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted the investigation.
United States v. Jose Manuel Valenzuela
No. 3:24-CR-01037 (Southern District of California)
ECS Assistant Chief Stephen DaPonte
AUSA Laura Sambataro
On March 18, 2025, Jose Manuel Valenzuela pleaded guilty to intentionally failing to present refrigerant tanks for inspection (19 U.S.C. §§ 1433, 1436). Sentencing is scheduled for June 10, 2025.
On April 22, 2024, Valenzuela (an HVAC technician) attempted to enter the United States from Mexico without declaring four 24-pound tanks of 404A refrigerant (a hydrofluorocarbon refrigerant) in his vehicle.
Customs and Border Protection, Homeland Security Investigations, and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Criminal Investigation Division conducted the investigation.
United States v. Robert C. Schmid
No. 3:25-mj-00011 (Eastern District of Virginia)
AUSA Carla Jordan-Detamore
On March 25, 2025, Robert C. Schmid pleaded guilty to violating the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) (7 U.S.C. §§ 136j(a)(1)(A), 1361(b)(1)(B)). Sentencing is scheduled for July 22, 2025.
Schmid owned the Atlantic Manufacturing Group, LLC (AMG), which manufactured and sold cleaning and janitorial products. AMG marketed and sold its products via various means, including a website, as well as through outside sales representatives. In September 2017, AMG entered into an agreement with “Company 1” to purchase a product called “Maquat 64-PD” for which Company 1 had obtained a registration from the EPA. AMG entered into this Agreement because it wanted to distribute and sell its liquid ProAmenities Lemon Detergent Disinfectant, made with Company 1’s Maquat 64-PD.
In October 2017, the EPA approved the label for AMG’s ProAmenities Lemon Detergent Disinfectant. The label made clear that the product was hazardous to humans and animals and was not for use on clothing or on skin.
Beginning in May 2020, and acting on behalf of AMG, Schmid began manufacturing and selling AMG “Hygienic Facility Wipes” that purportedly protected users from COVID-19. Schmid sold these wipes to janitorial services that supported government entities, gyms and health clubs, universities, and janitorial product retailers. AMG manufactured these wipes by applying the ProAmenities Lemon Detergent Disinfectant to dry wipes and packaging the wipes in plastic buckets or plastic packages. These wipes, however, were not registered with the EPA pursuant to FIFRA and did not have EPA approved labels or safety guidance. Investigators also determined that Schmid, his employees, and outside sales reps made unauthorized claims about the efficacy and safety of these wipes to potential customers.
After Company 1 issued Schmid a cease-and-desist email in August of 2020 about the unauthorized use of its product, Schmid switched to “Company 2” to use its liquid, which was not registered with the EPA, in its wipes. Schmid, however, continued to claim that his wipes were an EPA-registered product. AMG also generated product labels claiming the wipes eradicated corona viruses, in addition to other falsified information (to include the ingredient list).
Between March and November 2020, AMG sold approximately 5,000 cases of the wipes, taking in close to $415,000 in sales and making approximately $33,000 in gross profit.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Criminal Investigation Division conducted the investigation.
United States v. Robert J. Bullock, Sr.
No. 1:24-CR-10056 (District of Massachusetts)
AUSA Benjamin Tolkoff
On March 26, 2025, Robert J. Bullock, Sr., pleaded guilty to violating the Safe Drinking Water Act for tampering with public water systems (42 U.S.C. § 300i-1(a)). Sentencing is scheduled for June 25, 2025.
On the evening of November 29, 2022, Bullock, a former Stoughton Water Department employee, went into one of the Water Department’s pumping stations and turned off the pump that introduces chlorine into drinking water. As a result, water that had not been properly disinfected was introduced into the drinking water system.
When questioned by investigators, Bullock claimed to not have tampered with the water system. Specifically, Bullock said that he had not knowingly turned off the chlorine pump at Goddard Pumping Station 7 on the night of November 29, 2022, when in fact he had; and that he did not set the alarms for the chlorine level to zero that night, when he did.
The Federal Bureau of Investigations, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Criminal Investigation Division, and the Stoughton Massachusetts Police Department conducted the investigation.
Sentencings
United States v. National Water Main Cleaning Company
No. 3:25-CR-00002 (District of Connecticut)
AUSA Hal Chen
RCEC Man Chak Ng
On March 4, 2025, a court sentenced the National Water Main Cleaning Company (NWMCC) to pay a $500,000 fine, complete a three-year term of probation, and implement an environmental compliance program. The company will also employ an independent outside consultant to perform a compliance audit and identify an environmental compliance manager for its Connecticut facilities. NWMCC will also make a payment of $500,000 to the Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection (CT DEEP) to fund aquatic ecosystem enhancement projects in the South-Central Coastal Watershed.
The company pleaded guilty to violating the Clean Water Act (CWA) for knowingly discharging a pollutant into Cuff Brook while refurbishing a large culvert pipe in Cheshire, Connecticut, in July 2019 (33 U.S.C. §§ 1319 (c)(2)(A); 1311(a)). The unauthorized discharge of uncured geopolymer mortar killed more than 150 fish and contaminated Cuff Brook.
At the time of the incident, NWMCC was operating under a Code of Conduct as part of a 2014 settlement with the Massachusetts Attorney General’s Office to resolve civil allegations involving environmental pollution.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Criminal Investigation Division conducted the investigation, with assistance from the Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection.
United States v. Fidelity Development Group LLC
No. 3:24-CR-00077(Southern District of Ohio)
ECS Senior Trial Attorney Adam Cullman
On March 4, 2024, a court sentenced Fidelity Development Group LLC (Fidelity) to pay a $100,000 fine and complete a two-year term of probation. Fidelity pleaded guilty to violating the Clean Air Act for failing to inspect for the presence of asbestos (42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1)).
In 2015 or 2016, Fidelity purchased a building and planned to renovate it into a mixed-use property. Fidelity failed to perform or acquire an asbestos survey for the building prior to renovations. Around April 2020, a certified asbestos company conducted an asbestos survey in the Fidelity Building and identified more than 12,000 linear feet of 80% chrysolite asbestos pipe wrap insulation in friable condition.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Criminal Investigation Division conducted the investigation.
United States v. Frock Brothers Trucking, Inc.,et al.
Nos. 1:24-CR-00235, 00250 (Middle District of Pennsylvania)
AUSA William Behe
On March 6, 2025, a court sentenced Frock Brothers Trucking, Inc., to pay an $80,000 fine and complete a two-year term of probation. Mechanic Leon Martin will complete a two-year term of probation, to include three months’ home detention, and pay a $500,000 fine.
Both defendants pleaded guilty to conspiracy and to violating the Clean Air Act (CAA) for tampering with the emission control systems for several heavy-duty diesel trucks (18 U.S.C. § 371; 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(2)(C)).
Between 2018 and October 2023, Martin provided “tuning” or “reprogramming” services by modifying the engine control modules (ECMs) on diesel trucks. The ECM is a computerized system that manages and controls the engine’s performance. During that time, Martin tampered with the emissions diagnostic systems on the vehicles for many companies to prevent the diagnostic system software from monitoring the emission control system hardware.
Frock, a long-distance trucking company based in New Oxford, Pennsylvania, transports a variety of goods, including snack foods, refrigerated items, and produce. Ed Frock owned the company until his death in August 2022.
Between November 13, 2018, and December 28, 2018, Frock contracted with co-defendant Martin to disable and/or remove emission control components from eight of their diesel trucks. Frock removed the vehicles’ ECMs from their engines and shipped them to Martin for reprogramming. Once the devices were “tuned,” Martin shipped them back to Frock, where they were reinstalled on the trucks. Martin also tampered with the onboard diagnostic equipment (OBD) to delete factory-installed emission controls from Frock’s heavy duty diesel trucks. Martin’s tunes enabled those deleted trucks to operate without emission control devices, which are required by federal law.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Criminal Investigation Division conducted the investigation.
On March 6, 2025, a court sentencedBenjamin Gathercole to complete a one-year term of probation, after he pleaded guilty to violating the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) for illegally transporting hazardous waste without a manifest (42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(5)).
Gathercole lived in Tappahannock, Virginia, and worked at a local brake manufacturing facility. In 2019, a Virginia Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) inspector determined that the brake manufacturing facility failed to make an accurate waste determination for 32 55-gallon drums stored on site. Some of the drums displayed labels noting they contained hazardous waste, but not in accordance with RCRA requirements. The DEQ issued a notice of violation to the facility in May 2019.
In September and October 2019, Gathercole removed 31 of the 55-gallon drums from the facility and transported them to his residence. He dug a hole near his property and buried the drums in the ground. He crushed some of them in the process, causing their contents to spill onto the ground.
In December 2020, a citizen tipped off the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) about the illegal burial. In November 2021, agents executed a search warrant on the defendant’s property. Gathercole admitted to burying the drums at the request of his employer and directed authorities to where he had buried them. Further testing confirmed the waste was ignitable hazardous waste. The EPA finished excavating the site in November 2022.
The EPA Criminal Investigation Division and the EPA National Enforcement Investigation Center conducted the investigation.
United States v. Keidrick D. Usifo, et al.
No. 24-CR-00040 (Eastern District of Arkansas)
AUSA Edward Walker
On March 6, 2025, a court sentenced Keidrick Usifo to pay a $5,000 fine and complete a five-year term of probation. Co-defendant Deon Johnson will pay a $1,000 fine and complete an 18-month term of probation. Usifo and Johnson previously pleaded guilty to violating the Big Cat Public Safety Act (BCPSA)(16 U.S.C. §§ 3372 (e)(1)(A), 3373 (d)).
Lawmakers enacted the BCPSA in December 2022 to protect the public by prohibiting the private ownership of big cats (such as tigers and lions) as pets and by prohibiting exhibitors from allowing public contact with big cats, including tiger cubs. This law places new restrictions on the commerce, breeding, possession, and use of certain big cat species.
In April 2023, a citizen tipped off local game authorities after seeing a tiger cub in a residential neighborhood in Conway, Arkansas. Further investigation confirmed that Usifo purchased a tiger in March 2023 from a broker in Dallas, Texas, and brought it back to his residence in Arkansas.
After receiving a second complaint about the tiger cub, law enforcement conducted a traffic stop on April 21, 2023, arresting Usifo on a felony state warrant. The Conway Police Department then executed a search warrant at Usifo’s residence. The animal was not there, but they found evidence of its presence, including the fact that rooms in the house matched those in photos of the tiger that Usifo posted on Instagram.
While in the Pulaski County Detention Facility (PCDF), Usifo made several calls to Johnson, asking him to take care of the tiger while Usifo was held in detention. Johnson concealed his knowledge of the tiger when questioned by agents.
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Office of Law Enforcement conducted the investigation, with assistance from the Arkansas Game and Fish Commission, the Conway Police Department, and the Little Rock Police Department.
Tiger cub, now named Fred, rescued by the Turpentine Creek Wildlife Refuge. Photo taken by case agent June 2024.
United States v. Frankluis Carela De Jesús, et al.
No. 3:24-CR-00174 (District of Puerto Rico)
ECS Senior Trial Attorney Patrick Duggan
AUSA Seth Erbe
On March 6, 2025, a court sentenced the final two Dominican nationals who attempted to smuggle tropical birds from San Juan, Puerto Rico, to the Dominican Republic. Frankluis Carela De Jesús will serve 12 months and one day of incarceration, followed by three years of supervised release. Domingo Heureau Altagracia will complete eight months of incarceration and three years of supervised release. Waner Balbuena and Juan Graviel Ramírez Cedano were each previously sentenced to serve 12 months and one day of incarceration, followed by three years of supervised release. All the defendants pleaded guilty to Lacey Act trafficking and to smuggling wildlife from the United States (18 U.S.C. § 554; 16 U.S.C. §§ 3372(a)(1), (a)(4), 3373(d)(1)(B)).
On May 3, 2024, the four Dominican nationals traveled in a flagless vessel departing from San Juan, Puerto Rico, to the Dominican Republic. They intended to smuggle various species of tropical birds to the Dominican Republic for financial gain. When the vessel was approximately 30 nautical miles north of Puerto Rico, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) approached the vessel and witnessed the crew tossing objects overboard. Following the boarding of the vessel, USCG authorities recovered several of the jettisoned objects, which were wooden cages containing tropical birds. Approximately 113 birds drowned as a result.
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Office of Law Enforcement, the U.S. Coast Guard, and Customs and Border Protection conducted the investigation.
On March 10, 2025, a court sentenced Travis Larson to pay a $40,000 fine and complete a five-year term of probation. Larson will also pay $2,400 in restitution, to be divided between the State of Alaska and the Port Graham Authority. Larson will forfeit $150,000 and is prohibited from hunting anywhere in the world or providing any big game commercial services while under supervision. Larsen pleaded guilty to violating the Lacey Act for illegally transporting four black bears and making false records (16 U.S.C. §§ 3372(a)(2)(A), 3373(d)(1)(B); (d)(3)(A)).
Larson worked as a licensed big game transporter since 2010, and provided transport services through his company, Alaska Premier Sportfishing LLC (APS). Larson and APS offered paying clients transportation for multi-day hunting and fishing trips aboard a 65-foot liveaboard vessel, Venturess.
In May 2018, Larson transported eight hunters on a black bear hunt in the Nuka Bay area of the Kenai Peninsula. Each hunter paid $3,500 to participate in the hunt. The group included four Norwegian nationals. Larson knew all four people were not U.S. residents, nor were they accompanied by a licensed hunting guide or assistant guide, as required under state law.
On May 9, 2018, one foreign hunter was transported to a beach adjacent to Surprise Bay to hunt a black bear. The hunter shot and killed a black bear on land belonging to the State of Alaska. On May 10, 2018, Larson transported three foreign hunters to a beach adjacent to Beauty Bay to hunt black bears. Two of the hunters each shot and killed a black bear on land belonging to the Port Graham Corporation, an Alaska Native Corporation, and the other hunter shot and killed a black bear on land belonging to the State of Alaska. On both days, Larson transported the hunters and the illegally harvested black bears back to his vesselvia the smaller motorboat.
On May 11, 2018, Larson transported the four foreign hunters and the four illegally harvested black bears to Homer, Alaska, where he knew the black bears would be transported in interstate and foreign commerce following the hunt. The government dismissed the charges against Larson’s business.
The National Park Service Investigative Services Branch and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Office of Law Enforcement conducted the investigation.
On March 10, 2025, a court sentenced Dugan Paul Daniels to six months’ incarceration, followed by three years’ supervised release, for falsifying fishing records in violation of the Lacey Act and illegally taking a sperm whale in violation of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) (16 U.S.C. §§ 3372(d)(2), 3373(d)(3)(A), 1583(a)(1)(C), 1540(b)(1)). Daniels will also pay a $25,000 fine and perform 80 hours of community service, and is banned from commercial fishing for one year.
Daniels is a commercial fisherman with 20 years of experience. Between October and November 2020, he submitted falsified fishing records to make it appear that he lawfully caught sablefish, aka “black cod,” in federal waters on two separate occasions. In fact, Daniels illegally harvested the fish in State of Alaska waters, specifically, in Chatham Strait and Clarence Strait. The total market value of the illegally harvested fish was $127,528.
In March 2020, Daniels and three crew members were fishing for sablefish southwest of Yakobi Island in the Gulf of Alaska when they came upon a sperm whale. During the encounter, Daniels directed a crewman to shoot the whale multiple times and also tried to ram the whale with his fishing vessel. Daniels documented the encounter in writing and through text messages sent from a GPS communication device. Some of the messages stated he wished he “had a cannon to blow” the whale out of the water and that he hoped “to be reeling in a dead sperm whale.” It is a violation of the ESA to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct involving an endangered species.
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Office of Law Enforcement conducted the investigation.
No. 2:23-CR-00177 (Eastern District of Pennsylvania)
AUSA Christopher Parisi
On March 11, 2025, a court sentenced Bien King and Khalil King to each complete three-year terms of probation, to include six months’ home confinement. Bien King was also sentenced to pay a $1,000 fine. The defendants pleaded guilty to violating the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act for selling a misbranded pesticide and for violating the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act for selling misbranded animal drugs (7 U.S.C. §§ 136j(a)(1)(E); 21 U.S.C. § 331(a)).
Bien King started “Little City Dogs” (LCD) a New York corporation with office space in New York City. Bien King also created a website that sold various products intended to treat diseases or pests in animals. Bien King’s son, Khalil, worked in the New York office. Khalil King was responsible for mixing ingredients and packaging various products for shipment. The defendants obtained the ingredients for these products from various suppliers in China. They knew that these suppliers routinely mislabeled shipments of these products to avoid detection by customs officials.
When LCD received orders from online sales, Khalil King and others shipped the products from the New York office to customers throughout the United States. An undercover agent placed several orders for various products through the LCD website. These purchases included a January 17, 2020, order for fipronil drops and ivermectin. Fipronil is designed to treat external parasites such as fleas and ticks. Ivermectin is designed to control heartworms in dogs and cats.
The defendants shipped the fipronil drops and ivermectin from New York to an address in Springfield, Pennsylvania. The labeling and packaging material accompanying the fipronil drops did not include information required by law. The labeling and packaging material accompanying the ivermectin likewise did not include required information. Furthermore, LCD’s facility in New York City was not registered with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Criminal Investigation Division and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration Office of Criminal Investigations conducted the investigation.
United States v. Jose V. Fernandez
No. 1:24-CR-00071 (District of Rhode Island)
AUSA John McAdams
On March 11, 2025, a court sentenced Jose V. Fernandez to complete a two-year term of probation. Fernandez pleaded guilty to making false statements for distributing false asbestos abatement training certifications (18 U.S.C. § 1001 (a)(3)).
Fernandez owned the Rhode Island Safety Environment Training Center. The Rhode Island Department of Health (RIDH) accredited the facility to provide asbestos abatement training. On multiple occasions between 2021 and 2023, Fernandez submitted false documentation to the RIDH attesting that nearly two dozen individuals paid for, attended, and successfully completed an Environmental Protection Agency-approved abatement training program when, in fact, no one attended any classes.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Criminal Investigation Division and the Rhode Island Department of Health conducted the investigation.
On March 11, 2025, a court sentenced Pedro Luis Bones-Torres to 12 months’ incarceration, followed by one year of supervised release. Bones-Torres pleaded guilty to violating the Clean Water Act and the Rivers and Harbors Act for illegally constructing and depositing material into the wetlands and waters of the United States in the Jobos Bay National Estuarine Research Reserve (the “Jobos Estuarine Reserve”) and Las Mareas community of Salinas, Puerto Rico (33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 403).
Starting in January 2020, Bones-Torres engaged in construction and land clearing activities on a property to the South of Camino de Galileo in the Las Mareas area of Salinas, Puerto Rico (the “Property”). Much of the Property supported mangrove trees with an open area that was occasionally partially submerged by the sea tides. This wetland area was within the Jobos Estuarine Reserve.
Between January 2020 and October 2022, Bones-Torres removed mangroves from the Property, depositing fill material onto the wetland area using excavation and earth moving equipment. After he filled the wetlands, he built a concrete pad, a concrete gazebo with an outdoor kitchen, a wooden gazebo, and a dock extending into Mar Negro. Bones-Torres did not seek or receive approval to fill the wetlands and was at no point permitted to fill wetlands on or near the Property.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Criminal Investigation Division, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division, the Department of Commerce Office of Inspector General, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Office of Law Enforcement, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Office of Law Enforcement conducted the investigation.
United States v. Royce Gillham
No. 2:24-CR-14046 (Southern District of Florida)
ECS Senior Trial Attorney Adam Cullman
AUSA Daniel Funk
On March 13, 2025, a court sentenced Royce Gillham to 37 months’ incarceration, followed by three years of supervised release. Gillham, the former General Manager of a biofuel producer based in Fort Pierce, Florida, pleaded guilty to conspiring to commit wire fraud and conspiring to make false claims (18 U.S.C.§ 371).
This biofuel company produced and sold renewable fuel and fuel credits and claimed to turn various feedstocks into biodiesel. When reporting the number of gallons produced to the Internal Revenue Service and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Gillham and his employer vastly overstated their production volume in an effort to generate more credits. When auditors sought more information from the company, Gillham and his co-conspirators gave them false information about their fuel production and customers.
The scheme generated more than $7 million in fraudulent EPA renewable fuels credits and sought over $6 million in fraudulent tax credits connected to the purported production of biodiesel.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Criminal Investigation Division and the Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigations conducted the investigation.
No. 2:24-CR-00161 (Central District of California)
ECS Senior Trial Attorney Ryan Connors
ECS Trial Attorney Lauren Steele
AUSA Dennis Mitchell
ECS Law Clerk Maria Wallace
ECS Law Clerk Tonia Sibblies
On March 14, 2025, a court sentenced Sai Keung Tin, also known as Ricky Tin, to 30 months’ incarceration, followed by one year of supervised release. Tin will also pay a $5,000 fine for his role in smuggling protected turtles from the United States to Hong Kong. Tin pleaded guilty to four counts of exporting merchandise contrary to law (18 U.S.C. § 554).
Between February 2018 and June 2023, Tin, a Chinese citizen, assisted turtle smugglers in the United States. During that time, Tin aided and abetted the trafficking of approximately 2,100 turtles to Hong Kong. The turtles were intended to be sold as part of the illegal Asian pet trade. Based on a conservative, contemporary market valuation of $2,000 per turtle, the smuggled reptiles were valued at $4.2 million.
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) agents arrested Tin in February 2024 as he arrived at John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York.
USFWS agents obtained a search warrant to seize Tin’s cell phones, and found evidence that Tin came to the United States to smuggle turtles. He planned to travel to New Jersey, Texas, and Washington — familiarizing himself with tourist locations to present a false story if apprehended. His ultimate plan was to pay for turtles in cash, ship them around the country, and eventually illegally export them to Hong Kong.
Tin was associated with international turtle smuggler Kang Juntao, of Hangzhou City, China, who was extradited from Malaysia in 2019 and later sentenced to prison after pleading guilty to money laundering. Kang caused the shipment of approximately 1,500 turtles (with a market value exceeding $2.25 million) from the United States to Hong Kong, which included shipments to Tin.
The eastern box turtle is a subspecies of the common box turtle and native to the United States. Turtles with colorful markings are highly prized pets, particularly in China and Hong Kong, and are protected by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Office of Law Enforcement conducted the investigation, with assistance from Customs and Border Protection and Homeland Security Investigations.
On March 19, 2025, Hino Motors, Ltd. (HML) was sentenced to pay a criminal fine of $521.76 million, serve a five-year term of probation, during which it will be prohibited from importing any diesel engines it has manufactured into the United States, and implement a comprehensive compliance and ethics program and reporting structure. Additionally, the court entered a $1.087 billion forfeiture money judgment against the company.
Prosecutors charged HML in a single conspiracy count with five objects: to defraud the Environmental Protection Agency, to defraud the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration, to violate the Clean Air Act, to commit wire fraud, and to smuggle goods into the United States, all in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.
Between 2010 and 2019, HML submitted and caused to be submitted false applications for engine certification approvals. Company engineers regularly altered emission test data, conducted tests improperly, and fabricated data without conducting any underlying tests. HML submitted fraudulent carbon dioxide emissions test data, which resulted in the calculation of false fuel consumption values for its engines. Company engineers also failed to disclose software functions that could adversely affect engines’ emission control systems. As a result of the fraud, HML imported and sold more than 105,000 non-conforming engines between 2010 and 2022.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Criminal Investigation Division and the Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted the investigation.
Nos. 1:24-CR-00124, 1:21-CR-00016 (Northern District of New York)
AUSA Benjamin Clark
On March 20, 2025, a court sentenced Kyle Offringa to pay a $100,000 fine for conspiring to violate the Clean Air Act (CAA). His company, Highway and Heavy Parts, LLC (HHP), was sentenced on December 3, 2024, to pay a $25,000 fine. As part of the sentencing, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) will monitor the company for ongoing compliance for a two-year period. HHP and Offringa pleaded guilty to conspiring to tamper with a required monitoring device in violation of the CAA (18 U.S.C. § 371).
Between June 2017 and March 2019, HHP and Offringa conspired with a diesel truck operator, and others, including co-conspirators Daim Logistics, Inc., and Patrick Oare, to remove, delete, and tamper with monitoring devices that were required under the CAA to be installed on heavy-duty diesel trucks. Truck operators delete the emissions control hardware on heavy-duty diesel trucks to allow them to run at higher horsepower, with greater fuel efficiency, and with reduced maintenance costs. HHP charged its customers a fee for Offringa to reprogram the vehicles’ on-board detection equipment so regulators would not discover the tampering. Customers paid HHP between $1,000 and $1,500 for each truck Offringa altered.
Oare and Daim Logistics were sentenced in November 2024 for tampering with a monitoring device or method in violation of the CAA (42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(2)(C)). Oare was sentenced to time served and to pay a $15,000 fine; the company will pay a $13,000 fine. In addition, prior to sentencing, the EPA and the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation monitored Daim for approximately 18 months to ensure the company complied with all applicable federal, state, and local laws and regulations regarding the emission control devices installed on diesel vehicles owned or operated by the company.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Criminal Investigation Division conducted the investigation, with assistance from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation Police.
Headline: Members discuss decarbonization, traceability, packaging, medical devices; address notifications
Thematic session: Traceability requirements for bulk agricultural commodities
The session recognized that traceability systems are becoming an important tool to demonstrate that agricultural products meet sustainability standards and regulations. Speakers discussed how such schemes could restrict market access and reviewed the challenges businesses face in complying with such requirements, especially in developing economies. They emphasized the role of public-private collaboration, national strategies, and the availability of traceability-related data to facilitate compliance with these schemes. The TBT Agreement disciplines, particularly transparency and the need to avoid unnecessary trade restrictions, were underscored as crucial for designing balanced and effective traceability schemes.
Thematic session: Regulatory cooperation between members on food contact packaging
Balancing multiple objectives when designing and implementing measures for reducing food contact packaging is a challenge, the session stressed. The discussion noted that food packaging serves a unique and essential role in preserving the shelf-life and safety of food we consume. Speakers identified various considerations to address these challenges, including avoiding one-size-fits-all approaches, leveraging international standards, ensuring transparency, using the best available scientific information and avoiding unnecessary costs for businesses.
Thematic session: Decarbonization standards
Speakers recognized that standards and regulations are vital in supporting decarbonization objectives, with international standards playing an important role in ensuring interoperability in international markets. The importance of developing economies’ participation in developing international standards was acknowledged, alongside the necessity of coherence and periodic updates to standards.
Thematic session: Regulatory cooperation between members on medical devices regulation
Speakers emphasized the essential role of regulatory cooperation and convergence for ensuring timely access to safe and effective medical devices, particularly in times of public health emergencies. International standards were highlighted as a foundation for facilitating trade in safe medical devices, and the importance of avoiding duplication of regulatory efforts was underscored. Speakers stressed the TBT Agreement as a key tool to guide regulatory cooperation and reduce unnecessary trade barriers for medical devices.
TBT cross-cutting information session on trade and environment
The TBT Committee held a cross-cutting information session on trade and environment with the participation of delegates from the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) in an effort by members to find synergies across the work of relevant WTO bodies. Members shared their views on possible ways in which the TBT Committee can continue enhancing members’ understanding of TBT matters at the intersection of trade and environment.
As the TBT Committee’s agenda will continue to include issues related to environmental protection and TBT measures, members expressed support for closer cooperation between the TBT Committee and the CTE, noting the benefits of fostering synergies and cross-committee learning, while avoiding duplication.
Adoption of improved TBT notification formats
Following action taken by the Transparency Working Group, and in particular by Australia, Namibia, Paraguay, the United Kingdom and the United States, significant changes to TBT notification formats were adopted to streamline and modernize information contained in these documents.
Notifications resulting from actions of Transparency Working Group
Guyana, for the first time, submitted a notification on measures it has put into place to ensure the implementation of the TBT Agreement (Article 15.2). This follows last year’s adoption of a template and accompanying guidelines to help members prepare these notifications. The new notification facilitates access to information on government agencies involved in standards and regulations and the publications and websites they use to disseminate information about their work. Canada and Colombia also shared information on their recently submitted notifications.
ePing translations
The WTO Secretariat announced the launch of a new ePing feature that allows users to request unofficial translations of the full text of notified draft regulations into English, Spanish or French. This function is now available to all WTO members and ePing users. Additionally, the Secretariat encouraged members to update their enquiry point information on ePing, emphasizing the importance of keeping contact details up to date.
International Standards Organization (ISO)/ International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) terms and definitions
In conformity with a decision members took at the 10th Triennial Review of the TBT Agreement in November 2024 and following the Secretariat’s consultations with the ISO and IEC, access to their Guide containing standardization terms and definitions is now available on the WTO website. The Guide is expressly referred to in Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement.
Specific trade concerns
Members raised eight new trade concerns and 53 previous ones.
The new trade concerns addressed proposed measures related to eco-design requirements for electrical products such as chargers and sustainable products. They also covered regulatory issues on self-driving vehicles, restrictions on use of hazardous substances in certain electrical products, and recycling and recovery of materials from waste batteries. Concerns also addressed measures related to food and liquor labelling.
Members also shared progress in their discussion of trade concerns. The United States announced progress with respect to its concerns on Mexico’s measures affecting yoghurt and cheese. Mexico and the United States reported the resolution of their trade concern regarding Saudi Arabia’s technical regulation for electric vehicles.
Annual review
Every year, the TBT Committee carries out an annual review of activities relating to the implementation and operation of the TBT Agreement, including notifications, specific trade concerns, technical assistance activities and TBT related disputes. A brochure highlighting the Committee’s key results in 2024 is available here. These results include the MC13 Declaration on Regulatory Cooperation and the adoption of the 2025-2027 workplan.
As part of the next multiannual financial framework, the Commission intends to propose a European Competitiveness Fund[1], which will establish an investment capacity to support strategic sectors and technologies critical to the EU competitiveness, including research and innovation, and Important Projects of Common European Interest[2].
At this point, the size of the fund is not yet known. This will depend on a number of factors, including the priorities of the co-legislators.
As announced in the communication on ‘The Road to the next Multiannual Financial Framework’ of 11 February 2025[3], the Commission will make a proposal for the next multiannual financial framework in July 2025, with a view to securing a timely agreement before the start of its implementation in January 2028.
Italy’s Recovery and Resilience Plan provides for the financing for a total of EUR 1.5 billion of the so-called ‘IPCEI Fund’, which is also financed through national resources.
The objective of the measure is to provide support through the Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEI) Fund to projects belonging to four IPCEIs, namely, (i) the ‘Microelectronics and Communication Technologies’ IPCEI, (ii) the ‘Hydrogen Technology value chain’ IPCEI, (iii) the ‘Hydrogen related infrastructure and applications in the industrial sector’ IPCEI and (iv) the ‘Next Generation Cloud Infrastructure and Services’ IPCEI.
The Commission notes that innovative projects are generally expected to result in the creation of highly skilled jobs by the enterprises that undertake them.
The Commission is committed to strengthening the global competitiveness of the EU industry and net-zero technologies supply chains.
Such initiatives aim to provide predictability, certainty and long-term signals to incentivise demand and create conditions that facilitate investments in net-zero technology manufacturing, while supporting the workforce needed in this sector.
This work will draw on the report by Mario Draghi with the goal to enable sustainable prosperity and competitiveness. As its first major initiative, the Commission has presented a Competitiveness Compass that will frame the work for the rest of the term.
The Commission has also launched a Clean Industrial Deal and proposes a Circular Economy Act, a European Competitiveness Fund, as well as risk-absorbing measures to promote private investments in innovation and the twin transition.
The Commission will aim to ensure that these efforts benefit all, including by supporting quality jobs.