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  • MIL-OSI United Nations: IAEA Director General Grossi’s Statement to UNSC on Situation in Iran

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

    (As prepared for delivery)

    Attacks on nuclear sites in the Islamic Republic of Iran have caused a sharp degradation in nuclear safety and security in Iran. Though they have not so far led to a radiological release affecting the public, there is a danger this could occur.

    The International Atomic Energy Agency has been monitoring closely the situation at Iran’s nuclear sites since Israel began its attacks a week ago. As part of its mission, the IAEA is the global nerve centre for information on nuclear and radiological safety, and we can respond to any nuclear or radiological emergency.

    Based on information available to the IAEA, the following is the current situation at Iran’s nuclear sites. Which I offer as a follow up to my most recent report to this Security Council.

    The Natanz enrichment site contains two facilities. The first is the main Fuel Enrichment Plant. Initial attacks on the 13th of June targeted and destroyed electricity infrastructure at the facility, including an electrical sub-station, the main electric power supply building, and emergency power supply and back-up generators. On the same day, the main cascade hall appears to have been attacked using ground-penetrating munitions.

    The second facility at Natanz is the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant. It consists of aboveground and underground cascade halls. On the 13th of June the above-ground part was functionally destroyed and the strikes on the underground cascade halls were seriously damaging.

    The level of radioactivity outside the Natanz site has remained unchanged and at normal levels, indicating no external radiological impact on the population or the environment.

    However, within the Natanz facility there is both radiological and chemical contamination. It is possible that Uranium isotopes contained in Uranium Hexafluoride, Uranyl Fluoride and Hydrogen Fluoride are dispersed inside the facility. The radiation, primarily consisting of alpha particles, poses a significant danger if inhaled or ingested. This risk can be effectively managed with appropriate protective measures, such as using respiratory devices. The main concern inside the facility is chemical toxicity.

    Fordow is Iran’s main enrichment location for enriching uranium to 60%. The Agency is not aware of any damage at Fordow at this time.

    At the Esfahan nuclear site, four buildings were damaged in last Friday’s attack: the central chemical laboratory, a uranium conversion plant, the Tehran reactor-fuel manufacturing plant, and the enriched uranium metal processing facility, which was under construction.

    No increase of off-site radiation levels was reported. As in Natanz, the main concern is chemical toxicity.  

    The Khondab Heavy Water Research Reactor under construction in Arak, was hit on the 19th of June. As the reactor was not operational and did not contain any nuclear material, no radiological consequence is expected. The nearby Heavy Water Production Plant is also assessed to have been hit, and similarly no radiological consequence is expected.

    As stated in the IAEA’s update of the 18th of June, at the Tehran Research Center, one building, where advanced centrifuge rotors were manufactured and tested, was hit. At the Karaj workshop, two buildings, where different centrifuge components were manufactured, were destroyed. There was no radiological impact, internally or externally.

    Let me now refer to the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. This is the nuclear site in Iran where the consequences of an attack could be most serious. It is an operating nuclear power plant and as such it hosts thousands of kilograms of nuclear material. Countries of the region have reached out directly to me over the past few hours to express their concerns, and I want to make it absolutely and completely clear: In case of an attack on the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant a direct hit could result in a very high release of radioactivity to the environment.

    Similarly, a hit that disabled the only two lines supplying electrical power to the plant could cause its reactor’s core to melt, which could result in a high release of radioactivity to the environment. In their worst-case, both scenarios would necessitate protective actions, such as evacuations and sheltering of the population or the need to take stable iodine, with the reach extending to distances from a few to several hundred kilometres. Radiation monitoring would need to cover distances of several hundred kilometres and food restrictions may need to be implemented.

    Any action against the Tehran Nuclear Research Reactor could also have severe consequences, potentially for large areas of the city of Tehran and its inhabitants. In such a case, protective actions would need to be taken.

    I will continue to provide public updates about the developments at all these sites and their possible health and environmental consequences.

    The Agency is, as madame Undersecretary kindly reminded, and will remain present in Iran and inspections there will resume, as required by Iran’s safeguards obligations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement, as soon as safety and security conditions allow.

    In this context, let me restate that the safety of our inspectors is of utmost importance. The host country has a responsibility in this regard, and we expect every effort to be made to ensure that their security and their communication lines with the IAEA headquarters will be maintained.

    As stated in my most recent report to the Agency’s Board of Governors and based on inspections conducted at the relevant facilities since then, Iran’s uranium stockpiles remain under safeguards in accordance with Iran’s comprehensive safeguards agreement. You may recall that more than 400kg of this stockpile is uranium enriched up to 60% U-235. It is essential that the Agency resumes inspections as soon as possible to provide credible assurances that none of it has been diverted.

    Importantly, any special measures by Iran to protect its nuclear materials and equipment must be done in accordance with Iran’s safeguards obligations and the Agency.  

    Therefore, it is of paramount importance that the Agency’s inspectors are allowed to verify that all relevant materials, especially those enriched to 60%, are accounted for. Beyond the potential radiological risks, attacks on such materials would make this effort of course more difficult.

    Madame President,

    The IAEA has consistently underlined, as stated in its General Conference resolution, that armed attacks on nuclear facilities should never take place, and could result in radioactive releases with grave consequences within and beyond the boundaries of the State which has been attacked.

    I therefore again call on maximum restraint. Military escalation threatens lives and delays indispensable work towards a diplomatic solution for the long-term assurance that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon.

    Madame President,

    The presence, support, analysis and inspections of technical experts are crucial to mitigating risks to nuclear safety and security – that is true during peacetime and even more so during military conflict.

    For the second time in three years, we are witnessing a dramatic conflict between two UN and IAEA Member States in which nuclear installations are coming under fire and nuclear safety is being compromised. The IAEA, just as has been the case with the military conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, will not stand idle during this conflict.

    As I stated in this chamber just a few days ago, I am ready to travel immediately and to engage with all relevant parties to help ensure the protection of nuclear facilities and the continued peaceful use of nuclear technology in accordance with the Agency mandate, including by deploying Agency nuclear safety and security experts, in addition to our safeguards inspectors in Iran, wherever necessary.

    For the IAEA to act, a constructive, professional dialogue is needed. I urge the Members of this Council to support us in making it happen sooner rather than later.

    The IAEA must receive timely and regular technical information about affected nuclear facilities and their respective sites. I urge in this regard the Iranian regulatory authorities to continue a constructive dialogue with the IAEA Incident and Emergency Centre, which has been operating 24/7 since the beginning of this conflict.

    Nuclear facilities and material must not be shrouded by the fog of war.

    Yesterday there was an incorrect statement to the media by an Israeli military official that Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant had been attacked. Though the mistake was quickly identified and the statement retracted, the situation underscored the vital need for clear and accurate communication, and the Agency’s unique role in providing it in a technically accurate and politically impartial way is obvious.

    Let me conclude by assuring the international community of the IAEA’s continued support at this very grave time.

    A diplomatic solution is within reach if the necessary political will is there. Elements for an agreement have been discussed. The IAEA can guarantee, through a watertight inspections system, that nuclear weapons will not be developed in Iran.  They can form the basis of a long-standing agreement that brings peace and avoids a nuclear crisis in the Middle East. This opportunity should not be missed. The alternative would be a protracted conflict and a looming threat of nuclear proliferation that, while emanating from the Middle East, would effectively erode the NPT and the non-proliferation regime as a whole.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

  • MIL-Evening Report: Muted response from Albanese government on US attack on Iran

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of Canberra

    The Albanese government has given a tepid response to the United States’ bombing of Iran’s nuclear facilities.

    The Prime Minister’s Office issued a statement from a government spokesperson, but there were no plans on Sunday afternoon for Anthony Albanese or any minister to front the media.

    This contrasted with the full support given by the opposition, which said, “the Coalition stands with the United States of America today. We can never allow the Iranian regime the capacity to enact its objectives of the destruction of the United States and Israel.”

    The government has constantly urged deescalation of the Middle East conflict.

    The government spokesperson’s statement recognised the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear program but did not specifically refer to the American military action.

    It said: “we have been clear that Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile program has been a threat to international peace and security.”

    “We note the US President’s statement that now is the time for peace.

    “The security situation in the region is highly volatile.

    “We continue to call for de-escalation, dialogue and diplomacy.

    “Australians in Israel and Iran and the region should continue to monitor public safety information provided by local authorities, including to shelter in place when required.

    “The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade will be communicating directly with registered Australians about preparations for assisted departures.”

    Earlier, Defence Minister Richard Marles, interviewed before news of the US bombing, said the Australian government was making it clear it saw the Iranian program as a threat to the peace and stability of the region and the world.

    “What we’re saying in relation to this specific conflict is that we are worried about its prospect for escalation,” he said.

    Marles, who will attend this week NATO summit at The Hague, declined to say whether he had conversations or communication with US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth in the last week or so to discuss the American position.

    But he told Sky: “America is considering its position. So, exactly where America stands is a matter which is under consideration right now”.

    He said the US had been holding a defensive posture in support of their assets and people in the region.

    “We obviously understand that. And they too have been making arguments in relation to there being greater dialogue around this question and in this moment.”

    Opposition Leader Sussan Ley and acting Shadow Foreign Affairs Minister Andrew Hastie released a statement saying,

    “The world can never accept a nuclear-armed Iranian regime and today the United States military has taken proactive action to ensure that we never need to.

    “A nuclear armed Iranian regime would be a serious and direct threat to world peace and stability, especially as it continues to engage in terrorism including by supporting its proxies: Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen.”

    Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Muted response from Albanese government on US attack on Iran – https://theconversation.com/muted-response-from-albanese-government-on-us-attack-on-iran-259510

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-OSI China: Hainan free trade port moves to forefront of China’s opening-up drive

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    An immigration officer processes entry procedures for personnel attending the 2025 Blue Bay LPGA at Sanya Phoenix International Airport in Sanya, south China’s Hainan Province, March 3, 2025. (Xinhua/Yang Guanyu)

    For Canadian visitor Stephanie Wing See Yau, the therapy experience at a care center in Bo’ao, a coastal city in China’s southernmost island province of Hainan, felt more like “a vacation.”

    “This place is top-notch. They cater to so many aspects of wellness, not just physical, but mental too,” she told Xinhua during her stay in the Boao Lecheng International Medical Tourism Pilot Zone, which hosts over 30 top-tier domestic and international medical institutions.

    Thanks to special policy support, the pilot zone has introduced 485 cutting-edge medicines and medical devices that are licensed abroad but not yet available in the domestic market. The policy has benefited more than 130,000 patients, including individuals like Yau.

    Her four-day experience — blending advanced health screenings, traditional therapies, tea ceremonies, and cultural immersion — offers much more than just a chance to relax. It showcases a tangible outcome of a key move in China’s opening-up strategy: the transformation of Hainan into a Free Trade Port (FTP).

    As the Hainan FTP is set to begin independent customs operations by the end of the year, it is poised to become not only a tourist haven but also a pivotal gateway for China’s opening-up drive.

    Frontier for free-flowing factors

    A central component of this transformation is the Lecheng medical tourism pilot zone. A total of 25 medical tourism routes have been rolled out to cater to a wide range of needs, including traditional Chinese medicine, chronic disease care, luxury diagnostics and cosmetic rehab, garnering popularity among visitors from countries such as Indonesia, Russia, Spain, and beyond.

    In 2024, the medical special zone attracted over 410,000 medical visitors, up 36.76 percent year on year.

    Lecheng is only one part of Hainan’s wider push for opening up. Beyond the medical sector, the province has been fast-tracking foreign access across sectors ranging from finance and education to communication and high-tech industries, as China aims to build an FTP with global top-tier trade standards.

    Hainan, supported by the country’s vast domestic market and its strategic positioning, stands as a vital hub that connects the world’s second-largest economy with global markets.

    The FTP is gearing up to be “a pivotal gateway leading China’s new era of opening-up,” said Chi Fulin, head of the China Institute for Reform and Development.

    With independent customs operations imminent, the FTP’s policy framework, underpinned by features like zero tariffs, low tax rates, simplified tax systems and facilitated factor flows, has taken shape.

    For firms in Lecheng, a zero-tariff policy on medical imports has saved nearly 8.2 million yuan (about 1.14 million U.S. dollars) in duties since December 2024.

    The start of independent customs operations will represent a concrete step toward building a major gateway for China’s high-level opening-up, Chi said.

    Institutional opening-up luring foreign capital 

    As Hainan FTP has prioritized institutional integration and coordination across trade, finance and regulatory systems, experts believe this will create a powerful driving force for the development of the FTP and contribute to China’s high-standard opening up strategy.

    Official data showed that so far, the province has rolled out a total of 158 institutional innovation cases. These reform measures include technology-empowered public tendering, one-stop business licensing, and a specialized IP zone to support the seed industry.

    Hainan FTP serves not only as a testing ground for free-flowing goods, services and data, but as a frontier for the innovation of regulations and mechanisms, said Zhou Xiaochuan, vice chairman of the Boao Forum for Asia (BFA).

    With its optimized business environment, Hainan has emerged as a premier foreign investment destination, ranking among China’s top performers. In 2024, the number of foreign-invested enterprises in Hainan rose 19.2 percent year on year, while its foreign direct investment volume climbed to the tenth spot nationally.

    To date, Hainan has attracted investment from 158 countries and regions, while its economic openness ratio — the ratio of total trade to GDP — more than doubled from 17.3 percent in 2018 to 35 percent in 2024.

    High-profile events held in the province like the BFA, a premier platform advocating openness and multilateral cooperation, and the China International Consumer Products Expo, the largest consumer expo in the Asia-Pacific region, offer global investors dynamic gateways to observe the country’s evolving openness agenda.

    DFS, the travel retail company of the luxury goods conglomerate LVMH, in 2024 sealed its largest single investment in 60 years to launch a landmark complex in Yalong Bay of Sanya, the well-known tropical resort city in Hainan. The project will merge luxury retail, hotels and entertainment, with the goal of building a top destination for luxury shopping and tourism.

    “Hainan FTP embodies China’s commitment to high-standard openness,” said Nancy Liu, president of DFS China.

    China’s special economic zones, like Hainan FTP and the 21 pilot free trade zones, serve as pivotal engines for industrial transformation and opening up, Chi noted, highlighting their role as “growth accelerators for both regional and global economies.”

    When the independent customs operations begin, Hainan FTP will create key opportunities for international enterprises to access China’s domestic market more efficiently, and play a greater role in enhancing market connectivity with global markets through service trade-focused regulatory alignment, he added. 

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: NZ response to developments in Middle East

    Source: New Zealand Government

    The Government continues to call for diplomacy and dialogue in the Middle East,  Foreign Minister Winston Peters says.

    “We acknowledge developments in the last 24 hours, including President Trump’s announcement of US strikes on nuclear facilities in Iran,” Mr Peters says. 

    “Ongoing military action in the Middle East is extremely worrying, and it is critical further escalation is avoided. New Zealand strongly supports efforts towards diplomacy. We urge all parties to return to talks. Diplomacy will deliver a more enduring resolution than further military action.” 

    Meanwhile, the Government is pursuing all options for assisting New Zealanders stranded in Iran and Israel, Mr Peters and Defence Minister Judith Collins say.  

    “We remain seriously concerned about the risks New Zealanders face in Iran and Israel given continued military strikes between the two countries,” Mr Peters says.

    “Airspace has been closed since the beginning of the current conflict, and it is highly uncertain when it will reopen. That is why we continue to recommend that New Zealanders do everything they can to leave now if they can find a safe route.

    “We know it will not be safe for everyone to leave Iran or Israel, and many people may not have access to transport or fuel supplies. If you are in this situation you should shelter in place, follow appropriate advice from local authorities and stay in touch with family and friends where possible.” 

    As part of government efforts to pursue all options for assisting New Zealanders in harm’s way, government personnel and a C-130J Hercules aircraft are being deployed to the Middle East and will stand ready to assist if needed. The Government is also in discussion with commercial airlines to assess how they may be able to assist. 

    “This deployment is part of our contingency plans in preparation for supporting New Zealanders seeking to leave Iran and Israel,” Ms Collins says. 

    “The New Zealand Defence Force is playing an important role in this operation, stepping up to help New Zealanders in distress overseas.”

    “Airspace in Israel and Iran remains heavily restricted, which means getting people out by aircraft is not yet possible. But by positioning an aircraft and Defence and Foreign Affairs personnel in the region, we may be able to do more when airspace reopens.” 

    The situation in the Middle East is fast-moving and it will take several days for the C-130J Hercules, scheduled to leave Auckland tomorrow, to reach the region.

    All New Zealanders in the Middle East – not just in Iran and Israel – are urged to register on SafeTravel.

    The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade is running 24/7 consular operations, including via teams in the region. 

    New Zealanders in Iran and Israel needing urgent consular assistance should call the Ministry’s Emergency Consular Call Centre on +64 99 20 20 20.  

    MIL OSI New Zealand News –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: China Moves Towards Full Energy Independence to Become Major Energy Exporter – Rosneft CEO

    Source: Rosneft

    Headline: China Moves Towards Full Energy Independence to Become Major Energy Exporter – Rosneft CEO

    China is moving towards full energy independence and will turn from an importer to a major energy exporter in the foreseeable future, Rosneft CEO Igor Sechin said in his report at the Energy Panel of the XXVIII St. Petersburg International Economic Forum.

    He noted that China is a unique example of a competent approach to energy system development – the country now accounts for a third of the world’s investments in the energy sector.

    “In my opinion, China, which has already ensured its energy security, is confidently moving towards complete energy independence, forming a stable energy balance based on its own resources. There is no doubt, taking into account the persistence and professionalism of the Chinese comrades, that in the foreseeable future they will achieve the desired result, which will turn China from an importer of energy resources into a major energy exporter,” said the CEO of Rosneft.

    According to Igor Sechin, in recent years it is in China that the largest amount of new renewable energy capacity has been commissioned and more than 70% of the world’s capacity for the production of equipment for the “green” economy is located. This applies to the entire value chain: from critical minerals to the production of high-tech equipment that has no analogues in Western countries.

    Rosneft’s CEO also noted China’s efforts in increasing investments in related infrastructure: investments in power grids increased by 15% last year and may double this year. “investments in rechargeable batteries have grown almost fivefold to $11 billion. As of today, the total capacity of such batteries in China exceeds 35 GW , which amounts to two-thirds of the entire global capacity,” Igor Sechin said.

    At the same time, China has never given up fossil fuels. Over the last five years, the country has outpaced the rest of the world in terms of commissioning new coal-fired generation capacity. “Today, coal accounts for almost 60% of China’s electricity generation. Last year alone, China issued permits for about 100 gigawatts of new coal-fired power generation, the highest in a decade, which should strengthen coal’s role in the grid,” emphasized the CEO of Rosneft.

    China’s efforts to strengthen its own energy security have drawn a barrage of criticism, often disguised as concern for the environment. “As the outstanding Chinese strategist and thinker Sun Tzu aptly noted two and a half thousand years ago: ‘The more brilliant your plan, the fewer people will agree with it,’” the Rosneft CEO added. 

    According to Sechin, China’s coordinated approach to energy security is particularly clear from the example of electric cars. The growth of their sales led to a significant slowdown in demand for motor fuel last year, and “the continuation of this trend may have a significant reversing effect on the balance of the oil market”.

    An important part of China’s strategy to reduce its dependence on energy imports is the processing of coal into synthetic fuels and chemical products. “Chinese companies are investing billions of dollars in the development of this industry. According to experts, today in China 40 million tons of coal is used to produce synthetic fuels and more than 260 mln tons for ammonia and methanol production,” Igor Sechin concluded.

    Department of Information and Advertising
    Rosneft Oil Company
    June 21, 2025

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: China Moves Towards Full Energy Independence to Become Major Energy Exporter – Rosneft CEO

    Source: Rosneft

    Headline: China Moves Towards Full Energy Independence to Become Major Energy Exporter – Rosneft CEO

    China is moving towards full energy independence and will turn from an importer to a major energy exporter in the foreseeable future, Rosneft CEO Igor Sechin said in his report at the Energy Panel of the XXVIII St. Petersburg International Economic Forum.

    He noted that China is a unique example of a competent approach to energy system development – the country now accounts for a third of the world’s investments in the energy sector.

    “In my opinion, China, which has already ensured its energy security, is confidently moving towards complete energy independence, forming a stable energy balance based on its own resources. There is no doubt, taking into account the persistence and professionalism of the Chinese comrades, that in the foreseeable future they will achieve the desired result, which will turn China from an importer of energy resources into a major energy exporter,” said the CEO of Rosneft.

    According to Igor Sechin, in recent years it is in China that the largest amount of new renewable energy capacity has been commissioned and more than 70% of the world’s capacity for the production of equipment for the “green” economy is located. This applies to the entire value chain: from critical minerals to the production of high-tech equipment that has no analogues in Western countries.

    Rosneft’s CEO also noted China’s efforts in increasing investments in related infrastructure: investments in power grids increased by 15% last year and may double this year. “investments in rechargeable batteries have grown almost fivefold to $11 billion. As of today, the total capacity of such batteries in China exceeds 35 GW , which amounts to two-thirds of the entire global capacity,” Igor Sechin said.

    At the same time, China has never given up fossil fuels. Over the last five years, the country has outpaced the rest of the world in terms of commissioning new coal-fired generation capacity. “Today, coal accounts for almost 60% of China’s electricity generation. Last year alone, China issued permits for about 100 gigawatts of new coal-fired power generation, the highest in a decade, which should strengthen coal’s role in the grid,” emphasized the CEO of Rosneft.

    China’s efforts to strengthen its own energy security have drawn a barrage of criticism, often disguised as concern for the environment. “As the outstanding Chinese strategist and thinker Sun Tzu aptly noted two and a half thousand years ago: ‘The more brilliant your plan, the fewer people will agree with it,’” the Rosneft CEO added. 

    According to Sechin, China’s coordinated approach to energy security is particularly clear from the example of electric cars. The growth of their sales led to a significant slowdown in demand for motor fuel last year, and “the continuation of this trend may have a significant reversing effect on the balance of the oil market”.

    An important part of China’s strategy to reduce its dependence on energy imports is the processing of coal into synthetic fuels and chemical products. “Chinese companies are investing billions of dollars in the development of this industry. According to experts, today in China 40 million tons of coal is used to produce synthetic fuels and more than 260 mln tons for ammonia and methanol production,” Igor Sechin concluded.

    Department of Information and Advertising
    Rosneft Oil Company
    June 21, 2025

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI: BexBack Launches $50 Welcome Bonus and 100% Deposit Match to Empower Crypto Traders with 100x Leverage

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    SINGAPORE, June 21, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — BexBack Exchange has launched an aggressive new promotion to empower both new and seasoned crypto traders: a $50 welcome bonus and a 100% deposit match for all new users. As the crypto market braces for another period of high volatility, BexBack is making futures trading more accessible and profitable than ever. With up to 100x leverage, zero KYC requirements, and support for over 50 digital assets, the platform provides an ideal environment for those seeking to capitalize on market swings without large upfront capital.

    Advantages of 100x Leverage Crypto Futures

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    What Is 100x Leverage and How Does It Work?

    Simply put, 100x leverage allows you to open larger trading positions with less capital. For example:

    Suppose the Bitcoin price is $100,000 that day, and you open a long contract with 1 BTC. After using 100x leverage, the transaction amount is equivalent to 100 BTC.

    One day later, if the price rises to $105,000, your profit will be (105,000 – 100,000) * 100 BTC / 100,000 = 5 BTC, a yield of up to 500%.

    With BexBack’s deposit bonus

    BexBack offers a 100% deposit bonus. If the initial investment is 2 BTC, the profit will increase to 10 BTC, and the return on investment will double to 1000%.

    Note: Although leveraged trading can magnify profits, you also need to be wary of liquidation risks.

    How Does the 100% Deposit Bonus Work?
    The deposit bonus from BexBack cannot be directly withdrawn but can be used to open larger positions and increase potential profits. Additionally, during significant market fluctuations, the bonus can serve as extra margin, effectively reducing the risk of liquidation.

    About BexBack?

    BexBack is a leading cryptocurrency derivatives platform offering up to 100x leverage on futures contracts for BTC, ETH, ADA, SOL, XRP, and over 50 other digital assets. Headquartered in Singapore, the platform also operates offices in Hong Kong, Japan, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Argentina. Like many top-tier exchanges, BexBack holds a U.S. MSB (Money Services Business) license and is trusted by more than 500,000 traders worldwide. The platform accepts users from the United States, Canada, and Europe, with zero deposit fees and 24/7 multilingual customer support, delivering a secure, efficient, and user-friendly trading experience.

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    Disclaimer: This content is provided by BexBack. The statements, views, and opinions expressed in this content are solely those of the content provider and do not necessarily reflect the views of this media platform or its publisher. We do not endorse, verify, or guarantee the accuracy, completeness, or reliability of any information presented. We do not guarantee any claims, statements, or promises made in this article. This content is for informational purposes only and should not be considered financial, investment, or trading advice. Investing in crypto and mining-related opportunities involves significant risks, including the potential loss of capital. It is possible to lose all your capital. These products may not be suitable for everyone, and you should ensure that you understand the risks involved. Seek independent advice if necessary. Speculate only with funds that you can afford to lose. Readers are strongly encouraged to conduct their own research and consult with a qualified financial advisor before making any investment decisions. However, due to the inherently speculative nature of the blockchain sector—including cryptocurrency, NFTs, and mining—complete accuracy cannot always be guaranteed. Neither the media platform nor the publisher shall be held responsible for any fraudulent activities, misrepresentations, or financial losses arising from the content of this press release. In the event of any legal claims or charges against this article, we accept no liability or responsibility. Globenewswire does not endorse any content on this page.

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    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: China is ready to cooperate with Russia to strengthen political mutual trust and expand areas of common interest – Vice Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    St. Petersburg, June 21 (Xinhua) — Member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee and Vice Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) Ding Xuexiang said on Friday that China is ready to cooperate with Russia to continuously strengthen political mutual trust and expand areas of common interest.

    A senior Chinese official made the statement at a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

    He recalled that in May, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Russia at the invitation and took part in the celebrations of the 80th anniversary of the Soviet Union’s victory in the Great Patriotic War. According to him, Xi Jinping held in-depth strategic communication with V. Putin and developed new high-level projects for the development of Chinese-Russian relations at the next stage.

    Ding Xuexiang noted that the leadership and strategic guidance of Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin provide a reliable guarantee for deepening China-Russia cooperation and maintaining friendship for many generations, and also serve as confidence for the two countries to jointly overcome various uncertainties on the way forward.

    China is ready to cooperate with Russia to further expand trade and investment, deepen practical cooperation in the energy sector, promote relevant projects and mutually support development and national revival, the Vice Premier added.

    Against the backdrop of profound changes in the international situation, China and Russia should maintain comprehensive strategic coordination, uphold international fairness, support the multilateral trading system with the WTO at its core, jointly safeguard supply chain stability, and deepen multilateral cooperation through mechanisms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS, so as to promote the building of an equitable and orderly multipolar world as well as win-win and inclusive economic globalization.

    In turn, V. Putin noted that despite external difficulties and challenges, Russian-Chinese relations have received comprehensive development and reached an unprecedented high level.

    He expressed Russia’s readiness to further strengthen practical cooperation with China and work together to create a better future for both countries and the entire world.

    In conclusion, the Russian President stressed that he was looking forward to visiting China to participate in the SCO summit in Tianjin and the commemorative events dedicated to the 80th anniversary of the Victory in the Chinese People’s War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Hainan Free Trade Port to Play Key Role in China’s Opening-Up Policy

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    HAIKOU, June 21 (Xinhua) — Canadian tourist Stephanie Wing Xi Yao found the wellness treatments at a medical center in Boao Township, south China’s Hainan Province, more like a “resort.”

    “Everything here is top-notch, the staff pays attention to all aspects of health – not only physical but also mental,” she told Xinhua at the Lecheng International Medical Tourism Pilot Zone in Boao, which is home to more than 30 leading domestic and foreign medical institutions.

    Through special policy measures, 485 advanced drugs and medical equipment licensed abroad but not yet available domestically were brought into the pilot zone, benefiting more than 130,000 patients, including Yao.

    Her four-day experience at the medical centre, which combined cutting-edge medical examinations, traditional Chinese medicine treatments, tea ceremonies and cultural immersion, was much more than just a chance to relax. It demonstrates the concrete outcome of a key step in China’s opening-up strategy: turning Hainan into a free trade port (FTP).

    As Hainan FCT prepares to launch a separate customs control regime by the end of the year, it plans to become not only a tourist mecca but also an important gateway for China’s high-level opening-up.

    PLACE OF FREE MOVEMENT OF FACTORS

    The central component of this transformation is the Lecheng Medical Tourism Pilot Zone. A total of 25 medical tourism routes have been launched, covering a wide range of needs, including traditional Chinese medicine, chronic disease treatment, premium diagnostics, and beauty rehabilitation, which have gained popularity among residents of Indonesia, Russia, Spain, and other countries.

    In 2024, the medical special zone was visited more than 410,000 times, which is 36.76 percent more than the previous year.

    Lecheng is just one part of Hainan’s broader efforts to open up. Beyond the medical sector, the province is accelerating foreign companies’ access to finance, education, communications and high-tech industries as China seeks to create a free trade zone with the highest global trading standards.

    Backed by China’s huge domestic market and its strategic positioning, Hainan is an important hub linking the world’s second-largest economy to global markets.

    The Hainan PCT is poised to become “a key gateway leading China into a new era of opening up,” said Chi Fulin, head of the China Institute of Reform and Development Studies.

    With the approach of the launch of the separate customs control regime, the political system of the PST was formed, based on such features as zero tariffs, low tax rates, a simplified tax system and facilitated movement of production factors.

    For companies based in Lecheng, the zero-tariff policy on medical imports has saved nearly 8.2 million yuan (about $1.14 million) in duties since December 2024.

    The launch of separate customs control will be a concrete step towards creating an important gateway for China’s high-level opening up, Chi Fulin noted.

    INSTITUTIONAL OPENNESS ATTRACTS FOREIGN CAPITAL

    Since the Hainan FCT has prioritized institutional integration and coordination in trade, financial and regulatory systems, experts believe that this will create a strong driving force for the development of the FCT and contribute to China’s high-level opening-up expansion strategy.

    Official data show that Hainan Province has implemented a total of 158 institutional innovations to date. These reforms include technology-enhanced government tenders, a one-stop shop for business licenses, and the establishment of a dedicated IP zone to support the breeding industry.

    The Hainan Free Trade Zone serves not only as a testing ground for the free movement of goods, services and data, but also as a front for innovation in regulation and mechanisms, said Zhou Xiaochuan, vice chairman of the Boao Forum for Asia (BOA).

    With an optimized business environment, Hainan has become a leading destination for foreign investment, ranking among the best in the country in terms of its performance. In 2024, the number of foreign-invested enterprises in Hainan increased by 19.2 percent year-on-year, and the volume of foreign direct investment attracted allowed the region to rise to 10th place in the country.

    To date, Hainan has attracted investment from 158 countries and regions, and its economic openness ratio – the ratio of total foreign trade to GRP – has more than doubled from 17.3 percent in 2018 to 35 percent in 2024.

    The province’s landmark events such as BAF, a leading platform advocating for openness and multilateral cooperation, and the China International Consumer Goods Expo, the largest consumer expo in the Asia-Pacific region, offer dynamic opportunities for global investors to observe China’s evolving opening-up agenda.

    LVMH’s luxury retail arm DFS made its largest single investment in 60 years in 2024, opening a landmark complex in Yalong Bay in Sanya, Hainan’s famous tropical resort city. The project will combine luxury retail, hotels and entertainment to create a premier luxury shopping and tourism destination.

    “The Hainan FTA represents China’s commitment to high-standard opening-up,” said DFS China President Nancy Liu.

    China’s special economic zones, such as the Hainan Free Trade Zone and the 21 pilot free trade zones, serve as key drivers of industrial transformation and opening-up, Chi Fulin stressed, noting their role as “growth accelerators for both regional and global economies.”

    Once the separate customs control is put into effect, the Hainan FCP will create key opportunities for international enterprises to more effectively access China’s domestic market and play a greater role in strengthening market connectivity with global markets through regulatory harmonization focused on trade in services, he added. -0-

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI China: China ready to work with Russia to consolidate political mutual trust, strengthen bonds of shared interests: vice premier

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    China ready to work with Russia to consolidate political mutual trust, strengthen bonds of shared interests: vice premier

    Chinese Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang, also a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, meets with Russian President Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg, Russia, June 20, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

    ST. PETERSBURG, June 21 — Chinese Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang said here on Friday that China stands ready to work with Russia to continuously consolidate their political mutual trust and strengthen the bonds of shared interests.

    Ding, also a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, made the remarks when meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

    Ding first conveyed cordial greetings and best wishes from Chinese President Xi Jinping to Putin.

    Not long ago, Xi was invited to visit Russia and attend the celebrations marking the 80th anniversary of the victory in the Soviet Union’s Great Patriotic War, Ding said. Xi had in-depth strategic communication with Putin and made new top-level designs for the development of China-Russia relations for the next stage, he said.

    The leadership and strategic guidance of Xi and Putin provide the strongest assurance for deepening China-Russia cooperation and sustaining their friendship for generations to come, and also serve as the biggest certainty for the two countries to jointly deal with various uncertainties on the way forward, Ding said.

    He said China stands ready to work with Russia to further expand trade and investment, deepen practical cooperation in the energy sector, advance relevant projects, and support each other’s development and revitalization.

    The vice premier said that in the face of profound changes in the global landscape, China and Russia should uphold comprehensive strategic coordination, defend international justice, support the WTO-centered multilateral trading system, jointly safeguard the stability of supply chains, and deepen multilateral cooperation through mechanisms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS, so as to contribute to promoting an equal and orderly multipolar world as well as universally beneficial and inclusive economic globalization.

    For his part, Putin asked Ding to convey his sincere greetings to Xi and welcomed Ding’s attendance at the 28th St. Petersburg International Economic Forum.

    Putin said that despite external difficulties and challenges, Russia-China relations have achieved all-round development and reached an unprecedented level.

    He expressed Russia’s readiness to further strengthen practical cooperation with China and work together to create a better future for both countries and the world.

    Putin said he looks forward to visiting China for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Tianjin and the commemorative events marking the 80th anniversary of the victory in the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War.

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Tesla to Build Grid-Level Energy Storage Station in Shanghai

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    SHANGHAI, June 21 (Xinhua) — U.S. automaker Tesla signed a deal with Chinese partners on Friday to build a grid-scale energy storage station in Shanghai using its Megapack battery packs.

    The total investment in the project will be 4 billion yuan (about $556 million). The agreement marks Tesla’s entry into China’s rapidly growing energy storage market and paves the way for its facility to be connected to the world’s largest power grid.

    According to the agreement signed by Tesla, the Lingang New Area Government of China /Shanghai/ Pilot Free Trade Zone, the People’s Government of Fengxian District of Shanghai and China Kangfu International Leasing Co., Ltd., the gigawatt-hour energy storage station will be built in the Lingang New Area.

    It will be Tesla’s first grid-scale energy storage station built in mainland China.

    Tesla China’s energy business general manager Dong Kun said that once operational, the station will participate in spot electricity trading, helping to smooth out peak loads in local networks and improve the stability of the power system.

    Tesla also plans to expand its partnership with China Kangfu to deliver carbon-free energy solutions globally.

    In February of this year, the new Tesla Megafactory in the new Lingang area (Tesla’s second plant in Shanghai after the Gigafactory) began producing Megapack batteries.

    Tesla predicts 50 percent year-over-year growth in energy storage capacity in 2025. -0-

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: SCO Conference and Exhibition Complex Project in Qingdao Passes Construction Acceptance

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BEIJING, June 21 (Xinhua) — The grandiose Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Conference and Exhibition Complex project in the east China coastal city of Qingdao has recently passed the acceptance test for construction and installation work.

    As a key component of the China-SCO Regional Economic and Trade Cooperation Demonstration Zone in Qingdao, the SCO Conference and Exhibition Complex with a 50-meter-high main building began construction in September 2021. Its total construction area is 237,000 square meters.

    According to the Qingdao Daily newspaper, a total of 17,000 tons of steel materials were used to build the complex, with the steel truss used in the structure having a maximum weight of 65 tons and a maximum span of 54 meters, which is equal to the total length of two standard basketball courts. Advanced automatic software control technologies, including welding robots, were used in the processing of steel components. At present, 8 new applied technologies and 5 inventions have been patented for the project, the publication says.

    The construction of this complex is considered an important step in strengthening the platform construction for the development of international cooperation in the above-mentioned demonstration zone in Qingdao, allowing for the promotion of trade and economic ties with the SCO countries as well as the countries participating in the Belt and Road Initiative. After commissioning, it will be used to host SCO summits, international conferences and trade and investment fairs, and also function as a business center and be rented out as office space. -0-

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI China: Tianjin Pilot Free Trade Zone in north China

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Tianjin Pilot Free Trade Zone in north China

    Updated: June 21, 2025 08:51 Xinhua
    An aerial drone photo taken on May 14, 2025 shows a view of the central business district in Tianjin Pilot Free Trade Zone (FTZ), north China’s Tianjin. The Tianjin pilot FTZ was established in 2015. Over the past decade, the pilot FTZ in Tianjin municipality has yielded numerous achievements in institutional innovation. Leveraging resource strengths spanning its sea and air ports, industrial foundation, and policy innovations, the Tianjin pilot FTZ has established distinctive industrial clusters in aviation logistics, equipment manufacturing, and international trade. [Photo/Xinhua]
    An aerial drone photo taken on June 18, 2025 shows a view of the Tianjin Pilot Free Trade Zone (FTZ) in north China’s Tianjin. [Photo/Xinhua]
    An aerial drone photo taken on June 20, 2025 shows a view of the Tianjin Pilot Free Trade Zone (FTZ) in north China’s Tianjin. [Photo/Xinhua]
    An aerial drone photo taken on June 20, 2025 shows a view of the Dongjiang port area in Tianjin Pilot Free Trade Zone (FTZ), north China’s Tianjin. [Photo/Xinhua]

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-OSI China: Chinese premier holds talks with New Zealand’s PM

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Chinese Premier Li Qiang holds talks with New Zealand’s Prime Minister Christopher Luxon, who is on an official visit to China, at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, capital of China, June 20, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

    BEIJING, June 20 — Chinese Premier Li Qiang held talks with New Zealand’s Prime Minister Christopher Luxon in Beijing on Friday.

    Li emphasized that strengthening strategic communication and deepening mutually beneficial cooperation between China and New Zealand are of great significance in light of all the changes and turbulence in today’s world.

    President Xi Jinping met with Prime Minister Luxon this morning, pointing out the direction for the development of bilateral relations in the next stage, Li said, noting that China is willing to work with New Zealand to carry forward traditional friendship, consolidate political mutual trust, and expand practical cooperation, to promote common development and deliver greater benefits to both peoples.

    Highlighting high complementarity between the two economies, the premier proposed aligning development strategies to explore more converging interests, upgrading cooperation quality in all fields for higher-level win-win outcomes.

    He called on the two sides to further expand the scale of trade, continuously promote the liberalization and facilitation of trade and investment, expand cooperation in emerging fields and better promote regional economic integration.

    China stands ready to import more quality agricultural and food products from New Zealand, and will continue to encourage capable Chinese enterprises to invest in New Zealand, and hopes that New Zealand will provide a fair and open business environment for Chinese enterprises operating in the country, Li said.

    China welcomes New Zealand as the guest country of honor at the China Annual Conference & Expo for International Education 2025 and is willing to deepen exchanges with New Zealand in education, tourism, think tanks, and subnational cooperation, to enhance mutual understanding and amity between the two peoples.

    At present, the global economic and trade landscape is undergoing profound transformation and adjustment, Li said, adding that China is willing to strengthen communication and cooperation with New Zealand within frameworks such as the United Nations, World Trade Organization, and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, safeguard the rules-based multilateral trading system, create an open, inclusive and non-discriminatory international economic cooperation environment, and inject more stability and certainty into the turbulent world.

    Luxon reaffirmed New Zealand’s adherence to the one-China policy, expressing willingness to maintain high-level exchanges with China, strengthen mutual understanding and trust, and deepen exchange and cooperation in the fields of trade, agriculture, tourism, and education.

    New Zealand is also willing to enhance communication and coordination with China in such areas as response to climate change and green development, jointly committing to upholding the international order and promoting peace, stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region, Luxon said.

    After the talks, Li and Luxon jointly witnessed the signing of multiple cooperation documents covering customs, food safety, organic product certification, climate change, and cultural heritage.

    Chinese Premier Li Qiang holds talks with New Zealand’s Prime Minister Christopher Luxon, who is on an official visit to China, at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, capital of China, June 20, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Completes the Third Review under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement for Burkina Faso

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    June 20, 2025

    • The IMF Executive Board completed today the third review under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement for Burkina Faso. This enables an immediate disbursement of about US$32.8 million.
    • Supportive policies and favorable weather conditions boosted agricultural output in 2024; however, widespread insecurity continues to weigh on economic activity in other sectors, especially gold mining, the primary source of export earnings for the country.
    • Program performance has been broadly satisfactory. While end-December 2024 performance criteria for the primary fiscal deficit and net domestic financing were missed by 0.6 percent of GDP, the 2025 budget includes adequate corrective measures. On this basis, the Executive Board approved waivers of nonobservance of these performance criteria. All continuous performance criteria were met. Seven out of eight structural benchmarks were achieved, with the remaining one implemented later as a prior action.

    Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed the third review under the 48-month Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement that was approved on September 21, 2023. The completion of the review enables the immediate disbursement of SDR 24.08 million (about US$32.8 million), bringing total IMF financial support under the arrangement to SDR 96.32 million (about US$131.3 million). 

    Real GDP growth is estimated to have reached 5.0 percent in 2024. Strong growth in agriculture and services outweighed contractions in mining and manufacturing. Real GDP growth is projected to average 4.2 percent in 2025, as growth in the agricultural output is expected to soften in line with average rainfall conditions. Inflation is projected to ease to 3.0 percent in 2025 amid moderating food prices.

    Balance of payments strengthened, reflecting a positive shift in terms of trade. The current account deficit rose from 5.0 percent of GDP in 2023 to 5.7 percent in 2024 but is expected to narrow to 3.4 percent in 2025 due to record-high gold prices. Trade policy turbulences will likely have a marginal impact as the United States are not a major trading partner.   

    Elevated capital spending affected fiscal performance in 2024. Nonetheless, the overall fiscal deficit narrowed from 6.7 percent of GDP in 2023 to 5.8 percent in 2024. Building on the 2025 budget, fiscal policy is expected to be tightened considerably in 2025, with the overall fiscal deficit projected in the 3.3 to 4.0 percent of GDP range, depending on the availability of external concessional financing. Risks to the outlook are tilted to the downside due to terrorist threats.

    Progress under the ECF arrangement has been broadly satisfactory. Due to fiscal pressures in late 2024, the end-December performance criteria (PCs) on the primary fiscal deficit and net domestic financing were missed by 0.6 percent of GDP, while all other PCs were met. Three out of six indicative targets (ITs) were missed by small margins. All three continuous PCs and five end-March 2025 ITs, including on the primary fiscal deficit and net domestic financing were met, while the remaining four ITs were missed by small margins.

    The Burkinabè authorities advanced their structural reform agenda under the program. They met seven out of eight structural benchmarks (SBs) and have addressed the missed SB on the preparation of the clearance plan for domestic arrears as a prior action for the third review. They have also implemented two other prior actions: they shared a list of treasury deposit accounts and cleared all domestic arrears outstanding at end-2023. Three new SBs under the program aim to strengthen the governance in public procurement, uphold integrity in revenue administration, and increase control over the public wage bill.

    At the conclusion of the Executive Board’s discussion, Mr. Kenji Okamura, Deputy Managing Director, and Acting Chair, issued the following statement:

    “Burkina Faso’s economy has proven resilient notwithstanding security challenges, a difficult humanitarian situation, and weather shocks. A lasting improvement in socio‑economic conditions will require progress on security and structural reforms to foster diversification, fiscal governance, and resilience.

                “While the policy framework remains strong, fiscal pressures affected program performance in 2024. For the first time, and in difficult circumstances, performance criteria on the primary fiscal deficit and net domestic financing were missed. The margin of nonobservance—while not negligible—did not undermine the fiscal consolidation trend. The authorities counteracted the slippage with strong measures on the expenditure side and remain committed to reducing the overall fiscal deficit to three percent of GDP by the end of the ECF arrangement, while safeguarding fiscal space for poverty-reducing social spending. This commitment is reflected in the 2025 budget and fiscal performance through end-March.

                “The authorities are on track and have expanded their structural reform agenda, focusing on fiscal governance and transparency. They have provided a list of treasury deposit accounts, adopted an arrears’ clearance plan, and cleared all arrears outstanding at end-2023 following their audit. These measures are informed by the preliminary findings of the IMF’s Governance Diagnostic Assessment (GDA). The GDA report is being finalized. The authorities intend to publish the final report in coming weeks and adopt, within four months from publication, an action plan reflecting its key recommendations. Structural conditionality for the fifth review has been strengthened with the addition of benchmarks on implementing the action plan from the procurement audit and strengthening further wage bill control and governance in revenue services.”

    Table 1.  Burkina Faso: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 2023–29

    Population (2023): 23.3 million  

      Gini Index (2021): 37.4

    Per capita GDP (2023): 910 USD

    		      

    Life Expectancy (years): 60

    Share of population below the poverty line (2022): 43.7%

    Literacy rate (2022): 34%

    2023

    2024

    2024

    2025

    2025

    2026

    2027

    2028

    2029
     

    Act.

    ECF 2nd Review

    Prel.

    ECF 2nd Review

    Proj.

    Proj.

    Proj.

    Proj.

    Proj.
     

    (Annual percentage change, unless otherwise indicated)

    GDP and Prices

    		            

    GDP at constant prices

    3.0

    4.2

    5.0

    4.3

    4.2

    4.9

    4.7

    4.7

    4.7

    GDP deflator

    2.0

    7.2

    8.9

    5.6

    5.9

    4.0

    3.3

    2.8

    2.3

    Consumer prices (annual average)

    0.7

    3.6

    4.2

    3.0

    3.0

    2.5

    2.1

    2.0

    2.0

    Consumer prices (end of period)

    1.0

    3.4

    4.9

    2.8

    3.0

    2.5

    2.1

    2.0

    2.0
                 

    Money and Credit

    		            

    Net domestic assets (banking system) 1/

    5.3

    18.7

    0.4

    14.7

    6.1

    8.8

    8.7

    7.5

    7.0

    Credit to the government (banking system) 1/

    3.0

    9.8

    3.7

    8.1

    3.8

    3.4

    3.3

    2.3

    2.1

    Credit to private sector

    5.9

    13.1

    -2.2

    9.5

    2.6

    8.2

    8.3

    7.9

    7.5

    Broad money (M3)

    -3.0

    20.8

    7.2

    15.6

    6.1

    9.1

    8.1

    7.6

    7.1

    Private sector credit/GDP

    31.6

    30.7

    27.0

    30.5

    25.1

    24.9

    24.9

    25.0

    25.1
                 

    External Sector

    		            

    Exports (f.o.b.; valued in CFA francs)

    -3.1

    10.5

    2.0

    10.5

    25.3

    7.8

    5.3

    4.2

    2.7

    Imports (f.o.b.; valued in CFA francs)

    -1.5

    5.3

    4.8

    3.5

    10.8

    6.3

    6.5

    6.4

    5.7

    Current account (percent of GDP)

    -5.0

    -5.2

    -5.7

    -3.5

    -3.4

    -3.1

    -3.4

    -3.7

    -4.4
     

    (Percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

    Central Government Finances

    		            

    Current revenue

    20.6

    20.1

    20.6

    18.6

    19.8

    20.1

    20.4

    20.8

    20.9

     of which: Tax revenue

    18.2

    17.8

    18.3

    16.9

    18.1

    18.4

    18.8

    19.1

    19.3

    Total expenditure and net lending

    29.0

    26.3

    27.7

    24.1

    25.0

    24.7

    24.6

    24.9

    25.1

     of which: Current expenditure

    17.9

    16.5

    16.3

    15.4

    16.0

    15.5

    15.1

    14.7

    14.3

    Overall fiscal balance, incl. grants (commitments)

    -6.7

    -5.0

    -5.8

    -4.3

    -4.0

    -3.5

    -3.0

    -3.0

    -3.0

    Total public debt 2/

    56.2

    53.0

    56.9

    52.2

    56.1

    55.0

    54.0

    53.0

    52.3

            of which: External debt

    25.9

    23.7

    25.4

    22.2

    24.8

    24.0

    23.7

    23.3

    23.1

            of which: Domestic debt

    30.3

    29.4

    31.6

    29.9

    31.3

    30.9

    30.3

    29.7

    29.2
                 

    Memorandum Items:

    		            

    Nominal GDP (CFAF billion) 3/

    12,328

    14,330

    14,098

    15,791

    15,561

    16,973

    18,355

    19,755

    21,153

    Nominal GDP per capita (US$)

    874

    990

    975

    1,050

    1,002

    1,063

    1,120

    1,175

    1,227

    Nominal exchange rate (CFAF/US$, period average)

    606

    602

    606

    598

    635

    637

    637

    637

    637

    Gold price (USD/troy ounce)

    1,943

    2,342

    2,387

    2,608

    2,821

    2,963

    3,096

    3,198

    3,244

    Sources: Burkinabé authorities; IMF staff estimates and projections.

    1/ Percent of beginning-of-period broad money.

    2/ The 2nd review total public debt data has been retroactively adjusted to correct an exchange rate calculation error starting in 2023. In addition, the denominator (GDP) in the table has been revised (see footnote 3 below). Previously, total public debt in 2024 was estimated at 52.6 percent of GDP, while it was assessed to have reached 53.6 percent of GDP in 2023.

    3/ Historical nominal GDP figures have been revised down, in line with the most recent publication of official estimates by the National Institute of Statistics.
    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Tatiana Mossot

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/20/pr-25211-burkina-faso-imf-completes-the-3rd-review-under-the-ecf-arrangement

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Commissioner Kristin N. Johnson’s Keynote Remarks at the CCP AGM 2025

    Source: US Commodity Futures Trading Commission

    It is a pleasure to join CCP Global for your Annual General Meeting. Joining you today marks the third time that I have had the opportunity to address this important group at the center of the global derivatives markets. Addressing this body in Madrid, Spain in June of 2022 marked one of the earliest keynote addresses that I delivered during my time in service as a Commissioner only months after I joined the Commission.[1] 
    During my speech in Madrid, I reflected on then-recent market stress resulting from geopolitical events and a global pandemic. In February and March of 2020, our markets faced concerning shocks from the rise of a global pandemic[2] and regulatory responses to contain it.[3] Markets witnessed unprecedented volatility coupled with extreme volumes of trading and at times tight liquidity, placing extraordinary pressure on market infrastructures. Responding to these events, central counterparties CCPs carefully assessed initial and variation margin requirements and ultimately increased initial margin requirements (particularly for equity products) as an integral part of their market risk mitigating solutions.
    Facing these challenges, CCPs navigated the risks presented, deploying the carefully developed tools at hand with deep and continuous engagement with global regulators. As a result of effective reforms adopted almost a decade before the pressures of recent geopolitical events and a global pandemic at the start of this decade, our financial system demonstrated remarkable resilience.  As noted by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) – “Banks and FMIs, particularly CCPs, held up well and were largely able to absorb rather than amplify the shock.”[4]
    In many ways, market conditions during these events stress tested CCP resilience reforms implemented pursuant to the 2009 G20 Pittsburg Summit and the Principles for Financial Market Infrastructure (PFMI) codified under local laws such as the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act and European Market Infrastructure Regulation.[5]
    Turning back to the present, it is fitting that we gather here today in a building that has served as a gathering place for government and industry for hundreds of years. My understanding is that the building began as a convent in 1411, but later, in the 17th Century became the meeting place for the administrative board for the Admiralty of Amsterdam. And, in the mid-1600s, became known as a City Hall and served as the seat of Amsterdam’s government. 
    In the spirit of reflecting on the significant contributions of the CCP Global community and the issues that you will discuss and explore during your general meeting, I hope to highlight the work of the advisory committees of the CFTC. Over the last few years, your members have supported and served on a number of the CFTC advisory committees. Having a full complement of five Commissioners for the last three and a half-years means that we put lots of you to work. As the current remaining Commissioners, Acting Chair Pham and I are continuing our commitment to advance important multi-stakeholder dialogues through our role as advisory committee sponsors. I am hopeful that we may even find a path to collaborate with joint sessions hosted by the two advisory committees that we sponsor.   
    Today, please allow me to focus my remarks on the importance of our Commission’s advisory committees and highlight some of the suggestions put forth by the Market Risk Advisory Committee (MRAC) following deep engagement on these issues, especially those focused on operational resiliency and derivatives clearing organizations (DCOs) system safeguards, and DCO wind down and recovery plans.
    I know that many of you are familiar with the MRAC and other CFTC advisory committees from your service and support as members of their Committees and Subcommittees. The MRAC was established on May 6, 2014 in accordance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) after the Commission determined that MRAC was necessary and in the public’s interest.[6] MRAC’s purpose is to support the Commission in “promoting [] integrity, resilience, and vibrancy of the U.S. derivatives markets through sound regulation, as well as the monitoring and management of systemic risk.”[7] Since MRAC’s inception, each sponsoring Commissioner has recognized the vital role this advisory committee plays in the development of Commission rules and regulations and utilized MRAC to put forth important reports and recommendations.[8] 
    The MRAC has a diverse membership with deep experience across all corners of the derivatives space, including representatives of clearinghouses, exchanges, intermediaries, market makers, end-users, academia, public interest advocates, and regulators. Diversity of membership in our advisory committees is critically important to their success and will be vital as we address jurisdiction over emerging markets and novel asset classes as well as the continuous evolution of complex liquidity and market risk issues. Without perspectives from every side of the integral issues that these committees address, we run the risk of limiting our supervision and oversight and missing out on the opportunity to effectively address emerging risks to market stability and integrity.
    The benefits of multi-stakeholder gatherings to address emerging market risks cannot be overstated. Sharing a wide variety of perspectives across our markets to engage in deep, thoughtful, and actionable solutions enables regulators and market participants to be prepared to navigate risks with minimal disruptions and maximum resiliency for strong and vibrant derivatives markets in the U.S. and across the world. 
    This, in essence, is why I believe you all meet here on an annual basis as well – because you recognize the value of deliberative engagement. Allow me to share briefly on two issues that are top of mind for me and that the MRAC has made significant progress addressing– operational resilience of our derivatives markets and orderly wind down and recovery for DCOs.
    Navigating the Cyber Landscape for CCPs
    Cybersecurity risks are growing in our markets and must be proactively managed and addressed. In its 2024 Systemic Risk Barometer Survey, the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC) noted that cyber risk was a top five systemic risk to the global economy.[9] Similarly, in May 2024, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) stated that in the past 20 years, the financial sector has suffered over 20,000 cyber-attacks resulting in $12 billion in losses, and noted that there is a growing inequality between cyber resilient organizations and those that lack the resilience to withstand and prevent attacks.[10] Recent events demonstrate the chaos that cybersecurity events can cause for our markets, resulting in billions in losses.
    As many of you are aware, in January of 2023, ION Cleared Derivatives (ION) experienced a significant cyberattack. ION provides important back-office services for many global futures commission merchants (FCMs) and other market participants. ION’s effective operations and successful provision of these critical services enable many market participants to clear and settle a significant volume of global transactions on a daily basis. The cyberattack on ION triggered a series of disruptions across markets. Those who rely on ION to perform critical functions were taken offline and many had to rely on manual trade processing. The outage similarly delayed the Commission’s ability to deliver timely the Commitments to Traders reports.
    Two years later, in a very different corner of markets, on February 21, 2025, Bybit, a popular cryptocurrency exchange, lost nearly $1.5 billion in losses in mostly Ether from a hacking incident.[11] The Bybit hack represented one of the single largest losses by any cryptocurrency exchange since the first Bitcoin was mined. 
    The hackers identified a vulnerability in Bybit’s transaction approval process hosted through smart contract logic in off chain infrastructure. What appeared to be a routine transfer from Bybit’s Ethereum cold wallet ended up being a rerouting of the transaction to the hacker’s wallets. What kinds of vulnerabilities have enabled hackers to capture hundreds of millions of dollars in cryptocurrency? Commonly deployed tactics include phishing, supply chain compromises, and private key thefts. 
    In the context of the Bybit hack, reports indicate that the hackers accessed critical Bybit systems through a third party provided critical infrastructure system and used this access point to inject malicious software that detected and modified outgoing transactions in real time.[12] Hackers appear to have gained access to an off chain Safe user interface provided by a third-party service provider.[13]
    To provide guardrails for these types of issues, in December 2023, the Commission unanimously approved a proposed rule that would create an operational resilience framework for FCMs, swap dealers (SDs) and major swap participants (MSPs) to “identify, monitor, manage, and assess risks relating to information and technology security, third-party relationships, and emergencies or other significant disruptions to normal business operations”.[14] The proposed rule included three components: (1) an information and technology security program; (2) a third-party relationship program; and (3) a business continuity and disaster recovery plan. Each of these components was designed to deliver frameworks to establish protections to FCMs, SDs, and MSPs and, in an event like the ION Derivatives cyberattack, a plan to continue business as normal while post-mortem checks are completed.
    I want to highlight one of the risks that the proposed ORF seeks to address – concentration risks associated with critical third-party service providers. As early back as 2019, the FSB released a report on third-party dependencies in cloud services and considerations on financial stability implications, including implications of market concentration on competition.[15] These risks can be heightened for smaller or medium sized firms, who may lack both the resources to develop technology in house as well as the bargaining power to negotiate with limited service providers in many cases. 
    Evidence, as well as our experience in working towards the operational resilience framework, indicates that this may be more pronounced in the markets we regulate where there may be even more limited vendors that can provide the sophisticated technologies often used in the derivatives industry. This is not only a potential issue for compliance with regulations and risk management, but also a business risk for market participants.
    The Central Counterparty (CCP) Risk & Governance Subcommittee of MRAC recognized the need for a rule like ORF to create a regulatory framework for cybersecurity preparedness and business continuity for cyberattacks and built out a proposal to expand the scope to include DCOs and bolster system safeguards for critical third-party service providers.[16]
    MRAC’s Recommendation on DCO System Safeguards for Critical Third-Party Service Providers
    The DCO System Safeguards recommendations are an example of MRAC’s proactive response to a potential risk identified. The recommendations also highlight the value of the CFTC advisory committees and the potential for diverse stakeholders who may have divergent perspectives to work together to make real progress towards making our markets more resilient. 
    A technology and operations workstream of the CCP Risk & Governance Subcommittee began evaluating issues related to cybersecurity and third-party risk management in early 2023. In March of that year, MRAC held a “first-of-its-kind” public meeting to discuss the cybersecurity event at ION Cleared Derivatives that led to a ripple effect across our markets. This was the first chance for experts across our industry to come together following the ION cyberattack to evaluate the event and begin to map out next steps to ensure cyber preparedness among market participants, service providers, and other sources that have the potential to impact our markets. 
    At the meeting, Futures Industry Association (FIA) President and CEO Walt Lukken announced the creation of a new Cyber Risk Taskforce, the National Futures Association (NFA) President and CEO Tom Sexton discussed NFA’s role in standard setting to mitigate cyberthreats, and we heard from other experts including those from the White House’s Office of the National Cyber Director, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), and of course, the CFTC, on strategies to enhance the security and resilience of financial markets in the face of new and evolving cyber threats. 
    Later the same year, the FIA Cyber Risk Taskforce issued an After Action Report outlining the challenges facing our markets.[17] Key findings in the report include a lack of communication amongst market participants in the wake of a cyber incident and the need to connect our market with the broader financial sector to learn from and share the best operational resilience strategies for cyber events. The After Action Report made six recommendations based on their findings: (1) the creation of an “Industry Resilience Committee” to help develop information channels with respect to operational and cyber resilience; (2) connecting our industry with sector-wide specialist groups who focus on operational resilience across our markets; (3) a self-reflective review of our market participant’s policies and procedures for cyber incidents; (4) the establishment of procedures for sharing critical data and information during cyber incidents; (5) identification of ways to assess risk to create more robust operational resilience frameworks; and (6) participation in regularly held cyber preparedness exercises.[18]
    The CCP Risk & Governance Committee recognized that there may have been some important gaps in operational resilience and took up the mantle to continue to examine areas not fully addressed by the Commission. The Subcommittee’s recommendations highlight the importance of cyber resilience in DCOs and the need for a more robust regulatory framework. These recommendations, which the MRAC voted to advance to the Commission, would improve upon the existing framework and require that DCOs establish, implement, and maintain a third-party relationship management program. 
    The CCP Risk & Governance Committee’s report focuses on CFTC Rule 39.18, which establishes system safeguard standards for DCOs and addresses outsourcing but does not expressly discuss third-party relationships. The CCP Risk and Governance recommendations build upon the framework of Rule 39.18 by adding a third-party risk management program to (b)(2). The proposal suggests that a robust third party relationship management program that identifies, assesses, mitigates, and monitors the full risks that are associated with using third party arrangements for critical services should include robust risk management frameworks like policies and procedures that cover the lifecycle of the relationship, personnel assigned to onboarding and diligence of the third party relationships, risk-based monitoring, and more. 
    The recommendations build upon the philosophy of the DCO Core Principles, lessons learned and best practices from voices across the industry, and international standard setting bodies. As noted in the report,

    These principles are intended to reflect lessons learned from industry efforts and best practices in derivatives, the guidance notes in Form DCO, the NFA interpretive guidance, lessons learned from the wider context of third-party relationship management, as well as the principles enunciated in the PFMIs. Incorporating these principles in Commission regulations would enable the Commission to update its regulatory framework with respect to critical third party service providers and to bring its regulations in line with internationally accepted standards, while maintaining a principles based approach to regulation.[19]

    Operational resilience, and especially third-party risk management, is a key issue for me, which I continue to track closely and to discuss frequently with my colleagues at the CFTC and at other agencies, as well as with market participants that we regulate, and at events like these. I frequently request that we take these issues seriously and continue to consider actionable steps to address them. As I’ve noted previously, “effectively combatting cyber threats will require a coordinated effort among regulators and industry,” and I am committed to continuing to foster conversations about how we can work together to make our markets safer and more resilient.[20]
    I expect that MRAC will continue to consider issues related to cyber resilience and third-party risk management, including as the risks continue to evolve and AI-enhanced cybersecurity creates new or heightened risks.
    DCO Recovery and Wind Down: Parallelism with International Standards
    Similarly, the CCP Risk and Governance Subcommittee has outlined supplemental reforms that complement Commission staff work that aims to ensure recovery and orderly wind-down of DCOs as part of the post-crisis reforms and important robust preventative resilience framework. Since reforms adopted in the U.S. under the Dodd-Frank Act, international standard-setting bodies have adopted principles, guidance, and standards to support and inform national policymakers on CCP regulation.[21] The Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO and together with CPMI, CPMI-IOSCO) and the FSB have published numerous reports on these issues on resilience, recovery, and resolution.[22] In 2012, CPMI-IOSCO published a report setting forth 24 principles that financial market infrastructures, like CCPs, should apply, with the goal of enhancing safety and efficiency.[23] The principles, called the Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures (or PFMI), set forth four foundational pillars for managing financial risk associated with CCPs: governance arrangements of CCPs, comprehensive risk management frameworks, financial resources allocated to loss absorption, and stress testing for both credit and liquidity exposures. 
    The FSB issued guidelines[24] as well and worked together with CPMI-IOSCO to assess CCP financial resources in connection with recovery and resolution.[25] In the following years, the Commission took up a similar path, issuing a proposed rule that would apply guidelines and requirements for recovery and orderly wind down plans that are already required for systemically important DCOs (SIDCOs) and Subpart C DCOs to all DCOs.[26] 
    The Proposed DCO Recovery and Wind-Down Rule is robust and important to the Commission and its market participants. Again, MRAC and the CCP Risk & Governance Subcommittee identified four main areas to recommend enhancements: supervisory stress testing of recovery and wind-down plans; conducting recovery scenarios and analysis; inclusion of non-default loss (NDL) in recovery and wind-down plans; and porting of customer positions and collateral during a CCP resolution and clearing member default.[27]
    The MRAC’s Recommendations on DCO Recovery and Orderly Wind-Down Plans; Information for Resolution Planning
    At its April 2024 meeting, the MRAC approved another set of recommendations from the CCP Risk & Governance Subcommittee on DCO recovery and orderly wind-down plans and advanced them to the Commission. The recovery and resolution workstream worked on these recommendations in parallel with the Commission developing the Proposed DCO Recovery and Wind-Down Rule and aimed to support the staff in its drafting and the Commission in its consideration of such a rule. 
    The report included background about the importance of DCOs and CCPs in derivatives markets and actions taken both domestically and internationally to strengthen their resilience, some of which I have shared with you here today. The recommendations in the report demonstrate the depth of expertise available to the Commission through advisory committees and the inclusive nature of all participating viewpoints. For example, the recommendation to implement supervisory stress tests came with a caveat – while subcommittee members representing end-users, FCMs, and academia believed that stress tests should be required to take place annually, subcommittee members representing DCOs did not believe that the frequency of reverse stress tests should be annual but should be determined by Commission staff.[28] This is a prime example of why continued participation and robust discussion amongst all viewpoints is a necessity when evaluating the complex issues that face our markets. Although the Commission has yet to complete a final rulemaking on this topic, I hope that the recommendations made by MRAC in this report can provide a roadmap for future engagement.
    The Work Continues
    I will not have sufficient time today to share all of the details about all of the reports or recommendations that that MRAC has advanced during my time at the Commission, but if you will indulge me, I would like to say a word about some of the other projects that have been completed over the past two years. 
    The Market Structure Subcommittee developed a report and recommendations on the Treasury cash-futures basis trade and effective risk management practices, which the MRAC voted to advance to the Commission. The report takes a thoughtful and comprehensive look at the basis trade, including its mechanics and parties involved, the disruptions experienced in March 2020 during broader COVID-19-related market turmoil, and its impacts on the broader economy), and identifies both benefits and risks before the recommending effective risk management practices associated with the cash-futures basis trade.[29] 
    At the most recent MRAC meeting, Josh Frost, then-Assistant Secretary for Financial Markets at the Treasury Department, and members of the Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee spoke about the importance of Treasury markets and their role in price discovery and liquidity across the financial system, drawing on perspectives from a number of participants in the ecosystem, including both asset managers and hedge funds that participate in the basis trade. This discussion was a good example of the importance of the work of the MRAC on topics that have real implications for our market ecosystem, and the value of bringing together different voices to achieve a deeper, more informed understanding of important issues and how best we can address them.
    To take one more example, earlier last year, the MRAC Market Structure Subcommittee issued a report sharing results from a survey of data on FCMs spanning 2003-2023,[30] which showed some interesting trends in capacity and concentration. At a recent trade association meeting, FIA Boca, I described issues that I believe are critical for the Commission to consider as we begin to explore clearing U.S. Treasuries. 
    The data collected in the MRAC Market Structure Subcommittee report outlines industry concentration in the market for FCM services despite the growth of the industry. For example, the survey showed a disproportionate amount of increase in bank-affiliated FCMs and increased concentration of broker-dealer-FCMs that are dully registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. All of the top ten industry positions in terms of holdings of customer funds were associated with banks or broker-dealers, and they accounted for more than 80% of all customer funds.
    Conclusion
    We must continue to support our advisory committees and robust multi-stakeholder engagement. Each significantly benefit the stability and integrity of our markets. 
    Before closing, I would like to personally thank everyone that has supported the MRAC in any way, through service as an MRAC member, participation on a workstream to advance a set of recommendations to the Commission, by serving as an expert presenter at a meeting, or just tuning into the CFTC YouTube page to watch a meeting – thank you for dedicating your time. If you have not served on an advisory committee, I encourage you to consider service and the potential to contribute to the important engagement that service offers. 
    The broader CFTC community is part of what makes this agency so special and enables us to punch above our weight. It has been an honor to work with and learn from all of you, and I look forward to seeing what we can accomplish together next. 

    [1] Commissioner Johnson to Deliver Keynote Address at the 2022 CCP12 Annual General Meeting in Madrid (June 22, 2022), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/Events/opaeventjohnson062222; Commissioner Johnson to Provide a Keynote Speech and Participate in a Fireside Chat at the CCP-12 Annual General Meeting (June 14, 2023), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/Events/opaeventjohnson061523. As in my previous speeches, the views I express today are my own and not the views of the Commission, my fellow Commissioners or the staff of the CFTC.
    [2] Opening Remarks of Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, World Health Organization (WHO) Director-General, at the WHO Media Briefing on COVID-19 (March 11, 2020), https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19—11-march-2020.
    [3] Sir Jon Cunliffe, Keynote Address at the FIA & SIFMA Asset Management Derivatives Forum 2022 (Feb. 9, 2022), https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2022/february/jon-cunliffe-keynote-address-fia-sifma-asset-management-derivatives-forum.
    [4] FSB Interim Report, Lessons Learnt from the COVID-19 Pandemic from a Financial Stability Perspective (July 13, 2021), https://www.fsb.org/uploads/P281021-2.pdf.
    [5] See CFTC Regulation 39.13, applying a principles-based approach to managing procyclicality, and Article 41 of EMIR and Article 28 of the Regulatory Technical Standards, requiring CCPs to implement specific margin procyclicality mitigants.
    [6] Market Risk Advisory Committee, 79 Fed. Reg. 25844 (May 6, 2014), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2014/05/06/2014-10325/market-risk-advisory-committee.
    [7] CFTC, Renewal Chart of the Market Risk Advisory Committee (Apr. 16, 2024) (accessible at https://www.cftc.gov/About/AdvisoryCommittees/MRAC).
    [8] See, e.g.,  Opening Statement of Acting Chairman Rostin Behnam before the Market Risk Advisory Committee (Feb. 23, 2021), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/behnamstatement022321 (“Advisory committees like MRAC are vehicles for change, challenge, and perhaps most importantly, debate and consensus.”); Statement of Commissioner Sharon Bowen before the Market Risk Advisory Committee (Apr. 2, 2025), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/bowenstatement040215 (“The information and recommendations from this Committee will be invaluable”). For a list of reports and recommendations set forth by the MRAC, see Market Risk Advisory Committee, CFTC, https://www.cftc.gov/About/AdvisoryCommittees/MRAC.  
    [9] DTCC, Systemic Risk Barometer Survey, 2024 Risk Forecast (2024), https://www.dtcc.com/-/media/downloads/Systemic-Risk/29873-Systemic_Risk-2024.
    [10] World Economic Forum, Global financial stability at risk due to cyber threats, IMF warns. Here’s what to know (May 15, 2024), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2024/05/financial-sector-cyber-attack-threat-imf-cybersecurity/; see also World Economic Forum, Global Cybersecurity Outlook 2024 (January 11, 2024), https://www.weforum.org/publications/global-cybersecurity-outlook-2024/. 
    [11] Vicky Ge Huang and Robert McMillan, How the Biggest Crypto Hack Ever Nearly Destroyed the World’s No. 2 Exchange, WSJ (Mar. 6, 2025), https://www.wsj.com/finance/currencies/how-the-biggest-crypto-hack-ever-nearly-destroyed-the-worlds-no-2-exchange-ee273a3a?msockid=26f265067f5965a63f6273047e1464d0.  
    [12] Alexandra Andhov, Inside The Bybit Hacking Incident: Lessons From The Breach, Forbes (Apr. 1, 2025), https://www.forbes.com/sites/digital-assets/2025/04/01/inside-the-bybit-hacking-incident-lessons-from-the-breach/; see also Sandy Carter, Latest On The Bybit Record Breaking 1.4 Billion Dollar Crypto Hack, Forbes (Feb. 21, 2025), https://www.forbes.com/sites/digital-assets/2025/02/21/latest-on-the-bybit-record-breaking-14-billion-dollar-crypto-hack/.  
    [13] Taylar Rajic, The ByBit Heist and the Future of U.S. Crypto Regulation, CSIS (Mar. 18, 2025), https://www.csis.org/analysis/bybit-heist-and-future-us-crypto-regulation.
    [14] CFTC, Operational Resilience Framework for Futures Commission Merchants, Swap Dealers, and Major Swap Participants, 89 Fed. Reg. 4706 (proposed Jan. 24, 2024). 
    [15] Third-party dependencies in cloud services, Considerations on financial stability implications, FSB (Dec. 9, 2019), https://www.fsb.org/uploads/P091219-2.pdf. 
    [16] Recommendations on DCO System Safeguards Standards for Third Party Service Providers, Central Counterparty Risk and Governance (CCP) Subcommittee, Market Risk Advisory Committee of the U.S. CFTC (Dec. 2024) (available at https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/Events/opaeventmrac121024). 
    [17] FIA Taskforce On Cyber Risk After Action Report and Findings, FIA (Sept. 2023), https://www.fia.org/sites/default/files/2023-09/FIA_Taskforce%20on%20Cyber%20Risk_Recommendations_SEPT2023_Final2.pdf.
    [18] Id.
    [19] Recommendations on DCO System Safeguards Standards for Third Party Service Providers, Central Counterparty (CCP) Risk and Governance Subcommittee, MRAC (Dec. 2024) (available at https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/Events/opaeventmrac040924).
    [20] Keynote Remarks of Commissioner Kristin Johnson at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas (May 29, 2025), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opajohnson19.
    [21] Recommendations on Derivatives Clearing Organizations Recovery and Orderly Wind-Down Plans; Information for Resolution Planning, CCP Risk and Governance Subcommittee, MRAC (Aug. 2024) (available at https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/Events/opaeventmrac040924).
    [22] Id. 
    [23] CPMI-IOSCO, Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures (April 16, 2012), https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d101.htm; see also CPMI-IOSCO, Resilience and Recovery of Central Counterparties (CCPs): Further Guidance on the PFMI – Consultative Report (August 16, 2016), https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d149.htm; CPMI-IOSCO, Implementation Monitoring of PFMI: Level 3 Assessment – Report on the Financial Risk Management and Recovery Practices of 10 Derivatives CCPs (August 16, 2016), https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d148.htm.
    [24] FSB, Guidance on Central Counterparty Resolution and Resolution Planning (July 5, 2017) https://www.fsb.org/2017/07/guidance-on-central-counterparty-resolution-and-resolution-planning-2/; FSB, Guidance on Financial Resources to Support CCP Resolution and on the Treatment of CCP Equity in Resolution (November 16, 2020), https://www.fsb.org/2020/11/guidance-on-financial-resources-to-support-ccp-resolution-and-on-the-treatment-of-ccp-equity-in-resolution/.
    [25] FSB, Central Counterparty Financial Resources for Recovery and Resolution (March 10, 2022), https://www.fsb.org/2022/03/central-counterparty-financial-resources-for-recovery-and-resolution/.
    [26] CFTC, Derivatives Clearing Organizations Recovery and Orderly Wind-Down Plans; Information for Resolution Planning, 88 Fed. Reg. 48968 (proposed July 28, 2023) (Proposed DCO Recovery and Wind-Down Rule).
    [27] Recommendations on Derivatives Clearing Organizations Recovery and Orderly Wind-Down Plans; Information for Resolution Planning, CCP Risk and Governance Subcommittee, MRAC (Aug. 2024) (available at https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/Events/opaeventmrac040924).
    [28] Id.
    [29] The Treasury Cash-Futures Basis Trade and Effective Risk Management Practices, MRAC (Dec. 2024) (available at https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/Events/opaeventmrac121024).
    [30] Market Structure Subcommittee Data and Analysis Regarding FCM Capacity, MRAC (Apr. 2024) (available at https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/Events/opaeventmrac040924).

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: IAEA Director General Grossi’s Statement to UNSC on Situation in Iran

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

    (As prepared for delivery)

    Attacks on nuclear sites in the Islamic Republic of Iran have caused a sharp degradation in nuclear safety and security in Iran. Though they have not so far led to a radiological release affecting the public, there is a danger this could occur.

    The International Atomic Energy Agency has been monitoring closely the situation at Iran’s nuclear sites since Israel began its attacks a week ago. As part of its mission, the IAEA is the global nerve centre for information on nuclear and radiological safety, and we can respond to any nuclear or radiological emergency.

    Based on information available to the IAEA, the following is the current situation at Iran’s nuclear sites. Which I offer as a follow up to my most recent report to this Security Council.

    The Natanz enrichment site contains two facilities. The first is the main Fuel Enrichment Plant. Initial attacks on the 13th of June targeted and destroyed electricity infrastructure at the facility, including an electrical sub-station, the main electric power supply building, and emergency power supply and back-up generators. On the same day, the main cascade hall appears to have been attacked using ground-penetrating munitions.

    The second facility at Natanz is the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant. It consists of aboveground and underground cascade halls. On the 13th of June the above-ground part was functionally destroyed and the strikes on the underground cascade halls were seriously damaging.

    The level of radioactivity outside the Natanz site has remained unchanged and at normal levels, indicating no external radiological impact on the population or the environment.

    However, within the Natanz facility there is both radiological and chemical contamination. It is possible that Uranium isotopes contained in Uranium Hexafluoride, Uranyl Fluoride and Hydrogen Fluoride are dispersed inside the facility. The radiation, primarily consisting of alpha particles, poses a significant danger if inhaled or ingested. This risk can be effectively managed with appropriate protective measures, such as using respiratory devices. The main concern inside the facility is chemical toxicity.

    Fordow is Iran’s main enrichment location for enriching uranium to 60%. The Agency is not aware of any damage at Fordow at this time.

    At the Esfahan nuclear site, four buildings were damaged in last Friday’s attack: the central chemical laboratory, a uranium conversion plant, the Tehran reactor-fuel manufacturing plant, and the enriched uranium metal processing facility, which was under construction.

    No increase of off-site radiation levels was reported. As in Natanz, the main concern is chemical toxicity.  

    The Khondab Heavy Water Research Reactor under construction in Arak, was hit on the 19th of June. As the reactor was not operational and did not contain any nuclear material, no radiological consequence is expected. The nearby Heavy Water Production Plant is also assessed to have been hit, and similarly no radiological consequence is expected.

    As stated in the IAEA’s update of the 18th of June, at the Tehran Research Center, one building, where advanced centrifuge rotors were manufactured and tested, was hit. At the Karaj workshop, two buildings, where different centrifuge components were manufactured, were destroyed. There was no radiological impact, internally or externally.

    Let me now refer to the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. This is the nuclear site in Iran where the consequences of an attack could be most serious. It is an operating nuclear power plant and as such it hosts thousands of kilograms of nuclear material. Countries of the region have reached out directly to me over the past few hours to express their concerns, and I want to make it absolutely and completely clear: In case of an attack on the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant a direct hit could result in a very high release of radioactivity to the environment.

    Similarly, a hit that disabled the only two lines supplying electrical power to the plant could cause its reactor’s core to melt, which could result in a high release of radioactivity to the environment. In their worst-case, both scenarios would necessitate protective actions, such as evacuations and sheltering of the population or the need to take stable iodine, with the reach extending to distances from a few to several hundred kilometres. Radiation monitoring would need to cover distances of several hundred kilometres and food restrictions may need to be implemented.

    Any action against the Tehran Nuclear Research Reactor could also have severe consequences, potentially for large areas of the city of Tehran and its inhabitants. In such a case, protective actions would need to be taken.

    I will continue to provide public updates about the developments at all these sites and their possible health and environmental consequences.

    The Agency is, as madame Undersecretary kindly reminded, and will remain present in Iran and inspections there will resume, as required by Iran’s safeguards obligations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement, as soon as safety and security conditions allow.

    In this context, let me restate that the safety of our inspectors is of utmost importance. The host country has a responsibility in this regard, and we expect every effort to be made to ensure that their security and their communication lines with the IAEA headquarters will be maintained.

    As stated in my most recent report to the Agency’s Board of Governors and based on inspections conducted at the relevant facilities since then, Iran’s uranium stockpiles remain under safeguards in accordance with Iran’s comprehensive safeguards agreement. You may recall that more than 400kg of this stockpile is uranium enriched up to 60% U-235. It is essential that the Agency resumes inspections as soon as possible to provide credible assurances that none of it has been diverted.

    Importantly, any special measures by Iran to protect its nuclear materials and equipment must be done in accordance with Iran’s safeguards obligations and the Agency.  

    Therefore, it is of paramount importance that the Agency’s inspectors are allowed to verify that all relevant materials, especially those enriched to 60%, are accounted for. Beyond the potential radiological risks, attacks on such materials would make this effort of course more difficult.

    Madame President,

    The IAEA has consistently underlined, as stated in its General Conference resolution, that armed attacks on nuclear facilities should never take place, and could result in radioactive releases with grave consequences within and beyond the boundaries of the State which has been attacked.

    I therefore again call on maximum restraint. Military escalation threatens lives and delays indispensable work towards a diplomatic solution for the long-term assurance that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon.

    Madame President,

    The presence, support, analysis and inspections of technical experts are crucial to mitigating risks to nuclear safety and security – that is true during peacetime and even more so during military conflict.

    For the second time in three years, we are witnessing a dramatic conflict between two UN and IAEA Member States in which nuclear installations are coming under fire and nuclear safety is being compromised. The IAEA, just as has been the case with the military conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, will not stand idle during this conflict.

    As I stated in this chamber just a few days ago, I am ready to travel immediately and to engage with all relevant parties to help ensure the protection of nuclear facilities and the continued peaceful use of nuclear technology in accordance with the Agency mandate, including by deploying Agency nuclear safety and security experts, in addition to our safeguards inspectors in Iran, wherever necessary.

    For the IAEA to act, a constructive, professional dialogue is needed. I urge the Members of this Council to support us in making it happen sooner rather than later.

    The IAEA must receive timely and regular technical information about affected nuclear facilities and their respective sites. I urge in this regard the Iranian regulatory authorities to continue a constructive dialogue with the IAEA Incident and Emergency Centre, which has been operating 24/7 since the beginning of this conflict.

    Nuclear facilities and material must not be shrouded by the fog of war.

    Yesterday there was an incorrect statement to the media by an Israeli military official that Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant had been attacked. Though the mistake was quickly identified and the statement retracted, the situation underscored the vital need for clear and accurate communication, and the Agency’s unique role in providing it in a technically accurate and politically impartial way is obvious.

    Let me conclude by assuring the international community of the IAEA’s continued support at this very grave time.

    A diplomatic solution is within reach if the necessary political will is there. Elements for an agreement have been discussed. The IAEA can guarantee, through a watertight inspections system, that nuclear weapons will not be developed in Iran.  They can form the basis of a long-standing agreement that brings peace and avoids a nuclear crisis in the Middle East. This opportunity should not be missed. The alternative would be a protracted conflict and a looming threat of nuclear proliferation that, while emanating from the Middle East, would effectively erode the NPT and the non-proliferation regime as a whole.

    MIL OSI NGO –

  • MIL-OSI Security: IAEA Director General Grossi’s Statement to UNSC on Situation in Iran

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

    (As prepared for delivery)

    Attacks on nuclear sites in the Islamic Republic of Iran have caused a sharp degradation in nuclear safety and security in Iran. Though they have not so far led to a radiological release affecting the public, there is a danger this could occur.

    The International Atomic Energy Agency has been monitoring closely the situation at Iran’s nuclear sites since Israel began its attacks a week ago. As part of its mission, the IAEA is the global nerve centre for information on nuclear and radiological safety, and we can respond to any nuclear or radiological emergency.

    Based on information available to the IAEA, the following is the current situation at Iran’s nuclear sites. Which I offer as a follow up to my most recent report to this Security Council.

    The Natanz enrichment site contains two facilities. The first is the main Fuel Enrichment Plant. Initial attacks on the 13th of June targeted and destroyed electricity infrastructure at the facility, including an electrical sub-station, the main electric power supply building, and emergency power supply and back-up generators. On the same day, the main cascade hall appears to have been attacked using ground-penetrating munitions.

    The second facility at Natanz is the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant. It consists of aboveground and underground cascade halls. On the 13th of June the above-ground part was functionally destroyed and the strikes on the underground cascade halls were seriously damaging.

    The level of radioactivity outside the Natanz site has remained unchanged and at normal levels, indicating no external radiological impact on the population or the environment.

    However, within the Natanz facility there is both radiological and chemical contamination. It is possible that Uranium isotopes contained in Uranium Hexafluoride, Uranyl Fluoride and Hydrogen Fluoride are dispersed inside the facility. The radiation, primarily consisting of alpha particles, poses a significant danger if inhaled or ingested. This risk can be effectively managed with appropriate protective measures, such as using respiratory devices. The main concern inside the facility is chemical toxicity.

    Fordow is Iran’s main enrichment location for enriching uranium to 60%. The Agency is not aware of any damage at Fordow at this time.

    At the Esfahan nuclear site, four buildings were damaged in last Friday’s attack: the central chemical laboratory, a uranium conversion plant, the Tehran reactor-fuel manufacturing plant, and the enriched uranium metal processing facility, which was under construction.

    No increase of off-site radiation levels was reported. As in Natanz, the main concern is chemical toxicity.  

    The Khondab Heavy Water Research Reactor under construction in Arak, was hit on the 19th of June. As the reactor was not operational and did not contain any nuclear material, no radiological consequence is expected. The nearby Heavy Water Production Plant is also assessed to have been hit, and similarly no radiological consequence is expected.

    As stated in the IAEA’s update of the 18th of June, at the Tehran Research Center, one building, where advanced centrifuge rotors were manufactured and tested, was hit. At the Karaj workshop, two buildings, where different centrifuge components were manufactured, were destroyed. There was no radiological impact, internally or externally.

    Let me now refer to the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. This is the nuclear site in Iran where the consequences of an attack could be most serious. It is an operating nuclear power plant and as such it hosts thousands of kilograms of nuclear material. Countries of the region have reached out directly to me over the past few hours to express their concerns, and I want to make it absolutely and completely clear: In case of an attack on the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant a direct hit could result in a very high release of radioactivity to the environment.

    Similarly, a hit that disabled the only two lines supplying electrical power to the plant could cause its reactor’s core to melt, which could result in a high release of radioactivity to the environment. In their worst-case, both scenarios would necessitate protective actions, such as evacuations and sheltering of the population or the need to take stable iodine, with the reach extending to distances from a few to several hundred kilometres. Radiation monitoring would need to cover distances of several hundred kilometres and food restrictions may need to be implemented.

    Any action against the Tehran Nuclear Research Reactor could also have severe consequences, potentially for large areas of the city of Tehran and its inhabitants. In such a case, protective actions would need to be taken.

    I will continue to provide public updates about the developments at all these sites and their possible health and environmental consequences.

    The Agency is, as madame Undersecretary kindly reminded, and will remain present in Iran and inspections there will resume, as required by Iran’s safeguards obligations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement, as soon as safety and security conditions allow.

    In this context, let me restate that the safety of our inspectors is of utmost importance. The host country has a responsibility in this regard, and we expect every effort to be made to ensure that their security and their communication lines with the IAEA headquarters will be maintained.

    As stated in my most recent report to the Agency’s Board of Governors and based on inspections conducted at the relevant facilities since then, Iran’s uranium stockpiles remain under safeguards in accordance with Iran’s comprehensive safeguards agreement. You may recall that more than 400kg of this stockpile is uranium enriched up to 60% U-235. It is essential that the Agency resumes inspections as soon as possible to provide credible assurances that none of it has been diverted.

    Importantly, any special measures by Iran to protect its nuclear materials and equipment must be done in accordance with Iran’s safeguards obligations and the Agency.  

    Therefore, it is of paramount importance that the Agency’s inspectors are allowed to verify that all relevant materials, especially those enriched to 60%, are accounted for. Beyond the potential radiological risks, attacks on such materials would make this effort of course more difficult.

    Madame President,

    The IAEA has consistently underlined, as stated in its General Conference resolution, that armed attacks on nuclear facilities should never take place, and could result in radioactive releases with grave consequences within and beyond the boundaries of the State which has been attacked.

    I therefore again call on maximum restraint. Military escalation threatens lives and delays indispensable work towards a diplomatic solution for the long-term assurance that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon.

    Madame President,

    The presence, support, analysis and inspections of technical experts are crucial to mitigating risks to nuclear safety and security – that is true during peacetime and even more so during military conflict.

    For the second time in three years, we are witnessing a dramatic conflict between two UN and IAEA Member States in which nuclear installations are coming under fire and nuclear safety is being compromised. The IAEA, just as has been the case with the military conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, will not stand idle during this conflict.

    As I stated in this chamber just a few days ago, I am ready to travel immediately and to engage with all relevant parties to help ensure the protection of nuclear facilities and the continued peaceful use of nuclear technology in accordance with the Agency mandate, including by deploying Agency nuclear safety and security experts, in addition to our safeguards inspectors in Iran, wherever necessary.

    For the IAEA to act, a constructive, professional dialogue is needed. I urge the Members of this Council to support us in making it happen sooner rather than later.

    The IAEA must receive timely and regular technical information about affected nuclear facilities and their respective sites. I urge in this regard the Iranian regulatory authorities to continue a constructive dialogue with the IAEA Incident and Emergency Centre, which has been operating 24/7 since the beginning of this conflict.

    Nuclear facilities and material must not be shrouded by the fog of war.

    Yesterday there was an incorrect statement to the media by an Israeli military official that Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant had been attacked. Though the mistake was quickly identified and the statement retracted, the situation underscored the vital need for clear and accurate communication, and the Agency’s unique role in providing it in a technically accurate and politically impartial way is obvious.

    Let me conclude by assuring the international community of the IAEA’s continued support at this very grave time.

    A diplomatic solution is within reach if the necessary political will is there. Elements for an agreement have been discussed. The IAEA can guarantee, through a watertight inspections system, that nuclear weapons will not be developed in Iran.  They can form the basis of a long-standing agreement that brings peace and avoids a nuclear crisis in the Middle East. This opportunity should not be missed. The alternative would be a protracted conflict and a looming threat of nuclear proliferation that, while emanating from the Middle East, would effectively erode the NPT and the non-proliferation regime as a whole.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Chinese Premier Holds Talks with New Zealand Prime Minister

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BEIJING, June 20 (Xinhua) — Chinese Premier Li Qiang held talks with New Zealand Prime Minister Christopher Lacson in Beijing on Friday.

    Li Qiang said that in the current chaotic international environment, strengthening strategic communication and deepening mutually beneficial cooperation between China and New Zealand is of great significance to both sides.

    As the Premier of the State Council noted, this morning, Chinese President Xi Jinping met with Prime Minister K. Lacson, during which they outlined guidelines for the development of interstate relations at the next stage. The Chinese side is ready to jointly develop traditional friendship with the New Zealand side, strengthen political mutual trust, expand practical cooperation in order to more effectively promote the common development of the two countries and bring greater prosperity to their peoples, Li Qiang said.

    The head of the Chinese government noted that the economies of China and New Zealand have a high degree of complementarity. The Chinese side is ready to strengthen the alignment of development strategies with the New Zealand side, identify new points of convergence of interests, improve the quality and effectiveness of cooperation in all areas, achieving mutual benefit and common gain at a higher level, Li Qiang added.

    He called on the parties to further expand the scale of trade, continuously promote the liberalization and simplification of trade and investment procedures, expand cooperation in emerging areas, and more effectively promote regional economic integration.

    The Chinese side, Li Qiang noted, is willing to increase imports of high-quality agricultural and food products from New Zealand, will continue to encourage investment by Chinese companies with relevant capabilities in the New Zealand economy, and also expresses the hope that the New Zealand side will create a fair and open business environment for Chinese enterprises.

    China welcomes New Zealand’s selection as the guest of honor of the 2025 China International Education Annual Conference and Expo, and is willing to deepen exchanges with New Zealand in areas such as education, tourism, think tank exchanges and regional exchanges to enhance mutual understanding and friendship between the two peoples, the premier said.

    At present, Li Qiang continued, the global trade and economic architecture is undergoing profound transformations and adjustments. The Chinese side is willing to strengthen communication and interaction with the New Zealand side within the framework of the UN, the World Trade Organization, APEC and other multilateral platforms, jointly uphold the rules-based multilateral trading system, form an open, inclusive and non-discriminatory environment for international economic cooperation, thereby bringing more stability and certainty to the turbulent world, the head of the Chinese government added.

    K. Lacson, for his part, assured that the New Zealand side firmly adheres to the one-China policy, is ready to maintain high-level contacts with the Chinese side, deepen mutual understanding and mutual trust, develop exchanges and cooperation in such areas as trade and economy, agriculture, tourism and education, promoting common development.

    The New Zealand side is willing to strengthen communication and coordination with the Chinese side in areas such as climate change mitigation and green development, jointly contribute to safeguarding the international order, and promoting peace, stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region, Lacson added.

    Following the talks, the heads of government of the two countries jointly witnessed the signing of a package of bilateral documents covering areas of cooperation such as customs, food safety, organic certification, climate change and cultural heritage. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: Wrecking the future: The Trump war on the ocean, climate, and communities

    Source: Greenpeace Statement –

    During his first 100 days President Trump has been actively working to dismantle and weaken environmental protections and attack those who fight to protect nature and our shared climate, putting the corporate profits of his billionaire friends ahead of people and the planet. © Saf Suleyman / Greenpeace

    President Trump’s second term

    The first months of any administration are often dedicated to setting the tone of what constituents can expect for the next four years. For Trump’s second term, that message is clear: let it all burn. 

    Drastic agency cuts, reckless executive orders, and blatant industry giveaways promise devastating immediate and long-term consequences for our oceans, our climate, and our communities. 

    Dismantling climate defense 

    NOAA, the nation’s premier science agency for understanding, monitoring, and protecting our oceans, atmosphere, and climate, plays an essential role in safeguarding ecosystems and communities. Its data, forecasts, scientific expertise, and stewardship also support major sectors like tourism, transportation, food, and retail that rely on NOAA’s services to operate safely, efficiently, and sustainably.

    Yet the Trump Administration has moved aggressively to gut NOAA’s capacity–firing scientists, defunding critical research, and shutting down its extreme weather database, a vital tool that has tracked the financial toll of climate disasters since the 1980s. These cuts come as extreme weather events are becoming more intense and frequent. In 2024 alone, Americans faced at least $182.7 billion in damages from 27 weather and climate disasters. Undermining NOAA’s ability to forecast threats, inform the American and global public, and support disaster response endangers lives while ensuring greater loss and damage, higher costs, and deep suffering as the climate crisis accelerates.  

    Among NOAA Fisheries’ vital programs is the Seafood Import Monitoring Program (SIMP), the nation’s primary line of defense against seafood linked to fraud, forced labor, and environmental harm. With more than 80% of the seafood consumed in the U.S. imported and the global seafood supply chain riddled with these problems, SIMP plays a crucial role in ensuring the integrity of what ends up on American plates. Cuts to NOAA directly harm domestic fisheries as well, which rely on the agency to provide weather and pollution alerts. 

    These efforts have been further supported by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of Labor’s Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB), whose programs help combat child labor, forced labor, and human trafficking around the world. 

    So while Americans have made it clear that they want to know where their food comes from and to trust that it is safe, ethical, and sustainable, the Trump administration is undermining the very systems that deliver these safeguards. By weakening SIMP and cancelling $500 million in ILAB grants, it is putting seafood workers at greater risk of abuse and exploitation, and exposing Americans to products tainted by these harms.

    Endangering ocean futures

    While more countries move towards a ban, moratorium, or pause on deep sea mining, the Trump Administration is charging in the opposite direction– reviving a cold war-era law, the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, to launch an unnecessary industry that threatens irreversible harm to fragile ecosystems we are only beginning to understand.

    Trump’s executive order “Unleashing America’s Offshore Critical Minerals and Resources” directs federal agencies to fast-track permits for seabed mining in both U.S. and international waters. Widely condemned as environmentally reckless and politically explosive, the move is a direct attempt to sidestep the International Seabed Authority (ISA)—the UN body charged with protecting the deep ocean as the “common heritage of humankind.” In doing so, it threatens to unravel global cooperation, weaken environmental oversight, and set a dangerous precedent for the exploitation of one of Earth’s last untouched frontiers. The order, while lining up another ‘get richer scheme’ for the billionaire broligarchy, also ignores calls from over 35 countries for a moratorium, disregards the voices of Pacific Island communities, and pushes forward despite overwhelming ecological, legal, and moral objections. 

    The push is further reinforced by a pair of sweeping executive orders that aim to bulldoze environmental safeguards in the name of “energy dominance.” One declares a so-called “national energy emergency,” suspending key regulatory safeguards under bedrock environmental laws like the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Endangered Species Act, and the Clean Water Act. 

    Together, these orders will not just fast-tack deep sea mining but also accelerate offshore drilling, fracking infrastructure, and fossil fuel exports. This isn’t just deregulation—it’s a declaration of open season on the ocean. 

    All this comes as cobalt and nickel prices are plummeting, further undermining the already shaky economic case for mining the seafloor. Meanwhile, safer, cleaner, and more cost-effective alternatives, such as mineral recycling and domestic refining efforts, many of which are backed by the U.S. Department of Defense, are gaining momentum. But instead of investing in these sustainable solutions, the White House is reaching into the past to gamble with the future of our oceans and our planet. 

    ‘Unleashing’ America’s fishing industry into collapse

    In another destructive move, the Trump Administration has targeted New England’s fishing industry by opening the Northeast Canyons and Seamounts National Marine Monument–the first and only National Marine Monument in the U.S. Atlantic–to commercial fishing. This follows similar rollbacks opening the Pacific Islands Heritage Marine National Monument–long considered off-limits due to its ecological significance–to commercial fishing and broader dismantling of domestic fishing regulations.  

    There is no evidence that these protected areas harmed the fishing economy. But opening them to industrial fishing will cause irreversible damage, from increased bycatch and habitat destruction to plastic pollution from fishing gear, undoing decades of progress to end overfishing, rebuild fish stocks, and restore America’s fisheries. 

    At the same time, the earlier-mentioned cuts to NOAA will also hurt domestic fishing by leaving fishers without vital scientific insight needed for planning and responding to changing ocean conditions. This approach paves the way for overfishing and fishery collapse–again, directly contradicting the Trump Administration’s stated goal of supporting American fishing communities. 

    Scientists agree that protecting at least 30% of the world’s oceans by 2030 is essential to help marine ecosystems recover and thrive. When fish populations collapse, so do fishing jobs and fishing communities. Yet with these actions, the Trump Administration is again steering the US in the wrong direction—sidelining science, sustainability, and long-term economic resilience by jeopardizing the entire industry and the coastal communities it supports. 

    Taxing our health

    Trump’s chaotic tariff edicts have strained relationships with several key allies and raised costs for average Americans, all while giving fossil fuel interests a free pass. By exempting petrochemicals and polymers, the Administration has ensured that plastic packaging will remain cheap, abundant, and toxic. Companies like Coca-Cola, already the largest global producer of plastic packaging and the biggest source of branded plastic waste, are planning to ramp up plastic production in response to the tariffs on aluminum.  

    At the same time, the Administration issued yet another executive order, accompanied by a 36-page report, aimed at “bringing America back” to plastic straws. So, while more Americans struggle to make ends meet, they can be sure of one thing: there will be plenty of microplastics to go around.

    Plastics are not just a pollution problem; they are a public health crisis. Over 3,200 chemicals in plastics have been linked to a host of serious health conditions, including cancer, hormone disruption, reproductive problems, metabolic changes, obesity, premature births, neurological disorders, and learning disabilities. Toxic chemicals in plastic already cost Americans nearly $250 billion in healthcare expenses each year.

    And that burden is not shared equally. BIPOC and low-income communities face disproportionate exposure to pollution from plastic production, disposal, and incineration infrastructure, which are often located in or near their communities. These facilities poison the air, the water, and their bodies. While oil and gas companies rake in record profits and their billionaire CEO’s grow richer, these communities and working families across America are left paying the price. 

    Voters across the political spectrum – Democrats and Republicans alike– support strong action to reduce plastic pollution and protect public health. Yet, without pause at the staggering irony, the Trump Administration is slashing Medicaid, gutting personnel and budget from the Department of Health and Human Services, and increasing our exposure to toxic plastic— all while touting a “Make America Healthy Again” agenda. But even in an era of  “alternative facts” and the attempted erasure of diversity, equity, and inclusion, the truth is impossible to ignore. There is nothing left to sacrifice. 

    Time to resist 

    While the pace and scale of recent changes can seem overwhelming, it is worth remembering that part of this administration’s strategy is to flood the zone and try to get ahead of legal challenges and other obstacles to their agenda. The Trump Administration, like the “tech bros” who fell in line behind the President, is moving fast and breaking things. But there is growing resistance to their actions. In the last few weeks, especially, the number of new and successful legal challenges has been growing, with some law firms and academic institutions pushing back against the administration’s demands. This includes EarthJustice, Greenpeace, and allies in a joint litigation against Trump’s attempt to continue offshore drilling. 

    Meanwhile, millions of Americans—across generations, faiths, races, genders, and political ideologies—have been hitting the streets to defend their human rights, their environment, and their democracy. These peaceful protests have made one thing clear: We will not be silenced. We won’t back down. We won’t stop defending our communities in the face of government corruption and corporate greed. 

    MIL OSI NGO –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Concludes the Fifth Reviews Under the Extended Fund Facility and the Resilience and Sustainability Facility with Barbados

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    June 20, 2025

    • The IMF Executive Board concluded the fifth and final reviews under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) and the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) arrangements with Barbados, allowing an immediate disbursement of about US$19 million under the EFF arrangement and about US$39 million under the RSF arrangement.
    • Implementation of the home-grown Barbados Economic Recovery and Transformation (BERT 2022) plan has remained strong and the broad objectives of the EFF and RSF arrangements have been achieved. Macroeconomic stability has been reinforced, and reforms have been implemented to boost fiscal sustainability, enhance growth, and build resilience.
    • Barbados’ economy has continued to perform well. Growth has been robust, inflation has moderated, the fiscal and external positions have improved, and the public debt-to-GDP ratio has continued to decline. The outlook is stable but subject to downside risks, given heightened global uncertainty and vulnerabilities to external shocks and natural disasters.

    Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) today concluded the fifth and final reviews of the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) and the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) arrangements with Barbados. The completion of the reviews allows the authorities to draw the equivalent of SDR 14.175 million (about US$19 million) under the EFF arrangement and SDR 28.35 million (about US$39 million) under the RSF arrangement, bringing total disbursements under the EFF arrangement to SDR 85.05 million (about US$116 million) and SDR 141.75 million (about US$193 million) under the RSF arrangement. The authorities have consented to the publication of the staff report prepared for these reviews.[1]

    Economic activity in 2024 remained robust, with growth estimated at 4 percent, driven by tourism, construction, and business services. Inflation moderated to an average of 1.4 percent due to easing global commodity prices and prices of domestic goods and services. The external position strengthened further, with the current account deficit narrowing to 4.5 percent of GDP, supported by tourism receipts, declining import prices, and one-off current transfers. Gross international reserves reached US$1.6 billion at end-2024, equivalent to over 7 months of import cover, providing continued strong support to the exchange rate peg.

    The near-term outlook is stable. Growth is expected to reach 2.7 percent in 2025, supported by construction of tourism-related projects and government investment. Inflation is expected to pick up in 2025 due to the rising cost of non-fuel imports and some domestic agricultural products. Nevertheless, risks to the outlook are tilted to the downside, amidst the highly uncertain external economic environment and Barbados’ continued vulnerability to global shocks and natural disasters.

    Program performance has remained strong. All quantitative performance criteria and indicative targets were met. The authorities exceeded the primary fiscal surplus target for FY2024/25 and are targeting 4.4 percent of GDP for FY2025/26. Public debt has fallen below 105 percent of GDP, and the authorities remain committed to bringing it down to 60 percent of GDP by FY2035/36. The authorities met the EFF structural benchmarks for the review, including completing the assessment of human resource needs at the Barbados Customs and Excise Department, preparing a public-private partnership (PPP) framework, and developing a daily liquidity forecasting framework. Both reform measures for the RSF fifth review were also implemented. Key elements to strengthen the integration of climate concerns into public financial management have been completed, including the development of project appraisal guidelines, the deepening of fiscal risk analysis, and the preparation of the PPP framework. The Central Bank of Barbados has also included physical climate risk analysis in its bank stress testing.

    Following the Executive Board discussion on Barbados, Mr. Bo Li, Deputy Managing Director and Acting Chair, issued the following statement:

    “The implementation of Barbados’ homegrown Economic Recovery and Transformation program has remained strong, supported by the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) and the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) arrangements. The completion of the fifth and final reviews marks the successful conclusion of the Fund arrangements.

    “While the outlook is stable, risks remain tilted to the downside, given the highly uncertain external economic environment and Barbados’ vulnerability to shocks and natural disasters. The authorities remain strongly committed to ensuring macroeconomic stability and implementing structural reforms to boost potential growth and build resilience.

    “Maintaining strong fiscal surpluses will be necessary to achieve the public debt target of 60 percent of GDP by FY2035/36. The authorities’ focus on strengthening revenue mobilization and improving public financial management is appropriate. These measures will be key to preserving fiscal sustainability and creating space for public investment. Finalizing ambitious reforms of state-owned enterprises is a priority. The authorities are taking the necessary steps to mobilize external financing.

    “The exchange rate peg remains a critical anchor for macroeconomic stability, supported by ample international reserves. Measures have been taken to strengthen the monetary policy framework and financial safety nets. Efforts to enhance the local payments market and infrastructure are advancing, with the goal of moving to a digital payments system in 2026.

    “Reforms to improve the business environment and boost growth potential are key. Important measures include advancing the digitalization of government services and investing in skills and education. The authorities focus on boosting macroeconomic resilience to natural disasters and facilitating the transition to renewable energy is welcome.”

    [1] Under the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, publication of documents that pertain to member countries is voluntary and requires member consent. The staff report will be published shortly on the www.imf.org/Barbados page.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Meera Louis

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/20/pr-25210-barbados-imf-concludes-5th-reviews-under-the-eff-and-resil-and-sustainability-facility

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Experts of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women Praise Ireland for Increasing Women’s Representation in Decision-Making, Raise Issues Concerning Historic Rights Violations and Sexual Violence

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women today concluded its consideration of the eighth periodic report of Ireland, with Committee Experts praising the State’s efforts to increase women’s representation in decision-making and raising questions concerning redress for historic rights violations and measures to address sexual and gender-based violence.

    In the dialogue, several Committee Experts commended Ireland’s achievements in promoting women’s representation in decision-making, including its 40 per cent quota for female candidates in national elections.  Jelena Pia-Comella, Committee Expert and Rapporteur for Ireland, said statistics on Irish women’s participation in diplomacy were outstanding.

    Ms. Pia-Comella said the Committee was deeply concerned that there had yet to be recognition that women and girls of the Magdalene Laundries had experienced degrading treatment and gender-based discrimination; that arbitrary barriers to redress persisted within the Mother and Baby Institutions payment scheme; and that the State had failed to adequately implement the 2014 O’Keeffe judgment.  How would these issues be addressed?

    Another Committee Expert said one in five women in Ireland reportedly experienced non-consensual sex in their lifetimes.  There was insufficient funding for measures to address sexual offences.  What measures would the State party take to increase protection for women victims of sexual violence?

    Introducing the report, Colm Brophy, Minister of State for Migration of Ireland and head of the delegation, said the national strategy for women and girls 2017-2021 put a spotlight on promoting greater gender balance in decision-making.  Ireland’s largest listed companies had now reached the key milestone of 40 per cent female directors overall.  Legislation was also introduced in 2012 requiring political parties to meet gender quotas for candidates in parliamentary elections or face financial penalties.  The quota for the most recent elections in 2024 was 40 per cent.

    The delegation added that women made up 49 per cent of senior management of Ireland’s Foreign Service, and 54 per cent of heads of foreign missions.

    In the context of Mother and Baby and County Home Institutions, Mr. Brophy said the State repeatedly failed to protect vulnerable citizens, and to uphold their most fundamental rights.  The delegation added that the redress scheme established in 2013 regarding Magdalene Laundries was accessible for women living abroad.  The payment scheme was one of a large suite of actions implemented to redress the harms caused.  It was expected that legislation to implement the European Court of Human Rights decision on the O’Keeffe case would be implemented in coming weeks.

    Mr. Brophy also said the national strategy for women and girls prioritised action to combat domestic and gender-based violence.  Launched in 2022, the third national strategy on domestic, sexual and gender-based violence instituted fundamental structural reforms to Ireland’s approach to tackling the issue.  A new agency, Cuan, was established in 2024 to deliver services to victims.

    In closing remarks, Mr. Brophy said the Committee had invested significant time in understanding the issues facing women and girls in Ireland.  The State would develop measures in response to the Committee’s concluding observations.  Ireland was committed to its obligations under the Convention and to the United Nations.

    Nahla Haidar, Committee Chair, in concluding remarks, thanked the State party for its support to the treaty bodies, international law and the rule of law.  The dialogue had provided the Committee with further insight into the efforts made by Ireland to implement the Convention for the benefit of women and girls in the State.

    The delegation of Ireland consisted of representatives from the Department of Children, Disability and Equality; Department of Education and Youth; Department of Health; Department of Justice, Home Affairs and Migration; Office of the Attorney General; Department of Social Protection; Cuan, the Domestic, Sexual and Gender-Based Violence Agency; Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade; Department of Enterprise, Tourism and Employment; and the Permanent Mission of Ireland to the United Nations Office at Geneva.

    The Committee will issue the concluding observations on the report of Ireland at the end of its ninety-first session on 4 July. All documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, can be found on the session’s webpage.  Meeting summary releases can be found here.  The webcast of the Committee’s public meetings can be accessed via the UN Web TV webpage.

    The Committee will next meet at 3 p.m. on Monday, 23 June to meet with representatives from non-governmental organizations and national human rights institutions who will brief the Committee on the situation of women in Afghanistan, San Marino, Chad and Botswana, the reports of which the Committee will review next week.

    Report

    The Committee has before it the eighth periodic report of Ireland (CEDAW/C/IRL/8).

    Presentation of Report

    COLM BROPHY, Minister of State for Migration of Ireland and head of the delegation, said Ireland had worked actively over the period since 2017 to promote equality for women and to address issues facing them.  A national strategy for women and girls was launched in 2017 as the whole of Government framework for action on gender equality.  Women’s organizations participated in the strategy committee, chaired at Ministerial level, which monitored implementation.  A successor strategy was currently being finalised, in consultation with women across Ireland.

    Travellers were recognised as an ethnic minority in a landmark decision of Ireland’s Parliament in March 2017, a decision supported by all political parties at the time. The Government was working on identifying and eliminating barriers to access to public services for Travellers. The Irish health system partnered with Traveller organizations to train Travellers to become community health peer workers.  The success of these projects was reflected in higher rates of uptake of screening amongst Traveller women relative to the general population for breast and cervical cancers.  In education, the Traveller and Roma education strategy 2024–2030 committed to supporting Traveller and Roma women on their educational journey.

    The needs of migrant women were addressed through a combination of mainstream public services and a wide range of targeted supports, funded by grants from various national and European integration funds.  These supports played a crucial role in improving outcomes for migrant women in areas of particular concern, including labour market access and housing. A national migration and integration strategy, due to be published next year, would provide a cohesive policy framework for recognising and addressing the integration challenges facing migrant women. 

    The national strategy for women and girls 2017-2021 put a spotlight on promoting greater gender balance in decision-making.  The Government launched a business-led initiative entitled Balance for Better Business in 2018 which spearheaded a series of initiatives contributing to a significant improvement in the percentage of women on corporate boards, particularly of publicly listed companies. Ireland’s largest listed companies had now reached the key milestone of 40 per cent female directors overall, compared to 18 per cent in 2018.  Ireland now ranked sixth in the European Union for female board representation and fifth for leadership teams.

    Legislation was introduced in 2012 requiring political parties to meet gender quotas for candidates in parliamentary elections or face financial penalties.  The quota for the most recent elections in 2024 was 40 per cent and this would apply for future national elections.  Maternity leave entitlements were introduced for elected members of local authorities in 2022, and for members of both chambers of Ireland’s parliament in 2024.  A funding scheme had also been in place since 2019 to incentivise political parties to increase the number of women candidates for local elections.  The Government also provided funding for civil society organizations providing support for women candidates, and the new national Traveller and Roma inclusion strategy 2024-2028 included a commitment to promote greater participation by Traveller and Roma women in political and public life, including in leadership positions.

    During the period under review, the Government introduced major initiatives to enable parents to access childcare and had increased public funding of early learning and childcare to unprecedented levels.  Government expenditure now exceeded 1.37 billion euros in 2025, a 200 per cent increase on investment since 2017.  The early childhood care and education programme provided two years of pre-school without charge and enjoyed participation rates of 96 per cent each year. The national childcare scheme, introduced in 2019, provided targeted and universal subsidies to reduce the costs for parents.  In addition, the equal start scheme introduced in 2024 was specifically targeted at enabling children from disadvantaged households to access early learning and childcare.

    Mr. Brophy introduced Government measures to increase family leave entitlements, including extending parental leave to 26 weeks under the parental leave (amendment) act 2019; establishing a statutory right to flexible work arrangements; establishing the right to five days of paid sick leave through the sick leave act 2022; increasing the national minimum wage by 46 per cent, from 9.25 euros per hour in 2017 to 13.50 euros in 2025; and requiring relevant organizations to report on their gender pay gaps and transpose the European Union pay transparency directive. The Government had focused on promoting greater participation by women and girls in science, technology, engineering and maths subjects.  Thanks to Government action, the number of female apprentices doubled between 2021 and 2025. 

    The national strategy for women and girls prioritised action to combat domestic violence and gender-based violence.  This was reflected in Ireland’s decision to ratify the Council of Europe’s Istanbul Convention on Preventing and Combatting Violence against Women and Domestic Violence in 2019.  Ireland enacted the domestic violence act in 2018, which strengthened the protections available to those experiencing domestic violence and made coercive control a criminal offence. 

    Launched in 2022, the third national strategy on domestic, sexual and gender-based violence instituted fundamental structural reforms to Ireland’s approach to tackling the issue.  A new agency, Cuan, was established in 2024 to deliver services to victims and implement awareness raising campaigns on such violence.  Ireland also became one of the first countries to enable persons experiencing domestic violence to have five days of paid leave.  The Government had also introduced significant measures to combat trafficking.  The third national action plan to prevent and combat trafficking, launched in 2023, was working to implement a more victim-centred approach, while raising awareness among service providers of trafficking and providing appropriate training.

    Mr. Brophy also presented measures to address women’s health needs, including the establishment of the Women’s Health Taskforce in 2019; the women’s health action plans for 2022-2023 and 2024-2025, which ensured a continued focus and delivery of key women’s health actions; the allocation of over 180 million euros since 2020 in additional funding, including funding for free contraception for women from 17 to 35 years, in vitro fertilisation treatment, and public menopause clinics. 

    Ireland was the first county in the world to decide by referendum in 2015 that same-sex couples should be able to marry.  A referendum on removing the reference in article 41.2 of the Constitution to women’s place in the home was also held in March 2024, but this was defeated.  The people of Ireland voted in a referendum in May 2018 to amend the Irish Constitution to permit Ireland’s parliament to legislate for abortion.  All 19 maternity hospitals were now providing termination services, in accordance with legislation.  There had also been a sustained increase in community providers, which now stood at 455.

    In the context of Mother and Baby and County Home Institutions, the State repeatedly failed to protect vulnerable citizens, and to uphold their most fundamental rights. The Government was conscious of the terrible hurt and pain caused, and the impact that this had had, and continued to have on many individuals and their families.  The Commission of Inquiry’s report, and the official State apology which followed, were a starting point for the further restorative measures now being progressed.  Six of the seven major commitments made by the Government to survivors were in place, while the seventh, a National Centre for Research and Remembrance, was in progress. 

    Ireland enacted the landmark birth information and tracing act 2022, which had provided clear rights of access to birth and early life information, and a Mother and Baby Institutions payment scheme opened to applications in March 2024 and provided payments and health benefits to survivors.  To date, more than 4,500 payments had been made totalling over 66 million euros.  Last Monday, work began to excavate at the site of the former Tuam Mother and Baby Home so as to ensure the dignified burial of any babies found to have been buried there.  In addition, many women who spent time in Magdalen Laundries had now benefited from the Government’s redress scheme, which remained open for any further applications.

    The Government aimed to make equality a lived reality for women and girls in all of their diversity. There were areas where further progress or change was needed, but the Government was committed to creating a better society for women and girls.

    Statement by the National Human Rights Institution of Ireland

    DEIRDRE MALONE, Director, Ireland’s Human Rights and Equality Commission, said Ireland played a leadership role in the global struggle for gender equality.  However, its international ambition for gender equality was not always matched with domestic action on gender equality.  There had been procrastination in ratifying key treaties and removing reservations; delay in incorporating international standards into national law; continuing failure to implement the recommendations of treaty bodies, including those of the Committee; and in the case of O’Keeffe, a continuing refusal to follow the judgement of the European Court of Human Rights regarding redress.

    In areas such as the needs of Traveller and Roma women and access to abortion, Ireland had clear and comprehensive policies and strategies which were not being implemented.  In those areas where there was progress, it was often frustratingly slow.  While domestic, sexual and gender-based violence policy had seen several positive reforms in recent years, it was necessary to bridge the gap between the progressive policies and legislation that Ireland had enacted and the reality on the ground. 

    Women suffered disproportionately from an inadequate, arbitrary, and overly bureaucratic social welfare system, which was not benchmarked against the cost of living or indexed against national wages.  Some 4.8 per cent of women lived in consistent poverty with lone parent households headed by women, and low-income families being more susceptible to poverty. The Gender Pay Gap and the Gender Pension Gap remained stark.

    In areas including the treatment of women in prison and women’s participation in politics, there had been regression.  Prison overcrowding worsened daily.  Given the impact of prison on women and family life, Irish penal policy needed to be reformed in line with the Bangkok Rules.

    More than 75 per cent of seats in parliament were held by men; only three out of 15 newly appointed cabinet Ministers were women.  Ireland had made a commitment to the principles of the Convention but was not matching that commitment with action that transformed the lived realities of its women and girls.  By investing in an equal future, the Irish State – one that prided itself on its adherence to human rights and rule of law – could show leadership to other nations, at a time when such leadership was so badly needed.

    Questions by a Committee Expert 

    JELENA PIA-COMELLA, Committee Expert and Rapporteur for Ireland, congratulated Ireland on placing gender equality at the forefront of its agenda during its 2021-2022 tenure at the United Nations Security Council.

    The Committee regretted that, despite its previous recommendation, the State party did not intend to remove its reservations to the Convention and remained concerned that the Irish Constitution’s outdated language on women’s duties at home continued to discriminate against women’s rights in the economic and social spheres. Did the State party intend to devise a plan to implement the relevant recommendations of the gender equality bodies of the Citizen’s Assembly and Parliamentary Committee?  What was the status of review of the equality (miscellaneous provisions) bill of 2024?

    The Committee welcomed that State apologies had been issued for past human rights violations. However, it was deeply concerned that there had yet to be recognition that women and girls of the Magdalene Laundries had experienced degrading treatment and gender-based discrimination; that arbitrary barriers to redress persisted within the Mother and Baby Institutions payment scheme; and that the State had failed to adequately implement the 2014 O’Keeffe judgment. 

    What steps was the State party taking to provide up-front payment to women residing abroad; and to comprehensively address concerns raised regarding the operation of commissions of investigation?  Would the State overhaul the current model of investigations to embed human rights and equality principles in their operation?  Would the proposed commission of investigation into sexual abuse in day and boarding schools include non-religious schools, including the school Louise O’Keeffe attended?  What was the status of the National Centre for Research and Remembrance and how would it address the needs and views of affected persons?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said significant progress had been made in implementing the recommendations of the Citizen’s Assembly on Gender Equality.  Of 205 actions, 190 had been completed or were in progress.  The recommendations addressed sexual and gender-based violence, education in challenging gender stereotypes, and actions to improve the share of women in politics.

    The redress scheme established in 2013 regarding the Magdalene Laundries was accessible for women living abroad.  The State had worked actively to keep conditions under review.  Persons under 66 were entitled to a symbolic payment, which had been increased to 120 euros per week.  Women continued to receive payments under the scheme.  The payment scheme was one of a large suite of actions made to redress the harms caused in Mother and Baby County Home Institutions, including measures to support access to information.  Some 16,000 applications had been processed thus far.  The National Remembrance Centre would be in Dublin. A steering committee for the Centre was established in 2022 and development permission was received in 2025.

    To address shortcomings, a revised version of the O’Keeffe payment scheme was put in place in 2021, after which 128 applications were received.  It was expected that legislation to implement the decision of the European Court of Human Rights on this case would be implemented in coming weeks. A report into incidents of sexual abuse in residential institutions was published in 2024, and the Government was preparing measures to implement the recommendations of the report.

    A voluntary redress scheme had provided compensation to more than 375 women who had undergone symphysiotomy procedures.  The Government had fulfilled its obligations to women who had suffered due to these procedures.

    Equality legislation was currently being drafted and would be reviewed by a parliamentary committee over the summer.

    Questions by a Committee Expert 

    A Committee Expert asked about the timeline for the adoption of the new national strategy on women and girls?  How would it incorporate lessons from the previous cycle and align with Convention standards?  Would Traveller women’s needs be addressed in the strategy?  What measures were in place to monitor equality policies of Government bodies?  What training on gender equality was provided to Government officials?

    Ireland’s national human rights institution had “A” status under the Paris Principles and the appointment process for its commissioners was transparent.  Did the institution promote international and regional human rights frameworks?  Was the State party considering implementing the recommendation of the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions to establish a fixed term for members?

    The Committee welcomed that political parties would have their funding reduced by 50 per cent if they failed to present at least 40 per cent female candidates.  It called for a quota of 50 per cent female representation to be established.  Efforts to implement gender quotas had not produced meaningful representation of Traveller women.  It was welcome that women represented 40 per cent of board members in the largest publicly listed companies.  However, the share of female executive directors remained low, at 11 per cent. None of these companies had a female chief executive officer.  How would this be addressed, and how would the State party increase the representation of Traveller women in Government?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said representatives from Government and civil society monitored the implementation of actions on gender equality.  The forthcoming national strategy for women and girls was close to finalisation.  Work was underway to embed a focus on Traveller women in the new strategy.  It also included measures to strengthen training on gender equality for Government officials.  Some 6,900 civil servants had enrolled in online training on gender equality. A professional diploma on human rights was offered for public officials, which covered gender equality.

    The national human rights institution had its own dedicated budget, provided on an annual basis. Its funding allocations had been increased substantially in recent years – its allocation in 2025 was 3.5 million euros higher than in 2015.  The Government did not play a role in the appointment of its commissioners.

    The Balance for Better Business programme monitored gender representation on the boards of Irish companies.  The average level of female representation on the boards of all publicly listed companies was now at 37 per cent.  A new five-year strategy had been developed which set targets for more than 40 per cent female representation on the boards of all companies by 2028.  It included measures to improve the recruitment of women and promote women’s career pathways.

    Amendments were made to the electoral act of 1997 that improved the gender balance in political parties, with the introduction of 40 per cent quotas for women candidates in national elections.  There were no plans to extend these quotas to local elections.  Policies had been developed to promote the representation of Traveller women in politics, and the Women for Election organization, which was funded by the Government, was working toward this goal.

    Questions by Committee Experts 

    A Committee Expert said that Ireland’s work towards gender equality on the boards of companies was very impressive.

    One Committee Expert recognised progress in addressing gender-based violence, including the adoption of the Istanbul Protocol and the national strategy to combat domestic, sexual and gender-based violence.  What further measures would be adopted to address gender stereotypes with an intersectional approach?  Forced sterilisation of women with disabilities was still practiced and hate crimes against women had risen by four per cent over the reporting period. When would the State party develop a national action plan to address hate crimes and adopt measures to ban forced sterilisation?  What measures were in place to ensure that victims of female genital mutilation had access to health services?  Would it increase the number of specialised female genital mutilation clinics?

    One in five women in Ireland reportedly experienced non-consensual sex in their lifetimes. There were delays in access to justice and insufficient funding for measures to address sexual offences. What measures would the State party take to increase access to legal aid and protection for women victims of sexual violence?  What resources would be provided to strengthen support structures?  Would the State party consolidate legislation on sexual violence into one law?

    A Committee Expert said Ireland had made considerable efforts to combat trafficking, including by developing a national action plan to combat trafficking and establishing an independent monitoring mechanism.  However, there were shortcomings in identifying victims, particularly girls.  Only five children were identified as victims of trafficking in 2023, and the training of officials reportedly did not lead to effective prosecutions.  How would the State party train the judiciary and increase the prosecution of trafficking offences?  What steps had been taken to improve the identification of victims and ensure that no victims were excluded from support?  The Committee welcomed that a trafficking specific shelter had been established in 2023, but it was not large enough; were there plans to extend it?  There had only been 15 convictions of consumers of sex services in 2023; were there plans to increase prosecutions? 

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the national strategy for women and girls included measures to address gender stereotypes and to collect data on such stereotypes.  Ireland had taken measures to address gender stereotypes in the media, including through a media forum held in 2025, and measures to promote gender balance in the media.  A campaign on reporting harmful online content had also been developed.

    Women’s health services were trained on responding to victims of female genital mutilation, and management guidelines had been developed on caring for victims, who had access to free counselling services.  A project was underway to reduce waiting times for healthcare for victims of female genital mutilation.  Ireland had ratified the Council of Europe Convention that prohibited forced sterilisation.

    Work was ongoing to update legislation on hate crimes and to introduce a prohibition of the incitement of hatred online.  The Government had also drafted legislation on removing the guardianship rights of parents who killed their partners.  Ireland had comprehensive laws on sexual offences.  There had been a three-fold increase in funding for support for victims of domestic, sexual and gender-based violence, and a body had been established to promote the collection and accessibility of data on sexual violence.

    Competent authorities, as well as non-governmental organizations, were now able to refer suspected victims of human trafficking.  The Government was looking at expanding the shelter for victims of trafficking.  It funded several non-governmental organizations to provide trauma-informed support to victims.  The Irish police forces had worked to increase prosecutions of organised crime cases, which had proven effective in preventing trafficking.  Ireland had recently decriminalised the sale of sex; there was no plan to change this legislation.  The Government was planning to introduce on-the-spot fines and mobile phone searches to increase prosecutions for the consumption of sex services.

    Questions by Committee Experts 

    JELENA PIA-COMELLA, Committee Expert and Rapporteur for Ireland, welcomed the State party’s proactive efforts to address coercive practices.  Could it provide more information on the special measures it had developed to address rape?

    Another Committee Expert asked if legislation was planned to address drink spiking?  What services were provided to victims of gender-based violence in prisons?

    A Committee Expert asked how the State party was promoting the meaningful participation of women, including marginalised women, in the Foreign Service?  The Committee was concerned about online threats against women involved in politics and public life.  What monitoring mechanisms were in place?  There was no clear gender-responsive climate strategy.  How did the State party ensure that women and girls were included in decision-making processes on climate action?

    Another Committee Expert said there was no formal procedure for the determination of statelessness in Ireland.  How would the State party amend this deficiency?  What did the State party plan to do in response to the recent court decision on the right to guardianship for babies born through surrogacy?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the Government was prioritising the drafting of legislation on coercive practices.  The prison service provided support to persons who had experienced domestic, sexual and gender-based violence.  An intervention model was also in place to prevent revictimisation upon release. Drink spiking was a criminal offence.

    Last year, of the 67 persons identified as victims of human trafficking, 10 were children.  The third national action plan on trafficking included measures to tackle trafficking in children.  A series of training programmes had been developed for prosecutors on sexual offences.

    Women made up 49 per cent of senior management in Ireland’s Foreign Service, and 54 per cent of heads of foreign missions.  A code of conduct on countering online hate speech had been developed, as had guidance for candidates who faced online harassment on lodging complaints.

    The Government was working to provide pathways to the parents of babies born through surrogacy to have their parental rights recognised.

    Questions by Committee Experts 

    JELENA PIA-COMELLA, Committee Expert and Rapporteur for Ireland, said that the statics of female participation in diplomacy were outstanding.  The Committee welcomed the State party’s higher education authority act. The primary curriculum did not address gender equality; would it do so in future?  What measures were in place to promote equal access to education? How did the State party ensure that its sexual and reproductive health education addressed same-sex relationships, gender identity and abortion?

    Another Committee Expert said the Committee welcomed the reduction of the gender pay gap to 9.6 per cent in 2022. What enforcement mechanisms were in place to ensure private sector compliance with equal pay mechanisms? Women constituted 60 per cent of low paid workers.  How did the State party address the barriers faced by women in accessing decent work? Roma women had an estimated unemployment rate of 80 per cent; how was the State party addressing this issue? Were there plans to introduce a universal State pension to address the gender pension gap, which was currently at 36 per cent?

    The Committee was concerned about the unequal distribution of unpaid care work.  What measures were in place to ensure access to affordable childcare for all children and to encourage greater uptake of parental leave by men? How did the State party ensure effective redress in cases of workplace harassment?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the sexual and reproductive health education curriculum was being reviewed, and the updated curriculum would be introduced from 2027.  It focused on promoting healthy relationships, gender equality and safety online, preventing harmful gender narratives, addressing the root causes of domestic and sexual violence, assessing responses to unplanned pregnancies and rape, and the harms of pornography.

    The accessibility and affordability of early learning and childcare had been improved since 2017.  Up to two years of preschool education was now offered at no cost.  Universal subsidies were provided to families.  More than two million children were covered by the national childcare scheme, which had a budget of 529 million euros in 2025.  The equal start scheme provided targeted support in disadvantaged areas for Traveller, Roma and refugee children.

    Reporting on the gender pay gap required employers to consider the reasons for the gap.  Guidelines were being developed for different sectors on addressing gender pay gaps.  Employees could lodge complaints when their employer did not report on gender pay gaps. Paid parental leave created individual, non-transferrable entitlements for each parent.  The Government planned to increase awareness of parents’ entitlements. 

    One of the actions in the national Roma and Traveller strategy promoted their employment and participation in internships.  The Government was reaching out to marginalised groups to encourage participation in voluntary employment services.

    Questions by a Committee Expert

    A Committee Expert said Ireland had made significant progress in terms of women’s health.  How did the State ensure free access to healthcare for marginalised women?  How did the roadmap for digital health to 2030 address the needs of women and girls, including persons who had difficulties accessing digital services? Could the delegation provide data on women who had accessed legal abortions in 2023 and 2024?  How many women had had to travel abroad to obtain abortions?  How was the State party combatting stigma related to abortions and conscientious objections?  Was the State party considering abolishing the mandatory three-day waiting period for abortions?

    How was free, prior and informed consent guaranteed for medical interventions on institutionalised women and transgender persons?  There were reported cases of forced sterilisations and forced abortions; how did the State sanction such harmful practices, and how many cases of such practices had been brought before the courts?  How was the State party ensuring that mental health services were community-based and gender sensitive?  What steps had been taken to ensure that victims of gender-based violence could benefit from free mental health services?  Would the State prohibit the use of confidential health data of victims in court cases?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the parental leave scheme encouraged fathers to use it.  In 2024, over 66,000 parents had received parental benefits, of which 32 per cent were men.  Ireland’s State pension system recognised periods spent outside the workforce for caring requirements.  The long-term carers’ contribution supported the pensions of women who provided full-time care for long periods of time; over 7,000 women had been added to this scheme last year.  The difference in average pay to men and women was negligible in terms of the State pension.  The proposal of a universal pension could undermine progress made in recognising time spent by women providing care and would not resolve the pension issue. Ireland was in the process of adopting an auto-enrolment process for pensions which would particularly benefit women.

    The Government was considering ratifying International Labour Organization Conventions 156 and 183. The Workplace Relations Commission was responsible for deciding on workplace discrimination claims.  Some 63 claims had been received in 2024.  The Commission did not collect reasons for withdrawals of complaints.  It assisted all parties to reach a suitable outcome for a claim.

    The State party promoted collective bargaining to promote access to decent working conditions and wages. There was no legal impediment to collective bargaining.  The Government supported the rights of all workers to join and form trade unions. 

    Ireland was committed to gender transformative climate action.  Its delegation at the most recent Conference of the Parties in Baku was 50 per cent female. The Just Transition Commission had published a report that called for assessment of the gender implications of climate measures.

    Free hormone replacement therapy was provided to women experiencing the symptoms of menopause.  The Government was committed to ensuring safe and equitable access to pregnancy termination services for marginalised groups of society. In 2023, 10,033 women used termination services, while in 2022, 214 women went abroad to access such services. The free contraception scheme provided for the cost of contraception and related health consultations.  More than 200,000 women benefited from the scheme last year.  Since 2016, several million euros had been invested in maternity services, funding a large increase in maternity health staff.

    Women’s mental health remained a key priority in the national mental health strategy.  The State was providing mental health services to victims of violence that considered their gender and experience of trauma.  The State party was not aware of cases of forced sterilisation and forced abortion.

    Children could remain in the care of their mother in prison until 12 months of age.  High quality antenatal care was provided to women in prisons and there were mother and baby units in the State’s two women’s prisons.  Draft legislation had been developed that would limit the use of counselling records in court proceedings.  Banning disclosure of such records entirely could affect the right to a fair trial.  Measures were being developed to reduce revictimisation of survivors through disclosure hearings.

    The State was rolling out campaigns to encourage victims of sexual and gender-based violence to come forward and access support services, and was working with partners to ensure that frontline staff were delivering trauma-informed and culturally sensitive care to victims of violence.  The State was working to map the mental health needs of adolescent girls, which would inform the development of the national mental health strategy.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert said Ireland had developed initiatives to promote the empowerment of women.  Some 32 per cent of start-ups were headed by women in 2022. There was a risk of poverty and exclusion for single, women-headed families – there had been a 171 per cent increase in the number of women who were unable to access housing in 2023. How was the State party addressing this? What progress had been made in developing a second action plan on business and human rights?  How did the State party ensure obligatory due diligence in human rights?

    One Committee Expert said Traveller women were disproportionately represented in prisons.  How were prison services aligned with the Bangkok Rules? The Traveller and Roma women national strategy did not address access to justice.  Would this be rectified?  How many women of colour were represented in decision-making bodies?  How was Ireland promoting unimpeded access to humanitarian assistance to women and girls on the frontlines of conflict, and how did the State party encourage consideration of intersectionality globally?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said single parents were a target of social benefit schemes, including school meals programmes and the child benefit scheme, which had been extended to children up to age 18 in full-time education.  Ireland had piloted equality budgeting measures, including for gender budgeting. It was designing a tagging framework that would ensure the recording of expenditure on equality issues.

    Ireland was working to increase female participation in entrepreneurial activity through a six-year action plan, which included schemes for financial support for high potential start-ups led by women.  Mentorship, training and networking programmes were offered to women entrepreneurs. There was double the number of women accessing such training compared to men.

    Ireland’s first national action plan on business and human rights had concluded in 2023, and a consultation process for developing the second plan was currently underway.  A working outline of the plan was presented in June 2024. The next plan was likely to finish in 2028 or 2029.  The Government planned to include gender responsive due diligence in the plan.

    The Government was committed to providing affordable social homes at scale.  There were more than 20,000 social housing solutions delivered in 2024. Several million euros would be invested in programmes to address homelessness in 2025.  Around 15,500 persons accessed emergency accommodation in April 2025, including 4,700 children.  A national homelessness action committee was established in 2021 to address the issue; it had developed a national support framework. 

    The zero-tolerance strategy sought to increase the number of refuge units and safe homes for victims of violence. There were 141 refuge units at the outset of the strategy; the current number was 159.  By the end of 2025, more than 200 would be established.  There had been investments of over 100 million euros in Traveller-specific accommodation.

    There was disproportionate representation of Travellers within the justice system.  The family support model for Traveller women in prison provided intensive support at all judicial stages.  Services were being extended to pre-sentencing and post-release stages. There were plans for the establishment of an open women’s prison.

    Ireland was consistent in its participation in multilateral fora addressing lethal autonomous weapons.  It was presenting a value-based message that addressed gender issues.

    Questions by a Committee Expert 

    A Committee Expert asked why the findings of the independent review of the legal aid scheme of 2021 were not published.  How could women who could not afford legal representation have access to justice? How was the right of access to justice of women with disabilities respected?

    The Committee welcomed efforts to support women’s access to child maintenance payments.  Could the State party provide statistics on fathers who did not pay child maintenance?  Why had the State party decided not to establish a child maintenance agency? How did it respond to non-payment of maintenance?  Would it publish the results of a study into the economic consequences of divorce on both parents?  Women with disabilities were reportedly discriminated against in child custody decisions.  Would the State party investigate this issue?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the child maintenance review group was established in 2020 to assess whether to establish a State child maintenance agency; it had decided that such an agency should not be established.  Instead, it had called for a review of the enforcement of child maintenance orders to be undertaken and had issued 26 recommendations to ensure compliance with such orders.  Guidelines on the implementation of the recommendations were being developed. There had been significant increases in child support and working family payments recently.

    New legislation passed last year included provisions to make the family court process more accessible and less costly. The best interests of the child were a primary consideration in all family court proceedings.

    Frontline professionals across the justice sector were trained on identifying risks of sexual and gender-based violence and responding to such violence effectively.  Staff of the probation service were also trained on risk assessment and recognising cases of sexual and gender-based violence.

    The civil legal aid review was completed in May 2025 and the Government was now considering its results.  The judicial appointments act included provisions promoting equal numbers of men and women as members of the judiciary. The gender pay gap platform would allow for assessment of the pay gap in the legal sector.

    Concluding Remarks 

    COLM BROPHY, Minister of State for Migration of Ireland and head of the delegation, thanked the Committee for the constructive dialogue.  The Committee had invested significant time in understanding the issues facing women and girls in Ireland.  Ireland was committed to its obligations under the Convention and to the United Nations more broadly.  The State would develop measures in response to the Committee’s concluding observations, and brief civil society on them.  Mr. Brophy closed by thanking all those who had contributed to the dialogue. 

    NAHLA HAIDAR, Committee Chair, thanked the State party for its responses and its support to the treaty bodies, international law and the rule of law.  The dialogue had provided the Committee with further insight into the efforts made by Ireland to implement the Convention for the benefit of women and girls in the State.  The Committee would develop concluding observations to strengthen the implementation of the Convention in Ireland, including recommendations for immediate follow-up.  It looked forward to its next dialogue with the State party.

    ___________

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

     

    CEDAW25.015E

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – EU/Euratom Agreement on the interpretation and application of the Energy Charter Treaty: adoption by Euratom – P10_TA(2025)0127 – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    (Consultation)

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Commission proposal to the Council (COM(2024)0256),

    –  having regard to Article 203 of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, pursuant to which the Council consulted Parliament (C10‑0092/2024),

    –  having regard to Rule 84 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on International Trade,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (A10-0008/2025),

    1.  Approves the Commission proposal;

    2.  Calls on the Council to notify Parliament if it intends to depart from the text approved by Parliament;

    3.  Asks the Council to consult Parliament again if it intends to substantially amend the text approved by Parliament;

    4.  Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council and the Commission.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Missions – 26 June: INTA mission to Ghent – 26-06-2025 – Committee on International Trade

    Source: European Parliament

    A delegation of 6 Members of the Committee on International Trade (INTA) will travel to Ghent on 26 June to visit a steel and automotive company.

    The one day mission will provide an opportunity to INTA Members to visit the ArcelorMittal and Volvo Cars plant in the port of Ghent. This will allow more insight into the trade-related challenges the steel and automotive sectors are facing, in particular with regard to the US tariffs, unfair trade practices and geopolitical tensions.

    The delegation will be led by the INTA Chair, Bernd Lange (S&D, DE).

    The composition of the delegation:

    LANGE Bernd (S&D)

    VAN DIJCK Kris (ECR)

    SBAI Majdouline (Greens/EFA)

    BRICMONT Saskia (Greens/EFA)

    KENNES Rudi (The Left)

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: News 06/20/2025 Blackburn, Luján Call for Investigation into Spotify for Forcing Subscribers into Higher-Priced Subscriptions Without Their Consent

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator Marsha Blackburn (R-Tenn)

    NASHVILLE, Tenn. – Today, U.S. Senators Marsha Blackburn (R-Tenn.) and Ben Ray Luján (D-N.M.) sent a letter to Andrew Ferguson, Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), requestingan investigation into Spotify for converting premium subscriptions into higher-priced bundled subscriptions without consumers knowledge or consent:

    Americans Depend on a Healthy, Well-Functioning Market Built on Fair Prices and Compensation Through Music Royalty System

    “Millions of Americans who love and pay for music depend on a healthy, well-functioning market built upon fair prices and compensation through the music royalty system. We have serious concerns about Spotify’s recent move to convert all of its premium music subscribers into different—and ultimately higher-priced—bundled subscriptions without their knowledge or consent. These actions harm consumers and could deeply damage the marketplace and the music royalty system. We urge the FTC to investigate the impact of Spotify’s recent actions, to take steps to protect Americans from being forced into subscriptions without notice or choice, and to safeguard the music marketplace.”

    Spotify Has Forced Americans into Higher-Priced Bundled Subscriptions Without Their Knowledge or Consent

    “Tens of millions of Americans pay monthly fees for access to Spotify’s premium, ad-free, subscription music service through its ‘Premium Plans.’ The royalty rates that Spotify and other digital music service providers must pay songwriters and music publishers reside in federal regulations set by the Copyright Royalty Board. Current regulations allow digital music providers to pay a lower music royalty rate if their paid music subscription offering is bundled with other legitimate product offerings. Seeing an opportunity, Spotify has exploited this regulation by converting all Premium Plan music subscribers into a new, bundled subscription offering without consumers’ consent or any notice. Spotify’s intent seems clear—to slash the statutory royalties it pays to songwriters and music publishers. Not only has this harmed our creative community, but this action has also harmed consumers.”

    Spotify’s Bundled Plans Are Apparently Aimed at Boosting Its Profits While Lowering Royalties to Creators

    “Spotify’s Audiobook Access plan and the bundled Premium Plans are apparently aimed at increasing the company’s profits while lowering royalty payments to the creative community. Specifically, it seems clear that Spotify’s audiobooks service is set at an artificially high price for the purpose of gaming federal regulations and deeply cutting music royalty payments. For example, Spotify has priced its Audiobook Access plan with 15 hours of listening time per month from a limited catalog of 200,000 audiobooks at $9.99/month. In contrast, Spotify’s music-only Basic Plan—which includes unlimited hours of listening from a catalog of over 100 million songs—is priced only a dollar more. Under the regulations, the higher the Audiobooks Access plan is priced, the lower the music royalty Spotify must pay.”

    Click here to read the full letter. 

    RELATED

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Banking: Trade and Environment Week underscores members’ drive to advance environment discussions

    Source: World Trade Organization

    Since its launch in 2019, Trade and Environment Week has grown into a flagship forum for deepening the global conversation on the nexus between trade and the environment. Anchored around the CTE meeting, the Week was designed to complement the Committee’s work and spark inclusive dialogue on emerging environmental challenges with trade dimensions. It offers a unique platform for WTO members to engage directly with business leaders, international organizations, academic experts, civil society and environmental practitioners — fostering an exchange of insights, experiences and actionable ideas.

    In 2025, the Week will feature 15 sessions spanning a range of issues at the forefront of the trade and environment agenda. Topics include the global fight against plastics pollution, sustainable agriculture, the green transition in developing economies, carbon pricing mechanisms, deforestation-related regulations, the future of sustainable fuels, and trade-related climate policy measures.

    The CTE meeting will continue to advance discussions under a comprehensive work programme on trade and environment in line with the Committee’s mandate. Since its establishment in 1995, the CTE has facilitated dialogue among all WTO members on the interaction between trade and environmental policies.

    All 15 sessions are open to the public. The full programme for Trade and Environment Week, the live webcast link and registration information for in-person participation is available here.

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  • MIL-OSI Banking: Members agree on way forward for SPS transparency working group, launch mentoring system

    Source: WTO

    Headline: Members agree on way forward for SPS transparency working group, launch mentoring system

    New working group on transparency
    In adopting the Report of the Sixth Review of the SPS Agreement at its last meeting in March, members endorsed a recommendation to establish a Transparency Working Group for a two-year period.  The Committee followed up by agreeing to initiate working group discussions in November to focus on how to improve SPS notifications, track how comments are taken into account, and examine possible enhancements to the ePing SPS&TBT Platform.  The working group will also consider revisions of key SPS transparency documents.
    The Chair of the Committee, Ms Maria Cosme (France), noted that New Zealand and Chile volunteered to be stewards of the working group, which will be guided by the agreed operational guidelines.  The Transparency Working Group will hold its first meeting back-to-back with the November Committee meeting. 
    Launch of mentoring system
    In line with another recommendation in the Sixth Review, the Committee launched a new SPS mentoring system to assist developing and LDC members with transparency and timely engagement on SPS matters. The system will start with a pilot phase between June 2025 and June 2026 in which informal, ad hoc supportive relationships will be established between individual mentors and mentees for knowledge-sharing, peer learning and engagement on SPS-related issues.
    With the Committee’s agreement, the WTO Secretariat has set up a dedicated mentoring webpage, which includes an online form for interested government officials seeking mentoring during the pilot phase. After this, the Secretariat will select a limited number of requests for the pilot and will launch a call for mentors who could support the selected mentees to achieve their objectives.
    Thematic session
    On 17 June, the Committee held a thematic session on addressing relevant risks associated with antimicrobial resistance (AMR) through SPS measures in international trade.  The recordings of the session are available on the dedicated webpage. The session was based on a proposal submitted by the European Union.
    The event focused on steps being taken by members to address relevant risks related to AMR in the context of the SPS Agreement and international trade. It also explored the relationship between AMR and the SPS Agreement, and provided members, international organizations, academia and other stakeholders with an opportunity to share experiences and best practices in addressing relevant AMR-related risks while facilitating safe trade.
    Specific trade concerns
    Members raised 56 specific trade concerns (STCs) — four for the first time — at the meeting. The new STCs raised by members related to uncertainty regarding coffee beans imports into China; Thailand’s regulation to mitigate aflatoxins in peanut kernels; a ban on imports of aquaculture shrimp in Thailand; and Viet Nam’s procedure for the listing of exporting establishments.
    A list of the STCs discussed is available here.
    As of early 2025, close to 60% of all STCs raised in the SPS Committee had been reported as resolved or partially resolved.
    STDF annual report and updates
    The Standards and Trade Development Facility (STDF) shared updates on its work, including the launch of its 2024 Annual Report, which highlights project results, lessons learned and reflections on its 20th anniversary. The report also covers monitoring, evaluation, learning and Trust Fund financing, aligning with the STDF 2025–2030 Strategy.
    Next meeting
    The next regular meeting of the Committee is scheduled for 5-7 November 2025.

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  • MIL-OSI Banking: Members advance Bosnia and Herzegovina’s WTO accession negotiations closer to conclusion

    Source: WTO

    Headline: Members advance Bosnia and Herzegovina’s WTO accession negotiations closer to conclusion

    The Chair of the Working Party, Ambassador Anita Pipan of Slovenia, said the meeting was an opportunity to “inject fresh momentum into Bosnia and Herzegovina’s accession process, which is now in its 26th year and is technically advanced.”
    Ambassador Pipan asked delegations to clearly pinpoint the last outstanding issues of this accession process. She underlined that Bosnia and Herzegovina was identified by the WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala as one of three accessions with a strategic focus for this year and the 14th Ministerial Conference (MC14) next year in Cameroon, alongside Ethiopia and Uzbekistan.
    “Today’s meeting offers an opportunity to take stock of where we are, identify remaining concerns, and consider possible next steps toward the conclusion of the accession process,” she added.
    Mr. Hamdo Tinjak, Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations and Head of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s WTO Accession Team, led the delegation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Geneva.
    He said that through the WTO accession process, alongside other integration efforts, the country has succeeded in establishing an open and liberal foreign trade regime grounded in the principles of free movement of people, goods, services and capital, and the removal of trade barriers.
    “We view this as one of the most significant achievements of the accession process. Full WTO membership would serve as formal recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a country with harmonized and transparent trade legislation — a reliable partner for international trade and a favourable destination for foreign investment. This, in turn, is expected to contribute to the expansion of our foreign trade and, ultimately, to the broader economic development of the country,” said Mr Tinjak. See his full statement here.
    On the bilateral track, Bosnia and Herzegovina reported significant progress in the last remaining bilateral market access negotiations, following the resolution of a key outstanding issue relating to the regulation of petroleum fuels. On the multilateral track, Bosnia and Herzegovina stressed that the draft Working Party Report (the formal document that outlines the specific commitments an acceding government will undertake upon joining the WTO) is nearly complete, reflecting Bosnia and Herzegovina’s alignment with WTO rules and principles.
    Deputy Director-General Zhang Xiangchen said that the reactivation of this accession process after seven years “stands as a testament to the recent constructive developments in this technically advanced accession file, which have provided a clear basis for the Working Party to take its work towards finalization.”
    DDG Zhang, who accompanied the Working Party Chair on a visit to Sarajevo in November 2024, stressed that the WTO Secretariat remains fully committed to supporting efforts “to cross the finishing line in the very near future”.
    Delegations commended Bosnia and Herzegovina’s technical engagement, and the substantive progress made in the accession process.
    Next steps
    Recognizing the value of securing a potential deliverable for the WTO before or at MC14, Ambassador Pipan urged the conclusion of the remaining bilateral market access negotiations, which would enable the WTO Secretariat to consolidate the draft schedules of commitments on goods and services. On the multilateral front, she requested members to submit additional questions and comments by 17 July that will be circulated to the Working Party.
    Subsequently, the Secretariat will update the draft Working Party Report. “I very much hope that this next version will be final,” Ambassador Pipan said.
    Keeping in mind Bosnia and Herzegovina’s aspiration to finalize its accession process as soon as possible, the Chair added that the next Working Party meeting will depend on consultations with delegations and the Secretariat, particularly on the conclusion of the last outstanding bilateral market negotiations and the finalization of the draft Working Party Report.

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  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Hong Kong Customs combats sale of suspected counterfeit jewellery at fair booths (with photos)

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region – 4

    ​Hong Kong Customs today (June 20) conducted an enforcement operation at the Jewellery & Gem ASIA Hong Kong (JGA) being held at the Hong Kong Convention and Exhibition Centre (HKCEC), seizing about 50 pieces of suspected counterfeit jewellery with a total estimated market value of about $150,000.

    Customs received information alleging that counterfeit jewellery was displayed for sale at some booths at the JGA which began yesterday (June 19) and will last for four consecutive days.

    After an in-depth investigation and with the assistance of the trademark owners, Customs officers today conducted test-buy operations and seized about 50 pieces of suspected counterfeit jewellery, with a total estimated market value of about $150,000, from three booths.

    During the operation, three men and two women, aged between 28 and 48, were arrested for being suspected of contravening the Trade Descriptions Ordinance. Three of them are persons-in-charge and two of them are staff members. An investigation is ongoing and the likelihood of further arrests is not ruled out.

    Customs attaches great importance to combating infringing and counterfeiting activities and will deploy officers to different exhibitions to conduct inspections from time to time. Customs will contact the relevant trademark or copyright owners immediately to confirm the authenticity of the goods when suspected infringing or counterfeit goods are found. The department will also take enforcement action after investigations and with the assistance of the trademark or copyright owners.

    Customs will continue to take stringent enforcement action. Booth exhibitors are reminded to respect intellectual property rights and not to sell counterfeit goods.

    Under the Ordinance, any person who sells or possesses for sale any goods with a forged trademark commits an offence. The maximum penalty upon conviction is a fine of $500,000 and imprisonment for five years.

    Members of the public may report any suspected counterfeiting activities to Customs’ 24-hour hotline 182 8080 or its dedicated crime-reporting email account (crimereport@customs.gov.hk) or online form (eform.cefs.gov.hk/form/ced002).

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Implementation report on the Recovery and Resilience Facility – P10_TA(2025)0128 – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to Article 175 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility(1) (RRF Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2023/435 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 February 2023 amending Regulation (EU) 2021/241 as regards REPowerEU chapters in recovery and resilience plans and amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) 2021/1060 and (EU) 2021/1755, and Directive 2003/87/EC(2) (REPowerEU Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget(3) (Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation),

    –  having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/765 of 29 February 2024 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027(4) (MFF Regulation),

    –  having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources(5) (the IIA),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union(6) (Financial Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP), and amending Directive 2003/87/EC and Regulations (EU) 2021/1058, (EU) 2021/1056, (EU) 2021/1057, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) 2021/1060, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697 and (EU) 2021/241(7),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2024 on the effective coordination of economic policies and on multilateral budgetary surveillance and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97(8),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 23 June 2022 on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility(9),

    –  having regard to the Commission notice of 22 July 2024 entitled ‘Guidance on recovery and resilience plans’(10),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 21 February 2024 on strengthening the EU through ambitious reforms and investments (COM(2024)0082),

    –  having regard to the Commission’s third annual report of 10 October 2024 on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (COM(2024)0474),

    –  having regard to the Court of Auditors’ (ECA) annual report of 10 October 2024 on the implementation of the budget for the 2023 financial year, together with the institutions’ replies,

    –  having regard to special report 13/2024 of the ECA of 2 September 2024 entitled ‘Absorption of funds from the Recovery and Resilience Facility – Progressing with delays and risks remain regarding the completion of measures and therefore the achievement of RRF objectives’, special report 14/2024 of the ECA of 11 September 2024 entitled ‘Green transition – Unclear contribution from the Recovery and Resilience Facility’, and special report 22/2024 of the ECA of 21 October 2024 entitled ‘Double funding from the EU budget – Control systems lack essential elements to mitigate the increased risk resulting from the RRF model of financing not linked to costs’,

    –  having regard to the study of December 2023 supporting the mid-term Evaluation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility,

    –  having regard to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) 2024 annual report published on 3 March 2025,

    –  having regard to the report of September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’ (Draghi report),

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 8 October 2024 entitled ‘Mid-term review of the post-COVID European recovery plan (Recovery and Resilience Facility)’(11),

    –  having regard to the information published on the Recovery and Resilience Scoreboard (RRF Scoreboard),

    –  having regard to the Commission staff working document of 20 November 2024 entitled ‘NGEU Green Bonds Allocation and Impact report 2024’ (SWD(2024)0275),

    –  having regard to its in-house research, in-depth analysis and briefings related to the implementation of the RRF(12),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on the situation in Hungary and frozen EU funds(13),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure, as well as Article 1(1)(e) of, and Annex 3 to, the decision of the Conference of Presidents of 12 December 2002 on the procedure for granting authorisation to draw up own-initiative reports,

    –  having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Budgetary Control, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety and the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    –  having regard to the joint deliberations of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs under Rule 59 of the Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0098/2025),

    A.  whereas the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) was created to make European economies and societies more sustainable, resilient and better prepared in the light of unprecedented crises in 2019 and 2022, by supporting Member States in financing strategic investments and in implementing reforms;

    B.  whereas reforms and investments under the RRF help to make the EU more resilient and less dependent by diversifying key supply chains and thereby strengthening the strategic autonomy of the EU; whereas reforms and investments under the RRF also generate European added value;

    C.  whereas the RRF, as well as other EU funds, such as the European instrument for temporary support to mitigate unemployment risks in an emergency, has helped to protect labour markets from the risk of long-term damage caused by the double economic shock of the pandemic and the energy crisis;

    D.  whereas RRF expenditure falls outside the ceilings of the multiannual financial framework (MFF) and borrowing proceeds constitute external assigned revenue; whereas Parliament regrets that they do not form part of the budgetary procedure; whereas based on the Financial Regulation’s principle of transparency, citizens should know how and for what purpose funds are spent by the EU;

    E.  whereas, due to the lack of progress in introducing new own resources in the EU and the need to ensure the sustainability of the EU’s repayment plan, a clear and reliable long-term funding strategy is essential to meet repayment obligations without forcing difficult trade-offs in the EU budget that could undermine future investments and policy priorities; whereas further discussions and concrete financial solutions will be necessary to secure the long-term viability of the EU’s debt repayment plan;

    F.  whereas the borrowing costs for NextGenerationEU (NGEU) have to be borne by the EU budget and the actual costs exceed the 2020 projections by far as a result of the high interest rates; whereas the total costs for NGEU capital and interest repayments are projected to be around EUR 25 to 30 billion per year from 2028, equivalent to 15-20 % of the 2025 annual budget; whereas Parliament has insisted that the refinancing costs be placed over and above the MFF ceilings; whereas a three-step ‘cascade mechanism’ including a new special EURI instrument was introduced during the 2024 MFF revision to cover the significant cost overruns resulting from NGEU borrowing linked to major changes in the market conditions; whereas an agreement was reached during the 2025 budgetary procedure to follow an annual 50/50 benchmark, namely to finance the overrun costs in equal shares by the special EURI instrument de-commitment compartment and the Flexibility Instrument;

    G.  whereas the bonds issued to finance the RRF are to be repaid in a manner that ensures the steady and predictable reduction of liabilities, by 2058 at the latest; whereas the Council has yet to adopt the adjusted basket of new own resources proposed by the Commission, which raises concerns about the viability of the repayment of the debt undertaken under NGEU;

    H.  whereas the social dimension is a key aspect of the RRF, contributing to upward economic and social convergence, restoring and promoting sustainable growth and fostering the creation of high-quality employment;

    I.  whereas the RRF should contribute to financing measures to strengthen the Member States’ resilience to climate disasters, among other things, and enhance climate adaptation; whereas the Member States should conduct proper impact assessments for measures and should share best practice on the implementation of the ‘do no significant harm’ (DNSH) principle;

    J.  whereas the RRF plays an important role in supporting investments and reforms in sustainable mobility, smart transport infrastructure, alternative fuels and digital mobility solutions, thus enhancing connectivity and efficiency across the EU; whereas it is regrettable that only a few Member States chose to use the RRF to support investments, particularly in high-speed railway and waterway infrastructure, aimed at developing European corridors, despite the encouragement of cross-border and multi-country projects; whereas it is crucial to increase investments in transport infrastructure, particularly in underserved regions, to improve connectivity, support regional cohesion and contribute to the green transition;

    K.  whereas by 31 December 2024, Member States had submitted 95 payment requests and the level of RRF disbursements including pre-financing stood at EUR 197,46 billion in grants (55 % of the total grants envelope) and EUR 108,68 billion in loans (37 % of the total loans envelope); whereas three Member States have already received their fifth payment, while one Member State has not received any RRF funding; whereas all Member States have revised their national recovery and resilience plans (NRRP) at least once; whereas 28 % of milestones and targets have been satisfactorily fulfilled and the Commission has made use of the possibility to partially suspend payments where some milestones and targets linked to a payment request were not found to be satisfactorily fulfilled; whereas delays in the execution of planned reforms and investments, particularly in social infrastructure and public services, could lead to the underutilisation of available resources, thereby reducing the expected impact on economic growth, employment and social cohesion;

    L.  whereas the ECA has revealed various shortcomings of the RRF, in particular in relation to its design, its transparency and reporting, the risk of double funding and the implementation of twin transition measures;

    M.  whereas according to the ECA, performance is a measure of the extent to which an EU-funded action, project or programme has met its objectives and provides value for money; whereas moreover, financing not linked to costs does not, in itself, make an instrument performance-based;

    N.  whereas robust audit and control systems are crucial to protect the financial interests of the EU throughout the life cycle of the RRF; whereas the milestones commonly known as ‘super milestones’, in particular related to the rule of law, had to be fulfilled prior to any RRF disbursements;

    O.  whereas the RRF Regulation refers to the RRF’s ‘performance-based nature’ but does not define ‘performance’; whereas RRF performance should be linked to sound financial management principles and should measure how well an EU-funded action, project or programme has met its objectives and provided value for money;

    P.  whereas effective democratic control and parliamentary scrutiny over the implementation of the RRF require the full involvement of Parliament and the consideration of all its recommendations at all stages;

    Q.  whereas the Commission has to provide an independent ex post evaluation report on the implementation of the RRF by 31 December 2028, consisting of an assessment of the extent to which the objectives have been achieved, of the efficiency of the use of resources and of the European added value, as well as a global assessment of the RRF, and containing information on its impact in the long term;

    R.  whereas the purpose of this report is to monitor the implementation of the RRF, in accordance with Parliament’s role as laid down in the RRF Regulation, by pointing to the benefits and shortcomings of the RRF, while drawing on the lessons learnt during its implementation;

    Strengthening Europe’s social and economic resilience

    1.  Highlights the fact that the RRF is an unprecedented instrument of solidarity in the light of two unprecedented crises and a cornerstone of the NGEU instrument, ending in 2026; emphasises the importance of drawing lessons from its implementation for the upcoming MFF, including as regards transparency, reporting and coherent measurement of deliverables; highlights the stabilising effect of the RRF for Member States at a time of great economic uncertainty, as it mitigates negative economic and social consequences and supports governments by contributing to the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights, by promoting economic recovery and competitiveness, boosting resilience and innovation, and by supporting the green and digital transitions;

    2.  Highlights the important role of the RRF in preventing the fragmentation of the internal market and the further deepening of macroeconomic divergence, in fostering social and territorial cohesion by providing macroeconomic stabilisation, and in offering assurance to the financial markets by improving investor confidence in turbulent times, thereby lowering yield spreads;

    3.  Welcomes the fact that the RRF is a one-off instrument providing additional fiscal space that has contributed to the prevention of considerable economic and social divergences between Member States with diverse fiscal space; highlights the Commission finding that the RRF has led to a sustained increase in investments across the EU and that the Commission expects the RRF to have a lasting impact across the EU beyond 2026, given its synergies with other EU funds; is, however, concerned that the RRF expiration in 2026 poses a significant risk of a substantial decline in public investment in common European priorities;

    4.  Recalls that the MFF and RRF combined amount to almost EUR 2 trillion for the 2021-2027 programming period, but points to the fact that the high inflation rates and the associated increases in the cost of goods and services have decreased the current value of European spending agreed in nominal terms;

    5.  Takes note of the Commission’s projection in 2024 concerning the potential of NGEU’s impact on the EU’s real gross domestic product (GDP) by 2026, which is significantly lower than its simulation in 2020 (1,4 % compared with 2,3 %), due in part to adverse economic and geopolitical conditions, and of the estimation that NGEU could lead to a sizeable, short-run increase in EU employment by up to 0,8 %; notes that the long-term benefits of the RRF on GDP will likely exceed the budgetary commitments undertaken by up to three to six times , depending on the productivity effects of RRF investment and the diligent implementation of reforms and investments;

    6.  Highlights the difficulty of quantifying the precise social and economic impact of the RRF, as it takes time for the impact of reforms and investments to become clear; stresses the need for further independent evaluations to assess the effective impact of reforms and investments and for further improvements of the underlying methodology; notes the Commission’s finding that approximately half of the expected increase in public investment between 2019 and 2025 is related to investment financed by the EU budget, particularly by the RRF, but notes that some investments have not yet delivered measurable impact;

    7.  Notes that the RRF has incentivised the implementation of some reforms included in the country-specific recommendations made in the context of the European Semester through the inclusion of such reforms in the NRRPs; underlines that there has been a qualitative leap forward in terms of monitoring RRF implementation; recalls that the RRF Scoreboard is used to monitor the progress made towards achieving milestones and targets, as well as compliance with horizontal principles, and in particular the six pillars, namely the green transition, the digital transformation, smart, sustainable and inclusive growth (including economic cohesion, jobs, productivity, competitiveness, research, development and innovation, and a well-functioning internal market with strong small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)), social and territorial cohesion, health, economic, social and institutional resilience with the aim of, inter alia, increasing crisis preparedness and crisis response capacity, and policies for the next generation, children and young people, such as education and skills; highlights that the overall uptake of country-specific recommendations made in the context of the European Semester remains low and has even dropped;

    8.  Highlights that in the context of the new economic governance framework, the set of reforms and investments underpinning an extension of the adjustment period should be consistent with the commitments included in the approved NRRPs during the period of operation of the RRF and the Partnership Agreement under the Common Provisions Regulation(14); observes that the five Member States that requested an extension of the adjustment period by 31 December 2024 relied partly on the reforms and investments already approved under the RRF to justify the extension; takes note of the fact that most Member States have included information on whether the reforms and investments listed in the medium-term fiscal-structural plans are linked to the RRF;

    9.  Welcomes the fact that the RRF provides support for both reforms and investments in the Member States, but notes with concern that the short timeframe for the remaining RRF implementation poses challenges to the completion of key reforms and large-scale investments that are to be finalised towards the end of the RRF and to the timely fulfilment of the 70 % of milestones and targets that are still pending;

    10.  Recalls that RRF expenditure should not substitute recurring national budgetary expenditure, unless duly justified, and should respect the principle of additionality of EU funding; insists that the firm, sustainable and verifiable implementation of non-recurrence, together with the targeting of clearly defined European objectives of reforms and investments, is key to ensure additionality and the long-lasting effect of additional European funds; recalls the need to uphold this principle and appeals against the crowding out or replacement of cohesion policy by the RRF or other temporary instruments, as cohesion policy remains essential for long-term sustainable territorial cohesion and convergence;

    11.  Highlights that prioritising RRF implementation, the lack of administrative capacity in many Member States and challenges posed by global supply chains have contributed to the delayed implementation of cohesion policy; calls on the Commission, in this context, to provide a comprehensive assessment of the RRF’s impact on other financial instruments and public investments, technical support, and the administrative and absorption capacities of the Member States;

    12.  Recalls that, in reaction to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the REPowerEU revision contributes to Europe’s energy security by reducing its dependence on fossil fuels, diversifying its energy supplies, investing in European resources and infrastructure, tackling energy poverty and investing in energy savings and efficiency in all sectors, including transport; emphasises that through REPowerEU, an additional EUR 20 billion in grants was made available in 2023, including EUR 8 billion generated from the front-loading of Emissions Trading System allowances and EUR 12 billion from the Innovation Fund; highlights Parliament’s successes in negotiations, in particular on the provisions on replenishing the Innovation Fund, the 30 % funding target for cross-border projects, the focus of investments on tackling energy poverty for vulnerable households, SMEs and micro-enterprises, and the flexible use of unspent cohesion funds from the 2014-2020 MFF and of up to 7,5 % of national allocations under the 2021-2027 MFF;

    13.  Recalls its call to focus RRF interventions on measures with European added value and therefore regrets the shortage of viable cross-border or multi-country measures, including high-speed railway and sustainable mobility infrastructure projects for dual use that are essential for completing the TEN-T network, and the related risk of re-nationalising funding; notes that the broad scope of the RRF objectives has contributed to this by allowing a wide variety of nationally focused projects to fall within its remit;

    14.  Highlights the modification of Article 27 of the RRF Regulation through REPowerEU, which significantly strengthened the cross-border and multi-country dimensions of the RRF by encouraging the Member States to amend their NRRPs to add RepowerEU chapters, including a spending target of at least 30 % for such measures in order to guarantee the EU’s energy autonomy; is concerned by the broad interpretation adopted by the Commission, which allows any reduction in (national) energy demand to make a case for a cross-border and multi-country dimension;

    15.  Welcomes the possibility of using RRF funding to contribute to the objectives of the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP) by supporting investments in critical technologies in the EU in order to boost its industrial competitiveness; notes that no Member State has made use of the possibility to include in its NRRP an additional cash contribution to STEP objectives via the Member State compartment of InvestEU; recalls that Member States can still amend their national plans in that regard; expects the revision processes to be efficient, streamlined and simple, especially considering the final deadline of 2026, the current geopolitical context and the need to invest in European defence capabilities;

    16.  Recalls the application of the DNSH principle for all reforms and investments supported by the RRF, with a targeted derogation under REPowerEU for energy infrastructure and facilities needed to meet immediate security of supply needs; encourages the Commission to assess the feasibility of a more uniform interpretation of the DNSH principle between the RRF and the EU taxonomy for sustainable activities, while taking into account the specificities of the RRF as a public expenditure programme;

    Financial aspects of the RRF

    17.  Stresses that the RRF is the first major performance-based instrument at EU level which is exclusively based on financing not linked to costs (FNLC); recalls that Article 8 of the RRF Regulation stipulates that the RRF must be implemented by the Commission in direct management in accordance with the relevant rules adopted pursuant to Article 322 TFEU, in particular the Financial Regulation and the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation; regrets that the Council did not agree to insert specific rules in the Financial Regulation to address the risks of this delivery model, such as double funding; considers that the rules of the Financial Regulation should be fully applicable to future instruments based on FNLC, including as regards fines, penalties and sanctions;

    18.  Notes that only 13 Member States have requested loans and that EUR 92 billion of the EUR 385,8 billion available will remain unused since this amount was not committed by the deadline of 31 December 2023; takes note of the fact that loans were attractive for Member States that faced higher borrowing costs on the financial markets or that sought to compensate for a reduction in RRF grants; points out that some Member States have made limited use of RRF loans, either due to strong fiscal positions or administrative considerations; calls on the Commission to analyse the reasons for the low uptake in some Member States and to consider these findings when designing future EU financial instruments; notes with concern that national financial instruments to implement the NRRPs have not been sufficiently publicised, leading to limited awareness and uptake by potential beneficiaries; considers that a political discussion is needed on the use of unspent funds in the light of tight public budgets and urgent EU strategic priorities; calls for an assessment of how and under which conditions unused RRF funds could be redirected to boost Europe’s competitiveness, resilience, defence, and social, economic and territorial cohesion, particularly through investments in digital and green technologies aligned with the RRF’s original purpose;

    19.  Recalls the legal obligation to ensure full repayment of NGEU expenditure by 31 December 2058 at the latest; reminds the Council and the Commission of their legal commitment under the interinstitutional agreement concluded in 2020 to ensure a viable path to refinancing NGEU debt, including through sufficient proceeds from new own resources introduced after 2021 without any undue reduction in programme expenditure or investment instruments under the MFF; deplores the lack of progress made in this regard, which raises concerns regarding the viability of the repayment of the debt undertaken under NGEU, and urges the Council to adopt new own resources without delay and as a matter of urgency; urges the Commission, furthermore, to continue efforts to identify additional genuine new own resources beyond the IIA and linked to EU policies, in order to cover the high spending needs associated with the funding of new priorities and the repayment of NGEU debt;

    20.  Notes with concern the Commission’s estimation that the total cost for NGEU capital and interest repayments are projected to be around EUR 25 to 30 billion per year from 2028, equivalent to 15-20 % of the 2025 annual budget ; recalls that recourse to special instruments had to be made in the last three budgetary procedures to cover EURI instrument costs; highlights that the significant increase in financing costs puts pressure on the future EU budget and limits the capacity to respond to future challenges;

    21.  Takes note of the Commission’s target to fund up to 30 % of NGEU costs by issuing greens bonds; notes that by 31 December 2024 the Commission had issued European green bonds amounting to EUR 68.2 billion;

    Design and implementation of NRRPs

    22.  Notes that 47 % of the available RRF funds had been disbursed by 31 December 2024, with grants reaching 55 % and loans 37 %, which has resulted in a high proportion of measures still to be completed in 2025 and 2026; is concerned, however, about the ECA’s finding that only 50 % of disbursed funds had reached final beneficiaries in 15 out of 22 Member States by October 2023; calls on the Commission to take the recommendations of the ECA duly into account in order to improve the functioning of any future performance-based instruments similar to the RRF, in particular in the context of a more targeted MFF;

    23.  Welcomes the fact that all Member States have surpassed the targets for the green (37 %) and the digital transitions (20 %), with average expenditure towards climate and digital objectives of the RRF as a whole standing at 42 % and 26 % respectively; notes that the ECA has cast doubt on how the implementation of RRF measures has contributed to the green transition and has recommended improvements to the methodologies used to estimate the impact of climate-related measures; highlights the fact that the same methodological deficiencies exist across all pillars of the RRF;

    24.  Notes the tangible impact that the RRF could have on social objectives, with Member States planning to spend around EUR 163 billion; underlines that such spending must be result-oriented, ensuring measurable economic and/or social benefits; stresses the need to accelerate investments in the development of rural, peripheral and outermost, isolated and remote areas, and in the fields of affordable housing, social protection and the integration of vulnerable groups, and youth employment, where expenditure is lagging behind; calls for an in-depth evaluation by the Commission, under the RRF Scoreboard, of the projects and reforms related to education and young people implemented by Member States under the RRF; regrets the delayed implementation of health objectives observed in certain Member States, given that the instrument should also improve the accessibility and capacity of health systems, and of key social infrastructure investments, including early childhood education and care facilities; stresses that these delays, in some cases linked to shifting budgetary priorities and revised national implementation timelines, risk undermining the achievement of the RRF’s social cohesion objectives;

    25.  Reiterates its negotiating position to include targets for education (10 %) and for cultural activities (2 %); encourages the Commission’s effort to evaluate these targets as a benchmark in its assessment of education policy in NRRPs, through the RRF Scoreboard;

    26.  Observes that a large majority of NRRPs include a specific section explaining how the plan addresses gender-related concerns and challenges; is concerned, however, that some NRRPs do not include an explanation of how the measures in the NRRP are expected to contribute to gender equality and equal opportunities for all and calls on the Member States concerned to add such explanations without delay;

    27.  Stresses the importance of reforms focusing on labour market fragmentation, fostering quality working conditions, addressing wage level inequalities, ensuring decent living conditions, and strengthening social dialogue, social protection and the social economy;

    28.  Notes the tangible impact that the RRF could have on the digital transformation objective, with EUR 166 billion allocated to corresponding plans; welcomes the contributions made under the smart, sustainable and inclusive growth pillar, in particular to competitiveness and support for SMEs; notes the need for an acceleration of investments in transnational cooperation, support for competitive enterprises leading innovation projects, and regulatory changes for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, which are lagging behind;

    29.  Stresses that the success of EU investments depends on well-functioning capital markets; calls on the Member States to ensure a more effective and timely disbursement of funds, particularly for SMEs and young entrepreneurs, to streamline application procedures with a view to enhancing accessibility and to implement specific measures to provide targeted support to help them play a more prominent role in the process of smart and inclusive growth;

    30.  Is concerned that the achievement of milestones and targets lags behind the indicative timetable provided in the NRRPs, and that the pace of progress is uneven across Member States; regrets the time lag between the fulfilment of milestones and targets and the implementation of projects; highlights that the RRF will only achieve its long-term and short-term potential if the reform and investment components, respectively, are properly implemented; welcomes the fact that, following a slow start, RRF implementation has picked up since the second half of 2023 but significant delays affecting key reforms and investments still persist and have been attributed to various factors, including the revisions linked to the inclusion of REPowerEU, mounting inflation, the insufficient administrative capacity of Member States, in particular the smaller Member States, uncertainties regarding specific RRF implementation rules, high energy costs, supply shortages and an underestimation of the time needed to implement measures; notes that the postponement of key implementation deadlines by some governments to 2026 raises concerns about the capacity of some Member States to fully absorb the allocated funds within the set timeframe of the RRF; stresses the importance of maintaining a realistic and effective implementation schedule to prevent the risk of incomplete projects and missed opportunities for structural improvements; calls on the Commission to ensure that administrative bottlenecks are urgently addressed;

    31.  Recalls the modification of the RRF Regulation through the inclusion of the REPowerEU chapter; stresses the importance of the REPowerEU chapters in NRRPs and calls on the Member States to prioritise mature projects and implement their NRRPs more quickly, both in terms of reforms and investments, and, where necessary, to adjust NRRPs in line with the RRF’s objectives, without undermining the overall balance and level of ambition of the NRRPs, in order to respond to challenges stemming from geopolitical events and to tackle current realities on the ground;

    32.  Highlights the fact that the RRF could have helped to mitigate the effects of the current EU-wide housing crisis; regrets that some Member States did not make use of this opportunity and stresses the importance for the Member States to accelerate investments in availability and affordability of housing;

    33.  Highlights the role of ‘super milestones’ in protecting the EU’s financial interests against rule of law deficiencies and in ensuring the full implementation of the requirements under Article 22 of the RRF Regulation; welcomes the fact that all but one Member State have satisfactorily fulfilled their ‘super milestones’; recalls that the Commission must recover any pre-financing that has not been netted against regular payment requests by the end of the RRF;

    34.  Notes the high administrative burden and complexity brought by the RRF; stresses the considerable efforts required at national level to implement the RRF in parallel with structural funds; notes that between 2021 and 2024 the demand-driven Technical Support Instrument supported more than 500 RRF-related reforms in the Member States, directly or indirectly related to the preparation, amendment, revision and implementation of the NRRPs; takes note of the Commission guidance of July 2024 with simplifications and clarifications to streamline RRF implementation but expects the Commission to act swiftly on its promise to cut the administrative burden by 25 %; urges the Commission to give clear and targeted technical support to the Member States, allowing them to develop efficient administrative capacity to implement the milestones and targets; calls on the Commission to decrease the level of complexity of EU public procurement rules which apply to higher-value contracts;

    35.  Expresses concern over the complexity of application procedures for RRF funding, particularly for SMEs and non-governmental organisations, which require external consultancy services even for small grants; emphasises that such bureaucratic obstacles contradict the original objectives of the RRF, which aimed to provide rapid and direct financial support; calls for an urgent simplification of application and reporting requirements, particularly for smaller beneficiaries, to maximise the absorption and impact of funds and to assist with their contribution to the green and digital transitions;

    36.  Believes that implementation delays underscore the risk that measures for which RRF funding has been paid will not be completed by the 2026 payment deadline; welcomes the Commission’s statement at the Recovery and Resilience Dialogue (RRD) of 16 September 2024 that it will not reimburse non-implemented projects; considers it a shortcoming that RRF funds paid for milestones and targets assessed as fulfilled cannot be recovered if related measures are not eventually completed; encourages the Commission to take into account the ECA’s recommendations related to this and to assess, in cooperation with the Member States, the measures most at risk of not being completed by 31 August 2026; stresses the importance of monitoring these measures, facilitating timely follow-up and working towards solutions to overcome delays;

    37.  Notes with concern that the remaining implementation timeframe of the RRF is too short for the implementation of many innovative projects; further notes that innovative projects, by definition, are more difficult to plan and more likely to encounter obstacles during implementation, making them unsuited to the RRF’s strict deadlines; urges the Commission to create future programmes that are flexible enough to give proper answers in changing circumstances and that at the same time guarantee a certain degree of predictability;

    38.  Notes that some milestones and targets may be no longer achievable because of objective circumstances; stresses that any NRRP revisions should be made in accordance with the RRF Regulation, including the applicable deadlines, and should not entail backtracking on reforms, commitments or lower quality projects but should maintain the overall ambition and the efficiency of public spending;

    39.  Is concerned about the Commission’s uneven assessment of NRRPs, which has led to double standards in the application of the Regulation; is further concerned about the uneven and different definition of milestones and targets from one NRRP to the other, as consistently reported by the ECA;

    40.  Highlights that the duration of the Commission’s assessment of payment requests by Member States differs considerably among the Member States and stresses the need for more transparency from the Commission; urges the Commission to accelerate its assessments and to ensure the equal treatment of the Member States; highlights the need to ensure a level playing field across the EU for measures and indicators that are used to assess all RRF projects;

    41.  Urges the Member States to increase their efforts to address administrative bottlenecks and provide sufficient administrative capacity to accelerate RRF implementation in view of the 2026 deadline and to avoid concentrating RRF projects in more developed regions and capitals by enabling RRF funds to flow into projects in the most vulnerable regions, thereby serving the RRF’s objective to enhance the EU’s social, territorial and economic cohesion; emphasises the importance of fair regional distribution within the NRRPs while ensuring that RRF funds are allocated based on economic and social impact, feasibility and long-term benefits;

    42.   Calls for an 18-month extension of mature RRF projects through an amendment of the RRF Regulation by co-decision, if needed; emphasises that the envisaged extension of projects will be conducted by the Commission based on objective, clear and fair benchmarks; welcomes the possibility of establishing a targeted and performance-based prioritisation and transfer system after the 2026 deadline in order to allow for the finalisation of ongoing projects through other funding schemes, including the European Investment Fund and a possible new European competitiveness fund; urges the Commission to present a strategy to address the huge demand for public investment beyond 2026 without compromising budgetary resources in other critical areas;

    43.  Calls for an evaluation of how this framework could enable targeted investments in EU defence supply chains, strategic stockpiles and defence innovation, ensuring alignment with broader European security objectives;

    44.  Is concerned that some Member States might choose to forego parts of the amounts or entire amounts associated with their last payment request, thus avoiding the fulfilment of the last milestones and targets;

    Transparency, monitoring and control

    45.  Takes note of the fact that the Commission had planned to conduct 112 RRF audits in all Member States in 2024; reminds the Commission of its obligation, in accordance with Article 24(9) of the RRF Regulation, to recover funding in case of incorrect disbursements or reversals of measures;

    46.  Notes that the Commission relies on its own methodologies when calculating partial payments and suspensions of funds; regrets that these methodologies were only developed two years after the start of the RRF implementation and without the consultation of Parliament;

    47.  Welcomes the extensive work of the ECA in relation to the RRF and deems it important to thoroughly assess its findings, in particular its findings that milestones and targets are often rather vague and output-oriented and are therefore not fit to measure results and impacts, and its findings regarding the risks of double funding resulting from overlaps with other policies; notes that the Commission has accepted many but not all of the ECA’s recommendations; stresses that weaknesses in financial controls, as highlighted by the ECA, must be urgently addressed to prevent double funding, cost inefficiencies, and mismanagement of EU funds; calls for enhanced transparency and for the full consideration of the ECA’s recommendations without adding unnecessary administrative burden;

    48.  Notes that the ECA considers that the RRF focuses on progress on implementation rather than performance, particularly because RRF-funded measures focus on outputs rather than results, vary in ambition, sometimes lack clarity and do not always cover a measure’s key implementation stages, including completion;

    49.  Notes that the ECA’s audits revealed several cases in which funding had been disbursed but the requirements related to the fulfilment of corresponding milestones and targets had not been adequately met; further notes that the Commission framework for assessing the ‘satisfactory fulfilment’ of the relevant milestones and targets contains discretionary elements, such as ‘minimal deviation from a requirement’ or ‘proportional delays’, and that the methodology for the determination of partial payments does not provide an explanation for the values chosen as coefficients, thereby leaving room for interpretation; asks the Commission to provide Parliament with further clarification;

    50.  Insists that, as a rule, measures already included in other national plans benefiting from EU funding (e.g. cohesion, agriculture, etc.) should not be included in NRRPs, even if they do not incur any costs; urges the Commission to remain vigilant and proactive in identifying any potential situation of double funding in particular in regard to the different implementation models of the RRF and other EU funding instruments;

    51.  Regrets the lack of a proper RRF audit trail and the persistent lack of transparency despite the bi-annual reporting requirement for Member States on the 100 largest final recipients, which was introduced into REPowerEU upon Parliament’s request; regrets the delays in reporting by some Member States and the limited informative value of the information provided, which ultimately prevents compliance checks by the Commission or the ECA; reiterates its call for the lists of the largest final recipients for each Member State to be regularly updated and published on the RRF Scoreboard and to include information on the economic operators involved, including contractors and sub-contractors, and their beneficial owners, and not simply ministries or other government bodies or state companies; further regrets that the current definition of ‘final recipient’ leaves room for interpretation, resulting in different final beneficiaries for similar measures among Member States; calls on the Commission, in this context, to ensure a common understanding of what constitutes a ‘final recipient’ so that this can be applied consistently;

    52.  Is concerned about persistent weaknesses in national reporting and control mechanisms, due in part to absorption pressure affecting the capacity to detect ineligible expenditure and due to the complexity of the audit and control procedures, which created uncertainty in the Member States and an overload of administrative procedures; calls on the Commission to provide assurance on whether Member States’ control systems function adequately and to check the compliance of RRF-funded investment projects with EU and national rules; calls for payments to be reduced and, where appropriate, amounts to be recovered in accordance with Article 22 of the RRF Regulation, should weaknesses persist in the national control systems; regrets the reliance on manual cross-checks and self-declarations by recipients of EU funds in the absence of interoperable IT tools and harmonised standards, despite the existence of tools such as the Early Detection and Exclusion System and ARACHNE, whose use is currently not mandatory, thereby risking that expenditure is declared twice; recalls, in this regard, the reluctance of the Member States to make progress in developing the relevant IT tools in a timely manner;

    53.  Shares the view of the ECA that the FNLC model does not preclude reporting on actual costs; notes that having clear insights on costs also facilitates the work of control and oversight bodies, as well as the EPPO and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), and enables enhanced public scrutiny;

    54.  Reiterates the role of the RRF Scoreboard in providing information for citizens on the overall progress in the implementation of NRRPs; underlines the importance of the Scoreboard in strengthening transparency and calls on the Commission to increase the level of transparency and data visualisation in the Scoreboard;

    55.  Recalls that the reporting on the progress of implementation in the RRF Scoreboard is based on information provided by the Member States on a bi-annual basis;

    56.  Highlights the important role of the EPPO and OLAF in protecting the EU’s financial interests; welcomes the fact that EPPO investigations into RRF-related fraud and corruption cases have led to several arrests, indictments and seizures of RRF funds; recalls that the EPPO was handling 307 active cases related to the RRF in 2024, corresponding to about 17 % of all expenditure fraud investigations and causing an estimated damage to the EU’s financial interests of EUR 2,8 billion; expects the number of investigations to grow as RRF implementation advances; calls on the Commission to look into the management declarations of the Member States in terms of their reporting of detected fraud and the remedial measures taken;

    Role of the European Parliament

    57.  Reiterates the importance of Parliament’s role in scrutinising and monitoring the implementation of the RRF and in holding the Commission accountable; highlights Parliament’s input provided through various channels, in particular through various plenary debates, parliamentary resolutions, bi-monthly RRD meetings with the responsible Commissioners, over 30 meetings of the standing working group on the scrutiny of the RRF, numerous parliamentary questions, the annual discharge procedure of the Commission and the regular flow of information and ad hoc requests for information from the Commission; regrets that the model of using milestones and targets to trigger disbursement was not accompanied by adequate budgetary control mechanisms, resulting in a diminished role for Parliament compared to its scrutiny of MFF spending;

    58.  Recalls Parliament’s rights as laid down in Article 25 of the RRF Regulation, in particular the right to simultaneously receive from the Commission information that it transmits to the Council or any of its preparatory bodies in the context of the RRF Regulation or its implementation, as well as an overview of its preliminary findings concerning the satisfactory fulfilment of the relevant milestones and targets included in the NRRPs; encourages the sharing of relevant outcomes of discussions held in Council preparatory bodies with the competent parliamentary committees;

    59.  Recalls further the right of Parliament’s competent committees to invite the Commission to provide information on the state of play of the assessment of the NRRPs in the context of the RRD meetings;

    60.  Regrets the fact that Parliament has no role in the design of NRRPs and is not consulted on payment requests; criticises furthermore the fact that Parliament has not been provided with a clear and traceable overview of the implementation status of projects and payments; expects to be informed about the context of NRRP revisions in order to make its own assessment of the revisions and to have an enhanced role in possible future instruments based on the RRF experience;

    Stakeholder involvement

    61.  Regrets the insufficient involvement of local and regional authorities (LRAs), civil society organisations, social partners, national parliaments and other relevant stakeholders in the design, revision or implementation of NRRPs leading to worse policy outcomes, as well as limited ownership; regrets that in the design and implementation of the NRRPs, some Member States have clearly favoured some LRAs or stakeholders to the detriment of others; recalls that the participation of LRAs, national authorities and those responsible for developing these policies is crucial for the success of the RRF, as stated in Article 28 of the RRF Regulation; recalls that Parliament supported a binding provision in the RRF to establish a multilevel dialogue to engage relevant stakeholders and discuss the preparation and implementation of NRRPs with them, with a clear consultation period; calls, therefore, for the maximum possible stakeholder involvement in the implementation of NRRPs, in accordance with the national legal framework and based on clear and transparent principles;

    62.  Reiterates the need for regular interaction between national coordinating authorities and national stakeholders involved in the monitoring of the implementation of the NRRPs, in line with the principle of transparency and accountability; stresses that more regular and public communication from the national coordinating authorities is needed to ensure that updated information about the progress of the implementation of NRRPs is made available;

    63.  Stresses that decisions should be made at the level that is most appropriate; is convinced that the application of the partnership principle and a stronger involvement of LRAs could make project implementation more efficient, reduce disparities within Member States and result in more and better quality measures with a cross-border and multi-country dimension;

    64.  Believes that valuable lessons can be drawn from the RRF to be reflected in the design of performance-based instruments in the next MFF, in particular in the light of the EU’s competitiveness and simplification agendas;

    Lessons for the future

    65.  Believes that the combination of reforms and investments has proved successful but that a clearer link is needed between the two; highlights the importance of aligning any funding with the objectives of the instrument and disbursing it in line with the progress made towards them; insists that the level of ambition of NRRPs should not be lowered but should be commensurate with the RRF timeline to ensure their successful implementation;

    66.  Is convinced, as highlighted by the Draghi report, that boosting EU competitiveness, decarbonising the EU’s economy and making it more circular and resource-efficient, as well as closing the skills gap, creating quality jobs and enhancing the EU’s innovation capacity, will be central priorities beyond 2026; is concerned that a sizeable funding gap will arise after the RRF ceases to operate at the end of 2026, notably for public investment in common European priorities, since financial resources from national budgets vary significantly among Member States; highlights the need to use the lessons learned from the RRF to better leverage public and private investments with a view to addressing the financing gap in European objectives and transitions, which the Draghi report estimates at over EUR 800 billion annually, while ensuring seamless continuity of investments in common European goods;

    67.  Welcomes the enhanced use of financial instruments made possible by the option to channel RRF funds towards the Member States’ compartment of InvestEU;

    68.  Urges the Commission to apply the lessons learned and the ECA’s observations, and to ensure that future performance-based instruments are well-targeted, aligned with the aim of financing European public goods and prioritising the addressing of clearly defined strategic challenges, economic sustainability and competitiveness; calls for it to be ensured that all future instruments are designed to measure not only inputs or short-term outputs and progress but also results in terms of long-term impacts backed by outcomes;

    69.  Notes that, according to the ECA, it is essential that future performance-based instruments are not designed and implemented in a way that is detrimental to accountability and, in particular, that appropriate control systems are in place in the Member States and are checked by the Commission before implementation starts; notes that this would involve setting minimum requirements for the Member States’ controls and the Commission’s checks;

    70.  Calls on the Commission to conduct an independent evaluation and to report on the RRF impact on private investments at aggregate EU level, in particular on its potential crowding-out effect on private investments and its determinants; calls further for objective and clear analyses from the Commission on how the implementation of reforms and investments within the NRRPs affects the economies of the individual Member States, with special regard to smart, sustainable and inclusive growth; urges the Commission to take the lessons learned from these analyses and from the ECA’s observations on the RRF implementation into account when drawing up its proposals for the next programming period;

    71.  Underlines that all EU-funded investments and reforms should be coordinated and coherent with strategic planning at national level and should focus on projects with a clear European added value; underlines the need for a spending target for cross-border and multi-country investments; calls on the Commission to develop a credible methodology to assess the cross-border and multi-country dimensions of EU funded projects;

    72.  Highlights that meaningful social and territorial dialogues with a high level of involvement of LRAs, social partners, civil society organisations and national parliaments within the national legal framework are essential for national ownership, successful implementation and democratic accountability; expresses concern over the insufficient involvement of all relevant stakeholders in the implementation and oversight of RRF-funded initiatives; stresses in particular that regions and city councils cannot be mere recipients of decisions, without being given the opportunity to have a say on reforms and investments that truly transform their territories;

    73.  Believes that it is essential to adopt differentiated strategies that recognise the cultural diversity of the various regions and enhance their economic and social cohesion instead of applying a homogeneous or one-size-fits-all approach that could be to the detriment of the less developed regions; calls, therefore, for dialogues with stakeholders to be strengthened and more diligently employed as they could inspire future initiatives and mechanisms in the EU and its Member States;

    74.  Underlines the requirement of the RRF Regulation to publicly display information about the origin of funding for projects funded by the EU to ensure buy-in from European citizens;

    75.  Highlights that the RRD meetings have been an important tool in enhancing transparency and accountability, which are crucial for the optimal implementation of the RRF;

    76.  Reiterates that further efforts are required to improve the transparency and traceability of the use of EU funds; stresses the need to ensure that data that is relevant for performance measurement is available and that information on performance is presented in a better and more transparent manner; stresses that the feedback mechanism between performance information and programme design or adjustment should be enhanced;

    77.  Considers that better training and capacity-building across all regions and authorities involved, in particular at national level, could have accelerated the RRF’s implementation and enabled the implementing authorities to better adapt to the performance-based nature of the RRF; considers that the Commission could have assisted Member States more at the planning stage and provided earlier implementation guidance, in particular with a view to strengthening their audit and control systems and the cross-border dimension of the RRF;

    78.  Highlights the importance of mitigating the risk of double funding; suggests the deployment of an integrated and interoperable IT and data mining system and the development of clear standards for datasets to be applied across Member States, with a view to allowing comprehensive and automated expenditure tracking; calls for improved coordination mechanisms that define clear responsibilities among the bodies involved in the implementation of the various EU and national programmes, while avoiding unnecessary bureaucratic complexity and ensuring an efficient allocation of funds; encourages the integration of advanced data analytics and AI tools to enhance performance tracking, evaluation and reporting to alleviate manual workload and to streamline reporting processes; underlines that such progress can only happen if there is also operational support to digitalise administrations;

    79.  Strongly urges the Commission and the Member States to ensure that any type of EU FNLC or EU funding that is performance based complies with EU and national rules, ultimately protecting the financial interests of the EU; reiterates the accountability and responsibility of the Commission and the Member States to ensure the legality and the regularity of EU funding, as well as the respect of sound financial management principles;

    80.  Considers that the role of Parliament in the monitoring of the RRF should be further enhanced;

    81.  Calls for future performance-based instruments to have a single audit trail to trace budget contributions to the projects funded; underlines the need for project-level auditing to mitigate reputational risks in the eyes of the general public and to facilitate the recovery of funds in case measures are reversed; underlines the need to reduce administrative bottlenecks and burden;

    82.  Demands that any possible future performance-based programmes make clearer links between the milestones and targets and the actual projects being implemented; stresses that there should be less of a delay between the fulfilment of milestones and the implementation of projects;

    83.  Reiterates its call for an open platform which contains data on all projects, final recipients and the regional distribution of funding, thereby facilitating auditing and democratic oversight;

    84.  Stresses that any possible future budgetary decisions on EU borrowing should respect the unity of the budget and Parliament’s role as part of the budgetary authority; highlights the risks of cost overruns for the repayment of debt, resulting inter alia from volatile interest rates; deems it important to ensure from the outset that sufficient funding is available to cover these costs without presenting a detriment to other programmes or political priorities;

    85.  Invites the Commission and the Member States to closely assess and learn from instruments and tools such as the RRF, in order to maximise the efficiency and impact of EU funding, investments and reforms, streamline policy objectives, improve the collaboration of the institutions and stakeholders at national and European level, and increase national ownership;

    86.  Notes the declared intention of the Commission to draw on the RRF experience when designing its proposals for the post-2027 EU funding programmes, due later this year; acknowledges that the independent ex post evaluation will come too late to feed into the process leading up to the next programming period, but expects the Commission and the co-legislators to take due account of the lessons learned from the RRF and of the recommendations of relevant stakeholders, in particular LRA, civil society organisations and social partners; believes that, as the EU plans for future economic resilience, there is also a need to further mobilise private investment, strengthen capital markets and ensure that public spending remains fiscally responsible and strategically targeted to make the EU more resilient and sovereign in an ever more conflictual geopolitical context;

    o
    o   o

    87.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, and to the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

    (1) OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/241/oj.
    (2) OJ L 63, 28.2.2023, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/435/oj.
    (3) OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2092/oj.
    (4) OJ L, 2024/765, 29.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/765/oj.
    (5) OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 28.
    (6) OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj.
    (7) OJ L, 2024/795, 29.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/795/oj.
    (8) OJ L, 2024/1263, 30.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1263/oj.
    (9) OJ C 32, 27.1.2023, p. 42.
    (10) OJ C, C/2024/4618, 22.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4618/oj.
    (11) OJ C, C/2024/7057, 4.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/7057/oj.
    (12) European Parliament, Think Tank https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/research/advanced-search?textualSearch=RRF&startDate=01%2F07%2F2019&endDate=&sort=RELEVANCE.
    (13) OJ C, C/2024/5742, 17.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5742/oj.
    (14) Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy (OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 159, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1060/oj).

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