Category: Trade

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: New Russia sanctions target enablers of war, including Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’

    Source: New Zealand Government

    Foreign Minister Winston Peters has announced new sanctions on crucial enablers of Russia’s illegal war against Ukraine.

    This latest round of sanctions targets actors involved in Russia’s military-industrial complex, supporters from North Korea, Iran, and Belarus, as well as vessels that are part of Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’.

    “New Zealand must continue to hold Russia and its enablers accountable. Military support from actors in North Korea, Iran, and Belarus has helped Russia sustain its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine,” Mr Peters said.

    These new sanctions target a further 18 individuals and entities who have been assisting Russia’s war efforts.

    In addition, 27 ‘shadow fleet’ vessels have also been designated. Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’ enablers are involved in illegal activities to avoid sanctions, including through the transport of Russian oil at above the G7 Plus oil price cap, which New Zealand adopted last year.

    “The designation of Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’ reflects a joint effort with likeminded international partners to prevent sanctions evasion and to maintain the pressure on Russia in support of a just and lasting peace for Ukraine,” Mr Peters says.

    Since the Russia Sanctions Act entered into force in March 2022, New Zealand has imposed sanctions on more than 1,800 individuals, entities, and shipping vessels, along with a range of trade measures. 

    More information about sanctions, travel bans, and export controls against Russia, as well as diplomatic, military and economic support to Ukraine, can be found on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade website here

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Baldwin, Marshall Introduce Bill to Lower Costs and Improve Reliability of Freight Rail Service for American Businesses

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Wisconsin Tammy Baldwin
    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, U.S. Senators Tammy Baldwin (D-WI) and Roger Marshall (R-KS) reintroduced the Reliable Rail Service Act to help address the unreliable service and high costs of rail shipping for Wisconsin farmers and manufacturers. The legislation would strengthen our rail supply chain and ensure the largest freight railroads provide American businesses reliable services at reasonable rates so products can get to market more efficiently, and costs are lower for families. The Reliable Rail Service Act is supported by members of the agricultural industry, labor organizations, energy producers, and manufacturers who know firsthand how poor service, significant disruptions, and sky-high prices are impacting their businesses and prices for consumers.
    “Across the Badger State, our farmers, small businesses, and manufacturers rely on rail service to get their products to market and make ends meet,” said Senator Baldwin. “But when rail service is unreliable, it puts their livelihoods on the line, disrupts supply chains, and drives up costs for hardworking Wisconsin families. That’s why I am proud to work with my Republican colleague to once again introduce our Reliable Rail Service Act and help level the playing field for Wisconsin workers, grow our Made in Wisconsin economy, and keep costs down for consumers.”
    “Kansas’s farmers and ranchers depend upon reliable transport of their world-class goods to the rest of the country, and Class 1 railroads are not meeting expectations – this is a disservice to hard-working Kansans,” said Senator Marshall. “This bill lays out reasonable requirements for rail carriers to meet these important obligations, and I look forward to working with Senator Baldwin on getting this to the finish line.”
    Rail shippers including farmers, energy producers, and manufacturers continue to face poor service, significant service disruptions, and sky-high prices that are impacting communities and consumers, all while profits for the nation’s largest railroads are at record highs.
    The Reliable Rail Service Act takes a commonsense approach to addressing high costs and unreliable service by clarifying the “common carrier obligation,” which under current law requires rail carriers to serve the wider shipping public “on reasonable request.” Current ambiguity around this principle has contributed to insufficient rail services and exorbitant costs for American products to get to market. Clearly defining the “common carrier obligation” has taken on greater importance as the railroad industry faces consolidation and has undertaken Wall Street practices that reduce capacity on the rail network.
    The bill establishes specific criteria for the Surface Transportation Board (STB) to consider when evaluating whether carriers are meeting their common carrier obligation to give shippers much-needed certainty that is currently lacking.
    “For years, dairy processors have struggled to use America’s rail system because of lack of reliability and reduced service schedules. The Reliable Rail Service Act is commonsense legislation that will provide greater clarity to the railroad’s common carrier obligations and ensure that they provide more dependable service at sensible rates,” said Dr. Michael Dykes, President and CEO of the International Dairy Foods Association. “IDFA applauds Sen. Baldwin and Sen. Marshall for introducing this legislation to improve transparency in the rail industry and restore the balance between carriers and shippers so the U.S. dairy industry can move products more reliably by rail.”
    “Senators Baldwin and Marshall have proposed smart, and a much-needed reforms to help fix persistent freight rail service failures that are plaguing chemical manufacturers,” said Chris Jahn, President and Chief Executive Officer of the American Chemistry Council. “If members of Congress are serious about bringing jobs back, leading global trade, and making more in America—not China—they should back this bill. We urge Democrats and Republicans to support this important legislation because it will help ensure that railroads deliver on their obligation to provide reliable service to U.S. manufacturers.”
    “IWLA strongly supports the Reliable Rail Service Act and thanks Senator Baldwin for reintroducing this important bill,” said Jay D. Strother, International Warehouse Logistics Association (IWLA) President & CEO. “Clarifying the common carrier obligation is critical to ensuring that railroads provide consistent, fair, and timely service. This legislation gives the Surface Transportation Board the tools it needs to hold carriers accountable, enforce meaningful service standards, and support the 3PL warehouses that keep America’s supply chain moving.”
    “We applaud Senators Baldwin and Marshall for reintroducing the Reliable Rail Service Act to improve our nation’s freight rail network,” said Greg Regan, President of the Transportation Trades Department, AFL-CIO. “Unfortunately, America’s freight rail companies too often fail to provide the equal, timely, and affordable service required of them by federal law. Let’s hold railroads accountable and better serve the small businesses, farmers, and other customers who rely on freight rail to transport their goods.”
    “Clarification of the common carrier obligation has been needed for decades and this bipartisan bill provides STB with clear oversight rules to help address our nation’s freight railroad supply chain challenges and improve rail service for agricultural shippers,” said Mike Seyfert, President and CEO of the National Grain and Feed Association. “NGFA members appreciate Senator Baldwin and Senator Marshall’s leadership in responding to rail service issues and for cosponsoring this legislation, which will help regulators respond to service disruptions that cause hardship for livestock producers, grain exporters, and grain processing facilities.”
    “The Wisconsin Farm Bureau appreciates the work of Sen. Baldwin to address the definition of common carrier service obligation and increase the authority of the Surface Transportation Board to address agricultural rail needs,” said Brad Olson, President of the Wisconsin Farm Bureau Federation. “Wisconsin farmers are dependent on the movement of agricultural goods by rail and we hope this increased authority will lead to greater efficiency within the rail industry.”
    The Reliable Rail Service Act is endorsed by the Agricultural Retailers Association, American Petroleum Institute, American Chemistry Council, American Forest & Paper Association, American Soybean Association, Consumer Brands Association, Essential Minerals Association, Freight Rail Customer Alliance, Glass Packaging Institute, Growth Energy, International Dairy Foods Association, International Warehouse Logistics Association, National Grain and Feed Association, National Industrial Transportation League, National Milk Producers Federation, National Stone, Sand & Gravel Association, North American Millers’ Association, Private Rail Car Food and Beverage Association, The National Grange, Western Coal Traffic League, American Cement Association, Recycled Materials Association, Alliance for Chemical Distribution (ACD), National Farmers Union, Great Lakes Timber Professionals, American Train Dispatchers Association (ATDA), Brotherhood Of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen (BLET), Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes Division (BMWED)-IBT, Brotherhood of Railway Carmen (BRC), Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen (BRS), International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM), International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers (IBB), International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Teamsters Rail Conference, National Conference of Firemen and Oilers, SEIU (NCFO), Sheet Metal, Air, Rail and Transportation Workers-Mechanical Division (SMART-MD), Sheet Metal, Air, Rail and Transportation Workers-Transportation Division (SMART-TD), Transportation Communications Union (TCU), Transport Workers Union of America (TWU), and Transportation Trades Department (TTD).
    A one-pager on the legislation is available here. Full text of the legislation is available here.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI China: China expands zero-tariff policy for least developed countries

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    GENEVA, June 18 — China has notified the World Trade Organization (WTO) of its expanded zero-tariff policy for least developed countries (LDCs) that maintain diplomatic relations with Beijing, raising product coverage from 98 percent to 100 percent.

    The new policy, which took effect on Dec. 1, 2024, is part of China’s broader efforts to further open up to LDCs and African nations, the Chinese delegation said at a WTO meeting in Geneva on Wednesday.

    The delegation also briefed WTO members on a recent China-Africa declaration, in which China expressed readiness to extend the zero-tariff treatment to cover 100 percent of tariff lines for all 53 African countries that have diplomatic ties with China.

    In addition to the zero-tariff initiative, China pledged further steps to promote trade in goods, and to strengthen skills and technical training programs for African LDCs.

    According to the delegation, these measures aim to create new development opportunities and growth momentum for African countries and LDCs, while also contributing to the stability and positive momentum of global trade.

    Amid ongoing turbulence in international trade, China called on all WTO members to jointly uphold a free and open international economic and trade order, and to promote inclusive and universally beneficial globalization.

    China’s measures were broadly welcomed by WTO members. Representatives from LDCs, African countries and other economies expressed appreciation, highlighting the unprecedented challenges and uncertainties faced by developing nations. They urged more members to follow China’s example by offering targeted preferential policies, capacity-building assistance, and other support to LDCs to advance inclusive and sustainable global trade development.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: OPEC Fund Development Forum 2025 concludes with new commitments to accelerate global development impact

    Source: OPEC Fund

    18 June 2025 – Highlights:  

    – Announcement of over US$1 billion new financing: OPEC Fund signs US$362 million new loan agreements during the Forum and announces approval of US$720 million in new financing in the second Quarter
     – A Country Partnership Framework agreement with Rwanda earmarks US$300 million financing in the next three years 
    – At the high-level Mauritania roundtable hosted by the OPEC Fund, the Arab Coordination Group (ACG) announced a pledge of US$2 billion financing over the next 5 years to support Mauritania’s development priorities.
    June 18, 2025: The fourth OPEC Fund Development Forum concluded today with a strong slate of new commitments, loan agreements and strategic partnerships to advance inclusive transition and sustainable development. The Forum, which took place in Vienna, Austria brought together more than 600 global leaders, including government representatives, development institutions and private sector stakeholders, under the theme “A Transition That Empowers Our Tomorrow”.
    The OPEC Fund announced some US$720 million in new financing to support development efforts across Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and saw the signing of US$362 million in new loan agreements. A new Trade Finance Initiative is set to secure vital supplies and help close trade-related liquidity gaps in partner countries.
    OPEC Fund President Abdulhamid Alkhalifa said: “The OPEC Fund Development Forum reflects our conviction that partnerships must deliver results. Today we achieved tangible progress – with new signings, new partnerships and new approaches to help our partner countries turn ambition into action. Whether in energy, infrastructure, agriculture or finance, we are responding with solutions that make a difference.”
    As part of its Small Island Developing States (SIDS) initiative, the OPEC Fund signed cooperation agreements with Grenada, and the Solomon Islands, expanding support for climate resilience and sustainable infrastructure.
    Deepening Country Partnerships for Long-term Impact: New country-level agreements and cooperation frameworks include:  
    – A US$212 million loan agreement with Oman to finance the Khasab-Daba-Lima Road Project (Sultan Faisal bin Turki Road), improving local and regional connectivity, as well as a Country Partnership Framework (CPF) to strengthen cooperation over the next five years.
    – A US$25 million loan agreement with Cameroon to strengthen the Rice Value Chain Development Project, supporting smallholder farmers and strengthening food security in vulnerable regions, in collaboration with the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB), Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) and the Kuwait Fund.
    – A CPF with Rwanda to allocate up to US$300 million in financing for 2025 – 2028, supporting the country’s development priorities, including quality infrastructure, improved essential basic services and the promotion of entrepreneurship and the private sector.
    – Other country partnership agreements included: Azerbaijan to support infrastructure, energy transition and sustainable development; Botswana to support infrastructure, renewable energy, innovation and digital transformation, as well as private sector export-led growth over the next three years; Grenada to build resilience through sustainable development initiatives; Kyrgyz Republic to increase cooperation in transport, water supply and sanitation, energy, agriculture and banking sectors; and Solomon Islands to expand engagement and increase cooperation including in the private sector.
    Scaling up Private Sector Support : The OPEC Fund continues to prioritize private sector-led growth with targeted financing to financial institutions across Africa:
    – In Côte d’Ivoire, a €30 million loan agreement with Coris Bank International Côte d’Ivoire and a €35 million loan agreement with NSIA Banque will facilitate access to finance for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
    – A US$40 million loan agreement with the East African Development Bank (EADB) will boost economic investments across Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Rwanda, strengthening regional integration and inclusive growth.
    New Trade Finance Initiative: At the Forum the OPEC Fund also announced a new Trade Finance Initiative to boost trade resilience in partner countries by facilitating access to essential imports, closing liquidity gaps and strengthening resilience to external shocks in vulnerable economies.
    Advancing global cooperation: The Forum also featured new agreements to deepen multilateral cooperation:
    – A new cooperation agreement with the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI) will strengthen collaboration in infrastructure, energy and human development projects across the Latin America and Caribbean region.
    – The OPEC Fund and the Islamic Organization for Food Security (IOFS) formalized a cooperation agreement to coordinate efforts on climate-resilient agriculture and sustainable food systems.
    – A cooperation agreement with the International Anti-Corruption Academy (IACA) will support training programs to promote institutional transparency and anti-corruption capacity building in partner countries.
    Ahead of the Forum, the OPEC Fund hosted the Annual Meeting of the Heads of Institutions of the Arab Coordination Group (ACG). Delegates participated in a high-level roundtable with the President of Mauritania, Mohamed Ould Ghazouani to strengthen development collaboration and mobilize investment flows to Mauritania. 
    The roundtable resulted in an ACG joint pledge of US$2 billion financing over the next five years. This will be directed to vital sectors, including energy, water, transportation and digital infrastructure to stimulate economic growth. A dedicated Arab Donors Roundtable on the Sahel addressed strategies to mobilize greater support for the region’s urgent challenges. It was organized by the Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CLISS) and sponsored by the OPEC Fund’s partner institution, the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA).
    About the OPEC Fund
    The OPEC Fund for International Development (the OPEC Fund) is the only globally mandated development institution that provides financing from member countries to non-member countries exclusively. The organization works in cooperation with developing country partners and the international development community to stimulate economic growth and social progress in low- and middle-income countries around the world. The OPEC Fund was established in 1976 with a distinct purpose: to drive development, strengthen communities and empower people. Our work is people-centered, focusing on financing projects that meet essential needs, such as food, energy, infrastructure, employment (particularly relating to MSMEs), clean water and sanitation, healthcare and education. To date, the OPEC Fund has committed more than US$29 billion to development projects in over 125 countries with an estimated total project cost of more than US$200 billion. The OPEC Fund is rated AA+/Outlook Stable by Fitch and S&P Global Ratings. Our vision is a world where sustainable development is a reality for all.  

    MIL OSI – Submitted News

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: OPEC Fund Development Forum 2025 concludes with new commitments to accelerate global development impact

    Source: OPEC Fund

    18 June 2025 – Highlights:  

    – Announcement of over US$1 billion new financing: OPEC Fund signs US$362 million new loan agreements during the Forum and announces approval of US$720 million in new financing in the second Quarter
     – A Country Partnership Framework agreement with Rwanda earmarks US$300 million financing in the next three years 
    – At the high-level Mauritania roundtable hosted by the OPEC Fund, the Arab Coordination Group (ACG) announced a pledge of US$2 billion financing over the next 5 years to support Mauritania’s development priorities.
    June 18, 2025: The fourth OPEC Fund Development Forum concluded today with a strong slate of new commitments, loan agreements and strategic partnerships to advance inclusive transition and sustainable development. The Forum, which took place in Vienna, Austria brought together more than 600 global leaders, including government representatives, development institutions and private sector stakeholders, under the theme “A Transition That Empowers Our Tomorrow”.
    The OPEC Fund announced some US$720 million in new financing to support development efforts across Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and saw the signing of US$362 million in new loan agreements. A new Trade Finance Initiative is set to secure vital supplies and help close trade-related liquidity gaps in partner countries.
    OPEC Fund President Abdulhamid Alkhalifa said: “The OPEC Fund Development Forum reflects our conviction that partnerships must deliver results. Today we achieved tangible progress – with new signings, new partnerships and new approaches to help our partner countries turn ambition into action. Whether in energy, infrastructure, agriculture or finance, we are responding with solutions that make a difference.”
    As part of its Small Island Developing States (SIDS) initiative, the OPEC Fund signed cooperation agreements with Grenada, and the Solomon Islands, expanding support for climate resilience and sustainable infrastructure.
    Deepening Country Partnerships for Long-term Impact: New country-level agreements and cooperation frameworks include:  
    – A US$212 million loan agreement with Oman to finance the Khasab-Daba-Lima Road Project (Sultan Faisal bin Turki Road), improving local and regional connectivity, as well as a Country Partnership Framework (CPF) to strengthen cooperation over the next five years.
    – A US$25 million loan agreement with Cameroon to strengthen the Rice Value Chain Development Project, supporting smallholder farmers and strengthening food security in vulnerable regions, in collaboration with the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB), Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) and the Kuwait Fund.
    – A CPF with Rwanda to allocate up to US$300 million in financing for 2025 – 2028, supporting the country’s development priorities, including quality infrastructure, improved essential basic services and the promotion of entrepreneurship and the private sector.
    – Other country partnership agreements included: Azerbaijan to support infrastructure, energy transition and sustainable development; Botswana to support infrastructure, renewable energy, innovation and digital transformation, as well as private sector export-led growth over the next three years; Grenada to build resilience through sustainable development initiatives; Kyrgyz Republic to increase cooperation in transport, water supply and sanitation, energy, agriculture and banking sectors; and Solomon Islands to expand engagement and increase cooperation including in the private sector.
    Scaling up Private Sector Support : The OPEC Fund continues to prioritize private sector-led growth with targeted financing to financial institutions across Africa:
    – In Côte d’Ivoire, a €30 million loan agreement with Coris Bank International Côte d’Ivoire and a €35 million loan agreement with NSIA Banque will facilitate access to finance for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
    – A US$40 million loan agreement with the East African Development Bank (EADB) will boost economic investments across Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Rwanda, strengthening regional integration and inclusive growth.
    New Trade Finance Initiative: At the Forum the OPEC Fund also announced a new Trade Finance Initiative to boost trade resilience in partner countries by facilitating access to essential imports, closing liquidity gaps and strengthening resilience to external shocks in vulnerable economies.
    Advancing global cooperation: The Forum also featured new agreements to deepen multilateral cooperation:
    – A new cooperation agreement with the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI) will strengthen collaboration in infrastructure, energy and human development projects across the Latin America and Caribbean region.
    – The OPEC Fund and the Islamic Organization for Food Security (IOFS) formalized a cooperation agreement to coordinate efforts on climate-resilient agriculture and sustainable food systems.
    – A cooperation agreement with the International Anti-Corruption Academy (IACA) will support training programs to promote institutional transparency and anti-corruption capacity building in partner countries.
    Ahead of the Forum, the OPEC Fund hosted the Annual Meeting of the Heads of Institutions of the Arab Coordination Group (ACG). Delegates participated in a high-level roundtable with the President of Mauritania, Mohamed Ould Ghazouani to strengthen development collaboration and mobilize investment flows to Mauritania. 
    The roundtable resulted in an ACG joint pledge of US$2 billion financing over the next five years. This will be directed to vital sectors, including energy, water, transportation and digital infrastructure to stimulate economic growth. A dedicated Arab Donors Roundtable on the Sahel addressed strategies to mobilize greater support for the region’s urgent challenges. It was organized by the Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CLISS) and sponsored by the OPEC Fund’s partner institution, the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA).
    About the OPEC Fund
    The OPEC Fund for International Development (the OPEC Fund) is the only globally mandated development institution that provides financing from member countries to non-member countries exclusively. The organization works in cooperation with developing country partners and the international development community to stimulate economic growth and social progress in low- and middle-income countries around the world. The OPEC Fund was established in 1976 with a distinct purpose: to drive development, strengthen communities and empower people. Our work is people-centered, focusing on financing projects that meet essential needs, such as food, energy, infrastructure, employment (particularly relating to MSMEs), clean water and sanitation, healthcare and education. To date, the OPEC Fund has committed more than US$29 billion to development projects in over 125 countries with an estimated total project cost of more than US$200 billion. The OPEC Fund is rated AA+/Outlook Stable by Fitch and S&P Global Ratings. Our vision is a world where sustainable development is a reality for all.  

    MIL OSI – Submitted News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Review: BRICS Cooperation Space Constantly Expands – SPIEF Participants

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    St. Petersburg, June 18 (Xinhua) — The cooperation space between the BRICS countries is constantly expanding, especially after the expansion of the association began in 2024. This was stated on Wednesday by participants of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) at the session “BRICS and Partners: Creating a Joint Business Future.”

    Director of the Beijing-Moscow International Trade and Economic Center Ma Shuang noted that China has a long-term strategy for building relations with the BRICS countries. Among the areas that have the greatest potential for joint investment and opening up new markets, she named information technology and the Internet.

    Vice President of the India-South Africa Chamber of Commerce Lebohan Zulu stressed that the main barrier to increasing cooperation among BRICS countries is the legacy of the unipolar world system, which is expressed in the dominance of one currency in the world market, and the insufficient development of international transport and logistics networks. In her opinion, work in these areas, as well as the development of e-commerce platforms, can open up a huge number of prospects and opportunities for BRICS members and partners.

    According to Anna Nesterova, Chairperson of the Board of Directors of Global Rus Trade and Chairperson of the Russian Part of the BRICS Women’s Business Alliance, the expansion of the association has demonstrated broad interest in it among countries around the world. She believes that education and the involvement of more and more women in entrepreneurial activity are relevant areas for the development of cooperation in BRICS. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Concludes 2025 Article IV Consultation with Mauritius

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    June 18, 2025

    • The Mauritian economy continues to exhibit resilience with growth at 4.7 percent in 2024 and contained inflation. The growth outlook remains favorable, though risks are to the downside.
    • Mauritius needs to recalibrate the macroeconomic policy mix to rebuild fiscal space. The monetary policy framework needs to be strengthened while continued monitoring of macro-financial risks is essential to maintain financial stability.
    • Advancing key reforms to foster external competitiveness and private sector-led growth while enhancing climate resilience will reduce external imbalances.

    Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed the Article IV Consultation for Mauritius.[1]

    Mauritius’ economy remains resilient. Real GDP grew by 4.7 percent in 2024, from 5.0 percent in 2023, driven by services, construction, and tourism. Headline inflation (12-month average) declined to
    2.5 percent in March 2025 from 7.0 percent in 2023, helped by easing international food and energy prices and lower fuel excise duties. The external current account deficit widened in 2024 to
    6.5 percent of GDP, mostly reflecting higher imports and freight costs. Gross foreign reserves increased to US$8.5 billion by end-2024, covering almost 12 months of imports. Looking ahead, the country needs to address fiscal and structural challenges, notably the high public debt, significant public investment needs, low productivity, and an ageing society.

    The outlook for growth is favorable. Real GDP growth is projected to soften to 3.0 percent in 2025 due to weakening external demand, easing tourism activity, and the drought. Over the medium term, growth is expected at around 3.4 percent, reflecting demographic headwinds and labor shortages. Inflation is projected to average 3.6 percent in 2025 and remain within BOM’s target range over the medium term. The external current account deficit is projected to reduce to 4.7 percent of GDP in 2025—reflecting lower oil prices, as exports grow modestly amid the slowdown in global demand—and to increase in 2026 due to subdued exports, but gradually decline thereafter. The primary fiscal deficit (excluding grants) for FY24/25 is projected to worsen by 3.4 ppt of GDP relative to FY23/24, to 6.5 percent of GDP, mostly driven by higher compensation of employees, social benefits, and grants and transfers. The stock of public sector debt is projected at around 88 percent of GDP at end-June 2025, and to gradually decline in the medium term.

    Risks to the outlook are on the downside, including from global uncertainty, tariff wars, higher-than-anticipated fuel and food prices, and extreme climate shocks.

     

    Executive Board Assessment[2]

    The economy has recovered solidly from the pandemic and the outlook is favorable, but fiscal and structural challenges remain. The recovery has been driven by services, construction, and tourism. The medium-term outlook is favorable but held back by demographic headwinds and labor shortages. Mauritius is facing fiscal and structural challenges from high public debt, significant public investment needs for climate, low productivity, and an ageing society. Risks to the outlook are on the downside including from high global uncertainty, highlighting the importance of addressing fiscal and external imbalances to increase the resilience of the economy.

    Fiscal policy should pursue frontloaded growth-friendly consolidation to shore up fiscal credibility, helping rebuild fiscal space while protecting the most vulnerable. Tax revenue should be increased and current and ESFs’ spending contained while safeguarding critical social spending and growth-enhancing capital spending. Pension system reform remains key to support fiscal sustainability, especially given the ageing of Mauritius’ population. Strengthening public financial management, including by streamlining ESFs, will support fiscal consolidation, transparency, and good governance.

    BOM should start to gradually phase out its ownership of MIC and strengthen the implementation of the monetary policy framework by resuming uncapped issuance of 7-Day BOM bills (at the key policy rate). BOM should stand ready to tighten the monetary policy stance should inflationary pressures reemerge. BOM should adopt amendments to the BOM Act, including to ensure fiscal backing, to protect central bank independence. Ministry of Finance and BOM are encouraged to strengthen the commitment on their mutual agreement for BOM independence. Mauritius should continue to rely on exchange rate flexibility and FX purchases when opportunities arise, and in line with the monetary policy framework, to help further build foreign reserves buffers to ensure ability to respond to large external shocks. 

    Mauritius’ external position at end-2024 is assessed as weaker than the level implied by fundamentals and desirable policies, and structural reforms to foster external competitiveness are needed to reduce external imbalances. Steady progress in strengthening the AML/CFT framework is welcome and should be sustained, including provisions related to non-resident and cross-border activity. Financial sector risks should continue to be closely monitored including of the real estate sector. Ongoing efforts to improve external sector statistics, including measurement of the GBCs sector, should be sustained. Statistical gaps and discrepancies should be addressed to improve the quality and credibility of macroeconomic statistics.

    Mauritius should advance structural reforms that boost investment and innovation to secure longer-term private sector-led growth. Priorities include strengthening workers’ skills through better education and narrowing gender gaps as well as advancing climate adaptation efforts to support economic resilience.

     

    Mauritius: Selected Economic Indicators

     
     

    2020

    2021

    2022

    2023

    2024

    2025

    2026

    2027

    2028

    2029

    2030

     
           

    Est.

    Proj.

    Proj.

    Proj.

    Proj.

    Proj.

    Proj.

     
     
                               
     

    (Annual percent change, unless otherwise indicated)

       

    National income, prices and employment

                             

    Real GDP

     

    -14.5

    3.4

    8.7

    5.0

    4.7

    3.0

    3.4

    3.4

    3.4

    3.4

    3.4

     

    Real GDP per capita

     

    -14.6

    3.6

    8.9

    5.1

    4.9

    3.2

    3.6

    3.6

    3.6

    3.7

    3.8

     

    GDP per capita (in U.S. dollars)

     

    9,011

    9,087

    10,235

    11,188

    11,883

    12,448

    13,287

    14,183

    15,128

    16,131

    17,190

     

    GDP deflator

     

    2.6

    3.2

    9.6

    6.6

    3.8

    3.8

    3.7

    3.7

    3.6

    3.6

    3.6

     

    Consumer prices inflation (period average)

     

    2.5

    4.0

    10.8

    7.0

    3.6

    3.6

    3.6

    3.5

    3.5

    3.5

    3.5

     

    Consumer prices inflation (end of period)

     

    2.7

    6.8

    12.2

    3.9

    2.9

    3.9

    3.5

    3.5

    3.5

    3.5

    3.5

     

    Unemployment rate (percent)

     

    9.2

    9.1

    6.8

    6.1

    5.8

    5.9

    5.9

    5.9

    5.9

    5.9

    5.9

     
                               
       

    (Annual percent change)

       

    External sector

                             

    Exports of goods and services, f.o.b.

     

    -23.8

    5.2

    45.7

    4.0

    3.0

    1.7

    2.3

    7.1

    6.2

    6.5

    7.4

     

    Of which: tourism receipts

     

    -73.8

    -23.8

    313.1

    29.7

    6.0

    -4.6

    5.3

    7.7

    8.6

    8.1

    7.7

     

    Imports of goods and services, f.o.b.

     

    -29.1

    16.0

    32.9

    -0.3

    6.4

    0.7

    4.7

    5.3

    4.9

    4.3

    5.3

     

    Nominal effective exchange rate (annual average)

     

    -8.0

    -8.0

    3.6

    0.5

    -1.4

     

    Real effective exchange rate (annual average)

     

    -7.6

    -7.5

    6.2

    1.7

    -0.6

     

    Terms of trade

     

    5.1

    -12.0

    -5.1

    8.3

    0.0

    2.3

    2.0

    0.7

    0.5

    0.5

    0.4

     
                               
             

    Money and credit

                             

    Net foreign assets

     

    16.4

    18.6

    -3.6

    -0.3

    18.3

    1.5

    2.7

    2.5

    2.1

    2.2

    3.0

     

    Domestic credit

     

    7.9

    15.6

    13.1

    9.7

    13.7

    7.2

    6.5

    6.3

    6.1

    6.0

    5.9

     

    Net claims on government

     

    8.8

    34.8

    24.6

    26.1

    31.3

    13.2

    7.7

    6.0

    5.3

    4.5

    3.7

     

    Credit to non-government sector

     

    2.7

    0.4

    -0.6

    8.0

    8.3

    6.0

    6.9

    7.2

    7.1

    7.1

    7.1

     

    Broad money

     

    17.7

    8.6

    4.1

    7.8

    12.9

    6.4

    7.6

    8.5

    8.4

    8.4

    7.9

     

    Income velocity of broad money (M2)

     

    0.8

    0.8

    0.9

    0.9

    0.9

    0.9

    0.9

    0.9

    0.9

    0.9

    0.9

     
                               
       

    (Percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

       

    Central government finances 1

                             

    Overall borrowing requirement 2

     

    -22.1

    -5.5

    -4.7

    -6.1

    -10.4

    -5.4

    -3.7

    -3.4

    -2.9

    -2.4

    -2.0

     

    Primary balance (excluding grants) 

     

    -16.5

    -4.9

    -2.7

    -3.1

    -6.5

    -3.0

    -1.3

    -0.3

    0.1

    0.4

    0.5

     

    Revenues (incl. grants)

     

    21.6

    24.2

    24.5

    24.0

    25.7

    27.0

    27.3

    27.5

    27.5

    27.5

    27.4

     

    Expenditure, excl. net lending

     

    40.4

    31.1

    29.4

    29.7

    35.2

    32.3

    31.2

    30.3

    29.9

    29.4

    28.9

     

    Domestic debt of central government

     

    67.5

    61.9

    57.3

    58.7

    64.4

    65.8

    65.7

    65.3

    64.5

    64.0

    63.7

     

    External debt of central government

     

    15.8

    14.0

    13.8

    12.7

    14.8

    14.9

    14.8

    14.7

    14.6

    14.3

    13.9

     
                               

    Investment and saving 4

                             

    Gross domestic investment

     

    18.2

    19.8

    19.8

    20.2

    21.0

    22.0

    22.4

    22.5

    22.5

    22.5

    22.5

     

    Public

     

    4.1

    4.1

    3.9

    3.9

    3.8

    4.1

    4.2

    4.3

    4.3

    4.3

    4.3

     

    Private 3

     

    14.1

    15.7

    15.8

    16.3

    17.2

    17.9

    18.2

    18.2

    18.2

    18.2

    18.2

     

    Gross national savings

     

    11.6

    12.6

    17.1

    22.4

    23.4

    23.8

    25.0

    26.1

    26.5

    26.2

    26.4

     

    Public

     

    -7.9

    -5.6

    -2.0

    -2.4

    -4.5

    -4.0

    -1.7

    -0.7

    -0.1

    0.4

    0.8

     

    Private

     

    19.5

    18.2

    19.2

    24.8

    28.0

    27.8

    26.7

    26.8

    26.6

    25.9

    25.6

     

    External sector

                             

    Balance of goods and services

     

    -10.7

    -16.1

    -14.8

    -11.7

    -13.2

    -12.3

    -13.0

    -12.2

    -11.6

    -10.5

    -9.6

     

    Exports of goods and services, f.o.b.

     

    35.1

    36.7

    47.6

    45.3

    43.9

    42.7

    41.0

    41.2

    41.1

    41.2

    41.7

     

    Imports of goods and services, f.o.b.

     

    -45.8

    -52.7

    -62.4

    -56.9

    -57.2

    -55.0

    -54.0

    -53.4

    -52.7

    -51.7

    -51.2

     

    Current account balance

     

    -8.9

    -13.1

    -11.1

    -5.1

    -6.5

    -4.7

    -6.1

    -5.0

    -4.3

    -3.7

    -3.0

     

    Capital and financial account

     

    3.3

    23.3

    13.4

    -0.9

    14.5

    6.1

    9.1

    6.7

    5.9

    5.2

    4.6

     

    Overall balance

     

    -4.4

    10.2

    2.8

    -5.5

    7.3

    1.4

    2.9

    1.8

    1.6

    1.5

    1.6

     

    Total external debt

     

    110.7

    134.0

    132.2

    131.6

    139.2

    128.9

    119.3

    110.8

    102.2

    94.1

    87.1

     

    Gross international reserves (millions of U.S. dollars)

     

    7,242

    7,805

    7,740

    7,254

    8,510

    8,675

    9,163

    9,475

    9,781

    10,083

    10,420

     

    Months of imports of goods and services, f.o.b.

     

    14.3

    11.6

    11.6

    10.2

    11.8

    11.6

    11.6

    11.4

    11.3

    11.2

    11.1

     
                               

    Memorandum items:

                             

    GDP at current market prices (billions of Mauritian rupees)

     

    448.9

    478.8

    570.3

    638.3

    694.0

    742.3

    796.0

    853.3

    914.0

    979.0

    1,048.7

     

    GDP at current market prices (millions of U.S. dollars)

     

    11,408

    11,484

    12,908

    14,101

    14,953

    15,641

    16,662

    17,748

    18,890

    20,082

    21,326

     

    Public sector debt, fiscal year (percent of GDP)4

     

    91.9

    86.1

    81.8

    81.5

    88.3

    89.1

    88.1

    86.9

    85.3

    83.9

    82.7

     
                               

    Foreign and local currency long-term debt rating (Moody’s)

     

    Baa1

    Baa2

    Baa3

    Baa3

    Baa3

    Baa3

     
                             

    Sources:  Country authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

                             

    1GFSM 2001 concept of net lending/net borrowing, includes special and other extrabudgetary funds. Fiscal data reported for fiscal years (e.g, 2019=2019/20).

         

    2 Following the GFSM 2014, Sections 5.111.5.116, the transfers from the BOM to the

    Central Government are considered as financing.

               

    Excludes changes in inventories in 2022 and outer years.

                                                                                                 

    4 The public debt series has been reclassified starting in the 2024 AIV Mission to allow

    consolidation of central government securities held by non-financial
    public corporations

                                                                       
                                                                                                                 

     

    [1] Under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country’s economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board.

    [2] The Executive Board takes decisions under its lapse-of-time procedure when the Board agrees that a proposal can be considered without convening formal discussions.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Kwabena Akuamoah-Boateng

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/18/pr-25204-mauritius-imf-concludes-2025-article-iv-consultation

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Concludes 2025 Article IV Consultation with the Republic of Uzbekistan

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    June 18, 2025

    • Uzbekistan’s economic performance has remained strong, with robust growth, narrowing consolidated fiscal and current account deficits, and ample international reserves.
    • Despite elevated external uncertainty, growth is projected to stay robust amid ongoing reforms and strong remittances, while inflation is expected to moderate under tight macroeconomic and macroprudential policies.
    • The priorities ahead are to cement macro-financial stability and continue with the economic reform agenda to reduce the state’s footprint while fostering private sector-led and inclusive growth.

    Washington, DC: On June 16, 2025, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed the Article IV Consultation for the Republic of Uzbekistan.[1] The authorities have consented to the publication of the Staff Report prepared for this consultation.[2]

    Uzbekistan’s economic performance has remained strong. Real GDP growth stood at 6.5 percent in 2024, underpinned by robust domestic demand, and remained buoyant at 6.8 percent year-on-year in the first quarter of 2025. Inflation had trended downward through end-April 2024 but rose to 10.6 percent year-on-year in May 2024 that saw the implementation of needed energy price reform. By end-April 2025, it has only marginally eased to 10.1 percent. The current account deficit narrowed by 2.6 percentage points of GDP to about 5.0 percent in 2024, driven by strong remittances, rapidly growing non-gold exports, favorable commodity prices, and the unwinding of a one-off spike in imports in 2023. International reserves have remained ample. The consolidated fiscal deficit narrowed by 1.7 percentage points of GDP to 3.2 percent of GDP in 2024, largely on the back of growth-friendly expenditure measures, although borrowing and spending from the broader public sector were higher than anticipated.  

    The outlook remains broadly positive. Despite heightened global trade policy uncertainty, real GDP growth is projected to remain robust under the baseline, at close to 6 percent this year and next, supported by sustained strength in private consumption, investment, and advancement of structural reforms. The latter, continued tight monetary and macroprudential policies, and solidified fiscal discipline are expected to reduce inflation to the Central Bank of Uzbekistan’s (CBU) 5 percent target by end-2027. The external current account deficit is foreseen to stay at or slightly below 5 percent over 2025-26 while international reserves are expected to remain adequate, at 9.2 months of imports by end-2026.

    Downside risks to the outlook include prolonged and deeper trade policy shocks, more volatile commodity prices, tighter external financing, and contingent liabilities from state-owned enterprises and banks, and public-private partnerships. On the upside, opportunities stem from faster implementation of structural reforms, stronger inflows of income and capital, and favorable commodity prices.

    Executive Board Assessment[3]

    Executive Directors agreed with the thrust of the staff appraisal. They welcomed Uzbekistan’s positive economic outlook amid continued progress in the transition to a market-oriented economy. Directors noted, however, that significant vulnerabilities persist, including from the still large state footprint in the economy and rising external uncertainty. Against this background, they emphasized the importance of sustaining the momentum in structural and institutional reforms, supported by Fund technical assistance, to entrench macroeconomic stability and maintain robust and resilient growth.

    Directors commended the authorities for the significant fiscal consolidation achieved. They broadly called for reversing the decline in the tax-to-GDP ratio and improving expenditure efficiency to create fiscal space for priority social and development needs. Directors stressed the importance of adhering to external borrowing limits and avoiding government spending procyclicality in response to high gold prices to support inflation reduction. They also advised improving monitoring and management of fiscal risks from SOEs and public-private partnerships and further strengthening PFM and fiscal transparency.

    Directors welcomed the commitment of the Central Bank of Uzbekistan (CBU) to reduce inflation. They agreed that monetary policy should remain data driven and be tightened further if core inflation or inflation expectations do not decline. Directors encouraged the CBU to continue strengthening communication and monetary policy transmission. They also recommended adopting greater exchange rate flexibility and implementing outstanding safeguards recommendations to strengthen central bank governance and independence. 

    Directors called for enhancing bank supervision and regulation to safeguard financial stability, while reducing the state’s role in the financial sector. In this regard, they recommended bolstering the commercial orientation of state banks and their corporate governance, phasing out directed and preferential lending, and expediting and expanding privatization efforts. Directors also advised the authorities to strengthen asset classification, NPL reporting and resolution, and the regulatory, supervisory, crisis management, and AML/CFT frameworks following the recommendations of the country’s first Financial Sector Assessment Program. Additional macroprudential measures could help mitigate risks from rapid growth in microcredit. 

    Directors encouraged deepening and accelerating structural reforms. While welcoming the progress with WTO accession and energy sector reform, they emphasized that it will be essential to complete price and trade liberalization, phase out support to SOEs, and accelerate privatizations while carrying them out in line with international best practices. Directors called on the authorities to make further progress in governance reforms, including improvements in transparency and accountability and the approval of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy. Closing data gaps and improving data quality remain priorities. 

    It is expected that the next Article IV consultation with Uzbekistan will be held on the standard 12-month cycle.

    Uzbekistan: Selected Economic Indicators 2022-2026

    2022

    2023

    2024

    2025

    2026

    Est.

    Proj.

    Proj.

    National income 1/

    Real GDP growth (percent change)

    6.0

    6.3

    6.5

    5.9

    5.8

    Nominal GDP (in trillions of Sum)

    996

    1,204

    1,455

    1,733

    2,005

    GDP per capita (in U.S. dollars)

    2,555

    2,849

    3,113

    3,487

    3,805

    Population (in millions)

    35.3

    36.0

    36.9

    37.7

    38.5

    Prices

    (Percent change)

    Consumer price inflation (end of period) 2/

    12.3

    8.7

    9.8

    8.4

    6.5

    GDP deflator

    14.5

    13.8

    13.3

    12.5

    9.4

    External sector

    (Percent of GDP)

    Current account balance

    -3.2

    -7.6

    -5.0

    -5.0

    -4.8

    External debt

    49.2

    54.5

    56.2

    55.4

    55.2

                     (Level)

    Exchange rate (in sums per U.S. dollar; end of period)

    11,225

    12,339

    12,920

    Real effective exchange rate

           

    (ave, 2015 =100, decline = depreciation)

    61.8

    58.8

    55.4

    Government finance

    (Percent of GDP)

    Consolidated budget revenues

    28.8

    26.7

    26.5

    26.3

    26.4

    Consolidated budget expenditures

    32.3

    31.6

    29.7

    29.3

    29.4

    Consolidated budget balance

    -3.5

    -4.9

    -3.2

    -3.0

    -3.0

    Adjusted revenues 3/

    27.7

    25.9

    25.5

    25.3

    25.5

    Adjusted expenditures 3/

    31.3

    29.9

    27.8

    27.3

    27.8

    Adjusted fiscal balance

    -3.7

    -4.0

    -2.3

    -2.0

    -2.3

    Policy-based lending

    -0.1

    0.9

    0.9

    1.0

    0.7

    Overall fiscal balance 3/

    -3.5

    -4.9

    -3.2

    -3.0

    -3.0

    Public debt

    30.5

    32.2

    32.6

    33.3

    33.2

    Money and credit

    (Percent Change)

    Reserve money

    31.4

    4.9

    9.5

    9.2

    8.8

    Broad money

    30.2

    12.2

    30.6

    19.4

    16.3

    Credit to the economy

    21.4

    23.2

    4.0

    19.3

    16.0

    Sources: Country authorities; and IMF staff estimates.

    1/ Incorporates latest revision to national accounts data, which raised the average nominal GDP for 2017-2023 by about 11 percent. 

    2/ The CPI projection incorporates the effect of the announced increases in energy prices in 2024 and 2025.

    3/ IMF staff adjusts budget revenues and expenditures for financing operations, such as equity injections, policy lending, and privatization of state enterprises. The overall fiscal balance until 2021 is more negative than the consolidated budget balance as the latter excluded privatization receipts. Since 2022, there is no difference as the authorities started including all privatization receipts as financing.

    [1] Under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country’s economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board.

    [2] Under the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, publication of documents that pertain to member countries is voluntary and requires the member consent. The staff report will be shortly published on the www.imf.org/Uzbekistan page.

    [3] At the conclusion of the discussion, the Managing Director, as Chair of the Board, summarizes the views of Executive Directors, and this summary is transmitted to the country’s authorities. An explanation of any qualifiers used in summings up can be found here: http://www.IMF.org/external/np/sec/misc/qualifiers.htm.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Wafa Amr

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/18/pr-25206-uzbekistan-imf-executive-board-concludes-2025-article-iv-consultation

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-Evening Report: Winter viruses can trigger a heart attack or stroke, our study shows. It’s another good reason to get a flu or COVID shot

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Tu Nguyen, PhD Candidate, Department of Paediatrics, University of Melbourne, Murdoch Children’s Research Institute

    Irina Shatilova/Shutterstock

    Winter is here, along with cold days and the inevitable seasonal surge in respiratory viruses.

    But it’s not only the sniffles we need to worry about. Heart attacks and strokes also tend to rise during the winter months.

    In new research out this week we show one reason why.

    Our study shows catching common respiratory viruses raises your short-term risk of a heart attack or stroke. In other words, common viruses, such as those that cause flu and COVID, can trigger them.

    Wait, viruses can trigger heart attacks?

    Traditional risk factors such as smoking, high cholesterol, high blood pressure, diabetes, obesity and lack of exercise are the main reasons for heart attacks and strokes.

    And rates of heart attacks and strokes can rise in winter for a number of reasons. Factors such as low temperature, less physical activity, more time spent indoors – perhaps with indoor air pollutants – can affect blood clotting and worsen the effects of traditional risk factors.

    But our new findings build on those from other researchers to show how respiratory viruses can also be a trigger.

    The theory is respiratory virus infections set off a heart attack or stroke, rather than directly cause them. If traditional risk factors are like dousing a house in petrol, the viral infection is like the matchstick that ignites the flame.

    Think of a viral infection as the matchstick that ignites the flame, leading to a heart attack or stroke.
    anokato/Shutterstock

    For healthy, young people, a newer, well-kept house is unlikely to spontaneously combust. But an older or even abandoned house with faulty electric wiring needs just a spark to lead to a blaze.

    People who are particularly vulnerable to a heart attack or stroke triggered by a respiratory virus are those with more than one of those traditional risk factors, especially older people.

    What we did and what we found

    Our team conducted a meta-analysis (a study of existing studies) to see which respiratory viruses play a role in triggering heart attacks and strokes, and the strength of the link. This meant studying more than 11,000 scientific papers, spanning 40 years of research.

    Overall, the influenza virus and SARS-CoV-2 (the virus that causes COVID) were the main triggers.

    If you catch the flu, we found the risk of a heart attack goes up almost 5.4 times and a stroke by 4.7 times compared with not being infected. The danger zone is short – within the first few days or weeks – and tapers off with time after being infected.

    Catching COVID can also trigger heart attacks and strokes, but there haven’t been enough studies to say exactly what the increased risk is.

    We also found an increased risk of heart attacks or strokes with other viruses, including respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), enterovirus and cytomegalovirus. But the links are not as strong, probably because these viruses are less commonly detected or tested for.

    What’s going on?

    Over a person’s lifetime, our bodies wear and tear and the inside wall of our blood vessels becomes rough. Fatty build-ups (plaques) stick easily to these rough areas, inevitably accumulating and causing tight spaces.

    Generally, blood can still pass through, and these build-ups don’t cause issues. Think of this as dousing the house in petrol, but it’s not yet alight.

    So how does a viral infection act like a matchstick to ignite the flame? Through a cascading process of inflammation.

    High levels of inflammation that follow a viral infection can crack open a plaque. The body activates blood clotting to fix the crack but this clot could inadvertently block a blood vessel completely, causing a heart attack or stroke.

    Some studies have found fragments of the COVID virus inside the blood clots that cause heart attacks – further evidence to back our findings.

    We don’t know whether younger, healthier people are also at increased risk of a heart attack or stroke after infection with a respiratory virus.

    That’s because people in the studies we analysed were almost always older adults with at least one of those traditional risk factors, so were already vulnerable.

    The bad news is we will all be vulnerable eventually, just by getting older.

    What can we do about it?

    The triggers we identified are mostly preventable by vaccination.

    There is good evidence from clinical trials the flu vaccine can reduce the risk of a heart attack or stroke, especially if someone already has heart problems.

    We aren’t clear exactly how this works. But the theory is that avoiding common infections, or having less severe symptoms, reduces the chances of setting off the inflammatory chain reaction.

    COVID vaccination could also indirectly protect against heart attacks and strokes. But the evidence is still emerging.

    Heart attacks and strokes are among Australia’s biggest killers. If vaccinations could help reduce even a small fraction of people having a heart attack or stroke, this could bring substantial benefit to their lives, the community, our stressed health system and the economy.

    What should I do?

    At-risk groups should get vaccinated against flu and COVID. Pregnant women, and people over 60 with medical problems, should receive RSV vaccination to reduce their risk of severe disease.

    So if you are older or have predisposing medical conditions, check Australia’s National Immunisation Program to see if you are eligible for a free vaccine.

    For younger people, a healthy lifestyle with regular exercise and balanced diet will set you up for life. Consider checking your heart age (a measure of your risk of heart disease), getting an annual flu vaccine and discuss COVID boosters with your GP.

    Tu Nguyen is supported by an Australian Government Research Training Program PhD Scholarship and a Murdoch Children’s Research Institute Top-Up Scholarship.

    Christopher Reid receives funding from National Health and Medical Research Council and the Medical Research Future Fund.

    Jim Buttery receives funding from the Medical Research Future Fund, the US Centres for Disease Control, the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness and Innovation, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Victorian State Government.

    Diana Vlasenko and Hazel Clothier do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Winter viruses can trigger a heart attack or stroke, our study shows. It’s another good reason to get a flu or COVID shot – https://theconversation.com/winter-viruses-can-trigger-a-heart-attack-or-stroke-our-study-shows-its-another-good-reason-to-get-a-flu-or-covid-shot-256090

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-Evening Report: Winter viruses can trigger a heart attack or stroke, our study shows. It’s another good reason to get a flu or COVID shot

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Tu Nguyen, PhD Candidate, Department of Paediatrics, University of Melbourne, Murdoch Children’s Research Institute

    Irina Shatilova/Shutterstock

    Winter is here, along with cold days and the inevitable seasonal surge in respiratory viruses.

    But it’s not only the sniffles we need to worry about. Heart attacks and strokes also tend to rise during the winter months.

    In new research out this week we show one reason why.

    Our study shows catching common respiratory viruses raises your short-term risk of a heart attack or stroke. In other words, common viruses, such as those that cause flu and COVID, can trigger them.

    Wait, viruses can trigger heart attacks?

    Traditional risk factors such as smoking, high cholesterol, high blood pressure, diabetes, obesity and lack of exercise are the main reasons for heart attacks and strokes.

    And rates of heart attacks and strokes can rise in winter for a number of reasons. Factors such as low temperature, less physical activity, more time spent indoors – perhaps with indoor air pollutants – can affect blood clotting and worsen the effects of traditional risk factors.

    But our new findings build on those from other researchers to show how respiratory viruses can also be a trigger.

    The theory is respiratory virus infections set off a heart attack or stroke, rather than directly cause them. If traditional risk factors are like dousing a house in petrol, the viral infection is like the matchstick that ignites the flame.

    Think of a viral infection as the matchstick that ignites the flame, leading to a heart attack or stroke.
    anokato/Shutterstock

    For healthy, young people, a newer, well-kept house is unlikely to spontaneously combust. But an older or even abandoned house with faulty electric wiring needs just a spark to lead to a blaze.

    People who are particularly vulnerable to a heart attack or stroke triggered by a respiratory virus are those with more than one of those traditional risk factors, especially older people.

    What we did and what we found

    Our team conducted a meta-analysis (a study of existing studies) to see which respiratory viruses play a role in triggering heart attacks and strokes, and the strength of the link. This meant studying more than 11,000 scientific papers, spanning 40 years of research.

    Overall, the influenza virus and SARS-CoV-2 (the virus that causes COVID) were the main triggers.

    If you catch the flu, we found the risk of a heart attack goes up almost 5.4 times and a stroke by 4.7 times compared with not being infected. The danger zone is short – within the first few days or weeks – and tapers off with time after being infected.

    Catching COVID can also trigger heart attacks and strokes, but there haven’t been enough studies to say exactly what the increased risk is.

    We also found an increased risk of heart attacks or strokes with other viruses, including respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), enterovirus and cytomegalovirus. But the links are not as strong, probably because these viruses are less commonly detected or tested for.

    What’s going on?

    Over a person’s lifetime, our bodies wear and tear and the inside wall of our blood vessels becomes rough. Fatty build-ups (plaques) stick easily to these rough areas, inevitably accumulating and causing tight spaces.

    Generally, blood can still pass through, and these build-ups don’t cause issues. Think of this as dousing the house in petrol, but it’s not yet alight.

    So how does a viral infection act like a matchstick to ignite the flame? Through a cascading process of inflammation.

    High levels of inflammation that follow a viral infection can crack open a plaque. The body activates blood clotting to fix the crack but this clot could inadvertently block a blood vessel completely, causing a heart attack or stroke.

    Some studies have found fragments of the COVID virus inside the blood clots that cause heart attacks – further evidence to back our findings.

    We don’t know whether younger, healthier people are also at increased risk of a heart attack or stroke after infection with a respiratory virus.

    That’s because people in the studies we analysed were almost always older adults with at least one of those traditional risk factors, so were already vulnerable.

    The bad news is we will all be vulnerable eventually, just by getting older.

    What can we do about it?

    The triggers we identified are mostly preventable by vaccination.

    There is good evidence from clinical trials the flu vaccine can reduce the risk of a heart attack or stroke, especially if someone already has heart problems.

    We aren’t clear exactly how this works. But the theory is that avoiding common infections, or having less severe symptoms, reduces the chances of setting off the inflammatory chain reaction.

    COVID vaccination could also indirectly protect against heart attacks and strokes. But the evidence is still emerging.

    Heart attacks and strokes are among Australia’s biggest killers. If vaccinations could help reduce even a small fraction of people having a heart attack or stroke, this could bring substantial benefit to their lives, the community, our stressed health system and the economy.

    What should I do?

    At-risk groups should get vaccinated against flu and COVID. Pregnant women, and people over 60 with medical problems, should receive RSV vaccination to reduce their risk of severe disease.

    So if you are older or have predisposing medical conditions, check Australia’s National Immunisation Program to see if you are eligible for a free vaccine.

    For younger people, a healthy lifestyle with regular exercise and balanced diet will set you up for life. Consider checking your heart age (a measure of your risk of heart disease), getting an annual flu vaccine and discuss COVID boosters with your GP.

    Tu Nguyen is supported by an Australian Government Research Training Program PhD Scholarship and a Murdoch Children’s Research Institute Top-Up Scholarship.

    Christopher Reid receives funding from National Health and Medical Research Council and the Medical Research Future Fund.

    Jim Buttery receives funding from the Medical Research Future Fund, the US Centres for Disease Control, the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness and Innovation, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Victorian State Government.

    Diana Vlasenko and Hazel Clothier do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Winter viruses can trigger a heart attack or stroke, our study shows. It’s another good reason to get a flu or COVID shot – https://theconversation.com/winter-viruses-can-trigger-a-heart-attack-or-stroke-our-study-shows-its-another-good-reason-to-get-a-flu-or-covid-shot-256090

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-Evening Report: Robot eyes are power hungry. What if we gave them tools inspired by the human brain?

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Adam D Hines, Research Fellow, Centre for Robotics, Queensland University of Technology

    A hexapod robot navigating outdoors. Adam Hines

    Robots are increasingly becoming a part of our lives – from warehouse automation to robotic vacuum cleaners. And just like humans, robots need to know where they are to reliably navigate from A to B.

    How far, and for how long, a robot can navigate depends on how much power it consumes over time. Robot navigation systems are especially energy hungry.

    But what if power consumption was no longer a concern?

    Our research on “brain-inspired” computing, published today in Science Robotics, could make navigational robots of the future more energy efficient than previously imagined.

    This could potentially extend and expand what’s possible for battery-powered systems working in challenging environments such as disaster zones, underwater, and even in space.

    How do robots ‘see’ the world?

    The battery going flat on your smartphone is usually just a minor inconvenience. For a robot, running out of power can mean the difference between life and death – including for the people it might be helping.

    Robots such as search and rescue drones, underwater robots monitoring the Great Barrier Reef, and space rovers all need to navigate while running on limited power supplies.

    Robots that navigate challenging environments need a lot of battery power for their cameras and other sensors.
    NASA/JPL-Caltech/MSSS

    Many of these robots can’t rely on GPS for navigation. They keep track of where they are using a process called visual place recognition. Visual place recognition lets a robot estimate where it’s located in the world using just what it “sees” through its camera.

    But this method uses a lot of energy. Robotic vision systems alone can use up to a third of the energy from a typical lithium ion battery found onboard a robot.

    This is because modern robotic vision, including visual place recognition, typically relies on power-hungry machine learning models, similar to the ones used in AI like ChatGPT.

    By comparison, our brains require just enough power to turn on a light bulb, while allowing us to see things and navigate the world with remarkable precision.

    Robotics engineers often look to biology for inspiration. In our new study, we turned to the human brain to help us create a new, energy-efficient visual place recognition system.

    Mimicking the brain

    Our system uses a brain-inspired technology called neuromorphic computing. As the name suggests, neuromorphic computers take principles from neuroscience to design computer chips and software that can learn and process information like human brains do.

    An important feature of neuromorphic computers is that they are highly energy-efficient. A regular computer can use up to 100 times more power than a neuromorphic chip.

    Neuromorphic computing is not limited to just computer chips, however. It can be paired with bio-inspired cameras that capture the world more like the human eye does. These are called dynamic vision sensors, and they work like motion detectors for each pixel. They only “wake up” and send information when something changes in the scene, rather than constantly streaming data like a regular camera.

    What a regular camera sees (left) compared to a bio-inspired camera (right).
    Adam Hines

    These bio-inspired cameras are also highly energy efficient, using less than 1% of the power of normal cameras.

    So if brain-inspired computers and bio-inspired cameras are so wonderful, why aren’t robots using them everywhere? Well, there are a range of challenges to overcome, which was the focus of our recent research.

    A new kind of LENS

    The unique properties of a dynamic vision sensor are, ironically, a limiting factor in many visual place recognition systems.

    Standard visual place recognition models are built on the foundation of static images, like the ones taken by your smartphone. Since a neuromorphic sensor doesn’t produce static images but senses the world in a constantly changing way, we need a brain-inspired computer to process what it “sees”.

    Our research overcomes this challenge by combining neuromorphic chips and sensors for robots that use visual place recognition. We call this system Locational Encoding with Neuromorphic Systems, or LENS for short.

    LENS uses the continuous information stream from a dynamic vision sensor directly on a neuromorphic chip. The system uses a machine learning method known as spiking neural networks. These process information like human brains do.

    By combining all these neuromorphic components, we reduced the power needed for visual place recognition by over 90%. Since nearly a third of the energy needed for a robot is vision related, this is a significant reduction.

    To achieve this, we used an off-the-shelf product called SynSense Speck, which combines a neuromorphic chip and a dynamic vision sensor all in one compact package.

    The entire system only required 180 kilobytes of memory to map an area of Brisbane eight kilometres in length. That’s a tiny fraction of what would be needed in a standard visual place recognition system.

    Hexapod robots have six legs and can walk on different surfaces both indoors and outdoors.

    A robot in the wild

    For testing, we placed our LENS system on a hexapod robot. Hexapods are multi-terrain robots that can navigate both indoors and outdoors.

    In our tests, the LENS performed as well as a typical visual place recognition system, but used much less energy.

    Our work comes at a time when AI development is trending towards creating bigger, more power-hungry solutions for improved performance. The energy needed to train and use systems like OpenAI’s ChatGPT is notoriously demanding, with concerns that modern AI represents unsustainable growth in energy demands.

    For robots that need to navigate, developing more compact, energy-efficient AI using neuromorphic computing could be key for being able to go farther and for longer periods of time. There are still challenges to solve, but we are closer to making it a reality.

    Michael Milford receives funding from the Australian Research Council, the Australian Economic Accelerator, the Queensland Government, Amazon, Ford Motor Company, iMOVE CRC, the DAAD Australia-Germany Co-operation Scheme and DSTG. He is affiliated with the Motor Trades Association of Queensland as a non-executive board member.

    Tobias Fischer receives funding from the Australian Research Council, the DAAD Australia-Germany Co-operation Scheme, the Great Barrier Reef Foundation via the Reef Restoration and Adaptation Program, and the Queensland Department of Environment, Science and Innovation.

    Adam D Hines does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Robot eyes are power hungry. What if we gave them tools inspired by the human brain? – https://theconversation.com/robot-eyes-are-power-hungry-what-if-we-gave-them-tools-inspired-by-the-human-brain-257978

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-Evening Report: Robot eyes are power hungry. What if we gave them tools inspired by the human brain?

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Adam D Hines, Research Fellow, Centre for Robotics, Queensland University of Technology

    A hexapod robot navigating outdoors. Adam Hines

    Robots are increasingly becoming a part of our lives – from warehouse automation to robotic vacuum cleaners. And just like humans, robots need to know where they are to reliably navigate from A to B.

    How far, and for how long, a robot can navigate depends on how much power it consumes over time. Robot navigation systems are especially energy hungry.

    But what if power consumption was no longer a concern?

    Our research on “brain-inspired” computing, published today in Science Robotics, could make navigational robots of the future more energy efficient than previously imagined.

    This could potentially extend and expand what’s possible for battery-powered systems working in challenging environments such as disaster zones, underwater, and even in space.

    How do robots ‘see’ the world?

    The battery going flat on your smartphone is usually just a minor inconvenience. For a robot, running out of power can mean the difference between life and death – including for the people it might be helping.

    Robots such as search and rescue drones, underwater robots monitoring the Great Barrier Reef, and space rovers all need to navigate while running on limited power supplies.

    Robots that navigate challenging environments need a lot of battery power for their cameras and other sensors.
    NASA/JPL-Caltech/MSSS

    Many of these robots can’t rely on GPS for navigation. They keep track of where they are using a process called visual place recognition. Visual place recognition lets a robot estimate where it’s located in the world using just what it “sees” through its camera.

    But this method uses a lot of energy. Robotic vision systems alone can use up to a third of the energy from a typical lithium ion battery found onboard a robot.

    This is because modern robotic vision, including visual place recognition, typically relies on power-hungry machine learning models, similar to the ones used in AI like ChatGPT.

    By comparison, our brains require just enough power to turn on a light bulb, while allowing us to see things and navigate the world with remarkable precision.

    Robotics engineers often look to biology for inspiration. In our new study, we turned to the human brain to help us create a new, energy-efficient visual place recognition system.

    Mimicking the brain

    Our system uses a brain-inspired technology called neuromorphic computing. As the name suggests, neuromorphic computers take principles from neuroscience to design computer chips and software that can learn and process information like human brains do.

    An important feature of neuromorphic computers is that they are highly energy-efficient. A regular computer can use up to 100 times more power than a neuromorphic chip.

    Neuromorphic computing is not limited to just computer chips, however. It can be paired with bio-inspired cameras that capture the world more like the human eye does. These are called dynamic vision sensors, and they work like motion detectors for each pixel. They only “wake up” and send information when something changes in the scene, rather than constantly streaming data like a regular camera.

    What a regular camera sees (left) compared to a bio-inspired camera (right).
    Adam Hines

    These bio-inspired cameras are also highly energy efficient, using less than 1% of the power of normal cameras.

    So if brain-inspired computers and bio-inspired cameras are so wonderful, why aren’t robots using them everywhere? Well, there are a range of challenges to overcome, which was the focus of our recent research.

    A new kind of LENS

    The unique properties of a dynamic vision sensor are, ironically, a limiting factor in many visual place recognition systems.

    Standard visual place recognition models are built on the foundation of static images, like the ones taken by your smartphone. Since a neuromorphic sensor doesn’t produce static images but senses the world in a constantly changing way, we need a brain-inspired computer to process what it “sees”.

    Our research overcomes this challenge by combining neuromorphic chips and sensors for robots that use visual place recognition. We call this system Locational Encoding with Neuromorphic Systems, or LENS for short.

    LENS uses the continuous information stream from a dynamic vision sensor directly on a neuromorphic chip. The system uses a machine learning method known as spiking neural networks. These process information like human brains do.

    By combining all these neuromorphic components, we reduced the power needed for visual place recognition by over 90%. Since nearly a third of the energy needed for a robot is vision related, this is a significant reduction.

    To achieve this, we used an off-the-shelf product called SynSense Speck, which combines a neuromorphic chip and a dynamic vision sensor all in one compact package.

    The entire system only required 180 kilobytes of memory to map an area of Brisbane eight kilometres in length. That’s a tiny fraction of what would be needed in a standard visual place recognition system.

    Hexapod robots have six legs and can walk on different surfaces both indoors and outdoors.

    A robot in the wild

    For testing, we placed our LENS system on a hexapod robot. Hexapods are multi-terrain robots that can navigate both indoors and outdoors.

    In our tests, the LENS performed as well as a typical visual place recognition system, but used much less energy.

    Our work comes at a time when AI development is trending towards creating bigger, more power-hungry solutions for improved performance. The energy needed to train and use systems like OpenAI’s ChatGPT is notoriously demanding, with concerns that modern AI represents unsustainable growth in energy demands.

    For robots that need to navigate, developing more compact, energy-efficient AI using neuromorphic computing could be key for being able to go farther and for longer periods of time. There are still challenges to solve, but we are closer to making it a reality.

    Michael Milford receives funding from the Australian Research Council, the Australian Economic Accelerator, the Queensland Government, Amazon, Ford Motor Company, iMOVE CRC, the DAAD Australia-Germany Co-operation Scheme and DSTG. He is affiliated with the Motor Trades Association of Queensland as a non-executive board member.

    Tobias Fischer receives funding from the Australian Research Council, the DAAD Australia-Germany Co-operation Scheme, the Great Barrier Reef Foundation via the Reef Restoration and Adaptation Program, and the Queensland Department of Environment, Science and Innovation.

    Adam D Hines does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Robot eyes are power hungry. What if we gave them tools inspired by the human brain? – https://theconversation.com/robot-eyes-are-power-hungry-what-if-we-gave-them-tools-inspired-by-the-human-brain-257978

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI USA: Following Trump Attacks on TPS, Markey, Van Hollen, Senate Democrats Put Forward Bill to Protect TPS and DED Recipients

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Massachusetts Ed Markey

    Washington (June 18, 2025) – Today, U.S. Senator Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.) was joined by 30 Senate colleagues in putting forward legislation to provide qualified Temporary Protected Status (TPS) and Deferred Enforced Departure (DED) recipients a path to legal permanent residency. The Senators’ reintroduction of this legislation – the Safe Environment from Countries Under Repression and Emergency (SECURE) Act – comes as the Trump Administration and the right-wing Supreme Court undermine TPS, a program that has for years provided refuge to those living in America who have fled natural disasters, violence, and political insecurity. The Trump Administration has revoked TPS for an estimated 563,000 recipients from five countries – Venezuela, Haiti, Afghanistan, Cameroon, and Nepal – and while there have been legal challenges filed against this action, the Supreme Court has temporarily allowed the revocation to stand – putting hundreds of thousands at risk of deportation to their home countries where they would face serious danger.

    This legislation is endorsed by AFL-CIO, Laborers’ International Union of North America (LIUNA), International Union of Painters and Allied Trades (IUPAT), CASA, National TPS Alliance, Working Families United, the National Network for Arab American Communities, International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU), Service Employees International Union (SEIU), and Communities United for Status and Protection (CUSP).

    “As Donald Trump continues to strip immigrant communities of critical legal protections, we must protect the individuals who came to our country seeking safe harbor and who cannot return home safely. I am proud to join my colleagues in introducing the SECURE Act, to ensure that individuals fleeing armed conflicts, political unrest, or environmental disasters have a guaranteed pathway to safety in the United States. Recipients of Temporary Protected Status and Deferred Enforced Departure are our friends, our neighbors, our colleagues, and we cannot turn our backs on them. We must be loud and clear – immigrants are welcome here,” said Senator Markey.

    “America has long used the TPS and DED programs to offer special legal protections to individuals in the United States whose lives would be put at extreme risk if forced to return to their countries of origin. As they’ve sought safety and stability here, TPS and DED recipients have built new lives in America, living here legally for years – sometimes decades – and making important contributions to our communities. But the Trump Administration is threatening both the lives they have built and the safety of these individuals – forcing TPS recipients to return to dangerous places like Haiti, Venezuela, Afghanistan, and more. This bill offers much-needed certainty to TPS and DED recipients – providing a path to stay safely in the U.S. and continue to call America their home,” said Senator Van Hollen.

    “TPS and DED recipients are valuable members of our communities. Many have lived here for years with U.S. children, spouses, and even businesses they’ve built — yet they are forced to live in uncertainty and fear that they may lose everything if they lose TPS or DED. I’m proud to introduce this legislation to give TPS and DED recipients a path to permanent residence so they can continue to contribute to America,” said Senator Kaine.

    “America is strengthened by the contributions and hard work of immigrants. But this Administration’s cruelty has left thousands of workers in limbo — without legal status and without work authorization,” said Senator Padilla. “The SECURE Act provides TPS holders who live and work in the United States legally, seeking safety after fleeing dangerous conditions in their home countries, the security of a pathway to permanent residency protections while continuing to contribute to our communities and economy.”

    “TPS recipients have come to the U.S. to escape widespread violence and environmental disasters in their countries that make returning home unsafe.  As they rebuild their lives here, TPS recipients, as longtime residents of the United States, deserve security and certainty about their immigration status,” said Senator Durbin. “I’m joining Senator Van Hollen to introduce the SECURE Act to provide TPS recipients a pathway to legal permanent residency.”

    “As the Trump administration terrorizes immigrant communities and arbitrarily revokes TPS and DED for law-abiding immigrants, it’s important that we speak up and push back every way we can, and support individuals who are contributing to our communities and would be at severe risk if they were to be forced to return to their countries of origin,” said Senator Murray. “I’m proud to join my colleagues in introducing the SECURE Act to provide immigrants with Temporary Protected Status and Deferred Enforced Departure a path to legal permanent residency.”

    “After escaping horrific violence and persecution in their home countries, TPS and DED recipients come to this country in search of a better life,” said Senator Cortez Masto. “These hardworking men and women have been living in and contributing to our communities for years, and it’s common sense to give them the certainty they need to fulfill the American Dream.”

    “Virginia is home to tens of thousands of law-abiding immigrants who are unable to return to their countries of origin due to painful extraordinary circumstances. Though these individuals benefit from certain protections from deportation, they remain in limbo despite having lived and worked in the U.S. for years,” said Senator Warner. “I’m proud to introduce this legislation to create a real pathway to permanent residency for TPS and DED recipients who drive our economy and make valuable contributions to their communities.”

    “The Temporary Protected Status program has been a lifeline that has allowed people and families facing unimaginable circumstances to find a safe refuge here in the United States,” said Senator Rosen. “TPS recipients contribute to our communities and our economy, and they deserve a pathway to permanent residency, which is why I’m proud to help introduce this bill. I’ll keep standing up to protect Nevada’s immigrant families.”

    “TPS holders deserve certainty, especially when the Trump administration is suddenly ending people’s status with no justification and forcing them to return to unsafe conditions,” said Senator Schatz. “Our bill would enable TPS holders to apply for permanent status so they can continue to live, work, and contribute in the United States without constantly being stuck in limbo.”

    “Families should have protection from ongoing wars, environmental disasters, widespread illness, and other dangers that make it difficult to return home,” said Senator Warren. “While Donald Trump makes it harder for immigrants to navigate our complex immigration system, Senate Democrats are fighting back to protect these vulnerable families.”

    “Scripture tells us: welcome the stranger in your midst,” said Senator Coons. “When we welcome those fleeing persecution and violence, hunger and poverty around the world, we show the world our values. That makes America safer, and it grows the economy in states like Delaware. The SECURE Act gives people searching for freedom and safety, who love this country, and who are already adding their valuable skills and gifts to our nation, a path to continue to do so.”

    “Our country has long supported families fleeing violence and seeking refuge,” said Senator Luján. “As this administration continues its attacks on TPS recipients, Congress must ensure a legal pathway to permanent residency for those who contribute to our communities every day. That’s why I’m partnering with my colleagues to reintroduce the SECURE Act to provide permanent protections for thousands of TPS recipients who live and work lawfully in the U.S.”

    “As immigrant communities continue to come under attack, the SECURE Act provides a clear pathway to permanent residency—offering overdue, necessary protections for immigrants and the lives they’ve built in our nation. America is a nation of immigrants and has a storied history of providing opportunity and refuge for those fleeing hardship or crisis. Individuals with TPS and DED have made America their home—using their talents and skills to strengthen our economies and enrich our communities—often while the countries from which they fled remain in turmoil,” said Senator Blumenthal.

    “Trump’s heartless immigration policies do nothing to make us safer and betray our core values—our nation always has been and always will be stronger because of our immigrant communities,” said Senator Duckworth. “While no one is arguing that we shouldn’t be deporting violent criminals who pose a danger to our country, it’s cruel to target people who fled from life-threatening situations and have been productive members of our communities for years. I’m proud to help Senator Van Hollen reintroduce this legislation to help give TPS and DED recipients a path to remain here as legal permanent residents.”

    “Our country should serve as a refuge for individuals who cannot return to their home country due to dangerous circumstances,” said Senator Hirono. “TPS holders and DED recipients living in our country are essential members of our communities, making up a significant amount of our workforce and contributing to our economy. As this administration continues its all-out attack on immigrants and their loved ones, I am proud to reintroduce this legislation to provide TPS and DED recipients peace of mind that they can remain in the country safely and with a path to lawful permanent residence.”

    “This bill is a necessary step in creating a pathway to legal permanent residency for TPS recipients,” said Senator Bennet. “They are already facing extraordinary and unstable conditions in their home countries; they shouldn’t have to face those same conditions here in the U.S.”

    “I’m joining the effort to pass the SECURE Act to stand by thousands in New Jersey who do not deserve to live in uncertainty and fear as the Trump administration arbitrarily revokes Temporary Protected Status,” said Senator Kim. “TPS recipients are friends and neighbors who are part of our communities and are essential to the economic growth of our state. We should use this moment to address disorder in our TPS program and immigration system – and deliver eligible families a pathway toward permanent stability and security.”

    “TPS provides protection for individuals and families who are unable to return to their countries due to dangerous conditions, including natural disasters, armed conflicts, and other disasters. Many find refuge in California where they can live and work lawfully under its protections. This legislation would provide a much-needed sense of security and stability to those who are living in the legal limbo caused by President Trump’s targeting of this program and his continued erosion of our nation’s commitment to helping those fleeing violence, famine, disease, and disaster,” said Senator Schiff.

    The legislation is cosponsored by Senators Angela Alsobrooks (D-Md.), Tammy Baldwin (D-Wis.), Michael Bennet (D-Colo.), Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.), Cory Booker (D-N.J.), Chris Coons (D-Del.), Catherine Cortez-Masto (D-Nev.), Tammy Duckworth (D-Ill.), Dick Durbin (D-Ill.), Martin Heinrich (D-N.M.), John Hickenlooper (D-Colo.), Mazie Hirono (D-Hawaii), Tim Kaine (D-Va.), Andy Kim (D-N.J.) Amy Klobuchar (D-Minn.), Ben Ray Luján (D-N.M.), Patty Murray (D-Wash.), Alex Padilla (D-Calif.), Jack Reed (D-R.I.), Jacky Rosen (D-Nev.), Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.), Brian Schatz (D-Hawaii), Adam Schiff (D-Calif.), Tina Smith (D-Minn.), Mark Warner (D-Va.), Raphael Warnock (D-Ga.), Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.), Sheldon Whitehouse (D-R.I.), and Ron Wyden (D-Ore.).

    “Immigrant workers are under unprecedented attack: hundreds of thousands of people have been stripped of their legal status and work authorization, throwing families and industries into chaos and uncertainty. Workers with Temporary Protected Status, many of whom have lived and worked in our country for decades, are vital members of our communities and our unions. The SECURE Act is common-sense legislation that would provide TPS holders with stable, permanent lawful status so they can continue to raise their families, work, and contribute to our economy,” said Liz Shuler, AFL-CIO President.

    “LIUNA commends Senator Van Hollen for his tireless efforts to protect workers and their family members who have Temporary Protected Status (TPS), many of whom are members of our union and who have lived and worked in the U.S. for decades. About 1/3 of TPS holders work in construction. The SECURE Act will not only provide permanence to these hard-working immigrants, but will also help the U.S. economy by retaining these valued immigrants in our workforce,” said Brent Booker, General President, LIUNA.

    “Every day, thousands of people with TPS and DED who have built their lives, families, and futures here are forced to live with fear and uncertainty. They deserve more than endless waiting; they deserve real, permanent protection. As attacks on immigrant communities grow across the country, we must act without hesitation. We are grateful to Senator Van Hollen’s leadership – in this time of growing instability, the SECURE Act will offer dignity, safety, and security for our community,” said Cathryn Jackson, Public Policy Director of CASA.

    “Immigrant families and allies continue to advocate for permanent protections. The National TPS Alliance calls for long-overdue justice to our immigrant communities. The reintroduction of the SECURE Act in the Senate addresses the uncertainty that our families have been living for years. This bill is timely, ensuring that TPS holders don’t fall out of status and in turn preventing irreparable harm to whole communities, continuing critical contributions to the nation’s economy. We urge congressional leaders to support this critical effort,” said Mardoel Hernandez, TPS recipient from Honduras and National TPS Alliance Executive Committee Member.

    “TPS holders, including members of my own union, contribute to our economy every single day. Some may not know it, but our society is dependent on TPS holders in different industries, including in the building and construction trades. We need the SECURE Act so these workers can continue living, working, and raising their families without fear,” said IUPAT General President Jimmy Williams, Jr.; IUPAT is a member of the Working Families United Coalition.

    “The SECURE Act offers overdue protection for hundreds of thousands living in fear of being uprooted from the families, homes, and careers they built. The National Network for Arab American Communities believes this bill reflects a critical truth: our democracy and safety are strongest when everyone has the opportunity to live and contribute freely and lawfully,” said Rima Meroueh, Director, National Network for Arab American Communities.

    “Now more than ever, we need a solution for immigrants with Temporary Protected Status from countries like El Salvador, Honduras, Venezuela and Haiti, whose lives have been in limbo under the chaos of this administration. We applaud the reintroduction of the SECURE Act by Senator Chris Van Hollen, which would create a path to citizenship for these individuals who contribute billions to our economy and whose lives would be in danger if they were sent back immediately to their home countries,” said Rocio Saenz, Secretary-Treasurer, SEIU.

    “The ILWU stands in strong support of the SECURE Act, a commonsense measure that serves our country’s interests and recognizes the dignity and contributions of TPS and DED holders — hardworking individuals who have paid their taxes, contributed to our economy, and been model members of our communities. These men and women have earned a chance to live without fear, continue to contribute to their communities and build their lives in the country they’ve long called home. We urge Congress to pass this vital legislation without delay,” said International Longshore and Warehouse Union President Robert Olvera.

    “Communities United for Status & Protection (CUSP) endorses the SECURE Act as a critical step toward justice and stability for immigrants with Temporary Protected Status (TPS) and Deferred Enforced Departure (DED). For decades, these communities—Black, Asian, brown, working-class immigrants from countries facing war, repression, and climate disaster—have lived, worked, and raised families in the U.S. They are essential to our economy, our neighborhoods, and our collective future. Yet they continue to live in uncertainty, without a pathway to permanent protection. The SECURE Act honors their dignity, recognizes their profound contributions, and upholds our nation’s values of fairness and humanitarian responsibility. We urge Congress to act with courage and conscience and pass this bill without delay,” said Carolyn Tran, Executive Director, Communities United for Status & Protection (CUSP).

    Additional Background

    TPS is a temporary, legal immigration status granted to foreign citizens who are endangered by conditions in their home country resulting from extraordinary events such as ongoing armed conflict, environmental disaster, or epidemic. TPS status is granted for set periods ranging from six to 18 months, requiring the Department of Homeland Security to extend a country’s status on a recurring basis. Each time a country is recertified, recipients must reapply and pass a thorough background check. Recent estimates found there are approximately 860,000 people with TPS in the United States.

    Deferred enforced departure (DED) is a temporary and discretionary administrative stay of removal granted to foreign citizens from designated countries. Unlike TPS, a DED designation emanates from the President’s constitutional powers to conduct foreign relations and has no statutory basis. Grants are usually in response to war, civil unrest, or natural disasters, through an executive order or presidential memorandum that provides eligibility guidelines.

    The SECURE Act will provide long-term stability for these individuals and their communities by giving them the ability to apply for legal permanent residency. Under the bill, all TPS recipients – current and past – and TPS and DED eligible individuals who have been continuously present in the United States for at least three years would be eligible to apply for legal permanent residency.

    Additionally, under the SECURE Act:

    • A spouse, domestic partner, child, or unmarried child of a qualifying non-citizen would be eligible to obtain permanent resident status (upon meeting certain requirements).
    • Individuals with a pending TPS application will receive work authorization and be eligible for travel authorization.
    • Non-citizens who have a pending application or is prima facie eligible for permanent status under the bill and intends to apply are shielded from deportation.
    • Information from an applicant’s application may not be shared or used for immigration enforcement purposes, with limited exceptions, such as for the identification of fraudulent claims.
    • DHS must report to Congress when terminating a country’s TPS designation with an explanation to justify the termination.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Senators Ricketts and Kaine Introduce the AUKUS Improvement Act

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator Pete Ricketts (Nebraska)

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, U.S. Senators Pete Ricketts (R-NE) and Tim Kaine (D-VA) introduced the AUKUS Improvement Act. Building upon the bipartisan, AUKUS-enabling legislation in the FY24 National Defense Authorization Act, the AUKUS Improvement Act will further streamline defense industrial base collaboration and co-production between the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom.  The legislation was also sponsored by Senators John Cornyn (R-TX), Chris Murphy (D-CT), and Dan Sullivan (R-AK).

    The United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom collectively face our most challenging threat environment since WWII. As we approach the 4th anniversary of AUKUS, it’s clear more should be done to break down bureaucratic obstacles and ensure a more seamless defense innovation and trade environment,” said Ricketts. “By streamlining transfers of critical capabilities to two of our closest allies while also facilitating a more efficient co-production ecosystem, the AUKUS Improvement Act will strengthen our allies’ warfighting edge, improve interoperability, and support our own industrial base.”

    “The AUKUS partnership is critical to countering the threat from China and ensuring the Indo-Pacific remains free and open,” said Kaine. “I’m proud to introduce this bipartisan legislation to strengthen AUKUS and boost defense collaboration among our countries.”

    The AUKUS Improvement Act would:

    • Exempt State Department-vetted entities that have been approved as AUKUS Authorized Users from the requirement to obtain Third Party Transfer approvals under Foreign Military Sales. 
    • Exempt Australia and the United Kingdom from the need for Congressional Notification for overseas manufacturing.

    BACKGROUND:

    In the last five years, Australia has placed $23 billion in Foreign Military Sales (FMS) orders, making it one of the biggest users of the FMS process. FMS ensures Australia is procuring the exact same variant that the U.S. military uses, enabling greater interoperability. It also supports American deployed forces operating in Australia through access to spare parts. Australia is often required to transfer elements of equipment procured through FMS to industry for further development, operation, maintenance, and sustainment. In order to do this, it must obtain written consent from the State Department in the form of a Third Party Transfer (TPT) request. However, the TPT process can be slow, with applications often taking many months before being approved. By making TPTs made under FMS subject to similar export controls to those made under AUKUS for Direct Commercial Sales (DCS), the AUKUS Improvement Act will get capability in the hands of our allies faster.

    In March 2021, Australia established the Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance (GWEO) Enterprise to expand its munitions and missile stockpiles, establish domestic manufacturing ofguided weapons, and supplement international partners’ supply chains. As part of this announcement, Australia and the U.S. agreed to collaborate on a flexible guided weapons production capability in Australia, with an initial focus on the potential for co-production of Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS) by 2025, and eventual co-production of the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM).

    However, the Arms Export Control Act requires Congressional Notification (CN) 15 days prior to approving a commercial technical assistance or manufacturing license agreement to manufacture significant military equipment abroad, regardless of the value. Currently, State Department excludes any transfer of defense articles, technical data, or services that requires a CN from the license-free environment and expedited processing provisions under AUKUS. Therefore, Australia is required to obtain a Manufacturing License Agreement to receive the technical data and manufacturing know-how for each component of a precision-guided munition. This adds complexity, time, and cost, therebylimiting munitions co-production cooperation that benefits both the U.S. and Australia.

    Bill text can be found here.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Tribunal Initiates Final Injury Inquiry—Polyethylene terephthalate from China and Pakistan

    Source: Government of Canada News (2)

    Ottawa, Ontario, June 18, 2025—The Canadian International Trade Tribunal today initiated an inquiry to determine whether the dumping of polyethylene terephthalate from China and Pakistan and the subsidizing of the above-mentioned goods from China have caused injury or retardation or are threatening to cause injury. This final injury inquiry was initiated further to a notice received from the Canada Border Services Agency stating that preliminary determinations had been made respecting the dumping and subsidizing of the above-mentioned goods.

    On October 15, 2025, the Tribunal will determine whether the dumping and subsidizing have caused injury or retardation or are threatening to cause injury to the domestic industry.

    The Tribunal is an independent quasi-judicial body that reports to Parliament through the Minister of Finance. It hears cases on dumped and subsidized imports, safeguard complaints, complaints about federal government procurement and appeals of customs and excise tax rulings. When requested by the federal government, the Tribunal also provides advice on other economic, trade and tariff matters.

    Any interested person, association or government that wishes to participate in the Tribunal’s inquiry may do so by filing Form I—Notice of Participation.

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Tribunal Continues Orders—Circular Copper Tube from Brazil, Greece, China, South Korea and Mexico

    Source: Government of Canada News (2)

    Ottawa, Ontario, June 18, 2025—The Canadian International Trade Tribunal today continued its orders made on September 25, 2019, in expiry review RR‑2018‑005, concerning the dumping of circular copper tube from Brazil, Greece, China, South Korea and Mexico, and the subsidizing of these goods from China.

    The Tribunal found that the expiry of the orders was likely to result in injury. As such, the Tribunal continued its orders. The Canada Border Services Agency will therefore continue to impose anti-dumping and countervailing duties on these goods.

    The Tribunal is an independent quasi-judicial body that reports to Parliament through the Minister of Finance. It hears cases on dumped and subsidized imports, safeguard complaints, complaints about federal government procurement and appeals of customs and excise tax rulings. When requested by the federal government, the Tribunal also provides advice on other economic, trade and tariff matters.

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Vice Premier of the State Council of China calls for promoting high-quality development of foreign trade

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    QINGDAO, June 18 (Xinhua) — Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng has called for stepping up efforts to stabilize foreign trade, strengthening support and improving services for foreign trade enterprises, and giving full play to their competitive advantages to ensure high-quality development of China’s foreign trade.

    He Lifeng, also a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, made the remarks during an inspection tour of east China’s Shandong Province from Tuesday to Wednesday.

    The Vice Premier pointed out that amid the complicated international environment this year, Chinese industrial exporters have overcome serious challenges and demonstrated outstanding resilience. By offering high-quality products at competitive prices, they not only support domestic economic development, but also further strengthen the stability of the world economy, he said.

    Exporters should give full play to their advantages by focusing on key areas, He Lifeng said, calling on them to take root in international markets and continuously upgrade products, technologies and business models.

    The Vice Premier of the State Council also called on industrial exporters to organically combine the expansion of foreign trade with the satisfaction of domestic demand.

    He Lifeng called on local authorities to promptly resolve practical issues of concern to foreign trade enterprises, strengthen their support and improve services to promote high-quality development of foreign trade. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Chicago Lab Owner Sentenced to Seven Years in Prison in Connection with $14M COVID-19 Fraud Scheme

    Source: US State of California

    The owner of a Chicago laboratory has been sentenced today to seven years in prison for his role in a COVID-19 testing fraud scheme.

    According to court documents, Zishan Alvi, 46, of Inverness, Ill., owned and operated a laboratory in Chicago that performed testing for COVID-19. In 2021 and 2022, Alvi caused claims to be submitted to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) for COVID-19 tests that were either not performed at all or not performed correctly. As part of the scheme, the laboratory released negative test results to patients, even though the laboratory either had not tested the specimens or the results were inconclusive because Alvi had diluted the tests to save on costs, rendering the tests unreliable. Alvi knew that the laboratory was releasing negative results for tests that were not performed or were inconclusive but still caused the laboratory to bill HRSA for those tests. Alvi also lied to laboratory directors to conceal his fraud. As a result of the fraudulent claims, HRSA paid the laboratory more than $14 million.

    Alvi pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud on September 30, 2024. At sentencing, he was also ordered to pay $14,199,217 in restitution, and forfeit approximately $6.8 million in cash, a 2021 Range Rover HSE, and over $630,000 from an E-Trade account.

    Matthew R. Galeotti, Head of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division, U.S. Attorney Andrew S. Boutros for the Northern District of Illinois, Special Agent in Charge Douglas S. DePodesta of the FBI Chicago Field Office, and Deputy Inspector General for Investigations Christian J. Schrank, of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General (HHS-OIG) made the announcement.

    The FBI and HHS-OIG investigated the case.

    Trial Attorney Claire Sobczak Pacelli of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section and Assistant U.S. Attorney Jared Hasten for the Northern District of Illinois prosecuted the case.

    The Fraud Section leads the Criminal Division’s efforts to combat health care fraud through the Health Care Fraud Strike Force Program. Since March 2007, this program, currently comprised of nine strike forces operating in 27 federal districts, has charged more than 5,800 defendants who collectively have billed federal health care programs and private insurers more than $30 billion. In addition, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, working in conjunction with the Office of the Inspector General for the Department of Health and Human Services, are taking steps to hold providers accountable for their involvement in health care fraud schemes. More information can be found at https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/health-care-fraud-unit.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Denis Manturov met Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto at St. Petersburg airport

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    First Deputy Prime Minister of Russia Denis Manturov met Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto at Pulkovo Airport, who arrived on an official visit to hold talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin and participate in the XXVIII St. Petersburg International Economic Forum.

    Let us recall that First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov, as the chairman of the Russian part of the Russian-Indonesian Joint Commission on Trade, Economic and Technical Cooperation, visited Jakarta in April of this year to hold the 13th meeting of the commission.

    The high dynamics of bilateral contacts contribute to the successful development of cooperation between Russia and Indonesia in a wide range of areas, including trade, industry, agriculture, energy, transport, tourism, as well as humanitarian spheres, in particular education, culture and sports.

    By the end of 2024, the volume of trade turnover between Russia and Indonesia amounted to 4.3 billion dollars.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI USA: NASA Astronauts to Answer Questions from Students in New York, Utah

    Source: NASA

    Students from New York and Utah will hear from NASA astronauts aboard the International Space Station as they answer prerecorded questions in two separate events.
    At 11:30 a.m. EDT on Monday, June 23, NASA astronauts Nichole Ayers and Anne McClain will answer questions submitted by students from P.S. 71 Forest Elementary School in Ridgewood, New York. Media interested in covering the event must RSVP by 5 p.m. Friday, June 20, to Regina Beshay at: rbeshay2@school.nyc.gov or 347-740-6165.
    At 11:05 a.m. on Friday, June 27, Ayers and McClain will answer questions submitted by students from Douglas Space and Science Foundation, Inc., in Layton, Utah. Media interested in covering the event must RSVP by 5 p.m. Wednesday, June 25, to Sarah Merrill at: sarahmonique@gmail.com or 805-743-3341.
    Watch the 20-minute Earth-to-space calls on NASA STEM YouTube Channel.
    P.S. 71 Forest Elementary School will host kindergarten through fifth grade students. Douglas Space and Science Foundation will host participants from the Science, Technology, Achievement Research camp. Both events aim to inspire students to imagine a future in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics careers through ongoing collaborations, mentorship, and hands-on learning experiences.
    For nearly 25 years, astronauts have continuously lived and worked aboard the space station, testing technologies, performing science, and developing skills needed to explore farther from Earth. Astronauts aboard the orbiting laboratory communicate with NASA’s Mission Control Center in Houston 24 hours a day through SCaN’s (Space Communications and Navigation) Near Space Network.
    Important research and technology investigations taking place aboard the space station benefit people on Earth and lays the groundwork for other agency missions. As part of NASA’s Artemis campaign, the agency will send astronauts to the Moon to prepare for future human exploration of Mars; inspiring explorers and ensuring the United States continues to lead in space exploration and discovery.
    See videos of astronauts aboard the space station at:
    https://www.nasa.gov/stemonstation
    -end-
    Gerelle DodsonHeadquarters, Washington202-358-1600gerelle.q.dodson@nasa.gov
    Sandra JonesJohnson Space Center, Houston281-483-5111sandra.p.jones@nasa.gov

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Chicago Lab Owner Sentenced to Seven Years in Prison in Connection with $14M COVID-19 Fraud Scheme

    Source: United States Department of Justice Criminal Division

    The owner of a Chicago laboratory has been sentenced today to seven years in prison for his role in a COVID-19 testing fraud scheme.

    According to court documents, Zishan Alvi, 46, of Inverness, Ill., owned and operated a laboratory in Chicago that performed testing for COVID-19. In 2021 and 2022, Alvi caused claims to be submitted to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) for COVID-19 tests that were either not performed at all or not performed correctly. As part of the scheme, the laboratory released negative test results to patients, even though the laboratory either had not tested the specimens or the results were inconclusive because Alvi had diluted the tests to save on costs, rendering the tests unreliable. Alvi knew that the laboratory was releasing negative results for tests that were not performed or were inconclusive but still caused the laboratory to bill HRSA for those tests. Alvi also lied to laboratory directors to conceal his fraud. As a result of the fraudulent claims, HRSA paid the laboratory more than $14 million.

    Alvi pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud on September 30, 2024. At sentencing, he was also ordered to pay $14,199,217 in restitution, and forfeit approximately $6.8 million in cash, a 2021 Range Rover HSE, and over $630,000 from an E-Trade account.

    Matthew R. Galeotti, Head of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division, U.S. Attorney Andrew S. Boutros for the Northern District of Illinois, Special Agent in Charge Douglas S. DePodesta of the FBI Chicago Field Office, and Deputy Inspector General for Investigations Christian J. Schrank, of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General (HHS-OIG) made the announcement.

    The FBI and HHS-OIG investigated the case.

    Trial Attorney Claire Sobczak Pacelli of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section and Assistant U.S. Attorney Jared Hasten for the Northern District of Illinois prosecuted the case.

    The Fraud Section leads the Criminal Division’s efforts to combat health care fraud through the Health Care Fraud Strike Force Program. Since March 2007, this program, currently comprised of nine strike forces operating in 27 federal districts, has charged more than 5,800 defendants who collectively have billed federal health care programs and private insurers more than $30 billion. In addition, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, working in conjunction with the Office of the Inspector General for the Department of Health and Human Services, are taking steps to hold providers accountable for their involvement in health care fraud schemes. More information can be found at https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/health-care-fraud-unit.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Banking: WTO members review six regional trade agreements, discuss transparency issues

    Source: WTO

    Headline: WTO members review six regional trade agreements, discuss transparency issues

    The Committee considered the following Agreements:

    The Chair of the Committee, Ambassador José Valencia of Ecuador, noted that 61 RTAs in force have still not been notified to the WTO up to 2 June 2025 – up from 58 RTAs on the previous list.
    The Chair outlined the informal consultations he recently held with members on the issues of  non-notified RTAs, factual presentations, and possible inputs for the 14th WTO Ministerial Conference to be held in Yaoundé, Cameroon, on 26-29 March 2026.
    Ambassador Valencia shared a report summarizing members’ views, with background context provided primarily by the Secretariat, and his own suggestions for action. The report was presented under the Chair’s own responsibility and without prejudice to members’ views. Further informal consultations are planned after the summer to facilitate deeper discussions on the report’s content and future actions.
    Under other business, Brazil sought clarification on the trade deal recently announced by the United States and the United Kingdom. The US and the UK said they would relay the questions to capitals and revert back.
    Next meeting
    The next Committee meeting is scheduled for 10 November.

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    MIL OSI Global Banks

  • MIL-OSI Banking: Trade Policy Review: Colombia

    Source: World Trade Organization

    The following documents are available:

    Secretariat report

    A detailed report written independently by the WTO Secretariat.

    Government report

    A policy statement by the government of the member under review.

    From the meeting

    The Secretariat and Government reports are discussed by the WTO’s full membership in the Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB).

    Background

    Trade Policy Reviews are an exercise, mandated in the WTO agreements, in which member countries’ trade and related policies are examined and evaluated at regular intervals. Significant developments that may have an impact on the global trading system are also monitored. All WTO members are subject to review, with the frequency of review depending on the country’s size.

    Share

    MIL OSI Global Banks

  • MIL-OSI Banking: Strengthening The Rules-Based Fiscal Framework in Papua New Guinea: Papua New Guinea

    Source: International Monetary Fund

    Preview Citation

    Format: Chicago

    Yue Zhou, and Bryn Welham. “Strengthening The Rules-Based Fiscal Framework in Papua New Guinea: Papua New Guinea”, Selected Issues Papers 2025, 084 (2025), accessed June 18, 2025, https://doi.org/10.5089/9798229012164.018

    Export Citation

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    Summary

    Papua New Guinea’s public debt has increased significantly in recent years, leading to a high risk of debt distress and exposing significant gaps in the existing fiscal setting. This paper proposes to strengthen the authorities’ fiscal framework by introducing a clear public debt anchor and a primary balance rule. Specifically, we consider setting the medium-term debt anchor at between 30 and 40 percent of GDP to ensure that the debt limit of 60 percent is not breached under most scenarios, and using the primary balance as an operational policy instrument to facilitate the convergence of public debt to its anchor.

    Subject: Asset and liability management, Debt limits, Expenditure, Fiscal governance, Fiscal policy, Fiscal rules, Fiscal stance, Public debt

    Keywords: Debt anchor, Debt limits, Fiscal governance, Fiscal rule, Fiscal rules, Fiscal stance, Papua New Guinea, Public debt

    Publication Details

    MIL OSI Global Banks

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Adoption by the Union of the Agreement on the interpretation and application of the Energy Charter Treaty – P10_TA(2025)0126 – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

    Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 194 thereof,

    Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

    After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,

    Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee(1),

    After consulting the Committee of the Regions,

    Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure(2),

    Whereas:

    (1)  In its judgment of 2 September 2021 in case C‑741/19(3), Republic of Moldova v Komstroy (the ‘Komstroy judgment’), the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) held that Article 26(2), point (c), of the Energy Charter Treaty, approved on behalf of the European Communities by Council and Commission Decision 98/181/EC, ECSC, Euratom(4), is to be interpreted as not being applicable to disputes between a Member State and an investor of another Member State concerning an investment made by that investor in the first Member State, i.e. intra-EU disputes.

    (2)  Despite the Komstroy judgment, arbitral tribunals have continued to accept jurisdiction and to issue awards in intra-EU arbitration proceedings which are purportedly based on Article 26(2), point (c), of the Energy Charter Treaty. According to the CJEU, any such award is incompatible with Union law, in particular Articles 267 and 344 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Therefore, such awards cannot produce legal effects and the payment of compensation further to those awards cannot be enforced.

    (3)  The effective implementation of Union law is being undermined by the issuing of awards violating Union law in intra-EU arbitration proceedings. There is a risk of a conflict between the Treaties, on the one hand, and the Energy Charter Treaty as interpreted by some arbitral tribunals, on the other, which would, if confirmed by the courts of a third country, become a de facto legal conflict where such awards were circulating in the legal orders of third countries.

    (4)  According to the case law of the CJEU, the risk of a legal conflict is sufficient to render an international agreement incompatible with Union law. The risk of such a conflict between the Treaties and the Energy Charter Treaty should therefore be eliminated. The adoption of an instrument of international law, in the form of an agreement setting out the common understanding of the parties to that agreement on the non-applicability of Article 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty as a basis for intra-EU arbitration proceedings, would help to eliminate that risk.

    (5)  The Commission, on behalf of the Union, and the ▌ Member States have ▌ concluded negotiations on the terms of an agreement on the interpretation and application of the Energy Charter Treaty. The common understanding contained in that agreement has been reiterated in the ‘Declaration on the legal consequences of the judgment of the Court of Justice in Komstroy and common understanding on the non-applicability of Article 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty as a basis for intra-EU arbitration proceedings’ of 26 June 2024(5).

    (6)  The Agreement on the interpretation and application of the Energy Charter Treaty should therefore be approved in order to enable its signature by the Union and to express the Union’s consent to be bound by it,

    HAVE ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

    Article 1

    The Agreement on the interpretation and application of the Energy Charter Treaty accompanying this Decision is hereby approved.

    Article 2

    This Decision shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

    Done at …,

    For the European Parliament For the Council

    The President The President

    AGREEMENT ON THE INTERPRETATION

    AND APPLICATION OF THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY ▌

    THE KINGDOM OF BELGIUM,

    THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA,

    THE CZECH REPUBLIC,

    THE KINGDOM OF DENMARK,

    THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY,

    THE REPUBLIC OF ESTONIA,

    IRELAND,

    THE HELLENIC REPUBLIC,

    THE KINGDOM OF SPAIN,

    THE FRENCH REPUBLIC,

    THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA,

    THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC,

    THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS,

    THE REPUBLIC OF LATVIA,

    THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA,

    THE GRAND DUCHY OF LUXEMBOURG,

    THE REPUBLIC OF MALTA,

    THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS,

    THE REPUBLIC OF AUSTRIA,

    THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND,

    THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC,

    ROMANIA,

    THE REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA,

    THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC,

    THE REPUBLIC OF FINLAND,

    THE KINGDOM OF SWEDEN and

    THE EUROPEAN UNION ▌

    hereinafter jointly referred to as the ‘Parties’

    HAVING in mind the Energy Charter Treaty, signed in Lisbon on 17 December 1994(6) and approved on behalf of the European Communities by Council and Commission Decision 98/181/EC, ECSC, Euratom on 23 September 1997(7), as last amended ,

    HAVING in mind the rules of customary international law as codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, done at Vienna on 23 May 1969,

    CONSIDERING that the members of a Regional Economic Integration Organisation within the meaning of Article 1, point 3, of the Energy Charter Treaty hereby express a common understanding on the interpretation and application of a treaty in their inter se relations,

    RECALLING that withdrawal from the Energy Charter Treaty does not affect the composition of the Regional Economic Integration Organisation referred to in that Treaty, nor does it preclude an interest in expressing a common understanding on the interpretation and application of that Treaty for as long as it may be held to produce legal effects in relation to a Party that withdrew, and in particular in respect of Article 47(3) of the Energy Charter Treaty,

    HAVING in mind the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) ▌ and the general principles of European Union ▌ law,

    CONSIDERING that the references to the European Union in this Agreement are to be understood also as references to its predecessor, the European Economic Community and, subsequently, the European Community, until the latter was superseded by the European Union,

    RECALLING that, in line with the case-law of the Permanent Court of International Justice(8) and of the International Court of Justice(9), the right of giving an authoritative interpretation of a legal rule belongs to the parties to an international agreement in relation to that agreement,

    RECALLING that the Member States of the European Union (‘Member States’) have assigned the right of giving authoritative interpretations of Union ▌law to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), as explained by the CJEU in its judgment of 30 May 2006 in case C-459/03, Commission v Ireland (Mox Plant)(10), which held that the exclusive competence to interpret and apply Union ▌law extends to the interpretation and application of international agreements to which the European Union and its Member States are parties in the case of a dispute between two Member States or between the European Union and a Member State,

    RECALLING that, in accordance with Article 344 TFEU ▌, Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaties to a method of settlement other than those provided for therein,

    RECALLING that in its judgment of 6 March 2018 in case C-284/16, Achmea(11), the CJEU held that Articles 267 and 344 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding a provision in an international agreement concluded between Member States under which an investor from one of those Member States may, in the event of a dispute concerning investments in the other Member State, bring proceedings against the latter Member State before an arbitral tribunal whose jurisdiction that Member State has undertaken to accept,

    RECALLING the consistently reiterated position of the European Union that the Energy Charter Treaty was not meant to apply in intra-EU relations and that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of the European Union, of the European Atomic Energy Community and of their Member States that the Energy Charter Treaty would create any obligations among them since it was negotiated as an instrument of the European Union’s external energy policy with a view to establishing a framework for energy cooperation with third countries whereas, by contrast, the European Union’s internal energy policy consists of an elaborate system of rules designed to create an internal market in the field of energy which exclusively regulates relations between Member States in that field,

    RECALLING that in its judgment of 2 September 2021 in case C-741/19, Republic of Moldova v Komstroy(12) (the ‘Komstroy judgment’), as confirmed in its opinion of 16 June 2022, 1/20(13), the CJEU held that Article 26(2), point (c), of the Energy Charter Treaty must be interpreted as not being applicable to disputes between a Member State and an investor of another Member State concerning an investment made by the latter in the former Member State,

    RECALLING that, as an interpretation by the competent court and reflecting a general principle of public international law, the interpretation of the Energy Charter Treaty in the Komstroy judgment applies as of the approval of the Energy Charter Treaty by the European Communities and their Member States,

    CONSIDERING that Articles 267 and 344 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding an interpretation of Article 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty that allows for disputes between, on the one hand, an investor of one Member State and, on the other hand, another Member State or the European Union ▌to be resolved before an arbitral tribunal (‘intra-EU arbitration proceedings’),

    CONSIDERING, in any event, that, where a dispute between, on the one hand, an investor of one Member State and, on the other hand, another Member State or the European Union cannot be settled amicably, a party to that dispute may as always choose to submit it for resolution to the competent courts or administrative tribunals in accordance with national law, as guaranteed by general principles of law and respect for fundamental rights enshrined, inter alia, in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

    SHARING the common understanding expressed in this Agreement ▌that, as a result, a clause such as Article 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty could not in the past and cannot now or in the future serve as the legal basis for arbitration proceedings initiated by an investor from one Member State concerning investments in another Member State,

    REITERATING Declaration No 17 concerning primacy, annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, which recalls that the Treaties and the law adopted by the Union on the basis of the Treaties have primacy over the law of the Member States, and that the principle of primacy constitutes a conflict rule in their mutual relations,

    RECALLING, consequently, that, in order to resolve any conflict of norms, an international agreement concluded by the Member States under international law may apply in intra-EU relations only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with the EU Treaties,

    CONSIDERING that, as a result of the non-applicability of Article 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty as a legal basis for intra-EU arbitration proceedings, Article 47(3) of the Energy Charter Treaty cannot extend, and was not intended to extend, to such proceedings,

    CONSIDERING that, as a result of the non-applicability of Article 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty as a legal basis for intra-EU arbitration proceedings, Parties▌ that are concerned by pending intra-EU arbitration proceedings, whether as respondent or as the Member State of an investor, should cooperate in order to ensure that the existence of this Agreement is brought to the attention of the arbitral tribunal concerned to allow the appropriate conclusion to be drawn as to the absence of jurisdiction of that tribunal,

    CONSIDERING, in addition, that no new intra-EU arbitration proceedings should be registered, and AGREEING that, where a notice of arbitration is nevertheless delivered, the ▌ Parties that are concerned by those proceedings, whether as respondent or as the Member State of an investor, should cooperate in order to ensure that the existence of this Agreement is brought to the attention of the arbitral tribunal concerned to allow the appropriate conclusion to be drawn that Article 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty cannot serve as a legal basis for such proceedings,

    CONSIDERING, nevertheless, that settlements and awards in intra-EU investment arbitration cases that can no longer be annulled or set aside and that were voluntarily complied with or definitively enforced should not be challenged,

    REGRETTING that arbitral awards have already been rendered, continue to be rendered and could still be rendered, by arbitral tribunals in intra-EU arbitration proceedings initiated with reference to Article 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty, in a manner contrary to European Union law▌, including as expressed in the case-law of the CJEU,

    also REGRETTING that such arbitral awards are the subject of enforcement proceedings, including in third countries, that in pending intra-EU arbitration proceedings purportedly based on Article 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty arbitral tribunals do not decline competence and jurisdiction, and that arbitral institutions continue to register new arbitration proceedings and do not reject them as manifestly inadmissible due to lack of consent to submit to arbitration,

    CONSIDERING, therefore, that it is necessary to reiterate, expressly and unambiguously, the consistent position of the Parties by means of an agreement reaffirming their common understanding on the interpretation and application of the Energy Charter Treaty, as interpreted by the CJEU, to the extent that it concerns intra-EU arbitration proceedings,

    CONSIDERING that, in accordance with the judgment of the International Court of Justice of 5 February 1970, Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited(14), and as explained by the CJEU in the Komstroy judgment, certain provisions of the Energy Charter Treaty are intended to govern bilateral relations,

    CONSIDERING therefore that this Agreement only concerns bilateral relationships between the Parties and, by extension, investors from those Member States as Contracting Parties to the Energy Charter Treaty, and that, as a result, this Agreement affects only those Contracting Parties to the Energy Charter Treaty that are governed by the law of the European Union▌ as a Regional Economic Integration Organisation within the meaning of Article 1, point 3, of the Energy Charter Treaty and does not affect the enjoyment by the other Contracting Parties to the Energy Charter Treaty of their rights under that Treaty or the performance of their obligations,

    RECALLING that the Parties have informed the ▌ Contracting Parties to the Energy Charter Treaty of their intention to conclude this Agreement,

    CONSIDERING that by concluding this Agreement and in line with their legal obligations under European Union ▌law, but without prejudice to their right to make such claims as they consider appropriate in relation to costs incurred by them as respondents in relation to intra-EU arbitration proceedings, the Parties ensure full and effective compliance with the Komstroy judgment, and underline the unenforceability of existing arbitral awards, the obligation for arbitral tribunals to immediately terminate any pending intra-EU arbitration proceedings, the obligation for arbitral institutions not to register any future intra-EU arbitration proceedings, in line with their respective powers under Article 36(3) of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (‘ICSID’), concluded in Washington on 18 March 1965, and Article 12 of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (‘SCC’) arbitration rules, and the obligation for arbitral tribunals to declare that any intra-EU arbitration proceedings sought to be registered before them lack a legal basis,

    UNDERSTANDING that this Agreement covers investor-State arbitration proceedings involving the ▌Parties in intra-EU disputes based on Article 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty under any arbitration convention or set of rules, including ICSID and the ICSID arbitration rules, the Arbitration Institute of the SCC arbitration rules, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law arbitration rules and ad hoc arbitration, and

    BEARING in mind that the provisions of this Agreement are without prejudice to the right of the European Commission or any Member State to bring an action before the CJEU based on Articles 258, 259 and 260 TFEU,

    HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

    SECTION 1

    Common understanding on the non-applicability of article 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty as a basis for Intra-EU arbitration proceedings

    Article 1

    Definitions

    For the purposes of this Agreement, the following definitions shall apply:

    (1)  “Energy Charter Treaty” means the Energy Charter Treaty signed at Lisbon on 17 December 1994 and approved on behalf of the European Communities by Decision 98/181/EC, ECSC, Euratom on 23 September 1997, as it may be amended from time to time;

    (2)  “intra-EU relations” means relations between Member States ▌ or between a Member State and the European Union ▌;

    (3)  “intra-EU arbitration proceedings” means any proceedings before an arbitral tribunal initiated with reference to Article 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty to resolve a dispute between, on the one hand, an investor of one Member State and, on the other hand, another Member State or the European Union ▌.

    Article 2

    Common understanding ▌on the interpretation and continued non-applicability of Article 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty and the lack of legal basis for intra-EU arbitration proceedings

    1.  The ▌ Parties hereby reaffirm, for greater certainty, that they share a common understanding on the interpretation and application of the Energy Charter Treaty according to which Article 26 of that Treaty cannot and never could serve as a legal basis for intra-EU arbitration proceedings.

    The common understanding expressed in the first subparagraph is based on the following elements of European Union law:

    (a)  the interpretation by the CJEU of Article 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty to mean that that provision does not apply, and should never have been applied, as a basis for intra-EU arbitration proceedings; and

    (b)  the primacy of European Union law, recalled in Declaration No 17, annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, as a rule of international law governing conflict of norms in their mutual relations, with the result that, in any event, Article 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty does not and could not apply as a basis for intra-EU arbitration proceedings.

    2.  The ▌ Parties reaffirm, for greater certainty, that they share the common understanding that, as a result of the absence of a legal basis for intra-EU arbitration proceedings pursuant to Article 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty, Article 47(3) of the Energy Charter Treaty does not extend, and could not have extended at any time, to such proceedings. Accordingly, Article 47(3) of the Energy Charter Treaty cannot have produced legal effects in intra-EU relations when a Member State withdrew from the Energy Charter Treaty prior to the conclusion of this Agreement and would not produce legal effects in intra-EU relations if a ▌ Party withdrew from the Energy Charter Treaty subsequently.

    3.  For greater certainty, the ▌ Parties are in agreement that, in accordance with the common understanding expressed in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, and without prejudice thereto, Article 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty does not apply as a basis for intra-EU arbitration proceedings and Article 47(3) of the Energy Charter Treaty does not produce legal effects in intra-EU relations.

    4.  Paragraphs 1 to 3 are without prejudice to the interpretation and application of other provisions of the Energy Charter Treaty to the extent that they concern intra-EU relations.

    SECTION 2

    Final Provisions

    Article 3

    Depositary

    1.  The Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union shall act as depositary of this Agreement (the ‘Depositary’).

    2.  The Depositary shall notify the ▌ Parties of:

    (a)  the deposit of any instrument of ratification, approval or acceptance in accordance with Article 5;

    (b)  the date of entry into force of this Agreement in accordance with Article 6(1);

    (c)  the date of entry into force of this Agreement for each ▌ Party in accordance with Article 6(2).

    3.  The Depositary shall publish this Agreement in the Official Journal of the European Union and notify the depositary of the Energy Charter Treaty, as well as the Energy Charter Secretariat, of its adoption and entry into force.

    4.  The Depositary shall invite the depositary of the Energy Charter Treaty to notify this Agreement to the other Contracting Parties to the Energy Charter Treaty.

    5.  This Agreement shall be registered by the Depositary with the United Nations Secretariat, in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations, following its entry into force.

    Article 4

    Reservations

    No reservations shall be made to this Agreement.

    Article 5

    Ratification, approval or acceptance

    This Agreement shall be subject to ratification, approval or acceptance.

    The ▌ Parties shall deposit their instruments of ratification, approval or acceptance with the Depositary.

    Article 6

    Entry into force

    1.  This Agreement shall enter into force 30 calendar days after the date on which the Depositary receives the second instrument of ratification, approval or acceptance.

    2.  For each ▌ Party which ratifies, approves or accepts it after its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 1, this Agreement shall enter into force 30 calendar days after the date of deposit by such ▌ Party of its instrument of ratification, approval or acceptance.

    Article 7

    Authentic texts

    This Agreement, drawn up in a single original in the Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Irish, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, Slovenian, Spanish and Swedish languages, each text being equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary.

    IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, duly authorised to this effect, have signed this Agreement.

    Done at …, this … day of … in the year …

    For the Kingdom of Belgium,

    For the Republic of Bulgaria,

    For the Czech Republic,

    For the Kingdom of Denmark,

    For the Federal Republic of Germany,

    For the Republic of Estonia,

    For Ireland,

    For the Hellenic Republic,

    For the Kingdom of Spain,

    For the French Republic,

    For the Republic of Croatia,

    For the Italian Republic,

    For the Republic of Cyprus,

    For the Republic of Latvia,

    For the Republic of Lithuania,

    For the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg,

    For the Republic of Malta,

    For the Kingdom of the Netherlands,

    For the Republic of Austria,

    For the Republic of Poland,

    For the Portuguese Republic,

    For Romania,

    For the Republic of Slovenia,

    For the Slovak Republic,

    For the Republic of Finland,

    For the Kingdom of Sweden and

    For the European Union

    __________________

    (1) Opinion of 4 December 2024 (OJ C, C/2025/776, 11.2.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/776/oj).
    (2) Position of the European Parliament of 18 June 2025.
    (3) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 2 September 2021, Republic of Moldova v Komstroy, C‑741/19, ECLI:EU:C:2021:655, paragraph 66.
    (4) Council and Commission Decision 98/181/EC, ECSC, Euratom of 23 September 1997 on the conclusion, by the European Communities, of the Energy Charter Treaty and the Energy Charter Protocol on energy efficiency and related environmental aspects (OJ L 69, 9.3.1998, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/1998/181/oj).
    (5) OJ L, 2024/2121, 6.8.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/declar/2024/2121/oj.
    (6) Final Act of the Conference on the European Energy Charter (OJ L 380, 31.12.1994, p. 24, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/1994/998/oj).
    (7) Council and Commission Decision 98/181/EC, ECSC, Euratom of 23 September 1997 on the conclusion, by the European Communities, of the Energy Charter Treaty and the Energy Charter Protocol on energy efficiency and related environmental aspects (OJ L 69, 9.3.1998, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/1998/181/oj).
    (8) Permanent Court of International Justice, Question of Jaworzina (Polish-Czechoslovakian Frontier), Advisory Opinion, [1923] PCIJ Series B, No. 8, p. 37.
    (9) International Court of Justice, Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, [1951] I.C.J. Reports, 15, p. 20.
    (10) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 30 May 2006, Commission v Ireland, C-459/03, ECLI EU:C:2006:345, paragraphs 129 to 137.
    (11) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 6 March 2018, Achmea, C-284/16, ECLI EU:C:2018:158.
    (12) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 2 September 2021, Republic of Moldova v Komstroy, C‑741/19, ECLI:EU:C:2021:655, paragraph 66.
    (13) Opinion of the Court of Justice of 16 June 2022, 1/20, EU:C:2022:485, paragraph 47.
    (14) Judgment of the International Court of Justice of 5 February 1970, Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (ICJ Reports 1970, p. 3, paragraphs 33 and 35).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – EU-UA trade agreement – E-002387/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002387/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Anna Bryłka (PfE)

    Please provide information about the progress and state of play of the negotiations on the new EU-Ukraine trade conditions following the expiry of the transitional provisions under Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1132 of 3 June 2025 amending Implementing Regulations (EU) 2020/761 and (EU) 2020/1988 as regards tariff quotas for products originating in Ukraine in 2025.

    • 1.Will negotiations with Ukraine be concluded by the end of July?
    • 2.What new trade rules can be expected?
    • 3.Will trade rules based on the DCFTA be continued as from 1 January 2026?

    Submitted: 13.6.2025

    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: China criticizes EU Commission chief’s industrial policy remarks, calls for rejection of double standards

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BEIJING, June 18 (Xinhua) — China’s Foreign Ministry on Wednesday expressed strong dissatisfaction and firm opposition to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s recent remarks on China’s industrial subsidy policies, calling her words factually inaccurate and filled with bias and double standards.

    Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Guo Jiakun made the statement at a regular briefing in response to a journalist’s question about U. von der Leyen’s remarks at the G7 summit on June 16.

    China’s industrial subsidy policy adheres to the principles of openness, fairness and compliance with established norms, and strictly abides by the rules of the World Trade Organization, Guo Jiakun emphasized. According to him, China’s industrial development relies on the advantages of consistent technological innovation, a complete supply chain system, full-fledged market competition and abundant labor resources, which are due to the country’s actual capabilities rather than subsidies.

    As the diplomat emphasized, China’s new energy production capacity makes a significant contribution to the global fight against climate change and the energy transition. The so-called “overcapacity” problem, he noted, is essentially a projection of individual countries’ concerns about their own competitiveness and market share, which they intend to use as a pretext to justify protectionist measures.

    The official representative pointed out that in recent years the European Union has been continuously implementing industrial policy measures, providing a significant amount of subsidies to support European enterprises, and even openly offering to give preference to purchasing products from European manufacturers.

    The EU plans to provide more than €1.44 trillion in various subsidies from 2021 to 2030, with more than €300 billion already provided by 2024, Guo Jiakun said, citing incomplete statistics.

    According to him, at a time when the EU is striving to stimulate economic growth and increase competitiveness, it needs to abandon double standards and move towards greater openness in cooperation.

    In the 50 years since the establishment of diplomatic relations, cooperation between China and the EU has yielded fruitful results and brought tangible benefits to both sides, the official said, assuring that China, while continuing to firmly adhere to high-level opening up, will continue to provide European companies with its vast market and development opportunities.

    China hopes to strengthen communication and coordination with the European side and properly handle trade differences to achieve win-win results and common development, Guo Jiakun said. At the same time, he added, China firmly opposes any attempt to undermine its right to development or sacrifice Chinese interests for its own gains. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Concludes 2025 Article IV Consultation with Iceland

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    June 18, 2025

    • Growth decelerated in 2024 but is expected to rise to 1.6 percent in 2025 and 2.2 percent in 2026, while inflation is projected to decline to the Central Bank of Iceland’s 2.5 percent target in the second half of 2026. The direct impact of escalating global trade tensions is projected to be limited.
    • The authorities’ plans to turn the fiscal deficit in 2024 into a surplus by 2028 are appropriate given the need to rebuild buffers; details on the planned fiscal measures to achieve these targets have enhanced the credibility of the consolidation. Monetary policy is suitably tight given still elevated inflation, but the monetary stance should be reduced as inflation declines. Efforts to raise foreign exchange reserve coverage are welcome.
    • Investments in physical and human capital, alongside continued efforts to promote innovation and reduce skills mismatches are needed to support medium-term growth. Taxation can play a supportive role in reducing housing market imbalances.

    Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed the Article IV Consultation for Iceland.[1] The authorities have consented to the publication of the Staff Report prepared for this consultation.[2]

    The economy decelerated in 2024 to 0.5 percent due largely to weak exports from a disappointing fishing season and constraints on energy supply that curtailed aluminum production. Growth is expected to rebound to 1.6 percent in 2025 and 2.2 percent in 2026, driven by a recovery in exports, higher real wages, and continued monetary easing that more than offsets the impact of a moderately contractionary fiscal impulse. The impact of escalating global trade tensions is projected to be limited given that most goods exports are destined for Europe. Inflation is expected to gradually decline to the Central Bank of Iceland’s 2.5 percent target in the second half of 2026. Medium-term prospects are favorable, with continued diversification of the economy toward higher value-added export-oriented sectors anticipated to bolster productivity growth and inflows of foreign labor expected to support a modest increase in employment growth.

    Risks to growth are tilted to the downside while risks to inflation are broadly balanced. In particular, the impact of rising global trade tensions could be larger than anticipated if tariffs are extended to currently exempted items (e.g., pharmaceuticals) or if a reduction in travel to and from the US negatively affects tourism. Inflation could increase if trade tensions trigger supply disruptions or capital outflows, if a premature loosening of monetary policy further de-anchors inflation expectations, or as result of second-round effects from higher wage growth. Conversely, capital inflows could result in an appreciation of the exchange rate that would weaken competitiveness and put downward pressure on inflation.

    Executive Board Assessment[3]

    Executive Directors agreed with the thrust of the staff appraisal. They welcomed the prudent macroeconomic policies, which have helped to reduce imbalances. While noting that medium‑term growth prospects are favorable, Directors observed that risks are tilted to the downside, notably from rising trade tensions. They emphasized the need to ensure macroeconomic stability and gradually rebuild fiscal buffers, while supporting stronger growth and reducing vulnerability to shocks.

    Directors welcomed the ambitious fiscal targets and the improved transparency and credibility around the planned consolidation. They highlighted that increased infrastructure spending would help to close gaps in transport and energy and bolster growth prospects. Directors saw merit in implementing additional measures, if necessary, to achieve fiscal objectives. Noting the need to reduce procyclicality in fiscal policy, Directors supported the planned activation of revised fiscal rules in 2026. They also recommended measures to strengthen the Fiscal Council and increase the coverage and frequency of fiscal data. 

    Directors noted that price pressures remain elevated and agreed that tight monetary policy remained appropriate. They encouraged the Central Bank of Iceland (CBI) to gradually loosen the policy stance as inflation declines towards target and expectations become reanchored. Directors saw merit in transitioning to a more forecast‑based inflation targeting framework as uncertainty declines. Noting the importance of increasing reserves to more prudent levels, Directors welcomed the CBI’s decision to commence regular purchases of foreign exchange.  

    Directors welcomed that systemic risks in the financial sector are contained. They highlighted the need to remain vigilant to potential vulnerabilities in the housing market and the corporate sector, and to continue strengthening operational resilience. Directors saw scope to ease macroprudential policies should systemic risks recede as anticipated. While welcoming the progress on implementing FSAP recommendations, Directors urged further efforts to enhance pension fund governance, strengthen AML/CFT supervision of banks, and safeguard the independence and effectiveness of the CBI’s supervisory activities. 

    Directors emphasized the importance of reforms to bolster productivity and diversify the economy, including by improving infrastructure and supporting innovation. Important measures include reducing skill mismatches, maximizing the efficiency of R&D incentives, and promoting AI while mitigating related risks. Directors welcomed plans to increase housing supply and improve housing affordability. 

    It is expected that the next Article IV consultation with Iceland will be held on the standard 12‑month cycle. 

    Table 1. Iceland: Selected Economic Indicators, 2024–30

     

    2024

    2025

    2026

    2027

    2028

    2029

    2030

       

    Proj.

    Proj.

    Proj.

    Proj.

    Proj.

    Proj.

     

    (Percentage change unless otherwise indicated)

    National Accounts (constant prices)

                 

    Gross domestic product

    0.5

    1.6

    2.2

    2.4

    2.4

    2.4

    2.4

    Total domestic demand

    2.3

    1.5

    0.6

    2.2

    2.4

    2.4

    2.3

    Private consumption

    0.6

    2.2

    2.4

    2.5

    2.6

    2.6

    2.6

    Public consumption

    2.5

    1.5

    1.3

    1.0

    1.0

    1.0

    1.0

    Gross fixed investment

    7.5

    4.1

    -3.2

    2.8

    3.2

    3.2

    3.2

    Net exports (contribution to growth)

    -1.8

    -0.3

    1.6

    0.3

    0.1

    0.0

    0.2

    Exports of goods and services

    -1.2

    3.3

    3.0

    3.3

    3.1

    3.0

    3.2

    Imports of goods and services

    2.7

    3.9

    -0.7

    2.7

    2.9

    2.9

    2.9

    Output gap (percent of potential output)

    1.0

    0.2

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

                   

    Selected Indicators

                 

    Unemployment rate (percent of labor force)

    3.4

    3.9

    4.0

    4.0

    4.0

    4.0

    4.0

    Employment

    4.1

    0.4

    0.9

    1.1

    1.1

    1.1

    1.1

    Labor productivity

    -3.3

    1.2

    1.3

    1.3

    1.3

    1.3

    1.3

    Real wages

    0.5

    1.4

    1.3

    1.3

    1.3

    1.3

    1.3

    Nominal wages

    6.4

    4.9

    4.4

    3.8

    3.8

    3.9

    3.8

    Consumer price index (average)

    5.9

    3.5

    3.0

    2.5

    2.5

    2.5

    2.5

    Consumer price index (end period)

    4.7

    3.6

    2.5

    2.5

    2.5

    2.5

    2.5

    ISK/€ (average)

    164

     

     

    Money and Credit (end period)

                 

    Credit to nonfinancial private sector

    8.1

    5.6

    5.6

    5.6

    5.6

    5.6

    5.7

    Central bank 7 day term deposit rate 1/

    8.50

    7.50

     

    (Percent of GDP unless otherwise indicated)

    General Government Finances 2/

    Revenue

    42.8

    43.2

    42.4

    42.4

    42.4

    42.5

    42.6

    Expenditure

    46.3

    44.5

    43.2

    42.9

    42.8

    42.7

    42.7

    Overall balance 3/

    -3.5

    -1.3

    -0.7

    -0.5

    -0.3

    -0.2

    -0.1

    Cyclically-adjusted primary balance

    -1.5

    0.7

    0.9

    1.2

    1.4

    1.6

    1.7

    Structural primary balance 4/

    0.7

    1.1

    1.1

    1.3

    1.4

    1.6

    1.7

    Gross debt

    59.1

    47.7

    45.4

    43.6

    41.7

    39.9

    38.1

                   

    Balance of Payments

                 

    Current account balance

    -2.5

    -2.6

    -0.5

    0.0

    0.4

    0.7

    1.0

    Gross external debt

    67.0

    65.4

    61.6

    58.5

    55.4

    52.4

    49.5

    Sources: Central Bank of Iceland; Ministry of Finance; Statistics Iceland; and IMF staff projections.

    1/ For 2025, policy rate as of May.

    2/ In April 2025, an agreement was reached on the settlement of remaining outstanding liabilities in the IL Fund (HFF).

    3/ For 2024, the deficit now includes 1.2 percent of GDP in costs related to the purchase of houses in Grindavík that in the 2024 Article IV were classified below the line due to uncertainty about the correct statistical treatment.

    4/ Cyclically-adjusted primary balance excluding one offs.

    [1] Under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country’s economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board.

    [2] Under the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, publication of documents that pertain to member countries is voluntary and requires the member consent. The staff report will be shortly published on the www.imf.org/iceland page.

    [3] At the conclusion of the discussion, the Managing Director, as Chairman of the Board, summarizes the views of Executive Directors, and this summary is transmitted to the country’s authorities. An explanation of any qualifiers used in summings up can be found here: http://www.IMF.org/external/np/sec/misc/qualifiers.htm.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Boris Balabanov

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/18/pr-25201-iceland-imf-executive-board-concludes-2025-article-iv-consultation

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Keynote Remarks of Commissioner Kristin N. Johnson at RegHub Summit London 2025: The Future of Finance: Enabling AI Tools To Enhance Compliance and Surveillance

    Source: US Commodity Futures Trading Commission

    Good morning. Thank you for the kind invitation to deliver keynote opening remarks at the RegHub Summit and to join TradingHub Executive Chair Neil Walker for a fireside chat. I appreciate that you have historically had the pleasure of hearing from the most senior regulators in our industry including our immediate past Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) Chairman, Russ Behnam; President and CEO of the National Futures Association, Tom Sexton; and a recent past Director of Enforcement, Ian McGinley.
    I’ll hope to offer insights to complement the important and cutting edge topics that you will explore today including managing model risk in trade surveillance, best practices for validation and compliance, and building a unified approach to trade surveillance and data governance. Mostly, I’ll aim to be brief and, if I am correctly using these idioms, not put a foot wrong or let the side down. To that end, I should acknowledge that that the views I express today are my own and not the views of the Commission, my fellow Commissioners or the staff of the CFTC.
    Three Dimensions of a Financial Markets Governance and Compliance Framework
    Financial regulation in the U.S. significantly depends on a three-dimensional approach to regulatory compliance.
    First, from the earliest periods of community or state-based regulation in the U.S.—which only go as far back as the late 1700s—you could argue that our regulation has required entities operating in financial markets to police themselves. In other words, market participants must demonstrate a commitment to ensuring compliance with applicable regulations and reporting instances of disruption or compliance failures.
    Second, our regulation imposes both formal and informal (soft law) requirements on firms operating as critical market infrastructure resources. These entities, and in some instances, industry trade associations, have exercised market policing authority. In 1792, for example, twenty-four stock-brokers gathered under a buttonwood tree in lower Manhattan in New York City to sign the Buttonwood Agreement.[1] While I am fairly certain they were not sorting out a crypto regulatory framework, addressing complex issues such as initial and variation margin requirements during periods of heightened market distress, default risk management, cross-product margining, or clearing U.S. Treasuries, they were establishing a precedent that would serve as a foundational understanding in U.S. financial markets regulation: firms and industry have obligations to facilitate market stability, market integrity, and surveil markets for evidence of fraud and manipulation.
    Third, financial market regulators play an important role in supervising markets and enforcing expectations regarding compliance. At the CFTC, our principles-based regulation includes a supervision framework where organizations that play a critical role in market infrastructure, such as exchanges and clearing organizations, engage in surveillance and report to the Commission on the compliance of intermediaries.[2] Within individual organizations, registered market participants are charged with supervising the actors who directly engage in trading as well as actors who directly engage in customer solicitation.[3]
    Relying on firms to engage in market surveillance and intermediaries to engage in supervision balances the costs and obligations of supervision. We might describe the three legs of this regulatory framework as a governance and compliance framework.
    Technology-Driven Governance and Compliance 
    In recent years, the advent of increasingly sophisticated artificial intelligence (AI) technologies have promised to enable faster, more efficient, reduced cost supervision and compliance capabilities.
    This observation is not a revelation to anyone in this room. For decades, financial markets have integrated machine learning algorithms as a central aspect of predictive analytics. Increasingly advanced AI technologies—supervised and unsupervised machine learning algorithms, neural networks, generative AI and more recently agentic AI—have accelerated both interest in and adoption of AI for broader front office, back office, reporting, and supervision and monitoring obligations that arise in financial markets regulation.
    Requests for Information Regarding the Adoption of AI: CFTC, Federal Regulators, and Global Initiatives
    Over the last several years, I have worked closely with our Commission, other federal regulators, regulators around the world, and market participants to understand the benefits and limits of integrating AI into financial markets compliance and surveillance infrastructure.
    I actively worked with the CFTC senior staff across all divisions to develop the Commission’s first request for comment (RFC) on the uses of AI in CFTC-regulated markets.[4] It’s been a priority of mine to engage with the staff, as well as our registrants, about issues related to AI long before that RFC, and remains so to this date. Compliance use cases were identified by a number of market participants as AI uses in CFTC-registered markets.[5] This is consistent with a trend that has been identified in financial markets more broadly.  I also worked directly or participated in the development of consultations organized by the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury) and global international standard setting bodies seeking to better understand AI compliance and surveillance use cases.
    Many industry trade associations are similarly engaged in better understanding the potential for AI use cases. The Institute of International Finance (IIF), for example, surveys its members annually about its uses of artificial intelligence and machine learning. In the most recent IIF survey report, published in January 2025, compliance (including anti-money laundering and trade surveillance) ranked in the top four predictive AI use cases for respondents.[6] Treasury’s report on Artificial Intelligence in Financial Markets reports that “AI is widely used for…AML/CFT and sanctions compliance, including analyzing large sets of data, detecting anomalies, flagging suspicious activities, and verifying customer identities under the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) obligations.”[7] Other publications contain similar observations about compliance use cases as AI adoption in financial services continues to develop.[8]
    A recent consultation report published by the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) on AI in capital markets reports that IOSCO members and self-regulatory organizations (SROs) observed that market participants are:
    using AI to enhance the effectiveness of AML and CFT measures, particularly, and compliance more generally, including to identify suspicious transactions. For AML compliance, customer onboarding, and due diligence, respondents observed that market participants use ML models to perform pattern recognition and anomaly detection in surveillance software. They also use NLP to enhance the interpretation of unstructured data and to facilitate name screening and news analysis.[9]
    The IOSCO Report also noted that other recent reports had consistent findings, and cited numerous industry reports about how large language models (LLMs) are used for compliance tasks.[10]
    AI and Trade Surveillance
    Indisputably, AI technologies demonstrate significant potential for enhancing trade surveillance. The recent IOSCO Report referenced earlier notes the incorporation of “AI tools in surveillance and security solutions that could assist market participants to monitor client communications such as emails, calls, and mobile chat applications, and could raise alerts on suspicious communications for compliance review and investigation.”[11]
    One of the reasons that the markets that the CFTC regulates are the deepest and most liquid in the world is that our regulatory framework includes measures designed to ensure the integrity of the markets, a necessary feature for markets that so many rely on to hedge and manage risk.
    For example, Section 5 of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) sets forth core principles for designated contract markets (DCMs) that require DCMs to “establish, monitor, and enforce” compliance with a DCM’s rules and to establish and enforce certain rules and procedures to ensure financial stability of transactions on the DCM.[12] The implementing rules for each of these core principles include requirements related to surveillance. Rule 38.156 requires a DCM to “maintain an automated trade surveillance system capable of detecting and investigating potential trade practice violations” and includes additional requirements for the system including certain capabilities, features and timing.[13] Rule 38.604 states that “A designated contract market must monitor members’ compliance with the designated contract market’s minimum financial standards and, therefore, must routinely receive and promptly review financial and related information from its members, as well as continuously monitor the positions of members and their customers.”[14] Similarly, Section 5h of the CEA establishes compliance with rules and financial integrity as core principles for swap execution facilities (SEFs),[15] and implementing rules include requirements on SEFs to maintain an automated trade surveillance system pursuant to Rule 37.203 as part of their required rule enforcement program.[16]
    These are just a few examples, and perhaps one of the many reasons that it is not surprising to me that CFTC-regulated markets have always been among the most technology-forward, including with its use of AI.
    I continuously advocate for a number of policy initiatives related to AI, and the first one is the most fundamental: collaboration. I hope to continue to be able to learn how we can work together to discover how AI can be leveraged to enhance registrants’ ability to comply with our existing requirements, and to support a stronger, safer, and more vital derivatives market, while also enhancing efficiencies for registrants.
    A discussion of potential uses of AI in the derivatives markets requires also considering the broader financial market landscape. The IOSCO Report noted that respondents “observed efforts to enhance surveillance measures in the financial industry through the development of joint systems that can be used by multiple financial institutions to share data and intelligence to mitigate types of threats utilizing AI and other technologies.”[17]
    I have advocated for a number of policy initiatives related to AI consistently throughout my time at the Commission, and one of those policies is inter-governmental collaboration with other financial market regulators in the U.S. and globally. If we do not work together, we risk missing out on significant opportunities not only to learn from each other and build on best practices, but also opportunities to create broader initiatives that make our markets safer and more efficient.
    A Pause to Look Under the Hood
    As we consider the possibilities, we also need to be mindful of the risks. As AI tools become further integrated into organizational processes, especially those that relate to critical compliance or surveillance functions, those organizations, as well as regulators, need to have appropriate assurances that the tools will operate safely and reliably.
    It is imperative that we have a clear understanding of and appropriate guardrails to ensure the security and integrity of the data used to train AI models. Data governance must be a foundational, gatekeeping issue for the continued development of AI models, particularly LLMs that may rely on synthetic data. I have frequently raised concerns regarding these risks—including concerns regarding the potential for AI models to hallucinate or lack the ability to comprehend certain real-world roadblocks.[18] Agentic AI models, while able to overcome some of the limitations of generative AI models, are still limited by the data they are able to access.[19] I’ve also spoken about some of the other questions that need to be accounted for as we consider the integration of AI into financial markets, such as promoting explainability, implementing data controls and measures to address bias, focusing on governance of the models, and testing and monitoring output.[20]
    Market participants must understand the risks of data leakage which may include reduced accuracy, unfairness and bias, data privacy breaches, and other vulnerabilities.[21] I am hopeful that these are among the issues that participants at the Summit will explore today.
    Where Are We Going Next?
    Increasingly, I am asked this question on a frequent basis. In the context of AI, I believe there is significant potential for these technologies to enhance the tripartite approach to regulation—my earlier reference to three-dimensions or a three-legged stool of governance and compliance mentioned. Successful integration of AI will require careful consideration by firms and the industry as well as thoughtful regulatory oversight by domestic and international regulators. For a few hundred years, we have been on a journey to create a sound regulatory framework.
    My personal journey in service is not nearly as long but I am deeply committed to ensuring that we land on the right path as we integrate and potentially regulate AI. In becoming a CFTC Commissioner, I have had the privilege and the pleasure of fulfilling a personal professional goal—serving my country in a role that I hope fosters a healthy economy that enables responsible innovation, protects customers, and ensures the integrity and stability of financial markets for generations to come.
    Thanks for being on this journey with me. I look forward to continuing the conversation with you all today and in the coming years.

    [2] See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 7a-1(c)(2)(C)(ii); 17 C.F.R. § 39.12(a)(4) (requiring derivatives clearing organizations to have procedures to verify compliance of clearing members with participation requirements).

    [3] See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 38.604-605 (requiring designated contract markets to establish financial surveillance programs for futures commission merchants, retail foreign exchange dealers, and introducing brokers).

    [5] See, e.g., Letter from World Federation of Exchanges to CFTC, Regarding Response to Request for Comment on the Use of Artificial Intelligence in CFTC-Regulated Markets (Apr. 24, 2024), https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=73447&SearchText= (“AI can be used to reduce manual inputs for trade documentation and regulatory reporting, as well as reducing market manipulation….”); Letter from Futures Industry Association, FIA Principal Traders Group, CME Group, Inc., and Intercontinental Exchange Inc. to CFTC, Regarding Release No. 8853-24 (Jan. 25, 2024) Request for Comment on the Use of Artificial Intelligence in CFTC-Regulated Markets (Apr. 24, 2024), https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=73444&SearchText= (“We understand that FIA’s members may utilize AI, now in the future, across a broad array of areas, including…compliance processes and controls.”); Letter from Bank Policy Institute to CFTC, Regarding Request for Comment on the Use of Artificial Intelligence in CFTC-Regulated Markets (CFTC Release No. 8553-24) (Apr. 17, 2024), https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=73424&SearchText= (“Many banking organizations also use AI tools to enhance existing processes that facilitate compliance with BSA/AML and sanctions legal requirements and banking agency expectations. Some of these tools flag potentially suspicious activity, such as suspected money laundering, or potential sanctions concerns.”).

    [8] For example, a recent report by the Financial Stability Board on the financial stability implications of AI notes, “More broadly, the increasing regulatory requirements over the last seven years across multiple jurisdictions, for example, requirements on data protection, the growing use of principles to guide AI development and adoption, and the growing body of international standards, including in specific sectors such as financial services, have led financial firms to increasingly leverage AI to enhance their compliance capabilities.” Financial Stability Board, The Financial Stability Implications of Artificial Intelligence at 8 (Nov. 14, 2024), https://www.fsb.org/uploads/P14112024.pdf (citation omitted).

    [12] 7 U.S.C. § 7(d)(2), (11).

    [13] 17 C.F.R. § 38.156.

    [14] 17 C.F.R. § 38.604.

    [15] 7 U.S.C. § 7b-3(f)(2),(7).

    [16] 17 C.F.R. § 37.203(d).

    [17] IOSCO, Artificial Intelligence in Capital Markets: Use Cases, Risks, and Challenges: Consultation Report at 23.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Schakowsky, Warren Hit Five Big Pharma Companies for Paying Zero in Federal Taxes, Lobbying to Extend Trump Tax Loopholes

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congresswoman Jan Schakowsky (9th District of Illinois)

    “Our tax code has been skewed to benefit wealthy pharmaceutical corporations, enabling them to profit off Americans, charging them the highest drug prices in the world, without paying their fair share of taxes.”

    Full Text of Letters (PDF)

    WASHINGTON – Today, U.S. Representative Jan Schakowsky, Ranking Member of the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade, and U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) wrote to five major pharmaceutical companies, calling them out for paying $0 in federal taxes for profit earned last year, despite earning billions of dollars. These companies, which are Abbvie, Pfizer, Amgen, Merck, and Johnson & Johnson, have taken advantage of tax loopholes created by President Trump’s 2017 tax bill and have lobbied for even more tax giveaways.

    “This alarming fact illustrates just one of the ways in which our tax code has been skewed to benefit wealthy pharmaceutical corporations, enabling them to profit off Americans, charging them the highest drug prices in the world, without paying their fair share of taxes,” wrote the lawmakers.

    The passage of the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) by President Donald Trump created new incentives for pharmaceutical companies to avoid paying taxes by holding their profits and intellectual property abroad. As a result, pharmaceutical companies have engaged in complex tax planning to move their intellectual property and production facilities out of the United States to tax shelters like Ireland and Bermuda to take advantage of this new regime.

    Thanks to President Trump’s international taxation regime, these top pharmaceutical companies have paid almost nothing in U.S. taxes since 2018 while raking in billions of dollars in profit.

    • Johnson & Johnson paid zero dollars in federal taxes since 2018, while raking in over $594 billion in profits during that time.
    • Abbvie paid zero dollars in federal taxes since 2018, while raking in over $330 billion in profits during that time.
    • Pfizer paid zero dollars in federal taxes since 2018, while raking in over $429 billion in profits during that time.
    • Amgen paid zero dollars in federal taxes since 2018, while raking in over $186 billion in profits during that time.
    • Merck paid zero dollars in federal taxes since 2018, while raking in over $355 billion in profits during that time.

    “Now, pharmaceutical companies want to extend these tax giveaways from the TCJA, and they are lining up to make their case on Capitol Hill,” wrote the lawmakers.

    Indeed, lobbying by the pharmaceutical industry rose in 2024 compared to 2023, as the fight over extending the TCJA began. 

    “Congress should not slash Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, or other assistance to Americans trying to afford their prescription medication in order to pay for massive tax breaks for Big Pharma companies making record profits,” concluded the lawmakers.

    Representative Schakowsky and Senator Warren are pushing the companies for answers on their role in extending massive tax cuts for the pharmaceutical industry.

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    MIL OSI USA News