Source: The Conversation – France – By Benoît Grémare, Chercheur associé à l’Institut d’Etudes de Stratégie et de Défense, Université Jean Moulin Lyon 3
In February 2020, French President Emmanuel Macron said it was time to reflect on the European dimension of French nuclear deterrence. He proposed a strategic dialogue as well as joint nuclear exercises between European partners. Five years later, Germany’s likely next chancellor, Friedrich Merz, responded to this call, advocating an extension of the French nuclear umbrella to Germany – while a US led by President Donald Trump no longer appears to be a reliable partner for protecting Europe.
But does France have the capacity to defend Europe? Would the deployment of the French nuclear umbrella in Eastern Europe make Europe strategically autonomous, giving it the means to defend itself independently?
French nuclear deterrence against the Russian threat
France originally developed its nuclear arsenal in response to the threat of Soviet invasion and to avoid any dependence on the US. According to a stable doctrine that political leaders regularly reaffirmed, the state [would use] its strategic arsenal by air and submarine in the event of an attack against its vital interests.
But the fact remains that without US support, the balance of power appears largely unfavourable to France, which has a total of 290 nuclear warheads compared to at least 1,600 deployed warheads and nearly 2,800 stockpiled warheads on the Russian side.
Certainly, the explosive power of thermonuclear warheads, combined with the range of the French M51 strategic sea-to-land ballistic missile, would make it possible to destroy the main Russian cities, including Moscow.
However, the Russians would only need “200 seconds to atomise Paris”, according to an estimate given on Russian television about “Satan II” thermonuclear missiles.
These scenarios recall the spectre of adversaries destroying enemy cities in a piecemeal atomic exchange, in which Russia could rely on its vastness to win through attrition. This potential for reciprocity must be kept in mind amid the mutual bet of nuclear deterrence.
To boost the impact of French nuclear deterrence, a partnership could be envisaged with the United Kingdom. A nuclear power since 1952, London now only has ballistic missiles launched by submarine and has decided, since Brexit, to increase its arsenal to 260 warheads. But although they share common interests, these two European nuclear powers are not equivalent.
Unlike the UK, which is a member of NATO’s nuclear planning group and whose warheads are designed in the US, France produces its weapons on its own territory and is not subject to any NATO obligations. This gives Paris a great deal of leeway in defining its doctrine. France can also speak on behalf of the European Union, of which it has been a part since its creation.
French nuclear power: an alternative to US deterrence
France officially became an atomic power in 1960 by relying on its own resources, with US support fluctuating according to events. The emergence of an independent French strategic force long annoyed Washington, which sought to restrict it by means of international accords such as the 1963 treaty limiting atmospheric nuclear tests and the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty. Since 1974, the French nuclear force has officially had a specific dissuasive role within NATO, contributing to the overall security of the transatlantic alliance by complicating the calculations of potential adversaries.
Almost 60 years ago, US president Lyndon Johnson reinforced doubts about the White House’s determination to fully commit to the defence of Europe. Today, Trump’s desire to end US support for Ukraine confirms these suspicions. Consequently, increasingly insistent voices are calling for the acceptance of a French nuclear force that would extend to the European level.
A French nuclear umbrella in Eastern Europe
Merz’s call for the French nuclear umbrella to extend to Germany aligns with Paris’s proposal to establish a dialogue involving Europeans in a common approach. As France’s defence minister has pointed out, the precise definition of vital interest is up to its president. However, the use of nuclear weapons to protect Europe requires a strategic discussion to define the power to be acquired, the interests to be defended and the method of nuclear fire command.
Moving toward a Europeanisation of nuclear force means increasing deterrent capabilities and, therefore, expanding the French arsenal so it can respond to threats affecting all 27 EU member states. This would require the creation of additional stocks of fissile material and the reactivation of production plants in Pierrelatte and Marcoule, which were dismantled in the late 1990s.
Dogma about what constitutes a sufficient arsenal must also be questioned. If 290 nuclear warheads represent the value that France places on defending its existence, this price seems to neglect the scale of the European continent, and logic confirms it: continent-sized nuclear powers such as the US and Russia – and soon, China – are deploying an arsenal of around 1,000 thermonuclear warheads.
Ramping up power would take time and require a budgetary effort to increase the number of missiles and carrier aircraft. In addition to the construction of new infrastructure in European partner countries, the cost could exceed €10 billion per year, not including indirect costs related to maintenance and logistics. This is a lot to take into account, especially since the political and strategic offer of extended nuclear protection evolves according to circumstances.
Until now, Germany preferred that France assume a role that was simply complementary to the extended deterrence of the US, but Washington’s threatened abandonment of Ukraine increases the Russian threat. As Macron has indicated, France could respond by proposing the pre-positioning of its nuclear forces in Eastern European countries with the idea of eventually replacing the US.
This French nuclear umbrella would give concrete form to European strategic autonomy through the deployment of nuclear-capable combat aircraft, a sign of European political solidarity that would make Moscow’s calculations more difficult.
The visible presence of these aircraft in Eastern Europe could prevent Russia from attacking countries in the region with conventional means, as such an attack could provoke a French nuclear response on behalf of Europe.
Benoît Grémare ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.
– ref. French nuclear deterrence for Europe: how effective could it be against Russia? – https://theconversation.com/french-nuclear-deterrence-for-europe-how-effective-could-it-be-against-russia-251512