Category: Transport

  • MIL-OSI: Municipality Finance issues EUR 1.25 billion benchmark under its MTN programme

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Municipality Finance Plc
    Stock exchange release
    27 January 2025 at 10:00 am (EET)

    Municipality Finance issues EUR 1.25 billion benchmark under its MTN programme

    Municipality Finance Plc issues EUR 1.25 billion benchmark on 28 January 2025. The maturity date of the benchmark is 14 December 2029. The benchmark bear interest at a fixed rate of 2.625% per annum.

    The benchmark is issued under MuniFin’s EUR 50 billion programme for the issuance of debt instruments. The offering circular, the supplemental offering circular and the final terms of the benchmark are available in English on the company’s website at https://www.kuntarahoitus.fi/en/for-investors.

    MuniFin has applied for the benchmark to be admitted to trading on the Helsinki Stock Exchange maintained by Nasdaq Helsinki. The public trading is expected to commence on 28 January 2025.

    Danske Bank A/S, Citigroup Global Markets Limited, Crédit Agricole Corporate and Investment Bank and Landesbank Baden-Württemberg acts as the Joint Lead Managers for the issue of the benchmark.

    MUNICIPALITY FINANCE PLC

    Further information:

    Joakim Holmström
    Executive Vice President, Capital Markets and Sustainability
    tel. +358 50 444 3638

    MuniFin (Municipality Finance Plc) is one of Finland’s largest credit institutions. The company is owned by Finnish municipalities, the public sector pension fund Keva and the Republic of Finland.
    The Group’s balance sheet totals over EUR 50 billion.

    MuniFin builds a better and more sustainable future with its customers. MuniFin’s customers include municipalities, joint municipal authorities, wellbeing services counties, corporate entities under their control, and non-profit organisations nominated by the Housing Finance and Development Centre of Finland (ARA). Lending is used for environmentally and socially responsible investment targets such as public transportation, sustainable buildings, hospitals and healthcare centres, schools and day care centres, and homes for people with special needs.

    MuniFin’s customers are domestic but the company operates in a completely global business environment. The company is an active Finnish bond issuer in international capital markets and the first Finnish green and social bond issuer. The funding is exclusively guaranteed by the Municipal Guarantee Board.

    Read more: https://www.kuntarahoitus.fi/en/

    Important Information

    The information contained herein is not for release, publication or distribution, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, in or into any such country or jurisdiction or otherwise in such circumstances in which the release, publication or distribution would be unlawful. The information contained herein does not constitute an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to buy, nor shall there be any sale of, any securities or other financial instruments in any jurisdiction in which such offer, solicitation or sale would be unlawful prior to registration, exemption from registration or qualification under the securities laws of any such jurisdiction.

    This communication does not constitute an offer of securities for sale in the United States. The notes have not been and will not be registered under the U.S. Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “Securities Act”) or under the applicable securities laws of any state of the United States and may not be offered or sold, directly or indirectly, within the United States or to, or for the account or benefit of, U.S. persons except pursuant to an applicable exemption from, or in a transaction not subject to, the registration requirements of the Securities Act.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Nokia upgrades ESpanix’s IXP infrastructure to reduce energy consumption and complexity

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Press Release

    Nokia upgrades ESpanix’s IXP infrastructure to reduce energy consumption and complexity

    • First 400G IXP network in Spain.
    • Solution reduces complexity, lowers costs, and consumes less power than bonded 100G connections.
    • Supports ESpanix’s expansion into new locations to capture larger customers.

    27 January 2025
    Madrid, Spain – Nokia has been selected by ESpanix to provide Spain’s first 400G connectivity for IXP customers. The 400G upgrade uses Nokia’s Interconnect routers to deliver a more efficient and sustainable alternative to bundling multiple 100GE connections, reducing complexity, power consumption, and operational costs for ESpanix and its customers.

    ESpanix will also leverage Nokia’s Photonic Service Switch to optimize bandwidth across its optical transport network, allowing the IXP to select the most optimized solution for its customer needs.

    The layered network approach ensures scalability for larger customers and supports ESpanix’s goals of expanding its footprint and evolving its infrastructure. All ESpanix’s Points of Presence have been upgraded to 400G and are operational as of today.

    The upgrade project addresses the increasing demand for high-capacity and sustainable network services among ESpanix’s 180+ connected networks, including Internet Service Providers (ISPs), Content Service Providers, and national and international carriers.

    Amedeo Beck Peccoz, Head of Strategy, ESpanix, commented: “Our customers demand technology that is reliable and future-proof. Nokia’s solutions deliver the capacity and scalability we need to meet growing demand, enabling us to offer 400G connectivity to our members. With the support of Nokia, we not only become the most advanced IXP in the South Europe region, but our work together also aligns with our commitment to sustainability by reducing power consumption compared to traditional solutions.”

    Matthieu Bourguignon, Senior Vice President and head of Europe for Network Infrastructure business at Nokia, said: “Offering 400G connectivity is a testament to ESpanix’s forward-thinking approach to interconnection services. As the leading provider of IXP services, our work together ensures they can meet rising demand in a simple, efficient, and sustainable manner. By leveraging Nokia’s high-capacity IP networking technologies, ESpanix is paving the way for a new standard in IXP services across Southern Europe.”

    Resources and additional information
    ESpanix is one of the busiest Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) across the entire South Europe region, and operates facilities across Madrid and Barcelona, offering interconnection, data center, and value-added services. Across its network, ESpanix relies on Nokia technologies for Edge Routing, Data Center Interconnect and Metro links as well as customer-facing switches.

    Product page: Nokia 7250 Interconnect Routers
    Product page: Nokia 7750 Service Routers
    Product page: Nokia 1830 Photonic Service Switch (PSS)

    About Nokia 
    At Nokia, we create technology that helps the world act together. 

    As a B2B technology innovation leader, we are pioneering networks that sense, think and act by leveraging our work across mobile, fixed and cloud networks. In addition, we create value with intellectual property and long-term research, led by the award-winning Nokia Bell Labs.  

    With truly open architectures that seamlessly integrate into any ecosystem, our high-performance networks create new opportunities for monetization and scale. Service providers, enterprises and partners worldwide trust Nokia to deliver secure, reliable and sustainable networks today – and work with us to create the digital services and applications of the future.

    About ESpanix
    ESpanix is the largest Digital Hub in Southern Europe and the oldest one in Spain. The company operates across three business areas: interconnection, data centre and value-added services. ESpanix services are available in calle Mesena building in Madrid as well as in five POPs within the metropolitan areas of Madrid and Barcelona. ESpanix Datacentre is a Tier IV compliant building and allows for direct connection with all the major national and international fibre and capacity providers. The majority of Spanish ISPs are connected to ESpanix Node.

    # # #
    Media inquiries
    Nokia Press Office
    Email: Press.Services@nokia.com

    ESpanix Press Office
    Email: press@espanix.net

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    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Christine Lagarde: Central bank independence in an era of volatility

    Source: European Central Bank

    Lamfalussy Lecture by Christine Lagarde, President of the ECB, at the Lamfalussy Lectures Conference organised by the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, pre-recorded in Frankfurt am Main on 15 January 2025

    Budapest, 27 January 2025

    In his later years, Alexandre Lamfalussy was once asked what his fundamental motivation in life was. He recalled the experience of his turbulent youth, surrounded by the destruction caused by the Second World War.[1] “In the aftermath of the war,” Lamfalussy said, “I decided to serve the community in the rebuilding of Europe.”[2]

    He went on to do just that. A member of the Delors Committee and the first President of the European Monetary Institute, Lamfalussy helped pave the way for Europe’s monetary union and the establishment of the ECB.

    His generation had also been scarred by the difficulties of the “Great Inflation” in the 1970s.[3] And so Lamfalussy – alongside other architects of the euro[4] – ensured that the ECB would have sufficient powers to prevent a scenario where inflationary expectations once again became embedded in the economy.

    We can see proof of this today, as advanced economies emerge from the largest inflation shock in a generation.

    As in the 1970s, a series of shocks contributed to high and persistent inflation. But unlike the 1970s, inflation has since fallen relatively fast across advanced economies – and expectations have remained firmly anchored throughout.

    This hard-won progress has been in large part due to the independence of central banks, which has given them the ability to take difficult but necessary monetary policy decisions in pursuit of stable prices.

    The rise of central bank independence

    In the late twentieth century, central bank independence spread rapidly around the world.

    A strong social consensus about its benefits – emerging from the negative experience of the 1970s – sparked what Lamfalussy would later call a “sea change” in monetary policymaking.[5]

    By one account, over 80% of the world’s central banks became operationally independent by the turn of the millennium.[6] And price stability had been adopted as the primary objective of monetary policy frameworks across almost all advanced economies and many emerging market economies.[7]

    Moreover, independent central banks both contributed to – and benefited from – a period of low macroeconomic volatility.

    In their famous paper, Alesina and Summers found a positive relationship between the degree of independence of central banks and lower and less volatile inflation outcomes.[8] At the same time, substantial structural changes were afoot in the global economy, which also helped to reduce macroeconomic volatility – an era that soon came to be known as the Great Moderation.[9]

    Globalisation led to an enormous increase in both global labour supply and production capacity, which meant that prices and wages were often little affected even in the face of strong demand. And the oil crises of the 1970s had sparked a wave of change in global energy markets, resulting in a more elastic energy supply.

    The upshot of the Great Moderation was a virtuous circle.

    An environment of low macroeconomic volatility made it easier for independent central banks to deliver on their price stability mandates. That, in turn, solidified the social consensus in support of central bank independence and helped ensure its growing adoption around the world – further contributing to lowering levels of volatility.

    The era of volatility

    The end of the Great Moderation came suddenly and unexpectedly in 2008 with the arrival of the global financial crisis. And over the last years in particular, our world has changed dramatically.

    Indeed, the two forces that fostered the spread of central bank independence – a strong social consensus and growing pools of global supply – are now coming under increasing pressure.

    While recent research suggests that de jure central bank independence has never been more prevalent than it is today[10], there is no doubt that the de facto independence of central banks is being called into question in several parts of the world.

    One study examining 118 central banks in the 2010s shows that around 10% of them faced political pressure in an average year – even those central banks with a high degree of de jure independence.[11] Another paper finds that between 2018 and 2020 alone, de facto central bank independence deteriorated for almost half of those central banks in jurisdictions accounting for 75% of global GDP.[12]

    There is evidence to suggest that political influence on central bank decisions can also contribute substantially to macroeconomic volatility. For instance, persistent political pressure on a central bank has been found to affect the level and the volatility of exchange rates, bond yields and the risk premium.[13]

    At the same time, geopolitical tensions threaten to amplify volatility by increasing the frequency of shocks hitting the global economy.

    We have already seen the impact of geopolitical tensions play out in Europe. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, average output growth volatility in the euro area surged by 60% compared with before the global financial crisis, while average inflation volatility shot up by 280%.[14]

    An environment of heightened volatility could make the task of maintaining price stability more difficult to achieve.[15] This could raise concerns that independent central banks are failing to deliver on their mandates, which could undermine the social consensus and further amplify volatility in the economy.

    So, the question that comes to the fore is: will the current era of volatility turn the virtuous circle that facilitated the rise of central bank independence into a vicious circle that leads to it being undermined?

    The benefits of central bank independence in today’s world

    All things considered, I would argue that this is unlikely to happen.

    A volatile macroeconomic environment actually makes the benefits of central bank independence all the greater. We saw this during the recent inflation shock.

    In OECD countries, average annual inflation surged to 9.6% in 2022 as they faced a variety of shocks that compounded each other.[16] In response, independent central banks sharply increased policy rates.

    These actions led to a rapid decline and convergence in the respective inflation paths of major economies – despite all these economies facing different shocks. Moreover, inflation expectations have remained firmly anchored, suggesting that the public continues to have faith in independent central banks’ commitment to price stability over the long run.[17]

    In today’s world, central bank independence offers two key advantages.

    First, it acts as a headwind to volatility in these unpredictable times.

    As we emerge from a period of very high inflation, the issue of time inconsistency is more relevant than ever.[18] Compared with the pre-pandemic era of low inflation, central banks may need to contend with lower levels of rational inattention.[19]

    In this environment, credible policy regimes become even more important for maintaining trust in central banks. Research finds that higher trust in the ECB lowers inflation expectations on average and significantly reduces uncertainty about future inflation.[20]

    Second, central bank independence also contributes to regional strength in a world increasingly defined by geopolitical rivalries.

    Price stability provides the foundation upon which other strategic goals can be achieved. Regions with stable prices tend to have more efficient resource allocation and higher levels of competitiveness, and they attract greater levels of investment. At heart, strong economic institutions are the fundamental cause of long-run economic growth and development differences between regions.[21]

    Conclusion

    Lamfalussy once described the task of launching the euro as “navigating in uncharted waters”.[22] In an era of volatility, independent central banks now also find themselves in unfamiliar waters.

    While inflation has fallen sharply, central banks are still likely to face a more volatile macroeconomic environment compared with the Great Moderation.

    It therefore remains imperative that central banks have the independence to fully deliver on their price stability mandates.

    Thank you.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: ECB commemorates International Holocaust Remembrance Day with ceremony and temporary exhibition

    Source: European Central Bank

    27 January 2025

    • ECB and City of Frankfurt honour Holocaust victims, particularly those deported from Grossmarkthalle between 1941 and 1945
    • Opening of exhibition entitled “Survivors: Faces of Life after the Holocaust” by photographer Martin Schoeller at ECB from 29 January to 26 February 2025

    The European Central Bank (ECB) is hosting a commemorative event on International Holocaust Remembrance Day, 27 January 2025, at its main building in Ostend, Frankfurt. This year’s ceremony holds particular significance as it marks the 80th anniversary of the liberation of the Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration and extermination camp. The event will feature addresses by ECB President Christine Lagarde; Mike Josef, Lord Mayor of the City of Frankfurt am Main; and Professor Mirjam Wenzel, the Director of the Jewish Museum Frankfurt.

    “In today’s world, where rising populism and intolerance pose significant challenges, commemorating the Holocaust serves as an indispensable reminder of the need for vigilance and unity against hate and antisemitism,” said President Lagarde.

    “Remembering the crimes perpetrated by the Nazis during the Second World War is both our duty and our obligation. It is our responsibility to remember and visualise the reality of Jewish communities in Germany and Europe today. Let us together protect Jewish life now and in the future, and take a firm stand against antisemitism and racism,” said Lord Mayor Mike Josef.

    As part of the commemoration activities, the ECB is hosting a temporary photo exhibition by photographer Martin Schoeller in its main building, entitled “Survivors: Faces of Life after the Holocaust”. Maurice Gluck is one of the 56 Holocaust survivors featured in the exhibition. He will be present at the opening to share his personal story of how he survived the Holocaust after he was separated from his parents and hidden by a Catholic family in Brussels. The exhibition will be open to the public from 29 January until 26 February 2025, with a limited number of guided tours available.

    For more information on the temporary exhibition and to book a tour, please visit the Kulturothek website.

    Photos of the event can be found on the ECB’s Flickr account.

    For media queries, please contact Lena-Sophie Demuth, tel.: + 49 1622952316.

    Notes

    • The ECB’s location at the Grossmarkthalle carries deep historical significance. From 1941 to 1945, the basement of its eastern wing was used as a gathering point for carrying out the deportation of over 10,000 Jewish people to concentration camps. Working with the Jewish Community Frankfurt and the City of Frankfurt am Main, the ECB has established a memorial designed by architects KatzKaiser. The memorial is engraved with testimonies from victims and observers, creating a story that symbolises the extent of the deportations without diverting attention from the actual site.
    • Every year the ECB honours the memory of the Holocaust victims, including those deported from Frankfurt’s Grossmarkthalle, with a solemn ceremony at the memorial site.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Africa: DRC has created a reserve force to fight the M23 – why this may backfire

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Judith Verweijen, Assistant professor, Utrecht University

    After nearly three decades of warfare, armed conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) seems only to intensify. The Rwanda-backed M23 rebellion has been at the centre of attention in recent years. However, eastern DRC is home to more than 100 other armed groups, which are a major source of instability too. The question of their demobilisation has haunted the country ever since the end of the Second Congo War in 2003.

    A new chapter in this long-standing conundrum seems to have started. In 2022, the government decided to form an alliance with armed groups to fight their common enemy, the M23 and its Rwandan backers. At around the same time, it launched an initiative to create an army reserve, known as the Reserve armée de la défense (RAD). This formalised the Congolese army’s established practice of using armed groups as auxiliaries.

    The creation of the reserve army allows the government to reward armed group allies with integration while bringing them under institutionalised control. But will this actually work?

    Our past and ongoing research on army integration and demobilisation in eastern DRC casts doubt on the plan, for three reasons.

    The first risk is that armed groups will boost their numbers to gain a stronger bargaining position once integration does occur.

    Secondly, reservist forces may compete with the army over territorial control and limited resources and turn against those who created them.

    Finally, merely absorbing armed groups into a reserve force does little to address the long-standing grievances that underlie conflict in the east.

    The Wazalendo: eastern DRC’s predatory patriots

    On 9 May 2022, in a secretive meeting in the town of Pinga in North Kivu, the Congolese armed forces and several Congolese armed groups agreed to cease hostilities against each other and instead form an alliance to fight their common enemy, the M23.

    As a result, these groups became quasi-official and increasingly presented themselves as defenders of Congo’s territorial integrity. They started to call themselves Wazalendo or patriots in Kiswahili. Fuelled by President Félix Tshisekedi’s supportive rhetoric, the Wazalendo became symbols of Congolese resistance against foreign aggression. This benefited the president’s 2023 electoral campaign.

    Across North and South Kivu provinces, armed groups have rebranded themselves Wazalendo, even when not part of the coalition fighting the M23.

    As the Congolese army’s attention is on the M23, these armed groups have benefited from the lull in operations against them. Most Wazalendo groups are allowed to roam around freely and have dramatically expanded their zones of influence and violent systems of revenue generation.

    This includes taxation at markets and rapidly proliferating roadblocks, but also ransom kidnappings and contract killings. There is also evidence that Wazalendo groups are engaged in torture, sexual violence and arbitrary arrests, and frequently recruit child soldiers.

    Chequered history of integration

    A few months after the Pinga meeting, Congo’s government launched a new national defence policy that mentioned the establishment of the reserve army. Though it was passed unanimously in parliament in April 2023, MPs voiced concerns that the new army reserve risked repeating mistakes of the past.

    The army is itself the product of the painstaking integration of former belligerents after the Second Congo War (1998-2003). But rebel-military integration became an open-ended process. Armed group officers alternately integrated into and deserted from the army in the hope of gaining higher ranks and positions in a next round of integration.

    Unending rebel integration also weakened the national army. It reinforced parallel command chains, facilitated intelligence leaks and created a lopsided hierarchy.

    The first iteration of the M23 rebellion in 2012 was the result of rebel integration gone wrong. In its aftermath, the Congolese government banned the wholesale negotiated integration of armed groups into the army.

    Hurdles to integration

    The reserve army risks unleashing the same dynamics of rewarding rebellion by doling out positions to armed group leaders and granting them impunity for past violence. In April 2024, the leaders of many Wazalendo groups were flown to Kinshasa where the army reserve leadership told them to start preparing lists of their combatants ahead of their integration.

    This has prompted numerous armed groups to step up recruitment.

    The prospect of integration has also triggered fierce competition for positions between Wazalendo commanders. This risks worsening animosities between groups.

    Other hurdles, some of which have been faced before, include:

    Unity of command. Forcing smaller armed groups into a hierarchical mould doesn’t always work. Most have deep local roots, with their recruitment and influence limited to a relatively small area. Used to calling the shots in their home areas, these commanders tend to be reluctant to take orders from higher-placed outsiders.

    Ethnic competition. Armed groups may resist full integration if they feel their rank and positions in the reserve army will be lower and that this will hamper their ability to protect members of their ethnic community. Such “local security dilemmas” have obstructed army integration and demobilisation efforts in the past.

    Resources. Armed groups currently enjoy substantial income, and considerable freedom in obtaining it. Will the reserve army command allow its members to engage in illegal taxation, kidnapping for ransom, robbery and ambushes? If not, how will it compensate for their lost opportunities? In addition, the reserve army is likely to compete with the army over revenue-generating opportunities. And some of its members may leak intelligence to fellow armed groups.

    Painkiller or cure?

    The army reserve may be read as the latest attempt at solving the decades-old problem of getting rid of the many armed groups in eastern DRC, this time by bringing them into the fold of the state yet not into the army.

    However, this solution does risk unleashing many of the same detrimental dynamics as army integration. It may fuel armed mobilisation and militarisation rather than contain it.

    Wazalendo groups are currently in a comfortable position and there are no repercussions for not integrating the reserve force. To contain them, both the DRC’s army and the military justice system would need to be professionalised.

    Even if the reserve army did not have negative ripple effects, it would be an unlikely cure for armed mobilisation. That requires comprehensive, bottom-up peace efforts that tackle deep-seated grievances related to past violence and conflict over belonging, territory and local authority. Barring such efforts, the reserve force will remain a painkiller at best.

    – DRC has created a reserve force to fight the M23 – why this may backfire
    – https://theconversation.com/drc-has-created-a-reserve-force-to-fight-the-m23-why-this-may-backfire-247476

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Global: DRC has created a reserve force to fight the M23 – why this may backfire

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Judith Verweijen, Assistant professor, Utrecht University

    After nearly three decades of warfare, armed conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) seems only to intensify. The Rwanda-backed M23 rebellion has been at the centre of attention in recent years. However, eastern DRC is home to more than 100 other armed groups, which are a major source of instability too. The question of their demobilisation has haunted the country ever since the end of the Second Congo War in 2003.

    A new chapter in this long-standing conundrum seems to have started. In 2022, the government decided to form an alliance with armed groups to fight their common enemy, the M23 and its Rwandan backers. At around the same time, it launched an initiative to create an army reserve, known as the Reserve armée de la défense (RAD). This formalised the Congolese army’s established practice of using armed groups as auxiliaries.

    The creation of the reserve army allows the government to reward armed group allies with integration while bringing them under institutionalised control. But will this actually work?

    Our past and ongoing research on army integration and demobilisation in eastern DRC casts doubt on the plan, for three reasons.

    The first risk is that armed groups will boost their numbers to gain a stronger bargaining position once integration does occur.

    Secondly, reservist forces may compete with the army over territorial control and limited resources and turn against those who created them.

    Finally, merely absorbing armed groups into a reserve force does little to address the long-standing grievances that underlie conflict in the east.

    The Wazalendo: eastern DRC’s predatory patriots

    On 9 May 2022, in a secretive meeting in the town of Pinga in North Kivu, the Congolese armed forces and several Congolese armed groups agreed to cease hostilities against each other and instead form an alliance to fight their common enemy, the M23.

    As a result, these groups became quasi-official and increasingly presented themselves as defenders of Congo’s territorial integrity. They started to call themselves Wazalendo or patriots in Kiswahili. Fuelled by President Félix Tshisekedi’s supportive rhetoric, the Wazalendo became symbols of Congolese resistance against foreign aggression. This benefited the president’s 2023 electoral campaign.

    Across North and South Kivu provinces, armed groups have rebranded themselves Wazalendo, even when not part of the coalition fighting the M23.

    As the Congolese army’s attention is on the M23, these armed groups have benefited from the lull in operations against them. Most Wazalendo groups are allowed to roam around freely and have dramatically expanded their zones of influence and violent systems of revenue generation.

    This includes taxation at markets and rapidly proliferating roadblocks, but also ransom kidnappings and contract killings. There is also evidence that Wazalendo groups are engaged in torture, sexual violence and arbitrary arrests, and frequently recruit child soldiers.

    Chequered history of integration

    A few months after the Pinga meeting, Congo’s government launched a new national defence policy that mentioned the establishment of the reserve army. Though it was passed unanimously in parliament in April 2023, MPs voiced concerns that the new army reserve risked repeating mistakes of the past.

    The army is itself the product of the painstaking integration of former belligerents after the Second Congo War (1998-2003). But rebel-military integration became an open-ended process. Armed group officers alternately integrated into and deserted from the army in the hope of gaining higher ranks and positions in a next round of integration.

    Unending rebel integration also weakened the national army. It reinforced parallel command chains, facilitated intelligence leaks and created a lopsided hierarchy.

    The first iteration of the M23 rebellion in 2012 was the result of rebel integration gone wrong. In its aftermath, the Congolese government banned the wholesale negotiated integration of armed groups into the army.

    Hurdles to integration

    The reserve army risks unleashing the same dynamics of rewarding rebellion by doling out positions to armed group leaders and granting them impunity for past violence. In April 2024, the leaders of many Wazalendo groups were flown to Kinshasa where the army reserve leadership told them to start preparing lists of their combatants ahead of their integration.

    This has prompted numerous armed groups to step up recruitment.

    The prospect of integration has also triggered fierce competition for positions between Wazalendo commanders. This risks worsening animosities between groups.

    Other hurdles, some of which have been faced before, include:

    Unity of command. Forcing smaller armed groups into a hierarchical mould doesn’t always work. Most have deep local roots, with their recruitment and influence limited to a relatively small area. Used to calling the shots in their home areas, these commanders tend to be reluctant to take orders from higher-placed outsiders.

    Ethnic competition. Armed groups may resist full integration if they feel their rank and positions in the reserve army will be lower and that this will hamper their ability to protect members of their ethnic community. Such “local security dilemmas” have obstructed army integration and demobilisation efforts in the past.

    Resources. Armed groups currently enjoy substantial income, and considerable freedom in obtaining it. Will the reserve army command allow its members to engage in illegal taxation, kidnapping for ransom, robbery and ambushes? If not, how will it compensate for their lost opportunities? In addition, the reserve army is likely to compete with the army over revenue-generating opportunities. And some of its members may leak intelligence to fellow armed groups.

    Painkiller or cure?

    The army reserve may be read as the latest attempt at solving the decades-old problem of getting rid of the many armed groups in eastern DRC, this time by bringing them into the fold of the state yet not into the army.

    However, this solution does risk unleashing many of the same detrimental dynamics as army integration. It may fuel armed mobilisation and militarisation rather than contain it.

    Wazalendo groups are currently in a comfortable position and there are no repercussions for not integrating the reserve force. To contain them, both the DRC’s army and the military justice system would need to be professionalised.

    Even if the reserve army did not have negative ripple effects, it would be an unlikely cure for armed mobilisation. That requires comprehensive, bottom-up peace efforts that tackle deep-seated grievances related to past violence and conflict over belonging, territory and local authority. Barring such efforts, the reserve force will remain a painkiller at best.

    Michel Thill is a Senior Program Officer for swisspeace, a Basel University affiliated practice and research institute dedicated to advancing effective peacebuilding. swisspeace receives funding from research funding bodies, and bilateral and multilateral organizations. Michel is also a Fellow of the Rift Valley Institute.

    Judith Verweijen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. DRC has created a reserve force to fight the M23 – why this may backfire – https://theconversation.com/drc-has-created-a-reserve-force-to-fight-the-m23-why-this-may-backfire-247476

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Welcome to GUU: Open Day brought together future students

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: State University of Management – Official website of the State –

    On January 26, hundreds of applicants and parents came to the Open Day of the State University of Management.

    In total, more than 1,600 participants registered, half of whom came to the university to see everything with their own eyes.

    The meeting was opened by the Vice-Rector of the State University of Management, Dmitry Bryukhanov, who spoke about the key advantages of the university in all areas.

    “We are glad to see the first management university of the country on the site. In 2024, GUU celebrated its 105th anniversary. We rightfully bear the title of the first management university, because back in the USSR, we opened the first department for training managers. It was our scientists who wrote the first textbook on management science. Today, almost all basic areas of education are available at our university. As well as MBA programs, postgraduate studies, additional professional education, etc. Moreover, GUU implements the Presidential Program for the Training of Management Personnel and conducts foreign internships for its graduates,” said Dmitry Yuryevich.

    The head of the department for organizing the admission of applicants, Vadim Dikikh, announced changes in the university admission system in 2025/2026.

    “The admission rules change every year. Digitalization affects both our daily lives and all universities. Today, admission is a complex process that includes a number of steps using State Services. Therefore, you need to approach the process thoughtfully, understand and decide whether you plan to apply for a targeted or general competition, whether you have benefits or not, which areas of training, which Unified State Exams to take or which Olympiad you can take part in “tomorrow”. Most of the information can be obtained online, but if you have doubts or questions, the admissions committee staff will always help and point you in the right direction,” Vadim Dikikh advised.

    The guests were introduced to student life and extracurricular activities by the Vice-Rector of the State University of Management Pavel Pavlovsky, who noted only the main areas and opportunities, because our university has truly countless of them: KVN, “Service Learning”, university shifts, thematic summer camps in the All-Russian Children’s Center “Ocean” and Artek, dozens of federal competitions and projects in which everyone can find opportunities for self-realization.

    Also, as part of the official part, a representative of Sberbank spoke …, introducing future applicants and their parents to a preferential loan from Sberbank, available to applicants to the First Management. And the director of the Center for Professional Orientation Elena Likhatskikh told about how to earn additional points.

    Throughout the day, guests of the university were given tours of the GUU campus, consultations on admission issues, career guidance for schoolchildren, pre-university training and the infrastructure of the alma mater. Also, everyone could take part in a show match against the CS2 team, visit the Playstation zone or experience the possibilities of games in VR helmets.

    More photos from the Open Day can be seen in the album.

    Subscribe to the TG channel “Our GUU” Date of publication: 01/27/2025

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI China: China’s overall economic output continues to expand

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    An aerial drone photo taken on Jan. 15, 2025 shows the cruise ship Adora Flora City under construction at Shanghai Waigaoqiao Shipbuilding Co., Ltd. in Shanghai, east China. [Photo/Xinhua]

    China’s overall economic output continued to expand in January, reflecting a steady recovery momentum, according to official data.

    In January, China’s composite purchasing managers’ index (PMI) stood at 50.1, according to data released Monday by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS).

    The PMI for China’s manufacturing sector came in at 49.1, down from 50.1 in December. NBS statistician Zhao Qinghe said that the manufacturing PMI data in January were influenced by factors such as the approaching Spring Festival holiday and enterprise employees’ returning home for festival reunions.

    The Chinese New Year, or the Spring Festival, falls on Jan. 29 this year. It is the most important holiday on the Chinese calendar and an occasion for family reunions.

    The NBS data showed that the sub-indices of production and new orders came in at 49.8 and 49.2, respectively.

    The PMI for the equipment manufacturing sector remained above 50 for a sixth straight month, with its January reading at 50.2, according to the NBS.

    A reading above 50 indicates expansion, while a reading below 50 reflects contraction.

    The PMI for China’s non-manufacturing sector came in at 50.2 in January, down from 52.2 in December, official data showed Monday.

    The service sector continued to expand, with its sub-index standing at 50.3 in January, according to the NBS.

    Driven by the effects of the Spring Festival, business activity indices in sectors related to residents’ travel and consumption, including road transportation, accommodation, catering, ecological protection, and public facility management, have risen into the expansion zone, showing strengthened market activities.

    Meanwhile, business activity indices in sectors such as air transport, postal services, telecommunications, radio, television, satellite transmission services, and monetary and financial services remained above the 55-mark, indicating a robust growth in overall business volume.

    The expectation index for manufacturing production and business activity reached 55.3, while that for non-manufacturing business activity stood at 56.7, both within a relatively high range of prosperity. This suggests that most enterprises remain confident in market development following the holiday, according to Zhao.

    NBS data also showed that the combined profit of major industrial enterprises in China surpassed 7.43 trillion yuan (about $1.04 trillion) in 2024, while large enterprises in the cultural industry generated a combined profit of about 1.29 trillion yuan last year.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Hong Kong Customs detects case of illegally importing animals in third phase of “Pet Guardian” operation (with photos)

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    Hong Kong Customs detects case of illegally importing animals in third phase of “Pet Guardian” operation (with photos)
    Hong Kong Customs detects case of illegally importing animals in third phase of “Pet Guardian” operation (with photos)
    ******************************************************************************************

         Hong Kong Customs mounted an operation against smuggling of animals codenamed “Pet Guardian” with the Anti-Smuggling Bureau of Shenzhen Customs since November 2023. In late January this year, Hong Kong Customs launched the third phase of the operation and detected one suspected case of illegally importing animals on January 22. Four suspected illegally imported animals with an estimated market value of about $120,000 were seized.     On that day, Hong Kong Customs at Sha Tau Kok spotted a woman pushing a bike, who entered Hong Kong through the Chung Ying Street Checkpoint from the Mainland side of Chung Ying Street. The front basket of her bike carried two handbags suspected of containing animals. Customs officers then took action and found four suspected illegally imported animals, including one kitten and three puppies, inside the handbags. The 32-year-old woman was subsequently arrested.     Investigations of the case is ongoing and the four animals have been handed over to the Agriculture, Fisheries and Conservation Department for follow-up action.     Being a government department specifically responsible for tackling smuggling, Customs has long been combating various smuggling activities on all fronts. Customs will keep up its enforcement action and continue to resolutely combat all types of smuggling activities through proactive risk management and intelligence-based enforcement strategies, and carry out targeted anti-smuggling operations at suitable times to disrupt relevant crimes.     Customs reminds the public that importing animals into Hong Kong without a valid permit is an offence.     Under the Rabies Regulation, any person found guilty of illegally importing animals, carcasses or animal products is liable to a maximum fine of $50,000 and imprisonment for one year.

     
    Ends/Monday, January 27, 2025Issued at HKT 15:37

    NNNN

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI: Periodic announcement on the acquisition of the Bank‘s own shares and its results (week 12)

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    This announcement contains information on transactions of the acquisition of own shares of AB Šiaulių bankas (the Bank) carried during the period specified below under the Bank’s own share buy-back programme announced on 31 October 2024. 

    The period during which the acquisition of the Bank’s own shares under the programme was carried out – 04.11.2024 – 24.01.2025. 

    Period covered by this periodic report – 20.01.2025 – 24.01.2025. 

    Other information: 

    Transaction overview 
    Date  Total number of shares purchased on the day ( units)  Weighted average price (EUR)  Total value of transactions (EUR) 
    2025.01.20 125,000 0.914 114,229.88
    2025.01.21 125,000 0.914 114,187.70
    2025.01.22 125,000 0.915 114,329.92
    2025.01.23 125,000 0.914 114,250.00
    2025.01.24 125,000 0.913 114,080.01
    Total acquired during the current week  625,000 0.914 571,077.51
    Total acquired during the programme period  5,092,863 0.853 4,345,207.01
           
     

    The Bank’s own bought-back shares: 11,717,863 units.  

    Following the above transactions, the Bank will own a total of 12,342,863 units of own shares representing 1.86 % of the Bank’s issued shares. 

    Further detailed information on the transactions is attached. 

    This information is also available at: www.sb.lt   

    Additional information:
    Tomas Varenbergas
    Head of Investment Management Division
    tomas.varenbergas@sb.lt

    Attachment

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Šiaulių Bankas AB own shares acquisition programme completed

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    24 January 2025 Šiaulių Bankas AB (the Bank) has completed its own share buy-back programme on the regulated market, which was carried out from 4 November 2024. During this period, the Bank acquired 5,092,863 treasury shares, i.e. 74 % of the maximum number of shares within the limit set at the time of the programme’s expiry, for a total amount of EUR 4,345,207.01 million, at an average price of EUR 0.853 per share.

    “We are the first bank in the Baltic market to implement an open market buy-back programme for its own shares. The successful implementation of this programme has increased the Bank’s attractiveness to investors by increasing the liquidity of its shares on the stock exchange and the return to shareholders. In the long term, we plan to continue to optimise and efficiently manage the Bank’s capital in order to increase shareholder value. We will continue to use a variety of financial instruments, including buy-backs”, says Tomas Varenbergas, Board Member, Head of Investment Management Division of Šiaulių Bankas.

    On 15 August 2024, the Bank received authorisation from the European Central Bank (ECB) to buy back up to 13,745,114 of its own shares. The Bank has already purchased 11,092,863 treasury shares on the basis of this authorisation. The remaining unused limit amounts to 2,652,251 shares. The Bank will make efforts to use the remaining share buy-back to the full limits before the expiry of the authorisation period, i.e. by 15 August this year, taking into account the Bank’s market value and other circumstances.

    The Bank will inform about further buy-backs of its own shares in a separate announcement once the Management Board of the Bank will take a decision. This will be done no earlier than after the publication of the 2024 results and the drafting resolutions by the Management Board of the Bank for the Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders of Šiaulių Bankas to be held on 31 March 2025.

    Additional information:
    Tomas Varenbergas
    Head of Investment Management Division
    tomas.varenbergas@sb.lt

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Africa: DRC creates a reserve force to fight the M23 – why this may backfire

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Judith Verweijen, Assistant professor, Utrecht University

    After nearly three decades of warfare, armed conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) seems only to intensify. The Rwanda-backed M23 rebellion has been at the centre of attention in recent years. However, eastern DRC is home to more than 100 other armed groups, which are a major source of instability too. The question of their demobilisation has haunted the country ever since the end of the Second Congo War in 2003.

    A new chapter in this long-standing conundrum seems to have started. In 2022, the government decided to form an alliance with armed groups to fight their common enemy, the M23 and its Rwandan backers. At around the same time, it launched an initiative to create an army reserve, known as the Reserve armée de la défense (RAD). This formalised the Congolese army’s established practice of using armed groups as auxiliaries.

    The creation of the reserve army allows the government to reward armed group allies with integration while bringing them under institutionalised control. But will this actually work?

    Our past and ongoing research on army integration and demobilisation in eastern DRC casts doubt on the plan, for three reasons.

    The first risk is that armed groups will boost their numbers to gain a stronger bargaining position once integration does occur.

    Secondly, reservist forces may compete with the army over territorial control and limited resources and turn against those who created them.

    Finally, merely absorbing armed groups into a reserve force does little to address the long-standing grievances that underlie conflict in the east.

    The Wazalendo: eastern DRC’s predatory patriots

    On 9 May 2022, in a secretive meeting in the town of Pinga in North Kivu, the Congolese armed forces and several Congolese armed groups agreed to cease hostilities against each other and instead form an alliance to fight their common enemy, the M23.

    As a result, these groups became quasi-official and increasingly presented themselves as defenders of Congo’s territorial integrity. They started to call themselves Wazalendo or patriots in Kiswahili. Fuelled by President Félix Tshisekedi’s supportive rhetoric, the Wazalendo became symbols of Congolese resistance against foreign aggression. This benefited the president’s 2023 electoral campaign.

    Across North and South Kivu provinces, armed groups have rebranded themselves Wazalendo, even when not part of the coalition fighting the M23.

    As the Congolese army’s attention is on the M23, these armed groups have benefited from the lull in operations against them. Most Wazalendo groups are allowed to roam around freely and have dramatically expanded their zones of influence and violent systems of revenue generation.

    This includes taxation at markets and rapidly proliferating roadblocks, but also ransom kidnappings and contract killings. There is also evidence that Wazalendo groups are engaged in torture, sexual violence and arbitrary arrests, and frequently recruit child soldiers.

    Chequered history of integration

    A few months after the Pinga meeting, Congo’s government launched a new national defence policy that mentioned the establishment of the reserve army. Though it was passed unanimously in parliament in April 2023, MPs voiced concerns that the new army reserve risked repeating mistakes of the past.

    The army is itself the product of the painstaking integration of former belligerents after the Second Congo War (1998-2003). But rebel-military integration became an open-ended process. Armed group officers alternately integrated into and deserted from the army in the hope of gaining higher ranks and positions in a next round of integration.

    Unending rebel integration also weakened the national army. It reinforced parallel command chains, facilitated intelligence leaks and created a lopsided hierarchy.

    The first iteration of the M23 rebellion in 2012 was the result of rebel integration gone wrong. In its aftermath, the Congolese government banned the wholesale negotiated integration of armed groups into the army.

    Hurdles to integration

    The reserve army risks unleashing the same dynamics of rewarding rebellion by doling out positions to armed group leaders and granting them impunity for past violence. In April 2024, the leaders of many Wazalendo groups were flown to Kinshasa where the army reserve leadership told them to start preparing lists of their combatants ahead of their integration.

    This has prompted numerous armed groups to step up recruitment.

    The prospect of integration has also triggered fierce competition for positions between Wazalendo commanders. This risks worsening animosities between groups.

    Other hurdles, some of which have been faced before, include:

    Unity of command. Forcing smaller armed groups into a hierarchical mould doesn’t always work. Most have deep local roots, with their recruitment and influence limited to a relatively small area. Used to calling the shots in their home areas, these commanders tend to be reluctant to take orders from higher-placed outsiders.

    Ethnic competition. Armed groups may resist full integration if they feel their rank and positions in the reserve army will be lower and that this will hamper their ability to protect members of their ethnic community. Such “local security dilemmas” have obstructed army integration and demobilisation efforts in the past.

    Resources. Armed groups currently enjoy substantial income, and considerable freedom in obtaining it. Will the reserve army command allow its members to engage in illegal taxation, kidnapping for ransom, robbery and ambushes? If not, how will it compensate for their lost opportunities? In addition, the reserve army is likely to compete with the army over revenue-generating opportunities. And some of its members may leak intelligence to fellow armed groups.

    Painkiller or cure?

    The army reserve may be read as the latest attempt at solving the decades-old problem of getting rid of the many armed groups in eastern DRC, this time by bringing them into the fold of the state yet not into the army.

    However, this solution does risk unleashing many of the same detrimental dynamics as army integration. It may fuel armed mobilisation and militarisation rather than contain it.

    Wazalendo groups are currently in a comfortable position and there are no repercussions for not integrating the reserve force. To contain them, both the DRC’s army and the military justice system would need to be professionalised.

    Even if the reserve army did not have negative ripple effects, it would be an unlikely cure for armed mobilisation. That requires comprehensive, bottom-up peace efforts that tackle deep-seated grievances related to past violence and conflict over belonging, territory and local authority. Barring such efforts, the reserve force will remain a painkiller at best.

    – DRC creates a reserve force to fight the M23 – why this may backfire
    – https://theconversation.com/drc-creates-a-reserve-force-to-fight-the-m23-why-this-may-backfire-247476

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Crowd safety management measures and special traffic arrangements for Che Kung Festival

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

         Police will implement crowd safety management measures and special traffic arrangements to facilitate worshippers visiting Che Kung Temple in Sha Tin during the Che Kung Festival period.

    Crowd safety management measures
    ——————————–

         A large crowd is anticipated to visit Che Kung Temple and Che Kung Festival Fair during the Lunar New Year period. Depending on the crowd conditions, one-way pedestrian flow may be implemented at MTR Tai Wai Station and in the vicinity of Che Kung Temple, including Che Kung Miu Road and Chui Tin Street, between 11pm on January 28 and 8pm on Feberuary 2 to ensure public order and safety. Members of the public are urged to observe order and be patient while waiting in a queue.

    Special traffic arrangements
    —————————-

    A. Road closure

         The following roads will be closed from 8pm on January 28 to 8pm on February 2:

    – The slow lane of westbound Che Kung Miu Road between Sha Tin Tau Road and Chui Tin Street;
    – The right-turn lane of westbound Che Kung Miu Road between Chui
    Tin Street and near Che Kung Temple;
    – The slow lane of northbound Chui Tin Street between Che Kung Miu
    Road and the entrance of Sun Chui Estate near Sun Fong House; and
    – The slow lane of southbound Chui Tin Street between Che Kung Miu
    Road and the entrance of Sun Chui Estate near Sun Fong House.

    B. Traffic diversions

         The following traffic diversions will be implemented from 8pm on January 28 to 8pm on February 2:

    – Traffic along westbound Che Kung Miu Road cannot turn left to Chui Tin Street;
    – Traffic along westbound Che Kung Miu Road cannot turn right to the private road of The Wai;
    – Traffic along southbound Chui Tin Street cannot turn left to the road leading to the public car park at Chui Tin Street near Che Kung Temple;
    – Traffic along northbound Chui Tin Street cannot turn right to the road leading to the public car park at Chui Tin Street near Che Kung Temple;
    – Traffic along southbound Chui Tin Street cannot turn right to the entrance of Sun Chui Estate near Sun Fong House;
    – Traffic along northbound Chui Tin Street cannot go straight to the private road of The Wai;
    – Traffic along westbound Che Kung Miu Road heading for southbound Chui Tin Street and the private road of The Wai will be diverted via westbound Che Kung Miu Road, roundabout and eastbound Che Kung Miu Road;
    – Traffic along southbound Chui Tin Street heading for the entrance of Sun Chui Estate near Sun Fong House will be diverted via southbound Chui Tin Street, westbound Chui Tin Street, roundabout, eastbound Chui Tin Street and northbound Chui Tin Street; and
    – Traffic along northbound Chui Tin Street heading for the private
    road of The Wai will be diverted via westbound Che Kung Miu Road, roundabout and eastbound Che Kung Miu Road.

    C. Cycle track closure

         The following cycle tracks will be closed from 8pm on January 28 to 8pm on February 2:

    – The cycle track along Tsuen Lam Road between Tai Wai Road and the western riverside of Shing Mun River Channel;
    – The cycle track along the western riverside of Shing Mun River
    Channel between Tai Wai Soccer Pitch and Che Kung Miu Road;
    – The cycle track along the eastern riverside of Shing Mun River
    Channel between Tai Wai Soccer Pitch and Man Lai Court;
    – The cycle track connecting the eastern and western riverside of Shing Mun River Channel near Block 1 of Man Lai Court;
    – The cycle tracks along both sides of Che Kung Miu Road between
    Chui Tin Street and Sha Tin Tau Road;
    – The cycle track inside the subway system at the junction between Che Kung Miu Road and Chui Tin Street;
    – The cycle track inside the subway system at the junction between Che Kung Miu Road and Sha Tin Tau Road;
    – The cycle track along southern kerbside lane of Che Kung Miu Road between Chui Tin Street and Island School Tai Wai; and
    – The cycle tracks along both sides of Chui Tin Street between Che Kung Miu Road and the unnamed road leading to public car park near Che Kung Temple.

         During the cycle track closure period, cyclists may use the cycle track along the northern riverside of Shing Mun River Channel between Lion Rock Tunnel Road and Shing Wan Road commuting to and from Sha Tin.

    D. Suspension of car parks

         The public car park at Chui Tin Street near Che Kung Temple will be suspended from 6am on January 28 to 8pm on February 2, and from 7am to 6pm daily on February 8, 9, 15 and 16, except for vehicles with permit.

         The public car park at Chui Tin Street near Greenview Garden will be suspended from 6am on January 28 to 8pm on February 2, except for vehicles with permit.

         Members of the public are advised to make use of public transport to visit Che Kung Temple and Che Kung Festival Fair.

         During the implementation of the special traffic arrangements, any vehicles found illegally parked within the precincts mentioned above will be towed away without prior warning, and may be subject to multiple ticketing.

         Police will implement the above arrangements subject to traffic and crowd conditions in the area. Members of the public are advised to exercise tolerance and patience and take heed of instructions of the Police on site.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: WSD’s Photo-taking Challenge on 60th Anniversary of Dongjiang Water Supply to Hong Kong starts tomorrow (with photos)

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    WSD’s Photo-taking Challenge on 60th Anniversary of Dongjiang Water Supply to Hong Kong starts tomorrow (with photos)
    WSD’s Photo-taking Challenge on 60th Anniversary of Dongjiang Water Supply to Hong Kong starts tomorrow (with photos)
    ******************************************************************************************

         This year marks the 60th anniversary of Dongjiang water supply to Hong Kong. To commemorate this remarkable milestone with members of the public, the Water Supplies Department (WSD) is holding a Photo-taking Challenge on 60th Anniversary of Dongjiang Water Supply to Hong Kong from tomorrow (January 28) to May 18 with an aim to encourage members of the public to visit various related waterworks facilities to deepen their understanding of the Dongjiang water supply system, and also to learn from history and be grateful for the care rendered by the country. Participants who complete designated photo-taking tasks will have a chance to receive a limited edition souvenir. Members of the public are welcome to take part in the challenge.      The challenge covers six waterworks facilities, namely the Sheung Shui Dongjiang water main, the Plover Cove Reservoir, the Tai Lam Chung Reservoir, the High Island Reservoir, the Tin Shui Wai H2OPE Centre and the Shenzhen Reservoir. A section of the Sheung Shui Dongjiang water main is decorated as a bamboo with cute pandas and a WSD mascot named Water Save Dave dressed in a panda costume attract the public to take photos.      To participate, members of the public only have to take photos at the abovementioned waterworks facilities, share the photos in a public post on their Facebook or Instagram accounts and add designated hashtags and tags, and then email the screenshot of the post with the original photo to dj60@wsd.gov.hk. The challenge comprises eight challenge periods. The first 250 participants in each period to complete the above photo-taking challenge steps will receive a limited edition Water Save Dave family blind box doll. A set of four cute Water Save Dave family blind box dolls has been specially designed and produced to commemorate the 60th anniversary of Dongjiang water supply to Hong Kong, making the items exceptional collectibles. For details and rules of the challenge, please visit the event website.      Moreover, two special thematic guided tours of the Dongjiang water supply under the WSD’s “Excursion with Water Save Dave” visiting programme are being organised starting from October last year to March this year as one of the celebration activities for the 60th anniversary of the Dongjiang water supply to Hong Kong. Participants completing the two guided tours are also eligible to redeem a limited edition Water Save Dave family blind box doll. With the public’s great support and participation, the two thematic tours with 4,400 spaces has been fully taken up.

     
    Ends/Monday, January 27, 2025Issued at HKT 15:30

    NNNN

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Global: DRC creates a reserve force to fight the M23 – why this may backfire

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Judith Verweijen, Assistant professor, Utrecht University

    After nearly three decades of warfare, armed conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) seems only to intensify. The Rwanda-backed M23 rebellion has been at the centre of attention in recent years. However, eastern DRC is home to more than 100 other armed groups, which are a major source of instability too. The question of their demobilisation has haunted the country ever since the end of the Second Congo War in 2003.

    A new chapter in this long-standing conundrum seems to have started. In 2022, the government decided to form an alliance with armed groups to fight their common enemy, the M23 and its Rwandan backers. At around the same time, it launched an initiative to create an army reserve, known as the Reserve armée de la défense (RAD). This formalised the Congolese army’s established practice of using armed groups as auxiliaries.

    The creation of the reserve army allows the government to reward armed group allies with integration while bringing them under institutionalised control. But will this actually work?

    Our past and ongoing research on army integration and demobilisation in eastern DRC casts doubt on the plan, for three reasons.

    The first risk is that armed groups will boost their numbers to gain a stronger bargaining position once integration does occur.

    Secondly, reservist forces may compete with the army over territorial control and limited resources and turn against those who created them.

    Finally, merely absorbing armed groups into a reserve force does little to address the long-standing grievances that underlie conflict in the east.

    The Wazalendo: eastern DRC’s predatory patriots

    On 9 May 2022, in a secretive meeting in the town of Pinga in North Kivu, the Congolese armed forces and several Congolese armed groups agreed to cease hostilities against each other and instead form an alliance to fight their common enemy, the M23.

    As a result, these groups became quasi-official and increasingly presented themselves as defenders of Congo’s territorial integrity. They started to call themselves Wazalendo or patriots in Kiswahili. Fuelled by President Félix Tshisekedi’s supportive rhetoric, the Wazalendo became symbols of Congolese resistance against foreign aggression. This benefited the president’s 2023 electoral campaign.

    Across North and South Kivu provinces, armed groups have rebranded themselves Wazalendo, even when not part of the coalition fighting the M23.

    As the Congolese army’s attention is on the M23, these armed groups have benefited from the lull in operations against them. Most Wazalendo groups are allowed to roam around freely and have dramatically expanded their zones of influence and violent systems of revenue generation.

    This includes taxation at markets and rapidly proliferating roadblocks, but also ransom kidnappings and contract killings. There is also evidence that Wazalendo groups are engaged in torture, sexual violence and arbitrary arrests, and frequently recruit child soldiers.

    Chequered history of integration

    A few months after the Pinga meeting, Congo’s government launched a new national defence policy that mentioned the establishment of the reserve army. Though it was passed unanimously in parliament in April 2023, MPs voiced concerns that the new army reserve risked repeating mistakes of the past.

    The army is itself the product of the painstaking integration of former belligerents after the Second Congo War (1998-2003). But rebel-military integration became an open-ended process. Armed group officers alternately integrated into and deserted from the army in the hope of gaining higher ranks and positions in a next round of integration.

    Unending rebel integration also weakened the national army. It reinforced parallel command chains, facilitated intelligence leaks and created a lopsided hierarchy.

    The first iteration of the M23 rebellion in 2012 was the result of rebel integration gone wrong. In its aftermath, the Congolese government banned the wholesale negotiated integration of armed groups into the army.

    Hurdles to integration

    The reserve army risks unleashing the same dynamics of rewarding rebellion by doling out positions to armed group leaders and granting them impunity for past violence. In April 2024, the leaders of many Wazalendo groups were flown to Kinshasa where the army reserve leadership told them to start preparing lists of their combatants ahead of their integration.

    This has prompted numerous armed groups to step up recruitment.

    The prospect of integration has also triggered fierce competition for positions between Wazalendo commanders. This risks worsening animosities between groups.

    Other hurdles, some of which have been faced before, include:

    Unity of command. Forcing smaller armed groups into a hierarchical mould doesn’t always work. Most have deep local roots, with their recruitment and influence limited to a relatively small area. Used to calling the shots in their home areas, these commanders tend to be reluctant to take orders from higher-placed outsiders.

    Ethnic competition. Armed groups may resist full integration if they feel their rank and positions in the reserve army will be lower and that this will hamper their ability to protect members of their ethnic community. Such “local security dilemmas” have obstructed army integration and demobilisation efforts in the past.

    Resources. Armed groups currently enjoy substantial income, and considerable freedom in obtaining it. Will the reserve army command allow its members to engage in illegal taxation, kidnapping for ransom, robbery and ambushes? If not, how will it compensate for their lost opportunities? In addition, the reserve army is likely to compete with the army over revenue-generating opportunities. And some of its members may leak intelligence to fellow armed groups.

    Painkiller or cure?

    The army reserve may be read as the latest attempt at solving the decades-old problem of getting rid of the many armed groups in eastern DRC, this time by bringing them into the fold of the state yet not into the army.

    However, this solution does risk unleashing many of the same detrimental dynamics as army integration. It may fuel armed mobilisation and militarisation rather than contain it.

    Wazalendo groups are currently in a comfortable position and there are no repercussions for not integrating the reserve force. To contain them, both the DRC’s army and the military justice system would need to be professionalised.

    Even if the reserve army did not have negative ripple effects, it would be an unlikely cure for armed mobilisation. That requires comprehensive, bottom-up peace efforts that tackle deep-seated grievances related to past violence and conflict over belonging, territory and local authority. Barring such efforts, the reserve force will remain a painkiller at best.

    Michel Thill is a Senior Program Officer for swisspeace, a Basel University affiliated practice and research institute dedicated to advancing effective peacebuilding. swisspeace receives funding from research funding bodies, and bilateral and multilateral organizations. Michel is also a Fellow of the Rift Valley Institute.

    Judith Verweijen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. DRC creates a reserve force to fight the M23 – why this may backfire – https://theconversation.com/drc-creates-a-reserve-force-to-fight-the-m23-why-this-may-backfire-247476

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Russia: NSU scientists have designed a stand for studying radiation aging of semiconductor photodetectors

    Translation. Region: Russian Federation –

    Source: Novosibirsk State University – Novosibirsk State University –

    A rig for studying the radiation aging of solid-state photomultipliers (SPMT) was created by scientists from Novosibirsk State University together with their colleagues from the Budker Institute of Nuclear Physics SB RAS. The rig they developed is designed to operate at the boron neutron capture therapy (BNCT) facility, which is located at the INP SB RAS. It is integrated into the BNCT facility, expanding its capabilities. The rig is designed to study the radiation aging of SPMT. BNCT makes it possible to irradiate the devices under study with fast neutrons, and the rig, in turn, allows one to observe how this process affects their parameters. The first tests of the rig were conducted in November last year.

    Solid-state photomultiplier tubes (SSPMs) are a type of photodetector that are widely used in science. They can register single photons that result from the interaction of particles with the substance through which they pass. Since there are many such processes (scintillation, Cherenkov radiation, bremsstrahlung, etc.), the scope of application of SSPMs is very diverse. Almost every modern detector employs hundreds and thousands of SSPMs.

    — Under the influence of radiation — in our case, fast neutrons — the material is destroyed. In fact, neutrons destroy the structure of bonds in the semiconductor (usually silicon), from which the TFMTs are made. On the other hand, inside any detector operating at its collider, neutrons are also formed during the collision of counter beams of particles, and, therefore, along with the “useful” particles that the TFMTs are used to register, they undergo radiation aging. As a result, free charge carriers are formed, forming a dark current, and the TFMT at some point simply stops working. Therefore, it is necessary to know the permissible level of radiation at which they can be used. At the same time, the task of physicists is to make detectors such that their systems effectively register particles and at the same time are as little exposed to the harmful effects of radiation exposure as possible, — said the leading engineer of the interfaculty group of advanced developments of the Department of General Physics of the Physics Faculty of NSU, senior researcher at the Institute of Nuclear Physics named after G.I. Budker Institute of Nuclear Physics SB RAS Viktor Bobrovnikov.

    In 2022, scientists from NSU and INP SB RAS spent a month at the BNCT facility studying the effect of radiation on the optical transparency of the fiber used in the calibration system of the electromagnetic calorimeter of the CMS detector operating at the Large Hadron Collider at the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN). Part of this fiber is located quite close to the collision site of hadron beams, so it begins to darken – “age” under the influence of radiation. Studies conducted by scientists from NSU and INP SB RAS showed that the transparency of the fiber degrades by 25-30% at a dose corresponding to 3 years of CMS operation per experiment. The CMS calorimeter calibration team was completely satisfied with the result obtained. In this experiment, the researchers used the equipment and measurement methodology proposed by foreign colleagues. The experience gained was used to create our stand for studying TFMTs.

    The TFMT research setup consists of three main elements. The first is the light distribution system from the source (laser) to the TFMTs under study. It is necessary because all equipment must be located in a radiation-protected area (control room) to prevent damage to the equipment, while the TFMTs are directly exposed to radiation. The second element is a heat and cold chamber. Sometimes it is called a “climate chamber”. It allows you to set a certain temperature for the TFMT from -20 to 55 degrees. Temperature in this case is an important parameter, since the previously mentioned TFMT dark current (or noise) depends on it. If this noise is high enough, it can completely drown out the useful TFMT signal. Also, a “climate chamber” is necessary for researchers because the ambient temperature is quite unstable, and for repeatability of experiments to study the TFMT response, it is necessary to work in one temperature mode under strictly identical conditions. In addition, researchers are interested in conducting research outside room temperature in order to better understand the capabilities of the TFMT. The third important component of the stand is the data collection system. It is needed for digitalization and subsequent recording of signals from the studied TFEU, laser parameters, microclimate parameters in the TFEU location, signals from sensors measuring the stability of the laser source and the transparency of the optical fiber, and so on.

    — The solutions implemented in the stand are already used to one degree or another in various installations. The uniqueness lies in the process of irradiating the TFEU itself. Along with the simultaneous measurement of the TFEU parameters, we can evaluate the level of radiation dose. This gives us a rare opportunity to thoroughly study the level of radiation exposure to the TFEU. Such an opportunity is completely absent when conducting similar studies on reactors; in the end, you will only receive an answer about the initial and final state of your device without understanding how its parameters changed during irradiation, — explained Viktor Bobrovnikov.

    The stand was tested in November last year. A significant amount of data was obtained, which is currently being processed, but scientists are already noting that the effect of radiation aging of the TFEU has become quite obvious and it remains to complete the analysis to fully understand the whole picture.

    — We plan to upgrade the stand taking into account the experimental experience gained. It is impossible to take everything into account at once — some of the features are revealed directly in the process of work. In the conducted irradiation session, we worked with rather old TFEMs, which are now practically not used, but are quite suitable for “testing” the measurement technique in real conditions. Now we have three types of TFEMs, currently used in real experiments. One of them is used in the electromagnetic calorimeter “shashlik” of the MPD detector of the NIKA experiment (Dubna, Moscow). We and our colleagues are interested in knowing the response of these TFEMs to irradiation. So, we have extensive plans, at least for the next 2-3 years, — said Viktor Bobrovnikov.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI China: Classic Peking Opera still resonates on silver screen

    Source: China State Council Information Office 3

    Peking Opera master performer Cheng Yanqiu and playwright Weng Ouhong once collaborated in the production of Suo Lin Nang, a bittersweet tale with a happy ending.

    The production premiered in 1940 and remains a showpiece of the Cheng style of Peking Opera to this day. Its morals still resonate with audiences today — lending a helping hand to those in need, kindness begets kindness, and girls help girls.

    In the story, Xue Xiangling, the daughter of a wealthy family, receives a purse filled with jewels from her mother before her wedding. On the way to the ceremony, a sudden downpour forces her to seek shelter in a pavilion where she meets another bride, Zhao Shouzhen, who is crying over her poverty, so Xue gifts Zhao the purse.

    Years later, a flood separates Xue from her family, and she has to work as a maid. She accidentally finds the purse in the house and realizes that the lady of the household is Zhao. Recognizing Xue as her benefactor, Zhao helps her reunite with her family.

    For more than three years, Shanghai Film Group, the National Academy of Chinese Theatre Arts, Shanghai Media Group and the Capital Jinghu Arts Research Association worked together to bring the production to the silver screen, along with Zhang Huoding, a renowned Peking Opera artist and representative performer of the Cheng opera style.

    The film Suo Lin Nang, or The Kylin Purse, made its Beijing premiere at the China National Film Museum on Dec 27.

    “This year marks the 120th anniversary of the birth of Cheng Yanqiu. The Cheng-style influence is profound and the master’s thoughts and spirit continue to enlighten future generations,” Zhang, also a professor at the National Academy of Chinese Theatre Arts, said at the premiere.

    According to her, the film captures the classic stage production through visual storytelling, serving as a tribute to and remembrance of Peking Opera predecessors. “I sincerely hope that the Cheng style continues to thrive and the master’s art will endure,” she adds.

    At the premiere, director Teng Junjie, vice-president of the Shanghai Federation of Literary and Art Circles, said that during the filmmaking process, he was moved by the professionalism and pursuit of excellence demonstrated by the Peking Opera artists.

    Teng recalls filming during the coldest winter months along the coast of Zhejiang province, but the artists, exemplified by Zhang, gritted their teeth and overcame the difficulties while working more than 10 hours a day.

    “Zhang insisted on canceling the trailer we booked for her to save our limited budget to improve the film’s quality,” Teng says.

    Another example of this camaraderie is that while some supporting actors had limited scenes, they insisted on staying on the set, offering to help in any way they could.

    “With 8K resolution, this film is presented to today’s audience with the clearest images, the most saturated colors, and the most precise combination of camera movement and structure,” Teng says.

    This film is made for today and the future, he adds.

    “With this film, we pay tribute to Cheng Yanqiu, our national treasure Peking Opera, and the excellent contemporary performers of the Cheng style who have been working hard to pass down the art form,” Teng says.

    In 2014, the film concept was included in the Peking Opera Film Project, initiated in 2011 to preserve outstanding stage productions through cinematic techniques. It later received support from the China National Arts Fund, which was approved by the State Council in late 2013.

    The completion of The Kylin Purse highlights that all 21 films listed in the project have been produced, with Shanghai Film Group having filmed and produced six.

    Last June, the film made its Shanghai premiere at the 26th Shanghai International Film Festival.

    In November, it was screened at the 9th edition of the festival of traditional Chinese operas in Paris and won one of its top prizes.

    The China National Film Museum has entered all 21 films from the project into its archives and established a permanent exhibition themed on the project.

    “The Kylin Purse is a highly acclaimed classic in the Peking Opera scene,” says Huang Xiaowei, the museum’s curator.

    “Its script upholds long-standing values such as justice and gratitude. With the distinctive Cheng singing style, especially under the superb performance of Zhang Huoding, the production has remarkable artistic depth and appeal,”Huang adds.

    She stresses the vital role Peking Opera played in China’s cinematic history, as the first-ever Chinese film Dingjun Mountain, released in 1905, was a recording of veteran Peking Opera artist Tan Xinpei performing.

    “The exhibition themed on the Peking Opera Film Project has expanded and enriched our museum’s film collection. It has taken on an integral role in showcasing the achievements of Chinese cinema,”Huang adds.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI China: Colombia announces tit-for-tat tariffs on US goods following Trump threat

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    Colombian President Gustavo Petro on Sunday announced 25-percent tariffs on all goods from the United States in a tit-for-tat measure after U.S. President Donald Trump imposed tariffs on Colombia.

    Trump said he would impose 25 percent tariffs and various sanctions on Colombia after the South American country refused to allow the landing of two military aircraft carrying deported immigrants.

    “I order the Minister of Foreign Trade to raise tariffs on imports from the United States by 25 percent,” Petro posted on social media platform X. The president also said the government will assist in replacing those U.S. products with Colombian products.

    He said in another message that he would never allow Colombian immigrants to be transported in military aircraft handcuffed as if they were criminals.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Auction of personalised vehicle registration marks to be held on February 15

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    Auction of personalised vehicle registration marks to be held on February 15
    Auction of personalised vehicle registration marks to be held on February 15
    ****************************************************************************

         The Transport Department (TD) today (January 27) announced that an auction of personalised vehicle registration marks (PVRMs) will be held on February 15 (Saturday) in Meeting Room S421, L4, Old Wing, Hong Kong Convention and Exhibition Centre, Wan Chai.      “A total of 240 approved PVRMs will be put up for public auction. A list of the marks has been uploaded to the department’s website, www.td.gov.hk/en/public_services/vehicle_registration_mark/index.html,” a department spokesman said.      The reserve price of each of these marks is $5,000. Applicants who have paid a deposit of $5,000 should also participate in the bidding (including the first bid at the reserve price). Otherwise, the PVRM concerned may be sold to another bidder at the reserve price.      People who wish to participate in the bidding at the auction should take note of the following points: (1) Bidders are required to produce the following documents for completion of registration and payment procedures immediately after successful bidding: (i) the identity document of the successful bidder;(ii) the identity document of the purchaser (if the purchaser and the successful bidder are different persons);(iii) a copy of the Certificate of Incorporation (if the purchaser is a body corporate); and(iv) a crossed cheque made payable to “The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region” or “The Government of the HKSAR”. For an auctioned mark paid for by cheque, the first three working days after the date of auction will be required for cheque clearance confirmation before processing of the application for mark assignment can be completed. Successful bidders may also pay through the Easy Pay System (EPS), but are reminded to note the maximum transfer amount in the same day of the payment card. Payment by post-dated cheque, cash, credit card or other methods will not be accepted. (2) Purchasers must make payment of the purchase price through EPS or by crossed cheque and complete the Memorandum of Sale of PVRM immediately after the bidding. Subsequent alteration of the particulars in the Memorandum will not be permitted. (3) A PVRM can only be assigned to a motor vehicle which is registered in the name of the purchaser. The Certificate of Incorporation must be produced immediately by the purchaser if a vehicle registration mark purchased is to be registered under the name of a body corporate. (4) The display of a PVRM on a motor vehicle should be in compliance with the requirements stipulated in Schedule 4 of the Road Traffic (Registration and Licensing of Vehicles) Regulations. (5) Any change to the arrangement of letters, numerals and blank spaces of a PVRM, i.e. single and two rows as auctioned, will not be allowed. (6) The purchaser shall, within 12 months after the date of auction, apply to the Commissioner for Transport for the PVRM to be assigned to a motor vehicle registered in the name of the purchaser. If the purchaser fails to assign the PVRM within 12 months, allocation of the PVRM will be cancelled and arranged for re-allocation in accordance with the statutory provision without prior notice to the purchaser.      “Upon completion of the Memorandum of Sale of PVRM, the purchaser will be issued a receipt and a Certificate of Allocation of Personalised Registration Mark. The Certificate of Allocation will serve to prove the holdership of the PVRM. Potential buyers of vehicles bearing a PVRM should check the Certificate of Allocation with the sellers and pay attention to the details therein. For transfer of vehicle ownership, this certificate together with other required documents should be sent to the TD for processing,” the spokesman added.      For other auction details, please refer to the Guidance Notes – Auction of PVRM, which is available at the department’s licensing offices or can be downloaded from its website, www.td.gov.hk/en/public_services/vehicle_registration_mark/pvrm_auction/index.html.

     
    Ends/Monday, January 27, 2025Issued at HKT 14:30

    NNNN

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Name Release, Fatal crash, Winton Lorneville Highway

    Source: New Zealand Police (District News)

    Police can now confirm the name of the woman who died following a two-vehicle crash on Winton Lorneville Highway, Tuesday 21 January.

    She was Thachawalai Youngdaeng of Thailand.

    Our thoughts are with her family and loved ones at this difficult time.

    Enquiries into the circumstances of the crash are ongoing.

    ENDS

    Issued by Police Media Centre

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Detectives investigating a rape in Westminster release E-FIT of man they want to identify

    Source: United Kingdom London Metropolitan Police

    Detectives investigating a rape in Westminster have released an E-FIT image of a man they are working to identify.

    On Tuesday, 14 June 2022, a woman reported walking alone along Bradiston Road, W9, when a car, believed to be a dark coloured Audi A3, stopped at the junction ahead of her.

    An unknown man pushed the woman from behind into the vehicle, then drove away with her inside before raping her.

    After the assault the woman was pushed back out of the vehicle not far from where she’d been picked up.

    The incident happened at 21:00hrs one evening in March 2022.

    Detectives have released an e-fit of the man they urgently need to trace.

    He was described as speaking with a Jamaican accent and believed to be in his late 30s, tall with short dreadlocks, and a significant facial scar.

    Detective Constable, Leon Riley, from the policing team covering Westminster, said:

    “If you recognise the man in the image please contact us without delay.

    “We have been carrying out extensive enquiries since the incident and we continue to support the victim who, as far as possible, has been trying to live her life as normal since it happened.

    “It was a horrifying ordeal for her and we thank her for supporting the investigation to trace the man responsible for assaulting her, and now helping us build an e-fit of the suspect.

    “Women should be able to walk alone without fear and we are dedicated to protecting women and girls from predatory offenders such as this.

    “Anyone who recognises the man, or has information, please contact police on 101 quoting 6533840/22.

    “Or, to remain completely anonymous call the independent charity Crimestoppers on 0800 555 111 or visit crimestoppers-uk.org.”

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI China: China’s non-manufacturing PMI at 50.2 in January

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    The purchasing managers’ index (PMI) for China’s non-manufacturing sector came in at 50.2 in January, down from 52.2 in December, official data showed Monday.

    A reading above 50 indicates expansion, while below 50 reflects contraction.

    According to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), the service sector continued to expand, with its sub-index standing at 50.3 in January.

    Driven by the effects of the Spring Festival, business activity indices in sectors related to residents’ travel and consumption, including road transportation, accommodation, catering, ecological protection, and public facilities management, have risen into the expansion zone, showing strengthened market activities.

    Meanwhile, business activity indices in sectors such as air transport, postal services, telecommunications, radio, television, satellite transmission services, and monetary and financial services remained above the 55-mark, indicating a robust growth in overall business volume.

    In January, the construction sub-index came in at 49.3, according to NBS data.

    Monday’s data also showed that the country’s manufacturing PMI came in at 49.1 in January.

    Spring Festival, or the Chinese New Year, falls on Jan. 29 this year. It is the most important holiday on the Chinese calendar and an occasion for family reunions.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: DH enhances enforcement actions against illegal use of pharmacy logo and title with approach of Chinese New Year holidays

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    DH enhances enforcement actions against illegal use of pharmacy logo and title with approach of Chinese New Year holidays
    DH enhances enforcement actions against illegal use of pharmacy logo and title with approach of Chinese New Year holidays
    ******************************************************************************************

         With the Chinese New Year holidays approaching, the Department of Health (DH) today (January 27) reminded members of the public and travellers to verify the pharmacy logo in the prescribed form when purchasing medicines. The DH will continue to enhance enforcement actions against the illegal use of logos and titles of Authorized Sellers of Poisons (ASP) (commonly known as pharmacies) and carry out follow-up investigations of suspected violations.            Last year (2024), six limited companies and a proprietor of a retailer, which were not pharmacies, were convicted of displaying a logo, which so resembled the logo in the prescribed form of a pharmacy, at their premises, and were fined from $2,000 to $16,800.            According to the Pharmacy and Poisons Ordinance (Cap. 138) (the Ordinance), only persons authorised by the Pharmacy and Poisons Board of Hong Kong (the Board) as ASPs are allowed to conduct the relevant retail business of selling poisons at premises registered by the Board, including poisons listed in Part 1 and Part 2 of the Poisons List at Schedule 10 to the Pharmacy and Poisons Regulations (Cap. 138A). Displaying a logo in the prescribed form of a pharmacy or a logo which so resembled the logo in the prescribed form at a premises other than the registered premises of a pharmacy, or using the Chinese term “藥房” or the terms such as “pharmacy”, “dispensary”, “drug-store” in connection with any business engaged in the retail sale of poisons commits an offence. The maximum penalty upon conviction is a fine of $100,000 and two years’ imprisonment.           The use of a pharmacy logo or its title as stipulated by the Ordinance is applicable to all retailers, including those that are not licensed by the Board. The DH has been collecting intelligence through different channels. If any retailer is suspected of illegally displaying a pharmacy logo in the prescribed form or pharmacy title, the DH will follow up and carry out an investigation immediately and conduct joint operation with relevant departments when necessary.           To enable the public to identify registered pharmacies, the DH has formulated a label (see Annex) for identification of ASPs, and the labels have been sent to each pharmacy for display in a conspicuous position in the pharmacy. Users can obtain information of the registered pharmacy by scanning the QR Code on the label displayed in the pharmacy.           Members of the public can also visit the website of the Drug Office of the DH for educational materials on “‘Pharmacies’ in Hong Kong”, and names and addresses of all licensees (including ASPs).

     
    Ends/Monday, January 27, 2025Issued at HKT 12:00

    NNNN

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Gov. Pillen Releases Executive Order Establishing Support for Federal Immigration Policy Implementation

    Source: US State of Nebraska

    . Pillen Releases Executive Order Establishing Support for Federal Immigration Policy Implementation

    LINCOLN, NE – Today, Governor Jim Pillen signed an executive order establishing the Support for Federal Immigration Policy Implementation for the state of Nebraska. The document outlines actions to be undertaken by state agencies to effectuate the executive orders issued Jan. 20 by President Donald J. Trump.

    “This document demonstrates Nebraska’s alignment with the new federal immigration policy and provides guidance to state agencies for carrying out provisions contained in the President’s recently issued executive orders,” said Gov. Pillen.

    State agencies have no later than May 31 to ensure they have met the requirements of the Governor’s executive order. 

    A signed copy of EO 25-01 is included with this release.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Serious Crash, SH5, Waipunga

    Source: New Zealand Police (District News)

    Police are responding to a two-vehicle crash on State Highway 5 near Matea Road, Waipunga, Taupō District.

    The crash was reported around 4pm.

    Initial indications suggest at least two occupants are in a moderate to serious condition.

    The road is closed while emergency services work at the scene between Matea Road and Pohoukura Road. 

    Motorists are advised to expect delays and take an alternate route.

    ENDS 

    Issued by Police Media Centre

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Three property owners fined over $210,000 in total for not complying with removal orders

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

         â€‹Three property owners were convicted and fined over $210,000 in total at the Tuen Mun Magistrates’ Courts earlier this month for failing to comply with removal orders issued under the Buildings Ordinance (BO) (Cap. 123).

         The first case involved an unauthorised structure with an area of about 28 square metres on the flat roof of a residential building at Yan Oi Tong Circuit, Tuen Mun. As the unauthorised building works (UBWs) were carried out without prior approval and consent from the Buildings Department (BD), a removal order was served on the owner under section 24(1) of the BO.

         Failing to comply with the removal order, the owner was prosecuted by the BD and was fined $75,260, of which $55,260 was the fine for the number of days that the offence continued, upon conviction at the Tuen Mun Magistrates’ Courts on January 10.

         The second and the third cases involved several unauthorised structures with a total area of about 60 sq m on the yards and one of the roofs of two houses at San Tam Road, Yuen Long. As the UBWs were carried out without prior approval and consent from the BD, removal orders were served on two owners concerned under section 24(1) of the BO.

         Failing to comply with the removal orders, the two owners were prosecuted by the BD and were fined upon conviction at the Tuen Mun Magistrates’ Courts on January 10. One owner was fined $75,750, of which $50,750 was the fine for the number of days that the offence continued, while the other owner was fined $66,660, of which $44,660 was the fine for the number of days that the offence continued.

         A spokesman for the BD said today (January 27), “UBWs may lead to serious consequences. Owners must comply with removal orders without delay. The BD will continue to take enforcement action against owners who have failed to comply with removal orders, including instigation of prosecution, to ensure building safety.”

         Failure to comply with a removal order without reasonable excuse is a serious offence under the BO. The maximum penalty upon conviction is a fine of $200,000 and one year’s imprisonment, and a further fine of $20,000 for each day that the offence continues.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Economics: ADB, Ayala Sign $100 Million Financing Deal to Support Electric Mobility in the Philippines

    Source: Asia Development Bank

    MANILA, PHILIPPINES (27 January 2025) — The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has signed a financing package of up to $100 million to support Ayala Corporation’s contributions to the development of an electric mobility ecosystem in the Philippines. This funding will be used to procure and install electric vehicle charging stations (EVCS) and to purchase electric vehicles for commercial distribution.

    The package includes a concessional loan from the Canadian Climate and Nature Fund for the Private Sector in Asia (CANPA). ADB’s financing, along with the concessional loan, will be used to develop a network of EVCS in the Philippines. This blended financing features an innovative pricing structure aimed at accelerating deployment of EVCS infrastructure. A portion of the ADB financing will be allocated to procure electric vehicles from leading manufacturers for distribution across the country.

    “This project is a significant step towards a sustainable and low-carbon future for the Philippines,” said ADB Country Director for the Philippines Pavit Ramachandran. “By fostering the development of a robust electric mobility ecosystem, we are not only addressing critical environmental challenges such as air pollution, but also driving economic growth through the creation of green jobs, enhancing energy security, and promoting inclusive and resilient urban development.”

    Electric vehicle (EV) development is still nascent in the Philippines. High initial costs, limited charging infrastructure, and evolving technologies have posed significant barriers to adoption of EVs in the country. But the Philippine government’s Electric Vehicle Industry Development Act and various tax incentives are helping create a more favorable environment for the growth of the EV sector.

    The creation of an EVCS network is crucial for electric vehicles to become more popular. The EVCS to be set up with the ADB financing package will address gaps in EV charging infrastructure, thereby facilitating faster adoption of electric vehicles.

    “This innovative blended financing comes at an opportune time as Ayala, through ACMobility, continues to ramp up its electric mobility investments. As we help build a comprehensive EV ecosystem for the Philippines, we wish to thank like-minded institutional partners like ADB for helping us expand our electric mobility initiatives, accelerate our contribution to the Philippines’ climate goals, and reaffirm our purpose of building businesses that enable people to thrive,” said ACMobility’s President and CEO Jaime Alfonso Zobel de Ayala.

    Established in 2024, CANPA is a trust fund managed by ADB, supported by a commitment of Can$360 million from the Government of Canada. The fund builds on the success of the two previous funds, namely the Canadian Climate Fund for the Private Sector in Asia II (CFPS II) and its predecessor CFPS. CANPA aims to support private-sector projects in Asia and the Pacific that focus on climate and nature-based solutions, while also promoting gender equality.

    Ayala Corporation is one of the Philippines’ largest and most enduring conglomerates. With a diverse portfolio that includes real estate, banking, telecommunications, and renewable energy, the company is well-positioned to lead the development of the electric mobility ecosystem in the Philippines. Key to Ayala’s growing sustainable business portfolio is its access to innovative financing options such as blended finance, which is supported by public, private and philanthropic funds.

    ADB is committed to achieving a prosperous, inclusive, resilient, and sustainable Asia and the Pacific, while sustaining its efforts to eradicate extreme poverty. Established in 1966, it is owned by 69 members—49 from the region. 

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI China: Trump imposes 25% tariffs on Colombia after US deportation flights denied landing

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    U.S. President Donald Trump on Sunday announced 25-percent tariffs on all goods imported from Colombia after the Latin American country refused to allow the landing of two flights carrying deported immigrants.

    “I was just informed that two repatriation flights from the United States, with a large number of Illegal Criminals, were not allowed to land in Colombia,” Trump posted on his social media platform Truth Social.

    Colombian President Gustavo Petro’s rejection of these flights has “jeopardized the National Security and Public Safety of the United States,” Trump wrote, noting that he has directed his administration to immediately take “urgent and decisive retaliatory measures.”

    Trump’s retaliatory measures include: emergency 25-percent tariffs on all goods coming from Colombia, to be raised to 50 percent in one week; a travel ban and immediate visa revocations on Colombian government officials and all allies and supporters; visa sanctions on all party members, family members and supporters of the Colombian government; enhanced customs and border protection inspections of all Colombian nationals and cargo on national security grounds; International Emergency Economic Powers Act sanctions.

    Earlier Sunday, Petro posted on social media platform X, formerly known as Twitter, that his government would not accept U.S. deportation flights until a protocol is established by the Trump administration to treat migrants with dignity. He also urged the United States to use civilian planes instead of military ones.

    After Trump’s announcement, Petro posted on X that he had ordered his foreign trade minister to raise tariffs on U.S. imports by 25 percent.

    Just a few days ago, the United States sent four deportation flights carrying immigrants to Mexico. However, according to multiple U.S. media reports, at least one flight was refused entry.

    The United States also sent deportation flights to other countries, including Guatemala and Brazil. The Brazilian Foreign Ministry recently condemned the action, saying the immigrants on the deportation flights were subjected to humiliating treatment.

    During his presidential campaign, Trump promised to carry out large-scale deportations of illegal immigrants once he took office. After his inauguration on Jan. 20, deportation operations began in several parts of the United States, allegedly focusing on criminals. The White House claimed that over 1,000 illegal immigrants had been arrested on Thursday and Friday, and hundreds of them were deported via military aircraft.

    According to the Associated Press, Colombia accepted 475 deportation flights from the United States from 2020 to 2024. In 2024 alone, it accepted 124 deportation flights.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Quick reporting from public sees two teens arrested, Invercargill

    Source: New Zealand Police (National News)

    Attributable to Detective Peter Smallfield, Invercargill Police:

    Two young people are facing Youth Court in Invercargill after a series of burglaries in a stolen car overnight.

    A Mazda vehicle was stolen from a Kingswell address in the early hours of the morning by two people, who later pulled up to a jewellers in the central city around 5am.

    They have got out and attempted to smash the windows with a scooter, and when they were not able to gain entry, travelled to a service station in Newfield.

    Again, they were not able to gain entry.

    Stopping the vehicle on a street nearby, they have had an interaction with a member of the public, in which they have pretended to have a firearm with them in order to scare them away.

    They have then travelled to a dairy in Winsdor, where they have managed to smash their way in.

    The pair stole items including vapes, cash, and confectionery before getting back into the vehicle and driving a short distance away.

    A Police dog unit has located the vehicle and tracked the occupants who had fled on foot, taking them into custody shortly after 6am.

    Two young males were due in the Invercargill Youth Court today, appearing jointly on three charges of burglary, one of theft of a motor vehicle and one of being unlawfully in a closed yard.

    This behaviour is incredibly frustrating for residents and business owners in our community, and it’s pleasing to have been able to immediately hold this pair to account.

    We want to extend our thanks to the members of the public who observed suspicious behaviour and reported it to Police on 111 straight away, enabling the quick apprehension of the two youths.

    It is also a reminder to take every precaution possible to help avoid becoming a victim of crime.

    Remember to take property security measures with your vehicles – keep them inside a secure garage if possible, remove valuables, and consider a steering wheel lock. This all helps make your vehicle less desirable for opportunistic thieves.

    ENDS

    Issued by the Police Media Centre 

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI Australia: Transcript – ABC Brisbane: Steve Austin

    Source: Australian Executive Government Ministers

    STEVE AUSTIN: Catherine King is the Federal Minister for Infrastructure in Australia. Minister, thanks for joining me this morning. 

    CATHERINE KING: Very good to be with you. 

    STEVE AUSTIN: Can you tell me this is by Infrastructure Australia? Does this mean that you as the final decision maker will bump these off the priority list yourself? 

    CATHERINE KING: No, so, it’s a bit of a beat up of a story this morning, and it seems to be a bit of confusion about what the role of Infrastructure Australia is versus the role of the Australian Government that, of course, funds through the budget infrastructure projects in Queensland, some nationally significant, those very, very large infrastructure projects that operate where there are big missing links in freight routes, where there are big missing links in electricity transmission or water transmission, right the way across the country. And so it is, at that higher level of project. And so it’s really refining its list there. It doesn’t represent the funding decisions or the totality of all of the projects that the government, the Federal Albanese Government, is investing in and Infrastructure Australia it’s not, never has been an actual funding body. So that’s sort of revising its list. What it’s doing at the moment is it’s consulting with states and territories. I have not seen its list. Obviously, states have been given a draft to comment on and to look through, and states can work their way with Infrastructure Australia to look at projects of that nationally significant scale, to put back on the list, if that’s what they what they want to do, or to make sure that they’re on the list, or that, as I said, that it’s separate to the budget process. And it does seem, I did think was a sort of passing strange story today.

    STEVE AUSTIN: So because it’s off the Infrastructure Australia list doesn’t mean it’s off the agenda of the federal government or you as the Minister?

    CATHERINE KING: Yeah, correct. And in fact, what actually they do do is where a project already has a or has a full or partial commitment infrastructure, Australia says, well, our job’s done now like that. We’ve had that major piece of work done. We’ve analysed the cost benefit in the business case that states have put to us. It’s been on the infrastructure priority list. And again, these are only for really big projects. They’re not for the suburban roads or the bridges that we’re doing or a range of those things. And then what it does is, if it’s attracted funding, it says, okay, well now we will take that off the list, and we’ll put a new priority on at that scale. And so some of the projects that you mentioned at the start of your story already have really substantial federal funding attached to them, and that’s partly why I suspect Infrastructure Australia is removing them, or has removed them from the draft list. But again, they’re working with good faith with states and territories at the moment, and if the Queensland Government wants to submit projects to do that, it needs to have done the work. It needs to have really done the work. Because, of course, this was really about making sure, with Infrastructure Australia, that the Commonwealth Government gets good independent advice which take the politics out of infrastructure investments. We make sure that we got good, proper advice in which to make investments. 

    STEVE AUSTIN: I spoke with the mayor of the Sunshine Coast earlier this morning, Rosanna Natoli, and she’s worried about what the list means, particularly for the Sunshine Coast, which is under huge development pressure from increased population there, particularly for things like some of the big roads, but also the rail project, the Beerburrum to Nambour rail upgrade. Can you state what your position is on that today, please?

    CATHERINE KING: Well, of course, in terms of many again, of the projects that were referenced, there is already significant investment being made. For local councils where they want to put their views, they need to do that via state governments. They have every opportunity to do that, and we really encourage them to do that. But again, we’re investing really significantly, whether it’s Logan to Gold Coast faster rail, the Sunshine Coast rail line, direct sunshine coast, the Coomera Connector, the Bruce Highway investments. When we came to government, there was significant underfunding. There was $18 billion committed to Queensland from the previous government. We have upped that to $28 billion including the recent announcements to fix the Bruce Highway.  No funding cuts at all to Queensland. In fact, substantial investments in Queensland. 

    STEVE AUSTIN: So does that mean that Beerburrum to Nambour rail upgraders, it will be funded for the Sunshine Coast region?

    CATHERINE KING: In terms of that particular project that already has a total of $606.7 million from the Australian government committed to it. It’s a project of a funding total of a billion dollars. It is currently, as I understand, early works are being completed in pre-construction design, so the Commonwealth is already funding that project.

    STEVE AUSTIN:  Is there anything else you want to get on the record in relation to Queensland? Given the sort of the changes in infrastructure Australia’s priority list, you’re the final person who’ll say yay or nay?

    CATHERINE KING: So I’m not the final person. So Infrastructure Australia, again, independent of the government, I don’t say what’s on the list. 

    STEVE AUSTIN: No, I know. I know you will have to say as to what gets built and what doesn’t get built. As the federal infrastructure minister.

    CATHERINE KING: Yeah, so I will through the normal budget process. We do it every year. States write to me and they say, this is what you know, they want funding for, this is where we’ve got substantial cost pressures. The new Queensland Government has just done that recently, and we through the budget process systematically go through that. I seek advice from Infrastructure Australia as to whether something is investment ready, has the cost benefit work being done? Because what we had inherited was, frankly, a lot of press releases, a lot of press releases telling me that there was money set aside for projects –  chronically underfunded, and what we’ve had to do is really make sure we’ve got a disciplined process to look at Commonwealth investments. But again, as I said, we started when we came to government, $18 billion committed to Queensland. There’s now $28, billion committed to Queensland. I think we’ll stand on our record of the substantial investments we make to improve infrastructure in Queensland.

    STEVE AUSTIN:  Minister thanks for your time. 

    CATHERINE KING: Really good to be with you.

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