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  • MIL-OSI: Silvaco Expands its Victory TCAD and Digital Twin Modeling Platform to Planar CMOS, FinFET and Advanced CMOS Technologies

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    SANTA CLARA, Calif., Sept. 24, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Silvaco Group, Inc. (Nasdaq: SVCO, “Silvaco” or the “Company”), a provider of TCAD, EDA software, and SIP solutions that enable semiconductor design and digital twin modeling through AI software and innovation, today announced that its 2024 TCAD Baseline Release simulation platform with digital twin modeling, provides support for planar CMOS, FinFET and Gate-All-Around (GAA) transistor technologies, enabling semiconductor companies to accelerate technology development.

    Silvaco’s latest TCAD technology platform, enables advanced CMOS Process and Device simulation to support the development of next-generation semiconductor devices. This platform boosts performance, yield and efficiency across the evolving semiconductor design and manufacturing landscape. The solution enables highly accurate 3D process simulation, using digital twin-like precision and integrates stress simulation to model deformed structures. Additionally, the platform supports cryogenic applications through an atomistic quantum transport approach, enabling straightforward modeling of transistor structures down to 1 Kelvin.

    “Our TCAD platform has gained significant traction in the Display, Photonics, Memory and Power Semiconductor markets, where our solutions have been instrumental in driving innovation and enhancing performance,” said Dr. Babak Taheri, Chief Executive Officer, Silvaco. “We have now extended our comprehensive suite of tools to the advanced CMOS market, enabling next-generation advancements in technologies to address growing markets such as foundries, 5G, AI and high-performance computing. Our newly released TCAD platform has been utilized by a strategic customer for the past few years and is now available for broad market adoption. This new capability for advanced CMOS technology enables customers to accelerate their technology development with significant cost savings.”

    “Nanotechnology, like GAA, exhibits advanced quantum physical effects,” said Tillmann Kubis, Associate Professor in the Elmore Family School of Electrical and Computer Engineering at Purdue University. “Over the past six years, our team of scientists has collaborated with Silvaco to enable the simulation of full devices, such as nanowires and GAAs, powered by NEMO5 which is an NEGF-based atomistic quantum transport simulation tool developed at Purdue and licensed by Silvaco. This collaboration is now enabling Silvaco’s TCAD simulation performance with atomistic accuracy.”

    “This latest release of our TCAD platform is the culmination of years of intensive development, refinement and industry collaboration in order to meet the demanding needs of designing in advanced CMOS process technologies,” said Eric Guichard, Senior VP and General Manager TCAD Business Unit, Silvaco. “The latest release of our TCAD platform now incorporates digital twin modeling for CMOS technologies, as well as atomistic simulation technologies to provide a highly competitive and attractive alternative solution for semiconductor companies designing in advanced Planar CMOS, FinFET and emerging GAA process technologies.”

    About Silvaco

    Silvaco is a provider of TCAD, EDA software, and SIP solutions that enable semiconductor design and digital twin modeling through AI software and innovation. Silvaco’s solutions are used for semiconductor and photonics processes, devices, and systems development across display, power devices, automotive, memory, high-performance compute, foundries, photonics, internet of things, and 5G/6G mobile markets for complex SoC design. Silvaco is headquartered in Santa Clara, California, and has a global presence with offices located in North America, Europe, Brazil, China, Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan.

    Safe Harbor Statement

    This press release contains “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, each as amended, that are intended to be covered by the “safe harbor” provisions of those sections. Forward-looking statements include, but are not limited to, statements regarding the Company’s expectations, beliefs, intentions, plans, or strategies related to the release and adoption of its 2024 TCAD Baseline Release simulation platform, the anticipated benefits of this platform for advanced CMOS, FinFET, GAA, and other emerging technologies, and the potential advantages for customers in terms of performance, cost savings, and accelerated technology development. Forward-looking statements are typically identified by the use of words such as “anticipate,” “expect,” “intend,” “plan,” “believe,” “estimate,” “potential,” “continue,” and similar expressions, although not all forward-looking statements contain these words.

    These statements are based on the Company’s current expectations and assumptions and are subject to risks, uncertainties, and other factors, including those described in the Company’s most recent Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q and other filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission. These factors may cause actual results to differ materially from those expressed or implied by forward-looking statements. The Company undertakes no obligation to update or revise any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events, or otherwise, except as required by law.

    Media Contact
    Tyler Weiland
    +1 972-571-7834
    press@silvaco.com

    Investor Relations:
    Greg McNiff
    investors@silvaco.com

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI Reportage: Nine out of ten targeted by scams, but New Zealanders getting more scam savvy

    Source: BNZ statements

    New research from Bank of New Zealand (BNZ) shows a significant jump in scam activity over the past 12 months, with nine out of ten New Zealanders targeted by a scam, up 13 percent on the same time last year.

    But while the volume of scams has surged, New Zealanders are getting more scam savvy, with only one in ten falling victim.

    The research comes as BNZ launches its annual Scam Savvy Week to raise awareness, help people know how to identify scams, and be safer online.

    BNZ’s Head of Financial Crime, Ashley Kai Fong, says, “While it’s fantastic that New Zealanders are learning to spot the red flags, the sheer volume of scams is a stark reminder for all of us to remain vigilant.

    “All scams require people to do something – whether that’s clicking on a link, engaging in a conversation, or sending money. Ultimately the best defence against scams is you. If you can recognise the signs of a scam, you’re less likely to fall victim. That’s why BNZ has developed tools and resources to help New Zealanders get scam savvy at www.getscamsavvy.co.nz.”

    Businesses getting “con-conscious”  

    Businesses have also improved their ability to identify and avoid scams, with the number of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) falling victim to scams dropping from 47 percent in 2022 to 34 percent in 2023.

    “Scams are a significant threat to our business community, but these figures show that SMEs are taking the right steps to protect themselves,” says Kai Fong.

    Despite the reduction, businesses are not being complacent. Reporting of scams to banks has seen a marked increase, with 60 percent of businesses scammed in 2023 reporting the incident, compared to 39 percent in the previous year.

    “This underscores the growing awareness among businesses of the importance of swift reporting and robust prevention measures. It’s a clear indication that the business community is recognising the threat posed by scammers,” says Kai Fong.

    More people reporting scams, but further progress needed

    Reporting by individuals also increased with 64 percent of individuals impacted by a scam reporting it, up from 46 percent last year.

    “Reporting scams is a crucial step in fighting fraud,” says Kai Fong. “It provides valuable data to help us understand and combat these threats more effectively, making it harder for scammers to operate.

    “It’s great that Kiwis are increasingly reporting scams, but there is still a lot of room for improvement. Too many of us don’t report scams, or even tell loved ones, due to embarrassment or shame, but we need to remember that this is a scammer’s fulltime job.

    “Every minute of every day, they are out there thinking of new ways to take people’s hard-earned money. There is nothing to be embarrassed about if you do experience a scam, and by reporting it, you could be helping someone avoid being scammed in the future.”

    Top three scams 

    Government impersonation scams were the most prevalent over the last 12 months (45%), followed by bank impersonation scams (31%), and fake lottery, prize or grant scams (24%).

    Email was found to be the most common channel for scams (40%), followed by text (34%), and social media (28%).

    “Scammers are becoming increasingly sophisticated, impersonating trusted brands and institutions and exploiting a range of channels to deceive New Zealanders,” says Kai Fong.

    Despite the rise in scams, the research shows that educating New Zealanders to spot and avoid scams is helping to keep them safe.

    “Around two-thirds of those surveyed reported having seen educational material about scam prevention,” he says. “Knowledge is power. We want as many people as possible to get Scam Savvy as the more we know about scams, the better equipped we are to spot and avoid them.”

    Our Scam Savvy tools are available online at www.getscamsavvy.co.nz.

    Top tips to get Scam Savvy

    • Don’t click on links or open attachments sent by someone you don’t know or seem out of character for someone you do know. Hover over links to reveal the actual site.
    • If it doesn’t seem right, call the sender using contact details you already have or that are available on their public website.
    • Urgency is a red flag – scammers will try to rush you.
    • Banks will never ask for your bank account details, password or pin number, nor will they send you an email or text message with a link asking you to log in.
    • Keep your computer and phone security software up to date.
    • If you think you’ve been scammed, contact your bank as soon as possible.
    • Trust your gut – if it feels wrong, it probably is.

    Scam Savvy Research

    Other key findings from BNZ’s research:

    • One in ten New Zealanders have fallen victim to a scam in the last 12 months, losing money, personal information, bank or card details, or device access
    • Of those that lost money, two thirds (69%) lost under $500, 26 percent between $500 and $5,000, and five percent over $5,000
    • Email is the most common way to have fallen victim to a scam (40%), followed by text (34%), social media (28%), phone calls (18%), online websites (9%) or by someone you know (3%)
      • Those aged 15 – 34 years are more likely to have been targeted via social media (44%)
      • Social media and online website scams are harder for victims to recover stolen money, with 56 percent of victims who were targted via social media and 22 percent of victims targeted via an online website saying they couldn’t recover their money
    • Those over the age of 50 are more likely to be targeted by tech scam calls
    • One in ten males has responded to a dating or romance scam in the last 12 months, significantly higher than females
    • Females are more likely to be more concerned about their personal data online

    Business stats

    • 45 percent of SMEs reported being the target of scam attempts in the last year
    • Of those targeted, one third have responded to a scam attempt, by clicking on a link (15%), or replying to the scam via email, text, or phone call (14%)
    • Almost half (47%) of scam attempts are by email, with another 38% by text message. One third (33%) are by phone calling, with websites (19%) and social media (18%) rounding out the top 5
    • One in five (22%) of SMEs reported falling victim to a scam in the last 12 months
    • 43 percent of businesses that fell for a scam reported a financial loss. Of those, more than half lost less than $500, 38 percent between $501 and $5,000, and 11 percent lost more than $5,000. It is important to note that losses to scams are not just financial, and can include data loss, operational impacts, technical damage and/or reputational damage

    The post Nine out of ten targeted by scams, but New Zealanders getting more scam savvy appeared first on BNZ Debrief.

    MIL OSI Analysis –

  • MIL-OSI Reportage: BNZ scores naming rights partnership with the NZ Breakers; teams up with Kiwi Hoops to grow grassroots basketball

    Source: BNZ statements

    The New Zealand Breakers, the country’s top professional basketball team, are set to embark on a new chapter as the BNZ Breakers, thanks to a new naming rights partnership with the Bank of New Zealand (BNZ). The naming rights partnership was announced in Auckland this morning.

    In addition, BNZ is joining forces with Kiwi Hoops, Basketball New Zealand’s junior basketball programme, to help grow the sport at the grass roots level and foster the next generation of talent. These partnerships come hot on the heels of the bank’s naming rights sponsorship of the BNZ Northern Kāhu women’s basketball team, confirmed last month.

    BNZ CEO Dan Huggins says the bank is thrilled to back the Breakers and further cement its support for the sport. “From nurturing young talent in Kiwi Hoops, to bolstering women’s basketball with the Northern Kāhu, and now backing the premier professional team, the BNZ Breakers, our support is generational.”

    “Through these partnerships, we want to inspire the next generation and provide resources and opportunities that will help grow the sport, promote physical health, and foster a sense of community. We’re looking forward to seeing the positive ripple effects of these partnerships, from the school playground to the professional court.”

    Matt Walsh, majority owner of the Breakers, welcomed the new partnership. “We’re delighted to partner with BNZ, an organisation that shares our passion and commitment to basketball and the positive role it plays in schools and communities across Aotearoa. This partnership will provide us with the support to continue our success on the court and expand our programmes in the community.”

    “Our captain Tom Abercrombie is a shining example of how the Breakers is a pathway for local players to create a career out of basketball.  Tom went to school less than four kilometres from our club headquarters on Auckland’s North Shore and has travelled the world playing across the globe.

    “Next month he will play his record 400th game for the Breakers in our opening game of the season against the Cairns Taipans at Spark Arena.”

    The BNZ Breakers are actively involved in a range of community outreach initiatives, including their Champions Programme, teaching children aged 5-12 years about goal setting, nutrition, active lifestyles, and basketball fundamentals.

    Kiwi Hoops

    Kiwi Hoops is the Basketball New Zealand junior basketball programme. It aims to introduce the sport to young people, foster a love for the game, and develop skills. The partnership with BNZ will support the expansion of the programme, which already reaches 26,000 kids per year, to engage even more young people across New Zealand.

    Dillon Boucher, CEO of Basketball New Zealand, says, “By partnering with BNZ, we can expand our reach and impact, providing more opportunities for young Kiwis to engage with basketball. This partnership will not only help us grow the sport at the grassroots level, but also build a strong foundation for the future of basketball in New Zealand by developing the next generation of players.”

    Huggins concludes, “At BNZ, we’re committed to growing the social, cultural and financial wellbeing of New Zealanders, and believe in the power of sport to bring people together and inspire positive change. We’re proud to be part of the journey of basketball in New Zealand, and we can’t wait to see where these partnerships take us.”

    The post BNZ scores naming rights partnership with the NZ Breakers; teams up with Kiwi Hoops to grow grassroots basketball appeared first on BNZ Debrief.

    MIL OSI Analysis –

  • MIL-OSI Reportage: The economy in ten pics

    Source: BNZ statements

    • RBNZ kickstarts the easing cycle
    • Greenlights a slow ‘n’ steady downtrend
    • Helps the 2025 economic outlook, but near-term growth picture still troubled
    • With labour market to weaken further
    • Housing market in focus

     

    View PDF here

     

    Chart 1: So it begins

    There was nothing in the Reserve Bank’s (RBNZ) announcement to greatly challenge our view of the world. The Official Cash Rate (OCR) was lowered 25bps to 5.25% as we expected. The interest rate brake is still on, just less so than before.

    The most important aspect of the meeting in our view was the confirmation that the OCR will move a lot lower over the coming 18 months.

    It needs to. Our rough estimate of the ‘real’ (inflation-adjusted) cash rate has increased in recent months, even with this week’s cut. And it’s a long way down for the OCR to the RBNZ’s estimate of the long-run neutral rate around 3%.

    Chart 2: Chop

    The RBNZ’s updated forecasts were a shadow of their former selves. GDP growth, inflation and OCR forecasts got a chop while unemployment rate expectations were lifted ½% or so to a 5½% peak.

    This brings the RBNZ’s view of the economy down to, or even a touch weaker than, where we’ve been seeing things. Importantly, CPI inflation is now seen well inside the 1-3% target range in Q3 (2.3%y/y from 3.0% in May). As of yesterday, we concur.

    It means there’s a higher hurdle for incoming data to surprise the RBNZ on the downside. That doesn’t rule out a larger 50bps OCR cut being deployed at some point, but it does lean against the possibility in the short term.

    Chart 3: Joining the rate race

    Having been something of an outlier for a while, NZ is now back in the policy easing peloton. Most developed markets anticipate sizeable interest rate cuts over the coming 12 months.

    Markets price a better than even chance of a 50bp start to the US Federal Reserve’s easing cycle next month which, if delivered, may embolden global rate cut pricing further.

    Of those markets covered opposite, implied policy easing to February 2025 is most aggressive for the US (-185bps), NZ (-150bps), and Canada (-130bps), with Australia (-65bps) and Japan (+10bps) at the other end of the field.

    Chart 4: US sniffles

    Global financial markets have recovered much of their poise following the steep equity market declines of early last week. Sentiment is not what it was though. Investors are suddenly alert to any number of global fragilities.

    Most of the ‘blame’ for the wobble has been pinned on cooling tech/AI exuberance and US growth concerns. The outsized reaction last week may reflect the additional, creeping reliance on the US to drive the global expansion this year. The old ‘US catches a cold’ adage is still relevant.

    Chart 5: Jobs growth stalled

    The number of people employed nudged up 0.4% in the June quarter, according to official figures released last week. We’d pencilled in a small decline. Unemployment still rose to 4.6% as expected.

    Q2’s employment kick is unlikely to be repeated this quarter, and it also doesn’t change the broader narrative of jobs growth effectively stalling around mid-2023.

    Amongst the sectoral detail, it’s clear that the construction sector has been at the vanguard of the changing employment market.

    Chart 6: Relocating for work

    The lift in NZ’s unemployment rate in Q2 maintained a ½ percentage point gap to the (4.1%) Aussie equivalent.

    It doesn’t sound large, but that gap is the widest since 2013. Not coincidentally, net migration outflows to Australia are also running at the strongest level since 2013. People move to where the jobs are.

    Our forecasts imply both trends have got a ways to run. A climb in the NZ unemployment rate to a 5.5% peak in early 2025 against a lower (4.6%) peak in Australia would, on past form, be consistent with an acceleration in net outflows.

    Chart 7: Green f(lags)

    Wage inflation peaked in NZ about a year ago. We saw another notch in the downtrend last week. The private sector Labour Cost Index eased to 3.6%y/y in June, down from 3.8% the prior quarter and the 4.5% peak.

    More of the same easing is expected over the coming 12 months. It’s something that should help drain still-elevated domestic services inflation pressure. So, it’s not that high interest rates have been ineffective on non-tradables inflation, it’s that the impacts take time to turn up. The lags are real!

    Chart 8: No retail respite

    The trend in NZ retail card spending abruptly turned in early 2023, and it’s been downhill ever since. July’s 0.1%m/m contraction was the 6th consecutive monthly decline. Discretionary categories remain the hardest hit.

    The weakness is even more pronounced once buoyant population growth is accounted for. Our estimate of the average monthly spend per (working age) person is 8% below March 2023 levels. It’s a deeper and longer contraction than during the 2008 GFC.

    We’re hopeful the downtrend soon stabilises. Tax and interest rate cuts are supports, but falling population growth and job security are not.

    Chart 9: Housing market in focus

    The release of July REINZ housing market numbers has been shunted out to Tuesday, thus missing the cut for this edition of TEITC.

    But, it’s fair to say, housing stats will be watched more closely than usual as folk scour for green shoots in a sector likely to be one of the earlier responders to (recent and expected) falls in retail interest rates. There are stirrings in some of the anecdote and surveys, but we think the prognosis is more stabilisation than acceleration, for now.

    In the least, we’d expect a hearty bounce-back in July sales activity following the outsized, Matariki holiday-related, drop in June. That’s what we saw from this week’s Barfoot & Thompson figures covering a share of the Auckland market.

    Chart 10: Food for thought

    Food prices lifted 0.4%m/m (seasonally adjusted) in July. Prices have been flattish for the past year, but they’re still up 24% on 2020 levels.

    As you’d expect, there’s been a fair bit of variation amongst the components over that time. If you’re partial to an omelette and/or yogurt for breakfast you will be feeling the pinch a lot more than some. At least your morning brew is still, relatively speaking, cost effective.

    To subscribe to Mike’s updates click here

    Disclaimer: This publication has been produced by Bank of New Zealand (BNZ). This publication accurately reflects the personal views of the author about the subject matters discussed, and is based upon sources reasonably believed to be reliable and accurate. The views of the author do not necessarily reflect the views of BNZ. No part of the compensation of the author was, is, or will be, directly or indirectly, related to any specific recommendations or views expressed. The information in this publication is solely for information purposes and is not intended to be financial advice. If you need help, please contact BNZ or your financial adviser. Any statements as to past performance do not represent future performance, and no statements as to future matters are guaranteed to be accurate or reliable. To the maximum extent permissible by law, neither BNZ nor any person involved in this publication accepts any liability for any loss or damage whatsoever which may directly or indirectly result from any, opinion, information, representation or omission, whether negligent or otherwise, contained in this publication.

    The post The economy in ten pics appeared first on BNZ Debrief.

    MIL OSI Analysis –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Know your place: what happened to class in British politics – a new podcast series from The Conversation Documentaries

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Laura Hood, Host, Know Your Place podcast, The Conversation

    Even in the 21st century, social class is a part of being British. We talk of living in a post-class era but, in reality, our backgrounds affect our life chances and even just the way we interact with each other. We have a sense of our own class and make assumptions about others with class in the back of our minds.

    In a recent documentary about their rise to fame, David and Victoria Beckham squabbled about the latter’s claim to come from a working class family. She was derided across the internet for the claim, too.

    Is Victoria Beckham working class? You may scoff at the very thought. But then consider when she stopped being working class and you start to see the problem. If a wealthy British person who owns her own business is not working class, when did she cease to be so? Are her parents still working class if she is not?

    For much of the 20th century, class identities were clearer. There was also a strong, clear relationship between class and political preference. After all, one of the two main parties was established explicitly to represent the labour movement. It was loudly and proudly a political manifestation of the working class.

    There were of course exceptions but, by and large, if someone knew your class, they could make a fairly safe guess as to how you would vote. That is no longer true.

    This is what I’m exploring in a new podcast series Know your place: what happened to class in British politics on The Conversation Documentaries. Listen to the trailer now ahead of the series launch on October 7.

    Over the course of five episodes, I’ll be speaking to leading politics experts across the UK to find out why Labour can no longer take the working class vote for granted but also why the Conservatives can’t either.

    We’ll find out the truth behind the Liberal Democrats’ “Gail’s strategy” to capture the middle classes. We’ll explore how class is even defined in the 21st century and pinpoint when it stopped being the case that your background shaped your politics.

    And as the UK ushers in ostensibly the most working-class parliament that has been seen in years, we’ll investigate what difference it makes when people from working-class backgrounds hold the levers of power.

    Follow The Conversation Documentaries to listen to Know Your Place: what happened to class in British politics from October 7. The Conversation Documentaries, formerly called The Anthill, is the home for in-depth documentary podcast series from The Conversation.

    Know Your Place: what happened to class in British politics is produced and mixed by Anouk Millet for The Conversation. It’s supported by the National Centre for Social Research.

    Newsclips in the trailer from Keir Starmer, ITV News, PoliticsJOE and Angela Rayner MP.

    Listen to The Conversation Documentaries via any of the apps listed above, download it directly via our RSS feed or find out how else to listen here.

    Know Your Place: what happened to class in British politics is supported by the National Centre for Social Research.

    – ref. Know your place: what happened to class in British politics – a new podcast series from The Conversation Documentaries – https://theconversation.com/know-your-place-what-happened-to-class-in-british-politics-a-new-podcast-series-from-the-conversation-documentaries-239451

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Concludes 2024 Article IV Consultation with Botswana

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    September 10, 2024

    • Botswana’s economic growth is expected to slow to 1 percent in 2024 primarily because of a diamond market contraction, before picking up next year. Inflation has declined sharply since the peak of mid-2022 and returned to the central bank’s medium-term objective range of 3–6 percent, where it is expected to remain in the medium term.
    • The government plans a fiscal expansion in FY2024 followed by two years of substantial fiscal adjustment. Public debt is low (20 percent of GDP), but government deposits at the central bank have significantly reduced over the past decade.
    • The financial sector is sound, stable, and resilient.

    Washington, DC: On August 28, 2024, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the Article IV consultation[1] with Botswana and endorsed the staff appraisal without a meeting on a lapse-of-time basis.[2]

    Botswana’s economic growth decelerated from 5.5 percent in 2022 to 2.7 percent in 2023, below the long-run potential growth of 4 percent. A sharp decline in diamond trading and mining activities was the main contributor to the slowdown, as global demand for rough diamonds decreased. Inflation has remained below the ceiling of the central bank’s medium-term objective range since July 2023. Despite lower diamond exports, FX reserves increased in 2023 supported by higher customs union receipts. The financial sector is broadly sound, stable, and resilient.

    Botswana’s economy is expected to decelerate further this year, with growth projected at
    1 percent. The continued slowdown is mainly due to a fall in diamond production, partly offset by construction projects financed by the fiscal expansion. Growth is forecast to rebound – averaging 5 percent over the next two years – due to higher prices and quantities of diamonds produced. Inflation is projected to remain within the central bank’s objective range of
    3–6 percent.

    The fiscal deficit is projected to widen further to 6 percent of GDP in FY2024, reflecting a further decline in mineral revenues and higher capital expenditure. The government plans a substantial fiscal adjustment in the following two years to reach a fiscal surplus. The external position should soften over the medium term (with FX reserves decreasing to 5 months of imports) due to weak growth in customs revenues and higher government foreign debt repayments. Risks to the outlook remain elevated due to the emergence of cheaper lab-grown diamonds, and uncertainty over the recovery of major export markets.

    Executive Board Assessment

    In concluding the 2024 Article IV consultation with Botswana, Executive Directors endorsed staff’s appraisal, as follows:

    Botswana is facing a severe slowdown from a diamond market contraction in 2023 and 2024. Growth is expected to fall to 1.0 percent this year, from 2.7 percent in 2023 and 5.5 percent in 2022. This reflects weaker global demand for diamonds and a sharp increase in inventories.

    Real GDP growth should rebound next year, although risks to the outlook remain elevated. A strong recovery is projected in 2025, driven by the rebound in diamond production and trade. But the economic outlook is highly uncertain, with the emergence of cheaper lab-grown diamonds, and the announced sale of De Beers by its UK parent company.

    In the near term, the fall in diamond revenues could be accommodated by a mix of higher fiscal deficit and reprioritization of capital expenditure. Some fiscal relaxation is warranted in light of the widening of the output gap, but staff encourages the authorities to reprioritize capital projects to limit the increase in the deficit and ensure that they achieve the highest value for money.

    Over the medium term, the authorities’ planned fiscal consolidation is critical to put a stop to the depletion of government’s financial buffers, build resilience against shocks, and preserve fiscal sustainability. Staff assesses that targeting a 1 percent of GDP fiscal surplus would generate sufficient savings to protect the budget against major economic shocks. While the authorities’ adjustment plan focuses mostly on expenditure restraint, there is also scope to increase revenues. The medium-term adjustment should be supported by institutional reforms, including a fiscal rule, more credible medium-term budgeting, and possibly a well-designed SWF.

    The monetary policy stance is appropriate. Inflation has declined since August 2022 and is projected to remain within the central bank’s objective range in the medium term. Underlying pressures, as measured by core inflation indicators, seem contained, while inflation expectations are well anchored. The 2023 external position is assessed to be broadly in line with fundamentals and desirable policies.

    The authorities’ plans to strengthen financial sector oversight, deepening, and inclusion are welcomed. The financial sector is broadly sound and stable despite the economic slowdown. Faster implementation of the 2023 FSAP recommendations will further reduce financial risks. These include moving to implement Basel III liquidity standards, enhancing risk-based supervision of banks, reinforcing the crisis management framework (ELA, bank resolution), and deploying macroprudential tools to address household debt risk.

    Accelerating growth and job creation requires a fundamental shift towards greater private sector participation, a more diversified export base, and a more efficient public sector. The authorities should prioritize SOE modernization, improved infrastructure for doing business (internet, energy, logistics), trade facilitation measures, more efficient social protection, and financial inclusion reforms that support small entrepreneurs. These goals could be enshrined in the new NDP, supported by time-bound and well-prioritized action plans.

    Botswana: Selected Economic and Social Indicators, 2020-20291
     

    2020

    2021

    2022

    2023

    2024

    2025

    2026

    2027

    2028

    2029
     

    Projection

    (Annual percent change, unless otherwise indicated)

    National Income and Prices

    		                    

    Real GDP

    -8.7

    11.9

    5.5

    2.7

    1.0

    5.2

    4.8

    4.0

    4.0

    4.0

    Nonmineral

    -3.5

    7.9

    4.9

    2.6

    5.1

    4.1

    4.4

    4.4

    4.4

    4.5

    GDP per capita (US dollars)

    5,863

    7,244

    7,726

    7,250

    7,341

    8,003

    8,602

    9,146

    9,726

    10,437

    GNI per capita (US dollars)2

    5,872

    7,174

    7,220

    6,963

    7,150

    7,733

    8,290

    8,798

    9,344

    10,027

        Consumer prices (average)

    1.9

    6.7

    12.2

    5.1

    3.8

    4.5

    4.5

    4.5

    4.5

    4.5

    Diamond production (millions of carats)

    16.9

    22.7

    24.5

    25.1

    21.1

    23.3

    25.0

    25.5

    26.0

    26.4

    Money and Banking

    		                    

    Monetary Base

    -3.8

    -8.8

    -5.3

    33.1

    8.7

    9.7

    9.3

    9.2

    9.3

    9.3

    Broad money (M2)

    5.9

    5.0

    6.8

    9.3

    8.7

    9.7

    9.3

    9.2

    9.3

    9.3

    Credit to the private sector

    5.3

    5.4

    4.7

    5.6

    8.5

    11.0

    11.0

    11.0

    11.0

    11.0

    (Percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

    Investment and Savings

    		                    

    Gross investment (including change in inventories)

    32.8

    27.4

    25.0

    30.3

    35.4

    34.1

    35.0

    35.5

    36.7

    37.5

    Public

    6.5

    5.5

    5.4

    7.1

    8.4

    7.0

    6.2

    6.0

    5.5

    5.2

    Private

    26.3

    21.9

    19.6

    23.2

    26.9

    27.1

    28.8

    29.5

    31.2

    32.3

    Gross savings

    26.6

    28.1

    24.9

    29.9

    33.4

    35.6

    36.2

    36.8

    37.3

    37.7

    Public

    -4.3

    0.7

    4.0

    3.0

    2.4

    4.2

    5.4

    6.1

    5.9

    5.5

    Private

    30.8

    27.5

    20.8

    26.9

    31.0

    31.4

    30.9

    30.7

    31.4

    32.2

    Central Government Finances3

    		                    

    Total revenue and grants

    25.6

    29.0

    29.1

    28.4

    28.2

    28.8

    28.6

    28.8

    27.6

    26.7

    SACU receipts

    9.1

    6.5

    5.5

    9.1

    9.6

    7.0

    6.4

    6.6

    6.3

    5.9

    Mineral revenue

    5.3

    10.6

    13.3

    7.4

    5.8

    9.5

    9.9

    9.8

    8.9

    8.4

    Total expenditure and net lending

    36.5

    31.4

    29.1

    33.1

    34.2

    30.6

    29.1

    28.3

    27.1

    26.2

    Overall balance (deficit –)

    -10.9

    -2.4

    0.0

    -4.7

    -6.0

    -1.7

    -0.5

    0.5

    0.5

    0.5

    Non-mineral non-SACU balance4

    -25.3

    -19.5

    -18.8

    -21.3

    -21.3

    -18.2

    -16.7

    -15.9

    -14.7

    -13.8

    Net Debt

    15.3

    12.8

    12.6

    16.9

    22.2

    21.6

    20.2

    18.2

    16.2

    14.6

    Total central government debt5

    18.7

    18.7

    18.1

    20.1

    22.6

    22.1

    20.7

    20.1

    20.0

    20.0

    Government deposits with the BoB6

    3.4

    5.9

    5.5

    3.3

    0.4

    0.4

    0.6

    1.9

    3.8

    5.5

    External Sector

    		                    

        Trade balance

    -13.2

    -3.5

    2.7

    -2.4

    -6.9

    -0.9

    0.2

    0.3

    0.0

    0.0

    Current account balance

    -10.3

    -1.7

    -1.2

    -0.6

    -2.0

    1.5

    1.2

    1.2

    0.6

    0.2

    Overall Balance

    -11.7

    -1.4

    1.8

    0.6

    -0.9

    1.3

    1.3

    1.5

    0.9

    0.5

    Nominal effective exchange rate (2018=100)7

    94.0

    94.1

    90.8

    86.4

    –

    –

    –

    –

    –

    –

    Real effective exchange rate (2018=100)7

    94.4

    97.7

    99.1

    94.7

    –

    –

    –

    –

    –

    –

    Terms of trade (2005=100)

    140.5

    178.9

    161.3

    152.7

    125.9

    162.2

    171.4

    176.6

    181.6

    186.6

    External central government debt5

    7.8

    8.4

    7.5

    8.9

    8.3

    6.7

    5.6

    4.8

    3.9

    3.5

    Gross official reserves (end of period, millions of USD)

    4,944

    4,806

    4,281

    4,757

    4,587

    4,879

    5,198

    5,600

    5,852

    6,014

    Months of imports of goods and services8

    6.4

    6.6

    7.1

    7.3

    6.3

    6.0

    5.8

    5.6

    5.4

    5.1

    Months of non-diamond imports8

    9.3

    8.7

    8.2

    8.8

    7.9

    7.8

    7.6

    7.5

    7.2

    7.1

    Percent of GDP

    31.2

    27.1

    21.8

    24.2

    23.3

    22.3

    21.5

    21.7

    20.8

    19.6

    Sources: Botswana authorities and IMF staff estimates and projections.

    1 This table is based on calendar years unless otherwise indicated.

    2 Based on Atlas method from the World Bank.

    3 Fiscal variables are based on fiscal years (starting on April 1).

    4 The non-mineral non-SACU balance is computed as the difference between non-mineral non-SACU revenue and total expenditure.

    5Excludes guarantees. Debt data measured at end of fiscal year.

    6Government deposits with the BoB include Government Investment Account as well as other accounts. Deposits data measured at end of fiscal year.

    7 For 2020-2023, both effective exchange rates are from IMF INS database.

    8 Based on imports of goods and services for the following year.

    [1] Under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country’s economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board.

    [2] The Executive Board takes decisions under its lapse-of-time procedure when the Board agrees that a proposal can be considered without convening formal discussions.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Pavis Devahasadin

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    @IMFSpokesperson

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/09/09/pr-24321-botswana-imf-executive-board-concludes-2024-article-iv-consultation

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  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF statement on Honduras

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    September 10, 2024

    Washington, DC: An International Monetary Fund (IMF) mission led by Mr. Ricardo Llaudes issued a statement following in person and virtual discussions with the Honduran authorities on policies to support the authorities’ economic program:

    “The Fund team welcomes the adoption by the Council of Ministers of Honduras of the 2025 draft Budget Bill. The draft Budget is in line with the authorities’ economic program supported by the IMF, providing space for critical social and infrastructure spending.

    “In addition, productive discussions, both virtual and in person, have taken place over the past months on economic policies to safeguard Honduras’ domestic and external stability, paving the way for a program review mission planned for the first half of October.”

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Rosa A Hernandez

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    @IMFSpokesperson

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/09/10/pr24325-imf-statement-on-honduras

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    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Harnessing the Power of Integration: A Path to Prosperity in Central Asia

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    September 11, 2024

    Distinguished guests, I am delighted to be here in Bishkek on my first visit to the Kyrgyz Republic, in the heart of Central Asia.

    This region has been at the crossroads of civilizations for millennia. It is a mosaic of a rich cultural heritage, diverse peoples, and natural endowments that include spectacular mountains, lakes, rivers, and a rich biodiversity. It is also located very favorably at the crossroads of Asia and Europe. Needless to say, it is quite truly a unique region!

    As we gather here today to discuss the economic possibilities for the Caucasus and Central Asia (CCA) region, we all recognize that the world is changing rapidly, and this is a pivotal moment.

    It reminds me of another time of momentous opportunity, when the region gained independence in the 1990s. Since then, the CCA countries have made remarkable progress by unleashing their first wave of market- oriented reforms, generating higher growth and improving living standards.

    But new and unprecedented challenges have emerged. The Covid-19 pandemic and its aftermath are only just in our rear-view mirrors, as the region confronts emerging challenges from climate change to regional conflicts. The global economy has also shifted with geoeconomic fragmentation emerging as a key risk.

    The theme of my remarks today is simple: in this changing world, raising living standards in the CCA region requires bold, concerted action.

    We must strengthen stability and resilience, promote regional integration, and launch a new wave of reforms. This is how we can unleash the full economic potential of the region and its vibrant young populations, accelerate growth, create jobs and open-up opportunities for generations to come.

    Building on Macroeconomic Stability

    It is important to remind ourselves of the global context as we consider what is needed to propel the region to the next level of economic growth and prosperity.

    The world economy has shown remarkable resilience in the face of the pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and an inflation surge. Global growth bottomed out at 2.3 percent in 2022 and is expected to rebound to 3.2 percent in 2024 and 3.3 percent in 2025. Initial fears of recession and uncontrolled wage-price spirals fortunately did not materialize and there is less economic scarring from the pandemic than anticipated.

    However, medium-term growth projections remain below historical averages. Persistence of inflation in parts of the world, geopolitical conflicts, and the gaps in structural reforms needed to promote efficient resource allocation remain critical challenges. Global inflation is projected to decline to 5.9 percent in 2024 and 4.5 percent in 2025, with advanced economies returning to inflation targets before emerging market and developing economies.

    The risks to the outlook are still considerable. Notably, geopolitical tensions and regional conflicts pose downside risks, potentially causing new price spikes. Other risks include rising trade protectionism, increasing inequality, and financial market volatility. At the same time, the fact that this year saw the hottest day on record for the planet serves as a stark reminder of daunting challenges due to climate change.

    Policymakers in the CCA region deserve full credit for navigating their economies through these turbulent times and maintaining macroeconomic stability. Rapid COVID virus containment, decisive policy actions, and robust international support have led to a swift recovery, with the region growing at 4.9 percent in 2023.

    Inflation fell in most CCA countries, including in the Kyrgyz Republic, amid exchange rate appreciations and a decline in commodity prices. Inflation remained more persistent in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan due to strong domestic demand, elevated inflation expectations, and energy price reforms in Kazakhstan.

    In the April Regional Economic Outlook, we projected a growth slowdown to 3.9 percent in 2024, but inflows of income, capital, and migrants from Russia, and rerouting of trade though the region have again boosted growth to impressive high single digits so far this year in oil importing CCA economies, including the Kyrgyz Republic. In Kazakhstan, on the other hand, growth is expected to slow to 3.1 percent in 2024 before picking up to 5.6 percent in 2025 as production increases from the Tengiz oil fields.

    Over the medium term, growth in the region is expected to moderate to under 4 percent and inflation stabilize in mid-single digits. Escalation of the war in Ukraine and the Gaza conflict, however, could cause commodity price volatility and a reversal of the recent trade patterns.

    Achieving macroeconomic stability is just a beginning. It is not sufficient to meet the aspirations of current and future generations.

    Now is the time for us to come together and take bold steps to unleash a new wave of reforms that will durably raise growth, create more jobs, and improve living standards. This requires reforms to increase productivity, strengthen resilience to shocks, and expand markets.

    While this is ambitious, it is within our reach as long as there is consensus to move ahead on this path. The current favorable macroeconomic conditions offer a promising window of opportunity because, as our research shows, structural reforms yield greater growth dividends during economic expansions.

    From Stability to Prosperity

    Historically, this region has been a vital link between Europe and Asia, serving as a conduit for trade, culture, and innovation.

    Today, regional integration can once again harness this potential. It can facilitate the freer movement of goods, services, capital, and people, increase market size and economic efficiency, and promote inclusive prosperity.

    Moreover, deepening ties within the region and global markets can foster stability and peace. Regional integration is therefore not just an opportunity, but an economic necessity.

    Reducing nontariff trade barriers, boosting infrastructure investment, and enhancing regulatory quality could increase trade by up to 17 percent on average in the CCA region, as our research shows. They can also improve market access and foster diversification.

    Transportation networks, such as roads, railways, and ports are essential to facilitate cross-border trade. The planned construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway is an illustration of cross-country cooperation to improve connectivity between the East and the West, supporting the region’s ambition to regain its historical role. 

    You have abundant renewable energy resources in the region, including hydro, solar and wind power. Enhanced energy cooperation will help develop regional energy markets, ensure security, and create export opportunities. Collaborative projects, such as Kambarata-1, can help diversify the energy mix and reduce dependency on fossil fuels. Critically, it can also improve water availability for neighboring countries.

    Both of these investments—the railway and Kambarata-1—hold enormous potential for regional development and connectivity. Collective effort in mobilizing expertise and financing is essential for full realization of this potential while sustaining macroeconomic stability that has been a hallmark of the region’s recent achievements.

    This brings me to the importance of regional cooperation in addressing the risks of climate change, which requires immediate and resolute actions from all of us.

    A Path to a Low-Carbon Future

    The CCA region is highly vulnerable to climate change. Temperatures are rising fast, and droughts and floods have become more frequent and severe, causing immense damage to crops, infrastructure and livelihoods. We estimate that unabated climate change could cause a loss of annual output of nearly 6.5 percent in the region by 2060.

    The good news is that these losses could be substantially reduced by joint actions to cut emissions, adapt to climate change, and manage the risks of transition to a low-carbon economy.

    The region must collaborate to promote green technologies, improve energy efficiency, and manage natural resources sustainably. Scaling back energy subsidies and introducing carbon-pricing mechanisms can contribute to global mitigation efforts. In this respect, the Kyrgyz Republic’s commitment to raising electricity tariffs and gradually eliminating energy subsidies is a shining example.

    Such decisive measures can enhance resilience to climate change and create higher-paying jobs–green jobs that pay 7 percent more on average.

    Reforms for Enhanced Growth and Stability

    To fully realize the benefits of regional integration, structural reforms are essential. Our research finds that such reforms could lift output by 5-7 percent in the next 4 to 6 years.

    Let me highlight a few key areas where structural reforms can help achieve this boost:

    A vibrant private sector is the engine of growth. Strengthening governance, property rights and the rule of law, and reducing the state footprint in the economy by simplifying regulations, fostering competition, and combating corruption will build confidence and attract private investment.

    Importantly, we find that governance reforms yield the highest growth dividends and amplify the positive impacts of other reforms. The implication is clear: governance reforms should be prioritized and accompanied by other reforms.

    Prudent management of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is also critical. While some SOEs serve essential public-policy objectives and should remain in public hands, it is crucial that they operate efficiently and do not crowd out the private sector.

    In most cases, however, the private sector is more efficient in delivering goods and services and creating jobs. Therefore, privatization of non-essential SOEs can lead to more dynamic and competitive markets, enhancing growth and resilience.

    Investments in education, health, and digital infrastructure are vital to boost productivity. The full potential of the region’s young and dynamic population can only be unleashed through high quality education and healthcare.

    Enhancing digital infrastructure also offers vast opportunities for productivity growth, especially in a region with young people eager to embrace new technologies.

    As the CCA starts to reap the benefits of these reforms, it is equally important to ensure that growth benefits all segments of society, and the vulnerable are shielded from the impacts of energy subsidy reforms and climate change. Well-targeted social assistance is essential for reducing poverty and inequality.

    Benefits work best when they incentivize work and are targeted and timely to support adversely affected households during economic downturns but scale back when the recovery takes hold. Empowering women and promoting gender equality can unlock significant economic potential and contribute to more inclusive growth.

    IMF’s Commitment to CCA Stability and Growth

    The IMF has been a steadfast partner of the CCA region since its initial days of independence. We provide policy advice, financing, and technical assistance to help our members in the region stabilize their economies, develop sustainable growth, and reduce poverty.

    The IMF stands by all its member countries in both prosperous and challenging times. For example, our assistance during the COVID-19 pandemic helped our membership weather the crisis and lay the groundwork for recovery.

    To better support our member in the CCA, the IMF established the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Mongolia Regional Capacity Development Center. This center provides technical assistance and training to help countries in the region build stronger institutions and implement sound economic policies. It also represents our long-term commitment to the region’s development.

    Conclusion

    Let me conclude. Since its early days of independence, the CCA region has shown tremendous perseverance in laying the foundation of a prosperous, peaceful society.

    Today, you are confronting new global challenges that test the resilience and adaptability of your economies. Embracing continued market-oriented reforms is the most effective strategy to strengthen your economies. Now is the time to forge ahead with bold spirits.

    The IMF will continue to support your efforts, working in partnership for the benefit of all people in this region and beyond.

    Thank you.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Angham Al Shami

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100 Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    @IMFSpokesperson

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/09/11/sp09112024-harnessing-power-integration-path-prosperity-central-asia-dmd-bo-li

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  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Concludes 2024 Article IV Consultation Discussions with the Kingdom of the Netherlands—Curaçao and Sint Maarten

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    September 17, 2024

    Washington, DC: On September 10, 2024, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the Article IV consultation discussions[1] with the Kingdom of the Netherlands—Curaçao and Sint Maarten and endorsed the staff appraisal without a meeting on a lapse-of-time basis[2]. These consultation discussions form part of the Article IV consultation with the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

    Context. Curaçao and Sint Maarten have continued to experience a vigorous post-pandemic recovery underpinned by strong stayover tourism, which is outperforming Caribbean peers. Headline inflation has declined rapidly led by international oil price developments, notwithstanding a recent uptick, while core inflation remains elevated. In both countries, current account deficits improved markedly from pandemic years but remain high. Fiscal positions remained strong and in compliance with the fiscal rule. The landspakket, the structural reform package agreed with the Netherlands in 2020, continues to guide both countries’ reform agenda.

    Curaçao outlook. Growth is expected to accelerate in 2024 before gradually converging to its potential over the medium term. Stayover tourism supported by fiscal expansion is projected to drive economic growth at a robust 4.5 percent in 2024 due to new airlifts and further expansion in hotel capacity. Growth is then expected to moderate to reach 1.5 percent over the medium term, given subpar investment and productivity growth coupled with sustained population decline and beginning saturation in tourism flows, assuming no further reforms and diversification. Headline inflation is projected to decline mildly to 3.2 percent in 2024 from 3.5 percent in 2023, but to continue falling towards its steady state of around 2 percent by 2027 reflecting international price developments. Fiscal balances would be guided by the fiscal rule and debt would continue to decline, while surpluses narrow as investments return and social spending pressures mount. The current account deficit is expected to improve in the medium term but would remain elevated.

    Sint Maarten outlook. Growth is expected to moderate in the medium term as tourism recovery and the reconstruction taper off. Growth is expected to be 2.7 percent in 2024 and 3 percent in 2025, supported by a delayed recovery in cruise passengers towards pre-pandemic levels. However, the near-term outlook is threatened by the electricity load shedding (since June) and political instability. From 2026 onwards, growth is expected to gradually converge towards 1.8 percent as the stimulus from the reconstruction peters out, and tourism growth becomes constrained by the island’s carrying capacity and ailing infrastructure. Inflation is expected to remain broadly contained while remaining vulnerable to international price developments. Over the medium term, the government will continue to comply with the golden fiscal rule and capacity constraints will continue to weigh on public investment.

    Monetary Union. Monetary policy is appropriately targeted towards maintaining the peg. Efforts to absorb excess liquidity should continue while closely monitoring developments in core inflation driven by tourism-related services. The financial sector is sound and risks to financial stability have substantially diminished as the CBCS advances its reform agenda. Banks are highly liquid and adequately capitalized and systemic risks are contained. Building on the CBCS’s strong progress in strengthening supervisory and regulatory capacity, and the recent resolution agreement for ENNIA, staff welcomes CBCS’s continued efforts in its reform agenda, including financial stability and crisis management.

    Executive Board Assessment[3]

    Curaçao

    Curaçao’s economy successfully embraced the pivot towards tourism-led growth, giving rise to a strong near-term outlook. After losing key traditional industries, Curaçao quickly and successfully leveraged its tourism potential to grow, attract new hotels, and create jobs. While this is serving the economy well in the near term – growth is projected to accelerate to 4½ in 2024 – structural shifts have started to emerge, including a low-skilled, informal recovery of the labor market amidst low investment in non-tourist sectors. Growth is expected to moderate over the medium term given saturation in tourism flows, sustained population decline, and subpar investment. Notwithstanding the economy’s recent overperformance, inflation declined significantly and only reversed some of its gains recently on the back of higher international oil prices and unfavorable base effects. Inflation is expected to gradually converge towards its steady state rate of around 2 percent. Fiscal policy remains guided by the fiscal rule, albeit past surpluses are expected to unwind, allowing for the reversal of pandemic wage cuts and a return of public investments. The current account markedly improved thanks to lower oil prices but the deficit remains elevated.

    Risks to the outlook are broadly balanced. Growth slowdown in major economies could negatively impact tourism receipts, while positive surprises could boost foreign demand. Domestically, a successful expansion of renewable energy and faster-than-expected development of hotel capacity and yachting marinas would boost growth, while delays in public investment and more persistent core inflation could dent tourist experience and competitiveness.

    Efforts to safeguard recently created fiscal space are welcome. Overall surpluses in 2022 and 2023 helped reduce debt and granted access to favorable financing terms from the Netherlands. Safeguarding this space and avoiding procyclical impetus is warranted, including through more gradual unwinding of pandemic wage cuts in 2024, prudent liquidity management to repay a bullet loan in 2025, and general efforts to strengthen tax administration, review procurement and domestic arrears management, and streamline transfers to public entities. Ensuing room for maneuver could be used for priority investments, including for climate adaptation, guided by a medium-term fiscal framework steering towards the island’s debt anchor.

    Healthcare and pension reforms are needed to lock in a sustainable expenditure path and mitigate medium-term fiscal risks. Growing health and old-age pension deficits, exacerbated by an aging population, pose risks to the sustainability of public finances. Recent initiatives to incentivize the use of generics and raise the pension age are commendable, and more needs to be done to put the system on a sustainable path. Staff sees a broad range of efficiency gains in health spending, including lowering pharmaceuticals and laboratory costs and enhancing primary care’s gatekeeping role. Reforms on the revenue side, including broadening the contributor base and increasing co-payments, are politically more difficult.

    Sustaining the positive growth momentum in the medium term requires investments in capital and labor and resolving existing growth bottlenecks. First, moving up the value chain with high-end resorts and complementary recreational activities would help sustain valuable income growth from tourism but requires scaling up investments in infrastructure and deregulating the transportation sector. Second, further investments in electricity grid and energy storage, as well as a revised pricing strategy, are needed to accompany the ongoing energy transition and reap its vast benefits, including lower fuel imports, emissions, and electricity prices. The envisaged floating offshore wind park for hydrogen production would be a game changer for the island. Boosting public investment to achieve these objectives, however, requires ramping up capacity in planning and execution. Third, to further stimulate growth and offset the sustained population decline, formal labor markets and skills would need to be strengthened. And fourth, continued improvements in the business climate in line with the landspakket’s economic reform pillar could help overcome decade-low productivity growth.

    Important strides in reducing ML/FT vulnerabilities are welcome and could be built upon. The draft online gaming law, implementation of risk-based supervision, and a new law to address EU grey listing and enable automatic information exchange represent important strides in enhancing Curaçao’s defenses against ML/FT and related reputational risks. Curaçao can further improve upon these important accomplishments, including by passing and implementing the aforementioned legislations in a timely manner and enhancing coordination and monitoring across relevant agencies.

    Sint Maarten

    Near-term growth is strongly anchored but preserving the positive momentum hinges on investments to revamp an ailing infrastructure and improve tourism’s value added. The economic recovery is well underway, underpinned by tourism recovery and the reconstruction. GDP is expected to surpass its pre-Irma level in 2025. However, without investments to upgrade an ailing infrastructure, growth will falter as the island approaches its maximum carrying capacity. Strategies should continue to focus on enhancing tourist’s experience, differentiating from other Caribbean destinations, and improving tourism’s value added.

    A comprehensive strategy is required to durably resolve the electricity crisis. Mobile electricity generators have been leased and efforts to replace old engines are underway. Once the immediate crisis is resolved, efforts should be devoted towards developing a detailed masterplan for the energy transition with targets, projects, costing, timeline, and a comprehensive assessment of ancillary investments. The Trust Fund could receive a new mandate, beyond 2028, to operate as a public investment agency in charge of planning, securing the financing, and implementing plans for the energy transition.

    Revenue mobilization efforts are essential to ensure fiscal sustainability. Plans to lower tax rates, to make the country more competitive with neighboring islands, should be avoided as this would reduce government’s revenues and endanger fiscal sustainability. Instead, additional revenues are required to satisfy the fiscal rule, service loans with the Netherlands, raise public wages to attract and retain talent, increase transfers to cover public health costs, and clear public arrears with the SZV. Envisaged reforms to enhance the tax administration and to digitize and interface government systems should be complemented with plans to i) tax casinos’ profits, turnover, and winnings; ii) enforce the lodging tax on short-term rentals, and income and profit tax on the proceeds from such rentals; iii) update the price of land leases; and iv) institute a tourist levy at the airport.

    Without reforms, the healthcare and pensions funds are unsustainable. Health premiums and government transfers are insufficient to cover health costs, which are being cross-financed with pension savings. With unchanged policies, given population aging and rising administrative costs, both health and pensions funds will run deficits by 2027, and the SZV would deplete its liquid assets by 2027. By 2030, the government would need to transfer about 4 percent of GDP per year to sustain the system. Reforms are urgently needed to contain health costs including: i) introducing the General Health Insurance, ii) rationalizing benefits, iii) extending the use of generics, iv) optimizing referrals, v) strengthening preventing care, and vi) adopting out-of-pocket payments. Given the rapid pace of population aging, additional measures such as increasing the contribution rates and linking the retirement age to life expectancy, should also be considered.

    Strengthening the implementation of AML/CFT measures is necessary to increase effectiveness of the AML/CFT regime. Laws for an effective AML/CFT framework were approved but their implementation is lagging. UBO registration is yet to begin, while the investigation and prosecution of suspicious activities is lacking. Granting the FIU full independence to investigate and prosecute cases, and increasing its budget for recruitment and operations could strengthen the AML/CFT framework.

     

    The Monetary Union of Curaçao and Sint Maarten

    The current account deficit is expected to improve in the medium term but would remain elevated, while international reserves are expected to remain broadly stable. Large CADs in both countries are expected to improve and remain well-financed, leading to a stable and broadly adequate level of international reserves over the medium term. Curaçao’s external position is assessed to be weaker than implied by fundamentals and desired policy settings due to an elevated CAD and sustained appreciation of the real effective exchange rate, while that of Sint Maarten is considered in line with fundamentals and desired policy settings.

    Monetary policy is appropriately targeted towards maintaining the peg. In line with global monetary policy tightening, the CBCS increased its benchmark rate during 2022-23 and has kept it unchanged since September 2023. Efforts to absorb excess liquidity should continue while closely monitoring developments in core inflation driven by tourism-related services. Even though credit growth declined further and reached negative territory in real terms amidst monetary tightening, the transmission mechanism of monetary policy remains weak. Structural factors include the absence of interbank and government securities markets. The continued increase in mortgages, the only credit component to display growth, was accompanied by a broadly stable loan-to-value ratio on aggregate, albeit more granular data is needed to monitor potential vulnerabilities. Further acceleration in mortgage credit could warrant introducing a macro prudential limit below the currently by banks self-imposed ratio.

    The financial sector is sound and risks to financial stability have substantially diminished as the CBCS advances its reform agenda. Banks are highly liquid and adequately capitalized and systemic risks are contained. Near-term risks to financial stability have substantially diminished with the agreement for a controlled wind-down of ENNIA and the start of the restructuring process, as well as the CBCS’s continued improvements in supervision, regulation, and governance. Staff welcomes CBCS’s initiatives to establish a financial stability committee, further refine stress-testing, and enhance crisis management capacities, including lender of last resort and a deposit insurance scheme.

    Table 1. Curaçao: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 2020–25

    (Percent of GDP unless otherwise indicated)

     

    2020

    2021

    2022

    2023

    2024

    2025

    Prel.

    Prel.

    Prel.

    Prel.

    Proj.

    Real Economy

    Real GDP (percent change)

    -18.0

    4.2

    7.9

    4.2

    4.5

    3.5

    CPI (12-month average, percent change)

    2.2

    3.8

    7.4

    3.5

    3.2

    2.4

    CPI (end of period, percent change)

    2.2

    4.8

    8.4

    3.1

    3.2

    2.4

    GDP deflator (percent change)

    2.2

    3.8

    4.0

    3.5

    3.2

    2.4

    Unemployment rate (percent) 1/

    13.1

    13.5

    7.2

    7.0

    6.9

    6.6

    Central Government Finances 2/

    Net operating (current) balance

    -15.0

    -10.6

    0.7

    0.6

    0.0

    0.5

    Primary balance

    -13.2

    -8.8

    2.0

    2.5

    2.0

    1.9

    Overall balance

    -14.5

    -10.0

    1.0

    1.3

    0.1

    0.5

    Central government debt 3/

    87.1

    90.3

    81.6

    70.8

    65.4

    61.1

    General Government Finances 2, 4/

    Overall balance

    -15.7

    -10.4

    0.3

    0.9

    -0.3

    -0.1

    Balance of Payments

    Current account

    -27.2

    -18.6

    -26.8

    -19.7

    -17.9

    -16.5

    Goods trade balance

    -37.0

    -41.6

    -47.9

    -38.3

    -40.4

    -39.9

       Exports of goods

    10.7

    12.5

    18.0

    16.9

    16.5

    16.2

       Imports of goods

    47.7

    54.1

    65.9

    55.2

    56.9

    56.1

    Service balance

    9.6

    21.7

    20.5

    18.4

    22.6

    23.7

       Exports of services

    29.3

    37.2

    48.6

    46.6

    50.3

    51.3

       Imports of services

    19.7

    15.6

    28.1

    28.2

    27.7

    27.6

    External debt

    197.3

    194.8

    180.9

    177.1

    169.1

    164.0

    Memorandum Items

    Nominal GDP (millions of U.S. dollars)

    2,534

    2,740

    3,075

    3,318

    3,578

    3,789

    Per capita GDP (U.S. dollars)

    16,492

    18,135

    20,648

    22,160

    23,775

    25,065

    Credit to non-government sectors (percent change)

    0.1

    -9.7

    3.2

    2.5

    …

    …

    Sources: The Curaçao authorities and IMF staff estimates and projections.

    1/ Staff understands that the unemployment rate of 7.0 percent published in the 2023 Census data is not comparable to the historically published unemployment rates from the labor force survey by the Curacao Bureau of Statistics. As such, staff estimated the unemployment rate and overall labor force for the period of 2012 to 2022. Staff understands that the Curacao Bureau of Statistics intends to revise the historical series in the near future.

    2/ Defined as balance sheet liabilities of the central government except equities. Includes central government liabilities to the social security funds.

    3/ Budgetary central government consolidated with the social security fund (SVB).

    4/ The latest available datapoint is as of 2018. Values for 2019-2023 are IMF staff estimates based on BOP flow data.

     

     

    Table 2. Sint Maarten: Selected Economic Indicators 2020–25

    (Percent of GDP unless otherwise indicated)

     

    2020

    2021

    2022

    2023

    2024

    2025

    Est.

    Est.

    Est.

    Est.

    Proj.

    Real Economy

     

    		    

    Real GDP (percent change) 1/

    -20.4

    7.1

    13.9

    3.5

    2.7

    3.0

    CPI (12-month average, percent change)

    0.7

    2.8

    3.6

    2.1

    2.5

    2.3

    Unemployment rate (percent) 2/

    16.9

    10.8

    9.9

    8.6

    8.5

    8.2
       

    Government Finances

     

    		    

    Primary balance excl. Trust Fund operations 3/

    -8.7

    -5.4

    -0.6

    1.5

    0.9

    0.9

    Current balance (Authorities’ definition) 4/

    -9.6

    -6.3

    -1.5

    0.5

    -0.1

    0.0

    Overall balance excl. TF operations

    -9.3

    -5.9

    -1.1

    1.0

    0.2

    0.2

    Central government debt 5/

    56.1

    55.3

    49.3

    49.0

    46.2

    44.1
       

    Balance of Payments

     

    		    

    Current account

    -25.5

    -24.6

    -3.9

    -7.5

    -7.8

    -3.0

    Goods trade balance

    -40.7

    -49.8

    -59.2

    -59.3

    -62.4

    -60.5

       Exports of goods

    11.8

    11.4

    14.1

    14.8

    13.1

    11.2

       Imports of goods

    52.4

    61.2

    73.2

    74.1

    75.5

    71.7

    Service balance

    20.2

    33.1

    62.8

    60.3

    62.6

    65.2

       Exports of services

    34.4

    51.0

    78.7

    81.4

    81.5

    83.9

       Imports of services

    14.3

    17.9

    15.9

    21.1

    18.9

    18.7

    External debt 6/

    274.3

    253.7

    213.6

    206.3

    200.8

    194.0
       

    Memorandum Items

    		    

    Nominal GDP (millions of U.S. dollars)

    1,141

    1,268

    1,479

    1,563

    1,645

    1,733

    Per capita GDP (U.S. dollars)

    26,796

    29,646

    34,437

    36,088

    37,570

    39,160

    Credit to non-gov. sectors (percent change)

    2.4

    1.3

    4.5

    1.0

    …

    …
               

       Sources:

    		            

       1/ Central Bank of Curacao and Sint Maarten and IMF staff estimates.

    		            

       2/ The size of the 2022 labor force reported by the 2023 Census was adjusted to ensure consistency with the reported total population.

       3/ Excludes Trust Fund (TF) grants and TF-financed special projects.

    		  

       4/ Revenue excl. grants minus interest income, current expenditure and depreciation of fixed assets.

    		  

       5/ The stock of debt in 2018 is based on financial statements. Values in subsequent years are staff’s estimates and are higher than the values under authorities’ definition in quarterly fiscal reports.

       6/ The latest available datapoint is as of 2018. Values for 2019-2022 are IMF staff estimates based on BOP flow data.

    [1] Under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country’s economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board.

    [2] The Executive Board takes decisions under its lapse-of-time-procedure when the Board agrees that a proposal can be considered without convening formal discussions.

    [3] At the conclusion of the discussion, the Managing Director, as Chairman of the Board, summarizes the views of Executive Directors, and this summary is transmitted to the country’s authorities. An explanation of any qualifiers used in summings up can be found here: http://www.IMF.org/external/np/sec/misc/qualifiers.htm.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Reah Sy

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    @IMFSpokesperson

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/09/17/pr-24330-curacao-and-sint-maarten-imf-board-concludes-2024-article-iv-consultation-discussions

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: HK-SZ ecological meeting held

    Source: Hong Kong Information Services

    Secretary for Environment & Ecology Tse Chin-wan today led a delegation to Shenzhen to attend the Hong Kong-Shenzhen Joint Working Group on Environmental Protection meeting where various collaboration issues were discussed.

    The Hong Kong and Shenzhen delegations discussed landfill management, marine pollution prevention and control, and cross-border transportation using new energy.

    Both sides also reported on the progress of various work items.

    The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government has completed a freezing survey of the number and locations of oyster rafts in Deep Bay, and will continue to maintain close communication with Shenzhen regarding the management of the oyster rafts.

    Regarding the North East New Territories Landfill, Hong Kong has implemented a series of improvement measures and will continue to collaborate with Shenzhen to further enhance odour control at the landfill.

    Mr Tse said he looked forward to continuing to strengthen communication and co-operation with Shenzhen on ecological and environmental protection through the joint working group to enhance the work on environmental protection and ecology, as well as make proactive contributions to the country’s ecological civilisation.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Students urged to be aware of fire safety

    Source: Northern Ireland Direct

    Date published:

    Students are urged to be aware of the dangers of fire. Fire safety advice could be one of the most important lessons for students during their time at university or college.

    Smoke alarm and fire escape plan

    All students should take personal responsibility for looking after themselves and their housemates to protect them from the dangers of fire.

    Living away from home, especially if it’s for the first time, can be very exciting and it’s easy to get caught up in student life and forget about fire safety.

    Check your student accommodation to make sure it’s fire safe and fire safety checks should always be part of your routine.

    It’s important to have a working smoke alarm fitted on each level of accommodation and to test them once a week. This will alert you and your housemates to the earliest stage of a fire, giving vital extra time to escape.

    You should follow a good fire safe bedtime routine – checking a few things before going to bed can reduce the risk of fire. It only takes a minute and could save lives, so:

    • make sure all electrical appliances not designed to be left on are disconnected
    • fully put out cigarettes
    • close all doors

    Also, take some time to agree a fire escape plan to make sure everyone is clear what to do in an emergency. This means knowing where the fire exits are and making sure furniture or stored items do not block them.

    If there is no fire exit, plan an alternative escape route other than by the main entrance door.

    You can find out more about fire safety at this link:

    If you go home at weekends, make sure that accommodation is safely secured and protected from the risk of fire.

    Student fire safety advice

    You should:

    • test your smoke alarm every week
    • prepare a fire escape plan and know where your door keys are
    • carry out a night-time fire safe check routine
    • never leave cooking unattended, not even for a minute
    • never cook, light candles or use electric heaters when under the influence of alcohol
    • turn off all electrical appliances not designed to be left on
    • avoid overloading sockets
    • make sure you don’t leave phone, tablet and laptop on their chargers longer than necessary
    • put a guard on open fires
    • put out all cigarettes and empty ashtrays into a non-combustible container
    • never smoke in bed

    You should also check that any fire alarm system in your accommodation is working.  If it is showing a fault, contact the landlord or the Estates Officer at the university immediately.

    If a fire starts:

    • close the door on the fire
    • alert everyone in the property if safe to do so
    • get out and stay out
    • call 999 and get the Fire and Rescue Service out

    There is more information at this link:

    More useful links

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Consultation to open on whether draft Local Plan conforms to national planning policies

    Source: St Albans City and District

    Publication date:

    A technical consultation is to be held on whether a draft Local Plan for St Albans District has met all the necessary legal requirements.

    The Local Plan (LP) is a blueprint for future growth and identifies land for infrastructure, employment and housing developments in the years to 2041.

    It has been produced by St Albans City and District Council and has taken more than three years’ work to reach this stage.

    Residents, community groups, businesses, neighbouring local authorities and other organisations have helped shape the document by contributing to previous consultations.

    Numerous studies have also been undertaken to assess the impact of the proposals on the environment, transport, heritage, the Green Belt and social issues such as education and leisure.

    External planning and legal experts have also helped the Council’s spatial planning team to carry out some of the detailed work and provide a detached perspective.

    Councillors on the Planning Policy and Climate Committee gave approval for the next statutory procedure at its meeting on Monday 23 September.

    They agreed to start what is known as the Regulation 19 Consultation to allow for public comment on the draft LP’s compliance and ‘soundness’ with national planning policies.

    Chris Traill, the Council’s Strategic Director for Community and Place Delivery, said after the meeting:

    This has been described as something of a technical consultation.

    We are not asking people for feedback on their general views on the draft LP, but are asking whether it is in line with planning law and national planning policy.

    Neighbouring councils, for instance, need to consider if we have met our duty to cooperate with them while producing the draft LP.

    We have a responsibility as a Council to deliver an LP that conforms with planning law and national policies and we are confident that we have done so. This consultation, though, will put that to the test, allowing for any concerns to be raised.

    The consultation will start on Thursday 26 September and continue for six weeks to Friday 8 November.

    In the meantime, Full Council will decide whether to approve the draft LP at its meeting on Wednesday 16 October.

    Following this, the Planning Policy and Climate Committee on Thursday 28 November will consider a report on the Regulation 19 consultation feedback.

    Provided the draft LP was approved by Full Council and it is considered to be in accordance with national policy, it will then be submitted to the Government for examination by an independent planning inspector.

    Previously, it was intended to submit a draft LP in March next year. The timetable was brought forward to avoid potential changes to national planning policy that could have meant starting the whole LP process again from scratch.

    Ms Traill added:

    We feel it is very much in the interests of our residents to submit a Local Plan as soon as we can. We will be able to update it when required to.

    A delay of two or three years could leave us more open to speculative planning applications for all sorts of developments. It is these piecemeal, opportunistic developments rather than ones which form part of an overarching Local Plan that can cause major problems. They often don’t take sufficiently into account the impact on infrastructure, demand for school places and other issues.

    The draft LP proposes nine new primary schools, four new secondary schools, sites for 15,000 new homes, including social housing, locations for 15,000 jobs, and new parks and health facilities.

    Residents and other stakeholders gave their general views about the draft LP at an earlier Regulation 18 consultation, helping to shape the proposals.

    You can take part in the Regulation 19 consultation and view the draft LP along with other documents at https://www.stalbans.gov.uk/new-local-plan.

    Media contact: John McJannet, Principal Communications Officer: 01727 819533, john.mcjannet@stalbans.gov.uk.

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Smokers offered free support so they can Swap to Stop

    Source: City of Wolverhampton

    The Government recently announced a number of measures to ensure that the country achieves its ambition of becoming Smokefree by 2030, including the provision of a million ‘Swap to Stop’ kits as a way to support people to quit smoking.

    The City of Wolverhampton Council is working to make these kits available at a range of community venues, including the city’s 8 Family Hubs, the 3 WV Active leisure centres and Bilston, Warstones and Wednesfield libraries.

    The service will be delivered by trained members of staff, who will offer free vape starter kits alongside support and weekly ‘check-in’ sessions delivered from the convenience of local community venues to help people on their quitting journey over a period of 12 weeks.

    The new service was officially launched this week. To sign up for free, please visit Swap to Stop.

    Councillor Jasbir Jaspal, the City of Wolverhampton Council’s Cabinet Member for Adults and Wellbeing, said: “Stopping smoking is the best thing you can do for your health and the health of those around you.

    “Smoking is still the single largest preventable cause of death in England, accounting for around for 64,000 deaths annually. Almost every minute of every day someone is admitted to hospital with a smoking related disease – but, when you stop smoking, there are almost immediate improvements to your health.

    “And it’s not just your body which will benefit, your purse or wallet will too. On average smokers spend £38.59 a week on tobacco – and that means you could have around £2,000 more to spend a year by quitting, and even more if you are a really heavy smoker.

    “Nicotine vaping is substantially less harmful than smoking and is also one of the most effective tools for quitting, so we are delighted to deliver this Swap to Stop support in the community in Wolverhampton. If you want to quit, please sign up today.”

    For more help and support to stop smoking, please visit Quit Smoking.

    Meanwhile, the council announced last week that a new healthy lifestyles service, Live Well Wolverhampton, is being launched, offering people information, advice, guidance, self help tools and lifestyle interventions to enable them to make and maintain positive lifestyle choices.

    Initially, the service is being trialled on a small scale, providing support to help people quit smoking, while an adult weight management scheme is also expected to be launched in the near future. It will strengthen the existing support available in Wolverhampton and will be accessible to all those who live or are registered with a GP in the city. More information about Live Well Wolverhampton will be provided once the service is launched city wide.

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Care and health careers fair hailed a huge success 24 September 2024 Care and health careers fair hailed a huge success

    Source: Aisle of Wight

    More than 580 people descended on the Lord Louis Library in Newport last week to find out more about career opportunities within the Island’s care and health sector.

    Organised by the Isle of Wight Council, the event showcased the wide range of jobs, career paths and apprenticeships available on the Island to make a real difference to people’s lives.

    The day also provided an opportunity for those interested in a rewarding career in care and health to talk to staff to find out what skills are needed to get into these vital roles.

    Among the organisations in attendance were Mountbatten, the Isle of Wight NHS Trust, Alzheimer Cafe, Practice Plus Group and a host of independent care providers from around the Island, along with council teams from adult social care, children’s services and public health.

    Katy Harwood, the council’s recruitment team leader, said: “We wanted to shine a spotlight on the rewarding careers available locally.

    “We need more people to join the Island’s care and health workforce supporting Island residents when they need it most.

    “A career in care and health is so much more than people may think, so this event was a great opportunity to bring together a wide range of organisations and showcase the different types of jobs available and how valuable this work is.

    “Lots of employers had productive discussions on the day and potential hires which was great to hear.

    “As well as our sector employers, it was also good to see visitors engaging with additional support and training/learning services represented through Isle of Wight College, Adult Learning, DWP, Working Towards Wellbeing and National Careers Service.

    “I hope all involved found it a rewarding day, and that visitors left feeling inspired to pursue a career in care and health.”

    Councillor Debbie Andre, Cabinet member for adult social care and public health, added: “A career in health and social care can be incredibly rewarding and there are many different career paths that people can follow.

    “This event highlighted not only the range of employment available, but that entry can be open at any stage of life and that previous life experience can be a great advantage in enabling those supported to live their best lives through those joining the caring profession.”

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: New pilot nursery provision at d’Auvergne School23 September 2024 The Minister for Education and Lifelong Learning, Deputy Rob Ward, in conjunction with the Jersey Child Care Trust (JCCT), is opening a new nursery provision for 2–3-year-olds with additional needs,… Read more

    Source: Channel Islands – Jersey

    23 September 2024

    The Minister for Education and Lifelong Learning, Deputy Rob Ward, in conjunction with the Jersey Child Care Trust (JCCT), is opening a new nursery provision for 2–3-year-olds with additional needs, at d’Auvergne School.

    This provision is one of a number of initiatives taking place to support the Minister’s ambition to extend the nursery and childcare provision for children aged 2-3, within the Government’s Common Strategic Policy (CSP) 2024-2026.

    The nursery will open in October and is a pilot scheme; the opportunity to open more 2-3 provisions within Government primary schools is being explored.

    Deputy Ward said: “I’m delighted that we are able to offer this provision to parents and families in the coming weeks. It is the first step, and one of a number of possible options we’re looking at to achieve the universal offer for 2- to 3-year-olds.

    “I committed to these pilots when I became Minister, as part of this Government’s Common Strategic Policy, and reaching this point is the culmination of a lot of hard work.

    “I’d like to thank the Jersey Child Care Trust and the d’Auvergne leadership team for creating this new provision at such pace.”

    Headteacher of d’Auvergne, Sam Cooper said: “This marks an exciting new chapter for the school and makes clear sense to use free space in primary schools to expand our nursery provision. We’re very happy to support the pilot in any way we can and look forward to welcoming more children into our wider school community”.

    The provision will be known as ‘Play and Learn at d’Auvergne’ and will include the children’s families too, by inviting them to join in with Play and Learn sessions once a week.

    Fiona Vacher, Executive Director of JCCT said: “We know the life changing impact that a good quality, early years’ experience has on children and particularly those with developmental and financial need. Previously JCCT has been unable to fund a part-time nursery place for every child who needed it because of a lack of available nursery places.

    “When the Minister for Education approached us, we knew we had to prioritise creating ‘Play and Learn at d’Auvergne’ as we want to make sure that every child has access to the nurture, care and learning they need to thrive.”​

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Consultation begins on proposed licensing scheme for private sector rented housing

    Source: City of Leeds

    People in Leeds are being encouraged to have their say on the possible introduction of a new regulatory licensing scheme for private sector rented housing.

    Leeds City Council began operating a system known as ‘selective licensing’ in Beeston and Harehills in 2020 with the aim of driving up the standard of privately-rented homes and boosting wider efforts to tackle social and health inequalities in the two communities.

    Positive results have been achieved but – under the terms of the Housing Act 2004 – selective licensing schemes in England can only run for a period of five years.

    The council is therefore now considering plans for a new and expanded scheme that would again include much of Beeston and Harehills but would also take in parts of Armley, Holbeck, Cross Green and East End Park.

    All private landlords – with certain limited exceptions – would be required by law to obtain a licence for any residential property they are seeking to let in the designated area.

    The licence conditions would include ensuring the safe working of gas or electric appliances, providing smoke alarms and carbon monoxide detectors and keeping the property in a decent state of repair, both inside and out.

    A public consultation on the proposed scheme was launched yesterday (Monday, September 23), with the council keen to gather a wide cross-section of views before it decides whether to press ahead with its plans.

    And interested parties across the city – including landlords, tenants and other stakeholders – are being urged to take the opportunity to share their thoughts between now and the end of the consultation period on December 13.

    Councillor Jess Lennox, Leeds City Council’s executive member for housing, said:

    “Privately rented properties are a key source of housing in Leeds and it’s vitally important that they are safe, warm and well managed places to live.

    “We want to explore options for protecting and improving the quality of every type of home in our city, with the newly-launched consultation on selective licensing forming part of that work.

    “I would encourage as many people as possible to let us know their views over the course of the next few months.”

    More than 4,500 inspections and other visits have been conducted at properties in Beeston and Harehills under their existing schemes, which both come to an end next year.

    Landlords have had to carry out improvement work on more than 1,500 homes where issues were identified during these checks.

    The visits have also given council officers increased opportunities to identify situations where tenants are facing non-housing related problems, with more than 1,700 referrals being made to partner agencies for support with health, financial and other challenges.

    The areas provisionally earmarked for the new scheme all sit within the Armley, Beeston & Holbeck, Burmantofts & Richmond Hill, Gipton & Harehills and Hunslet & Riverside council wards.

    These wards have higher levels of deprivation than the city as a whole and an above-average concentration of private rented housing.

    A decision on whether to bring in the new Selective Licensing in East, South & West Leeds scheme is expected in the first half of 2025.

    To learn more about the consultation and how to submit feedback, click here. Further information can also be obtained by e-mailing ESWselective.licensing@leeds.gov.uk or ringing 0113 378 2899.

    ENDS

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Maksim Liksutov: the first carriages of the latest Russian train “White Gyrfalcon” (Bely Krechet) will depart for Saint Petersburg on the HSR by 2028

    Source: Moscow Metro

    Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin presented a model of the latest domestic train “White Gyrfalcon” (Bely Krechet) for the high-speed rail line Moscow — Saint Petersburg, a project initiated by Russian President Vladimir Putin, at the “Manezh Station: Moscow Transport 2030” exhibition. The train will reach speeds of up to 400 km/h.

    Latest domestic train “White Gyrfalcon”. Moscow Metro.

    During the presentation at Manezh, an agreement was signed for the delivery of 41 Russian trains for the high-speed rail line HSR-1 “Moscow – Tver – Veliky Novgorod – Saint Petersburg.”

    The ceremony saw attendance from Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin, Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Vitaly Saveliev, Deputy Transport Minister Alexey Shilo, Deputy Mayor of Moscow for Transport Maksim Liksutov, General Director of Russian Railways JSC (RZD) Oleg Belozerov, First Deputy Chairman of the Board of Sberbank Alexander Vedyakhin, General Director of HSR Two Capitals LLC Oleg Toni, General Director of GTLK JSC Evgeny Ditrikh, General Director of Sinara Group JSC Viktor Lesh, and Anatoly Gavrilenko, General Director of Leader CJSC – the company organizing the financing for the project through non-state pension funds.

    Inside the latest domestic train “White Gyrfalcon”. Moscow Metro.

    The innovative Russian rolling stock meets the highest safety and comfort standards. All key components are manufactured in Russia, with assembly and commissioning taking place at the Ural Locomotives plant in Sverdlovsk Oblast.

    According to Deputy Mayor of Moscow for Transport Maksim Liksutov, the domestic trains are both safe and comfortable. Each train consists of 8 carriages with several service classes. The train ride to Saint Petersburg will be nearly twice as fast as the Sapsan, taking only 2 hours and 15 minutes. The first carriages will depart for Saint Petersburg in 2028.

    Travel time between Moscow and Tver will be 39 minutes, between Saint Petersburg and Veliky Novgorod — 29 minutes. From Zelenograd to central Moscow, the journey will take just 14 minutes.

    The latest domestic train “White Gyrfalcon”. Moscow Metro.

    “On behalf of Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin, we have presented a unique transportation exhibit at the Manezh Central Exhibition Hall. A part of the exhibition is dedicated to President Vladimir Putin’s project — HSR-1. The first carriages of the latest ‘White Gyrfalcon’ train will depart for Saint Petersburg on the HSR in 2028. The main design solutions for creating Russia’s first high-speed train HSR-1 were developed in Moscow. Some components for the high-speed trains will be produced by Moscow enterprises. The lifespan of the trains is 30 years, during which the manufacturer will be responsible under a life cycle contract,” said Maksim Liksutov.

    Along with the HSR train model, visitors at Manezh Square can see the newest “Ivolga 4.0” trains, the “Moscow-2024” metro carriage, and the updated “Kamaz” electric bus. The internal exhibition features a multimedia HSR train where visitors can take a virtual journey along the high-speed rail route and explore the landmarks of the cities along the way.

    The “Manezh Station: Moscow Transport 2030” exhibition, where the model is featured, is part of the forum-festival “Future Territory: Moscow 2030” and has become the most visited in Manezh’s history. Admission is free, and the exhibition runs until September 8 at the Manezh Central Exhibition Hall.

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Navigating Through Financial Turbulences with Preparedness, Competence, and Confidence

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    OeNB | SUERF | Joint Vienna Institute | Yale Program on Financial Stability Conference on Building Resilience and Managing Financial Crises
    Vienna, Austria
    Tobias Adrian, IMF Financial Counsellor and Director of the Monetary and Capital Markets Department

    September 18, 2024

    It is a great pleasure to speak to you today on a policy area at the forefront of our work at the IMF in helping our members prepare for, and deal with, financial instability. I will provide a snapshot of the progress that has been made and what remains to be done to deal effectively with bank runs and bank failures. I will also explain what we are doing at the IMF to help our membership make further progress in this critical area.

    The bank failures in 2023 in the US and Switzerland presented the most significant test since the global financial crisis of the reforms taken collectively to end “too-big-to-fail.” It’s not often that policymakers get to field test plans for dealing with failing systemic banks, let alone one for a global systemically important bank (G-SIB).

    In our view, the failures of Credit Suisse in Switzerland and SVB, Signature, and First Republic in the US, showed that while significant progress has been made, further progress is still required to deliver on the too-big-to-fail reform agenda and reduce the risk that taxpayers bail out shareholders and creditors when banks fail.

    On the one hand, the actions the authorities took last year successfully avoided deeper financial turmoil. In addition, unlike many of the failures during the global financial crisis, significant losses were shared with the shareholders and some creditors of the failed banks. However, taxpayers were once again on the hook as extensive public support was used to protect more than just the insured depositors of failed banks.

    In Switzerland, amid a massive creditor run, the Credit Suisse acquisition was backed by a government guarantee and liquidity facilities nearly equal to a quarter of Swiss economic output. While the public support was ultimately recovered, it entailed very significant contingent fiscal risk, and created a larger, more systemic bank. Indeed, UBS now has the largest ratio of assets to home country GDP of any individual G-SIB.

    The use of standing resolution powers to transfer ownership of Credit Suisse, after bailing in shareholders and creditors, rather than relying on emergency legislation to effect a merger, would have fully wiped out the equity of Credit Suisse shareholders and limited the need for public support.

    What lessons have we learnt?

    Domestic and international authorities have published extensively on the lessons learnt and we share many of the conclusions. The key points I would highlight include:

    The importance of intrusive supervision and early intervention. Credit Suisse depositors lost confidence after prolonged governance and risk management failures. The banks which failed in the US pursued risky business strategies and very rapid growth with inadequate risk management. Supervisors in both jurisdictions should have acted faster and been more assertive and conclusive. Policymakers need to empower supervisors with both the ability and the will to act.

    Even relatively small banks can prove systemic. A lesson from many past crises, including the US bank failures in 2023, is that you can’t always judge in advance which banking problems will become systemic. In many countries, including the US and Switzerland, we think authorities should do more to be ready for crises affecting their medium-sized banks. Banking supervisory and resolution authorities should ensure that sufficient recovery and resolution planning takes place across the banking sector as a whole. This should include, on a proportional basis, banks that may not be systemic in all circumstances, but that could certainly be systemic in some.

    Central banks should be prepared to provide extensive liquidity support during a crisis. Banks should be familiar with the central bank’s operations and facilities and be ready to use them at short notice. Who can access central bank lending is also an important question as liquidity risks have partially moved away from the usual central bank counterparties. While widening the counterparty list could help central banks intervene more broadly in a crisis, it runs the risk of rewarding regulatory arbitrage, giving raise to difficult trade-offs and requiring careful assessment. Central banks may well have to lend against illiquid collateral in a crisis. In that context, prepositioning would help to ensure operational preparedness especially to ascertain the legal claim on the collateral and to calibrate appropriate haircuts. An open question is whether the prepositioning should be voluntary or required, and how much counterparties should preposition if required. The benefits of enhanced lending “fire power” would have to be compared with the cost that prepositioning entails for the banks and the costs to the central bank, including risks to its balance sheet. If propositioning is directly linked with risk (e.g., a percentage of uninsured deposit), the impact on intermediation and the interaction with other prudential regulation would need to be carefully assessed.

    Resolution plans and regimes need sufficient flexibility. We very much support the conclusion of the Financial Stability Board’s lessons learned report that resolution authorities need to “better operationalize a range of resolution options for different circumstances.” Every bank failure presents different challenges and resolution authorities need to be flexible enough to deal with the actual crisis that presents itself, balancing risks to financial stability with those to taxpayers. Authorities should make sure that they carefully balance rules versus discretion and detailed planning versus optionality in designing their resolution regimes. The rapid sale of Credit Suisse should prompt us to think about what would be needed for the successful sale in resolution of even the largest banking groups, at least in some circumstances.

    Strikingly, every one of the cases I mentioned from Spring 2023, involved the transfer of the failing bank’s business lines to an acquiring bank, even where this had not been the focus of prior resolution planning. Two of the US cases also involved the intermediate step of transfer to bridge banks. So, we have timely and high-profile reminders that transfer powers should be a core part of the resolution toolkit and should be duly planned for and readily implementable, including at short notice.

    Cooperation and effective implementation of resolution powers across borders is imperative. One notable feature of last year’s bank failures was the degree of international cooperation between regulators and resolution authorities in their handling of these cases. The Swiss authorities worked intensively with international counterparts to prepare for a resolution of Credit Suisse, which would have needed supportive actions from the supervisors and resolution authorities responsible for Credit Suisse’s main foreign operations, including in the US, UK, and EU. SVB’s UK subsidiary was resolved by the Bank of England, ultimately being sold to HSBC, and the FSB report highlights that the UK relied on the deep relationships built over the years with their US counterparts to help implement this. This cooperation seems to have begun earlier and worked a lot better than in similar cases during the global financial crisis, such as the failure of Lehman Brothers.

    That experience highlights how global financial stability depends on authorities being able to work together across borders and to build in peacetime the routine contacts and good understanding ex ante of what each authority would be likely to do to make that possible. However, there was a wrinkle in this otherwise positive experience, as highlighted in the Financial Stability Board’s report on the bank failures, which relates to the importance of the US securities markets to most major foreign banks. Credit Suisse and most other major banks have debt securities issued in US dollars and/or under New York law, the holders of which may incur losses in a resolution. As a recent report of the Financial Stability Board highlighted, there remain significant open questions about how disclosure and other US securities legal requirements would be applied in the circumstances where securities issued in the US are envisaged to be converted in a short period, for example, over a resolution weekend. This is an important issue where further work is needed and this is being taken forward by the Financial Stability Board, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and others.

    Finally, effective deposit insurance regimes are crucial. Banks typically fail when creditors lose confidence, even before their balance sheet reflects potential losses. Authorities in many countries need to strengthen deposit insurance regimes. New technology like 24/7 payments, mobile banking, and social media have accelerated deposit runs. Last year’s failures followed rapid deposit withdrawals, and deposit insurers and other authorities should be ready and able to act more quickly than many currently can.

    IMF staff are working actively to support efforts in member countries to strengthen their supervision, resolution, liquidity assistance, and deposit insurance frameworks including through FSAPs and technical assistance. In the US, we have seen lessons learned reports and policy proposals from many of the US banking authorities, several of which pick up on issues and recommendations that were discussed in the IMF’s assessment of the US financial sector (“FSAP”) in 2020. Our next FSAPs for Switzerland and the Euro Area will be published next year, and as we start work on that we will be taking a close look at the authorities’ and the FSB’s findings and will likely reiterate many of our previous findings, including on strengthening deposit insurance regimes. We are also contributing to policy formulation at the international level, including a recently announced review of the international deposit insurance standard, and by earlier this year hosting with the Financial Stability Board a workshop for policymakers on the use of transfer powers in resolution.

    The bottom line is that progress has been made, but there is still further to go in putting an end to too-big-to-fail. Most of the areas where further progress is needed are already well known; last year’s bank failures should provide the impetus for policymakers to cover the remaining ground.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER:

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    @IMFSpokesperson

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/09/16/sp091824-navigating-through-financial-turbulences-with-preparedness-competence-and-confidence

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Concludes 2024 Article IV Consultation with Bhutan

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    September 19, 2024

    Washington, DC: On September 9, 2024, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the Article IV consultation with Bhutan[1].

    During the past decade Bhutan adeptly balanced economic growth and poverty reduction with environmental sustainability. Sustained growth increased incomes, lifting living conditions and eliminating extreme monetary poverty by 2022. Bhutan has a long history of leading environmental conservation and climate change action and is committed to remaining carbon neutral. While the pandemic hindered economic development, strong policies limited its health impact.

    Growth remained subdued during 2023. Large-scale emigration and policies to curb imports hindered a more robust recovery. Inflation accelerated in the second half of 2023, driven by wage increases in the public sector. The current account deficit (CAD) widened to around 30 percent of GDP driven by a large investment in crypto assets mining and the slow recovery in tourism. The fiscal deficit narrowed but remained high and non-hydro debt nearly doubled from pre-pandemic levels.

    Boosted by hydro-power projects and grant-financed capital investment, growth is projected to accelerate over the medium term, averaging 6.3 percent of GDP, but to remain volatile. A gradual easing of inflation towards 4 percent is expected as the impact of wage increase subside. The CAD is expected to narrow, supported by higher electricity exports due to the commissioning of new hydropower plants, a continued recovery in tourism, and crypto assets exports. Securing diverse sources of growth that provide quality employment opportunities while preserving Bhutan’s commitment to environmental sustainability remains a key medium‑term challenge.

    Uncertainty remains elevated with the balance of risks tilted to the downside. Domestic risks include slippages on implementation of the goods and services tax, delays in hydropower projects, and fiscal risks from the materialization of contingent liabilities in the financial sector. External risks include volatile commodity prices—particularly of fuel—and a global slowdown that could hinder non-hydro exports. Bhutan is vulnerable to climate change, given the importance of hydroelectricity and agriculture. Crypto mining entails significant upside and downside risks given their price volatility. Overall, the large external debt and persistent CADs—while supporting growth-enhancing investments and financed by development partners—are nonetheless a source of vulnerability. On the upside, the pursuit of stronger‑than-envisaged fiscal consolidation would accelerate the pace at which fiscal and external buffers are rebuilt.

    Executive Board Assessment[2]

    Executive Directors agreed with the thrust of the staff appraisal. They commended Bhutan’s significant reduction in poverty and inequality during the last decade. Directors welcomed that growth is expected to accelerate over the medium term, boosted by a large hydroproject, higher capital spending, and the slowdown of emigration. Noting downside risks to the outlook, they underscored that tighter fiscal and monetary policies are needed to support the peg, reduce domestic and external imbalances, and rebuild buffers; while carefully managing potential risks stemming from crypto assets operations is also needed. Directors called for structural reforms to foster high-quality jobs in the private sector and diversify the economy, and commended the authorities’ commitment to ecological conservation and climate change action. They noted that continued support from the Fund’s capacity development is important.

    Directors stressed that a gradual and sustained fiscal consolidation, based on revenue mobilization and spending restraint, is essential to rebuild buffers and preserve debt sustainability. They welcomed the authorities’ commitment to a timely implementation of the Goods and Services Tax and to undertaking additional tax and revenue administration measures to achieve the planned fiscal consolidation. Directors recommended strengthening public financial management, public investment management, and domestic debt management.

    Directors underscored that monetary policy needs to be tightened in tandem with fiscal policy to ease balance-of-payment pressures and rebuild reserves. They stressed the need for a well-functioning domestic liquidity management framework to support the monetary policy operation function. Directors encouraged the authorities to phase out existing exchange restrictions once conditions allow. They noted the need to address remaining financial sector vulnerabilities, particularly given the expiration of COVID-related support measures. In this context, they welcomed the new guidelines and regulations to address credit quality and the progress in moving toward risk-based supervision. Directors recommended further enhancing the AML/CFT framework. 

    Directors called for structural reforms to diversify the economy and foster the creation of private sector jobs for high-skilled workers. They recommended improving the business environment, strengthening human capital accumulation, and improving active labor market policies. Directors welcomed efforts toward a new FDI policy, which relaxes some restrictions, including access to foreign currency, local employment requirements, and caps on foreign ownership. They also welcomed the improvements in data quality and called for further progress in this area.

    Directors stressed the need to further strengthen public sector governance, including the Royal Monetary Authority’s (RMA) governance framework and independence as well as the transparency in the operations of state-owned enterprises. Noting the need to mitigate the potential risks stemming from crypto asset operations, they welcomed RMA’s efforts to strengthen its reserve management strategy and the forthcoming audited financial statements of crypto-mining operations.

    Bhutan: Selected Economic Indicators, 2018/19-2028/29

    2018/19

    2019/20

    2020/21

    2021/22

    2022/23

    2023/24

    2024/25

    2025/26

    2026/27

    2027/28

    2028/29

    Act.

    Act.

    Act.

    Act.

    		  

    Projections
                       

     

    (In percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

    National Accounts

    		                

    Nominal GDP (in millions of ngultrums) 1/

    184,660

    187,378

    193,386

    216,239

    		  

    237,322

    261,026

    292,837

    325,812

    357,677

    393,607

    438,906

    Real GDP growth (percent change) 1/

    4.6

    -2.5

    -3.3

    4.8

    		  

    5.0

    5.2

    7.2

    6.4

    5.2

    5.6

    7.2

     

    Prices

    Consumer prices (EoP; percent change)

    2.8

    4.5

    7.4

    6.5

    3.9

    4.8

    4.7

    4.4

    4.0

    4.0

    4.0

    Consumer prices (avg; percent change)

    2.8

    3.0

    8.2

    5.9

    4.6

    4.6

    4.7

    4.5

    4.2

    4.0

    4.0

    GDP deflator (percent change)

    2.2

    4.0

    6.7

    6.7

    4.5

    4.6

    4.6

    4.6

    4.4

    4.2

    4.1

     

    General Government Accounts

    Total revenue and grants

    22.8

    29.1

    30.9

    25.1

    24.2

    24.2

    28.1

    31.5

    30.1

    28.2

    27.3

    Domestic revenue

    18.8

    19.3

    18.5

    18.1

    18.9

    20.3

    19.3

    20.7

    20.7

    20.8

    22.4

    Tax revenue

    14.7

    12.2

    10.7

    12.0

    13.3

    13.4

    14.0

    14.4

    14.8

    14.8

    15.2

    Non-tax revenue

    4.1

    7.2

    7.9

    6.1

    5.6

    6.9

    5.4

    6.3

    5.9

    6.0

    7.3

    Foreign grants

    5.5

    8.5

    7.5

    6.2

    6.0

    3.9

    8.8

    10.8

    9.4

    7.4

    4.9

    Internal and other receipts

    -1.6

    1.3

    4.9

    0.9

    -0.7

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    Total expenditure 2/

    24.2

    30.9

    36.6

    32.1

    29.0

    28.8

    32.5

    34.2

    33.4

    32.1

    32.2

    Current expenditure

    15.0

    19.0

    22.5

    15.9

    14.9

    17.1

    17.0

    17.8

    18.7

    18.8

    19.4

    Capital expenditure

    8.8

    11.8

    14.3

    16.1

    14.2

    11.8

    15.5

    16.4

    14.8

    13.3

    12.8

    Primary expenditure 2/

    23.4

    30.5

    35.7

    30.6

    27.3

    27.2

    30.5

    31.4

    29.9

    28.3

    27.7

    Primary balance

    -0.6

    -1.4

    -4.8

    -5.5

    -3.1

    -3.0

    -2.4

    0.1

    0.2

    -0.1

    -0.4

    Overall balance

    -1.5

    -1.8

    -5.8

    -7.0

    -4.8

    -4.6

    -4.4

    -2.7

    -3.3

    -3.9

    -4.8

    General government debt 3/

    100

    115

    123

    117

    116

    114

    109

    123

    122

    119

    130

    Domestic

    3

    1

    9

    11

    13

    14

    15

    12

    11

    13

    13

    External

    97

    114

    114

    106

    103

    100

    94

    111

    111

    106

    117
                       

    Monetary Sector

     

    		              

    Broad money (M2) growth (percent change)

    5.6

    19.3

    24.4

    9.4

    9.8

    12.6

    13.2

    12.3

    13.0

    12.2

    11.5

    Private credit growth (percent change)

    20.5

    13.3

    6.5

    10.8

    19.3

    9.1

    11.2

    11.1

    11.5

    10.0

    10.2

    Balance of Payments

    Current account balance

    -19.2

    -14.8

    -11.2

    -28.1

    -34.4

    -17.7

    -32.1

    -20.5

    -12.5

    -17.1

    -14.1

    Goods balance

    -15.3

    -12.1

    -6.4

    -21.1

    -25.7

    -12.9

    -26.9

    -15.0

    -6.1

    -10.1

    -8.8

    Hydropower exports

    6.0

    12.1

    13.5

    11.0

    8.7

    6.3

    8.2

    9.5

    9.1

    10.4

    11.9

    Non-hydropower exports

    17.3

    13.0

    13.9

    15.8

    14.9

    15.7

    15.9

    15.8

    17.1

    18.1

    18.8

    Imports of goods

    38.6

    37.1

    33.9

    47.9

    		  

    49.2

    40.2

    55.6

    52.4

    45.6

    42.1

    42.2

    Services balance

    -1.9

    -3.5

    -4.4

    -6.5

    		  

    -6.7

    -3.7

    -2.8

    -3.6

    -3.8

    -3.6

    -3.0

    Primary balance

    -8.4

    -5.7

    -5.7

    -5.5

    -5.0

    -5.6

    -4.5

    -4.2

    -4.6

    -4.9

    -4.8

    Secondary balance

    6.5

    6.6

    5.4

    5.1

    2.9

    4.5

    2.1

    2.2

    2.0

    1.6

    2.5

    Capital account balance

    8.0

    7.1

    3.8

    3.6

    4.1

    3.1

    8.2

    9.8

    8.6

    6.6

    2.9

    Financial account balance

    -4.5

    -15.1

    -9.1

    -8.2

    -10.7

    -15.9

    -24.0

    -20.2

    -19.2

    -13.6

    -13.6

    Net errors and emissions

    10.4

    5.4

    -4.8

    1.2

    11.8

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    Overall balance

    3.7

    12.9

    -3.0

    -15.1

    -7.8

    1.2

    0.1

    9.4

    15.3

    3.2

    2.5

    Gross official reserves (in USD millions)

    1065

    1344

    1332

    840

    574

    606

    604

    969

    1616.3

    1758.9

    1878.7

    (In months of imports)

    12.4

    17.5

    17.9

    7.6

    4.8

    5.8

    3.7

    5.7

    10.0

    10.8

    10.3

    (In months of goods and services imports)

    10.1

    14.2

    15.6

    6.6

    3.9

    4.6

    3.2

    4.8

    8.1

    8.6

    8.4
     

    Memorandum Items

    Hydropower exports growth rate 4/

    -1.2

    105.6

    15.8

    -9.4

    -13.2

    -20.7

    46.2

    30.4

    4.5

    26.1

    27.3

    Non-hydropower exports growth rate 4/

    13.7

    -24.1

    11.0

    26.8

    3.2

    16.2

    13.5

    10.7

    18.8

    16.5

    16.0

    Hydropower good imports 4/

    -15.3

    -3.5

    -21.2

    -11.6

    14.9

    50.8

    18.4

    61.1

    14.0

    3.3

    -19.1

    Non-hydropower good imports 4/

    10.3

    -2.3

    -4.3

    63.8

    12.7

    -13.0

    58.1

    1.5

    -6.1

    1.4

    15.2

    Population in million (eop)

    0.7

    0.7

    0.8

    0.8

    0.8

    0.8

    0.8

    0.8

    0.8

    0.8

    0.8

    External financing gap in US million

    …

    …

    …

    …

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    		  

    [1] Under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country’s economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board.

    [2] At the conclusion of the discussion, the Managing Director, as Chairman of the Board, summarizes the

    views of Executive Directors, and this summary is transmitted to the country’s authorities. An explanation

    of any qualifiers used in summing up can be found here: http://www.IMF.org/external/np/sec/misc/qualifiers.htm.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Pemba Sherpa

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    @IMFSpokesperson

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/09/19/pr-24336-bhutan-imf-concludes-2024-article-iv-consultation

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Moscow Metro Embraces Innovation: QR Code Payment Now Available at Turnstiles

    Source: Moscow Metro

    Moscow’s transportation system is taking a leap forward with the launch of QR code payment via the Faster Payment’s System (FPS) at Metro and Moscow Central Circle (MCC) turnstiles. This innovative service, powered by the Bank of Russia, is also being implemented at 1,700 ticket vending machines across the city.

    Moscow Metro QR code-ready.

    The FPS is already integrated into all regular river transport turnstiles and ground transport validators. This is a convenient and modern service. Now, this innovative payment method is available at ticket booths and vending machines, – said Maksim Liksutov, Moscow’s Deputy Mayor for Transport and Industry.

    To utilize QR code payment, passengers need to generate a QR code in the Moscow Metro app and hold their smartphone screen up to the scanner at the turnstile. The phone should be held 20-25 cm away from the scanner, at a 45-degree angle, with the active QR code facing the scanner. A green signal will appear on the turnstile when the payment is successful.

    Additionally, passengers registered in the mobile app and loyalty program are eligible for a special promotion. They will receive cashback for each payment made through the FPS, credited to their account within one minute.

    This new payment option offers Moscow residents a convenient, modern, and secure way to pay for their transportation needs.

    The FPS was first launched in June 2023 in the ticket offices of all open stations of the Big Circle Line (BCL).

    The Moscow Transport news channel https://t.me/DTRoadEn            

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: 10m holiday travellers expected

    Source: Hong Kong Information Services

    The Immigration Department today said it estimates that around 10.03 million passengers will pass through Hong Kong’s sea, land and air control points during the upcoming National Day festive period from September 28 to October 7.

    In consultation with the Shenzhen General Station of Exit & Entry Frontier Inspection, the department added that it estimates around 8.54 million passengers will transit through land boundary control points.

    The number of outbound and inbound passengers using land boundary control points will be relatively higher on October 1, with around 523,000 and 632,000 passengers respectively.

    Passenger traffic at the Lo Wu Control Point is expected to reach a daily average of about 208,000 passengers, while the Lok Ma Chau Spur Line Control Point and the Shenzhen Bay Control Point are forecast to handle around 185,000 and 118,000 passengers respectively.

    To cope with the anticipated heavy traffic during the festive period, the department has minimised leave for frontline officers for the flexible deployment and operation of extra clearance counters and kiosks. Additional security guards will also be deployed to provide crowd management support.

    Apart from setting up a joint command centre at the Lo Wu Control Point with Police, Customs and the Mass Transit Railway Corporation to closely monitor passenger conditions, the department will establish close communication with Mainland authorities.

    Appropriate traffic diversion plans will also be adopted when necessary to ensure a smooth passenger traffic flow.

    Travellers are advised to plan in advance and avoid making their journeys during busy times.

    They can check the expected busy times at boundary control points on the department’s website and find the estimated waiting times at all land boundary control points via its app.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Save the Children supports thousands of Palestinians, including newborn babies, medically evacuated from Gaza to Egypt, with funding from Community Jameel

    Source: Save the Children

    Thousands of Palestinians, including newborn babies, evacuated from Gaza to Egypt with urgent medical needs are receiving critical support from Save the Children as part of a Community Jameel-funded initiative to support pregnant mothers and children.
    With Community Jameel’s support, Save the Children has procured 20 incubators and other medical supplies and installed these in Ministry of Health neonatal intensive care units in Egypt, where medics are delivering urgent obstetric and paediatric care to mothers and neonates, including preterm babies, who have been evacuated from Gaza.
    Since October 2023, around 5,000 people have been evacuated for treatment outside Gaza, with over 80% receiving care in Egypt, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, and a further 10,000 patients currently in need of medical evacuation for specialised care. This includes newborn babies requiring intensive care whose families are trying to evacuate them following the bombing of specialist maternity units across Gaza.
    The number of evacuations has decreased drastically since the closure of border crossings, with around 2,150 patients unable to leave Gaza since May due to the closure of the Rafah crossing. The health system in Gaza has all but collapsed, with the World Health Organization (WHO) warning that, as the war continues to drive critical medical needs, the number of patients requiring medical evacuation is expected to increase. Relentless bombardment and the ongoing siege have dismantled the healthcare infrastructure, with 19 out of 36 hospitals out of service.
    The WHO also said that there are more than 500,000 women of reproductive age in Gaza who now lack access to essential services including antenatal and postnatal care. Maternity services are only provided at eight out of 17 partially functioning hospitals, and at four field hospitals.
    Since last October, Gaza’s Ministry of Health has estimated that 20,000 babies have been born in the Gaza Strip. Research shows that about 15% of women giving birth are likely to experience complications in pregnancy.
    Matteo Caprotti, Country Director at Save the Children Egypt, said:
    “Repeated so-called “evacuation” orders, access restrictions on medical supplies and fuel and attacks on hospitals and medical points in Gaza are destroying children’s chances to get life-saving treatment. Those who managed to be evacuated to Egypt are suffering from injuries and are haunted by the horrors they have experienced. We’re proud to partner with Community Jameel to provide Palestinian children with the support they have a right to and so critically need.”
    George Richards, Director of at Community Jameel, said:
    “Palestinian mothers in Gaza are giving birth in traumatic, unhygienic and undignified conditions without access to basic care. Some women are self-inducing labour to avoid giving birth on the move, while others are scared to seek vital prenatal care because of fears of bombing, and some have died due to a lack of access to doctors. With Community Jameel’s support, Save the Children is providing lifesaving treatment to pregnant mothers and newborn babies in need of urgent care who are evacuated from Gaza through the Rafah crossing to Egypt.”
    With Community Jameel’s support, Save the Children is also providing equipment and specialist training to Egyptian ambulance paramedics, who receive and transport medical evacuees from Gaza, including training on child safeguarding and psychological first aid and self-care. Faced with a humanitarian emergency where patients, including children, have suffered deprivation of basic necessities, trauma and catastrophic injuries, paramedics require specialist skills to manage their mental health and wellbeing.
    Hakim-, a paramedic who received psychological first aid and safeguarding training from Save the Children as part of the initiative, said:
    “I learned that we must build a secure bridge between us and the children to make them feel safe and help them calm down. You start to examine the child’s condition afterwards because first you must establish trust with the child and help them feel secure. For children who have been subjected to a psychological trauma such as the war in Gaza, treatment will vary based on their age. Children who are younger than three will require special treatment because they cannot fully verbally express themselves, they can only cry. This makes identifying what they need more challenging.”
    Following initial training of about 90 paramedics, the Egyptian ambulance authority has now requested Save the Children to scale up training to its full staff of 16,000 paramedics as they rotate from across Egypt into the North Sinai governorate to support the Gaza crisis response.
    Save the Children in Egypt has been supporting Palestinian children and families who have fled the war in Gaza into Egypt with urgent assistance and support, providing mental health and psychosocial (MHPSS) sessions to children and adults, health services and cash assistance to thousands of stranded Palestinians to support them to meet their basic needs. Since the beginning of the crisis and up until the closure of the Rafah crossing, Save the Children has procured and delivered emergency humanitarian assistance to Gaza through the crossing, including water, medicine, food parcels, shelter kits, baby and dignity kits.
    About Community Jameel:
    Community Jameel advances science and learning for communities to thrive. An independent, global organisation, Community Jameel was launched in 2003 to continue the tradition of philanthropy and community service established by the Jameel family of Saudi Arabia in 1945. CommunityJameel supports scientists, humanitarians, technologists and creatives to understand and address pressing human challenges in areas such as climate change, health and education.
    The work enabled and supported by Community Jameel has led to significant breakthroughs and achievements, including the MIT Jameel Clinic’s discovery of the new antibiotics halicin and abaucin, critical modelling of the spread of COVID-19 conducted by the Jameel Institute at Imperial College London, and a Nobel Prize-winning experimental approach to alleviating global poverty championed by the co-founders of the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab at MIT.
    Community Jameel is separate and distinct from Community Jameel Saudi, the civil society organisation registered with the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Development in Saudi Arabia.

    MIL OSI New Zealand News –

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Remarks by Secretary for Health after receiving vaccinations

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

         â€‹Following are the remarks by the Secretary for Health, Professor Lo Chung-mau, at a media session after receiving vaccinations against seasonal influenza and COVID-19 today (September 24):

    Reporter: What do you think of Professor Dennis Lo possibly becoming the new head of CUHK (Chinese University of Hong Kong)? Is there any progress about the review submitted by the HA (Hospital Authority) Review Committee?

    Secretary for Health: I am still waiting for the official announcement of the Vice-Chancellor and President of the Chinese University of Hong Kong. As far as Professor Dennis Lo is concerned, I know that he is a very renowned scientist involving in genetic molecular diagnostics, especially in pre-natal diagnosis and, more recently, early diagnosis of cancer. I really look forward to the official announcement by the Chinese University of Hong Kong about the next Vice-Chancellor and President. Of course, as far as the Chinese University of Hong Kong is concerned, they have a first-class medical school. Our healthcare service depends very much on the graduates from both existing medical schools, including that of the Chinese University of Hong Kong.

         About the report of the Review Committee, I understand that the Committee has already submitted the report to the Hospital Authority. As the Chairman of the Hospital Authority has just mentioned, they are studying it in detail because there are 30 recommendations on different aspects of the governance and management of the Hospital Authority. The Hospital Authority is studying it in detail and will make certain analysis and further recommendations to the Health Bureau. We will work together to see how we can, based on this report, improve and enhance public healthcare services in Hong Kong. 

    (Please also refer to the Chinese portion of the remarks.)

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Applications for Sale of Home Ownership Scheme Flats 2024 to commence from October 3 onwards (with photos)

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    Applications for Sale of Home Ownership Scheme Flats 2024 to commence from October 3 onwards (with photos)
    Applications for Sale of Home Ownership Scheme Flats 2024 to commence from October 3 onwards (with photos)
    ******************************************************************************************

    The following is issued on behalf of the Hong Kong Housing Authority:      The Hong Kong Housing Authority (HA) announced today (September 24) that the Sale of Home Ownership Scheme (HOS) Flats 2024 (HOS 2024) will open for applications for three weeks, starting from 8am on October 3 until 7pm on October 23.      “Eligible applicants may submit online applications or paper applications for HOS 2024 either in person or by post. The application fee is $290. Balloting is expected to be held in the fourth quarter this year and flat selection is expected to start from the second quarter of 2025. Flats for sale include a total of 7 132 flats in five new HOS developments at a wide variety of locations (including Kai Tak, Yau Tong, Kwun Tong, Tung Chung and Tuen Mun), providing choices of flats of various sizes with saleable areas ranging from about 17.3 square metres to about 47.4 sq m (about 186 square feet to about 510 sq ft) (Annex 1). Large flats, with saleable areas ranging from about 41.1 sq m to about 47.4 sq m (about 442 sq ft to about 510 sq ft), account for about a quarter of the total number of flats. Meanwhile, around 70 rescinded HOS flats (as at July 31, 2024) from developments sold under HOS 2020, HOS 2022 and HOS 2023 (Annex 2), and a new batch of about 350 recovered Tenants Purchase Scheme (TPS) flats are also included,” a spokesman for the HA said. Prices      The HA continues to price HOS flats at an affordable level. The average flat selling prices are set at a 30 per cent discount from the current assessed market values, i.e. for sale at 70 per cent of the assessed market values. The selling prices of flats in the five new HOS developments range from $1.43 million to $4.67 million with an average selling price of about $2.7 million.      “Based on the average flat selling price at about $2.7 million (saleable area of about 35 sq m or about 380 sq ft), the mortgage payment is only $11,600 per month assuming that he/she takes out a mortgage at 90 per cent of the flat price at a term of 30 years and interest rate of 4 per cent. For one to two-person flats, which we believe will be welcomed by young families and young people, the average selling price is about $1.7 million and the mortgage payment is only $7,300 per month. As some banks have just announced to adjust the mortgage interest rate downward, the mortgage payment will also be reduced,” the spokesman said.      The list prices of the unsold TPS flats in the 39 estates range from about $140,000 to $1.28 million, and the discounts range from 79 per cent to 84 per cent of assessed market values. The final price range will depend on the recovered TPS flats that will be put up for sale under in this sale exercise.               Priority for flat selection and quota      “The order of priority for flat selection by eligible applicants will be determined by the application category, quota allocation and ballot results. A quota of 2 900 flats will be set for families applying under the Priority Scheme for Families with Elderly Members and the newly introduced Families with Newborns Flat Selection Priority Scheme (Priority Newborns Scheme). Family applicants with babies born on or after October 25, 2023, will be eligible to apply for the Priority Newborns Scheme if their babies are aged 3 or below on the closing date of the application of HOS 2024. Separately, a quota of 700 flats will be set for one-person applicants,” the spokesman said. Application arrangements      Starting from tomorrow (September 25), application forms, application guides, and sales booklets for HOS flats (sales leaflets for rescinded HOS flats and recovered TPS flats) will be available on the HA/Housing Department (HD)’s designated website for HOS 2024 (www.housingauthority.gov.hk/hos/2024), while printed copies can be obtained during opening hours from the Housing Authority Customer Service Centre (HACSC) in Lok Fu, the office of the HA’s Green Form Subsidised Home Ownership Scheme Sales Unit in Kwun Tong, estate offices and District Tenancy Management Offices of the HA, rental estate offices of the Hong Kong Housing Society and the Home Affairs Enquiry Centres of the Home Affairs Department.      Sales exhibition in respect of HOS developments and TPS estates under HOS 2024 will be available for public viewing at the HACSC in Lok Fu starting from September 25 up to the end of the application period. Related information is also available on the HA/HD’s designated websites.           “Members of the public are reminded to read carefully the application guide before submission of applications. They may call the 24-hour HA Sales Hotline at 2712 8000 on matters concerning applications for the HOS 2024,” the spokesman said. Enforcement of domestic property ownership restriction      The HA reminds applicants, “Starting from HOS 2023, Green Form applicants, same as White Form applicants, should not have owned any domestic property in Hong Kong during the period from 24 months preceding the closing date for submitting the application up to the time of purchase. The HD has set up a data-matching mechanism together with the Land Registry, and over 1 100 applications of the previous HOS sale exercise were identified with records of domestic property ownership in Hong Kong. Relevant applications have been cancelled accordingly, and depending on the circumstances of individual cases, the HA will consider taking prosecution action.”

     
    Ends/Tuesday, September 24, 2024Issued at HKT 19:18

    NNNN

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

  • MIL-OSI: Draganfly Receives Military Purchase Order for its Commander 3XL to be used for logistics within various branches of the U.S. Department of Defense

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Commander 3XL to be used as a primary transport vehicle for the TB2 Aerospace DROPS UAV Cargo POD for autonomous tactical resupply

    Saskatoon Sask, Sept. 24, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Draganfly Inc. (NASDAQ: DPRO) (CSE: DPRO) (FSE: 3U8A) (“Draganfly” or the “Company”), an award-winning, industry-leading drone solutions and systems developer, is pleased to announce that it has received a purchase order from TB2 Aerospace (TB2) for Commander 3XL Drones to be deployed with TB2 Drone Recharging Operational Payload System Pods (DROPS) within the DoD for various mission types. This order represents the beginning of the deployment and scaling of the DROPs system in conjunction with the Draganfly line of drones.

    The Commander 3XL will be utilized to carry out various logistics missions. The Commander 3XL is well suited as a transport vehicle, as is the entire Draganfly drone product line for TB2 Aerospace’s smart logistics PODs, as Draganfly Drones are interoperable, providing operators a variety of aircraft size, payload capacity and weight configurations that utilize common communication, counter electronic warfare options, mission planning software, accessories, payloads and more. TB2 Aerospace and Draganfly have collaborated to integrate TB2’s DROPS Pods on Draganfly’s drones, positioning Draganfly as a primary transport vehicle for TB2 Aerospace deployments within the DoD.

    “We are honored to be doing this exciting work with TB2 and to have been selected for this important work in the military logistics sector,” said Cameron Chell, CEO of Draganfly. “Draganfly thrives at working to provide exceptional capabilities by integrating our line of drones, experience, and technology stack into mission profiles and use cases with our commercial and military partners—and doing it within time frames and at costs that few others can.”

    “We chose Draganfly to be our launch and developmental partner as they have a fantastic series of UAVs,” said Hank Scott, CEO of TB2. “Their aircraft are very stable, easy to fly and set up, and we were impressed by the commonality between their three UAVs. Common controllers, batteries, motors, and parts mean that the DoD can train a Warfighter to operate three different-sized UAVs with a simple, standardized training package. The commonality and interchangeable components will reduce DoD operational and training costs, and standardize the supply chain. Adding the DROPS system will make each of their UAVs a Multi-Mission Payload capable system too. It’s a win-win.”

    About Draganfly

    Draganfly Inc. (NASDAQ: DPRO; CSE: DPRO; FSE: 3U8A) is the creator of quality, cutting-edge drone solutions, software, and AI systems that revolutionize how organizations can do business and serve their stakeholders. Recognized as being at the forefront of technology for over 24 years, Draganfly is an award-winning industry leader serving the public safety, agriculture, industrial inspections, security, mapping, and surveying markets. Draganfly is a company driven by passion, ingenuity, and the need to provide efficient solutions and first-class services to its customers around the world with the goal of saving time, money, and lives.

    For more information on Draganfly, please visit us at www.draganfly.com. For additional investor information, visit:

    Media Contact Email: media@draganfly.com

    Company Contact Email: info@draganfly.com

    About TB2

    TB2 Aerospace from Golden, Colorado, USA is the developer the Drone Recharging Operational Payload System. This system enables a UAV to turn into a Multi-Mission Payload System capable of autonomously capturing, delivering, and recovering Cargo Pod and other payloads such as Weapons Systems and Ground Sensors without the need to place a Warfighter in harm’s way.

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This release contains certain “forward looking statements” and certain “forward-looking ‎‎‎‎information” as ‎‎‎‎defined under applicable securities laws. Forward-looking statements ‎‎‎‎and information can ‎‎‎‎generally be identified by the use of forward-looking terminology such as ‎‎‎‎‎“may”, “will”, “expect”, “intend”, ‎‎‎‎‎“estimate”, “anticipate”, “believe”, “continue”, “plans” or similar ‎‎‎‎terminology. Forward-looking statements ‎‎‎‎and information are based on forecasts of future ‎‎‎‎results, estimates of amounts not yet determinable and ‎‎‎‎assumptions that, while believed by ‎‎‎‎management to be reasonable, are inherently subject to significant ‎‎‎‎business, economic and ‎‎‎‎competitive uncertainties and contingencies. Forward-looking statements ‎‎‎‎include, but are not ‎‎‎‎limited to, statements with respect to the purchase order positioning Draganfly as a primary transport vehicle for TB2 Aerospace deployments within the DoD. Forward-‎‎‎‎looking statements and information are subject to various ‎known ‎‎and unknown risks and ‎‎‎‎‎uncertainties, many of which are beyond the ability of the Company to ‎control or ‎‎predict, that ‎‎‎‎may cause ‎the Company’s actual results, performance or achievements to be ‎materially ‎‎different ‎‎‎‎from those ‎expressed or implied thereby, and are developed based on assumptions ‎about ‎‎such ‎‎‎‎risks, uncertainties ‎and other factors set out here in, including but not limited to: the potential ‎‎‎‎‎‎‎impact of epidemics, ‎pandemics or other public health crises, including the ‎COVID-19 pandemic, on the Company’s business, operations and financial ‎‎‎‎condition; the ‎‎‎successful integration of ‎technology; the inherent risks involved in the general ‎‎‎‎securities markets; ‎‎‎uncertainties relating to the ‎availability and costs of financing needed in the ‎‎‎‎future; the inherent ‎‎‎uncertainty of cost estimates; the ‎potential for unexpected costs and ‎‎‎‎expenses, currency ‎‎‎fluctuations; regulatory restrictions; and liability, ‎competition, loss of key ‎‎‎‎employees and other related risks ‎‎‎and uncertainties disclosed under the ‎heading “Risk Factors“ ‎‎‎‎in the Company’s most recent filings filed ‎‎‎with securities regulators in Canada on ‎the SEDAR ‎‎‎‎website at www.sedar.com and with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) on EDGAR through the SEC’s website at www.sec.gov. The Company undertakes ‎‎‎no obligation to update forward-‎looking ‎‎‎‎information except as required by applicable law. Such forward-‎‎‎looking information represents ‎‎‎‎‎managements’ best judgment based on information currently available. ‎‎‎No forward-looking ‎‎‎‎statement ‎can be guaranteed and actual future results may vary materially. ‎‎‎Accordingly, readers ‎‎‎‎are advised not to ‎place undue reliance on forward-looking statements or ‎‎‎information.‎

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Moscow is ready for the new heating season

    MIL OSI Translation. Region: Russian Federation –

    Source: Moscow Government – Government of Moscow –

    All utility systems, residential buildings, municipal facilities, equipment and machinery are ready for the autumn-winter period. The Moscow Government has considered the issue of the readiness of the capital’s housing stock and housing and communal facilities for the autumn-winter season of 2024/2025.

    Preparations for the heating season for 74 thousand buildings, including 34.6 thousand residential buildings, 8.4 thousand social facilities and 30.8 thousand economic facilities, were carried out from May to August.

    City services carried out preventive inspections and necessary repairs of engineering systems and equipment of boiler houses, central heating stations, large energy facilities, engineering networks of heat, gas, water and electricity supply.

    The existing power reserves allow for a stable and uninterrupted supply of energy resources to consumers, as well as to meet the needs of promising city programs and infrastructure projects.

    In case of possible failures and damage to utility networks, 1,093 emergency teams, 1,229 units of specialized equipment, as well as backup sources of electricity and heat supply have been prepared.

    The required amount of road cleaning, engineering and other specialized equipment, as well as small mechanization tools, will be used to maintain urban areas and facilities. Snow will be disposed of at 51 stationary snow melting points.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please note; This information is raw content directly from the information source. It is accurate to what the source is stating and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    https://vvv.mos.ru/major/themes/11819050/

    EDITOR’S NOTE: This article is a translation. Apologies should the grammar and or sentence structure not be perfect.

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Sudan’s famine-hit Zamzam camp receive vital food, as WFP faces a race against time to save lives

    Source: World Food Programme

    This is a summary of what was said by Leni Kinzli, spokesperson for WFP Sudan (speaking from Nairobi) to whom quoted text may be attributed – at a press briefing In Geneva today.

    Nairobi/Geneva: The United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) is in a race against time to save lives in war-torn Sudan, as 1.5 million people across the country either face famine or are at risk of famine. Without urgent assistance, hundreds of thousands of people could die.

    WFP is working tirelessly to get aid into the hands of people who are facing starvation, and we are saving thousands of lives every single day in Sudan. So far this year, we’ve supported 5.4 million people with life-saving food and nutrition assistance. As we speak, we are urgently getting basic staple foods into the hands of 180,000 people facing famine in Zamzam camp. Vulnerable communities are receiving a package of wheat flour, lentils, oil and salt. 

    Meanwhile in Khartoum, WFP is supporting community kitchens to provide around 175,000 hot meals daily. We’ve also just started in-kind food distributions for around 155,000 people in Karrari and Omdurman where people will receive two-month rations. Around 16,000 people in the metropolitan area received mobile money transfers in July and August, with a higher number planned for this month. WFP has also launched self-registration pilots to expand mobile money transfers to North and South Darfur, South Kordofan, and Gezira State. 

    WFP is taking advantage of the reopening of the Adre border from Chad into the conflict-rattled Darfur region. Trucks carrying vital food and nutrition supplies are crossing that border most days, despite facing delays due to flooded seasonal rivers and muddy road conditions where aid convoys are getting stuck. Since Adre reopened one month ago, we’ve transported 2,800 metric tonnes of food supplies into Darfur region via this route, enough aid for over 250,000 people. Of that, over 100,000 people in risk of famine areas in West Darfur have so far received emergency food and nutrition supplies. 

    Even though we are doing everything we can – it’s just a drop in the ocean compared to the needs, not just in Sudan but regionally. Across Sudan, South Sudan and Chad, around 36 million people have been pushed into hunger because of the ongoing war. 

    I was recently in Adre, Chad – where around 800,000 people have fled to. After enduring unimaginable violence, they are only met with hunger and destitution. Despite receiving food assistance, many are struggling to get by, eating once a day if they are lucky. Like a teenage girl I met called Thuraya who lost both her parents and is solely responsible for her younger siblings, sometimes only able to offer them water instead of a meal. If that is the situation for people in a comparably safe and stable place – it is hard to imagine what people facing famine or at risk of famine in Sudan are going through. I did get a glimpse from the stories I heard of women who had recently fled from ‘risk of famine’ areas. Women like Nadjua. Nadjua, along with other new arrivals, risked their lives to get to safety in Chad because there was nothing left to eat, and all their crops had been destroyed by floods. Others said they could not farm because it was too unsafe to go their fields. Health and nutrition workers in the camp told me that over half of their malnutrition cases in the camp were new arrivals coming from risk of famine areas in Sudan. 

    It is people like Thuraya and Nadjua – who are among tens of millions bearing the brunt of the brutal war in Sudan – that world leaders need to pay attention to. It is for them that they need to step up for during the United Nations General Assembly in New York this week. WFP and other aid agencies cannot tackle these challenges alone. We are doing everything we can, but we cannot stop widespread starvation and hunger-related deaths without the support and attention of the international community, too.

    World leaders need to give this humanitarian catastrophe the attention it requires. That attention then needs to be translated into concerted diplomatic efforts – at the highest levels – to push for a humanitarian ceasefire and ultimately an end the conflict. We also need the international community to step up in demanding that the warring parties guarantee safe and unfettered humanitarian access and adhere to international humanitarian law.  Lastly, we need a surge in funding to address the extraordinary level of need – over $600 million in coming six months, to provide urgent aid to people in the most severe levels of hunger across the region. We would require even more to help everyone who needs it. 

    For over 500 days the Sudanese people have been bearing the brunt of this war, feeling forgotten and abandoned by the world. They are still holding on to hope that one day they can return to their lives. Together, we owe it to the Sudanese people to step up collective action and prevent mass-scale starvation. The hopes of the Sudanese people, their future, are riding on what we do next. We cannot let them down. 

                                             #                           #                            #

    The United Nations World Food Programme is the world’s largest humanitarian organization, saving lives in emergencies and using food assistance to build a pathway to peace, stability and prosperity for people recovering from conflict, disasters and the impact of climate change.

    Follow us on Twitter @wfp_media 

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

  • MIL-OSI Germany: Guardian of the culture of stability – paying tribute to Helmut Schlesinger on his 100th birthday | Guest contribution by Joachim Nagel, President of the Deutsche Bundesbank, in the Börsen-Zeitung

    Source: Deutsche Bundesbank in English

    Helmut Schlesinger turns 100 on 4 September, an anniversary that adds a wholly new numerical dimension to the honorary title of former Bundesbank President. Helmut Schlesinger is certainly no stranger to accolades celebrating his milestone birthdays. The “Börsen-Zeitung”, for one, marked his 80th birthday by writing that his name is synonymous with the pursuit of monetary stability, in a reference to the Bundesbank’s particular culture of stability, in which Mr Schlesinger’s thinking and attitudes resonate to this day.
    Mr Schlesinger’s presidency marked the pinnacle of over 41 years at the Bundesbank and in pursuit of a stable currency. He is rightly regarded as one of the most influential Bundesbankers of all time. The “Börsen-Zeitung” once dubbed him a home-grown product of the Bundesbank, a description that I like a lot. It wrote that Helmut Schlesinger embodied an exceptional period of monetary history, which came to an end as it were with the transition to the euro, characterised, on balance, by the continuity of success.
    During the 1950s and 1960s, in the early days of the Deutsche Mark, Mr Schlesinger followed an unusually steep career as a Bundesbank civil servant, culminating in him heading the Economics and Statistics Department. It was a time in which West Germany was experiencing the economic miracle. Under the fixed exchange rate regime, the Bundesbank led the money and credit sector out of planning and currency reform until it was finally opened and liberalised in 1958. Over the entire period, the Bundesbank succeeded in keeping the Deutsche Mark stable.
    In 1972, Mr Schlesinger was appointed to the Bundesbank’s Directorate and became its chief economist. The circumstances of the time required a complete realignment of monetary policy: the Bretton Woods exchange rate system teetered and finally collapsed in 1973. Western Europe’s exchange rates entered a new equilibrium – first in the European exchange rate arrangement, then in the European Monetary System (EMS). In economic terms, the 1970s were dominated by oil crises and rising unemployment. The combination of high inflation and a stagnant economy led to a new term being coined: stagflation. At that time, the Bundesbank was the first central bank to introduce monetary targeting. Mr Schlesinger played a key role in translating monetarist theory into a monetary policy strategy.
    He always saw the importance of explaining monetary policy, in personal contributions and in the Bundesbank’s Monthly Report, which he edited meticulously and with a sure sense of style. Many at the Bundesbank will remember the notes he made in pencil – he preferred an HB, or medium, hardness grade. As a monetary policymaker, however, some considered him a hard pencil lead, his argumentation consistent, but never simplistic. Time and again, he demonstrated the interaction between economic analysis, theoretical monetary concepts, political decision-making and historical change.
    During the 1970s and 1980s, the Deutsche Mark proved one of the world’s most stable currencies. Mr Schlesinger, who was made Vice-President in 1980, was regarded as the “conscience of stability policy”. US Treasury Secretary James A. Baker III is once said to have accused Schlesinger of seeing inflation under every pebble. This period saw the Deutsche Mark evolve into the anchor currency of the EMS. In 1991, Schlesinger was promoted from Vice-President to President – for a tumultuous 26 months. The Bundesbank used interest rate hikes in a bid to bring down the inflation caused by German reunification. Its stubborn high-interest-rate policy met with criticism within Germany and elsewhere. Many of the EMS partner countries likewise blamed the Bundesbank for the currency crises and rounds of depreciation of 1992‑93. When the United Kingdom was forced to withdraw from the EMS in 1992, UK politicians and the British media levelled serious accusations at Mr Schlesinger. Yet he was never a narrow-minded monetary policy nationalist; he followed a clear monetary compass. When Mr Schlesinger, a passionate hillwalker, was asked on a Himalayan tour about the importance of the oldest Buddhist mantra om mani padme hum, he is said to have answered: keep the money supply tight.
    Nowadays, the monetary targeting he introduced and that proved so successful back then has a different role to play. The structure of the economy has changed fundamentally. Mr Schlesinger himself always underscored that monetary policy strategy had to be adapted to structural change if it was to maintain monetary stability. Another of Mr Schlesinger’s insights also remains as true now as it was then: Stable money not only needs stability-oriented policies from both the government and the central bank. Business, employers and trade unions, and consumers also need to behave appropriately – what you might call a culture of stability. He established this culture of stability not just within the Bundesbank, but throughout west German society and later German society as a whole. It is a culture that is an obligation to all of his successors in the office of Bundesbank President. As the fifth in this line, I am honoured to offer my felicitations: heartfelt congratulations on your 100th birthday, Helmut Schlesinger!
     

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI German News –

  • MIL-OSI Germany: „We’ve ridden out the big wave of inflation” | Interview with F.A.Z.

    Source: Deutsche Bundesbank in English

    The interview was conducted by Christian Siedenbiedel.Translation: Deutsche Bundesbank
    Mr Nagel, is this terrible wave of inflation finally over?
    Yes, I believe this wave of inflation is coming to an end. In its initial phase, it was very challenging, or, as you put it, “terrible”. However, we in the euro area are now well on the way to sustainably achieving our inflation target of 2 %. Based on the Eurosystem projection from June, we should hit this target at the end of 2025. In Germany, the inflation rate of 2 % in August, as measured by the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices, was a little deceptive, if only for purely technical reasons: the year-on-year rate, that is, compared with August 2023, was more favourable than in other months. We’ll be seeing somewhat higher rates again soon. But I think that we’re past the worst of it: we’ve ridden out the big wave.
    Is it still possible that inflation could get out of hand?
    I wouldn’t say so. Provided that we don’t see any more unexpected major shocks, like Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, for example, then inflation should continue to trend towards 2 %. Nevertheless, we shouldn’t celebrate prematurely and start patting ourselves on the back. We haven’t quite hit our target yet. We must remain vigilant and be wary of the risks on the way back to stable prices – that is our job as a central bank.
    How seriously should we be taking the repeated upside surprises to services inflation?
    We are taking the higher inflation for services seriously. After all, services make up nearly half of the basket of consumer goods – that’s a lot. In Germany, the prices for services are still rising by around 4 % each year. Strong growth in wages is especially contributing to this. And we are expecting wage settlements in Germany to remain relatively high over the remaining course of 2024 as well. In annual terms, negotiated wages are likely to rise by around 6 %. While there is some fluctuation in the monthly figures, wage pressures in Germany will remain high overall for the time being.
    Given this state of affairs, do you think the ECB should risk lowering interest rates for a second time in September?
    On the ECB Governing Council, we have stressed that we will not pre-commit to any particular path of interest rates and that we will follow a data-dependent approach to our decisions. Following the interest rate reduction in June, it was a wise move to then wait and see in July and not cut rates any further. For this reason, I will really only be making up my mind at next week’s ECB Governing Council meeting, when I will have a full overview of all the data. As before, we are not flying on autopilot. But I’ll say one thing: I think inflation is making good progress.
    When interest rates were first cut in June, only the Governor of the Oesterreichische Nationalbank, Robert Holzmann, voted against the reduction. After all, the ECB had just been forced to adjust its inflation projections upward. Did you not have any concerns in cutting interest rates?
    No, I had no concerns in June. From my perspective, the interest rate step was justified by the data. They did not cast any doubt on the general direction of travel, that is, the decline in the inflation rate over a longer period of time. And our monetary policy is still tight, even after the cut in interest rates. However, I do, of course, respect the decision of my colleague Robert Holzmann.
    During his time as President, your predecessor Jens Weidmann was often the one who took on the role of the most hawkish member of the ECB Governing Council, the most strident advocate of tight monetary policy. How do you view your role on the Governing Council?
    Comparing two completely different situations is always difficult, and it should be up to others to evaluate my work. Our decisions on the Governing Council are reached as a team – one that strives to make responsible monetary policy for the euro area. I wish to seek out solutions together with my colleagues on the ECB Governing Council, which is why I focus more on the team as a whole than on individuals. I think we have done well on this score over the past two years: we have succeeded in bringing inflation down in a challenging environment.
    There are economists who fear that inflation could settle at a level noticeably above the ECB’s target of 2 % in the medium term. Do you think that the risk of there being structurally higher inflation in future can be completely ruled out?
    In this context, we must clearly distinguish between two things. First, there is the question of whether we are going to see stronger price pressures in the future. That’s something I can’t rule out. We are keeping close tabs on how certain developments are impacting on inflation – these include geopolitical developments, the green transformation and demographic developments. Some academics expect these developments to lead to pressure towards higher inflation rates. A different question altogether is whether inflation will be higher over the long term because of this. And I will be quite clear on this matter: that’s something monetary policymakers hold sway over. Our mandate is price stability.
    Would you then say that the ECB is partly to blame for inflation getting out of hand in recent years?
    I wouldn’t use the word blame in this context – I consider that to be the wrong category. Hindsight is always 20/20. What is certainly true is that at the end of 2021 – before I joined the ECB Governing Council – it was already foreseeable that the inflation rate would rise, and the ECB continued its asset purchases. In January 2022, prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, we already had an inflation rate of 5 %, which was probably due in part to the coronavirus pandemic. As part of the ECB strategy review that has just begun, we will have to examine the role monetary policy measures, such as asset purchases, played during the low inflation period.
    Was it a sticking point that the ECB had committed to tapering asset purchases first before starting to raise interest rates? The economist Markus Brunnermeier mentioned this recently in a discussion with you. As a result, the central bank was unable to respond quickly enough with the interest rate hikes that inflation would have required …
    Back then, it was important to gradually ready financial markets for this reversal. This happened through a series of announcements starting from December 2021. If you look at developments in financial markets, then I’d say that the markets understood this communication and were prepared. The ECB thus succeeded in keeping the negative side effects often associated with changes in monetary policy relatively manageable.
    In your role as Bundesbank President, how do you view the economic situation in Germany at present. Is it being talked down?
    We are navigating an economic situation characterised by strong headwinds. Recent business communications make it clear that certain sectors are under pressure and need to take countermeasures. But I am very much against talking the situation down, because that stimulates exactly those developments that are being lamented.
    What do you mean by headwinds?
    As a large export economy, Germany is particularly hard hit by the geoeconomic changes happening at the moment. Let me give an example: we export especially large amounts to China, meaning that any slowdown in the economy there impacts us particularly hard. The uncertainty that we are seeing among consumers and firms is a factor as well. As a result, investment in machinery, equipment and vehicles fell by 4.1 % between the first and second quarter. Overall, economic output contracted by 0.1 % in the second quarter. That should serve as a wake-up call. We need to put growth front and centre, and that means investment needs to become a more attractive option again.
    So where might impetus to boost growth come from?
    I think the Federal Government’s growth initiative is on the right
    track: getting rid of bracket creep for taxpayers, cutting bureaucratic red tape, making improvements to depreciation on investments, but also bringing in measures to strengthen incentives to work. These are all sound steps. But, with the summer break over now, they actually need to be put into practice. Words have to be followed up with deeds. It is particularly important that politicians give a clear indication of where things are headed. If there is a dependable setting, firms will start investing more again. The debt brake could also stand to undergo moderate reform, in my view. The Bundesbank has put forward some proposals that would create a little more leeway, provided that Germany keeps to the EU’s rules on debt. But now it’s up to politicians to take action.
    How concerned are you by what has happened in Thuringia and Saxony?
    I find it very unsettling. Democracy, freedom, openness, including to people from other countries – these are core values. When these are being called into question, we at the Bundesbank cannot just look on dispassionately, either; we need to take a clear stand. A central bank also has a responsibility to society in this regard. And, as you know, we at the Bundesbank have just had renowned historians probe the history of central banking in Germany between 1924 and 1970. I worry when I read about calls for Germany to exit the European Union or leave the monetary union. That sort of thing jeopardises Germany’s position as a business location; it undermines European cohesion. And it’s harmful to our prosperity.
    The Bundesbank itself is in the midst of profound change. The plan for the new Central Office in Frankfurt was pared back, there are to be no new high-rises, and eight out of 31 branches are set to be closed. Where do things stand – is more on the way?
    Well, that’s already a fair amount that we have planned. This is about making the Bundesbank fit for the future. But it’s also about the Bundesbank’s duty to uphold cost-efficiency. Together with our staff representation committees, we have agreed to let staff work up to 60 % of their hours from home. That has allowed us to significantly downsize our construction plans for Frankfurt. In terms of office space, we can even do without new builds entirely. And we will be designing our future open-plan workspaces in a manner befitting a modern institution. We need to reduce the number of branches because of the trend decline in the use of cash. But the closures will be planned with a long lead time and carried out in a socially responsible way. And we will make sure that the cash supply throughout Germany remains fully intact at all times in future.
    So what do the Bundesbank’s staff have to say when they find out they will no longer have their own office in future under these plans?
    When the employees first set eyes on their new office environment, there’s bound to be plenty who say it is really great. Despite the success of working from home, it has also taught us how important it is to engage with others. This is tremendously helpful in fulfilling the Bundesbank’s tasks, and that often works better in open-plan workspaces than behind closed doors. It will of course still be possible to go into a quiet space for a while when concentrated individual work is required.
    You have also announced your intention to use AI to a greater extent, for example in inflation forecasts. Have there been any successes yet in this regard?
    Yes, we are already trialling quite a few things on this front, for example in the area of short-term inflation forecasting. For very complex problems, in particular – which we at the Bundesbank are often confronted with – AI delivers an initial assessment very quickly. We are also already using it to prepare for our meetings. However, for us it is important that AI remains just a tool. People continue to bear responsibility. We remain in the driving seat.
    The ECB is currently reviewing its monetary policy strategy again. What would you consider to be important here?
    One thing we need to do is to reflect on the past: what was good about the non-standard monetary policy measures, and what was bad? A critical look in the rear-view mirror is important in order to check our use of instruments going forward. Are we well equipped in this context? What topics will be relevant in future?
    Would you also want to talk about the inflation target of 2 %?
    A review of the inflation target is not on our agenda. We have fared very well with our inflation target of 2 %, also of late. I see no reason to change the target in the current situation.
    There was much debate at the time – especially in Germany – about the ECB’s multi-trillion euro asset purchases. Some central bank staff even resigned over the matter. What is your view of this now, after a few years of experience and the realisation of high operating losses at the Bundesbank?
    Obviously I would also rather announce profits, and indeed we did have profits over many years. Now, however, we will have to deal with a few years of losses – and we will manage. This is, incidentally, a topic that we communicated at a very early stage. After all, when monetary policymakers purchase assets on a large scale, it is clear that rising interest rates will impact the central bank balance sheet. And this is indeed what has happened. We had to raise interest rates sharply. As the largest central bank in the Eurosystem, the Bundesbank has to shoulder the greatest burden. In the current year, we could potentially see a magnitude similar to that of 2023. Since we have virtually exhausted our risk provisions, we will have to make use of loss carryforwards in the coming years. Nevertheless, an important aspect for me is that the Bundesbank will return to profitability in future. The Bundesbank’s balance sheet is sound as we have large revaluation reserves. For this reason, there is no need for anyone to worry – the Bundesbank does not need any additional capital.
    And what’s your takeaway for the asset purchases? Should this instrument be abolished?
    One should certainly exercise caution with regard to substantial asset purchases at the zero lower bound. When it comes to safeguarding price stability, it should remain an exceptional instrument for exceptional circumstances. I hope that such exceptional circumstances do not occur again in the foreseeable future. I at least don’t see any signs of this happening. The substantial monetary policy asset purchases were associated with numerous side effects in financial markets. In the strategy review I am calling for a clear delineation of asset purchases at the zero lower bound – we mustn’t overuse this instrument.
    © FAZ. All rights reserved.

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI German News –

  • MIL-OSI China: China’s manned deep-sea submersible Jiaolong arrives in Hong Kong for 1st time

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    HONG KONG, Sept. 24 — China’s research vessel Deep Sea No. 1, carrying manned submersible Jiaolong, received a warm welcome Tuesday in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR), the first time they visited the city.

    The vessel is on a home-bound voyage after completing a scientific mission in the Western Pacific Ocean. During their two-day stay in Hong Kong, scientists on board will give lectures to Hong Kong students and hold a number of international seminars to share the results of this scientific expedition.

    Warner Cheuk, deputy chief secretary for administration of the HKSAR government, said that the visits ahead of the 75th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China fully demonstrated the central government’s care and support for Hong Kong’s marine scientific research development and ecological conservation.

    It is hoped that this event will inspire more young people in Hong Kong to engage in deep-sea research and make planet Earth a better place to live in, he said.

    Wu Changbin, director of China Ocean Mineral Resources R&D Association, congratulated the successful completion of the Western Pacific international voyage scientific expedition, saying that this voyage not only enhanced China’s scientific understanding of deep-sea biodiversity and ecosystems but also contributed important scientific data to global marine scientific research.

    The scientific expedition team of Chinese and foreign scientists set sail on Aug. 10 from Qingdao, east China’s Shandong Province, and made a total of 18 dives in the Western Pacific. It was the first time that foreign scientists have carried out deep-sea scientific research on Jiaolong.

    MIL OSI China News –