Category: Transport

  • MIL-OSI USA: NASA’s LRO Views ispace HAKUTO-R Mission 2 Moon Lander Impact Site

    Source: NASA

    On June 11, NASA’s LRO (Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter) captured photos of the site where the ispace Mission 2 SMBC x HAKUTO-R Venture Moon (RESILIENCE) lunar lander experienced a hard landing on June 5, 2025, UTC.

    RESILIENCE was launched on Jan. 15 on a privately funded spacecraft.
    LRO’s right Narrow Angle Camera (one in a suite of cameras known as LROC) captured the images featured here from about 50 miles above the surface of Mare Frigoris, a volcanic region interspersed with large-scale faults known as wrinkle ridges.
    The dark smudge visible above the arrow in the photo formed as the vehicle impacted the surface, kicking up regolith — the rock and dust that make up Moon “soil.” The faint bright halo encircling the site resulted from low-angle regolith particles scouring the delicate surface.

    LRO is managed by NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland, for the Science Mission Directorate at NASA Headquarters in Washington. Launched on June 18, 2009, LRO has collected a treasure trove of data with its seven powerful instruments, making an invaluable contribution to our knowledge about the Moon. NASA is returning to the Moon with commercial and international partners to expand human presence in space and bring back new knowledge and opportunities.
    More on this story from Arizona State University’s LRO Camera website
    Media ContactKaren Fox / Molly WasserHeadquarters, Washington202-358-1600karen.c.fox@nasa.gov / molly.l.wasser@nasa.gov
    Lonnie ShekhtmanNASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, Md.lonnie.shekhtman@nasa.gov

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: NASA Aircraft to Make Low-Altitude Flights in Mid-Atlantic, California

    Source: NASA

    From Sunday, June 22 to Wednesday, July 2, two research aircraft will make a series of low-altitude atmospheric research flights near Philadelphia, Baltimore, and some Virginia cities, including Richmond, as well as over the Los Angeles Basin, Salton Sea, and Central Valley in California.

    Pilots will operate the aircraft at altitudes lower than typical commercial flights, executing specialized maneuvers such as vertical spirals between 1,000 and 10,000 feet, circling above power plants, landfills, and urban areas. The flights will also include occasional missed approaches at local airports and low-altitude flybys along runways to collect air samples near the surface.
    The East Coast flights will be conducted between June 22 and Thursday, June 26 over Baltimore and near Philadelphia, as well as near the Virginia cities of Hampton, Hopewell, and Richmond. The California flights will occur from Sunday, June 29 to July 2.
    The flights, part of NASA’s Student Airborne Research Program (SARP), will involve the agency’s Airborne Science Program’s P-3 Orion aircraft (N426NA) and a King Air B200 aircraft (N46L) owned by Dynamic Aviation and contracted by NASA. The program is an eight-week summer internship program that provides undergraduate students with hands-on experience in every aspect of a scientific campaign.
    The P-3, operated out of NASA’s Wallops Flight Facility in Virginia, is a four-engine turboprop aircraft outfitted with a six-instrument science payload to support a combined 40 hours of SARP science flights on each U.S. coast. The King Air B200 will fly at the same time as the P-3 but in an independent flight profile. Students will assist in the operation of the science instruments on the aircraft to collect atmospheric data.
    “The SARP flights have become mainstays of NASA’s Airborne Science Program, as they expose highly competitive STEM students to real-world data gathering within a dynamic flight environment,” said Brian Bernth, chief of flight operations at NASA Wallops.
    “Despite SARP being a learning experience for both the students and mentors alike, our P-3 is being flown and performing maneuvers in some of most complex and restricted airspace in the country,” said Bernth. “Tight coordination and crew resource management is needed to ensure that these flights are executed with precision but also safely.”
    For more information about Student Airborne Research Program, visit:
    https://science.nasa.gov/earth-science/early-career-opportunities/student-airborne-research-program/
    By Olivia LittletonNASA’s Wallops Flight Facility, Wallops Island, Va.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: NASA History News and Notes – Summer 2025

    Source: NASA

    In the summer 2025 issue of the NASA History Office’s News & Notes newsletter, examples of leadership and critical decision-making in NASA’s history form the unifying theme. Among the topics discussed are NASA’s Shuttle-Centaur program, assessing donations to the NASA Archives, how the discovery of the first exoplanet orbiting a sun-like star catalyzed NASA’s exoplanet program, and Chief of the Medical Operations Office Charles A. Berry’s decisions surrounding crew health when planning the Project Gemini missions.

    Volume 42, Number 2Summer 2025

    From the Chief Historian
    By Brian Odom
    NASA’s is a history marked by critical decisions. From George Mueller’s 1963 decision for “all up” testing of the Saturn V rocket to Michael Griffin’s 2006 decision to launch a final servicing mission to the Hubble Space Telescope, the agency has continually met key inflection points with bold decisions. These choices, such as the decision to send a crewed Apollo 8 mission around the Moon in December 1968, stand at the center of the agency’s national legacy and promote confidence in times of crisis.  Continue Reading
    Shuttle-Centaur: Loss of Launch Vehicle Redundancy Leads to Discord
    By Robert Arrighi
    “Although the Shuttle/Centaur decision was very difficult to make, it is the proper thing to do, and this is the time to do it.” With those words on June 19, 1986, NASA Administrator James Fletcher canceled the intensive effort to integrate the Centaur upper stage with the Space Shuttle to launch the Galileo and Ulysses spacecraft. The decision, which was tied to increased safety measures following the loss of Challenger several months earlier, brought to the forefront the 1970s decision to launch all U.S. payloads with the Space Shuttle. Continue Reading

    A View into NASA’s Response to the Apollo 1 Tragedy
    By Kate Mankowski
    On January 27, 1967, Mission AS-204 (later known as Apollo 1) was conducting a simulated countdown when a fire suddenly broke out in the spacecraft, claiming the lives of astronauts Virgil I. “Gus” Grissom, Edward H. White, and Roger B. Chaffee. The disaster highlighted the risks that come with spaceflight and the work that still needed to be accomplished to meet President Kennedy’s challenge of going to the Moon before the end of the decade. With the complexity of the Apollo spacecraft, discerning the cause of the fire proved to be incredibly difficult. Continue Reading
    The Fight to Fund AgRISTARS
    By Brad Massey
    Robert MacDonald, the manager of NASA’s Large Area Crop Inventory Experiment (LACIE), was not pleased in January 1978 after he read a draft copy of the U.S. General Accounting Office’s (GAO’s) “Crop Forecasting by Satellite: Progress and Problems” report. The draft’s authors argued that LACIE had not achieved its goals of accurately predicting harvest yields in the mid-1970s. Therefore, congressional leaders should “be aware of the disappointing performance of LACIE to date when considering the future direction of NASA’s Landsat program and the plans of the Department of Agriculture.” Continue Reading
    The Hubble Space Telescope: The Right Project at the Right Time
    By Jillian Rael
    This year, NASA commemorates 35 years of the Hubble Space Telescope’s study of the cosmos. From observations of never-before-seen phenomena within our solar system, to the discovery of distant galaxies, the confirmation of the existence of supermassive black holes, and precision measurements of the universe’s expansion, Hubble has made incredible contributions to science, technology, and even art. Yet, for all its contemporary popularity, the Hubble program initially struggled for congressional approval and consequential funding. For its part, NASA found new ways to compromise and cut costs, while Congress evaluated national priorities and NASA’s other space exploration endeavors against the long-range value of Hubble. Continue Reading

    Appraisal: The Science and Art of Assessing Donations to the NASA Archives
    By Alan Arellano
    The major functions of an archivist center include appraising, arranging, describing, preserving, and providing access to historical records and documents. While together these are pillars of archival science, they are more of an art than a science in their application, fundamentally necessitating skilled decision making. Throughout the NASA archives, staff members make these decisions day in and day out. Continue Reading
    Orbit Shift: How 50 Pegasi b Helped Pull NASA Toward the Stars in the 1990s
    By Lois Rosson
    On October 20, 1995, the New York Times reported the detection of a distant planet orbiting a Sun-like star. The star, catalogued as 51 Pegasi by John Flamsteed in the 18th century, was visible to the naked eye as part of the constellation Pegasus—and had wobbled on its axis just enough that two Swiss astronomers were able to deduce the presence of another object exerting its gravitational pull on the star’s rotation. The discovery was soon confirmed by other astronomers, and 51 Pegasi b was heralded as the first confirmed exoplanet orbiting a star similar to our own Sun. Continue Reading

    Four, Eight, Fourteen Days: Charles A. Berry, Gemini, and the Critical Steps to Living and Working in Space
    By Jennifer Ross-Nazzal
    In 1963, critical decisions had to be made about NASA’s upcoming Gemini missions if the nation were to achieve President John F. Kennedy’s lunar goals. Known as the bridge to Apollo, Project Gemini was critical to landing a man on the Moon by the end of the decade and returning him safely to Earth. The project would demonstrate that astronauts could rendezvous and dock their spacecraft to another space vehicle and give flight crews the opportunity to test the planned extravehicular capabilities in preparation for walking on the lunar surface on future Apollo flights. Perhaps most importantly, Gemini had to show that humans could live and work in space for long periods of time, a fiercely debated topic within and outside of the agency.  Continue Reading

    Imagining Space: The Life and Art of Robert McCall
    By Sandra Johnson
    As we walked into Bob McCall’s Arizona home, it quickly became obvious that two talented and creative people lived there. Tasked with interviewing one of the first artists to be invited to join the NASA Art Program, our oral history team quickly realized the session with McCall would include a unique perspective on NASA’s history. We traveled to Arizona in the spring of 2000 to capture interviews with some of the pioneers of spaceflight and had already talked to an eclectic group of subjects in their homes, including a flight controller for both Gemini and Apollo, an astronaut who had flown on both Skylab and Space Shuttle missions, a former NASA center director, and two former Women’s Airforce Service Pilots (WASPs) who ferried airplanes during WWII. However, unlike most interviews, the setting itself provided a rare glimpse into the man and his inspiration.  Continue Reading
    Inside the Archives: Biomedical Branch Files
    By Alejandra Lopez
    The Biomedical Branch Files (1966–2008) in the Johnson Space Center archives showcase the inner workings of a NASA office established to perform testing to provide a better understanding of the impacts of spaceflight on the human body. Ranging from memos and notes to documents and reports, this collection is an invaluable resource on the biomedical research done with NASA’s Apollo, Skylab, Space Shuttle, and Space Station projects. Files in the collection cover work done by groups within the branch such as the Toxicology, Microbiology, Clinical, and Biochemistry Laboratories. It also reveals the branch’s evolution and changes in its decision-making process over the years. Continue Reading

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Security: New Orleans Man Guilty of Third Drug Trafficking Offense and Multiple Firearms Offenses

    Source: US FBI

    NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA –ODINE DOMINICK (“DOMINICK”), age 34, a resident of New Orleans, pleaded guilty on June 10, 2025, the morning his jury trial was set to begin, before U.S. District Judge Lance M. Africk to possession with the intent to distribute more than 40 grams of fentanyl and a quantity of marijuana, in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Sections 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), and 841(b)(1)(D); possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 924(c)(1)(A)(i); and being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(8). 

    According to court documents, in the fall of 2023, law enforcement officers observed a photograph of DOMINICK with a rifle magazine in his waistband and a video of DOMINICK inside of a stolen car with a handgun.  On December 14, 2023, the New Orleans Police Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation executed a search warrant at DOMINICK’s residence and found over 100 grams of a mixture of fentanyl and heroin; vacuum sealed bags of marijuana weighing over a kilogram; eight digital scales; drug trafficking supplies; 400 rounds of various calibers of ammunition; and a loaded Glock Model 23 .40 caliber handgun with an extended magazine.

    Prior to his most recent arrest, DOMINICK had already been convicted of conspiracy to distribute more than 100 grams of heroin, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, attempted possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in Orleans Parish, and being a felon in possesion of a firearm, in St. Bernard Parish.

    Because of his prior federal drug trafficking conviction, DOMINICK was charged with a sentencing enhancement.  As to Count 1, he faces a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years and up to life in prison, up to an $8,000,000 fine, and at least eight years of supervised release.  As to Count 2, he faces a mandatory minimum sentence of five years and up to life in prison, which must run consecutively to all other sentences, up to a $250,000 fine, and up to five years of supervised release.  As to Count 3, he faces up to 15 years in prison, up to a $250,000 fine, and up to three years of supervised release.  Each count also carries a mandatory special assessment fee of $100.

    This case is part of Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN), a program bringing together all levels of law enforcement and the communities they serve to reduce violent crime and gun violence, and to make our neighborhoods safer for everyone.  On May 26, 2021, the Department launched a violent crime reduction strategy strengthening PSN based on these core principles: fostering trust and legitimacy in our communities, supporting community-based organizations that help prevent violence from occurring in the first place, setting focused and strategic enforcement priorities, and measuring the results.

    The case was investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the New Orleans Police Department.  It is being prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorney David Berman of the Violent Crime Unit.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: New Orleans Man Guilty of Being Felon in Possession of Firearms Stemming from New Orleans East Shooting

    Source: US FBI

    NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA – Acting U.S. Attorney Michael M. Simpson announced today that DANTRELL MCZEAL (“MCZEAL”), age 34, a resident of New Orleans, pleaded guilty on May 27, 2025 to being a felon in possession of firearms, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(8).  MCZEAL faces a maximum term of imprisonment of fifteen (15) years, a fine of up to $250,000.00, a period of supervised release of up to 3 years, and a mandatory special assessment fee of $100.00.

    The Honorable District Judge Darrel James Papillion will sentence MCZEAL on September 9, 2025.

    According to court documents, in July 2022, MCZEAL and an unknown individual, were involved in a shootout with each other in the parking lot of a gas station located on the corner of Downman Road and Morrison Road in New Orleans.  MCZEAL was shot in the leg during the gunfire exchange and the unknown individual fled in his vehicle.  MCZEAL also fled, but lost control of his vehicle, and struck a light pole.  MCZEAL was observed limping away from his vehicle while in possession of a firearm.

    New Orleans Police Department officers later recovered a Glock Model 30GEN4, .45 caliber semi-automatic pistol from inside MCZEAL’s vehicle.  While on the scene, officers also observed a trail of blood outside of the vehicle leading to a nearby residence.  Later, officers received a call from a nearby resident stating that an unknown male, later identified as MCZEAL, had entered her residence.  The resident reported that MCZEAL had a firearm, later determined to be a Palmetto State Armory Model PA-15, .223 REM/5.56 x 45 milli-meter semi-automatic rifle.  Federal law prohibits convicted felons, such as MCZEAL , from possessing firearms.

    This case is part of Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN), a program bringing together all levels of law enforcement and the communities they serve to reduce violent crime and gun violence, and to make our neighborhoods safer for everyone.  On May 26, 2021, the Department launched a violent crime reduction strategy strengthening PSN based on these core principles: fostering trust and legitimacy in our communities, supporting community-based organizations that help prevent violence from occurring in the first place, setting focused and strategic enforcement priorities, and measuring the results.

    The case was investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the New Orleans Police Department.  It is being prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorney Brittany Reed of the Violent Crime Unit.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI USA: Cornyn, Colleagues Introduce Resolution Recognizing Juneteenth

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Texas John Cornyn
    News
    June 18, 2025
    WASHINGTON – Today, U.S. Senator John Cornyn (R-TX), who successfully led the effort in Congress to make Juneteenth a federal holiday, introduced a bipartisan Senate resolution along with 31 of his Senate colleagues recognizing Juneteenth Independence Day. Text is below, and you can view the full resolution here.
    “Whereas news of the end of slavery did not reach the frontier areas of the United States, in particular the State of Texas and the other Southwestern States, until months after the conclusion of the Civil War, more than 21⁄2 years after President Abraham Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation on January 1, 1863;
    Whereas, on June 19, 1865, Union soldiers, led by Major General Gordon Granger, arrived in Galveston, Texas, with news that the Civil War had ended and the enslaved were free;
    Whereas African Americans who had been slaves in the Southwest celebrated June 19, commonly known as “Juneteenth National Independence Day,” as inspiration and encouragement for future generations;
    Whereas African Americans from the Southwest have continued the tradition of observing Juneteenth National Independence Day for more than 150 years;
    Whereas Juneteenth National Independence Day began as a holiday in the State of Texas and is now a Federal holiday that is celebrated in all 50 States and the District of Columbia as a special day of observance in recognition of the emancipation of all slaves in the United States;
    Whereas Juneteenth National Independence Day celebrations have been held to honor African-American freedom while encouraging self-development and respect for all cultures;
    Whereas the faith and strength of character demonstrated by former slaves and the descendants of former slaves remain an example for all people of the United States, regardless of background, religion, or race;
    Whereas slavery was not officially abolished until the ratification of the 13th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States in December 1865; and
    Whereas, over the course of its history, the United States has grown into a symbol of democracy and freedom around the world: Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved, That the Senate—
    (1)   commemorates June 19, 2025, as “Juneteenth National Independence Day;”
    (2)   recognizes the historical significance of Juneteenth National Independence Day to the United States;
    (3)   supports the continued nationwide celebration of Juneteenth National Independence Day to provide an opportunity for the people of the United States to learn more about the past and to better understand the experiences that have shaped the United States; and
    (4)   recognizes that the observance of the end of slavery is part of the history and heritage of the United States.”
    Senators Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY), Ted Cruz (R-TX), Bill Cassidy (R-LA), Catherine Cortez Masto (D-NV), Susan Collins (R-ME), Angus King (I-ME), Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), Kevin Cramer (R-ND), Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), Raphael Warnock (D-GA), Mark Kelly (D-AZ), Ron Johnson (R-WI), Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI), Maria Cantwell (D-WA), Mazie Hirono (D-HI), Cindy Hyde-Smith (R-MS), John Hickenlooper (D-CO), Tim Scott (R-SC), John Hoeven (R-ND), Roger Wicker (R-MS), Todd Young (R-IN), Marsha Blackburn (R-TN), Jim Justice (R-WV), Katie Britt (R-AL), Bernie Sanders (I-VT), Tim Kaine (D-VA), Dick Durbin (D-IL), Ron Wyden (D-OR), Jeff Merkley (D-OR), Alex Padilla (D-CA), and Cory Booker (D-NJ) joined the resolution.
    Background:
    Sen. Cornyn has been a leader in introducing a resolution honoring Juneteenth each year since 2011. In 2021, Sen. Cornyn’s legislation to establish Juneteenth as a federal holiday was signed into law. He also authored a bill with the late Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee (TX-18) for a federal study of a National Emancipation Trail from Galveston to Houston, following the path of slaves freed on June 19, 1865 to spread the news, which was signed into law in 2020.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Macro-financial assistance to Egypt – P10_TA(2025)0125 – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

    Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 212(2) thereof,

    Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

    After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,

    Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure(1),

    Whereas:

    (1)  Relations between the Union and the Arab Republic of Egypt (‘Egypt’) are developed within the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Arab Republic of Egypt, of the other part(2) (the ‘Association Agreement’), in force since 2004. The Union and Egypt adopted the latest EU-Egypt Partnership Priorities (2021-2027) at the ninth EU-Egypt Association Council, established by the Association Agreement, on 19 June 2022 (the ‘Partnership Priorities’). The Partnership Priorities reconfirm the joint aim of addressing common challenges facing the Union and Egypt, promoting joint interests and guaranteeing long-term stability and sustainable development on both sides of the Mediterranean. The shared commitment to the universal values of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights continues to underpin the Partnership Priorities, as is also reflected in the EU-Egypt Multi-Annual Indicative Programme for the period of 2021-2027 (the ‘EU-Egypt MIP’).

    (2)  The Partnership Priorities reflect the shared commitment of the Union and Egypt to reinforce cooperation in support of Egypt’s ‘Sustainable Development Strategy Vision 2030’ and the Union’s determination to act on a renewed impetus to strengthen the partnership with its Southern Neighbourhood. In particular, in the conclusions of the European Council of 10-11 December 2020, the Union identified a democratic, more stable, greener and more prosperous Southern Neighbourhood as a strategic priority. The EU Agenda for the Mediterranean, and the Economic and Investment Plan for the Southern Neighbours set out in the Joint Communication of the Commission and of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 9 February 2021 entitled ‘Renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood: A new Agenda for the Mediterranean’ present the Union’s objectives of achieving long-term, sustainable socioeconomic recovery and resilience and of advancing the twin green and digital transitions in the region.

    (3)   On 17 March 2024, Egypt and the Union jointly decided to upgrade their relations to a strategic and comprehensive partnership, based on the values of equity and mutual respect and trust in order to strengthen their common stability, peace and prosperity.

    (4)  In line with the Partnership Priorities, the Union and Egypt are committed to ensuring accountability, the rule of law, full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as promoting democracy, gender equality and equal opportunities as constitutional rights of all their citizens. Those commitments contribute to the advancement of the partnership and to Egypt’s sustainable social and economic development, good governance and socio-economic stability. The increased and constructive engagement between the Union and Egypt in the last period has opened the path to more meaningful dialogue on human rights-related issues. In the framework of the Association Agreement, the subcommittee on Political Matters, Human Rights and Democracy – International and Regional issues ▌ and the Association Committee provide the institutional platforms to exchange views on an array of human rights issues, which the Union would like to continue and build upon. The steady future improvement of the human rights situation in Egypt in key areas related to civil, political, economic, social rights and fundamental freedoms regularly addressed by both partners in bilateral and international fora will have a positive impact on relations between the Union and Egypt.

    (5)  Assistance to Egypt is funded mainly through the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI-GE), established by Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council(3). The Union’s indicative allocation for Egypt under the NDICI-GE for the first period (2021-2024) of the EU-Egypt MIP was EUR 240 million. This is in addition to the ongoing cooperation portfolio of EUR 1,3 billion and other budget support and emergency measures in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine amounting to EUR 307 million. The Partnership Priorities for 2021-2027 are reflected in the EU-Egypt MIP, which has been prepared in close consultation with all relevant stakeholders, and cover three broad areas: (i) Sustainable Modern Economy and Social Development; (ii) Partnering in Foreign Policy, and (iii) Enhancing Stability. The NDICI-GE replaces the European Neighbourhood Instrument under which the Union’s bilateral assistance to Egypt for the period 2014-2020 amounted to EUR 756 million.

    (6)  The Union recognises Egypt’s key role for regional security and stability, and has a strong interest in preventing short-term economic instability in Egypt that could have broader consequences and a negative impact on the geopolitical landscape. Terrorism, organised crime, such as human trafficking, irregular migration, disinformation and conflicts, are common threats against common security and the social fabric of nations across both sides of the Mediterranean. The Union acknowledges Egypt’s contribution to addressing such issues. Furthermore, energy security is one of the most pressing challenges facing countries on both sides of the Mediterranean. Energy cooperation between the Union and Egypt could not only offer a source of economic prosperity for the region, but also strengthen energy security by diversifying energy supplies and encouraging regional collaboration. Therefore, the Union and Egypt have a common interest in strengthening cooperation highlighted in the Partnership Priorities, in full compliance with international law, including human rights and international humanitarian law, as well as in promoting joint interests and addressing common challenges.

    (7)  Recalling the global and regional geopolitical challenges, such as the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, resulting from the aftermath of the Hamas terrorist attacks across Israel on 7 October 2023, the escalating tensions in the Horn of Africa and the safety of navigation in the Red Sea, as well as migratory pressure from the conflict in Sudan, uncertainties in Syria, the instability in Libya, Egypt’s role as a host to large numbers of refugees and migrants, and the strategic importance of Egypt as the largest country in the region and a pillar of stability for the whole Middle East, the Union has embarked on a strategic and comprehensive partnership with Egypt as outlined in the Joint Declaration of the Union and Egypt, signed in Cairo on 17 March 2024 (the ‘Joint Declaration’).

    (8)  The objective of the strategic and comprehensive partnership with Egypt is to elevate the political relations of the Union and Egypt to a strategic partnership and to enable Egypt to fulfil its key role of providing stability in the region, the Middle East and North Africa. That partnership aims to contribute to supporting Egypt’s macroeconomic resilience and enabling the implementation of ambitious socio-economic reforms in a manner that complements and reinforces the reform process provided for under the International Monetary Fund (IMF) programme for Egypt. As outlined in the Joint Declaration, the strategic and comprehensive partnership will address a wide set of policy measures clustered across six pillars of intervention, namely political relations, economic stability, investment and trade, migration, security and law enforcement cooperation, demography and human capital. The strategic and comprehensive partnership should be developed in line with initiatives at Union and Member State level.

    (9)  Underpinning the strategic and comprehensive partnership is a financial package of EUR 7,4 billion consisting of short- and longer-term support for the macro-fiscal and socio-economic reform agenda, as well as increased amounts available to support investments in Egypt and targeted support for the implementation of the different strategic priorities, which include renewable energy and migration, amongst others. Part of the support package is the Union’s macro-financial assistance package of up to EUR 5 billion in loans, composed of two macro-financial assistance operations, a short-term operation of a maximum amount of EUR 1 billion and a medium-term operation of a maximum amount of EUR 4 billion. That financial package also includes financial instruments, such as guarantees and blending instruments, aimed to mobilise public and private investments with the objective of generating substantial new investments with positive economic impacts which can benefit all Egyptians. This will be complemented by programmes to support specific priorities under the strategic and comprehensive partnership through individual projects and technical assistance implemented under the NDICI-GE.

    (10)  Egypt’s macro-fiscal situation has faced significant challenges and has deteriorated substantially over recent months, as external pressures have intensified and public debt has increased further, with substantial downside risks to the economic outlook persisting. The repercussions of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the geopolitical tensions and conflicts in the Middle East have led to protracted capital outflows and lower foreign currency receipts, in particular due to sharply easing income from tourism, Suez Canal proceeds, and gas production amid volatility of confidence among foreign investors. This is particularly challenging in Egypt’s difficult fiscal situation, which is characterised by constant fiscal deficits and high and growing debt-to-GDP ratios. Despite that difficult external context, in 2024 Egypt was able to implement reforms, such as the unification of exchange rates and making progress in tightening monetary policy, to help preserve its macroeconomic stability.

    (11)  Egypt’s economic and financial situation has been supported by several disbursing IMF programmes since 2016. Those are a three-year Extended Fund Facility of USD 12 billion adopted in 2016, emergency financial assistance under the Rapid Financing Instrument of USD 2,8 billion adopted in 2020, a one-year Stand-By Arrangement of USD 5,2 billion adopted in 2020, and a four-year Extended Fund Facility of USD 3 billion adopted in 2022 and augmented to USD 8 billion in 2024. Egypt made considerable reform efforts during the first part of its engagement with the IMF in 2016-2021. Reforms included a significant currency devaluation, accompanied by monetary policy reforms focused on an inflation target corridor. Fuel subsidy reform was coupled with a significant strengthening of a targeted social transfer system. Public finance management was strengthened by developing medium-term revenue and debt management strategies. The Egyptian authorities also began improving the governance of state-owned enterprises.

    (12)  After the adoption of a follow-up IMF programme in December 2022, reform progress was less noticeable, although Egypt has implemented steps to level the playing field between public and private companies through a law to abolish the tax privileges of state-owned enterprises, albeit with exemptions on the basis of national security, and through the adoption of a state ownership policy, aimed to reduce the presence of the State in the economy, which remains large and distorting despite recent limited progress, and clarifying the rationale of continued State involvement in certain strategic sectors. However, Egypt did not implement its commitment to make the currency durably flexible in 2023, leading to a largely stable official exchange rate and a substantial parallel currency market with a significantly depreciated and highly volatile exchange rate. That fragmentation weighed heavily on foreign investment and domestic business activity.

    (13)  Egypt re-engaged with the IMF in early 2024, and reached a staff-level agreement on 6 March 2024 on a revamped extended fund facility programme scaled up to USD 8 billion. The new programme was adopted by a Decision of the IMF Executive Board on 29 March 2024, and it aims to address the areas of: (i) credible exchange rate flexibility; (ii) sustainable tightening of monetary policy; (iii) fiscal consolidation to preserve debt sustainability; (iv) a new framework to rein in infrastructure spending; (v) provision of adequate levels of social spending to protect vulnerable groups, including from rises in the cost of living and energy price; and (vi) implementation of the state ownership policy and reforms to level the playing field with a view to promoting the development of the private sector in the economy. Together with the signature of the staff-level agreement, Egypt also enacted a flexibilisation of the exchange rate, and raised the central bank’s key policy rate by a sizeable 600 basis points, in line with the priorities of the IMF programme. Staff-level agreement on the fourth review of Egypt’s economic reform programme was reached in December 2024, and the IMF Executive Board completed the review in March 2025.

    (14)  In view of a worsening economic situation and outlook clouded by substantial downside risks in relation to ongoing external shocks, Egypt requested complementary macro-financial assistance from the Union on 12 March 2024.

    (15)  Given that Egypt is a country covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy, it should be considered to be eligible to receive macro-financial assistance from the Union.

    (16)  The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be an exceptional instrument of untied and undesignated balance-of-payments support, which aims to address Egypt’s immediate external financing needs, and it should underpin the implementation of a policy programme containing strong immediate adjustment and structural reform measures designed to improve Egypt’s balance-of-payments position.

    (17)  Given that there is still a significant residual external financing gap in Egypt’s balance of payments over and above the resources provided by the IMF and other multilateral institutions and regional partners, the Union’s macro-financial assistance to be provided to Egypt is, under the current exceptional circumstances, considered to be an appropriate response to Egypt’s request to the Union to support Egypt’s economic stabilisation, in conjunction with the IMF programme. The Union’s EUR 5 billion macro-financial assistance package, including the macro-financial assistance of up to EUR 4 billion under this Decision, seeks to support the economic stabilisation and the structural reform agenda of Egypt, supplementing resources made available under the IMF programme. The first part of the package, a macro-financial assistance loan of EUR 1 billion, was disbursed in December 2024 after a positive assessment by the Commission.

    (18)  The Union’s macro-financial assistance should aim to support the restoration of a sustainable external financing situation for Egypt, thereby supporting its economic and social development. By fostering stability and prosperity in its Neighbourhood, the provision of the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Egypt could also contribute to the Union’s growth and economic resilience.

    (19)  The determination of the amount of the Union’s macro-financial assistance should be based on a complete quantitative assessment of Egypt’s residual external financing needs and should take into account Egypt’s capacity to finance itself with its own resources, in particular the international reserves at its disposal. The Union’s macro-financial assistance is part of an international joint effort, effectively complementing the programmes and resources provided by the IMF and the World Bank. The determination of the amount of the assistance should also take into account expected financial contributions from multilateral donors and the need to ensure fair burden sharing between the Union and other donors, as well as the pre-existing deployment of the Union’s other external financing instruments in Egypt and the added value of the Union’s overall involvement in Egypt.

    (20)  The Commission should ensure that the Union’s macro-financial assistance is legally and substantially in accordance with the key principles and objectives of the different areas of external action, with measures taken in respect of those areas, and with other relevant Union policies and Union values, such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law.

    (21)  The Union’s macro-financial assistance should support the Union’s external policy towards Egypt. The Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) should work closely together throughout the macro-financial assistance operation in order to coordinate, and ensure the consistency of, the Union’s external policy.

    (22)  The Union’s macro-financial assistance should support Egypt’s commitment to foster values shared with the Union, including democracy, the rule of law, good governance, respect for human rights, sustainable development and poverty reduction, as well as its commitment to the principles of open, rule-based and fair trade.

    (23)  A precondition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Egypt should be that Egypt continue to make concrete, credible and tangible steps towards respecting effective democratic mechanisms, including a multi-party parliamentary system, and the rule of law, and guaranteeing respect for human rights. In addition, the specific objectives of the Union’s macro-financial assistance should strengthen the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems, the governance and supervision of the financial sector in Egypt, and should promote structural reforms that aim to support sustainable and inclusive growth, decent employment creation and fiscal consolidation. The Commission and the EEAS should regularly monitor the fulfilment of that precondition and the achievement of those specific objectives.

    (24)  The link of the Union’s macro-financial assistance to an on-track disbursing IMF programme, with its strong macro-fiscal framework and rigorous debt sustainability analysis, provides reassurances in relation to Egypt’s repayment capacity. In addition, in order to ensure that the Union’s financial interests linked to the Union’s macro-financial assistance are protected efficiently, Egypt should take appropriate measures relating to the prevention of, and fight against, fraud, corruption and any other irregularities linked to that assistance. The transparent management of funds allocated under the Union’s macro-financial assistance is essential. In addition, a loan agreement to be concluded between the Commission and the Egyptian authorities should contain provisions authorising the European Anti-Fraud Office to carry out investigations, including on-the-spot checks and inspections, in accordance with the provisions and procedures laid down in Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council(4) and Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96(5), the Commission and the Court of Auditors to carry out audits and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office to exercise its competences with regard to the provision of the Union’s macro-financial assistance during and after the availability period of that assistance.

    (25)  The release of the Union’s macro-financial assistance is without prejudice to the powers of the European Parliament and the Council as budgetary authority.

    (26)  The amounts of the provision required for macro-financial assistance in the form of loans should be consistent with the budgetary appropriations provided for in the multiannual financial framework.

    (27)  The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be managed by the Commission. In order to ensure that the European Parliament and the Council are able to follow the implementation of this Decision, the Commission should regularly inform them of developments relating to that assistance and provide them with relevant documents.

    (28)  The annual report on the implementation of this Decision should include information on concrete, tangible and credible steps taken by Egypt towards respecting effective democratic mechanisms, including a multi-party parliamentary system, and the rule of law, and guaranteeing respect for human rights.

    (29)  In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Decision, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council(6).

    (30)  The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be subject to economic policy conditions, to be set out in a memorandum of understanding (MoU). In order to ensure uniform conditions of implementation and for reasons of efficiency, the Commission should be empowered to negotiate such conditions with the Egyptian authorities under the supervision of the committee of representatives of the Member States in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. Under Regulation (EU) No 182/2011, the advisory procedure should, as a general rule, apply in all cases other than as provided for in that Regulation. Considering the potentially significant impact of assistance of more than EUR 90 million, it is appropriate that the examination procedure as specified in Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 be used for operations above that threshold. Considering the amount of the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Egypt, that examination procedure should apply to the adoption of the MoU, and to any reduction, suspension or cancellation of that assistance.

    (31)  Since the objective of this Decision, namely to address Egypt’s external financing needs cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States but can rather be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Decision does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve that objective.

    (32)  In order to enable the prompt provision of macro-financial assistance to Egypt, this Decision should enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union,

    HAVE ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

    Article 1

    1.  The Union shall make macro-financial assistance in the form of loans of a maximum amount of up to EUR 4 billion available to Egypt (the ‘Union’s macro-financial assistance’), with a view to supporting Egypt’s economic stabilisation and a substantive reform agenda. The release of the Union’s macro-financial assistance is subject to the adoption of the Union budget for the relevant year by the European Parliament and the Council. The Union’s macro-financial assistance shall contribute to covering Egypt’s balance-of-payments needs as identified in the IMF programme.

    2.  In order to finance the Union’s macro-financial assistance, the Commission shall be empowered, on behalf of the Union, to borrow the necessary funds on the capital markets or from financial institutions and to on-lend them to Egypt.

    3.  The release of the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be managed by the Commission in a manner consistent with the agreements or understandings reached between the IMF and Egypt, and with the key principles and objectives of economic reforms set out in the Association Agreement.

    The Commission shall regularly inform the European Parliament and the Council of developments regarding the Union’s macro-financial assistance, including disbursements thereof, and shall provide those institutions with the relevant documents in due time.

    4.  The Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be made available for a period of two and a half years, starting from the first day after the date of entry into force of the MoU referred to in Article 3(1).

    5.  Where the financing needs of Egypt decrease fundamentally during the period of the disbursement of the Union’s macro-financial assistance compared to the initial projections, the Commission, acting in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 7(2), shall reduce the amount of the assistance, suspend or cancel it.

    Article 2

    1.  A precondition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be that Egypt continue to make concrete and credible steps towards respecting effective democratic mechanisms, including a multi-party parliamentary system, and the rule of law, and guaranteeing respect for human rights.

    2.  The Commission and the EEAS shall monitor the fulfilment of the precondition set out in paragraph 1 throughout the life-cycle of the Union’s macro-financial assistance.

    3.  Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall apply in accordance with Council Decision 2010/427/EU(7).

    Article 3

    1.  The Commission, in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 7(2), shall agree with the Egyptian authorities on clearly defined economic policy and financial conditions, focusing on structural reforms and sound public finances, to which the Union’s macro-financial assistance is to be subject. Those economic policy and financial conditions shall be set out in a memorandum of understanding (MoU) which shall include a timeframe for their fulfilment. Those economic policy and financial conditions shall be consistent with the agreements or understandings referred to in Article 1(3), including the macroeconomic adjustment and structural reform programmes implemented by Egypt with the support of the IMF.

    2.  The economic policy and financial conditions referred to in paragraph 1 shall aim, in particular, to enhance the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems in Egypt, including for the use of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. Progress in mutual market opening, including for small and medium-sized enterprises, the development of rule-based and fair trade, sustainable development, good governance and other priorities in the context of the Union’s external policy shall also be duly taken into account when designing the policy measures. The Commission shall regularly monitor Egypt’s progress in attaining those objectives.

    3.  The detailed financial terms of the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be laid down in a loan agreement to be concluded between the Commission and the Egyptian authorities in accordance with Article 223 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council(8) (the ‘Financial Regulation’) (the ‘loan agreement’).

    4.  The Commission shall verify, at regular intervals, that the conditions referred to in Article 4(3), first subparagraph, continue to be met, including whether the economic policies of Egypt are in accordance with the objectives of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. For the purposes of that verification, the Commission shall coordinate closely with the IMF and the World Bank, and, where necessary, with the European Parliament and with the Council.

    Article 4

    1.  Subject to the conditions referred to in paragraph 3, first subparagraph, the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be made available by the Commission in instalments. The size of each of those instalments shall be set out in the MoU. An instalment may be disbursed in one or more tranches.

    2.  The amounts of the Union’s macro-financial assistance provided in the form of loans shall be provisioned, where required, in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/947.

    3.  The Commission shall decide on the release of the instalments subject to the fulfilment of the following conditions:

    (a)  the precondition set out in Article 2(1);

    (b)  a continuous satisfactory track record of implementing a policy programme that contains strong adjustment and structural reform measures supported by a non-precautionary IMF credit arrangement; and

    (c)  the satisfactory implementation of the economic policy and financial conditions agreed in the MoU.

    The release of the second instalment shall not, in principle, take place earlier than three months after the release of the first instalment. The release of the third instalment shall not, in principle, take place earlier than three months after the release of the second instalment.

    4.  Where the conditions set out in paragraph 3, first subparagraph, are not met, the Commission shall temporarily suspend or cancel the disbursement of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. In such cases, it shall inform the European Parliament and the Council without delay of the reasons for that suspension or cancellation.

    5.  The Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be disbursed to the Central Bank of Egypt. Subject to the agreed provisions set out in the MoU, including a confirmation of residual budgetary financing needs, the Union funds may be transferred by the Central Bank of Egypt to the Egyptian Ministry of Finance as the final beneficiary.

    Article 5

    1.  In order to finance the Union’s macro-financial assistance in the form of loans, the Commission shall be empowered, on behalf of the Union, to borrow the necessary funds on the capital markets or from financial institutions in accordance with Article 224 of the Financial Regulation.

    2.  The Commission shall enter into a loan agreement referred to in Article 3(3) in respect of the amount referred to in Article 1. The loan agreement shall lay down the availability period and the detailed terms of the Union’s macro-financial assistance, including in relation to the internal control systems. Egypt shall repay the loan, which shall be granted on terms that allow its repayment over a long period, including a possible grace period. The maximum duration of the loan shall be 35 years. ▌

    3.   The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of developments in the operations referred to in paragraph 2.

    Article 6

    1.  The Unions macro-financial assistance shall be implemented in accordance with the Financial Regulation.

    2.  The Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be implemented under direct management.

    3.  Before the implementation of the Union’s macro-financial assistance, the Commission shall assess, by means of an operational assessment, the soundness of Egypt’s financial arrangements, administrative procedures, and internal and external control mechanisms which are relevant to the assistance.

    Article 7

    1.  The Commission shall be assisted by a committee. That committee shall be a committee within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011.

    2.  Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 shall apply.

    Article 8

    1.  By 30 June of each year, the Commission shall submit to the European Parliament and to the Council a report on the implementation of this Decision in the preceding year, including an evaluation of that implementation. That report shall:

    (a)  examine the progress made in implementing the Union’s macro-financial assistance;

    (b)  assess the economic situation and prospects of Egypt, as well as progress made in implementing the policy measures referred to in Article 3(1);

    (c)  indicate the connection between the economic policy and financial conditions set out in the MoU, Egypt’s on-going economic and fiscal performance and the Commission’s decisions to release the instalments of the Union’s macro-financial assistance, while outlining concrete and credible steps taken towards respecting democratic mechanisms and the rule of law and guaranteeing human rights.

    2.  Not later than two years after the expiry of the availability period referred to in Article 1(4), the Commission shall submit to the European Parliament and to the Council an ex post evaluation report, assessing the results and efficiency of the completed Union’s macro-financial assistance and the extent to which it has contributed to the aims of the assistance.

    Article 9

    This Decision shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

    Done at …,

    For the European Parliament For the Council

    The President The President

    (1) Position of the European Parliament of 18 June 2025.
    (2) OJ L 304, 30.9.2004, p. 39.
    (3) Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe, amending and repealing Decision No 466/2014/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EU) 2017/1601 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 480/2009 (OJ L 209, 14.6.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/947/oj).
    (4) Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 September 2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (Euratom) No 1074/1999 (OJ L 248, 18.9.2013, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/883/oj).
    (5) Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96 of 11 November 1996 concerning on-the-spot checks and inspections carried out by the Commission in order to protect the European Communities’ financial interests against fraud and other irregularities (OJ L 292, 15.11.1996, p. 2, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/1996/2185/oj).
    (6) Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers (OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2011/182/oj).
    (7) Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service (OJ L 201, 3.8.2010, p. 30, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2010/427/oj).
    (8) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: EIB backs new military base in Lithuania with €540 million loan

    Source: European Investment Bank

    • EIB approves €540 million loan for Lithuanian military base in Rūdninkai to strengthen NATO defence capabilities.
    • Base near border with Belarus to host German military brigade, feature training, medical and housing facilities.
    • EIB financing reflects commitment to European security and defence.

    The European Investment Bank (EIB) plans to lend €540 million for Lithuania to build a military base south of the capital Vilnius, highlighting Europe’s collective commitment to bolster its defence infrastructure and deterrence capacity. The new base in Rūdninkai will host a German brigade, strengthening the rapid-response capabilities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the region.

    Construction of the Rūdninkai military site, which will be located 35 kilometres from the border with Belarus, is due to begin in 2026. The project will span 170 hectares, lay out 11 kilometres of roads and feature around 150 buildings including medical centres, residential units, training facilities, warehouses, hangars and helipads.

    “This is a landmark step in how we support Europe’s security,” EIB Group President Nadia Calviño said in Luxembourg where she met Lithuanian Finance Minister Rimantas Šadžius. “By financing large-scale military infrastructure, we’re demonstrating our readiness to meet the region’s evolving defence needs. It reflects the EIB’s growing role in safeguarding stability across the European Union.”

    The initiative is strategically important for NATO’s eastern defence. Rūdninkai is near a narrow corridor that represents the only land route between the Baltic states and the rest of NATO as well as of the EU. The corridor, known as the Suwałki Gap, is bordered by Belarus to the southeast and Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave to the northwest.

    The financing from the EIB is part of its recently expanded scope of activities in the areas of security and defence to include military investments that align with the EU’s goals of bolstering preparedness and crisis management. The approved EIB loan will be to private partners to be selected by the Lithuanian Ministry of Defence to carry out the project.

    “I greatly appreciate the invaluable expertise and financial support from the EIB in implementing the Rūdninkai project that will strengthen Lithuania’s defense capabilities,” said Lithuanian Finance Minister Šadžius. “We are already seeing the results of financial diplomacy and we can confidently state that the EIB’s involvement will contribute not only to Lithuania’s debt sustainability and stronger fiscal stance but also to the security of our country.”

    The EIB Board of Directors approved the €540 million loan at a meeting on 19 June in Luxembourg. The endorsement paves the way for legal and financial negotiations over the loan that are expected to be completed in the coming months. 

    “This investment marks a historic milestone for Lithuania’s national security and NATO’s collective defence,” said Lithuanian Minister of National Defence Dovilė Šakalienė. “The Rūdninkai military base will not only strengthen our defence posture but also serve as a permanent home for the German brigade – a cornerstone of NATO’s deterrence in the region. The EIB’s support is a clear sign that European resilience begins with shared responsibility.”

    The EIB backing for the Rūdninkai military site will help spread the costs of the project, easing the burden on Lithuanian finances and on companies involved in an initiative that takes the form of a public-private partnership (PPP). The EIB is also providing advisory services to ensure that the PPP agreements meet market standards and follow best practices.

    The Rūdninkai base will accommodate around 4,000 German troops and 750 civilian personnel.

    In April 2025 Germany activated the 45th Panzer Brigade of the German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr), also known as the Lithuania Brigade. For Germany, it`s the first brigade-sized unit to be based abroad permanently since World War II.

    Background information   

    EIB Group

    The European Investment Bank (ElB) is the long-term lending institution of the European Union, owned by its Member States. Built around eight core priorities, the EIB finances investments that contribute to EU policy objectives by bolstering climate action and the environment, digitalisation and technological innovation, security and defence, cohesion, agriculture and the bioeconomy, social infrastructure, the capital markets union and a stronger Europe in a more peaceful and prosperous world.  

    The EIB Group, which also includes the European Investment Fund (EIF), signed nearly €89 billion in new financing for over 900 high-impact projects in 2024, boosting Europe’s competitiveness and security.    

    The EIB Group stepped up its support to Europe’s security and defence industry by expanding the scope of projects eligible for financing and setting up a one-stop shop to streamline processes, doubling investment to €1 billion in 2024. The EIB Group expects to multiply this amount in 2025 to new record.

    The Board of Directors in March approved a series of additional measures to further contribute to European peace and included peace and security as a cross-cutting Public Policy Goal to finance large-scale strategic projects in areas such as land-border protection, military mobility, critical infrastructure, military transport, space, cybersecurity, anti-jamming technologies, radar systems, military equipment and facilities, drones, bio-hazard and seabed infrastructure protection, critical raw materials and research. 

    High-quality, up-to-date photos of the EIB Group’s headquarters for media use are available here

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Plan ahead for a busy Fourth of July travel weekend

    Source: Washington State News 2

    No travel charts this year, but several WSDOT tools can help travelers prep and stay informed throughout the holiday weekend

    OLYMPIA – The Independence Day weekend is always a busy summer travel time – and this year will be no exception. The Washington State Department of Transportation urges all travelers to plan ahead this holiday.

    WSDOT will not publish Fourth of July holiday travel charts this year, due to a lack of historical hourly vehicle volume data. The last time July 4 fell on a Friday was more than a decade ago and under standard state retention laws that data was deleted. Travel forecasts typically rely on a mix of current traffic conditions and past patterns. Without the historical data, analysts were unable to produce reliable charts. WSDOT is changing retention schedules going forward to improve future holiday forecasting. (The retention issue will not affect this year’s Labor Day or Thanksgiving weekend travel charts).

    Instead of travel charts, travelers are encouraged to use WSDOT resources and follow these tips whether traveling across town or statewide:

    • Get informed about WSDOT’s online tools, including the WSDOT mobile app, traffic cameras and email alerts.
    • Visit online traveler information for traffic, weather, ferry schedules and a real-time travel map.
    • Follow WSDOT on various social media platforms including Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, YouTube, Bluesky and X.
    • Identify potential safety rest areas before heading out, to ensure enough breaks to avoid drowsy driving.
    • Pre-program vehicle radios to 530 AM and 1610 AM for highway advisory radio alerts – and be alert for other stations listed on notice signs in some areas.
    • Have a backup outdoor destination as parks and other outdoor recreation sites tend to fill up quickly on holiday weekends. If a site’s parking is full, never park along road shoulders as this is unsafe for everyone on the roadway, including emergency response vehicles.

    What to expect

    Travel will be busy across the state – no matter where and how people choose to travel.

    Holiday weekends often mean increased traffic and delays along state highways, waterways, airports and pedestrian trails. Travelers should be patient, expect delays, allow extra travel time and stay alert. Delays may also occur as crews respond to crashes or conduct emergency repairs.

    In general, all travelers should expect:

    • Heavier traffic on Thursday and Friday, July 3-4 as people set out for holiday destinations.
    • Heavy return traffic on Sunday and Monday, July 6-7.

    Most highway construction paused

    Most state highway construction work is suspended Friday, July 4 and throughout the holiday weekend to ease congestion. However, travelers should stay alert for lane shifts or work zone staging that may remain in place.

    Ferry travel 

    People boarding a ferry by vehicle can expect the busiest sailings and longer wait times likely westbound (or onto an island) Wednesday through Friday, July 2-4, and eastbound (or off island) Saturday and Sunday, July 5-6. Walk-on passengers can bypass vehicle lines and usually board much faster. Washington state ferry routes also are expected to be busy and reservations are strongly encouraged on routes that offer them.

    Snoqualmie Pass

    No construction is planned on I-90 from Friday, July 4 to Sunday, July 6. However, the usual holiday increase in traffic means travelers should expect delays, especially eastbound on Friday and westbound on Sunday. People can receive text message alerts about significant delays by texting the words “WSDOT Snoqualmie” to 468311.

    Mount Rainier information

    Vantage Bridge To help accommodate increased travel during the holiday weekend, all four lanes of I-90 across the Vantage Bridge will be open Thursday through Tuesday, July 3-8. Outside of that time, the bridge will have only one lane in each direction through fall due to construction on the bridge. This project is part of a long-term effort to replace the deteriorating bridge deck, with construction expected to be complete by fall 2028.

    Tolling

    In the Puget Sound region, weekend toll rates will be in effect on Friday, July 4, on the State Route 520 bridge and SR 99 tunnel. The I-405 express toll lanes and SR 167 HOT lanes will be free and open to all drivers on July 4. Out-of-town travelers, including those using rental cars, can learn about toll roads and temporary account payment options on the Good To Go! visitors page.

    Trains, airports and transit

    Travelers making a trip by train, personal aircraft or bus also should plan ahead to avoid holiday delays:

    • Amtrak Cascades passengers are encouraged to purchase tickets early and plan to arrive at the station one hour before departure. Trains are running between Vancouver, British Columbia and Eugene, Oregon, stopping at 18 stations along the way. Buses also are available for travel between Seattle and Vancouver, British Columbia and between Seattle and Bellingham. Visit www.AmtrakCascades.com or call 800-USA-RAIL for tickets and schedules.
    • For information about traveling via state-sponsored airports, visit wsdot.wa.gov/travel/aviation/airports-list or call 360-618-2477.
    • Check with local public transit agencies for any holiday schedule or service changes, including some Dial-A-Ride and fixed-route service that may not run on holidays.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: Iran: Growing fears over torture and executions of individuals accused of ‘espionage’ for Israel

    Source: Amnesty International –


    The Iranian authorities must halt all plans to carry out arbitrary executions and protect all those arrested over accusations of espionage for Israel from enforced disappearance, torture and other ill-treatment, Amnesty International said today.

    Since Israel’s attacks on Iran began on 13 June, Iranian authorities have arrested scores of people over accusations of “collaboration” with Israel, made chilling calls for expedited trials and executions, and executed one man on 16 June.

    There are also grave concerns for those who were already on death row, including at least eight men sentenced to death for such accusations following unfair trials.

    “Official calls for expediated trials and executions of those arrested for alleged collaboration with Israel show how the Iranian authorities weaponize the death penalty to assert control and instil fear among the people of Iran. The authorities must ensure all those detained are protected from enforced disappearance, torture and other ill-treatment, and afforded fair trials at all times, including during armed conflict,” said Hussein Baoumi, Deputy Regional Director for the Middle East and North Africa at Amnesty International.

    “The death penalty is the ultimate cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment and it should not be used under any circumstances. Its use for espionage or other related offences that do not involve intentional killing is particularly prohibited under international law. A rush to execute people after torture-tainted ‘confessions’ and grossly unfair trials would be a horrifying abuse of power and a blatant assault on the right to life. The authorities must immediately halt all plans to carry out further executions or to impose death sentences and urgently establish a moratorium on all executions.”

    The authorities must ensure all those detained are protected from enforced disappearance, torture and other ill-treatment, and afforded fair trials at all times, including during armed conflict

    Hussein Baoumi, Deputy Regional Director for MENA

    Alarming calls for expedited trials and executions

    Fears of arbitrary executions have mounted following alarming official statements,reviewed by Amnesty International, announcing scores of arrests across the country for alleged “espionage” or “collaboration” with Israel, along with orders for expedited trials and executions.

    On 15 June, the Head of Iran’s Judiciary, Gholamhossein Mohseni Eje’i, instructed the country’s Prosecutor General and provincial prosecutors to punish “elements who disturb the peace and security of the people” or “collaborate” with Israel. He said expedited proceedings will “deter” people and ordered individuals be tried, convicted, and punished “extremely quickly.”

    The same day, the Supreme Council of National Security, Iran’s highest decision-making body, announced that so-called actions “in favour of Israel would be met with a decisive response and the harshest punishment” of execution under the charges of “enmity against God” (moharebeh) and “corruption on earth” (efsad fel-arz), which incur the death penalty under Iranian law.

    The statement explained that the actions, which the Supreme Council of National Security deems as falling under these two capital charges, include efforts to: “legitimize or sanitize the image of the Zionist regime”; “disseminate rumors or false information”; “incite or encourage individuals or groups to act against national security”; or “sow division among the segments of society, ethnicities, and religious sects of the country”.

    The statement underscores long-standing concerns about the overly broad charges of “enmity against God” (moharebeh) and “corruption on earth” (efsad fel-arz), which under Iranian law permit use of the death penalty to punish the exercise of the right to freedom of expression, which should never be criminalized, and for internationally recognizable offences such as espionage that, while criminal, do not meet the threshold of “most serious crimes” involving intentional killing required under international law for the application of the death penalty.

    On 17 June 2025, Iran’s parliament also approved a motion to fast-track a bill which facilitates greater use of the death penalty for “espionage” or “cooperation with hostile governments”, including Israel and the United States. Currently, the punishment for the charge of espionage is imprisonment; therefore, to pursue the death penalty, prosecutors must combine various different acts to argue that they collectively amount to “corruption on earth” (efsad fel-arz). Under this bill, “espionage” or “cooperation with hostile governments” will automatically fall under the charge of “corruption on earth” (efsad fel-arz) and incur the death penalty.

    Given the Iranian authorities’ long and harrowing record of violating the rights of those detained on national security charges, Amnesty International renews its urgent calls on them to ensure that all those recently arrested are protected from enforced disappearance, torture and other ill-treatment. All people deprived of their liberty must be granted access to lawyers of their choosing from the time of arrest and provided fair trials in line with international law, without resort to the death penalty. Those detained for their peaceful exercise of the right to freedom of expression must be released immediately and unconditionally.

    Heightened risk of execution for those already on death row

    Following the execution of one man, Esmail Fekri, on 16 June, in Ghezel Hesar prison in Karaj, Alborz province, after a grossly unfair trial, Amnesty International is concerned that in a misguided attempt to project strength, the authorities may execute at least eight other individuals sentenced to death in separate cases on accusations of espionage or collaboration with Israel following grossly unfair trials.

    Amongst them is Swedish-Iranian academic Ahmadreza Djalali, held in Tehran’s Evin prison, who has been arbitrarily detained since 2016. A Revolutionary Court sentenced him to death for “corruption on earth” (efsad-e fel-arz) in October 2017 following a grossly unfair trial based on forced “confessions” made under torture and other ill-treatment, including threats to execute him and kill or otherwise harm his family.

    Others at risk include Afshin Ghorbani Meyshani, Azad Shojaei, Edris Aali, and Iraqi national Rasoul Ahmad Rasoul, all held in Urumieh Central prison, West Azerbaijan province; Mohammad Amin Mahdavi Shayesteh, held in Ghezal Hesar prison, Alborz province; Rouzbeh Vadi, held in Evin prison, Tehran province; and Shahin Basami, held in Adel Abad prison, Fars province.

    Ahmadreza Djalali, Afshin Ghorbani Mishani, Azad Shojaie, Edris Aali, and Mohammad Amin Mahdavi Shayesteh are all at imminent risk of execution as the Supreme Court has upheld their death sentences.

    Amnesty International opposes the death penalty without exception, regardless of who is accused, the nature or circumstances of the crime, guilt or innocence, or the method of execution.

    Background

    Since the escalation of hostilities between Israel and Iran began on 13 June, at least 224 people have been killed in Iran, including 74 women and children according to an Iranian government spokesperson. Meanwhile, at least 24 people, including women and children, have been killed in Israel, according to the Israeli Military Home Front.

    MIL OSI NGO

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: On World Refugee Day, States throughout the Americas must uphold the right to seek asylum  

    Source: Amnesty International –

    In response to measures being adopted by states across the Americas that violate the human rights of people seeking safety, Ana Piquer, Americas director at Amnesty International, said the following:

    “On World Refugee Day, we are witnessing a devasting erosion of the rights of people seeking safety and asylum protections across the Americas. The Trump administration has issued a barrage of executive actions which have halted the US Refugee Admissions Program and make it nearly impossible to seek asylum in the United States, placing countless lives at risk. These policies have already resulted in thousands of people being forcibly returned to places where their lives or safety are at risk. Currently, there is no longer any way for people to seek asylum at the US-Mexico border. This is not only unlawful but inhumane and cruel.

    The Trump administration has issued a barrage of executive actions which have halted the US Refugee Admissions Program and make it nearly impossible to seek asylum in the United States, placing countless lives at risk…This is not only unlawful but inhumane and cruel.

    Ana Piquer, Americas director at Amnesty International.

    The Trump administration has also dismantled other critical protections for people seeking safety, including stripping Temporary Protected Status from individuals of certain nationalities and revoking humanitarian parole granted to Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans and Venezuelans, which contradicts the narrative that these very same countries are experiencing the most dire human rights crises in the region. At the same time, the United States has escalated mass immigration raids, is detaining and separating families, is unlawfully removing individuals from the US with no due process guarantees, and is criminally prosecuting individuals for the way in which they entered the country – treating people in need of international protection as criminals.

    These harmful policies have rippled across the region. Costa Rica and Panama have accepted deportation flights of third-country nationals from the United States – many with ongoing asylum claims – leaving them stranded with limited access to humanitarian assistance and international protection. El Salvador is complicit in the enforced disappearance of hundreds of Venezuelans illegally expelled from the US under the guise of the Alien Enemies Act in the notorious CECOT prison, who were in the midst of ongoing court processes, were arrested while complying with their immigration obligations, were already granted protections in the United States including under the Convention Against Torture, and were labeled as gang members for their tattoos or connection to the Venezuelan state of Aragua with no other evidence.

    The Safe Third Country Agreement (STCA) between Canada and the United States bars most people crossing into Canada via the United States from seeking refugee protection in Canada, and vice versa. The agreement has forced individuals to attempt dangerous border crossings and has pushed people underground in order to seek safety, and resulted in people and families detained in the US. As the United States becomes increasingly unsafe for asylum seekers, the Canadian government must withdraw from the agreement immediately. 

    The Dominican Republic has been implementing a series of racist migration policies, without even recognizing the right to seek asylum for those fleeing violence from Haiti, and targeting people of Haitian origin. Haitians are being collectively expelled from the Dominican Republic despite the worsening humanitarian and security crisis in Haiti, placing those forcibly returned at grave risk and undermining the principle of non-refoulement.   

    People from Venezuela, Haiti, Cuba, Nicaragua, and across the region and beyond are fleeing widespread human rights crises. Instead of finding refuge and protection, they are being met with hostility, militarized borders and criminalization. The immigration and asylum policies being implemented by countries across the Americas are fueled by racist and xenophobic rhetoric that dehumanizes people seeking safety. 

    The immigration and asylum policies being implemented by countries across the Americas are fueled by racist and xenophobic rhetoric that dehumanizes people seeking safety. 

    Ana Piquer, Americas director at Amnesty International.

    The situation is further exacerbated by the US government’s severe cuts to foreign assistance, which have weakened shelters and frontline organizations that provide life-saving support to people seeking safety and internally displaced people. From Costa Rica to Mexico to the Haiti-Dominican Republic border, organizations have been forced to scale back or close food, shelter and legal and psychosocial programs for people seeking safety, just as need grows. 

    On World Refugee Day, Amnesty International urgently calls on states in the Americas to protect, not punish, people seeking safety. States must immediately restore access to asylum, reverse discriminatory policies and uphold their obligations under international law. We stand in solidarity with people across the region who have been forced to flee their homes in search of safety and dignity. Seeking safety is a human right. It’s time for governments to act like it.”

    MIL OSI NGO

  • MIL-OSI Banking: Trade and Environment Week underscores members’ drive to advance environment discussions

    Source: World Trade Organization

    Since its launch in 2019, Trade and Environment Week has grown into a flagship forum for deepening the global conversation on the nexus between trade and the environment. Anchored around the CTE meeting, the Week was designed to complement the Committee’s work and spark inclusive dialogue on emerging environmental challenges with trade dimensions. It offers a unique platform for WTO members to engage directly with business leaders, international organizations, academic experts, civil society and environmental practitioners — fostering an exchange of insights, experiences and actionable ideas.

    In 2025, the Week will feature 15 sessions spanning a range of issues at the forefront of the trade and environment agenda. Topics include the global fight against plastics pollution, sustainable agriculture, the green transition in developing economies, carbon pricing mechanisms, deforestation-related regulations, the future of sustainable fuels, and trade-related climate policy measures.

    The CTE meeting will continue to advance discussions under a comprehensive work programme on trade and environment in line with the Committee’s mandate. Since its establishment in 1995, the CTE has facilitated dialogue among all WTO members on the interaction between trade and environmental policies.

    All 15 sessions are open to the public. The full programme for Trade and Environment Week, the live webcast link and registration information for in-person participation is available here.

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    MIL OSI Global Banks

  • MIL-OSI Banking: Verizon announces expiration date results of its private exchange offers for 10 series of notes and expiration of related tender offers

    Source: Verizon

    Headline: Verizon announces expiration date results of its private exchange offers for 10 series of notes and expiration of related tender offers

    NEW YORK, N.Y. –  Verizon Communications Inc. (“Verizon”) (NYSE, Nasdaq: VZ) today announced the expiration and preliminary expiration date results of its Exchange Offers (as defined below) and the expiration of its Cash Offers (as defined below).

    Exchange Offers

    The first transaction consists of 10 separate private offers to exchange (the “Exchange Offers”) any and all of the outstanding series of notes listed in the table below (as used in the context of the Exchange Offers and the Cash Offers (as defined below), collectively the “Old Notes”) in exchange for newly issued 5.401% Notes due 2037 of Verizon (the “New Notes”), on the terms and subject to the conditions set forth in the Offering Memorandum dated June 12, 2025 (the “Offering Memorandum”), the eligibility letter (the “Eligibility Letter”) and the accompanying exchange offer notice of guaranteed delivery (the “Exchange Offer Notice of Guaranteed Delivery” which, together with the Offering Memorandum and the Eligibility Letter, constitute the “Exchange Offer Documents”).

    The Exchange Offers expired at 5:00 p.m. (Eastern time) on June 18, 2025 (the “Exchange Offer Expiration Date”). The “Exchange Offer Settlement Date” with respect to the Exchange Offers will be promptly following the Exchange Offer Expiration Date and is expected to be June 25, 2025. In addition to the applicable Total Exchange Price (as defined in the Offering Memorandum and set forth in the table below), Exchange Offer Eligible Holders (as defined below) whose Old Notes are accepted for exchange will receive a cash payment equal to the accrued and unpaid interest on such Old Notes from and including the immediately preceding interest payment date for such Old Notes to, but excluding, the Exchange Offer Settlement Date. Interest will cease to accrue on the Exchange Offer Settlement Date for all Old Notes accepted, including those tendered through the Guaranteed Delivery Procedures (as defined in the Offering Memorandum).

    Unless otherwise defined herein, capitalized terms used under the heading Exchange Offers have the respective meanings assigned thereto in the Exchange Offer Documents.

    The table below indicates, among other things, the aggregate principal amount of each series of Old Notes validly tendered for exchange and not validly withdrawn at or prior to the Exchange Offer Expiration Date in connection with Verizon’s offer to exchange any and all of its outstanding notes listed below for New Notes:

    Acceptance Priority Level(1)

    Title of Security

    CUSIP
    Number(s)

    Principal Amount Outstanding

    Principal Amount Tendered for Exchange by the Expiration Date(2)

    1

    1.450% Notes due 2026

    92343VGG3

    $838,579,000

    $1,689,000

    2

    Floating Rate Notes due 2026

    92343VGE8

    $212,932,000

    $4,987,000

    3

    4.125% Notes due 2027

    92343VDY7

    $2,903,541,000

    $316,360,000

    4

    3.000% Notes due 2027

    92343VFF6

    $569,992,000

    $64,673,000

    5

    4.329% Notes due 2028

    92343VER1/

    92343VEQ3/

    U9221ABK3

    $3,640,515,000

    $722,436,000

    6

    2.100% Notes due 2028

    92343VGH1

    $2,139,693,000

    $196,532,000

    7

    4.016% Notes due 2029

    92343VEU4/

    92343VET7/

    U9221ABL1

    $4,000,000,000

    $523,460,000

    8

    3.150% Notes due 2030

    92343VFE9

    $1,464,080,000

    $266,808,000

    9

    1.680% Notes due 2030

    92343VFX7/

    92343VFN9/

    U9221ABS6

    $1,098,195,000

    $270,138,000

    10

    7.750% Notes due 2030

    92344GAM8/

    92344GAC0

    $562,561,000

    $30,303,000

    (1) Subject to the satisfaction or waiver of the conditions of the Exchange Offers described in the Offering Memorandum, if the New Notes Capacity Condition (as defined if the Offering Memorandum) and/or the corresponding Cash Offer Completion Condition (as defined if the Offering Memorandum) is not satisfied with respect to every series of Old Notes, Verizon will accept Old Notes for exchange in the order of their respective Acceptance Priority Level specified in the table above (as used in the context of the Exchange Offers and the Cash Offers, each an “Acceptance Priority Level,” with 1 being the highest Acceptance Priority Level and 10 being the lowest Acceptance Priority Level). It is possible that a series of Old Notes with a particular Acceptance Priority Level will not be accepted for exchange even if one or more series with a higher or lower Acceptance Priority Level are accepted for purchase.

    (2) The principal amounts tendered as reflected in the table above, does not include the aggregate principal amounts of Old Notes that may be validly tendered pursuant to Guaranteed Delivery Procedures and not validly withdrawn prior to the guaranteed delivery date and accepted for exchange.

    Verizon is offering to accept for exchange validly tendered Old Notes using a “waterfall” methodology under which such Old Notes of different series will be accepted in the order of their respective Acceptance Priority Levels as listed in the table above, subject to a $2.5 billion cap on the maximum aggregate principal amount of New Notes that Verizon will issue in all of the Exchange Offers (the “New Notes Maximum Amount”). However, subject to applicable law, Verizon, in its sole discretion, has the option to waive or increase the New Notes Maximum Amount at any time.

    Based on the principal amount of Old Notes validly tendered for exchange and not validly withdrawn at or prior to the Exchange Offer Expiration Date and the Total Exchange Prices set forth in the table above, Verizon expects that the Minimum Issue Requirement (as defined in the Offering Memorandum) will be satisfied.  Verizon will not receive any cash proceeds from the Exchange Offers. The actual aggregate principal amount of New Notes that will be issued on the Exchange Offer Settlement Date is subject to change, based on the amount of Old Notes delivered pursuant to the Guaranteed Delivery Procedures and satisfaction or waiver of the conditions set forth in the Offering Memorandum, including the Cash Offer Completion Condition.

    If and when issued, the New Notes will not be registered under the Securities Act or any state securities laws. Therefore, the New Notes may not be offered or sold in the United States absent registration or an applicable exemption from the registration requirements of the Securities Act and any applicable state securities laws. Verizon will enter into a registration rights agreement with respect to the New Notes.

    Only a holder who had duly completed and returned an Eligibility Letter certifying that it was either (1) a “qualified institutional buyer” (as defined in Rule 144A under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “Securities Act”)); or (2) a person located outside the United States who is (i) not a “U.S. person” (as defined in Rule 902 under the Securities Act), (ii) not acting for the account or benefit of a U.S. person and (iii) a “Non-U.S. qualified offeree” (as defined below), was authorized to receive the Offering Memorandum and to participate in the Exchange Offers (such holders, “Exchange Offer Eligible Holders”).

    Global Bondholder Services Corporation is acting as the Information Agent and the Exchange Agent for the Exchange Offers. Questions or requests for assistance related to the Exchange Offers or for additional copies of the Exchange Offer Documents may be directed to Global Bondholder Services Corporation at (212) 430-3774.You may also contact your broker, dealer, commercial bank, trust company or other nominee for assistance concerning the Exchange Offers. The Exchange Offer Documents can be accessed at the following link: https://gbsc-usa.com/eligibility/verizon.

    Cash Offers

    The second transaction consists of 10 separate offers to purchase for cash (the “Cash Offers”) any and all of each series of Old Notes, on the terms and subject to the conditions set forth in the Offer to Purchase dated June 12, 2025 (the “Offer to Purchase”), the certification instructions letter (the “Certification Instructions Letter”) and the accompanying cash offer notice of guaranteed delivery (the “Cash Offer Notice of Guaranteed Delivery” which, together with the Offer to Purchase and the Certification Instructions Letter, constitute the “Tender Offer Documents”).

    The Cash Offers expired at 5:00 p.m. (Eastern time) on June 18, 2025 (the “Cash Offer Expiration Date”). The “Cash Offer Settlement Date” with respect to the Cash Offers will be promptly following the Cash Offer Expiration Date and is expected to be June 25, 2025.

    Unless otherwise defined herein, capitalized terms used under the heading Cash Offers have the respective meanings assigned thereto in the Tender Offer Documents.

    The table below indicates, among other things, the aggregate principal amount of each series of Old Notes tendered and not validly withdrawn at or prior to the Cash Offer Expiration Date in connection with Verizon’s offer to purchase any and all of its outstanding notes listed below:

    Acceptance Priority Level(1)

    Title of Security

    CUSIP
    Number(s)

    Principal Amount Outstanding

    Principal Amount Tendered for Purchase by the Expiration Date(2)

    1

    1.450% Notes due 2026

    92343VGG3

    $838,579,000

    $14,136,000

    2

    Floating Rate Notes due 2026

    92343VGE8

    $212,932,000

    $2,287,000

    3

    4.125% Notes due 2027

    92343VDY7

    $2,903,541,000

    $174,419,000

    4

    3.000% Notes due 2027

    92343VFF6

    $569,992,000

    $25,913,000

    5

    4.329% Notes due 2028

    92343VER1/

    92343VEQ3/

    U9221ABK3

    $3,640,515,000

    $158,375,000

    6

    2.100% Notes due 2028

    92343VGH1

    $2,139,693,000

    $255,691,000

    7

    4.016% Notes due 2029

    92343VEU4/

    92343VET7/

    U9221ABL1

    $4,000,000,000

    $109,039,000

    8

    3.150% Notes due 2030

    92343VFE9

    $1,464,080,000

    $43,536,000

    9

    1.680% Notes due 2030

    92343VFX7/

    92343VFN9/

    U9221ABS6

    $1,098,195,000

    $39,519,000

    10

    7.750% Notes due 2030

    92344GAM8/

    92344GAC0

    $562,561,000

    $2,818,000

    (1) Subject to the satisfaction or waiver of the conditions of the Cash Offers described in the Offer to Purchase, including if the Maximum Total Consideration Condition (as defined in the Offer to Purchase) is not satisfied with respect to every series of Old Notes, Verizon will accept Notes for purchase in the order of their respective Acceptance Priority Level specified in the table above. It is possible that a series of Old Notes with a particular Acceptance Priority Level will not be accepted for purchase even if one or more series with a higher or lower Acceptance Priority Level are accepted for purchase.

    (2) The principal amounts tendered reflect the preliminary results of the Cash Offer and are subject to change following review of the documentation submitted by holders of Old Notes to determine the validity of the tenders received pursuant to the Tender Offer Documents. The principal amounts tendered does not include the aggregate principal amounts of Old Notes that may be validly tendered pursuant to Guaranteed Delivery Procedures and not validly withdrawn prior to the guaranteed delivery date and accepted for exchange.

    Verizon is offering to purchase validly tendered Old Notes using a “waterfall” methodology under which such Old Notes of different series will be accepted in the order of their respective Acceptance Priority Levels as listed in the table above, subject to the Maximum Total Consideration Condition and the Exchange Offer Completion Condition (each as defined in the Offer to Purchase). However, subject to applicable law, Verizon, in its sole discretion, has the option to waive or increase the Maximum Total Consideration Condition at any time.

    In addition to the applicable Total Consideration, Cash Offer Eligible Holders (as defined below) whose Old Notes are accepted for purchase will be paid accrued and unpaid interest on such Old Notes from and including the immediately preceding interest payment date for such Old Notes to, but excluding, the Cash Offer Settlement Date. Interest will cease to accrue on the Cash Offer Settlement Date for all Old Notes accepted in the Cash Offers, including those Old Notes tendered through the Guaranteed Delivery Procedures.

    Only holders who were not Exchange Offer Eligible Holders (“Cash Offer Eligible Holders”) were eligible to participate in the Cash Offers. Holders of Old Notes participating in the Cash Offers were required to complete the Certification Instructions Letter and certify that they are Cash Offer Eligible Holders.

    Verizon is in the process of reviewing the documentation submitted by holders of Old Notes pursuant to the Cash Offers to determine the validity of the tenders received in the Cash Offers pursuant to the Tender Offer Documents. Verizon will announce the final principal amount of each series of Old Notes validly tendered and accepted for exchange and for purchase as soon as practicable, but no later than 9:00 a.m. (Eastern time) on June 23, 2025.

    Global Bondholder Services Corporation is acting as the Information Agent and the Tender Agent for the Cash Offers. Questions or requests for assistance related to the Cash Offers or for additional copies of the Tender Offer Documents may be directed to Global Bondholder Services Corporation at (212) 430-3774. You may also contact your broker, dealer, commercial bank, trust company or other nominee for assistance concerning the Cash Offers. The Tender Offer Documents can be accessed at the following link: https://www.gbsc-usa.com/verizon.

    Verizon refers to the Exchange Offers and the Cash Offers, collectively, as the “Offers.”

    Verizon retained Barclays Capital Inc, Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC, J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, RBC Capital Markets, LLC to act as lead dealer managers for the Offers and Scotia Capital (USA) Inc., Truist Securities, Inc. and U.S. Bancorp Investments, Inc. to act as co-dealer managers for the Offers.

    This announcement is for informational purposes only. This announcement is not an offer to purchase or a solicitation of an offer to purchase any Old Notes. The Exchange Offers are being made solely pursuant to the Offering Memorandum and related documents and the Cash Offers are being made solely pursuant to the Offer to Purchase and related documents. The Offers are not being made to holders of Old Notes in any jurisdiction in which the making or acceptance thereof would not be in compliance with the securities, blue sky or other laws of such jurisdiction. In any jurisdiction in which the securities laws or blue sky laws require the Offers to be made by a licensed broker or dealer, the Offers will be deemed to be made on behalf of Verizon by the dealer managers or one or more registered brokers or dealers that are licensed under the laws of such jurisdiction.

    This communication and any other documents or materials relating to the Exchange Offers have not been approved by an authorized person for the purposes of Section 21 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, as amended (the “FSMA”). Accordingly, this announcement is not being distributed to, and must not be passed on to, persons within the United Kingdom save in circumstances where section 21(1) of the FSMA does not apply. Accordingly, this communication is only addressed to and directed at persons who are outside the United Kingdom and (i) persons falling within the definition of investment professionals (as defined in Article 19(5) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Financial Promotion) Order 2005 (the “Financial Promotion Order”)), or (ii) within Article 43 of the Financial Promotion Order, or (iii) high net worth companies and other persons to whom it may lawfully be communicated falling within Article 49(2)(a) to (d) of the Financial Promotion Order, or (iv) to whom an invitation or inducement to engage in investment activity (within the meaning of Section 21 of the FSMA) in connection with the issue or sale of any securities may otherwise lawfully be communicated or caused to be communicated (such persons together being “relevant persons”). The New Notes are only available to, and any invitation, offer or agreement to subscribe, purchase or otherwise acquire such New Notes will be engaged in only with, relevant persons. Any person who is not a relevant person should not act or rely on any document relating to the Exchange Offers or any of their contents.

    This communication and any other documents or materials relating to the Exchange Offer are only addressed to and directed at persons in member states of the European Economic Area (the “EEA”), who are “Qualified Investors” within the meaning of Article 2(e) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1129. The New Notes are only available to, and any invitation, offer or agreement to subscribe, purchase or otherwise acquire such New Notes, will be engaged in only with, Qualified Investors. The Exchange Offer is only available to Qualified Investors. None of the information in the Offering Memorandum and any other documents and materials relating to the Exchange Offer should be acted upon or relied upon in any member state of the EEA by persons who are not Qualified Investors.

    “Non-U.S. qualified offeree” means:

    (i)       in relation to any investor in the European Economic Area (the “EEA”), a qualified investor as defined in Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 (as amended or superseded) that is not a retail investor.  For these purposes, a retail investor means a person who is one (or more) of: (a) a retail client as defined in point (11) of Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/65/EU (as amended, “MiFID II”); or (b) a customer within the meaning of Directive (EU) 2016/97, where that customer would not qualify as a professional client as defined in point (10) of Article 4(1) of MiFID II;

    (ii)      in relation to any investor in the United Kingdom, a qualified investor as defined in Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 as it forms part of domestic law by virtue of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 that is not a retail investor and that (a) has professional experience in matters relating to investments and qualifies as an investment professional within the meaning of Article 19(5) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Financial Promotion) Order 2005 (as amended, the “Financial Promotion Order”), (b) is a person falling within Article 49(2)(a) to (d) (“high net worth companies, unincorporated associations etc.”) of the Financial Promotion Order, or (c) is a person to whom an invitation or inducement to engage in investment activity (within the meaning of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, as amended (the “FSMA”)) in connection with the issue or sale of any notes may otherwise lawfully be communicated or caused to be communicated (all such persons together being referred to as “relevant persons”). For these purposes, a retail investor means a person who is one (or more) of: (x) a retail client, as defined in point (8) of Article 2 of Regulation (EU) No 2017/565 as it forms part of domestic law by virtue of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (“EUWA”); or (y) a customer within the meaning of the provisions of the FSMA and any rules or regulations made under the FSMA to implement Directive (EU) 2016/97, where that customer would not qualify as a professional client, as defined in point (8) of Article 2(1) of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 as it forms part of domestic law by virtue of the EUWA; or

    (iii)      any entity outside the U.S., the EEA and the United Kingdom to whom the Exchange Offer may be made in compliance with all applicable laws and regulations of any applicable jurisdiction without registration of the Exchange Offer or any related filing or approval.

    Cautionary Statement Regarding Forward-Looking Statements

    In this communication Verizon has made forward-looking statements, including regarding the conduct and completion of the Offers. These forward-looking statements are not historical facts, but only predictions and generally can be identified by use of statements that include phrases such as “will,” “may,” “should,” “continue,” “anticipate,” “assume,” “believe,” “expect,” “plan,” “appear,” “project,” “estimate,” “hope,” “intend,” “target,” “forecast,” or other words or phrases of similar import. Similarly, statements that describe our objectives, plans or goals also are forward-looking statements. These forward-looking statements are subject to risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially from those currently anticipated, including those discussed in the Offering Memorandum and Offer to Purchase under the heading “Risk Factors” and under similar headings in other documents that are incorporated by reference in the Offering Memorandum and Offer to Purchase. Holders are urged to consider these risks and uncertainties carefully in evaluating the forward-looking statements and are cautioned not to place undue reliance on these forward-looking statements. The forward-looking statements included in this press release are made only as of the date of this press release, and Verizon undertakes no obligation to update publicly these forward-looking statements to reflect new information, future events or otherwise. In light of these risks, uncertainties and assumptions, the forward-looking events might or might not occur. Verizon cannot assure you that projected results or events will be achieved.

    MIL OSI Global Banks

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – 2023 and 2024 reports on Montenegro – P10_TA(2025)0130 – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Montenegro, of the other part(1), which entered into force on 1 May 2010,

    –  having regard to Montenegro’s application for membership of the European Union of 15 December 2008,

    –  having regard to the Commission opinion of 9 November 2010 on Montenegro’s application for membership of the European Union (COM(2010)0670), the European Council’s decision of 16-17 December 2010 to grant Montenegro candidate status and the European Council’s decision of 29 June 2012 to open EU accession negotiations with Montenegro,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III)(2),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans(3),

    –  having regard to the Presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of 19-20 June 2003,

    –  having regard to the Sofia Declaration of the EU-Western Balkans summit of 17 May 2018 and the Sofia Priority Agenda annexed thereto,

    –  having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits of 13 December 2023 in Brussels, and of 18 December 2024 in Brussels,

    –  having regard to the Berlin Process launched on 28 August 2014,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October 2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Montenegro 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0694),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2024 entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report’ (COM(2024)0800), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report – The rule of law situation in the European Union: Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Montenegro’ (SWD(2024)0829),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Montenegro 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0694),

    –  having regard to the Commission’s overview and country assessments of 31 May 2023 and of 13 June 2024 of the economic reform programme of Montenegro, and to the joint conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkans and Türkiye adopted by the Council on 16 May 2023 and to the joint conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkans Partners, Türkiye, Georgia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine adopted by the Council on 14 May 2024,

    –  having regard to the EU-Montenegro Intergovernmental Accession Conferences of 22 June 2021, 13 December 2021, 29 January 2024, 26 June 2024 and 16 December 2024,

    –  having regard to the 11th EU-Montenegro Stabilisation and Association Council on 14 July 2022,

    –  having regard to the declaration and recommendations adopted at the 22nd meeting of the EU-Montenegro Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee, held on 31 October and 1 November 2024,

    –  having regard to Montenegro’s accession to NATO on 5 June 2017,

    –  having regard to Special Report 01/2022 of the European Court of Auditors of 10 January 2022 entitled ‘EU support for the rule of law in the Western Balkans: despite efforts, fundamental problems persist’,

    –  having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the Istanbul Convention), ratified by Montenegro in 2013, and to the recommendations of the Commission on gender equality and combating gender-based violence,

    –  having regard to the World Press Freedom Index report published annually by Reporters Without Borders,

    –  having regard to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) data on the Ukraine Refugee Situation as of April 2025,

    –  having regard to its recommendation of 23 November 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning the new EU strategy for enlargement(4),

    –  having regard to its previous resolutions on Montenegro,

    –  having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement(5),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0093/2025),

    A.  whereas enlargement is a key EU foreign policy tool and a strategic geopolitical investment in peace, stability, security and prosperity;

    B.  whereas the new enlargement momentum, sparked by the changing geopolitical reality and the EU membership applications by several Eastern Partnership countries, has prompted the EU to accelerate its efforts towards delivering on its long-overdue commitments to the Western Balkans; whereas the future of the Western Balkan countries lies within the EU;

    C.  whereas each country is judged on its own merits in fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, including full respect for democracy, the rule of law, good governance, fundamental EU values and alignment with EU foreign and security policy; whereas the implementation of necessary reforms in the area of ‘fundamentals’ determines the timetable and progress in the accession process;

    D.  whereas Montenegro has gone furthest in the accession process, with all 33 chapters of the EU acquis open and six provisionally closed, and has significant public support therefor;

    E.  whereas the EU is Montenegro’s largest trading partner, investor and provider of financial assistance;

    F.  whereas Montenegro is exposed to malign foreign influence, disinformation campaigns and other forms of influence, including election meddling, hybrid warfare strategies and unfavourable investments from non-EU actors, particularly Russia and China, which are trying to influence Montenegro’s political, economic and strategic trajectory and threaten democratic processes and media integrity, jeopardising the country’s prospects for EU accession;

    G.  whereas on 8 June 2024, an ‘All-Serb Assembly’ took place in Belgrade with the participation of high-ranking parliamentarians under the slogan ‘One people, one Assembly’;

    Commitment to EU accession

    1.  Recognises Montenegro’s firm commitment to EU accession and reaffirms its full support for the country’s future EU membership; welcomes Montenegro’s leading regional position in the EU accession process as well as the overwhelming support of Montenegro’s citizens and the majority of political actors for joining the EU in 2028;

    2.  Welcomes Montenegro’s positive progress in enacting EU-related reforms and measures, underpinned by an ambitious timeline and calls for collective efforts of political actors, civil society and citizens; commends Montenegro for meeting the interim benchmarks for Chapters 23 and 24, which continue to determine the overall pace of negotiations, and for receiving a positive Interim Benchmark Assessment Report; welcomes the closure of three more negotiating chapters, bringing the total to six;

    3.  Encourages all political actors to stay focused on EU integration and the required reforms; stresses the need for political stability, commitment and constructive engagement in consensus building across party lines in order to move swiftly and more effectively towards closing additional chapters in 2025, so as to achieve the country’s ambitious timeline; stresses that the reforms adopted must be implemented effectively and consistently to ensure genuine progress and full alignment with EU legislation; calls for a strengthening of the functioning of, and coordination between, state institutions in order to achieve political stability and advance the country’s substantial progress in implementing key EU-related reforms, in particular electoral and judicial reforms and the fight against organised crime and corruption;

    4.  Underlines that the credibility of the EU, including its enlargement policy as a whole, would be affected if tangible progress achieved by certain Western Balkan countries does not translate into clear advancements on the EU accession path;

    5.  Welcomes Montenegro’s sustained full alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP), including EU restrictive measures, inter alia, those related to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and those targeted against cyberattacks, as well as its support for the international rules-based order at UN level; encourages Montenegro to strengthen the enforcement of restrictive measures and avoid their circumvention and to seize the assets of those sanctioned; calls on all government representatives to respect and promote CFSP alignment and EU values and refrain from any activities that may threaten Montenegro’s strategic path towards EU membership and its sovereignty; is highly concerned, in this context, by public high officials’ statements in support of the President of the Republika Srpska entity, Milorad Dodik, who is undermining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina; regrets the participation of high-ranking parliamentarians from Montenegro in the ‘All-Serbian Assembly’ in Belgrade as well as their support for the declaration adopted on that occasion undermining the sovereignty of Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo;

    6.  Underlines the strategic importance of Montenegro’s NATO membership and welcomes its active involvement in EU common security and defence policy missions and operations, such as EU Naval Force Operation Atalanta, and in NATO and other international and multilateral missions; welcomes the decision of Montenegro’s Council for Defence and Security to approve the participation of its armed forces in the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine and NATO’s Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine and calls on the Montenegrin Parliament to adopt these decisions, thereby reinforcing the country’s commitment to collective security;

    7.  Commends Montenegro for its humanitarian and material support to Ukraine and for extending the temporary protection mechanism that grants persons fleeing Ukraine the right to stay in Montenegro for one year; recalls that Montenegro is among the Western Balkan countries hosting the largest number of Ukrainian refugees, with over 18 800 refugees from Ukraine registered in Montenegro as of 31 January 2025, according to UNHCR statistics;

    8.  Remains seriously concerned by malign foreign interference, destabilisation efforts, cyberattacks, hybrid threats and disinformation campaigns, including attempts to influence political processes and public opinion, by third-country actors, which discredit the EU and undermine Montenegro’s progress on its accession path; urges Montenegro to adopt countermeasures in stronger cooperation with the EU and NATO and through increased regional cooperation among the Western Balkan countries; notes that religious institutions can be used as a tool for external influence and condemns any undue interference by the Serbian Orthodox Church in this regard; reiterates the importance of building resilience capacity against foreign information manipulation and interference, including through greater oversight of the media landscape, public awareness campaigns and media literacy programmes; recommends that Montenegro establish a dedicated hybrid threat task force;

    9.  Urges the Commission, the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Delegation of the EU to Montenegro and the Montenegrin authorities to boost strategic communication to Montenegrin citizens on the benefits of the enlargement process and EU membership, as well as on the concrete accession criteria that Montenegro still needs to fulfil to align with EU requirements; urges them, furthermore, to improve the EU’s visibility in the country, including as regards EU-funded projects; calls for StratCom monitoring to be expanded in order to concentrate on cross-border disinformation threats in the Western Balkan countries and their neighbours; calls on the Commission to further support the efforts of the EEAS and the Western Balkans Task Force so as to expand outreach activities by increasing visibility in local media, fact-checking reports and partnering with civil society organisations to counter false narratives more effectively;

    10.  Welcomes the Montenegrin Parliament’s renewed engagement in the Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee;

    Democracy and the rule of law

    11.  Recognises the Montenegrin Parliament’s key role in the accession process, notably as regards passing accession-related legislation, and underlines the importance of parliamentary cooperation in this regard; reiterates the European Parliament’s readiness to use its political and technical resources to advance the EU-related reform agenda, including through democracy support activities; notes, with concern, the re-emerging tensions and ethnic polarisation, which are slowing the reform process; calls for constructive dialogue and consensus building across the political spectrum, prioritising legislative quality, and strongly urges that solutions be found through parliamentary dialogue; calls for preventing identity politics from diverting attention from the EU agenda or straining relations with its neighbours, ensuring that Montenegro remains firmly on the EU path; welcomes the agreement between the Montenegrin Prime Minister and opposition leaders to request an opinion from the Venice Commission regarding the termination of the mandate of Constitutional Court judge Dragana Đuranović and for the opposition to return to the parliament;

    12.  Expresses its concern about attempts to amend the law on Montenegrin citizenship in the Montenegrin Parliament, which could have serious and long-term implications for the country’s decision-making processes and identity, while emphasising that any discussions on identity politics must be handled with the utmost sensitivity to avoid further polarisation and should aim for broad societal consensus; encourages the Montenegrin authorities to consult and coordinate with the EU on any possible changes to the law on citizenship and stresses the importance of achieving consensus on any matters relating to this subject of crucial importance for the identity and independence of Montenegro;

    13.  Strongly encourages the Montenegrin Parliament to hold inclusive and transparent public consultations and regular and meaningful engagement with civil society in decision-making from an early stage in the legislative process, notably for key legislation in the EU reform process; encourages a more active role for the Montenegrin Parliamentary Women’s Club;

    14.  Calls on Montenegro to fully align its electoral legal framework with EU standards, notably as regards harmonising electoral legislation, voting and candidacy rights restrictions, transparency, dispute resolution mechanisms, campaign and media oversight, and political party and election campaign financing, and to implement the recommendations of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights(6); urges Montenegro to increase transparency and control of political party spending and prevent the abuse of state resources by bringing the relevant legislation into line with EU standards, as well as enhancing the enforcement of third-party financing rules and strengthening sanctions for violations; highlights the role of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption (APC) in this regard, and calls for increased cooperation between the APC and financial intelligence authorities to detect and prevent foreign influence in political campaigns; calls, furthermore, on Montenegro to implement the recommendations of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) on gender parity on electoral lists;

    15.  Reiterates its call on the Montenegrin authorities to establish a single nationwide municipal election day, as provided for in the Law on Local Self-Government, in order to enhance governance efficiency, reduce political tensions and strengthen the stability and effectiveness of municipal and state institutions; recalls that future disbursement of funds under the Reform and Growth Facility is contingent on the fulfilment of this reform, in line with Montenegro’s commitments in its reform agenda, and should be pursued as a matter of priority; welcomes the fact that, in 2022, elections in 14 municipalities were held on the same day; calls for a robust legislative framework in this regard; is concerned by the misconduct of the electoral process in the municipality of Šavnik;

    16.  Calls on the Montenegrin authorities to adopt the Law on Government that should enable an improved governance framework and the optimisation of public administration;

    17.  Underlines the importance of a professional, merit-based, transparent and depoliticised civil service; calls on Montenegro to amend and implement the relevant legislation to provide a framework for the professionalisation, optimisation and rationalisation of state administration, including procedural safeguards against politically motivated decisions on appointments and dismissals, as well as high standards for managerial positions; regrets the lack of significant progress in adopting and effectively implementing such legislation and highlights that this allows for public service recruitment to remain subject to political influence;

    18.  Welcomes Montenegro’s inclusion in the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report; notes, with concern, the identified deficiencies, including judicial appointments and the independence of the prosecutor’s office;

    19.  Welcomes the progress made in implementing key judicial reforms, adopting a new strategic framework and completing long-outstanding judicial appointments; calls on Montenegro to fill the remaining high-level judicial positions;

    20.  Urges Montenegro to further align its legal framework, including the constitution, in particular on the composition and decision-making process of the Judicial Council, with EU laws and standards on the independence, accountability, impartiality, integrity and professionalism of the judiciary, and to further depoliticise appointments to bolster independence, implement outstanding international recommendations, and determine criteria for the retirement of judges and prosecutors in line with European standards and in full compliance with the Constitution; regrets the pending case backlog and calls on Montenegro to take measures to reduce the duration of legal proceedings, particularly for serious and organised crime cases, notably on money laundering; recommends that Montenegro adopt the amendments to the Constitution in the final stage of the country’s EU accession negotiations;

    21.  Notes the steps taken in the fight against corruption, including new laws and provisions on the protection of whistleblowers, the creation of a new National Council for the fight against corruption and a new anti-corruption strategy for 2024-2028; encourages Montenegro to further align with the EU acquis and EU standards and address recommendations by the Commission, the Venice Commission and the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO); encourages the Montenegrin authorities to continue addressing existing deficiencies in the handling of organised crime cases and the seizure and confiscation of criminal assets;

    22.  Urges Montenegro to step up its criminal justice response to high-level corruption, including by strengthening the effective enforcement of existing criminal legislation and imposing effective and deterrent penalties, and to create conditions for judicial institutions and independent bodies dealing with corruption to function effectively, free from political influence;

    23.  Notes the work of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption and calls for it to be provided with sufficient funding and for it to be depoliticised; expects the Agency to deliver tangible results and act non-selectively to strengthen its integrity and enhance its authority in carrying out its competences effectively; calls for a stronger corruption prevention framework;

    24.  Urges Montenegro to align its weapons legislation with EU law and international standards, particularly as regards technical standards for firearm markings, deactivation procedures and regulations for alarm and signal weapons, as well as to establish a standardised and effective data collection and reporting system for firearms; is appalled by the tragic mass shooting in Cetinje and expresses its condolences to the victims’ families; expresses its concern over the exploitation of this tragedy for disinformation and ethnic polarisation; urges Montenegro to strengthen its crisis communication to counter disinformation and ensure responsible media reporting in the aftermath of violent incidents; calls for systematic actions in the areas of security, mental well-being and institutional transparency, as well as in civic education and public awareness, outreach and educational initiatives, on the dangers and risks of firearms, in line with citizens’ expectations and societal needs;

    25.  Calls on Montenegro to urgently fully align its visa policy with that of the EU, especially as regards countries posing irregular migration or security risks to the EU; expresses its concern that, contrary to expectations, two additional countries have been added to the visa-free regime and that Russian and Belarusian passport holders continue to benefit from a visa-free regime; notes that the harmonisation of the visa policy is also provided for in Montenegro’s reform agenda under the Reform and Growth Facility;

    26.  Welcomes the ongoing cooperation between Montenegro and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), Europol, Eurojust and the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL), and notes the importance of this cooperation in tackling cross-border crime, including the trafficking of weapons, drugs and human beings, and in combating terrorism and extremism; welcomes the entry into force of the upgraded agreement on operational cooperation in border management with Frontex on 1 July 2023 and encourages further cooperation between Montenegro and Frontex to strengthen border management, support asylum procedures, fight smuggling and enhance readmission;

    Fundamental freedoms and human rights

    27.  Regrets that the most vulnerable groups in society still face discrimination; calls on Montenegro to adopt a new anti-discrimination law and relevant strategies, through an inclusive, transparent and meaningful process that actively involves those most affected, to improve vulnerable groups’ access to rights; underlines that respect for the rights of all national minorities is an integral part of the EU acquis; calls for stronger implementation to ensure equal treatment of all ethnic, religious, national and social groups so that they are guaranteed equal rights and opportunities and can fully participate in social, political and economic life;

    28.  Welcomes Montenegro’s multi-ethnic identity and calls for the further promotion of and respect for the languages, cultural heritage and traditions of local communities and national minorities, as this is closely intertwined with Montenegro’s European perspective;

    29.  Underlines the multi-ethnic identity of the Bay of Kotor; stresses that Montenegro’s European perspective is closely intertwined with the protection of minorities and their cultural heritage; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to nurture the multi-ethnic nature of the state, including the traditions and cultural heritage of the Croatian community in the Bay of Kotor;

    30.  Expresses its grave concern over the endangered heritage sites in Montenegro such as the Bay of Kotor and Sveti Stefan; stresses that Sveti Stefan, along with Miločer Park, was listed among the ‘7 Most Endangered heritage sites in Europe’ for 2023;

    31.  Calls on the Montenegrin authorities to address the difficult living conditions of Roma people in Montenegro and the discrimination they face, and calls for more measures to promote intercultural understanding in schools; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to also take measures to improve the climate of societal inclusion for LGBTI persons;

    32.  Welcomes that Montenegro has aligned its legislative and institutional framework with the EU acquis and international human rights standards regarding compliance with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and its optional protocols; urges the authorities to address shortcomings in implementation, namely related to accountability and monitoring;

    33.  Calls for the effective implementation of strategies to uphold the rights of persons with disabilities across all sectors and policies;

    34.  Condemns all hate speech, including online and gender-based hate speech, and hate crimes; welcomes the criminalisation of racism and hate speech;

    35.  Emphasises the need to strengthen institutional mechanisms for gender quality and calls on the Montenegrin authorities to address the gender pay gap, to improve women’s participation in decision-making – in both the public domain, particularly public administration, and judicial and security sectors, and in business – to ensure the increased political participation of women, to introduce gender responsive budgeting, and to combat gender stereotypes and strengthen efforts to combat discrimination against women, particularly in rural areas; welcomes recent efforts aimed at boosting women’s representation in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) and encourages further efforts in technology sectors;

    36.  Is deeply concerned by the high rates of gender-based violence, including domestic violence and femicide; calls on Montenegro to fully align its definitions of gender-based violence and domestic violence with the Istanbul Convention, and with recommendations of international bodies, and to set up effective protection and prevention mechanisms and support centres, and ensure effective judicial follow-up for victims of domestic and sexual violence as well as a more robust penal policy towards perpetrators; calls for the collection of disaggregated data on gender-based violence and gender disparities to improve policy responses;

    37.  Regrets that the draft law on legal gender recognition was not adopted in 2024, despite it being a measure under Montenegro’s EU accession programme; urges Montenegro to adopt the law without delay;

    38.  Welcomes Montenegro’s new media laws and its strategy for media policy aimed at strengthening the legal framework to effectively protect journalists and other media workers; insists on a zero-tolerance policy with regard to pressure on, harassment of, or violence against journalists, particularly by public figures; underlines the need for effective investigations, the prosecution of all instances of hate speech, smear campaigns and strategic lawsuits against journalists, and follow-up of past cases; stresses the need to ensure journalists’ rights to access information and maintain a critical stance; notes a significant improvement in Montenegro’s press freedom, demonstrated by its progress on the World Press Freedom Index;

    39.  Expresses its concern over cases where journalists, academics and civil society organisations have faced pressure for exercising free speech, including instances where the police have initiated misdemeanour proceedings against them; is concerned by the use of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) to target journalists;

    40.  Regrets the prevailing high level of polarisation in the media and its vulnerability to political interests and foreign influence as well as foreign and domestic disinformation campaigns that spread narratives that negatively impact democratic processes in the country and endanger Montenegro’s European perspective; calls on Montenegro to further develop improved media literacy programmes and include them as a core subject in education; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to ensure the editorial, institutional and financial independence of the public service broadcaster RTCG, as well as the legality of the appointment of its management and full respect for court rulings concerning RTCG; recalls that it needs to comply with the law and the highest standards of accountability and integrity; regrets that the independence of public media is being weakened and undermined; calls on all media entities to comply with legal requirements on public funding transparency;

    41.  Welcomes the publication of the 2023 population census results; calls on the authorities to avoid any politicisation of the process; encourages stakeholders to use these results in a non-discriminatory manner;

    42.  Welcomes Montenegro’s vibrant and constructive civil society and underlines its importance in fostering democracy and pluralism and in promoting good governance and social progress; expresses its concern over the shrinking space for civil society organisations with a critical stance, and condemns all smear campaigns, intimidation and attacks against civil society organisations, notably by political figures in the context of proposals for a ‘foreign agent law’; notes that such laws have the potential to undermine fundamental freedoms and the functioning of civil society and are inconsistent with EU values and standards; calls for a supportive legal framework and clear and fair selection criteria in relation to public funding; calls for the Council for Cooperation between the Government and non-governmental organisations to resume work; underlines the importance of building collaborative relationships and genuinely consulting civil society on draft legislation from an early stage onwards;

    Reconciliation, good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation

    43.  Recalls that good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation are essential elements of the enlargement process; commends Montenegro’s active involvement in regional cooperation initiatives; recalls that good neighbourly relations are key for advancing in the accession process;

    44.  Regrets that Chapter 31 could not be closed in December 2024; calls on all engaged parties to find solutions to outstanding bilateral issues in a constructive and neighbourly manner and prioritise the future interests of citizens in the Western Balkans; recalls that using unresolved bilateral and regional disputes to block candidate countries’ accession processes should be avoided; welcomes bilateral consultations between the Republic of Croatia and Montenegro on the status of unresolved bilateral issues; encourages the authorities to continue pursuing confidence-building measures;

    45.  Notes Montenegro’s amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code to address legal and practical obstacles to the effective investigation, prosecution, trial and punishment of war crimes in line with relevant recommendations; calls on Montenegro to apply a proactive approach to handling war crimes cases, in line with international law and standards, to identify, prosecute and punish the perpetrators and the glorification of war crimes and ensure access to, and delivery of justice, redress and reparations for victims, and clarify the fate of missing persons; calls on Montenegro to allocate sufficient resources to specialised prosecutors and courts and proactively investigate all war crime allegations and raise issues of command responsibility, as well as to review past cases that were not prosecuted in line with international or domestic law; calls for regional cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of individuals indicted for war crimes; recognises that addressing these issues and safeguarding court-based facts are an important foundation for trust, democratic values, reconciliation and strengthening bilateral relations with neighbouring countries, and encourages Montenegro to step up these efforts;

    46.  Warns against the dangers of political revisionism, which distorts historical facts for political purposes, undermines accountability and deepens societal divisions; strongly condemns the glorification of war criminals and widespread public denial of international verdicts for war crimes, including by the Montenegrin authorities; considers that President Jakov Milatović’s statement expressing regret over the participation of Montenegrin forces in the bombardment of the city of Dubrovnik was a valuable contribution to regional peace and reconciliation;

    47.  Reiterates its support for the initiative to establish the Regional Commission for the establishment of facts about war crimes and other gross human rights violations on the territory of the former Yugoslavia (RECOM);

    48.  Reiterates its call for the archives that concern the former republics of Yugoslavia to be opened and for access to be granted to the files of the former Yugoslav Secret Service and the Yugoslav People’s Army Secret Service in order to thoroughly research and address communist-era crimes;

    Socio-economic reforms

    49.  Welcomes Montenegro’s inclusion in SEPA payment schemes, lowering costs for citizens and businesses; underlines that this opens up opportunities for business expansion, increased competitiveness, innovation and improved access to foreign direct investments;

    50.  Welcomes the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, which aims to integrate the region into the EU’s single market, promote regional economic cooperation and deepen EU-related reforms, and which includes the EUR 6 billion Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans; welcomes Montenegro’s adoption of a reform agenda and encourages its full implementation; notes that the implementation of the defined reform measures under Montenegro’s reform agenda for the Growth Plan would provide access to over EUR 380 million in grants and favourable loans, subject to successful implementation; stresses the importance of inclusive stakeholder consultations, including local and regional authorities, social partners and civil society, in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation phases;

    51.  Encourages Montenegro to make best use of all EU funding available under the Pre-accession Assistance Instrument (IPA III), the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans, the IPARD programme and the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, to accelerate socio-economic convergence with the EU and further align its legislation with the EU on fraud prevention; recalls the conditionality of EU funding, which may be modulated or suspended in the event of significant regression or persistent lack of progress on fundamentals;

    52.  Calls for the EU and the Western Balkan countries to establish a framework for effective cooperation between the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and the accession countries in order to facilitate close cooperation and the prosecution of the misuse of EU funds, including through the secondment of national liaison officers to the EPPO; encourages Montenegro to fully implement working arrangements with the EPPO; calls for the EU to make the necessary legal and political arrangements to extend the jurisdiction of the EPPO to EU funds devoted to Montenegro as a candidate country;

    53.  Positively notes Montenegro’s economic growth; calls for more steps to reduce the budget deficit and public debt, and to further remove indirect tax exemptions that do not align with the EU acquis; welcomes the efforts to reduce these fiscal vulnerabilities; reiterates the need for increased public investment in the education system for sustainable social and economic development;

    54.  Notes Montenegro’s public debt to foreign financial institutions and companies that can be used as a tool to influence its policy decisions, in particular those related to China and Russia; welcomes the efforts to reduce these vulnerabilities and calls on the authorities to further reduce economic dependence on China and to continue making use of the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans, the EU Global Gateway initiative and the Reform and Growth Facility, with a view to finding greener and more transparent alternatives for financing infrastructure projects; calls on Montenegro to increase transparency in future infrastructure projects, ensure competitive bidding and avoid excessive debt dependence on foreign creditors;

    55.  Calls on the Montenegrin authorities to take measures to counter depopulation and emigration, in particular through investments in education and healthcare, especially in the north of the country, as well as through decentralisation by investing in medium-sized cities;

    56.  Encourages the Montenegrin authorities to boost the digital transformation and pursue evidence-based labour market policies to address the persistently high unemployment rate, in particular among women and young people, while bolstering institutional capacity and enhancing the underlying digital policy framework, and to effectively implement the Youth Guarantee and the new Youth Strategy; urges the authorities to address brain drain as a matter of urgency; encourages the development of targeted preventive measures and incentives to legalise informal businesses and employees, as a large informal sector continues to hinder economic and social development in Montenegro;

    57.  Welcomes the calls for the prompt integration of all Western Balkan countries into the EU’s digital single market before actual EU membership, which would crucially enable the creation of a digitally safe environment;

    58.  Calls for more transparency in public procurement, notably for procedures via intergovernmental agreements, and for full compliance with EU rules and principles; calls on Montenegro to reduce the number of public procurement procedures without notices; expresses its concern over the financial burden and lack of transparency surrounding the construction of the Bar-Boljare motorway financed by a Chinese loan; stresses that the secrecy surrounding loan agreements and construction contracts raises accountability concerns;

    59.  Expresses its concern over any agreements or projects that circumvent public procurement rules, transparency obligations and public consultation requirements, as set out in national legislation and EU standards; calls on the Government of Montenegro to ensure full respect for the principles of transparency, accountability, inclusive decision-making and the rule of law in all public infrastructure and development initiatives;

    Energy, the environment, biodiversity and connectivity

    60.  Urges Montenegro to advance the green transition, with the support of EU funding, improve its institutional and regulatory framework and enhance energy resilience by finally adopting and implementing the long-overdue National Energy and Climate Plan, adopting energy efficiency laws and integrating further with EU energy markets; calls for all new green transition projects to be implemented in line with EU standards on the environment, State aid and concessions;

    61.  Regrets the lack of progress on key sector reforms in the area of transport policy; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to align the country’s transport development with the Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy for the Western Balkans, focusing on railways, multimodality and reducing CO2 emissions and other environmental impacts, and to further implement its Transport Development Strategy and strengthen administrative capacities for the implementation of trans-European transport networks;

    62.  Welcomes the reduction of data roaming charges between the EU and the Western Balkan countries and calls on the authorities, private actors and all stakeholders to take all necessary steps towards the goal of bringing data roaming prices close to domestic prices by 2028; welcomes the entry into force of the first phase of the implementation of the roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU;

    63.  Encourages the adoption of sectoral strategies for waste management, air and water quality, nature protection and climate change, ensuring strategic planning for investments; notes the lack of progress and associated rising costs in building essential waste water treatment plants to prevent sewage pollution in rivers and the sea in seven municipalities;

    o
    o   o

    64.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commissioner for Enlargement, the Commissioner for the Mediterranean, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and to the President, Government and Parliament of Montenegro, and to have it translated and published in Montenegrin.

    (1) OJ L 108, 29.4.2010, p. 3, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2010/224/oj.
    (2) OJ L 330, 20.9.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1529/oj.
    (3) OJ L, 2024/1449, 24.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1449/oj.
    (4) OJ C 167, 11.5.2023, p. 105.
    (5) OJ C, C/2024/6746, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6746/oj.
    (6) https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/montenegro.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – The Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law report – P10_TA(2025)0129 – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Articles 2, 3(1), 3(3), second subparagraph, 4(3), 5, 6, 7, 11, 19 and 49 thereof,

    –  having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular to the articles thereof relating to respect for and the protection and promotion of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights in the Union, including Articles 70, 258, 259, 260, 263, 265 and 267,

    –  having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter),

    –  having regard to the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2024 entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report – The rule of law situation in the European Union’ (COM(2024)0800), and the annex thereto containing recommendations for the Member States,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 on EU enlargement policy (COM(2024)0690) and its accompanying staff working documents (the Enlargement Package),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget(1) (the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy(2) (the Common Provisions Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union(3) (the Financial Regulation), in particular Article 6(3) thereof,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/692 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1381/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EU) No 390/2014(4),

    –  having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

    –  having regard to the UN instruments on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRDP), the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities and the Recommendations of the UN Forum on Minority Issues, and to the recommendations and reports of the UN Universal Periodic Review, as well as the case-law of the UN treaty bodies and the special procedures of the Human Rights Council,

    –  having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Social Charter, the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the European Committee of Social Rights, and the conventions, recommendations, resolutions, opinions and reports of the Parliamentary Assembly, the Committee of Ministers, the Commissioner for Human Rights, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, the Steering Committee on Anti-Discrimination, Diversity and Inclusion, the Venice Commission and other bodies of the Council of Europe,

    –  having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence,

    –  having regard to the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities of the Council of Europe,

    –  having regard to the memorandum of understanding between the Council of Europe and the European Union of 23 May 2007 and the Council conclusions of 17 December 2024 on EU priorities for cooperation with the Council of Europe 2025-2026,

    –  having regard to the Commission’s reasoned proposal of 20 December 2017 for a Council decision on the determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law (COM(2017)0835), issued in accordance with Article 7(1) TEU,

    –  having regard to its resolution of 25 October 2016 with recommendations to the Commission on the establishment of an EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights(5),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 7 February 2018 on protection and non-discrimination with regard to minorities in the EU Member States(6);

    –  having regard to its resolution of 1 March 2018 on the Commission’s decision to activate Article 7(1) TEU as regards the situation in Poland(7),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 19 April 2018 on the need to establish a European Values Instrument to support civil society organisations which promote fundamental values within the European Union at local and national level(8),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 12 September 2018 on a proposal calling on the Council to determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded(9),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 13 November 2018 on minimum standards for minorities in the EU(10),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 14 November 2018 on the need for a comprehensive EU mechanism for the protection of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights(11),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 7 October 2020 on the establishment of an EU Mechanism on Democracy, the Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights(12),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 13 November 2020 on the impact of COVID-19 measures on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights(13),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 17 December 2020 on the European Citizens’ Initiative ‘Minority SafePack – one million signatures for diversity in Europe’(14),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 10 June 2021 on the rule of law situation in the European Union and the application of the Conditionality Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092(15),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 24 June 2021 on the Commission’s 2020 Rule of Law Report(16),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 8 July 2021 on the creation of guidelines for the application of the general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget(17),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2021 with recommendations to the Commission on identifying gender-based violence as a new area of crime listed in Article 83(1) TFEU(18),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 11 November 2021 on strengthening democracy and media freedom and pluralism in the EU: the undue use of actions under civil and criminal law to silence journalists, NGOs and civil society(19),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 15 December 2021 on the evaluation of preventive measures for avoiding corruption, irregular spending and misuse of EU and national funds in case of emergency funds and crisis-related spending areas(20),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 8 March 2022 on the shrinking space for civil society in Europe(21),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 10 March 2022 on the rule of law and the consequences of the ECJ ruling(22),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2022 on the Commission’s 2021 Rule of Law Report(23),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 9 June 2022 on the rule of law and the potential approval of the Polish national recovery plan (RRF)(24),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union in 2020 and 2021(25),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on the proposal for a Council decision determining, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded(26),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2022 on the rule of law in Malta, five years after the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia(27),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2022 on growing hate crimes against LGBTIQ+ people across Europe in light of the recent homophobic murder in Slovakia(28),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 10 November 2022 on racial justice, non-discrimination and anti-racism in the EU(29),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 24 November 2022 on the assessment of Hungary’s compliance with the rule of law conditions under the Conditionality Regulation and state of play of the Hungarian RRP(30),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 30 March 2023 on the 2022 Rule of Law Report – the rule of law situation in the European Union(31),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 18 April 2023 on the institutional relations between the EU and the Council of Europe(32),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 28 February 2024 ‘Report on the Commission’s 2023 Rule of Law report’(33),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement(34),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 1 June 2023 on the breaches of the Rule of Law and fundamental rights in Hungary and frozen EU funds(35),

    –  having regard to the report of its Committee of Inquiry to investigate the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware (PEGA) and to its recommendation of 15 June 2023 to the Council and the Commission following the investigation of alleged contraventions and maladministration in the application of Union law in relation to the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware(36),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 11 July 2023 on the electoral law, the investigative committee and the rule of law in Poland(37),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 19 October 2023 on the rule of law in Malta: six years after the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia, and the need to protect journalists(38),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 6 December 2023 entitled ‘No place for hate: a Europe united against hatred’ (JOIN(2023)0051),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union – annual report 2022 and 2023(39),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on extending the list of EU crimes to hate speech and hate crime(40),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 24 April 2024 on ongoing hearings under Article 7(1) TEU regarding Hungary to strengthen the rule of law and its budgetary implications(41),

    –  having regard to the conclusion of the Article 7 TEU procedure in relation to Poland, as announced by the Commission on 29 May 2024, following steps taken by Poland to restore compliance with EU rule of law standards;

    –  having regard to Resolution 2262 (2019) of 24 January 2019 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on promoting the rights of persons belonging to national minorities,

    –  having regard to the recommendations and reports of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the High Commissioner on National Minorities, the Representative on Freedom of the Media and other bodies of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), to the cooperation between the EU and the OSCE on democratisation, institution-building and human rights and to the annual OSCE hate crime report, in which participating states have committed themselves to passing legislation that provides for penalties that take into account the gravity of hate crime, to taking action to address under-reporting and to introducing or further developing capacity-building activities for law enforcement, prosecution and judicial officials to prevent, investigate and prosecute hate crimes,

    –  having regard to the special reports of the European Court of Auditors of 17 December 2024 on Enforcing EU Law (28/2024), of 22 February 2024 on the Rule of Law in the EU (03/2024), and of 10 January 2022 on EU support for the rule of law in the Western Balkans (01/2022), and to its review of 28 February 2024 on the Commission’s rule of law reporting (02/2024), and to their respective recommendations,

    –  having regard to the Political Guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029, presented to Parliament on 18 July 2024 by Ursula von der Leyen, candidate for President of the Commission,

    –  having regard to the 2024 Eurobarometer surveys on corruption, which show that corruption remains a serious concern for citizens and businesses in the EU,

    –  having regard to the feedback reports, mission reports, written questions and answers of its Democracy, Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights Monitoring Group (DRFMG)(42),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A10-0100/2025),

    A.  whereas the Union is founded on the common values enshrined in Article 2 TEU of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities – values that are common to the EU Member States and are reflected in the Charter and embedded in international human rights treaties; whereas the Charter is part of EU primary law; whereas democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights are mutually reinforcing values which, when undermined, pose a systemic threat to the rights and freedoms of the people living in the EU;

    B.  whereas it is apparent from Article 49 TEU, which provides the possibility for any European state to apply to become a member of the European Union, that the Union is composed of states which have freely and voluntarily committed themselves to the common values referred to in Article 2 TEU, which respect those values and which undertake to promote them; whereas EU law is thus based on the fundamental premise that each Member State shares with all the other Member States, and recognises that those Member States share with it, those same values; whereas that premise implies and justifies the existence of mutual trust between the Member States that those values will be recognised and, therefore, that the law of the EU that implements them will be respected(43),(44); whereas the Member State are required to ensure that any regression in the protection of the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU is prevented;

    C.  whereas civil society organisations (CSOs), the legal community, associations, independent media and grassroots movements remain a cornerstone of the rule of law by promoting transparency, accountability and citizen participation in democratic processes; whereas these actors have been instrumental in safeguarding judicial independence, freedom of expression and other constitutional values, often operating under increasing political and legal constraints;

    D.  whereas the principle of sincere cooperation in Article 4(3) TEU places an obligation on the Union and the Member States to assist each other in carrying out obligations that arise from the Treaties in full mutual respect, and on Member States to take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations arising from the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union; whereas Member States should refrain from any measures which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives;

    E.  whereas in a recent Eurobarometer survey, 74 % of respondents thought that the EU plays an important role in upholding the rule of law and 89 % believed that it is important for all Member States to respect the EU’s core values; whereas, in the current global economic and political context, bolstering citizens’ trust in the rule of law and the resilience of democracies at EU level is a crucial factor;

    F.  whereas accession to the EU must always be a merit-based procedure in which there is an assessment of whether an applicant fulfils the Copenhagen criteria, in particular those guaranteeing full respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law, in order to ensure that EU enlargement strengthens rather than weakens the EU and its single market; whereas the fundamental role of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance as a Union instrument is to support the rule of law, democracy and human rights in candidate and potential candidate countries, including the strengthening of democratic institutions and CSOs, as well as progress on good governance and the fight against corruption, the promotion and protection of non-discrimination and gender equality and the strengthening of capacities for conflict prevention and resolution;

    Independence of the judiciary

    1.  Underlines that fair and accessible justice is a basic rule of law principle that requires an independent judiciary; reiterates that access to justice is essential for citizens to exercise rights, challenge discrimination and hold decision makers accountable;

    2.  Recalls that robust national legal systems are indispensable in Member States, candidate and potential candidate countries, given that the Commission relies on national judicial authorities to enforce EU law, and that they are fundamental to judicial cooperation across the EU and to fostering mutual trust; notes with concern that while some judicial systems may appear robust on paper, this does not always align with reality;

    3.  Stresses the need for the impartiality of judges; recalls that the appointment and promotion of judges must be determined solely by their qualifications and not be influenced by political or personal considerations, as the judges essential for safeguarding judicial independence; recalls that the criteria for nominations and appointments to high-level judicial positions must be fully transparent;

    4.  Underlines the important role of the national councils of the judiciary in safeguarding judicial independence; considers it necessary to evaluate the reforms that are in the process of being adopted in different Member States and encourages the adaptation of the composition and functioning of these bodies to the standards established by the Commission and the Council of Europe, and which have been endorsed by the CJEU; calls on the Commission in its future rule of law reports to place a particular focus on the roles, structures and functioning of Member States’ national judicial councils as part of its assessment of judicial independence;

    5.  Points out that the prosecution service is a key element in the capacity of a Member State to fight crime and corruption; regrets any governmental or political interference in corruption investigations and recalls that no one is above the law; condemns the misuse of the judicial system for political purposes, including the persecution of political opponents and interference in corruption investigations; stresses that both politically motivated prosecutions and amnesty laws and pardon procedures driven by political interests undermine public trust in constitutional principles and EU standards; highlights the importance of guaranteeing the autonomy and independence of the prosecution service, thereby preventing any political interference in its work, especially from the government; highlights the role of transparent appointment processes for prosecutors as a key factor in maintaining public confidence in criminal justice; highlights its concern about repeated attacks on judges and prosecutors who are conducting high-profile political investigations linked to cases of corruption and abuse of power perpetrated against political opponents;

    6.  Calls for disciplinary procedures for judges and prosecutors to be handled by independent bodies free from political influence and, where necessary, for the system of disciplinary procedures to be reformed to preclude their use by political authorities to control the judiciary;

    7.  Calls on the Commission to maintain constant oversight, ensuring that judges and prosecutors remain independent of the authorities responsible for appointing or reappointing them; calls on the Commission to proactively monitor and swiftly react to risks of rule of law backsliding in areas of judicial independence and access to justice, in line with the principle of non-regression as clarified in recent CJEU case-law;

    8.  Notes that the Commission has found that there are structural challenges with regard to improving the efficiency, accessibility and quality of the judiciary of some Member States(45) and of candidate and potential candidate countries; notes that the Commission has found that several Member States have allocated additional resources to strengthening the resilience of justice systems to ensure the timely resolution of cases and reduce backlogs, while in other Member States levels of remuneration continue to pose challenges, often leading to shortages and vacancies; notes that underfunding and understaffing can undermine the accessibility and effectiveness of judicial systems, thus eroding trust in the rule of law; emphasises that adequate remuneration is essential to attract and retain qualified judicial personnel; strongly believes that training is a key element that guarantees the independence of judges, as well as the quality and efficiency of the judicial system; states that an important element of the state of the rule of law and fair proceedings are judicial procedures conducted in a reasonable time frame; notes, in that context, that the justice scoreboard indicates significant discrepancies across the EU legal area;

    9.  Encourages the Member States to ensure training opportunities for judges; strongly believes that training should be multidisciplinary, with a particular focus on gender equality; reiterates that adequate resources, including funding, infrastructure and qualified personnel, are crucial for the efficiency and accessibility of the justice system; recognises the role of court staff, including notaries, in numerous Member States; calls on all Member States to follow up on corruption cases within a reasonable time limit so as to not foster a feeling of impunity among their citizens; invites Member States to take advantage of the opportunities offered by digitalisation to simplify procedures and processes, improve efficiency and accessibility, save time and reduce storage costs;

    10.  Stresses the importance of independent judicial systems and access to free legal aid in ensuring equal access to justice; reiterates that adequate resources, including infrastructure and personnel, are crucial to improving justice systems; recommends that Member States take concrete steps to improve access to justice for marginalised and vulnerable groups, including adequately funded, enhanced legal aid systems and measures to address language barriers and digital divides;

    11.  Recalls that the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report states that serious concerns persist regarding judicial independence in Hungary and that political influence on the prosecution service remains, with the risk of undue interference in individual cases, and that the freedom of expression of judges remains under pressure and smear campaigns against judges continue in the media;

    12.  Welcomes the pivotal role of the CJEU in upholding the rule of law across the EU; endorses further initiatives to enhance the resources and the capabilities of the CJEU to effectively address further challenges to the rule of law; reiterates that, in accordance with Article 19 TEU and Article 267 TFEU, national courts cannot be hindered from using the possibility of a referral for preliminary ruling to the CJEU; calls on the Commission to carry out a systematic check in this regard as part of its annual rule of law report, and to start infringement proceedings in cases where national judges face obstacles in this regard;

    13.  Regrets the trend whereby some Member States are selectively applying, delaying or failing to implement CJEU and ECtHR judgments and calls for their timely and effective implementation; emphasises that Member States and EU institutions must systematically integrate and implement the latest CJEU case-law to uphold the rule of law and ensure the uniform application of EU law; calls for the swift adaptation of national legislation and institutional frameworks to comply with court rulings;

    14.  Reiterates its strong support for the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court (ICC) as essential, independent and impartial jurisdictional institutions at a particularly challenging time for international justice; recalls the need to fully implement the orders of the International Court of Justice, which are legally binding; calls for the Union, its Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to continue to support the ICC;

    15.  Urges the Commission, as the guardian of the Treaties, to meet its responsibility for the enforcement of the Union’s basic values, including those laid down in Article 2 TEU and in the EU’s primary law, and not to rely only on citizens going to court themselves to ensure the application of EU law; stresses that the non-implementation of domestic and international judgments is violating the rule of law and risks leaving people without remedy and can create a perception among the public that judgments can be disregarded, undermining general trust in fair adjudication; underlines the fundamental role of the CJEU and the ECtHR in ensuring respect for the law and guaranteeing uniformity in its application; proposes establishing clear deadlines for the implementation of court rulings, as well as a detailed monitoring plan for the implementation of pending judgments; urges the Commission to launch infringement procedures if needed, together with motions for interim measures; calls on the Member States to implement pending judgments of the CJEU and the ECtHR promptly and suggests the establishment of a monitoring unit to monitor the implementation of CJEU and ECtHR rulings relating to democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights in EU countries, and to fully integrate the monitoring unit’s findings into the annual rule of law report; recommends that the Commission, in particular, take action regarding failures to implement CJEU judgments under Article 260(2) TFEU and apply the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation in cases of non-compliance with CJEU and ECtHR judgments where the breach identified affects or seriously risks affecting the Union budget or financial interests; stresses that systematic non-compliance with EU law must entail tangible financial penalties to ensure genuine deterrence; calls on the Commission to assess whether delays or non-compliance with such rulings warrant proceedings for failure to act under Article 258 TFEU; calls on the Commission to systematically analyse data on non-compliance with country-specific views of UN Treaty Bodies;

    16.  Welcomes the revision of the Victims’ Rights Directive(46) to close legal gaps, ensuring that victims can access justice and receive support; calls on the Council to include as much as possible from Parliament’s mandate, including provisions ensuring victims’ right to review decisions in criminal proceedings, on access to legal remedies and fair compensation, and on comprehensive support services, particularly for those in vulnerable situations; stresses the importance of effective data collection, of enhancing resource allocation for victim assistance and of safeguarding victims’ privacy and personal data to prevent secondary victimisation and ensure that victims, including undocumented migrants and asylum seekers, can safely report crimes; expects co-legislators to adopt solutions that are victim-centred;

    17.  Recognises the essential role of law enforcement in upholding the rule of law and protecting fundamental rights; calls on the Member States to ensure adequate funding, training and resources for the police and law enforcement agencies; calls on the Member States to take into account the Council of Europe’s Code of Police Ethics in this regard; emphasises that any use of force must be strictly necessary, proportionate and subject to clear safeguards; calls on the Member States to introduce guidelines for the transparent, independent and consistent selection, testing and trialling of weapons used by law enforcement agents, based on UN standards, recommendations and guiding principles; notes that this assessment should determine that such weapons are compliant with international human rights law and standards prior to their selection and deployment; calls on the Member States to thoroughly investigate any cases of excessive use of force and discriminatory treatment by law enforcement agencies;

    18.  Calls on the Commission to include, as a rule of law concern, the conditions in prisons in future rule of law reports, given the serious and growing concerns across Europe regarding overcrowding, inadequate living conditions and the alarming rates of suicide within prisons;

    19.  Calls on the Commission to pay special attention to analysing procedural justice with a view to identifying strengths, gaps, discrepancies and best practice in ensuring transparency, efficiency and fair treatment in strengthening administrative justice across the EU, as a means of ensuring the accountability of public authorities;

    Anti-corruption framework

    20.  Stresses that the rule of law requires that persons holding public office cannot act arbitrarily or abuse their power for personal gain; underlines that governments should adopt laws in the interest of the general public and not in the interest of specific individuals;

    21.  Reiterates that corruption is a serious threat to democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law in Member States, candidate countries and potential candidate countries; underlines that corruption erodes citizens’ trust in public institutions; deplores the fact that the 2024 Eurobarometer on corruption shows that corruption remains a serious concern for EU citizens and businesses, with 68 % of Europeans considering corruption to be widespread in their country, 65 % believing that high-level corruption cases are not pursued sufficiently and 41 % believing that the level of corruption has increased; considers this a call for the EU to step up its efforts to combat corruption;

    22.  Reiterates its call on the Commission to immediately finalise negotiations on the EU’s membership of the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO); notes that such membership will ensure greater transparency, accountability and efficiency in the management of EU funds, the legislative process and the work of the EU institutions, and demands that the annual rule of law report cover EU institutions;

    23.  Reiterates its call on all Member States to adopt a code of conduct for judges following the GRECO recommendations, and taking into account the codes applicable at the ECtHR and the CJEU; calls on Member States to create independent mechanisms to investigate alleged violations of the code of conduct and other laws, to improve disclosure and transparency with regard to conflicts of interest and gifts received by the judiciary, and to address the issue of revolving doors;

    24.  Calls on the Member States, candidate countries and potential candidate countries, and the EU institutions to enhance transparency and accountability in public institutions by strengthening anti-corruption and conflict of competence legal frameworks and reporting processes to ensure the effective investigation and prosecution of corruption cases, including high-level corruption cases (inter alia those linked to public procurement procedures and those relating to high-risk areas such as ports or land borders), reinforcing oversight mechanisms and bodies and the independence and proper functioning of existing agencies, fostering protection for whistle-blowers, improving integrity frameworks and lobbying for legislation; regrets the lack of relevant progress made and stresses that final convictions and deterrent penalties are necessary to demonstrate genuine commitment to tackling corruption; calls on Member States to ensure the transparency and accountability of lobbying activities, including the establishment or improvement of mandatory lobbying registers and ‘legislative footprint’ mechanisms for tracking the influence of lobbying activities on lawmaking processes;

    25.  Acknowledges the important role of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) in safeguarding the rule of law and combating corruption within the EU; encourages the Commission to closely monitor Member States’ level of cooperation with the EPPO; endorses the reinforcement of the monitoring and coordinative powers of the EPPO with a view to strengthening its ability to combat corruption in Member States; calls on the Commission to propose, under Article 86(4) TFEU, an expansion of the mandate of the EPPO to avoid circumvention of EU restrictive measures and cross-border environmental crimes, and to accelerate the revision of the EPPO Regulation(47) and the Directive on the fight against fraud to the EU’s financial interests by means of criminal law(48) in order to safeguard and clarify the primary competence of the EPPO with regard to corruption offences affecting the EU’s financial interests or committed by EU officials;

    26.  Urges all Member States that have not yet done so to join the EPPO in order to enhance the effectiveness of the fight against corruption, particularly in relation to the protection of EU funds; calls on all candidate and potential candidate countries to establish a framework for effective cooperation with the EPPO;

    27.  Calls on European bodies such as Europol, Eurojust, the European Court of Auditors, the EPPO and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) to improve their cooperation in the fight against corruption and fraud affecting EU finances;

    28.  Calls on the Commission to enhance transparency and accountability in all of its communications, visits and meetings, especially with high-level national actors;

    29.  Welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a directive on combating corruption which harmonises the definition of corruption offences in the public and private sector and the corresponding penalties; welcomes the inclusion of preventive measures, including on illicit political financing and training, in the directive on combating corruption, such as effective rules for the disclosure and management of conflicts of interest, open access to information and effective rules regulating the interaction between the private and the public sector; calls on the Member States to also put in place effective rules to address revolving doors, establish codes of conduct for public officials, establish a public legislative footprint, and ensure transparency in the funding of candidatures for elected public officials and political parties; appreciates that almost all Member States now have anti-corruption strategies in place; regrets, at the same time, that implementation and effectiveness vary; calls on the Member States that have not yet done so to develop and implement robust and effective anti-corruption strategies with the involvement of civil society; underlines the importance of the identification, notification, representation and coordination of victims of corruption; calls on the Member States to protect victims of corruption and enable them to have their views and concerns presented and considered at appropriate stages during criminal proceedings; calls on the Member States to ensure that victims of corruption have the right to adequate and proportionate compensation;

    30.  Calls on all the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies to strengthen their anti-corruption measures with regard to the disclosure and management of conflicts of interest, open access to information, rules regulating the interaction of EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies with the private sector, revolving doors and the code of conduct for public officials; considers that during their term of office, Members of the European Parliament should not engage in paid side activities with for-profit organisations or businesses seeking to influence EU policymaking

    31.  Recognises the crucial role that whistle-blowers play in exposing corruption and promoting transparency across both the public and private sectors; stresses the need to protect whistle-blowers from retaliation and harassment; calls for independent and autonomous whistle-blower protection authorities to be further strengthened and further integrated into broader national anti-corruption frameworks, ensuring a unified and robust approach to combating corruption throughout all Member States;

    Media pluralism and freedom

    32.  Welcomes initiatives to promote free, independent and pluralistic media and a safe and enabling environment for journalists such as the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA)(49) and calls for its swift implementation; calls on the Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to improve transparency in the allocation of state advertising online and offline and to follow the recommendations contained in Commission Recommendation (EU) 2021/1534 of 16 September 2021 on ensuring the protection, safety and empowerment of journalists and other media professionals in the European Union; calls on the Commission to provide the Member States with the necessary assistance in transposing the EMFA into national law, and to monitor its implementation, especially in certain Member States that rank poorly in freedom indices; underlines that the EMFA is a crucial milestone in safeguarding the independence, pluralism and integrity of the media landscape across the Union;

    33.  Expresses deep concern over the increasing attacks on journalists and publishers, with a disproportionate impact on women; calls on the Commission and the Member States and on candidate and potential candidate countries to ensure the safety and protection of journalists, including investigative journalists and fact checkers who are particularly exposed; highlights the fact that the most common forms of threat include verbal attacks, online harassment, intimidation through social media and email, and legal threats, including cases covered by the Anti-SLAPP (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’) Directive(50), as well as instances of stalking and personal harassment;

    34.  Calls on the Member States to fully implement the Anti-SLAPP Directive and Commission Recommendation (EU) 2022/758 of 27 April 2022 on protecting journalists and human rights defenders who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings(51), and to adopt comprehensive domestic anti-SLAPP measures to protect journalists and provide support for those facing intimidation, defamation and limitations on the ability to exercise their profession; recommends that, when transposing the directive, Member States extend its application to also include national cases, since the majority of SLAPP cases occur at the national level; calls on the Commission to put forward proposals to address SLAPP cases not covered under the current Directive;

    35.  Calls for the introduction of specific aggravating circumstances in criminal law for offences committed against journalists when such acts are motivated by or connected to their professional activities;

    36.  Urges the Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to protect and promote media freedom and pluralism, ensure transparent allocation of public funds, prevent the concentration of media ownership, protect editorial independence and combat disinformation, particularly through robust laws, including specific provisions on media ownership transparency, and independent regulators; underlines the important role of public service media; welcomes initiatives at national level to create a media registry containing public information about ownership and advertising investment in order to ensure transparency, impartiality and verifiability; further calls on Member States to ensure adequate, sustainable and predictable funding and budgetary stability based on transparent and objective criteria for public service media; recommends the creation of a dedicated EU media freedom fund supporting independent journalism and local media outlets;

    37.  Condemns the spread of hate speech, including in mainstream and social media, as it poses a serious threat to democracy and the rule of law; calls for stronger enforcement of media regulations to combat hate speech and safeguard a diverse and inclusive media landscape, in accordance with its resolution of 18 January 2024 on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union; underlines the fact that prominent public figures and politicians have to lead by example and need to ensure a respectful debate; recalls that freedom of expression is a fundamental value of democratic societies and should not be unjustifiably restricted; further recalls that any legislation on hate speech and hate crime should be grounded in the principles of necessity and proportionality; underlines that freedom of expression must be exercised within the law and in line with Article 11 of the Charter and should not be exploited as a shield for hate speech and hate crimes;

    38.  Acknowledges that citizens perceive signs of an erosion of democracy fuelled by misinformation and disinformation, and that the spread of false information through social media could lead to the erosion of general respect for the rule of law; calls on digital platforms to take immediate action by ensuring compliance with their own community standards and European laws, including the Digital Services Act(52) (DSA) and competition rules; calls on the Commission to assess such compliance regularly and take measures where necessary; recommends that Member States, candidate and potential candidate countries develop comprehensive strategies to combat disinformation and foreign interference in democratic processes, while safeguarding freedom of expression and media pluralism;

    39.  Strongly condemns state control and political interference in media operations; highlights the fact that media regulators must be adequately protected by legal safeguards to ensure their independence and freedom from political pressure, with sufficient budgetary resources at their disposal; underlines the democratic importance of independent media regulators;

    40.  Expresses deep concern over the abuse of spyware and the lack of sufficient safeguards against illegal surveillance of journalists; calls on the Commission to implement the recommendations of Parliament’s PEGA Inquiry Committee on banning politically motivated surveillance;

    41.  Urges Member States to ensure that the transposition of Directive (EU) 2016/343(53) on the presumption of innocence does not introduce restrictions on the right to report on and inform the public of matters of public interest, including judicial investigations, that are not provided for by the Directive; calls on Member States to review and, if necessary, modify existing national provisions that could limit journalistic freedoms;

    42.  Calls on the Member States to ensure that the national coordinators established under the DSA are fully empowered to perform their role in facilitating information exchange and cooperation at the European level;

    Civil society organisations (CSOs)

    43.  Agrees with the Commission’s assessment that CSOs, including those advocating for the rule of law and democracy, the protection of marginalised groups, environmental protection and social justice, and human rights defenders (HRDs) are essential for the checks and balances and for the protection of fundamental values and Union law that are a cornerstone of the EU; appreciates that CSOs and professional associations representing groups such as judges, prosecutors or journalists support the rule of law; underlines, in particular, the importance of local, vibrant civil societies in candidate and potential candidate countries, which play a constructive role in the EU accession processes; recognises their role as watchdogs against rule of law violations and their contribution to promoting and safeguarding democratic principles; recalls the need for a safe, supportive and enabling environment for their work;

    44.  Highlights the role of civil society and independent oversight bodies in monitoring, verifying and supporting the implementation of the recommendations of the 2024 Rule of Law Report; calls for a structured civil dialogue framework to integrate civil society contributions into the annual rule of law cycle, as recommended by the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC)(54) and civil society networks(55); reiterates the importance of broad consultation when drafting the report; supports the Commission’s plan to draft a strategy on space for and the protection of civil society and HRDs; recommends that the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders be fully implemented; calls on the Commission to conduct visits to Member States on-site whenever possible, rather than virtually, as on-site visits could paint a fuller and more contextual picture of the local situation;

    45.  Is concerned by the growing trend of CSOs and HRDs facing further legal restrictions, a lack of funding, and attacks, which undermine freedom of association, freedom of assembly and freedom of expression; notes with concern that several Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries have imposed disproportionate measures, including the excessive use of force and the detention of protesters to prevent people from participating in protests in some Member States, as well as pre-emptive bans on public gatherings on the vague grounds of security; stresses that courts have overturned such bans in multiple cases; strongly condemns the use of ‘foreign agent laws’, which stifle dissent, harass CSOs and restrict their operations, creating a chilling effect on civil society and HRDs; regrets the fact that restrictions on freedom of assembly, expression and association and the use of excessive force often disproportionately affect specific causes or groups(56);

    46.  Stresses that peaceful assembly, freedom of association and expression, and freedom of the arts and sciences are fundamental rights protected by international law and are essential for democracy; condemns the increased pressure on these rights, where proven, and notes the trend of restricting them; condemns also, in this context, episodes of violence against police forces; calls on the Commission to reflect these freedoms in the annual report;

    47.  Expresses deep concern about the shrinking civic space and increasing persecution of CSOs and HRDs in the EU, particularly those working on anti-racism, climate justice, LGBTIQ rights, women’s rights and migrant supports; notes that these groups face a range of threats including legal and financial restrictions, funding suspensions, smear campaigns, intimidation and criminalisation; condemns, in particular, the growing repression of climate activism in several Member States, including the misuse of anti-terrorism and organised crime laws and the classification of peaceful climate activists as members of ‘criminal organisations’; calls on the Member States to refrain from disproportionate legal action against such activists; urges the Commission to systematically monitor the situation of these organisations in its rule of law reports and to expand dedicated EU funding for civil society actors combating racism and working on other fundamental rights;

    48.  Calls on the Commission to address such breaches in a dedicated pillar of the annual rule of law reports; calls on the Commission to strengthen the protection of CSOs and HRDs, by establishing early warning mechanisms, increasing the transparency of funding for all actors in the scope of the EU Transparency Register and expanding funding to support CSOs to enable them to operate freely and independently;

    49.  Urges the Member States to create an enabling environment for CSOs and HRDs, adopt the Anti-SLAPP Directive, and implement Commission Recommendation (EU) 2022/758 to protect CSOs from legal harassment; calls for strengthened independence of national oversight bodies, with adequate resources and safeguards against political interference; encourages support for CSOs in developing and disseminating educational initiatives to ensure broad outreach and accessibility;

    50.  Considers that the Commission and the Member States should improve funding mechanisms for CSOs and initiatives that strengthen the judiciary and uphold court independence, namely through the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme and the Justice programme; welcomes the fact that the Commission plans to draft a strategy for protecting civil society, recalls, at the same time, that there should be a special focus on HRDs; calls on the Commission to include a rapid response mechanism to support threatened CSOs and HRDs within the Union, drawing on the model of the EU-funded ‘Protect Defenders’ mechanism, which currently has a non-EU focus only; emphasises that this mechanism could provide resources for advocacy, legal aid and awareness campaigns, while ensuring that these organisations can operate without undue restrictions or harassment; calls for the full and consistent application of the Union guidelines on HRDs in candidate and potential candidate countries; is concerned, however, by the growing trend in some Member States of CSOs and HRDs facing challenges, with new legal restrictions, a lack of funding, and physical or verbal attacks, and by the deplorable acceptance of such practices and the chilling effect thereof, including on their freedom of speech within the Member States(57) and the EU institutions; considers that CSOs and HRDs play an essential supportive role in monitoring Member States’ compliance with the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU;

    Equality and non-discrimination before the law

    51.  Recalls that Member States’ legal frameworks must enshrine equal legal treatment and promote equality and the right of individuals not to be discriminated against in judicial proceedings; stresses that the rule of law and fundamental rights are interlinked and that violations of the rule of law have an immediate impact on fundamental rights and disproportionately affect women, minorities and vulnerable groups; calls on the Commission to monitor the effect of any violations of the rule of law on fundamental rights and to ensure that equality and non-discrimination before the law for all people are protected through the use of all relevant instruments, including infringement procedures, where appropriate;

    52.  Stresses the need to fight against all types of discrimination before the law; expresses its concern over the lack of progress in and implementation of equality and anti-discrimination laws in some Member States; regrets the fact that, despite existing EU legislation such as Directive 2000/78/EC(58) on equal treatment, gaps in the legal framework and in implementation persist, leaving victims without adequate legal recourse; recalls that Member States’ legal frameworks must enshrine equal legal treatment and promote equality and the right of individuals not to be discriminated against in legal remedy; calls on the Commission to act in cases of non-compliance with these principles; deplores the intention of the Commission to withdraw the proposal for a horizontal equal treatment directive(59) and urges the Council to adopt the directive without further delay;

    53.  Is concerned that the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report noted that some Member States fail to effectively prosecute hate crimes or provide sufficient support to victims of hate crimes, undermining trust in judicial systems and perpetuating inequality before the law; calls on the Council to extend the current list of ‘EU crimes’ in Article 83(1) TFEU to include hate crimes and hate speech and calls on the Commission to put forward a legislative proposal on hate crime and hate speech; asks the Commission to focus on hate crimes in its rule of law reports and, in this regard, to closely monitor and record hate crimes;

    54.  Underlines that gender-based violence, online and offline, is a major and pervasive offence, as well as a radical violation of fundamental rights, and it violates the principle of equality before the law; calls on the Commission and the Member States to take action against gender-based violence, both online and offline, including violence committed through the use of digital platforms; calls for gender-based violence to be added to the list of EU crimes and for an EU legislative proposal on combating rape based on the lack of consent, also in candidate and potential candidate countries;

    55.  Recalls the need for access to sexual and reproductive rights and health and calls for access to safe, legal abortion to be enshrined in the Charter;

    56.  Calls on all Member States to protect LGBTIQ rights in compliance with Union law, the Charter, and CJEU and ECtHR case-law, recalls that legal barriers to recognising same-sex partnerships or parenthood across borders persist in several Member States; warns that such practices not only hinder the free movement of LGBTIQ families within the EU, but also violate the rule of law principle of non-discrimination before the law, highlighting the lack of uniform protection for LGBTIQ individuals across Member States; calls on the Member States who have not yet done so to introduce legal recognition of same-sex partnerships; calls on the Commission to recast Directive 2004/38/EC(60) in order to include an explicit cross-border recognition of private and family life rights, including parenthood for same-sex parents, in the light of the latest rulings(61) of the CJEU; stresses that all children are equal before the law and that Member States must act in the best interests of the child, increase legal certainty and reduce discrimination against the children of same-sex parents; recalls Parliament’s position supporting the recognition of parenthood across the EU, irrespective of how a child is conceived or born, or the type of family they have; urges the Commission to present a renewed LGBTIQ strategy that fully addresses the challenges throughout Europe; calls on the Commission and the Council to make LGBTIQ rights a cross-cutting priority across all policy fields; calls on the Commission to put forward appropriate legislative measures to ensure respect for these principles, as well as to rely on infringement procedures against Member States; urges the Commission to present legislative proposals to combat hate crimes and hate speech on grounds of gender identity, sex characteristics and sexual orientation;

    57.  Is deeply concerned about the discriminatory measures introduced in some Member States under the pretext of fighting ‘LGBTIQ propaganda’ and ‘gender ideology’ which are contributing to an alarming increase in hate crimes and hate speech targeting LGBTIQ individuals in several Member States and have a negative impact on children, families and workers; welcomes the CJEU’s opinion of 5 June 2025 stating that it considers Hungary to be in violation of EU law in prohibiting or restricting access to LGBTIQ+ content; highlights the negative impact of such measures on the freedom of expression and assembly for LGBTIQ groups and beyond; emphasises that these actions encourage discrimination against LGBTIQ individuals and contravene EU law; urges the Commission to present a proposal for a binding EU ban on conversion practices in all Member States; notes that in 2024, both the Commission and the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) noted an alarming increase in hate crimes and hate speech targeting LGBTIQ individuals and other minorities in several Member States, stresses the importance of the right to self-determination of LGBTIQ persons and reminds Member States that, in accordance with case-law, the right to self-determination is a fundamental right; therefore urges all Member States who have not done so yet to make sure that LGBTIQ individuals have access to legal gender recognition;

    58.  Is deeply concerned by and strongly condemns the rising levels of anti-Semitism across the EU; is also deeply concerned and strongly condemns the rising levels of Islamophobia and all other forms of discrimination across the EU, including acts of violence, intimidation, hate speech and the display of hate symbols in public spaces; calls on the Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to make sure that members of all minorities are equal before the law; calls on the Member States to review laws and policies to ensure that they do not discriminate against minorities, directly or indirectly, and to review any discriminatory legal provisions and regulations; calls for sustained efforts at both EU and national levels to monitor, prevent and prosecute related hate crimes and to protect Jewish and Muslim communities from harassment and violence;

    59.  Emphasises that a lack of accountability disproportionately affects minorities’ communities, fair political representation, and economic opportunities; calls for increased transparency in public decision-making processes to ensure inclusive and equitable governance;

    60.  Calls on the Member States to fully implement Directive 2024/1500(62) and Directive 2024/1499(63), which establish minimum standards for equality bodies; calls for concrete measures to guarantee their independence and ensure their effectiveness in promoting equality;

    61.  Underlines that third-country nationals legally residing in the EU, regardless of their nationality or place of birth, must be treated in a non-discriminatory manner and enjoy fair and equal treatment in the areas specified by existing legislation; points out that third-country nationals, regardless of their nationality, place of birth or residence status, have the right to apply for international protection in compliance with international and EU law, of which the non-refoulement principle is an integral part; calls on the Commission to support the Member States in upholding the rule of law and fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter and in implementing the legislation adopted by the co-legislators; stresses the binding nature of the judgments of the CJEU and the ECtHR;

    62.  Urges the Commission to ensure that the free movement of persons within the EU, the right to reside freely, and family reunification are fully respected in the EU territory and that every citizen can enjoy equal rights and fully exercise their rights;

    63.  Urges the Commission to strengthen the focus in the annual rule of law report on strengthening the fight against all forms of discrimination in access to justice; calls on the Commission and the Member States to combat discrimination on grounds of racial and ethnic origin, religion or belief, nationality, political opinion, language, disability, age, gender, including gender identity and gender expression, and sexual orientation; urges the Council to reach an agreement on Directive 2008/0140(CNS)(64); urges the Commission to introduce new pillars in the annual rule of law report focusing on combating all forms of hatred and discrimination as enshrined in Article 21 of the Charter, namely regarding crimes that target minority groups and members of national, ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities, as well as the conditions of civil society in Member States; calls on the Commission to require Member States to collect comparable and robust disaggregated equality data to fully assess the impact of structural discrimination on the rule of law; calls on the Commission to reconsider its position on the Minority SafePack Initiative and to put forward legislative initiatives to safeguard the promotion of minority rights and language rights; reiterates its call for the EU to accede to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages; calls for closer ties between the EU and the Council of Europe on minority rights, including in view of the enlargement process;

    64.  Emphasises the need for Member States to address the gender gap in the judiciary and other key democratic institutions; recommends implementing targeted measures to increase women’s representation in senior judicial and public administration positions;

    65.  Calls on the Member States to establish national human rights institutions, in accordance with the UN Paris Principles, to guarantee their independence and to ensure that they have the capacity to carry out their tasks effectively;

    Single market and the rule of law

    66.  Highlights the importance of the rule of law in ensuring the smooth and efficient functioning of the single market and reaffirms that well-functioning, independent judicial systems, effective anti-corruption frameworks and strong protection of media freedom are crucial for maintaining fair competition, upholding legal certainty and fostering trust among economic operators; underlines that non-compliance and circumvention of European regulations lead to enormous distortions of competition in the internal market; emphasises that reliable and stable rule of law structures are key pillars for investment and trade, which are essential for competitiveness and, therefore, for the capacity of the welfare system and the labour market in the EU;

    67.  Stresses that the proper functioning of the single market depends on the effective application of the principle of mutual trust and recognition in both judicial and administrative cooperation; recalls that such trust can only be sustained where the rule of law – as also recommended by the Venice Commission in its rule of law checklist – is fully upheld; indicates that the principle of mutual recognition should be suspended in cases of systemic breaches;

    68.  Underlines the negative economic impact that corruption and weak judiciary systems have on investor confidence and cross-border cooperation; is concerned that national governments and institutions which fail to uphold the rule of law may allow anti-competitive behaviour to flourish, or may even actively encourage it for political or economic gain, thereby potentially damaging the EU’s economy and undermining the fairness of its internal market;

    69.  Recalls that, within the scope of application of the Treaties, any discrimination on the grounds of nationality is prohibited in accordance with the Charter, and that freedom of establishment, service provision and movement of capital are fundamental to the single market; underlines that the rules regarding equality of treatment forbid overt and covert discrimination by reason of nationality or, in the case of a company, its seat; recalls its condemnation of the reported systemic discriminatory, non-transparent and unfair practices against companies in some Member States;

    70.  Condemns systemic discriminatory practices in Hungary, including the misuse of EU funds to benefit political allies, violations of EU competition rules, and the concentration of businesses in the hands of oligarchs with ties to the government; deplores the release of EU funds to the Hungarian Government despite ongoing deficiencies in judicial independence and anti-corruption frameworks; recommends suspending disbursements until all rule of law benchmarks are met; urges the Commission to ensure that EU funds reach the Hungarian population, including through direct and indirect funding mechanisms for beneficiaries independent of the Hungarian Government;

    71.  Highlights the importance of addressing economic inequality and social exclusion as threats to democratic participation and the rule of law;

    72.  Calls on the Commission to integrate the single market dimension of the rule of law more explicitly into its monitoring mechanisms, with a stronger focus on the uniform and rapid application, implementation and enforcement of existing legislation, ensuring that Member States’ adherence to rule of law principles is assessed not only from a democratic and judicial standpoint but also in terms of its economic impact on the single market and financial stability; requests that the Commission include in its 2025 rule of law report a dedicated chapter on the single market dimension; urges the Commission to use all available legal tools to address rule of law deficiencies, including launching infringement procedures and competition law enforcement powers when necessary, to preserve the functioning of the internal market;

    Rule of law toolbox

    73.  Stresses the importance of embedding rule of law milestones in funding instruments such as the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF); deplores the release of EU funds to the Hungarian Government despite ongoing deficiencies in judicial independence and anti-corruption frameworks; recommends suspending disbursements until all rule of law benchmarks are met; urges the Commission to ensure that EU funds reach the Hungarian population, including through direct and indirect funding mechanisms for beneficiaries independent of the Hungarian Government, while maintaining the full impact of the measures taken;

    74.  Criticises the Council’s inaction in advancing ongoing Article 7 TEU proceedings, which weakens the EU’s credibility in upholding the rule of law; urges the Council to unblock the next steps in the Article 7 TEU procedure in relation to Hungary, given persistent violations on judicial independence, media freedom and civil society, which necessitate immediate and decisive action; recommends that the Council ensure that hearings take place at least once per presidency during ongoing Article 7 procedures and also that new developments affecting the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights are addressed; emphasises that there is no need for unanimity in the Council in order to identify a clear risk of a serious breach of Union values under Article 7(1) TEU, or to address concrete recommendations to the Member States in question and provide deadlines for the implementation of those recommendations; reiterates its call on the Council to do so, underlining that any further delaying of such action would amount to a breach of the rule of law principle by the Council itself; insists that Parliament should have a more active role in Article 7 TEU proceedings, including the ability to present reasoned proposals to the Council, attend Council hearings and be fully informed at every stage of the procedure;

    75.  Welcomes the preventive tools in the rule of law toolbox, such as the annual rule of law cycle, the EU justice scoreboard, the European Semester, EU funds to support civil society, judicial networks and media freedom and the rule of law milestones in the RRF; insists that a closer link between the findings of the 2024 Rule of Law Report and the allocation of financial support under the Union budget is introduced, in terms of milestones, ensuring that EU funds are tied to the achievement of necessary reforms; calls on the Commission to further develop a direct link between preventive and reactive instruments and hence, on the basis of the findings in the annual rule of law reports, to promptly and in a coordinated manner launch infringement procedures, set further steps in applying the Article 7 TEU procedure, and apply the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation and the horizontal enabling conditions related to the Charter, as well as provisions from the Financial Regulation and Common Provisions Regulation; calls on the Commission to assess and report on the potential risks to the Union budget posed by weaknesses in rule of law regimes in the annual rule of law reports starting with the 2025 report; underlines that both the triggering of the reactive instruments and the closure of relevant procedures must be based on the objective criterion of compliance with the rule of law and with EU and international law as interpreted by international courts;

    76.  Calls on the Commission to systemically resort to expedited procedures and applications for interim measures before the CJEU in infringement cases; calls on the Commission to revise its policy, outlined in its 2022 communication on enforcing EU law(65), not to use infringement actions for ‘individual’ redress, as this policy has led to serious deprivation of rights for citizens across the EU, especially where their own governments are refusing to comply with EU law or CJEU judgments, also because most of these cases are not merely individual but address strategic and fundamental issues; asks the Commission to report annually on the application and effectiveness of the tools used against breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Member States;

    77.  Underlines the need for an ever more comprehensive toolbox ensuring compliance, beyond its budgetary dimension, with EU values across all Union law, including financial instruments, to prevent backsliding; urges the Commission to identify the gaps and present relevant proposals broadening the scope of this toolbox; supports stronger application of the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation, with cross-cutting conditionality in EU funding programmes; maintains its position that frozen EU funds should only be released once meaningful reforms have been fully implemented and rule of law compliance has been verifiably achieved in practice; emphasises the need for consistency and transparency in applying the toolbox to protect Union values, without political considerations and using objective criteria to trigger reactive instruments; highlights the fact that conditionality should equally apply to candidate and potential candidate countries; insists on the importance of Parliament’s role in overseeing the use of those tools; urges the Commission to conduct systematic audits of the distribution of EU funds to prevent conflicts of interest, political instrumentalisation or opacity in fund allocation at the national level;

    78.  Insists on the introduction of a performance-based instrument in the multiannual financial framework (MFF) to strengthen the alignment between EU funds and the respect for Union values enshrined in Article 2 TEU such as democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law; requests that the future MFF include robust rule of law safeguards applicable to all EU funds;

    79.  Expresses concern that the suspension of EU funds could be misused as a political weapon against civil society and local authorities; recalls that the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation ensures that final recipients should not lose access to EU funds if sanctions are applied to their government; calls for ‘smart conditionality’ that would enable national governments undermining the rule of law to be bypassed by allocating decommitted EU funds directly to local and regional authorities and to non-governmental organisations and businesses that comply with EU law, as well as by simplifying the reallocation of funds intended for the benefit of the Member State in question to other EU programmes; proposes the establishment of a transparent system for local authorities to request EU funds when national governments block or misuse EU funds; stresses the importance of strictly applying the conditionality mechanisms as enshrined in the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance and in the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans in a transparent manner;

    Checks and balances

    80.  Underlines the importance of safeguarding the separation of powers and a stable institutional framework in every Member State; calls on the Member States to ensure that any constitutional or legislative reforms affecting the separation of powers fully comply with EU fundamental values and legal principles;

    81.  Calls on the Member States to refrain from excessively using accelerated procedures that bypass stakeholder and civil society consultation, including parliamentary scrutiny or emergency powers, as these negatively impact the stability and the quality of lawmaking and democracy; calls on the Member States to set up transparent lawmaking processes following systematic and public consultation with various stakeholders and advisory bodies;

    82.  Encourages national governments and parliaments to publish publicly accessible impact assessments and consultation findings for every major legislative proposal;

    83.  Underlines the recommendation of the Venice Commission that complaints and appeals in the case of electoral irregularities, in particular with regard to vote buying, ballot-box stuffing and incorrect vote counting, be followed up effectively; recalls the importance of the EU legislation adopted in this regard, namely the DSA, the Digital Markets Act(66), the AI Act(67), Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising(68) and the EMFA; calls on the Commission and the Member States to fully implement these acts and provide adequate public resources for the measures under them;

    84.  Calls on the Member States to strengthen the independence of national oversight bodies in order to ensure resources and freedom from political interference; stresses the importance of civil society and HRDs in promoting accountability and protecting fundamental rights;

    85.  Expresses deep concern about the rise of extremism and its corrosive effect on democratic norms and the rule of law in several Member States; notes with concern that extremist groups actively target minorities and contribute to a climate of fear, discrimination and polarisation; calls on the Commission to explicitly identify such groups as a threat to democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms, including academic and media independence, in its annual rule of law report; urges the Member States to take decisive action to counter their influence through robust legal frameworks, education promoting democratic values, and support for CSOs countering extremism; calls for coordinated EU action to counter this threat, including through education, social inclusion programmes and, where necessary, legal measures;

    86.  Expresses concern about the reported cases of the use of surveillance technologies by Member State governments against journalists, activists, opposition figures and staff of the EU institutions; recalls that the use of spyware must be strictly proportionate and necessary and urges the Commission to present a plan of measures to prevent its abuse without undue delay, making full use of all available legislative means provided by the Treaties, as recommended by the PEGA Committee;

    87.  Notes with concern the increasing use of artificial intelligence for national security and law enforcement purposes across the EU, stressing the risks to fundamental rights and freedoms(69); recalls the need to ensure robust data protection safeguards when Member States or national authorities employ surveillance software; calls for strengthened EU legislation to prevent mass surveillance and discrimination;

    88.  Is concerned about foreign interference in the Member States and in candidate and potential candidate countries, including social media manipulation and disinformation by forces both inside and outside the Union to manipulate public opinion and distort democratic debate; stresses the importance of transparency in platform algorithms, independent audits and robust fact-checking mechanisms to combat disinformation and safeguard democracy; calls on major digital platforms to cooperate with national law enforcement authorities to support investigations into illegal online activities; calls on the Commission and the Member States to monitor this and to apply the DSA and the Digital Markets Act swiftly, particularly regarding very large online platforms; calls on the Commission to include greater scrutiny of online platform disinformation in Pillar 3 (Pluralism and Media Freedom) of its rule of law report;

    89.  Stresses the importance of academic freedom as an integral aspect of the rule of law and urges the Member States to protect universities from political interference and ensure institutional autonomy; encourages the Member States to foster a culture of the rule of law through awareness campaigns, outreach initiatives and action promoting democratic values and principles;

    90.  Invites the Commission and the Member States to consider engaging in a process focused on improving administrative procedures and practices that have an impact on the functioning of key democratic processes and the exercise of checks and balances in line with the EU’s established, shared principles;

    Horizontal recommendations

    91.  Recognises the Commission’s rule of law report as a key preventive tool for monitoring the state of the rule of law across the EU, facilitating dialogue between Member States, and guiding reforms in areas such as judicial independence, anti-corruption, media freedom and other checks and balances;

    92.  Acknowledges that the Commission’s rule of law report has become more comprehensive since its inception in 2020; deplores, however, the fact that essential elements from Parliament’s 2016 resolution have not yet been implemented and that the Commission has not fully addressed the recommendations made by Parliament in its previous resolutions; considers that these recommendations remain valid and reiterates them; calls for the inclusion in the annual report of important missing elements of the Venice Commission’s rule of law checklist, such as prevention of the abuse of powers, equality before the law and non-discrimination; reiterates its position that the report should cover the full scope of the values of Article 2 TEU, as these cannot be seen in isolation; asks the Commission to explore the potential release, at around the same time, of all reports related to the rule of law or fundamental rights, such as the annual reports on compliance with the Charter or the report by the FRA, in order to enable a simultaneous global debate on these issues; regrets, however, that despite the growing threats of disinformation, propaganda and information manipulation targeting European democracy, a similar peer review practice among the Member States, in support of the efforts of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, has not yet been considered;

    93.  Calls on the Commission to expand the scope of the report next year; insists that the Commission’s 2025 rule of law report cover the entire scope of Article 2 TEU and include broader indicators, such as media independence, the role of civil society, fundamental rights, academic and artistic freedom, gender equality, the protection of minorities and vulnerable groups, respect for international law, free and fair elections and the functioning of democratic institutions, in order to provide a fuller picture of rule of law standards across the EU, and in candidate and potential candidate countries;

    94.  Calls on the Commission to publish the criteria it uses to select information from civil society, international bodies, national authorities and other stakeholders in the process of their rule of law reporting; repeats its call on the Commission to invite the FRA to provide methodological advice and conduct comparative research in order to add detail in key areas of the annual report, given the intrinsic links between fundamental rights and the rule of law;

    95.  Encourages the Commission to use clearer language and transparent assessment rules to evaluate compliance with the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; reiterates its call to the Commission to differentiate clearly between systemic and isolated breaches of the rule of law in Member States, to avoid the risk of trivialising the most serious breaches of the rule of law, and to make clear that when the values of Article 2 TEU are systematically, deliberately and gravely violated over a period of time, Member States could fail to meet all criteria that define a democracy; indicates that the recommendations should better reflect negative findings in the report and be more detailed; believes that the assessment of the fulfilment of previous recommendations should be more precise and qualitative, not relying only on legislative changes but also on real and independent evidence of their implementation in practice; invites the Commission to conduct field visits and provide assessments based on concrete and independent evidence of implementation in practice;

    96.  Warns that failing to link monitoring to real consequences risks diminishing the report’s relevance in the Member States; calls for a greater focus on implementing country-specific recommendations, with timelines and measurable benchmarks, including, where relevant, reference to existing opinions of international bodies (e.g. the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission, UN Special Rapporteurs) or relevant court rulings (including from the ECtHR); calls on the Commission to detail the possible consequences in the event of non-compliance, including by referring to specific instruments from the toolbox, which includes budgetary tools and funding conditionality; believes that certain breaches of the values deserve immediate enforcement action and other breaches require recommendations to be implemented urgently; urges the Member States to implement the recommendations outlined in previous reports and commends those Member States that have not only implemented the recommendations but have also exceeded the established standards;

    97.  Notes that the release date of the annual rule of law report in July is not conducive to generating sufficient visibility and is contrary to the report’s intended purpose of generating a genuine public debate about its findings; urges the Commission to reconsider the publication date and undertake additional efforts to make its findings widely known in all Member States;

    98.  Recalls that decisions taken or not taken by the EU institutions often influence the rule of law situation in the Member States; criticises the fact that the rule of law status at the EU institutions remains outside the scope of the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report; requests that a chapter on the EU’s adherence to rule of law standards, based on an independent review mechanism, be included in the Commission’s 2025 rule of law report;

    99.  Proposes a comprehensive interinstitutional mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights covering all the values set out in Article 2 TEU and involving all EU institutions, Member States and candidate countries in order to foster uniformity; emphasises the need to ensure full independence and objectivity in the composition and functioning of this body, while adapting its mandate specifically to address rule of law challenges;

    100.  Believes that EU-level interinstitutional dialogue and cooperation on the rule of law should be strengthened; regrets the fact that the Commission and the Council have so far rejected its offer to enter into an interinstitutional agreement on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights; reaffirms its willingness to resume talks on this agreement; calls on the other institutions, in the meantime, to at least explore further cooperation in the context of the proposed interinstitutional pilot on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights, which would help build trust between the institutions in a practical way, in particular by sharing monitoring, dialogue and meeting practices; calls on the Council to make its rule of law dialogue more inclusive by inviting other institutions, such as the Venice Commission, the Human Rights Commissioner and representatives of Parliament, to its sessions; believes that the Council’s rule of law dialogue should become more interactive, with systematic provision of feedback; calls on the Member States to invest in proper preparation for this dialogue; emphasises that increased transparency would enhance the rule of law dialogue within the Union and therefore invites the Council to provide detailed public conclusions; urges the Council to engage with national parliaments to enhance democratic oversight of Member States’ compliance with EU rule of law standards; stresses that the rule of law report should be evidence-based and objective, addressing the Member States and EU institutions, and should include preventive and corrective measures;

    101.  Calls on the Member States to ensure that emergency measures adopted in response to crises (such as pandemics or security threats) are subject to regular parliamentary scrutiny and judicial review, and are strictly time-limited and proportionate;

    102.  Considers that cooperation between the EU and international organisations such as the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the UN in promoting and defending democracy, the rule of law, fundamental freedoms and human rights, including the rights of minorities, should be further strengthened;

    103.  Encourages the Member States to develop and implement comprehensive civic education programmes that foster understanding of democratic institutions, the rule of law and fundamental rights among citizens of all ages;

    104.  Deplores the fact that the Commission has not incorporated many of Parliament’s repeated requests regarding the Commission’s rule of law reports; demands that the Commission issue a communication by 31 December 2025 detailing which of the requests adopted by Parliament in relation to the Commission’s rule of law reports since 2021 the Commission will implement, which it will not, and why;

    105.  Welcomes the extension of the Commission’s rule of law report to cover candidate countries, namely Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia, reinforcing the fact that the EU’s fundamental values must be respected not only by current Member States but also by future members during the accession processes; encourages a close evaluation of the rule of law in all countries in an accession process; encourages the Commission to provide concrete recommendations to accession countries on the state of the rule of law, and to ensure alignment with the enlargement report; expects the Commission to include all candidate countries in its 2025 rule of law report;

    o
    o   o

    106.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, the Council of Europe and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

    (1) OJ L 433, 22.12.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2092/oj.
    (2) OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 159, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1060/oj.
    (3) OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj.
    (4) OJ L 156, 5.5.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/692/oj.
    (5) OJ C 215, 19.6.2018, p. 162.
    (6) OJ C 463, 21.12.2018, p. 21.
    (7) OJ C 129, 5.4.2019, p. 13.
    (8) OJ C 390, 18.11.2019, p. 117.
    (9) OJ C 433, 23.12.2019, p. 66.
    (10) OJ C 363, 28.10.2020, p. 13.
    (11) OJ C 363, 28.10.2020, p. 45.
    (12) OJ C 395, 29.9.2021, p. 2.
    (13) OJ C 415, 13.10.2021, p. 36.
    (14) OJ C 445, 29.10.2021, p. 70.
    (15) OJ C 67, 8.2.2022, p. 86.
    (16) OJ C 81, 18.2.2022, p. 27.
    (17) OJ C 99, 1.3.2022, p. 146.
    (18) OJ C 117, 11.3.2022, p. 88.
    (19) OJ C 205, 20.5.2022, p. 2.
    (20) OJ C 251, 30.6.2022, p. 48.
    (21) OJ C 347, 9.9.2022, p. 2.
    (22) OJ C 347, 9.9.2022, p. 168.
    (23) OJ C 479, 16.12.2022, p. 18.
    (24) OJ C 493, 27.12.2022, p. 108.
    (25) OJ C 125, 5.4.2023, p. 80.
    (26) OJ C 125, 5.4.2023, p. 463.
    (27) OJ C 149, 28.4.2023, p. 15.
    (28) OJ C 149, 28.4.2023, p. 22.
    (29) OJ C 161, 5.5.2023, p. 10.
    (30) OJ C 167, 11.5.2023, p. 74.
    (31) OJ C 341, 27.9.2023, p. 2.
    (32) OJ C, C/2023/442, 1.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/442/oj.
    (33) OJ C, C/2024/6743, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6743/oj.
    (34) OJ C, C/2024/6746, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6746/oj.
    (35) OJ C, C/2023/1223, 21.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/1223/oj.
    (36) OJ C, C/2024/494, 23.1.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/494/oj.
    (37) OJ C, C/2024/3995, 17.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/3995/oj.
    (38) OJ C, C/2024/2656, 29.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/2656/oj.
    (39) OJ C, C/2024/5739, 17.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5739/oj.
    (40) OJ C, C/2024/5733, 17.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5733/oj.
    (41) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2024)0367.
    (42) For all DRFMG monitoring activities, see: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/libe-democracy-rule-of-law-and-fundament/product-details/20190103CDT02662.
    (43) Opinion 2/13 of the Court of Justice of 18 December 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, paragraph 168.
    (44) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 24 June 2019, European Commission v Republic of Poland, C-619/18, ECLI:EU:C:2019:531, paragraph 42.
    (45) COM(2024)0800, Annex with recommendations, pp. 1, 9, 11, 19 and 24.
    (46) Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA (OJ L 315, 14.11.2012, p. 57, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2012/29/oj).
    (47) Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (‘the EPPO’) (OJ L 283, 31.10.2017, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/1939/oj).
    (48) Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law (OJ L 198, 28.7.2017, p. 29, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2017/1371/oj).
    (49) Regulation (EU) 2024/1083 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market and amending Directive 2010/13/EU (European Media Freedom Act) (OJ L, 2024/1083, 17.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1083/oj).
    (50) Directive (EU) 2024/1069 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded claims or abusive court proceedings (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’) (OJ L, 2024/1069, 16.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1069/oj).
    (51) OJ L 138, 17.5.2022, p. 30, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/2022/758/oj.
    (52) Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) (OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj).
    (53) Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings (OJ L 65, 11.3.2016, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2016/343/oj).
    (54) EESC opinion of 14 February 2024 entitled ‘Strengthening civil dialogue and participatory democracy in the EU: a path forward’.
    (55) Civil Society Europe, ‘Joint Civil Society Contribution on Civic Space to the 2024 Annual Rule of Law Report’, June 2024.
    (56) European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Addressing racism in policing, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024.
    (57) Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, Drozd v. Poland, 15158/19 of 6 April 2023, and Mándli and Others v Hungary, 63164/16 of 26 May 2020.
    (58) Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (OJ L 303, 2.12.2000, p. 16, http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2000/78/oj).
    (59) Proposal for a Council Directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation (COM(2008)0426).
    (60) Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC (OJ L 158, 30.4.2004, p. 77, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2004/38/oj).
    (61) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 5 June 2018, Relu Adrian Coman and Others v Inspectoratul General pentru Imigrări and Ministerul Afacerilor Interne, C‑673/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:385.
    (62) Directive (EU) 2024/1500 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on standards for equality bodies in the field of equal treatment and equal opportunities between women and men in matters of employment and occupation, and amending Directives 2006/54/EC and 2010/41/EU (OJ L, 2024/1500, 29.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1500/oj).
    (63) Council Directive (EU) 2024/1499 of 7 May 2024 on standards for equality bodies in the field of equal treatment between persons irrespective of their racial or ethnic origin, equal treatment in matters of employment and occupation between persons irrespective of their religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation, equal treatment between women and men in matters of social security and in the access to and supply of goods and services, and amending Directives 2000/43/EC and 2004/113/EC (OJ L, 2024/1499, 29.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1499/oj).
    (64) Proposal for a Council Directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation (COM(2008)0426).
    (65) Commission communication of 13 October 2022 entitled ‘Enforcing EU law for a Europe that delivers’ (COM(2022)0518).
    (66) Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act) (OJ L 265, 12.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1925/oj).
    (67) Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act) (OJ L, 2024/1689, 12.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj).
    (68) Regulation (EU) 2024/900 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising (OJ L, 2024/900, 20.3.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/900/oj).
    (69) Europol, ‘AI and policing – The benefits and challenges of artificial intelligence for law enforcement’, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Implementation report on the Recovery and Resilience Facility – P10_TA(2025)0128 – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to Article 175 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility(1) (RRF Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2023/435 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 February 2023 amending Regulation (EU) 2021/241 as regards REPowerEU chapters in recovery and resilience plans and amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) 2021/1060 and (EU) 2021/1755, and Directive 2003/87/EC(2) (REPowerEU Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget(3) (Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation),

    –  having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/765 of 29 February 2024 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027(4) (MFF Regulation),

    –  having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources(5) (the IIA),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union(6) (Financial Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP), and amending Directive 2003/87/EC and Regulations (EU) 2021/1058, (EU) 2021/1056, (EU) 2021/1057, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) 2021/1060, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697 and (EU) 2021/241(7),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2024 on the effective coordination of economic policies and on multilateral budgetary surveillance and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97(8),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 23 June 2022 on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility(9),

    –  having regard to the Commission notice of 22 July 2024 entitled ‘Guidance on recovery and resilience plans’(10),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 21 February 2024 on strengthening the EU through ambitious reforms and investments (COM(2024)0082),

    –  having regard to the Commission’s third annual report of 10 October 2024 on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (COM(2024)0474),

    –  having regard to the Court of Auditors’ (ECA) annual report of 10 October 2024 on the implementation of the budget for the 2023 financial year, together with the institutions’ replies,

    –  having regard to special report 13/2024 of the ECA of 2 September 2024 entitled ‘Absorption of funds from the Recovery and Resilience Facility – Progressing with delays and risks remain regarding the completion of measures and therefore the achievement of RRF objectives’, special report 14/2024 of the ECA of 11 September 2024 entitled ‘Green transition – Unclear contribution from the Recovery and Resilience Facility’, and special report 22/2024 of the ECA of 21 October 2024 entitled ‘Double funding from the EU budget – Control systems lack essential elements to mitigate the increased risk resulting from the RRF model of financing not linked to costs’,

    –  having regard to the study of December 2023 supporting the mid-term Evaluation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility,

    –  having regard to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) 2024 annual report published on 3 March 2025,

    –  having regard to the report of September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’ (Draghi report),

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 8 October 2024 entitled ‘Mid-term review of the post-COVID European recovery plan (Recovery and Resilience Facility)’(11),

    –  having regard to the information published on the Recovery and Resilience Scoreboard (RRF Scoreboard),

    –  having regard to the Commission staff working document of 20 November 2024 entitled ‘NGEU Green Bonds Allocation and Impact report 2024’ (SWD(2024)0275),

    –  having regard to its in-house research, in-depth analysis and briefings related to the implementation of the RRF(12),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on the situation in Hungary and frozen EU funds(13),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure, as well as Article 1(1)(e) of, and Annex 3 to, the decision of the Conference of Presidents of 12 December 2002 on the procedure for granting authorisation to draw up own-initiative reports,

    –  having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Budgetary Control, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety and the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    –  having regard to the joint deliberations of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs under Rule 59 of the Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0098/2025),

    A.  whereas the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) was created to make European economies and societies more sustainable, resilient and better prepared in the light of unprecedented crises in 2019 and 2022, by supporting Member States in financing strategic investments and in implementing reforms;

    B.  whereas reforms and investments under the RRF help to make the EU more resilient and less dependent by diversifying key supply chains and thereby strengthening the strategic autonomy of the EU; whereas reforms and investments under the RRF also generate European added value;

    C.  whereas the RRF, as well as other EU funds, such as the European instrument for temporary support to mitigate unemployment risks in an emergency, has helped to protect labour markets from the risk of long-term damage caused by the double economic shock of the pandemic and the energy crisis;

    D.  whereas RRF expenditure falls outside the ceilings of the multiannual financial framework (MFF) and borrowing proceeds constitute external assigned revenue; whereas Parliament regrets that they do not form part of the budgetary procedure; whereas based on the Financial Regulation’s principle of transparency, citizens should know how and for what purpose funds are spent by the EU;

    E.  whereas, due to the lack of progress in introducing new own resources in the EU and the need to ensure the sustainability of the EU’s repayment plan, a clear and reliable long-term funding strategy is essential to meet repayment obligations without forcing difficult trade-offs in the EU budget that could undermine future investments and policy priorities; whereas further discussions and concrete financial solutions will be necessary to secure the long-term viability of the EU’s debt repayment plan;

    F.  whereas the borrowing costs for NextGenerationEU (NGEU) have to be borne by the EU budget and the actual costs exceed the 2020 projections by far as a result of the high interest rates; whereas the total costs for NGEU capital and interest repayments are projected to be around EUR 25 to 30 billion per year from 2028, equivalent to 15-20 % of the 2025 annual budget; whereas Parliament has insisted that the refinancing costs be placed over and above the MFF ceilings; whereas a three-step ‘cascade mechanism’ including a new special EURI instrument was introduced during the 2024 MFF revision to cover the significant cost overruns resulting from NGEU borrowing linked to major changes in the market conditions; whereas an agreement was reached during the 2025 budgetary procedure to follow an annual 50/50 benchmark, namely to finance the overrun costs in equal shares by the special EURI instrument de-commitment compartment and the Flexibility Instrument;

    G.  whereas the bonds issued to finance the RRF are to be repaid in a manner that ensures the steady and predictable reduction of liabilities, by 2058 at the latest; whereas the Council has yet to adopt the adjusted basket of new own resources proposed by the Commission, which raises concerns about the viability of the repayment of the debt undertaken under NGEU;

    H.  whereas the social dimension is a key aspect of the RRF, contributing to upward economic and social convergence, restoring and promoting sustainable growth and fostering the creation of high-quality employment;

    I.  whereas the RRF should contribute to financing measures to strengthen the Member States’ resilience to climate disasters, among other things, and enhance climate adaptation; whereas the Member States should conduct proper impact assessments for measures and should share best practice on the implementation of the ‘do no significant harm’ (DNSH) principle;

    J.  whereas the RRF plays an important role in supporting investments and reforms in sustainable mobility, smart transport infrastructure, alternative fuels and digital mobility solutions, thus enhancing connectivity and efficiency across the EU; whereas it is regrettable that only a few Member States chose to use the RRF to support investments, particularly in high-speed railway and waterway infrastructure, aimed at developing European corridors, despite the encouragement of cross-border and multi-country projects; whereas it is crucial to increase investments in transport infrastructure, particularly in underserved regions, to improve connectivity, support regional cohesion and contribute to the green transition;

    K.  whereas by 31 December 2024, Member States had submitted 95 payment requests and the level of RRF disbursements including pre-financing stood at EUR 197,46 billion in grants (55 % of the total grants envelope) and EUR 108,68 billion in loans (37 % of the total loans envelope); whereas three Member States have already received their fifth payment, while one Member State has not received any RRF funding; whereas all Member States have revised their national recovery and resilience plans (NRRP) at least once; whereas 28 % of milestones and targets have been satisfactorily fulfilled and the Commission has made use of the possibility to partially suspend payments where some milestones and targets linked to a payment request were not found to be satisfactorily fulfilled; whereas delays in the execution of planned reforms and investments, particularly in social infrastructure and public services, could lead to the underutilisation of available resources, thereby reducing the expected impact on economic growth, employment and social cohesion;

    L.  whereas the ECA has revealed various shortcomings of the RRF, in particular in relation to its design, its transparency and reporting, the risk of double funding and the implementation of twin transition measures;

    M.  whereas according to the ECA, performance is a measure of the extent to which an EU-funded action, project or programme has met its objectives and provides value for money; whereas moreover, financing not linked to costs does not, in itself, make an instrument performance-based;

    N.  whereas robust audit and control systems are crucial to protect the financial interests of the EU throughout the life cycle of the RRF; whereas the milestones commonly known as ‘super milestones’, in particular related to the rule of law, had to be fulfilled prior to any RRF disbursements;

    O.  whereas the RRF Regulation refers to the RRF’s ‘performance-based nature’ but does not define ‘performance’; whereas RRF performance should be linked to sound financial management principles and should measure how well an EU-funded action, project or programme has met its objectives and provided value for money;

    P.  whereas effective democratic control and parliamentary scrutiny over the implementation of the RRF require the full involvement of Parliament and the consideration of all its recommendations at all stages;

    Q.  whereas the Commission has to provide an independent ex post evaluation report on the implementation of the RRF by 31 December 2028, consisting of an assessment of the extent to which the objectives have been achieved, of the efficiency of the use of resources and of the European added value, as well as a global assessment of the RRF, and containing information on its impact in the long term;

    R.  whereas the purpose of this report is to monitor the implementation of the RRF, in accordance with Parliament’s role as laid down in the RRF Regulation, by pointing to the benefits and shortcomings of the RRF, while drawing on the lessons learnt during its implementation;

    Strengthening Europe’s social and economic resilience

    1.  Highlights the fact that the RRF is an unprecedented instrument of solidarity in the light of two unprecedented crises and a cornerstone of the NGEU instrument, ending in 2026; emphasises the importance of drawing lessons from its implementation for the upcoming MFF, including as regards transparency, reporting and coherent measurement of deliverables; highlights the stabilising effect of the RRF for Member States at a time of great economic uncertainty, as it mitigates negative economic and social consequences and supports governments by contributing to the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights, by promoting economic recovery and competitiveness, boosting resilience and innovation, and by supporting the green and digital transitions;

    2.  Highlights the important role of the RRF in preventing the fragmentation of the internal market and the further deepening of macroeconomic divergence, in fostering social and territorial cohesion by providing macroeconomic stabilisation, and in offering assurance to the financial markets by improving investor confidence in turbulent times, thereby lowering yield spreads;

    3.  Welcomes the fact that the RRF is a one-off instrument providing additional fiscal space that has contributed to the prevention of considerable economic and social divergences between Member States with diverse fiscal space; highlights the Commission finding that the RRF has led to a sustained increase in investments across the EU and that the Commission expects the RRF to have a lasting impact across the EU beyond 2026, given its synergies with other EU funds; is, however, concerned that the RRF expiration in 2026 poses a significant risk of a substantial decline in public investment in common European priorities;

    4.  Recalls that the MFF and RRF combined amount to almost EUR 2 trillion for the 2021-2027 programming period, but points to the fact that the high inflation rates and the associated increases in the cost of goods and services have decreased the current value of European spending agreed in nominal terms;

    5.  Takes note of the Commission’s projection in 2024 concerning the potential of NGEU’s impact on the EU’s real gross domestic product (GDP) by 2026, which is significantly lower than its simulation in 2020 (1,4 % compared with 2,3 %), due in part to adverse economic and geopolitical conditions, and of the estimation that NGEU could lead to a sizeable, short-run increase in EU employment by up to 0,8 %; notes that the long-term benefits of the RRF on GDP will likely exceed the budgetary commitments undertaken by up to three to six times , depending on the productivity effects of RRF investment and the diligent implementation of reforms and investments;

    6.  Highlights the difficulty of quantifying the precise social and economic impact of the RRF, as it takes time for the impact of reforms and investments to become clear; stresses the need for further independent evaluations to assess the effective impact of reforms and investments and for further improvements of the underlying methodology; notes the Commission’s finding that approximately half of the expected increase in public investment between 2019 and 2025 is related to investment financed by the EU budget, particularly by the RRF, but notes that some investments have not yet delivered measurable impact;

    7.  Notes that the RRF has incentivised the implementation of some reforms included in the country-specific recommendations made in the context of the European Semester through the inclusion of such reforms in the NRRPs; underlines that there has been a qualitative leap forward in terms of monitoring RRF implementation; recalls that the RRF Scoreboard is used to monitor the progress made towards achieving milestones and targets, as well as compliance with horizontal principles, and in particular the six pillars, namely the green transition, the digital transformation, smart, sustainable and inclusive growth (including economic cohesion, jobs, productivity, competitiveness, research, development and innovation, and a well-functioning internal market with strong small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)), social and territorial cohesion, health, economic, social and institutional resilience with the aim of, inter alia, increasing crisis preparedness and crisis response capacity, and policies for the next generation, children and young people, such as education and skills; highlights that the overall uptake of country-specific recommendations made in the context of the European Semester remains low and has even dropped;

    8.  Highlights that in the context of the new economic governance framework, the set of reforms and investments underpinning an extension of the adjustment period should be consistent with the commitments included in the approved NRRPs during the period of operation of the RRF and the Partnership Agreement under the Common Provisions Regulation(14); observes that the five Member States that requested an extension of the adjustment period by 31 December 2024 relied partly on the reforms and investments already approved under the RRF to justify the extension; takes note of the fact that most Member States have included information on whether the reforms and investments listed in the medium-term fiscal-structural plans are linked to the RRF;

    9.  Welcomes the fact that the RRF provides support for both reforms and investments in the Member States, but notes with concern that the short timeframe for the remaining RRF implementation poses challenges to the completion of key reforms and large-scale investments that are to be finalised towards the end of the RRF and to the timely fulfilment of the 70 % of milestones and targets that are still pending;

    10.  Recalls that RRF expenditure should not substitute recurring national budgetary expenditure, unless duly justified, and should respect the principle of additionality of EU funding; insists that the firm, sustainable and verifiable implementation of non-recurrence, together with the targeting of clearly defined European objectives of reforms and investments, is key to ensure additionality and the long-lasting effect of additional European funds; recalls the need to uphold this principle and appeals against the crowding out or replacement of cohesion policy by the RRF or other temporary instruments, as cohesion policy remains essential for long-term sustainable territorial cohesion and convergence;

    11.  Highlights that prioritising RRF implementation, the lack of administrative capacity in many Member States and challenges posed by global supply chains have contributed to the delayed implementation of cohesion policy; calls on the Commission, in this context, to provide a comprehensive assessment of the RRF’s impact on other financial instruments and public investments, technical support, and the administrative and absorption capacities of the Member States;

    12.  Recalls that, in reaction to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the REPowerEU revision contributes to Europe’s energy security by reducing its dependence on fossil fuels, diversifying its energy supplies, investing in European resources and infrastructure, tackling energy poverty and investing in energy savings and efficiency in all sectors, including transport; emphasises that through REPowerEU, an additional EUR 20 billion in grants was made available in 2023, including EUR 8 billion generated from the front-loading of Emissions Trading System allowances and EUR 12 billion from the Innovation Fund; highlights Parliament’s successes in negotiations, in particular on the provisions on replenishing the Innovation Fund, the 30 % funding target for cross-border projects, the focus of investments on tackling energy poverty for vulnerable households, SMEs and micro-enterprises, and the flexible use of unspent cohesion funds from the 2014-2020 MFF and of up to 7,5 % of national allocations under the 2021-2027 MFF;

    13.  Recalls its call to focus RRF interventions on measures with European added value and therefore regrets the shortage of viable cross-border or multi-country measures, including high-speed railway and sustainable mobility infrastructure projects for dual use that are essential for completing the TEN-T network, and the related risk of re-nationalising funding; notes that the broad scope of the RRF objectives has contributed to this by allowing a wide variety of nationally focused projects to fall within its remit;

    14.  Highlights the modification of Article 27 of the RRF Regulation through REPowerEU, which significantly strengthened the cross-border and multi-country dimensions of the RRF by encouraging the Member States to amend their NRRPs to add RepowerEU chapters, including a spending target of at least 30 % for such measures in order to guarantee the EU’s energy autonomy; is concerned by the broad interpretation adopted by the Commission, which allows any reduction in (national) energy demand to make a case for a cross-border and multi-country dimension;

    15.  Welcomes the possibility of using RRF funding to contribute to the objectives of the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP) by supporting investments in critical technologies in the EU in order to boost its industrial competitiveness; notes that no Member State has made use of the possibility to include in its NRRP an additional cash contribution to STEP objectives via the Member State compartment of InvestEU; recalls that Member States can still amend their national plans in that regard; expects the revision processes to be efficient, streamlined and simple, especially considering the final deadline of 2026, the current geopolitical context and the need to invest in European defence capabilities;

    16.  Recalls the application of the DNSH principle for all reforms and investments supported by the RRF, with a targeted derogation under REPowerEU for energy infrastructure and facilities needed to meet immediate security of supply needs; encourages the Commission to assess the feasibility of a more uniform interpretation of the DNSH principle between the RRF and the EU taxonomy for sustainable activities, while taking into account the specificities of the RRF as a public expenditure programme;

    Financial aspects of the RRF

    17.  Stresses that the RRF is the first major performance-based instrument at EU level which is exclusively based on financing not linked to costs (FNLC); recalls that Article 8 of the RRF Regulation stipulates that the RRF must be implemented by the Commission in direct management in accordance with the relevant rules adopted pursuant to Article 322 TFEU, in particular the Financial Regulation and the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation; regrets that the Council did not agree to insert specific rules in the Financial Regulation to address the risks of this delivery model, such as double funding; considers that the rules of the Financial Regulation should be fully applicable to future instruments based on FNLC, including as regards fines, penalties and sanctions;

    18.  Notes that only 13 Member States have requested loans and that EUR 92 billion of the EUR 385,8 billion available will remain unused since this amount was not committed by the deadline of 31 December 2023; takes note of the fact that loans were attractive for Member States that faced higher borrowing costs on the financial markets or that sought to compensate for a reduction in RRF grants; points out that some Member States have made limited use of RRF loans, either due to strong fiscal positions or administrative considerations; calls on the Commission to analyse the reasons for the low uptake in some Member States and to consider these findings when designing future EU financial instruments; notes with concern that national financial instruments to implement the NRRPs have not been sufficiently publicised, leading to limited awareness and uptake by potential beneficiaries; considers that a political discussion is needed on the use of unspent funds in the light of tight public budgets and urgent EU strategic priorities; calls for an assessment of how and under which conditions unused RRF funds could be redirected to boost Europe’s competitiveness, resilience, defence, and social, economic and territorial cohesion, particularly through investments in digital and green technologies aligned with the RRF’s original purpose;

    19.  Recalls the legal obligation to ensure full repayment of NGEU expenditure by 31 December 2058 at the latest; reminds the Council and the Commission of their legal commitment under the interinstitutional agreement concluded in 2020 to ensure a viable path to refinancing NGEU debt, including through sufficient proceeds from new own resources introduced after 2021 without any undue reduction in programme expenditure or investment instruments under the MFF; deplores the lack of progress made in this regard, which raises concerns regarding the viability of the repayment of the debt undertaken under NGEU, and urges the Council to adopt new own resources without delay and as a matter of urgency; urges the Commission, furthermore, to continue efforts to identify additional genuine new own resources beyond the IIA and linked to EU policies, in order to cover the high spending needs associated with the funding of new priorities and the repayment of NGEU debt;

    20.  Notes with concern the Commission’s estimation that the total cost for NGEU capital and interest repayments are projected to be around EUR 25 to 30 billion per year from 2028, equivalent to 15-20 % of the 2025 annual budget ; recalls that recourse to special instruments had to be made in the last three budgetary procedures to cover EURI instrument costs; highlights that the significant increase in financing costs puts pressure on the future EU budget and limits the capacity to respond to future challenges;

    21.  Takes note of the Commission’s target to fund up to 30 % of NGEU costs by issuing greens bonds; notes that by 31 December 2024 the Commission had issued European green bonds amounting to EUR 68.2 billion;

    Design and implementation of NRRPs

    22.  Notes that 47 % of the available RRF funds had been disbursed by 31 December 2024, with grants reaching 55 % and loans 37 %, which has resulted in a high proportion of measures still to be completed in 2025 and 2026; is concerned, however, about the ECA’s finding that only 50 % of disbursed funds had reached final beneficiaries in 15 out of 22 Member States by October 2023; calls on the Commission to take the recommendations of the ECA duly into account in order to improve the functioning of any future performance-based instruments similar to the RRF, in particular in the context of a more targeted MFF;

    23.  Welcomes the fact that all Member States have surpassed the targets for the green (37 %) and the digital transitions (20 %), with average expenditure towards climate and digital objectives of the RRF as a whole standing at 42 % and 26 % respectively; notes that the ECA has cast doubt on how the implementation of RRF measures has contributed to the green transition and has recommended improvements to the methodologies used to estimate the impact of climate-related measures; highlights the fact that the same methodological deficiencies exist across all pillars of the RRF;

    24.  Notes the tangible impact that the RRF could have on social objectives, with Member States planning to spend around EUR 163 billion; underlines that such spending must be result-oriented, ensuring measurable economic and/or social benefits; stresses the need to accelerate investments in the development of rural, peripheral and outermost, isolated and remote areas, and in the fields of affordable housing, social protection and the integration of vulnerable groups, and youth employment, where expenditure is lagging behind; calls for an in-depth evaluation by the Commission, under the RRF Scoreboard, of the projects and reforms related to education and young people implemented by Member States under the RRF; regrets the delayed implementation of health objectives observed in certain Member States, given that the instrument should also improve the accessibility and capacity of health systems, and of key social infrastructure investments, including early childhood education and care facilities; stresses that these delays, in some cases linked to shifting budgetary priorities and revised national implementation timelines, risk undermining the achievement of the RRF’s social cohesion objectives;

    25.  Reiterates its negotiating position to include targets for education (10 %) and for cultural activities (2 %); encourages the Commission’s effort to evaluate these targets as a benchmark in its assessment of education policy in NRRPs, through the RRF Scoreboard;

    26.  Observes that a large majority of NRRPs include a specific section explaining how the plan addresses gender-related concerns and challenges; is concerned, however, that some NRRPs do not include an explanation of how the measures in the NRRP are expected to contribute to gender equality and equal opportunities for all and calls on the Member States concerned to add such explanations without delay;

    27.  Stresses the importance of reforms focusing on labour market fragmentation, fostering quality working conditions, addressing wage level inequalities, ensuring decent living conditions, and strengthening social dialogue, social protection and the social economy;

    28.  Notes the tangible impact that the RRF could have on the digital transformation objective, with EUR 166 billion allocated to corresponding plans; welcomes the contributions made under the smart, sustainable and inclusive growth pillar, in particular to competitiveness and support for SMEs; notes the need for an acceleration of investments in transnational cooperation, support for competitive enterprises leading innovation projects, and regulatory changes for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, which are lagging behind;

    29.  Stresses that the success of EU investments depends on well-functioning capital markets; calls on the Member States to ensure a more effective and timely disbursement of funds, particularly for SMEs and young entrepreneurs, to streamline application procedures with a view to enhancing accessibility and to implement specific measures to provide targeted support to help them play a more prominent role in the process of smart and inclusive growth;

    30.  Is concerned that the achievement of milestones and targets lags behind the indicative timetable provided in the NRRPs, and that the pace of progress is uneven across Member States; regrets the time lag between the fulfilment of milestones and targets and the implementation of projects; highlights that the RRF will only achieve its long-term and short-term potential if the reform and investment components, respectively, are properly implemented; welcomes the fact that, following a slow start, RRF implementation has picked up since the second half of 2023 but significant delays affecting key reforms and investments still persist and have been attributed to various factors, including the revisions linked to the inclusion of REPowerEU, mounting inflation, the insufficient administrative capacity of Member States, in particular the smaller Member States, uncertainties regarding specific RRF implementation rules, high energy costs, supply shortages and an underestimation of the time needed to implement measures; notes that the postponement of key implementation deadlines by some governments to 2026 raises concerns about the capacity of some Member States to fully absorb the allocated funds within the set timeframe of the RRF; stresses the importance of maintaining a realistic and effective implementation schedule to prevent the risk of incomplete projects and missed opportunities for structural improvements; calls on the Commission to ensure that administrative bottlenecks are urgently addressed;

    31.  Recalls the modification of the RRF Regulation through the inclusion of the REPowerEU chapter; stresses the importance of the REPowerEU chapters in NRRPs and calls on the Member States to prioritise mature projects and implement their NRRPs more quickly, both in terms of reforms and investments, and, where necessary, to adjust NRRPs in line with the RRF’s objectives, without undermining the overall balance and level of ambition of the NRRPs, in order to respond to challenges stemming from geopolitical events and to tackle current realities on the ground;

    32.  Highlights the fact that the RRF could have helped to mitigate the effects of the current EU-wide housing crisis; regrets that some Member States did not make use of this opportunity and stresses the importance for the Member States to accelerate investments in availability and affordability of housing;

    33.  Highlights the role of ‘super milestones’ in protecting the EU’s financial interests against rule of law deficiencies and in ensuring the full implementation of the requirements under Article 22 of the RRF Regulation; welcomes the fact that all but one Member State have satisfactorily fulfilled their ‘super milestones’; recalls that the Commission must recover any pre-financing that has not been netted against regular payment requests by the end of the RRF;

    34.  Notes the high administrative burden and complexity brought by the RRF; stresses the considerable efforts required at national level to implement the RRF in parallel with structural funds; notes that between 2021 and 2024 the demand-driven Technical Support Instrument supported more than 500 RRF-related reforms in the Member States, directly or indirectly related to the preparation, amendment, revision and implementation of the NRRPs; takes note of the Commission guidance of July 2024 with simplifications and clarifications to streamline RRF implementation but expects the Commission to act swiftly on its promise to cut the administrative burden by 25 %; urges the Commission to give clear and targeted technical support to the Member States, allowing them to develop efficient administrative capacity to implement the milestones and targets; calls on the Commission to decrease the level of complexity of EU public procurement rules which apply to higher-value contracts;

    35.  Expresses concern over the complexity of application procedures for RRF funding, particularly for SMEs and non-governmental organisations, which require external consultancy services even for small grants; emphasises that such bureaucratic obstacles contradict the original objectives of the RRF, which aimed to provide rapid and direct financial support; calls for an urgent simplification of application and reporting requirements, particularly for smaller beneficiaries, to maximise the absorption and impact of funds and to assist with their contribution to the green and digital transitions;

    36.  Believes that implementation delays underscore the risk that measures for which RRF funding has been paid will not be completed by the 2026 payment deadline; welcomes the Commission’s statement at the Recovery and Resilience Dialogue (RRD) of 16 September 2024 that it will not reimburse non-implemented projects; considers it a shortcoming that RRF funds paid for milestones and targets assessed as fulfilled cannot be recovered if related measures are not eventually completed; encourages the Commission to take into account the ECA’s recommendations related to this and to assess, in cooperation with the Member States, the measures most at risk of not being completed by 31 August 2026; stresses the importance of monitoring these measures, facilitating timely follow-up and working towards solutions to overcome delays;

    37.  Notes with concern that the remaining implementation timeframe of the RRF is too short for the implementation of many innovative projects; further notes that innovative projects, by definition, are more difficult to plan and more likely to encounter obstacles during implementation, making them unsuited to the RRF’s strict deadlines; urges the Commission to create future programmes that are flexible enough to give proper answers in changing circumstances and that at the same time guarantee a certain degree of predictability;

    38.  Notes that some milestones and targets may be no longer achievable because of objective circumstances; stresses that any NRRP revisions should be made in accordance with the RRF Regulation, including the applicable deadlines, and should not entail backtracking on reforms, commitments or lower quality projects but should maintain the overall ambition and the efficiency of public spending;

    39.  Is concerned about the Commission’s uneven assessment of NRRPs, which has led to double standards in the application of the Regulation; is further concerned about the uneven and different definition of milestones and targets from one NRRP to the other, as consistently reported by the ECA;

    40.  Highlights that the duration of the Commission’s assessment of payment requests by Member States differs considerably among the Member States and stresses the need for more transparency from the Commission; urges the Commission to accelerate its assessments and to ensure the equal treatment of the Member States; highlights the need to ensure a level playing field across the EU for measures and indicators that are used to assess all RRF projects;

    41.  Urges the Member States to increase their efforts to address administrative bottlenecks and provide sufficient administrative capacity to accelerate RRF implementation in view of the 2026 deadline and to avoid concentrating RRF projects in more developed regions and capitals by enabling RRF funds to flow into projects in the most vulnerable regions, thereby serving the RRF’s objective to enhance the EU’s social, territorial and economic cohesion; emphasises the importance of fair regional distribution within the NRRPs while ensuring that RRF funds are allocated based on economic and social impact, feasibility and long-term benefits;

    42.   Calls for an 18-month extension of mature RRF projects through an amendment of the RRF Regulation by co-decision, if needed; emphasises that the envisaged extension of projects will be conducted by the Commission based on objective, clear and fair benchmarks; welcomes the possibility of establishing a targeted and performance-based prioritisation and transfer system after the 2026 deadline in order to allow for the finalisation of ongoing projects through other funding schemes, including the European Investment Fund and a possible new European competitiveness fund; urges the Commission to present a strategy to address the huge demand for public investment beyond 2026 without compromising budgetary resources in other critical areas;

    43.  Calls for an evaluation of how this framework could enable targeted investments in EU defence supply chains, strategic stockpiles and defence innovation, ensuring alignment with broader European security objectives;

    44.  Is concerned that some Member States might choose to forego parts of the amounts or entire amounts associated with their last payment request, thus avoiding the fulfilment of the last milestones and targets;

    Transparency, monitoring and control

    45.  Takes note of the fact that the Commission had planned to conduct 112 RRF audits in all Member States in 2024; reminds the Commission of its obligation, in accordance with Article 24(9) of the RRF Regulation, to recover funding in case of incorrect disbursements or reversals of measures;

    46.  Notes that the Commission relies on its own methodologies when calculating partial payments and suspensions of funds; regrets that these methodologies were only developed two years after the start of the RRF implementation and without the consultation of Parliament;

    47.  Welcomes the extensive work of the ECA in relation to the RRF and deems it important to thoroughly assess its findings, in particular its findings that milestones and targets are often rather vague and output-oriented and are therefore not fit to measure results and impacts, and its findings regarding the risks of double funding resulting from overlaps with other policies; notes that the Commission has accepted many but not all of the ECA’s recommendations; stresses that weaknesses in financial controls, as highlighted by the ECA, must be urgently addressed to prevent double funding, cost inefficiencies, and mismanagement of EU funds; calls for enhanced transparency and for the full consideration of the ECA’s recommendations without adding unnecessary administrative burden;

    48.  Notes that the ECA considers that the RRF focuses on progress on implementation rather than performance, particularly because RRF-funded measures focus on outputs rather than results, vary in ambition, sometimes lack clarity and do not always cover a measure’s key implementation stages, including completion;

    49.  Notes that the ECA’s audits revealed several cases in which funding had been disbursed but the requirements related to the fulfilment of corresponding milestones and targets had not been adequately met; further notes that the Commission framework for assessing the ‘satisfactory fulfilment’ of the relevant milestones and targets contains discretionary elements, such as ‘minimal deviation from a requirement’ or ‘proportional delays’, and that the methodology for the determination of partial payments does not provide an explanation for the values chosen as coefficients, thereby leaving room for interpretation; asks the Commission to provide Parliament with further clarification;

    50.  Insists that, as a rule, measures already included in other national plans benefiting from EU funding (e.g. cohesion, agriculture, etc.) should not be included in NRRPs, even if they do not incur any costs; urges the Commission to remain vigilant and proactive in identifying any potential situation of double funding in particular in regard to the different implementation models of the RRF and other EU funding instruments;

    51.  Regrets the lack of a proper RRF audit trail and the persistent lack of transparency despite the bi-annual reporting requirement for Member States on the 100 largest final recipients, which was introduced into REPowerEU upon Parliament’s request; regrets the delays in reporting by some Member States and the limited informative value of the information provided, which ultimately prevents compliance checks by the Commission or the ECA; reiterates its call for the lists of the largest final recipients for each Member State to be regularly updated and published on the RRF Scoreboard and to include information on the economic operators involved, including contractors and sub-contractors, and their beneficial owners, and not simply ministries or other government bodies or state companies; further regrets that the current definition of ‘final recipient’ leaves room for interpretation, resulting in different final beneficiaries for similar measures among Member States; calls on the Commission, in this context, to ensure a common understanding of what constitutes a ‘final recipient’ so that this can be applied consistently;

    52.  Is concerned about persistent weaknesses in national reporting and control mechanisms, due in part to absorption pressure affecting the capacity to detect ineligible expenditure and due to the complexity of the audit and control procedures, which created uncertainty in the Member States and an overload of administrative procedures; calls on the Commission to provide assurance on whether Member States’ control systems function adequately and to check the compliance of RRF-funded investment projects with EU and national rules; calls for payments to be reduced and, where appropriate, amounts to be recovered in accordance with Article 22 of the RRF Regulation, should weaknesses persist in the national control systems; regrets the reliance on manual cross-checks and self-declarations by recipients of EU funds in the absence of interoperable IT tools and harmonised standards, despite the existence of tools such as the Early Detection and Exclusion System and ARACHNE, whose use is currently not mandatory, thereby risking that expenditure is declared twice; recalls, in this regard, the reluctance of the Member States to make progress in developing the relevant IT tools in a timely manner;

    53.  Shares the view of the ECA that the FNLC model does not preclude reporting on actual costs; notes that having clear insights on costs also facilitates the work of control and oversight bodies, as well as the EPPO and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), and enables enhanced public scrutiny;

    54.  Reiterates the role of the RRF Scoreboard in providing information for citizens on the overall progress in the implementation of NRRPs; underlines the importance of the Scoreboard in strengthening transparency and calls on the Commission to increase the level of transparency and data visualisation in the Scoreboard;

    55.  Recalls that the reporting on the progress of implementation in the RRF Scoreboard is based on information provided by the Member States on a bi-annual basis;

    56.  Highlights the important role of the EPPO and OLAF in protecting the EU’s financial interests; welcomes the fact that EPPO investigations into RRF-related fraud and corruption cases have led to several arrests, indictments and seizures of RRF funds; recalls that the EPPO was handling 307 active cases related to the RRF in 2024, corresponding to about 17 % of all expenditure fraud investigations and causing an estimated damage to the EU’s financial interests of EUR 2,8 billion; expects the number of investigations to grow as RRF implementation advances; calls on the Commission to look into the management declarations of the Member States in terms of their reporting of detected fraud and the remedial measures taken;

    Role of the European Parliament

    57.  Reiterates the importance of Parliament’s role in scrutinising and monitoring the implementation of the RRF and in holding the Commission accountable; highlights Parliament’s input provided through various channels, in particular through various plenary debates, parliamentary resolutions, bi-monthly RRD meetings with the responsible Commissioners, over 30 meetings of the standing working group on the scrutiny of the RRF, numerous parliamentary questions, the annual discharge procedure of the Commission and the regular flow of information and ad hoc requests for information from the Commission; regrets that the model of using milestones and targets to trigger disbursement was not accompanied by adequate budgetary control mechanisms, resulting in a diminished role for Parliament compared to its scrutiny of MFF spending;

    58.  Recalls Parliament’s rights as laid down in Article 25 of the RRF Regulation, in particular the right to simultaneously receive from the Commission information that it transmits to the Council or any of its preparatory bodies in the context of the RRF Regulation or its implementation, as well as an overview of its preliminary findings concerning the satisfactory fulfilment of the relevant milestones and targets included in the NRRPs; encourages the sharing of relevant outcomes of discussions held in Council preparatory bodies with the competent parliamentary committees;

    59.  Recalls further the right of Parliament’s competent committees to invite the Commission to provide information on the state of play of the assessment of the NRRPs in the context of the RRD meetings;

    60.  Regrets the fact that Parliament has no role in the design of NRRPs and is not consulted on payment requests; criticises furthermore the fact that Parliament has not been provided with a clear and traceable overview of the implementation status of projects and payments; expects to be informed about the context of NRRP revisions in order to make its own assessment of the revisions and to have an enhanced role in possible future instruments based on the RRF experience;

    Stakeholder involvement

    61.  Regrets the insufficient involvement of local and regional authorities (LRAs), civil society organisations, social partners, national parliaments and other relevant stakeholders in the design, revision or implementation of NRRPs leading to worse policy outcomes, as well as limited ownership; regrets that in the design and implementation of the NRRPs, some Member States have clearly favoured some LRAs or stakeholders to the detriment of others; recalls that the participation of LRAs, national authorities and those responsible for developing these policies is crucial for the success of the RRF, as stated in Article 28 of the RRF Regulation; recalls that Parliament supported a binding provision in the RRF to establish a multilevel dialogue to engage relevant stakeholders and discuss the preparation and implementation of NRRPs with them, with a clear consultation period; calls, therefore, for the maximum possible stakeholder involvement in the implementation of NRRPs, in accordance with the national legal framework and based on clear and transparent principles;

    62.  Reiterates the need for regular interaction between national coordinating authorities and national stakeholders involved in the monitoring of the implementation of the NRRPs, in line with the principle of transparency and accountability; stresses that more regular and public communication from the national coordinating authorities is needed to ensure that updated information about the progress of the implementation of NRRPs is made available;

    63.  Stresses that decisions should be made at the level that is most appropriate; is convinced that the application of the partnership principle and a stronger involvement of LRAs could make project implementation more efficient, reduce disparities within Member States and result in more and better quality measures with a cross-border and multi-country dimension;

    64.  Believes that valuable lessons can be drawn from the RRF to be reflected in the design of performance-based instruments in the next MFF, in particular in the light of the EU’s competitiveness and simplification agendas;

    Lessons for the future

    65.  Believes that the combination of reforms and investments has proved successful but that a clearer link is needed between the two; highlights the importance of aligning any funding with the objectives of the instrument and disbursing it in line with the progress made towards them; insists that the level of ambition of NRRPs should not be lowered but should be commensurate with the RRF timeline to ensure their successful implementation;

    66.  Is convinced, as highlighted by the Draghi report, that boosting EU competitiveness, decarbonising the EU’s economy and making it more circular and resource-efficient, as well as closing the skills gap, creating quality jobs and enhancing the EU’s innovation capacity, will be central priorities beyond 2026; is concerned that a sizeable funding gap will arise after the RRF ceases to operate at the end of 2026, notably for public investment in common European priorities, since financial resources from national budgets vary significantly among Member States; highlights the need to use the lessons learned from the RRF to better leverage public and private investments with a view to addressing the financing gap in European objectives and transitions, which the Draghi report estimates at over EUR 800 billion annually, while ensuring seamless continuity of investments in common European goods;

    67.  Welcomes the enhanced use of financial instruments made possible by the option to channel RRF funds towards the Member States’ compartment of InvestEU;

    68.  Urges the Commission to apply the lessons learned and the ECA’s observations, and to ensure that future performance-based instruments are well-targeted, aligned with the aim of financing European public goods and prioritising the addressing of clearly defined strategic challenges, economic sustainability and competitiveness; calls for it to be ensured that all future instruments are designed to measure not only inputs or short-term outputs and progress but also results in terms of long-term impacts backed by outcomes;

    69.  Notes that, according to the ECA, it is essential that future performance-based instruments are not designed and implemented in a way that is detrimental to accountability and, in particular, that appropriate control systems are in place in the Member States and are checked by the Commission before implementation starts; notes that this would involve setting minimum requirements for the Member States’ controls and the Commission’s checks;

    70.  Calls on the Commission to conduct an independent evaluation and to report on the RRF impact on private investments at aggregate EU level, in particular on its potential crowding-out effect on private investments and its determinants; calls further for objective and clear analyses from the Commission on how the implementation of reforms and investments within the NRRPs affects the economies of the individual Member States, with special regard to smart, sustainable and inclusive growth; urges the Commission to take the lessons learned from these analyses and from the ECA’s observations on the RRF implementation into account when drawing up its proposals for the next programming period;

    71.  Underlines that all EU-funded investments and reforms should be coordinated and coherent with strategic planning at national level and should focus on projects with a clear European added value; underlines the need for a spending target for cross-border and multi-country investments; calls on the Commission to develop a credible methodology to assess the cross-border and multi-country dimensions of EU funded projects;

    72.  Highlights that meaningful social and territorial dialogues with a high level of involvement of LRAs, social partners, civil society organisations and national parliaments within the national legal framework are essential for national ownership, successful implementation and democratic accountability; expresses concern over the insufficient involvement of all relevant stakeholders in the implementation and oversight of RRF-funded initiatives; stresses in particular that regions and city councils cannot be mere recipients of decisions, without being given the opportunity to have a say on reforms and investments that truly transform their territories;

    73.  Believes that it is essential to adopt differentiated strategies that recognise the cultural diversity of the various regions and enhance their economic and social cohesion instead of applying a homogeneous or one-size-fits-all approach that could be to the detriment of the less developed regions; calls, therefore, for dialogues with stakeholders to be strengthened and more diligently employed as they could inspire future initiatives and mechanisms in the EU and its Member States;

    74.  Underlines the requirement of the RRF Regulation to publicly display information about the origin of funding for projects funded by the EU to ensure buy-in from European citizens;

    75.  Highlights that the RRD meetings have been an important tool in enhancing transparency and accountability, which are crucial for the optimal implementation of the RRF;

    76.  Reiterates that further efforts are required to improve the transparency and traceability of the use of EU funds; stresses the need to ensure that data that is relevant for performance measurement is available and that information on performance is presented in a better and more transparent manner; stresses that the feedback mechanism between performance information and programme design or adjustment should be enhanced;

    77.  Considers that better training and capacity-building across all regions and authorities involved, in particular at national level, could have accelerated the RRF’s implementation and enabled the implementing authorities to better adapt to the performance-based nature of the RRF; considers that the Commission could have assisted Member States more at the planning stage and provided earlier implementation guidance, in particular with a view to strengthening their audit and control systems and the cross-border dimension of the RRF;

    78.  Highlights the importance of mitigating the risk of double funding; suggests the deployment of an integrated and interoperable IT and data mining system and the development of clear standards for datasets to be applied across Member States, with a view to allowing comprehensive and automated expenditure tracking; calls for improved coordination mechanisms that define clear responsibilities among the bodies involved in the implementation of the various EU and national programmes, while avoiding unnecessary bureaucratic complexity and ensuring an efficient allocation of funds; encourages the integration of advanced data analytics and AI tools to enhance performance tracking, evaluation and reporting to alleviate manual workload and to streamline reporting processes; underlines that such progress can only happen if there is also operational support to digitalise administrations;

    79.  Strongly urges the Commission and the Member States to ensure that any type of EU FNLC or EU funding that is performance based complies with EU and national rules, ultimately protecting the financial interests of the EU; reiterates the accountability and responsibility of the Commission and the Member States to ensure the legality and the regularity of EU funding, as well as the respect of sound financial management principles;

    80.  Considers that the role of Parliament in the monitoring of the RRF should be further enhanced;

    81.  Calls for future performance-based instruments to have a single audit trail to trace budget contributions to the projects funded; underlines the need for project-level auditing to mitigate reputational risks in the eyes of the general public and to facilitate the recovery of funds in case measures are reversed; underlines the need to reduce administrative bottlenecks and burden;

    82.  Demands that any possible future performance-based programmes make clearer links between the milestones and targets and the actual projects being implemented; stresses that there should be less of a delay between the fulfilment of milestones and the implementation of projects;

    83.  Reiterates its call for an open platform which contains data on all projects, final recipients and the regional distribution of funding, thereby facilitating auditing and democratic oversight;

    84.  Stresses that any possible future budgetary decisions on EU borrowing should respect the unity of the budget and Parliament’s role as part of the budgetary authority; highlights the risks of cost overruns for the repayment of debt, resulting inter alia from volatile interest rates; deems it important to ensure from the outset that sufficient funding is available to cover these costs without presenting a detriment to other programmes or political priorities;

    85.  Invites the Commission and the Member States to closely assess and learn from instruments and tools such as the RRF, in order to maximise the efficiency and impact of EU funding, investments and reforms, streamline policy objectives, improve the collaboration of the institutions and stakeholders at national and European level, and increase national ownership;

    86.  Notes the declared intention of the Commission to draw on the RRF experience when designing its proposals for the post-2027 EU funding programmes, due later this year; acknowledges that the independent ex post evaluation will come too late to feed into the process leading up to the next programming period, but expects the Commission and the co-legislators to take due account of the lessons learned from the RRF and of the recommendations of relevant stakeholders, in particular LRA, civil society organisations and social partners; believes that, as the EU plans for future economic resilience, there is also a need to further mobilise private investment, strengthen capital markets and ensure that public spending remains fiscally responsible and strategically targeted to make the EU more resilient and sovereign in an ever more conflictual geopolitical context;

    o
    o   o

    87.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, and to the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

    (1) OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/241/oj.
    (2) OJ L 63, 28.2.2023, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/435/oj.
    (3) OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2092/oj.
    (4) OJ L, 2024/765, 29.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/765/oj.
    (5) OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 28.
    (6) OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj.
    (7) OJ L, 2024/795, 29.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/795/oj.
    (8) OJ L, 2024/1263, 30.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1263/oj.
    (9) OJ C 32, 27.1.2023, p. 42.
    (10) OJ C, C/2024/4618, 22.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4618/oj.
    (11) OJ C, C/2024/7057, 4.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/7057/oj.
    (12) European Parliament, Think Tank https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/research/advanced-search?textualSearch=RRF&startDate=01%2F07%2F2019&endDate=&sort=RELEVANCE.
    (13) OJ C, C/2024/5742, 17.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5742/oj.
    (14) Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy (OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 159, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1060/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – 2023 and 2024 reports on Moldova – P10_TA(2025)0131 – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Republic of Moldova 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0698),

    –  having regard to the Commission opinion of 17 June 2022 on the application by the Republic of Moldova (hereinafter ‘Moldova’) for membership of the European Union (COM(2022)0406) and the joint staff working document of 6 February 2023 entitled ‘Association Implementation Report on the Republic of Moldova’ (SWD(2023)0041),

    –   having regard to Regulation (EU) 2025/535 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 March 2025 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova(1),

    –  having regard to its previous resolutions on Moldova,

    –  having regard to the Commission analytical report of 1 February 2023 on Moldova’s alignment with the EU acquis (SWD(2023)0032),

    –  having regard to the proposal of 9 October 2024 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova (COM/2024/0469),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 9 October 2024 on the Moldova Growth Plan (COM/2024/0470),

    –  having regard to the Council conclusions of 17 December 2024 on enlargement,

    –  having regard to the visit of the delegation of the Committee on Foreign Affairs to Moldova on 25-27 February 2025,

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0096/2025),

    A.  whereas, following Moldova’s application for EU membership of 3 March 2022, the European Council granted it candidate status on 23 June 2022 and subsequently decided to open accession negotiations on 14 December 2023;

    B.  whereas in June 2024 negotiations on Moldova’s EU accession started;

    C.  whereas Moldova held a referendum on 20 October 2024, the outcome of which confirmed the embedding of EU accession into its Constitution, despite various forms of manipulative interference to destabilise the country, illicit financing of political actors, disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks;

    D.  whereas the Association Agreement(2), which includes a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (AA/DCFTA), remains the basis for political association and economic integration between the EU and Moldova, and a regular political and economic dialogue is ongoing between the two sides;

    Progress with EU accession-related reforms, in particular on the rule of law and governance

    1.  Commends Moldova’s exemplary commitment and steady progress with EU accession-related reforms despite significant internal and external challenges – such as Russia’s full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine – which made it possible for accession negotiations to start in June 2024, half a year after the relevant decision by the European Council on 14 December 2023 and less than two years after the country’s application for EU membership on 3 March 2022;

    2.  Recognises that EU-Moldova relations have entered into a new phase, with intensifying cooperation, gradual alignment across all policy areas of the EU acquis and advancement on the EU integration path; welcomes the progress achieved in the bilateral screening process since it started in July 2024 and the recent closing of screening for cluster 1 (fundamentals) and cluster 2 (internal market); commends and supports the ambition of the Moldovan Government to open negotiations on cluster 1 (fundamentals), cluster 2 (internal market) and cluster 6 (external relations) in the coming months, as well as completing the screening process for all clusters by the end of 2025; calls on the Commission to enhance its support to the Moldovan Government in order to ensure the successful achievement of these key objectives; encourages the Council to take a merit-based approach in its decisions on Moldova’s negotiation process; deplores the bilateralisation and instrumentalisation of the EU accession process, such as the opposition of the Hungarian Government to opening negotiations on clusters 1, 2 and 6, which has led to a delay and serves Russia’s objective of obstructing the European integration of the region;

    3.  Believes that Moldova’s capacity to consolidate its current progress with EU accession-related reforms and sustain the ambitious pace towards EU membership will require the strong and genuine support of a parliamentary majority after the elections in autumn 2025;

    4.  Notes that the outcomes of both the constitutional referendum on EU accession, held on 20 October 2024, and the presidential election, held on 20 October 2024 and 3 November 2024, confirmed the support of a majority of the people of Moldova for the country’s goal of EU membership and the required pro-EU reforms; underlines that this referendum and election were held professionally and with an extraordinary sense of duty and dedication, despite a massive hybrid campaign by Russia and its proxies which used various tools, such as the strategic exploitation of social media, AI-generated content, ‘leaks’ of fake documents, intimidation, which entailed various forms of manipulative interference to destabilise the country, illicit financing of political actors, vote-buying, including by Russia’s instrumentalisation of parts of the clergy from the Metropolis of Chisinau and All Moldova, disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks; recalls that these attacks had four key strategies: divide society, delegitimise institutions, discredit democratic actors and promote Russian influence; welcomes the outcome of the 2024 constitutional referendum which enshrined the commitment to joining the EU in the country’s constitution; strongly condemns the increasing attempts by Russia, pro-Russian oligarchs and Russian-sponsored local proxies to destabilise Moldova, sow divisions within Moldovan society and derail the country’s pro-EU direction through hybrid attacks, the instrumentalisation of energy supplies, disinformation, manipulation and intimidation campaigns targeting civil society organisations and independent media;

    5.  Notes that the upcoming parliamentary elections on 28 September 2025 will be of crucial importance for the continuation of Moldova’s pro-EU trajectory; is concerned about the likely intensification of foreign, in particular Russian, malign interference and hybrid attacks ahead of the elections; calls for the EU to increase its support, including financial and technical support, for the Moldovan Government’s efforts to counter such interference in the country’s democratic process, including through additional sanctions listings, an extension and consolidation of the mandate and resources of the EU Partnership Mission (EUPM) in Moldova and the granting of additional support thereto, and the sharing of expertise in foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), countering hybrid threats and strengthening resilience; calls similarly for an increase in efforts by the Moldovan authorities and the EU in support of independent media and pro-democracy civil society, in order to enable journalists at national and regional level to counter FIMI and to strengthen digital literacy;

    6.  Stresses the importance of strategic communication, debunking and combating false, Russia-promoted narratives about the EU and its policies and of highlighting the concrete short- and long-term benefits of EU accession for the people of all of Moldova, with a special focus on regions such as Gagauzia as well as socio-economically disadvantaged communities in rural areas; calls for the EU to step up its support for Moldova in this regard;

    Socio-economic reforms

    7.  Welcomes the Commission’s Moldova Growth Plan, which is aimed at supporting Moldova’s socio-economic and fundamental reforms and enhancing access to the EU’s single market; welcomes the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova, which underpins the Growth Plan and is worth EUR 2,02 billion, making it the largest EU financial support package for Moldova since its independence; underlines that this facility provides Moldova with EUR 520 million in non-repayable support and a maximum amount of EUR 1,5 billion in loans, with an 18 % pre-financing rate, demonstrating the EU’s recognition of the urgency of supporting Moldova’s reforms and resilience; calls on the Commission to support the Moldovan authorities in implementing the necessary Reform Agenda for the effective absorption of funds from this facility, ensuring that the benefits of this support are promptly felt by Moldova’s citizens; looks forward to the announced impact assessment of the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova in the form of a Commission staff working document within three months of the adoption of the corresponding regulation;

    8.  Calls on the Commission to include adequate dedicated pre-accession funds for Moldova in the EU’s next multiannual financial framework, and to begin preparing Moldova for the efficient use of future pre-accession funds as a newly designated EU candidate country;

    9.  Reiterates that the support of the people of Moldova for European integration can be strengthened with a tangible improvement in their livelihoods, by strengthening state institutions and public administration in order to use project funding effectively and to implement and enforce the EU acquis, ensuring a robust welfare system and fighting corruption and oligarchic influence and ensuring accountability; calls on the Moldovan authorities to continue to ensure the meaningful involvement of civil society organisations, diaspora, vulnerable groups and social partners, including trade unions, in order to strengthen trust in democratic institutions and processes and boost public support for EU accession-related reforms;

    10.  Stresses the importance of civil society organisations in monitoring governance and progress with EU-related reforms, promoting transparency, defending human rights and countering disinformation and external malign influence by anti-reform political actors and Russian proxies;

    11.  Calls for comprehensive social policy reforms to address poverty and persistent large-scale emigration, increase healthcare coverage, strengthen public education, improve working conditions and develop adequate social protection systems; emphasises that economic development must be inclusive and sustainable, with opportunities for small and medium-sized enterprises; stresses the need for targeted social investment in Moldova’s young people and rural areas to reduce regional disparities and safeguard social cohesion;

    12.  Calls for special emphasis on Moldova’s participation in EU social, educational, and cultural programmes in order to promote social convergence, innovation and technological advancement;

    13.  Calls on Moldova to implement the Reform Agenda, which outlines the key socio-economic and fundamental reforms to accelerate the growth and competitiveness of Moldova’s economy and its convergence with the EU on the basis of enhanced implementation of the AA/DCFTA;

    14.  Strongly calls for the acceleration of Moldova’s gradual integration into the EU and the single market by continuing to align its legal and regulatory framework with the EU acquis and associating the country to more EU programmes and initiatives, including through the granting of observer status to Moldovan officials and experts in relevant EU bodies, which would deliver tangible socio-economic benefits even before the country formally joins the EU; congratulates Moldova on its inclusion in the geographical scope of the Single Euro Payments Area payment schemes, facilitating transfers in euro and reducing costs for Moldova’s citizens and businesses; commends the inclusion of roaming liberalisation in the updated EU–Moldova Association Agreement; welcomes Moldova’s recent progress in the transposition of the EU’s roaming and telecommunications acquis and expresses support for a swift decision on the inclusion of Moldova into the EU ‘roam like at home’ area; calls on the service providers to cooperate in good faith with the Moldovan authorities on implementing ‘roam like at home’;

    15.  Welcomes the renewal of the EU’s temporary trade liberalisation measures in July 2024 in order to support Moldova’s economy, substituting the loss of trade caused by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its unfriendly policies towards Moldova; calls for the EU to take swift and significant steps towards the permanent liberalisation of its tariff-rate quotas, in order to ensure predictability and increase the country’s attractiveness to investors;

    16.  Notes that the recent decision of the US administration to suspend support for civil society, independent media, key reforms and infrastructure projects has created additional urgent needs in Moldova, regarding which the EU should step in; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to increase its funding for EU instruments supporting democracy, such as the European Endowment for Democracy, and for other key projects that had until recently been funded by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and other US agencies;

    Human rights

    17.  Notes Moldova’s progress towards achieving gender equality, including its adoption of the Programme for Promoting and Ensuring Equality between Women and Men for the 2023-2027 period, and calls for its continued efforts in this regard, particularly to reduce the gender pay gap, fight against stereotypes, discrimination and gender-based violence, and to increase the representation of women in politics and business;

    18.  Welcomes the efforts by the Moldovan authorities to combat violence against women and improve protection for survivors, in particular the adoption of the National Programme on Preventing and Combatting Violence against Women and Domestic Violence for the 2023-2027 period; notes that the impact of this, however, is still lacking and therefore calls for the establishment of more shelters for survivors of domestic violence, for adequate attention by the justice system to violence against women and for policy changes and increased awareness-raising among men regarding gender-based violence;

    19.  Calls on the Moldovan Government to strengthen its efforts, including the effective implementation of its legislative framework, to combat racial discrimination, marginalisation, racist hate speech and hate crimes targeting members of ethnic minority groups, including the Roma;

    20.  Commends Moldova’s efforts to improve the rights of the LGBTIQ+ community in recent years;

    21.  Calls on the Moldovan Government to fully align its legislation on the rights of persons with disabilities with the EU acquis and to tackle the systemic problem of children with intellectual disabilities being placed in psychiatric institutions;

    Energy, environment and connectivity

    22.  Condemns Russia’s instrumentalisation of energy against Moldova, most recently by halting gas supplies to the Transnistrian region on 1 January 2025, in violation of contractual obligations, and thereby provoking a serious crisis in the region; applauds the Commission’s swift proposal of a Comprehensive Strategy for Energy Independence and Resilience and its support package worth EUR 250 million, which will reduce the energy bills of Moldovan consumers, including in the Transnistrian region, support Moldova’s decoupling from Russia’s energy supplies and integrate Moldova into the EU energy market; emphasises the need for the EU and the Moldovan authorities to effectively communicate about the substantial EU support package aimed at addressing Moldova’s energy crisis;

    23.  Commends the alignment of the Moldovan energy sector with the EU acquis; calls on the Moldovan Government to continue its efforts, with EU support that includes the tools available from the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova, to diversify gas and electricity supply routes, develop connectivity, increase energy efficiency and its internal production and storage capacity, as well as advance its full integration into the EU energy market in order to ensure Moldova’s energy security and resilience; stresses the importance of the completion of the Vulcanesti-Chisinau 400 kV overhead power line by the end of 2025 in order to reduce Moldova’s reliance on energy infrastructure in the Transnistrian region; calls on the EU to mobilise the necessary resources to help compensate for the withdrawal of USAID support for Moldova’s energy sector;

    24.  Commends the Moldovan Government for its progress on decarbonisation, energy efficiency and transitioning to a green economy, including doubling the share of renewable energy to 30 % by 2030; encourages the EU and its Member States to continue to provide financial support and expertise to Moldovan counterparts in this area; welcomes the adoption in 2023 of Moldova’s National Climate Change Adaptation Programme until 2030 and its Action Plan for this purpose; calls on the Moldovan Government to adopt and begin implementing its National Energy and Climate Plan for the 2025-2030 period; notes the importance of implementing the commitments of the Energy Community’s Decarbonisation Roadmap, and implementing the Monitoring, Reporting, Verification and Accreditation package with a view to introducing carbon pricing and aligning with the EU emissions trading system;

    25.  Believes that an extension of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) corridor Baltic Sea-Black Sea-Aegean Sea (Corridor IX) to include the route of Chisinau-Constanta-Varna-Bourgas would be a strategic investment in the region’s transport infrastructure, enhancing connectivity and promoting economic growth, in view of the enlargement of the EU to the east and the potential positive impact of this extension on the region’s security and stability, serving as a key logistics route for NATO and enhancing the EU’s geostrategic autonomy;

    Rule of law and good governance

    26.  Underlines that comprehensive justice reform remains key for the success of Moldova’s democratic and EU accession-related reforms; recognises Moldova’s sustained efforts to build an independent, impartial, accountable and professional judicial system and conclude the vetting process by the end of 2026; calls, therefore, for the EU to continue actively supporting the justice reform and the process of vetting both judges and prosecutors, including the attraction, training and recruitment of qualified judicial personnel and increase in judicial capacity;

    27.  Notes that Moldova has achieved progress in the fight against and prevention of corruption, but stresses the need to continue the fight against money laundering; welcomes the entry into force in February 2024 of Moldova’s National Integrity and Anti-Corruption Programme for 2024-2028; highlights the need to ensure enhanced coordination among all key anti-corruption and justice institutions in order to implement comprehensive reforms and to ensure that they have adequate resources and capacities; stresses that results in terms of prosecution and conviction in corruption cases need to be delivered in order to ensure public trust in the ongoing reforms;

    28.  Recalls the importance of continuing the investigation and bringing to justice those responsible for the 2014 bank fraud; welcomes the fact that, after long efforts by the Moldovan authorities, Interpol has finally added one of the alleged perpetrators, Vladimir Plahotniuc, to its list of internationally wanted persons;

    29.  Welcomes the adoption by Moldova in 2023 of a new national strategy for preventing and combating human trafficking, aligned with the EU acquis, and the cooperation of Moldova with Europol in combating drug trafficking;

    30.  Expresses its readiness to continue supporting the Parliament of Moldova through mutually agreed democracy support activities that respond to the needs of the institution, its elected members and staff; underlines the importance of the Parliament of Moldova in fostering public debate about the country’s European future and achieving a broad consensus over, and democratic legitimacy of, EU accession-related reforms across political parties and among broader society; highlights the decision of 10 March 2025 to open a European Parliament office in Chisinau to further strengthen Parliament’s engagement with the Eastern Partnership region;

    Cooperation in the field of common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and progress on resolving the Transnistrian conflict

    31.  Welcomes Moldova’s consistent cooperation on foreign policy issues and the significantly increased rate, notably from 54 % in 2022 to 86 % in 2024, of its alignment with the EU’s CFSP positions and restrictive measures; invites it to continue to improve this alignment, including on restrictive measures against Russia, and to continue cooperation on preventing the circumvention of sanctions against Russia and Belarus related to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

    32.  Underlines that Moldova is a key contributor to the regional and European security, including through its unwavering support to Ukraine since the start of Russia’s war of aggression, for example by welcoming Ukrainian war refugees, and through its contributions to the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, for example by deploying firefighting teams to tackle severe wildfires in Greece;

    33.  Expresses its support for the EUPM in Moldova and calls on the Member States to contribute the necessary experts and financial resources, in anticipation of a potential intensification of hybrid threats; welcomes the recent extension of the EUPM’s mandate until April 2026; encourages the Moldovan authorities to make full use of the EUPM’s expertise to enhance its preparedness, particularly in view of repeated electoral interference ahead of the parliamentary elections on 28 September 2025; calls for the EU to draw from the experience gained in Moldova in protecting the electoral process and democratic institutions in the EU itself; encourages the European External Action Service and the Commission to use all available EU instruments in the area of countering hybrid threats, in order to continue to support Moldova, including by swiftly deploying a Hybrid Rapid Response Team; welcomes the establishment of Moldova’s Centre for Strategic Communications and Countering Disinformation, as a means of coordinating the fight against foreign interference among the various Moldovan institutions, and of the National Agency for Cyber Security and the National Institute for Cyber Security Innovations; notes that Moldova’s National Security Strategy, adopted in December 2023, highlights EU accession as a key objective and for the first time identifies Russia as the source of major threats to Moldova’s security; stresses the importance of improving information sharing and intelligence cooperation between Moldova and the EU and its Member States on security threats;

    34.  Reiterates its full commitment to Moldova’s territorial integrity and to the peaceful resolution of the conflict, based on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Moldova in its internationally recognised borders;

    35.  Welcomes the Commission’s initiatives to include proactive support for the Transnistrian region in its energy emergency support packages, and exchange of information and practical cooperation between the Moldovan Government and the de facto authorities of the Transnistrian region throughout the energy crisis caused by Russia; welcomes the progress regarding the conditionalities for Tiraspol in light of the recent gas transit agreement and calls for the full implementation of these conditionalities, including the release of all political prisoners by Tiraspol and the dismantling of the remaining illegal checkpoints;

    36.  Welcomes Moldova’s keen interest in contributing to the EU’s common security and defence policy (CSDP) and the fact that Moldova is the first country to sign a security and defence partnership with the EU; welcomes Moldova’s continued active participation in EU missions and operations under the CSDP, namely the EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Operation Althea) and the EU Training Mission in Somalia, its interest in participation in PESCO projects and the ongoing negotiations on a framework agreement with the European Defence Agency; calls on the EU to include Moldova in the EU security and defence programmes and related budget allocations, including the European Defence Industry Programme and Readiness 2030, allowing the country to participate in joint procurement alongside the Member States;

    37.  Welcomes the allocation of EUR 50 million to modernise the defence capacities of the Moldovan Armed Forces in the context of the current security challenges through the European Peace Facility (EPF) for 2024; notes that Moldova is the second-largest EPF beneficiary after Ukraine, with a total of EUR 137 million allocated since 2021; welcomes the announced support of EUR 60 million to be provided to Moldova from the EPF budget in 2025; calls on the Member States to progressively increase the EPF funding for Moldova to further enhance the country’s defence capabilities;

    o
    o   o

    38.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and to the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Moldova.

    (1) OJ L, 2025/535, 21.3.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/535/oj.
    (2) Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Moldova, of the other part (OJ L 260, 30.8.2014, p. 4, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2014/492/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Violation of children’s rights in Italy: failure to hear a child, despite the Cartabia reform, and forced meetings with her father – E-001466/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Children’s rights are protected under Article 24 of the EU Charter[1], which guarantees their right to be heard in matters affecting them.

    The Commission is committed to ensuring the respect of the Charter within the remit of its competences[2]. The Brussels IIb Regulation[3] provides uniform rules obliging the courts of the Member States to hear a child when exercising jurisdiction in parental responsibility matters.

    Family law remains under national jurisdiction, according to the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity, and aligned with national and international law.

    When child victims are heard in criminal proceedings, pursuant to the Victims’ Rights Directive[4], the procedural rules are determined by national law.

    Directive (EU) 2024/1385[5] further recognises child victims, as witnesses to domestic violence, requiring child-friendly procedures, trained professionals, and safe contact arrangements between a child and a holder of parental responsibility who is an offender or suspect of violence against women or domestic violence. Member States must transpose it into their national legislation (by June 2027).

    During this period, the Commission will hold implementation workshops to steer the timely and complete transposition.

    In its role as guardian of the Treaties, the Commission will continue monitoring the application of the relevant legal provisions and may decide to take appropriate action.

    • [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/char_2012/oj/eng.
    • [2] According to its Article 51(1), the Charter applies to Member States only when they are implementing EU law.
    • [3] Council Regulation (EU) 2019/1111 of 25 June 2019 on jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, and on international child abduction (recast) OJ L 178, 2.7.2019, p. 1-115.
    • [4] Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA, OJ L 315, 14.11.2012, p. 57.
    • [5] Directive (EU) 2024/1385 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on combating violence against women and domestic violence, OJ L, 2024/1385, 24.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1385/oj.
    Last updated: 20 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Addressing the rising youth mental health crisis linked to fast fashion advertisements on social media – E-001056/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission Communication on a comprehensive approach to mental health[1] aims to support children and young people. Under one of its flagship initiatives the Commission collaborates with Unicef to develop a prevention toolkit as a guidance tool for Member States’ policymakers on how to improve children’s health, including the impact of digital tools and social media.

    The President of the Commission announced as one of the Commission’s priorities to address the impact of social media and excessive screen time, especially on young people, and their wellbeing and mental health[2].

    To have an evidence-based discussion on this, an EU-wide inquiry on the broader impacts of social media on wellbeing will be carried out. The exact format, content, and timeline are currently being discussed.

    The Digital Services Act obliges providers of online platforms to ensure high privacy, safety, and security on their service. It is supported and complemented by the Better Internet for Kids strategy (BIK+)[3].

    Additionally, the upcoming Digital Fairness Act, planned to be proposed in 2026 will address consumer protection, tackling issues such as unfair influencer marketing[4].

    The Commission Recommendation on integrated child protection systems[5] calls on Member States to act to protect children’s physical and mental integrity by strengthening child protection systems and providing comprehensive support, including prevention and psychological support.

    These combined efforts aim to foster a nourishing environment for young people, mitigating mental health challenges from social pressures, including fast fashion. The Commission remains devoted to comprehensive strategies addressing youth mental health issues.

    • [1] COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS on a comprehensive approach to mental health COM/2023/298 final.
    • [2] Political Guidelines (p. 20): https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683-f63ffb2cf648_en?filename=Political%20Guidelines%202024-2029_EN.pdf.
    • [3] The BIK platform and network of Safer Internet Centres across EU aims to raise awareness on online risks including on mental health of young people. More information at: https://better-Internet-for-kids.europa.eu/en.
    • [4] https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/707d7404-78e5-4aef-acfa-82b4cf639f55_en?filename=Commission%20Staff%20Working%20Document%20Fitness%20Check%20on%20EU%20consumer%20law%20on%20digital%20fairness.pdf.
    • [5] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32024H1238.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI: Stifel Welcomes Olympic Gold Medal Cyclist Kristen Faulkner as Newest Brand Ambassador

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    ST. LOUIS, June 20, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Stifel Financial Corp. (NYSE: SF) announced today the signing of Olympic gold medalist Kristen Faulkner as the firm’s newest brand ambassador. Faulkner made history at the 2024 Paris Olympics by winning gold in both the women’s individual road race and the women’s track cycling team pursuit. She brings extraordinary drive, determination, and a compelling personal story to Stifel, perfectly aligning with the firm known as a place “Where Success Meets Success.”

    Before becoming a world-class cyclist, Faulkner began her career in venture capital, working at Bessemer Venture Partners and Threshold Ventures. Her bold leap from finance to Olympic champion has made her a symbol of resilience, ambition, and excellence. She is the first American woman to win gold in both road and track cycling in a single Olympic Games.

    “We are incredibly proud to welcome Kristen Faulkner to the Stifel team,” said Ronald J. Kruszewski, Chairman and CEO of Stifel. “As our sports partnership portfolio continues to grow, Kristen’s commitment to excellence and inspiring journey, together with her experience as a financial professional, align perfectly with Stifel’s values. Her story is remarkable, and we are excited to have her represent our brand.”

    As a brand ambassador, Faulkner will collaborate with Stifel on initiatives promoting financial wellness and empowering individuals to pursue their financial goals. She will participate in community outreach programs, engaging with Stifel clients and associates, represent Stifel at key events, and appear in select Stifel creative campaigns.

    “I am honored to join Stifel and their impressive group of brand ambassadors,” said Faulkner. “Both financial success and athletic success require discipline, patience, and hard work. I’m excited to partner with a firm that shares these same values.”

    Faulkner joins a roster of decorated athletes who serve as Stifel ambassadors, including all-time leader in World Cup alpine skiing victories Mikaela Shiffrin, three-time Olympic medalist in cross-country skiing Jessie Diggins, and two-time Olympic medalist in halfpipe skiing Alex Ferreira.

    Stifel is also a proud partner of the Stifel U.S. Ski Team, the St. Louis Cardinals, the St. Louis Blues, and the Stifel Charity Classic of the PGA Tour Champions.

    Stifel Company Information
    Stifel Financial Corp. (NYSE: SF) is a financial services holding company headquartered in St. Louis, Missouri, that conducts its banking, securities, and financial services business through several wholly owned subsidiaries. Stifel’s broker-dealer clients are served in the United States through Stifel, Nicolaus & Company, Incorporated, including its Eaton Partners and Miller Buckfire business divisions; Keefe, Bruyette & Woods, Inc.; and Stifel Independent Advisors, LLC; in Canada through Stifel Nicolaus Canada Inc.; and in the United Kingdom and Europe through Stifel Nicolaus Europe Limited. The Company’s broker-dealer affiliates provide securities brokerage, investment banking, trading, investment advisory, and related financial services to individual investors, professional money managers, businesses, and municipalities. Stifel Bank and Stifel Bank & Trust offer a full range of consumer and commercial lending solutions. Stifel Trust Company, N.A. and Stifel Trust Company Delaware, N.A. offer trust and related services. To learn more about Stifel, please visit the Company’s website at www.stifel.com. For global disclosures, please visit https://www.stifel.com/investor-relations/press-releases.

    Media Contact
    Neil Shapiro, +1 (212) 271-3447
    shapiron@stifel.com

    Brian Spellecy, +1 (314) 342-2000
    spellecb@stifel.com

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI USA: Warner, Kaine, Scott Urge EPA to Reinstate Funding for Canceled Community Resilience Grants

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Commonwealth of Virginia Mark R Warner

    WASHINGTON – Today, U.S. Sens. Mark R. Warner, Tim Kaine (both D-VA), and Rep. Bobby Scott (D-VA-03) sent a letter to Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator Lee Zeldin urging the agency to reverse its decision to terminate two major Community Change Grants in Virginia. The canceled grants – approximately $40 million – would have supported dozens of community projects aimed at strengthening flood resilience, reducing pollution, and improving energy efficiency in Hampton and across Southwest Virginia.

    The grants, funded by the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), were intended to support projects that increase resilience to major weather events, reduce pollution, and build community capacity.

    The City of Hampton received $20 million in federal funding to address severe flood risk in the Aberdeen Gardens neighborhood. That funding would have advanced 51 projects ranging from stormwater infrastructure upgrades and rain garden construction to stream restoration efforts and improved public health protections for an area where over 22 percent of properties fall within FEMA-designated flood zones.

    United Way of Southwest Virginia and the University of Virginia’s College at Wise also received nearly $20 million in federal funding to support flood-resilient housing, the construction of a community center and flood shelter in Dickenson County, and energy efficiency upgrades at childcare centers in eight counties in Southwest Virginia. These investments would have delivered long-term savings, improved disaster readiness, and supported vulnerable Appalachian communities hit hard by extreme weather in recent years.

    In the letter, the lawmakers wrote, “We are deeply concerned that the EPA no longer considers community resiliency, environmental conservation, and economic development to be administration funding priorities.”

    They continued, “EPA’s decision to terminate these grants will leave communities in Virginia less resilient, less prosperous, and more vulnerable to extreme weather-related disasters. We urge you to reinstate this critical funding for communities throughout Virginia.”

    Sens. Warner, Kaine, and Rep. Scott have long advocated for resiliency efforts in Virginia, championing legislation and funding to help communities strengthen infrastructure against extreme weather. The senators were strong supporters of the Inflation Reduction Act, which authorized the Community Change Grants program to help historically neglected and underserved communities address flooding, pollution, and climate vulnerabilities.

    The lawmakers have also continuously stood up against the Trump administration’s efforts to cancel necessary federal funding for Virginia’s communities. Most recently, Sens. Warner, Kaine, and Rep. Scott wrote to Department of Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem to reverse the cancellation of critical infrastructure funding for the Commonwealth. 

    Text of the letter is available here and below.

    Dear Administrator Zeldin:

    We write regarding the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) decision to terminate approximately $40 million in funding intended to prevent localized pollution and mitigate the effects of flooding in Hampton, Virginia, and to support economic development, enhance resilient infrastructure, and lower energy costs across seven counties in Southwest Virginia. We strongly urge you to reverse this decision that will impact efforts to improve resiliency, environmental conservation, energy efficiency, and economic outcomes in communities across the Commonwealth.

    The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) provided approximately $2 billion to EPA to establish the Community Change Grants Program. Congress intended this funding to be used to support projects that increase community resilience, reduce pollution, and build community capacity. In 2024, EPA selected 105 projects, including two projects in Virginia.

    The City of Hampton, Virginia, was awarded just over $20 million to address significant flood risk in the historic Aberdeen Gardens neighborhood. In a locality where 22 percent of properties are in Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)-designated Special Flood Hazard Areas, the city and their nonprofit partner, Wetlands Watch, planned to leverage federal funding to advance 51 projects to update stormwater infrastructure, initiate stream-restoration projects, and construct community rain gardens. These projects were intended to mitigate flood risk, lessen the financial burden of flooding on the neighborhood’s residents, and improve environmental and public health outcomes.

    The United Way of Southwest Virginia and the University of Virginia were awarded nearly $20 million to fund eight projects across the Virginia coalfields. Funding would have supported the construction of flood-resilient housing infrastructure in Buchanan County and a new community center and flood shelter in Dickenson County, two communities that have been devastated by flooding and extreme weather in recent years. Additionally, the grant would support energy efficiency upgrades at childcare facilities in eight counties, enabling thousands of dollars of energy cost savings to go towards childcare worker salaries.

    In terminating these grants, EPA wrote to awardees that, “the objectives of the award are no longer consistent with EPA funding priorities.” We are deeply concerned that the EPA no longer considers community resiliency, environmental conservation, and economic development to be administration funding priorities. EPA’s decision to terminate these grants will leave communities in Virginia less resilient, less prosperous, and more vulnerable to extreme weather-related disasters. We urge you to reinstate this critical funding for communities throughout Virginia. 

    Thank you for your attention to this letter. We look forward to your response.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Cassidy, Grassley, Republicans Introduce Legislation to Keep Communities Safe from Violent Criminals

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Louisiana Bill Cassidy

    WASHINGTON – U.S. Senator Bill Cassidy, M.D. (R-LA), Chuck Grassley (R-IA), and a group of Republican colleagues introduced the Combating Violent and Dangerous Crime Act to strengthen violent crime statutes and help prevent future crime. The bill would address ambiguity and conflicting court decisions by clarifying penalties for violent offenses like carjacking, robbery, and kidnapping.
    “Violent criminals should be kept far away from our families and children. While Republicans work to ensure they are, Democrats are silent on this issue. America is a country of law and order. Time to act like it,” said Dr. Cassidy.
    “Under the Biden-Harris administration, our nation saw a massive spike in violent crime. As the Trump administration works to clean up the previous administration’s mess, Congress has a duty to resolve any legal ambiguities that may weaken our ability to hold criminals fully accountable,” said Senator Grassley. “Our bill includes several modest, but meaningful, reforms to tamp down on future crime and ensure justice is served.”
    Among other provisions, the Combating Violent and Dangerous Crime Act would:

    Resolve conflicting circuit court decisions that have resulted in a higher burden to charge violent offenses;
    Clarify that an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offence involving physical force meets the legal definition of a violent crime;
    Increase the statutory maximum penalty for carjacking and remove a duplicative intent requirement needed to charge a carjacking offense;
    Clarify that attempted bank robbery and conspiracy to commit bank robbery are punishable under the current bank robbery statute;
    Outlaw the marketing of candy-flavored drugs to minors; and
    Establish a new category of violent kidnapping offences, allowing for greater penalties for violent kidnapping.

    Cassidy and Grassley were joined by U.S. Senators John Boozman (R-AR), Kevin Cramer (R-ND), James Lankford (R-OK), Mitch McConnell (R-KY), Susan Collins, (R-ME), Shelley Moore Capito (R-WV), Mike Crapo (R-ID), Thom Tillis (R-NC), and Jim Risch (R-ID) in introducing the legislation.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Cassidy, Grassley, Republicans Introduce Legislation to Keep Communities Safe from Violent Criminals

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Louisiana Bill Cassidy

    WASHINGTON – U.S. Senator Bill Cassidy, M.D. (R-LA), Chuck Grassley (R-IA), and a group of Republican colleagues introduced the Combating Violent and Dangerous Crime Act to strengthen violent crime statutes and help prevent future crime. The bill would address ambiguity and conflicting court decisions by clarifying penalties for violent offenses like carjacking, robbery, and kidnapping.
    “Violent criminals should be kept far away from our families and children. While Republicans work to ensure they are, Democrats are silent on this issue. America is a country of law and order. Time to act like it,” said Dr. Cassidy.
    “Under the Biden-Harris administration, our nation saw a massive spike in violent crime. As the Trump administration works to clean up the previous administration’s mess, Congress has a duty to resolve any legal ambiguities that may weaken our ability to hold criminals fully accountable,” said Senator Grassley. “Our bill includes several modest, but meaningful, reforms to tamp down on future crime and ensure justice is served.”
    Among other provisions, the Combating Violent and Dangerous Crime Act would:

    Resolve conflicting circuit court decisions that have resulted in a higher burden to charge violent offenses;
    Clarify that an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offence involving physical force meets the legal definition of a violent crime;
    Increase the statutory maximum penalty for carjacking and remove a duplicative intent requirement needed to charge a carjacking offense;
    Clarify that attempted bank robbery and conspiracy to commit bank robbery are punishable under the current bank robbery statute;
    Outlaw the marketing of candy-flavored drugs to minors; and
    Establish a new category of violent kidnapping offences, allowing for greater penalties for violent kidnapping.

    Cassidy and Grassley were joined by U.S. Senators John Boozman (R-AR), Kevin Cramer (R-ND), James Lankford (R-OK), Mitch McConnell (R-KY), Susan Collins, (R-ME), Shelley Moore Capito (R-WV), Mike Crapo (R-ID), Thom Tillis (R-NC), and Jim Risch (R-ID) in introducing the legislation.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Warner & Kaine Decry GOP Plan’s Devastating Impact on Rural Virginia Communities

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Virginia Tim Kaine

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – U.S. Senators Mark R. Warner and Tim Kaine (both D-VA) today issued the following statement slamming congressional Republicans’ bill that would devastate rural communities across Virginia by gutting Medicaid and accelerating hospital closures:

    “The big GOP plan is a direct threat to families in rural Virginia who rely on Medicaid to access care and keep their community hospitals open. This bill would strip health care from thousands of Virginians, gut funding for struggling rural hospitals, and undo decades of progress. Almost forty percent of kids in rural Virginia are covered by Medicaid. Without that lifeline, families would face impossible choices, and many local hospitals wouldn’t survive. For rural Virginia, this bill might mean the difference between a hospital that’s five minutes away and one that’s 50. It is a slap in the face to the health care workers, parents, and local leaders doing everything they can to keep their communities afloat. We refuse to stand by while Republicans gamble with Virginians’ lives.”

    Small towns and rural areas in Virginia have the highest rates of Medicaid coverage. According to research by the Georgetown Center for Children and Families:

    • 37.9 percent of children in Virginia’s small towns and rural areas rely on Medicaid/CHIP for their coverage, compared to 30 percent in metro/urban areas;
    • Among Virginia adults younger than 65, 18.9 percent of those in small towns and rural areas get their coverage through Medicaid/CHIP, compared to 13.7 percent in metro areas; and
    • Among seniors, 11.7 percent of those living in Virginia’s small towns and rural areas were covered by Medicaid, compared to 10.7 percent in metro/urban areas.

    Nearly half – 47 percent – of rural births in the U.S. are covered by Medicaid, as are 65 percent of nursing home residents in rural counties.

    Almost half of rural hospitals nationwide are already operating at a financial loss, according to the American Hospital Association. The GOP’s proposed Medicaid cuts would push already-struggling rural hospitals further toward financial collapse, particularly in areas like Southwest and Southside Virginia. Detailed data from the Cecil G. Sheps Center for Health Services Research at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill concluded that Republican health care cuts could place more than 300 rural hospitals across the U.S. – including six hospitals in Southwest and Southside Virginia – at disproportionate risk of closure, conversion, or service reductions.

    Since the Affordable Care Act expanded Medicaid in Virginia, the uninsured rate has fallen dramatically, and rural hospitals have seen a critical infusion of funds to help keep their doors open. The GOP’s plan to give giant tax cuts to the ultra wealthy while slashing Medicaid and other investments threatens to reverse that trend.

    Warner and Kaine have long championed Medicaid expansion and rural health infrastructure, including broadband-enabled telehealth services and rural hospital stabilization programs. They have pledged to fight the GOP plan as long as Republicans in Congress continue to insist on gutting vital programs in order to pay for tax breaks for the richest Americans, noting that the GOP bill would strip health insurance from more than 302,000 Virginians, cut SNAP benefits, raise energy costs for Virginia households, jeopardize more than 20,000 Virginia jobs, raise taxes on minimum wage workers while giving the richest 0.1% a $188,000 tax cut, make tax filing more expensive, and explode the deficit, among other devastating impacts to Virginia families.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Azerbaijan approves cooperation plan with China on Belt and Road initiative

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Baku, June 20 /Xinhua/ — Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has approved a cooperation plan with China to jointly advance the Belt and Road initiative, the presidential press service said on Friday.

    According to the signed decree, the document has been officially adopted. The plan provides for the development of cooperation in the field of transport, trade and logistics, aimed at strengthening the interconnectedness and expanding economic ties between the two countries.

    According to the decree, the Ministry of Economy of Azerbaijan will coordinate the implementation of the plan’s provisions, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been instructed to notify the Chinese government after completing all necessary internal procedures.

    The adoption of the plan was a continuation of the agreements reached during I. Aliyev’s state visit to China. On April 23, a signing ceremony of the document was held in Beijing with the participation of Chinese President Xi Jinping and Azerbaijani President I. Aliyev. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Security: First Sentencing in Burglary of Dozens of Firearms from Maryland Pawn Shop

    Source: United States Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF)

                WASHINGTON – Juwon Markel Anderson, 22, of the District of Columbia, was sentenced today in U.S. District Court to 84 months in federal prison for his role in the December 2023 burglary of a Maryland pawn shop that netted dozens of firearms and for his subsequent attempt to sell several of the stolen guns.

                The sentencing was announced by U.S. Attorney Jeanine Ferris Pirro, Special Agent in Charge Anthony Spotswood of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) Washington Field Division, and Chief Pamela A. Smith of the Metropolitan Police Department.   

                Anderson, aka “Peezy,” pleaded guilty on March 4, 2025, to one count of conspiracy to commit firearms trafficking. In addition to the prison term, Judge Amy Berman Jackson ordered Anderson to serve three years of supervised release.

                According to the court documents, on Dec. 13, 2023, Anderson and at least four co-conspirators drove in two vehicles from the District to the A&D Pawn Shop, a Federal Firearms Licensee, in Glen Burnie, Maryland.

                At the pawn shop, one of the co-conspirators used a portable saw to cut the locks on a pull-down security gate. Another co-conspirator then used a crowbar-type tool to pry open the main door. Once inside, the quintet grabbed an array of rifles, shotguns, and pistols from the shelves and display racks. They fled with at least 34 guns. Two days after the burglary, on December 15, 2023, Anderson was arrested with two of the stolen firearms. He has been detained ever since.

                Co-defendant Tyjuan McNeal, 27, is scheduled to be sentenced July 1 for conspiracy to commit firearms trafficking. Vincent Lee Alston, 23, and Niquan Odum, 23, pleaded guilty March 6, 2025. Alston, aka “Vedo,” pleaded to one count of conspiracy to commit firearms trafficking. Cy’juan Hemsley, who pleaded guilty on May 7, 2025, and Odumn, aka “Stickz,” pleaded to conspiracy to commit theft from a firearms licensee and to possession of stolen firearms.

                This case is being investigated by the ATF Washington Field Division and the Metropolitan Police Department, with assistance from the ATF Baltimore Field Division. It is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorney Shehzad Akhtar with valuable assistance from former Special Assistant U.S. Attorney Ryan Lipes.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Southern District of Texas charges 215 people in third week of June in relation to border enforcement efforts

    Source: United States Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF)

    HOUSTON – A total of 204 new cases have been filed in the last week related to immigration, border security and related offenses from June 13-19, announced U.S. Attorney Nicholas J. Ganjei. 

    Among those are 65 people who face charges of illegally reentering the country. The majority have prior felony convictions for narcotics, violent crime, prior immigration crimes and more. A total of 125 people are charged with illegally entering the country, while five cases allege various instances of human smuggling with the remainder involving other immigration crimes and more, including assault on officers.

    Two such charged include Adrian Alberto Castillo-Contador and Lorenzo Ramirez. Castillo-Contador, a Mexican national, allegedly attempted to make entry into the United States through the Hidalgo port of entry. The charges allege he failed to comply with commands and attempted to evade a Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officer. Castillo-Contador allegedly pushed the officer and caused injury but was apprehended before able to exit.

    In another case, authorities allegedly found Lorenzo Ramirez near an abandoned vehicle after a failed smuggling event near Weslaco. The criminal complaint alleges that as a Border Patrol (BP) agent approached him, Ramirez fled, and a foot chase ensued. Law enforcement caught him, but during the struggle, Ramirez punched and elbowed the agent in the thigh and head, respectively, according to the charges. Ramirez also allegedly kicked another agent in the leg. The charges further allege authorities had to taser him. Both men face up to eight years in federal prison if convicted for assaulting an officer.

    Also part of the new cases are several complaints alleging previous felons had illegally reentered the United States. Mexican nationals Ivan Edgar Martinez, Carlos Bartolo Santiago-Hernandez and Hugo Jimenez-Castillo had all been previously removed from the country on various dates between 2017-2014, acceding to their respective charges. However, all were allegedly found in the Rio Grande Valley area this week. Martinez and Santiago-Hernandez have convictions for illegal reentry, while Jimenez-Castillo had been sentenced to two years in prison for his driving while intoxicated conviction, according to the allegations. If convicted, all face up to 20 years in prison.

    Throughout the district, law enforcement partners made multiple arrests, including nearly two dozen charged in large drug and money laundering operation. Grand juries in Houston and McAllen returned the five separate, but related indictments in May. The charges allegedly involve cocaine, heroin and methamphetamine trafficking, firearms-related offenses and money laundering. The arrests are the culmination of multiple months-long Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) investigations dubbed Operation Red Ranger, Borrowed Time and Resurrection. During the investigation and operations, law enforcement also seized over 170 kilograms of cocaine and heroin, over two thousand kilograms methamphetamine, more than 100 firearms and nearly $3 million as well as four properties valued at $1.2 million.

    In Laredo, two cartel firearms traffickers have now been sent to federal prison. Mexican national Jorge Alberto Morales-Calvo received a 41-month-term, while Homero Arteaga Jr. previously received 57 months. At the hearing, the court heard additional evidence that the firearms were going to be smuggled across the border and delivered to the Jalisco New Generation Cartel. On Sept. 18, 2024, they planned to purchase a Barrett .50 caliber rifle for $15,000 and a FN Herstal Belgium, 5.7 x 28 caliber pistol with a large capacity magazine for $850. They were both arrested as they tried to complete the transaction.

    “The Department of Justice is looking to hit the cartels from every angle and at every opportunity, which includes vigorously prosecuting not just the members of these terror groups, but those that enable them as well,” said Ganjei. “Those that arm or otherwise empower the cartels are going to the meet the full force of the federal criminal justice system.”

    In Corpus Christi, an Arkansas man was ordered to prison for 36 months for transporting illegal aliens in wheel well and fuel tank. The jury deliberated for less than 30 minutes following a less than two-day trial before finding Noel Mercado guilty on two counts of alien smuggling March 11. At the sentencing hearing, the court noted the egregious crime and said the smuggled individuals had been “treated like trash.” All the illegal aliens were from the countries of Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala with no authority to be in the United States.

    “As we continue our successful campaign to secure the border, human smugglers are going to get increasingly desperate,” said Ganjei. “No matter how creative they think they are in their methods, our law enforcement partners are always one step ahead.”

    A Laredo felon was also sentenced for transporting illegal aliens. Braulio Ivan Rueda was ordered to serve 21 months after he had engaged in a high-speed chase. Rueda picked up several people running from the Rio Grande River into his SUV. When authorities tried to block the vehicle, four Guatemalan nationals fled towards the river. Rueda sped away and led authorities on a three-mile chase before stopping in a commercial parking lot and attempted to escape on foot. He admitted he needed money and agreed to smuggle the aliens for “easy money.”

    Also in Laredo, Anthony Jacob Garza was suspiciously driving a Ford Expedition about 20 miles north of the U.S.-Mexico border in April. He admitted he stopped at a gas station, where authorities ultimately found three illegal aliens hiding under a blanket in the SUV’s cargo area. He had picked them up near a county road. He faces up to 10 years in prison.

    Two Mexican nationals and convicted felons, one who had previously assaulted public servant, are on their way back to prison for illegal reentry into the country. Abelino Hernandez-Torres was ordered to serve 60 months. He has prior convictions for illegal reentry as well as evading arrest with a motor vehicle and assault on a public servant. He was first ordered removed from the United States in 2015 and again in 2019 and 2020, and returned illegally.

    Authorities had encountered Hector Ruben Cardenas-Morales in jail following charges of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and unlawful restraint. He has other convictions, including burglary, evading arrest with a motor vehicle and illegal reentry and was last removed in 2023. At the sentencing hearing, the court noted how this was his fifth time coming back and was not serving himself by returning to the country or learning from his mistakes, stating “Sir, you have no future in the United States.” He was sentenced to 63 months in federal prison.

    These cases were referred or supported by federal law enforcement partners, including Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) – Homeland Security Investigations, ICE – Enforcement and Removal Operations, BP, CBP, Drug Enforcement Administration, FBI, U.S. Marshals Service and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives with additional assistance from state and local law enforcement partners.

    The cases are part of Operation Take Back America, a nationwide initiative that marshals the full resources of the Department of Justice to repel the invasion of illegal immigration, achieve the total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations and protect our communities from the perpetrators of violent crime. Operation Take Back America streamlines efforts and resources from the Department’s OCDTF and Project Safe Neighborhood.

    Under current leadership, public safety and a secure border are the top priorities for this district. Enhanced enforcement both at the border and in the interior of the district have yielded aliens engaged in unlawful activity or with serious criminal history, including human trafficking, sexual assault and violence against children.  

    The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Texas remains one of the busiest in the nation. It represents 43 counties and more than nine million people covering 44,000 square miles. Assistant U.S. Attorneys from all seven divisions including Houston, Galveston, Victoria, Corpus Christi, Brownsville, McAllen and Laredo work directly with our law enforcement partners on the federal, state and local levels to prosecute the suspected offenders of these and other federal crimes. 

    An indictment or criminal complaint is a formal accusation of criminal conduct, not evidence. A defendant is presumed innocent unless convicted through due process of law.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Cassa Depositi e Prestiti and SACE provide EUR250 Million to Africa Finance Corporation


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    Africa Finance Corporation (AFC) (www.AfricaFC.org), the continent’s leading infrastructure solutions provider, has secured a landmark EUR 250 million 10-year term loan facility from Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (CDP) the Italian Financial Institution for Development Cooperation. The transaction is backed by a guarantee from SACE, the Italian insurance and financial group fully owned by the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance, covering up to 80% of the facility amount.

    The financing builds on engagement at the Mattei Plan-Global Gateway summit, attended by Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, European Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen, CDP, SACE and AFC, where the parties confirmed their intent to collaborate. The facility is structured to cultivate Italian supply chain opportunities in infrastructure and renewable energy generation, including the supply of components for the Lobito Railway Corridor – a commercial railway line that will run through Angola and extend to the borders of Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

    This long-term facility deepens AFC’s strategic partnership with both CDP and SACE, while reinforcing its mandate to mobilise high-quality, long-tenor capital in support of delivering sustainable infrastructure across Africa.

    “Cassa Depositi e Prestiti confirms its role as a strategic partner in supporting infrastructure projects with a high social and economic impact in Africa. With this financing – said Dario Scannapieco, Chief Executive Officer of CDP – we are strengthening business and technological relations between Italy and Africa, enhancing talent and innovation. We are convinced that investing in strategic projects not only creates new opportunities for our companies but also helps to build lasting and shared ties capable of fostering growth and well-being for local communities.”

    “We are proud to contribute to the involvement of Italian companies in the transport and logistics sector to realise a significant strategic project like the Lobito Railway Corridor within the Mattei Plan,” said Alessandra Ricci, CEO of SACE. “This collaboration reaffirms SACE’s commitment to promoting new connections for Italian companies seeking to diversify their exports and embrace new growth opportunities.”

    Our partnership with CDP, further strengthened by SACE’s guarantee, exemplifies the power of blended finance in unlocking capital for infrastructure development in Africa,” said Banji Fehintola, Executive Board Member and Head, Financial Services, AFC. The Lobito Corridor is a transformational project that will open new trade routes for resources, support regional industrialisation, accelerate job creation and strengthen Africa’s position in global value chains, while delivering long-term, inclusive growth.

    Distributed by APO Group on behalf of Africa Finance Corporation (AFC).

    SACE Media gallery: https://apo-opa.co/4ecSix5

    Media Enquiries:
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    Africa Finance Corporation
    Email: communications@africafc.org

    SACE
    Press Office
    ufficiostampa@sace.it

    CDP Media Relations
    ufficio.stampa@cdp.it 
    Tel: +39 06 42213990
    Website: www.CDP.it

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    About Lobito Corridor Rail Project:
    The railway line will be approximately 830 km long and will connect Chingola in Zambia to Luacano in Angola with the aim of facilitating the transportation of agricultural products, minerals and consumer goods. The greatest opportunities for the Italian supply chain in the region lie in sectors such as energy, renewables, transportation and logistics.

    About CDP:
    Cassa Depositi e Prestiti is the National Promotional Institute which has been supporting the Italian economy since 1850. The main goal of CDP is to accelerate the industrial and infrastructural development of Italy to boost its economic and social growth. CDP focuses its activities on sustainable development at local level, supporting the innovation and growth of Italian enterprises, also in the international arena. It partners local authorities, in a financing and advisory capacity, to create infrastructures and improve services of public value. CDP also participates actively in international cooperation initiatives to realize projects in developing countries and emerging markets. Cassa Depositi e Prestiti is entirely financed by private capital, through the issuing of Postal Savings Bonds and Postal Savings Passbooks, and through issues on national and international financial markets.

    About SACE:
    SACE is the insurance and financial group controlled by the Ministry of Economy and Finance, specialising in supporting the growth of Italian companies through a wide range of solutions to facilitate export and innovation, including financial guarantees, factoring, risk management and protection, advisory services and business matching. With a network of 11 offices in Italy and 13 worldwide in target countries for Made in Italy products, SACE serves over 60,000 companies, supporting their growth in Italy and globally, with a portfolio of insured operations and guaranteed investments totalling EU 267 billion across approximately 200 foreign markets.

    About AFC:
    AFC was established in 2007 to be the catalyst for pragmatic infrastructure and industrial investments across Africa. AFC’s approach combines specialist industry expertise with a focus on financial and technical advisory, project structuring, project development, and risk capital to address Africa’s infrastructure development needs and drive sustainable economic growth. Eighteen years on, AFC has developed a track record as the partner of choice in Africa for investing and delivering on instrumental, high-quality infrastructure assets that provide essential services in core infrastructure sectors. AFC has 45 member countries and has invested over US$15 billion since its inception.

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Hungary: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2025 Article IV Mission

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    June 20, 2025

    A Concluding Statement describes the preliminary findings of IMF staff at the end of an official staff visit (or ‘mission’), in most cases to a member country. Missions are undertaken as part of regular (usually annual) consultations under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, in the context of a request to use IMF resources (borrow from the IMF), as part of discussions of staff monitored programs, or as part of other staff monitoring of economic developments.

    The authorities have consented to the publication of this statement. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF Executive Board for discussion and decision.

    Washington, DC: An International Monetary Fund (IMF) mission, led by Anke Weber and comprising Aleksandra Alferova, Jakree Koosakul, Moheb Malak, Augustus Panton, and Atticus Weller, visited Budapest during June 5-17 to conduct discussions on the 2025 Article IV Consultation with the Hungarian authorities. At the end of the visit, the mission issued the following statement:

    The Hungarian economy is at a challenging juncture. Output has stagnated over the past 3 years, while inflation remains well above the central bank’s 3 percent target. Regulatory measures—such as price, interest and margin caps, along with windfall taxes and subsidized lending schemes—have distorted market signals and added uncertainty. Despite significant fiscal adjustment in recent years, public debt remains elevated given high financing costs. Timely domestic policy reforms are needed to reinforce resilience amid an unsettled external environment. Key to this will be well-designed fiscal measures to strengthen public finances, a continued tight monetary policy to bring down inflation, and structural reforms to raise productivity and safeguard growth against trade tensions and heightened uncertainty.    

     

    Economic Outlook

    High domestic and external uncertainty are expected to continue weighing on the outlook. Modest consumption-driven growth of 0.7 percent is expected in 2025, underpinned by favorable wage dynamics. Growth is projected to increase to 2 percent in 2026—on a recovery in investment and a positive impulse from German fiscal expansion—and to converge to its long-term potential of around 2½ percent by 2030. Inflation is forecast at 4.5 percent in Q4:2025, and to gradually decelerate to the MNB’s 3 percent target by 2027. The current account surplus is expected to fall to around 1¼ percent of GDP in 2025 and to increase gradually over the medium term as battery and electric vehicle production expands. These projections are based on the IMF’s April World Economic Outlook global assumptions.

    Risks to growth remain on the downside. Deepening geoeconomic fragmentation and rising trade tensions would affect Hungary’s exports directly, while indirect effects may be even larger, arising from prolonged trade uncertainty undermining private investment and further weakening global economic activity. Geopolitical tensions could lead to commodity price volatility, intensifying inflationary pressures and negatively impacting fiscal and external balances. On the domestic front, a delay in the needed fiscal adjustment could heighten market concerns about debt sustainability, further increase risk premia, and exacerbate sovereign-bank linkages. A lack of progress on governance reforms being discussed with the EC could further delay or result in cancellation of EU funds with negative consequences for growth and market confidence. Inflation could be more persistent than projected, including from larger-than-anticipated effects of minimum wage hikes necessitating tighter monetary policy for longer.

    Strengthening Fiscal Sustainability for Future Growth

    Staff estimates that currently announced policies fall short of achieving the authorities’ budget targets. The authorities remain committed to reaching their 2025 and 2026 deficit targets of 4.1 and 3.7 percent of GDP, respectively. Their medium-term fiscal structural plan (MTFSP) envisages a further deficit reduction to below 2 percent of GDP by 2028. Under staff’s baseline scenario, which incorporates only legislated or officially endorsed measures, the deficit is projected to decline slightly to 4.8 percent of GDP in 2025 and 4.6 percent of GDP in 2026. In the medium term, the deficit would remain around 4½ percent of GDP, while the debt-to-GDP ratio would rise to about 79 percent in 2030 from 73½ percent in 2024. Debt dynamics have deteriorated since last year, following fiscal slippages and a weaker outlook, and remain sensitive to the real interest and growth path.

    Significant additional fiscal efforts are needed to preserve fiscal space and rebuild buffers. Over the medium term, a surplus of around 1¾ percent of GDP excluding debt servicing and adjusting for economic cycles would appropriately balance debt sustainability and output stabilization objectives. The implied cumulative adjustment of around 2 percent of GDP over 2025-2028 would bring the deficit below 3 percent of GDP by 2027 and reduce the public debt ratio below 70 percent by 2029. Any additional defense spending should be accommodated within staff’s recommended path.

    Measures underpinning the adjustment should be well-designed and growth-friendly.

    • Revenue enhancements: The recent doubling of family tax allowances and expansion of personal income tax exemptions for mothers will significantly reduce revenues. In staff’s view an alternative that would minimize fiscal costs and labor market distortions would be to provide capped tax credits per child for both parents. A more targeted tax regime with fewer exemptions would raise revenue, improve efficiency, and simplify administration. Staff notes that a higher marginal personal income tax rate for high earners would increase revenue and fairness while taxation of corporates could be made more equitable and efficient by rationalizing tax incentives. A reduced reliance on distortionary windfall and financial transactions taxes would be more conducive to investment and growth.
    • Expenditure rationalization: A phaseout of distortive retail energy subsidies and their replacement by targeted cash transfers would free up fiscal resources. A review of procurement and government employment would help the authorities to better target a reduction of administrative expenditures, which are high relative to peers, while a strategy is needed to limit transfers to SOEs and other public organizations. The realized savings from these measures could be used to bolster underfunded areas—health, primary education, and social protection. Public financial management reforms and a strengthened expenditure review process could enhance spending efficiency and support better fiscal governance. Relying on capital spending cuts to achieve targets would weaken growth and should be avoided.

    Further efforts will be needed to reduce long-term spending pressures. Population aging is expected to add roughly 3.5 percent of GDP in additional pension and healthcare costs by 2050. An increase in the retirement age, adjustment of benefit levels, and a limited increase in the social security contribution rate would help to control pension costs in the long term. mproved digitalization and efficient procurement would help to contain health expenditures.  

    Fiscal risk monitoring and mitigation could be improved. A comprehensive, consolidated and regular risk assessment of SOEs would provide early warning of potential vulnerabilities. The issuance of new guarantees should be capped by ceilings, and the stock of guarantees, risk of their activation, and performance of underlying liabilities assessed on an annual basis. Channeling public resources into fund management structures or private equity undermines budgetary transparency, risks resource misallocation and could result in unforeseen contingent liabilities. Finally, to mitigate distortions, it would be beneficial to limit the use of subsidized lending by state-owned banks to addressing market failures.

    Bringing Inflation Durably Back to Target

    The monetary policy stance will need to remain tight into next year to durably return inflation to target. Monetary policy has been appropriately cautious, with the MNB signaling that maintaining tight monetary conditions is warranted. With average inflation expected to remain above the tolerance band in 2025, staff sees limited scope for rate cuts this year. However, the balance of risks to growth and inflation is evolving. Given exceptional uncertainty, the MNB should thus maintain a data-driven approach. The flexible exchange rate regime and adequate reserve coverage can continue to help reduce Hungary’s vulnerability to external shocks. Price, fee, and margin controls are not a sustainable path to lasting disinflation and should be phased out.

    Staff welcomes ongoing efforts to refine the MNB’s focus on the core objectives of price and financial stability. The proposed change to the MNB Act—prohibiting foundations from engaging in asset management activities—is a step in the right direction. In this context, a broader review of the MNB’s non-core functions is warranted, including measures relating to its secondary goal of environmental sustainability. While the MNB should play an active role in climate-risk supervision, prudential regulation should remain risk focused, and all climate-related initiatives be consistent with the MNB’s price and financial stability mandates.

    Safeguarding Financial Sector Stability

    Systemic risks in the financial sector are assessed as broadly contained. Overall, the banking system remains well-capitalized, liquid, profitable, and resilient to external shocks. But emerging pockets of vulnerability merit continued vigilance, including an increase in the share of FX corporate loans, banks’ growing sovereign exposure and significant FX positions, elevated commercial real estate (CRE) vacancies, and buoyant house prices.

    The capital-based macroprudential toolkit is broadly appropriate, though further refinements may be warranted. The planned introduction of a one percent positive neutral countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) in July 2025 amid heightened uncertainty is welcome, as was the reactivation of the systemic risk buffer (SyRB) for banks’ CRE exposures in 2024. While risks arising from banks’ growing sovereign exposures are partially mitigated by their high leverage ratio (capital-to-total exposure), consideration could be given to incorporating appropriate sovereign-bank nexus stress scenarios into regular supervisory stress testing.

    Differentiation in borrower-based macroprudential limits should be introduced only on financial stability grounds. Recent relaxations of loan-to-value (LTV) and debt-service-to-income (DSTI) limits for first-time buyers and green homes appear to be partly driven by housing affordability and energy efficiency concerns. Such considerations should instead be tackled through appropriate structural and fiscal policies. Moreover, DSTI limits of 60 percent for first-time home buyers and for energy-efficient homes appear high relative to the overall limits in some peers. The reintroduction of voluntary APR ceilings for housing loans, while more restricted in scope, distorts risk pricing and should be reversed. Scaling back housing-related fiscal incentives would help contain future price pressures and safeguard financial stability.

    Boosting Productivity Through Reforms

    Boosting productivity growth will require comprehensive reforms that foster firm dynamism. Firm entry and exit rates remain low amid high regulatory barriers and an insolvency framework that impedes the timely exit of non-viable firms. Streamlining licensing and overlapping permits and enabling creditor-initiated and out-of-court restructuring would enhance capital and labor mobility toward more productive business ventures. Public R&D support should be performance-based and policy efforts aimed at promoting entrepreneurship and technology adoption better targeted, especially toward young, high-growth firms.

    Productivity gains from industrial policy interventions remain elusive, underscoring the need for more effective horizontal reforms. Hungary has implemented repeated waves of industrial policies (IP) to boost competitiveness and productivity in targeted sectors. Yet, their impact on sustained productivity growth remains elusive. Given their high fiscal cost, IP should not substitute for broader structural reforms. Where used, such measures must be appropriately targeted to address market failures and be time-bound and transparent. As a small, open economy, Hungary would benefit most from a coordinated approach to state aid and IP at the EU-level.

    Strengthening energy security can enhance competitiveness and facilitate the green transition. Ongoing efforts to diversify energy supply and increase renewable energy generation are commendable. Still, the Hungarian economy remains energy-intensive with high corporate energy prices weighing on cost competitiveness. EU-wide policy measures—including regional electricity market integration—should be complemented with domestic reforms such as targeted phaseout of household fossil fuel subsidies, enhanced energy efficiency standards, and accelerated permitting procedures for renewable energy investment.

    Governance reforms are foundational for fostering a predictable business environment and boosting potential growth. Hungary has taken some important steps, including the 2023 judicial reforms aimed at strengthening the National Judicial Council. Further governance reforms and their effective enforcement—including related to public procurement, scope of the asset declaration system, conflict-of-interest rules, regulatory oversight, and functioning of the Integrity Authority—could unlock EU funds and amplify the growth dividends of other reforms.

    The mission thanks the Hungarian authorities and our other interlocutors in Hungary for the productive collaboration, constructive policy dialogue, and warm hospitality.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Eva-Maria Graf

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/20/hungary-staff-concluding-statement-of-the-2025-article-iv-mission

    MIL OSI

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  • MIL-OSI USA: Co-Founder of Los Cuinis Drug Cartel Sentenced to 30 Years in Prison; High-Ranking Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) Operative Pleads Guilty

    Source: US State of California

    Today, a Mexican national and the co-founder of the armed, violent, and prolific Los Cuinis drug cartel was sentenced to 30 years in prison for his role in a major drug trafficking conspiracy. 

    According to court documents, Jose Gonzalez-Valencia, 49, of Michoacan, Mexico, was one of the top leaders — alongside his brothers, Gerardo Gonzalez-Valencia and Abigael Gonzalez-Valencia — of Los Cuinis, a major Mexican drug cartel responsible for trafficking multiple tons of cocaine from South America, through Mexico, into the United States. Los Cuinis financed the founding and growth of the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG), which traffics hundreds of tons of cocaine, methamphetamine, and fentanyl into the United States and other countries, and is known for extreme violence, murders, torture, and corruption.

    In February 2025, President Trump designated CJNG a foreign terrorist organization. According to court documents, the top leader of CJNG, Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, also known as “El Mencho,” is the brother-in-law of the Gonzalez-Valencia brothers. Closely allied, Los Cuinis and CJNG form one of the most violent and prolific transnational criminal organizations in the world, responsible for sending staggering amounts of drugs into the United States and inflicting extreme violence to further that objective.

    Also today, as part of the Department of Justice’s focus on dismantling CJNG, another Mexican national, Cristian Fernando Gutierrez-Ochoa, also known as “El Guacho,” a high-ranking CJNG member and El Mencho’s son-in-law, pleaded guilty to one count of international money laundering conspiracy.

    “Today, the Criminal Division dealt two more devastating blows to CJNG and Los Cuinis through the sentencing of Jose Gonzalez-Valencia and the conviction of Cristian Fernando Gutierrez-Ochoa,” said Matthew R. Galeotti, Head of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division. “These men and the cartels they led are responsible for immeasurable death and destruction in the United States and Mexico. The Justice Department will continue to dismantle CJNG, Los Cuinis and all other transnational criminal organizations that flood our streets with dangerous drugs and engage in extreme violence to control their operations.”

    “CJNG is one of the most powerful, influential, and ruthless criminal organizations to threaten our public safety and national security. Each leader and associate of CJNG who faces justice within the United States brings us one step closer to dismantling this terrorist organization,” said Acting Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Administrator Robert Murphy. “DEA will continue to use all available resources to disrupt CJNG’s drug trafficking and money laundering operations and systematically destroy their network.”

    From at least 2006 to 2016, according to court documents, Jose Gonzalez-Valencia directed and coordinated numerous multi-ton shipments of cocaine destined for the United States using air, land, sea, and underwater methods. In 2007 the U.S. Coast Guard seized one shipment from a semi-submersible vessel that was transporting at least 4,000 kilograms of cocaine from Colombia to Mexico for further distribution into the United States.

    As one of Los Cuinis’ top leaders, Jose Gonzalez-Valencia directed acts of extreme violence in furtherance of drug trafficking activities, including the murder of an individual who allegedly stole a shipment of approximately 1,000 kilograms of cocaine from Los Cuinis, according to court documents. Jose Gonzalez-Valencia personally carried firearms in furtherance of his drug trafficking activities and supplied weapons and ammunition to the CJNG.

    In 2015, Jose Gonzalez-Valencia went into hiding in Bolivia — a country that did not extradite anyone to the United States from 2001 to 2023, despite an existing extradition treaty — and resided there for over two years under a fictitious identity. In 2017, Jose Gonzalez-Valencia was arrested in Brazil while on vacation and was subsequently extradited to the United States. Brazil’s extradition treaty required that the U.S. Government not recommend more than a 30-year sentence.

    Pursuant to his plea agreement, Gutierrez-Ochoa admitted that he was a member of CJNG who was connected to CJNG’s top leadership. He also admitted that from at least 2023 until his arrest in 2024, he and other CJNG operatives used sophisticated money laundering methods involving real estate transactions, shell companies, and international money transfers to launder CJNG’s drug trafficking proceeds. For example, Gutierrez-Ochoa and others completed two wire transfers totaling $1.2 million of CJNG’s drug proceeds to purchase a luxury residence in Riverside, California, titled in the name of a Mexican entity owned and controlled by CJNG. When Gutierrez-Ochoa was arrested in November 2024, he was living at that property under a fictitious identity and possessed two untraceable and illegal firearms, approximately $2.2 million of CJNG’s drug proceeds, and numerous luxury items purchased with CJNG’s drug proceeds, including jewelry, watches, and vehicles.

    Gutierrez-Ochoa is scheduled to be sentenced on Nov. 7 and faces a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison. A federal district court judge will determine his sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

    Today’s sentencing of Gonzalez-Valencia and conviction of Gutierrez-Ochoa follow several recent strikes into CJNG’s most inner circle.

    El Mencho’s older brother, Antonio Oseguera Cervantes, and Erick Valencia Salazar, an alleged co-founder of CJNG and El Mencho’s close advisor, were among the 29 wanted cartel leaders taken into U.S. custody on Feb. 27, 2025.

    Shortly after, on March 7, 2025, El Mencho’s son, Ruben Oseguera-Gonzalez, known as El Menchito, was sentenced to a term of life in prison plus 30 years to run consecutively and ordered to forfeit over $6 billion in drug trafficking proceeds. Before his arrest, Oseguera-Gonzalez was CJNG’s second-in-command and led CJNG for nearly seven years. He is responsible for trafficking more than 50 metric tons of cocaine and supervising drug labs that produced more than 1,000 metric tons of methamphetamine in Mexico. In 2013, he was one of the first contributors to the fentanyl epidemic in the United States, pledging to “do it big” and build an empire from counterfeit oxycontin pills laced with fentanyl. As the evidence at trial showed, he also committed heinous acts of violence. According to statements made in court and trial testimony, Oseguera-Gonzalez ordered the murder of more than 100 people, some of whom he murdered himself.

    The DEA and the Criminal Division’s Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section have been systematically dismantling the leadership of the CJNG and Los Cuinis at the highest level. To date, the ongoing investigation has led to indictments of approximately 30 high-value CJNG and Los Cuinis command-and-control targets, including seven Consolidated Priority Organization Targets (CPOTs), the top drug trafficking command-and-control leaders. As of June 2025, 12 defendants have been convicted, including two at trial.

    A number of indicted leaders of CJNG and Los Cuinis remain fugitives, including El Mencho, whose capture reward was recently increased to $15 million under the State Department’s Narcotic Rewards Program. Abigael Gonzalez-Valencia, another top leader of Los Cuinis and El Mencho’s brother-in-law, was arrested in 2015 by Mexican authorities pursuant to the U.S. indictment but since then has been fighting extradition to the United States.

    The DEA Los Angeles Field Division investigated the cases. The Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs provided critical assistance with obtaining foreign evidence and securing Jose Gonzalez-Valencia’s extradition to the United States.

    Trial Attorneys Lernik Begian, Gwen Stamper, and Douglas Meisel of the Criminal Division’s Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section are prosecuting the cases.

    This case is part of Operation Take Back America, a nationwide initiative that marshals the full resources of the Department of Justice to repel the invasion of illegal immigration, achieve the total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations and protect our communities from the perpetrators of violent crime. Operation Take Back America streamlines efforts and resources from the Department’s Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces and Project Safe Neighborhood. 

    MIL OSI USA News