Category: Ukraine

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Missions – SEDE delegation to the United Kingdom – 28-30 October 2024 – 28-10-2024 – Committee on Security and Defence

    Source: European Parliament

    Britain votes to leave: Reactions from the European Parliament © European Parliament

    The 6-Member SEDE delegation to the United Kingdom mission organised in close co-operation with AFET and INTA, was a very timely visit following the announcement by the President of the European Commission and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to enhance strategic cooperation after their leaders’ meeting of 2 October 2024. The UK in particular has set out its ambition for an “enhanced EU-UK defence cooperation,” in light of Russia’s continuing war of aggression in Ukraine.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the European Semester for economic policy coordination 2025 – A10-0022/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the European Semester for economic policy coordination 2025

    (2024/2112(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular Articles 121, 126 and 136 thereof,

     having regard to Protocol No 1 to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the TFEU on the role of national parliaments in the European Union,

     having regard to Protocol No 2 to the TEU and the TFEU on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality,

     having regard to Protocol No 12 to the TEU and the TFEU on the excessive debt procedure,

     having regard to the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union,

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2024 on the effective coordination of economic policies and on multilateral budgetary surveillance and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97[1],

     having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1264 of 29 April 2024 amending Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure[2],

     having regard to Council Directive (EU) 2024/1265 of 29 April 2024 amending Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States[3],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area[4],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area[5],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances[6],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability[7],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area[8],

     having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget[9] (the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation),

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility[10] (the RRF Regulation),

     having regard to the Commission’s Spring 2024 Economic Forecast of 15 May 2024,

     having regard to the Commission’s Autumn 2024 Economic Forecast of 15 November 2024,

     having regard to the Commission’s Debt Sustainability Monitor 2023 of 22 March 2024,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 17 December 2024 entitled ‘Alert Mechanism Report 2025’ (COM(2024)0702) and to the Commission recommendation of 17 December 2024 for a Council recommendation on the economic policy of the euro area (COM(2024)0704),

     having regard to the Commission proposal of 17 December 2024 for a joint employment report from the Commission and the Council (COM(2024)0701),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 8 March 2023 entitled ‘Fiscal policy guidance for 2024’ (COM(2023)0141),

     having regard to the Commission report of 19 June 2024 prepared in accordance with Article 126(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (COM(2024)0598),

     having regard to the Council Recommendation of 12 April 2024 on the economic policy of the euro area[11],

     having regard to the European Fiscal Board assessment of 3 July 2024 on the fiscal stance appropriate for the euro area in 2025,

     having regard to the Eurogroup statement of 15 July 2024 on the fiscal stance for the euro area in 2025,

     having regard to the European Fiscal Board’s 2024 annual report, published on 2 October 2024,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 19 June 2024 entitled ‘2024 European Semester – Spring Package’ (COM(2024)0600),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 17 December 2024 entitled ‘2025 European Semester – Autumn package’ (COM(2024)0700),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 entitled ‘The European Green Deal’ (COM(2019)0640), to the Paris Agreement adopted on 12 December 2025 in the context of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and to the UN Sustainable Development Goals,

     having regard to the Eighth Environment Action Programme to 2030,

     having regard to the Interinstitutional Proclamation of 17 November 2017 on the European Pillar of Social Rights[12] and to the Commission communication of 4 March 2021 entitled ‘The European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan’ (COM(2021)0102),

     having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2021 on access to decent and affordable housing for all[13],

     having regard to the document by Ursula von der Leyen, candidate for President of the European Commission, of 18 July 2024 entitled ‘Europe’s choice – Political guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029’, and to the statement made by Valdis Dombrovskis, Commissioner for Economy and Productivity, Implementation and Simplification, at his confirmation hearing on 7 November 2024,

     having regard to International Monetary Fund working paper 24/181 of August 2024 entitled ‘Taming Public Debt in Europe: Outlook, Challenges, and Policy Response’,

     having regard to the International Monetary Fund’s Fiscal Monitor entitled ‘Putting a Lid on Public Debt’ of October 2024,

     having regard to Special Report 13/2024 of the European Court of Auditors entitled ‘Absorption of funds from the Recovery and Resilience Facility – Progressing with delays and risks remain regarding the completion of measures and therefore the achievement of RRF objectives’,

     having regard to the in-depth analysis entitled ‘The new economic governance framework: implications for monetary policy’, published by its Directorate-General for Internal Policies on 20 November 2024[14],

     having regard to the in-depth analysis entitled ‘Economic Dialogue with the European Commission on EU Fiscal Surveillance’, published by its Directorate-General for Internal Policies on 1 December 2024[15],

     having regard to Mario Draghi’s report of 9 September 2024 entitled ‘The future of European Competitiveness’ (the Draghi report),

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0022/2025),

    A. whereas the European Semester plays an essential role in coordinating economic and budgetary policies in the Member States, and thus preserves the macroeconomic stability of the economic and monetary union;

    B. whereas the European Semester aims to promote sustainable, inclusive and competitive growth, employment, macroeconomic stability and sound public finances throughout the entire EU, with a view to ensuring the sustained upward convergence of the economic, social and environmental performance of the Member States;

    C. whereas the 2024 European Semester marked the first implementation cycle of the new economic governance framework, which came into force on 30 April 2024, guiding the EU and its Member States through a transitional phase;

    D. whereas the 2024 Council Recommendation on the economic policy of the euro area calls on the Member States to take action, both individually and collectively, to strengthen competitiveness, boost economic and social resilience, preserve macro-financial stability and sustain a high level of public investment to support the green and digital transitions; whereas fiscal stability is a basis for both sustainable high social standards in the EU and the competitiveness of the EU;

    E. whereas the main objectives of the new economic governance framework are to strengthen debt sustainability and sustainable and inclusive growth in all Member States, as well as enabling all Member States to undertake the necessary reforms and investments in the EU’s common priorities, which include (i) a fair green and digital transition, (ii) social and economic resilience including the European pillar of social rights, (iii) energy security, and (iv) the build-up of defence capabilities; whereas disparities in fiscal capacity among Member States hinder equitable investment in strategic priorities and weaken cohesion within the single market;

    F. whereas reference values of up to 3 % of government deficit to GDP and 60 % of public debt to GDP are defined by the TFEU; whereas the EU’s headline deficit and government debt-to-GDP ratio remain above the reference values; whereas both the headline deficit and government debt-to-GDP ratio vary across the EU, with significantly divergent situations in different Member States;

    G. whereas excessive deficit procedures were opened, or kept open, for eight Member States in 2024; whereas some Member States were not subject to an excessive deficit procedure, despite having a deficit above 3 % of GDP in 2023, as decided by the Council and the Commission after a balanced assessment of all the relevant factors;

    H. whereas no procedure concerning macroeconomic imbalances has been opened by the Council since the establishment of this procedure in 2011; whereas, in accordance with its Alert Mechanism Report, the Commission will conduct an in-depth review of 10 countries identified as experiencing macroeconomic imbalances or excessive imbalances in 2025;

    I. whereas the success of a framework relies heavily on its proper, transparent and effective implementation from the outset, while taking into account the Member States’ starting points and the individual challenges they face;

    J. whereas the timely submission of the national medium-term fiscal-structural and draft budgetary plans is a precondition for the effective implementation and credibility of the new rules; whereas the first national fiscal and budgetary plans have already been assessed by the Council; whereas the equal treatment of the Member States and compliance with the requirements outlined in Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 as regards the fiscal plans are necessary for the effective implementation of the framework;

    K. whereas the economic outlook for the EU remains highly uncertain and there is a growing risk of future events or situations that will negatively affect the economy; whereas Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and the conflicts in the Middle East are aggravating geopolitical risks and highlighting Europe’s energy vulnerability; whereas a rise in protectionist measures by trading partners may affect world trade, with negative repercussions for the EU economy; whereas current geopolitical tensions have demonstrated the need for the EU to further strengthen its open strategic autonomy and remain competitive in the global market, while ensuring that no one is left behind;

    L. whereas the implementation of the revised economic governance framework is expected to lead to a restrictive fiscal stance for the euro area, as a whole, of 0.5 % of GDP in 2024 and 0.25 % of GDP in 2025; whereas political discussion is needed to ensure appropriate public investment levels following the expiry of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) in 2026;

    M. whereas the Draghi report points out that the gap between the EU and the United States in the level of GDP at 2015 prices has gradually widened, from slightly more than 15 % in 2002 to 30 % in 2023, and estimates the necessary additional annual investment by the EU at EUR 800 billion, including EUR 450 billion for the energy transition;

    N. whereas the new Commission has set the goal of being an ‘investment Commission’; whereas discussions on addressing the significant investment gap and reducing borrowing costs are needed in the EU; whereas the framework, where appropriate, should be strengthened by EU-level investment instruments and tools designed to minimise the cost for EU taxpayers and maximise efficiency in the provision of European public goods;

    O. whereas the Member States need to have the necessary control and audit mechanisms to ensure respect for the rule of law and to protect the EU’s financial interests, in particular to prevent fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest and to ensure transparency;

    P. whereas it is important to increase the share of ‘fully implemented’ country-specific recommendations (CSRs) and to link them more closely to the respective country reports in order to contribute to more effective economic governance;

    1. Notes that in the last few years, the EU has demonstrated a high degree of resilience and unity in the face of major shocks, thanks, among other things, to a coordinated policy response involving all the EU institutions, including a flexible approach to the use of new and existing instruments; further recalls that promoting long-term sustainable growth means promoting a balance between responsible fiscal policies, structural reforms and investments that together increase efficiency, productivity, employment and prosperity, and also entails boosting competitiveness, fostering the single market, developing economic growth policies and revising the regulatory framework to attract investments; stresses the fundamental need for sustainable, inclusive and competitive economic growth;

    2. Notes that economic policy coordination is fundamentally necessary for a successful economic and monetary union; recalls that the European Semester is the well-established framework for coordinating fiscal, economic, employment and social policies across the EU, in line with the Treaties, while respecting the defined national competences;

    3. Notes the Commission’s commitment to ensure that the European Semester drives policy coordination for competitiveness, sustainability and social fairness, as well as the integration of the UN Sustainable Development Goals and the European pillar of social rights; notes that the European Green Deal remains a core deliverable for the Commission;

    4. Highlights the fact that an integrated, coordinated, targeted and horizontal industrial policy is vital to increase investments in the EU’s innovation capacity, while bolstering competitiveness and the integrity of the single market;

    5. Highlights that public and private investments are crucial for the EU’s ability to cope with existing challenges, including developing the EU’s innovation capacity and implementing the just green and digital transitions, and that they will increase the EU’s resilience, long-term competitiveness and open strategic autonomy; calls attention to the need for strategic investments in energy interconnections, low-carbon energies (such as renewables) and energy efficiency to, among other things, (i) make the EU independent from imported fossil fuels and prevent the possible inflationary effects of dependence on these, (ii) modernise production systems and (iii) promote social cohesion; recalls that the materialisation of climate-change-related physical risks can greatly affect public finances, as demonstrated by the floods in Valencia in October 2024 and the cyclone in Mayotte in December 2024; calls on the Member States to make the necessary investments to improve climate change mitigation and adaptation and enhance the resilience of the EU economy;

    6. Calls on the Commission to come up with initiatives, on the basis of the Budapest Declaration; to make the EU more competitive, productive, innovative and sustainable, by building on economic, social and territorial cohesion and ensuring convergence and a level playing field both within the EU and globally; notes the development of a new competitiveness coordination tool; expects the Commission to clarify how this tool will interact with the European Semester; stresses the importance of supporting micro, small and medium-sized enterprises as key drivers of economic growth and employment within the EU;

    7. Stresses the need to foster a dynamic entrepreneurial ecosystem that supports innovators, recognising their critical role in driving global competitiveness, economic resilience, job creation and open strategic autonomy;

    8. Welcomes the Commission’s recommendations regarding the economic policy of the euro area, urging the Member States to enhance competitiveness and foster productivity through improved access to funding for businesses, reduced administrative burdens, and public and private investment in areas of EU common priorities, which include (i) a fair green and digital transition, (ii) social and economic resilience including the European pillar of social rights, (iii) energy security, and (iv) the build-up of defence capabilities;

    9. Welcomes the Commission’s recommendation that, when defining fiscal strategies, euro area Member States should aim to improve the quality and efficiency of public expenditure and public revenue, which are essential for ensuring the sustainability of public finances, while minimising detrimental and distortive impacts on economic growth; stresses that this could be achieved by, among other things, increasing European coordination and reducing tax avoidance and tax evasion; welcomes the Draghi report’s conclusion that a coordinated reduction of labour income taxation for low- to middle-income workers is needed to promote EU competitiveness; recalls the Member States’ competence in tax policy; invites the Member States to redirect the tax burden from income to less distortive tax bases;

    10. Highlights the need to create fiscal buffers to address fiscal sustainability challenges, ensuring sufficient resources for investment and for dealing with potential future shocks and crises; stresses the importance of promoting competitive, sustainable and inclusive growth in supporting long-term fiscal stability and resilience;

    Economic prospects for the EU

    11. Expresses concern that, according to the Commission’s autumn 2024 economic forecast, EU GDP is expected to grow by 0.9 % (0.8 % in the euro area) in 2024, by 1.5 % (1.3 % in the euro area) in 2025 and by 1.8% (1.6% in the euro area) in 2026; recalls that these figures reflect a gradual recovery, but also limited economic expansion compared to previous economic cycles; notes that the economic outlook for the EU remains highly uncertain, with risks more likely to negatively affect economic growth;

    12. Notes that the public debt ratio is projected to increase to 83.0 % in the EU and 89.6 % in the euro area in 2025 and to 83.4 % in the EU and 90 % in the euro area in 2026, when the output gap will be virtually closed both in the EU and in the euro area, and that this is higher than the levels in 2024 (82.4 % for the EU and 89.1 % for the euro area);

    13. Recalls that developments in public debt ratios vary from country to country; points out that policy uncertainty and geopolitical risks can contribute significantly to increasing the cost of borrowing on the financial markets for the Member States; notes that unsustainable debt levels could undermine economic stability and decrease the Member States’ economic resilience and capacity to respond to crises; highlights that in 2024 and 2025, 11 euro area Member States are expected to have debt ratios above the Treaty reference value of 60 %, with 5 remaining above 100 %;

    14. Notes that according to the Commission’s 2024 autumn economic forecast, the general government deficit in the EU and the euro area is expected to decline to 3.1 % and 3 % of GDP, respectively, in 2024, and to decrease further to 3 % and 2.9 % of GDP in 2025 and 2.9 % and 2.8 % of GDP in 2026; stresses that 10 EU Member States are expected to post a deficit above the Treaty reference value of 3 % of GDP in 2024; points out that this number will remain stable in 2025, and that in 2026, most Member States are forecast to have weaker budgetary positions than before the pandemic (2019), with 9 of them still posting deficits of above 3 %;

    15. Notes that eight Member States have excessive deficits; recalls that the Council has taken remedial action and calls on the Member States concerned to take steps to reduce excessive deficits while minimising the socio-economic impact; recalls the importance of consistency in applying the excessive deficit procedure to the Member States;

    16. Notes that according to the Commission’s autumn 2024 economic forecast, inflation is projected to fall from 2.6 % in 2024 to 2.4 % in 2025 and 2 % in 2026 in the EU, and from 2.4 % in 2024 to 2.1 % in 2025 and 1.9 % in 2026 in the euro area; recalls that although this reduction is a positive development, core inflation remains relatively high, which points to persistent inflationary pressures; notes that fiscal policy, while safeguarding fiscal sustainability, can support monetary policy in reducing inflation, and should provide sufficient space for additional investments and support long-term growth;

    17. Notes that the Commission has not been able to present the Annual Sustainable Growth Survey, the Alert Mechanism Report, the draft euro area recommendation and the draft joint employment report at the same time;

    18. Observes that according to the Commission’s 2025 Alert Mechanism Report, in-depth reviews will be prepared in 2025 for the nine countries that were identified as experiencing imbalances or excessive imbalances in 2024, while another in-depth review should be undertaken for another Member State, as it presents particular risks of newly emerging imbalances;

    19. Underlines that housing is directly interconnected with the macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area, with damaging implications for economic resilience, dynamism and social progress and for regional and intra-EU mobility; is concerned that in some Member States, house prices are likely to increase and may become hard to curb in the absence of a holistic strategy;

    Revised EU economic governance framework and its effective implementation

    20. Recalls that the reform aims to make the framework simpler, more transparent and more effective, with greater national ownership and better enforcement, while differentiating between Member States on the basis of their individual starting points, representing a step forward in ending the ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach in view of the country-specific fiscal sustainability considerations embodied in the net expenditure path; recalls, furthermore, that the reform aims to strengthen fiscal sustainability through gradual and tailor-made adjustments complemented by reforms and investments and to promote countercyclical fiscal policies;

    21. Acknowledges that the new fiscal rules provide greater flexibility and incentives linked to the investments and national reforms required to address the economic, social and geopolitical challenges facing the EU; acknowledges that financial resources and contributions from national budgets differ from one Member State to another; welcomes the fact that the net expenditure indicator excludes all national co-financing in EU-funded programmes, providing increased fiscal space for Member States to invest in the EU’s common priorities, as laid down in Regulation (EU) 2024/1263, thus helping to strengthen synergies between the EU and national budgets, thereby reducing fragmentation and increasing the overall efficiency of public spending in some areas, such as defence;

    22. Highlights that the debt sustainability analysis (DSA) plays a key role in the reformed EU fiscal rules; is of the opinion that the discretionary role of the Commission in the DSA requires the relevant assessments to be fully transparent, predictable, replicable and stable; calls on the Commission to address possible methodological improvements, such as assessing spillover effects between Member States, and to duly inform Parliament in this regard;

    23. Notes the Commission’s inconsistent application of the fiscal rules framework in the past, and the Member States’ uneven compliance with the rules; stresses that it is essential for the new framework to ensure the equal treatment of the Member States; affirms that a successful framework relies heavily on proper, transparent and effective implementation from the outset, while taking into account the Member States’ starting points and the individual challenges they face; takes note of the changes introduced in the new framework to improve the credibility of the financial sanctions regime;

    24. Encourages the Member States to align the technical definition of their national operational indicator to the European primary net expenditure indicator;

    25. Emphasises the role of Parliament and of independent fiscal authorities in the EU’s economic governance framework; underlines the discretionary power of the Commission in developing the medium-term fiscal-structural plans; emphasises the need for increased scrutiny of the Commission by Parliament and by the European Fiscal Board, as envisioned in Regulation (EU) 2024/1263, and for an increase in the flow of information towards Parliament to enable its effective oversight;

    National medium-term fiscal-structural and budgetary plans

    26. Notes that not all Member States were able to submit their national medium-term fiscal-structural and draft budgetary plans on time; notes that, as a result of general elections and the formation of new governments, five Member States have not yet submitted their national medium-term fiscal-structural plans and two Member States have not yet submitted their draft budgetary plans, while one Member State has not submitted its draft budgetary plan for other unspecified reasons; calls on these Member States to submit the relevant plans as soon as possible; underlines that the timely submission of these plans is a precondition for the effective implementation and credibility of the new rules; reaffirms the importance of the timely submission of draft budgetary plans to translate commitments outlined in fiscal plans into concrete policies following approval of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans;

    27. Recalls that the reforms and investments outlined in the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans should align with the EU’s common priorities as laid down in Regulation (EU) 2024/1263; emphasises that, under the new framework, the Commission should pay particular attention to these priorities when assessing the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans;

    28. Acknowledges that 21 of the 22 national medium-term fiscal-structural plans that have been reviewed so far received a positive evaluation; notes that the new framework allows Member States to use assumptions that differ from the Commission’s DSA if these differences are explained and duly justified in a transparent manner and are based on sound economic arguments in the technical dialogue with the Member States; observes, however, that in the plans submitted by five Member States, the Commission found insufficiently justified inconsistencies and deviations from the DSA framework in macroeconomic assumptions related to potential GDP and/or the GDP deflator; stresses that such deviations and risks of backloading could potentially threaten future fiscal sustainability; notes that in the plans submitted by three Member States, the Commission acknowledges a concentration of the fiscal adjustment towards the end of the period; calls on the Commission to ensure that any such concentration of the adjustment meets the requirements set out in the regulation and calls on it to prevent procyclical policies;

    29. Takes note of the fact that only seven Member States have sought an opinion from their relevant independent fiscal institution, which provides an important additional scrutiny dimension; notes with caution that some independent fiscal institutions gave a negative opinion on their Member State’s national fiscal plan; stresses that nine Member States did not meet their obligation to conduct political consultations with civil society, social partners, regional authorities and other relevant stakeholders prior to submitting their national plans; further regrets the fact that several Member States have not involved their national parliaments in the approval process for the plans and have not reported whether the required consultations with national parliaments took place as laid down in the new framework;

    30. Observes that five Member States have requested an extension of the adjustment period; emphasises that any such extension should be based on a set of investment and reform commitments that, taken all together, improve the potential growth and resilience of the economy, support fiscal sustainability, address the EU’s common priorities and the relevant CSRs and have been assessed as meeting the conditions outlined in the regulation for such an extension; notes that the reforms and investments used to justify this extension rely considerably on reforms already approved under the RRF; highlights the importance of and need for reforms and investments that contribute positively to the potential GDP growth of the Member States; calls on the Commission to effectively evaluate ex post the impact of agreed investments and reforms in terms of supporting fiscal sustainability, enhancing the growth potential of the economy, addressing the EU’s common priorities and the CSRs and ensuring the required level of nationally financed public investment;

    31. Notes the Commission’s assessment that only 8 of the 17 draft budgetary plans presented are in line with fiscal recommendations stemming from the national medium-term fiscal-structural plan; regrets the fact that 7 plans were assessed as not being fully in line with the recommendations, 1 as non-compliant and 1 as at risk of not being in line with the recommendations; is concerned that six Member States have presented draft budgetary plans with annual or cumulative expenditure growth above their prescribed ceilings;

    Fiscal stance and the role of fiscal policy in the provision of European public goods

    32. Notes the Commission’s projection that the implementation of the revised governance framework is expected to lead to a reduction of the primary structural balance for the euro area as a whole of 0.5 % of GDP in 2024 and 0.25 % of GDP in 2025; notes the Commission’s assessment that this is in line with the process of enhancing fiscal sustainability and support the ongoing disinflationary process as economic uncertainty remains high; notes that GDP growth will continue to support fiscal consolidation throughout the EU; calls for fiscal policies that restore stability while promoting innovation, industrial competitiveness and long-term economic growth; stresses the need to create additional fiscal space to tackle future challenges and potential crises while preserving a sufficient level of investment to support and foster sustainable and inclusive growth, industrialisation and prosperity for all;

    33. Considers that the effective implementation of the fiscal rules, although necessary, is not in itself sufficient to achieve the optimal fiscal stance at all times and ensure a high standard of living for all Europeans; notes that the fiscal stance is still projected to differ greatly from one Member State to another in 2025; calls on the Commission to explore ideas for a mechanism that helps ensure that the cyclical position of the EU as a whole is appropriate for the macroeconomic outlook at all times;

    34. Recalls that, according to the Commission, the fiscal drag in 2025 will be partly offset by a slight expansion in investment, financed both by national budgets and by RRF grants and other EU funds; emphasises the RRF’s role in addressing EU investment needs, noting that it will expire by the end of 2026, which might lead to a decrease in public investment in common European priorities;

    35. Calls on the Commission to initiate discussions on addressing the significant investment gap in the EU and to reduce borrowing costs, strengthen financial stability and enable strategic investments in line with the EU’s objectives and for the provision of European public goods, such as defence capabilities to match needs in a context of growing threats and security challenges; calls for full use to be made of the efficiency gains that may stem from the provision of European public goods at EU scale through the effective coordination of investment priorities among Member States; believes that this framework, where appropriate, should be strengthened by EU-level investment instruments and tools designed to minimise the cost for EU taxpayers and maximise efficiency in the provision of European public goods;

    36. Recalls that any EU funding must be accompanied by robust controls ensuring transparency, accountability and the efficient use of funds, so as to avoid unjustified increases in public spending;

    37. Encourages the Member States to promote investment spending that produces a positive rate of return; acknowledges the Draghi report’s assessment that around four fifths of productive investments will be undertaken by the private sector in the EU, while public investment will also play a catalysing role; welcomes the Commission initiative to propose a competitiveness fund under the new multiannual financial framework and calls on it to make full use of financial guarantees to leverage private investment; stresses that the Member States must step up their efforts, in particular budgetary efforts, to accelerate innovation, digitalisation, education, training and decarbonisation, to strengthen European competitiveness and to reduce dependencies;

    Country-specific recommendations

    38. Notes that the share of ‘fully implemented’ CSRs has dropped from 18.1 % (in the period 2011-2018) to 13.9 % (in the period 2019-2023); recalls that implementing CSRs, including with regard to the efficiency of public spending, is a key part of ensuring fiscal sustainability and addressing macroeconomic imbalances; advocates a more efficient implementation of the CSRs and the relevant reforms; calls for ways of increasing the share of ‘fully implemented’ CSRs to be explored; calls on the Commission to link the CSRs more closely to the respective country reports; calls for the impact of reforms and the progress towards reducing identified investment gaps to be evaluated; calls for greater transparency in the preparation of CSRs;

    39. Reiterates, in this regard, that CSRs should be enhanced by focusing on a limited set of challenges, in particular specific Member States’ structural challenges and the EU’s common priorities, with a view to promoting sound and inclusive economic growth, enhancing competitiveness and macroeconomic stability, promoting the green and digital transitions and ensuring social and intergenerational fairness;

    40. Recalls the Member States’ commitment to address, in their national fiscal plans, the relevant CSRs in both their economic and social dimensions, as expressed under the European Semester; notes that the Commission has found unaddressed CSRs in the national fiscal plans;

    41. Highlights the importance of the CSRs in tackling the longer-term drivers of fiscal sustainability, including the sustainability and proper provision of public pension systems, the healthcare and long-term care systems in the face of demographic challenges such as ageing populations, and preparedness for adverse developments, including climate-change-related physical risks; stresses the relevance of CSRs in addressing the stability of the housing market in order to contribute to the economic resilience of the EU;

    °

    ° °

    42. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Missions – SEDE ad hoc delegation to the United Kingdom – 28-30 October 2024 – 28-10-2024 – Committee on Security and Defence

    Source: European Parliament

    Britain votes to leave: Reactions from the European Parliament © European Parliament

    The 6-Member SEDE ad hoc delegation to the United Kingdom mission organised in close co-operation with AFET and INTA, was a very timely visit following the announcement by the President of the European Commission and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to enhance strategic cooperation after their leaders’ meeting of 2 October 2024. The UK in particular has set out its ambition for an “enhanced EU-UK defence cooperation,” in light of Russia’s continuing war of aggression in Ukraine.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Missions – SEDE mission to Ukraine – 25-26 October 2024 – 25-10-2024 – Committee on Security and Defence

    Source: European Parliament

    SEDE_flags Ukraine and EU.jpg © Adobe Stock

    The eight-member delegation from the Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE) was in Kyiv on 25 and 26 October 2024. This mission was the first in the new parliamentary term and allowed the Members to express a strong message of solidarity and unwavering support to Ukraine and its citizens in the face of Russia’s unjust and illegal war of aggression.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI: Golar LNG Limited Preliminary fourth quarter and financial year 2024 results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Highlights and subsequent events

    • Golar LNG Limited (“Golar” or “the Company”) reports Q4 2024 net income attributable to Golar of $3 million inclusive of $29 million of non-cash items1, and Adjusted EBITDA1 of $59 million.
    • Full year 2024 net income attributable to Golar of $50 million inclusive of $131 million of non-cash items1, and Adjusted EBITDA1 of $241 million.
    • Total Golar Cash1 of $699 million.
    • Acquired all remaining minority interests in FLNG Hilli.
    • FLNG Hilli maintained market-leading operational track record and exceeded 2024 production target.
    • Pampa Energia S.A., Harbour Energy plc and YPF joined Southern Energy S.A. (“SESA”), creating a consortium of leading Argentinian gas producers planning to use FLNG Hilli under definitive agreements announced in July 2024.
    • FLNG Gimi commissioning commenced and first LNG produced, after receiving first gas from the GTA field.
    • MKII FLNG conversion project on schedule (9% complete) and Fuji LNG arrived at the shipyard for conversion works.
    • Sold shareholding in Avenir LNG Limited (“Avenir”) for net proceeds of $39 million.
    • Completed exit from LNG shipping with sale of the LNG carrier, Golar Arctic for $24 million.
    • Declared dividend of $0.25 per share for the quarter.

    FLNG Hilli: Maintained her market leading operational track record and exceeded her contracted 2024 production volume resulting in the recognition of $0.5 million of 2024 over production accrued revenue. Q4 2024 Distributable Adjusted EBITDA1 was $68 million excluding overproduction revenue. FLNG Hilli has offloaded 128 cargoes to date.

    In December 2024, Golar acquired all remaining third party minority ownership interests in FLNG Hilli for $60 million in cash and a $30 million increase in Golar’s share of contractual debt. The acquisitions included a total of 5.45% common units, 10.9% Series A shares and 10.9% Series B shares. The transaction was equivalent to ~8% of the full FLNG capacity. Following this, Golar has a 100% economic interest in FLNG Hilli.

    The acquisition is immediately accretive to Golar’s cash flow. Annual Adjusted EBITDA1 from the base tolling fee is expected to increase by approximately $7 million. The Brent oil linked commodity element of the current FLNG Hilli charter will increase from $2.7 million to $3.1 million in annual Adjusted EBITDA1 attributable to Golar per dollar for Brent oil prices between $60/bbl and the contractual ceiling. The TTF linked component of the current tariff will similarly increase annual Adjusted EBITDA1 generation attributable to Golar from $3.2 million to $3.7 million per $/MMBtu of European TTF gas prices above a floor price that delivers a base annual TTF fee of $5 million. The acquisition of the minority ownership interests is also accretive to Golar’s Adjusted EBITDA backlog1, with an ~8% shareholding of the 20-year charter in Argentina starting in 2027* increasing the backlog by approximately $0.5 billion, before commodity exposure.

    Golar expects to release significant capital from a contemplated refinancing of FLNG Hilli following completion of the conditions precedent in the SESA 20-year charter.

    FLNG Gimi: Following the commercial reset with bp announced in August 2024, accelerated commissioning commenced in October 2024 using gas from a LNG carrier. In January 2025, gas from the carrier was replaced by feedgas from the bp operated FPSO which allowed full commissioning to commence. This milestone triggered the final upward adjustment to the Commissioning Rate under the commercial reset. LNG is now being produced, and subject to receipt of sufficient feed gas, the first LNG export cargo is expected within Q1 2025. Assuming all conditions are met, the Commercial Operations Date (“COD”) is expected within Q2 2025. COD will trigger the start of the 20-year Lease and Operate Agreement that unlocks the equivalent of around $3 billion of Adjusted EBITDA backlog1 (Golar’s share) and recognition of contractual payments comprised of capital and operating elements in both the balance sheet and income statement.

    A debt facility to refinance FLNG Gimi is in an advanced stage, with credit approvals now received. The transaction is subject to customary closing conditions and third party stakeholder approvals.

    MKII FLNG 3.5MTPA conversion: Conversion work on the $2.2 billion MK II FLNG (“MK II”) is proceeding to schedule. After discharging her final cargo as an LNG carrier in January 2025, the conversion vessel Fuji LNG entered CIMC’s Yantai yard in February 2025. Golar has spent $0.6 billion to date, all of which is equity funded. The MK II is expected to be delivered in Q4 2027 and be the first available FLNG capacity globally.

    As part of the EPC agreement, Golar also has an option for a second MK II conversion slot at CIMC for delivery within 2028.

    FLNG business development: In July 2024, Golar announced that it had entered into definitive agreements for the deployment of an FLNG in Argentina. In October 2024, Golar received a notice reserving FLNG Hilli for the 20-year charter. During November 2024, Pampa Energia joined the SESA project with a 20% equity stake, in December 2024 Harbour Energy joined with a 15% equity stake and in February 2025 YPF joined with a 15% equity stake. Pan American Energy (“PAE”) remains with a 40% equity stake and Golar with its 10% equity stake. SESA will be responsible for sourcing Argentine natural gas to the FLNG, chartering and operating FLNG Hilli and marketing and selling LNG globally. The addition of leading natural gas and oil producers in Argentina further strengthens both the project and Golar’s charter counterparty.

    Following the end of FLNG Hilli’s current charter in July 2026 offshore Cameroon, FLNG Hilli will undergo vessel upgrades to maintain 20-years of continuous operations offshore. Operations in Argentina are expected to commence in 2027. FLNG Hilli is expected to generate an annual Adjusted EBITDA1 of approximately $300 million, plus a commodity linked element in the FLNG tariff and commodity exposure through Golar’s 10% equity stake in SESA.

    The project remains subject to defined conditions precedent (“CP”), including an export license, environmental assessment and Final Investment Decision (“FID”) by SESA. Workstreams for each CP are advancing according to schedule and are expected to be concluded within Q2 2025.

    Golar’s position as the only proven service provider of FLNG globally, our market leading capex/ton and operational uptime continues to drive interest in our FLNG solutions. The MKII under construction is now the focus of multiple commercial discussions. Advanced discussions are taking place in the Americas, West Africa, Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Once a charter is secured for the MKII under construction, we aim to FID our 4th FLNG unit. In addition to the option for a second MKII at CIMC Raffles shipyard, we are now in discussions with other capable shipyards for this potential 4th unit, focused on design, liquefaction capacity, capex/ton and delivery.

    Other/shipping: Operating revenues and costs under corporate and other items are comprised of two FSRU operate and maintain agreements in respect of the LNG Croatia and Italis LNG. The non-core shipping segment was comprised of the LNGC Golar Arctic, and Fuji LNG. During February 2025, Fuji LNG entered CIMC’s yard for her FLNG conversion and Golar Arctic was sold for $24 million. This concludes Golar’s 50-year presence in the LNG shipping business.  

    In January 2025, Golar also agreed to sell its non-core 23.4% interest in Avenir. The transaction closed in February 2025 upon receipt of $39 million of net proceeds.

    Shares and dividends: As of December 31, 2024, 104.5 million shares are issued and outstanding. Golar’s Board of Directors approved a total Q4 2024 dividend of $0.25 per share to be paid on or around March 18, 2025. The record date will be March 11, 2025.

    Financial Summary

    (in thousands of $) Q4 2024 Q4 2023 % Change YTD 2024 YTD 2023 % Change
    Net income/(loss) attributable to Golar LNG Ltd 3,349 (32,847) (110)% 49,694 (46,793) (206)%
    Total operating revenues 65,917 79,679 (17)% 260,372 298,429 (13)%
    Adjusted EBITDA 1 59,168 114,249 (48)% 240,500 355,771 (32)%
    Golar’s share of contractual debt 1 1,515,357 1,221,190 24% 1,515,357 1,221,190 24%

    Financial Review

    Business Performance:

      2024 2023
      Oct-Dec Jul-Sep Oct-Dec
    (in thousands of $) Total Total Total
    Net income/(loss)        15,037      (35,969)      (31,071)
    Income taxes            (504)              208              332
    Income/(loss) before income taxes        14,533      (35,761)      (30,739)
    Depreciation and amortization        13,642        13,628        12,794
    Impairment of long-term assets        22,933                —                —
    Unrealized loss on oil and gas derivative instruments        14,269        73,691      126,909
    Other non-operating loss          7,000                —                —
    Interest income        (9,866)        (8,902)      (11,234)
    Interest expense, net                —                —        (1,107)
    (Gains)/losses on derivative instruments        (8,711)        14,955        16,542
    Other financial items, net          1,153              470            (157)
    Net income from equity method investments          4,215              948          1,241
    Adjusted EBITDA (1)        59,168        59,029      114,249
      2024
      Oct-Dec Jul-Sep
    (in thousands of $) FLNG Corporate and other Shipping Total FLNG Corporate and other Shipping Total
    Total operating revenues      56,396         6,025         3,496      65,917      56,075         6,212         2,520      64,807
    Vessel operating expenses     (19,788)       (5,048)       (3,073)     (27,909)     (20,947)       (7,403)       (3,373)     (31,723)
    Voyage, charterhire & commission expenses              —              —          (446)          (446)              —              —          (888)          (888)
    Administrative expenses          (264)       (7,240)               (1)       (7,505)          (568)       (6,498)               (7)       (7,073)
    Project expenses       (3,624)       (1,236)              —       (4,860)       (1,249)       (1,894)              —       (3,143)
    Realized gains on oil derivative instrument (2)      33,502              —              —      33,502      37,049              —              —      37,049
    Other operating income            469              —              —            469              —              —              —              —
    Adjusted EBITDA (1)      66,691       (7,499)            (24)      59,168      70,360       (9,583)       (1,748)      59,029

    (2) The line item “Realized and unrealized (loss)/gain on oil and gas derivative instruments” in the Unaudited Consolidated Statements of Operations relates to income from the Hilli Liquefaction Tolling Agreement (“LTA”) and the natural gas derivative which is split into: “Realized gains on oil and gas derivative instruments” and “Unrealized (loss)/gain on oil and gas derivative instruments”.

      2023
      Oct-Dec
    (in thousands of $) FLNG Corporate and other Shipping Total
    Total operating revenues        72,433          5,510          1,736        79,679
    Vessel operating expenses      (16,510)        (4,765)        (2,005)      (23,280)
    Voyage, charterhire & commission (expenses)/income            (133)                —            (900)        (1,033)
    Administrative income/(expenses)                29        (7,031)                (1)        (7,003)
    Project development expenses            (958)              380              (99)            (677)
    Realized gains on oil derivative instrument        53,520                —                —        53,520
    Other operating income        13,043                —                —        13,043
    Adjusted EBITDA (1)      121,424        (5,906)        (1,269)      114,249

    Golar reports today Q4 2024 net income of $3 million, before non-controlling interests, inclusive of $29 million of non-cash items1, comprised of:

    • A $23 million impairment of LNG carrier, Golar Arctic;
    • TTF and Brent oil unrealized mark-to-market (“MTM”) losses of $14 million; and
    • A $8 million MTM gain on interest rate swaps.

    The Brent oil linked component of FLNG Hilli’s fees generates additional annual cash of approximately $3.1 million for every dollar increase in Brent Crude prices between $60 per barrel and the contractual ceiling. Billing of this component is based on a three-month look-back at average Brent Crude prices. During Q4, we recognized a total of $34 million of realized gains on FLNG Hilli’s oil and gas derivative instruments, comprised of a: 

    • $14 million realized gain on the Brent oil linked derivative instrument;
    • $12 million realized gain on the hedged component of the quarter’s TTF linked fees; and
    • $8 million realized gain in respect of fees for the TTF linked production.

    Further, we recognized a total of $14 million of non-cash losses in relation to FLNG Hilli’s oil and gas derivative assets, with corresponding changes in fair value in its constituent parts recognized on our unaudited consolidated statement of operations as follows:

    • $12 million loss on the economically hedged portion of the Q4 TTF linked FLNG production; and 
    • $2 million loss on the Brent oil linked derivative asset.

    Balance Sheet and Liquidity:

    As of December 31, 2024, Total Golar Cash1 was $699 million, comprised of $566 million of cash and cash equivalents and $133 million of restricted cash. 

    Golar’s share of Contractual Debt1 as of December 31, 2024 is $1,515 million. Deducting Total Golar Cash1 of $699 million from Golar’s share of Contractual Debt1 leaves a debt position net of Total Golar Cash of $816 million. 

    Assets under development amounts to $2.2 billion, comprised of $1.7 billion in respect of FLNG Gimi and $0.5 billion in respect of the MKII. The carrying value of LNG carrier Fuji LNG, currently included under Vessels and equipment, net will be transferred to Assets under development in Q1, 2025.

    Following agreement by the consortium of lenders who provide the current $700 million FLNG Gimi facility, Golar drew down the final $70 million tranche of this facility in November 2024. Of the $1.7 billion FLNG Gimi investment as of December 31, 2024, inclusive of $297 million of capitalized financing costs, $700 million was funded by the current debt facility. Both the FLNG Gimi investment and outstanding Gimi debt are reported on a 100% basis. All capital expenditure in connection with the 100% owned MK II is equity funded. 

    Non-GAAP measures

    In addition to disclosing financial results in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (US GAAP), this earnings release and the associated investor presentation contains references to the non-GAAP financial measures which are included in the table below. We believe these non-GAAP financial measures provide investors with useful supplemental information about the financial performance of our business, enable comparison of financial results between periods where certain items may vary independent of business performance, and allow for greater transparency with respect to key metrics used by management in operating our business and measuring our performance.

    This report also contains certain forward-looking non-GAAP measures for which we are unable to provide a reconciliation to the most comparable GAAP financial measures because certain information needed to reconcile those non-GAAP measures to the most comparable GAAP financial measures is dependent on future events some of which are outside of our control, such as oil and gas prices and exchange rates, as such items may be significant. Non-GAAP measures in respect of future events which cannot be reconciled to the most comparable GAAP financial measure are calculated in a manner which is consistent with the accounting policies applied to Golar’s unaudited consolidated financial statements.

    These non-GAAP financial measures should not be considered a substitute for, or superior to, financial measures and financial results calculated in accordance with GAAP. Non-GAAP measures are not uniformly defined by all companies and may not be comparable with similarly titled measures and disclosures used by other companies. The reconciliations as at December 31, 2024 and for the year ended December 31, 2024, from these results should be carefully evaluated.

    Non-GAAP measure Closest equivalent US GAAP measure Adjustments to reconcile to primary financial statements prepared under US GAAP Rationale for adjustments
    Performance measures
    Adjusted EBITDA Net income/(loss)  +/- Income taxes
    + Depreciation and amortization
    + Impairment of long-lived assets
    +/- Unrealized (gain)/loss on oil and gas derivative instruments
    +/- Other non-operating (income)/losses
    +/- Net financial (income)/expense
    +/- Net (income)/losses from equity method investments
    +/- Net loss/(income) from discontinued operations
    Increases the comparability of total business performance from period to period and against the performance of other companies by excluding the results of our equity investments, removing the impact of unrealized movements on embedded derivatives, depreciation, impairment charge, financing costs, tax items and discontinued operations.
    Distributable Adjusted EBITDA Net income/(loss)  +/- Income taxes
    + Depreciation and amortization
    + Impairment of long-lived assets
    +/- Unrealized (gain)/loss on oil and gas derivative instruments
    +/- Other non-operating (income)/losses
    +/- Net financial (income)/expense
    +/- Net (income)/losses from equity method investments
    +/- Net loss/(income) from discontinued operations
    – Amortization of deferred commissioning period revenue
    – Amortization of Day 1 gains
    – Accrued overproduction revenue
    + Overproduction revenue received
    – Accrued underutilization adjustment
    Increases the comparability of our operational FLNG Hilli from period to period and against the performance of other companies by removing the non-distributable income of FLNG Hilli, project development costs, the operating costs of the Gandria (prior to her disposal) and FLNG Gimi.
    Liquidity measures
    Contractual debt 1 Total debt (current and non-current), net of deferred finance charges  +/-Variable Interest Entity (“VIE”) consolidation adjustments
    +/-Deferred finance charges
    During the year, we consolidate a lessor VIE for our Hilli sale and leaseback facility. This means that on consolidation, our contractual debt is eliminated and replaced with the lessor VIE debt.

    Contractual debt represents our debt obligations under our various financing arrangements before consolidating the lessor VIE.

    The measure enables investors and users of our financial statements to assess our liquidity, identify the split of our debt (current and non-current) based on our underlying contractual obligations and aid comparability with our competitors.

    Adjusted net debt Adjusted net debt based on
    GAAP measures:
    -Total debt (current and
    non-current), net of
    deferred finance
    charges
    – Cash and cash
    equivalents
    – Restricted cash and
    short-term deposits
    (current and non-current)
    – Other current assets (Receivable from TTF linked commodity swap derivatives)
    Total debt (current and non-current), net of:
    +Deferred finance charges
    +Cash and cash equivalents
    +Restricted cash and short-term deposits (current and non-current)
    +/-VIE consolidation adjustments
    +Receivable from TTF linked commodity swap derivatives
    The measure enables investors and users of our financial statements to assess our liquidity based on our underlying contractual obligations and aids comparability with our competitors.
    Total Golar Cash Golar cash based on GAAP measures:

    + Cash and cash equivalents

    + Restricted cash and short-term deposits (current and non-current)

    -VIE restricted cash and short-term deposits We consolidate a lessor VIE for our sale and leaseback facility. This means that on consolidation, we include restricted cash held by the lessor VIE.

    Total Golar Cash represents our cash and cash equivalents and restricted cash and short-term deposits (current and non-current) before consolidating the lessor VIE.

    Management believe that this measure enables investors and users of our financial statements to assess our liquidity and aids comparability with our competitors.

    (1) Please refer to reconciliation below for Golar’s share of Contractual Debt

    Adjusted EBITDA backlog: This is a non-GAAP financial measure and represents the share of contracted fee income for executed contracts or definitive agreements less forecasted operating expenses for these contracts/agreements. Adjusted EBITDA backlog should not be considered as an alternative to net income / (loss) or any other measure of our financial performance calculated in accordance with U.S. GAAP.

    Non-cash items: Non-cash items comprised of impairment of long-lived assets, release of prior year contract underutilization liability, mark-to-market (“MTM”) movements on our TTF and Brent oil linked derivatives, listed equity securities and interest rate swaps (“IRS”) which relate to the unrealized component of the gains/(losses) on oil and gas derivative instruments, unrealized MTM (losses)/gains on investment in listed equity securities and gains on derivative instruments, net, in our unaudited consolidated statement of operations.

    Abbreviations used:

    FLNG: Floating Liquefaction Natural Gas vessel
    FSRU: Floating Storage and Regasification Unit
    MKII FLNG: Mark II FLNG
    FPSO: Floating Production, Storage and Offloading unit

    MMBtu: Million British Thermal Units
    mtpa: Million Tons Per Annum

    Reconciliations – Liquidity Measures

    Total Golar Cash

    (in thousands of $) December 31, 2024 September 30, 2024 December 31, 2023
    Cash and cash equivalents           566,384           732,062           679,225
    Restricted cash and short-term deposits (current and non-current)           150,198             92,025             92,245
    Less: VIE restricted cash and short-term deposits            (17,472)            (17,463)            (18,085)
    Total Golar Cash           699,110           806,624           753,385

    Contractual Debt and Adjusted Net Debt

    (in thousands of $) December 31, 2024 September 30, 2024 December 31, 2023
    Total debt (current and non-current) net of deferred finance charges        1,451,110        1,422,399        1,216,730
    VIE consolidation adjustments           242,811           233,964           202,219
    Deferred finance charges             22,686             24,480             23,851
    Total Contractual Debt        1,716,607        1,680,843        1,442,800
    Less: Keppel’s and B&V’s share of the FLNG Hilli contractual debt                     —            (30,884)            (32,610)
    Less: Keppel’s share of the Gimi debt         (201,250)         (184,625)         (189,000)
    Golar’s share of Contractual Debt        1,515,357        1,465,334        1,221,190
    Less: Total Golar Cash         (699,110)         (806,625)         (753,385)
    Less: Receivables from the remaining unwinding of TTF hedges                     —            (12,360)            (57,020)
    Golar’s Adjusted Net Debt           816,247           646,349           410,785

    Please see Appendix A for a capital repayment profile for Golar’s contractual debt.

    Forward Looking Statements

    This press release contains forward-looking statements (as defined in Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended) which reflects management’s current expectations, estimates and projections about its operations. All statements, other than statements of historical facts, that address activities and events that will, should, could or may occur in the future are forward-looking statements. Words such as “if,” “subject to,” “believe,” “assuming,” “anticipate,” “intend,” “estimate,” “forecast,” “project,” “plan,” “potential,” “will,” “may,” “should,” “expect,” “could,” “would,” “predict,” “propose,” “continue,” or the negative of these terms and similar expressions are intended to identify such forward-looking statements. These statements are not guarantees of future performance and are based upon various assumptions, many of which are based, in turn, upon further assumptions, including without limitation, management’s examination of historical operating trends, data contained in our records and other data available from third parties. Although we believe that these assumptions were reasonable when made, because these assumptions are inherently subject to significant uncertainties and contingencies which are difficult or impossible to predict and are beyond our control, we cannot assure you that we will achieve or accomplish these expectations, beliefs or projections. Therefore, actual outcomes and results may differ materially from what is expressed or forecasted in such forward-looking statements. You should not place undue reliance on these forward-looking statements, which speak only as of the date of this press release. Unless legally required, Golar undertakes no obligation to update publicly any forward-looking statements whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise. Other important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those in the forward-looking statements include but are not limited to:

    • our ability and that of our counterparty to meet our respective obligations under the 20-year lease and operate agreement (the “LOA”) with BP Mauritania Investments Limited, a subsidiary of BP p.l.c (“bp”), entered into in connection with the Greater Tortue Ahmeyim Project (the “GTA Project”), including the commissioning and start-up of various project infrastructure. Delays could result in incremental costs to both parties to the LOA, delay floating liquefaction natural gas vessel (“FLNG”) commissioning works and the start of operations for our FLNG Gimi (“FLNG Gimi”);
    • our ability to meet our obligations under our commercial agreements, including the liquefaction tolling agreement (the “LTA”) entered into in connection with the FLNG Hilli Episeyo (“FLNG Hilli”);
    • our ability to meet our obligations with Southern Energy S.A. SESA in connection with the recently signed agreement on FLNG deployment in Argentina, and SESAs ability to meet its obligations with us;
    • the ability to secure a suitable contract for the MK II within the expected timeframe, including the impact of project capital expenditures, foreign exchange fluctuations, and commodity price volatility on investment returns and potential changes in market conditions affecting deployment opportunities;
    • changes in our ability to obtain additional financing or refinance existing debts on acceptable terms or at all, or to secure a listing for our 2024 Unsecured Bonds;
    • Global economic trends, competition, and geopolitical risks, including U.S. government actions, trade tensions or conflicts such as between the U.S. and China, related sanctions, a potential Russia-Ukraine peace settlement and its potential impact on LNG supply and demand;
    • a material decline or prolonged weakness in tolling rates for FLNGs;
    • failure of shipyards to comply with schedules, performance specifications or agreed prices;
    • failure of our contract counterparties to comply with their agreements with us or other key project stakeholders;
    • increased tax liabilities in the jurisdictions where we are currently operating or expect to operate;
    • continuing volatility in the global financial markets, including but not limited to commodity prices, foreign exchange rates and interest rates;
    • changes in general domestic and international political conditions, particularly where we operate, or where we seek to operate;
    • changes in our ability to retrofit vessels as FLNGs, including the availability of vessels to purchase and in the time it takes to build new vessels or convert existing vessels;
    • continuing uncertainty resulting from potential future claims from our counterparties of purported force majeure (“FM”) under contractual arrangements, including but not limited to our future projects and other contracts to which we are a party;
    • our ability to close potential future transactions in relation to equity interests in our vessels or to monetize our remaining equity method investments on a timely basis or at all;
    • increases in operating costs as a result of inflation, including but not limited to salaries and wages, insurance, crew provisions, repairs and maintenance, spares and redeployment related modification costs;
    • claims made or losses incurred in connection with our continuing obligations with regard to New Fortress Energy Inc. (“NFE”), Energos Infrastructure Holdings Finance LLC (“Energos”), Cool Company Ltd (“CoolCo”) and Snam S.p.A. (“Snam”);
    • the ability of Energos, CoolCo and Snam to meet their respective obligations to us, including indemnification obligations;
    • changes to rules and regulations applicable to FLNGs or other parts of the natural gas and LNG supply chain;
    • changes to rules on climate-related disclosures as required by the European Union or the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Commission”), including but not limited to disclosure of certain climate-related risks and financial impacts, as well as greenhouse gas emissions;
    • actions taken by regulatory authorities that may prohibit the access of FLNGs to various ports and locations; and
    • other factors listed from time to time in registration statements, reports or other materials that we have filed with or furnished to the Commission, including our annual report on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2023, filed with the Commission on March 28, 2024 (the “2023 Annual Report”).

    As a result, you are cautioned not to rely on any forward-looking statements. Actual results may differ materially from those expressed or implied by such forward-looking statements. The Company undertakes no obligation to publicly update or revise any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise unless required by law.

    Responsibility Statement

    We confirm that, to the best of our knowledge, the unaudited consolidated financial statements for the year ended December 31, 2024, which have been prepared in accordance with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States give a true and fair view of Golar’s unaudited consolidated assets, liabilities, financial position and results of operations. To the best of our knowledge, the report for the year ended December 31, 2024, includes a fair review of important events that have occurred during the period and their impact on the unaudited consolidated financial statements, the principal risks and uncertainties and major related party transactions.

    Our actual results for the quarter and year ended December 31, 2024 will not be available until after this press release is furnished and may differ from these estimates. The preliminary financial information presented herein should not be considered a substitute for the financial information to be filed with the SEC in our Annual Report on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2024 once it becomes available. Accordingly, you should not place undue reliance upon these preliminary financial results.

    February 27, 2025
    The Board of Directors
    Golar LNG Limited
    Hamilton, Bermuda
    Investor Questions: +44 207 063 7900
    Karl Fredrik Staubo – CEO
    Eduardo Maranhão – CFO

    Stuart Buchanan – Head of Investor Relations

    Tor Olav Trøim (Chairman of the Board)
    Dan Rabun (Director)
    Thorleif Egeli (Director)
    Carl Steen (Director)
    Niels Stolt-Nielsen (Director)
    Lori Wheeler Naess (Director)
    Georgina Sousa (Director)

    This information is subject to the disclosure requirements pursuant to Section 5-12 the Norwegian Securities Trading Act

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Outbrain Announces Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2024 Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Reports another quarter of accelerated growth and profitability, achieved Q4 guidance on Ex TAC gross profit and Adjusted EBITDA, and generated strong cash flow

    Closed acquisition of Teads in February 2025; Combined company operating under the name Teads

    NEW YORK, Feb. 27, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Outbrain Inc. (Nasdaq: OB), which is operating under the new Teads brand, announced today financial results for the quarter and full year ended December 31, 2024.

    Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2024 Key Financial Metrics:

      Three Months Ended
    December 31,
      Twelve Months Ended
    December 31,
    (in millions USD)   2024       2023     % Change     2024       2023     % Change
    Revenue $ 234.6     $ 248.2       (5 )%   $ 889.9     $ 935.8       (5 )%
    Gross profit   56.1       53.2       5  %     192.1       184.8       4  %
    Net (loss) income   (0.2 )     4.1       (104 )%     (0.7 )     10.2       (107 )%
    Net cash provided by operating activities   42.7       25.5       67 %     68.6       13.7       399  %
                                   
    Non-GAAP Financial Data*                              
    Ex-TAC gross profit   68.3       63.8       7  %     236.1       227.4       4  %
    Adjusted EBITDA   17.0       14.0       21  %     37.3       28.5       31  %
    Adjusted net income (loss)   3.5       4.3       (20 )%     4.1       (3.9 )     205  %
    Free cash flow   37.6       21.0       79  %     51.3       (6.5 )   NM

    _____________________________

    NM Not meaningful

    * See non-GAAP reconciliations below

    “Continued momentum in our growth areas helped drive accelerated growth and profitability, with a record level of cash flow” said David Kostman, CEO of Outbrain.

    “A few weeks post closing of our merger with Teads, I am even more excited about combining the category-leading branding and performance capabilities of Outbrain and Teads into one of the largest Open Internet platforms. We believe the new Teads will better serve enterprise brands and agencies, as well as mid-market and direct response advertisers, by delivering elevated outcomes from branding to performance across curated, quality media environments from digital to CTV,” added Kostman.

    Recent Developments

    On February 3, 2025, we completed the acquisition of Teads, for total value of approximately $900 million, comprised of $625 million in cash and 43.75 million shares of Outbrain common stock. The combined company will operate under the name Teads.

    In connection with the acquisition:

    • On February 3, 2025, entered into a credit agreement with Goldman Sachs Bank, U.S. Bank Trust Company, and certain other lenders, which provided, among other things, for a new $100.0 million super senior secured revolving credit facility maturing on February 3, 2030, which may be used for working capital and other general corporate purposes.
    • On February 11, 2025, completed the private offering of $637.5 million in aggregate principal amount of 10.0% senior secured notes due 2030 at an issue price of 98.087% of the principal amount in a transaction exempt from registration. The proceeds were used, together with cash on hand, to repay in full and cancel a bridge credit facility used to finance the cash consideration paid at closing.
    • Terminated the existing revolving credit facility with the Silicon Valley Bank, a division of First Citizens Bank & Trust Company, dated as of November 2, 2021.
    • We expect to realize approximately $65 million to $75 million of annual synergies in 2026 with further opportunities for expanded synergies. Of this amount, approximately $60 million relates to cost synergies, including approximately $45 million of compensation-related expenses, with approximately 70% of the estimated compensation-related synergies already actioned in February.

    Fourth Quarter 2024 Business Highlights:

    • Continued acceleration of year-over-year growth of Ex-TAC gross profit, improvement in Ex-TAC gross margin, and growth in Adjusted EBITDA.
    • Fifth consecutive quarter of year-over-year RPM growth.
    • Strong initial reception of our Moments offering, launched in Q3 and live on over 40 publishers, including New York Post, NewsCorp Australia, RTL and Rolling Stone.
    • Continued growth in advertiser spend on Outbrain DSP (previously known as Zemanta), by approximately 45% in FY 2024, as compared to the prior year.
    • Continued supply expansion outside of traditional feed product representing approximately 30% of our revenue in Q4 2024, versus 26% in Q4 2023.
    • Premium supply competitive wins include Penske Media (US) and Prensa Ibérica (Spain), and renewals including Spiegel (Germany), Il Messaggero (Italy), and Grape (Japan).

    Fourth Quarter 2024 Financial Highlights:

    • Revenue of $234.6 million, a decrease of $13.6 million, or 5%, compared to $248.2 million in the prior year period, including net unfavorable foreign currency effects of approximately $1.8 million.
    • Gross profit of $56.1 million, an increase of $2.9 million, or 5%, compared to $53.2 million in the prior year period. Gross margin increased 250 basis points to 23.9%, compared to 21.4% in the prior year period.
    • Ex-TAC gross profit of $68.3 million, an increase of $4.5 million, or 7%, compared to $63.8 million in the prior year period, as lower revenue was more than offset by our Ex-TAC gross margin improvement of approximately 340 basis points to 29.1%, compared to 25.7% in the prior year period.
    • Net loss of $0.2 million, compared to net income of $4.1 million in the prior year period. Net loss in the current period includes acquisition-related costs of $3.6 million, net of taxes.
    • Adjusted net income of $3.5 million, compared to adjusted net income of $4.3 million in the prior year period.
    • Adjusted EBITDA of $17.0 million, compared to Adjusted EBITDA of $14.0 million in the prior year period. Adjusted EBITDA included net unfavorable foreign currency effects of approximately $0.8 million.
    • Generated net cash provided by operating activities of $42.7 million, compared to $25.5 million in the prior year period. Free cash flow was $37.6 million, as compared to $21.0 million in the prior year period.
    • Cash, cash equivalents and investments in marketable securities were $166.1 million, comprised of cash and cash equivalents of $89.1 million and short-term investments in marketable securities of $77.0 million as of December 31, 2024.

    Full Year 2024 Financial Results:

    • Revenue of $889.9 million, a decrease of $45.9 million, or 5%, compared to $935.8 million in the prior year period, including net unfavorable foreign currency effects of approximately $2.4 million.
    • Gross profit of $192.1 million, an increase of $7.3 million, or 4%, compared to $184.8 million in the prior year period, including net unfavorable foreign currency effects of approximately $1.3 million. Gross margin increased 190 basis points to 21.6% in 2024, compared to 19.7% in 2023.
    • Ex-TAC gross profit of $236.1 million, an increase of $8.7 million, or 4%, compared to $227.4 million in the prior year period, including net unfavorable foreign currency effects of approximately $1.3 million.
    • Net loss of $0.7 million, including net one-time expenses of $4.8 million, compared to net income of $10.2 million, including net one-time benefits of $14.1 million in the prior year. See non-GAAP reconciliations below for details of one-time items.
    • Adjusted net income of $4.1 million, compared to adjusted net loss of $3.9 million in the prior year.
    • Adjusted EBITDA of $37.3 million, compared to $28.5 million in the prior year. Adjusted EBITDA included net unfavorable foreign currency effects of approximately $1.2 million.
    • Generated net cash provided by operating activities of $68.6 million, compared to net cash provided $13.7 million in the prior year. Free cash flow was $51.3 million, compared to a use of cash of $6.5 million in the prior year.

    Share Repurchases:

    There were no share repurchases during the three months ended December 31, 2024. During the twelve months ended December 31, 2024, we repurchased 1,410,001 shares for $5.8 million, including related costs, under our $30 million stock repurchase program authorized in December 2022. The remaining availability under the repurchase program was $6.6 million as of December 31, 2024.

    2025 Full Year and First Quarter Guidance

    The following forward-looking statements reflect our expectations for 2025, including the contribution from Teads.

    For the first quarter ending March 31, 2025, which includes the results for the legacy Outbrain business plus the addition of operating results for legacy Teads beginning on February 3, 2025, we expect:

    • Ex-TAC gross profit of $100 million to $105 million
    • Adjusted EBITDA of $8 million to $12 million

    For the full year ending December 31, 2025, we expect:

    • Adjusted EBITDA of at least $180 million

    The above measures are forward-looking non-GAAP financial measures for which a reconciliation to the most directly comparable GAAP financial measure is not available without unreasonable efforts. See “Non-GAAP Financial Measures” below. In addition, our guidance is subject to risks and uncertainties, as outlined below in this release.

    Conference Call and Webcast Information

    Outbrain will host an investor conference call this morning, Thursday, February 27 at 8:30 am ET. Interested parties are invited to listen to the conference call which can be accessed live by phone by dialing 1-877-497-9071 or for international callers, 1-201-689-8727. A replay will be available two hours after the call and can be accessed by dialing 1-877-660-6853, or for international callers, 1-201-612-7415. The passcode for the live call and the replay is 13750872. The replay will be available until March 13, 2025. Interested investors and other parties may also listen to a simultaneous webcast of the conference call by logging onto the Investors Relations section of the Company’s website at https://investors.outbrain.com. The online replay will be available for a limited time shortly following the call.

    Non-GAAP Financial Measures

    In addition to GAAP performance measures, we use the following supplemental non-GAAP financial measures to evaluate our business, measure our performance, identify trends, and allocate our resources: Ex-TAC gross profit, Ex-TAC gross margin, Adjusted EBITDA, free cash flow, adjusted net income (loss), and adjusted diluted EPS. These non-GAAP financial measures are defined and reconciled to the corresponding GAAP measures below. These non-GAAP financial measures are subject to significant limitations, including those we identify below. In addition, other companies in our industry may define these measures differently, which may reduce their usefulness as comparative measures. As a result, this information should be considered as supplemental in nature and is not meant as a substitute for revenue, gross profit, net income (loss), diluted EPS, or cash flows from operating activities presented in accordance with U.S. GAAP.

    Because we are a global company, the comparability of our operating results is affected by foreign exchange fluctuations. We calculate certain constant currency measures and foreign currency impacts by translating the current year’s reported amounts into comparable amounts using the prior year’s exchange rates. All constant currency financial information that may be presented is non-GAAP and should be used as a supplement to our reported operating results. We believe that this information is helpful to our management and investors to assess our operating performance on a comparable basis. However, these measures are not intended to replace amounts presented in accordance with GAAP and may be different from similar measures calculated by other companies.

    The Company is also providing fourth quarter and full year guidance. These forward-looking non-GAAP financial measures are calculated based on internal forecasts that omit certain amounts that would be included in GAAP financial measures. The Company has not provided quantitative reconciliations of these forward-looking non-GAAP financial measures to the most directly comparable GAAP financial measures because it is unable, without unreasonable effort, to predict with reasonable certainty the occurrence or amount of all excluded items that may arise during the forward-looking period, which can be dependent on future events that may not be reliably predicted. Such excluded items could be material to the reported results individually or in the aggregate.

    Ex-TAC Gross Profit

    Ex-TAC gross profit is a non-GAAP financial measure. Gross profit is the most comparable GAAP measure. In calculating Ex-TAC gross profit, we add back other cost of revenue to gross profit. Ex-TAC gross profit may fluctuate in the future due to various factors, including, but not limited to, seasonality and changes in the number of media partners and advertisers, advertiser demand or user engagements.

    We present Ex-TAC gross profit, Ex-TAC gross margin (calculated as Ex-TAC gross profit as a percentage of revenue), and Adjusted EBITDA as a percentage of Ex-TAC gross profit, because they are key profitability measures used by our management and board of directors to understand and evaluate our operating performance and trends, develop short-term and long-term operational plans, and make strategic decisions regarding the allocation of capital. Accordingly, we believe that these measures provide information to investors and the market in understanding and evaluating our operating results in the same manner as our management and board of directors. There are limitations on the use of Ex-TAC gross profit in that traffic acquisition cost is a significant component of our total cost of revenue but not the only component and, by definition, Ex-TAC gross profit presented for any period will be higher than gross profit for that period. A potential limitation of this non-GAAP financial measure is that other companies, including companies in our industry, which have a similar business, may define Ex-TAC gross profit differently, which may make comparisons difficult. As a result, this information should be considered as supplemental in nature and is not meant as a substitute for revenue or gross profit presented in accordance with U.S. GAAP.

    Adjusted EBITDA

    We define Adjusted EBITDA as net income (loss) before gain on convertible debt; interest expense; interest income and other income (expense), net; provision for income taxes; depreciation and amortization; stock-based compensation; and other income or expenses that we do not consider indicative of our core operating performance, including but not limited to, merger and acquisition costs, regulatory matter costs, and severance costs related to our cost saving initiatives. We present Adjusted EBITDA as a supplemental performance measure because it is a key profitability measure used by our management and board of directors to understand and evaluate our operating performance and trends, develop short-term and long-term operational plans and make strategic decisions regarding the allocation of capital, and we believe it facilitates operating performance comparisons from period to period.

    We believe that Adjusted EBITDA provides useful information to investors and others in understanding and evaluating our operating results in the same manner as our management and board of directors. However, our calculation of Adjusted EBITDA is not necessarily comparable to non-GAAP information of other companies. Adjusted EBITDA should be considered as a supplemental measure and should not be considered in isolation or as a substitute for any measures of our financial performance that are calculated and reported in accordance with U.S. GAAP.

    Adjusted Net Income (Loss) and Adjusted Diluted EPS

    Adjusted net income (loss) is a non-GAAP financial measure, which is defined as net income (loss) excluding items that we do not consider indicative of our core operating performance, including but not limited to gain on convertible debt, merger and acquisition costs, regulatory matter costs, and severance costs related to our cost saving initiatives. Adjusted net income (loss), as defined above, is also presented on a per diluted share basis. We present adjusted net income (loss) and adjusted diluted EPS as supplemental performance measures because we believe they facilitate performance comparisons from period to period. However, adjusted net income (loss) or adjusted diluted EPS should not be considered in isolation or as a substitute for net income (loss) or diluted earnings per share reported in accordance with U.S. GAAP.

    Free Cash Flow

    Free cash flow is defined as cash flow provided by (used in) operating activities less capital expenditures and capitalized software development costs. Free cash flow is a supplementary measure used by our management and board of directors to evaluate our ability to generate cash and we believe it allows for a more complete analysis of our available cash flows. Free cash flow should be considered as a supplemental measure and should not be considered in isolation or as a substitute for any measures of our financial performance that are calculated and reported in accordance with U.S. GAAP.

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This press release contains forward-looking statements within the meaning of the federal securities laws, which statements involve substantial risks and uncertainties. Forward-looking statements may include, without limitation, statements generally relating to possible or assumed future results of our business, financial condition, results of operations, liquidity, plans and objectives, and statements relating to our recently completed acquisition of Teads S.A., a public limited liability company(société anonyme) incorporated and existing under the laws of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg (“Teads”). You can generally identify forward-looking statements because they contain words such as “may,” “will,” “should,” “expects,” “plans,” “anticipates,” “could,” “intends,” “guidance,” “outlook,” “target,” “projects,” “contemplates,” “believes,” “estimates,” “predicts,” “foresee,” “potential” or “continue” or the negative of these terms or other similar expressions that concern our expectations, strategy, plans or intentions or are not statements of historical fact. We have based these forward- looking statements largely on our expectations and projections regarding future events and trends that we believe may affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations. The outcome of the events described in these forward-looking statements is subject to risks, uncertainties and other factors including, but not limited to: the ability of Outbrain to successfully integrate Teads or manage the combined business effectively; our ability to realize anticipated benefits and synergies of the acquisition, including, among other things, operating efficiencies, revenue synergies and other cost savings; our due diligence investigation of Teads may be inadequate or risks related to Teads’ business may materialize; unexpected costs, charges or expenses resulting from the acquisition; the outcome of any securities litigation, stockholder derivative or other litigation related to the acquisition; our ability to raise additional financing in the future to fund our operations, which may not be available to us on favorable terms or at all; the volatility of the market price of our common stock and any drop in the market price of our common stock following the acquisition; our ability to attract and retain customers, management and other key personnel; overall advertising demand and traffic generated by our media partners; factors that affect advertising demand and spending, such as the continuation or worsening of unfavorable economic or business conditions or downturns, instability or volatility in financial markets, and other events or factors outside of our control, such as U.S. and global recession concerns, geopolitical concerns, including the ongoing war between Ukraine-Russia and conditions in Israel and the Middle East, tariffs and trade wars, supply chain issues, inflationary pressures, labor market volatility, bank closures or disruptions, the impact of challenging economic conditions, political and policy changes or uncertainties in connection with the new U.S. presidential administration, and other factors that have and may further impact advertisers’ ability to pay; our ability to continue to innovate, and adoption by our advertisers and media partners of our expanding solutions; the success of our sales and marketing investments, which may require significant investments and may involve long sales cycles; our ability to grow our business and manage growth effectively; our ability to compete effectively against current and future competitors; the loss or decline of one or more of our large media partners, and our ability to expand our advertiser and media partner relationships; conditions in Israel, including the sustainability of the recent cease-fire between Israel and Hamas and any conflicts with other terrorist organizations; our ability to maintain our revenues or profitability despite quarterly fluctuations in our results, whether due to seasonality, large cyclical events, or other causes; the risk that our research and development efforts may not meet the demands of a rapidly evolving technology market; any failure of our recommendation engine to accurately predict attention or engagement, any deterioration in the quality of our recommendations or failure to present interesting content to users or other factors which may cause us to experience a decline in user engagement or loss of media partners; limits on our ability to collect, use and disclose data to deliver advertisements; our ability to extend our reach into evolving digital media platforms; our ability to maintain and scale our technology platform; our ability to meet demands on our infrastructure and resources due to future growth or otherwise; our failure or the failure of third parties to protect our sites, networks and systems against security breaches, or otherwise to protect the confidential information of us or our partners; outages or disruptions that impact us or our service providers, resulting from cyber incidents, or failures or loss of our infrastructure; significant fluctuations in currency exchange rates; political and regulatory risks in the various markets in which we operate; the challenges of compliance with differing and changing regulatory requirements; the timing and execution of any cost-saving measures and the impact on our business or strategy; and the risks described in the section entitled “Risk Factors” and elsewhere in the Annual Report on Form 10-K filed for the year ended December 31, 2023, in our definitive proxy statement filed with the SEC on October 31, 2024 and in subsequent reports filed with the SEC. Accordingly, you should not rely upon forward-looking statements as an indication of future performance. We cannot assure you that the results, events and circumstances reflected in the forward-looking statements will be achieved or will occur, and actual results, events, or circumstances could differ materially from those projected in the forward-looking statements. The forward-looking statements made in this press release relate only to events as of the date on which the statements are made. We may not actually achieve the plans, intentions or expectations disclosed in our forward-looking statements and you should not place undue reliance on our forward-looking statements. We undertake no obligation and do not assume any obligation to update any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or circumstances after the date on which the statements are made or to reflect the occurrence of unanticipated events or otherwise, except as required by law.

    About The Combined Company

    Outbrain Inc. (Nasdaq: OB) and Teads combined on February 3, 2025 and are operating under the new Teads brand. The new Teads is the omnichannel outcomes platform for the open internet, driving full-funnel results for marketers across premium media. With a focus on meaningful business outcomes, the combined company ensures value is driven with every media dollar by leveraging predictive AI technology to connect quality media, beautiful brand creative, and context-driven addressability and measurement. One of the most scaled advertising platforms on the open internet, the new Teads is directly partnered with more than 10,000 publishers and 20,000 advertisers globally. The company is headquartered in New York, with a global team of nearly 1,800 people in 36 countries.

    Media Contact

    press@outbrain.com

    Investor Relations Contact

    IR@outbrain.com

    (332) 205-8999

    OUTBRAIN INC.
    Condensed Consolidated Statements of Operations
    (In thousands, except for share and per share data)
     
      Three Months Ended
    December 31,
      Twelve Months Ended
    December 31,
        2024       2023       2024       2023  
      (Unaudited)
    Revenue $ 234,586     $ 248,229     $ 889,875     $ 935,818  
    Cost of revenue:              
    Traffic acquisition costs   166,247       184,425       653,731       708,449  
    Other cost of revenue   12,277       10,572       44,042       42,571  
    Total cost of revenue   178,524       194,997       697,773       751,020  
    Gross profit   56,062       53,232       192,102       184,798  
    Operating expenses:            
    Research and development   9,434       8,369       37,080       36,402  
    Sales and marketing   25,736       25,254       97,498       98,370  
    General and administrative   18,357       13,899       70,162       58,665  
    Total operating expenses   53,527       47,522       204,740       193,437  
    Income (loss) from operations   2,535       5,710       (12,638 )     (8,639 )
    Other income (expense), net:              
    Gain on convertible debt               8,782       22,594  
    Interest expense   (699 )     (965 )     (3,649 )     (5,393 )
    Interest income and other income, net   1,522       2,060       9,209       7,793  
    Total other income, net   823       1,095       14,342       24,994  
    Income before income taxes   3,358       6,805       1,704       16,355  
    Provision for income taxes   3,525       2,748       2,415       6,113  
    Net (loss) income $ (167 )   $ 4,057     $ (711 )   $ 10,242  
                   
    Weighted average shares outstanding:              
    Basic   49,767,704       50,076,364       49,321,301       50,900,422  
    Diluted   49,767,704       50,108,460       52,709,356       56,965,299  
                   
    Net income (loss) per common share:              
    Basic $ 0.00     $ 0.08     $ (0.01 )   $ 0.20  
    Diluted $ 0.00     $ 0.08     $ (0.11 )   $ (0.06 )
    OUTBRAIN INC.
    Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheets
    (In thousands, except for number of shares and par value)
     
      December 31,
    2024
      December 31,
    2023
      (Unaudited)    
    ASSETS:      
    Current assets:      
    Cash and cash equivalents $ 89,094     $ 70,889  
    Short-term investments in marketable securities   77,035       94,313  
    Accounts receivable, net of allowances   149,167       189,334  
    Prepaid expenses and other current assets   27,835       47,240  
    Total current assets   343,131       401,776  
    Non-current assets:      
    Long-term investments in marketable securities         65,767  
    Property, equipment and capitalized software, net   45,250       42,461  
    Operating lease right-of-use assets, net   15,047       12,145  
    Intangible assets, net   16,928       20,396  
    Goodwill   63,063       63,063  
    Deferred tax assets   40,825       38,360  
    Other assets   24,969       20,669  
    TOTAL ASSETS $ 549,213     $ 664,637  
           
    LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS’ EQUITY:      
    Current liabilities:      
    Accounts payable $ 149,479     $ 150,812  
    Accrued compensation and benefits   19,430       18,620  
    Accrued and other current liabilities   113,630       119,703  
    Deferred revenue   6,932       8,486  
    Total current liabilities   289,471       297,621  
    Non-current liabilities:      
    Long-term debt         118,000  
    Operating lease liabilities, non-current   11,783       9,217  
    Other liabilities   16,616       16,735  
    TOTAL LIABILITIES $ 317,870     $ 441,573  
           
    STOCKHOLDERS’ EQUITY:      
    Common stock, par value of $0.001 per share − one billion shares authorized; 63,503,274 shares issued and 50,090,114 shares outstanding as of December 31, 2024; 61,567,520 shares issued and 49,726,518 shares outstanding as of December 31, 2023   64       62  
    Preferred stock, par value of $0.001 per share − 100,000,000 shares authorized, none issued and outstanding as of December 31, 2024 and December 31, 2023          
    Additional paid-in capital   484,541       468,525  
    Treasury stock, at cost − 13,413,160 shares as of December 31, 2024 and 11,841,002 shares as of December 31, 2023   (74,289 )     (67,689 )
    Accumulated other comprehensive loss   (9,480 )     (9,052 )
    Accumulated deficit   (169,493 )     (168,782 )
    TOTAL STOCKHOLDERS’ EQUITY   231,343       223,064  
    TOTAL LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS’ EQUITY $ 549,213     $ 664,637  
    OUTBRAIN INC.
    Condensed Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows
    (In thousands)
     
      Three Months Ended December 31,   Twelve Months Ended December 31,
        2024       2023       2024       2023  
      (Unaudited)
    CASH FLOWS FROM OPERATING ACTIVITIES:              
    Net (loss) income $ (167 )   $ 4,057     $ (711 )   $ 10,242  
    Adjustments to reconcile net (loss) income to net cash provided by (used in) operating activities:              
    Gain on convertible debt               (8,782 )     (22,594 )
    Stock-based compensation   3,974       2,988       15,461       12,141  
    Depreciation and amortization of property and equipment   1,658       1,720       6,312       6,915  
    Amortization of capitalized software development costs   2,477       2,372       9,758       9,633  
    Amortization of intangible assets   850       853       3,409       4,154  
    Provision for credit losses   55       1,931       3,006       8,008  
    Non-cash operating lease expense   1,305       1,092       5,130       4,453  
    Deferred income taxes   (664 )     (1,478 )     (5,095 )     (4,312 )
    Amortization of discount on marketable securities   (396 )     (729 )     (2,235 )     (3,604 )
    Other   665       (483 )     47       (717 )
    Changes in operating assets and liabilities:              
    Accounts receivable   4,471       (16,939 )     35,905       (12,946 )
    Prepaid expenses and other current assets   9,291       2,409       18,412       843  
    Accounts payable and other current liabilities   18,867       27,127       (11,696 )     (1,228 )
    Operating lease liabilities   (1,223 )     (1,018 )     (5,092 )     (4,297 )
    Deferred revenue   555       1,524       (1,496 )     1,621  
    Other non-current assets and liabilities   945       51       6,228       5,434  
    Net cash provided by operating activities   42,663       25,477       68,561       13,746  
                   
    CASH FLOWS FROM INVESTING ACTIVITIES:              
    Acquisition of a business, net of cash acquired         (77 )     (181 )     (389 )
    Purchases of property and equipment   (2,712 )     (2,257 )     (7,380 )     (10,127 )
    Capitalized software development costs   (2,321 )     (2,243 )     (9,913 )     (10,107 )
    Purchases of marketable securities   (34,436 )     (44,658 )     (90,602 )     (131,543 )
    Proceeds from sales and maturities of marketable securities   31,068       35,228       175,325       221,878  
    Other   (15 )     (63 )     (96 )     (72 )
    Net cash (used in) provided by investing activities   (8,416 )     (14,070 )     67,153       69,640  
                   
    CASH FLOWS FROM FINANCING ACTIVITIES:              
    Repayment of long-term debt obligations               (109,740 )     (96,170 )
    Payment of deferred financing costs   (598 )           (1,099 )      
    Treasury stock repurchases and share withholdings on vested awards   (210 )     (5,270 )     (6,600 )     (18,521 )
    Principal payments on finance lease obligations         (353 )     (263 )     (1,830 )
    Payment of contingent consideration liability up to acquisition-date fair value                     (547 )
    Net cash used in financing activities   (808 )     (5,623 )     (117,702 )     (117,068 )
                   
    Effect of exchange rate changes   (1,400 )     564       634       (1,004 )
                   
    Net increase (decrease) in cash, cash equivalents and restricted cash $ 32,039     $ 6,348     $ 18,646     $ (34,686 )
    Cash, cash equivalents and restricted cash — Beginning   57,686       64,731       71,079       105,765  
    Cash, cash equivalents and restricted cash — Ending $ 89,725     $ 71,079     $ 89,725     $ 71,079  
    OUTBRAIN INC.
    Non-GAAP Reconciliations
    (In thousands)
    (Unaudited)
     

    The following table presents the reconciliation of Gross profit to Ex-TAC gross profit and Ex-TAC gross margin, for the periods presented:

    Three Months Ended December 31,   Twelve Months Ended December 31,
      2024       2023       2024       2023  
    Revenue $ 234,586     $ 248,229     $ 889,875     $ 935,818  
    Traffic acquisition costs   (166,247 )     (184,425 )     (653,731 )     (708,449 )
    Other cost of revenue   (12,277 )     (10,572 )     (44,042 )     (42,571 )
    Gross profit   56,062       53,232       192,102       184,798  
    Other cost of revenue   12,277       10,572       44,042       42,571  
    Ex-TAC gross profit $ 68,339     $ 63,804     $ 236,144     $ 227,369  
                   
    Gross margin (gross profit as % of revenue)   23.9 %     21.4 %     21.6 %     19.7 %
    Ex-TAC gross margin (Ex-TAC gross profit as % of revenue)   29.1 %     25.7 %     26.5 %     24.3 %

    The following table presents the reconciliation of net income (loss) to Adjusted EBITDA, for the periods presented:

    Three Months Ended December 31,   Twelve Months Ended December 31,
      2024       2023       2024       2023  
    Net (loss) income $ (167 )   $ 4,057     $ (711 )   $ 10,242  
    Interest expense   699       965       3,649       5,393  
    Interest income and other income, net   (1,522 )     (2,060 )     (9,209 )     (7,793 )
    Gain on convertible debt               (8,782 )     (22,594 )
    Provision for income taxes   3,525       2,748       2,415       6,113  
    Depreciation and amortization   4,985       4,945       19,479       20,702  
    Stock-based compensation   3,974       2,988       15,461       12,141  
    Regulatory matter costs                     742  
    Acquisition-related costs   5,469             14,256        
    Severance and related costs         361       742       3,509  
    Adjusted EBITDA $ 16,963     $ 14,004     $ 37,300     $ 28,455  
                   
    Net (loss) income as % of gross profit   (0.3 )%     7.6 %     (0.4 )%     5.5 %
    Adjusted EBITDA as % of Ex-TAC Gross Profit   24.8 %     21.9 %     15.8 %     12.5 %

    The following table presents the reconciliation of net income (loss) and diluted EPS to adjusted net income (loss) and adjusted diluted EPS, respectively, for the periods presented:

    Three Months Ended December 31,   Twelve Months Ended December 31,
      2024       2023       2024       2023  
    Net loss (income) $ (167 )   $ 4,057     $ (711 )   $ 10,242  
    Adjustments:              
    Gain on convertible debt               (8,782 )     (22,594 )
    Regulatory matter costs                     742  
    Acquisition-related costs   5,469             14,256        
    Severance and related costs         361       742       3,509  
    Total adjustments, before tax   5,469       361       6,216       (18,343 )
    Income tax effect   (1,844 )     (97 )     (1,438 )     4,234  
    Total adjustments, after tax   3,625       264       4,778       (14,109 )
    Adjusted net income (loss) $ 3,458     $ 4,321     $ 4,067     $ (3,867 )
                   
    Basic weighted-average shares, as reported   49,767,704       50,076,364       49,321,301       50,900,422  
    Restricted stock units   793,713       32,096       519,729        
    Adjusted diluted weighted average shares   50,561,417       50,108,460       49,841,030       50,900,422  
                   
    Diluted net income (loss) per share – reported $     $ 0.08     $ (0.11 )   $ (0.06 )
    Adjustments, after tax   0.07       0.01       0.19       (0.02 )
    Diluted net income (loss) per share – adjusted $ 0.07     $ 0.09     $ 0.08     $ (0.08 )

    The following table presents the reconciliation of net cash provided by (used in) operating activities to free cash flow, for the periods presented:

      Three Months Ended December 31,   Twelve Months Ended December 31,
        2024       2023       2024       2023  
    Net cash provided by operating activities $ 42,663     $ 25,477     $ 68,561     $ 13,746  
    Purchases of property and equipment   (2,712 )     (2,257 )     (7,380 )     (10,127 )
    Capitalized software development costs   (2,321 )     (2,243 )     (9,913 )     (10,107 )
    Free cash flow $ 37,630     $ 20,977     $ 51,268     $ (6,488 )

    Teads
    Non-IFRS Reconciliations
    (In thousands)
    (Unaudited)

    The below information is presented for informational purposes only. The acquisition of Teads closed in February 2025. Therefore, its results are not included in Outbrain Inc.’s consolidated results of operations for any periods in 2024. The following is a summary of Teads’ non-IFRS financial measures, as calculated based on Teads’ historical financial statements, which we may publicly present from time to time, and which differ from US GAAP. Non-IFRS financial measures should be viewed in addition to, and not as an alternative for, Teads’ historical financial results prepared in accordance with IFRS. The financial information set forth below for the three months and twelve months ended December 31, 2024 is preliminary and is subject to change. Actual financial results may differ from these preliminary estimates due to the completion of Teads’ annual audit and are subject to adjustments and other developments that may arise before such results are finalized.

    Ex-TAC Gross Profit is defined as gross profit plus other cost of revenue. The following table presents the reconciliation of Ex-TAC Gross Profit to gross profit for the periods presented:

    Three Months
    Ended
    March 31,
    2024
      Three Months
    Ended
    June 30,
    2024
      Three Months
    Ended
    September 30,
    2024
      Three Months
    Ended
    December 31,
    2024
      Twelve Months
    Ended
    December 31,
    2024
    (in thousands)
    Revenue $ 125,372     $ 153,734     $ 149,376     $ 188,953     $ 617,435  
    Traffic acquisition costs   (46,939 )     (55,716 )     (59,085 )     (69,091 )     (230,831 )
    Other cost of revenue(a)   (26,387 )     (26,721 )     (26,865 )     (26,441 )     (106,414 )
    Gross profit   52,046       71,297       63,426       93,421       280,190  
    Other cost of revenue(a)   26,387       26,721       26,865       26,441       106,414  
    Ex-TAC Gross Profit $ 78,433     $ 98,018     $ 90,291     $ 119,862     $ 386,604  

    __________________________________
    (a) Other cost of revenue for Teads is subject to accounting policy alignment with Outbrain, with no impact to Ex-TAC Gross Profit included in the above table.

    Teads defines Adjusted EBITDA as profit (loss) for the year/period before income tax expense, finance costs, other financial income and expenses, depreciation and amortization, other expenses and income (capital gains, non-recurring litigation, restructuring costs) and share-based compensation. This may not be comparable to similarly titled measures used by other companies. Further, this measure should not be considered as an alternative for net income as the effects of income tax expense, finance costs, other financial income and expenses, depreciation and amortization, other expenses and income (such as severance costs, and merger and acquisition costs) and share-based compensation excluded from Adjusted EBITDA do affect the operating results. Teads believes that Adjusted EBITDA is a useful supplementary measure for evaluating the operating performance of Teads’ business. The following table provides a reconciliation of profit (loss) for the period to Adjusted EBITDA, the most directly comparable IFRS measure, for the periods presented:

    Three Months
    Ended
    March 31,
    2024
      Three Months
    Ended
    June 30,
    2024
      Three Months
    Ended
    September 30,
    2024
      Three Months
    Ended
    December 31,
    2024
      Twelve Months
    Ended
    December 31,
    2024
    (in thousands)
    (Loss) profit for the period   (36,551 )     23,323       32,933     $ 46,158     $ 65,863  
    Finance Costs   250       277       532       117       1,176  
    Other financial (income) and expenses   20,531       (12,432 )     (20,529 )     (19,967 )     (32,397 )
    Provision for income taxes   716       10,800       10,597       17,637       39,750  
    Depreciation and amortization   3,180       3,350       3,277       3,027       12,834  
    Share-based compensation   25,612       5,760       (3,284 )     (134 )     27,954  
    Severance costs   281       520       398       394       1,593  
    Merger and acquisition costs   323       763       (125 )     4,929       5,890  
    Adjusted EBITDA $ 14,342     $ 32,361     $ 23,799     $ 52,161     $ 122,663  

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: 11 years since Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea: UK statement to the OSCE

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Speech

    11 years since Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea: UK statement to the OSCE

    Ambassador Holland comments on the eleventh anniversary of Russia’s illegal annexation of Ukraine, a violation of international law, and the campaign of systematic human rights violations and abuse against its people that followed.

    Thank you, Mr Chair.  This month marks 11 years since Russia illegally annexed Crimea —a violation of international law.

    Yesterday marked the Day of Resistance, commemorating the courage and resilience of Ukrainians who continue to stand against Russian occupation of Crimea. On that day in 2014, thousands of Ukrainians gathered peacefully in Simferopol, defending Ukraine’s territorial integrity and their democratic rights.

    Since 2014, the situation in Crimea has deteriorated significantly. Russia’s occupation has been characterised by systematic human rights abuses and a campaign to suppress dissent, erase Ukrainian cultural identity, and silence those who speak out.

    The UN reports that the Crimean Tatar community continues to face serious persecution, including arbitrary detentions, forced disappearances, and the closure of media outlets. It concludes that their cultural and political rights have been violated.

    OHCHR reports that at least 219 Ukrainians from Crimea, including 133 Crimean Tatars, have been arbitrarily detained in Russia since Russia’s annexation of Crimea. At least 40 of these are being denied the urgent medical care they need — among them, human rights defenders Tofik Abdulhaziiev and Enver Ametov.

    Religious freedoms are also under attack. Communities that refuse to conform to the Russian Orthodox Church, including Ukrainian Orthodox believers, Muslims, and Jehovah’s Witnesses face harassment, surveillance, and unjustified legal action. These actions violate fundamental human rights, including the freedom of religion and belief, which are enshrined in international law.

    And since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s repressive measures in Crimea have become the blueprint for the restrictions on human rights and fundamental freedoms in the newly occupied territories.

    Russia’s attempts to legitimise its occupation of sovereign Ukrainian territory through sham referenda and forced passportisation are equally concerning. These actions attempt to manipulate the demographic and political landscape of Ukraine, further isolating the occupied regions from Ukraine and the international community. The UK rejects these measures as unlawful.

    We call for the immediate release of all those arbitrarily detained by Russia in Ukraine, including the three members of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission—Vadym Golda, Maxim Petrov, and Dmytro Shabanov—who have been unjustly held since 2022 for performing their official duties. International human rights monitoring bodies be granted full and unrestricted access to Crimea. Justice must be served for victims of human rights abuses, including those forcibly disappeared or tortured.

    The UK reaffirms its unwavering support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, including Crimea. We will stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes, and we will continue to work with our international partners to hold the Russian authorities accountable.

    Updates to this page

    Published 27 February 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-Evening Report: Eugene Doyle: Yellow Peril!  Red Peril! ‘We cannot hide anymore’. Chinese warships in the Tasman Sea. 

    Report by Dr David Robie – Café Pacific.

    COMMENTARY: By Eugene Doyle

    The Western media went into overdrive this week to work the laconic Kiwis into a mild frenzy over three Chinese naval vessels conducting exercises in the Tasman Sea a few thousand kilometres off our shores.

    What was really behind this orchestrated campaign?

    The New Zealand government led the rhetorical charge over the Hengyang, the Zunyi and the Weishanhu in mare nostrum (“Our Sea”, as the Romans liked to call the Mediterranean).

     “We cannot hide at this end of the world anymore,” Defence Minister Judith Collins said in light of three Chinese boats in the Tasman.

    Warrior academics were next . “We need to go to the cutting edge, and we need to do that really, really fast,” the ever-reliable China hawk Anne-Marie Brady of Canterbury University said, telling 1 News the message of the live-firing exercises was that China wants to rule the waves.

    The British Financial Times chimed in with a warning that “A confronting strategic future is arriving fast”.

    Could this have anything to do with the fact we are fast approaching the New Zealand government’s 2025 budget and that they — and their Australian, US and UK allies — are intent on a major increase in Kiwi defence funding, moving from around 1.2 percent of GDP to possibly two percent? A long-anticipated Defence Capability Review is also around the corner and is likely to come with quite a shopping list of expensive gear.

    The New Zealand government led the rhetorical charge over the Hengyang, the Zunyi and the Weishanhu in mare nostrum (“Our Sea”, as the Romans liked to call the Mediterranean). Image: www.solidarity.co.nz

    What’s good for the goose . . .
    It is worth pointing out that New Zealand and Australian warships sailed through the contested Taiwan Strait and elsewhere in the South China Sea as recently as September 2024. What’s good for the goose is good for the Panda.

    And, of course, at any one time about 20 US nuclear submarines are prowling in the deep waters of the Pacific Ocean and South China Sea. Each can carry missiles the equivalent of over 1000 Hiroshima bombs — truly apocalyptic.

    Veteran New Zealand peace campaigner Mike Smith (a friend) was not in total disagreement with the hawks when it came to the argy-bargy in the Tasman.

    “The emergence apparently from nowhere of a Chinese naval expedition in our waters I think may be intended to demonstrate that they have a large and very capable blue water navy now and won’t be penned in by AUKUS submarines when and if they arrive off their coast.

    “I think the main message is to the Australians: if you want to homebase nuclear-capable B-52s we have more than one way to come at you. That was also the message of the ICBM they sent into the Pacific: Australia is no longer an unsinkable aircraft carrier.”

    According to the Asia Times, China fired the ICBM — the first such shot into the Pacific by China — just days after HMNZS Aotearoa sailed through the Taiwan Strait with Australian vessel HMAS Sydney.

    Smith says our focus should be on building positive relationships in the Pacific on our terms. “Buying expensive popguns will not save us.”

    China Scare a page out of Australia’s Red Scare playbook
    For people good at pattern recognition this week’s China Scare was obviously a page or two out of the same playbook that duped a majority of Australians into believing China was going to invade Australia. They were lulled into a false sense of insecurity back in 2021 — the mediascape flooded with Red Alert, China panic stories about imminent war with the rising Asian power.

    As a sign of how successful the mainstream media can be in generating fear that precedes major policy shifts: research by Australia’s Institute of International & Security Affairs showed that more Australians thought that China would soon attack Australia than Taiwanese believed China would attack Taiwan!

    Once the population was conditioned, they woke one morning in September 2021 with the momentous news that Australia had ditched a $90 billion submarine defence deal with France and the country was now part of a new anti-Chinese military alliance called AUKUS. This was the playbook that came to mind last week.

    There are strong, rational arguments that could be made to increase our spending at this time. But I loathe and decry this kind of manipulation, this manufacturing of consent.

    I also fear what those billions of dollars will be used for. Defending our coastlines is one thing; joining an anti-Chinese military alliance to please the US is quite another.

    Prime Minister Luxon has called China — our biggest trading partner — a strategic competitor. He has also suggested, somewhat ludicrously, that our military could be a “force multiplier” for Team AUKUS.

    We are hitching ourselves to the US at the very time they have proven they treat allies as vassals, threatened to annex Greenland and the Panama Canal, continue to commit genocide in Gaza, and are now imposing an unequal treaty on Ukraine.


    Australia’s ABC News on Foreign Minister Winston Peter’s talks in China. Video: ABC

    Whose side – or calmer independence?
    Whose side should we be on? Or should we return to a calmer, more independent posture?

    And then there’s the question of priorities. The hawks may convince the New Zealand population that the China threat is serious enough that we should forgo spending money on child poverty, fixing our ageing infrastructure, investing in health and education and instead, as per pressure from our AUKUS partners, spend some serious coin — billions of dollars more — on defence.

    Climate change is one battle that is being fought and lost. Will climate funding get the bullet so we can spend on military hardware? That would certainly get a frosty reaction from Pacific nations at the front edge of sea rise.

    The government in New Zealand is literally taking the food out of children’s mouths to fund weapons systems. The Ka Ora, Ka Ako programme provides nutritious lunches every day to a quarter of a million of New Zealand’s most needy children.

    Its funding has recently been slashed by over $100 million by the government despite its own advisors telling it that such programmes have profound long-term wellbeing benefits and contribute significantly to equity. In the next breath we are told we need to boost funding for our military.

    The US appears determined to set itself on a collision course with China but we don’t have to be crash test dummies sitting alongside them. Prudence, preparedness, vigilance and risk-management are all to be devoutly wished for; hitching our fate to a hostile US containment strategy is bad policy both in economic and defence terms.

    In the absence of a functioning media — one that showcases diverse perspectives and challenges power rather than works hand-in-glove with it — populations have been enlisted in the most abhorrent and idiotic campaigns: the Red Peril, the Jewish Peril and the Black Peril (in South Africa and the southern states of the USA), to name three.

    Our media-political-military complex is at it again with this one — a kind of Yellow Peril Redux.

    New Zealand trails behind both Australia and China in development assistance to the Pacific. If we wish to “counter” China, supporting our neighbours would be a better investment than encouraging an unwinnable arms race.

    In tandem, I would advocate for a far deeper diplomatic and cultural push to understand and engage with China; that would do more to keep the region peaceful and may arrest the slow move in China towards seeking other markets for the high-quality primary produce that an increasingly bellicose New Zealand still wishes to sell them.

    Let’s be friends to all, enemies of none. Keep the Pacific peaceful, neutral and nuclear-free.

    Eugene Doyle is a community organiser and activist in Wellington, New Zealand. He received an Absolutely Positively Wellingtonian award in 2023 for community service. His first demonstration was at the age of 12 against the Vietnam War. This article was first published at his public policy website Solidarity and he is a regular contributor to Asia Pacific Report and Café Pacific.

    This article was first published on Café Pacific.

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI Video: Peace Formula for Ukraine | World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2025

    Source: World Economic Forum (video statements)

    With Ukraine entering the fourth year since the invasion, attention is turning to whether an end to hostilities could come in 2025. Ukraine’s Victory Plan was presented by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in 2024 as the key framework to achieve a just and lasting peace.

    How should Ukraine and its international partners proceed in the year ahead?

    Speakers: Jens Stoltenberg, Andriy Yermak, Sasha Vakulina

    The 55th Annual Meeting of the World Economic Forum will provide a crucial space to focus on the fundamental principles driving trust, including transparency, consistency and accountability.

    This Annual Meeting will welcome over 100 governments, all major international organizations, 1000 Forum’s Partners, as well as civil society leaders, experts, youth representatives, social entrepreneurs, and news outlets.

    The World Economic Forum is the International Organization for Public-Private Cooperation. The Forum engages the foremost political, business, cultural and other leaders of society to shape global, regional and industry agendas. We believe that progress happens by bringing together people from all walks of life who have the drive and the influence to make positive change.

    World Economic Forum Website ► http://www.weforum.org/
    Facebook ► https://www.facebook.com/worldeconomicforum/
    YouTube ► https://www.youtube.com/wef
    Instagram ► https://www.instagram.com/worldeconomicforum/
    X ► https://twitter.com/wef
    LinkedIn ► https://www.linkedin.com/company/world-economic-forum
    TikTok ► https://www.tiktok.com/@worldeconomicforum
    Flipboard ► https://flipboard.com/@WEF

    #Davos2025 #WorldEconomicForum #wef25

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aXaFbz4o58k

    MIL OSI Video

  • MIL-OSI China: Zelensky: Ukraine, US preparing for talks on Friday

    Source: China State Council Information Office 3

    This photo taken on Aug. 15, 2024 shows a Ukrainian tank destroyed during Russian attacks in Toretsk. [Photo/Xinhua]

    Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said Wednesday that U.S. and Ukrainian teams are preparing for negotiations on Friday.

    In his evening address, Zelensky said he will meet U.S. President Donald Trump.

    The minerals partnership agreement, support for Ukraine and security guarantees will be on the agenda of the potential meeting, Zelensky said.

    “It is important to me and to all of us around the world that the U.S.’s aid is not stopped. Strength is essential on the path to peace,” he said.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI China: UK PM makes defense pledge before US trip

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    British Prime Minister Keir Starmer delivers a speech during 2024 Labour Party Conference in Liverpool, Britain, Sept. 24, 2024. [Photo/Xinhua]

    United Kingdom Prime Minister Keir Starmer was set to meet United States President Donald Trump in Washington on Thursday after having pledged to increase British defense spending in the face of what he called a “generational” security challenge.

    The decision to raise military expenditure to 2.5 percent of GDP by 2027, and 3 percent by 2033, was announced on Tuesday, with Starmer saying he had “hard choices” to make in ensuring that the “defense and security of the British people must always come first”.

    But his decision to partly fund it by a cut in overseas aid has been criticized by charities and some members of his own governing Labour Party.

    “Through those choices, as hard as they are, we must also seek unity — a whole society effort that will reach into the lives, the industries, and the homes of the British people,” Starmer explained.

    The timing of the announcement was notable, coming as it did just before his visit to the White House and at a time when security links between Europe and the U.S. are under great strain.

    U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth welcomed Starmer’s decision, calling it a “strong step from an enduring partner”.

    Trump has long been critical of European members of the NATO military alliance for not contributing enough to the communal defense budget. The current requirement, met by most members, is for 2 percent of GDP to be spent on defense, but Trump has said it should be as high as 5 percent, even though the U.S. itself is currently only the third-highest proportionally contributing member nation, with 3.37 percent of its GDP.

    According to data from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, in 2023 the UK was the world’s fifth-largest international aid donor.

    Writing in The Guardian newspaper, Foreign Minister David Lammy insisted the “most vital programs in the world’s worst conflict zones of Ukraine, Gaza, and Sudan” would not be affected, “but there can be no hiding from the fact that many programs doing vital work will have to be put on hold”.

    Former Labour Party foreign secretary David Miliband, who is now head of the International Rescue Committee charity, called the aid cut “a blow to Britain’s proud reputation as a global humanitarian and development leader”, while Nick Dearden, director of campaign group Global Justice Now, said it was “a day of shame for Britain” with the move being taken “to appease Trump”.

    The United Nations children’s agency UNICEF and the charity Oxfam were also heavily critical of the decision, while Labour Party member of parliament Sarah Champion, who is chair of the parliamentary International Development Select Committee, spoke out against her own party leader, saying: “Aid vs defense isn’t a realistic narrative for keeping the world safe.”

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI China: Ukraine adopts measures for signing minerals partnership agreement with US

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal announced Wednesday that his government adopted a set of measures needed for signing the minerals partnership agreement with the United States, the Interfax-Ukraine news agency reported.

    “Today the government is making decisions necessary for signing an agreement between Ukraine and the United States,” Shmyhal said.

    Under the agreement, Ukraine and the United States are set to establish a joint investment fund which will be co-owned and co-managed by both governments, Shmyhal said.

    He emphasized that Ukrainian mineral resources will remain the property of Ukraine and will not be transferred to the U.S. ownership.

    According to the deal, Ukraine will contribute 50 percent of its future revenues from its natural resources to the fund, while the United States will provide funds to support Ukraine’s recovery.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI China: Russian, US officials to meet for work of embassies

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    Russian and U.S. officials will meet in Türkiye’s Istanbul on Thursday to discuss issues concerning the operation of their two countries’ embassies, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov announced in Doha on Wednesday at a press conference.

    Lavrov said the meeting would focus on creating better conditions for diplomatic missions in both countries and addressing rows over staffing levels and properties of the missions.

    The agenda for the upcoming meeting, as explained by Lavrov, indicates that the two sides will first seek to remove technical barriers to diplomatic relations before moving toward other ambitious goals.

    The top Russian diplomat also emphasized Moscow’s efforts to end the conflict with Ukraine, noting that dialogue between concerned parties would contribute to achieving a ceasefire.

    Lavrov arrived Tuesday night in Doha for a visit, as part of his Middle East working trip. Following his meeting with Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, Lavrov stated that their discussions focused on the latest developments in the Middle East, particularly in the Palestinian territories and Syria.

    “We have emphasized to the United Nations the need to lift sanctions on Syria, as they are harming the Syrian people. We know that the current Syrian administration is ready to cooperate and stabilize the situation in the country in a balanced manner,” Lavrov said.

    He also warned that the displacement of Palestinians would turn the regional situation into a ticking time bomb.

    In addition, the talks between Lavrov and the emir touched on bilateral relations and cooperation in energy and investment, according to a statement by the Emiri Diwan, the administrative office of the Qatari emir.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Durbin Announces Murkowski As New Cosponsor Of Bill To Grant Ukrainians Already In The U.S. Temporary Guest Status

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Illinois Dick Durbin
    February 26, 2025
    WASHINGTON – Following the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, U.S. Senate Democratic Whip Dick Durbin (D-IL), Ranking Member of the Senate Judiciary Committee and Co-Chair of the Senate Ukraine Caucus, announced U.S. Senator Lisa Murkowski (R-AK) is a cosponsor of his Protecting our Guests During Hostilities in Ukraine Act, legislation that would provide temporary guest status to Ukrainians and their immediate family members who are already in the United States through the “Uniting for Ukraine” parole process. The bill allows Ukrainians to stay and work in the U.S. until the Secretary of State determines that hostilities in Ukraine have ceased and it is safe for them to return. In addition to Murkowski, U.S. Senators Tammy Duckworth (D-IL), Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), Jacky Rosen (D-NV), Chris Van Hollen (D-MD), Peter Welch (D-VT), Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), Michael Bennet (D-CO), Alex Padilla (D-CA), and Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI) are cosponsors of the legislation.
    “Three years ago, Putin began his brutal, criminal, full-scale invasion of Ukraine—which remains on the frontlines of democracy and transatlantic security,” said Durbin. “When the war started, Americans across the country opened their hearts and communities to Ukrainians fleeing Russian aggression. Both Republicans and Democrats petitioned President Biden to protect them from deportation. I’m glad Senator Murkowski joined my legislation to ensure Ukrainians lawfully present in the U.S. have temporary guest status until conditions in Ukraine are safe for return. I hope others will follow her lead.”
    “I have had the opportunity to visit with many Ukrainians who fled Russia’s unprovoked war who have found safety and community in Alaska. These families—and the Alaskans and Alaskan businesses who have supported and employed them—have expressed their strong desire to remain and work here,” said Murkowski. “Granting temporary guest status for Ukrainians already in the United States achieves this goal. As the war enters its fourth year, we must continue to provide the Ukrainians who have taken refuge in the U.S. a safe haven to weather the storm.”
    The individuals included in the bill already underwent rigorous vetting to ensure that they present no criminal or public safety risks. The legislation would also allow the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to revoke this temporary status if new information raises such concerns about any individual. Bill text can be found here.  
    The following organizations endorsed the Protecting our Guests During Hostilities in Ukraine Act: Refugee Council USA; Chin Association of Maryland; HIAS; World Relief; Center for Gender & Refugee Studies; Human Rights First; Church World Service; International Refugee Assistance Project; Global Refuge; Boat People SOS; Center for Victims of Torture; Jesuit Refugee Service; and Veterans forAmerican Ideals.
    -30-

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI China: Zelensky says Ukraine, US preparing for talks on Friday

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said Wednesday that U.S. and Ukrainian teams are preparing for negotiations on Friday.

    In his evening address, Zelensky said he will meet U.S. President Donald Trump.

    The minerals partnership agreement, support for Ukraine and security guarantees will be on the agenda of the potential meeting, Zelensky said.

    “It is important to me and to all of us around the world that the U.S.’s aid is not stopped. Strength is essential on the path to peace,” he said.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Short-term Policy Responses to Geoeconomic Shocks in CESEE Countries

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    Speech by Alfred Kammer, Director, IMF European Department, Amsterdam, February 14, 2025

    February 26, 2025

    It is a great pleasure to open this session.

    Let me begin by setting the stage for what I hope will be an insightful discussion on short-term policy responses to geoeconomic shocks. I will focus on the Central, Eastern, and South Eastern European (CESEE) countries.

    The CESEE region experienced a respectable recovery last year with growth accelerating from 0.8 percent in 2023 to 2.5 percent in 2024.

    As expected, the composition of growth changed. Domestic demand (consumption and investment) rebounded, while net exports—which had been a key driver in 2023—turned into a drag.

    Supportive fiscal policies at both the national and EU level played a role alongside a strong labor market and disinflation aided by tight monetary policy.

    However, the growth momentum is weakening.

    Geoeconomic fragmentation, linked to both Russia’s war in Ukraine and trade policy uncertainty, is weighing on demand.

    In my remarks today, I will address three key questions:

    • How much can the CESEE region rely on domestic and external demand for a continuation of the cyclical recovery into 2025?
    • How well-prepared is the region to handle external demand challenges arising from geoeconomic fragmentation? And,
    • What can policymakers do in the short term?

    Let me start with the first question.

    How much can the CESEE region rely on domestic and external demand to support growth in 2025?

    Our baseline forecast assumes moderate growth in 2025 at around 3 percent, supported by some remaining pent-up demand.

    However, the cyclical recovery has largely run its course for three reasons.

    • First, the recovery in household spending is nearly complete. While strong wage and income growth initially supported consumption, momentum is fading as wage growth slows alongside inflation. Additionally, upward shift in uncertainty has also raised precautionary savings, dampening spending. This is unlikely to change anytime soon.
    • Second, business investment is not expected to accelerate further. Despite improved financing conditions from less restrictive monetary policy, firms remain cautious due to diminished growth expectations and uncertainty about trade policies and EU reforms.
    • Third, external demand remains weak, limiting the region’s ability to rely on exports for additional growth.

    Let me add two more observations:

    Not all CESEE countries face the same challenges.

    Albania, Croatia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, will continue to benefit from remittances, EU support, and tourism revenues, offering them some insulation from external risks.

    However, others will be impacted by the effects of the strong nominal wage growth over the last few years.

    • For one, minimum wage increases are unlikely to be repeated. More broadly, household incomes will grow much more slowly in 2025 as wage negotiations follow inflation, which is slowing down.
    • In addition, like elsewhere, households have changed their savings behavior and are spending less out of their earned income, likely due to the lingering memory of recent income shocks and uncertainty about external developments.

    Taken together this means that with a few exceptions the region’s recovery momentum is weakening.

    Let me now turn to the second question.

    How well-prepared is the region to handle external demand challenges arising from geoeconomic fragmentation?

    The region faces three key vulnerabilities in the face of geoeconomic fragmentation:

    One, rising labor and high energy costs are eroding competitiveness.

    Two, high trade openness and deep integration into global value chains—once advantages during globalization—now heighten exposure to external demand shocks in times of de-globalization, and

    Three, there is limited room from returning to accommodative macroeconomic policies.

    Let me start with a word on cost competitiveness.

    Export growth has stalled across the region with net exports subtracting about ½ percentage point from GDP growth last year.

    Several adverse cost developments weigh now on CESEE’s competitiveness:

    • Energy costs in Europe remain significantly higher than in the US—nearly five times more for natural gas and more than double for electricity (CHART).
    • The level of labor costs is becoming a headwind. The real effective exchange rate (REER) relative to unit labor costs (CHART) has deteriorated for the region.
    • Additional wage increases and persistently higher energy prices could translate into higher production costs and, eventually, higher final prices—just as external demand conditions are weakening.

    These cost pressures have significant economic implications. If the REER continues to appreciate by 2 percentage points per year, as observed over the past five years, export growth could be dampened by approximately 0.6-0.8 percentage points per year.

     

    Beyond costs, the CESEE region’s integration into global value-chains and trade linkages create exposure to shifting trade dynamics.

    A recent IMF study shows that Chinese EV imports could have very large GDP effects on CESEE countries through the supply chain.

    For example, the estimated negative impact on Hungary and the Czech Republic from a shift to EVs is about 10 times larger than in advanced European economies, reducing GDP by 1.5 to 2.0 percent (cumulatively) over 5 years. For these countries and sectors to adjust, retaining cost competitiveness plays an important factor. 

    Now to the third question:

    What can policymakers do in the short term?

    After waves of external shocks, reducing uncertainty through clear communication is crucial. Governments should focus on reinforcing fundamentals, pursuing credible and sustainable macroeconomic policies, and building resilience.

    Fiscal consolidation is necessary, but it is not sufficient.

    Despite the recovery, fiscal balances have not improved (LHS) and long-term fiscal spending needs remain high [RHS]. They are mostly aging-related (health and pensions), security related (defense) and climate-related.

    An important discussion to be had is on the next EU budget, including on expenditures on European public goods, such as defense and the environment.

    Monetary policy needs to move cautiously in removing its restrictive stance.

    While weakening of external demand is likely to be disinflationary (barring sharp currency depreciations), inflation persistence remains a concern. This is especially the case in countries where inflation expectations remain above inflation targets (RHS) and where sustained wage growth is not supported by productivity gains.

    Growth-oriented reforms and moderation in public sector wage raises—serving as signals to the private sector—are key.

    Two observations on the role of central banks:

    • Effective communication is crucial. Given the uncertainty, central banks must clearly communicate policy intentions to steer expectations. To clarify policy responses sensitivity analyses or scenarios are useful.
    • Maintaining central bank independence is essential. Pressures on institutional independence have risen in several countries. Research shows that lower trust in central banks increases the costs of achieving price stability, a risk that the region cannot afford.

    And last but not least in terms of policy priorities, countries need to accelerate structural reforms, to raise their growth potential and strengthen economic resilience.

    We are currently undertaking new work on assessing national structural reform priorities across Europe. (This complements work on what can be done at the EU level).

    This work finds that the CESEE region lags behind its European and global peers in almost all areas (see chart).

    Governance and trade-related barriers are two areas where gaps are large. Similarly, credit and capital markets remain underdeveloped notwithstanding healthy banking sectors.

    These gaps limit growth potential but can be addressed with limited fiscal costs. Targeted reforms could unlock investment and long-term competitiveness gains.

    Thank you.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER:

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/02/26/022625-Alfred-Amsterdam

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI USA News: Remarks by President Trump Before Cabinet Meeting

    Source: The White House

    class=”has-text-align-center”>Cabinet Room

    11:42 A.M. EST

         THE PRESIDENT:  Okay.  Thank you very much.  We appreciate you being here.  And we’ve put together a great Cabinet.  And we’ve had tremendous success.  We’ve been given a lot of credit for having a very successful first month, and we want to make that many months — and years, actually.  But we’re going to have many good months, and we’re going to have many good years, I hope.  And we’re going to solve a lot of problems. 

         We’re doing very well with Russia-Ukraine.  President Zelenskyy is going to be coming on Friday.  It’s now confirmed.  And we’re going to be signing an agreement, which will be a very big agreement.  And I want to thank Howard and Scott for the job you guys did in putting it together.  Really did an amazing job.  And that’ll be on rare earth and other things. 

         And as you know, we’re in for, probably, $350 billion and Europe is in for $100 billion.  And that’s a big difference.  So, we’re in for, probably, three times as much.  And yet, it’s very important to everybody, but Europe is very close.  We have a big ocean separating us.  So, it’s very important for Europe.  And they, hopefully, will step up and do maybe more than they’re doing and maybe a lot more.

         The previous administration put us in a very bad position, but we’ve been able to make a deal where we’re going to get our money back and we’re going to get a lot of money in the future.  And I think that’s appropriate, because we have taxpayers that are — shouldn’t be footing the bill, and they shouldn’t be footing the bill at more than the Europeans are paying. 

         So, it’s all been worked out.  We’re happy about it.  And I think that, very importantly, we’re going to be able to make a deal. 

         Most importantly, by far, we’re going to make a deal with Russia and Ukraine to stop killing people.  They’ll stop killing young Russian soldiers and young Ukrainian soldiers and other people, in addition, in the towns and cities.  And we will consider that a very important thing and a big accomplishment, because it was going nowhere until this administration came in.  They hadn’t spoken to President Putin in two years.  And so, we’ll keep you advised.

         Before we begin the Cabinet, I’d like to have Scott

    and a couple of people say a few things.  But most importantly — where are you?

         SECRETARY TURNER:  I’m right here, sir.

         THE PRESIDENT:  This is a gentleman who’s going places — the head of HUD.  And he’s going to say — you all know him.  And you’re going to say grace —

         SECRETARY TURNER:  Yes, sir.

         THE PRESIDENT:  — and then we’ll have our meeting, right?

    SECRETARY TURNER:  Yes.

         THE PRESIDENT:  Thank you very much. 

         SECRETARY TURNER:  Thank you, Mr. President.  Let’s pray.

         Father, we thank you for this awesome privilege, Father, to be in your presence.  God, thank you that you’ve allowed us to see this day.  The Bible says that your mercies are new every morning.  And, Father God, we give you the glory and the honor.  Thank you, God, for President Trump, Father, for appointing us.  Father God, thank you for anointing us to do this job.  Father, we pray you’ll give the president and the vice president wisdom, Father God, as they lead. 

         Father, I pray for all of my colleagues that are here around the table and in this room.  Lord God, we pray that we would lead with a righteous clarity, Father God, and as we serve the people of this country and every perspective agency, every job that we have, Father, we would humble ourselves before you that we would lead in a manner that you’ve called us to lead and to serve. 

         Father, the Bible says the blessed is the nation whose God is the Lord.  But, Father, we today honor you.  And in your rightful place, Father, thank you for giving us this opportunity to restore faith in this country and be a blessing to the people of America.  And, Lord God, today in our meeting, we pray that you will be glorified in our conversation.
        
         In Jesus’ name, amen.

         PARTICIPANTS:  Amen.

         THE PRESIDENT:  Scott, that was a very good job you did.  You’ve done that before, haven’t you?  (Laughter.)  Wow. 

         So, Scott Turner is a terrific young guy.  He’s heading up HUD, and he’s going to make us all very proud, right?

         SECRETARY TURNER:  Thank you, Mr. President.  Yes, sir.

         THE PRESIDENT:  Thank you very much.  Great job. 

         In just over one month, illegal border crossings have plummeted by numbers that nobody has actually ever seen before.  It’s much more than 100 percent. 

    And we’ve unleashed American energy at levels that will soon be reported, but we think we’re going to get it going very quickly.  We have incredible people on the energy front. 

    I think we have really great people on every front.  I’ll let you know if they’re not good, but I think they really are. 

    And we’re fighting every day to get the prices down.  The inflation is stopping slowly, but part of the reason it’s stopping is because of high interest rates and other problems that we inherited.  But we have to get the prices down — not the inflation down — the prices of eggs and various other things.  Eggs are a disaster. 

         The secretary of Agriculture is going to be showing you a chart that’s actually mindboggling what’s happened — how low they were with us and how high they are now.  But I think we can do something about it —

         SECRETARY ROLLINS:  Yes, sir.

         THE PRESIDENT:  — Madam Secretary.

         SECRETARY ROLLINS:  Yes, sir.

         THE PRESIDENT:  And I think you’re going to do a fantastic job in that position. 

    One of the most important initiatives is DOGE, and we have cut billions and billions and billions of dollars.  We’re looking to get it maybe to a trillion dollars.  If we can do that, we’re going to start getting to be at a point where we can think in terms of balancing budgets, believe it or not, something you haven’t heard in many, many years — decades, actually.  And it’s a big — whether it’s this year or next year, I think we’ll be very close to balancing budgets.  And the DOGE is very important. 

    And Elon is here to give you a summary of what’s happening, some of the things they found — some of the horrible things they found — some of the theft and fraud, and we call it waste and abuse, but a lot of fraud, and probably some fraud that we’re not going to be able to prove is fraud, but when you hear the names and the places where this money is going, it’s a disgrace. 

         But we’ve requested that a lot of people — we want to make sure that the people are working.  So, letters were sent out, and I think everyone at this table is very much behind it.  And if they aren’t, I’d want them to speak up.  But they’re very much behind it. 

         Letters were sent out to people just to find out, if the people exist, do they work?  Who do they work for?  Where are they?  You know, where have they been working?  Have they been working for other companies or other entities at all and being paid by the government, so they have two jobs, but they’re supposed to have one? 

    And the letter asks some simple questions like, “What have you done lately?”  And if they can answer that — because I can.  I can tell you everything I’ve done for the last long period of time — a lot more than a week. 

    And in many cases, we haven’t gotten responses.  Usually that means that maybe that person doesn’t exist or that person doesn’t want to say they’re working for another company while being paid by the United States government. 

    So, there’s a lot of interesting things.  It’s very unique, but we have a very unique situation because we have a lot of people that were scamming our country.  We have a lot of dishonest people.  We have a lot of people that took advantage of a lot of different situations, and we’re not going to let that happen. 

    So, I’m going to ask, if it’s possible, to have Elon get up first and talk about DOGE, because it seems to be of great interest to everyone. 

    I will say that there is a large group of people in this country that have such admiration for what we’re doing.  I got elected with a tremendous vote — winning every swing state, winning the popular vote, winning the counties by thousands of counties.  I think it was 2,800 to 500.  2,800 counties to 500 counties.  Think of that. 

    And so, we have a mandate to do this, and this is part of the reason I got elected.  I got elected based on taxes and based on many things, the border, but also based on balancing budgets and getting our country back into shape, and this is a big part of it. 

    So, Elon, if you could get up and explain where you are, how you’re doing, and how much we’re cutting.  And it’s an honor to have you.  He’s been a tremendously successful guy.  He’s really working so hard.  And he’s got businesses to run.  And in many ways, they say, “How do you do this?”  And, you know, he’s sacrificing a lot and — getting a lot of praise, I’ll tell you, but he’s also getting hit.  And we would expect that, and that’s the way it works. 

    So, I’d like to have Elon Musk please say a few words.

         MR. MUSK:  Well, tha- — thank you —
        
         THE PRESIDENT:  Thank you, Elon.

    MR. MUSK:  Thank you, Mr. President.  Well, I a- — I actually just call myself humble tech support here — (laughter) — because this is actually — as crazy as it sounds, that — that is almost a literal description of the work that the DOGE team is doing is helping fix the government computer systems.  Many of these systems are extremely old.  They don’t communicate.  There are a lot of mistakes in the systems.  The software doesn’t work.  The — so, we are actually tech support.  It’s — it’s a — it’s ironic, but it’s true.

    The — the overall goal here with the DOGE team is to help address the enormous deficit.  We simply cannot sustain, as a country, $2 trillion deficits.  The interest rates — just the interest on the national debt now exceeds the Defense Department spending. 

    We spend a lot on the Defense Department, but we’re spending, like, over a trillion dollars on interest.  If this continues, the country will go — become de facto bankrupt.  It’s — it’s not an optional thing.  It is an essential thing.  That — that’s — that’s the reason I’m here and taking a lot of flak and getting a lot of death threats, by the way.  I can, like, stack them up, you know.

    But if we don’t do this, America will go bankrupt.  That’s why it has to be done.  And I’m confident, at this point — knock on wood, you know — knock on my wooden head — (laughter) — the — there’s a lot of wood up there — that we can actually find a trillion dollars in savings.  That would be roughly 15 percent of the $7 trillion budget.

    And obviously, that can only be done with the support of everyone in this room.  And I’d like to thank everyone for — for your support.  Thank you very much this.  This — this can only be done with — with your support.

    So, this is — it’s really — DOGE is a support function for the president and for the — the agencies and departments to help achieve those savings and to effect- — effectively find 15 percent in reduction in fraud and — and waste.

    And — and we bring the receipts.  So, people say, like, “Well, is this real?”  Just go to DOGE.gov.  We l- — we — line item by line item, we specify each item.  So — and w- — and I — I should say, we — also, we will make mistakes.  We won’t be perfect.  But when we make mistake, we’ll fix it very quickly. 

    So, for example, with USAID, one of the things we accidentally canceled, very briefly, was Ebola — Ebola prevention.  I think we all wanted Ebola prevention.  So, we restored the Ebola prevention immediately, and there was no interruption.

    But we do need to move quickly if we’re — if we’re to achieve a trillion-dollar deficit reduction in tw- — in — in financial year 2026.  It requires saving $4 billion per day, every day from now through the end of September.  But we can do it, and we will do it.

    Thank you. 

    THE PRESIDENT:  Well, do you have any questions of Elon while we’re on the subject of DOGE?  Because we’ll finish off with that.  And if you would have any questions, please ask — you could ask me or Elon.

    Go ahead, please. 

    Q    Thank you, Mr. President.  Thank you, Mr. Musk.  I just wanted to ask you, the — President Trump put out a Truth Social today saying that everybody in the Cabinet was — was happy with you.  I just wondered if that — if you had heard otherwise, and if you had heard anything about members of the Cabinet who weren’t happy with the way things were going.  And if so, what are you doing to address those — any dissatisfaction?

    MR. MUSK:  To the best of —

    THE PRESIDENT:  Hey, Elon, let the Cabinet speak just for a second.  (Laughter.) 

         Is anybody unhappy with Elon?  If you are, we’ll throw them out of here.  (Laughter.)  Is anybody unhappy?  (Applause.)

    They are — they have a lot of respect for Elon and that he’s doing this.  And some disagree a little bit, but I will tell you, for the most part, I think everyone is not only happy, they’re thrilled. 

    So, go ahead, Elon.

    SECRETARY ROLLINS:  And grateful.

    MR. MUSK:  And President Trump has put together, I think, the best cabinet ever, literally.  So, I — and I do not give false praise.  This — this is an incredible group of people.  I don’t think such a talented team has actually ever been assembled.  I think it’s literally the best cabinet that the country has ever had.  And I think the companies should be incredibly appreciative of the people in this room.

    Q    Mr. President —

    THE PRESIDENT:  Please.  Yeah.  Go ahead.

    Q    Mr. President, thank you.  Mr. Musk.  Are there — about half of the government employees so far appear to have responded to your request for what they’ve been doing over the past week.  Is there a timeline in place for next moves for people being fired?  And when can the American people expect to see results from that?

    MR. MUSK:  Yes.  Well, to be — to be clear, like, the — I think that email, perhaps, was misinterpreted as a performance review, but actually it was a pulse check review.  “Do you have a pulse?”  (Laughter.)  “Do you have a pulse and two neurons?”  (Laughter.)  So, if you have a pulse and two neurons, you can reply to an email.

    This is, you know, I think, not a high bar, is what I’m saying.  This is a — should be — anyone could accomplish this. 

    But what we are trying to get to the bottom of is we think there are a number of people on the government payroll who are dead, which is probably why they can’t respond, and — and some people who are not real people, like they’re literally fictional individuals that are collecting payche- — well, somebody is collecting paychecks on a fictional individual.  So, we’re just literally trying to figure out are these people real, are they alive, and can they write an email, which I think is a reasonable expectation for the Amer- — you know, the American public would have at least that expectation of someone in the public sector.

    Q    Mr. Musk —

    Q    Mr. Musk —

    Q    — roughly a million employees —

    MR. MUSK:  (Laughs.)  This is not a — this is not a high bar, guys.  Come on.  (Laughter.)

    Q    Roughly a million employees have responded so far to this email.  Does that mean that the remaining 1 million or so federal employees now risk being terminated?  And is it your understanding and expectation when you post a directive on X that the Cabinet secretaries will follow that order?  Because several agencies have instructed employees that this is voluntary or not to respond.

    MR. MUSK:  Yeah.  Well, I mean, to be cl — so, I guess there was a — like, last week, the president en- — encouraged me, via Truth Social and also via phone call, to be more aggressive.  And I was like, “Okay.”  You know, “Yes, sir, Mr. President.  We will indeed do that.”  The president is the commander in chief.  I — I do what the president asks.

    So — and I said, “Can we send out an email to everyone, just saying, ‘What did you get done last week?’”  The president said yes.  So, I — I did that. 

    And, you know, we — we got a partial response.  But we — we’re going to send another email.  But we — our — our goal is not to be capricious or — or unfair.  It’s — we want to give people every opportunity to send an email and the email could simply be “What I’m working on is too sensitive or classified to — to describe.”  Like, literally, just re- — that would be sufficient.  We’re — we’re — you know, I think this is just common sense. 

    Q    And what is your target number for — for how many workers, employees you’re looking to cut total?

    MR. MUSK:  We — we wish to keep everyone who is doing a job that is essential and doing that job well.  But if — if they’re — if the job is not essential or they’re not doing the job well, they obviously should not be on the public payroll. 

    (Cross-talk.)

    THE PRESIDENT:  No, I have to — I would like to add —

    (Cross-talk.)

    Wait a minute.  Wait.  Wait.  I’d like to add that those million people that haven’t responded, though, Elon, they are on the bubble.  You know, I wouldn’t say that we’re thrilled about it.  You know, they haven’t responded.  Now, maybe they don’t exist.  Maybe we’re paying people that don’t exist.

    Don’t forget, we just got here.  This group just got here.  But those people are on the bubble, as they say.  You know, maybe they’re going to be gone.  Maybe they’re not around.  Maybe they have other jobs.  Maybe they moved and they’re not where they’re supposed to be.  A lot of things could have happened.

    I wouldn’t say that Biden ran a very tight administration.  They spent money like nobody has ever spent money before, wasted money — the Green New Scam, all of the different things they spent money on. 

    And you’ve seen that.  You’ve seen that with some of the things that I read in speeches.  I read them, and people can’t believe, when I read them, $20 million here, $30 million here for, you know, a little educational course on something.  Circumcision, right?  Circumcision.  $20 million to inform the people of such-and-such a country on other things and other things other than that.

    So, yeah, those people are — right now, we’re trying to find out who those people are that haven’t responded.  Now, there’ll be some agencies — like Marco has people within State that are right now doing very classified, very confidential work.  And we understand that, and we’ve talked.  And, you know, we’re being a little more surgical. 

    And Marco is doing a lot of things himself.  He’s — and some of the secretaries are.  We’re going to be going to them.  We’re going to be talking about it today.  We’re going to ask them to do their own DOGE.  In other words, they’ll look in their group and who —

    I spoke with Lee Zeldin, and he thinks he’s going to be cutting 65 or so percent of the people from Environmental, and we’re going to speed up the process, too, at the same time.  He had a lot of people that weren’t doing their job — they were just obstructionists — and a lot of people that didn’t exist, I guess, Lee, too.  You found a lot of empty spots that the people weren’t there.  They didn’t exist.

    And I think Education is going to be one of those.  You go around Washington, you see all these buildings — the Department of Education.  We want to move education back to the states, where it belongs.  Iowa should have education.  Indiana should run their own education.  You’re going to see education go way up.

    Right now, we’re ranked at the very bottom of the list, but we’re at the top of the list in one thing: the cost per pupil.  We spend more money per pupil than any other country in the world, and yet it’s Denmark and Norway, Sweden.  And I — you hate to say this — and, you know, we’re going to get along very well with China, but it’s a competitor: They’re at the top of the list.  They’re among the top 10, usually.  And they’re a very big country, so we can’t use that as an excuse — right? — because we’re a very big country too.

    But we’re – we were ranked last time — under Biden, we were ranked 40 out of 40.  They do the 40 certain nations that they’ve done for a long time.  It seems to be 40, for whatever reason.  And we were ranked number 40.  A year ago, we were 38.  Then we were 39.  We’re — we hit 40.  And so, we’re last in that, and we’re first in cost per pupil.  So, I would say that’s unacceptable.

    Lawrence, do you have something?  Go ahead.

    Q    So, Mr. President, I know you like competition, and I know it’s early.  So, which department are you most impressed with? 

    And then, to Mr. Mu- — (laughter).  That’s the first one.  And, Mr. Musk, which department have you received the most resistance from? 

         Mr. President, you first.

    THE PRESIDENT:  Well, I think both of those questions are a little bit — well, you’re a pretty controversial guy.  (Laughter.)  Look, it’s very early.  Right now, I think I’m impressed with everybody.  So far, everybody.  If I wasn’t, in the first month, we’d — and some of them just got here.  They just got approved two days ago, right?

    But I think I’m very impressed with everybody.  So far, I’m very happy with all of the choices.

    I think that Elon has done incredibly with some groups.  And some groups are much easier than others.  It is true: State is a, you know, very difficult situation.  We’re right now negotiating very successfully, I think, with Russia and with Ukraine, and we have a lot of countries involved.  And we have to be a little bit careful what we do and who we’re terminating.  But Marco is doing that very — I think he’s going to be very precise.  It’s going to be —

    We’re cutting down government.  We’re cutting down the size of government.  We have to.  We’re bloated.  We’re sloppy.  We have a lot of people that aren’t doing their job.  We have a lot of people that don’t exist. 

         You look at Social Security as an example.  I mean, you have so many people in Social Security where, if you believe it, they’re 200 years old.  And what we’re doing is finding out: Are checks going out for that and is somebody cashing those checks who’s maybe 35 years old?  Okay? 

         So, there’s a lot of dishonesty.  There’s a lot of fraud. 

         But I think at this moment, I’ll take Elon off the spot.  I think that he’s impressed — he said it very well –better than I can say it — that he’s impressed with the people in this room.  Very impressed.  And I am too.  And it’s too early to say, but I think everybody is on board.  They all know — we want to balance a budget.  We want to have a balanced budget within a reasonably short period of time, meaning maybe by next year or the year after, but maybe — maybe even sooner than that. 

         Q    Mr. President, your — your number one issue was the border.  We just got new information that they’re doxing our federal agents.  They’re putting their personal information out there, these activists, and they’re disrupting the operations.  So, you got Tren de Aragua running all across the country —

         THE PRESIDENT:  Well, we have activists.  That’s true.  And a lot of those —

         Q    So, what are we going to do about the activists —

         THE PRESIDENT:  Yeah.  A lot of those activists are acting illegally.  And we’ll give that to our attorney general, and she’ll take a look at that very strongly.  But we’re also having tremendous support from Border Patrol, from ICE.  The ICE agents have been unbelievable.  Border Patrol — their leadership at Border Patrol has been incredible, and they’re working very well. 

         And, as you know — and I saw you reporting it this morning, actually — we set records on the least number of illegal aliens coming in, migrants coming into our country that we’ve had in more than 50 years.  And we did this all within a period of weeks, because we took over a mess.  The world was pouring in.  And remember, they were coming in from jails and prisons and mental institutions and insane asylums, and they were gang members and drug dealers.  Anybody who wanted to come in, they came.  And from not just South America, from all over the world.  So, it’s amazing what they’ve done. 

         And Kristi and — and Tom Homan, the job they’ve done has been absolutely amazing.  We set records for — and we want people to come into our country, by the way, but they want to come in — they have to come in legally. 

         I want that to be really understood.  We want people in our country, but they have to come in legally. 

         Q    Can I follow on that, Mr. President?

    Q    Mr. President.

    Q    About the — the Trump gold card idea —

         THE PRESIDENT:  Yeah.

         Q    — that you unveiled yesterday.

         THE PRESIDENT:  I hope you liked it.  (Laughter.)

         Q    I await more information.  But the question is: Does this reflect a view, on your part, that the American immigration system has never been properly monetized as you feel it should be?
        

         THE PRESIDENT:  Well, not so much monetized.  It hasn’t been properly run.  I get calls from, as an example, companies where they want to hire the number one student at a school.  A person comes from India, China, Japan, lots of different places, and they go to Harvard, the Wharton School of Finance.  They go to Yale.  They go to all great schools.  And they graduate number one in their class, and they are made job offers, but the offer is immediately rescinded because you have no idea whether or not that person can stay in the country.  I want to be able to have that person stay in the country. 

         These companies can go and buy a gold card, and they can use it as a matter of recruitment. 

         At the same time, the company is using that money to pay down debt.  We’re going to — we’re going to pay down a lot of debt with that.

         Q    Are they going to have to —

         THE PRESIDENT:  And I think the gold card is going to be used by — not only for that.  I mean, they’ll be used by companies.  I mean, I could see Apple — I’ve spoken with Tim Cook — and, by the way, he’s going to make a $500 billion investment in the country only because of the results of the election and, I think, because of tariffs.  He’s going to want to be in the country because of tariffs.  Because if you’re in the country, there is no tariff.  If you’re out of the country, you got to pay tariffs.  And that’s going to be a great investment, I think, that he’s making.  I know it’s going to be a great investment. 

         But we have to be able to get people in the country, and we want people that are productive people.  And I will tell you, the people that can pay $5 million, they’re going to create jobs.  They’re going to spend a lot of money on jobs.  They’re going to have to pay taxes on that too.  So, they’re going to be hiring people, they’re going to be bringing people in and companies in.  And, I don’t know, maybe it will sell like crazy.  I happen to think it’s going to sell like crazy.  It’s a bargain.

         But we’ll —

         Q    Will they have to commit to a certain number?

         THE PRESIDENT:  — know fairly soon.  I think Howard and — and Scott — a few of you, really, are responsible for it.  But, Howard, if you want to discuss that for a couple of minutes, I think I’d like to have you.  I think it’s going to be a very successful program.

         SECRETARY LUTNICK:  Sure.

         THE PRESIDENT:  This is Commerce.

         SECRETARY LUTNICK:  So, the EB-5 program, which has been around for many years, had investment of a million dollars into projects in America.  And those projects were often suspect, they didn’t really work out, there wasn’t any oversight of it.  And so, for a million-dollar investment, you got a visa, and then you came into the country and ended up with a green card. 

         So, it was poorly overseen, poorly executed.  Then you had our border open, where millions of people came through. 

         So, the idea is we will have a proper business.  We will modify the EB-5 agreement.  Kristi and I are working on it together.  For $5 million, they’ll get a license from the Department of Commerce.  Then they’ll make a proper investment on the EB-5, right?  And we think Scott and I will design the EB-5 investment model, because Scott and I are the best people together to do that.  So, this is joint. 

         This is exactly the Trump administration.  We all work together.  We work it out to be the best.  And if we sell — just remember — 200,000 — there’s a line for EB-5 of 250,000 right now — 200,000 of these gold green cards is $1 trillion

    to pay down our debt, and that’s why the president is doing it, because we are going to balance this budget, and we are going to pay off the debt under President Trump. 

         Q    Mr. —

    Q    And to qualify, do you have to promise and make commitments to create a certain number of jobs here in the U.S.?

         THE PRESIDENT:  No.  No.  Because not all these people are going to be job builders.  They’ll be successful people, or they’ll be people that were hired from colleges, like — sort of like paying an athlete a bonus.  I mean, Apple or one of the companies will go out and they’ll spend five mil- — they’ll buy five of them, and they’re going to get five people. 

         Look, I’ve had the complaint where — I’ve had the complaint from a lot of companies where they go out to hire people, and they can’t hire them b- — out of colleges.  And you know what they do?  They go back to India, or they go back to the country where they came, and they open up a company, and they become billionaires.  They become — and they’re employing thousands and there are a lot of examples. 

    There are some really big examples where they were forced out of the country.  They graduated top in their class at a great school, and they weren’t able to stay.  This is all the time you hear it. 

    And the biggest complaint I get from companies, other than overregulation, which we took care of, but we’re going to have to take care of it here, because a lot of that was put back on by Biden.  But the biggest complaint is the fact that they can’t have any longevity with people.  This way, they have pretty much unlimited longevity. 

    Also, with the $5 million, you know, that’s a path to citizenship.  So, that’s going to be — it’s sort of a green card-plus, and it’s a path to citizenship.  We’re going to call it the gold card.  And I think it’s going to be very treasured.  I think it’s going to do very well.  And we’re going to start selling, hopefully, in about two weeks.

    Now, just so you understand, if we sell a million — right? — a million, that’s $5 trillion.  Five trillion.  Howard was using a different number, but that’s $5 trillion.  If we sell 10 million, which is possible — 10 million highly productive people coming in or people that we’re going to make productive — they’ll be young, but they’re talented, like a talented athlete — that’s $50 trillion. 

    That means our debt is totally paid off, and we have $15 trillion above that.  And — now, I don’t know that we’re going to sell that many.  Maybe we won’t so many at all.  But I think we’re going to sell a lot, because I think there’s — there really is a thirst. 

    No other country can do this, because people don’t want to go to other countries.  They want to come here.  Everybody wants to come here, especially since November 5th.  (Laughter.)

    (Cross-talk.)

    SECRETARY LUTNICK:  They’ll all be vetted, by the way.  All these people will be vetted. 

    Q    How?

    SECRETARY LUTNICK:  Okay?  They’ll be vetted.

    Q    Mr. President, on Ukraine.  Can you talk a lot — a little bit about what type of security guarantees you’re willing to make?

    THE PRESIDENT:  Well, I’m not going to make security guarantees beyond very much.  We’re going to have Europe do that, because it’s in — you know, we’re talking about Europe is their next-door neighbor.  But we’re going to make sure everything goes well. 

    And as you know, we’ll be making a — we’ll be really partnering with Ukraine in terms of rare earth.  We very much need rare earth.  They have great rare earth.  We’ll be working with Secretary Burgum and with Chris.  You’ll be working on that together. 

    And we’re going to be able to have tremendous — I mean, this gives us — because we don’t have that much of it here.  We have some, but we don’t have that much, and we need a lot more to really propel us to the next level of — to lead in every way.  We’re leading right now with AI.  We’re leading with everything right now, but we have to — we need resources. 

    We have to double our electric capacity.  We have to do many things.  We have to really triple, if you think of it, the electric capacity from what we have right now, if you can believe it.  (Laughter.) 

    Q    But will the United States — can I —

    THE PRESIDENT:  So, I just say this.  So, the deal we’re making gets us — it brings us great wealth.  We get back the money that we spent, and we hope that we’re going to be able to settle this up. 

    We want to settle it.  We want to stop — I tell you what.  I’m doing it for two reasons, but the number one reason, by far, is to watch — all these people being killed.  I see pictures every week from — I assume satellite pictures, mostly, but there’s some pictures on site of thousands of soldiers that are being killed.  They’re being decimated, because equipment today — military equipment is so powerful and so devastating.  And, number one, I want to see people stop. 

    And they’re not from here.  They’re from primarily two other countries. 

    And then, by the way, let’s talk about the Middle East.  We got to solve that problem too.  And that’s come a long way.  We’re doing very well in that also.  A lot of things are happening on that.  But I’m watching soldiers being killed — Ukrainian and Russian soldiers being killed.  My number one thing is to get that stopped. 

    My number two thing is I don’t want to have to pay any more money, because we’ve — Biden has spent $350 billion without any chance of getting it back.  Now we’re going to be getting all of that money back, plus a lot more.  And we provided a great thing.  I mean, we’ve provided something very important, and we’ll be working with Ukraine and — because we’ll be taking that — we’re going to be taking what we’re entitled to take. 

    Now, they spent $350 billion, and Europe spent $100 billion.  Now, does anybody really think that’s fair?  But then we find out, a little while ago — not so long ago, a few months ago, I found out that the money they spent, they get back, but the money we spent, we don’t get back.  I said, “Well, we’re going to get it back.” 

    And we’ll be able to make a deal.  And again, President Zelenskyy is coming to sign the deal.  And it’s a great thing.  It’s a great deal for Ukraine, too, because they get us over there, and we’re going to be working over there.  We’ll be on the land.  And, you know, in that way, it’s — there’s sort of automatic security, because nobody’s going to be messing around with our people when we’re there.  And so, we’ll be there in that way. 

    But Europe will be watching it very closely.  I know that UK has said and France has said that they want to put — they volunteered to put so-called peacekeepers on the site.  And I think that’s a good thing.

    (Cross-talk.)

    Q    Mr. President, you had mentioned the high cost of eggs, and we’ve seen consumer confidence this week have a sharp drop from last month — the biggest dip in, I believe, three years.  Why is that — your assessment, why is that the case and is there anything you can do? 

    THE PRESIDENT:  Well, I think that consumer confidence — if you look at confidence in the nation, it had the biggest increase in the history of the chart.  It went up 42 points in a period of, like, days after the election, since the election.  So, since the election, the confidence in our nation — including right track, wrong track — the first time it’s ever happened, where we were on the right track, because this country has been on the wrong track for a long time. 

    So, the confidence in business, confidence in the country has reached an all-time high.  We have never reached levels like we are right now.

    Okay.

    (Cross-talk.)

    Q    Mr. President, you said — Mr. President, you’ve been very clear in saying that as long as you’re president, Iran will never get a nuclear weapon. 

    THE PRESIDENT:  That’s true. 

    Q    Is it also your policy that as long as you’re president, China will never take Taiwan by force?

    THE PRESIDENT:  I never comment on that.  I don’t comment on any — because I don’t want to ever put myself in that position.  And if I said it, I certainly wouldn’t be saying it to you.  I’d be saying it to other people, maybe people around this table — (laughter) — and very specific people around this table.  

    Q    Is it a concern (inaudible)?

    THE PRESIDENT:  So, I don’t want to put myself in that position.  But I can tell you what, I have a great relationship with President Xi.  I’ve had a great relationship with him.  We want them to come in and invest. 

    I see so many things saying that we don’t want China in this country.  That’s not right.  We want them to invest in the United States.  That’s good.  That’s a lot of money coming in.  And we’ll invest in China.  We’ll do things with China. 

    The relationship we’ll have with China would be a very good one.  I see all of these phony reports that we don’t want their money; we don’t want anything to do with them.  That’s wrong. 

    We’re going to have a good relationship with China, but they won’t be able to take advantage of us.  What they did to Biden was — he didn’t know what was happening.  He didn’t know what he was doing.  The administration didn’t know what they were doing.  It was very sad to watch. 

         But we’re going to have a good relationship with China and Russia and Ukraine and the Middle East.  We’re doing things that —

    Look, when I left, we had no wars.  We had defeated ISIS totally.  We had no inflation.  We didn’t have the Afghanistan withdrawal — the worst withdrawal anybody has ever seen.  I think that’s one of the reasons that President Putin looked at that.  He said, “Wow, these guys are a paper tiger.  Look at” — we’re no paper tiger. 

    Don’t forget: We got rid of ISIS in three weeks.  People said it would take five years.  We did it, because when I came in, I let them do what they had to do.  And the man that headed that operation is now going to be your — your chairman, right?

    SECRETARY HEGSETH:  Yes, sir.

    THE PRESIDENT:  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. 

    SECRETARY HEGSETH:  Yes, sir.

    THE PRESIDENT:  And — “Razin” Caine.  I liked him right from the beginning.  As soon as I heard his name, I said, “That’s my guy.” 

    Okay.  Any other questions?

    (Cross-talk.)

    Q    Mr. President, has there been enough de- — decreases in crossings at the border for you to continue the pause on tariffs against Mexico and Canada?  And, if not —

    THE PRESIDENT:  No, no.  I’m going to — I’m not stopping the tariffs, no.  Millions of people have died because of the fentanyl that comes over the border. 

    Q    Even with the 90 percent drop in border crossings, though, this —

    THE PRESIDENT:  Well, that’s — well —

    Q    — last month compared to about a year ago?

    THE PRESIDENT:  Yeah, they’ve been good, but that’s also due to us.  Mostly due to us.  I mean —

    Q    Mr. President —

         Q    Mr. President, on CBS — 

    THE PRESIDENT:  — it’s very hard.  It’s, right now, very hard to come through the border.  But the — look, the damage has been done.  We’ve lost millions of people due to fentanyl.  It comes mostly from China, but it comes through Mexico, and it comes through Canada. 

    Q    Mr. Presi- —

    THE PRESIDENT:  And I have to tell you that, you know, on April 2nd — I was going to do it on April 1st, but I’m a little bit superstitious, so I made it April 2nd — the tariffs go on, not all of them but a lot of them.  And I think you’re going to see something that’s going to be amazing. 

    We’ve been taken advantage of as a country for a long period of time.  We’ve been — we’ve been tariffed, but we didn’t tariff.  Now, I did.  When I was here, I tariffed.  We took in $700 billion from China — $700 billion.  Not one president in this — in the history of our country took in 10 cents from China.  At the same time, China respected us. 

    Now, when COVID came in, that was a different deal.  I used to call it the China virus.  I guess I can call it the China virus again, but, you know, it was — it’s an accurate term, but I won’t do that out of respect to China.  Okay?

    (Cross-talk.)

    Say it again.  What?

    Q    On Gaza.  I just wondered if there’s any progress towards the second phase of the ceasefire that you can tell us about.

    THE PRESIDENT:  Well, I’m very disappointed when I see four — four bodies came in today.  These are young people.  Young people don’t die.  Okay?  Young people don’t die.  These are young people.  Four bodies came in today.  They think they’re doing us a favor by sending us bodies. 

    So, look, that’s a decision that has to be made by Israel, by Bibi, but Israel has to make that decision.  We got a lot of hostages back, but it’s very sad what happened to those people.  I mean, you had a young lady with her hand practically blown off.  You know why it blew up?  Because she put up her hand to try and stop a bullet that was coming her way, and it hit her hand and blew off her fingers, big part of her hand. 

    This is a vicious group of people, and Israel is going to have to decide what they’re doing.  Phase one is going to be ending.  Think of it: Today, they sent in four bodies.  Bodies. 

    And I will say one thing, though.  I’ve spoken to a lot of the parents and a lot of the people involved.  They want those bodies almost as much and maybe even just as much as they wanted their son or their daughter.  Amazing.  “Please, sir.  Please.  My son is dead, but they have his body.  Please can you get it for us?”  They — it’s the biggest thing.  It’s incredible the level — they want the bodies of these people.  They’re dead.  They’re dead. 

    And, you know, when I saw the ones that came in two weeks ago, they looked like they just got out of a concentration camp.  Then, the following week, a group came in, and they weren’t as bad — in as bad of shape.

    But Israel is going to have to make a decision.  You’re right, phase one, and now phase two has started.  And today, we got some, you know, very, very sad — we knew they were dead, by the way.  We knew they were going to be bodies, as opposed to people that were living.  But it’s a very sad situation. 

    At some point, somebody is going to say we got to do something about this.

    (Cross-talk.)

    Q    Mr. President, you were just talking about Afghanistan and the botched withdrawal.  Have all the generals or command staff that were involved with the withdrawal been fired or relieved of duty?

    THE PRESIDENT:  Well, that’s a great idea.  It’s — (laughter) — sorry, I’m not going to tell this man what to do, but I will say that.  If I had his place, I’d fire every single one of them, Pete.  Pete, that’s a very good question. 

    SECRETARY HEGSETH:  Well, it’s a question we’ve thought a lot about.  We’re doing a complete review of every single aspect of what happened with the botched withdrawal of Afghanistan and plan to have full accountability.  It’s one of the first things we announced at the Defense Department for that reason, sir. 

    Certainly General “Razin” Caine, who’s on his way in, was not a part of that.  Instead, was a part of leading the effort against ISIS by untying the hands of war fighters and finishing the job properly and then bringing our troops home. 

    So, we’re taking a very different view, obviously, than the previous administration, and there will be full accountability. 

    THE PRESIDENT:  I don’t see big promotions in that group.  (Laughter.)  And I think they’re going to be largely gone.  I know the man on my left.  I think they’re going to be largely gone. 

    That was a horrible display.  And, you know, I’ve dealt with the parents and the family of the 13 that were killed.  But, you know, nobody ever talks about the 40 that were so badly hurt, with the arms and the legs and the face and the whole thing — the missing arms and legs.  It was so terrible, the way that was handled.

    And it should have been gone through Bagram.  We have a big base with big fences that nobody can get in, and you have, you know, hundreds of acres, instead of a little local airport where the whole place went crazy.  That was so badly handled.  And I would think that most of those people are going to be gone. 

    Q    Are we going to take Bagram back?

    THE PRESIDENT:  So, I’ll tell you what has bothered me very much — very, very much: We give billions of dollars to Afghanistan.  Nobody knows that.  Nobody knew that.  Do you know we give billions of dollars to Afghanistan?  And yet we left behind all of that equipment, which wouldn’t have happened. 

    You know, we were getting out under me.  I’m the one that got it down to 5,000 people.  We were going to get out, but we were going to keep Bagram, not because of Afghanistan but because of China, because it’s exactly one hour away from where China makes its nuclear missiles. 

    So, we were going to keep Bagram.  We were going to keep a small force on Bagram.  We were going to have Bagram Air Base, one of the biggest air bases in the world.  One of the biggest runways, one of the most powerful runways, in the sense that it was very heavy concrete and steel.  You could carry about anything.  You could land anything on those runways. 

    We gave it up.  And you know who’s occupying it right now?  China.  China.  Biden gave it up.  So, we’re going to keep that, and we’re going to have a withdrawal, and we’re going to take our equipment.  We’re going to do it properly.  We’re going to do it very — we’re going to keep the equipment. 

         Well, they ran out.  It was — what happened there was a — in fact, you know, in all fairness to Putin, when he saw that, he said, “Well, this is our time to go and go into Ukraine,” I guess, because it was — the timing seemed to be about right. 

         But we send them billions of dollars in aid, which nobody knows.  If they — if the American public knew that — they know it now.  And if we’re doing that, I think they should give our equipment back.  And I told Pete to study that. 

    But we left billions — tens of billions of dollars’ worth of equipment behind.  Brand-new trucks.  You see them display it every year on their little roadway someplace where they have a road and they drive the — you know, waving the flag and talking about America.  Beautiful equipment that’s all — I mean, the top-of-the-line stuff, brand-new stuff.  Now it’s getting older. 

         But you know what?  We’re going to pay them.  I think we should get a lot of that equipment back. 

         You know that Afghanistan is one of the biggest sellers of military equipment in the world.  You know why?  They’re selling the equipment that we left.  We’re first.  They were second or third.  Can you believe it?  They’re selling 777,000

    rifles, 70,000 armor-plated — many of them were armor-plated trucks and vehicles — 70,000. 

         If you think of a used car lot, the biggest one in the country, you have — I would say, JD, if somebody had 500 cars, that would be a lot. 

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  Yeah, that would be quite a lot.

    THE PRESIDENT:  This is 70,000 vehicles we had there, and we left it for them.  I think we should get it back.

         (Cross-talk.)

         Q    Mr. President, the spending bill that passed last night aims to cut $2 trillion.

         THE PRESIDENT:  Right.

         Q    Can you guarantee that Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security will not be touched?

         THE PRESIDENT:  Yeah.  I mean, I have said it so many times, you shouldn’t be asking me that question.  Okay?  This will not be “read my lips.”  It won’t be “read my lips” anymore: We’re not going to touch it.

         Now, we are going to look for fraud.  I’m sure you’re okay with that, like people that shouldn’t be on, people that are illegal aliens and others — criminals, in many cases.  And that’s with Social Security.  We have a lot of people — you see that immediately.  When you see people that are 200 years old that are being sent checks for Social Security — some of them are actually being sent checks. 

    So, we’re tracing that down, and I have a feeling that Pam is going to do a very good job with that.  But you have a lot of fraud. 

         But, no, I’m not — we’re not doing anything on that.

         Q    Mr. President, part of your mission, sir —

         Q    Mr. President — Mr. President, on CBS News.  Mr. President, you’re in litigation —
        
         Q    Part of your mission has been — thank you.  I’m sorry. 

         Part of your mission has been to restore executive control over the executive branch.  Is it your view of your authority that you have the power to call up any one of or all of the people seated at this table and issue orders that they’re bound to follow?

         THE PRESIDENT:  Oh, yeah.  They’ll follow the orders.  Yes, they will. 

         Q    No exceptions? 

         THE PRESIDENT:  No except- — well, let’s see.  Let me think.  Oh, yeah.  Yeah.  She’ll have an exception.  (The president points at Secretary Rollins.)  (Laughter.)

         Of course, no exceptions.  You know that.

         Q    Mr. President, can you clarify the Canada/Mexico tariffs.  You had put that 30-day pause. 

    THE PRESIDENT:  Yeah.

    Q    You just referred to —

         THE PRESIDENT:  It’s 25 percent.

         Q    Twenty-five percent.  When does it go into effect?

         THE PRESIDENT:  April 2nd. 

         Q    April 2nd for Canada and Mexico?

         THE PRESIDENT:  Correct.  And for —

         Q    And for the reciprocal?

         THE PRESIDENT:  — and for everything. 

         SECRETARY LUTNICK:  Well, we have the — the — fentanyl-related is a pause.  If they can prove to the president they’ve done an excellent job, that’s what they first do in 30 days.

         Q    Have you guys seen any changes?

         SECRETARY LUTNICK:  But then the overall is April 2nd.  So, the big transaction is April 2nd, but the fentanyl-related things, if they’re working hard on the border, at the end of that 30 days, they have to prove to the president that they’ve satisfied him to that regard.  If they have —

         THE PRESIDENT:  It’s going to be hard to satisfy.

         SECRETARY LUTNICK:  — then we’ll give them a pause or he won’t. 

         THE PRESIDENT:  It’s going to be hard to satisfy.

         SECRETARY LUTNICK:  But that’s up to him to see.

         THE PRESIDENT:  We lose 300,000 people a year to fentanyl.  Not 100-, not 95-, not 60-, like you read.  You know, you’ve been reading it for years. 

         We lost, in my opinion, over the last couple of years, on average, maybe close to 300,000 people dead, and the families are ruined.  You know, when they lose a daughter, when they lose a son, the families are never the same.  You’re never going to be the same.  So, you’re talking about a million people. 

         But when the daughters die, I see it — daughters die and the sons die because of fentanyl.  And in some cases, they don’t even know they’re taking it.  They — they’re buying something else, and it’s laced with fentanyl, and they end up dying.  And I’ve known many people who have lost children to fentanyl and for other reasons, but to fentanyl.  It’s such a big killer.  And those people are never the same people. 
        
         I mean, I’ve seen people that — for the rest of their lives, they’re not the same people.  They’re so different, it’s not even believable.  Dynamic people, happy people that are — they die a miserable death.  And that’s because of the crap that comes in through China and through Mexico and through Canada.  A lot of it comes through Canada. 

         The — Canada — look, we support Canada $200 billion a year in subsidies one way or the other.  We let them make millions of cars.  We let them send us lumber.  We don’t need their lumber.  We’re going to free up our lumber.  Lee is going to do — the head of environmental.  We’re going to free up our lumber.  We have the best lumber there is.  We don’t need their lumber.  What do we need their lumber for?

         When you look at the — we subsidize them $200 billion a year.  Without us, Canada can’t make it.  You know, Canada relies on us 95 percent.  We rely on them 4 percent.  Big difference.  And I say Canada should be our 51st state.  There’s no tariffs, no nothing. 
        
         And — and I say that, we give them military protection.  They have a very small military.  They spend very little money on military.  Or NATO, they’re just about last in terms of payment, because they say, “Why should we spend on military?”  That’s a tremendous cost.  Most nations can’t afford to even think about it.  “Why should we spend on military?  The United States protects us.” 

         And I would say that’s largely true.  We protect Canada.  But it’s not fair.  It’s not fair that they’re not paying their way.  And if they had to pay their way, they couldn’t exist. 

         When I spoke to — let’s call it the prime minister, rather than the governor.  (Laughter.)  But when I spoke to him, I said, “Why are we giving you $200 billion a year?”  He was unable to answer the question.  I said, “Why are we letting you make millions of cars and send them in?”  He was unable to answer the question — Justin Trudeau, a nice guy.  I think he’s a very good guy.  I call him Governor Trudeau. 

         He should be governor, because the fact is that if we don’t give them cars — we don’t have to give them cars.  The c- — tariffs will make it impossible for them to sell cars into the United States.  The tariffs will make it impossible to — for them to sell lumber or anything else into the United States. 

    And all I’m asking to do is break even or lose a little bit, but not lose $200 million.  And we love Canada.  I love Canada.  I love the people of Canada.  And — but, honestly, it’s not fair for us to be supporting Canada.  And if we don’t support them, they don’t subsist as a — as a nation. 

    Okay.

    Q    Mr. President, when you were talking to Elon —

    Q    Mr. President, on the EU tariffs.  Mr. President, have you made a decision on what level you will seek on tariffs on the European Union?

    THE PRESIDENT:  We have made a decision, and we’ll be announcing it very soon.  And it’ll be 25 percent, generally speaking, and that’ll be on cars and all other things. 

    And European Union is a different case than Canada — different kind of case.  They’ve really taken advantage of us in a different way.  They don’t accept our cars.  They don’t accept, essentially, our farm products.  They use all sorts of reasons why not.  And we accept everything of them, and we have about a $300 billion deficit with the European Union. 

    Now, I love the countries of Europe.  I guess I’m from there at some point, a long time ago, right?  (Laughter.)  But indirectly — well, pretty directly, too, I guess.  But I love the countries of Europe.  I — I love all countries, frankly.  All different.

    But European Union has been — it was formed in order to screw the United States.  I mean, look, let’s be honest.  The European Union was formed in order to screw the United States.  That’s the purpose of it, and they’ve done a good job of it, but now I’m president.

    Q    What will happen if these countries or the EU retaliate?

    THE PRESIDENT:  They can’t.  I mean, they can try, but they can’t. 

    Q    China did.  They imposed tariffs —

    Q    They are pledging to, sir.

    Q    — that are — went into effect, China’s retaliatory tariffs —

    THE PRESIDENT:  That’s right.  That’s right.  But —

    Q    — on the — the 10th of February.  Has there been any —

    THE PRESIDENT:  That’s right.

    Q    — impact that you’ve been able to observe?

    THE PRESIDENT:  That’s right.  No, they can do it, and they can try, but the numbers can never equal what ours, because we can go off.  We are the pot of gold.  We’re the one that everybody wants.  And they can retaliate, but it cannot be a successful retaliation, because we just go cold turkey.  We don’t buy anymore.  And if that happens, we win. 

    Q    Are you talking to Erik Prince about privatat- —

    THE PRESIDENT:  No.

    Q    — privatizing deportations?

    THE PRESIDENT:  No, I haven’t.  I haven’t.

    Q    Mr. President, you’re in litigation with CBS News.  Is this a case that you’d like to see go to trial, or are you open a settelm- —

    THE PRESIDENT:  With who?

    Q    CBS, the — “60 Minutes.”

    THE PRESIDENT:  CBS?

    Q    Yes.

    THE PRESIDENT:  Well, CBS did something that was amazing.  Kamala was unable to answer a question properly, and they took the question that they asked, and they inserted an answer.  They gave her an answer.  This was two days before the election, right before — the Sunday night before the election.  And they wrote out a — they put her words from another question that was asked about a half an hour later, and they put that into the question. 

    Nobody’s ever even heard of it before.  Nobody’s ever heard of anything like this before.  But they then did it, they say, on numerous occasions.  And the FCC is looking at it very strongly, and everybody’s looking at it, and I’m — but nobody’s ever seen anything. 

    Think of it.  They took her answers, and they changed them.  And I don’t mean they changed a word or two, or they cut off a half a sentence, or they cut off a couple of words.  I mean, I’ve had that happen too.  But that, you — you just say — you know, then they say, “Well, we want brevity.  You know, we wanted to do it for time.” 

    Q    Would — would you encourage —

    THE PRESIDENT:  They took out her answer, and they inserted an entirely different answer that made her sound competent.  And they did this, and nobody’s ever — I thought I’ve heard of everything when it comes to that stuff.  No — I’ve never heard of it.  Nobody has ever seen.  So, we sued, and we are in discussions of settlement. 

    Q    What would a number be?  Like a hu- — what — what’s a number that you would think would be appropriate?

    THE PRESIDENT:  I think it’s a lot.  (Laughter.) 

    Q    What’s the timeline and process —

    THE PRESIDENT:  No, I mean, it — look, it could have — it probably did affect the election.  I mean, we won by a lot.  As I said, “Too big to rig.”  But it probably did affect the election.  Yeah, probably could have won by more, but I could have lost the election because of that. 

    It’s — we have to get to honest elections.  We have to go back to paper ballots.  We have to go back to voter ID.  One-day election, ideally, or short term, not these 48-day and 61-day elections where boxes are put in a room, and, “Oh, let’s move the boxes, because we’re putting in a new air conditioning system.”  Then you see the boxes move, and then you say, “Well, where are all the boxes?”  You know, —

    Q    But would you —

    THE PRESIDENT:  “What happened to the boxes that never came back?” 

    No, our elections are extremely dishonest.  We’re the only country in the world that has mail-in voting and all of these different things that we put in.  Nobody — no other country in the world has it. 

    You know, France went to — they had some of the things that we had, and they went to same-day voting, all paper.  And, you know, paper is very sophisticated now.  It’s a very sophisticated — it’s a very sophisticated form of voting right now.  It’s a very safe form of voting. 

    You know, the other thing is for the governors.  I wish the governors would do it, because the paper ballots will cost 9 percent of the machines, and they’re 100 percent.  You know, they’re — I don’t — nothing’s foolproof, but they’re as close as you get.  So, we’ll see what happens. 

    But on the “60 Minute” thing, nobody’s ever seen anything like it. 

    Q    And would you link the FCC action to the litigation?  I mean, does it make se- —

    THE PRESIDENT:  I don’t think it’s linked, but probably the lawyers look at it, you know, because I know it’s going along.  FCC is headed by a very competent person, and you have some very competent people on the board, and so I think they’re looking at it very seriously. 

    Yeah.

    Q    Mr. President —

    Q    Sir, of all the deals that you’ve done in your life, all the people you’ve sat across from and negotiated with, is President Putin distinct in any way?

    THE PRESIDENT:  He’s a very smart guy.  He’s a very cunning person.  But I’ve dealt with some people that — I’ve dealt with some really bad people.  But I will tell you, as far as this is concerned, we’ve — you have to understand, he was — he had no intention, in my opinion, of settling this war.  I think he wanted the whole thing. 

    When I got elected, we spoke, and I think we’re going to have a deal.  I can’t guarantee you that.  You know, a deal is a deal.  Lots of crazy things happen in deals, right?  But I think we’re going to have a deal. 

    If I didn’t get elected, I believe he would have just continued to go through Ukraine, and over a period of time, a lot of people — a lot of people would have been killed.  It would have lasted for a period of time. 

    And the reason that Ukraine — and I give — I have great respect for the Ukraine as fighters.  They have great fighters.  But without our equipment, that war would have been over, like people said, in a very short period of time. 

    Q    Is there a timeline (inaudible) — 

    THE PRESIDENT:  And if you remember, I gave the Javelins, and the Javelins are the things that knocked out those tanks right at the beginning of the war.  They said that — that Obama, at the time, gave sheets, and Trump gave Javelins.  Well, I was the one that did that.  But I want to see it come to an end. 

    Q    Will he have to make concessions — President Putin?

    THE PRESIDENT:  Yeah, he will.  He will.  He’s going to have to.  And —

    Q    Can you preview that?

    THE PRESIDENT:  And I think — I believe that, because we got elected, that war will come to an end.  And I also believe, if we didn’t get elected, if this administration didn’t win the election by a lot, that that war would go on for a long time, and he would want to take the whole thing. 

    Q    What concessions?  What concessions?

    Q    On the — on the —

    THE PRESIDENT:  The big question I had is: Does he want to take the whole thing?  But the reason — and — and the Ukrainians are good fighters, I have to say, but without the equipment — without our equipment — we have the best equipment in the world.  We have the best military equipment in the world.  Without our equipment, that would have been over very quickly. 

    Q    What concessions would you like to see? 

    Q    On the (inaudible), sir?  On — on the —

    Q    What concessions would you like to see?

    THE PRESIDENT:  Oh, I don’t want to tell right now.  But I can tell you that NATO, you can forget about.  That’s been — I think that’s probably the reason the whole thing started.  And I think, JD, we can say that. 

    What — do you have a statement on that?  You’ve been very much involved. 

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  (Laughs.)

    THE PRESIDENT:  I gave him the beauty.

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  Great.  You gave me the — the hardest question, sir. 

    Q    Concessions from Russia.

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  I mean, look, as the president said, we’re not going to do the negotiation in public with the American media.  He’s going to do it in private with the president of — of Russia, with the president of Ukraine, and with other leaders.  And I think that’s how this has to go. 

    I think the — I just want to push back against some of the criticism I’ve seen in the administration on this, because every single time the president engages in diplomacy, you guys preemptively accuse him of conceding to Russia.  He hasn’t conceded anything to anyone.  He’s doing the job of a diplomat, and he is, of course, the diplomat in chief as the president of the United States. 

    Q    On the gold cards, sir.  Can you talk a little bit more about the vetting process, you know —

    THE PRESIDENT:  They’ll go through a process.  The process is being worked out right now, and we’re going to be — we’re going to be very careful. 

    Q    And will there be restrictions on, for instance, can Chinese nationals get one? 

    THE PRESIDENT:  No, we’re not going to restrict. 

    Q    Can Iranian nationals get —

    THE PRESIDENT:  We’re probably not going to be restricting too much in — in terms of countries, but maybe in terms of individuals.  We want to make sure we have people that love our country and are capable of loving the country.

    Q    Is there a process, sir —

    Q    Mr. President, there is a measles outbreak in Texas at the moment in which a child is reported to have died.  Do you have concerns about that?  And have you asked Secretary Kennedy to look into that outbreak? 

    THE PRESIDENT:  Well, why don’t we — Bobby, do you want to speak on that, please?

    SECRETARY KENNEDY:  We are following the measles epidemic every day.  I think there’s 124 people who have contracted measles at this point, mainly in Gaines County, Texas; mainly, we’re told, in the Mennonite community. 

    There are two people who have died, but the — we’re watching it.  And there — there are about 20 people hospitalized, mainly for quarantine. 

    We’re watching it.  We put out a post on it yesterday, and we’re going to continue to follow it. 

    Q    Mr. President —

    SECRETARY KENNEDY:  Inci- — incidentally, there have been four measles outbreaks this year in this country.  Last year, there were 16.  So, it’s not unusual.  We have measles outbreaks every year. 

    Q    You sound a little under the weather yourself right now.  Are you all right?

    SECRETARY KENNEDY:  I just — I have a permanently bad throat. 

    Q    (Inaudible) coughing.

    Q    Mr. President, would you — would you send U.S. peacekeepers to just — to support the — the European peacekeepers?  Would you do any sort of U.S. —

    THE PRESIDENT:  No, we’re going to support Europe, yeah. 

    Q    And how would we do that?  How would the United States do that?

    THE PRESIDENT:  We’re very friendly with Europe.  We have a great relationship with Europe.  I mean, you could ask — you could talk about France.  You could talk about any of them.  Yeah, we have a great relationship with Europe. 

    Q    But how will we — how will the United States do that?  Would there be boots on —

    THE PRESIDENT:  Well, how?  I mean, you’re asking me a question: What are we doing in the — let’s worry — I hope we have that problem, where we can worry about peacekeeping.  We got to get there first.

    (Secretary Lutnick knocks on the table.)

    But I hope we have the problem of worrying about peacekeeping.  That’ll be the easiest problem, I think, JD, that we’ve ever had.  (Laughter.)

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  I think so, sir.

    Q    That would be part of the deal, presumably, that the Ukrainians —

    THE PRESIDENT:  We’ll — we’re —

    Q    — would want —

    THE PRESIDENT:  We’ll do it at the time, but we’ll — peacekeeping is very easy.  It’s making the deal that’s very tough. 

    And, again, nobody was speaking to Russia at all.  And, you know, probably a million and a half soldiers have been killed — close to a million and a half soldiers, not to mention a treme- — I will tell you, the — the thing with that horrible war that should have never started — it would have never started if I were president, and it didn’t start for four years, and it was not even thought about starting.  But the thing with that war is that you’re highly underestimating the number of people that have been killed.  Far more people have been killed in that war than you talk about.  You know, you like to talk about numbers, like, a million people.  Well, they had much more than a million soldiers killed.

    But you have a lot of cities that have been knocked to the ground.  They’re demolition sites.  Literally, demolition sites.  Every single building is knocked to the ground, and a lot of people were killed in those buildings.  And you’ll hear a report, “Two people were minorly injured” or “just injured a little bit.”  No.  No.  People were killed by the thousands.

    And there are a lot more people killed in that war than the media wants to talk about, because Biden did a horrible, horrible job.  He should have prevented that war.  He could have prevented that war. 

    Putin would have never gone in.  I’ll tell you one thing: He would have never gone in.  That war would never have taken place if I were president. 

    Q    I think what people are trying to understand, Mr. President —

    Q    Mr. President —

    Q    — is how would the United States — what would you be willing to do to support this European peacekeeping effort?  Would there be —

    THE PRESIDENT:  Again, you’re asking me the same question?  (Laughter.)

    Q    I’m just trying —

    THE PRESIDENT:  How many times do you have to answer it?  You’re talking about after we make peace.  Let me make peace first. 

    Once we make peace, I’ll give you all the answers you want.  But how many times can you ask the same question?

    Q    Mr. President, on the Middle East.  Did you receive —

    Q    Is loosening the sanctions on —

    THE PRESIDENT:  Yeah, go ahead.  Behind.

    Q    Is loosening the sanctions on Russia a potential option as part of an overall deal?

    THE PRESIDENT:  Not now, no.  No.  We have sanctions on Russia.  No, I want to see if we make a deal first.  But I think we will.  I’ve had very —

    Q    But is it a bargaining chip, I’m asking.

    THE PRESIDENT:  I’ve had very good conversations with President Putin.  I’ve had very good conversations with President Zelenskyy.  And until four weeks ago, nobody had conversations with anybody.  It wasn’t even a consideration.  Nobody thought you could make peace.  I think you can. 

    Q    Mr. President, just —

    Q    But if Mr. Putin gets to keep his —

    Q    — just to bring this —

    Q    — the land that was claimed by force, if the Russians get to keep the territory that they — they claimed by force, doesn’t that send a dangerous message, let’s say, to China about Taiwan?

    THE PRESIDENT:  Oh, okay.  You try and take it away, right?  We’re going to do the best we can.  (Laughter.)  We’re going to do the best we can to make the best deal we can for both sides.  But for Ukraine, we’re going to try very hard to make a good deal so that they can get as much back as possible.  We want to get as much back as possible. 

    Q    Mr. President, just to bring this full —

    THE PRESIDENT:  And we’ll — we’ll cut it out after maybe this question.  Go ahead.

    Q    To bring this full circle, back to —

    THE PRESIDENT:  Unless it’s a bad question, and then we’ll (inaudible).  (Laughter.)

    Q    And back to —

    THE PRESIDENT:  You always like to finish on a good one.

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  But, sir, they want you to negotiate with them instead of President Putin.

    THE PRESIDENT:  I know.  I know.

    Q    Back to the question about the —

    THE PRESIDENT:  They want to continue to talk about the peacekeepers.  (Laughter.)  They’re — you have a lot of confidence in us, because you assume there’s going to be peace.  You know, it’s possible it doesn’t work out.  There is possibility. 

         Q    And I had —

         THE PRESIDENT:  But I hope it does, for the sake of humanity, because if you look at the pictures that I’ve looked at, you don’t want to look at them. 

         Go ahead.

         Q    I had a question back on these cuts to the federal workforce.  You mentioned you — you’re interested in doing another round of this email.  When would you like to

    see that?  What would be the deadline?  And —

         THE PRESIDENT:  I — I’m not — I think —

         Q    — this time, would it be mandatory?

         THE PRESIDENT:  I think Elon — I think Elon wants to.  And I think it’s a good idea because, you know, those people, as I said before, they’re on the bubble.  You got a lot of people that have not responded, so we’re trying to figure out, do they exist?  Who are they?  And it’s possible that a lot of those people will be actually fired. 

         Q    And —

         THE PRESIDENT:  And if that happened, that’s okay, because that’s what we’re trying to do. 

         This country has gotten bloated and fat and disgusting and incompetently run. 

         I think we had the worst president in the history of our country.  He just left office.  I think he’s a disgrace.  What he’s done to our country by allowing millions of people to come into our country like that and all of the other things — the inflation, which he caused because of energy and stupid spending.  To spend hundreds of millions, trillions and trillions of dollars on the Green New Scam — a total scam.  I have the best energy people, the best environmental people in the world around this table, and they — they can’t even believe he got away with it. 

         And then, in leaving office, to send $20 billion here and $20 million there and $10 million and $5 million, and they couldn’t spend the money fast enough, and “Let’s get it out before Trump gets in.  Let’s just get it out to anybody.”  This is a disgrace to our nation.

         And you don’t write the fair thing.  But, look, you know the good news?  The people see it, and that’s why we won the election by so much. 

         Thank you very much, everybody.  I appreciate it.  Thank you.  Thank you.   

         Q    Thank you, Mr. President.

         THE PRESIDENT:  Thank you very much, Doug.  Pulitzer Prize.

         THE VICE PRESIDENT:  Sir, how many peacekeepers are you going to send to — (laughter) —

         THE PRESIDENT:  “What will you do?”  “How will it be?”  (Laughter.)

         SECRETARY LUTNICK:  “How will you address this?”

                                    END            12:47 P.M. EST

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-Evening Report: Quantum navigation could transform how we travel. So what is it, and how does it work?

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Allison Kealy, Director, Innovative Planet Institute, Swinburne University of Technology

    Triff/Shutterstock

    Quantum technology is no longer confined to the lab – it’s making its way into our everyday lives. Now, it’s about to transform something even more fundamental: how we navigate the world.

    Imagine submarines travelling beneath the ocean, never needing to surface for location updates. Planes flying across continents with unshakeable precision, unaffected by signal disruptions.

    Emergency responders could navigate smoke-filled buildings or underground tunnels with flawless accuracy, while autonomous vehicles chart perfect courses through dense urban environments.

    These scenarios might sound like science fiction, but they can all be made possible with an emerging approach known as quantum navigation.

    This game-changing tech will one day redefine movement, exploration and connectivity in ways we’re only just beginning to imagine. So, what is it?

    Satellite navigation is at the heart of many things

    Global navigation satellite systems, like GPS, are deeply embedded in modern society. We use them daily for navigation, ordering deliveries and tagging photo locations. But their impact goes far beyond convenience.

    Timing signals from satellites in Earth’s orbit authenticate stock market trades and help balance the electricity grid. In agriculture, satellite navigation guides autonomous tractors and helps muster cattle.

    Emergency services rely on navigation satellite systems for rapid response, reducing the time it takes to reach those in need.

    Despite their benefits, systems like GPS are quite vulnerable. Satellite signals can be jammed or interfered with. This can be due to active warfare, terrorism or for legitimate (or illegitimate) privacy concerns. Maps like GPSJAM show real-time interference hotspots, such as those in the Middle East, areas around Russia and Ukraine, and Myanmar.

    The environment of space isn’t constant, either. The Sun regularly ejects giant balls of plasma, causing what we know as solar storms. These emissions slam into Earth’s magnetic field, disrupting satellites and GPS signals. Often these effects are temporary, but they can also cause significant damage, depending on the severity of the storm.

    An outage of global navigation satellite systems would be more than an inconvenience – it would disrupt our most critical infrastructure.

    Estimates suggest a loss of GPS would cost just the United States economy about US$1 billion per day (A$1.5 billion), causing cascading failures across interconnected systems.

    Quantum navigation to the rescue

    In some environments, navigation signals from satellites don’t work very well. They don’t penetrate water or underground spaces, for example.

    If you’ve ever tried to use Google Maps in a built-up city with skyscrapers, you may have run into issues. Tall buildings cause signal reflections that degrade accuracy, and signals are weakened or completely unavailable inside buildings.

    This is where quantum navigation could step in one day.

    Quantum science describes the behaviour of particles at scales smaller than an atom. It reveals mind-boggling effects like superposition – particles existing in multiple states simultaneously – and entanglement (when particles are connected through space and time in ways that defy classical understanding).

    These effects are fragile and typically collapse under observation, which is why we don’t notice them in everyday life. But the very fragility of quantum processes also lets them work as exquisite sensors.

    A sensor is a device that detects changes in the world around it and turns that information into a signal we can measure or use. Think automatic doors that open when we walk near them, or phone screens that respond to our touch.

    Quantum sensors are so sensitive because quantum particles react to tiny changes in their environment. Unlike normal sensors, which can miss weak signals, quantum sensors are extremely good at detecting even the smallest changes in things like time, gravity or magnetic fields.

    Their sensitivity comes from how easily quantum states change when something in their surroundings shifts, allowing us to measure things with much greater accuracy than before.

    This precision is critical for robust navigation systems.

    Our team is researching new ways to use quantum sensors to measure Earth’s magnetic field for navigation. By using quantum effects in diamonds, we can detect Earth’s magnetic field in real time and compare the measurements to pre-existing magnetic field maps, providing a resilient alternative to satellite navigation like GPS.

    Since magnetic signals are unaffected by jamming and work underwater, they offer a promising backup system.

    A quantum magnetometer used in our research.
    Swinburne University/RMIT/Phasor

    The future of navigation

    The future of navigation will integrate quantum sensors to enhance location accuracy (via Earth’s magnetic and gravitational fields), improve orientation (via quantum gyroscopes), and enable superior timing (through compact atomic clocks and interconnected timekeeping systems).

    These technologies promise to complement and, in some cases, provide alternatives to traditional satellite-based navigation.

    However, while the potential of quantum navigation is clear, making it a practical reality remains a significant challenge. Researchers and companies worldwide are working to refine these technologies, with major efforts underway in academia, government labs and industry.

    Startups and established players are developing prototypes of quantum accelerometers (devices that measure movement) and gyroscopes, but most remain in early testing phases or specialised applications.

    Key hurdles include reducing the size and power demands of quantum sensors, improving their stability outside of controlled laboratory settings, and integrating them into existing navigation systems.

    Cost is another barrier – today’s quantum devices are expensive and complex, meaning widespread adoption is still years away.

    If these challenges can be overcome, quantum navigation could reshape everyday life in subtle but profound ways. While quantum navigation won’t replace GPS overnight, it could become an essential part of the infrastructure that keeps the world moving.

    Allison Kealy is affiliated with Quantum Australia as a board member.

    Allison Kealy is a research collaborator with RMIT University and Phasor Quantum.

    ref. Quantum navigation could transform how we travel. So what is it, and how does it work? – https://theconversation.com/quantum-navigation-could-transform-how-we-travel-so-what-is-it-and-how-does-it-work-250285

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Growth and security at heart of Prime Minister’s meeting with President Trump

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Press release

    Growth and security at heart of Prime Minister’s meeting with President Trump

    The Prime Minister will be focused on delivering prosperity and security for the British people, when he meets President Trump today (Thursday 27 February) in Washington D.C.

    • Prosperity and security for working people focus of Prime Minister’s meeting with President Trump.   

    • Special relationship between UK and US critical to deliver growth and security, with further collaboration on AI and tech.    

    • Prime Minister to reiterate shared US-UK commitment to reaching a durable and lasting peace in Ukraine, and the need for Europe to step up to the challenge.

    The Prime Minister will be focused on delivering prosperity and security for the British people, when he meets President Trump today (Thursday 27 February) in Washington D.C.

    The UK and the US share a unique and historic relationship, based on shared values and a mutual commitment to economic and defence cooperation.  

    The UK and the US have one of the biggest trading relationships of any two countries in the world, worth around 400 billion dollars and supporting over 2.5 million jobs across both countries.     

    This visit comes just days after the third anniversary of Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine. The Prime Minister and President Trump share a commitment to delivering lasting peace in Ukraine, and the Prime Minister will reiterate the UK’s commitment to securing a just and enduring peace, bringing an end to Russia’s illegal war.     

    The Prime Minister will be clear that there can be no negotiations about Ukraine, without Ukraine and will recognise the need for Europe to play its part on global defence and step up for the good of collective European security.    

    On Tuesday, the Prime Minister announced that defence spending will increase to 2.5% of GDP from April 2027, with an ambition to reach 3% in the next parliament. This will drive economic growth and create jobs across the UK, while bolstering national security and protecting borders.   

    Prime Minister Keir Starmer said:    

    The world is becoming ever more dangerous, and it is more important than ever that we are united with our allies.     

    A stable economy, secure borders and national security are the foundations of my Plan for Change, and the US-UK relationship is integral to delivering them. These principles will be at the heart of discussions with President Trump today.     

    There are huge opportunities for us to deepen our special relationship, deliver growth and security, and improve the lives of working people in both our great nations.

    Both countries are world leaders in AI and advanced technologies, and the Prime Minister will be looking to build on these strong foundations to create jobs and economic growth.     

    The discussion will have a particular focus on the opportunities that further technology and AI partnerships could deliver. These include a proposal of high-ambition shared moonshot missions across top technologies including quantum and AI, and a deeper partnership on space.     

    The US and UK are the only two allied countries with trillion-dollar technology eco-systems, and the Prime Minister will make the case for further integration between the two countries’ tech sectors to make them the most efficient, ambitious technology sectors in the world.     

    In October, US tech firms announced a £6.3 billion package of investment to support UK data centres – a central pillar of the government’s plan to ramp up the country’s AI capacity. In January a further £12 billion investment from Vantage Data Centers created over 11,500 jobs as the government published its AI Opportunities Action Plan.   

    These investments represent just one facet of the deepening science, innovation, and technology collaboration between both countries. In AI, researchers from both sides of the Atlantic have dedicated research exchange programmes to share knowledge and expertise in delivering the next wave of cutting-edge innovations that improve people’s lives in areas such as personalised care, autonomous surgeries, and cancer diagnosis – on top of a broader AI partnership which has also been signed by the AI Institutes of both countries. 

    On a visit to the West Coast at the end of last year Technology Secretary Peter Kyle met a range of companies to bang the drum for further investment in the UK’s technology sector. Just two weeks ago, he also put pen to paper on a new partnership with leading AI firm Anthropic which will explore how the technology can be put to work to transform the public services that UK citizens rely on, and deliver on the government’s Plan for Change.   

    The Prime Minister will join President Trump at the White House on Thursday, where he will be greeted by the President before signing the White House Guest Book and a tete a tete at the Oval Office. This will be followed by a bilateral lunch, and a joint press conference. He will also carry out a defence focused visit.   

    On arrival on Wednesday night, he will meet a select group of CEOs from large US businesses to discuss their existing and growing presence in the UK, and the importance of UK-US trade and investment. He will outline the strength of the UK offer to investors: policy stability; an active partnership with government; an open, trading economy; and a reform agenda focused on making it easier to do business.   

    The Prime Minister will be accompanied by the Foreign Secretary David Lammy, who will join the Prime Minister’s programme at the White House.

    Updates to this page

    Published 26 February 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: New report flags severity of US funding cuts to global AIDS response

    Source: United Nations 2

    Health

    Shuttered clinics and health workers laid off around the world reflect the widespread, negative toll the United States funding freeze is taking on the global AIDS response, according to a new situation report released on Wednesday by the UN agency charged with responding to the disease.

    UNAIDS said that at least one status report on the impact of cuts has been received from 55 different countries up to the start of this week.

    That includes 42 projects that are supported by the US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and 13 that receive some US support.

    Two days after President Trump’s executive order in late January declared a 90-day pause to all foreign assistance, the Secretary of State issued an emergency waiver to resume “life-saving” humanitarian assistance, including HIV treatment.

    UNAIDS reported just over a week later that there was widespread “confusion” over how the waiver was being implemented on the ground.

    The 16 reports received from UNAIDS country offices around the world during the week of 17 to 21 February show that these waivers have led to the resumption of some clinical services, such as HIV treatment and prevention of vertical transmission, in many countries that are highly dependent on US funding.

    © UNICEF/Rindra Ramasomanana

    A mother-to-be is tested for HIV in the Analanjirofo region of Madagascar.

    Many projects ineligible

    However, it’s unclear how long funding will last amid multiple reports that key US government systems and staff responsible for paying implementing partners are either offline or working at greatly reduced capacity, the UN agency said.

    In addition, critical layers of national AIDS responses are ineligible for these waivers, including many HIV prevention and community-led services for key populations and adolescent girls and young women, according to the UN agency.

    At the same time, data collection and analysis services have been disrupted in numerous countries, according to reports received last week, which note that the overall quantity and quality of HIV prevention, testing and treatment services has been eroded.

    © UNICEF/Olivier Asselin

    In Côte d’Ivoire, a woman living with HIV holds three pills she takes daily as part of antiretroviral therapy.

    Waiting times increase

    Staff working in health facilities are facing increased workloads, and patients are experiencing increased wait times to receive lifesaving services, UNAIDS said.

    Other concerns persist, from hobbled health systems to addressing gender-related priorities.

    “US Government statements to UN system organizations suggest US-funded programmes focused on gender equality and transgender populations may not resume,” according to the UNAIDS situation report.

    Fresh data analysis

    The situation report covers more granular analysis on the global AIDS response’s heavy reliance on US foreign assistance, extracted from the datasets managed by UNAIDS.

    For example, more than half of HIV medicines purchased for the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Haiti, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia are purchased by the US.

    Before the freeze, the US Government provided two thirds of international financing for HIV prevention in low and middle-income countries, according to estimates from the Global HIV Prevention Coalition.

    The report also named the 20 countries that rely most heavily on funding from Washington: DRC, Haiti, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Uganda, Nigeria, Rwanda, Angola, Kenya, Ukraine, Burkina Faso, Burundi, El Salvador, Zimbabwe, Togo, Nepal, Côte d’Ivoire, Eswatini and Benin.

    Services at a standstill

    Civil society and community-led interventions are central to ending AIDS and to sustaining the gains into the future, according to UN agency.

    People living with HIV and key populations at higher risk of infection, play a crucial role in maintaining the local services needed to stay healthy, UNAIDS said.

    Yet, many critical services have ground to a halt. Here are some examples:

    • Mozambique: Community workers and test counsellors supported by PEPFAR funding are not being paid. As a result, HIV testing is unavailable in most parts of the country, enrolment of new patients is on hold and efforts to support people living with HIV to adhere to their treatment have been compromised
    • Tanzania: Young people working as peer educators, community health workers or lay counsellors funded by PEPFAR have been issued temporary job termination notices
    • Rwanda: Community-level and facility-based HIV-prevention services targeting populations at high risk of HIV infection, including adolescent girls and young women, gay men and sex workers were not covered by waivers received from the US Government
    • South Africa: US-funded facilities that support gay men, such as Engage Men’s Health, remain closed
    • Ghana: All civil society organizations funded by PEPFAR have halted services to people living with HIV and key populations

    Learn more about UNAIDS here.

    On the ground in Côte d’Ivoire

    Here is an emblematic snapshot of how the UN funding freeze has already affected this West African nation of 27 million, where Washington has supported more than half the total response to assist more than 400,000 adults and children living with AIDS.

    © UNICEF/Frank Dejong

    A mother, holding her two-year-old in southwest Côte d’Ivoire, discovered she was seropositive during her pregnancy. (file)

    • The stop-work order triggered a complete shutdown of services funded by the PEPFAR programme, which covers 516 health facilities in 70 per cent of the country’s health districts and 85 per cent of people living with HIV on treatment (about 265,000 people)
    • More than 8,600 staff were affected, including 597 clinical workers (doctors, nurses and midwives) and 3,591 community workers
    • Distribution of medicines and transport of diagnostic samples ground to halt
    • US-funded services partially resumed on 12 February following receipt of waivers, but the majority of US-funded HIV-prevention services for people at high risk of infection, remain shut
    • Other national health programmes and systems are affected by the freeze, including the malaria and tuberculosis control programmes and another serving mother and child health alongside the supply chain system for medicines and diagnostics

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Duckworth Slams Trump Administration for Purging Top Military Leadership While Pushing DoD Cuts, Both of Which Will Harm Readiness and National Security

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Illinois Tammy Duckworth
    February 26, 2025
    [WASHINGTON, D.C.] – Yesterday, combat Veteran and U.S. Senator Tammy Duckworth (D-IL)—a member of the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee—slammed President Trump and his Administration for putting our military readiness and national security at risk by firing our nation’s top military leaders while the Administration continues to push for 8% cuts to the defense budget for the next five years. Additionally, Duckworth expressed her outrage that Donald Trump is siding with Russian dictator Vladimir Putin in his unjustified and unlawful war against Ukraine and pressed the Deputy Secretary of Defense nominee Stephen Feinberg to admit that Russia was the one who started the war. Ultimately, Mr. Feinberg refused to answer. Duckworth’s full remarks can be found on the Senator’s YouTube.
    “By firing our top military leaders and removing JAG officers who ensure our military doesn’t break the law, Donald Trump is behaving like a wanna-be dictator and jeopardizing our military readiness and national security,” said Duckworth. “While I’m glad Mr. Feinberg could publicly pledge that he would refuse an unlawful order—clearing the absolute lowest bar for Senate consideration—his inability to acknowledge basic, public facts about vitally important defense issues, like that it was Russia, not Ukraine, who started this devastating, three-years long war, made it clear I cannot support his nomination. Given how grossly unqualified Secretary Hegseth is to lead our nation’s Defense Department, our men and women in uniform deserve a Deputy Secretary who will have their backs and be more than just a yes-man for President Trump.”
    When Duckworth pressed the nominee to admit that it was Russia who invaded Ukraine, Mr. Feinberg offered a concerning non-answer, responding: “I don’t feel that I should publicly comment in the middle of a tense negotiation when I’m not privy to the facts.”
    Additionally, Duckworth underscored that due to the utter lack of qualifications of Secretary Hegseth, Mr. Feinberg would manage the minutiae of the Department of Defense and be solely responsible for managing the budget and day-to-day operations, stating: “You are it. You are second in command.” She pressed Mr. Feinberg to state that he would push back against orders that would undermine our military readiness and ensure stability at the Department. 
    Duckworth is an outspoken vocal critic of Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and voted against his confirmation. During Hegseth’s confirmation hearing, Duckworth demonstrated some of the areas where he lacks the experience or knowledge that a serious Defense Secretary nominee should have, grilling him on basic questions that he failed to answer. She asked him if he ever led an audit. He would not confirm. She asked him to describe at least one of the main international security agreements a Secretary of Defense is responsible for leading. He could not name any. She asked him to name at least one nation that is a part of ASEAN, an organization with several member states who have mutual defense treaties, alliances or enhanced defense cooperation agreements with the U.S. None of the three countries he named were correct.
    Duckworth then delivered an impassioned speech on the Senate floor slamming Hegseth for his lack of experience and qualifications to lead the Department of Defense. Speaking next to a framed copy of the Soldier’s Creed—a copy that hangs over her desk in the Senate and hung above her bed during her recovery at Walter Reed Medical Center after the helicopter she co-piloted was shot down—Duckworth underscored that it is insulting to ask our servicemembers to train and perform to the absolute highest standards when the Senate confirms a Secretary of Defense who is wholly unprepared and unqualified to lead them in any way.
    -30-

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter – annual report 2024 – A10-0012/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter – annual report 2024

    (2024/2081(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

     having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights,

     having regard to Articles 2, 3, 8, 21 and 23 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

     having regard to Articles 17 and 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

     having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other United Nations human rights treaties and instruments,

     having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

     having regard to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,

     having regard to the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,

     having regard to the United Nations 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol thereto,

     having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 and United Nations Human Rights Council Resolution 43/29 of 22 June 2020 on the prevention of genocide,

     having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 18 December 1979,

     having regard to the United Nations Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment  of 10 December 1984 and the Optional Protocol thereto, adopted on 18 December 2002,

     having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities  of 12 December 2006 and the Optional Protocol thereto, adopted on 13 December 2006,

     having regard to the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid of 1976,

     having regard to the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, proclaimed by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 36/55 of 25 November 1981,

     having regard to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities of 18 December 1992,

     having regard to the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights Defenders, adopted by consensus by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 53/144 on 9 December 1998,

     having regard to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples of 13 September 2007,

     having regard to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas of 28 September 2018,

     having regard to the Programme of Action of the Cairo International Conference of Population and Development in 1994 and its review conferences,

     having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989 and the two Optional Protocols thereto, adopted on 25 May 2000,

     having regard to the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty, which entered into force on 24 December 2014, and the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports of 5 June 1998,

     having regard to the United Nations Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action of September 1995 and its review conferences,

     having regard to the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development adopted on 25 September 2015, in particular goals 1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 10 and 16 thereof,

     having regard to the United Nations Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration adopted on 19 December 2018 and the United Nations Global Compact on Refugees adopted on 17 December 2018,

     having regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court adopted on 17 July 1998, which entered into force on 1 July 2002,

     having regard to the Agreement between the European Union and the International Criminal Court on cooperation and assistance of 10 April 2006[1],

     having regard to the Council of Europe Conventions of 4 April 1997 for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, and the Additional Protocols thereto, of 16 May 2005 on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, and of 25 October 2007 on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse,

     having regard to the Council of Europe Convention of 11 May 2011 on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the Istanbul Convention), which not all Member States have ratified but which entered into force for the EU on 1 October 2023,

     having regard to Protocols Nos 6 and 13 to the Council of Europe Convention of 28 April 1983 for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty,

     having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2020/1998 of 7 December 2020 concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses[2],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe[3],

     having regard to the Council conclusions of 22 January 2024 on EU Priorities in UN Human Rights Fora in 2024,

     having regard to the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024, adopted by the Council on 17 November 2020 and its Mid-term Review adopted on 9 June 2023,

     having regard to the Council conclusions of 27 May 2024 on the alignment of the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024 with the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027,

     having regard to the EU Gender Action Plan (GAP) III – an ambitious agenda for gender equality and women’s empowerment in external action (JOIN(2020)0017),

     having regard to the EU Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025 (COM(2020)0152),

     having regard to the EU LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025 (COM(2020)0698),

     having regard to the EU strategy on the rights of the child (COM(2021)0142),

     having regard to the EU Strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2021-2030 (COM(2021)0101),

     having regard to the EU anti-racism action plan 2020-2025 (COM(2020)0565),

     having regard to the EU Roma strategic framework for equality, inclusion and participation (COM(2020)0620),

     having regard to the EU Guidelines on human rights defenders, adopted by the Council on 14 June 2004 and revised in 2008, and the second guidance note on the Guidelines’ implementation, endorsed in 2020,

     having regard to the EU Guidelines on violence against women and girls and combating all forms of discrimination against them, adopted by the Council on 8 December 2008,

     having regard to the EU Guidelines on promoting compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL) of 2005, as updated in 2009,

     having regard to the EU Guidelines on the death penalty, as updated by the Council on 12 April 2013,

     having regard to the EU Guidelines to promote and protect the enjoyment of all human rights by LGBTI persons, adopted on 24 June 2013,

     having regard to the EU Guidelines on the promotion and protection of freedom of religion or belief, adopted by the Council on 24 June 2013,

     having regard to the EU Guidelines on freedom of expression online and offline, adopted by the Council on 12 May 2014,

     having regard to the EU Guidelines on non-discrimination in external action, adopted by the Council on 18 March 2019,

     having regard to the EU Guidelines on safe drinking water and sanitation, adopted by the Council on 17 June 2019,

     having regard to the revised EU Guidelines on EU policy towards third countries on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, adopted by the Council on 16 September 2019,

     having regard to the revised EU Guidelines on human rights dialogues with partner/third countries, approved by the Council on 22 February 2021,

     having regard to the revised EU Guidelines on children and armed conflict, approved by the Council on 24 June 2024,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 12 September 2012 entitled ‘The roots of democracy and sustainable development: Europe’s engagement with Civil Society in external relations’ (COM(2012)0492),

     having regard to the Council conclusions of 10 March 2023 on the role of the civic space in protecting and promoting fundamental rights in the EU,

     having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/1760 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on corporate sustainability due diligence and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 and Regulation (EU) 2023/2859[4],

     having regard to the Commission proposal of 14 September 2022 for a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union market (COM(2022)0453),

     having regard to the joint proposal from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 3 May 2023 for a Council regulation on restrictive measures against serious acts of corruption (JOIN(2023)0013),

     having regard to the 2023 EU Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World,

     having regard to its Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, which in 2024 was awarded to María Corina Machado, as the leader of the democratic forces in Venezuela, and President-elect Edmundo González Urrutia, representing all Venezuelans inside and outside the country fighting for the reinstitution of freedom and democracy,

     having regard to its resolution of 15 January 2019 on EU Guidelines and the mandate of the EU Special Envoy on the promotion of freedom of religion or belief outside the EU[5],

     having regard to its resolution of 23 October 2020 on Gender Equality in EU’s foreign and security policy[6],

     having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2021 on human rights protection and the EU external migration policy[7],

     having regard to its resolution of 8 July 2021 on the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (EU Magnitsky Act)[8],

     having regard to its resolution of 28 February 2024 on human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter – annual report 2023[9], and to its previous resolutions on earlier annual reports,

     having regard to its resolutions on breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law (known as urgency resolutions), adopted in accordance with Rule 150 of its Rules of Procedure, in particular those adopted in 2023 and 2024,

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0012/2025),

    A. whereas the EU is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, as set out in Articles 2 and 21 TEU; whereas the EU’s action worldwide must be guided by the universality and indivisibility of human rights and by the fact that the effective protection and defence of human rights and democracy is at the core of the EU’s external action;

    B. whereas consistency and coherence across the EU’s internal and external policies are key for achieving an effective and credible EU human rights policy, and in defending and supporting freedom and democracy;

    C. whereas democratic systems are the most suitable to guarantee that every person has the ability to enjoy their human rights and fundamental freedoms; whereas effective rules-based multilateralism is the best organisational system to defend democracies;

    D. whereas the EU strongly believes in and fully supports multilateralism, a rules-based global order and the set of universal values, principles and norms that guide the UN member states and that the UN member states have pledged to uphold, in accordance with the UN Charter; whereas a world of democracies, understood as a world of political systems that defend and protect human rights worldwide, is a safer world, as democracies have significant checks and balances in place to prevent the unpredictability of autocracies;

    E. whereas the rise in authoritarianism, totalitarianism and populism threatens the global rules-based order, the protection and promotion of freedom and human rights in the world, as well as the values and principles on which the EU is founded;

    F. whereas in December 2023, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights celebrated its 75th anniversary; whereas today, more than ever since the UN’s foundation, totalitarian regimes challenge the UN Charter’s basic principles, seek to rewrite international norms, undermine multilateral institutions and threaten peace and security globally;

    G. whereas in November 2024, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child celebrated its 35th anniversary;

    H. whereas the United Nations Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action is regarded as a turning point for the global agenda on gender equality and will celebrate its 30th anniversary in 2025;

    I. whereas the legitimacy and functioning of the international rules-based order are dependent on compliance with the orders of, and respect for, international bodies, such as United Nations General Assembly and Security Council resolutions and orders and decisions of the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court (ICC); whereas multilateralism is being challenged by increasing global threats, such as terrorism and extremism, which threaten compliance with such orders and decisions, as well as, generally, with provisions of international law, human rights law and international humanitarian law in emerging and ongoing conflict situations; whereas international institutions, their officials, and those cooperating with them, are the subject of attacks and threats; whereas the international community, including the EU, has a responsibility to uphold the international rules-based order by enforcing universal compliance, including by its partners;

    J. whereas the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court establishes a framework of accountability for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes; whereas the independence of the ICC is vital to ensure that justice is delivered impartially and without political interference;

    K. whereas the 2023 Mid-term Review of the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024, now extended to 2027, has shown that, despite the progress achieved so far, more needs to be done, in cooperation with like-minded democratic partners, especially in the context of the unprecedented challenges the world has experienced since its adoption;

    L. whereas human rights defenders (HRDs) and civil society organisations (CSOs) are crucial partners in the EU’s efforts to safeguard and advance human rights, democracy and the rule of law, as well as to prevent conflicts globally; whereas state and non-state actors around the world are increasingly censoring, silencing and harassing, among others, HRDs, CSOs, journalists, religious communities, opposition leaders and other vulnerable groups in their work, shrinking the civil space ever further; whereas this behaviour includes measures encompassing strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs), restrictive government policies, transnational repression, defamation campaigns, discrimination, intimidation and violence, including extrajudicial and extraterritorial killings, abductions, and arbitrary arrests and detention; whereas attacks on HRDs are increasingly extending to their families and communities, including those living in exile;

    M. whereas gender equality is a core EU value, and the human rights of women and girls, including their sexual and reproductive rights, continue to be violated across the world; whereas women experience unique and disproportionate impacts from conflicts, climate change and migration, including increased risks of gender-based violence, economic marginalisation and barriers to accessing resources; whereas women HRDs and CSOs continue to experience shrinking space for their critical work, as well as threats of violence, harassment and intimidation;

    N. whereas the past year has been marked by a further proliferation of laws on ‘foreign agents’ or foreign influence, including in countries with EU candidate status, targeting CSOs and media outlets and attempting to prevent them from receiving financial support from abroad, including from the EU and its Member States, fostering a climate of fear and self-censorship;

    O. whereas in 2024, more than half the world’s population went to the polls, and many of these elections were marked by manipulation, disinformation and attempts at interference from inside or outside the country;

    P. whereas the 2024 World Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders (RSF) warns of a decline in the intent of states and other political forces to protect press freedom; whereas, according to RSF, 47 journalists and media workers have been killed, most of them in conflict zones, and 573 have been imprisoned since 1 January 2024;

    Q. whereas 251 million children and young people are deprived of their fundamental right to education and remain out of school, according to the UNESCO Global Education Monitoring Report 2024; whereas girls and women are affected not only by poverty but also by cultural norms, gender bias, child marriage and violence through official, discriminatory policies that prevent them from accessing education and the labour market and attempt to erase them from public life;

    R. whereas at least one million people are unjustly imprisoned for political reasons, among them several laureates and finalists of Parliament’s Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought;

    S. whereas environmental harm and the impacts of climate change are intensifying precariousness, marginalisation and inequality, and increasingly displacing people from their homes or trapping them in unsafe conditions, thereby heightening their vulnerability and jeopardising their human rights;

    Global challenges to democracy and human rights

    1. Reasserts the universality, interdependence, interrelatedness and indivisibility of human rights and the inherent dignity of every human being; reaffirms the duty of the EU and its Member States to promote and protect democracy and the universality of human rights around the world; calls for the EU and its Member States to lead by example, in line with its values, to promote and strictly uphold human rights and international justice;

    2. Insists that respect, protection and fulfilment of human rights and fundamental freedoms must be the cornerstone of the EU’s external policy, in line with its founding principles; strongly encourages the EU and its Member States, to that end, to strive for a continued ambitious commitment to make freedom, democracy and human rights and their protection a central part of all EU policies in a streamlined manner and to enhance the consistency between the EU’s internal and external policies in this field, including through all of its international agreements;

    3. Stresses that the EU must be fully prepared to counter the rise of authoritarianism, totalitarianism and populism, as well as the increasing violations of the principles of universality of human rights, democracy and international humanitarian law;

    4. Condemns the increasing trend of violations and abuses of human rights and democratic principles and values across the world, such as, among others, threats of backsliding on human rights, notably women’s rights, as well as executions, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests and detentions, torture and ill treatment, gender-based violence, clampdowns on civil society, political opponents, marginalised and vulnerable groups including children and elderly people, migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, and  ethnic and religious minorities; condemns, equally, slavery and forced labour, excessive use of violence by public authorities, including violent crackdowns on peaceful protests and other assemblies, systematic and structural discrimination, instrumentalisation of the judiciary, censorship and threats to independent media, including threats in the digital sphere such as online surveillance and internet shutdowns, political attacks against international institutions and the rules-based international order, and increasing use of unlawful methods of war in grave breach of international humanitarian law and human rights law; deplores the weakening of the protection of democratic institutions and processes, and the shrinking space for civil societies around the world; denounces the transnational repression, by illiberal regimes, of citizens and activists who have sought refuge abroad, including on EU soil;

    5. Notes with deep concern the ongoing international crisis of accountability and the challenge to the pursuit of ending impunity for violations of core norms of international human rights and humanitarian law in conflicts around the world; reaffirms the neutrality and importance of humanitarian aid in all conflicts and crises; underlines the serious consequences of discrediting and attacking the organisations of multilateral forums, such as the UN, which can foster a culture of impunity and undermine the trust in and functioning of the UN system; calls for the EU to uphold the international legal system and take effective measures to enforce compliance;

    6. Notes with satisfaction that there are also ‘human rights bright spots’ within this context of major challenges to human rights worldwide; highlights, in particular, the work of CSOs and HRDs; underlines the need for a more strategic communication on human rights and democracy by spreading news about positive results, policies and best practices; supports the Good Human Rights Stories initiative[10] as a way of promoting positive stories about human rights and recommends that it be updated; underlines the role of the EU’s public and cultural diplomacy, as well as international cultural relations, in the promotion of human rights, and calls for the Strategic Communication and Foresight division of the European External Action Service (EEAS) to increase its efforts in this regard;

    Strengthening the EU’s toolbox for the promotion and protection of human rights and democracy around the world

    7. Notes with concern the increasing divide worldwide; stresses the shared responsibility of the EU to continue defending democratic values and principles and human rights, international justice, peace and dignity around the world, which are even more important to defend in the current volatile state of global politics; calls upon the EU to keep communication channels open with different stakeholders and to continue to develop a comprehensive toolbox to strengthen human rights and democracy globally;

    EU action plan on human rights and democracy

    8. Observes that the EU and its Member States have made substantial progress in implementing the EU action plan on human rights and democracy, although they have not reached all of its goals, in part also due to the unprecedented challenges the world has experienced since its adoption; welcomes, in this sense, the extension of the action plan until 2027, with a view to maximising the synergies and complementarity between human rights and democracy at local, national and global levels;

    EU Special Representative (EUSR) for Human Rights

    9. Fully supports the work of the EUSR for Human Rights in contributing to the visibility and coherence of the EU’s human rights actions in its external relations; upholds the EUSR’s central role in the EU’s promotion and protection of human rights by engaging with non-EU countries and like-minded partners; underlines the need for close cooperation between the EUSR for Human Rights and other EUSRs and Special Envoys in order to further improve this coherence, and calls for greater visibility for the role of the EUSR for Human Rights; calls for the EUSR to be supported in his work with increased resources and better coordination with EU delegations around the world; regrets, despite continuous calls, Parliament’s exclusion from the process of selecting the EUSR; insists on the need for the EUSR to report back to Parliament regularly;

    Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe and the human rights and democracy thematic programme

    10. Recalls the fundamental role of the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) – Global Europe, including its thematic programme on human rights and democracy, as a flagship EU instrument in promoting and protecting human rights and democracy around the world; highlights the need to engage with civil society in all the EU’s relevant external activities, including the Global Gateway Strategy which is financed through the NDICI-Global Europe; reiterates the importance of streamlining a human-rights based approach in the EU’s external action instruments; underlines Parliament’s role in the instrument’s programming process and calls on the Commission and the EEAS to share all relevant information in a timely manner in order to enable Parliament to play its role accordingly, in particular during high-level geopolitical dialogues with the Commission and in the mid-term review process as well as in its resolutions; calls on the EEAS and the Commission to ensure that a response is provided to the recommendation letters following each geopolitical dialogue and each resolution; urges the Commission to develop and launch a comprehensive, centralised website dedicated to the NDICI-Global Europe, including information on all the multiannual indicative programmes, detailing their respective budgets, associated actions and the financial allocations they are backing, organised both by country and by theme; notes that the NDICI-Global Europe and all future instruments must focus on the fundamental drivers of ongoing challenges, including the need to strengthen the resilience of local communities and democracy support activities by supporting economic development;

    11. Calls for independent, ex ante assessments to determine the possible implications and risks of projects with regard to human rights, in line with Article 25(5) of  Regulation (EU) 2021/947; calls for independent human rights monitoring throughout the implementation of projects in third countries, especially in relation to projects entailing a high risk of violations; calls for a suspension of projects that (in)directly contribute to human rights violations in non-EU countries; reiterates the prohibition on allocating EU funds to activities that are contrary to EU fundamental values, such as terrorism or extremism; calls on the Commission to share all human rights-related assessments with Parliament in a proactive manner;

    EU trade and international agreements

    12. Reiterates its call to integrate human rights assessments and include robust clauses on human rights in agreements between the EU and non-EU countries, supported by a clear set of benchmarks and procedures to be followed in the event of violations; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to ensure that the human rights clauses in current international agreements are actively monitored and effectively enforced and to improve their communication with Parliament concerning considerations and decisions regarding this enforcement; reiterates that in the face of persistent breaches of human rights clauses by its partner countries, including those related to the Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus programme, the EU should react swiftly and decisively, including by suspending the agreements in question if other options prove ineffective; calls for the EU Ombudsman’s recommendation concerning the creation of a complaint-handling portal to be implemented, within the framework of EU trade and financial instruments, or for the Commission’s Single Entry Point to be adapted to allow complaints regarding failure to comply with human rights clauses to be submitted; calls on the EU institutions to engage regularly with the business community and civil society in order to strengthen the links between international trade, human rights and economic security; calls for the EU to ensure human rights promotion and protection through its Global Gateway investments and projects, by ensuring that they do no harm;

    EU human rights dialogues

    13. Stresses the important role of human rights dialogues within the EU’s human rights toolbox and as a key vehicle for the implementation of the EU action plan on human rights and democracy; highlights that these dialogues must address the overall situation of human rights and democracy with the relevant countries; notes that human rights dialogues should be seen as a key element of sustained EU engagement and not as a free-standing instrument, and that the persistent failure of non-EU countries to genuinely engage in dialogues and to implement key deliverables should lead to the use of other appropriate foreign policy tools; recalls that these dialogues need to be used in conjunction and synergy with other instruments, using a more-for-more and a less-for-less approach; reiterates the need to raise individual cases, in particular those of Sakharov Prize laureates and those highlighted by Parliament in its resolutions, and ensure adequate follow-up; calls on the EEAS and EU delegations to increase the visibility of these dialogues and their outcomes, ensuring that they are results-oriented and based on a clear set of benchmarks that can be included in a published joint press statement, and to conduct suitable follow-up action on it; calls for the enhanced and meaningful involvement of civil society in the dialogues; stresses that genuine CSOs must not be impeded from participating in human rights dialogues and that any dialogue must include all genuine CSOs without any limitations;

    EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (GHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act)

    14. Welcomes the increasing use of the EU GHRSR as a key political tool in the EU’s defence of human rights and democracy across the world; regrets, however, that its use has continued to be limited, especially in the current geopolitical landscape; notes, however, the challenges that the requirement of unanimity poses in the adoption of sanctions and reiterates its call on the Council to introduce qualified majority voting for decisions on the GHRSR; recalls, in this regard, the formal request submitted by Parliament to the Council in 2023, on calling an EU reform convention, with the aim, among others, of increasing the number of decisions taken by qualified majority; calls for a stronger use of the GHRSR and other ad hoc sanctions regimes on those responsible for serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, including high-level officials; fully supports the possibility of imposing targeted anti-corruption sanctions within the EU framework in this regard, which has been a long-standing priority of Parliament, whether through its inclusion in the GHRSR or under a different regime; highlights the need for the complete enforcement of sanctions and calls for circumventions to be tackled;

    Democracy support activities

    15. Reiterates its concern regarding the increasing attacks by authoritarian and illiberal regimes on democratic principles, values and pluralism; stresses that the defence and support of democracy around the world is increasingly becoming of geopolitical and strategic interest; emphasises the importance of Parliament’s efforts in capacity-building for partner parliaments, promoting mediation and encouraging a culture of dialogue and compromise, especially among young political leaders, and empowering women parliamentarians, HRDs and representatives from civil society and independent media; reiterates its call on the Commission to continue and expand its activities in these areas by increasing funding and support for EU bodies, agencies and other grant-based organisations; stresses the critical importance of directly supporting civil society and persons expressing dissenting views, particularly in the current climate of growing global tensions and repression in increasing numbers of countries; reiterates the importance of EU election observation missions and Parliament’s contribution to developing and enhancing their methodology; calls for the development of an EU toolbox to be used in cases of disputed or non-transparent election results in order to prevent political and military crises in the post-election environment; calls for enhanced EU action to counter manipulative and false messages against the EU in election campaigns, in particular in countries that receive significant EU humanitarian and development assistance and in countries that are candidates for EU membership; calls for enhanced collaboration between Parliament’s Democracy Support and Election Coordination Group, the relevant Commission directorates-general and the EEAS;

    EU support for human rights defenders

    16. Is extremely concerned by the continuing restriction of civil society space and rising threats to the work of HRDs and members of CSOs, as well as their families, communities and lawyers, and finds particularly concerning the increasingly sophisticated means used to persecute them; strongly condemns their arbitrary detentions and killings; deplores the harassment of CSOs through legislative provisions such as foreign agents laws and similar, and other restrictions they face; deplores the fact that women HRDs continue to face relentless and ever more sophisticated violations against them, including targeted killings, physical attacks, disappearances, smear campaigns, arrests, judicial harassment and intimidation; notes with concern that these attacks seem designed to systematically silence women HRDs and erase their voices from the public sphere; supports wholeheartedly the work of HRDs and EU action to ensure their protection worldwide; underscores the pressing need for a comprehensive and timely revision of the EU Guidelines on HRDs, with a view to addressing the emerging challenges and threats, and to ensuring their applicability and effectiveness in the protection of HRDs globally, while integrating gender-sensitive and intersectional approaches in the updated Guidelines, reflecting the diverse backgrounds and experiences of HRDs, and taking into account the specific vulnerabilities they may face; calls for the complete and consistent application of the EU Guidelines on HRDs by the EU and its Member States; calls for efforts to enhance communication strategies to increase the visibility of EU actions and channels for the protection of and the support mechanisms for HRDs;

    17. Raises serious concerns over the increasing phenomenon of transnational repression against HRDs, journalists and civil society; calls for the formulation of an EU strategy harmonising national responses to transnational repression;

    18. Expresses deep concern regarding the increasingly precarious financial landscape faced by HRDs and communities advocating for rights, particularly within a global context characterised by intensifying repression; notes that, as a result of the current geopolitical context, HRDs’ need for support has increased; calls, therefore, for the EU and its Member States to make full use of their financial support for HRDs, ensuring the establishment of flexible, accessible and sustained funding mechanisms that enable these defenders to continue their vital work in the face of mounting challenges;

    19. Insists that the EEAS, the Commission and the EU delegations pay particular attention to the situation of the Sakharov Prize laureates and finalists at risk and take resolute action, in coordination with the Member States and Parliament, to ensure their well-being, safety or liberation;

    20. Welcomes the update of the EU Visa Code Handbook in relation to HRDs and calls for its full and consistent application by the Member States; reiterates its call for the Commission to take a proactive role in the establishment of a coordinated approach among the Member States for HRDs at risk, for instance streamlining visa procedures and promoting harmonisation in the EU’s visa application process;

    Combating impunity and corruption

    21. Underlines that both impunity and corruption enable and aggravate human rights violations and abuses and the erosion of democratic principles; welcomes the anti-corruption actions in EU external policies in the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 3 May 2023 on the fight against corruption (JOIN(2023)0012); supports the anti-corruption provisions included in the EU trade agreements with non-EU countries; stresses the important role of civil society and journalists in non-EU countries in the oversight of the fight against impunity and corruption; calls for the EU and its Member States to increase their efforts in justice reforms, the fight against impunity, and the improvement of transparency and of anti-corruption institutions in non-EU countries; encourages the EU and its Member States to coordinate more closely with allies and partners wherever possible in order to counter systemic corruption that enables autocrats to maintain power, deprives societies of key resources and undermines democracy, human rights and the rule of law;

    22. Insists on the need for the EU to take clear steps to recognise the close link between corruption and human rights violations in order to target economic and financial enablers of human rights abusers;

    EU actions at multilateral level

    23. Reaffirms that promoting the respect, protection and fulfilment of human rights around the world requires strong international cooperation at a multilateral level; underlines the particularly important role of the UN and its bodies as the main forum which must be able to effectively advance efforts for peace and security, sustainable development and respect for human rights and international law; calls for the EU and its Member States to continue supporting the work of the UN, its agencies and special procedures, both politically and financially, to ensure that it is fit for purpose, and to push back against the influence of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes; stresses that the current multilateral order needs to fully incorporate into its architecture the new global actors, especially those focusing on democracy and human rights; reiterates the need for the EU and its Member States to speak with one voice at the UN and in other multilateral forums in order to effectively tackle global challenges to human rights and democracy in multilateral forums and to support the strongest possible language in line with international human rights standards; calls, to this end, for progress in ensuring that the EU has a seat in international organisations, including the UN Security Council, in addition to the existing Member States’ seats; calls for EU delegations to play a stronger role in multilateral forums, for which they should have appropriate resources available;

    24. Is deeply concerned by growing attacks against the rules-based global order by authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, including through unprovoked and unjustified aggression against peaceful neighbours and through the undermining of the functioning of UN bodies, namely the abuse of veto power at the UN Security Council; underlines that the diminished effectiveness of these bodies brings with it real costs in terms of conflicts, lives lost and human suffering, and seriously weakens the general ability of countries to deal with global challenges; calls on the Member States and like minded partners to develop a robust strategy and to intensify their efforts to reverse this trend and to send a united and strong message of support to those organisations when they are attacked or threatened; believes that the UN, its bodies, and other multilateral organisations are in need of reform, in order to address these growing challenges and threats;

    25. Reiterates the strong support of the EU for the International Court of Justice and the ICC as essential, independent and impartial jurisdictional institutions amid a particularly challenging time for international justice; recalls that a well-funded ICC is essential for the effective prosecution of serious international crimes; welcomes the political and financial support the EU has given to the ICC, including the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the ICC, and the launch of the ‘Global initiative to fight against impunity for international crimes’ offering financial support to CSOs dedicated to fostering justice and accountability for international crimes and serious human rights violations, including by facilitating survivors’ participation in legal proceedings; calls for the EU and its Member States to continue and intensify their support to the ICC – including to the ICC Trust Fund for Victims – with the necessary means, including resources and political backing, and to use all instruments at their disposal to combat impunity worldwide and enable the ICC to fulfil its mandate effectively; calls on all the Member States to respect and implement the actions and decisions of the International Court of Justice and all organs of the ICC, including the OTP and the Chambers, to urge other countries to join and cooperate with the court, including to enforce ICC arrest warrants, and to support their work as an independent and impartial international justice institution everywhere in the world; regrets the failure of some ICC member states to execute ICC arrest warrants, thereby undermining the court’s work; calls for the EU to urge non-EU countries, including its major partners, to recognise the ICC and become a state party to the Rome Statute;

    26. Stresses the importance of not politicising the ICC, as trust in the court is eroded if its mandate is misused; condemns, in particular and in the most critical terms, the political attacks, sanctions and other coercive measures introduced or envisaged against the ICC itself and against its staff; calls on the Member States and the EU institutions to cooperate to work on solutions in order to protect the institution of the ICC and its staff from any future sanctions that would threaten the functioning of the court;

    27. Recognises universal jurisdiction as an important tool of the international criminal justice system to prevent and combat impunity and promote international accountability; calls on the Member States to apply universal jurisdiction in the fight against impunity;

    28. Calls for the EU and its Member States to lead the global fight against all forms of extremism and welcomes the adoption of an EU strategy to this end; demands that the fight against terrorism be at the top of the EU’s domestic and foreign affairs agenda;

    Upholding international humanitarian law

    29. Notes with concern the increasing disregard for international humanitarian law and international human rights law, particularly in the form of ongoing conflicts around the world; strongly condemns the increase in deliberate, indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks on civilians and civilian objects in multiple conflict settings; underlines that it is of the utmost importance that all UN and humanitarian aid agencies are able to provide full, timely and unhindered assistance to all people in vulnerable situations and calls on all parties to armed conflicts to fully respect the work of these agencies and ensure they can meet the basic needs of civilians without interference; denounces attempts to undermine UN agencies delivering humanitarian aid; urges all parties to armed conflicts to protect civilian populations, humanitarian and medical workers, and journalists and media workers; calls on all parties to armed conflicts to respect the legitimacy and inviolability of UN peacekeeping missions; calls on all states to unconditionally and fully conform with international humanitarian law; calls on the international community, and the Member States in particular, to promote accountability and the fight against impunity for grave breaches of international humanitarian law; calls for the systematic creation of humanitarian corridors in regions at war and in combat situations, whenever necessary, in order to allow civilians at risk to escape conflicts, and strongly condemns any attacks on them; demands unhindered access for humanitarian organisations monitoring and assisting prisoners of war, as provided for in the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War; expects international organisations to abide by international law regarding the treatment of prisoners of war; calls for international cooperation and assistance in the return of forcibly deported persons, in particular children and hostages;

    30. Reiterates its call on the Member States to help contain armed conflicts and serious violations of human rights or international humanitarian law by strictly abiding by the provisions of Article 7 of the UN Arms Trade Treaty of 2 April 2013 on Export and Export Assessment and Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment;

    31. Given the gendered impacts of armed conflicts, deplores the insufficient priority and focus given to sexual and gender-based violence and to sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) across the EU’s humanitarian and refugee response; reiterates that humanitarian crises intensify SRHR- and gender-related challenges and recalls that in crisis zones, particularly among vulnerable groups such as refugees and migrants, women and girls are particularly exposed to sexual violence, sexually transmitted diseases, sexual exploitation, rape as a weapon of war and unwanted pregnancies; calls on the Commission and the Member States to give high priority to gender equality and SRHR in their humanitarian aid and refugee response, as well as accountability and access to justice and redress for sexual and reproductive rights violations and gender-based violence, including in terms of training for humanitarian actors, and existing and future funding;

    Team Europe approach

    32. Recognises the potential for stronger alignment in approaches to human rights protection and promotion between EU institutions, Member States’ embassies and EU delegations in non-EU countries, particularly in encouraging those countries to comply with their international obligations and to refrain from harassment and persecution of critical voices; emphasises the opportunity for Member States’ embassies to take an increasingly active role in advancing and safeguarding human rights, while also supporting civil society in these countries; calls for the EU and its Member States to use all possible means to urge countries to release political prisoners; highlights the importance of shared responsibility between Member States and EU delegations in these efforts; calls for the EU and its Member States to intensify their collective efforts to promote the respect, protection and fulfilment of human rights and to support democracy worldwide; encourages careful monitoring and assessment of the capacity of EU delegations to ensure that each one has a designated point of contact for cases of human rights violations, and that this mandate is allocated sufficient resources to respond in an effective and timely manner; reiterates, in this context, the importance, for the EU delegations, of existing EU guidelines related to specific areas of human rights;

    Responding to universal human rights and democracy challenges

    Right to freedom from torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment

    33. Condemns any action or attempt to legalise, instigate, authorise, consent or acquiesce to torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment methods under any circumstances; condemns the increasing reports of the use of torture by state actors in many different contexts, including in custodial and extra-custodial settings – of political prisoners, among others – and in conflict situations around the world, notably in violation of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War, as well as the killing of prisoners of war, which amounts to a war crime, and reiterates the non-derogable nature of the right to be free from torture or other forms of inhuman or degrading treatment; reiterates the EU’s zero-tolerance policy to torture and other ill-treatment and calls on the relevant institutions, including the European Court of Human Rights, to take a thorough stance on any such case;

    34. Reiterates its calls for universal ratification of the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and its Optional Protocol thereto, and for the need for states to bring their national provisions in this respect in line with international standards; reiterates, in accordance with the revised Guidelines on the EU’s policy towards third countries on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, adopted by the Council on 16 September 2019, the importance of engaging with relevant stakeholders in the fight to eradicate torture, and to monitor places of detention;

    Right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association

    35. Reiterates the need to protect the EU democratic space and the exercise of fundamental freedoms therein, particularly freedoms of assembly and association; highlights the growing violent repression of protest and peaceful assemblies within the EU civic space, with cases of torture and ill-treatment resulting in deaths and other serious violations; underscores the need to strengthen this fundamental right in conjunction with the absolute prohibition of torture and ill-treatment;

    Right to food, water and sanitation

    36. Recalls that the right to food, including having physical and economic access to adequate food or the means to its procurement, is a human right; is extremely concerned about the challenges to the right to food worldwide, especially in situations of war and conflicts; condemns the increasing reports of the weaponisation of food in situations of armed conflict; calls for the EU and its Member States to promote mandatory guidelines on the right to food without discrimination within the UN system; urges the EU and the Member States to fully support, politically and financially, organisations and agencies working to secure the right to food in conflict zones; recalls the importance of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas in view of attaining food security; commends the work of the UN World Food Programme, in this regard;

    37. Reaffirms the rights to safe drinking water and to sanitation as human rights, both rights being complementary; underlines that access to clean drinking water is indispensable to a healthy and dignified life and is essential for the maintenance of human dignity; highlights the fact that the right to water is a fundamental precondition for the enjoyment of other rights, and as such must be guided by a logic grounded in the public interest, and in common public and global goods; underscores the importance of the EU Guidelines on safe drinking water and sanitation, and urges the EU institutions and the Member States to implement and promote their application in non-EU countries and in multilateral forums;

    Climate change and the environment

    38. Highlights that climate change and its impact on the environment has direct effects on the effective enjoyment of all human rights; recognises the important work of CSOs, indigenous peoples and local communities, land and environmental HRDs and indigenous activists for the protection of a clean, healthy and sustainable environment, including access to land and water sources; deplores the risks that environmental HRDs and indigenous activists face and calls for their effective protection to be guaranteed; notes that communities contributing the least to climate change are the ones more likely to be affected by climate risks and natural disasters and calls, in this regard, for increasing support to the most vulnerable groups; recalls that indigenous peoples and local communities play an important role in the sustainable management of natural resources and the conservation of biodiversity; recalls that the transition to clean energy must be fair and respect everyone’s fundamental rights; reiterates the importance of the achievement of the UN sustainable development goals (SDGs) for the protection of the human rights of present and future generations;

    39. Notes with deep concern the increasing threats to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment posed by the deployment of weapons of mass destruction and other forms of warfare that adversely and disproportionately affect the environment; stresses the need to effectively address the displacement of people caused by environmental destruction and climate change, which increases the risk of human rights violations and heightens vulnerabilities to different forms of exploitation; recognises that children face more acute risks from climate-related disasters and are also one of the largest groups to be affected; calls for the EU to focus on addressing the impacts of climate change on the enjoyment of the rights of the child;

    Rights of the child

    40. Calls for a systematic and consistent approach to promoting and defending children’s rights, including for those most marginalised and those in the most vulnerable situations, through all of the EU’s external policies; calls for more concerted efforts to promote the respect, protection and fulfilment of children’s rights in crisis or emergency situations; condemns the decline in respect for the rights of the child and the increasing violations and abuses of these rights, including through violence, early and forced marriage, sexual abuse including genital mutilation, trafficking, child labour, honour killings, recruitment of child soldiers, lack of access to education and healthcare, malnutrition and extreme poverty; further condemns the increase in deaths of children in situations of armed conflict and stresses the need for effective protection of children’s rights in active warfare; calls for new EU initiatives to promote and protect children’s rights, with a view to rehabilitating and reintegrating conflict-affected children, ensuring that they have a protected, family- and community-based environment as a natural context for their lives, in which assistance and education are fundamental elements; reiterates its call for a systematic and consistent approach to promoting and defending children’s rights through all EU external policies; calls on all countries to ratify the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child as a matter of urgency, in order to allow for the universal ratification of this foundational instrument;

    41. Stresses the importance of closing the financing gap that would enable countries to meet their SDG 4 targets on quality education and ensure access to education for all children and young people; reiterates its calls to address cultural norms and gender biases that prevent girls and women from receiving an education and urges the creation of gender-responsive education systems worldwide;

    42. Stresses that education represents the starting point for cultivating principles and values that contribute to the personal development of children, as well as to social cohesion and democracy, and the rule of law around the world; to that end calls for the EU to promote its values through supporting access to education and learning for women and girls;

    Rights of women and gender equality

    43. Stresses that women’s rights and gender equality are indispensable and indivisible human rights, as well as a basis for the rule of law and inclusive resilient democracies; deplores the fact that millions of women and girls continue to experience discrimination and violence, especially in the context of conflicts, post-conflict situations and displacements, and are denied their dignity, autonomy and even life; condemns the impunity with which perpetrators commit violations against women HRDs; is appalled by the use of rape and sexual violence as a weapon of war and stresses the need to shed light on these instances, and for better international cooperation on fighting impunity for these crimes; calls for the EU, its Member States and like-minded partners to step up their efforts to ensure the full enjoyment and protection of women’s and girls’ human rights, and to incorporate a gender mainstreaming approach across all policies, taking into account the differentiated impacts of global challenges such as climate change or conflicts; condemns in the strongest terms the increasing attacks on SRHR around the world, as well as gender-based violence; strongly deplores cases of female genital mutilation, honour killings, child marriages and forced marriages; welcomes the accession of the EU to the Istanbul Convention and strongly encourages the remaining EU Member States to ratify the Istanbul Convention without further delay; calls for the EU and its international partners to strengthen their efforts to ensure that women fully enjoy human rights and are treated equally to men; emphasises the importance of safeguarding the rights of women, ensuring that their health, safety and dignity are protected, particularly in the context of healthcare access and workplace protections; underlines the need to keep opposing and condemning, in the strongest terms, anti-abortion laws that punish women and girls with decades-long jail sentences, even in cases of rape, incest or when the life of the pregnant woman is at risk; stresses the need to pursue efforts to fully eradicate the practice of female genital mutilation; fully supports the role of the EU Ambassador for Gender and Diversity;

    44. Recognises that gender apartheid constitutes a systematic and institutionalised form of oppression, depriving women and girls of fundamental rights solely on the basis of their gender; notes with deep concern the entrenchment of gender apartheid in certain regions, where women face extensive restrictions on education, employment, healthcare and freedom of movement, often underpinned by legal and cultural frameworks that reinforce gender-based discrimination; urges the EU and the Member States to proactively address gender apartheid through strengthened diplomatic efforts, targeted economic measures and accountability mechanisms that support civil society organisations advocating for gender equality; calls for the formal recognition of gender apartheid as a distinct human rights violation and for support for international initiatives for its classification as a crime against humanity, thus contributing to the establishment of a global accountability standard;

    Rights of refugees and asylum seekers

    45. Denounces the erosion of the human rights and the safety of refugees, asylum seekers and forcibly displaced persons; reaffirms their inalienable human rights and fundamental right to seek asylum; recalls the obligation of states to protect them in accordance with international law; underlines the importance of identification and registration of individuals, including children, as a key tool for protecting refugees and ensuring the integrity of refugee protection systems, preventing human trafficking and the recruitment of children into armed militias; calls for the EU and its Member States to effectively uphold their rights in the EU’s asylum and migration policy and in the EU’s cooperation with partner countries in this regard; deplores the increasing xenophobia, racism and discrimination towards migrants, as well as the different forms of violence they face, including during their displacement, and the many barriers they face, including in access to healthcare; condemns the instrumentalisation of migration at EU borders by foreign actors, which constitutes hybrid attacks against the Member States as well as a dehumanisation of migrants; stresses that the EU should step up its efforts to acknowledge and develop ways to address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement, building the resilience of migrants’ communities of origin and helping them offer their members the possibility to enjoy a decent life in their home country; calls for the EU and its Member States to continue and, where possible, step up their support for countries hosting the most refugees, as well as for transit countries; reiterates that close cooperation and engagement with non-EU countries, with full respect for fundamental rights, remain key to preventing migrant smuggling; stresses, in this regard, that the dissemination of information and awareness-raising campaigns on the risks of smuggling are crucial, as well as of the migration laws of the destination countries, in order to prevent the undertaking of unnecessarily risky journeys by those who do not have grounds for asylum; calls for EU-funded humanitarian operations to take into consideration the specific needs and vulnerabilities of children and to ensure their protection while they are displaced; underlines the importance of developing an effective framework of safe and legal pathways to the EU and welcomes, in this regard, the Commission communication on attracting skills and talent to the EU[11], including the development of talent partnerships with partner countries; calls for respect for the principle of non-refoulement to countries where the life and liberty of people would be threatened; calls for the EU and its Member States to discuss the phenomenon of instrumentalised migration orchestrated by authoritarian regimes and organised crime groups, and emphasises the need to conduct a comprehensive analysis of this phenomenon, develop effective countermeasures, and consider its implications for the human rights framework;

    46. Reaffirms that no agreement with a non-EU country designated as a transit country should be concluded without Parliament’s scrutiny, and calls on the Commission and the Member States to include robust human rights clauses, monitoring mechanisms and impact assessments therein; reiterates its call on the Commission to integrate ex ante human rights impact assessments into such agreements;

    Rights of LGBTIQ+ persons

    47. Deplores the human rights violations, including discrimination, persecution, violence and killings, against lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, non-binary, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ+) persons around the world; is extremely concerned by the spreading of hatred and anti-LGBTIQ+ narratives and legislation that target LGBTIQ+ persons and HRDs; calls for the adoption of policies that protect LGBTIQ+ people and give them the tools to safely report a violation of their rights, in line with the EU Guidelines to Promote and Protect the Enjoyment of all Human Rights by LGBTI Persons; expresses special concern over LGBTIQ+ people living under non-democratic regimes or in conflict situations, and calls for rapid response mechanisms to protect them as well as their defenders; reiterates its calls for the full implementation of the LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025 as the EU’s tool for improving the situation of LGBTIQ+ people around the world; calls for  the use of the death penalty to be rejected under all circumstances, including any legislation that would impose the death penalty for homosexuality; calls for the EU and its Member States to further engage the countries with such legislation in reconsidering their position on the death penalty; notes further that the imposition of the death penalty on the basis of such legislation is arbitrary killing per se, and a breach of Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

    Rights of persons with disabilities

    48. Is concerned by the challenges to the full enjoyment of the rights of persons with disabilities; reiterates its calls for the EU to assist partner countries in the development of policies in support of carers of persons with disabilities; calls for the raising of social awareness and the combating of discriminatory behaviours against persons with disabilities; points to the additional complications faced by persons with disabilities in conflict situations and natural disasters, as they are more vulnerable to violence and often do not receive adequate support; urges all parties to conflict situations worldwide to take adequate measures to mitigate the risks to them as much as possible; emphasises the need to safeguard children with disabilities from any form of exploitation; calls for the EU, in its external policy, to make use of the strategy for the rights of persons with disabilities 2021-2030 as a tool to improve the situation of persons with disabilities, particularly concerning poverty and discrimination, but also problems with access to education, healthcare and employment, and participation in political life; encourages the EU to support partner countries in developing inclusive economic policies that promote accessible vocational training and employment opportunities for persons with disabilities, fostering their full and active economic participation;

    Rights of elderly people

    49. Reiterates its call for the EU and its Member States to develop new avenues to strengthen the rights of elderly people, taking into account the multiple challenges they face, such as age-based discrimination, poverty, violence and a lack of social protection, healthcare and other essential services, as well as barriers to employment; calls for the implementation of specific measures to combat the risk of poverty for older women through increased social support; underlines the work of the UN Open-ended Working Group on Ageing on a legally binding instrument to strengthen the protection of the human rights of older people and calls for the EU and its Member States to consider actively supporting that work; stresses the need for a cross-cutting intergenerational approach in EU policies, in order to build and encourage solidarity between young people and elderly people;

    Right to equality and non-discrimination

    50. Reiterates its condemnation of all forms of racism, intolerance, antisemitism, Islamophobia, persecution of Christians, xenophobia and discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, nationality, social class, disability, caste, religion, belief, age, sexual orientation or gender identity; condemns the growing international threat of hate speech and speech that incites violence, including online; reiterates the crucial role of education and dialogue in promoting tolerance, understanding and diversity; calls for the adoption or the strengthening of mechanisms for reporting discriminatory behaviours as well as access to effective legal remedies, to help end the impunity of those who engage in this behaviour;

    Right to life: towards the universal abolition of the death penalty

    51. Reiterates its principled opposition to the death penalty, which is irreversible and incompatible with the right to life and with the prohibition of torture, and a cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment; stresses that the EU must be relentless in its pursuit of the universal abolition of the death penalty as a major objective of its human rights foreign policy; notes that despite the trend in some non-EU countries to take steps towards abolishing the death penalty, significant challenges in this regard still exist; deplores the fact that in other non-EU countries the number of death sentences that have been carried out has reached its highest level in the last five years; reiterates its call for all countries to completely abolish the death penalty or establish an immediate moratorium on the use of the death penalty (sentences and executions) as a first step towards its abolition; urges, in this regard, the EU to intensify diplomatic engagement with countries that continue to practise the death penalty, encouraging dialogue and cooperation on human rights issues and providing support for the development of judicial reforms that could lead towards its abolition;

    Right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief

    52. Reiterates its concern regarding violations of the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief; is concerned about the worldwide increase in intolerance towards different religious communities; deplores the instrumentalisation of religious or belief identities for political purposes and the exclusion of persons belonging to religious and belief minorities and religious communities, including from political participation, as well as the destruction and vandalism of sites and works of art of cultural and historical value, in certain non-EU countries; stresses that the freedom to choose one’s religion, to believe or not to believe is a human right that cannot be punished; condemns, therefore, the existence and implementation of so-called apostasy laws and blasphemy laws that lead to harsh penalties, degrading treatment and, in some cases, even to death sentences; calls for the abolition of apostasy laws and blasphemy laws; stresses that the Special Envoy for the promotion and protection of freedom of religion or belief outside the EU should be granted more resources so that he can efficiently carry out his mandate; highlights the need for the Special Envoy to continue to work closely and in a complementary manner with the EUSR for Human Rights and the Council Working Party on Human Rights; calls for the EU and its Member States to step up their efforts to protect the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, to raise these issues at UN human rights forums and to continue working with the relevant UN mechanisms and committees; calls for the EU to request and consolidate reports by EU delegations on the state of freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief;

    53. Recalls that most of the drivers of violent conflicts worldwide involve minority grievances of exclusion, discrimination and inequalities linked to violations of the human rights of minorities, as observed by the UN Special Rapporteur on minority issues; stresses the need to mainstream the protection of the rights of minorities and for the development of protection mechanisms at the level of the UN; recalls the obligations of states to protect the rights of their national, ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic minorities within their respective territories; calls on the Commission to support the protection of the rights of persons belonging to minorities worldwide, including this as a priority under the human rights and democracy thematic programme of the EU’s NDICI-Global Europe;

    Right to freedom of expression, academic freedom, media freedom and the right to information

    54. Emphasises the critical significance of freedom of expression and access to trustworthy and diverse sources of information for sustaining democracy and a thriving civic space; recalls that democracies can only function when citizens have access to independent and reliable information, making journalists key players in the safeguarding of democracy; is therefore seriously concerned about the increasing restrictions on freedom of expression in numerous countries worldwide, particularly for journalists, through censorship, enforced self-censorship, so-called foreign agents laws and the misuse of counter-terrorism or anti-corruption laws to suppress journalists and civil society groups; is concerned by the use of hate speech against journalists, both online and offline, leading to a deterrent effect; raises concerns, additionally, about the physical security of journalists and media workers and their being targeted in conflict zones; notes the number of journalists killed in conflict situations in 2023, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists, has increased alarmingly – by 85 % – since 2022;

    55. Calls urgently for the EU to back trustworthy media and information outlets that promote the accountability of authorities and support democratic transitions, while stressing the need to preserve the principles of pluralism, transparency and independence; highlights the role played by fact checkers in the media landscape, ensuring that the public can trust the information they receive; is concerned that they are therefore major targets for attacks by illiberal regimes that originate and disseminate disinformation, propaganda and fake news; condemns the extensive use of SLAPPs to silence journalists, activists, trade unionists and HRDs globally; welcomes, in this context, the directive designed to shield journalists and HRDs from abusive legal actions and SLAPPs; encourages lawmakers in non-EU countries to develop legislation with the same goal, as part of broader efforts to promote and protect media freedom and pluralism; requests that attacks on media freedom, as well as the persistent and systematic erosion of the right to information, be taken into account in the EU’s monitoring of the compliance of international agreements;

    56. Welcomes the Commission’s plan to finance initiatives that support journalists on legal and practical matters, including beyond the EU, through the European Democracy Action Plan; calls for the EU to strengthen its efforts to aid targeted journalists globally, recalling that independent journalists are on the frontline of the fight against disinformation, which undermines democracies; acknowledges the contribution to achieving this goal of programmes such as the now-defunct Media4Democracy and other EU-funded activities, including those of the European Endowment for Democracy; urges the EU to help make reliable news sources available to more people living in countries that restrict press freedom;

    57. Remains deeply concerned by the deteriorating state of press freedom around the world; condemns the censorship of journalists, HRDs and CSOs through the application of so-called foreign agents laws, as well as other legislative and non-legislative measures adopted by authoritarian and illiberal regimes;

    58. Reaffirms its commitment to protecting and promoting academic freedom as a key component of open and democratic societies; underlines the attacks to academic freedom not only by authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, but also by extreme and populist forces worldwide; calls for the development of benchmarks for academic freedom into institutional quality assurance within academic rankings, procedures and criteria;

    59. Notes with concern that more than half of the world’s population lives within environments of completely or severely restricted levels of academic freedom, which has severe consequences for the right to education, the enjoyment of the benefits of scientific progress and the freedom of opinion and expression; urges the EU and its Member States to step up their efforts to halt censorship, threats or attacks on academic freedom, and especially the imprisonment of scholars worldwide; welcomes the inclusion of academics at risk in the EU Human Rights Defenders Mechanism; calls on the Commission to ensure continued high-level support for the Global Campus of Human Rights, which has provided a safe space for students and scholars who had to flee their countries for defending democracy and human rights;

    Rights of indigenous peoples

    60. Notes with regret that indigenous peoples continue to face widespread and systematic discrimination and persecution worldwide, including forced displacements; condemns arbitrary arrests and the killing of human rights and land defenders who stand up for the rights of indigenous peoples; stresses that the promotion of the rights of indigenous peoples and their traditional practices are key to achieving sustainable development, combating climate change and conserving biodiversity; urges governments to pursue development and environmental policies that respect economic, social and cultural rights, and that are inclusive of indigenous peoples and local populations, in line with the UN SDGs; reiterates its call for the EU, its Member States and their partners in the international community to adopt all necessary measures for the recognition, protection and promotion of the rights of indigenous people, including as regards their languages, lands, territories and resources, as set out in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, including the principle of free, prior and informed consent; calls on all states to ensure that indigenous peoples and local communities are included in the deliberations and decision-making processes of international climate diplomacy; encourages the Commission to continue to promote dialogue and collaboration between indigenous peoples and the EU;

    Right to public participation

    61. Deplores that the right to participate in free and fair elections is not respected in authoritarian, illiberal, and totalitarian regimes; highlights that these regimes conduct fake elections with the aim of entrenching their power, as they lack real political contestation and pluralism; is alarmed by current trends in electoral processes, such as the increasing decline in electoral participation and democratic performance or the growing disputes concerning the credibility of elections; highlights with deep concern the growing interference by some states in other countries’ elections through hybrid tactics; reaffirms the necessity of increasing political representation of women, young people and vulnerable groups and to guarantee the public participation of minorities; underlines that distrust in the electoral process can be exacerbated not only by irregularities but also by public statements, including from participants; emphasises that public perception of electoral process is as crucial as the process itself, as its manipulation can lead to polarisation or targeted attacks; calls on non-EU countries to reinforce their efforts to clearly communicate all the steps of their respective electoral processes and systems, as well as the existing accountability mechanisms in case of irregularities; calls on the EEAS and the Commission to analyse and report to Parliament their initiatives to tackle the challenges posed by articifical intelligence (AI) in electoral processes;

    Human rights, business and trade

    62. Stresses the role of trade as a major instrument to promote and improve the human rights situation in the EU’s partner countries; urges the Commission to improve coordination between the EU’s trade, investment and development policies and prioritise and promote the development of human rights through EU trade policies, including the Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus; notes, however, that there has been little to no improvement in some of the countries concerned; stresses the responsibilities of states and other actors, such as corporations, to mitigate the effects of climate change, prevent their negative impact on human rights and promote appropriate policies in compliance with human rights obligations; deplores the detrimental effects of some excessive and exploitative business activities on human rights and democracy; welcomes the harmonisation resulting from the adoption of the Directive on corporate sustainability due diligence with binding EU rules on responsible corporate behaviour with regard to human, labour and environmental rights; further welcomes the Regulation on prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union market[12] and calls for its swift implementation at Member State level; calls for the implementation of the EU Ombudsman’s recommendation concerning the creation of a complaint-handling portal, within the framework of EU trade and financial instruments, and for the adaptation of the Commission’s Single Entry Point to allow for the submission of complaints regarding failures to comply with human rights clauses, which should be accessible, citizen-friendly and transparent; calls for the EU to continue its efforts to eliminate child labour, and forced and bonded labour; stresses the importance of remediation and access to justice measures that are in line with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, including financial and non-financial measures in consultation with the victims; calls on the Council to adopt an ambitious mandate for the EU to engage in the ongoing negotiations on the UN legally binding instrument on business and human rights as soon as possible;

    63. Highlights that in many regions of the world, micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) are often the driving force of local economies with an increasing number of women running them; underlines that MSMEs account for 90 % of businesses, 60 to 70 % of employment and 50 % of gross domestic product worldwide; highlights the importance of MSMEs in their contribution to the 2030 Agenda and the achievement of the SDGs, namely those on the eradication of poverty and decent working conditions for all;

    Human rights and digital technologies

    64. Is concerned by the threat that AI can pose to democracy and human rights, especially if it is not duly regulated; highlights the need for oversight, robust transparency and appropriate safeguards for new and emergent technologies, as well as a human-rights based approach; welcomes the Council conclusions on Digital Diplomacy of 26 June 2023 to strengthen the EU’s role and leadership in global digital governance, in particular its position as a shaper of the global digital rulebook based on democratic principles; welcomes, in this regard, the adoption of the EU Artificial Intelligence Act which aims to harmonise the rules on AI for protecting human rights, and the advantages that AI can bring to human wellbeing; is deeply concerned about the harmful consequences of the misuse of AI and deepfakes, particularly for women and children; notes with concern the adverse effects of the ‘fake content industry’ on the right to information and press freedom, including the rapid development of AI and the subsequent empowerment of the disinformation industry[13]; condemns the use of new and emerging technologies, such as facial recognition technology and digital surveillance, as coercive instruments and their use in the increasing harassment, intimidation and persecution of HRDs, activists, journalists and lawyers; calls on the Council for the listing under the EUGHRSR of state and non-state actors that are engaging in these practices; notes with concern the rapid development of AI in military applications, as well as the potential development and deployment of autonomous systems that could make life-or-death decisions without human input;

    65. Recalls that the international trade in spyware to non-EU countries where such tools are used against human rights activists, journalists and government critics, is a violation of the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter;

    66. Welcomes the adoption in May 2024 of the first Council of Europe Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law, aimed at ensuring that activities within the entire life cycle of AI systems are fully consistent with human rights, democracy and the rule of law; reiterates the need for greater legislative attention to be paid to the profound changes arising from activities within the life cycle of AI systems, which have the potential to promote human prosperity, individual and social well-being, sustainable development, gender equality, and the empowerment of all women and girls, but also pose the risk of creating or exacerbating inequalities and incentivising cyber and physical violence, including violence experienced by women and individuals in vulnerable situations;

    67. Stresses that the internet should be a place where freedom of expression prevails; considers, nevertheless, that the rights of individuals need to be respected; is of the opinion that, where applicable, what is considered to be illegal offline, should be considered illegal online; expresses concern for the growing number of internet shutdowns; highlights that internet shutdowns are often used by authoritarian regimes, among others, to silence political dissidence and curb political freedom; calls urgently for the EU to combat this alarming phenomenon, including considering allowing EU-based providers to offer safe communication tools to people who have been thereby deprived of online access; urges the EU to take a firm stance against any attempts by tech giants to circumvent or undermine national legal systems and independent court decisions, and to protect democratic principles and implement measures to maintain the integrity of elections, as well as to protect the right to information, especially during electoral periods;

    °

    ° °

    68. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European Union Special Representative for Human Rights, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the United Nations Security Council, the United Nations Secretary-General, the President of the 79th session of the United Nations General Assembly, the President of the United Nations Human Rights Council, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the European Union Heads of Delegation.

    EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

    Each year, the European Parliament adopts three annual reports on the EU’s foreign, security and defence, and human rights policies.

     

    The three reports are on:

     

     the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy – annual report 2024 (based on the report of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Policy to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy) – competence of the AFET Committee,

     Human Rights and Democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter – annual report 2024 (based on the EU Annual report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World) – competence of the DROI Subcommittee, and

     the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy – annual report 2024 (based on the report of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Policy to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy) – competence of the SEDE Subcommittee.

     

    These reports monitor and assess the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, including the EU policy on Human Rights and the Common Security and Defence Policy. They are a key component of the European Parliament’s contribution to EU foreign policy making, most notably in regard to the strengthened right of scrutiny conferred to the European Parliament by the Treaty of Lisbon. It is essential that the European Parliament responds to the annual reports issued by other institutions as soon as they are published.

    ANNEX I: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that she has received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the report, until the adoption thereof in committee:

    Entity and/or person

    European Partnership for Democracy/International Dalit Solidarity Network

    Clean Clothes Campaign

    Protection International

    Race & Equality

    FIDH – International Federation for Human Rights

    International Partnership for Human Rights

    Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies

    Front Line Defenders

    Save the Children

    Avocats Sans Frontières

    Center for Reproductive Rights

    Reporters without Borders

    End FGM European Network

     

    The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

     

    Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that she has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do ), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

     

    ANNEX II: INDIVIDUAL CASES RAISED BY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT FROM DECEMBER 2023 TO JANUARY 2025

     

    COUNTRY

     

    Individual

    BACKGROUND

    ACTION TAKEN BY THE PARLIAMENT

    AFGHANISTAN

     

    Manizha Seddiqi Ahmad Fahim Azimi

    Sediqullah Afghan, Fardin Fedayee  Ezatullah Zwab

    Manizha Seddiqi, Ahmad Fahim Azimi, Sediqullah Afghan, Fardin Fedayee and Ezatullah Zwab are human rights defenders who have been detained in Afghanistan.

    In its resolution of 14 March 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Condemns the arbitrary detention of human rights defenders, including Manizha Seddiqi, Ahmad Fahim Azimi, Sediqullah Afghan, Fardin Fedayee and Ezatullah Zwab;

     

    – Calls for victims of violence against women and girls to be released from prison, where they are being held in inhumane conditions to the detriment of their mental and physical health.

     

    ALGERIA

     

    Boualem Sansal

    French-Algerian writer Boualem Sansal was detained on 16 November 2024 by the Algerian authorities, his whereabouts remained unknown for over a week, during which time he was denied access to his family and legal counsel; he was subsequently charged with national security-related offences under Article 87bis of the Algerian Penal Code, and he is awaiting trial.

    In its resolution of 23 January 2025, the European Parliament:

     

    – Condemns the arrest and detention of Boualem Sansal and calls for his immediate and unconditional release;

     

    – Equally condemns the arrests of all other activists, political prisoners, journalists, human rights defenders and others detained or sentenced for exercising their right to freedom of opinion and expression, including journalist Abdelwakil Blamm and writer Tadjadit Mohamed, and calls for their release;

     

    – Reiterates, as enshrined in the EU-Algeria Partnership Priorities, the importance of the rule of law in order to consolidate freedom of expression; stresses that renewing this agreement must be based upon continued and substantial progress in the aforementioned domains and underscores that all future disbursements of EU funds should consider the progress made in this regard.

     

    AZERBAIJAN

     

    Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu

    Ilhamiz Guliyev

    Ulvi Hasanli Sevinj Vagifgizi

    Nargiz Absalamova

    Hafiz Babali,

    Elnara Gasimova Aziz Orujov

    Rufat Muradli

    Avaz Zeynalli

    Elnur Shukurov

    Alasgar Mammadli

    Farid Ismayilov

     

    Gubad Ibadoghlu, a political economist and opposition figure, was arrested by Azerbaijani authorities in July 2023 and remained in detention until 22 April 2024, when he was transferred to house arrest; his health has deteriorated significantly since his arrest, as a result of torture, inhumane detention conditions and refusal of adequate medical care, thus endangering his life.

     

    Ilhamiz Guliyev, a human rights defender, was arbitrarily arrested on 4 December 2023 on dubious accusations of drug trafficking after he testified as whistleblower about the police tampering with evidence against government critics; he is facing up to 12 years in prison.

     

    Tofig Yagublu, Akif Gurbanov, Bakhtiyar Hajiyev are political prisoners, and Ulvi Hasanli, Sevinj Vagifgizi, Nargiz Absalamova, Hafiz Babali, Elnara Gasimova, Aziz Orujov, Rufat Muradli, Avaz Zeynalli, Elnur Shukurov, Alasgar Mammadli, Farid Ismayilov are human rights defenders and journalists.

    In its resolution of 25 April 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Urges Azerbaijan to immediately and unconditionally release Ilhamiz Guliyev; notes that Gubad Ibadoghlu has been released and placed under house arrest and calls on the authorities to lift the travel ban and drop all charges against him; calls on Azerbaijan to urgently ensure that he receives an independent medical examination by a doctor of his own choosing and to allow him to receive treatment abroad;

     

    – Urges Azerbaijan to immediately and unconditionally release all other political prisoners, including Tofig Yagublu, Akif Gurbanov, Bakhtiyar Hajiyev, human rights defenders and journalists Ulvi Hasanli, Sevinj Vagifgizi, Nargiz Absalamova, Hafiz Babali, Elnara Gasimova, Aziz Orujov, Rufat Muradli, Avaz Zeynalli, Elnur Shukurov, Alasgar Mammadli, Farid Ismayilov, as well as EU and other nationals.

     

    AZERBAIJAN

     

    Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu, Anar Mammadli, Kamran Mammadli, Rufat Safarov and Meydan TV

    Political prisoner and 2024 Sakharov Prize finalist Gubad Ibadoghlu remains under house arrest; the European Court of Human Rights ruled that his health condition is critical, requiring hospitalisation and urgent heart surgery.

     

    Civil society leader Anar Mammadli has been in pre-trial detention since April 2024 on bogus charges, with his health deteriorating due to denied healthcare.

     

    In early December 2024, the Azerbaijani authorities arrested MeydanTV journalists Aynur Ganbarova, Aytaj Ahmadova, Khayala Agayeva, Natig Javadli and Aysel Umudova, and journalists Ramin Jabrayilzade and Ahmad Mukhtar; they also arrested Baku Journalism School deputy director Ulvi Tahirov, political leader Azer Gasimli and human rights defender Rufat Safarov; all face unfounded, politically motivated charges.

     

    In its resolution of 19 December 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Urges the Azerbaijani authorities to immediately end the crackdown on all dissident groups and unconditionally release and drop all charges against human rights defenders, journalists and political and other activists prosecuted under fabricated, politically motivated charges;

     

    – Demands that the authorities immediately lift the travel ban on Ibadoghlu, unconditionally drop all charges against him and allow him to receive urgent treatment abroad; deplores the fact that Ibadoghlu was not allowed to attend the Sakharov Prize ceremony or connect remotely;

     

    – Calls on Azerbaijan to lift undue restrictions on independent media by aligning its laws on the registration and funding of non-governmental groups and media with Venice Commission recommendations; demands that the authorities end the repression of MeydanTV, ToplumTV, Abaz Media and Kanal13;

     

    – Calls for EU sanctions under its global human rights sanctions regime to be imposed on Azerbaijani officials responsible for serious human rights violations, including Fuad Alasgarov, Vilayat Eyvazov and Ali Naghiyev.

     

    BELARUS

     

    Marina Adamovich, Mikalai Statkevich  Tatsiana Seviarynets, Pavel Seviarynets Daria Losik

    Ihar Losik

    Mikalai Kazlou

    Ryhor Kastusiou Mikalai Statkevich Pavel Seviarynets

    Marina Adamovich, wife of Mikalai Statkevich (political prisoner), Tatsiana Seviarynets, mother of Pavel Seviarynets (political prisoner), and earlier-arrested Daria Losik, wife of Ihar Losik (political prisoner), have suffered interrogations and detentions by the KGB. 

     

    Mikalai Kazlou, Ryhor Kastusiou, Mikalai Statkevich and Pavel Seviarynets, all political prisoners, face isolation, torture, denial of medical care and forced labour.

    In its resolution of 14 December 2023, the European Parliament:

     

    – Strongly condemns the recent wave of mass arrests in Belarus and urges the illegitimate Lukashenka regime to cease repression, especially any gender-based persecution, and reminds the regime of its international obligations;

     

    – Calls for the immediate unconditional release and compensation of all more than 1 400 political prisoners, as well as their families and arbitrarily detained persons, while restoring their full rights.

     

    BELARUS

     

    Mikola Statkevich

    Ales Bialiatski

    Maria Kalesnikava Siarhei Tsikhanouski Viktar Babaryka Maksim Znak

    Pavel Sevyarynets Palina Sharenda-Panasiuk

    Andrzej Poczobut  Ihar Losik

    Former presidential candidate and 2020 Sakharov Prize laureate Mikola Statkevich has been imprisoned on politically motivated charges for 14 years; he is kept in solitary confinement under maximum security; his health is deteriorating and his lawyers and family have been denied information and contact for over 300 days.

     

    Prominent Belarusian political prisoners, including Ales Bialiatski, Maria Kalesnikava, Siarhei Tsikhanouski, Viktar Babaryka, Maksim Znak, Pavel Sevyarynets, Palina Sharenda-Panasiuk, Andrzej Poczobut and Ihar Losik, have been subjected to similar isolation.

    In its resolution of 8 February 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Demands the immediate, unconditional release of Mikola Statkevich and all 1 500 political prisoners; calls for the withdrawal of all charges against them, their full rehabilitation and financial compensation for the damage suffered as a result of being deprived of liberty;

     

    – Insists that the prisoners must receive proper medical assistance and access to lawyers, family, diplomats and international organisations, which can assess their condition and provide aid; regrets the inaction of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Belarus;

     

    – Strongly condemns the unjustified, politically motivated sentences and continued repression of Belarusian democratic forces, civil society, human rights defenders, trade unionists, journalists, clergy, political activists and their family members.

     

    CHINA

     

    Ding Yuande

    Ma Ruimei

     

    On 12 May 2023 Falun Gong practitioners Mr Ding Yuande and his wife Ms Ma Ruimei were arrested without a warrant; Ms Ma was released on bail, but was then intimidated by police because of a rescue campaign launched by their son abroad.

     

    Mr Ding was detained with no family visits for eight months; on 15 December 2023 he was sentenced to three years in prison with a CNY 15 000 fine.

    In its resolution of 18 January 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Strongly urges the PRC to immediately end the persecution of Falun Gong practitioners and other minorities, including Uyghurs and Tibetans; demands the immediate and unconditional release of Mr Ding and all Falun Gong practitioners in China;

     

    – Calls for the PRC to end domestic and transnational surveillance and control and the suppression of religious freedom; urges the PRC to abide by its obligations under international law and its own constitution to respect and protect human rights.

     

    CHINA

     

    Ilham Tohti

    Gulshan Abbas

    In 2014 Ilham Tohti was convicted of politically motivated charges of ‘separatism’ and sentenced to life imprisonment; he worked to foster dialogue between Uyghurs and Han Chinese; he was awarded the 2019 Sakharov Prize. Gulshan Abbas has been serving a 20-year sentence on fallacious terrorism-related charges relating to activities of her sister, a defender of the human rights of persecuted Uyghurs in the PRC.

     

     

    Gulshan Abbas, is a Uyghur retired doctor, who was forcibly disappeared in retaliation of her sisters public criticism of the treatment of Uyghurs. She has received a 20-year sentence in 2020, for participating in a terrorist organisation.

     

    In its resolution of 10 October 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Strongly condemns the PRC’s violations of the human rights of Uyghurs and people in Tibet, Hong Kong, Macau and mainland China;

     

    – Urges the PRC to immediately and unconditionally release Ilham Tohti and Gulshan Abbas, as well as those arbitrarily detained in China and those mentioned by the EU during the 57th session of the UN Human Rights Council, guarantee their access to medical care and lawyers, provide information on their whereabouts and ensure family visiting rights; calls for the EU and the Member States to apply pressure in this respect at every high-level contact;

     

    – Demands that the PRC authorities halt their repression and targeting of Uyghurs with abusive policies, including intense surveillance, forced labour, sterilisation, birth prevention measures and the destruction of Uyghur identity, which amount to crimes against humanity and a serious risk of genocide; calls for the closure of all internment camps;

     

    – Strongly condemns the PRC for not implementing the recommendations of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR); calls on the PRC to allow the OHCHR independent access to XUAR and invites the OHCHR to issue a comprehensive situational update and an action plan for holding the PRC accountable;

     

    – Welcomes the EU’s forced labour regulation and insists on its full implementation; calls on businesses operating in the PRC, particularly in XUAR, to comply with their HR due diligence obligations.

     

    CUBA

     

    José Daniel Ferrer Garcia

     

    Human rights defender and opposition leader José Daniel Ferrer García was detained on 11 July 2021 in the context of widespread protests in Cuba, and has been held in isolation since 14 August 2021; the Cuban regime has imprisoned, harassed and intimidated him for over a decade for his peaceful political activism; since March 2023, he has been held incommunicado and his family have received no information about his health and have been denied the right to visit him.

    In its resolution of 19 September 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – The Cuban regime holds political prisoners in the most appalling conditions; whereas reports indicate that José Daniel Ferrer is in a critical condition and has been held without access to medical treatment, with inadequate food and in unsanitary conditions, which constitute forms of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment;

     

    – The human rights situation in Cuba is alarming, particularly for dissidents, who are subjected to worrying levels of surveillance and arbitrary detention; whereas the number of political prisoners is unknown but reliable sources state that the regime holds over a thousand prisoners, including minors; whereas among the many political prisoners are Luis Manuel Otero Alcántara and Lizandra Gongora, whose health condition is critical;

     

    – Urges the Cuban regime to immediately and unconditionally release José Daniel Ferrer and all persons politically and arbitrarily detained for exercising their rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly;

     

    – Condemns the torture and inhuman, degrading and ill-treatment perpetrated by the Cuban authorities against José Daniel Ferrer and the other political prisoners; calls for the families of victims of the regime’s persecution to be granted immediate access to them, pending their release, and for the victims to be given medical care.

     

    CRIMEA

    Iryna Danylovych, Tofik Abdulhaziiev and Amet Suleymanov

    Crimean journalist and human rights defender Iryna Danylovych was abducted in 2022, accused of possessing explosives and sentenced to 6 years and 11 months of imprisonment; NGO activist Tofik Abdulhaziiev was arrested in 2019 and sentenced to 12 years in a maximum security prison on trumped-up charges, and since 2023 is being held in a prison some 2 700 km away from Crimea; citizen journalist Amet Suleymanov was sentenced to 12 years of prison in 2021.

     

    In its resolution of 19 December 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Condemns Russia’s continuous targeting of ethnic Ukrainians and systematic persecution of indigenous Crimean Tatars, which aims to erase their identity, heritage and culture, echoing, for the Crimean Tatars, the genocidal deportations of 1944; considers that Crimea’s future is tied to its recognition as the Crimean Tatars’ historic homeland;

     

    – Condemns the persecution of journalists, civil society activists and human rights defenders and the deportation of civilians including political prisoners from Crimea to penitentiary institutions across Russia, contrary to international law;

     

    – Demands the immediate and unconditional release of Iryna Danylovych, Tofik Abdulhaziiev and Amet Suleymanov and other political prisoners; calls for immediate medical care to be provided; denounces the upholding of verdicts against seriously ill individuals, which constitutes a blatant violation of international human rights standards; calls on the International Committee of the Red Cross and the UN to establish the whereabouts of civilian detainees from Crimea.

     

    DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

     

    Jean-Jacques Wondo

    Jean-Jacques Wondo, a Belgian-Congolese security, military and political expert, was arrested following a failed coup on 19 May 2024, for which he was accused of being the ‘intellectual perpetrator’, on 13 September 2024, Wondo and 36 others were sentenced to death by a military court.

     

    In its resolution of 23 January 2025, the European Parliament:

     

    – Strongly condemns the sentencing to death of Wondo and others and the grave violations of their right to a fair trial;

     

    – Urges the DRC Government to immediately overturn the death sentences, reinstate a moratorium on executions and take steps towards the full abolition of the death penalty;

     

    –  Expresses deep concern about Wondo’s deteriorating health, calls for him to be given immediate access to medical treatment and insists on his immediate release;

     

    – Calls for systemic reforms to be implemented in the DRC to rebuild the judiciary into an independent, fair and efficient institution that guarantees due process and the protection of fundamental rights.

     

    GREECE

     

    George Karaivaz

    George Karaivaz was a journalist who have been murdered on 9 April 2021.

    In its resolution of 7 February 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Is deeply concerned by the failure of law enforcement and the judicial authorities in Greece to make progress in the investigation into the murder of the Greek journalist George Karaivaz on 9 April 2021; notes that two suspects were arrested in April 2023, but otherwise there has not been any discernible activity in the police investigation; strongly urges the authorities to take all the necessary steps towards conducting a thorough and effective investigation, and to bring those involved in the murder, at any level, to justice; urges the authorities to request assistance from Europol.

     

    HONG KONG

     

    Andy Li

    Joseph John

    Andy Li, a pro-democracy activist and key witness in Jimmy Lai’s trial, allegedly confessed, under torture, to conspiracy and collusion with foreign entities.

     

    Joseph John, a HK-Portuguese dual national, is the first extraterritorial application of the NSL to an EU citizen; John was arrested for allegedly posting anti-China social media content and committing, from Europe, incitement to ‘secession’, and was sentenced on 11 April 2024 to five years’ imprisonment.

    In its resolution of 25 April 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Urges the HK Government to immediately and unconditionally release Li, John, Lai, Kok Tsz-lun and all other pro-democracy representatives and activists detained for exercising their freedoms and democratic rights, and to drop all charges against them;

     

    – Highlights the SNSO’s undermining of press freedoms; calls on the authorities to stop harassing and prosecuting journalists.

     

    HONG KONG/ CHINA

     

    Jimmy Lai

    Jimmy Lai has been detained since 2020 on trumped-up charges; his trial started in 2023 after various delays; he denied these charges and faces life imprisonment; his British lawyer has been refused permission to represent him. Jimmy Lai a British national since 1996, is a Hong Kong media tycoon, and a known pro- democracy supporter.  Political prisoners in HK endure difficult conditions, often affecting their health, throughout lengthy pre-trial detentions, as with 76-year-old Lai, who has diabetes and has been denied Communion in prison.

     

    45 pro-democracy politicians, activists and journalists were sentenced for subversion, in the ‘Hong Kong 47’ case, for organising unofficial election primaries; their trials were the largest national security trials to date;

     

    In its resolution of 28 November 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Condemns the sentencing of pro-democracy activists on national security charges, in violation of international law; calls for the repeal of the NSL and the SNSO; denounces the degradation of basic freedoms in HK;

     

    – Urges the HK Government to immediately and unconditionally release all pro-democracy activists, including Lai and Chung, and to drop all charges against them;

     

    – Calls on the EEAS and the Member States to warn China that its actions in HK will have consequences for EU-China relations; calls on the Council to review its 2020 conclusions on HK and to impose targeted sanctions on John Lee and other HK and Chinese officials responsible for human rights violations, to revoke HK’s favourable customs treatment and review the status of the HK Economic Trade Office in Brussels; urges the Member States to file an ICJ case against China’s decision to impose the NSL on HK and Macau.

     

    IRAN

     

    Pakhshan Azizi and Wrisha Moradi

    Kurdish activists, social worker Pakhshan Azizi and advocate for women’s rights Verisheh (Wrisha) Moradi were sentenced to death for ‘armed rebellion against the state’.

    In its resolution of 23 January 2025, the European Parliament:

     

    – Denounces the Iranian regime’s unrestrained repression of human rights, in particular the targeting of women activists; strongly condemns the death sentence against Pakhshan Azizi and Wrisha Moradi; demands that Iran immediately and unconditionally release all unjustly imprisoned human rights defenders and political prisoners, including Pakhshan Azizi, Wrisha Moradi and at least 56 other political prisoners on death row;

     

    – Calls for the EU and its Member States to increase support for Iranian human rights defenders and expresses its full support and solidarity with Iranians united in the ‘Woman, Life, Freedom’ movement;

     

    – Urges the Iranian authorities to immediately release, safely repatriate and drop all charges against EU nationals, including Olivier Grondeau, Cécile Kohler, Jacques Paris and Ahmadreza Djalali; strongly condemns Iran’s use of hostage diplomacy; calls for the EU and its Member States to undertake joint diplomatic efforts and work collectively towards their release;

     

    – Strongly condemns the murder of Jamshid Sharmahd; urges the Islamic regime in Iran to provide details of the circumstances of his death and for his remains to be immediately returned to his family;

     

    – Reiterates its call on the Council to designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps a terrorist organisation and to extend EU sanctions to all those responsible for human rights violations, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, President Masoud Pezeshkian, Judiciary Chief Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i, Prosecutor-General Mohammad Movahedi-Azad and Judge Iman Afshari;

     

    – Urges the Iranian authorities to provide the UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Iran and the UN fact-finding mission with full, unimpeded access to enact their mandates.

     

    KYRGYZSTAN

     

    Temirlan Sultanbekov

    Temirlan Sultanbekov is the leader of the Kyrgyzstan Social Democrats party (SDK), he and other party officials have been arrested for vote-buying allegations, with an audiotape of unknown origin serving as the primary evidence, for which the judicial authorisation is unclear and its connection with the detainees unknown.

    In its resolution of 19 December 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Urges the Kyrgyz authorities to immediately release Mr Sultanbekov and other party officials and adopt alternative measures to detention, while respecting their right to due process in line with the civil and political rights guaranteed under the Kyrgyz constitution and international obligations; calls on the authorities to ensure his safety and well-being;

     

    – Urges the Kyrgyz government to halt its campaign of intimidation and legal persecution against opposition parties, independent media outlets and journalists; is concerned by the adoption of the Russian-style ‘foreign agents’ law; urges the Kyrgyz authorities to drop all charges against human rights defenders, including Makhabat Tazhibek Kyzy, Azamat Ishenbekov, Aktilek Kaparov and Ayke Beishekeeva, journalists from the Temirov Live and Ait Ait Dese channels.

     

    RUSSIA

     

    Alexei Navalny

    Vladimir Kara-Murza

    Yuri Dmitriev

    Ilya Yashin

    Alexei Gorinov

    Lilia Chanysheva Ksenia Fadeeva, Vadim Ostanin

    Daniel Kholodny Vadim Kobzev

    Igor Sergunin

    Alexei Liptser Viktoria Petrova Maria Ponomarenko Alexandra Skochilenko

    Svetlana Petriychuk Evgenia Berkovich Dmitry Ivanov

    Ioann Kurmoyarov Igor Baryshnikov Dmitry Talantov Alexei Moskalev

    Oleg Orlov

    Boris Kagarlitsky

    Ivan Safronov

     

    Alexei Navalny, a prominent Russian political figure and the 2021 laureate of the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, perished in a Siberian penal colony north of the Arctic Circle while serving a unfounded, politically motivated prison sentence. He had been in detention since 17 January 2021, the date on which he returned to Russia following medical rehabilitation after an attempted state-sponsored assassination using the internationally banned nerve agent Novichok; he had previously been detained and arrested many times and had been sentenced, on fabricated and politically motivated grounds, to long prison terms in evident attempts to stop his political activities and anti-corruption campaigns.

     

    Vladimir Kara-Murza, Yuri Dmitriev, Ilya Yashin, Alexei Gorinov, Lilia Chanysheva, Ksenia Fadeeva, Vadim Ostanin, Daniel Kholodny, Vadim Kobzev, Igor Sergunin, Alexei Liptser, Viktoria Petrova, Maria Ponomarenko, Alexandra Skochilenko, Svetlana Petriychuk, Evgenia Berkovich, Dmitry Ivanov, Ioann Kurmoyarov, Igor Baryshnikov, Dmitry Talantov, Alexei Moskalev, Oleg Orlov, Boris Kagarlitsky and Ivan Safronov are political prisoners.

     

    In its resolution of 29 February 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Strongly condemns the murder of Alexei Navalny; expresses its wholehearted condolences to his family, associates and colleagues, and to his countless supporters across Russia; expresses its full support to Yulia Navalnaya in her determination to continue the work started by Alexei Navalny with her support, and to the Anti-Corruption Foundation founded by Navalny, which is continuing its work under the new circumstances;

     

    – Calls on the Russian authorities to drop all arbitrary charges and to immediately and unconditionally release all political prisoners and arbitrarily detained persons.

    TAJIKISTAN

     

    Abdullo Ghurbati Daler Imomali Zavqibek Saidamini Abdusattor Pirmuhammadzoda Ulfatkhonim Mamadshoeva Khushruz Jumayev Khurshed Fozilov

    Manuchehr Kholiknazarov Buzurgmehr Yorov

     

    Abdullo Ghurbati, Daler Imomali, Zavqibek Saidamini, Abdusattor Pirmuhammadzoda, Ulfatkhonim Mamadshoeva, Khushruz Jumayev and Khurshed Fozilov are journalists who have been sentenced to between seven and over 20 years in prison in retaliation for their coverage of social issues and human rights abuses, including in GBAO.

     

    Manuchehr Kholiknazarov and Buzurgmehr Yorov  are human rights lawyers who have been detained.

    In its resolution of 18 January 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Strongly condemns the ongoing crackdown, including anti-extremism legislation, against independent media, government critics, human rights activists and independent lawyers; condemns the closure of independent media and websites, including the online media outlets Pamir Daily News, New Tajikistan 2 and Akhbor.com;

     

    – Condemns all politically motivated trials and the lack of fair and public hearings by independent courts; urges the authorities to stop persecuting journalists, immediately and unconditionally release those who have been arbitrarily detained and drop all charges against them, stop the persecution of lawyers defending government critics and release human rights lawyers Manuchehr Kholiknazarov and Buzurgmehr Yorov;

     

    – Urges the government to ensure that detainees have access to adequate healthcare; calls for a thorough investigation into allegations of mistreatment in custody and forced confessions, and those responsible to be brought to justice.

     

    TÜRKIYE

     

    Bülent Mumay

    Bülent Mumay is a Turkish journalist and coordinator of the Istanbul bureau of Deutsche Welle’s Turkish editorial office, was sentenced to 20 months in prison for social media posts about a pro-government company’s seizure of Istanbul Municipality’s subway funds during the AKP administration; his appeal was rejected, and his tweets removed.

    In its resolution of 10 October 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Condemns the sentence against Bülent Mumay, which follows a broader pattern of silencing critical journalism; calls on the Turkish authorities to drop the charges against Bülent Mumay, and all arbitrarily detained media workers and journalists, as well as political opponents, human rights defenders, civil servants and academics;

     

      Is deeply concerned about the ongoing deterioration of democratic standards in Türkiye, relentless crackdown on any critical voices and targeting of independent journalists, activists and opposition members amid frequent reports of legal intimidation, censorship and financial coercion as ways to suppress criticism and investigative journalism.

     

    VENEZUELA

     

    Rocío San Miguel

    General Hernández Da Costa 

    Ronald Ojeda

    María Corina Machado

    Juan Freites

    Luis Camacaro Guillermo Lopez Emil Brandt

     

    Rocío San Miguel is a lawyer and human rights activist with Spanish nationality, who got kidnapped by the Venezuelan regime on 9 February 2024, and sentenced on politically motivated grounds of suspected conspiracy against Nicolás Maduro and his regime; she is currently being detained in El Helicoide prison, which is known for human rights abuses, including torture.

     

    Hernández Da Costa has been a political prisoner since August 2018; on 19 February 2024, he was forcibly transferred to El Rodeo 1 prison, designed to detain political prisoners; an unknown number of prisoners, including some EU citizens, were also transferred; the general suffers from medical ailments that require constant treatment, which he is being denied.

     

    Ronald Ojeda was a former political prisoner who escaped the Maduro regime, and got murdered in Chile.

     

    Juan Freites, Luis Camacaro, Guillermo Lopez and Emil Brandt are four campaign coordinators working for the opposition to the regime’s presidential candidate, and have been detained on political grounds.

     

    In its resolution of 14 March 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Demands the immediate unconditional release of all political prisoners and arbitrarily detained persons, and the full restoration of their rights; exhorts the regime to cease its policy of repression and attacks on civil society and the opposition;

     

    – Strongly condemns the Maduro regime for imprisoning hundreds of political prisoners;

     

    – Calls on the international community to support a return to democracy in Venezuela, particularly in the light of the upcoming elections, in which the leader of the opposition to the regime, María Corina Machado, must be allowed to fully participate.

    VENEZUELA

     

    Maria Corina Machado

    Juan Freites

    Luis Camacaro Guillermo López

    Maria Corina Machado was selected as the presidential candidate of the democratic opposition to the regime, winning with 92,35 % of the votes in the primary elections. She got a disqualification of 15 years.

     

    For several months, members of María Corina Machado’s campaign team – including Juan Freites, Luis Camacaro and Guillermo López, who were unlawfully detained and have since been reported missing.

    In its resolution of 8 February 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all the arbitrarily arrested political and social leaders, including three campaign staffers of the presidential candidate of the opposition to the regime María Corina Machado, namely Juan Freites, Luis Camacaro and Guillermo Lopez;

     

    – Strongly condemns the attempts to disqualify the presidential candidate of the democratic opposition to the regime, María Corina Machado, and others, such as Henrique Capriles, from holding public office;

     

    – Urges the Venezuelan regime to immediately stop the persecution of the primary winner and thus fully legitimate candidate of the opposition to the regime, María Corina Machado, and other opposition politicians.

     

     

     

     

    ANNEX III: LIST OF SAKHAROV PRIZE LAUREATES AND FINALISTS IMPRISONED AND DEPRIVED OF LIBERTY

     

    Year of Sakharov Prize award

    Name and surname

    Laureate / Finalist

    Country

    Situation (Detention / house arrest / temporarily released)

    Length of prison sentence

    Start date of detention

    2024

    Gubad Ibadoghlu

    Finalist

    Azerbaijan

    Under travel ban

     

    A court rejected Ibadoglu’s appeal against the travel ban on 3/12/2024

    2021

    Alexei Navalny

    Laureate

     

    Russia

    Deceased in prison on 16/2/2024

     

    3,5 + 9 + 19 years

    Last detained 17/2/21, last sentenced 4/8/23

    2020

    Siarhei Tsikhanouski

     

    Maryia Kalesnikava

     

    Mikola Statkevich

     

     

    Ales Bialiatski

    Laureate

     

    Laureate

     

    Laureate

     

     

    Laureate

    Belarus

     

    Detention

     

    Detention

     

    Detention

     

     

    Detention

    18 years

     

    11 years

     

    14 years

     

     

    10 years

     

    Detained 29/5/20, sentenced 14/12/21

    Detained 07/9/20, sentenced 06/9/21

    Last detained 31/5/20, last sentenced 14/12/21

    Last detained 15/7/21, last sentenced 03/03/23

    2020

    Porfirio Sorto Cedillo, José Avelino Cedillo, Orbin Naún Hernández, Kevin Alejandro Romero, Arnold Javier Aleman, Ever Alexander Cedillo, Daniel Marquez and Jeremías Martínez Díaz

    Finalists

    Honduras

    Detention

    Unknown

    1/9/2019, released on 24/2/2022, after a ruling by the Supreme Court of Honduras

    2019

    Ilham Tohti

    Laureate

    China

    Detention

    Unknown

    23/9/2014

    2018

    Nasser Zefzafi

     

    Finalist

    Morocco

    Detention

    20 years

    5/4/2019

    2017

    Dawit Isaak

    Finalist

    Eritrea

    Incommunicado detention

    Unknown

    23/9/2001

    2015

    Raif Badawi

    Laureate

    Saudi Arabia

    Released on 11/3/2022, since then under a 10-year travel ban

     

    10 years

    First sentenced on 17/12/2012, but announced on 30/3/2013

    2012

    Nasrin Sotoudeh

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Jafar Panahi

    Laureate

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Laureate

    Iran

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Iran

    Detention, on temporary medical furlough since July 2021, arrested again 29/10/2023 and released 15/11/2023

     

    Detained in 2022,

    released on 3/2/2023 after hunger strike

    38 years

     

     

     

     

     

     

    6 years

    6/3/2019 (most recent)

     

     

     

     

     

    compelled in July 2022 to serve a 10-years old prison sentence

    2011

    Razan Zaitouneh

    Laureate

    Syria

    Kidnapped in 2013. Presumptions of detention and death.

     

    9/12/2013

    2009

    Memorial – Oleg Orlov

    Laureate

     

     

    Russia

    Released on 1/8/2024 as part of a prisoner exchange with the US and Germany

    2.5 years

    Latest sentence in February 2024. Memorial as legal entity liquidated in January 2022.

     

     

    ANNEX IV: LIST OF RESOLUTIONS

    List of resolutions adopted by the European Parliament from December 2023 to January 2025 and related directly or indirectly to human rights violations in the world

     

     

    Country/Region

    Date of adoption in plenary

     

    Title

    Africa

     

     

    Algeria

    23.01.2025

    The case of Boualem Sansal in Algeria

    Democratic Republic of the Congo

    23.01.2025

    The case of Jean-Jacques Wondo

     

    Gambia

     

    25.04.2024

    On the proposed repeal of the law banning female genital mutilation in The Gambia

    Nigeria

    08.02.2024

    On the recent attacks on Christmas Eve in Plateau State in Nigeria

    Sudan

    18.01.2024

    On the threat of famine following the spread of the conflict in Sudan

    Tanzania

    14.12.2023

    On the Maasai Communities in Tanzania

    Americas

     

     

    Cuba

    29.02.2024

    On the critical situation in Cuba

    Cuba

    19.09.2024

    The case of José Daniel Ferrer García in Cuba

    Guatemala

    14.12.2023

    On the attempt at a coup d’état in Guatemala

    Venezuela

    08.02.2024

    On further repression against the democratic forces in Venezuela: attacks on presidential candidate María Corina Machado

     

    Venezuela

     

    14.03.2024

    On the case of Rocío San Miguel and General Hernández Da Costa, among other political prisoners in Venezuela

    Venezuela

    19.09.2024

    Situation on Venezuela

    Venezuela

    23.01.2025

    Situation in Venezuela following the usurpation of the presidency on 10 January 2025

    Asia

     

     

     

    Afghanistan

     

     

    14.03.2024

    On the repressive environment in Afghanistan, including public executions and violence against women

    Afghanistan

    19.09.2024

    The deteriorating situation of women in Afghanistan due to the recent adoption of the law on the “Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice”

     

    Azerbaijan

     

    25.04.2024

    On Azerbaijan, notably the repression of civil society and the cases of Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu and Ilhamiz Guliyev

    Azerbaijan

    19.12.2024

    Continued repression of civil society and independent media in Azerbaijan and the cases of Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu, Anar Mammadli, Kamran Mammadli, Rufat Safarov and Meydan TV

    Cambodia

    28.11.2024

    The shrinking space for civil society in Cambodia, in particular the case of the labour rights organisation CENTRAL

     

    China

     

    18.01.2024

    On the ongoing persecution of Falun Gong in China, notably the case of Mr Ding Yuande

    China

     

    10.10.2024

    The cases of unjustly imprisoned Uyghurs in China, notably Ilham Tohti and Gulshan Abbas

    China/ Taiwan

    24.10.2024

    Misinterpretation of UN resolution 2758 by the People’s Republic of China and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan

     

    Hong Kong

     

    25.04.2024

    On the new security law in Hong Kong and the cases of Andy Li and Joseph John

    Hong Kong/ China

     

    28.11.2024

    Hong Kong, notably the cases of Jimmy Lai and the 45 activists recently convicted under the national security law

    Kyrgyzstan

    19.12.2024

    Human rights situation in Kyrgyzstan, in particular the case of Temirlan Sultanbekov

    Tajikistan

    18.01.2024

    On Tajikistan: state repression against the independent media

     

    Tibet

     

    14.12.2023

    On the abduction of Tibetan children and forced assimilation practices through Chinese boarding schools in Tibet

    Middle East

     

     

     

    Iran/Israel

     

    25.04.2024

    On Iran’s unprecedented attack against Israel, the need for de-escalation and an EU response

     

    Iran

     

    08.02.2024

    On the increased number of executions in Iran, in particular the case of Mohammad Ghobadlou

    Iran

    28.11.2024

    The increasing and systematic repression of women in Iran

    Iran

    23.01.2025

    Systematic repression of human rights in Iran

    Iraq

    10.10.2024

    Iraq, notably the situation of women’s rights and the recent proposal to amend the Personal Status Law

     

    Palestine

     

    18.01.2024

    On the humanitarian situation in Gaza, the need to reach a ceasefire and the risks of regional escalation

     

    Palestine

     

    14.03.2024

    On the immediate risk of mass starvation in Gaza and the attacks on humanitarian aid deliveries

    Europe and Eastern Partnership countries

     

     

     

    Azerbaijan/Armenia

     

    13.03.2024

    On closer ties between the EU and Armenia and the need for a peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia

    Azerbaijan/ Armenia

    24.10.2024

    Situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia

     

    Belarus

     

    14.12.2023

    On the unknown status of Mikola Statkevich and the recent attacks on Belarusian politicians’ and activists’ family members

     

    Belarus

     

    08.02.2024

    on the new wave of mass arrests in Belarus of opposition activists and their family members

    Belarus

    19.09.2024

    The severe situation of political prisoners in Belarus

    Belarus

    22.01.2025

    Actions to address the continued oppression and fake elections in Belarus

    Crimea

    19.12.2024

    11th year of the occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol by the Russian Federation and the deteriorating human rights situation in occupied Crimea, notably the cases of Iryna Danylovych, Tofik Abdulhaziiev and Amet Suleymanov

     

    Georgia

     

    25.04.2024

    On attempts to reintroduce a foreign agent law in Georgia and its restrictions on civil society

    Georgia

    09.10.2024

    The democratic backsliding and threats to political pluralism in Georgia

    Georgia

    28.11.2024

    Georgia’s worsening democratic crisis following the recent parliamentary elections and alleged electoral fraud

    Greece

    07.02.2024

    On the rule of law and media freedom in Greece

     

    Hungary

     

    24.04.2024

    On ongoing hearings under Article 7(1) TEU regarding Hungary to strengthen the rule of law and its budgetary implications

    Hungary

    18.01.2024

    On the situation in Hungary and frozen EU funds

    Moldova

    09.10.2024

    Strengthening Moldova’s resilience against Russian interference ahead of the upcoming presidential elections and a constitutional referendum on EU integration

     

    Russia

     

    29.02.2024

    On the murder of Alexei Navalny and the need for EU action in support of political prisoners and oppressed civil society in Russia

     

    Russia

     

    08.02.2024

    On Russiagate: allegations of Russian interference in the democratic processes of the European Union

     

     

    Russia

     

     

    25.04.2024

    On new allegations of Russian interference in the European Parliament, in the upcoming EU elections and the impact on the European Union

     

    Russia

     

    25.04.2024

    On Russia’s undemocratic presidential elections and their illegitimate extension to the occupied territories

    Russia

     

    14.11.2024

    EU actions against the Russian shadow fleets and ensuring a full enforcement of sanctions against Russia

    Russia

     

    23.01.2025

    Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine

    Russia/ North Korea

    28.11.2024

    Reinforcing EU’s unwavering support to Ukraine against Russia’s war of aggression and the increasing military cooperation between North Korea and Russia

    Serbia

    08.02.2024

    On the situation in Serbia following the elections

     

    Slovakia

     

    17.01.2024

    On the planned dissolution of key anti-corruption structures in Slovakia and its implications for the rule of law

    Türkiye

    10.10.2024

    European Parliament resolution of 10 October 2024 on the case of Bülent Mumay in Türkiye

    Cross-cutting issues

     

     

    Children liberty

    13.12.2023

    On the situation of children deprived of liberty in the world

     

    LGBTIQ rights

     

    08.02.2024

    On the implementation of the EU LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025

     

     

    Protection of journalists

     

     

    27.02.2024

    On the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings

     

    Human rights and democracy

     

    28.02.2024

    Human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter – annual report 2023

    Foreign and security policy

    28.02.2024

    Implementation of the common foreign and security policy – annual report 2023

     

     

    Media freedom

     

     

    13.03.2024

    On the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market

     

     

    Forced labour

     

     

    23.04.2024

    On the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union market

    Right of abortion

    11.04.2024

    On including the right to abortion in the EU Fundamental Rights Charter

     

     

    Due diligence

     

     

    24.04.2024

    On the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence and amending Directive

     

    Fundamental rights

     

    18.01.2024

    On the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union – annual report 2022 and 2023

    Hate speech

    18.01.2024

    On extending the list of EU crimes to hate speech and hate crime

     

     

    Business and human rights

     

     

    18.01.2024

    On shaping the EU’s position on the UN binding instrument on business and human rights, in particular on access to remedy and the protection of victims

    Freedom of scientific research

    17.01.2024

    On promotion of the freedom of scientific research in the EU

    Citizens, equality, rights and values

    16.01.2024

    On the implementation of the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme 2021-2027

     

     

    Violence against women

     

     

    24.04.2024

    On the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating violence against women and domestic violence

     

    Human beings traffic

     

    23.04.2024

    On preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: SNP block action to halt funding for companies arming Israel

    Source: Scottish Greens

    Not a penny of public money should go to companies arming genocide.

    The SNP has used a wrecking amendment to keep grants for arms companies complicit in Israel’s genocidal assault on Gaza.

    The Scottish Government has rightly and strongly opposed the bombing and collective punishment of Gaza. Despite this, since the war began, it has given over £1 million to companies that have armed Israel via Scottish Enterprise.

    Scottish Green Co-leader Lorna Slater said:

    “The humanitarian crisis in Gaza is one of the worst in the world, and this was an opportunity for our parliament to take concrete steps to ensure that Scotland is playing no part in it. It is deeply disappointing that the SNP chose to block action.

    “The Scottish Government is right to support a ceasefire in Gaza, but it is simply hypocritical for them to continue backing companies who are enabling and profiting from the atrocities that have been inflicted by Israeli forces.

    “When Russia invaded Ukraine the Scottish Government rightly took action against companies who were supporting Putin and his war machine, with measures that went far further than arms companies. It is time for them to do the same for Israel.

    “Not a penny of public money should be given to companies that are profiting from genocide or war crimes whether they are being carried out by Russian forces or by Israel.”

    As part of the debate the SNP agreed to review the human rights checks which are applied by public bodies to grant applicants. To date, no company has ever failed one of the existing tests, including many of the world’s biggest arms companies.

    Ms Slater added:

    “We welcome the SNP’s commitment to review the human rights checks that are applied, but it should not have taken our debate to make them do that.

    “The new tests need to be far more robust than anything we have had to date, as no human rights check worthy of the name would allow grants to companies that are complicit in genocide.”

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Global: How Trump the ‘master deal-maker’ failed when it came to negotiating with the Taliban in Afghanistan

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Philip A. Berry, Visiting Research Fellow, Department of War Studies, King’s College London

    News that Ukraine may be ready to sign a deal granting the US joint development rights to its minerals in the hope of a future security guarantee may be seen as a win by Donald Trump’s supporters who criticised Joe Biden’s unconditional support for Ukraine. After all, whether and how this agreement will actually protect Ukraine from continuing Russian aggression remains unclear.

    But Kyiv will be well aware that Trump’s track record as an international deal broker is less than stellar, despite the US president’s regular boast that he is a master deal-maker.

    Trump’s self-belief was encapsulated in his ghostwritten memoir, The Art of the Deal, which laid out his tactics to negotiate business transactions. One important tip was: “The best thing you can do is deal from strength, and leverage is the biggest strength you can have.”

    Last week, Trump left Zelensky, and European nations reeling when he cut them out of talks with Russia over the war in Ukraine. In doing so, the president had arguably forgotten his own advice: to deal from strength and to use leverage in negotiations.

    Trump may have extracted a concession from Ukraine in the form of the mineral deal – although far less than the US$500 billion (£394 billion) of revenue he initially demanded – but in doing so he significantly weakened the US position towards Russia.

    Trump not only shattered the western position on Ukraine, but he also unilaterally ended Russia’s three-year isolation without securing any concessions from the Kremlin before inviting them to the negotiating table.

    Instead, it was the US that gave leverage away by sidelining Ukraine from the talks, rejecting the country’s desire for Nato membership and conceding that Ukraine was unlikely to restore its pre-2014 borders.

    Trump further undermined Zelensky by promoting the false claim that Ukraine started the war and calling him a “dictator”. This week, the US even voted with Russia and China at the United Nations security council over the conflict.

    Trump’s criticism of an ally and conciliatory overtures to a country that illegally invaded its neighbour marks a dramatic swing in US policy. The previous US administration provided Ukraine with military and diplomatic support, while imposing economic sanctions on Russia.

    A key question being asked in Kyiv and western capitals is what else Trump will concede to secure a deal with the Kremlin. While the contexts between the US’s involvement in Afghanistan and support for Ukraine are very different, Trump’s early strategy for the latter has some hallmarks of the US’s disastrous deal with the Taliban.

    Trump’s deal with the Taliban

    In response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, a US-led coalition invaded Afghanistan in October 2001. The allies quickly deposed the repressive Taliban regime and installed a western-backed government.

    But by the time that Trump came to office in 2017, the war was at a stalemate. To make matters worse for the president, the US was spending US$27 billion (£21.3 billion) annually on military expenditure. Given this, Trump’s reflex was to withdraw from Afghanistan as quickly as possible.

    However, the president’s national security team – largely comprised of former and current military generals who did not owe personal loyalty to Trump – persuaded him to increase the US’s commitment to Afghanistan. The new strategy also set the conditions for a negotiated settlement with the Taliban.

    The following year, angered by the lack of progress, Trump argued that the US should “get out” of Afghanistan as the strategy had been a “total failure”.

    By this time, the US had talked directly to the Taliban, without the Afghan government in the room – a key Taliban demand. While the talks were designed to lead to intra-Afghan negotiations, it resulted in the Afghan republic being sidelined from the process.

    Throughout these talks, Trump frequently threatened to withdraw from Afghanistan. US officials referred to this constant threat as the “Tweet of Damocles” – meaning at any point, the president would announce on Twitter that the US was departing Afghanistan.

    The secretary of state at the time, Mike Pompeo – a diehard Trump loyalist – knew the president could pull the plug on the talks at any time. He therefore instructed lead US negotiator, Zalmay Khalilzad, to secure a deal at all costs.

    As a former senior Pentagon official who was present at the talks told me, it became clear Pompeo and Khalilzad had “no red lines” as both believed that “any deal was better than no deal”.

    Khalilzad abandoned the original Afghan-led process and worked to secure an agreement with the Taliban, which inevitably caused dismay within the sidelined Afghan government. Trump also largely refused to consult the Afghan president, Ashraf Ghani, about his plans.

    Compounding matters, the US president made several public statements about his desire to withdraw US forces from Afghanistan. This weakened Khalilzad’s position and encouraged the Taliban to remain resolute in negotiations.

    The US-Taliban agreement, which was signed in Doha in February 2020, favoured the insurgents and damaged the Afghan government. Khalilzad had conceded to the Taliban’s key demand: the withdrawal of all US and coalition troops from the country, which was scheduled over 14 months.

    In return, the Taliban promised to prevent terrorist groups from basing themselves in Afghanistan and agreed to hold talks with the Afghan government. If the Taliban did not adhere to these conditions, the US would – in theory – halt reducing its troop numbers.

    “This was a terrible deal. It was deeply injurious to US interests, let alone ruinous to Afghan interests,” the former Pentagon official told me.

    In the end, the Taliban failed to honour its counterterrorism commitments, and only half-heartedly pursued intra-Afghan talks.

    The deal set the conditions for the insurgents to retake Kabul by force, although the disastrous withdrawal overseen by the administration of Trump’s successor, Joe Biden, in 2021 proved fatal for the Afghan government.

    Trump’s Taliban deal excluded the US’s ally, conceded too much to an adversary, and was partly motivated by the perception of wasting American dollars in a far-off land. Unfortunately, these hallmarks are all too evident in the president’s stance on Ukraine.

    The early signs of Trump’s approach to talks with Russia do not augur well for Ukraine or the western alliance. If Trump does secure a peace deal with Russia that mirrors the accord struck with the Taliban, not only will Ukraine lose out, but Russia may be emboldened to again pursue its expansionist agenda.

    Philip A. Berry does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. How Trump the ‘master deal-maker’ failed when it came to negotiating with the Taliban in Afghanistan – https://theconversation.com/how-trump-the-master-deal-maker-failed-when-it-came-to-negotiating-with-the-taliban-in-afghanistan-250835

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: UK urges Russia to respect the Geneva Conventions and ensure the humane treatment of Prisoners of War: UK statement to the OSCE

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Speech

    UK urges Russia to respect the Geneva Conventions and ensure the humane treatment of Prisoners of War: UK statement to the OSCE

    UK Counsellor, Ankur Narayan, cites multiple independently-verified sources documenting Russia’s widespread use of torture against Ukrainian prisoners of war, a clear violation of its obligations under the Geneva Conventions.

    Thank you, Mr Chair.  This month marked eleven years since Russia began its illegal annexation of Crimea.  Earlier this week marked three years since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, enabled by Belarus.  Each week, this Forum has executed its mandate by recording the related breaches of OSCE commitments and violations of international law.

    At last month’s FSC Opening Session, the Russian Delegation called on us to “create favourable conditions for the fulfilment of the [FSC’s] mandate … including the Code of Conduct”.  We agree.

    As Russia knows, paragraphs 30, 31 and 34 of the Code of Conduct compel States to ensure that their armed and security forces abide by international law.  As Russia knows, Paragraph 34 explicitly references the Hague Conventions and the Geneva Conventions.  As Russia knows, I will only cite independently-verified, internationally-respected sources.

    Mandate after mandate, the UN has consistently reported that the torture of Ukrainian prisoners of war by the Russian authorities is widespread and systematic.  In recent months, assessments have only worsened.  The Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine has concluded that Russia’s use of torture against POWs and civilian detainees amounts to “crimes against humanity”.

    The OHCHR continued to document the “widespread use of torture and ill-treatment”, including sexual violence, against civilians and Ukrainian prisoners of war held by the Russian Federation. The OHCHR also documented the continued efforts of family members to obtain information about the fate and whereabouts of civilian detainees and POWs in captivity.

    Mr Chair, Russia must abide by its Geneva Convention obligations.  This means it must treat all civilian detainees and prisoners of war humanely.  It must also allow immediate unimpeded access by the ICRC.

    The UK condemns Russia’s exploitation of Prisoners of War for political and propaganda purposes. We are deeply concerned that Russia has detained two British nationals Mr James Anderson and Mr Hayden Davies on false charges of so-called mercenaryism. They are not mercenaries. They are Prisoners of War. Ukraine has confirmed that both are members of Ukrainian Armed Forces. They must be provided all the rights and protections afforded to Prisoners of War under the Geneva Conventions. We demand Russia respects its obligations under International Law.

    The Code of Conduct commits us to act in solidarity if OSCE norms and commitments are violated.  As catalogued by the OSCE Moscow Mechanisms, ODIHR and UN, there is irrefutable independent evidence of Russia violating international law, including international humanitarian law.  As per paragraph 1 of the Code, such breaches are a “direct and legitimate” concern for us all.

    That is why we call on Russia to respect the Geneva Conventions and ensure the humane treatment of Prisoners of War.  That is why Russia must also release all civilians who have been arbitrarily detained – including the three Special Monitoring Mission staff.  Thank you.

    Updates to this page

    Published 26 February 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: World Trade Organisation 2nd Trade Policy Review of Ukraine – Joint Statement

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments 3

    News story

    World Trade Organisation 2nd Trade Policy Review of Ukraine – Joint Statement

    At the second Trade Policy Review of Ukraine, the UK and Members from across the WTO reiterated their unwavering solidarity and support for Ukraine in a joint statement at the World Trade Organization.

    We, the delegations of the undersigned WTO Members, on the occasion of the Second Trade Policy Review of Ukraine in the WTO, held on 26 and 28 February 2025, reiterate our full support for and solidarity with the people of Ukraine. We express our deep sadness at the devastating human losses and profound suffering caused by Russia’s ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine, which continues for the fourth year in gross violation of international law and the Charter of the United Nations.

    We reaffirm our commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity and call for the Russian Federation to immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders.

    Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine continues to have devastating global and regional impacts, including on Ukraine’s economy and ability to trade. The destruction of significant parts of Ukraine’s transport routes, port infrastructure, and grain storage facilities as well as the mining of millions of hectares of agricultural land is impeding Ukraine’s ability to produce, export, and import. We are gravely concerned about the consequences of this destruction for Ukraine and for global trade, in particular with regard to the supply to international markets of a number of key commodities produced by Ukraine, including agricultural and food products, fertilisers, and critical minerals. We are also deeply concerned by reports of attacks on civilian vessels transporting agricultural goods from Ukrainian Black Sea ports and millions of tonnes of grain being plundered by Russia from illegally occupied regions of Ukraine using falsified phytosanitary certificates and hiding vessels’ data. These actions violate the principles and values of the WTO.

    Ukraine is one of the world’s top exporters of key agricultural commodities such as wheat, maize, barley, soybeans and sunflower oil. We recognise Ukraine’s determination, despite Russia’s war of aggression, to ensure global food security and supply to some of the most vulnerable parts of the world, particularly developing countries and LDCs. In this regard, the “Grain from Ukraine” initiative, which has already helped to feed 20 million people in 13 countries, continues to be an important tool to help to respond to world hunger. We praise Ukraine’s achievement of maintaining under difficult conditions food exports by its Black Sea corridor to global markets and commend the ongoing functioning of the EU Solidarity Lanes and their contribution to global food security and Ukraine’s economy. This benefits all countries, notably the most in need. In this context, it is necessary to ensure free, full, and safe navigation in the Black and Azov Seas and that sea routes and ports are not threatened or blocked by threat of or use of force.

    We underscore the need to reach, as soon as possible, a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace in Ukraine, in full respect of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, based on the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. We welcome Ukraine’s efforts aimed at achieving peace, including through the principles laid out in the Peace Formula and Joint Communiqué on a Peace Framework adopted at the Summit on Peace in Ukraine on Bürgenstock. We reiterate that the Russian Federation must bear the legal consequences of all of its internationally wrongful acts, including making reparation for injury and loss, including for any humanitarian, economic, and environmental damage caused by such acts.

    We will continue work to support Ukraine and to facilitate its exports and supply chains for the benefit of global food security. We encourage all WTO Members to do likewise in a manner commensurate with their capacity, including by facilitating the use of infrastructure, as well as facilitating and simplifying customs procedures. Within the capacity of each WTO Member, we will continue to provide assistance to Ukraine to alleviate the suffering of the Ukrainian people. We will also continue to look for practical ways to help and assist Ukraine in its reconstruction efforts, economic recovery, activities, and projects to overcome the negative consequences of Russia’s war of aggression.

    Albania, Australia, Canada, Chile, European Union, Georgia, Iceland, Japan, Republic of Korea, Liechtenstein, Montenegro, New Zealand, Republic of Moldova, Norway, Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, Switzerland, United Kingdom and Ukraine

    Updates to this page

    Published 26 February 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Foreign Secretary article on defence spending: February 2025

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments 3

    Authored article

    Foreign Secretary article on defence spending: February 2025

    Foreign Secretary David Lammy writes in the Guardian about the biggest sustained increase in defence spending since the cold war.

    There are moments in history when everything turns, but the extent of change is not perceived until later when the fog has cleared. These are hinge points that require clear leadership and bold action. In the late 1940s, my [political content redacted] predecessor and hero Ernie Bevin, alongside Clement Attlee, saw through the fog when they led Britain into Nato and the UN, and secured the development of Britain’s nuclear deterrent.

    In the 1960s, Harold Wilson saw through the paranoia of the cold war, refusing Lyndon Johnson’s request to send British troops to Vietnam. In the 1990s, Tony Blair understood that unless we stopped the president of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević, there would be no peace in the Balkans.

    Three years into Vladimir Putin’s brutal war, this is again a hinge point for Britain. Keir Starmer’s commitment to dramatically raise defence spending in both this and the next parliament shows his leadership through the fog. Putin’s Russia is a threat not only to Ukraine and its neighbours, but to all of Europe, including the UK.

    Over successive administrations, our closest ally, the US, has turned increasingly towards the Indo-Pacific, and it is understandably calling for Nato’s European members to shoulder more of the burden for our continent’s security. Around the world, the threats are multiplying: from traditional warfare to hybrid threats and cyber-attacks.

    The first duty and foundation of this government’s Plan for Change is our national security. Seven months ago, the public gave us this responsibility, and we hold it with a profound sense of duty. [political content redacted] We will deliver the biggest sustained increase in defence spending since the cold war (political content redacted).

    So we will hit our 2.5% promise in 2027 and, subject to economic conditions, go further, with defence spending rising to 3% during the next parliament. This is a pledge to safeguard our future – and act as a pillar of security on our continent –in a world plagued by more active conflicts than at any time since the second world war.

    To make this commitment, and stick within our fiscal rules, we have had to make the extremely difficult decision to lower our spending on international development. As the Prime Minister said, we do not pretend any of this is easy.

    This is a hard choice that no government (political content redacted)makes lightly. I am proud of our record on international development. It helps address global challenges from health to migration, contributes to prosperity, and supports the world’s most vulnerable people.

    It grows both our soft power and our geopolitical clout, while improving lives. For all of those reasons, this government remains committed to reverting spending on overseas aid to 0.7% of gross national income when the fiscal conditions allow.

    But we are a government of pragmatists not ideologues – and we have had to balance the compassion of our internationalism with the necessity of our national security.

    As we reduce the overseas aid budget, we will protect the most vital programmes in the world’s worst conflict zones of Ukraine, Gaza and Sudan. But there can be no hiding from the fact that many programmes doing vital work will have to be put on hold. The work of making further tough choices about programmes will proceed at pace over the weeks and months ahead, but our core priorities will remain the same.

    My vision for a reformed Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office fit for this more contested and dangerous world, in which diplomacy is more important than ever, remains paramount. We are working closely with the Treasury to ensure our diplomatic, intelligence and development footprint will align with our priorities. In a tough fiscal environment, all our spending must be laser-focused on delivering the maximum possible impacts for our national security and growth, equipping the FCDO to deliver the government’s plan for change internationally.

    At the height of the cold war, defence spending fluctuated between about 4% and 7% of GDP. At this moment of fiscal and geopolitical flux, not meeting the moment on defence would mean leaving Britain ill-prepared for a more dangerous world, potentially requiring even tougher choices down the line.

    I have written previously about this government’s foreign policy being founded on progressive realism. Being clear about our values, but treating the world as it is, not as we would wish it to be. These are the principles that guide our choices through these dangerous times. We will always do what is necessary to keep the public safe.

    This article was first published in The Guardian on 25 February 2025.

    Updates to this page

    Published 25 February 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Global: No world order: Europe needs more radical thinking for the Trump era

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Richard Youngs, Professor of International and European Politics, University of Warwick

    There is general agreement that the US’s geopolitical shock therapy is a sign of a new world order. While European powers nominally recognise this, their policies are not, in practice, tailored towards such a change.

    The EU and other European governments are, understandably, focused on very immediate matters – talks on Ukraine, defence budgets, rebutting big US tech firms. But they also need to be guided by a clearer vision of the broader international order that flows from this inflection point.

    Even though the world has already changed profoundly over the last decade, most observers judge the current juncture to be a decisive watershed. Yet the tumult unleashed in 2025 feels not so much like a well-defined new world order as the chaotic imprecision of “no world order”. Nothing concrete has emerged as a replacement for the long-crumbling liberal order.

    Multi-polarity is not fully evident because there is little balance between powers. But the current influence of large powers rubs uneasily with the notion of a “G-zero world” in which no countries have any real control.

    The long-predicted plurilateralism, in which smaller groups of states reach political agreements, has not become reality. Yet neither is a well-ordered concert of great powers especially evident.

    A concert-based order would hardly accord the primacy now reassigned to Russia, a country that enjoys only a few of the long-term structural attributes of great-power status.

    But it’s also worth noting that “no world order” is not quite the same thing as “new world disorder”. Although many leaders make a show of flouting international rules and norms on high-profile issues like international courts, the reality is that they still matter in conditioning international behaviour.

    It can reasonably be suggested that the new order will be eclectic or composite – essentially, a combination of all of the above. Yet, the current jumble and clash of dynamics does not constitute a patterned “order”. The relationships between the different forces at work are nowhere near being worked out.

    What is European ‘independence’?

    In this void, European governments and the EU are leaning heavily on two long-familiar tenets, even as these raise operational question marks.

    One is the notion of autonomy. European leaders have now doubled down on their calls for more strategic autonomy and a narrative of Europe of being “independent” from the US and “writing its own history”.

    But autonomy is a somewhat hazy geopolitical motif. European powers of course need the autonomy to chart their own strategic priorities, but current crises palpably reinforce the need to manage complex interdependencies. Autonomy in the sense of deploying economic, political or military capabilities unconstrained by other powers is a diminished prospect.

    The other European reflex is to stress a determination to “reinforce multilateralism”, something few other world powers are apparently willing to do now.

    But multilateralism in its current form is surely beyond resuscitation. The imperative is rather to rethink multilateral norms and salvage the most essential core of liberal cooperation amid today’s lurch towards uncontrolled turbulence and power-expediency.

    I have previously proposed what I term “geoliberalism” as a path forward. This is a model that balances geopolitical reality alongside liberal and democratic values. In the second Trump era, the liberal elements of this concept are even more squeezed than they were before he was re-elected.




    Read more:
    Europe is still in short-term crisis mode over Ukraine and lacks a vision for its post-war identity


    Despite the multilateralism rhetoric, European powers actually seem to be leaning towards a more absolute version of realpolitik, with diplomacy based on practical rather than moral considerations. The European Commission president, Ursula von der Leyen, talks of “hyper-transactionalism”, which is less a vision of order than its negation.

    European international liberalism needs to be reframed, not jettisoned. It will be more rearguard and selective, but needs also to be more concerted to hold at bay today’s turbo-charged illiberal assault.

    It can lock onto powerful global societal trends to which realpolitik is dangerously and self-defeatingly blind. European Union powers need to be more measured but also more pointed in salvaging islands of liberal order – for example on climate change cooperation.

    There is little sign of such reflection. Familiar cliches are dominating the European response to the US illiberal pivot.

    The strategic debate has narrowed, especially around the question of defence spending. Repeating ad nauseum that “Europe must step up” and “get its act together” says little about what kind of strategy is needed to navigate the current order implosion, the end towards which defence capabilities are ultimately directed.

    European governments should indeed boost their defence spend, but that spend needs to be rooted in and directed towards an appropriate strategy for global re-ordering.

    The current flux means this is a moment when the parameters of the next international order will be defined. European powers need to prioritise practical action to influence that order more than endless, self-referential speeches about their own power status.

    Even if a degree of self-survival short-termism is understandable, the EU and European governments must lift their eyes to craft more far-sighted responses to the world’s collapsing certainties.

    Richard Youngs does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. No world order: Europe needs more radical thinking for the Trump era – https://theconversation.com/no-world-order-europe-needs-more-radical-thinking-for-the-trump-era-250864

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: Starmer announces aid cuts to fund defence – but Britain’s days as an aid superpower are already long over

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Balazs Szent-Ivanyi, Reader in Politics and International Relations and Deputy Director Aston Centre for Europe, Aston University

    Keir Starmer’s announcement that the UK will cut foreign aid in order to fund more defence spending seems like smart politics. With the US’s commitment to European security in question, it is clear that European countries, including the UK, need to spend more on defence.

    The US president, Donald Trump, with whom the prime minister is meeting on Thursday, has long called out Europeans for free-riding on America’s security guarantee. Credible promises of more British defence spending (including on American kit) may also deter Trump from introducing tariffs on UK imports.

    Building up the UK’s and Europe’s defence capabilities comes with a hefty price tag, and finding the money is tricky. The UK economy has weak growth prospects, and Labour has made a pledge not to increase taxes “on working people”. This leaves budget cuts in other areas as the only approach. The government seems to have decided that cutting foreign aid may be the least painful option for voters.


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    Foreign aid has generally been seen as an area of government spending which has relatively weak groups of domestic supporters. Charities and companies that directly benefit from aid spending through government contracts are a smallish group, and many receive funding from several sources.

    Hostility to aid among the general public is relatively high. According to a 2024 survey by the British Foreign Policy Group, 46% of Britons surveyed thought that UK aid should not return to its previous high of 0.7% of gross national income (GNI), or should be cut even further below the 0.5% at the time of that survey.

    A frequent argument made by successive British governments is that aid, by targeting poverty and conflict, can address the root causes of migration. The public, however, is sceptical about aid’s ability to reduce irregular migration or make the UK safer.




    Read more:
    Why many policies to lower migration actually increase it


    Although Labour voters are more positive about aid’s benefits, it is unlikely that the government would see any major electoral harm from reductions to the aid budget.

    Where aid is really used

    While cutting aid may be a smart move politically, it will have longer-term consequences for the UK’s global influence and its ability to achieve positive change in the world. Many charities were quick to point this out, arguing that it will hurt the lives of the poorest across the world.

    Aid is now set to shrink from 0.5% of GNI to 0.3%, which implies the UK will still have a substantial aid programme. On average, rich countries spent 0.37% of their GNI on aid in 2023 – not much more than what the UK will spend now.

    In practice, however, 23% of the British aid budget in 2023 was made up by Home Office spending on housing refugees in the UK. This is unlikely to decline quickly, even though the government has said it aims to reduce it. A further 34% consisted of contributions to multilateral organisations like the United Nations and World Bank. While there is scope to cut some of this, large savings are difficult without the UK leaving some organisations.

    Given these two fixed items, very little will remain for “genuine” development programmes in partner countries – the kind of funding that is actually visible as UK aid.




    Read more:
    The UK spent a third of its international aid budget on refugees in the UK – what it’s paying for, and why it’s a problem


    Such a small genuine aid programme will undoubtedly mean lower development impact and lower British influence. But the UK’s standing and soft power, particularly in poorer countries, was already in tatters well before Starmer’s announcement.

    The merger between the Foreign Office and Department for International Development in 2020, followed by budget cuts and the re-allocation of aid to the Home Office, has destroyed the UK’s reputation as an “aid superpower” and champion of the global poor.

    Across-the-board cuts have even devastated programmes which the UK has declared as priority areas, such as support for women and girls. Some would argue that after these cuts, the UK did not have much of a reputation left to lose.

    But this story of UK aid is not unique. Indeed, the world has entered a new era of aid fatigue. The populist right portrays aid as wasteful and ineffective, as shown by the Trump administration’s dismantling of the US Agency for International Development.




    Read more:
    USAID’s freeze has thrust the entire global aid system into uncertainty


    Many Africans see aid as a neocolonial enterprise aimed at spreading western ideologies, a sentiment often echoed by the progressive left. Western countries themselves are increasingly open about their selfish reasons for providing aid, such as boosting business, while many non-western donors have emerged as alternatives.

    It is not a surprise that the west’s influence in the world has waned, as evidenced by its failure to build a global anti-Russia coalition following the invasion of Ukraine.

    The UK will need to adapt to these realities. Designing a smarter and highly targeted aid programme, perhaps from the ground up, is now more important than ever to rebuild Britain’s reputation.

    Balazs Szent-Ivanyi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Starmer announces aid cuts to fund defence – but Britain’s days as an aid superpower are already long over – https://theconversation.com/starmer-announces-aid-cuts-to-fund-defence-but-britains-days-as-an-aid-superpower-are-already-long-over-250873

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: Ukraine war: why negotiations depend on trust

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By David J. Wilcox, Part-Time Teaching Fellow, Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Birmingham

    Donald Trump may have begun discussions with the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, over a possible end to the war in Ukraine, but there currently appears to be something of a stalemate.

    Russia’s stated objectives of holding on to five regions of Ukraine (including Crimea) as well as ensuring Ukraine’s permanent neutrality is unlikely to be acceptable to Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelensky. Meanwhile, Zelensky and Trump had a very public falling out, with the US president calling Zelensky a “dictator”.

    This seems to have been resolved somewhat now that the pair appear to have agreed a deal for the US to jointly develop Ukraine’s mineral resources. But serious further negotiation to actually end the war will depend on whether the key players can trust each other as well as whether Zelensky perceives anything Putin and Trump have to say as believable.

    Broadly speaking, trust and its development between leaders offers a potential route to overcoming international conflict and bringing about diplomatic agreement. Indeed, a minimum level of trust is needed to enable states to work together.

    An example of this was how the relationship between Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and US president Ronald Reagan developed. Arguably it was regular face-to-face interactions between Gorbachev and Reagan (four summits in just over three years) which allowed them to develop a level of understanding and increase trust, allowing them to reduce nuclear weapon stockpiles.

    Nevertheless, it still took time to develop their trust and this remained fragile.

    How is trust won?

    Trust is an important element in effective negotiations and can shape their outcome and influence whether peace talks are successful. The importance of trust in a negotiation can be found throughout history.

    US talks with Russia in Saudi Arabia, February 2025.

    Even if trust has potentially developed between leaders, if other individual decision-makers, such as military leaders, do not share that trust, it can seriously damage negotiations. One example of this is how the Lahore peace process between India and Pakistan in 1999 was undermined by Pakistani military action.

    General Pervez Musharraf, head of the armed forces, conducted a military incursion into the Jammu and Kashmir area, violating the treaty between the two states and leading to a breakdown in trust, undermining the peace deal signed earlier that year between the Pakistani prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, and his Indian counterpart, Atal Bihari Vajpayee

    Who do you trust?

    In international relations terms the key factors that create trust are considered by scholars to be capacity, peaceful intention, integrity and predictability . Trump seems to believe that Putin is a trustworthy negotiating partner because he perceives him as sincere in his desire for peace. This view is not shared by Zelensky, who questions Putin’s sincerity, intentions and integrity .

    Zelensky suggests that Putin’s past actions (including leading a full-scale invasion of Ukraine) point towards his future untrustworthiness. This may be underlined by Russia’s dismissal of the Minsk agreements of 2014 and 2015, which were an attempt to negotiate a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine but were never properly implemented. Instead of pursuing implementation, Russia chose further military action against Ukraine in 2022.

    To move forward with negotiations, Zelensky will need to be convinced that Putin is serious in his intentions and willing to act with integrity. The Ukrainian leader will also need to be convinced that Trump is trustworthy and that he can trust that the US will ensure that Putin honours any agreement reached.

    If Trump is to achieve his aim of bringing the war to an end, then he will clearly need to address this lack of trust. One temptation may emerge to simply exclude Zelensky from face-to-face meetings (to sidestep the issue altogether) but there are risks in leaders not meeting opponents.

    When it came to trying to reach an agreement with the Palestinians in the 1990s, the then Israeli prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin, regretted not having met the PLO chairman, Yasser Arafat, before reaching agreement on the framework for the Oslo accords because he would have better understood how Arafat saw the negotiations. The implication was that Rabin would have proceeded differently if he had known Arafat better.

    Alternatively, Trump could leverage his own relationship with Putin to “encourage” the Russian leader to take steps that demonstrate to Zelensky that he is a trustworthy negotiating partner. Crucially, it will be for Putin to demonstrate his seriousness and sincerity towards meaningful negotiations and a peaceful resolution. Gestures of conciliation could hold the key.

    One famous examples of this is when Egyptian president Anwar Sadat visited Jerusalem in 1978, becoming the first Arab leader to speak to the Israeli parliament. This was seen as vital to peace talks between the two countries and resulted in the 1979 Camp David accords.

    Face-to-face interactions between Putin and Zelensky could provide a way of reassuring the Ukrainian leader. However, much more is required to demonstrate that an individual or even a state is trustworthy than not.

    As Deborah Larson, professor of political science at the University of California, once said,: “People believe that a good person will never do anything bad, whereas a bad person can do occasional good as well as bad deeds. As a result, just one misdeed indicates that an actor is immoral, whereas one good act does not demonstrate much.”

    Another approach would be to start Russian-Ukrainian negotiations at a much lower level and develop them upwards (or in parallel to higher-level negotiations). Individuals representing the key decision makers could develop their own interpersonal relations, while working out how to bridge gaps between the different leaders.

    Any negotiations to end the war will rest ultimately on those two states and their leaders. Ignoring the interpersonal relationships and lack of trust between the two people who will sign off any agreement makes any agreement almost impossible.

    David J. Wilcox does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Ukraine war: why negotiations depend on trust – https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-why-negotiations-depend-on-trust-250102

    MIL OSI – Global Reports