NewzIntel.com

Category: Ukraine

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: President Lai attends opening of 2025 Halifax Taipei forum

    Source: Republic of China Taiwan

    On the afternoon of February 20, President Lai Ching-te attended the opening of the 2025 Halifax Taipei forum. In remarks, President Lai thanked the Halifax International Security Forum for their strong support for Taiwan, and for having chosen Taiwan as the first location outside North America to hold a forum. Noting that we face a complex global landscape, the president called on the international community to take action. He said that as authoritarianism consolidates, democratic nations must also come closer in solidarity, and called on the international community to create non-red global supply chains, as well as unite to usher in peace. President Lai emphasized that Taiwan will work toward maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, and collaborate with democratic partners to form a global alliance for the AI chip industry and together greet a bright, new era.
    A transcript of President Lai’s remarks follows:
    To begin, I want to give a warm welcome to all the distinguished guests here at the very first Halifax Taipei forum. The Halifax International Security Forum, held every year in Canada, has been an important gathering for freedom-loving nations worldwide.
    I would like to thank Halifax and President [Peter] Van Praagh for their strong support for Taiwan. Every year since 2018, Taiwan has been invited to participate in the forum. Last year, former President Tsai Ing-wen was invited to speak, and this year, Halifax has chosen Taiwan as the first location outside North America to hold a forum.
    As President Van Praagh has said, “While the security challenges ahead are too big for any single country to solve alone, there is no challenge that can’t be met when the world’s democracies work together.” Today, we have world leaders and experts who traveled from afar to be here, showing that they value and support Taiwan. It demonstrates solidarity among democracies and the determination to take on challenges as one.
    I would like to express my gratitude and admiration to all of you for serving as defenders of freedom. At this very moment, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is still ongoing. Authoritarian regimes including China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran continue to consolidate. China is hurting economies around the world through its dumping practices. We face grave challenges to global economic order, democracy, freedom, peace, and stability.
    Taiwan holds a key position on the first island chain, directly facing an authoritarian threat. But we will not be intimidated. We will stand firm and safeguard our national sovereignty, maintain our free and democratic way of life, and uphold peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan cherishes peace, but we also have no delusions about peace. We will uphold the spirit of peace through strength, using concrete actions to build a stronger Taiwan and bolster the free and democratic community.
    I sincerely thank the international community for continuing to attach importance to the situation in the Taiwan Strait. Recently, US President Donald Trump and Japan’s Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru issued a joint leaders’ statement expressing their firm support for peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, and for Taiwan’s participation in international affairs.
    As we face a complex global landscape, I call on the international community to take the following actions:
    First, as authoritarianism consolidates, democratic nations must also come closer in solidarity.
    Just a few days ago, the top diplomats of the US, Japan, and South Korea held talks, underlining the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. They also conveyed their stance against “any effort to destabilize democratic institutions, economic independence, and global security.” On these issues, Taiwan will also continue to contribute its utmost.
    I recently announced that we will prioritize special budget allocations to ensure that our defense budget exceeds 3 percent of GDP. 
    Soon after I assumed office last year, I formed the Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee at the Presidential Office. This committee aims to combine the strengths of government and civil society to enhance our resilience in national defense, economic livelihoods, disaster prevention, and democracy. We will also deepen our strategic partnerships in the democratic community to mutually increase defense resilience, demonstrate deterrence, and achieve our goal of peace throughout the world.
    Second, let’s create non-red global supply chains. 
    For the democratic community to deter the expansion of authoritarianism, it must have strong technological capabilities. These can serve as the backbone of national defense, promote industrial development, and enhance economic resilience. So, in addressing China’s red supply chain and the impact of its dumping, Taiwan is willing and able to work with global democracies to maintain the technological strengths among our partners and build resilient non-red supply chains.
    As a major semiconductor manufacturing nation, Taiwan will introduce an initiative on semiconductor supply chain partnerships for global democracies. We will collaborate with our democratic partners to form a global alliance for the AI chip industry and establish democratic supply chains for industries connected to high-end chips. The achievements of today’s semiconductor industry in Taiwan can be attributed to our collective efforts. Government, industry, academia, and research institutions had to overcome various challenges over the last 50 years for us to secure this position. 
    We hope Taiwan can serve as a base for linking the capabilities of our democratic partners so that each can play a suitable role in the semiconductor industry chain and develop its own strengths, deepening our mutually beneficial cooperation in technology. This benefits all of us. Moreover, it allows us to further enhance deterrence and maintain global security.
    Third, let’s unite to usher in peace.
    China has not stopped intimidating Taiwan politically and militarily. Last year, China launched several large-scale military exercises in the Taiwan Strait. Its escalation of gray-zone aggression now poses a grave threat to the peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific region. As a responsible member of the international community, Taiwan will maintain the status quo. We will not seek conflict. Rather, we are willing to engage in dialogue with China, under the principles of parity and dignity, and work toward maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
    As the agenda of this forum suggests, democracy and freedom create more than just opportunities; they also bring resilience, justice, partnerships, and security.
    Taiwan will continue working alongside its democratic partners to greet a bright, new era. Once again, a warm welcome to all of you. I wish this forum every success. Thank you.
    Also in attendance at the event were Mrs. Abe Akie, wife of the late former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo of Japan, and Halifax International Security Forum President Van Praagh.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Congressman Cohen’s Statement on Support for Ukraine

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Steve Cohen (TN-09)

    MEMPHIS – Congressman Steve Cohen (TN-9), the House Ranking Member on the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the Helsinki Commission, made the following statement on his support for Ukraine as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Parliamentary Assembly prepares to meet in Vienna:

    “As the House Ranking Member of the Helsinki Commission, the U.S. delegation to the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA), which is convening this weekend in Vienna for its Annual Meeting, I have strongly supported Ukraine as a free and democratic country since Russia invaded on February 24, 2022. 

    “As Hannah Arendt would say, it is ‘preposterous’ to suggest Ukraine started this war. By parroting this and other Russian propaganda, President Trump is betraying and abandoning President Zelensky who is fighting on behalf of the entire free world. Despite enduring military and civilian casualties, continued bombings and war crimes including child abductions, the people of Ukraine have maintained pride in their country and love for democracy by fighting on. 

    “I am appalled by the conduct of President Trump who ordered U.S.-Russia talks in Saudi Arabia that not only excluded our European allies but excluded Ukraine itself. If this war is to come to a successful conclusion, Ukraine and all our NATO allies need to be at the negotiating table. We cannot discuss the future of Ukraine without Ukraine. There must be security assurances and mechanisms strong enough to enforce peace by deterring Putin from starting any new wars. 

    “I advise President Trump not to believe Putin so readily. Putin has a terrible track record for telling the truth including saying he wouldn’t invade Ukraine days before doing it and refusing to call his war anything other than a ‘special military operation.’ 

    “I will continue my strong support for Ukraine and admire the work of President Zelensky and the people of Ukraine. They are on the front lines of democracy and are fighting for democracy in Europe and around the world.”

    # # #

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI: ING to redeem Perpetual Capital Securities

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    ING to redeem Perpetual Capital Securities

    ING announced today it will redeem USD 1,250 million of 6.500% Perpetual Additional Tier 1 Contingent Convertible Capital Securities (the “Perpetual Capital Securities”) on the call date of 16 April 2025, in line with ING’s goal to continuously optimise its capital structure.

    The Perpetual Capital Securities (CUSIP 456837AF0/ISIN US456837AF06) will be redeemed in full in accordance with their terms, with payment to be made on 16 April 2025. The redemption price will be the principal amount of the Perpetual Capital Securities. Accrued and unpaid interest due on the redemption date will be paid in the usual manner to holders of record as of 15 April 2025. The paying agent for the Perpetual Capital Securities is The Bank of New York Mellon, London Branch 160 Queen Victoria Street London EC4V 4LA United Kingdom.

    Any future decisions by ING as to whether it will exercise (or cause to be exercised) calls in respect of debt securities will be made on an economic basis, taking into account the interests of all stakeholders. Other factors that ING will consider include prevailing market conditions, regulatory approval and capital requirements.

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    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-Evening Report: The ASIO threat assessment is a dark outlook for Australia’s security. Are our laws up to the task?

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Sarah Kendall, Adjunct Research Fellow, The University of Queensland

    Shutterstock

    This week, ASIO chief Mike Burgess delivered his sixth Annual Threat Assessment.

    His approach this time was unprecedented. Instead of focusing on past and present threats, Burgess declassified parts of ASIO’s assessment for the future, warning us about Australia’s security outlook to 2030.

    Over the next five years, ASIO is expecting “an unprecedented number of challenges, and an unprecedented cumulative level of potential harm”, Burgess warned. At the same time, the threat environment will become more diverse.

    Espionage and foreign interference are already at extreme levels, but are anticipated to intensify. Sabotage is expected to pose an increasing threat. Politically motivated violence and communal violence will also remain an elevated concern.

    What does this mean for our criminal laws? Are they robust enough to protect us from the growing and diversifying threat of espionage, sabotage and foreign interference? Or will they need bolstering?

    What are the threats?

    Espionage, or spying, involves the theft of information. Burgess has warned that both our enemies and our friends will seek to steal information from us.

    This includes information about our military capabilities and alliances, such as AUKUS.

    Instead of using traditional spies to gather this information, Burgess expects greater use of proxies.

    These proxies could be unwittingly involved in the espionage efforts of a foreign country – such as private investigators. Or they could know exactly what they’re doing.

    Foreign interference involves covertly shaping decision-making to the advantage of a foreign power. Burgess has warned that foreign governments are monitoring, intimidating and coercing Australians and diaspora communities, including engaging in coerced repatriations.

    He also expects that foreign interference may be used to undermine community support for AUKUS.

    Concerningly, ASIO has disrupted plots by foreign countries to physically harm (or even kill) people living in Australia. This includes activists, journalists and ordinary citizens – all critics of certain foreign governments.

    Both espionage and foreign interference will be enabled by advances in technology, including artificial intelligence (AI), deep fakes and large online pools of personal data.

    Sabotage involves deliberately destroying or damaging infrastructure.

    Russia has been engaging in diverse acts of sabotage in Europe, aiming to erode support for Ukraine and damage cohesion. These attacks include arson against various types of infrastructure (including defence and munitions facilities), jamming civil aviation GPS systems, and disrupting railways.

    While Burgess warned that the risk of similar attacks against Australia is increasing (including attacks against infrastructure arising out of AUKUS), cyber-enabled sabotage will be of more concern. At the moment, foreign governments are exploring and exploiting Australia’s critical infrastructure networks to map systems and maintain access in the future.

    As with espionage, Burgess expects criminal proxies to be used more frequently to engage in sabotage. This includes state-sponsored or state-supported terrorist groups.

    Are our laws ready to deal with this?

    With the espionage, sabotage and foreign interference threat growing and diversifying over the next five years, you’d be right to ask whether our criminal laws are robust enough to stand up to the challenge.

    For the most part, they are.

    All the laws apply to conduct that occurs “in the real world” and online. The laws also apply to any foreign country, including our friends, as well as terrorist organisations.

    In addition to foreign countries, the laws apply to conduct on behalf of a foreign country, including where the conduct is directed, funded or supervised by the foreign country or a person acting on its behalf. This means the laws would apply to proxies hired to engage in espionage or sabotage.

    Our sabotage laws are broad enough to cover the explorations of critical infrastructure networks currently being undertaken. An act of sabotage does not have to be committed to be an offence under these laws.

    Our foreign interference laws would cover coerced repatriations. While plots to harm Australians may also fall within these offences, a number of other offences also exist for harming or killing Australian citizens or residents.

    Room for improvement

    Our espionage, sabotage and foreign interference laws certainly are “world-leading”. However, there are some drawbacks.

    For example, the laws are yet to grapple with the rise of AI and its use to gather information for espionage or generate mis- or disinformation for foreign interference.

    While the laws have broad extraterritorial reach – they apply to conduct that occurs within or outside Australia – the practicalities of enforcing the laws when offenders are located overseas is a big barrier.

    But in today’s digital age where espionage, sabotage and foreign interference can be conducted online from the safety of a foreign country and therefore beyond the reach of Australia’s criminal law, we need more than a robust legal response.

    As Burgess stressed, these issues “require whole of government, whole of community, whole of society responses […] national security is truly national security: everybody’s business”.

    We all need to be aware of the risks and what we – as individuals, employees, researchers and business owners – can do to mitigate them.

    This article was written in Sarah Kendall’s personal capacity as an Adjunct Research Fellow at the University of Queensland School of Law. It does not reflect the views of the Queensland Law Reform Commission or the Queensland Government.

    – ref. The ASIO threat assessment is a dark outlook for Australia’s security. Are our laws up to the task? – https://theconversation.com/the-asio-threat-assessment-is-a-dark-outlook-for-australias-security-are-our-laws-up-to-the-task-250372

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-OSI China: Putin: Russian troops crossed into Ukraine from Kursk region

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    Russian President Vladimir Putin speaks at the plenary session of the 27th St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in St. Petersburg, Russia, on June 7, 2024. [Photo/Xinhua]

    Russian President Vladimir Putin said that he was informed an hour ago that Russian forces had crossed the border with Ukraine from the Kursk region, the TASS news agency reported Wednesday.

    “The most recent information that I was reported just an hour ago is that tonight the fighters of the 810th brigade crossed the border of the Russian Federation and Ukraine and entered the territory of the enemy,” Putin said, while answering journalists’ questions during a visit to a drone plant in St. Petersburg.

    Russia’s army has been pushing back Ukrainian forces in Kursk region following their surprise cross-border attack in August 2024.

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-OSI China: Chinese FM calls for true multilateralism, more equitable global governance system

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, also a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, chairs the UN Security Council’s high-level meeting on “Practicing multilateralism, reforming and improving global governance” at the UN headquarters in New York on Feb. 18, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

    Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on Tuesday called for reinvigorating true multilateralism and speeding up the efforts to build a more just and equitable global governance system.

    Wang, also a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, made the remarks in his speech at the UN Security Council’s high-level meeting on “Practicing multilateralism, reforming and improving global governance.”

    The year 2025 marks the 80th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations, Wang said.

    The 80 years of history is enlightenment enough. In the face of the turbulent and changing international landscape, the UN-centered international system provides important safeguards for the cause of human progress, and the vision of multilateralism with coordination and cooperation as its cornerstone is the best solution to global issues, he said.

    In the face of the historical trend of shared future, no country can prosper alone, and mutually beneficial cooperation is the right choice. In the face of the profoundly changing international landscape, the Global South should not only achieve the historic feat of moving toward modernization together, but also remain at the forefront of improving the global governance system, he added.

    “In a time of intensifying turbulence and transformation, we need, more than ever, to remind ourselves of the founding mission of the United Nations, reinvigorate true multilateralism, and speed up the efforts to build a more just and equitable global governance system,” said Wang.

    In this connection, Wang made a four-point proposal:

    First, upholding sovereign equality. In advancing global governance, all countries have the right to participate as equals, make decisions as equals, and benefit as equals. There is a need to respect the development paths chosen independently by people of all countries, uphold the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, and not impose one’s will upon others.

    Second, upholding fairness and justice. A critical part of global governance is to ensure that justice prevails. Under the new circumstances, international affairs should no longer be monopolized by a small number of countries. The reform of the Security Council should continue to emphasize democratic consultation, increase the representation and say of developing countries, especially African countries, and effectively redress historical injustice.

    Third, upholding solidarity and coordination. Promoting international cooperation is an important purpose of the UN Charter, and a sure path toward improving global governance. Countries should commit themselves to the principle of extensive consultation and joint contribution for shared benefit, replace confrontation with coordination, prevent lose-lose through win-win cooperation, and break down small circles with greater solidarity.

    Fourth, upholding an action-oriented approach. Global governance has to be improved, not through words but through action. In the face of protracted wars, loss of innocent lives, and challenges brought by new technologies, UN agencies should seek solutions rather than chant slogans.

    On the situation in the Middle East, Wang said it is vital to uphold the two-state solution, press for a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement of the Palestinian question, and bring lasting peace and security to the Middle East.

    On the Ukraine crisis, the foreign minister said that since the start of the crisis, China has been calling for a political settlement and pushing for peace talks, and China supports all efforts conducive to peace.

    Noting that China has remained steadfast in making its contribution to global governance, Wang said a community with a shared future for mankind, the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative and the Global Civilization Initiative represent China’s proposal for the reform and improvement of global governance.

    Stressing that China pursues peace and security, advances common development, champions openness and inclusiveness, and upholds multilateral cooperation in global governance, Wang said that China, as a founding member of the United Nations, takes the lead in practicing true multilateralism.

    China is a member of almost all universal intergovernmental organizations and a party to over 600 international conventions and their amendments, he said, adding China supports the United Nations in playing a central role in international affairs and makes continuous contribution to the UN cause.

    With the United Nations about to enter its next 80 years, China stands ready to work with all parties to draw wisdom from history, open a new era for multilateralism, and make global governance more fair and equitable, Wang said.

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Duckworth Reaction to Trump’s Latest Betrayal of Our Partners in Ukraine in Favor of Authoritarian Dictator Vladimir Putin

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Illinois Tammy Duckworth
    February 19, 2025
    [WASHINGTON, D.C.] – Today, U.S. Senator Tammy Duckworth (D-IL) released the following statement in response to President Donald Trump’s latest false claims about Russia’s unjustified war and his outrageous prioritization of Vladimir Putin over our partners in Ukraine:
    “Trump’s latest comments parroting Vladimir Putin’s talking points are a complete betrayal of the Ukrainian people, American leadership and our values. By inviting Putin to visit the U.S., suggesting President Zelenskyy is a ‘dictator’ or claiming that anyone other than Putin ‘started this war,’ our Commander-in-Chief is proving again and again that one of America’s main adversaries has him exactly where he wants him—and that should terrify all of us.
    “Adding insult to injury, it is extremely alarming that Trump would even consider beginning negotiations with Putin without Ukraine or our European allies—allies who be on the front lines if Putin continues his march West. The more Donald Trump cozies up to this dictator, the more he emboldens Russian aggression that puts Ukraine, our national security and the security of all NATO allies at risk.
    “My Republican colleagues need to grow a spine and condemn Trump’s remarks for what they are: wrong, unhinged and dangerous. America’s allies are watching.”
    -30-

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Global: In pushing for Ukraine elections, Trump is falling into Putin-laid trap to delegitimize Zelenskyy

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Lena Surzhko Harned, Associate Teaching Professor of Political Science, Penn State

    President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy meet on Sept. 25, 2019, on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly. Saul Loeb/AFP via Getty Images

    Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was shut out of the discussions concerning the future of his country, which took place in Saudi Arabia on Feb. 18, 2025. In fact, there were no Ukrainian representatives, nor any European Union ones – just U.S. and Russian delegations, and their Saudi hosts.

    The meeting – which followed a mutually complimentary phone call between U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian leader Vladimir Putin just days earlier – was gleefully celebrated in Moscow. The absence of Ukraine in deciding its own future is very much in line with Putin’s policy toward its neighbor. Putin has long rejected Ukrainian statehood and the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government, or as he calls it the “Kyiv regime.”

    While the U.S. delegation did reiterate that future discussions would have to involve Ukraine at some stage, the Trump administration’s actions and words have no doubt undermined Kyiv’s position and influence.

    To that end, the U.S. is increasingly falling in line with Moscow on a key plank of the Kremlin’s plan to delegitimize Zelenskyy and the Ukrainian government: calling for elections in Ukraine as part of any peace deal.

    Questioning Zelenskyy’s legitimacy

    Challenging Zelenskyy’s legitimacy is part of a deliberate ongoing propaganda campaign by Russia to discredit Ukrainian leadership, weaken support for Ukraine from its key allies and remove Zelenskyy – and potentially Ukraine – as a partner in negotiations.

    Claims by the Russian president that his country is ready for peace negotiations appear, to many observers of its three-year war, highly suspect given Russia’s ongoing attacks on its neighbor and its steadfast refusal to date to agree to any temporary truce.

    Yet the Kremlin is pushing the narrative that the problem is that there is no legitimate Ukrainian authority with which it can deal. As such, Putin can proclaim his commitments to a peace without making any commitments or compromises necessary to any true negotiation process.

    Meanwhile, painting Zelenskyy as a “dictator” dampens the enthusiastic support that once greeted him from democratic countries. This, is turn, can translate to the reduction or even end of military support for Kyiv, Putin hopes, allowing him a fillip in what has become a war of attrition.

    What Putin needs for this plan to work is a willing partner to help get the message out that Zelenskyy and the current Ukraine government are not legitimate representatives of their country – and into this gap the new U.S. administration appears to have stepped.

    Then-candidate Volodymyr Zelenskyy at a polling station during Ukraine’s presidential election in Kiev on March 31, 2019.
    Genya Savilov/AFP via Getty Images)

    Dictating terms

    Take the narrative on elections.

    At the meeting in Saudi Arabia, the U.S. reportedly discussed elections in Ukraine as being a key part of any peace deal. Trump himself has raised the prospect of elections, noting in a Feb. 18 press conference: “We have a situation where we haven’t had elections in Ukraine, where we have martial law.” The U.S. president went on to claim, incorrectly, that Zelenskyy’s approval rating was down to “4%.” The latest polling actually shows the Ukrainian president to be sitting on a 57% approval rating.

    A day later, Trump upped the attacks, describing Zelenskyy as a “dictator without elections.”

    Such statements echo Russia’s narrative that the government in Kyiv is illegitimate.

    The Kremlin’s claims regarding what it describes as the “legal aspects related to his [Zelenskyy’s] legitimacy” are based on the premise that the Ukraine president’s five-year term as president of Ukraine should have ended in 2024.

    And elections in Ukraine would have taken place in May of that year had it not been for the martial law that Ukraine put into place when the Russian Federation launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

    The Martial Law Act – which Ukraine imposed on Feb. 24, 2022 – explicitly bans all elections in Ukraine for the duration of the emergency action.

    And while the Ukrainian Constitution only includes language regarding the extension of parliament’s powers until martial law is lifted, constitutional lawyers in Ukraine tend to agree that the implication is that this also applies to presidential powers.

    Notwithstanding what the law says, the Kremlin’s questioning of the democratic institutions of Ukraine and its push for elections in Ukraine have found traction in Washington of late. Trump’s special envoy Gen. Keith Kellogg declared on Feb. 1 that elections “need to be done” as part of peace process, saying that elections are a “beauty of a solid democracy.”

    The ballot box trap

    Zelenskyy is not opposed to elections in principle and has agreed that elections should be held when the time is right. “Once martial law is over, then the ball is in parliament’s court – the parliament then picks a date for elections,” Zelenskyy stated in a Jan. 2 interview.

    And he appears to have the backing of the majority of Ukrainians. In May 2024, 69% of Ukrainians polled said Zelenskyy should remain president until the end of marshal law, after which elections should be held.

    The issue, as Zelenskyy has said, is the timing and circumstances. “During the war, there can be no elections. It’s necessary to change legislation, the constitution, and so on. These are significant challenges. But there are also nonlegal, very human challenges,” he said on Jan. 4.

    Even opposition politicians in Ukraine agree that now is not the time. Petro Poroshenko, Zelenskyy’s main political rival, has dismissed the idea of wartime elections, as has Inna Sovsun, the leader of the opposition Golos Party.

    Apart from logistical problems of ensuring free and fair elections in the middle of a war, the conflict would present logistical hurdles to campaigning and accessing polling sites. There is also the question of whether and how to include Ukrainians in Russian-occupied territories and those who are internally displaced, as well as the 6.5 million who fled fighting and currently reside abroad.

    Good elections … and bad

    Russia did, of course, hold elections during the current conflict. But the 2024 election that Putin won with 87% of the vote was, according to most international observers, neither free nor fair.

    Rather, it was a sham vote that only underlined what most political scientists will confirm: Elections are at best a necessary but insufficient marker of democracy.

    This point is not wasted on Ukrainians, whose commitment to democracy strengthened in the years leading up to the 2022 invasion. Indeed, a survey taken a few months into the war found that 76% of Ukrainians agreed that democracy was the best form of governance – up from 41% three years earlier.

    There are other reasons Ukraine might be wary of elections. The adversarial nature of political campaigns can be divisive, especially among a society in high stress.

    Ukrainian politicians have openly argued that holding an election during the war would be destabilizing for Ukrainian society, undermining the internal unity in face of Russian aggression.

    Outside influence

    And then there is concern over outside influence in any election. Ukrainians have had enough experience with Russian meddling in their politics to take it for granted that the Kremlin will attempt to put a thumb on the scale.

    Russia has since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 employed its substantial resources to influence Ukraine’s politics through all available means, ranging from propaganda, economic pressures and incentives to energy blackmail, threats and use of violence.

    In 2004, Moscow’s electoral manipulations in favor of the pro-Russian candidate, Viktor Yanukovich, led to the Orange Revolution – in which Ukrainians rose up to reject rigged elections. Nine years later, Yanukovich – who became president in 2010 – was deposed though the Revolution of Dignity, which saw Ukrainians oust a man many saw as a Russian stooge in favor of a path toward greater integration with Europe.

    Putin’s history of meddling in elections extends beyond Ukraine, of course. Most recently, the Romanian Constitutional Court annulled the country’s presidential elections, citing an electoral process compromised by foreign interference.

    An impossible position

    In raising elections as a prerequisite to negotiations, Putin is setting a
    “catch-22” trap for Ukraine: The Ukrainian Constitution states that elections can happen only when martial law is lifted; but the lifting of the martial law is possible only when the “hot phase” of the war is over. So without a ceasefire, no election is possible.

    But in refusing to agree to elections, Ukraine can be cast as the blockage to any peace deal – playing to a narrative that is already forming in the U.S. administration that Kyiv is the problem and will need to be sidelined for there to be progress.

    In short, in seemingly echoing Russian talking points on an election being a prerequisite for peace, the U.S. puts the Ukrainian government in an impossible position: Agree to the vote and risk internal division and outside interference, or reject it and allow Moscow – and, perhaps, Washington – to frame Ukraine’s leaders as illegitimate and unable to negotiate on the behalf of their people.

    Lena Surzhko Harned does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. In pushing for Ukraine elections, Trump is falling into Putin-laid trap to delegitimize Zelenskyy – https://theconversation.com/in-pushing-for-ukraine-elections-trump-is-falling-into-putin-laid-trap-to-delegitimize-zelenskyy-250003

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Murphy, 21 Colleagues Urge Secretary Rubio to Replace Nuclear Arms Treaty With Russia

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Connecticut – Chris Murphy

    February 19, 2025

    WASHINGTON—U.S. Senator Chris Murphy (D-Conn.), a member of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on Wednesday joined 21 members of Congress in writing a letter to U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, urging him to replace the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), a nuclear arms agreement between the United States and Russia. On February 5, 2026, the 2010 New START Treaty between the United States and Russia will expire. Unless a new agreement is in place by that date, there will be no legal limits on U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces, reversing decades of work to reduce the risk of nuclear war. In their letter, the bicameral lawmakers urge Secretary Rubio to work with Congress to replace New START and prevent a dangerous and costly arms race between the United States and Russia.
    “The Trump administration has a historic opportunity to initiate high-level talks for a new pact and, until those talks reach completion, to mutually agree to respect the limits of New START using existing technical means of verification. Given the time it would take to negotiate a new agreement, an executive understanding that both sides will adhere to New START limits would help to reduce uncertainty in this interim period,” the members wrote.
    They added: “We condemn Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling against Ukraine. Russia’s illegal war against the Ukrainian people is at odds with our democratic ideals. Yet even when our nations have had profound disagreements, including during the Cold War, we managed to come to the table to bring the world back from the precipice of nuclear catastrophe.”
    U.S. Senators Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.), Jeff Merkley (D.-Ore.), Peter Welch (D-Vt.), Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.), Jack Reed (D-R.I), Ron Wyden (D-Ore.), Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.), Mark Kelly (D-Ariz.), Andy Kim (D-N.J.), Cory Booker (D-N.J), Dick Durbin (D-Ill.), Angus King (I-Maine), Tammy Baldwin (D-Wisc.) and Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) also signed the letter, along with U.S. Representatives Bill Foster (D-Ill.-11), Jim McGovern (D-Mass.-02), Gregory Meeks (D-N.Y.-05), Eleanor Holmes-Norton (D-D.C.), Ilhan Omar (D-Minn.-05), Rashida Tlaib (D-Mich.-12), and Lloyd Doggett (D-Texas-37).
    Full text of the letter is available HERE and below.
    Dear Secretary Rubio:
    On February 5, 2026, the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) between the United States and Russia will expire. Unless a new agreement is in place by that date, there will be no legal limits on U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces, reversing decades of work to reduce the risk of nuclear war.
    We urge you to work with Congress to replace New START and prevent a dangerous and costly arms race between the United States and Russia, the world’s two largest nuclear powers. We also ask that the Department of State provide a briefing on the Administration’s plan for New START in a timely manner.
    For five decades, American presidents, including Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and both George H.W. and George W. Bush, have supported the U.S.-Russia nuclear arms control process. This long-standing, bipartisan effort has enjoyed high approval ratings among the American public, who recognize the dangers of nuclear proliferation.
    The Trump Administration has a historic opportunity to initiate high-level talks for a new pact and, until those talks reach completion, to mutually agree to respect the limits of New START using existing technical means of verification. Given the time it would take to negotiate a new agreement, an executive understanding that both sides will adhere to New START limits would help to reduce uncertainty in this interim period. It is critical that the Administration not increase the U.S. arsenal above New START limits or resume nuclear testing, which would set back the bipartisan progress made on nuclear nonproliferation and arms control. An unconstrained arms race would make the U.S. less secure and increase the risks to global security.
    New START enhances U.S. national security by placing legal limits on all Russian-deployed intercontinentalrange nuclear weapons. The United States and Russia agreed in 2021 to extend the treaty through February 5, 2026, and in February 2023, President Vladimir Putin announced Russia was “suspending” its implementation of the treaty. While Russia has agreed to abide by the treaty’s limits, we believe it is in the best interest of both of our nations to pursue formal mechanisms aimed at preventing a nuclear arms race.
    We condemn Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling against Ukraine. Russia’s illegal war against the Ukrainian people is at odds with our democratic ideals. Yet even when our nations have had profound disagreements, including during the Cold War, we managed to come to the table to bring the world back from the precipice of nuclear catastrophe. Today, we must do so again.
    Thank you for your attention to this important issue.
    Sincerely,

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Housing and Construction – The staggering increase in home building costs over 4 years – QV

    Source: Quotable Value (QV)

    Building costs have increased at an average rate of 44% over the last four years, despite the rate of inflation slowing markedly last year.
    This was the major finding from a new QV CostBuilder study that looked at the comparative cost of building a standardised 150m² home across six main urban centres – Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch, Dunedin, Hamilton and Palmerston North.
    This bespoke research also showed that construction costs have increased by the largest percentage in Dunedin (47.1%) since 2020, followed by Palmerston North (46%).
    Despite always being the most expensive city to build a home in overall, construction costs actually increased by the smallest margin in Auckland (39.4%). Christchurch (40.5%) wasn’t far behind, with Hamilton (44.8%) sitting just above average.
    In real dollar terms, however, Wellington saw the largest average increase in the cost to build a home; its average build cost increased by $900 per square metre in five years. As a percentage, the cost of building a home in the capital increased by an average of 45.9% since 2020.
    But the good news for developers or for anyone looking at building a home is that the rate of building cost inflation has slowed markedly in recent years. In 2024, costs increased at a rate of between 0.7% and 2.2% across these six main urban areas.
    The smallest percentage increases last year were in Auckland (0.7%) and Hamilton (0.7%). Palmerston North (2.2%) saw the largest increase in 2024.
    “There are currently no significant differences in the rate of construction cost increases across the country. What these numbers show is just a relatively small difference in cost, which can be attributed to variable labour rates, different company overheads, some variance in materials, and differing transport costs across the country,” QV CostBuilder quantity surveyor Martin Bisset said.
    “After years of pronounced inflation that came as a result of managing the Covid-19 epidemic here and abroad, it’s good to see that construction costs have become significantly more stable in recent years. Hopefully the years of such staggeringly large construction cost increases are now firmly in the rear-view mirror.”
    Mr Bisset is currently busy preparing QV CostBuilder’s latest quarterly update for release next month. Though still early in the process, he said it looked as though Q1 in 2025 had been another relatively flat quarter.
    However, he also pointed out that ongoing geopolitical instability in Ukraine and the Middle East, the proliferation of US-led trade wars, and increased tariffs on construction materials could all have a major detrimental impact on the cost of building a home in New Zealand in the future.
    “Given that Aotearoa relies so heavily on importing building materials, a lot always depends on the buying power of the New Zealand dollar.”
    For this research, the standard home was based on three or four bedrooms, with one or two bathrooms. Construction consisted of Ribraft floor slab, Colorsteel® roof, weatherboard or brick veneer cladding, 2.4m high stud, floor tiles to bathrooms and kitchen, half height wall tiles to bathroom, and medium quality fittings.
    These rates are based on the total floor area of all levels, measured over all external walls. They include the following percentages, which are based on the total cost of the building – preliminaries at 7%, margin at 5%, and contingency at 1.5%.
    Mr Bisset noted these rates exclude the cost of land, demolition of existing structures on site, site works to achieve the starting level of the build, increased structural requirements, external works, utilities (outside the boundary of the site), professional and legal fees, fittings, furniture, or equipment. They also exclude GST.
    “It’s important to remember that all of these figures are averages and the cost of building will always depend on the level of finishes, internal layout, and all manner of other elements,” he said.

    MIL OSI New Zealand News –

  • MIL-OSI: Ansys Announces Q4 and FY 2024 Financial Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    / Q4 2024 Results

    • Revenue of $882.2 million
    • GAAP diluted earnings per share of $3.21 and non-GAAP diluted earnings per share of $4.44
    • GAAP operating profit margin of 40.3% and non-GAAP operating profit margin of 53.3%
    • Operating cash flows of $258.0 million and unlevered operating cash flows of $266.8 million
    • Annual contract value (ACV) of $1,094.6 million

    /FY 2024 Results

    • Revenue of $2,544.8 million
    • GAAP diluted earnings per share of $6.55 and non-GAAP diluted earnings per share of $10.91
    • GAAP operating profit margin of 28.2% and non-GAAP operating profit margin of 45.7%
    • Operating cash flows of $795.7 million and unlevered operating cash flows of $834.6 million
    • ACV of $2,563.0 million
    • Deferred revenue and backlog of $1,718.3 million on December 31, 2024

    PITTSBURGH, Feb. 19, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — ANSYS, Inc. (NASDAQ: ANSS), today reported fourth quarter 2024 revenue of $882.2 million, an increase of 10% in reported currency, or 11% in constant currency, when compared to the fourth quarter of 2023. For FY 2024, revenue growth was 12% in reported currency, or 13% in constant currency, when compared to FY 2023. For the fourth quarter of 2024, the Company reported diluted earnings per share of $3.21 and $4.44 on a GAAP and non-GAAP basis, respectively, compared to $3.14 and $3.94 on a GAAP and non-GAAP basis, respectively, for the fourth quarter of 2023. For FY 2024, the Company reported diluted earnings per share of $6.55 and $10.91 on a GAAP and non-GAAP basis, respectively, compared to $5.73 and $8.80 on a GAAP and non-GAAP basis, respectively, for FY 2023. Additionally, the Company reported fourth quarter and FY 2024 ACV growth of 15% and 11% in reported currency, respectively, or 16% and 13% in constant currency, respectively, when compared to the fourth quarter and FY 2023. Fourth quarter 2024 ACV of $1.1 billion contributed 43% of the full year 2024 ACV while Q1, Q2 and Q3 each contributed 16%, 20% and 21%, respectively. The Company expects double-digit FY 2025 ACV growth.

    As previously announced, on January 15, 2024, Ansys entered into a definitive agreement with Synopsys, Inc. (“Synopsys”) under which Synopsys will acquire Ansys. As previously announced by Synopsys, Ansys and Synopsys have received conditional clearance from the European Commission. The U.K. Competition and Markets Authority provisionally accepted our remedies towards a transaction approval in Phase 1. The State Administration for Market Regulation of the People’s Republic of China has officially accepted our filing, and its review of the proposed transaction is in process. We continue to work with the regulators in other relevant jurisdictions to conclude their reviews. The transaction is anticipated to close in the first half of 2025, subject to the receipt of required regulatory approvals and other customary closing conditions. As previously announced, in light of the pending transaction with Synopsys, Ansys has suspended quarterly earnings conference calls and no longer provides quarterly or annual guidance.

    The non-GAAP financial results highlighted represent non-GAAP financial measures. Reconciliations of these measures to the comparable GAAP measures can be found later in this release.
     

    / Summary of Financial Results

    Ansys’ fourth quarter and fiscal year (FY) 2024 and 2023 financial results are presented below. The 2024 and 2023 non-GAAP results exclude the income statement effects of stock-based compensation, excess payroll taxes related to stock-based compensation, amortization of acquired intangible assets, expenses related to business combinations and adjustments for the income tax effect of the excluded items.

    Our results are as follows:

      GAAP
    (in thousands, except per share data and percentages) Q4 QTD
    2024    		   Q4 QTD
    2023    		   % Change   FY
    2024    		   FY
    2023    		   % Change
    Revenue $ 882,174     $ 805,108     9.6 %   $ 2,544,809     $ 2,269,949     12.1 %
    Net income $ 282,688     $ 274,762     2.9 %   $ 575,692     $ 500,412     15.0 %
    Diluted earnings per share $ 3.21     $ 3.14     2.2 %   $ 6.55     $ 5.73     14.3 %
    Gross margin   91.8 %     91.3 %         89.0 %     88.0 %    
    Operating profit margin   40.3 %     41.4 %         28.2 %     27.6 %    
    Effective tax rate   21.3 %     15.4 %         19.8 %     15.5 %    
                                           
      Non-GAAP
    (in thousands, except per share data and percentages) Q4 QTD
    2024    		   Q4 QTD
    2023    		   % Change   FY
    2024    		   FY
    2023    		   % Change
    Net income $ 391,044     $ 345,317     13.2 %   $ 959,252     $ 769,308     24.7 %
    Diluted earnings per share $ 4.44     $ 3.94     12.7 %   $ 10.91     $ 8.80     24.0 %
    Gross margin   94.6 %     94.3 %         93.1 %     92.2 %    
    Operating profit margin   53.3 %     53.0 %         45.7 %     42.6 %    
    Effective tax rate   17.5 %     17.5 %         17.5 %     17.5 %    
                                           
      Other Metrics
    (in thousands, except percentages) Q4 QTD
    2024    		   Q4 QTD
    2023    		   % Change   FY
    2024    		   FY
    2023    		   % Change
    ACV $   1,094,552   $   955,161   14.6 %   $ 2,563,029   $ 2,300,466   11.4 %
    Operating cash flows $   257,973   $   232,722   10.9 %   $    795,740   $    717,122   11.0 %
    Unlevered operating cash flows $   266,777   $   242,848   9.9 %   $    834,582   $    755,129   10.5 %
                                       

    / Key Long-Term Metrics

    The Company’s long-term outlook covering the years 2022 through 2025 provided at the 2022 Investor Update has been suspended given the pending transaction with Synopsys. Below is a summary of key metrics covering the years 2022 through 2024.

    • Consistent double-digit ACV growth with a 2022 through 2024 CAGR of 12.3% at actual exchange rates and 13.0% at 2022 exchange rates.
    • Unlevered operating cash flows grew faster than ACV with a 2022 through 2024 CAGR of 13.5%.
    • With FY 2024 unlevered operating cash flows of $834.6 million, cumulative 3-year unlevered operating cash flows (FY 2022 to 2024) are $2.2 billion.
    • Note: 2024 unlevered operating cash flows includes $28.2 million of cash outflows primarily associated with the pending transaction with Synopsys.
    Supplemental Financial Information

    / Annual Contract Value

    (in thousands, except percentages) Q4 QTD
    2024    		   Q4 QTD 2024 in Constant Currency   Q4 QTD
    2023    		   % Change   % Change in
    Constant Currency
    ACV $    1,094,552   $      1,110,711   $        955,161   14.6 %   16.3 %
                       
    (in thousands, except percentages) FY
    2024    		   FY 2024 in
    Constant Currency    		   FY
    2023    		   % Change   % Change in
    Constant Currency
    ACV $    2,563,029   $      2,593,819   $    2,300,466   11.4 %   12.8 %
                                 

    *Subscription lease ACV includes the bundled arrangement of time-based licenses with related maintenance.
    **Perpetual and service ACV includes perpetual licenses, with related maintenance, and services.

    Recurring ACV includes both subscription lease ACV and all maintenance ACV (including maintenance from perpetual licenses). It excludes perpetual license ACV and service ACV.

      

    / Revenue

    (in thousands, except percentages) Q4 QTD
    2024    		   Q4 QTD 2024 in Constant Currency   Q4 QTD
    2023    		   % Change   % Change in
    Constant Currency
    Revenue $        882,174   $         893,996   $        805,108   9.6 %   11.0 %
                       
    (in thousands, except percentages) FY
    2024    		   FY 2024 in
    Constant Currency    		   FY
    2023    		   % Change   % Change in
    Constant Currency
    Revenue $    2,544,809   $     2,570,207   $    2,269,949   12.1 %   13.2 %
                                 
    REVENUE BY LICENSE TYPE
                           
    (in thousands, except percentages) Q4 QTD
    2024    		   % of Total   Q4 QTD
    2023    		   % of Total   % Change   % Change in Constant Currency
    Subscription Lease $        441,120   50.0 %   $        399,556   49.6 %   10.4 %   12.1 %
    Perpetual            102,295   11.6 %              102,721   12.8 %   (0.4)%   1.7 %
    Maintenance1            319,381   36.2 %              283,130   35.2 %   12.8 %   13.8 %
    Service              19,378   2.2 %                19,701   2.4 %   (1.6)%   (1.2)%
    Total $        882,174       $        805,108       9.6 %   11.0 %
                           
                           
    (in thousands, except percentages) FY
    2024    		   % of Total   FY
    2023    		   % of Total   % Change   % Change in Constant Currency
    Subscription Lease $        948,831   37.3 %   $        786,050   34.6 %   20.7 %   22.1 %
    Perpetual            315,085   12.4 %              302,698   13.3 %   4.1 %   5.1 %
    Maintenance1         1,209,217   47.5 %           1,103,523   48.6 %   9.6 %   10.6 %
    Service              71,676   2.8 %                77,678   3.4 %   (7.7)%   (7.4)%
    Total $    2,544,809       $    2,269,949       12.1 %   13.2 %
                                   

    1Maintenance revenue is inclusive of both maintenance associated with perpetual licenses and the maintenance component of subscription leases.

    REVENUE BY GEOGRAPHY
                           
    (in thousands, except percentages) Q4 QTD
    2024    		   % of Total   Q4 QTD
    2023    		   % of Total   % Change   % Change in Constant Currency
    Americas $        457,752   51.9 %   $        410,681   51.0 %   11.5 %   11.5 %
                           
    Germany              98,527   11.2 %                81,828   10.2 %   20.4 %   24.2 %
    Other EMEA            170,541   19.3 %              155,023   19.3 %   10.0 %   12.2 %
    EMEA            269,068   30.5 %              236,851   29.4 %   13.6 %   16.3 %
                           
    Japan              52,294   5.9 %                61,243   7.6 %   (14.6)%   (11.1)%
    Other Asia-Pacific            103,060   11.7 %                96,333   12.0 %   7.0 %   10.1 %
    Asia-Pacific            155,354   17.6 %              157,576   19.6 %   (1.4)%   1.8 %
                           
    Total $        882,174       $        805,108       9.6 %   11.0 %
                           
                           
    (in thousands, except percentages) FY
    2024    		   % of Total   FY
    2023    		   % of Total   % Change   % Change in Constant Currency
    Americas $    1,297,367   51.0 %   $    1,106,242   48.7 %   17.3 %   17.3 %
                           
    Germany            209,714   8.2 %              199,068   8.8 %   5.3 %   6.6 %
    Other EMEA            445,791   17.5 %              406,719   17.9 %   9.6 %   9.8 %
    EMEA            655,505   25.8 %              605,787   26.7 %   8.2 %   8.8 %
                           
    Japan            184,547   7.3 %              203,013   8.9 %   (9.1)%   (2.1)%
    Other Asia-Pacific            407,390   16.0 %              354,907   15.6 %   14.8 %   16.9 %
    Asia-Pacific            591,937   23.3 %              557,920   24.6 %   6.1 %   10.0 %
                           
    Total $    2,544,809       $    2,269,949       12.1 %   13.2 %
                                   
    REVENUE BY CHANNEL
                   
      Q4 QTD
    2024    		   Q4 QTD
    2023    		   FY
    2024    		   FY
    2023
    Direct revenue, as a percentage of total revenue 79.7 %   74.5 %   75.2 %   73.9 %
    Indirect revenue, as a percentage of total revenue 20.3 %   25.5 %   24.8 %   26.1 %
                           

    / Deferred Revenue and Backlog

    (in thousands) December 31,
    2024    		   September 30,
    2024    		   December 31,
    2023    		   September 30,
    2023
    Current Deferred Revenue $            504,527   $            427,188   $            457,514   $            349,668
    Current Backlog                524,617                  475,604                  439,879                  424,547
    Total Current Deferred Revenue and Backlog            1,029,144                  902,792                  897,393                  774,215
                   
    Long-Term Deferred Revenue                  31,778                    24,150                    22,240                    20,765
    Long-Term Backlog                657,345                  536,855                  552,951                  410,697
    Total Long-Term Deferred Revenue and Backlog                689,123                  561,005                  575,191                  431,462
                   
    Total Deferred Revenue and Backlog $        1,718,267   $        1,463,797   $        1,472,584   $        1,205,677
                           

    / Currency

    The fourth quarter and FY 2024 revenue, operating income, ACV and deferred revenue and backlog, as compared to the fourth quarter and FY 2023, were impacted by fluctuations in the exchange rates of foreign currencies against the U.S. Dollar. The currency fluctuation impacts on revenue, GAAP and non-GAAP operating income, ACV, and deferred revenue and backlog based on 2023 exchange rates are reflected in the tables below. Amounts in brackets indicate an adverse impact from currency fluctuations.

    (in thousands) Q4 QTD
    2024    		   FY
    2024
    Revenue $       (11,822 )   $       (25,398 )
    GAAP operating income $          (9,057 )   $       (19,588 )
    Non-GAAP operating income $          (9,076 )   $       (19,335 )
    ACV $       (16,159 )   $       (30,790 )
    Deferred revenue and backlog $       (38,306 )   $       (40,993 )
                   

    The most meaningful currency impacts are typically attributable to U.S. Dollar exchange rate changes against the Euro and Japanese Yen. Historical exchange rates are reflected in the charts below.

      Period-End Exchange Rates
    As of EUR/USD   USD/JPY
    December 31, 2024                    1.04                       157
    December 31, 2023                    1.10                       141
    December 31, 2022                    1.07                       131
           
      Average Exchange Rates
    Three Months Ended EUR/USD   USD/JPY
    December 31, 2024                    1.07                       153
    December 31, 2023                    1.08                       148
           
      Average Exchange Rates
    Twelve Months Ended EUR/USD   USD/JPY
    December 31, 2024                    1.08                       151
    December 31, 2023                    1.08                       140
           

    / GAAP Financial Statements

    ANSYS, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES
    Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheets
    (Unaudited)
    (in thousands) December 31, 2024   December 31, 2023
    ASSETS:      
    Cash & short-term investments $                      1,497,517   $                          860,390
    Accounts receivable, net                          1,022,850                                864,526
    Goodwill                          3,778,128                             3,805,874
    Other intangibles, net                              716,244                                835,417
    Other assets                          1,036,692                                956,668
    Total assets $                      8,051,431   $                      7,322,875
    LIABILITIES & STOCKHOLDERS’ EQUITY:      
    Current deferred revenue $                          504,527   $                          457,514
    Long-term debt                              754,208                                753,891
    Other liabilities                              706,256                                721,106
    Stockholders’ equity                          6,086,440                             5,390,364
    Total liabilities & stockholders’ equity $                      8,051,431   $                      7,322,875
               
    ANSYS, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES
    Condensed Consolidated Statements of Income
    (Unaudited)
      Three Months Ended   Twelve Months Ended
    (in thousands, except per share data) December 31,
    2024    		   December 31,
    2023    		   December 31,
    2024    		   December 31,
    2023
    Revenue:              
    Software licenses $                   543,415     $                   502,277     $               1,263,916     $           1,088,748  
    Maintenance and service                       338,759                           302,831                        1,280,893                   1,181,201  
    Total revenue                       882,174                           805,108                        2,544,809                   2,269,949  
    Cost of sales:              
    Software licenses                         12,947                             10,909                             45,367                         40,004  
    Amortization                         21,801                             20,586                             88,560                         80,990  
    Maintenance and service                         37,940                             38,554                           145,892                       150,304  
    Total cost of sales                         72,688                             70,049                           279,819                       271,298  
    Gross profit                       809,486                           735,059                        2,264,990                   1,998,651  
    Operating expenses:              
    Selling, general and administrative                       314,009                           269,857                           995,340                       855,135  
    Research and development                       134,259                           126,288                           528,014                       494,869  
    Amortization                            5,623                                5,914                             23,748                         22,512  
    Total operating expenses                       453,891                           402,059                        1,547,102                   1,372,516  
    Operating income                       355,595                           333,000                           717,888                       626,135  
    Interest income                         14,636                                7,199                             51,131                         19,588  
    Interest expense                        (10,924 )                          (12,551 )                          (47,849 )                     (47,145 )
    Other expense, net                               (14 )                            (2,876 )                            (3,132 )                       (6,440 )
    Income before income tax provision                       359,293                           324,772                           718,038                       592,138  
    Income tax provision                         76,605                             50,010                           142,346                         91,726  
    Net income $                   282,688     $                   274,762     $                   575,692     $              500,412  
    Earnings per share – basic:              
    Earnings per share $                          3.23     $                          3.16     $                          6.59     $                     5.76  
    Weighted average shares                         87,455                             86,888                             87,313                         86,833  
    Earnings per share – diluted:              
    Earnings per share $                          3.21     $                          3.14     $                          6.55     $                     5.73  
    Weighted average shares                         88,137                             87,541                             87,895                         87,386  
                                   

    / Glossary of Terms

    Annual Contract Value (ACV): ACV is a key performance metric and is useful to investors in assessing the strength and trajectory of our business. ACV is a supplemental metric to help evaluate the annual performance of the business. Over the life of the contract, ACV equals the total value realized from a customer. ACV is not impacted by the timing of license revenue recognition. ACV is used by management in financial and operational decision-making and in setting sales targets used for compensation. ACV is not a replacement for, and should be viewed independently of, GAAP revenue and deferred revenue as ACV is a performance metric and is not intended to be combined with any of these items. There is no GAAP measure comparable to ACV. ACV is composed of the following:

    • the annualized value of maintenance and subscription lease contracts with start dates or anniversary dates during the period, plus
    • the value of perpetual license contracts with start dates during the period, plus
    • the annualized value of fixed-term services contracts with start dates or anniversary dates during the period, plus
    • the value of work performed during the period on fixed-deliverable services contracts.

    When we refer to the anniversary dates in the definition of ACV above, we are referencing the date of the beginning of the next twelve-month period in a contractually committed multi-year contract. If a contract is three years in duration, with a start date of July 1, 2024, the anniversary dates would be July 1, 2025 and July 1, 2026. We label these anniversary dates as they are contractually committed. While this contract would be up for renewal on July 1, 2027, our ACV performance metric does not assume any contract renewals.

    Example 1: For purposes of calculating ACV, a $100,000 subscription lease contract or a $100,000 maintenance contract with a term of July 1, 2024 – June 30, 2025, would each contribute $100,000 to ACV for fiscal year 2024 with no contribution to ACV for fiscal year 2025.

    Example 2: For purposes of calculating ACV, a $300,000 subscription lease contract or a $300,000 maintenance contract with a term of July 1, 2024 – June 30, 2027, would each contribute $100,000 to ACV in each of fiscal years 2024, 2025 and 2026. There would be no contribution to ACV for fiscal year 2027 as each period captures the full annual value upon the anniversary date.

    Example 3: A perpetual license valued at $200,000 with a contract start date of March 1, 2024 would contribute $200,000 to ACV in fiscal year 2024.

    Backlog: Deferred revenue associated with installment billings for periods beyond the current quarterly billing cycle and committed contracts with start dates beyond the end of the current period.

    Deferred Revenue: Billings made or payments received in advance of revenue recognition.

    Subscription Lease or Time-Based License: A license of a stated product of our software that is granted to a customer for use over a specified time period, which can be months or years in length. In addition to the use of the software, the customer is provided with access to maintenance (unspecified version upgrades and technical support) without additional charge. The revenue related to these contracts is recognized ratably over the contract period for the maintenance portion and up front for the license portion.

    Perpetual / Paid-Up License: A license of a stated product and version of our software that is granted to a customer for use in perpetuity. The revenue related to this type of license is recognized up front.

    Maintenance: A contract, typically one year in duration, that is purchased by the owner of a perpetual license and that provides access to unspecified version upgrades and technical support during the duration of the contract. The revenue from these contracts is recognized ratably over the contract period.

    / Reconciliations of GAAP to Non-GAAP Measures (Unaudited)

      Three Months Ended
      December 31, 2024
    (in thousands, except percentages and per share data) Gross Profit   % of Revenue   Operating Income   % of Revenue   Net Income   EPS – Diluted1
    Total GAAP $      809,486   91.8 %   $      355,595   40.3 %   $    282,688     $        3.21  
    Stock-based compensation expense               3,635   0.4 %              73,016   8.2 %             73,016                 0.83  
    Excess payroll taxes related to stock-based awards                     39   — %                1,272   0.2 %               1,272                 0.01  
    Amortization of intangible assets from acquisitions             21,801   2.4 %              27,424   3.1 %             27,424                 0.31  
    Expenses related to business combinations                     —   — %              12,988   1.5 %             12,988                 0.15  
    Adjustment for income tax effect                     —   — %                      —   — %             (6,344 )             (0.07 )
    Total non-GAAP $      834,961   94.6 %   $      470,295   53.3 %   $    391,044     $        4.44  
                                           

    1 Diluted weighted average shares were 88,137.

      Three Months Ended
      December 31, 2023
    (in thousands, except percentages and per share data) Gross Profit   % of Revenue   Operating Income   % of Revenue   Net Income   EPS – Diluted1
    Total GAAP $      735,059   91.3 %   $     333,000   41.4 %   $    274,762     $        3.14  
    Stock-based compensation expense               3,413   0.4 %              63,358   7.9 %             63,358                 0.73  
    Excess payroll taxes related to stock-based awards                       4   — %                   271   — %                  271                    —  
    Amortization of intangible assets from acquisitions             20,586   2.6 %              26,500   3.3 %             26,500                 0.30  
    Expenses related to business combinations                     —   — %                3,664   0.4 %               3,664                 0.04  
    Adjustment for income tax effect                     —   — %                      —   — %           (23,238 )             (0.27 )
    Total non-GAAP $      759,062   94.3 %   $     426,793   53.0 %   $    345,317     $        3.94  
                                           

    1 Diluted weighted average shares were 87,541.

      Twelve Months Ended
      December 31, 2024
    (in thousands, except percentages and per share data) Gross Profit   % of Revenue   Operating Income   % of Revenue   Net Income   EPS – Diluted1
    Total GAAP $   2,264,990   89.0 %   $     717,888   28.2 %   $    575,692     $        6.55  
    Stock-based compensation expense             14,313   0.6 %           270,900   10.7 %           270,900                 3.08  
    Excess payroll taxes related to stock-based awards                  506   — %                8,643   0.3 %               8,643                 0.10  
    Amortization of intangible assets from acquisitions             88,560   3.5 %           112,308   4.4 %           112,308                 1.28  
    Expenses related to business combinations                     —   — %             52,841   2.1 %             52,841                 0.60  
    Adjustment for income tax effect                     —   — %                      —   — %           (61,132 )             (0.70 )
    Total non-GAAP $   2,368,369   93.1 %   $ 1,162,580   45.7 %   $    959,252     $      10.91  
                                           

    1 Diluted weighted average shares were 87,895.

      Twelve Months Ended
      December 31, 2023
    (in thousands, except percentages and per share data) Gross Profit   % of Revenue   Operating Income   % of Revenue   Net Income   EPS – Diluted1
    Total GAAP $   1,998,651   88.0 %   $     626,135   27.6 %   $    500,412     $        5.73  
    Stock-based compensation expense             13,337   0.6 %           221,891   9.9 %           221,891                 2.54  
    Excess payroll taxes related to stock-based awards                  307   0.1 %                5,541   0.2 %               5,541                 0.06  
    Amortization of intangible assets from acquisitions             80,990   3.5 %           103,502   4.5 %           103,502                 1.18  
    Expenses related to business combinations                     —   — %                9,422   0.4 %               9,422                 0.11  
    Adjustment for income tax effect                     —   — %                      —   — %           (71,460 )             (0.82 )
    Total non-GAAP $   2,093,285   92.2 %   $     966,491   42.6 %   $    769,308     $        8.80  
                                           

    1 Diluted weighted average shares were 87,386.

      Three Months Ended   Twelve Months Ended
    (in thousands) December 31,
    2024    		   December 31,
    2023    		   December 31,
    2024    		   December 31,
    2023    		   December 31,
    2022
    Net cash provided by operating activities $            257,973     $            232,722     $            795,740     $            717,122     $            631,003  
    Cash paid for interest                  10,671                      12,274                      47,081                      46,069                      20,844  
    Tax benefit                   (1,867 )                     (2,148 )                     (8,239 )                     (8,062 )                     (3,752 )
    Unlevered operating cash flows $            266,777     $            242,848     $            834,582     $            755,129     $            648,095  
                                           

    / Use of Non-GAAP Measures

    We provide non-GAAP gross profit, non-GAAP gross profit margin, non-GAAP operating income, non-GAAP operating profit margin, non-GAAP net income, non-GAAP diluted earnings per share and unlevered operating cash flows as supplemental measures to GAAP regarding our operational performance. These financial measures exclude the impact of certain items and, therefore, have not been calculated in accordance with GAAP. A detailed explanation of each of the adjustments to these financial measures is described below. This press release also contains a reconciliation of each of these non-GAAP financial measures to its most comparable GAAP financial measure, as applicable.

    We use non-GAAP financial measures (a) to evaluate our historical and prospective financial performance as well as our performance relative to our competitors, (b) to set internal sales targets and spending budgets, (c) to allocate resources, (d) to measure operational profitability and the accuracy of forecasting, (e) to assess financial discipline over operational expenditures and (f) as an important factor in determining variable compensation for management and employees. In addition, many financial analysts that follow us focus on and publish both historical results and future projections based on non-GAAP financial measures. We believe that it is in the best interest of our investors to provide this information to analysts so that they accurately report the non-GAAP financial information. Moreover, investors have historically requested, and we have historically reported, these non-GAAP financial measures as a means of providing consistent and comparable information with past reports of financial results.

    While we believe that these non-GAAP financial measures provide useful supplemental information to investors, there are limitations associated with the use of these non-GAAP financial measures. These non-GAAP financial measures are not prepared in accordance with GAAP, are not reported by all our competitors and may not be directly comparable to similarly titled measures of our competitors due to potential differences in the exact method of calculation. We compensate for these limitations by using these non-GAAP financial measures as supplements to GAAP financial measures and by reviewing the reconciliations of the non-GAAP financial measures to their most comparable GAAP financial measures.

    The adjustments to these non-GAAP financial measures, and the basis for such adjustments, are outlined below:

    Amortization of intangible assets from acquisitions. We incur amortization of intangible assets, included in our GAAP presentation of amortization expense, related to various acquisitions we have made. We exclude these expenses for the purpose of calculating non-GAAP gross profit, non-GAAP gross profit margin, non-GAAP operating income, non-GAAP operating profit margin, non-GAAP net income and non-GAAP diluted earnings per share when we evaluate our continuing operational performance because these costs are fixed at the time of an acquisition, are then amortized over a period of several years after the acquisition and generally cannot be changed or influenced by us after the acquisition. Accordingly, we do not consider these expenses for purposes of evaluating our performance during the applicable time period after the acquisition, and we exclude such expenses when making decisions to allocate resources. We believe that these non-GAAP financial measures are useful to investors because they allow investors to (a) evaluate the effectiveness of the methodology and information used by us in our financial and operational decision-making, and (b) compare our past reports of financial results as we have historically reported these non-GAAP financial measures.

    Stock-based compensation expense. We incur expense related to stock-based compensation included in our GAAP presentation of cost of maintenance and service; research and development expense; and selling, general and administrative expense. We also incur excess payroll tax expense related to stock-based compensation, which is an additional non-GAAP adjustment. Although stock-based compensation is an expense and viewed as a form of compensation, we exclude these expenses for the purpose of calculating non-GAAP gross profit, non-GAAP gross profit margin, non-GAAP operating income, non-GAAP operating profit margin, non-GAAP net income and non-GAAP diluted earnings per share when we evaluate our continuing operational performance. Specifically, we exclude stock-based compensation during our annual budgeting process and our quarterly and annual assessments of our performance. The annual budgeting process is the primary mechanism whereby we allocate resources to various initiatives and operational requirements. Additionally, the annual review by our Board of Directors during which it compares our historical business model and profitability to the planned business model and profitability for the forthcoming year excludes the impact of stock-based compensation. In evaluating the performance of our senior management and department managers, charges related to stock-based compensation are excluded from expenditure and profitability results. In fact, we record stock-based compensation expense into a stand-alone cost center for which no single operational manager is responsible or accountable. In this way, we can review, on a period-to-period basis, each manager’s performance and assess financial discipline over operational expenditures without the effect of stock-based compensation. We believe that these non-GAAP financial measures are useful to investors because they allow investors to (a) evaluate our operating results and the effectiveness of the methodology used by us to review our operating results, and (b) review historical comparability in our financial reporting as well as comparability with competitors’ operating results.

    Expenses related to business combinations. We incur expenses for professional services rendered in connection with acquisitions and divestitures, which are included in our GAAP presentation of selling, general and administrative expense. We also incur other expenses directly related to business combinations, including compensation expenses and concurrent restructuring activities, such as employee severances and other exit costs. These costs are included in our GAAP presentation of selling, general and administrative and research and development expenses. We exclude these acquisition-related expenses for the purpose of calculating non-GAAP operating income, non-GAAP operating profit margin, non-GAAP net income and non-GAAP diluted earnings per share when we evaluate our continuing operational performance, as we generally would not have otherwise incurred these expenses in the periods presented as a part of our operations. We believe that these non-GAAP financial measures are useful to investors because they allow investors to (a) evaluate our operating results and the effectiveness of the methodology used by us to review our operating results, and (b) review historical comparability in our financial reporting as well as comparability with competitors’ operating results.

    Non-GAAP tax provision. We utilize a normalized non-GAAP annual effective tax rate (AETR) to calculate non-GAAP measures. This methodology provides better consistency across interim reporting periods by eliminating the effects of non-recurring items and aligning the non-GAAP tax rate with our expected geographic earnings mix. To project this rate, we analyzed our historic and projected non-GAAP earnings mix by geography along with other factors such as our current tax structure, recurring tax credits and incentives, and expected tax positions. On an annual basis we re-evaluate and update this rate for significant items that may materially affect our projections.

    Unlevered operating cash flows. We make cash payments for the interest incurred in connection with our debt financing which are included in our GAAP presentation of operating cash flows. We exclude this cash paid for interest, net of the associated tax benefit, for the purpose of calculating unlevered operating cash flows. Unlevered operating cash flow is a supplemental non-GAAP measure that we use to evaluate our core operating business. We believe this measure is useful to investors and management because it provides a measure of our cash generated through operating activities independent of the capital structure of the business.

    Non-GAAP financial measures are not in accordance with, or an alternative for, GAAP. Our non-GAAP financial measures are not meant to be considered in isolation or as a substitute for comparable GAAP financial measures and should be read only in conjunction with our consolidated financial statements prepared in accordance with GAAP.

    We have provided a reconciliation of the non-GAAP financial measures to the most directly comparable GAAP financial measures as listed below:

    GAAP Reporting Measure Non-GAAP Reporting Measure
    Gross Profit Non-GAAP Gross Profit
    Gross Profit Margin Non-GAAP Gross Profit Margin
    Operating Income Non-GAAP Operating Income
    Operating Profit Margin Non-GAAP Operating Profit Margin
    Net Income Non-GAAP Net Income
    Diluted Earnings Per Share Non-GAAP Diluted Earnings Per Share
    Operating Cash Flows Unlevered Operating Cash Flows
       

    Constant currency. In addition to the non-GAAP financial measures detailed above, we use constant currency results for financial and operational decision-making and as a means to evaluate period-to-period comparisons by excluding the effects of foreign currency fluctuations on the reported results. To present this information, the 2024 period results for entities whose functional currency is a currency other than the U.S. Dollar were converted to U.S. Dollars at rates that were in effect for the 2023 comparable period, rather than the actual exchange rates in effect for 2024. Constant currency growth rates are calculated by adjusting the 2024 period reported amounts by the 2024 currency fluctuation impacts and comparing the adjusted amounts to the 2023 comparable period reported amounts. We believe that these non-GAAP financial measures are useful to investors because they allow investors to (a) evaluate the effectiveness of the methodology and information used by us in our financial and operational decision-making, and (b) compare our reported results to our past reports of financial results without the effects of foreign currency fluctuations.

    / About Ansys

    Our Mission: Powering Innovation that Drives Human Advancement™

    When visionary companies need to know how their world-changing ideas will perform, they close the gap between design and reality with Ansys simulation. For more than 50 years, Ansys software has enabled innovators across industries to push boundaries by using the predictive power of simulation. From sustainable transportation to advanced semiconductors, from satellite systems to life-saving medical devices, the next great leaps in human advancement will be powered by Ansys.

    / Forward-Looking Information

    This document contains forward-looking statements within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the Securities Act), and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the Exchange Act). Forward-looking statements are statements that provide current expectations or forecasts of future events based on certain assumptions. Forward-looking statements are subject to risks, uncertainties, and factors relating to our business which could cause our actual results to differ materially from the expectations expressed in or implied by such forward-looking statements.

    Forward-looking statements use words such as “anticipate,” “believe,” “could,” “estimate,” “expect,” “forecast,” “intend,” “likely,” “may,” “outlook,” “plan,” “predict,” “project,” “should,” “target,” or other words of similar meaning. Forward-looking statements include those about market opportunity, including our total addressable market, the proposed transaction with Synopsys, including the expected date of closing and the potential benefits thereof, and other aspects of future operations. We caution readers not to place undue reliance upon any such forward-looking statements, which speak only as of the date they are made. We undertake no obligation to update forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise, except as may be required by law.

    The risks associated with the following, among others, could cause actual results to differ materially from those described in any forward-looking statements:

    • our ability to complete the proposed transaction with Synopsys on anticipated terms and timing, including completing the associated divestiture of our PowerArtist RTL business and obtaining regulatory approvals, and other conditions related to the completion of the transaction with Synopsys;
       
    • the realization of the anticipated benefits of the proposed transaction with Synopsys, including potential disruptions to our and Synopsys’ businesses and commercial relationships with others resulting from the announcement, pendency, or completion of the proposed transaction and uncertainty as to the long-term value of Synopsys’ common stock;
       
    • restrictions on our operations during the pendency of the proposed transaction with Synopsys that could impact our ability to pursue certain business opportunities or strategic transactions, including tuck-in M&A;
       
    • adverse conditions in the macroeconomic environment, including inflation, recessionary conditions and volatility in equity and foreign exchange markets;
       
    • political, economic and regulatory uncertainties in the countries and regions in which we operate;
       
    • impacts from tariffs, trade sanctions, export controls or other trade barriers, including export control restrictions and licensing requirements for exports to China;
       
    • impacts resulting from the conflict between Israel and Hamas and other countries and groups in the Middle East, including impacts from changes to diplomatic relations and trade policy between the United States and other countries resulting from the conflict;
       
    • impacts from changes to diplomatic relations and trade policy between the United States and Russia or between the United States and other countries that may support Russia or take similar actions due to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine;
       
    • constrained credit and liquidity due to disruptions in the global economy and financial markets, which may limit or delay availability of credit under our existing or new credit facilities, or which may limit our ability to obtain credit or financing on acceptable terms or at all;
       
    • our ability to timely recruit and retain key personnel in a highly competitive labor market, including potential financial impacts of wage inflation and potential impacts due to the proposed transaction with Synopsys;
       
    • our ability to protect our proprietary technology; cybersecurity threats or other security breaches, including in relation to breaches occurring through our products and an increased level of our activity that is occurring from remote global off-site locations; and disclosure or misuse of employee or customer data whether as a result of a cybersecurity incident or otherwise;
       
    • volatility in our revenue due to the timing, duration and value of multi-year subscription lease contracts; and our reliance on high renewal rates for annual subscription lease and maintenance contracts;
       
    • declines in our customers’ businesses resulting in adverse changes in procurement patterns; disruptions in accounts receivable and cash flow due to customers’ liquidity challenges and commercial deterioration; uncertainties regarding demand for our products and services in the future and our customers’ acceptance of new products; delays or declines in anticipated sales due to reduced or altered sales and marketing interactions with customers; and potential variations in our sales forecast compared to actual sales;
       
    • our ability and our channel partners’ ability to comply with laws and regulations in relevant jurisdictions; and the outcome of contingencies, including legal proceedings, government or regulatory investigations and tax audit cases;
       
    • uncertainty regarding income tax estimates in the jurisdictions in which we operate; and the effect of changes in tax laws and regulations in the jurisdictions in which we operate;
       
    • the quality of our products, including the strength of features, functionality and integrated multiphysics capabilities; our ability to develop and market new products to address the industry’s rapidly changing technology, including the use of artificial intelligence and machine learning in our products as well as the products of our competitors; failures or errors in our products and services; and increased pricing pressure as a result of the competitive environment in which we operate;
       
    • investments in complementary companies, products, services and technologies; our ability to complete and successfully integrate our acquisitions and realize the financial and business benefits of such transactions; and the impact indebtedness incurred in connection with any acquisition could have on our operations;
       
    • investments in global sales and marketing organizations and global business infrastructure, and dependence on our channel partners for the distribution of our products;
       
    • current and potential future impacts of any global health crisis, natural disaster or catastrophe; the actions taken to address these events by our customers, our suppliers, and regulatory authorities; the resulting effects on our business, the global economy and our consolidated financial statements; and other public health and safety risks and related government actions or mandates;
       
    • operational disruptions generally or specifically in connection with transitions to and from remote work environments; and the failure of our technological infrastructure or those of the service providers upon whom we rely including for infrastructure and cloud services;
       
    • our intention to repatriate previously taxed earnings and to reinvest all other earnings of our non-U.S. subsidiaries;
       
    • plans for future capital spending; the extent of corporate benefits from such spending including with respect to customer relationship management; and higher than anticipated costs for research and development or a slowdown in our research and development activities;
       
    • our ability to execute on our strategies related to environmental, social, and governance matters, and meet evolving and varied expectations, including as a result of evolving regulatory and other standards, processes, and assumptions, the pace of scientific and technological developments, increased costs and the availability of requisite financing, and changes in carbon markets; and
       
    • other risks and uncertainties described in our reports filed from time to time with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC).  

    Ansys and any and all ANSYS, Inc. brand, product, service and feature names, logos and slogans are registered trademarks or trademarks of ANSYS, Inc. or its subsidiaries in the United States or other countries. All other brand, product, service and feature names or trademarks are the property of their respective owners.

    Visit https://investors.ansys.com for more information.

    ANSS-F

    Photos accompanying this announcement are available at
    https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/771cf00e-f710-44a2-8ccc-01eb3722147f

    https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/463dbc35-5aba-4a20-b2cb-2f5ed540482e

    https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/37428910-76eb-46be-b869-77a96fa55c58

    https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/37a46a1f-16f4-49b3-b28b-7074ac1615f3

    This press release was published by a CLEAR® Verified individual.

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: PM call with President Zelenskyy of Ukraine: 19 February 2025

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    The Prime Minister spoke to President Zelenskyy this evening.

    The Prime Minister spoke to President Zelenskyy this evening and stressed the need for everyone to work together. 

    The Prime Minister expressed his support for President Zelenskyy as Ukraine’s democratically elected leader and said that it was perfectly reasonable to suspend elections during war time as the UK did during World War II. 

    The Prime Minister reiterated his support for the US-led efforts to get a lasting peace in Ukraine that deterred Russia from any future aggression.

    Updates to this page

    Published 19 February 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Press release – Parliament and member states agree on new support plan for Moldova

    Source: European Parliament 3

    EU member states and MEPs have agreed on essential improvements to a new support facility for Moldova, focusing on better financing and democratic oversight.

    Negotiators from the European Parliament and the Council of the EU have reached a provisional agreement on Wednesday on the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova. The Facility aims to support Moldova in facing significant challenges, notably to mitigate the profound impact of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine on Moldova’s security, economy, and citizens’ livelihoods and to strengthen its resilience against the ongoing and unprecedented hybrid attacks and foreign malign interference targeting the country and democratic processes and institutions.

    Key improvements:

    Increased grant-based support: Negotiators agreed to allocate €520 million in grants – a €100 million increase compared to initial proposals – alongside €1.5 billion in low-interest loans. This adjustment ensures Moldova can implement reforms without unsustainable debt accumulation.

    Accelerated funding access: The Facility provides 18% pre-financing, up from 7% originally, of total support, enabling rapid deployment of resources to address energy security, anti-corruption infrastructure, and public service modernisation.

    Administrative capacity building: A dedicated 20% of grant funds will strengthen Moldova’s institutions through digital governance systems, civil service training, and judicial reforms – prerequisites for effective EU fund management.

    Reinforced oversight framework: To ensure full parliamentary scrutiny the agreement establishes a Dialogue between Parliament and the Commission to review implementation progress regularly.

    Also agreed was to make available additional voluntary contributions in the form of external assigned revenue from other donors such as international financing organisations for further financial support to Moldova, and that the Facility shall not support activities or measures which undermine the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Moldova.

    Quotes

    Siegfried Mureșan (EPP, Romania), co-rapporteur for the Committee on Budgets: “With a €200 million increase in pre-financing and €100 million in total allocations, we are mobilizing enhanced immediate support to assist Moldova in advancing reforms, accelerating its European integration, and countering the economic and energy repercussions of Russian aggression. This ambitious agreement underscores Europe’s capacity to respond decisively to escalating geopolitical challenges.”

    Sven Mikser (S&D, Estonia), co-rapporteur for the Committee on Foreign Affairs: “This Facility underscores our commitment to Moldova’s EU accession journey and supports the country in undertaking necessary reforms to strengthen democratic institutions, enhance energy security, boost economic growth, and improve the lives of its citizens. Raising the grant component to 20.5% and the pre-financing rate to 18% secures €520 million in non-repayable support for Moldova and ensures rapid access to funding.”

    Next steps

    The provisional agreement will be submitted to Parliament’s plenary (March) and the Council for final approval.

    Background

    Between 2025 and 2027, the maximum resources to be made available to Moldova through the Facility will amount to €1.785 billion (in current prices). This includes up to €1.5 billion in concessional loans and €385 million in non-repayable financial support. Additionally, €135 million will be set aside to provision the loans.

    The Reform and Growth Facility is part of a broader EU Growth Plan for Moldova aimed at doubling its economy within a decade while fostering socio-economic stability. The facility is modelled after similar initiatives in other EU candidate regions, such as the Western Balkans Facility, representing a significant step forward in Moldova’s path toward EU membership.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Video: Secretary-General Travel, Deputy Secretary-General & other topics – Daily Press Briefing

    Source: United Nations (Video News)

    Noon Briefing by Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesperson for the Secretary-General.

    – Secretary-General Travel
    – Deputy Secretary-General
    – Occupied Palestinian Territory
    – Democratic Republic of the Congo
    – Children in Eastern and Southern Africa
    – Sudan
    – Libya
    – Myanmar
    – Central America
    – Ukraine
    – Guest Tomorrow
    – Financial Contribution

    SECRETARY-GENERAL TRAVEL
    The Secretary-General traveled to Bridgetown, Barbados today where, this evening, he will speak at the opening ceremony of the 48th Regular Meeting of the Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, also known as CARICOM. 
    In his remarks, he is expected to highlight three key areas where, together, we must drive progress – peace and security, the climate crisis and sustainable development.
    Also today, the Secretary-General will hold a bilateral meeting with Prime Minister Mia Mottley of Barbados.
    Tomorrow, the Secretary-General will have a closed session with CARICOM Heads of Government, to exchange views on pressing issues in the region, such as Haiti. 
    He is expected back in New York later tomorrow.

    DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL
    The Deputy Secretary-General, Amina Mohammed, arrived in Johannesburg, South Africa today to attend the G20 Foreign Ministers meeting on behalf of the Secretary-General. Ms. Mohammed will underline support for multilateral cooperation and the South African G20 Presidency and reinforce the case for dialogue and joint action to address common challenges, including trade, tax, debt, and financing climate action. On the margins of the meeting, she is expected to meet with senior government officials from G20 members and guest countries.
    From Johannesburg, Ms. Mohammed will proceed to Nairobi, Kenya, to hold meetings with a wide range of stakeholders and UN entities in preparation of the second UN Food System Summit Stocktaking and to meet with senior government officials.
    On 26 February, Ms. Mohammed will return to South Africa – this time to Cape Town to attend the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting and open the Finance in Common Summit 2025 on behalf of the Secretary-General.
    The Deputy Secretary-General will return to New York on 27 February.

    OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY
    The World Health Organization and UNICEF say that the emergency polio outbreak response in the Gaza Strip is continuing, with a mass vaccination campaign scheduled to begin on Saturday and continue until 26 February. The novel oral polio vaccine type 2 will be administered to more than 591,000 children under 10 years of age to protect them from polio. The campaign aims to reach all children under 10 – including those previously missed – to close immunity gaps and end the outbreak.
    Meanwhile, partners supporting water, sanitation and hygiene services are working to increase the production and distribution of water for drinking and domestic purposes to improve living conditions in the Strip and minimize public health risks.
    There are now more than 1,780 operational water points across Gaza. Over 85 per cent of them are used to support water trucking activities by UN partners. 
    The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reports that UN partners are also training and deploying mobile teams and volunteers at aid distribution points to ensure that vulnerable groups – including people with disabilities – have safe and dignified access to humanitarian assistance. More than 100 such teams are operating at nearly 70 aid distribution points throughout Gaza.
    Turning to the West Bank, OCHA says that Israeli forces’ operations in northern areas continue, causing further destruction and displacement among Palestinian residents.
    Yesterday, in Tulkarm refugee camp, Israeli forces demolished at least five homes, with several others also slated for demolition.

    Full Highlights: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/ossg/noon-briefing-highlight?date%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=19+February+2025

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A0iEq-V8ZyE

    MIL OSI Video –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: President Calviño’s interview with the Süddeutsche Zeitung

    Source: European Investment Bank

    Interview by Matthias Kolb and Alexander Mühlauer (Süddeutschen Zeitung)

    Nadia Calviño is President of the European Investment Bank (EIB), the largest promotional bank in the world. On behalf of the EU Member States, it is tasked with ensuring stability through investments within and beyond the European Union. So it’s little wonder that the former Deputy Prime Minister of Spain would attend the 61st Munich Security Conference. Shortly before the event, Calviño visited Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Kyiv, signing investment agreements totalling around  €1 billion. Before beginning her interview with the Süddeutsche Zeitung, the 56-year-old wanted to get one thing straight, right from the start: Europe must realise that we are at a turning point in history.

    Something seems to have ruptured between the United States and the European Union. Trump is talking with Putin about the future of Ukraine, without the EU at the table. The US Secretary of Defense says that America will no longer guarantee security in Europe. And US Vice President J.D. Vance says the greatest risk for Europe is not Russia or China, but the alleged internal threat to freedom of expression. How shocked are you by this?

    Calviño: I’m not shocked, or even surprised. I was certain we would see a fundamental change in transatlantic relations. We Europeans need to remember where our strengths lie, stand up for our interests and defend the rules-based world order from which we have benefited so richly over the past 80 years. And the Americans even more so.

    Isn’t the new US government threatening to destroy this world order?

    I am convinced that good transatlantic relations are strategically important for both sides. We must work to create a new foundation for them. In such turbulent times, it is more important than ever for Europe to stand for stability and reliability – not just within our own borders, but also for the rest of the world. That Europe should do even more to uphold a rules-based world order is something I hear often from our partners across the globe.

    But again, do the United States pose a risk to the global order?

    It is in their interest to preserve the things that have made America great. Institutions like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund or the World Trade Organization, which we founded together. That’s one reason the US dollar is a global reserve currency. There are many win-win situations to be had from working together, and with Europe. But the most important thing is for us to accept that the world of tomorrow is very different from the world of yesterday.

    “We are at a turning point in history.”

    The European Investment Bank is the world’s largest promotional bank. As its president, what can you do to help Europe stand the test of time in this new world?

    We are at a crucial moment in history. And at a turning point in the geopolitical order. The future will depend on the decisions we make today, and every decision counts.

    What does that mean exactly?

    Since I joined the EIB as president in 2024, I have held talks with all 27 EU Member States and our European and international partners, but also with civil society and industry. For the first time, we have set out a clear Strategic Roadmap. 2024 was a record year for us, in which the EIB signed €89 billion in financing to strengthen Europe’s competitiveness and security. These funds will go, for example, to energy infrastructure and renewable projects, to new technologies like artificial intelligence or quantum computers, and to supporting the transport and automotive industries. In 2024, we invested a record amount in energy networks. We also doubled our support for security and defence – to €1 billion – and we expect to double it again in 2025.

    At the Munich Security Conference, we kept hearing the question of where Member States could get the many billions of euros they would need to invest in their armies, including under pressure from Trump. Are they all coming to you now?

    Ursula von der Leyen has already proposed relaxing the rules under the Stability Pact so that EU countries can finance their defence spending. Olaf Scholz has similar ideas. The EIB is not a defence ministry, but there is a lot we can do to help in this area. For example, if Member States want to renovate their roads and bridges to improve military mobility, we can fund that, just like we can fund protection of critical infrastructure like submarine cables, or investments in cybersecurity. We are doing this, and are exchanging with Europe’s finance and defence ministries and with industry.

    What is the EIB financing in Germany in this domain?

    We are currently looking into 14 specific projects across Europe. In 2021, for example, we granted the Munich-based drone startup Quantum Systems a loan of €10 million. Their products are now used by the Ukrainian military, and have both civilian and military applications, so they can be supported by the EIB. The Lithuanian government has just applied to us with a proposal that we are now evaluating. It seeks financial assistance to build the base for the new German army brigade in Rūdninkai, near the border with Belarus.

    Soon 5 000 German soldiers will be permanently stationed in Lithuania, as a deterrent to Russia. Cost projections by the German Defence Ministry for this brigade are over €10 billion. Lithuania would like to invest around €1 billion in the new base. How much money could come from the EIB?

    This is a very important and demanding project, and we’ve only just started looking into the details. Another good example is the EIB support for the expansion of the Danish port in Esbjerg. Going forward, it will be better able to accommodate NATO vessels and the transport of materials for offshore wind farms.

    You just came from a visit to Ukraine. How is the EIB supporting that country?

    The trip to Ukraine was my first one outside the EU as EIB President. We are probably Ukraine’s most important investment partner, and our role is one that our partners value greatly. During my visit, we signed agreements for investment totalling around €1 billion. They will allow major Ukrainian banks to grant more loans to medium-sized companies. And with the country’s government, we have signed packages to finance infrastructure for energy, transport, water and district heating, as well as the construction of bunkers in schools and nurseries. So we are actively investing in all of the important areas for the Ukrainian people to lead normal lives, as far as possible. And, of course, we aim to strengthen the country’s resilience.

    Are you also supporting Ukraine’s defence industry?

    We support the European security and defence industry, which also helps Ukraine. In 2024 we expanded the dual-use approach, so that we can now support a wide range of projects, such as border security, cybersecurity, satellites and drones, and mine clearance.

    The CEO of the Italian arms company Leonardo recently told our reporters that Europe has one main problem: Member States spend more and more money on defence, but don’t work together enough. Is he right?

    It is clear that a common European procurement system would make us stronger and more efficient, especially when it comes to our flagship projects. And yes, I think the European Investment Bank can contribute by acting as an independent appraiser for projects. In 2024, to bring in top expertise, we signed agreements with the NATO Innovation Fund and the European Defence Agency so that we can draw on their technical knowledge in this regard.

    Is there any dispute at the EIB due to differing positions on Ukraine, with member countries like Hungary or Slovakia that have pro-Moscow governments?

    No, not at all.

    “I would never presume to tell a Member State what to do.”

    So you are president of one of the only EU institutions that aren’t divided?

    I told you that I visited the 27 Member States, and listened very carefully to them. On that basis, we drew up our strategy, which was unanimously supported. We are therefore well aligned with the EU priorities and the expectations of the Member States. There is strong support for what we are doing. Including in Ukraine.

    When it comes to Europe’s future, one word always comes up: competitiveness. What does Europe need to do to avoid falling even further behind the US and China economically?

    The different reports, for example by Enrico Letta and Mario Draghi, are quite unanimous: We need market integration, streamlining and investment. So what we need to do is clear. And I think the new Commission is willing to go in that direction. On streamlining, for example, we have teamed up with the Commission to adapt environmental reporting standards so that we can pursue the Paris Agreement and our green transformation objectives in a way that promotes the competitiveness of European industry, as well as green finance and green investment.

    How optimistic are you that Europe will finally begin to react more quickly and actually make decisions? With the capital markets union, we’ve been waiting ten years for things to finally happen. And that’s just one example of many.

    As Spain’s Minister of Finance and its Deputy Prime Minister, I saw lots of things. The euro area crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic. And I have seen how Europe can succeed: Together, we developed the vaccines, and we dealt with the crisis. With the NextGenerationEU package, Spain has made some very far-reaching reforms and, thanks to mobilising investment, it is now the best-performing economy in Europe and a driver of growth and prosperity on the continent. We succeed when we unite, act decisively, truly focus and bring all our energy together.

    In contrast to Spain and other countries, Germany’s economy has been hit hard. Many experts see the debt brake as an obstacle to further growth. What does Germany have to do for things to start looking up again?

    I would never presume to tell a Member State what to do. I simply wish for a strong Germany with a stable, pro-Europe government – because we need a strong Germany at the centre of our union.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Durbin Condemns President Trump’s Comments About Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Illinois Dick Durbin

    February 19, 2025

    WASHINGTON – U.S. Senate Democratic Whip Dick Durbin (D-IL), Co-Chair of the Senate Ukraine Caucus, released the following statement after President Donald Trump publicly attacked Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. In the post, President Trump claimed the U.S. was “duped” into spending billions to help Ukraine defend itself following Russia’s 2022 full-scale military invasion and that President Zelenskyy is a “dictator without elections.” Further parroting a Kremlin propaganda point, President Trump also falsely claimed that Ukraine started the war against Russia.

    “The 46,000 Ukrainians who have died defending their country from Putin’s invasion deserve more than the insulting rant President Trump delivered this morning.

    “I would call on President Trump to apologize to the people of Ukraine, but it would be a waste of breath. Donald Trump is a pushover for Putin.”

    -30-

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Briefing – Displaced Ukrainians: Challenges and outlook for integration in the EU – 19-02-2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 forced millions of people to flee Ukraine. To date, approximately 6.8°million people have had to seek refuge, mostly in the EU and its neighbourhood. The EU responded rapidly in March 2022, activating the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD) for the first time ever. The TPD’s emergency mechanism offers swift protection and rights to those in need who arrive in large numbers, preventing Member States’ asylum systems from becoming overwhelmed. Rights under the TPD include access to a residence permit, employment, housing, medical and social welfare assistance, and education for children and adolescents. For those fleeing Ukraine, these rights also include travel within the EU, and to and from Ukraine. Currently, the largest number of beneficiaries of temporary protection from Ukraine reside in Germany, Poland and Czechia. Among them are nearly 1.3 million children, with 50 % still awaiting enrolment in their host countries’ education systems. Many pupils attend online classes delivered from Ukraine, as parents prefer to keep ties with their home country. The EU and its Member States have made efforts and funds available to support the integration of displaced people from Ukraine in terms of employment, housing, education and healthcare. Research indicates that Ukrainian refugees have a high employment rate in host countries, reflecting the circular mobility pattern observed among Ukrainians prior to 2022, when they were the largest non-EU workforce within the EU. However, with no end to the war in sight, the situation of Ukrainian refugees remains uncertain. There is currently no EU-level strategy regarding the status of refugees from Ukraine beyond the extension of temporary protection until March 2026. By April 2024, an estimated 1.2 million Ukrainians had already returned to their country despite the war. While most only go for brief visits to see family or tend to their properties, some intend to return permanently. Both the EU and Ukrainian policymakers face questions about the potential scale of and reasons for returns, as they seek to adapt and prepare their policies.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Briefing – EU-India relations: Time for a new boost? – 19-02-2025

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Union (EU) is seeking to strengthen its strategic partnership with India, in place since 2004. The European Commission has given a strong signal in this direction. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced in Davos that the first visit of the whole College of Commissioners to a third country would be to India, on 27 and 28 February 2025. The EU-India Trade and Technology Council will also meet. A joint communication on a new strategic EU-India agenda is expected in the second quarter of 2025. An EU-India summit may take place in the last quarter of 2025. The EU wants to develop its relationship with India, whose market and economic growth (including in green technology) represents a valuable opportunity for EU companies. India’s strategic geographical position in the heart of the Indo-Pacific, where about 80 % of total global trade by volume passes, makes it a key partner for maintaining the security of the region and the freedom of navigation that are crucial to EU interests. The EU is also looking to expand its circle of key partners, against a backdrop of uncertainty over transatlantic relations. India meanwhile maintains a privileged relationship with Russia and is strengthening ties with the Trump administration. The EU and India are currently negotiating a free trade agreement, an investment protection agreement and an agreement on geographical indications. They also cooperate on a wide range of policies, including security, climate and energy, connectivity, research and innovation, and space. However, as the European Parliament underlined in its report on EU-India relations in January 2024, the partnership has not yet reached its full potential. Meanwhile, the EU-India five-year roadmap to 2025 is coming to an end, creating an opportunity to continue building a strong relationship. To develop their partnership, the EU and India would need to address some challenges. In particular, on trade negotiations New Delhi considers the EU carbon border adjustment mechanism and deforestation legislation to be unfair and detrimental to domestic markets. The EU is concerned about India’s stance on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and about its human rights situation.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Ukraine: Three years of war reverses progress for women and girls

    Source: United Nations MIL OSI b

    Peace and Security

    Three years of war in Ukraine have reversed decades of progress for women and girls, leaving millions in urgent need of support, according to UN Women.

    Russia’s full-scale invasion has forced more than 1.8 million women to flee their homes within Ukraine, while nearly 6.7 million require humanitarian assistance.

    More than 3,799 women and 289 girls have been killed, though the real toll is believed to be significantly higher.

    “The full-scale war has pushed an entire generation of Ukrainian women backwards,” said Sabine Freizer Gunes, UN Women Representative in the country.

    “They are facing heightened exposure to gender-based violence; rising unemployment; decreased decision-making power; greater domestic burdens; and a severe mental health crisis,” she explained.

    Stressed out

    Gender-based violence has surged by 36 per cent since 2022, driven in part by conflict-related stress, UN Women reported. In parallel, depression rates among women and girls have worsened.

    On the economic front, opportunities have shrunk. By 2024, less than half of displaced women had jobs whilst the gender pay gap doubled since the beginning of the war.

    Meanwhile, the burden of unpaid care, from cooking to caring for children, has intensified as childcare services centres have closed and services dwindled. Women spent an average of 56 hours a week on childcare in 2024, up from 49 hours before the war.

    Leaders of humanitarian recovery

    Despite these hardships, Ukrainian women are leading humanitarian responses and driving economic resilience.

    Women have assumed key roles as aid workers, community leaders and entrepreneurs. Today, one in every two businesses in Ukraine is founded by a woman.

    Women are also entering traditionally male-dominated sectors such as security, transportation and demining.

    “Donors’ support to Ukrainian women-led organizations and programmes is crucial so they can continue promoting gender equality, women’s rights and leadership,” said Ms. Gunes.

    “Women’s full engagement will be essential to rebuild Ukraine as a gender-equal and gender-responsive society,” she added.

    Support and call for action

    In 2024 alone, UN Women supported more than 180,000 women and girls affected by the war through initiatives under the Women Peace and Humanitarian Fund.

    The agency provides life-saving humanitarian aid, psychosocial and legal support, protection services and programmes to strengthen women’s economic independence.

    Four years on since the beginning of the war, UN Women is working to ensure that women are included in decision-making and recovery efforts, advocating for legal reforms to secure equal rights and representation.

    Overnight attack on Odesa

    The UN aid coordination office in Ukraine, OCHA, reported that an attack on Odesa City in the small hours of Wednesday morning had injured a number of civilians, including a child.

    Local authorities say the attack left a large residential area without electricity and heating, affecting at least 160,000 people – in the midst of winter.

    “Multiple apartment buildings were damaged, as well as a children’s hospital, and a kindergarten. For our part, we are providing emergency shelter materials, hot meals, psychosocial support, legal aid, and child protection services,” said UN Spokesperson Stéphane Dujarric.,            

    Medical teams are conducting quick health checks and distributing medicines, while schools will remain closed until power and heating are restored.  

    In the southern city of Kherson aid workers are continuing to respond to an attack that took place on 17 February, and damaged a critical energy facility. 2,500 residents were left without electricity, heating, and water.  

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Censorship, abortion and the ‘threat within’: what a free speech expert thinks of J.D. Vance’s remarks to Europe

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Eric Heinze, Professor of Law, Queen Mary University of London

    Donald Trump is famous for his attacks on journalists and the media. He has banned critical reporters from official events, threatened them with lawsuits, and branded mainstream outlets the “enemy of the people”. Since last year, the US has dropped ten notches on the World Press Freedom Index. Now in 55th place, the country trails far behind many European and other democracies.

    It is ironic, then, that vice president J.D. Vance dashed to the Munich Security Conference last week to scold Europeans for their supposed failings on free speech and democracy.

    Speaking to European leaders, Vance fretted: “The threat that I worry the most about vis-à-vis Europe is not Russia, it’s not China, it’s not any other external actor.” Rather, it is “the threat from within”. This rehashing of tropes about “the enemy within” forms part of a Trumpist vocabulary borrowed from the most sinister 20th century autocracies.

    One of Vance’s key claims for the decline of free speech in Europe left many UK observers dumbfounded. He rebuked the Scottish government for sending out letters in October 2024 cautioning citizens that, in his words, “even private prayer within their own homes may amount to breaking the law”.

    Vance was referring to Scotland’s Safe Access Zones Act, which prohibits protesters from gathering within 200 metres of clinics that perform abortions. Yet his accusation teaches volumes about Trumpism. To call it distorted would be diplomatic: it is a bold-faced lie. The Scottish government has confirmed that letters sent to residents near safe access zones did not instruct people to stop praying in the privacy of their homes.

    However, the letters did advise against conduct such as displaying anti-abortion posters or banners, or protesting on their property in ways that might be seen or heard within proximity of the clinics, or might encourage such activity in those areas.

    The Scottish law echoes similar laws in other democracies, including several US states. Yes, the right to protest is essential to democratic societies, but these societies have always accepted that protesters must not harass or threaten citizens going about their everyday business, let alone when seeking essential services such as medical appointments.

    Admittedly, “buffer zones” around abortion clinics cannot and need not extend so far as to impede protesters’ freedoms of expression, so a debate about the precise reach of the Scottish law can and should take place. However, as observed in England and Wales, zones have not generally been drawn with excessively broad perimeters.

    Clearly, Vance’s eyes were more fixed on his own future presidential bid, playing more to religious fundamentalists back home than to anyone who might seriously care about free expression. His 18-minute speech invoked God three times, and “prayer” nine times, while saying nothing about the main issue for which delegates had gathered: Russia’s unprovoked onslaught on Ukraine.

    Curiously, Vance whispered not a word of criticism about UK government crackdowns on the kinds of protests that, in the US, Trump most fears, such as protests against specific government policies and practices.

    I should not have to point out that anti-abortionists in Scotland remain entirely free to proclaim their opinions, in public and in print, alongside countless other types of political expression. Such expression has long been recognised as protected under UK law, and enshrined in the Human Rights Act.

    The only impact of Scotland’s new law is to prevent residents living within 200 metres of such clinics from displaying placards or holding events that would target women visiting such facilities. Admittedly, someone “only standing and praying” nearby a clinic may present a borderline case – but well within bounds that can be assessed through our democratic processes, the very processes that Trump loyalists increasingly disdain.

    We can debate the rights and wrongs of the Scottish law, but any suggestion that it seriously abridges free speech – when compared to the kinds of incursions Trump himself wages – would be farcical.

    Admittedly, while Scotland rightly protects its medical facilities, some people will ask whether a law can legitimately reach so far as to regulate the opinions that people wish to display in their windows and gardens. In recent years, many UK homes have flown Ukrainian or Palestinian flags from their homes, which some neighbours may find inappropriate. Yet British law protects their rights to do so.

    Clearly then, we can have meaningful debates about how far free expression in the home extends, but nothing in what Trump officials have said or done on their home turf suggests that this is their real concern.

    Free speech in retreat?

    As it happens, Vance was not totally wrong when he mused: “In Britain and across Europe, free speech, I fear, is in retreat.” For years, Hungarians have faced relentless attacks on free speech under Viktor Orbán – the autocrat whom Trump followers, including Vance himself, have so often praised.

    On several occasions in The Conversation and elsewhere, I have advocated free speech and I have every intention to continue doing so. I am also willing to concede that, despite Trump’s compulsive attacks on free speech, his supporters have raised some valid concerns about the stifling of opinion on the left.

    Abortion exemplifies the type of issue that sparks widespread ethical controversies. Any democracy must ensure that speakers on all sides have safe means of expressing their views in the public arena. Everyone in today’s democracies could use a few lessons in free speech – and the Trump team tops the list.

    Eric Heinze has received past funding from the European Union.

    – ref. Censorship, abortion and the ‘threat within’: what a free speech expert thinks of J.D. Vance’s remarks to Europe – https://theconversation.com/censorship-abortion-and-the-threat-within-what-a-free-speech-expert-thinks-of-j-d-vances-remarks-to-europe-250188

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Hawley Announces Legislation to Audit U.S. Tax Dollars Sent to Ukraine

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator Josh Hawley (R-Mo)

    Tuesday, February 18, 2025

    U.S. Senator Josh Hawley (R-Mo.) released the following statements this afternoon, demanding a new inspector general be created to investigate the billions in American tax dollars spent on aid to Ukraine.

    Senator Hawley is renewing his push today for an independent watchdog to oversee and audit Ukraine aid after a Democrat-controlled Senate voted down his legislation to establish one back in 2023. 

    The Senator has argued that Americans deserve an immediate accounting of every tax dollar spent on Ukraine aid, in light of the wasteful spending recently unveiled within the United States Agency for International Development.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Global: How medical treatments devised for war can quickly be implemented in US hospitals to save lives

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Vikhyat Bebarta, Professor of Emergency Medicine and Medical Toxicology, Pharmacology, University of Colorado Anschutz Medical Campus

    Military medicine moves faster than traditional research. Tech. Sgt. Darius Sostre-Miroir/920th Rescue Wing

    For decades, military doctors faced a critical challenge: What’s the best way to safely and effectively deliver oxygen to patients in remote combat zones, rural hospitals or disaster-stricken areas?

    Oxygen tanks are heavy, costly and dangerous in combat zones. A direct hit from a missile or a bullet can turn a lifesaving resource into a deadly hazard.

    Marine Corps Gen. Ernest T. Cook once said, “Logistics is the hard part of fighting a war.” It goes beyond oxygen. For deployed U.S. troops, the supplies available during combat for treating wounded soldiers can mean the difference between life and death.

    The Department of Defense turned to us, military physicians and academic researchers in military medicine at the University of Colorado Center for COMBAT Research, to study whether the military needs to bring oxygen to the battlefield for soldiers – and, if so, how much.

    This approach to research is known as a military-civilian partnership. These partnerships aim to save lives on the battlefield. But they also save lives across the U.S. by turning military medical gains into better health care for all.

    Innovation and agility

    In the civilian world, it takes 17 years on average for a research discovery to change medical practice. One of the most well-known examples of this is the use of tranexamic acid for trauma patients. Tranexamic acid is injected to stop bleeding during surgery or after trauma. It was discovered in 1962 but not approved by the FDA until 1986. It wasn’t used for traumatic bleeding until 2012.

    The changing nature of war and threats against U.S. forces require military medicine to move faster. Injuries and infections in combat push researchers to find better ways to save lives, often faster than in civilian health care.

    Military medicine must move quickly to keep up with the pace of war.
    Contributor/Anadolu via GettyImages

    At the center, scientists work side by side with military medical teams to study, develop and test solutions tailored for the battlefield.

    Whether it’s addressing oxygen use, traumatic brain injuries, burn treatments or trauma care, these partnerships allow military and civilian researchers to translate discoveries into practice rapidly.

    Rethinking oxygen

    The immediate administration of oxygen to an injured or ill patient has long been a cornerstone of trauma and burn care. The logic seemed simple: When patients are in shock or have severe injuries, their bodies struggle to get enough oxygen, so doctors provided extra.

    Our research, and that of others, found that too much oxygen can actually be harmful. Excess oxygen triggers oxidative stress – an overload of unstable molecules called free radicals that can damage healthy cells. That can lead to more inflammation, slower healing and even organ failure.

    In short, while oxygen is essential, more isn’t always better.

    We conducted a series of military-civilian collaborative trials called Strategy to Avoid Excessive Oxygen, or SAVE-O2. We discovered that severely injured patients often require less oxygen than previously believed. In fact, little or no supplemental oxygen is needed to safely care for 95% of these patients.

    This finding challenges decades of conventional medical wisdom. It will reshape how medical professionals approach critical care in not only military settings, but civilian hospitals as well.

    Within a year of presenting our findings to military medical leaders, these insights have already influenced changes and updates to patient care guidelines, medic training and even decisions on medical equipment purchases.

    To build on our findings, we’ve launched a trial to study the use of artificial intelligence to automate oxygen delivery. This military-funded study could provide better care for wounded soldiers in remote combat zones and for injured civilians in ambulances or rural hospitals before they reach large referral and trauma centers.

    An oxygen mask that uses artificial intelligence could help medics in rural combat zones and rural U.S. hospitals.
    John Moore/GettyImages

    In rural or remote areas of the U.S., access to supplemental oxygen can be limited due to supply chain challenges, high costs and shortages. This is particularly true in small hospitals and affects first responders after a natural disaster or accident. In the intensive care units of these hospitals, using oxygen more efficiently could preserve limited oxygen supplies for patients who need it.

    Prolonged casualty care: A new frontier

    While researching oxygen needs in combat zones, we realized another pressing issue: the challenges of prolonged casualty care. During a conflict, military medics often need to treat critically injured soldiers for hours or even days before the wounded person can be evacuated.

    In a future conflict with a “near-peer” adversary such as China or Russia, the U.S. may not have the ability to evacuate wounded troops quickly. Without reliable helicopter or airplane transport, many casualties may not reach trauma care within the “golden hour.” This is the critical first 60 minutes after a severe injury, when rapid treatment is essential.

    The ongoing war in Ukraine illustrates the challenge of prolonged casualty care. In hospitals across Ukraine, doctors are increasingly having trouble treating the wounds of civilian and military patients because of rising antibiotic resistance.

    Future military conflicts in the Indo-Pacific regions will present similar challenges, including long patient transport times and concerns about wound infections due to prolonged casualty care.

    However, this challenge isn’t unique to the battlefield. Prolonged casualty care also happens in civilian crises. For example, during a natural disaster, emergency responders must manage patients without quick access to hospitals.

    Once patients are treated in the field or in disaster scenarios, providers must often sustain care with limited resources. They have to prioritize essential interventions, minimize resource use and stabilize patients for eventual transfer to higher levels of care.

    Innovation in health care thrives on collaboration. Military-civilian partnerships are one way to advance medical solutions faster and more effectively. These innovations save lives in combat, improve care and allow us to apply our 98% survival rate in war to our trauma centers, rural hospitals and disaster zones in the U.S.

    The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense (DoD), the United States Government, or any of its agencies. The appearance of external links or mention of specific commercial products does not constitute endorsement by the DoD.

    Adit Ginde receives research funding from the U.S. Department of Defense. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense (DoD), the United States Government, or any of its agencies. The appearance of external links or mention of specific commercial products does not constitute endorsement by the DoD.

    Arthur Kellermann previously served as dean of the school of medicine at the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences. His views are his own and do not neccessarily represent those of the U.S. Department of Defense.

    – ref. How medical treatments devised for war can quickly be implemented in US hospitals to save lives – https://theconversation.com/how-medical-treatments-devised-for-war-can-quickly-be-implemented-in-us-hospitals-to-save-lives-247752

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI: Data443 Partners with TierPoint to Expand Data Center Footprint

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Collaboration Triples Infrastructure Capacity to Support Rapid Customer Growth and AI Initiatives

    RESEARCH TRIANGLE PARK, N.C., Feb. 19, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Data443 Risk Mitigation, Inc. (OTCPK: ATDS) (“Data443” or the “Company”), a data security and privacy software company for “All Things Data Security,” today announced a strategic agreement with TierPoint, a premier provider of secure, connected data center and cloud solutions. This agreement will enable Data443 to triple its data center infrastructure capacity, supporting the company’s rapid customer growth, operational efficiency initiatives, and upcoming artificial intelligence programs.

    Through this collaboration, Data443 will leverage TierPoint’s state-of-the-art facilities to enhance its infrastructure capabilities while optimizing operational expenses. The expansion addresses increasing customer demand for Data443’s comprehensive suite of data security, privacy, and compliance solutions.

    Jason Remillard, Founder and CEO of Data443 commented: “Our partnership with TierPoint came together out of necessity in tripling our data center capacity to meeting the current demands of our growing customer base. Working with TierPoint positions us for future expansion, particularly in the realm of AI-driven security solutions. TierPoint’s robust infrastructure and proven track record make them the ideal partner for these initiatives.”

    “Our support for Data443 highlights TierPoint’s ability to deliver scalable and reliable data center solutions,” said Gus Hoover, Director Data Center Operations at TierPoint. “By scaling quickly to support Data443’s growth and leveraging redundant infrastructure, we’re providing a cutting-edge solution tailored to their needs.”

    The expanded infrastructure will support Data443’s continued innovation in data security and privacy solutions and is expected to generate substantial operational cost savings through improved efficiency and economies of scale.

    The collaboration delivers multiple strategic advantages that will strengthen Data443’s market position and operational capabilities. The immediate tripling of data center capacity will accommodate the company’s rapid customer growth, while enhanced infrastructure capabilities will power next-generation AI initiatives. Additionally, the expanded infrastructure will enable accelerated deployment of new services and solutions, allowing Data443 to respond more quickly to evolving market demands.

    Recently the company announced its acquisition of leading AI email managment provider Breezemail.ai as it continues innovation in the data security realms.

    About TierPoint

    TierPoint (tierpoint.com) is a leading provider of secure, connected IT platform solutions that power the digital transformation of thousands of clients, from the public to private sectors, from small businesses to Fortune 500 enterprises. Taking an agnostic approach to helping clients achieve their most pressing business objectives, TierPoint is a champion for untangling the complexity of hybrid, multi-platform approaches to IT infrastructure, drawing on a comprehensive portfolio of services, from public to multitenant and private cloud, from colocation to disaster recovery, security, and more. TierPoint also has one of the largest and most geographically diversified U.S. footprints, with dozens of world-class, cloud-ready data centers in 20 markets, connected by a coast-to-coast network.

    About Data443 Risk Mitigation, Inc.

    Data443 Risk Mitigation, Inc. (OTCPK: ATDS) provides software and services to enable secure data across devices and databases, at rest and in flight/in transit, locally, on a network or in the cloud. We are All Things Data Security™. With over 10,000 customers in over 100 countries, Data443 provides a modern approach to data governance and security by identifying and protecting all sensitive data regardless of location, platform or format. Data443’s framework helps customers prioritize risk, identify security gaps and implement effective data protection and privacy management strategies. For more information, visit: https://data443.com.

    Forward-Looking Statements 

    This press release contains forward-looking statements. These statements are made under the “safe harbor” provisions of the U.S. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Forward-looking statements may be identified by use of terms such as “expect,” “believe,” “anticipate,” “may,” “could,” “will,” “should,” “plan,” “project,” “intend,” “estimate,” “predict,” “potential,” “pursuant,” “target,” “continue” or the negative of these words or other comparable terminology. Statements in this press release that are not historical statements, including statements regarding Data443’s plans, objectives, future opportunities for Data443’s services, future financial performance and operating results, and any other statements regarding Data443’s future expectations, beliefs, plans, objectives, financial conditions, assumptions or future events or performance, or regarding the anticipated consummation of any transaction, are forward-looking statements. These statements are not guarantees of future performance and are subject to numerous risks, uncertainties and assumptions, many of which are difficult to predict or are beyond Data443’s control. These risks, uncertainties and assumptions could cause actual results to differ materially from the results expressed or implied by the statements. They may relate to the outcome of litigation, settlements and investigations; actions by third parties, including governmental agencies; volatility in customer spending; global economic conditions; inability to hire and retain personnel; loss of, or reduction in business with, key customers; difficulty with growth and integration of acquisitions; product liability; cybersecurity risk; anti-takeover measures in the Company’s charter documents; and the uncertainties created by global health issues, such as the ongoing outbreak of COVID, and political unrest and conflict, such as the invasion of Ukraine by Russia. These and other important risk factors are described more fully in the Company’s reports and other documents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“the SEC”), including in Part I, Item 1A of the Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K filed with the SEC on April 17, 2024, and subsequent filings with the SEC. Undue reliance should not be placed on the forward-looking statements in this press release, which are based on information available to the Company on the date hereof. Except as otherwise required by applicable law, Data443 undertakes no obligation to publicly update or revise any forward-looking statements, whether because of new information, future events or otherwise.

    “DATA443” is a registered trademark of Data443 Risk Mitigation, Inc.

    All product names, trademarks and registered trademarks are property of their respective owners. All company, product and service names used in this press release are for identification purposes only. Use of these names, trademarks and brands does not imply endorsement.

    For further information:
    Follow us on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/data443-risk-mitigation-inc/
    Follow us on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCZXDhJcx-XgMBhvE9aFHRdA
    Sign up for our Investor Newsletter: https://data443.com/investor-email-alerts/

    To learn more about Data443, please watch the Company’s video introduction on its YouTube channel: https://youtu.be/1Fp93jOxFSg

    Investor Relations Contact:
    Matthew Abenante
    ir@data443.com
    919.858.6542

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Human Rights Council to Hold its Fifty-Eighth Regular Session from 24 February to 4 April 2025

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The United Nations Human Rights Council will hold its fifty-eighth regular session from 24 February to 4 April 2025 at the Palais des Nations in Geneva, starting with its high-level segment from 24 to 26 February, when dignitaries representing more than 100 Member States will address the Council.

    The session will open at 9 a.m. on Monday, 24 February under the Presidency of Ambassador Jürg Lauber of Switzerland. Delivering statements at the opening will be the Secretary-General of the United Nations, António Guterres; the President of the United Nations General Assembly , Philemon Yang; the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk; as well as the Chief of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland, Ignazio Cassis. The Council will be meeting in room XX of the Palais des Nations.

    On Monday, 3 March, the Council is scheduled to hear a global update by the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights around the world. The general debate on his global update will start following his presentation of a number of country-specific reports and updates.

    During the session, the Council will hold 30 interactive dialogues with the High Commissioner, his Office and designated experts, with Special Procedure mandate holders and investigative mechanisms, and with Special Representatives of the Secretary-General. The Council will also hold five enhanced interactive dialogues and one high-level dialogue, as well as nine general debates.

    The Council will also hold the annual high-level panel discussion on human rights mainstreaming with a focus on the thirtieth anniversary of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action; the biennial high-level panel on the death penalty ; panel discussions on early warning and genocide, HIV response and leaving no one behind, and on rights to work and to social security ; the annual interactive debate on the rights of persons with disabilities; the annual discussion on the rights of the child; and a commemoration of the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.

    The Council will examine the situation of human rights in a number of countries under its various agenda items, including the situation in the occupied Palestinian territory, Eritrea, Sudan, South Sudan, Nicaragua, Afghanistan and Myanmar under agenda item two; in Iran, Syria, Venezuela, Ukraine, Belarus, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and Myanmar under agenda item four; and in Mali, Haiti, Ukraine, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan and Central African Republic under agenda item 10.

    The final outcomes of the Universal Periodic Review of 14 States will also be considered, namely those of Norway, Albania, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Portugal, Bhutan, Dominica, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Brunei Darussalam, Costa Rica, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Qatar and Nicaragua. 

    Towards the end of the session, the Council will appoint three new members of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

    A detailed agenda and further information on the fifty-eighth session can be found on the session’s webpage . Reports to be presented are available here. 

    First Week of the Session 

    The fifty-eighth regular session will open at 9 a.m. on Monday, 24 February with a short opening meeting, followed by the start of the high-level segment, which will continue until 26 February, and during which the Council will hear addresses by more than 100 dignitaries. Intervening during the high-level segment will be the annual high-level panel discussion on human rights mainstreaming in the afternoon of 24 February and the biennial high-level panel on the death penalty in the morning of Tuesday, 25 February. The general segment will follow the conclusion of the high-level segment in the afternoon of Wednesday, 26 February.

    On Thursday, 27 February, the Council will hold an interactive dialogue on the High Commissioner’s report on the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, and the obligation to ensure accountability and justice, followed by enhanced interactive dialogues on the situation of human rights in Eritrea and on the High Commissioner’s report on Sudan, with the assistance of the designated Expert. Friday, 28 February, will see the conclusion of the discussion on Sudan, followed by an enhanced interactive dialogue on the report of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan. This will be followed by three interactive dialogues, the first on the report of the Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua, the second with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, and the third on the High Commissioner’s oral update on Myanmar.

    Second Week of the Session 

    At the beginning of the second week, on the morning of Monday, 3 March, the Council will hear the High Commissioner’s global update, then conclude the interactive dialogue on the High Commissioner’s oral update on Myanmar. This will be followed by the presentation of reports on the activities of the Office of the High Commissioner in Colombia, Guatemala and Honduras, and of another report on Cyprus, and oral updates on Sri Lanka and Nicaragua. The Council will then begin the general debate under agenda item two, namely the annual report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General, which will conclude on Tuesday, 4 March. The Council will subsequently begin its considerations under agenda item three on the promotion and protection of all human rights, holding interactive dialogues with the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and with the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief.

    On the morning of Wednesday, 5 March, the Council will hold a panel on early warning and genocide prevention, then conclude its interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief. This will be followed by an enhanced interactive dialogue on the report of the Office of the High Commissioner on transitional justice. Another panel will be held on Thursday, 6 March on HIV response and leaving no one behind, in addition to two interactive dialogues with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders and the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights. A third panel will be held in the morning of Friday, 7 March on rights to work and to social security, followed by two interactive dialogues with the Special Rapporteur on the right to adequate housing and the Independent Expert on the rights of persons with albinism.

    Third Week of the Session 

    The Council will start its third week on Monday, 10 March with a focus on disability, beginning with an interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the rights of persons with disabilities, to be followed by the annual debate on the rights of persons with disabilities. The day will conclude with an interactive dialogue with the Independent Expert on foreign debt, which will continue in the morning of Tuesday, 11 March. Two more interactive dialogues will also be held on Tuesday with the Special Rapporteur on the right to food and the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism.

    Wednesday, 12 March will see a further three interactive dialogues with the Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy, and the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General on violence against children and on children and armed conflict, the latter of which will conclude on Thursday, 13 March. The focus on children will continue on Thursday, with the Council also holding its annual discussion on the rights of the child, the theme of which will be early childhood development, and starting an interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the sale of children, which will conclude on Friday, 14 March.

    On Friday, an interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the human right to a healthy environment will precede the presentation of reports by the open-ended intergovernmental working group on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights, the Secretary-General, the High Commissioner and his Office, followed by the start of the general debate on agenda item three.

    Fourth Week of the Session

    The first day of the Council’s fourth week, Monday 17 March, will be devoted to concluding the general debate on agenda item three. From Tuesday, 18 March, consideration of agenda item four, human rights situations that require the Council’s attention, will begin. First on the schedule is a joint interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur and the independent international fact-finding mission on the situation of human rights in Iran, followed by interactive dialogues with the independent international commission of inquiry on Syria, the fact-finding mission on Venezuela and the independent international commission of inquiry on Ukraine.

    On Wednesday, 19 March, after the conclusion of the dialogue with the commission of inquiry on Ukraine, three more separate interactive dialogues will be held with the group of independent experts on the situation of human rights in Belarus and with the Special Rapporteurs on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and in Myanmar.

    Thursday, 20 March, will see the Council hear the presentation of the High Commissioner’s report on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and his oral update of the situation of human rights in Venezuela. This will be followed by the general debate on agenda item four, which will conclude on the morning of Friday, 21 March. On Friday, the Council will also hold an interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on minority issues, before beginning considerations under agenda item five on human rights bodies and mechanisms. After hearing the presentation of reports by the Forum on Minority Issues, the Social Forum, and the Special Procedures of the Council, it will commence the general debate on agenda item five.

    Fifth Week of the Session 

    The Council will start its fifth week on Monday, 24 March with its consideration under agenda item six of the final outcomes of the Universal Periodic Reviews of 14 States: Norway, Albania, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Portugal, Bhutan, Dominica, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Brunei Darussalam, Costa Rica, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Qatar and Nicaragua. This consideration will continue through to the morning of Wednesday, 26 March, after which the Council will hold a general debate on agenda item six. This will be followed by the presentation of the reports of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General under agenda item seven, namely the human rights situation in Palestine and other occupied Arab territories, and the general debate on this agenda item. The general debate under agenda item eight – follow-up and implementation of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action – is also scheduled to commence on Wednesday afternoon.

    Ending racism will be the Council’s theme for Thursday, 27 March. After concluding the debate under agenda item eight, it will hear the presentation of the report of the intergovernmental working group on the effective implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, then hold its general debate on agenda item nine, namely racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related forms of intolerance, follow-up to and implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action. From 2:30 to 4:30 p.m., the Council will also hold a meeting in commemoration of the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.

    Friday, 28 March will begin with the conclusion of the debate under agenda item nine, followed by three interactive dialogues conducted under agenda item 10 on technical assistance and capacity-building. The first dialogue will be with the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Mali; the second on the High Commissioner’s report on the situation of human rights in Haiti, with the participation of the Independent Expert on the subject; and the third on the High Commissioner’s oral update on the situation of human rights in Ukraine.

    Sixth Week of the Session 

    Monday, 31 March is a United Nations holiday. On Tuesday, 1 April, the Council will hold an enhanced interactive dialogue on oral updates by the High Commissioner and by the team of international experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, followed by an interactive dialogue on the report of the Office of the High Commissioner on technical assistance and capacity building for South Sudan and a high-level dialogue on the Central African Republic. At the end of the day, the Council will hear the annual presentation of the High Commissioner on technical cooperation and his oral update on Georgia, and the presentation of the report of the Board of Trustees of the Voluntary Fund for Technical Cooperation, followed by the general debate on agenda item 10.

    The general debate will conclude on Wednesday, 2 April, and the Council will then start to act on draft decisions and resolutions, appoint three new members of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and adopt the report of the fifty-eighth regular session, before closing the session on Friday, 4 April.

    The Human Rights Council 

    The Human Rights Council is an inter-governmental body within the United Nations system, made up of 47 States, which is responsible for strengthening the promotion and protection of human rights around the globe. The Council was created by the United Nations General Assembly on 15 March 2006 with the main purpose of addressing situations of human rights violations and making recommendations on them.

    The composition of the Human Rights Council at its fifty-eighth session is as follows: Albania (2026); Algeria (2025); Bangladesh (2025); Belgium (2025); Benin (2027); Bolivia (2027); Brazil (2026); Bulgaria (2026); Burundi (2026); Chile (2025); China (2026); Colombia (2027); Costa Rica (2025); Côte d’Ivoire (2026); Cuba (2026); Cyprus (2027); Czechia (2027); Democratic Republic of the Congo (2027); Dominican Republic (2026); Ethiopia (2027); France (2026); Gambia (2027); Georgia (2025); Germany (2025); Ghana (2026); Iceland (2027); Indonesia (2026); Japan (2026); Kenya (2027); Kuwait (2026); Kyrgyzstan (2025); Malawi (2026); Maldives (2025); Marshall Islands (2027); Mexico (2027); Morocco (2025); Netherlands (2026); North Macedonia (2027); Qatar (2027); Republic of Korea (2027); Romania (2025); South Africa (2025); Spain (2027); Sudan (2025); Switzerland (2027); Thailand (2027); and Viet Nam (2025).

    The term of membership of each State expires in the year indicated in parentheses.

    The President of the Human Rights Council in 2025 is Jürg Lauber (Switzerland). The four Vice-Presidents are Tareq Md Ariful Islam (Bangladesh), Razvan Rusu (Romania), Paul Empole Losoko Efambe (Democratic Republic of the Congo) and a fourth Vice-President to be elected later from the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States. Mr. Efambe will also serve as Rapporteur of the Geneva-based body.

    The dates and venue of the fifty-eighth session are subject to change.

    Information on the fifty-eighth session can be found here , including the annotated agenda and the reports to be presented.

    For further information, please contact Pascal Sim (simp@un.org), Matthew Brown (matthew.brown@un.org) or David Díaz Martín (David.diazmartin@un.org)

    ___________

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

     

    HRC.25.001E

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Isabel Schnabel: Interview with the Financial Times

    Source: European Central Bank

    Interview with Isabel Schnabel, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, conducted by Olaf Storbeck on 14 February 2025

    19 February 2025

    How relevant is the natural rate – R* – for day-to-day policymaking from your point of view?

    The natural rate of interest is an important theoretical concept. But it’s not well-suited to determine the appropriate monetary policy stance. The ECB staff analysis that was published recently had one main message: we know that we know very little. Model and estimation uncertainty result in confidence bands that are so wide that they include any reasonable interest rate that the ECB may set at this point. Moreover, R* is a steady-state concept for a world without shocks. That’s certainly not the world that we are in today. Just look at what’s happening with the evolving trade conflict on which we are getting news on a daily basis. So for all those reasons, I think R* cannot be any reliable guide for monetary policy in real time.

    Has your view on this changed?

    The point I have always emphasised is how R* is evolving over the longer term. People have focused too much on the narrow range for R* that was given in the staff note. This is misleading for several reasons. The narrow range only includes the models for which estimates were already available for the fourth quarter of 2024. If you look at the R* estimates for the third quarter, you see that the range actually goes up all the way to 3%. This is even above the current deposit facility rate of 2.75%. And that range still only includes the uncertainty stemming from using different models. If you add the parameter and filtering uncertainty, you get even wider bands. The one thing that you do see is that the overall range seems to have moved up over recent years. For me, that is the key point.

    But the most recent ECB estimates of R* also suggest that the current level is still lower than it was before the global financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis.

    That remains to be seen. There has been a clear upward trend. I expect this trend to continue for a number of reasons, including high and rising public debt and the huge investment needs for the digital and green transitions. Another factor is increasing global fragmentation. It leads to a partial reversal of the global savings glut, due to shrinking current account surpluses of some major economies, which was one of the main factors that had pushed R* down. So for me, the main message from the R* analysis is: maintaining price stability over the medium term is likely to require higher real rates in the future than before the pandemic. We cannot pin down the level of R* with any degree of confidence, but we can get an impression about the direction. For me, that direction for R* now is upwards again.

    The Euro zone economy suffers from a lack of economic dynamism and economic growth. Doesn’t this put downward pressure on the natural interest rate?

    Yes, there have been secular factors that have pushed R* down. But we are currently in a situation of transformation that may actually reverse that trend. That’s the whole point.

    When you say that R* is not very helpful for short-term monetary policymaking, why have you stressed it so much in your speeches and interviews?

    It’s important that we understand general macroeconomic trends. Also in the pre-pandemic period, it was very important to understand the underlying natural real rate environment. It can never be precise, but it helps us understand the broader picture. It has no impact on any individual rate decision.

    But would you say that it is relevant for the medium-term trajectory of monetary policy, let’s say for the next year or two? Or does it only matter over the next ten or 20 years?

    I think it has an impact on our medium-term thinking.

    Medium-term thinking would mean: it matters over the next two to three years, right?

    Well, it’s hard to pin down precisely.

    Some ECB observers have suggested that the natural rate was used by more hawkish voices as an argument in favour of being more careful and not lowering interest rates too fast. Would you agree?

    If you believe that R* has moved up, this argues for a more cautious approach. But this cannot just depend on R*. We need to look at the incoming data in order to understand how restrictive our monetary policy is. And the more evidence we have that monetary policy is no longer restrictive, the more cautious we have to become because further rate cuts may no longer be appropriate.

    So how restrictive is the ECB’s monetary policy at the moment?

    The data are showing that the degree of restriction has come down significantly, up to a point where we can no longer say with confidence that our monetary policy is still restrictive. One of the important data sources in this context is the bank lending survey.

    We’re looking at that very carefully. For corporate loans, 90% of banks said in the most recent round that the general level of interest rates has no impact on loan demand, while 8% said it has lifted credit demand. A year ago, a third of banks said that interest rates were weighing on loan demand. It’s even clearer when you look at mortgages. Almost half of banks said in the most recent round that the general level of interest rates is supporting loan demand. A year ago, more than 40% said that it was constraining loan demand. This is also reflected in a historically strong increase in mortgage demand in that same survey, which is gradually transmitting into the hard data on loan growth. Corporate loans were growing by 1.5% in December, mortgages by 1.1%.

    The easing is also being transmitted to the real economy. Consumption picked up in the third quarter by more than we had expected. And the savings rate has started to come down from its very high level. But of course, there are transmission lags, and part of the easing is still in the pipeline.

    You said that you can’t say with confidence anymore if monetary policy is still restrictive. The last ECB policy statement clearly stated that it still is. Do you have a different view than the ECB stated in its latest policy statement?

    No, I fully agreed with the statement last time. But we are now a step further, right? The January monetary policy statement referred to the interest rate of 3% and the level of restrictiveness before the latest monetary policy decision. The further we go down, the lower my conviction in such a statement will be. And note that I’m not saying our monetary policy is no longer restrictive. What I’m saying is I’m no longer sure whether it is still restrictive. But we should not overstate a difference of 25 basis points.

    Should the ECB drop the reference to restrictiveness in March?

    That is a discussion we should have in the next meeting.

    In an FT survey of Euro zone economists just before Christmas, half of them said they think that the ECB is behind the curve. What is your view on this?

    I’m firmly in the camp of the other half who think that we are right on track. The data that we’ve seen have confirmed that our gradual and cautious approach has been appropriate. Domestic inflation is still high, wage growth is still elevated, and we’ve seen new shocks to energy prices. We’ve also seen that inflation expectations are very sensitive to such shocks. So I think our approach is just right.

    Some economists argue that the big uncertainty and all those shocks could justify insurance cuts. Do you have any view on that?

    I don’t see any argument for that at this point, especially as we are getting closer to no longer being restrictive. If anything, we are getting closer to the point where we may have to pause or halt our rate cuts.

    Pause or halt… but not increase?

    No. That I would exclude.

    How close do you think we are to the point where the ECB should pause its easing?

    I will leave that to your interpretation. I don’t know what’s going to happen in the next meetings, so let’s see. But we need to start that discussion.

    That’s not what markets take as the base case scenario right now. Do you think that markets are ahead of themselves?

    Well, markets have been jumping around a bit in response to what is happening in the world. But an April rate cut is no longer fully priced in. So markets are not entirely sure either.

    How well is monetary transmission working at the moment? We saw quite an uptick in yields in December although there wasn’t any change in monetary policy. All other things being equal, this slows down monetary policy transmission, doesn’t it?

    We have lowered the deposit facility rate by 125 basis points over the past eight months, and this has been transmitted smoothly to short-term market rates. We’ve also seen that bank lending rates have come down quite a bit – corporate loan rates by 92 basis points and mortgage rates by 64 basis points by December. This is significant. It tells you that transmission is working. When it comes to government bond yields, it’s important to look through the short-term volatility and take a somewhat longer perspective. And what you see then is that sovereign bond yields have remained rather stable. We had a strong repricing in 2022, when the ten-year Bund moved from negative territory at the end of 2021 to around 2.4% in October 2022. That is very close to the number that we’re seeing today. So we’ve been seeing a return of long-term sovereign bond yields to their new normal. We shouldn’t overstate the short-term volatility that we’ve experienced over the past weeks.

    There’s another aspect that is quite important. One of the most interesting features of this tightening cycle is that it has not led to a comparable tightening of broader financial conditions. The exceptionally strong risk appetite of financial investors has even boosted equity prices and compressed credit spreads, and that has weakened monetary policy transmission. And part of that is due to the fact that we are still holding a very large monetary policy bond portfolio.

    But overall, also taking into account the lags, monetary policy transmission is working fine.

    Is the ECB’s “meeting-by-meeting” communication really credible? The ECB now says that the direction of travel is clear. Isn’t this a pre-commitment to further rate cuts?

    I firmly believe in the meeting-by-meeting approach. The current time of high volatility is certainly not the time to tie our hands through forward guidance. And this is also what we stress in our monetary policy statements: we are not pre-committing to any particular rate path. At the time when it was still relatively clear that monetary policy was restrictive, one could infer the direction of travel from that. But this is no longer the case. And therefore, for me, the direction of travel is not so clear anymore.

    Is this view shared by the majority of the Executive Board or the Governing Council?

    It’s not for me to comment on that. It’s going back to the point that we now have to start the discussion on how far we should go. I’m not saying that we’re there yet. But we have to start the discussion.

    If we take the meeting-by-meeting approach and data dependency as a given, does the type of data that has to be assessed need to change over time?

    There are broadly two sets of data that we need to focus on. The first one refers to the inflation outlook: inflation itself, inflation expectations, wages, productivity, exchange rates. We use incoming data to cross-check the assumptions underlying our projections. This is why I never saw data dependence as a backward-looking concept. It was always forward-looking because we use incoming data to learn more about the credibility of our inflation outlook. The second set of data relates to the level of restrictiveness of monetary policy: interest rates, broader financial conditions, lending markets, the housing market as well as domestic demand, that is consumption, savings and investment. Of course, when we have a monetary policy meeting, we always look at all available data.

    Can I challenge you on your claim that it was always forward-looking? At the time of high inflation, the ECB put a lot of emphasis on the actual inflation data from the previous month, which by definition is backward-looking. GDP numbers are by definition also very backward-looking.

    I don’t agree. What do we learn from the current inflation data? We learn whether the transmission of our policy or of shocks is working as expected. High services inflation tells us something about its stickiness. If we spot deviations, we will eventually adjust our models but we also have to change our view about the medium-term outlook. So, in my view it was never backward-looking.

    Data dependence is all the more important in today’s world. Some people say that the projections have become more credible. But who knows what’s going to happen as regards the trade conflict, the war in Ukraine and so on. We are faced with an unusual number of shocks, and that requires us to be always able to react. I don’t have a fixed mindset about what to do. Quite the opposite. I think we need to be able to adjust to whatever data or shock is coming in and what’s happening in the world and in the euro area economy.

    What are the current data telling us about the inflation outlook?

    Both services inflation and wage growth are still at an uncomfortably high level. Our projections foresee a deceleration of both. But this still needs to materialise. Services inflation has been stuck at around 4% since November 2023, and it still has to come down. For me, this is actually quite important. And therefore, the incoming data will be very relevant because our projections foresee a relatively quick deceleration of services inflation over this year.

    How quickly do you want to see service inflation coming down?

    It should start to come down in February. That’s what we expect. Over time, it does not necessarily have to come down to 2% but to a level that is consistent with our medium-term 2% target. Wage growth is also still high, but we have many indications that it is going to decelerate. For example, our wage tracker shows that wage growth is expected to drop steeply in the second half of the year. Part of that is due to a base effect from one-off payments. Hence, wage growth is expected to stay relatively elevated over the first half of the year. So we still need to see this deceleration. This is something that I pay a lot of attention to.

    How concerned are you about recent swings in energy prices?

    Energy and food prices can always offer surprises. We have seen some relatively strong moves in energy prices recently. Gas prices moved up a lot. That was mainly driven by cold temperatures. Very recently, gas prices dropped sharply. This seems to be driven partly by uncertainty about whether countries will fill up their gas storages as quickly as originally intended. A second reason is the debate about a potential ceasefire in Ukraine. This can cause a lot of volatility, which can have a strong impact on headline inflation and also on underlying inflation because energy serves as an input. We have to monitor this carefully.

    What are the implications for monetary policy from energy price volatility? Is this deflationary or inflationary?

    Recent volatility has been extreme. Before the recent fall in gas prices it was clearly inflationary. But now we have to see how that is going to play out. In general, I see risks to our inflation outlook as somewhat skewed to the upside. So I would not exclude that inflation comes back to 2% later than we had anticipated. But that remains to be seen.

    The ECB this year will review its monetary strategy. President Lagarde has excluded the current inflation target from that review. Do you think that’s the right call?

    Our symmetric, medium-term inflation target of 2% has served us very well in the high inflation period. So I really don’t see any reason to question it. And I believe there is strong support for this view in the Governing Council. What we have seen, however, is how quickly the inflation environment can change. And we have also learned how much people dislike inflation. But for me, that has implications primarily for the reaction function and not for the target. I think these two should be kept apart.

    What are the potential implications for the reaction function?

    The reaction function should be part of the debate. Back in 2021 during the previous strategy review, the discussion was very much under the impression of the low-for-long period. The main concern at the time was that our monetary policy was constrained by the effective lower bound on interest rates. When you read the monetary policy strategy statement today, you would think it comes from a different world. It focused on the risk of inflation being too low, and stated that we should be particularly forceful or persistent in such a scenario. But we have shifted to a new world. The past few years have shown that there are also risks of a de-anchoring of inflation expectations to the upside and that upside inflation risks can materialise quickly and become more persistent due to second-round effects. And therefore, I believe that the new reaction function should be symmetric in order to take into account the risks in both directions. This is especially true given that we are likely to face more adverse supply-side shocks going forward.

    So effectively you are arguing in favour of a more hawkish reaction function?

    I don’t like these notions of hawks and doves, and I don’t think that they are relevant here. My point is that our reaction function should acknowledge the fundamental shift of the macroeconomic environment. Up to 2021, we paid very little attention to upside risks to inflation. There was the perception that central banks would know precisely how to deal with a surge in inflation. But we’ve experienced that it has been quite difficult. Inflation has been above target now for almost four years. Looking forward, we should be putting equal weight on risks in both directions. And I wouldn’t call that a hawkish assertion.

    Should the ECB toolkit be changed?

    We’ve gained a lot of experience with the different tools. I do believe that all the tools we have should remain in our toolkit. But we’ve learned how important it is to carefully weigh the benefits and costs of our instruments – especially when it comes to asset purchases. They have proven very effective in stabilising markets. But as a monetary policy stance instrument, they have been less beneficial and costlier than we thought. This should be taken into account. The same applies to forward guidance. Many people believe that forward guidance led to a delayed response to the inflation surge. So forward guidance is another tool that we need to look at very carefully.

    Are you implicitly saying that ECB should not have done as much quantitative easing as it did in the years up to 2021?

    My point is that once we are back to a more normal world – a situation where inflation expectations are well anchored, and services inflation and unit labour cost growth have come down – and we are confident that we are sustainably back at our target, then we could become more tolerant of moderate deviations from our target. We should stop fine-tuning and responding to single data points. We should instead focus on large persistent shocks that give rise to a risk of a de-anchoring of inflation expectations in either direction.

    So is your point that the ECB should be more willing to tolerate downward deviations to the 2% target in a steady state?

    We should be more willing to tolerate both moderate downward and upward deviations, and act when there is a threat of de-anchoring.

    But that’s an implicit change to the inflation target, is it not?

    No, not at all. My point is that we should be less activist and rather take the time to assess whether shocks pose a serious risk to inflation expectations. Of course, we should keep in mind that the vulnerability of inflation expectations may have changed after the recent inflation experience. People have learned that inflation can increase sharply and that this is very harmful. Firms have learned that they can reprice relatively quickly, and we have to take this into account.

    Finally, we need to think about how to deal with the uncertainty around our economic and inflation outlook. For me, the most useful way to deal with that is to make greater use of scenario analysis – and in a different way than we’ve done over the past years. Back then we were looking at tail risks, which was very useful. But in the future, we should also look at plausible alternative scenarios in order to get away from the illusion of precision that we create by just focusing on the baseline point estimate. We all know there is a lot of uncertainty around it. So I think it would be important to also look at plausible alternative scenarios to illustrate this uncertainty.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Isabel Schnabel: Interview with the Financial Times

    Source: European Central Bank

    Interview with Isabel Schnabel, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, conducted by Olaf Storbeck on 14 February 2025

    19 February 2025

    How relevant is the natural rate – R* – for day-to-day policymaking from your point of view?

    The natural rate of interest is an important theoretical concept. But it’s not well-suited to determine the appropriate monetary policy stance. The ECB staff analysis that was published recently had one main message: we know that we know very little. Model and estimation uncertainty result in confidence bands that are so wide that they include any reasonable interest rate that the ECB may set at this point. Moreover, R* is a steady-state concept for a world without shocks. That’s certainly not the world that we are in today. Just look at what’s happening with the evolving trade conflict on which we are getting news on a daily basis. So for all those reasons, I think R* cannot be any reliable guide for monetary policy in real time.

    Has your view on this changed?

    The point I have always emphasised is how R* is evolving over the longer term. People have focused too much on the narrow range for R* that was given in the staff note. This is misleading for several reasons. The narrow range only includes the models for which estimates were already available for the fourth quarter of 2024. If you look at the R* estimates for the third quarter, you see that the range actually goes up all the way to 3%. This is even above the current deposit facility rate of 2.75%. And that range still only includes the uncertainty stemming from using different models. If you add the parameter and filtering uncertainty, you get even wider bands. The one thing that you do see is that the overall range seems to have moved up over recent years. For me, that is the key point.

    But the most recent ECB estimates of R* also suggest that the current level is still lower than it was before the global financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis.

    That remains to be seen. There has been a clear upward trend. I expect this trend to continue for a number of reasons, including high and rising public debt and the huge investment needs for the digital and green transitions. Another factor is increasing global fragmentation. It leads to a partial reversal of the global savings glut, due to shrinking current account surpluses of some major economies, which was one of the main factors that had pushed R* down. So for me, the main message from the R* analysis is: maintaining price stability over the medium term is likely to require higher real rates in the future than before the pandemic. We cannot pin down the level of R* with any degree of confidence, but we can get an impression about the direction. For me, that direction for R* now is upwards again.

    The Euro zone economy suffers from a lack of economic dynamism and economic growth. Doesn’t this put downward pressure on the natural interest rate?

    Yes, there have been secular factors that have pushed R* down. But we are currently in a situation of transformation that may actually reverse that trend. That’s the whole point.

    When you say that R* is not very helpful for short-term monetary policymaking, why have you stressed it so much in your speeches and interviews?

    It’s important that we understand general macroeconomic trends. Also in the pre-pandemic period, it was very important to understand the underlying natural real rate environment. It can never be precise, but it helps us understand the broader picture. It has no impact on any individual rate decision.

    But would you say that it is relevant for the medium-term trajectory of monetary policy, let’s say for the next year or two? Or does it only matter over the next ten or 20 years?

    I think it has an impact on our medium-term thinking.

    Medium-term thinking would mean: it matters over the next two to three years, right?

    Well, it’s hard to pin down precisely.

    Some ECB observers have suggested that the natural rate was used by more hawkish voices as an argument in favour of being more careful and not lowering interest rates too fast. Would you agree?

    If you believe that R* has moved up, this argues for a more cautious approach. But this cannot just depend on R*. We need to look at the incoming data in order to understand how restrictive our monetary policy is. And the more evidence we have that monetary policy is no longer restrictive, the more cautious we have to become because further rate cuts may no longer be appropriate.

    So how restrictive is the ECB’s monetary policy at the moment?

    The data are showing that the degree of restriction has come down significantly, up to a point where we can no longer say with confidence that our monetary policy is still restrictive. One of the important data sources in this context is the bank lending survey.

    We’re looking at that very carefully. For corporate loans, 90% of banks said in the most recent round that the general level of interest rates has no impact on loan demand, while 8% said it has lifted credit demand. A year ago, a third of banks said that interest rates were weighing on loan demand. It’s even clearer when you look at mortgages. Almost half of banks said in the most recent round that the general level of interest rates is supporting loan demand. A year ago, more than 40% said that it was constraining loan demand. This is also reflected in a historically strong increase in mortgage demand in that same survey, which is gradually transmitting into the hard data on loan growth. Corporate loans were growing by 1.5% in December, mortgages by 1.1%.

    The easing is also being transmitted to the real economy. Consumption picked up in the third quarter by more than we had expected. And the savings rate has started to come down from its very high level. But of course, there are transmission lags, and part of the easing is still in the pipeline.

    You said that you can’t say with confidence anymore if monetary policy is still restrictive. The last ECB policy statement clearly stated that it still is. Do you have a different view than the ECB stated in its latest policy statement?

    No, I fully agreed with the statement last time. But we are now a step further, right? The January monetary policy statement referred to the interest rate of 3% and the level of restrictiveness before the latest monetary policy decision. The further we go down, the lower my conviction in such a statement will be. And note that I’m not saying our monetary policy is no longer restrictive. What I’m saying is I’m no longer sure whether it is still restrictive. But we should not overstate a difference of 25 basis points.

    Should the ECB drop the reference to restrictiveness in March?

    That is a discussion we should have in the next meeting.

    In an FT survey of Euro zone economists just before Christmas, half of them said they think that the ECB is behind the curve. What is your view on this?

    I’m firmly in the camp of the other half who think that we are right on track. The data that we’ve seen have confirmed that our gradual and cautious approach has been appropriate. Domestic inflation is still high, wage growth is still elevated, and we’ve seen new shocks to energy prices. We’ve also seen that inflation expectations are very sensitive to such shocks. So I think our approach is just right.

    Some economists argue that the big uncertainty and all those shocks could justify insurance cuts. Do you have any view on that?

    I don’t see any argument for that at this point, especially as we are getting closer to no longer being restrictive. If anything, we are getting closer to the point where we may have to pause or halt our rate cuts.

    Pause or halt… but not increase?

    No. That I would exclude.

    How close do you think we are to the point where the ECB should pause its easing?

    I will leave that to your interpretation. I don’t know what’s going to happen in the next meetings, so let’s see. But we need to start that discussion.

    That’s not what markets take as the base case scenario right now. Do you think that markets are ahead of themselves?

    Well, markets have been jumping around a bit in response to what is happening in the world. But an April rate cut is no longer fully priced in. So markets are not entirely sure either.

    How well is monetary transmission working at the moment? We saw quite an uptick in yields in December although there wasn’t any change in monetary policy. All other things being equal, this slows down monetary policy transmission, doesn’t it?

    We have lowered the deposit facility rate by 125 basis points over the past eight months, and this has been transmitted smoothly to short-term market rates. We’ve also seen that bank lending rates have come down quite a bit – corporate loan rates by 92 basis points and mortgage rates by 64 basis points by December. This is significant. It tells you that transmission is working. When it comes to government bond yields, it’s important to look through the short-term volatility and take a somewhat longer perspective. And what you see then is that sovereign bond yields have remained rather stable. We had a strong repricing in 2022, when the ten-year Bund moved from negative territory at the end of 2021 to around 2.4% in October 2022. That is very close to the number that we’re seeing today. So we’ve been seeing a return of long-term sovereign bond yields to their new normal. We shouldn’t overstate the short-term volatility that we’ve experienced over the past weeks.

    There’s another aspect that is quite important. One of the most interesting features of this tightening cycle is that it has not led to a comparable tightening of broader financial conditions. The exceptionally strong risk appetite of financial investors has even boosted equity prices and compressed credit spreads, and that has weakened monetary policy transmission. And part of that is due to the fact that we are still holding a very large monetary policy bond portfolio.

    But overall, also taking into account the lags, monetary policy transmission is working fine.

    Is the ECB’s “meeting-by-meeting” communication really credible? The ECB now says that the direction of travel is clear. Isn’t this a pre-commitment to further rate cuts?

    I firmly believe in the meeting-by-meeting approach. The current time of high volatility is certainly not the time to tie our hands through forward guidance. And this is also what we stress in our monetary policy statements: we are not pre-committing to any particular rate path. At the time when it was still relatively clear that monetary policy was restrictive, one could infer the direction of travel from that. But this is no longer the case. And therefore, for me, the direction of travel is not so clear anymore.

    Is this view shared by the majority of the Executive Board or the Governing Council?

    It’s not for me to comment on that. It’s going back to the point that we now have to start the discussion on how far we should go. I’m not saying that we’re there yet. But we have to start the discussion.

    If we take the meeting-by-meeting approach and data dependency as a given, does the type of data that has to be assessed need to change over time?

    There are broadly two sets of data that we need to focus on. The first one refers to the inflation outlook: inflation itself, inflation expectations, wages, productivity, exchange rates. We use incoming data to cross-check the assumptions underlying our projections. This is why I never saw data dependence as a backward-looking concept. It was always forward-looking because we use incoming data to learn more about the credibility of our inflation outlook. The second set of data relates to the level of restrictiveness of monetary policy: interest rates, broader financial conditions, lending markets, the housing market as well as domestic demand, that is consumption, savings and investment. Of course, when we have a monetary policy meeting, we always look at all available data.

    Can I challenge you on your claim that it was always forward-looking? At the time of high inflation, the ECB put a lot of emphasis on the actual inflation data from the previous month, which by definition is backward-looking. GDP numbers are by definition also very backward-looking.

    I don’t agree. What do we learn from the current inflation data? We learn whether the transmission of our policy or of shocks is working as expected. High services inflation tells us something about its stickiness. If we spot deviations, we will eventually adjust our models but we also have to change our view about the medium-term outlook. So, in my view it was never backward-looking.

    Data dependence is all the more important in today’s world. Some people say that the projections have become more credible. But who knows what’s going to happen as regards the trade conflict, the war in Ukraine and so on. We are faced with an unusual number of shocks, and that requires us to be always able to react. I don’t have a fixed mindset about what to do. Quite the opposite. I think we need to be able to adjust to whatever data or shock is coming in and what’s happening in the world and in the euro area economy.

    What are the current data telling us about the inflation outlook?

    Both services inflation and wage growth are still at an uncomfortably high level. Our projections foresee a deceleration of both. But this still needs to materialise. Services inflation has been stuck at around 4% since November 2023, and it still has to come down. For me, this is actually quite important. And therefore, the incoming data will be very relevant because our projections foresee a relatively quick deceleration of services inflation over this year.

    How quickly do you want to see service inflation coming down?

    It should start to come down in February. That’s what we expect. Over time, it does not necessarily have to come down to 2% but to a level that is consistent with our medium-term 2% target. Wage growth is also still high, but we have many indications that it is going to decelerate. For example, our wage tracker shows that wage growth is expected to drop steeply in the second half of the year. Part of that is due to a base effect from one-off payments. Hence, wage growth is expected to stay relatively elevated over the first half of the year. So we still need to see this deceleration. This is something that I pay a lot of attention to.

    How concerned are you about recent swings in energy prices?

    Energy and food prices can always offer surprises. We have seen some relatively strong moves in energy prices recently. Gas prices moved up a lot. That was mainly driven by cold temperatures. Very recently, gas prices dropped sharply. This seems to be driven partly by uncertainty about whether countries will fill up their gas storages as quickly as originally intended. A second reason is the debate about a potential ceasefire in Ukraine. This can cause a lot of volatility, which can have a strong impact on headline inflation and also on underlying inflation because energy serves as an input. We have to monitor this carefully.

    What are the implications for monetary policy from energy price volatility? Is this deflationary or inflationary?

    Recent volatility has been extreme. Before the recent fall in gas prices it was clearly inflationary. But now we have to see how that is going to play out. In general, I see risks to our inflation outlook as somewhat skewed to the upside. So I would not exclude that inflation comes back to 2% later than we had anticipated. But that remains to be seen.

    The ECB this year will review its monetary strategy. President Lagarde has excluded the current inflation target from that review. Do you think that’s the right call?

    Our symmetric, medium-term inflation target of 2% has served us very well in the high inflation period. So I really don’t see any reason to question it. And I believe there is strong support for this view in the Governing Council. What we have seen, however, is how quickly the inflation environment can change. And we have also learned how much people dislike inflation. But for me, that has implications primarily for the reaction function and not for the target. I think these two should be kept apart.

    What are the potential implications for the reaction function?

    The reaction function should be part of the debate. Back in 2021 during the previous strategy review, the discussion was very much under the impression of the low-for-long period. The main concern at the time was that our monetary policy was constrained by the effective lower bound on interest rates. When you read the monetary policy strategy statement today, you would think it comes from a different world. It focused on the risk of inflation being too low, and stated that we should be particularly forceful or persistent in such a scenario. But we have shifted to a new world. The past few years have shown that there are also risks of a de-anchoring of inflation expectations to the upside and that upside inflation risks can materialise quickly and become more persistent due to second-round effects. And therefore, I believe that the new reaction function should be symmetric in order to take into account the risks in both directions. This is especially true given that we are likely to face more adverse supply-side shocks going forward.

    So effectively you are arguing in favour of a more hawkish reaction function?

    I don’t like these notions of hawks and doves, and I don’t think that they are relevant here. My point is that our reaction function should acknowledge the fundamental shift of the macroeconomic environment. Up to 2021, we paid very little attention to upside risks to inflation. There was the perception that central banks would know precisely how to deal with a surge in inflation. But we’ve experienced that it has been quite difficult. Inflation has been above target now for almost four years. Looking forward, we should be putting equal weight on risks in both directions. And I wouldn’t call that a hawkish assertion.

    Should the ECB toolkit be changed?

    We’ve gained a lot of experience with the different tools. I do believe that all the tools we have should remain in our toolkit. But we’ve learned how important it is to carefully weigh the benefits and costs of our instruments – especially when it comes to asset purchases. They have proven very effective in stabilising markets. But as a monetary policy stance instrument, they have been less beneficial and costlier than we thought. This should be taken into account. The same applies to forward guidance. Many people believe that forward guidance led to a delayed response to the inflation surge. So forward guidance is another tool that we need to look at very carefully.

    Are you implicitly saying that ECB should not have done as much quantitative easing as it did in the years up to 2021?

    My point is that once we are back to a more normal world – a situation where inflation expectations are well anchored, and services inflation and unit labour cost growth have come down – and we are confident that we are sustainably back at our target, then we could become more tolerant of moderate deviations from our target. We should stop fine-tuning and responding to single data points. We should instead focus on large persistent shocks that give rise to a risk of a de-anchoring of inflation expectations in either direction.

    So is your point that the ECB should be more willing to tolerate downward deviations to the 2% target in a steady state?

    We should be more willing to tolerate both moderate downward and upward deviations, and act when there is a threat of de-anchoring.

    But that’s an implicit change to the inflation target, is it not?

    No, not at all. My point is that we should be less activist and rather take the time to assess whether shocks pose a serious risk to inflation expectations. Of course, we should keep in mind that the vulnerability of inflation expectations may have changed after the recent inflation experience. People have learned that inflation can increase sharply and that this is very harmful. Firms have learned that they can reprice relatively quickly, and we have to take this into account.

    Finally, we need to think about how to deal with the uncertainty around our economic and inflation outlook. For me, the most useful way to deal with that is to make greater use of scenario analysis – and in a different way than we’ve done over the past years. Back then we were looking at tail risks, which was very useful. But in the future, we should also look at plausible alternative scenarios in order to get away from the illusion of precision that we create by just focusing on the baseline point estimate. We all know there is a lot of uncertainty around it. So I think it would be important to also look at plausible alternative scenarios to illustrate this uncertainty.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Causes of rising food prices – E-002505/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    1. Food prices have increased as a result of changing market conditions derived from the Russian war on Ukraine and resulting surge in input prices in 2022-2023, especially for energy and fertilisers. Prices were influenced by external factors, including the geopolitical situation and the impact of severe weather events on production capacity.

    2. EU rules require all imported agri-food products to comply with EU health and food safety standards. The Commission maintains its commitment to act multilaterally, bilaterally and autonomously to strengthen the alignment of imports with EU production standards, and ensure that applying standards to EU producers does not lead to social and environmental leakages.

    3. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) remains essential for supporting farmers’ income, rewarding ecosystem services, compensating for work on land with natural constraints, and investing to improve competitiveness and resilience. Several concrete steps were taken to improve farmers’ position, including an ambitious simplification proposal[1] in 2024 to alleviate some of the burden. In the second week of taking office, this Commission immediately put forward two new proposals to strengthen farmers’ position in the agri-food supply chain, and to enhance cross-border enforcement against unfair trading practices[2]. The forthcoming Vision for Agriculture and Food will address the sector’s long-term attractiveness, competitiveness, resilience and sustainability.

    • [1] Simplification Regulation (EU) 2024/1468, see also Commission Staff Working Document ‘Simplification measures for farmers’, SWD(2024) 360 final.
    • [2] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_6321
    Last updated: 19 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Video: Global solidarity needed more than ever – UN Chief | Security Council Briefing | United Nations

    Source: United Nations (Video News)

    Remarks to the Security Council by António Guterres, Secretary-General of the United Nations, on practicing multilateralism, reforming and improving global governance.

    Excellencies,

    I thank Minister Wang Yi and China for convening this important discussion.

    This year marks the 80th anniversary of the United Nations.

    Born out of the ashes of the Second World War, our organization was the result of a global commitment to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.”

    It also signaled a commitment to an entirely new level of international cooperation grounded in international law and our founding Charter.

    To help countries move past the horrors of conflict to forge sustainable peace.

    To tackle poverty, hunger and disease.

    To assist countries in climbing the development ladder.

    To provide humanitarian support in times of conflict and disaster.

    To embed justice and fairness through international law and respect for human rights.

    And to work through this Council to push for peace through dialogue, debate, diplomacy and consensus-building.

    Eight decades later, one can draw a direct line between the creation of the United Nations and the prevention of a third world war.

    Eight decades later, the United Nations remains the essential, one-of-a-kind meeting ground to advance peace, sustainable development and human rights.

    But eight decades is a long time.

    And because we believe in the singular value and purpose of the United Nations, we must always strive to improve the institution and the way we work.

    We have the hardware for international cooperation — but the software needs an update.

    An update in representation to reflect the realities of today.

    An update in support for developing countries to redress historical injustices.

    An update to ensure countries adhere to the purposes, principles and norms that ground multilateralism in justice and fairness.

    And an update to our peace operations.

    Excellencies,

    Global solidarity and solutions are needed more than ever.

    The climate crisis is raging, inequalities are growing, and poverty is on the rise.

    As this Council knows well, peace is getting pushed further out of reach — from the Occupied Palestinian Territory to Ukraine to Sudan to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and beyond.

    Terrorism and violent extremism remain persistent scourges.

    We see a dark spirit of impunity spreading.

    The prospect of nuclear war remains — outrageously — a clear and present danger.

    And the limitless promise of emerging technologies like Artificial Intelligence is matched by limitless peril to undermine and even replace human thought, human identity and human control.
    These global challenges cry out for multilateral solutions.

    The Pact for the Future you adopted in September is aimed at strengthening global governance for the 21st century and rebuilding trust — trust in multilateralism, trust in the United Nations, and trust in this Council.

    At its heart, the Pact for the Future is a pact for peace — peace in all its dimensions.

    It puts forward concrete solutions to strengthen the machinery of peace, drawing from proposals to the New Agenda for Peace that prioritize prevention, mediation and peacebuilding.

    The Pact seeks to advance coordination with regional organizations, and ensure the full participation of women, youth and marginalized groups in peace processes.

    And it calls for strengthening the Peacebuilding Commission to mobilize political and financial support for nationally owned peacebuilding and prevention strategies.

    The Pact also includes the first multilateral agreement on nuclear disarmament in more than a decade…

    New strategies to end the use of chemical and biological weapons…

    And revitalized efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space and advance discussions on lethal autonomous weapons.

    It also calls on Member States to live up to their commitments enshrined in the UN Charter, and the principles of respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and the political independence of states.

    It reaffirms unwavering commitment to abide by international law and prioritize the peaceful settlement of disputes through dialogue.

    It recognizes the role of the United Nations in preventive diplomacy.

    It reinforces the need to uphold all human rights — civil, political, economic, social and cultural.

    It calls for the meaningful inclusion of women and youth in all peace processes.
    And it specifically calls on this Council to ensure that peace operations are guided by clear and sequenced mandates that are realistic and achievable — with viable exit strategies and transition plans.

    But the Pact does even more for peace.

    Full remarks: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2025-02-18/secretary-generals-remarks-the-security-council-the-maintenance-of-international-peace-and-security-practicing-multilateralism-reforming-and-improving-global-governance

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HHTYrcsFJCE

    MIL OSI Video –

  • MIL-OSI: Global-e Reports Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2024 Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    PETAH-TIKVA, Israel, Feb. 19, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Global-e Online Ltd. (Nasdaq: GLBE) the platform powering global direct-to-consumer e-commerce, today reported financial results for the fourth quarter of 2024 and full year 2024.

    “2024 was yet another record-breaking year for Global-e, and it came to a great close with a fourth quarter which was our strongest quarter ever, as we continued to execute on our strategy and further solidify Global-e’s leadership position in the global e-commerce space,” said Amir Schlachet, Founder and CEO of Global-e. “In addition, we achieved two important financial milestones during the quarter. For the first time in our journey, we crossed the 20% Adjusted EBITDA Margin mark, which was the long-term target we set for ourselves at the IPO, and we reached GAAP profitability for the first time as a public company; a testament to our relentless focus on delivering fast yet durable growth.”

    “As we head into 2025, we remain as committed as ever to continue on our growth path, deliver more cutting-edge and market-leading solutions to our merchants and seize more and more of the great opportunities that lie ahead of us in the world of global e-commerce. In 2025, we also expect to achieve three additional key financial milestones: surpass the 20% Adjusted EBITDA Margin mark on a full year basis, achieve annual GAAP profitability, and most importantly, for the first time, cross an annual run-rate of $1 billion in Revenues.”

    Q4 2024 Financial Results

    • GMV1 in the fourth quarter of 2024 was $1,713 million, an increase of 44% year over year
    • Revenue in the fourth quarter of 2024 was $262.9 million, an increase of 42% year over year, of which service fees revenue was $117.3 million and fulfillment services revenue was $145.6 million
    • Non-GAAP gross profit2 in the fourth quarter of 2024 was $120.9 million, an increase of 53% year over year. GAAP gross profit in the fourth quarter of 2024 was $118.7 million
    • Non-GAAP gross margin2 in the fourth quarter of 2024 was 46%, an increase of 330 basis points from 42.7% in the fourth quarter of 2023. GAAP gross margin in the fourth quarter of 2024 was 45.1%
    • Adjusted EBITDA3 in the fourth quarter of 2024 was $57.1 million compared to $35.2 million in the fourth quarter of 2023, an increase of 62% year over year
    • Net profit in the fourth quarter of 2024 was $1.5 million
    • Net cash provided by operating activities in the fourth quarter of 2024 was $129.3 million, while capital expenditures totaled $0.5 million, leading to free cash flow of $128.8 million

    FY 2024 Financial Results

    • GMV1 for the full year was $4,858 million, an increase of 37% year over year
    • Revenue for the full year was $752.8 million, an increase of 32% year over year, of which service fees revenue was $350.3 million and fulfillment services revenue was $402.5 million
    • Non-GAAP gross profit2 for the full year was $349.4 million, an increase of 43% year over year. GAAP gross profit for the full year was $339.4 million
    • Non-GAAP gross margin2 for the full year was 46.4%, an increase of 350 basis points from 42.9% in 2023. GAAP gross margin for the full year was 45.1%
    • Adjusted EBITDA3 for the full year was $140.8 million compared to $92.7 million in 2023, an increase of 51.8% year over year
    • Net loss for the full year was $75.5 million
    • Net cash provided by operating activities in the full year was $169.4 million, while capital expenditures totaled $2.3 million, leading to free cash flow of $167.1 million

    Recent Business Highlights

    • Throughout 2024, our existing merchant base continued to stay and grow with us, as reflected in our annual enterprise NDR rate of 119% and GDR rate of 93.5%. GDR and NDR were negatively impacted by the out of the ordinary bankruptcy of Ted Baker and by several Borderfree merchants that chose not to re-platform to the Global-e platform. NDR and GDR excluding the out of the ordinary churn for 2024 is close to 123% and 97%, respectively
    • Recently launched with Logitech, one of the world’s largest and most innovative providers of computer peripherals and input devices, gaming accessories, audio and video gear and smart home device
    • On-boarded many additional new merchants located around the globe and trading in various verticals, including:
      • North America – shapewear brand Spanx, Thursday Boots, and the web store of famous fashion designer Tom Ford
      • UK and Europe – Spanish brand Tous, Italian fashion brand Slowear, UK footwear brand Phoebe Philo, German brand IvyOak, Swiss running gear brand Compressport, famous Austrian lingerie brand Triumph, French brands ZAPA and MOLLI, and the Finish brand HURTTA
      • APAC – Japanese brands Komehyo, one of Japan’s largest retailers of second-hand goods, Kyoto-based wristwatch brand Kuoe, novelty brands Mofusand and Taito, and the tailored shirt brand Kamakura Shirts, as well as the renowned Korean cosmetics brand Depology, and Australian fashion brands Zoe Kratzmann and SECONDLEFT
    • Expanded to new lanes with existing merchants – added Romania and Croatia to the markets we operate for Adidas, went live with a new outlet site for John Smedley, and added Strellson, the third brand to go live with us out of the Swiss Holy Fashion Group
    • Shopify Managed Markets – continued joint work with Shopify to add new features and functionalities to the Managed Markets offering, aimed at making it applicable to a wider range of merchants on the Shopify platform

    Q1 2025 and Full Year Outlook

    Global-e is introducing first quarter and full year guidance as follows:

        Q12025   FY 2025
        (in millions)
    GMV(1) $1,210 – $1,250   $6,190 – $6,490
    Revenue $184.5 – $191.5   $917 – $967
    Adjusted EBITDA(3) $29.5 – $33.5   $179 – $199

    1 Gross Merchandise Value (GMV) is a key operating metric. See “Non-GAAP Financial Measures and Key Operating Metrics” for additional information regarding this metric.
    2 Non-GAAP Gross profit and Non-GAAP gross margin are non-GAAP financial measures. See “Non-GAAP Financial Measures and Key Operating Metrics” for additional information regarding this metric.
    3 Adjusted EBITDA is a non-GAAP financial measure. See “Non-GAAP Financial Measures” for additional information regarding this metric, including the reconciliations to Operating Profit (Loss), its most directly comparable GAAP financial measure. The Company is unable to provide a reconciliation of Adjusted EBITDA to Operating Profit (Loss), its most directly comparable GAAP financial measure, on a forward-looking basis without unreasonable effort because items that impact this GAAP financial measure are not within the Company’s control and/or cannot be reasonably predicted. These items may include, but are not limited to, share-based compensation expenses. Such information may have a significant, and potentially unpredictable impact on the Company’s future financial results.

    Conference Call Information

    Global-e will host a conference call at 8:00 a.m. ET on Wednesday, February 19, 2025.
    The call will be available, live, to interested parties by dialing:

    United States/Canada Toll Free:  1-800-717-1738
    International Toll: 1-646-307-1865

    A live webcast will also be available in the Investor Relations section of Global-e’s website at: https://investors.global-e.com/news-events/events-presentations

    Approximately two hours after completion of the live call, an archived version of the webcast will be available on the Investor Relations section of the Company’s web site and will remain available for approximately 30 calendar days.

    Non-GAAP Financial Measures and Key Operating Metrics

    To supplement Global-e’s financial information presented in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles in the United States of America, or GAAP, Global-e considers certain financial measures and key performance metrics that are not prepared in accordance with GAAP including:

    • Non-GAAP gross profit, which Global-e defines as gross profit adjusted for amortization of acquired intangibles. Non-GAAP gross margin is calculated as Non-GAAP gross profit divided by revenues
    • Adjusted EBITDA, which Global-e defines as operating profit (loss) adjusted for stock-based compensation expenses, depreciation and amortization, commercial agreements amortization, amortization of acquired intangibles and merger related contingent consideration.
    • Free cash flow, which Global-e defines as net cash provided by operating activities less purchase of property and equipment.

    Global-e also uses Gross Merchandise Value (GMV) as a key operating metric. Gross Merchandise Value or GMV is defined as the combined amount we collect from the shopper and the merchant for all components of a given transaction, including products, duties and taxes and shipping.

    The aforementioned key performance indicators and non-GAAP financial measures are used, in conjunction with GAAP measures, by management and our board of directors to assess our performance, including the preparation of Global-e’s annual operating budget and quarterly forecasts, for financial and operational decision-making, to evaluate the effectiveness of Global-e’s business strategies, and as a means to evaluate period-to-period comparisons. These measures are frequently used by analysts, investors and other interested parties to evaluate companies in our industry. We believe that these non-GAAP financial measures are appropriate measures of operating performance because they remove the impact of certain items that we believe do not directly reflect our core operations, and permit investors to view performance using the same tools that we use to budget, forecast, make operating and strategic decisions, and evaluate historical performance.

    Global-e’s definition of Non-GAAP measures may differ from the definition used by other companies and therefore comparability may be limited. In addition, other companies may not publish these metrics or similar metrics. Furthermore, these metrics have certain limitations in that they do not include the impact of certain expenses that are reflected in our consolidated statement of operations that are necessary to run our business. Thus, Non-GAAP measures should be considered in addition to, not as substitutes for, or in isolation from, measures prepared in accordance with GAAP.

    For more information on the non-GAAP financial measures, please see the reconciliation tables provided below. The accompanying reconciliation tables have more details on the GAAP financial measures that are most directly comparable to non-GAAP financial measures and the related reconciliations between these financial measures.

    Cautionary Note Regarding Forward Looking Statements

    This press release contains estimates and forward-looking statements within the meaning of the U.S. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. We intend such forward-looking statements to be covered by the safe harbor provisions for forward-looking statements as contained in Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”). All statements contained in this press release other than statements of historical fact, including, without limitation, statements regarding our future strategy and projected revenue, GMV, Adjusted EBITDA and other future financial and operational results, growth strategy and plans and objectives of management for future operations, including, among others, expansion in new and existing markets, the launch of large enterprise merchants, and our ongoing partnership with Shopify, are forward-looking statements. As the words “may,” “might,” “will,” “could,” “would,” “should,” “expect,” “plan,” “anticipate,” “intend,” “target,” “seek,” “believe,” “estimate,” “predict,” “potential,” “continue,” “contemplate,” “possible” or the negative of these terms or other similar expressions are intended to identify forward-looking statements, though not all forward-looking statements use these words or expressions. Forward-looking statements are predictions, projections and other statements about future events that are based on current expectations and assumptions and, as a result, are subject to risks and uncertainties. Global-e believes there is a reasonable basis for its expectations and beliefs, but they are inherently uncertain. Many factors could cause actual future events to differ materially from the forward-looking statements in this announcement, including but not limited to, our rapid growth and growth rates in recent periods may not be indicative of future growth; the ability to retain merchants or the GMV generated by such merchants; the ability to retain existing, and attract new merchants; our business acquisitions and ability to effectively integrate acquired businesses; our ability to anticipate merchant needs or develop or acquire new functionality or enhance our existing platforms to meet those needs; our ability to implement and use artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies successfully; our ability to compete in our industry; our reliance on third-parties, including our ability to realize the benefits of any strategic alliances, joint ventures, or partnership arrangements and to integrate our platforms with third-party platforms; our ability to develop or maintain the functionality of our platforms, including real or perceived errors, failures, vulnerabilities, or bugs in our platforms; our history of net losses; our ability to manage our growth and manage expansion into additional markets; increased attention to ESG matters and our ability to manage such matters; our ability to accommodate increased volumes during peak seasons and events; our ability to effectively expand our marketing and sales capabilities; our expectations regarding our revenue, expenses and operations; our ability to operate internationally; our reliance on third-party services, including third-party providers of cross-docking services and third-party data centers, in our platforms and services and harm to our reputation by our merchants’ or third-party service providers’ unethical business practices; our ability to adapt to changes in mobile devices, systems, applications, or web browsers that may degrade the functionality of our platforms; our operation as a merchant of record for sales conducted using our platform; regulatory requirements and additional fees related to payment transactions through our e-commerce platforms could be costly and difficult to comply with; compliance and third-party risks related to anti-money laundering, anti-corruption, anti-bribery, regulations, economic sanctions and export control laws and import regulations and restrictions; our business’s reliance on the personal importation model; our ability to securely store personal information of merchants and shoppers; increases in shipping rates; fluctuations in the exchange rate of foreign currencies has impacted and could continue to impact our results of operations; our ability to offer high quality support; our ability to expand the number of merchants using our platforms and increase our GMV and to enhance our reputation and awareness of our platforms; our dependency on the continued use of the internet for commerce; our ability to adapt to emerging or evolving regulatory developments, changing laws, regulations, standards and technological changes related to privacy, data protection, data security and machine learning technology and generative artificial intelligence evolves; the effect of the situation in Ukraine on our business, financial condition and results of operations; our role in the fulfilment chain of the merchants, which may cause third parties to confuse us with the merchants; our ability to establish and protect intellectual property rights; and our use of open-source software which may pose particular risks to our proprietary software technologies; our dependency on our executive officers and other key employees and our ability to hire and retain skilled key personnel, including our ability to enforce non-compete agreements we enter into with our employees; litigation for a variety of claims which we may be subject to; the adoption by merchants of a direct to consumer model; our anticipated cash needs and our estimates regarding our capital requirements and our needs for additional financing; our ability to maintain our corporate culture; our ability to maintain an effective system of disclosure controls and internal control over financial reporting; our ability to accurately estimate judgments relating to our critical accounting policies; changes in tax laws or regulations to which we are subject, including the enactment of legislation implementing changes in taxation of international business activities and the adoption of other corporate tax reform policies; requirements to collect sales or other taxes relating to the use of our platforms and services in jurisdictions where we have not historically done so; global events such as war, health pandemics, climate change, macroeconomic events and the recent economic slowdown; risks relating to our ordinary shares, including our share price, the concentration of our share ownership with insiders, our status as a foreign private issuer, provisions of Israeli law and our amended and restated articles of association and actions of activist shareholders; risks related to our incorporation and location in Israel, including risks related to the ongoing war and related hostilities; and the other risks and uncertainties described in Global-e’s Annual Report on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2023, filed with the SEC on March 28, 2024 and other documents filed with or furnished by Global-e from time to time with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”). The foregoing list of factors is not exhaustive. You should carefully consider the foregoing factors. These filings identify and address other important risks and uncertainties that could cause actual events and results to differ materially from those contained in the forward-looking statements. These statements reflect management’s current expectations regarding future events and operating performance and speak only as of the date of this press release. Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date they are made. Readers are cautioned not to put undue reliance on forward-looking statements Although we believe that the expectations reflected in the forward-looking statements are reasonable, we cannot guarantee that future results, levels of activity, performance and events and circumstances reflected in the forward-looking statements will be achieved or will occur. We undertake no obligation to update any forward-looking statements made in this press release to reflect events or circumstances after the date of this press release or to reflect new information or the occurrence of unanticipated events, except as required by law. We may not actually achieve the plans, intentions or expectations disclosed in our forward-looking statements, and you should not place undue reliance on our forward-looking statements.

    About Global-E Online Ltd.

    Global-e (Nasdaq: GLBE) is the world’s leading platform enabling and accelerating global, Direct-To-Consumer e-commerce. The chosen partner of over 1,000 brands and retailers across the United States, EMEA and APAC, Global-e makes selling internationally as simple as selling domestically. The company enables merchants to increase the conversion of international traffic into sales by offering online shoppers in over 200 destinations worldwide a seamless, localized shopping experience. Global-e’s end-to-end e-commerce solutions combine best-in-class localization capabilities, big-data best-practice business intelligence models, streamlined international logistics and vast global e-commerce experience, enabling international shoppers to buy seamlessly online and retailers to sell to, and from, anywhere in the world. For more information, please visit: www.global-e.com.

    Investor Contact:
    Erica Mannion or Mike Funari
    Sapphire Investor Relations, LLC
    IR@global-e.com 
    +1 617-542-6180

    Press Contact:
    Sarah Schloss
    Headline Media
    Globale@headline.media 
    +1 786-233-7684 

    Global-E Online Ltd.
    CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS
    (In thousands)    		  
        Period Ended  
        December 31,     December 31,  
        2023     2024  
              (Unaudited)  
    Assets                
    Current assets:                
    Cash and cash equivalents   $ 200,081     $ 250,773  
    Short-term deposits     96,939       187,322  
    Accounts receivable, net     27,841       41,171  
    Prepaid expenses and other current assets     63,967       84,613  
    Marketable securities     20,403       36,345  
    Funds receivable, including cash in banks     111,232       122,984  
    Total current assets     520,463       723,208  
    Property and equipment, net     10,236       10,440  
    Operating lease right-of-use assets     23,052       24,429  
    Long term deposits     3,552       3,786  
    Deferred contract acquisition costs, noncurrent     2,668       3,787  
    Other assets, noncurrent     4,078       4,527  
    Commercial agreement asset   192,721       66,527  
    Goodwill     367,566       367,566  
    Intangible assets     78,024       59,212  
    Total long-term assets     681,897       540,274  
    Total assets   $ 1,202,360     $ 1,263,482  
    Liabilities and Shareholders’ Equity                
    Current liabilities:                
    Accounts payable   $ 50,943     $ 79,559  
    Accrued expenses and other current liabilities     107,306       141,551  
    Funds payable to Customers     111,232       122,984  
    Short term operating lease liabilities     4,031       4,347  
    Total current liabilities     273,512       348,441  
    Long-term liabilities:                
    Deferred tax liabilities     6,507       –  
    Long term operating lease liabilities     19,291       20,510  
    Other long-term liabilities     1,071       1,098  
    Total liabilities   $ 300,381     $ 370,049  
                     
    Shareholders’ deficit:                
    Share capital and additional paid-in capital     1,360,250       1,425,317  
    Accumulated comprehensive income     (1,420 )     515  
    Accumulated deficit     (456,851 )     (532,399 )
    Total shareholders’ (deficit) equity     901,979       893,433  
    Total liabilities and shareholders’ equity   $ 1,202,360     $ 1,263,482  
    Global-E Online Ltd.
    CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS
    (In thousands, except share and per share data)    		  
        Three Months Ended   Year Ended  
        December 31,   December 31,  
        2023     2024     2023       2024  
        (Unaudited)           (Unaudited)  
    Revenue   $ 185,401     $ 262,912     $ 569,946       $ 752,764  
    Cost of revenue     109,080       144,253       336,343         413,331  
    Gross profit     76,321       118,659       233,603         339,433  
                                     
    Operating expenses:                                
    Research and development     25,169       28,284       97,568         105,487  
    Sales and marketing     58,756       70,936       217,035         250,661  
    General and administrative     15,451       14,257       56,059         51,213  
    Total operating expenses, net     99,376       113,477       370,662         407,361  
    Operating profit (loss)     (23,055 )     5,182       (137,059 )       (67,928 )
    Financial expenses (income), net     (5,010 )     6,073       (5,262 )       11,465  
    Loss before income taxes     (18,045 )     (891 )     (131,797 )       (79,393 )
    Income tax (benefit) expenses     4,055       (2,400 )     2,008         (3,845 )
    Net profit (loss) attributable to ordinary shareholders   $ (22,100 )   $ 1,509     $ (133,805 )     $ (75,548 )
    Net profit (loss) per share attributable to ordinary shareholders, basic   $ (0.13 )   $ 0.01     $ (0.81 )     $ (0.45 )
    Net profit (loss) per share attributable to ordinary shareholders, diluted   $ (0.13 )   $ 0.01     $ (0.81 )     $ (0.45 )
    Weighted-average shares used in computing net loss per share attributable to ordinary shareholders, basic     165,626,904       168,419,800       164,353,909         167,323,350  
    Weighted-average shares used in computing net loss per share attributable to ordinary shareholders, diluted     165,626,904       175,674,929       164,353,909         167,323,350  
    Global-E Online Ltd.
    CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF CASH FLOWS
    (In thousands)
        Three Months Ended     Year Ended
        December 31,     December 31,
        2023     2024     2023     2024  
        (Unaudited)             (Unaudited)  
    Operating activities                                
    Net profit (loss)   $ (22,100 )   $ 1,509     $ (133,805 )   $ (75,548 )
    Adjustments to reconcile net profit (loss) to net cash provided by operating activities:                                
    Depreciation and amortization     489       547       1,788       2,131  
    Share-based compensation expenses     12,180       9,538       44,960       39,158  
    Commercial agreement asset     37,433       37,433       150,451       148,594  
    Amortization of intangible assets     5,091       4,402       20,434       18,812  
    Unrealized loss (gain) on foreign currency     (3,011 )     3,554       (1,901 )     4,468  
    Changes in accrued interest and exchange rate on short-term deposits     72       (1,373 )     (416 )     (1,329 )
    Changes in accrued interest and exchange rate on long-term deposits     (144 )     364       (255 )     200  
    Accounts receivable     (14,390 )     15,925       (11,417 )     (13,330 )
    Prepaid expenses and other assets     61       (24,164 )     (11,736 )     (18,019 )
    Funds receivable     (9,038 )     8,726       (11,074 )     (3,205 )
    Long-term receivables     (1,497 )     51       (339 )   551  
    Funds payable to customers     40,817       2,564       33,107       11,752  
    Operating lease ROU assets     786       991       3,230       3,691  
    Deferred contract acquisition costs     (772 )     (322 )     (1,207 )     (1,382 )
    Accounts payable     18,438       37,176       (1,277 )     28,617  
    Accrued expenses and other liabilities     25,345       35,945       30,625       34,272  
    Deferred taxes     3,635       (2,592 )     120       (6,507 )
    Operating lease liabilities     99       (987 )     (3,067 )     (3,533 )
    Net cash provided by operating activities     93,494       129,287       108,222       169,393  
    Investing activities                                
    Investment in marketable securities     (851 )     (18,331 )     (3,728 )     (21,128 )
    Proceeds from marketable securities   –     2,028         671       4,988  
    Investment in short-term deposits     (43,250 )     (77,848 )     (175,237 )     (269,601 )
    Proceeds from short-term deposits     34,318       22,298       125,068       180,548  
    Purchases of long-term investments     (4 )     (307 )     (82 )     (1,459 )
    Proceeds from long-term deposits     10       24       10       24  
    Purchases of property and equipment     (926 )     (482 )     (1,741)       (2,335 )
    Net cash used in investing activities     (10,703 )     (72,618 )     (55,039 )     (108,963 )
    Financing activities                                
    Proceeds from exercise of Warrants to ordinary shares     –     3       22     5  
    Proceeds from exercise of share options     244       1,632       1,969       3,271  
    Net cash provided by financing activities     244       1,635       1,991       3,276  
    Exchange rate differences on balances of cash, cash equivalents and restricted cash     3,011       (3,554 )     1,901       (4,468 )
    Net Increase in cash, cash equivalents, and restricted cash     86,046       54,750       57,075       59,238  
    Cash and cash equivalents and restricted cash—beginning of period     182,551       273,086       211,522       268,597  
    Cash and cash equivalents and restricted cash—end of period   $ 268,597     $ 327,835     $ 268,597     $ 327,835  
    Global-E Online Ltd.
    SELECTED OTHER DATA
    (In thousands)
    		  
        Three Months Ended     Year Ended  
        December 31,     December 31,  
        2023     2024     2023     2024  
        (Unaudited)     (Unaudited)  
    Key performance metrics            
    Gross Merchandise Value     1,189,467               1,712,903               3,557,444               4,857,970          
    Adjusted EBITDA (a)     35,178               57,102               92,735               140,767          
                                                                     
    Revenue by Category                                                                
    Service fees     89,936       49 %     117,268       45 %     262,255       46 %     350,311       47 %
    Fulfillment services     95,465       51 %     145,644       55 %     307,692       54 %     402,453       53 %
    Total revenue   $ 185,401       100 %   $ 262,912       100 %   $ 569,946       100 %   $ 752,764       100 %
                                                                     
    Revenue by merchant outbound region                                                                
    United States     94,887       51 %     146,250       56 %     285,619       50 %     399,596       53 %
    United Kingdom     54,962       30 %     55,807       21 %     173,584       30 %     182,904       24 %
    European Union     29,421       16 %     44,469       17 %     92,566       16 %     125,547       17 %
    Israel     479       0 %     1,671       1 %     1,806       0 %     2,746       0 %
    Other   5,652     3 %     14,715       5 %   16,371     3 %     41,971       6 %
    Total revenue   $ 185,401       100 %   $ 262,912       100 %   $ 569,946       100 %   $ 752,764       100 %

    (a) See reconciliation to adjusted EBITDA table

    Global-E Online Ltd.
    RECONCILIATION TO Non-GAAP GROSS PROFIT
    (In thousands)    		  
        Three Months Ended     Year Ended  
        December 31,     December 31,  
        2023     2024     2023     2024  
      (Unaudited)
    Gross Profit     76,321       118,659       233,603       339,433  
                                     
    Amortization of acquired intangibles included in cost of revenue     2,796       2,198       11,183       9,994  
    Non-GAAP gross profit     79,117       120,857       244,786       349,427  
    Global-E Online Ltd.
    RECONCILIATION TO ADJUSTED EBITDA
    (In thousands)    		  
        Three Months Ended     Year Ended  
        December 31,     December 31,  
        2023     2024     2023     2024    
        (Unaudited)  
    Operating profit (loss)     (23,055 )     5,182       (137,059 )     (67,928 )  
    (1) Stock-based compensation:                                
    Cost of revenue     186       275       639       929    
    Research and development     6,962       4,153       26,266       17,291    
    Selling and marketing     1,238       1,528       4,259       5,836    
    General and administrative     3,794       3,582       13,796       15,102    
    Total stock-based compensation     12,180       9,538       44,960       39,158    
                                     
    (2) Depreciation and amortization     489       547       1,788       2,131    
                                     
    (3) Commercial agreement asset amortization   37,433       37,433     150,451       148,594    
                                 
    (4) Amortization of acquired intangibles   5,091       4,402     20,434       18,812    
                                 
    (5) Merger related contingent consideration   3,040       –     12,161       –    
                                 
    Adjusted EBITDA     35,178       57,102       92,735       140,767    
    Global-E Online Ltd.
    RECONCILIATION TO FREE CASH FLOW
    (In thousands)
        Three Months Ended   Year Ended
        December 31,   December 31,
        2023     2024     2023     2024  
      (Unaudited)
    Net cash provided by operating activities     93,434       129,287       108,222       169,393  
    Less:                          
    Purchase of property and equipment     (926 )     (482 )     (1,741 )     (2,335 )
    Free cash flow     92,508       128,805       106,481       167,058  

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Ukraine must have a central role in shaping its future: UK Statement to the OSCE

    Source: United Kingdom – Government Statements

    Politico-Military Counsellor Ankur Narayan says that the UK’s priority is to ensure Ukraine is in the strongest possible position for negotiations.

    Thank you, Mr Chair. The UK’s commitment to supporting Ukraine is unwavering. Our support is not only about providing military assistance, which remains crucial in ensuring Ukraine’s ability to defend itself, but also about standing by Ukraine as it seeks a just and lasting peace. As we take stock, it seems timely to reiterate the importance of the principles of the Helsinki Final Act.

    Principle I includes the phrase: ‘Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty, including the right to belong or not to belong to international organisations.’

    On 14 February the Prime Minister yet again reaffirmed the UK’s commitment to Ukraine’s irreversible path to NATO and has since called for ongoing support from Allies, as agreed at the Washington Summit last year. Ukraine’s aspiration to join NATO reflects its desire for security and recognition of shared values on democracy, rule of law, and human rights. The UK believes Ukraine’s NATO membership would strengthen the Alliance and contribute to European stability and security. NATO has shown its commitment to Ukraine’s security through military support, training, and intelligence-sharing, and remains determined to assist Ukraine in defending its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

    Principle III includes the phrase: ‘Inviolability of frontiers. States will refrain from any demand for, or act of, seizure and usurpation of part or all of the territory of any participating State.’

    Principle IV includes the phrase: ‘Territorial integrity of States. States will refrain from making each other’s territory the object of military occupation or other measures of force in contravention of international law. No such occupation or acquisition will be recognized as legal.’

    We all want to reach a durable peace as soon as possible, no one more so than Ukraine. Russia could end this war tomorrow, if Russia chose to respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and withdraw its troops.  A just and lasting peace is only possible if we continue to show strength and provide Ukraine with the support it needs to defend itself against continued Russian aggression.  The UK stands firmly with Ukraine in its struggle for freedom, sovereignty, and security.

    Principle V includes the phrase: ‘Peaceful settlement of disputes. States will use means such as negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, or other peaceful means of their choice, including any settlement procedure agreed to in advance of disputes to which they are parties.’

    We understand that peace cannot be achieved through force alone but through a comprehensive, diplomatic process that respects the rights and aspirations of the Ukrainian people. And we must be clear that peace cannot come at any cost. It is vital that Ukraine’s voice is at the heart of any talks. President Zelensky and the Ukrainian people have shown the most extraordinary resilience. This is why the UK continues to work closely with its allies to ensure Ukraine is in the strongest possible position for legitimate negotiation when the time comes.

    Peace comes through strength. This is the moment for us all to step up – and the PM has made clear that the UK will do so, because it is the right thing to do for the values we hold dear, and because it is fundamental to our own national security. Ukraine needs strong security guarantees, further lethal aid, and a sovereign future. The UK is ready to play a leading role in accelerating work on security guarantees for Ukraine. This includes further support for Ukraine’s military – where the UK has already committed £3 billion a year until at least 2030.

    In closing, it is critical to note that Ukraine is still fighting with immense courage. Our priority is to ensure Ukraine is in the strongest possible position for negotiations, and we believe Ukraine’s future is in NATO, as a member of a secure and stable Europe. The UK remains resolute in its belief that Ukraine must have a central role in shaping its future. This illegal war instigated by Russia can end only when Russia chooses to withdraw its forces and cease its unlawful aggression, allowing Ukraine to chart its own course free from external threats. At this crucial moment, we will not step back but step up our support to Ukraine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Updates to this page

    Published 19 February 2025

    Invasion of Ukraine

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –