Category: Ukraine

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Foreign Minister Lin hosts welcome luncheon for Ukrainian parliamentary delegation

    Source: Republic of China Taiwan 3

    Foreign Minister Lin hosts welcome luncheon for Ukrainian parliamentary delegation

    Date:2024-10-04
    Data Source:Department of European Affairs

    October 4, 2024  
    No. 329  

    Minister of Foreign Affairs Lin Chia-lung hosted a luncheon on October 4 to welcome a delegation of Ukrainian parliamentarians led by MP Mykola Kniazhytskyi, Cochair of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC), and MP Akhtem Chyihoz. The two sides exchanged views on the Russia-Ukraine war, the peaceful development of Ukraine, and potential cooperation projects. 
     
    Minister Lin said that although Taiwan and Ukraine were geographically distant, both nations stood on the front line of democratic defense against the expansion of authoritarian regimes. He commended Ukraine for demonstrating resilience as well as defense and disaster response capabilities in its war against Russia, adding that this served as a valuable lesson and inspiration to all democratic countries. Minister Lin stated that Taiwan had actively assisted Ukraine with rebuilding critical infrastructure, schools, churches, and hospitals in the spirit of humanitarianism. He pledged that Taiwan would continue to support Ukraine through this difficult time. 
     
    The members of the Ukrainian delegation thanked the government of Taiwan and expressed appreciation for Taiwan’s humanitarian assistance and support. They stated that the people of Ukraine were deeply touched by Taiwan’s goodwill. Noting that Taiwan and Ukraine shared the core values of freedom, democracy, and human rights, they expressed the hope that the two countries would continue to support each other and cooperate on the basis of friendship and mutual trust. 
     
    Both Taiwan and Ukraine enjoy the common values shared by democracies and are faced with authoritarian expansionism. Since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war in February 2022, Taiwan has extended consistent and unwavering support to Ukraine, staunchly backing democracy and freedom. Taiwan will continue to work with like-minded nations to assist Ukraine in overcoming adversity and returning to normal life as soon as possible. (E)

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Foreign Secretary Oral Statement on the Chagos Islands – 7 October 2024

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Foreign Secretary, David Lammy, provided an update to the House of Commons on the conclusion of negotiations on the exercise of sovereignty over the British Indian Ocean Territory.

    With permission, Mr Speaker, I will make a statement on the conclusion of negotiations on the exercise of sovereignty over the British Indian Ocean Territory. 

    On Thursday the third of October, my Right Honourable Friend the Prime Minister and Mauritian Prime Minister Jugnauth made an historic announcement.

    After two years of negotiations,…

    …and decades of disagreement,…

    …the UK and Mauritius have reached a political agreement on the future of the British Indian Ocean Territory.

    Mr Speaker, the treaty is neither signed nor ratified.

    But I wanted to update the House on the conclusion of formal negotiations at the earliest opportunity.

    Members will appreciate the context.

    Since its creation, the Territory and the joint UK-US military base on Diego Garcia has had a contested existence.

    In recent years, the threat has risen significantly.

    Coming into office, the status quo was clearly not sustainable.

    A binding judgement against the UK seemed inevitable.

    It was just a matter of time before our only choices would have been abandoning the base altogether.

    Or breaking international law.

    If you oppose the deal, which of these alternatives do you prefer?

    Doing this deal – on our terms – was the sole way to maintain the full and effective operations of the base into the future.

    Mr Speaker, this must be why, in November 2022, the then Foreign Secretary, the Right Honourable Member for Braintree, initiated sovereignty negotiations.

    It’s also why my immediate predecessor, Lord Cameron of Chipping Norton, ultimately continued with those talks.

    Under the previous Government there were eleven rounds of negotiations, the last one held just weeks before the General Election was called.

    So, in July, this Government inherited unfinished business.

    Where a threat was real, and inaction was not a strategy.

    Inaction posed several acute risks to the UK.

    First, it threatened the UK-US base.

    From countering malign Iranian activity in the Middle East to ensuring a free and open Indo-Pacific, it is critical for our national security.

    Without surety of tenure, no base can operate effectively – nor truly deter our enemies.

    Critical investment decisions were already being delayed.

    Second, it impacted on our relationship with the US,…

    …who neither wanted nor welcomed the legal uncertainty,…

    …and strongly encouraged us to strike a deal.   

    I am a trans-Atlanticist.

    We had to protect this important relationship.

    And third, it undermined our international standing.

    We are showing that what we mean is what we say on international law and desire for partnerships with the Global South.

    This strengthens our arguments when it comes to issues like Ukraine or the South China Sea.

    Mr Speaker, further legal wrangling served nobody’s interests but our adversaries’.

    In a more volatile world,…

    …a deal benefited us all,…

    …the UK, US and Mauritius.

    This Government therefore made striking the best possible deal a priority.

    We appointed Jonathan Powell.

    As the Prime Minister’s Special Envoy for these negotiations, he has worked closely with a brilliant team of civil servants and lawyers.

    Their goal was a way forward which serves UK national interests,…

    …respects the interests of our partners,…

    …and upholds the international rule of law.

    This agreement fulfils these objectives.

    It is strongly supported by partners,…

    …with Present Biden going so far as to ‘applaud’ our achievement within minutes of the announcement!

    Secretary Blinken and Secretary Austin have also backed this ‘successful outcome’ which ‘reaffirms [our] special defence relationship’.

    And the agreement has been welcomed by the Indian government and commended by the UN Secretary-General.

    In return for agreeing to Mauritian sovereignty over the entire islands, including Diego Garcia,…

    …the UK-US base has an uncontested long-term future.  

    Base operations will remain under full UK control well into the next century.

    Mauritius will authorise us to exercise their sovereign rights and authorities in respect of Diego Garcia.

    This is initially for 99 years, but the UK has the right to extend this.

    And we have full Mauritian backing for robust security arrangements…

    …including preventing foreign armed forces from accessing or establishing themselves on the outer islands.

    The base’s long-term future is therefore more secure under this agreement than without it.

    If this were not the case, I doubt the White House, State Department or Pentagon would have praised the deal so effusively.

    This agreement will be underpinned by a financial settlement that is acceptable to both sides. 

    Members will be aware the Government does not normally reveal payments for our military bases overseas.

    And so it would be inappropriate to publicise further details of these arrangements at this stage.

    Mr Speaker, the agreement also recognises the rights and wrongs of the past.

    The whole House would agree that the manner in which Chagossians were forcibly removed in the 1960s was deeply wrong and regrettable.

    Mauritius is now free to implement a resettlement programme to islands other than Diego Garcia.

    The UK and Mauritius have also committed to support Chagossians’ welfare,…

    …establishing a new Trust Fund capitalised by the UK…

    …and providing additional Government support to Chagossians in the UK.

    And the UK will maintain the pathway for Chagossians to obtain British Citizenship.

    Furthermore, Mauritius and the UK will now establish a new programme of visits to the archipelago for Chagossians. 

    This agreement also ushers in a new era in our relations with Mauritius.

    A Commonwealth nation and Africa’s leading democracy.

    We have agreed to intensify cooperation on our shared priorities, including security, growth and the environment. 

    The agreement ensures continued protection of these islands’ unique environment, home to over two hundred species of coral and over eight hundred species of fish.

    Finally Mr Speaker, I want to reassure the House,…

    …and all members of the UK family worldwide,…

    …that this agreement does not signal any change in policy to Britain’s other Overseas Territories.

    British sovereignty of the Falkland Islands, Gibraltar and the Sovereign Base Areas is not up for negotiation.

    The situations are not comparable.

    This, Mr Speaker, has been acknowledged across our Overseas Territories.

    Fabian Picardo, Chief Minister of Gibraltar, vocally supported this agreement…

    …stating that there is “no possible read across” to Gibraltar on the issue of sovereignty.

    Similarly, the Governor of the Falklands has confirmed that the historic contexts of the Chagos Archipelago and Falklands are “very different”.

    The Government remains firmly committed to modern partnerships with our Overseas Territories based on mutual consent.

    After Mauritian elections, the Government will move towards treaty signature.

    And it is then our intention to pursue ratification in 2025,…

    …by submitting the Treaty and a Bill to this House for scrutiny.

    This is a historic moment, a victory for diplomacy.

    We have saved the base.

    We have secured Britain’s national interests for the long-term.

    I commend this statement to the House.

    Updates to this page

    Published 7 October 2024

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI USA: Speaker Johnson Makes Multiple Sunday Show Appearances

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Representative Mike Johnson (LA-04)

    This morning, Speaker Johnson joined George Stephanopoulos on ABC’s This Week and Shannon Bream on Fox News Sunday to discuss the federal response to Hurricane Helene, standing with Israel, and the need keep the 2024 election about policy, not politics. 

    Click here to watch ABC interview, here to watch Fox interview

    On the federal response to Hurricane Helene:

    At the federal level, this has been a massive failure, and you could just ask the people there on the ground. I have been there. I was in Georgia, I was in Florida where Hurricane Helene made landfall there on the coast. And then we’ll be going to the hardest hit parts of North Carolina on Wednesday of this week. 

    When you talk to the people who are directly affected, they will tell you that this has been an abject failure. FEMA has lost sight of its core mission I think in so many cases, and the administration has not shown that they were prepared for this eventuality and this terrible disaster. The thing about hurricanes, Shannon, is that we know that they’re coming well in advance. You know, they had more than a week’s notice of this, and yet we still have people who have not been served and even rescued in North Carolina. It is a heartbreaking, tragic, and infuriating situation to have the federal government fail as they have.

    On FEMA funding to house illegal aliens: 

    The streams of funding are different, that is not an untrue statement of course. But the problem is what the American people see and what they’re frustrated by, is that FEMA should be involved – they are the Federal Emergency Management Association – their mission is to help people in times like this of natural disaster, not to be engaged in using any pool of funding from any account for resettling illegal aliens who have come across the border. That’s what the Biden Administration, Kamala Harris, and Secretary Mayorkas have been engaged in this program, and they have spent precious treasure of the American people and taxpayers to do just that. 

    When you see illegals in your local airport and you see them being transported around the country with planes, trains, and automobiles to every community everywhere, every state’s a border stat now because of that. That’s the NGOs, the non-governmental organizations mostly that are transporting those people around. And then they send the receipts to the federal government and Biden Harris and Mayorkas gleefully pay those receipts because they open the border intentionally. The American people are disgusted by this. They’re fed up with it, and so are Republicans in Congress. And it’ll stop after November 5th because we’re going to have unified government with the Republicans in charge and we will bring sanity back to this situation.

    On keeping the 2024 election focused on policy:

    We have to talk about the greatest collection of challenges that this country is facing, probably since World War II, maybe the Civil War. Let’s put all this political nonsense behind us and talk about how we get out of this mess. And I believe the way we do, and I believe a large number of the majority of the American people understand you have to put steady hands at the wheel. You’ve got to put President Donald J. Trump back in the White House because he will bring stability back. 

    He will get the economy going again. He will restore our stature on the world stage at a time where we’re almost on the verge of World War III. You have got to get his leadership back in the White House. That’s why the massive crowds are drawn to these rallies, and that’s why I believe we’re going to win in November.

    On supporting Israel:

    Everything that they have done, since day one, the Biden-Harris Administration, is project weakness on the world stage. And that has put us in the most dangerous situation that we have been in since World War II. Our allies are nervous. Our adversaries do not fear us. They don’t respect us, and that is why China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, terrorists and tyrants around the world are coordinating against us. And that is why you’re seeing the provocations of the war in Israel. 

    Russia moved on Ukraine, China doing all the things they’re doing and threatening Taiwan. None of this happened on President Trump’s watch because he was a steady hand, a strong hand at the wheel. We have got to reelect him so that we can restore the order in the world and project peace through strength again. That’s what we have to get back to, and it cannot happen soon enough.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Defense News: SECNAV Del Toro As-Written Remarks at the Netherlands Armed Forces Day

    Source: United States Navy

    Good evening, everyone! Thank you, Ambassador Tazelaar and General Eichelsheim, for inviting me to join you this evening to celebrate the Netherlands Armed Forces Day, and for providing me with the opportunity to say a few words.

    Shortly after I was sworn into office as the 78th Secretary of the Navy three years ago, I made Enhancing Strategic Partnerships one of our Department’s three enduring priorities.

    This priority has a twofold focus—building new relationships throughout the international community, as well as with industry and academia, and, equally important, reinforcing and expanding our partnerships with allies who have stood by us and with us for decades.

    As founding members of NATO in 1949, the United States and the Netherlands have, for 75 years, stood shoulder-to-shoulder in defense of our shared ideals and freedoms.

    And as we celebrate NATO’s 75th Anniversary this year, I would be remiss if I did not highlight how excited we are to work with your former prime minister, Mark Rutte [ROO-duh], when he assumes his role as NATO’s 14th Secretary General on October 1st. 

    As we consider the global challenges we face today, we are proud to sail, fly, and operate alongside the Dutch Armed Forces.

    In Europe, we are grateful for your commitment to supporting our Ukrainian partners as they fight to restore their territorial and national sovereignty in the wake of Russia’s illegal, unprovoked full-scale invasion three years ago.

    From providing Ukraine with Patriot air defense systems to playing a leading role in training Ukrainian pilots on F-16 fighter jets, your support is invaluable as Ukraine defends itself.

    South of Europe, in the Red Sea, our navies have sailed together in the defense of international commerce, deterring and responding to Houthi attacks against innocent merchant mariners.

    HNLMS Tromp and HNLMS Karel Doorman were both integral to our combined, sustained presence, reassuring our regional allies and partners of our resolve to ensure the safe passage of civilian ships and to keep a sea lane critical to keeping our international economy open.

    And earlier this summer, in the Indo-Pacific, we were pleased to welcome HNLMS Tromp and her sailors to exercise Rim of the Pacific 2024, operating alongside 25,000 personnel from 29 countries.

    As we continue to work together to address the challenges of today and prepare for the future, we look forward to working together and expanding our cooperation in key regions, including the Indo-Pacific.

    Our partnership is indeed global, and we are honored to count the Netherlands as not just an ally, but a friend.

    I am extraordinarily proud to stand here with you this evening and recognize the extraordinary contributions of the Netherlands armed forces, knowing we are committed to peace and security together, united by our common values. 

    Thank you.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Defense News: SECNAV Del Toro As-Written Remarks at the OJAG Change of Command and VADM Crandall Retirement

    Source: United States Navy

    Introduction/Thank You

    Good morning, everyone!

    It is an honor to be here with you this morning to celebrate the service of Vice Admiral Crandall and to welcome Vice Admiral French as he assumes the role of Judge Advocate General of the Navy and command of the Office of the Judge Advocate General.

    First and foremost, I would like to thank Vice Admiral Crandall’s family and friends here with us today.

    To Vice Admiral Crandall’s wife, Barb, thank you for your dedication and all you have sacrificed on behalf of the Navy.

    You have been a valued member of our Navy team since your husband’s time in NROTC over forty years ago.

    I thank you for your selfless volunteer work with the Navy and Marine Corps Relief Society and the Navy Officer’s Spouses Club, along with organizations outside of the Navy such as the annual Alzheimer’s Walk for Life and Christ Church Washington Parish for Calvary Women’s Services.

    All this while working part-time as the office manager and paralegal at a law firm in Burke, Virginia.

    While we are celebrating your husband’s achievements today, we are also celebrating yours, and I wish you the best in your retirement. Congratulations.

    To Mr. Darse Crandall and Mrs. Ruth Ann Crandall, thank you for raising an incredible son who dedicated his career and indeed his life in service of our great Nation.

    Kathie and Amy, it is wonderful to have you here in celebration of your nephew and brother.

    And to Admiral Crandall’s sons William, Andrew, and Edward, thank you for your support throughout your father’s distinguished career.

    I also want to welcome and thank Vice Admiral French’s family for being here today.

    To Vice Admiral French’s children, Lieutenant Caity French and First Lieutenant Andy French, I thank you not only for your unwavering support of your father throughout his career, but also for your own service in the United States Navy and United States Army, respectively.

    As we all know, families truly are the backbone of our armed forces, and I was blessed to have the support of my wife Betty and our sons throughout my career in the Navy and now.

    I welcome and thank our Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Franchetti, for her leadership of our United States Navy.

    General Dunford and General Milley, thank you for your guidance of our service men and women around the world during your tenures.

    Admiral Richardson and Admiral Gilday, thank you for being here and for your leadership of our Sailors and service to this great Nation.

    Deputy Assistant to the President Geltzer, I thank you for your presence today and for your important work at the National Security Council.

    Thank you to General Counsel Krass, former General Counsel Preston, General Counsel Coffey, and General Counsel Beshar for your service within the Department of Defense, for our service members, and for the civilians who support them.

    Welcome to Chief Justice Ohlson, Senior Judge Effron, and Judge Maggs. Thank you for your presence today and your work at the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.

    And to all of our general officers, flag officers, senior enlisted leaders, distinguished visitors, guests, family, and friends: welcome, and thank you for joining us for this ceremony.

    I am humbled and honored to be a part of this momentous occasion today—the changing of command from one accomplished officer to another, and to celebrate the service of Vice Admiral Crandall.

    World Today/OJAG Accomplishments

    Our Navy JAG Corps is essential to ensuring our Sailors are ready.

    And this is vital, because as you have seen and read in the news, we face tremendous uncertainty in the world today.

    For the first time since World War II, we face a comprehensive maritime power—our pacing challenge—in the Indo-Pacific.

    The People’s Republic of China continues to exert its excessive maritime claims through their navy, coast guard, and maritime militia.

    In Europe, Russia is well into the third year of its full-scale and illegal invasion of Ukraine.

    Ukraine is fighting not just for their own liberty and freedom—they are fighting to protect democracy in Europe and indeed around the world.

    In the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, we are working alongside our NATO allies and Middle East Partners to ensure the safety of innocent, civilian mariners and protecting our commercial shipping against Iranian-aligned Houthi attacks.

    Immediately following Hamas’s brutal attack against the people of Israel on October 7th, our Sailors and Marines were on station, the ready integrated force the world needed.

    Our Navy-Marine Corps Team is at the forefront of defending and preserving global stability, and we remain committed to ensuring freedom of navigation of the world’s seas and oceans.

    Our mission would be impossible without the essential work of our Navy JAG Corps. And Vice Admiral Crandall’s leadership of the twenty-three hundred attorneys, enlisted Legalmen, and civilian employees of the Navy JAG Corps community was integral to their many successes.

    Throughout his time as Judge Advocate General of the Navy, Vice Admiral Crandall provided tailored legal advice for high-profile cases and the most sensitive matters affecting the Department of the Navy.

    Under his supervision, the JAG Corps teams adeptly operated a full federal court-martial system, with counsel and judges executing military justice matters from investigation to final appeal.

    He implemented a total overhaul of the Navy’s legal technology, modernizing the Navy’s case management and tracking systems, and implementing deliberate, repeatable processes to ensure these systems continue far into the future.

    While accomplishing all of this, he also led the Navy’s implementation of Congressional and DoD reforms, including establishing and reaching full operational capability for the Office of Special Trial Counsel.

    This worldwide military justice organization prosecutes “covered offenses”—violations of certain Punitive Articles of the UCMJ—and overall increases readiness of our Fleet and Force.

    Throughout his tenure, the JAG Corps has grown significantly, adjusting to unprecedented demands and cases. And throughout this growth and extraordinary change, Vice Admiral Crandall has never forgotten about the Sailors and civilians of the JAG Corps.

    He, in fact, committed to and prioritized strengthening the cooperation between the Department of the Navy’s uniformed and civilian lawyers, and graciously welcomed my General Counsel aboard in early 2022.

    Vice Admiral Crandall, I could create a laundry list of your accomplishments over the past three years as Judge Advocate General of the Navy, but we would be here all day.

    And although I know you may be eager to begin charging by the hour, I’m afraid you’re going to have to take these remarks pro bono.

    The tremendous work you accomplished during your tenure as principal military legal counsel to both myself and the Chief of Naval Operations cannot be overstated.

    Thank you for your tireless pursuit of justice and protection of the law.

    Because of your efforts, experience, and vision, you leave a lasting legacy for others to follow.

    Closing

    I thank you all once again for this opportunity to speak at this incredible occasion.

    Vice Admiral Crandall, thank you for your four decades of honorable and faithful service to the United States Navy and this great Nation. It is my sincere hope that you and Barb enjoy a wonderful and fulfilling retirement.

    Vice Admiral French, I wish you the best of luck as you assume command of the Office of the Judge Advocate General. Admiral Franchetti and I look forward to working with you and benefitting from your sound counsel.

    You should have no trouble tracking me down if there is anything you need.

    And I certainly look forward to hearing about the continued success of our Navy JAG Corps.

    May God bless our Sailors, Marines, civilians, and their families with fair winds and following seas. Thank you.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Update 253 – IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been informed both by the Russian Federation and Ukraine about the assassination last week of an individual in the city where most staff of the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) live, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said today.

    The person, identified as Mr Korotkyi, reportedly died in a car bomb explosion on Friday morning in Enerhodar, which is located a few kilometres from the ZNPP. In a letter to the IAEA, Russia affirmed he was “one of the key staff members responsible for ensuring nuclear security” at the plant. Ukraine told the IAEA he was not a ZNPP staff member anymore.

    The IAEA is also aware of a public statement issued the same day by Ukraine’s military intelligence indicating that this person’s alleged actions after Russia took control of the ZNPP in March 2022 were the reason he was targeted. In addition, the country’s military intelligence posted an image of a destroyed car, and suggested others may also face “retribution”.

    In follow-up communication with the IAEA, Ukraine said it “does not attack civilians”. Ukraine did not confirm or deny any responsibility for the attack.

    In a letter to the IAEA, the Russian Federation said Mr Korotkyi was “head of the permits bureau” at the ZNPP and called the attack a “horrific crime” committed by Ukraine.

    Director General Grossi reiterated that while the IAEA does not have forensic capabilities or authorities to investigate the incident, maintaining nuclear safety and security remains of paramount importance to prevent a nuclear accident during the conflict. With this vital objective, the IAEA in March 2022 established seven indispensable pillars for nuclear safety and security that have been supported by all IAEA Member States.

    Pillar 3 states that “the operating staff must be able to fulfil their safety and security duties and have the capacity to make decisions free of undue pressure”.

    “Any targeting of employees of nuclear power plants would constitute a blatant violation of this pillar fundamental for overall nuclear safety and security,” Director General Grossi said.

    “In addition, any statements indicating further retaliatory measures – potentially affecting staff of the Zaporizhzhya NPP – would be unacceptable and contrary to the safety pillars established by the IAEA,” he said. “Any such threats deny staff who are not responsible for the overarching political and military situation the minimum standards of working conditions to do their jobs properly.”

    Director General Grossi once again called for maximum restraint during the conflict and said any action targeting staff at the ZNPP – in order to address issues related to its status – has a direct impact on nuclear safety and security and must cease.

    “The only way to avert the threat of a nuclear accident with transboundary radiological consequences during this war is to fully respect and adhere to the seven indispensable pillars for nuclear safety and security as well as the five concrete principles for the protection of the Zaporizhzhya NPP,” he said.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the democratic backsliding and threats to political pluralism in Georgia – B10-0070/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    to wind up the debate on the statement by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

    Urmas Paet, Petras Auštrevičius, Dan Barna, Helmut Brandstätter, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Bernard Guetta, Ľubica Karvašová, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Marie‑Agnes Strack‑Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar, Dainius Žalimas
    on behalf of the Renew Group

    B10‑0070/2024

    European Parliament resolution on the democratic backsliding and threats to political pluralism in Georgia

    (2024/2822(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to its previous resolutions on Georgia,

     having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part[1],

     having regard to the European Council conclusions of 14 and 15 December 2023 and to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), which outline the steps for Georgia’s candidacy status, particularly step 9, concerning the freedom of civil society,

     having regard to the statement by the spokesperson for the European External Action Service of 4 September 2024 on the legislative package on ‘family values and protection of minors’ in Georgia,

     having regard to the statement of 18 September 2024 by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the laws, adopted by the Georgian Parliament, on ‘family values and protection of minors’,

     having regard to the opinions adopted or endorsed by the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) on various pieces of Georgian legislation at its 139th session (21-22 June 2024),

     having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas the Constitution of Georgia protects the exercise of the freedoms of opinion, expression, association and peaceful assembly, and the right to universal, equal and free elections, as fundamental rights; whereas the Constitution of Georgia also guarantees the equality of all persons and protects them from discrimination; whereas, according to Article 78 of the Constitution of Georgia, ‘the constitutional bodies shall take all measures within the scope of their competences to ensure the full integration of Georgia into the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’;

    B. whereas, despite widespread public protests and calls from the EU and Georgia’s other Western partners, the ruling Georgian Dream party has adopted a Russian-inspired bill on the ‘transparency of foreign influence’, which requires civil society and media organisations that accept funds from abroad to register as ‘organisations pursuing the interest of a foreign power’ or face fines;

    C. whereas this legislation limits the capacity of civil society and media organisations to operate freely, curtails freedom of expression and unfairly stigmatises organisations that deliver clear benefits to the citizens of Georgia;

    D. whereas in March 2023, a proposal for similar legislation sparked widespread protests in Georgia, leading to its withdrawal; whereas since the proposal’s withdrawal in 2023, the ruling party and pro-government media have continued to escalate rhetoric against civil society and journalists;

    E. whereas on 20 February 2024, the ruling Georgian Dream party adopted amendments to the electoral legislation, endangering the independence and impartiality of the Central Election Commission and undermining public trust in this institution;

    F. whereas in late August 2024, oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili urged voters to help the Georgian Dream party retain a supermajority in the Georgian Parliament in order to initiate the process of outlawing several opposition parties; whereas this was supported by Georgia’s Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze, who announced that the government would seek to ban more than half a dozen parties following the parliamentary elections;

    G. whereas on 17 September 2024, the ruling Georgian Dream party passed a law on ‘family values and protection of minors’, which strips LGBTIQ+ people of their rights;

    H. whereas two days after the introduction of the law on ‘family values and protection of minors’, Kesaria Abramidze, a transgender model and prominent public figure, was killed in her apartment;

    I. whereas previously, on 4 April 2024, the ruling Georgian Dream party abolished the mandatory gender quotas for political parties’ electoral lists contained in Georgia’s election code and overturned the gender-related funding rule laid down in the law on political associations of citizens, thereby undoing the progress achieved on the promotion of women’s political participation and representation;

    J. whereas the Georgian authorities have not acted on a single recommendation of the Venice Commission regarding the annulment or modification of the above-mentioned legislation on the ‘transparency of foreign influence’ and on ‘family values and protection of minors’, the abolition of gender quotas in local and parliamentary elections, and the formation of the Central Election Commission;

    K. whereas the ruling Georgian Dream party and pro-government media are spreading anti-EU and anti-democratic propaganda, as well as conspiracy theories;

    L. whereas the ruling Georgian Dream party and its leadership continue to escalate divisive, distorted and violent rhetoric against political opponents and international partners, including Ukraine; whereas the ruling party uses despicable political banners depicting Ukrainian cities destroyed by Russia, thus capitalising on the suffering of brave Ukrainians;

    M. whereas Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s statement expressing his readiness to help Georgia normalise its relations with ‘the neighbouring … states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia’ was praised by the leaders of the ruling party, demonstrating the Georgian Government’s departure from its policy of non-recognition of the occupied regions of Georgia;

    N. whereas in the Commission communication entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’, the Commission recommended granting candidate status to Georgia on the understanding that Georgia takes nine steps, which include combating disinformation and interference against the EU and its values, engaging opposition parties and civil society in governance, and ensuring freedom of assembly and expression, as well as consulting civil society and involving it meaningfully in legislative and policymaking processes and ensuring that civil society can operate freely;

    O. whereas on 14 December 2023, Georgia was granted EU candidate status by the European Council on the understanding that the nine steps set out in the Commission recommendation are taken;

    P. whereas Georgia’s Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze has stated that Georgia will not impose sanctions on Russia, but only prevent their circumvention from happening on its territory;

    Q. whereas trade and business cooperation between Georgia and Russia has increased over the past two years, with more than 100 000 Russians having moved to Georgia, opened more than 26 000 businesses, purchased real estate and engaged in activities that create risks of money laundering; whereas this situation jeopardises Georgia’s national security and increases its dependence on Russia;

    R. whereas in recent months, the United States has imposed financial sanctions on Georgian security officials and the leaders of a far-right party for undermining and suppressing the freedom of peaceful assembly in Georgia, and has imposed travel sanctions on 60 other individuals, including senior government officials; whereas the National Bank of Georgia has refused to comply with these sanctions;

    S. whereas parliamentary elections are scheduled to be held in Georgia on 26 October 2024;

    1. Strongly condemns the adoption of the so-called ‘transparency of foreign influence’ and ‘family values and protection of minors’ legislation, as well as the abolition of gender quotas in local and parliamentary elections and the changes in formation of the Central Election Commission by the Georgian Dream majority; underlines that this legislation is incompatible with EU norms and values, damages Georgia’s reputation and jeopardises its efforts towards EU accession;

    2. Urges the Georgian Dream majority to immediately withdraw the legislation on the ‘transparency of foreign influence’ and ‘family values and protection of minors’, to reintroduce gender quotas in local and parliamentary elections, and to ensure a consensus-based political process, which is crucial for the independence and impartiality of the Central Election Commission and for public trust in that institution; urges the Georgian Dream majority to implement the other recommendations of the Venice Commission; reiterates its call to cease all attacks on civil society, independent media, gender equality and the LGBTIQ+ community and to ensure a genuine enabling environment for civil society and media in the country;

    3. Stresses that the withdrawal of the legislation on the ‘transparency of foreign influence’ and ‘family values and protection of minors’ will be necessary steps in improving the relationship between the EU and Georgia;

    4. Stands in solidarity with the courageous Georgian people fighting for their democratic rights and the European future of their country; reiterates its unwavering support for all those who advocate for and defend human rights and work for a peaceful country and society committed to equality and human dignity for all;

    5. Calls for the EU funding provided to the Georgian Government to be frozen until these illiberal pieces of legislation are repealed, and for strict conditions to be placed on the disbursement of any future funding to the Georgian Government;

    6. Reiterates its calls on the Commission to promptly assess how Georgia’s legislation on the ‘transparency of foreign influence’ and ‘family values and protection of minors’, as well as the abolition of gender quotas and other changes in its electoral legislation, and the implementation of the Venice Commission’s recommendations in general, affect Georgia’s continuous fulfilment of the visa liberalisation benchmarks, in particular the fundamental rights benchmark, which is a crucial component of the EU visa liberalisation policy;

    7. Calls for the EU and its Member States to impose sanctions on Georgian officials who are involved in human rights violations against Georgian citizens or in the country’s democratic backsliding; reiterates its call on the Council to consider imposing personal sanctions on Bidzina Ivanishvili for his role in the deterioration of the political process and the human rights situation in Georgia; urges Georgian commercial banks to implement international sanctions;

    8. Reminds the Georgian Government that the EU granted Georgia candidate status on the understanding that the steps set out in the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 would be taken; underscores that the recently adopted pieces of legislation clearly go against this goal and put Georgia’s EU integration on hold;

    9. Reiterates its call on the Georgian Government to uphold its commitment to the promotion of democracy, the rule of law and human rights, and encourages it to adopt and implement reforms that are in line with its stated objective of joining the EU, as demanded by a large majority of Georgia’s citizens;

    10. Strongly urges Georgia, as an EU candidate country, to impose sanctions on Russia in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and to effectively enforce measures to prevent the circumvention of EU sanctions, as it has committed to doing; is deeply concerned by the alignment of the Georgian Government with Russian policies and the increasing dependence of Georgia on Russia, and by the Georgian Dream party’s use of violent images of the war in Ukraine as a means of manipulating public opinion and spreading disinformation in its campaign ahead of the October 2024 elections; calls on Georgia to fully align with the EU’s foreign policy and the EU’s strategy towards Russia;

    11. Calls for the EU and its Member States to guarantee their full support to Georgian civil society organisations in this difficult period, including on issues linked to fines and other burdens imposed on them by the new legislation;

    12. Urges the Georgian authorities to ensure that the October 2024 parliamentary elections adhere to the highest international standards, guaranteeing a transparent, free and fair process that reflects the democratic will of the people; urges the abolition of the ingrained practice of misusing public resources and administrative capacity for the benefit of the ruling party; insists that the presence of both domestic and international observers should be ensured in order to safeguard the integrity of the elections and calls for an expanded EU election observation mission;

    13. Is deeply concerned by reports that the Georgian Government is creating obstacles for the coalition of 30 NGOs and Transparency International Georgia in their efforts to conduct the ‘Go Out and Vote’ campaign; considers these obstacles an attempt to undermine democracy in the country;

    14. Is extremely concerned about the police brutality that occurred during the protests of March-June 2024 in Tbilisi, and calls on the Georgian authorities to conduct timely and thorough investigations into that police brutality;

    15. Reiterates its call for an impartial and independent long-term international election observation mission by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, in order to monitor Georgia’s upcoming parliamentary elections;

    16. Reiterates its call on the Georgian authorities to immediately release former President Mikheil Saakashvili and to allow him to receive proper medical treatment abroad;

    17. Calls for the EU and its Member States to continue to pay close attention to these matters and to closely monitor developments in Georgia ahead of and after the country’s October 2024 parliamentary elections;

    18. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the President, Government and Parliament of Georgia.

     

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on strengthening Moldova’s resilience against Russian interference ahead of the upcoming presidential elections – B10-0073/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    to wind up the debate on the statement by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

    Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Adam Bielan, Mariusz Kamiński, Cristian Terheş, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Jaak Madison, Rihards Kols, Jadwiga Wiśniewska, Carlo Fidanza, Michał Dworczyk, Roberts Zīle, Alberico Gambino, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Ivaylo Valchev, Veronika Vrecionová, Ondřej Krutílek, Tobiasz Bocheński, Assita Kanko, Alexandr Vondra
    on behalf of the ECR Group

    B10‑0073/2024

    European Parliament resolution on strengthening Moldova’s resilience against Russian interference ahead of the upcoming presidential elections

    (2024/2821(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to its previous resolutions on the Republic of Moldova and on Eastern Partnership countries,

     having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Moldova, of the other part[1], which includes a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area and which fully entered into force on 1 July 2016,

     having regard to Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union,

     having regard to the Republic of Moldova’s application for European Union (EU) membership, submitted on 3 March 2022,

     having regard to the Versailles Declaration of 10 and 11 March 2022,

     having regard to the EU statement of 21 March 2024 at the OSCE Permanent Council No 1466 in Vienna on the recent security incidents in the Transnistrian region,

     having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas a presidential election is scheduled to be held in Moldova on 20 October 2024; whereas a referendum on Moldova’s accession to the EU is set to take place on the same day as the presidential election;

    B. whereas Russia has persistently sought to influence, subvert and undermine free, fair and independent elections in Moldova, as well as in various EU countries, by using disinformation, covert activities, corruption and many other hybrid warfare tactics aimed at destabilising the West; whereas, despite recent legislative improvements, concerns regarding campaign financing and the use of illicit Russian funds to influence electoral outcomes remain among the most sensitive issues within Moldova’s electoral landscape; whereas Russia’s efforts to exert influence are expected to increase in the run-up to Moldova’s presidential election;

    C. whereas there has been a noticeable shift in Russian interference tactics, with Russia expanding its support beyond traditional hard-line pro-Russian parties to a broader spectrum of political actors; whereas this spectrum now includes not only moderately pro-Russian and pro-Moldovan groups but also groups presenting themselves as ‘pro-European’; whereas this strategy appears, deceptively, to offer disillusioned voters a range of alternatives to the Party of Action and Solidarity, seeking to fragment the political landscape and dilute genuine support for the current government; whereas this shift reflects the Kremlin’s evolving approach to influence operations, prioritising the creation of multiple fronts to undermine democratic processes and foment internal discord;

    D. whereas Moldova’s local elections on 5 November 2023 reportedly saw unprecedented levels of Russian interference, including disinformation campaigns, voter bribery and financial support for pro-Russian parties, which pose a serious threat to Moldova’s democratic process ahead of the presidential election in October 2024; whereas recent reports by Moldovan investigators unveil the possibility that more than USD 15 million of Russian funds have allegedly been transferred to bribe voters in the upcoming elections;

    E. whereas Moldova has taken steps to combat Russian interference, including by banning pro-Russian parties, sanctioning oligarchs, suspending media outlets that spread disinformation, and increasing customs controls; whereas these efforts require further support from the international community and the EU in particular;

    F. whereas on 3 March 2022 the Republic of Moldova applied for EU membership and, on 17 June 2022, the European Commission presented its opinions on the applications submitted by Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova; whereas Moldova was granted the status of candidate country on 23 June 2022 by unanimous agreement of the 27 Member States; whereas the Commission outlined nine steps for Moldova to address in its 2023 Enlargement Package report, which was presented on 8 November 2023, recommending the opening of accession negotiations, provided that remaining reforms in justice, anti-corruption and deoligarchisation were accomplished; whereas the Council decided to open accession negotiations on 14 December 2023, and the first intergovernmental conference formally launching these negotiations was held on 25 June 2024;

    G. whereas the EU has imposed sanctions on key Moldovan oligarchs and pro-Russian actors, and the United States (US) has repeatedly warned Moldova of Russian plans to destabilise and overthrow its government;

    H. whereas Russian actors, including sanctioned individuals like fugitive Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor, have been directly involved in those destabilisation efforts, using state-funded Russian media outlets located in Russian territory and criminal networks to influence Moldovan politics;

    I. whereas Russian interference, combined with Moldova’s vulnerable economic situation, political divisions and geostrategic importance, risks undermining Moldova’s future in the EU, despite its significant progress towards EU accession; whereas oligarch-backed media and corrupt financial networks continue to destabilise Moldova’s political landscape, posing a threat to its sovereignty and democratic institutions;

    J. whereas Russia Today (RT) and its employees, including editor-in-chief Margarita Simonyan, have directly coordinated with the Kremlin to support Russian Government efforts to influence the October 2024 Moldovan election; whereas Simonyan leverages the state-funded platforms in which she holds leadership positions – namely RT, Sputnik, and their parent company, the international information agency Rossiya Segodnya, a federal state unitary enterprise – to attempt to foment unrest in Moldova, likely with the specific aim of causing protests to turn violent;

    K. whereas Russia is escalating its years of ‘grey zone’ assaults on Moldova through disinformation, cyberattacks, bomb threats and other manipulations; whereas this campaign is part of what experts and government officials discuss as Russia’s steadily evolving hybrid war from the Baltic to the Black Sea: its invasion of Ukraine and destabilisation efforts against Georgia, Estonia and other neighbours; whereas Putin’s primary instruments for destabilising Moldova are propaganda and the corruption exercised by billionaire allies such as Ilan Shor and former ruling party leader Vladimir Plahotniuc, as well as Russia’s influence over two regions: Gagauzia, a stronghold of Ilan Shor in the south, and Transnistria, located on Moldova’s eastern border and controlled by Russian troops;

    L. whereas in 2023, the Russian government expanded the operational scope of RT by embedding within it a cyber-unit with direct ties to the Russian state; whereas this unit has been involved in intelligence and influence operations globally, including in Moldova; whereas the information gathered by this entity, operating under RT’s cover, is reportedly funnelled to Russian intelligence agencies, state-controlled media, mercenary groups and other actors aligned with the Russian Government; whereas RT is also engaged in disinformation campaigns, covert influence operations and military procurement efforts in support of Russia’s war in Ukraine;

    M. whereas the Intelligence and Security Service of the Republic of Moldova published a report in 2023 highlighting the unprecedented intensity of the actions carried out by the Russian Federation aimed at anchoring the Republic of Moldova within its sphere of influence; whereas the mechanism used to carry out this threat is of a hybrid nature, aiming operationally at attacking democratic processes and undermining Moldova’s path towards European integration by amplifying radical, separatist tendencies in the southern region of Moldova, particularly in Gagauzia, spreading propaganda and altering the information space, interfering in Moldova’s electoral process and conducting subversive operations;

    N. whereas on 18 September 2024 two close allies of Ilan Shor – Marina Tauber, member of the Parliament of Moldova, and Governor (Bashkan) of Gagauzia Evghenia Guțul – met the spokesperson of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Maria Zakharova, and subsequently released false information about the EU and Moldova’s future in it, thus manipulating Moldovan citizens and trying to influence the upcoming election;

    O. whereas Moldova faces growing economic and security challenges, including the risk of political backsliding if Russia-backed candidates succeed in the upcoming presidential election;

    P. whereas Ukraine’s decision to close its border with Transnistria, which hosts 1 500 Russian troops, significantly curtailed trade between Kyiv and Tiraspol, cutting off critical revenue streams and reducing Transnistria’s trade volumes with Russia by 22 % in 2022; whereas Moldova now controls most of Transnistria’s access to external trade, representing an unprecedented opportunity to influence the separatist region; whereas Moldova has implemented a pressure strategy that includes criminalising separatism, tightening customs checks and stripping Transnistrian businesses of customs privileges, thus creating significant economic strain; whereas, despite receiving free Russian gas, Transnistria remains vulnerable to the potential cutting off of the Russian gas transit through Ukraine by December 2024, which could leave the region without energy;

    Q. whereas Russia has a substantial military presence in the Black Sea, including through undisclosed numbers and capabilities of its submarines, and considerable potential to dominate adjacent maritime transport routes; whereas the volatile situation in Transnistria poses a strategic risk, as Russia could seize control of the region and escalate the conflict, owing to Ukraine’s likely military response;

    R. whereas, according to journalistic investigations, dozens of priests from the Metropolis of Moldova travel to Russia, where they receive cards through which they later withdraw funds; whereas these trips are reportedly organised by Ilan Shor in close collaboration with the Russian Orthodox Church, which is closely aligned with the Kremlin regime, with the intention of using the clergy for electoral purposes;

    S. whereas in response to Russia’s continued efforts to undermine Moldovan democracy and interfere in Moldova’s electoral processes, the US State Department is imposing additional sanctions on a critical aspect of Russia’s malign influence in Moldova;

    1. Stands in solidarity with the people of the Republic of Moldova and reiterates its unwavering support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova within its internationally recognised borders; in particular, commends Moldova for its 2022 electoral code reforms, which addressed long-standing recommendations and set a stronger framework for the upcoming election and for an increase in the number of polling stations abroad and a new partial postal voting initiative; stresses also the important role being played by the Republic of Moldova in the safety and stability of the EU’s eastern border in the context of the humanitarian crisis caused by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

    2. Strongly condemns Russia’s repeated attempts to destabilise the Republic of Moldova, its institutions and society; calls on the Russian authorities to respect the Republic of Moldova’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, to cease its provocations and attempts to destabilise the country, and to immediately and unconditionally withdraw its military forces from the occupied territories of Moldova (Transnistria), Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) and Ukraine;

    3. Reaffirms its full commitment to the Republic of Moldova’s membership of the EU; welcomes the Moldovan authorities’ considerable efforts to advance the reform agenda and their determination to fulfil the nine steps identified in the Commission’s opinion of 17 June 2022 in order to progress towards EU membership, despite Russia’s pressure on Moldova and the crises triggered by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

    4. Stresses that, based on the experience of the 2023 local elections, the Russian Federation is likely to employ the tactic of using ‘filler’ parties in the upcoming parliamentary elections in 2025, creating a smokescreen to facilitate the entry of at least one Ilan Shor-controlled party into Parliament;

    5. Congratulates Moldova for the first intergovernmental conference on the opening of accession negotiations, which occurred in June 2024, only two years after the granting of candidate status, and thus serves as evidence of Moldova’s determination to fulfil the EU’s reform agenda; acknowledges the significant progress made by Moldova in the EU accession process and calls for the intergovernmental conference to conclude cluster 1 of the negotiations in the coming year;

    6. Calls on NATO and its members to consider enhancing NATO’s naval presence and readiness in the Black Sea region;

    7. Calls for the EU to support Moldova’s efforts toward the peaceful reintegration of Transnistria by providing financial and technical assistance for economic stabilisation, social cohesion measures and the diversification of Transnistria’s energy through neighbouring Member States, ensuring that Moldova’s progress toward EU accession is not undermined by the unresolved status of Transnistria;

    8. Encourages the Government of Moldova, as the country advances on its path to EU accession, to repair the injustices done by the oppressive Soviet occupation to all religious denominations;

    9. Recognises the Orthodox Metropolis of Bessarabia as a victim of Soviet oppression; notes in this regard that the Orthodox Metropolis of Bessarabia, after it was abusively abolished by the Soviet authorities, was not officially recognised until 2002, after a decision of the European Court of Human Rights;

    10. Calls on the Commission, the European External Action Service and the Member States to urgently provide funding and expertise to support the training of short-term election observers in Moldova for the October 2024 elections, in collaboration with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and its dedicated services and offices;

    11. Calls on the Commission to consider enhanced cooperation to provide Moldova with specific counter-interference technical assistance and to improve Moldova’s election infrastructure, including assisting with the implementation of secure voting technologies and measures to ensure the integrity of the transmission of vote count results;

    12. Urges the Commission to develop and present a comprehensive growth plan for Moldova that would aim to facilitate foreign investment and foster economic development within the country; calls for the continued provision of robust financial support to Moldova to ensure its sustainable growth and stability; further calls for the permanent abolition of import duties and quotas on Moldovan exports to the EU;

    13. Welcomes the assistance provided under the European Peace Facility in support of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova, aimed at modernising the country’s air defence capabilities, and calls for the continued provision of such support; notes that every sovereign state has the inherent right to invest in its defence capabilities, and affirms that such actions are fully consistent with the Republic of Moldova’s status of neutrality;

    14. Commends the launch of the EU Partnership Mission in the Republic of Moldova under the common security and defence policy, aimed at strengthening the resilience of Moldova’s security sector; strongly supports the mission’s activities and its role in providing crucial assistance and expertise to enhance the country’s security and stability;

    15. Commends the signing of the security and defence partnership, which will strengthen Moldova’s resilience and enable the EU and Moldova to jointly address common security challenges; emphasises that Moldova is the first country to sign such a partnership with the EU, demonstrating the strong commitment of both parties to enhanced cooperation in the field of security and defence;

    16. Calls for the EU, the US, Canada and the United Kingdom to continue to apply and expand sanctions against individuals, media outlets and entities involved in Kremlin-sponsored activities to subvert the democratic processes and electoral integrity of Moldova and all EU countries and partners;

    17. Urges the Moldovan Government to increase vigilance over potential electoral irregularities, enhance public communication on election security, and prepare to address Russian attempts to incite protests following the election results;

    18. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Government and Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the United Nations and the Council of Europe.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the democratic backsliding and threats to political pluralism in Georgia – B10-0079/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    to wind up the debate on the statement by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

    Rasa Juknevičienė, Michael Gahler, Andrzej Halicki, Sebastião Bugalho, David McAllister, Željana Zovko, Nicolás Pascual De La Parte, Isabel Wiseler‑Lima, Antonio López‑Istúriz White, Wouter Beke, Daniel Caspary, Sandra Kalniete, Ondřej Kolář, Andrey Kovatchev, Andrius Kubilius, Miriam Lexmann, Vangelis Meimarakis, Ana Miguel Pedro, Davor Ivo Stier, Michał Szczerba, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Matej Tonin, Milan Zver
    on behalf of the PPE Group

    B10‑0079/2024

    European Parliament resolution on the democratic backsliding and threats to political pluralism in Georgia

    (2024/2822(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to its previous resolutions on Georgia,

     having regard to the statement by the High Representative and the Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement of 17 April 2024 on the adoption of the ‘transparency of foreign influence’ law,

     having regard to the statement by the High Representative of 18 September 2024 on the Georgian law on ‘family values and protection of minors’,

     having regard to the statement by the European External Action Service Spokesperson of 4 April 2024 on the draft law on ‘transparency of foreign influence’,

     having regard to the European Council conclusions of 14 and 15 December 2023,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690),

     having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part[1],

     having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

     having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights,

     having regard to the joint statement by the Chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Chair of the Delegation for relations with the South Caucasus and the European Parliament’s Standing Rapporteur on Georgia of 18 April 2024 on the reintroduction of the draft law on ‘transparency of foreign influence’ in Georgia,

     having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas the exercise of freedom of opinion, expression, association and peaceful assembly is a fundamental rights enshrined in the Georgian Constitution;

    B. whereas Georgia, as a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as a member of the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, has committed itself to the principles of democracy, the rule of law and respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights;

    C. whereas Article 78 of the Georgian Constitution provides that ‘the constitutional bodies shall take all measures within the scope of their competence to ensure the full integration of Georgia into the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’;

    D. whereas the EU expects Georgia, a candidate country for EU accession, to abide fully by the Association Agreement and other international commitments it has made and, in particular, to fulfil the conditions and take the steps set out in the Commission’s recommendation of 8 November 2023; whereas the European Council decided to grant candidate status to Georgia solely on the understanding that these steps would be taken, including combating disinformation and interference against the EU and its values, engaging opposition parties and civil society in governance, and ensuring freedom of assembly and expression, as well as meaningfully consulting civil society and involving it in legislative and policymaking processes and ensuring that it can operate freely;

    E. whereas on 20 February 2024 the Parliament of Georgia passed amendments to the electoral code, changing the procedure for the election of chairman and so-called professional members of the Central Election Commission and abolishing the post of deputy chairman, which is filled by an opposition representative;

    F. whereas on 4 April 2024 the Georgian Parliament adopted amendments to the country’s electoral code, abolishing mandatory parliamentary quotas for women, which required that at least one in four candidates on a party list be of a different gender than the majority;

    G. whereas on 28 May 2024, the Georgian Parliament adopted the so-called transparency of foreign influence law, which requires organisations receiving over 20 % of their funding from abroad to register within two months as ‘organisations pursuing the interests of a foreign power’ and label themselves as such; whereas these organisations are subjected to additional scrutiny, reporting requirements and possibly sanctions, including administrative penalties of up to GEL 25 000; whereas this law seriously restricts media and civil society organisations’ ability to operate freely; whereas adopting this law has led to the suspension of EU financial assistance for Georgia;

    H. whereas on 6 June 2024 the US imposed visa restrictions on dozens of Georgian officials over the adoption of the ‘foreign agents law’;

    I. whereas on 11 July 2024 the US Congress Committee on Foreign Affairs adopted Georgia sanctions legislation known as the Megobari Act, which imposes sanctions against Georgian officials responsible for undermining the country’s democratic system;

    J. whereas on 17 September 2024 the Georgian Parliament passed a law on ‘family values and the protection of minors’, which strips the LGBTI community of its rights and bans Pride events and public displays of the rainbow flag;

    K. whereas a parliamentary election will take place in Georgia on 26 October 2024; whereas there is growing anti-Western and hostile rhetoric from the Georgian Dream party against Georgia’s democratic partners, as well as promotion of Russian disinformation and manipulation; whereas the Georgian Dream party is pursuing a narrative of the West as a ‘global war party’ trying to push Georgia back into a war with Russia;

    L. whereas on 28 August 2024, the leader of Georgian Dream, Bidzina Ivanishvili, at the inauguration of his party’s electoral campaign, spoke of his desire to ban democratic opposition parties; whereas he was seconded by the Prime Minister, Irakli Kobakhidze, who stated that if their party achieved a majority in the Georgian Parliament, it would ban certain opposition parties;

    1. Strongly condemns the adoption of the law on ‘transparency of foreign influence’ and the law on ‘family values and protection of minors’, as well as the changes to the electoral code; considers that the foregoing are incompatible with EU values and democratic principles, run against Georgia’s ambitions for EU membership, damage Georgia’s international reputation and endanger the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration; strongly underlines that unless the abovementioned legislation is rescinded, progress cannot be made in Georgia’s relations with the EU; regrets that Georgia, once a champion of democratic progress with Euro-Atlantic aspirations, has been in a democratic backsliding free fall for a considerable period;

    2. Expects Georgian Dream to respect the will and free choice of the Georgian people in the upcoming parliamentary election and to relinquish power peacefully if defeated; demands that Georgian Dream and its leaders immediately stop the violence, intimidation, hate speech, persecution and repression that it is committing against the opposition, civil society and independent media;

    3. Strongly believes that the EU should consider temporarily suspending its visa-free regime with Georgia if the conduct of the election is not in line with accepted international standards and base its decision to do so also on Georgia’s fulfilment of the visa liberalisation benchmarks, in particular the fundamental rights benchmark;

    4. Strongly believes that the upcoming election will be decisive in determining Georgia’s future democratic development and geopolitical choice, as well its ability to make progress with its EU member state candidacy; considers that the result of the Georgian election should allow the country to return to its pro-Western democratic agenda, implement the necessary reforms and launch accession negotiations with the EU;

    5. Reiterates its unwavering support for the Georgian people’s legitimate European aspirations and their wish to live in a prosperous country, free from corruption, that fully respects fundamental freedoms, protects human rights and guarantees an open society and independent media; underlines that the decision to grant Georgia EU candidate country status was motivated by the wish to acknowledge the achievements and democratic efforts of Georgia’s civil society, as well as the overwhelming support for EU accession among its citizens; appreciates the efforts made by Georgia’s President Salome Zourabishvili to return Georgia to the democratic and pro-European path of development;

    6. Deplores the personal role played by Georgia’s sole oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, who returned to active politics on 30 December 2023 when he became ‘honorary chairman’ of the Georgian Dream party, in the current political crisis and in yet another attempt to undermine the country’s Western-oriented course in favour of pivoting towards Russia; reiterates its call on the Council and the EU’s democratic partners to consider imposing personal sanctions on Ivanishvili for his role in bringing about the deterioration of the political process in Georgia and in working against the interests of its people;

    7. Calls for the EU and its Member States to hold to account and impose personal sanctions on all those responsible for undermining democracy in Georgia, who are complicit in the violence committed against political opponents and peaceful protesters and who spread anti-Western disinformation; welcomes the personal sanctions imposed by the US on Georgian Dream officials;

    8. Highlights the worrying fact that many recent legislative decisions of Georgian Dream betray the aspirations of the large majority of the Georgian people to live in a democratic society, continue democratic and rule of law reforms, pursue close cooperation with Euro-Atlantic partners and commit to a path towards EU membership;

    9. Emphasises that the rights to freedom of expression and assembly and to peaceful protest are fundamental freedoms and must be respected under all circumstances, particularly in a country aspiring to join the EU;

    10. Recalls that the European Council of 14 and 15 December 2023 granted Georgia candidate country status on the understanding that the relevant steps set out in the Commission recommendation of 8 November 2023 would be taken; stresses that recently adopted legislation clearly goes against this ambition and has effectively put on hold Georgia’s integration into the EU;

    11. Urges the Georgian Government to return to its European path, uphold its commitment to respect, strengthen and promote democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and genuinely engage in the full implementation of the steps required to fulfil the conditions for candidate country status and EU membership, in a spirit of engagement and cooperation with Georgia’s civil society and political opposition;

    12. Reiterates the tangible opportunities that Georgia would take advantage of once the accession negotiations begin, such as pre-accession assistance that would improve the standard of living of Georgian citizens, as well as support the institutions, infrastructure and social services;

    13. Expresses deep concern about the increased influence of Russia in Georgia, the increased number of Russian citizens residing in Georgia, increased trade ties with Russia, and Georgia’s willingness to pursue reconciliation with Russia despite Russia’s war in Ukraine and its occupation of a fifth of Georgian sovereign territory; calls on the Government of Georgia to impose sanctions against Russia in response to its war of aggression against Ukraine;

    14. Reiterates its call on the Georgian authorities to release former President Mikheil Saakashvili from prison;

    15. Calls on the Georgian Bureau of Investigation to conduct a thorough investigation of police brutality during the spring protests against the law on ‘transparency of foreign influence’ in Georgia;

    16. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the President, Government and Parliament of Georgia.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Boosting the Greek defence industry – E-001385/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Precise, detailed and official data on the proportion of the defence budget of each Member State that is spent on domestic production and imports from Member States or third countries is currently not available.

    There are, however, strong indications of persistent fragmentation in the European defence equipment market and an increasing reliance on imports from third countries.

    More details can be found for instance in the European Defence Industrial Strategy[1] and in the Staff Working Document accompanying the proposal for a regulation establishing the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP)[2].

    The EU programmes that can be used to support the capacity of the Greek defence industry include in particular: the European Defence Fund[3], which supports collaborative defence research and development projects with a budget of over EUR 7 billion over 2021-2027; the regulation on supporting ammunition production (ASAP)[4], which was adopted as an emergency response following Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine and supported the ramp-up of ammunition and missiles production capacity across Europe; the EDIP[5] proposal, through which the Commission foresees in particular the extension of the ASAP support logic in time (over 2025-2027) and in scope (beyond the field of ammunition and missiles only).

    Also, Member States may use the Cohesion Policy Funds[6] for the modernisation and building of industrial capacities, including defence industry capacities, as far as the investments contribute to the objectives of the respective funds[7].

    Last updated: 7 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Easing of visa requirements for Russians and Belarusians by the Hungarian Government – E-001472/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    As explained in the Commission’s answer to the Written Question E-0001438/2024 on the same issue, on 1 August 2024, a letter has been sent to the Hungarian Minister of the Interior in which the Commission’s concerns about the extension of the ‘National Card’ scheme to citizens of Russia and Belarus were expressed.

    Hungary was reminded of the importance of upholding enhanced standards of scrutiny and vigilance with regards to the entry of Russian nationals into the Schengen area.

    The dialogue with the Hungarian authorities is ongoing to assess the implications of the ‘National Card’ extension for the security of the Schengen area.

    Hungary remains bound by the obligation to thoroughly check whether all entry conditions of Article 6 of the Schengen Borders Code[1] (SBC) applicable to third-country nationals have been met.

    This includes, amongst others, the absence of alerts issued in the Schengen Information System or other indications that an individual poses a threat to public policy, internal security, public health or the international relations of any of the Member States. A third-country national who does not fulfil the entry conditions must be refused entry (Article 14 SBC).

    On 30 September 2022, the Commission issued updated guidelines on controls of Russian citizens at the external borders in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine[2].

    According to these guidelines, border guards should exercise intensive individual scrutiny in assessing the potential heightened security risk posed by Russian nationals.

    • [1] Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), OJ L 77, 23.3.2016.
    • [2] https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-09/Communication%20from%20the%20Commission%20on%20updating%20guidelines%20on%20general%20visa%20issuance%20in%20relation%20to%20Russian%20applicants%20and%20on%20providing%20guidelines%20on%20controls%20of%20Russian%20citizens%20at%20the%20external%20borders_en.pdf
    Last updated: 7 October 2024

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  • MIL-OSI USA: Ricketts Joins Senate Republicans to Stand with Israel, Condemn Iran-Backed Hamas

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator Pete Ricketts (Nebraska)
    October 7, 2024
    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, one year since the October 7th Hamas terrorist attack killed dozens of Americans, U.S. Senator Pete Ricketts (R-NE) joined all 48 of his Senate Republican colleagues to fully condemn Iran-backed Hamas for its actions, support the forever survival of Israel, and call for the safe release of American hostages.
    The Senate resolution was led by U.S. Senator Joni Ernst (R-IA), chair of the Republican Policy Committee. Click here to view the full Senate resolution.
    “On October 7th, the world witnessed a heinous terror attack as Hamas murdered innocent women, men and children,” Ricketts said. “We must remain vigilant and unwavering in our commitment to bringing Hamas terrorists to justice. To the people of Israel, we stand with you, we mourn with you, and we will continue to support you until every hostage is brought home and Hamas surrenders.”
    “This time last year, I woke up in the Middle East to the unbearable news that Israel was under attack by Iran-backed terrorists and Americans were being killed and taken hostage,” said Ernst, a combat veteran. “I immediately traveled into Israel to show that our nation’s friendship is unwavering, in good times and bad. Regardless of whether I have been in Jerusalem, Washington, or Iowa, I have worked around the clock to hold the White House accountable to its ‘ironclad’ commitment, bring our hostages home, and cut off the source of terrorism in Tehran. One year since that day, as Israel remains under attack on all fronts, Senate Republicans stand united with our greatest ally in the Middle East.”
    Background
    Ricketts has been a staunch supporter of Israel’s sovereignty, their right to defend themselves against Iran and its terrorist proxies, and Israel’s efforts to bring home the remaining hostages. 
    In the weeks following the October 7th attack, Rickettsintroduced legislation to enact a permanent ban on U.S. funding for United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Since October 7th, numerous reports have revealed UNRWA staff was directly involved in Hamas’ attack on Israel. The Stop Support for Hamas Act would:
    Cut off contributions for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), which has been described as “effectively a branch of Hamas;”
    Freeze Economic Support Funds (ESF) to Gaza and the West Bank until Israel has verifiably dismantled the terrorist infrastructure of Hamas and other terrorist groups in Gaza;
    Strengthen certification requirements under the Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act of 2006 to ensure that no ministry, agency or instrumentality of the Palestinian Authority (PA) employs members, agents or affiliates of Hamas;
    Ensure any U.S. assistance to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating in Gaza and the West Bank does not benefit Hamas or any other terrorist organization; and
    Strengthen Taylor Force Act provisions to prevent any U.S. funding that directly or indirectly benefits the PA until it ends its “pay for slay” program.
    Over the past year, Ricketts has also repeatedly criticizedthe Biden-Harris administration for their failure to stand unequivocally with America’s strongest ally. He was critical when Kamala Harris refused to fulfill her Vice Presidential duty to preside over Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s address to Congress. As a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he directly confronted Secretary of State Antony Blinken for strengthening the hand of adversaries like Hamas and Russia by conditioning U.S. aid to allies like Israel and Ukraine. He’s repeatedly called out the United Nations for being an “antisemitic organization.” He’s also called for the United States to take action against the International Criminal Court (ICC) for emboldening terrorists and promoting antisemitism. 

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – EU failure to act against the 50-year occupation of Cyprus – E-001740/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001740/2024/rev.1
    to the Council
    Rule 144
    Nikolaos Anadiotis (NI)

    Ever since its illegal military invasion in 1974, Türkiye has been occupying more than 36% of the territory of Cyprus, in breach of every concept of law.

    It now maintains some 35 000 soldiers in the Occupied Territories. Their pseudo-state, still with the support of Türkiye, has been steadily and methodically settling the Occupied Territories with Turks, continuing to grant them pseudo-nationality and thereby distorting the demographic character of the population.

    At present, there are 160 000 illegal settlers living in the Occupied Territories.[1] The EU effectively leaves Türkiye unpunished for these crimes against a Member State, Cyprus, the whole of which (including the Occupied Territories) has been EU territory since it joined the Union.

    In view of the above, can the Council answer the following:

    • 1.What explanation is there for the impunity Türkiye enjoys in respect of its systematic crimes against a Member State, as opposed to the measures and sanctions imposed on Russia for its invasion of a non-Member State (Ukraine)?
    • 2.Does the EU intend to impose matching sanctions on Türkiye for the above crimes?
    • 3.By what specific measures does the EU plan to protect Cyprus against Turkish aggression?

    Submitted: 17.9.2024

    • [1] https://mfa.gov.cy/turkish-military-invasion-and-occupation.html
    Last updated: 7 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on strengthening Moldova’s resilience against Russian interference ahead of the upcoming presidential election and a constitutional referendum on EU integration – B10-0082/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    to wind up the debate on the statement by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

    B10‑0000/2024

    European Parliament resolution on strengthening Moldova’s resilience against Russian interference ahead of the upcoming presidential election and a constitutional referendum on EU integration

    (2024/2821(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to Articles 2 and 49 of the Treaty on European Union,

     having regard to the European Council decision of 23 June 2022 to grant EU candidate country status to Moldova,

     having regard to the interim opinion of the Venice Commission of 13 March 2023 on the draft law on limiting excessive economic and political influence in public life (de‑oligarchisation),

     having regard to the joint staff working document of 6 February 2023 entitled ‘Association Implementation Report on the Republic of Moldova’, reviewing Moldova’s implementation of reforms under the EU-Moldova Association Agreement since October 2021 (SWD(2023)0041),

     having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas Moldova is one of the poorest countries in Europe; whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has further affected living standards;

    B. whereas the Russian Federation has been using provocation, disinformation, illegal funding of political parties, cyberattacks and other hybrid means to undermine the stability, sovereignty, constitutional order and democratic institutions of the Republic of Moldova;

    C. whereas Russian missiles targeting Ukraine have flown over the Republic of Moldova’s territory on several occasions, in clear violation of Moldova’s sovereignty;

    D. whereas oligarchs have an excessive influence on vested interests in economic, political and public life in Moldova;

    E. whereas in September, certain members of the party founded by fugitive oligarch Ilan Șor were accused by the Moldovan judiciary of having received money from accounts held by the Russian bank Promsvyazbank in order to take part in demonstrations ahead of the presidential election in October; whereas oligarch Ilan Șor fled to Russia in 2019 after being sentenced to 15 years in prison for fraud and money laundering; whereas Șor’s party was declared ‘unconstitutional’ by the Constitutional Court, accused of seeking to destabilise Moldova in collusion with Russia, and banned;

    F. whereas in July 2023, the Transnistrian Communist Party leader, Oleg Khorzhan, was found stabbed to death in his home; whereas Oleg Khorzhan was a public critic of the de facto authorities and reported on human rights abuses in prison; whereas no effective investigation into his death has been carried out;

    G. whereas presidential elections are scheduled to be held on 20 October 2024 in conjunction with a referendum on joining the EU; whereas Moldova was officially granted candidate status by the EU in June 2022 and negotiations were opened in December 2023;

    H. whereas reducing corruption is one of the nine steps Moldova needs to address before joining the EU;

    1. Notes with concern the attempts by Russia to influence the outcome of the presidential election and referendum in Moldova, notably through the actions of several members of the party funded by the convicted oligarch Ilan Șor, who is also subject to EU sanctions;

    2. Notes with concern the increasing spread of pre-election propaganda and disinformation by Russian sources in Moldova on social media, with the aim of misleading voters or reducing turnout in the referendum; calls on social media platforms to adapt the design of their algorithms to mitigate the spread of illegal content, hate speech and disinformation online;

    3. Recognises and encourages the efforts of the Moldovan authorities to allow all Moldovans to vote, including those living in the breakaway Republic of Transnistria or residing abroad;

    4. Expresses understanding that the Moldovan authorities are intervening against social media and other actors who are clearly operating on behalf of Russia in spreading lies and seeking to sabotage a fair election process; underlines the importance of supporting the Moldovan authorities in their efforts to counter Russian influence; calls for the EU to continue helping Moldova to strengthen its capacities and resilience in the area;

    5. Calls on the Moldovan authorities to protect basic democratic values, including freedom of expression, the media and organisation, and to never impose any limits on the possibility to work for a legitimate opposition or engage in critical scrutiny of the media;

    6. Underlines the importance of a stable and democratic Moldova for stability, peace and cooperation throughout the region; calls for the EU to continue to support Moldova’s democratic structures;

    7. Takes note of the importance of the nine conditions set by the Commission for the accession procedure; recognises Moldova’s reform efforts; underlines the importance of continued support from the EU, including strengthening the rule of law and the independence and effectiveness of the Moldovan authorities;

    8. Underscores that financial support should have strong social conditionalities attached to it; recalls that such support should also encompass strengthening the capacities, independence and plurality of civil society organisations and social partner organisations; recommends establishing a sustainable social dialogue as another key area of social intervention;

    9. Highlights the need to speed up the introduction of the new guaranteed minimum wage for all and to improve social protection; reiterates its criticism that the implementation of the social acquis is under-represented in the Commission’s assessments and recommendations and calls for this situation to be changed;

    10. Notes with concern the strong direct and indirect dependence on Russian gas; calls for the EU to support energy conservation, domestic renewable energy production and Moldova’s continued integration into European electricity and gas grids;

    11. Recognises the significant efforts made by the country in receiving Ukrainian refugees; is concerned, however, that with the newest immigration regime, refugees risk losing access to critical goods and services, including access to employment and certain other rights;

    12. Notes Russia’s attempts to foment tensions between the autonomous region of Gaugazia and the Moldovan authorities; condemns Gaugazia Governor Evghenia Gutul’s meeting with Vladimir Putin; encourages the Moldovan Government’s efforts to reduce tensions with the autonomous region of Gaugazia through dialogue and reform;

    13. Underlines the fact that the region of Transnistria is under Russian influence and is being used to destabilise the democratic government in Moldova; condemns President Vladimir Putin’s decision to revoke a 2012 decree committing Russia to finding a solution for Transnistria; calls on Russia to immediately dismantle its military presence in Transnistria; reiterates its support for a comprehensive and peaceful settlement of the Transnistrian conflict, based on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Moldova with a special status for the region of Transnistria; encourages the implementation of all confidence-building measures designed to avoid destabilisation; believes that a comprehensive and peaceful settlement of the Transnistrian conflict is important for Moldova’s EU accession process;

    14. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Government and Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation, the UN, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Council of Europe.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – The European Union’s double standard in relation to Ukraine and Cyprus – E-001884/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001884/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Loucas Fourlas (PPE)

    The European Union has shown a strong and immediate response to Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, imposing tough sanctions, providing military and humanitarian assistance and supporting the territorial integrity of the country.

    However, it seems that this same determination and solidarity does not apply in relation to the Republic of Cyprus – a Member State of the European Union – part of which has been illegally occupied by Türkiye for 50 years. The EU has not imposed corresponding sanctions against Türkiye, nor has it exerted the same political pressure to end the occupation.

    In view of this:

    • 1.Given that both Ukraine and Cyprus are facing illegal military occupations, how does the Commission justify the double standard in its approach to the situations in the two countries?
    • 2.Will the Commission review its policy and adopt a more assertive stance towards Türkiye with regard to the illegal occupation of Cyprus, imposing sanctions and other measures equivalent to those in place against Russia?

    Submitted: 30.9.2024

    Last updated: 7 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on strengthening Moldova’s resilience against Russian interference ahead of the upcoming presidential elections and a constitutional referendum on EU integration – B10-0080/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    to wind up the debate on the statement by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

    Siegfried Mureşan, Andrzej Halicki, Michael Gahler, Sebastião Bugalho, David McAllister, Željana Zovko, Nicolás Pascual De La Parte, Isabel Wiseler‑Lima, Antonio López‑Istúriz White, Wouter Beke, Krzysztof Brejza, Daniel Caspary, Rasa Juknevičienė, Sandra Kalniete, Ondřej Kolář, Andrey Kovatchev, Andrius Kubilius, Miriam Lexmann, Vangelis Meimarakis, Ana Miguel Pedro, Davor Ivo Stier, Michał Szczerba, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Matej Tonin, Milan Zver, Ioan‑Rareş Bogdan, Daniel Buda, Gheorghe Falcă, Mircea‑Gheorghe Hava, Dan‑Ştefan Motreanu, Virgil‑Daniel Popescu, Adina Vălean, Loránt Vincze, Iuliu Winkler
    on behalf of the PPE Group

    B10‑0080/2024

    European Parliament resolution on strengthening Moldova’s resilience against Russian interference ahead of the upcoming presidential elections and a constitutional referendum on EU integration

    (2024/2821(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to its recent resolutions on the Republic of Moldova,

     having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Moldova, of the other part[1], which includes a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area,

     having regard to the Republic of Moldova’s application for EU membership of 3 March 2022, and the European Council’s consequent granting of candidate status on 23 June 2022 based on a positive assessment by the Commission and in line with the views expressed by Parliament,

     having regard to the convening of the first intergovernmental conference on Moldova’s accession to the EU, held in June 2024,

     having regard to Articles 2 and 49 of the Treaty on European Union,

     having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas the Republic of Moldova will hold presidential elections and a constitutional referendum on EU integration on 20 October 2024;

    B. whereas the Russian Federation has been using provocation, disinformation, illegal funding of political parties, cyberattacks and other hybrid means to undermine the stability, sovereignty, constitutional order and democratic institutions of the Republic of Moldova; whereas Russia’s subversive activities in Moldova seek to undermine popular support for the European path chosen by the Moldovan people and foster destabilisation;

    C. whereas in 2023, the EU imposed sanctions on key Moldovan oligarchs and pro-Russian sympathisers, such as Ilan Shor, Vladimir Plahotniuc, Igor Ceaika, Gheorghe Cavaliuc and Marina Tauber, on the basis of a recently established sanctions regime targeting persons responsible for actions aimed at destabilising, undermining or threatening the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Moldova;

    D. whereas in June 2024, the US, together with the UK and Canada, exposed Russia’s efforts to engage in subversive activities and electoral interference targeting the Republic of Moldova;

    E. whereas in September 2024, the US designated three entities and two individuals for their involvement in Russia’s destabilising actions abroad, highlighting the covert capabilities of state-funded RT, formerly Russia Today; whereas the US revealed that RT has moved beyond media operations and is actively engaged in cyber activities, covert influence, military procurement, information warfare across multiple regions and efforts to interfere in Moldova’s electoral processes, as well as directly supporting fugitive Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor and coordinating with Russian intelligence to influence the outcome of Moldova’s October 2024 presidential elections and constitutional referendum on EU accession;

    F. whereas the Republic of Moldova has taken steps to combat Russian interference, including by banning pro-Russian political parties, sanctioning oligarchs, suspending media outlets that spread disinformation, and increasing customs controls;

    G. whereas, despite all these attempts at destabilisation, the Moldovan people and the Moldovan leadership have remained determined to follow their chosen pro-European path;

    H. whereas on 3 March 2022, the Republic of Moldova applied for EU membership and, on 17 June 2022, the Commission presented its opinions on the applications submitted by Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova; whereas Moldova was granted the status of EU candidate country on 23 June 2022; whereas the Commission outlined nine steps for Moldova to address in its 2023 enlargement package report, which was presented on 8 November 2023, recommending the opening of accession negotiations, provided that remaining reforms in justice, anti-corruption and deoligarchisation were accomplished; whereas the European Council decided to open accession negotiations on 14 December 2023, and the first intergovernmental conference formally launching these negotiations was held on 25 June 2024; whereas EU accession remains a merit-based process that requires fulfilment of the EU membership criteria;

    I. whereas the Moldovan Government has been pursuing an ambitious political, judicial and institutional reform process; whereas despite the dramatic effects of the war on Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova has managed to significantly consolidate its democracy and maintain the reform trajectory; whereas the improvements in the country’s democratic system have been reflected in its progress on various international indexes;

    J. whereas on 24 April 2023, the EU set up the Partnership Mission in Moldova under the common security and defence policy, with the objective of enhancing the security sector’s resilience in the areas of crisis management, hybrid threats and countering foreign information manipulation and interference;

    K. whereas on 21 May 2024, Moldova became the first country to sign a Security and Defence Partnership with the EU, which will help strengthen cooperation on security and defence policy between the EU and Moldova;

    1. Reaffirms its commitment to the Republic of Moldova’s future membership of the EU and acknowledges that its place is in the EU; believes that its membership in the EU would constitute a geostrategic investment in a united and strong Europe;

    2. Calls on the Commission to accelerate the completion of the bilateral screening process, which will allow for the swift organisation of future intergovernmental conferences and for the opening of negotiations under Cluster I on Fundamentals as soon as possible;

    3. Condemns the increasing malicious activities, interference and hybrid warfare deployed by the Russian Federation, its institutions and proxies, with the aim of undermining and subverting the democratic electoral process, stability and sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova ahead of the presidential elections and the constitutional referendum on EU integration;

    4. Reiterates its call on the Russian authorities to respect the Republic of Moldova’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to cease its provocations and attempts to destabilise the country and undermine its constitutional order and democratic institutions;

    5. Calls for the EU and its Member States to ensure that all necessary assistance is provided to the Republic of Moldova to strengthen its institutional mechanisms and its ability to respond to hybrid threats and counter disinformation and cyberattacks; underlines the importance of the EU Partnership Mission in the Republic of Moldova in strengthening the resilience of Moldova’s security sector in the areas of crisis management and hybrid threats, including cybersecurity and countering foreign information manipulation and interference, and calls for its mandate to be extended;

    6. Encourages the EU and its Member States to actively support Moldova in countering disinformation, hybrid threats, cyberattacks and multifaceted Russian interference; emphasises the particular importance of countering Russia’s falsification and instrumentalisation of history, which underscores its malign interference in the Republic of Moldova and is used to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine and its threats of further aggression against other states; considers that this should include enhancing the Republic of Moldova’s capacity to combat disinformation, strengthen its cybersecurity infrastructure and improve resilience against foreign malign influence, ensuring a secure and democratic environment; calls for increased support for Moldova’s Center for Strategic Communication and Combating Disinformation;

    7. Calls for the EU and like-minded states to closely monitor Russian interference in the Moldovan electoral process and to stand ready to use existing sanctions regimes against individuals and entities that actively participate in subverting and destabilising the political landscape, spread disinformation and sow chaos;

    8. Underlines the importance of continuing the country’s reform process, not only in order to achieve the political objective of EU membership, but above all to tangibly improve the standard of living for all sections of society in the country; welcomes the widespread support in the Republic of Moldova for its European integration;

    9. Calls for the EU and its Member States to increase financial and technical assistance to the Republic of Moldova to facilitate the process of the country’s swift and effective integration into the EU; recommends the creation of robust and flexible tools tailored to Moldova’s specific needs in order to efficiently address its economic and structural challenges, ensuring the country remains resilient and capable of implementing necessary reforms on its EU accession path, and ensuring that it is adequately funded; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to include the Republic of Moldova in the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance and to prioritise funding for candidate countries in its proposal for the next multiannual financial framework (2028-2034), ensuring the path towards EU membership;

    10. Calls for the adoption of a new growth plan for the Republic of Moldova so as to adequately finance and support Moldova in achieving economic convergence with the EU; believes that this plan should finance investments in infrastructure, human capital and the digital and green transitions, facilitating sustainable economic growth;

    11. Reiterates its call for an innovative, complementary and flexible interaction between the implementation of the Association Agreement and the accession negotiation process, allowing for the Republic of Moldova’s gradual integration into the EU single market, based on a priority action plan and relevant sectoral programmes and providing access to relevant EU funds, enabling Moldovan citizens to reap the benefits of accession during the process rather than only at its completion;

    12. Advocates increased financial assistance from the European Peace Facility to further enhance Moldova’s defence capabilities, with a particular focus on air defence systems, mobility and transport, command and control, electronic warfare and logistics;

    13. Welcomes the Moldovan authorities’ considerable efforts to advance the reform agenda in order to progress towards EU membership; commends the progress made by the Republic of Moldova on justice-sector reform, especially in the context of the implementation of the Commission recommendations on Moldova’s accession application; encourages the Moldovan Government to continue working with all stakeholders towards a sustainable and comprehensive justice and anti-corruption reform, in line with EU and Venice Commission recommendations; emphasises the absolute priority of strengthening the rule of law, which has substantially gained in importance in the EU accession process and remains one of the most important conditions for EU membership to ensure that EU enlargement strengthens rather than weakens the EU and its single market;

    14. Encourages the Commission to assist the Republic of Moldova in strengthening its energy security by supporting the construction of new electricity interconnections with neighbouring countries; calls on the Commission to stand ready to offer emergency assistance in case of an energy crisis ahead of and during the heating season; calls for the EU to support energy efficiency and renewable energy projects as a clean and sustainable way of diversifying Moldova’s energy supply;

    15. Commends Moldova’s accession to EU programmes such as EU4Health, Customs, Horizon Europe, LIFE, FISCALIS, Connecting Europe Facility, the Single Market Programme, Digital Europe, Creative Europe, the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, Joint Procurement Agreement to procure medical countermeasures, Employment and Social Innovation Programme, Interreg NEXT Black Sea Basin Programme 2021-2027, Interreg Danube Region Programme 2021-2027, Interreg NEXT Romania-Republic of Moldova Programme 2021-2027 and Erasmus+; supports the inclusion of Moldova in the ‘roam like at home’ initiative;

    16. Calls on the Commission and the European External Action Service to improve strategic communication about the EU in the Republic of Moldova; calls on the Commission and the Member States to continue to support media literacy and the independence of the media in the Republic of Moldova, and to support the digital hardening of its critical infrastructure and the replacement of Russian-origin information and communications technology systems;

    17. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Government and Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation, the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Council of Europe.

     

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  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Committee on Enforced Disappearances Closes Twenty-Seventh Session after Adopting Concluding Observations on Morocco, Norway and Ukraine

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Committee on Enforced Disappearances this afternoon closed its twenty-seventh session after adopting its concluding observations on the reports of Morocco, Norway and Ukraine.

    Juan Pablo Albán Alencastro, Committee Rapporteur, said the Committee held constructive dialogues with Morocco, Norway and Ukraine, and adopted concluding observations on their reports, which would be published next Tuesday.  In addition, the Committee adopted lists of issues in the absence of a report for Lesotho and Seychelles, as well as lists of themes on additional information for Belgium and Serbia. 

    The Rapporteur recalled that at the opening of the session, the Committee paid tribute to the victims of enforced disappearance, and heard the testimony of Ms. Shui-Meng Ng, wife of Sombath Somphone, disappeared in Lao People’s Democratic Republic.  During the session, the Committee held productive meetings with States parties, civil society organizations and victims.  It also held discussions on its methods of work and adopted several amendments to its Rules of Procedure.  It adopted its report on the urgent action mechanism.

    The Committee also adopted the final draft of the joint statement on short-term enforced disappearances, drafted with the Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances; made the decision to initiate the process for the future adoption of a general comment on women and enforced disappearances; and continued planning the World Forum on Enforced Disappearances, to be held on 15 and 16 January 2025.

    Milica Kolakovic-Bojovic, Committee Vice-Chair, presented the illustrated Spanish version of the general comment on enforced disappearances in the context of migration, which was available to be downloaded and would soon be printed and distributed. 

    The Committee also screened a short extract of a documentary on international adoptions which had their roots in enforced disappearance, which would soon be aired on television.

    Olivier de Frouville, Committee Chairperson, in concluding remarks, expressed thanks to all those who had contributed to the twenty-seventh session, which had been very intense.  The Committee had opened the session under the banner of the multiplication of armed conflicts, and unfortunately was closing it in a situation that had become even worse, particularly in the Middle East. 

    During the session, the Committee had held a constructive dialogue with Ukraine. Today, thousands of families in Ukraine were searching for their loved ones. 

    The dialogue with Morocco had made it possible to highlight the weight of the past.  While the work of the Equity and Reconciliation Commission established the State’s responsibility for enforced disappearances committed between 1956 and 1999, and clarified the fate of many disappeared persons, the issue remained a matter of concern in Moroccan society. 

    The question of the past was also present in the dialogue with Norway.  In the contemporary period, many countries like Norway had to face the challenges posed by the disappearances of migrants, but also revelations related to illegal international adoptions, which in some cases could be caused by enforced disappearances. 

    Mr. de Frouville said the Committee had adopted its report on the urgent action procedure, which showed an increase in cases of disappearances with a transnational dimension and involving several States.  The Committee was particularly concerned that several authors had indicated that they no longer wished to follow up on an urgent action initiated by them, for fear of reprisals, or because the State concerned did not provide them with access to the file.  It was crucial that all perpetrators of urgent actions, as well as all persons cooperating with the Committee, were protected from all forms of reprisals and were able to participate fully in the search for the disappeared. 

    The World Congress on Enforced Disappearances would take place on 15 and 16 January 2025. The Committee invited all interested States, civil society actors and organizations of victims of enforced disappearances to attend.  Registration for the Conference was available online as of today. 

    All documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, can be found on the session’s webpage, where the concluding observations on the reports of Morocco, Norway and Ukraine will be available next Tuesday.  Summaries of the public meetings of the Committee can be found here, while webcasts of the public meetings can be found here.

    The Committee’s twenty-eighth session is scheduled to be held from 17 March to 4 April 2025, during which the Committee will examine the reports of the Central African Republic, Malta and Sri Lanka.   It will also review responses provided by Argentina and Peru to its request for additional information and hold the official launch of the joint statement on so-called short-term enforced disappearances. 

     

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

     

    CED24.011E

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI USA News: Press Briefing by President  Biden, Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre, and National Economic Adviser Lael  Brainard

    Source: The White House

    2:06 P.M. EDT

    THE PRESIDENT:  Hey, folks.  My name is Joe Biden.  (Laughter.)

    Q    Welcome to the briefing room.

    Q    Welcome, Mr. President. 

    Q    We’ve been waiting for you. 

    THE PRESIDENT:  Welcome to the swimming pool.

    Q    Finally.  This is — this is great.

    THE PRESIDENT:  Hey, look, folks, good afternoon.  The past two days have gotten some — we’ve gotten very good news about the American economy. 

    Just yesterday, shipping carriers, after some discussion, and the International Longshoreman’s Union came to an agreement to keep their ports in the East Coast and Gulf ports open.  We averted what could have become a major crisis for the country.  And a tentative agreement, which includes record wage increases for dockworkers and shows the importance of collective bargaining and represents, I think, critical progress toward a strong contract. 

    I especially want to thank the carriers, the port operators, and the longshoreman’s union for reaching this agreement at a time when the nation has experienced such terrible devastation from Hurricane Helene.  It was truly a service to the American people for all the parties to come together and to respond to our request to keep the ports open. 

    I was determined to — to avert a crisis at this moment, because it’s a critical moment.  If we didn’t do this now, we’d have a real problem.  

    I also want to thank my White House team for the work — they worked around the clock to bring the parties together. 

    But, today, I — we got more incredible news.  Although the strength of the American economy is a — it’s about the strength of the American economy.  The new jobs report, as you all know and you’ve been reporting, created 250,000 jobs in September.  The expectation was for 150,000 jobs in September, which is — far exceeds that number.  Not only the previous two months — but not only that, the previous two months was revised up 150,000 — 75,000 jobs. 

    And from the very beginning, we were told time and again that the polices we were pursuing — we’d put forward weren’t –weren’t going to work, make things worse, including some of the other team who are still saying they’re going to make things worse.  But we’ve proven them wrong.

    You know, we were told our American — we’ve — we were told our American Rescue Plan was too big and it would crowd out private investment.  We proved them wrong.  It vaccinated a nation and got immediate economic relief to people in need. 

    When I came to office determined to end trickle-down economics and to grow the economy from the middle out and the bottom up — I know you’re tired of hearing me say that over and over again, but that was the policy; it remains the policy — because when you do that, everyone does well.  When the middle class grows, the nation is stronger.  And the nation is stronger when there is a strong union movement as well. 

    We were told it wouldn’t work, but I was also determined to do what was ignored for much too long.  Presidents have been authorized since the ‘30s to be able to spend the money given by Congress — to spend the money on hiring American workers and using American product where they were available.  And that’s what we did.  

    We were told that was going to be a big problem, but all the money we — I was authorized to spend by the Congress has gone to building a mi- — to — gone to hiring American workers and using American products.  We were told it wasn’t going to be — I — we were told that was going to be a big problem, but it’s working. 

    We were also told that our historic laws to invest in America and all Americans would crowd out private-sector investment.  Well, that was proven wrong too.

    We’ve attracted nearly $1 trillion since we’ve come to office in private-sector investment from domestic and foreign companies investing in America — in America.  And not this stuff with sh- — shipping jobs overseas for cheaper labor and bringing back a product to America.  We’re building it here and sending it overseas.  And look at the results across the board.

    Unemployment is back down 4- — to 4.1 percent.  And every month f- — that Vice President Harris and I have been in office, we’ve been — there’s been — we’ve created jobs every single month. 

    The nation has now created 16 million jobs since I’ve come to office, more jobs created in a single presidential term than at any time in American history. 

    Our GDP shows our economy grew at — at 10 percent under my administration.  Unemployment reached the lowest level in 50 years. 

    We were also told inflation couldn’t come down without massive job losses or sending the economy into economic recession. 

    Once again, the outside experts were wrong.  Inflation has come way down.  Wages have gone up, growing faster than prices.  The interest rates are down.  A record 19 million new business applications have been filed for.  The stock market continues to reach new heights. 

    We’ve got more work to do though to keep getting — keep — to keep getting prices down, like more affordable housing, extending what I’ve done for seniors and lowering prescription drug costs by letting Medicare negotiate the prices — make sure that’s available to everyone. 

    And, by the way, what we’ve done so far — just what we’ve brought down the prices for seniors under Medicare, it saved the taxpayers billions of dollars — billions of dollars.  Saved the taxpayers billions of dollars.  That’s important to note because they don’t have to pay the exorbitant and ratio- — irrational prices that these companies are charging.

    The simple fact is we’ve gone from an economy in crisis to literally having the strongest economy in the world.  And — but we got — we — we got more work to do.  We’ve got more work to do to deal the — the things I’ve just mentioned.  And we’re going to have to deal with unforeseen costs of what this — this hu- — this hurricane is going to cost.  It’s going to cost a lot of money, and I’m going to probably have to ask the Congress before we leave for more money to deal with some of those problems, but that remains to be seen. 

    I’ll take a few questions before I turn it over to —

    Q    Mr. President —

    THE PRESIDENT:  You pick out the questions.

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  Oh, okay.  Yes, sir.  (Laughter.)  Yes, sir. 

    Go ahead, Josh. 

    Q    Thanks again for doing this, Mr. President.  Two questions.  The first, Florida Senator Marco Rubio described today’s jobs report as having “fake numbers.”  What do you make of that?  And how worried are you that many Americans are hearing that the jobs numbers aren’t real? 

    THE PRESIDENT:  Look, I’m going to be very careful here.  If you notice anything the MAGA Republicans don’t like, they call “fake.”  Anything.  The job numbers are what the job numbers are.  They’re real.  They’re sincere.  They’re — what we are. 

    But — and, by the way, just look at how the EU talks about us, how they’d like to have an economy like ours.  Let’s talk about the rest of the world looks at us and what we’re doing. 

    So, I — well, I don’t want to get going. 

    Q    And — and then, secondly, could you clarify some of your comments yesterday with regard to strikes on Iranian oil facilities?  What did you mean by them, given some of the reactions we’re seeing in the market?

    THE PRESIDENT:  Well, look, the Israelis have not concluded how they’re — what they’re going to do in terms of a strike.  That’s under discussion.  I think there are — if I were in their shoes, I’d be thinking about other alternatives than striking oil fields. 

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  Go ahead, Weijia.

    Q    Thank you, Karine.  Thank you so much, Mr. President, for being here. 

    This week, Senator Chris Murphy said, “It’s certainly a possibility that the Israeli government is not going to sign any diplomatic agreement prior to the election,” which is what you have been calling for for so long, “potentially to try to influence the result.” 

    Do you agree?  Do you have any worries that Netanyahu may be trying to influence the election, and that’s why he has not agreed to a diplomatic solution?

    THE PRESIDENT:  No administration has helped Israel more than I have.  None.  None.  None.  And I think Bibi should remember that. 

    And whether he’s trying to influence the election, I don’t know, but I’m not counting on that.

    Q    You’ve said many times recently that you want to speak to him, that you plan to —

    THE PRESIDENT:  No, I didn’t say “plan to.”  I didn’t say “want to.”

    Q    You don’t want to?

    THE PRESIDENT:  No, I didn’t say that.  You’re making it sound like I’m seeking an inv- — speak- — I’m assuming when they make their judgment of how they’re going to respond, we will then have a discussion. 

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  Go ahead, Selina.

    Q    Thank you.

    Q    Thank you, Mr. President, for being here.  What are you advising the Israelis to do in terms of their retaliation to Iran?  And at this point, you still haven’t spoken to Netanyahu.  Is it fair to say that you have little personal influence over what he decides to do?

    THE PRESIDENT:  No.  Look, our — our teams are in contact 12 hours a day.  They’re constantly in contact.  I’ve already had my presidential daily brief.  We’ve already had interface between our military, our — the diplomats.  It’s in constant contact. 

    They are trying to figure out — this is High Holidays as well.  They’re not going to make a decision immediately.  And so, we’re going to wait to see what they — when they want to talk. 

    Q    But over the past few months, they’ve consistently defied your administration’s own advice.  So, do you believe that the Israelis are going to listen to the advice you’re giving them?

    THE PRESIDENT:  What I know is the plan that I put together received the support of the U.N. Security Council and the vast majority of our allies around the world as a way to bring this to an end. 

    One of — look, the Israelis have every right to respond to the vicious attacks on them not just from the Iranians but from the — everyone from Hezbollah to the Houthis to — anyway.  And — but the fact is that they have to be very much more careful about dealing with civilian casualties.

    Q    So, how should they respond?  You expressed concerns about attacks on Iranian oil facilities.  How should they respond?

    THE PRESIDENT:  That’s between me and them.

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  All right.  We got to move on.  Go ahead, Tam.

    Q    The election is a month away.  One, I’d like to know how you’re feeling about how this election is going.  And then, also, do you have confidence that it will be a free and fair election and that it will be peaceful?

    THE PRESIDENT:  Two separate questions.

    Q    Very much.

    THE PRESIDENT:  I’m confident it’ll be free and fair.  I don’t know whether it will be peaceful. 

    The things that Trump has said and the things that he said last time out when he didn’t like the outcome of the election were very dangerous. 

    If you notice — I — I noticed that the vice-presidential Republican candidate did not say he’d accept the outcome of the election.  And they haven’t even accepted the outcome of the last election.  So, I’m — I’m concerned about what they’re — what they’re going to do.

    Q    Are you making any preparations?  Getting security briefings related to domestic security?

    THE PRESIDENT:  I always get those briefings.

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  All right.  We got to move on.  Go ahead, Akayla.  And we have — do a couple more.

    Q    Hi.  Hi, Mr. President.  When are you considering imposing sanctions on Iran?  And would you include oil in those sanctions?

    THE PRESIDENT:  That’s som- — that’s be- — that’s under consideration right now, the whole thing.  I’m not going to discuss that out loud.

    Q    And just on your comments yesterday on the port strike.  You said by “the grace of God,” it’s going to hold.  Is there any reason you think that this —

    THE PRESIDENT:  Well, there’s more to do.

    Q    — this temporary suspension —

    THE PRESIDENT:  It’s a month from now, and there’s more to do in terms of everything from the whole notion of me- — me- — excuse me — mechanization of the ports and the like.  There’s more to more to re- — more to resolve.

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  Go ahead, Danny.

    Q    Thanks, Karine.  Thank you, Mr. President.  Last night, you said that there’s still a lot to do to avoid an all-out war in the Middle East.  I mean, firstly, aren’t we pretty close to that definition already?  And — and, secondly, what — what can you really do to stop that happening?

    THE PRESIDNET:  There’s a lot we are doing.  The main thing we can do is try to rally the rest of the world and our allies into participating, like the French are, in — in Lebanon and other places to tamp this down.  And — but when you have proxies as irrational as Hezbollah and the Houthis and — it’s a — it’s a hard thing to determine.

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  Go ahead, Toluse.

    THE PRESIDENT:  I’ve got to go, kid.

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  I know.  I know.  (Laughter.)  He’s telling me, “I got to go.”

    THE PRESIDENT:  I said I’d take a couple questions.  (Laughter.)

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  All right. 

    Q    We’ll take (inaudible) —

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  You’re the la- — you’re the last one, Toluse.

    THE PRESIDENT:  I think she’s decreasing her credibility.  (Laughter.)

    Q    First — first time in four years; you have to take some more.

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  Toluse, you’re going to be the last one.

    Q    Thank you, Mr. President.  Thank you for — for spending some time here with us.  There have obviously been a number of crises that the country has been facing over the past several days with the hurricane, with port strike, with the situation in the Middle East.  Can you talk about how your vice president, who is running for the presidency, has worked on these crises and what role she has played over the past several

    days?

    THE PRESIDENT:  Well, she’s — I’m in constant contact with her.  She’s aware of where — we all — we’re singing from the same song sheet.  We — she helped pass the l- — all the laws that are being employed now.  She was a major player in everything we’ve done, including passage of legislation, which we were told we could never pass.  And so, she’s been — and her — her staff is interlocked with mine in terms of all the things we’re doing.

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  All right, sir.  Thank you, sir.

    (Cross-talk.)

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  It’s up to you, sir.  (Laughs.)

    (Cross-talk.)

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  Totally up to you, sir.

    (Cross-talk.)

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  All right.  All right.  Go ahead.  Go ahead.  Go ahead.  Go ahead.

    (Cross-talk.)

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  Yeah, Nandita.  Nandita.

    Sir — sir — no.  No.  Sir — I didn’t call on you, sir.  I didn’t call on you.  Nandita.

    Q    Pope Francis is calling for a day of —

    Q    Thank you.  Thank you, Karine.

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  Nandita. 

    Q    — prayer —

    Q    Mr. President —

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  Go, Nandita.

    Q    — and fasting.  What’s —

    Q    Mr. President —

    THE PRESIDENT:  On Pope Francis —

    Q    Yeah.

    THE PRESIDENT:  — calling for a day of prayer and fasting —

    Q    A day of prayer and fasting this Monday, October 7th.  You reaction, sir?

    THE PRESIDENT:  I will prayer and fast.

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  All right.  That’s —

    (Cross-talk.)

    Q    Mr. President, what is acceptable to you in terms of Israel’s response?  How long are you okay with Israel bombing Lebanon?  What is acceptable to you?

    Q    Mr. President —

    (Cross-talk.)

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  All right, guys.  That’s it.  Thank you, everybody. 

    THE PRESIDENT:  Thank you.

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  Thank you, Mr. President.  Thank you, sir.

    THE PRESIDENT:  Thank you.

    (Cross-talk.)

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  Thank you, every- — thank you, sir.

    Q    Mr. President, on Ukraine.  Have you made a decision on long-range weapons?

    Q    Do you re- — want to reconsider dropping out of the race?

    THE PRESIDENT:  I’m back in.  (Laughter.)

    Q    What made you want to come here today, Mr. President?

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  All right, everybody.

    Q    Thank — thank you, Mr. President.

    Q    Thank you. 

    Q    Please come back. 

    Q    Thank you, Karine.

    Q    Karine, can we do that again?

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  No.  (Laughter.)

    You hear- — you heard I was already told that.  (Laughs.) 

    Q    So, that’s why we were late? 

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  I mean, are we always on — any — always on time?  (Laughter.)  I — I could call myself out for that.

    All right, everybody.  Thank you so much.  Thank you, Mr. President.

    Okay.  So, this week, the United States has faced a — a number of competing challenges, from tensions in the Middle East, to a port strike that threatened our nation’s supply chains, to a historic hurricane that washed away entire communities.

    Moments like these underscore the importance of American leadership and resolve, and they show what is possible when we come together.

    Under the leadership of President Biden and Vice President Harris, we were able to successfully protect our allies, ensure the viability of critical supplies, stand up for good-paying union jobs, and get resources to people impacted by the storm in North Carolina and beyond.

    In the Middle East, the president showed that our ironclad support for Israelis’ security is not just a talking point; it saves lives.  Prior to Iran’s attack on Israel, the president convened his national security team in the Situation Room to monitor developments in real time, ensure we were prepared to assist in Israelis’ defense, and protect U.S. personnel in the region.

    Under the president’s leadership, the United States successfully defended Israel an- — from Iran’s missiles, standing shoulder to shoulder with the people of Israel.

    On the home front, the president and his team brought union workers, ocean carriers, and port operators to the table to — successfully to resolve a strike that threatened U.S. supply chains and the economic progress this president has made to lower prices for the American people.

    And in the Southwest United States — Southeast, pardon me, United States, the administration pre-positioned 1,500 federal personnel, along with critical resources like food, water, and fuel, to ensure that communities in the path of Hurricane Helene were prepared ahead of the storm. 

    Now, we are getting more resources into the hardest-hit communities every day, and we have provided over $45 million directly to individuals and families to help them recover.

    And a wide range of bipartisan officials, including the governors of every affected state, are working together with us and have praised the federal response. 

    These response- — responses underscore why leadership matters.  The president’s leadership in this moment helps to save lives, pra- — protect critical alliances, and ensure that our economy remains strong.  But more importantly, it proves that nothing is beyond America’s capacity when we do it together.

    And really quickly, because I know you all a- — asked for this.  This is the week ahead.  Next week, the president will travel to Milwaukee, Wisconsin, to discuss his administration’s work to replace lead pipes in the state and across the country through the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law.  This law is investing historic resources into our communities and creating good-paying jobs.

    The president will also be traveling to Philadelphia for a campaign engagement. 

    He will also travel to Germany and Angola to underscore the enduring strength and importance of two strategic bilateral relationships in addressing a comprehensive range of global stra- — challenges.  The value of strong alliances and partnerships in the defense of freedom and democracy has never resonated more in Europe, Africa, and beyond.

    President Biden has made revitalizing our international alliances and partnerships a key priority, recognizing that today’s challenges require global perspectives and shared responses.

    Those are the details I am able to share with — for now, but certainly, we will have more in the upcoming days. 

    And finally, n- — finally, we have Lael Bran- — Brai- — Brainard — (laughs) — our national economic adviser to the president.  She’s going to provide more information on how the president helped reopen our ports, as well as the strong job market economy report that we saw today, showing that more than 250,000 jobs this — this September under the president — President Biden.

    MS. BRAINARD:  Well, thanks, Karine.  And it’s good to see everybody today.

    It is a good day for American workers and families.  We saw more than 250,000 new jobs created in the month of September.  We saw unemployment back down to 4.1 percent at a time when inflation is back down to pre-pandemic levels.

    The East Coast and Gulf ports are opening back up, and dockworkers are getting back to work on the basis of a strong tentative agreement on wages and a contract extension between the International Longshoreman’s Association and the United St- — States Maritime Alliance.

    Just a week ago, the negotiation had totally stalled out.  The union and employers had not spoken to each other for months.  The last time a wage offer had been put on the table was in the middle of 2023.

    The president and the vice president directed us to get the parties back to the table to reach a good deal.  We worked around the clock to help them find common ground. 

    And the president was clear throughout that process on three things: We needed to get the union and the employers back to the table on the basis of a strong progress on wages so nothing would get in the way of hurricane recovery; Taft-Hartley was off the table because collective bargaining works; and workers should share in the large profits of the ocean carriers, particularly after those dockworkers sacrificed so much to keep goods moving for the American public during the pandemic.

    And as a result of the hard work that I undertook along with Secretary Buttigieg, [Acting] Secretary Su, a number of people in the White House.  We are seeing dockworkers get a fair share of the industry’s record returns.  We’re seeing ports opening so consumers and businesses can get what they need.  And we don’t expect to see any effects on our economy or for consumers, businesses, and farmers because we have strong supply chains that we built in the wake of the pandemic. 

    The president and the vice president have consistently supported the collective bargaining process.  When employers and workers come to the table, they find a good outcome. 

    That’s a vastly different approach from previous administrations that might have busted unions and rolled back worker protections. 

    And finally, I would simply say that the data that we’re seeing, the data we saw last week confirms that our economy is delivering for workers. 

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  All right.  I’m going to take a couple of questions. 

    Go ahead, Selina.

    Q    Thank you so much for being here.  Would you say at this point that the U.S. has achieved a soft landing?  And if not, at what point will we be there?

    MS. BRAINARD:  Yeah, I would say that, look, we have seen unemployment — the lowest average unemployment rate of any administration in 50 years, and we have seen inflation come back down to pre-pandemic levels. 

    That is exactly the kind of growth that you would want to see.  Growth has actually been revised up.  It’s been above 3 percent over the last year, and we’re continuing to see very resilient consumers.  So, yes, that’s exactly the kind of Goldilocks results that you would want to see.

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  Go ahead, Josh.

    Q    Thanks again for doing this.  If I could ask about an otherwise strong jobs report.  You still have manufacturing employment dip by 7,000.  What do you think is happening in the manufacturing sector right now?  Is this response to higher rates, or are you seeing something else going on?

    MS. BRAINARD:  Yeah, so I think if you look more broadly across the administration, you have seen manufacturing jobs growing by more than 700,000, in contrast to the previous administration that actually saw manufacturing job losses even before the pandemic. 

    And I think the right way to think about this — because we have so much new investment dollars from the Investing in America agenda, the right way to think about it is to look at construction and manufacturing jobs together.  And there, what we’ve seen is continued growth. 

    That construction workforce is hard at work with factory construction that is multiples of the previous administrations.  That construction of factories is going to turn into the manufacturing jobs of the future. 

    So, we see that investment in today’s economy, whether it be in chip manufacturing or clean energy, that is going to result in tomorrow’s manufacturing jobs.

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  Go ahead.

    Q    Thank you, Karine. 

    Just after the last Fed rate cut, do you think the administration has won its fight against inflation?

    MS. BRAINARD:  So, I would say, if you look at the data on inflation, it is now back down to pre-pandemic levels.  Don’t forget, nobody said that could happen with a strong labor market.  I think people just really need to go back and see some of the predictions.  Nobody thought we could have the strongest recovery in our peer economies — strongest on jobs, strongest on growth — and get inflation down as fast as we did. 

    And so, that just shows that the president’s investments and the focus on supply chains has really worked. 

    Q    And then just a follow-up on the consumer confidence

    numbers.  I mean, there was, you know, an upward revision in August, but now it’s down in September.  I’m just sort of wondering if you can comment on that.

    MS. BRAINARD:  Yeah, so I think the most recent Michigan sentiment numbers actually are showing strength.  And, you know, if you look at what consumers are talking about, they’re talking about good jobs, good job opportunities.  And we’ve seen a lot of people moving into new sectors with better wages, and there is now a lot more confidence that interest rates are coming down, inflation is down, and that’s going to enable consumers to feel more confident about investing in some of those bigger-ticket items.

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  All right.  Just a couple more. 

    Go ahead.

    Q    Thank you.  On the jobs report, the data also showed that the employment picture in July and August was also brighter than previously thought.  For Americans who are concerned about the rate that they may pay on their mortgage or their car that they might buy, what do you see that doing to the path of interest rates going forward?

    MS. BRAINARD:  You know, I think that we are now in a part of the recovery where inflation is back down, and that’s really what is going to determine whether interest rates continue to fall.  And market interest rates have remained low.  Mortgage rates have come all the way down close to 6 percent.  We anticipate, because inflation is back down, that that will continue to show through to market rates.

    Q    And on the hurricane that ravaged the Southeast, what are your early indications of how that could impact economic growth and the jobs picture in November, with so many in that region out of work?

    MS. BRAINARD:  Yeah, so we do think normally with a hurricane of this size, with the devastation that it has caused in many communities, that it will affect the employment statistics for that month.  But what we know is that, generally, you see the economy overall bouncing back very quickly and the growth numbers really becoming sort of strong pretty rapidly because of all that rebuilding activity that we are committed to. 

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  Go ahead, Jacqui.

    Q    That was my —

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  Oh, okay.

    Q    — on interest rates.  Yeah.  (Laughter.) 

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  Go ahead.

    Q    How concerned are you right now about the instability

    in the Middle East and its impact on oil prices?

    MS. BRAINARD:  Yeah, so, it is something that we track very closely.  Obviously, prices at the pump right now, $3.18 on average — not that I track it closely, but that is today’s number — (laughter) — and below $3 in many states.  We believe that global markets are well supplied, and continue to expect that in the U.S., we’ll continue to see those low gas prices. 

    And of course, we have really effective ways of addressing some of those geostrategic volatility.  We’ve used it in the past.  We have the capacity to use it again. 

    So, right now, markets are very well supplied, and we anticipate them to remain so. 

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  All right, last question to — oh — 

    Q    Yeah, I’ll —

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  No, I — I can go to Gerren too.  (Laughs.)  Go ahead. 

    Q    Thanks.  A federal judge in Missouri issued an injunction blocking the president’s student loan program hours after a judge in Georgia allowed it to advance.  What is the White House’s message to this dizzying legal battle?  And that was lifted up as an economic policy to, particularly, closing the racial wealth gap.  And what is your message to Black and brown Americans who are really relying on this relief?

    MS. BRAINARD:  Yeah.  So, student loan debt relief is so important for so many young people who are trying to build wealth, particularly for people who are first generation, to be able to invest in small businesses, to invest in starting a family, to invest in a house for the first time.  So, we are going to continue to work to deliver that debt relief to so many students who deserve it. 

    I do want to say that we have 5 million Americans who have already received debt relief.  And, you know, you can go on TikTok and other social media platforms and see their testimonials what a difference it makes in their lives.  And that is why the president, vice president going to continue working so hard to deliver.  

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  Awesome.  Thank you so much, Lael.

    MS. BRAINARD:  Thank you.

    Q    More Americans are food insecure.

    MS. BRAINARD:  Thank you. 

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  Thank you.  Thank you so much. 

    Q    Could you address food insecurity?

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  I appreciate it. 

    Q    The numbers are rising —

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  Thank you, thank you.

    Q    — according to the USDA.  Food insecurity numbers? 

    Maybe, Karine, if you could address it?

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  No.  Not — not right now.

    Q    Food insecurity?

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  I — I’m — I’m not talking to you, sir.

    Q    Okay.

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  I’m just not.  It would be nice if you would be less disrespectful in the room.

    Q    I’m just asking questions.

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  Inappropriately. 

    Okay.  Go ahead, Josh.  I don’t know if — maybe you guys are done with me.  Maybe I can walk out.  (Laughs.)  You guys got — you guys got all the best.  (Laughs.)  You guys got all the best. 

    Go ahead, Josh.

    Q    So, if we were to, like, zoom out —

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  Yeah.

    Q    — President Biden came in here today. 

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  Yeah.

    Q    He’s going to be with Pennsylvania Senator Bob Casey this week.  Then he goes to Germany and Angola.  He said he’s singing from the same song sheet as vice president Kamala Harris on the campaign.  How does he see his public role in the next few weeks as we get closer to the election?  What does — what’s he trying to achieve?

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  I — look —

    Q    And how’s he thinking about it?

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  I think he’s doing his job as president, right?  I think that’s the most important thing.  I mean, I started off at the top, at least of this — this part of the program, where I said that we’ve had three major events happen this week.  And what did the president do?  What did the vice president do?  They worked shoulder and shoulder to deal with these major events. 

    Now we see a deal with the port — a negotiated deal with the ports.  Obviously, it — it — that collective bargaining is extended until January 15th, which is incredibly important, especially in the midst of a hurricane that we saw — this historic hurricane that we just saw — Hurricane Helene. 

    We s- — we see what’s happening in the Middle East.  The president and the vice president continue to have diplomatic conversations, if you will, to deal — to de-escalate, to deal with what we’re seeing in — in that — in the region.

    And the hurricane.  You saw the — the vice president in — in Georgia; the president in North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, himself, and also in North — also in Florida, pardon me. 

    And so, I think what you’re going to see is him continuing to do his job, working closely with the vice president. 

    Look, before Hurricane Helene, President Biden was planning to campaign this week, and you heard — you heard me say he’s going to go to Pennsylvania.  He’s going to go to Wisconsin next week.  And so, we have — you know, we — we have — you all have covered how much of a whirlwind week this has been. 

    And so, the president is going to be president.  He’s going to be commander in chief.  And obviously, he’s going to be supporting his vice president. 

    I can’t speak specifically about the campaign because of — we do respect the Hatch Act here — at least for myself, as a federal employee, and many of us here. 

    And so, look, he’s going to continue to — to do the work that he’s doing.  We saw strong jobs numbers.  That’s one of the reasons he came out.  He came out because he wanted to talk about that.  He wanted to talk about what we have seen this week.

    And so — and so, look, we’re going to continue to doing the work, and I think that’s what the American people want to see. 

    Go ahead, Selina.

    Q    Thanks, Karine.  So, former President Donald Trump threatened to revoke the legal status of Haitian migrants.

    What is the president’s reaction to that?  This is something that the former president had tried to do during his own administration. 

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  Look, here’s the fact.  The fact is they are here legally, right?  That is the fact.  TPS, that’s what it gives you.  And honestly, I wouldn’t take legal advice from the former president.  I don’t know.  That’s not something I would do. 

    Go ahead.

    Q    And how concerned is the administration about the economic impact of Hurricane Helene?

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  Look, as you can see, we have been working around the clock.  The president directed his team very early on to work around the clock to make sure that the states who were — that were affected, the states that he’s visited and the vice president has visited over the past couple of days, got everything that they need.  And we — and we did that by pre-positioning — pre-positioning some of the personnel — about 1,500 federal personnel — to do that. 

    What we are doing: We’re going to make sure — obviously, we’re going to always monitor any of the economic impact.  But we’re going to continue to make sure that we are dealing — we are focused on lifesaving and life-sustaining efforts.  That’s the focus that we’re going to have here. 

    And we’re going to continue to monitor.  But obviously, reacting and providing the needs of the states right now, of the — of citizens who are living in those states is probably the most key and most important.  And continue to call on Congress to move forward with additional funding. 

    As you know, in the CR there was a robust ask for funding — for disaster funding, and that didn’t make it in the bipartisan CR.  And so, we got to get that done.  And we’re going to continue to have conversations with Congress.

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  Go ahead, Nandita.

    Q    Karine, I tried asking the president this —

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  Nandita, I’ve called on you, like, three times today.  (Laughter.)  I know some folks in the back are just going to be like, “Yeah.” 

    Q    I appreciate it.  I appreciate it.

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  So — yeah.

    Q    I tried asking President Biden —

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  (Laughs.)

    Q    (Inaudible.)

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  I hear you, Kimberly.  I hear you.

    Go ahead.

    Q    What is acceptable to the U.S. in terms of Israel’s response, right?  How long is the U.S. comfortable with Israel bombing Lebanon?

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  I — I know you guys are going to ask this question every which way, and I totally understand that.  We are having conversations, discussions.  We’re in contact with the Israelis on — on what’s next. 

    We have been very clear there will be consequences.  You saw the joint statement with the G7.  There’s going to be consequences.  There’s going to be sanctions.  And I’m not going to preview those sanctions from here. 

    But we have always said Israel has the right to defend itself.  And we — and you saw just on Tuesday night — and not just Tuesday night, in April — how — how much we are prepared to defend and protect Israel, because that is our ironclad commitment. 

    I’m not going to get into pu- — into diplomatic conversations in — in the public here.

    Q    And there was a report that quotes U.S. officials saying the White House wants to take advantage of the massive blow to Hezbollah’s leadership and infrastructure to push for a new Lebanese president in the coming days.  Can you comment on that?

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  I’m not going to comment on that.  I’m not going to comment on sources or reporting out there.  That is — that is not something I’m going to speak to, sourcing that I can’t even verify from here. 

    Go ahead.

    Q    Thank you.  On the port strike reaching a tentative agreement.  The White House and several officials were involved in — in the 90-day extension of those talks.  I’m wondering what the significance of that timeline is and whether the election being five weeks away played any role in it?

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  Look, this is about the right thing to do for workers.  Many of those workers put their lives at risk during the pandemic.  We have always said collective bargaining is — works.  We believe it works.  And we have seen — we have seen parties reach a fair agreement when you put — when you have — when they come in — come to the table and — in good faith and do that collective bargaining.  This is what’s important. 

    It was important to this president to get this done.  This is not about an election.  This is about what is the right thing to do for the American people.  This is the right thing to do for — for workers, again, who — who deserve higher wages, who deserve benefits. 

    And so, the president is proud to have been able to do that.  His team — obviously, with his team, in the dir- — and he directed his team to do this.  And so, now collective bargaining is going to continue, and we’ll see where we are in the next couple of — couple of months. 

    But this is not about politics for this president.  He — and you have seen that in the last three and a half years when we’ve been in these types of situation where there was negotiation, and we have been very, very clear: collective bargaining and supporting workers.

    Q    On congressional funding.  You mentioned some of the items that were lacking in the short-term funding bill that Republicans had put forth.  I’m wondering if the president has spoken with any members of the Big Four in Congress to bring those concerns to them directly. 

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  So, I don’t have any conversations to speak to that the president has had with members of Congress. 

    I mean, you saw him on the road.  He was able — you saw him in a bipartisan way on the road in North Carolina, South Carolina, in Georgia, and — and Florida.  And he — you saw him with Republican congressional members and governors and Republican — and Democratic congressional members and also governors.  And you saw that bipartisanship. 

    I’m certainly not going to get into any private conversations that they have had.  But we will continue to speak to congressional leadership and members about getting that extra funding.  It is important.  They need to act.  They need to act. 

    AIDE:  Karine, you (inaudible).

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  Go ahead.  Go ahead.

    Q    Hey, thanks, Karine.  Can you talk about how President Biden will be marking Monday’s one-year anniversary of the October 7th attack on Israel?

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  So, obviously, it’s going to be a painful — a painful day for — for many, including for — for all of us here.  And so, we will have more to share on how we will be commemorating that devastating day that we saw a year ago.  Don’t have anything to share at this time. 

    Q    And — and, secondly, this was President Biden’s first time — correct? — to the press briefing room —

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  Yeah.

    Q    — since he’s —

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  Yep.

    Q    What — why not —

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  And you’re welcome. 

    Q    Yeah.

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  You’re welcome.  I know you’re — I know this —

    Q    I know.  I know.

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  I know the way — the way this question is going to go.

    Q    We appreciate it.  I —

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  It’s going to be great.  It’s going to be great.  (Laughs.)

    Q    Let’s — let’s do it again.

    Q    I would have preferred a further question, but that’s all — that’s all right.  (Laughter.)  But real quick: Why not — why didn’t he come in the three and a half years before? 

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  I —

    Q    Why —

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  I mean, he came today.  And you got to see him.

    Q    Yes.  Yeah, but —

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  And you were here. 

    Q    — you know, I mean, he had the opportunity —

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  Aw, man.  Come on.

    Q    All right.  All right.

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  Come on.  He was here.  He took your questions.  And he —

    Q    It seemed like he wanted to stay a little bit longer.

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  I — (laughter) —

    Q    Every Friday?

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  He is — he is — every Friday?  (Laughter.)  Friday — Friday with the POTUS.  Friday with the POTUS.  We —

    Q    I’ll bring ice cream.  Bring ice cream.

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  Well, no, you guys got to bring the ice cream.  You guys got to bring the ice cream. 

    (Cross-talk.)

    Okay.  I’m going to do a couple more.  Go ahead.  I haven’t called on you.  Go ahead.  Go ahead.

    Q    Thank you, Karine.  I want to go back to Haitians and the TPS.  But first, you know, it was — it’s another week of misery in Haiti. 

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  Yeah.

    Q    There was this report from the World Food Programme describing acute hunger.  What more can the U.S. do to improve the situation in Haiti?  And conc- — if there’s no improvement, is it conceivable that the TPS for Haitians will never be lifted?

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  So, look, on your last question, I’ll do that first — the last part of your question, I’ll do that first.  I — we — I can’t predetermine what TPS status is going to be.  It’s not something that I can do from here.  Obviously, as you know, that is a decision with DHS and the State Department.  They decide TPS and the best way to move forward.  So, I’m not going to get into a hypothetical about that.

    But as it relates to Haiti more broadly and to the question of instability and what’s happening, look, despite that — despite the instability that continues, the recent deployment, as you know, of MSS mission is a unique opportunity to build a foundation of security and bring hope to Haitians that deserve to live their lives free of violence. 

    And so, to that end, the United States has delivered well over $300 million to support the MSS mission, while urging the international to community — community to support that — that mission as well.  The United States will continue to hold those undermining Haiti’s institutions and committing serious human rights abuses accountable.  That is our commitment. 

    We are committed to doing our part both to address immediate security needs and invest in Haiti’s long-term successes.  We stand with the people of Haiti and will continue supporting their aspirations of more security, certainly democratic and prosperous future.  That is our commitment, and we’ll continue to support the mission. 

    Go ahead, Michael.

    Q    Thanks, Karine.  It seems as if the president has spoken with pretty much every governor in the affected —

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  He has.  He has.  That was affected in the region.

    Q    But has he spoken with Governor DeSantis of Florida?

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  Touché.  Good point.  So — (laughter).  Touché. 

    So — and I think we read out that he spoke to the governor of Tennessee on our way back from — back from our trip to Florida and Georgia yesterday. 

    I don’t have a — a conversation to read out with the Florida — the governor of Florida.  But what I can say is that we have been in touch.  Our team has been in touch with local officials on the ground.  We are committed to providing what is needed in the state, obviously, to those who were affected in the state, and are committed — our commitment is clear.  The president has always said it doesn’t matter if you’re in a red state or a blue state; he’s a president for all Americans.  And that’s — continues to be, certainly, his commitment. 

    Go ahead.

    AIDE:  Last one.

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  I know.  I’m getting — I’m getting pulled.  But go ahead.  Then I’ll come back to you.

    Q    Thank you, Karine.  The president seemed to suggest that he is asking — or he seems to be suggesting that Israel should consider other alternatives, rather than attacking Iranian oil facilities.  But should Israel make such an attack, how is the administration preparing for an Iranian retaliation on the Strait of Hormuz that would disrupt oil supply and disrupt oil prices globally?

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  So, also as the president said, we continue to have these discussions.  I’m not going to get into hypotheticals Israel — about Israel’s response to Tues- — Tuesday — Tuesday night attacks. 

    What I will say is that we understand that they are still determining what exactly they will do.  That is something that we understand. 

    I’m just not going to prejudge.  I’m not going to get ahead of anything, and the discussions to continue.

    Q    But can we say that the administration is preparing for that possibility?

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  I — I’m just not going to get — I’m not going to speculate.  They’re still — I’m — I’m telling you, they’re — still haven’t decided what their next steps are going to be. 

    Q    Okay.

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  So that’s what I’m saying to you.  That’s what we understand.  I don’t have anything else beyond that.

    Q    And on Angola — on the President’s trip, Karine.  Amnesty International is criticizing the administration’s, quote, “silence” on human rights violations in Angola ahead of the president’s visit, calling out the administration’s focus on private-sector investment to counter China.  This is obviously in reference to the Lobito Corridor.  Do you have a response?

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  Look, I mean, I — we get this question — this type of question about human rights violations any time he meets, he travels and if that’s going to come up.  The president, as you know, has never shied away from direct conversation about human rights and democracy in any conversation, and I could expect that he will do the same in this upcoming trip. 

    And so, I don’t have anything beyond that, but the president has never shied away from that.  Never shied away.

    Go ahead.

    Q    Thank you, Karine.  Does the administration have any concerns about how the — the aftermath of this storm could impact the vote, whether it’s talking to the Postal Service about mail-in ballots that may not be getting to people or impacting the infrastructure in these critical states?

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  So, look, we are go- — using every available resources to help this com- — the community respond.  That’s what we’re going to do and recover from this disaster.  That is our commitment.  That’s what you’ve heard from this president. That’s what you heard from the FEMA administrator and so many others in the president’s administration, and certainly that means ensuring that Americans’ have — voices are heard this November.  And so, that is our commitment.  We want to make sure that people’s voices are heard. 

    And so, any specifics on where the infrastructure is and what that looks like, certainly, I would have to refer you to the state election officials on — on those and — and cybersecurity and infrastructure and all of those pieces — on what that looks like for them.  But — but —

    Q    Have any of the states voiced concerns to the administration?

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  I — well, I cannot speak to that.  I have not heard of that. 

    But look, our commitment, again, is to make sure that the resources available so that community can respond to recovery and also get back on their feet and deal with this disaster.  We want to make sure — we want to make sure that Americans’ voices are heard this — this November. 

    That is im- — important and so — but certainly that is something that state elected officials can speak to more directly, but we’re going to try and make sure they get back on — back on that.

    And I haven’t called on you yet.  Go ahead.

    Q    Thank you. 

    Q    Former President Trump is accusing the Biden administration of using FEMA funding to support undocumented migrants.  How is the White House responding to that?

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:   I mean, it’s just categorically fla- — false.  It is not true.  It is a false statement.  And look, the fact of the matter is — I think the Washington Post fact-checker did a piece and the headline recently, just moments ago, not too long ago, and the headline was “No, Biden didn’t take FEMA relief money to use — to use on migrants – but Trump did.”

    I’ll leave it there. 

    Q    And a quick follow-up —

    Q    Karine?  Karine? 

    Q    — on that?  A follow on — 

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  Yep.  Yep.  Yep.   

    Q    Secretary Mayorkas had said earlier this week that he was concerned that FEMA didn’t have enough funding until the end — for the rest of the hurricane season.  Now that President Biden has seen the damage firsthand in the Carolinas, Florida, Georgia — we heard him say at the podium he may have to call Congress back from recess — what exactly is he waiting for to be able to make that call?

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  I — look, here’s the thing: We put forth a pretty substantial, robust — I mentioned this moments ago — to be part of the CR.  We were disappointed that it was not part of the CR.  And if congressional Republicans were serious — if they were really, truly serious — about doing something for the communities that was impacted by Hurricane Helene, they would join us in calling for additional funding.  This is what we’ve been doing.  And so, if they’re serious, they would get to — to work and get that done. 

    Just like in the — with the border, if they were serious about the border, they wouldn’t vote against their own bipartisan proposal that they worked with us on — they’re against it now; they weren’t — they would move it forward.  It would actually start fixing the broken system that we’re seeing right now. 

    And, you know, they can — if they really want to help us in dealing what we’re seeing, whether it’s at the border or getting more funding for disaster monies that’s going to be needed to get into the communities, they should be serious.  Congressional Republicans need to get serious here, and they’re just not.

    Go ahead, Akayla.

    Q    Thanks, Karine.  Just a quick question on the port strike suspension.  Is the White House going to continue to be in touch with ILA to sort of support those negotiations as they continue?

    MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  I think, look, there’s congressional — congressional — collective bargaining continues.  I think that’s really important.  That’s what we’re seeing, and that’s what we want to continue to see.  And so, we will be in touch as necessary. 

    But I think what’s important is they came up with an agreement.  That’s because of this president’s leadership.  And the way to get this done is getting col- — is continuing that collective bargaining, and we believe that certainly works. 

    Thanks, everybody.  All right.  Have a great weekend. 

    Q    Thank you. 

    2:55 P.M. EDT

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Prime Minister Justin Trudeau meets with President of Côte d’Ivoire Alassane Ouattara

    Source: Government of Canada – Prime Minister

    Today, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau met with the President of Côte d’Ivoire, Alassane Ouattara, on the margins of the 19th Sommet de la Francophonie.

    The leaders expressed their interest in working together closely to advance shared priorities within La Francophonie. Prime Minister Trudeau emphasized Côte d’Ivoire’s commitment to the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, and in particular to chairing its Membership Committee. He also recognized Côte d’Ivoire’s principled stand in condemning Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine. President Ouattara acknowledged Canada’s positive role in supporting West Africa and the region. The leaders also discussed the ongoing situation in the Middle East.

    The Prime Minister underscored Canada’s commitment to continue strengthening bilateral relations with Francophone countries. The two leaders discussed their shared commitment to increase access to education. They also discussed opportunities for Canadian business in Côte d’Ivoire, particularly in the natural resources, agriculture, infrastructure, and technology sectors.

    The two leaders expressed their concerns over the increasing instability in Western Africa. Prime Minister Trudeau thanked President Ouattara for his leadership in the region and lauded his efforts to welcome refugees from the Sahel.

    Prime Minister Trudeau and President Ouattara agreed to remain in close and regular contact and looked forward to continue working together to advance shared priorities.

    Associated Links

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI Translation: Prime Minister Justin Trudeau meets with Ivory Coast President Alassane Ouattara

    MIL OSI Translation. Canadian French to English –

    Source: Prime Minister of Canada – in French

    Today, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau met with the President of Côte d’Ivoire, Alassane Ouattara, on the sidelines of the 19th Summit of La Francophonie.

    The leaders expressed their interest in working closely to advance shared priorities within La Francophonie. Prime Minister Trudeau highlighted Côte d’Ivoire’s commitment to the International Organization of La Francophonie, including as Chair of its Membership Committee. He also acknowledged Côte d’Ivoire’s principled position condemning Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine. President Ouattara commended Canada’s positive role in supporting West Africa and the region. The leaders also discussed the current situation in the Middle East.

    The Prime Minister highlighted Canada’s commitment to continuing to strengthen bilateral relations with Francophone countries. The two leaders discussed their shared commitment to increased access to education. They also discussed opportunities for Canadian businesses in Côte d’Ivoire, particularly in the natural resources, agriculture, infrastructure and technology sectors.

    Both leaders expressed concern about growing instability in West Africa. Prime Minister Trudeau thanked President Ouattara for his leadership in the region and praised his efforts to welcome refugees from the Sahel.

    Prime Minister Trudeau and President Ouattara agreed to remain in close and regular contact and looked forward to continuing to work together to advance their shared priorities.

    Related links

    EDITOR’S NOTE: This article is a translation. Apologies should the grammar and/or sentence structure not be perfect.

    MIL Translation OSI

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Prime Minister Justin Trudeau meets with Prime Minister of Belgium Alexander De Croo

    Source: Government of Canada – Prime Minister

    Today, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau met with the Prime Minister of Belgium, Alexander De Croo, on the margins of the 19th Sommet de la Francophonie.

    The leaders exchanged views on pressing geopolitical issues. They reaffirmed their unwavering support for Ukraine in the face of Russia’s unjustifiable war of aggression. They also emphasized the importance of promoting lasting peace and security in the Middle East, of upholding international humanitarian law, and of protecting civilians.

    The two leaders discussed the benefits of the Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, which continues to create significant opportunities for businesses and workers in Canada and Belgium.

    Prime Minister Trudeau and Prime Minister De Croo reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening bilateral relations and advancing common interests.

    Associated Links

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI Translation: Prime Minister Justin Trudeau meets with Prime Minister of Belgium Alexander De Croo

    MIL OSI Translation. Canadian French to English –

    Source: Prime Minister of Canada – in French

    Today, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau met with the Prime Minister of Belgium, Alexander De Croo, on the margins of the 19th Summit of La Francophonie.

    The leaders exchanged views on pressing geopolitical issues. They reaffirmed their unwavering support for Ukraine in the face of Russia’s unjustifiable war of aggression. They also stressed the importance of promoting lasting peace and security in the Middle East, upholding international humanitarian law and protecting civilians.

    The two leaders recalled the benefits of the Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, which continues to create significant opportunities for businesses and workers in Canada and Belgium.

    Prime Minister Trudeau and Prime Minister De Croo reiterated their commitment to strengthening bilateral relations between the two countries and advancing their shared priorities.

    Related links

    EDITOR’S NOTE: This article is a translation. Apologies should the grammar and/or sentence structure not be perfect.

    MIL Translation OSI

  • MIL-OSI Translation: 19th Francophonie Summit: first day in Villers-Cotterêts.

    MIL OSI Translation. Government of the Republic of France statements from French to English –

    Majesty, Monsignor, Ladies and Gentlemen Heads of State and Government, Madam Secretary General, dear Louise, Ladies and Gentlemen Ministers, Ladies and Gentlemen Heads of Delegation, Ladies and Gentlemen Parliamentarians, Ladies and Gentlemen Ambassadors, Mr. Prefect, Mr. Mayor, Ladies and Gentlemen in your ranks and capacities.

    Protocol places me here, at this lectern, to welcome you and wish you a warm welcome. It is an honour for me. And as you have understood, no one had anticipated, in the middle of October, that the sun, with the castle of Villers-Cotterêts, would welcome you. But the truth is that you are at home here. Yes, in a place where reigns greater than us, a very old lady of more than five centuries, ancestral and yet eternally young, our language. Welcome to her home. Welcome to this summit which celebrates her and which celebrates all of you, speakers of French from the 5 continents.

    This castle of Villers-Cotterêts, as you have just recalled, is the one where in August 1539, a royal decree marked the first official milestone in the expansion of our language. It was here that François I began to build the unity of the French Nation through its language, an instrument of unity, of power, decisive for our country. If you had come just 5 years ago, you would have seen here only a castle on the verge of ruin, a piece of petrified archive whose plaster was falling off, whose doors were barricaded. Today, it has become this living place, an exhibition and reception center, dedicated to the history and teaching of our language to all. I would like to thank all those who have worked during these years to rebuild, restore, but also to think about and invent this place which is not, as you have seen, simply a museum, but a city. A place of welcome, research, exploration. We are all citizens of this place, because we are all citizens of the French language.

    Yes, we have much in common, more than phonemes, morphemes, lexemes. More than shared tergiversations on the use of the pluperfect subjunctive and the same despair when it comes to agreeing past participles after pronominal verbs. We possess a Rabelaisian heritage in perpetual innovation, combining scholarly culture and its creative verve with that indefinable grain of salt of humor that spans the ages. Our language, from Quebec, Acadia, Louisiana and Haiti, from the heart of the African continent, from Morocco and Tunisia, to the Congo River basin, from Madagascar and Reunion, to Vietnam or Cambodia, from our Oceania, from French Polynesia to Vanuatu, on this language, the sun never sets. There are more than 300 million women and men who speak the French language on 5 continents. More than 300 million women and men who are constantly perfecting it, modernizing it, and enriching it.

    On the vault of the great courtyard, you saw earlier, in huge steel letters, the French words forged by all parts of the world, “zibulateur”, “camberé”, “techniquer”, as they say in Rwanda, dear Paul. This Francophonie that unites us was thought of and desired, I always repeat, by others than France itself. It was first desired by our writers, then our journalists and our radios. It was then promoted and institutionalized in 1970, in Niamey, by Presidents Senghor, Bourguiba, and by Prince Sihanouk.

    Today, 88 States are part of it. I congratulate in advance those who will join us tomorrow, Madam Secretary-General. From the beginning, it has been a decentralized organization that, as a child of decolonization, wanted to claim a language that we share. This is why the French language continues to constitute itself in the Francophonie as well, by equipping itself with its own tools, by structuring itself, by building its own influence. Our language is a space that is being built. So, of course, there is our Académie française and I salute the immortals here present, which is the institution, but there is also the Dictionnaire des francophones et de la francophonie, which we built, not as a competition, but as a tool that made it possible to bring together all the words that are invented. Our language is also a space for learning, understanding the world.

    Since yesterday, we have had the joy of welcoming another face to our family photo, since the presidency of TV Monde, our French-speaking television channel, is now held by Mrs. Kim YOUNES. I would like to thank Canada, Switzerland, Belgium, Monaco, Canada, Quebec and Wallonia, as well as Brussels, for their contribution to this magnificent project of informing the world and sharing our common understanding. We also want to allow new partners, particularly from the entire African continent who pay the same attention to supporting free and independent journalism, to join us. This is a discussion that we have been conducting with President OUATTARA for several years and which is, I believe, a great project.

    Our language is also a space to create. The Francophonie is the treasure of our literature, of our authors that we share, whether at the foot of the cedar or at the top of our mountains. Because beyond language, our authors have built worlds, imaginations, which are those that structure the Francophonie. Sharing them beyond our borders is a duty. In this respect, I am delighted with the development, supported by our partners, of a collection of literary works of reference of the Francophonie that will be made available in several languages, the “Fenêtres” collection. To begin with, it will contain French-language works translated into Arabic, distributed in paper format, at $2, and via press channels, in order to allow everyone to access the ideas, imaginations and values conveyed by French-language works. This is, I believe, an equally important step forward, in the same way that in 2018, at the Académie française, we launched this support program for our interpreters and translators.

    This language, our language, is more than a tool, it is a universe. It is a space of opportunity to create, offered to those who write it, sing it, plough it as a field of artistic expression. I know your attachment, Madam Secretary-General, to cultural and creative industries, and we will have the opportunity to hear it throughout the day. In a moment, Guillaume GALLIENNE will read us some magnificent texts, and the Comédie Française will be there, in Villers-Cotterêts, to share these texts with us, and throughout the day we will have French-speaking artists who will be with us to carry this creativity.

    Our language is also a language for doing business, for trading. First, because it is a great conduit. Take the African continent, take Oceania. French is the language of passage par excellence. It is the one that allows you to switch between all the regional or local languages, the one that sometimes allows you to unify the commercial universe of a country or an entire sub-region. In this respect, it is a great lever of opportunity, and I say this for all our young people, all those who are moving towards trade. Don’t just think English. Think French to trade and reunify it across the Indian Ocean. And from Madagascar to Mauritius, via Reunion or Mayotte and the Comoros, it is a language that unifies this regional space in the same way for Oceania, in the same way for all of West Africa.

    So yes, if the 330 million people we have today in our space will double in the coming decades, it is because this will make French a deeply attractive language in terms of commercial and economic power. Attractiveness is a French word. Entrepreneur is a French word, despite what our English-speaking friends think. And that is why I salute with great respect all the entrepreneurs and innovators who have joined us for this Summit. And I really want to salute the extraordinary energy of our partners at the FrancoTech Show. Thank you, dear Geoffroy ROUX DE BÉZIEUX. Thank you to the summit teams, whom I congratulate, and to its Secretary General, to the Business France teams. You have demonstrated that it has the capacity to innovate in all areas of technology, innovation and sustainable development. That it allowed the entire French-speaking area to move forward and create opportunities. Bravo to you! Yes, innovation is a French word. Invention too. This is why we have worked hard in recent months with our partners, and in particular the World Intellectual Property Organization, dear Daren TANG, to facilitate the launch of a French-speaking intellectual property alliance.

    Our language is also a space for transmission. And I want to pay tribute here to the professors, to the teachers who, in the four corners of the world, teach the language of French speakers.

    Whether French is our mother tongue or whether we have learned it, it has become a piece of our intimate life. It carries our thoughts, our hopes, our ambitions, our revolts, our emotions. The words we speak condition the ideas we deploy, which themselves condition the freedom we have. This is why we must support its teaching more than ever, quality teaching, in order to allow each and every French speaker to build their academic and professional paths. And we will continue to support the educational systems of French-speaking countries on other continents through the OIF, our bilateral actions, as we have also done through the reform of the AEFE. These are shared objectives within our organization. I am of course thinking of the actions of the regional education and training centers with which, at a national level, our cultural network cooperates. I am thinking of the actions of TV5Monde, the Agence universitaire de la Francophonie, and Senghor University, in the beautiful city of Alexandria. And allow me in this regard to address the delegation of Egypt to welcome the support of your authorities for the upcoming installation of Senghor University in this brand new campus of Borg el Arab.

    But also right here, in this Cité internationale de la langue française, in Villers-Cotterêts. You will not only have a wonderful heritage site that we have renovated. You will not only have a wonderful place of culture, of permanent creation. And I congratulate the teams, dear Paul, and all the artists who, all year round, bring this place to life. You will have artist residencies, training places. And we will create, on the occasion of this summit, the Collège international de Villers-Cotterêts. Next year, the Cité internationale de la langue française will itself become a laboratory of excellence for training teachers of and in French, future French-speaking education executives, translators, interpreters, while welcoming researchers and experts in didactics in residence. It will be a place of innovation, of transmission, which will allow to irrigate everything that is done in our capitals, but also in our regions, to allow to boost teaching in French and the teaching of French. Because teaching and translating French are the vectors of our language. And I want to thank Kamel DAOUD in particular for his inspiration, his vision on the importance of translation to give everyone access to our wealth and diversity. Because yes, if there is one thing that also characterizes the Francophonie, it is both its hospitality, we welcome in our language, and it is that it thinks and has always thought in multilingualism, in translation. And as important as teaching French everywhere in the world, it is our ability to teach in our regions, in our countries, English, Mandarin, Arabic, Spanish.

    Because it is this ability to think about language and its passages. A language is not thought of as isolated, closed. Our language is open and opens a space to communicate, share, be a hyphen. Yes, the Francophonie, everywhere, is in some way a trick, it is this language that allows us to build the mesh, the network of friendship, a human understanding, a diplomacy of action, of analysis. It is also, and we always see it, I was in Canada a few days ago, and it is always fascinating to see the love of French that is carried in this wonderful country. And it is carried in Montreal as in Ottawa in different ways. But I was able to measure it. Because it is a language of resistance, of combat, sometimes of contraband, always of invention and reinvention. Yes. This is why the Francophonie and this brotherhood are without exclusivity that only aspires to share its values. It is this utopia that opens its place today among us. It is this great current of air across the world that is constantly in crossbreeding, in creolization, in reinvention. And it is this wonderful place that allows writers like François CHENG, who learned our language at the age of 20, to become the dean of our academy, which allows a young Lebanese to write in our language and to become, like Mr. Amin MAALOUF, the perpetual secretary of our academy, which allows a young Russian, like Andreï MAKINE, to discover the French language in the middle of Siberia and to devote his life to it. And which allows a young Haitian writer to become one of the favorite authors of Canadians and to be adopted by the Académie française to become immortal there like Dany LAFERRIÈRE. Which allows Karim KATTAN, born in Jerusalem, to write his first novel in French, whose plot is both Palestinian and Proustian. Which allows Liliana LAZARE, Romanian, born in Moldova, to unravel the mysteries and poetic torments of a country by using the French language, which is not the language of her characters, but to which nothing human is foreign. A sign, if one were still needed, that French is this bridge between centuries, peoples and individuals.

    Yes, the Francophonie is what allows us, in doing so, to build a shared and reinvented universal. A decentralized, plural, respectful universal, based on the recognition of cultures and peoples. The same one that Souleymane BACHIR DIAGNE admirably describes in his latest book. This is also why, I am convinced, the Francophonie is a space of diplomatic influence that allows us to embrace the challenges of the century. It is together, as Francophones, that we must try to understand technological transformations. It is together, as Francophones, that we must encourage innovation and multiply our capacities for creation and exchange, but also build a digital order that protects citizens. It is together, as Francophones, that we must better fight against disinformation, the spread of hatred online, fight against hate speech, racist speech, anti-Semitic speech. And this is why, and Bruno PATINO, in a moment, will demonstrate it with the debate that animates it and by explaining its content. This is also why today, with the Villers-Cotterêts appeal, we are launching an extremely clear call to the major players in the digital world to build a safer and more diverse space, to have a requirement for moderation in the French language and to fight against all this hate speech. And the International Organization of La Francophonie, Dear Louise, in this regard, will have a very special role as guarantor. It is also in French-speaking terms that we must think about innovations in artificial intelligence, pursue major innovations, make the French-speaking world a space for open-source innovation and promote our major players. And this is also why next year, we will have the Action Summit on Artificial Intelligence in France in February, where the French-speaking world will be a central player to allow us to have a dialogue on innovation and regulation, and where, I know, the G7 that Prime Minister TRUDEAU will have organized will also bring together the convictions that we share together.

    I deeply believe that the Francophonie, yes, is a place where we can together carry out a diplomacy that defends sovereignty, territorial integrity throughout the planet, that carries the same discourse alongside Ukraine, attacked today, threatened in its borders and in its territorial integrity by the Russian war of aggression, but that defends a vision where there is no room for double standards, where all lives are equal for all conflicts throughout the world. And we all believe in the freedom of peoples to determine their own destiny, we are convinced that there can be no peace in the Middle East without a two-state solution. We all stand alongside our Armenian brothers for the respect of their sovereignty, their territorial integrity. We all stand alongside the friendly Lebanese people, today shaken in their sovereignty and their peace. We all stand alongside the sovereignty of all the peoples and all the States of the Pacific, which must be a peaceful region where no power can challenge this peace through territorial provocations or any repetition of tests whatsoever. We carry within us these humanist values that call us alongside all our brothers, in the French-speaking world and elsewhere, in need of assistance and we urge that the humanitarian space and the civilian population be protected everywhere and at all times.

    You have understood that the agenda that the Francophonie is carrying is an agenda of peace, of sustainable development, as we have shown again by voting together, on September 22, for the adoption of the pact of the future. And I congratulate in particular the DRC whose intervention was decisive in allowing us to move forward. The Francophonie is this united city of 330 million souls that we can be proud to inhabit. A city that has the French language as its foundation and the world as its horizon, and which, with Aimé CÉSAIRE, desires a universal that is rich in all individuals. This is why I am very proud and very happy to welcome you alongside all the elected representatives of the territory, in this city of Villers-Cotterêts, city of the royal ordinance of François I, city which also saw the birth of Alexandre DUMAS, city which is yours, by this international city, for this beautiful 19th summit of the Francophonie, thanking you all for your presence and for your commitment. Long live the French language, to the common work that the International Organization of the Francophonie carries high. Long live everyone and us. I thank you.

    EDITOR’S NOTE: This article is a translation. Apologies should the grammar and/or sentence structure not be perfect.

    MIL Translation OSI

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: 1,000 UK troops show commitment to eastern Europe in NATO exercise

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    More than 1,000 British troops have begun one of the largest exercises this year in the Balkans, showing the UK’s commitment to the region’s security.

    More than 1,000 British troops have begun one of the largest exercises this year in the Balkans, showing the UK’s commitment to the region’s security.

    The training will develop the UK’s ability to operate alongside NATO allies and underlines Britain’s commitment to eastern Europe.

    With 18 activities taking place across three months, one of the standout training exercises under Operation Chelonia involves the UK’s deployment of troops to Kosovo. These troops arrived via amphibious landing on a beach with no established infrastructure, via a world-leading motorised floating platform.

    This training exercise takes place close to Pasha Liman Naval Base in Southern Albania.

    Minister for the Armed Forces Luke Pollard said:

    These exercises show our unwavering commitment to standing united with our allies and working hand in hand to boost our collective security. The UK has always had a major presence in the Western Balkans, and it’s important we demonstrate a united front to ensure regional security.

    Working closely with our NATO partners, we are demonstrating our combined efforts to safeguard peace, stability, and security in the region.

    The landing was led by the Strategic Reserve Force (SRF), a group of 600 Army personnel held at readiness to deploy at two weeks’ notice should pressures in the region escalate. In 2024, the SRF is led by the 1st Battalion of the Royal Yorkshire Regiment.

    The scenario required the services of the Mexeflote, a world-leading modular motorised floating platform that can dock on the stern ramp of a ship, load with heavy military hardware (including trucks and main battle tanks if required), ferry the cargo to the beach and enable the cargo to be unloaded. 

    To put into context the scale of the operation, 26,000 linear metres of vehicles and equipment were landed on the beach. All equipment was brought to Albania from the UK aboard the 13,500 tonne Ro-Ro vessel, Hartland Point.

    The Royal Air Force have also undertaken training in the region to ensure all personnel have the training they need to keep us secure at home and strong abroad.

    The British Army have previously deployed at pace in Kosovo, with 200 personnel from the (1st battalion) of the Princess of Wales’ Royal Regiment (PWRR) sent to the country last year under NATO command, following an increase in tensions in the north of the country.

    Other nations involved in these key exercises with the UK include Serbia, Romania, Kosovo, Georgia, Croatia, and Moldova.

    This exercise reaffirms the UK’s commitment to our allies in the region. Whilst Putin continues his illegal and reckless invasion of Ukraine and aggressive posturing, it is vital that the UK works consistently alongside our NATO allies to display a united front of our collective strength.

    From our continued presence in Kosovo, to our counter-disinformation support in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the UK remains completely committed to upholding democracy and supporting our allies in the Western Balkans.

    Updates to this page

    Published 6 October 2024

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Translation: Prime Minister to attend ASEAN Summit and 25th Meeting of Contact Group on Ukraine’s Defence

    MIL OSI Translation. Canadian French to English –

    Source: Prime Minister of Canada – in French

    Prime Minister Justin Trudeau today announced that he will participate in the ASEAN Summit in Vientiane, Laos, and the 25th meeting of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group at Ramstein Air Base in Germany.

    For nearly half a century, Canada and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have worked in partnership to promote peace, prosperity, and progress. As we create well-paying jobs, fight climate change, and grow our economies, Canada and ASEAN are working together to improve the lives of people in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond.

    At the Summit, to be held on October 10-11, 2024, Prime Minister Trudeau will underscore Canada and ASEAN’s longstanding commitment to building a fairer and more prosperous future for people on both sides of the Pacific. As work continues toward a Canada-ASEAN free trade agreement, the Prime Minister will highlight progress made under the ASEAN-Canada Strategic Partnership and emphasize the importance of long-term sustainable growth that focuses on the well-being of all, empowers women and girls, and is anchored in the clean energy transition.

    ASEAN is one of the fastest-growing economic regions in the world. That is why Canada is working to increase trade and investment with ASEAN and to put Canadians at the forefront of this immense opportunity. Together, ASEAN member states were Canada’s fourth-largest merchandise trading partner in 2023, with increased progress in agriculture, agri-food, and people-to-people digital trade. Indeed, increased trade and investment fosters jobs, innovation, and growth.

    As part of theCanada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, Prime Minister Trudeau will also meet with ASEAN partners at the ASEAN-Canada Special Summit to strengthen collaboration and effectively support prosperity and stability across the region. The Prime Minister will also highlight Canada’s constructive role in addressing new and emerging challenges to peace and security, including malicious cyber activity and cybercrime threats.

    This visit will mark the first official visit by a Canadian Prime Minister to Laos. As Canada and Laos celebrate 50 years of bilateral relations this year, Prime Minister Trudeau will seek to advance shared interests and further strengthen ties between our two countries.

    The Prime Minister will then participate in the 25th meeting of the Contact Group on the Defense of Ukraine, which will take place at the US air base in Ramstein, Germany, on October 12, 2024.

    At the meeting, which will be hosted by United States President Joe Biden, international leaders will reaffirm global solidarity with Ukraine as it defends itself against Russia’s unjustifiable war of aggression. Building on progress made at the NATO Summit in Washington DC, United States of America, earlier this year, Prime Minister Trudeau will emphasize the importance of maintaining international support for Ukraine and finding a just and lasting peace for Ukrainians.

    The Prime Minister will also highlight the importance of addressing Ukraine’s immediate defence and security needs, including providing the country with military equipment, security assistance and training, and economic support. He will also highlight Canada’s commitment to Ukraine’s long-term security, as demonstrated by theCanada-Ukraine Security Cooperation Agreement, which was concluded earlier this year.

    Canada will continue to work closely with its international partners to support Ukraine and Ukrainians in their struggle for freedom, independence and democracy.

    Quote

    “To meet common challenges, we need to find common solutions, and the ASEAN Summit and the Ukraine Defence Contact Group are helping us do just that. Whether it’s fighting climate change, creating good-paying jobs or strengthening democracy, Canada is playing a leading role in creating a better, safer and more just future for people around the world.”

    Highlights

    ASEAN is a regional intergovernmental organization with 10 member states. Its objectives are to: Accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development. Promote regional peace and stability, and respect for justice and the rule of law. Enhance regional collaboration in a range of economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields. The ASEAN region as a whole is Canada’s fourth largest trading partner. In 2023, bilateral trade reached more than $38.8 billion. Last year, Canada and ASEAN launched a Strategic Partnership to strengthen collaboration in strategic areas of mutual interest, including peace and security, and economic and socio-cultural cooperation. Canada became an ASEAN Dialogue Partner in 1977 and is one of 11 partners to have achieved this designation. Dialogue partners engage with ASEAN on political and security issues, regional integration, economic interests, interfaith dialogue, transnational crime and counter-terrorism, disaster risk reduction, and other areas. Other dialogue partners include Australia, China, the European Union, India, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy advances and defends Canada’s interests, helping to build a more secure, prosperous, inclusive, and sustainable region, and protects Canada’s national and economic security at home and abroad. The Ukraine Defense Contact Group was established by the U.S. Secretary of Defense in April 2022 to enable Allies and partners to synchronize donations, consult, and coordinate military assistance to Ukraine, while strengthening the capabilities of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The Ukraine Defense Contact Group, which meets monthly at the ministerial level, now includes representatives from more than 50 countries. Since the launch of theOperation UNIFIER, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) has trained more than 43,000 members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Canada announced an extension of the mission until March 2026, so that the CAF can continue to meet Ukraine’s training needs. Since 2022, Canada has provided more than $19.5 billion to support Ukraine in a variety of ways, including more than $12.4 billion in financial assistance, which allows the Ukrainian government to continue to function, including providing essential government services and pensions to Ukrainians. Other assistance includes more than $4.5 billion in military aid and military equipment donations, $358.2 million in humanitarian assistance, $442 million in development assistance, and more than $210 million in security and stabilization programming. According to expert estimates, since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, thousands of Ukrainian children have been deported, forcibly transferred or relocated from the territory of Ukraine to the temporarily occupied territories, and to Russia, in order to erase their identities. To date, hundreds of children have been repatriated to Ukraine and reunited with their families. Since 2014, Canada has imposed sanctions on more than 3,000 individuals and entities in Russia, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine for their complicity in violating Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and their gross and systematic violations of human rights. Many of these sanctions have been implemented in coordination with Canada’s partners.

    Related links

    EDITOR’S NOTE: This article is a translation. Apologies should the grammar and/or sentence structure not be perfect.

    MIL Translation OSI

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Prime Minister to participate in ASEAN Summit and the 25th meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group

    Source: Government of Canada – Prime Minister

    The Prime Minister, Justin Trudeau, today announced that he will participate in the ASEAN Summit in Vientiane, Laos, and the 25th meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group at the U.S. air base in Ramstein, Germany. 

    For almost half a century, Canada and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have been partners in promoting peace, prosperity, and progress. As we create good-paying jobs, fight climate change, and grow our economies, Canada and ASEAN stand united to make life better for people in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond.

    At the Summit, from October 10 to 11, 2024, Prime Minister Trudeau will highlight Canada and ASEAN’s long-standing commitment toward building a fairer, more prosperous future for people on both sides of the Pacific. As work toward a Canada-ASEAN free trade agreement continues, the Prime Minister will note progress on last year’s ASEAN-Canada Strategic Partnership and underscore the importance of sustainable long-term growth that works for everyone, empowers women and girls, and is anchored in the clean energy transition.

    ASEAN is one of the world’s fastest growing economic regions. That’s why Canada is increasing trade and investment with ASEAN and putting Canadians at the forefront of this immense opportunity. As a group, ASEAN member states represented Canada’s fourth largest merchandise trading partner in 2023, with increased progress in agriculture, agrifood, and digital trade between our peoples. Greater trade and investment mean more jobs, more innovation, and more growth.

    Building on Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, Prime Minister Trudeau will also meet with ASEAN partners at the ASEAN-Canada Special Summit to enhance collaboration so we can effectively support prosperity and stability throughout the region. He will emphasize Canada’s constructive role in addressing new and emerging challenges to peace and security, including malicious cyber activity and threats from cybercrime.

    This visit will mark the first official visit of a Canadian Prime Minister to Laos. As Canada and Laos celebrate 50 years of bilateral relations this year, Prime Minister Trudeau will work to advance shared interests and forge even stronger ties between our two countries.

    The Prime Minister will then participate in the 25th meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group at the U.S. air base in Ramstein, Germany, on October 12, 2024.

    Hosted by the President of the United States of America, Joe Biden, leaders from the international community will reaffirm global solidarity with Ukraine as it defends itself against Russia’s unjustifiable war of aggression. Building on the progress made at the NATO Summit in Washington, D.C., United States of America, earlier this year, Prime Minister Trudeau will emphasize the importance of sustained international support for Ukraine and a just and lasting peace for Ukrainians.

    The Prime Minister will highlight the importance of addressing Ukraine’s immediate defence and security needs, including the provision of military equipment, security assistance and training, and economic support. He will also highlight Canada’s commitment to Ukraine’s long-term security, as evidenced by the Agreement on security cooperation between Canada and Ukraine, which was concluded earlier this year. 

    Canada will continue to work closely with its international partners to support Ukraine and Ukrainians as they continue to fight for their freedom, independence, and democracy.

    Quote

    “Shared challenges require shared solutions – that’s what the ASEAN Summit and the Ukraine Defense Contact Group are all about. Whether it’s fighting climate change, creating good-paying jobs, or strengthening democracy, Canada is playing a leadership role in creating a better, safer, and fairer future for people across the world.”

    Quick Facts

    • ASEAN is a regional intergovernmental organization comprising 10 member states. The objectives of ASEAN are to:
      • Speed up economic growth, social progress, and cultural development.
      • Promote regional peace and stability and respect for justice and the rule of law.
      • Increase collaboration across a range of economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific, and administrative spheres.
    • Together, ASEAN as a regional bloc represents Canada’s fourth-largest trading partner, with over $38.8 billion in bilateral trade in 2023.
    • Last year, Canada and ASEAN launched a strategic partnership for further collaboration in strategic areas of mutual interest, including peace and security and economic and socio-cultural co-operation.
    • Canada became an ASEAN dialogue partner in 1977 and is one of 11 partners with this designation.
    • ASEAN Dialogue Partners co-operate on political and security issues, regional integration, economic interests, inter-faith dialogue, transnational crime and counterterrorism, disaster risk reduction, and other areas. Other Dialogue Partners include: Australia, China, the European Union, India, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America.
    • Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy advances and defends Canada’s interests by supporting a more secure, prosperous, inclusive, and sustainable Indo-Pacific region while protecting Canada’s national and economic security at home and abroad.
    • The Ukraine Defense Contact Group (UDCG) was created by the United States Secretary of Defense in April 2022 to allow Allies and partners to synchronize donations to Ukraine, consult and co-ordinate military assistance, and build up the capabilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU). Convening monthly at the ministerial level, the UDCG now brings together more than 50 countries.
    • Since the launch of Operation UNIFIER, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) has trained more than 43,000 members of the AFU. Canada has announced the extension of this mission until March 2026 so the CAF can continue to respond to Ukraine’s training needs.
    • Since 2022, Canada has committed over $19.5 billion in multifaceted support to Ukraine. This includes over $12.4 billion in financial assistance, which has helped the Ukrainian government to continue to operate, including by delivering essential government services and pensions to Ukrainians. Other assistance includes over $4.5 billion in military aid and equipment donations, $358.2 million in humanitarian assistance, $442 million in development assistance, and over $210 million in security and stabilization programming.
    • Experts estimate that since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, thousands of Ukrainian children have been deported, forcibly transferred, or otherwise displaced from Ukraine to temporarily occupied territories and to Russia, for the purpose of erasing their Ukrainian identity. To date, hundreds of children have been returned to Ukraine and reunited with their families.
    • Since 2014, Canada has imposed sanctions on more than 3,000 individuals and entities in Russia, Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine for their complicity in the violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as gross and systematic human rights violations. Many of these sanctions have been implemented in co-ordination with Canada’s partners.

    Associated Links

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI Translation: VATICAN – Pope announces a Consistory: 21 new Cardinals in December

    MIL OSI Translation. Region: Italy –

    Source: The Holy See in Italian

    Sunday, October 6, 2024

    Vatican Media

    Vatican City (Agenzia Fides) – “I am pleased to announce that on December 8th I will hold a Consistory for the nomination of new Cardinals”. Surprisingly, as has often happened in these years of pontificate, Pope Francis, at the Angelus, announces the imposition of the red hat. In total, 21 monsignors will receive the purple: 10 are European, of which 4 are Italian; 6 are from the American continent, of which 5 are South American, 4 Asian, two African. Of these, only one, having reached the age limit, will not be an elector in a future conclave. Among them also Bishop Baldassarre Reina who from today, as specified by the Pontiff, will hold the role of new Vicar General for the Diocese of Rome, thus succeeding Cardinal De Donatis, appointed Major Penitentiary last April. Here are the names of the new Cardinals: H.E. Monsignor Angelo Acerbi, Apostolic Nuncio; H.E. Monsignor Carlos Gustavo Castillo Mattasoglio, Archbishop of Lima, Peru; H.E. Monsignor Vicente Bokalic Iglic, C.M., Archbishop of Santiago del Estero, Primate of Argentina; H.E. Mons. Cabrera Gerardo Cabrera Herrera, O.F.M., Archbishop of Guayaquil, Ecuador; H.E. Monsignor Natalio Chomalí Garib, Archbishop of Santiago de Chile, Chile; H.E. Mons. Tarcisio Isao Kikuchi, S.V.D, Archbishop of Tokyo, Japan; H.E. Monsignor Pablo Virgilio Siongco David, Bishop of Kalookan, Philippines; H.E. Monsignor Ladislav Nemet, S.V.D., Archbishop of Beograd -Smederevo, Serbia;H.E. Mons. Jaime Spengler, O.F.M, Archbishop of Porto Alegre; H.E. Monsignor Ignace Bessi Dogbo, Archbishop of Abidjan, Ivory Coast; H.E. Monsignor Jean-Paul Vesco, O.P., Archbishop of Alger, Algeria; H.E. Mons. Paskalis Bruno Syukur, O.F.M, Bishop of Bogor, Indonesia; H.E. Mons. Joseph Mathieu, O.F.M. Conv., Archbishop of Tehran Ispahan, Iran; H.E. Monsignor Roberto Repole, Archbishop of Turin, Italy; H.E. Monsignor Baldassare Reina, from today Vicar General for the Diocese of Rome; H.E. Mons. Francis Leo, Archbishop of Toronto, Canada; H.E. Mons. Rolandas Makrickas, Coadjutor Archpriest of the Papal Basilica of Santa Maria Maggiore; H.E. Mons. Mykola Bychok, C.Ss.R., Eparch of Saints Peter and Paul of Melbourne of the Ukrainians; Rev. Father Timothy Peter Joseph Radcliffe, O.P, theologian; Rev. Father Fabio Baggio, C.S., Under-Secretary of the Dicastery for the Service of Integral Human Development; Mons. George Jacob Koovakad, Official Secretary of State, responsible for Papal Trips. In total, in these almost twelve years of pontificate, Pope Francis has created 142 cardinals of which 113 electors. From Sunday 8 December 2024, the College of Cardinals will be enriched with new members and will therefore be composed of 256 members, of which 141 electors and 115 non-electors. The biographies of the new cardinalsS. E. Monsignor Tarcisio Isao KIKUCHI, S.V.D., Archbishop of Tokyo (Japan). He was born on 1 November 1958 in the prefecture of Iwate, diocese of Sendai. He studied in Japan. He made his perpetual profession in the Congregation of the Missionaries Verbiti in March 1985 and was ordained a priest in March 1986. He completed his studies at the “Spiritual Institute of Sacred Heart” in Melbourne (Australia). He was: 1986-1992: Missionary in the dioceses of Accra and Koforidua, in Ghana; 1993-1994: Trainer and vice-prefect of Verbiti postulants in Japan, and director for vocations of the Institute; 1994-1999: Provincial Councilor of the Verbiti. Since 1994: Teacher at Nanzan University, member of the “International Aid Committee” of the Episcopal Conference of Japan. Since 1996 he has been Coordinator of the “Justice and Peace” Office in the Asia and Pacific area of ​​the Verbiti. Since 1998: Member of Caritas Japan and representative of the Japanese Bishops for various international conferences and meetings. Since 1999: Provincial Superior of the Verbites in Japan (second mandate since 2002). Executive Director of Caritas Japan. Member of the committee for the ongoing formation of the clergy of the diocese of Nagoya. Prior to his installation as archbishop of Tokyo in 2017, he had served as bishop of Niigata since 2004, when he was first appointed as bishop.H.E. Monsignor Pablo Virgilio SIONGCO DAVID, Bishop of Kalookan (Filipinas) He was born in Betis, Guagua, Pampanga, in the archdiocese of San Fernando, on 2 March 1959. He was ordained a priest on 12 March 1983 for the archdiocese of San Fernando. After a year as assistant parish priest, he was Director of the Mother of God Counsel Seminary until 1986. From 1986 to 1991 he studied abroad, obtaining a licentiate and then a doctorate in Holy Theology at the Catholic University of Louvain, and attending courses at the Ecole Biblique de Jerusalem where he graduated. Upon returning to his homeland he held various management and teaching roles in the educational team of the archdiocesan seminary. In 2002 he became director of the seminary’s Theology Department, continuing to teach Sacred Scripture. In the same year he was elected Vice-President of the Association of Catholic Biblical Scholars of the Philippines and Vice-President of the Archidiocesan Media Apostolate Networks. He is the author, at both an academic and popular level, of several publications on Sacred Scripture. On 27 May 2006 he was appointed titular bishop of Guardialfiera and auxiliary of San Fernando by Benedict XVI, and was consecrated the following 10 July. On 14 October 2015, he was appointed Bishop of Kalookan (Philippines).H.E. Monsignor Paskalis Bruno SYUKUR, O.F.M., Bishop of Bogor (Indonesia) He was born on 17 May 1962 in Ranggu, in the diocese of Ruteng, on the Island of Flores (Indonesia). After primary school, he attended the Pius X minor seminary in Kisol. He completed his philosophical studies at the Faculty of Driyakara Philosophy in Jakarta, then continued his theological studies at the Faculty of Theology in Yogyakarta. He made his solemn profession with the Franciscans Minor on 22 January 1989. He was ordained a priest on 2 February 1991. He then held the following roles: 1991-1993: Ministry in the parish of Moanemani, diocese of Jayapura (West Papua); 1993-1996: Studies for the Licentiate in Spirituality at the Antonianum, in Rome; 1996-2001: Master of Novices at Depok; 1998-2001: Guardian of the O.F.M. Community in Depok and Member of the Provincial Council; 2001-2009: Provincial Minister in Indonesia; since 2009: General Definitor of the O.F.M. for Asia and Oceania in Rome. On 21 November 2013, Pope Francis appointed him Bishop of the diocese of Bogor (Indonesia).S. E. Mons. Dominique Joseph MATHIEU, O.F.M. Conv., Archbishop of Tehran Ispahan (Iran) He was born on 13 June 1963 in Arlon, Belgium. After his high school studies, he entered the Order of Friars Minor Conventual. He made his solemn profession in 1987 and was ordained a priest on 24 September 1989. Since 2013 he has been incardinated in the Provincial Custody of the East and of the Holy Land. Within his Order, he held various positions: Vocational Promoter, Secretary, Vicar and Provincial Minister of the Belgian Province of the Conventual Friars Minor, becoming General Delegate after unification with the Province of France; Rector of the National Sanctuary of Saint Anthony of Padua in Brussels and Director of the related Confraternity. He was also President of two different non-profit associations linked to the presence of the Conventual Friars Minor in Belgium, with roles of responsibility in the Catholic School of Landen. He was President of the Central European Federation of Conventual Friars Minor and a member of the International Commission for the Economy of his Order. Having moved to Lebanon in 2013, he was Custodial Secretary, Formator, Master of Novices and Rector of Postulants and Candidates in the Provincial Custody of the East and the Holy Land. Since 2019 he has been General Definitor and General Assistant for the Central European Federation of Conventual Friars Minor. On 8 January 2021, he was appointed Archbishop of Tehran Ispahan (Iran).H.E. Mons. Jean-Paul VESCO, O.P., Archbishop of Alger (Algeria) He was born in Lyon (France) on 10 March 1962. He obtained a degree in Law and practiced law in a lawyer’s office in Lyon, until the choice to enter the Order of Preacher Fathers. In 1995 he began his novitiate year and made his first religious profession on 14 September 1996. He was ordained a priest on 24 June 2001 in Lyon. He arrived in the diocese of Oran (Algeria) on 6 October 2002 at the convent of Tlemcen. In 2004 he was chosen as a delegate of the diocese for the preparation of the Interdiocesan Assembly of Algeria (AIDA). Since 2005 he has been Vicar General of the same diocese and since 2007 he has also assumed the office of diocesan bursar. On 16 October 2007 he was elected Superior of the Dominican Community of Tlemcen, a position he held until January 2011, when he was elected Provincial Superior of France. On 1 December 2012, he was appointed Bishop of Oran (Algeria), until 27 December 2022, when the Holy Father appointed him Metropolitan Archbishop Alger (Algeria).H.E. Mons. Ignace BESSI DOGBO, Archbishop of Abidjan (Ivory Coast) He was born on 17 August 1961 in Niangon-Adjamé, Diocese of Yopougon. He was ordained a priest on 2 August 1987. He has held the following positions: parish ministry (1987-1989); License in Exegesis from the Pontifical Biblical Institute of Rome; diocesan director of the Pontifical Mission Societies (1993-1995); Vicar General of Yopougon (1995-2004); parish priest of Yopougon Cathedral (1997-2004); Professor of Biblical Languages ​​in the Saint Paul Major Seminary of Abadjin Kouté; Diocesan Spiritual Assistant of the J.E.C. He was elected Bishop of the Diocese of Katiola on 19 March 2004 and received episcopal consecration on the following 4 July; President of the Episcopal Conference (2017-2023); since 2017, Apostolic Administrator ad nutum Sanctae Sedis of the Metropolitan Archdiocese of Korhogo; from 2021 to 2024, Metropolitan Archbishop of Korhogo. On 20 May 2024, he was appointed Archbishop of Abidjan (Ivory Coast).H.E. Mons. Carlos Gustavo CASTILLO MATTASOGLIO Archbishop of Lima (Peru) He was born in Lima on 28 February 1950. Having entered the Santo Toribio major seminary of Mogrovejo of the archdiocese of Lima, he was sent to Rome for his ecclesiastical studies where, in 1979, he obtained a bachelor’s degree in philosophy and, in 1983, in theology from the Pontifical Gregorian University. He was ordained a priest, incardinating in the archdiocese of Lima on 15 July 1984. He obtained the licentiate in 1985 and, in 1987, the doctorate in dogmatic theology, again from the Pontifical Gregorian University. He has held the following positions: Professor of Theology at the Pontifical Catholic University of Peru (from 1987 to the present); Councilor of the National Union of Catholic Students (1987-1998); Parochial vicar in the parish of San Francisco de Asís (1987-1990); Parochial vicar of the parish of La Encarnación (1990-1991); Archdiocesan head of the University Pastoral of Lima and collaborator at the parish of San Juan Apóstol (1991-1999); Vicar for youth ministry of Lima, organizer of the vicar for youth and responsible for vocational ministry (1996-1999); National Councilor of the Episcopal Commission for Youth of the Peruvian Episcopal Conference (1990-2001); parochial vicar of the parish of San Juan Apóstol (1999-2001); National councilor for youth ministry (2000); parish priest of the parish of Virgen Medianera (2002-2009); Director of relations with the Church and member of the University Council of the Pontifical Catholic University of Peru (2003-2006); Parish priest of the parish of San Lázaro (2010-2015). On 25 January 2019 Pope Francis appointed him Metropolitan Archbishop of the archdiocese of Lima (Peru).H.E. Monsignor Vicente BOKALIC IGLIC C.M., Archbishop of Santiago del Estero (Primado de la Argentina). He was born on 11 June 1952 in Lanús (Buenos Aires). In 1970 he entered the Congregation of the Mission (Lazarists). He studied philosophy at the Jesuit Maximo College in San Miguel, and theological studies at the Seminary of Buenos Aires. He took his perpetual vows on 5 June 1976. Ordained a priest on 1 April 1978, he was in charge of the vocational and youth ministry of Buenos Aires and, since 1981, he has also exercised the office of Parish Vicar of Nuestra Señora de la Medalla Milagrosa. From 1983 to 1986 he was a formator and bursar, and from 1987 to 1990 superior in the Seminary of the Congregation of the Mission. From 1991 to 1993 he worked again in the Nuestra Señora de la Medalla Milagrosa Parish, from 1994 to 1997 he was a missionary in the Prelature of Deán Funes and, from 1997 to 2000, Superior of the Seminary of his Congregation in San Miguel. Missionary and parish priest in the diocese of Goya from 2000 to 2003, from December 2003 to December 2009 he exercised the office of Provincial Superior of the Congregation of the Mission. Then he was sent again to the Nuestra Señora de la Medalla Milagrosa Parish in Buenos Aires. On 15 March 2010 he was appointed titular bishop of Summa and auxiliary of Buenos Aires (Argentina). He received episcopal consecration on May 29 of the same year. On 23 December 2013, Pope Francis appointed him Bishop of Santiago del Estero (Argentina). On 22 July 2024, the Holy Father elevated the Diocese of Santiago del Estero (Argentina) to the rank of Primatial Archdiocese of Argentina, and appointed him the first Archbishop of Santiago del Estero (Argentina).H.E. Mons. Luis Gerardo CABRERA HERRERA, O.F.M., Archbishop of Guayaquil (Ecuador). He was born in Azogues on 11 October 1955. He attended the Franciscan minor seminary in Azogues and Quito, studied philosophy and theology at the Pontifical Catholic University of Ecuador and he obtained a Doctorate in philosophy from the Antonianum in Rome. He was ordained a priest on 3 September 1983. He held the following roles: assistant to the Master of Novices O.F.M. and then novitiate master of Riobamba; member of the Provincial Council of the Order, responsible for vocational pastoral care and the formation of aspirants of the Franciscan province; Director of the philosophical-theological institute “Card. B. Echeverría” of Quito; Secretary of the ecumenism sector of the Episcopal Commission of Magisterium and Doctrine of the Ecuadorian Episcopal Conference. In August 2000 he was elected Provincial Minister of the Franciscans of the Province of Ecuador and Vice President of the Conference of Religious. From 2003 until 2009 he was Definitor of the Franciscan Order and Delegate of the Minister General for the Franciscan Provinces of Latin America and the Caribbean. On 20 April 2009 he was appointed Archbishop of Cuenca, receiving episcopal consecration the following 4 July. In the period 2001-2014 he was Vice-President of the Ecuadorian Episcopal Conference. Since 24 September 2015 he has been Archbishop of Guayaquil (Ecuador).H.E. Monsignor Fernando Natalio CHOMALÍ GARIB Archbishop of Santiago de Chile (Chile) He was born on 10 March 1957 in Santiago de Chile. After graduating in Civil Engineering from the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, he completed his philosophical and theological studies at the Pontifical Major Seminary of Santiago. He received priestly ordination on 6 April 1991 for the Archdiocese of Santiago de Chile. He held the following positions and carried out further studies: Licentiate in Moral Theology at the Pontifical Alphonsian Academy in Rome; Doctorate in Theology at the Pontifical Gregorian University of Rome; Master in Bioethics at the Pontifical John Paul II Theological Institute for Marriage and Family Sciences in Rome; Parish vicar; Episcopal Delegate for University Pastoral; Professor of Moral Theology and Bioethics in the Faculties of Theology and Medicine of the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile and in the Major Seminary; Parish Priest of Santa María de la Misericordia; Moderator of the Curia and President Delegate of the Economic Council of the Archdiocese of Santiago de Chile; Member of the Pontifical Academy for Life (since 2001). On 6 April 2006 he was appointed titular bishop of Noba and auxiliary of Santiago de Chile, receiving episcopal consecration the following 3 June. On 20 April 2011 he was appointed Archbishop of Concepción and, on 25 October 2023, Archbishop of Santiago de Chile. He is currently Vice President of CECH.S.E. Mons. Jaime SPENGLER, O.F.M., Archbishop of Porto Alegre (Brasil) He was born on 6 September 1960, in Blumenau, in the State of Santa Catarina, in the diocese of the same name. He did his Franciscan postulancy in Guaratinguetá (1981) and his novitiate in Rodeio (1982); he made his perpetual profession in 1985 and was ordained a priest on 17 November 1990. He completed his studies in philosophy at the São Boaventura Philosophical Institute in Campo Largo and those in theology, first at the Franciscan Theological Institute in Petrópolis (1986- 1987) and then at the Theological Institute of Jerusalem (1987-1990), where he obtained a license in Sacred Scripture. Subsequently he obtained a degree in Philosophy in Rome, at the Pontifical Athenaeum Antonianum (1995-1998). He has held the following positions: Professor in the Franciscan Novitiate in Rodeio, Master of Postulants (1990); Professor in the Postulancy and Parish Vicar in Guaratinguetá (1991-1994); Professor and Vice-Rector of the São Boaventura Institute of Philosophy in Campo Largo (2000-2003); Religious Assistant of the Federação Brasileira das Irmãs Concepcionistas (2001-2002); local superior and parish vicar of the Senhor Bom Jesus Parish, in the archdiocese of Curitiba (2004-2006), Professor of Philosophy at the São Boaventura Faculty in Curitiba (2000-2003); Vice-president of the Franciscan Association of Ensino Senhor Bom Jesus in Campo Largo and Guardian of the Local Convent. On 10 November 2010 he was appointed titular bishop of Patara and auxiliary of Porto Alegre. He received episcopal ordination on 5 February 2011. On 18 September 2013, he was appointed Metropolitan Archbishop of Porto Alegre (Brazil).H.E. Mons. Francis LEO, Archbishop of Toronto (Canada) He was born on 30 June 1971 in Montreal (Canada). In 1990 he entered the Seminary obtaining the Baccalaureate in Philosophy (1992), the Licentiate and then the Doctorate in Theology (2005), with specialization in Marian Studies, obtained at the International Marian Research Institute (IMRI), University of Dayton (Ohio ). He was ordained a priest on December 14, 1996 for the Metropolitan Archdiocese of Montreal. After his priestly ordination, he was Deputy Parish Priest of Notre-Dame-de-la-Consolata (1996-2001); Administrator of the Parish Saint-Joseph-de-Rivière-des-Prairies (2003-2005); Chaplain of the Roscelli School and religious teacher of the Collège Reine-Marie (2003-2005); Parish priest of Saint-Raymond-de-Peñafort (2005-2006). From 2006 to 2008 he was sent to the Pontifical Ecclesiastical Academy in Rome. Having entered the diplomatic service of the Holy See, he worked in the Apostolic Nunciature in Australia (2008-2011) and then at the Study Mission of the Holy See in Hong Kong (2011-2012). Returning to Montreal in 2012, he was appointed Director and Professor of Dogmatics of the Major Seminary, Director of the Department of Canon Law of the IFTM and Vice President of the Diocesan Work for Vocations. From 2013 to 2015 he was a member of the Presbyteral Council. From 2015 to 2021 he was General Secretary of the Canadian Episcopal Conference. In 2021 he received the role of Vicar General and Moderator of the Archdiocesan Curia of Montreal. On 16 July 2022 he was appointed titular bishop of Tameda and auxiliary of Montreal, and was consecrated the following 12 September. On 11 February 2023 he was appointed Auxiliary Bishop of the Metropolitan Archdiocese of Montreal.S.E. Monsignor Mykola BYCHOK, C.Ss.R., Bishop of the Eparchy Saints Peter and Paul of Melbourne of the Ukrainians. He was born on 13 February 1980 in Ternopil in Ukraine. He entered the Redemptorist Order in July 1997, and trained in Ukraine and Poland, obtaining a license in Pastoral Theology. On 17 August 2003 he took his final vows, and on 3 May 2005 he was ordained a priest in Lviv. He has held the following positions: missionary in the Mother Church of Perpetual Help in Prokopyevsk in Russia, Superior of the Monastery of St. Joseph and Parish Priest of the Mother Parish of Perpetual Help in Ivano-Frankivsk in Ukraine, Bursar of the Redemptorist Province of Lviv and since 2015 Vicar of the Parish of St. John the Baptist in Newark, NJ, Archeparchy of Philadelphia of the Ukrainians. On 15 January 2020 he was appointed Bishop of the Eparchy Saints Peter and Paul of Melbourne of the Ukrainians. On 7 June 2020 he was consecrated bishop by His Beatitude Patriarch Sviatoslav Shevchuk in St. George’s Cathedral, Lviv. On 12 July 2021, the feast of Saints Peter and Paul in the Julian Calendar, he was enthroned as the third bishop of the Eparchy of Melbourne by His Grace Peter Comensoli, Archbishop of Melbourne, in the Cathedral of Saints Peter and Paul, Melbourne.S. E. Monsignor Ladislav NEMET, S.V.D., Archbishop of Beograd – Smederevo, (Serbia) He was born on 7 September 1956 in Odžaci, in the Diocese of Subotica (Serbia). In 1977 he entered the Society of the Divine Word and was ordained a priest on 1 May 1983. He obtained a Doctorate in Dogmatic Theology from the Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome. He held the following positions: Missionary in the Philippines; Teacher in Poland, Austria and Croatia; Collaborator of the Permanent Mission of the Holy See to the UN in Vienna; Provincial of the Hungarian Province of the Society of the Divine Word; General Secretary of the Hungarian Episcopal Conference. He was appointed Bishop of Zrenjanin on 23 April 2008. In 2021, he was re-elected for a second term as President of the International Episcopal Conference of Saints Cyril and Methodius; furthermore, he is Vice President of the Council of Episcopal Conferences of Europe (CCEE).H.E. Mons. Rolandas MAKRICKAS, Coadjutor Archpriest Papal Basilica of Santa Maria Maggiore He was born in Biržai, Lithuania, on 31 January 1972. Ordained a priest on 20 July 1996 for the Diocese of Panevėžys, from 1996 to 2001 he was under-secretary of the Lithuanian Episcopal Conference and head of the National Committee of the Great Jubilee of 2000. He obtained a Doctorate in Ecclesiastical History from the Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome in 2004. Having entered the diplomatic service of the Holy See on 1 July 2006, he worked at the Pontifical Representations in Georgia, Sweden, the United States of America and Gabon, and at the General Affairs Section of the Secretariat of State. From 15 December 2021 to 19 March 2024 he was extraordinary commissioner for the Papal Basilica of Santa Maria Maggiore. On 11 February 2023 he was appointed titular Archbishop of Tolentino and on the following 15 April he received episcopal ordination, in the Basilica of Santa Maria Maggiore in Rome, from Cardinal Pietro Parolin, Secretary of State of His Holiness. On 19 March 2024 he was appointed by the Holy Father Coadjutor Archpriest with right of succession of the Papal Basilica of Santa Maria Maggiore.H.E. Mons. Baldassare REINA, auxiliary bishop of Rome, former vice-gerent and, from today, Vicar General for the Diocese of Rome. He was born on 26 November 1970 in San Giovanni Gemini, in the province and Archdiocese of Agrigento. He entered the Archbishop’s Seminary in 1981. In 1995 he obtained a Baccalaureate in Sacred Theology and in 1998 a Licentiate in Biblical Theology from the Pontifical Gregorian University of Rome. He was ordained a priest on 8 September 1995. From 1998 to 2001 he was Diocesan Assistant of Catholic Action and Vice-Rector of the Archbishop’s Seminary of Agrigento. From 2001 to 2003 he was parish priest of the Blessed Mary Virgin of Itria in Favara. From 2003 to 2009 he was Prefect of studies of the San Gregorio Agrigentino Theological Study and from 2009 to 2013 Parish Priest of S. Leonead Agrigento. From 2013 to 2022 he was Rector of the Major Seminary of Agrigento. He also held the following roles in the Diocese: Teacher of Sacred Scripture at the Institute of Religious Sciences; Permanent teacher at the San Gregorio Agrigentino Theological Studio; Director of the Culture Office; Canon of the Cathedral Chapter; Member of the Presbyteral Council and of the College of Consultors. On 27 May 2022, he was appointed titular bishop of Acque di Mauritania and auxiliary of Rome. On 6 January 2023, the Holy Father appointed him Vicegerent of the Diocese of Rome.H.E. Mons. Roberto REPOLE, Archbishop of Turin (Italy) He was born in Turin on 29 January 1967. Having entered the Seminary at the age of eleven, he completed his high school studies at the Minor Seminary, obtaining his classical high school diploma at the Valsalice Salesian High School in Turin in 1986. He studied philosophy and theology at the archiepiscopal seminary of Turin and received presbyteral ordination on 13 June 1992. From 1992 to 1996 he was parochial vicar at the parish of Gesù Redentore and collaborator of the parish of Ss. Nome di Maria in Turin. He continued his studies in systematic theology at the Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome, obtaining his licentiate in 1998 and his doctorate in 2001 with a thesis on the thought of Henri de Lubac in dialogue with Gabriel Marcel. Since 2001 he has taught systematic theology at the parallel Turin branch of the Theological Faculty of Northern Italy and the Higher Institute of Religious Sciences of the same city. Canon of the Royal Church of San Lorenzo in Turin since 2010, he was president of the Italian Theological Association from 2011 to 2019; dean of the Turin section of the Theological Faculty of Northern Italy and collaborator of the Santa Maria della Stella parish in Druento. On 19 February 2022, Pope Francis appointed him the 95th Metropolitan Archbishop of Turin and Bishop of Susa, thus uniting the two sees in person as bishops. On 7 May 2022 he received episcopal ordination. In September 2022, the Permanent Episcopal Council of the CEI appointed him as a member of the Episcopal Commission for Catholic Education, School and University. In October 2022 in Aosta the bishops of Piedmont and Valle d’Aosta elected him vice president of the Episcopal Conference of Piedmont and Valle d’Aosta (CEP).R.P. Timothy Peter Joseph RADCLIFFE, OP, theologian Born in London in 1945, he joined the Dominican order in 1965. After completing his studies in Oxford and Paris, he began teaching sacred Scripture at the University of Oxford. Ordained a priest in 1971, actively involved in the peace movement, he also carried out pastoral ministry among AIDS sufferers. From 1982 to 1988 he was prior of the convent of Oxford, then provincial of England from 1988 to 1992, and finally master general of the order founded by Saint Dominic from 1992 to 2001. Orator, lecturer, preacher and writer of international fame, he is member of CAFOD (agency of the Catholic Church of England and Wales, involved in charitable support and development in overseas countries) and of the theological commission of international Caritas. He has received honorary degrees from Oxford University and other academic institutions in France, Italy and the United States. In 2007 he was awarded the Michael Ramsey Prize for theological writings.R. Fr Fabio BAGGIO, C.S., under secretary of the Dicastery for Promoting Integral Human Development. He was born in Bassano del Grappa in 1965 and, in 1976, entered the Scalabrini-Tirondola Seminary of the Missionaries of San Carlo, making his perpetual profession in 1991. The following year he was ordained a Priest. In 1998 he obtained a doctorate in Church History from the Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome. From 1995 to 1997, in Santiago de Chile, in addition to exercising the pastoral ministry, he held the position of Advisor to the Episcopal Commission for Migration of Chile (INCAMI). Subsequently, until 2002, he was Director of the Department for Migration of the Archdiocese of Buenos Aires, also covering, in 1999, the role of National Secretary of the Society for the Propagation of the Faith, Pontifical Mission Societies Argentina. On 14 December 2016 he was appointed Under-Secretary of the Dicastery for Promoting Integral Human Development. On 23 April 2022, the Holy Father confirmed him as Under-Secretary of the Dicastery for Promoting Integral Human Development also with responsibility for the Migrants and Refugees Section and Special Projects Mons. George Jacob KOOVAKAD, Official of the Secretary of State, responsible for Papal Trips. He was born in Chethipuzha (India) on 11 August 1973. He was ordained a Priest on 24 July 2004, incardinated in Changanacherry. Graduated in Canon Law. Having entered the Diplomatic Service of the Holy See on 1 July 2006, he was assigned to the Apostolic Nunciature in Algeria, as Attache. On March 2, 2009, he was transferred to the Apostolic Nunciature in Korea until February 2012, when he was transferred to the Apostolic Nunciature in Iran. On February 16, 2015, he was transferred to the Apostolic Nunciature in Costa Rica. Since July 10, 2020, he has worked in the Secretariat of State, General Affairs section. on 10 July 2020. From 2021, Pope Francis has entrusted him with the organization of papal trips.H.E. Mons. Angelo Acerbi, Apostolic Nuncio He was born on 23 September 1925 in Sesta Godano (Italy) and was ordained a priest on 27 March 1948 for the then Diocese of Pontremoli. Having entered the diplomatic service of the Holy See in 1956, he served in the Papal Representations in Colombia, Brazil, France, Japan and Portugal, as well as in the Council for Public Affairs of the Church of the Secretariat of State. St. Paul VI, on June 22, 1974, appointed him an apostolic pro-nuncio in New Zealand and apostolic delegate in the Pacific Ocean, assigning him the headquarters of Zella and the personal title of Archbishop; The same Holy Pontiff, on the following 30 June, conferred him the episcopal ordination in the papal basilica of San Pietro in the Vatican. St. John Paul II, then, sent him as Nunzio to Colombia – where, together with other diplomats, he was hostage for six weeks by the guerrillas of the Movimiento 19 de Abril – and, subsequently, in Hungary and Moldova and in the Netherlands. From 2001 to 2015 he held the office of prelate of the Sovereign Military Hospital Order of San Giovanni di Jerusalem of Rhodes and Malta.

    EDITOR’S NOTE: This article is a translation. Apologies should the grammar and/or sentence structure not be perfect.

    MIL Translation OSI

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: UK trade mission visits Kyiv to deepen industry ties

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Trade mission agrees key requirements for Ukraine’s future equipment and capability needs.

    A UK trade mission, formed of representatives from the Ministry of Defence, Department for Business and Trade, and the defence trade association ADS, visited Ukraine to hold meetings with Ukrainian Government and industry representatives.

    It is the latest step in the growing relationship between the UK’s defence industrial sector and Ukraine’s, following the signing of a major agreement in July which will enable Ukraine to harness the power of UK industry by drawing on £3.5 billion worth of export finance to purchase further military capabilities.

    The cross-government group, led by the Minister for the Armed Forces, travelled to Kyiv, where the trade mission visited the Ukraine Defence Industrial Forum to take part in a series of meetings and forum discussions.

    Whilst there the minister discussed the UK’s steadfast support for Ukraine as long as it takes, the ever-growing relationship between the UK and Ukraine’s defence industry and the government’s pledge to continue to boost investment into our own industry which will in turn support Ukraine’s fight.

    Agreements were made with Ukrainian officials on their requirements for complex weapons and land systems support during the event, which provides a signal to UK industry as to the types of equipment they most need and for which the MOD will now contract with UK industry on Ukraine’s behalf.

    Minister for the Armed Forces, Luke Pollard MP said:

    The UK’s support for Ukraine is ironclad. We continue to lead the way in providing military aid, but our support is much broader than simply providing equipment. Our flourishing defence industrial relationship symbolises the work happening across Government and the private sector to ramp up and speed up our support.

    By deepening our ties with Ukraine’s defence industry, we are expanding own industrial capacity, while boosting Ukraine’s own capabilities. We stand shoulder to shoulder with Ukraine, and we will provide support for as long as it takes.

    The MOD already placed contracts with Thales for air defence missiles and Sheffield Forgemasters for artillery gun barrels forgings, in order to warm up industry in preparation for further orders.  Future orders are in the pipeline and will be funded by Ukraine, drawing on their own reserves and the £3.5 billion of United Kingdom export finance made available by the UK to support Ukraine’s war effort.

    Task Force HIRST is the UK cross-government team incorporating MOD, DBT and UK Export Finance to stimulate UK industrial production and international collaboration in support of Ukraine, including collaboration with Ukrainian companies.

    Last week, the Defence Secretary confirmed the Government is delivering on its commitment to speed up and ramp up deliveries of support for Ukraine, surpassing its pledge to deliver 12 AS90 artillery guns within 100 days of taking office.

    A total of 16 units are now on course to be delivered, with 10 already provided, and six more to follow in the coming weeks.

    Updates to this page

    Published 6 October 2024

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI USA: Readout of Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco’s Trip to the G7 Interior Minister’s Meeting in Italy

    Source: US State of Vermont

    Deputy Attorney General (Deputy AG) Lisa Monaco traveled to Mirabella Eclano, Italy, on Oct. 3-4 for the G7 Interior Ministers Meeting, where she highlighted the importance of international partnerships in supporting the rule of law and protecting against persistent global threats.

    The Deputy AG described the current threat environment to her G7 colleagues as a time where the threats have never been more diverse — from more aggressive actors — and all fueled by international conflicts and emerging, disruptive technologies — especially cyber and AI. She urged the ministers to stay united against threats posed by autocratic nations like Russia, Iran, and China looking to project power at home and abroad through transnational repression, malicious cyber activity, the abuse of emerging technologies, such as AI and cryptocurrencies, and malign foreign influence — especially in a global election year.

    The Deputy AG joined her colleagues in committing to deepening international collaboration against these threats, as well as against terrorism, malign cyber actors, and synthetic drugs such as fentanyl. She shared how the Justice Department is targeting the broader ecosystem that allows cyber criminals and malign nation state actors to flourish — by prioritizing disruptions and placing victims first — and also highlighted how the Department is tackling all aspects of the deadly fentanyl supply chain, in every part of the globe, to protect innocent lives.

    Ahead of the one-year anniversary of Hamas’s brutal October 7 terrorist attacks in Israel, the Deputy AG and Ministers unequivocally condemned terrorism and violent extremism in all forms, both online and offline. They pledged to continue the information sharing and law enforcement partnerships that are integral to thwarting acts of terror around the world. 

    The Deputy AG and ministers also met virtually with Ukrainian Interior Minister, Ihor Klymenko, and reaffirmed their unwavering support for Ukraine and their resolve to hold Russia accountable for the war crimes and atrocities it is perpetrating in its war of aggression. She reiterated the need for sustained coordination in these efforts and underscored the Justice Department’s continued efforts to deprive the Russian war machine of funding and supplies. She joined the other ministers in announcing new efforts to help Ukraine build the rule of law and fight corruption, including through a new G7 Anti-Corruption Task Force.

    As part of their efforts to build cooperation and coordination among the G7 to promote the rule of law around the world, the Deputy AG and Ministers discussed common frameworks to harness the promise of AI while also protecting against the perils of its abuse. The Deputy AG cautioned that AI is changing how crimes are committed, from intensifying cyberattacks, to making fraud scams more believable, to creating child exploitative material, to supercharging malign foreign influence in elections.

    On the margins of the G7 Ministerial, the Deputy AG held several bilateral meetings, including with United Kingdom Home Secretary Yvette Cooper; Canadian Minister of Public Safety Dominic Leblanc; German Minister of Interior Nancy Faeser; and European Commissioner for Home Affairs Ylva Johansson. The Deputy AG also met with the G7 host, Italian Minister of the Interior Matteo Piantedosi, to thank him for his leadership of the G7 and his hospitality. In all these discussions, the Deputy AG reinforced the steadfast commitment of the Justice Department to partnerships that uphold the rule of law and strengthen democracies around the world. 

    Italian Minister of the Interior Matteo Piantedosi welcoming Deputy AG Monaco to the G7 Ministerial. Photo credit: Italian Ministry of the Interior. 
    Deputy AG Monaco with UK Home Secretary Yvette Cooper. Photo credit: UK Home Office. 
    Deputy AG Monaco with G7 leaders. Photo credit: Italian Ministry of the Interior.
    Deputy AG Monaco meeting with Italian Minister of the Interior Matteo Piantedosi. Photo credit: Italian Ministry of the Interior.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-Evening Report: Could NZ foreign policy be Trumped? Why the government will be hoping Kamala Harris wins the US election

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Robert G. Patman, Professor of International Relations, University of Otago

    Getty Images

    One of the political ironies of the race for the White House is that the foreign policy interests of New Zealand’s centre-right government are probably best served by Democratic candidate Kamala Harris winning.

    Since the end of World War II, all New Zealand governments have supported multilateralism and an international rules-based order enshrined in the institutions of the United Nations.

    The relationship with the United States has reflected that, and tends to outlast the periodic fluctuations associated with changes in government and policy in Wellington or Washington.

    New Zealand’s current National-led coalition inherited close relations with the US, too. American visitor numbers were second only to Australians last year. The US is our third largest export market. And the two countries remain strategically linked within the Five Eyes intelligence sharing arrangement.

    Nevertheless, one of the key foreign policy goals of the coalition is to strengthen alignment with traditional allies such as the US. Given the very different worldviews of Kamala Harris and Donald Trump, the November 5 election will have a large bearing on how successful any push for closer relations with the US can be.

    Closer relations in the balance

    On the one hand, Republican candidate Trump is opposed to multilateral institutions, unless they explicitly serve US national interests. And he wants to reverse the impact of globalisation by constraining immigration, free trade and global governance.

    Nationalist slogans like “America First” promise a return to a so-called golden era of patriotism and sovereignty: a top-down world where the greatest power of all is unencumbered and free to assert its dominance.

    On the other hand, Harris would seem to support a more traditional US foreign policy agenda. This recognises the importance of international institutions and alliances in a world where “isolation is not insulation”.

    Whoever occupies the White House next, then, is likely to have a significant impact on New Zealand foreign policy.

    Isolation and dominance: Trump plays the immigration card at Republican National Convention in July 18.
    Getty Images

    Power plays and the Pacific

    First, Trump’s belief in an international system run by great powers would seem to be a recipe for depriving smaller states like New Zealand of a voice on international issues that affect them.

    Second, New Zealand’s regional focus on ties with Pacific Island nations – underpinned by close people-to-people links and a significant proportion of the country’s overseas development aid programme – is more likely to be complemented by a Harris foreign policy.

    Outgoing president Joe Biden reversed decades of US neglect of much of the Pacific, which had played to the advantage of other external powers – notably China.

    The Biden team launched the annual US-Pacific Islands Summit in 2022. And Kamala Harris played an active role in delivering US$800 million in development and climate assistance to Pacific Island nations in 2022-23.

    Whether Trump will maintain this enhanced diplomatic and economic engagement in the Pacific (and elsewhere) is questionable. Similarly, after Biden rejoined the Paris Climate Accord, Trump will probably quit it for a second time.

    Kamala Harris hosts Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the White House in September.
    Getty Images

    AUKUS and Ukraine

    Third, the New Zealand government faces the delicate task of navigating relations with an increasingly assertive China – the country’s biggest trade partner – while pursuing its goal of moving closer to the US.

    Since March 2023, successive New Zealand governments have been considering joining an arrangement to share advanced defence technologies under pillar two of the AUKUS security partnership that aims to deter a rising China in the Indo-Pacific region.

    It remains to be seen how China would react if New Zealand did join. But Trump’s insistence on US primacy in any multilateral agreement could make it more difficult for the government to win domestic support for pillar two membership.

    Even outside the AUKUS debate, Trump is more likely to insist allies spend more on defence than they did traditionally.

    Fourth, New Zealand has a big stake in the failure of Russia’s attempted annexation of Ukraine. Wellington’s interests are clearly more in line with Harris’ pledge to maintain support for Ukraine to restore its territorial integrity.

    Trump’s promise to end the war within 24 hours, on the other hand, could probably only be achieved by giving Vladimir Putin what he wants.

    The Middle East and the UN

    Finally, there do not seem to be substantive policy differences between Trump and Harris on the catastrophic situation in Gaza, and increasingly Lebanon.

    There remains a slim possibility a Harris administration might recognise unconditional support for the Israeli government of Benjamin Netanyahu is not sustainable for a superpower whose foreign policy is supposed to be driven by universal values and respect for international law.

    But this would be near impossible for Trump. Indeed, he would probably provide Netanyahu with even greater support.

    Overall, the foreign policy interests of the National-led coalition seem to align more with a Harris presidency than one led by Trump.

    But even if Harris wins, the alignment of interests will not be perfect. US exceptionalism – an informal ideology that claims the nation is a political exemplar for the rest of the world – and Washington’s veto power in the UN security Council are likely to remain constraining factors on the New Zealand-US relationship.

    The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Could NZ foreign policy be Trumped? Why the government will be hoping Kamala Harris wins the US election – https://theconversation.com/could-nz-foreign-policy-be-trumped-why-the-government-will-be-hoping-kamala-harris-wins-the-us-election-240538

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