Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Michael McCaul (10th District of Texas)
Austin, Texas –U.S. Congressman Michael McCaul (R-Texas) — chairman emeritus of the House Foreign Affairs and Homeland Security Committees — joined CBS’ “Face the Nation” with Ed O’Keefe to discuss the latest on ceasefire efforts in Ukraine, President Trump’s upcoming visit to the Middle East, and more.
Click here to watch
On ceasefire negotiations between Ukraine and Russia:
“It’s very intense. … Mr. Putin decided to bomb Ukraine on Palm Sunday. He’s not making any concessions at all, while Zelensky seems to be making all the concessions. So the bottom line is: Putin has to agree to a 30-day cease-fire for any peace talks to go forward, and the land that he is asking for is — you know, even JD Vance talked about this, and the president — land that Russia has not even occupied in Ukraine. So [Putin] has to operate in good faith. We want peace, but not peace at any price. Because peace at any price is like appeasement, like we saw with Chamberlain and Hitler, and that’s unacceptable.
On the likelihood of the US passing a sanctions package:
“If Mr. Putin does not agree to a 30-day ceasefire, I think the sanctions are almost certain, not only from the Congress, but from the White House. … Getting [the national security supplemental package] passed the last time was a major accomplishment. Had we not accomplished that, Ed, Russia would be occupying Ukraine today — no question in my mind. … So again, it’s really up to Mr. Putin, who so far has not been negotiating in good faith, as to how we proceed from here. And we all want this war to end. We all want peace, but we want a just peace.”
On President Trump’s upcoming trip to the Middle East:
“We don’t have all the details. I know he’s there to discuss an economic alliance with the Saudis, with the UAE, with the Arab nations. And that’s important. Just like the minerals deal that the Ukraine parliament voted for, the more economically we’re tied to the Middle East, the more we’re security tied, and that will push China out of the region. The ultimate goal here, though, is a normalization agreement with Israel. We were getting close to that, until Iran decided, through its proxy in in Gaza — Hamas — to invade on October 7. So the point is, we need to be talking about all this as a package. But again, we cannot have normalization until you have a cease-fire in Gaza. And I think that’s the more difficult piece here.”
Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News
Delegations of Russia and Ukraine start their meeting in Istanbul, Türkiye, May 16, 2025. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Türkiye/Handout via Xinhua)
Delegations of Russia and Ukraine concluded their meeting in Türkiye’s Istanbul on Friday, agreeing to hold a new round of negotiations and have a large-scale prisoner exchange.
As a key outcome of the two-hour talks, Russia and Ukraine agreed to a prisoner exchange involving 1,000 people from each side.
According to Russian diplomatic sources, Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky said the swap would take place soon. He also expressed overall satisfaction with the meeting and confirmed that Russia is ready to continue the dialogue.
Medinsky noted that both sides will soon present their detailed views on a possible ceasefire, after which the negotiations will move forward.
He also said that Ukraine proposed direct talks between the two presidents, and that Russia “took note” of the request.
The convoy arrives at the Dolmabahce Presidential Office for meeting in Istanbul, Türkiye, May 16, 2025. Delegations from the United States, Ukraine and Türkiye convened at the Dolmabahce Presidential Office here on Friday for the first trilateral meeting ahead of the Russia-Ukraine peace talks. Following the trilateral meeting, a separate session will be held between delegations from Russia, Ukraine and Türkiye. (Xinhua/Liu Lei)
Meanwhile, Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov, quoted by the state-run Anadolu Agency, said both sides focused on three key topics: a ceasefire, the prisoner exchange, and the possibility of a future presidential summit.
Umerov described the agreement on the prisoner swap as “the largest exchange since the beginning of the war.”
In a post on X, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, who chaired the negotiation, noted that the meeting produced several important outcomes aimed at building trust and laying the foundation for future negotiations.
He said Russia and Ukraine agreed to “share with the other side in writing the conditions that would make it possible to reach a ceasefire,” and reached an agreement “to meet again in principle.”
“As Türkiye, we will continue to make every effort to enable a lasting peace between Russia and Ukraine,” he said.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky speaks at a press conference at the Ukrainian Embassy in Ankara, Türkiye, May 15, 2025. Zelensky said on Thursday that he would not personally show up at the negotiating table in Istanbul with a commitment to ending the conflict with Russia. (Mustafa Kaya/Handout via Xinhua)
The Istanbul talks follow a proposal by Putin on Sunday to resume direct negotiations with Ukraine. Zelensky has previously said he is open to a face-to-face meeting with Putin. However, the Kremlin said Putin would not attend the talks.
The last direct talks between Ukraine and Russia took place in Istanbul in March 2022, where the two sides failed to agree to halt the fighting.
Remarks by Philip R. Lane, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the Second Thomas Laubach Research Conference
Washington, D.C., 16 May 2025
In my remarks today I will focus on how the ECB communicates its monetary policy decisions, with a particular emphasis on the integration of risks and uncertainty into the monetary policy decision-making process.[1][2]
Monetary policy meetings take place over two days. On Wednesday afternoon, there are presentations by ECB Executive Board members: Isabel Schnabel reports on the latest financial market developments and I review the global environment and the latest economic, monetary and financial developments in the euro area. This is followed by a general discussion of these topics by Governing Council members. On Thursday morning, I present a proposal for the monetary policy decision, which is then discussed by the Governing Council. After the monetary policy decision is made (typically by consensus), the monetary policy statement is finalised by the Governing Council, concluding the Thursday morning session.
In the afternoon, a press release announcing the decision is published at 2:15 p.m. While this press release was quite succinct in the past, a summary explanation for the decision is now included, and — for the quarterly meetings — the main elements of the staff macroeconomic projections are reported.
At the opening of the press conference at 2:45 p.m., President Lagarde reads out the monetary policy statement. The opening section matches the press release, while further sections go into more detail on economic activity, inflation, the risk assessment and monetary and financial developments. This is followed by a question-and-answer session. After the press conference, the quarterly forecast meetings also see the publication of a staff article that explains the new set of macroeconomic projections. About two weeks later, the Economic Bulletin is published, containing summaries of the preparatory analysis that was made available to the Governing Council prior to the meeting. An account of the meeting is published about a month after the meeting.
The aim of the monetary policy statement is not only to explain the immediate decision but also to update the underlying narrative in terms of the overall orientation of the monetary stance, the main forces shaping the dynamics of the economy and the inflation process, the evolving risk assessment and monetary and financial developments. The discipline of limiting the length of the monetary policy statement (it was about 1,500 words in April) puts a premium on identifying the main issues that the Governing Council wishes to emphasise. At the same time, this length offers room for a sufficiently broad survey of these themes to underpin the monetary policy decision. Naturally, at the quarterly meetings, there is also considerable external interest in the details of the new staff macroeconomic projections: it makes sense to publish the staff article after the press conference. In that way, the initial focus in the monetary policy statement and the press conference is on the Governing Council’s overall assessment of the situation, whereas the technical details of the staff work follow thereafter.
The publication of the meeting account summarises the presentations by Isabel and myself and the ensuing discussions among the members of the Governing Council. The account includes a section entitled “Monetary policy considerations and policy options” that provides the main features of the monetary policy proposal that I presented at the meeting. This typically includes considerations of how risk factors were taken into account in the proposal.[3] Especially since the Governing Council’s monetary policy decisions are typically consensual, the summary of the discussion provides valuable insights into the range of views expressed at the meeting.
Taken together, the press release, the MPS, the press conference, the staff macroeconomic projections article, the Economic Bulletin and the meeting accounts provide a phased sequence of public information releases that helps external audiences to understand how we make our monetary policy decisions. In addition, in pursuing a multi-layered approach to public communication, a visual monetary policy statement is also released, which explains the monetary policy decision in short and easy-to-understand language, accompanied by a set of infographics to illustrate the main messages.[4]
These decision materials are complemented by speeches and interviews by Executive Board and Governing Council members. The publication of an array of analytical contributions by staff (through the Economic Bulletin, the ECB Blog, working papers and occasional papers) also helps improve understanding of monetary policy formation, including in relation to the staff projections, which form a key analytical input into monetary policy meetings.
In view of this rich information set, would it be a game changer if the Governing Council additionally published its conditional assessment of the most likely future rate path, as practised by some other central banks? Putting aside the logistical challenge of forming a consensus on the conditional future rate path among the twenty-six members of the Governing Council, it is my view that such an exercise would create unwarranted expectations about the future rate path. Moreover, it would distort the monetary policy decision-making process in view of the potential reputational costs associated with deviations of actual decisions from the previously-flagged path.[5] Procedurally, publishing a conditional rate path would also be awkward in the context of a staff-led projections exercise that is based on the market rate path.
More fundamentally, publishing a conditional baseline for the future rate path would not well capture the sensitivity of future rate decisions to the evolving macroeconomic environment and shifts in the risk assessment. As part of the meeting preparations, the staff analyse a family of plausible future rate paths and it would convey excessive confidence if any one candidate rate path were to be singled out. In particular, staff simulation exercises show the sensitivity of rate paths to both the point-in-time macroeconomic projections and various underlying assumptions that underpin model-based optimal rate paths as well as “robust” rate paths that seek to minimise the risk of a policy error across a range of plausible scenarios. Importantly, all such rate path analyses are sensitive to the assumptions made about the preferences of policymakers.[6] Even if the rate path simulation exercises are highly valuable inputs into the internal development of the monetary policy proposal, it is preferable to take a meeting-by-meeting approach and focus the public communication on the immediate decision.[7]
At the same time, to improve external understanding of how we make decisions, it is helpful set out the criteria guiding the reaction function to the main risk factors prevailing at any point in time.[8] This provides “reaction function” guidance in terms of the key inputs driving monetary policy decisions.[9] For instance, during the disinflation process over the last two years, the Governing Council has highlighted that measures of underlying inflation and the incoming evidence on the strength of monetary policy transmission were especially important in guiding decisions, in addition to the “standard” role of the inflation outlook (comprising both the baseline and the risks around it). The prominence of these specific risk proxies reflected the high uncertainty about the intrinsic persistence of the inflation surge (such that measures of underlying inflation provided important insights into the persistent component of inflation) and, similarly, the high uncertainty about the impact of the exceptionally fast pace of the cumulative rate hiking over 2022-2023 (such that monitoring the evidence on the strength of monetary transmission was crucial). Since both inflation persistence and the strength of monetary transmission are first order influences on the calibration of the rate path, the prominence given to these factors in our public communication have helped market participants to understand that the incoming information along these dimensions is central to our data-dependent monetary policy decisions. Looking to the future, the exact articulation of reaction function guidance should be periodically updated in line with the evolving risk environment: there is unlikely to be a fixed, timeless list of risk proxies.
The risk assessment section of the monetary policy statement provides additional signals regarding the factors that might shape future rate decisions. The meeting-by-meeting list of upside and downside risks to growth and inflation help to shape market pricing of future rate decisions: as the evolution of these risks become more or less prominent between meetings, market participants can revise their views. Naturally, this risk assessment is informed by considerable staff analysis that identifies and calibrates material threats to the growth and inflation projections.
Finally, alternative scenarios have been included in the staff macroeconomic projections exercise in the context of specific risk constellations. These include the onset of the pandemic in early 2020, the unjustified invasion of Ukraine by Russia in early 2022 and the elevation of geopolitical tensions in the Middle East in autumn 2023. In the near term, the ongoing uncertainty about US tariff policies means that alternative scenarios will also be included in the June macroeconomic projections exercise. These staff exercises are valuable in conveying the scale of revisions to the projected inflation and output paths that would be triggered under the realisation of the alternative scenarios.[10]
In providing the risk assessment in the monetary policy statement and by staff publishing alternative macroeconomic projection scenarios in the context of specific risk constellations, there is extensive communication on how different risk factors might shape future decisions. Some might wish that the Governing Council lays out specific policy responses to these various risk profiles in order to “fill out” the distribution of future rate paths. However, as outlined above, the rich information set that is attached to each monetary policy decision together with reaction function guidance provides a sufficient foundation for market participants to assess how the realisation of various risks could affect the future rate path.
An additional potential application of scenario analysis is to construct a limited set of specific “curated” alternative scenarios by combining selected alternative calibrations of the primary economic and financial judgements underpinning the baseline projections. Publishing such alternative scenarios can be helpful in conveying the difficult choices embedded in making forecasts and in capturing possible differences in policy preferences across policymakers. From a communications perspective, this can be particularly helpful in systems where policymakers have a collective responsibility to endorse the published forecast but retain individual responsibility in casting votes.
Since the ECB relies on a staff-led projections exercise and has a strong preference for consensual decisions, the set of considerations in publishing such curated scenario analyses is different. In making sure monetary policy decisions are robust to non-baseline realisations, it is also not clear whether such a curated approach would be superior to a “many scenario” internal staff analysis (possibly augmented by machine learning algorithms) that explores robustness across the many combinations of shocks and modelling choices that are considered at each meeting. In addition, if the aim is to capture the main risk concerns of policymakers, selecting a limited set of curated alternative scenarios (out of very many possible scenarios) for each meeting would be logistically taxing for a twenty-six member Governing Council. A basic concern is that the selected curated scenarios might turn out to have shined the spotlight on risk factors that proved to be immaterial and might give the impression that the risk analysis was too narrow in scope.
In any event, the specific methods used to convey how risks and uncertainty are incorporated into the monetary policy decision-making process are less important than the underlying commitment to articulate that policy decisions not only take into account the baseline but also the surrounding risk environment. Moreover, there is an active research agenda in academia and policy organisations on how best to incorporate uncertainty into monetary policy decisions and monetary policy communications: as this research bears fruit over time, central banks should adapt their practices.[11]
In these remarks, I have focused on how we currently communicate our monetary policy decisions and the associated decision-making framework. How best to integrate risk and uncertainty into our monetary policy decisions and our communication is a key topic for our ongoing assessment of our monetary policy strategy.[12] We will publish our updated strategy in the second half of the year.
On Friday (16 May), NATO Deputy Secretary General Radmila Shekerinska travelled to Estonia.
She began at the Ämari Airbase, from where the Portuguese Air Force currently helps secure the skies as part of NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission. The Deputy Secretary General was also briefed on the ongoing multinational exercise Hedgehog/Siil. Led by Estonia, the exercise brings together over 18,000 Estonian military personnel and forces from eleven Allied countries, including NATO’s multinational presence in Estonia.
At the Lennart Meri Conference later in the day, the Deputy Secretary General outlined NATO’s priorities for the upcoming Summit in The Hague. She discussed the ways to strengthen deterrence and defence in the face of global security challenges, emphasising the importance of increasing defence spending and defence production. She also discussed NATO’s support to Ukraine. Mrs. Shekerinska also visited the Regional Hub of NATO’s Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA), where start-ups work to adapt their innovative technologies to defence, in areas such as sensing and surveillance, energy, and critical infrastructure.
The Deputy Secretary General met the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Margus Tsahkna, and the Minister of Defence, Mr Hanno Pevkur. She thanked Estonia for its exemplary commitment to investing in defence, support for Ukraine, as well as for its contributions to defence innovation and cyber defence.
Following Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the Commission outlined in REPowerEU the strategic necessity to accelerate the clean energy transition and diversify natural gas supplies, including through domestic gas resources[1]. The EastMed pipeline is one of the options to transport gas from Israeli and Cypriot fields to Greece.
The Commission continuously monitors energy infrastructure developments in alignment with EU policy objectives and available policy instruments. The EastMed pipeline is included in the list of Projects of Common Interest (PCIs) and Projects of Mutual Interest (PMIs), and therefore can benefit from streamlined permitting processes, improved regulatory treatment and funding from the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) under certain conditions. The project has received funding under the CEF to carry out a feasibility study. The feasibility of the EastMed pipeline will depend on its commercial viability, including future demand dynamics in line with our climate ambitions, and its potential to contribute to the goals of the REPowerEU.
The Commission monitors the implementation of the priority projects and works alongside Member States to address emerging challenges. For instance, the EU addresses challenges like cyber threats and physical security to energy infrastructure via the Critical Entities Resilience Directive[2] and the Network and Information Directive (NIS2 Directive)[3], and is reviewing the Union’s energy security framework.
on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the modification of customs duties applicable to imports of certain goods originating in or exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus
–having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2025)0034),
–having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 207(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C10‑0006/2025),
–having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
–having regard to the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 26 March 2025 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
–having regard to Rule 60 of its Rules of Procedure,
–having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development,
–having regard to the report of the Committee on International Trade (A10-0087/2025),
1.Adopts its position at first reading, taking over the Commission proposal;
2.Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal;
3.Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT
Since 2022 when Russia started its full-scale invasion and brutal war of aggression against Ukraine, the EU has implemented multiple rounds of sanctions as well as increased trade tariffs to reduce trade with the aggressor. As a result, the imports into the EU from Russia have decreased by 85 % compared to pre-war levels.
However, there are still Russian products that flow into the EU market, consequently fuelling the Russian war machine. This has to be stopped and brought to complete standstill.
The EU imports of urea and nitrogen-based fertilisers from Russia have significantly increased over the last years. The import levels were already worryingly high in 2023 (3.6 million tonnes, worth EUR 1.28 billion, representing more than 25 % of total EU imports), and have increased significantly in 2024 to 4.4 million tonnes, worth EUR 1.5 billion and with an import share of 30 %. Therefore, imports of the fertilisers covered by this Regulation currently reflect a situation ofgrowingeconomic dependence on Russia.
The European Parliament have already called for a ban on importing Russian grain, potash and fertilisers in Resolution on continued financial and military support to Ukraine by EU Member States.
The aim of this Regulation is to eliminate dependencies on imports from Russia and to prevent circumvention through Belarus. Such imports, particularly of fertilisers, make the EU vulnerable to potential coercive actions by Russia and thus present a risk to EU food security. This Regulationproposes that the tariff increase on nitrogen-based fertilisers takes place gradually over a transition period of three years.Through increased import duties and prohibitive tariffs, theRussian share of fertiliser import into the EU will gradually be replaced by other sources. Some of the EU Member States have already decoupled from Russian nitrogen-based fertilisers, without seeing shortages of supply or market price increases.
The tariffs willsupport the growth of the EU’s domestic production of fertiliser, which suffered during the energy crisis and due to the influx of fertilisers from Russia. EU production reached only 14 million tonnes in 2023, down from an average of 18 million tonnes in the previous 5 years. Despite the closure of some production facilities following the increase in energy prices, the European industry has around 20 % spare capacity (ca 3 million tonnes), on top of 9.5 million tonnes of nitrogen fertilisers exported in 2024. If used, it is expected that this spare capacitycould almost completely compensate the shortfall of reducing Russian importsinto the EU.
The tariff measures will also allow for the furtherdiversification of supply from third countries. There are many suppliers on the world market who can replace Russian exporters, including Egypt, Algeria, Norway, Morocco, Oman and the US. Indeed, there is room to strengthen the transatlantic cooperation. This will help ensure a steady fertiliser supply and foster market competitiveness.
It is vital that we ensure that Russia’s war economy is weakened. At the same time, we must ensure sure that there is a steady stream of quality fertiliser supply for agriculture in the European Union, and, importantly, ensurethat fertilisers remain available for EU farmers at an affordable price. Therefore, the proposal includes monitoring provisions and if needed mitigating measures, should a substantial increase in fertiliser prices occur. The gradual phasing-in of applicable tariff measures will allow European farmers to adapt to the new conditions.
In order to prevent circumvention of these measures, the rapporteur welcomes the fact that the tariff measures will also apply to Belarus to prevent potential Russian imports to the EU being circumvented through Belarus. The rapporteur believes that potential increase of imports from other countries, which are not the traditional exporters have to beclosely monitoredto detect any possible circumvention.
Besides the import of fertilisers,the Regulation also targets the remaining 15 % of agricultural importsfrom Russia that had not yet been subject to increased tariffs. With this Regulation, all agricultural imports from Russia will be the subject of EU tariffs. The tariff level would be prohibitive, thus high enough to halt the importation of these goods. Continued imports of the agricultural products concerned could create an additional economic dependence on Russia, which could, if left unchecked, harm the EU’s food security.
The rapporteur welcomes that these combined measures will prevent Russia from benefiting financially from exports to the EU to fund its war of aggression against Ukraine. It is also a matter of EU’s security and strategic autonomy.
The regulation is not expected to negatively affect global food security because the increase in tariffs applies only to imports into the EU.
The rapporteur welcomes Article 207 TFEU as alegal basisas it is a trade policy measure requiring EP co-decision in line with OLP.
The rapporteur hopes the Regulation will be adopted in its current form and in time for the entry into force by 1 July 2025, in order to ensure rapid implementation.
.
ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOMTHE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT
Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that she received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the draft report, prior to the adoption thereof in committee:
Entity and/or person
Yara, VP European Government Relations & External Communications, VP Corporate affairs and Industrial Relations
Zemnieku Saeima (Association Farmers’ Council), Foreign policy specialist
European Commission, DG Trade Unit E2, DG Trade Unit E3
Fertilizers Europe, Director General, Trade & Economic Senior Manager
Association of the Potash and Salt Industry / VKS – Verband der Kali- und Salzindustrie e.V, Managing Director, EU Office Brussels
Latvijas Lauksaimniecības kooperatīvu asociācija (Latvian Association of Agricultural Cooperatives), Director-General
Business & Science Poland, Polish Chamber of Chemical Industry, ANWIL
Permanent Representation of the Republic of Latvia to the EU, Counsellor (SCA Spokesperson, Common Agricultural Policy)
Council, Permanent Representation of the Republic of Poland to the EU, Chair of Trade Policy Committee-Deputies, Vice-Chair of Trade Policy Committee-Deputies
The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.
Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that she has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.
OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT (7.5.2025)
for the Committee on International Trade
on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the modification of customs duties applicable to imports of certain goods originating in or exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus
The Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development submits the following to the Committee on International Trade, as the committee responsible:
Amendment1
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1
Text proposed by the Commission
Amendment
(1)The Union’s imports of urea and nitrogen-based fertilisers from the Russian Federation were significant at3.6million tonnesin 2023and increased considerably in 2024 by comparison with 2023. The level of the Union’s imports from the Russian Federation of the agricultural goods covered by this Regulation (‘the concerned agricultural goods’) is relatively low for most goods, but could increase significantly if the current trading conditions persist.
(1)The Union’s imports of urea and nitrogen-based fertilisers from the Russian Federationdoubled between 2020/2021 and 2022/2023, followed by further growth in 2023 and 2024. In 2023, the Union’s imports of those fertiliserswere significant at3,6million tonnes,and increased considerably in 2024 by comparison with 2023. The level of the Union’s imports from the Russian Federation of the agricultural goods covered by this Regulation (‘the concerned agricultural goods’) is relatively low for most goods, but could increase significantly if the current trading conditions persist.
Amendment2
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2
Text proposed by the Commission
Amendment
(2)The imports of the fertilisers covered by this Regulation (‘the concerned fertilisers’) currently reflect a situation of economic dependency on the Russian Federation. Moreover, the imports of the concerned agricultural goods could create a similar and additional economic dependency on the Russian Federation, which should in the present circumstances be prevented and reduced in order to protect the Union’s markets and safeguard the Union’s food security.
(2)The imports of the fertilisers covered by this Regulation (‘the concerned fertilisers’) currently reflect a situation of economic dependency on the Russian Federation, which continues to hinder Union fertiliser production due to an unequal level playing field. The large volumes of fertilisers from the Russian Federation intended for export are gradually distorting supply diversification by eliminating both local and third-country suppliers. Moreover, the imports of the concerned agricultural goods could create a similar and additional economic dependency on the Russian Federation, which should in the present circumstances be prevented and reduced in order to protect the Union’s markets and safeguard the Union’s food security.
Amendment3
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4 a (new)
Text proposed by the Commission
Amendment
(4a)Reduction of the Union’s dependence on fertilisers fromthe Russian Federation, avoiding the creation of new dependencies, ensuring the steady supply of cost-competitive fertilisers at affordable price levels for Union farmers in the short, medium and long term and increasing the Union’s strategic autonomy require the development of a long-term Union fertiliser strategy that should primarily focus on enhancing the competitiveness of the Union’s fertilisers production sector in order to secure a steady supply of fertilisers at affordable price levels. That strategy should focus on supporting innovation, attracting investments and developing new business models to reduce or eliminate potentially harmful import dependencies, as well as a trade diversification strategy promoting stable trade relations and securing alternative supply chains. In parallel, measures should also improve access to organic fertilisers and nutrients from recycled waste streams and increase the circularity of farming practices. It is noteworthy that, although the European Parliament has repeatedly expressed concerns regarding fertilisers, particularly through its resolutions of 24 March2022 on the need for an urgent EU action plan to ensure food security inside and outside the EU in light of the Russian invasion of Ukraine1a, and of 16 February 2023 on the Commission communication on ensuring availability and affordability of fertilisers1b, the Commission has not come forward with clear and sufficient measures to support domestic fertiliser production.
_________________
1aOJ C 361, 20.9.2022, p. 2.
1bOJ C 283, 11.8.2023, p. 51.
Amendment4
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5 a (new)
Text proposed by the Commission
Amendment
(5a)The production and cost of mineral fertilisers largely depend on the availability and affordability of natural gas.
Amendment5
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5 b (new)
Text proposed by the Commission
Amendment
(5b)Changes are needed to truly address the Union industry and agriculture structural problems, such as access to energy and raw materials at high prices, the European Green Deal, and excessive regulation.
Amendment6
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 7
Text proposed by the Commission
Amendment
(7)Imports of the concerned agricultural goods and fertilisers that originate in or are exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus should therefore be subject to higher customs duties than imports from other third countries.
(7)Imports of the concerned agricultural goods and fertilisers that originate in or are exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus should therefore be subject to higher customs duties than imports from other third countrieswhile securing the Union´s market stability, and food security and affordability.
Amendment7
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8 a (new)
Text proposed by the Commission
Amendment
(8a)At the same time, it is important to consider the Union’s high dependence on fertiliser imports from the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus. Therefore, this Regulation should be accompanied by the development of a mechanism for balancing fertiliser prices and possible subsidies for farmers if the new tariffs results in an excessive increase in the price of fertilisers and thus in reduced profitability of agricultural production. Revenues generated from higher customs duties should be a part of that mechanism.
Amendment8
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9
Text proposed by the Commission
Amendment
(9)The envisaged increase in customs duties is not expected to negatively affect global food security because the increase in tariffs applies only to imports into the Union and does not affect goods concerned Regulation if they are only transiting through the Union’s territory to third countries of final destination. To the contrary, the envisaged increase in Union import duties may increase the exportation of those goods to third countries and increase the availability of supplies there.
(9)The envisaged increase in customs duties is not expected to negatively affect global food security because the increase in tariffs applies only to imports into the Union and does not affect goods concerned Regulation if they are only transiting through the Union’s territory to third countries of final destination.However, monitoring transit will be critical to prevent any sort of intentional dumping by the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus.To the contrary, the envisaged increase in Union import duties may increase the exportation of those goods to third countries and increase the availability of supplies there.
Amendment9
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10
Text proposed by the Commission
Amendment
(10)At the same time, fertilisers playa significantrole forthefood security as well as for the financial stability of the farmers in the Union. It is therefore necessary to ensure predictable and sufficient access to fertilisers, at affordable price levels for Union farmers, which should in turn contribute to the stabilisation of agricultural markets. During a transitional period, the proposed measure would stimulate stepping up the Union production and allow for reinforcing alternative sources of supply from other international partners, minimising the risk that fertilisers prices for Union farmers increase substantially.To this end, the Commission should monitor closely the evolution of fertiliser priceson theUnionmarket. Should fertiliser prices substantially increase, the Commission shouldassess the situation andtake all appropriate actions to remedy such surge.
(10)At the same time, fertilisers playan essentialrole for food security as well as for the financial stability of the farmers in the Union. It is therefore necessary to ensure predictable and sufficient access to fertilisers, at affordable price levels for Union farmers. During a transitional period, the proposed measure would stimulate stepping up the Union production and allow for reinforcing alternative sources of supply from other international partners, minimising the risk that fertilisers prices for Union farmers increase substantially.The Commission shall address the difficult situation of the fertiliser industry in the Union, which has been under strain over the last four years due to high-energy prices,production costs, and challenges posed by existing regulations.The Commission shouldtherefore implement measures to alleviate the high costs burdening the Union industry, which directly impact the entire supply chain, particularly farmers. The Commission should alsomonitor closely the evolution of fertiliser pricesat the Member State andUnionlevels. Should fertiliser prices substantially increase, the Commission should take all appropriate actionsin a timely mannerto remedy suchasurge.
Amendment10
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10 a (new)
Text proposed by the Commission
Amendment
(10a)Ensuring farmers’ access to affordable and sufficient quantities of fertilisers is essential for safeguarding food security across the Union. Therefore, the Commission should urgently explore and propose appropriate support mechanisms to guarantee the availability of fertilisers at competitive prices for farmers in the Union and introduce targeted measures to support the farmers impacted.
Amendment11
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10 b (new)
Text proposed by the Commission
Amendment
(10b)The Commission must ensure that the introduction of additional tariffs on fertiliser imports from the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus does not generate above-average purchase prices, thereby undermining farmers’ access to essential inputs. Given the significant volumes currently imported and the limited short-term flexibility to shift suppliers without incurring additional costs, such measures should not result in the reduction of fertilised agricultural areas and sub-optimal application rates. The Commission must ensure that those measures do not lead to lower yields, diminish profitability, and have potentially negative consequences for food security and farmers’ livelihoods. Therefore, a mandatory monthly monitoring, including at Member State level, of the prices of products listed in Annex II should be established to ensure timely responses and safeguard the viability of the Union farming sector. The price indicators should be published monthly in order to increase transparency. Furthermore, the role of the EU Fertilisers Market Observatory should be increased. Moreover, the European Board on Agriculture and Food (EBAF) should hold regular exchanges on the availability and price affordability of fertilisers, ensuring an active dialogue with the actors of the food supply chain, including farmers, and provide high-level advice to the Commission on this strategic matter.
Amendment12
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10 c (new)
Text proposed by the Commission
Amendment
(10c)To accelerate the reduction of imports of agricultural goods and fertilisers from the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus, the Commission should assess the possibility of developing alternative sources of supply from the Union and other international partners and to authorise alternative measures, such as the use of manure and processed animal manure, including RENURE and digestate, as a sustainable alternative which reduces CO2emissions by decreasing the need for fertiliser imports, aligns with circular economy principles, and strengthens the Union’s agricultural resilience. The Commission should establish a legal and financial framework that makes manure and processed animal manure, including RENURE and digestate, a viable alternative. That framework should provide regulatory flexibility, beyond the limits currently established by the Council Directive 91/676/EEC1a, while upholding environmental protection and the principles of efficiency and safety, and include financial incentives to keep it affordable for the farmers in the Union.
__________________
1aCouncil Directive 91/676/EEC of 12 December 1991 concerning the protection of waters against pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources (OJ L 375, 31.12.1991, p. 1).
Amendment13
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11
Text proposed by the Commission
Amendment
(11)The envisaged increase in customs duties is consistent with the Union’s external action in other areas, as set out in Article 21(3) of the Treaty on European Union. The state of relations between the Union and the Russian Federation has greatly deteriorated in recent years and particularly since 2022. This is due to the Russian Federation’s blatant disregard for international law and, in particular, its unprovoked and unjustified military aggression and full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Since July 2014, the Union has progressively imposed restrictive measures on trade with the Russian Federation in response to the Russian Federation’s actions vis-à-vis Ukraine.
(11)The envisaged increase in customs duties is consistent with the Union’s external action in other areas, as set out in Article 21(3) of the Treaty on European Union. The state of relations between the Union and the Russian Federation has greatly deteriorated in recent years and particularly since 2022. This is due to the Russian Federation’s blatant disregard for international law and, in particular, its unprovoked and unjustified military aggression and full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Since July 2014, the Union has progressively imposed restrictive measures on trade with the Russian Federation in response to the Russian Federation’s actions vis-à-vis Ukraine.If the Union fails to impose the envisaged tariffs, it would indirectly contribute to financing the war efforts of the Russian Federation against Ukraine and risk supporting other autocratic regimes, as sanctioned gas from the Russian Federation would be utilised for the production and export of cheap fertilisers to the Union.
Amendment14
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14 a (new)
Text proposed by the Commission
Amendment
(14a)Given that fertilisers are widely traded commodities with a substantial risk of circumvention, Member States and their customs authorities should strictly verify and validate the true origin of fertilisers imported into the Union market. That verification process should include thorough scrutiny of shipment documentation and proactive monitoring to prevent any re-export schemes designed to circumvent the tariff-increases. Where circumvention of the measures in force takes place, the imposed tariffs could be extended to goods from other third countries concerned.
Amendment15
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point d
Text proposed by the Commission
Amendment
(d)The Commissionmayadopt an implementing act laying down the arrangements for monitoring the import volumes referred to in paragraph 2. That implementing act shall be adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure set out in Article 4 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011.
(d)The Commissionshalladopt an implementing act laying down the arrangements for monitoring the import volumes referred to in paragraph 2. That implementing act shall be adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure set out in Article 4 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011.
Amendment16
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point d a (new)
Text proposed by the Commission
Amendment
(da)The Commission shall, without undue delay, propose a legal and financial framework to scale up the use of manure and processed animal manure, including Renure, as a sustainable alternative to synthetic fertilisers.
Amendment17
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1
Text proposed by the Commission
Amendment
1.The Commission shall monitor prices applicable in the Union of the goods listed in Annex IIduring four years from the application of this Regulation.
1.From the date of application of this Regulation,the Commission shall,on a monthly basis,monitor prices applicable inthe Member States andtheUnion of the goods listed in Annex II. The Commission shall publish in a transparent way the results of such monitoring.
Amendment18
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 a (new)
Text proposed by the Commission
Amendment
1a.The Commission and national customs authorities shall closely monitor imports of the goods listed in Article 1.
Amendment19
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 2
Text proposed by the Commission
Amendment
2.Should the price levels of the goods listed in Annex II substantially exceed the levels of 2024 in the period referred to in paragraph 1, the Commission shallassess the situation andtake all appropriate actions to remedy such surge. This may include, if appropriate, proposing the temporary suspension of tariffs for concerned goods imported from origins other than the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus.
2.Should the price levels of the goods listed in Annex II substantially exceed the levels of 2024 in the period referred to in paragraph 1, the Commission shall take all appropriate actionswithin 14 daysto remedy such surge. This may include, if appropriate,the following actions:
(a)proposing the temporary suspension of tariffs for concerned goods imported from origins other than the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus;
(b)making financial support available to farmers if a substantial increase in fertiliser prices noticeably reduces the profitability of agricultural production.
Amendment20
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 2 a (new)
Text proposed by the Commission
Amendment
2a.If appropriate, the Commission shall propose the temporary suspension of tariffs for goods concerned listed in Annex II and imported from origins other than the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus.
Amendment21
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 2 b (new)
Text proposed by the Commission
Amendment
2b.If it is determined that circumvention practices of the import of products listed in Annexes I and II originating in the Russian Federation or the Republic of Belarus through a third country to the Union have occurred, the Commission shall initiate an anti-circumvention investigation. In order to prevent circumvention practices, the Commission shall examine the possibility of using a licensing system for imports from the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus.
Amendment22
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 2 c (new)
Text proposed by the Commission
Amendment
2c.The Commission shall monitor and assess this Regulation every year in terms of food security and sovereignty and, if necessary, propose that it be repealed.
Amendment23
Proposal for a regulation
Annex I – table – rows 59 a, 59 b and 59 c (new)
Text proposed by the Commission
Amendment
– Of rape or colza seeds:
2306 41 –Of low erucic acid rape or colza seeds
2306 49 –Other
ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT
Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur for the opinion received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the opinion:
Entity and/or person
COPA-COGECA,Secretary General
European Commission, DG AGRI Unit E.1
European Commission, DG Trade Unit E2
Fertilizers Europe, Director General,
LAT Nitrogen, Head of Public Affairs Europe
Asociación Nacional de Fabricantes de Fertilizantes (ANFFE) (Spanish National Association of Fertilizer Manufacturers)Secretary General
Asociación Agraria – Jóvenes Agricultores ASAJA- (Association of young farmers). President, EU Office Brussels
Cooperativas Agrolimentarias de España, (Sapnish Association of Agricultural Cooperatives) EU Office Brussels
Unión de Pequeños Agricultores y Ganaderos (UPA) (Association of small farmers) EU Office Brussels
The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur for the opinion.
Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur for the opinion declares that she has submitted to the concerned natural persons the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.
PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION
Title
Modification of customs duties applicable to imports of certain goods originating in or exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus
Sergio Berlato, Mireia Borrás Pabón, Asger Christensen, Barry Cowen, Carmen Crespo Díaz, Ivan David, Valérie Deloge, Salvatore De Meo, Csaba Dömötör, Paulo Do Nascimento Cabral, Herbert Dorfmann, Sebastian Everding, Carlo Fidanza, Maria Grapini, Cristina Guarda, Martin Häusling, Krzysztof Hetman, Céline Imart, Elsi Katainen, Stefan Köhler, Tomáš Kubín, Norbert Lins, Cristina Maestre, Maria Noichl, Gilles Pennelle, André Rodrigues, Katarína Roth Neveďalová, Bert-Jan Ruissen, Arash Saeidi, Eric Sargiacomo, Christine Singer, Pekka Toveri, Jessika Van Leeuwen, Veronika Vrecionová, Thomas Waitz, Maria Walsh
Substitutes present for the final vote
Peter Agius, Wouter Beke, Benoit Cassart, David Cormand, Claire Fita, Esther Herranz García, Anna Zalewska
Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote
A surgical unit at Pavlusenko Hospital in Zhytomyr has been rebuilt to serve nearly two million residents in the oblast.
It is now equipped with modern medical systems and upgraded infrastructure, doubling the hospital’s capacity to treat patients.
The project to rebuild the surgical unit was implemented under the EIB’s Ukraine Recovery Programme, which supports local communities across the country by helping to restore essential social infrastructure.
A surgical unit at V.P. Pavlusenko Hospital No.2 in Zhytomyr opened today following a comprehensive reconstruction project supported by the European Investment Bank (EIB). As an important healthcare provider in the region, the hospital plays a vital role in delivering specialised surgical care to residents of Zhytomyr and to internally displaced people now living in the oblast. Thanks to EU support, over 6 000 patients will now benefit from timely, high-quality treatment every year in an improved and more efficient setting.
The reconstruction project involved upgrading the surgical unit’s internal infrastructure, creating a safer and more functional space for surgical care. The work covered essential systems, such as heating, ventilation and cooling systems, internal water supply and wastewater systems, electrical equipment and lighting, medical gas supply, the fire alarm and wired internet network – all critical for the smooth operation of a medical facility. The surgical unit also received essential medical support systems, including a vacuum station, a compressor unit and a modular chiller, along with new hospital furniture to equip the facility for daily use.
The total investment of €511 000 was provided under the Ukraine Recovery Programme – a joint initiative of the European Union and its bank, the EIB, implemented in partnership with Ukraine’s Ministry for Development of Communities and Territories, the Ministry of Finance and the local authorities of Zhytomyr Oblast and the city of Zhytomyr. Technical assistance for the programme was provided by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Ukraine.
In total, 13 projects under EIB-financed recovery programmes – with a total value of nearly €20 million – have either been completed or are in progress in Zhytomyr Oblast. These include projects to rehabilitate healthcare and education facilities and an administrative building, as well as key water and sanitation infrastructure – all essential to maintain public services and improve living conditions amid the ongoing war.
EIB Vice-President Teresa Czerwińska, who is responsible for the Bank’s operations in Ukraine, said: “I am pleased to see another reconstructed facility delivered quickly and according to the highest standards – this time, the surgical unit at Zhytomyr Hospital. Through our recovery programmes, the EIB is helping to rebuild vital social infrastructure across Ukraine – hospitals, schools, kindergartens, social housing and water facilities – ensuring that all communities have access to quality services and dignified living conditions.”
Rémi Duflot, Chargé d’Affaires a.i. of the EU Delegation to Ukraine, said: “In the face of ongoing destruction and daily attacks by Russia, the European Union stands steadfast in its commitment to help Ukraine rebuild itself. Each completed project – such as this surgical unit at Zhytomyr Hospital No. 2 – is a powerful symbol of solidarity and cooperation. These efforts are not only about restoring what has been lost, but also about rebuilding a stronger, better future for Ukraine. We are proud to be working alongside the European Investment Bank, the local community, and UNDP to help enhance healthcare services for all.
Deputy Prime Minister for Restoration of Ukraine – Minister for Development of Communities and Territories of Ukraine Oleksii Kuleba said: “The restoration of access to social and healthcare services remains a strategic priority for the Ministry. These efforts are fundamental to the sustainable recovery of communities and to the support of internally displaced persons. We deeply thank the European Union and the European Investment Bank for their continued support in restoring critical social infrastructure, particularly in the healthcare sector. Your contribution plays an essential role in enhancing Ukraine’s resilience in the face of ongoing challenges.”
Minister of Finance of Ukraine Sergii Marchenko said: “The EU’s support for Ukraine is not only about emergency aid, it’s about investing in the infrastructure that keeps society functioning and enables economic recovery. Rebuilding facilities like this surgical unit in Zhytomyr helps restore essential services, strengthen resilience, and lay the groundwork for sustainable growth.”
Head of the Zhytomyr Regional Military Administration Vitalii Bunechko said: “The upgraded surgical unit strengthens our region’s healthcare system, bringing modern, high-quality care closer to thousands of residents. Despite the war, the hospital team and local contractors worked tirelessly to finish the project on time. Their dedication shows how committed Ukrainians are to moving forward, even under fire. It’s one of 13 projects supported by the EIB in Zhytomyr Oblast, and we are sincerely grateful to the European Union for its support.”
First Deputy Mayor of Zhytomyr Svitlana Olshanska said: “The major reconstruction of the surgical unit at V.P. Pavlusenko Hospital No.2 was urgently needed, it has turned it into a modern, fully equipped space where patients can receive high-quality care in safe and comfortable conditions. This is a vital improvement for our city, and we are continuing this progress with the ongoing capital repairs of the hospital’s emergency department, also supported by the EIB.”
UNDP Resident Representative in Ukraine Jaco Cilliers said: “UNDP is proud to support Ukrainian communities on the ground by helping turn recovery plans into reality. Thanks to EIB financing and national leadership, we are ensuring that EU-backed projects like this surgical unit in Zhytomyr deliver real impact where it’s needed most.”
Background information
The EIB in Ukraine
The EIB Group has supported Ukraine’s resilience, economy and recovery efforts since the first days of Russia’s full-scale invasion, with €2.2 billion already disbursed since 2022. The EIB continues to focus on securing Ukraine’s energy supply, restoring damaged infrastructure and maintaining essential public services across the country. Under a guarantee agreement signed with the European Commission, the EIB is set to invest at least €2 billion more in urgent recovery and reconstruction. This funding is part of the European Union’s €50 billion Ukraine Facility for 2024-2027 and is fully aligned with the priorities of the Ukrainian government.
EIB recovery programmes in Ukraine
The war has inflicted severe damage on Ukraine’s healthcare system. According to the Fourth Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA4), the health sector has suffered substantial losses since February 2022. Direct damage to healthcare facilities is a major concern, with RDNA4 finding that 1 603 facilities (16.2%) have been destroyed or damaged. The war has also disrupted access to care and strained resources, putting immense pressure on medical personnel. The reconstruction of the surgical unit in Zhytomyr is a critical part of the effort to rebuild and strengthen healthcare infrastructure, ensuring that residents can receive necessary medical care amidst these challenges.
The reconstruction of the surgical unit at V.P. Pavlusenko Hospital No. 2 in Zhytomyr was carried out under the Ukraine Recovery Programme, one of three recovery programmes supported by the European Investment Bank (EIB). As of May 2025, the EIB has provided €740 million across these programmes to support Ukraine’s recovery. The funding helps the government to restore essential services in communities across the country – including schools, kindergartens, hospitals, housing, heating and water systems. These EIB-backed programmes are further supported by €15 million in EU grants to facilitate implementation. The Ministry for Development of Communities and Territories of Ukraine, in cooperation with the Ministry of Finance, coordinates and oversees programme implementation, while local authorities and self-governments are responsible for managing recovery sub-projects. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Ukraine provides technical assistance to local communities, supporting project implementation and ensuring independent monitoring for transparency and accountability. More information about the programmes is available here.
Question for oral answer O-000016/2025 to the Commission Rule 142 Ilhan Kyuchyuk on behalf of the Committee on Legal Affairs
On 27 June 2024, the United Kingdom signed and ratified the Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters (the Judgments Convention), which has also been signed by Uruguay, Israel, Costa Rica, Russia, the United States and Ukraine. The Judgments Convention entered into force on 1 September 2023, one year after the first two parties deposited their instruments of ratification/accession. In accordance with Article 29(2) of the Judgments Convention, the EU can notify the depositary, before 27 June 2025, that ratification by the UK does not have the effect of establishing treaty relations between the UK and the EU. If no such notification is issued – that is, if the EU tacitly accepts the UK’s accession – the Judgments Convention will begin to apply between the two parties on 1 July 2025.
Parliament understands that the Commission’s assessment of the UK’s accession is positive and that the Commission would be in favour of tacitly accepting it. However, the significance of private international law rules[1] for EU citizens in this particular area also has a political and legal impact, not only on the area of judicial cooperation but also beyond, bearing in mind the relevance of relations between the EU and the UK in a volatile international context.
With respect for each EU institution’s prerogatives and Parliament’s consistent position[2], a statement would allow the Commission to tacitly accept the UK’s accession to the Judgments Convention on the EU’s behalf, under the relevant provisions of that Convention.
1.Given the deadline set down in the Judgments Convention, the need for the EU institutions to act without delay to ascertain the EU’s acceptance of the UK’s accession to the Convention, and Parliament’s intention to make an appropriate statement in this regard, could the Commission confirm its assessment of the UK’s accession to the Convention?
2.Having regard to the commitments made in November 2024[3] by Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič with regard to third countries’ accession to conventions and respect for Article 218(6) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, what concrete steps does the Commission intend to take in future to ensure that Parliament’s prerogatives relating to third countries’ accession to the Judgments Convention are always fully and formally respected under the Treaties, and what timetable does it envisage for taking these steps?
Submitted: 13.5.2025
Lapses: 14.8.2025
[1] Study requested by Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs – ‘Ensuring Efficient Cooperation with the UK in civil law matters – Situation after Brexit and Options for Future Cooperation’, European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, March 2023: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2023/743340/IPOL_STU(2023)743340_EN.pdf.
[2] European Parliament resolution of 15 June 2023 on supporting the accession of Ukraine to the Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters (OJ C, C/2024/489, 23.1.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/489/oj).
Source: The Conversation – UK – By Edward Armston-Sheret, IHR Fellow, School of Advanced Study, University of London
By July 1858, the English explorer John Hanning Speke had been in Africa for 18 months. His eyes and body were weakened by fever, and he still hadn’t found what he set out to discover – the source of the River Nile.
Squinting through the heat on July 30, however, he spotted a body of water, about four miles away, surrounded by grass and jungle. At first, he could see only a small creek, flanked by lush fertile land used for growing crops and grazing by local people. But he pressed onward, dragging a reluctant donkey through jungle and over dried-up streams.
It wasn’t until August 3 that he could comprehend the full size of the lake. After winding up a gradual hill near Mwanza, located in the north of modern-day Tanzania, Speke was finally able to see a “vast expanse” of “pale-blue” water. He gazed on the lake’s islands and could see the outline of hills in the distance. Speke was arrested by the “peaceful beauty” of the scene. At the same time he was excited – he was convinced that this lake was what he’d been looking for. He was right. The Nile is the lake’s only outlet, and the huge body of water – now known as Lake Victoria – is the world’s second-largest freshwater lake.
Lack of time and money prevented Speke from travelling any further, so he came to understand the lake’s size by speaking to local people. As he didn’t speak any African languages, such conversations had to be translated multiple times. Thankfully, he had Sidi Mubarak Bombay to help him, a key figure in the expedition, who spoke both Hindi (which Speke could understand) and Swahili.
Despite another multi-year expedition from Zanzibar travelling inland to the area, in his own lifetime, Speke struggled to prove his claims. That’s because he only saw part of the lake and was unable to follow the river that flowed out of it the whole way to the coast. He died in 1864 from self-inflicted wounds sustained during a strange shooting incident, shortly before speaking at a debate about the source of the Nile.
But at least he is remembered by history. Bombay and the hundreds of African men and women who made his journey possible have since been largely forgotten. Such people did most of the hard work of exploration, building camps, navigating, cooking food and caring for Speke when he was sick.
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They are not the only ones. As a researcher specialising in the history of geography, I’ve spent almost eight years examining Victorian and Edwardian exploration and learned about the lives and experiences of African and Asian explorers, including Bombay. They included men and women who were formerly enslaved and were either forced into the work, or paid a pittance. Some of the women were forced into sexual relationships and marriages. Many were killed or badly injured in floggings at the hands of their brutal “masters” keen to administer punishment for perceived transgressions.
Their names should be in the pantheon of exploration, but all too often they are either ignored or misrepresented within the historical record. These are just some of their stories.
The illness and suffering Speke endured left a lasting mark on his body. Though he claimed to have fully recovered, his fellow British explorer on the expedition, the eccentric Richard F. Burton, argued in his book The Lake Regions of Central Africa (1860) that Speke had sustained brain damage from sun stroke. In reality, he might have been showing the after effects of malaria and hearing loss. At one stage, a beetle had crawled into his ear, leaving him deaf for a month.
Even so, Speke led a further expedition to Africa to try to prove once and for all that he had “discovered” the source of the Nile.
He also published two books on his journeys. In the front of one, he used an etching of himself (based on a painting) standing before Lake Victoria. A copy of this painting still hangs in the headquarters of the Royal Geographical Society in South Kensington, London.
The image depicts Speke as a heroic and masculine figure. What we don’t see are the men and women who did the hard work of bringing Speke to the lake in the first place.
Sidi Mubarak Bombay was one of the most important figures within Speke’s expeditions. From Speke’s book about the expedition, which included a short biography of Bombay, we know he was born in 1820 near the modern border of Tanzania and Mozambique. His mother died when he was young, yet he remembered life in his village as one of “happy contentment” until, at the age of 12, when he was captured and enslaved by Swahili-speaking merchants.
He was then marched to the coast in chains before being sold at a slave market in Zanzibar. The man who bought him then transported him to India. Eventually, his owner died, and Bombay was freed. He returned to East Africa and enlisted in the Sultan of Zanzibar’s army. There, he met Speke and joined the East African Expedition in February 1857 and was paid five silver dollars a month.
The appointment changed Bombay’s life. The expedition was led by Burton, who had become famous for travelling to Mecca and Medina disguised as a Muslim pilgrim. Bombay became a key member of the expeditionary party.
Not only did he translate both Burton and Speke’s orders, but he also negotiated with local leaders for food, shelter and safe passage through their territory and cared for the explorers when they were sick. Bombay developed an active interest in the expedition’s work. In his book, Speke wrote that “by long practice, he has become a great geographer”.
When Speke returned to Zanzibar in 1860 for his next expedition, Bombay was one of the first men he recruited. He stayed with the expedition on its multi-year journey from Zanzibar to Cairo. Bombay went on to work for other European explorers, including Henry Morton Stanley who searched for the “lost” explorer David Livingstone, and Verney Lovett Cameron, who sought to investigate the lakes and rivers of Africa.
With Lovett Cameron, Bombay crossed equatorial Africa from coast to coast, completing much of the journey on foot. Even Victorian geographers recognised Bombay’s contribution, and he eventually received an award and pension from the Royal Geographical Society.
Anonymous labour and explorers’ violence
Bombay was a remarkable man. But Speke’s explorations also depended on many people we know far less about.
Both of Speke’s journeys to Lake Victoria were huge undertakings, involving hundreds of people. Much of the hard work was carried out by Nyamwezi porters from the central region of modern-day Tanzania. These men often worked on the pre-existing trade routes that connected the lake regions to the east African coast.
They carried the explorers’ supplies, basic equipment, trade goods and food. Explorers’ accounts often describe these people in racially offensive ways. Even so, their private letters also show their reliance on them.
An image from Speke’s book Journal of the Discovery of the Source of the Nile, illustrated by James Grant, showing ‘Speke’s faithfuls’. Wiki Commons
On his journey to Lake Victoria, Speke struggled to recruit enough porters and complained: “I cannot move independently of the natives, and now the natives are not to be got for love or money [sic]. This alone has detained me here four whole months doing nothing.”
Alongside the porters, Speke also employed Swahili-speaking men from Zanzibar. These men often had their origins in East Africa and had often been enslaved in childhood. In his published account, Speke portrayed them in terms that drew on colonial tropes about childlike Africans.
In one letter to the British consul in Zanzibar, sent on December 12 1860, he was more positive, saying that such men do “all the work and do it as an enlightened and disciplined people”. These contrasting assessments perhaps reflect Speke’s varying mood. However, the different way he wrote in public might also be part of an effort to emphasise the difficulty of the journey and his leadership qualities.
Yet explorers sometimes struggled to maintain control over the parties they led. One problem was the fact that, once away from the coast and the power of the Zanazibari state, expedition members could easily slip away. Understandably, porters were more likely to leave an expedition when conditions became bad and food scarce.
Violent punishments were also a common feature of expeditions in this region. The explorers did not invent them – such punishments were also used by Arabic or Swahili-speaking merchants travelling in the area – but they showed little hesitation in using them. In his book on their 1856-59 expedition, Burton boasted that the expedition’s porters referred to him as “the wicked white man”.
Porters referred to Richard F. Burton as ‘the wicked white man’. Hulton Archive
On Speke’s second expedition to Lake Victoria, his Scottish companion Grant described how one man “roared for mercy” when he was flogged 150 times after stealing cloth to buy food. In a letter to the Royal Geographical Society on February 17 1861, Speke wrote that this was the maximum number of lashes he would give out “for fear of mortal consequences”.
Later expeditions, such as those led by the Welsh-American explorer Henry Morton Stanley were even more violent.
During the Emin Pasha Relief Expedition (1887-89), Stanley decided to divide the party, leaving a “rear column” behind. Conditions in this group soon deteriorated, due to food shortages and disease. The column’s leader, the explorer Major Edmund Bartlott, carried out a string of violent punishments. One Sudanese porter was executed, while a Zanzibari man was flogged so many times that he died of the injuries.
Bartlott was only stopped from carrying out further acts of violence when he was killed by an African man fearful that he was about to attack his wife.
Women and girls on African expeditions
When Speke’s final expedition arrived in Cairo in 1863, having travelled from Zanzibar, the party also contained four young women who were photographed there. Their presence shows that African women often formed part of explorers’ expeditionary parties.
Sometimes the women joined voluntarily, often as the partners of porters. Others were enslaved women and girls purchased by other expedition members. One of the girls photographed in Cairo was named Kahala. Along with an older girl named Meri, she had been “given” to Speke by the queen mother of the African Kingdom of Buganda during Speke’s extended stay in the country.
Women and girls in Speke’s party in Cairo, from his Journal of the Discovery of the Source of the Nile, 1863. CC BY-SA
Speke’s relationship with Meri took a remarkable turn. In an unpublished draft of his book, now held at the National Library of Scotland, he described her as “18 years or so” and “in the prime of youth and beauty”.
The manuscript also implies that their relationship had a sexual dimension, although it’s unclear if this was consensual. On April 12 1862, Speke claimed that he spent the night “taming the silent shrew” – alluding to a play by William Shakespeare in which a husband torments his strong-willed wife into submission. Even in his highly edited published account, Speke described himself as a “henpecked husband”.
His account then described the breakdown of their relationship in early May 1862. The breakup, Speke wrote in the unpublished draft of his book, “nearly drove my judgement from me” and left him with a “nearly broken … heart.” After this, Meri apparently showed “neither love, nor attachment for me”, suggesting she had shown some before this.
Speke eventually “gave” the younger girl, Kahala, to Bomaby because “she preferred playing with dirty little children to behaving like a young lady”. At first, Kahala was unhappy about this transfer and tried to run away. But she was soon found and returned to the party. She then stayed with the expedition to Cairo and travelled with Bombay when he returned to Zanzibar.
It was not unusual for women to try to join expeditionary parties. Explorers often had concerns about the presence of unmarried women within their ranks. For instance, in his book To The Central African Lakes and Back (1881) Joseph Thomson, who led an expedition to the Lake Regions of central Africa between 1878 and 1880, reported finding a woman in the expedition’s camp who was trying to reach the coast.
On the advice of the expedition’s experienced African headman James Chuma (who, like Bombay, became involved in multiple expeditions), Thomson forced the woman to marry one of the expedition’s porters. The woman does not seem to have been happy with this arrangement. While she stayed with the expedition for a while, she slipped away when they neared the coast.
We only know the names of a small fraction of the women involved in such expeditions. Grant wrote a book on their journey that gives further details about women in the party.
In it he noted that several of the porters travelled alongside female partners who were “generally carrying a child each on their backs, a small stool … on their heads, and inveterately smoking during the march. They would prepare some savoury dish of herbs for their men on getting into camp, where they lived in bell-shaped erections made with boughs of trees”.
Such passages give us only a tantalising glimpse of these women. We’re left without a detailed knowledge of their names or lives. But we do know that they contributed to these expeditions in important ways.
Isabella Bird and Ito
More well known are the stories of the growing number of British women who became explorers in the Victorian era. Foremost among them was Isabella Bird.
Isabella Bird wearing Manchurian clothing from a journey through China. New York Public Library
Born in 1831 to an upper-middle class family and less than 5ft tall, Bird did not begin her career as an explorer until middle age. She was also disabled. At the age of 18, Bird had a “fibrous tumour” removed from the base of her spine and afterwards lived with chronic back pain. She travelled, often on horseback, to every continent of the world except Antarctica. Bird was also one of the first women admitted to the then all-male Royal Geographical Society in 1892.
Bird’s gender and disability shaped how she travelled. Unable to walk for long distances, she often rode cross-saddle, rather than the more traditionally feminine side-saddle, which she found painful. In some places, she faced specific hostility because she was a woman.
Yet, in other ways, Bird’s journeys had shared similarities with those made by men. Like them, she often depended on local people during her journeys. When she travelled through Japan in 1878, she relied on the services of an 18-year-old Japanese man named Itō Tsurukichi. He played a vital role in her journey across the country, arranging much of her travel, translating conversation with local people and explaining what she was looking at.
In Bird’s published accounts, her descriptions of Tsurukichi are often laced with racial prejudice. She often referred to him as a “boy” and was disparaging about his physical appearance. Her perspective on him did soften a little, however, as their journey continued. She was impressed by his qualities as a translator and the fact that he was continually trying to improve his linguistic skills.
Tsurukichi’s essential role was also illustrated when Bird attended a Japanese wedding to which he was not invited. She complained that it was like being “deprived of the use of one of her senses”.
Bird’s account also raises questions of who the leader of their journey through Japan was. “I am trying to manage him, because I saw that he meant to manage me,” she wrote in her book Unbeaten Tracks in Japan (1880). Bird also reported an incident where a Japanese boy thought “that Ito was a monkey-player, ie. the keeper of a monkey theatre, I a big ape, and the poles of my bed the scaffolding of the stage!”
Bird viewed the child’s misunderstanding as amusing, but it does suggest that some outsiders thought Tsurukichi was leading the party. He was clearly a skilled guide and translator, and he went on to become one of the foremost tour guides in Japan, taking numerous western travellers around the country.
Like Burton and Speke, Bird often depended on guides on her journeys. Sometimes, she led much larger groups. In such situations, others cooked her food, packed her tent, and translated conversations with local people.
When she travelled in China in the 1890s, Bird was carried across much of the country in an open chair on the shoulders of three separate groups of chair-bearers. She often didn’t record the names of the men who did such work and only described their labour in quite general terms – though she did photograph some of them and her chair.
However little men like Bombay and Tsurukichi are remembered, it is at least possible to recover their names.
Scott and Antarctica – exploration in an unpopulated land
In the early 20th century, the exploration of Antarctica was a thoroughly masculine affair. Some women did apply to join Antarctic expeditions, such as those led by Ernest Shackleton, but their applications were turned down. Antarctic expeditions were also less ethnically diverse than those in the Arctic. In the north, explorers often relied on the skills and labour of Indigenous people. There were also Black explorers, including Matthew Henson, an African-American man who claimed to be one of the first men to stand on the North Pole.
Antarctica presented a unique challenge: it is unpopulated, and when British explorers made their first attempts to explore its interior in the early 20th century, they had no idea what to expect.
In contrast to diverse expeditions elsewhere in the world, Antarctic expeditions were comparatively homogenous undertakings. British expeditions, led by Robert Falcon Scott and Shackleton, mostly employed white men from within the British empire. Sledging journeys in Antarctica were quite egalitarian compared with expeditions in Africa and Asia. Sledging often required upper and middle-class officers and scientists to work collaboratively with working class sailors, who often pulled sledges forward by sheer force of muscle.
Shackleton, Scott and Edward Wilson before their march south during the Discovery expedition in 1902. Sledges visible in the background. National Library of New Zealand
On the British National Antarctic Expedition, Scott completed a long sledge journey to the Polar Plateau with stoker William Lashly and petty officer Edgar Evans. The men cooked, ate, slept and laboured together. Scott, an officer, found the experience revealing, learning much about the working-class men’s experiences in the Royal Navy. Antarctic explorers were more willing to acknowledge the manual labour that made their expeditions possible than Burton, Speke or Bird, partly because this work was done by white men.
Some working-class sailors – such as Edgar Evans, Tom Crean, or William Lashly – did achieve a certain degree of celebrity. But others figures are overlooked. On Scott’s expedition he employed two men from within the Russian empire to help care for and train the expedition’s ponies and huskies: Dmitrii Girev and Anton Omelchenko. Apsley Cherry-Garrard, the expedition’s assistant zoologist, noted that they “were brought originally to look after the ponies and dogs on their way from Siberia to New Zealand. But they proved such good fellows and so useful that we were very glad to take them on the strength of the landing party”.
Girev, from the far east of Russia specialised in looking after the expedition’s Siberian huskies, while Omelchenko, born in Ukraine, specialised in caring for the ponies who would haul Scott’s supplies towards the South Pole. They therefore played a vital role in the expedition. In their accounts, Scott and Cherry-Garrard referred to these adult men using the infantilising term “boys” – thereby stripping them of their status as full and equal members of the expeditionary party.
Even among the British expedition members, there were still significant disparities in how labour on polar expeditions was rewarded or reported. Working-class men, mostly sailors drawn from the Royal Navy, did much of the hard, unglamorous work. They were also paid much less than officers and scientists.
On Scott’s two Antarctic expeditions, much of the day-to-day work at base camp – such as cooking, cleaning, and collecting ice to melt into drinking water – was carried out by working-class sailors.
On his final expedition, the explorers spent the winter in a small hut on Ross Island. One man, Thomas Clissold, worked as the expedition’s cook. Frederick Hooper, a steward who joined the shore party, swept the floor in the morning, set the table, washed crockery and generally tidied things. “I think it is a good thing that in these matters the officers need not wait on themselves,” Scott commented in his diary. “It gives long unbroken days of scientific work and must, therefore, be an economy of brain in the long run.”
He had adopted a similar approach on his first expedition, which left some sailors frustrated. “We don’t have any idea of what has been done in the scientific work, as they don’t give us any information,” James Duncan, a Scottish shipwright on the British National Antarctic Expedition (1901-1904) complained in his diary. “It’s rather hard on the lower deck hands.”
Even memorials to Antarctic explorers perpetuate many of the heroic myths of exploration. If you walk around London today, you might stumble on the statue of Scott in Waterloo Place or one of Shackleton outside the headquarters of the Royal Geographical Society in South Kensington. Such statues embody much of what we often get wrong about exploration, depicting explorers as solitary. Expeditions were collective projects, and many of the people involved haven’t had their contributions fully recognised.
In many parts of the world, expeditions were large, diverse undertakings. Yet many of the people who did most of the work have been forgotten. My research seeks to put them in the spotlight and recover something of their lives and experiences.
Expeditions are extreme situations in which human bodies are pushed to (and sometimes beyond) their limits. Because of this, they vividly illustrate the various ways humans depend on each other – for care, food, shelter, transport and companionship. Today, human societies are more complex and interdependent than ever. Though often in less extreme or dramatic ways, like explorers, we all depend on other people for survival.
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Edward Armston-Sheret has received funding from the Institute of Historical Research (via the Alan Pearsall Fellowship in Naval and Maritime History), the Royal Historical Society, The Royal Geographical Society, and the Arts and Humanities Research Council (via the Techne Doctoral Training Partnership).
Source: United States Senator Joni Ernst (R-IA)
WASHINGTON — U.S. Senator Joni Ernst (R-Iowa) released the following statement on the Russia-Ukraine negotiations:
“Just like President Trump, I want an end to this war that never should have started. The president has been working to bring both sides together, but Putin has shown his true colors and again refused to come to the table. I support President Trump’s efforts to get a peace deal done now and will keep working with my colleagues to equip the president to enforce crippling sanctions on Russia if they continue to drag out peace talks and the needless bloodshed.”
Senator Ernst is a cosponsor of Senator Lindsey Graham’s (R-S.C.) bipartisan legislation to introduce primary and secondary sanctions against Russia and actors supporting Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. She is also leading the bipartisan Global Hunt for Offshore Smuggling and Trafficking (GHOST) Act to strengthen enforcement of U.S. sanctions against Russia.
On Friday 16 May (2025), NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte joined European leaders at a meeting of the European Political Community in Tirana, Albania to discuss shared security concerns.
Amongst other engagements, Mr Rutte met with the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen and took part in a bilateral meeting with Prime Minister of Albania Edi Rama, at which they discussed the situation in the Western Balkans. The Secretary General also participated in a roundtable on boosting European competitiveness and security through innovation and resilience.
The war against Ukraine remained at the forefront of leaders’ minds, with the Secretary General renewing calls for Russia to engage meaningfully in peace talks. “He has to be serious about wanting peace. I think all the pressure is now on Putin” Mr Rutte said, commending the Ukrainians for attending the discussions with a delegation willing to negotiate a ceasefire.
Remarks by Philip R. Lane, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the Second Thomas Laubach Research Conference
Washington, D.C., 16 May 2025
In my remarks today I will focus on how the ECB communicates its monetary policy decisions, with a particular emphasis on the integration of risks and uncertainty into the monetary policy decision-making process.[1][2]
Monetary policy meetings take place over two days. On Wednesday afternoon, there are presentations by ECB Executive Board members: Isabel Schnabel reports on the latest financial market developments and I review the global environment and the latest economic, monetary and financial developments in the euro area. This is followed by a general discussion of these topics by Governing Council members. On Thursday morning, I present a proposal for the monetary policy decision, which is then discussed by the Governing Council. After the monetary policy decision is made (typically by consensus), the monetary policy statement is finalised by the Governing Council, concluding the Thursday morning session.
In the afternoon, a press release announcing the decision is published at 2:15 p.m. While this press release was quite succinct in the past, a summary explanation for the decision is now included, and — for the quarterly meetings — the main elements of the staff macroeconomic projections are reported.
At the opening of the press conference at 2:45 p.m., President Lagarde reads out the monetary policy statement. The opening section matches the press release, while further sections go into more detail on economic activity, inflation, the risk assessment and monetary and financial developments. This is followed by a question-and-answer session. After the press conference, the quarterly forecast meetings also see the publication of a staff article that explains the new set of macroeconomic projections. About two weeks later, the Economic Bulletin is published, containing summaries of the preparatory analysis that was made available to the Governing Council prior to the meeting. An account of the meeting is published about a month after the meeting.
The aim of the monetary policy statement is not only to explain the immediate decision but also to update the underlying narrative in terms of the overall orientation of the monetary stance, the main forces shaping the dynamics of the economy and the inflation process, the evolving risk assessment and monetary and financial developments. The discipline of limiting the length of the monetary policy statement (it was about 1,500 words in April) puts a premium on identifying the main issues that the Governing Council wishes to emphasise. At the same time, this length offers room for a sufficiently broad survey of these themes to underpin the monetary policy decision. Naturally, at the quarterly meetings, there is also considerable external interest in the details of the new staff macroeconomic projections: it makes sense to publish the staff article after the press conference. In that way, the initial focus in the monetary policy statement and the press conference is on the Governing Council’s overall assessment of the situation, whereas the technical details of the staff work follow thereafter.
The publication of the meeting account summarises the presentations by Isabel and myself and the ensuing discussions among the members of the Governing Council. The account includes a section entitled “Monetary policy considerations and policy options” that provides the main features of the monetary policy proposal that I presented at the meeting. This typically includes considerations of how risk factors were taken into account in the proposal.[3] Especially since the Governing Council’s monetary policy decisions are typically consensual, the summary of the discussion provides valuable insights into the range of views expressed at the meeting.
Taken together, the press release, the MPS, the press conference, the staff macroeconomic projections article, the Economic Bulletin and the meeting accounts provide a phased sequence of public information releases that helps external audiences to understand how we make our monetary policy decisions. In addition, in pursuing a multi-layered approach to public communication, a visual monetary policy statement is also released, which explains the monetary policy decision in short and easy-to-understand language, accompanied by a set of infographics to illustrate the main messages.[4]
These decision materials are complemented by speeches and interviews by Executive Board and Governing Council members. The publication of an array of analytical contributions by staff (through the Economic Bulletin, the ECB Blog, working papers and occasional papers) also helps improve understanding of monetary policy formation, including in relation to the staff projections, which form a key analytical input into monetary policy meetings.
In view of this rich information set, would it be a game changer if the Governing Council additionally published its conditional assessment of the most likely future rate path, as practised by some other central banks? Putting aside the logistical challenge of forming a consensus on the conditional future rate path among the twenty-six members of the Governing Council, it is my view that such an exercise would create unwarranted expectations about the future rate path. Moreover, it would distort the monetary policy decision-making process in view of the potential reputational costs associated with deviations of actual decisions from the previously-flagged path.[5] Procedurally, publishing a conditional rate path would also be awkward in the context of a staff-led projections exercise that is based on the market rate path.
More fundamentally, publishing a conditional baseline for the future rate path would not well capture the sensitivity of future rate decisions to the evolving macroeconomic environment and shifts in the risk assessment. As part of the meeting preparations, the staff analyse a family of plausible future rate paths and it would convey excessive confidence if any one candidate rate path were to be singled out. In particular, staff simulation exercises show the sensitivity of rate paths to both the point-in-time macroeconomic projections and various underlying assumptions that underpin model-based optimal rate paths as well as “robust” rate paths that seek to minimise the risk of a policy error across a range of plausible scenarios. Importantly, all such rate path analyses are sensitive to the assumptions made about the preferences of policymakers.[6] Even if the rate path simulation exercises are highly valuable inputs into the internal development of the monetary policy proposal, it is preferable to take a meeting-by-meeting approach and focus the public communication on the immediate decision.[7]
At the same time, to improve external understanding of how we make decisions, it is helpful set out the criteria guiding the reaction function to the main risk factors prevailing at any point in time.[8] This provides “reaction function” guidance in terms of the key inputs driving monetary policy decisions.[9] For instance, during the disinflation process over the last two years, the Governing Council has highlighted that measures of underlying inflation and the incoming evidence on the strength of monetary policy transmission were especially important in guiding decisions, in addition to the “standard” role of the inflation outlook (comprising both the baseline and the risks around it). The prominence of these specific risk proxies reflected the high uncertainty about the intrinsic persistence of the inflation surge (such that measures of underlying inflation provided important insights into the persistent component of inflation) and, similarly, the high uncertainty about the impact of the exceptionally fast pace of the cumulative rate hiking over 2022-2023 (such that monitoring the evidence on the strength of monetary transmission was crucial). Since both inflation persistence and the strength of monetary transmission are first order influences on the calibration of the rate path, the prominence given to these factors in our public communication have helped market participants to understand that the incoming information along these dimensions is central to our data-dependent monetary policy decisions. Looking to the future, the exact articulation of reaction function guidance should be periodically updated in line with the evolving risk environment: there is unlikely to be a fixed, timeless list of risk proxies.
The risk assessment section of the monetary policy statement provides additional signals regarding the factors that might shape future rate decisions. The meeting-by-meeting list of upside and downside risks to growth and inflation help to shape market pricing of future rate decisions: as the evolution of these risks become more or less prominent between meetings, market participants can revise their views. Naturally, this risk assessment is informed by considerable staff analysis that identifies and calibrates material threats to the growth and inflation projections.
Finally, alternative scenarios have been included in the staff macroeconomic projections exercise in the context of specific risk constellations. These include the onset of the pandemic in early 2020, the unjustified invasion of Ukraine by Russia in early 2022 and the elevation of geopolitical tensions in the Middle East in autumn 2023. In the near term, the ongoing uncertainty about US tariff policies means that alternative scenarios will also be included in the June macroeconomic projections exercise. These staff exercises are valuable in conveying the scale of revisions to the projected inflation and output paths that would be triggered under the realisation of the alternative scenarios.[10]
In providing the risk assessment in the monetary policy statement and by staff publishing alternative macroeconomic projection scenarios in the context of specific risk constellations, there is extensive communication on how different risk factors might shape future decisions. Some might wish that the Governing Council lays out specific policy responses to these various risk profiles in order to “fill out” the distribution of future rate paths. However, as outlined above, the rich information set that is attached to each monetary policy decision together with reaction function guidance provides a sufficient foundation for market participants to assess how the realisation of various risks could affect the future rate path.
An additional potential application of scenario analysis is to construct a limited set of specific “curated” alternative scenarios by combining selected alternative calibrations of the primary economic and financial judgements underpinning the baseline projections. Publishing such alternative scenarios can be helpful in conveying the difficult choices embedded in making forecasts and in capturing possible differences in policy preferences across policymakers. From a communications perspective, this can be particularly helpful in systems where policymakers have a collective responsibility to endorse the published forecast but retain individual responsibility in casting votes.
Since the ECB relies on a staff-led projections exercise and has a strong preference for consensual decisions, the set of considerations in publishing such curated scenario analyses is different. In making sure monetary policy decisions are robust to non-baseline realisations, it is also not clear whether such a curated approach would be superior to a “many scenario” internal staff analysis (possibly augmented by machine learning algorithms) that explores robustness across the many combinations of shocks and modelling choices that are considered at each meeting. In addition, if the aim is to capture the main risk concerns of policymakers, selecting a limited set of curated alternative scenarios (out of very many possible scenarios) for each meeting would be logistically taxing for a twenty-six member Governing Council. A basic concern is that the selected curated scenarios might turn out to have shined the spotlight on risk factors that proved to be immaterial and might give the impression that the risk analysis was too narrow in scope.
In any event, the specific methods used to convey how risks and uncertainty are incorporated into the monetary policy decision-making process are less important than the underlying commitment to articulate that policy decisions not only take into account the baseline but also the surrounding risk environment. Moreover, there is an active research agenda in academia and policy organisations on how best to incorporate uncertainty into monetary policy decisions and monetary policy communications: as this research bears fruit over time, central banks should adapt their practices.[11]
In these remarks, I have focused on how we currently communicate our monetary policy decisions and the associated decision-making framework. How best to integrate risk and uncertainty into our monetary policy decisions and our communication is a key topic for our ongoing assessment of our monetary policy strategy.[12] We will publish our updated strategy in the second half of the year.
ICON maintains its place as the most active contract research organization (CRO) for Q1 2025 and Russia keeps its spot with the most clinical trials initiated in Europe despite the ongoing war with Ukraine, according to a report by GlobalData, a leading data and analytics company.
Kathryn Kinch, Pharma Product Manager at GlobalData, comments: “AstraZeneca led among large- and mega-cap sponsors of drug trials. Oncology trials dominated the landscape, making up the largest share of new trials, with solid tumors as the most studied indication and pain leading in central nervous system research.”
The report also identifies the top 10 trial sites in North America, Europe, and the rest of the world based on the number of trials initiated. On a global scale, oncology was the leading therapeutic area of focus. 1,513 oncology-related clinical trials were either launched or scheduled to commence in Q1 2025. Following closely behind, central nervous system (CNS) diseases accounted for 1,421 trials, reflecting a robust commitment to addressing complex neurological challenges.
However, the quarter did see a slight dip in both oncology and CNS trials compared to the previous year, where 1,573 and 1,438 trials were recorded, respectively. Within oncology, solid tumors dominated the landscape with 1,194 trials, while pain management emerged as the most studied indication in the CNS category, boasting 671 trials.
The CRO Activity and Intel report is published on a quarterly basis. The data presented in this report reflects the database as of April 10, 2025.
Source: United States Senator for Massachusetts – Elizabeth Warren
May 16, 2025
Repair restrictions limit service members’ abilities to fix their weapons even in the middle of life-and-death missions
Warren successfully pushed the Army to get rid of right-to-repair restrictions, urges the rest of the military to follow
Video of Exchange (YouTube)
Washington, D.C. – At a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) uplifted how right-to-repair can help the U.S. military and allied forces promote innovation and reduce costs.
As Senator Warren explained, the Department of Defense (DoD) spends billions of dollars buying equipment, but contractors impose repair restrictions preventing servicemembers from fixing their weapons, even in the middle of dangerous missions, and often at the expense of innovation. She highlighted how important innovation has been in Ukraine’s ability to continue to defend itself against Russia.
Dr. Lisa Saum-Manning, Associate Director, International Security and Defense Policy Program for RAND, testified to the importance of servicemembers’ ability to repair their own weapons without unnecessary contractor interference, stating, “When it comes to life and death decisions, I think you sort of overlook policy… that’s what I would do if I were on the battlefield.”
This month, Secretary of the Army Daniel Driscoll announced that the Army will ensure right-to-repair provisions are included in future Army contracts and will identify and propose contract modifications for right-to-repair provisions in current contracts.
“Army Secretary Driscoll has taken a necessary and overdue step, but we need all of the services and DOD to prioritize lethality. And that means commanders in the field should never have to beg a contractor to come repair a plane that the Air Force owns or that soldiers could fix themselves,” said Senator Warren.
Senator Warren argued that right-to-repair can help strengthen American allied forces and enhance their capabilities, allowing them to work better with our troops, take missions off the military’s plate, and support U.S. jobs. If U.S. contractors limit our allies and partners’ ability to sustain equipment, that can hurt the ability of those companies to win contracts. Dr. Saum-Manning expressed support for adopting a right-to-repair policy across the military, stating that RAND researchers agreed on a need for change.
Senator Warren has been a leader on right-to-repair, including in the military. In January 2025, Senator Warren secured a commitment from Secretary Driscoll during his nomination hearing about enhancing the Army’s right to repair its own equipment. Senator Warren also pushed for commitments from the Navy Secretary and Military Transportation Command Chief on allowing servicemembers to repair their own equipment.
“I look forward to working with my colleagues on this committee to make sure that we aren’t letting bad contracting practices limit our soldiers’ ability to win on the battlefield,” concluded Senator Warren.
Transcript:Hearings to examine the Department of Defense responsibilities related to Foreign Military Sales system and international armaments cooperation Senate Armed Services Committee May 15, 2025
Senator Elizabeth Warren: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So, being lethal on the battlefield means being scrappy. And when Russia first invaded Ukraine, we sat in the briefings when we were told by experts that Ukraine would only be able to hold out for a few weeks maximum. But over the past three years, Ukrainians have been incredibly innovative, especially in the deployment of drones to keep Russian forces at bay.
The U.S. military may not be nearly as agile. One problem: soldiers are not allowed to repair many of their own weapons. DoD spends billions of dollars buying all sorts of equipment, but then contractors impose restrictions on who can maintain systems and who can produce spare parts. Contractors rake in billions, but service members are not allowed to fix their own weapons when they break, even in the middle of life-and-death missions. That is the opposite of scrappy.
Dr. Saum-Manning, you are an expert on building military capacity. How important is it for readiness for service members just to be able to repair their own weapons?
Dr. Lisa Saum-Manning: I mean, they are on the front lines and critical. When it comes to life and death decisions, I think you sort of overlook policy. That would—, that’s what I would do if I were on the battlefield. Again, this is my personal opinion, not an opinion of RAND.
Senator Elizabeth Warren: But I take it. You think the right to repair is important to being able to do your job?
Dr. Saum-Manning: I do think it’s important, that said, you have to know how to do it. And so I would want to make sure that they actually knew what they were doing.
Senator Elizabeth Warren: Okay. The problem we’ve got is that too often, when the U.S. military goes to contractors, they are told when something is broken, they’re going to have to wait months for critical parts. In just one case that we have, the Army discovered that instead of waiting months, they could actually just use a 3D printer to print the safety clip they needed in less than an hour and for 1/100th of the cost that was being charged by the contractor.
So, this month, the Trump administration took an important step toward making sure that U.S. soldiers can be just as scrappy as the Ukrainians. The Army’s new transformation initiative requires new contracts to include a right to repair their own equipment, and they’re also going back to review old contracts to add similar protections. I want to give a shout-out to the new Secretary of the Army, Dan Driscoll, for pushing this initiative.
So, Dr. Saum-Manning, would adopting this policy across the military services enhance innovation and help reduce costs?
Dr. Saum-Manning: Well, as all RAND researchers say, we have to study that. This is very new. It’s very exciting to see, when we were doing our study, the Army was in the midst of their sort of transformation, and there was a consensus of opinion that it needed to change. And so it’s exciting that they’re innovating. We’re watching it. It’s definitely a great experiment to see if it happens and to see if we can apply these lessons elsewhere.
Senator Warren: Well, you know, I would argue here on right-to-repair that it can also be used to help strengthen American allied forces as well. When our closest allies buy U.S. weapons, it can help enhance their capabilities, help them work better with our troops. We really like all of that. They can take missions off our plate, and they can support U.S. jobs. But our allies and partners have a lot of other companies that they can choose from, and they are willing to drive a harder bargain than we are. For example, a Canadian task force found that failing to acquire data rights hurt their ability to independently support their own equipment— right to repair—and they recommended prioritizing sustainability and competition. The bottom line? Lockheed Martin’s higher repair costs meant that Lockheed Martin just wasn’t competitive for the contract.
So Dr. Saum-Manning isn’t the best outcome for us, is not only if we can repair our own equipment, but also if our allies, who are buying from us contractors, can repair their weapons in the field and have those weapons made in America?
Dr. Saum-Manning: Well, we have not studied that, but I would say that if we are, sort of, part of that process and can help train, help equip, help be there to help sustain—our partners need to actually be able to sustain the equipment that we give them. Those are priority decisions that need to be made prior to them actually getting on the battlefield.
Senator Warren: Yeah, well, Army Secretary Driscoll has taken a necessary and overdue step, but we need all of the services and DOD to prioritize lethality. And that means commanders in the field should never have to beg a contractor to come repair a plane that the Air Force owns or/and that soldiers could fix themselves. Our Navy should never have to wonder if an ally won’t show up because they’re waiting months for a contractor to fix a fuel gauge. I look forward to working with my colleagues on this committee to make sure that we aren’t letting bad contracting practices limit our soldiers’ ability to win on the battlefield. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Source: The Conversation – UK – By Natasha Lindstaedt, Professor in the Department of Government, University of Essex
Over three years after Russia invaded Ukraine, the countries are finally meeting for direct peace talks in Istanbul. Vladimir Putin will be not be attending.
Ironically, given his no-show, it was Putin who suggested the peace talks instead of immediately agreeing to a proposed 30-day ceasefire. But like Russia’s 2024 presidential elections, from the outside the peace talks appear to be a total farce. Putin is not just stringing the international community along, he is also testing his “friendship” with the US president, Donald Trump.
Trump ran on a platform that he would he end the war in Ukraine quickly (in 24 hours), arguing that he was the only one with the gravitas and strength to handle the Russian leader. Yet Putin has repeatedly ignored Trump’s warnings.
Two days after Trump was inaugurated, the US president posted that new sanctions would be imposed on Russia if the conflict did not end quickly. Then in early and late March, Trump again threatened sanctions if there was no ceasefire. Most recently, on May 8, Trump called for a 30-day unconditional ceasefire, warning that violations would be met with sanctions.
Putin disregarded every threat, and Trump did nothing to follow through. The pattern seems to be repeating itself.
Now, Trump is trying to save face by claiming that peace talks are only possible if he and Putin meet in person. If that was the case, why didn’t Trump himself attend? He was only a four-hour plane flight away, making billion dollar deals in the Gulf. But as recently as Thursday, Trump floated the idea that he would only attend if “something happened”.
Given how important these peace talks should be, it’s odd that there’s so much confusion about why Putin and Trump are not attending. US special envoy Keith Kellogg stated that if Putin had attended, Trump would be there. Trump, meanwhile, has framed Putin’s snub the other way around, claiming the only reason Putin did not attend was because he was not there.
Meanwhile, Europeans had warned Putin that if he did not attend and the talks failed to produce a ceasefire, he would face tougher sanctions. But Putin was never going to attend these peace talks even as his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelensky, goaded him to do so by arriving in Ankara a few days ahead of time.
What could still happen?
Representatives from the Turkish, Ukrainian and American delegations were due to meet on the morning of May 16, followed by a session with Russia. Reportedly, Turkey is doing everything it can to get the two sides in the same room.
But hopes are not high for any breakthrough. The US secretary of state, Marco Rubio, said he has no expectations, and Zelensky believes Russia is not serious about achieving anything at these talks.
Though Putin was the one who suggested the peace talks “without preconditions”, he has sent a low-level delegation. Zelensksy promised to attend if Putin did, but has interpreted the Russian president’s absence as a sign of disrespect.
Given this backdrop, what can be achieved? Putin has sent his aide (and former minister of culture) Vladimir Medinsky, who Zelensky describes as a “theatre prop”. In Zelensky’s place, the Ukrainian delegation is led by Kyiv’s defence minister, Rustem Umerov.
Umerov has an impossible task, but will be trying to use the peace talks to take the first steps towards de-escalation. The only real winner in these talks is Turkey, which is playing a much bigger role than expected on the international stage as a power broker and mediator, since Putin didn’t come. Turkey also has good relationships with both Putin and Zelensky.
It’s certainly hard to take peace talks seriously when there is an awkward back-and-forth just about who is going to attend. And while Trump thinks peace is only possible through bilateral meetings between himself and Putin, it’s clear he can’t even influence Putin to show up to peace talks that the Russian president himself suggested.
This should give the world little confidence that Putin will agree to a 30-day ceasefire, Ukraine’s main proposal, let alone ever agree to any wider concessions. What’s not clear is what Trump is going to do about it.
Natasha Lindstaedt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Friedrich Merz received a rude shock on the morning of May 6, 2025, as he prepared to lose the “in-waiting” qualifier from his title as German chancellor.
After weeks of negotiations following February’s federal election, Merz’s Christian Democrats (CDU) had struck a coalitional bargain with the center-left Social Democrats (SPD), giving the bloc a thin majority of 13 seats in the 630-member Bundestag, the lower house of Germany’s parliament. Yet, Merz still struggled to ratify his chancellorship.
He fell short of the majority he needed on the first vote, with 18 members of his coalition voting against him.
Though he was elected on a second ballot, the initial “no” vote was unprecedented for an incoming chancellor in the postwar federal republic, with insiders claiming that some of those voting “no” were conservatives opposed to Merz’s push to loosen German fiscal rules. Aside from the immediate political embarrassment, the vote was symptomatic of something else: a more deep-seated weakness in both the new chancellor and his government. As a scholar of German politics and history and the author of a forthcoming book on German state traditions and economic governance, I see Merz’s problems, and those of his country, as having deep historical roots.
Taking the brakes off?
For Germany and Europe, the stakes in the run-up to the vote to ratify Merz as chancellor could not have been higher – a cascade of crises confronts both. As SPD’s parliamentary leader Jens Spahn noted in the run-up to the May 6 vote: “All of Europe, perhaps the whole world, is watching this ballot.”
The German chancellor is looking to strengthen both Europe and Germany through firm leadership and heavier spending. He has promised a massive increase in defense outlays in order to create the “strongest conventional army in Europe,” to counter the threat from a bellicose Russia and the United States’ wavering over traditional security commitments to the continent.
This broad vision, however, is confronted by a number of obstacles, most importantly the so-called “debt brake.” Adopted after the 2008 financial crisis, this “brake” limited annual deficits to a paltry 0.35% of gross domestic product and proscribed any debts at all for the German “Länder,” or regions.
In March, soon after the February election but before the seating of the new Bundestag, then-presumptive Chancellor Merz called for an exemption to the debt brake for defense spending above 1% of annual gross domestic product, with a promise to do “whatever it takes” to bolster Germany’s military and verbally committing to spend up to US$1.12 trillion (1 trillion euros) over 10 years. The outgoing parliament agreed and also created a $560 billion (500 billion euros) fund dedicated to rehabilitating Germany’s crumbling infrastructure.
But Merz’s plans to revitalize Germany’s military and infrastructure could be seriously undermined by domestic forces – both within and outside of his coalition. It runs up against long-standing German norms and ideologies that threaten to hamper the state’s capacity and the government’s ability to act decisively.
Ambivalence about state power
This wobbly start to the new government hearkens back to old and deeply rooted divisions about the character of the post-World War II German state.
In the late 1960s, West German Chancellor-to-be Willy Brandt quipped that the federal republic had become an “economic giant but a political dwarf.”
Though the phrase would become a cliché, it captured both the fraught legacies of World War II and older German ambivalence about state power, which had long been associated with authoritarian politics under both the Nazis and the Wilhelmine Reich following German unification under Bismarck in 1871.
U.S. President John F. Kennedy, left, rides through the streets of Berlin with West Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt, center, and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. Bettmann/Contributor
Until the 1980s, such constraints posed relatively few problems. The country’s postwar “economic miracle” legitimized the fledgling democratic state, while empowering capital and labor within the export sectors that fueled the boom. This effectively devolved political power to economically strategic actors.
These institutional features also reflected a distinctive postwar model of German politics that weakened centralized power. Achieved in the late 1940s by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, West German sovereignty was fragmented: domestically by federalism and decentralized political institutions, and internationally through integration into NATO and the European Economic Community.
This “semi-sovereign state,” in political scientist Peter Katzenstein’s famous formulation, helped reclaim German moral credibility from the ashes of fascism and genocide. A decentralized state with robust checks and balances was viewed as both a bulwark against authoritarianism and a recipe for export-led growth and political stability.
Even after the restoration of full sovereignty with German reunification in 1990, German officials still trod lightly. Their concern was that a more assertive Germany would reawaken old fears about German militarism. Moreover, they were content to privilege economic rather than military power as the coin of their peculiar realm.
A nation of Swabian housewives?
The historical ambivalence about the German state’s role and related dilemmas about German power will not be easy for Merz to resolve.
But instead, Scholz’s “traffic light coalition” of (yellow) Liberals, Greens, and (red) Social Democrats dithered and bickered, eventually succumbing to a rare – in German politics – public interparty squabble that ultimately brought down the government in late 2024.
Reluctant to send its most advanced weapons – notably long-range Taurus cruise missiles – to Ukraine, and unable to overcome the Liberals’ hostility to badly needed fiscal expansion, Scholz was criticized for leading from behind, wary of backlash from pacifist currents in the German electorate and captive to long-held German concerns over expanding the national debt.
Merz is looking not to repeat the same mistakes. But to accomplish his vision of a revitalized and more secure Germany, he has to overcome both the debt brake and, even more important, the deep ideological currents that gave rise to it.
These factors intensified long-standing constraints on defense spending, which had failed to keep up with inflation for much of the 2000s and remained far below the NATO norm of 2% of annual gross domestic product.
The “brake” was subsequently embraced by governments of both left and right, from SPD Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s “Red-Green” coalition of 1998 to 2005 to the governments of Christian Democrat Angela Merkel from 2005 to 2021. As is abundantly clear in the pages of Merkel’s recent memoir, the proverbial character of the frugal “Swabian housewife” was one that she relished rather than resisted.
But to many observers, this fetishization of austerity has contributed to decades of underinvestment in domestic infrastructure − from roads, to schools, to public buildings, to broader public services − failures which the AfD has been eager to exploit. And as promising as it seems, Merz’s commitment of $560 billion (500 billion euros) is approximately equivalent to the country’s existing needs, without accounting for future depreciation.
Far-right activists gather near the Ostkreuz railway station in Berlin, Germany, on March 22, 2025 . Omer Messinger/Getty Images
Even Germany’s traditionally punctual train service has become a laughingstock, with jokes about late or canceled trains now standard fare for German comics.
Going beyond rhetoric
It remains unclear whether Merz’s rhetorical shift and a constitutional change that permits but does not in itself create more robust defense spending augur a new direction in German politics, or whether Europe’s largest economy will continue to be hobbled by self-imposed constraints and parliamentary squabbling. If the latter happens, Germany risks both continued economic decline and bolstering the AfD, whose support comes disproportionately from economically stagnant former Eastern regions, and which last month surpassed Merz’s CDU in public opinion polls.
And despite Merz’s commitments, not a single euro of the promised military and infrastructure funds has yet been budgeted. And even if it were, that would not address the country’s yawning needs in other areas, such as state-funded research and development and education.
Europe, too, needs Merz’s words to turn into action − and soon. The threat of Russia to the east and the turning tide of relations with Trump’s America to the west has put the EU in a bind and in need of strong leadership.
Mark I. Vail does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –
Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News
ISTANBUL, May 16 (Xinhua) — Delegations from the United States, Ukraine and Turkey held their first trilateral meeting at the Dolmabahce Presidential Office here on Friday ahead of the Russia-Ukraine peace talks.
The American delegation included Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Ambassador to Turkey Thomas Barrack and Special Representative for Ukraine Keith Kellogg.
The Ukrainian side was represented by the head of the presidential office Andriy Yermak, Minister of Defense Rustem Umerov and Minister of Foreign Affairs Andriy Sybiha.
The meeting was held behind closed doors. A published photo shows Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan chairing the meeting, accompanied by the head of the National Intelligence Organization, Ibrahim Kalin.
Following this meeting, negotiations will be held between delegations of the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Turkey. The Russian delegation will be headed by presidential aide Vladimir Medinsky.
Ukrainian and Russian officials will speak directly for the first time since a meeting in Istanbul in March 2022 that ended without a ceasefire agreement. –0–
Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News
Delegations of Russia and Ukraine have started their meeting in Türkiye’s Istanbul on Friday, televised footage showed.
In his opening remarks at the meeting, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said, “This meeting will determine the future meeting between the leaders of the countries.”
The European Union is working on a new package of sanctions to increase pressure on Russian President Vladimir Putin over the war in Ukraine, EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said on Friday as leaders from across Europe met in Tirana.
The EU, however, has already adopted 17 sanction packages – the latest one this week – and diplomats say it is increasingly difficult to get the necessary unanimity among the bloc’s 27 members to pass new measures.
“He does not want peace, so we have to increase the pressure, and this is why we are working on a new package of sanctions,” von der Leyen said, referring to Putin, before the European Political Community summit in Albania.
“This package will include for instance sanctions on Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2. It will include working on listing more vessels of the Russian shadow fleet and also lowering the oil price cap, and also more sanctions on the financial sector in Russia.”
Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2, each consisting of two pipes, were built by Russia’s state-controlled Gazprom to pump natural gas to Germany under the Baltic Sea. They were ruptured by a series of blasts in 2022.
“Massive” sanctions European leaders have threatened over the past days would need U.S. support to succeed, officials and diplomats have said.
Meanwhile, Russian and Ukrainian negotiators were in Istanbul on Friday for what was billed as their first direct peace talks in more than three years, under pressure from U.S. President Donald Trump to end Europe’s deadliest conflict since World War Two.
Putin on Sunday proposed direct talks with Ukraine in Turkey, but has spurned a challenge from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy to meet him in person, and instead has sent a team of mid-ranking officials to the talks.
NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte said Putin “made a mistake by sending a low-level delegation”.
“What we saw yesterday and overnight is yet more evidence that Putin is not serious about peace,” British Prime Minister Keir Starmer said as he arrived at the Tirana summit.
“He’s been dragging his heels, and I think it’s really important therefore, that we have absolute unity with our allies. We’ll be working on that again today to be clear that there must be a ceasefire, but also to be clear that should there not be a ceasefire, then we will act together in relation to sanctions.”
“The number of people affected by armed conflict, including those reported missing in this context has only continued to increase,” said Khaled Khiari, Assistant Secretary-General for the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific.
Briefing the Security Council today (May 15), Khaled Khiari said that in 2024 alone, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) registered 56,000 new cases of missing persons. “There is no comprehensive figure for those missing in conflict, but we know enough that the situation is dire,” he said.
Khiari welcomed the recent release of Edan Alexander, an American-Israeli national previously held hostage in Gaza, calling it “a source of hope.” He added, “I echo the Secretary-General’s words of profound relief that Mr. Alexander was able to return to his family and loved ones after this harrowing ordeal. However, many more remain missing. An estimated 58 Israeli hostages, 35 of them presumed dead, still remain unaccounted for in Gaza.”
He also voiced concern over the situation of Palestinians detained by Israeli authorities since October 2023, noting that many of them “remain unaccounted for.”
On Ukraine, Khiari reported that following Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, large numbers of civilians in Russian-occupied territories have been detained, with some held incommunicado. “According to OHCHR, some of these cases may amount to enforced disappearances,” he said. “An unspecified number of Ukrainian civilians, including Ukrainian children, have also been reportedly transferred to the Russian Federation.”
Sung Eui Lee, Chief Director of the Korean War Abductees’ Family Union (KWAFU), said, “Family is one of the most fundamental values for human beings made to be together, and the abduction, a crime of enforced disappearance is a serious crime against humanity that produces ongoing tragedy.”
Ruby Chen, father of hostage Itay Chen, said, “What kind of human beings take deceased people and use them as negotiation chips? Who denies the deceased the last basic human dignity that they deserve?” He described the withholding of information about his son as “a form of slow and enduring psychological torture.”
Russia’s Deputy Permanent Representative Maria Zabolotskaya said, “Even such an important matter as the search for missing persons is being used as a means of political pressure.” She added, “This approach is counterproductive and leads to the degradation of humanitarian cooperation.”
Israeli Ambassador Danny Danon said, “So many in this Council, so many righteous nations, have said next to nothing. There are currently 58 hostages being held in Gaza, some alive, some murdered. All denied the rights. All denied access. All denied the dignity that should never be in question.”
Priority question for written answer P-001903/2025 to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Rule 144 Isabella Lövin (Verts/ALE)
Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, seafood products have only been included in the last 16 sanction packages in a marginal way, with the products chosen being economically insignificant. However, reports by the European Market Observatory for fisheries and aquaculture products show that in 2023, seafood products worth more than EUR 800 million were imported from the Russian Federation, with some individual species comprising 25 % of the imported volume (e.g. cod and Alaska pollock). In 2024, these values fell only slightly, when EU imports constituted almost 180 000 tonnes with a value of more than EUR 700 million. With the new sanctions package being proposed, we now have an opportunity to address this issue. It is unreasonable that these products are exempted, and we are convinced that EU citizens would not want the fish they eat to come from Russia.
Questions:
1.Will the Commission include a more significant amount of seafood products in the upcoming 17th sanctions package?
2.Will the Commission place tariffs on imports of seafood products?
3.What will the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy do to ensure this issue is addressed?
Russian and Ukrainian negotiators were in Istanbul on Friday for what was billed as their first direct peace talks in more than three years, under pressure from U.S. President Donald Trump to end Europe’s deadliest conflict since World War Two.
The encounter anticipated at the Dolmabahce Palace on the Bosphorus would be a sign of diplomatic progress between the warring sides, who had not met face-to-face since March 2022, the month following Russia’s invasion.
Expectations for a major breakthrough, already low, were dented further on Thursday when Trump said there would be no movement without a meeting between himself and Russia’s President Vladimir Putin.
Trump, winding up a Middle East tour and heading back to Washington, said on Friday he would meet the Russian leader “as soon as we can set it up”.
In Istanbul, a Reuters reporter saw the first vehicles arriving at the talks venue, including white minibuses and several black cars. A Turkish Foreign Ministry source said a meeting had started between Turkish, U.S. and Ukrainian officials.
Turkish sources had said the Ukrainian and Russian delegations would meet in the presence of Turkish officials, beginning at 0930 GMT.
Putin on Sunday proposed direct talks with Ukraine in Turkey, but has spurned a challenge from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy to meet him in person, and instead has sent a team of mid-ranking officials to the talks.
Zelenskiy said Putin’s decision not to attend but to send what he called a “decorative” lineup showed the Russian leader was not serious about ending the war. Russia accused Ukraine of trying “to put on a show” around the talks.
U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who also flew to Istanbul on Friday, told reporters the night before that, based on the level of the negotiating teams, a major breakthrough was unlikely.
“I hope I’m wrong. I hope I’m 100% wrong. I hope tomorrow the news says they’ve agreed to a ceasefire; they’ve agreed to enter serious negotiations. But I’m just giving you my assessment, honestly,” he said.
Russia says it sees the talks as a continuation of the negotiations that took place in the early weeks of the war in 2022, also in Istanbul.
But the terms under discussion then, when Ukraine was still reeling from Russia’s initial invasion, would be deeply disadvantageous to Kyiv. They included a demand by Moscow for large cuts to the size of Ukraine’s military.
With Russian forces now in control of close to a fifth of Ukraine, Putin has held fast to his longstanding demands for Kyiv to cede territory, abandon its NATO membership ambitions and become a neutral country.
Ukraine rejects these terms as tantamount to capitulation, and is seeking guarantees of its future security from world powers, especially the United States.
Source: ASEAN – Association of SouthEast Asian Nations
BANGKOK, 16 May 2025 – Senior officials of ASEAN and the Republic of Korea (ROK) reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) at the 29th ASEAN-ROK Dialogue held today in Bangkok.
The Meeting acknowledged the positive momentum of ASEAN-ROK cooperation following the establishment of the CSP in conjunction with the 35th anniversary of Dialogue Relations in 2024. Substantive progress has been achieved across a wide range of areas of cooperation under the ASEAN-ROK Plan of Action (POA) 2021-2025, including political and security cooperation, trade and investment, digital transformation, tourism, energy, environment, disaster management, education, culture, youth and people-to-people exchanges. Both sides looked forward to the finalisation of the successor POA for the term 2026–2030, which is expected to be adopted by the Foreign Ministers of both sides in July 2025 during the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference with the ROK.
The ROK expressed its support for Malaysia’s ASEAN Chairmanship and priorities this year under the theme “Inclusivity and Sustainability”. The ROK also affirmed its continued support for ASEAN Community-building efforts and ASEAN Centrality, including the implementation of the ASEAN 2045: Our Shared Future that will be adopted at the 46th ASEAN Summit.
ASEAN and the ROK renewed their commitment to strengthening cooperation under the CSP. Focus will be placed on key areas such as trade and investment, including through the upgrade of the ASEAN-ROK Free Trade Are (AKFTA), digital transformation, cybersecurity, clean energy, ASEAN Power Grid, smart cities, climate change and environmental, education and youth empowerment, and narrowing the development gap. ASEAN welcomed the ROK’s implementation of various initiatives under the Korea-ASEAN Solidarity Initiative (KASI) to further enhance cooperation.
Both sides also agreed to continue advancing practical cooperation in the four priority areas of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), in accordance with the Joint Statement on Cooperation on the AOIP adopted at the 24th ASEAN-ROK Summit in 2023.
The Meeting exchanged views on international and regional issues, including the situations on the Korean Peninsula, in South China Sea, in Myanmar, in Ukraine and in the Middle East. Both sides emphasised the importance of strengthening cooperation amidst the ongoing global uncertainties, including the need to uphold multilateralism and the open and free trading system.
The 29th ASEAN-ROK Dialogue was co-chaired by Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, SOM Leader of Thailand, Eksiri Pintaruchi, and Deputy Minister for Political Affairs, SOM Leader of the ROK, Chung Byung-won. It was attended by Senior Officials of ASEAN Member States and the Deputy Secretary-General of ASEAN for ASEAN Political-Security Community. Timor-Leste attended as Observer.
The post ASEAN, Republic of Korea pledged to enhance comprehensive strategic partnership appeared first on ASEAN Main Portal.
Russia’s Vladimir Putin spurned a challenge to meet face-to-face with Volodymyr Zelenskiy in Turkey on Thursday, instead sending a second-tier delegation to planned peace talks, while Ukraine’s president said his defence minister would head up Kyiv’s team.
They will be the first direct talks between the sides since March 2022, but hopes of a major breakthrough were further dented by U.S. President Donald Trump, who said there would be no movement without a meeting between himself and Putin.
U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio later echoed that view, telling reporters in the Turkish resort of Antalya that Washington “didn’t have high expectations” for the Ukraine talks in Istanbul.
The head of the Russian delegation, presidential adviser Vladimir Medinsky, said he expected Ukraine’s representatives to turn up for the beginning of discussions on Friday in Istanbul at 10 a.m. local time (0700 GMT).
“We are ready to work,” Medinsky said in a video posted on the Telegram messaging app. He said his delegation had held “productive” talks on Thursday evening with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan.
Zelenskiy said Putin’s decision not to attend but to send what he called a “decorative” lineup showed the Russian leader was not serious about ending the war. Russia accused Ukraine of trying “to put on a show” around the talks.
“We can’t be running around the world looking for Putin,” Zelenskiy said after meeting Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan in Ankara.
“I feel disrespect from Russia. No meeting time, no agenda, no high-level delegation – this is personal disrespect. To Erdogan, to Trump,” Zelenskiy told reporters.
Zelenskiy said he would also not go to Istanbul and that his team’s mandate was to discuss a ceasefire.
A decree issued by Zelenskiy said Ukraine’s delegation would be led by Defence Minister Rustem Umerov and include the deputy heads of its intelligence services, the deputy chief of the military’s general staff and the deputy foreign minister.
Ukraine backs an immediate, unconditional 30-day ceasefire but Putin has said he first wants to start talks at which the details of such a truce could be discussed. More than three years after its full-scale invasion, Russia has the advantage on the battlefield and says Ukraine could use a pause in the war to call up extra troops and acquire more Western weapons.
Both Trump and Putin have said for months they are keen to meet each other, but no date has been set. Trump, after piling heavy pressure on Ukraine and clashing with Zelenskiy in the Oval Office in February, has lately expressed growing impatience that Putin may be “tapping me along.”
“Nothing’s going to happen until Putin and I get together,” Trump told reporters aboard Air Force One.
Rubio, speaking in Antalya, later echoed that thought: “It’s my assessment that I don’t think we’re going to have a breakthrough here until the President (Trump) and President Putin interact directly on this topic.”
Referring to the current state of the talks as a “logjam,” Rubio said he would travel to Istanbul to meet with Turkey’s foreign minister and Ukraine’s delegation on Friday.
The diplomatic disarray was symptomatic of the hostility between the sides and the unpredictability injected by Trump, whose interventions since returning to the White House in January have often provoked dismay from Ukraine and its European allies.
While Zelenskiy waited in vain for Putin in Ankara, the Russian negotiators had no one to talk to on the Ukrainian side. Some 200 reporters milled around near the Dolmabahce Palace on the Bosphorus Strait that the Russians had specified as the venue.
CEASEFIRES AND PEACE TALKS
The enemies have been wrestling for months over the logistics of ceasefires and peace talks while trying to show Trump they are serious about trying to end what he calls “this stupid war.”
Hundreds of thousands have been killed and wounded on both sides in the deadliest conflict in Europe since World War Two. Washington has threatened repeatedly to abandon its mediation efforts unless there is clear progress.
Asked if Putin would join talks at some future point, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said: “What kind of participation will be required further, at what level, it is too early to say now.”
Russia said on Thursday its forces had captured two more settlements in Ukraine’s Donetsk region. A spokesperson for Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov pointedly reminded reporters of his comment last year that Ukraine was “getting smaller” in the absence of an agreement to stop fighting.
FIRST TALKS FOR THREE YEARS
Once they start, the talks will have to address a chasm between the two sides over a host of issues.
Russian delegation head Medinsky is a former culture minister who has overseen the rewriting of history textbooks to reflect Moscow’s narrative on the war. It includes a deputy defence minister, a deputy foreign minister and the head of military intelligence.
Key members of the team, including its leader, were also involved in the last direct peace talks in Istanbul in March 2022 – and Medinsky confirmed on Thursday that Russia saw the new talks as a resumption of those interrupted three years ago.
“The task of direct negotiations with the Ukrainian side is sooner or later to achieve long-term peace by eliminating the basic root causes of the conflict,” said Medinsky.
The terms under discussion in 2022, when Ukraine was still reeling from Russia’s initial invasion, would be deeply disadvantageous to Kyiv. They included a demand by Moscow for large cuts to the size of Ukraine’s military.
With Russian forces now in control of close to a fifth of Ukraine, Putin has held fast to his longstanding demands for Kyiv to cede territory, abandon its NATO membership ambitions and become a neutral country.
Ukraine rejects these terms as tantamount to capitulation, and is seeking guarantees of its future security from world powers, especially the United States.
Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky speaks at a press conference at the Ukrainian Embassy in Ankara, Türkiye, May 15, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said on Thursday that a Ukrainian delegation would attend the upcoming peace talks in Istanbul with a commitment to ending the conflict with Russia, though he would not personally show up at the negotiating table.
At the Ukrainian embassy in Ankara following talks with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Zelensky told reporters that Ukraine would send a delegation to Istanbul.
Zelensky said Ukraine remained committed to dialogue but expressed doubts about Moscow’s intentions. He told reporters that Ukraine did not see “any decision-makers” from the Russian delegation who will be present at the talks.
The delegation will be led by Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov, alongside professionals, including military and intelligence officers, Zelensky remarked, noting that Ukraine is awaiting confirmation from both Washington and Moscow on the exact schedule for the talks, which are expected to take place either Thursday or Friday.
On top of that, Zelensky stressed that he is ready for discussions if an unconditional ceasefire will be discussed at the level of leaders.
Meanwhile, Vladimir Medinsky, head of the Russian delegation and senior aide to President Vladimir Putin, stated that his team has the necessary competencies to conduct negotiations and will focus on “finding possible solutions” and common ground through a constructive approach.
Speaking outside the Russian consulate in Istanbul, the diplomat said that Russia views the fresh negotiations with Ukraine in Istanbul as a “continuation” of the peace process disrupted in 2022, claiming that his team’s objective is to secure a lasting peace by “addressing the underlying causes of the conflict.”
Addressing reporters separately after a NATO foreign ministers’ meeting in Türkiye’s Antalya, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said that both Russia and Ukraine have, in principle, expressed their willingness for a ceasefire. However, each has its own considerations: Ukraine favors an immediate, unconditional ceasefire, while Russia maintains that certain modalities must first be understood and agreed upon.
Fidan said the Ukraine-Russia negotiations have now reached a certain stage, urging both parties to make concessions and take steps towards establishing a common peace.
U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, also attending the NATO meeting, said Washington supports a negotiated settlement. “We will see what happens over the next couple of days in that regard, but we want to see progress,” he said.
The Istanbul talks follow a proposal by Putin on Sunday to resume direct negotiations with Ukraine. Zelensky has previously said he is open to a face-to-face meeting with Putin. However, the Kremlin said Putin would not attend the talks.
The last direct talks between Ukraine and Russia took place in Istanbul in March 2022, where the two sides failed to agree to halt the fighting.
Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Peter Zámborský, Senior Lecturer, Management & International Business, University of Auckland, Waipapa Taumata Rau
The space economy is being reshaped — not just by innovation, but by geopolitics. What was once dominated by state space agencies, and more recently by private ventures, is evolving into a hybrid model in which government priorities and commercial capabilities are intertwined.
The rise of protectionist policies, tariff wars, export controls and national security concerns is forcing space firms to adapt their strategies – and in many cases, to rethink where and how they operate.
This offers countries such as New Zealand the opportunity to stand out in the new space race – becoming neutral ground with fewer trade and other regulatory barriers for the growth of the emerging hybrid space economy.
New Zealand’s flagship player in the space sector is Rocket Lab. Founded in 2006, the integrated space firm was listed on NASDAQ in 2021. By the end of 2024, the company was worth around US$8 billion.
While its headquarters are in the United States, Rocket Lab also operates in Canada and keeps around 700 of its 2,000 global staff and its key launch site in New Zealand. Recently, it also announced the acquisition of a German optical communications supplier, Mynaric.
Founded in New Zealand by Peter Beck, Rocket Lab is now headquartered in the United States with sites in Canada and elsewhere. Phil Walter/Getty Images
Opportunities in US trade war
Rocket Lab’s decision to engage in substantial foreign investment and diversify its operations across the US, New Zealand, Canada and Europe gives it flexibility in responding to the US-initiated trade war.
The current and possible future US tariffs have created uncertainty for investors. Along with retaliatory measures by China and other nations, these developments have significant consequences for space firms.
Companies in this field rely on globally sourced components (for example, semiconductors and electronic components) and materials such as steel and specialised fuel for their operations.
Firms based in just one location can suffer from tariffs or retaliatory restrictions. But those with operations in several countries — especially in more neutral countries such as New Zealand and some Southeast Asian nations — may benefit from geopolitical tensions. Geostrategic diversification gives them more options, including less risky locations for operations, trade and investments in the space sector.
A recent Deloitte report noted that companies in the space ecosystem may prefer to look for launch sites and satellite providers on neutral ground.
Initiatives are already emerging in Indonesia and Malaysia to construct commercial spaceports and attract investment in satellite manufacturing.
The benefits of being neutral
The rising geopolitical tensions mean new space firms from relatively neutral countries such as New Zealand are increasingly aligning with national defence priorities. The emerging hybrid space economy is, in some ways, a response to this global power realignment.
New Zealand has historically sought to balance strong trade ties with China, its largest trading partner, with security cooperation with the US as part of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance. But recent developments have prompted a reassessment.
Notably, the presence of Chinese warships in the Tasman Sea and upheavals in the global security climate after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has led to a review of New Zealand’s defence posture.
Earlier this year, Rocket Lab also declared it was “ready to serve the Pentagon”. For example, it secured contracts worth about US$500 million to launch a satellite from New Zealand for BlackSky, a US-based space-based intelligence provider.
Rocket Lab also became one of five launch companies invited to compete for missions under the US National Security Space Launch program. This program puts the most valuable military and spy satellites into orbit, worth up to US$6 billion of Pentagon contracts in the next few years.
Ongoing economic strife and possible military conflicts have important implications for the strategies of new space firms and the policies of nations seeking space investment.
New space firms may redirect their investment to countries where their main customers are located (for example, the US or European Union) or to neutral countries less affected by geopolitical tensions (for example, New Zealand). This allows them to diversify and reduce exposure to tariffs and other restrictions.
In New Zealand, this may mean more government investment not only by Rocket Lab, but also involvement by other industry players from the US, Japan or Europe.
Commercial opportunities in the new space sector will remain. But the shape of the sector may move towards a more hybrid space, recognising both commercial and national security interests in times of economic war.
The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
When Prime Minister Anthony Albanese steps into St Peter’s Square for the inaugural Mass of Pope Leo XIV on Sunday, the optics will be far more than pious courtesy.
For a day, the Vatican will temporarily be the world’s premier diplomatic stage. And a canny Australian leader can use such an occasion to advance domestic and foreign policy agendas simultaneously.
Faith optics and domestic politics
Albanese has lately spoken of “reconnecting” with his Catholic heritage. He called the election of the US-born pontiff “momentous” for believers and non-believers alike.
In multicultural Australia, where roughly one in four citizens identifies as Catholic, Albanese’s trip to the Vatican allows him to reassure a core constituency that sometimes feels politically overlooked: Catholics.
This signalling costs Albanese nothing. Yet, it helps to boost Labor’s broader narrative of inclusion and respect for faith communities.
St Peter’s Square as a diplomatic crossroads
The inaugural mass will also attract a rare concentration of global powerbrokers in one square kilometre. The head-of-state guest list is still fluid, but several confirmations make the trip worth Albanese’s while.
The Australian has reported that Albanese hopes to bend the ear of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa.
Albanese will also get a chance to meet Prince Edward, who will represent King Charles III, as well as his newly elected counterpart in Canada, Prime Minister Mark Carney.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is also expected to attend after a week of overtures to the new pope concerning Kyiv’s quest for a just peace in its war with Russia.
Speculation was swirling around the possibility of US President Donald Trump returning to Rome, fresh from his high-visibility appearance at Pope Francis’s funeral on April 26.
For Albanese, a corridor encounter with Vance would allow him to set a personal tone before his expected visit to Washington later this year, without the media glare that accompanies an Oval Office photo-op.
Why leaders flock to the Vatican
Some commentators may frame the attendance of world leaders at the mass cynically: a chance to use a sacred event for their own political purposes.
Yet, politicians have long been a fixture at papal events. Such participation is hardly exceptional. It reflects a centuries-old dynamic in which those with temporal political power seek moral sanction, and the papacy demonstrates its enduring capacity to convene the political order.
First, it is a neutral micro-state whose moral authority can confer legitimacy on secular, political initiatives. Consider, for example, John Paul II’s role in Poland’s democratic revolution.
Second, the Holy See’s diplomatic corps is the world’s oldest continuous foreign service. It boasts diplomatic relations with 184 states, including Palestine and Taiwan (one of a dozen states in the world to do so).
Although every pontiff is first and foremost the universal pastor of the Catholic Church, the Lateran Treaty of 1929 also endowed him with full sovereignty over the territory of Vatican City.
The pope’s head-of-state status is most visible at multilateral forums. In 2024, for instance, Pope Francis became the first pontiff to address a G7 summit, speaking in a special session on artificial intelligence.
He also had a string of bilateral meetings on the sidelines with the leaders of the United States, Ukraine, France, Brazil, Turkey, Canada and India, among others.
When a pope travels, host governments roll out the symbols of a state visit, though the Vatican insists on calling such trips “apostolic journeys”. Conversely, when foreign leaders come to Rome, they are received in the pope’s own apartments, not in a government palace. These meetings therefore take on a spiritual, as well as political, cast.
In short, the pope moves with ease between being a shepherd and sovereign. His spiritual authority opens doors for dialogue, while his head-of-state status allows him to receive ambassadors, sign treaties and sit across the table from presidents and prime ministers.
The result is a singular blend of moral voice and diplomatic reach unmatched in global affairs.
Pragmatic statecraft under the colonnade
For a middle-power such as Australia, dialogue between a prime minister and a pope can have a multiplier top-down effect. These discussions often echo across chancelleries in the Global South, especially in Catholic Latin America and the Philippines. These are both priority markets for Australian education and green-hydrogen exports.
In Rome, Albanese can also affirm Australia’s commitment to multilateralism at a moment when Indo-Pacific tensions have nudged Canberra towards increased defence spending and an over-militarised image. The sacred stage permits a softer register: diplomacy as dialogue, not deterrence.
When the incense clears on Sunday, most viewers will remember the pageantry: the fisherman’s ring (a gold signet ring cast for each new pope), the pallium (the white woollen band draped over the pope’s shoulders during mass), and the roar of 100,000 pilgrims.
Yet, the quieter choreography in the diplomatic boxes may shape trade flows, security partnerships and refugee corridors for years.
Albanese appears to have recognised this rare alchemy. Showing up in Rome is pragmatic statecraft, executed under Bernini’s colonnade. This is where religious and political figures have long mingled — and will continue to do so as long as popes and prime minister seize the moment.
Darius von Guttner Sporzynski does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –
Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News
Moscow, May 16 /Xinhua/ – The Russian delegation will be waiting for the Ukrainian side on Friday from 10 am, it should arrive for the meeting, TASS reported with reference to the head of the Russian delegation at the talks with Ukraine in Istanbul, aide to the Russian president Vladimir Medinsky.
“Tomorrow morning, literally from 10 am, we will be waiting for the Ukrainian side, which should arrive for the meeting. We are ready to work,” he said.
Russian President Vladimir Putin, speaking to journalists in the Kremlin on the night of May 11, proposed that the authorities in Kyiv resume direct negotiations, which they interrupted in 2022, without preconditions. It was proposed to begin the dialogue on May 15 in Istanbul.
On the night of May 15, V. Putin approved the composition of the Russian delegation. It is headed by the Russian presidential aide Vladimir Medinsky, who represented the country at the negotiations in 2022. –0–
Source: United States Senator for Delaware Christopher Coons
WASHINGTON – Today, U.S. Senators Chris Coons (D-Del.), Thom Tillis (R-NC), Pete Ricketts (R-NE), Katie Britt (R-AL) and Chris Murphy (D-CT) issued the following statement on the upcoming presidential election runoff in Romania: “In advance of the presidential election runoff in Romania this weekend, we remain confident in the strength of Romania’s democracy and reaffirm the steadfast alliance between the U.S. and Romania. Romania is a vital and dependable NATO ally, a net European security contributor, and a leader in securing NATO’s eastern flank. Romania consistently pulls its weight, from supporting Ukraine in its fight against Russian aggression to partnering with Moldova to accelerate its European Union accession. “This weekend, the Romanian people will go to the polls to choose a new leader and chart their future path, one we hope will deepen the U.S. partnership with Romania and reaffirm its strong role within Europe. We urge the Romanian people, including members of the Romanian diaspora around the world, to show up, vote, and exercise their right to self-determination. We also call on the Romanian authorities to ensure free and fair elections, untainted by outside interference. “We look forward to embarking on the next chapter of the U.S.-Romania partnership with Romania’s future and duly elected leaders.”
Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments
Speech
All parties to conflict must reunite families and grant access to information on missing persons: UK statement at the UN Security Council
Statement by Ambassador Barbara Woodward, UK Permanent Representative to the UN, at the UN Security Council meeting on the protection of civilians in armed conflict.
I will make three points.
First, as we’ve heard, the impact of those missing in conflict is lasting and devastating with families forced to live without knowledge of the fate of their loved ones.
As we’ve heard, the ICRC registered 56,000 new cases of missing persons in 2024 alone.
The United Kingdom supported the adoption of UN Security Council resolution 2474.
This requires parties to armed conflict to help reunite and reconnect separated families, to collect and protect information on missing persons, and to return remains to relatives.
Yet in too many cases these requirements have not been fulfilled.
As Ms Lee made clear, despite decades passing, DPRK has still not shared information about those it abducted with their families.
It is critical that all parties and stakeholders comply with resolution 2474 and IHL provisions, and that the ICRC and relevant actors are granted access to information on persons reported missing and to those detained or taken hostage.
Second, conflicts around the world continue to tear people away from their loved ones.
This includes in Ukraine, where thousands remain missing, including tens of thousands of children forcibly deported to Russia.
In Syria, over 130,000 people remain missing, and we welcome the new Syrian Government’s commitment to establish a national commission to clarify their fate.
Third, I want also to highlight the unimaginable ordeal faced by hostages held by Hamas.
This Council has heard first-hand from former hostages Eli Sharabi and Noa Argamani of the cruel and dehumanising treatment they were subjected to.
Hamas must be held accountable for its despicable actions.
We welcome the release of Edan Alexander who was reunited with his family this week. But as we heard from Ms Chen today, many more families continue to wait in agony.
This also includes the families of Avinatan Or, Yossi Sharabi, and Shay Levinson, who have strong links to the UK.
President, a ceasefire in Gaza is the best way to bring the hostages home, end the suffering of Palestinians and bring us back to much needed peace. Far too many have lost their lives and been torn away from their families.
No-one should have to suffer this fate, whether in Gaza or elsewhere in the world.
It is time for the spirit of SCR 2474 to be realised for the sake of all those who remain missing.