Category: Ukraine

MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section IV – Court of Justice – A10-0050/2025

Source: European Parliament

2. MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

with observations forming an integral part of the decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section IV – Court of Justice of the European Union

(2024/2022(DEC))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section IV – Court of Justice of the European Union,

– having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0050/2025),

A. whereas in the context of the discharge procedure, the discharge authority wishes to stress the particular importance of further strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the Union institutions by improving transparency and accountability, and by implementing the concept of performance-based budgeting and good governance of human resources;

B. whereas the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is the judicial institution of the Union, having the task of ensuring compliance with Union law by overseeing the uniform interpretation and application of the Treaties and ensuring the lawfulness of measures adopted by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies;

C. whereas the CJEU helps preserving the values of the Union and, through its case-law, works towards the building of Europe;

D. whereas the CJEU comprises two courts: the Court of Justice and the General Court;

E. whereas Parliament and Council amended Protocol No 3 on the Statute of the CJEU (the ‘Statute’)[7] in 2024 with respect to the transfer of preliminary rulings in specific areas to the jurisdiction of the General Court;

1. Notes that the budget of the CJEU falls under MFF heading 7, ‘European public administration’, which amounted to EUR 12,3 billion in 2023 (representing 6,4 % of the total Union budget); notes that the CJEU’s budget of approximately EUR 0,5 billion represents approximately 3,9 % of the total administrative expenditure of the Union;

2. Notes that the Court of Auditors (the ‘Court’), in its Annual Report for the financial year 2023 (the ‘Court’s report’) examined a sample of 70 transactions under the heading ‘Administration’, 10 more than were examined in 2022; the Court further states that administrative expenditure comprises expenditure on human resources, including expenditure on pensions, which in 2023 accounted for approximately 70 % of the total administrative expenditure, and expenditure on buildings, equipment, energy, communications and information technology (IT), and that its work over many years indicates that, overall, this spending is low risk;

3. Notes that 21 (30 %) of the 70 transactions contained errors but that the Court, based on the five errors which were quantified, estimates the level of error to be below the materiality threshold;

4. Notes that the Court’s report did not identify any specific issues concerning the CJEU;

Budgetary and financial management

5. Notes that the budget allocated for the CJEU in 2023 amounted to EUR 486 025 796, which represented an increase of 3,9 % compared to 2022; notes that this increase was mainly related to salary adjustments forecasted for 2023; stresses that the budget of the CJEU is essentially administrative, with around 75 % of the appropriations related to expenditure for its members and staff, and almost all of the rest related to expenditure for buildings and IT;

6. Notes that the overall implementation rate of the budget at the end of 2023 was 97,72%; notes that five transfers were submitted to the budgetary authority in accordance with Article 29 of the Financial Regulation to reinforce the budget lines for ‘Energy consumption’, ‘Purchases, work, servicing and maintenance of equipment and software’ and ‘buildings’ from other budget lines, mainly the budget line for staff ‘Remuneration and allowances’; notes that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine continued to create budgetary pressure for the CJEU, including through rising inflation and salary adjustments, strongly increasing energy costs and costs for a number of goods and services;

7. Notes with satisfaction that the authorising officer by delegation declared that the resources allocated had been used for the purpose intended and in accordance with the principle of sound financial management and that the control procedures put in place provided the necessary guarantees as to the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions;

8. Notes that the average payment time stood at 23,1 days in 2023 compared to 24,32 days in 2022; calls on the CJEU to continue its efforts to reduce the time for payment, particularly considering that 81 % of invoices were received electronically in 2023;

9. Notes that the CJEU’s mission budget, which stood at EUR 638 000 for both staff and Members in 2023, continued to decrease by 3,3 % in 2023 compared to 2022; notes that 85,1 % of the appropriations for missions in 2023 were used compared to 46,6 % in 2022 due to the persistent travel restrictions in application at that time;

Internal management, performance and internal control

10. Notes the significant steps taken by the CJEU in 2023 towards its judicial reform which has led to the partial transfer of jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings from the Court of Justice to the General Court; notes that a political agreement with Parliament and Council was reached at the end of 2023 in view of the amendment to the Statute of the CJEU and with a view to improving the functioning of the CJEU against the background of a steady increase in the caseload and in the complexity and sensitive nature of questions raised; notes that, further to the adoption of the reform in 2024, detailed rules and procedures were adopted in order to complete the reform and allow the implementation of the new regulatory framework as of 1 October 2024;

11. Notes that, in 2023, the Court of Justice ruled on five cases concerning the principle of primacy in the context of four preliminary rulings brought by the courts in Germany, Ireland, Poland, and Romania, as well as one infringement case concerning Poland; stresses the fundamental importance of the principle of primacy of Union law, which ensures the uniform interpretation and application of Union law across all Member States and safeguards the rule of law as a core value of the Union; strongly reaffirms that the primacy of Union law is the cornerstone of the Union’s legal order and highlights the pivotal role of the CJEU in upholding the rule of law across the Union. Furthermore, notes that the General Court ruled on six cases related to measures for the protection of the Union budget against breaches of the principles of the rule of law by the Hungarian government, which systematically undermines core Union values; urges the Commission to take decisive enforcement actions against any Member State that challenges or disregards the binding nature of CJEU rulings;

12. Condemns any national measures or legislative actions that seek to undermine the codification and enforcement of CJEU judgments; calls for the establishment of a formal monitoring mechanism to track Member State compliance with CJEU rulings and recommends linking compliance with EU funding disbursement under the rule of law conditionality framework;

13. Notes that 821 new cases were submitted to the Court of Justice in 2023, compared to 806 in 2022, out of which 63% were references for preliminary ruling and 28,6% were appeals against decisions of the General Court; notes that the General Court saw a major increase of cases with 1 271 new cases in 2023 compared to 904 in 2022, including an exceptional series of 404 joint cases submitted in October 2023; notes that in 2023 for the General Court, 37% of the new cases, including the series of 404 joint cases, concerned actions relating to institutional law, 24,3% concerned actions relating to intellectual property and 6 % concerned disputes between institutions of the Union and their staff; notes that the total number of pending cases remains stable when compared to previous years: considering the previously mentioned 404 cases as a single case, 2 587 cases were pending at the end of 2023, compared to 2 585 at the end of 2022 and 2 541 at the end of 2021;

14. Notes that the Court of Justice closed 783 cases in 2023, compared to 808 in 2022, and that the General Court closed 904 cases in 2023, compared to 858 in 2022;

15. Welcomes the decrease in the average length of proceedings for the cases closed by the Court of Justice, whereas in 2023 that average was 16,1 months, compared to 16,4 months in 2022; notes that the average duration for the cases closed by the General Court was 18,2 months, compared to 16,2 months in 2022, which the General Court explained was due to the nature and related complexity of the proceedings managed in 2023;

16. Notes the decrease in the average time taken to deal with direct actions before the Court of Justice (from 23,5 months in 2022 to 20,8 months in 2023) and with references for preliminary rulings (from 17,3 months to 16,8 months); notes that, as regards the litigation before the Court of Justice, there was a significant increase in the number of direct actions, in particular in the field of the environment, and that the questions referred to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling in 2023 related principally to the area of freedom, security and justice, followed by taxation, consumer protection and transport; notes that, as regards the litigation before the General Court, there was an increase of cases in the fields of intellectual property and economic and monetary policy, including banking;

17. Notes with satisfaction the high use rate of e-Curia in 2023, with 10 502 e-Curia accounts being registered: 94 % of lodgements before the General Court were made via e-Curia, which is the same as in 2022, while the use rate of e-Curia at the Court of Justice went up to approximately 89 %, compared to 87 % in 2022;

18. Appreciates the progress made in digitising the judicial archives with a view to preserving documents for future consultation and facilitating access for researchers and the public by means of a digital portal;

19. Welcomes the performance-based approach developed by the CJEU, allowing the CJEU to take decisions based on performance outcomes and the level of achievement of its objectives, measured through a set of workload and operational indicators; notes that the key performance indicators used by the CJEU cover a wide range of specific areas in support of the five management objectives relating to the proper functioning of the CJEU, digitalisation and emerging technologies, openness and transparency, multilingualism and human resources management;

20. Notes that the internal control framework of the CJEU was subject to an in-depth evaluation in 2022-2023, which confirmed its soundness; notes that, as part of that evaluation, the financial control circuits were adapted in order to make the controls more efficient;

21. Notes that the main internal audits carried out in 2023 concerned the CJEU’s expenditure on the cleaning of buildings, the effectiveness of the internal control system to safeguard the CJEU’s IT assets and the staff selection procedures; notes that an internal audit also carried out a study on the use of artificial intelligence in the area of justice in relation to the implementation of a “strategy for integrating tools based on artificial intelligence into the operation of the CJEU”; notes that, in many cases, the services of the CJEU took actions to implement the internal audit recommendations before the formal finalisation of the internal audits and that those actions were considered satisfactory by the internal auditor;

Human resources, equality and staff well-being

22. Notes that, at the end of 2023, the CJEU employed 1340 officials (58 %), 765 temporary agents (33 %) under Articles 2(a), 2(b) and 2(c) of the Conditions of Employment of Other Staff of the EU, and 198 contract agents (9 %); notes that, at the end of 2023, the occupation rate of the establishment plan stood at 97,11 %; notes further that the annual turnover of staff was 7,8 % in 2023, which was particularly due to the 20% of those staff who left the CJEU by taking retirement;

23. Notes that the Court of Justice is composed of 27 Judges and 11 Advocates General and that no new Judge or Advocate General took office in 2023; notes further that the General Court is composed of 54 Judges and that two new Judges, one woman and one man, took office during 2023; notes further that a new Registrar for the General Court was elected in 2023;

24. Welcomes the CJEU’s detailed responses to the questionnaire from Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control, provided as part of the current discharge procedure, particularly regarding staff distribution at the end of 2023; notes that the gender composition of the Court of Justice and the General Court continues to be very unbalanced; expresses its appreciation of the letter from the President of the General Court to the President of the Conference of the Representatives of the Member States in 2024, calling on Member States to take the need for gender balance into account when nominating candidates for the replacement of Judges and Advocates General; calls on Member States to take the need for gender balance into account when nominating candidates for the replacement of judges;

25. Takes note that, of the 2 303 officials and agents serving at the end of 2023, 61 % are women; welcomes the fact that the proportion of women in administrative positions is 55 %, and especially the fact that, in managerial posts, the proportion has increased to 43 %, compared to 40 % in 2022 and 2021, confirming the upward trend recorded since 2018 (41 % in 2020, 39 % in 2019 and 37,5 % in 2018); notes however that representation of women was the highest in assistant grades, whereas it was the lowest in senior management positions; calls on the CJEU to ensure a greater representation of women in senior management positions and take further measures to promote gender balance at all levels; welcomes the efforts deployed by the CJEU in favour of equality, inclusion and diversity, especially at recruitment stage;

26. Calls on the CJEU to publish an annual Gender and Diversity Report to provide transparency on gender representation at all levels of the institution, including Judges, Advocates General, and administrative staff, as well as to provide for concrete measures of improving gender parity in senior positions;

27. Welcomes that all Union nationalities are represented in the staff of the CJEU, but notes that certain nationalities are more represented than others; welcomes the continued efforts of the CJEU to promote a better geographical balance among its staff, in particular by fostering the visibility and attractiveness of its job vacancies, creating and offering more favourable job conditions to attract temporary agents from certain less-represented Member States and communicating widely to varied audiences on the job opportunities at the CJEU in 2023; notes that a significant effort was made to attract many talented young people from different Member States though the CJEU’s internship programme; invites the CJEU to examine whether trainees are proportionally represented from all member states;

28. Urges the CJEU to promote a multilingual working environment, recognizing its potential to enhance the fair distribution of nationalities among its staff; calls on all EU institutions to uphold and ensure the principle of multilingualism;

29. Welcomes the work done by the High Level Interinstitutional Group on enhancing the attractiveness of Luxembourg as a place of work for staff; calls on the CJEU to maintain and enhance cooperation with other Luxembourg-based institutions across different initiatives; notes with appreciation that the budgetary authority approved for the financial year 2025 the necessary appropriations in order to allow the granting of a housing allowance to staff at lower grades, as recommended by the High Level Interinstitutional Group; asks that Parliament be updated on the progress of such initiatives intended to improve the attractiveness of Luxembourg as a place of work;

30. Notes that, in 2023, the CJEU implemented several initiatives to promote physical and mental wellbeing of staff through specialised workshops and awareness-raising activities; notes that the teleworking scheme, which entered into force on 1 May 2022, was assessed positively by the managers, among whom 92 % replied that the productivity of staff teleworking was either equivalent or better than prior to the existence of the teleworking scheme; notes that, with a view to achieving a better work and personal-life balance, in 2023, the CJEU renewed the possibility for its staff to telework from outside the place of employment up to 10 days per year, especially during the judicial vacations;

31. Welcomes the ongoing awareness-raising, information and training campaigns aiming at promoting inclusion, mutual respect, cooperation and support for people with disabilities and their helpers;

32. Notes that the number of working days of sick leave was 20 198 in 2023, corresponding to a reduction of 14,78 % compared to 2022; notes with concern that the medical service reported 11 cases of burnout in 2023; welcomes a thorough analysis of diagnostic reports undertaken by the CJEU to identify instances of professional burnout and the CJEU’s focus on preventive measures, especially the reinforcement of its medical and social workers’ team, the prevention of psychosocial risks in the workplace and the introduction of awareness-raising activities for management on the right to disconnect and the risks of over-performance; encourages the CJEU to maintain focus on this problem in order to prevent any further cases associated with burnout and inform the Parliament of the measures taken in this regard;

33. Notes that an administrative enquiry was launched in 2023 on an alleged case of sexual harassment concerning a member of staff and that this case was closed in 2024 with a sanction; expresses concern that a procedure of assistance for alleged harassment concerning a judge was also filed in 2023 but no harassment was established in that case; notes that an interdepartmental working group, established in March 2023, therefore ahead of the ratification of the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence, examined the rules and procedures in place in the CJEU to prevent harassment and made some recommendations with a view to improving these rules and procedures; encourages the CJEU to follow up and continue to show no tolerance for harassment in the workplace by introducing mandatory training on unconscious bias and ethical standards for all judges and senior officials to prevent abuse of power;

Ethical framework

34. Notes with satisfaction that, as requested in previous discharge recommendations, the new code of conduct on the rights and obligations of officials and other servants of the CJEU reflecting the CJEU’s values and commitment to ethics was drawn up in 2023 and adopted in March 2024; notes that the code of conduct includes provisions on conflict of interests, duty of loyalty, duty of confidentiality and discretion, outside activities, occupational activities after leaving the service and publications and also applies to seconded national experts and trainee judges hosted under the European Judicial Training Network; notes that, in 2023, awareness-raising activities and revamped training on the code of conduct were organised for staff and managers, with a particular focus on newcomers; calls for a mandatory training for all staff on a regular basis and asks that Parliament be kept informed about the implementation of the code of conduct;

35. Notes that, before the code of conduct entered into force, two potential cases of conflict of interest were declared and handled in accordance with the procedures in place, with the aim of ensuring that the new members of staff concerned were not involved in the management of files that they knew from a previous job;

36. Notes that, further to the adoption of the code of conduct for Members and former Members of the CJEU, the declaration of interests of the Members have been published online to avoid any potential conflict of interest in the handling of cases; notes that the CJEU is constantly reassessing its internal rules on this matter with a view to updating those rules and to ensuring the highest possible standards of ethical behaviour; calls on the CJEU to establish an independent ethics committee to oversee compliance with the code of conduct and investigate potential breaches; calls for mandatory annual ethics training for all CJEU personnel, including Judges and Advocates General to preserve the integrity of the Court; asks the CJEU to inform Parliament about the results of any further assessment of the effectiveness of that measure aimed at the prevention of conflicts of interest;

37. Welcomes the publication of the declarations of interests of the Members of the CJEU but calls for the introduction of a standard pre-appointment screening process to identify and mitigate potential conflicts of interest at an early stage; urges the Council to establish transparent guidelines for Member States when nominating candidates for judicial positions at the CJEU;

38. Urges the CJEU to introduce a mandatory recusal policy for judges in cases where they have past professional affiliations with litigants appearing before the Court; calls for stricter conflict-of-interest screening for judges and high-ranking staff, including regular updates to financial disclosure requirements; asks for the publication of real-time recusal decisions in cases where judges declare a conflict of interest, ensuring greater transparency in the judicial process and reinforcing public confidence in the impartiality and integrity of the CJEU;

39. Notes that in 2023, all Members of the CJEU were resident of Luxembourg in accordance with Article 14 of the Statute;

40. Notes that the list of external activities carried out by the Members of both the Court of Justice and the General Court has been published on the CJEU website since 2018; further notes that the list is difficult to read for the general public and recommends its revision to ensure greater clarity and informativeness; notes that the prior authorisation by the general meeting of the Court of Justice or by the plenary conference of the General Court is only granted when the external activity is compatible with the requirements of the code of conduct and with the Members’ obligations to be available for judicial activities; asks the CJEU to inform the discharge authority about any initiatives to improve the readability of the information related to external activities, in line with previous discharge recommendations;

41. Notes that the rules governing Members’ travels, missions and use of drivers and cars, as updated in 2021, provide that only the running costs resulting from the car use for purposes related to the execution of a mission order or to the exercise of his or her mandate within a limit of 10 000 km are borne by the CJEU; reiterates its opinion that the use of the car fleet outside of the strict performance of the duties of the Members of the CJEU should not take place under any circumstances, notes that the CJEU reported to be in discussion with other institutions in order to obtain a harmonised set of rules for the use of official vehicles, while respecting the autonomy of each institution; invites all Union institutions to agree on a single system to be applied horizontally, which would reduce the confusion and increase transparency and efficiency in the use of public money; asks the CJEU to keep Parliament informed of any progress in this matter;

42. Notes that an OLAF case, referred to in previous discharge resolutions, which dealt with the conduct of a member of staff that might have constituted a serious failure to comply with their obligations, was closed in 2023; notes that the CJEU is not aware of any new OLAF investigation or recommendation in 2023;

43. Notes that the CJEU did not report any cases of fraud, corruption or misuse of Union funds in 2023; notes that the CJEU’s anti-fraud strategy is an integral part of its integrated internal control and risk management framework, with a particular focus on the risks of improper disclosure of information;

Transparency and access to justice for citizens

44. Welcomes the CJEU’s engagement to enhance transparency, access to justice and public openness, thus contributing to foster public trust in the Union institutions;

45. Notes that, in 2023, the CJEU consolidated the streaming service for hearings of the Court of Justice and of the General Court on the Curia website, thus facilitating the access of citizens to the judicial activities of the CJEU; welcomes the improvement of the CVRIA website, in terms of its structure, functionalities and content; welcomes that the delivery of judgments of the Court of Justice, the reading of opinions of the Advocates General, the hearings of the Grand Chamber and certain hearings of chambers sitting with five Judges have been broadcast live on the Curia website since 2023; calls on the CJEU to further improve transparency by broadcasting all hearings of the two Courts on its website and permanently storing them online;

46. Welcomes that, further to the reform of its Statute, the CJEU will publish statements of case or written observations lodged in preliminary ruling proceedings after the closure of such proceedings, except in cases of objection to the publication of a person’s statement of case or observation; underlines that such publication will improve transparency and access to justice for citizens and calls on the CJEU to publish all documents related to a file on its website; calls on the CJEU to implement a procedure that could be used by any person to access in house all the documents related to a case;

47. Notes that rules on the use of videoconferencing were adopted by the General Court in April 2023 and by the Court of Justice in September 2024, according to which a party may request the use of videoconferencing where security or other serious reasons prevent that party’s representative from participating in a hearing in person;

48. Notes that the rules laid down by the CJEU decision of 26 November 2019 concerning public access to documents held by the CJEU in the exercise of its administrative function do not apply to judicial documents for which access is governed by the Rules of Procedure of the Courts; notes that the CJEU registered 21 requests of public access to administrative documents in 2023 and granted access to administrative documents in 12 cases; notes that the European Ombudsman found no instances of maladministration on the part of the CJEU in 2023;

49. Invites the Court to simplify the process of finding specific rulings on e-curia; welcomes efforts to make the interface more client-friendly and intuitive;

Digitalisation, cybersecurity and data protection

50. Notes that compared to 2022 the budget expenditure increased by 10,9 % for IT projects, by 13 % for IT equipment, by 59 % for cybersecurity projects and by 72 % for cybersecurity services, licences and equipment in 2023;

51. Notes that the implementation of major digitalisation projects under the digital transformation strategy remained a priority for the CJEU in 2023, such as the development of the integrated case management system (SIGA), the promotion of the use of the e-Curia application for the lodging and notification of procedural documents by electronic means, the adoption of eSignature and the adoption of HAN/Ares electronic document record and management system; notes that the CJEU tracks the return on investment in digitalisation projects in terms of costs and resources efficiency and asks the CJEU to keep the discharge authority informed of its findings in that area;

52. Notes that, as part of its comprehensive initiative to increase accessibility and inclusion for persons with vulnerability, the CJEU has continued to implement the “accessibility by design” approach for any change and evolution of its IT systems; notes that, following an audit of the Curia website, the CJEU started to improve the site’s accessibility to a wide range of users, such as people with visual impairments, hearing impairments or learning disabilities;

53. Notes that the CJEU implemented several projects based on artificial intelligence (AI), such as the automation of document analysis for references to applicable legislation and assistance with invoice verification through robotic processes and hearing transcription, in line with its new AI integration strategy adopted in June 2023; underlines that it is of vital importance that AI is used in a manner which fully preserves the independence, the quality and the serenity of the legal processes, is in full consideration of ethical matters and is used under human oversight and allowing human intervention in order to avoid negative consequences or risks, or stop the system if it does not perform as intended; notes that, as part of that strategy, the CJEU set up an AI management board composed of members of the Court of Justice and of the General Court to oversee the ethical aspects of AI use within the CJEU and to set clear boundaries for its application; welcomes the staff guidelines on the use of AI issued by the board; welcomes the initiatives in place to upskill employees in digital competencies through the training path developed in cooperation with the Interinstitutional Committee for Digital Transformation (ETA); emphasises that the digitalisation of justice and the adoption of emerging technologies such as AI will offer significant advantages for the efficient functioning of the Court; recommends however that the Court of justice anticipate the associated cybersecurity risks and strengthen even more its collaboration with the EU Agency for Cybersecurity and CERT-EU;

54. Notes that no EDPS enquiries were communicated to the CJEU in 2023; notes that, in 2023, EDPS had not addressed any specific recommendation to the CJEU following its investigation regarding the use of cloud services by Amazon web services; notes that EDPS published a decision in 2023 confirming compliance of the CJEU’s use of cloud videoconferencing services with data protection law; reiterates however its concerns regarding the use of external cloud services, given the growing threats about cybersecurity and digital sovereignty;

55. Welcomes the CJEU adoption of a cyber roadmap in 2023 and strengthening of its cybersecurity operational capabilities to better protect its systems against the increasing number of cyberattacks; underlines furthermore that a robust cybersecurity strategy is an essential tool to fight against foreign interferences aiming to undermine the integrity of the European Institutions; notes that the CJEU has taken various measures to reinforce its cybersecurity preparedness and ability to recover from security incidents, including through its participation in the governance of the Interinstitutional Cybersecurity Board and through a combination of cybersecurity controls and tools in line with the recommendations of CERT-EU; notes that the budgetary authority approved for the financial year 2025 the necessary appropriations for two additional posts in order to reinforce the CJEU’s staff capacities in the field of cybersecurity;

56. Welcomes the measures taken, such as cybersecurity audits, staff training and rapid incident response protocols, to protect the CJEU’s technological infrastructure from cyber threats; stresses that the digitisation of justice and the use of new technologies such as artificial intelligence will bring many benefits in terms of the smooth functioning of the CJEU, but also entail risks that the Court needs to pre-empt and protect itself against; suggests in this regard that the Court of Justice develop a cybersecurity strategy and step up collaboration with other Union institutions, in particular ENISA (the EU Agency for Cybersecurity), on the prevention of cyber-attacks, the number and sophistication of which are growing exponentially in Europe;

57. Welcomes the initiative to assign fictitious names to anonymised cases, by using a computerised automatic name generator, in order to strengthen the protection of personal data and facilitate the identification of individual cases;

58. Notes with satisfaction the amendment to the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, which will clarify and simplify judicial procedures, including the possibility of using videoconferencing for hearings, electronic signature of decisions and the designation of pilot cases;

Buildings

59. Notes that, following-up on the cross services reflection about the most efficient use of the CJEU’s premises, that was concluded in 2023, pilot projects were launched; notes that the results of those projects, together with other factors, such as environmental and budgetary aspects, quality of justice, well-being at work, inclusion, accessibility and the attractiveness of the CJEU, will be taken into account in the final decision on the use of the CJEU’s buildings; asks that Parliament be kept informed about the implementation of those conclusions and the consequences for the organisation of the workspace;

60. Notes that, in 2023, the CJEU further pursued its comprehensive initiative to increase accessibility and inclusion for persons with disabilities, with the aim of guaranteeing access to the CJEU, physically or virtually, to all individuals, participants in proceedings and visitors; notes further that, in 2023, the CJEU started to make an inventory of its infrastructure with a view to complying with the new national accessibility legislation as of 1 January 2032; asks that Parliament be kept informed about further initiatives in this area;

Environment and sustainability

61. Notes with satisfaction that, in 2023, the CJEU continued to significantly reduce its energy consumption and carbon footprint compared to 2015, which is the baseline for the implementation of the CJEU’s eco-management and audit scheme strategy, thanks to energy-saving measures and optimisation of its heating, cooling and lighting infrastructures; notes that heating consumption was reduced by 33,5 %, electricity by 28,7 %, water by 20,1 %, office paper by 63 %, office and canteen waste by 43% and greenhouse gas emissions by 30,2 % in 2023 compared to 2015; welcomes that the CJEU applied green procurement criteria in 10 calls for tender above EUR 60 000; welcomes the CJEU’s commitment to the Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS); encourages the CJEU to continue its efforts in reducing its environmental impact, with a strategy to reach carbon neutrality by 2035;

62. Welcomes that the CJEU has taken several initiatives to support and increase sustainable mobility for its staff and Members, including subsidies for public transportation, subsidies for self-service bicycles, improved bike parking facilities and improved facilities for hybrid and electrical cars;

Interinstitutional cooperation

63. Welcomes the budgetary savings achieved through cooperation with other institutions and in particular the shared applications and hosting services based on service-level agreements with the Commission as well as the participation in interinstitutional procurement procedures, which have allowed the CJEU to optimise costs and resources;

64. Welcomes the efforts of the European Judicial Training Network (EJTN) in training national judges on EU law; notes with appreciation that, in line with the CJEU’s declaration entitled “Supporting the EJTN to shape a sustainable European judicial culture”, the CJEU and the EJTN sought to increase the diversity of long-term trainees in 2023, with the aim of ultimately increasing their number to one per Member State; notes that the measures taken have already been successful since the CJEU has trainees from some Member States which previously did not actively participate in the programme; notes that 15 remunerated traineeships were offered for the year 2023-24; calls on the CJEU to further develop its knowledge-sharing initiatives, including joint case-law databases and virtual collaboration platforms to support national courts in complex legal interpretations;

65. Emphasises that traineeships should be remunerated in compliance with the European Parliament’s resolution of 14 June 2023 on Quality Traineeships in the Union (2020/2005(INL)), which calls for all internships in Europe to be paid; welcomes that currently all trainees at the CJEU receive a grant during their stay, mainly from the CJEU and, in some specific cases, from other sources; take notes that the CJEU only accepts a few trainees (less than 10 per year) paid by other sources, and for short periods (on average 2 months); welcomes that in such cases, the CJEU administration carefully checks that these trainees receive a grant, allowance or remuneration for this traineeship, paid directly by their employer or academic institution;

66. Appreciates that the CJEU fully cooperates with OLAF, the Court of Auditors, the EDPS and the European Ombudsman; notes that, in 2023, the CJEU has continued to work towards maintaining the established dialogue with national courts, and in particular with the constitutional and supreme courts, and that the CJEU hosted a number of meetings, including the annual meeting of national judges; encourages deeper cooperation between the CJEU and national courts to strengthen uniform application of Union law; recommends establishing a permanent judicial exchange programme for judges from Member States to work alongside their CJEU counterparts, fostering best practices in the interpretation of Union law;

Communication

67. Notes that, in 2023, the CJEU strengthened its efforts to engage with Union citizens by enhancing its outreach on social media; notes that, at the end of 2023, the number of subscribers to the CJEU’s LinkedIn account increased by 32 % and the number of followers on the CJEU’s two accounts on X (formerly Twitter) by 9 %,while the views on its YouTube channel increased by 84,96 % compared to the previous year;

68. Welcomes the CJEU’s efforts to enhance strategic communication and transparency towards Union citizens on the judicial activities of the CJEU, especially through the organisation of an open day, the offer for visitors, in particular the special virtual visits, in which 800 students participated in 2023, and the review of the drafting of its press releases and online publications in an accessible style, about matters of media interest or which have an impact on the lives of citizens.

OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AFFAIRS (30.1.2025)

for the Committee on Budgetary Control

on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section IV – Court of Justice of the European Union

(2024/2022(DEC))

Rapporteur for opinion: Ilhan Kyuchyuk

OPINION

The Committee on Legal Affairs calls on the Committee on Budgetary Control, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions into its motion for a resolution:

1. Appreciates the CJEU’s very high budgetary implementation rate for 2023 (99,2 %), a further increase as compared to previous years (98,4 % in 2022 and 98,7 % in 2021);

2. Stresses that the budget of the CJEU is essentially administrative, with around 75 % of the appropriations related to expenditure for its members and staff, and almost all of the rest related to expenditure for buildings and IT;

3. Welcomes the recent amendment to Protocol n° 3 on the Statute of the CJEU, enacted by Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2019 of the European Parliament and of the Council [8], that transfers part of the Court of Justice’s jurisdiction for preliminary rulings to the General Court and extends the mechanism for the Court of Justice to decide whether appeals shall be allowed to proceed or not, for considerations relating to legal certainty and expedition, in order to preserve the ability of the Court of Justice to deliver high quality judgements in a timely manner, hence serving to guarantee the right to effective remedy by the national authorities; as well as strengthening access to justice by facilitating intervention in judicial proceedings by the European Parliament, the Council and the European Central Bank where a particular interest is invoked; Welcomes that with the amendment to Protocol n° 3 on the Statute of the CJEU, transparency and openness of judicial proceedings will be strengthened through the publication of written submissions submitted by an interested person on the website of the CJEU, after the closing of the case, unless that person raises objections to the publication of that person’s own written submissions; stresses in this regard the need for a reflection on the implementation of the Statute through the constructive dialogue between the European Parliament and the CJEU;

4. Notes that the number of cases brought before the Court of Justice in 2023 was just one short of the exact average for the last three years – in 2023, 821 new cases were registered, 15 more than in 2022 (806 cases) and 17 fewer than in 2021 (838 cases); takes note that the breakdown of litigation by type of case is also broadly similar to that in previous years – with the number of requests for preliminary rulings and appeals still accounting for over 90 % of all the cases brought before the Court; also notes the increase in the number of direct actions brought before the Court in 2023;

5. Welcomes the fact that the average length of proceedings for cases completed before the Court of Justice decreased to 16,1 months in 2023, compared to 16,4 months in 2022, and notes that the average length of proceedings before the General Court was 18,2 months, compared to 16,2 months in 2022, which increase was mainly due to the closure of several complex cases or groups of cases, in particular in the fields of state aid and competition;

6. Notes the decrease in the average time taken to deal with direct actions before the Court of Justice (from 23.5 months in 2022 to 20.8 months in 2023) and with references for preliminary rulings (from 17.3 months to 16.8 months);

7. Notes that the number of cases brought before the two courts in 2023 exceeded, for the first time, the emblematic threshold of 2 000 (2 092 cases), including a series of 404 essentially identical cases brought before the General Court, and that, even if those cases are counted as a single case, the number of cases remains at a very high level (1 689), close to that of the preceding years (1 710 cases in 2022 and 1 720 in 2021);

8. Underlines that, together, the Court of Justice and the General Court were able to complete 1 687 cases in 2023, compared to 1 666 cases in 2022, with an average duration of proceedings of 17.2 months, and notes that the total number of pending cases remains stable when compared to previous years: considering the previously mentioned 404 cases as a single case, 2 587 cases were pending at the end of 2023, compared to 2 585 at the end of 2022 and 2 541 at the end of 2021;

9. Notes with satisfaction the high use rate of e-Curia in 2023, with 10 502 e-Curia accounts being registered: 94 % of lodgements before the General Court were made via e-Curia, which is the same as in 2022, while the use rate of e-Curia at the Court of Justice went up to approximately 89 %, compared to 87 % in 2022;

10. Notes that, as regards the litigation before the Court of Justice, there was a significant increase in the number of direct actions, in particular in the field of the environment, and that the questions referred to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling in 2023 related principally to the area of freedom, security and justice, followed by taxation, consumer protection and transport;

11. Notes that, as regards the litigation before the General Court, there was an increase of cases in the fields of intellectual property and economic and monetary policy, including banking;

12. Points out that dialogue and cooperation with national courts is central to the Court’s mission; acknowledges and welcomes the pursuit of the activities carried out by the Judicial Network of the European Union, which contributes to fostering and facilitating the cooperation between the CJEU and the national courts, and especially with the constitutional and supreme courts, and welcomes the strengthening of the cooperation between the CJEU and the European Judicial Training Network, which allows for the presence of national judges for traineeships, study visits and annual seminars at the CJEU; welcomes the adoption by the Court, in 2023, of the declaration entitled ‘Supporting the European Judicial Training Network to shape a sustainable European judicial culture’, which shows the Court’s commitment to that network;

13. Appreciates the progress made in digitising the judicial archives with a view to preserving documents for future consultation and facilitating access for researchers and the public by means of a digital portal;

14. Welcomes the adoption by the CJEU of an Artificial Intelligence Strategy of the Court of Justice of the European Union’, which seeks to improve the efficiency and efficacy of administrative and judicial processes, enhance the quality and consistency of court decisions and improve access to justice and transparency for EU citizens, followed by the setting up of an AI Management Board and the adoption of certain guidelines for the use of AI-based tools;

15. Welcomes the measures taken, such as cybersecurity audits, staff training and rapid incident response protocols, to protect the CJEU’s technological infrastructure from cyber threats; stresses that the digitisation of justice and the use of new technologies such as artificial intelligence will bring many benefits in terms of the smooth functioning of the CJEU, but also entail risks that the Court needs to pre-empt and protect itself against; suggests in this connection that the Court of Justice develop a cybersecurity strategy and step up collaboration with other EU institutions, in particular ENISA (the EU Agency for Cybersecurity), on preventing of cyber-attacks, whose number and sophistication are growing exponentially in Europe;

16. Welcomes the initiative to assign fictitious names to anonymised cases, through the use of a computerised automatic name generator, in order to strengthen the protection of personal data and facilitate the identification of individual cases;

17. Notes with satisfaction the amendment to the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, which will clarify and simplify judicial procedures, including the possibility of using videoconferencing for hearings, electronic signature of decisions and the designation of pilot cases;

18. Notes with satisfaction the adoption of a code of conduct for the staff or the CJEU, which code of conduct entered into force in March 2024;

19. Appreciates the CJEU’s inter-departmental project that is focused on physical and digital accessibility and inclusion of persons with disabilities; accessibility is essential to enabling persons with disabilities to exercise their basic human rights;

20. Takes notes that, of the 2 303 officials and agents serving at the end of 2023, 61 % are women; welcomes the fact that the proportion of women in administrative positions is 55 %, and especially the fact that, in managerial posts, the proportion has increased to 43 %, compared to 40 % in 2022 and 2021, confirming the upward trend recorded since 2018 (41 % in 2020, 39 % in 2019 and 37,5 % in 2018).

21. Notes, however, the still existing imbalanced situation in terms of women’s representation among the judges of both the Court of Justice and the General Court; exhorts, once again, the Members of the Council to address this situation by actively promoting gender parity in the appointment of judges, in line with the principles enshrined in Article 8 TFEU and Article 23 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and with the commitments taken under Regulations (EU, Euratom) 2015/2422 [9] and (EU, Euratom) 2019/629 [10] of the European Parliament and of the Council.

ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR FOR THE OPINION HAS RECEIVED INPUT

Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the Chair in his capacity as rapporteur for opinion declares that he received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the opinion:

Entity and/or person

Court of Justice

The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the Chair in his capacity as rapporteur for opinion.

Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the Chair in his capacity as rapporteur for opinion declares that he has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

INFORMATION ON ADOPTION BY COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

Date adopted	30.1.2025
Result of final vote	+: –: 0:	16 4 1
Members present for the final vote	Maravillas Abadía Jover, José Cepeda, Ton Diepeveen, Mario Furore, Juan Carlos Girauta Vidal, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Sergey Lagodinsky, Mario Mantovani, Victor Negrescu, Kira Marie Peter-Hansen, Pascale Piera, René Repasi, Krzysztof Śmiszek, Dominik Tarczyński, Adrián Vázquez Lázara, Axel Voss, Marion Walsmann, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Dainius Žalimas
Substitutes present for the final vote	Angelika Niebler, Jana Toom
Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote	Lara Wolters

MIL OSI Europe News –

April 24, 2025

MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on Banking Union – annual report 2024 – A10-0044/2025

Source: European Parliament

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on Banking Union – annual report 2024

(2024/2055(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its resolution of 16 January 2024 on Banking Union – annual report 2023 [1],

– having regard to the Commission’s follow-up to Parliament’s resolution of 16 January 2024 on Banking Union – annual report 2023,

– having regard to document published by the European Central Bank (ECB) on 25 March 2024, entitled ‘Feedback on the input provided by the European Parliament as part of its resolution on Banking Union 2023’,

– having regard to the ECB’s 2023 Annual Report on supervisory activities, published in March 2024,

– having regard to the 2023 Annual Report of the Single Resolution Board (SRB), published on 28 June 2024,

– having regard to the adoption of the Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMLD)[2] and the Anti-Money Laundering Regulation (AMLR)[3], and to the establishment of the Anti-Money Laundering Authority (AMLA)[4],

– having regard to the implementation of the Basel III standards, namely to the adoption of amendments to the Capital Requirements Directive [5] and to the Capital Requirements Regulation [6],

– having regard to the adoption of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/2795 of 24 July 2024 amending Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to the date of application of the own funds requirements for market risk [7],

– having regard to its position at first reading of 24 April 2024 on the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 as regards early intervention measures, conditions for resolution and funding of resolution action [8],

– having regard to its position at first reading of 24 April 2024 on the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/59/EU as regards early intervention measures, conditions for resolution and financing of resolution action [9],

– having regard to its position at first reading of 24 April 2024 on the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/49/EU as regards the scope of deposit protection, use of deposit guarantee schemes funds, cross-border cooperation, and transparency [10],

– having regard to the report of its Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of 23 April 2024 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 806/2014 in order to establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme,

– having regard to the Commission proposal of 14 March 2018 for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on credit servicers, credit purchasers and the recovery of collateral (COM(2018)0135),

– having regard to the Five Presidents’ Report of 22 June 2015 entitled ‘Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union’,

– having regard to Enrico Letta’s report of 10 April 2024 entitled ‘Much more than a market – Speed, security, solidarity: empowering the Single Market to deliver a sustainable future and prosperity for all EU Citizens’,

– having regard to Mario Draghi’s report of 9 September 2024 entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’,

– having regard to the Eurogroup statement of 11 March 2024 on the future of Capital Markets Union, and to the Eurogroup statement of 16 June 2022 on the future of the Banking Union and the Eurogroup follow-up thereto of 28 April 2023,

– having regard to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s disclosure framework for banks’ cryptoasset exposures and to the targeted amendments to its prudential standard on banks’ exposures to cryptoassets, both published on 17 July 2024,

– having regard to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s core principles for effective banking supervision, published on 25 April 2024,

– having regard to the ECB’s Financial Stability Review of May 2024,

– having regard to the ECB Occasional Paper No 328 of 2023 entitled ‘The Road to Paris: stress testing the transition towards a net-zero economy’,

– having regard to the Financial Stability Board publication of 9 November 2015 entitled ‘Principles on Loss-absorbing and Recapitalisation Capacity of G-SIBs in Resolution’,

– having regard to the Financial Stability Board report of 10 October 2023 entitled ‘2023 Bank Failures – Preliminary lessons learnt for resolution’,

– having regard to Peterson Institute for International Economics Working Paper No 24-15 of 25 June 2024 entitled ‘Europe’s banking union at ten: unfinished yet transformative’[11],

– having regard to the Single Supervisory Mechanism supervisory priorities for 2024-2026, published in December 2023,

– having regard to the SRB’s biannual reporting note to the Eurogroup of 13 May 2024,

– having regard to the outcome of the 2023 EU-wide transparency exercise of the European Banking Authority, published on 28 July 2023,

– having regard to Special Report 12/2023 of the European Court of Auditors of 12 May 2023 entitled ‘EU supervision of banks’ credit risk – The ECB stepped up its efforts but more is needed to increase assurance that credit risk is properly managed and covered’,

– having regard to the statements by Claudia Buch, Chair of the Supervisory Board of the ECB, at the hearings conducted by Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs on 21 March 2024 and 2 September 2024,

– having regard to the statements by Dominique Laboureix, Chair of the SRB, at the hearings conducted by Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs on 21 March 2024 and 23 September 2024,

– having regard to the European Banking Authority’s risk assessment reports of July 2024 and December 2024,

– having regard to its resolution of 14 March 2019 on gender balance in EU economic and monetary affairs nominations [12],

– having regard to its resolution of 25 March 2021 on strengthening the international role of the euro [13],

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0044/2025),

A. whereas the Banking Union (BU) encompasses the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Single Resolution Mechanism and a European deposit insurance that is still missing;

B. whereas the main objective of the BU is to safeguard the stability of the banking sector in Europe and prevent the need to bail out banks at risk of failure with taxpayers’ money;

C. whereas a completed BU would be a positive development for citizens and the EU economy, as it would improve the competitiveness and stability of the banking sector, reduce systemic risk, improve supply and consumer choice and offer increased opportunities for cross-border banking that enhances access to financing for households and businesses, thereby reducing costs for banks’ customers, while ensuring that public funds are not used to bail out the banking sector; whereas the ‘too big to fail’ risk has not yet been fully addressed;

D. whereas concluding the reform of the EU frameworks for bank crisis management and deposit insurance, focusing particularly on small and medium-sized banks, is fundamental in order to provide Europe’s banking sector with security, stability and resilience; whereas a complete BU with a true European deposit insurance scheme is a basic condition for ensuring that citizens trust European banks;

E. whereas fragmentation and the lack of cross-border consolidation of the EU banking sector is affecting its global competitiveness; whereas the profitability gap between EU and US banks has widened;

F. whereas a strong and diversified banking sector is key to delivering economic growth, increasing the possibility of home ownership, fostering investment and job creation, financing small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and start-ups and ensuring the transition to a green and digital economy;

G. whereas around 80 % of external financing for EU companies comes from banks, while only 20 % comes from the capital markets; whereas only 30 % of credit for US firms comes from banks, while 70 % is funded via capital markets, including corporate bond holdings and shares;

H. whereas the EUR 356.1 billion in non-performing loans recorded at the 110 supervised institutions in 2024, compared with EUR 988.9 billion in non-performing loans recorded at the 102 supervised institutions in the second quarter of 2015, reflects a significant downward trajectory, leaving the total non-performing loan stock at 36 % of its 2015 level; whereas further efforts are required;

I. whereas in April 2024, it adopted its position on the review of the crisis management and deposit insurance framework;

J. whereas in April 2024, its Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs adopted a report on the Commission’s proposal to establish a European deposit insurance scheme;

K. whereas financial institutions rely increasingly on the use of information and communications technology (ICT); whereas the digitalisation of finance provides key opportunities for the banking sector and has brought about significant technological advances in the EU banking sector through increased efficiency in the provision of banking services and a greater appetite for innovation; whereas it also poses challenges, including with regard to data protection, reputational risks, anti-money laundering and consumer protection concerns; whereas the EU banking sector must increase its cyber resilience to ensure that ICT systems can withstand various types of cyber security threats; whereas the ECB is currently studying the establishment of a digital euro;

L. whereas EU banks have withstood the impact of Russian aggression; whereas they play a pivotal role in ensuring the ongoing implementation of and compliance with the sanctions imposed by the EU against Russia in response to the invasion; whereas further coordination is needed to avoid circumvention of sanctions;

M. whereas climate change, environmental degradation and the transition to a low-carbon economy are factors to be taken into account when assessing the risks on banks’ balance sheets, as a source of risk potentially impacting investments across regions and sectors;

General considerations

1. Acknowledges the progress made over the last 10 years through the establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM); notes that the BU will not be completed without the establishment of its third pillar, the European deposit insurance scheme;

2. Asks the Commission to ensure that the completion of the BU and the Capital Markets Union remains a key priority; highlights that these projects offer households and SMEs access to broader funding, reduce the high reliance on bank credit to foster investments and job creation, increase financial stability, reduce the impact of economic downturns, support competitiveness, give additional investment opportunities, fund the transition to a green and digital economy and unlock the EU’s growth potential; notes that the Commission is requested to take into consideration the specificities of the different banking models, while preserving a level playing field;

3. Notes the need to be prepared for episodes of banking stress that could potentially lead to bank runs such as those witnessed in some jurisdictions outside the EU in March 2023, and the need to ensure the stability of deposits;

4. Points out that cyber resilience is a key element for the competitiveness of the EU banking sector, in particular taking into account the geopolitical situation and the need to preserve financial stability;

5. Notes that a more integrated BU would help to make the EU banking sector more resilient, improve access to credit and reduce costs; notes that better cross-border integration of banking business would increase the potential for private risk sharing and ensure diversification in the EU banking market; points out that a more integrated BU is not necessarily the same as a more consolidated banking market and that there are benefits for competition in a diversified banking market; stresses that a fully developed BU would allow EU banks to grow and put them in a better position to compete in the international arena;

6. Regrets that EU banks’ ability to finance major investments is constrained by lower profitability that is not sufficient to ensure their competitiveness; notes that the profitability gap as compared with other jurisdictions is due to both structural and regulatory factors and calls for a review to streamline the regulatory framework; notes that the specific character of the EU banking system, with its large number of smaller banks, calls for proportionate solutions that take this into account and are tailored to its characteristics, without undermining financial stability; remains mindful of the ‘too big to fail’ risk;

7. Calls on the Commission to assess the need to develop targeted frameworks within the BU to enhance access to finance for SMEs and start-ups, recognising their role as the backbone of the EU economy;

8. Regrets that EU banks’ cross-border activity is still rather limited, particularly with regard to granting loans; takes the view, therefore, that it is important to complete the BU in order to uphold the free movement of capital in a fully integrated internal market;

9. Calls on the EU banks still operating in Russia to exit the Russian market as soon as possible; calls on supervisory institutions to ensure that those banks push ahead with exiting the Russian market swiftly;

10. Invites the Commission to further explore whether the creation of a separate jurisdiction for EU banks with substantial cross-border operations [14] could help to complete the BU or whether this would increase banking sector fragmentation;

11. Notes that a review of the securitisation framework to strengthen European markets and the introduction of European Secured Notes as a dual-recourse funding instrument for SMEs for long-term financing could be explored, taking due account of financial stability risks;

12. Underlines that financial literacy is essential in modern economies, contributing to the resilience of the banking systems across Member States and encouraging cross-border financial activity;

13. Underlines that a high level of consumer protection will make the BU more resilient;

14. Takes the view that the Commission should focus on aspects that contribute to achieving the goals of digitalisation, modernisation, simplification, streamlining and increased competitiveness; maintains that legal certainty, security, predictability and stability are essential for EU banks to be able to operate under favourable conditions;

15. Notes that, in addition to traditional loans, diverse sources of financing can be beneficial for EU growth and EU competitiveness, and recognises the low-risk nature of asset-backed financing solutions;

16. Notes the ECB’s progress on the digital euro and the parliamentary dialogue being held with the ECB on the topic; understands existing reservations, such as with regard to its offline functionality, given that offline transactions reduce visibility and impair financial crime prevention; recalls that the digital euro should complement, not replace, cash; considers that the decision on whether or not to introduce a digital euro is ultimately a political decision that has to be taken by the EU’s co-legislators, given the profound potential impact of this decision on a wide range of EU domains, including privacy, consumer protection, financial stability, financial policy and other areas that go beyond the strict remit of monetary policy;

17. Regrets the failure of some financial institutions to ensure gender balance, especially in their management bodies; stresses that gender balance on boards and in the workforce brings both societal and economic returns; calls on financial institutions to regularly update their diversity and inclusion policies and help to foster healthy working cultures that prioritise inclusivity; calls on private and public entities to address the lack of diversity and gender balance in the management bodies of financial institutions;

Supervision

18. Welcomes the adoption by the co-legislators of the new banking package implementing Basel III standards in the EU; notes the current lack of clarity concerning the implementation of the Basel III standards in some other jurisdictions and the potential risk for an international level playing field; stresses that the Commission should evaluate whether targeted changes could help to maintain the international competitiveness of EU banks without weakening their resilience; recalls that the delegated act on the date of application of the own funds requirements for market risk postponed the date of application of the new market risk framework by one year to 1 January 2026; calls on the Commission to assess whether the equivalence decisions taken with the jurisdictions not implementing the Basel III standards need to be reviewed in order to preserve the financial stability of the EU financial sector;

19. Recalls that the Banking Package contains a high number of mandates to the European Banking Authority; calls on the European Banking Authority to respect these mandates;

20. Notes that even within the existing regulatory framework the banking sector has shown its resilience during the market events of recent years, and that the average Common Equity Tier 1 ratio has remained at high levels, at 15.81 %;

21. Notes that the non-performing loans ratio has remained stable at 2.30 % and the liquidity coverage ratio at 159.39 %;

22. Notes the varying levels of exposure to non-performing loans and recalls that there are Member States which have exposure levels in the order of 1 % or even lower, while other Member States have exposure levels exceeding 4 %; considers that efforts to reduce European banks’ exposure to this type of loan should continue as good risk management practice;

23. Highlights the fact that adverse macroeconomic conditions, geopolitical headwinds and the rapid development of deferred payment services may lead to a deterioration in asset quality and affect the level of non-performing loans in the future; highlights, therefore, the importance of prudent risk management and appropriate provisioning;

24. Notes that the current levels of banking sector profitability may provide an opportunity for an increase in macroprudential buffers and help to preserve banking sector resilience; invites the Commission to further explore this option and carefully evaluate how to revise the macroprudential framework, taking into consideration the potential impact on capital requirements and bearing in mind a level playing field with other jurisdictions;

25. Notes that the banking sector plays a role in supporting the transition to a digitalised and carbon neutral economy, in channelling funds to renewable energy sources and in supporting the achievement of the objectives of the EU Green Deal and the EU Climate Law;

26. Notes that the ECB takes account of climate- and nature-related financial risks in its supervisory practices and monitors growing physical and transition risks closely;

27. Welcomes the idea of increasing venture capital and unlocking capital to finance fast-growing companies in the EU; notes Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s commitment to put forward risk-absorbing measures to make it easier for commercial banks, investors and venture capital to finance fast-growing companies [15]; notes that this must be done in a way that does not pose a systemic risk or moral hazard;

28. Welcomes the creation of the new Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism, which will allow more effective ways to combat money laundering and terrorist financing via direct supervision of certain financial entities and better cooperation, a better flow of information between national authorities and better coordination among sanctions enforcement authorities in Members States to help close gaps in the implementation of targeted sanctions;

29. Stresses the need to enhance the resilience of non-bank financial intermediaries, including by designing specific regulatory and supervisory tools; points out that such measures must guarantee the security of the financial system and be in the best interests of the customer; welcomes the Commission consultation on macroprudential policies for non-bank financial intermediaries; supports the Eurosystem’s recommendation to introduce system-wide stress tests to identify and quantify risks to the resilience of core markets; invites the Commission to investigate whether there are any gaps in the supervisory toolkit, including in relation to potential liquidity crunches and implications for systemic risk;

30. Notes that crypto-assets create new challenges and opportunities for the financial system but also pose risks to it, and that these require attention from the national supervisors, the SSM and the European Systemic Risk Board;

Resolution

31. Recalls that the position adopted by Parliament in April 2024 on the crisis management and deposit insurance framework ensures a more consistent approach across all Member States to the application of resolution tools and deposit protection to enhance financial stability, taxpayer protection and depositor confidence; notes that small banks have some specificities that may warrant a proportionate approach; stresses that European and national competent authorities should have at their disposal appropriate and sufficient tools to respond effectively to bank failures and safeguard financial stability, and that banks need to operate in an effective regulatory environment that fosters their development;

32. Highlights the importance of preserving shareholders’ and creditors’ primary responsibility for bearing losses in the event of a bank’s failure; stresses that resorting to using taxpayers’ money must be avoided, which is still a key lesson learned from the global financial crisis; stresses that the bail-in of shareholders and creditors must remain the main source for resolution financing before any recourse is made to industry-funded sources;

33. Recalls that a sufficient minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) is crucial for a credible resolution framework and for ensuring that resolution authorities have sufficient flexibility to effectively apply the resolution strategies needed in a specific crisis situation; underlines that this minimum requirement should be sufficient to effectively implement any of the resolution strategies included in a bank’s resolution plan; recalls that the resolution framework should avoid undue increases in MREL calibration and disproportionate contributions to the Single Resolution Fund;

34. Stresses that if a bank’s eligible liabilities are issued to non-EU investors, the write-down or conversion of these liabilities should be enforceable with full certainty to safeguard the effective application of resolution tools;

35. Notes that any reliance on taxpayer money for the resolution of banks, including for liquidity support, should be avoided, in keeping with the principles of fiscal and social responsibility and market discipline;

36. Recalls that banks need to continue to meet their obligations and perform their key functions after the implementation of a resolution decision;

37. Recalls the importance of clarifying the role of the ECB as liquidity provider in resolution, paying due attention to appropriate guarantees and the ECB’s mandate;

38. Underlines the SRB’s announcement that it will enhance its capabilities for launching enforcement action to remove substantive impediments to resolvability; calls for the publication, at the end of each resolution planning cycle, of an anonymised list of identified impediments to resolvability and the actions adopted to address them;

39. Welcomes the ‘SRM Vision 2028’ strategic review initiated by the SRB to set its long-term goals, address new challenges and further strengthen collaboration with the national resolution authorities and other stakeholders; notes, in particular, the SRB’s intention to identify areas where sustainability can be embedded further in its daily operations and core business; highlights the need to ensure efficiency and cost-effectiveness in the implementation of the new strategy;

40. Welcomes the SRB plan to streamline the annual resolution planning cycle to ensure that it is increasingly efficient and has a greater focus on testing banks’ resolvability and the operationalisation of resolution strategies;

41. Welcomes the fact that the Single Resolution Fund has now been built up; calls for the full ratification of the Amending Agreement to the ESM Treaty by all Member States, including the establishment of a common backstop to the Single Resolution Fund;

42. Highlights the need for additional efforts to ensure full resolvability for all banks falling under the scope of resolution; recalls that achieving resolvability cannot be considered a ‘moving target’ and therefore calls for more standardisation and harmonisation of the resolvability assessment; recalls, nonetheless, the important role played by national resolution authorities in the assessment of resolvability;

Deposit insurance

43. Underlines the fact that the Commission’s proposal to establish a European deposit insurance scheme was published back in 2015 and that the landscape has changed significantly since then;

44. Recalls that the position of its Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs on a European deposit insurance scheme was adopted in April 2024; notes that that position deviates from the Commission’s 2015 proposal and adopts a new approach; is waiting for, and encourages the Council to move forward with, the negotiations on a European deposit insurance scheme;

45. Notes that national deposit guarantee schemes were introduced successfully and have proved their functionality in a number of cases; underlines the need to take specific national characteristics into account and to preserve the well-functioning systems for smaller banks that are already in place in some Member States, such as institutional protection schemes, in a way that ensures a level playing field across the BU;

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46. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the European Central Bank, the Single Resolution Board and the European Banking Authority.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

While the Banking Union – annual reports 2022 and 2023 focused on the war in Ukraine and the ongoing Russian aggression against Ukraine, this report focuses more on the challenges for the EU and for the European Parliament, as mirrored in the new mandate of the Commission, namely the EU priorities to foster competitiveness, to strengthen the European single market and to boost economic growth.

The Union is currently at a turning point, which will determine the economic future in the upcoming decades. The 2024 reports of Enrico Letta and Mario Draghi underline that the EU needs a major turnaround to be able to compete with the US or China. Against this background, the Banking Union is a major cornerstone of competitiveness. A strengthened Banking Union will enable the EU to generate the necessary capital to make the European economy fit for the future.

EU banks play a key role in financing the required investments since bank loans are still the most important source of external financing for companies. However, EU banks suffer from a lower profitability compared to their US counterparts caused by too many regulatory hurdles and by an incomplete Banking Union. A robust and competitive banking sector is necessary to finalise the BU. In the last year, while co-legislators made much progress on crucial legislation for the Banking Union, the EU still has to monitor closely if the EU economy, EU citizens and EU banks benefit from those adopted proposals. This report provides realistic and achievable recommendations, which could help to strengthen further the Banking Union.

However, not only EU businesses need better access to capital. EU citizens are currently struggling to afford housing or to finance investments in sustainable renovations. It is therefore crucial to boost the profitability of EU banks, since this would in turn allow them to provide private households with better and easier access to affordable loans.

MIL OSI Europe News –

April 24, 2025

MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the EU joint undertakings for the financial year 2023 – A10-0056/2025

Source: European Parliament

1. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023

(2024/2031(DEC))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the final annual accounts of the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

– having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies [1],

– having regard to the statement of assurance [2] as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 17 February 2025 on discharge to be given to the Joint Undertaking in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (05757/2025 – C10‑0025/2025),

– having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 [3], and in particular Article 71 thereof,

– having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union [4], and in particular Article 71 thereof,

– having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014 [5], and in particular Article 26 thereof,

– having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/887 of 13 March 2019 on the model financial regulation for public-private partnership bodies referred to in Article 71 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council [6],

– having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

1. Grants the Executive Director of the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking discharge in respect of the implementation of the Joint Undertaking’s budget for the financial year 2023;

2. Sets out its observations in the resolution below;

3. Instructs its President to forward this decision and the resolution forming an integral part of it to the Executive Director of the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for their publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

2. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

on the closure of the accounts of the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023

(2024/2031(DEC))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the final annual accounts of the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

– having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies [7],

– having regard to the statement of assurance [8] as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023;

2. Instructs its President to forward this decision to the Executive Director of the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

3. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Circular Bio-based Europe Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023

(2024/2031(DEC))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the final annual accounts of the Circular Bio-based Europe Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

– having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies [13],

– having regard to the statement of assurance [14] as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 17 February2025 on discharge to be given to the Joint Undertaking in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (05757/2025 – C10‑0025/2025),

– having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

1. Grants the Executive Director of the Circular Bio-based Europe Joint Undertaking discharge in respect of the implementation of the Joint Undertaking’s budget for the financial year 2023;

2. Sets out its observations in the resolution below;

3. Instructs its President to forward this decision and the resolution forming an integral part of it to the Executive Director of the Circular Bio-based Europe Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for their publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

4. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

on the closure of the accounts of the Circular Bio-based Europe Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023

(2024/2031(DEC))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the final annual accounts of the Circular Bio-based Europe Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

– having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies [19],

– having regard to the statement of assurance [20] as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the Circular Bio-based Europe Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023;

2. Instructs its President to forward this decision to the Executive Director of the Circular Bio-based Europe Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

5. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023

(2024/2031(DEC))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the final annual accounts of the Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

– having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies [25],

– having regard to the statement of assurance [26] as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 17 February2025 on discharge to be given to the Joint Undertaking in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (05757/2025 – C10‑0025/2025),

– having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

1. Grants the Executive Director of the Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking discharge in respect of the implementation of the Joint Undertaking’s budget for the financial year 2023;

2. Sets out its observations in the resolution below;

3. Instructs its President to forward this decision and the resolution forming an integral part of it to the Executive Director of the Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for their publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

6. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

on the closure of the accounts of the Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023

(2024/2031(DEC))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the final annual accounts of the Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

– having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies [31],

– having regard to the statement of assurance [32] as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023;

2. Instructs its President to forward this decision to the Executive Director of the Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

7. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023

(2024/2031(DEC))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the final annual accounts of the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

– having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies [37],

– having regard to the statement of assurance [38] as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

1. Grants the Interim Executive Director of the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking discharge in respect of the implementation of the Joint Undertaking’s budget for the financial year 2023;

2. Sets out its observations in the resolution below;

3. Instructs its President to forward this decision and the resolution forming an integral part of it to the Interim Executive Director of the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for their publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

8. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

on the closure of the accounts of the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023

(2024/2031(DEC))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the final annual accounts of the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

– having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies [43],

– having regard to the statement of assurance [44] as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023;

2. Instructs its President to forward this decision to the Interim Executive Director of the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

9. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023

(2024/2031(DEC))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the final annual accounts of the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

– having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies [49],

– having regard to the statement of assurance [50] as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/1173 of 13 July 2021 on establishing the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1488 [53], and in particular Article 19 thereof,

– having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

1. Grants the Executive Director of the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking discharge in respect of the implementation of the Joint Undertaking’s budget for the financial year 2023;

2. Sets out its observations in the resolution below;

3. Instructs its President to forward this decision and the resolution forming an integral part of it to the Executive Director of the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for their publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

10. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

on the closure of the accounts of the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023

(2024/2031(DEC))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the final annual accounts of the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

– having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies [55],

– having regard to the statement of assurance [56] as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023;

2. Instructs its President to forward this decision to the Executive Director of the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

11. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy for the financial year 2023

(2024/2031(DEC))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the final annual accounts of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy for the financial year 2023,

– having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies [61],

– having regard to the statement of assurance [62] as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Article 106a of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community,

– having regard to Council Decision No 2007/198/Euratom of 27 March 2007 establishing the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy and conferring advantages upon it [65], and in particular Article 5 thereof,

– having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/715 of 18 December 2018 on the framework financial regulation for the bodies set up under the TFEU and Euratom Treaty and referred to in Article 70 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council [66],

– having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

1. Grants the Director of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy discharge in respect of the implementation of the Joint Undertaking’s budget for the financial year 2023;

2. Sets out its observations in the resolution below;

3. Instructs its President to forward this decision and the resolution forming an integral part of it to the Director of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for their publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

12. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

on the closure of the accounts of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy for the financial year 2023

(2024/2031(DEC))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the final annual accounts of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy for the financial year 2023,

– having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies [67],

– having regard to the statement of assurance [68] as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Article 106a of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community,

– having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy for the financial year 2023;

2. Instructs its President to forward this decision to the Director of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

13. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023

(2024/2031(DEC))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the final annual accounts of the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

– having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies [73],

– having regard to the statement of assurance [74] as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

1. Grants the Executive Director of the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking discharge in respect of the implementation of the Joint Undertaking’s budget for the financial year 2023;

2. Sets out its observations in the resolution below;

3. Instructs its President to forward this decision and the resolution forming an integral part of it to the Executive Director of the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for their publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

14. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

on the closure of the accounts of the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023

(2024/2031(DEC))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the final annual accounts of the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

– having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies [79],

– having regard to the statement of assurance [80] as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023;

2. Instructs its President to forward this decision to the Executive Director of the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

15. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023

(2024/2031(DEC))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the final annual accounts of the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

– having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies [85],

– having regard to the statement of assurance [86] as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

1. Grants the Executive Director of the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking discharge in respect of the implementation of the Joint Undertaking’s budget for the financial year 2023;

2. Sets out its observations in the resolution below;

3. Instructs its President to forward this decision and the resolution forming an integral part of it to the Executive Director of the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for their publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

16. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

on the closure of the accounts of the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023

(2024/2031(DEC))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the final annual accounts of the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

– having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies [91],

– having regard to the statement of assurance [92] as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023;

2. Instructs its President to forward this decision to the Executive Director of the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

17. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Chips Joint Undertaking (before 21.9.2023 Key Digital Technologies Joint Undertaking) for the financial year 2023

(2024/2031(DEC))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the final annual accounts of the Chips Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

– having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies [97],

– having regard to the statement of assurance [98] as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regarding to Council Regulation (EU) 2023/1782 of 25 July 2023 amending Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe, as regards the Chips Joint Undertaking,

– having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

1. Grants the Executive Director of the Chips Joint Undertaking discharge in respect of the implementation of the Joint Undertaking’s budget for the financial year 2023;

2. Sets out its observations in the resolution below;

3. Instructs its President to forward this decision and the resolution forming an integral part of it to the Executive Director of the Chips Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for their publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

18. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

on the closure of the accounts of the Chips Joint Undertaking (before 21.9.2023 Key Digital Technologies Joint Undertaking) for the financial year 2023

(2024/2031(DEC))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the final annual accounts of the Chips Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

– having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies [103],

– having regard to the statement of assurance [104] as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the Chips Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023;

2. Instructs its President to forward this decision to the Executive Director of the Chips Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

19. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023

(2024/2031(DEC))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the final annual accounts of the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

– having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies [109],

– having regard to the statement of assurance [110] as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

1. Grants the Executive Director of the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking discharge in respect of the implementation of the Joint Undertaking’s budget for the financial year 2023;

2. Sets out its observations in the resolution below;

3. Instructs its President to forward this decision and the resolution forming an integral part of it to the Executive Director of the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for their publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

20. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

on the closure of the accounts of the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023

(2024/2031(DEC))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the final annual accounts of the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

– having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies [115],

– having regard to the statement of assurance [116] as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023;

2. Instructs its President to forward this decision to the Executive Director of the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

21. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023

(2024/2031(DEC))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the final annual accounts of the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

– having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies [121],

– having regard to the statement of assurance [122] as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

1. Grants the Executive Director of the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking discharge in respect of the implementation of the Joint Undertaking’s budget for the financial year 2023;

2. Sets out its observations in the resolution below;

3. Instructs its President to forward this decision and the resolution forming an integral part of it to the Executive Director of the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for their publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

22. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

on the closure of the accounts of the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023

(2024/2031(DEC))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the final annual accounts of the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

– having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies [127],

– having regard to the statement of assurance [128] as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023;

2. Instructs its President to forward this decision to the Executive Director of the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

23. MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

with observations forming an integral part of the decisions on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the EU joint undertakings for the financial year 2023

(2024/2031(DEC))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

– having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Circular Bio-based Europe Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

– having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

– having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

– having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

– having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy for the financial year 2023,

– having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

– having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

– having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Chips Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

– having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

– having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

– having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

A. whereas the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking, the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking, the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking, the Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking, the Circular Bio-based Europe Joint Undertaking, the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking, the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking and the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking were set up by Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014 [133], the latter being referred to as the Single Basic Act (SBA);

B. whereas the Key Digital Technologies Joint Undertaking was set up by Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014; whereas the Key Digital Technologies Joint Undertaking was transformed into the Chips Joint Undertaking in July 2023 pursuant to Council Regulation (EU) 2023/1782 of 25 July 2023 amending Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe, as regards the Chips Joint Undertaking [134];

C. whereas the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy was established in April 2007 by the Council Decision of 27 March 2007 establishing the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy and conferring advantages upon it (2007/198/Euratom)[135];

D. whereas the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking was set up by Council Regulation (EU) 2021/1173 of 13 July 2021 on establishing the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1488 [136];

E. whereas the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking is a public-private partnership for the development of modernised air traffic management (ATM) in Europe and for the acceleration through research and innovation of the delivery of the Digital European Sky;

F. whereas the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking is a public-private partnership focusing on research and innovation in order to transform aviation towards a sustainable and climate neutral future;

G. whereas the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking is a public-private partnership focusing on interdisciplinary, sustainable, and patient-centric health research and innovation;

H. whereas the Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking is a public-private partnership in the field of hydrogen and fuel cells technology research and innovation;

I. whereas the Chips Joint Undertaking is a public-private partnership focusing on research and innovation in key digital technologies essential for Europe’s competitive leadership in digital economy, in particular in the electronic components and systems sector;

J. whereas the Circular Bio-based Europe Joint Undertaking is a public-private partnership focusing on research and innovation for a sustainable and competitive circular bio-based industries sector;

K. whereas the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking is a public-private partnership for research and innovation in the railway sector;

L. whereas the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking is a public-private partnership enabling the pooling of resources for the development and deployment of high-performance computing in Europe;

M. whereas the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking is a public-private partnership focusing on strengthening Europe’s technological leadership and its strategic alignment with the telecommunications industry and fostering the uptake of digital solutions;

N. whereas the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking is a public-private partnership focusing on reducing the socioeconomic burden of infectious diseases in sub-Saharan Africa thanks to new and improved health technological applications as well as improving the preparedness and response to infectious diseases for global purposes;

O. whereas the aim of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy is to provide the Union’s contribution to the ITER international fusion energy project, to implement the broader approach agreement between Euratom and Japan, and to prepare for the construction of a demonstration fusion reactor and related facilities;

General

1. Notes that the role of the joint undertakings should be to support research and innovation activities in the areas of transport, energy, health, circular bio-based industries, key electronic components, supercomputing, and network systems; calls on the joint undertakings to promote the transformation of scientific knowledge into marketable innovations, and to establish mechanisms to ensure that their activity leads to an increase in European competitiveness in the world;

2. Underlines that under the current multiannual financial framework, according to the Court of Auditors, joint undertakings are expected to receive a combined budget of EUR 17 billion from the Union cash contribution and to leverage EUR 21,1 billion of contributions from other members;

3. Notes that the nature of joint undertakings is based on public-private partnerships that steer investment and leverage public and private funds to fund common goals; reminds, in that regard, that the contributions of private members must meet established targets in order for such partnerships to remain mutually beneficial; calls on joint undertakings which allow in-kind contributions to additional activities (IKAA) to avoid, where possible, an excessive reliance on such contributions in order to meet established targets;

4. Acknowledges the significant contributions of the joint undertakings in advancing research, innovation, and technology development across various sectors, including aviation, rail, and air traffic management, as integral to achieving the Union’s strategic objectives of sustainability, digital transformation, and competitiveness.

5. Welcomes the annual report of the Court of Auditors on the European Union’s joint undertakings for the financial year 2023 (the ‘Court’s report’); underlines that the mission of the Court of Auditors is crucial for the sound implementation of the Union budget and for oversight of the budget;

6. Welcomes the fact that the Court of Auditors provided the discharge authority with an annual report on EU Joint Undertakings which contains a specific statement of assurance for each of the joint undertakings as regards their annual accounts and underlying transactions; shares the view that in addition to the legal provisions binding the Court, the institutional framework of joint undertakings renders these worthy of specific attention from the Court of Auditors; calls for the continuation of this good practice; welcomes the good cooperation of joint undertakings with the Court during the drafting of the Court’s report and welcomes the explanations provided on some of the observations and emphases of matter made in the replies provided by the joint undertakings;

7. Welcomes the fact that two joint undertakings attained financial autonomy during the financial year 2023, namely the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking on 24 October 2023 and the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking on 23 November 2023; notes furthermore that as a result, the Court of Auditors audited these two joint undertakings for the first time, in addition to the nine joint undertakings the Court of Auditors had already audited for the financial year 2022;

8. Stresses its awareness that some joint undertakings were affected significantly during the financial year 2023 by important events with an impact likely to alter their performance; emphasises, more precisely, that:

(a) Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has had a significant impact on the Union economy and on supply chains, affecting greatly the activities of some joint undertakings;

(b) the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic is still felt throughout Europe today and during the financial year 2023, still constituted a massive shock to economic and administrative activities;

(c) the high levels of inflation caused by the two aforementioned events had an impact on the supplies and delivery time for the joint undertakings;

9. Acknowledges the benefits of joint undertakings, the importance of public-private cooperation in fostering innovation, promoting research and development and the economic benefits of the partnerships; notes that by pooling resources and expertise from both sectors, public and private, joint undertakings can face the challenges more effectively; underlines the importance of transparency, accountability and efficient use of public funds by joint undertakings;

10. Recognises the value of initiatives fostering stakeholder engagement and participation, such as open calls for expressions of interest and joint calls across the joint undertakings, as instrumental in leveraging the collective expertise and resources; draws particular attention to the joint call for proposals launched by Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking and the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking – the first joint call of its kind from joint undertakings aimed at developing an integrated air and rail network for a sustainable multimodal transport system;

11. Recalls that joint undertakings must conduct their operations according to sound financial management, thereby contributing effectively to Union policy objectives as well as to the sound implementation of the Union budget; nevertheless is concerned with a series of elements, in light of the findings of the Court of Auditors, as presented in this resolution;

Annual accounts

12. Notes that the Court’s report finds that the 2023 annual accounts of the eleven joint undertakings audited present fairly, in all material respects, their financial position as of 31 December 2023, the results of their operations and cash flows, and changes in net assets for the year ended, in accordance with their financial regulations and the accounting rules adopted by the Commission’s accounting officer; notes furthermore that as a result, the Court issued unqualified audit opinions on the reliability of the annual accounts of the joint undertakings;

13. Notes that the Court’s report finds that the underlying transactions to the annual accounts are legal and regular in all material respects; notes furthermore that as a result, the Court issued unqualified audit opinions on the legality and regularity of both the revenue and the payments underlying the accounts of the joint undertakings;

14. Takes note of the fact that, in the view of the Court of Auditors, insufficient guidance was provided to the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking and the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking on their first-time annual accounts, especially as regards the need for clarity in distinguishing the financial resources managed by the Commission before they attained their financial autonomy and by the joint undertakings after they attained it; echoes the Court’s recommendation for action in this regard which recommends that accounting guidelines should be developed in a clear and comprehensible way which should specify the rules for the presentation of the first annual accounts of new joint undertakings and that these guidelines should include instructions on how to separate the financial resources implemented by the Commission from those implemented by a joint undertaking after it attained its financial autonomy; notes that the risk to the reliability of annual accounts was deemed to be low for all joint undertakings except for the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking and the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking, for which the risk to reliability was deemed to be medium, due to the complexities brought about by the transfer of budget appropriations and assets from the responsibility of the Commission to the responsibility of the joint undertaking;

15. Takes note of the fact that the annual accounts of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy are produced on the basis of the baseline of the ITER project in place in 2023 but that the latter is the subject of an ongoing revision, the result of which is likely to result in significant changes for the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy and its estimated total cost at completion; underlines that the joint undertaking concerned should take all actions necessary to ensure that the future baseline and its consequences for the need for Union cash contributions to the joint undertaking do not constitute a liability for the Union budget; notes from the hearing of the joint undertaking concerned in the Committee on Budgetary Control that at the time of the hearing and according to the joint undertaking concerned, it was too early to provide an estimate of the financial impact of this revision; is furthermore concerned by the delays impacting the ITER project, due to factors beyond the joint undertaking’s control;

16. Is concerned by the potential impact that the reorganisation of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy will have on its activities, notably the short to medium-term instabilities and operational risks for the joint undertaking; welcomes the awareness of the joint undertaking concerned of these issues and the explanation provided on its views on the situation; welcomes the additional information provided during the hearing of the joint undertaking concerned in the Committee on Budgetary Control, notably as regards the fact that the risk for business continuity has so far been mitigated thanks to a strong reliance on existing programmes and projects; welcomes the flexibility brought along by the new matrix structure;

17. Takes note of the fact that the risk to the legality and regularity of revenue was deemed to be low for all joint undertakings;

Budgetary and financial management

18. Notes that the total available budget in 2023 for the eleven joint undertakings audited by the Court amounted to EUR 4,25 billion in commitment appropriations and EUR 3,87 billion in payment appropriations, according to the Court of Auditors, which considers that the total available budget includes unused appropriations from previous years, which the joint undertakings entered again in the budget of the current year and assigned revenues and reallocations to the next year; notes more precisely that:

(a) the total available budget in 2023 for the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking amounted to EUR 111,2 million in commitment appropriations (compared to EUR 158,8 million in 2022) and EUR 241,5 million in payment appropriations (compared to EUR 146,9 million in 2022); understands furthermore that according to the report on budgetary and financial management of the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking, its total budget execution rate for the financial year 2023 reached 92 % for commitment appropriations and 81 % for payment appropriations, indicating that there were no severe issues related to the pace of implementation of the budget; nevertheless stresses the low execution rate of its payment appropriations dedicated to infrastructure and operating expenditure, which reached 55 %; notes the explanation of the joint undertaking and generally calls on the joint undertaking to ensure a healthy pace of implementation for each section of its budget;

(b) The total available budget in 2023 for the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking amounted to EUR 269 million in commitment appropriations (compared to EUR 411,2 million in 2022) and EUR 486,4 million in payment appropriations (compared to EUR 415,3 million in 2022); understands furthermore that according to the report on budgetary and financial management of the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking, its total budget execution rate for the financial year 2023 reached 98,58 % for commitment appropriations and 51,18 % for payment appropriations, indicating that there were serious issues related to the pace of implementation of the budget; notes in particular that the execution rates of its two operational expenditure titles stand at 80,50 % and 81,11 % respectively for payment appropriations; furthermore stresses the low execution rate of its payment appropriations dedicated to infrastructure expenditure, which reached 60,52 %; deeply regrets the important amount allocated to title 5 of its budget for unused payment appropriations of EUR 177 million, which has a technical execution rate of 0 %; notes the explanation of the joint undertaking and generally calls on the joint undertaking to ensure a healthy pace of implementation for each section of its budget;

(c) The total available budget in 2023 for the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking amounted to EUR 223,2 million in commitment appropriations (compared to EUR 272,4 million in 2022) and EUR 225,9 million in payment appropriations (compared to EUR 174,8 million in 2022); understands furthermore that according to the report on budgetary and financial management of the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking, its total budget execution rate for the financial year 2023 reached 92,65 % for commitment appropriations and 90,29 % for payment appropriations, indicating that there were no severe issues related to the pace of implementation of the budget; nevertheless stresses the low execution rates of its commitment and payment appropriations dedicated to infrastructure expenditure, which reached 68,67 % and 67,30 % respectively; notes the explanation of the joint undertaking and generally calls on the joint undertaking to ensure a healthy pace of implementation for each section of its budget;

(d) The total available budget in 2023 for the Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking amounted to EUR 268,9 million in commitment appropriations (compared to EUR 314,3 million in 2022) and EUR 327,8 million in payment appropriations (compared to EUR 118,3 million in 2022); understands furthermore that according to the report on budgetary and financial management of the Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking, its total budget execution rate for the financial year 2023 reached 96,62 % for commitment appropriations and 85,43 % for payment appropriations, indicating that there were no severe issues related to the pace of implementation of the budget; nevertheless stresses the low execution rate of payment appropriations dedicated to its operational expenditure financed under Horizon 2020 which reached 69,41 %; moreover stresses the low execution rate of its commitment and payment appropriations dedicated to infrastructure expenditure, which reached 71,21 % and 60,60 % respectively; notes the explanations of the joint undertaking and generally calls on the joint undertaking to ensure a healthy pace of implementation for each section of its budget;

(e) The total available budget in 2023 for the Chips Joint Undertaking amounted to EUR 835,7 million in commitment appropriations (compared to EUR 261,4 million in 2022) and EUR 518,4 million in payment appropriations (compared to EUR 222,2 million in 2022); understands furthermore that according to the report on budgetary and financial management of the Chips Joint Undertaking, its total budget execution rate for the financial year 2023 reached 100 % for commitment appropriations and 37 % for payment appropriations, indicating that there were serious issues related to the pace of implementation of the budget; in particular, stresses the extremely low execution rate of payment appropriations dedicated to operational expenditure, which reached 36 %; notes the explanation of the joint undertaking but deeply regrets such a low execution rate and generally calls on the joint undertaking to ensure a healthy pace of implementation for each section of its budget; takes note of the fact that these elements, in relation to the increased funding that the Chips Joint Undertaking benefited from in 2023 and which the Chips Joint Undertaking had to implement, led the Court to consider the risk to budget management to be medium for this joint undertaking;

(f) The total available budget in 2023 for the Circular Bio-based Europe Joint Undertaking amounted to EUR 227,4 million in commitment appropriations (compared to EUR 264,2 million in 2022) and EUR 137,4 million in payment appropriations (compared to EUR 80,3 million in 2022); understands furthermore that according to the report on budgetary and financial management of the Circular Bio-based Europe Joint Undertaking, its total budget execution rate for the financial year 2023 reached 97,6 % for commitment appropriations and 90,3 % for payment appropriations, indicating that there were no severe issues related to the pace of implementation of the budget; nevertheless stresses the low execution rates of commitment and payment appropriations for the part of its administrative expenditure dedicated to salaries, which reached 64 % and 57 % respectively, as well as the low execution rate of payment appropriations for the part of its administrative expenditure dedicated to other administrative expenditure, which reached 54 %; notes the explanation of the joint undertaking and generally calls on the joint undertaking to ensure a healthy pace of implementation for each section of its budget;

(g) The total available budget in 2023 for the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking amounted to EUR 102,6 million in commitment appropriations (compared to EUR 171,4 million in 2022) and EUR 120,3 million in payment appropriations (compared to EUR 180,8 million in 2022); understands furthermore that according to the report on budgetary and financial management of the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking, its total budget execution rate for the financial year 2023 reached 97 % for commitment appropriations and 82 % for payment appropriations, indicating that there were no severe issues related to the pace of implementation of the budget; nevertheless stresses the low execution rate of payment appropriations for the part of its operational expenditure financed under Horizon 2020, which reached 67 %; notes the explanation of the joint undertaking and generally calls on the joint undertaking to ensure a healthy pace of implementation for each section of its budget; points out that Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking postponed final payments to 2024 due to technical issues experienced by beneficiaries; takes notice of the several projects that did not fully claim their budgets, reducing the need for operational payments by approximately EUR 4,1 million; calls on the joint undertaking concerned to elaborate a plan on how to improve the accounting reporting obligations; highlights the importance of supporting the joint undertaking given rail’s inherent advantages in terms of environmental performance, land use, energy consumption, and safety;

(h) The total available budget in 2023 for the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking amounted to EUR 1136 million in commitment appropriations (compared to EUR 1374,5 million in 2022) and EUR 1058 million in payment appropriations (compared to EUR 629,9 million in 2022); understands furthermore that according to the report on budgetary and financial management of the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking, its total budget execution rate for the financial year 2023 reached 83% for commitment appropriations and 19 % for payment appropriations, indicating that there were serious issues related to the pace of implementation of the budget; in particular, stresses the extremely low execution rate of payment appropriations dedicated to operational expenditure, which reached 19 %; notes the explanation of the joint undertaking but deeply regrets such a low execution rate; moreover stresses the low execution rate of its commitment and payment appropriations dedicated to administrative expenditure, which reached 45 % and 42 % respectively; notes the explanation of the joint undertaking and generally calls on the joint undertaking to ensure a healthy pace of implementation for each section of its budget; takes note of the fact that these elements, in relation to the increased funding that the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking benefited from in 2023 and which the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking had to implement, led the Court to consider the risk to budget management to be medium for this joint undertaking; welcomes the additional information provided during the hearing of the joint undertaking concerned in the Committee on Budgetary Control on the reasons behind this slow execution rate;

(i) The total available budget in 2023 for the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking amounted to EUR 134,7 million in commitment appropriations and EUR 122,9 million in payment appropriations; understands furthermore that according to the report on budgetary and financial management of the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking, its total budget execution rate for the financial year 2023 reached 99 % for commitment appropriations and 89 % for payment appropriations; deems that given the short period of time during which the joint undertaking had attained financial autonomy in the financial year 2023, there are no sufficient grounds on which the European Parliament could express its view on the quality of the financial management of the joint undertaking while doing so in good faith; nevertheless notes that due to this situation, the risk to the legality and regularity of administrative expenditure was deemed as medium for the joint undertaking;

(j) The total available budget in 2023 for the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking amounted to EUR 136,4 million in commitment appropriations and EUR 2,2 million in payment appropriations; understands furthermore that according to the report on budgetary and financial management of the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking, its total budget execution rate for the financial year 2023 reached 100 % for commitment appropriations and 47 % for payment appropriations; deems that given the short period of time during which the joint undertaking had attained financial autonomy in the financial year 2023, there are no sufficient grounds on which the European Parliament could express its view on the quality of the financial management of the joint undertaking while doing so in good faith; nevertheless notes that due to this situation, the risk to the legality and regularity of administrative expenditure was deemed as medium for the joint undertaking;

(k) The total available budget in 2023 for the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy amounted to EUR 807 million in commitment appropriations (compared to EUR 981,2 million in 2022) and EUR 631,5 million in payment appropriations (compared to EUR 844 million in 2022); understands furthermore that according to the report on budgetary and financial management of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy, its total budget execution rate for the financial year 2023 reached 73 % for commitment appropriations and 95 % for payment appropriations, indicating that there were serious issues related to the pace of implementation of the budget; in particular, stresses the low execution rate of commitment appropriations dedicated to operational expenditure, which reached 70 %; notes the explanation of the joint undertaking and takes note of the resulting transfers made back to the initially planned Euratom and ITER Host State contributions and generally calls on the joint undertaking to ensure a healthy pace of implementation for each section of its budget; takes note of the fact that these elements, which are related to delays and implementation difficulties, led the Court to consider the risk to budget management to be medium for this joint undertaking;

19. Echoes the Court’s concerns as regards unused appropriations in the implementation of programmes of certain joint undertakings and calls on the joint undertakings concerned to avoid the reoccurrence of similar situations, as the accumulation of unused appropriations leads to cash surpluses, which are therefore not available to the Union for the financing of other activities and programmes; underlines that this is not in line with the principle of sound financial management and has resulted in a total of EUR 1,5 billion of cash surplus for the financial year 2023; echoes the Court’s recommendation for action in this regard which recommends that the joint undertakings concerned should develop corrective mechanisms to reduce their cash surpluses to a reasonable level and subsequently align their cash requests for each financial year with their estimated spending needs, in coordination with the Commission; is aware of possibilities under the financial rules of the joint undertakings concerned for unused appropriations to be entered in the estimate of revenue and expenditure of up to the three financial years following their reception; is nevertheless concerned more precisely with:

(a) the shortcomings in the cash planning of the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking, following the request for additional Union financial contributions of EUR 178 million in excess of cash needs for planned payment in 2023, resulting in a cash surplus of EUR 237 million at the end of 2023; takes note however of the explanation of the joint undertaking; nevertheless repeats its call for the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking to avoid the reoccurrence of similar situations and welcomes the adjustments announced by the joint undertaking for 2024;

(b) the shortcomings in the cash planning of the Chips Joint Undertaking, following the request for additional EU financial contributions of EUR 196 million in excess of cash needs for planned payment in 2023, resulting in a cash surplus of EUR 438 million at the end of 2023; takes note however of the explanation of the joint undertaking; nevertheless repeats its call for the Chips Joint Undertaking to avoid the reoccurrence of similar situations and welcomes the ambition announced by the joint undertaking for 2024;

(c) the shortcomings in the cash planning of the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking, following the request for additional Union financial contributions of EUR 488,6 million in excess of cash needs for planned payment in 2023, resulting in a cash surplus of EUR 840,7 million at the end of 2023; understands the situation faced by the joint undertaking which led to this surplus and welcomes the additional information provided during the hearing of the joint undertaking concerned in the Committee on Budgetary Control, notably as regards the expectations for projects related to Artificial Intelligence to provide an opportunity for an important cash-out; nevertheless repeats its call for the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking to avoid the reoccurrence of similar situations;

20. Stresses that all joint undertakings shall strengthen internal financial controls and public transparency mechanisms, ensuring that funds are distributed efficiently and in a manner consistent with EU strategic objectives;

21. Echoes the Court’s concerns as regards the contribution of members to certain joint undertakings, in particular as regards the possibility that some joint undertakings could not meet their contribution targets or only do so through high reliance on in-kind contributions to additional activities and calls on the joint undertakings concerned to take all actions necessary to prevent these situations from arising in the future; underlines that meeting contribution targets is the responsibility and obligation of the concerned joint undertakings and that failing to meet contribution targets goes against the founding idea of joint undertakings; is concerned, more precisely, with:

(a) the situation of the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking, whose operational contribution target of its member Eurocontrol only reached a level of 70 %, which resulted in the joint undertaking not having the planned contributions at its disposal to fully implement its part of Horizon 2020; takes notes of the fact that this element did not however lead the Court to consider the risk to programme implementation to be medium or high for this joint undertaking, as it was deemed to be low;

(b) the situation of the Circular Bio-based Europe Joint Undertaking, which performed well in reaching its contribution target under Horizon 2020, however notably did so through a revision of the balance between the targets for in-kind contributions to operational activities and for in-kind contributions to additional activities, the latter being raised to EUR 2 444,5 million, which corresponds to 90 % of the overall target; underlines that such a reliance on in-kind contributions to additional activities presents a risk to the implementation of the Horizon 2020 programme; underlines the substantial impact of the revision performed by the joint undertaking; takes notes of the explanation of the joint undertaking and of the fact that additional activities contribute to the overall objectives of the joint undertaking; nevertheless stresses that this constitutes an excessive reliance on in-kind contribution to additional activities to meet established targets and calls on the joint undertaking to avoid the reoccurrence of such a situation; takes note of the fact that these elements led the Court to consider the risk to programme implementation to be high for this joint undertaking;

(c) the situation of the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking, whose contribution from private members under Horizon 2020 only reached a reported amount of EUR 18,4 million against a target of EUR 420 million, which constitutes a severe difference; notes furthermore that such a situation might occur again under Horizon Europe and Digital Europe as the contribution target for private members has increased significantly to EUR 900 million while the financing arrangements that caused difficulties for private members under Horizon 2020 remain in place; takes note of the fact that these elements led the Court to consider the risk to programme implementation to be high for this joint undertaking; understands from the additional information provided during the hearing of the joint undertaking concerned in the Committee on Budgetary Control that this issue is being dealt with in cooperation with the Governing Board; nevertheless echoes the Court’s recommendation for action in this regard which recommends that the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking should support the Commission’s reassessment of the current target in order to ensure that it can attain its contribution target for private members under Horizon Europe and Digital Europe and stresses once again that reaching contribution targets should not simply be considered as an ambition but as a duty;

22. Underlines that to promote better efficiency, the Single Basic Act of the joint undertakings provides for an obligation for joint undertakings to achieve synergies via the establishment of back-office arrangements operating in a series of identified areas; understands that four areas have been identified as a priority by the joint undertakings concerned, namely accounting activities, legal activities, information and communication technologies and human resources; particularly welcomes in that regard:

(a) the fact that the back-office arrangements dedicated to accounting activities have been operational since December 2022 and were therefore in operation for the entirety of financial year 2023, which could be observed in the production of the annual accounts as well as the fact that the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking took the lead in operating these back-office arrangements;

(b) the fact that the Circular Bio-based Europe Joint Undertaking and the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking took the lead in operating back-office arrangements for the management of common recruitment, the legal framework of human resources and the digitalisation of human resources;

(c) the fact that the Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking and the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking took the lead in operating back-office arrangements for the management of Information and Communication Technologies services;

(d) the fact that the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking, the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking and the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking took the lead in operating back-office arrangements for the management of administrative procurements;

(e) the fact that joint undertakings are further implementing the joint strategic ICT plan of the joint undertakings located in the White Atrium building;

23. Calls on the joint undertakings concerned by the obligation under the Single Basic Act to keep reporting on their establishment of back-office arrangements, to provide clear information on which joint undertakings operate tasks for other joint undertakings in certain areas, to include as soon as possible communication, logistics, events and meeting room management as well as the support for audit and anti-fraud strategies on the list of priorities and to provide information on the areas to be considered for the establishment of back-office arrangements in the future, once arrangements in the areas identified as a priority have been concluded;

Procurement and tenders

24. Echoes the Court’s concerns as regards procurement procedures and calls on joint undertakings to ensure that the compliance with relevant legal provisions and the necessary complexity of certain procurement procedures do not lead to an increased risk to the legality and regularity of operational expenditure; is concerned, more precisely, by:

(a) the situations of the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking and of the Chips Joint Undertaking, for both of which the Court of Auditors observed weaknesses in the design and evaluation of one significant procurement procedure; takes notes of the fact that this element did not however lead the Court to consider the risk to operational control expenditure to be medium or high for this joint undertaking; nevertheless stresses the fact that such weaknesses may result in irregular contracts and payments if not addressed in future procurement procedures; welcomes the readiness of the joint undertakings to take action on these specific cases and to improve their procurement processes;

(b) the fact that the Court of Auditors has evaluated the risk to operational contract expenditure to be medium for the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking and the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy because of their complex procurement procedures for high-value contracts;

25. Underlines the financial exposure of the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking to a supplier facing difficulties which is evaluated by the joint undertaking as ranging from a potential low impact of EUR 0 to an estimated maximum impact of EUR 88 million; understands from the annual accounts of the joint undertaking that this situation is being carefully scrutinised; calls on the joint undertaking to take all actions necessary to minimise financial liabilities; welcomes the additional information provided during the hearing of the joint undertaking concerned in the Committee on Budgetary Control, especially as regards the additional guarantees requested by the joint undertaking concerned to minimise this financial liability as well as the explanation provided on the key role of this specific supplier;

26. Takes note of the fact that the levels of detail and the level of accessibility vary when it comes to the quantitative data provided by the joint undertakings on the gender balance of experts selected to work with the joint undertakings; calls on all joint undertakings to increase transparency and to include clear quantitative data on gender balance among the experts selected in their future Annual Activity Reports; calls on all joint undertakings to intensify their efforts to promote gender equality at all levels and to ensure that gender balance remains a horizontal priority in all activities related to procurement, grants and tenders and to provide explanations when gender balance cannot be achieved;

27. Takes note of the fact that the levels of detail and the level of accessibility vary when it comes to the quantitative data provided by the joint undertakings on the geographical distribution of experts selected to work with the joint undertakings; calls on all joint undertakings to include clear quantitative data on the geographical distribution of the experts selected in their future Annual Activity Reports; calls on all joint undertakings to ensure that geographical distribution remains a horizontal priority in all activities related to procurement, grants and tenders and to provide explanations when sufficient geographical distribution cannot be achieved;

28. Calls for a fair and equitable geographical distribution of funding from the joint undertakings, ensuring that regions with lower innovation capacity and SMEs receive adequate support;

Staff and recruitment

29. Is concerned with the state of play of recruitment within the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking, which received 39 additional posts to be recruited by the end of the financial year 2023 in order to implement the significant funds received under the current multiannual financial framework but which only managed to recruit 21 additional staff; is furthermore concerned with the assessment of the Court of Auditors which determined that the recruitment procedures of the joint undertakings were not sufficiently transparent due to a lack of clear and previously agreed upon scoring-grids to assess candidates and their qualifications as well as due to a lack of sufficient documentation on the underlying decision-making process; regrets that in the view of the Court of Auditors, this situation may have resulted in a lack of equal treatment of candidates; reminds that it is paramount to avoid the application of double standards during the recruitment process and requests for all necessary actions to be taken in this regard; echoes the Court’s recommendation for action in this regard which recommends that the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking should use its increased staff effectively to achieve its recruitment target by the end of 2024 and that, in order to increase the transparency of its recruitment procedures and to substantiate the decision-making processes of the selection committee, the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking should use a pre-agreed scoring grid during the pre-selection phase, in line with the practice of other joint undertakings and Union bodies; welcomes the readiness of the joint undertaking to integrate recommendations for improvements;

30. Emphasises the need for a coherent and fair staffing policy across all Joint Undertakings to ensure adequate and inclusive working conditions, career development opportunities, and work-life balance for staff; calls for the implementation of measures to prevent excessive reliance on temporary contracts and precarious employment; underlines the importance of mental health support structures, flexible working arrangements, and fair internal promotion opportunities to improve staff well-being;

31. Calls on all joint undertakings to implement concrete measures to improve gender balance in leadership positions and decision-making bodies, including setting gender balance targets and regularly monitoring progress; stresses the need to address gender pay gaps and ensure equal opportunities for career advancement;

32. Takes note of the fact that the Court considered the risk to the legality and regularity of administrative expenditure to be low for all joint undertakings except for the Chips Joint Undertaking and the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking for which it was deemed to be medium due to their high recruitment level, as well as for the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking and the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking, due to their recent financial autonomy;

33. Is concerned with the situation of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy as regards different aspects related to the management of human resources observed by the Court of Auditors, especially as regards the use of external service providers, notably:

(a) the important reliance of the joint undertaking on external service providers, as it was observed that near to half of the staff of the joint undertaking consisted of external service providers (361 external service providers and 429 statutory staff in 2023) which makes that situation a critical issue with a potential large-scale impact on the capacity of the joint undertaking to manage its human resources in a sustainable manner while ensuring a capacity for retention of knowledge and institutional memory, which also allow for financial gains in the long run;

(b) the fact that the joint undertaking did not adopt a unique formal definition of external service providers, which resulted in a lack of clarity in its assessment of their impact on statutory staff needs; notes furthermore that the risk register of the joint undertaking did not include all the potential risks related to a high level of reliance on external service providers in the long term, which might prevent the internal control of the joint undertaking from having adequate mitigating measures put in place to address those risks;

(c) the findings of the audit conducted on this matter by the Commission’s internal audit service which revealed that the joint undertaking had not set up a centralised function for the coordination and management of external service providers, nor had it set up a methodology for assessing its aggregate human resources needs, and in particular its needs for external service providers; underlines that it was observed that the joint undertaking’s decision on the use of external service providers was therefore based on budgetary concerns rather than human resources needs;

(d) the lack of transparency in the reporting of the joint undertaking on its human resources; particularly as regards the presentation of permanent and non-permanent staff figures, given that 224 of the 386 temporary and contract staff had in reality an indefinite contract and could therefore have been considered as permanent staff from a practical point of view; calls on the joint undertaking to underline such nuances in the future in its reporting on human resources;

(e) echoes the Court’s recommendation for action which recommends that the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy should establish a centralised coordination and management function for external service providers and adopt a comprehensive methodology to regularly assess its total human resources needs based on the expected workload and required skills and that the joint undertaking concerned should also supplement its risk register with the most important risks deriving from its high level of use of external service providers in the long run;

(f) welcomes the commitments made by the joint undertaking and welcomes its explanation of the challenges leading to an important use of external service providers; is nevertheless concerned with this important dependency and the related risks; calls on the joint undertaking to provide more detailed information in the future on the decision-making processes leading to the use of external service providers;

34. Takes note of the fact that the levels of detail and the level of accessibility vary when it comes to the quantitative data provided by the joint undertakings on the gender balance among their staff and within their governing bodies and structures in their Annual Activity Reports; calls on all joint undertakings to include a clear section dedicated to quantitative data on gender balance among their staff and within their governing bodies and structures in their future Annual Activity Reports, including the disaggregation of data between different levels of responsibility and different types of contract; calls on all joint undertakings to ensure that gender balance remains an objective at all levels of responsibility and to persist in their efforts to enhance it, in order to ensure a fair representation of society within their staff and to promote a healthy and productive working environment and to provide explanations when gender balance cannot be achieved;

35. Takes note of the fact that the levels of detail and the level of accessibility vary when it comes to the quantitative data provided by the joint undertakings on the geographical distribution within their staff and within their governing bodies and structures in their Annual Activity Reports; calls on all joint undertakings to include a clear section dedicated to quantitative data on geographical distribution among their staff and within their governing bodies and structures in their future Annual Activity Reports, including the disaggregation of data between different levels of responsibility and different types of contract; calls on all joint undertakings to ensure that a satisfactory geographical distribution remains an objective at all levels of responsibility and to provide explanations when a sufficient geographical distribution cannot be achieved;

36. Welcomes the work of the EU Agencies Network (EUAN) and its Working Group on Diversity and Inclusion which led to the EUAN Charter on Diversity and Inclusion; invites joint undertakings to adopt this Charter;

37. Underlines that joint undertakings shall ensure that funded projects contribute to social well-being and inclusivity, respect workers’ rights and labour conditions and align with the principles of a just transition to sustainable technologies;

Management and control systems

38. Welcomes the work of the Court of Auditors on the examination of grant payments made by the ten joint undertakings implementing research and innovation projects, especially as regards its complementary audit of a sample of grant payments at beneficiary level under Horizon 2020; is concerned with the results of this examination which showed that there were persistent systemic errors, especially as regards declared personnel and equipment costs; calls for correction of the systemic errors;

39. Underlines that the Court of Auditors found one case of quantified and serious error in payments under Horizon 2020 for the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking, the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking, the Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking, the Circular Bio-based Europe Joint Undertaking, as well as for the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking; welcomes the initiatives taken in this regard to raise awareness at beneficiary level; calls on all joint undertakings to ensure the legality and regularity of operational expenditure and underlines that the Court of Auditors deemed the risk to the interim and final grant payments of the joint undertakings to be medium;

40. Calls on the Commission to implement: i) mandatory financial training for beneficiaries of the joint undertakings to prevent recurrent accounting errors; ii) automated verification tools to enhance accuracy in personnel cost calculations; iii) stronger ex-ante audit procedures to ensure proper use of Union funds;

41. Welcomes the fact that according to the extrapolation of the Court of Auditors for all joint undertakings, the average error rate is just below the materiality threshold of 2% for grant expenditure, as well as the fact that the residual error rates calculated by the Commission’s common audit service were also below the materiality threshold;

42. Takes note of the fact that the number of Horizon Europe and Digital Europe interim payments was too small to feature in the sample audited by the Court of Auditors in 2023;

43. Takes note of the fact that there were several changes to the internal control framework of joint undertakings under Horizon Europe, notably the fact that the Commission no longer intends to make specific representative ex-post audits on behalf of individual Horizon Europe stakeholders, such as joint undertakings; notes furthermore that the Commission plans to apply the same change to grant payments under Digital Europe;

44. Is concerned with the lack of communication, collaboration and coordination between the risk management of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy and its internal audit functions, as well as with the related lack of an integrated risk management process and the fact that the joint undertaking could not provide satisfactory evidence that it regularly uses risk management information when planning internal audit activities; echoes the Court’s recommendation for action in this regard which recommends that the joint undertaking concerned implement an integrated risk management process in its internal control framework in order to manage its risks effectively; welcomes the plans of the joint undertaking to take action on this issue;

45. Underlines the importance of implementing a comprehensive and up to date business continuity plan and disaster recovery plan for the joint undertakings; regrets in that regard that at the end of the financial year 2023, the joint undertakings, with the exception of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy, did not have a satisfactory policy in place in this regard; welcomes the plans of the joint undertaking to take action on this issue;

46. Points out that the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking and the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking still had not fully implemented the Commission’s internal control framework and calls on these two joint undertakings to fully implement that framework;

Fraud, ethics and conflicts of interests

47. Takes note of the fact that the Court of Auditors made one notification of suspected fraud to the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) during its audit of the financial year 2023; understands that the case was later dismissed by OLAF as no fraud was observed in relation to the staff matter concerned; welcomes the diligence of the Court of Auditors and the cooperation within the anti-fraud architecture;

48. Underlines the importance of implementing an internal control policy on sensitive functions for the joint undertakings; stresses that such a policy can prevent and mitigate the risk of inappropriate or fraudulent action; regrets that at the end of the financial year 2023, the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking, the Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking, the Chips Joint Undertaking, the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking as well as the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy did not yet have a policy in that regard; stresses the critical nature of this situation and urges the joint undertakings to take action without unnecessary delays;

49. Takes note of the situation in the Chips Joint Undertaking referred to by the Court of Auditors, which saw one of its former senior staff members who had left the joint undertaking recently take up a new occupational activity without prior notice to the joint undertaking concerned; calls on the joint undertaking concerned and all other joint undertakings to conduct active monitoring of the new occupational activities of former senior staff members as well as of staff members occupying a sensitive function; welcomes the additional information provided by the joint undertaking concerned on this specific case;

50. Calls on all joint undertakings to enhance their transparency policies, particularly regarding potential conflicts of interest; urges joint undertakings to publish declarations of interest for their members of boards of management, scientific committees, and external experts, ensuring that any financial, professional, or personal ties to entities benefiting from funding from the joint undertakings are disclosed; insists on the introduction of a mandatory ‘cooling-off’ period for senior staff of the joint undertakings before they can take up employment in organisations that receive funding from the joint undertakings;

51. Takes note of the information reported by the joint undertakings on their activities related to prevention, detection, and correction of fraud; calls on all joint undertakings to strengthen their role and identify their weaknesses by engaging further in anti-fraud discussions and to report on such elements and to include in their future reports a clear presentation of the legal framework and policies put in place in this regard;

Remarks on the follow-up of Joint Undertakings to the previous discharge exercise

52. Welcomes the fact that joint undertakings have produced a follow-up report to the European Parliament resolutions with observations forming an integral part of the decisions on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the joint undertakings for the financial year 2022; notes that these reports provide the views of the joint undertakings on the issues underlined by the European Parliament to a satisfactory extent;

53. Welcomes the fact that the Court’s report also includes an analysis of the follow-up of joint undertakings to previous observations and recommendations for actions published by the Court; notes in this regard that out of 37 observations not sufficiently addressed at the end of 2022, 16 were closed and 21 remained open at the end of 2023; furthermore notes that out of the 15 recommended actions in the annual reports of 2021 and 2022, 9 had been fully implemented, 2 in most respects, 3 in some respects and 1 not implemented at all; understands that some recommendations that still need to be implemented further mainly relate to human resources issues which the joint undertakings can only implement in cooperation with the Directorate-General for Budget of the Commission and once applications are ready to be implemented; understands that the recommendations that had to be implemented before the end of 2023 were implemented in due time;

54. Welcomes the fact that the Court of Auditors has now provided a deadline for implementation for each of its open recommendations for action, which were defined in cooperation with the joint undertakings to ensure their feasibility; calls on all joint undertakings to continue to report back to the Court of Auditors and the European Parliament on these issues;

55. Notes with concern the persistent challenges related to cost overruns, delays, and governance issues in the implementation of the ITER project; calls for improved financial oversight and enhanced budgetary transparency, including more detailed public reporting on cost developments, spending efficiency, and progress toward key project milestones; stresses the need for stricter auditing mechanisms to ensure that Union contributions to the project are effectively utilised; urges the joint undertaking to strengthen internal governance by ensuring regular and independent evaluations of project risks and by increasing accountability mechanisms for senior management;

Other priorities for the joint undertakings

56. Is aware of the administrative and budgetary constraints of joint undertakings and in respect of these constraints, calls on joint undertakings to better disseminate their contribution to research and innovation activities through accessible communication material intended for academic and research institutions, public and private organisations and European and national authorities; calls for this accessible communication material to promote the opportunities for procurement contracts and grants offered by the joint undertakings in the area of research and innovation activities;

57. Calls on joint undertakings to proactively engage in communication activities in order to reach a wide range of EU citizens in a pedagogical effort to present their contribution to common goals and the need for institutionalised partnerships that involve private members;

58. Calls on the joint undertakings to establish the cooperation with universities in order to reach out to young European graduates to strengthen their future recruitment processes;

59. Calls on joint undertakings to continue to report effectively and to the extent of their capacity on their contribution to employment and to the competitiveness of the European economy, in light of the necessity for all important stakeholders of the European Union in the area of research and innovation to focus on the reindustrialisation of the European Union;

60. Calls on joint undertakings to continue to ensure a sufficient level of participation of private firms, especially of small and medium-sized enterprises, which constitute the strongest asset of the European economy;

61. Calls on joint undertakings to report effectively on their contribution to horizontal priorities of the budget of the European Union, including as regards climate mainstreaming and to provide explanations where relevant on how their activities can contribute to the objectives of the European Green Deal;

62. Calls on all joint undertakings to continue to act with diligence in the conduct of their activities when dealing with international stakeholders, especially in light of the regime of restrictive measures put in place by the European Union; underlines the particular situation of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy in this regard and welcomes the explanations provided during the hearing of the joint undertaking concerned in the Committee on Budgetary Control on measures put in place to prevent any issues in the framework of the ITER project;

63. Calls on all joint undertakings to ensure that their staff are making a good use of possible synergies with other entities from the European Union, such as agencies, in all relevant areas and in order to increase the efficiency and impact of their operations; calls on all joint undertakings to ensure that their staff are making good use of the platform that constitutes the EU Agencies Network (EUAN);

64. Emphasies the need for digital sovereignty in research funded by the Union; in that regard puts special emphasis on the Chips Joint Undertaking, Euro European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking, and the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking who shall prioritise projects that enhance Union autonomy in semiconductor manufacturing, artificial intelligence, and cybersecurity; asks the Commission to ensure that projects funded by joint undertakings: i) are not excessively reliant on third-country suppliers for critical technologies; ii) contribute to the Union’s industrial resilience and strategic independence; iii) foster domestic R&D in key digital sectors;

Call for a follow-up

65. Calls on each joint undertaking considered for the granting of discharge for the financial year 2023 to produce an individual follow-up report on all actions taken to address the specific issues mentioned in this resolution and to submit this follow-up report signed by the (Executive) Director of the joint undertaking to the European Parliament by no later than 30 September 2025;

66. Underlines that follow-up reports may also contain the general views of the joint undertakings on this resolution and on other matters relevant for the discharge authority; expects the joint undertakings to draft this report with a comprehensive approach, to touch on all issues addressed by the European Parliament concerning their activities, and to do so in good faith and cooperation.

ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that he received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the report, prior to the adoption thereof in committee:

Entity and/or person

European Court of Auditors

European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking

The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that he has submitted to the concerned natural persons the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORT AND TOURISM (29.1.2025)

for the Committee on Budgetary Control

on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the EU joint undertakings for the financial year 2023

(2024/2031(DEC))

Rapporteur for opinion: Gheorghe Falcă

OPINION

The Committee on Transport and Tourism calls on the Committee on Budgetary Control, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following into its motion for a resolution:

1. Welcomes the ‘clean’ opinion for the 2023 financial year provided by the European Court of Auditors (‘the Court’) in relation to the reliability of the annual accounts, as well as the legality and regularity of the revenues and payments underlying the accounts of the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking (CAJU), the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking (SESAR 3 JU), and the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking (EU Rail);

2. Notes the Court’s observations directed at all three Joint Undertakings (JU) concerning their outdated business continuity and disaster recovery plans; welcomes the measures taken by the JUs following the Court’s assessment to ensure that these plans are regularly updated and adapted to organisational changes and emerging risks in the operating environment;

3. Welcomes the 2023 activities related to the calls for proposals and grant management carried out by the three JUs under their respective programmes; recognizes the value of initiatives fostering stakeholder engagement and participation, such as open calls for expressions of interest and joint calls across the JUs, as instrumental in leveraging the collective expertise and resources; draws particular attention to the joint call for proposals launched by EU-Rail and SESAR 3 JU – the first ever cross-joint undertaking synergy topic call aimed at developing an integrated air and rail network for a sustainable multimodal transport system;

4. Takes notice of the back-office arrangements signed by the three JUs in 2023, facilitating their collaboration with the other joint undertakings for efficiency gains in various shared areas, including human resources, accounting, ICT, and procurement;

5. Acknowledges the significant contributions of the JUs in advancing research, innovation, and technology development across various sectors, including aviation, rail, and air traffic management, as integral to achieving the EU’s strategic objectives of sustainability, digital transformation, and competitiveness.

Part I – Discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking (CAJU)

1. Takes notice of the reduced 2023 commitment budget of CAJU (EUR 269 million, down from EUR 411,2 million in 2022), reflecting the lower value of the Horizon Europe calls launched in 2023; points out that its increased 2023 payment budget (EUR 468,4 million, up from EUR 415,3 million in 2022) covered the interim payments for the ongoing Horizon 2020 projects and the significant pre-financing for grant agreements planned by the end of 2023 under the Horizon Europe programme;

2. Observes that the members’ commitments for the JU’s operational and additional activities under Horizon 2020 programme exceeded their operational contribution targets, therefore, at the end of 2023, CAJU still had to pay around EUR 41 million (or 2,4%) in the coming years for projects yet to be completed, and to validate in-kind contributions to its operational activities of EUR 244,3 million and in-kind contributions to additional activities of EUR 153,4 million;

3. Notes that the implementation rate for the 2023 operational payment appropriations under the Horizon Europe programme decreased to 51%, primarily due to the slower start of the CAJU’s technically complex activities and delays in ongoing Horizon 2020 activities; notes that in 2023, CAJU requested EUR 178 million in additional EU financial contributions, exceeding the cash needs and resulting in a EUR 237 million cash surplus, which indicates shortcomings in its cash planning; notes that it is imperative to make the accumulated cash surplus available for other urgent EU needs and urges CAJU to define its goals and future financial resource needs more clearly, to prevent similar situations in the future [137]a;

4. Notes that the technical activity under the Clean Sky 2 (CS2) programme mostly completed in 2023 and acknowledges the progress made in finalisation of the remaining technology maturation and demonstration activities, notably in delivering a series of key demonstrators in the programme’s different System & Platform Demonstrator (SPD) areas;

5. Points out that the 20 projects selected in the first call for proposals of the Clean Aviation programme successfully kicked-off in January 2023, committing 40% of the funding available over the life cycle of the programme (EUR 736 million); takes notice of the second call launched in February 2023, which resulted in the signature of 8 grant agreements for a maximum amount of approximately EUR 137 million (7,5% of the funding available), that will aim at definition of novel aircraft concepts, innovative propulsion architectures, as well as new fuselage and wing designs;

6. Draws attention to the open call for expression of interest published by CAJU in May 2023, targeting private stakeholders to become Associated Members of CAJU; notes that, following the evaluation, 20 new Associated Members from 12 different countries acceded to the Clean Aviation Partnership in December 2023, bringing the number of its Members to 59.

Part II – Discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking (SESAR 3 JU)

1. Takes notice of the reduced 2023 commitment budget of SESAR 3 JU (EUR 111,2 million, down from EUR 158,8 million in 2022), reflecting the lower number of calls for Horizon Europe projects; points out that its increased 2023 payment budget (EUR 241,5 million, up from 146,9 million in 2022) covered the interim payments for the ongoing Horizon 2020 projects and the significant pre-financing payments for the grant agreements and contracts planned by the end of 2023 under the Horizon Europe programme;

2. Highlights that by the end of 2022, EU and the JU’s private members met their operational contribution targets, while Eurocontrol committed only 70% of its target; notes that this shortfall prevented SESAR 3 JU from receiving all planned contributions necessary for the full implementation of its part of the Horizon 2020 programme; further notes that by the end of 2023, the JU had EUR 36,8 million (6,6%) in outstanding payments for incomplete projects and contracts, and needed to validate in-kind contributions of EUR 105,1 million;

3. Regrets that at the end of 2023, SESAR 3 JU still lacked a policy on the management of sensitive functions, essential to prevent or mitigate the risk of inappropriate actions and corruption, in accordance with the European Commission’s Internal Control Principles; notes that in 2023, the Commission’s Internal Audit Service observed that the JU’s business continuity plan (BCP) and the related disaster recovery plan (DRP) had not been updated since 2016; calls on SESAR 3 JU to regularly update its BCP and DRP1b [138];

4. Welcomes the successful closure in 2023 of the remaining projects funded under the SESAR 2020 programme, integrating their outcomes into the new Digital European Sky (DES) programme; points out that the 2023 exploratory and industrial research calls under DES resulted in 50 projects, covering the nine SESAR flagship areas; welcomes three new Digital Sky Demonstrator projects funded under the Connecting Europe Facility along to the five already managed by the SESAR 3 JU; notes that 58 DES projects that involve more than 300 different beneficiaries, represent a total investment of more than EUR 600 million;

5. Welcomes the update of the European ATM Master Plan, commenced by SESAR 3 JU in order to set out the vision and prioritize the digital solutions necessary to deliver DES; points out that the update campaign includes extensive consultations with stakeholders to ensure a collaborative and aligned approach towards achieving the strategic objectives leading to ATM modernization; expects the Governing Board to have it adopted by December 2024.

Part III – Discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking (EU-Rail)

1. Notes that the reduced commitment and payment budgets for 2023 (respectively, EUR 102,6 million and 120,3 million, down from EUR 171,4 million and 180,8 million in 2022) reflected the lower value of calls for Horizon Europe projects and the diminishing level of payments related to Horizon 2020 projects;

2. Observes that the members’ commitments for the JU’s operational and additional activities under the Horizon 2020 programme exceeded their operational contribution targets, noting that at the end of 2023, EU-Rail still had to pay around EUR 40,5 million (or 10.8%) for projects and contracts yet to be completed, and to validate in-kind contributions to its operational activities of EUR 44,7 million;

3. Remarks that although the 2023 implementation rate for operational payment appropriations of Horizon 2020 programme increased to 67% (from 47% in 2022), it remained below expectations; points out that EU-Rail postponed final payments to 2024 due to technical issues experienced by beneficiaries; takes notice of the several projects that did not fully claim their budgets, reducing the need for operational payments by approximately EUR 4,1 million; calls on EU-Rail to take action to improve the implementation rate for operational payment appropriations and to elaborate a plan on how to improve the accounting reporting obligations1c [139];

4. Commends the strong cooperation of the JU with the European Union Agency for Railways to ensure the interoperability of the developed projects; commends the collaboration with the sectoral associations, third country programmes and other programmes, partnerships, and bodies, to establish further synergies;

5. Welcomes the commitment of the JU to facilitate R&I activities to deliver an integrated European railway network by design, eliminating interoperability barriers and delivering smart, sustainable, and resilient railway system to ensure a harmonized approach to the evolution of the Single European Rail Area; commends the integrated EU-Rail programme for its continued efforts to disseminate information on the benefits of rail transportation and travel to European citizens, and recognizes the complementarity between its R&I output, particularly in fostering interoperability, and the key objectives outlined in the European Green Deal and the Smart and Sustainable Mobility Strategy; acknowledges the progress made under the programme, based on its System Pillar, the “generic system integrator” for the future of the EU rail, providing governance, resources, and outputs to support a coherent and coordinated approach to railway system development, as well as on its Innovation Pillar, which encompasses advanced operational and technological solutions aimed at creating a more efficient railway system, including large-scale demonstrations and exploratory research; takes notice of the 2023 decision of the Governing Board to establish the Deployment Group to advise on the market uptake of rail innovation developed by EU-Rail and to support the deployment of innovative solutions;

6. Welcomes the 2023 achievements under the European Digital Automatic Coupler (DAC) Delivery Programme that facilitated cooperation among rail stakeholders, enhancing the implementation of DAC for European rail freight;

7. Congratulates the JU for its continued, active reporting on its contributions to the United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as well as its contribution to completing the Single European Railway Area;

8. Highlights the importance of supporting the JU given rail’s inherent advantages in terms of environmental performance, land use, energy consumption, and safety.

ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

The rapporteur for the opinion declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

INFORMATION ON ADOPTION BY COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

Date adopted	29.1.2025
Result of final vote	+: –: 0:	31 6 6
Members present for the final vote	Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Daniel Attard, Tom Berendsen, Rachel Blom, Nikolina Brnjac, Nina Carberry, Benoit Cassart, Carlo Ciccioli, Anna Maria Cisint, Vivien Costanzo, Johan Danielsson, Valérie Devaux, Siegbert Frank Droese, Gheorghe Falcă, Jens Gieseke, Borja Giménez Larraz, Sérgio Gonçalves, Roman Haider, Sérgio Humberto, Dariusz Joński, François Kalfon, Martine Kemp, Sophia Kircher, Elena Kountoura, Luis-Vicențiu Lazarus, Julien Leonardelli, Vicent Marzà Ibáñez, Alexandra Mehnert, Ştefan Muşoiu, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Philippe Olivier, Matteo Ricci, Rosa Serrano Sierra, Stanislav Stoyanov, Kai Tegethoff, Elissavet Vozemberg-Vrionidi, Kosma Złotowski
Substitutes present for the final vote	Alberico Gambino, Jutta Paulus, Dario Tamburrano, Kris Van Dijck, Ana Vasconcelos
Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote	Elisabeth Grossmann

FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL IN COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

31	+
PPE	Tom Berendsen, Nikolina Brnjac, Nina Carberry, Gheorghe Falcă, Jens Gieseke, Borja Giménez Larraz, Sérgio Humberto, Dariusz Joński, Martine Kemp, Sophia Kircher, Alexandra Mehnert, Elissavet Vozemberg-Vrionidi
Renew	Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Benoit Cassart, Valérie Devaux, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Ana Vasconcelos
S&D	Daniel Attard, Vivien Costanzo, Johan Danielsson, Sérgio Gonçalves, Elisabeth Grossmann, François Kalfon, Ştefan Muşoiu, Matteo Ricci, Rosa Serrano Sierra
The Left	Elena Kountoura, Dario Tamburrano
Verts/ALE	Vicent Marzà Ibáñez, Jutta Paulus, Kai Tegethoff

6	–
ESN	Siegbert Frank Droese, Stanislav Stoyanov
NI	Luis-Vicențiu Lazarus
PfE	Rachel Blom, Julien Leonardelli, Philippe Olivier

6	0
ECR	Carlo Ciccioli, Alberico Gambino, Kris Van Dijck, Kosma Złotowski
PfE	Anna Maria Cisint, Roman Haider

Key to symbols:

+ : in favour

– : against

0 : abstention

INFORMATION ON ADOPTION IN COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

Date adopted	18.3.2025
Result of final vote	+: –: 0:	20 4 2
Members present for the final vote	Georgios Aftias, Arno Bausemer, Damian Boeselager, Gilles Boyer, Olivier Chastel, Caterina Chinnici, Tamás Deutsch, Dick Erixon, Daniel Freund, Esteban González Pons, Niclas Herbst, Monika Hohlmeier, Virginie Joron, Kinga Kollár, Giuseppe Lupo, Marit Maij, Csaba Molnár, Fidias Panayiotou, Jacek Protas, Julien Sanchez, Jonas Sjöstedt, Carla Tavares, Tomáš Zdechovský
Substitutes present for the final vote	Bert-Jan Ruissen, Annamária Vicsek, Michal Wiezik
Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote	Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Gaetano Pedulla’

FINAL VOTES BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

Final votes on proposals for decisions

Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking

21	+
ECR	Bert-Jan Ruissen
NI	Fidias Panayiotou
PPE	Georgios Aftias, Caterina Chinnici, Esteban González Pons, Monika Hohlmeier, Kinga Kollár, Jacek Protas, Tomáš Zdechovský
Renew	Gilles Boyer, Olivier Chastel, Michal Wiezik
S&D	Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Giuseppe Lupo, Marit Maij, Csaba Molnár, Carla Tavares
The Left	Gaetano Pedulla’, Jonas Sjöstedt
Verts/ALE	Damian Boeselager, Daniel Freund

4	–
ECR	Dick Erixon
ESN	Arno Bausemer
PfE	Virginie Joron, Julien Sanchez

2	0
PfE	Tamás Deutsch, Annamária Vicsek

Key to symbols:

+ : in favour

– : against

0 : abstention

Circular Bio-based Europe Joint Undertaking

22	+
ECR	Bert-Jan Ruissen
NI	Fidias Panayiotou
PPE	Georgios Aftias, Caterina Chinnici, Esteban González Pons, Niclas Herbst, Monika Hohlmeier, Kinga Kollár, Jacek Protas, Tomáš Zdechovský
Renew	Gilles Boyer, Olivier Chastel, Michal Wiezik
S&D	Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Giuseppe Lupo, Marit Maij, Csaba Molnár, Carla Tavares
The Left	Gaetano Pedulla’, Jonas Sjöstedt
Verts/ALE	Damian Boeselager, Daniel Freund

4	–
ECR	Dick Erixon
ESN	Arno Bausemer
PfE	Virginie Joron, Julien Sanchez

2	0
PfE	Tamás Deutsch, Annamária Vicsek

Key to symbols:

+ : in favour

– : against

0 : abstention

Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking

21	+
ECR	Bert-Jan Ruissen
NI	Fidias Panayiotou
PPE	Georgios Aftias, Caterina Chinnici, Esteban González Pons, Niclas Herbst, Monika Hohlmeier, Kinga Kollár, Jacek Protas, Tomáš Zdechovský
Renew	Gilles Boyer, Olivier Chastel, Michal Wiezik
S&D	Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Giuseppe Lupo, Marit Maij, Csaba Molnár, Carla Tavares
The Left	Gaetano Pedulla’
Verts/ALE	Damian Boeselager, Daniel Freund

3	–
ECR	Dick Erixon
PfE	Virginie Joron, Julien Sanchez

3	0
ESN	Arno Bausemer
PfE	Tamás Deutsch, Annamária Vicsek

Key to symbols:

+ : in favour

– : against

0 : abstention

Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking

21	+
ECR	Bert-Jan Ruissen
NI	Fidias Panayiotou
PPE	Georgios Aftias, Caterina Chinnici, Esteban González Pons, Niclas Herbst, Monika Hohlmeier, Kinga Kollár, Jacek Protas, Tomáš Zdechovský
Renew	Olivier Chastel, Michal Wiezik
S&D	Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Giuseppe Lupo, Marit Maij, Csaba Molnár, Carla Tavares
The Left	Gaetano Pedulla’, Jonas Sjöstedt
Verts/ALE	Damian Boeselager, Daniel Freund

4	–
ECR	Dick Erixon
ESN	Arno Bausemer
PfE	Virginie Joron, Julien Sanchez

2	0
PfE	Tamás Deutsch, Annamária Vicsek

Key to symbols:

+ : in favour

– : against

0 : abstention

European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking

22	+
ECR	Bert-Jan Ruissen
NI	Fidias Panayiotou
PPE	Georgios Aftias, Caterina Chinnici, Esteban González Pons, Niclas Herbst, Monika Hohlmeier, Kinga Kollár, Jacek Protas, Tomáš Zdechovský
Renew	Gilles Boyer, Olivier Chastel, Michal Wiezik
S&D	Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Giuseppe Lupo, Marit Maij, Csaba Molnár, Carla Tavares
The Left	Gaetano Pedulla’, Jonas Sjöstedt
Verts/ALE	Damian Boeselager, Daniel Freund

3	–
ECR	Dick Erixon
PfE	Virginie Joron, Julien Sanchez

3	0
ESN	Arno Bausemer
PfE	Tamás Deutsch, Annamária Vicsek

Key to symbols:

+ : in favour

– : against

0 : abstention

European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy

20	+
ECR	Bert-Jan Ruissen
NI	Fidias Panayiotou
PPE	Georgios Aftias, Caterina Chinnici, Esteban González Pons, Niclas Herbst, Monika Hohlmeier, Kinga Kollár, Jacek Protas, Tomáš Zdechovský
Renew	Gilles Boyer, Olivier Chastel, Michal Wiezik
S&D	Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Giuseppe Lupo, Marit Maij, Csaba Molnár, Carla Tavares
Verts/ALE	Damian Boeselager, Daniel Freund

5	–
ECR	Dick Erixon
PfE	Virginie Joron, Julien Sanchez
The Left	Gaetano Pedulla’, Jonas Sjöstedt

3	0
ESN	Arno Bausemer
PfE	Tamás Deutsch, Annamária Vicsek

Key to symbols:

+ : in favour

– : against

0 : abstention

Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking

22	+
ECR	Bert-Jan Ruissen
NI	Fidias Panayiotou
PPE	Georgios Aftias, Caterina Chinnici, Esteban González Pons, Niclas Herbst, Monika Hohlmeier, Kinga Kollár, Jacek Protas, Tomáš Zdechovský
Renew	Gilles Boyer, Olivier Chastel, Michal Wiezik
S&D	Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Giuseppe Lupo, Marit Maij, Csaba Molnár, Carla Tavares
The Left	Gaetano Pedulla’, Jonas Sjöstedt
Verts/ALE	Damian Boeselager, Daniel Freund

4	–
ECR	Dick Erixon
ESN	Arno Bausemer
PfE	Virginie Joron, Julien Sanchez

2	0
PfE	Tamás Deutsch, Annamária Vicsek

Key to symbols:

+ : in favour

– : against

0 : abstention

Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking

20	+
ECR	Bert-Jan Ruissen
NI	Fidias Panayiotou
PPE	Georgios Aftias, Caterina Chinnici, Esteban González Pons, Monika Hohlmeier, Kinga Kollár, Jacek Protas, Tomáš Zdechovský
Renew	Gilles Boyer, Olivier Chastel, Michal Wiezik
S&D	Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Giuseppe Lupo, Marit Maij, Csaba Molnár, Carla Tavares
The Left	Gaetano Pedulla’, Jonas Sjöstedt
Verts/ALE	Damian Boeselager

4	–
ECR	Dick Erixon
ESN	Arno Bausemer
PfE	Virginie Joron, Julien Sanchez

2	0
PfE	Tamás Deutsch, Annamária Vicsek

Key to symbols:

+ : in favour

– : against

0 : abstention

Chips Joint Undertaking (before 21.9.2023: Key Digital Technologies Joint Undertaking)

21	+
ECR	Bert-Jan Ruissen
NI	Fidias Panayiotou
PPE	Georgios Aftias, Caterina Chinnici, Esteban González Pons, Monika Hohlmeier, Kinga Kollár, Jacek Protas, Tomáš Zdechovský
Renew	Gilles Boyer, Olivier Chastel, Michal Wiezik
S&D	Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Giuseppe Lupo, Marit Maij, Csaba Molnár, Carla Tavares
The Left	Gaetano Pedulla’, Jonas Sjöstedt
Verts/ALE	Damian Boeselager, Daniel Freund

3	–
ECR	Dick Erixon
PfE	Virginie Joron, Julien Sanchez

3	0
ESN	Arno Bausemer
PfE	Tamás Deutsch, Annamária Vicsek

Key to symbols:

+ : in favour

– : against

0 : abstention

Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking

23	+
ECR	Dick Erixon, Bert-Jan Ruissen
NI	Fidias Panayiotou
PPE	Georgios Aftias, Caterina Chinnici, Esteban González Pons, Niclas Herbst, Monika Hohlmeier, Kinga Kollár, Jacek Protas, Tomáš Zdechovský
Renew	Gilles Boyer, Olivier Chastel, Michal Wiezik
S&D	Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Giuseppe Lupo, Marit Maij, Csaba Molnár, Carla Tavares
The Left	Gaetano Pedulla’, Jonas Sjöstedt
Verts/ALE	Damian Boeselager, Daniel Freund

3	–
ESN	Arno Bausemer
PfE	Virginie Joron, Julien Sanchez

2	0
PfE	Tamás Deutsch, Annamária Vicsek

Key to symbols:

+ : in favour

– : against

0 : abstention

Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking

21	+
ECR	Bert-Jan Ruissen
NI	Fidias Panayiotou
PPE	Georgios Aftias, Caterina Chinnici, Esteban González Pons, Monika Hohlmeier, Kinga Kollár, Jacek Protas, Tomáš Zdechovský
Renew	Gilles Boyer, Olivier Chastel, Michal Wiezik
S&D	Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Giuseppe Lupo, Marit Maij, Csaba Molnár, Carla Tavares
The Left	Gaetano Pedulla’, Jonas Sjöstedt
Verts/ALE	Damian Boeselager, Daniel Freund

3	–
ESN	Arno Bausemer
PfE	Virginie Joron, Julien Sanchez

3	0
ECR	Dick Erixon
PfE	Tamás Deutsch, Annamária Vicsek

Key to symbols:

+ : in favour

– : against

0 : abstention

Final vote on motion for a resolution

20	+
ECR	Bert-Jan Ruissen
NI	Fidias Panayiotou
PPE	Georgios Aftias, Caterina Chinnici, Esteban González Pons, Niclas Herbst, Monika Hohlmeier, Kinga Kollár, Jacek Protas, Tomáš Zdechovský
Renew	Gilles Boyer, Olivier Chastel, Michal Wiezik
S&D	Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Giuseppe Lupo, Marit Maij, Csaba Molnár, Carla Tavares
Verts/ALE	Damian Boeselager, Daniel Freund

4	–
ECR	Dick Erixon
ESN	Arno Bausemer
PfE	Virginie Joron, Julien Sanchez

2	0
PfE	Tamás Deutsch, Annamária Vicsek

Key to symbols:

+ : in favour

– : against

0 : abstention

MIL OSI Europe News –

April 24, 2025

MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section IX – European Data Protection Supervisor – A10-0053/2025

Source: European Parliament

2. MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

with observations forming an integral part of the decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section IX – European Data Protection Supervisor

(2024/2028(DEC))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section IX – European Data Protection Supervisor,

– having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0053/2025),

A. whereas, in the context of the discharge procedure, the discharge authority wishes to stress the particular importance of further strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the Union institutions by improving transparency and accountability, and implementing the concept of performance-based budgeting and good governance of human resources (HR);

B. whereas data protection is a fundamental right, protected by Union law and enshrined in Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union;

C. whereas Article 16 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides that compliance with the rules relating to the protection of individuals, with regard to the processing of personal data concerning them, is to be subject to control by an independent authority;

D. whereas Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 provides for the establishment of an independent authority, the European Data Protection Supervisor (the ‘EDPS’), responsible for protecting and guaranteeing the right to data protection and privacy, and tasked with ensuring that the institutions and bodies, offices and agencies of the Union embrace a strong data protection culture;

E. whereas the EDPS carries out its functions in close cooperation with fellow Data Protection Authorities (DPAs) as part of the European Data Protection Board (EDPB), and it serves the public interest while being guided by principles of impartiality, integrity, transparency, pragmatism and respects Union legislation;

1. Notes that the budget of the EDPS falls under MFF Heading 7 ’European public administration’, which amounted to a total of EUR 12,3 billion, i.e. 6,4 % of Union budget spending, in 2023; notes that the budget of the EDPS represented 0,18 % of MFF Heading 7 appropriations;

2. Notes that the Court of Auditors (the ‘Court’), in its Annual Report (the ‘Court’s report’) for the financial year 2023, examined a sample of 70 transactions under MFF Heading 7, of which 21 (30 %) contained errors; further notes that for five of those errors, which were quantified by the Court, the Court estimated a level of error below the materiality threshold;

3. Notes from the Court’s report its observation that administrative expenditure comprises expenditure on HR including pensions, which in 2023 accounted for about 70 % of the total administrative expenditure, and on buildings, equipment, energy, communications and information technology; welcomes the Court’s renewed opinion that, overall, administrative spending is low risk;

4. Notes from the Court’s report that in 2023 it audited a salary payment of an official who had last made a declaration concerning rights to family and child allowance in 2020; echoes the Court’s concern that delays in receiving and verifying such declarations increase the risk of ineligible payments;

Budgetary and financial management

5. Notes that the final adopted budget for the EDPS was EUR 22 711 559 in 2023, which represents an increase of 12,06 % compared to 2022; notes that the budget of the EDPS also covers the work of the independent Secretariat of the EDPB; notes from the Annual report of the EDPS for 2023 (the ‘Annual Report’) that the adopted budget of the EDPB was EUR 7,67 million in 2023, including EUR 300 000 granted by means of an amending budget which was needed due to an increase in litigation activities in 2023;

6. Acknowledges that the budget monitoring and planning efforts of the EDPS in the financial year 2023 resulted in a budget implementation rate of current year commitment appropriations of 96 % in 2023 (slightly lower than in 2022 when that rate was 98 %); further notes from the report on the EDPS annual accounts for 2023 that the current year payment appropriations execution rate was 84 % (lower than 88 % in 2022); notes in addition, from EDPS replies to the questionnaire submitted by the Committee on Budgetary Control for the 2023 budgetary discharge (the ‘Questionnaire’), that the execution rate of payment appropriations overall was 91,33 % in 2023 (lower than 94,09 % in 2022);

7. Notes further that the amount of carry-overs (C8) from 2023 to 2024 was EUR 2 517 942,67 or 11,08 % of the total budget for 2023, compared to EUR 1 827 354,23 or 9,01 % of the total budget for 2022; notes that the execution rate of the C8 budget in 2023 was 76,65 % (higher than 73,77 % in 2022);

8. Welcomes an improvement in the average time to pay from 25 days in 2022 to 19 days in 2023, with 97,50 % of payments processed on time; notes that that improvement is also due to the EDPS having solved an old bug with the electronic payment system for invoices linked to mission costs; notes further a significant increase in the number of payments from 799 in 2022 to 1335 in 2023; observes in that context that the number of transactions is still lower than pre-pandemic levels due to changes in the way of working (such as hybrid meetings or virtual events for experts);

9. Notes that the effects of illegal Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine continued to create budgetary pressure on the EDPS in 2023, including through rising inflation and the consequent increase in energy costs, with the most affected budget lines being staff salaries, building security and rental costs, mission costs and services provided by external staff; commends in that context the EDPS for having re-adjusted its priorities and having implemented internal reallocation within budget chapters; understands that budgetary optimisation was necessary in order to successfully manage the indexation of staff salaries and rental costs, as well as an increase in the costs of external lawyer support services due to an increased number of EDPS binding decisions which led to a bigger number of cases to be defended before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) with the help of external legal assistance; regrets in that context that the EDPS had to postpone some of its activities, such as a feasibility study on artificial intelligence; calls on the EDPS to abide to the competences of its mandate with a collaborative approach with the Union institutions and agencies and to avoid initiating any legal action, especially those which are manifestly inadmissible, in order to avoid negative repercussions on the management of resources, which do not allow the EDPS to carry out its activities as an Institution;

10. Expresses concern about the significant increase in EDPS staff mission costs, from EUR 28 789 in 2021 and EUR 176 903 in 2022, to EUR 284 580 in 2023; calls on the EDPS to assess whether the resources spent on missions are being used appropriately and effectively; notes that the EDPS ceased making public the number of missions funded by organisers, as well as information on which unit or sector participated in each mission, thus reducing transparency regarding mission expenses; calls on the EDPS to reinstate this practice; encourages the EDPS to promote the use of video-conferencing tools where suitable, as this could contribute to lowering the number of missions and reducing costs; calls on the EDPS to assess whether the resources spent on missions are being used appropriately and effectively.

Internal management, performance and internal control

11. Notes that the EPDS used nine key performance indicators (KPIs) to monitor its performance in 2023, in alignment with the main objectives of the EDPS Strategy 2020-2024 which is implemented through the Annual Management Plan; notes from the Annual Report that the EDPS over-delivered in almost all areas, as indicated by the results of KPIs for 2023, except for one KPI (the number of EDPS followers on some social media accounts); notes with concern that the EDPS encountered considerable challenges due to a growing workload and intricate data protection issues arising from the rapidly evolving digital landscape, as well as due to the extension of the EDPS mandate to supervisory activities (such as audits and investigations) and replies to consultations and prior consultations, all in the context of a limited budget; notes from the EDPS’ follow-up report to Parliament’s resolution on the implementation of the EDPS’ budget for 2022 (the ‘Follow-up Report’) that several legislative developments in the last two years have impacted the work and resources of the EDPS, due to the extension of Eurojust’s mandate, new information to be received by Europol under the Digital Services Act, the roll out of the new Union’s large-scale databases and interoperability framework in the justice and home affairs field and the entry into force of the Artificial Intelligence Act (the “AI Act”); calls on the Commission and on the budgetary authority to take those matters into consideration during the annual budgetary procedure;

12. Welcomes the fact that, in 2023, the EDPS strengthened its ability to assess and prepare for emerging technological trends and their potential impact on privacy and data protection; notes that this was achieved through a foresight-based approach, with a focus on monitoring developments in areas such as large language models, digital identity wallets, the internet of behaviours, extended reality, and deep fake detection; welcomes in that context the publication by the EDPS of its third TechSonar initiative on emerging technologies; congratulates moreover the EDPS for having been awarded the GPA Global Privacy and Data Protection Awards 2023 in the category of innovation;

13. Notes that 2023 was marked by several organisational changes or updates that were needed in order to respond and adapt to the evolving data protection challenges; welcomes in this context the appointment of a Secretary-General from 1 July 2023; notes in addition the transition of two sectors into units such as ‘Information and Communication’ and ‘Governance and Internal Control’ and the creation of three new specialised sectors under the ‘Technology and Privacy’ (T&P) unit: ‘Systems Oversight and Audit’, ‘Technology Monitoring and Foresight’ and ‘Digital Transformation’;

14. Emphasises the role of the EDPS in supervising the processing of personal data by Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies; notes with concern the length of proceedings before the EDPS, as the EDPS did not close a single investigation in 2023, but in comparison to the previous year, in 2023, the number of notifications beyond the 72 hours significantly decreased;

15. Notes that the EDPS received 420 complaints, i.e. 53 more than in 2022, out of which 73 were admissible and 347 inadmissible in 2023; notes that the EDPS issued a final decision, opinion or reply in 31 out of 73 complaint cases received in 2023 within 44 days on average and responded to all 347 inadmissible complaints received; notes that, out of all admissible complaints (ongoing and received in 2023), 55 cases were finalised in 2023, which represents an increase of 17 % compared to 2022; acknowledges the efforts made by the EDPS to reduce the high number of complaints by developing a dynamic tool on the EPDS’ website, although the volume of complaints remained challenging due to limited resources in 2023; notes with satisfaction that the EDPS developed various procedural tools and policies to enhance its investigatory processes in 2023; commends in that context the EDPS for having amended its Rules of Procedure, whereby the “review procedure” is replaced by a “preliminary assessment” in order to safeguard the right to be heard of all the involved parties, thus contributing to a fair and timely handling of complaints and investigations;

16. Underlines the important role of consultation and advice of EDPS in the legislative process; notes that, pursuant to Article 42(1) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725, the EDPS responded to 80 formal legislative consultations and its advice took the form of 54 opinions (27 in 2022), 26 formal comments (49 in 2022) and 34 informal comments (30 in 2022) to the Commission and to the co-legislators in response to legislative consultation requests in 2023; commends the EDPS for its input with regard to the AI Act, in particular EDPS’ own-initiative opinion on the AI Act and advice on the AI liability rules, as well as for EDPS’ input to the GPA resolution on generative AI systems; acknowledges a significant increase (+93 %) of consultation requests over the last five years;

17. Notes that, in 2023, the EDPS carried out eight investigations and five pre-investigations, marking a significant increase compared to previous years; notes that in 2023 the EDPS was actively involved in a total of 13 investigations and seven pre-investigations, either launched in 2023 or carried over from prior years; notes that the EPDS continued two complex and resource-intensive formal investigations from 2021 into the use by European Union Institutions, Bodies and Agencies (EUIBAs) of cloud services from non-EU/EEA entities, including a focus on the Commission’s use of Microsoft 365; urges the finalisation of those investigations on time because of their significant impact on the working of institutions; notes further that the EDPS also launched five investigations based on complaints about EUIBAs’ websites, focusing in a broad way on privacy and data protection issues, with preliminary assessments expected in 2024;

18. Urges the EDPS to prioritise and enhance procedures for handling the personal data of minors under 15, particularly in the context of Europol’s systems, where such individuals may be marked as suspects; recognises the heightened vulnerability of that group and the need for robust safeguards;

19. Notes that the EDPS investigated the Commission’s alleged use of micro-targeting on platform X and continued two pre-investigations: one case concerning EUIBAs’ use of Trello cloud service, which was closed in 2023 and another one on EUIBAs’ use of profiling, which was carried out in 2024; notes that a total of six investigations and four pre-investigations (one pre-investigation in 2022) were launched in the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice (FSJ), reflecting a significant increase from 2022; notes the EDPS’ concerns with regard to the challenges that may arise in the case of investigations where joint action between national authorities and EUIBA’s is needed; notes in addition that, as part of its audit plan for 2023, the EDPS audited the following bodies: the European Personnel Selection Office, the European Investment Bank, the European Central Bank, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control and the European Medicines Agency;

20. Recalls that in 2022 the EDPS brought an action for annulment of two provisions of the amended Europol Regulation before the General Court, which was later rejected; notes that meanwhile the EDPS decided to appeal the order of the General Court in case T-578/22 [8], believing the issues raised should be addressed at the highest level; regrets that the EDPS did not realise the manifest inadmissibility of its appeal, even if the institution did not intend to challenge an act by Europol, but a retroactive change in the legal framework aimed at neutralising the effects of the EDPS’ enforcement actions; calls on the institution to cooperate with Union institutions and agencies, before initiating legal proceedings that prevent the fulfilment of its mandate and the use of its resources for purposes for which they were intended; notes further that the EDPS also followed up on the implementation of its Order of 3 January 2022, including checks on Europol’s reporting; regrets that the final report on that matter was communicated by the EDPS only on 22 July 2024;

21. Notes that, after the pilot implementation of the new risk management framework at the EDPS in late 2022, an anonymous satisfaction survey was conducted in May 2023 to assess its effectiveness and gather additional suggestions; notes further that the survey results were positive, leading to the formal adoption of the framework on 26 June 2023;

22. Notes that the internal audit service (IAS) carried out an audit on the methodology for the planning of EDPS audits in the EDPS in 2023; notes that the audit was concluded with two recommendations for which the EDPS submitted an action plan to the IAS; calls on the EDPS to keep the discharge authority informed on a regular basis on the progress made in that matter;

23. Recalls the Treaty on the European Union that the EU and its institutions shall promote solidarity and equality between women and men;

HR, equality and staff well-being

24. Notes that, at the end of 2023, the EDPS had 129 members of staff, compared to 127 in 2022; notes that the EDPS employed 50 contract staff (CA) under Article 3(b) of the Staff Regulations of Officials and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants (52 CA in 2022), 7 temporary agents (TA) under Article 2(b) and 2(c) (6 TA in 2022) and used the services of 12 external services providers (EXT) working intra-muros in 2023 (8 EXT in 2022); encourages the EDPS to continue its efforts towards a more balanced geographical representation among all Member States specifically at managerial level; welcomes the increased diversity of nationalities represented, but notes with regret the continued underrepresentation of women in senior management positions; calls for the adoption of a gender parity roadmap, including proactive recruitment measures and leadership training programs for female staff members;

25. Notes that the EDPS had 23 nationalities (from the Member States) represented among its staff in 2023, which is an improvement in comparison with 22 nationalities in 2022; notes with dissatisfaction the over-representation of five nationalities and an underrepresentation of other nationalities; urges the EDPS to continue its efforts to achieve a balanced geographical distribution of nationals from all Member States within its staff, by improving communication, fostering visibility, and enhancing job conditions to attract underrepresented nationalities;

26. Observes that, in 2023, the EDPS maintained a workforce comprising 65 % women and 35 % men, consistent with trends from previous years; regrets the absence of women in senior management roles, despite achieving gender parity among the six middle management positions; urges the EDPS to intensify its efforts to ensure gender-balanced representation across all staff levels, and invites the EDPS to promote the application of women also with a view to the next election of the Supervisor by Parliament;

27. Notes a high occupancy rate of the establishment plan of 95,65 % but also a high turnover rate of 13 % in 2023; notes that most of the unfilled positions were a result of candidates being unsuitable, given the EDPS’ need for highly specialised profiles and the small pool of eligible candidates; welcomes the addressing of those challenges through republication with a wider or more targeted dissemination of the vacancy or by redrafting the requirements; welcomes the steps taken by the EDPS regarding the hiring process; calls on the EDPS to continue to address the challenges in finding suitable candidates and to keep the discharge authority informed about improvements on staff recruitment and turnover;

28. Notes that, in the second half of 2023, the EDPS’ HR team launched a pilot for a new on-boarding process for newcomers, with sessions that cover, inter alia, presentations of core units’ work, ethics, procurement procedures and information security, whereas three on-boarding sessions were offered in 2023; invites the EDPS to continue offering to newcomers “on-boarding” and to all members of staff mandatory sessions that remind the importance of principles such as ethics, conflicts of interest, transparency, internal control and anti-fraud, as they have become the standard in the Union institutions; notes moreover that 12 individual sessions were offered for EDPS and EDPB staff, six sessions of group coaching in which participants (manager level) learned from each other, as well as a one-year team coaching with a designer for leadership development at the European School of Administration in 2023;

29. Notes, from the Questionnaire, that the EDPS offers flexible and hybrid working arrangements, that are well-received by members of staff who can benefit, inter alia, from parental leave, time credits, part-time work or working from abroad for a limited number of days per year; notes that, in 2023, the majority of staff made use of those working conditions, whereas 86,30 % of staff made use of teleworking arrangements in 2023; considers that the building infrastructure should be optimised to reflect that high rate of teleworking, which could contribute to reducing operational costs and ensuring more efficient use of office space; welcomes the EDPS’ continued efforts to actively improve physical and mental well-being of its staff;

30. Commends the EDPS for carrying out several awareness-raising actions during the year 2023 with information sharing on elimination of racial discrimination, International Women’s Day, EU diversity month and learning about neurodiversity; notes that currently the EDPS does not employ staff with disabilities but has an equal opportunities clause included in all EDPS vacancy notices and actively encourages applications from candidates with disabilities;

31. Notes from the Questionnaire that the EDPS considers confidential any information on burnout cases, including the number thereof; disagrees with that opinion and calls the EDPS to provide the discharge authority with the number of burnout cases on a yearly basis; notes with satisfaction that, in 2023, there were no harassment cases reported at the EDPS; welcomes the fact that, in 2023, the EDPS continued to provide an anti-harassment presentation delivered by one of the EDPS’ confidential counsellors, as part of the induction training called the ‘EDPS Welcome Day’; commends the publication of the decision on anti-harassment and the role of the confidential counsellors on the EDPS’ intranet;

Ethical framework and transparency

32. Notes that, in 2023, the EDPS focused its efforts on increasing staff awareness of the EDPS/EDPB ethical framework by organising mandatory dedicated training sessions for all staff and induction trainings for EDPS/EDPB newcomers, appointing a new ethics officer and participating in the ‘Comité Paritaire des Questions Statuaries’ working group on ethics; welcomes the establishment of a mailbox by the EPDS, where members of staff can submit their requests regarding any ethics related inquiries, as well as the use of Commission’s Ethics module in Sysper; encourages the EDPS to continue raising awareness and organising surveys to assess the level of staff awareness of the EDPS/EDPB ethical framework;

33. Welcomes the overall high level of transparency achieved by the EDPS concerning its activities, in particular as regards the publication of the agenda and the declaration of interests of the Supervisor and of the Head of EDPS Administration, in line with the Supervisor’s code of conduct of 2019; notes from the Follow-up Report that the EDPS has adopted two codes of conduct, whereas one of them applies to the Supervisor and the other one applies to the EDPS staff; understands that in cases when the Secretary-General is called to replace the Supervisor, the latter’s code of conduct also applies to the Secretary-General;

34. Notes with satisfaction that the EDPS has never been involved in any investigations by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) since its establishment;

35. Notes that, out of five inquiries opened by the Ombudsman in 2023 concerning the EDPS, four were closed without any further inquiry; notes that, for one enquiry, the decision was still pending and expected for Q4 2024; calls on the EDPS to keep the discharge authority informed as to the outcome of this enquiry;

36. Regrets that the EDPS has still not formally joined the Union’s Transparency Register (TR); nevertheless notes from the Follow-up Report that, with a view to formally joining the TR, the EDPS has launched an internal assessment on transparency measures, whereas, in 2023, exploratory meetings and exchanges of the EDPS with secretariat of the TR took place; calls on the EDPS to inform the discharge authority of the outcome of that assessment exercise; reiterates its call on the EDPS to join and use the TR, including for the proactive disclosure of meetings with any third parties, to ensure transparency in EDPS’ regulatory and advisory functions;

37. Notes with satisfaction that, in 2023, the EPDS established internal rules applicable to the hearing of persons that could be affected by an EDPS final decision adopted in own-initiative investigations and inquiries in order to ensure the proper exercise of their fundamental right to be heard in such proceedings; commends the EPDS for publishing a new factsheet on EDPS Investigations and a new EDPS Investigation Policy as well as for ensuring that all financial reports, including annual budgets, accounting and audit reports, are made publicly accessible through a Union institution website and other official channels, as the EPDS takes a leading role in enhancing the cybersecurity preparedness of the Union institutions;

38. Notes with satisfaction from the Questionnaire that no cases of conflicts of interest, whistleblowing or fraud were reported in the EDPS in 2023; notes that the EDPS has set up a framework to prevent conflicts of interest at the level of senior management and staff through codes of conduct, awareness raising and declarations of absence of conflicts of interest and confidentiality; notes that, in addition to the mandatory introduction to the ethical framework of the EDPS for all new members of staff, new members of staff are also introduced to the EDPS’ anti-fraud strategy;

39. Notes from the Questionnaire that the EDPS has internal rules on whistleblowing, which define safe routes and channels through which staff may raise concerns about fraud, corruption or any other serious wrongdoing, without prejudice to the confidentiality of the identity of the whistleblower and of the information reported; notes that, so far, there has never been a whistleblowing case reported to the EDPS;

40. Urges the EDPS to publicly disclose any recusals due to conflicts of interest in its enforcement decisions, ensuring full transparency in regulatory oversight and decision-making;

Digitalisation, cybersecurity and data protection

41. Notes from the Questionnaire that the 2023 budget for IT equipment and projects was 9,5 % lower compared to 2022; notes that that decrease was primarily because no new IT feasibility studies were being commissioned in 2023, as opposed to 2022 where such studies represented a substantial portion of the IT budget; notes further that other cost elements remain relatively stable between the two years, including general IT services and maintenance;

42. Notes from the Follow-up Report and the Questionnaire the conclusions of the IT feasibility study carried out in 2022, whereby there are gaps between what the IT tools and services provided by the Commission and Parliament can offer and the specific needs of the EDPS; notes that those gaps should be addressed by developing in-house capabilities and applications for which a minimum of five IT staff and partial outsourcing EDPS was deemed necessary; regrets that, due to budgetary constraints, implementation of the recommendations of the study remained on hold; calls on the EDPS to consider a step-by-step approach by starting with those recommendations and projects that would require fewer resources;

43. Commends the progress made in 2023 by the EDPS in digitalising its workflows and processes, with the introduction of ARES, the qualified digital signature (e-IDAS) and a collaborative platform (Nextcloud) for drafting documents and video-conferencing, as well as updates to the tool (Website Evidence Collector) that automates the collection of personal data processing on websites of data controllers and processors, the adoption of the acceptance environment of EU Send Web, a service/channel to exchange sensitive non-classified information with other EUIBAs and further progress made towards implementing services that cannot be outsourced, such as the form and the electronic workflow to manage data breach notifications; notes nevertheless issues with regard to the use and maintenance of the e-procurement system;

44. Welcomes the EDPS’s focus on ensuring that external contractors meet the necessary moral and ethical standards expected of all Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, particularly in light of the previous use of external companies by EDPS that, according to Yale University’s ranking, continue to operate in Russia;

45. Acknowledges that the EDPS successfully relies on many of the administrative systems used by the Commission, particularly in the field of HR and business administration processes, as well as on some of Parliament’s services, including the provision of laptops, network infrastructure and video-conferencing; commends the fact that the project to improve the quality and performance of the computers provided to EDPS staff, in collaboration with Parliament, with a view to the generalisation of hybrid work, has been completed;

46. Acknowledges the leading role of EDPS in enhancing the cybersecurity preparedness of the Union institutions, while working closely with bodies such as European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) and cybersecurity hubs such as CERT-EU; urges it to develop a structured audit framework for cybersecurity risks within Union bodies; notes that, in 2023, the EDPS continued to improve its readiness to protect personal data and sensitive information against cyber-attacks in view of the rapidly changing cybersecurity threat landscape; commends in that context the EDPS for reviewing its security policies and methodologies in preparation for the impact of the Cybersecurity Regulation (Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2023/2841); notes from the Questionnaire that the EDPS introduced a request for two additional full-time equivalents to cover cybersecurity infrastructure in connection with EDPS’s obligations under that Regulation as well as the EDPS’ role as a member of the Interinstitutional Cybersecurity Board (IICB); notes further with appreciation that the EPDS upgraded its Information Security Policy and the EDPS Acceptable Use Policy to address specific cybersecurity threats in relation to teleworking, use of personal mobile devices and banning of dangerous applications (TikTok); notes that the EDPS did not encounter any cyber-attacks in 2023; calls for annual public reporting on detected threats, response measures, and institutional cyber resilience;

47. Commends the EDPS for updating cybersecurity training for all staff and revamping the security training model for newcomers; appreciates that the EPDS has been proactive in raising awareness about cyber security risks, for instance by preparing fact sheets, conducting surveys with EUIBAs and running awareness campaigns; encourages the EDPS to ensure that staff receives compulsory training on the safe and ethical use of AI tools to enhance their understanding and mitigate potential risks;

Buildings

48. Notes that in 2023, as in 2022, the EDPS and EDPB were the sole tenants of Parliament’s building where they were located, following the move of the Ombudsman at the end of 2021 and that by renting their premises from the Parliament rather than the private market the EDPS intends to keep the rental and maintenance costs at a reasonable level; notes that the EDPS had to request an additional EUR 81 856,84 for paying rental costs to Parliament, given that the indexation rate was 8,82 % and thus higher than the 2 % ceiling for administrative expenditures;

49. Notes that, in terms of accessibility of its building, the EDPS relies on the decisions taken and implemented by Parliament, as part of their building policy; notes from the Follow-up Report that the EDPS employs staff with physical impairments due to serious illness; welcomes the commitment of the EDPS to explore the possibilities of hiring trainees with reduced mobility or disabilities;

Environment and sustainability

50. Notes that the EDPS has not joined the Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS) but has implemented several measures to reduce its environmental footprint, such as regulating the temperature automatically and centrally, turning lights off automatically when there is no movement in the room, purchasing eco-friendly products and services and automating the workflows with the introduction of ARES; notes from the Follow-up Report that according to the information received by Parliament’s Directorate-General for Infrastructure and Logistics, responsible for the management of the building rented by the EDPS, solar panels are installed on that building; asks the EDPS to inform the discharge authority to report on the share (%) of the solar-panel produced electricity in the EDPS’ total energy consumption needs per year; calls further on the EDPS to inform the discharge authority of any new developments regarding the EMAS certification process;

51. Notes that the EPDS has not assessed its carbon footprint in 2023; welcomes, however, that the EDPS continues to apply measures that reduce the carbon footprint by reducing the travel of journey to the office through teleworking possibilities, reimbursing 50 % of staff’s monthly/annual subscriptions for the use of public transport, encouraging the staff to favour videoconferencing and train travel for short distances, managing the cycle for invoices electronically and achieving an entirely paperless selection procedure and appraisal exercise as regards HR;

52. Urges the EDPS to adopt the EMAS to systematically monitor and improve its environmental footprint, particularly in terms of energy consumption, waste reduction, and sustainable office policies;

53. Notes that the EDPS addresses sustainability-related risks (such as environmental, social and governance risks) in a comprehensive way through an annual risk assessment exercise; welcomes in that context that the EDPS adopted its new risk management process in 2023, which should help the EDPS to target and better analyse those risks and consequently better calibrate mitigating actions;

Interinstitutional cooperation

54. Welcomes the budgetary and administrative savings achieved by the EDPS through inter-institutional cooperation, particularly the conclusion of service-level agreements with Parliament for the rental of its premises and the use of IT system applications, hardware supplies and maintenance and with the Commission for HR and business administration processes, as well as through participation in large interinstitutional framework contracts in areas such as IT consultancy, interim services and office supplies; commends in addition the EDPS for maintaining a structured cooperation with the Ombudsman, the Agency for Fundamental Rights and CERT-EU through memorandums of understanding;

55. Notes that the EDPS participates in meetings of various interinstitutional bodies; welcomes in this context the participation of the EPDS in meetings of the Heads of Administration and the Interinstitutional Online Communication Committee, led by Parliament’s Directorate-General for Communication; acknowledges that interinstitutional cooperation with EDPS, in his supervisory role, is of key importance for the other Union institutions to enhance their level of compliance with the data protection legal framework;

56. Calls for closer cooperation between the EDPS, the Court of Auditors, OLAF, and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) to develop common protocols for fraud detection in digital data and financial transactions within EU institutions; stresses the need for joint audits on AI-based fraud risks;

57. Welcomes the pivotal role played by the EDPS in 2023 in the coordination of the Data Protection Authorities of the Member States (DPAs) to promote consistent data protection across the Union; notes that the EDPS joined 26 DPAs in a coordinated enforcement action on the role and tasks of data protection officers (DPOs), assessing their compliance with Regulation (EU) 2018/1725; notes the continued active involvement of the EPDS in the Coordinated Supervision Committee (CSC) within the area of FSJ addressing issues such as handling complaints against Europol and enhancing cooperation processes; appreciates furthermore all the other steps taken to improve cooperation between the EDPS and the DPAs such as the conduction of a joint Europol inspection with national authorities (Poland and Lithuania) and the participation in the coordinated supervisory action on processing minors’ data in Europol systems, the participation in an operational visit to the European Delegated Prosecutor’s office in Lisbon under a Working Arrangement with Portugal’s DPA and the coordination of an onsite inspection in Lesvos with Greece’s DPA to verify data collection practices during Joint Operations by Frontex; acknowledges that those interinstitutional engagements help the EDPS align with best practices of Union institutions and benefit from the exchange of information with peer departments;

Communication

58. Notes that the budget for public communication and promotional activities in 2023 amounted to EUR 468 000, which represented an increase of 54 % compared to 2022;

59. Notes with satisfaction that the EDPS organised several communication events online as well as in person in 2023, aimed at raising awareness of EDPS’ role and mission among a wider public and the importance of respecting Union data protection rules, such as Data Protection Day, the EDPS Trainees’ conference (twice a year), the EDPS Seminar on the essence of the fundamental rights to privacy and data protection, and other international events;

60. Notes that the EDPS communicates online via its website and its social media accounts on X (ex-twitter) (29 400 followers), LinkedIn (71 000 followers), YouTube (2 900 followers), EU-Voice (5 900 followers) and EU-Video (750 followers);

61. Notes that the pilot project of the platforms EU Voice and EU Video (free and open-source social media networks, privacy-oriented and based on Mastodon and PeerTube software) continued in 2023; welcomes in that context the EDPS’ contribution to the Union’s strategy on data and digital sovereignty in order to promote the Union’s independence in the digital world and compliance with the data protection legal framework.

MIL OSI Europe News –

April 24, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Serbia – A10-0072/2025

Source: European Parliament

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Serbia

(2025/2022(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States of the one part, and the Republic of Serbia, of the other part [1], which entered into force on 1 September 2013,

– having regard to Serbia’s application for membership of the EU of 19 December 2009,

– having regard to the Commission opinion of 12 October 2011 on Serbia’s application for membership of the European Union (COM(2011)0668), the European Council’s decision of 1 March 2012 to grant Serbia candidate status and the European Council’s decision of 28 June 2013 to open EU accession negotiations with Serbia,

– having regard to the Brussels Agreement of 27 February 2023 and the Ohrid Agreement of 18 March 2023 and the Implementation Annex thereto,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III)[2],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans [3],

– having regard to the presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of 19 and 20 June 2003,

– having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits of 17 May 2018 in Sofia and of 6 May 2020 in Zagreb,

– having regard to its resolutions on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation,

– having regard to the Berlin Process, launched on 28 August 2014,

– having regard to the first agreement on principles governing the normalisation of relations between the governments of Serbia and Kosovo of 19 April 2013, to the agreements of 25 August 2015, and to the ongoing EU-facilitated dialogue for the normalisation of relations,

– having regard to the agreement on free movement between the governments of Serbia and Kosovo of 27 August 2022, to the agreement on licence plates of 23 November 2022, and to the Energy Agreements’ Implementation Roadmap in the EU-facilitated Dialogue of 21 June 2022,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2020 entitled ‘Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0057),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October 2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Serbia 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0695),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Serbia 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0695),

– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 9 February 2023 on the EU-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina,

– having regard to Article 14 of the Serbian Constitution on the protection of national minorities,

– having regard to the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, ratified by Serbia in 2001 and the Council of Europe’s European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, ratified by Serbia in 2006,

– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 26 and 27 October 2023 on Kosovo and Serbia,

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 17 December 2024 on enlargement,

– having regard to the final report of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) election observation mission on the early parliamentary and presidential elections of 3 April 2022 in Serbia, published on 19 August 2022,

– having regard to the European Council conclusions of December 2006, to the Council conclusions of March 2020 and to the Conclusions of the Presidency of the European Council in Copenhagen of 21-22 June 1993, also known as the Copenhagen criteria,

– having regard to the final report of the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission on the early parliamentary elections of 17 December 2023 in Serbia, published on 28 February 2024,

– having regard to the memorandum of understanding between the European Union and the Republic of Serbia on a strategic partnership on sustainable raw materials, battery value chains and electric vehicles, signed on 19 July 2024,

– having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement [4],

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Serbia, in particular that of 19 October 2023 on the recent developments in the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue, including the situation in the northern municipalities in Kosovo [5], and that of 8 February 2024 on the situation in Serbia following the elections [6],

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0072/2025),

A. whereas enlargement is one of the most successful EU foreign policy instruments and a strategic geopolitical investment in long-term peace, stability and security throughout the continent;

B. whereas according to the Copenhagen criteria, candidate countries must adhere to the values of the Union in order to be able to join it;

C. whereas democracy and the rule of law are the fundamental values on which the EU is founded;

D. whereas in recent years, political rights and civil liberties have been steadily eroded, putting pressure on independent media, the political opposition and civil society organisations;

E. whereas the Fourth Opinion on Serbia of the Council of Europe Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention on National Minorities, adopted on 26 June 2019, criticised Serbia’s delays in fully implementing education rights for minorities;

F. whereas freedom of religion is a core European value and a fundamental human right and Serbia is therefore obliged to respect and guarantee this freedom for all individuals residing within its territory, in accordance with its international commitments and human rights obligations;

G. whereas in line with Chapter 23 of the acquis, Serbia must demonstrate real improvements in the effective exercise of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities;

H. whereas each candidate country for enlargement is judged on its own merits, including their respect for and unwavering commitment to shared European rights and values and alignment with the EU’s foreign and security policy;

I. whereas Serbia has not imposed sanctions against Russia following the Russian aggression in Ukraine; whereas Serbia’s rate of alignment with the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) has been steadily declining since 2021; whereas Serbia supports the territorial integrity and political independence of Ukraine, and has clearly condemned the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine and voted alongside the EU in the UN, even though it has not imposed sanctions against Russia; whereas Serbia’s rate of alignment with the CFSP dropped from 54 % in 2023 to 51 % in 2024 while other candidate countries in the region – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and North Macedonia – achieved 100 % alignment;

J. whereas Serbia remains a critical battleground for foreign disinformation campaigns, notably by Russia and China, which seek to create an anti-Western rhetoric; whereas the final report of the OSCE/ODHIR on the early parliamentary elections held on 17 December 2023 pointed out several procedural deficiencies, as well as the use of harsh rhetoric and the presence of consistent bias in the media that gave an unbalanced advantage to the ruling party; whereas the issues identified in that report need to be assessed thoroughly and promptly; whereas as part of the accession negotiations, Serbia adopted the Strategy for Combating Cybercrime 2019-2023 and the relevant action plans in September 2018; whereas the strategy and the relevant action plans were not renewed after December 2023; whereas Serbia did not align with the EU’s restrictive measures in reaction to cyberattacks in 2023 and 2024;

K. whereas the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia is a precondition for the progression of both countries towards EU membership;

L. whereas accession to the EU inevitably requires full alignment with the foreign policy objectives of the Union;

M. whereas Serbia recognises the territorial integrity of Ukraine, including the Crimean peninsula and the Donbas region;

N. whereas the EU is Serbia’s main trading partner, accounting for 59.7 % of Serbia’s total trade;

O. whereas Russia is using its influence in Serbia to try to destabilise, interfere in and threaten neighbouring sovereign states and undermine Serbia’s European future; whereas Russian propaganda outlets such as RT (formerly Russia Today) and Sputnik operate freely in Serbia and exert significant influence in shaping anti-EU and anti-democratic narratives; whereas disinformation often originates from a false or misleading statement by a political figure, which is then reported by state-owned media and subsequently amplified on social media, often with an intention to undermine political opponents and democratic principles;

P. whereas on 8 June 2024, an ‘All-Serb Assembly’ took place in Belgrade with the participation of political leaders from Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Kosovo under the slogan ‘One people, one assembly’;

Commitment to EU accession

1. Notes Serbia’s stated commitment to EU membership as its strategic goal and its ambition to align fully with the EU acquis by the end of 2026; urges Serbia to deliver quickly and decisively on essential reforms, especially in cluster 1, for this very ambitious commitment to be perceived as realistic, genuine and meaningful; stresses the need for Serbia to seriously and categorically demonstrate that it is strategically oriented towards the EU, by showing strong political will and consistency in the implementation of EU-related reforms and by communicating objectively and unambiguously with its citizens about the EU, Serbia’s European path and the required reforms;

2. Reiterates the strategic importance of the Western Balkans in the current geopolitical context and for the security and stability of the EU as a whole; outlines that, owing to its geopolitical position, the country has a direct impact on the overall stability of the region; condemns, therefore, Serbia’s attempts to establish a sphere of influence undermining the sovereignty of neighbouring countries;

3. Acknowledges Serbia’s good level of preparation with regard to macroeconomic stability and fiscal discipline and the Commission’s assessment that cluster 3 is technically ready for opening but notes with concern that there has been limited or no overall progress in meeting the benchmarks for EU membership across negotiating chapters, with particular shortcomings in critical areas such as the rule of law, media freedom, public administration reform, and alignment with EU policies, particularly the EU’s foreign policy;

4. Regrets the fact that no substantial progress has been made on Chapter 31, as Serbia’s pattern of alignment with EU foreign policy positions has remained largely unchanged, mainly due to Serbia’s close relations with Russia; recalls that Serbia remains a notable exception in the Western Balkans regarding CFSP alignment; calls on Serbia to reverse this trend and to demonstrate positive steps towards full alignment; notes that Serbia’s rate of compliance with EU statements and declarations is increasing but remains at only 61 %; welcomes Serbia’s continued active participation in and positive contribution to EU military crisis management missions and operations;

5. Welcomes Serbia’s humanitarian support for Ukraine and takes note of the sale of ammunition to the value of EUR 800 million for use by Ukraine in a mutually beneficial agreement; notes that Serbia has aligned with some of the EU’s positions regarding Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; regrets, however, that Serbia still does not align with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia; calls on the EU to reconsider the extent of the financial assistance provided by the EU to Serbia in the event of continued support for anti-democratic ideologies and non-alignment with the EU’s restrictive measures and the CFSP; calls on Serbia to swiftly align with the EU’s restrictive measures and general policy towards Russia and Belarus, systematically and without delay;

6. Stresses the importance of implementing sanctions against Russia for the security of Europe as a whole; deplores Serbia’s continued close relations with Russia, raising concerns about its strategic orientation; reiterates its calls on the Serbian authorities to enhance transparency regarding the role and activities of the so-called Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Center in Nis and to immediately terminate all military cooperation with Russia; notes Serbia’s decision to support the UN resolution condemning Russia’s aggression against Ukraine three years after the full-scale invasion; regrets President Vučić’s immediate verbal retraction of Serbia’s UN vote, calling it a ‘mistake’; considers that maintaining privileged relations with the Kremlin regime undermines not only Serbia’s credibility as a candidate country but also the trust of its European partners and the future of EU-Serbia relations;

7. Regrets the continued decline in public support for EU membership in Serbia and the growing support for the Putin regime, which is the result of a long-standing anti-EU and pro-Russian rhetoric from the government-controlled media as well as some government officials; calls on the Serbian authorities to foster a fact-based and open discussion on accession to the EU;

8. Deplores the continued spread of disinformation, including about Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; condemns the spillover effects of these actions in other countries in the region; calls on the Serbian authorities to combat disinformation and calls for the EU to enhance cooperation with Serbia to strengthen democratic resilience and counter hybrid threats;

9. Notes Serbia’s progress on aligning with EU visa policy and calls for full alignment, in particular with regard to those non-EU countries presenting a security threat to the EU, including the threat of cyberattacks; welcomes the agreement signed on 25 June 2024 between the EU and Serbia on operational cooperation on border management with Frontex, highlighting the need to act in line with fundamental rights and international standards;

10. Reiterates that the overall pace of the accession negotiations should depend on tangible progress on the fundamentals, the rule of law and a commitment to the shared European rights and values as well as to the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue, which is to be conducted in good faith so that it results in a legally binding agreement based on mutual recognition, as well as alignment with the EU’s CFSP; reiterates its position that accession negotiations with Serbia should only advance if the country aligns with EU sanctions against Russia and makes significant progress on its EU-related reforms, in particular in the area of the fundamentals;

11. Repeats its concern regarding the appeasing approach of the Commission towards Serbia against the backdrop of the country’s year-long rollback on the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights, as well as its destabilising influence on the whole region; urges the Commission to use clearer language, including on the highest level, towards Serbia, consistently addressing significant shortcomings, lack of progress and even backsliding, thus upholding the EU’s fundamental values;

12. Calls on the Serbian Government to promote the role and benefits of EU accession and EU-funded projects and reforms among the Serbian population;

Democracy and the rule of law

13. Notes the ongoing challenges in ensuring judicial independence, including undue influence and political pressure on the judiciary; expresses concern about the failure to implement safeguards preventing political interference in judicial appointments and disciplinary actions against judges and prosecutors; calls on Serbia to ensure that the High Judicial Council, the High Prosecutorial Council and the Government and Parliament of Serbia effectively and proactively defend judicial independence and prosecutorial autonomy;

14. Stresses the importance of adopting the Law on the Judicial Academy and the Venice Commission opinion and making necessary judicial appointments to reduce existing vacancies and improve the overall effectiveness of the judicial system; notes that the delay in adopting this law has stalled key judicial reforms necessary for alignment with EU standards; calls for the draft law to be amended following transparent consultation with all relevant stakeholders, with a view to ensuring the independence and control mechanisms of the institution in order to contribute to overall judicial independence;

15. Notes that limited progress has been made in the fight against corruption despite the adoption of a new anti-corruption strategy for 2024-2028; calls on Serbia to adopt and begin implementing the accompanying anti-corruption action plan and to establish an effective monitoring and coordination mechanism to track progress, in line with international standards; expresses concern that corruption is still prevalent in many areas, particularly related to ‘projects of interests for the Republic of Serbia’, and that strong political will is required to effectively address corruption as well as to mount a robust criminal justice response to high-level corruption; notes that Serbia ranks 105th in the Corruption Perceptions Index 2024, well below the EU average; considers that the level of corruption in Serbia is a significant obstacle to its EU accession process; notes with concern that results have still not been delivered in cases of high public interest, after several years, such as in the long-standing cases of Krušik, Jovanjica, Savamala and Belivuk; calls on Serbia to strengthen the independence of its anti-corruption institutions by ensuring that they are adequately resourced and protected from political interference; calls on the Government of Serbia to sign the Anti-Bribery Convention of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and to fully align its legal framework on police cooperation and organised crime with that of the EU;

16. Welcomes the more pluralistic composition of the new parliament, with a broader representation of political parties, including parties of national minorities; notes that the early election and the corresponding break in the functioning of the government and parliament have impeded progress on reforms; notes the frequent pattern of early elections, a permanent campaign mode and long delays in forming governments, as well as the disrupted work of the national parliament, including the absence of government question-time sessions, the lack of discussion on the reports of independent institutions, and the more frequent use of urgent procedures, which lead to a lack of parliamentary legislative oversight and legitimacy and do not contribute to the effective democratic governance of the country;

17. Takes note of the resignation of Prime Minister Miloš Vučević on 28 January 2025, which was confirmed by the National Assembly on 19 March 2025; takes note of the resumption of the work of the National Assembly on 4 March 2025, after a pause of three months, and condemns all the acts of violence that occurred on this occasion;

18. Reiterates its readiness to support the National Assembly and the members thereof in the democratic processes related to Serbia’s European path, including the proper functioning of the parliament in accordance with its rules of procedure, by using the European Parliament’s existing democracy support tools and initiatives and by supporting increased parliamentary oversight of the EU accession process and reforms;

19. Takes note, with deep concern, of the final report of the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission on the December 2023 elections; notes that in April 2024, the National Assembly formed a working group for the improvement of the election process but that, by the end of the year, it had not agreed on any legal measures to improve the election process; notes that two out of three representatives of civil society left the working group in February 2025; notes that steps were taken in the first months of 2025 on amending the Law on Unified Voter Registry but that there is no consensus among political and civil society actors on the content; calls on all parliamentary groups in the National Assembly to decide on the implementation of ODIHR recommendations, with the agreement of all groups; calls for equal treatment of all members of parliament in the work of the National Assembly, consistent and effective implementation of the parliamentary Code of Conduct and the impartial sanctioning of breaches of parliamentary integrity;

20. Is concerned about the increasing role of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) and foreign cyber operations and interference in Serbia’s democratic election processes;

21. Stresses the critical importance of ensuring the independence of key institutions, including media regulators such as the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media (REM); regrets the delay in the election of the new members; regrets the irregularities in the nomination process; notes the withdrawal of several candidates from the selection in February 2025, who justified their decision on the basis of these irregularities; deeply regrets the fact that the REM neglected its legal obligations to scrutinise the conduct of the 2023 election campaign in the media in a timely manner, to report on its findings and to sanction media outlets that breached the law, spread hate speech or violated journalistic standards; notes, with concern, the absence of pluralistic political views in the nationwide media; notes that the REM should actively promote media pluralism and transparency regarding the ownership structures of media outlets and independence from foreign actors;

22. Notes that the REM awarded four national frequencies to channels that have a history of violating journalistic standards, including using hate speech and misleading the public, not complying with warnings issued by the REM, spreading disinformation and supporting the Kremlin’s narrative on Russia’s war in Ukraine; deeply regrets the fact that REM has not issued the fifth national licence and calls for it to be awarded through a transparent and impartial process without unnecessary delay and in compliance with international media freedom standards as soon as a new REM council is elected; calls for the Serbian Government to scrap and re-start the process of electing new members, in line with Serbian law and international media freedom standards;

Fundamental freedoms and human rights

23. Expresses its sincere condolences to the families of the 15 victims who lost their lives and to those who were injured following the collapse of the canopy of Novi Sad train station on 1 November 2024; calls for full and transparent legal proceedings following the investigation by the authorities, to bring those responsible to justice; underlines the need to examine more broadly to what extent corruption led to the lowering of safety standards and contributed to this tragedy;

24. Regrets the delayed response and accountability of the Serbian authorities, the slow investigation process and the lack of transparency in the aftermath of the tragedy, which were partially addressed in the face of escalating public pressure;

25. Expresses deep concern about the systemic issues highlighted by the student protests and various other protests in Serbia, such as issues relating to civil liberties, separation of powers, corruption, environmental protection, institutional and financial transparency, especially in relation to infrastructure projects, and accountability; regrets the fact that the government missed the opportunity to meet the demands of the students and of the citizens who support the students in good faith; affirms that the students’ demands align with reforms that Serbia is expected to implement on its European path;

26. Underlines the importance of freedom of speech and assembly; calls on the authorities of Serbia to ensure the protection of those participating in the peaceful protests; takes note of the mass protests on 15 March 2025, the largest in the modern history of Serbia; calls for an impartial investigation of the claims that unlawful technology of crowd control was used against the protesters, causing injuries to a number of them;

27. Condemns, in the strongest terms, the misuse of personal data from public registries to retaliate against peaceful protesters; calls on the prosecution office in Serbia to file charges against all persons who physically attacked and incited violence against the participants of the demonstrations; is deeply concerned about any act of violence; is carefully following developments as regards arrests of protesters and legal proceedings that have been opened against them; is concerned about the reports that the security services were involved in intimidation and surveillance of the protesters; condemns the language used by the Serbian authorities inciting violence against students and other protesters; notes that student activists have faced legal harassment, intimidation and excessive use of force by the authorities; calls for a thorough, impartial and speedy investigation into allegations of violence used against demonstrators and police misconduct during protests; urges the diplomatic missions of the EU and the Member States to continue to monitor closely the ongoing legal cases relating to the protests;

28. Is deeply alarmed that the Serbian authorities have engaged in widespread illegal surveillance practices using spyware against activists, journalists and members of civil society, as indicated in the recent reports by Amnesty International and the SHARE Foundation; urges the Government of Serbia to immediately cease the use of advanced surveillance technology against activists, journalists and human rights defenders, and calls on the competent state authorities to conduct a thorough investigation into all existing cases of unlawful surveillance and use of spyware and to initiate appropriate proceedings against those responsible; calls on the European Commission, in the light of this, to follow up on these incidents, address these issues with the Serbian authorities and insist on a thorough investigation into these matters;

29. Rejects allegations that the EU and some of its Member States were involved in organising the student protests with a view to triggering a ‘colour revolution’; strongly condemns, in that context, the unlawful arrests and expulsions of EU citizens and the public disclosure, by convicted war criminals, of the personal data of EU citizens, as well as hate speech against national minorities; expresses concern about the rising number of detention cases involving EU citizens at Serbia’s border; notes that anti-EU narratives are being manifested in decreasing support for EU integration in Serbian society and in a strengthening of the presence of foreign autocratic actors in the country;

30. Calls on the Serbian authorities to restore citizens’ confidence in state institutions by granting transparency and accountability; encourages all political and social actors to engage in an inclusive, substantive dialogue aimed at fulfilling EU-related reforms;

31. Notes that media freedom in Serbia has deteriorated further, as evidenced by Serbia’s drop to 98th place in the 2024 Reporter Without Borders World Press Freedom Index; urges Serbia to improve and protect media professionalism, diversity and media pluralism, and to promote quality investigative journalism, the highest ethical journalistic standards, through respecting journalistic codes of conduct, and media literacy; recalls the importance of the plurality and transparency of the media, including on aspects related to ownership and state financing, most notably through better involvement of the REM; recalls that the concentration of media ownership can have adverse effects on the freedom of the media and the professionalism of reporting; reaffirms that, as part of the accession negotiations, Serbia needs to align with the EU in matters of strategic importance, such as countering FIMI; calls on Serbia to align with EU policies in countering foreign interference and disinformation campaigns by implementing concrete regulatory measures in line with EU standards, such as the provisions included in the Digital Services Act [7] and Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising [8]; encourages cooperation between Serbia, the European External Action Service and the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in tackling disinformation; expects the authorities to investigate and prosecute all instances of hate speech, smear campaigns and strategic lawsuits against journalists;

32. Expresses its deep concerns about reported cases of abusive attacks, digital surveillance and harassment against journalists, human rights activists and civil society organisations, most recently a police raid on 25 February 2025 on four leading civil society organisations, ostensibly regarding their misuse of US Agency for International Development funds; strongly condemns persistent smear campaigns and intimidation against civil society in Serbia, including false allegations about plots to overthrow the government with foreign support;

33. Expresses concern that civil society organisations in Serbia face increasing challenges, including restrictive conditions, funding constraints, police raids and other forms of intimidation from state authorities; underlines the importance of a framework that enables local, vibrant civil society organisations to operate freely and participate in policymaking, including EU integration processes, in inclusive and meaningful ways; regrets that Serbia currently does not provide a framework that enables its lively and pluralistic civil society organisations, particularly those engaged in democracy support and electoral observation, to operate freely and participate in policymaking in inclusive and meaningful ways; expresses concern about recent raids of the offices of civil society organisations; calls for investigations into all attacks and smear campaigns against civil society organisations and for the improved transparency of public funding;

34. Urges the Serbian authorities to expand the availability of public broadcasting services in all minority languages across the country, ensuring equal access to media for all communities, while drawing on the best practice of the region of Vojvodina;

35. Expresses its deep concern about the draft law submitted to the Serbian Parliament on 29 November 2024, which proposes the establishment of a Russian-style foreign agents law; reminds Serbian legislators that civil society organisations and journalists play a key role in a healthy democratic society; reiterates that such legislation is incompatible with the values of the EU; notes that multiple civil society organisations suspended their cooperation with the legislative and executive branches of the government in February 2025;

36. Expresses grave concern about the increasing political interference in heritage protection in Serbia, including the removal of protected status from cultural monuments and the disregard for legal procedures governing their preservation, as in the case of the Generalštab Modernist Complex;

37. Calls on Serbia to fight disinformation, including manipulative anti-EU narratives and, in particular, to end its own state-sponsored disinformation campaigns; condemns the opening of an RT office in Belgrade, the launch of RT’s online news service in Serbian and the continued operation of the Russian online news service Sputnik Srbija, which is used to propagate pro-Russian narratives and misinformation across the Western Balkans region; urges the Serbian authorities to counter hybrid threats and fully align with the Council’s decision on the suspension of the broadcasting activities of Sputnik and RT; is deeply concerned about the spread of disinformation about the Russian aggression against Ukraine; calls on Serbia and the Commission to bolster infrastructure to fight disinformation and other hybrid threats; condemns the increasing influence of Russian and Chinese state-sponsored disinformation in Serbia, including the dissemination of anti-EU and anti-democratic narratives;

38. Takes note of the adoption of the national strategy for equality and the strategy for prevention of and protection against discrimination, and calls for their full implementation and for further alignment with European standards; urges the Serbian authorities to address the recommendations of the Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (GREVIO), with a view to improving compliance with the Istanbul Convention ratified by Serbia; notes with concern the temporary suspension of the implementation of the Law on Gender Equality by the Constitutional Court; expresses concern about the persistent lack of adequate support for organisations promoting women’s rights and gender equality;

39. Stresses that the Serbian authorities must take concrete measures to uphold and strengthen the respect for the rights of the child in the country, including by ratifying the third Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopting a national action plan for the rights of the child, adopting a new strategy on violence against children, given the expiry of the previous framework, and establishing a national framework to protect children from abuse and neglect;

40. Welcomes the fact that Belgrade Pride 2024 parade, the biggest in Serbia so far, passed off peacefully, though being protected by a high-profile police presence;

41. Highlights the need for strong commitment to safeguarding the rights of national minorities, ensuring their full representation at all levels of government, preserving their cultural identity through the use of their respective languages and by meeting their educational needs, freedom of expression and access to information, and to actively pursuing investigations into hate-motivated crimes as an irreplaceable part of common European values; regrets the fact that almost all national minorities are protected only formally; expresses concerns about the practice of pro forma representation of national minorities who are under government control; calls on Serbia to protect and promote the cultural heritage and traditions of its national minorities, in particular to create a positive atmosphere for education in minority languages, including by providing sufficient numbers of teachers, textbooks and additional materials, and deplores the violation of minority rights in this area; calls on Serbia to refrain from exploiting the national identities of national minorities that create division within these communities, and strongly condemns recorded cases of hate speech against some of them; notes the considerable delay in drafting a new action plan for the realisation of national minority rights and stresses the urgent need for Serbia to finalise and implement it promptly; highlights the need for the new action plan to fully incorporate the findings and recommendations of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities;

42. Expresses concerns about the significant decline in the population of certain minority groups, including the Bulgarian minority; calls on Serbia to ensure the right to use names and language specific to minority groups, including women within the Bulgarian community; notes with concern that not all school textbooks have been translated into Bulgarian; calls on the Serbian Government to ensure reciprocal equal rights for the Croatian minority in Serbia as the Serbian minority enjoys in Croatia, in particular with regard to ensuring their reciprocal representation at all levels of government, including regional and local levels; reiterates its concern regarding the restrictive and arbitrary enforcement of the Law on Permanent and Temporary Residence related to the passivation of address of thousands of Albanians in the south of Serbia; emphasises the situation of the Romanian Orthodox Church in Serbia, which is not officially recognised by the state as a traditional church;

43. Regrets the attempts by the Serbian authorities to undermine the national identity of communities within the country; expresses concern, in this context, about the promotion of narratives such as that of the ‘Shopi nation’, which seek to erase the existence of the Bulgarian community and deny its historical roots and cultural heritage; regrets the searches carried out by the Serbian authorities at the Bosilegrad Cultural Centre and the initiation of pre-trial proceedings for ‘ethnic hatred’ against activists from non-governmental organisations;

44. Calls on Serbia to refrain from distorting historical events, such as the narrative surrounding the so-called Surdulica massacre, which only serve to spread division and hatred against minorities and neighbouring countries, which is incompatible with EU membership;

Reconciliation and good neighbourly relations

45. Reiterates that good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation remain essential elements of the enlargement process; calls on Serbia to stop restrictions on entry for regional civil society activists and artists as such practices undermine regional dialogue and cooperation; reaffirms, furthermore, the importance of the stability of south-eastern European countries and their resilience against foreign interference in internal democratic processes; stresses the importance of Serbia developing good neighbourly relations, implementing bilateral agreements and resolving outstanding bilateral issues with its neighbours; notes Serbia’s participation in regional initiatives and its active involvement in the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans and the Common Regional Market; underlines the fact that respect for national minority rights is an essential condition of Serbia’s advancement along its European path;

46. Calls for historical reconciliation and the overcoming of discrimination and prejudices from the past; deplores the recent inflammatory rhetoric by the government, targeting neighbouring states that did not support the opening of cluster 3 for Serbia;

47. Reiterates that Serbia must refrain from influencing the domestic politics of its neighbouring Western Balkan countries, including regarding the unconstitutional celebration of Republika Srpska Day in Bosnia and Herzegovina and questioning Bosnia and Herzegovina’s court decisions;

48. Urges Serbia to step up its reconciliation efforts and seek solutions to past disputes, in particular when it comes to missing persons, who account for 1 782 people in Croatia, 7 608 people in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 1 595 people in Kosovo; calls on the Serbian authorities to achieve justice for victims by recognising and respecting court verdicts on war crimes, fighting against impunity for wartime crimes, investigating cases of missing persons, investigating grave sites, and supporting domestic prosecutors in bringing perpetrators to justice, which requires the cooperation of other parties too; strongly condemns the widespread public denials of international verdicts for war crimes, including the denial of the Srebrenica genocide;

49. Calls on the judicial authorities in Serbia to ensure compliance with the standards of fair trial and satisfaction of justice for victims in all war crime cases; calls for the denial of war crimes and the glorification of war criminals to be included in the Criminal Code, with a view to prosecuting any form of denial of war crimes determined by the verdicts of the International Criminal Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia and the International Court of Justice;

50. Reiterates its position on the importance of opening and publishing wartime archives, and reiterates its call for the former Yugoslav archives to be opened and, in particular, for access to be granted to the files of the former Yugoslav secret service (UDBA) and the Yugoslav People’s Army Counterintelligence Service (KOS), and for the files to be returned to the respective governments if they so request;

51. Reiterates its full support for the EU-facilitated dialogue and welcomes the appointment of Peter Sørensen as the EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue;

52. Reiterates the importance of constructive engagement on the part of the authorities of both Serbia and Kosovo in order to achieve a comprehensive, legally binding normalisation agreement, based on mutual recognition and in accordance with international law; calls on both Kosovo and Serbia to implement the Brussels and Ohrid Agreements, including the establishment of the Association/Community of Serb-majority municipalities, and the lifting of Serbia’s opposition of Kosovo’s membership in regional and international organisations, and to avoid unilateral actions that could undermine the dialogue process;

53. Expects Kosovo and Serbia to fully cooperate and take all the necessary measures to apprehend and swiftly bring to justice the perpetrators of the 2023 terrorist attack in Banjska; deplores the fact that Serbia still has not prosecuted the culprits, most notably Milan Radoičić, the Vice-President of Srpska Lista; reiterates that the perpetrators of the terrorist attack in Zubin Potok must also be held accountable and must face justice without delay;

54. Calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and on the Commission to take a more proactive role in leading the dialogue process; calls for an enhanced role for the European Parliament in facilitating the dialogue through regular joint parliamentary assembly meetings;

Socio-economic reforms

55. Welcomes Serbia’s steady progress towards developing a functioning market economy with positive GDP growth and increased foreign investment in some sectors; takes note of that fact that Serbia received its first-ever investment-grade credit rating; underlines the fact that the EU is Serbia’s main trading partner, the largest source of foreign direct investment and by far the largest donor; reiterates that the financial assistance, which is of great benefit to Serbia, is conditional on the strengthening of democratic principles and alignment with the CFSP and other EU policies; reiterates the need for more substantial reforms in the labour market, education and public administration, including to address social inequalities; expresses concern about the scale and scope of intergovernmental contracts awarded that are exempt from the current legislative framework on public procurement; regrets, however, the fact that public debt as a percentage of GDP remains well above the eastern European average;

56. Is concerned about the investment in Serbia by Russia and China and their growing influence on the political and economic processes in the region;

57. Calls on Serbia to intensify efforts and increase investment in the socio-economic development of its border regions to address depopulation and ensure that the residents have access to essential services, including professional opportunities, healthcare and education; underlines the potential of the IPA III cross-border cooperation programmes as a key tool to promote long-term sustainable regional growth;

58. Welcomes Serbia’s active engagement in the implementation of the new Growth Plan for the Western Balkans; takes note of the fact that Serbia adopted its Reform Agenda on 3 October 2024; believes that embracing the opportunities of the growth plan would further enhance the Serbian economy, which over the past three years benefited from more than EUR 586 million in financial and technical assistance under IPA III; believes that the EU funding should better support the democratic reforms of the country; calls, in that context, for the relevant EU funding, including from the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, to be reprogrammed to redirect more funds towards supporting judiciary reforms and anti-corruption measures, as well as towards independent media and civil society organisations, in order to support their critical work, in particular in the vacuum created by the withdrawal of US donors; calls, furthermore, for the EU and the Western Balkan countries to establish a framework for fruitful cooperation between the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and its Western Balkan counterparts in order to ensure that the EPPO can effectively exercise its power on IPA III and Western Balkan Facility funds in the recipient countries; urges the Serbian authorities to step up efforts to communicate clearly to citizens the benefits of the EU funds and to improve their visibility;

59. Regrets the lack of public consultation during the adoption of the Serbian Reform Agenda; calls for more effective oversight of the EU funding programmes and projects;

60. Advocates increased regional cooperation among Western Balkan countries to share best practice and develop joint strategies in combating disinformation and foreign interference; emphasises the role of the EU in facilitating such collaborative efforts; calls for the continuation and further reinforcement of the IPA regional cybersecurity programme;

61. Recognises the important role of Serbia’s business community in advancing economic convergence with the EU, including through the opportunities offered by and in the implementation of the growth plan as a sustainable alternative to Russian and Chinese investment in the country; welcomes the business community’s contribution to advancing socio-economic relations in the Western Balkans;

62. Takes note of Serbia’s business community’s efforts in advocating for the accession of the Western Balkans to the EU’s single market as a concrete step towards full EU membership; calls for clear, measurable actions and well-defined roles and responsibilities for the implementation of the Common Regional Market action plan, as a key driver for the region’s successful accession to the EU’s single market;

Energy, the environment, sustainable development and connectivity

63. Calls on Serbia to increase its efforts towards the transposition of relevant environmental and climate acquis and to ensure the proper application of environmental protection standards, including by significantly enhancing its administrative and technical capacities at all levels of government, notably on waste management legislation and the adoption of the Climate Change Adaptation Programme and the National Energy and Climate Plan; urges the Serbian authorities to improve the transparency and environmental impact assessment of all investment, including from China and Russia;

64. Reiterates its regret regarding the lack of action on the pollution of the Dragovishtitsa river by mines operating in the region and the detrimental effect on the health of the local people and the environment;

65. Calls on Serbia to increase its efforts towards the decarbonisation of its energy system and to enable effective enforcement of pollution reduction regulations related to thermal power plants;

66. Emphasises the need for further progress in transboundary cooperation with neighbouring countries, especially with regard to transboundary road infrastructure; urges Serbia to begin implementing the activities outlined in the memorandum of understanding on environmental protection cooperation with Bulgaria;

67. Takes note of the EU-Serbia memorandum of understanding launching a strategic partnership on sustainable raw materials, battery value chains and electric vehicles, in view of the European energy transition and in line with the highest environmental standards; recalls that dialogue with the affected populations, the scientific community and civil society should be at the centre of any such strategic partnership;

68. Welcomes the agreement reached at the EU-Western Balkans summit in Tirana on reduced roaming costs; calls, in this respect, on the authorities, private actors and all stakeholders to facilitate reaching the agreed targets to achieve a substantial reduction of roaming charges for data and further reductions leading to prices close to the domestic prices between the Western Balkans and the EU by 2027; welcomes the entering into force of the first phase of implementation of the roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU;

69. Reiterates that it is important for Serbia to continue diversifying its energy supply, to be able to break away from its dependency on Russia; takes note of the sanctions announced by the United States against Naftna Industrija Srbije (NIS), a subsidiary of the Russian Gazprom; welcomes the completion of the gas interconnector between Serbia and Bulgaria (IBS) in December 2023; regrets the postponement of the launching of the IBS’s commercial operation; calls for the swift finalisation of the permitting process to ensure its full operability in compliance with the energy community acquis; notes that Serbia is taking steps to introduce a carbon tax by 2027 as a step towards aligning with the EU emissions trading system;

70. Notes that all chapters in cluster 4 on the green agenda and sustainable connectivity have been opened; notes the adoption of the Law on Environmental Impact Assessment as a positive step towards environmental protection in Serbia, while expressing its regret that the new law fails to align fully with the relevant EU Directive 2014/52/EU [9], since it still leaves the opportunity for significant projects to advance without comprehensive environmental scrutiny; reiterates the need to designate and rigorously manage protected areas, particularly those identified as Important Bird and Biodiversity Areas (IBAs); calls for special attention to be given to critical sites where enforcement against poaching needs to be improved;

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71. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the President, Government and National Assembly of Serbia.

MIL OSI Europe News –

April 24, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Türkiye – A10-0067/2025

Source: European Parliament

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Türkiye

(2025/2023(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 17 and 18 April 2024, 30 June 2023, 23 June 2022, 24 June 2021 and 12 December 2019, and to all relevant previous Council and European Council conclusions,

– having regard to Türkiye’s membership of the Council of Europe and NATO,

– having regard to the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey on the readmission of persons residing without authorisation [1] (EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement),

– having regard to the statement of the members of the European Council of 25 March 2021 on Türkiye,

– having regard to the ‘EU-Turkey statements’ of 18 March 2016 and 29 November 2015,

– having regard to the ‘Turkey Negotiating Framework’ of 3 October 2005,

– having regard to the declaration issued by the European Community and its Member States on 21 September 2005 following the declaration made by Turkey upon its signature of the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement on 29 July 2005,

– having regard to the Council conclusions of December 2006 and March 2020, and to the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council in Copenhagen of 21-22 June 1993, also known as the Copenhagen Criteria,

– having regard to the Council conclusions on Enlargement of 17 December 2024 and of 12 December 2023,

– having regard to the International Law of the Sea and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 on EU enlargement policy (COM(2024)0690) and to the accompanying Türkiye 2024 Report (SWD(2024)0696),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 on EU enlargement policy (COM(2023)0690) and to the accompanying Türkiye 2023 Report (SWD(2023)0696),

– having regard to Special report 06/2024 of the European Court of Auditors of 24 April 2024 entitled ‘The Facility for Refugees in Turkey – Beneficial for refugees and host communities, but impact and sustainability not yet ensured’,

– having regard to the joint communications from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Council of 29 November 2023 (JOIN(2023)0050) and of 22 March 2021 (JOIN(2021)0008) on the state of play of EU-Türkiye political, economic and trade relations,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 19 December 2024 entitled ‘Eighth Annual Report of the Facility for Refugees in Turkey’ (COM(2024)0593),

– having regard to the fundamental principles of international law and to the Charter of the United Nations, the 1977 and the 1979 High-Level Agreements between the leaders of the two communities, and the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council on Cyprus, including Resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964, which reaffirms the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, Resolution 550 (1984) of 11 May 1984 on secessionist actions in Cyprus, Resolution 789 (1992) of 25 November 1992, and Resolution 2537 (2020) on the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP),

– having regard to Article 46 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which states that the contracting parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in any case to which they are parties, and to the ensuing obligation of Türkiye to implement all judgments of the ECtHR,

– having regard to the relevant resolutions of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe,

– having regard to the 2025 Freedom in the World report published by Freedom House,

– having regard to the 2024 World Press Freedom Index published by Reporters Without Borders,

– having regard to the January 2025 prison statistics report published by the Civil Society in the Penal System Association (CISST) and to the 2024 country profile for Türkiye published by Prison Insider,

– having regard to the Global Gender Gap Report 2024 published by the World Economic Forum,

– having regard to recent reports of the We Will Stop Femicide Platform (Kadın Cinayetlerini Durduracağız Platformu),

– having regard to the UNESCO statement on Hagia Sophia of 10 July 2020, and to the relevant UNESCO World Heritage Committee decisions 44 COM 7B.58 (2021) and 45 COM 7B.58 (2023), adopted in its 44th and 45th sessions respectively,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Türkiye, in particular those of 13 September 2023 on the 2022 Commission Report on Türkiye [2], of 7 June 2022 on the 2021 Commission Report on Turkey [3], and of 26 November 2020 on escalating tensions in Varosha following the illegal actions by Türkiye and the urgent need for the resumption of talks [4],

– having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement [5],

– having regard to its resolution of 15 April 2015 on the centenary of the Armenian Genocide [6],

– having regard to its resolutions of 5 May 2022 on the case of Osman Kavala in Turkey [7], of 10 October 2024 on the case of Bülent Mumay in Türkiye [8] and of 13 February 2025 on recent dismissals and arrests of mayors in Türkiye [9],

– having regard to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s visit to Ankara in December 2024,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0067/2025),

A. whereas Türkiye remains a candidate for EU accession, and EU membership remains the repeatedly declared political goal of the Turkish Government, although the gap with the values and interests of the EU is growing; whereas EU accession negotiations have effectively been at a standstill since 2018, owing to the deterioration of the rule of law and democracy in Türkiye;

B. whereas any accession country is expected to respect democratic values, the rule of law and human rights, and to abide by EU law; whereas Türkiye needs to credibly demonstrate its commitment to closer relations and alignment with the European Union in order to reinvigorate its European perspective; whereas being a candidate country presumes a willingness to progressively approach and align with the EU in all aspects, including values, interests, standards and policies, inter alia with its common foreign and security policy, to respect and uphold the Copenhagen criteria, and to pursue and maintain good neighbourly relations with the EU and all of its Member States without discrimination; whereas the tensions between the EU and Türkiye in relation to the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean have de-escalated but not ceased; whereas Türkiye has repeatedly been asked to refrain from all actions which violate the sovereignty and sovereign rights of all EU Member States and are in breach of international and EU law;

C. whereas the 2023 Commission progress report on Türkiye painted a picture of continued backsliding, while its latest progress report of 2024 appears to present a slightly more positive overall picture of progress on enlargement-related reforms in Türkiye, such as in the area of economic and monetary policies; whereas this cannot, however, be applied to the core matters related to democracy and fundamental rights, which have deteriorated even further since the release of the Commission’s latest report; whereas the gap between Türkiye and the EU’s values and normative framework has therefore remained unaddressed during the recent period with the persistent use of laws and measures aimed at curtailing the rule of law and human rights, fundamental freedoms and civil liberties;

D. whereas the joint communication on the state of play of EU-Türkiye relations of 29 November 2023 struck a more positive note, putting forward a set of recommendations on cooperating in areas of joint interest in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner and based on the established conditionalities; whereas only a few concrete steps in line with the commitments therein have been taken so far; whereas the April 2024 European Council mandated Coreper to advance in the implementation of this joint communication; whereas nevertheless this joint communication has not yet received a clear political endorsement by the Council;

E. whereas Türkiye is a member of the Council of Europe and is therefore bound by the judgments of the ECtHR; whereas owing to its failure to apply landmark ECtHR rulings, Türkiye is currently facing historical infringement proceedings; whereas Türkiye consistently ranks among the countries most frequently found in violation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms protected by the European Convention on Human Rights; whereas as of late November 2024, Türkiye had the highest number of pending cases before the ECtHR, with 22 450 applications, representing 36.7 % of the Court’s total caseload of 61 250 applications;

F. whereas Türkiye is classified as ‘not free’ by Freedom House and has experienced one of the worst declines in the level of freedom in the world in the past 10 years; whereas Türkiye ranks 158th out of 180 countries in the 2024 World Press Freedom Index; whereas the Turkish Government has closed dozens of media outlets, routinely blocks online articles, is reported to control 85 % of national media and uses its state agency Anadolu as an organ of propaganda;

G. whereas the Turkish constitution provides for sufficient protection of fundamental rights, but the practice of the institutions and the critical state of the judiciary, including the lack of respect for Constitutional Court rulings, are the main reasons for the dire situation of the rule of law and human rights in the country, issues repeatedly described in the reports of the EU, the Council of Europe and international organisations;

H. whereas Türkiye has the highest incarceration rate and the largest prison population of all Council of Europe Member States, with an overcrowded prison population that has grown by 439 % between 2005 and 2023 and currently represents more than a third of all inmates of Council of Europe countries;

I. whereas Türkiye is ranked 127th out of 146 countries in the 2024 Global Gender Gap Index, underscoring severe gender inequality and systemic failures in protecting women’s rights; whereas according to the 2024 report of the We Will Stop Femicide Platform (Kadın Cinayetlerini Durduracağız Platformu), 394 women were murdered by men and 259 women were found dead in suspicious circumstances in Türkiye in 2024, the highest number recorded since the civil society group started collecting data in 2010; whereas in its 2023 report, the platform noted that 315 women were killed by men, and 248 women were found dead in suspicious circumstances;

J. whereas in recent months, Türkiye has taken steps towards the resumption of a process for a peaceful resolution of the Kurdish question; whereas on 27 February 2025 jailed militant leader Abdullah Öcalan called on his Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to disarm and disband, providing a historic opportunity to end the Turkish-Kurdish conflict; whereas these efforts have been accompanied by increasing repression and the curtailment of the powers of democratic local governments, including the dismissal of elected Kurdish and other opposition mayors;

K. whereas, alongside being a candidate for EU accession, Türkiye is a NATO ally and a key partner in the areas of trade, economic relations, security, the fight against terrorism, and migration; whereas Türkiye continues to play a key role in the region, acts as a bridge between Europe and Asia, and remains a key partner for the stability of the wider East Mediterranean region; whereas Türkiye continues to play a significant role in the Syrian conflict and maintains a military presence in northern Syria;

L. whereas Türkiye has not aligned with EU sanctions against Russia; whereas trade between Türkiye and Russia has nearly doubled since the EU’s imposition of sanctions against Russia; whereas despite some steps taken, Türkiye has not prevented its territory from being used to circumvent EU sanctions against Russia;

M. whereas the 2024 Commission progress report on Türkiye states that, as at 30 September 2024, the country maintained a very low alignment rate of 5 % with relevant statements of the High Representative on behalf of the EU and with relevant Council decisions, compared to 9 % in 2023;

N. whereas Türkiye is the EU’s fifth largest trade partner, and the EU is Türkiye’s largest trading partner by far, as well as its primary source of foreign direct investment;

O. whereas in the past year, the level of engagement between the EU and Türkiye has increased in terms of both technical and high-level meetings in sectoral areas;

P. whereas Türkiye has applied for membership of BRICS+ and shown interest in joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO);

Q. whereas following a period of unorthodox economic policy, Türkiye has implemented a tighter monetary policy over the past year leading to a reduction in external imbalances and a moderation of inflationary pressures;

R. whereas Türkiye hosts the largest refugee population in the world, with around 3.1 million registered refugees, mainly from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan; whereas since 2011 the EU has directed more than EUR 10 billion to assisting refugees and host communities in Türkiye; whereas according to a credible investigative report by Lighthouse Reports and eight media partners, the EU is funding removal centres in Türkiye implicated in the detention, abuse and forced deportations of refugees under the guise of voluntary return;

S. whereas in addition to the emergency assistance coordinated via the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, with an estimated financial value of EUR 38 million, the EU provided EUR 78.2 million in humanitarian aid for the earthquake response in 2023, and EUR 26 million in humanitarian aid in 2024; whereas the EU signed an additional EUR 400 million in assistance under the EU Solidarity Fund to finance recovery operations following the devastating earthquake;

T. whereas Türkiye has systematically misused counterterrorism laws to target elected officials, opposition politicians and human rights defenders, among others;

Commitment to EU accession

1. Recognises the long-standing aspirations of Turkish civil society regarding accession to the European Union; welcomes the Turkish Government’s recent statements reiterating its commitment to EU membership as a strategic goal amid an effort to revitalise EU-Türkiye relations in line with relevant European Council conclusions in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner; recognises the EU’s commitment to fostering this engagement through enhanced dialogue and cooperation;

2. Stresses that EU membership is contingent on fulfilling the accession (Copenhagen) criteria, which require stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and the protection of minorities, good neighbourly relations, respect for international law and alignment with the EU CFSP; further notes that these are absolute criteria, not issues subject to transactional strategic considerations and negotiations; stresses that recognition of all Member States is a necessary component of the accession process;

3. Regrets, in this regard, that the aforementioned positive statements have not been accompanied by any concrete actions by the Turkish authorities to close the persistent and vast gap between Türkiye and the EU on values and standards, particularly with regard to the fundamentals of the accession process; reiterates its previously adopted conclusion that the Turkish Government continues to show, as it has done for the past few years, a clear lack of political will to carry out the necessary reforms to reactivate the accession process and continues to pursue a deeply entrenched authoritarian understanding of the presidential system;

4. Acknowledges the strategic and geopolitical importance of Türkiye, and its increasing presence and influence in areas critical to international security, such as the Black Sea region, including Ukraine, and the Middle East; reiterates that Türkiye is a strategic partner and NATO ally, and a country with which the EU has close relations in the areas of security, trade, economy and migration; welcomes closer cooperation between Türkiye and the EU, to which the Turkish Government has made frequent reference, but stresses that this cannot in any way be a substitute for the necessary real progress which Türkiye, as a candidate country, needs to make with regard to meeting the fundamental requirements for accession; highlights, in this regard, that there are no shortcuts in the accession process and that no argument can be put forward to avoid discussing the democratic principles which are at the core of the accession process;

5. Notes that the Commission’s Türkiye report 2024 paints a more positive picture of reform implementation in the context of Türkiye’s accession process than the Türkiye report 2023, shifting from further deterioration to ‘no progress’ with regard to the rule of law and human rights issues; is of the opinion, however, that at least in key areas such as democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights, this is due to the fact that a very low point had already been reached and this situation has remained unchanged;

6. Further takes note of a nuanced shift in focus of the Türkiye report 2024, by contrast with the 2023 report, away from the accession process towards a strategic partnership between the European Union und Türkiye; is of the opinion that the critical state of the accession process is driving the Commission and the Council to focus merely on the partnership dimension of the EU’s relations with Türkiye, as is also reflected in the joint communication on the state of play of EU-Türkiye relations of 29 November 2023, and of 22 March 2021; highlights the increasing shift towards a different framework for the relationship, which might come at the expense of the accession process;

The core of the accession process: democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights

7. Considers that, in terms of human rights and the rule of law, Parliament’s recent resolutions on the matter remain valid in light of the continued dire human rights situation and democratic backsliding in Türkiye over the last year; fully endorses the latest resolutions of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the related report by its Monitoring Committee, as well as the resolutions adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which depict in detail the wide range of serious shortfalls in human rights constantly reported by locally and internationally renowned human rights organisations;

8. Notes the Turkish Government’s stated commitment to judicial reform and the introduction of measures of an organisational nature; highlights, however, the need to introduce structural measures ensuring judicial independence; deeply regrets that, despite a reform strategy with nine judicial reform packages, the state of independence of the judiciary in Türkiye remains desolate following systematic government interference in and political instrumentalisation of the judicial system; deplores, in this regard, the weakening of remaining constitutional review mechanisms, particularly individual applications, and the frequent violations of due process;

9. Is dismayed by the persecution of legal professionals, including most recently the lawsuit filed by the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office that resulted in the removal of the leadership of the Istanbul Bar Association on charges of ‘making propaganda for a terrorist organization’ and ‘publicly disseminating misleading information’ for having asked for an investigation into the murders of two Kurdish journalists in Syria, and in the imprisonment of one of the members of the Istanbul Bar Association’s executive board following his trip to Strasbourg to hold meetings with Council of Europe institutions;

10. Is alarmed by the blatant lack of implementation of decisions by the Constitutional Court, including in the case of MP Can Atalay, which has turned into a serious judicial crisis, with the Court of Cassation filing a criminal complaint against nine judges of the Constitutional Court; is worried by the recent decision of the Court of Cassation to overturn the sentences of and release the terrorists involved in the ISIS attack at Istanbul’s Atatürk Airport, which claimed 45 lives in 2016;

11. Calls on Türkiye to strengthen its commitment to democratic governance, especially through reforms that ensure an independent judiciary; takes notes of the recent announcement of the Fourth Judicial Reform Strategy, spanning 2025-2029; calls on the Turkish Government to move from the superficial changes made so far through the recurrent reform packages and action plans to a profound and long overdue reform that will address, through real political will, the serious and structural shortcomings of Türkiye’s judiciary; stresses that putting an end to political interference in the judiciary requires no strategy or reform package but merely the political will to do so;

12. Remains deeply concerned by the continued deterioration of democratic standards and relentless crackdown by the Turkish authorities on any critical voices by means of a growing battery of repressive laws, the regular misuse of counterterrorism laws, including their application in relation to minors (as in the ‘Kız Çocukları Davası’ trial), the disproportionate use of the crime of insulting a public official, the extensive use of secret witnesses and dormant cases in flawed judicial proceedings, and the recurrent practice of exaggerated night arrests and home raids to portray targeted persons as extremely dangerous;

13. Welcomes the withdrawal in November 2024 of the draft amendment to Türkiye’s espionage laws, known as the ‘agent of influence’ law; urges the Turkish authorities to refrain from reintroducing a similar overly broad and vague law in the future, given the serious risk that it would be used as a tool to further criminalise the legitimate activities of civil society organisations within the country; calls on the Turkish authorities to ensure that the recently approved cybersecurity bill will serve its legitimate purpose of protecting data privacy and national security without giving way to potential infringements of fundamental rights or becoming another tool for further repression; stresses that the judicial apparatus remains heavily restrictive, with a complex web of legislation serving as a tool to systematically control and silence any critical voice, such as the 2020 social media law, the 2021 anti-money laundering law and the 2022 disinformation law;

14. Is concerned by the recent approval of legal provisions granting extraordinary powers to the State Supervisory Council (DDK) and the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF), including the possibility for the former to dismiss public officials of all types and levels and appoint trustees, which could be used in an arbitrary manner;

15. Urges the Turkish authorities to put an end to the current serious restrictions on fundamental freedoms, in particular of expression, of assembly and of association, and to the constant attacks on the fundamental rights of members of the opposition, human rights defenders, lawyers, trade unionists, members of minorities, journalists, academics, artists and civil society activists, among others; strongly condemns the recent waves of mass arrest and imprisonment on politically motivated charges, and on the grounds of suspected terror links, affecting political figures, academics and journalists, including the arrests of Elif Akgül, independent journalist, Yıldız Tar, editor in chief of LGBT+ news site Kaos GL, and Ender İmrek, columnist of Evrensel daily, all well known for their work on human rights issues;

16. Deplores the continued prosecution, censorship and harassment of journalists and independent media, denying them the freedom to carry out their professional duties and inform the public, which is essential to a functioning democratic society; calls on the Turkish authorities to refrain from further attacks on independent media and to uphold fundamental rights and civil liberties such as freedom of speech and of the press; remains deeply concerned by the existing legislation that prevents an open and free internet, with lengthy prison sentences imposed for social media posts, scores of access blocks and content removal orders, and by the continued use of the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) to crack down on media criticism and even on outlets deemed to spread ‘pessimism’ instead of positive news;

17. Acknowledges the positive developments in relation to the partial lifting by the minister of the interior of restrictions on the weekly vigils of the Saturday Mothers, Cumartesi Anneleri, in Istanbul’s Galatasaray Square, and the recent acquittal of all 46 people prosecuted for more than 6 years in the case surrounding the organisation’s 700th gathering in August 2018; calls for the complete removal of all restrictions on their peaceful protest, in full compliance with the relevant Constitutional Court ruling, and for an end to the ongoing judicial case against several of its members and sympathisers; is concerned by the ongoing trial against prominent human rights defender Nimet Tanrıkulu, who was released on 4 March 2025 after spending 94 days in pre-trial detention; urges the Turkish authorities to ensure the immediate release of all individuals detained for exercising their fundamental freedoms;

18. Continues to be appalled by the Turkish authorities’, in particular the Turkish judiciary’s, continuous disregard for and failure to apply landmark ECtHR rulings; reiterates its condemnation of Türkiye’s blatant misuse of the judicial system and the refusal to release from detention human rights defender Osman Kavala and opposition politicians Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ,for which Türkiye is facing historical infringement proceedings in the Council of Europe, with long-awaited consequences yet to be determined; calls on Türkiye to fully comply with the ECtHR judgements related to missing persons and properties (inter alia in the Fokas case) in Cyprus; deplores the politically motivated nature of these prosecutions, which form part of a broader pattern of judicial harassment; calls on Türkiye to fully implement all judgments of the ECtHR in line with Article 46 of the ECHR and in line with the unconditional obligations derived from Article 90 of the Turkish constitution; calls on the European Commission and Member States to use all diplomatic channels to urge Türkiye to implement relevant ECtHR rulings and consider implementing relevant funding conditionality in relation to compliance with ECtHR rulings;

19. Expresses its deep concern about the dire situation in Turkish prisons owing to severe overcrowding and poor living conditions, with reports, including by the Council of Europe, of torture and ill-treatment being widespread, and access to basic needs such as hygiene and information being severely limited; is particularly worried by the conditions of imprisonment of elderly and seriously ill prisoners; is concerned by the continued use of humiliating strip searches in prisons and other places of detention and by the persisting harassment of MP Ömer Faruk Gergerlioğlu, who is currently facing six proceedings for the removal of his parliamentary seat and immunity, among other reasons for his having denounced this very practice;

20. Strongly condemns the Turkish Government’s decision to dismiss, following the March 2024 local elections, the democratically elected mayors of at least 13 municipalities and districts (Hakkari, Mardin, Batman, Halfeti, Tunceli, Bahçesaray, Akdeniz, Siirt, Van and Kağızman, won by the DEM Party; and Esenyurt Ovacık and Şişli, won by CHP Party) and to replace them with government trustees appointed by the interior ministry; regards this long-standing practice of appointing trustees as a blatant attack on the most basic principles of local democracy; urges the Turkish authorities to immediately cease and reverse repression of political opposition and to respect the rights of voters to elect their chosen representatives in line with the recommendations of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe and the Venice Commission; reiterates its call on the VP/HR to consider restrictive measures under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime against Turkish officials assuming the role of trustee and those appointing them; denounces the severe repression of protests against the removal of elected mayors, including the arbitrary arrest of hundreds of protesters, some of whom were minors; regards the decision of the Turkish Government to return to this practice after the last local elections of March 2024 as a clear sign of its lack of commitment to addressing the democratic shortcomings within the country and in clear contradiction to the declared willingness to revitalise the accession process, as such actions undermine the prospects for a stronger, more comprehensive partnership with the EU and are detrimental to long-term progress towards closer cooperation;

21. Deplores the permanent targeting of political parties and members of the opposition, who continue to suffer increasing pressure; is extremely concerned by the recent arrest and removal from office of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality CHP Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, along with the mayors of Şişli and Beylikdüzü, in the framework of two separate investigations on alleged corruption and terrorist-related charges involving a total of 106 suspects; highlights that theses last cases, which are part of a long list of 42 administrative and 51 judicial investigations since İmamoğlu’s election in 2019, were launched just a few days before the internal party election to nominate him presidential candidate and the day after the controverted decision by Istanbul University to revoke his diploma, a requisite for his eligibility to be President; is appalled by the decision to temporarily ban all demonstrations in Istanbul and other provinces across the country, the slowdown on social media, the detention of journalists and the crackdown on peaceful protesters; considers that this is a politically motivated move aimed at preventing a legitimate challenger from standing in the upcoming elections and that with these actions the current Turkish authorities are further pushing the country towards a fully authoritarian model;

22. Further expresses its concern about the recent separate cases against Istanbul’s Beşiktaş district CHP Mayor Rıza Akpolat, Istanbul’s Beykoz district CHP Mayor Alaattin Köseler, CHP Youth Branch Chair Cem Aydın, and Zafer Party Chair Ümit Özdag; is appalled by the brutal and relentless crackdown on any kind of criticism to which all sectors of Turkish society have recently been subjected by the Turkish authorities, as illustrated, among others, by the case of Ayşe Barım, a well-known talent manager imprisoned since 27 January 2025 for alleged involvement in the Gezi Park protest 12 years ago, the investigation launched against Orhan Turan and Ömer Aras, the president and an executive of TÜSIAD, the country’s main business group, and the indictment, with the aim of imposing hefty prison sentences, of Halk TV Editor-in-Chief Suat Toktaş and journalists Seda Selek, Barış Pehlivan, Serhan Asker and Kürşad Oğuz, who have been provisionally acquitted; is concerned by the involvement in these and other cases of recently appointed Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor Akın Gürlek, who has a long record of involvement, in different positions, in high-profile cases against political figures, and which may give grounds for considering the application of restrictive measures under the EU Human Rights sanction regime; is also concerned by the growing financial pressure on opposition municipalities and controversial announcements, such as that made in relation to day-care centres run by opposition municipalities;

23. Expresses its deep concern at the deterioration in women’s rights, at gender-based violence and at the increase in the incidence of femicide in Türkiye in 2024, which has been the highest since 2010, the year before the signing of the Istanbul Convention; reiterates its strong condemnation of Türkiye’s withdrawal, by presidential decree, from this international agreement and reiterates its call to reverse this decision; urges the Turkish authorities to improve the legislative framework and its implementation, including by fully applying Protection Law no. 6284, in order to effectively tackle all forms of violence against women and the practice of so called ‘honour killings’, end the persistent policy of impunity by holding abusers to account, and advance towards gender equality, particularly with regard to the participation of women in decision-making and policymaking processes;

24. Strongly condemns the ongoing violations and lack of protection of the fundamental rights of LGBTI+ persons in Türkiye, including the increased incidence of hate speech, hate crimes and discriminatory rhetoric, as well as continued media stereotyping based on sexual orientation and gender identity; deplores the fact that this continued discrimination is often sanctioned by the authorities, as evidenced by the mass arrests made during the Pride March in 2023 and the banning of the march in 2024, while anti-LGBTI+ marches were permitted; urges the Turkish authorities to stop banning activities against homophobia, including Pride marches, with immediate effect;

25. Welcomes the increased dialogue with Christian minorities, but stresses that no significant progress has been registered with regard to the protection of the rights of ethnic and religious minorities, in particular as regards their legal personality, including those of the Greek Orthodox population of the islands of Gökçeada (Imvros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos); calls for Türkiye to implement the Venice Commission recommendations and all relevant ECtHR rulings in this regard; notes with concern that representatives of different confessions, including non-Muslim and Alevi communities, continue to face bureaucratic obstacles when attempting to register places of worship; highlights that this is a violation of the right to freedom of religion and belief; calls on Türkiye to adopt the long-awaited regulation on the election of board members in non-Muslim minority foundations controlling community hospitals; reiterates its call on Türkiye to respect the role of the Ecumenical Patriarchate for Orthodox Christians all over the world and to recognise its legal personality and the public use of the ecclesiastical title of Ecumenical Patriarch; calls on Türkiye to fully respect and protect the outstanding universal value of Hagia Sophia and the Chora museum, which are inscribed on UNESCO’s World Heritage List; notes with concern that Türkiye has still not implemented two decisions of the UNESCO World Heritage Committee of 2021 and 2023 regarding its obligations to undertake special measures to protect these monuments; deplores the lack of protection of Panagia Soumela Monastery, which has been put forward for inclusion in the UNESCO World Heritage Monuments list; stresses the need to eliminate restrictions on the training, appointment and succession of clergy; welcomes the envisaged reopening of the Halki Seminary and calls for the lifting of all obstacles to its proper functioning; calls on the Turkish authorities to effectively investigate and prosecute people responsible for any hate crimes, including hate speech, committed against minorities; condemns the antisemitic statements made in the media and by high-level officials following the Hamas terrorist attacks against Israel on 7 October 2023; notes that all of these practices against any religious minority are incompatible with EU values;

26. Welcomes Abdullah Öcalan’s recent call on the PKK to lay down arms and dissolve, and to engage in a peace process, as a historic and long-awaited step that could help end a period of 40 years of violence that has caused more than 40 000 deaths; praises the efforts made by all stakeholders involved to facilitate these developments, including the constructive approach of different political leaders that was started by MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli, the visits to Imrali prison granted to a delegation of the DEM Party, and the broad consultations that this party has led with other political parties; underlines that this represents a significant opportunity and must be followed by an inclusive political process, with a prominent role for the Turkish Parliament, aimed at the peaceful and sustainable resolution of the Kurdish issue in its political, social, democratic and security-related aspects; stresses the need to uphold human rights, political pluralism, and civil rights for all citizens, including Kurds; regrets the continued political repression, judicial harassment and restrictions on cultural and linguistic rights faced by Kurdish citizens, which undermine democratic principles and social cohesion;

Regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations

27. Continues to commend Türkiye for hosting around 3.1 million refugees, including 2.9 million Syrians under temporary protection in 2024, down from 3.2 million in 2023; reiterates the importance of Türkiye’s collaboration for the effective and orderly management of migration flows; further welcomes the fact that since 2011 the EU has contributed close to EUR 10 billion to assist Türkiye in hosting refugees; notes that some EU funding has been allocated to strengthening Turkish border control and containment capabilities; welcomes the EU’s decision to allocate an additional EUR 1 billion in December 2024 to further support the healthcare, education, and integration of refugees in Türkiye since the fall of the Assad regime; at the same time, notes that these funds had already been pledged in May 2024, and therefore do not constitute new funds; calls on the Commission to ensure utmost transparency and accuracy in the allocation of funds and that EU-funded projects, particularly those related to removal centres and border control, comply with all relevant human rights standards; is alarmed by credible reports uncovering grave human rights violations at EU-funded removal centres in Türkiye and calls on the Commission to launch a transparent and independent review into the matter; notes with concern that a continuing increase in asylum applications has been registered in the Republic of Cyprus over recent years; recalls Türkiye’s obligation to take all necessary measures to halt the existing illegal migration routes and prevent the creation of new sea or land routes for illegal migration from Türkiye to the EU, particularly to Greece and the Republic of Cyprus; points out the risks related to any possible instrumentalisation of migrants by the Turkish Government; underlines the need to ensure the protection of all refugees’ and migrants’ rights and freedoms; calls on Türkiye to ensure the full and non-discriminatory implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement of 2016 and the EU-Türkiye Readmission Agreement vis-à-vis all Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus; expresses cautious hope that developments in Syria will gradually allow an increasing number of refugees to return home; reiterates that returns should only be carried out on a voluntary basis and under conditions of safety and dignity; condemns repeated violent attacks against refugees and migrants fuelled by xenophobic rhetoric among politicians and host communities; calls on the European Commission and the EU Member States to increase their efforts to preserve humanitarian and protection space for Syrian refugees in Türkiye and to uphold the principle of non-refoulement as a cornerstone of EU policies;

28. Reiterates its strong interest in stability and security in the Eastern Mediterranean; welcomes the continued de-escalation and positive momentum in the region and the recent climate of re-engagement between Türkiye and Greece, albeit that unresolved issues continue to affect bilateral relations; deplores the fact that Türkiye continues to violate the sovereignty and sovereign rights of EU Member States, such as Greece and the Republic of Cyprus, including through the promotion of the Blue Homeland doctrine; underlines that, although Turkish violations of Greek airspace have drastically decreased, violations of Greek territorial waters have risen compared to 2023, and systematic illegal fishing activities have been conducted by Turkish vessels within Greek territorial waters; deeply regrets that Türkiye also continues to uphold a formal threat of war against Greece (casus belli) at 12 nautical miles; calls on Türkiye to fully respect the sovereignty of all EU Member States over their territorial sea and airspace, and their other sovereign rights, including the right to explore and exploit natural resources in accordance with EU and international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which is part of the EU acquis; reiterates its view that the memorandum of understanding between Türkiye and Libya on delimitation of the maritime jurisdiction areas in the Mediterranen infringes upon the sovereign rights of third States, does not comply with the Law of the Sea and cannot produce any legal consequences for third States;

29. Regrets the fact that the Cyprus problem remains unresolved, and calls for serious reengagement and the political will of all parties involved to bring about peaceful UN-led negotiations, with a view to achieving real progress in the Cyprus settlement talks; welcomes the resumption of informal talks under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General on 18 and 19 March 2025, which were held in a constructive atmosphere in which both sides showed a clear commitment to making progress and continuing dialogue; welcomes the agreement between both sides on opening four crossing points, demining, establishing a youth affairs committee and launching environmental and solar energy projects, as part of a new set of confidence-building measures; encourages all sides to use this momentum to move towards the resumption of negotiations;

30. Strongly reaffirms its view that the only solution to the Cyprus problem is a fair, comprehensive, viable and democratic settlement, including of its external aspects, within the agreed UN framework, on the basis of a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation with a single international legal personality, single sovereignty, single citizenship and political equality, as set out in the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, the agreed areas of convergence and the Framework of the UN Secretary General, as well as in accordance with international law and the principles and values on which the Union is founded; calls, as a matter of urgency, for the resumption of negotiations on the reunification of Cyprus under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General as soon as possible, from the point at which they were interrupted in Crans-Montana in 2017; calls on Türkiye to abandon the unacceptable proposal for a two-state solution in Cyprus and to return to the agreed basis for a solution and the UN framework; further calls on Türkiye to withdraw its troops from Cyprus and refrain from any unilateral action which would entrench the permanent division of the island and from action altering the demographic balance;

31. Calls on Türkiye to respect the status of the buffer zone and the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP); reiterates its call for cooperation among the Republic of Cyprus, Türkiye, the United Kingdom and the UN to implement concrete measures for a demilitarisation of the buffer zone, and to improve security on the island; urges Türkiye and the Turkish Cypriot leadership to reverse all unilateral actions and violations within and in the vicinity of the buffer zone and refrain from any further such actions and provocations; condemns the ongoing ‘opening’ of Varosha by Türkiye, as this negatively alters the situation on the ground, undermines mutual trust and negatively impacts the prospects for the resumption of direct talks on the comprehensive solution of the Cyprus problem; calls on Türkiye to reverse its illegal actions in violation of UN Security Council resolutions 550(1984) and 789(1992) on Varosha, which call on Türkiye to transfer the area of Varosha to its lawful inhabitants under the temporary administration of the UN, and to withdraw from Strovilia and facilitate the full implementation of the Pyla Understanding;

32. Reiterates its call on Türkiye to give the Turkish Cypriot community the necessary space to act in accordance with its role as a legitimate community of the island, which is a right guaranteed by the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus; reiterates its call on the Commission to step up its efforts to engage with the Turkish Cypriot community, with a view to facilitating the resolution of the Cyprus problem and recalling that its place is in the European Union; calls for all parties involved to demonstrate a more courageous approach to bringing the communities together; stresses the need for the EU body of law to be implemented across the entire island following a comprehensive resolution of the Cyprus problem;

33. Takes note of the significant work of the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus (CMP) and calls for improved access to military zones by the Turkish army, access to its military archives and information as to the relocation of remains from former to subsequent burial sites; remains deeply concerned about the education and religious restrictions and impediments faced by the enclaved Greek Cypriots; calls on Türkiye to step up its cooperation with the Council of Europe and its relevant bodies and institutions, to address their key recommendations, to fully implement the European Convention of Human Rights with regard to respecting the freedom of religion and the freedom of opinion and expression, and the right to access and enjoy cultural heritage, and to stop the deliberate destruction of cultural and religious heritage; condemns the repeated attempts by Türkiye to intimidate and silence Turkish Cypriot journalists, trade unionists, human rights defenders and progressive citizens in the Turkish Cypriot community, thus violating their right to freedom of opinion and expression; calls on Türkiye to halt its proclaimed aggressive policy of the sale and exploitation of Greek Cypriot properties, a policy designed to create irreversible effects on the ground and which completely disregards the European Code of Human Rights ruling on this issue;

34. Regrets Türkiye’s continuing refusal to comply with aviation law and establish a channel of communication between air traffic control centres in Türkiye and the Republic of Cyprus, the absence of which entails real safety risks and dangers as identified by the European Union Aviation Safety Agency and the International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations; regrets, too, its denial of access to vessels under the flag of one Member State to the Straits of Bosporus and the Dardanelles; takes the view that these could be areas where Türkiye can prove its commitment to confidence building measures and calls on Türkiye to collaborate by fully implementing EU aviation law; regrets that Türkiye has continued its attempts to impede the implementation of the Great Sea Interconnector, an EU project of common interest, and has persisted in its plans for an illegal electricity interconnector with the occupied area of Cyprus;

35. Regrets that for 20 years Türkiye has refused to implement the obligations assumed towards the EU, including those in relation to Cyprus, as per the Negotiating Framework of October 2005; stresses that recognition of all Member States is a necessary component of the accession process; reiterates its call on Türkiye to fulfil its obligation of full, non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement in relation to all Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus; further calls on Türkiye to ensure that the human and political rights of all Cypriots are fully respected and that compliance with the fundamental principles of the European Union and the European acquis is guaranteed;

36. Affirms its support for a free, secure and stable future for Syria and its citizens and highlights the need for an inclusive and peaceful political transition process that is Syrian-led and Syrian- owned, including the protection and inclusion of religious and ethnic communities; expresses its commitment to constructive cooperation between the EU and Türkiye to that end, on humanitarian aid, promoting a sustainable political solution in Syria, and the fight against DAESH, given that Türkiye has a key role in promoting stability in the region; recalls that Syria’s sovereignty must be restored; acknowledges the importance of rebuilding Syria’s economy as a pillar of long-term stability and prosperity for the region; calls on Türkiye to respect Syria’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and immediately cease all attacks and incursions on and occupation of Syrian territory in full compliance with international law; condemns the attacks carried out in recent weeks, taking advantage of the collapse of the Assad regime, by Turkish-backed militias against Syrian Kurdish forces in the north of Syria; expresses deep concern, as these attacks increase the number of internally displaced persons but also threaten the efficiency and continuity of the fight against Daesh; notes that its ongoing presence risks further destabilising and undermining efforts towards a sustainable political resolution in Syria; further notes that, citing security concerns, Türkiye also illegally occupies areas in Iraq; reiterates that civilian populations should never be the victim of military self-defence; calls for the necessary investigation into the cases in which there have been civilian casualties and to stop the crackdown on journalists working in the area; calls on Türkiye to support the process of implementing the agreement between the Syrian transitional government and the Kurdish-led SDF and refrain from any interference in Syria’s internal processes;

37. Supports the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Türkiye in the interests of reconciliation, good neighbourly relations, regional stability and security and socio-economic development, and welcomes the progress achieved so far; welcomes the continued efforts to restore links between the two countries; urges Türkiye to ensure the speedy implementation of agreements reached by the Turkish and Armenian Governments’ special representatives, such as the opening of the airspace and the border between the two countries for the third country nationals, and, subsequently, for holders of diplomatic passports; welcomes the temporary opening of the Margara-Alican border crossing between Armenia and Türkiye to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid to Syria; expresses the hope that these developments may give impetus to the normalisation of relations in the South Caucasus region, also in terms of security and socio-economic development, and stresses the EU’s interest in supporting this process; encourages Türkiye to play a constructive role in promoting regional stability by facilitating the swift conclusion of the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, inter alia by exerting its influence on Azerbaijan and by deterring Azerbaijan from any further military action against Armenian sovereignty; encourages Türkiye once again to acknowledge the Armenian genocide in order to pave the way for genuine reconciliation between the Turkish and Armenian peoples and to fully respect its obligations to protect Armenian cultural heritage;

38. Notes that Türkiye’s stance in relation to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine continues to affect EU-Türkiye relations, as Türkiye attempts to maintain ties with both the West and Russia simultaneously; notes Türkiye’s diplomatic attempts to mediate between Russia and Ukraine, particularly regarding the Black Sea Grain Initiative, as well as its continued support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine, including its vote in favour of UN General Assembly resolutions condemning the Russian aggression against Ukraine; regrets that, on the other hand, trade between Türkiye and Russia has risen sharply since the start of the war in Ukraine, making Türkiye Russia’s second largest trading partner despite EU sanctions against Russia, and that Türkiye is the only NATO member state not having imposed any sanctions on Russia; further notes that the European Union’s anti-fraud office, OLAF, has initiated an investigation into a loophole that enables countries like Türkiye to rebrand sanctioned Russian oil and export it to the EU; welcomes, however, positive steps such as Türkiye’s blocking of exports to Russia for certain dual use goods, as well as products originating in the United States and the United Kingdom that are of benefit to Russian military action; reiterates its call on the Turkish Government to halt its plans for the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant, which will be built, operated and owned by Russia’s state atomic energy corporation, Rosatom; expresses concern at Türkiye’s ongoing discussions with Russia to establish a gas-trading hub in Istanbul, scheduled to begin operations in 2025;

39. Welcomes Türkiye’s participation in various crisis management missions and operations (within the framework of the common security and defence policy); regrets, however, the further deterioration in the level of alignment on common foreign and security policy positions, including on sanctions and countering the circumvention of sanctions, which has fallen to a historically low rate of 5 %, the lowest rate for any accession country; recalls that EU candidate countries are required to progressively align with the common foreign and security policy of the European Union and comply with international law; regrets that Türkiye has not undertaken any steps in this regard, notably by failing to align with EU sanctions against Russia, and that in many areas of mutual interest the foreign policies of the EU and Türkiye are worryingly divergent; urges Türkiye to align with and fully implement the EU sanctions against Russia, including on anti-circumvention measures and to cooperate closely with the EU’s Sanctions Envoy;

40. Stresses the importance of reinforcing EU-Türkiye cooperation in global security matters, particularly in light of the changing geopolitical landscape and potential shifts in US foreign policy; expresses cautious hope that recent informal engagement, such as the participation of the Turkish Foreign Minister in the informal meeting of EU foreign affairs ministers in 2024, may provide an impetus towards better relations; acknowledges Türkiye’s key role as an ally in NATO and welcomes the Turkish Parliament’s decision to ratify Sweden’s NATO accession in January 2024; recalls, in this regard, that Türkiye has a key responsibility to foster stability at both regional and global levels and is expected to act in line with its NATO obligations, especially given the current geopolitical upheavals; encourages constructive engagement in a more structured and frequent political dialogue on foreign, security and defence policy to seek collaboration on convergent interests while working to reduce divergences, particularly with regard to removing persistent obstacles to the enhancement of a genuine relationship between the EU and NATO, including the acquisition from Russia of the S-400 air defence system; remains duly concerned that Türkiye continues to exclude a Member State from cooperation with NATO;

41. Welcomes Türkiye’s long-standing position in favour of a two-state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, its calls for a ceasefire in the Israel-Hamas war, and its ongoing efforts to supply humanitarian aid to Gaza throughout the conflict; deeply regrets, at the same time, the Turkish authorities’, including the President’s, active support for the EU-listed terror group Hamas and their stance on the attack against Israel on 7 October 2023, which the Turkish Government failed to condemn; points out that Türkiye’s open support for Hamas and its refusal to designate it a terrorist organisation is not compatible with the EU’s foreign and security policy; calls, therefore, for a revision of this position;

42. Notes with concern that Türkiye has asked to be a member of BRICS+ and been offered ‘partner country’ status, and is considering the same for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), where it holds the status of a dialogue partner; expresses serious concern over Türkiye’s increasing interest in an alternative partnership framework, which is fundamentally incompatible with the EU accession process; insists that Türkiye’s new status as a BRICS partner country must not affect Türkiye’s responsibilities within NATO; notes that Türkiye has been cultivating cooperation formats, partnerships and regional alliances beyond the EU; is concerned by Türkiye’s tendency to use this multi-vector approach to advance its interests without committing to a full-fledged cooperation with any of these alliances;

43. Remains concerned by the Turkish Government’s use of the Turkish diaspora as an instrument for occasional meddling in EU Member States’ domestic policies;

Socio-economic and sustainability reforms

44. Welcomes Türkiye’s return to a more conventional economic and monetary policy, while maintaining robust growth and a moderate budget deficit; regrets, however, that the cost of this is yet again being borne by citizens in the form of higher interest rates; highlights that social vulnerabilities have increased, particularly among children and older people, primarily due to the absence of a comprehensive poverty reduction strategy and income inequalities; underlines the necessity for the Turkish authorities to implement comprehensive social protection measures, strengthen collective bargaining rights and ensure that economic reforms prioritise reducing inequality and creating decent work opportunities;

45. Regrets the fact that despite the progress observed in economic and monetary policies, other actions by the Turkish Government affecting the rule of law continue to undermine basic principles such as legal certainty, which impacts negatively on Türkiye’s potential capacity to receive investments; welcomes the removal of Türkiye from the grey list of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in June 2024, following significant progress in improving its anti-money laundering regime and combating the financing of terrorism;

46. Welcomes Türkiye’s increased investment activity in the green energy sector and calls on Türkiye to continue improving the compatibility of its energy policy with the EU acquis, exploiting Türkiye’s enormous potential in renewable energy; expresses concern about the lack of any significant progress on climate action, in particular owing to the absence of a comprehensive climate law, a domestic emissions trading system, and a long-term low-emission development strategy, which undermines its 2053 climate neutrality target; highlights the need for a robust legal framework and stricter enforcement mechanisms to safeguard environmental and natural resources; urges Türkiye to align its environmental policies with the EU acquis, including respecting natural habitats when conducting mining projects, and underlines the importance of Türkiye’s adherence to the Aarhus Convention; commends the work of environmental rights defenders in Türkiye and warns against the dire environmental impact of extensive government projects, such as the expansion of its copper mining activities in Mount Ida (Kaz Daglari);

47. Highlights the fact that Türkiye has taken steps to diversify energy supplies and increase its renewable energy share; notes that the country is the seventh largest LNG market and highlights its potential as a regional energy hub; takes note that Türkiye has subscribed to the global goals on energy efficiency and renewable energy capacity by 2030; calls on the Commission to take into account Türkiye’s potential as a regional energy hub in initiatives to increase the installed renewable capacity in the Mediterranean region and in the development of the New Pact for the Mediterranean, and calls for energy cooperation to be part of the common agenda;

48. Observes some improvements in labour market conditions and points out a number of pending critical challenges, such as informal employment, the gender gap, and income inequality; is worried about the low coverage of collective bargaining and the lack of recognition of trade union rights for certain public sector employees; believes that more efforts are needed to enhance social dialogue mechanisms and address emerging occupational safety challenges; recalls that trade union freedom and social dialogue are crucial to the development and prosperity of a pluralistic society; deplores, in this regard, the recent detentions of trade unionists including Remzi Çalişkan, vice-president of the DISK confederation, and president of Genel-Iş, who was released after a month in prison, Kemal Göksoy, President of the Mersin Branch of Genel-İş, who remains in prison, and Mehmet Türkmen, chair of the textile sector union BİRTEK SEN, who was detained on 14 February 2025;

Wider EU-Türkiye relations

49. Reiterates its firm conviction that, beyond the currently frozen accession process, Türkiye is a country of strategic relevance, a key partner for the stability of the wider region and plays an important role in addressing security challenges, migration management, counterterrorism, and energy security; stresses the importance of maintaining constructive dialogue and deepening cooperation in areas of mutual strategic interest; points to a number of policy areas for future engagement, whether it be the green transition, trade, energy, a modernised customs union and visa liberalisation, among others; reaffirms that the EU is committed to pursuing the best possible relations with Türkiye, based on dialogue, respect and mutual trust, in line with international law and good neighbourly relations;

50. Stresses the importance of encouraging deeper partnership in all economic sectors, to the benefit of the EU and all of its Member States and Türkiye; notes in particular the importance of cooperation in the fields of energy, innovation, artificial intelligence, health, security and migration management, among others; in this regard, welcomes various high-level dialogues (HLDs) held recently, including the HLD on trade, and the plans for an HLD on economy, as positive steps towards pragmatic forms of cooperation in areas of mutual importance; calls again for the resumption of all relevant HLDs and for the establishment of structured HLDs on sectoral cooperation, to address common challenges and explore opportunities for joint initiatives in fields such as security, climate change, research and innovation; stresses that trade between the EU and Türkiye hit a record high last year and that the EU remains Türkiye’s largest trade and investment partner; calls for the removal of all existing trade barriers and irritants;

51. Stands ready to support an upgraded customs union with a broader, mutually beneficial scope, which could encompass a wide range of areas of common interest, including digitalisation, Green Deal alignment for green energy policies, public procurement, sustainable development commitments, and due diligence, contributing to the economic security of both sides; supports accompanying this upgraded customs union with an efficient and effective dispute settlement mechanism; underlines the fact that for Parliament to give its consent at the end of the process, such a modernisation would need to be based on strong conditionality related to human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for international law and good neighbourly relations, including Türkiye’s full implementation of the Additional Protocol on extending the Ankara Agreement to all Member States without exception and in a non-discriminatory fashion;

52. Notes with deep regret that no progress has been made by Türkiye towards meeting the required benchmarks for visa liberalisation; reiterates its willingness to start the visa liberalisation process as soon as the Turkish authorities fully fulfil the six clearly outstanding benchmarks in a non-discriminatory manner vis-à-vis all EU Member states while aligning with EU visa policy; regrets that Turkish citizens are facing problems with visa requests/applications to EU Member States owing to a marked increase in demand and fears of abuse of the system; recognises, however, the political commitment to improving access to visas and calls for intensified efforts on both sides to address the remaining technical and administrative barriers; calls on the EU Member states to increase the resources allocated to this matter; supports measures on visa facilitation, particularly with regard to business activities and Erasmus students; deeply regrets the constant attempts by the Turkish authorities to blame the EU for not making progress on this dossier, while not taking any necessary steps to comply with the remaining benchmarks; reminds Türkiye that the lack of tangible and cumulative progress on the pending conditions has a direct impact on business activities and Erasmus students; appreciates the invaluable contribution of Erasmus+ exchanges in providing rich cross-cultural educational opportunities;

The way forward for EU-Türkiye relations

53. Considers, in view of the above, that the Turkish Government has failed to take the necessary steps to address the existing fundamental democratic shortcomings within the country and therefore reiterates its view that Türkiye’s EU accession process cannot be resumed in the current circumstances, despite the democratic and pro-European aspirations of a large part of Turkish society; recalls that, as in the case of any other candidate, the accession process is contingent on full compliance with the Copenhagen criteria and on the normalisation of relations with all EU Member States;

54. Urges the Turkish Government and the EU institutions and Member States to continue working, beyond the currently frozen accession process, on the basis of the relevant Council and European Council conclusions and the established conditionality, towards a closer, more dynamic and strategic partnership with particular emphasis on climate action, energy security, counter-terrorism cooperation and regional stability; insists on the need to begin a process of reflection on how this new constructive and progressive framework for EU-Türkiye relations can encompass the interests of all parties involved, for example by modernising and enhancing the current Association Agreement;

55. Considers the joint communication of 29 November 2023 on the state of play of EU-Türkiye relations a good basis on which to move forward in the overall relations between the EU and Türkiye; regrets the lack of a clear political endorsement of this joint communication so far by the Council; reiterates that recognition of all EU Member States is a necessary component of any agreement between the EU and Türkiye; stresses that Türkiye’s constructive engagement, including in relation to the Cyprus problem, remains key to advancing closer cooperation between the EU and Türkiye;

56. Warns, nevertheless, that a further drift towards authoritarianism by the Turkish authorities, such as we have been witnessing recently, will ultimately have a severe impact on all dimensions of EU-Türkiye relations, including trade and security cooperation, as it prevents the trust and reliability needed between partners and antagonises both sides in the current geopolitical scene;

57. Continues to acknowledge and commend the democratic and pro-European aspirations of the majority of Turkish society (particularly among Turkish youth), whom the EU will not forsake; regards these aspirations as a major reason for keeping Türkiye’s accession process alive; calls therefore on the Commission to uphold and increase its political and financial support to the vibrant and pro-democratic civil society in Türkiye, whose efforts can contribute to generating the political will necessary for deepening EU-Türkiye relations; highlights, nevertheless, that the resumption of the accession process depends on the unwavering political will of Türkiye’s authorities and society to become a full-fledged democracy, which cannot be forced upon it by the EU;

58. Reiterates its call to strengthen and deepen mutual knowledge and understanding between our societies, promoting cultural growth, socio-cultural exchanges and combating all manifestations of social, religious, ethnic or cultural prejudice; encourages Türkiye and the EU to promote shared values, particularly by supporting young people; reiterates its utmost commitment to sustaining and increasing support for Türkiye’s independent civil society;

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59. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Council and the Commission; asks that this resolution be translated into Turkish and forwarded to the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Türkiye.

MIL OSI Europe News –

April 24, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the protection of the European Union’s financial interests – combating fraud – annual report 2023 – A10-0049/2025

Source: European Parliament

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on the protection of the European Union’s financial interests – combating fraud – annual report 2023

(2024/2083(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to Articles 310(6) and 325(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

– having regard to the Commission report of 25 July 2024 entitled ‘35th Annual Report on the protection of the European Union’s financial interests and the fight against fraud – 2023’ (COM(2024)0318) (2023 PIF Report),

– having regard to the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) 2023 annual report [1] and the Activity report of the Supervisory Committee of OLAF – 2023 [2],

– having regard to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) 2023 Annual Report published on 1 March 2024,

– having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget [3] (the Conditionality Regulation),

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law [4] (the Whistleblower Directive) and to the Commission report of 3 July 2024 on its implementation and application (COM(2024)0269),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 5 July 2023 entitled ‘2023 Rule of Law Report – The rule of law situation in the European Union’ (COM(2023)0800), and to the European Parliament resolution of 28 February2024 entitled ‘Report on the Commission’s 2023 Rule of Law report’[5],

– having regard to the Commission’s decision of 16 December 2024 not to lift the measure imposed in application of Article 2(2) of Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022 on measures for the protection of the Union budget against breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Hungary,

– having regard to the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) of 16 February 2022 in Cases C-156/21 [6] and C-157/21 [7] and to Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022 on measures for the protection of the Union budget against breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Hungary, all of which refer to the Conditionality Regulation,

– having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union [8] (the Financial Regulation),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1624 [9], Regulation (EU) 2024/1620 [10] and Directive (EU) 2024/1640 [11], all of the European Parliament and of the Council, all adopted on 31 May 2024 and all concerning the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, including through the establishment of the Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism,

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law [12] (the PIF Directive),

– having regard to the Commission report of 16 September 2022 entitled ‘Second report on the implementation of Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law’ (COM(2022)0466),

– having regard to the Commission report of 3 July 2024 on the implementation and application of Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law (COM(2024)0269),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy [13] (the Common Provisions Regulation),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2024 entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report – The rule of law situation in the European Union’ (COM(2024)0800),

– having regard to the study entitled ‘Strengthening the fight against organised crime: Assessing the legislative framework’, published in December 2022 [14],

– having regard to the study entitled ‘Strengthening the fight against corruption: assessing the legislative and policy framework’, published in January 2023 [15],

– having regard to the study entitled ‘Compliance assessment of measures adopted by the Member States to adapt their systems to Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (‘the EPPO’)’ and its extension, both published in December 2023 [16],

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 3 May 2023 on the fight against corruption (JOIN(2023)0012) and to the Commission proposal of 3 May 2023 for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating corruption, replacing Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA and the Convention on the fight against corruption involving officials of the European Communities or officials of Member States of the European Union and amending Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council (COM(2023)0234),

– having regard to the joint Europol-OLAF report of 6 June 2023 entitled ‘Assessing the Threats to the NextGenerationEU (NGEU) Fund’,

– having regard to the European Ombudsman’s closing note of 12 September 2023 on the Strategic Initiative concerning the transparency and accountability of the Recovery and Resilience Facility in relation to Case SI/6/2021/PVV, opened on 24 February 2022,

– having regard to the European Court of Auditors (ECA) report entitled ‘Our activities in 2023’, published on 9 October 2024,

– having regard to ECA Review 04/2023 of 6 July 2023 entitled ‘Digitalising the management of EU funds’,

– having regard to Special Eurobarometer 534 entitled ‘Citizens’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU in 2023’[17],

– having regard to ECA special report 06/2023 of 13 March 2023 entitled ‘Conflict of interest in EU cohesion and agricultural spending – Framework in place but gaps in transparency and detection measures’,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/785 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the Union Anti-Fraud Programme and repealing Regulation (EU) No 250/2014 [18],

– having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on the protection of the European Union’s financial interests – combating fraud – annual report 2022 [19],

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0049/2025),

A. whereas, in line with the obligation laid down in Article 325(5) TFEU, each year, the Commission submits to the European Parliament and to the Council a report drafted in cooperation with the Member States on the measures taken for the implementation of this article (known as PIF reports);

B. whereas PIF reports are based mainly on information provided by the Member States, including data on irregularities and fraud detected, via the Irregularity Management System (IMS), and on data extracted from the Commission’s accounting system (ABAC);

C. whereas effective measures to protect the EU’s financial interests at EU level have to be implemented on the basis of data-based knowledge of the specific situation in each Member State, particularly in cases involving complex criminal activity;

D. whereas the number of irregularities detected and reported demonstrates the results of Member States’ efforts to counter illegal activities in this area and is not to be interpreted, by itself, as an indication of the level of mismanagement or fraud in the Member States;

E. whereas the links between irregularities’ occurrence, their detection and the reporting level require a wider overall assessment;

F. whereas sound management of public resources and protecting the EU’s financial interests across all EU policies should be key to increasing citizens’ confidence by ensuring the proper and effective use of taxpayers’ money;

G. whereas protecting the EU budget involves multiple actors at various levels who can only achieve their mandate through a structured network of relationships and coordination within the anti-fraud architecture (AFA)[20];

H. whereas the diversity of legal and administrative systems in the Member States and their varying levels of digitalisation need to be adequately addressed with the creation of more unified, interoperable and comparable administrative and reporting systems in the EU in order to effectively prevent and counter fraud, corruption, irregularities and other infringements;

I. whereas solid cooperation between authorities conducting administrative investigations and those conducting criminal investigations at both EU and Member State levels should be encouraged;

J. whereas the Early Detection and Exclusion System (EDES) and ARACHNE are effective tools to protect the EU budget from risks of insolvency, negligence, fraud or irregularity committed by private actors, in the case of the EDES, and via a data-mining and risk-scoring approach, in the case of ARACHNE;

K. whereas criminal networks operating in the EU are fully embracing the entire range of cutting-edge information technology, including artificial intelligence (AI), to facilitate their criminal activities, posing an even more complex threat to the EU budget and a new challenge for law enforcement and requiring the AFA to fast-track its exploration of AI use in the fight against fraud;

L. whereas respect for the values on which the EU is founded and for fundamental rights, as well as compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, are prerequisites for accessing EU funding;

M. whereas the rule of law conditionality mechanism applies across the entire EU budget as a prerequisite for accessing all EU funds and allows measures to be taken in cases of breaches of the rule of law principles that affect or seriously risk affecting the sound financial management of the EU budget or the EU’s financial interests;

N. whereas Article 22 of Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility [21] (the RRF Regulation) contains provisions concerning the protection of the EU’s financial interests;

General remarks on PIF reporting and on major threats

1. Welcomes the 2023 PIF Report and its analyses on the relevant findings, and endorses its recommendations;

2. Shares the view that effective protection of the Union’s financial interests requires the acceleration of the digitalisation that facilitates knowledge sharing, data accessibility and data processing and that would enhance the governance of the overall AFA; maintains that both the EU and national authorities should intensify the use of digital tools with a view to facilitating cooperation;

3. Reiterates that a more measurable and results-oriented governance of the activities of the AFA’s many components is key both to effectively protecting the Union’s financial interests and to assessing the AFA’s efficiency;

4. Recalls that solid cooperation between the administrative and judicial authorities conducting investigations at both EU and Member State levels is essential; reiterates its concerns over the still suboptimal situation, in particular as regards the detection and reporting of suspected fraud and irregularities and their follow-up, in which there are marked differences between Member States; encourages the Member States, therefore, to take a proactive approach to protecting the Union’s financial interests and to enhance the exchange of information between their national authorities and with EU bodies and agencies, including in order to identify and address emerging risks and fraud trends in a timely manner; underlines the fact that the fight against fraud requires a holistic and comprehensive approach, covering all stages of the anti-fraud cycle and reflecting the multiple, interconnected and interdependent actors and processes in place for the protection of the financial interests of the Union;

5. Notes that the overall number of cases of fraud and irregularities reported by the competent EU and national authorities increased significantly, by 9 %, in 2023 (13 563) compared to 2022 (12 455); regrets the fact that this is an all-time high and is the continuation of a growing trend over the last five years; observes, further, that the overall financing concerned in relation to these cases in 2023 (EUR 1.90 billion) was markedly higher than in 2022 (EUR 1.77 billion), having increased by 7.3 %; acknowledges that the multiannual cycle of implementation of numerous programmes makes comparisons based on a five-year average more appropriate than year-to-year comparisons for identifying real-time situations and obtaining reliable analysis of trends and patterns; appreciates, accordingly, that the 2023 PIF Report refers to the results of the 2019-2023 period; observes that the rise in the number of irregularities and in funding that achieves no positive results highlights the need to correlate budgets with the performance indicators of the competent institutions;

6. Is concerned by the overall scenario depicted by the multiannual analysis in the 2023 PIF Report; emphasises that the current situation justifies the efforts made to ensure more effective deployment of adequate resources and their more efficient use, which requires better governance and cooperation; underlines that fraud, corruption and violations of democracy, justice and the rule of law are deeply interconnected and cannot be tackled in isolation; calls on the Commissioners on budget, fraud and public administration and on democracy, justice and the rule of law to work closely and immediately on launching initiatives to make the actions and the results of the AFA measurable and more tangible and to present them to Parliament, in line with the commitment made at the confirmation hearings; suggests that stronger synergies be created between the Commission’s Directorate-General for Budget and other Commission directorates-general working on the rule of law and the protection of other EU values, particularly the Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, the Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion and the Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy, to ensure that all the departments work together, rather than in silos, to address these systemic challenges more effectively;

7. Reiterates the call for a holistic approach in PIF reports, which are also considered an AFA governance tool, in order to provide a comprehensive overview of the synergies between all the relevant actors, identify best practices and address shortcomings; is aware that, as emphasised in the 2023 PIF Report, the operational protection of the Union’s financial interests from fraud, irregularities and other illicit activities is entrusted to national authorities, OLAF and the EPPO, and welcomes the integration of OLAF and EPPO findings in the 2023 PIF Report; asks for a deeper analysis of the interaction between the AFA components, and for the introduction of measures to increase the efficiency of the competent institutions with a view to reducing fraud and irregularities; calls for the further improvement of this holistic approach to provide a clearer, more complete and more concrete picture of the overall state of play of the protection of the Union’s financial interests, encompassing the entirety of anti-fraud action at both national and EU levels;

8. Welcomes OLAF’s investigative performance, in particular the increased number of recommendations issued (309 compared to 275 in 2022) and the overall amount recommended for financial recovery (EUR 1 043.8 million compared to EUR 426.8 million in 2022) against a stable number of cases opened (190 in 2023 and 192 in 2022) and concluded (265 in 2023 and 256 in 2022); points out, in particular, that over the 2019-2023 period, more than 88 % of the irregularities identified as potentially fraudulent and related to expenditure disbursed under direct management were detected following OLAF investigations; regrets that the long duration of the investigations can have a negative impact regarding the consequential late launching of remedial measures; reiterates its request to receive comprehensive and adequately detailed figures on the amounts effectively recovered by the Commission on the grounds of the financial recommendations issued by OLAF; calls on the Commission also to integrate in the next PIF reports ad hoc sections on OLAF in order to develop a more granular analysis and reporting of its activities and of the financial recoveries carried out;

9. Welcomes the way in which the EPPO, operationally active since June 2021, has developed and increased its activities, which is well-reflected in the numbers of opened investigations (1 371 compared to 865 in 2022), of overall currently active investigations (1 927 compared to 1 117 in 2022) and of indictments (139 compared to 87 in 2022); appreciates the level of detail in EPPO reporting, which offers relevant information on many trends and on the situation in the participating Member States; calls for greater EPPO efficiency, with this being reflected in the amounts recovered and not just in the number of investigations;

10. Stresses the added value that EU bodies bring to the protection of the financial interests of the Union and the fight against fraud, especially when it comes to cross-border crime, as shown by the operational results of the EPPO and OLAF in 2023 too; reiterates its call for all relevant EU actors involved in the fight against fraud to be guaranteed adequate resources and, in this regard, reminds the Commission and the Council that every euro spent on investigation and anti-fraud action returns to the EU budget;

11. Is concerned that the substantial financial loss of value added tax (VAT) fraud reported by the EPPO is having a detrimental effect on the national budgets of the Member States while simultaneously threatening fair taxation and fair competition between businesses in the single market; underlines the fact that VAT is an important resource for the Union’s budget too; deems it appropriate to take into account the complexity of the underlying provisions on the system of own resources of the Union when quantifying the financial impact of the EPPO’s activities [22]; points out the concerning number of investigations into the recovery and resilience programmes (233) and the estimated financial loss (EUR 1.86 billion); calls, therefore, for adequate measures to be taken at both national and EU levels;

12. Calls on the Commission to develop and implement solutions allowing a follow-up to OLAF recommendations and EPPO prosecutions, their analysis and the measurability of the actual impact of their actions on the protection of the Union’s budget in terms of recovery of both mismanaged funds and of uncollected resources, with a view to providing additional justification for results-oriented policymaking; calls on the Commission to notify Parliament of the outcomes of EPPO prosecutions;

13. States that communication and transparency are essential to address fraud and corruption; emphasises the importance of engaging civil society, the media and investigative journalism to enhance awareness; underlines the central role played by the media and investigative journalism in the fight against fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and other misuse of public funds; considers that it is essential to safeguard the media from political pressure and influence to protect its independence and its role as a watchdog of democracy and the sound management of public funds;

14. Underlines that transparency plays an important role in the management of public funds; encourages the Commission and the Member States to maximise transparency in the use of funds, including with regard to information about final beneficiaries;

15. Underlines the importance of the role played by public authorities in fostering a zero-tolerance culture with regard to fraud and states that communication and transparency are essential to address fraud and corruption; emphasises the importance of engaging civil society, the private sector, the media and investigative journalism to enhance awareness; encourages the Commission to provide support to these relevant actors in the form of training programmes, funding and any other measures required to ensure their independence from external influence and from unlawful state surveillance, intimidation and attempts to undermine their legitimacy, in line with EU fundamental rights and the rule of law; invites the Commission to launch an EU-wide public awareness campaign on the risks of fake news, misinformation and deepfake content in fraud cases affecting EU-funded projects;

16. Is concerned about the EPPO’s and Europol’s clear warning on the increasing presence of groups of organised criminals behind the most relevant cases of cross-border fraud; notes that the EPPO’s annual report indicates 209 investigated offences concerning PIF-focused criminal organisations in its active investigations up to the end of 2023; understands that organised crime affects Union resources substantially and that the scale of fraud affecting the financial interests of the Union, in particular on the revenue side of the budget, can only be explained by the heavy involvement of serious organised criminal groups; is aware that the current analysis and reporting tools do not allow its quantification in a way that is satisfactory for evaluating the effectiveness or the shortcomings of the measures and policies in place; calls on the Commission to swiftly launch all necessary actions to address the analysis and reporting issue;

17. Maintains that the fact that the relevant EU legislation has not been transposed efficiently into the national legislation of many Member States and the fact that the Member States’ national laws are not harmonised give organised criminal groups opportunities to conduct a number of illegal cross-border activities in areas affecting the Union’s financial interests; reiterates, therefore, its previous calls for the revision of Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA on the fight against organised crime [23] and for the introduction of a new common definition of organised crime, taking into account, in particular, the use of corruption, violence, threat or intimidation to obtain control of economic activities or procurement;

18. Points out the results of the 2023 Eurobarometer survey on ‘Citizens’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU in 2023’, showing that corruption is a serious concern for EU citizens and businesses in the EU; maintains that high-level corruption, including in EU institutions, not only affects the Union’s financial interests and the EU economy as a whole, but also undermines citizens’ trust in democratic institutions, both in the EU and in the Member States; underlines that organised criminal groups are increasingly using corruption to infiltrate public administrations and gain economic advantages;

19. Points out that, in relation to corruption cases, the EPPO reported 131 investigated offences up to the end of 2023 (there were 87 cases in 2022) and that, over the years 2019-2023, 65 cases were reported to the Commission via IMS [24] by 11 countries, and that the reported irregular amounts linked to such cases come to about EUR 50.5 million; calls on the Commission to request that the EPPO inform Parliament of how much of that EUR 50.5 million has been recovered;

20. Acknowledges that anti-corruption strategies are in place in the Member States; calls for an evaluation and a periodical revision of these strategies; emphasises the importance of taking into account and fully addressing country-specific recommendations relating to the fight against corruption;

21. Acknowledges the Commission’s efforts to prevent and address cases of conflict of interest in the management of the Union’s financial resources; observes that, in the 2019-2023 period, 419 cases were reported via the IMS related to conflict of interest (there were 375 in 2018-2022), involving in total about EUR 112 million; stresses that the ECA has indicated in its audit work [25] that the main source of information on conflict of interest is the IMS and that the quantity and quality of the data recorded in the IMS varies between Member States; underlines that where Member States consider a conflict of interest to be a minor component in a wider fraud case, they do not report such cases as relating to conflicts of interest; calls on the Commission to adopt initiatives necessary to ensure consistent and adequately detailed reporting in the IMS of the above situations; calls for the provisions on conflicts of interest to be applied in a way that ensures legal certainty, be based on a clear and proportionate assessment of the risks and allow practical application by the competent authorities;

Revenue

22. Observes that, in 2023, the overall number of fraudulent and non-fraudulent irregularities related to traditional own resources (TOR) (5 118 compared to 4 661 in 2022) was 10 % higher than the five-year average (2019-2023), but that the amount involved decreased by 12 % to EUR 478 million (compared to EUR 783 million bat the end of2022); regrets that while the data show improved recovery for non-fraudulent cases (82 %), the recovery rate for fraudulent cases remains unchanged at 25 %, which is still low and is distributed unevenly across the Member States;

23. Points out that, in 2023, the Commission considered that in only five of the new write-off reports submitted to it by the Member States had it been satisfactorily demonstrated that TOR had been lost for reasons not imputable to the Member States in question and that the latter were not financially responsible for the loss; notes, by contrast, that in 81 cases, amounting to almost EUR 69 million, the Commission considered that the Member States had not satisfactorily demonstrated that TOR had been lost for reasons not imputable to them and that they were therefore financially responsible for the loss; concludes, therefore, that there is actionable room for improvement in the collection of TOR by the Member States;

24 Underlines that it is essential for Member States to live up to their responsibility to collect TOR in order to ensure that the burden of financing EU expenditure is shared fairly among the Member States and maintain a level playing field for economic actors in the single market; calls on the Member States to step up their efforts to improve the effectiveness of their national administrations’ activity in the field of recovery, following the detection of irregularities and fraud relating to VAT, in order to increase the amount of TOR made available to the EU budget; acknowledges that the VAT compliance gap relates to more than just fraud and evasion, but also covers VAT lost as a result of insolvencies, bankruptcies, administrative errors and legal tax optimisation; believes, however, that VAT fraud, such as missing trader intra-Community fraud, contributes meaningfully to VAT non-compliance and reiterates its call for the issue to be addressed through digital means, the fraud-proofing of VAT rules and stronger cooperation between national tax authorities and the competent EU investigative bodies;

25. Acknowledges the current legal framework relating to cooperation with OLAF, the EPPO and Eurofisc; calls on the Commission to speed up the process of revising the current legal framework to provide a clear legal basis for direct cooperation between Eurofisc and the EPPO; encourages OLAF to maximise the possibilities offered by mutual administrative assistance practices to detect and identify customs fraud and related VAT fraud, as well as to report such cases to the EPPO without delay; stresses that, in 2023, the EPPO identified VAT fraud in about 20 % of its active cases (873 cases), making this the second most frequent type of crime after non-procurement expenditure fraud (1 586 cases); is concerned by the increasing participation of groups of organised criminals in VAT fraud operations and by the identified connections between this kind of fraud and other kinds of very serious crimes, such as money laundering;

26. Reiterates its call on the Commission to reconsider the threshold of EUR 10 million set in the PIF Directive, which has a major impact on the EPPO’s activities in VAT fraud cases; maintains that different interpretations of the methodologies for calculating this threshold make the situation unclear; emphasises that the current threshold limits deterrence and allows perpetrators to seek out the weakest jurisdiction to elude the EPPO’s intervention; believes that the revision of the PIF Directive should either remove the threshold or substantially lower it; calls on the Commission, in the meantime, to provide adequate guidance on the calculation method for cases prior to the amendment of the PIF Directive;

27. Stresses the importance of effective and efficient cooperation between OLAF and the EPPO in this specific revenue sector and maintains that adequate detection and data transmission by OLAF to the EPPO could increase the collection of VAT and customs revenue for the EU budget, and would help avoid any overlap between the activities of the two offices;

Expenditure

28. Is concerned by the high levels of fraud and irregularities detected, both in 2023 and in 2022, under the common agricultural policy, both in rural development and in support for agriculture; remarks that the data confirm patterns and risks identified in previous years; observes that, during the 2019-2023 period, fraudulent irregularities reported for rural development increased, mainly owing to a rising number of irregularities detected for the 2014-2020 programming period; notes that during the 2019-2023 period, the number of non-fraudulent rural development irregularities continuously increased in line with the implementation of the programmes;

29. Observes that in cohesion policy the number and financial amounts of non-fraudulent irregularities reported for the 2014-2020 programming period are much lower than those reported during the first 10 years of implementation of the 2007-2013 programming period; points out that the fraud detection rate [26] (0.53 %) for the 2014-2020 programming period is similar to the rate for the 2007-2013 programming period, while the irregularity detection rate (0.67 %) is much lower than the rate recorded for the 2007-2013 programming period (2.5 %); notes that individual irregularities involving large financial amounts have a substantial impact on the fraud detection rate; calls for further clarification of the correlation between the fraud detection rate and the occurrence of fraud;

30. Welcomes OLAF’s analytical report entitled ‘Fraud and irregularities by areas of the cohesion policy – comparing risks’, which refers to information from Member States for the 2014-2020 programming period up until December 2023 and identifies areas particularly exposed to fraud risk (such as investments for the environment, climate change and the transition to a low carbon economy, research, development and innovation); remarks that the largest financial amounts in fraud cases were in environmental protection and research, technology development and innovation;

31. Reiterates its concern over the lengthy administrative procedures for dealing with the fraudulent cases reported; points out that, on average, during the 2019-2023 period, under the common agricultural policy, nearly four years were required from the start of an irregularity to arrive at a suspicion of fraudulent activity, and nearly three more years to close the case after its being reported to the Commission; highlights that, for cohesion, on average and during the 2014-2020 period, it took about a year and a half to arrive at a suspicion that a fraudulent irregularity had been committed and more than two years to close the case after its being reported to the Commission; asks the Commission to intensify dialogue with, and provide advice to, the Member State authorities to reduce the length of administrative procedures;

32. Observes that, for direct management between 2019 and 2023, OLAF was mentioned as the source of detection of fraudulent irregularities for 88.4 % of recovery items, corresponding to 92.1 % of total recovery amounts; asks the Commission to provide clear information on the data and on the actions taken to enhance swift recovery, including data on overall recovery levels for fraudulent and non-fraudulent irregularities;

33. Emphasises that when, despite preventive measures, fraudulent or non-fraudulent irregularities are detected, recovery is the measure that protects the Union’s financial interests, allowing for the correct implementation of EU policies and for the refunding of disbursed expenditure that is non-compliant with the funding requirements; stresses the findings of ECA special report 7/2024 [27] when referring to the 2014-2020 period, for which the reported irregular expenditure was EUR 14 billion, which is to be refunded via recovery; stresses the need to speed up the recovery process by establishing clear deadlines and imposing penalties for delays, so that funds are returned to the EU budget as quickly as possible; calls on the Commission to propose adequate measures to provide complete information on irregular expenditure and the associated corrective measures taken;

34. Stresses the importance of follow-up measures after the necessary corrective actions have been taken, with a view to learning from cases of fraud and improving procedures to prevent similar cases from occurring in the future; considers it important, in this regard, that the Member States thoroughly follow up on cases by analysing the enabling factors behind fraud and assessing the need to revise their management and control systems accordingly;

35. Understands that, following a lack of support in the Council for its initiatives in 2004 and 2014, the Commission is not willing to put forward another legislative proposal for mutual administrative assistance in the areas of EU spending that do not currently provide for this practice; encourages the Commission to take advantage of the revision of the OLAF Regulation [28], which already provides OLAF with an enhanced mandate for the coordination of Member States’ actions in order to further develop the current provisions with a view to filling this gap;

36. Notes that civil society organisations are an essential component of a vibrant democratic society, ensuring the broad coverage of diverse views in public debates; recognises that these organisations may receive Union funds to support their work in contributing to democratic dialogue and public engagement; emphasises that transparency in stakeholder meetings is fundamental to democratic integrity and should apply equally to all entities engaging with EU institutions; stresses that clear documentation and disclosure of such interactions strengthens public trust and democratic accountability; stresses that lobbying should be transparent, with full disclosure of all parties involved; takes notes of the allegations that the Commission subsidises NGOs to influence Members of the European Parliament; stresses that, if their existence is confirmed, such practices could distort policy discussions and contravene the principle of separation of powers and should therefore be ended; calls on the ECA to audit the programmes concerned and give its recommendations; expects the future ECA report to bring clarity on these issues; recalls that the ECA asked, in special report 05/2024 [29], for more efforts to be made to improve checks on the ground; notes with concern the ECA’s observation that lobbyists can choose to which category they belong, regardless of their legal form, to avoid disclosing financial information; notes that the EU is one of the largest global funders of civil society organisations; underlines the need for the EU Transparency Register Secretariat to enhance its systematic checks of the self-declarations of entities declaring themselves to be ‘NGOs, platforms, networks and similar’; observes that such systematic checks could be based on a set of criteria, including non-profit status, objectives relating to public benefit, and independence, to strengthen the trust in all entities registered in the EU Transparency Register, and should be supported by robust requirements for accountability and transparency;

37. Considers that when assessing delivery models for EU expenditure, the susceptibility of the various options to fraud and other misuse should be taken into account; calls on the Commission to ensure that the lessons learnt from the design and implementation of the RRF, including the recommendations addressed to it by the ECA and Parliament, are taken into account in future EU funding instruments, notably the post-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF); underlines that the shortcomings identified in the implementation of the RRF, including risks of fraud, double funding, and lack of transparency, must serve as a lesson for future EU financial frameworks; opposes any replication of the RRF model in its current form and stresses that any future performance-based funding must be accompanied by significantly stronger safeguards, transparency requirements and fraud prevention mechanisms to ensure the sound management of EU funds;

NextGenerationEU (NGEU) and the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF)

38. Appreciates the efforts made by the Commission in the revision of the 27 recovery and resilience plans (RRPs) to adjust to the energy market disruptions following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine; notes that the integration into the RRPs of REPowerEU is expected to contribute to reducing dependence on Russian fossil fuels and increasing European self-sufficiency;

39. Recalls, nevertheless, that delays can be observed in the implementation of the RRF and calls on the Commission to remain vigilant, in particular towards the end of the RRF life cycle, in order to ensure that Member States adequately protect the financial interests of the EU and that EU taxpayers’ money is spent appropriately;

40. Underlines the importance of robust management and control systems in preventing fraud as they have the effect of deterring criminals from attempting to defraud public authorities; expresses concerns about the ECA’s repeated observations pointing to persistent weaknesses in the implementation of Member State control systems, as this poses risks to the availability of complete and accurate data underlying payment requests, access to those requests for control purposes, and the effective functioning of Member State control systems to protect the EU’s financial interests; regrets that in several Member States, the control systems were not fully functional when the national RRPs started to be implemented, and underlines that such issues pose risks to the regularity of RRF payments and to the protection of the EU’s financial interests; calls on the Commission to ensure that the Member States remedy the inadequacies identified in their control frameworks without delay, including by implementing the recommendations addressed to it by the ECA;

41. Observes that the Commission’s control framework for the RRF relies primarily on the responsibility of the Member States to protect the EU’s financial interests; calls on the Commission to maintain a high level of attention to the fulfilment by the Member States of the specific audit and control milestones added to those RRPs which had lacked robustness and to continue efforts to close accountability gaps; takes notes of the actions launched by the Commission following the ECA’s recommendations on the identifiable weaknesses of some Member States’ control and reporting systems; urges the Commission to take decisive and swift action whenever necessary and to make full use of the provisions of the RRF Regulation if deficiencies persist in the control systems of Member States;

42. Notes with grave concern that ECA special report 14/2024 found that the climate impact of green spending under the RRF could have been overestimated by up to EUR 34.5 billion, with some projects having minimal impact on the energy transition or even causing environmental harm while also increasing the risk of fraud;

43. Calls for the establishment of clear, measurable criteria for green investments under the EU budget and the RRF to ensure that only projects with significant and proven environmental and economic benefits receive funding, thereby enhancing accountability and long-term sustainability while reducing the risk of fraud;

44. Observes that, for the RRF in 2023, the 2023 PIF Report indicates the number of cases of suspected fraud reported by the Commission (15) and the number of audits (13, compared with 16 carried out in 2022), but it does not include the concerningly high number of EPPO investigations (233 investigations referred to recovery and resilience programmes, with an estimated financial loss of EUR 1.86 billion); is concerned by a possible increase in the number of cases of fraud, corruption, double funding and conflicts of interest in the coming years and urges the Commission and the Member States to act swiftly in order to ensure the sound management and fair distribution of RRF funds;

45. Calls on the Commission to introduce mandatory fraud reporting via the IMS for all RRF-related cases, ensuring that irregularities and fraud affecting RRF funds are systematically recorded and monitored; notes with concern the lack of transparency in reporting fraud linked to RRF funds and insists that all Member States comply with standardised reporting obligations;

46. Asks OLAF to continue its risk analysis, which, in 2023, was made available to Member States along with an updated version of the ‘RRF risk framework’, and with the training and seminars for Member State authorities; endorses the use of the IMS for reporting RRF irregularities; reiterates its call on the Commission, on the specialised EU agencies and bodies, as well as on Member States, to actively cooperate and interact to ensure the protection of the EU’s financial interests when implementing the NGEU;

47. Observes that, as part of the Guidance on RRPs, the Commission has adopted [30] Annex IV on the framework for reduction and recoveries under the RRF; understands that the reduction of a payment is feasible when there are still payments to be effected; recalls that the RRF ends in 2026; points out that recovery is only to be launched whenever no further instalments remain; is concerned by the fact that this recovery procedure, borrowed from the model for implementing cohesion funds, has proved to be extremely ineffective and was abandoned in the current MFF; strongly regrets the fact that by the end of 2023 there were no recovery orders in ABAC concerning the RRF, and that there is still no obligation for Member States to report irregularities related to the RRF via the IMS;

48. Reiterates that transparency plays a vital role in exposing fraudulent schemes and discouraging fraudsters; reiterates its dissatisfaction with the interpretation endorsed by the Commission of the concept of ‘final recipient’ under the RRF; rejects the Commission’s incomplete and misleading interpretation [31]; remarks that, even according to the Commission guidelines [32], the ‘final recipient’ is the ‘last entity’ that receives funds for an RRF measure, and that any initial or intermediary recipient of funding, such as ministries or agencies operating merely as distributors of the funds, should not be considered to be the ‘last entity’; asks the Commission again to request that the Member States provide information on the ‘final recipient’ or ‘last entity’ and not to accept from Member States any information on ‘second-level recipients’ that is not in line with the agreement between the co-legislators; calls on the Commission to review its guidance by providing cases and examples that can clarify the provision and be a solid term of reference for the national authorities, in such a way as to endorse an adequate transparency level and a homogeneous interpretation across all the Member States; stresses that, should the Commission continue to refuse to ensure full transparency, Parliament must consider all available measures to enforce compliance;

49. Is concerned by the ECA’s opinion [33] on the increasing risk of EU funds being spent twice on the same measure and handed out twice for the same action; understands that corresponding measures in similar areas, such as transport and energy infrastructure, are financed from both the EU budget and the RRF, because the EU’s pandemic recovery fund finances actions similar to those covered by standard EU programmes; acknowledges that complementarity between the RRF and other EU instruments is allowed, but observes that this could result in delivering milestones that are fully financed by funds other than the RRF, because the RRF is not linked to the reimbursement of costs effectively incurred, but rather rewards the fulfilment of milestones and targets; emphasises that the several layers of governance, the fragmented IT landscape and the limited exchanges of data or use of data-mining tools such as ARACHNE, prevent the detection of double funding, and therefore the control mechanisms in place may be insufficient to properly mitigate this increased risk; maintains that the absence of direct access to the full list of RRF final recipients limits the Commission’s capacity to detect potential cases of double funding; believes that the precaution adopted by some Member States of avoiding combining the RRF with other EU instruments contributes to mitigating the risk of double funding; calls on the Commission to increase its controls in this regard;

50. Observes that Member States may include measures in their RRPs with no estimated costs or estimated costs of zero [34]; points out also that these ‘cost-free’ milestones are the main term of reference for assessing the correct use of RRF resources for their intended purposes; understands that the payments for these ‘cost-free’ or ‘zero-cost’ milestones are released following the milestones’ achievement, irrespective of the cost sustained, in line with the ‘financing not linked to cost’ approach under the RRF; observes, however, that such milestones make it impossible to verify the sound management of paid RRF resources, because such resources are disbursed in connection with a milestone for which they have not been deployed; calls on the Commission to reconsider its assumption that a ‘zero-cost’ measure cannot induce double funding, irrespective of whether other EU funds are used to implement it; strongly calls on the Commission to strengthen controls on ‘zero-cost’ measures and to give guidance to the Member States on how to address the financial design of the measures concerned in order to prevent such risk;

51. Reiterates its calls on the Commission to maintain adequate ex post audit procedures and to pay close attention to the risk of reversal after payment for the achievement of targets previously audited and assessed as satisfactorily fulfilled;

52. Follows up on the Ombudsman’s strategic initiative, launched in February 2022 and closed in September 2023, conducted on the transparency and accountability of the RRF, whose results it fully endorses; welcomes the ongoing dialogue between the Commission and the Ombudsman to address the suboptimal situations detected, in particular concerning the scoreboard and the proactive publication of documents related to the RRF;

Digitalisation and transparency to enhance the fight against fraud

53. Welcomes the political agreement reached on the proposed recast text of the Financial Regulation; believes that extending the scope of EDES to include shared management, and the adoption of a legal basis to use ARACHNE as a model for an EU-wide data-mining and risk-scoring tool, will strengthen the protection of the EU’s financial interests; recalls the calls made in previous reports to ensure that all Member States make use of data-mining tools, especially ARACHNE, to ensure timely and diligent reporting standards;

54. Shares the view that the IMS, the system through which Member States report to the Commission on irregularities and fraud affecting the EU budget, has potential for greater interoperability with other corporate tools of the Commission, such as ARACHNE and EDES, and with digital tools in Member States; asks to be informed, following the recast of the Financial Regulation, on the progress of the EDES-IMS interface and about the possible use of IMS data within the data-mining and risk-scoring tool (ARACHNE);

55. Reiterates its call for increased interoperability between data systems and for the harmonisation of reporting, monitoring and auditing in the Union; is aware of the crosscutting nature of interoperability and appreciates the adoption of the Interoperable Europe Act [35];

56. Underlines the findings of ECA Review 4/2023 of 6 July 2023 on digitalising the management of EU funds; recalls the positive effects of digitalisation on prevention and detection of fraud and irregularities, as well as on the management, control and auditing of EU funds, by allowing easier and quicker access to data and remote cross-checks, thereby limiting costs by reducing the need for controls and on-the-spot checks;

57. Recognises that taking advantage of a real-time and data-driven economy has significant benefits for the protection of the Union’s financial interests, while reducing the administrative burden on public authorities and businesses operating and trading across borders within the EU; calls for the EU and the Member States to improve the effectiveness of data sharing by creating a digital ecosystem allowing for the seamless, real-time and secure movement of standardised, structured and machine-readable data between businesses and public authorities, in particular national tax administrations, with a view to limiting possibilities for committing fraud and tax evasion;

58. Shares the view that digitalisation should be at the core of every anti-fraud strategy, and in particular that it should be integrated into national anti-fraud strategies to allow coordination between its constituent parts and for the threats posed by new technologies to be factored in;

59. Believes that digitalisation offers opportunities for tangible improvements to the governance of the anti-fraud network and that by facilitating communication and accessibility it helps to improve reporting, thereby allowing for a better understanding of the obstacles that persist and a more timely and comprehensive response by decision-makers and co-legislators; welcomes the fact that over half of the Member States have taken steps to identify and address skills gaps in digitalisation, in particular a lack of information and access to data on digitalisation; encourages the Member States and actors in the AFA to continue addressing skills gaps through measures involving, inter alia, knowledge sharing, training and the broadening of know-how and skills in the field of digitalisation;

60. Welcomes the efforts of many components of the AFA in assessing and further developing the options offered by AI and machine learning in identifying and detecting irregularities and pursuing efficiency gains in both analysis and classic administrative tasks; reiterates that human assessment must remain the pivotal characteristic of every process; adds that AI has the potential to be a game changer in the fight against fraud, allowing the rapid analysis of large data sets, as well as enhancing fraud detection and identification of fraud patterns; recalls that the successful use of AI relies on effective collaboration between all stakeholders and on the availability of high quality data, underpinned by the effective use of ARACHNE; urges the Commission to work towards developing AI in Europe so as to uphold data sovereignty and ensure robust data protection, aligning with the principles outlined in the AI Act [36] and the General Data Protection Regulation [37] (GDPR); calls on all anti-fraud actors to strengthen their cooperation to leverage the use of AI effectively and responsibly in the fight against fraud;

61. Recognises the growing risk of AI-generated content being used to manipulate procurement processes, financial transactions and evidence in fraud investigations; calls on the Commission to prioritise research and policy measures to combat fraudulent activities enabled by artificial intelligence, including deepfake technology and AI-driven disinformation campaigns that could compromise financial and anti-fraud mechanisms; calls on the Commission to propose stricter legal provisions and penalties for entities found to be using AI to commit or facilitate financial fraud, including AI-driven money laundering schemes, falsification of contracts, and digital identity theft in procurement processes;

62. Acknowledges the importance of the use of AI to make improvements in the quality and completeness of data exchanged with Member States; welcomes, in this regard, OLAF’s actions, including recommendations in the annual PIF reports, structured bilateral dialogues with Member States, the revision of the Commission Anti-Fraud Strategy action plan, and interinstitutional exchanges focusing on these matters;

63. Further calls for a dedicated EU-wide initiative to develop AI-driven fraud detection mechanisms within OLAF, the EPPO, and Europol, to increase efficiency in tracking and preventing financial crimes against the EU budget; recommends the establishment of an EU-wide task force composed of representatives from OLAF, the EPPO, Europol and national anti-fraud units, with a dedicated focus on digital fraud threats, including deepfake technology, AI-generated fake documents and synthetic identity fraud; underlines that this task force should develop and share best practices with the Member States;

64. Stresses the need for increased cross-border cooperation and data-sharing mechanisms between Member States to combat AI-enabled fraud, particularly in high-risk areas such as VAT, customs and financial aid distribution; encourages the creation of a joint EU intelligence hub to track fraudulent AI activity in real time; calls on the Commission and the Member States to integrate AI and data analytics into fraud detection systems, ensuring interoperability between national and EU-level databases while maintaining strong data protection safeguards;

65. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to implement strict transparency and audit measures in AI-based fraud detection tools to prevent bias, algorithmic manipulation and misuse in financial oversight systems; urges the development of AI ethics guidelines for anti-fraud institutions to ensure accountability;

66. Calls for a mandatory forensic verification process for all digital evidence submitted in financial fraud cases, ensuring the authenticity of documents and audio and video material used in investigations;

The internal layer of the EU’s AFA – 2023 key measures at EU level

67. Underlines the fact that the EU’s AFA is a composite institutional architecture designed to detect, prevent and combat fraud and other forms of misconduct affecting the EU’s financial interests, built on a multi-layered network of cooperation in which the first layer (OLAF, the EPPO, Europol, Eurojust, AMLA, the Commission, the ECA and the European Investment Bank (EIB)) is grounded on horizontal cooperation between the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, while the other layers are based on vertical relationships between EU and national authorities, and between EU authorities and international organisations; points out that the AFA has evolved over the years through a series of separate decisions that have led to an innovative network of entities; underlines that their coordinated activities in recent years have generated valuable experience that should be considered in the future revision of the relevant regulations; stresses that with the creation of the EPPO, the first European prosecutorial authority was established, enabling prompt and direct criminal law investigations and prosecutions, and that the lessons learnt in the first years of its operational activity need to be adequately integrated in the legislative framework to be able to take full advantage of the available tools and resources; stresses the importance of clear mandates between the various EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies in order to minimise the risk of overlaps and duplication and thereby ensure the efficiency of the functioning of the AFA;

68. Appreciates the integration in the 2023 PIF Report of the main administrative and judicial results achieved by OLAF and the EPPO, respectively, which follows the many calls from Parliament for more comprehensive reporting of the actions carried out by the components of the AFA; considers, however, that the differences in nature, scope and granularity between the two reports should be addressed and that the areas of cooperation should be indicated clearly; deems the differences in the figures provided by OLAF, the EPPO and the 2023 PIF Report to be justified in the current circumstances; highlights that reporting bodies in the Member States may report on criminal investigations only when the relevant judicial authorities grant the authorisation for them to do so, and this implies that while the EPPO and OLAF report data on active investigations, the reporting bodies are often unable to enter these details in the IMS database because of the need to protect confidentiality and ensure the proper conduct of investigations; understands that these cases result in a divergence in the data (‘delta’) that can only be eliminated when the investigations are completed and the relevant data are included in the reporting to the Commission so they can be included in a future PIF Report;

69. Welcomes the adoption by the Commission, in May 2023, of a package of anti-corruption measures which encompasses a proposal for a directive on combating corruption; believes that prevention and prosecution of corruption need to be stepped up and calls on the Commission to intensify the monitoring of the enforcement of measures in the Member States;

70. Welcomes the establishment of a network against corruption, which met for the first time on 20 September 2023, believes that the mapping of areas at a high-risk of corruption could contribute effectively to the further development of the EU anti-corruption strategy;

71. Underlines the importance of the rule of law as one of the fundamental values of the Union and stresses that the rule of law conditionality mechanism is crucial in order to ensure that Member States continue to respect rule of law principles; reiterates its deep concern regarding the situation concerning the rule of law in certain Member States, which is deeply worrying in its own right and can lead to serious losses for the Union budget; calls on the Commission to ensure the strict and fast implementation of all elements of the mechanism when Member States breach rule of law principles and when this affects, or risks affecting, EU financial interests; further insists on the need for coherence across various instruments when assessing the rule of law situation in Member States;

72. Notes that the fourth Commission Report 2023 on the rule of law, adopted in February 2024, provides a follow-up to the recommendations issued in the previous year’s Rule of Law Report; acknowledges that, in the fight against corruption, various Member States have updated or launched a revision of their national strategies and/or action plans, while others have reformed criminal law to strengthen the fight against corruption; observes that for many Member States the main obstacle to the fight against corruption is the limited resources of prosecution services; calls on the Commission to continue encouraging and supporting the efforts of Member States to reform and improve the efficacy of criminal proceedings and addressing the other challenges identified in the report; reminds the Commission of the effective tools at its disposal to safeguard the rule of law, such as infringement procedures, funding conditionality and the Article 7 TEU procedures, and expects it to make full use of them all; highlights, in this regard, that the new Financial Regulation introduces conditionality linked to the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU and calls on the Commission to start applying it, particularly in cases where infringement procedures have already been launched against a Member State for violations of the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, as this constitutes a clear recognition of an ongoing breach that could also impact the sound financial management of the Union budget;

73. Takes note of the Commission’s decision not to lift the measure under Article 2(2) of Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022 on measures for the protection of the Union budget against breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Hungary [38]; expects the Commission and the Council to lift the adopted measures only where evidence is collected that the remedial measures adopted by the Hungarian Government have proven effective in practice and, in particular, that no regression has been detected on already adopted measures; condemns the threats, such as espionage, to which EU institution staff are exposed, such as OLAF staff during their investigative missions in Hungary; stresses that such actions gravely undermine the rule of law and the integrity of the EU institutions; calls for the swift establishment of robust protection measures to safeguard EU institution staff on missions; calls on the Hungarian authorities to take immediate and concrete steps to safeguard judicial independence, uphold media freedom and fully implement the recommendations of the Commission’s Rule of Law Report to restore democratic checks and balances; urges the Council to continue the Article 7 TEU procedure against the Hungarian Government;

74. Emphasises that respect for the rule of law, including the fight against corruption, is a key determinant of the single market environment that fosters investment, growth, jobs and innovation, and protects small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and economic operators operating across borders; stresses that the Commission is accountable for rigorous verification, as a condition for disbursing funding, of the fulfilment of the rule of law-related milestones integrated in the various Member State RRPs; recalls that the Commissioner for democracy, justice and rule of law, working in close coordination with the recently appointed Commissioner on budget, anti-fraud and public administration, holds primary responsibility for the full application of the general regime of conditionality; calls on the Commission not to use ‘dialogue’ with Member States or the ‘pilot’ procedure as an open-ended means to avoid launching actual infringement procedures; calls, furthermore, on the Commission to prioritise horizontally infringements affecting the EU’s financial interests, in particular regarding the PIF Directive and the EPPO Regulation [39]; welcomes the statement in the Commission Political Guidelines on the importance of the rule of law for EU funds and the commitment by the Commissioner for budget, anti-fraud and public administration to introduce strong safeguards on the rule of law in the next MFF;

75. Considers that the protection of the common EU values enshrined in Article 2 TEU currently included in the Common Provisions Regulation needs to be further strengthened; calls on the Commission to explore how a mechanism equivalent to the horizontal enabling conditions could be developed as a general feature in all areas of the EU budget, with a view to linking a wider range of policies to all the values set out in Article 2 TEU; calls on the Commission to explore means of linking funding to rule of law conditions and the completion of necessary reforms in order to ensure a comprehensive approach, applied horizontally to all EU funds; calls on the Commission to pursue a comprehensive approach and to put forward proposals for further strengthening the Union’s rule of law toolbox as a priority, including strengthened rule of law conditionality for funds deployed in the current programming period;

76. Maintains that corruption is intrinsically linked to money laundering, and that money laundering is one of the most important enablers of illegal activities by organised criminals, as it allows them to transfer the proceeds of their crime into the legal economy; recognises that the heterogeneous national legal systems and fragmented application of the Union’s anti-money laundering framework have made it difficult to prevent, detect and counter money laundering; welcomes, in this regard, the adoption of the ambitious legislative package on anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism, which will unify national rules and thus enhance the collective fight against money laundering across the Union; welcomes the establishment of the new Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AMLA); considers that the new agency will play a central role in the new anti-money laundering framework through its coordinating and supervisory responsibilities; recalls that money laundering and terrorist financing are intrinsically linked and calls for the EPPO, OLAF and the ECA to have a stronger role in countering these phenomena;

77. Shares the view that the protection of the EU’s financial interests has been strengthened by the recast Financial Regulation; points out that the scope of EDES has been extended to encompass shared and direct management and provide new grounds for exclusion; welcomes the introduction of a legal basis for a risk-scoring and data-mining tool to be used by all Member States and in all management modes; regrets that both these measures will enter into force only in 2028 and only from the next MFF, resulting in several more years without comprehensive transparency regarding the final recipients of EU funds and missing a crucial opportunity to use these data to strengthen safeguards against corruption and fraud;

78. Appreciates the adoption of an updated action plan [40] for the 2019 Commission Anti-Fraud Strategy; notes that it includes 44 actions distributed over seven themes covering, in particular, digitalisation, cooperation, the RRF, customs fraud, and awareness-raising in ethical and anti-fraud culture matters;

79. Points out that the EU’s anti-fraud programme (UAFP) is the only spending programme specifically dedicated to fighting fraud affecting the EU’s financial interests and that it provides relevant support to all Member States’ authorities as components of the external layer of the AFA, in order to strengthen the fight against fraud; observes that the UAFP has the flexibility needed to adapt to the constantly changing anti-fraud landscape and is aligned with the seven-year period (2021-2027) of the current MFF; notes that, so far, 55 % of the total implementation of the UAFP has contributed to the digital transition;

80. Calls on the Commission to build on the success of the UAFP and encourages the Commissioner on budget and anti-fraud to consider the UAFP as a model to be extended in the next MFF, in line with the task, indicated in the mission letter, of securing support for Member States’ efforts to protect the Union’s financial interests;

81. Welcomes the first UAFP association request received in 2023 from a non-EU country, namely Ukraine, with which an association agreement covering its participation in the programme has been negotiated and was adopted in March 2024;

82. Expresses concern that the Commission’s latest interim evaluation of Hercule III found aspects that may have hampered the programme’s effectiveness, notably that certain Member States’ administrations lacked the resources to enable them to cope with the programme’s administrative requirements;

83. Takes note of the reiterated calls from the EPPO to bolster the detection capacity of the relevant components of the AFA, and recalls that, in line with the Commission Anti-Fraud Strategy, emphasis is to be given to data analysis as a tool for detecting fraud; highlights, in this regard, the importance of harmonising definitions in order to obtain comparable data across the EU; encourages the Commission to strengthen the use of the IMS as a tool to support auditors’ risk analysis when preparing audit activities; invites OLAF to increase its training offer to Commission staff, including auditors and relevant actors in the financial flow circuit;

84. Is aware that the decentralised structure of the EPPO entails an interplay between national law and EU law and between national authorities and the EPPO; understands that the EPPO operates based on the directly applicable EU regulations but that it also requires adequate implementing measures to be adopted via national legislation transposing the PIF Directive and other relevant Union acts; calls on the Commission to ensure that national legislation is fully in line with the EPPO Regulation and the PIF Directive, launch infringement proceedings and propose the revision of these legal acts in order to make the EPPO more effective in the exercise of its mandate;

85. Notes the results of the Compliance assessment of measures adopted by the Member States to adapt their systems to the EPPO Regulation [41], which was presented in September 2023; regrets that many situations are still suboptimal and need to be addressed because they weaken the effectiveness of the protection of the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal investigations; refers, in particular, to the attribution of competence between national prosecution services and the EPPO; stresses also that the EPPO Regulation stipulates the reporting of possible EPPO cases directly and without undue delay; calls on the Commission to verify and monitor Member States’ full compliance with the EPPO Regulation and their prompt reporting of suspicions of fraud in areas within the EPPO’s competence directly to it;

86. Is concerned that in many Member States the designated national authority deciding on disagreements between the EPPO and national authorities on the competence for prosecuting a case is not a ‘court’ or a ‘tribunal’; calls on the Commission to verify and monitor whether Member States are fully complying with Article 25(6) and Article 42(2)(c) of the EPPO Regulation, which requires the possibility of an appeal to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) against a decision by a national authority on the attribution of competence;

87. Stresses that the current control by national authorities over the ‘necessary’ resources and equipment of the European Delegated Prosecutors (EDPs) and the need to refer to the national authorities’ provisions for ‘adequate arrangements’ on social security, pensions and insurance coverage could constrain the autonomy and independence of the EPPO’s actions; calls on the Commission to propose adequate solutions in the forthcoming revision of the EPPO Regulation;

88. Points out that the transposition of the PIF Directive differs between Member States, which, in some cases, affects the cross-border exercise of EPPO competences; calls on the Commission to ensure proper implementation of the PIF Directive and to propose its revision, based on the experience gathered;

89. Underlines that Article 25(3) of the EPPO Regulation, which elaborates on the exercise of the EPPO’s competence in the event of non-PIF offences inextricably linked to PIF offences, raises legal and practical questions and requires further streamlining in order to make effective use of the EPPO’s legal framework; calls on the Commission to propose suitable solutions in the forthcoming revision of the EPPO Regulation in order to reinforce the EPPO’s ability to investigate cross-border organised crime;

90. Reiterates [42] that the EPPO has an important role in safeguarding the rule of law and in combating corruption in the Union, and encourages the Commission to closely monitor Member States’ level of cooperation with the EPPO in the rule of law reports; welcomes the accession of Poland and Sweden to the EPPO; notes with approval Ireland’s recent announcement of its intention to participate; calls on the Government of Hungary, the sole remaining Member State that has not yet joined the EPPO, despite the absence of any legal or constitutional impediment, to join the EPPO without further delay; recalls that broad public support for Hungary’s accession has been demonstrated by the collection of 680 000 signatures in favour of joining the EPPO, underscoring a strong societal demand for enhanced legal safeguards against fraud and corruption affecting the Union’s financial interests;

91. Reiterates its call for the launch of an exchange of views on the possible clarification of the competence of the EPPO within its mandate, as defined in the Treaty, as regards protecting the financial interests of the Union;

92. Notes that in 2023, cooperation between the relevant actors increased, with the EPPO and Eurojust cooperating on 26 ongoing cases at the end of 2023; observes that also in 2023 the EPPO and Europol cooperated efficiently on various operational matters, and understands that this cooperation almost doubled in 2023, with Europol providing support on 47 cases upon the EPPO’s request; calls on the Commission to request that the EPPO and Eurojust specify the efficiency criteria on the basis of which they conduct their activities;

93. Welcomes the efforts by OLAF and the EPPO to strengthen their cooperation; understands that information is being exchanged between the two offices in order to avoid parallel investigations into the same matters, and that, in 2023, 22 complementary investigations were opened by OLAF and four supporting investigations were requested by the EPPO; is aware that the synergies resulting from the use of complementary investigations (ex Article 12(f) of the OLAF Regulation) and investigations in support (ex Article 12(e) of the OLAF Regulation) are suboptimal; calls on the Commission to address the legal and operational causes of this when reviewing its regulations;

94. Is concerned about the lack of analysis and accurate information on the recoveries to the benefit of the Union’s budget that should follow both OLAF and EPPO investigations; is aware that the impact of the AFA on the security of citizens and on the enforcement of the rule of law in the Union goes beyond the quantification of financial recoveries alone; stresses, however, that the results of the efforts made to create the AFA should tend towards measurability and be tangible at least as regards the budgetary aspects; emphasises that the impact of the activities implemented for the protection of the Union’s financial interests should be assessed and taken into consideration in the allocation of resources and definition of mandates;

95. Understands that the Commission has yet to provide data on the recoveries to the benefit of the Union budget following the EPPO activities reported to the Commission, as provided by Article 103(2) of the EPPO Regulation, and that this matter is included in the mission letter of the Commissioner for budget, anti-fraud and public administration; observes that the freezing of assets is essential to combat crime affecting the EU budget and that a certain amount of time is needed for freezing to be converted into actual confiscations and recoveries; highlights that the amount confiscated is not expected to return by default to the Union’s budget; notes that, in line with Article 38 of the EPPO Regulation, the potential revenue resulting from seizure and confiscation measures taken by EDPs in Member States should flow back into the EU budget and could be accounted for in the EU budget as non-assigned revenue; calls on the Commission to make the necessary arrangements with the relevant national authorities to allow these sums to enter the EU budget;

96. Points out that data on effective recoveries following OLAF financial recommendations are not published in the OLAF Annual Report or in any other official report from the Commission; regrets that only aggregated data are made available and they refer to 2 299 financial recommendations issued by OLAF between 2012 and 2023 for an overall amount of about EUR 9 billion; remarks that the analysis of the available figures suggests considerable room for improvement; observes that a large gap exists between the amounts recommended for recovery by OLAF, the amount established as recoverable by the Commission’s services and the amount eventually effectively recovered; is concerned by the low recovery rates for undue expenditure (for activities implemented under shared and indirect management modes the rate is 34 % and 11 %, respectively, and for recovery under direct management only 22 %); calls on the Commission to provide data with adequate granularity on recovery and to assess the reasons behind the recovery gap; stresses the need for OLAF and the Commission to agree upon, and apply consistently, common evaluation criteria that ensure greater convergence and clarity, thereby improving the efficiency and effectiveness of financial recovery assessment; emphasises that recovery following an OLAF recommendation and the EPPO’s investigations is an important measurement of the efficiency of the AFA and calls for more transparency in this regard;

The external layer of the EU’s AFA – key measures at national level in 2023

97. Understands that the overall level of implementation by the Member States of the Commission’s recommendations issued in the 2022 PIF Report is considered satisfactory; highlights, however, that significant differences between Member States persist; is concerned, in particular, by the cases of inadequate reporting of irregularities by some Member States via the IMS; recalls that reporting is mandatory under the current regulations and encourages OLAF to strengthen its oversight and monitoring actions with a view to achieving uniform reporting across the Union;

98. Calls on the Commission to monitor the comprehensiveness of the reporting in IMS by countries benefiting from pre-accession assistance and welcomes the initiatives of the Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations to enforce candidate countries’ obligations to report irregularities in the IMS on a regular basis;

99. Encourages the Member States to report in the IMS the irregularities related to the RRF, in line with the ECA recommendations; calls on the Commission to facilitate such use of the IMS by the Member States by providing support in the form of training, seminars and exchange of best practices;

100. Welcomes the participation of Sweden and Poland in the EPPO, decided on in 2024, as well as the objective of the new Irish Government to join the EPPO; insists that Member States that are not yet participating must do so without delay and calls on the Commission to incentivise participation in the EPPO through positive measures;

101. Reiterates that Member States’ ineffective, untimely or lack of cooperation with the EPPO and OLAF constitute grounds for action under the Conditionality Regulation; calls on the Commission to take into due consideration all information from the EPPO and OLAF on situations where Member States fail to comply with their obligations;

102. Maintains that National Anti-Fraud Strategies (NAFS) are the most effective tool for coordination between the various national, regional and sectoral authorities and the many local entities entrusted with the tasks into which the anti-fraud cycle is organised; notes that, in 2023, 21 out of 27 Member States reported having an anti-fraud strategy; observes that out of 21, only 10 Member States had a full national anti-fraud strategy [43] while 11 Member States had only sectoral rather than national anti-fraud strategies in place; recognises that the approach taken by Member States in their anti-fraud strategies today varies widely; regrets that six Member States do not have any anti-fraud strategy at all; strongly regrets this highly unsatisfactory situation, which compromises the integrity of EU spending and undermines citizens’ trust in EU institutions;

103. Maintains that Member States would benefit from a periodic evaluation of their anti-fraud frameworks; calls on the Commission to encourage Member States to run independent or peer reviews of their anti-fraud frameworks to enhance consistency and pursue high standards;

104. Encourages the Commission to propose enforceable initiatives to clarify the relationship and consider establishing a link between the adoption of NAFS by the Member States and the level of financial support they receive;

105. Asks the Commission to launch, in preparation for the revision of the OLAF Regulation, a monitoring exercise on the state of play of the Anti-Fraud Coordination Services (AFCOS) established in the Member States; encourages the Commission to plan for the update and redesign of their structure, role, responsibilities and mandate; regrets the suboptimal staffing level across the majority of the AFCOS in the Member States; underlines the need to ensure sufficient levels of expertise among staff in national anti-fraud coordinating structures; calls on the Commission to encourage and support Member States in addressing these issues as a matter of priority, including in the context of the European Semester cycle;

106. Underlines the role played by public authorities in fostering a zero-tolerance culture against fraud and stresses, in particular, the importance of fraud prevention to ensure that fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and other misuse of funds do not occur in the first place; recalls that the correct transposition of the PIF Directive, adopted on 5 July 2017, is crucial for the protection of the Union budget, for the implementation of all the EU policies for which EU money is used, including in the context of RRF deployment, and for establishing the scope of investigations and prosecutions by the EPPO, whose competence is established by reference to the PIF Directive, as implemented by national law; expects national authorities, including governments, in all Member States unequivocally to condemn fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and any other misuse of public funds, taking a proactive approach in protecting the financial interests of the Union through effective measures in areas including risk assessment, communication and information sharing, and training of staff; calls on the Commission to intervene in a timely manner through infringement procedures to ensure the consistent transposition of the PIF Directive and the effective liability of – and sanctions for – legal and natural persons;

107. Reiterates that whistleblowers play a key role in boosting fraud detection, investigation and prosecution; understands that, by the end of 2023, 24 Member States had adopted national legislation to transpose the Whistleblower Directive and declared their transposition complete; regrets, however, that in March 2023, after analysis of the national measures adopted, the Commission was obliged to refer six Member States to the CJEU for their failure to transpose the Directive and failure to notify transposition measures, asking the Court to impose financial sanctions; is concerned by the further infringement proceedings [44] ongoing against six other Member States; calls on the Commission to intensify the monitoring of national transposition measures and report to Parliament accordingly; stresses that Parliament itself must also urgently ensure the proper transposition of the Directive, as confirmed by the CJEU ruling of 11 September 2024, which found that Parliament’s current framework fails to provide balanced and effective protection against retaliation; calls for Parliament to immediately adopt robust rules in line with the Directive to safeguard its own whistleblowers;

108. Notes that the Investigative Division of the European Investment Bank (EIB IG/IN) had made 10 referrals to the EPPO and 17 to OLAF by the end of 2023; is aware that entities which have been found by EIB IG/IN to engage in prohibited practices may be excluded, in other words declared ineligible, for a stated period, from being awarded any contracts or entering into any relationship with the EIB; observes that, in 2023, these exclusion proceedings resulted in the exclusion of five economic operators for a minimum duration of three years, while five other companies reached settlement agreements applying conditionality to their eligibility;

External dimension of the protection of the EU’s financial interests

109. Welcomes the Commission’s reaction to its call to increase the monitoring of, and control over, the funds under the Global Europe, Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument for assistance to non-EU countries, as well as via the joint communication with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy [45]; appreciates the Commission’s continuous efforts to ensure that anti-corruption measures are mainstreamed into EU external action instruments; reiterates its recommendation to suspend budgetary support and de-commit funds to non-EU countries, including candidate countries, where the authorities clearly fail to take genuine action against widespread corruption, without compromising support for the civil population; emphasises that respect for and commitment to promoting EU values is an essential precondition for all partners aspiring to join the Union; reiterates that accession to the EU is a merit-based process whereby each applicant is assessed on its own merits and its fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria; considers that when applying the revised enlargement methodology there should be a particular focus on fundamental reforms, and that fair and rigorous conditionality should be applied as well as reversibility where setbacks occur; considers that appropriate tools must be used to ensure that candidate countries show concrete and sustainable compliance with the rule of law, democratic principles and fundamental rights, both before and after joining the Union;

110. Observes that in the context of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, Ukraine will continue to require substantial support in the current and next MFF and, in the perspective of a fair and sustainable peace agreement, Ukraine will need support for post-war reconstruction, including for central government services and reforms;

111. Considers that the three pillars of the Ukraine Facility could be reshaped accordingly and that reconstruction should align with pre-accession requirements; emphasises the importance of close coordination and cooperation with the Ukraine coordination mechanism established by the G7; calls for the EU and all Member States to increase their support for Ukraine, while putting appropriate measures in place to protect the financial interests of the EU through the prevention, detection and correction of fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and irregularities in the use of Union funds, including by performing more thorough checks, in order to ensure that EU funds sent to Ukraine and to its neighbouring countries are adequately monitored and controlled and end up benefiting those most in need;

112. Stresses that the unprecedented volume of financial support received by Ukraine from the EU in recent years, and deployed in the extremely adverse conditions imposed by the ongoing war, imply the adoption of appropriate measures to ensure that such resources are employed as intended, in particular where they are aimed at benefiting infrastructure and people in need;

113. Appreciates the work carried out by OLAF and the EPPO in protecting the financial interests of the Union by providing training to increase administrative capacity and autonomy, carrying out investigations in Ukraine and agreeing on the working arrangement with the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine to facilitate cooperation in the investigation of corruption; invites the competent EU offices to continue their cooperation with and support for the Ukrainian authorities;

114. Acknowledges, in this regard, the progress made by Ukraine in advancing reforms related to judicial independence, accountability, anti-corruption and anti-money laundering, despite the difficult conditions caused by Russia’s ongoing war of aggression; encourages Ukraine to continue on the path of reform, including with regard to the influence of oligarchs in politics;

115. Welcomes the enhanced sanctions adopted by the EU against Russia so far, encompassing the banning of Russian nationals and entities from participating in public procurement contracts in the EU and restrictions on EU funding for Russian publicly owned or controlled entities; recognises, however, that despite the current measures, individuals and entities subject to the sanctions against Russia can still find ways to circumvent the sanctions and calls, therefore, for the EU and the Member States to maintain, reinforce and extend the scope and effectiveness of the sanctions policy against Russia and Belarus;

116. Recognises that the Member States and their relevant competent authorities are responsible for the effective implementation and enforcement of EU sanctions, as well as for identifying breaches and imposing appropriate penalties; underlines the role played by customs authorities and the importance of their close cooperation in strengthening the uniform enforcement of sanctions; welcomes, in this regard, the Baltic Customs Initiative;

117. Underlines that the EU is the biggest provider of external assistance to Palestinian refugees; stresses that the Union budget must continue to provide support to build peace and stability in the Middle East region, combat terrorism, hate, fundamentalism and disinformation, as well as promote human rights, fight impunity and strengthen adherence to the rule of law; emphasises, accordingly, that EU budgets must not support, under any circumstances, activities that go against these objectives; notes that, following the heinous terror attacks of 7 October 2023 by Hamas and allegations of misuse of EU funds for terrorism, a funding review has been conducted by the Commission, which, although concluding that no evidence has been found, to date, that money had been diverted for unintended purposes (including for support for incarcerated terrorists) and reporting that the safeguards in place worked well, still called for certain additional measures that were deemed necessary; recalls that all hostages taken by Hamas have to be released; emphasises the importance of ensuring that EU funds are effectively allocated and managed in order to achieve their intended goals, even via scrutiny by the EPPO, OLAF and the ECA where appropriate; recalls the ongoing issue of the destruction of EU-funded projects in Gaza and the West Bank and calls for greater accountability and safeguards in this context;

118. Stresses that suspension of budgetary support in non-EU countries, including candidate countries, is an appropriate measure in the event of failure to take genuine action against widespread corruption; expects priority to be given to the fight against corruption in pre-accession negotiations, with capacity building via the establishment of specialised anti-corruption bodies; asks the Commission to ensure, also in cases where funding is suspended, assistance for civil populations, where possible through alternative channels;

119. Underlines the importance of cooperation with international organisations in combating fraud; regrets the lack of cooperation by some international organisations in providing the ECA with complete, unlimited and timely access to the documents necessary to carry out its tasks; notes that the Commission has stepped up communication with international organisations and calls on it to further intensify efforts to ensure access to all requested documentation;

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120. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

MIL OSI Europe News –

April 24, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the ninth report on economic and social cohesion – A10-0066/2025

Source: European Parliament

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on the ninth report on economic and social cohesion

(2024/2107(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty on European Union,

– having regard to Articles 4, 162, 174 to 178, and 349 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy [1] (Common Provisions Regulation),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1058 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 on the European Regional Development Fund and on the Cohesion Fund [2],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1059 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 on specific provisions for the European territorial cooperation goal (Interreg) supported by the European Regional Development Fund and external financing instruments [3],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1296/2013 [4],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1056 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the Just Transition Fund [5],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 establishing rules on support for strategic plans to be drawn up by Member States under the common agricultural policy (CAP Strategic Plans) and financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1305/2013 and (EU) No 1307/2013 [6],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/460 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 March 2020 amending Regulations (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013 and (EU) No 508/2014 as regards specific measures to mobilise investments in the healthcare systems of Member States and in other sectors of their economies in response to the COVID-19 outbreak (Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative)[7],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/558 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2020 amending Regulations (EU) No 1301/2013 and (EU) No 1303/2013 as regards specific measures to provide exceptional flexibility for the use of the European Structural and Investments Funds in response to the COVID-19 outbreak [8],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/461 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 March 2020 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 in order to provide financial assistance to Member States and to countries negotiating their accession to the Union that are seriously affected by a major public health emergency [9],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/2221 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 December 2020 amending Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 as regards additional resources and implementing arrangements to provide assistance for fostering crisis repair in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and its social consequences and for preparing a green, digital and resilient recovery of the economy (REACT-EU)[10],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/562 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 April 2022 amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013 and (EU) No 223/2014 as regards Cohesion’s Action for Refugees in Europe (CARE)[11],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/2039 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013 and (EU) 2021/1060 as regards additional flexibility to address the consequences of the military aggression of the Russian Federation FAST (Flexible Assistance for Territories) – CARE [12],

– having regard to the URBACT programme for sustainable urban cooperation, established in 2002,

– having regard to the Urban Agenda for the EU of 30 May 2016,

– having regard to the Territorial Agenda 2030 of 1 December 2020,

– having regard to the 9th Cohesion Report, published by the Commission on 27 March 2024 [13], and the Commission communication of 27 March 2024 on the 9th Cohesion Report (COM(2024)0149),

– having regard to the study entitled ‘The future of EU cohesion: Scenarios and their impacts on regional inequalities’, published by the European Parliamentary Research Service in December 2024,

– having regard to the Commission report of February 2024 entitled ‘Forging a sustainable future together – Cohesion for a competitive and inclusive Europe’[14],

– having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 31 May 2024 on the 9th Cohesion Report [15],

– having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 21 November 2024 entitled ‘A renewed Cohesion Policy post 2027 that leaves no one behind – CoR responses to the 9th Cohesion Report and the Report of the Group of High-Level Specialists on the Future of Cohesion Policy’,

– having regard to the report entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness – A competitiveness strategy for Europe’, published by the Commission on 9 September 2024,

– having regard to the agreement adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP21) in Paris on 12 December 2015 (the Paris Agreement),

– having regard to the study entitled ‘Streamlining EU Cohesion Funds: addressing administrative burdens and redundancy’, published by its Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union in November 2024 [16],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2025/XXXX of the European Parliament and of the Council of [INSERT DATE] on the Border Regions’ Instrument for Development and Growth in the EU (BRIDGEforEU) [INSERT FOOTNOTE ONCE PUBLISHED IN OJ],

– having regard to the Commission communication of 3 May 2022 entitled ‘Putting people first, securing sustainable and inclusive growth, unlocking the potential of the EU’s outermost regions’ (COM(2022)0198),

– having regard to the opinion in the form of a letter from the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (XXX),

– having regard to its resolution of 25 March 2021 on cohesion policy and regional environment strategies in the fight against climate change [17],

– having regard to its resolution of 20 May 2021 on reversing demographic trends in EU regions using cohesion policy instruments [18],

– having regard to its resolution of 14 September 2021 entitled ‘Towards a stronger partnership with the EU outermost regions [19],

– having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on economic, social and territorial cohesion in the EU: the 8th Cohesion Report [20],

– having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2023 on possibilities to increase the reliability of audits and controls by national authorities in shared management [21],

– having regard to its resolution of 23 November 2023 on harnessing talent in Europe’s regions [22],

– having regard to its resolution of 14 March 2024 entitled ‘Cohesion policy 2014-2020 – implementation and outcomes in the Member States [23],

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Regional Development (A10-0066/2025),

A. whereas cohesion policy is at the heart of EU policies and is the EU’s main tool for investments in sustainable economic, social and territorial development, and contributing to the Green Deal objectives, across the EU under its multiannual financial frameworks for the periods of 2014-2020 and 2021-2027; whereas cohesion policy, as mandated by the Treaties, is fundamental for a well-functioning and thriving internal market by promoting the development of all regions in the EU, and especially the less developed ones;

B. whereas cohesion policy has fostered economic, social and territorial convergence in the EU, notably by increasing the gross domestic products, for example, of central and eastern EU Member States, which went from 43 % of the EU average in 1995 to around 80 % in 2023; whereas the 9th Cohesion Report highlights that, by the end of 2022, cohesion policy supported over 4.4 million businesses, creating more than 370 000 jobs in these companies; whereas it also underlines that cohesion policy generates a significant return on investment, and that each euro invested in the 2014–2020 and 2021–2027 programmes will have generated 1.3 euros of additional GDP in the Union by 2030; whereas cohesion policy constituted, on average, around 13 % of total public investment in the EU [24];

C. whereas the Commission report entitled ‘The long-term vision for the EU’s rural areas: key achievements and ways forward’, presented alongside the ninth Cohesion Report, underlines that EUR 24.6 billion, or 8 % of the rural development pillar of the common agricultural policy, is directed towards investments in rural areas beyond farming investments, setting the scene for a debate on the future of rural areas;

D. whereas between 2021 and 2027, cohesion policy will have invested over EUR 140 billion in the green and digital transitions [25], to help improve networks and infrastructure, support nature conservation, improve green and digital skills and foster job creation and services for the public;

E. whereas despite the widely acknowledged and proven positive impact of cohesion policy on social, economic and territorial convergence, significant challenges remain, marked notably by development disparities at sub-national level, within regions and in regions caught in a development trap, and by the impact of climate change, in terms of demography, the digital and green transitions, and connectivity, but also in terms of sustainable economic development, in particular in least developed regions and rural and remote areas;

F. whereas cohesion policy and sectoral programmes of the EU have repeatedly and efficiently helped regions to respond effectively to emergencies and asymmetric shocks such as the COVID-19 crisis, Brexit, the energy crisis and the refugee crisis caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as well as natural disasters, even though it is a long-term, structural policy and not a crisis management instrument or the ‘go-to’ emergency response funding mechanism; whereas such crises have delayed the implementation of the European Structural and Investment Funds and whereas a considerable number of projects financed with Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) funds have been taken for the most part from projects that had been slated for investment under cohesion policy;

G. whereas despite measures already taken for the 2014-2020 and 2021-2027 periods, the regulatory framework governing the use and administration of cohesion policy instruments and funds should be further simplified and interoperable digital tools better used and developed, including the establishment of one-stop digitalised service centres, with the objective of streamlining procedures, enhancing stakeholder trust, reducing the administrative burden, increasing flexibility in fund management and speeding up payments, not only for the relevant authorities but also for the final beneficiaries; whereas it is necessary to increase the scope for using funds more flexibly, including the possibility of financing the development of dual-use products; whereas it is of utmost importance to formulate any future cohesion policy with a strategic impetus throughout the funding period, which could, however, be reassessed at midterm;

H. whereas the low absorption rate of the 2021-2027 cohesion policy funds, currently at just 6 %, is not because of a lack of need from Member States or regions, but rather stems from delays in the approval of operational programmes, the transition period between financial frameworks, the prioritisation of NextGenerationEU by national managing authorities, limited administrative capacity and complex bureaucratic procedures; whereas Member States and regions may not rush to absorb all available funds as they anticipate a possible extension under the N+2 or N+3 rules;

I. whereas radical modifications to the cohesion regulatory framework, from one programming period to the next, contribute to generating insecurity among the authorities responsible and beneficiaries, gold-plating legislation, increasing error rates (and the accompanying negative reputational and financial consequences), delays in implementation and, ultimately, disaffection among beneficiaries and the general population;

J. whereas there is sometimes competition between cohesion funds, emergency funds and sectoral policies;

K. whereas demographic changes vary significantly across EU regions, with the populations of some Member States facing a projected decline in the coming years and others projected to grow; whereas demographic changes also take place between regions, including movement away from outermost regions, but are generally observed as movement from rural to urban areas within Member States, wherein women are leaving rural areas in greater numbers than men, but also to metropolitan areas, where villages around big cities encounter difficulties in investing in basic infrastructure; whereas the provision of essential services such as healthcare, education and transportation must be reinforced in all regions, with a particular focus on rural and remote areas; whereas a stronger focus is needed on areas suffering from depopulation and inadequate services, requiring targeted measures to encourage young people to remain through entrepreneurship projects, high-quality agriculture and sustainable tourism;

L. whereas taking account of the ageing population is crucial in order to ensure justice among the generations and thereby to strengthen participation, especially among young people;

M. whereas urban areas are burdened by new challenges resulting from the population influx to cities, as well as rising housing and energy prices, requiring the necessary housing development, new environmental protection and energy-saving measures, such as accelerated deep renovation to combat energy poverty and promote energy efficiency; whereas the EU cohesion policy should help to contribute to an affordable and accessible housing market for all people in the EU, especially for low- and middle-income households, urban residents, families with children, women and young people;

N. whereas effective implementation of the Urban Agenda for the EU can enhance the capacity of cities to contribute to cohesion objectives, thereby improving the quality of life of citizens and guaranteeing a more efficient use of the EU’s financial resources;

O. whereas particular attention needs to be paid to rural areas, as well as areas affected by industrial transition and EU regions that suffer from severe and permanent natural or demographic handicaps, brain drain, climate-related risks and water scarcity, such as the outermost regions, and in particular islands located at their peripheries or at the periphery of the EU, sparsely populated regions, islands, mountainous areas and cross-border regions, as well as coastal and maritime regions;

P. whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has created a new geopolitical reality that has had a strong impact on the employment, economic development and opportunities, and general well-being of the population living in regions bordering Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, as well as candidate countries such as Ukraine and Moldova, which therefore require special attention and support, including by accordingly adapting cohesion policy; whereas this war has led to an unprecedented number of people seeking shelter in the EU, placing an additional burden on local communities and services; whereas the collective security of the EU is strongly dependent on the vitality and well-being of regions situated at the EU’s external borders;

Q. whereas the unique situation of Northern Ireland requires a bespoke approach building on the benefits of PEACE programmes examining how wider cohesion policy can benefit the process of reconciliation;

R. whereas 79 % of citizens who are aware of EU-funded projects under cohesion policy believe that EU-funded projects have a positive impact on the regions [26], which contributes to a pro-EU attitude;

S. whereas overall awareness of EU-funded projects under cohesion policy has decreased by 2 percentage points since 2021 [27], meaning that greater decentralisation should be pursued to bring cohesion policy even closer to the citizen;

1. Insists that the regional and local focus, place-based approach and strategic planning of cohesion policy, as well as its decentralised programming and implementation model based on the partnership principle with strengthened implementation of the European code of conduct, the involvement of economic and civil society actors, and multi-level governance, are key and positive elements of the policy, and determine its effectiveness; is firmly convinced that this model of cohesion policy should be continued in all regions and deepened where possible as the EU’s main long-term investment instrument for reducing disparities, ensuring economic, social and territorial cohesion, and stimulating regional and local sustainable growth in line with EU strategies, protecting the environment, and as a key contributor to EU competitiveness and just transition, as well as helping to cope with new challenges ahead;

2. Calls for a clear demarcation between cohesion policy and other instruments, in order to avoid overlaps and competition between EU instruments, ensure complementarity of the various interventions and increase visibility and readability of EU support; in this context, notes that the RRF funds are committed to economic development and growth, without specifically focusing on economic, social and territorial cohesion between regions; is concerned about the Commission’s plans to apply a performance-based approach to the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF); acknowledges that performance-based mechanisms can be instrumental in making the policy more efficient and results-orientated, but cautions against a one-size-fits-all imposition of the model and expresses serious doubt about ideas to link the disbursement of ESIF to the fulfilment of centrally defined reform goals, even more so if the reform goals do not fall within the scope of competence of the regional level;

3. Is opposed to any form of top-down centralisation reform of EU funding programmes, including those under shared management, such as the cohesion policy and the common agricultural policy, and advocates for greater decentralisation of decision-making to the local and regional levels; calls for enhanced involvement of local and regional authorities and economic and civil society actors at every stage of EU shared management programmes, from preparation and programming to implementation, delivery and evaluation, keeping in mind that the economic and social development of, and territorial cohesion between, regions can only be accomplished on the basis of good cooperation between all actors;

4. Emphasises that the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) plays a key role, alongside cohesion policy funds, in supporting rural areas; stresses that the EAFRD’s design must align with the rules of cohesion policy funds to boost synergies and facilitate multi-funded rural development projects;

5. Is convinced that cohesion policy can only continue to play its role if it has solid funding; underlines that this implies that future cohesion policy must be provided with robust funding for the post-2027 financial period; stresses that it is necessary to provide funding that is ambitious enough and easily accessible to allow cohesion policy to continue to fulfil its role as the EU’s main investment policy, while retaining the flexibility to meet potential new challenges, including the possibility of financing the development of dual-use products, and to enable local authorities, stakeholders and beneficiaries to effectively foster local development; is of the firm opinion that the capacity to offer flexible responses to unpredictable challenges should not come at the expense of the clear long-term strategic focus and objectives of cohesion policy;

6. Underlines the importance of the next EU multiannual financial framework (MFF) and the mid-term review of cohesion policy programmes 2021-2027 in shaping the future of cohesion policy; reiterates the need for a more ambitious post-2027 cohesion policy in the next MFF 2028-2034; calls, therefore, for the upcoming MFF to ensure that cohesion policy continues to receive at least the same level of funding as in the current period in real terms; furthermore calls for cohesion policy to remain a separate heading in the new MFF; stresses that cohesion policy should be protected from statistical effects that may alter the eligibility of regions by changing the average EU GDP; reiterates the need for new EU own resources;

7. Proposes, therefore, that next MFF be more responsive to unforeseen needs, including with sufficient margins and flexibilities from the outset; emphasises in this regard, however, that cohesion policy is not a crisis instrument and that it should not deviate from its main objectives, namely from its long-term investment nature; calls for the European Union Solidarity Fund to be strengthened, including in its pre-financing, making it less bureaucratic and more easily accessible, in order to develop an appropriate instrument capable of responding adequately to the economic, social and territorial consequences of future natural disasters or health emergencies; emphasises the need for Parliament to have adequate control over any emergency funds and instruments;

8. Recognises the need to also use nomenclature of territorial units for statistics (NUTS) 3 classification for specific cases, in a manner that recognises that inequalities in development exist within all NUTS 2 regions; is of the opinion that regional GDP per capita must remain the main criterion for determining Member States’ allocations under cohesion policy; welcomes the fact that, following Parliament’s persistent calls, the Commission has begun considering additional criteria [28] such as greenhouse gas emissions, population density, education levels and unemployment rates, in order to provide a better socio-economic overview of the regions;

9. Stresses that the rule of law conditionality is an overarching conditionality, recognising and enforcing respect for the rule of law, also as an enabling condition for cohesion policy funding, to ensure that Union resources are used in a transparent, fair and responsible manner with sound financial management; considers it necessary to reinforce respect for the rule of law and fundamental rights, and to ensure that all actions are consistent with supporting democratic principles, gender equality and human rights, including workers’ rights, the rights of disabled people and children’s rights, in the implementation of cohesion policy; highlights the important role of the European Anti-Fraud Office and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office in protecting the financial interests of the Union;

10. Calls for further efforts to simplify, make more flexible, strengthen synergies and streamline the rules and administrative procedures governing cohesion policy funds at EU, national and regional level, taking full advantage of the technologies available to increase accessibility and efficiency, building on the existing and well-established shared management framework, in order to strengthen confidence among users, thus encouraging the participation of a broader range of economic and civil society actors in projects supported and maximising the funds’ impact; calls for further initiatives enabling better absorption of cohesion funds, including increased co-financing levels, higher pre-financing and faster investment reimbursements; calls for local administration, in particular representing smaller communities, to be technically trained for better administrative management of the funds; stresses, therefore, the importance of strengthening the single audit principle, further expanding simplified cost options and reducing duplicating controls and audits that overlap with national and regional oversight for the same project and beneficiary, with a view to eliminating the possibility of repeating errors in subsequent years of implementation;

11. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to give regions greater flexibility already at the programming stage, in order to cater for their particular needs and specificities, emphasising the need to involve the economic and civil society actors; underlines that thematic concentration was a key element in aligning cohesion policy with Europe 2020 objectives; asks the Commission, therefore, to present all findings related to the implementation of thematic concentration and to draw lessons for future legislative proposals;

12. Acknowledges that the green, digital and demographic transitions present significant challenges but, at the same time, opportunities to achieve the objective of economic, social and territorial cohesion; recognises that, statistically, high-income areas can hide the economic problems within a region; is aware of the risk of a widening of regional disparities, a deepening of social inequalities and a rising ‘geography of discontent’ related to the transition process; underlines the need to reach the EU’s sustainability and climate objectives, and to maintain shared economic growth by strengthening the Union’s competitiveness; calls, therefore, for a European strategy that guarantees harmonious growth within the Union, meeting the respective regions’ specific needs; reaffirms its commitment to pursuing the green and digital transitions, as this will create opportunities to improve the EU’s competitiveness; underlines the need to invest in infrastructure projects that enhance connectivity, particularly in sustainable, intelligent transport, and in energy and digital networks, ensuring that all regions, including remote and less-developed ones, are fully integrated into the single market and benefit equitably from the opportunities it provides; emphasises, in this context, the need to support the development of green industries, fostering local specificities and traditions to increase the resilience of the economic environment and civil society to future challenges;

13. Urges that the cohesion policy remain consistent with a push towards increasing innovation and completing the EU single market, in line with the conclusions of the Draghi report on European competitiveness; underlines, in the context of regional disparities, the problem of the persisting innovation divide and advocates for a tailored, place-based approach to fostering innovation and economic convergence across regions and reducing the innovation gap; calls for a stronger role for local and regional innovation in building competitive research and innovation ecosystems and promoting territorial cohesion; points to new EU initiatives, such as regional innovation valleys and partnerships for regional innovation, that aim to connect territories with different levels of innovation performance and tackle the innovation gap; considers that this approach will reinforce regional autonomy, allowing local and regional authorities to shape EU policies and objectives in line with their specific needs, characteristics and capacities, while safeguarding the partnership principle;

14. Is convinced that cohesion policy needs to continue to foster the principle of just transition, addressing the specific needs of regions, while leaving no territory and no one behind; calls for continued financing of the just transition process, with the Just Transition Fund being fully integrated into the Common Provisions Regulation and endowed with reinforced financial means for the post-2027 programming period; emphasises, nonetheless, the need to assess the impact of the Just Transition Fund on the transformation of eligible regions and, while ensuring it remains part of cohesion policy, refine its approach in the new MFF on the basis of the findings and concrete measures to ensure the economic and social well-being of affected communities;

15. Underlines the need to improve the relationship between cohesion policy and EU economic governance, while avoiding a punitive approach; stresses that the European Semester should comply with cohesion policy objectives under Articles 174 and 175 TFEU; calls for the participation of the regions in the fulfilment of these objectives and for a stronger territorial approach; calls for a process of reflection on the concept of macroeconomic conditionality and for the possibility to be explored of replacing this concept with new forms of conditionality to better reflect the new challenges ahead;

16. Is concerned about the growing number of regions in a development trap, which are stagnating economically and are suffering from sharp demographic decline and limited access to essential services; calls, therefore, for an upward adjustment in co-financing for projects aimed at strengthening essential services; stresses the role of cohesion policy instruments in supporting different regions and local areas that are coping with demographic evolution affecting people’s effective right to stay, including, among others, challenges related to depopulation, ageing, gender imbalances, brain drain, skills shortages and workforce imbalances across regions; recognises the need for targeted economic incentives and structural interventions to counteract these phenomena; in this context, calls for the implementation of targeted programmes to attract, develop and retain talent, particularly in regions experiencing significant outflows of skilled workers, by fostering education, culture, entrepreneurship and innovation ecosystems that align with local and regional economic needs and opportunities;

17. Recognises the importance of supporting and financing specific solutions for regions with long-standing and serious economic difficulties or severe permanent natural and demographic handicaps; reiterates the need for maintaining and improving the provision of quality essential services (such as education and healthcare), transport and digital connectivity of these regions, fostering their economic diversification and job creation, and helping them respond to challenges such as rural desertification, population ageing, poverty, depopulation, loneliness and isolation, as well as the lack of opportunities for vulnerable people such as persons with disabilities; underlines the need to prioritise the development and adequate funding of strategic sectors, such as renewable energy, sustainable tourism, digital innovation and infrastructure, in a manner that is tailored to the economic potential and resources of each region, in order to create broader conditions for endogenous growth and balanced development across all regions, especially rural, remote and less-developed areas, border regions, islands and outermost regions; recalls the importance of strong rural-urban linkages and particular support for women in rural areas;

18. Emphasises the need for a tailored approach for the outermost regions, as defined under Article 349 TFEU, which face unique and cumulative structural challenges due to their remoteness, small market size, vulnerability to climate change and economic dependencies; underlines that these permanent constraints, including the small size of the domestic economy, great distance from the European continent, location near third countries, double insularity for most of them, and limited diversification of the productive sector, result in additional costs and reduced competitiveness, making their adaptation to the green and digital transition particularly complex and costly; underlines their great potential to further develop, inter alia through improved regional connectivity, key sectors such as blue economy, sustainable agriculture, renewable energies, space activities, research or eco-tourism; reiterates its long-standing call on the Commission to duly consider the impact of all newly proposed legislation on the outermost regions, with a view to avoiding disproportionate regulatory burdens and adverse effects on these regions’ economies;

19. Underlines the fact that towns, cities and metropolitan areas have challenges of their own, such as considerable pockets of poverty, housing problems, traffic congestion and poor air quality, generating challenges for social and economic cohesion created by inharmonious territorial development; emphasises the need for a specific agenda for cities and calls for deepening their links with functional urban areas, encompassing smaller cities and towns, to ensure that economic and social benefits are spread more evenly across the entire territory; highlights the need to strengthen coordination between the initiatives of the Urban Agenda for the EU and the instruments of cohesion policy, favouring an integrated approach that takes into account territorial specificities and emerging challenges; calls, furthermore, for more direct access to EU funding for regional and local authorities, as well as cities and urban authorities, by inter alia widening the use of integrated territorial investments (ITI);

20. Stresses the need to continue and strengthen investments in affordable housing within the cohesion policy framework, recognising its significance for both regions and cities; highlights the need to foster its changes relevant to investing in housing beyond the two current possibilities (energy efficiency and social housing); emphasises the important role that cohesion policy plays in the roll-out and coordination of these initiatives; believes, furthermore, that it is important to include housing affordability in the URBACT initiative;

21. Stresses the strategic importance of strong external border regions for the security and resilience of the EU; calls on the Commission to support the Member States and regions affected by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, in particular the regions on the EU’s eastern border, by revising the Guidelines on regional State aid [29], through tailor-made tools and investments under the cohesion policy, as well as supporting them to make the most of the possibilities offered by the cohesion policy funds, including Interreg, in a flexible way, to help cope with the detrimental socio-economic impact of the war on their populations and territories; calls, furthermore, for support to be given to regions bordering candidate countries such as Ukraine and Moldova to strengthen connections and promote their EU integration;

22. Highlights the added value of territorial cooperation in general and cross-border cooperation in particular; underlines the importance of Interreg for cross-border regions, including outermost regions; emphasises its important role in contributing to their development and overcoming cross-border obstacles, including building trust across borders, developing transport links, identifying and reducing legal and administrative obstacles and increasing the provision and use of cross-border public services, among others; considers Interreg as the main EU instrument for tackling the persistent cross-border obstacles faced by emergency services, and proposes that there be a more prominent focus on these services; underlines the fact that cross-border areas, including areas at the EU’s external borders, bordering aggressor countries often face specific challenges; believes that EU border regions, facing multiple challenges, must be supported and is of the opinion that they must be provided with increased means; welcomes the new regulation on BRIDGEforEU; emphasises the importance of small-scale and cross-border projects and stresses the need for effective implementation on the ground; calls on the Commission to encourage Member States to actively support awareness-raising campaigns in bordering regions to maximise the impact of cross-border cooperation;

23. Recalls the need to ‘support cohesion’, rather than just rely on the ‘do no harm to cohesion’ principle, which means that no action should hamper the convergence process or contribute to regional disparities; calls for a stronger integration of these principles as cross-cutting in all EU policies, to ensure that they support the objectives of social, economic and territorial cohesion, as set out in Articles 3 and 174 TFEU; calls, furthermore, on the Commission to issue specific guidelines on how to implement and enforce these principles across EU policies, paying particular attention to the impact of EU laws on the competitiveness of less developed regions; reiterates that new legislative proposals need to take due account of local and regional realities; suggests that the Commission draw on innovative tools such as RegHUB (the network of regional hubs) to collect data on the impact of EU policies on the regions; to this end, underlines the need to strengthen the territorial impact assessment of EU legislation, with a simultaneous strengthening of the territorial aspects of other relevant policies; insists that promoting cohesion should also be seen as a way of fostering solidarity and mutual support among Member States and their regions; calls on the Commission and the Member States to continue their efforts regarding communication and visibility of the benefits of cohesion policy, demonstrating to citizens the EU’s tangible impact and serving as a key tool in addressing Euroscepticism; welcomes the launch of the multilingual version of the Kohesio platform;

24. Notes with concern the severe decline in recent years of adequate levels of national funding by Member States towards their poorer regions; recalls the importance of respecting the EU rule on additionality; calls on the Commission to ensure that national authorities take due account of internal cohesion in drafting and implementing structural and investment fund projects;

25. Insists that, in addition to adjusting to regional needs, cohesion policy must be adapted to the smallest scale, i.e. funds must be accessible to the smallest projects and project bearers; points out that their initiatives are often the most innovative and have a significant impact on rural development; reiterates that these funds should be accessible to all, regardless of their size or scope; approves of the Cohesion Alliance’s call for ‘a post-2027 Cohesion Policy that leaves no one behind’;

26. Stresses that delays in the MFF negotiations, together with the fact that Member States have placed a greater focus on the programming of the RRF funds, led to considerable delays in the programming period 2021-2027; stresses the importance of a timely agreement in the next framework, and therefore calls for the Common Provisions Regulation (CPR) and the budget negotiations to be finalised at least one year before the start of the new funding period so that Member States can develop their national and regional funding strategies in good time to ensure a successful transition to the next funding period and the continuation of existing ESIF projects;

27. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the European Economic and Social Committee, the European Committee of the Regions and the national and regional parliaments of the Member States.

MIL OSI Europe News –

April 24, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Ukraine peace talks: E3 statement, 23 April 2025
Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

Press release

Ukraine peace talks: E3 statement, 23 April 2025

A statement on behalf of E3 members, the UK, France and Germany, following today’s meeting with the US and Ukraine in London.
An FCDO spokesperson said:

Representatives of the UK, France, Germany and the US met today in London with a Ukrainian delegation led by Head of Office of the President of Ukraine Yermak, Foreign Minister Sybiha, and Defence Minister Umerov, for another round of intensive talks following up on the meeting in Paris last week.

All parties reiterated their strong support for President Tump’s commitment to stopping the killing and achieving a just and lasting peace.

The talks today were productive and successful, and significant progress was made on reaching a common position on next steps. All agreed to continue their close coordination and looked forward to further talks soon.

Media enquiries

Email newsdesk@fcdo.gov.uk

Telephone 020 7008 3100

Contact the FCDO Communication Team via email (monitored 24 hours a day) in the first instance, and we will respond as soon as possible.

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Published 23 April 2025
MIL OSI United Kingdom –
April 24, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Feenstra Asks Trump Administration to Allow Nationwide Sale of E-15 This Summer

Source: United States House of Representatives – Representative Randy Feenstra (IA-04)

HULL, IOWA – Today, U.S. Rep. Randy Feenstra (R-Hull) joined a letter – led by U.S. Reps. Adrian Smith (R-NE) and Angie Craig (D-MN) – urging the Trump administration to allow for the nationwide sale of E-15 this summer.

In a bipartisan letter to President Donald Trump, Feenstra and his colleagues asked the Trump administration to extend the Reid vapor pressure (RVP) waiver from June 1 through September 15, 2025.

“To safeguard our energy supply, we must preserve the home-grown, affordable option higher ethanol blends provide,” the lawmakers wrote. “The administration’s efforts to unleash American energy independence is a long-term goal but can begin in the short term with preserving flexibility in our domestic energy production and supply through this emergency waiver.”

“Extending the nationwide sale of E15 can again bolster our nation’s energy resilience by adding billions of gallons of ethanol to the nation’s fuel supply, lowering the cost of gas for American families at a time when prices are already too high,” the lawmakers continued. “As affirmed when you first allowed for year-round E15 in 2019, and those approved for the summers afterward, the sale of higher blends of biofuels during the summer months supports the domestic fuel supply, reduces consumer costs, and promotes American biofuels and agriculture feedstocks.”

In February, Feenstra joined a letter to Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator Lee Zeldin, urging the EPA to prioritize homegrown Iowa biofuels as part of the Trump administration’s energy dominance strategy.

Feenstra has also worked every Congress to make E-15 permanently available at gas stations year-round and nationwide.

The full letter can be read HERE or below:

Dear President Trump:

We write to once again request your swift action to permit the nationwide sale of fuel blended with up to 15 percent ethanol (E15) during the 2025 summer driving season by extending the Reid vapor pressure (RVP) waiver from June 1 through September 15, 2025.

In 2022, 2023 and 2024 the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) enabled the year-round sale of E15 by granting temporary waivers under Clean Air Act Section 211(c)(4)(C)(ii), temporarily waiving the 9.0 psi RVP limit for ethanol gasoline blends. This action allowed the U.S. energy supply chain to remain resilient, despite conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, by bolstering the domestic biofuels market, lowering gas prices, and empowering consumer choice.

To safeguard our energy supply, we must preserve the home-grown, affordable option higher ethanol blends provide. Agriculture and energy supply chains are exceptionally responsive to market shocks. Efforts to realign our trade balances, particularly with key energy partners, can create uncertainty in the short term. This is only exacerbated by the ongoing war in Ukraine, which continues to impact the global energy availability and reshape supply lines. The administration’s efforts to unleash American energy independence is a long-term goal but can begin in the short term with preserving flexibility in our domestic energy production and supply through this emergency waiver. This action would be firmly in line with the section of your executive order “Declaring a National Energy Emergency” which implores Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Zeldin and Department of Energy Secretary Wright to consider issuing these emergency waivers.

Currently, the eight Midwestern governors’ petitions to sell E15 year-round has allowed for an agreement between both ethanol and petroleum stakeholders in support of a permanent legislative solution to allow nationwide, year-round E15 sales. In the interim, taking action to permit the sale of E15 nationwide during the 2025 summer driving season also will be beneficial for consumers, the domestic energy industry, and agricultural producers. To ensure nationwide uniformity in the gasoline market, we urge you to apply the temporary emergency waivers to E15 in all states and engage directly with the eight states who petitioned EPA to opt out of the RVP waiver program to ensure their recent requests are adhered to.

Extending the nationwide sale of E15 can again bolster our nation’s energy resilience by adding billions of gallons of ethanol to the nation’s fuel supply, lowering the cost of gas for American families at a time when prices are already too high. As affirmed when you first allowed for year-round E15 in 2019, and those approved for the summers afterward, the sale of higher blends of biofuels during the summer months supports the domestic fuel supply, reduces consumer costs, and promotes American biofuels and agriculture feedstocks.

The issuance of a nationwide waiver for the 2025 summer driving season is a straightforward solution to challenges throughout our energy supply chain and is firmly in the public interest. Thank you for your prompt consideration of this request.

###

MIL OSI USA News –

April 24, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Rep. Larsen Statement on Ukraine-Russia Peace Talks

Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Rick Larsen (2nd Congressional District Washington)

Rep. Larsen Statement on Ukraine-Russia Peace Talks

Washington, April 23, 2025

Washington, D.C. — Today, U.S. Representative Rick Larsen (WA-02) released the following statement on ongoing peace talks between Ukraine and Russia:

“In word and in action, the U.S. must continue to stand up for the young democracy in Ukraine. I don’t care what President Trump says – Putin started this war and the crisis is not over until Ukraine’s borders are restored and Ukrainians have the freedom to choose their own leaders and future. I will continue to advocate for aid to Ukraine in its fight against Putin’s war of aggression, and continue to welcome and support Ukrainian families in Northwest Washington and across the U.S.

“The Trump administration’s offer to recognize Crimea as Russian territory is just the latest example of Trump rolling over for Putin. Rewarding Russia for invading a neighbor by providing formal recognition and sanctions relief invites further aggression.

“I commend President Zelenskyy for standing up against Russian aggression and continuing to fight for a free Ukraine. American interests are clear – standing with our allies and partners, not with Russia.”

###

MIL OSI USA News –

April 24, 2025
MIL-OSI: Radware Finds 57% of Online Shopping Traffic Now Bots, Not Buyers
Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

MAHWAH, N.J., April 23, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Radware^® (NASDAQ: RDWR), a global leader in application security and delivery solutions for multi-cloud environments, today released its “2025 E-commerce Bot Threat Report.” The report found that automated bots—good and bad bots—accounted for 57% of e-commerce website traffic during the 2024 holiday season. It marks the first time that automated, non-DDoS generating bots drove more traffic than human shoppers, signaling a critical shift in the cybersecurity landscape for e-commerce providers and online retailers.

“Bad bots are no longer just based on simple scripts—they’re sophisticated, AI-enhanced agents capable of outsmarting traditional defenses,” said Ron Meyran, vice president of cyber threat intelligence at Radware. “E-commerce providers and online retailers that rely on conventional security measures will find themselves increasingly exposed, not just during the holidays but year-round.”

The report highlights major bot attack trends and real-world attack data observed during the 2024 online holiday shopping season. In addition, it offers insights into the distributed, multi-vector attacks e-commerce providers and retailers can expect to battle this year.

Key findings and insights
- AI-generated bots with human-like behavior gain dominance: According to the report, bad bots made up 31% of total internet traffic during the last holiday season. Nearly 60% of the malicious traffic employed advanced behavioral techniques to evade traditional, signature-based detection. Combating these bots requires accurate AI-powered detection of attack patterns, including rotating IPs and identities, distributed attacks, CAPTCHA farm services, and other advanced anomalies, without causing false positives.
- Mobile-focused attacks surge: Malicious bot traffic directed at mobile platforms rose 160% between the 2023 and 2024 holiday shopping seasons, representing a fundamental shift in attacker focus. Security strategies need to be shored up and tailored for vulnerable mobile platforms and attackers using more sophisticated techniques, including mobile emulators, mobile-specific proxies, and headless browsers with mobile user-agent strings.
- Attacks leveraging distributed infrastructures and residential proxy networks increase: The proportion of holiday attack traffic originating from and blending in with ISP networks increased 32% between 2023 and 2024. Attackers are leveraging wider network and residential proxy services to evade rate-limiting, geo-based, and IP-based blocking mechanisms, creating even greater mitigation challenges for security teams working without advanced, multi-layered protections.
- Coordinated multi-vector attack campaigns escalate: To maximize their success, attackers are targeting applications by combining bot attacks with web application vulnerability exploits, business logic attacks, and API-focused attacks. Protecting already burdened security systems requires an integrated application security strategy that uses the latest threat intelligence and cross-correlates security threats across security modules.
Radware will be addressing the new report and advanced protection strategies during the RSA 2025 Conference at the Moscone Center in San Francisco (booth #S-1227). The event takes place April 28–May 1, 2025.

Radware’s complete bot report can be downloaded here.

About Radware
Radware^® (NASDAQ: RDWR) is a global leader in application security and delivery solutions for multi-cloud environments. The company’s cloud application, infrastructure, and API security solutions use AI-driven algorithms for precise, hands-free, real-time protection from the most sophisticated web, application, and DDoS attacks, API abuse, and bad bots. Enterprises and carriers worldwide rely on Radware’s solutions to address evolving cybersecurity challenges and protect their brands and business operations while reducing costs. For more information, please visit the Radware website.

Radware encourages you to join our community and follow us on: Facebook, LinkedIn, Radware Blog, X, and YouTube.

©2025 Radware Ltd. All rights reserved. Any Radware products and solutions mentioned in this press release are protected by trademarks, patents, and pending patent applications of Radware in the U.S. and other countries. For more details, please see: https://www.radware.com/LegalNotice/. All other trademarks and names are property of their respective owners.

THIS PRESS RELEASE AND 2025 E-COMMERCE BOT THREAT REPORT ARE PROVIDED FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY. THESE MATERIALS ARE NOT INTENDED TO BE AN INDICATOR OF RADWARE’S BUSINESS PERFORMANCE OR OPERATING RESULTS FOR ANY PRIOR, CURRENT, OR FUTURE PERIOD.

Radware believes the information in this document is accurate in all material respects as of its publication date. However, the information is provided without any express, statutory, or implied warranties and is subject to change without notice.

The contents of any website or hyperlinks mentioned in this press release are for informational purposes and the contents thereof are not part of this press release.

Safe Harbor Statement
This press release includes “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Any statements made herein that are not statements of historical fact, including statements about Radware’s plans, outlook, beliefs, or opinions, are forward-looking statements. Generally, forward-looking statements may be identified by words such as “believes,” “expects,” “anticipates,” “intends,” “estimates,” “plans,” and similar expressions or future or conditional verbs such as “will,” “should,” “would,” “may,” and “could.” For example, when we say in this press release that e-commerce providers and online retailers that rely on conventional security measures will find themselves increasingly exposed, not just during the holidays but year-round, we are using forward-looking statements. Because such statements deal with future events, they are subject to various risks and uncertainties, and actual results, expressed or implied by such forward-looking statements, could differ materially from Radware’s current forecasts and estimates. Factors that could cause or contribute to such differences include, but are not limited to: the impact of global economic conditions, including as a result of the state of war declared in Israel in October 2023 and instability in the Middle East, the war in Ukraine, tensions between China and Taiwan, financial and credit market fluctuations (including elevated interest rates), impacts from tariffs or other trade restrictions, inflation, and the potential for regional or global recessions; our dependence on independent distributors to sell our products; our ability to manage our anticipated growth effectively; our business may be affected by sanctions, export controls, and similar measures, targeting Russia and other countries and territories, as well as other responses to Russia’s military conflict in Ukraine, including indefinite suspension of operations in Russia and dealings with Russian entities by many multi-national businesses across a variety of industries; the ability of vendors to provide our hardware platforms and components for the manufacture of our products; our ability to attract, train, and retain highly qualified personnel; intense competition in the market for cybersecurity and application delivery solutions and in our industry in general, and changes in the competitive landscape; our ability to develop new solutions and enhance existing solutions; the impact to our reputation and business in the event of real or perceived shortcomings, defects, or vulnerabilities in our solutions, if our end-users experience security breaches, or if our information technology systems and data, or those of our service providers and other contractors, are compromised by cyber-attackers or other malicious actors or by a critical system failure; our use of AI technologies that present regulatory, litigation, and reputational risks; risks related to the fact that our products must interoperate with operating systems, software applications and hardware that are developed by others; outages, interruptions, or delays in hosting services; the risks associated with our global operations, such as difficulties and costs of staffing and managing foreign operations, compliance costs arising from host country laws or regulations, partial or total expropriation, export duties and quotas, local tax exposure, economic or political instability, including as a result of insurrection, war, natural disasters, and major environmental, climate, or public health concerns; our net losses in the past and the possibility that we may incur losses in the future; a slowdown in the growth of the cybersecurity and application delivery solutions market or in the development of the market for our cloud-based solutions; long sales cycles for our solutions; risks and uncertainties relating to acquisitions or other investments; risks associated with doing business in countries with a history of corruption or with foreign governments; changes in foreign currency exchange rates; risks associated with undetected defects or errors in our products; our ability to protect our proprietary technology; intellectual property infringement claims made by third parties; laws, regulations, and industry standards affecting our business; compliance with open source and third-party licenses; complications with the design or implementation of our new enterprise resource planning (“ERP”) system; our reliance on information technology systems; our ESG disclosures and initiatives; and other factors and risks over which we may have little or no control. This list is intended to identify only certain of the principal factors that could cause actual results to differ. For a more detailed description of the risks and uncertainties affecting Radware, refer to Radware’s Annual Report on Form 20-F, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the other risk factors discussed from time to time by Radware in reports filed with, or furnished to, the SEC. Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date on which they are made and, except as required by applicable law, Radware undertakes no commitment to revise or update any forward-looking statement in order to reflect events or circumstances after the date any such statement is made. Radware’s public filings are available from the SEC’s website at www.sec.gov or may be obtained on Radware’s website at www.radware.com.

The MIL Network –
April 24, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: How Pope Francis changed the Catholic Church’s foreign policy

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Massimo D’Angelo, Research Associate in the Institute for Diplomacy and International Affairs, Loughborough University

Pope Francis greets visitors at Saint Peter’s Square, Vatican City. Ricardo Perna / Shutterstock

When the late Pope Francis first stepped on to the balcony of Saint Peter’s Basilica following his election 12 years ago, he remarked that he had been called almost from the “end of the world”. He was the first non-European pontiff since Gregory III, elected in AD731, who was of Syrian origin. And he was the first pope in history to come from Latin America.

This is not merely a biographical detail. His papacy was transformative in shaping a Catholic Church that was not focused solely on Europe. He shifted its attention from the old continent to the world’s peripheries, aspiring to create a truly global church.

Before his election, Pope Francis was called Jorge Mario Bergoglio and had, since 1998, held the office of Archbishop of Buenos Aires. In Argentina, he worked to expand and support the efforts of priests serving in the slums.

The Catholic Church has maintained a presence in the peripheries of Buenos Aires since the 1960s, when a group called Priests for the Third World established itself in impoverished neighbourhoods. These priests advocated for the rights of their parishioners and preached liberation theology, a movement that aligns the Catholic Church with the struggles of marginalised groups.

The theme of the peripheries became a defining thread of Pope Francis’s papacy. Days before he became pope, Francis told the cardinals that elected him that the Church must “come out of herself and to go to the peripheries, not only geographically, but also the existential peripheries”.

Without doing so, he warned, the Church risks becoming structurally disconnected from the ambivalent and contradictory processes that shape the modern global era.

Read more:
Pope Francis dies: an unconventional pontiff who sought to modernise Catholicism

Pope Francis navigated a complex relationship with liberation theology. Some interpretations of the movement, which gained prominence in the late 1960s, incorporate Marxist elements. This raised concerns within the Church hierarchy and among western governments during the cold war.

As a young Jesuit in Argentina, Bergoglio was influenced by the 1969 Declaration of San Miguel. This rejected Marxist interpretations of liberation theology and developed an alternative called the “theology of the people”. Rather than drawing on Marxist analysis, it emphasises the faith, culture and spiritual expressions of ordinary people, especially the poor.

And from 1976 to 1983, when Argentina was ruled by a military dictatorship, Bergoglio distanced himself from radical priests engaged in liberation theology. His caution not to alienate military hierarchy led to tensions, most notably in the 1976 abduction of two Jesuits, Orlando Yorio and Franz Jalics.

The then Father Bergoglio was accused of withdrawing his protection from the priests, which allegedly left them exposed to the regime. In 2005, a secret dossier was anonymously circulated among cardinals accusing him of complicity in the abduction, based on a complaint by human rights lawyer Marcelo Parrilli.

Some sources claimed this was smear campaign orchestrated by Jesuits who had previously clashed with Bergoglio. And in his testimony, Bergoglio stated that he met on two occasions with the dictators and members of the military, Jorge Videla and Emilio Massera, but to intercede on behalf of the detained priests. The Vatican denied he was guilty of any wrongdoing.

Despite his cautious stance, Bergoglio consistently upheld the Church’s priority of addressing the needs of the poor. This was a principle that later defined his papacy. As Pope Francis, he softened the Vatican’s previous opposition to liberation theology, reaffirming its emphasis on social justice while distancing it from Marxist rhetoric.

A post-European Pope

Pope Francis’s predecessor, Joseph Ratzinger, maintained a profound engagement with Europe. This shaped his thinking as a theologian, cardinal and later as Pope Benedict XVI. His papacy was marked by numerous visits across the continent, where he delivered significant speeches on the Church’s role and Europe’s intellectual and spiritual challenges.

One of his most notable speeches, delivered at the University of Regensburg in Germany in 2006, sparked considerable controversy in the Muslim world. The lecture explored Europe’s relationship with Christianity and its future responsibilities.

But it became infamous for his quotation of Manuel II Palaiologos, a Byzantine emperor who characterised aspects of Islam as violent. This remark provoked widespread anger and protests across the Muslim world, highlighting the sensitivities surrounding interfaith dialogue and the role of religion in global politics.

In contrast, Pope Francis recognised that Christians must go “beyond the walls” to embrace humanity as a whole. In his vision, the Church should function as a “field hospital”, extending its care even to the so-called “churches of the decimal point” – those with only a tiny percentage of Catholics relative to the populations in which they exist.

Under his leadership, the Vatican’s geopolitical focus shifted significantly. The composition of the College of Cardinals, which will elect his successor, has changed. The historic European influence has been diluted.

The regional distribution of the 135 cardinal electors now includes 23 from Asia, 20 from North America, 18 each from South America and Africa, and three from Oceania. Europe, which comprised a slight majority of the body when Francis was elected in 2013, has 53 cardinals.

This diversification aligns with Francis’s vision of a Church that is truly present across the globe. Pope Francis’s apostolic journeys further reflected this global reorientation, taking him to places such as Iraq, Kazakhstan, the United Arab Emirates and South Korea.

Pope Francis during his visit to Iraq in 2021.
Jon_photographi / Shutterstock

Another major transformation has been in the Church’s relationship with political power. While Ratzinger often saw alliances with political parties as necessary to safeguard the Church’s survival in an era of secular decline, Francis rejected this approach.

As he stated in Kazakhstan in 2022, “the sacred must not be instrumentalised by the profane”. This stance has drawn criticism, particularly in relation to his responses to conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza. His constant appeals for peace, rather than direct condemnation of religious or political leaders, led some to perceive his position as one of “neutralism” or even pro-Russian.

Yet his approach appears to have been rooted in the conviction that dialogue is essential, even with the most controversial figures. This was evident in his willingness to engage with General Min Aung Hlaing, the head of Myanmar’s military government, further underscoring his effort to desacralise worldly power.

Massimo D’Angelo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. How Pope Francis changed the Catholic Church’s foreign policy – https://theconversation.com/how-pope-francis-changed-the-catholic-churchs-foreign-policy-255051

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

April 24, 2025
MIL-OSI Africa: SA to host Ukrainian President on an Official Visit

Source: South Africa News Agency

Wednesday, April 23, 2025

President Cyril Ramaphosa will host Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the Union Buildings in Pretoria on Thursday, marking the first official visit by a Ukrainian Head of State to South Africa.

This engagement follows President Ramaphosa’s visit to Ukraine in June 2023, as part of the African Peace Initiative, which also saw African leaders meeting with both Zelenskyy and Russian President Vladimir Putin to table a 10-point peace proposal.

Alongside leaders from six other African nations, President Ramaphosa emphasised Africa’s call for negotiation, respect for sovereignty, and an urgent end to the conflict which continues to impact global and African economies.

“The visits provide South Africa and Ukraine with an opportunity to discuss bilateral relations and expand bilateral cooperation in the areas of trade, agriculture and education. It will also explore areas of cooperation with the objective to support efforts to bring lasting peace,” the Presidency said.

The official visit will commence with a welcome ceremony where President Ramaphosa will receive President Zelenskyy at the Union Buildings. They will proceed to a closed session to hold official talks.

Later in the day, President Ramaphosa and President Zelenskyy will address a media briefing. – SAnews.gov.za

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MIL OSI Africa –

April 23, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Joint statement between the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the Prime Minister of New Zealand
Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

Press release

Joint statement between the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the Prime Minister of New Zealand

This Joint Statement follows the meeting of the United Kingdom and New Zealand Prime Ministers in London on 22 April 2025.
This Joint Statement follows the meeting of the United Kingdom and New Zealand Prime Ministers in London on 22 April 2025.

Reflecting on the enduring UK-NZ partnership, underpinned by shared values, rich connections between our people, and profound mutual trust, and cognisant of these uncertain times, the Prime Ministers expressed high ambition to deepen cooperation to ensure our modern and dynamic partnership continues to thrive, and contributes to our security and prosperity. We are energised by our shared commitment to deliver for our people.

The Prime Ministers reiterated their commitment to upholding the fundamental principles that underpin our partnership – democracy, human rights and the rule of law – which are central to a stable international order. They reaffirmed their commitment to international cooperation to address global challenges, supported by effective and efficient multilateral institutions, and recognised the indivisibility of the security and prosperity of the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions.

The Prime Ministers reiterated their unwavering support for Ukraine and welcomed US-led efforts to achieve a just and lasting peace for Ukraine. The United Kingdom and New Zealand called on Russia to withdraw its forces immediately and end its illegal invasion. They called on those supporting Russia’s Military-Industrial Complex through the supply of dual use components and weapons, to cease fuelling Russia’s war against Ukraine. The Prime Ministers expressed gratitude to the military personnel of the United Kingdom and New Zealand who have trained over 54,000 Ukrainians through Operation Interflex the UK-led multinational training effort. As the conflict evolves, both Leaders agreed to coordinate on training to meet Ukraine’s evolving needs.

The Prime Ministers welcomed on-going discussions on future support for Ukraine as part of the UK and France-led Coalition of the Willing – a multinational reassurance force to support Ukraine’s long-term defence and security. Prime Minister Starmer thanked New Zealand for its ongoing participation in military and diplomatic discussions about possible post-conflict support for Ukraine.

Noting the mounting threats to international peace and security, the Prime Ministers noted the decisions taken by both governments to substantially increase defence spending. They agreed to renew our historic defence partnership to make it fit for the future, and to deepen cooperation in our defence capabilities and industries.

The Prime Ministers acknowledged the ongoing cooperation between our defence forces on global challenges, including in the Middle East and Indo-Pacific. Prime Minister Starmer welcomed New Zealand’s upcoming participation in the UK-led Carrier Strike Group deployment in the Indo-Pacific, and welcomed ongoing consultations as New Zealand continues to explore potential opportunities for participation in AUKUS Pillar II.

The Prime Ministers agreed that maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait is indispensable to international security and prosperity. They reiterated their concern at China’s recent military exercises around Taiwan and called for the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait Issues.

The Prime Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to work together to promote the prosperity, security and resilience of Pacific Small Island Developing States. In the context of climate change they welcomed joint work on the TIDES renewable energy investment fund.

Free trade is a cornerstone of prosperity in both countries. Recognising that open markets, and reliable legal and regulatory frameworks are essential for trade, the Prime Ministers committed to strengthening and modernising the rules-based trading system. The Prime Ministers welcomed our enhanced trading relationship since the entry into force of the UK-NZ Free Trade Agreement, with the United Kingdom now one of New Zealand’s fastest growing export markets.

The Prime Ministers agreed to work together to strengthen the role that free trade plays in increasing prosperity, including the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (which the United Kingdom and New Zealand are Parties to). This includes growing the agreement ambitiously through further accessions and pursuing concrete updates through the ongoing General Review.

Noting that economic growth and improving the lives of British and New Zealand citizens are fundamental priorities for both governments, the Prime Ministers welcomed the signing of commercial deals including on clean technology and infrastructure.

The Prime Ministers agreed to further enhance our mutual security and prosperity by:

Forging a new Clean Energy Partnership to encourage two-way investment in renewable energy and low and zero emissions technologies.

Launching an investor partnership for New Zealand investment into agritech SMEs in the UK, and collaboration on Earth Observation from space.

Affirming our partnership with, and support for, Pacific Island countries’ climate resilience through clean energy, ecosystem resilience, and climate adaptation.

Continuing close cooperation to protect Antarctica as a place for peace and science and upholding the Antarctic Treaty System.

Strengthening cooperation in support of the rules-based system, including through reform of multilateral institutions.

Updating our Double Taxation Agreement to provide long term certainty and stability to business.

Recognising the renewed mutual recognition of professional qualifications between Engineering New Zealand and UK’s Engineering Council.

Modernising our Film and TV Co-production Treaty to promote the growth of our world-class screen industries and bring more iconic stories to the screen.

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Published 23 April 2025
MIL OSI United Kingdom –
April 23, 2025
MIL-OSI NGOs: Meet three female Indigenous anti-war activists from Russia

Source: Amnesty International –

During Russia’s escalating repression following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, 172 indigenous and decolonial organisations have been designated as “terrorist” by the Russian authorities.

Amnesty International spoke to three female Indigenous rights activists from Russia, currently in exile, to discuss the impact of Russia’s war in Ukraine on their activism, their communities and women’s leadership.

Zarema Gasanova is an Avar indigenous rights and feminist activist from Dagestan, Victoria Maladaeva is a Buryat-Mongolian activist and co-founder of the Indigenous of Russia Foundation, while Viliuia Choinova is an environmental engineer and Sakha activist from the Republic of Sakha, currently studying in Berlin.

Amnesty: How did Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine affect indigenous women in Russia?

Victoria: Even before the war, women in Russia lacked protection from domestic violence. In the republics with a significant Indigenous population, such as Yakutia, Buryatia or the republics of the North Caucasus, men have been disproportionately affected by the military draft.

In one village in Buryatia, local women raised the alarm as all the men from the village were drafted to be sent to fight in Ukraine. Now, as the drafted troops return home, there are reports of rising rates of domestic abuse and femicide.

The Free Yakutia Foundation reported numerous cases of violence against women at the hands of men returning from the war. This is just the beginning; there will likely be even more cases when tens of thousands of soldiers return home.

Viliuia: Many Indigenous families in the north, including those in my native Republic of Sakha, rely on traditional subsistence activities such as reindeer herding, fishing, and farming. With men drafted en masse to fight Ukraine, women are left to take on physically demanding tasks that were traditionally shared or primarily carried out by men. This has significantly increased their workload and made survival more difficult, especially in regions with poor infrastructure and harsh climates.

The war has also disrupted the ability to maintain traditional cultural practices, which require generational knowledge often carried by men, risking the loss of cultural continuity. With Indigenous populations already declining due to high mortality rates and low birth rates, the disproportionate drafting of Indigenous men further exacerbates this issue, threatening the long-term survival of Indigenous peoples.

Zarema: While men are disproportionately drafted to the army, women are left to bear the brunt of resistance. When Vladimir Putin announced military mobilization in September 2022, large numbers of women in Dagestan came out to the streets to protest it. They confronted officials, reminding them that it’s not Ukraine that invaded Russia, formed barricades to block police cars and tried to liberate those arrested by the police. During the protest dispersals, police were particularly violent towards women – they pushed, beat, dragged and verbally abused them.

Victoria: Indeed, it is women who hide their husbands and relatives from mobilization. Almost all requests for help I receive are from women searching for ways to keep their sons, husbands, or fathers from being sent to war. It is Indigenous women who write letters, reach out to human rights organizations, and fight for their loved ones.

Amnesty: How did the full-scale invasion affect your activism?

Viliuia: Speaking out against Russia’s war in Ukraine and its colonial policies has become increasingly dangerous, with Indigenous activists facing imprisonment, exile, or violence. The recent designation of 172 Indigenous and ethnic organizations as “terrorist” has criminalized Indigenous activism, making legal operations nearly impossible and forcing many into exile or underground work.

Despite the challenges, the conflict has also created new opportunities for collaboration, as international organizations are now paying greater attention to Indigenous issues in Russia and strengthening global solidarity with other decolonial movements.

Zarema: I had to leave Russia due to the risk of persecution for my anti-war position. Now in exile, my activism has shifted towards raising awareness internationally, supporting Indigenous communities in resisting militarization, as well as creating networks of solidarity among Indigenous peoples facing similar struggles.

The full-scale invasion has made Indigenous activism more dangerous, especially in the North Caucasus. Russia’s colonial narratives have long portrayed the Caucasus as aggressive and marginalized. The government frames any activism in the region as a threat to the state and labels Indigenous activists as societal dangers, making their dissent appear more menacing.

Despite these challenges, Indigenous activists continue to speak out, drawing attention to systemic injustices and advocating for their communities.

Victoria: Since the start of the war in Ukraine, my activism became more visible, and now I frequently receive threats. Although I don’t live in Russia, I have to take safety precautions, as there are threats to get to me even here in the United States. My social media accounts are constantly under attack, and at one point, I was receiving 3-5 hacking attempt notifications on my Instagram per day.

Despite that, activism has also introduced me to courageous and honest people from different regions. We are all united by a common struggle – the fight for the survival of our peoples. We are building networks of solidarity and working on joint projects. Together, we are strong, and we are each other’s support.

Amnesty: In a country like Russia, where most influential politicians are men, many Indigenous rights groups from Russia are led by women. What is the reason for this?

Viliuia: The female leadership of the Indigenous rights movements reflects both Indigenous social structures and the colonial system. In the Republic of Sakha, societal roles between men and women have traditionally been more equal, with women often serving as matriarchs and playing central roles in decision-making, economic activities, and cultural preservation. This strong presence in both domestic and public life has translated into leadership in activism.

In my family, women have been ambitious, pursuing university degrees, owning small businesses, and even becoming auto mechanics. Meanwhile, men have continued traditional ways of life or taken on practical jobs in housing, communal services, driving, and mining. This contrast mirrors a broader reality in Indigenous communities, where women often lead in education, business, and activism, while men are drawn to physically demanding labour that keeps them away from home for long periods.

Zarema: Indigenous women have a strong tradition of resistance, driven by their responsibility to preserve language, culture, and traditions under colonial oppression. Grassroots movements like Feminist Anti-War Resistance intersect feminist and decolonial agendas, providing a space for Indigenous women to combat both gender-based and colonial oppression. The authoritarian nature of the Russian government leaves no room for Indigenous political participation, forcing women to turn to grassroots activism.

Zarema: There are multiple ways to support us. People from outside Russia can help amplify our voices by sharing our stories and perspectives. International media can help us challenge Russian propaganda and the Kremlin’s narratives that use Indigenous peoples as symbols of loyalty to the state. International organisations can help us advocate for Indigenous rights at international institutions like the UN, ensuring that Indigenous voices from Russia are included in discussions about human rights and decolonization. They can also help us establish connections between Indigenous activists from Russia and those from other colonized regions. Shared experiences and strategies can strengthen resistance efforts.

By supporting Indigenous women in Russia, the international community contributes to both anti-war efforts and the broader fight for Indigenous rights and decolonization.

Victoria: One of the biggest challenges we face is the lack of financial support for our projects. Indigenous organizations are not only marginalized but often have to operate on a volunteer basis. Having support in accessing funding would help us to step up our efforts.

Viliuia: Despite the importance of our presence in global advocacy spaces, it remains difficult for Indigenous peoples to access these platforms, due to financial constraints, bureaucratic visa processes and exclusionary institutional structures. Addressing these challenges is essential to ensuring Indigenous perspectives are not just included, but prioritized in global decision-making processes.

The war in Ukraine has exposed Russia’s colonial nature more clearly than ever before. Indigenous women from Russia are not just victims of this war – we are frontline defenders of our peoples, cultures, and lands. The international community must recognize our struggles, amplify our voices, and support our right to self-determination. Decolonization is not just a theoretical concept; it is a necessary process for justice and long-lasting peace.

MIL OSI NGO –

April 23, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: Young UK journalists learn towards activist roles, away from objectivity – new survey

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Imke Henkel, Lecturer in Journalism and Media, University of Leeds

fizkes/Shutterstock

The role of journalists has been changing for some time now. Due to the rise of social media, journalists no longer hold the monopoly on informing the public and holding the powerful to account. Nor do they keep their role as exclusive gatekeepers for news. And many readers find that algorithms do a better job of selecting news than human editors.

For a new report on the state of the journalism profession in the UK in the 2020s, my colleagues and I asked journalists what they think their role in society should be today. Facing a world of rising authoritarianism, war in Europe and catastrophic climate change, a younger generation of UK journalists increasingly believe they should occupy a more activist role in society.

We asked a representative sample of 1,130 UK journalists how important a selection of 24 roles were to them. These included informer roles such as “being a detached observer”, to advocating roles such as “promote peace and tolerance” and audience-oriented roles such as “provide entertainment and relaxation”. We measured their answers on a scale from “not at all important” to “extremely important”.

These questions were part of a wider survey my colleagues Neil Thurman, Sina Thäsler-Kordonouri and I conducted at the end of 2023. Our survey is the UK leg of the third wave of the Worlds of Journalism Study, a global project researching the state of journalism across 75 countries.

The survey follows a similar one conducted eight years earlier. Comparing journalists’ answers to both allows us to understand how their professional attitudes have changed.

Then and now, the roles journalists hold to be most important are those considered to be the traditional purpose of journalism: being a detached observer (linked to objectivity), providing analysis of current affairs, and – the classic watchdog role – monitoring and scrutinising those in power. More than half of our respondents thought that these roles were “extremely” or “very important”.

However, we found a notable shift in which roles journalists emphasise over others. While they still consider their traditional roles to be essential, many appear to be leaning more towards activist roles, and away from roles linked to objectivity.

In 2015, 77% of respondents thought that “being a detached observer” was “extremely” or “very important”. In 2023, it was 69%. Tellingly, there is also a generational shift. While 74% of respondents over 40 rate their role as detached observers as very or extremely important, just 60% of those under 40 do.

The activist role

UK journalists’ interest in the more activist watchdog role has risen between 2015 and 2023. It should be noted that the question was asked slightly differently in 2015. Then, 48% found it very or extremely important to monitor and scrutinise political leaders, and 59% thought the same about business. In 2023, 65% considered monitoring and scrutinising those in power very or extremely important.

In general, we found that as younger journalists are turning away from roles that can be considered more neutral, such as “providing analysis of current affairs”, they are becoming more interested in more activist roles.

Roles such as “speaking on behalf of the marginalised” and “shining a light on society’s problems” are both more important for journalists under 40 than for older journalists.

We also found that the role of “educating the audience” was significant – 88% of respondents said it was important. This role can sometimes be considered more activist, as it may involve conveying cultural or moral values in addition to information. Along with younger journalists, we found those who produce for podcasts and for radio are significantly more interested in this role than other journalists.

Young journalists were more likely to embrace activist roles.
Silatip/Shutterstock

We also observed that roles which support active participation in democracy, such as “provide information people need to form political opinions”, are more favoured by journalists working for local and regional media than by their colleagues at national outlets.

Those working for internet native media reported being less interested in these roles than those in legacy media (newspaper, TV or radio). Additionally, journalists’ interest in commercially driven roles like “providing the kind of news that attracts the largest audience”, has decreased.

Responding to pressure

Recent political and social upheavals have raised confronting questions about journalists’ role in society.

In the aftermath of Brexit, journalists were accused of failing their democratic role. So-called mainstream media have been criticised by alternative media for supposedly reinforcing the establishment’s agenda. And journalists’ traditionally most treasured value – objectivity – has been questioned in the face of the war in Ukraine, social movements such as Black Lives Matter and existential threats like climate change. It’s no wonder that many journalists themselves are perturbed by what is happening to their profession.

Our survey points to a notable shift in journalists’ professional attitudes. UK journalists, especially the younger generation, seem to respond more to the pressures that challenge their traditional roles. Meanwhile, local news outlets and legacy media emerge as the most determined advocates for journalism’s democratic role.

The dispute about the contested value of journalistic objectivity has become a bellwether for journalists’ changing professional culture. Our survey shows that, while still important for UK journalists, it is indeed eroding.

Imke Henkel does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Young UK journalists learn towards activist roles, away from objectivity – new survey – https://theconversation.com/young-uk-journalists-learn-towards-activist-roles-away-from-objectivity-new-survey-254839

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

April 23, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: President Lai pays respects to Pope Francis

Source: Republic of China Taiwan

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2025-04-23
President Lai meets US CNAS NextGen fellows
On the morning of April 23, President Lai Ching-te met with fellows from the Shawn Brimley Next Generation National Security Leaders Program (NextGen) run by the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). In remarks, President Lai thanked the government of the United States for continuing its arms sales to Taiwan over the years, supporting Taiwan’s efforts to enhance its national defense capabilities and jointly maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. The president pointed out that we will promote our “Taiwan plus one” policy, that is, new arrangements for Taiwan plus the US, and form a “Taiwan investment in the US team” to expand investment and bring about even closer Taiwan-US trade cooperation, allowing us to reduce the trade deficit and generate development that benefits both sides. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: Ms. Michèle Flournoy, chair of the CNAS Board of Directors, is a good friend of Taiwan, and she has made major contributions to Taiwan-US relations through her long-time efforts on various aspects of our cooperation. I am happy to welcome Chair Flournoy, who is once again leading a NextGen Fellowship delegation to Taiwan. CNAS is a prominent think tank focusing on US national security and defense policy based in Washington, DC. Its NextGen Fellowship has fostered talented individuals in the fields of national security and foreign affairs. This year’s delegation is significantly larger than those of the past, demonstrating the increased importance that the next generation of US leaders attach to Taiwan. On behalf of the people of Taiwan, I extend my sincerest welcome to you all. The Taiwan Strait, an issue of importance for our guests, has become a global issue. There is a high degree of international consensus that peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait are indispensable elements in global security and prosperity. Facing military threats from China, Taiwan proposed the Four Pillars of Peace action plan. First, we are actively implementing military reforms, enhancing whole-of-society defense resilience, and working to increase our defense budget to more than 3 percent of GDP. Second, we are strengthening our economic resilience. As Taiwan’s economy must keep advancing, we can no longer put all our eggs in one basket. We are taking action to remain firmly rooted in Taiwan while expanding our global presence and marketing worldwide. In these efforts, we are already seeing results. Third, we are standing side-by-side with other democratic countries to demonstrate the strength of deterrence and achieve our goal of peace through strength. And fourth, Taiwan is willing, under the principles of parity and dignity, to conduct exchanges and cooperate with China towards achieving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. This April 10 marked the 46th anniversary of the enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act. We thank the US government for continuing its arms sales to Taiwan over the years, supporting Taiwan’s efforts to enhance its national defense capabilities and jointly maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. We look forward to Taiwan and the US continuing to strengthen collaboration on the development of both our defense industries as well as the building of non-red supply chains. This will yield even more results and further deepen our economic and trade partnership. The US is now the main destination for outbound investment from Taiwan. Moving forward, we will promote our “Taiwan plus one” policy, that is, new arrangements for Taiwan plus the US. And our government will form a “Taiwan investment in the US team” to expand investment. We hope this will bring Taiwan-US economic and trade cooperation even closer and, through mutually beneficial assistance, allow us to generate development that benefits both our sides while reducing our trade deficit. In closing, thank you once again for visiting Taiwan. We hope your trip is fruitful and leaves you with a deep impression of Taiwan. We also hope that going forward you continue supporting Taiwan and advancing even greater development for Taiwan-US ties. Chair Flournoy then delivered remarks, first thanking President Lai for making time to receive their delegation. Referring to President Lai’s earlier remarks, she said that it is quite an impressive group, as past members of this program have gone on to become members of the US Congress, leading government experts, and leaders in the think-tank world and in the private sector. She remarked that investing in this group is a wonderful privilege for her and that they appreciate President Lai’s agreeing to take the time to engage in exchange with them. Chair Flournoy emphasized that they are visiting Taiwan at a critical moment, when there is so much change and volatility in the geostrategic environment, a lot of uncertainty, and a lot of unpredictability. She stated that given our shared values, our shared passion for democracy and human rights, and our shared interests in peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, this is an important time for dialogue, collaboration, and looking for additional opportunities where we can work together towards regional peace and stability.

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2025-04-18
President Lai meets US delegation from Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific
On the afternoon of April 18, President Lai Ching-te met with a delegation led by Senator Pete Ricketts, chairman of the United States Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy. In remarks, President Lai said we hope to promote our Taiwan plus one policy, that is, new industrial arrangements for Taiwan plus the US, to leverage the strengths of both sides and reinforce our links in such areas as the economy, trade, and technological innovation. The president said that by deepening cooperation, Taiwan and the US will be better positioned to work together on building non-red supply chains. He said a more secure and sustainable economic and trade partnership will allow us to address the challenges posed by geopolitics, climate change, and the restructuring of global supply chains. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: I warmly welcome you all to Taiwan. I want to take this opportunity to especially thank Chairman Pete Ricketts and Ranking Member Chris Coons for their high regard and support for Taiwan. Chairman Ricketts has elected to visit Taiwan on his first overseas trip since taking up his new position in January. Ranking Member Coons made a dedicated trip to Taiwan in 2021 to announce a donation of COVID-19 vaccines on behalf of the US government. He also visited last May, soon after my inauguration, continuing to deepen Taiwan-US exchanges. Thanks to support from Chairman Ricketts and Ranking Member Coons, the US Congress has continued to introduce many concrete initiatives and resources to assist Taiwan through the National Defense Authorization Act and Consolidated Appropriations Act, bringing the Taiwan-US partnership even closer. For this, I want to again express my gratitude. There has long been bipartisan support in the US Congress for maintaining security in the Taiwan Strait. Faced with China’s persistent political and military intimidation, Taiwan will endeavor to reform national defense and enhance whole-of-society defense resilience. We will also make special budget allocations to ensure that our defense budget exceeds 3 percent of GDP, up from the current 2.5 percent, so as to enhance Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities. We look forward to Taiwan and the US continuing to work together to maintain peace and stability in the region. We will also promote our Taiwan plus one policy, that is, new industrial arrangements for Taiwan plus the US. We hope to leverage the strengths of both sides and reinforce our links in such areas as the economy, trade, and technological innovation, jointly promoting prosperity and development. We believe that by deepening cooperation through the Taiwan plus one policy, Taiwan and the US will be better positioned to work together on building non-red supply chains. A more secure and sustainable economic and trade partnership will allow us to address the challenges posed by geopolitics, climate change, and the restructuring of global supply chains. In closing, I wish Chairman Ricketts and Ranking Member Coons a smooth and successful visit. Chairman Ricketts then delivered remarks, first thanking President Lai for his hospitality. He said that he and his delegation have had a wonderful time meeting with government officials, industry representatives, and the team at the American Institute in Taiwan. Highlighting that Taiwan has long been a friend and partner of the US, he said their bipartisan delegation to Taiwan emphasizes long-time bipartisan support in the US Congress for Taiwan, and though administrations change, that bipartisan support remains. Chairman Ricketts stated that the US is committed to peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific and that they want to see peace across the Taiwan Strait. He also stated that the US opposes any unilateral change in the status of Taiwan and that they expect any differences between Taiwan and China to be resolved peacefully without coercion or the threat of force. To that end, he said, the US will continue to assist Taiwan in its self-defense and will also step up by bolstering its own defense capabilities, noting that there is broad consensus on this in the US Congress. Chairman Ricketts stated that they want to see Taiwan participate in international organizations and memberships where appropriate, and encourage Taiwan to reach out to current and past diplomatic allies to strengthen those bilateral relationships. He pointed out that the long economic relationship between the US and Taiwan is important for our as well as the entire world’s security and prosperity. He also noted that there are many opportunities for us to continue to grow the economic relationship that will help create more prosperity for our respective peoples and ensure that we are more secure in the world. Chairman Ricketts emphasized that they made this trip early on in the new US administration to work with Taiwan to develop three points: security, diplomatic relations, and the economy. He stated that in the face of rising aggression from communist China, the US will provide commensurate help to Taiwan in self-defense and that they will continue to provide the services and tools needed. In closing, Chairman Ricketts once again thanked President Lai for the hospitality and said he looks forward to dialogue on how we can continue these relationships. Ranking Member Coons then delivered remarks. Mentioning that their delegation also visited the Philippines on this trip, he said that there and in Taiwan, they have been focused on peace, stability, and security, and the ways for deepening and strengthening economic and security relations. He noted that 46 years ago, the US Senate passed the Taiwan Relations Act, adding that it was strongly bipartisan when enacted and that support for it is still strongly bipartisan today. Its core commitment, he said, is that the US will be engaged and will be a partner in ensuring that any dispute or challenge across the strait will be resolved peacefully, and that Taiwan will have the resources it needs for its self-defense. Ranking Member Coons said that between people, friendships are deepest and most enduring when they are based not just on interests but on values, and that the same is true between the US and Taiwan. Free press, free enterprise, free societies, democracy – these core shared values, he said, anchor our friendship and partnership, making them deeper. He remarked that they are grateful for the significant investment in the US being made by companies from Taiwan, but what anchors our partnership, in addition to these important investments and investments being made by Taiwan in its own security, are the values that mobilize our free-enterprise spirit and our commitment to free societies. In Europe in recent years, Ranking Member Coons said, an aggressive nation has tried to change boundaries and change history by force. He said that the US and dozens of countries committed to freedom have come to the aid of Ukraine to defend it, help it stabilize, and secure its future. So too in this region of the world, he added, the US and a bipartisan group in the US Senate are committed to stable, secure, peaceful relations and to deterring any unilateral effort to change the status quo by force. In closing, he said he is grateful for a chance to return to Taiwan after the pandemic and that he looks forward to our conversation, our partnership, and the important work we have in front of us. The delegation was accompanied to the Presidential Office by American Institute in Taiwan Taipei Office Director Raymond Greene.

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2025-04-17
President Lai meets New Zealand delegation from All-Party Parliamentary Group on Taiwan
On the morning of April 17, President Lai Ching-te met with a delegation from New Zealand’s All-Party Parliamentary Group on Taiwan. In remarks, President Lai thanked the government of New Zealand for reiterating the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait on multiple occasions since last year. He also stated that this year, the Taiwan-New Zealand economic cooperation agreement (ANZTEC) is being implemented in its complete form. The president expressed hope that deeper collaboration in such fields as smart agriculture, food manufacturing, biomedicine, the digital economy, and clean energy, as well as exchanges among our indigenous peoples, will allow our economies and industries to continue evolving as they adapt to the challenges arising from global changes. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: I extend a warm welcome to all of our guests. New Zealand’s All-Party Parliamentary Group on Taiwan was established in 2023, marking a significant milestone in the deepening of Taiwan-New Zealand relations. I would like to thank Members of Parliament Stuart Smith and Tangi Utikere for leading this delegation, and thank all our guests for demonstrating support for Taiwan through action. We currently face a rapidly changing international landscape. Authoritarian regimes continue to converge and expand. Democracies must actively cooperate and jointly safeguard peace, stability, and the prosperous development of the Indo-Pacific region. Since last year, the government of New Zealand has on multiple occasions reiterated the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. On behalf of the people of Taiwan, I would like to express our sincere gratitude for these statements and demonstrations of support. This year, ANZTEC is being implemented in its complete form. We look forward to exploring even more diverse markets with New Zealand. Deeper collaboration in such fields as smart agriculture, food manufacturing, biomedicine, the digital economy, and clean energy, as well as exchanges among indigenous peoples, will allow our economies and industries to continue evolving as they adapt to the challenges arising from global changes. Taiwan and New Zealand share the universal values of democracy, freedom, and respect for human rights, and parliamentary diplomacy is a tradition practiced by democracies around the world. Looking ahead, our parliamentary exchanges and mutual visits are bound to become more frequent. This will enable us to explore even more opportunities for cooperation and further deepen and solidify the democratic partnership between Taiwan and New Zealand. Thank you once again for making the long journey to visit us. I wish you a fruitful and successful trip. I also hope that everyone can take time to see more of Taiwan, try our local cuisine, and learn more about our culture. I hope our guests will fall in love with Taiwan. MP Smith then delivered remarks, saying that it is a great pleasure and an honor to be received by President Lai. The MP, noting that President Lai already covered many of the points he planned to make, went on to say that New Zealand and Taiwan share many values. He indicated that both are trading nations that rely on easy access for imports and exports, and that is why freedom of navigation is so important. That is why New Zealand had a naval vessel sail through the Taiwan Strait, he said, to underline the importance of freedom of navigation and our mutual security. MP Smith said that they look forward to building stronger relationships and enhancing the trade between our two nations. He added that New Zealand has much to offer in the field of geothermal energy to assist Taiwan, and mentioned that New Zealand is third largest in terms of the number of rocket launchers for satellites, which could assist Taiwan with communications in the future. New Zealand has other products as well, he said, but looks for assistance from Taiwan’s technology and technological sector. Lastly, MP Smith stated that he looks forward to a long and prosperous relationship between Taiwan and New Zealand. MP Utikere then delivered remarks, indicating that like Taiwan, New Zealand is a nation that is surrounded by ocean, which means that they rely on strong partnerships with communities of interest all around the globe. He said that the all-party parliamentary friendship group that was established and that they are a part of goes a long way in ensuring that a secure relationship between our two parliaments can continue to prosper. The MP also thanked Taiwan’s Representative to New Zealand Joanne Ou (歐江安) and her team for their work, which has ensured the success of the delegation’s visit. He said that the delegation experienced meetings with ministers in Taiwan’s government, members of the legislature, and those from the non-government organization sector as well. He also said that they enjoyed the opportunity to visit Wulai, and that the strength of the connections between the indigenous peoples of Taiwan and the indigenous peoples of Aotearoa New Zealand is something that certainly landed with members of the delegation. MP Utikere noted that he will take up President Lai’s offer on experiencing more of Taiwan, and will spend a few extra days in Tainan, which he understands has a very special place in the president’s heart, adding that he looks forward to his time and experiences there. The MP concluded his remarks by saying that this will be a relationship that continues to go from strength to strength. After their remarks, the New Zealand delegation sang the Māori song “Tutira Mai Nga Iwi” to extend best wishes to Taiwan. Also in attendance at the meeting were New Zealand Members of Parliament Jamie Arbuckle, Greg Fleming, Hamish Campbell, Cameron Luxton, and Helen White.

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2025-04-15
President Lai meets delegation led by Tuvalu Deputy Prime Minister Panapasi Nelesone
On the afternoon of April 15, President Lai Ching-te met with a delegation led by Tuvalu Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance and Economic Development Panapasi Nelesone and his wife. In remarks, President Lai thanked Tuvalu for its staunch and long-term backing of Taiwan’s international participation. The president said he looks forward to our nations deepening bilateral ties in such areas as agriculture, medicine, education, and information and communications technology and working together toward greater peace, prosperity, and development in the Pacific region. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: I extend a very warm welcome to Deputy Prime Minister Nelesone and Madame Corinna Ituaso Laafai as they lead this delegation to Taiwan. Our distinguished guests are the first delegation from Tuvalu that I have received at the Presidential Office this year. During my visit to Tuvalu last year, I met and exchanged views with Deputy Prime Minister Nelesone and the ministers present. I am delighted to meet you again today and thank you once again for the hospitality you accorded my delegation. The culture of Tuvalu and the warmth of its people are not easily forgotten. Tuvalu’s support for Taiwan has also touched us deeply. I want to take this opportunity to thank Tuvalu for staunchly backing Taiwan’s international participation over the past several decades. Our two countries have supported each other like family and have together made contributions in the international arena. Last Tuesday, I received the credentials of Ambassador Lily Tangisia Faavae and expressed my hope for Taiwan and Tuvalu continuing to deepen bilateral relations. This visit by Deputy Prime Minister Nelesone is an important step in that regard. Our two countries will be signing a labor cooperation agreement and an agreement concerning the recognition of training and certification of seafarers. This will expand bilateral cooperation at multiple levels and bring our relations even closer. Taiwan and Tuvalu are maritime nations and share the values of democracy and freedom. Our two countries have stood shoulder to shoulder to protect marine resources and address the challenges posed by climate change and authoritarianism, and we aspire to work toward greater peace, prosperity, and development in the Pacific region. Our nations have produced fruitful results in such areas as agriculture, medicine, education, and information and communications technology. I anticipate that, with the support of Deputy Prime Minister Nelesone and our distinguished guests, we can continue to employ a more diverse range of strategies to begin a new chapter in our diplomatic partnership. Together, we can make even greater and more concrete contributions to regional development. Deputy Prime Minister Nelesone then delivered remarks, first thanking President Lai for his kind words of welcome and the warm hospitality extended to his delegation. On behalf of the government and people of Tuvalu, he conveyed their gratitude to the president and the people of Taiwan for the generous support, as well as for the enduring friendship we share. He said that Taiwan’s steadfast commitment to our bilateral relationship has been instrumental in advancing our shared values of democracy, resilience, and sustainable development. From vital development assistance to cooperation in health, education, and climate change resilience, he added, Taiwan’s contributions have made a significant impact on the lives of the people of Tuvalu. For Taiwan’s recent generous donation of shoes for Tuvaluan primary school students, Deputy Prime Minister Nelesone expressed thanks to President Lai. He commented that these gifts, which underscore a deep commitment to the welfare of their youth, transcend mere material support; they are symbols of care, friendship, and hope for the future generations. Noting that our bilateral relationship is built on mutual respect, shared values, and a common vision for sustainable development in the Pacific, he expressed confidence that this partnership will continue to flourish and will serve as a beacon of cooperation and solidarity within our region. The delegation also included Tuvalu Minister of Foreign Affairs, Labour, and Trade Paulson Panapa; Minister of Public Works, Infrastructure Development and Water Ampelosa Tehulu, and was accompanied to the Presidential Office by Tuvalu Ambassador Faavae.

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2025-04-10
President Lai pens Bloomberg News article on Taiwan’s response to US reciprocal tariffs
On April 10, an article penned by President Lai Ching-te entitled “Taiwan Has a Roadmap for Deeper US Trade Ties” was published by Bloomberg News, explaining to a global audience Taiwan’s strategy on trade with the United States, as well as how Taiwan will engage in dialogue with the aim of removing bilateral trade barriers, increasing investment between Taiwan and the US, and reducing tariffs to zero. The following is the full text of President Lai’s article: Last month, the first of Taiwan’s 66 new F-16Vs rolled off the assembly line in Greenville, South Carolina. Signed during President Donald Trump’s first term, the $8 billion deal stands as a testament to American ingenuity and leadership in advanced manufacturing. Beyond its economic impact – creating thousands of well-paying jobs across the US – it strengthens the foundations of peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific. This deal is emblematic of the close interests shared between Taiwan and the US. Our bond is forged by an unwavering belief in freedom and liberty. For decades, our two countries have stood shoulder-to-shoulder in deterring communist expansionism. Even as Beijing intensifies its air force and naval exercises in our vicinity, we remain resolute. Taiwan will always be a bastion of democracy and peace in the region. This partnership extends well beyond the security realm. Though home to just 23 million people, Taiwan has in recent years become a significant investor in America. TSMC recently announced it will raise its total investment in the US to $165 billion – an initiative that will create 40,000 construction jobs and tens of thousands more in advanced chip manufacturing and R&D. This investment will bolster the emergence of a new high-tech cluster in Arizona. Taiwan is committed to strengthening bilateral cooperation in manufacturing and innovation. As a trade-dependent economy, our long-term success is built on trade relationships that are fair, reciprocal and mutually beneficial. Encouraging Taiwanese businesses to expand their global footprint, particularly in the US, is a vital part of this strategy. Deepening commercial ties between Taiwanese and American firms is another. These core principles will guide our response to President Trump’s reciprocal tariffs. First, we will seek to restart trade negotiations with a common objective of reducing all tariffs between Taiwan and the US. While Taiwan already maintains low tariffs, with an average nominal rate of 6%, we are willing to further cut this rate to zero on the basis of reciprocity with the US. By removing the last vestiges to free and fair trade, we seek to encourage greater trade and investment flows between our two countries. Second, Taiwan will rapidly expand procurement of American goods. Over the past five years, rising demand for semiconductors and AI-related components has increased our trade surplus. In response to these market trends, Taiwan will seek to narrow the trade imbalance through the procurement of energy, agriculture and other industrial goods from the US. These efforts will create thousands of new jobs across multiple sectors. We’ll also pursue additional arms procurements that are vital to our self-defense and contribute to peace and stability over the Taiwan Strait. During President Trump’s first term, we secured $18 billion in arms deals, including advanced fighter jets, tanks and anti-ship missiles. Future purchases, which are not reflected in trade balances, build on our economic and security partnership while being essential to Taiwan’s “Peace Through Strength” approach. Third, new investments will be made across the US. Already, Taiwanese firms support 400,000 jobs throughout all 50 states. Beyond TSMC, we also see emerging opportunities in electronics, ICT, energy and petrochemicals. We will establish a cross-agency “US Investment Team” to support bilateral trade and investment – and we hope that efforts will be reciprocated by the Trump administration. Fourth, we are committed to removing non-tariff trade barriers. Taiwan will take concrete steps to resolve persistent issues that have long impeded trade negotiations. And finally, we will strongly address US concerns over export controls and improper transshipment of low-cost goods through Taiwan. These steps form the basis of a comprehensive roadmap for how Taiwan will navigate the shifting trade landscape, transforming challenges in the Taiwan-US economic relationship into new opportunities for growth, resilience and strategic alignment. At a time of growing global uncertainty, underpinned by growing Chinese assertiveness, closer trade ties are more than sound economics; they are a critical pillar of regional security. Our approach is long-term and principled, grounded in a lasting commitment to our friendship with the US, a firm belief in the benefits of fair and reciprocal trade, and an unwavering dedication to peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. We are confident that our shared economic and security interests will not only overcome turbulence in the international trade environment – they will define the future of a free and open Indo-Pacific.

Details
2025-04-06
President Lai delivers remarks on US tariff policy response
On April 6, President Lai Ching-te delivered recorded remarks regarding the impact of the 32 percent tariff that the United States government recently imposed on imports from Taiwan in the name of reciprocity. In his remarks, President Lai explained that the government will adopt five response strategies, including making every effort to improve reciprocal tariff rates through negotiations, adopting a support plan for affected domestic industries, adopting medium- and long-term economic development plans, forming new “Taiwan plus the US” arrangements, and launching industry listening tours. The president emphasized that as we face this latest challenge, the government and civil society will work hand in hand, and expressed hope that all parties, both ruling and opposition, will support the measures that the Executive Yuan will take to open up a broader path for Taiwan’s economy. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: My fellow citizens, good evening. The US government recently announced higher tariffs on countries around the world in the name of reciprocity, including imposing a 32 percent tariff on imports from Taiwan. This is bound to have a major impact on our nation. Various countries have already responded, and some have even adopted retaliatory measures. Tremendous changes in the global economy are expected. Taiwan is an export-led economy, and in facing future challenges there will inevitably be difficulties, so we must proceed carefully to turn danger into safety. During this time, I want to express gratitude to all sectors of society for providing valuable opinions, which the government regards highly, and will use as a reference to make policy decisions. However, if we calmly and carefully analyze Taiwan’s trade with the US, we find that last year Taiwan’s exports to the US were valued at US$111.4 billion, accounting for 23.4 percent of total export value, with the other 75-plus percent of products sold worldwide to countries other than the US. Of products sold to the US, competitive ICT products and electronic components accounted for 65.4 percent. This shows that Taiwan’s economy does still have considerable resilience. As long as our response strategies are appropriate, and the public and private sectors join forces, we can reduce impacts. Please do not panic. To address the reciprocal tariffs by the US, Taiwan has no plans to adopt retaliatory tariffs. There will be no change in corporate investment commitments to the US, as long as they are consistent with national interests. But we must ensure the US clearly understands Taiwan’s contributions to US economic development. More importantly, we must actively seek to understand changes in the global economic situation, strengthen Taiwan-US industry cooperation, elevate the status of Taiwan industries in global supply chains, and with safeguarding the continued development of Taiwan’s economy as our goal, adopt the following five strategies to respond. Strategy one: Make every effort to improve reciprocal tariff rates through negotiations using the following five methods: 1. Taiwan has already formed a negotiation team led by Vice Premier Cheng Li-chiun (鄭麗君). The team includes members from the National Security Council, the Office of Trade Negotiations, and relevant Executive Yuan ministries and agencies, as well as academia and industry. Like the US-Mexico-Canada free trade agreement, negotiations on tariffs can start from Taiwan-US bilateral zero-tariff treatment. 2. To expand purchases from the US and thereby reduce the trade deficit, the Executive Yuan has already completed an inventory regarding large-scale procurement plans for agricultural, industrial, petroleum, and natural gas products, and the Ministry of National Defense has also proposed a military procurement list. All procurement plans will be actively pursued. 3. Expand investments in the US. Taiwan’s cumulative investment in the US already exceeds US$100 billion, creating approximately 400,000 jobs. In the future, in addition to increased investment in the US by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, other industries such as electronics, ICT, petrochemicals, and natural gas can all increase their US investments, deepening Taiwan-US industry cooperation. Taiwan’s government has helped form a “Taiwan investment in the US” team, and hopes that the US will reciprocate by forming a “US investment in Taiwan” team to bring about closer Taiwan-US trade cooperation, jointly creating a future economic golden age. 4. We must eliminate non-tariff barriers to trade. Non-tariff barriers are an indicator by which the US assesses whether a trading partner is trading fairly with the US. Therefore, we will proactively resolve longstanding non-tariff barriers so that negotiations can proceed more smoothly. 5. We must resolve two issues that have been matters of longstanding concern to the US. One regards high-tech export controls, and the other regards illegal transshipment of dumped goods, otherwise referred to as “origin washing.” Strategy two: We must adopt a plan for supporting our industries. For industries that will be affected by the tariffs, and especially traditional industries as well as micro-, small-, and medium-sized enterprises, we will provide timely and needed support and assistance. Premier Cho Jung-tai (卓榮泰) and his administrative team recently announced a package of 20 specific measures designed to address nine areas. Moving forward, the support we provide to different industries will depend on how they are affected by the tariffs, will take into account the particular features of each industry, and will help each industry innovate, upgrade, and transform. Strategy three: We must adopt medium- and long-term economic development plans. At this point in time, our government must simultaneously adopt new strategies for economic and industrial development. This is also the fundamental path to solutions for future economic challenges. The government will proactively cooperate with friends and allies, develop a diverse range of markets, and achieve closer integration of entities in the upper, middle, and lower reaches of industrial supply chains. This course of action will make Taiwan’s industrial ecosystem more complete, and will help Taiwanese industries upgrade and transform. We must also make good use of the competitive advantages we possess in such areas as semiconductor manufacturing, integrated chip design, ICT, and smart manufacturing to build Taiwan into an AI island, and promote relevant applications for food, clothing, housing, and transportation, as well as military, security and surveillance, next-generation communications, and the medical and health and wellness industries as we advance toward a smarter, more sustainable, and more prosperous new Taiwan. Strategy four: “Taiwan plus one,” i.e., new “Taiwan plus the US” arrangements: While staying firmly rooted in Taiwan, our enterprises are expanding their global presence and marketing worldwide. This has been our national economic development strategy, and the most important aspect is maintaining a solid base here in Taiwan. We absolutely must maintain a solid footing, and cannot allow the present strife to cause us to waver. Therefore, our government will incentivize investments, carry out deregulation, and continue to improve Taiwan’s investment climate by actively resolving problems involving access to water, electricity, land, human resources, and professional talent. This will enable corporations to stay in Taiwan and continue investing here. In addition, we must also help the overseas manufacturing facilities of offshore Taiwanese businesses to make necessary adjustments to support our “Taiwan plus one” policy, in that our national economic development strategy will be adjusted as follows: to stay firmly rooted in Taiwan while expanding our global presence, strengthening US ties, and marketing worldwide. We intend to make use of the new state of supply chains to strengthen cooperation between Taiwanese and US industries, and gain further access to US markets. Strategy five: Launch industry listening tours: All industrial firms, regardless of sector or size, will be affected to some degree once the US reciprocal tariffs go into effect. The administrative teams led by myself and Premier Cho will hear out industry concerns so that we can quickly resolve problems and make sure policies meet actual needs. My fellow citizens, over the past half-century and more, Taiwan has been through two energy crises, the Asian financial crisis, the global financial crisis, and pandemics. We have been able to not only withstand one test after another, but even turn crises into opportunities. The Taiwanese economy has emerged from these crises stronger and more resilient than ever. As we face this latest challenge, the government and civil society will work hand in hand, and I hope that all parties in the legislature, both ruling and opposition, will support the measures that the Executive Yuan will take to open up a broader path for Taiwan’s economy. Let us join together and give it our all. Thank you.

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

April 23, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Telegram as a tool used by the Russian authorities and the Commission’s slow and inadequate response – E-001504/2025
Source: European Parliament
Question for written answer E-001504/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Mariusz Kamiński (ECR)

The Russian Telegram platform is widely used by the Russian authorities and organised crime groups. The Kremlin treats it as a safe and effective tool not only for spreading propaganda and disinformation, but also for carrying out specific acts of sabotage on EU territory. One example is a group recruited and instructed via Telegram to conduct a campaign against Poland’s Law and Justice Government, President Andrzej Duda, Ukraine and NATO[1].

Authorities in the Netherlands and Lithuania have warned that Telegram is being used as a ‘notice board’ for drug trafficking, as well as other serious crimes, such as paedophilia and human trafficking.

During a meeting of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield (EUDS) on 27 March 2025, representatives of the Estonian Consumer Protection and Technical Regulatory Authority pointed out that cooperation with Telegram in the prosecution of the perpetrators of these crimes and the removal of illegal content is very limited.

Despite the seriousness of the threats that it poses, Telegram, after opening an office in Brussels, enjoys full freedom of activity in the territory of the EU. At the same time, by understating the number of users, it is able to evade obligations regarding the transparency of algorithms imposed on VLOPs. Experts and regulators indicate that the actual number of users exceeds the threshold of 45 million.

1.Given the examples presented of the use of Telegram by the Russian authorities and criminal groups, is the Commission cooperating with Member States, Europol and Eurojust to thoroughly assess and counter this threat?

2.Is the Commission working with the Belgian regulatory authority and other national authorities to urgently conduct a thorough assessment to determine whether Telegram should be classified as a VLOP?

Submitted: 11.4.2025

[1] https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/poland-investigating-russian-espionage-security-agency-says/
Last updated: 23 April 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
April 23, 2025
MIL-OSI NGOs: “Let us do our jobs” — Major aid groups in Gaza warn aid system is collapsing

Source: Oxfam –

After 18 months of war, a staggering toll on civilians and aid workers, and now a six-week total siege, the humanitarian aid system in Gaza is facing total collapse with the CEOs of 12 major aid organisations making an urgent plea: let us do our jobs.

A new humanitarian access survey of 43 international and Palestinian aid organisations working in Gaza found nearly all of them – 95% – have had to suspend or dramatically cut services since the ceasefire ended one month ago on 18 March, with widespread and indiscriminate bombing making it extremely dangerous to move around.

The people of Gaza – particularly women and children – are paying the price. Families are living amongst the rubble of their destroyed homes.  Famine is not just a risk, but likely rapidly unfolding in almost all parts of Gaza. The UN has warned the humanitarian crisis in Gaza is the worst it has been in 18 months.

Stripped of the means to keep people alive, hospitals have become morgues. More than 51,000 Palestinians have been reported killed. One of the last partially functioning hospitals, Al-Ahli Arab Hospital in northern Gaza, was bombed last Sunday.

“This is one of the worst humanitarian failures of our generation. Every single person in Gaza is relying on humanitarian aid to survive. That lifeline has been completely cut off since a blockade on all aid supplies was imposed by Israeli authorities on 2 March.

“We have supplies ready. We have trained medical staff. We have the expertise. What we don’t have is the access – or the guarantee by Israeli authorities that our teams can safely do their jobs.

“Survival itself is now slipping out of reach and the humanitarian system is at breaking point,” the CEOs of the 12 aid organisations said in their joint statement.

Twenty-four of the surveyed organisations reported increased movement restrictions in Gaza, impeding their ability to deliver aid. Nineteen aid organisations reported having cargo stuck outside Gaza, totaling at least 9,000 pallets of aid supplies.

Gaza now holds the disastrous record of being the deadliest place on earth for humanitarian workers. We cannot operate under fire or stay silent while our staff are killed.

More than 400 aid workers and over 1,300 health workers have been reported killed in Gaza since October 2023, despite the requirement under international humanitarian law for humanitarian workers to be protected.  

The recent killing of 15 Palestinian paramedics and rescue workers, whose bodies were found buried in a mass grave triggered global outrage, but many violations and attacks go unreported.

Despite hopes that the eight-week pause in hostilities would become a turning point, the violence against civilians and aid workers has only worsened. Since Israeli forces resumed bombardments, at least 14 organisations reported Israeli fire directly or indirectly hitting their staff or aid facilities.

Every day, aid workers – the majority of whom are Palestinian – are targeted, detained, obstructed or killed. Just as every day, rules meant to protect civilians in war are ignored with impunity.  When our staff and partners, our convoys, our offices, our warehouses are shelled, the message is loud and clear: even lifesaving aid is no longer protected.

This is unacceptable.

Meanwhile, Israeli authorities have proposed a new authorisation mechanism for the delivery of aid in Gaza that the UN Secretary-General has described as “limiting aid down to the last calorie and grain of flour.” This mechanism would set a dangerous new global precedent and eliminate any remaining space to deliver aid independent of military and political motivations. New NGO visa and registration rules, based on vague criteria, will censor humanitarian reporting and prevent us from fulfilling our mandate. 

We call on all parties to guarantee the safety of our staff and to allow the safe, unfettered access of aid into and across Gaza through all entry points, and for world leaders to oppose further restrictions.

We call for the protection of civilians and civilian infrastructure including hospitals, schools and shelters and the immediate restoration of basic services – water, electricity, and sanitation as required under international law.

We call for the release of the hostages.

We call for the release of all Palestinians arbitrarily detained.

We call, yet again, resoundingly, for an immediate and permanent ceasefire.

Humanitarian aid must never be used as a political tool. Saving lives should not be controversial. Laws of war developed over centuries to govern conduct and protect civilians should not now be discarded.

Let us do our jobs.

INGER ASHING, CEO, Save the Children International

AMITABH BEHAR, Executive Director, Oxfam International

SEAN CARROLL, President and CEO, Anera

STEVE CUTTS, interim Chief Executive Officer, Medical Aid for Palestinians (MAP)

NICOLAS DOTTA, CEO, Médecins du Monde Spain

JAN EGELAND, Secretary General, Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)

REENA GHELANI, CEO, Plan International

MANUEL PATROUILLARD, Managing Director, Humanity & Inclusion – Handicap International

MORGANE ROUSSEAU, CEO, Médecins du Monde Switzerland

REINTJE VAN HAERINGEN, Chair – Executive Committee, CARE International

JOEL WEILER, CEO, Médecins du Monde France

ROB WILLIAMS, CEO, War Child Alliance

MIL OSI NGO –

April 23, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: President Lai meets US CNAS NextGen fellows

Source: Republic of China Taiwan

Details
2025-04-18
President Lai meets US delegation from Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific
On the afternoon of April 18, President Lai Ching-te met with a delegation led by Senator Pete Ricketts, chairman of the United States Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy. In remarks, President Lai said we hope to promote our Taiwan plus one policy, that is, new industrial arrangements for Taiwan plus the US, to leverage the strengths of both sides and reinforce our links in such areas as the economy, trade, and technological innovation. The president said that by deepening cooperation, Taiwan and the US will be better positioned to work together on building non-red supply chains. He said a more secure and sustainable economic and trade partnership will allow us to address the challenges posed by geopolitics, climate change, and the restructuring of global supply chains. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: I warmly welcome you all to Taiwan. I want to take this opportunity to especially thank Chairman Pete Ricketts and Ranking Member Chris Coons for their high regard and support for Taiwan. Chairman Ricketts has elected to visit Taiwan on his first overseas trip since taking up his new position in January. Ranking Member Coons made a dedicated trip to Taiwan in 2021 to announce a donation of COVID-19 vaccines on behalf of the US government. He also visited last May, soon after my inauguration, continuing to deepen Taiwan-US exchanges. Thanks to support from Chairman Ricketts and Ranking Member Coons, the US Congress has continued to introduce many concrete initiatives and resources to assist Taiwan through the National Defense Authorization Act and Consolidated Appropriations Act, bringing the Taiwan-US partnership even closer. For this, I want to again express my gratitude. There has long been bipartisan support in the US Congress for maintaining security in the Taiwan Strait. Faced with China’s persistent political and military intimidation, Taiwan will endeavor to reform national defense and enhance whole-of-society defense resilience. We will also make special budget allocations to ensure that our defense budget exceeds 3 percent of GDP, up from the current 2.5 percent, so as to enhance Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities. We look forward to Taiwan and the US continuing to work together to maintain peace and stability in the region. We will also promote our Taiwan plus one policy, that is, new industrial arrangements for Taiwan plus the US. We hope to leverage the strengths of both sides and reinforce our links in such areas as the economy, trade, and technological innovation, jointly promoting prosperity and development. We believe that by deepening cooperation through the Taiwan plus one policy, Taiwan and the US will be better positioned to work together on building non-red supply chains. A more secure and sustainable economic and trade partnership will allow us to address the challenges posed by geopolitics, climate change, and the restructuring of global supply chains. In closing, I wish Chairman Ricketts and Ranking Member Coons a smooth and successful visit. Chairman Ricketts then delivered remarks, first thanking President Lai for his hospitality. He said that he and his delegation have had a wonderful time meeting with government officials, industry representatives, and the team at the American Institute in Taiwan. Highlighting that Taiwan has long been a friend and partner of the US, he said their bipartisan delegation to Taiwan emphasizes long-time bipartisan support in the US Congress for Taiwan, and though administrations change, that bipartisan support remains. Chairman Ricketts stated that the US is committed to peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific and that they want to see peace across the Taiwan Strait. He also stated that the US opposes any unilateral change in the status of Taiwan and that they expect any differences between Taiwan and China to be resolved peacefully without coercion or the threat of force. To that end, he said, the US will continue to assist Taiwan in its self-defense and will also step up by bolstering its own defense capabilities, noting that there is broad consensus on this in the US Congress. Chairman Ricketts stated that they want to see Taiwan participate in international organizations and memberships where appropriate, and encourage Taiwan to reach out to current and past diplomatic allies to strengthen those bilateral relationships. He pointed out that the long economic relationship between the US and Taiwan is important for our as well as the entire world’s security and prosperity. He also noted that there are many opportunities for us to continue to grow the economic relationship that will help create more prosperity for our respective peoples and ensure that we are more secure in the world. Chairman Ricketts emphasized that they made this trip early on in the new US administration to work with Taiwan to develop three points: security, diplomatic relations, and the economy. He stated that in the face of rising aggression from communist China, the US will provide commensurate help to Taiwan in self-defense and that they will continue to provide the services and tools needed. In closing, Chairman Ricketts once again thanked President Lai for the hospitality and said he looks forward to dialogue on how we can continue these relationships. Ranking Member Coons then delivered remarks. Mentioning that their delegation also visited the Philippines on this trip, he said that there and in Taiwan, they have been focused on peace, stability, and security, and the ways for deepening and strengthening economic and security relations. He noted that 46 years ago, the US Senate passed the Taiwan Relations Act, adding that it was strongly bipartisan when enacted and that support for it is still strongly bipartisan today. Its core commitment, he said, is that the US will be engaged and will be a partner in ensuring that any dispute or challenge across the strait will be resolved peacefully, and that Taiwan will have the resources it needs for its self-defense. Ranking Member Coons said that between people, friendships are deepest and most enduring when they are based not just on interests but on values, and that the same is true between the US and Taiwan. Free press, free enterprise, free societies, democracy – these core shared values, he said, anchor our friendship and partnership, making them deeper. He remarked that they are grateful for the significant investment in the US being made by companies from Taiwan, but what anchors our partnership, in addition to these important investments and investments being made by Taiwan in its own security, are the values that mobilize our free-enterprise spirit and our commitment to free societies. In Europe in recent years, Ranking Member Coons said, an aggressive nation has tried to change boundaries and change history by force. He said that the US and dozens of countries committed to freedom have come to the aid of Ukraine to defend it, help it stabilize, and secure its future. So too in this region of the world, he added, the US and a bipartisan group in the US Senate are committed to stable, secure, peaceful relations and to deterring any unilateral effort to change the status quo by force. In closing, he said he is grateful for a chance to return to Taiwan after the pandemic and that he looks forward to our conversation, our partnership, and the important work we have in front of us. The delegation was accompanied to the Presidential Office by American Institute in Taiwan Taipei Office Director Raymond Greene.

Details
2025-04-17
President Lai meets New Zealand delegation from All-Party Parliamentary Group on Taiwan
On the morning of April 17, President Lai Ching-te met with a delegation from New Zealand’s All-Party Parliamentary Group on Taiwan. In remarks, President Lai thanked the government of New Zealand for reiterating the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait on multiple occasions since last year. He also stated that this year, the Taiwan-New Zealand economic cooperation agreement (ANZTEC) is being implemented in its complete form. The president expressed hope that deeper collaboration in such fields as smart agriculture, food manufacturing, biomedicine, the digital economy, and clean energy, as well as exchanges among our indigenous peoples, will allow our economies and industries to continue evolving as they adapt to the challenges arising from global changes. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: I extend a warm welcome to all of our guests. New Zealand’s All-Party Parliamentary Group on Taiwan was established in 2023, marking a significant milestone in the deepening of Taiwan-New Zealand relations. I would like to thank Members of Parliament Stuart Smith and Tangi Utikere for leading this delegation, and thank all our guests for demonstrating support for Taiwan through action. We currently face a rapidly changing international landscape. Authoritarian regimes continue to converge and expand. Democracies must actively cooperate and jointly safeguard peace, stability, and the prosperous development of the Indo-Pacific region. Since last year, the government of New Zealand has on multiple occasions reiterated the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. On behalf of the people of Taiwan, I would like to express our sincere gratitude for these statements and demonstrations of support. This year, ANZTEC is being implemented in its complete form. We look forward to exploring even more diverse markets with New Zealand. Deeper collaboration in such fields as smart agriculture, food manufacturing, biomedicine, the digital economy, and clean energy, as well as exchanges among indigenous peoples, will allow our economies and industries to continue evolving as they adapt to the challenges arising from global changes. Taiwan and New Zealand share the universal values of democracy, freedom, and respect for human rights, and parliamentary diplomacy is a tradition practiced by democracies around the world. Looking ahead, our parliamentary exchanges and mutual visits are bound to become more frequent. This will enable us to explore even more opportunities for cooperation and further deepen and solidify the democratic partnership between Taiwan and New Zealand. Thank you once again for making the long journey to visit us. I wish you a fruitful and successful trip. I also hope that everyone can take time to see more of Taiwan, try our local cuisine, and learn more about our culture. I hope our guests will fall in love with Taiwan. MP Smith then delivered remarks, saying that it is a great pleasure and an honor to be received by President Lai. The MP, noting that President Lai already covered many of the points he planned to make, went on to say that New Zealand and Taiwan share many values. He indicated that both are trading nations that rely on easy access for imports and exports, and that is why freedom of navigation is so important. That is why New Zealand had a naval vessel sail through the Taiwan Strait, he said, to underline the importance of freedom of navigation and our mutual security. MP Smith said that they look forward to building stronger relationships and enhancing the trade between our two nations. He added that New Zealand has much to offer in the field of geothermal energy to assist Taiwan, and mentioned that New Zealand is third largest in terms of the number of rocket launchers for satellites, which could assist Taiwan with communications in the future. New Zealand has other products as well, he said, but looks for assistance from Taiwan’s technology and technological sector. Lastly, MP Smith stated that he looks forward to a long and prosperous relationship between Taiwan and New Zealand. MP Utikere then delivered remarks, indicating that like Taiwan, New Zealand is a nation that is surrounded by ocean, which means that they rely on strong partnerships with communities of interest all around the globe. He said that the all-party parliamentary friendship group that was established and that they are a part of goes a long way in ensuring that a secure relationship between our two parliaments can continue to prosper. The MP also thanked Taiwan’s Representative to New Zealand Joanne Ou (歐江安) and her team for their work, which has ensured the success of the delegation’s visit. He said that the delegation experienced meetings with ministers in Taiwan’s government, members of the legislature, and those from the non-government organization sector as well. He also said that they enjoyed the opportunity to visit Wulai, and that the strength of the connections between the indigenous peoples of Taiwan and the indigenous peoples of Aotearoa New Zealand is something that certainly landed with members of the delegation. MP Utikere noted that he will take up President Lai’s offer on experiencing more of Taiwan, and will spend a few extra days in Tainan, which he understands has a very special place in the president’s heart, adding that he looks forward to his time and experiences there. The MP concluded his remarks by saying that this will be a relationship that continues to go from strength to strength. After their remarks, the New Zealand delegation sang the Māori song “Tutira Mai Nga Iwi” to extend best wishes to Taiwan. Also in attendance at the meeting were New Zealand Members of Parliament Jamie Arbuckle, Greg Fleming, Hamish Campbell, Cameron Luxton, and Helen White.

Details
2025-04-15
President Lai meets delegation led by Tuvalu Deputy Prime Minister Panapasi Nelesone
On the afternoon of April 15, President Lai Ching-te met with a delegation led by Tuvalu Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance and Economic Development Panapasi Nelesone and his wife. In remarks, President Lai thanked Tuvalu for its staunch and long-term backing of Taiwan’s international participation. The president said he looks forward to our nations deepening bilateral ties in such areas as agriculture, medicine, education, and information and communications technology and working together toward greater peace, prosperity, and development in the Pacific region. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: I extend a very warm welcome to Deputy Prime Minister Nelesone and Madame Corinna Ituaso Laafai as they lead this delegation to Taiwan. Our distinguished guests are the first delegation from Tuvalu that I have received at the Presidential Office this year. During my visit to Tuvalu last year, I met and exchanged views with Deputy Prime Minister Nelesone and the ministers present. I am delighted to meet you again today and thank you once again for the hospitality you accorded my delegation. The culture of Tuvalu and the warmth of its people are not easily forgotten. Tuvalu’s support for Taiwan has also touched us deeply. I want to take this opportunity to thank Tuvalu for staunchly backing Taiwan’s international participation over the past several decades. Our two countries have supported each other like family and have together made contributions in the international arena. Last Tuesday, I received the credentials of Ambassador Lily Tangisia Faavae and expressed my hope for Taiwan and Tuvalu continuing to deepen bilateral relations. This visit by Deputy Prime Minister Nelesone is an important step in that regard. Our two countries will be signing a labor cooperation agreement and an agreement concerning the recognition of training and certification of seafarers. This will expand bilateral cooperation at multiple levels and bring our relations even closer. Taiwan and Tuvalu are maritime nations and share the values of democracy and freedom. Our two countries have stood shoulder to shoulder to protect marine resources and address the challenges posed by climate change and authoritarianism, and we aspire to work toward greater peace, prosperity, and development in the Pacific region. Our nations have produced fruitful results in such areas as agriculture, medicine, education, and information and communications technology. I anticipate that, with the support of Deputy Prime Minister Nelesone and our distinguished guests, we can continue to employ a more diverse range of strategies to begin a new chapter in our diplomatic partnership. Together, we can make even greater and more concrete contributions to regional development. Deputy Prime Minister Nelesone then delivered remarks, first thanking President Lai for his kind words of welcome and the warm hospitality extended to his delegation. On behalf of the government and people of Tuvalu, he conveyed their gratitude to the president and the people of Taiwan for the generous support, as well as for the enduring friendship we share. He said that Taiwan’s steadfast commitment to our bilateral relationship has been instrumental in advancing our shared values of democracy, resilience, and sustainable development. From vital development assistance to cooperation in health, education, and climate change resilience, he added, Taiwan’s contributions have made a significant impact on the lives of the people of Tuvalu. For Taiwan’s recent generous donation of shoes for Tuvaluan primary school students, Deputy Prime Minister Nelesone expressed thanks to President Lai. He commented that these gifts, which underscore a deep commitment to the welfare of their youth, transcend mere material support; they are symbols of care, friendship, and hope for the future generations. Noting that our bilateral relationship is built on mutual respect, shared values, and a common vision for sustainable development in the Pacific, he expressed confidence that this partnership will continue to flourish and will serve as a beacon of cooperation and solidarity within our region. The delegation also included Tuvalu Minister of Foreign Affairs, Labour, and Trade Paulson Panapa; Minister of Public Works, Infrastructure Development and Water Ampelosa Tehulu, and was accompanied to the Presidential Office by Tuvalu Ambassador Faavae.

Details
2025-04-10
President Lai pens Bloomberg News article on Taiwan’s response to US reciprocal tariffs
On April 10, an article penned by President Lai Ching-te entitled “Taiwan Has a Roadmap for Deeper US Trade Ties” was published by Bloomberg News, explaining to a global audience Taiwan’s strategy on trade with the United States, as well as how Taiwan will engage in dialogue with the aim of removing bilateral trade barriers, increasing investment between Taiwan and the US, and reducing tariffs to zero. The following is the full text of President Lai’s article: Last month, the first of Taiwan’s 66 new F-16Vs rolled off the assembly line in Greenville, South Carolina. Signed during President Donald Trump’s first term, the $8 billion deal stands as a testament to American ingenuity and leadership in advanced manufacturing. Beyond its economic impact – creating thousands of well-paying jobs across the US – it strengthens the foundations of peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific. This deal is emblematic of the close interests shared between Taiwan and the US. Our bond is forged by an unwavering belief in freedom and liberty. For decades, our two countries have stood shoulder-to-shoulder in deterring communist expansionism. Even as Beijing intensifies its air force and naval exercises in our vicinity, we remain resolute. Taiwan will always be a bastion of democracy and peace in the region. This partnership extends well beyond the security realm. Though home to just 23 million people, Taiwan has in recent years become a significant investor in America. TSMC recently announced it will raise its total investment in the US to $165 billion – an initiative that will create 40,000 construction jobs and tens of thousands more in advanced chip manufacturing and R&D. This investment will bolster the emergence of a new high-tech cluster in Arizona. Taiwan is committed to strengthening bilateral cooperation in manufacturing and innovation. As a trade-dependent economy, our long-term success is built on trade relationships that are fair, reciprocal and mutually beneficial. Encouraging Taiwanese businesses to expand their global footprint, particularly in the US, is a vital part of this strategy. Deepening commercial ties between Taiwanese and American firms is another. These core principles will guide our response to President Trump’s reciprocal tariffs. First, we will seek to restart trade negotiations with a common objective of reducing all tariffs between Taiwan and the US. While Taiwan already maintains low tariffs, with an average nominal rate of 6%, we are willing to further cut this rate to zero on the basis of reciprocity with the US. By removing the last vestiges to free and fair trade, we seek to encourage greater trade and investment flows between our two countries. Second, Taiwan will rapidly expand procurement of American goods. Over the past five years, rising demand for semiconductors and AI-related components has increased our trade surplus. In response to these market trends, Taiwan will seek to narrow the trade imbalance through the procurement of energy, agriculture and other industrial goods from the US. These efforts will create thousands of new jobs across multiple sectors. We’ll also pursue additional arms procurements that are vital to our self-defense and contribute to peace and stability over the Taiwan Strait. During President Trump’s first term, we secured $18 billion in arms deals, including advanced fighter jets, tanks and anti-ship missiles. Future purchases, which are not reflected in trade balances, build on our economic and security partnership while being essential to Taiwan’s “Peace Through Strength” approach. Third, new investments will be made across the US. Already, Taiwanese firms support 400,000 jobs throughout all 50 states. Beyond TSMC, we also see emerging opportunities in electronics, ICT, energy and petrochemicals. We will establish a cross-agency “US Investment Team” to support bilateral trade and investment – and we hope that efforts will be reciprocated by the Trump administration. Fourth, we are committed to removing non-tariff trade barriers. Taiwan will take concrete steps to resolve persistent issues that have long impeded trade negotiations. And finally, we will strongly address US concerns over export controls and improper transshipment of low-cost goods through Taiwan. These steps form the basis of a comprehensive roadmap for how Taiwan will navigate the shifting trade landscape, transforming challenges in the Taiwan-US economic relationship into new opportunities for growth, resilience and strategic alignment. At a time of growing global uncertainty, underpinned by growing Chinese assertiveness, closer trade ties are more than sound economics; they are a critical pillar of regional security. Our approach is long-term and principled, grounded in a lasting commitment to our friendship with the US, a firm belief in the benefits of fair and reciprocal trade, and an unwavering dedication to peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. We are confident that our shared economic and security interests will not only overcome turbulence in the international trade environment – they will define the future of a free and open Indo-Pacific.

Details
2025-04-08
President Lai receives credentials from new Tuvalu Ambassador Lily Tangisia Faavae
On the morning of April 8, President Lai Ching-te received the credentials of new Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Tuvalu to the Republic of China (Taiwan) Lily Tangisia Faavae. In remarks, President Lai welcomed the ambassador to her new post and thanked Tuvalu for its long-term support for Taiwan’s international participation. The president also noted that joint efforts between our two countries have produced fruitful results in such areas as medicine and public health, agricultural and fisheries technology, and information and communications technology. He expressed his hope that we will continue to deepen our bilateral relations so as to generate even greater well-being for our peoples and promote peace, stability, and prosperity in the Pacific region. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: It is a great pleasure today to receive the credentials of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Tuvalu Lily Tangisia Faavae. On behalf of the Republic of China (Taiwan), I extend my warmest welcome to you. Last year, the Republic of China (Taiwan) and Tuvalu celebrated 45 years of diplomatic relations. Prime Minister Feleti Teo visited Taiwan in May last year for the inauguration of myself and Vice President Bi-khim Hsiao and again in October for our National Day celebrations. When I visited Tuvalu last December, I was warmly received by the government and people of Tuvalu, and I deeply felt that our two countries were like family. Ambassador Faavae’s posting to Taiwan demonstrates the importance Prime Minister Teo places on our ties. Widely recognized for her exceptional talent, Ambassador Faavae is an outstanding official with extensive experience in public service. Moreover, during her term as Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, she voiced support for Taiwan at the World Health Assembly. I believe that with her assistance, our two nations will further advance cooperation and exchanges. I want to thank the government of Tuvalu for long supporting Taiwan’s international participation. Furthermore, joint efforts between our two countries have produced fruitful results in such areas as medicine and public health, agricultural and fisheries technology, and information and communications technology. Last year, Prime Minister Teo and I signed a joint communiqué on advancing the comprehensive partnership between Taiwan and Tuvalu. Going forward, we will stand together in tackling the challenges we face, including climate change and expanding authoritarianism. And we will continue to deepen our bilateral relations so as to generate even greater well-being for our peoples and promote peace, stability, and prosperity in the Pacific region. Once again, I warmly welcome Ambassador Faavae to her new post in Taiwan. Please convey warmest regards from Taiwan to Prime Minister Teo and all of our friends in Tuvalu. I wish you all the best in work and life during your term in Taiwan. Ambassador Faavae then delivered remarks, saying that it is a great honor and privilege to meet with President Lai today as the new Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Tuvalu to Taiwan, and to present to him her letter of credence. She then extended, on behalf of the government and people of Tuvalu, her warmest greetings and deep respect to the president and people of Taiwan. The letter of credence, she noted, signifies the trust and confidence that her government and governor-general have placed in her to represent their nation and to foster and strengthen the bonds of friendship and cooperation between our countries. Ambassador Faavae said that our two countries have enjoyed a longstanding relationship of 45 years based on mutual respect, cooperation, and shared values. She added that we have collaborated, and continue to do so, in such fields as education, health, climate change adaptation and sea level rise mitigation, agriculture, clean energy, and internet connectivity. Ambassador Faavae pointed out that Tuvalu remains committed to deepening ties with Taiwan and that it values people-to-people connections and our shared Austronesian heritage. She noted that the people of Tuvalu, a small developing nation, have greatly benefited from Taiwan’s advanced technical expertise and diverse financial assistance. She said she believes Tuvalu and Taiwan share a common interest and are united in our efforts and commitment to upholding democracy, peace, stability, and prosperity for our people and making the world better and safer. Ambassador Faavae stated that as ambassador of Tuvalu to Taiwan, she pledges to work diligently and respectfully to enhance our bilateral relations, promote mutual understanding, and facilitate collaboration in areas of shared concern. The ambassador said she looks forward to collaborating closely with the Taiwan government and other stakeholders to achieve our common objectives and to continue building a more prosperous and harmonious future for our nations. In closing, she thanked President Lai for the opportunity to serve and to further the enduring friendship between our two countries.

Details
2025-04-06
President Lai delivers remarks on US tariff policy response
On April 6, President Lai Ching-te delivered recorded remarks regarding the impact of the 32 percent tariff that the United States government recently imposed on imports from Taiwan in the name of reciprocity. In his remarks, President Lai explained that the government will adopt five response strategies, including making every effort to improve reciprocal tariff rates through negotiations, adopting a support plan for affected domestic industries, adopting medium- and long-term economic development plans, forming new “Taiwan plus the US” arrangements, and launching industry listening tours. The president emphasized that as we face this latest challenge, the government and civil society will work hand in hand, and expressed hope that all parties, both ruling and opposition, will support the measures that the Executive Yuan will take to open up a broader path for Taiwan’s economy. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: My fellow citizens, good evening. The US government recently announced higher tariffs on countries around the world in the name of reciprocity, including imposing a 32 percent tariff on imports from Taiwan. This is bound to have a major impact on our nation. Various countries have already responded, and some have even adopted retaliatory measures. Tremendous changes in the global economy are expected. Taiwan is an export-led economy, and in facing future challenges there will inevitably be difficulties, so we must proceed carefully to turn danger into safety. During this time, I want to express gratitude to all sectors of society for providing valuable opinions, which the government regards highly, and will use as a reference to make policy decisions. However, if we calmly and carefully analyze Taiwan’s trade with the US, we find that last year Taiwan’s exports to the US were valued at US$111.4 billion, accounting for 23.4 percent of total export value, with the other 75-plus percent of products sold worldwide to countries other than the US. Of products sold to the US, competitive ICT products and electronic components accounted for 65.4 percent. This shows that Taiwan’s economy does still have considerable resilience. As long as our response strategies are appropriate, and the public and private sectors join forces, we can reduce impacts. Please do not panic. To address the reciprocal tariffs by the US, Taiwan has no plans to adopt retaliatory tariffs. There will be no change in corporate investment commitments to the US, as long as they are consistent with national interests. But we must ensure the US clearly understands Taiwan’s contributions to US economic development. More importantly, we must actively seek to understand changes in the global economic situation, strengthen Taiwan-US industry cooperation, elevate the status of Taiwan industries in global supply chains, and with safeguarding the continued development of Taiwan’s economy as our goal, adopt the following five strategies to respond. Strategy one: Make every effort to improve reciprocal tariff rates through negotiations using the following five methods: 1. Taiwan has already formed a negotiation team led by Vice Premier Cheng Li-chiun (鄭麗君). The team includes members from the National Security Council, the Office of Trade Negotiations, and relevant Executive Yuan ministries and agencies, as well as academia and industry. Like the US-Mexico-Canada free trade agreement, negotiations on tariffs can start from Taiwan-US bilateral zero-tariff treatment. 2. To expand purchases from the US and thereby reduce the trade deficit, the Executive Yuan has already completed an inventory regarding large-scale procurement plans for agricultural, industrial, petroleum, and natural gas products, and the Ministry of National Defense has also proposed a military procurement list. All procurement plans will be actively pursued. 3. Expand investments in the US. Taiwan’s cumulative investment in the US already exceeds US$100 billion, creating approximately 400,000 jobs. In the future, in addition to increased investment in the US by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, other industries such as electronics, ICT, petrochemicals, and natural gas can all increase their US investments, deepening Taiwan-US industry cooperation. Taiwan’s government has helped form a “Taiwan investment in the US” team, and hopes that the US will reciprocate by forming a “US investment in Taiwan” team to bring about closer Taiwan-US trade cooperation, jointly creating a future economic golden age. 4. We must eliminate non-tariff barriers to trade. Non-tariff barriers are an indicator by which the US assesses whether a trading partner is trading fairly with the US. Therefore, we will proactively resolve longstanding non-tariff barriers so that negotiations can proceed more smoothly. 5. We must resolve two issues that have been matters of longstanding concern to the US. One regards high-tech export controls, and the other regards illegal transshipment of dumped goods, otherwise referred to as “origin washing.” Strategy two: We must adopt a plan for supporting our industries. For industries that will be affected by the tariffs, and especially traditional industries as well as micro-, small-, and medium-sized enterprises, we will provide timely and needed support and assistance. Premier Cho Jung-tai (卓榮泰) and his administrative team recently announced a package of 20 specific measures designed to address nine areas. Moving forward, the support we provide to different industries will depend on how they are affected by the tariffs, will take into account the particular features of each industry, and will help each industry innovate, upgrade, and transform. Strategy three: We must adopt medium- and long-term economic development plans. At this point in time, our government must simultaneously adopt new strategies for economic and industrial development. This is also the fundamental path to solutions for future economic challenges. The government will proactively cooperate with friends and allies, develop a diverse range of markets, and achieve closer integration of entities in the upper, middle, and lower reaches of industrial supply chains. This course of action will make Taiwan’s industrial ecosystem more complete, and will help Taiwanese industries upgrade and transform. We must also make good use of the competitive advantages we possess in such areas as semiconductor manufacturing, integrated chip design, ICT, and smart manufacturing to build Taiwan into an AI island, and promote relevant applications for food, clothing, housing, and transportation, as well as military, security and surveillance, next-generation communications, and the medical and health and wellness industries as we advance toward a smarter, more sustainable, and more prosperous new Taiwan. Strategy four: “Taiwan plus one,” i.e., new “Taiwan plus the US” arrangements: While staying firmly rooted in Taiwan, our enterprises are expanding their global presence and marketing worldwide. This has been our national economic development strategy, and the most important aspect is maintaining a solid base here in Taiwan. We absolutely must maintain a solid footing, and cannot allow the present strife to cause us to waver. Therefore, our government will incentivize investments, carry out deregulation, and continue to improve Taiwan’s investment climate by actively resolving problems involving access to water, electricity, land, human resources, and professional talent. This will enable corporations to stay in Taiwan and continue investing here. In addition, we must also help the overseas manufacturing facilities of offshore Taiwanese businesses to make necessary adjustments to support our “Taiwan plus one” policy, in that our national economic development strategy will be adjusted as follows: to stay firmly rooted in Taiwan while expanding our global presence, strengthening US ties, and marketing worldwide. We intend to make use of the new state of supply chains to strengthen cooperation between Taiwanese and US industries, and gain further access to US markets. Strategy five: Launch industry listening tours: All industrial firms, regardless of sector or size, will be affected to some degree once the US reciprocal tariffs go into effect. The administrative teams led by myself and Premier Cho will hear out industry concerns so that we can quickly resolve problems and make sure policies meet actual needs. My fellow citizens, over the past half-century and more, Taiwan has been through two energy crises, the Asian financial crisis, the global financial crisis, and pandemics. We have been able to not only withstand one test after another, but even turn crises into opportunities. The Taiwanese economy has emerged from these crises stronger and more resilient than ever. As we face this latest challenge, the government and civil society will work hand in hand, and I hope that all parties in the legislature, both ruling and opposition, will support the measures that the Executive Yuan will take to open up a broader path for Taiwan’s economy. Let us join together and give it our all. Thank you.

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

April 23, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: ‘Energy security’ is being used to justify more fossil fuels – but this will only make us less secure

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Freddie Daley, Research Associate, Centre for Global Political Economy, University of Sussex

corlaffra / shutterstock

The UK government is about to host a summit with the International Energy Agency (IEA) on the future of energy security. It does so as the world grapples with war, geopolitical realignments and trade barriers, against a backdrop of accelerating climate upheavals. One of the expected outcomes of this summit is a new, agreed definition of what constitutes energy security in the 21st century.

Common understandings of energy security have focused on making supplies reliable and affordable, with less attention paid to ensuring sources of energy are sustainable and less volatile over the medium- and long-term. This neglect compromises our collective security.

The IEA’s 31 member countries and 13 associates include most of the world’s most powerful states. Its influence means that this new definition of energy security will be used to inform government policies and investment decisions around the world. Given the cost of energy infrastructure, and the lengthy time it takes to build these projects, this definition is set to shape our future, economically and climatically.

But there is a very real risk that this definition will open the door to further investments into fossil fuel production under the guise of energy security.

International Energy Agency (IEA) member and ‘association member’ countries.
IEA, CC BY-SA

After Russia invaded Ukraine, governments rushed to cut their reliance on Russian fossil fuels. This caused major disruptions as prices spiked and millions were pushed into energy poverty.

Europe alone spent an extra €517–€831 billion (£444–£713 billion) on energy in 2021 and 2022, even though some imports from Russia continued through so-called “shadow fleets”. Some argued that high fossil fuel prices only embolden leaders like Putin and help fund their conflicts.

Governments responded with “energy nativism”, as they sought to secure as much energy as possible for their citizens at whatever cost. This typically meant boosting renewables and bulk buying oil and gas. In the UK’s case, it also meant the previous government issuing hundreds of new licenses to drill for oil and gas to “increase energy security” – licenses the current government says it will honour).

Shipments of liquified natural gas (LNG) were also redirected from poorer countries like Pakistan and Bangladesh towards the highest bidders in Europe and Asia. This raises the question of who exactly is becoming more energy secure and at what cost.

Meanwhile, large fossil fuel exporters like Qatar, the US and Australia ramped up production. A US official even referred to its gas exports as “molecules of freedom”. Australia has exported so much natural gas it may have to buy its own gas back from Japan at market price.

The sheer volume of investment in new oil and gas infrastructure like offshore rigs or LNG terminals, combined with long build times, has locked in higher fossil fuel production and pushed emissions to record levels. This poses significant risks for both exporters and importers, especially as future demand is uncertain and energy markets remain volatile.

Fossil fuels remain dominant

More fundamentally, continued reliance on fossil fuels is making humanity less secure. The vast majority of emissions still come from burning coal, oil or gas. Preventing climate catastrophe therefore requires us to phase out fossil fuels as fast as possible – with wealthy nations leading the charge. In their place, we’ll have to generate energy from renewable sources that do not replicate the volatility of globally traded fossil fuels.

Yet despite some progressive policies, fossil fuels remain dominant across the global economy. Investment in oil and gas today is almost double the level it must fall below if the world is to reach net zero by 2050, according to the IEA’s own modelling.

The pursuit of energy security has boosted renewables, but adding additional clean energy isn’t enough – it must ultimately displace fossil fuels entirely. This will require a whole-economy shift. That means cutting production of fossil fuels while also reducing demand, stabilising prices and building out clean energy fast enough to support the electrification of transport, industry and heating.

But supply chains for batteries, solar panels and other key technologies are vulnerable. Delays and shortages could mean electricity prices spike, sparking social unrest. This is yet another risk of getting energy security wrong: if inflationary pressures drive the immiseration of the general public, governments and their energy plans will be short lived.

The definition of energy security that comes out of the IEA summit should reflect the fact we’re now in a world of constant crises. True energy security means charting a path towards a world that is more socially, economically and environmentally secure. This means developing a well-managed global plan to phase out fossil fuels.

Peter Newell receives research funding from UKRI for work on energy transitions.

Freddie Daley does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. ‘Energy security’ is being used to justify more fossil fuels – but this will only make us less secure – https://theconversation.com/energy-security-is-being-used-to-justify-more-fossil-fuels-but-this-will-only-make-us-less-secure-254094

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

April 23, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Reeves: I will always act to defend British interests
Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

Press release

Reeves: I will always act to defend British interests

Chancellor Rachel Reeves travels to Washington DC for her first spring meetings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
The Chancellor has pledged to “stand up for Britain’s national interest”, as she heads to Washington DC for her first spring meetings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

During a three-day visit to the United States, Rachel Reeves is set to hold meetings with G7, G20 and IMF counterparts about the changing global economy. She will make the case for open trade that provides stability for businesses and security for working people. The Chancellor will underline the importance of tackling barriers to trade to kickstart economic growth, supporting businesses and putting more money in working people’s pockets.

Earlier this month the Chancellor announced over £400 million of trade and investment deals with the Indian Government across a range of business sectors, including defence, financial services, education, and development. In recent weeks the government has acted to save British Steel, safeguarding the future of steelmaking in the UK and protecting 2,700 jobs in Scunthorpe and up to 37,000 jobs in the wider supply chain, announced a £20 billion boost to UK Export Finance which will give thousands of British access to government-backed financing and announced new measures to give British car makers certainty and stability, and to support them on the transition to electric vehicles. Earlier this month over 3 million workers in shops, restaurants and workplaces across the UK received a pay boost worth £1,400 a year for an eligible full-time worker, while also rolling out free breakfast clubs in primary schools putting £450 a year in the pockets of working parents and protecting the payslips of working people from higher taxes.

She will hold discussions with finance ministers about the opportunities to strengthen economic ties with Britain, including members of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. Talks with European finance ministers will also focus on going further and faster to increase defence spending and improve cooperation in response to continued Russian aggression and the invasion of Ukraine.

Reeves will hold her first in person meeting with her US counterpart Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent about working together to deepen the UK-US economic partnership through a new trade agreement.

In Washington, the Chancellor will also meet with business leaders to talk about the government’s Plan for Change to kickstart economic growth. She will champion Britain as the best place to live, work and grow a business, highlighting the government’s ambition to go further and faster to tackle the barriers to investment. By backing the builders not the blockers, through reforms to the National Planning Policy Framework – which alone is expected to deliver an extra 170,000 homes by 2029/30, as well upcoming the Planning and Infrastructure Bill and a government pledge to cut the administrative cost of regulation on business by a quarter, making Britain the best place to do business and drive economic growth.

Speaking ahead of her visit, Chancellor of the Exchequer Rachel Reeves said:

The world has changed, and we are in a new era of global trade. I am in no doubt that the imposition of tariffs will have a profound impact on the global economy and the economy at home.

This changing world is unsettling for families who are worried about the cost of living and businesses concerned about what tariffs will means for them. But our task as a government is not to be knocked off course or to take rash action which risks undermining people’s security.

Instead, we must rise to meet the moment and I will always act to defend British interests as part of our Plan for Change. We need a world economy that provides stability and fairness for businesses wanting to invest and trade, more trade and global partnerships between nations with shared interests, and security for working people who want to get on with their lives.

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Published 23 April 2025
MIL OSI United Kingdom –
April 23, 2025
MIL-OSI New Zealand: Aid cuts threaten the lives of 110,000 children with severe malnutrition reliant on emergency treatment from Save the Children

Source: Save the Children

At least 110,000- severely acutely malnourished children supported by Save the Children in 10 countries could be left without access to life-saving ready-to-use emergency food and nutrition programmes as aid cuts hit supplies in coming months, according to a Save the Children analysis.

Globally, one in five deaths among children aged under 5 are attributed to severe acute malnutrition, making it one of the top threats to child survival. Community-based programmes combining medical treatment and therapeutic foods, including a fortified peanut paste, have a 90% success rate.

Ready-to-Use Therapeutic Food (RUTF) is an energy-dense, micronutrient paste typically made using peanuts, sugar, milk powder, oil, vitamins and minerals that is packaged in foil pouches with a long shelf life and no need of refrigeration. Over the past 30 years this emergency therapeutic food has saved the lives of millions of children facing acute malnutrition [1] [2].

At a time when global hunger is skyrocketing [3], the current global supply of RUTF is already not even meeting 40% of global needs, Save the Children said, leaving millions of children without access to this life-saving intervention.

In 2024 there were large-scale breaks in the supply of RUTF as rising malnutrition rates drove up demand and due to disruptions in global supply chains and insufficient funding. This situation is expected to worsen in 2025. An analysis by Save the Children of the 10 countries forecast to have the biggest gaps in supplies found 110,000 malnourished children could miss out on this vital treatment by the end of the year. RUTF supplies are expected to run out in many locations from next month due to a lack of funding.

Globally at least 18.2 million children were born into hunger in 2024, or about 35 children a minute, with children in conflict zones from Gaza to Ukraine, to Haiti, Sudan to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), struggling daily to get enough to eat. Famine has been declared in several parts of Sudan where people are resorting to eating grass to stay alive.

Hannah Stephenson, Head of Hunger and Nutrition at Save the Children, said:

“Right now, funding shortfalls mean essential nutrition packs are not reaching the children who desperately need them. We know we have the expertise and the track record to reach children around the world but what we urgently need now is the funding to ensure children can receive life-saving treatment. We are running out of time, and t his will cost children’s lives.

“We also need to see long-term commitments to tackle the root causes of hunger and malnutrition, or else we will continue to see the reversal of progress made for children.”

In Kenya, one of the countries where Save the Children treats acute malnutrition cases, 18-month-old Ereng has just recovered from malnutrition with treatment from Community Health Promoter Charles, who was trained in basic healthcare by Save the Children.

Lomanat and Daniel, Ereng’s parents, walked for several kilometres to reach Charles’ clinic. The family are pastoralists, but recent droughts have killed their livestock, and the family now has no sustainable income and no reliable food source.

They know how important treatment is for children like Ereng, who gained 2.4 kgs (5.3 pounds) in two months once she started receiving nutrition treatment using the fortified peanut paste which has about 500 calories in each portion. Lomanat said:

“Our child was in a very bad shape, and the doctor helped by giving her peanut paste. I am very happy, because she is cured.”

In Somalia, where Save the Children also treats child with acute malnutrition, 7-month-Mukhtar- arrived at a health centre in Puntland after contracting flu which led to breathing difficulties and malnutrition.

His mother Shamso, 40, who has eight other children, feared her son would not survive with the family struggling after drought killed all but six of their herd of 30 goats. But after receiving medical care and treatment for malnutrition with peanut paste, Mukhtar recovered and returned home.

“His condition was serious when I brought him in and I didn’t expect him to reach the town alive ,” said Shamso. “My biggest worry is the children, whether my own, those of the relatives or those of my neighbours. When drought comes, it follows that hunger will strike.”

Children are always the most vulnerable in food crises and, without enough to eat and the right nutritional balance, they are at high risk of becoming acutely malnourished.

Malnutrition can cause stunting, impede mental and physical development, and increase the risk of contracting deadly diseases.

About 1.12 billion children globally – or almost half of the world’s children – are unable to afford a balanced diet now, according to data from Save the Children released last month.

In 2025, Save the Children aims to treat 260,000 children for severe acute malnutrition at outpatient sites in 10 countries that are now experiencing therapeutic food shortages.

Save the Children is urgently trying to raise $7 million to provide 110,000 severely malnourished children with life-saving RUTF and the critical services needed to treat malnutrition 1 including skilled health workers, community follow-up, immunizations, safe spaces for treatment, safe water, hygiene and sanitation support.

In the United States, actress and Save the Children ambassador Jennifer Garner launched her #67Strong4Kids campaign on her birthday last week. For #67Strong4Kids she is running a mile a day for 67 consecutive days to raise awareness about Ready-to-Use Therapeutic Food (RUTF). The amount $67 covers a six-week course of RUTF that treats a child suffering from severe acute malnutrition and potentially saves their life.

NOTES:

-Methodology: Save the Children used the target reach figures for all outpatient severe acute malnutrition treatment in 10 countries facing the largest disruption to the RUTF supply and compared with the current funding gaps for RUTF in those countries. Given the continued uncertainty in supply funding these figures are preliminary and up to date as of 26 March 2025. The 10 countries facing the largest disruptions are Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Myanmar, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Yemen.

REFERENCES

[1] UNICEF https://www.unicef.org/nutrition/RUTF

[2] UN News https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/10/1155756

[3] WFP https://www.wfp.org/news/tens-millions-risk-extreme-hunger-and-starvation-unprecedented-funding-crisis-spirals

About Save the Children NZ:

Save the Children works in 120 countries across the world. The organisation responds to emergencies and works with children and their communities to ensure they survive, learn and are protected.

Save the Children NZ currently supports international programmes in Fiji, Cambodia, Bangladesh, Laos, Nepal, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea. Areas of work include child protection, education and literacy, disaster risk reduction and climate adaptation, and alleviating child poverty.

MIL OSI New Zealand News –

April 23, 2025
MIL-Evening Report: Who will the next pope be? Here are some top contenders

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Darius von Guttner Sporzynski, Historian, Australian Catholic University

The death of Pope Francis this week marks the end of a historic papacy and the beginning of a significant transition for the Catholic Church. As the faithful around the world mourn his passing, attention now turns to the next phase: the election of a new pope.

This election will take place through a process known as the conclave. Typically held two to three weeks after a pope’s funeral, the conclave gathers the College of Cardinals in the Vatican’s Sistine Chapel. Here, through prayer, reflection and secret ballots, they must reach a two-thirds majority to choose the next Bishop of Rome.

While, in theory, any baptised Catholic man can be elected, for the past seven centuries the role has gone to a cardinal. That said, the outcome can still be unpredictable – sometimes even surprising the electors themselves.

Read more:
How will a new pope be chosen? An expert explains the conclave

An unlikely candidate

Cardinal Jorge Mario Bergoglio – who became Pope Francis – wasn’t among the front-runners in 2013. Nonetheless, after five rounds of voting, he emerged as the top candidate. Something similar could happen again.

This conclave will take place during a time of tension and change within the church. Francis sought to decentralise Vatican authority, emphasised caring for the poor and the planet, and tried to open dialogue on sensitive issues such as LGBTQIA+ inclusion and clerical abuse. The cardinals must now decide whether to continue in this direction, or steer towards a more traditional course.

There is historical precedent to consider. For centuries, Italians dominated the papacy. Of the 266 popes, 217 have been Italian.

However, this pattern has shifted in recent decades: Francis was from Argentina, John Paul II (1978–2005) from Poland, and Benedict XVI (2005–2013) from Germany.

The top papabili

As with any election, observers are speaking of their “favourites”. The term papabile, which in Italian means “pope-able”, or “capable of becoming pope”, is used to describe cardinals who are seen as serious contenders.

Among the leading papabili is Cardinal Pietro Parolin, aged 70, the current Secretary of State of Vatican City. Parolin has long been one of Francis’ closest collaborators and has led efforts to open dialogue with difficult regimes, including the Chinese Communist Party.

Parolin is seen as a centrist figure who could appeal to both reform-minded and more conservative cardinals. Yet some observers argue he lacks the charismatic and pastoral presence that helped define Francis’ papacy.

Another name to watch is Cardinal Pierbattista Pizzaballa, the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem. At 60, he is younger than many of his colleagues, but brings extensive experience in interfaith dialogue in the Middle East. His fluency in Hebrew and his long service in the Holy Land could prove appealing.

Then again, his relative youth may cause hesitation among those concerned about electing a pope who could serve for decades. As the papacy of John Paul II demonstrated, such long reigns can have a profound impact on the church.

Cardinal Luis Antonio Tagle of the Philippines is also frequently mentioned. Now 67, Tagle is known for his deep commitment to social justice and the poor. He has spoken out against human rights abuses in his home country and has often echoed Francis’ pastoral tone. But some cardinals may worry that his outspoken political views could complicate the church’s diplomatic efforts.

Cardinal Peter Turkson of Ghana, now 76, was a prominent figure during the last conclave. A strong voice on environmental and economic justice, he has served under both Benedict XVI and Francis.

Turkson has largely upheld the church’s traditional teachings on matters such as male-only priesthood, marriage between a man and a woman, and sexuality. He is also a strong advocate for transparency, and has spoken out against corruption and in defence of human rights.

Though less widely known among the public, Cardinal Mykola Bychok of Melbourne may also be considered. His election would be as surprising (and perhaps as symbolically powerful) as that of John Paul II in 1978. A Ukrainian-Australian pope, chosen during the ongoing war in Ukraine, would send a strong message about the church’s concern for suffering peoples and global peace.

Other names that may come up are Cardinal Fridolin Ambongo Besungu from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Cardinal Jaime Spengler of Brazil – both of whom lead large and growing Catholic communities. Although news reports don’t always list them among the top contenders, their influence within their regions – and the need to recognise the church’s global demographic shifts – means their voices will matter.

On the more conservative side is American Cardinal Raymond Burke, who had been one of Francis’ most vocal critics. But his confrontational stance makes him an unlikely candidate.

More plausible would be Cardinal Péter Erdő of Hungary, aged 71. Erdő is a respected canon lawyer with a more traditional theological orientation. He was mentioned in 2013 and may reemerge as a promising candidate among conservative cardinals.

Cardinal Péter Erdő was ordained as a priest in 1975 and has a doctorate in theology. He will be a top pick among conservatives.
Wikimedia, CC BY-SA

One tough act to follow

Although Francis appointed many of the cardinals who will vote in the conclave, that doesn’t mean all of them supported his agenda. Many come from communities with traditional values, and may be drawn to a candidate who emphasises older church teachings.

The conclave will also reflect broader questions of geography. The church’s growth has shifted away from Europe, to Asia, Africa and Latin America. A pope from one of these regions could symbolise this change, and speak more directly to the challenges faced by Catholic communities in the Global South.

Ultimately, predicting a conclave is impossible. Dynamics often change once the cardinals enter the Sistine Chapel and begin voting. Alliances shift, new names emerge, and consensus may form around someone who was barely discussed beforehand.

What is certain is that the next pope will shape the church’s future: doctrinally, diplomatically and pastorally. Whether he chooses to build on Francis’ legacy of reform, or move in a new direction, he will need to balance ancient traditions with the urgent realities of the modern world.

Darius von Guttner Sporzynski does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Who will the next pope be? Here are some top contenders – https://theconversation.com/who-will-the-next-pope-be-here-are-some-top-contenders-255006

MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

April 23, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: Who will the next pope be? Here are some top contenders

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Darius von Guttner Sporzynski, Historian, Australian Catholic University

The death of Pope Francis this week marks the end of a historic papacy and the beginning of a significant transition for the Catholic Church. As the faithful around the world mourn his passing, attention now turns to the next phase: the election of a new pope.

This election will take place through a process known as the conclave. Typically held two to three weeks after a pope’s funeral, the conclave gathers the College of Cardinals in the Vatican’s Sistine Chapel. Here, through prayer, reflection and secret ballots, they must reach a two-thirds majority to choose the next Bishop of Rome.

While, in theory, any baptised Catholic man can be elected, for the past seven centuries the role has gone to a cardinal. That said, the outcome can still be unpredictable – sometimes even surprising the electors themselves.

Read more:
How will a new pope be chosen? An expert explains the conclave

An unlikely candidate

Cardinal Jorge Mario Bergoglio – who became Pope Francis – wasn’t among the front-runners in 2013. Nonetheless, after five rounds of voting, he emerged as the top candidate. Something similar could happen again.

This conclave will take place during a time of tension and change within the church. Francis sought to decentralise Vatican authority, emphasised caring for the poor and the planet, and tried to open dialogue on sensitive issues such as LGBTQIA+ inclusion and clerical abuse. The cardinals must now decide whether to continue in this direction, or steer towards a more traditional course.

There is historical precedent to consider. For centuries, Italians dominated the papacy. Of the 266 popes, 217 have been Italian.

However, this pattern has shifted in recent decades: Francis was from Argentina, John Paul II (1978–2005) from Poland, and Benedict XVI (2005–2013) from Germany.

The top papabili

As with any election, observers are speaking of their “favourites”. The term papabile, which in Italian means “pope-able”, or “capable of becoming pope”, is used to describe cardinals who are seen as serious contenders.

Among the leading papabili is Cardinal Pietro Parolin, aged 70, the current Secretary of State of Vatican City. Parolin has long been one of Francis’ closest collaborators and has led efforts to open dialogue with difficult regimes, including the Chinese Communist Party.

Parolin is seen as a centrist figure who could appeal to both reform-minded and more conservative cardinals. Yet some observers argue he lacks the charismatic and pastoral presence that helped define Francis’ papacy.

Another name to watch is Cardinal Pierbattista Pizzaballa, the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem. At 60, he is younger than many of his colleagues, but brings extensive experience in interfaith dialogue in the Middle East. His fluency in Hebrew and his long service in the Holy Land could prove appealing.

Then again, his relative youth may cause hesitation among those concerned about electing a pope who could serve for decades. As the papacy of John Paul II demonstrated, such long reigns can have a profound impact on the church.

Cardinal Luis Antonio Tagle of the Philippines is also frequently mentioned. Now 67, Tagle is known for his deep commitment to social justice and the poor. He has spoken out against human rights abuses in his home country and has often echoed Francis’ pastoral tone. But some cardinals may worry that his outspoken political views could complicate the church’s diplomatic efforts.

Cardinal Peter Turkson of Ghana, now 76, was a prominent figure during the last conclave. A strong voice on environmental and economic justice, he has served under both Benedict XVI and Francis.

Turkson has largely upheld the church’s traditional teachings on matters such as male-only priesthood, marriage between a man and a woman, and sexuality. He is also a strong advocate for transparency, and has spoken out against corruption and in defence of human rights.

Though less widely known among the public, Cardinal Mykola Bychok of Melbourne may also be considered. His election would be as surprising (and perhaps as symbolically powerful) as that of John Paul II in 1978. A Ukrainian-Australian pope, chosen during the ongoing war in Ukraine, would send a strong message about the church’s concern for suffering peoples and global peace.

Other names that may come up are Cardinal Fridolin Ambongo Besungu from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Cardinal Jaime Spengler of Brazil – both of whom lead large and growing Catholic communities. Although news reports don’t always list them among the top contenders, their influence within their regions – and the need to recognise the church’s global demographic shifts – means their voices will matter.

On the more conservative side is American Cardinal Raymond Burke, who had been one of Francis’ most vocal critics. But his confrontational stance makes him an unlikely candidate.

More plausible would be Cardinal Péter Erdő of Hungary, aged 71. Erdő is a respected canon lawyer with a more traditional theological orientation. He was mentioned in 2013 and may reemerge as a promising candidate among conservative cardinals.

Cardinal Péter Erdő was ordained as a priest in 1975 and has a doctorate in theology. He will be a top pick among conservatives.
Wikimedia, CC BY-SA

One tough act to follow

Although Francis appointed many of the cardinals who will vote in the conclave, that doesn’t mean all of them supported his agenda. Many come from communities with traditional values, and may be drawn to a candidate who emphasises older church teachings.

The conclave will also reflect broader questions of geography. The church’s growth has shifted away from Europe, to Asia, Africa and Latin America. A pope from one of these regions could symbolise this change, and speak more directly to the challenges faced by Catholic communities in the Global South.

Ultimately, predicting a conclave is impossible. Dynamics often change once the cardinals enter the Sistine Chapel and begin voting. Alliances shift, new names emerge, and consensus may form around someone who was barely discussed beforehand.

What is certain is that the next pope will shape the church’s future: doctrinally, diplomatically and pastorally. Whether he chooses to build on Francis’ legacy of reform, or move in a new direction, he will need to balance ancient traditions with the urgent realities of the modern world.

Darius von Guttner Sporzynski does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Who will the next pope be? Here are some top contenders – https://theconversation.com/who-will-the-next-pope-be-here-are-some-top-contenders-255006

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

April 23, 2025
MIL-Evening Report: Only a third of Australians support increasing defence spending: new research

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Richard Dunley, Senior Lecturer in History and Maritime Strategy, UNSW Sydney

National security issues have been a constant feature of this federal election campaign.

Both major parties have spruiked their national security credentials by promising additional defence spending. The Coalition has pledged to spend 3% of Australia’s GDP on defence within a decade, while Labor is accelerating its own spending increase of $50 billion over the next decade.

Even the Greens have got in on the act, pledging to “decouple” Australia from the US military.

Against this backdrop, of course, is the omnipresent figure of US President Donald Trump, with questions about the reliability of the US as an ally and the impact his policy decisions will have on Australian security. The possible deployment of Russian aircraft to Indonesia and the Chinese warships sailing around Australia have made these issues even more salient.

But what do Australians actually know about defence issues, and what are they comfortable spending on it?

According to our major new survey of 1,500 Australian adults, only a third of respondents thought the defence budget should be increased.

The survey was conducted from late February to early March as part of our work at the War Studies Research Group to measure public attitudes towards the Australian Defence Force (ADF).

Australians know little about the ADF’s role

More than two-thirds of our respondents said they had a positive opinion of the ADF, and only 8% held a negative opinion. There were significant differences by political affiliation, with 76% of those expecting to vote for the Liberal Party having positive views compared to 72% of Labor supporters. By contrast, only 53% of Greens supporters felt the same way.

However, when asked how much they actually knew about the ADF and its activities, only a quarter of respondents felt well-informed.

One reason for this is that only 22% of respondents served in the ADF themselves, or had an immediate family member who had. Similarly, only 35% of respondents knew a veteran.

But even public knowledge on issues that have received considerable media attention was limited.

Remarkably, only 56% of respondents were aware of the allegations that Australian Special Forces soldiers committed war crimes in Afghanistan. Less than half had heard of the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide.

Support for increasing defence spending is mixed

Successive governments have emphasised the rapidly deteriorating strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific region. This has led to much debate over whether Australia should increase its defence spending – and by how much.

In this election, both sides have committed more resources to upgrade and expand Australia’s military capabilities.

However, despite efforts to turn defence spending into a major issue at this election (especially on the right of politics), it is far from clear this has cut through with the wider population.

Our survey reveals public support for a larger ADF is split. Just over half of respondents thought the ADF was appropriately sized, while 41% considered it too small and 7% thought it too large.

Notably, when asked whether they thought more money should be spent on defence, the support for growth shrinks further.

Liberal supporters were the most likely to favour increasing the defence budget. But only 44% of them did, suggesting a majority felt that current spending on the ADF was either appropriate or too large.

Only 28% of Labor voters supported an increase in the defence budget. And among Greens voters, those supporting cuts to the defence budget outnumbered those in favour of expansion.

Read more:
Should Australia increase its defence spending? We asked 5 experts

Most still support the US, despite Trump

Ever since the US presidential election in November, many Australians have also questioned the US alliance and the AUKUS agreement, specifically. Recent actions by Trump – most notably his public statements on the Ukraine war – have only reinforced these doubts.

Given the tone of the public debate, we expected to see lower levels of support in our survey for the US alliance as the bedrock of Australian security.

However, respondents strongly favoured (75%) the ADF continuing to prioritise working closely with allies and partners, especially the US. Only 2% opposed it. Notably, there was very little variation based on political allegiance.

However, the idea of deploying the ADF to support our allies and partners overseas, including in the event of a conflict, saw greater division among respondents.

Two-thirds favoured deploying troops to support our allies overall. Liberal voters largely supported this proposition (75%), while 64% of Labor supporters backed it. Only about half of Greens voters felt the same way.

Respondents were also asked whether Australia should focus primarily on the defence of our territory rather than supporting our allies and partners in maintaining wider regional security. Just under half (46%) of respondents agreed with this idea, while 38% expressed neutral opinions and only 17% opposed it.

Overall, the results of this survey suggest that while the Australian public generally holds the ADF in high regard, they don’t know very much about it, nor do they consider additional funding for defence and security to be a real priority.

Successive governments, intelligence agencies and military analysts have long warned of the growing threats to Australia’s national security. Our survey suggests, however, that this messaging is either not cutting through – or that other concerns, such as housing or cost-of-living pressures, are taking priority.

Either way, it does not look like this issue will be decisive in the coming election.

This piece is part of a series on the future of defence in Australia. Read the other stories here.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Only a third of Australians support increasing defence spending: new research – https://theconversation.com/only-a-third-of-australians-support-increasing-defence-spending-new-research-253943

MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

April 23, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Durbin Statement On Secretary of State Rubio Announcing “Sweeping Reorganization” At The State Department

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Illinois Dick Durbin

April 22, 2025

CHICAGO – U.S. Senate Democratic Whip Dick Durbin (D-IL) released the following statement after Secretary of State Marco Rubio unveiled a plan to significantly reorganize the State Department, including targeting human rights programs and others focused on war crimes and democracy:

“The chaos and cruelty of this Administration knows no bounds. After dismantling USAID, the Trump Administration is now going after the State Department—a critical department that executes our foreign policy goals, maintains our alliances around the world, and promotes the long-term security of the United States.

“As more information becomes available, I will be monitoring these ‘reforms’ closely. I am particularly concerned over reports that the Trump Administration plans to target human rights programs and the monitoring of war crimes and democracy abroad. Secretary Rubio and I worked closely on many of these priorities during his time in the Senate and I know he understand the importance of American leadership on these issues.

“With instability continuing in challenging corners of the globe, now, more than ever, we need America’s top diplomats engaged—not ceding our leadership to China and Russia.”

In Congress and as Co-Chair of the Senate Ukraine Caucus, Durbin has continuously called out Russia for committing war crimes in Ukraine. Durbin and Senator Chuck Grassley’s (R-IA) bipartisan Justice for Victims of War Crimes Act – which updates the current war crimes statute to enable prosecution of war criminals in the United States regardless of the nationality of the perpetrator or victim – was signed into law by President Biden.

-30-

MIL OSI USA News –

April 23, 2025
MIL-OSI Canada: Minister of Finance to co-chair G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors meeting in Washington, D.C.

Source: Government of Canada News (2)

April 22, 2025 – Ottawa, Ontario – Department of Finance Canada

As part of Canada’s G7 presidency, the Minister of Finance, the Honourable François-Philippe Champagne, will be in Washington, D.C. this week, to co-chair, with Bank of Canada Governor Tiff Macklem, a meeting of the G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors. This will be taking place on the margins of the 2025 Spring Meetings of the World Bank Group and International Monetary Fund.

The meeting is an opportunity to discuss the global economic outlook and Ukraine.

Minister Champagne will also attend other meetings, including the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors meeting, and will take this opportunity to meet with his international counterparts.

MIL OSI Canada News –

April 23, 2025

MIL-OSI: First Busey Corporation Announces 2025 First Quarter Results

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

LEAWOOD, Kan., April 22, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — First Busey Corporation (Nasdaq: BUSE) reports first quarter results.

Busey completed the transformative acquisition of CrossFirst Bankshares, Inc. on March 1, 2025, significantly impacting first quarter results and resetting the baseline for financial performance for future quarters in a multitude of positive ways.

Net Income (Loss)	Diluted EPS	Net Interest Margin¹	ROAA¹	ROATCE¹
$(30.0) million	$(0.44)	3.16%	(0.82)%	(7.99)%
$39.9 million (adj)²	$0.57 (adj)²	3.08% (adj)²	1.09% (adj)²	10.64% (adj)²

MESSAGE FROM OUR CHAIRMAN & CEO

The transformative partnership between Busey and CrossFirst takes our organization to new heights, combining our growing commercial bank with the power of Busey’s core deposit franchise, wealth management platform, and payment technology solutions at FirsTech, Inc. As we build upon Busey’s forward momentum, we are grateful for the opportunities to consistently earn the business of our customers, based on the contributions of our talented associates and the continued support of our loyal shareholders.

Van A. Dukeman
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer

PARTNERSHIP WITH CROSSFIRST

Effective March 1, 2025, First Busey Corporation (“Busey,” “Company,” “we,” “us,” or “our”), the holding company for Busey Bank, completed its previously announced acquisition (the “Merger”) of CrossFirst Bankshares, Inc. (“CrossFirst”) (NASDAQ: CFB), the holding company for CrossFirst Bank, pursuant to an Agreement and Plan of Merger, dated August 26, 2024, by and between Busey and CrossFirst (the “Merger Agreement”). This partnership creates a premier commercial bank in the Midwest, Southwest, and Florida, with 78 full-service locations across 10 states—Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Missouri, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas. The combined holding company will continue to operate under the First Busey Corporation name. Busey common stock will continue to trade on the Nasdaq under the “BUSE” stock ticker symbol.

Upon completion of the acquisition, each share of CrossFirst common stock converted to the right to receive 0.6675 of a share of Busey’s common stock, with the result that holders of Busey’s common stock owned approximately 63.5% of the combined company and holders of CrossFirst’s common stock owned approximately 36.5% of the combined company, on a fully-diluted basis. Further, upon completion of the acquisition, each share of CrossFirst preferred stock converted to the right to receive one share of Busey preferred stock.

CrossFirst Bank’s results of operations were included in Busey’s consolidated results of operations beginning March 1, 2025. Busey will operate CrossFirst Bank as a separate banking subsidiary until it is merged with and into Busey Bank, which is expected to occur on June 20, 2025. At the time of the bank merger, CrossFirst Bank locations will become banking centers of Busey Bank.

The acquisition was accretive to tangible book value, exceeding initial projections of a six-month earn back period.

Further details are included with Busey’s Current Report on Form 8‑K announcing completion of the acquisition, which was filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) on March 3, 2025.

FINANCIAL RESULTS

CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF INCOME *(unaudited)*

	Three Months Ended
(dollars in thousands, except per share amounts)	March 31, 2025			December 31, 2024			March 31, 2024
Net interest income	$	103,731		$	81,578		$	75,854
Provision for credit losses		42,452			1,273			5,038
Total noninterest income		21,223			35,221			34,913
Total noninterest expense		115,171			78,167			70,769
Income (loss) before income taxes		(32,669	)		37,359			34,960
Income taxes		(2,679	)		9,254			8,735
Net income (loss)	$	(29,990	)	$	28,105		$	26,225

Basic earnings (loss) per common share	$	(0.44	)	$	0.49		$	0.47
Diluted earnings (loss) per common share	$	(0.44	)	$	0.49		$	0.46
Effective income tax rate		8.20	%		24.77	%		24.99	%

Busey’s results of operations for the first quarter of 2025 was a net loss of $(30.0) million, or $(0.44) per diluted common share, compared to net income of $28.1 million, or $0.49 per diluted common share, for the fourth quarter of 2024, and $26.2 million, or $0.46 per diluted common share, for the first quarter of 2024. Annualized return on average assets and annualized return on average tangible common equity² were (0.82)% and (7.99)%, respectively, for the first quarter of 2025.

Busey views certain non-operating items, including acquisition-related expenses, restructuring charges, and one-time strategic events, as adjustments to net income reported under U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”). We also adjust for net securities gains and losses to align with industry and research analyst reporting. The objective of our presentation of adjusted earnings and adjusted earnings metrics is to allow investors and analysts to more clearly identify quarterly trends in core earnings performance. Non-operating pre-tax adjustments for acquisition and restructuring expenses² in the first quarter of 2025 were $26.0 million. Further, $3.1 million other noninterest expense was recorded to establish an initial allowance for Unfunded Commitments² and $42.4 million provision expense was recorded to establish an initial Allowance for Credit Losses for loans purchased without credit deterioration (“non-PCD” loans) immediately following the close of the acquisition in accordance with Accounting Standards Codification 326-20-30-15. Additionally, net securities losses were $15.8 million, primarily related to the execution of a strategic balance sheet repositioning. Lastly, $4.6 million in one-time deferred tax valuation expense² was recorded in connection with the CrossFirst acquisition, which is expected to lower our effective blended state tax rate in future periods but created a negative adjustment to the carrying value of our deferred tax asset in the current period. For more information and a reconciliation of these non-GAAP measures (which are identified with the endnote labeled as 2) in tabular form, see “Non-GAAP Financial Information.”

Adjusted net income², which excludes the impact of non-GAAP adjustments, was $39.9 million, or $0.57 per diluted common share, for the first quarter of 2025, compared to $30.9 million, or $0.53 per diluted common share, for the fourth quarter of 2024 and $25.7 million or $0.46 per diluted common share for the first quarter of 2024. Annualized adjusted return on average assets² and annualized adjusted return on average tangible common equity² were 1.09% and 10.64%, respectively, for the first quarter of 2025.

Pre-Provision Net Revenue²

Pre-provision net revenue² was $25.6 million for the first quarter of 2025, compared to $38.8 million for the fourth quarter of 2024 and $46.4 million for the first quarter of 2024. Pre-provision net revenue to average assets² was 0.70% for the first quarter of 2025, compared to 1.28% for the fourth quarter of 2024, and 1.55% for the first quarter of 2024.

Adjusted pre-provision net revenue² was $54.7 million for the first quarter of 2025, compared to $42.0 million for the fourth quarter of 2024 and $38.6 million for the first quarter of 2024. Adjusted pre-provision net revenue to average assets² was 1.50% for the first quarter of 2025, compared to 1.38% for the fourth quarter of 2024 and 1.29% for the first quarter of 2024.

Net Interest Income and Net Interest Margin²

Net interest income was $103.7 million in the first quarter of 2025, compared to $81.6 million in the fourth quarter of 2024 and $75.9 million in the first quarter of 2024.

Net interest margin² was 3.16% for the first quarter of 2025, compared to 2.95% for the fourth quarter of 2024 and 2.79% for the first quarter of 2024. Excluding purchase accounting accretion, adjusted net interest margin² was 3.08% for the first quarter of 2025, compared to 2.92% in the fourth quarter of 2024 and 2.78% in the first quarter of 2024.

Components of the 21 basis point increase in net interest margin² during the first quarter of 2025, which includes approximately +12 basis points contributed by CrossFirst Bank, are as follows:

Increased loan portfolio and held for sale loan yields contributed +36 basis points
Increased purchase accounting accretion contributed +5 basis points
Decreased borrowing expense contributed +3 basis points
Decreased expense on rate swaps contributed +2 basis points
Increased non-maturity deposit funding costs contributed -17 basis points
Decreased cash and securities portfolio yield contributed -8 basis points

Based on our most recent Asset Liability Management Committee (“ALCO”) model, a +100 basis point parallel rate shock is expected to increase net interest income by 1.8% over the subsequent twelve-month period. Busey continues to evaluate and execute off-balance sheet hedging and balance sheet repositioning strategies as well as embedding rate protection in our asset originations to provide stabilization to net interest income in lower rate environments. Time deposit and savings specials have provided funding flows, and we had excess earning cash during the first quarter of 2025. A portion of the acquired CrossFirst Bank securities portfolio was liquidated when the acquisition was finalized, providing additional excess cash that will allow us to unwind non-core funding. As brokered CDs mature, Busey will continue to deploy excess cash to reduce wholesale funding levels during subsequent quarters. Total deposit cost of funds increased from 1.75% during the fourth quarter of 2024 to 1.91% during the first quarter of 2025. Deposit betas increased with the higher mix of acquired indexed and wholesale deposits and a full quarter of the consolidated Company’s funding base is projected to increase total deposit cost of funds during the second quarter of 2025. With the expectation of Busey paying down non-core funding, the deposit beta will lessen during the year and is expected to normalize in the 45% to 50% beta range. Growth in higher yielding earning assets is expected to offset the increased cost of funds pressure and we project further net interest margin expansion during the second quarter of 2025.

Noninterest Income

	Three Months Ended
(dollars in thousands)	March 31, 2025			December 31, 2024			March 31, 2024
NONINTEREST INCOME
Wealth management fees	$	17,364		$	16,786		$	15,549
Fees for customer services		8,128			7,911			7,056
Payment technology solutions		5,073			5,094			5,709
Mortgage revenue		329			496			746
Income on bank owned life insurance		1,446			1,080			1,419
Realized net gains (losses) on the sale of mortgage servicing rights		—			—			7,465
Net securities gains (losses)		(15,768	)		(196	)		(6,375	)
Other noninterest income		4,651			4,050			3,344
Total noninterest income	$	21,223		$	35,221		$	34,913

Total noninterest income decreased by 39.7% compared to the fourth quarter of 2024 and decreased by 39.2% compared to the first quarter of 2024, primarily due to net securities losses that were recorded in connection with a strategic balance sheet repositioning.

Excluding the impact of net securities gains and losses and the gains on the sale of mortgage servicing rights, adjusted noninterest income² increased by 4.4% to $37.0 million, or 26.3% of operating revenue², during the first quarter of 2025, compared to $35.4 million, or 30.3% of operating revenue², for the fourth quarter of 2024. Compared to the first quarter of 2024, adjusted noninterest income² increased by 9.4% from $33.8 million, or 30.8% of operating revenue².

Our fee-based businesses continue to add revenue diversification. Wealth management fees, wealth management referral fees included in other noninterest income, and payment technology solutions contributed 61.1% of adjusted noninterest income² for the first quarter of 2025.

Noteworthy components of noninterest income are as follows:

Wealth management fees increased by 3.4% compared to the fourth quarter of 2024. Compared to the first quarter of 2024 wealth management fees increased by 11.7%. Busey’s Wealth Management division ended the first quarter of 2025 with $13.68 billion in assets under care, compared to $13.83 billion at the end of the fourth quarter of 2024 and $12.76 billion at the end of the first quarter of 2024. Our portfolio management team continues to focus on long-term returns and managing risk in the face of volatile markets and has outperformed its blended benchmark³ over the last three and five years. The Wealth Management segment reported another quarter of record high revenue for the first quarter of 2025.
Payment technology solutions revenue decreased slightly compared the fourth quarter of 2024. Compared to the first quarter of 2024, payment technology solutions revenue decreased by 11.1% primarily due to decreases in income from electronic, online, and interactive voice response payments, partially offset by increases in lockbox and merchant services income.
Fees for customer services increased by 2.7% compared to the fourth quarter of 2024 primarily due to increases in income from analysis charges and interchange fees, offset by lower non-sufficient funds charges. Compared to the first quarter of 2024, fees for customer services increased by 15.2% primarily due to increases in analysis charges, automated teller machine fees, and interchange fees, offset by lower non-sufficient funds charges. Increases in fees for customer services are primarily attributable to the inclusion of one month of CrossFirst’s income in our first quarter results.
Other noninterest income increased by 14.8% compared to the fourth quarter of 2024 and by 39.1% compared to the first quarter of 2024. The increase for both periods was driven by increases in swap origination fee income, commercial loan sales gains, letter of credit fee income, and other real estate owned income, offset by decreases in venture capital income.

Operating Efficiency

	Three Months Ended
(dollars in thousands)	March 31, 2025		December 31, 2024		March 31, 2024
NONINTEREST EXPENSE
Salaries, wages, and employee benefits	$	67,563	$	45,458	$	42,090
Data processing expense		9,575		6,564		6,550
Net occupancy expense of premises		5,799		4,794		4,720
Furniture and equipment expense		1,744		1,650		1,813
Professional fees		9,511		4,938		2,253
Amortization of intangible assets		3,083		2,471		2,409
Interchange expense		1,343		1,305		1,611
FDIC insurance		2,167		1,330		1,400
Other noninterest expense		14,386		9,657		7,923
Total noninterest expense	$	115,171	$	78,167	$	70,769

Total noninterest expense increased by 47.3% compared to the fourth quarter of 2024 and increased by 62.7% compared to the first quarter of 2024. Growth in noninterest expense was primarily attributable to one-time acquisition expenses related to the CrossFirst acquisition as well as added costs for operating expenses for two banks during one month of the quarter. Annual pre-tax expense synergy estimates resulting from the CrossFirst acquisition remain on track at $25.0 million. Busey anticipates a 50% rate of synergy realization in 2025 and 100% in 2026.

Adjusted noninterest expense², which excludes acquisition and restructuring expenses, amortization of intangible assets, and the provision for unfunded commitments, was $82.9 million in the first quarter of 2025, compared to $72.6 million in the fourth quarter of 2024 and $68.6 million in the first quarter of 2024. As our business grows, Busey remains focused on prudently managing our expense base and operating efficiency.

Noteworthy components of noninterest expense are as follows:

Salaries, wages, and employee benefits expenses increased by $22.1 million compared to the fourth quarter of 2024, and by $25.5 million compared to the first quarter of 2024, of which $15.6 million and $15.8 million, respectively, was attributable to increases in non-operating expenses, with additional severance, retention, and stock-based compensation. Busey has added 501 full time equivalent associates (“FTEs”) over the past year, mostly as a result of acquisitions, including 437 CrossFirst Bank FTEs added in March 2025 and 46 Merchants & Manufacturers Bank FTEs added in April 2024.
Data processing expense increased by $3.0 million compared to both the fourth quarter of 2024 and the first quarter of 2024, of which $2.3 million and $2.2 million, respectively, was attributable to increases in non-operating expenses. Busey has continued to make investments in technology enhancements and has also experienced inflation-driven price increases.
Professional fees increased by $4.6 million compared to the fourth quarter of 2024, of which $4.3 million was attributable to increases in non-operating expenses. Compared to the first quarter of 2024, professional fees increased by $7.3 million, of which $7.2 million was attributable to increases in non-operating expenses.
Amortization of intangible assets increased by $0.6 million compared to the fourth quarter of 2024, and by $0.7 million compared to the first quarter of 2024. The CrossFirst acquisition added an estimated $81.8 million of finite-lived intangible assets, which will be amortized using an accelerated amortization methodology.
Other noninterest expense increased by $4.7 million compared to the fourth quarter of 2024, and increased by $6.5 million compared to the first quarter of 2024, of which $0.3 million and $0.5 million, respectively, resulted from increases in non-operating expenses related to acquisition and restructuring expenses. Further, $3.1 million of non-operating expenses was recorded for the Day 2 provision for unfunded commitments. Multiple expense items contributed to the remaining fluctuations in this expense category, including marketing, business development, regulatory expenses, mortgage servicing rights valuation expenses, and other real estate owned.

Busey’s efficiency ratio² was 79.3% for the first quarter of 2025, compared to 64.5% for the fourth quarter of 2024 and 58.1% for the first quarter of 2024. Our adjusted efficiency² ratio was 58.7% for the first quarter of 2025, compared to 61.8% for the fourth quarter of 2024, and 62.3% for the first quarter of 2024.

Busey’s annualized ratio of adjusted noninterest expense to average assets was 2.27% for the first quarter of 2025, compared to 2.39% for the fourth quarter of 2024 and 2.30% for the first quarter of 2024.

BALANCE SHEET STRENGTH

CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS *(unaudited)*

	As of
*(dollars in thousands, except per share amounts)*	March 31, 2025			December 31, 2024			March 31, 2024
ASSETS
Cash and cash equivalents	$	1,200,292		$	697,659		$	591,071
Debt securities available for sale		2,273,874			1,810,221			1,898,072
Debt securities held to maturity		815,402			826,630			862,218
Equity securities		10,828			15,862			9,790
Loans held for sale		7,270			3,657			6,827
Portfolio loans		13,868,357			7,697,087			7,588,077
Allowance for credit losses		(195,210	)		(83,404	)		(91,562	)
Restricted bank stock		53,518			49,930			6,000
Premises and equipment, net		182,003			118,820			121,506
Right of use assets		40,594			10,608			10,590
Goodwill and other intangible assets, net		496,118			365,975			351,455
Other assets		711,206			533,677			533,414
Total assets	$	19,464,252		$	12,046,722		$	11,887,458

LIABILITIES & STOCKHOLDERS’ EQUITY
Liabilities
Total deposits	$	16,459,470		$	9,982,490		$	9,960,191
Securities sold under agreements to repurchase		137,340			155,610			147,175
Short-term borrowings		11,209			—			—
Long-term debt		306,509			227,723			223,100
Junior subordinated debt owed to unconsolidated trusts		77,117			74,815			72,040
Lease liabilities		41,111			11,040			10,896
Other liabilities		251,890			211,775			191,405
Total liabilities		17,284,646			10,663,453			10,604,807

Stockholders’ equity
Retained earnings		249,484			294,054			248,412
Accumulated other comprehensive income (loss)		(172,810	)		(207,039	)		(222,190	)
Other stockholders’ equity¹		2,102,932			1,296,254			1,256,429
Total stockholders’ equity		2,179,606			1,383,269			1,282,651
Total liabilities & stockholders’ equity	$	19,464,252		$	12,046,722		$	11,887,458

SHARE AND PER SHARE AMOUNTS
Book value per common share²	$	24.13		$	24.31		$	23.19
Tangible book value per common share²	$	18.62		$	17.88		$	16.84
Ending number of common shares outstanding		90,008,178			56,895,981			55,300,008

___________________________________________
1. Net balance of preferred stock ($0.001 par value), common stock ($0.001 par value), additional paid-in capital, and treasury stock.
2. See “Non-GAAP Financial Information” for reconciliation.

AVERAGE BALANCES *(unaudited)*

	Three Months Ended
*(dollars in thousands)*	March 31, 2025		December 31, 2024		March 31, 2024
ASSETS
Cash and cash equivalents	$	861,021	$	776,572	$	594,193
Investment securities		2,782,435		2,597,309		2,907,144
Loans held for sale		3,443		6,306		4,833
Portfolio loans		9,838,337		7,738,772		7,599,316
Interest-earning assets		13,363,594		11,048,350		11,005,903
Total assets		14,831,298		12,085,993		12,024,208

LIABILITIES & STOCKHOLDERS’ EQUITY
Noninterest-bearing deposits		3,036,127		2,724,344		2,708,586
Interest-bearing deposits		9,142,781		7,325,662		7,330,105
Total deposits		12,178,908		10,050,006		10,038,691
Federal funds purchased and securities sold under agreements to repurchase		144,838		135,728		178,659
Interest-bearing liabilities		9,627,841		7,763,729		7,831,655
Total liabilities		12,896,222		10,689,054		10,748,484
Stockholders’ equity – preferred		2,669		—		—
Stockholders’ equity – common		1,932,407		1,396,939		1,275,724
Tangible common equity¹		1,521,387		1,029,539		922,710

___________________________________________
1. See “Non-GAAP Financial Information” for reconciliation.

Busey’s financial strength is built on a long-term conservative operating approach. That focus will not change now or in the future.

Total assets were $19.46 billion as of March 31, 2025, compared to $12.05 billion as of December 31, 2024, and $11.89 billion as of March 31, 2024. Average interest-earning assets were $13.36 billion for the first quarter of 2025, compared to $11.05 billion for the fourth quarter of 2024, and $11.01 billion for the first quarter of 2024.

Portfolio Loans

We remain steadfast in our conservative approach to underwriting and our disciplined approach to pricing, particularly given our outlook for the economy in the coming quarters. Portfolio loans totaled $13.87 billion at March 31, 2025, compared to $7.70 billion at December 31, 2024, and $7.59 billion at March 31, 2024. Busey Bank’s portfolio loans grew by $133.6 million during the first quarter of 2025, with growth centered in the commercial category. In addition, as of March 31, 2024, CrossFirst Bank added $6.04 billion in loans to Busey’s loan portfolio.

Average portfolio loans were $9.84 billion for the first quarter of 2025, compared to $7.74 billion for the fourth quarter of 2024 and $7.60 billion for the first quarter of 2024.

Asset Quality

Asset quality continues to be strong. Busey Bank maintains a well-diversified loan portfolio and, as a matter of policy and practice, limits concentration exposure in any particular loan segment. CrossFirst Bank’s policies are similar in nature to Busey Bank’s policies and Busey is in the process of migrating the legacy CrossFirst portfolio toward Busey Bank’s policies.

ASSET QUALITY *(unaudited)*

	As of
(dollars in thousands)	March 31, 2025			December 31, 2024			March 31, 2024
Total assets	$	19,464,252		$	12,046,722		$	11,887,458
Portfolio loans		13,868,357			7,697,087			7,588,077
Loans 30 – 89 days past due		18,554			8,124			7,441
Non-performing loans:
Non-accrual loans		48,647			22,088			17,465
Loans 90+ days past due and still accruing		6,077			1,149			88
Non-performing loans		54,724			23,237			17,553
Other non-performing assets		4,757			63			65
Non-performing assets		59,481			23,300			17,618
Substandard (excludes 90+ days past due)		131,078			62,023			87,830
Classified assets	$	190,559		$	85,323		$	105,448

Allowance for credit losses	$	195,210		$	83,404		$	91,562

RATIOS
Non-performing loans to portfolio loans		0.39	%		0.30	%		0.23	%
Non-performing assets to total assets		0.31	%		0.19	%		0.15	%
Non-performing assets to portfolio loans and other non-performing assets		0.43	%		0.30	%		0.23	%
Allowance for credit losses to portfolio loans		1.41	%		1.08	%		1.21	%
Coverage ratio of the allowance for credit losses to non-performing loans	3.57 x			3.59 x			5.22 x
Classified assets to Bank Tier 1 capital¹and reserves		8.40	%		5.61	%		7.24	%

___________________________________________
1. Capital amounts for the first quarter of 2025 are not yet finalized and are subject to change.

Loans 30-89 days past due increased by $10.4 million compared to December 31, 2024, and increased by $11.1 million compared to March 31, 2024. Busey Bank’s loans 30-89 days past due were $6.1 million, a decrease of $2.0 million compared to December 31, 2024. CrossFirst Bank’s loans 30-89 days past due were $12.5 million as of March 31, 2025.

Non-performing loans increased by $31.5 million compared to December 31, 2024, and increased by $37.2 million compared to March 31, 2024. Busey Bank’s non-performing loans were $6.8 million, a decrease of $16.4 million compared to December 31, 2024. CrossFirst Bank’s non-performing loans were $47.9 million as of March 31, 2025. Continued disciplined credit management resulted in non-performing loans as a percentage of portfolio loans of 0.39% as of March 31, 2025, a 9 basis point increase from December 31, 2024, and a 16 basis point increase from March 31, 2024.

Non-performing assets increased by $36.2 million compared to December 31, 2024, and increased by $41.9 million compared to March 31, 2024. Busey Bank’s non-performing assets were $7.1 million, a decrease of $16.2 million compared to December 31, 2024. CrossFirst Bank’s non-performing assets were $52.4 million as of March 31, 2025. Non-performing assets represented 0.31% of total assets as of March 31, 2025, a 12 basis point increase from December 31, 2024, and a 16 basis point increase from March 31, 2024.

Classified assets increased by $105.2 million compared to December 31, 2024, and increased by $85.1 million compared to March 31, 2024. Busey Bank’s classified assets were $81.3 million, a decrease of $4.0 million compared to December 31, 2024. CrossFirst Bank’s classified assets were $109.3 million as of March 31, 2025.

The allowance for credit losses was $195.2 million as of March 31, 2025, representing 1.41% of total portfolio loans outstanding, and providing coverage of 3.57 times our non-performing loans balance. In connection with the CrossFirst acquisition, the Day 1 allowance recorded for loans that were purchased with credit deterioration (“PCD” loans) was $100.8 million. The Day 1 PCD allowance was recorded as an adjustment to the fair value of the PCD loans.

NET CHARGE-OFFS (RECOVERIES) AND PROVISION EXPENSE (RELEASE) *(unaudited)*

	Three Months Ended
(dollars in thousands)	March 31, 2025		December 31, 2024		March 31, 2024
Net charge-offs (recoveries)	$	31,429	$	2,850	$	5,216
Provision expense (release)		42,452		1,273		5,038

Net charge-offs increased by $28.6 million when compared to the fourth quarter of 2024, and by $26.2 million when compared with the first quarter of 2024. Net charge-offs include $29.6 million related to PCD loans acquired from CrossFirst Bank, which were fully reserved at acquisition and did not require recording additional provision expense.

Busey’s results for the first quarter of 2025 include $42.5 million provision expense for credit losses, which includes $42.4 million that was recorded to establish an initial allowance for credit losses on non-PCD acquired loans.

Deposits

Total deposits were $16.46 billion at March 31, 2025, compared to $9.98 billion at December 31, 2024, and $9.96 billion at March 31, 2024. Average deposits were $12.18 billion for the first quarter of 2025, compared to $10.05 billion for the fourth quarter of 2024 and $10.04 billion for the first quarter of 2024.

Core deposits² accounted for 89.7% of total deposits as of March 31, 2025. The quality of our core deposit franchise is a critical value driver of our institution. We estimated that 32% of our deposits were uninsured and uncollateralized⁴ as of March 31, 2025, and we have sufficient on- and off-balance sheet liquidity to manage deposit fluctuations and the liquidity needs of our customers.

We have executed various deposit campaigns to attract term funding and savings accounts at a lower rate than our marginal cost of funds. New certificate of deposit production in the first quarter of 2025 had a weighted average term of 7.8 months at a rate of 3.58%, which was 96 basis points below our average marginal wholesale equivalent-term funding cost during the quarter.

Borrowings

As of March 31, 2025, Busey Bank held $16.7 million of long-term Federal Home Loan Bank (“FHLB”) borrowings. In comparison, Busey Bank had no short-term or long-term FHLB borrowings as of December 31, 2024, or March 31, 2024. As of March 31, 2025, CrossFirst Bank held $11.2 million of short-term FHLB borrowings and $61.9 million of long-term FHLB borrowings.

In addition, associated with the CrossFirst acquisition, Busey assumed trust preferred securities with a recorded balance of $2.2 million as of March 31, 2025.

Liquidity

As of March 31, 2025, our available sources of on- and off-balance sheet liquidity⁵ totaled $8.55 billion. Furthermore, our balance sheet liquidity profile continues to be aided by the cash flows we expect from our relatively short-duration securities portfolio. Those cash flows were approximately $119.7 million in the first quarter of 2025. Cash flows from maturing securities within our portfolio are expected to be approximately $302.3 million for the remainder of 2025, with a current book yield of 2.55%, and approximately $308.1 million for 2026, with a current book yield of 2.59%.

Capital Strength

The strength of our balance sheet is also reflected in our capital foundation. Although impacted by the strategic deployment of capital for the CrossFirst acquisition, our capital ratios remain strong, and as of March 31, 2025, our regulatory capital ratios continued to provide a buffer of more than $630 million above levels required to be designated well-capitalized. Busey’s Common Equity Tier 1 ratio is estimated⁶ to be 11.99% at March 31, 2025, compared to 14.10% at December 31, 2024, and 13.45% at March 31, 2024. Our Total Capital to Risk Weighted Assets ratio is estimated⁶ to be 14.87% at March 31, 2025, compared to 18.53% at December 31, 2024, and 17.95% at March 31, 2024.

Busey’s tangible common equity² was $1.68 billion at March 31, 2025, compared to $1.02 billion at December 31, 2024, and $931.2 million at March 31, 2024. Tangible common equity² represented 8.83% of tangible assets at March 31, 2025, compared to 8.71% at December 31, 2024, and 8.07% at March 31, 2024.

Busey’s tangible book value per common share² was $18.62 at March 31, 2025, compared to $17.88 at December 31, 2024, and $16.84 at March 31, 2024, reflecting a 10.6% year-over-year increase. The ratios of tangible common equity to tangible assets² and tangible book value per common share have been impacted by the fair market valuation adjustment of Busey’s securities portfolio as a result of the current rate environment, which is reflected in the accumulated other comprehensive income (loss) component of shareholder’s equity.

Busey’s strong capital levels, coupled with its earnings, have allowed the Company to provide a steady return to its stockholders through dividends. During the first quarter of 2025, we paid a dividend of $0.25 per share on Busey’s common stock, which represents a 4.2% increase from the previous quarterly dividend of $0.24 per share. Busey has consistently paid dividends to its common stockholders since the bank holding company was organized in 1980.

During the first quarter of 2025, Busey resumed making stock repurchases under its stock repurchase plan, purchasing 220,000 shares of its common stock at a weighted average price of $21.98 per share for a total of $4.8 million. As of March 31, 2025, Busey had 1,699,275 shares remaining on its stock repurchase plan available for repurchase.

FIRST QUARTER EARNINGS INVESTOR PRESENTATION

For additional information on Busey’s financial condition and operating results, please refer to our Q1 2025 Earnings Investor Presentation furnished via Form 8‑K on April 22, 2025, in connection with this earnings release.

CORPORATE PROFILE

As of March 31, 2025, First Busey Corporation (Nasdaq: BUSE) was a $19.46 billion financial holding company headquartered in Leawood, Kansas.

Busey Bank, a wholly-owned bank subsidiary of First Busey Corporation headquartered in Champaign, Illinois, had total assets of $11.98 billion as of March 31, 2025. Busey Bank currently has 62 banking centers, with 21 in Central Illinois markets, 17 in suburban Chicago markets, 20 in the St. Louis Metropolitan Statistical Area, three in Southwest Florida, and one in Indianapolis. More information about Busey Bank can be found at busey.com.

CrossFirst Bank, a wholly-owned bank subsidiary of First Busey Corporation headquartered in Leawood, Kansas, had total assets of $7.45 billion as of March 31, 2025. CrossFirst Bank currently has 16 banking centers located across Arizona, Colorado, Kansas, Missouri, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas. More information about CrossFirst Bank can be found at crossfirstbank.com. It is anticipated that CrossFirst Bank will be merged with and into Busey Bank on June 20, 2025.

Through Busey’s Wealth Management division, the Company provides a full range of asset management, investment, brokerage, fiduciary, philanthropic advisory, tax preparation, and farm management services to individuals, businesses, and foundations. Assets under care totaled $13.68 billion as of March 31, 2025. More information about Busey’s Wealth Management services can be found at busey.com/wealth-management.

Busey Bank’s wholly-owned subsidiary, FirsTech, specializes in the evolving financial technology needs of small and medium-sized businesses, highly regulated enterprise industries, and financial institutions. FirsTech provides comprehensive and innovative payment technology solutions, including online, mobile, and voice-recognition bill payments; money and data movement; merchant services; direct debit services; lockbox remittance processing for payments made by mail; and walk-in payments at retail agents. Additionally, FirsTech simplifies client workflows through integrations enabling support with billing, reconciliation, bill reminders, and treasury services. More information about FirsTech can be found at firstechpayments.com.

For the fourth consecutive year, Busey was named among 2025’s America’s Best Banks by Forbes. Ranked 88th overall, Busey was one of seven banks headquartered in Illinois included on this year’s list. Busey was also named among the 2024 Best Banks to Work For by American Banker, the 2024 Best Places to Work in Money Management by Pensions and Investments, the 2024 Best Places to Work in Illinois by Daily Herald Business Ledger, the 2025 Best Places to Work in Indiana by the Indiana Chamber of Commerce, and the 2024 Best Companies to Work For in Florida by Florida Trend magazine. We are honored to be consistently recognized globally, nationally and locally for our engaged culture of integrity and commitment to community development.

NON-GAAP FINANCIAL INFORMATION

This earnings release contains certain financial information determined by methods other than GAAP. Management uses these non-GAAP measures, together with the related GAAP measures, in analysis of Busey’s performance and in making business decisions, as well as for comparison to Busey’s peers. Busey believes the adjusted measures are useful for investors and management to understand the effects of certain non-core and non-recurring items and provide additional perspective on Busey’s performance over time.

The following tables present reconciliations between these non-GAAP measures and what management believes to be the most directly comparable GAAP financial measures.

These non-GAAP disclosures have inherent limitations and are not audited. They should not be considered in isolation or as a substitute for operating results reported in accordance with GAAP, nor are they necessarily comparable to non-GAAP performance measures that may be presented by other companies. Tax effected numbers included in these non-GAAP disclosures are based on estimated statutory rates, estimated federal income tax rates, or effective tax rates, as noted with the tables below.

RECONCILIATION OF NON-GAAP FINANCIAL MEASURES (Unaudited)

Pre-Provision Net Revenue and Related Measures

		Three Months Ended
(dollars in thousands)		March 31, 2025			December 31, 2024			March 31, 2024
Net interest income (GAAP)		$	103,731		$	81,578		$	75,854
Total noninterest income (GAAP)			21,223			35,221			34,913
Net security (gains) losses (GAAP)			15,768			196			6,375
Total noninterest expense (GAAP)			(115,171	)		(78,167	)		(70,769	)
Pre-provision net revenue (Non-GAAP)	[a]		25,551			38,828			46,373
Acquisition and restructuring expenses			26,026			3,585			408
Provision for unfunded commitments¹			3,141			(455	)		(678	)
Realized (gain) loss on the sale of mortgage service rights			—			—			(7,465	)
Adjusted pre-provision net revenue (Non-GAAP)	[b]	$	54,718		$	41,958		$	38,638

Average total assets	[c]		14,831,298			12,085,993			12,024,208

Pre-provision net revenue to average total assets (Non-GAAP)²	[a÷c]		0.70	%		1.28	%		1.55	%
Adjusted pre-provision net revenue to average total assets (Non-GAAP)²	[b÷c]		1.50	%		1.38	%		1.29	%

___________________________________________

For the three months ended March 31, 2025, the provision for unfunded commitments included Day 2 provision expense of $3.139 million recorded in connection with the CrossFirst acquisition.
Annualized measure.

Adjusted Net Income, Average Tangible Common Equity, and Related Ratios

		Three Months Ended
(dollars in thousands, except per share amounts)		March 31, 2025			December 31, 2024			March 31, 2024
Net income (loss) (GAAP)	[a]	$	(29,990	)	$	28,105		$	26,225
Acquisition expenses			26,026			2,469			285
Restructuring expenses			—			1,116			123
Day 2 provision for credit losses¹			42,433			—			—
Day 2 provision for unfunded commitments²			3,139			—			—
Net securities (gains) losses			15,768			196			6,375
Realized net (gains) losses on the sale of mortgage servicing rights			—			—			(7,465	)
Related tax (benefit) expense³			(22,069	)		(1,014	)		170
One-time deferred tax valuation adjustment⁴			4,591			—			—
Adjusted net income (Non-GAAP)⁵	[b]	$	39,898		$	30,872		$	25,713

Weighted average number of common shares outstanding, diluted (GAAP)	[c]		68,517,647			57,934,812			56,406,500
Diluted earnings (loss) per common share (GAAP)	[a÷c]	$	(0.44	)	$	0.49		$	0.46

Weighted average number of common shares outstanding, diluted (Non-GAAP)⁶	[d]		69,502,717			57,934,812			56,406,500
Adjusted diluted earnings per common share (Non-GAAP)⁵^,6	[b÷d]	$	0.57		$	0.53		$	0.46

Average total assets	[e]	$	14,831,298		$	12,085,993		$	12,024,208
Return on average assets (Non-GAAP)⁷	[a÷e]	(0.82		)%		0.93	%		0.88	%
Adjusted return on average assets (Non-GAAP)^5,⁷	[b÷e]		1.09	%		1.02	%		0.86	%

Average common equity		$	1,932,407		$	1,396,939		$	1,275,724
Average goodwill and other intangible assets, net			(411,020	)		(367,400	)		(353,014	)
Average tangible common equity (Non-GAAP)	[f]	$	1,521,387		$	1,029,539		$	922,710

Return on average tangible common equity (Non-GAAP)⁷	[a÷f]	(7.99		)%		10.86	%		11.43	%
Adjusted return on average tangible common equity (Non-GAAP)^5,⁷	[b÷f]		10.64	%		11.93	%		11.21	%

___________________________________________

The Day 2 allowance for credit losses was recorded in connection with the CrossFirst acquisition to establish an allowance on non-PCD loans and is reflected within the provision for credit losses line on the Statement of Income.
The Day 2 provision for unfunded commitments was recorded in connection with the CrossFirst acquisition and is reflected within the other noninterest expense line, as a component of total noninterest expense, on the Statement of Income.
Tax benefits were calculated using tax rates of 25.3%, 26.8%, and 24.9% for the three months ended March 31, 2025, December 31, 2024, and March 31, 2024, respectively.
The deferred tax valuation adjustment was recorded in connection with the CrossFirst acquisition and relates to the expansion of Busey’s footprint into new states. The deferred tax valuation adjustment is reflected within the income taxes line on the Statement of Income.
Beginning in 2025, Busey revised its calculation of adjusted net income for all periods presented to include, as applicable, adjustments for net securities gains and losses, realized net gains and losses on the sale of mortgage servicing rights, and one-time deferred tax valuation adjustments. In 2024, these adjusting items were previously presented as further adjustments to adjusted net income.
Dilution includes shares that would have been dilutive if there had been net income during the period.
Annualized measure.

Tax-Equivalent Net Interest Income, Adjusted Net Interest Income, Net Interest Margin, and Adjusted Net Interest Margin

		Three Months Ended
(dollars in thousands)		March 31, 2025			December 31, 2024			March 31, 2024
Net interest income (GAAP)		$	103,731		$	81,578		$	75,854
Tax-equivalent adjustment¹			537			446			449
Tax-equivalent net interest income (Non-GAAP)	[a]		104,268			82,024			76,303
Purchase accounting accretion related to business combinations			(2,728	)		(812	)		(204	)
Adjusted net interest income (Non-GAAP)	[b]	$	101,540		$	81,212		$	76,099

Average interest-earning assets (Non-GAAP)	[c]	$	13,363,594		$	11,048,350		$	11,005,903

Net interest margin (Non-GAAP)²	[a÷c]		3.16	%		2.95	%		2.79	%
Adjusted net interest margin (Non-GAAP)²	[b÷c]		3.08	%		2.92	%		2.78	%

___________________________________________

Tax-equivalent adjustments were calculated using an estimated federal income tax rate of 21%, applied to non-taxable interest income on investments and loans.
Annualized measure.

Adjusted Noninterest Income, Revenue Measures, Adjusted Noninterest Expense, Efficiency Ratios, and Adjusted Noninterest Expense to Average Assets

		Three Months Ended
(dollars in thousands)		March 31, 2025			December 31, 2024			March 31, 2024
Net interest income (GAAP)	[a]	$	103,731		$	81,578		$	75,854
Tax-equivalent adjustment¹			537			446			449
Tax-equivalent net interest income (Non-GAAP)	[b]		104,268			82,024			76,303

Total noninterest income (GAAP)			21,223			35,221			34,913
Net security (gains) losses			15,768			196			6,375
Noninterest income excluding net securities gains and losses (Non-GAAP)	[c]		36,991			35,417			41,288
Realized net (gains) losses on the sale of mortgage servicing rights			—			—			(7,465	)
Adjusted noninterest income (Non-GAAP)	[d]	$	36,991		$	35,417		$	33,823

Tax-equivalent revenue (Non-GAAP)	[e = b+c]	$	141,259		$	117,441		$	117,591
Adjusted tax-equivalent revenue (Non-GAAP)	[f = b+d]	$	141,259		$	117,441		$	110,126
Operating revenue (Non-GAAP)	[g = a+d]	$	140,722		$	116,995		$	109,677

Adjusted noninterest income to operating revenue (Non-GAAP)	[d÷g]		26.29	%		30.27	%		30.84	%

Total noninterest expense (GAAP)		$	115,171		$	78,167		$	70,769
Amortization of intangible assets			(3,083	)		(2,471	)		(2,409	)
Noninterest expense excluding amortization of intangible assets (Non-GAAP)	[h]		112,088			75,696			68,360
Acquisition and restructuring expenses			(26,026	)		(3,585	)		(408	)
Provision for unfunded commitments²			(3,141	)		455			678
Adjusted noninterest expense (Non-GAAP)³	[i]	$	82,921		$	72,566		$	68,630

Efficiency ratio (Non-GAAP)	[h÷e]		79.35	%		64.45	%		58.13	%
Adjusted efficiency ratio (Non-GAAP)³	[i÷f]		58.70	%		61.79	%		62.32	%

Average total assets	[j]	$	14,831,298		$	12,085,993		$	12,024,208
Adjusted noninterest expense to average assets (Non-GAAP)⁴	[i÷j]		2.27	%		2.39	%		2.30	%

___________________________________________

Tax-equivalent adjustments were calculated using an estimated federal income tax rate of 21%, applied to non-taxable interest income on investments and loans.
For the three months ended March 31, 2025, the provision for unfunded commitments included Day 2 provision expense of $3.139 million recorded in connection with the CrossFirst acquisition.
Beginning in 2025, Busey revised its calculation of adjusted noninterest expense and the adjusted efficiency ratio for all periods presented to include, as applicable, adjustments for the provision for unfunded commitments. In 2024, these adjustments were previously presented as adjustments for adjusted core expense and the adjusted core efficiency ratio.
Annualized measure.

Tangible Assets, Tangible Common Equity, and Related Measures and Ratio

		As of
(dollars in thousands, except per share amounts)		March 31, 2025			December 31, 2024			March 31, 2024
Total assets (GAAP)		$	19,464,252		$	12,046,722		$	11,887,458
Goodwill and other intangible assets, net			(496,118	)		(365,975	)		(351,455	)
Tangible assets (Non-GAAP)¹	[a]	$	18,968,134		$	11,680,747		$	11,536,003

Total stockholders’ equity (GAAP)		$	2,179,606		$	1,383,269		$	1,282,651
Preferred stock and additional paid in capital on preferred stock			(7,750	)		—			—
Common equity	[b]		2,171,856			1,383,269			1,282,651
Goodwill and other intangible assets, net			(496,118	)		(365,975	)		(351,455	)
Tangible common equity (Non-GAAP)¹	[c]	$	1,675,738		$	1,017,294		$	931,196

Tangible common equity to tangible assets (Non-GAAP)¹	[c÷a]		8.83	%		8.71	%		8.07	%

Ending number of common shares outstanding (GAAP)	[d]		90,008,178			56,895,981			55,300,008
Book value per common share (Non-GAAP)	[b÷d]	$	24.13		$	24.31		$	23.19
Tangible book value per common share (Non-GAAP)	[c÷d]	$	18.62		$	17.88		$	16.84

___________________________________________

Beginning in 2025, Busey revised its calculation of tangible assets and tangible common equity for all periods presented to exclude any tax adjustment.

Core Deposits and Related Ratio

		As of
(dollars in thousands)		March 31, 2025			December 31, 2024			March 31, 2024
Total deposits (GAAP)	[a]	$	16,459,470		$	9,982,490		$	9,960,191
Brokered deposits, excluding brokered time deposits of $250,000 or more			(722,309	)		(13,090	)		(6,001	)
Time deposits of $250,000 or more			(967,262	)		(334,503	)		(326,795	)
Core deposits (Non-GAAP)	[b]	$	14,769,899		$	9,634,897		$	9,627,395

Core deposits to total deposits (Non-GAAP)	[b÷a]		89.73	%		96.52	%		96.66	%

FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS

This press release may contain “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 with respect to Busey’s financial condition, results of operations, plans, objectives, future performance, and business. Forward-looking statements, which may be based upon beliefs, expectations and assumptions of Busey’s management and on information currently available to management, are generally identifiable by the use of words such as “believe,” “expect,” “anticipate,” “plan,” “intend,” “estimate,” “may,” “will,” “would,” “could,” “should,” “position,” or other similar expressions. Additionally, all statements in this document, including forward-looking statements, speak only as of the date they are made, and Busey undertakes no obligation to update any statement in light of new information or future events.

A number of factors, many of which are beyond Busey’s ability to control or predict, could cause actual results to differ materially from those in any forward-looking statements. These factors include, among others, the following: (1) the strength of the local, state, national, and international economies and financial markets (including effects of inflationary pressures and supply chain constraints); (2) changes in, and the interpretation and prioritization of, local, state, and federal laws, regulations, and governmental policies (including those concerning Busey’s general business); (3) the economic impact of any future terrorist threats or attacks, widespread disease or pandemics, or other adverse external events that could cause economic deterioration or instability in credit markets (including Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the conflict in the Middle East); (4) unexpected results of acquisitions, including the acquisition of CrossFirst, which may include the failure to realize the anticipated benefits of the acquisitions and the possibility that the transaction and integration costs may be greater than anticipated; (5) the imposition of tariffs or other governmental policies impacting the value of products produced by Busey’s commercial borrowers; (6) new or revised accounting policies and practices as may be adopted by state and federal regulatory banking agencies, the Financial Accounting Standards Board, the Securities and Exchange Commission, or the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board; (7) changes in interest rates and prepayment rates of Busey’s assets (including the impact of sustained elevated interest rates); (8) increased competition in the financial services sector (including from non-bank competitors such as credit unions and fintech companies) and the inability to attract new customers; (9) changes in technology and the ability to develop and maintain secure and reliable electronic systems; (10) the loss of key executives or associates, talent shortages, and employee turnover; (11) unexpected outcomes and costs of existing or new litigation, investigations, or other legal proceedings, inquiries, and regulatory actions involving Busey (including with respect to Busey’s Illinois franchise taxes); (12) fluctuations in the value of securities held in Busey’s securities portfolio, including as a result of changes in interest rates; (13) credit risk and risk from concentrations (by type of borrower, geographic area, collateral, and industry), within Busey’s loan portfolio and large loans to certain borrowers (including commercial real estate loans); (14) the concentration of large deposits from certain clients who have balances above current Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation insurance limits and may withdraw deposits to diversify their exposure; (15) the level of non-performing assets on Busey’s balance sheets; (16) interruptions involving information technology and communications systems or third-party servicers; (17) breaches or failures of information security controls or cybersecurity-related incidents; (18) the economic impact on Busey and its customers of climate change, natural disasters, and exceptional weather occurrences such as tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, blizzards, and droughts; (19) the ability to successfully manage liquidity risk, which may increase dependence on non-core funding sources such as brokered deposits, and may negatively impact Busey’s cost of funds; (20) the ability to maintain an adequate level of allowance for credit losses on loans; (21) the effectiveness of Busey’s risk management framework; and (22) the ability of Busey to manage the risks associated with the foregoing. These risks and uncertainties should be considered in evaluating forward-looking statements and undue reliance should not be placed on such statements.

Additional information concerning Busey and its business, including additional factors that could materially affect Busey’s financial results, is included in Busey’s filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

END NOTES

1	Annualized measure.
2	Represents a non-GAAP financial measure. For a reconciliation to the most directly comparable financial measure calculated and presented in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”), see “Non-GAAP Financial Information.”
3	The blended benchmark consists of 60% MSCI All Country World Index and 40% Bloomberg Intermediate US Government/Credit Total Return Index.
4	Estimated uninsured and uncollateralized deposits consist of account balances in excess of the $250 thousand Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation insurance limit, less intercompany accounts, fully collateralized accounts (including preferred deposits), and pass-through accounts where clients have deposit insurance at the correspondent financial institution.
5	On- and off-balance sheet liquidity is comprised of cash and cash equivalents, debt securities excluding those pledged as collateral, brokered deposits, and Busey’s borrowing capacity through its revolving credit facility, the FHLB, the Federal Reserve Bank, and federal funds purchased lines.
6	Capital amounts and ratios for the first quarter of 2025 are not yet finalized and are subject to change.

INVESTOR CONTACT: Scott A. Phillips, Interim Chief Financial Officer | 239-689-7167

The MIL Network –

April 23, 2025

Category: Ukraine

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