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Category: Ukraine

  • MIL-OSI: Satellogic Announces Closing of $20 Million Registered Direct Offering of Class A Common Stock

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    NEW YORK, April 16, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Satellogic Inc. (NASDAQ: SATL), a leader in high-resolution Earth observation data, announced today that it has closed the purchase and sale of 6,451,612 shares of the Company’s Class A Common Stock at a purchase price of $3.10 in a registered direct offering pursuant to a definitive share purchase agreement entered into with a certain institutional investor on April 15, 2025.

    Cantor Fitzgerald & Co. acted as the exclusive placement agent for the offering.

    The gross proceeds from the offering are expected to be approximately $20 million, before deducting the placement agent’s fees and other offering expenses payable by the Company. The Company intends to use the net proceeds from this offering for general corporate purposes.

    “This offering, coupled with our recently announced $30 million low latency, near-daily AI-first constellation contract, and our strategic realignment as a U.S. company, positions Satellogic to focus on significant growth opportunities, underscoring the value of our data insights and technology,” said Emiliano Kargieman, the Company’s Chief Executive Officer.

    Rick Dunn, Chief Financial Officer, added, “the additional $20 million bolsters our liquidity, allowing our team to fully focus on the operational execution of our strategy and high growth initiatives that will drive real outcomes for our customers.”

    The shares of Class A Common Stock issued in the offering were offered by the Company pursuant to a “shelf” registration statement on Form S-3 (File No. 333-283719) previously filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) and declared effective by the SEC on March 31, 2025. The offering was made only by means of a prospectus, including a prospectus supplement, forming a part of the effective registration statement, relating to the offering that was filed with the SEC on April 15, 2025. Electronic copies of the final prospectus supplement and accompanying prospectus may be obtained on the SEC’s website at http://www.sec.gov or by contacting Cantor Fitzgerald & Co. at Cantor Fitzgerald & Co., Attention: Capital Markets, 110 East 59th Street, 6th Floor, New York, New York 10022, or by email at prospectus@cantor.com.

    This press release shall not constitute an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy Class A Common Stock, nor shall there be any sale of Class A Common Stock in any state or other jurisdiction in which such offer, solicitation or sale would be unlawful prior to the registration or qualification under the securities laws of any such state or other jurisdiction.

    About Satellogic

    Founded in 2010 by Emiliano Kargieman and Gerardo Richarte, Satellogic (NASDAQ: SATL) is the first vertically integrated geospatial company, driving real outcomes with planetary-scale insights. Satellogic is creating and continuously enhancing the first scalable, fully automated EO platform with the ability to remap the entire planet at both high-frequency and high-resolution, providing accessible and affordable solutions for customers.

    Satellogic’s mission is to democratize access to geospatial data through its information platform of high-resolution images to help solve the world’s most pressing problems including climate change, energy supply, and food security. Using its patented Earth imaging technology, Satellogic unlocks the power of EO to deliver high-quality, planetary insights at the lowest cost in the industry.

    With more than a decade of experience in space, Satellogic has proven technology and a strong track record of delivering satellites to orbit and high-resolution data to customers at the right price point.

    To learn more, please visit: http://www.satellogic.com

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This press release contains “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of the U.S. federal securities laws. The words “anticipate”, “believe”, “continue”, “could”, “estimate”, “expect”, “intends”, “may”, “might”, “plan”, “possible”, “potential”, “predict”, “project”, “should”, “would” and similar expressions may identify forward-looking statements, but the absence of these words does not mean that a statement is not forward-looking. These forward-looking statements are based on Satellogic’s current expectations and beliefs concerning future developments and their potential effects on Satellogic and include statements concerning Satellogic’s registered direct offering. Forward-looking statements are predictions, projections and other statements about future events that are based on current expectations and assumptions and, as a result, are subject to risks and uncertainties. These statements are based on various assumptions, whether or not identified in this press release. These forward-looking statements are provided for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to serve, and must not be relied on by an investor as, a guarantee, an assurance, a prediction or a definitive statement of fact or probability. Actual events and circumstances are difficult or impossible to predict and will differ from assumptions. Many actual events and circumstances are beyond the control of Satellogic. Many factors could cause actual future events to differ materially from the forward-looking statements in this press release, including but not limited to: (i) our ability to generate revenue as expected, (ii) our ability to effectively market and sell our EO services and to convert contracted revenues and our pipeline of potential contracts into actual revenues, (iii) risks related to the secured convertible notes, (iv) the potential loss of one or more of our largest customers, (v) the considerable time and expense related to our sales efforts and the length and unpredictability of our sales cycle, (vi) risks and uncertainties associated with defense-related contracts, (vii) risk related to our pricing structure, (viii) our ability to scale production of our satellites as planned, (ix) unforeseen risks, challenges and uncertainties related to our expansion into new business lines, (x) our dependence on third parties to transport and launch our satellites into space, (xi) our reliance on third-party vendors and manufacturers to build and provide certain satellite components, products, or services, (xii) our dependence on ground station and cloud-based computing infrastructure operated by third parties for value-added services, and any errors, disruption, performance problems, or failure in their or our operational infrastructure, (xiii) risk related to certain minimum service requirements in our customer contracts, (xiv) market acceptance of our EO services and our dependence upon our ability to keep pace with the latest technological advances, (xv) competition for EO services, (xvi) challenges with international operations or unexpected changes to the regulatory environment in certain markets, (xvii) unknown defects or errors in our products, (xviii) risk related to the capital-intensive nature of our business and our ability to raise adequate capital to finance our business strategies, (xix) substantial doubt about our ability to continue as a going concern, (xx) uncertainties beyond our control related to the production, launch, commissioning, and/or operation of our satellites and related ground systems, software and analytic technologies, (xxi) the failure of the market for EO services to achieve the growth potential we expect, (xxii) risks related to our satellites and related equipment becoming impaired, (xxiii) risks related to the failure of our satellites to operate as intended, (xxiv) production and launch delays, launch failures, and damage or destruction to our satellites during launch and (xxv) the impact of natural disasters, unusual or prolonged unfavorable weather conditions, epidemic outbreaks, terrorist acts and geopolitical events (including the ongoing conflicts between Russia and Ukraine, in the Gaza Strip and the Red Sea region) on our business and satellite launch schedules. The foregoing list of factors is not exhaustive. You should carefully consider the foregoing factors and the other risks and uncertainties described in the “Risk Factors” section of Satellogic’s Annual Report on Form 10-K and other documents filed or to be filed by Satellogic from time to time with the Securities and Exchange Commission. These filings identify and address other important risks and uncertainties that could cause actual events and results to differ materially from those contained in the forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date they are made. Readers are cautioned not to put undue reliance on forward-looking statements, and Satellogic assumes no obligation and does not intend to update or revise these forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events, or otherwise. Satellogic can give no assurance that it will achieve its expectations.

    Media Contacts

    Satellogic, Inc.
    Ryan Driver, VP of Strategy & Corporate Development
    pr@satellogic.com

    The MIL Network –

    April 17, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Viper Energy, Inc. Provides Financial and Operating Update for the First Quarter of 2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    MIDLAND, Texas, April 16, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Viper Energy, Inc. (NASDAQ: VNOM) (“Viper” or the “Company”), a subsidiary of Diamondback Energy, Inc. (NASDAQ: FANG) (“Diamondback”), today provided a financial and operating update for the first quarter of 2025. The Company is releasing this information to provide flexibility to opportunistically continue its stock repurchase program given the current market volatility.

    FIRST QUARTER 2025 HIGHLIGHTS

    • Average production of 31,311 bo/d (57,367 boe/d)
    • Average unhedged realized prices of $71.33 per barrel of oil, $24.52 per barrel of natural gas liquids and $2.08 per Mcf of natural gas
    • Average hedged realized prices of $70.26 per barrel of oil, $24.52 per barrel of natural gas liquids and $3.74 per Mcf of natural gas
    • Realized commodity hedging gains of $9.1 million

    SECOND QUARTER 2025 HIGHLIGHTS

    • As of April 15, 2025, repurchased 176,771 shares of common stock to date in Q2 2025 for $6.6 million, excluding excise tax (at a weighted average price of $37.27 per share); $427.6 million remaining on Viper’s current share buyback authorization

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This news release contains “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, which involve risks, uncertainties, and assumptions. All statements, other than statements of historical fact, including statements regarding Viper’s: future performance; business strategy; future operations; estimates and projections of operating income, losses, costs and expenses, returns, cash flow, and financial position; production levels on properties in which Viper has mineral and royalty interests, developmental activity by other operators; reserve estimates and Viper’s ability to replace or increase reserves; anticipated benefits or other effects of strategic transactions; and plans and objectives (including Diamondback’s plans for developing Viper’s acreage and Viper’s cash dividend policy and common stock repurchase program) are forward-looking statements. When used in this news release, the words “aim,” “anticipate,” “believe,” “continue,” “could,” “estimate,” “expect,” “forecast,” “future,” “guidance,” “intend,” “may,” “model,” “outlook,” “plan,” “positioned,” “potential,” “predict,” “project,” “seek,” “should,” “target,” “will,” “would,” and similar expressions (including the negative of such terms) as they relate to Viper are intended to identify forward-looking statements, although not all forward-looking statements contain such identifying words. Although Viper believes that the expectations and assumptions reflected in its forward-looking statements are reasonable as and when made, they involve risks and uncertainties that are difficult to predict and, in many cases, beyond its control. Accordingly, forward-looking statements are not guarantees of Viper’s future performance and the actual outcomes could differ materially from what Viper expressed in its forward-looking statements.

    Factors that could cause the outcomes to differ materially include (but are not limited to) the following: changes in supply and demand levels for oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquids, and the resulting impact on the price for those commodities; the impact of public health crises, including epidemic or pandemic diseases, and any related company or government policies or actions; actions taken by the members of OPEC and Russia affecting the production and pricing of oil, as well as other domestic and global political, economic, or diplomatic developments, including any impact of the ongoing war in Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas war on the global energy markets and geopolitical stability; instability in the financial sector; higher interest rates and their impact on the cost of capital; regional supply and demand factors, including delays, curtailment delays or interruptions of production on Viper’s mineral and royalty acreage, or governmental orders, rules or regulations that impose production limits on such acreage; federal and state legislative and regulatory initiatives relating to hydraulic fracturing, including the effect of existing and future laws and governmental regulations; physical and transition risks relating to climate change and the risks and other factors disclosed in Viper’s filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission, including its Forms 10-K, 10-Q and 8-K, which can be obtained free of charge on the Securities and Exchange Commission’s web site at http://www.sec.gov.

    In light of these factors, the events anticipated by Viper’s forward-looking statements may not occur at the time anticipated or at all. Moreover, the new risks emerge from time to time. Viper cannot predict all risks, nor can it assess the impact of all factors on its business or the extent to which any factor, or combination of factors, may cause actual results to differ materially from those anticipated by any forward-looking statements it may make. Accordingly, you should not place undue reliance on any forward-looking statements made in this news release. All forward-looking statements speak only as of the date of this news release or, if earlier, as of the date they were made. Viper does not intend to, and disclaims any obligation to, update or revise any forward-looking statements unless required by applicable law.

    Investor Contact:
    Chip Seale
    +1 432.247.6218
    cseale@viperenergy.com

    The MIL Network –

    April 17, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Diamondback Energy, Inc. Provides Operational Update for the First Quarter of 2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    MIDLAND, Texas, April 16, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Diamondback Energy, Inc. (NASDAQ: FANG) (“Diamondback” or the “Company”) provided an operational update for the first quarter of 2025.

    The Company is releasing this information to provide flexibility to opportunistically continue its stock repurchase program given the current market volatility.

    FIRST QUARTER 2025 HIGHLIGHTS

    • Average production of 475.9 MBO/d (850.7 MBOE/d)
    • Average unhedged realized prices of $70.95 per barrel of oil, $23.94 per barrel of natural gas liquids and $2.11 per Mcf of natural gas
    • Average hedged realized prices of $70.06 per barrel of oil, $23.94 per barrel of natural gas liquids and $3.34 per Mcf of natural gas
    • Realized hedge gain of $85 million, with unrealized hedge gain of $141 million, resulting in total gain on derivatives of $226 million
    • Cash capital expenditures of $942 million
    • Repurchased 3,656,044 shares of common stock in Q1 2025 for $575 million, excluding excise tax (at a weighted average price of $157.15 per share); repurchased 1,560,200 shares of common stock to date in Q2 2025 for $200 million, excluding excise tax (at a weighted average price of $128.19 per share)
    • Q1 2025 weighted average basic and diluted shares outstanding (in thousands) of 289,612
    • Giving effect to the closing of the Double Eagle acquisition and share repurchases to date in the second quarter, Diamondback currently has approximately 293 million shares outstanding

    2025 OPERATING PLAN UPDATE

    Given recent market volatility, Diamondback is closely monitoring the macro environment and is actively reviewing its operating plan for the remainder of 2025. Should low commodity prices persist or worsen, Diamondback has the flexibility to reduce activity to maximize free cash flow generation. Additionally, Diamondback believes it can further lower its breakeven oil price through capital and operating cost reductions.

    The following table sets forth selected operating data for the three months ended March 31, 2025:

      Three Months Ended March 31, 2025
       
    Production Data:  
    Oil (MBbls)   42,835
    Natural gas (MMcf)   100,578
    Natural gas liquids (MBbls)   16,961
    Combined volumes (MBOE)(1)   76,559
       
    Daily oil volumes (BO/d)   475,944
    Daily combined volumes (BOE/d)   850,656
       
    Average Prices:  
    Oil ($ per Bbl) $ 70.95
    Natural gas ($ per Mcf) $ 2.11
    Natural gas liquids ($ per Bbl) $ 23.94
    Combined ($ per BOE) $ 47.77
       
    Oil, hedged ($ per Bbl)(2) $ 70.06
    Natural gas, hedged ($ per Mcf)(2) $ 3.34
    Natural gas liquids, hedged ($ per Bbl)(2) $ 23.94
    Average price, hedged ($ per BOE)(2) $ 48.89
    (1) Bbl equivalents are calculated using a conversion rate of six Mcf per Bbl.
    (2) Hedged prices reflect the effect of our commodity derivative transactions on our average sales prices and include gains and losses on cash settlements for matured commodity derivatives, which we do not designate for hedge accounting. Hedged prices exclude gains or losses resulting from the early settlement of commodity derivative contracts.
       

    Derivative Activity

    For the first quarter of 2025, Diamondback anticipates a net gain on cash settlements for derivative instruments of $85 million and a net non-cash gain on derivative instruments of $141 million as detailed in the table below (in millions):

    Gain (loss) on derivative instruments, net:  
    Commodity contracts $ 214  
    Interest rate swaps   11  
    2026 WTI Contingent Liability   2  
    Treasury locks(1)   (1 )
    Total $ 226  
       
    Net cash received (paid) on settlements:  
    Commodity contracts $ 86  
    Treasury locks(1)   (1 )
    Total $ 85  
    (1) Loss on 10 year treasury locks executed prior to, and fully settled upon, pricing of the senior notes issued in March 2025.
       

    Weighted Average Basic and Diluted Shares Outstanding

    For the first quarter of 2025, basic and diluted weighted average shares outstanding are as follows (in thousands):

    Basic weighted average shares outstanding 289,612
    Diluted weighted average shares outstanding 289,612
       

    About Diamondback Energy, Inc.

    Diamondback is an independent oil and natural gas company headquartered in Midland, Texas focused on the acquisition, development, exploration and exploitation of unconventional, onshore oil and natural gas reserves in the Permian Basin in West Texas.

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This news release contains “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act and Section 21E of the Exchange Act, which involve risks, uncertainties, and assumptions. All statements, other than statements of historical fact, including statements regarding Diamondback’s: future performance; business strategy; future operations (including drilling plans and capital plans); estimates and projections of revenues, losses, costs, expenses, returns, cash flow, and financial position; reserve estimates and its ability to replace or increase reserves; anticipated benefits or other effects of strategic transactions (including the recently completed Endeavor merger, the recently completed Double Eagle acquisition and other acquisitions or divestitures); and plans and objectives of management (including plans for future cash flow from operations and for executing environmental strategies) are forward-looking statements. When used in this news release, the words “aim,” “anticipate,” “believe,” “continue,” “could,” “estimate,” “expect,” “forecast,” “future,” “guidance,” “intend,” “may,” “model,” “outlook,” “plan,” “positioned,” “potential,” “predict,” “project,” “seek,” “should,” “target,” “will,” “would,” and similar expressions (including the negative of such terms) as they relate to Diamondback are intended to identify forward-looking statements, although not all forward-looking statements contain such identifying words. Although Diamondback believes that the expectations and assumptions reflected in its forward-looking statements are reasonable as and when made, they involve risks and uncertainties that are difficult to predict and, in many cases, beyond Diamondback’s control. Accordingly, forward-looking statements are not guarantees of future performance and Diamondback’s actual outcomes could differ materially from what Diamondback has expressed in its forward-looking statements.

    Factors that could cause the outcomes to differ materially include (but are not limited to) the following: changes in supply and demand levels for oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquids, and the resulting impact on the price for those commodities; the impact of public health crises, including epidemic or pandemic diseases and any related company or government policies or actions; actions taken by the members of OPEC and Russia affecting the production and pricing of oil, as well as other domestic and global political, economic, or diplomatic developments, including any impact of the ongoing war in Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas war on the global energy markets and geopolitical stability; instability in the financial markets; inflationary pressures; higher interest rates and their impact on the cost of capital; regional supply and demand factors, including delays, curtailment delays or interruptions of production, or governmental orders, rules or regulations that impose production limits; federal and state legislative and regulatory initiatives relating to hydraulic fracturing, including the effect of existing and future laws and governmental regulations; physical and transition risks relating to climate change; those risks described in Item 1A of Diamondback’s Annual Report on Form 10-K, filed with the SEC on February 26, 2025, and those risks disclosed in its subsequent filings on Forms 10-K, 10-Q and 8-K, which can be obtained free of charge on the SEC’s website at http://www.sec.gov and Diamondback’s website at www.diamondbackenergy.com/investors.

    In light of these factors, the events anticipated by Diamondback’s forward-looking statements may not occur at the time anticipated or at all. Moreover, Diamondback operates in a very competitive and rapidly changing environment and new risks emerge from time to time. Diamondback cannot predict all risks, nor can it assess the impact of all factors on its business or the extent to which any factor, or combination of factors, may cause actual results to differ materially from those anticipated by any forward-looking statements it may make. Accordingly, you should not place undue reliance on any forward-looking statements. All forward-looking statements speak only as of the date of this letter or, if earlier, as of the date they were made. Diamondback does not intend to, and disclaims any obligation to, update or revise any forward-looking statements unless required by applicable law.

    Investor Contact:
    Adam Lawlis
    +1 432.221.7467
    alawlis@diamondbackenergy.com

    The MIL Network –

    April 17, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: Update 286 – IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

    Frequent air raid alarms, the regular sound of explosions nearby and the presence of drones are continuing to highlight the dangers facing Ukraine’s main nuclear sites during the military conflict, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said today.

    “The nuclear safety and security situation in Ukraine remains precarious. This is very clear from the daily reports of our teams on the ground. Military activities are still taking place in the vicinity of nuclear sites, putting their safety at constant risk. Our work to help prevent a nuclear accident is far from over,” Director General Grossi said.

    The IAEA continues to monitor and assess nuclear safety and security at Ukraine’s five main nuclear facilities and deliver essential equipment and other technical assistance, including medical support.

    At the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) over the past week, the IAEA team based at the site has heard explosions at varying distances almost every day, as well as occasional bursts of gunfire.

    As part of regular walkdowns across the site, the team visited the turbine halls of two reactor units, where they were again denied access to the western parts of the halls. The team also visited the site’s water treatment facility where they confirmed the arrangements for the treatment of wastewater and observed the testing of an emergency diesel generator.

    At the South Ukraine NPP, the IAEA team was informed that five drones were detected 2 km west of the site during the night of 11-12 April. From their residence, the team observed the drones and heard gunfire apparently aimed at repelling them.

    At the Chornobyl site, the IAEA team visited the New Safe Confinement and received an update on its status following the mid-February drone attack that punched a hole in the structure. Radiation levels remained normal for the area and there had been no release of radioactive substances beyond the established limits.

    Air raid alarms were heard on most days over the past week at these two sites, the IAEA teams reported.

    Over the past week, the IAEA has organised five additional deliveries of equipment as part of its efforts to help ensure nuclear safety and security, bringing the total to 130 since the start of the conflict.

    The Rivne NPP received two static test benches that had been refurbished and modernized in Germany, with funding from Norway. Plant staff also received training on the newly automated system. The benches are used to test the plant’s hydraulic shock absorbers, which reduce vibrations in coolant pumps, steam generators and other equipment essential for nuclear safety.

    Other types of equipment were delivered to Chornobyl, the Centralized Dry Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility and State Specialized Enterprise “Radon Association”, which manages radioactive waste. These deliveries were funded by the European Union, Denmark and Sweden. The Khmelnytskyy NPP received medical equipment supported with funding from Norway.

    MIL Security OSI –

    April 17, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi receives a telephone call from the President of the Republic of Finland H.E. Mr. Alexander Stubb

    Source: Government of India

    Posted On: 16 APR 2025 5:45PM by PIB Delhi

    The leaders review ongoing bilateral collaboration and reiterated commitment to  to further deepen the partnership.

    They exchanged view on regional and global issues

    Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi had a telephonic conversation with the President of the Republic of Finland H.E. Mr. Alexander Stubb today.

    The leaders reviewed the ongoing collaboration between the two countries including in the areas of digitalization, sustainability and mobility. They reiterated their commitment to further strengthen and deepen the partnership including  in the areas of quantum, 5G-6G, AI and cyber-security. 

    The leaders also exchanged the views on regional and global issues of mutual interest, including the situation in Ukraine.  President Stubb expressed Finland’s support for closer  
    India- EU relations and conclusion of a mutually beneficial FTA at the earliest.  

    The two leaders agreed to remain in touch. 

    ******

    MJPS/SR/SKS

    (Release ID: 2122157) Visitor Counter : 53

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

    April 17, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Assistance to Eastern Neighbourhood countries following the loss of USAID funding – E-001472/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001472/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Liudas Mažylis (PPE)

    Following severe cuts to or even the outright termination of USAID funding, many of the initiatives that were receiving support – including in the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood – have been left in a vulnerable position. The EU can and should take over some of their funding commitments.

    • 1.Is the Commission prepared to contribute to funding the various projects and programmes in Eastern Europe that are being terminated by USAID, if so, to what extent, what amount could be allocated to this and from what specific sources?
    • 2.How will the Commission respond to the possible suspension of humanitarian assistance to Ukraine in general, and how does the Commission plan to play a role in healthcare in the context of the conflict, in particular in the provision of prostheses for soldiers who have lost limbs?
    • 3.Will the Commission contribute to supporting Moldova, which has received a wide range of assistance through USAID and, if so, how?

    Submitted: 9.4.2025

    Last updated: 16 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 17, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Ukraine: Odesa Oblast improves emergency services with safety centre expansion, thanks to EU bank support

    Source: European Investment Bank

    EIB

    • A new building has opened at the Citizen Safety Centre in Avangard, Odesa Oblast, expanding emergency services for over 36 000 residents in the settlement and neighbouring communities.
    • Equipped to handle wartime challenges, the new facility will strengthen rescue operations, allow for on-site staff training, and provide shelter for civilians and emergency teams during air raids.
    • The facility’s construction was supported through the Ukraine Early Recovery Programme, which helps rebuild essential social infrastructure in Ukrainian communities.

    A second building has been added to the Citizen Safety Centre in Avangard, Odesa Oblast, increasing the emergency response capacity in a region regularly targeted by Russian shelling and located on key transport routes. The centre plays a vital role in firefighting, emergency response and public awareness – not only for Avangard, but for other nearby communities as well. Supported by the European Union and its financial arm, the European Investment Bank (EIB), this new building significantly increases the centre’s ability to respond to emergencies and support local residents.

    The new building will improve emergency response times by enabling faster deployment of rescue teams and equipment, thanks to indoor storage, better administrative space and increased operational capacity. It will also be a safe shelter for staff and residents during air raids, and offer social support services, including basic humanitarian assistance and information for internally displaced persons. The building features modern training facilities to support the skills development and operational readiness of emergency personnel.

    The expansion project has a total investment value of €484 000, and comes under the Ukraine Early Recovery Programme, a joint initiative of the European Union and its bank, EIB. The programme is being implemented in partnership with Ukraine’s Ministry for Development of Communities and Territories and Ministry of Finance, Odesa Oblast Military Administration and Avangard Village Council, with technical assistance from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Ukraine.

    In Odesa Oblast alone, 28 projects under EIB-backed recovery programmes are ongoing or complete, with a total investment value of €48.7 million. These include the reconstruction of 15 educational institutions, seven medical facilities, three administrative buildings, two sewage treatment facilities and a heating plant – all of which will improve services and lead to better quality of life for local residents and displaced communities.

    EIB Vice-President Teresa Czerwińska, who is responsible for the Bank’s operations in Ukraine, said, “This new facility at the Citizen Safety Centre in Avangard is a meaningful investment in the safety and resilience of Odesa Oblast. Supporting infrastructure like this is exactly what the EIB, as the bank of the European Union, is here for: to help Ukrainian communities stay strong, respond quickly and move forward with recovery.”

    Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the EU Delegation to Ukraine Rémi Duflot said, “Today’s opening of the expanded and refurbished Citizen Safety Centre in Avangard marks an important step towards strengthening local resilience and emergency response services in Odesa Oblast. Together with the EIB, we are continuing to restore essential social infrastructure across Ukraine to help communities recover in the face of Russia’s brutal aggression.”

    Deputy Prime Minister for Restoration of Ukraine – Minister for Development of Communities and Territories of Ukraine Oleksii Kuleba said, “Each new facility opened under the EIB’s recovery programmes, like today’s Citizen Safety Centre in Avangard, makes our communities stronger, more prepared and better equipped with modern solutions. Thanks to EU support, we are not only responding to today’s challenges, but also building the foundations for the longer-term recovery, development and resilience of Ukraine.”

    Head of the Odesa Oblast Military Administration Oleh Kiper said, “The expansion of the Citizen Safety Centre in Avangard is part of a broader effort to strengthen essential services and improve the daily lives of people across Odesa Oblast. With support from the EU and the EIB, 28 recovery projects are already making a real difference – from schools and hospitals to heating and water infrastructure. These investments help our communities stay resilient and move forward despite the war.”

    Head of Avangard Village Council Serhii Khrustovskyy said, “This centre stands for protection and rapid response – exactly what Odesa Oblast needs under the constant threat. I’m proud that the Avangard community is setting an example of how, with the right support, local leadership can deliver real impact.”

    UNDP Resident Representative in Ukraine Jaco Cilliers said, “Ukraine’s recovery is already underway, and we at UNDP are proud to support it through the EIB’s recovery programmes. Together, we are delivering tangible results to communities like Avangard, which can now better serve and support their residents – even under the most challenging conditions.”

    Background information

    The EIB in Ukraine 

    The EIB Group has supported Ukraine’s resilience, economy and recovery efforts since the first days of Russia’s full-scale invasion, with €2.2 billion already disbursed since 2022. The Bank continues to focus on securing Ukraine’s energy supply, restoring damaged infrastructure and maintaining essential public services across the country. Under a guarantee agreement signed with the European Commission, the EIB is set to invest at least €2 billion more in urgent recovery and reconstruction. This funding is part of the European Union’s €50 billion Ukraine Facility for 2024-2027 and is fully aligned with the priorities of the Ukrainian government.

    EIB recovery programmes in Ukraine

    Construction of the second building of the Citizen Safety Centre in Avangard, Odesa Oblast was carried out under the Ukraine Early Recovery Programme, a €200 million multisectoral framework loan from the EIB. The Bank finances three recovery programmes in all, totalling €640 million, which are provided as framework loans to the government of Ukraine. Through these programmes, Ukrainian communities gain access to financial resources to restore essential social infrastructure, including schools, kindergartens, hospitals, housing, and heating and water systems. These EIB-backed programmes are further supported by €15 million in EU grants to facilitate implementation. The Ministry for Development of Communities and Territories of Ukraine, in cooperation with the Ministry of Finance, coordinates and oversees the programme implementation, while local government bodies are responsible for managing recovery sub-projects. The UNDP in Ukraine provides technical assistance to local communities, supporting project implementation and ensuring independent monitoring for transparency and accountability. More information about these programmes is available here.

    Ukraine: Odesa Oblast improves emergency services with safety centre expansion, thanks to EU bank support
    Ukraine: Odesa Oblast improves emergency services with safety centre expansion, thanks to EU bank support
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    Ukraine: Odesa Oblast improves emergency services with safety centre expansion, thanks to EU bank support
    Ukraine: Odesa Oblast improves emergency services with safety centre expansion, thanks to EU bank support
    ©EIB
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    Ukraine: Odesa Oblast improves emergency services with safety centre expansion, thanks to EU bank support
    Ukraine: Odesa Oblast improves emergency services with safety centre expansion, thanks to EU bank support
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    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 17, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Durbin Statement On Ed Martin’s Undisclosed Appearances On Russian State Media

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Illinois Dick Durbin

    April 16, 2025

    SPRINGFIELD – U.S. Senate Democratic Whip Dick Durbin (D-IL), Ranking Member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, today released the following statement regarding reportsthat Ed Martin, President Donald Trump’s pick to be U.S. Attorney for D.C., appeared on RT and Sputnik—networks funded and directed by the Russian government—150 times as a guest commentator from August 2016 to April 2024, something he failed to disclose in his Senate Judiciary Committee questionnaire:

    “It is well-documented that Ed Martin is a Donald Trump loyalist who has embraced a Nazi sympathizer and attacked law enforcement who kept lawmakers and staff safe during the January 6 insurrection. The 150 undisclosed appearances Mr. Martin has made on Russian state media as recently as April of last year—as Russia was actively bombing Ukraine—raises further serious questions about whether he has the temperament to serve as U.S. Attorney, concerns that have been underlined by his misconduct as Interim U.S. Attorney.

    “I understand that Chairman Grassley has submitted questions to Mr. Martin in response to the issues that Committee Democrats and I raised with respect to Mr. Martin’s record, and Mr. Martin will submit responses to our written questions during this April recess. However, today’s reporting is further evidence that the Committee must hold a hearing and hear from Ed Martin directly, under oath. We must take our constitutional duty of advice and consent seriously.”

    Durbin has continuously called out Mr. Martin’s long record of objectionable statements and conduct. This includes: Mr. Martin repeatedly attacking law enforcement officers who kept members and staff safe during the January 6 insurrection and the Assistant U.S. Attorneys who were assigned to prosecute the rioters who brutally attacked police officers; Mr. Martin calling Michael Fanone, a 20-year veteran of the Metropolitan Police Department who was nearly killed on January 6, “a fake cop”; Mr. Martin advocating for “less judgment on somebody who hit a cop” on January 6; Mr. Martin repeatedly attacking prosecutors who were assigned to work on January 6 cases, calling them “terrorists” and “despicable people who decided to do something wrong”; and Mr. Martin’s close relationship with Timothy Hale-Cusanelli, a January 6 rioter and Nazi sympathizer whom he called an “extraordinary man, an extraordinary leader” who is “worthy of being listened to by lots of folks.”

    -30-

    MIL OSI USA News –

    April 17, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: Military Committee in Chiefs of Defence Session

    Source: NATO

    NATO’s highest Military Authority, the Military Committee, will meet on 14 May 2024, at the Chiefs of Defence level. The Chair of the Military Committee (CMC), will preside the meeting, with the participation of the 32 Allies, along with the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), and Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT).

    The NATO Secretary General will join the Military Committee for the opening session to address the Alliance’s key priorities and challenges.

    During the first session SACEUR will brief the Chiefs of Defence on NATO’s continued efforts to further strengthen its collective deterrence and defence posture. Allied Chiefs of Defence will also exchange views on ongoing NATO-led missions and activities, and on NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU).

    In the second session, SACT will provide an update on NATO’s Defence Planning Process, and related innovation opportunities and challenges.  

    The last session will be held in a NATO-Ukraine Council format to discuss Russia’s continued war of aggression against Ukraine, the situation on the ground, and NATO and Allied continued support to Ukraine.

    CMC will hold a press conference, upon conclusion of the meeting.
     

    Media advisory

    08:30 (CEST) Opening remarks

    • Admiral Giuseppe Cavo Dragone, Chair of the NATO Military Committee
    • NATO Secretary General, Mr. Mark Rutte

    17:45 (CEST) Press conference with Admiral Giuseppe Cavo Dragone, Chair of the NATO Military Committee

    Media coverage

    Media representatives wishing to attend the press conference are invited to contact the NATO IMS Public Affairs and Strategic Communications (PASCAD) Office via email (pascad@hq.nato.int) with a completed accreditation form no later than 1400hrs (Brussels Time) on Monday, 5 May 2025.

    Download media accreditation forms: English, French

    Once approved, media passes will not be mailed to applicants, but must be collected in person at the Guard House South, NATO Headquarters, Boulevard Leopold III, Brussels, upon presentation of a valid ID card / passport, along with a valid national Press pass (or accreditation letter from a recognized media organisation), and a copy of the confirmation email of successful accreditation.

    Passes must be always worn visibly during the stay at NATO Headquarters. Security personnel may ask to check another form of ID, at any time. Media representatives are informed that security personnel will examine and may test equipment and personal effects carried onto the site. Media representatives are also advised to arrive at NATO Headquarters with sufficient lead-time to complete their in-processing.

    The opening remarks delivered by the NATO Chair of the NATO Military Committee and the NATO Secretary General will be streamed live on the NATO website. 

    The press conference will also be streamed live on the NATO website and the live feed will be provided to EBU.

    Video footage will be available for free download from the NATO Multimedia Portal after the event.

    Imagery

    Following each event, photos, video and audio files will be made available on the Military Committee in Chiefs of Defence Session (MCCS) event page.

    Social media

    Latest information and photos from the MCCS will be posted on the following X accounts: @CMC_NATO  and  @NATO_PASCAD.

    Please use the hashtags #NATOCHoDs and #NATOMC when posting about the NATO Military Committee.

    Media enquiries

    Capt (N) Giovanni Galoforo, Public Affairs and Strategic Communications Advisor to the NATO Military Committee and the NATO International Military Staff.
    Tel: +32 2 707 5983
    E-Mail: Galoforo.Giovanni@hq.nato.int

    Cdr Grzegorz Łyko, Deputy Public Affairs and Strategic Communications Advisor to the NATO Military Committee and the NATO International Military Staff.
    Tel: + 32 477 57 07 46    
    E-Mail: lyko.grzegorz@hq.nato.int

    Find more background information about the NATO Military Committee

    MIL Security OSI –

    April 17, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: How could Canada deter an invasion? Nukes and mandatory military service

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Aisha Ahmad, Associate Professor, Political Science, University of Toronto

    United States President Donald Trump has been loud and clear. America’s liberal democratic allies cannot rely on the U.S. to protect them.

    Trump has also suggested using illegal force to achieve his own imperialist ambitions, even against former allies.

    Message received.

    Canadians and Europeans understand the American partnership is over.

    They’re now processing the implications of America’s apparent democratic collapse for global security.

    Does Trump’s stance mean that liberal democracies are now vulnerable to invasions, annexations and theft of natural resources? Yes, it does.




    Read more:
    An American military invasion of Canada? No longer unthinkable, but highly unlikely


    International security scholarship shows that, unless they are deterred, predatory superpowers use force to seize territory and natural resources for the purpose of aggrandizement.

    While an invasion of Canada is not imminent, the threats to democratic nations are now fully detectable and predictable.

    The responsible time to deter these threats is right now.

    Asymmetric deterrence

    Deterrence works when the imposed cost of an action is higher than its expected benefit. That means a hostile power won’t attack Canada if the risks of invasion are higher than the value of seizing our natural resources.

    Given that Canada is extremely resource-rich, that’s a challenge.

    While the Canadian government can make smart choices on military procurement, there is little any Canadian leader can do to transform the Canadian Armed Forces into a superpower army.

    Even if Canada redirected every penny of its budget to defence spending, it could not catch up with American, Russian or Chinese military power. Given this asymmetry, is deterrence possible?

    Absolutely.

    To get there, Canada must take two big steps: first, adopt a “whole-of-society” defence system to protect the homeland; and second, contribute to a democratic nuclear umbrella.




    Read more:
    Amid U.S. threats, Canada’s national security plans must include training in non-violent resistance


    Whole-of-society defence

    In “whole-of-society” defence, all citizens play a role in national security and emergency response. This approach requires mandatory military service and nationwide civil defence preparations.

    Whole-of-society defence not only improves societal resilience, but it also scares away potential invaders.

    Ordinary citizens can in fact defeat superpowers using nothing more than small arms and light weapons. The U.S. and Russia have both been trounced in the past by well-armed resistance movements.

    For a power-drunk dictator, whole-of-society defence is a sobering reality check.

    The presence of a large, well-armed and well-trained domestic population promises invaders a bloody, expensive and protracted ground war. That means high risks, low rewards, skyrocketing costs and decades-long timelines.

    That’s enough to deter a predatory superpower.




    Read more:
    Why annexing Canada would destroy the United States


    Many of Canada’s democratic allies have already embraced whole-of-society defence. Norway, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland all have mandatory military service and civil defence, and sensible gun regulations that allow law-abiding citizens to contribute to national security.

    Canada has every reason to adopt the Scandinavian approach to national defence, including mandatory military and civil service and the removal of some restrictions on Canadian firearms. An excellent model to consider is Sweden’s brand new “Total Defence” system.

    Norwegians, Finns and Swedes are peaceful people who have learned to survive next to a dangerous superpower. Canadians must look at their own vulnerabilities and see the logic and wisdom behind the Scandinavian approach.

    A democratic nuclear umbrella

    Although the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty prohibits nuclear weapons development, the Trump administration’s utter disdain for democratic allies has prompted a global rethink. Trump has demanded NATO countries stop relying on the U.S. military and spend more on their own defence.

    Nuclear weapons acquisition complies with his demand.

    Germany and Poland have reopened the nuclear debate, but most European democracies lack the materials to develop their own weapons. Instead, they are looking to France and the United Kingdom to create a new European nuclear umbrella.

    Some Canadians hope the U.K. and French umbrellas could protect Canada, too.

    That’s the wrong mentality.

    The U.K. and France have a combined 515 nuclear weapons. Russia has 5,580.

    Instead of asking the U.K. and France to further stretch their limited arsenals, Canada could step up and contribute to the solution.

    Canada is already a nuclear-threshold state with both the know-how and raw materials to develop a nuclear weapon. It would take time and money, but Canada is in a better position to help than most other European countries.

    Once across the nuclear threshold, Canada would have a bulletproof defence of its homeland. It could then work with the U.K. and France as an equal and reliable partner, contributing to a democratic nuclear umbrella to protect vulnerable allies.

    This would require formal withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but that action doesn’t need to be provocative or unilateral. Canada could co-ordinate its withdrawal with European allies as part of a collective defence of liberal democracies.

    In the face of rising tyranny and superpower conquest, Canada can either choose to be a burden on its overstretched French and British allies or a source of renewed safety for its democratic friends.

    Defending democracy

    Deterrence is hard work, but it is infinitely better than the horrors of invasion.

    Mandatory military service and nuclear weapons may be new ideas for Canadians, but other friendly democracies have been using these strategies for decades.

    The good news is that successful deterrence means stability and peace, so citizens can relax and carry on with their lives. Canadians want this safety for themselves, and for their allies, too.

    The time for Canada to act is now, when threats are foreseeable but not imminent. Waiting until an army amasses at the border is too late.

    To deter aggression, Canadians need to step up and be a little more like their Scandinavian, British and French allies. That is the price of continued freedom.

    Aisha Ahmad receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

    – ref. How could Canada deter an invasion? Nukes and mandatory military service – https://theconversation.com/how-could-canada-deter-an-invasion-nukes-and-mandatory-military-service-253414

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    April 17, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: Joint press statement

    Source: NATO

    (As delivered)

    President Zelenskyy, Dear Volodymyr,
    It is important for me to be standing next to you today in Odesa, a city that has been under constant attack throughout Russia’s war against Ukraine. 

    Only this weekend, Russia attacked residential buildings and a hospital here with kamikaze drones. Today we both visited a hospital where I talked with some of the people injured in the war.

    Just two days ago, in Sumy on Palm Sunday –the holiest day in the Christian calendar –  two Russian ballistic missiles killed over 30 civilians – men, women, children. 
    Over 100 were injured – many seriously.
    This is simply outrageous. It’s part of a terrible pattern of Russia attacking civilian targets and infrastructure across Ukraine. Even hundreds of hospitals and medical workers have been targeted over the last years.

    I am here today because I believe Ukraine’s people deserve real peace – real safety and security in their country. In their homes.
    My heart goes out to the people of Ukraine. 
    Those who lost loved ones in these recent strikes. And so many over the years. 
    Those who have been injured. Or lost their homes. Or had their dreams shattered by this unjust and unlawful war. 

    So I am here with you today, dear Volodymyr, 
    To affirm to you and the Ukrainian people this simple message: 
    NATO stands with Ukraine. 

    You and I know that this has been true all along.
    I also know that some have called NATO’s support into question in the last couple of months. 
    But let there be no doubt. 
    Our support is unwavering. 

    NATO continues to provide political and practical support for Ukraine by delivering security assistance and training through our command in Wiesbaden. And we work closely together in Kyiv and in Brussels. 

    What’s more, just in the first three months of 2025, NATO Allies have already pledged more than 20 billion euros in security assistance for Ukraine this year. 
    Our commitment is clear – and concrete.
    We saw further contributions as you rightly said from Allies during the latest Ramstein meeting that was held in Brussels on Friday

    Our support to Ukraine is designed to ensure that your country is strong and sovereign. Able to defend today and to deter any future aggression. 
    All of this to underpin the efforts towards a just and lasting peace. 

    Indeed, today we again spoke about the important talks that President Trump is leading with Ukraine as well as with Russia to try to end the war and secure a durable peace. 
    These discussions are not easy – not least in the wake of this horrific violence –  but we all support President Trump’s push for peace. 

    Other Allies – including through efforts led by France and the United Kingdom – are ready, willing and able to shoulder more responsibility in helping to secure a peace when the time comes.

    So let me say again – to the people of Ukraine.
    We stand with you. 
    And look forward to a day that the brave men and women of this incredible country can enjoy freedom without fear. 
    So dear Volodymyr, thank you for inviting me here today. I am grateful for your leadership, for our friendship, and for our continued cooperation. 

    Slava Ukraini.

    Question: I have one question for both of you but in different forms. First of all today Mr. Witkoff said that the peace agreement that is being discussed as we understand with Russia includes some five territories , there is no NATO, there is no five article. That is why I have a different question to you. Mr General Secretary do you understand what Russia and America discussed about NATO without you and what it means for NATO, for Ukraine and for all the world? (continues in Ukrainian)

    Mark Rutte, NATO Secretary General: Let me first say that I want to commend President Trump for breaking the deadlock and starting these talks about peace in Ukraine. I think this is important because we have seen so many people die, we have seen so many cities being destroyed, the infrastructure having been targeted by the Russians so I think this is an important effort. And I have decided not to comment on all the intermediate stages of this whole process because I do not want to interfere with the peace process. Whatever we do when it comes to helping here we do as discreetly as possible and I cannot comment on this in the press. I am sorry.

    Question: Mr Secretary General thank you for being here. The first question to you is, is there any information you could disclose on the update of the naval deployment of the coalition of the willing for securing of the Black Sea security situation? (Continues in Ukrainian)

    Mark Rutte, NATO Secretary General: NATO is involved in a couple of these talks. We are of course following closely with our American friends, the initiatives by President Trump to bring Ukraine and Russia to a ceasefire and we support those efforts. Then through our command in Wiesbaden, so-called NSATU, we are working with Ukraine. And you had a visit last week of the French and the British senior officers here in Ukraine to discuss, going forward, what will be the best format to organise the Ukrainian armed forces for the future. Of course it will also help now with the fight against the Russians but also for the long term future. Because that will, in any case, be the first line of deterrence  to make sure that whenever a peace deal is struck/a ceasefire is agreed, that the Ukrainian armed forces are, as the first line of deterrence, capable and able long term to defend the country. And there are initiatives ongoing, and I think you are particularly now referring to what the French and the Brits are working on through the Coalition of the Willing. And we are also very much, of course, part of those talks and trying to advise wherever we can these discussions in the right direction. And I am very happy that the French and the Brits took this initiative to make sure that when, as a first line of defence, you have the Ukrainian armed forces, post a peace deal/ceasefire, that there might be more necessary to make sure that Putin will never ever ever ever try this again. Because nobody wants to get back to a situation of Minsk 2014, where you think you have a sort of peace deal but basically it is not strong enough, it is not holding and Putin tries this again. And whenever we come to a conclusion of this terrible war, it has to be clear to Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin that he can never ever try again to capture one square kilometre or one square mile of Ukraine. So that is why the French, the Brits and others are discussing what we need more, on top of Ukrainian armed forces going forward, to make sure that that guarantee is there. This is all still being debated. It will also depend, it is my absolute conviction, on the exact outcome of a peace deal/a ceasefire and hopefully a strong combination of the two. What exactly will be that format and how it will work and who will do what, etc. These talks are ongoing. As we are preparing for that hopeful soon-to-be-achieved eventuality, I hope of course that NATO tries to steer that in the direction we think will be advisory.

    (response from President Zelenskyy in Ukrainian)

    Mark Rutte, NATO Secretary General: maybe I can add one sentence that Türkiye has in 2022 already successfully agreed a ceasefire on the grain deal, they agreed to a grain deal in 2022, so let’s be positive about the fact that Türkiye again tries to bring together all relevant parties and let’s hope they are successful.

    Question: in Ukrainian

    Mark Rutte, NATO Secretary General: Yes they are the aggressor. Let me be very clear. Russia is the aggressor. Russia started this war and there is no doubt.

    MIL Security OSI –

    April 17, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Christophe Kamp visits Ukraine, reiterates support for legislative and institutional framework on national minority issues

    Source: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe – OSCE

    Headline: OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Christophe Kamp visits Ukraine, reiterates support for legislative and institutional framework on national minority issues

    OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Christophe Kamp visits Ukraine, reiterates support for legislative and institutional framework on national minority issues | OSCE
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    Home Newsroom News and press releases OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Christophe Kamp visits Ukraine, reiterates support for legislative and institutional framework on national minority issues

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 17, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Nations: 16 April 2025 Departmental update Country-level champions meet to strengthen interagency coordination of mental health and psychosocial support across humanitarian emergencies

    Source: World Health Organisation

    In February 2025, the co-chairs of mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS) Technical Working Groups (TWGs) from humanitarian emergencies around the world gathered in Ethiopia for a global meeting to strengthen interagency coordination and share country-level experiences.

    Hosted by WHO Ethiopia and convened by the IASC MHPSS Reference Group, the meeting brought together 40 MHPSS leaders from 29 emergency settings, including Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lebanon, Mali, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, and the occupied Palestinian territories.

    The four-day strategic forum provided an opportunity for participants to exchange practical approaches to coordination, identify common challenges, and explore solutions to strengthen MHPSS service delivery in crisis settings. It also reinforced the importance of country-led leadership, peer learning, and interagency collaboration in advancing the MHPSS agenda in emergencies. The IASC MHPSS Reference Group serves as a global platform and is the highest level of humanitarian coordination in MHPSS. It is co-chaired by WHO and IFRC and comprises 65 member organizations, including NGOs, UN agencies, international agencies, and academics.

    This was this was the second meeting of its kind organized by the Reference Group, following the first held in Ukraine in 2019. The wide geographic representation and diversity of agency and sectors contributed to productive discussions and exchanges. Participants rated the meeting highly, highlighting the value of the interactive sessions, peer learning opportunities, and combination of theoretical learning, real-world case study exercises to practice skills, and  one-on-one consultation clinics with global and country-level technical experts.

    Global MHPSS TWG Meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 3-6 Feb 2025 – packed with sessions on multisectoral deep dives, tool and method highlights, country experiences, consultations, technical insights, team building and learnings, and interactive exercises on technical topics such as IASC tools including the MHPSS Minimum Service Package, MHPSS coordination, mapping, monitoring and evaluation, assessments, etc.

    In the same week, an MHPSS global-national forum was organized to capitalize on the presence of international MHPSS country leaders and engage national professionals in Ethiopia dedicated to enhancing MHPSS in humanitarian crises. The event, organized by IASC MHPSS RG and WHO Ethiopia, featured a series of high-level and technical interventions focused on ways to strengthen MHPSS coordination and service delivery, particularly in Ethiopia, and globally. Speakers included the WHO Representative to Ethiopia, the IASC MHPSS RG Co-chairs from WHO and IFRC, TWG chairs, and representatives from Africa CDC, UNICEF, ECHO, the Embassy of the Netherlands, country offices of partner agencies. 

    Following the Global MHPSS TWG meeting, an Academic Writing training was held from February 8 to 9. This training, convened by the IASC MHPSS RG and hosted by ARQ International, and co-organized by WHO, the UK Public Health Rapid Support Team and Intervention journal, brought together MHPSS experts to support the development of country-led, evidence-based documentation and publications. Participants took part in theoretical presentations, interactive exercises, and dedicated writing time, covering essential topics such as formulating working titles, pitching ideas, drafting outlines, navigating the publication process, and leveraging AI tools. Ongoing technical support is being provided to assist participants in finalizing and submitting their publications. 

    MHPSS Academic Writing Training, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 8-9 Feb 2025

    Together, the global meeting, national forum, and academic writing training represented a coordinated effort to strengthen MHPSS leadership, collaboration, and evidence generation in humanitarian settings. These events underscored the value of sustained investment in interagency coordination and knowledge sharing to improve mental health and psychosocial support for people affected by crises.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

    April 17, 2025
  • MIL-Evening Report: Poll shows Australians hate Trump policies and have lost trust in US, but still strongly believe in alliance

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of Canberra

    Australians strongly disagree with key policies of US President Donald Trump, and have overwhelmingly lost trust in the United States to act responsibly in the world, according to the Lowy Institute’s 2025 poll.

    Despite this, 80% of people say the alliance is “very” or “fairly” important for Australia’s security, only fractionally down on last year’s 83%.

    The poll also found people nearly evenly divided on whether Peter Dutton (35%) or Anthony Albanese (34%) would be the better leader to manage Australia’s relations with Trump.

    But Albanese rated much more strongly than Dutton as better able to manage Australia’s relationship with China and President Xi Jinping (45% to 25%).

    Albanese was also well ahead (41%-29%) when people were asked who would be more competent at handling Austrlaia’s foreign policy over the next three years.

    The poll comes as the “Trump effect” has overshadowed the campaign, and increasingly worked against Dutton. Labor has cast Dutton as having looked to the US for policies, such as his proposed cuts to the public service. It has labelled him “DOGEy Dutton”, a reference to Elon Musk’s so-called Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE).

    The Lowy poll of 2,117 people was taken between March 3 and 16. This was after Trump had announced plans for a 25% tariff on steel and aluminium imports, and other tariffs, but before his “Liberation Day” regime which saw a 10% general tariff hitting all countries.

    Trust in the US has plummeted since the last Lowy poll in 2024, with nearly two-thirds of respondents (64%) having little or no trust in the US to act responsibly in the world, compared with 44% a year before.

    This is a new low in the poll’s two-decade history. Trust fell dramatically among older voters. Trust was already relatively low among younger voters, and fell by a smaller margin.

    On various Trump stances, the poll found Australians most disapproving (89%) of Trump’s pressure on Denmark to sell or or hand over its self-governing territory of Greenland to the US.

    More than eight in ten (81%) disapproved of Trump’s use of tariffs to pressure other countries to comply with his administration’s objectives.

    Three-quarters disapproved of the US withdrawing from the World Health Organization (76%) and from international climate change agreements (74%).

    In addition, three-quarters (74%) disapproved of Trump negotiating a deal on the future of Ukraine with Russian President Vladimir Putin that might require Ukraine to accept a loss of territory. The dramatic Oval Office showdown between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US Vice President JD Vance took place just before the survey.

    Australians also disapproved of the US cutting spending on foreign aid (64%) and undertaking mass deportations of undocumented migrants (56%).

    On Trump’s demand that US allies spend more on defence people were, however, evenly divided (49% approved/disapproved).

    Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Poll shows Australians hate Trump policies and have lost trust in US, but still strongly believe in alliance – https://theconversation.com/poll-shows-australians-hate-trump-policies-and-have-lost-trust-in-us-but-still-strongly-believe-in-alliance-254587

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

    April 17, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Draganfly Establishes Public Safety Advisory Board, Appoints Homeland Security and Law Enforcement Expert Paul Goldenberg as Chair

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Industry Veteran Joins Draganfly to Drive Innovation at the Intersection of Public Safety and Technology

    Tampa, FL, April 16, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Draganfly Inc. (NASDAQ: DPRO) (CSE: DPRO) (FSE: 3U8) (“Draganfly” or the “Company”), an industry-leading developer of drone solutions and systems, is proud to announce the formation of its Public Safety Advisory Board. This new initiative reinforces Draganfly’s commitment to delivering cutting-edge, mission-critical technologies that support enforcement and public safety agencies worldwide. Renowned global public safety expert and Homeland Security advisor Paul Goldenberg will serve as the inaugural Chair of the Board.

    With more than 30 years of experience in law enforcement, global security, and national intelligence, Goldenberg brings unparalleled expertise to the role. Recently named America’s Most Influential Person in Homeland Security, he has advised U.S. Presidents, members of Congress, and international security bodies on counterterrorism, cybercrime, and public safety. As a former senior member of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC), Goldenberg led pivotal initiatives, including the DHS Cybersecurity Task Force and the Countering Foreign Influence Task Force. He currently serves as Chief Advisor for Policy and International Policing at the Rutgers University Miller Center on Policing, a Distinguished Visiting Fellow for Transnational Security at the University of Ottawa, and a member of the National Sheriffs’ Association Southern Border Security Committee.

    Goldenberg’s career also includes directing the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) transitional policing mission, working on the ground in regions such as Kosovo, Bosnia, Ukraine, and France. His efforts focused on strengthening police responses to extremism and fostering collaboration between law enforcement agencies and vulnerable communities.

    “Draganfly’s commitment to utilizing technology to enhance public safety and law enforcement aligns with my lifelong mission to improve security and foster trust between agencies and the communities they serve,” said Goldenberg. “Given the challenges law enforcement agencies face, including recruitment and retention issues, drones have become an invaluable tool that helps officers protect both themselves and the communities they serve.”

    Cameron Chell, CEO of Draganfly, emphasized the significance of Goldenberg’s appointment:
    “Paul’s vast experience in homeland security, counterterrorism, and law enforcement makes him the ideal choice to lead our Public Safety Advisory Board. His leadership will be instrumental in advancing Draganfly’s mission to deliver innovative, AI-powered drone technologies that improve situational awareness and operational efficiency for law enforcement agencies across the globe.”

    Goldenberg’s past roles have included serving as the first Chief of the New Jersey Attorney General’s Office for Hate Crime and Domestic Terrorism Investigations, managing major organized crime cases, spending six years deep undercover as part of the South Florida Task Force, and leading one of the United States’ largest social service and juvenile justice systems. His work has directly influenced modern policing strategies and shaped national and international policy.

    The creation of Draganfly’s Public Safety Advisory Board marks a pivotal step in the Company’s continued efforts to strengthen public safety and law enforcement capabilities, offering innovative solutions that support officers in the field.

    About Draganfly

    Draganfly Inc. (NASDAQ: DPRO; CSE: DPRO; FSE: 3U8A) is a pioneer in drone solutions, AI-driven software, and robotics. With over 25 years of innovation, Draganfly has been at the forefront of drone technology, providing solutions for public safety, agriculture, industrial inspections, security, mapping, and surveying. The Company is committed to delivering efficient, reliable, and industry-leading technology that helps organizations save time, money, and lives.

    For more information, visit www.draganfly.com.

    For investor details, visit:
    CSE
    NASDAQ
    FRANKFURT

    Media Contact
    media@draganfly.com

    Company Contact
    info@draganfly.com

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This release contains certain “forward looking statements” and certain “forward-looking ‎‎‎‎information” as ‎‎‎‎defined under applicable securities laws. Forward-looking statements ‎‎‎‎and information can ‎‎‎‎generally be identified by the use of forward-looking terminology such as ‎‎‎‎‎“may”, “will”, “expect”, “intend”, ‎‎‎‎‎“estimate”, “anticipate”, “believe”, “continue”, “plans” or similar ‎‎‎‎terminology. Forward-looking statements ‎‎‎‎and information are based on forecasts of future ‎‎‎‎results, estimates of amounts not yet determinable and ‎‎‎‎assumptions that, while believed by ‎‎‎‎management to be reasonable, are inherently subject to significant ‎‎‎‎business, economic and ‎‎‎‎competitive uncertainties and contingencies. Forward-looking statements ‎‎‎‎include, but are not ‎‎‎‎limited to, statements with respect to the Public Safety Advisory Board advancing Draganfly’s mission to deliver innovative, AI-powered drone technologies that improve situational awareness and operational efficiency for law enforcement agencies across the globe. Forward-‎‎‎‎looking statements and information are subject to various ‎known ‎‎and unknown risks and ‎‎‎‎‎uncertainties, many of which are beyond the ability of the Company to ‎control or ‎‎predict, that ‎‎‎‎may cause ‎the Company’s actual results, performance or achievements to be ‎materially ‎‎different ‎‎‎‎from those ‎expressed or implied thereby, and are developed based on assumptions ‎about ‎‎such ‎‎‎‎risks, uncertainties ‎and other factors set out here in, including but not limited to: the potential ‎‎‎‎‎‎‎impact of epidemics, ‎pandemics or other public health crises, including the ‎COVID-19 pandemic, on the Company’s business, operations and financial ‎‎‎‎condition; the ‎‎‎successful integration of ‎technology; the inherent risks involved in the general ‎‎‎‎securities markets; ‎‎‎uncertainties relating to the ‎availability and costs of financing needed in the ‎‎‎‎future; the inherent ‎‎‎uncertainty of cost estimates; the ‎potential for unexpected costs and ‎‎‎‎expenses, currency ‎‎‎fluctuations; regulatory restrictions; and liability, ‎competition, loss of key ‎‎‎‎employees and other related risks ‎‎‎and uncertainties disclosed under the ‎heading “Risk Factors“ ‎‎‎‎in the Company’s most recent filings filed ‎‎‎with securities regulators in Canada on ‎the SEDAR ‎‎‎‎website at www.sedar.com and with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) on EDGAR through the SEC’s website at www.sec.gov. The Company undertakes ‎‎‎no obligation to update forward-‎looking ‎‎‎‎information except as required by applicable law. Such forward-‎‎‎looking information represents ‎‎‎‎‎managements’ best judgment based on information currently available. ‎‎‎No forward-looking ‎‎‎‎statement ‎can be guaranteed and actual future results may vary materially. ‎‎‎Accordingly, readers ‎‎‎‎are advised not to ‎place undue reliance on forward-looking statements or ‎‎‎information.‎

    The MIL Network –

    April 16, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Trade liberalisation with Ukraine – E-001455/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001455/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Waldemar Buda (ECR)

    The current agreement on the temporary suspension of import duties and quotas on Ukrainian exports to the EU – struck to support Ukraine’s economy in the face of Russian aggression – expires on 5 June 2025. The Commission has made it clear that rather than prolonging this temporary measure, it aims to find a permanent solution for liberalisation of trade with Ukraine by revising Article 29 of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement[1]. However, little has been shared about the state of play and progress in negotiations with Ukraine.

    Clarity on the situation is needed, also for the economic stability of Member States, particularly these bordering Ukraine.

    • 1.What is the current state of play and how are negotiations with Ukraine on Article 29 of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement progressing?
    • 2.With less than two months left before the current temporary measures expire and no agreement on the permanent solution in sight, what is the Commission’s backup plan?
    • 3.How will the Commission ensure the right balance and adequate protection of European industry and agriculture?

    Submitted: 9.4.2025

    • [1] Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2014/295/oj.
    Last updated: 16 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 16, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Tariff rate quota system with Ukraine – E-001473/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001473/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Anna Bryłka (PfE)

    In connection with the ongoing work on a new trade agreement with Ukraine, the Commission has announced that it is preparing a new tariff rate quota system with a different structure to the one currently in force.

    Please provide full information on the type of quota system being prepared by the Commission, along with a timetable for the development of the new agreement.

    Submitted: 9.4.2025

    Last updated: 16 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 16, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Europe’s elderly need migrant caregivers – whether we like it or not

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Zuzanna Marciniak-Nuqui, Senior Analyst, RAND Europe

    Yuri A/Shutterstock

    Who will care for your ageing relatives when you can’t? It’s a question that many families in Europe are having to answer, as demographic changes caused by Europe’s ageing populations become more deeply embedded.

    As loved ones get older or face long-term illnesses and disabilities, the demand for care is skyrocketing. But the workforce isn’t keeping up. One in five Europeans is already 65 or older, and by 2050, that number will hit 30%. This demographic shift will drive a 23.5% increase in demand for long-term care workers – but where will they come from?

    Right now, the numbers don’t add up. Europe’s long-term care sector employs around 6.3 million people, yet there is already a massive shortfall of carers. Millions of families are stepping in, with 44 million Europeans – mostly women – providing unpaid, informal care for elderly relatives. This burden is neither sufficiently acknowledged nor sustainable. Our recent research shows the extent to which migrant care workers bridge this gap.

    Across the EU, nearly 10% of long-term care workers are foreign-born. Some come from within the EU, but many arrive from South America (20%), Africa (12%), and Asia (10%). Once in Europe, they plug a critical gap in the care system, taking on jobs that local workers won’t or can’t do.

    Despite their essential role, migrant care workers frequently suffer poor treatment. Many work on temporary contracts, earning lower wages than their European counterparts and contending with exploitative conditions. Some work in undeclared jobs, leading to informal roles with no legal protections, making them vulnerable to abuse.

    In Norway, migrant carers tend to be given lower-status jobs, even when their qualifications match or exceed those of their local colleagues. They are also perceived as less professional, despite their experience and training. In Germany, a family hiring a Polish caregiver through an agency was shocked to learn she received just €1,000 (£860) per month, while they were paying €2,800 (£2400) – with the agency pocketing the difference.

    In some EU countries, restrictive immigration policies make things harder for migrant care workers. In Cyprus and Malta, for example, migrant care workers on temporary visas are denied access to social benefits, even after years of service. Many also struggle with language barriers, making it harder to assert their rights or have their qualifications recognised.

    Labour shortages

    Nearly all EU countries face critical labour shortages in long-term care. The problem is worse in lower-income EU countries, where attracting and retaining care workers is more difficult. Low wages and difficult working conditions make these jobs unattractive to locals, pushing many to seek employment in western European countries with better pay.

    The disparities are stark. In the Netherlands, long-term care workers earn 96% of the national average hourly wage. In Bulgaria, it is just 62%. Many eastern European and Baltic states also suffer from a lack of home care services, forcing families to rely on underfunded nursing homes or informal, unregulated care.

    shutterstock.
    M-Production/Shutterstock

    The European Commission introduced the skills and talents package in 2022, to improve conditions and legal migration processes for workers in sectors with shortages. This included a proposal for the EU Talent Pool – a digital platform to connect employers in the EU with skilled workers from non-EU countries. The European Parliament’s civil liberties committee endorsed the plan in March of this year, paving the way for a new approach to international recruitment.

    If properly implemented, this initiative could help fill Europe’s care workforce gap and provide a legal, structured pathway for skilled migrants to join the sector. But public resistance to migration remains a huge barrier.

    Anti-immigration sentiment

    Europeans want their elderly relatives to receive quality care, but many are unwilling to accept that foreign workers are one of the ways to make that happen. This tension between public attitudes and economic realities threatens the future of long-term care in Europe.

    Research shows that western European Millennials (born 1982–1991) are now more anti-immigrant than those born between 1952–1961.

    The EU recognises the need for foreign workers, yet politicians are reluctant to make the case publicly. Public attitudes towards migration remain deeply divided, with preference often given to migrants from other EU countries or from Ukraine, following Russia’s 2022 invasion.




    Read more:
    What Britons and Europeans really think about immigration – new analysis


    The EU’s reliance on migrant care workers will only increase in the coming decades. However, simply recruiting more foreign workers is not a sustainable solution unless the system itself changes.

    Several measures could help ensure that migrant care workers receive fair treatment. Firstly, introducing a specific care visa for non-EU workers would ensure they have legal status and job security. Stronger legal protections against exploitative contracts and unfair wages are necessary. And making it easier to recognise foreign qualifications would allow skilled workers to take on roles that better match their experience.

    Fairer wages and working conditions are essential to attract and retain both migrant and local workers. International cooperation between the EU and third countries could also create ethical, regulated migration pathways.

    The bottom line is this: Europe’s population is getting older, and without migrant workers, millions of families will struggle to find care for their loved ones. Europe must support and protect workers, both migrant and local, in the care system for its own sake.

    The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Europe’s elderly need migrant caregivers – whether we like it or not – https://theconversation.com/europes-elderly-need-migrant-caregivers-whether-we-like-it-or-not-250121

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    April 16, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Moldova and Ukraine: Strengthening energy resilience in the face of extreme weather with OSCE workshop in Chisinau

    Source: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe – OSCE

    Headline: Moldova and Ukraine: Strengthening energy resilience in the face of extreme weather with OSCE workshop in Chisinau

    Participants in an OSCE workshop on strengthening energy resilience in the face of extreme weather in Chisinau, 14 April 2025. (OSCE) Photo details

    As extreme weather events become more frequent and climate conditions continue to evolve, the energy sectors face increasing risks. From heatwaves straining power grids to storms damaging infrastructure and climate variability disrupting natural resources, these challenges add uncertainty to energy diversification and transition efforts.
    To help Moldova and Ukraine build resilience in the face of these growing threats, the OSCE held a workshop on 14 and 15 April in Chisinau, Moldova: “Building Energy System Resilience Against Extreme Weather and Evolving Conditions in Moldova and Ukraine: Modelling and its Applications for Energy Planning”.
    The event brought together more than 40 experts and decision-makers from Moldova and Ukraine, including Moldova’s State Secretaries for Energy and Environment and Ukraine’s Deputy Minister of Energy. Participants explored how to assess climate vulnerabilities in critical energy infrastructure and integrate climate risks into energy planning, security, and transition strategies.
    A key focus of the workshop was improving access to downscaled climate data: detailed, localized projections essential for protecting energy infrastructure and informing policy and investment decisions. Through a partnership with Argonne National Laboratory, the OSCE provided participants with critical high-resolution datasets and modelling tools to support science-based decision-making.
    Attendees were also trained on how to use this granular data to evaluate risks and opportunities across the energy sector. This support strengthens the capacity of both countries to plan for future climate scenarios and protect vital energy systems.
    This workshop is the first in a series of regional trainings under the OSCE’s project “Mitigating Climate Change Threats to the Energy Sector in the OSCE Region”, set to continue throughout 2025 and 2026.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 16, 2025
  • MIL-OSI China: Zelensky meets Rutte on Ukrainian, European security

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met on Tuesday with visiting North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Secretary General Mark Rutte to discuss Ukrainian and European security, the presidential press service reported.

    At the meeting in Ukraine’s southern city of Odesa, Zelensky and Rutte discussed various formats of cooperation between Ukraine and NATO member states, including in Ramstein format.

    The talks also focused on Ukraine’s relations with the U.S. and Washington’s efforts in negotiations with Russia.

    The report said Zelensky accused Russia of “ignoring the U.S. proposal for a full ceasefire” and continuing its strikes on Ukraine.

    Emphasizing the need to strengthen Ukraine’s air defense, Zelensky voiced hope for the implementation of air defense-related agreements with partners in Europe and the U.S.

    He also noted that the UK, France, and other NATO countries are actively laying the foundation for a security contingent in Ukraine.

    For his part, Rutte reaffirmed that the alliance will continue to stand with Ukraine.

    According to him, in the first three months of this year, NATO member states pledged over 20 billion euros (about 22.5 billion U.S. dollars) in security assistance to Ukraine for 2025.

    MIL OSI China News –

    April 16, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Rep. Doggett and Other House Democrats Introduce Major Russian Sanctions, Ukraine Assistance Bill

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Lloyd Doggett (D-TX)

    Contact: Alexis.Torres@mail.house.gov

    Washington, D.C.—As President Trump defends Russia’s deadliest attack against Ukrainian civilians this year and continues to parrot Kremlin propaganda blaming Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky for starting the war, U.S. Representatives Lloyd Doggett (D-TX); Gregory W. Meeks (D-NY), Ranking Member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee; Steny Hoyer (D-MD), former Majority Leader; William Keating (D-MA), Ranking Member of the Europe Subcommittee; and Gerry Connolly (D-VA), Ranking Member of the Oversight and Government Reform Committee, introduced a comprehensive bill to support Ukraine and thwart Russia’s ability to wage its brutal, illegal war. 

    Specifically, the legislative package imposes numerous sanctions and other economic measures against Russia, sustains defensive security assistance to Ukraine, generates resources for post-war reconstruction, and overrides presidential actions to terminate existing sanctions without cause. The bill would also enact new sanctions and export control authorities to place additional pressure on Russia, including to curb tankers carrying Russian oil above the international price cap and to ensure dual-use controls on semiconductors and other technologies that could be used to support Russia’s weapons capabilities.

    The morning after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine three years ago, which is now the deadliest war in Europe since World War II, Rep. Doggett filed the first sanctions legislation against Russia and remains a steadfast, ironclad supporter of Ukrainians in their fight for freedom. This legislative package builds on his bill banning Russian energy that was signed into law and includes two provisions he authored to strengthen the current ban on Russian petroleum products laundered into the United States and leverage frozen Russian sovereign assets to establish a reconstruction trust fund for Ukraine.

     A section-by-section of the legislation can be found here. A PDF of the bill can be found here.

    “I’m pleased to join this comprehensive bill, including provisions I authored to stop laundered Russian oil imports and to use frozen Russian assets for compensation to Ukrainians. We support Ukraine and reaffirm our recognition of Putin as a war criminal with sole responsibility for the war. And we strongly reject appeasement by Trump and his Republican enablers of Putin, who should bear the ever-mounting costs of his ongoing destruction. The world is watching whether America will remain a beacon of hope, standing with our democratic allies, or drift itself into Russian-style authoritarianism,” said Rep. Doggett. 

     “The US-led international response to Russia’s illegal, full-scale invasion of Ukraine has isolated Moscow as a global pariah, devastated the Kremlin’s capacity to fund this war, and provided essential support to the Ukrainians fighting for freedom. Now is not the time to ease up on this successful approach nor put pressure solely on the victim, Ukraine. The U.S. must remain committed to shoring up Ukraine’s ability to negotiate a just, acceptable end to this war and to holding Russia – and those supporting its illegal invasion – accountable for as long as Putin’s war of choice continues. This weekend’s missile attack in Sumy that claimed dozens of civilian lives, including children, further demonstrates the barbarity Russia has used to sow terror throughout this war, and the need to impose serious consequences for its atrocities. Make no mistake – Vladimir Putin started this war. He is a bully with no respect for peace, Ukrainian sovereignty, or international norms, and he will only end this illegal war when the world compels him to,” said Ranking Member Meeks.

     “Our allies in Ukraine are on the front lines of freedom – fighting not only for their nations’ sovereignty but also against authoritarianism worldwide. I am glad to join my colleagues in introducing urgently needed legislation that will support our allies in Ukraine and invest in their recovery through tougher sanctions on Russian oil exports, security and military assistance, and dual use export provisions. Importantly, this legislation also includes provisions that will allow the Congress, a coequal branch of government, to advance resolutions of disapproval if the President waves his authority – and assert with our own voice that Ukraine has bipartisan support in the United States,” said Rep. Steny Hoyer. “I thank Ranking Member Greg Meeks for his work to put together comprehensive legislation that reflects our values, strengthens our democracy, and ensures the United States remains on the right side of history. We must not give aid and comfort to our enemy, Russia, and we must remain steadfast in the battle for democracy.”

     “I am co-sponsoring this legislation because it reaffirms the American people’s unwavering commitment to a sovereign, democratic Ukraine,” said Ranking Member Keating. “As Ukraine continues to defend itself against Russia’s brutal full-scale invasion, it is critical that the United States stands firmly by its side—not just militarily, but economically and diplomatically. This legislation includes key provisions from my own bills that aim to support Ukraine across multiple fronts. It provides war risk insurance to ensure the continued flow of international commerce with Ukraine, blocks illegal U.S. technology exports to Iran where they are used to manufacture drones deployed by Russia, and promotes the diversification of Ukraine’s energy supply. Ukraine’s victory requires more than military support – it demands a comprehensive strategy to help rebuild its economy, secure its infrastructure, and restore its independence.”

    “Our friends in Ukraine are fighting for the democratic ideals we share against a war criminal, Vladimir Putin, and the rising threat of authoritarianism globally,”said Ranking Member Connolly. “The American commitment to Ukraine, its sovereignty, and its recovery must be lasting and ironclad. We must stand firmly behind the Ukrainian people by countering Russian disinformation, advocating for multilateral support for Ukraine’s reconstruction, providing additional U.S. security assistance, and implementing crippling sanctions on Russia and its enablers to force Putin to the negotiating table. That’s why this bill includes provisions from my bipartisan legislation to expand sanctions on North Korea for its material support for Russia’s illegal invasion. The war in Ukraine is a battle between dictatorship and democracy. Between freedom and oppression. The United States must remain on the right side of history. Slava Ukraini.” 

    MIL OSI USA News –

    April 16, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Minister highlights key foreign policy milestones and sets future direction

    Source: France-Diplomatie – Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development

    Statements by M. Jean-Noël Barrot, Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs, at his hearing before the National Assembly Foreign Affairs Committee (excerpts) (April 2, 2025)

    (…)

    Thank you for giving me the opportunity to outline the diplomatic track record of the first 100 days of François Bayrou’s government.

    UKRAINE

    The first point, unsurprisingly, relates to Europe’s strategic reawakening and Ukraine’s security. Just over a month ago we entered the fourth year of Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, which was a huge jolt for European nations. In recent weeks, as you’ve seen, we’ve made considerable progress towards what could be the resolution of this crisis and, more broadly, a European security architecture capable of deterring the threat for good.

    The Franco-British proposal for a one-month ceasefire in the air, at sea and on energy infrastructure was taken up by the Ukrainian President during his discussions with the United States, which, for its part, insisted on an immediate, complete and unconditional 30-day ceasefire. The Ukrainians, for whom this is a significant compromise, accepted it. (…)

    The Russians rejected the proposal, after suggesting they would abide by it. The situation is now clear: Russia is engaging in delaying tactics and wants to gain time. It hasn’t given up its territorial ambitions, it’s proceeding with further strikes on energy infrastructure, is continuing its war crimes and has even just launched the biggest conscription drive for 14 years – 160,000 young people expected to leave for the front. At this stage, it seems to me that Russia owes the United States, which is striving to lead the mediation, a clear response: yes or no.

    LEBANON

    The second point in our track record is support for Lebanon on the road to reconstruction. Although Lebanon was on the edge of the abyss, we managed to negotiate with our US partners a ceasefire that restored the country’s security and stability. It’s holding, despite the tensions, including the most recent ones. Israeli troops have withdrawn from 99% of the territories they had occupied.

    We’ve helped bring an end to a two-and-a-half-year vacancy for the head of State’s role. President Joseph Aoun was elected in January; he met President Macron in Paris on Friday 28 March. Prime Minister Nawaf Salam is working to give shape to the new hope for that country so close to France’s heart.

    We’ll continue to support its economic recovery and the restoration of a sovereign State by organizing an international conference dedicated to Lebanon’s reconstruction, in Paris this autumn. Between now and then, we’re advising Israel to enter into talks with Lebanon with a view to a definitive withdrawal from the five points it still occupies and the resolution of border disputes.

    SYRIA

    The third point in our record is our clear-sighted and conditional engagement with Syria following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s criminal regime. We’ve chosen a demanding engagement with the new Syrian authorities, whose past we are aware of, with two goals: to foster a peaceful and inclusive political transition in keeping with Syria’s pluralism, guaranteeing respect for the rights of women and all communities; and to ensure that our security interests, particularly the fight against Islamist terrorism, the destruction of chemical weapons and an end to drug trafficking, are taken into account.

    This explains my visit to Damascus on 3 January and the organization of an international conference on Syria in Paris on 13 February. More recently, we encouraged the signing of an agreement on 10 March between the Damascus authorities and our Kurdish partners in the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which have spearheaded the fight against Daesh in recent years, so that their rights and interests are taken into account in the Syrian transition and we can continue the fight against terrorism. We also ensured that the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) can be deployed in Syria to destroy the regime’s stockpile of illegal chemical weapons.

    Our engagement is clear-sighted, demanding, conditional and reversible. We strongly condemned the massacres of Alawite civilians and let the Damascus authorities know that, in the absence of a fight against impunity, we shall not proceed with a lifting of sanctions.

    AFRICA

    The fourth point in the record is the renewal of our partnerships in Africa. At the end of November, the President of Nigeria was welcomed to Paris to strengthen our ties with the continent’s leading demographic power. It was the first state visit to France by an African head of State since 2017. In mid-January we hosted a state visit by the President of Angola, which took over the presidency of the African Union (AU) a month later.

    I personally have made several visits to sub-Saharan Africa: to the Sudanese border, to demonstrate our unfailing mobilization in the face of the world’s biggest humanitarian crisis; to Addis Ababa, headquarters of the AU, to revitalize, five years after the last session, our strategic dialogue with this new G20 member – because the AU has been admitted as a fully-fledged member; to Thiaroye in Senegal, to speak the truth about our shared history; to Johannesburg, to make France’s voice heard at the G20, whose presidency South Africa holds this year; and to Kinshasa and Kigali, to call on the Congolese and Rwandan heads of State to prioritize diplomacy rather than weapons.

    CHINA/TRADE

    Fifth point in the record: progress on trade negotiations in China. My visit last weekend was a first step towards resolving our dispute on Cognac and Armagnac. Before my visit to Beijing, the industry was under threat of an immediate imposition of definitive tariffs ranging from 34% to 39% on Cognac and Armagnac and the definitive closure of access to duty-free shops.

    The demanding dialogue we’ve been conducting has enabled us to maintain this access for goods that have already arrived in China and delay by three months any imposition of definitive tariffs. This significant reprieve allows us to continue this demanding dialogue with China in order to put this dispute behind us. Next step: high-level dialogue between the Economy and Finance Minister and his Chinese counterpart on 15 May.

    ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

    The sixth point in the record is the success of the Artificial Intelligence (AI) Action Summit, held in Paris in January with more than 100 countries. Co-chaired by France and India, whose prime minister paid an official visit to France on the occasion, it concluded with a statement tackling, for the first time, the challenges of AI in their entirety – environmental, social and democratic. We also managed to secure an announcement of private investment in France to the tune of €109 billion, to benefit our businesses and fellow citizens, which will be followed up with a €50-billion investment by the European Commission, testifying to France’s attractiveness when it comes to this promising technology.

    IRAN/FRENCH HOSTAGES

    The seventh point in the record is the release of several French hostages. On 17 March, after months of active efforts and four conversations with my counterpart, we secured the release of Olivier Grondeau. It was an especially moving moment, shared by the nation’s elected representatives during a tribute paid on 25 March to him and our two other compatriots, Jacques Paris and Cécile Kohler, who are still being held after more than 1,000 days.

    To free them, we’ll be stepping up the pressure on the Iranian regime. First of all, in the coming days, probably during the European Foreign Affairs Council on 14 April, we’ll be adopting additional European sanctions against those Iranians responsible for the state hostages policy. Secondly, given the unacceptable violations of our two compatriots’ right to consular protection, which are sadly just one aspect of their harsh conditions of detention, we’ll be lodging a complaint against Iran with the International Court of Justice, for violating the right to consular protection. (…)

    What makes our diplomacy strong is precisely that it has a more extensive arsenal than others, ranging from dialogue to sanctions, and that it uses it wisely, having learnt from decades and even centuries of French diplomatic successes.

    It’s this strength that I’ll be harnessing in the next 100 days to defend and promote French interests.

    GAZA

    The first area on which we’re focusing efforts is the search for a lasting political solution in Gaza. We’re working for a permanent ceasefire enabling the release of all the hostages and the massive delivery of humanitarian aid, blocked for several weeks, to the civilian population, who are in a tragic situation. We’re convinced that there’s no military solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In particular, annexation, the forced displacement of people, and settlement activity are a dead end and a threat to the security of Israel itself.

    We’ll continue to work to find the path to a lasting political solution. In Gaza, we support the Arab plan, which proposes a reconstruction framework and credible security guarantees. It aims to establish a new Palestinian governance, in which Hamas must in no way take part. Outside Gaza, we’ll continue working with our Saudi partners, co-chairing an international conference at the United Nations headquarters in New York in the summer, aimed at restoring the prospect of a two-State solution, which alone guarantees peace and security to the Israelis and Palestinians.

    SUDAN

    The second area we’re focusing on concerns the crisis in Sudan, the world’s biggest humanitarian crisis in terms of its scale – 26 million children, women and men in a situation of absolute humanitarian distress. 15 April will mark the second anniversary of the conflict.

    In 2024 we hosted a major international conference on support for Sudan and the neighbouring countries, which raised more than €2 billion in humanitarian commitments. On 15 April I’ll be visiting London for the second conference, co-organized with the United Kingdom, Germany, the European Union and the AU. We’ll review the commitments made last year and call on those involved to shoulder their responsibilities, to ensure that the conflict does not see a third anniversary.

    DRC/RWANDA

    The third area of work concerns diplomatic and humanitarian support in the Great Lakes region. We’re making active efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis tearing apart the eastern DRC, where Rwandan troops are deployed supporting the rebel group M23, in breach of Congolese sovereignty.

    We’re pursuing this goal at several levels: bilaterally, President Macron is in close contact with his two counterparts and the region’s leaders; at the level of the European Union, which recently adopted new individual measures against military leaders from Rwanda and the M23 rebel group; and at the UN, where we played a key role and got the Security Council to adopt a historic resolution at the end of February, unanimously condemning the presence of Rwandan troops in the eastern DRC.

    We’re also in contact with African mediators, who are working on the front line to secure a political resolution to the crisis – i.e. in practical terms, a lasting and mutually-agreed ceasefire and a resumption of negotiations. It’s a matter of urgency. The whole region’s stability is at stake, and the conflict has already led to the displacement of nearly a million people since the beginning of the year, and several thousand deaths. It’s the world’s second most serious humanitarian crisis. So I’ve decided, regardless of the budgetary constraints, to increase our humanitarian support package by €5.5 million.

    IRAN/NUCLEAR PROGRAMME

    Our fourth area of work concerns the search for a binding agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme. Despite the setbacks it has suffered in recent months – the heavy defeat of Hezbollah in Lebanon, the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Israel’s aerial attack on its territory, a disastrous economic situation – Iran is continuing an agenda of destabilization, raising the stakes in its nuclear programme, which is reaching unprecedented levels, continuing its support for groups that destabilize the region such as the Houthis, supporting Russia’s war in Ukraine by delivering drones and missiles, and a policy of state hostages.

    Ten years after the conclusion of the Joint Plan of Action (JPoA), we remain convinced that Iran must never obtain a nuclear weapon. Our priority is to achieve an agreement that restricts its nuclear programme in a lasting and verifiable way. The window of opportunity is narrow: we have only a few months before the expiry of the JPoA, secured in particular thanks to French negotiators, to whom I pay tribute. In the event of failure, a military confrontation would become all but inevitable. Its cost would be very high, in that it would very badly destabilize the region. We’ve been doing everything to prevent that, for the past 10 years.

    ALGERIA

    Fifthly, we’re focusing our efforts on opening up diplomatic space with Algeria. The tensions between us, which we didn’t cause, serve neither its interests nor ours. We must reduce them rigorously and with honesty, without weakness. That was the approach behind the Prime Minister’s convening of an interministerial meeting on immigration control providing for a re-examination of the agreements reached between the two countries.

    The telephone conversation between President Macron and his Algerian counterpart reopened a diplomatic space allowing the crisis to be resolved. We intend to take advantage of it to achieve results, in the interests of French people, as regards cooperation on migration, justice, security, the economy and remembrance. The two heads of State decided on some principles. They must now find a way to implement them. On Sunday I’ll be visiting Algiers for this. Other ministerial, and no doubt parliamentary, visits will follow.

    WESTERN BALKANS

    Sixth area where we’re focusing our efforts: the Western Balkans. Exactly 30 years ago, the region was in the grip of a very high-intensity war, right at the heart of the European continent, less than 2,000 kilometres from France. In Serbia, the authorities are facing unprecedented public unrest. The negotiations conducted for several months between President Vucic and the demonstrators have made it possible to announce the formation of a new government in the next few weeks, which is a first step towards calming down the situation. Last Saturday, during a conversation, President Macron had the opportunity to encourage him to move further along that path.

    In Bosnia and Herzegovina, since an arrest warrant was issued against him, the President of Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik, is stepping up his secessionist initiatives, which we have systematically condemned. We gave our consent to a strengthening of the European ALTHEA force, which is under French command, by some 600 additional personnel, so that it could be in a position to calm down the situation if it became toxic. (…)

    We’re focusing on the European Political Community summit being held in Tirana on 16 May, providing President Macron with the opportunity to hold meetings with the authorities in the countries of the region – both the ones gripped by the crisis and those which, on the contrary, are making good progress on their pathway to the European Union, particularly Albania and Montenegro.

    ARMENIA/AZERBAIJAN

    The seventh area on which we’re focusing efforts is the Caucasus, particularly with our support for Armenia. We welcomed the conclusion of negotiations on the peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Nothing stands now in the way of it being signed, which I hope will take place as soon as possible. France will continue to unfailingly support Armenia’s resilience and sovereignty. The determination of Nikol Pashinyan’s government to stay on the path of independence, democracy and peace is remarkable, especially as Russia is not hiding its hostility.

    In this context, we are closely following the trial of the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh, which began on 17 January at the Baku Military Court. We are being very vigilant as regards the concerns expressed by human rights organizations about the fairness of trials and the treatment of defendants. We call for the release of all prisoners held arbitrarily in Azerbaijan and would like the normalization process between the two countries to allow the issue of prisoners and detainees to be resolved.

    UN OCEAN CONFERENCE

    Our eighth area of work concerns the organization of the third United Nations Ocean Conference (UNOC) in Nice in June. A highlight of our international calendar, 10 years after the conclusion of the Paris climate agreement, it’s set to be its equivalent for the oceans. We’re aiming at several outcomes – one of them is being debated in the Chamber at this very moment – including the entry into force of the international treaty for the protection of the high seas and marine biodiversity, which requires it to be ratified by 60 signatory States. We’ve got to about 20. We’re making active efforts at every level, including that of your committee through Éléonore Caroit, whom I thank. We’ll be opening a ratification office in Nice during UNOC, to encourage countries that are delaying to submit their ratification instruments.

    Allow me to say a word about the two main projects to transform the Ministry.

    INFORMATION WAR

    The first concerns rearmament in the face of the information war. In 2024 France was the European Union country most targeted by foreign interference, with 152 of the 505 cases detected in Europe between November 2023 and November 2024. That year, 2024, saw a great deal of evidence that operations of influence, particularly Russian ones, were being conducted against our civilian population. France has assets to defeat this, but must invest more in informing French people. More broadly, it must not only beef itself up to defend itself but also reinvent itself to make its voice heard, at a time when the information space has become fragmented.

    FOREIGN MINISTRY AND THE PUBLIC

    The second transformation project consists in focusing the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs more on French people and creating through this key State ministry – which is probably one of those least known by our compatriots – a link between diplomacy and nation such as that between the army and the nation. What happens beyond our borders has probably never had so much impact on our compatriots’ daily lives, and both you and I saw during scrutiny of the budget an insufficient understanding of the work we do in parliamentary and ministerial diplomacy to serve our compatriots.

    This transformation project is very far-reaching and affects every dimension of our action. It’s about better assessing and developing the response the Ministry provides to French people’s concerns, for example in terms of employment, the ecological transition, health and immigration. It’s about activating links with French people by supporting economic diplomacy and decentralized cooperation – local authorities are the Ministry’s chief partner. It’s about taking resolute action, with elected representatives of the regions, departments and cross-border communities, to finally remove the many irritants facing the millions of our compatriots who have daily experience of the border. It’s about increasing the number of visits by the Minister within France, which is not customary but seems important in the period we are going through, because our compatriots are worried about what is happening abroad and need to be given some control. Finally, it’s about opening the Quai d’Orsay right up and increasing the number of visits there so that people can properly understand the professions of the diplomatic service, how it can change our compatriots’ lives and why it’s so useful on a daily basis. (…)./.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 16, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Billions of euro in cash sent from EU banks to Russia before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine – E-001344/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001344/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Tomáš Zdechovský (PPE)

    According to a recent investigation by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) and Süddeutsche Zeitung, Western banks – particularly those based in Germany and Austria – transferred billions of euro in cash to Russia in the period immediately preceding Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Deutsche Bank alone is reported to have sent over EUR 2 billion in cash to Russia in 2022. These transfers, allegedly driven by the demand of Western companies for Russian roubles, may have contributed to stabilising the Russian economy and currency just as the EU was imposing sweeping sanctions on Moscow.

    Given that the EU has maintained a sanctions regime against Russia since 2014, and that it significantly strengthened this following the 2022 invasion, these transfers give rise to serious concerns about their compatibility with both the letter and the spirit of EU sanctions.

    I therefore ask:

    • 1.Was the Commission informed in advance about these cash transfers to Russia, and does it consider them compatible with the EU sanctions framework?
    • 2.Has the Commission investigated whether these transfers may have helped the Russian Government finance military operations or circumvent EU financial sanctions?
    • 3.What measures does the Commission intend to take to prevent future sanctions circumvention through legal but highly problematic financial operations?

    Submitted: 2.4.2025

    Last updated: 15 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 16, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Seizing the Russian shadow fleet in the Baltic Sea: the Commission’s measures to prevent vessel sales – E-001174/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001174/2025/rev.1
    to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
    Rule 144
    Pekka Toveri (PPE), Mika Aaltola (PPE), Aura Salla (PPE), Tomas Tobé (PPE), Rasa Juknevičienė (PPE), Sirpa Pietikäinen (PPE), Ville Niinistö (Verts/ALE), Jörgen Warborn (PPE), Dainius Žalimas (Renew), Elsi Katainen (Renew), Rihards Kols (ECR), Nikola Minchev (Renew), Merja Kyllönen (The Left), Jonas Sjöstedt (The Left), Tomáš Zdechovský (PPE), Paulius Saudargas (PPE), Hannah Neumann (Verts/ALE), Krzysztof Brejza (PPE), Anna-Maja Henriksson (Renew), Markéta Gregorová (Verts/ALE), Villy Søvndal (Verts/ALE), Alice Teodorescu Måwe (PPE), Arba Kokalari (PPE), Sebastião Bugalho (PPE), Inese Vaidere (PPE), Ondřej Krutílek (ECR), Hélder Sousa Silva (PPE), Henrik Dahl (PPE), Klára Dobrev (S&D), Ľubica Karvašová (Renew), Lucia Yar (Renew), Martin Hojsík (Renew), Michal Wiezik (Renew), Magdalena Adamowicz (PPE), Nora Junco García (ECR), Diego Solier (ECR), Sebastian Tynkkynen (ECR), Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann (Renew), Roberts Zīle (ECR), Rasmus Nordqvist (Verts/ALE), Petras Auštrevičius (Renew), Jessica Polfjärd (PPE), Katri Kulmuni (Renew), Andrzej Halicki (PPE), Michał Dworczyk (ECR), Wouter Beke (PPE), Adnan Dibrani (S&D), Sofie Eriksson (S&D), Heléne Fritzon (S&D), Johan Danielsson (S&D), Evin Incir (S&D), Riho Terras (PPE), Per Clausen (The Left), Michał Szczerba (PPE), Francisco Assis (S&D), Liudas Mažylis (PPE), Miriam Lexmann (PPE), Karlo Ressler (PPE), Csaba Molnár (S&D), Sandra Kalniete (PPE), Piotr Müller (ECR)

    We, the undersigned Members of the European Parliament, are writing to express our deep concern regarding recent reports that European and US ship owners have sold at least 230 ageing oil tankers to entities facilitating the Russian shadow fleet.

    The shadow fleet enables Russia to circumvent international sanctions, thereby sustaining its oil exports and financing its ongoing aggression against Ukraine.

    Despite the restrictive measures that the EU has already imposed on the Russian shadow fleet, the continued sale of tankers to the shadow fleet indicates that current measures may not be sufficient. It has been estimated that the number of hybrid operations will increase in the future, and the shadow fleet poses a significant security and environmental threat, especially to the countries in the Baltic Sea region.

    Given this situation:

    • 1.What measures is the Commission planning to introduce to prevent the sale of vessels to the shadow fleet?
    • 2.How does the Commission plan to effectively track the shadow fleet and block its access to the sea?

    Submitted: 19.3.2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 16, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Why does Putin insist Ukranians and Russians are ‘one people’? The answer spans centuries of colonisation and resistance

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Darius von Guttner Sporzynski, Historian, Australian Catholic University

    Russian president Vladimir Putin does not seem interested in peace: Sunday’s missile strike on Sumy, the worst civilian attack this year, proves he is determined to expand into Ukraine at any cost.

    This is a war of ideas, narratives and myths – one that can be traced to the mid-1500s, when Ivan the Terrible, Grand Duke of Muscovy declared himself the first “tsar” of all Russia.

    As part of his quest for power, Ivan the Terrible challenged King Sigismund I of Poland, who as Duke of Rus, ruled over territories that now comprise parts of modern-day Ukraine.

    Russian rulers have often repurposed history to build their power, according to historian Orlando Figes. Putin wrote a well known essay in 2021 that called Russians and Ukrainians “one people”. He was relying on old beliefs that Russia has the right to “restore” or reunite lands it once ruled.

    Ukraine has survived bans on its language, forced assimilation policies, and famines like the Holodomor, orchestrated by Stalin in the 1930s. The country declared independence from Russia in 1991. Now, teachers, artists and local leaders have joined soldiers in resisting Russia.

    Empire and a holy mission

    A broad expanse of the former medieval kingdom of Kyivan Rus incorporated territories in present-day Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, including Ukraine’s capital, Kyiv. From 1386 until 1772, the majority of these lands came under the rule of Poland-Lithuania, governed by the Lithuanian Jagiellon dynasty, and their successors.

    Today, Russia often points to Kyivan Rus (which lasted from the 9th to the 13th century), claiming it is reuniting these ancient lands, as Ivan the Terrible claimed in the mid-1500s.

    Grand Duchy of Lithuania, ruled by the Jagiellon dynasty in the 13th to 15th centuries.
    Wikipedia, CC BY

    In 1547, Ivan declared Muscovy a tsardom and Moscow to be the “Third Rome” – in other words, the latest centre of true Christianity, after Rome and Constantinople. This idea made conquest seem like a holy mission. By the late 1700s, the Russian Empire had destroyed Poland-Lithuania in a series of territorial annexations and wars. It had spread far to the south and east, and now bordered with Prussia and Austria.

    Ukraine, with its rich farmland and cultural connection to Kyivan Rus, was a top prize. Russian leaders called Ukraine “Malorossiya”, or “Little Russia”, to claim it was just a small part of a larger, Russian whole. They banned Ukrainian-language publications, forced the Orthodox Church of Ukraine to answer to Moscow, and tried to stamp out any sense of a separate Ukrainian identity.

    However, Ukraine developed its own cultural identity, shaped by its Cossack traditions, its history under Polish–Lithuanian rule, and its separate experiences. Many Ukrainians argue their culture existed long before Muscovy evolved into an empire.

    Winter Scene in Little Russia.
    Ivan Constantinovich Aivazovsky/Wikimedia Commons

    Meanwhile, Russia had expanded into its next-door neighbours, then pretended these lands had always been part of Russia. Historian Alexander Etkind calls this process “internal colonisation”. This strategy helped Russia become a vast empire. But it also built lasting resentment, particularly in Ukraine.

    Famine and ‘fascists’

    The Soviet Union (USSR), established in 1922 in the wake of the successful Bolshevik Coup in 1917, claimed to be a union of equal republics. But in practice, Moscow stayed firmly in control.

    Ukraine had the label of “Soviet Republic”, but had little genuine independence. Soviet leaders demanded enormous amounts of grain, coal, and labour from Ukraine to support the rest of the USSR.

    A postcard printed in Germany by Ukrainian Youth Association for the 15th anniversary of Holodomor, 1933.
    Wikimedia Commons, CC BY

    One of the darkest periods in Ukrainian history was the Holodomor, an orchestrated famine that spanned 1932–33, in which millions of Ukrainians died of hunger, after Stalin’s government seized huge amounts of grain from farmers. These policies aimed to break Ukrainian resistance and nationalist feelings.

    The Holodomor was an act of genocide against Ukrainians, though Russia disputes this interpretation.

    After World War II, the Soviet Union took over the Baltic states and parts of Poland, including regions now in western Ukraine. Although Ukraine became one of the more industrialised parts of the USSR, genuine displays of Ukrainian culture or independent thought were often met with harsh punishment. People who spoke out were labelled “fascists”, a term still used in Russia’s modern propaganda.

    Starved peasants on a street in Kharkiv during the famine.
    Widener Library, Harvard University

    Reclaiming Ukraine

    The USSR fell apart in 1991. Ukraine, along with other former Soviet republics, became independent nations. This was a major blow to Russia’s idea of itself as a world empire. For centuries, Moscow had seen Ukraine as central to its identity.

    The 1990s brought tough economic reforms and political changes in Russia. Then Vladimir Putin rose to power in the early 2000s, promising to restore Russia’s influence. He described the former Soviet states as the “near abroad”, suggesting Moscow still had special rights over these regions.

    In 2008, Russia went to war with Georgia. After winning, it recognised two breakaway provinces in Georgia, effectively keeping troops there.

    In 2014, Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine, claiming it was protecting Russian speakers. It also backed separatists in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region. The United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 68/262 in March 2014, declaring Russia’s annexation of Crimea illegal. The Kremlin continued its policies regardless.

    ‘Denazifying’ Ukraine?

    In February 2022, Russia expanded the conflict by launching an invasion of Ukraine. It described its actions as a mission to “denazify” the country, accusing Ukraine’s government of being controlled by Nazis – although president Zelenskyy has Jewish heritage.

    There was no evidence to support these claims. Still, Russian leaders used these slogans to justify their aggressive push. They also spoke of “traditional values” and “Orthodox unity”, painting themselves as defenders of a shared Slavic culture.

    The military objective was to capture the Donbas completely, create a land bridge to Crimea, and maybe advance further to Transnistria in Moldova, a pro-Russian separatist region.

    What Russia hoped would be a quick victory has become a long, brutal conflict. For many Ukrainians, independence is more than just avoiding control by Moscow. It is about creating a society built on democracy, human rights and ties to Europe.

    These values inspired the Euromaidan protests in Kyiv in 2013–14, where demonstrators demanded less corruption and closer links to the European Union. Russia used these protests to justify seizing Crimea in 2014.

    A message of self-determination

    The Kremlin’s insistence that Ukrainians and Russians are the same mirrors the older imperial model: expand, absorb and claim these territories were always part of Russia. Breaking free from this “mental empire” demands a deep shift in how Russians, Ukrainians, and the world view Eastern Europe’s past and present.

    When the Soviet Union collapsed, many hoped for a new era of cooperation in Eastern Europe. Instead, authoritarian politics and old beliefs about empire have led to a devastating conflict.

    By refusing to be pulled back into Russia’s orbit, Ukrainians send a message about self-determination. They reject the claim bigger nations can absorb smaller ones simply by invoking a shared past.

    Darius von Guttner Sporzynski does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Why does Putin insist Ukranians and Russians are ‘one people’? The answer spans centuries of colonisation and resistance – https://theconversation.com/why-does-putin-insist-ukranians-and-russians-are-one-people-the-answer-spans-centuries-of-colonisation-and-resistance-253043

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    April 16, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain third countries with Council Implementing Decision concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine

    Source: Council of the European Union

    Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain third countries with Council Implementing Decision concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 16, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Council and Ukrainian Embassy reinforce York’s support for Ukraine

    Source: City of York

    Leaders from City of York Council met yesterday with representatives from the Ukrainian Embassy in the UK to discuss how York can continue supporting Ukraine and Ukrainians.

    Cllr Claire Douglas, Leader of City of York Council, and Cllr Katie Lomas, Executive Member for Finance, Performance, Major Projects, Human Rights, Equality and Inclusion, welcomed Mr Oleksandr Yurkin, Counsellor for Consular Issues, and Ms Inna Pylypchuk, who is responsible for interregional and twinning cooperation at the Ukrainian Embassy.

    During the meeting, which took place at the council’s West Offices headquarters, Cllr Douglas highlighted York’s continued support for its Ukrainian community, particularly those who arrived in the city after fleeing the war.

    Since 2022, a total of 419 Ukrainians have arrived in York as part of the Homes for Ukraine scheme, with 223 York households offering accommodation to the new arrivals.

    Through a dedicated Homes for Ukraine team, the council has provided help, including financial support, longer-term housing, employment and education, health, and more to both guests and hosts.

    The meeting also marked another step forward in developing closer ties between York and the city of Lviv, following the passing of a council motion in 2022.

    Lviv is situated in the west of Ukraine, approximately seventy miles from the Polish border and has a population of just over 700,000. Lviv’s centre is a UNESCO World Heritage site, and like York, Lviv is a designated UNESCO Creative City, recognised for its literary culture.

    Cllr Claire Douglas, Leader of City of York Council, said:

    It was a privilege to welcome Mr Yurkin and Ms Pylypchuk to York this week to discuss our ongoing support for the Ukrainian community here and deepen our relationship with Lviv in the spirit of solidarity and friendship.

    “Our priority remains finding practical and meaningful ways to support both the people of Lviv, and our Ukrainian guests in York and we will continue to do this, with the support of our communities across the city.”

    Oleksandr Yurkin, Head of Consular Section at the Embassy of Ukraine in London, said:

    Our visit to York and meeting with City of York Council leaders was a powerful reminder of the strength of international partnerships in times of crisis.

    “We are deeply grateful for the solidarity shown by the people of York and look forward to growing our relationship through shared understanding, cultural exchange, and future cooperation between York and Lviv.”
     

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    April 16, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Canada’s federal election doesn’t seem like it’s about climate change, but it actually is

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Mark Winfield, Professor, Environmental and Urban Change, York University, Canada

    A defining feature of the ongoing federal election campaign has been the apparent marginalization of the environment and climate change as top-of-mind issues due to threats by the United States against Canadian sovereignty, security and trade.

    But how Canada responds to U.S. President Donald Trump’s actions will also have profound implications for its future greenhouse gas emissions and its economy.

    The current federal election is very different from those held in 2015, 2019 and 2021. In those elections, the environment and climate were central issues. Each time, more than 60 per cent of Canadian voters chose parties (Liberal, NDP, Bloc Québécois and Green) that advocated for strong climate action, including some form of carbon pricing.




    Read more:
    Canada’s federal election made big strides for climate and the environment


    The increasing evidence of the consequences of a changing climate had placed the environment and climate change among the leading issues in the minds of Canadians for nearly two decades. The political landscape has shifted dramatically since then.

    The role of inflation

    Although Trump’s second presidency is often cited as the trigger point for a decline of the environment as a top-of-mind concern for Canadians, the slide actually began a year earlier, in the fall of 2023.

    Despite the record wildfire season that summer, the impact of inflation, triggered in large part by the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, moved economic concerns to the forefront of the public’s mind. Government stimulus programs needed to counter the impacts of the pandemic contributed to inflationary pressures, prompting the Bank of Canada to hike interest rates in response, adding to Canadians’ economic distress.

    Amid high inflation and high interest rates, the Liberal government’s climate strategies — especially consumer carbon pricing — became an easy political target, particularly for a Conservative opposition with little apparent concern for the climate challenge.

    But even though climate change is no longer top of mind for Canadians, it remains a significant embedded concern, with as many as 70 per cent of Canadians believing climate change is real and caused by human activity. And perhaps surprisingly, despite the criticism levelled at the consumer carbon tax, between 60 and 70 per cent of non-Conservative leaning voters (those intending to cast their ballots for Liberal, NDP, Bloc and Green candidates) continue to support the concept of carbon pricing.

    Focus on fossil fuels

    Despite this, many political and business leaders have responded to Trump’s actions by focusing on natural resource exports, especially fossil fuels and critical minerals, to bolster the Canadian economy.

    This has been accompanied by calls to further streamline environmental review and approval processes for resource extraction and export projects like pipelines, and to expand their subsidization by taxpayers.

    Discussions about the climate implications of these initiatives have been noticeably absent. So have conversations about the long-term economic viability and desirability of expanding Canada’s dependency on resource commodity exports to increasingly uncertain global markets.

    On fossil fuels, the International Energy Agency and others are predicting that global consumption will peak within the next decade. This will reflect the falling costs of renewable energy, improving energy productivity and the imperative of reaching net zero greenhouse gas emissions by mid-century.

    The peak will likely happen before any new major export infrastructure can be built in Canada, regardless of what review and approval requirements they might be subjected to.

    In a world of declining fossil fuel consumption, Canada — increasingly reliant on high-cost and high-carbon production like oilsands crude and fracked and liquified natural gas — seems more likely to be among the earliest producers to fall than among the last standing. Public investments in new export infrastructure look like dubious propositions in this scenario.




    Read more:
    Coal in Alberta: Neither public outrage nor waning global demand seem to matter to Danielle Smith


    International markets for critical minerals are likely to remain in deep flux as the pace of technological development in renewable energy and energy storage accelerates to reduce or avoid dependency on costly and difficult-to-access materials.

    Mining operations also continue to have substantial environmental impacts with significant implications for reconciliation with Indigenous Peoples in Canada.

    Backwards approach

    All of this means there must be continued meaningful scrutiny of projects in terms of their implications for climate change, environmental sustainability and reconciliation, as well as their economic viability and potential legacy costs for taxpayers — not a further streamlining of review processes.

    Falling back on fossil fuels in response to Trump is a fundamentally backwards approach. It ignores the implications of the climate challenge. As recently noted by at least one Canadian business leader, it also overlooks the need to not just diversify Canada’s markets, but to diversify Canadian products as well.

    Canada must design and implement strategies that transform its industries from producers of low-value raw materials into producers of higher-value products and services for a world that must decarbonize and advance sustainability.

    As a coalition of Canadian mayors recently pointed out, climate change remains a real threat to Canadians and their communities. It’s not going away regardless of what Trump’s executive orders might say.

    As they campaign to lead the country, the situation requires more substantive responses from Canada’s would-be prime ministers than Canadians are getting right now.

    Mark Winfield receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

    – ref. Canada’s federal election doesn’t seem like it’s about climate change, but it actually is – https://theconversation.com/canadas-federal-election-doesnt-seem-like-its-about-climate-change-but-it-actually-is-254458

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    April 16, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Children affected by war receive support in new OSCE-equipped spaces in Ukraine

    Source: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe – OSCE

    Headline: Children affected by war receive support in new OSCE-equipped spaces in Ukraine

    Three dedicated centres equipped to provide psychological assistance to children affected by war and their caregivers were opened on 15 April — two in Vinnytsia and one in Pohrebyshche. The initiative is implemented by the OSCE Support Programme for Ukraine (SPU) in partnership with the National Social Service of Ukraine (NSSU), local authorities such as the Vinnytsia Regional Military Administration and local communities.
    The support spaces — named “Tvii” after the Ukrainian word for “Yours” — offer a wide range of services: from group sessions, art therapy and individual consultations with professionals for children to legal, psychological and informational support for parents and guardians. The centres are located on the premises of municipal facilities, and staffed by trained psychologists and social workers.
    “The ‘Tvii’ spaces are not about opening new institutions, but about meaningfully strengthening the existing support systems within communities. This is a new model of service delivery that becomes part of the local infrastructure and will remain with the community for the long term,” said Vasyl Lutsyk, Head of NSSU.
    The OSCE refurbished and equipped the rooms — with furniture, toys and books — and covered all staff expenses for the first year. Thereafter, the management and operation of the spaces will be transferred to local communities to ensure long-term sustainability.
    “There are numerous studies stating that childhood traumas can seriously affect the rest of one’s life. And what could be more traumatising than an ongoing war? While some things cannot be undone, it is important that we help the affected children overcome their tragic experiences,” said Pierre Baussand, Chief of Operations at OSCE SPU. “Opening comfort spaces where children and their parents can get such assistance is an important step in this direction. We hope that, together with our Ukrainian partners, we will generate positive practices that inspire communities across the country to do everything in our power to mitigate the effects of the war on minors”.
    Nine more “Tvii” spaces are scheduled to open in the Lviv, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, Chernivtsi and Zakarpattia regions by the end of the year. To further strengthen the capacity of national and local authorities to provide assistance to those in need, the OSCE delivered 12 trainings for 350 social workers and psychologists in 2024.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 16, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Joint Statement: 16th Ukraine Defence Contact Group – National Armaments Directors Format

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Press release

    Joint Statement: 16th Ukraine Defence Contact Group – National Armaments Directors Format

    Joint Statement from Ukraine, Germany and the United Kingdom, co-chairs of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group (UDCG).

    MOD Crown Copyright.

    On Friday 11 April the National Armaments Directors (NADs) from over 40 nations met at the NATO Headquarters in Brussels. They were supported by multiple international government organisations.

    They agreed to ensure that the commitments made in the UDCG Ministerial Format are rapidly converted into contracts with industry and the tangible delivery of support to Ukraine to ensure Ukraine is able to sustain the resolute defence of her sovereignty and her people and negotiate a lasting and secure peace.

    MOD Crown Copyright.

    The UDCG NAD Format, co-chaired by Ukraine, Germany and the UK and building on the work of the US since its inception, will report its progress to the June ministerial meeting.

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    Updates to this page

    Published 15 April 2025

    Invasion of Ukraine

    • UK visa support for Ukrainian nationals
    • Move to the UK if you’re coming from Ukraine
    • Homes for Ukraine: record your interest
    • Find out about the UK’s response

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    April 16, 2025
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