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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Piero Cipollone: Enhancing cross-border payments in Europe and beyond

    Source: European Central Bank

    Speech by Piero Cipollone, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the Regional Governors’ Meeting

    Osijek, 1 April 2025

    As we gather here today in Osijek, we stand at a crossroads in the world of payments.

    Digitalisation is driving economic progress and transforming the way we make retail payments, yet there is growing frustration that the dramatic decline in IT and telecommunications costs has not been reflected in lower fees for cross-border payments in many parts of the world.

    This has proven to be an obstacle to economic integration, including in this part of Europe. For instance, a small business owner here in Croatia trying to make a €5,000 transfer to a supplier in a Western Balkan economy that is not part of the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) faces costs up to 12 times higher than when sending the same amount to a counterpart within SEPA.[1]

    Such disparities are a barrier to growth. Addressing them is a priority, not only to reduce costs but also to drive economic development and bring us closer together. This is why the expansion of SEPA is so important and a key milestone on the European integration path.

    Montenegro, Albania and North Macedonia recently joined SEPA.[2] This paves the way for the payment service providers in these countries to be operationally ready to offer SEPA transfers as of October[3], facilitating transfers in euro at a considerably reduced cost. We also very much support the efforts being made in the other Western Balkan economies towards joining SEPA.

    The pressing need to enhance cross-border payments is not just a regional concern, it is a matter of urgency worldwide. As international transaction volumes have surged, outstripping GDP growth, the economic toll of inefficient cross-border payments has continued to mount. Despite technological advancements and recent improvements, progress is heterogeneous across countries and cross-border payment transactions remain expensive and slow in many places.

    Moreover, the shifting geopolitical landscape has introduced a new dimension to this challenge. Rising geopolitical tensions have spurred initiatives to create alternatives to existing global infrastructure. This could lead to fragmentation of the global financial system into multiple, non-communicating blocs, which would further hamper the efficiency of cross-border payments and contribute to the refragmentation of trade and investment. In parallel, the emergence of stablecoins – which the United States intends to promote worldwide[4] – brings its own risks, including for currency substitution.

    The Eurosystem is responding proactively to these challenges in line with the G20 Roadmap for enhancing cross-border payments.[5] Our approach rests on two pillars: on the one hand, harnessing the potential of fast payment systems to enhance the efficiency of cross-border payments and deliver tangible improvements in speed and cost; on the other, continuing to respect the sovereignty and stability of our partners. This can be achieved by interlinking fast payment systems across countries. In other words, we are aiming to address inefficiencies and build lasting connections that are rooted in trade openness and balanced relationships with our partners – goals which have long been a hallmark of the European approach to economic integration.

    Today, I will focus on three points. First, I will examine the current state of cross-border payments. Second, I will discuss how geopolitical fragmentation is creating a further imperative to act. Lastly, I will present the Eurosystem’s strategic response to these challenges, which includes initiatives such as interlinking fast payment systems and exploring the possible use of a digital euro in third countries.

    The state of cross-border retail payments

    Over the past few decades, the world has witnessed a significant surge in cross-border payments, driven by the globalisation of trade, capital and migration flows. Cross-border payment flows are projected to double to €268 trillion by 2030.[6] But despite this significant expansion and the improvements that have resulted from international efforts, international payments too often remain prohibitively expensive and inefficient.[7]

    While domestic payments have undergone a digital revolution – becoming faster, cheaper and more accessible – cross-border transactions have yet to fully benefit from these technological advancements.[8] The average cost of international retail payments remains high: for nearly one-quarter of global payment corridors, costs exceed 3%. And in too many cases, cross-border payment is still slow: one-third of retail cross-border payments took more than one business day to be settled in 2024.[9]

    These inefficiencies raise three pressing issues that demand our attention.

    First, high costs and slow transaction times are undermining economic integration and growth. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which form the backbone of many economies are disproportionately affected. For SMEs operating on tight margins, exorbitant fees are not just an inconvenience but a barrier that often discourages them from engaging in cross-border trade. According to research by the World Bank, in 2023 it cost SMEs about ten times more to transfer €5,000 between Western Balkan economies than between EU countries.[10]

    Second, the world’s most vulnerable groups – such as migrant workers sending remittances home – bear a disproportionate share of these costs. Remittances are a lifeline for millions of families worldwide, supporting one in nine people globally. Yet sending money home remains prohibitively expensive in many regions. The cost of remittances to the Western Balkan economies averaged 6.7% until recently[11], only slightly below the 7.7% paid in Sub-Saharan Africa[12]. The impact that reducing these fees will have on financial inclusion and well-being cannot be overstated. The World Bank has estimated that by meeting the global Sustainable Development Goal target of 3%, the Western Balkan economies would save approximately half a billion euros per year.[13]

    Third, the inefficiencies affecting cross-border payments have created a vacuum that alternative players, particularly in the crypto-asset space, are eager to fill. However, many of these solutions come with significant risks that cannot be overlooked. Unbacked crypto-assets, for instance, are highly volatile and speculative in nature, creating risks for unsuspecting households and businesses.

    Furthermore, the United States’ push to maintain the dollar’s global dominance through the promotion of stablecoins worldwide presents its own set of challenges. While stablecoins may be touted as the solution to a problem, they in fact create new problems that require a solution. Unless they are properly regulated according to the Financial Stability Board principles (as achieved in Europe through the Regulation on markets in crypto-assets[14]), they cannot guarantee convertibility at par value at all times and are susceptible to runs. They may thus destabilise the very system they are meant to improve. Also, because 99% of stablecoins are denominated in US dollar and their expansion could leverage the global customer base of big tech companies[15], they could considerably increase currency substitution risks, leading to “digital dollarisation”.[16] This would impair the effectiveness of domestic monetary policy and increase financial stability risks by amplifying capital outflows in response to negative shocks. This could have a destabilising effect on emerging markets and less developed economies, particularly small economies integrated in global value chains.[17]

    Geopolitical fragmentation

    That brings me to my second point: the fundamentally changed international order and its potential to fragment payment systems worldwide.

    Rising geopolitical tensions are reshaping the very foundations of cross-border payments and endangering the global rules-based system. This could challenge established correspondent banking networks and messaging systems such as Swift.

    At a time when we should be integrating payment systems to reduce their complexity and cost for users, separate platforms have sought to create alternatives to existing global infrastructures. This trend began as early as 2013 when Iran, in response to its exclusion from Swift, created its own messaging system. Russia followed suit in 2014 with the System for Transfer of Financial Messages after its annexation of Crimea. China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System, launched in 2015, has seen remarkable growth, with over 1,500 financial institutions using it in 2024, a number that has more than doubled since 2018.

    The pace of these initiatives has accelerated significantly since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In the past two years alone, we have seen nearly 20 new initiatives from countries in emerging markets aimed at bypassing Swift and western correspondent banks. At the BRICS Summit in October 2024, member countries agreed to explore the feasibility of establishing an independent cross-border settlement and depositary infrastructure, BRICS Clear.[18]

    These developments raise serious concerns about the potential fragmentation of the global financial system. We could face disrupted international capital flows and reduced efficiency as the system risks being splintered into multiple, non-communicating blocs.

    For the euro’s international role[19] to contribute to preserving a stable and integrated financial system, the euro needs to provide the benefits of a global public good.[20] We must ensure it can reliably connect various parts of the global payments system and deliver tangible benefits in terms of speed and cost, while respecting the integrity, sovereignty and stability of our partners.

    The Eurosystem’s strategy for efficient and open cross-border payments

    In this context, the European Central Bank (ECB), together with euro area national central banks, is promoting a strategy for the integration of global cross-border payments to address inefficiencies while maintaining openness. This strategy rests on two main initiatives.[21]

    Interlinking fast payment systems

    The first is the interlinking of fast payment systems. Over the past decade, central banks have made significant improvements to the backend infrastructure for facilitating payments, thereby fostering the digitalisation of domestic payment systems. As of today, over 100 jurisdictions worldwide have implemented their own fast payment systems.[22] There is already evidence that the global network of fast payment systems tends to be segmented along geopolitical lines[23], but interlinking these systems could help overcome this fragmentation and extend the benefits of digitalisation to cross-border payments.

    This approach offers several advantages. It would reduce costs, increase the speed and transparency of cross-border payments and shorten transaction chains. It would also enable payment service providers to conduct transactions without having to use multiple payment systems or a long chain of correspondent banks. Moreover, it would ensure that the platform to connect and convert currencies would be managed as a public good, thus avoiding closed loops and discriminatory pricing. Accordingly, the G20 Roadmap has identified interlinking as a key strategy for enhancing cross-border payments.[24]

    Europe serves as a compelling example of what this interconnected payments landscape might look like. Within the euro area, account holders can transfer funds instantly 24/7 through the TARGET Instant Payment Settlement (TIPS) service. A key feature of TIPS is that it is a multi-currency platform that settles instant payments within a payment scheme – the SEPA Instant Credit Transfer scheme – governed by uniform rules, standards and protocols, avoiding the risk of fragmentation.

    Taking advantage of this multi-currency feature, Sweden is already using TIPS for making fast payments in kronor.[25] Denmark will do the same as of this month[26] and Norway as of 2028[27].

    In October 2024 the ECB’s Governing Council decided to take concrete steps towards interlinking TIPS with other fast payment systems to improve cross-border payments globally.[28]

    First, a cross-currency settlement service will be implemented within TIPS. This will make it possible for instant payments originating in one TIPS currency to be settled in another. Initially, this service will enable cross-currency payments between the euro area, Sweden and Denmark.[29]

    Second, a cross-currency settlement service will be implemented for the exchange of cross-border payments between TIPS and other fast payment systems globally.[30] This will allow to explore interlinking TIPS with fast payment systems that have a compatible scheme, are interested in being involved and ensure full compliance with the standards set by the Financial Action Task Force to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.

    Third, the Eurosystem will explore connecting TIPS to a multilateral network of instant payment systems through Project Nexus, led by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).[31] By connecting to Nexus, TIPS could evolve into a hub for processing instant cross-border payments to and from the euro area and other countries that are using TIPS.[32]

    Fourth, the Eurosystem is currently assessing the feasibility of creating a bilateral link with India’s Unified Payments Interface (UPI).[33] UPI has the highest instant payment transaction volumes in the world, with close to 500 million transactions per day[34], and India is among the top ten recipients of euro area remittances.

    We are going even further to address the situation in the Western Balkans, since most countries in the region do not yet have a fast payment system.[35] As a service provider for TIPS, Banca d’Italia is working with the central banks of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Montenegro to develop an instant multi-currency payment system based on TIPS software, with North Macedonia potentially joining at a later stage.[36] The new platform will make it possible to pay instantly within each country and across countries. It will also ease the path towards enabling instant payments between participating countries and the euro area.

    The international role of the digital euro

    Now let me turn to the second initiative we are exploring to enhance cross-border retail payments, namely the creation of a digital euro and its use in third countries.

    A digital euro would be a central bank digital currency, an electronic equivalent to cash. It would complement banknotes and coins, giving people an additional option that they could use free of charge for any digital payment across the euro area. It would work both online and offline in shops or when making person-to-person or e-commerce transactions. Moreover, it would provide a European infrastructure that could be used by private payment service providers to offer their own solutions across the continent, thereby fostering competition and innovation.

    While the digital euro would primarily be used in the euro area, it is worth considering its possible international use. The current draft legislation foresees an approach that respects the sovereignty of third countries, mitigates potential risks for them and offers them new opportunities.

    Non-euro area residents could have access to the digital euro when visiting the euro area temporarily by setting up an account with a European payment service provider. We also believe that we could enable merchants outside the euro area to accept digital euro payments from euro area residents.[37]

    Moreover, users outside the euro area could be granted permanent access to the digital euro subject to an agreement between the EU and third countries, complemented by an arrangement between the ECB and the respective central banks.[38]

    In any case, use of the digital euro in third countries would be implemented gradually and with the appropriate safeguards to ensure that it would be used primarily as a means of payment and would not stoke currency substitution. For instance, individual holding limits for users outside the euro area would not be allowed to exceed the limits set for euro area residents and citizens.

    Moreover, the digital euro’s design includes multi-currency enabling features similar to those of TIPS. In practice, this means that non-euro area countries could use the digital euro infrastructure to offer their own digital currencies, thus facilitating transactions across these currencies. The digital euro could therefore provide a solution for offering and transferring central bank digital currencies internationally and serve as a platform for innovation in cross-border payments. On this basis, the digital euro could facilitate cross-border payments and remittances, making them more efficient and cost-effective.

    Conclusion

    Let me conclude.

    We find ourselves at a pivotal moment in the evolution of cross-border payments. The current geopolitical landscape threatens to fragment our global payment systems, potentially leading to inefficiencies and reduced transparency. However, this challenge also presents an opportunity for positive change.

    The region where we are meeting today exemplifies the challenges we face, what we can achieve through collaboration and the potential for further progress.

    As we move forward, our goal is clear: we must develop safer, more accessible alternatives that make global payments cheaper, faster and more transparent, without compromising on integrity, stability and sovereignty.

    The time for action is now. Through innovation, interoperability and a commitment to open financial markets, we can build a global payment system that is resilient to geopolitical shifts and can support economic growth and financial inclusion worldwide.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI China: Putin signs decree for spring conscription

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    Russian President Vladimir Putin has signed a decree on the routine spring conscription campaign, a document from the Kremlin showed on Monday.

    A total of 160,000 citizens aged 18 to 30 will be drafted from April 1 to July 15, said the decree.

    The conscription campaign is not linked with the special military operation in Ukraine, the Russian Defense Ministry said in a statement, adding that conscripts will be sent to permanent deployment locations of military units, formations and other military structures.

    Russia conducts conscriptions twice a year, namely in spring and autumn. The spring 2024 draft saw the enlistment of 150,000 people. All men in Russia are required to participate in military service for one year or equivalent training during higher education from the age of 18. 

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-OSI China: Sweden unveils new military aid for Ukraine

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    Sweden on Monday pledged 16 billion Swedish kronor (1.59 billion U.S. dollars) in new military support for Ukraine.

    The package would bring Sweden’s total military assistance to Kiev to 29.5 billion Swedish kronor this year and around 80 billion Swedish kronor since 2022, the government said.

    “This is our largest military support package to date,” Swedish Defence Minister Pal Jonson said on social media platform X.

    The aid would include air defence systems, artillery, satellite communications, and naval support, as well as equipment from the Swedish Armed Forces and industry. (1 Swedish krona = 0.099 U.S. dollar)

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-OSI: Ellomay Capital Reports Results for the Fourth Quarter and Full Year of 2024

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    TEL-AVIV, Israel, March 31, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Ellomay Capital Ltd. (NYSE American; TASE: ELLO) (“Ellomay” or the “Company”), a renewable energy and power generator and developer of renewable energy and power projects in Europe, USA and Israel, today reported its unaudited consolidated financial results for the fourth quarter and year ended December 31, 2024.

    Financial Highlights

    • Total assets as of December 31, 2024 amounted to approximately €676.7 million, compared to total assets as of December 31, 2023 of approximately €612.9 million.
    • Revenues1 for the three months ended December 31, 2024 were approximately €8.7 million, compared to revenues of approximately €8.4 million for the three months ended December 31, 2023. Revenues for the year ended December 31, 2024 were approximately €40.5 million, compared to revenues of approximately €48.8 million for the year ended December 31, 2023.
    • Loss from continuing operations for the three months ended December 31, 2024 was approximately €12 million, compared to loss from continuing operations of approximately €8 million for the three months ended December 31, 2023. Loss from continuing operations for the year ended December 31, 2024 was approximately €9.6 million, compared to profit from continuing operations of approximately €2.4 million for the year ended December 31, 2023.
    • Loss for the three months ended December 31, 2024 was approximately €12 million, compared to loss of approximately €9.8 million for the three months ended December 31, 2023. Loss for the year ended December 31, 2024 was approximately €9.5 million, compared to profit of approximately €0.6 million for the year ended December 31, 2023.
    • EBITDA for the three months ended December 31, 2024 was approximately €7.6 million, compared to EBITDA loss of approximately €2.5 million for the three months ended December 31, 2023. EBITDA for the year ended December 31, 2024 was approximately €25.1 million, compared to EBITDA of approximately €18.8 million for the year ended December 31, 2023. See below under “Use of Non-IFRS Financial Measures” for additional disclosure concerning EBITDA.
    • On December 31, 2023, the Company executed an agreement to sell its holdings in the 9 MW solar plant located in Talmei Yosef. The sale was consummated on June 3, 2024, and the net consideration received at closing was approximately NIS 42.6 million (approximately €10.6 million). In connection with the sale, the Company presents the results of this solar plant as a discontinued operation.

    Financial Overview for the Year Ended December 31, 2024

    • Revenues1 were approximately €40.5 million for the year ended December 31, 2024, compared to approximately €48.8 million for the year ended December 31, 2023. This decrease mainly results from a reduction in electricity prices in Spain between February and May 2024 and lower gas prices in the Netherlands in 2024 compared to prices in 2023, partially offset by income generated by our 20 MW solar power plants in Italy which were connected to the grid during 2024. The decrease is also due to loss of revenues in connection with the fire near the Talasol Solar S.L. (300 MV solar) (“Talasol”) and Ellomay Solar S.L. (28 MV solar) (“Ellomay Solar”) facilities in Spain in July 2024. In connection with such loss of revenues, the Company recorded an amount of approximately €1.7 million as ‘other income’ for the year ended December 31, 2024, based on compensation from the insurers for loss of income.
    • Operating expenses were approximately €19.8 million for the year ended December 31, 2024, compared to approximately €22.9 million for the year ended December 31, 2023. This decrease mainly results from a decrease in direct taxes on electricity production paid by the Company’s Spanish subsidiaries as a result of reduced electricity prices. The operating expenses of the Company’s Spanish subsidiaries for the year ended December 31, 2023 were impacted by the Spanish RDL 17/2022, which established the reduction of returns on the electricity generating activity of Spanish production facilities that do not emit greenhouse gases, accomplished through payments of a portion of the revenues by the production facilities to the Spanish government. The increased expenses during the year ended December 31, 2023 resulting from this impact, were partially offset by lower costs in connection with the acquisition of feedstock by our Dutch biogas plants. Depreciation and amortization expenses were approximately €16.5 million for the year ended December 31, 2024, compared to approximately €16 million for the year ended December 31, 2023.
    • Project development costs were approximately €4.1 million for the year ended December 31, 2024, compared to approximately €4.5 million for the year ended December 31, 2023.
    • General and administrative expenses were approximately €6.1 million for the year ended December 31, 2024, compared to approximately €5.3 million for the year ended December 31, 2023. The increase in general and administrative expenses is mostly due to higher consultancy expenses.
    • Share of profits of equity accounted investee, after elimination of intercompany transactions, was approximately €11.1 million for the year ended December 31, 2024, compared to approximately €4.3 million for the year ended December 31, 2023. The increase in share of profits of equity accounted investee resulted mainly from the increase in revenues of Dorad Energy Ltd. (“Dorad”) due to higher quantities of electricity produced partially offset by an increase in operating expenses in connection with the increased production. In addition, in December 2024, Dorad received payment in an amount of approximately $130 million pursuant to an arbitration ruling in a derivative claim submitted by certain of its shareholders, which increased Dorad’s net profit for 2024 by approximately NIS 215.6 million (after the effect of taxes). These amounts were recorded by Dorad in its financial statements for the year ended December 31, 2024 in the income statement partially as a reduction in depreciation expenses, partly as finance income, and the remainder as a decrease in general and administrative expenses.
    • Other income, net was approximately €3.4 million for the year ended December 31, 2024, compared to €0 for the year ended December 31, 2023. The income was recognized based on insurance compensation in connection with the fire near the Talasol and Ellomay Solar facilities in Spain in July 2024, net of impairment expenses related to the damaged fixed assets. The amount to be received due to loss of income is approximately €1.7 million.
    • Financing expense, net was approximately €19.7 million for the year ended December 31, 2024, compared to financing expense, net of approximately €3.6 million for the year ended December 31, 2023. The increase in financing expenses, net, was mainly attributable to higher expenses resulting from exchange rate differences that amounted to approximately €7.8 million for the year ended December 31, 2024, compared to income from exchange rate differences of approximately €6.7 million for the year ended December 31, 2023, an aggregate change of approximately €14.5 million. The exchange rate differences were mainly recorded in connection with the New Israeli Shekel (“NIS”) cash and cash equivalents and the Company’s NIS denominated debentures and were caused by the 5.4% reevaluation of the NIS against the euro during the year ended December 31, 2024, compared to a devaluation of 6.9% during the year ended December 31, 2023. The increase in financing expenses for the year ended December 31, 2024 was also due to increased interest expenses mainly resulting from the issuance of the Company’s Series F Debentures in January, April, August and November 2024. These increases in financing expenses were partially offset by an increase in financing income of approximately €0.9 million in connection with derivatives and warrants in the year ended December 31, 2024, compared to the year ended December 31, 2023.
    • Tax benefit was approximately €1.5 million for the year ended December 31, 2024, compared to a tax benefit of approximately €1.4 million for the year ended December 31, 2023.
    • Loss from continuing operations for the year ended December 31, 2024 was approximately €9.6 million, compared to profit from continuing operations of approximately €2.4 million for the year ended December 31, 2023.
    • Profit from discontinued operation (net of tax) for the year ended December 31, 2024 was approximately €137 thousand, compared to loss from discontinued operation of approximately €1.8 million for the year ended December 31, 2023.
    • Loss for the year ended December 31, 2024 was approximately €9.5 million, compared to a profit of approximately €0.6 million for year ended December 31, 2023.
    • Total other comprehensive income was approximately €13.1 million for the year ended December 31, 2024, compared to total other comprehensive income of approximately €41.3 million for the year ended December 31, 2023. The change in total other comprehensive income mainly results from foreign currency translation adjustments due to the change in the NIS/euro exchange rate and from changes in fair value of cash flow hedges, including a material decrease in the fair value of the liability resulting from the financial power swap that covers approximately 80% of the output of the Talasol solar plant (the “Talasol PPA”). The Talasol PPA experienced high volatility due to the substantial change in electricity prices in Europe. In accordance with hedge accounting standards, the changes in the Talasol PPA’s fair value are recorded in the Company’s shareholders’ equity through a hedging reserve and not through the accumulated deficit/retained earnings. The changes do not impact the Company’s consolidated net profit/loss or the Company’s consolidated cash flows.
    • Total comprehensive income was approximately €3.6 million for the year ended December 31, 2024, compared to total comprehensive income of approximately €41.9 million for the year ended December 31, 2023.
    • Net cash provided by operating activities was approximately €8 million for the year ended December 31, 2024, compared to approximately €8.6 million for the year ended December 31, 2023. The decrease in net cash provided by operating activities for the year ended December 31, 2024, is mainly due to the decrease in electricity prices in Spain. In addition, during the year ended December 31, 2023, the Company’s Dutch biogas plants elected to temporarily exit the subsidy regime and sell the gas at market prices and during the year ended December 31, 2024 these plants returned to the subsidy regime. Under the subsidy regime, plants are entitled to monthly advances on subsidies based on the production during the previous year. As no subsidies were paid to the Company’s Dutch biogas plants for 2023, these plants were entitled to low advance payments for 2024 and the payment for gas produced by the plants during 2024 is expected to be received until July 2025 and reflected accordingly in the Company’s cash flow from operations.

    CEO Review for 2024

    In 2024, the Company presented an increase of 71% in the operating profit to approximately €7.7 million and of 33.5% in the EBITDA to approximately €25.1 million compared to 2023, despite a decrease of approximately €9 million in the annual revenues, which was caused by low and even negative electricity prices in Spain in the first half of 2024. During 2024 and in recent months the Company made significant advancements in the development of new projects, which are expected to contribute to an increase in revenues in coming years:

    In Italy – finance agreements were executed with respect to projects with an aggregate capacity of 198 MW (of which 38 MW are already connected to the electricity grid) and construction agreements for the remainder of the projects with an aggregate capacity of 160 MW were also executed.

    In the USA – the Company is advancing additional projects with an aggregate capacity of approximately 50 MW that are expected to begin construction during 2025.

    In the Netherlands – the Company advanced in obtaining licenses to expand the operations of the biogas facilities by additional 50% while making relatively small investments.

    In Israel – the approval of the National Infrastructures Committee to expand the Dorad power plant by 650 MW was received.  

    Operating expenses in 2024 decreased by approximately €3 million compared to 2023. Project development expenses in 2024 decreased by approximately €0.4 million compared to 2023 despite the inclusion of non-recurring expenses of approximately €0.5 million in connection with the cancellation of a guarantee in the project development expenses for 2024. Following the advancement of project development and the transition to the construction stage, the decrease in project development expenses is expected to continue during the year.

    The appreciation of the NIS against the euro at the end of 2024 caused revaluation losses of approximately €7.8 million compared to revaluation profit of approximately €6.7 million in 2023. The aggregate change is approximately €14.5 million and is the main cause for the increase in financing expenses in 2024.

    In March 2025 a transaction was executed between Zorlu Enerji Elektrik Üretim A.S (“Zorlu”) and The Phoenix Insurance Company Ltd. for the sale of Zorlu’s entire holdings in Dorad (25% of Dorad’s outstanding shares). The consideration for the shares represents a value of NIS 2.8 billion for Dorad. Ellomay Luzon Energy Infrastructures Ltd. (50% held by the Company), which currently holds 18.75% of Dorad’s shares, has a right of first refusal over 15% of Dorad’s shares included in the transaction. The Company believes that the price is attractive and therefore intends to act to exercise the right of first refusal. Activity in Spain:

    The electricity prices in the second half of 2024 increased and stabilized on the projected seasonal price. The revenues from the sale of electricity in 2024 were approximately €23 million compared to approximately €32 million in 2023. The decrease is primarily attributable to the low/negative electricity prices in the first half of 2024, as well as to the loss of revenues in the amount of approximately €1.7 million due to a fire. The loss of revenues due to the fire will be covered in full by the insurance company.

    Activity of Dorad:

    In 2024, the Dorad power plant recorded an increase in profit, with net profit of approximately NIS 452.3 million, an increase of approximately NIS 241 million compared to 2023. The Dorad power station received the approval of the National Infrastructures Committee and a positive connection survey to increase the capacity by an additional 650 MW. Due to the final award in the arbitration against Edeltech and Zorlu, Dorad received during 2024 compensation of approximately $130 million that increased Dorad’s net profit for 2024 by approximately NIS 215.6 million (after the effect of taxes).

    Activity in the USA:

    In the USA, the development and construction activities of solar projects are progressing at a rapid pace and the construction of the first four projects, with a total capacity of approximately 49 MW, began in early 2024. At the end of 2024, construction of two projects (in an aggregate capacity of approximately 27 MW) was completed and the IRS approval of entitlement to tax credits was received. These projects were connected to the electricity grid at the end of March 2025. The additional two projects (in an aggregate capacity of approximately 22 MW) are under construction and their construction is expected to end during April and June 2025. Additional projects with an aggregate capacity of approximately 50 MW are under development and are intended to begin construction in 2025. The Company executed an agreement to sell the tax credits of the first four projects for approximately $19 million.

    Activity in Italy:

    The Company has a portfolio of 460 MW solar projects in Italy of which 38 MW are connected to the grid and operating 294 MW are ready to build and 128 MW are under advanced development. The Company executed construction agreements with the Engineering, Procurement and Construction (“EPC”) contractor for 160 MW that are ready to build, the commencement of construction is expected in the beginning of the second quarter of 2025 and the construction is expected to take approximately 18 months. A financing agreement with a European institutional investor was executed for the financing of the construction of 198 MW (including the connected projects and the projects for which the EPC agreements were executed) for 23 years with a fixed annual interest of 4.5%.

    New legislation in Italy prohibits the establishment of new projects on agricultural land. This prohibition increases the value of the Company’s portfolio, which is not subject to the prohibition or located on agricultural land. The Company estimates that new possibilities are emerging for obtaining a power purchase agreement (“PPA”) in Italy, therefore it expects that in the future project financing will be possible more easily and at lower costs.

    Activity in Israel:

    The Manara Cliff Pumped Storage Project (Company’s share is 83.34%): A project with a capacity of 156 MW, which is in advanced construction stages. The Iron Swords War, which commenced on October 7, 2023, stopped the construction work on the project. The project has protection from the state for damages and losses due to the war within the framework of the tariff regulation (covenants that support financing). The project was expected to reach commercial operation during the first half of 2027 and the continuation of the Iron Swords war will cause a delay in the date of activation. The Israeli Electricity Authority currently approved a postponement of sixteen months of the dates for the project. The Company and its partner in the project, Ampa, invested the equity required for the project (other than linkage differences), and the remainder of the funding is from a consortium of lenders led by Mizrahi Bank, at a scope of approximately NIS 1.18 billion.

    Development of Solar licenses combined with storage:

    1. The Komemiyut and Qelahim Projects: each intended for 21 solar MW and 50 MW / hour batteries. The sale of electricity will be conducted through a private supplier.
      The Company waived the rights it won in a solar / battery tender process in connection with these projects and therefore paid a forfeiture of guarantee in the amount of NIS 1.8 million and is in advanced negotiations with a local virtual electricity supplier for the execution of a long-term PPA.
    2. The Talmei Yosef Project: intended for 10 solar MW and 22 MW / hour batteries. The request for zoning approval was approved in the fourth quarter of 2023.
    3. The Talmei Yosef Storage Project in Batteries: there is a zoning approval for approximately 400 MW / hour. The project is designed for the regulation of high voltage storage.

    Activity in the Netherlands:

    During 2024, high production levels were maintained in the Company’s three biogas plants. In addition, significant progress was made in the process of obtaining the licenses to increase production by about 50% in each of the Company’s plants. Increasing production will require relatively small investments and is expected to significantly increase income and EBITDA. Following the directive of the European Union to act to significantly increase the production of green gas, the Dutch parliament approved the legislation mandating the obligation to mix green gas with fossil gas, which will become effective commencing January 1, 2026. This legislation is expected to have a positive effect on revenues from the sale of green gas and the price of the accompanying green certificates. Agreements were executed for the future sale of green certificates for green gas in the context of the new regulation at a price of approximately €1 per certificate. The Company’s Dutch subsidiaries generate approximately 16 million green certificates a year.

    Use of Non-IFRS Financial Measures

    EBITDA is a non-IFRS measure and is defined as earnings before financial expenses, net, taxes, depreciation and amortization. The Company presents this measure in order to enhance the understanding of the Company’s operating performance and to enable comparability between periods. While the Company considers EBITDA to be an important measure of comparative operating performance, EBITDA should not be considered in isolation or as a substitute for net income or other statement of operations or cash flow data prepared in accordance with IFRS as a measure of profitability or liquidity. EBITDA does not take into account the Company’s commitments, including capital expenditures and restricted cash and, accordingly, is not necessarily indicative of amounts that may be available for discretionary uses. Not all companies calculate EBITDA in the same manner, and the measure as presented may not be comparable to similarly-titled measure presented by other companies. The Company’s EBITDA may not be indicative of the Company’s historic operating results; nor is it meant to be predictive of potential future results. The Company uses this measure internally as performance measure and believes that when this measure is combined with IFRS measure it add useful information concerning the Company’s operating performance. A reconciliation between results on an IFRS and non-IFRS basis is provided on page 15 of this press release.

    About Ellomay Capital Ltd.

    Ellomay is an Israeli based company whose shares are registered with the NYSE American and with the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange under the trading symbol “ELLO”. Since 2009, Ellomay focuses its business in the renewable energy and power sectors in Europe, USA and Israel.

    To date, Ellomay has evaluated numerous opportunities and invested significant funds in the renewable, clean energy and natural resources industries in Israel, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and Texas, USA, including:

    • Approximately 335.9 MW of operating solar power plants in Spain (including a 300 MW solar plant in owned by Talasol, which is 51% owned by the Company) and approximately 38 MW of operating solar power plants in Italy;
    • 9.375% indirect interest in Dorad Energy Ltd., which owns and operates one of Israel’s largest private power plants with production capacity of approximately 850MW, representing about 6%-8% of Israel’s total current electricity consumption;
    • Groen Gas Goor B.V., Groen Gas Oude-Tonge B.V. and Groen Gas Gelderland B.V., project companies operating anaerobic digestion plants in the Netherlands, with a green gas production capacity of approximately 3 million, 3.8 million and 9.5 million Nm3 per year, respectively;
    • 83.333% of Ellomay Pumped Storage (2014) Ltd., which is involved in a project to construct a 156 MW pumped storage hydro power plant in the Manara Cliff, Israel;
    • Solar projects in Italy with an aggregate capacity of 294 MW that have reached “ready to build” status; and
    • Solar projects in the Dallas Metropolitan area, Texas, USA with an aggregate capacity of approximately 27 MW that are placed in service and in process of connection to the grid and additional 22 MW are under construction.

    For more information about Ellomay, visit http://www.ellomay.com.

    Information Relating to Forward-Looking Statements

    This press release contains forward-looking statements that involve substantial risks and uncertainties, including statements that are based on the current expectations and assumptions of the Company’s management. All statements, other than statements of historical facts, included in this press release regarding the Company’s plans and objectives, expectations and assumptions of management are forward-looking statements. The use of certain words, including the words “estimate,” “project,” “intend,” “expect,” “believe” and similar expressions are intended to identify forward-looking statements within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. The Company may not actually achieve the plans, intentions or expectations disclosed in the forward-looking statements and you should not place undue reliance on the Company’s forward-looking statements. Various important factors could cause actual results or events to differ materially from those that may be expressed or implied by the Company’s forward-looking statements, including changes in electricity prices and demand, regulatory changes increases in interest rates and inflation, changes in the supply and prices of resources required for the operation of the Company’s facilities (such as waste and natural gas) and in the price of oil, the impact of the war and hostilities in Israel and Gaza, the impact of the continued military conflict between Russia and Ukraine, technical and other disruptions in the operations or construction of the power plants owned by the Company and general market, political and economic conditions in the countries in which the Company operates, including Israel, Spain, Italy and the United States. These and other risks and uncertainties associated with the Company’s business are described in greater detail in the filings the Company makes from time to time with Securities and Exchange Commission, including its Annual Report on Form 20-F. The forward-looking statements are made as of this date and the Company does not undertake any obligation to update any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise.

    Contact:
    Kalia Rubenbach (Weintraub)
    CFO
    Tel: +972 (3) 797-1111
    Email: hilai@ellomay.com

    Ellomay Capital Ltd. and its Subsidiaries

    Unaudited Condensed Consolidated Statements of Financial Position

      December 31,
    2024 2023 2024
    Unaudited Audited Unaudited
    € in thousands Convenience Translation into US$ in thousands*
    Assets      
    Current assets:      
    Cash and cash equivalents 41,134 51,127 42,819
    Short term deposits – 997 –
    Restricted cash 656 810 683
    Intangible asset from green certificates 178 553 185
    Trade and other receivables 20,734 11,717 21,583
    Derivatives asset short-term 146 275 152
    Assets of disposal groups classified as held for sale – 28,297 –
      62,848 93,776 65,422
    Non-current assets      
    Investment in equity accounted investee 41,324 31,772 43,017
    Advances on account of investments 547 898 569
    Fixed assets 482,166 407,982 501,918
    Right-of-use asset 34,315 30,967 35,721
    Restricted cash and deposits 17,052 17,386 17,751
    Deferred tax 9,039 8,677 9,409
    Long term receivables 13,411 10,446 13,960
    Derivatives 15,974 10,948 16,628
      613,828 519,076 638,973
    Total assets 676,676 612,852 704,395
           
    Liabilities and Equity      
    Current liabilities      
    Current maturities of long-term bank loans 21,316 9,784 22,189
    Current maturities of other long-term loans 5,000 5,000 5,205
    Current maturities of debentures 35,706 35,200 37,169
    Trade payables 8,856 5,249 9,219
    Other payables 10,896 10,859 11,342
    Current maturities of derivatives 1,875 4,643 1,952
    Current maturities of lease liabilities 714 700 743
    Liabilities of disposal groups classified as held for sale – 17,142 –
    Warrants 1,446 84 1,505
      85,809 88,661 89,324
    Non-current liabilities      
    Long-term lease liabilities 25,324 23,680 26,361
    Long-term bank loans 245,866 237,781 255,938
    Other long-term loans 31,314 29,373 32,597
    Debentures 155,823 104,887 162,206
    Deferred tax 2,486 2,516 2,588
    Other long-term liabilities 939 855 977
    Derivatives 288 – 300
      462,040 399,092 480,967
    Total liabilities 547,849 487,753 570,291
           
    Equity      
    Share capital 25,613 25,613 26,662
    Share premium 86,271 86,159 89,805
    Treasury shares (1,736) (1,736) (1,807)
    Transaction reserve with non-controlling Interests 5,697 5,697 5,930
    Reserves 14,338 4,299 14,925
    Accumulated deficit (12,019) (5,037) (12,511)
    Total equity attributed to shareholders of the Company 118,164 114,995 123,004
    Non-Controlling Interest 10,663 10,104 11,100
    Total equity 128,827 125,099 134,104
    Total liabilities and equity 676,676 612,852 704,395

    * Convenience translation into US$ (exchange rate as at December 31, 2024: euro 1 = US$ 1.041)

    Ellomay Capital Ltd. and its Subsidiaries

    Unaudited Condensed Consolidated Statements of Comprehensive Income

      For the three months ended December 31, For the year ended December 31, For the three months ended December 31, For the year ended December 31,
    2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2024
    Unaudited Unaudited Audited Unaudited
    € in thousands (except per share data) Convenience Translation into US$*
    Revenues 8,678 8,424 40,467 48,834 9,033 42,125
    Operating expenses (5,298) (5,460) (19,803) (22,861) (5,515) (20,614)
    Depreciation and amortization expenses (4,126) (4,265) (16,468) (16,012) (4,295) (17,143)
    Gross profit (loss) (746) (1,301) 4,196 9,961 (777) 4,368
                 
    Project development costs (790) (2,025) (4,101) (4,465) (822) (4,269)
    General and administrative expenses (1,384) (1,320) (6,063) (5,283) (1,441) (6,311)
    Share of profit (loss) of equity accounted investee 5,767 (279) 11,062 4,320 6,003 11,515
    Other income, net 524 – 3,409 – 545 3,549
    Operating profit (loss) 3,371 (4,925) 8,503 4,533 3,508 8,852
                 
    Financing income 710 345 2,495 8,747 739 2,597
    Financing income (expenses) in connection with derivatives and warrants, net (664) 336 1,140 251 (691) 1,187
    Financing expenses in connection with projects finance (1,544) (1,465) (6,190) (6,077) (1,607) (6,444)
    Financing expenses in connection with debentures (1,762) (1,008) (6,641) (3,876) (1,834) (6,913)
    Interest expenses on minority shareholder loan (528) (541) (2,144) (2,014) (550) (2,232)
    Other financing expenses (13,099) (1,499) (8,311) (588) (13,636) (8,651)
    Financing expenses, net (16,887) (3,832) (19,651) (3,557) (17,579) (20,456)
                 
    Profit (loss) before taxes on income (13,516) (8,757) (11,148) 976 (14,071) (11,604)
    Tax benefit 1,475 799 1,547 1,436 1,535 1,610
    Profit (loss) for the period from continuing operations (12,041) (7,958) (9,601) 2,412 (12,536) (9,994)
    Profit (loss) from discontinued operation (net of tax) 58 (1,857) 137 (1,787) 60 143
    Profit (loss) for the period (11,983) (9,815) (9,464) 625 (12,476) (9,851)
    Profit (loss) attributable to:            
    Owners of the Company (10,887) (8,490) (6,982) 2,219 (11,333) (7,268)
    Non-controlling interests (1,096) (1,325) (2,482) (1,594) (1,143) (2,583)
    Profit (loss) for the period (11,983) (9,815) (9,464) 625 (12,476) (9,851)
    Other comprehensive income (loss) item            
    that after initial recognition in comprehensive income (loss) were or will be transferred to profit or loss:            
    Foreign currency translation differences for foreign operations 13,159 1,234 8,007 (7,949) 13,698 8,335
    Foreign currency translation differences for foreign operations that were recognized in profit or loss – – 255 – – 265
    Effective portion of change in fair value of cash flow hedges (3,781) (10,718) 5,631 39,431 (3,937) 5,861
    Net change in fair value of cash flow hedges transferred to profit or loss 1,108 19,183 (813) 9,794 1,154 (846)
    Total other comprehensive income 10,486 9,699 13,080 41,276 10,915 13,615
                 
    Total other comprehensive income (loss) attributable to:            
    Owners of the Company 11,354 5,172 10,039 16,931 11,818 10,450
    Non-controlling interests (868) 4,527 3,041 24,345 (903) 3,165
    Total other comprehensive income (loss) for the period 10,486 9,699 13,080 41,276 10,915 13,615
    Total comprehensive income (loss) for the period (1,497) (116) 3,616 41,901 (1,561) 3,764
                 
    Total comprehensive income (loss) attributable to:            
    Owners of the Company 467 (3,318) 3,057 19,150 485 3,182
    Non-controlling interests (1,964) 3,202 559 22,751 (2,046) 582
    Total comprehensive income (loss) for the period (1,497) (116) 3,616 41,901 (1,561) 3,764
                 

    * Convenience translation into US$ (exchange rate as at December 31, 2024: euro 1 = US $ 1.041)

    Ellomay Capital Ltd. and its Subsidiaries

    Unaudited Condensed Consolidated Statements of Comprehensive Income (cont’d)

      For the three months ended December 31, For the year ended December 31, For the three months ended December 31, For the year ended December 31,
    2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2024
    Unaudited Unaudited Audited Unaudited
    € in thousands (except per share data) Convenience Translation into US$*
    Basic profit (loss) per share (0.85) (0.66) (0.54) 0.17 (0.91) (0.56)
    Diluted profit (loss) per share (0.85) (0.66) (0.54) 0.17 (0.91) (0.56)
                 
    Basic profit (loss) per share continuing operations (0.85) (0.14) (0.55) 0.31 (0.91) (0.57)
    Diluted profit (loss) per share continuing operations (0.85) (0.14) (0.55) 0.31 (0.91) (0.57)
                 
    Basic profit (loss) per share discontinued operation – (0.52) 0.01 (0.14) – 0.01
    Diluted profit (loss) per share discontinued operation – (0.52) 0.01 (0.14) – 0.01
                 

    * Convenience translation into US$ (exchange rate as at December 31, 2024: euro 1 = US$ 1.041)

    Ellomay Capital Ltd. and its Subsidiaries

    Unaudited Condensed Consolidated Statements of Changes in Equity

                         
    Attributable to shareholders of the Company
    		 Non-controlling Interests Total Equity
    Share capital Share premium Accumulated Deficit Treasury shares Translation reserve from foreign operations Hedging Reserve Interests Transaction reserve with non-controlling Interests Total    
    € in thousands
    For the year ended                    
    December 31, 2024 (unaudited):                    
    Balance as at January 1, 2024 25,613 86,159 (5,037) (1,736) 385 3,914 5,697 114,995 10,104 125,099
    Profit (loss) for the period – – (6,982) – – – – (6,982) (2,482) (9,464)
    Other comprehensive income (loss) for the period – – – – 8,061 1,978 – 10,039 3,041 13,080
    Total comprehensive income (loss) for the period – – (6,982) – 8,061 1,978 – 3,057 559 3,616
    Transactions with owners of the Company, recognized directly in equity:                    
    Share-based payments – 112 – – – – – 112 – 112
    Balance as at December 31, 2024 25,613 86,271 (12,019) (1,736) 8,446 5,892 5,697 118,164 10,663 128,827
                         
                         
    For the three months                    
    ended December 31, 2024 (unaudited):                    
    Balance as at September 30, 2024 25,613 86,250 (1,132) (1,736) (4,377) 7,361 5,697 117,676 12,627 130,303
    Profit (loss) for the period – – (10,887) – – – – (10,887) (1,096) (11,983)
    Other comprehensive income (loss) for the period – – – – 12,823 (1,469) – 11,354 (868) 10,486
    Total comprehensive income (loss) for the period – – (10,887) – 12,823 (1,469) – 467 (1,964) (1,497)
    Transactions with owners of the Company, recognized directly in equity:                    
    Share-based payments – 21 – – – – – 21 – 21
    Balance as at December 31, 2024 25,613 86,271 (12,019) (1,736) 8,446 5,892 5,697 118,164 10,663 128,827

    Ellomay Capital Ltd. and its Subsidiaries

    Unaudited Condensed Consolidated Statements of Changes in Equity (cont’d)

      Share capital Share premium Attributable to shareholders of the Company Non- controlling Total
    Interests Equity
    Accumulated deficit Treasury shares Translation reserve from
    foreign operations    		 Hedging Reserve Interests Transaction reserve with
    non-controlling Interests    		 Total    
    € in thousands
    For the year ended December 31, 2023 (audited):                    
    Balance as at January 1, 2023 25,613 86,038 (7,256) (1,736) 7,970 (20,602) 5,697 95,724 (12,647) 83,077
    Profit (loss) for the year – – 2,219 – – – – 2,219 (1,594) 625
    Other comprehensive loss for the year – – – – (7,585) 24,516 – 16,931 24,345 41,276
    Total comprehensive loss for the year – – 2,219 – (7,585) 24,516 – 19,150 22,751 41,901
    Transactions with owners of the Company, recognized directly in equity:                    
    Share-based payments – 121 – – – – – 121 – 121
    Balance as at December 31, 2023 25,613 86,159 (5,037) (1,736) 385 3,914 5,697 114,995 10,104 125,099
                         
    For the three months                    
    ended December 31, 2023 (unaudited):                    
    Balance as at September 30, 2023 25,613 86,131 3,453 (1,736) (801) (72) 5,697 118,285 6,902 125,187
    Profit (loss) for the period – – (8,490) – – – – (8,490) (1,325) (9,815)
    Other comprehensive income (loss) for the period – – – – 1,186 3,986 – 5,172 4,527 9,699
    Total comprehensive income (loss) for the period – – (8,490) – 1,186 3,986 – (3,318) 3,202 (116)
    Transactions with owners of the Company, recognized directly in equity:                    
    Share-based payments – 28 – – – – – 28 – 28
    Balance as at December 31, 2023 25,613 86,159 (5,037) (1,736) 385 3,914 5,697 114,995 10,104 125,099

    Ellomay Capital Ltd. and its Subsidiaries

    Unaudited Condensed Consolidated Statements of Changes in Equity (cont’d)

          Attributable to shareholders of the Company Non- controlling Total
        Interests Equity
    Share capital Share premium Accumulated deficit Treasury shares Translation reserve from
    foreign operations    		 Hedging Reserve Interests Transaction reserve with
    non-controlling Interests    		 Total    
    Convenience translation into US$ (exchange rate as at December 31, 2024: euro 1 = US$ 1.041)
    For the year ended December 31, 2024 (unaudited):                    
    Balance as at January 1, 2024 26,662 89,688 (5,243) (1,807) 401 4,074 5,930 119,705 10,518 130,223
    Profit (loss) for the period – – (7,268) – – – – (7,268) (2,583) (9,851)
    Other comprehensive income (loss) for the period – – – – 8,391 2,059 – 10,450 3,165 13,615
    Total comprehensive income (loss) for the period – – (7,268) – 8,391 2,059 – 3,182 582 3,764
    Transactions with owners of the Company, recognized directly in equity:                    
    Share-based payments – 117 – – – – – 117 – 117
    Balance as at December 31, 2024 26,662 89,805 (12,511) (1,807) 8,792 6,133 5,930 123,004 11,100 134,104
                         
    For the three months                    
    ended December 31, 2024 (unaudited):                    
    Balance as at September 30, 2024 26,662 89,783 (1,178) (1,807) (4,555) 7,663 5,930 122,498 13,146 135,644
    Profit (loss) for the period – – (11,333) – – – – (11,333) (1,143) (12,476)
    Other comprehensive income (loss) for the period – – – – 13,347 (1,530) – 11,817 (903) 10,914
    Total comprehensive income (loss) for the period – – (11,333) – 13,347 (1,530) – 484 (2,046) (1,562)
    Transactions with owners of the Company, recognized directly in equity:                    
    Share-based payments – 22 – – – – – 22 – 22
    Balance as at December 31, 2024 26,662 89,805 (12,511) (1,807) 8,792 6,133 5,930 123,004 11,100 134,104

    Ellomay Capital Ltd. and its Subsidiaries

    Unaudited Condensed Consolidated Statements of Cash Flow

      For the three months ended December 31, For the year ended December 31, For the three months ended December 31, 2024 For year ended December 31, 2024
    2024 2023 2024 2023
    Unaudited Unaudited Audited Unaudited
    € in thousands Convenience Translation into US$*
    Cash flows from operating activities            
    Profit (loss) for the period (11,983) (9,815) (9,464) 625 (12,476) (9,851)
    Adjustments for:            
    Financing expenses, net 16,887 3,632 19,247 3,034 17,579 20,035
    Loss from settlement of derivatives contract 266 – 316 – 277 329
    Impairment losses on assets of disposal groups classified as held-for-sale – 2,565 405 2,565 – 422
    Depreciation and amortization 4,126 4,378 16,516 16,473 4,295 17,193
    Share-based payment transactions 21 28 112 121 22 117
    Share of profits of equity accounted investees (5,767) 279 (11,062) (4,320) (6,003) (11,515)
    Payment of interest on loan from an equity accounted investee – 33 – 1,501 – –
    Change in trade receivables and other receivables (5,606) (1,317) (8,824) (302) (5,836) (9,185)
    Change in other assets 2,894 69 3,770 (681) 3,013 3,924
    Change in receivables from concessions project – 259 793 1,778 – 825
    Change in trade payables 48 (332) (31) (45) 50 (32)
    Change in other payables 4,747 (2,492) 4,454 (2,235) 4,941 4,636
    Tax benefit (1,475) (1,391) (1,552) (1,852) (1,535) (1,615)
    Income taxes refund (paid) 277 (473) 623 (912) 288 649
    Interest received 605 524 2,537 2,936 630 2,641
    Interest paid (2,618) (4,132) (9,873) (10,082) (2,725) (10,277)
      14,405 1,630 17,431 7,979 14,996 18,147
    Net cash provided by (used in) operating activities 2,422 (8,185) 7,967 8,604 2,520 8,296
                 
    Cash flows from investing activities            
    Acquisition of fixed assets (22,894) (7,365) (72,922) (58,848) (23,832) (75,909)
    Interest paid capitalized to fixed assets (887) (2,283) (2,515) (2,283) (923) (2,618)
    Proceeds from sale of investments – – 9,267 – – 9,647
    Repayment of loan by an equity accounted investee – 1,221 – 1,324 – –
    Loan to an equity accounted investee – (60) – (128) – –
    Advances on account of investments – – (163) (421) – (170)
    Proceeds from advances on account of investments 514 297 514 2,218 535 535
    Proceeds in marketable securities – – – 2,837 – –
    Investment in settlement of derivatives, net (540) – (316) – (562) (329)
    Proceeds from (investment in) restricted cash, net 532 (53) 689 840 554 717
    Proceeds from (investment in) short term deposit 2,408 – 1,004 (1,092) 2,507 1,045
    Net cash used in investing activities (20,867) (8,243) (64,442) (55,553) (21,721) (67,082)
                 
    Cash flows from financing activities            
    Issuance of warrants – – 2,666 – – 2,775
    Cost associated with long-term loans (556) (690) (2,567) (1,877) (579) (2,672)
    Payment of principal of lease liabilities (2,276) (190) (2,941) (1,156) (2,369) (3,061)
    Proceeds from long-term loans 175 10,787 19,482 32,157 182 20,280
    Repayment of long-term loans (4,668) (5,746) (11,776) (12,736) (4,859) (12,258)
    Repayment of Debentures – – (35,845) (17,763) – (37,313)
    Proceeds from issuance of Debentures, net 15,118 – 73,943 55,808 15,737 76,972
    Net cash provided by (used in) financing activities 7,793 4,161 42,962 54,433 8,112 44,723
                 
    Effect of exchange rate fluctuations on cash and cash equivalents 3,330 1,723 3,092 (2,387) 3,467 3,215
    Increase (decrease) in cash and cash equivalents (7,322) (10,544) (10,421) 5,097 (7,622) (10,848)
    Cash and cash equivalents at the beginning of the period 48,456 62,099 51,127 46,458 50,441 53,221
    Cash from (used in) disposal groups classified as held-for-sale – (428) 428 (428) – 446
    Cash and cash equivalents at the end of the period 41,134 51,127 41,134 51,127 42,819 42,819

    * Convenience translation into US$ (exchange rate as at December 31, 2024: euro 1 = US$ 1.041)

    Ellomay Capital Ltd. and its Subsidiaries

    Operating Segments (Unaudited)

     
                           
    Italy Spain USA Netherlands Israel  
    Solar Subsidized Solar
    Plants    		 28 MW
    Solar    		 Talasol
    Solar    		 Solar Biogas Dorad Manara Pumped Storage Solar* Total
    reportable
    segments    		 Reconciliations
    		 Total consolidated
      For the year ended December 31, 2024
      € in thousands
                             
    Revenues 2,293 2,974 1,741 18,365 – 15,094 67,084 – 278 107,829 (67,362) 40,467
    Operating expenses (109) (519) (593) (4,695) – (13,887) (50,065) – (142) (70,010) 50,207 (19,803)
    Depreciation and amortization expenses (89) (919) (1,088) (11,453) – (2,897) (2,489) – (48) (18,983) 2,515 (16,468)
    Gross profit (loss) 2,095 1,536 60 2,217 – (1,690) 14,530 – 88 18,836 (14,640) 4,196
                             
    Adjusted gross profit (loss) 2,095 1,536 60 2,217 – (1,690) 14,530 – 3172 19,065 (14,869) 4,196
    Project development costs                       (4,101)
    General and administrative expenses                       (6,063)
    Share of income of equity accounted investee                       11,062
    Other income, net                       3,409
    Operating profit                       8,503
    Financing income                       2,495
    Financing income in connection with
    derivatives and warrants, net    		                       1,140
    Financing expenses in connection with projects finance                       (6,190)
    Financing expenses in connection with debentures                       (6,641)
    Interest expenses on minority shareholder loan                       (2,144)
    Other financing expenses                       (8,311)
    Financing expenses, net                       (19,651)
    Profit before taxes on income                       (11,148)
                             
    Segment assets as at December 31, 2024 67,546 12,633 19,403 225,452 55,564 31,779 109,579 186,333 – 708,289 (31,613) 676,676

    * The results of the Talmei Yosef solar plant are presented as a discontinued operation.

    Ellomay Capital Ltd. and its Subsidiaries

    Reconciliation of Profit (Loss) to EBITDA (Unaudited)

      For the three months ended December 31, For the year ended December 31, For the three months ended December 31, For the year ended December 31,
    2024 2023 2024 2023 2024 2024
      € in thousands Convenience Translation into US$ in thousands*
    Net profit (loss) for the period (11,983) (9,815) (9,464) 625 (12,476) (9,851)
    Financing expenses, net 16,887 3,832 19,651 3,557 17,579 20,456
    Tax benefit (1,475) (799) (1,547) (1,436) (1,535) (1,610)
    Depreciation and amortization 4,126 4,265 16,468 16,012 4,295 17,143
    EBITDA 7,555 (2,517) 25,108 18,758 7,863 26,138

    * Convenience translation into US$ (exchange rate as at December 31, 2024: euro 1 = US$ 1.041)

    Ellomay Capital Ltd.

    Information for the Company’s Debenture Holders

    Financial Covenants

    Pursuant to the Deeds of Trust governing the Company’s Series C, Series D, Series E, Series F and Series G Debentures (together, the “Debentures”), the Company is required to maintain certain financial covenants. For more information, see Items 4.A and 5.B of the Company’s Annual Report on Form 20-F submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission on April 18, 2024, and below.

    Net Financial Debt

    As of December 31, 2024, the Company’s Net Financial Debt, (as such term is defined in the Deeds of Trust of the Company’s Debentures), was approximately €159.4 million (consisting of approximately €308.53 million of short-term and long-term debt from banks and other interest bearing financial obligations, approximately €200.54 million in connection with the Series C Debentures issuances (in July 2019, October 2020, February 2021 and October 2021), the Series D Convertible Debentures issuance (in February 2021), the Series E Secured Debentures issuance (in February 2023) and the Series F Debentures issuance (in January, April, August and November 2024)), net of approximately €41.1 million of cash and cash equivalents, short-term deposits and marketable securities and net of approximately €308.55 million of project finance and related hedging transactions of the Company’s subsidiaries). The Net Financial Debt and other information included in this disclosure do not include the issuance of the Company’s Series G Debentures in February 2025.

    Discussion concerning Warning Signs

    Upon the issuance of the Company’s Debentures, the Company undertook to comply with the “hybrid model disclosure requirements” as determined by the Israeli Securities Authority and as described in the Israeli prospectuses published in connection with the public offering of the company’s Debentures. This model provides that in the event certain financial “warning signs” exist in the Company’s consolidated financial results or statements, and for as long as they exist, the Company will be subject to certain disclosure obligations towards the holders of the Company’s Debentures.

    One possible “warning sign” is the existence of a working capital deficiency if the Company’s Board of Directors does not determine that the working capital deficiency is not an indication of a liquidity problem. In examining the existence of warning signs as of December 31, 2024, the Company’s Board of Directors noted the working capital deficiency as of December 31, 2024, in the amount of approximately €23 million. The Company’s Board of Directors reviewed the Company’s financial position, outstanding debt obligations and the Company’s existing and anticipated cash resources and uses and determined that the existence of a working capital deficiency as of December 31, 2024, does not indicate a liquidity problem. In making such determination, the Company’s Board of Directors noted the following: (i) the issuance of the Company’s Series G Debentures in consideration for approximately NIS 211.7 million (net of offering expenses), which was completed after December 31, 2024 and therefore not reflected on the Company’s balance sheet, (ii) the execution of the agreement to sell tax credits in connection with the US solar projects, which is expected to contribute approximately $19 million during the next twelve months, and (iii) the Company’s positive cash flow from operating activities during 2023 and 2024.

    Ellomay Capital Ltd.

    Information for the Company’s Debenture Holders (cont’d)

    Information for the Company’s Series C Debenture Holders

    The Deed of Trust governing the Company’s Series C Debentures (as amended on June 6, 2022, the “Series C Deed of Trust”), includes an undertaking by the Company to maintain certain financial covenants, whereby a breach of such financial covenants for two consecutive quarters is a cause for immediate repayment. As of December 31, 2024, the Company was in compliance with the financial covenants set forth in the Series C Deed of Trust as follows: (i) the Company’s Adjusted Shareholders’ Equity (as defined in the Series C Deed of Trust) was approximately €118.8 million, (ii) the ratio of the Company’s Net Financial Debt (as set forth above) to the Company’s CAP, Net (defined as the Company’s Adjusted Shareholders’ Equity plus the Net Financial Debt) was 57.3%, and (iii) the ratio of the Company’s Net Financial Debt to the Company’s Adjusted EBITDA,6 was 6.1.

    The following is a reconciliation between the Company’s loss and the Adjusted EBITDA (as defined in the Series C Deed of Trust) for the four-quarter period ended December 31, 2024:

      For the four-quarter period ended December 31, 2024
    Unaudited
    € in thousands
    Loss for the period (9,464)
    Financing expenses, net 19,651
    Taxes on income (1,547)
    Depreciation and amortization expenses 16,468
    Share-based payments 112
    Adjustment to revenues of the Talmei Yosef PV Plant due to calculation based on the fixed asset model 981
    Adjusted EBITDA as defined the Series C Deed of Trust 26,201

    Ellomay Capital Ltd.

    Information for the Company’s Debenture Holders (cont’d)

    Information for the Company’s Series D Debenture Holders

    The Deed of Trust governing the Company’s Series D Debentures includes an undertaking by the Company to maintain certain financial covenants, whereby a breach of such financial covenants for the periods set forth in the Series D Deed of Trust is a cause for immediate repayment. As of December 31, 2024, the Company was in compliance with the financial covenants set forth in the Series D Deed of Trust as follows: (i) the Company’s Adjusted Shareholders’ Equity (as defined in the Series D Deed of Trust) was approximately €118.8 million, (ii) the ratio of the Company’s Net Financial Debt (as set forth above) to the Company’s CAP, Net (defined as the Company’s Adjusted Shareholders’ Equity plus the Net Financial Debt) was 57.3%, and (iii) the ratio of the Company’s Net Financial Debt to the Company’s Adjusted EBITDA7 was 6.

    The following is a reconciliation between the Company’s loss and the Adjusted EBITDA (as defined in the Series D Deed of Trust) for the four-quarter period ended December 31, 2024:

      For the four-quarter period ended December 31, 2024
    Unaudited
    € in thousands
    Loss for the period (9,464)
    Financing expenses, net 19,651
    Taxes on income (1,547)
    Depreciation and amortization expenses 16,468
    Share-based payments 112
    Adjustment to revenues of the Talmei Yosef PV Plant due to calculation based on the fixed asset model 981
    Adjustment to data relating to projects with a Commercial Operation Date during the four preceding quarters8 440
    Adjusted EBITDA as defined the Series D Deed of Trust 26,641

    Ellomay Capital Ltd.

    Information for the Company’s Debenture Holders (cont’d)

    Information for the Company’s Series E Debenture Holders

    The Deed of Trust governing the Company’s Series E Debentures includes an undertaking by the Company to maintain certain financial covenants, whereby a breach of such financial covenants for the periods set forth in the Series E Deed of Trust is a cause for immediate repayment. As of December 31, 2024, the Company was in compliance with the financial covenants set forth in the Series E Deed of Trust as follows: (i) the Company’s Adjusted Shareholders’ Equity (as defined in the Series E Deed of Trust) was approximately €118.8 million, (ii) the ratio of the Company’s Net Financial Debt (as set forth above) to the Company’s CAP, Net (defined as the Company’s Adjusted Shareholders’ Equity plus the Net Financial Debt) was 57.3%, and (iii) the ratio of the Company’s Net Financial Debt to the Company’s Adjusted EBITDA9 was 6.

    The following is a reconciliation between the Company’s loss and the Adjusted EBITDA (as defined in the Series E Deed of Trust) for the four-quarter period ended December 31, 2024:

      For the four-quarter period ended December 31, 2024
    Unaudited
    € in thousands
    Loss for the period (9,464)
    Financing expenses, net 19,651
    Taxes on income (1,547)
    Depreciation and amortization expenses 16,468
    Share-based payments 112
    Adjustment to revenues of the Talmei Yosef PV Plant due to calculation based on the fixed asset model 981
    Adjustment to data relating to projects with a Commercial Operation Date during the four preceding quarters10 440
    Adjusted EBITDA as defined the Series E Deed of Trust 26,641
       

    In connection with the undertaking included in Section 3.17.2 of Annex 6 of the Series E Deed of Trust, no circumstances occurred during the reporting period under which the rights to loans provided to Ellomay Luzon Energy Infrastructures Ltd. (formerly U. Dori Energy Infrastructures Ltd. (“Ellomay Luzon Energy”)), which were pledged to the holders of the Company’s Series E Debentures, will become subordinate to the amounts owed by Ellomay Luzon Energy to Israel Discount Bank Ltd.

    As of December 31, 2024, the value of the assets pledged to the holders of the Series E Debentures in the Company’s books (unaudited) is approximately €41.3 million (approximately NIS 156.8 million based on the exchange rate as of such date).

    Ellomay Capital Ltd. and its Subsidiaries

    Information for the Company’s Debenture Holders (cont’d)

    Information for the Company’s Series F Debenture Holders

    The Deed of Trust governing the Company’s Series F Debentures includes an undertaking by the Company to maintain certain financial covenants, whereby a breach of such financial covenants for the periods set forth in the Series F Deed of Trust is a cause for immediate repayment. As of December 31, 2024, the Company was in compliance with the financial covenants set forth in the Series F Deed of Trust as follows: (i) the Company’s Adjusted Shareholders’ Equity (as defined in the Series F Deed of Trust) was approximately €118.4 million, (ii) the ratio of the Company’s Net Financial Debt (as set forth above) to the Company’s CAP, Net (defined as the Company’s Adjusted Shareholders’ Equity plus the Net Financial Debt) was 57.4%, and (iii) the ratio of the Company’s Net Financial Debt to the Company’s Adjusted EBITDA11 was 6.

    The following is a reconciliation between the Company’s loss and the Adjusted EBITDA (as defined in the Series F Deed of Trust) for the four-quarter period ended December 31, 2024:

      For the four-quarter period ended December 31, 2024
    Unaudited
    € in thousands
    Loss for the period (9,464)
    Financing expenses, net 19,651
    Taxes on income (1,547)
    Depreciation and amortization expenses 16,468
    Share-based payments 112
    Adjustment to revenues of the Talmei Yosef PV Plant due to calculation based on the fixed asset model 981
    Adjustment to data relating to projects with a Commercial Operation Date during the four preceding quarters12 440
    Adjusted EBITDA as defined the Series F Deed of Trust 26,641
       

    Ellomay Capital Ltd. and its Subsidiaries

    Information for the Company’s Debenture Holders (cont’d)

    Information for the Company’s Series G Debenture Holders

    The Deed of Trust governing the Company’s Series G Debentures includes an undertaking by the Company to maintain certain financial covenants, whereby a breach of such financial covenants for the periods set forth in the Series G Deed of Trust is a cause for immediate repayment. As of December 31, 2024, the Company was in compliance with the financial covenants set forth in the Series G Deed of Trust as follows: (i) the Company’s Adjusted Shareholders’ Equity (as defined in the Series G Deed of Trust) was approximately €118.4 million, (ii) the ratio of the Company’s Net Financial Debt (as set forth above) to the Company’s CAP, Net (defined as the Company’s Adjusted Shareholders’ Equity plus the Net Financial Debt) was 57.4%, and (iii) the ratio of the Company’s Net Financial Debt to the Company’s Adjusted EBITDA13 was 6.

    The following is a reconciliation between the Company’s loss and the Adjusted EBITDA (as defined in the Series G Deed of Trust) for the four-quarter period ended December 31, 2024:

      For the four-quarter period ended December 31, 2024
    Unaudited
    € in thousands
    Loss for the period (9,464)
    Financing expenses, net 19,651
    Taxes on income (1,547)
    Depreciation and amortization expenses 16,468
    Share-based payments 112
    Adjustment to revenues of the Talmei Yosef PV Plant due to calculation based on the fixed asset model 981
    Adjustment to data relating to projects with a Commercial Operation Date during the four preceding quarters14 440
    Adjusted EBITDA as defined the Series G Deed of Trust 26,641
       

    1 The revenues presented in the Company’s financial results included in this press release are based on IFRS and do not take into account the adjustments included in the Company’s investor presentation.

    2 The gross profit of the Talmei Yosef solar plant located in Israel is adjusted to include income from the sale of electricity (approximately €1,264 thousand) and depreciation expenses (approximately €757 thousand) under the fixed asset model, which were not recognized as revenues and depreciation expenses, respectively, under the financial asset model as per IFRIC 12.

    3 The amount of short-term and long-term debt from banks and other interest-bearing financial obligations provided above, includes an amount of approximately €4.7 million costs associated with such debt, which was capitalized and therefore offset from the debt amount that is recorded in the Company’s balance sheet.

    4 The amount of the debentures provided above includes an amount of approximately €6.9 million associated costs, which was capitalized and discount or premium and therefore offset from the debentures amount that is recorded in the Company’s balance sheet. This amount also includes the accrued interest as at December 31, 2024 in the amount of approximately €2.1 million.

    5 The project finance amount deducted from the calculation of Net Financial Debt includes project finance obtained from various sources, including financing entities and the minority shareholders in project companies held by the Company (provided in the form of shareholders’ loans to the project companies).

    6 The term “Adjusted EBITDA” is defined in the Series C Deed of Trust as earnings before financial expenses, net, taxes, depreciation and amortization, where the revenues from the Company’s operations, such as the Talmei Yosef solar plant, are calculated based on the fixed asset model and not based on the financial asset model (IFRIC 12), and before share-based payments. The Series C Deed of Trust provides that for purposes of the financial covenant, the Adjusted EBITDA will be calculated based on the four preceding quarters, in the aggregate. The Adjusted EBITDA is presented in this press release as part of the Company’s undertakings towards the holders of its Series C Debentures. For a general discussion of the use of non-IFRS measures, such as EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA see above under “Use of NON-IFRS Financial Measures.”

    7 The term “Adjusted EBITDA” is defined in the Series D Deed of Trust as earnings before financial expenses, net, taxes, depreciation and amortization, where the revenues from the Company’s operations, such as the Talmei Yosef PV Plant, are calculated based on the fixed asset model and not based on the financial asset model (IFRIC 12), and before share-based payments, when the data of assets or projects whose Commercial Operation Date (as such term is defined in the Series D Deed of Trust) occurred in the four quarters that preceded the relevant date will be calculated based on Annual Gross Up (as such term is defined in the Series D Deed of Trust). The Series D Deed of Trust provides that for purposes of the financial covenant, the Adjusted EBITDA will be calculated based on the four preceding quarters, in the aggregate. The Adjusted EBITDA is presented in this press release as part of the Company’s undertakings towards the holders of its Series D Debentures. For a general discussion of the use of non-IFRS measures, such as EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA see above under “Use of NON-IFRS Financial Measures.”

    8 The adjustment is based on the results of solar plants in Italy that were connected to the grid and commenced delivery of electricity to the grid during the year ended December 31, 2024. The Company recorded revenues and only direct expenses in connection with these solar plants from the connection to the grid and until PAC (Preliminary Acceptance Certificate – reached during the fourth quarter of 2024). However, for the sake of caution, the Company included the expected fixed expenses in connection with these solar plants in the calculation of the adjustment.

    9 The term “Adjusted EBITDA” is defined in the Series E Deed of Trust as earnings before financial expenses, net, taxes, depreciation and amortization, where the revenues from the Company’s operations, such as the Talmei Yosef PV Plant, are calculated based on the fixed asset model and not based on the financial asset model (IFRIC 12), and before share-based payments, when the data of assets or projects whose Commercial Operation Date (as such term is defined in the Series E Deed of Trust) occurred in the four quarters that preceded the relevant date will be calculated based on Annual Gross Up (as such term is defined in the Series E Deed of Trust). The Series E Deed of Trust provides that for purposes of the financial covenant, the Adjusted EBITDA will be calculated based on the four preceding quarters, in the aggregate. The Adjusted EBITDA is presented in this press release as part of the Company’s undertakings towards the holders of its Series E Debentures. For a general discussion of the use of non-IFRS measures, such as EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA see above under “Use of NON-IFRS Financial Measures.”

    10 The adjustment is based on the results of solar plants in Italy that were connected to the grid and commenced delivery of electricity to the grid during the year ended December 31, 2024. The Company recorded revenues and only direct expenses in connection with these solar plants from the connection to the grid and until PAC (Preliminary Acceptance Certificate – reached during the fourth quarter of 2024). However, for the sake of caution, the Company included the expected fixed expenses in connection with these solar plants in the calculation of the adjustment.

    11 The term “Adjusted EBITDA” is defined in the Series F Deed of Trust as earnings before financial expenses, net, taxes, depreciation and amortization, where the revenues from the Company’s operations, such as the Talmei Yosef PV Plant, are calculated based on the fixed asset model and not based on the financial asset model (IFRIC 12), and before share-based payments, when the data of assets or projects whose Commercial Operation Date (as such term is defined in the Series F Deed of Trust) occurred in the four quarters that preceded the relevant date will be calculated based on Annual Gross Up (as such term is defined in the Series F Deed of Trust). The Series F Deed of Trust provides that for purposes of the financial covenant, the Adjusted EBITDA will be calculated based on the four preceding quarters, in the aggregate. The Adjusted EBITDA is presented in this press release as part of the Company’s undertakings towards the holders of its Series F Debentures. For a general discussion of the use of non-IFRS measures, such as EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA see above under “Use of Non-IFRS Financial Measures.”

    12 The adjustment is based on the results of solar plants in Italy that were connected to the grid and commenced delivery of electricity to the grid during the year ended December 31, 2024. The Company recorded revenues and only direct expenses in connection with these solar plants from the connection to the grid and until PAC (Preliminary Acceptance Certificate – reached during the fourth quarter of 2024). However, for the sake of caution, the Company included the expected fixed expenses in connection with these solar plants in the calculation of the adjustment.

    13 The term “Adjusted EBITDA” is defined in the Series G Deed of Trust as earnings before financial expenses, net, taxes, depreciation and amortization, where the revenues from the Company’s operations, such as the Talmei Yosef PV Plant, are calculated based on the fixed asset model and not based on the financial asset model (IFRIC 12), and before share-based payments, when the data of assets or projects whose Commercial Operation Date (as such term is defined in the Series G Deed of Trust) occurred in the four quarters that preceded the relevant date will be calculated based on Annual Gross Up (as such term is defined in the Series G Deed of Trust). The Series G Deed of Trust provides that for purposes of the financial covenant, the Adjusted EBITDA will be calculated based on the four preceding quarters, in the aggregate. The Adjusted EBITDA is presented in this press release as part of the Company’s undertakings towards the holders of its Series G Debentures. For a general discussion of the use of non-IFRS measures, such as EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA see above under “Use of Non-IFRS Financial Measures.”

    14 The adjustment is based on the results of solar plants in Italy that were connected to the grid and commenced delivery of electricity to the grid during the year ended December 31, 2024. The Company recorded revenues and only direct expenses in connection with these solar plants from the connection to the grid and until PAC (Preliminary Acceptance Certificate – reached during the fourth quarter of 2024). However, for the sake of caution, the Company included the expected fixed expenses in connection with these solar plants in the calculation of the adjustment.

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI Video: Secretary Rubio’s Travel to Brussels – NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting

    Source: United States of America – Department of State (video statements)

    U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio will travel to Brussels, Belgium from April 2-4 to attend the NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting. He will discuss security priorities, including increased Allied defense investment, securing lasting peace in Ukraine, and the shared threat of China to the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific Alliances.

    More: https://www.state.gov/secretary-rubios-travel-to-brussels/

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=reZqh6piyDI

    MIL OSI Video –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Press release – Remembering Bucha: Real peace must be based on justice

    Source: European Parliament

    Russia must be held accountable for war crimes committed during its war of aggression in Ukraine, said EP Vice-President Hojsík in Kyiv at the event commemorating victims of Bucha tragedy.

    Martin Hojsík represented European Parliament President Roberta Metsola on Monday at the 2025 Bucha Summit, a conference of Speakers and Heads of Delegation of national parliaments of European countries held to commemorate the third anniversary of the liberation of Bucha from Russia .

    “Peace without justice is not a real peace. Victims of the Russian massacre in Bucha are a reminder of this. This is why the European Parliament has been calling since the beginning of the Russian aggression for a fair investigation and punishment of war crimes and crimes against humanity,” Parliament’s Vice-President Martin Hojsík stressed.

    “Our support for Ukraine remains unwavering. We must keep standing with Ukraine and step up our efforts for a just and lasting peace. The future of Ukraine is in the European Union,” he said.

    2025 Bucha summit

    The European Parliament was represented at the event together with speakers and heads of delegation of the national parliaments of Belgium, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom, convened in Kyiv on Monday 31 March to commemorate the victims of the Bucha massacre.

    In their joint statement, the parliament leaders condemned “in the strongest possible terms the Russian Federation’s unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine”, reaffirmed their “full respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders”, and called for “the establishment of a special tribunal for the crime of aggression against Ukraine”.

    They called for a “significant increase in aid for Ukraine” and “the strongest possible sanctions and measures against Russia that could support steps towards a comprehensive, just and lasting peace”. Finally, they reaffirmed their support for Ukraine’s European integration and sovereign right to determine its future free from external pressure or interference.

    Background

    In a 12 March resolution the European Parliament reaffirmed its commitment to supporting Ukraine’s desire for a just and lasting peace, and also called on the EU and its member states to significantly increase their assistance to Ukraine.

    On Tuesday 1 April morning, MEPs and EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas will discuss the need to hold Russia accountable for its war crimes in Ukraine. You can follow the debate live here (1.4.2025).

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on targeted attacks against Christians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo – defending religious freedom and security – B10-0212/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    B10‑0212/2025

    European Parliament resolution on targeted attacks against Christians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo – defending religious freedom and security

    (2025/2612(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966,

    – having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in particular Article 10 thereof on freedom of thought, conscience and religion,

    – having regard to its previous resolutions on the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC),

    – having regard to the statements by the European External Action Service on the security and human rights situation in the DRC,

    – having regard to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,

    – having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas the DRC is experiencing an escalation of violence, particularly in the eastern regions, where armed groups such as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) have targeted Christian communities;

    B. whereas between 12 and 15 February 2025, more than 70 Christians were found dead in a Protestant church near Kazanga, North Kivu province in the DRC; whereas the victims had been beheaded by the Islamist ADF, an affiliate militia of Islamic State Central Africa Wilayat (ISCAP);

    C. whereas according to BBC Monitoring analysis, ISCAP is now the deadliest armed group in the DRC; whereas from 1 January to 30 June 2024, Islamic State claimed responsibility for killing a total of 698 African Christians; whereas ISCAP claimed responsibility for killing 639 Christians;

    D. whereas the National Episcopal Conference of Congo (CENCO) has amplified Pope Francis’s appeals for an end to the violence and has initiated discussions between the government and rebel groups, with consultations ongoing; whereas CENCO and the Church of Christ in Congo have launched an appeal for 2025 to be a ‘Year of Peace and Good Coexistence’ to address the ongoing violence;

    E. whereas churches and Christian institutions have increasingly become targets of violence and persecution by terrorist groups, including the ADF, which has pledged allegiance to Islamic State; whereas the ADF, originally an armed Ugandan rebel movement, has evolved into a jihadist terrorist group operating in the eastern DRC, conducting mass killings, attacking civilian populations and disrupting agricultural and economic activities; whereas despite military operations by Congolese and Ugandan forces, the ADF continues to perpetrate violence and instability in the region;

    F. whereas ISIS-DRC continues to pose a severe threat in the region, carrying out deadly attacks against civilians, including the January 2025 massacre in Makoko, North Kivu, and the December 2024 attack in Batangi-Mbau; whereas recent operations by Interpol and Afripol have led to the arrest of 37 suspected terrorists across East Africa, yet ISIS-DRC remains active, exploiting instability and weak governance to sustain its violent campaign;

    G. whereas the appointment of a new EU Special Envoy for religious freedom by the Commission on 7 December 2022 followed a three-year standstill, during which the former Special Envoy who had been appointed in 2021 returned his mandate after a few months to assume another position in a national government;

    H. whereas in 2016 the Hungarian Government set up a special department for persecuted Christians around the world; whereas the State Secretariat for the Aid of Persecuted Christians supports, through its ‘Hungary Helps’ programme, faith-based initiatives in more than 50 countries, with hundreds of humanitarian and development projects; whereas in 2019 the Italian Government established a fund for persecuted Christian communities; whereas in May 2022 the Italian Government led by Mario Draghi appointed a special envoy for the protection of religious freedom and interreligious dialogue; whereas in 2023 the Italian Government led by Giorgia Meloni appointed a special envoy attached to the foreign ministry to protect Christian communities around the world;

    I. whereas over the past decade, the EU has provided significant financial assistance to the DRC, including over EUR 272 million in humanitarian aid between 2023 and 2025 to address urgent needs such as shelter, clean water, food and education for vulnerable populations; whereas the EU allocated EUR 584 million through the European Development Fund for the period 2008-2013 to support stability and development projects; whereas the EU has also been involved in security and peacekeeping efforts, deploying missions such as the EU Security Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUSEC) and the EU Police Mission for the DRC (EUPOL RD Congo) to assist in rebuilding the Congolese security forces;

    L. whereas the DRC has consistently ranked among the most corrupt countries in the world, scoring 20 out of 100 in the 2023 Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International and ranking 162nd out of 180 countries; whereas a conservative estimate of 30 % of the approximately EUR 1.2 billion in aid funded with EU taxpayers’ money, provided between 2008 and 2024, suggests that at least EUR 360 million may have been misappropriated by corrupt officials, seriously undermining efforts to enhance governance, stability, safety and living conditions in the DRC;

    M. whereas the EU and Rwanda signed a memorandum of understanding on sustainable raw materials value chains in February 2024, granting the EU access to sources of raw materials and rare earth elements in Rwanda; whereas several UN reports state that Rwanda supports the M23 group as a means of extracting and exporting minerals from the DRC; whereas the US Embassy in the DRC confirmed that Congolese minerals are being transported, with the support of armed groups, to Rwanda, where they are subsequently sold to international buyers;

    N. whereas this conflict has been overshadowed by global attention focused on crises in the Middle East and Ukraine, despite over 10 million lives lost in years of violence and an estimated 3 000 people killed in just a few days;

    1. Strongly condemns the murder of Christians in the DRC, and all acts of violence targeting them, and expresses its solidarity with the victims;

    2. Notes that the DRC ranks 35th on the Open Doors’ World Watch List 2025 of countries where Christians are persecuted because of their faith; emphasises that Christians face severe persecution and violence especially from Islamist groups; emphasises that the ADF abduct and kill Christians and attack churches, leading to terror, insecurity and population displacement; emphasises that the M23 group also targets Christian civilians; is concerned about the involvement of the M23 group in the widespread violence in the DRC; takes note of the EU sanctions against people holding leading positions in the Rwanda Defence Force and M23; demands that the Rwandan Government withdraw its troops from the DRC and cease its cooperation with M23; notes that the DRC ranks fourth on Global Christian Relief’s Red List of countries where Christians have been forced to flee their homes due to violence;

    3. Is worried about the growing threat posed by ISCAP in Central Africa; notes that the increasing number of violent attacks demonstrates both ISCAP’s willingness and operational capability to intensify its campaign of terror and violent attacks against Christians; is worried that the expansion of Islamic State in Central Africa poses a danger to the security of the whole continent;

    4. Is of the opinion that by stalling the process of mandating an EU Special Envoy for religious freedom for almost three years, the Commission signalled to the outside world that the issue of the persecution of Christians worldwide is not one of the EU’s priorities; notes that this reflects its policy in the EU, only appointing a coordinator for combating Muslim hatred, and neglecting the rising violence against Christians in the EU; finds this lack of commitment highly regrettable and problematic in the light of the rising violence against Christians worldwide; is of the opinion that the significant delay in appointing the EU Special Envoy for religious freedom undermines the credibility of the EU’s commitment to protecting religious freedom and belief beyond its borders;

    5. Welcomes the ‘Hungary Helps’ programme, which helps Christian communities rebuild after persecution and manages projects, reconstructing institutions and improving education and healthcare after violent persecution by Islamic terrorist groups; emphasises that the Hungarian initiative, enabling people to build their future in their own country, is also an important migration prevention policy; welcomes the fact that the ‘Hungary Helps’ programme and the Reformed Church of Hungary will give donations to help the victims of the Islamist terrorist attacks on Christians in the DRC; welcomes the cooperation between the Hungarian and Italian Governments to undertake joint initiatives in Africa, with a focus on supporting persecuted Christians; hopes that Hungarian and Italian policy will inspire other Member States to follow suit;

    6. Calls for the EU and the EU Special Envoy for religious freedom to take all the necessary diplomatic and political initiatives to protect Christians in the DRC;

    7. Calls on the DRC and its authorities to conduct a thorough investigation of the murders and to ensure that the criminals responsible are brought to justice;

    8. Calls on the DRC and its authorities to take immediate and effective action to protect Christian communities and all religious minorities from further violence and persecution;

    9. Calls on the DRC and its authorities to provide financial and logistical support for local and international humanitarian organisations assisting the victims of religious persecution in the DRC;

    10. Welcomes the efforts of religious leaders to foster peace and dialogue and urges all parties involved to seek constructive solutions rather than resorting to violence;

    11. Encourages regional and international African bodies such as the African Union and the East African Community to take the lead in addressing the conflict, as they are the best suited for this task; encourages these African bodies to enhance counter-terrorism cooperation, intelligence-sharing and military coordination against extremist groups operating in the region;

    12. Calls strongly for the EU to work with regional and international actors to protect civilians and Christian communities and bring the perpetrators of these criminal acts to justice;

    13. Emphasises the need to address these crimes at the African Union level;

    14. Calls on the Commission to suspend the implementation of the memorandum of understanding on sustainable raw materials value chains signed with Rwanda in February 2024, in the light of credible reports linking Rwanda to the illicit exploitation and export of minerals from the eastern DRC, including through its support for the M23 armed group; stresses that the continuation of this agreement risks fuelling the ongoing conflict, undermining regional stability and leading to the further killing of Christians in the region;

    15. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the EU Special Envoy for religious freedom, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN), the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, the Special Rapporteur on Torture, Degrading and Inhuman Treatment, the African Union Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, the Government and Parliament of the Democratic Republic of Congo, the African Union and the East African Community.

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Study – Budgetary Outlook for the European Union 2025 – 31-03-2025

    Source: European Parliament

    This study seeks to provide a concise and succinct overview of the structure, key facts and figures, and rules and procedures of the EU budget, and informs on the latest developments in EU finances and budgeting. It aims to serve both as a reference guide for experienced EU budget actors and as a primer for newcomers to the EU budget. It continues an annual series of ‘Outlooks’ produced by the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) over the past eight years. This study analyses the expenditure challenges for the EU’s next multiannual financial framework, including financing EU defence, further support for Ukraine, the costs of enlargement, the financing of competitiveness and the repayment of debt incurred by Next Generation EU grants. The study examines EU budget revenues and a reform of the own resources system, including the option to increase EU debt. Finally, it analyses the annual budget, the discharge procedure, rule of law conditionality, and budgetary scrutiny.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the targeted attacks against Christians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: defending religious freedom and security – B10-0216/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Adam Bielan, Mariusz Kamiński, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Cristian Terheş, Maciej Wąsik, Aurelijus Veryga, Jadwiga Wiśniewska, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Waldemar Tomaszewski, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński
    on behalf of the ECR Group

    B10‑0216/2025

    European Parliament resolution on the targeted attacks against Christians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: defending religious freedom and security

    (2025/2612(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which affirms the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, as well as the right to manifest one’s religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance,

    – having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which recognises the right of individuals to freedom of religion, including freedom to worship and observe religious practices,

    – having regard to the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which guarantees the right to freedom of conscience and the free exercise of religious worship for all citizens,

    – having regard to the UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 25 November 1981,

    – having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights, particularly Article 9 thereof, which guarantees the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion,

    – having regard to reports from the UN and various other human rights organisations, detailing the rise in attacks and indiscriminate killings and ongoing violations of the freedom of belief by armed groups, including Islamist militants, against Christian communities in the eastern DRC region,

    – having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas the DRC has endured decades of widespread violence and instability in its eastern provinces, exacerbated by armed conflicts that have created fertile ground for the emergence of over 100 extremist groups targeting vulnerable populations, including religious communities;

    B. whereas Christians in the DRC’s eastern provinces are facing an increasing number of targeted attacks, killings and abductions as well as the destruction of their property, perpetrated by armed groups with extremist ideologies;

    C. whereas, according to local reports, on 13 February 2025, 70 Christians were abducted in the village of Mayba and later found dead in a church in nearby Kasanga; whereas the attack was reportedly committed by militants of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF);

    D. whereas the ADF is one of the most prominent extremist groups with explicitly religious objectives, especially since its leader pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2019;

    E. whereas in May 2020, the ADF participated in ISIS’s global ‘Battle of Attrition’, specifically targeting Christian communities in seven neighbourhoods throughout north-eastern DRC; whereas in 2021, a prominent local Muslim leader received death threats from the ADF, and he was later gunned down; whereas in 2023, the ADF bombed services at a Pentecostal church in Kasindi, killing 14 people; whereas in January 2024, the ADF killed eight people in Beni during an attack on a Pentecostal church and, in May 2024, ADF assailants reportedly killed 14 Catholics in North Kivu province for refusing to convert to Islam; whereas the ADF also reportedly executed 11 Christians in the village of Ndimo in Ituri province and kidnapped several others;

    F. whereas in addition to the ADF, several armed groups in the eastern DRC have politicised religion, targeting religious infrastructure as part of their insurgency strategies;

    G. whereas in 2024, 355 people were reportedly killed in the DRC for their faith, compared to 261 in 2023, while an estimated 10 000 people were internally displaced because of their faith, marking a tenfold increase from 2023; whereas houses have been looted and burned down, schools relocated, churches and healthcare facilities closed, and several Christian villages have been abandoned altogether;

    H. whereas the attacks on Christians are part of a broader trend of escalating violence and religious intolerance, with religious leaders and communities increasingly finding themselves under threat in areas controlled by armed groups;

    I. whereas the recent activities of the March 23 Movement (M23) rebel group have further exacerbated the vulnerability of religious communities in the region;

    J. whereas converts to Christianity from Islam and indigenous religions face pressure from their families to revert to their former faiths;

    K. whereas local and international human rights organisations have documented numerous instances of religious violence in the DRC, highlighting the failure of the state to provide adequate protection; whereas, while the DRC Government has demonstrated a strong intention to address the impacts of armed group violence in the eastern DRC, other recent developments call into question the government’s commitment to safeguarding religious freedom specifically;

    L. whereas the EU has repeatedly affirmed its commitment to the promotion and protection of religious freedom globally, and has taken steps to combat religious persecution and intolerance in various parts of the world; whereas Christians are the most persecuted religious group in the world;

    M. whereas Parliament has consistently called for the strengthening of international efforts to combat religious persecution and to hold accountable those responsible for attacks on religious communities;

    1. Strongly condemns the targeted attacks against Christian communities in the DRC, including killings, abductions and the destruction of religious property, and calls for an immediate halt to such acts of violence;

    2. Is deeply concerned about the situation of Christians and Christian converts from Islam and indigenous religions in the region, who are facing a severe and escalating crisis owing to a combination of militant threats, familial pressure and political interference;

    3. Expresses its deep concern about the violence committed by the ADF and other extremist groups in the eastern DRC and underlines that the chaos created by the M23 rebel group has further exacerbated the vulnerability of religious communities;

    4. Calls for the immediate cessation of all forms of violence and for the commitment of all parties involved in the ongoing conflict in the eastern DRC to respect international humanitarian law;

    5. Calls on the DRC Government to counter extremist propaganda and provide armed security at churches and other religious buildings;

    6. Calls for the establishment of early warning mechanisms to more effectively prevent and respond to attacks by the ADF and other armed groups against civilians;

    7. Stresses the critical importance of supporting the DRC Government in strengthening the rule of law, improving security and ensuring the protection of religious communities at risk, while ensuring that perpetrators of attacks against religious communities are brought to justice;

    8. Echoes the calls for international solidarity in defending religious freedom and the protection of religious minorities in conflict zones, particularly in the DRC, while addressing the root causes of violent extremism in the DRC and its neighbourhood;

    9. Encourages the establishment of safe zones in the eastern DRC, where religious communities and other civilians who have been targeted can have access to legal services and psychological support;

    10. Stresses the need for a comprehensive approach that combines humanitarian aid, peacebuilding initiatives and support for the rule of law so as to ensure lasting protection for all religious communities in the DRC, including Christians; underlines the role of religious communities in the DRC in promoting peace, social cohesion and the well-being of local communities;

    11. Urges the EU to uphold its commitment to the promotion of religious freedom and the protection of religious communities, ensuring that the rights of these groups are prioritised in the EU’s external policies;

    12. Calls for enhanced cooperation between the EU and the African Union, as well as regional actors, to promote stability and prevent extremist groups from using religion as a tool for violence and division;

    13. Notes, with concern, the growing influence of the Russian Orthodox Church in Africa, which is a staunch supporter of the Putin regime and its violent, unlawful war in Ukraine; underlines that, on 29 December 2021, the Russian Orthodox Church officially announced the formation of the Patriarchate Exarchate of Africa, which consists of two dioceses: the South African Diocese, encompassing 24 countries, and the North African Diocese, covering 31 countries;

    14. Underlines that this move significantly expands the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church across the African continent, encroaching on the jurisdiction of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Alexandria, which holds the official canonical responsibility for the entire African continent; underlines that this development raises significant questions regarding the broader geopolitical and ideological objectives of the Russian Federation in Africa;

    15. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European External Action Service, the African Union, the Joint Council of Ministers and Joint Parliamentary Assembly of the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States and the EU, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Government and Parliament of the DRC.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Baldwin Leads Colleagues in Laying Out Worker-First American Trade Policy

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Wisconsin Tammy Baldwin

    WASHINGTON, D.C. –  As the Trump Administration plans to reshape the nation’s trade policy, U.S. Senator Tammy Baldwin (D-WI) is leading her Midwest colleagues, U.S. Senators Gary Peters (D-MI) and Elissa Slotkin (D-MI), in laying out a vision to prioritize American workers in trade policy, re-establish the United States as a world leader in manufacturing, and strengthen national security. Senator Baldwin has long worked against trade deals that undermine American workers, including opposing the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) with China, and other deals that are a race to the bottom. Since 2001, flawed trade policies have contributed to the loss of 4.3 million manufacturing jobs in the U.S. 

    “For too long, the deck has been stacked against workers and has benefited trade cheats like China and the corporate fat cats in board rooms. Workers are the ones who make our economy go around and they are the ones we need to prioritize. Right now, we have a real opportunity to level the playing field for American workers and crack down on trade cheats, grow our Made in America economy, and ensure workers get the pay they deserve to live a good, middle-class life,” said Senator Baldwin.

    “We need trade policies that provide a level playing field for American workers to compete and succeed,” said Senator Peters. “For far too long, American businesses and workers have paid the price of a trade landscape that benefits countries like China who blatantly cheat the system and undercut our businesses without being held accountable. Now is the time to take a real, comprehensive look at our trade policies to ensure we are putting American workers first and preventing good-paying jobs from being shipped overseas.”

    “For 30 years we’ve been outsourcing our supply chains way too far, and too many Michigan workers have suffered because of it,” said Senator Slotkin. “Democrats, especially in the Midwest, need a vision for a 21st century trade policy. To me, that strategy isn’t rocket science. It should strengthen the Middle Class and protect American manufacturing and jobs, provide certainty for American businesses and farmers, and recognize that the U.S. has powerful economic levers to wield against our adversaries.”

    In the letter to President Trump, Baldwin and her colleagues outline the details of a trade agenda that would center workers, stand up to trade cheats like China, and grow the American manufacturing sector, including:

    • Advocating for a Complete Reimagining of Relationship with People’s Republic of China (PRC): The plan calls for revising our trade relationship with China. By allowing China to join the World Trade Organization, the United States opted to treat China like a market economy. China’s non-market practices, rampant abuses of labor and human rights, and government-sponsored trade cheating call for a complete rethinking of our economic relationship, including Permanent Normal Trade Relations.
    • Review & Revise Free Trade Agreements: Baldwin calls for reviewing and revising each of the United States’ 14 free trade agreements with 20 countries, including the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), to ensure the best outcomes for American workers.
    • Strengthen Trade Enforcement Mechanisms: Baldwin looks to strengthen trade enforcement mechanisms to curb cheating and manipulation by foreign countries. Baldwin identifies bipartisan legislation, such as the Leveling the Playing Field 2.0 Act to strengthen trade remedies, Fighting Trade Cheats Act to empower private companies to hold bad actors accountable, and efforts that can be addressed by executive action, like closing the de minimis loophole, which results in lost tariff revenue and the importing of counterfeit products and contraband drugs like fentanyl.
    • Support for Workers Who Lost Jobs Due to Short-Sighted Policies of the Past: Baldwin also calls for the strengthening and reauthorization of the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) to provide critical support for American workers who lose their jobs due to the short-sighted policies of the past, so those workers can access job training benefits and quickly return to the workforce.

    Full text of the letter can be found here and below.

    Dear Mr. President:

    Your Administration has announced that it is undertaking a comprehensive review of our nation’s trade policy, an action that is welcome and long overdue. Free trade and globalization have left us with offshored manufacturing, devastated communities, workers out of a job or in jobs with lower wages, and supply chains overly dependent on our adversaries in too many areas. Our states have suffered disproportionately, and we write to share policy solutions informed by that experience and to urge you to implement a pro-American worker trade policy.

    The current global and domestic economic landscape is the result of deliberate policy choices. Now is the time to break the cycle and boldly set a new standard for how we design, implement, monitor and enforce our trade policies. Presidents of both parties have failed Americans on trade policy, and Congress has validated their mistakes—often, in close votes. Misguided decisions like granting Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR), which paved the way for China’s accession into the World Trade Organization (WTO), along with the passage of NAFTA and CAFTA, as well as support of the Trans Pacific Partnership, are part of a misguided narrative that free trade and liberalization would improve economic growth and living standards, which for many communities has proven false. Since 2001, flawed trade policies have contributed to the loss of 4.3 million manufacturing jobs here in the U.S. We have fought for a pro-American worker trade policy, and would strongly support reforms that are reasoned, strategic, and durable. Our goal should be a combined pro-U.S. worker trade agenda and proactive industrial policy and strategic use of tariffs that secures supply chains, revitalizes communities, creates good-paying, union jobs and re-establishes the United States as a leader in world manufacturing.

    First and foremost, we must drastically revise our trade relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). By allowing China to join the WTO, the United States opted to treat the PRC like a market economy. Proponents claimed this would bring market reforms. That has proven a naïve and misguided approach. China still embraces a state-directed approach to trade and targets entire sectors and industries for global domination. China’s non-market practices, rampant abuses of labor and human rights, and government-sponsored trade cheating call for a complete rethinking of our economic relationship, including PNTR.

    Each of the United States’ 14 free trade agreements with 20 countries, including the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), must be reviewed and revised where necessary, in order to ensure the best outcomes for American workers. While your Administration oversaw the negotiations of the USMCA, which contained the strongest labor standards of any free trade agreement thus far, there are urgent issues to be addressed during the upcoming review. The PRC has increasingly located facilities in Mexico to take advantage of proximity to the United States and preferential treatment of goods under USMCA. It has also failed to fundamentally change a core challenge facing American workers: the continued offshoring of good manufacturing jobs because of wage suppression, union busting and weak regulations in Mexico. There are long-standing challenges to the U.S. economy that USMCA’s dispute mechanism has failed to address, such as Canada’s treatment of the United States dairy sector. Separate from USMCA, the United States is part of agreements about government procurement, through the WTO or negotiated separately, that result in a losing deal for Americans. All such agreements must be thoroughly reviewed and recalibrated to level the playing field.

    The ultimate goal of our trade enforcement mechanisms should not be to react to injury, it must be to deter and prevent cheating in the first place. Foreign entities will continue to transship, evade trade remedies, and create new ways to cheat and take advantage of the United States, and stopping problems as they come up in a “whack-a-mole” fashion is a reactive strategy. Strengthening trade enforcement mechanisms will curb cheating and manipulation by foreign countries. There are substantive bipartisan efforts in this area, such as the Leveling the Playing Field 2.0 Act to strengthen trade remedies and the Fighting Trade Cheats Act to empower private companies to hold bad actors accountable. Furthermore, there are some bipartisan efforts that can be addressed by executive action, like closing the de minimis loophole, which your Administration acknowledges results in lost tariff revenue and the importation of counterfeit products and contraband drugs like fentanyl. The loophole also puts American manufacturers and retailers at a disadvantage. In addition, critical support for American workers who lose their jobs due to the short-sighted policies of the past, such as Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA), must be reauthorized and strengthened as we try to right the ship on trade policy, to allow those workers to access job training benefits and quickly return to the workforce.

    Tariffs are important tools for leveling the playing field when they are enacted in a strategic, deliberate, and durable way, but it can take months and years for supply chains to adjust. The positive impact of tariffs and trade policy must be bolstered by a robust industrial policy to create and sustain good-paying jobs with efforts such as investments, Buy America requirements, tax incentives, and other programs like those included in Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, the CHIPS and Science Act, and the Inflation Reduction Act. To be successful, we must also keep corporations in check with equitable tax rates and strong antitrust laws to prevent price gouging. Critically, we must empower workers to join unions and earn fair wages to support a middle class lifestyle and be able to save for a safe and secure retirement.

    Lastly, we want to emphasize this proposal is critical to workers and communities in our states, as well as to our national security and emergency preparedness. Re-evaluating American trade policy and securing supply chains will strengthen our national security and better position the United States to defend itself if faced with conflict. During World War II, United States automakers shifted from producing civilian passenger vehicles to producing military equipment and weapons like tanks, engines, and aircraft. More recently, global events like the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine exposed the risks of our fragile supply chains. Now is the time to learn from these lessons and prioritize a trade policy that puts American workers first.

    Thank you for your consideration of this most important issue.

    Sincerely,

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: PM call with President Zelenskyy of Ukraine: 31 March 2025

    Source: United Kingdom – Government Statements

    News story

    PM call with President Zelenskyy of Ukraine: 31 March 2025

    Prime Minister Keir Starmer spoke to President Zelenskyy.

    The Prime Minister spoke to the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, this evening.

    The leaders reflected on their visit to Paris last week and agreed there was real momentum to support Ukraine’s security for the long term.

    A meeting of the British, French and Ukrainian military leadership in the coming days would drive forward the next stage of detailed planning, the Prime Minister added.

    The leaders also discussed the third anniversary of the liberation of Bucha today. The Prime Minister reflected on his visit to the city in 2023 and paid tribute to the courage and strength of the residents and their loved ones that he met.

    Their stories of suffering were a painful reminder of Russia’s barbarity over the past three years, he added. 

    The leaders agreed to stay in close touch.

    Updates to this page

    Published 31 March 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: PM meeting with President Stubb of Finland: 31 March 2025

    Source: United Kingdom – Prime Minister’s Office 10 Downing Street

    Press release

    PM meeting with President Stubb of Finland: 31 March 2025

    The Prime Minister welcomed the President of Finland Alexander Stubb to Downing Street this afternoon.

    The Prime Minister welcomed the President of Finland Alexander Stubb to Downing Street this afternoon.

    They discussed the successful Coalition of the Willing meeting in Paris last week, noting the strong momentum from European leaders to keep Ukraine in the fight and increase the pressure on Putin to agree a peace deal.

    The Prime Minister then updated the President on his ongoing work to strengthen the UK’s relationship with the European Union across a number of areas including defence and security, trade and economic growth. The President warmly welcomed the progress made so far.

    As fellow NATO and JEF members, they agreed that the UK and Finland share a close and unique partnership which they will continue working to strengthen in the coming months.

    Updates to this page

    Published 31 March 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Joint Declaration by the Foreign Ministers of the Weimar +

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Press release

    Joint Declaration by the Foreign Ministers of the Weimar +

    Joint Declaration by the Foreign Ministers of United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Poland, Spain as well as the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in Madrid (31st March 2025)

    30/03/2025. Madrid, Spain. Foreign Secretary David Lammy poses for family photo ahead of Weimar+ meeting. Picture by Ben Dance / FCDO

    Three days after the anniversary of the Bucha massacre, we reiterate our unwavering support for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and for a comprehensive, just and lasting peace based on the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law, building on our Warsaw Declaration of 19 November, our Berlin Declaration of 12 December and our Paris Declaration of 12 February.

    Ukraine has shown its strong commitment to peace, also by agreeing to a full ceasefire without preconditions. However, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has not ceased. Instead of imposing new conditions and launching continued attacks on Ukrainian cities and infrastructure that cause more and more victims, Russia must now show it is serious about ending its war.  We call on Russia to stop its delaying tactics and reciprocate by agreeing without delay, as Ukraine has done, to an immediate unconditional ceasefire on equal terms and implementing it fully. We need to see progress within a clear timeframe.

    Building on the recent meetings in Paris and London, we took forward the discussion on how best to support a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine, which is vital for Ukraine, for Europe and for the whole international community.

    We remain committed to further political, financial, economic, humanitarian, military and diplomatic support for Ukraine, together with our international partners. To this end, we will strengthen Ukraine through significant short and long-term military support, also in the framework of Capability Coalitions and the Ukraine Defence Contact Group, which will hold its next meeting on 11 April. Many European partners, including the members of this group, have made substantive additional pledges to support Ukraine militarily and are planning similar commitments in the future.

    We also stand ready to apply further pressure on Russia using all tools available, including by adopting new sanctions, to hinder its ability to wage its war of aggression and to ensure Ukraine is placed in the best position possible to secure a just and lasting peace. We reiterate that Russia’s assets should remain immobilized until Russia ceases its war of aggression against Ukraine and compensates it for the damage caused.

    We are also strongly committed to ensuring full accountability for war crimes and the other most serious crimes committed in connection with Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. The progress made on establishing a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine, within the framework of the Council of Europe, is an important step.

    A credible pathway to peace must include humanitarian relief efforts, notably the exchange of prisoners of war, the release of civilians and the return of all Ukrainian children and other civilians unlawfully deported and transferred to Russia and Belarus.

    We support efforts for a ceasefire that can lead to the establishment of a just and lasting peace. We welcome recent progress to define the essential elements for a viable and sustainable ceasefire, including a clear framework of monitoring and verification.

    Peace must be sustainable, backed by effective guarantees to prevent further acts of aggression. Real, robust and credible security guarantees for Ukraine are an indispensable element of a just and lasting peace, based on Ukraine’s sovereign right to determine its security relationships with its partners, and on the duty of the international community to prevent future Russian aggression. We stand ready to play a leading role in this regard.

    Peace must be just, and Russia’s war of aggression cannot end with a reward to the aggressor. There can be no agreement that compromises on Euro-Atlantic security and the independence, sovereignty territorial integrity of Ukraine. We will not accept any agreement that restricts Ukraine’s military and defence industry or the military presence of partner countries in Ukraine.

    We stand ready to do our share in order to achieve this peace. Europe now provides almost two thirds of all support to Ukraine, and 60% of military aid. We reiterate our ironclad commitment to NATO as the bedrock of Euro-Atlantic security and commit to take on greater responsibility for the future of the security and defense of the European continent, aiming at a significant result at the summit in The Hague.

    We reiterate the inherent right of Ukraine to choose its own destiny and to defend its democracy. Ukraine’s future is in Europe and in the European Union, and Ukraine’s future is crucial for the security of Europe. Europe must be fully involved in the negotiations and will make its own decisions.  

    We remain committed to supporting Ukraine’s repair, recovery and reconstruction, in coordination with international partners.

    We reaffirm our commitment to our democratic values, and to further engage with our global partners in order to promote together a just and lasting peace in Ukraine, based on the universal principles of the United Nations Charter.

    We reaffirm that Europe must assume more responsibility for its own security and become better equipped and deal with immediate and future challenges.

    Updates to this page

    Published 31 March 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Maritime associations launch updated guidance to protect vessels and seafarers from rapidly evolving security threats

    Source: International Marine Contractors Association – IMCA

    Headline: Maritime associations launch updated guidance to protect vessels and seafarers from rapidly evolving security threats

    An alliance of maritime associations has released new best practice guidance to help vessels and crews respond to the growing challenge of maritime security threats.

    The interactive report – BMP Maritime Security – aims to help vessels plan voyages safely and to detect, avoid, deter, delay, and report attacks and incidents, wherever they occur.

    It has been created by the Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO), the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), the International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners (INTERCARGO), the International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO), the Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF), and the International Marine Contractors Association (IMCA), with the support of over 40 maritime stakeholders.

    BMP Maritime Security consolidates previously published regional publications into a single, comprehensive report with actionable insights and advice. 

    It focuses on providing the maritime sector with a threat and risk management process and, recognising the dynamic nature of regional security situations, provides signposts to direct users to the most up-to-date security intelligence and risk assessment information.

    BMP MS is now available to download here, and to view on the Maritime Global Security website here.

    Seafarers operating ships around the world encounter a range of maritime security threats, which often involve aggressive state and non-state actors.

    Although these threats vary across regions and in their severity, they can have a traumatic effect on seafarers who face unwarranted physical and mental harm – in some cases, being held as hostages and subjected to violence and ill-treatment for extended periods.

    To counter the threat, BMP guidance has greatly improved the industry’s ability to understand, detect, and deter maritime security threats in recent years, but the advice needs to keep pace with the rapidly evolving threat environment.

    In BMP Maritime Security, users can navigate easily to different sections and link directly to external sources and access details on global authorities and, importantly, appropriate contacts and tools for seafarer welfare support.

    IMCA Chief Executive Iain Grainger said: “The maritime industry faces an ever-evolving landscape of security threats, making it essential for seafarers to have access to the most up-to-date and practical guidance. BMP Maritime Security provides a consolidated resource that helps vessels proactively manage risk, safeguard the welfare of crews, and enhance maritime security resilience worldwide. People are our key asset, so IMCA is proud to support this initiative, ensuring that best practices continue to evolve alongside the challenges our industry faces.”

    David Loosley, BIMCO Secretary General and CEO, said: “2024 saw an unprecedented spike in attacks against merchant ships. Ships were attacked with weapons of war in the Black Sea and in the Southern Red Sea more than 100 times, and four innocent seafarers lost their lives. Globally, 126 seafarers were held hostage during pirate attacks and armed robberies, and 12 seafarers were kidnapped. BMP MS will reduce risks and save lives. While we cannot control how the threats will develop in 2025 and beyond, we can make sure that we have the best tools available to help protect our seafarers and world trade.” 

    ICS Secretary General Guy Platten, said: “Recent years have shown the stark security threats that seafarers and the industry can face in the service of world trade. From the conflict in Ukraine to the Red Sea Crisis, the dangers faced by shipping have increased to a severity not seen in two generations. This new global BMP continues the shipping industry’s unswerving commitment to protecting seafarers and mitigating threats to the trade on which we all depend.”

    Kostas G. GKONIS, PhD,  Director / Secretary General at INTERCARGO, said: “The new consolidated BMP guidance, developed by the maritime industry in coordination with naval forces, addresses escalating global threats to the safety and well-being of seafarers. INTERCARGO proudly supports this vital collaboration which cuts across traditional sector boundaries to deliver clear, actionable security protocols to protect those working at sea. Through our joint work, we should collectively ensure that these practices reach and empower every vessel, requiring sustained cooperation between frontline crews, whose dedication keeps global trade moving, and security resources and expertise.”

    Tim Wilkins, Managing Director at INTERTANKO, said: “As seafarers navigate conflict and armed threats, it is our duty as shipowner representatives to provide them with the most up-to-date information and guidance to ensure their safety. The revised BMP and related threat overviews reflect the collaborative efforts of many of our members, drawing on the hard-earned experience of the maritime industry. INTERTANKO considers BMP as being a vital reference for every vessel.”

    Karen Davis, Managing Director at OCIMF, said: “In the current heightened threat environment, where seafarers face unprecedented security challenges, the maritime community needs clear advice on how to manage threats, the risks, and the best mitigations to implement. This publication builds on a successful series of BMPs consolidating the best information available in one publication, BMP Maritime Security.” 

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Nuclear war threat: why Africa’s pushing for a complete ban

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Olamide Samuel, Track II Diplomat and Expert in Nuclear Politics, University of Leicester

    At a time of heightened geopolitical tensions between Russia and Ukraine, intensified by strategic dynamics involving the US, Nato and Russia over Europe’s security, nuclear weapons are back on the agenda.

    In recent times, Russia has openly threatened to use nuclear weapons. The UK and France are considering ways to rapidly increase their nuclear weapons stockpiles.

    Germany, Poland, Sweden, Finland, South Korea and Japan are now seeking nuclear weapons capabilities.

    Even a limited nuclear war in Europe would lead to catastrophic global climatic effects. Huge amounts of debris thrown high into the atmosphere would block sunlight, causing global temperatures to drop sharply. It would be much harder to grow food around the world.

    This would severely threaten Africa’s food security, exacerbating mass migration, disrupting supply chains and potentially collapsing public order systems.

    How should African countries respond to this growing threat?

    Based on my experience in nuclear non-proliferation and politics, I argue that African leaders need to proactively confront the risks, while there is still time.

    All African states, except for South Sudan, abide by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This is an international agreement which limits the spread of nuclear weapons. And 43 African states have gone further to join the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba). This was negotiated in the belief that it would “protect African states against possible nuclear attacks on their territories”.

    As conflict and uncertainty pushes many western leaders to support the madness of nuclear weapons proliferation, African leaders are in a unique position to push back against this.

    Africa’s strength in numbers in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, also known as the Nuclear Ban Treaty, is a vehicle the continent can use to address nuclear weapons risks, head-on.

    Global divide

    On one side, nuclear-armed states cling to deterrence for their national security. They insist that possessing nuclear arsenals keeps them safe.

    At present, there are nine nuclear-armed states: the US, Russia, the UK, China, France, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea. These countries possess around 12,331 nuclear warheads (as of 2025).

    The use of only 10% of these weapons could disrupt the global climate and threaten the lives of up to 2 billion people.

    On the other side, African countries and other non-nuclear-weapon states such as Ireland, Austria, New Zealand and Mexico highlight how deterrence creates unacceptable risks for the entire international community.

    This global majority – the 93 countries that have signed the Nuclear Ban Treaty and 73 that are party to it – argue that real safety comes from eliminating nuclear threats.

    The Nuclear Ban Treaty became international law on 22 January 2021. It is the first instance of international law challenging the legality and morality of nuclear deterrence.

    Since 2022, states parties to the Nuclear Ban Treaty have held formal meetings to address current nuclear risks. In March 2025, at their third meeting, 17 African states officially recognised nuclear deterrence as a critical security concern. They called on nuclear armed states to end deterrence.

    The deterioration of the international security environment is so palpable that there has been a noticeable shift in nuclear ban states’ perception of nuclear threats. Nuclear disarmament is no longer just a humanitarian or moral concern to these states, it is now a national security concern.

    South Africa warned that

    any use of nuclear weapons would result in catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would have a global impact.

    Ghana likewise stressed that Africa is not immune to nuclear war’s fallout:

    Africa, despite its geographic distance from the immediate hotspots of nuclear conflict, is not immune to the repercussions of nuclear weapons.

    Africa bears a unique historical connection to nuclear issues. Nuclear testing in the Sahara Desert in the 1960s, when France detonated nuclear bombs in Algeria, had devastating consequences. Widespread radioactive contamination harmed local communities, caused long-lasting health problems, displaced populations, and left large areas environmentally damaged and unsafe for generations.

    For its part, Nigeria recalled that Africa had “long acknowledged the existential threat nuclear weapons posed to human existence.”

    The meeting determined that it is unacceptable that states parties are exposed to nuclear risks, “created without their control and without accountability”. It stressed that eliminating nuclear risks “is a prime and legitimate concern and national responsibility” of states.

    Next steps

    Delegates effectively asked whether their own national security concerns had less value than those of nuclear-armed states. I think this is a valid question.

    Africa’s leaders and their allies in the Nuclear Ban Treaty are reframing what “national security” means in the nuclear age.

    Rather than accepting a world perpetually held hostage by the madness of nuclear deterrence, they are asserting that the security of nations – and of peoples – is best served by dismantling this threat to humanity.

    They are prioritising human life, development and international law over the threat of overwhelming force.

    The outcome of this contest will have profound implications, not just for Africa but for the entire globe.

    Olamide Samuel is affiliated with the Open Nuclear Network.

    – ref. Nuclear war threat: why Africa’s pushing for a complete ban – https://theconversation.com/nuclear-war-threat-why-africas-pushing-for-a-complete-ban-253171

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Nuclear war threat: why Africa’s pushing for a complete ban

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Olamide Samuel, Track II Diplomat and Expert in Nuclear Politics, University of Leicester

    At a time of heightened geopolitical tensions between Russia and Ukraine, intensified by strategic dynamics involving the US, Nato and Russia over Europe’s security, nuclear weapons are back on the agenda.

    In recent times, Russia has openly threatened to use nuclear weapons. The UK and France are considering ways to rapidly increase their nuclear weapons stockpiles.

    Germany, Poland, Sweden, Finland, South Korea and Japan are now seeking nuclear weapons capabilities.

    Even a limited nuclear war in Europe would lead to catastrophic global climatic effects. Huge amounts of debris thrown high into the atmosphere would block sunlight, causing global temperatures to drop sharply. It would be much harder to grow food around the world.

    This would severely threaten Africa’s food security, exacerbating mass migration, disrupting supply chains and potentially collapsing public order systems.

    How should African countries respond to this growing threat?

    Based on my experience in nuclear non-proliferation and politics, I argue that African leaders need to proactively confront the risks, while there is still time.

    All African states, except for South Sudan, abide by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This is an international agreement which limits the spread of nuclear weapons. And 43 African states have gone further to join the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba). This was negotiated in the belief that it would “protect African states against possible nuclear attacks on their territories”.

    As conflict and uncertainty pushes many western leaders to support the madness of nuclear weapons proliferation, African leaders are in a unique position to push back against this.

    Africa’s strength in numbers in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, also known as the Nuclear Ban Treaty, is a vehicle the continent can use to address nuclear weapons risks, head-on.

    Global divide

    On one side, nuclear-armed states cling to deterrence for their national security. They insist that possessing nuclear arsenals keeps them safe.

    At present, there are nine nuclear-armed states: the US, Russia, the UK, China, France, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea. These countries possess around 12,331 nuclear warheads (as of 2025).

    The use of only 10% of these weapons could disrupt the global climate and threaten the lives of up to 2 billion people.

    On the other side, African countries and other non-nuclear-weapon states such as Ireland, Austria, New Zealand and Mexico highlight how deterrence creates unacceptable risks for the entire international community.

    This global majority – the 93 countries that have signed the Nuclear Ban Treaty and 73 that are party to it – argue that real safety comes from eliminating nuclear threats.

    The Nuclear Ban Treaty became international law on 22 January 2021. It is the first instance of international law challenging the legality and morality of nuclear deterrence.

    Since 2022, states parties to the Nuclear Ban Treaty have held formal meetings to address current nuclear risks. In March 2025, at their third meeting, 17 African states officially recognised nuclear deterrence as a critical security concern. They called on nuclear armed states to end deterrence.

    The deterioration of the international security environment is so palpable that there has been a noticeable shift in nuclear ban states’ perception of nuclear threats. Nuclear disarmament is no longer just a humanitarian or moral concern to these states, it is now a national security concern.

    South Africa warned that

    any use of nuclear weapons would result in catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would have a global impact.

    Ghana likewise stressed that Africa is not immune to nuclear war’s fallout:

    Africa, despite its geographic distance from the immediate hotspots of nuclear conflict, is not immune to the repercussions of nuclear weapons.

    Africa bears a unique historical connection to nuclear issues. Nuclear testing in the Sahara Desert in the 1960s, when France detonated nuclear bombs in Algeria, had devastating consequences. Widespread radioactive contamination harmed local communities, caused long-lasting health problems, displaced populations, and left large areas environmentally damaged and unsafe for generations.

    For its part, Nigeria recalled that Africa had “long acknowledged the existential threat nuclear weapons posed to human existence.”

    The meeting determined that it is unacceptable that states parties are exposed to nuclear risks, “created without their control and without accountability”. It stressed that eliminating nuclear risks “is a prime and legitimate concern and national responsibility” of states.

    Next steps

    Delegates effectively asked whether their own national security concerns had less value than those of nuclear-armed states. I think this is a valid question.

    Africa’s leaders and their allies in the Nuclear Ban Treaty are reframing what “national security” means in the nuclear age.

    Rather than accepting a world perpetually held hostage by the madness of nuclear deterrence, they are asserting that the security of nations – and of peoples – is best served by dismantling this threat to humanity.

    They are prioritising human life, development and international law over the threat of overwhelming force.

    The outcome of this contest will have profound implications, not just for Africa but for the entire globe.

    – Nuclear war threat: why Africa’s pushing for a complete ban
    – https://theconversation.com/nuclear-war-threat-why-africas-pushing-for-a-complete-ban-253171

    MIL OSI Africa –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Remarks

    Source: NATO

    First of all, thank you so much, Mr President, dear Donald again for hosting me and also for taking time in Florida a couple of weeks after you were re-elected. And of course, our phone call a couple of weeks ago.

    And I must say, Trump 45 you basically, you originated the fact that in Europe, we’re now spending, when you take it to aggregate 700 billion more on defence than when you came in office in 2016/2017. But that was Trump 45. But then when you look at Trump 47 what happened the last couple of weeks is really staggering. The Europeans committing to a package of 800 billion defence spending. The Germans now potentially up to half a trillion extra in defence spending. And then, of course, you have Keir Starmer here – the British Prime Minister – and others all committing to much higher defence spending. They’re not there. We need to do more. But I really want to work together with you in the run up to the Hague Summit to make sure that we will have a NATO which is really reinvigorated under your leadership, and we are getting there.

    We’ll also discuss defence production, because we need to produce more weaponry. We are not doing enough, and not in the US, not in Europe, and we are lagging behind when you compare to the Russians and the Chinese, and you have a huge defence industrial base. Europeans buying four times more here than the other way around, which is good, because you have a strong defence industry, but we need to do more there to make sure that we ramp up the production and kill the red tape. So I would love to work with you on that.

    And finally, Ukraine. You broke the deadlock, as you said – all the killing, the young people dying, cities getting destroyed. The fact that you did that, that you started the dialogue with the Russians and the successful talks in Saudi Arabia, now with the Ukrainians, I really want to commend you for this. So, well, The Hague is my hometown. I’d love to host you there in the summer and work together to make sure that it will be a splash. A real success – projecting American power on the world stage.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Security: NATO Secretary General visits the United States of America

    Source: NATO

    On Thursday 13 and Friday 14 March [2025] NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte visited Washington DC to meet the President of the United States of America Donald J. Trump.

    Discussions throughout the trip centred on the urgent need to increase defence spending and production, bring a lasting end to the war against Ukraine, and on other priorities for the forthcoming NATO Summit in The Hague.
     
    On Thursday, the Secretary General participated in a bilateral meeting with President Trump in the Oval Office of the White House. Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, National Security Adviser Mike Waltz, Counselor of the State Department Michael Needham, US Special Envoy for Ukraine and Russia Lieutenant General (ret.) Keith Kellogg, and Ambassador-Nominee Matthew Whitaker, were in attendance. Mr Rutte praised the President for his pivotal role in accelerating Allied defence investment and breaking the deadlock on the war in Ukraine. The conversation continued over a working lunch.
     
    While in Washington, Mr Rutte also met with Senate Majority Leader, John Thune, and a number of other Senators, both Republican and Democrat, and took part in a working lunch hosted by the Atlantic Council.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Security: NATO Innovation Hackathon recognises advanced technologies for defence

    Source: NATO

    From 11 to 18 March 2025, NATO and the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) brought together more than 60 companies from across the Alliance to compete in the first NATO Innovation Hackathon. The aim was to uncover new technological solutions to improve intelligence gathering and Unmanned Arial Vehicles (UAV) and electronic warfare system detection, including in degraded visual environments, such as at night.

    Challenges run during the competition were directly drawn from those faced daily in war zones such as Ukraine. To address these challenges, contestants were assisted by mentors from DIANA and the Ukrainian innovation ecosystem. 

    The hackathon rewarded ten companies for their proposed technological solutions in areas such as AI, acoustic sensors, robotics and Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) detection. In addition to up to 20,000 EUR funding, the winning teams were also offered the opportunity to further engage with DIANA.

    The NATO Innovation Hackathon underscores NATO’s commitment to accelerating the development and adoption of innovative defence technologies. It also contributes to the implementation of the NATO-Ukraine Innovation Cooperation Roadmap and actively supports Ukraine’s needs from the battlefield.

     

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Security: The Republic of Korea joins NATO Science & Technology Organization (STO) Partnership

    Source: NATO

    On 1 March 2025, the Republic of Korea joined NATO’s Science & Technology Organization (STO) Science & Technology (S&T) Enhanced Partnership, a programme designed to promote joint research and development in advanced S&T fields. With this status, the Republic of Korea will participate in the NATO S&T Board, which provides strategic guidance on NATO’s collaborative scientific research, and engages in joint research and development projects in areas such as medicine, sensing, cyber security, propulsion and power systems.

    That same day, Switzerland and Ukraine also joined the STO S&T Enhanced Partnership. Australia and Japan were the first S&T Partner nations, in 2015 and 2020 respectively. 

    Dr Bryan Wells, NATO Chief Scientist, said: “The NATO S&T Organization has always had a strong tradition of building close relations with NATO Partners. Bringing the Republic of Korea, Switzerland and Ukraine together with Australia and Japan as S&T Enhanced Partners marks a step change in our engagement. I look forward to welcoming our new S&T Enhanced Partners to their first NATO S&T Board meeting in Brussels in early April.”

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Security: NATO Aviation Committee meets in New Zealand to discuss future cooperation on air activities

    Source: NATO

    The NATO Aviation Committee was hosted by the Royal New Zealand Air Force in Christchurch, on 18-20 March 2025. This was the first time a NATO senior policy level committee met in the Indo-Pacific region, and a demonstration of NATO’s commitment to boosting cooperation with its four Indo-Pacific partners (Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea).

    Over 100 participants – including from partner countries and international organisations – shared views on the challenges faced by the military aviation of Allied and partner countries, and on the prospects of enhanced resilience, interoperability and civil-military cooperation.

    In the margins of the meeting, a NATO Industry Seminar brought together senior civil and military officials and industry leaders from the region, to better understand the strategic importance of aviation and space capabilities, share lessons learned, and enhance the safe development of cutting-edge commercial innovation. NATO officials also engaged with government officials and representatives of local universities to discuss NATO’s relations with New Zealand.

    In the current context of increasing geopolitical competition, NATO and New Zealand have been strengthening their relations to address shared security challenges and to contribute to defending international law. They also cooperate as part of NATO’s broader relations with its partners in the Indo-Pacific region. New Zealand has made valuable contributions to NATO-led operations and missions for many years, and in support to Ukraine – including through the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) – following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

    “The Euro-Atlantic region and the Indo-Pacific region are closely interlinked; we have had historic links for decades, and currently we face many of the same security challenges, and share the same values and the same strong interest in protecting international law,” NATO’s Assistant Secretary General for Defence Investment, Taja Jaakkola highlighted. “Let me be clear: this is not about NATO going to the region. NATO is and will remain a regional alliance whose aim is to protect its own region – North America and Europe; but we need to have a global outlook, and we see our partnerships with countries in the Indo-Pacific region as key in the current context; we have had closer dialogue in the last three NATO Summits with the leaders of Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand; this dialogue is very important to better understand the challenges we face in our respective regions, and share best practices about how we deal with them,” she underscored.

    “NATO is a longstanding and likeminded security partner for New Zealand; our enduring partnership is key to providing the doctrine, tactics, training and procedures that underpin the New Zealand Defence Force’s interoperability with key partners; the finalisation last year of the New Zealand NATO Individually Tailored Partnership Programme demonstrates our intent to continue partnering with the Alliance on shared security challenges, including emerging disruptive technologies, cyber defence, industrial cooperation and climate change,” said New Zealand’s Associate Minister of Defence, Chris Penk. “With the launch last year of the ‘New Zealand Space and Advanced Aviation Strategy’ New Zealand aims to have an aviation regulatory environment that supports innovation while maintaining safety and protecting our national interests, including national security and New Zealand’s foreign policy interests; this strategy will support the growth and development of New Zealand’s space and advanced aviation sectors, with a view to New Zealand becoming an even greater hub of space and aviation activity,” he added.

    The Aviation Committee advises the North Atlantic Council on a “Total System Approach to Aviation (TSAA)” in support of NATO’s core tasks (collective deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security). It contributes to making Allied air activities more effective and to mitigate hazards, safety and security risks to air activities. It is NATO’s primary forum for the engagement of international aviation organisations and institutions at the policy and technical levels.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Security: NATO Deputy Secretary General welcomes renewed European defence efforts at the European Parliament

    Source: NATO

    On Thursday (20 March), NATO Deputy Secretary General Radmila Shekerinska addressed the European Parliament’s Security and Defence Committee (SEDE). She commended Europeans for stepping up investment in defence to deliver security, praised cooperation with the European Union (EU) and answered questions from Members of the European Parliament (MEPs).

    Ms. Shekerinska hailed initiatives at the European and national levels to boost defence spending, capabilities and readiness, while noting that the transatlantic relationship remains the cornerstone of European security. In her remarks to MEPs, she stressed the need for a stronger European pillar within a strong NATO.

    The Deputy Secretary General emphasised the importance of continuing to strengthen NATO-EU cooperation. She underscored that NATO and the EU are natural and indispensable partners, and that the EU can use its unique economic leverage to boost defence production, innovation, and military mobility in line with NATO’s military plans, capabilities, and standards. In this regard she also pointed to the need to involve non-EU allies as much as possible in the EU’s initiatives on defence. Ms. Shekerinska welcomed the ReArm Europe plan, as well as European support for Ukraine.  

    In a security context where Europe faces instability and threats from many directions, the Deputy Secretary General highlighted that “keeping our people safe is our most sacred duty.”

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Security: NATO Secretary General to attend a meeting of European leaders in France

    Source: NATO

    On Thursday, 27 March 2025, the NATO Secretary General, Mr Mark Rutte, will travel to Paris, France, to attend a meeting of European leaders and Canada with Ukraine.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Security: NATO Allies discuss boosting defence spending and industrial capacity with the European Commissioner for Defence and Space

    Source: NATO

    On Wednesday (26 March 2025), NATO Deputy Secretary General Radmila Shekerinska welcomed the European Commissioner for Defence and Space, Andrius Kubilius, to NATO Headquarters for a meeting with Allies in the North Atlantic Council.

    Ms. Shekerinska emphasised the need for Europe to boost defence spending and ramp up defence production, noting that a stronger European defence will also contribute to a stronger Alliance. Recognising that NATO and the EU are natural and indispensable partners, she stressed that efforts directed toward the European defence industry and capability development need to be complementary, coherent and interoperable with NATO, and involve non-EU Allies as much as possible.

    The Deputy General Secretary also highlighted the decisive role that NATO and the EU have played in helping Ukraine defend itself. She underscored the importance of further strengthening Ukraine both on the battlefield and at the negotiating table.

    Ms. Shekerinska underlined the importance of continued NATO-EU exchanges to foster transparency on the issues of clear common interest and to explore further avenues of cooperation. She welcomed the White Paper for European Defence, and looked forward to working in “a truly collaborative way” during its implementation.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Secretary General reaffirms transatlantic unity in Warsaw: There is no alternative to NATO

    Source: NATO

    NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte visited Warsaw on Wednesday (26 March 2025), where he met Polish President Andrzej Duda, Prime Minister Donald Tusk, Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz, and Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski. The Secretary General then gave a speech at a public event co-hosted by the Warsaw School of Economics and the Polish Institute of International Affairs.

    Secretary General Rutte praised Poland for its leadership within the Alliance, including its strong support to Ukraine and record-high defence spending, set to reach 4.7% of GDP this year. “Poland’s investment in defence is an example to all Allies. Not only do you top the NATO charts, you plan to spend even more,” he said. 
     
    In his keynote speech, the Secretary General underlined the strength of the transatlantic bond and laid out NATO’s path to the upcoming Summit in The Hague.
     
    “When it comes to keeping Europe and North America safe, there is no alternative to NATO,” he said, stressing that it is not possible to imagine the defence of Europe without the Alliance.

    As Russia’s war against Ukraine rages on and its military cooperation with China, Iran, and North Korea intensifies, Mr Rutte warned that President Putin “has not given up on his ambition to reshape the global security order.” He underlined that a strong transatlantic Alliance remains the foundation of European security and that stronger European Allies are a unique strategic asset to the United States – allowing America, he said, to “promote peace through strength on the global stage.”

    Secretary General Rutte reiterated his confidence in the United States’ continued commitment to NATO and Article 5. “Listen to President Trump, who has repeatedly stated his commitment to a strong NATO. Listen to the strong bipartisan support in the US Congress,” he said. “And listen to the American people,” three-quarters of whom support NATO according to a recent Gallup poll.

    Mr Rutte also emphasised that the US commitment to NATO comes with a clear expectation: that European Allies and Canada take on greater responsibility for our shared security.

    Looking ahead to the NATO Summit in The Hague, the Secretary General said the Alliance would “begin a new chapter for our transatlantic Alliance. Where we build a stronger, fairer and more lethal NATO, to face a more dangerous world.”

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Video: A Stronger Europe: EU Safety and Preparedness

    Source: European Commission (video statements)

    On 01 April, 2025 during the European Plenary Session, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen shares the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 20 March 2025 Russia’s war crimes in Ukraine. With focus on the EU Safety and Preparedness.

    Follow us on:
    -X: https://twitter.com/EU_Commission
    -Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/europeancommission/
    -Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/EuropeanCommission
    -LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/european-commission/
    -Medium: https://medium.com/@EuropeanCommission

    Visit our website: http://ec.europa.eu

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sthgu2b_M7w

    MIL OSI Video –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: PM remarks at the Organised Immigration Summit in central London: 31 March 2025

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Speech

    PM remarks at the Organised Immigration Summit in central London: 31 March 2025

    The Prime Minister’s remarks at the Organised Immigration Summit in central London today (Monday 31 March).

    It’s great to welcome you all to Lancaster House. It was right here, earlier this month that the UK convened leaders from across Europe together with President Zelenskyy to support a just and lasting peace in Ukraine.

    Because we know that Ukraine’s security is our security. And we can only deliver it by taking bold action at home, with the biggest increase in defence spending since the Cold War.

    And also, by working together with our international partners. 

    Now – the same is clearly true for the security of our borders.

    Illegal migration is a massive driver of global insecurity. It undermines our ability to control who comes here. And that makes people angry. 

    It makes me angry, frankly because it is unfair on ordinary working people who pay the price, from the cost of hotels to our public services struggling under the strain.

    And it’s unfair on the illegal migrants themselves. Because these are vulnerable people being ruthlessly exploited by vile gangs.

    So look, we must each take decisive action in our own countries to deal with this. Nobody can doubt that the people we serve want this issue sorted.

    But the truth is – we can only smash these gangs, once and for all if we work together.

    Because this evil trade, it exploits the cracks between our institutions. Pits nations against one another. Profits from our inability at the political level to come together.

    And that’s why from the moment I took office we said the UK would convene this Summit.

    And I’m delighted today to be joined by all of you. Representatives from more than 40 countries across the world, building a truly international effort to defeat organised immigration crime.

    And let me tell you why. Let me take you back to a visit I made as a relatively new Member of Parliament in 2016 to the camp on the outskirts of Calais.

    I can still picture it now. The muddy ground, sodden with rain and human waste. 

    Children as young as five and seven, the same age as my children were then huddling together in freezing temperatures with almost nothing to keep them warm.

    Now, of course, that infamous camp has long since gone. But the evil of the people smuggling businesses that put people there, that remains.

    The gangs remain. That exploitation of desperation, misery and false hope – that all remains.

    There’s nothing progressive or compassionate about turning a blind eye to this. Nothing progressive or compassionate about continuing that false hope which attracts people to make those journeys.

    No – we have got to get to grips with it once and for all. That’s why when I spoke at the INTERPOL meeting in Glasgow last year I said we need to treat people-smuggling as a global security threat similar if you like to terrorism.

    We’ve got to bring to bear all the powers we have at our disposal in much the same way we do against terrorism.

    Before I was a politician, I was the Director of Public Prosecutions in England and Wales. We worked across borders throughout Europe and beyond to foil numerous plots.

    Saving thousands of lives in the process. We prevented planes from being blown up over the Atlantic. And we brought the perpetrators to justice.

    So I believe we should treat organised immigration crime in the exactly same way. I simply don’t believe organised immigration crime cannot be tackled.

    So – we’ve got to combine resources. Share intelligence and tactics. Tackle the problem upstream at every step of the people smuggling journey, from North Africa and the Middle East to the high streets of our biggest cities. 

    And look, to that end, we’ve already got to work. Begun to make progress since I came into office. The UK has re-set its entire approach to international collaboration.

    I’ve put smashing the gangs on the agenda of international summits. Showing that the UK now means business. Working together with our allies. We’ve struck new agreements and plans with so many of the countries represented in the room here today.

     Take our work with France as a good example. Now previously – their maritime doctrine prevented French law enforcement from responding to small boats in shallow waters.

    But now we’re working with them to change that, to make sure we get new border patrols and specialist units on the French coast using state-of-the-art surveillance technology.

    With Germany another example, if you can believe it, it wasn’t technically illegal to facilitate people-smuggling to a country outside the EU, like the United Kingdom. But now it will be.

    And with our new bilateral agreement Germany will be able to prosecute the criminal networks facilitating this vile trade.

    Just a few examples of the international collaboration that is so important to taking this challenge on. And it’s beginning to bear fruit.

    At the end of last year, a major operation by French, German and British law enforcement smashed an Iraqi smuggling network with multiple arrests and the seizure seizing hundreds of boats and engines.

    In Amsterdam, a man was arrested on suspicion of supplying hundreds of small boat parts to people smugglers.

    That was a joint operation with our National Crime Agency together with Dutch and Belgian police.

    We’re also working upstream to address factors that drive people towards small boats in the first place.

    Working with the authorities in Albania and Vietnam on campaigns to deter those who are thinking about making that perilous journey.

    Because there is also nothing progressive about allowing working age people to come here illegally instead of supporting them to build their own economies, secure a better future for their own countries, and build a safer, more prosperous world.

    But look – as we work together more closely I think than ever before we’ve also got to take the tough measures at home in our own countries.

    That doesn’t mean gimmicks. You may be familiar with the gimmicks of the last 14 years here in Britain. It means understanding the problem.

    And coming up with pragmatic solutions that work. Actually, fixing what’s wrong.

    Few things show this more clearly, than our approach to border security. We inherited this total fragmentation between our policing, our Border Force and our intelligence agencies.

    A fragmentation that made it crystal clear, when I looked at it, that there were gaps in our defence. An open invitation at our borders for the people smugglers to crack on.

    To be honest it should have been fixed years ago. But we’re doing it now with our new Border Security Command. Led by Martin Hewitt – who many of you I think will know.

    We’re recruiting hundreds of specialist investigators from across our police, our Border Force and intelligence agencies. Creating an elite Border Force. Working with our international partners. Ending the fragmentation. 

    £150 million invested over the next two years and new powers and criminal offences to get the job done. So the police will be able to seize the phones and devices of migrants arriving on our shores and gather intelligence about the smugglers. 

    The police will be able to act when they have reason to believe preparations are being made for criminal activity instead of waiting for a crime to happen before they can act.

    And it will be an offence to endanger lives at sea to prevent more tragic deaths in the Channel.

    We are also redeploying resources away from the Tory’s wasteful Rwanda scheme. A scheme that spent over 700 million pounds of taxpayer money to remove just four volunteers.

    You know, even if that scheme had gone well, they were claiming they might remove – 300 people a year.

    Since coming to office – I can announce today we have returned more than 24,000 people who have no right to be here. 

    That would have taken the Rwanda scheme 80 years to achieve. This is what I mean about not giving in to gimmicks. Just focusing our efforts and resources on the nuts and bolts of removing people. Getting the asylum system working properly. That’s how we’ve delivered the highest returns rate for eight years and the four biggest return flights ever.

    We’re also ramping up the deportation of Foreign National Offenders with a new team of specialist frontline staff going into our prisons, speeding up the removal of prisoners who have no right to be in this country.

    Now, all of this is providing a real disincentive to people thinking about coming to Britain illegally. But if we’re talking about incentives – we need to talk about the people smugglers as well.

    Because they don’t care about borders. They don’t care about the people they traffic. And they don’t care about our country and our people.

    They only care about one thing: money. They make huge profits out of ruining people’s lives. I mean – a few months ago, I went to see some of the boats that had been seized at the NCA headquarters. 

    Now we call them small boats, but honestly they’re not worthy of the name boat. I don’t know what you would call them. To me they look like death traps.

    Flimsy. Rubber. No firm structure. You would not let your children climb aboard, even for a second in shallow waters.

    Seriously – if they were a car, they’d be off the road in minutes. The police would intervene. 

    And don’t tell me they’ve got any purpose other than people smuggling. So I see no reason why we can’t go after them. And so we are.

    We have seized hundreds of boats and engines, driving up the costs for the smugglers.

    We have taken down 18,000 social media accounts. That’s 10,000 more than last year, disrupting the way smugglers promote their services.

    And more than that, we have announced a new sanctions regime. Treating people smugglers like terrorists. Freezing their assets, banning their travel.

    Putting them behind bars – where they belong. But just as important – putting their entire model, out of business, securing our borders on behalf of working people.

    Because as I said at the start – this is about fairness. And there is little that strikes working people as more unfair than watching illegal migration drive down their wages, their terms and their conditions through illegal work in their community. 

    We have to be honest here. For too long, the UK has been a soft touch on this. While the last government were busy with their Rwanda gimmick, they left the door wide open for illegal working.

    Especially in short-term or zero-hours roles like in construction, beauty salons and courier services.

    And while of course most companies do the responsible thing and carry out right to work checks.

    Too many dodgy firms have been exploiting a loophole to skip this process: hiring illegal workers, undercutting honest businesses, driving down the wages of ordinary working people. 

    And all of this, of course fuelling that poisonous narrative of the gangs who promise the dream of a better life to vulnerable people yet deliver a nightmare of squalid conditions and appalling exploitation.

    Well, today we are changing that because this government is introducing a tough new law to force all companies to carry out these checks on right to work.

    They take just minutes to complete – so they are not burdensome for business. And they can be done free of charge – so there will be no excuses.

    And no ability to claim they didn’t know they had illegal workers. And failure to comply will result in fines of up to £60,000. Prison terms of up to 5 years and the potential closure of their business.

    Now, none of these strategies on their own are a silver bullet. I know that.

    But each of them is another tool. An arsenal we are building up to smash the gangs once and for all.

    We must pull every lever available. And that is what this Labour government is doing. 

    No short cuts, no gimmicks. Just the hard graft of sleeves-rolled-up, practical government. 

    Securing our borders. Getting a grip on illegal migration. Delivering our Plan for Change.

    We want to work with you and with everyone who is as determined as we are to end the misery and evil of people-smuggling.

    Because together we will save lives.

    We will secure our borders.

    We will smash the gangs that undermine our security…

    And deliver fairness for the working people we serve.

    Thank you.

    Updates to this page

    Published 31 March 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI: Westport Reports Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2024 Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    VANCOUVER, British Columbia, March 31, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Westport Fuel Systems Inc. (“Westport”) (TSX: WPRT / Nasdaq: WPRT) today reported financial results for the fourth quarter and year ended December 31, 2024, and provided an update on operations. All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise stated.

    “The past year has been transformative for Westport as we sharpened our strategic focus, advanced our clean transportation technologies, and enhanced operational efficiencies. We have made significant strides in aligning our operations with our competitive strengths, improving margins, and reinforcing our commitment to delivering cost-effective solutions that drive decarbonization in the transportation sector. We have also transformed our culture to be one built on discipline and excellence, driving a high-performance mindset in everything we do.

    The launch of Cespira, our joint venture with Volvo Group, was a key milestone for us in 2024. Cespira is committed to accelerating the commercialization of HPDI™ technology with carbon-neutral fuels like hydrogen and renewable natural gas. This partnership underscores the industry’s recognition of HPDI as a leading solution to enable affordable, sustainable heavy transport.

    Additionally, we are taking bold steps to streamline our operations and strengthen our financial footing, allowing us to focus on areas with the highest growth potential. A prime example of this strategic realignment is our recently announced proposed divestiture of the Light-Duty business. This decision is expected to enable us to concentrate fully on providing affordable solutions for hard to decarbonize mobility applications like long haul and heavy-duty trucking that can take advantage of the unique, practical and affordable HPDI technology and our world class high-pressure components and systems technologies and scalable alternative fuel solutions, ensuring that we remain at the forefront of emissions-reducing innovations that are cost effective.

    Looking ahead, we are focused on scaling our alternative fuel-based solutions, including advancements in CNG, RNG, and hydrogen systems, while navigating a rapidly evolving transportation landscape. Hydrogen remains a critical component of the future but, in the meantime, we are delivering practical, commercially viable low-carbon solutions today such as natural gas and renewable natural gas solutions which, in some cases, can represent a lower total cost of ownership than incumbent technologies. Driven by these environmental and economic considerations we are seeing a global resurgence of interest in the heavy-duty transport sector towards utilizing natural gas as an alternative to diesel. While we will continue to invest in technology, we are positioned to take advantage of markets that are embracing products enabled by our years of investment in innovation as the world pivots to more practical and cost-effective solutions to decarbonize.  

    We are committed to providing sustainable, high-performance solutions that help our customers achieve their commercial and environmental goals, now and for years to come.”

    Dan Sceli, Chief Executive Officer

    2024 Highlights

    • Revenue was $302.3 million for 2024 and $75.1 million for the fourth quarter. Full year results were primarily driven by the transition of the Heavy-Duty OEM business into Cespira, partially offset by an increase in revenue in our Light-Duty segment. Cespira earned $22.8 million for the three months ended December 31, 2024 and $43.1 million for the period from June 3, 2024 through to December 31, 2024.
    • Net loss for the year ended December 31, 2024 was $21.8 million, or $1.27 loss per share, compared to net loss of $49.7 million for the prior year. Net loss for the fourth quarter in 2024 was $10.1 million, or $0.59 loss per share, compared to net loss of $13.9 million, or $0.81 loss per share, for the same period in 2023. For the year, the net positive change was primarily a result of improvements in gross margin, a $15.2 million gain on deconsolidation of the HPDI business in the formation of the joint venture with Volvo Group on June 3, 2024, reductions in operating expenditures and depreciation and amortization expense due to continuation of the HPDI business in Cespira, partially offset by higher income tax expense and foreign exchange losses in the year.
    • Adjusted EBITDA1 loss of $11.2 million, compared to a loss of $21.5 million in the prior year. Adjusted EBITDA for the fourth quarter was a loss of $1.8 million.
    • Cash and cash equivalents were $37.6 million for the year ended December 31, 2024. Cash provided by operating activities during the year was $7.2 million.
    • Announced the closing the HPDI joint venture, Cespira, with Volvo Group, working together to accelerate the commercialization and global adoption of the HPDI™ fuel system technology for long-haul and off-road applications.

    1 Adjusted earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation is a non-GAAP measure. Please refer to GAAP and NON-GAAP FINANCIAL MEASURES in Westport’s Management Discussion and Analysis for the reconciliation.

    Consolidated Results            
    ($ in millions, except per share amounts)     Over / (Under)
    %    		     Over / (Under)
    %
      4Q24 4Q23 FY24 FY23
    Revenue $75.1 $87.2 (14)% $302.3 $331.8   (9)%  
    Gross Profit(2) 14.3 8.0 79% 57.6 48.9   18%  
    Gross Margin(2) 19% 9% — 19% 15%   —  
    Income (loss) from Investments Accounted for by the Equity Method(1) (2.0) 0.1 (2,100)% (5.4) 0.8   (775)%  
    Net Loss (10.1) (13.9) 27% (21.8) (49.7)   56%  
    Net Loss per Share – Basic (0.59) (0.81) 27% (1.27) (2.90)   56%  
    Net Loss per Share – Diluted (0.59) (0.81) 27% (1.27) (2.90)   56%  
    EBITDA (2) (6.1) (10.9) 44% (6.6) (35.9)   82%  
    Adjusted EBITDA (2) (1.8) (10.0) 82% (11.2) (21.5)   48%  

    (1)This includes income or loss primarily from our investments in Cespira and Minda Westport Technologies Limited
    (2)Gross margins, EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA are non-GAAP measures. Please refer to GAAP and NON-GAAP FINANCIAL MEASURES for the reconciliation to equivalent GAAP measures and limitations on the use of such measures.

    Segment Information

    Light-Duty Segment

    Revenue for the three months and year ended December 31, 2024 was $68.0 million and $262.2 million, respectively, compared with $63.4 million and $263.6 million for the three months and year ended December 31, 2023.

    Light-Duty revenue increased by $4.6 million for the three months ended December 31, 2024 as compared to the prior year. This was primarily driven by a significant increase in sales of LPG fuel system solutions to a global Original Equipment Manufacturer (“OEM”) for their Euro 6 vehicle applications in our light-duty OEM business and an increase in delayed OEM business, partially offset by lower revenues in other business lines.

    Light-Duty revenue decreased by $1.4 million for the year ended December 31, 2024 compared to the prior year. This was primarily driven by a decrease in sales in our delayed OEM business in the first half of 2024, decrease in sales to customers in developing markets, and our fuel storage business. This was partially offset by the aforementioned increase in sales of LPG fuel system solutions in our light-duty OEM business.

    Gross profit increased by $2.0 million to $14.0 million, or 21% of revenue for the three months ended December 31, 2024, as compared to $12.0 million, or 19% of revenue, for the same prior year period. This was primarily driven by a change in sales mix with an increase in sales to European customers and a reduction in sales to developing regions along with an increase in sales volumes.

    Gross profit for the year ended December 31, 2024 increased by $6.3 million to $55.4 million, or 21% of revenue, compared to $49.1 million, or 19% of revenue, for the prior year. This was primarily driven by a change in sales mix with an increase in sales to European customers and a reduction in sales to developing regions. The segment’s manufacturing operations continues to implement operational improvement initiatives lowering its manufacturing overhead costs in the year. For the year ended December 31, 2024, Light-Duty recorded inventory write-downs of $2.1 million related to our restructuring activities in India for $0.9 million and $0.5 million related to components for markets that we have exited, and the remainder due to our periodic analysis of excess and obsolete inventory.

    Westport began supplying its Euro 6 LPG fuel system to its global OEM customer in early 2024. This production supply agreement has been instrumental in improving revenue and delivering higher margins, which more than offset the decline in revenue as a result of a key delayed OEM customer continuing to work through their inventory. Production for the Euro 7 LPG fuel system for the same global OEM customer is anticipated to begin mid-to-late 2025.

    High-Pressure Controls & Systems Segment

    Revenue for the three months and year ended December 31, 2024 was $1.4 million and $8.8 million, respectively, compared with $2.5 million and $12.0 million for the three months and year ended December 31, 2023. Revenue for the three months ended December 31, 2024 decreased by $1.1 million compared to the prior year period. Revenue for the year ended December 31, 2024 decreased $3.2 million compared to the prior year.

    The decrease in revenue for the three months and year ended December 31, 2024 compared to the prior year periods continues to be primarily driven by the general slowdown in hydrogen infrastructure development, leading to a slower adoption of automotive and industrial applications powered by hydrogen.

    Gross profit for the three months ended December 31, 2024 decreased by $0.4 million to nominal, or 0% of revenue, compared to $0.4 million, or 16% of revenue, for the same prior year period. This was primarily driven by lower sales volumes, increasing the per unit manufacturing costs in the quarter.

    Gross profit for the year ended December 31, 2024 decreased by $1.3 million to $1.5 million, or 17% of revenue, compared to $2.8 million, or 23% of revenue, for the prior year. This was primarily driven by decrease in sales volume for the year. The segment recorded $0.8 million in inventory write-downs in the year due to slow-moving inventory.

    Heavy-Duty OEM Segment

    Revenue for the three months and year ended December 31, 2024 includes revenue until the closing of the transaction to form Cespira, which occurred on June 3, 2024. Revenue for the three months and year ended December 31, 2024 was $5.7 million and $31.3 million, respectively, compared with $21.3 million and $56.2 million for the three months and year ended December 31, 2023.

    The decrease in revenue for the three months and year ended December 31, 2024 is a result of the continuation of the business in Cespira. Refer to the “Selected Cespira Financial Information” for more information on the performance of the business. Revenue earned in the three months ended December 31, 2024 reflects revenue earned from a transitional services agreement in place with Cespira that we expect to expire by the end of Q2 2026.

    Gross profit for the three months ended December 31, 2024 increased by $4.7 million to $0.3 million, or 5% of revenue, compared to negative $4.4 million or negative 21% of revenue, for the three months ended December 31, 2023. The Heavy-Duty OEM segment was impacted by a $4.5 million inventory write-down in the prior year period.

    Gross profit increased by $3.7 million to $0.7 million, or 2% of revenue, for the year ended December 31, 2024 compared to negative $3.0 million, or negative 5% of revenue, for the prior year. Heavy-Duty OEM recorded $0.4 million in inventory write-downs in the year. The segment was impacted by the aforementioned inventory write-down of $4.5 million in the prior year.

    Selected Cespira Financial Information

    We account for Cespira using the equity method of accounting. However, due to its significance to our long-term strategy and operating results, we disclose certain financial information from Cespira in notes 8 and 22 in our consolidated financial statements for the year ended December 31, 2024 and the period from June 3, 2024 to December 31, 2024.

    The following table sets forth a summary of the financial results of Cespira for the three months ended December 31, 2024 and the period between June 3, 2024 to December 31, 2024:

      (in millions of U.S. dollars)   Three months ended December 31,   Change   Year ended December 31,   Change
        2024   2023   $   %   2024   2023   $   %
    Revenue   $ 22.8     $ —     $ 22.8     — %   $ 43.1     $ —     $ 43.1     — %
    Gross profit     1.4       —       1.4     — %     0.5       —       0.5     — %
    Gross margin1     6 %     — %             1 %     — %        
    Operating loss     (4.8 )     —       (4.8 )   — %     (12.1 )     —       (12.1 )   — %
    Net loss attributable to the Company     (2.6 )     —       (2.6 )   — %     (6.7 )     —       (6.7 )   — %

    1Gross margin is non-GAAP financial measure. See the section ‘Non-GAAP Financial Measures’ for explanations and discussions of these non-GAAP financial measures or ratios.

    Cespira revenue was $22.8 million for the three months ended December 31, 2024. For the prior year period, the Heavy-Duty OEM segment, which included our HPDI business, earned $21.3 million. This was primarily driven by an increase in HPDI fuel systems sold in the period.

    Cespira gross profit was $1.4 million for the three months ended December 31, 2024. For the prior year period, the Heavy-Duty OEM segment had negative $4.4 million in gross profit primarily driven by the aforementioned $4.5 million inventory write-down in the prior year period.

    Cespira incurred operating losses of $4.8 million for the three months ended December 31, 2024. For the prior year quarter, the Heavy-Duty OEM had operating losses of $9.3 million. Aside from the aforementioned inventory write-down in the prior year period, the Heavy-Duty OEM had comparable operating losses compared to Cespira.

    As previously announced, Westport and Weichai are parties to a technology development and supply agreement which contains an obligation for Weichai to order, and Westport to supply, certain volumes of HPDI fuel system components prior to December 31, 2024. Significant orders for HPDI fuel system components against this agreement were not received prior to year-end. Westport and Cespira continue to collaborate with Weichai Power Co. Ltd (“Weichai Power”) on an HPDI fuel system equipped version of the Weichai Power engine platforms. The parties are currently discussing the next stages of this work and the obligations of each party going forward.

    Liquidity and Going Concern

    In addition, as disclosed in Westport Management Discussion & Analysis, for the year ended December 31, 2024, we continue to sustain operating losses and use cash to support our business activities. Cash provided by operating activities was $7.2 million for the year ended December 31, 2024 was primarily driven by reductions in working capital.

    As at December 31, 2024, we had cash and cash equivalents of $37.6 million and long-term debt of $33.7 million, of which $14.7 million was current. Based on our projected capital expenditures, debt servicing obligations and operating requirements under our current business plan, we are projecting that our cash and cash equivalents will not be sufficient to fund our operations through the next twelve months from the date of the issuance of this MD&A. These conditions raise substantial doubt about Westport’s ability continue as a going concern within one year after the date our December 31, 2024 Consolidated Financial Statements are issued.

    We plan to improve our liquidity position by selling certain subsidiaries in Europe and Argentina which comprise substantially all the assets and liabilities reported within the Light-Duty segment and continue our cost reduction initiatives. On March 30, 2025, we entered into a share purchase agreement (“SPA”) with a wholly-owned investment vehicle of Heliaca Investments Coöperatief U.A. (“Heliaca Investments”), a Netherlands based investment firm supported by Ramphastos Investment Management B.V. a prominent Dutch venture capital and private equity firm, to sell all of the issued and outstanding shares of Westport Fuel Systems Italia S.r.l for a base purchase price of $73.1 million (€67.7 million), subject to certain adjustments and potential earnouts of up to an estimated $6.5 million (€6.0 million) if certain conditions are achieved, in accordance with the terms of the Share Purchase Agreement. If we are successful in closing the sale, we will receive sufficient cash to fund our operations for the next twelve months and alleviate the risk of substantial doubt identified. As of the date of issuance of our December 31, 2024 financial statements, we are seeking shareholder approval of the plan to complete the sale of these businesses to the buyer. As such, there can be no assurances that Westport will be successful in obtaining sufficient funding. Accordingly, we concluded under the accounting standards that these plans do not alleviate the substantial doubt about Westport’s ability to continue as a going concern.

    Divestment of the Light-Duty Business and 2025 Outlook

    Westport recently announced the proposed divestment of its Light-Duty business, which includes the light-duty OEM, delayed OEM, and independent aftermarket businesses (the “Transaction”). The Transaction is designed to focus the Company’s strategy and streamline its operations allowing Westport to direct its energy on solution to address hard to decarbonize sectors like long-haul, heavy-duty trucking and off-road applications that can take advantage of Cespira and our High-Pressure Controls & Systems technology – where Westport sees the largest opportunities to grow and where the Company has a unique and differentiated offering generating interest with customers as the world transitions to a more practical and easier to adopt approach to decarbonization.

    Highlights of the Transaction include:

    • Provides immediate up front proceeds to alleviate liquidity concerns, strengthening the balance sheet and funds near-term growth in Cespira and the High-Pressure Controls & Systems business;
    • Brings forward more cash today than the Light-Duty business was projected to earn over 5-years on an undiscounted cash basis; and
    • Enables management to focus exclusively on the higher growth HPDI and high-pressure segments.

    In light of the evolving market and regulatory environment, over the long term, the Light-Duty business’ ability to grow LPG / CNG sales in developed markets is expected to continue facing increased competition from pure electrification or petrol – electrification hybrids.

    The base purchase price of the Transaction is $73.1 million (€67.7 million), subject to certain adjustments and potential earnouts of up to an additional $6.5 million (€6.0 million) if certain conditions are achieved, in accordance with the terms of the Share Purchase Agreement. The purchaser is a wholly-owned investment vehicle of Heliaca Investments Coöperatief U.A. (“Heliaca Investments”), a Netherlands based investment firm supported by Ramphastos Investment Management B.V. a prominent Dutch venture capital and private equity firm.

    Net proceeds from the transaction are to be used to bolster the balance sheet, fund organic growth opportunities through Cespira and High-Pressure Controls & Systems over the near term as well as opportunistic bolt on acquisitions. The Transaction ultimately eliminates future restructuring costs required by the Italian operations in the light-duty business.

    Westport is shifting to a smaller, more focused organization, that is positioned to provide solutions to decarbonize challenging segments of the mobility and industrial markets.​ Westport has 30 years of experience delivering component solutions and developing HPDI fuel technology​. We are focused on scaling our alternative fuel-based solutions, including advancements in CNG, RNG, and hydrogen systems, while navigating a rapidly evolving transportation landscape.

    The Company anticipates that the closing of the transaction will occur late in Q2 2025, subject to receiving shareholder approval.

    Conference call

    Westport has scheduled a conference call for Monday, March 31, 2025, at 10:30 am Pacific Time (1:30 pm Eastern Time) to discuss these results. To access the conference call please register at https://register.vevent.com/register/BI1ba7402b85a5491292e48354a2e80b90. 

    The live webcast of the conference call can be accessed through the Westport website at https://investors.wfsinc.com/. 

    Participants may register up to 60 minutes before the event by clicking on the call link and completing the online registration form. Upon registration, the user will receive dial-in info and a unique PIN, along with an email confirming the details.

    The webcast will be archived on Westport’s website at https://investors.wfsinc.com. 

    Financial Statements and Management’s Discussion and Analysis

    To view Westport full financials for the fourth quarter and year ended December 31, 2024, please visit https://investors.wfsinc.com/financials/. 

    About Westport Fuel Systems

    At Westport Fuel Systems, we are driving innovation to power a cleaner tomorrow. We are a leading supplier of advanced fuel delivery components and systems for clean, low-carbon fuels such as natural gas, renewable natural gas, propane, and hydrogen to the global transportation industry. Our technology delivers the performance and fuel efficiency required by transportation applications and the environmental benefits that address climate change and urban air quality challenges. Headquartered in Vancouver, Canada, with operations in Europe, Asia, North America, and South America, we serve our customers in approximately 70 countries with leading global transportation brands. At Westport Fuel Systems, we think ahead. For more information, visit www.wfsinc.com.

    Cautionary Note Regarding Forward Looking Statements
    This press release contains forward-looking statements, including statements regarding future strategic initiatives and future growth, future of our development programs (including those relating to HPDI and Hydrogen) including testing to the HPDI fuel system, scaling our alternative fuel-based solutions, our expectations for 2025 and beyond, including the demand for our products, the future success of our business and technology strategies, shareholder approval of the Transaction, our ability to successfully close the Transaction and realize the benefits therefrom, including, potential earn-out payments, the Transaction alleviating liquidity concerns, our focus on providing affordable solutions to decarbonize long haul and heavy-duty trucking, our ability to bolster our balance sheet, fund organic growth as well as opportunistic bolt on acquisitions, a shift to operating as a smaller, more efficient organization. These statements are neither promises nor guarantees, but involve known and unknown risks and uncertainties and are based on both the views of management and assumptions that may cause our actual results, levels of activity, performance or achievements to be materially different from any future results, levels of activities, performance or achievements expressed in or implied by these forward-looking statements. These risks, uncertainties and assumptions include those related to our revenue growth, operating results, industry and products, changes in business strategy, shifts in market demand, the general economy including impacts due to inflation, the effects of competition and pricing pressures, conditions of and access to the capital and debt markets, solvency, governmental policies, trade restrictions or other changes to international trade agreements, sanctions and regulation including the imposition of tariffs, technology innovations, fluctuations in foreign exchange rates, operating expenses, continued reduction in expenses, ability to successfully commercialize new products, the performance of our joint ventures, the availability and price of natural gas, new environmental regulations, the acceptance of and shift to natural gas and hydrogen vehicles, the relaxation or waiver of fuel emission standards, the inability of fleets to access capital or government funding to purchase natural gas vehicles, the development of competing technologies, our ability to adequately develop and deploy our technology, the actions and determinations of our joint venture and development partners, the effects and duration of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, supply chain disruptions as well as other risk factors and assumptions that may affect our actual results, performance or achievements or financial position discussed in our most recent Annual Information Form and other filings with securities regulators. Readers should not place undue reliance on any such forward-looking statements, which speak only as of the date they were made. We disclaim any obligation to publicly update or revise such statements to reflect any change in our expectations or in events, conditions or circumstances on which any such statements may be based, or that may affect the likelihood that actual results will differ from those set forth in these forward-looking statements except as required by National Instrument 51-102. The contents of any website, RSS feed or twitter account referenced in this press release are not incorporated by reference herein.

    Inquiries:
    Investor Relations
    T: +1 604-718-2046
    invest@wfsinc.com

    GAAP and Non-GAAP Financial Measures

    Our financial statements are prepared in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (“U.S. GAAP“). These U.S. GAAP financial statements include non-cash charges and other charges and benefits that may be unusual or infrequent in nature or that we believe may make comparisons to our prior or future performance difficult. In addition to conventional measures prepared in accordance with U.S. GAAP, Westport and certain investors use EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA as an indicator of our ability to generate liquidity by producing operating cash flow to fund working capital needs, service debt obligations and fund capital expenditures. Management also uses these non-GAAP measures in its review and evaluation of the financial performance of Westport. EBITDA is also frequently used by investors and analysts for valuation purposes whereby EBITDA is multiplied by a factor or “EBITDA multiple” that is based on an observed or inferred relationship between EBITDA and market values to determine the approximate total enterprise value of a company. We believe that these non-GAAP financial measures also provide additional insight to investors and securities analysts as supplemental information to our U.S. GAAP results and as a basis to compare our financial performance period-over-period and to compare our financial performance with that of other companies. We believe that these non-GAAP financial measures facilitate comparisons of our core operating results from period to period and to other companies by, in the case of EBITDA, removing the effects of our capital structure (net interest income on cash deposits, interest expense on outstanding debt and debt facilities), asset base (depreciation and amortization) and tax consequences. Adjusted EBITDA provides this same indicator of Westports’ EBITDA from continuing operations and removing such effects of our capital structure, asset base and tax consequences, but additionally excludes any unrealized foreign exchange gains or losses, stock-based compensation charges and other one-time impairments and costs which are not expected to be repeated in order to provide greater insight into the cash flow being produced from our operating business, without the influence of extraneous events.

    Segment Information

    EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA are intended to provide additional information to investors and analysts and do not have any standardized definition under U.S. GAAP, and should not be considered in isolation or as a substitute for measures of performance prepared in accordance with U.S. GAAP. EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA exclude the impact of cash costs of financing activities and taxes, and the effects of changes in operating working capital balances, and therefore are not necessarily indicative of operating profit or cash flow from operations as determined under U.S. GAAP. Other companies may calculate EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA differently.

    Segment earnings or losses before income taxes, interest, depreciation, and amortization (“Segment EBITDA”) is the measure of segment profitability used by the Company. The accounting policies of our reportable segments are the same as those applied in our consolidated financial statements. Management prepared the financial results of the Company’s reportable segments on basis that is consistent with the manner in which Management internally disaggregates financial information to assist in making internal operating decisions. Certain common costs and expenses, primarily corporate functions, among segments differently than we would for stand-alone financial information prepared in accordance with GAAP. These include certain costs and expenses of shared services, such as IT, human resources, legal, finance and supply chain management. Segment EBITDA is not defined under US GAAP and may not be comparable to similarly titled measures used by other companies and should not be considered a substitute for net earnings or other results reported in accordance with GAAP. Reconciliations of reportable segment information to consolidated statement of operations can be found in section “NON-GAAP FINANCIAL MEASURES & RECONCILIATIONS” within this press release.

      Year ended December 31, 2024
      Light-Duty   High-Pressure Controls & Systems   Heavy-Duty OEM   Cespira   Total Segment
    Revenue $ 262.2   $ 8.8     $ 31.3     $ 43.1     $ 345.4  
    Cost of revenue   206.8     7.3       30.6       42.6       287.3  
    Gross profit   55.4     1.5       0.7       0.5       58.1  
    Operating expenses:
    Research & development   13.0     4.4       4.2       4.7       26.3  
    General & administrative   19.2     1.0       3.1       5.6       28.9  
    Sales & marketing   9.9     0.7       0.9       1.0       12.5  
    Depreciation & amortization   2.6     0.3       0.1       1.7       4.7  
    Equity income   1.3     —       —       —       1.3  
    Add back: Depreciation & amortization1   6.4     0.5       1.4       3.8       12.1  
    Segment EBITDA $ 18.4   $ (4.4 )   $ (6.2 )   $ (8.7 )   $ (0.9 )
      Year ended December 31, 2023
      Light-Duty   High-Pressure Controls & Systems   Heavy-Duty OEM   Total Segment
    Revenue $ 263.6   $ 12.0     $ 56.2     $ 331.8  
    Cost of revenue   214.5     9.2       59.2       282.9  
    Gross profit   49.1     2.8       (3.0 )     48.9  
    Operating expenses:
    Research & development   13.1     3.6       9.3       26.0  
    General & administrative   21.6     1.3       6.4       29.4  
    Sales & marketing   10.6     0.7       2.9       14.1  
    Depreciation & amortization   3.2     0.2       0.4       3.8  
    Equity income   0.8     —       —       0.8  
    Add back: Depreciation & amortization1   6.7     0.4       4.9       11.9  
    Segment EBITDA $ 8.1   $ (2.6 )   $ (17.1 )   $ (11.6 )


    NON-GAAP FINANCIAL MEASURES RECONCILIATION

    Gross Profit   Years ended December 31,
    (expressed in millions of U.S. dollars)   2024   2023
    Revenue   $ 302.3   $ 331.8
    Less: Cost of revenue   $ 244.7   $ 282.9
    Gross Profit   $ 57.6   $ 48.9
    Gross Margin as a percentage of Revenue   Years ended December 31,
    (expressed in millions of U.S. dollars)     2024       2023  
    Revenue   $ 302.3     $ 331.8  
    Gross Margin   $ 57.6     $ 48.9  
    Gross Margin as a percentage of Revenue     19 %     15 %
      Year ended December 31, 2024
      Total Segment   Less: Cespira   Add: Corporate & unallocated   Total Consolidated
    Revenue $ 345.4   $ 43.1   $ —     $ 302.3  
    Cost of revenue   287.3     42.6     —       244.7  
    Gross profit   58.1     0.5     —       57.6  
    Operating expenses:
    Research & development   26.3     4.7     —       21.6  
    General & administrative   28.9     5.6     14.4       37.7  
    Sales & marketing   12.5     1.0     1.2       12.7  
    Depreciation & amortization   4.7     1.7     0.4       3.4  
    Equity income (loss)   1.3     —     (6.7 )     (5.4 )
      Year ended December 31, 2023
      Total Segment   Add: Corporate & unallocated   Total Consolidated
    Revenue $ 331.8   $ —   $ 331.8
    Cost of revenue   282.9     —     282.9
    Gross profit   48.9     —     48.9
    Operating expenses:
    Research & development   26.0     —     26.0
    General & administrative   29.4     14.8     44.2
    Sales & marketing   14.1     2.2     16.3
    Depreciation & amortization   3.8     0.5     4.3
    Equity income   0.8     —     0.8
    Reconciliation of Segment EBITDA to Loss before income taxes   Years ended December 31,
        2024       2023  
    Total Segment EBITDA   $ (0.9 )   $ (11.6 )
    Adjustments:
    Depreciation and amortization     8.7       12.5  
    Cespira’s Segment EBITDA     (8.7 )     —  
    Cespira’s equity loss     6.7       —  
    Corporate and unallocated operating expenses     15.6       17.0  
    Foreign exchange loss     6.2       4.0  
    Loss on sale of assets     0.7       —  
    Gain on deconsolidation     (15.2 )     —  
    Loss on sale of investment     0.4       —  
    Impairment of long-term investment     —       0.4  
    Loss on extinguishment of royalty payable     —       2.9  
    Interest on long-term debt and accretion of royalty payable     2.8       3.0  
    Interest and other income, net of bank charges     (1.2 )     (2.7 )
    Loss before income taxes   $ (16.9 )   $ (48.7 )
    EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA                
    Three months ended   31-Mar-23   30-Jun-23   30-Sep-23   31-Dec-23   31-Mar-24   30-Jun-24   30-Sep-24   31-Dec-24
    Income (loss) before income taxes   $         (9.7 )   $         (13.0 )   $         (12.0 )   $         (14.0 )   $         (12.9 )   $         6.8             $         (2.5 )   $         (8.3 )
    Interest expense, net             0.4                       (0.1 )             0.2                       (0.2 )             0.5                       0.5                       0.4                       0.2          
    Depreciation and amortization             3.0                       3.0                       3.2                       3.3                       3.2                       1.7                       1.8                       2.0          
    EBITDA   $         (6.3 )   $         (10.1 )   $         (8.6 )   $         (10.9 )   $         (9.2 )   $         9.0             $         (0.3 )   $         (6.1 )
    Stock based compensation (recovery)   $         0.7             $         0.8             $         (0.3 )   $         1.4             $         0.3             $         1.2             $         (0.1 )   $         —          
    Unrealized foreign exchange (gain) loss   $         1.1             $         2.4             $         1.4             $         (0.9 )   $         1.8             $         0.1             $         (1.1 )   $         5.4          
    Loss on extinguishment of royalty payable   $         —             $         2.9             $         —             $         —             $         —             $         —             $         —             $         —          
    Severance costs   $         —             $         —             $         4.5             $         —             $         0.5             $         0.2             $         0.1             $         0.1          
    Gain on deconsolidation   $         —             $         —             $         —             $         —             $         —             $         (13.3 )   $         —             $         (1.9 )
    Loss on sale of investment   $         —             $         —             $         —             $         —             $         —             $         —             $         0.4             $         —          
    Restructuring costs   $         —             $         —             $         —             $         —             $         —             $         0.8             $         0.2             $         —          
    Loss on sale of assets   $         —             $         —             $         —             $         —             $         —             $         —             $         —             $         0.7          
    Impairment of long-term investment   $         —             $         —             $         —             $         0.4             $         —             $         —             $         —             $         —          
    Adjusted EBITDA   $         (4.5 )   $         (4.0 )   $         (3.0 )   $         (10.0 )   $         (6.6 )   $         (2.0 )   $         (0.8 )   $         (1.8 )
    WESTPORT FUEL SYSTEMS INC.
    Consolidated Balance Sheets
    (Expressed in thousands of United States dollars, except share amounts)
    December 31, 2024 and 2023
        December 31,
          2024       2023  
    Assets        
    Current assets:        
    Cash and cash equivalents (including restricted cash)   $ 37,646     $ 54,853  
    Accounts receivable     73,054       88,077  
    Inventories     53,526       67,530  
    Prepaid expenses     5,660       6,323  
    Total current assets     169,886       216,783  
    Long-term investments     39,732       4,792  
    Property, plant and equipment     41,956       69,489  
    Operating lease right-of-use assets     19,019       22,877  
    Intangible assets     5,277       6,822  
    Deferred income tax assets     9,695       11,554  
    Goodwill     2,876       3,066  
    Other long-term assets     3,180       20,365  
    Total assets   $ 291,621     $ 355,748  
    Liabilities and Shareholders’ Equity        
    Current liabilities:        
    Accounts payable and accrued liabilities   $ 88,123     $ 95,374  
    Current portion of operating lease liabilities     2,624       3,307  
    Short-term debt     —       15,156  
    Current portion of long-term debt     14,660       14,108  
    Current portion of warranty liability     3,861       6,892  
    Total current liabilities     109,268       134,837  
    Long-term operating lease liabilities     16,433       19,300  
    Long-term debt     19,067       30,957  
    Warranty liability     1,456       1,614  
    Deferred income tax liabilities     4,029       3,477  
    Other long-term liabilities     4,343       5,115  
    Total liabilities     154,596       195,300  
    Shareholders’ equity:        
    Share capital:        
    Unlimited common and preferred shares, no par value        
    17,282,934 (2023 – 17,174,502) common shares issued and outstanding     1,245,805       1,244,539  
    Other equity instruments     9,472       9,672  
    Additional paid-in-capital     11,516       11,516  
    Accumulated deficit     (1,096,275 )     (1,074,434 )
    Accumulated other comprehensive loss     (33,493 )     (30,845 )
    Total shareholders’ equity     137,025       160,448  
    Total liabilities and shareholders’ equity   $ 291,621     $ 355,748  
    WESTPORT FUEL SYSTEMS INC.  
    Consolidated Statements of Operations and Comprehensive Income (Loss)  
    (Expressed in thousands of United States dollars, except share and per share amounts)  
    Years ended December 31, 2024 and 2023  
        Years ended December 31,
          2024       2023  
    Revenue   $ 302,299     $ 331,799  
    Cost of revenue     244,708       282,862  
    Gross profit     57,591       48,937  
    Operating expenses:        
    Research and development     21,587       26,003  
    General and administrative     37,679       44,234  
    Sales and marketing     12,676       16,278  
    Foreign exchange loss     6,248       3,974  
    Depreciation and amortization     3,367       4,299  
    Loss on sale of assets     703       32  
          82,260       94,820  
    Loss from operations     (24,669 )     (45,883 )
             
    Income from investments accounted for by the equity method     (5,402 )     780  
    Gain on deconsolidation     15,198       —  
    Loss on sale of investment     (352 )     —  
    Loss on extinguishment of royalty payable     —       (2,909 )
    Interest on long-term debt and accretion of royalty payable     (2,797 )     (2,981 )
    Impairment of long-term investment     —       (413 )
    Interest and other income, net of bank charges     1,161       2,690  
    Loss before income taxes     (16,861 )     (48,716 )
    Income tax expense (recovery):        
    Current     3,183       1,786  
    Deferred     1,797       (784 )
          4,980       1,002  
    Net loss for the year     (21,841 )     (49,718 )
    Other comprehensive income (loss):        
    Cumulative translation adjustment     (2,535 )     4,473  
    Ownership share of equity method investments’ other comprehensive loss   $ (113 )   $ —  
        $ (2,648 )   $ 4,473  
    Comprehensive loss   $ (24,489 )   $ (45,245 )
    Loss per share:        
    Net loss per share – basic and diluted   $ (1.27 )   $ (2.90 )
    Weighted average common shares outstanding:        
    Basic and diluted     17,248,090       17,173,016  
    WESTPORT FUEL SYSTEMS INC.
    Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows
    (Expressed in thousands of United States dollars)
    Years ended December 31, 2024 and 2023
        Years ended December 31,
          2024       2023  
             
    Operating activities:        
    Net loss for the year   $ (21,841 )   $ (49,718 )
    Adjustments to reconcile net loss to net cash provided by (used in) operating activities:        
    Depreciation and amortization     8,661       12,490  
    Stock-based compensation expense     1,066       1,727  
    Unrealized foreign exchange loss     6,248       3,974  
    Deferred income tax expense (recovery)     1,797       (784 )
    Loss (income) from investments accounted for by the equity method     5,402       (780 )
    Interest on long-term debt and accretion of royalty payable     74       9  
    Impairment of long-term investment     —       413  
    Change in inventory write-downs to net realizable value     3,283       7,066  
    Gain on deconsolidation     (15,198 )     —  
    Loss on sale of investment     352       —  
    Net loss on sale of assets     627       32  
    Loss on extinguishment of royalty payable     —       2,909  
    Change in bad debt expense     282       56  
    Changes in operating assets and liabilities:        
    Accounts receivable     25,567       5,340  
    Inventories     (6,836 )     9,481  
    Prepaid expenses     (153 )     2,869  
    Accounts payable and accrued liabilities     2,233       (2,448 )
    Warranty liability     (4,380 )     (5,829 )
    Net cash provided by (used in) operating activities     7,184       (13,193 )
    Investing activities:        
    Purchase of property, plant and equipment     (16,923 )     (15,574 )
    Proceeds on sale of investments     29,994       —  
    Proceeds on sale of assets     998       161  
    Dividends received from investments accounted for by the equity method     297       —  
    Capital contributions to investments accounted for by the equity method     (9,900 )     —  
    Net cash provided by (used in) investing activities     4,466       (15,413 )
    Financing activities:        
    Drawings on operating lines of credit and long-term facilities     19,336       46,367  
    Repayment of operating lines of credit and long-term facilities     (44,546 )     (39,904 )
    Payment of royalty payable     —       (8,687 )
    Net cash used in financing activities     (25,210 )     (2,224 )
    Effect of foreign exchange on cash and cash equivalents     (3,647 )     (501 )
    Net decrease in cash and cash equivalents     (17,207 )     (31,331 )
    Cash and cash equivalents, beginning of year (including restricted cash)     54,853       86,184  
    Cash and cash equivalents, end of year (including restricted cash)     37,646       54,853  

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: VATICAN/ANGELUS – Pope Francis: “Lent, a time of healing. I too am experiencing it this way, in my soul and in my body”

    Source: Agenzia Fides – MIL OSI

    Sunday, 30 March 2025

    Vatican Media

    Vatican City (Agenzia Fides) – “Let us live this Lent as a time of healing, all the more as it is the Jubilee. I too am experiencing it this way, in my soul and in my body,” said Pope Francis in the text published by the Vatican for the midday prayer on the fourth Sunday of Lent (Laetare).In his commentary on the parable of the Prodigal Son, the Bishop of Rome notes that with this story, Jesus reveals “the heart of God”: “always merciful towards all,” “he heals our wounds so that we can love each other as brothers.”Hence, heartfelt thanks to “all those who, in the image of the Saviour, are instruments of healing for their neighbour with their word and their knowledge, with kindness and with prayer. Frailty and illness are experiences we all have in common; all the more, however, we are brothers in the salvation Christ has given us.””Trusting in the mercy of God the Father,” Pope Francis said, “we continue to pray for peace: in martyred Ukraine, in Palestine, Israel, Lebanon, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Myanmar, which is also suffering so much because of the earthquake.” In his message, the Pope also expressed his concern about the situation in South Sudan: “I renew my heartfelt appeal to all leaders to do their utmost to lower the tension in the country. We must put aside our differences and, with courage and responsibility, sit around a table and engage in constructive dialogue. Only in this way will it be possible to alleviate the suffering of the beloved South Sudanese people and to build a future of peace and stability.”And in Sudan, “the war continues to claim innocent victims. I urge the parties concerned in the conflict,” the Pope emphasized, “to put the safeguarding of the lives of their civilian brothers and sisters first; and I hope that new negotiations will begin as soon as possible, capable of securing a lasting solution to the crisis. May the international community increase its efforts to address the appalling humanitarian catastrophe.””Thanks be to God, there are also positive events,” the Pope concluded: “I cite as an example the ratification of the Agreement on the demarcation of the border between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which is an excellent diplomatic achievement. I encourage both countries to continue on this path.””May Mary, Mother of Mercy, help the human family to be reconciled in peace,” we read at the end of the Pontiff’s text. (F.B.) (Agenzia Fides, 30/3/2024)
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    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Angelus of the Fourth Sunday of Lent

    Source: The Holy See

    The following is the text prepared by the Holy Father Francis for the Angelus of this fourth Sunday of Lent:

    Text prepared by the Holy Father
    Dear brothers and sisters, Happy Sunday!
    In today’s Gospel (Lk 15:1-3, 11-32) Jesus notices that the Pharisees are scandalised and murmur behind His back, instead of being happy because sinners come to Him. So Jesus tells them about a father who has two sons: one leaves home, but then, having been reduced to poverty, he returns and is welcomed with joy. The other, the ‘obedient’ son, is indignant at his father and does not want to enter the feast. This is how Jesus reveals the heart of God: He is always merciful towards all; he heals our wounds so that we can love each other as brothers.
    Dearest friends, let us live this Lent as a time of healing, all the more as it is the Jubilee. I too am experiencing it this way, in my soul and in my body. That is why I give heartfelt thanks to all those who, in the image of the Saviour, are instruments of healing for their neighbour with their word and their knowledge, with kindness and with prayer. Frailty and illness are experiences we all have in common; all the more, however, we are brothers in the salvation Christ has given us.
    Trusting in the mercy of God the Father, we continue to pray for peace: in martyred Ukraine, in Palestine, Israel, Lebanon, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Myanmar, which is also suffering so much because of the earthquake.
    I am following the situation in South Sudan with concern. I renew my heartfelt appeal to all leaders to do their utmost to lower the tension in the country. We must put aside our differences and, with courage and responsibility, sit around a table and engage in constructive dialogue. Only in this way will it be possible to alleviate the suffering of the beloved South Sudanese people and to build a future of peace and stability.
    And in Sudan, the war continues to claim innocent victims.I urge the parties concerned in the conflict to put the safeguarding of the lives of their civilian brothers and sisters first; and I hope that new negotiations will begin as soon as possible, capable of securing a lasting solution to the crisis. May the international community increase its efforts to address the appalling humanitarian catastrophe.
    Thanks be to God, there are also positive events: for example, the ratification of the Agreement on the demarcation of the border between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which is an excellent diplomatic achievement.I encourage both countries to continue on this path.
    May Mary, Mother of Mercy, help the human family to be reconciled in peace.

    MIL OSI Europe News –