Category: Weather

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Beating malaria: what can be done with shrinking funds and rising threats

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Taneshka Kruger, UP ISMC: Project Manager and Coordinator, University of Pretoria

    Healthcare in Africa faces a perfect storm: high rates of infectious diseases like malaria and HIV, a rise in non-communicable diseases, and dwindling foreign aid.

    In 2021, nearly half of the sub-Saharan African countries relied on external financing for more than a third of their health expenditure. But donor fatigue and competing global priorities, such as climate change and geopolitical instability, have placed malaria control programmes under immense pressure. These funding gaps now threaten hard-won progress and ultimately malaria eradication.

    The continent’s healthcare funding crisis isn’t new. But its consequences are becoming more severe. As financial contributions shrink, Africa’s ability to respond to deadly diseases like malaria is being tested like never before.

    Malaria remains one of the world’s most pressing public health threats. According to the World Health Organization there were an estimated 263 million malaria cases and 597,000 deaths globally in 2023 – an increase of 11 million cases from the previous year.

    The WHO African region bore the brunt, with 94% of cases and 95% of deaths. It is now estimated that a child under the age of five dies roughly every 90 seconds due to malaria.

    Yet, malaria control efforts since 2000 have averted over 2 billion cases and saved nearly 13 million lives globally. Breakthroughs in diagnostics, treatment and prevention have been critical to this progress. They include insecticide-treated nets, rapid diagnostic tests, artemisinin-based combination therapies (drug combinations to prevent resistance) and malaria vaccines.

    Since 2017, the progress has been flat. If the funding gap widens, the risk is not just stagnation; it’s backsliding. Several emerging threats such as climate change and funding shortfalls could undo the gains of the early 2000s to mid-2010s.

    New challenges

    Resistance to drugs and insecticides, and strains of the malaria parasite Plasmodium falciparum that standard diagnostics can’t detect, have emerged as challenges. There have also been changes in mosquito behaviour, with vectors increasingly biting outdoors, making bed nets less effective.

    Climate change is shifting malaria transmission patterns. And the invasive Asian mosquito species Anopheles stephensi is spreading across Africa, particularly in urban areas.

    Add to this the persistent issue of cross-border transmission, and growing funding shortfalls and aid cuts, and it’s clear that the fight against malaria is at a critical point.

    As the world observes World Malaria Day 2025 under the theme “Malaria ends with us: reinvest, reimagine, reignite”, the call to action is urgent. Africa must lead the charge against malaria through renewed investment, bold innovation, and revitalised political will.

    Reinvest: Prevention is the most cost-effective intervention

    We – researchers, policymakers, health workers and communities – need to think smarter about funding. The economic logic of prevention is simple. It’s far cheaper to prevent malaria than to treat it. The total cost of procuring and delivering long-lasting insecticidal nets typically ranges between US$4 and US$7 each and the nets protect families for years. In contrast, treating a single case of severe malaria may cost hundreds of dollars and involve hospitalisation.

    In high-burden countries, malaria can consume up to 40% of public health spending.

    In Tanzania, for instance, malaria contributes to 30% of the country’s total disease burden. The broader economic toll – lost productivity, work and school absenteeism, and healthcare costs – is staggering. Prevention through long-lasting insecticidal nets, chemoprevention and health education isn’t only humane; it’s fiscally responsible.

    Reimagine: New tools, local solutions

    We cannot fight tomorrow’s malaria with yesterday’s tools. Resistance, climate-driven shifts in transmission, and urbanisation are changing malaria’s patterns.

    This is why re-imagining our approach is urgent.

    African countries must scale up innovations like the RTS,S/AS01 vaccine and next-generation mosquito nets. But more importantly, they must build their own capacity to develop, test and produce these tools.

    This requires investing in research and development, regional regulatory harmonisation, and local manufacturing.

    There is also a need to build leadership capacity within malaria control programmes to manage this adaptive disease with agility and evidence-based decision-making.

    Reignite: Community and collaboration matters

    Reigniting the malaria fight means shifting power to those on the frontlines. Community health workers remain one of Africa’s greatest untapped resources. Already delivering malaria testing, treatment and health education in remote areas, they can also be trained to manage other health challenges.

    Integrating malaria prevention into broader community health services makes sense. It builds resilience, reduces duplication, and ensures continuity even when external funding fluctuates.

    Every malaria intervention delivered by a trusted, local health worker is a step towards community ownership of health.

    Strengthened collaboration between partners, governments, cross-border nations, and local communities is also needed.

    The cost of inaction is unaffordable

    Africa’s malaria challenge is part of a deeper health systems crisis. By 2030, the continent will require an additional US$371 billion annually to deliver basic primary healthcare – about US$58 per person.

    For malaria in 2023 alone, US$8.3 billion was required to meet global control and elimination targets, yet only US$4 billion was mobilised. This gap has grown consistently, increasing from US$2.6 billion in 2019 to US$4.3 billion in 2023.

    The shortfall has led to major gaps in the coverage of essential malaria interventions.

    The solution does not lie in simply spending more, but in spending smarter by focusing on prevention, building local innovation, and strengthening primary healthcare systems.

    The responsibility is collective. African governments must invest boldly and reform policies to prioritise prevention.

    Global partners must support without dominating. And communities must be empowered to take ownership of their health.

    – Beating malaria: what can be done with shrinking funds and rising threats
    – https://theconversation.com/beating-malaria-what-can-be-done-with-shrinking-funds-and-rising-threats-255126

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: Toxic threat: New Greenpeace report outlines unacceptable risk of nuclear waste in Australia

    Source: Greenpeace Statement –

    SYDNEY, Thursday 24 April 2025 — A new report from Greenpeace Australia Pacific has shown the Coalition’s nuclear plan could produce 14 billion Coke cans’ worth of radioactive waste a year, warning it is a matter of when, not if, a nuclear waste accident could occur in Australia.

    Released in the lead-up to the 39th anniversary of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, the report, ‘Toxic threat: The danger of nuclear waste in Australia’ shows that the Coalition has grossly understated the volume of dangerous waste its nuclear plan will produce — 14 billion times more than the ‘single coke can’ for a small modular reactor touted by Peter Dutton.

    The report also outlines the unacceptable risk this waste poses to Australian communities, and warns Australia’s long history of nuclear waste management failures point to a very high likelihood of future nuclear disaster. 

    Joe Rafalowicz, Head of Climate and Energy at Greenpeace Australia Pacific, said: “Peter Dutton’s nuclear plan is a dangerous and expensive disaster waiting to happen. From Chernobyl to Fukushima, the devastation of nuclear disasters is a risk that Australia cannot afford to, and doesn’t need to, take. 

    “Australians don’t need the equivalent of 14 billion Coke cans of radioactive nuclear waste every year. The Coalition has not offered a credible plan for how it will manage nuclear waste safely, nor how it will fund this multibillion dollar effort. 

    “Australia’s unenviable track record of mismanaging even low-level nuclear waste, as well as a history of radioactive incidents in the US, UK and EU, reveals how complex it is to manage nuclear waste safely. Multiplying that challenge many times over by building a fleet of nuclear reactors could have devastating consequences for communities and ecosystems. 

    “International examples show that accidents, natural disasters, and other waste management failures occur with alarming regularity. A nuclear waste accident could lead to mass casualties, long-term health impacts, and the contamination of groundwater, farmland, and ecosystems for millennia. The clean-up bill from an incident would be astronomical, costing billions of dollars. 

    “Australia doesn’t need nuclear energy, which is just a smokescreen to prolong the use of climate-wrecking coal and gas for decades. We are almost halfway to powering the nation with clean, affordable wind and solar, and should be supercharging efforts to get to 100% renewables backed by storage.

    “The Coalition has not asked communities like Collie, Latrobe Valley and the Hunter Valley for their consent to build nuclear reactors and waste dumps in their backyards, but the upcoming Federal Election is a chance for voters to have a say in Australia’s energy future. Peter Dutton’s nuclear plan is too dangerous to proceed, and Australians should strongly reject the idea of nuclear energy here.” 

    —ENDS—

    Note to editors: Images of a recent Greenpeace anti-nuclear protest at the Coalition’s election campaign launch party are available here

    For more information or to arrange an interview, please contact Vai Shah on 0452 290 082 / [email protected]

    MIL OSI NGO

  • MIL-OSI Global: Beating malaria: what can be done with shrinking funds and rising threats

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Taneshka Kruger, UP ISMC: Project Manager and Coordinator, University of Pretoria

    Healthcare in Africa faces a perfect storm: high rates of infectious diseases like malaria and HIV, a rise in non-communicable diseases, and dwindling foreign aid.

    In 2021, nearly half of the sub-Saharan African countries relied on external financing for more than a third of their health expenditure. But donor fatigue and competing global priorities, such as climate change and geopolitical instability, have placed malaria control programmes under immense pressure. These funding gaps now threaten hard-won progress and ultimately malaria eradication.

    The continent’s healthcare funding crisis isn’t new. But its consequences are becoming more severe. As financial contributions shrink, Africa’s ability to respond to deadly diseases like malaria is being tested like never before.

    Malaria remains one of the world’s most pressing public health threats. According to the World Health Organization there were an estimated 263 million malaria cases and 597,000 deaths globally in 2023 – an increase of 11 million cases from the previous year.

    The WHO African region bore the brunt, with 94% of cases and 95% of deaths. It is now estimated that a child under the age of five dies roughly every 90 seconds due to malaria.

    Yet, malaria control efforts since 2000 have averted over 2 billion cases and saved nearly 13 million lives globally. Breakthroughs in diagnostics, treatment and prevention have been critical to this progress. They include insecticide-treated nets, rapid diagnostic tests, artemisinin-based combination therapies (drug combinations to prevent resistance) and malaria vaccines.

    Since 2017, the progress has been flat. If the funding gap widens, the risk is not just stagnation; it’s backsliding. Several emerging threats such as climate change and funding shortfalls could undo the gains of the early 2000s to mid-2010s.

    New challenges

    Resistance to drugs and insecticides, and strains of the malaria parasite Plasmodium falciparum that standard
    diagnostics can’t detect, have emerged as challenges. There have also been changes in mosquito behaviour, with vectors increasingly biting outdoors, making bed nets less effective.

    Climate change is shifting malaria transmission patterns. And the invasive Asian mosquito species Anopheles stephensi is spreading across Africa, particularly in urban areas.

    Add to this the persistent issue of cross-border transmission, and growing funding shortfalls and aid cuts, and it’s clear that the fight against malaria is at a critical point.

    As the world observes World Malaria Day 2025 under the theme “Malaria ends with us: reinvest, reimagine, reignite”, the call to action is urgent. Africa must lead the charge against malaria through renewed investment, bold innovation, and revitalised political will.

    Reinvest: Prevention is the most cost-effective intervention

    We – researchers, policymakers, health workers and communities – need to think smarter about funding. The economic logic of prevention is simple. It’s far cheaper to prevent malaria than to treat it. The total cost of procuring and delivering long-lasting insecticidal nets typically ranges between US$4 and US$7 each and the nets protect families for years. In contrast, treating a single case of severe malaria may cost hundreds of dollars and involve hospitalisation.

    In high-burden countries, malaria can consume up to 40% of public health spending.

    In Tanzania, for instance, malaria contributes to 30% of the country’s total disease burden. The broader economic toll – lost productivity, work and school absenteeism, and healthcare costs – is staggering. Prevention through long-lasting insecticidal nets, chemoprevention and health education isn’t only humane; it’s fiscally responsible.

    Reimagine: New tools, local solutions

    We cannot fight tomorrow’s malaria with yesterday’s tools. Resistance, climate-driven shifts in transmission, and urbanisation are changing malaria’s patterns.

    This is why re-imagining our approach is urgent.

    African countries must scale up innovations like the RTS,S/AS01 vaccine and next-generation mosquito nets. But more importantly, they must build their own capacity to develop, test and produce these tools.

    This requires investing in research and development, regional regulatory harmonisation, and local manufacturing.

    There is also a need to build leadership capacity within malaria control programmes to manage this adaptive disease with agility and evidence-based decision-making.

    Reignite: Community and collaboration matters

    Reigniting the malaria fight means shifting power to those on the frontlines. Community health workers remain one of Africa’s greatest untapped resources. Already delivering malaria testing, treatment and health education in remote areas, they can also be trained to manage other health challenges.

    Integrating malaria prevention into broader community health services makes sense. It builds resilience, reduces duplication, and ensures continuity even when external funding fluctuates.

    Every malaria intervention delivered by a trusted, local health worker is a step towards community ownership of health.

    Strengthened collaboration between partners, governments, cross-border nations, and local communities is also needed.

    The cost of inaction is unaffordable

    Africa’s malaria challenge is part of a deeper health systems crisis. By 2030, the continent will require an additional US$371 billion annually to deliver basic primary healthcare – about US$58 per person.

    For malaria in 2023 alone, US$8.3 billion was required to meet global control and elimination targets, yet only US$4 billion was mobilised. This gap has grown consistently, increasing from US$2.6 billion in 2019 to US$4.3 billion in 2023.

    The shortfall has led to major gaps in the coverage of essential malaria interventions.

    The solution does not lie in simply spending more, but in spending smarter by focusing on prevention, building local innovation, and strengthening primary healthcare systems.

    The responsibility is collective. African governments must invest boldly and reform policies to prioritise prevention.

    Global partners must support without dominating. And communities must be empowered to take ownership of their health.

    The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Beating malaria: what can be done with shrinking funds and rising threats – https://theconversation.com/beating-malaria-what-can-be-done-with-shrinking-funds-and-rising-threats-255126

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Be prepared and plan ahead for Anzac weekend

    Source: Auckland Council

    After last week’s dose of wet and windy weather, Aucklanders are getting a bit of a reprieve for Anzac Day but may see rain over the weekend, most likely Sunday. We’re reminding people to check drains and gutters again; plan travel carefully and stay up to date with weather forecasts.

    Auckland Emergency Management General Manager Adam Maggs says Aucklanders did a great job preparing for the impacts of ex-tropical Cyclone Tam and responding to the weather conditions over the Easter weekend.

    “Aucklanders across the region experienced heavy rain, strong winds and flooding in places just days ago, over the Easter long weekend.

    “While there’s still a high degree of uncertainty, we could see some wet weather in parts of Tāmaki Makaurau over the Anzac long weekend.

    “We understand Aucklanders may be sick of hearing about the weather, but it doesn’t take long to do a few important things – a quick check of gutters and drains on your property, and a regular update on the weather forecast over the weekend,” says Adam.

    Keep up to date with the weather forecast

    MetService has not issued any current weather watches or warnings for the weekend as it’s too early to predict how the weekend weather will pan out. A top tip is to download the MetService app from the App Store or Google Play and sign up for push notifications to your phone.

    “At this stage, it looks like we’re in for rain overnight on Saturday and into Sunday morning – right about the time when people may start heading home from school holidays or long weekend breaks.

    “There is still uncertainty about when and where bad weather will hit, so make sure you check the forecast when planning any weekend travel or activities and check it again for any changes before you go out. Don’t forget, if you’re heading to another region, check the weather there too.

    “With soil saturation levels now very high, there is always the possibility of flooding if heavy rain eventuates.

    “If you’re on the roads, drive to the conditions, take care and give yourself plenty of time,” he says.

    Add property prep to your weekend checklist

    Taking half an hour to make sure your home and property are prepared for bad weather could prevent unnecessary damage and disruption.

    “Securing or storing outdoor furniture and umbrellas ahead of bad weather doesn’t take much time and could stop these items from getting damaged or damaging your property.

    “If we get gusty winds, these can easily pick up small or loose items, flip trampolines or lightweight outdoor furniture and play equipment,” says Adam.

    Checking drains, gutters and trees or plants on your property that can lose branches or clog drains is a good idea at this time of year.

    “Auckland Council’s Healthy Waters team has again been out this week checking hot spots and clearing drains. It’s important that residents do this too.

    “Anything on your property that may wash into the stormwater system and cause blockages should be removed. Clearing gutters and drains on your property will also help prevent damage, leaks and flooding. 

    “It’s always a good time to check your emergency readiness supplies – in the unlikely event the power goes out or, for those in more remote parts of the region, you get temporarily cut off.

    “Visit our website (aucklandemergencymanagement.govt.nz) or getready.govt.nz for good advice on getting your household prepared for an emergency,” says Adam.

    Always in the know: top tips for wild weather

    • Follow weather forecasts for regular updates – forecasts can change.
    • Plan your travel carefully and never drive through floodwater.
    • If life or property is at risk, phone 111.
    • If you live somewhere prone to flooding, slips or power outages, ensure you have a supply of food and provisions in case you become isolated.
    • Treat power lines as live at all times.
    • Report flooding and blocked stormwater drains to Auckland Council on 09 301 0101.
    • Visit aucklandcouncil.govt.nz and click “Report a problem” to report trees down on public land.
    • If your property is damaged, take photographs for your insurer as early as possible.

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-Evening Report: Markets are choppy. What should you do with your super if you are near retirement?

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Natalie Peng, Lecturer in Accounting, The University of Queensland

    Shutterstock

    For Australians approaching retirement, recent market volatility may feel like more than just a bump in the road.

    Unlike younger investors, who have time on their side, retirees don’t have the luxury of waiting out downturns. A sharp dip just before, or as you begin drawing down your superannuation, can leave lasting damage.

    It’s not just about watching your super balance dip.

    The real danger comes if you need to start withdrawing funds during a slump. Doing so can lock in losses and make it harder for your remaining savings to recover. The timing of poor market returns is known in finance circles as “sequencing risk”. And it can shorten the life of your retirement savings.

    What’s going on in markets?

    So far in 2025, global shares as measured by the MSCI World Index have fallen 4.6%. Concerns over stubborn inflation and trade tensions that will hurt growth are keeping investors on edge.

    If your superannuation is in a “balanced” option, with diversified investments in stocks, bonds, private markets and cash, your balance will have fallen by less than this amount.

    Zoom out and the story looks better. Over the past year, total returns for the MSCI index remain strong, up 6.5%.

    It’s a reminder that downturns are often followed by rebounds. We saw this during the COVID crash in 2020, when markets plummeted, only to recover more than 50% over the following year.

    Still, for those nearing retirement, the timing of these dips matters more than the averages. Uncertainty makes planning all the more crucial.

    Is your super still in high gear?

    Many Australians don’t know exactly how their super is invested. Most people are in default “balanced” or “lifecycle” options, which automatically shift from high-growth assets like shares to safer investments like bonds and cash as retirement approaches.

    A lifecycle option in super will automatically adjust your investments as you age.
    Darren Baker/Shutterstock

    This design helps cushion your balance from big market hits as you near retirement. But if you’ve chosen a high-growth option or haven’t reviewed your investment settings in years, you could still be heavily exposed to volatility.

    In that case, now’s the time to consider your options:

    • delay retirement by a year or two to give your portfolio time to recover

    • move to part-time work instead of retiring fully, reducing how much super you need to draw down

    • review your budget. You can’t control the markets, but you can control your spending plans.

    Don’t panic – reacting emotionally can cost you

    When markets fall, it’s natural to feel the urge to switch your portfolio mix from stocks into cash. But this can turn temporary losses into permanent ones.

    Instead, consider more measured steps. Transition-to-retirement strategies let you draw a partial income while keeping most of your super invested.

    Annuities – which offer guaranteed income for life or a fixed term – are another option. Newer products also address longevity risk, which is the risk of outliving your savings.

    What does a 5% drop really mean?

    Let’s say you’re 65 and have a super balance of A$200,000 (for men, that’s roughly the median; for women, it’s lower due to factors like lower lifetime earnings and career breaks).

    Long-term returns may be lower than in recent years.
    Shutterstock

    A 5% fall translates to a $10,000 loss. That might not seem huge, but if you were planning to draw down 5% of your balance annually – about $10,000 a year – that loss could effectively wipe out an entire year’s retirement income.

    It doesn’t stop there. If left invested, that $10,000 could have continued to grow. Over a 20-year retirement, and assuming a 5% annual return, that $10,000 could have grown to over $26,000.

    For retirees with smaller super balances or higher withdrawal rates, the impact of a market dip can be even more significant.

    Many experts now expect long-term returns to be more modest than in recent decades. Ageing populations, climate change and shifting global dynamics are likely to weigh on growth.

    This makes it even more important to avoid switching entirely into cash, which can erode your savings through inflation over what could be a 20- or 30-year retirement.

    A smarter path to retirement

    The best approach is to gradually shift your investments in the years leading up to retirement – not all at once in response to a market dip. Lifecycle options do this automatically, but if you’re managing your super yourself, it’s worth getting advice.

    Your super fund’s website likely offers tools and calculators to help. ASIC’s MoneySmart retirement planner is another great resource. And don’t underestimate the value of calling your fund to ask:

    • How is my super invested?

    • Does this match my age and risk tolerance?

    • What are my options if I want to make changes?

    The bottom line

    Retiring in a volatile market isn’t easy, but panic isn’t a plan. By understanding your investment mix, taking advantage of flexible retirement strategies, and seeking advice when needed, you can navigate uncertainty more confidently.

    Planning for retirement isn’t about avoiding all risk – it’s about managing it. With the right tools and mindset, you can stay on course, even when markets wobble.




    Read more:
    How much do you need to retire? It’s probably a lot less than you think


    Natalie Peng does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Markets are choppy. What should you do with your super if you are near retirement? – https://theconversation.com/markets-are-choppy-what-should-you-do-with-your-super-if-you-are-near-retirement-255017

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-Evening Report: ER Report: A Roundup of Significant Articles on EveningReport.nz for April 24, 2025

    ER Report: Here is a summary of significant articles published on EveningReport.nz on April 24, 2025.

    The ocean can look deceptively calm – until it isn’t. Here’s what ‘hazardous surf’ really means
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Samuel Cornell, PhD Candidate, Beach Safety Research Group, School of Population Health, UNSW Sydney Over the Easter weekend, seven people drowned along the Australian coast. Most were swept off rock platforms – extremely dangerous locations that are increasingly prevalent in Australia’s coastal fatality data. The weather was

    The major parties have announced their plans to address domestic and family violence. How do they stack up?
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Kate Fitz-Gibbon, Professor (Practice), Faculty of Business and Economics, Monash University In the past week, at least seven women have been killed in Australia, allegedly by men. These deaths have occurred in different contexts – across state borders, communities and relationships. But are united by one truth:

    The biggest losers: how Australians became the world’s most enthusiastic gamblers
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Wayne Peake, Adjunct research fellow, School of Humanities and Communication Arts, Western Sydney University The story goes that the late billionaire Australian media magnate Kerry Packer once visited a Las Vegas casino, where a Texan was bragging about his ranch and how many millions it was worth.

    A golden era for personalized medicine is approaching, but are we ready?
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Nazia Pathan, PhD, Postdoctoral Researcher, Population Health Research Institute, McMaster University Biobanks have become some of the most transformative tools in medical research, enabling scientists to study the relationships between genes, health and disease on an unprecedented scale (Piqsels/Siyya) If there’s a disease that seems to run

    The billions spent on NZ’s accommodation supplement is failing to make rent affordable – so what will?
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Edward Yiu, Associate Professor, School of Business, University of Auckland, Waipapa Taumata Rau Pixelbliss/Shutterstock New Zealand’s unaffordable housing market has left many low and middle-income families reliant on the accommodation supplement to cover rent and mortgage payments. But our new research has found the scheme, which costs

    Fossil teeth show extinct giant kangaroos spent their lives close to home – and perished when the climate changed
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Christopher Laurikainen Gaete, PhD Candidate, University of Wollongong Chris Laurikainen Gaete Large kangaroos today roam long distances across the outback, often surviving droughts by moving in mobs to find new food when pickings are slim. But not all kangaroos have been this way. In new research published

    The billions spent on NZ’s accomodation supplement is failing to make rent affordable – so what will?
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Edward Yiu, Associate Professor, School of Business, University of Auckland, Waipapa Taumata Rau Pixelbliss/Shutterstock New Zealand’s unaffordable housing market has left many low and middle-income families reliant on the accommodation supplement to cover rent and mortgage payments. But our new research has found the scheme, which costs

    The gambling industry has women in its sights. Why aren’t policymakers paying attention?
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Simone McCarthy, Postdoctoral Research Fellow – Commercial Determinants of Health, Deakin University Wpadington/Shutterstock Whatever the code, whatever the season, Australian sports fans are bombarded with gambling ads. Drawing on Australians’ passion, loyalty and pride for sport, the devastating health and social consequences of gambling – including financial

    When ‘equal’ does not mean ‘the same’: Liberals still do not understand their women problem
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Carol Johnson, Emerita Professor, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Adelaide “Women’s” issues are once again playing a significant role in the election debate as Labor and the Liberals trade barbs over which parties’ policies will benefit women most. In the latest salvo, the opposition

    Tremors, seizures and paralysis: this brain disorder is more common than multiple sclerosis – but often goes undiagnosed
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Benjamin Scrivener, PhD Candidate, Faculty of Medical and Health Sciences, University of Auckland, Waipapa Taumata Rau Kateryna Kon/Shutterstock Imagine suddenly losing the ability to move a limb, walk or speak. You would probably recognise this as a medical emergency and get to hospital. Now imagine the doctors

    The origin story of the Anzac biscuit is largely myth – but that shouldn’t obscure the history of women during the war
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Garritt C. Van Dyk, Senior Lecturer in History, University of Waikato Australian Comforts Fund buffet in Longueval, France, 1916. Australian War Memorial The Anzac biscuit is a cultural icon, infused with mythical value, representing the connection between women on the home front and soldiers serving overseas during

    Politics with Michelle Grattan: historian Frank Bongiorno on dramatic shifts in how elections are fought and won
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of Canberra This election has been lacklustre, without the touch of excitement of some past campaigns. Through the decades, campaigning has changed dramatically, adopting new techniques and technologies. This time, we’ve seen politicians try to jump onto viral podcasts. To discuss old

    Albanese government announces $1.2 billion plan to purchase critical minerals
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of Canberra A re-elected Albanese government will take the unprecedented step of buying or obtaining options over key critical minerals to protect Australia’s national interest and boost its economic resilience. The move follows US President Donald Trump’s ordering a review into American

    Why special measures to boost Fiji women’s political representation remain a distant goal
    RNZ Pacific Despite calls from women’s groups urging the government to implement policies to address the underrepresentation of women in politics, the introduction of temporary special measures (TSM) to increase women’s political representation in Fiji remains a distant goal. This week, leader of the Social Democratic Liberal Party (Sodelpa), Cabinet Minister Aseri Radrodro, and opposition

    Albanese government announces $1.2 billion in plan to purchase critical minerals
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of Canberra A re-elected Albanese government will take the unprecedented step of buying or obtaining options over key critical minerals to protect Australia’s national interest and boost its economic resilience. The move follows US President Donald Trump’s ordering a review into American

    Flooding incidents in Ghana’s capital are on the rise. Researchers chase the cause
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Stephen Appiah Takyi, Senior Lecturer, Department of Planning, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST) Urban flooding is a major problem in the global south. In west and central Africa, more than 4 million people were affected by flooding in 2024. In Ghana, cities suffer damage

    Australia needs bold ideas on defence. The Coalition’s increased spending plan falls disappointingly short
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Peter Layton, Visiting Fellow, Strategic Studies, Griffith University Just as voting has begun in this year’s federal election, the Coalition has released its long-awaited defence policy platform. The main focus, as expected, is a boost in defence spending to 3% of Australia’s GDP within the next decade.

    Sniping koalas from helicopters: here’s what’s wrong with Victoria’s unprecedented cull
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Liz Hicks, Lecturer in Law, The University of Melbourne Roberto La Rosa/Shutterstock Snipers in helicopters have shot more than 700 koalas in the Budj Bim National Park in western Victoria in recent weeks. It’s believed to be the first time koalas have been culled in this way.

    Rather than short-term fixes, communities need flexible plans to prepare for a range of likely climate impacts
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Tom Logan, Senior Lecturer Above the Bar of Civil Systems Engineering, University of Canterbury Dave Rowland/Getty Images As New Zealanders clean up after ex-Cyclone Tam which left thousands without power and communities once again facing flooding, it’s tempting to seek immediate solutions. However, after the cleanup and

    Why do Labor and the Coalition have so many similar policies? It’s simple mathematics
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Gabriele Gratton, Professor of Politics and Economics and ARC Future Fellow, UNSW Sydney Pundits and political scientists like to repeat that we live in an age of political polarisation. But if you sat through the second debate between Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and Opposition leader Peter Dutton

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI China: Xi addresses Leaders Meeting on Climate and the Just Transition, urging jointly advancing global climate governance

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Xi addresses Leaders Meeting on Climate and the Just Transition, urging jointly advancing global climate governance

    Chinese President Xi Jinping delivers a speech via video link at the Leaders Meeting on Climate and the Just Transition, April 23, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

    BEIJING, April 23 — Chinese President Xi Jinping delivered a speech via video link at the Leaders Meeting on Climate and the Just Transition on Wednesday.

    Noting that this year marks the 10th anniversary of the Paris Agreement and the 80th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations (UN), Xi said as unprecedented global changes unfold at a faster pace, humanity has come to a new crossroads.

    Although some major country’s persistent pursuit of unilateralism and protectionism has seriously impacted international rules and the international order, history will, as always, move forward through twists and turns, Xi said.

    “As long as we enhance confidence, solidarity and cooperation, we will overcome the headwinds and steadily move forward global climate governance and all progressive endeavors of the world,” he said.

    Xi shared four points in this regard.

    “First, we must adhere to multilateralism,” he said, adding that all countries should firmly safeguard the UN-centered international system and the international order underpinned by international law, and firmly safeguard international fairness and justice.

    “It is important for all countries to champion the rule of law, honor commitments, prioritize green and low-carbon development, and jointly respond to the climate crisis through multilateral governance,” said Xi.

    Second, the international cooperation must be deepened, he said. “We should rise above estrangement and conflict with openness and inclusiveness, boost technological innovation and industrial transformation through cooperation, and facilitate the free flow of quality green technologies and products, so that they can be accessible, affordable and beneficial for all countries, especially the developing ones.”

    China will vigorously deepen South-South cooperation and continue to provide help for fellow developing countries to the best of its capability, added Xi.

    “Third, we must accelerate the just transition,” Xi said, adding that green transformation must be people-centered and pursued in a way that advances the well-being of people and climate governance in tandem, and strike a balance between multiple goals including environmental protection, economic growth, job creation, and poverty alleviation.

    “Developed countries are obliged to extend assistance and support to developing countries, help drive the global shift toward green and low-carbon development, and contribute to the common and long-term well-being of people of all countries,” said Xi.

    Fourth, results-oriented actions must be strengthened, according to Xi.

    “All parties should do their utmost to formulate and implement their program of action for nationally determined contributions (NDCs) while coordinating economic development and energy transition,” he said.

    China will announce its 2035 NDCs covering all economic sectors and all greenhouse gases before the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Belem, Brazil, added Xi.

    Xi highlighted that harmony between man and nature is a defining feature of Chinese modernization, and China is a steadfast actor and major contributor in promoting global green development.

    “Since I announced China’s goals for carbon peaking and carbon neutrality five years ago, we have built the world’s largest and fastest-growing renewable energy system as well as the largest and most complete new energy industrial chain,” he said, adding that China also leads the world in the speed and scale of “greening,” contributing a quarter of the world’s newly-added area of afforestation.

    “However the world may change, China will not slow down its climate actions, will not reduce its support for international cooperation, and will not cease its efforts to build a community with a shared future for mankind,” said Xi.

    China is willing to work with all parties to earnestly honor the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, do the utmost respectively and collectively, and build a clean, beautiful, and sustainable world together, he added.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Continued progress in cyclone recovery

    Source: New Zealand Government

    Councils from regions severely impacted by the 2023 North Island Severe Weather Events continue to make steady progress repairing transport routes and building future flood resilience for their communities, Emergency Management and Recovery Minister, Mark Mitchell says. 
    “As at the end of February 2025, Auckland, Gisborne and Hawke’s Bay councils have stabilised 1,125 slips, repaired 25 local bridges and completed 51 km of stop banks.
    “The Crown cost-share agreements with these councils provided more than $1.6 billion for the council-led Category 3 residential property buyouts, flood risk mitigation and local transport projects. 
    “The Government recently approved plans for the final three projects, bringing the total number of approved projects to 54,” says Mr Mitchell.
    “I would like to acknowledge the considerable work councils in Hawke’s Bay, Tairāwhiti and Auckland have done to prepare Delivery Plans for these projects.
    “Some of these projects have required significant programmes of work involving multiple workstreams, and I am conscious that councils have also been delivering other aspects of their region’s recovery. 
    “Many of the flood mitigation projects are technically complex, and councils have taken time to plan and consult with impacted communities to balance the level of protection with minimising the impact on properties before deciding on the final design. 
    “Completing the flood mitigation projects, which are part funded by the councils, will reduce the risk of future flooding, allowing many impacted properties to move from Category 2C. This will mean many people can continue living on their property with greater confidence. 
    “Progressing the flood risk mitigation projects and repairing roads and bridges will make a considerable difference for impacted communities and will support growth in these regions.”
    Combined, the total cost of the flood risk mitigation and local transport projects is $1,050 million of which the Crown is funding $907 million.

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: VANUATU: Families find climate-smart ways to grow crops 18 months on from cyclone devastation

    Source: Save the Children

    Families in Vanuatu are adopting climate-smart agricultural techniques to improve food security, such as growing climate resistant crops, to prepare for future climate-driven disasters in the wake of devastating Tropical Cyclone Lola 18 months ago.
    Tropical Cyclone Lola was one of the most powerful off-season storms to strike the Pacific when it made landfall in October 2023 with wind speeds of up to 215 km/h, destroying homes, schools and plantations, claiming the lives of at least four people [2] and affecting about 91,000 people [1]. 
    Recovery efforts were made significantly more challenging when Vanuatu’s capital Port Vila was then hit by a 7.3 magnitude earthquake in December last year, claiming 14 lives and destroying critical infrastructure.
    Madleen, 11, said when the cyclone hit, her family’s crops were destroyed, leaving them short of food. 
    “It destroyed the food crops. When we came outside, we saw the crops were destroyed. The banana tree was just bearing fruit and it was destroyed. And we didn’t have enough food. We were eating rice, but we were almost running short. We were not eating well, we ate just enough. I felt bad.”  
    After the cyclone, a shortage of nutritious food put children at risk of hunger as well as diseases like diarrhea, with typically an increase in the number of children hospitalised for diarrhea following cyclones, Save the Children said. 
    Vanuatu is already one of the most climate disaster-prone countries in the world, and scientists say tropical cyclones will become more extreme as the climate crisis worsens. This will disproportionately impact children due to food shortages, disruption to education and psychosocial trauma associated with experiencing disasters. 
    Save the Children, alongside Vanuatu’s Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, Forestry, Fisheries, and Biosecurity (MALFFB) and local partners, is supporting Madleen and her family through the Tropical Cyclone Lola Recovery Programme, which is helping improve food security and resilience in communities impacted by the cyclone. 
    As a part of the Recovery Programme, over 1,100 households have received climate-resistant [3] seeds from a seedbank. These seeds, for growing watermelon, papaya, Chinese cabbage, tomato, capsicum and cucumber, are proven to perform in Vanuatu’s changing climate, with tolerance to high rainfall, drought, pests and disease. Farmers are encouraged to preserve the seeds from crops and sell them back to the seed bank. 
    The programme is also training communities in other climate-smart agricultural techniques such as growing smaller fruit trees that are robust enough to withstand strong cyclone winds.
    Save the Children has also built a collapsible nursery for plants in Madleen’s community that can be taken down when a cyclone is predicted, so saplings and trees can be stored, protected and replanted after it passes.
    Save the Children Vanuatu Country Director, Polly Banks, said:
    “In just 18 months, people in Vanuatu have been deeply shaken by a devastating cyclone and a powerful earthquake.
    “Children have borne the brunt of this, with food taken off their plates, crops destroyed, homes and schools damaged and diseases on the rise. As the climate crisis accelerates, we must work with communities to strengthen their resilience, so children and their families are better equipped to face whatever comes next.
    “We’re working in partnership with the Government of Vanuatu and local partners to help communities build the skills and resources they need to support themselves when future cyclones and disasters strike.”
    Save the Children has been working in in Vanuatu for more than 40 years to make sure children are learning, protected from harm, and grow up healthy and strong.
    Notes:
    This project was also supported by the New Zealand Government’s Disaster Response Partnership programme.
    [3] Open-pollinated seeds (OP seeds) produce plants that can reproduce true to type, meaning farmers can save seeds from their harvest and plant them in the next season with similar results. OP varieties used and recommended by the Vanuatu Agriculture Research and Technical Centre are often locally adapted, meaning they’ve been trialed and selected for their performance in Vanuatu’s climate – including tolerance to high rainfall, drought, pests and diseases. These seeds have genetic diversity, allowing plants to better adapt to changing weather patterns.
    About Save the Children NZ:
    Save the Children works in 120 countries across the world. The organisation responds to emergencies and works with children and their communities to ensure they survive, learn and are protected.
    Save the Children NZ currently supports international programmes in Fiji, Cambodia, Bangladesh, Laos, Nepal, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea. Areas of work include child protection, education and literacy, disaster risk reduction and climate adaptation, and alleviating child poverty.

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Rep. Mike Levin Reintroduces Legislation to Ban Drilling Off of Southern California

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Representative Mike Levin (CA-49)

    April 22, 2025

    Washington, D.C. – Today, Rep. Mike Levin (CA-49) reintroduced the Southern California Coast and Ocean Protection Act, which would prohibit offshore drilling along the Southern California coast, as a part of a larger initiative to ban offshore drilling in sensitive areas and protect our vibrant coastal communities.

    Rep. Levin’s bill, The Southern California Coast and Ocean Protection Act, would prevent new leasing for the exploration, development, or production of oil or natural gas along the Southern California coast, from San Diego to the northern border of San Luis Obispo County.

    Rep. Levin introduced this bill along with:

    • Rep. Huffman’s (D-CA) West Coast Ocean Protection Act
    • Rep. Pallone’s (D-NJ) Clean Ocean and Safe Tourism (COAST) Anti-Drilling Act
    • Rep. Castor’s (D-FL) Florida Coast Protection Act
    • Rep. Carbajal’s (D-CA) California Clean Coast Act
    • Rep. Panetta’s (D-CA) Central Coast of California Conservation Act of 2025
    • Rep. Magaziner’s (D-RI) New England Coastal Protection Act of 2025
    • Rep. Ross’ (D-NC) Defend our Coast Act

    These bills would prohibit the Secretary of the Interior from issuing any oil and gas lease leases or any other authorizations along the entire coast of California and in other coastal areas across the country. Together, these bills will protect valuable ecosystems and the economic viability of communities concerned about oil spills.

    “I’m joining my colleagues to permanently protect our beautiful coasts and put a stop to offshore drilling in sensitive areas,” said Rep. Mike Levin. “These bills take a vitally important step in protecting our communities from the consequences of offshore drilling, especially as the Trump Administration attempts to unleash drilling on our coastline in San Diego and Orange County. The Administration wants to risk disastrous environmental impacts on our beaches, threatening our coastal economy and way of life to line the pockets of oil executives. I’m proud to join my colleagues in the California Delegation and across the country in taking a stand against offshore drilling nationwide.”

    Rep. Levin has advocated extensively for a ban on offshore drilling. In November 2024, Rep. Levin sent a letter to the Biden Administration that resulted in the withdrawal of future oil and natural gas leasing in sensitive coastal areas across the country, including in Southern California. In January 2025, the Trump Administration once again opened these areas to drilling and has taken measures to expand offshore drilling and roll back environmental regulations
                              

    “The Southern California Coast and Ocean Protection Act will protect our environment, economy, climate, and way of life from the harmful effects of offshore oil and gas development. The 2021 Amplify Energy Oil Spill off Orange County showed the damage that offshore drilling can inflict on coastal ecosystems and marine wildlife and triggered beach and fishery closures that disrupted southern California’s tourism-based economy. The Surfrider Foundation urges members of Congress to support these and other bills to permanently prohibit new offshore drilling in U.S. waters,” said Pete Stauffer, Ocean Protection Manager, Surfrider Foundation.

    “Southern California’s coastal communities depend on thriving oceans and wildlife, and they know all too well the devastating costs of offshore spills, busted pipelines, and oil-covered beaches,” said Joseph Gordon, Oceana Campaign Director. “Oceana commends Congressman Levin for reintroducing this important legislation that would permanently protect the Golden State’s beloved southern coast from the dangers of oil and gas drilling and spilling. This bill is part of a state and national movement to safeguard our multi-billion-dollar coastal economies from dirty and dangerous offshore drilling.” 

    “The Surf Industry Members Association is proud to support the Southern California Coast and Ocean Protection Act. Our coastline is not just a vital economic engine—it’s the heart of our culture and way of life for millions across the region. Prohibiting new offshore oil and gas leasing in Southern California is a critical step to protect our waves, our marine ecosystems, and the communities that depend on them. We urge Congress to pass it to ensure a clean, thriving ocean for generations to come,” said Vipe Desai, Executive Director, Surf Industry Members Association

    “This administration is determined to sell off our oceans to pad Big Oil pockets. Permanently protecting the waters off southern California puts coastal communities and wildlife above polluters and brings us closer to a world where our waters are free from oil spills, endangered whale populations are free from seismic blasting, and ecosystems have a chance to thrive,” said Taryn Kiekow Heimer, Director of Ocean Energy at NRDC (Natural Resources Defense Council).  “Now more than ever, we need leadership from Congress to set us back on track to tackle climate change and protect our ocean from an industry that only cares about its bottom line.”

    This legislation is endorsed by organizations including: Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), Earthjustice, Oceana, Sierra Club, Surfrider Foundation, League of Conservation Voters, Futureswell, Ocean Conservancy, Environment America, WILDCOAST, Surf Industry Members Association, Food & Water Watch, Peace Boat US, Defenders of Wildlife, Ocean Defense Initiative, Center for Biological Diversity, The Ocean Project, Business Alliance to Protect the Pacific Coast, Animal Welfare Institute, U.S. Climate Action Network, American Bird Conservancy, Hispanic Access Foundation

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    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: State’s Outdoor Recreation and Conservation Leaders Announce Launch of Colorado’s Outdoors Strategy

    Source: US State of Colorado

    Collaborative vision for conservation, outdoor recreation, and climate resilience ensures an enduring future for generations to come

    COLORADO SPRINGS – Colorado Governor Jared Polis and coordinating partners from several state conservation, outdoor recreation, and climate resilience departments and programs, announced today the launch of Colorado’s Outdoors Strategy, a statewide vision and framework for action that ensures a future where Colorado’s outdoors, people, community character, and ways of life endure for generations to come. The Strategy was unveiled at the Partners in the Outdoors Conference in Colorado Springs. Coordinating partners involved in the Strategy development and rollout included Colorado Parks and Wildlife, Great Outdoors Colorado (GOCO), Colorado Department of Natural Resources, the Colorado Outdoor Recreation Industry Office, and the Governor’s Office of Climate Preparedness & Disaster Recovery.

    Colorado’s Outdoors Strategy, one of the first of its kind in the United States, is the state’s conservation, outdoor recreation, and climate resilience strategy. It advances coordination, tools, and funding to align, prioritize, and implement strategic actions on the landscape for conservation, outdoor recreation, and climate resilience.  

    “Coloradans and our visitors love our great outdoors, and the outdoors are essential to what makes our state special,” said Governor Polis. “The health of our wildlife, biodiversity, people, communities, agriculture, and economies depends on thriving natural environments and amazing outdoor recreation experiences that our state provides. But our wild areas face significant and urgent pressures from growing populations, human disturbance, climate change, wildfires, and drought – and we are at an important crossroads. Our Strategy provides structure and important tools to help communities effectively and successfully plan and implement for the future.”

    Outdoor spaces are vital to residents, with 96% engaging in outdoor activities at least annually and 90 million visitors exploring the state in 2022. With more than 960 wildlife species and a population expected to grow from 5.5 million to 8.5 million by 2050, the Strategy supports Colorado’s efforts to celebrate and balance both conservation and recreation.  Colorado’s Outdoors Strategy has three goals:

    1. Climate-Resilient Conservation and Restoration: Conservation and restoration of lands and waters help wildlife and biodiversity thrive; habitats are resilient and connected; communities benefit from healthy ecosystems and agricultural lands.
    2. Exceptional and Sustainable Outdoor Recreation: A diversity of high-quality outdoor experiences are accessible, equitable, and inclusive; management and stewardship enhance benefits for and minimize impacts to people, landscapes, and communities.
    3. Coordinated Planning and Funding: Planning and implementation are interdisciplinary; supported by robust funding and capacity; inclusive of diverse perspectives and communities; and drive meaningful action for the outdoors.

    “The Strategy supports all who love the outdoors in working together to achieve climate-resilient conservation and restoration coupled with exceptional and sustainable outdoor recreation,” said Jeff Davis, Director, Colorado Parks and Wildlife. “Everyone can use the Strategy’s vision and goals as ‘North Stars’ to champion Colorado’s outdoors and coordinate efforts to achieve key outcomes for the state. The success of Colorado’s Outdoors Strategy hinges on partnerships to work together toward common goals and solutions.”  

    The Strategy comes to life through 9 objectives and 33 coordinating partner actions, along with a Resource Hub, offering free online data, mapping tools, and other resources to support conservation, outdoor recreation, and climate resilience planning. Available to public and private partners, the hub streamlines collaboration and enhances planning efforts for the outdoors. It currently provides:  

    • An interactive data dashboard with state and county scale information, data, and links for conservation, outdoor recreation, and climate resilience.  
    • An interactive plan library that is searchable for federal, regional, state, and county scale conservation, outdoor recreation, and climate resilience plans in Colorado.
    • Planning resources and guidance for conservation, outdoor recreation, and climate resilience.  
    • A statewide Guidance Framework for Tribal Collaboration in Conservation, Outdoor Recreation, and Climate Resilience.  
    • An interactive Equity, Diversity, and Inclusion Resource and Action Guide that is searchable by topic area.  
    • Colorado’s Conservation Data Explorer (CODEX) and StoryMap with conservation, outdoor recreation, and climate resilience mapping tools.  

    Coordinating partners worked to develop the Strategy and Resource Hub over the past year. Other key partners contributed to the effort including state, federal, and local governments; Tribal Nations; private and agricultural land/water rights owners and managers; local communities; Colorado Regional Partnerships Initiative; Colorado Outdoor Partnership; and diverse private and public sector partners in conservation, restoration, outdoor recreation, stewardship, climate resilience, and equity, diversity, and inclusion.  

    “Colorado’s Outdoors Strategy is a bold, collaborative vision for the future of our state’s great outdoors. With leadership from the Department of Natural Resources, Great Outdoors Colorado, Colorado Parks and Wildlife, the Outdoor Recreation Office, and the Governor’s office, we’ve developed an innovative framework that will guide how we protect and steward Colorado’s landscapes — making them more climate-resilient, while also ensuring exceptional recreational opportunities are accessible to all. Our outdoors are more than just playgrounds — they are the heart of our Colorado way of life. But they’re under pressure — from population growth, increasing visitation, climate change, wildfires, and drought. To help tackle these challenges, we’ve spent the last few years listening — to communities, to experts, to everyday Coloradans — and crafting a strategy that reflects our shared commitment to protecting what makes this state so special. We’re proud of the work that’s been done, and even more excited about what comes next,” said Dan Gibbs, Executive Director, Colorado Department of Natural Resources.

    “As Colorado’s significant outdoor industry continues to grow, the Colorado Outdoor Strategy offers a vital roadmap for balancing economic opportunity with environmental stewardship and conservation. It empowers communities, businesses, and land managers to work together in building a future where our landscapes are resilient, recreation is sustainable, and access is equitable. This strategy reflects our shared belief that the outdoors are central to Colorado’s identity, economy, and way of life—and that we all have a role in protecting them,” said Conor Hall, Director, Colorado Outdoor Recreation Industry Office.

    “Colorado’s Outdoors Strategy boosts Colorado’s technical chops, partner collaboration and funding menu to answer the question; how do we ensure our wild places, wildlife and wild opportunities thrive even while accounting for a changing climate and growing state. The Office of Climate Preparedness is proud to see this multi-year effort launch, advancing Colorado’s preparedness for a climate impacted future, building a state of the art technical foundation, on which state, local and federal partnerships can work together to realize a flourishing future for Colorado’s outdoors,” said Jonathan Asher, Director, Governor’s Office of Climate Preparedness & Disaster Recovery.

    “Colorado’s outdoor champions are showing their strength. The strategy is a testament to the power of partnership. United by a shared vision and leveraging the best available research, data, and resources, we are equipped to make decisions that will protect Colorado’s landscapes, foster vibrant communities, and improve Coloradans’ quality of life for years to come,” said GOCO’s Executive Director Jackie Miller. “We’ve accomplished so much already, and we’re just getting started.”  

    “The Nature Conservancy in Colorado is proud to have offered our science, insights, and expertise to help develop Colorado’s Outdoors Strategy. We are excited to be part of this historic milestone for conservation, outdoor recreation, and climate resilience, and we believe it will have far-reaching and meaningful impacts to benefit our lands, waters, recreation, and economy. Efforts like Colorado’s Outdoors Strategy show that we can work together to find solutions that benefit people and nature,” said Carlos Fernández, Colorado State Director, The Nature Conservancy.

    “The Strategy’s Guidance Framework for Tribal Collaboration offers a much-needed approach to ensuring that Tribes are actively involved in decision-making processes, and we appreciate the opportunity to contribute our expertise and traditional knowledge to help shape the direction of this work. By supporting this framework, our focus is to enhance Tribal participation in land and water management decisions, protect sacred lands, and preserve ecosystems that are vital to the health and well-being of our communities,” said Chairman Melvin J. Baker of the Southern Ute Indian Tribe.

    “To plan for recreation and conservation as separate pursuits would be like planting two halves of a tree on opposite sides of the forest — they will grow at the same time, but they will never form the same canopy. The health of the land requires harmony, not division. The Colorado Outdoor Strategy offers a way to manage the needs of wildlife and the wanderings of people in concert,” said Patt Dorsey, West Region Director of Conservation Operations, National Wild Turkey Federation.

    “Colorado’s Outdoors Strategy is a voluntary collaborative partnership for agriculture, conservation and recreation possibilities, whilst safeguarding Agriculture integrity and productivity,” said Tony Hass, Las Animas County Commissioner and Manager, Walking Y Ranch.

    “I am immensely grateful to have been chosen as a member of the Colorado Outdoors Strategy Steering Committee. The Strategy has the potential of memorializing a comprehensive approach to the symbiotic relationship between recreation and conservation that exists in Colorado and fairly makes this state a mecca for high quality experiences,” said Janelle Kukuk, Former State Trails Member, snowmobile at-large.

    “Colorado’s Outdoors Strategy represents years of hard work by countless communities, organizations and individuals, but more importantly it represents a collective commitment to look forward in a proactive and inclusive manner to avoid the mistakes of our past. Our ability to address the challenges of climate change, wildlife habitat loss and fragmentation, and fostering equitable and inclusive outdoor recreation opportunities requires collaboration from all stakeholders and Colorado’s Outdoors Strategy provides the framework for our local Regional Partnership Initiatives to envision what they want their communities to invest in for the future, a future that all Coloradans now have a stake in because of the Strategy,” said Luke Shafer, West Slope Director, Conservation Colorado.

    “Envision is excited to see Colorado’s Outdoors Strategy launch. Since 2016, Envision has been listening to residents and visitors and taking action with community and agency partners to sustain the healthy forests, waters, wildlife, working agricultural landscapes and exceptional outdoor recreation that make Chaffee County and Colorado such a special place to live and to visit. The Strategy offers a statewide framework to connect and empower grassroots efforts and organizations like ours to do more to protect the Colorado we love together,” said Cindy Williams, Chair, Envision Chaffee County.

    “Strategic approaches have been the cornerstone for much of the success around land conservation and outdoor recreation state-wide. Colorado’s Outdoors Strategy represents a cohesive and forward thinking approach to how we continue to balance the conservation of key landscapes that characterize the beauty and sustainability of our state while at the same time providing for meaningful outdoor experiences,” said Daylan Figgs, Director, Larimer County Natural Resources.

    “Colorado’s Outdoors Strategy cohesively aligns with Larimer County’s vision for the future by outlining a pathway to conserve its vibrant natural resources and valuable outdoor experiences. It is clear the challenges we face as a state are not unique to any one of us alone. The Strategy guides our future as partners in solving issues collectively, strengthening our resiliency as we face the future,” said Jody Shadduck-McNally, Larimer County Commissioner.

    “COS is a transformative path to a future where Colorado’s nature, people, and ways of life endure and thrive. The Colorado Natural Heritage Program is proud to have been a partner on the project team, helping to build a legacy of planning tools to inform decision-making in climate-resilient conservation, exceptional and sustainable outdoor recreation, and coordinated planning and funding. We are thrilled to host the map layers from COS on Colorado’s Conservation Data Explorer (CODEX), a collaborative space where all Coloradans can explore these tools and use them to drive sustainable investment in Colorado’s future. CNHP will use COS tools across our program, including our five-year Statewide Natural Heritage Survey, in which we are leveling up Colorado’s conservation data in the service of the COS, the Regional Partnership Initiative, and all of Colorado’s communities,” said David Anderson, Director and Chief Scientist, Colorado Natural Heritage Program, Colorado State University.

    “The love of the outdoors brings Coloradoans together. The COS is a voluntary partnership and tool that will help communities and regions celebrate and enhance access to Colorado’s innate natural beauty,” said Kelly Flenniken, Executive Director, Colorado Counties, Inc.

    “I am thrilled to see the release of Colorado’s Outdoors Strategy after years working with stakeholders from around the state to address community needs and find a balance between conservation and outdoor recreation. BLM depends on partnerships with the state and local communities to meet the needs of the over 10 million visitors each year to BLM public lands, which generate over $1.5 billion in economic impact each year. This new strategy continues Colorado’s leadership in fostering collaboration between hunters, anglers, boaters, climbers, equestrians, mountain bikers, OHVers, and so many more partners, to steward our incredible public lands,” said Doug Vilsack, Colorado State Director, Bureau of Land Management.

    “Colorado has thousands of miles of incredible rivers that hundreds of thousands of residents and visitors flock to every year. American Whitewater is very excited about the direction and guidance Colorado’s Outdoors Strategy will provide. This effort is sure to protect our incredible recreational resources and vital ecosystems for many future generations,” said Hattie Johnson, Southern Rockies Restoration Director, American Whitewater.

    “COS provides navigational guidance and robust tools to integrate wildlife conservation needs and outdoor recreation desires,” said Suzanne O’Neill, Colorado Wildlife Federation.

    “Colorado’s Outdoors Strategy was born to help Coloradans enjoy robust wildlife populations, awe-inspiring landscapes, fulfilling recreational opportunities, and strong economies. But this future is only possible through informed planning followed by strategic action that avoids, minimizes, and mitigates adverse impacts to important habitats. Colorado’s Outdoors Strategy helps pave the way for community-developed, interdisciplinary plans that simultaneously conserve our wildlife and wild places and support sustainable recreation for all people,” Liz Rose, Colorado Program Manager, Theodore Roosevelt Conservation Partnership.

    “We at the Pikes Peak Outdoor Recreation Alliance are excited to see the launch of Colorado’s Outdoors Strategy for so many reasons. Among them, in our own partnerships, we’ve been able to utilize the data collection and resources that will now be available to us across the state. We leveraged the Strategy’s statewide conservation summary data and worked with local expertise to build a Pikes Peak Region conservation summary, which will inform planning and decision making moving forward. The Strategy’s north star goals support exceptional recreation and exceptional conservation of our natural resources. Our regional partnership’s advancement of a new land management partnership on Pikes Peak – America’s Mountain will support the Strategy, and we look forward to seeing it develop,” said Becky Leinweber, Executive Director, PPORA leading Outdoor Pikes Peak Initiative.

    Moving forward, Colorado Parks and Wildlife will steward Colorado’s Outdoors Strategy by coordinating collaborative leadership and implementation with GOCO, the Department of Natural Resources, Outdoor Recreation Industry Office, and the Governor’s Office, along with other agencies and partners.

    For more information, or to access Colorado’s Outdoors Strategy Resource Hub, visit the website.

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    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Oregon State Treasury Completes Total Of $1.48 Billion In Bond Sales Despite Historic Market Instability

    Source: US State of Oregon

    ast week, the Oregon State Treasury successfully completed two major bond sales through its Buy Oregon Bonds Program, providing nearly $1.5 billion for statewide projects and programs, including affordable housing, educational facility improvements, pollution control, and agricultural grant programs.

    “Oregon bonds continue to attract strong investor demand, offering a solid investment opportunity even amid ongoing volatility in national financial markets driven by federal policy shifts and tariff-related challenges,” said Oregon State Treasurer Elizabeth Steiner, MD. “The strong performance and investor response to these offerings demonstrates Oregon’s fiscal resilience and Treasury’s thoughtful stewardship of the state’s debt.”

    Amid historic market instability not seen since the COVID-19 pandemic, Treasury’s Debt Management team worked closely with financial partners to monitor conditions and time the sales for optimal results. This diligent work, combined with the state’s strong credit ratings, contributed to the oversubscription of both sales and secured low-cost financing, saving Oregon millions of dollars.

    The first sale, a $925 million General Obligation Bond issuance, featured 3rd-party verified Sustainability Bonds and lower denomination offerings to broaden investor participation. Proceeds from this sale will fund approximately 20 projects and programs across 12 state agencies, including affordable housing, pollution control, and capital improvements to the State Capitol, K-12 schools, public universities, and other state facilities.

    The sale’s Sustainability Bonds component, totaling $301 million, will support Oregon’s Permanent Supportive Housing and Local Innovation and Fast Track Housing Programs. Kestrel, an approved verifier accredited by the Climate Bonds Initiative, awarded the accreditation following an independent external review, in which they determined the projects and associated Series B Bonds would address housing needs in Oregon, meet green building requirements, and advance Oregon’s goal of reducing statewide energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions.

    Later in the week, Treasury took advantage of another favorable market window to issue $555 million in Lottery Revenue Bonds. These proceeds will support approximately 34 projects and programs from nine (9) state agencies. Fund projects include city and community college capital improvements, such as the construction of a new ballpark for the Hillsboro Hops minor league baseball team and renovations to the Center for Native Arts And Cultures, as well as seismic improvements to transportation infrastructure and statewide programs like the agricultural irrigation modernization grants program.

    The sale also included a $250 million refunding of existing state debt component to reduce debt service costs and increase capacity for future infrastructure investments. The refunding is projected to yield approximately $11.2 million in present value savings.

    “The proceeds from these bond sales will support vital projects that improve the quality of life for Oregonians, invest in our schools, expand affordable housing, and strengthen our state’s infrastructure,” said Treasurer Steiner. “These investments reflect Oregon’s commitment to developing resilient communities and promoting the well-being of Oregonians.”

    For more information about the Buy Oregon Bonds Program and upcoming bond offerings visit: www.BuyOregonBonds.com

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Video: Climate, Gaza & other topics – Daily Press Briefing | United Nations

    Source: United Nations (Video News)

    Noon Briefing by Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesperson for the Secretary-General.

    Highlights:

    – Climate
    – Deputy Secretary-General
    – Occupied Palestinian Territory
    – Yemen
    – Sudan
    – Sudan/Humanitarian
    – Democratic Republic of the Congo
    – Democratic Republic of the Congo/Peacekeeping
    – Somalia
    – Ukraine
    – Kashmir
    – International Days
    – Briefings Tomorrow

    CLIMATE
    This morning, the Secretary-General and President Lula of Brazil convened a virtual leaders’ session on climate and just transition.
    After the meeting he spoke to some of you and said that he heard a unifying message: our world faces massive headwinds and a multitude of crises, but we cannot allow climate commitments to be blown off course.
    The Secretary-General added that we must keep building momentum for action at COP30 in Brazil— and that today was an important part of that effort.
    The Secretary-General also said that renewables are the economic opportunity of the century. Dissenters and fossil fuel interests may try to stand in the way, but the world is moving forward – full speed ahead.
    The Secretary-General urged leaders to take action on two fronts: first — to step up efforts to submit the strongest possible national climate plans well ahead of COP30.
    And second, to scale-up support for developing countries.

    DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL
    The Deputy Secretary-General, Amina Mohammed, is travelling to Washington, D.C. this afternoon, to attend the World Bank/International Monetary Fund Annual Spring Meetings and engage in discussions with key stakeholders and government officials.
    Ms. Mohammed will participate in a ministerial roundtable to discuss the upcoming fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD4) and priority actions to support the Sustainable Development Goals. She will separately meet with Finance Ministers, leaders of International Financial Institutions and Multilateral Development Banks to discuss the challenging global economic context, its implications for sustainable development, and how to mitigate the risks for the world’s poorest countries.
    The Deputy Secretary-General will return to New York tomorrow evening. 

    Full Highlights: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/noon-briefing-highlight?date%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=23%20April%202025

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=31B80i3kYCM

    MIL OSI Video

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section VII – Committee of the Regions – A10-0046/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    2. MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    with observations forming an integral part of the decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section VII – Committee of the Regions

    (2024/2026(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section VII – Committee of the Regions,

     having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0046/2025),

    A. whereas in the context of the discharge procedure, the discharge authority wishes to stress the particular importance of further strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the Union institutions by improving transparency and accountability, and implementing the concept of performance-based budgeting and good governance of human resources;

    B. whereas the Committee of the Regions (the ‘Committee’) is a political assembly of 329 members elected in the regions, cities, villages and municipalities of the 27 Member States of the Union, operating as a consultative body for the Union institutions, with the mission of contributing to the Union policy shaping and decision making process from the point of view of the local and regional authorities, and at the same time contributing to make the Union more effective and closer to the citizens;

    C. whereas the consultation of the Committee by the Commission or the Council is mandatory in certain cases, while the Committee may also adopt opinions on its own initiative and enjoys a wide area for referral, as set out in the Treaties, allowing it to be consulted by Parliament;

    D. whereas the Committee’s activities are defined on the basis of its overall political strategy as set out in its resolution of 2 July 2020 on its priorities for 2020-2025[7], and whereas the Committee adopted three political priorities for the 2020-2025 mandate, accompanied by three communication campaigns: Bringing Europe closer to people, Building resilient regional and local communities, and Promoting cohesion as a fundamental value of the EU;

    E. whereas the local and regional administrations account for one third of public spending, half of public investment and one fourth of tax revenues and, in many Member States, hold competencies in key areas such as education, economic development and cohesion, environment, social protection, health and services of general interest, hence the coordination of local, regional, national and European levels increases the legitimacy of the legislation, improves ownership and pursues more effectively the benefit of citizens;

    F. whereas the Committee pursues its political goal to strengthen its involvement in the entire Union political and legislative cycle while making more tangible the connection with Union citizens using the Committee’s members as powerful multipliers in their communities and in their national associations of local and regional authorities;

    G. whereas the Committee identified eleven key priority areas to make its action more strategic and impactful in 2023: (1) Follow-up to the Conference on the Future of Europe, Active Subsidiarity and Better Regulation; (2) Ukraine and Enlargement; (3) Energy and climate crisis; (4) Environment; (5) Cohesion Policy – Ramping up Cohesion policy implementation and shaping its future for the post-2027 period; (6) Multi-annual Financial Framework; (7) Economic governance for a fair and sustainable Europe; (8) European Year of Skills 2023; (9) Partnership for Regional Innovation and the promotion of territorial missions; (10) Civil protection; (11) Food security;

    H. whereas Regulation (EU) 2021/1060[8], governing Union cohesion policy and funding between 2021 and 2027, that entered into force in July 2021, encompasses references to the partnership and multilevel governance principle, supported by the Committee and Parliament and entailing the involvement of regions and their local and regional authorities; strongly supports the strengthening of Union investments linked to regional and local resilience in the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF);

    I. whereas the over 400 national and regional programmes in place for the delivery of Union cohesion policy in the 2021-2027 programming period will make available around EUR 380 billion, under different funds, to tackle the economic, social and environmental challenges that Union regions, cities, villages and municipalities are facing;

    J. whereas, on 19 February 2021, Regulation (EU) 2021/241[9], establishing the Union’s Recovery and Resilience Facility, entered into force, providing the legal basis for distributing funds and loans of up to EUR 672,5 billion (in 2018 prices) to the Member States between 2021 and 2026 and also aiming to support economic, social and territorial cohesion and to address disparities between the regions of the Union;

    K. whereas, as a Union institution within the meaning of the Financial Regulation, the Committee is required to adopt its own annual accounts, prepared in accordance with the accounting rules adopted by the Commission’s accounting officer (European Union Accounting Rules) and based on the International Public Sector Accounting Standards, which are ultimately consolidated into those of the Union;

    1. Notes that the budget of the Committee falls under MFF Heading 7 ‘European public administration’ (‘Heading 7’), which amounted to a total of EUR 12,3 billion, i.e., 6,4 % of Union budget spending, in 2023; notes that, in 2023, the budget of the Committee represented 0,95 % of MFF Heading 7 appropriations;

    2. Notes that the Court of Auditors (the ‘Court’), in its annual report (the ‘Court’s report’) for the financial year 2023, examined a sample of 70 transactions under Heading 7, of which 21 (30 %) contained errors; further notes that for five of those errors, which were quantified by the Court, the Court estimated a level of error below the materiality threshold;

    3. Notes from the Court’s report its observation that administrative expenditure comprises expenditure on human resources including pensions, which in 2023 accounted for about 70 % of the total administrative expenditure, and expenditure on buildings, equipment, energy, communications and information technology; welcomes the Court’s renewed opinion that, overall, administrative spending is low risk;

    4. Notes with regret from the Court’s report its opinion regarding a transaction made by the Committee in 2023, whereby the 10-year duration of a building maintenance contract was not sufficiently justified;

    Budgetary and financial management

    5. Notes from the Committee’s annual activity report for 2023  that the final adopted budget of the Committee was EUR 116 675 392 in 2023, including the Amending Budget 4/2023 (salary and energy related), representing an increase of EUR 6 698 534 (i.e., +6,10 %) compared to 2022; notes with satisfaction that the rate of the Committee’s budget implementation of current year commitment appropriations increased from 99,20 % in 2022 to 99,9 % in 2023, and the current year payment appropriations execution rate increased from 88 % in 2022 to 91,20 % in 2023; welcomes further an increase in the execution rate of C8 appropriations from 81,60 % in 2022 to 85 % in 2023; considers that these high execution rates are on the one hand a sign of good budgetary and financial management by the Committee, on the account of strengthened budget execution monitoring, timely budget forecasting and reallocation of resources to address unforeseen events, but on the other hand could also be a sign that the Committee needs additional resources; calls on the Commission and the budgetary authority to take this into account in the framework of the budgetary procedure;

    6. Notes that in the course of 2023, the Committee implemented 31 transfers for a total of EUR 2,84 million, of which 25 internal transfers for a total of EUR 0,98 million and six external transfers for a total of EUR 1,86 million, of which approximately EUR 0,8 million transferred to budget lines covering contracts impacted by high inflation/indexation; notes that impact of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine continued to create budgetary pressure for the Committee in 2023; notes in this context that the Committee was most affected by the high inflation rate, directly or indirectly, in areas such as travel costs (missions), energy, rents and lease of buildings, maintenance contracts, construction projects and paper and offset plates;

    7. Notes an increase by approximately 20 % of payments made for the members of the Committee, from EUR 6 573 307 in 2022 to EUR 7 955 968 in 2023, with payments made for travel expenses (8 119 payments), travel allowances (4 449 payments), meeting allowances for in-person participation (7 845 payments) and remote participation (152 payments);

    8. Notes that the mission’s budget (current year appropriations) remained stable, with EUR 420 833 in 2023 (compared to EUR 419 657 in 2022) and execution rate of approximately 80 % in 2023 (similar to 2022); notes that, despite an increase in the average cost of accommodation and travel costs, the Committee’s missions budget remained stable due to a reduction of 13 % in the number of missions carried out in 2023 compared to 2022; welcomes that the allowance for the Committee’s Presidency (President and First Vice-President) for travel and meeting expenses, financed from the general budget for members’ expenses, decreased from EUR 71 810 to EUR 62 268, representing a 13 % reduction between 2022 and 2023; encourages the Committee to further rationalize and reduce expenditure in this area, ensuring optimal allocation of resources in line with the principles of sound financial management;

    9. Observes with concern an increase in the current year appropriations for interpreting services of approximately 19 %, from EUR 3,494 million in 2022 to EUR 4,167 million in 2022; asks the Committee to explain the reasons for that increase, given the fact that at the same time the Committee has reported savings in connection with the use of remote interpretation in 2023;

    10. Notes that until 23 July 2023, the flat-rate remote meeting allowance paid by the Committee to its members, their alternates, as well as to rapporteurs’ experts and speakers invited to attend remote or hybrid meetings was EUR 200; notes further that on that date, new rules on the matter entered into force setting the flat-rate remote meeting allowance at 50 % of the regular meeting allowance, with the latter being EUR 359 and the former EUR 179,50; notes in this context a significant decrease in the total amount paid for remote meeting allowances from EUR 1 742 000 in 2021 and EUR 489 600 in 2022 to EUR 32 632 in 2023, while the overall expenditure linked to budget line 1004 (‘Travel and subsistence allowances, attendance at meetings and associated expenditure’) has increased considerably from approximately EUR 6,6 million in 2022 to approximately EUR 8 million in 2023, mainly due to a strong return to in-person meetings in 2023 and the increase in the travel related prices in the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic;

    11. Expresses concern over the significant increase in travel and meeting allowances paid to Committee members, rising from EUR 6,6 million in 2022 to EUR 8 million in 2023; calls on the Committee to adopt a clear cost-efficiency strategy for travel expenditures, including greater use of remote participation and hybrid meetings to reduce unnecessary costs and emissions while maintaining political engagement;

    12. Regrets that the average time for payment increased from 17,87 days in 2022 to 21,88 days in 2023; understands nevertheless that that increase is the result of the fact that in 2023 the Committee processed and paid a record number of invoices, i.e., 5 723 compared to 4 260 in 2022; notes in this context that the share of commercial invoices received electronically by the Committee has increased from 68 % in 2022 to 76 % in 2023 and continued to increase in 2024;

    Internal management, performance and internal control

    13. Acknowledges that the Committee plays a fundamental role in contributing to the Union’s policy development and decision-making processes by representing the interests of local and regional authorities within the Union; notes that for 2023, as part of its annual operational plan, the reporting of the performance of the Committee was based on 25 objectives, the achievement of which was assessed through 80 quantitative indicators, whereas the targets of the majority of those indicators (approximately 75 %) was achieved with a level of 90 % or more;

    14. Recalls that the Committee contributes to the Union policy and decision making process from the perspective of the regional and local authorities within the Union and provides a framework to enhance cooperation between the local, regional, national and European levels and to bring Europe closer to its citizens; regrets that budget limitations have impaired the Committee’s ability to fully deliver on its objective of bringing citizens closer to the Union, limiting the Committee’s added value;

    15. Considering the important role of the Committee in increasing the democratic legitimacy of Union legislation by providing an active coordination of regional and local authorities, supports the Committee in its effort to provide more territorial impact assessments (TIA), also in line with the Conference on the Future of Europe final report and recommendations;

    16. Commends the Committee for its political achievements in its key priority areas in 2023; notes that the Committee pursues its mission through opinions, which refer to legislative proposals made by the Commission (referrals), own-initiative opinions, which call on the Union institutions to take action, and through resolutions, which highlight the Committee’s positions on specific topics; notes that, in 2023, the Committee adopted 53 opinions and 6 resolutions, a decrease from 55 opinions and 8 resolutions adopted in 2022 despite the increase in appropriations and staff; encourages the Committee to continue to work on the performance improvement as well as effectiveness improvement; welcomes the Committee’s efforts to introduce reformative and innovative solutions, streamline the administration and avoid overlapping roles with other bodies;

    17. Appreciates that in 2023 the Committee continued implementing measures to modernise its administration and enhance cost-effectiveness in the context of the ‘Going for IMPact’ programme; notes in this context the progress made with regard to digitalisation and workflow optimisation, the modernisation of the Committee’s planning and reporting instruments, the creation of a central meeting service, and the enhancement of cooperation with other institutions or bodies (e.g., the European Economic and Social Committee (‘EESC’), Commission, Parliament, Office for Infrastructure and Logistics), among others; commends the Committee for having implemented almost 90 % of the simplification projects launched in 2021, in the areas of administrative processes, written procedures and (internal) legal documents;

    18. Notes with satisfaction from the Committee’s replies to the questionnaire submitted by the Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control for the 2023 budgetary discharge (the ‘Questionnaire’) that, thanks to the ‘Going for IMPact’ programme, the Committee has managed in 2023 to align its objectives to the available resources which were under pressure as a result of the inflationary effects of the war in Ukraine; commends in particular the progress made by the Committee in implementing ‘Project Convergence’ (a SharePoint-based tool for planning, reporting, risk assessment, and business continuity) and the new business continuity policy;

    19. Acknowledges the impact of the Committee’s work, in particular its opinions, some which were reflected in resolutions, positions, proposals, reports, reviews, conclusions or trilogues of the Commission, Parliament or the Council in 2023; invites the Committee to continue on the path of providing useful and relevant input, such as data from the ground and analysis, to Union institutions and other beneficiaries of Union policies; welcomes the Committee’s strengthened involvement along the whole political and legislative cycle of the Union through cooperation agreements and action plans with the Commission, Parliament and the European Investment Bank; considers that members of the Committee and of the EESC should be invited to relevant parliamentary meetings on matters within their remit; notes that, in 2023, Committee members also met the Council and Permanent Representations and participated in the events organised by the Council’s Presidency, in order to ensure that the Committee’s positions are reflected in the Union’s legislation; congratulates the Committee for strengthening its involvement in legislative trilogues, notably by being granted access, for the first time, to trilogue documents in 2023;

    20. Calls on the Committee to ensure stronger involvement of regional and local governments in Union decision-making by creating structured consultation mechanisms with regional and local authorities, including parliaments, municipalities, and local civil society organizations before issuing opinions; urges the Committee to advocate for a mandatory consultation process on legislative matters that significantly impact regional development and cohesion policy;

    21. Notes with regard to its new internal control framework, that the Committee implemented a new methodology on ex post controls as of 2023, aiming to simplify and align the approach to the practice of the other Union institutions, with the ex post controls now being centralised instead of the prior decentralised practice; notes that, in 2023, ex post controls focused on the basic salary and the time worked, with 55 files having been verified, and that the statistical estimate of the error affecting the reference population was 0 %; notes further that in 2023 the Committee renewed its compliance and effectiveness exercise to assess the extent of the Committee’s compliance with certain internal control standards and the effectiveness of their implementation; commends the Committee for reporting an improvement in this matter compared to the results of the 2022 exercise; encourages the Committee to continue its efforts to further step up the level of compliance and the degree of effectiveness of the internal control measures in place; notes with satisfaction, as regards the new sensitive posts policy, that in 2023 the Committee ran a screening exercise to identify the level of risk of each post and, thus, the sensitivity level thereof, as well as the necessary measures to mitigate those risks;

    22. Notes that the Committee launched in 2023 two new audits: one on the compliance of various functions (e.g., risk management, planning, control system) with the relevant data protection legislation and another one on the performance of the IT organisation in Joint Services (the Committee and the EESC’s new joint Directorate for Innovation and IT); notes that for each of those audits: 11 recommendations were issued and seven recommendations were considered very important; notes further that following the audit on management of the vacant posts launched in 2022, 10 recommendations were issued, three of which were very important; calls on the Committee to implement all pending recommendations as soon as possible and keep the discharge authority informed of progress in this matter;

    Human resources, equality and staff well-being

    23. Notes that, at the end of 2023, the Committee had a total of 559 members of staff (seconded national experts, interim, intra muros and trainees not included), compared to 533 in 2022; notes that 74 contract agents, compared to 56 contract agents in 2022 and 96 temporary agents, compared to 89 temporary agents in 2022, were employed by the Committee at the end of 2023, out of which 21 contract agents had an open-ended contract, 53 contract agents had a time-limited contract, 53 temporary agents were on permanent posts with time-limited contract, 50 temporary agents had an open-ended contract and 3 temporary agents held a temporary position (in two cases with an indefinite contract and, in the case of the Secretary-General, for a fixed duration of five years); notes, in addition, that the Committee employed 5 interim agents and 12 external members of staff working on-site, excluding external service providers in the fields of logistics and IT; hopes that the increase in staff has its reasonable justification; notes that in 2023 the occupation rate of the posts in the establishment plan was 98 % (an increase from 96 % in 2022) and the turnover rate was 6,6 % (a decrease from 10,80 % in 2022), respectively;

    24. Observes an increased reliance of the Committee on contract agents and temporary agents (representing up to 26 % of the Committee’s staff); notes from the Questionnaire that said reliance is due in particular to the absence of EPSO reserve lists for generalist administrator profiles since 2018; is worried that the Committee’s long-term stability and business continuity are threatened by the absence of attractiveness of the time-limited contracts offered; underlines the importance of permanent staff in maintaining skills, continuity and productive working environment; notes that the Committee organised an internal competition for generalists across five grades (AST/SC1, AST1, AST3, AD5, and AD7) in 2024; supports the Committee in its endeavours to respond to those challenges; asks the Committee to report to the discharge authority on such competitions organised in 2024;

    25. Notes that, at the end of 2023, the Committee employed 56,9 % women and 43,1 % men; regrets that the Committee has not yet achieved gender parity in leadership positions, but acknowledges the significant progress made under the Committee’s five-year diversity and inclusion strategy and action plan for 2022-2026, including a marked increase in the proportion of women in senior management positions from 37,5 % in 2022 to 44,4 % in 2023; recommends measures to enhance inclusivity in vacancy notices and to encourage greater female participation in senior and middle management roles, including through gender balance targets, balanced representation on selection boards, targeted training opportunities for female staff aspiring to managerial positions, and the promotion of more flexible working arrangements; encourages the Committee to continue its efforts for achieving gender balance and requires, in this context, Member States to nominate both a male and a female candidate for appointments for Committee membership to improve representation at all levels;

    26. Notes that, as a result of a pilot project on a hybrid working regime and a staff satisfaction survey launched in 2022, the Committee adopted on 1 January 2024 a decision which provides for a hybrid working regime and a personalised weekly working schedule for each staff, as well as the possibility to work from home for up to 60 % of staff’s working time (except for staff categories incompatible with telework) and work from outside the city of employment for up to 15 days per year; recognises that these measures aim to enhance work-life balance while maintaining operational efficiency and staff satisfaction;

    27. Notes with satisfaction that the Committee’s hybrid working regime has had a positive impact with regard to short-term sick leave, whereas: – the number of staff without sick leave increased from 71 (or 12 % of all staff) in 2018 to 211 (or 36 % of all staff) in 2023; – the number of staff on sick leave for less than seven days decreased from 257 (or 46 % of all staff) in 2018 to 201 (or 35 % of all staff) in 2023 and; – the number of staff on sick leave for a duration between 7,5 and 21 days decreased from 140 (or 25 % of all staff) in 2018 to 92 (or 16 % of all staff) in 2023; invites the Committee to monitor the impact of the new working regime and keep this topic in upcoming staff satisfaction surveys; notes with satisfaction that 90,25 % (82 % in the case of managers) of those that responded to the staff survey of December 2022 indicated their satisfaction with the flexible arrangements;

    28. Notes with concern that 18 cases of burnout were reported in the Committee in 2023, representing an increase from 16 cases in 2022; underlines the significant social and professional impact of burnout on staff well-being and performance; notes further that the Committee managed to reintegrate 16 members of staff in 2023 after long-term absence as a result of burnout, thanks to a personalised follow-up of long-term sickness leave; welcomes the preventive actions taken by the Committee to reduce psychosocial risks and burnout; appreciates in this regard the proactive approach of the medical service and the awareness-raising conferences, trainings and courses organised by the Committee; stresses, however, the need for further strengthening of efforts to address the root causes of burnout and to foster a healthier work environment;

    29. Notes that in 2023 the Committee continued to raise awareness of the measures put in place to prevent and combat harassment in the workplace, in accordance with its Decision of 26 April 2021 on protecting dignity at work, managing conflict and combatting harassment, notably through dedicated guidance, internal communication and the organisation of several information sessions for staff and managers; welcomes in particular the organisation of five training sessions on ‘Preventing psychological and sexual harassment’ and ‘Respect and Dignity for a high-performing team’ in 2023 and recommends continuity of this initiative; further notes with satisfaction that no new, ongoing, or closed cases concerning sexual harassment were reported during the year;

    30. Commends the Committee for its actions taken in 2023 in connection with the integration of persons with disabilities, such as making accessible the Committee’s buildings to persons with reduced mobility and ensuring that all job vacancies are accessible to candidates with disabilities;

    31. Notes that, in 2023, the Committee was employing staff representing all Union nationalities (and one staff member of Ukrainian nationality), with some of them being overrepresented (e.g., Belgium); welcomes the additional efforts of the Committee aiming at balancing the geographical distribution among staff by targeting a wider audience through the publication on its website and social media of calls for expression of interest for contract and temporary staff; regrets the persistent lack of geographical balance within the Committee’s staff, with certain nationalities remaining overrepresented in comparison to others; encourages the Committee to intensify its efforts to achieve a more balanced geographical distribution, particularly at the management level; asks the Committee to keep the discharge authority informed of the outcome of this type of action;

    32. Welcomes the participation of the Committee’s Traineeships Office, for the second consecutive time, in the session titled ‘Opportunities for young Roma’ in April 2023; commends the initiative to present the Committee’s traineeships scheme to young and motivated Roma and non-Roma participants, reflecting a strong commitment to promoting inclusivity, diversity, and equal opportunities; encourages the continuation and expansion of such initiatives to further engage underrepresented communities and foster a more inclusive European workforce;

    33. Welcomes the progress made with regard to gender balance in management, with an increase of the percentage of women both in middle management positions (from 29,7 % in 2022 to 32,5 % in 2023) and in senior management positions (from 37,5 % in 2022 to 44,4 % in 2023);

    Ethical framework and transparency

    34. Welcomes the work done by the Committees in 2023 to consolidate ethical rules and practices into a single ethical legal framework (Decision n⁰ 157/2023) covering disciplinary procedure, dignity at work, conflict management, combatting harassment, outside activities and whistleblowing among others; notes that that work culminated with a decision (n⁰ 157/2023) which was the outcome of comprehensive consultations with different stakeholders, as well as a follow-up to an internal survey on staff ethics awareness and the implementation of an internal audit recommendation on that topic; commends the Committee for continuing to offer training courses on ethics, integrity and respect and dignity at work to different groups of staff ranging from newcomers, managers and staff overall in 2023;

    35. Notes that the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) processed two cases in 2023: one case on alleged outside gainful activities of a Committee member and another case on allegations of recidivism on unauthorised external activities by a staff member; notes that in the former case no OLAF investigation was opened on the grounds of lack of proportionality between the resources needed to conduct an investigation and the expected results, while the Committee considered that there were no conflicts of interest on the grounds that Committee members do not receive any remuneration from the Union, nor are they required to declare their professional activities, for which they may be paid for local or regional mandates that those members may have; notes with regard to the latter case that OLAF opened an investigation which was concluded with two recommendations, which the Committee implemented by opening a disciplinary procedure against the staff member concerned and by recovering gains in connection with that person’s unauthorised outside activities; recalls that the case closed in 2022 on allegations of financial wrongdoings, harassment and mismanagement in a Committee-EESC joint service, gave rise to a conflict-management exercise involving the persons concerned and to a five-point action plan; notes with satisfaction from the Committee’s follow-up report to Parliament’s discharge decision covering the Committee’s budget implementation year 2022 that that action plan was fully implemented by the end of 2023;

    36. Recalls that the Committee adopted Regulation n⁰ 6/2023 of 4 July 2023 laying down transparency measures that focus on office-holding members and rapporteurs; commends in this context the Committee for having formally joined the EU Transparency Register on 1 January 2024;

    37. Urges the Committee to enhance the detection and prevention of conflicts of interest by introducing a mandatory cooling-off period for outgoing members before they can engage in lobbying or advisory roles involving Union institutions; calls for the proactive publication of all recusal decisions taken by Committee members due to conflicts of interest;

    38. Welcomes the Committee’s renewed efforts in the area of detection and prevention of conflicts of interest in 2023; notes that thanks to its Decision n⁰157/2023, the Committee defined the concept of conflicts of interest and has put in place a mechanism to detect and prevent it whereby staff are required to declare whether they might have a conflict of interest (potential or possible), by filling in a form at various key moments of their career or professional activities; notes with satisfaction from the Questionnaire that the annual information regarding the occupation activities of former senior officials is published in a transparent way on the Committee’s website; notes that the Committee did not detect any situations of conflicts of interest which would have required follow-up by the administration in 2023;

    39. Notes that no cases of whistleblowing were reported to the Committee in 2023, except for information received from OLAF about a whistleblowing case against a staff member of the Committee, which was eventually dismissed by OLAF; notes that the Committee did not adopt any new measures concerning whistleblowing in 2023 and continued to rely on the measures in place since 2015 and to promote them through ethics training and awareness raising; supports regular mandatory ethic trainings both for staff as well as for management level;

    40. Notes that the Committee has had in place a range of anti-fraud measures and actions applicable to its members and its staff which are implemented by different services; observes that no anti-fraud strategy was in place in 2023 despite Parliament’s requests in previous discharge resolutions; notes with satisfaction, following Parliament’s recommendation, and as indicated in the Questionnaire, the Committee’s commitment to further strengthen the existing anti-fraud measures by adopting an anti-fraud strategy in 2025; encourages the Committee to facilitate regular and compulsory anti-fraud trainings as part of the strategy; asks the Committee to keep the discharge authority informed on this matter;

    Digitalisation, cybersecurity and data protection

    41. Notes that the combined IT budget of the Committee and the EESC was EUR 12,7 million in 2023, compared to EUR 11,712 million in 2022, i.e., an increase of 8,40 %, whereas EUR 350 000 of that budget was paid for cybersecurity in 2023;

    42. Welcomes the Committee’s new ‘Digital Strategy 2024-2026’ adopted at the end of 2023; commends in this context the Committee for its digitalisation progress made in 2023 in different areas such as the administrative processes (including staff selection), procurement and interpretation, among others; calls on the Committee to accelerate digital transformation efforts by ensuring the full implementation of electronic workflows, e-signatures, and digital case management tools by 2026, reducing paper-based processes in line with sustainability commitments, shifting towards a more paperless administration;

     

    43. Notes with satisfaction that 90 % of the projects for simplification through digitalisation under the ‘Going for impact’ initiative were fully implemented by the end of 2023; notes in addition that further efficiencies were tapped due to an IT project to define the best tool for the electronic management of form-based workflows with, as a result, many of the Committee’s processes having begun to be simplified and digitalised through Microsoft 365 tools; notes with satisfaction that the Committee uses procurement modules such as e-Tendering, e-Notices, e-Submission, MyWorkplace, as well as the qualified electronic signature, for the signature of contracts, introduced in 2023; welcomes the adoption by the Committee of internal guidelines on use of artificial intelligence laying the ground for possible future solutions and encourages introduction of regular mandatory trainings on safe use of artificial intelligence;

    44. Notes further that the European Data Protection Supervisor (‘EDPS’) did not conduct any investigation or enquiry into the processing of personal data by the Committee in 2023; notes that in 2023 the EDPS launched a general questionnaire on the designation and position of the data protection officer (DPO), which was answered by the Committee’s DPO;

    45. Notes that the Committee did not encounter any cyber-attacks in 2023, other than certain denial of service attacks against the Committee’s externally hosted website; notes from the Questionnaire of the Committee’s tools and strategies for real-time threat monitoring and identifying vulnerabilities in the Committee’s systems; commends the Committee for adhering to standards in matters related to cybersecurity-related risk assessments, as well as for having put in place a system based on incident response plans, recovery measures and lessons learned; notes with satisfaction that the Committee and the EESC adopted the NIST Cybersecurity Framework with focus, in 2023, on the principles: ‘protect’ and ‘detect’; encourages the Committee to raise the cybersecurity awareness of their members and staff, to carry out regular risk assessments of its IT infrastructure and to ensure regular audits and tests of its cyber defences;

    Buildings

    46. Notes that the Committee’s budget (current year appropriations) in 2023 was EUR 18,594 million (compared to EUR 18,930 million in 2022) with a payment execution rate of 93,70 % (compared to 82,60 % in 2022); notes with satisfaction that, as result of exchanging the B68 and TRE74 buildings for the VMA building in 2022, savings were achieved due to lower costs of renting the entire VMA in 2023;

    47. Notes that renovation works of the VMA (third to ninth floor) continued in 2023; notes further a low payment execution rate with regard to the C8 appropriations (carried over from 2022 to 2023), i.e., 18,90 %, used for the fitting-out of the VMA premises; understands the Committee’s explanation for that low rate whereas the contractor was not able to finish parts of the renovation works in the VMA buildings; reiterates its call to the Committee to provide the discharge authority with an update on the return on investment in relation to the smart technologies installed in the VMA;

    48. Welcomes the commitment of the Committee and the EESC to apply systematically the ‘design for all’ principle to their infrastructure, ensuring accessibility of their building by design; notes that the Committees took a range of different measures to ensure accessibility of their buildings to people with various kinds of disabilities (wheelchair users, blind and visually impaired people, deaf persons, elderly people with muscular or vascular problems);

    Environment and sustainability

    49. Notes that the Committee continued to implement a variety of green practices in 2023, such as the use of innovative energy-efficient building installations, the purchase of 100 % green electricity, the replacement of paperless workflows with digital signatures, the application of environmental criteria in all tender procedures (with customised green criteria for calls for tender above EUR 60 000), a focus on waste reduction and increase in the recycling rate, the implementation of measures for a more sustainable travel by staff, including financial contributions by the Committee to its staff’s public transport costs, the use of full remote interpretation for statutory meetings, and other energy saving measures; notes with satisfaction from the Questionnaire a reduction of carbon emissions linked to the Committee’s administration’s activities by 18 % compared to 2019;

    50. Notes with satisfaction from the questionnaire that, thanks to its energy saving measures, the Committee’s energy consumption was reduced by an estimated 3,4 % in 2023 compared to 2022, corresponding to a financial gain of EUR 64 240; congratulates the Committees for having exceeded the EMAS objectives for 2021-2025 in all areas (electricity, gas, water, waste, waste sorting, paper for office use, CO2 emissions);

    Interinstitutional cooperation

    51. Welcomes the budgetary and administrative savings achieved through interinstitutional cooperation, and in particular the close cooperation established at administrative level with the EESC, with which the Committee shares premises and joint services in the areas of translation, infrastructure, logistics and IT, with 470 members of staff and approximately EUR 60 million (excluding salary related expenditures) pooled together by both institutions in 2023; notes with satisfaction that the Committee further extended its cooperation with the EESC by exploiting additional synergies through joint medical services and joint central data protection register and processing operations based on the Joint Controllership Arrangement signed by the Committee and the EESC in 2023; reiterates its call on the Committee to pursue and expand that cooperation in other areas with a view to avoiding duplication and further rationalising the operating costs of services available in the premises shared by the Committee and the EESC; invites the Committee and the EESC to explore the possibility of setting up a single administration for their joint services, keeping separate directorates or units for the services dealing with matters related to their specific and independent mandates; encourages the Committee and the EESC to continue their efforts to develop further cooperation and synergies;

    52. Welcomes the Committee’s search for synergies by purchasing services from other institutions through service-level agreements and by participating in interinstitutional coordination bodies and interinstitutional procurement procedures; welcomes the efficiency gains, with regard to the communication for the 2024 European elections, reported by the Committee in the Questionnaire; notes that those gains were possible because the Committee signed with Parliament a Memorandum of Understanding in February 2024 and a new Cooperation Agreement (CP) in May 2024; notes further that the CP also covered cooperation at political and administrative level between the two institutions;

    53. Calls on the Committee to deepen its cooperation with Parliament and the Commission by establishing a structured annual dialogue between Committee representatives and Union legislators on key legislative files affecting regional development, climate policy, and social cohesion; urges the Committee to explore joint initiatives with Parliament’s Committees on Regional Development (REGI) and on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety (ENVI) to promote sustainable regional investments;

    54. Notes that the Committee cooperates with the Commission (for an annual fee) for the handling of HR matters and the use of various IT platforms for financial management and HR; notes further that the Committee holds its plenary sessions in the premises of Parliament and the Commission to compensate for the lack of capacity in its own conference rooms and buys interpreting services from those two institutions; 

    55. Welcomes the reviewing in 2023 of the Cooperation Agreement of the Committee with Parliament in view of its final signature in 2024; supports the cooperation of the Committee with several parliamentary committees, intergroups and directorates-general of Parliament and convene to considers vital that members of the Committee and EESC be regularly and systematically invited to relevant parliamentary exchanges, including committee meetings, on issues they are dealing with;

    Communication

    56. Notes that the Committee’s communication activities focus on relationship with press, organisation of events and digital content and social media with a total budget (current year appropriations) of approximately EUR 2,8 million in 2023; regrets a very low payment execution rate in those areas (ranging from 24,70 % to 48,20 %); notes nevertheless a high execution rate with regard to C8 appropriations (carried over from 2022 to 2023) of between 98 % and 100 %; calls on the Committee to take measures for improving its budgetary planning with regard to communication related budgetary items;

    57. Notes with satisfaction the Committee’s achievements in promoting Union policies and programs at local and regional level, improving the outreach of its consultative works and enhancing its visibility and impact; notes that the Committee’s communication strategy seeks to strengthen its institutional and political profile as the voice of the Union’s regions, cities, villages, and municipalities, while showcasing the essential contributions of its members in connecting Union policies with citizens and fostering engagement at the local and regional level; notes in this context the Committee’s communication actions in 2023 in areas such as: – cohesion (e.g., the ‘Promoting cohesion as a fundamental value of the Union’s campaign in the framework of the EURegionsWeek with more than 8 000 participants); – climate change (e.g., the ‘Building resilient and innovative local communities’ campaign); – democracy (e.g., the ‘A new chapter for EU democracy’ campaign with 1 400 registrations for participation at the 14th EuropCom conference); – rural development (the ‘2023 LEADER European Congress’ conference) in 2023; commends the Committee for the increase in the number of persons registered in the Network of Regional and Local EU Councillors (from 2 307 in 2022 to 3 000 in 2023) and the number of participants in the Young Elected Politicians programme (from 775 in 2022 to 836 in 2023);

    58. Welcomes the Committee’s efforts to increase outreach to regional governments and local communities, including the expansion of the Network of Regional and Local EU Councillors and the Young Elected Politicians program; calls on the Committee to allocate additional resources to support regional capacity-building programs that empower local governments to better implement Union policies;

    59. Notes the Committee’s success with regard to media outreach as shown by the overall metrics for 2023, such as: 13 210 media mentions, 129 % increase on web visitors and 11 % increase on followers; notes that in terms of digital engagement, the Committee fell short of achieving its target for 2023; notes that, at the end of 2023, the Committee had 200 000 followers on its social media channels, i.e., 15 % more than in 2022 of which 57 603 followers (+5 %) on X (ex-Twitter), 61 170 (+5 %) on Facebook, 68 613 (+31 %) on LinkedIn and 15 392 (+47 %) on Instagram;

    60. Notes with satisfaction from the Questionnaire the Committee’s initiatives to raise awareness about the specific measures of the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Acts, as well as cybersecurity and online safety; acknowledges the Committee’s role in advancing the Union’s path to a digital future; commends in this context the Committee for organising in 2023 the Digital Masterclass series, for both staff and external audiences.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the European Water Resilience Strategy – A10-0073/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the European Water Resilience Strategy

    (2024/2104(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular Article 191 thereof,

     having regard to the Agreement adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP21) in Paris on 12 December 2015 (the Paris Agreement),

     having regard to the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), with particular emphasis on the SDG 6 onclean water and sanitation,

     having regard to the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, adopted in December 2022,

     having regard to the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants of 22 May 2021,

     having regard to the precautionary principle and the principles that preventive action should be taken, that environmental damage should, as a priority, be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay, as enshrined in Article 191(2) TFEU,

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulations (EC) No 401/2009 and (EU) 2018/1999 (European Climate Law)[1],

     having regard to Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy[2] (Water Framework Directive),

     having regard to Directive 2006/118/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on the protection of groundwater against pollution and deterioration[3] (Groundwater Directive),

     having regard to Directive 2008/105/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on environmental quality standards in the field of water policy, amending and subsequently repealing Council Directives 82/176/EEC, 83/513/EEC, 84/156/EEC, 84/491/EEC, 86/280/EEC and amending Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council[4] (Environmental Quality Standards Directive),

     having regard to Directive 2007/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on the assessment and management of flood risks[5],

     having regard to Directive (EU) 2020/2184 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on the quality of water intended for human consumption[6] (Drinking Water Directive),

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/741 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 2020 on minimum requirements for water reuse[7] (Water Reuse Regulation),

     having regard to Directive 2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 establishing a framework for community action in the field of marine environmental policy (Marine Strategy Framework Directive)[8],

     having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/3019 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2024 concerning urban wastewater treatment[9] (revised Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive),

     having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/1785 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2024 amending Directive 2010/75/EU on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) and Council Directive 1999/31/EC on the landfill of waste[10],

     having regard to Council Directive 91/676/EEC of 12 December 1991 concerning the protection of waters against pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources[11],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1991 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2024 on nature restoration and amending Regulation (EU) 2022/869[12],

     having regard to Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC[13] (Critical Entities Resilience Directive),

     having regard to Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council on 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive)[14],

     having regard to Directive 2009/128/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 establishing a framework for Community action to achieve the sustainable use of pesticides[15],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 establishing rules on support for strategic plans to be drawn up by Member States under the common agricultural policy (CAP Strategic Plans) and financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1305/2013 and (EU) No 1307/2013[16],

     having regard to Commission Regulation (EU) 2024/3190 of 19 December 2024 on the use of bisphenol A (BPA) and other bisphenols and bisphenol derivatives with harmonised classification for specific hazardous properties in certain materials and articles intended to come into contact with food, amending Regulation (EU) No 10/2011 and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/213[17],

     having regard to the Commission communication of 19 February 2021 entitled ‘A Vision for Agriculture and Food’ (COM(2025)0075),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 on the European Green Deal (COM(2019)0640),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2025 entitled ‘A Competitiveness Compass for the EU’ (COM(2025)0030),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 12 May 2021 entitled ‘Pathway to a Healthy Planet for All – EU Action Plan: ‘Towards Zero Pollution for Air, Water and Soil’’ (COM(2021)0400),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 24 February 2021 entitled ‘Forging a climate-resilient Europe – the new EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change’ (COM(2021)0082),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 18 July 2007 on addressing the challenge of water scarcity and droughts in the European Union (COM(2007)0414),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 11 March 2020 entitled ‘A new Circular Economy Action Plan: For a cleaner and more competitive Europe’ (COM(2020)0098),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 14 November 2012 entitled ‘A Blueprint to Safeguard Europe’s Water Resources’ (COM(2012)0673),

     having regard to the EU biodiversity strategy for 2030,

     having regard to the COP29 Declaration on Water for Climate Action, endorsed by the European Union,

     having regard to the European Oceans Pact announced by Commission President von der Leyen in her political guidelines for the next European Commission (2024-2029) on 18 July 2024,

     having regard to the European climate adaptation plan and the European water resilience strategy announced by Commission President von der Leyen in her political guidelines for the next European Commission (2024-2029) on 18 July 2024,

     having regard to the EU’s 8th environment action programme,

     having regards to its resolution of 5 October 2022 entitled ‘Access to water as a human right – the external dimension’[18],

     having regard to its resolution of 19 September 2024 on the devastating floods in central and eastern Europe, the loss of lives and the EU’s preparedness to act on such disasters exacerbated by climate change[19],

     having regard to its resolution of 6 October 2022 on momentum for the ocean: strengthening ocean governance and biodiversity[20],

     having regard to its resolution of 28 November 2019 on the climate and environment emergency[21],

     having regard to its resolution of 14 November 2024 on the UN climate change conference in Baku, Azerbaijan (COP29)[22],

     having regard to the Commission report  of 4February 2025 on the implementation of the Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC) and the Floods Directive (2007/60/EC) entitled ‘Third river basin management plans – Second flood risk management plans’ (COM(2025)0002),

     having regard to the European Court of Auditors special report 15/2024 of 16 October 2024 entitled ‘Climate adaptation in the EU – action not keeping up with ambition’,

     having regard to former Finnish President Sauli Niinistö’s report of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s civil and military preparedness and readiness’,

     having regard to Enrico Letta’s report of April 2024 entitled ‘Much more than a market’,

     having regard to its resolution of 17 December 2020 on the implementation of the EU water legislation[23],

     having regard to the European Court of Auditors special report 33/2018 of 18 December 2018 entitled ‘Combating desertification in the EU: a growing threat in need of more action,

     having regard to the European citizens’ initiative (ECI) on the right to water,

     having regard to its resolution of 8 September 2015 on the follow-up to the European Citizens’ Initiative Right2Water[24],

     having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 64/292 of 28 July 2010, which recognises the human right to water and sanitation,

     having regard to the Strategic Dialogue on the future of EU agriculture,

     having regard to the European Court of Auditors special report 20/2024 of 30 September 2024 entitled ‘Common Agricultural Policy Plans – Greener, but not matching the EU’s ambitions for the climate and the environment’,

     having regard to European Environment Agency report 07/2024 of 15 October 2024 entitled ‘Europe’s state of water 2024: the need for improved water resilience’ (EEA Report 07/2024),

     having regard to the Environment Council conclusions of 17 June 2024 on the 8th environment action programme,

     having regard to European Court of Auditors special report 20/2021 of 28 September 2021 entitled ‘Sustainable water use in agriculture: CAP funds more likely to promote greater rather than more efficient water use’,

     having regard to the European Economic and Social Committee declaration of 26 October 2023 for an EU Blue Deal,

     having regard to the Commission proposal of 5 July 2023 for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Soil Monitoring and Resilience (Soil Monitoring Law) (COM(2023)0416),

     having regard to its position  at first reading of 24 April 2024 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2000/60/EC establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy, Directive 2006/118/EC on the protection of groundwater against pollution and deterioration and Directive 2008/105/EC on environmental quality standards in the field of water policy[25],

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety (A10-0073/2025),

    A. whereas water is essential for life and humanity; whereas the EU has to manage current and future water resources efficiently and respond effectively to the current water challenges, as they directly affect human health, the environment and its ecosystems, strategic socio-economic activities such as energy production, agriculture and food security, and the EU’s competitiveness;

    B. whereas water is a scarce and limited resource and, while 70 % of the earth’s surface is water-covered, available and usable fresh water accounts for only 0.5 % of water on earth[26]; whereas mountains are real water towers and important freshwater reservoirs in Europe, the Alps alone providing 40 % of Europe’s fresh water[27];

    C. whereas groundwater supplies two thirds of the EU’s drinking water and supports many ecosystems[28]; whereas the services provided by freshwater ecosystems are worth over EUR 11 trillion in Europe, and provide considerable health and recreational benefits, such as from angling[29];

    D. whereas water stress is already occurring in Europe, affecting approximately 20 % of Europe’s territory and 30 % of the population on average every year, figures that are likely to increase in the future on account of climate change[30], despite the fact that total water abstraction at the EU-27 level appeared to decrease by 15 % between 2000 and 2019; whereas the increase in the number and recurrence of extreme weather events such as droughts and floods, and the fact that they are expected to become yet more frequent in the near future, poses a risk to human life and the EU’s food sovereignty and could lead to regions in Europe becoming uninhabitable;

    E. whereas 78 % of Europeans consider that the EU should propose additional measures to address water-related issues in Europe and 21 % of Europeans consider pollution to be the main threat linked to water in their country[31];

    F. whereas the human right to water and sanitation was recognised as a human right in a resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly on 28 July 2010;

    G. whereas the European Citizens’ Initiative Right2Water was the first ever to gather the required number of signatories, calling for the EU to ensure the right to water for all;

    H. whereas the provisions of Article 14 TFEU and Protocol No 26 thereto on Services of General Interest are key elements to be prominently taken into account in all aspects of the design and implementation of the European water resilience strategy (EWRS), thus safeguarding the status of Europe’s water services as essential public services, and ensuring accessibility, equity, affordability and the maintenance of high quality standards;

    I. whereas the Member States should follow up on the recommendations of the Commission report of November 2023[32] in order to improve water balances as the knowledge basis for making decisions about water allocation;

    J. whereas substantive corporate value may be at risk owing to worsening water insecurity, with a decrease in the capacity of production or its complete halt as a consequence; whereas assets in water-stressed regions could become stranded, temporarily or permanently, if assumptions made about water availability and access prove inaccurate, if regulatory responses are unanticipated or if risk mitigation and stewardship plans are not put in place[33];

    K. whereas the deadline set by the Water Framework Directive (WFD) for European rivers, lakes, transitional waters, coastal waters and groundwaters to achieve ‘good’ status was 2015, with a possible postponement to 2027 under certain conditions; whereas the objective of achieving good chemical status for all EU water bodies by 2027 remains far from being achieved, primarily due to substances such as mercury, brominated flame retardants and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons[34];

    L. whereas the 2025 report on the implementation of the WFD shows that delays in meeting the WFD’s targets are not due to a deficiency in the legislation but to a lack of funding, slow implementation and insufficient integration of environmental objectives into sectoral policies; whereas analysis has shown that the Member States are not meeting the annual investment needs, which are estimated to be EUR 77 billion, with a financing gap currently estimated at around EUR 25 billion a year; whereas the report also shows the clear need for the Member States to increase their level of ambition and accelerate action to reduce the compliance gap as much as possible before 2027, to increase investment and ensure adequate financing, including via EU funds, to achieve the objectives of their programmes of measures, as well as to put in place additional measures to reduce current persistent environmental challenges to and improve transboundary cooperation;

    M. whereas the water legislation has been evaluated as fit for purpose; whereas it establishes a framework for the protection of inland surface waters, transitional waters, coastal waters and groundwater; whereas, at the same time, it allows for less stringent environmental objectives to be achieved if socio-economic needs served by such human activity cannot be achieved by other means and it allows for a failure to achieve the objectives for water bodies if the reason for the failure is overriding public interest; whereas the legislation is proportionate and mandates the authorities of the Member States, in line with the principle of subsidiarity, to decide on the overriding public interest; whereas in some cases this may be the protection of the environment and in others a socio-economic activity;

    N. whereas industry accounts for approximately 40 % of total water abstraction in Europe; whereas the largest categories of the annual water abstraction in the EU-27, according to the statistical classification of economic activities in the European Community (NACE), are abstraction for cooling in electricity generation (34 %), followed by abstraction for agriculture (29 %), public water supply (21 %) and manufacturing (15 %)[35]; whereas data on water abstraction and use in the EU is historical and poor[36];

    O. whereas electricity production is the largest water-abstracting sector, but most of the water is returned to the environment after cooling or turbine propulsion; whereas overall, agriculture is the highest net water-consuming sector at the EU level, as most of the water is consumed by the crop or evaporates; whereas other uses, such as industry and water utilities, abstract and consume comparatively less water, but they can represent significant pressures at a local level, especially on groundwater[37];

    P. whereas all industrial activity requires water to produce its end products or to support production activities; whereas businesses depend on water for their daily operations, and as water scarcity increases, it can disrupt operations, raise costs and create regulatory and reputational risks;

    Q. whereas the energy sector relies heavily on water resources; whereas this dependency poses a serious risk as water scarcity can impact energy production processes and supply security, especially where water is used as feedstock or for cooling; whereas the transition to renewable energy, particularly wind and solar energy, offers sustainable and water-efficient decarbonisation pathways and the opportunity to halt or reverse the trend of increasing water consumption;

    R. whereas water is an essential resource for agriculture in the production of high-quality food, feed and renewable raw materials; whereas agriculture depends on water availability and irrigation helps to shield farmers from irregular rainfall and to increase the viability, yield and quality of the crops, but is a significant drain on water resources; whereas in view of climate change, changing weather patterns and increased frequency of floods and droughts, the importance of water as a resource for the production of high-quality agricultural products and of the need for water to be used efficiently will therefore be fundamental to the security of food supply and to the solutions to address water scarcity; whereas reducing pressure on surface water and groundwater from agriculture must go hand in hand with investment aimed at the use of reclaimed water and innovative desalination technologies, thereby achieving a better water balance as well as promoting clean alternative energies such as green hydrogen;

    S. whereas reliable data on water accounting, that is, the systematic study of the current status and trends in water supply, demand, accessibility and use in domains that have been specified[38], is crucial for an assessment of the current situation in the EU and for European competitiveness;

    T. whereas the potential of wastewater as an alternative water supply is underestimated, given that 60-70 % of the potential value of wastewater across the EU is currently unexploited[39] and less than 3 % of treated wastewater is reused in the EU[40]; whereas there is significant potential for circular approaches to water in households, as only a small amount of the water in households is used for drinking and eating and therefore requires the highest quality standards;

    U. whereas a very large quantity of water is lost due to obsolete or ageing water networks and the lack of necessary maintenance; whereas investment in the maintenance, improvement and development of resilient innovative irrigation infrastructures is essential for reducing and improving the efficiency of water consumption in agriculture; whereas such improvements in efficiency enable the water saved to be used for other purposes or enable the natural flow rates of watercourses to be maintained;

    V. whereas clean and sufficient water is an essential element in implementing and achieving a real sustainable circular economy in the EU;

    W. whereas water leakage is an underestimated global issue, which significantly exacerbates water scarcity, with an average of 23 % of treated water lost during distribution in the EU due to leaky pipes, outdated treatment facilities and insufficient reservoirs[41]; whereas the revised Drinking Water Directive included measures to reduce water leakages, as well as risk assessment and management of the catchment areas for drinking water abstraction;

    X. whereas in 2021, 91 % of Europe’s groundwater bodies were reported as having achieved ‘good quantitative status’, while 77 % were reported as having ‘good chemical status’[42];

    Y. whereas in 2021, only 37 % of Europe’s surface water bodies were reported as being in ‘good’ or ‘high’ ecological status, while 29 % achieved ‘good chemical status’[43];

    Z. whereas the European Environment Agency emphasises that the proportion of surface waters failing to achieve good ecological status is uneven across Europe, and that these are more prevalent in parts of central and western Europe, and stresses that differences in water status between the Member States may be caused by different pressures, but that those differences may also result from varying approaches to monitoring and assessment[44];

    AA. whereas the quality of surface waters across the continent reflects continuing and combined pressures, in particular diffuse pollution and the degradation of their natural flow and physical features; whereas pollution by nutrients and persistent priority substances, as well as by substances newly emerging as pollutants, continues; whereas groundwaters are affected by diffuse pollution and also suffer from intensive abstraction[45];

    AB. whereas groundwater supplies 65 % of water for drinking and 25 % of water for agricultural irrigation in the EU[46]; whereas it is a finite resource that needs to be protected from pollution and over-exploitation[47];

    AC. whereas monitoring data from the European Environment Agency indicates widespread pollution by per- and polyfluoralkyl substances (PFAS), commonly referred to as ‘forever chemicals’, in European waters, posing significant risks to aquatic ecosystems and human health; whereas short-chain PFAS trifluoroacetic acid (TFA) has been detected in drinking water all over Europe; whereas PFAS persist in the environment, bioaccumulate in living organisms and cause adverse (eco)toxicological effects; whereas from a group of 6 000 to 10 000 individual substances, only a few have been extensively studied and their impact on human health and environment is known; whereas 99 % of PFAS remain undetected in the environment as a result of limits in monitoring;

    AD. whereas the lack of EU-wide quality standards for PFAS in groundwater and insufficient monitoring of less-studied PFAS compounds exacerbate the challenge of achieving good chemical status for EU waters in line with the WFD and pose a substantial technical and financial burden on health systems and on water service providers while jeopardising applications of water and sewage sludge reuse;

    AE. whereas hazardous chemicals, including heavy metals and other pollutants, released into water bodies by industrial activities, significantly impact water quality and aquatic ecosystems[48];

    AF. whereas pharmaceutical substances are increasingly identified in surface water and groundwater; whereas pollution caused by pharmaceutical residues necessitates advanced water treatment technologies, including membrane filtration, activated carbon treatment, advanced oxidation processes and other innovative purification techniques;

    AG. whereas Directive 2010/75/EU[49] mandates that the potential aggravation of the impact of industrial discharges on the state of water bodies due to variations of water flow dynamics should be explicitly taken into account in the granting and reviewing of permits; whereas the best available techniques will newly incorporate notions of environmental performance levels related to water and permits, which translate the use of these techniques into environmental performance limit values; whereas this is a welcome change with a potential improvement to the industry’s resilience, as EU installations may already face a lower production capacity seasonally due to water scarcity;

    AH. whereas urban wastewater is one of the main sources of water pollution, if not properly collected and treated; whereas the objectives of the Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive should not be lowered, and its scope should be extended to other sectors and substances that contribute to water pollution;

    AI. whereas nutrient pollution in EU water bodies leads to eutrophication, loss of biodiversity, and degradation of aquatic ecosystems[50]; whereas pesticide run-off contaminates surface water and groundwater, threatening water quality and human health;

    AJ. whereas research indicates that exposure in Europe to the synthetic chemical bisphenol A (BPA), which is used in products ranging from plastic and metal food containers to reusable water bottles, is well above acceptable health safety levels[51];

    AK. whereas soil and nutrient management lies at the basis of improving water quality and availability; whereas the EWRS should focus on improving nutrient management, with the aim of closing nutrient loops to reduce nutrient emissions to waterways; whereas the safe use of sewage sludge in agriculture will also reduce the EU’s very high dependency on the import of phosphorus mineral fertiliser, for example, from Russia; whereas the safe use of sludge should therefore also be considered as contributing to European resilience and strategic autonomy;

    AL. whereas climate change represents a major threat to water resources and aquatic ecosystems; whereas many impacts of climate change are felt through water, such as more intense and frequent droughts, more extreme flooding and more erratic seasonal rainfall; whereas floods and water scarcity compromise food and water security, and the health of the general population, ultimately affecting social cohesion, economic prosperity and stability, as well as jeopardising the long-term availability of this valuable resource;

    AM. whereas the European climate risk assessment recognised that Europe’s policies and adaptation actions are not keeping pace with the rapidly growing risks that threaten ecosystems, infrastructure, food and water supply and people’s health, as well as the economy and finance[52];

    AN. whereas assessments by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change show that the sea level rise due to climate change is leading to an increase in the salinity of soils and freshwaters, compromising ecosystem health and water quality, as well as affecting 80 million Europeans living in low elevation coastal zones and flood plains; whereas freshwater and marine ecosystems are interconnected as riverine pollution, disruption to sediment flows and water shortages all have a very strong impact on the health of marine ecosystems, particularly the coastal ones, as well as on the viability of social and economic activities that depend on them, such as transport, fisheries, agriculture, aquaculture and tourism;

    AO. whereas prolonged drought, extreme heat and large-scale flooding events, caused by changing weather patterns, will intensify and become more frequent throughout the continent, damaging ecosystems and human health and leading to major disruption to economic activities and decreasing the overall quantity and quality of available water; whereas preserving water resources and the natural functions of rivers, while supplying sufficient water of good quality, is becoming a major challenge that will require increased climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts, effective management and innovative measures to increase water availability; whereas managing water scarcity and flood risks affordably and sustainably will increasingly become important across the EU;

    AP. whereas in 2022, Europe experienced its hottest summer and the second warmest year on record, leading to drought impacting over 15 % of EU territory; whereas the average annual economic loss caused by droughts in the EU between1981 and 2010 was estimated at around EUR 9 billion per year; whereas with no adaptation measures, it is estimated that annual drought losses in Europe and the UK could increase to EUR 45 billion per year up to 2100 with warming of 3°C[53]; whereas in the period of 1998-2020, floods comprised 43 % of all disaster events in Europe; whereas climate change impacts and socio-economic developments are leading to more frequent flooding, affecting an increasing number of people and causing increasing damage; whereas 12 % of Europe’s population lives in floodplains[54];

    AQ. whereas the cost of inaction in addressing water-related challenges is extremely high, given that 90 % of disasters are related to water[55]; whereas without policy action, the cost of economic losses from coastal floods alone could exceed EUR 1 trillion per year by the end of the century in the EU[56] and the economic cost of droughts in Europe could exceed EUR 65 billion a year by 2100[57];

    AR. whereas significant differences exist between the Member States in water availability, management strategies and usage patterns, and vulnerability to climate change impacts can vary considerably; whereas a tailored approach is required to enhance water resilience and ensure sustainable water management;

    AS. whereas droughts constitute one of the chief catastrophic consequences of climate change; whereas around 23 % of the EU’s territory is moderately susceptible to desertification and 8 % is highly susceptible to it; whereas Hungary, Bulgaria, Spain and Italy are among the countries most affected, and 74 % of Spain’s surface area is at risk of desertification; whereas the EWRS should look beyond prolonged droughts, but rather address the reality that the semi-arid line is moving north, resulting in increasing areas in the EU that will face chronic long-term unavailability of sufficient freshwater resources;

    AT. whereas policies related to desertification, water consumption and climate change are closely interconnected; whereas as part of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, the EU reaffirmed in 2015 and later re-confirmed in 2024[58] its commitment to achieving land degradation neutrality by 2030, which, according to the European Court of Auditors special report on desertification, is unlikely to be achieved;

    AU. whereas water infrastructure can help maintain a constant and predictable flow and supply of water; whereas in 2022, the annual average river discharge across Europe was the second lowest since records began in 1991[59];

    AV. whereas downstream areas are particularly dependent on upstream water management and abstraction; whereas the Member States should refrain from implementing measures that significantly increase flood risks upstream or downstream of other countries in the same river basin, in accordance with the WFD;

    AW. whereas nature-based solutions are pertinent interventions that, when tailored to specific ecosystems and needs, can increase resilience in the water cycle and provide multiple benefits in terms of biodiversity protection, carbon sequestration, improved water quality, nutrient retention, supply of drinking water, wildfire prevention and flood risk mitigation; whereas nature-based solutions can enhance the effectiveness and the operable life of water infrastructure, therefore ensuring, in many cases, complementarity of both solutions;

    AX. whereas natural water retention measures are nature-based solutions that aim to store water in natural, agricultural, forested and urban landscapes;

    AY. whereas water is not a commercial product like any other but, rather, a heritage which must be protected, defended and treated as such; whereas, under Directive (EU) 2024/1203 on the protection of the environment through criminal law[60], abstraction of surface water or groundwater within the meaning of the WFD constitutes a criminal offence where such conduct is unlawful and intentional, and causes, or is likely to cause, substantial damage to the ecological status or the ecological potential of surface water bodies or to the quantitative status of groundwater bodies;

    AZ. whereas soil biodiversity and soil organic carbon affect water retention capacity; whereas soil erosion, compaction and certain soil management practices that cause soil degradation lead to a steady decrease in the water retention capacity of soil, which as a consequence exacerbates drought and flood events with a direct negative impact on farming; whereas healthy soil is therefore one of the drivers of water resilience, which itself should be approached and managed at river basin level; whereas better land management is key to preventing disasters;

    BA. whereas the current multiannual financial framework (MFF) includes an ambitious but non-binding target of dedicating at least 7.5 % of annual EU spending to the biodiversity objectives in 2024 and 10 % in both 2026 and 2027; whereas the new financial framework should incorporate a water perspective with a view to allocating sufficient resources to the future EWRS in order to ensure resilient water ecosystems and infrastructure, and security of water supply, and to facilitate investments in innovative solutions;

    BB. whereas cohesion funding has played a crucial role in improving water and sanitation services across the Member States; whereas continued support is required to ensure their long-term resilience and compliance with increasingly stringent quality standards;

    BC. whereas pricing policies can improve the efficiency of water use; whereas such policies are a national competence and account for the regional differences in water availability and the source of water supply; whereas pricing can play a significant role in prompting households and other economic sectors to optimise consumption, as well as in ensuring that water users effectively participate in recovering the costs of water services; whereas pricing policies should also consider affordability for households and small businesses;

    BD. whereas digitalisation and innovation can effectively assist the Member States, regional bodies and the Commission in collecting data on and monitoring water management; whereas the EU is at the forefront of new technological developments in the water sector, accounting for 40 % of all international patent families in this sector between 1992 and 2021[61], a position that needs to be fostered and nurtured, and the potential of the internal market fully exploited; whereas hurdles for the introduction and scaling-up of new water technologies need to be examined and a just European level playing field guaranteed; whereas continued support for research in water technology innovation is needed to secure and to create jobs and boost European competitiveness;

    BE. whereas innovation is a crucial tool to help the water sector meet the challenges of the United Nation’s SDGs, adapt to climate change and become more water-efficient;

    BF. whereas deployment of monitoring and modelling technologies is still lagging behind in many Member States, and the digitalisation of the sector is too slow; whereas provisions on the river basin management plans in the WFD do not explicitly include concrete measures to digitise the water sector; whereas common shortcomings for the current policies harnessing the potential digital solutions are related to the lack of technology guidance, monitoring standards, policy integration, standardisation and public involvement;

    BG. whereas the water sector is vulnerable to various threats, including physical attacks, cyberattacks and contamination with harmful agents; whereas such incidents could result in widespread illness, casualties and service disruptions, significantly impacting public health, the environment and economic stability; whereas the digitalisation of  water management might introduce further security risks in a context of increasing hostile attacks on critical infrastructure; whereas the implementation of the NIS2 Directive and Critical Entities Resilience Directive can contribute to mitigating security risks to vital (drinking) water systems and (drinking) water infrastructure, arising from geopolitical tensions;

    BH. whereas advances in sensor technology, computing, artificial intelligence (AI) and big data management can help monitor water quantity and quality and inform the operational decisions of the policymakers and water management companies; whereas innovations in nature-based systems to manage water are available and can contribute to resilient water management;

    BI. whereas water is a vital component in the life cycle of AI, both in the operation of data centres and the manufacture of hardware; whereas the rapid expansion of AI could result in an exponential increase in water demand; whereas that dependency on an increasingly scarce resource poses significant challenges in terms of sustainability; whereas strategic technologies, such as semiconductors, hydrogen, electric vehicle batteries and data centres, play a key role in achieving a competitive and autonomous EU;

    BJ. whereas chiller and cooling tower systems, based on innovative cooling technologies such as evaporative and closed-loop cooling, are already available and can contribute to reducing water consumption in industrial, heating, ventilation and air conditioning systems applications;

    BK. whereas research must be promoted with a view to producing alternative active ingredients to combat pests, to ensure greater plant health and reduce the use of inputs and phytosanitary products;

    BL. whereas water resilience is crucial in education and teaching, and in raising awareness and giving information about the functioning of the water cycle;

    BM. whereas limited access to water and related infrastructure has a negative impact, especially on women, as it undermines the realisation of other human rights, such as self-determination, economic independence and education;

    BN. whereas 60 % of European river basin districts are transnational, which makes effective transboundary cooperation crucial; whereas 20 European countries depend on other countries for more than 10 % of their water resources, with five countries relying on more than 75 % of their resources coming from abroad via rivers[62]; whereas this cooperation should be strengthened to account for current and future climate challenges such as droughts and floods;

    BO. whereas United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres appointed a Special Envoy on Water, aiming to enhance international cooperation and synergies among international water processes;

    BP. whereas clean water access and sustainable and resilient sanitation infrastructure are key components of the One Health approach, recognising the interconnection between the health of humans and water pollution;

    BQ. whereas water cooperation across borders and sectors generates many benefits, including enhancing food security, sustaining healthy livelihoods and ecosystems, helping address resilience to climate change, contributing to disaster risk reduction, providing renewable energy, supporting cities and industry, and fostering regional integration and peace;

    BR. whereas geopolitical developments demonstrate that the EU should be ready to withstand the challenges that go beyond the environmental sphere; whereas non-environmental threats, such as recent accidents related to the damaged cable in the Baltic Sea, send the EU a strong message that strengthening transboundary cooperation is key in addressing both the environmental and security-related objectives;

    BS. whereas about 41 000 kilometres of inland waterways flow through 25 of the Member States; whereas inland waterways, which rely on the availability of water resources, perform a crucial role in optimising water supply and mitigating the impact of droughts and floods, as well as supporting the economic activities and the development of regions;

    BT. whereas the increasing water scarcity, inequalities in access to water, and external shocks to the water sector have heightened interdependencies, increasing competition for water and leading to complex economic repercussions;

    General remarks

    1. Welcomes and supports President von der Leyen’s announcement in the political guidelines for the next European Commission (2024-2029) on putting forward a European Water Resilience Strategy (EWRS) addressing water efficiency, scarcity, pollution and water-related risks, as well as the recognition that water is an indispensable resource that is increasingly under stress from climate change and increasing demands;

    2. Believes that while implementing legislation, economic competitiveness should be taken into account in line with the Competitiveness Compass; calls for the implementation of EU environmental legislation in order to build a resilient and competitive Europe, mitigate and adapt to climate change, halt biodiversity loss, prevent pollution, ensure food security, limit resource use and waste, and strive towards efficient use of resources, including water, while taking into account the precautionary principle, the control-at-source principle and the polluter-pays principle; highlights the fact that water availability impacts the quantity, quality, variety and seasonal availability of foods that can be produced;

    3. Calls for the EU to integrate its commitments to the COP29 Baku Dialogue on Water for Climate Action and the UN 2023 Water Conference into the international dimension of the strategy;

    4. Stresses the urgent need to enhance water resilience and management to ensure sustainable freshwater supplies for people, the economy and the environment; emphasises that the EWRS should be developed in coordination with the European Oceans Pact, ensuring a cohesive and integrated approach to managing freshwater and ocean resources, addressing interconnected challenges, enhancing competitiveness and promoting sustainable water management across inland and marine environments, while ensuring a holistic ‘source-to-sea’ approach;

    5. Insists on the need for a comprehensive and holistic EWRS that integrates water quality, quantity, security, infrastructure, technology and management aspects and includes the restoration of the water cycle as a key element, as it underpins economic activities, ensures resource availability and contributes to climate regulation;

    6. Stresses the importance of water supply, in particular drinking water, as well as water security of supply; points out that all environmental restoration projects should take into account the water security aspects, prioritising solutions that not only provide environmental benefits, but also guarantee the supply and efficient management of water; emphasises, furthermore, that ecological restoration measures should be carried out in synergy with the development of the EU’s renewable energy potential and not impact the overall energy resilience;

    7. Recommends that lakes and other freshwater-dependent habitats be included in the strategy, alongside rivers, transitional waters and groundwater, as essential components of the EU’s water resilience efforts;

    8. Stresses the urgent need to improve crisis-warning systems with regard to heavy water incidents, as well as to improve preventive measures;

    9. Calls on the Commission to present a European climate adaptation plan, including concrete legislative proposals and actions, particularly regarding infrastructure resilience, water management and nature-based solutions, while prioritising the protection of vulnerable communities, to make the EU more resilient and to lead by example;

    10. Reiterates that access to clean and safe drinking water and sanitation is a human right; emphasises that this right must be unequivocally ensured, with everyone having access to affordable and good quality water services, including the inhabitants of islands and outermost regions;

    11. Notes that industrial activities and agricultural production require water to produce their end products or to support production activities, with the amount of water used varying depending on the type of activity; highlights the fact that ensuring Europe’s competitiveness and strategic autonomy requires a water-smart society where technology and data enhance a circular economy, fostering sustainable and water-efficient practices; calls on all relevant actors to accelerate the transition towards water-efficient, circular industry and agriculture by promoting and investing in innovative solutions, including digital tools and technologies, resource recovery, water reuse, renewable energy production, infrastructure, nature-based solutions and inclusive governance mechanisms;

    12. Urges the Commission to integrate and mainstream the water dimension into internal and external EU policies through a cross-sectoral approach in order to ensure that water resilience, sustainability and security is woven into the fabric of European policies; calls on the Commission, in particular, to carry out a water-related assessment of any regulatory measure, including related to energy, as part of the socio-economic and environmental impact assessment; emphasises that assessing how each EU policy, and EU-funded projects and infrastructure, can impact water resources in terms of quantity, quality and accessibility would ensure that water resilience is a cornerstone of policy formulation and implementation, thus shifting the paradigm from treating water as an infinite resource to recognising its intrinsic value for humanity and for the EU’s ecological and socio-economic landscape and its competitiveness;

    Water efficiency

    13. Stresses that efficient water use is essential for preserving the EU’s water resources and that water efficiency should be a key objective of the EU; calls, in this regard, for a consequential reduction in water demand, including by addressing excessive leakage levels, investing in research and innovative solutions, modernising industrial and production processes, upgrading water infrastructure, managing water resources and peak demands sustainably, prioritising uses and ensuring that higher water efficiency results in a reduction in overall freshwater consumption as well as in an increase in water availability in water-stressed areas at the local and regional levels; believes that areas affected by prolonged drought and desertification should be given priority;

    14. Calls for a legislative framework setting sectoral water efficiency and water abstraction targets at basin level, based on up-to-date assessments of water availability and climate risks, including a water valuation approach that accounts for ecosystem services and long-term sustainability, and covering all water uses, including industry, energy, agriculture, public institutions and households; underlines the fact that these targets should be ambitious yet adaptable, taking into account the specific circumstances and progress already achieved by each Member State to ensure continued efforts towards efficiency gains across all regions; stresses the importance of efficient and uniform data collection practices across the Member States and all sectors, including through the use of innovative technologies, as well as real-time data collection points for more transparency on water consumption; emphasises the need to carry out an appropriate assessment of the environmental and socio-economic impacts of water use;

    15. Reiterates the need to develop a common EU methodology for setting water efficiency and water abstraction targets to ensure the sustainable use of available renewable water resources within an integrated water resources management framework which gives due consideration to linkages beyond the water sector through the water-energy-food-ecosystems nexus, thus enabling decision-makers and economic actors to plan the necessary investment to ensure water supply security in an increasingly sustainable manner, while giving due consideration to the characteristics of the water bodies concerned;

    16. Calls for close collaboration on integrated energy and water resource planning and related technologies across all sectors at national, regional and local levels, including between all stakeholders, in order to establish mechanisms for ensuring coherence across water and energy policies;

    17. Calls on the Commission to put forward a comprehensive policy on sustainable water management for industry based on reducing, recovering, reusing and recycling, including a focus on the use of water-efficient and circular technologies, water recycling, pollutant reduction strategies and the promotion of closed-loop systems;

    18. Recalls that the growing threat of water scarcity is jeopardising industries and projects that are key to Europe’s competitiveness drive, including semiconductors, data centres, renewable hydrogen and electric vehicle battery production; notes that these industries will increasingly face pressure to reduce their environmental impact and improve water resource efficiency, including both direct and indirect water usage; calls on the Member States to support water-intensive industries in setting up water-efficiency plans aimed at saving, reusing and recycling water, preventing water pollution and implementing water-efficient technologies; calls on the Commission to incorporate comprehensive water management strategies into relevant EU industrial policies and sector-specific transition pathways, with a particular focus on strategic water-intensive sectors;

    19. Stresses that knowledge, data, research and technology are key for efficient water use; calls for adequate financial and technical support to be given to the Member States to implement efficient water management measures, including by means of innovative and modern technologies;

    20. Welcomes the recommendations of the final report of the Strategic Dialogue on the future of EU agriculture underlining that sustainable farming practices and new business models need to be scaled up to promote more efficient use of natural resources, especially water;

    21. Calls for the transition to a more sustainable and competitive farming model, assisted by the implementation of sustainable practices and innovative solutions that promote biodiversity, reduce chemical inputs and enable water resources to be managed efficiently, including nature-based solutions, regenerative management, smart precision irrigation technologies, digital monitoring systems, advanced treatment methods and smart water distribution networks, optimising consumption and preventing water resource depletion, and that help ensure continued productivity while enabling agriculture to reduce pollution, use pesticides and fertilisers efficiently, improve the hydrological cycle, enhance groundwater recharge and adapt to lower water use; considers that technological solutions can also include measures that can increase water absorption, infiltration and retention in agricultural systems, which are important amid increasing occurrences of both drought and heavy rains;

    22. Points out that innovative irrigation solutions and practices can enhance water efficiency in agriculture, gaining an economic advantage while also reducing environmental burdens; notes that farmers generally lack sufficient means and incentives to know about water use by crops, actual irrigation applications, the yield responses of crops to different water management practices, and thus current on-farm water-efficiency levels; calls on the Commission and the Member States to incentivise the uptake and support the maintenance of innovative irrigation solutions such as drip irrigation to allow for an active management of water levels and efficient use of water resources, as well as to promote continuous knowledge exchange, so that all relevant stakeholders can share greater responsibility across the entire water supply chain;

    23. Recommends better consideration of the nutrient cycle in agricultural production and the exploitation of the value in urban wastewater; calls for more research into the effective use of nutrients and the development of nutrient recovery technologies, in order to decrease the Union’s dependence on imported raw materials; recognises the high potential for nutrient recovery from water and calls on the Member States to support the agricultural sector to optimise their nutrient consumption including by using resources (nitrate and phosphorus) recovered from wastewater treatment plants; calls on the Commission to propose an integrated nutrient management action plan to effectively address loss of valuable agricultural inputs, recycling of nutrients, nutrient pollution and inefficiencies in the nutrient cycle;

    24. Emphasises, in line with the final report of the Strategic Dialogue on the future of EU agriculture, the need to support the transition to regionally adapted crop and seed varieties and the switch to different crops, with reduced water requirements and greater drought resistance, as well as the need to support the adoption of appropriate soil management practices; considers the need for stronger support for scientific research and technological development related to the breeding of new species, to enable the production and supply of foodstuffs to be diversified and their quality enhanced, while raising the level of protection for human health and the environment; notes the potential of plant varieties that are more resistant to water stress and pests and could play a role in reducing water use and could reduce the environmental footprint of crops;

    25. Calls for financial and technical support for farmers and rural communities, particularly in water-stressed areas, to help them adopt sustainable land management practices that improve soil and water quality, contribute to biodiversity and mitigate climate change; emphasises the need for special attention to be given to regions that are particularly vulnerable to soil degradation and water scarcity;

    26. Points to the success of the agricultural  European Innovation Partnership EIP‑AGRI and calls for the continuation of knowledge exchange, expertise and peer-to-peer learning via the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) Network;

    27. Notes the links between carbon sinking and water availability, and calls for coherence between the water resilience strategy and carbon farming schemes;

    28. Reiterates that the Water Reuse Regulation aims at reducing the pressure on water bodies by setting out provisions on reusing water after appropriate treatment extends its life cycle, thereby preserving water resources; emphasises, however, that regulatory, financial and technological barriers, including the economic competitiveness of reclaimed wastewater, risk management planning and the sharing of responsibilities, contribute to the slow uptake of reuse of reclaimed water for agriculture; calls, therefore, on the Commission and the Member States to adopt supportive policies, at both the EU and the local level, that incentivise water reuse practices, taking into account the importance of adapting wastewater treatment and quality requirements to the intended water use; notes that treated wastewater also finds valuable applications in various industrial processes and urban contexts, contributing to reducing the pressure on freshwater resources and the conservation of drinking water; calls therefore on the Commission to assess a possible extension of the scope of the Water Reuse Regulation in order to establish, at EU level, minimum water quality standards for safe water reuse for industrial and urban purposes;

    29. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to specify systems of regulatory and financial incentives for the reuse of treated wastewater in water-intensive sectors and to provide specific funding for the construction of infrastructure connecting wastewater treatment plants and refined water distribution networks; urges a streamlined approach in EU legislation to remove administrative barriers and promote safe and efficient water recycling across the Member States; calls on the Member States to set up national water reuse and saving plans to incentivise cross-sectoral cooperation in water management;

    30. Reiterates that reused water could alleviate abstraction from rivers, lakes and groundwater for irrigated agriculture; underlines the fact that reused water can contribute to maintaining base flows and minimum water levels during dry periods;

    31. Highlights the potential of the building sector to save water, for example, with the help of smart sub-metering systems, efficient greywater systems, reuse of domestic wastewater or rainwater harvesting; stresses that the energy performance of buildings can be enhanced by water efficiency, reducing greenhouse gas emissions; calls on the Member States and local authorities to incentivise water-saving features in new buildings; stresses, in this regard, that water-efficient practices should be factored into urban planning; highlights the fact that harvesting rain water as well as using and reusing water efficiently can improve climate adaptation in cities;

    32. Calls for the transition, in industry and in the energy and digital sectors, to optimised cooling efficiency and alternative cooling methods that are less water-dependent, in order to ensure significant water savings in these sectors;

    33. Points out that, while households represent 10 % of the overall water consumption in the EU, action on improving domestic water efficiency is also necessary; notes that water-saving technological solutions are readily available and can reduce water consumption in households without compromising comfort or requiring high investment; calls on the Member States to support consumers in transitioning towards such technologies and to strengthen consumer awareness of water consumption and potential efficiency gains by anchoring domestic water efficiency in water, building and consumer policies across the EU;

    34. Notes that the leakage rates from pipes are high in some Member States, which increases the total share of domestic water consumption; welcomes the provisions of the new Drinking Water Directive on leakage rates and the ongoing work of the Commission to evaluate those rates and set threshold values that will trigger action in the Member States concerned; calls on the Member States to urgently tackle leakage in water supply networks and to fully implement the monitoring and reporting requirements of the Drinking Water Directive, so that the Commission can set a threshold value for leakage by January 2028; emphasises the need for sustainable urban irrigation networks to be modernised, to curb leakages and reduce their water footprint; calls on the Member States to regularly inform the public about the efficiency and effectiveness of their water supplies;

    35. Points out that public sector organisations provide significant untapped potential for saving water by virtue of their size or their nature as public organisations; believes that the public sector should act as a role model for other sectors;

    36. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to promote easily accessible and free information, training, advisory programmes and information campaigns aimed at raising public awareness of sustainable water resource management;

    37. Recommends that water-efficiency aspects, such as reductions in water loss and reuse of water, be integrated in the upcoming revision of the public procurement framework;

    Water pollution

    38. Underlines the fact that the existing EU water policy framework is designed to address the effective management of water resources and the protection and restoration of freshwater and marine ecosystems, but that its poor implementation and enforcement, insufficient funding and lack of proper cost-benefit analyses of the implementation measures undermine its effectiveness;

    39. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to implement and enforce the current legislation, in particular the WFD and its ‘daughter’ directives (the Groundwater Directive and the Environmental Quality Standards Directive), with a particular focus on strengthening the monitoring and reporting mechanisms to ensure that all Member States consistently implement the required water protection measures; recalls the need for sufficient funding to implement these acts;

    40. Stresses that the chemical pollution of surface water and groundwater poses a threat to the aquatic environment, with effects such as acute and chronic toxicity in aquatic organisms, accumulation of pollutants in the ecosystem and loss of habitats and biodiversity, as well as to human health;

    41. Calls for the establishment of a comprehensive EU-wide quality standard for PFAS totals in groundwater and surface water; stresses that respective updates of the relevant directives are essential for safeguarding water quality and achieving good chemical status for water bodies as mandated under the WFD;

    42. Insists that essential uses of PFAS, for example for medical devices, pharmaceuticals and products necessary for the transition to climate neutrality, are not endangered; calls on the Commission to propose to phase out forever chemicals (PFAS) in consumer goods with proven concerns for human health and the environment, and only where there are safe alternatives;

    43. Calls on the Commission to propose updated limits on PFAS in drinking water, taking into account the latest scientific knowledge;

    44. Emphasises the urgency of addressing, primarily at the source, and effectively monitoring pollution from pharmaceuticals, bisphenols, antimicrobial resistance genes, persistent organic pollutants and other existing and emerging pollutants, to align with the EU’s zero pollution ambition and the goal of achieving good chemical status for all water bodies;

    45. Calls on the Commission to close the gaps with enhanced funding and the enforcement of current laws, and the integration of circular economy principles to mitigate pollution at its source and safeguard water ecosystems for future generations; underscores the fact that antibiotic-resistant bacteria and certain emerging pollutants remain insufficiently addressed, necessitating further innovation and investment; emphasises the need for all sectors to apply sustainable production processes and circular practices, proactively preventing pollutants from entering water systems;

    46. Recalls that microplastics may enter drinking water sources in a number of ways: from surface run-off (for example, after a rain event) to wastewater effluent (both treated and untreated), combined sewer overflows, industrial effluent, degraded plastic waste and atmospheric deposition; calls on the Commission to put forward, in line with the requirements of the Drinking Water Directive, a full risk assessment of microplastics in drinking water, while continuously working on reliable and robust sampling and analytical methods in order to appropriately address the potential threat of this emerging pollutant to sources of water intended for human consumption;

    47. Emphasises the need to improve the monitoring and regulation of plastic pollution in freshwater and marine environments, with particular attention to microplastics and single-use plastics; encourages the Commission to assess current enforcement mechanisms and consider further measures to protect water quality;

    48. Calls on the stakeholders to develop safe water contact materials, to substitute BPA and other bisphenols and ensure compliance with Regulation (EU) 1935/2004 on materials and articles intended to come into contact with food[63] and the recently adopted provisions as regards the use of BPA and other bisphenols and bisphenol derivatives (Commission Regulation (EU) 2024/3190);

    49. Recalls that the revised Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive, in effect since 1 January 2025, imposes new obligations regarding water purification, requiring pharmaceutical and cosmetic producers to cover at least 80 % of the costs of removing micropollutants from wastewater, with the aim of reducing harmful substances in the environment;

    50. Calls for increased EU support for local authorities for the modernisation of wastewater treatment plants and the promotion of water reuse, to align with the EU’s zero pollution ambition, ensuring that municipal wastewater management contributes effectively to good chemical and ecological water status;

    51. Calls for increased monitoring of pesticide residues in water bodies and enforcement of pesticide application regulations to mitigate their impact on water quality; stresses the need for increased funding to support farmers in the adoption of low-input and organic farming practices that reduce reliance on chemical pesticides and fertilisers, as well as to provide appropriate training and independent advisory services to farmers and other operators on the use, effectiveness and toxicity of pesticides, as well as best practice;

    52. Insists on the integration of circular economy principles to reduce hazardous chemical use in industrial processes; stresses the need for additional funding to support industries in transitioning to clean technologies that minimise water pollution[64];

    53. Recognises the role of treated sludge as a local and circular source of fertiliser, contributing to soil health, nutrient recycling and reduced dependency on synthetic fertilisers; emphasises the importance of preventing PFAS, heavy metals, microplastics and other harmful substances from entering sewer networks in order to enable the safe and sustainable use of high-quality sewage sludge in agriculture;

    54. Calls on the Commission to include an overview of measures in an annex to the EWRS, with a timeline for achieving the objectives in question;

    Adaptation to climate change: floods, droughts, stress areas, disaster preparedness

    55. Calls for the climate adaptation proofing of all new EU legislative and non-legislative acts in order to ensure the integration of climate adaptation into sectoral plans and policy measures affecting water and land use; highlights, in this regard, the need for increased climate ambition as part of the fight against climate change, while urging the Member States to ensure that all climate adaptation measures affecting water use contribute to long-term, improved water resilience; calls on the Commission to take fully into account the geographical and environmental conditions in the Member States, as well as the specific situation of islands, outermost regions and other areas of high vulnerability, such as areas affected by desertification, when adopting new legislative and non-legislative proposals; asks the Commission to present a roadmap for current and ongoing legislative and non-legislative policy measures, including targets and monitoring requirements affecting water and land use;

    56. Emphasises the need for tailored climate adaptation measures for the Mediterranean region, which faces unique challenges such as prolonged droughts and saline intrusion into freshwater resources;

    57. Stresses the specific challenges faced by island areas due to the scarcity of drinking water and calls for targeted measures to protect island water resources, including improving rainwater collection and storage infrastructure, and implementing alternative water sources, while enhancing water resource monitoring and management systems; calls, further, on the Member States to take better account of mountainous regions in national adaptation plans in order to meet the specific challenges of water management in mountainous areas;

    58. Reiterates that climate change mitigation and adaptation solutions should not come at the cost of ecosystem degradation, and should avoid increasing the demand for water- and energy-intensive activities, and should instead prioritise energy- and water-efficient innovation and technologies as part of moving towards a more resource-efficient economy, without undermining its productivity, while ensuring equitable access to water for all; points out that, in order to be effective, climate change mitigation and adaptation solutions should be tailored to national circumstances, while enhancing competitiveness and productivity in the short and long term; points out the possibilities of synergies, in this regard, with innovative energy production such as photovoltaics and biogas, as it can also contribute to an increase in agricultural income;

    59. Recognises the importance of reserving water for nature and the need to maintain healthy freshwater ecosystems, for the good functioning of the water cycle, for human activities and for mitigating the impacts of droughts and water scarcity; underlines, in the context of restoring freshwater ecosystems and the natural functions of rivers, the importance of removing ‘obsolete barriers’, namely artificial barriers that no longer fulfil their original purpose or are no longer needed, wherever such opportunities exist, on the basis of current knowledge and experience; calls for the establishment of specific programmes for the cleaning and conservation of river channels, ensuring minimum flow and reducing the accumulation of debris and sediment that can affect water storage and distribution capacity;

    60. Insists that, with climate change impact becoming more persistent, flood and drought management must fully integrate the arising risks, including changing weather patterns, such as increased rain patterns leading to excess of water; is convinced that a combination of monitoring and data collection, preparedness, emergency and recovery responses taking into account the principle of ‘building back better’[65]on the one hand, and adapting societal and economic activities on the other, is essential to reduce vulnerability and increase resilience, especially in the light of the quantitative aspect of water becoming more prominent; stresses, in this regard, the need for climate-resilient nature-based solutions and infrastructure that take into account the impact of extreme climate events in their development to ensure their viability in the face of extreme climate events;

    61. Recalls that in 2007, the WFD was supplemented by Directive 2007/60/EC on the assessment and management of flood risks, which aims to establish a framework to reduce the adverse consequences of flooding on human health, the environment, cultural heritage and economic activity; notes that making the two directives mutually compatible is achieved through risk management plans and river basin flood management plans as the components of an integrated water management system in which coordination is crucial; recalls that flood prevention is closely connected to urban green spaces, soil protection strategies and investment in drainage networks;

    62. Stresses that preparedness for water scarcity and drought can be significantly improved in the EU, considering that no drought management plans are in place in several Member States[66]; calls on the Member States and, where applicable, competent regional and local authorities, to develop drought management plans, particularly with a view to ensuring the provision of drinking water, ensuring food production and integrating digitalised monitoring, control and early warning systems in order to support effective and data-based decisions on protection, response and communication measures with clearly defined areas of responsibility; points out the need to introduce EU-level provisions as regards drought management plans, similar to the ones on flood management plans;

    63. Insists, in view of the numerous climatic events, such as floods, droughts and cyclones, which have affected Europe, on the importance of the EU having a robust mechanism for responding to such crises, including systems for warning and providing assistance to the civilian population; points out that digital monitoring, adequate public display of relevant data and early warning systems are key to developing effective drought and flood management plans at the level of the Member States; emphasises, further, the importance of fully using the available EU tools, such as the flood forecasts of the European Flood Awareness System and the Global Flood Awareness System, and the Global Flood Monitoring tool, as part of the Copernicus Emergency Management Service;

    64. Stresses the importance of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) in helping countries hit by water-related disasters such as flood and droughts; calls for increased funding to provide the UCPM with sufficient and upgraded resources in order to increase preparedness and improve capacity building;

    65. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to enhance citizen preparedness in the event of water-related disasters or crisis; stresses the importance of information campaigns and demonstration exercises in education facilities, public administration and businesses in order to build a ‘preparedness culture’ for citizens;

    66. Calls on the Member States to systematically renew and upgrade their water infrastructure, including drinking water and sanitation infrastructure, as well as infrastructure regulating river flows, and to invest in innovative solutions based on good practice, making water systems more resilient to climate change, ensuring stable drinking water supply, enabling the early detection of losses and reducing water leakages and waste, while optimising water transport and storage systems; highlights the fact that funding for innovative water infrastructure is insufficient compared to the investment needs across the EU; calls, in this regard, for dedicated funding, on national, regional or EU level, to ensure adequate financing for the development, maintenance and modernisation of water-resilient infrastructure, to foster innovative solutions and technologies and ensure long-term sustainability of that water infrastructure;

    67. Regrets that, despite the threat that desertification poses to water quality and availability, soil fertility and food production, and despite the fact that 13 Member States have declared themselves to be affected by desertification in the context of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, the Commission is not addressing desertification effectively and efficiently; urges the Commission, therefore, in line with the Council conclusions of 14 October 2024 on desertification, land degradation and drought, to present an integrated EU-wide action plan to combat desertification, land degradation and drought, aiming at building resilience to drought and achieving land degradation neutrality in the EU by 2030, based on a full impact assessment;

    68. Calls on the Member States to create natural water reserves based on up-to-date assessments of climate risks to protect critical water supplies and their catchments, and taking into consideration the environmental and socio-economic impact of developing such reserves; points out that such natural water reserves would complement the WFD’s requirement for Member States to identify water bodies used for drinking water abstraction, making sure they meet the objectives set out in Article 4 WFD and in the Drinking Water Directive, and would ensure their necessary protection; notes that such natural water reserves already exist under different forms in various Member States; stresses that assistance should be given to Member States or local and regional governments to help them develop natural water reserves;

    69. Notes the potential of retention infrastructure as an example of water generation systems created using the best available, cost-effective techniques that have the lowest environmental impact, including by means of wastewater reuse or rainwater collection, in order to reduce the risks of droughts and floods, increase water security and foster circularity, water reclamation and reuse; believes that water retention facilities may be useful tools provided that they are authorised by local or national authorities under clear conditions, including the capacity of local groundwater to sustain such activities and the need for farmers accessing the water resource to adapt their practices to more sustainable practices, in particular in terms of water needs and water quality; calls on the Commission to use its available tools, including financial support, to streamline this approach among the Member States;

    70. Deplores the unlawful or intentional abstraction of water, which is likely to cause substantial damage to water bodies; calls for strong dissuasive measures to be applied, including through the criminal law, to protect the ecological status or the ecological potential of surface water bodies or of the quantitative status of groundwater bodies; notes that additional support for training and knowledge transfer for national enforcement capacities is needed;

    71. Notes the important cross-cutting role of nature-based solutions in addressing the challenges of the triple planetary crisis and restoring the natural water cycle; calls on the Commission and the Member States to prioritise, taking into account the environmental and socio-economic impacts, the deployment of nature-based solutions for water resilience in their policy actions and recommendations, such as the re-wetting of wetlands and peatlands to increase ground water availability and surrounding soil moisture, the restoration and protection of floodplains, natural water retention measures, revegetation as a barrier against floods, and rainwater conservation, in order to strengthen water availability, mitigate climate change risks and support long-term resilience for communities, businesses and food production; underlines that, in addition to nature-based solutions, complementary investment in engineering solutions remains necessary to ensure successful climate adaptation and water resilience in the long term;

    Funding and pricing

    72. Notes that nature-based solutions and natural water retention measures have the potential to restore groundwater levels and support ecological flows while reducing water-related risks from water scarcity, floods and droughts; notes that in flood management, nature-based solutions cannot usually replace existing solutions and may not be effective for the most extreme events; points out, however, that nature-based solutions can enhance the effectiveness and operable life of grey infrastructure by increasing water absorption capacity, reducing water velocity and regulating peak flows; reiterates, in this regard, that the effectiveness of nature-based solutions is context-specific and must be adapted to the local situation; emphasises in this regard that a ‘one solution that fits all’ does not exist;

    73. Stresses the need to provide financial support for sustainable innovative methods and solutions, while having due regard to public-private partnerships;

    74. Stresses, in the context of climate adaptation, the importance of healthy soils in ensuring water security and circularity; emphasises that the natural water retention of soils must be improved through measures to enhance soil health, minimising carbon losses, as well as actions at the level of the water body, such as the stabilisation of riverbanks, including through re-naturalisation, and the restoration of the retention capacities of aquifers;

    75. Notes that thoroughly designed forest management measures can improve watershed health, regulate water flow and reduce drought and flood stress, given the essential role of trees and forests in water cycle regulation, through their ability to purify water, increase the availability of water resources and improve soil moisture retention; proposes that this be duly considered when the Commission, in cooperation with the Member States, develops Union disaster resilience goals and that it be considered in the development and refinement of disaster risk management and contingency planning; highlights the need, in this regard, for more research, data collection, innovation and funding to support land managers in preventing the impact of environmental stressors such as drought floods and diminishing watershed function;

    76. Recognises that urban areas are increasingly vulnerable to water-related climate risks such as flooding, water shortages and heat stress; calls for the integration of urban water resilience planning into climate adaptation strategies, including investment in green roofs, permeable infrastructure, rainwater harvesting and storm water retention systems, as well as measures aimed at increasing green and blue spaces in urban areas, in order to mitigate extreme weather impacts and to reduce the risks to human life and property; calls further for the maintenance of, and regained access to, urban waterways in cities;

    77. Emphasises that the EWRS should ensure adequate funding from public and private sources in order to support the modernisation, upgrading, adaptation and maintenance of resilient water infrastructure, sustainable water management, data collection, research, effective monitoring, digitalisation, upskilling, nature-based solutions, the development and the uptake of innovative water-efficient technologies, as well as to ensure environmental and socio-economic sustainability in line with the goals set by the new European Competitiveness Compass;

    78. Calls on the Commission to create a separate and dedicated fund for water resilience within the upcoming MFF; believes that specific financial mechanisms should also be established within the European Regional Development Fund and the Cohesion Fund to support water-smart technologies and water investment; strongly believes that, in the interim, water should be prioritised in existing funding frameworks, including the Cohesion Fund; stresses that EU funding mechanisms must incorporate considerations of social equity and affordability, in particular in the context of providing water services to the population, ensuring support for Member States and citizens with greater financial constraints and specific realities, while meeting water management obligations; highlights the importance of adjusting existing funding, subsidies and financing streams related to water management and other related land uses, moving away from outdated engineering solutions to innovative ones, as well as nature-based solutions or a combination thereof;

    79. Calls for targeted funding, via Horizon Europe and the EIP-AGRI, for field trials on the water relations of different cropping systems; calls for the recognition of the role of women in water policies and for specific funding to be identified to promote their access to agriculture;

    80. Recalls that the lack of dedicated funding for water or binding funding targets within the current MFF limits the EU’s capacity to direct targeted investment towards essential water resilience measures, including infrastructure modernisation, innovation, climate adaptation measures and the implementation of nature-based solutions, and thus its competitive capacity, as the absence of a water balance creates an additional burden for the economy of the regions; notes that outermost and mountainous regions and islands in the EU are particularly struggling to access funding or public-private partnerships to support local and regional investment in water management and infrastructure;

    81. Stresses the important role of the European Investment Bank (EIB) in water financing; highlights the fact that the EIB is actively investing in and supporting the water sector; stresses that the EU should collaborate with the EIB to share best practice and calls, further, on the EIB and other financial institutions to strengthen their role in the funding of innovative and resilient water infrastructure, improved sanitation and drinking water infrastructure, digitalisation, as well as to support projects aimed at flood risk reduction, erosion prevention and the revitalization of watercourses, by facilitating favourable conditions for water investment;

    82. Urges the Commission to explore and promote innovative financing mechanisms, including payments for ecosystem services and green bonds, while ensuring regulatory clarity and safeguards to prevent market distortions; calls on the EIB and other financial institutions to prioritise low-interest loans and credits for Member States and regional and local authorities undertaking large-scale restoration projects, with specific provisions to support economically disadvantaged regions;

    83. Highlights the importance of public-private partnerships as a source of funding for water investment; calls on the Commission to incentivise private investment in the water sector by creating a supportive regulatory framework that may include co-financing opportunities and public-private partnerships in order to drive innovation, improve infrastructure and ensure sustainable water management solutions across the Member States; underlines, nevertheless, that the involvement of private investment in the EU water sector must not undermine the status of water as a public good and a public service, and that the long-term resilience of the sector, as well as the principles of accessibility, affordability and sustainability must be ensured;

    84. Calls on the Member States to adopt governance frameworks that clearly define the roles and responsibilities of stakeholders in planning, financing and implementing nature-based solutions; believes that these frameworks should integrate funding from diverse sources, including philanthropic contributions and private-sector partnerships, while ensuring equitable access to resources for small-scale projects, particularly managed at local or regional levels;

    85. Urges the Commission and the Member States to address water aspects in their budgets and to improve governance within the regions in the use of EU funds;

    86. Underlines the need to provide targeted financial and technical assistance to municipalities to facilitate compliance with water-related legislation;

    87. Encourages the Member States to accelerate the granting of authorisations for sustainable and innovative resilient water infrastructure projects to enable their rapid implementation in the face of the urgent challenges;

    88. Notes that the application of the cost recovery principle on water services, which provides that all water users effectively and proportionately participate financially in the recovery of the costs of water services, remains low to non-existent in several Member States; calls on the Member States and their regional authorities to implement adequate water pricing policies and apply the cost recovery principle for both environmental and resource costs in line with the WFD; calls on the Member States to take into account the long investment cycles when implementing the cost recovery principle and to ensure sufficient funding is available for needed (re)investment;

    89. Stresses the importance of ensuring that water pricing supports long-term water security by reflecting the economic, environmental and resource costs of water use; encourages the Member States and competent regional and local authorities to ensure that water pricing is economically sustainable, socially fair and promotes efficient water use, and that it reflects the availability of water across different Member States and regions, particularly in water-stressed regions, while safeguarding affordability for households and small businesses; calls on the Member States and competent regional and local authorities to insure transparent water prices and to raise awareness of the value of water services;

    90. Points out that competent national water authorities will play a central role in implementing new water management and conservation plans at the level of the Member States; calls, therefore, on the Members States to financially and technically increase the capacity of those competent authorities to play a more significant enabling and advisory role in sustainable and future-proof water management and storage infrastructure; believes that EU funds, such as the Just Transition Fund, should be used to further assist Member States and water agencies in implementation;

    Digitalisation, security and technological innovation

    91. Stresses the potential and the necessity for digitalisation and AI in improving the management and monitoring of bodies of water and water infrastructure, as well as in reporting and ensuring the comparability of data reflecting different geographical flow conditions;

    92. Calls on the Commission, the Member States and water providers to mainstream transparency and digitalisation as fundamental principles in water management and to enhance the use of management and metering data, with the aim of strengthening  monitoring, assessment, accountability and decision-making, while optimising and simplifying reporting obligations; calls for digitally enabled water technologies to facilitate real-time, sample-based and distance monitoring and reporting on water quality, leakages, usage and resources; calls for improved efficiency in the use of public funds and public spending in this area; recognises that widespread deployment of innovative digital technologies needs to be accompanied by digital skills training;

    93. Emphasises the need to promote digitalisation and data-centric solutions in building a water-smart society; stresses the need to develop digital solutions for monitoring water consumption and optimising the use of water resources across all sectors; calls on the Commission, in cooperation with the Member States, to provide financial support for the implementation of smart water management systems, focusing on the needs of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs);

    94. Points out that water systems, including water treatment and distribution systems, are considered one of the nation’s critical infrastructures and security pillars, and hence key for the EU’s strategic autonomy, and require increased protection and the ability of utilities to detect, respond to, and recover from physical and cyberthreats and cyberattacks; notes that a higher level of digitalisation comes with new vulnerabilities; points out that, in the event of a threat or an attack, water system operators can lose their ability to control the flow and quality of the water or lose the ability to track the true status of the water system; insists that vulnerability assessments and an emergency response plan should be an integral part of the water management system in every Member State; encourages the promotion of information sharing about threats to cybersecurity and procedures to exchange best practice among operators, as well as to establish a cybersecurity culture through technical security measures, competence building and awareness creation and communication; draws attention to the measures and provisions in the NIS2 Directive and the Critical Entities Resilience Directive which could help mitigate the arising security risks; calls on the Commission to take the lead in reinforcing the EU-level coordination formats and to propose effective tools in the upcoming Preparedness Union Strategy with the aim of ensuring timely preparedness to tackle environmental and non-environmental risks to the water bodies that are threatening the EU’s overall security;

    95. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to increase the involvement of women in decisions regarding water resilience; calls for the adoption of a methodological approach that effectively considers gender-related needs in the implementation of water supply projects, by implementing monitoring, reporting and tracking that use tools and indicators disaggregated by gender;

    96. Notes that better data and data analysis are key to evidence-based decision-making and the swift identification of small changes in water quality that could present a threat to bodies of water, together with the evaluation of best practice and identification of the most cost-effective and impactful measures;

    97. Stresses that improved, reliable and interoperable data on water supply, demand, distribution, accessibility and use are needed and that data points need to be established; urges the Commission and the Member States to enhance data collection and improve data interoperability across all levels to support the implementation of current water legislation, as well as to facilitate circular economy and water-smart industrial symbiosis strategies; highlights the fact that data and AI could be used in modelling water and energy consumption as well as reuse and recycling capacities;

    98. Calls on the Commission to better recognise the fundamental role of the water sector in bolstering EU competiveness by fostering research and innovation and promoting entrepreneurship and talent; emphasises, in this regard, the importance of ramping up innovation in the water sector; points out that the European Innovation Centre for Industrial Transformation and Emissions, created as part of Directive 2010/75/EU, could play a role in this regard, as it evaluates the environmental performance of industrial technologies and gathers information on innovative industrial environmental techniques; points, further, to existing partnerships like the Water4All Partnership, a funding programme for scientific research;

    99. Believes that there is a need to build and nurture multi-stakeholder platforms to promote innovation uptake at all levels, local and national; recommends that these platforms involve a wide range of participants – the public and private sectors, and civil society associations – to build a coalition of partners to bring about change; supports the promotion of knowledge sharing on how digital water technologies can support the implementation of existing EU water legislation, as well as capacity building at local, regional and national levels; calls on the Commission and the Members States to expand digital skills, and research and development (R&D) programmes targeting water, including through collaboration with universities, research centres and SMEs;

    100. Acknowledges the critical role of data centres in the digital economy; notes with concern that the rapid expansion of the technology could lead to a substantial increase in AI’s demand for water resources associated with their operations, which could undermine the environmental benefits that AI promises to deliver, such as resource optimisation and carbon emission reductions, and stresses the need to integrate water efficiency measures in their design and operation; urges the Commission to address the use of water resources by information and communications technologies (ICT) and, in particular, by AI and data centres in its EWRS, in particular by encouraging data centres to reuse treated water and to promote the design of more efficient chips and components to reduce the need for cooling; recommends that the Member States prioritise water resilience strategies that address the specific challenges posed by data centres to ensure the sustainability of both the digital and the environmental agendas;

    101. Recalls that seawater desalination is the process of removing salt from sea or brackish water to make it useable for a range of ‘fit for use’ purposes, including drinking, and that it is thus an important technological solution for people’s livelihoods; notes that, at the same time, desalination is an energy-intensive process and should ideally be done using renewable energy, whenever possible, in order to minimise environmental impacts; reiterates that desalination produces a by-product, brine (a concentrated salt solution), that must be properly disposed of to avoid adverse impacts on the marine environment; considers, therefore, that desalination based on reverse osmosis or thermal technologies should be applied, if other more environmentally sustainable options are not available or cannot be implemented, particularly in remote areas and islands; highlights, in this regard, the ongoing work on new technological solutions, such as microbial desalination cells, offering an environmentally sustainable and innovative alternative to traditional desalination methods, particularly to provide clean water and wastewater treatment to small, isolated locations without electricity;

    102. Stresses the need for increased funding and R&D into technologies such as innovative desalination techniques in order to increase the efficiency, sustainability and the scaling up of such technologies; calls for research into the possibilities of using such technologies in agriculture to diversify the water supply points and therefore decrease the vulnerability of the sector to water stress;

    103. Notes that in the last decade, there have been many scientific breakthroughs for making water treatment smarter and more circular, with these solutions offering opportunities for using digital solutions, AI and remote sensing to use water more efficiently and by reusing treated wastewater for irrigation and recovering energy and nutrients from wastewater;

    104. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to address the regulatory obstacles within the single market to facilitate the development, scaling-up, and placing on the market of innovative biotechnology and biomanufacturing solutions and the promotion of cleaner manufacturing and circularity;

    105. Calls for the funding, development and authorisation of innovative solutions for crop protection and fertilisation, including biological control agents and active substances with lower impact on the environment, which are needed for a just transition to more sustainable agricultural systems;

    106. Calls for specific programmes to be established for the cleaning and conservation of river channels, ensuring adequate flow and reducing the accumulation of debris and sediment that can affect water storage and distribution capacity;

    Cross-border and international cooperation

    107. Stresses the need for a comprehensive EWRS that fosters cross-border cooperation, more uniform data collection and reporting, sharing best practice between local, regional and national actors, ensuring sustainable water management and equitable resource distribution among the Member States, preventing water challenges such as scarcity and flood risk from being passed on to other Member States;

    108. Emphasises that climate change represents a major threat to water resources and aquatic ecosystems; notes that floods and water scarcity compromise food and water security and the health of the general population, ultimately affecting social cohesion and stability; recognises that water resilience is crucial for preventing and addressing current and future health, food, energy and security crises; emphasises that water resilience promotes transboundary water cooperation, serving as a catalyst for peace and security, as countries are interconnected through shared rivers and groundwater resources;

    109. Calls for increased cross-border cooperation between the Member States in the management of shared river basins and groundwater aquifers and in the effective collection and sharing of data on water quality, pollution levels and water levels; recommends the establishment of regional cooperation centres to coordinate the implementation of joint water resilience strategies, taking into account the climate, social and economic challenges of each territory;

    110. Calls for enhanced international cooperation, including at the level of river basins, to address the growing water crisis, ensure clean and high-quality water, promote sustainable water management and implement various innovative water technologies, including nature-based solutions; calls for the anchoring of cooperation across borders at operational, tactical and strategic levels;

    111. Calls for the establishment of cross-border projects under Interreg and other EU funds to improve regional cooperation in the management of water resources, with a particular focus on ensuring the fair distribution of water between sectors and Member States;

    112. Stresses the need to strengthen EU monitoring capacities through digitalisation and modern technologies, including satellite surveillance and real-time pollution tracking, which are essential for preventing and combating cross-border pollution;

    113. Urges the Commission to implement a specific diplomatic role dedicated to resolving water-related conflicts, promoting water cooperation and protecting water sources and systems, particularly during armed conflicts and in transboundary contexts;

    114. Urges the EU to lead international efforts to protect and restore water ecosystems in line with the SDG 6 on clean water and sanitation;

    °

    ° °

    115. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Special Category National Panchayat Awards-2025 to Be Conferred on April 24th, National Panchayati Raj Day, in Bihar

    Source: Government of India

    Special Category National Panchayat Awards-2025 to Be Conferred  on April 24th, National Panchayati Raj Day,  in Bihar

    In a First,  Ministry of Panchayati Raj Institutionalises Special Category Awards to Recognise Panchayats’ Efforts in Climate Action and Self-Reliance

    Posted On: 23 APR 2025 4:30PM by PIB Delhi

    This year’s National Panchayati Raj Day  (NPRD) will mark a special moment with the presentation of the Special Category National Panchayat Awards–2025 at the National event of NPRD-2025 to be held at Lohna Uttar Gram Panchayat, District Madhubani, Bihar on 24th April, 2025. It is for the first time, that the Ministry of Panchayati Raj has institutionalised dedicated Special Category Awards to incentivize and acknowledge exemplary efforts of Gram Panchayats in the key national priorities of Climate Action and Atmanirbharta (Self-Reliance) through augmentation of Own Sources Revenue (OSR). In addition the awards for best Institutions for Capacity Building of Panchayats aligned with the Localisation of Sustainable Development Goals (LSDGs) will also be conferred on the occasion.

    The following Special Category National Panchayat Awards have been introduced to acknowledge outstanding contributions by Panchayats/ Institutions in key national priority areas:

    Climate Action Special Panchayat Award (CASPA) – to encourage Panchayats to act as climate-responsive local governments;

    Atma Nirbhar Panchayat Special Award (ANPSA) – to promote Atmanirbharta through augmentation of Own Source Revenue (OSR) by Panchayats;

    Panchayat Kshamta Nirman Sarvottam Sansthan Puraskar (PKNSSP) – to recognize excellence in capacity building and training of Panchayati Raj representatives and functionaries. This award was instituted by the Ministry in 2023 and first awards were conferred in 2024.

    The Awardees for Special Categories of National Panchayat Awards–2025 are:

    Climate Action Special Panchayat Award (CASPA)

    • Rank 1: Dawwa S Gram Panchayat, Gondia District, Maharashtra
    • Rank 2: Biradahalli Gram Panchayat, Hassan District, Karnataka
    • Rank 3: Motipur Gram Panchayat, Samastipur District, Bihar

    Atma Nirbhar Panchayat Special Award (ANPSA)

    • Rank 1: Mall Gram Panchayat, Rangareddi District, Telangana
    • Rank 2: Hatbadra Gram Panchayat, Mayurbhanj District, Odisha
    • Rank 3: Gollapudi Gram Panchayat, Krishna District, Andhra Pradesh

    Panchayat Kshamta Nirman Sarvottam Sansthan Puraskar (PKNSSP)

    • Rank 1: Kerala Institute of Local Administration (KILA), Kerala
    • Rank 2: State Institute for Rural Development and Panchayati Raj, Odisha
    • Rank 3: State Institute of Panchayat and Rural Development, Assam

    Each award includes a financial incentive of Rs.1 crore (Rank 1), Rs.75 lakh (Rank 2), and Rs.50 lakh (Rank 3) respectively. The awardees will be presented with specially designed trophies and certificates. Notably, 3 of the 6 awardee Gram Panchayats – from Bihar (Motipur Gram Panchayat), Maharashtra (Dawwa S Gram Panchayat), and Odisha (Hatbadra Gram Panchayat) – are headed by women Sarpanches.

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    Aditi Agrawal

    (Release ID: 2123817) Visitor Counter : 21

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi to address Gram Sabhas Nationwide on 24th April, National Panchayati Raj Day from Madhubani, Bihar

    Source: Government of India

    Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi to address Gram Sabhas Nationwide on 24th April, National Panchayati Raj Day from Madhubani, Bihar

    Prime Minister to also confer Special Category National Panchayat Awards 2025, Dedicate Infra Projects worth ₹ 13,500 Crores on the occasion

    Posted On: 23 APR 2025 3:53PM by PIB Delhi

    The nation will commemorate National Panchayati Raj Day (NPRD) on 24th April 2025, marking thirty-two years of the 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992, which gave constitutional status to Panchayats as institutions of rural local self-government. The main function will be organized in the august presence of the Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi, at Lohna Uttar Gram Panchayat, Jhanjharpur Block in  Madhubani District of Bihar. The Prime Minister will address Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) and Gram Sabhas across the country and also confer Special Category National Panchayat Awards 2025 on this occasion. This year, National Panchayati Raj Day is being observed as a major national programme through a “Whole-of-Government” approach, involving participation of six Union Ministries: the Ministry of Rural Development, Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, Ministry of Power, Ministry of Railways, and Ministry of Road Transport and Highways. Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi will dedicate to the nation and  lay foundation stone for several key infrastructure and welfare projects linked to these Ministries on this occasion. These include LPG bottling plants, electrification projects, housing schemes, railway infrastructure, and road development, amounting to approximately Rs.13,500 crores. Financial assistance under Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana (Gramin and Urban) and DAY–NRLM will also be disbursed during the program. With these initiatives, Grameen Bharat, particularly rural regions of Bihar, stand to benefit immensely through enhanced connectivity, services, and economic opportunity.

    The event will be attended by several dignitaries including Shri Nitish Kumar, Chief Minister of Bihar; Shri Rajiv Ranjan Singh alias Lalan Singh, Union Minister of Panchayati Raj; Shri Samrat Choudhary and Shri Vijay Kumar Sinha, Deputy Chief Ministers of Bihar; Shri Kedar Prasad Gupta, Panchayati Raj Minister, Bihar; Shri Amrit Lal Meena, Chief Secretary, Bihar; and Shri Vivek Bharadwaj, Secretary, Ministry of Panchayati Raj, along with other senior officers from the participating Ministries and representatives from across Panchayats. The observance of NPRD 2025 from the Gram Panchayat level emphasizes the Government’s commitment to ensuring that Viksit Panchayats form the solid foundation of Viksit Bharat.

    About the Special Category National Panchayat Awards 2025

    These awards include the Climate Action Special Panchayat Award (CASPA), Atma Nirbhar Panchayat Special Award (ANPSA), and Panchayat Kshamta Nirman Sarvottam Sansthan Puraskar (PKNSSP). The awards aim to recognize Gram Panchayats and institutions that have demonstrated exemplary performance in areas such as climate resilience, fiscal self-reliance, and capacity building. Awardees have been selected from States including Bihar, Maharashtra, Odisha, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Kerala, and Assam. It is noteworthy that three of the six awardee Gram Panchayats – Motipur (Bihar), Dawwa S (Maharashtra), and Hatbadra (Odisha) – are led by women Sarpanches, reflecting inclusive leadership at the grassroots.

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    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Increasing frequency and intensity of wildfires – E-001412/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001412/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy (Renew), Grégory Allione (Renew)

    March 2025 was the driest month ever recorded in the Netherlands, leading to a record number of wildfires. France has already experienced nearly as many wildfires so far this year as in all of 2024. Climate change will exacerbate droughts and extend wildfire seasons. This trend is reflected by the increasing solicitation of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. Between 2007 and 2024, nearly 20 % of all requests for assistance were in response to wildfires. Considering the increasing frequency and intensity of wildfires, we have the following questions:

    • 1.What is the Commission’s projection of the costs of wildfires in the EU in the coming 10 years, and will these costs be taken into account in the next multiannual financial framework and in the EU’s industrial strategy, in particular as regards the funding of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, the development of European firefighting aircraft and the strengthening of the European aerial firefighting industry?
    • 2.How will the increasing frequency of wildfires impact insurance for citizens and entrepreneurs in high-risk areas, and what steps is the Commission taking to address this?
    • 3.What amount of the LIFE Programme subsidies is allocated to drought prevention and what other EU programmes are (partly) dedicated to this, and how much EU funding is allocated in total to drought prevention?

    Submitted: 7.4.2025

    Last updated: 23 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the control of the financial activities of the European Investment Bank – annual report 2023 – A10-0068/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the control of the financial activities of the European Investment Bank – annual report 2023

    (2024/2052(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the European Investment Bank Group (‘EIB Group’) 2023 activity report of 1 February 2024 entitled ‘A Blueprint for Sustainable Living’, and to the EIB Group document of 2 February 2023 entitled ‘EIB Group Operational Plan 2023-2025’,–  having regard to the European Investment Bank (‘EIB’, ‘the Bank’) Investment Report 2023/2024 entitled ‘Transforming for competitiveness’, published on 7 February 2024,

     having regard to the EIB document of 8 May 2023 entitled ‘Mid-term review of the EIB Energy Lending Policy’,

     having regard to the EIB Group report on the implementation of the EIB Group Transparency Policy in 2023, published on 1 July 2024,

     having regard to the EIB Group document of 27 November 2023 entitled ‘The EIB Group PATH Framework – Version 1.2 of November 2023 – Supporting counterparties on their pathways to align with the Paris Agreement’,

     having regard to the EIB Group and EIB documents of 21 June 2024 entitled ‘EIB Group 2024-2027 Strategic Roadmap’ and of 29 November 2023 entitled ‘EIB Global Strategic Roadmap’,

     having regard to the EIB Group Sustainability Report 2023, published on 25 July 2024,

     having regard to the EIB information note of 6 February 2023 entitled ‘The European Investment Bank’s approach to human rights’,

     having regard to the EIB Group Complaints Mechanism Report 2023, published on 10 June 2024,

     having regard to the EIB Group document of 14 October 2024 entitled ‘Diversity, Equity and Inclusion at the EIB Group’,

     having regard to the EIB publication of 23 September 2024 entitled ‘EIB Audit Committee Annual Reports for the year 2023’,

     having regard to the EIB Group report of 15 July 2024 entitled ‘EIB Group activities in EU cohesion regions 2023’,–  having regard to the EIB report of 19 October 2023 entitled ‘EIB Investment Survey 2023 – European Union overview’,

      having regard to the EIB Group report of 26 June 2024 entitled ‘EIB Group support for EU businesses: Evidence of impact in addressing market failures’,

     having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 5 March 2024 entitled ‘A new European Defence Industrial Strategy: Achieving EU readiness through a responsive and resilient European Defence Industry’ (JOIN(2024)0010),

     having regard to European Court of Auditors Special Report 22/2024 entitled ‘Double funding from the EU budget’,

     having regard to the EIB Group report of 29 December 2023 entitled ‘European Investment Bank Group Risk Management Disclosure Report – June 2023’,

     having regard to the joint communication of 19 March 2025 from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy entitled ‘Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0120),

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0068/2025),

    A. whereas the EIB Group includes the EIB and the European Investment Fund (EIF); whereas the EIB stands as the world’s largest multilateral development bank; whereas the EIB is treaty-bound to contribute to EU integration; whereas the EIB’s key priorities include providing funding for projects to foster European integration and social cohesion; whereas the EIF acts as a dedicated body for supporting the European Union’s policy objectives in the areas of entrepreneurship, job creation and economic cohesion;

    B. whereas, as a bank owned by the EU Member States, the EIB is governed by a Board of Governors, a Board of Directors and a Management Committee, and it maintains robust internal mechanisms for accountability, governance and audit; whereas the EIF is owned by the EIB (60 %), the EU (30 %) and financial institutions (10 %) from the Member States, the UK and Türkiye, and is managed by the General Meeting of EIF shareholders, the Board of Directors and the Chief Executive, with independent internal mechanisms for accountability, governance and audit, some of which are shared at the Group level;

    C. whereas both the EIB and the EIF operate within a competitive market but are held to high standards of transparency and stakeholder engagement as EU bodies;

    D. whereas the EIB Group promotes EU policies both within and outside the EU and collaborates closely with other EU and national institutions, aligning its financing with the EU’s political priorities; whereas the EIB Group outlined eight strategic priorities in its Strategic Roadmap for 2024-2027: climate action, digital transformation, defence, cohesion, agriculture, social infrastructure, external financing and promoting the Capital Markets Union;

    E. whereas the EIB is also tasked with securing resources through borrowing activities, which are crucial for implementing the EU’s policies;

    F. whereas the European Council’s strategic agenda for 2024-2029 envisages an enhanced role for the EIB Group as a driver of EU defence and security, and emphasises the need to boost EU competitiveness and improve citizens’ economic and social well-being through significant collective investment efforts, leveraging both public and private funding;

    G. whereas the Draghi report on the future of European competitiveness[1] proposed numerous ways to expand the EIB’s role in financing EU policies and to enable the EIB to assume more risk;

    H. whereas the EIB Group’s core mission is to bolster Europe’s potential for job creation and economic growth; whereas its investments should tackle inequalities by improving access to jobs, training opportunities, housing and education in order to address poverty and unemployment; whereas it is crucial to overcome barriers to financing for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and mid-caps; whereas public lending and guarantee schemes serve as vital countercyclical policy tools, especially during economic downturns, and help mitigate structural market failures;

    I. whereas the EIB is a cornerstone of the European financial architecture for development and the largest multilateral lender in the EU’s neighbouring regions, including the Eastern Neighbourhood countries, the Western Balkans, the Middle East, and North Africa; whereas the EIB is expected to help close the gap in productive investment between Europe and its main competitors by increasing investment in innovation, communication technology and intellectual property;

    J. whereas the success of the EU’s policy objectives and their effective implementation increasingly depend on the EIB Group; whereas the depth and quality of Parliament’s oversight of the EIB’s financial operations should therefore be in line with the intensity of EIB-Commission cooperation, which has become very significant;

    K. whereas the EIB’s business model requires the highest standards of integrity, accountability and transparency, and robust measures must be implemented and regularly updated to combat financial fraud, corruption, money laundering, terrorism, organised crime and both tax evasion and avoidance; whereas the EIB Group has a control framework aimed at preventing and mitigating sanctions risks;

    L. whereas the EIB Group adheres to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s definition of compliance risk, with the aim of preventing the risk of legal or regulatory sanctions, material financial loss, or damage to reputation; whereas the Bank takes appropriate measures to mitigate such risks by ensuring strict compliance with legal and regulatory frameworks, both at EU and international level;

    Financial operations and performance

    1. Acknowledges that the EIB has operated effectively and efficiently in a landscape marked by significant global challenges, including geopolitical tensions, climate change impacts and other factors influencing the global economy; suggests exploring both the EIB’s effectiveness and efficiency through thoughtful analysis, particularly focusing on the impact on competitiveness and growth;

    2. Recognises that EIB financing is becoming increasingly crucial in the context of high interest rates and constrained public finances; expects the EIB, in the context of a challenging economic outlook and increased global competition, to address constraints to EU competitiveness, such as volatile energy prices, skills shortages in key sectors and insufficient investments in innovation and new technologies;

    3. Notes that the EIB Group achieved strong consolidated results amounting to EUR 2.272 billion in 2023 under the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), compared to EUR 2.327 billion in 2022, reflecting a year-on-year decrease of 2.4 %; calls for a detailed analysis of the factors contributing to this decrease, especially since the period was marked by steady economic growth; observes that EIB reserves reached over EUR 56 billion in 2023, up from EUR 53.9 billion in 2022 and EUR 36 billion in 2014;

    4. Notes that the EIB’s total liquidity ratio remained well within internal limits to the end of 2023 and that the EIB’s Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio stood at 33.1 % in 2023, significantly higher than the average ratio of significant institutions supervised by the European Central Bank (ECB) at that time; emphasises that maintaining the EIB’s AAA rating with a ‘stable’ outlook is crucial for securing favourable market financing at preferential rates and should be preserved; underlines that the EIB’s high credit standing is key to its successful business model;

    5. Calls on the EIB to maintain its strong capital position and consistently high profits, but notes that the Bank has potential to absorb potential fluctuations in returns without compromising shareholder capital or its credit rating, has the capacity to take on more risk in strategic investments and is well-equipped to invest more in higher-risk innovative projects where private capital remains hesitant;

    6. Highlights that the EIB’s total disbursements reached EUR 54.4 billion in 2023, with EUR 53.4 billion from its own resources, compared to EUR 54.3 billion (EUR 53.3 billion from its own resources) in 2022; observes that the EIF’s disbursements on private equity investments amounted to EUR 139.7 million in 2023, compared to EUR 113.7 million in 2022; notes that, according to an economic model developed jointly by the EIB’s Economics Department and the Commission’s Joint Research Centre, the EIB Group’s overall investment within the EU in 2023 is expected to create around 1 460 000 new jobs in the EU-27 by 2027 and boost the EU’s GDP by 1.03 percentage points; calls on the EIB Group to ensure a more balanced geographical distribution of investments to maximise their impact across all EU regions, promoting cohesive and inclusive growth throughout the Union, with particular attention to under-represented and less developed areas;

    7. Recalls that the EIB’s Statute mandates geographical balance among its staff and that the selection of staff members must be based on merit, while also considering fair representation of nationals from all Member States; encourages the Bank to continuously monitor geographical balance among its staff and to adjust the recruitment process accordingly, if needed;

    8. Welcomes the fact that the EIB Group upholds a rigorous policy against tax fraud, tax evasion, tax avoidance, money laundering and terrorism financing;

    InvestEU, the simplification of the multiannual financial framework, and the Recovery and Resilience Facility

    9. Welcomes the adoption, on 13 December 2023, of the EIB Group Operational Plan 2024-2026, which outlines the priorities and activities for implementing the EIB Group’s strategy over the next three years; calls for adjustments to new market conditions, including simplification and a reduction of bureaucracy to remove barriers to financing for SMEs, which must be significantly increased; acknowledges that increasing higher-risk activities and mandates is crucial for providing effective support to high value-added and innovative sectors;

    10. Recalls that the EIB Group has been allocated 75 % (EUR 19.6 billion) of the EU budgetary guarantee under the InvestEU Regulation[2]; highlights that, in 2023 alone, the EIB approved 30 operations under InvestEU totalling EUR 9.1 billion; believes that in order to stay competitive, significant investments are needed, primarily from the private sector; believes that focusing on innovative projects, start-ups and scale-ups would enhance European competitiveness and growth; notes that this requires mobilising private investments; calls, therefore, on the EIB to play a more significant role in strategic de-risking through guarantees, thereby encouraging private capital investment;

    11. Stresses that, within the current 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework, the EIB manages 87 mandates from the Commission, increasing to about 130 if those relating to shared management and assigned by local governments and the Member States are included, and notes that the EIB produces no fewer than 457 reports a year for these; points out that de-bureaucratisation and simplification are deemed necessary to enable better use of resources;

    12. Emphasises that the EIB is managing six Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) mandates in four Member States, signed in 2021 (Greece and Italy), 2022 (Romania) and 2024 (Spain), totalling EUR 8.7 billion; acknowledges that the adoption of ‘financing not linked to costs’ instruments, which have significantly expanded with the RRF, inherently raises the risk of errors and double funding; expresses its concern about the transparency, auditing and monitoring of the implementation of the RRF; calls on the EIB to cooperate with Member States to address government capacity constraints and the lack of technical skills so as to ensure that RRF resources are managed as effectively as possible, in alignment with national structures and complying with all RRF reporting requirements, especially in the implementation of investment projects and reforms; urges the Commission and the EIB, in its advisory role, to refrain from proposing new financing mechanisms based on the RRF model without taking corrective measures, including in the upcoming post-2027 multiannual financial framework; stresses that, while the EIB seeks simplification, it must not compromise the soundness of EU resource management or the ability to maintain oversight and accountability, as mandated by the Treaties;

    Energy security

    13. Notes the EIB’s continued support for security of supply, which mainly takes the form of reinforcing electricity grids and cross-border infrastructure, of reducing energy demand through energy efficiency projects and of fostering low-carbon power generation; commends the fact that the EIB has supported new dimensions of energy security, such as demand response and energy storage, and has promoted the development of a sustainable supply of critical raw materials (CRM) needed for the energy transition; calls for an urgent analysis of the real impact of these projects implemented to date, especially of their impact on the availability and cost of energy and thus on the general competitiveness of European companies;

    14. Reiterates the need to address energy poverty and emphasises the need for a fair and inclusive energy transition; recalls that the energy crisis is exacerbating inflation, increasing food insecurity and straining household budgets; encourages the EIB to leverage the Just Transition Mechanism and the Modernisation Fund to support regions and populations most affected by the energy transition; stresses the importance of using the Just Transition Mechanism to support workers and regions affected by the phase out of fossil fuels, ensuring access to retraining and quality jobs; recognises that numerous sectors are grappling with challenges stemming from the combined effects of adaption to European Green Deal objectives and the repercussions of the energy crisis and inflation; stresses that accelerating the deployment of innovative low-carbon technologies requires bringing their costs to a level that is competitive with fossil fuels and adjusting to the ongoing reform of the green policies;

    15. Acknowledges that the REPowerEU plan is a crucial new element in the EU policy response to the energy crisis; notes that, in July 2023, the EIB Group increased the financing targets of the October 2022 commitment from EUR 30.0 billion until 2027 to EUR 45.0 billion (REPowerEU+), in order to scale up its efforts to support the EU’s energy security; calls for a clear overview of potential double funding of energy projects;

    16. Underlines that in 2023, the EIB provided approximately EUR 21.4 billion in financing for energy-related projects, of which around EUR 19.8 billion in the EU and EUR 1.6 billion outside the EU; considers it necessary to increase not only the volume of financing for energy-related projects, but also the efficiency of the investments; underlines, in this regard, the importance of the EIB’s combined offer of competent technical assistance and innovative financial support, and encourages the Bank to expand the range of innovative financing products offered to economic operators, going beyond the standard market offer;

    17. Believes that hydrogen and its derivatives, particularly when sourced from renewable energy, can significantly contribute to the EU’s decarbonisation goals and reduce dependence on fossil fuels; urges the EIB to take a leading role in mobilising private investments, which are essential for scaling up hydrogen production across the EU, while ensuring technological neutrality and supporting a diverse range of innovative solutions for decarbonisation, including further scientific research aimed at enhancing and stabilising the efficiency of hydrogen technology; encourages the Bank to consider the cost-effectiveness of such projects from the perspective of their total life cycle;

    Defence and security policy

    18. Welcomes the significant role that the EIB Group plays in supporting the EU’s defence and security policy by providing funding and leveraging private investment to enhance the Union’s strategic autonomy and resilience; stresses the importance of the EIB’s investment capabilities, supporting initiatives that contribute to strengthening the EU’s defence industry, advancing cybersecurity infrastructure and promoting innovation in critical defence technologies;

    19. Appreciates that security and defence is set as one of the Bank’s core priorities in its Strategic Roadmap for 2024-2027; highlights that in May 2024, the EIB’s Board of Directors approved the EIB Group Security and Defence Industry Action Plan, which follows the EIB Group 2022 Strategic European Security Initiative aimed at supporting innovation in dual-use technology, in order to enhance support for the EU’s security and defence industry; notes, with satisfaction, that EIB Group support is provided to SMEs and innovative start-ups within the security and defence sector under the ‘dual-use’ principle, upholding the ‘credible civil use’ criterion, but waiving the revenue test; welcomes the decision of the EIB Board of Directors of 21 March 2025 to expand the Bank’s eligibilities for financing Europe’s security and defence industry and infrastructure, by ensuring that excluded activities are as limited as possible in scope;

    20. Welcomes the EIB’s targeted investments in both defence and civilian infrastructure and emphasises the need for strategic investment in technologies that serve both civilian and defence purposes, in line with the EU’s broader goals of promoting innovation and enhancing the Union’s security; calls on the EIB Group to conduct a review of the impact of the extension of its new dual-use goods policy;

    21. Stresses the importance of SMEs, start-ups and mid-caps in the security and defence industry and in developing a common European market for defence; believes that smaller actors play a crucial role in strengthening the Union’s capacity and autonomy to develop innovative defence products; encourages the EIB to further support cross-border research and development (R&D) cooperation, particularly by paving the way for smaller actors to take part in the defence supply chains; stresses that greater EIB investment in the defence sector can encourage investment by commercial banks in the same area and considers it necessary to increase the flexibility of lending to SMEs in this regard;

    22. Notes that the resources allocated to support the defence and security sector mainly come from the European Defence Fund (EDF) (EUR 8 billion), the EIB Strategic European Security Initiative (SESI) (EUR 8 billion) and the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) (EUR 1.5 billion); calls for a dedicated capital allocation on defence and the further adjustment of the scope of eligible investments in order to meet the ambitious role of contributing to Europe’s peace and security set by the White Paper on European Defence Readiness 2030 for the EIB Group; welcomes the integration of the EIB’s existing EUR 8 billion SESI into a cross-cutting and permanent public policy goal and the removal of a predefined ceiling for financing in this area; believes that these measures will allow the Bank to respond to the investment needs in security and defence, while safeguarding its operations and strong financial position; believes that the decision by the Board of Governors in June 2024 to increase the gearing ratio of the Bank will enable increased investments in areas of strategic importance, including in security and defence;

    23. Underlines the added value of the innovative measures that the EIB has adopted to accelerate investments in security and defence, and of the ‘one-stop shop’ that acts as the single point of entry for clients and external stakeholders, to whom it offers expert assistance to streamline access and speed up deployment of financing available under the SESI; encourages the EIB to continue developing and implementing agreed upon measures that simplify client procedures and further accelerate investment processes, while ensuring that the AAA rating is preserved;

    24. Notes, with appreciation, that in June 2023, the EIB approved an increase in SESI for security investments in the EU from EUR 6.0 billion to EUR 8.0 billion for the period from 2022 to 2027, also including the space and cybersecurity sectors; encourages the EIB to strengthen institutional partnerships with the EU Agency for the Space Programme and other potentially relevant partners, in accordance with EU competition rules;

    25. Commends the EIB’s cooperation with all relevant stakeholders, including Member State governments, the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the NATO Innovation Fund; appreciates, in particular, the EIB Group’s cooperation with the EDA and welcomes the signing of an update to the memorandum of understanding between the two bodies on 3 October 2024, which will allow them to strengthen strategic partnerships and jointly identify financing needs to better support research, development and innovation (RDI) in the area of security and defence in the Union;

    26. Invites the EIB to further strengthen such collaboration with key stakeholders with a view to increasing impact, synergies and complementarity with EU defence programmes, ensuring that its investments complement broader EU defence policy goals and contribute to achieving economies of scale in European defence capabilities; asks the EIB to enhance regional security and resilience, particularly in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean through the creation of infrastructure that supports regional security and fosters greater cooperation between EU Member States on defence matters; stresses, furthermore, the importance of exploring cooperation with the NATO Innovation Fund in order to improve access to financing for technology start-ups, in parallel to the deployment of the EIF Defence Equity Facility;

    Social infrastructure and housing

    27. Asks the EIB to increase risk-taking for projects providing essential services with long-term clear and measurable benefits; welcomes, in this vein, the EIB Group’s actions and measures in the area of housing and social infrastructure that contribute to affordable housing, social inclusion and regional development, while also supporting sustainability and innovation; calls on the EIB to prioritise its investments towards these goals in order to achieve better economic growth, social inclusion and regional cohesion, while also supporting the EU’s sustainability objectives; invites the Bank to focus on sustainable urban development and inclusive growth by ensuring that the EU’s housing and infrastructure needs are met for a stronger, more cohesive and prosperous Europe;

    28. Emphasises that housing purchase and rental costs have surged significantly in recent years, reducing the affordability of many metropolitan areas in the EU and limiting access to housing; stresses that the EIB must play a stronger role in addressing the housing crisis; welcomes the inclusion of support for social infrastructure in the EIB Group’s eight strategic priorities for 2024-2027 and agrees that investments in energy-efficient, sustainable and accessible housing, and education within easy reach are crucial for boosting productivity and fostering strong and resilient societies; encourages the EIB to prioritise investments in housing cooperatives, energy-efficient social housing and renovation projects targeting low-income households; believes that addressing the EU’s major housing investment gaps requires overcoming both financial and non-financial investment barriers and the large-scale mobilisation of resources and capacities;

    29. Welcomes that the EIB, in collaboration with the Commission, has initiated a pan-European investment platform aimed at promoting affordable and sustainable housing, combining advisory services and financing, and encourages the participants to continue this initiative;

    30. Welcomes the EIB’s commitment to easing the pressure on housing markets in Europe; stresses that housing purchase and rental prices have increased significantly in recent years, reducing the affordability of many metropolitan areas in the EU and compromising access to these; emphasises that EIB analysis shows that the EU needs about 1.5 million new housing units per year to cope with demand, and that about 75 % of the EU’s building stock needs to be renovated, representing an additional 5 million units per year; welcomes the fact that the EIB supports the reconstruction of existing housing and the construction of new social and affordable accommodation; encourages the EIB to mobilise more funding for affordable housing projects among the Member States;

    31. Calls for the strengthening of technical assistance and financial expertise in support of local and regional authorities, especially in areas with low investment capacity, in order to improve access to EIB funding; believes that cooperation with local authorities, local governments and civil society representatives should foster the development of social housing suitable for all, and especially for the most vulnerable citizens of the concerned Member State; is aware that the effectiveness of the EIB’s action in the housing and social infrastructure sector also depends on the removal of policy and regulatory hurdles;

    32. Notes that, in 2023, the EIB signed EUR 8.3 billion in financial support for energy efficiency operations, of which 65 % was for energy efficiency in buildings; invites the EIB to prioritise long-term affordable and accessible solutions, and sustainable investments, such as energy-efficient renovations and the reuse of vacant buildings;

    33. Believes that the related investments should ensure sufficient durability before any change of destination or use is authorised;

    34. Invites the EIB to build on its long-standing experience as an accelerator of European investments and to also deploy its potential in the education and training and healthcare sectors, including through advisory services; calls on the Bank to strengthen support for healthcare capacities, both within and outside the EU, thus  ensuring a stronger role for Europe in the world;

    Support for SMEs, mid-caps, start-ups, scale-ups and businesses in rural and remote areas, the Capital Markets Union and the role of the EIF

    35. Highlights that SMEs, start-ups and scale-ups are vital for the EU’s economy; notes that these businesses encounter significant hurdles in accessing financing, markets and talent, which constrains their growth; asserts that business growth, dynamism and public investment are essential for fostering innovation, competitiveness and productivity; encourages the EIB Group to continue addressing these challenges, notably in the current geopolitical context, through customised financial programmes, risk-sharing mechanisms and targeted financial instruments, while ensuring the additionality of public resources for these purposes and avoiding the crowding out of private capital; notes that different instruments to support lending to businesses can be combined depending on the context, and that different EIB Group instruments target different market failures and firm types; stresses the need to provide technical assistance to SMEs before project approval, in order to improve access to EIB funding;

    36. Notes that the development of a well-functioning securitisation market can be a key first step towards establishing a strong Capital Markets Union (CMU); believes that the CMU will benefit consumers and SMEs by offering high-yield investment opportunities in the real economy and will eventually boost the venture capital market by improving access to diversified funding sources; believes that financing European scale-ups with European capital should be a priority, as exemplified by the European Tech Champions Initiative, which was launched in February 2023 to finance promising European tech companies and prevent the sale of businesses to foreign investors because of the lack of European investment; encourages the EIF to explore establishing the second generation of this initiative; observes that the European Tech Champions Initiative is complemented by the European Scale-up Initiative, which aims to provide crucial financing for Europe’s high-tech companies in their late-stage development; notes that these investments should be in line with policy actions at EU and national level; is aware of the comparative weaknesses of the European venture capital market in respect of other competitors’ markets, and that European start-ups and scale-ups are often obliged to relocate or search for foreign buyers or rely on sources of financing other than venture capital, hence less suited to high-growth;

    37. Acknowledges the mission of the EIF to support access to financing for European micro, small and medium-sized enterprises; believes that the EIF should significantly step up its activities for the development of the European venture capital ecosystem, while maintaining a geographical balance; calls for the EIF’s activities to be strengthened, enabling increased investment in high-growth sectors, enhancing risk-sharing between public and private investors, and promoting innovation throughout Europe; considers it necessary to monitor the rate of increase in support for micro, small and medium-sized enterprises;

    38. Encourages the EIF to further develop its monitoring tools to better track the long-term performance of venture capital funds and SME financing operations, especially in terms of job creation, innovation diffusion and regional impact; stresses also the critical role of large European companies in Europe’s economic structure, particularly those operating in essential sectors such as energy, defence and infrastructure; calls for a balanced approach that ensures the EIB continues to support large European companies in securing investment capital for major projects and research and development initiatives, thereby enhancing Europe’s global competitiveness;

    39. Praises the support provided by the EIB Group to about 400 000 SMEs and mid-caps in 2023 alone, with EUR 31.1 billion in financing, including loans and guarantees for businesses (of which EUR 14.9 billion was deployed by the EIF), resulting in the mobilisation of over EUR 134 billion, and notes that it teamed up with almost 300 partner institutions across Europe to this end; encourages the EIB to continue its role in improving access to financing for SMEs, which often face barriers to funding from traditional financial institutions, providing targeted financing to ensure sufficient resources to grow and thrive; welcomes and calls for the constant expansion of the number of partner institutions to reach a wide geographical and sectoral coverage;

    40. Recalls that the deployment of the European Guarantee Fund ended in 2023 and that its disbursements to help SMEs to recover from the adverse impact of the pandemic reached approximately 200 000 SMEs across the EU; recalls the concerns expressed in previous resolutions about the transparency of the decision-making processes and information about final recipients;

    41. Welcomes that EIF measures on anti-money-laundering, countering the financing of terrorism and tax avoidance encompass risk assessments for products and transactions, thorough due diligence on counterparties and screening the ownership structures and key individuals against sanctions and adverse media; welcomes the introduction of mandatory staff training and the conclusion of an agreement with the Financial Intelligence Unit of Luxembourg on the reporting of and follow-up on any suspicious transactions detected;

    Key policy areas of cohesion, climate action and environmental sustainability, and digitalisation

    42. Appreciates that in its 2021-2027 Cohesion Orientation, the EIB committed to dedicating at least 40 % of its total financing in the EU between 2022 and 2024 to projects in cohesion regions; notes that, in 2023, such financing amounted to EUR 29.8 billion, equivalent to 45 % of the Bank’s total signatures in the EU; underlines that the share of EIB financing allocated to less developed regions increased from 24 % in 2022 to 26 % in 2023, totalling EUR 17.2 billion, well above the 21 % target set in the EIB Cohesion Orientation for 2023; reiterates the call for the EIB to continue monitoring, analysing and addressing the shortcomings that prevent certain regions or countries from fully benefiting from the EIB’s financial support and assistance;

    43. Acknowledges the role played by the EIF in contributing to economic and social cohesion in the Union through a wide range of financial instruments; notes that EIF commitments to credit guarantees, venture capital and private equity investments for cohesion regions in 2023 stood at EUR 6.8 billion, representing 48 % of total EIF commitments in the EU; notes that in 2023, the EIF was especially active in Central and Eastern Europe;

    44. Notes that the EIB Environmental and Social Sustainability Framework includes revised environmental and social policy and standards promoting an integrated approach to impact and risk assessment and management;

    45. Acknowledges that over the past 15 years, EIB Advisory has supported over 1 000 projects in cohesion regions; calls on the Bank to actively promote financing opportunities in less developed and transition regions, including by boosting the presence of advisory services in EIB local offices; considers it necessary to also take into account the geographical distribution of EIB support for increasing social cohesion;

    46. Highlights the EIB’s initiatives in cohesion regions to support the healthcare sector, including the HERA Invest programme, a EUR 100 million guarantee established with the Commission to support research and development in addressing pressing cross-border health threats; encourages the EIB to promote targeted investments in key systemic enablers such as healthcare, education, social housing, digital connectivity and local financing for cities and regions, ensuring a better geographical balance, either through direct lending or financial instruments, and to leverage synergies between EU grants and EIB loans to enhance cross-border rail connectivity, which is crucial for better integration within the EU single market;

    47. Acknowledges the EIB’s strategic orientation since 2019 to be the EU Climate Bank; emphasises that in 2023 alone, the EIB signed EUR 41.8 billion in financing for climate action and EUR 25.1 billion for environmental sustainability (EUR 35.1 billion and EUR 15.9 billion respectively in 2022); notes that EIB financing for climate change adaptation totalled EUR 2.7 billion in 2023, corresponding to 6.4 % of its total climate action (compared to EUR 1.9 billion, or 5.4 %, in 2022); welcomes that climate action and environmental sustainability financing, as a whole, accounted for 60 % of EIB financing in 2023; calls for maintaining technological neutrality in its investment strategy in climate and sustainable financing;

    48. Recalls that the EIB Energy Lending Policy (ELP), adopted in 2019, established a ‘phase out support to energy projects reliant on unabated fossil fuels’ and introduced a transition period during which the Bank could continue to approve projects already under appraisal, but the Board of Directors did not approve any such project after the end of 2021; remarks that, in 2022, the EIB Group introduced a temporary and exceptional extension of the exemptions to the Paris Alignment for Counterparties Framework (so-called PATH) in support of REPowerEU, to cover projects with high innovative content and renewable energy projects and electric vehicle charging infrastructure in the EU; observes that, in 2023, the EIB Group decided to apply the same temporary and exceptional extension also for projects in the spirit of REPowerEU outside the EU; notes that such temporary and exceptional extensions are expected to run until 2027, subject to a Climate Bank roadmap review expected in 2025; recalls its previous resolution[3] and maintains that PATH offers the appropriate framework for supporting counterparties on their pathways to align with the Paris Agreement objectives; emphasises that the EIB is expected to intensify its engagement with all of its clients to foster the development of their decarbonisation plans;

    49. Notes the EIB Group Climate Bank Roadmap mid-term review, approved in 2023, which includes a simplified Paris Alignment framework for microenterprises, the revision of the PATH framework’s disclosure requirements for financial intermediaries and a temporary extension of the list of countries in which the EIB can act as a sole financier of climate adaptation projects due to their particular vulnerability to climate change;

    50. Welcomes the EIB Group’s inclusion of agriculture and bioeconomy among its key priorities, but notes that agriculture, fisheries and forestry received only 1.1 % of the EIB’s lending stock in 2023; considers it important for the EIB to programme significant amounts for financing the agricultural sector and through simplified procedures;

    51. Underlines that agriculture is a key driver of growth and development in rural areas; acknowledges the increasing challenges faced by the agricultural sector and the need for EU farmers to adapt to the European Green Deal objectives, cope with the energy crisis and manage rising inflation; calls on the EIB Group to enhance support and foster innovation for this vital sector, which plays a significant role in ensuring food security, leveraging the EU’s One Health approach by integrating human, animal, plant and environmental health to create sustainable, resilient and productive agri-food systems; highlights the financial challenges faced by farmers, particularly young and small operators, noting that farmers and the enterprises in this sector experience lower success rates when applying for financing;

    52. Stresses that EIB support should have a just transition approach in order to achieve sustainable agriculture that protects the environment, human health and animal welfare, while improving farmers’ livelihoods, in particular for small and medium-sized farms; maintains that supporting rural areas is essential for promoting balanced and inclusive development, generational renewal and equal access to financial opportunities for women and men; reiterates its call on the EIB Group to increase its involvement in the agricultural sector by improving access to funding;

    53. Appreciates that the EIB Group is one of the key supporters of digitalisation in the EU, particularly in financing digital infrastructure and supporting innovative digital start-ups; encourages the EIB to enhance its support for digital networks strengthening the EU’s technological autonomy and innovation in key technologies;

    54. Believes that reducing digital inequality and preventing social exclusion requires significant public investment in telecommunications infrastructure, particularly in rural areas; encourages the EIB to support European citizens in acquiring adequate digital literacy to fully participate in society, with a special focus on the elderly and those with disabilities;

    55. Recognises the critical role of the cybersecurity sector in protecting businesses and governments from advanced digital threats and foreign influence; welcomes the increase in security investments from EUR 6 billion to EUR 8 billion, financed through the SESI to address security challenges, including those in the New Space industry;

    56. Welcomes the EIB’s focus on gender equality and women’s economic empowerment, resulting in a total of EUR 5.8 billion in investment in this field in 2023 (compared to EUR 5.1 billion in 2022); believes that the EIB could further increase microfinance loans to women-led businesses, which still face discrimination in access to financing;

    57. Highlights that the security of supply of critical raw materials is crucial for both the green and digital transitions, as well as for the defence sector and the EU industrial base in general; calls on the EIB to increase investments in the CRM sector to help diversify the supply of both primary and secondary raw materials and to develop circular economy solutions, in particular R&D for alternative materials, such as bio-based materials; welcomes, in this regard, the adoption on 21 March 2025 of a new CRM strategic initiative, with an expected EUR 2 billion in financing for CRM investment in 2025, a new CRM Task Force and a dedicated one-stop shop to build and manage a pipeline of CRM operations and advisory activities and increased technical expertise and partnerships;

    The EIB’s activities outside the EU

    58. Underlines that in EIB Global’s second year of existence, it provided financing amounting to EUR 8.4 billion (compared to EUR 9.1 billion in 2022); notes that, as EIB Global financing is limited to 50 % of the total cost of a project, investment co-financing with development finance institutions and multilateral development banks is recurring; calls on the EIB and the Commission to invest in internal audit and independent control functions to guarantee the integrity and soundness of all operations;

    59. Recalls that EIB Global is among the key implementing actors of the European Global Gateway and, as such, is expected to apply the highest standards of transparency and accountability;

    60. Notes the adoption by the EIB Board of Directors of the EIB Global Strategic Roadmap and its commitment to respect and promote human rights and the rule of law in the projects it supports;

    61. Highlights the importance of ensuring that the EIB Group’s interventions in Ukraine are guided by the priorities for the country’s reconstruction agreed with the EU, and are consistent with the methods and frameworks laid out in the Ukraine Plan and with the provisions of the EU Treaties; notes that the EIB is further enhancing its efforts to address fraud and corruption in relation to the EIB Group projects implemented in Ukraine; calls for the continued application of appropriate conditionality on the financial assistance provided to Ukraine, with a focus on ensuring effective oversight mechanisms, such as access to information and premises, and the monitoring of visits, and calls for conditionality to be extended to all non-EU countries for which it provides financing;

    62. Urges the strengthening of the administrative and audit capacity of Ukrainian authorities responsible for implementing, monitoring, controlling and supervising funded actions, in particular for the prevention of fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and irregularities; reiterates that the EIB should have clear and unrestricted oversight at all times;

    63. Believes that a greater role for the EIB will bring added value for both the reconstruction of Ukraine and the enlargement process and for prospective partnerships under the EU’s Global Gateway agenda and neighbourhood policy and in support of the Sustainable Development Goals; encourages the Commission to maximise cooperation with the EIB to leverage the EU’s strategic autonomy, particularly on energy and raw materials;

    64. Welcomes the adoption, in 2024, of the Ukraine Facility, which follows the EIB’s EU for Ukraine (EU4U) initiative and establishes a support mechanism based on EU budget resources; encourages the Member States to ensure that solid support continues to be provided to the country, in line with its needs;

    65. Stresses that, in order to support Ukraine, the EIB has built up a loan portfolio of over EUR 7 billion since the beginning of the conflict with Russia in 2014; underlines that, as of 31 December 2023, the EIB’s exposure (disbursed and not yet disbursed) amounted to EUR 5.750 billion, predominantly covered by EU guarantees under the External Lending Mandate; notes that, in addition, the Bank also granted financial guarantees on exposures to counterparties located in Ukraine, fully covered by EU Comprehensive Guarantees, for a signed amount of EUR 388.7 million at the end of 2023 (compared to EUR 478.8 million at the end of 2022);

    66. Notes the growing financial engagement of the EIB in Ukraine; calls on the Bank to provide regular, detailed updates to the budgetary authority and relevant audit bodies regarding the disbursement and implementation of funds covered by EU guarantees;

    67. Underlines the disproportionate impact of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine on eastern EU regions bordering Russia and Belarus; draws attention to the costs borne by these regions and Member States as a result of their shared border with hostile neighbouring countries, notably their need to increasingly redirect public funds towards security, defence and preparedness, while dealing with severely reduced resources due to a disruption in economic activities, cross-border trade and other exchanges, and in cohesion programmes; calls on the EIB to take this into account in its financing decisions;

    68. Welcomes the significant investments made in Moldova to support economic resilience, improving energy security, enhancing infrastructure and aiding the country’s progress towards EU integration; acknowledges that in the Western Balkans, EIB Global invested EUR 1.2 billion in 2023, plus an additional EUR 700 million to enhance road safety and improve railway networks; welcomes the adoption of the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans in 2024 and the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova approved by the European Parliament;

    69. Recognises the role played by the EIB in supporting the Western Balkans on their path to Union membership, in line with the EU’s enlargement policy; observes that EIB Global invested EUR 1.2 billion in the Western Balkans in 2023, mobilising a total of over EUR 6 billion in investments; notes that the majority of the financing was allocated to sustainable connectivity, followed by credit lines for SMEs, infrastructure projects in the healthcare, education and skills sectors, and water supply and sanitation;

    70. Asks the EIB to collaborate with other bilateral and multilateral institutions to develop and apply common methodologies for development impact analysis, with a view to ensuring added value and long-term, positive impacts;

    EIB accountability architecture

    71. Recalls that internal oversight at the EIB is headed by the Inspectorate General (IG), which comprises three accountability-related divisions – operations evaluation, the complaints mechanism and fraud investigation – that hold complementary roles, contributing to the consistent handling of allegations and complaints;

    72. Observes that the EIB Complaints Mechanism (EIB-CM) handled a total of 104 cases in 2023 (97 in 2022); notes that 60 new complaints were received in 2023 (54 in 2022), of which 44 were considered admissible and 29 were related to EIB-financed projects, of which 27 were located outside Europe;

    73. Notes that the EIB Procurement Complaints Committee is the independent EIB committee handling complaints about project procurement procedures relating to EIB-financed projects outside the EU;

    74. Welcomes the efforts of the Investigative Division (IG/IN) to cooperate and coordinate efforts with the other components of the EU’s anti-fraud architecture, in particular the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), which received 37 % of the referrals made for investigations in 2023 (27 cases out of 74); encourages the IG/IN to strengthen its cooperation with all components of the EU’s anti-fraud architecture;

    75. Notes that the IG/IN carries out proactive fraud detection activities using the Fraud and Integrity Risk Scoring Tool and the Corruption Risk In Procurement robot and that, in 2023, 24 reviews identified targets for three full and in-depth proactive integrity reviews; invites the Bank to assess how these digital tools could be further enhanced to support transparency and financial accountability;

    76. Regrets the fact that, despite repeated calls by Parliament, the IG/IN annual report does not provide adequate information about the financial magnitude of the cases it handles, the funds or mandates affected, the kinds of projects concerned, the mitigating measures adopted, the role of the EIB services and of the intermediaries or partners in the cases, or even the Member States concerned; invites the representatives of the IG/IN to increase the level of engagement, interactions and transparency with Parliament, especially regarding the control of the financial activities; reiterates its call to the IG/IN to go beyond providing a mere narrative description of a few case studies, and to periodically report valuable insights into the extent to which financial interests are safeguarded; suggests that the IG/IN adopt a reporting model similar to those used by other investigative bodies, such as EPPO and OLAF, where a proper balance between transparency and duty of confidentiality or of professional secrecy is pursued;

    77. Is aware that the EIB Exclusion Policy provides for an autonomous exclusion process that is not fully equivalent to the Commission’s Early Detection and Exclusion System in terms of decision-making standards, results and remedies; reiterates its call on the EIB Group and the Commission to cooperate in identifying the potential gaps and proposing remedies, including an expedited procedure to enforce EIB exclusion decisions via the Early Detection and Exclusion System; observes that in 2023, exclusion proceedings based on IG/IN findings excluded five companies from participating in any EIB-financed activity for a period of five years;

    78. Welcomes the approval, in 2023, of the EIB Group’s Internal Control Framework Policy; acknowledges the results of the group alignment process between the EIB and the EIF insofar as they reflect the different business models and governance structures of the two entities; refers, in particular, to the Audit Committee’s remarks that both internal audit and the internal control framework should evolve to become group functions;

    79. Notes that the EIB’s independent external auditor is the third line of defence; points out that the regular rotation of auditors and assignments allows fresh perspectives, and therefore observes that the EIB external auditor should be rotated periodically, yet its mandate was extended until 2027 and it has been the auditor of the EIB Group since 2009;

    80. Appreciates that the EIB Group Risk Management Framework and EIB Group’s semi-annual Risk Management Disclosure Reports are effective and are aligned with the requirements and technical standards of the European Banking Authority;

    81. Stresses that, in 2023, despite difficult market conditions, the EIB’s portfolio continued to exhibit very low levels of non-performing exposures (NPEs); takes the view that even if a significant portion of the Bank’s loan portfolio benefits from credit enhancements or from EU Member State guarantees, the high quality of the EIB’s portfolio results from the diligent implementation of very effective EIB lending policies;

    82. Highlights that the EIB does not fall within the scope of application of the EU’s legislation applicable to credit institutions, in particular the Capital Requirements Regulation[4] and Directive[5] (CRR, CRD), thus the Bank is entitled to determine its capital and liquidity requirements in a manner that is adequate and appropriate to its activities, its mission and the market conditions; points out that the EIB Group is committed to conform to the best banking and market practices and can determine their applicability in line with the proportionality principle; stresses that the implementation of these norms should not create unwarranted burden; welcomes the fact that the EIB Group voluntarily performed the Review and Evaluation Process; points out that this should be in line with the EIB’s governance structure and mission;

    83. Understands that, in line with the EU’s evolving needs, the EU institutions approved, in 2024, the change in statute proposed by the EIB Board of Governors by amending the statutory limit on its gearing ratio[6] and raising it from 250 % to 290 %, to enable the EIB to invest more without increasing its equity base;

    84. Notes that the amended gearing ratio paves the way for increased risk-taking; acknowledges that investments in renewable energy, sustainable infrastructure and innovative technologies are crucial for the EU’s competitiveness, but often carry greater risk because of the uncertainty of returns; points out that increased risk-taking may increase the volatility of the EIB’s returns, but observes that the EIB maintains capital buffers that would support expanded risk activities;

    85. Is alarmed by the situation of Northvolt AB, a battery manufacturer considered pivotal in the green transition; stresses that Northvolt has benefited from a substantial EIB lending package of slightly over EUR 942.6 million as part of the debt financing to expand a gigafactory site; notes that Northvolt filed for bankruptcy in March 2025; calls on the EIB to provide details about the evaluation and decision-making process to fund Northvolt AB and the causes that led to the failure of the project;

    86. Stresses that the expansion of the gigafactory site was expected to increase the annual output capacity for battery production and was of strategic importance for global competitiveness and was consistent with the EU’s strategies in the sector;

    87. Calls on the Commission and the EIB Board of Directors to launch an in-depth internal review without undue delay to verify the financial damage, the reasons for and the background to the failure of this flagship project and to learn from this experience in order to prevent the recurrence of a similar situation or enable the early detection thereof;

    88. Maintains that the greatest added value of EU support lies in fostering higher-risk investments in innovative projects, scaling up EU strategic goals and enabling long-term transition projects that cannot get funding from the private sector; believes that to effectively pursue its targets in innovation and competitiveness, the InvestEU programme should focus on financing higher-risk and more scale-up investment and that the EIB Group should take on more and larger high-risk projects, which should involve primarily and preferentially European investors, combining a more risk-absorption-oriented deployment of InvestEU resources with an equivalent orientation in the use of the EIB Group’s own financial resources; urges the EIB to introduce stricter conditions to prevent EU public financing from being used to subsidise companies relocating production outside Europe, ensuring that all EIB-funded projects contribute to long-term European industrial resilience;

    89. Is aware that members of the EIB’s Management Committee are often civil servants in their countries of origin before beginning their terms at the EIB, which typically last for two to six years, and that they are therefore entitled to pursue professional development opportunities subject to certain conditions during the cooling-off period (which has been extended to a period of 24 months after the end of their term at the EIB); notes that Management Committee members are asked to inform the Ethics and Compliance Committee and seek approval as soon as possible for any negotiations regarding prospective employment;

    90. Strongly echoes Parliament’s repeated calls to strengthen the mechanism to prevent conflicts of interest within the EIB and to improve the handling of such cases, and to better define the terms under which EIB vice-presidents can participate in decisions about operations in their countries of origin, and insists that these matters be addressed in a future revision of the Management Committee code of conduct;

    91. Highlights that on 31 October 2023, the European Ombudsman ruled in Case 611/2022/KR that a former vice-president had participated in approving financing agreements between the EIB and a national promotional bank[7] in his country of origin just weeks before becoming the Chief Executive Officer of that national promotional bank, despite the EIB’s Chief Compliance Officer advising against such actions during the appointment process; understands that this case predates the entry into force of the current Management Committee code of conduct, which now includes specific provisions regarding the prospective employment of its members; notes that, in the future review of the rules applicable to its Ethics and Compliance Committee, the EIB has committed to consider the European Ombudsman recommendation to make public the Committee’s decisions;

    92. Observes that mitigating measures, such as ring-fencing and cooling-off periods, are the most common precautionary clauses to be used when handling a revolving-doors case and understands that such measures are implemented and are complied with by the members of the Management Committee, including those recently reported on in the media;

    93. Shares the view of the European Ombudsman that the role of the EIB Ethics and Compliance Committee should be strengthened when it comes to overseeing the intended new jobs of Management Committee members and that it should be able to impose and enforce risk-mitigating measures; understands that the role of the Ethics and Compliance Committee has become more prominent in recent years and that internal discussions are ongoing on how to enhance its efficiency;

    94. Invites the Bank to boost the participation of European companies in procurement processes launched for projects financed by the EIB; encourages the Bank to advise borrowers to prioritise eligibility for European companies in order to strengthen European competitiveness;

    95. Reiterates its call on the EIB to ensure proper geographical representation, including at middle and senior management levels, and calls on it to publish an annual breakdown of the gender and nationality for middle and senior management positions;

    Scrutiny, transparency and oversight

    96.  Strongly regrets the fact that the European Court of Auditors (ECA) still lacks full access to all data relating to EIB operations; acknowledges that not all the activities of the EIB are directly financed by the EU and, therefore, not all activities are automatically accessible to the ECA; insists that the ECA should have access to the necessary information to comprehensively and exhaustively assess all EIB operations involving EU funds, including those conducted through financial intermediaries, designed to implement EU policies; calls on the ECA to fully scrutinise, to the best of its abilities, all operations involving the EU budget to any degree;

    97. Observes that the main relevant audit tasks are entrusted to the EIB Audit Committee, which is a fully independent body; believes that the participation of qualified external representatives in specific Audit Committee tasks could enhance the objectivity of the Audit Committee’s analyses;

    98. Notes that the EIB’s Transparency Policy strikes a compromise between the principle of openness and the need to safeguard sensitive information; observes that the policy indicates what information should be published proactively and when – stipulating, for instance, that project summaries should be published at least three weeks before the project’s financing is considered for approval by the EIB Board of Directors – and sets out the relevant derogations; calls for these summaries to provide meaningful information to stakeholders;

    99. Notes that in 2023, 449 projects were approved by the EIB Board of Directors and that almost all (94 %) of the project summaries were published, in the majority (57 %) of cases before approval; observes that all EIB operations conducted through financial intermediaries are published on the EIB’s website and that the EIB provides details on request;

    100. Recalls that all EIB documents are accessible to the public in line with the presumption in favour of disclosure; emphasises that all applicants should be informed in advance about public access to documents, and any refusals should be based solely on specified exceptions; stresses that the EIB should consider publishing, in a timely manner, information regarding the rationale and context for projects and the explanation of their alignment with and contribution to EU policy goals; calls on the EIB to systematically publish audit results of its largest financial operations, ensuring independent scrutiny of its risk management and impact assessments; expects the EIB to limit non-disclosure to the applicable exceptions listed in Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001[8] and Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006[9]; calls for the full implementation of the Ombudsman’s recommendations issued following its inquiries into EIB disclosure policy and related requests for access to documents;

    101. Recalls that all recipients of EU funding have a general obligation to acknowledge its origin and ensure the visibility of any EU funding received; calls on the EIB Group to ensure that final recipients comply with the visibility criteria of the EU’s financial support;

    102. Highlights that the Bank is working to reduce the time needed to bring a product from conception to market availability (time to market) by fully digitising its project cycles; calls for the Bank to intensify its efforts in the digitalisation of its operations;

    103 Reiterates its call on the EIB to strengthen and fully implement its policy on tax fraud, evasion and avoidance, including by refraining from funding beneficiaries or financial intermediaries which have been found to be, or are at high risk of being, involved in such practices;

    104. Reiterates that more structured dialogue between Parliament and the EIB would be enhanced by the adoption of a memorandum of cooperation; praises, in this connection, the EIB’s unprecedented cooperation with Parliament for the preparation of this resolution, noting that it is a tangible expression of openness and transparency;

    Follow-up on Parliament’s recommendations

    105. Urges the EIB to continue reporting on the status of previous recommendations issued by Parliament, particularly regarding the outcomes achieved and the impact of the actions taken to implement its priorities and the EU’s policies, especially as regards:

    (a) impact (economic, environmental and social) of its investment strategy and results achieved in contributing to the balanced and steady development of the internal market in the interests of the Union;

    (b) actions adopted to enhance the prevention and countering of conflicts of interest, fraud, corruption and other potential forms of misconduct;

    (c) new measures to strengthen transparency;

    (d) measures to strengthen support for SMEs and eligible economic operators during the implementation of EU policies;

    (e) follow-up on the calls and requests adopted via the present resolution;

    °

    ° °

    106. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission, and asks that the Council and the EIB Board of Directors hold a debate on Parliament’s positions presented herein.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on Banking Union – annual report 2024 – A10-0044/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on Banking Union – annual report 2024

    (2024/2055(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to its resolution of 16 January 2024 on Banking Union – annual report 2023[1],

     having regard to the Commission’s follow-up to Parliament’s resolution of 16 January 2024 on Banking Union – annual report 2023,

     having regard to document published by the European Central Bank (ECB) on 25 March 2024, entitled ‘Feedback on the input provided by the European Parliament as part of its resolution on Banking Union 2023’,

     having regard to the ECB’s 2023 Annual Report on supervisory activities, published in March 2024,

     having regard to the 2023 Annual Report of the Single Resolution Board (SRB), published on 28 June 2024,

     having regard to the adoption of the Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMLD)[2] and the Anti-Money Laundering Regulation (AMLR)[3], and to the establishment of the Anti-Money Laundering Authority (AMLA)[4],

     having regard to the implementation of the Basel III standards, namely to the adoption of amendments to the Capital Requirements Directive[5] and to the Capital Requirements Regulation[6],

     having regard to the adoption of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/2795 of 24 July 2024 amending Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to the date of application of the own funds requirements for market risk[7],

     having regard to its position at first reading of 24 April 2024 on the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 as regards early intervention measures, conditions for resolution and funding of resolution action[8],

     having regard to its position at first reading of 24 April 2024 on the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/59/EU as regards early intervention measures, conditions for resolution and financing of resolution action[9],

     having regard to its position at first reading of 24 April 2024 on the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/49/EU as regards the scope of deposit protection, use of deposit guarantee schemes funds, cross-border cooperation, and transparency[10],

     having regard to the report of its Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of 23 April 2024 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 806/2014 in order to establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme,

     having regard to the Commission proposal of 14 March 2018 for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on credit servicers, credit purchasers and the recovery of collateral (COM(2018)0135),

     having regard to the Five Presidents’ Report of 22 June 2015 entitled ‘Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union’,

     having regard to Enrico Letta’s report of 10 April 2024 entitled ‘Much more than a market – Speed, security, solidarity: empowering the Single Market to deliver a sustainable future and prosperity for all EU Citizens’,

     having regard to Mario Draghi’s report of 9 September 2024 entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’,

     having regard to the Eurogroup statement of 11 March 2024 on the future of Capital Markets Union, and to the Eurogroup statement of 16 June 2022 on the future of the Banking Union and the Eurogroup follow-up thereto of 28 April 2023,

     having regard to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s disclosure framework for banks’ cryptoasset exposures and to the targeted amendments to its prudential standard on banks’ exposures to cryptoassets, both published on 17 July 2024,

     having regard to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s core principles for effective banking supervision, published on 25 April 2024,

     having regard to the ECB’s Financial Stability Review of May 2024,

     having regard to the ECB Occasional Paper No 328 of 2023 entitled ‘The Road to Paris: stress testing the transition towards a net-zero economy’,

     having regard to the Financial Stability Board publication of 9 November 2015 entitled ‘Principles on Loss-absorbing and Recapitalisation Capacity of G-SIBs in Resolution’,

     having regard to the Financial Stability Board report of 10 October 2023 entitled ‘2023 Bank Failures – Preliminary lessons learnt for resolution’,

     having regard to Peterson Institute for International Economics Working Paper No 24-15 of 25 June 2024 entitled ‘Europe’s banking union at ten: unfinished yet transformative’[11],

     having regard to the Single Supervisory Mechanism supervisory priorities for 2024-2026, published in December 2023,

     having regard to the SRB’s biannual reporting note to the Eurogroup of 13 May 2024,

     having regard to the outcome of the 2023 EU-wide transparency exercise of the European Banking Authority, published on 28 July 2023,

     having regard to Special Report 12/2023 of the European Court of Auditors of 12 May 2023 entitled ‘EU supervision of banks’ credit risk – The ECB stepped up its efforts but more is needed to increase assurance that credit risk is properly managed and covered’,

     having regard to the statements by Claudia Buch, Chair of the Supervisory Board of the ECB, at the hearings conducted by Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs on 21 March 2024 and 2 September 2024,

     having regard to the statements by Dominique Laboureix, Chair of the SRB, at the hearings conducted by Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs on 21 March 2024 and 23 September 2024,

     having regard to the European Banking Authority’s risk assessment reports of July 2024 and December 2024,

     having regard to its resolution of 14 March 2019 on gender balance in EU economic and monetary affairs nominations[12],

     having regard to its resolution of 25 March 2021 on strengthening the international role of the euro[13],

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0044/2025),

    A. whereas the Banking Union (BU) encompasses the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Single Resolution Mechanism and a European deposit insurance that is still missing;

    B.  whereas the main objective of the BU is to safeguard the stability of the banking sector in Europe and prevent the need to bail out banks at risk of failure with taxpayers’ money;

    C. whereas a completed BU would be a positive development for citizens and the EU economy, as it would improve the competitiveness and stability of the banking sector, reduce systemic risk, improve supply and consumer choice and offer increased opportunities for cross-border banking that enhances access to financing for households and businesses, thereby reducing costs for banks’ customers, while ensuring that public funds are not used to bail out the banking sector; whereas the ‘too big to fail’ risk has not yet been fully addressed;

    D.  whereas concluding the reform of the EU frameworks for bank crisis management and deposit insurance, focusing particularly on small and medium-sized banks, is fundamental in order to provide Europe’s banking sector with security, stability and resilience; whereas a complete BU with a true European deposit insurance scheme is a basic condition for ensuring that citizens trust European banks;

    E. whereas fragmentation and the lack of cross-border consolidation of the EU banking sector is affecting its global competitiveness; whereas the profitability gap between EU and US banks has widened;

    F. whereas a strong and diversified banking sector is key to delivering economic growth, increasing the possibility of home ownership, fostering investment and job creation, financing small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and start-ups and ensuring the transition to a green and digital economy;

    G. whereas around 80 % of external financing for EU companies comes from banks, while only 20 % comes from the capital markets; whereas only 30 % of credit for US firms comes from banks, while 70 % is funded via capital markets, including corporate bond holdings and shares;

    H. whereas the EUR 356.1 billion in non-performing loans recorded at the 110 supervised institutions in 2024, compared with EUR 988.9 billion in non-performing loans recorded at the 102 supervised institutions in the second quarter of 2015, reflects a significant downward trajectory, leaving the total non-performing loan stock at 36 % of its 2015 level; whereas further efforts are required;

    I. whereas in April 2024, it adopted its position on the review of the crisis management and deposit insurance framework;

    J. whereas in April 2024, its Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs adopted a report on the Commission’s proposal to establish a European deposit insurance scheme;

    K. whereas financial institutions rely increasingly on the use of information and communications technology (ICT); whereas the digitalisation of finance provides key opportunities for the banking sector and has brought about significant technological advances in the EU banking sector through increased efficiency in the provision of banking services and a greater appetite for innovation; whereas it also poses challenges, including with regard to data protection, reputational risks, anti-money laundering and consumer protection concerns; whereas the EU banking sector must increase its cyber resilience to ensure that ICT systems can withstand various types of cyber security threats; whereas the ECB is currently studying the establishment of a digital euro;

    L. whereas EU banks have withstood the impact of Russian aggression; whereas they play a pivotal role in ensuring the ongoing implementation of and compliance with the sanctions imposed by the EU against Russia in response to the invasion; whereas further coordination is needed to avoid circumvention of sanctions;

    M.  whereas climate change, environmental degradation and the transition to a low-carbon economy are factors to be taken into account when assessing the risks on banks’ balance sheets, as a source of risk potentially impacting investments across regions and sectors;

    General considerations

    1. Acknowledges the progress made over the last 10 years through the establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM); notes that the BU will not be completed without the establishment of its third pillar, the European deposit insurance scheme;

    2. Asks the Commission to ensure that the completion of the BU and the Capital Markets Union remains a key priority; highlights that these projects offer households and SMEs access to broader funding, reduce the high reliance on bank credit to foster investments and job creation, increase financial stability, reduce the impact of economic downturns, support competitiveness, give additional investment opportunities, fund the transition to a green and digital economy and unlock the EU’s growth potential; notes that the Commission is requested to take into consideration the specificities of the different banking models, while preserving a level playing field;

    3. Notes the need to be prepared for episodes of banking stress that could potentially lead to bank runs such as those witnessed in some jurisdictions outside the EU in March 2023, and the need to ensure the stability of deposits;

    4. Points out that cyber resilience is a key element for the competitiveness of the EU banking sector, in particular taking into account the geopolitical situation and the need to preserve financial stability;

    5. Notes that a more integrated BU would help to make the EU banking sector more resilient, improve access to credit and reduce costs; notes that better cross-border integration of banking business would increase the potential for private risk sharing and ensure diversification in the EU banking market; points out that a more integrated BU is not necessarily the same as a more consolidated banking market and that there are benefits for competition in a diversified banking market; stresses that a fully developed BU would allow EU banks to grow and put them in a better position to compete in the international arena;

    6. Regrets that EU banks’ ability to finance major investments is constrained by lower profitability that is not sufficient to ensure their competitiveness; notes that the profitability gap as compared with other jurisdictions is due to both structural and regulatory factors and calls for a review to streamline the regulatory framework; notes that the specific character of the EU banking system, with its large number of smaller banks, calls for proportionate solutions that take this into account and are tailored to its characteristics, without undermining financial stability; remains mindful of the ‘too big to fail’ risk;

    7. Calls on the Commission to assess the need to develop targeted frameworks within the BU to enhance access to finance for SMEs and start-ups, recognising their role as the backbone of the EU economy;

    8. Regrets that EU banks’ cross-border activity is still rather limited, particularly with regard to granting loans; takes the view, therefore, that it is important to complete the BU in order to uphold the free movement of capital in a fully integrated internal market;

    9. Calls on the EU banks still operating in Russia to exit the Russian market as soon as possible; calls on supervisory institutions to ensure that those banks push ahead with exiting the Russian market swiftly;

    10. Invites the Commission to further explore whether the creation of a separate jurisdiction for EU banks with substantial cross-border operations[14] could help to complete the BU or whether this would increase banking sector fragmentation;

    11. Notes that a review of the securitisation framework to strengthen European markets and the introduction of European Secured Notes as a dual-recourse funding instrument for SMEs for long-term financing could be explored, taking due account of financial stability risks;

    12. Underlines that financial literacy is essential in modern economies, contributing to the resilience of the banking systems across Member States and encouraging cross-border financial activity;

    13. Underlines that a high level of consumer protection will make the BU more resilient;

    14. Takes the view that the Commission should focus on aspects that contribute to achieving the goals of digitalisation, modernisation, simplification, streamlining and increased competitiveness; maintains that legal certainty, security, predictability and stability are essential for EU banks to be able to operate under favourable conditions;

    15. Notes that, in addition to traditional loans, diverse sources of financing can be beneficial for EU growth and EU competitiveness, and recognises the low-risk nature of asset-backed financing solutions;

    16. Notes the ECB’s progress on the digital euro and the parliamentary dialogue being held with the ECB on the topic; understands existing reservations, such as with regard to its offline functionality, given that offline transactions reduce visibility and impair financial crime prevention; recalls that the digital euro should complement, not replace, cash; considers that the decision on whether or not to introduce a digital euro is ultimately a political decision that has to be taken by the EU’s co-legislators, given the profound potential impact of this decision on a wide range of EU domains, including privacy, consumer protection, financial stability, financial policy and other areas that go beyond the strict remit of monetary policy;

    17. Regrets the failure of some financial institutions to ensure gender balance, especially in their management bodies; stresses that gender balance on boards and in the workforce brings both societal and economic returns; calls on financial institutions to regularly update their diversity and inclusion policies and help to foster healthy working cultures that prioritise inclusivity; calls on private and public entities to address the lack of diversity and gender balance in the management bodies of financial institutions;

    Supervision

    18. Welcomes the adoption by the co-legislators of the new banking package implementing Basel III standards in the EU; notes the current lack of clarity concerning the implementation of the Basel III standards in some other jurisdictions and the potential risk for an international level playing field; stresses that the Commission should evaluate whether targeted changes could help to maintain the international competitiveness of EU banks without weakening their resilience; recalls that the delegated act on the date of application of the own funds requirements for market risk postponed the date of application of the new market risk framework by one year to 1 January 2026; calls on the Commission to assess whether the equivalence decisions taken with the jurisdictions not implementing the Basel III standards need to be reviewed in order to preserve the financial stability of the EU financial sector;

    19. Recalls that the Banking Package contains a high number of mandates to the European Banking Authority; calls on the European Banking Authority to respect these mandates;

    20. Notes that even within the existing regulatory framework the banking sector has shown its resilience during the market events of recent years, and that the average Common Equity Tier 1 ratio has remained at high levels, at 15.81 %;

    21. Notes that the non-performing loans ratio has remained stable at 2.30 % and the liquidity coverage ratio at 159.39 %;

    22. Notes the varying levels of exposure to non-performing loans and recalls that there are Member States which have exposure levels in the order of 1 % or even lower, while other Member States have exposure levels exceeding 4 %; considers that efforts to reduce European banks’ exposure to this type of loan should continue as good risk management practice;

    23. Highlights the fact that adverse macroeconomic conditions, geopolitical headwinds and the rapid development of deferred payment services may lead to a deterioration in asset quality and affect the level of non-performing loans in the future; highlights, therefore, the importance of prudent risk management and appropriate provisioning;

    24. Notes that the current levels of banking sector profitability may provide an opportunity for an increase in macroprudential buffers and help to preserve banking sector resilience; invites the Commission to further explore this option and carefully evaluate how to revise the macroprudential framework, taking into consideration the potential impact on capital requirements and bearing in mind a level playing field with other jurisdictions;

    25. Notes that the banking sector plays a role in supporting the transition to a digitalised and carbon neutral economy, in channelling funds to renewable energy sources and in supporting the achievement of the objectives of the EU Green Deal and the EU Climate Law;

    26. Notes that the ECB takes account of climate- and nature-related financial risks in its supervisory practices and monitors growing physical and transition risks closely;

    27. Welcomes the idea of increasing venture capital and unlocking capital to finance fast-growing companies in the EU; notes Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s commitment to put forward risk-absorbing measures to make it easier for commercial banks, investors and venture capital to finance fast-growing companies[15]; notes that this must be done in a way that does not pose a systemic risk or moral hazard;

    28. Welcomes the creation of the new Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism, which will allow more effective ways to combat money laundering and terrorist financing via direct supervision of certain financial entities and better cooperation, a better flow of information between national authorities and better coordination among sanctions enforcement authorities in Members States to help close gaps in the implementation of targeted sanctions;

    29. Stresses the need to enhance the resilience of non-bank financial intermediaries, including by designing specific regulatory and supervisory tools; points out that such measures must guarantee the security of the financial system and be in the best interests of the customer; welcomes the Commission consultation on macroprudential policies for non-bank financial intermediaries; supports the Eurosystem’s recommendation to introduce system-wide stress tests to identify and quantify risks to the resilience of core markets; invites the Commission to investigate whether there are any gaps in the supervisory toolkit, including in relation to potential liquidity crunches and implications for systemic risk;

    30. Notes that crypto-assets create new challenges and opportunities for the financial system but also pose risks to it, and that these require attention from the national supervisors, the SSM and the European Systemic Risk Board;

    Resolution

    31. Recalls that the position adopted by Parliament in April 2024 on the crisis management and deposit insurance framework ensures a more consistent approach across all Member States to the application of resolution tools and deposit protection to enhance financial stability, taxpayer protection and depositor confidence; notes that small banks have some specificities that may warrant a proportionate approach; stresses that European and national competent authorities should have at their disposal appropriate and sufficient tools to respond effectively to bank failures and safeguard financial stability, and that banks need to operate in an effective regulatory environment that fosters their development;

    32. Highlights the importance of preserving shareholders’ and creditors’ primary responsibility for bearing losses in the event of a bank’s failure; stresses that resorting to using taxpayers’ money must be avoided, which is still a key lesson learned from the global financial crisis; stresses that the bail-in of shareholders and creditors must remain the main source for resolution financing before any recourse is made to industry-funded sources;

    33. Recalls that a sufficient minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) is crucial for a credible resolution framework and for ensuring that resolution authorities have sufficient flexibility to effectively apply the resolution strategies needed in a specific crisis situation; underlines that this minimum requirement should be sufficient to effectively implement any of the resolution strategies included in a bank’s resolution plan; recalls that the resolution framework should avoid undue increases in MREL calibration and disproportionate contributions to the Single Resolution Fund;

    34. Stresses that if a bank’s eligible liabilities are issued to non-EU investors, the write-down or conversion of these liabilities should be enforceable with full certainty to safeguard the effective application of resolution tools;

    35. Notes that any reliance on taxpayer money for the resolution of banks, including for liquidity support, should be avoided, in keeping with the principles of fiscal and social responsibility and market discipline;

    36. Recalls that banks need to continue to meet their obligations and perform their key functions after the implementation of a resolution decision;

    37. Recalls the importance of clarifying the role of the ECB as liquidity provider in resolution, paying due attention to appropriate guarantees and the ECB’s mandate;

    38. Underlines the SRB’s announcement that it will enhance its capabilities for launching enforcement action to remove substantive impediments to resolvability; calls for the publication, at the end of each resolution planning cycle, of an anonymised list of identified impediments to resolvability and the actions adopted to address them;

    39. Welcomes the ‘SRM Vision 2028’ strategic review initiated by the SRB to set its long-term goals, address new challenges and further strengthen collaboration with the national resolution authorities and other stakeholders; notes, in particular, the SRB’s intention to identify areas where sustainability can be embedded further in its daily operations and core business; highlights the need to ensure efficiency and cost-effectiveness in the implementation of the new strategy;

    40. Welcomes the SRB plan to streamline the annual resolution planning cycle to ensure that it is increasingly efficient and has a greater focus on testing banks’ resolvability and the operationalisation of resolution strategies;

    41. Welcomes the fact that the Single Resolution Fund has now been built up; calls for the full ratification of the Amending Agreement to the ESM Treaty by all Member States, including the establishment of a common backstop to the Single Resolution Fund;

    42. Highlights the need for additional efforts to ensure full resolvability for all banks falling under the scope of resolution; recalls that achieving resolvability cannot be considered a ‘moving target’ and therefore calls for more standardisation and harmonisation of the resolvability assessment; recalls, nonetheless, the important role played by national resolution authorities in the assessment of resolvability;

    Deposit insurance

    43. Underlines the fact that the Commission’s proposal to establish a European deposit insurance scheme was published back in 2015 and that the landscape has changed significantly since then;

    44. Recalls that the position of its Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs on a European deposit insurance scheme was adopted in April 2024; notes that that position deviates from the Commission’s 2015 proposal and adopts a new approach; is waiting for, and encourages the Council to move forward with, the negotiations on a European deposit insurance scheme;

    45. Notes that national deposit guarantee schemes were introduced successfully and have proved their functionality in a number of cases; underlines the need to take specific national characteristics into account and to preserve the well-functioning systems for smaller banks that are already in place in some Member States, such as institutional protection schemes, in a way that ensures a level playing field across the BU;

    °

    ° °

    46. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the European Central Bank, the Single Resolution Board and the European Banking Authority.

    EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

    While the Banking Union – annual reports 2022 and 2023 focused on the war in Ukraine and the ongoing Russian aggression against Ukraine, this report focuses more on the challenges for the EU and for the European Parliament, as mirrored in the new mandate of the Commission, namely the EU priorities to foster competitiveness, to strengthen the European single market and to boost economic growth.

    The Union is currently at a turning point, which will determine the economic future in the upcoming decades. The 2024 reports of Enrico Letta and Mario Draghi underline that the EU needs a major turnaround to be able to compete with the US or China. Against this background, the Banking Union is a major cornerstone of competitiveness. A strengthened Banking Union will enable the EU to generate the necessary capital to make the European economy fit for the future.

    EU banks play a key role in financing the required investments since bank loans are still the most important source of external financing for companies. However, EU banks suffer from a lower profitability compared to their US counterparts caused by too many regulatory hurdles and by an incomplete Banking Union. A robust and competitive banking sector is necessary to finalise the BU. In the last year, while co-legislators made much progress on crucial legislation for the Banking Union, the EU still has to monitor closely if the EU economy, EU citizens and EU banks benefit from those adopted proposals. This report provides realistic and achievable recommendations, which could help to strengthen further the Banking Union.

    However, not only EU businesses need better access to capital. EU citizens are currently struggling to afford housing or to finance investments in sustainable renovations. It is therefore crucial to boost the profitability of EU banks, since this would in turn allow them to provide private households with better and easier access to affordable loans.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Serbia – A10-0072/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Serbia

    (2025/2022(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States of the one part, and the Republic of Serbia, of the other part[1], which entered into force on 1 September 2013,

     having regard to Serbia’s application for membership of the EU of 19 December 2009,

     having regard to the Commission opinion of 12 October 2011 on Serbia’s application for membership of the European Union (COM(2011)0668), the European Council’s decision of 1 March 2012 to grant Serbia candidate status and the European Council’s decision of 28 June 2013 to open EU accession negotiations with Serbia,

     having regard to the Brussels Agreement of 27 February 2023 and the Ohrid Agreement of 18 March 2023 and the Implementation Annex thereto,

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III)[2],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans[3],

     having regard to the presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of 19 and 20 June 2003,

     having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits of 17 May 2018 in Sofia and of 6 May 2020 in Zagreb,

     having regard to its resolutions on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation,

     having regard to the Berlin Process, launched on 28 August 2014,

     having regard to the first agreement on principles governing the normalisation of relations between the governments of Serbia and Kosovo of 19 April 2013, to the agreements of 25 August 2015, and to the ongoing EU-facilitated dialogue for the normalisation of relations,

     having regard to the agreement on free movement between the governments of Serbia and Kosovo of 27 August 2022, to the agreement on licence plates of 23 November 2022, and to the Energy Agreements’ Implementation Roadmap in the EU-facilitated Dialogue of 21 June 2022,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2020 entitled ‘Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0057),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October 2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Serbia 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0695),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Serbia 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0695),

     having regard to the European Council conclusions of 9 February 2023 on the EU-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina,

     having regard to Article 14 of the Serbian Constitution on the protection of national minorities,

     having regard to the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, ratified by Serbia in 2001 and the Council of Europe’s European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, ratified by Serbia in 2006,

     

     having regard to the European Council conclusions of 26 and 27 October 2023 on Kosovo and Serbia,

     having regard to the Council conclusions of 17 December 2024 on enlargement,

     having regard to the final report of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) election observation mission on the early parliamentary and presidential elections of 3 April 2022 in Serbia, published on 19 August 2022,

     having regard to the European Council conclusions of December 2006, to the Council conclusions of March 2020 and to the Conclusions of the Presidency of the European Council in Copenhagen of 21-22 June 1993, also known as the Copenhagen criteria,

     having regard to the final report of the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission on the early parliamentary elections of 17 December 2023 in Serbia, published on 28 February 2024,

     having regard to the memorandum of understanding between the European Union and the Republic of Serbia on a strategic partnership on sustainable raw materials, battery value chains and electric vehicles, signed on 19 July 2024,

     having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement[4],

     having regard to its previous resolutions on Serbia, in particular that of 19 October 2023 on the recent developments in the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue, including the situation in the northern municipalities in Kosovo[5], and that of 8 February 2024 on the situation in Serbia following the elections[6],

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0072/2025),

    A. whereas enlargement is one of the most successful EU foreign policy instruments and a strategic geopolitical investment in long-term peace, stability and security throughout the continent;

    B. whereas according to the Copenhagen criteria, candidate countries must adhere to the values of the Union in order to be able to join it;

    C. whereas democracy and the rule of law are the fundamental values on which the EU is founded;

    D. whereas in recent years, political rights and civil liberties have been steadily eroded, putting pressure on independent media, the political opposition and civil society organisations;

    E. whereas the Fourth Opinion on Serbia of the Council of Europe Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention on National Minorities, adopted on 26 June 2019, criticised Serbia’s delays in fully implementing education rights for minorities;

    F. whereas freedom of religion is a core European value and a fundamental human right and Serbia is therefore obliged to respect and guarantee this freedom for all individuals residing within its territory, in accordance with its international commitments and human rights obligations;

    G. whereas in line with Chapter 23 of the acquis, Serbia must demonstrate real improvements in the effective exercise of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities;

    H. whereas each candidate country for enlargement is judged on its own merits, including their respect for and unwavering commitment to shared European rights and values and alignment with the EU’s foreign and security policy;

    I. whereas Serbia has not imposed sanctions against Russia following the Russian aggression in Ukraine; whereas Serbia’s rate of alignment with the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) has been steadily declining since 2021; whereas Serbia supports the territorial integrity and political independence of Ukraine, and has clearly condemned the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine and voted alongside the EU in the UN, even though it has not imposed sanctions against Russia; whereas Serbia’s rate of alignment with the CFSP dropped from 54 % in 2023 to 51 % in 2024 while other candidate countries in the region – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and North Macedonia – achieved 100 % alignment;

    J. whereas Serbia remains a critical battleground for foreign disinformation campaigns, notably by Russia and China, which seek to create an anti-Western rhetoric; whereas the final report of the OSCE/ODHIR on the early parliamentary elections held on 17 December 2023 pointed out several procedural deficiencies, as well as the use of harsh rhetoric and the presence of consistent bias in the media that gave an unbalanced advantage to the ruling party; whereas the issues identified in that report need to be assessed thoroughly and promptly; whereas as part of the accession negotiations, Serbia adopted the Strategy for Combating Cybercrime 2019-2023 and the relevant action plans in September 2018; whereas the strategy and the relevant action plans were not renewed after December 2023; whereas Serbia did not align with the EU’s restrictive measures in reaction to cyberattacks in 2023 and 2024;

    K. whereas the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia is a precondition for the progression of both countries towards EU membership;

    L. whereas accession to the EU inevitably requires full alignment with the foreign policy objectives of the Union;

    M. whereas Serbia recognises the territorial integrity of Ukraine, including the Crimean peninsula and the Donbas region;

    N. whereas the EU is Serbia’s main trading partner, accounting for 59.7 % of Serbia’s total trade;

    O. whereas Russia is using its influence in Serbia to try to destabilise, interfere in and threaten neighbouring sovereign states and undermine Serbia’s European future; whereas Russian propaganda outlets such as RT (formerly Russia Today) and Sputnik operate freely in Serbia and exert significant influence in shaping anti-EU and anti-democratic narratives; whereas disinformation often originates from a false or misleading statement by a political figure, which is then reported by state-owned media and subsequently amplified on social media, often with an intention to undermine political opponents and democratic principles;

    P. whereas on 8 June 2024, an ‘All-Serb Assembly’ took place in Belgrade with the participation of political leaders from Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Kosovo under the slogan ‘One people, one assembly’;

    Commitment to EU accession

    1. Notes Serbia’s stated commitment to EU membership as its strategic goal and its ambition to align fully with the EU acquis by the end of 2026; urges Serbia to deliver quickly and decisively on essential reforms, especially in cluster 1, for this very ambitious commitment to be perceived as realistic, genuine and meaningful; stresses the need for Serbia to seriously and categorically demonstrate that it is strategically oriented towards the EU, by showing strong political will and consistency in the implementation of EU-related reforms and by communicating objectively and unambiguously with its citizens about the EU, Serbia’s European path and the required reforms;

    2. Reiterates the strategic importance of the Western Balkans in the current geopolitical context and for the security and stability of the EU as a whole; outlines that, owing to its geopolitical position, the country has a direct impact on the overall stability of the region; condemns, therefore, Serbia’s attempts to establish a sphere of influence undermining the sovereignty of neighbouring countries;

    3. Acknowledges Serbia’s good level of preparation with regard to macroeconomic stability and fiscal discipline and the Commission’s assessment that cluster 3 is technically ready for opening but notes with concern that there has been limited or no overall progress in meeting the benchmarks for EU membership across negotiating chapters, with particular shortcomings in critical areas such as the rule of law, media freedom, public administration reform, and alignment with EU policies, particularly the EU’s foreign policy;

    4. Regrets the fact that no substantial progress has been made on Chapter 31, as Serbia’s pattern of alignment with EU foreign policy positions has remained largely unchanged, mainly due to Serbia’s close relations with Russia; recalls that Serbia remains a notable exception in the Western Balkans regarding CFSP alignment; calls on Serbia to reverse this trend and to demonstrate positive steps towards full alignment; notes that Serbia’s rate of compliance with EU statements and declarations is increasing but remains at only 61 %; welcomes Serbia’s continued active participation in and positive contribution to EU military crisis management missions and operations;

    5. Welcomes Serbia’s humanitarian support for Ukraine and takes note of the sale of ammunition to the value of EUR 800 million for use by Ukraine in a mutually beneficial agreement; notes that Serbia has aligned with some of the EU’s positions regarding Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; regrets, however, that Serbia still does not align with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia; calls on the EU to reconsider the extent of the financial assistance provided by the EU to Serbia in the event of continued support for anti-democratic ideologies and non-alignment with the EU’s restrictive measures and the CFSP; calls on Serbia to swiftly align with the EU’s restrictive measures and general policy towards Russia and Belarus, systematically and without delay;

    6. Stresses the importance of implementing sanctions against Russia for the security of Europe as a whole; deplores Serbia’s continued close relations with Russia, raising concerns about its strategic orientation; reiterates its calls on the Serbian authorities to enhance transparency regarding the role and activities of the so-called Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Center in Nis and to immediately terminate all military cooperation with Russia; notes Serbia’s decision to support the UN resolution condemning Russia’s aggression against Ukraine three years after the full-scale invasion; regrets President Vučić’s immediate verbal retraction of Serbia’s UN vote, calling it a ‘mistake’; considers that maintaining privileged relations with the Kremlin regime undermines not only Serbia’s credibility as a candidate country but also the trust of its European partners and the future of EU-Serbia relations;

    7. Regrets the continued decline in public support for EU membership in Serbia and the growing support for the Putin regime, which is the result of a long-standing anti-EU and pro-Russian rhetoric from the government-controlled media as well as some government officials; calls on the Serbian authorities to foster a fact-based and open discussion on accession to the EU;

    8. Deplores the continued spread of disinformation, including about Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; condemns the spillover effects of these actions in other countries in the region; calls on the Serbian authorities to combat disinformation and calls for the EU to enhance cooperation with Serbia to strengthen democratic resilience and counter hybrid threats;

    9. Notes Serbia’s progress on aligning with EU visa policy and calls for full alignment, in particular with regard to those non-EU countries presenting a security threat to the EU, including the threat of cyberattacks; welcomes the agreement signed on 25 June 2024 between the EU and Serbia on operational cooperation on border management with Frontex, highlighting the need to act in line with fundamental rights and international standards;

    10. Reiterates that the overall pace of the accession negotiations should depend on tangible progress on the fundamentals, the rule of law and a commitment to the shared European rights and values as well as to the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue, which is to be conducted in good faith so that it results in a legally binding agreement based on mutual recognition, as well as alignment with the EU’s CFSP; reiterates its position that accession negotiations with Serbia should only advance if the country aligns with EU sanctions against Russia and makes significant progress on its EU-related reforms, in particular in the area of the fundamentals;

    11. Repeats its concern regarding the appeasing approach of the Commission towards Serbia against the backdrop of the country’s year-long rollback on the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights, as well as its destabilising influence on the whole region; urges the Commission to use clearer language, including on the highest level, towards Serbia, consistently addressing significant shortcomings, lack of progress and even backsliding, thus upholding the EU’s fundamental values;

    12.  Calls on the Serbian Government to promote the role and benefits of EU accession and EU-funded projects and reforms among the Serbian population;

    Democracy and the rule of law

    13. Notes the ongoing challenges in ensuring judicial independence, including undue influence and political pressure on the judiciary; expresses concern about the failure to implement safeguards preventing political interference in judicial appointments and disciplinary actions against judges and prosecutors; calls on Serbia to ensure that the High Judicial Council, the High Prosecutorial Council and the Government and Parliament of Serbia effectively and proactively defend judicial independence and prosecutorial autonomy;

    14. Stresses the importance of adopting the Law on the Judicial Academy and the Venice Commission opinion and making necessary judicial appointments to reduce existing vacancies and improve the overall effectiveness of the judicial system; notes that the delay in adopting this law has stalled key judicial reforms necessary for alignment with EU standards; calls for the draft law to be amended following transparent consultation with all relevant stakeholders, with a view to ensuring the independence and control mechanisms of the institution in order to contribute to overall judicial independence;

    15. Notes that limited progress has been made in the fight against corruption despite the adoption of a new anti-corruption strategy for 2024-2028; calls on Serbia to adopt and begin implementing the accompanying anti-corruption action plan and to establish an effective monitoring and coordination mechanism to track progress, in line with international standards; expresses concern that corruption is still prevalent in many areas, particularly related to ‘projects of interests for the Republic of Serbia’, and that strong political will is required to effectively address corruption as well as to mount a robust criminal justice response to high-level corruption; notes that Serbia ranks 105th in the Corruption Perceptions Index 2024, well below the EU average; considers that the level of corruption in Serbia is a significant obstacle to its EU accession process; notes with concern that results have still not been delivered in cases of high public interest, after several years, such as in the long-standing cases of Krušik, Jovanjica, Savamala and Belivuk; calls on Serbia to strengthen the independence of its anti-corruption institutions by ensuring that they are adequately resourced and protected from political interference; calls on the Government of Serbia to sign the Anti-Bribery Convention of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and to fully align its legal framework on police cooperation and organised crime with that of the EU;

    16. Welcomes the more pluralistic composition of the new parliament, with a broader representation of political parties, including parties of national minorities; notes that the early election and the corresponding break in the functioning of the government and parliament have impeded progress on reforms; notes the frequent pattern of early elections, a permanent campaign mode and long delays in forming governments, as well as the disrupted work of the national parliament, including the absence of government question-time sessions, the lack of discussion on the reports of independent institutions, and the more frequent use of urgent procedures, which lead to a lack of parliamentary legislative oversight and legitimacy and do not contribute to the effective democratic governance of the country;

    17. Takes note of the resignation of Prime Minister Miloš Vučević on 28 January 2025, which was confirmed by the National Assembly on 19 March 2025; takes note of the resumption of the work of the National Assembly on 4 March 2025, after a pause of three months, and condemns all the acts of violence that occurred on this occasion;

    18. Reiterates its readiness to support the National Assembly and the members thereof in the democratic processes related to Serbia’s European path, including the proper functioning of the parliament in accordance with its rules of procedure, by using the European Parliament’s existing democracy support tools and initiatives and by supporting increased parliamentary oversight of the EU accession process and reforms;

    19. Takes note, with deep concern, of the final report of the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission on the December 2023 elections; notes that in April 2024, the National Assembly formed a working group for the improvement of the election process but that, by the end of the year, it had not agreed on any legal measures to improve the election process; notes that two out of three representatives of civil society left the working group in February 2025; notes that steps were taken in the first months of 2025 on amending the Law on Unified Voter Registry but that there is no consensus among political and civil society actors on the content; calls on all parliamentary groups in the National Assembly to decide on the implementation of ODIHR recommendations, with the agreement of all groups; calls for equal treatment of all members of parliament in the work of the National Assembly, consistent and effective implementation of the parliamentary Code of Conduct and the impartial sanctioning of breaches of parliamentary integrity;

    20. Is concerned about the increasing role of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) and foreign cyber operations and interference in Serbia’s democratic election processes;

    21. Stresses the critical importance of ensuring the independence of key institutions, including media regulators such as the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media (REM); regrets the delay in the election of the new members; regrets the irregularities in the nomination process; notes the withdrawal of several candidates from the selection in February 2025, who justified their decision on the basis of these irregularities; deeply regrets the fact that the REM neglected its legal obligations to scrutinise the conduct of the 2023 election campaign in the media in a timely manner, to report on its findings and to sanction media outlets that breached the law, spread hate speech or violated journalistic standards; notes, with concern, the absence of pluralistic political views in the nationwide media; notes that the REM should actively promote media pluralism and transparency regarding the ownership structures of media outlets and independence from foreign actors;

    22. Notes that the REM awarded four national frequencies to channels that have a history of violating journalistic standards, including using hate speech and misleading the public, not complying with warnings issued by the REM, spreading disinformation and supporting the Kremlin’s narrative on Russia’s war in Ukraine; deeply regrets the fact that REM has not issued the fifth national licence and calls for it to be awarded through a transparent and impartial process without unnecessary delay and in compliance with international media freedom standards as soon as a new REM council is elected; calls for the Serbian Government to scrap and re-start the process of electing new members, in line with Serbian law and international media freedom standards;

    Fundamental freedoms and human rights

    23. Expresses its sincere condolences to the families of the 15 victims who lost their lives and to those who were injured following the collapse of the canopy of Novi Sad train station on 1 November 2024; calls for full and transparent legal proceedings following the investigation by the authorities, to bring those responsible to justice; underlines the need to examine more broadly to what extent corruption led to the lowering of safety standards and contributed to this tragedy;

    24. Regrets the delayed response and accountability of the Serbian authorities, the slow investigation process and the lack of transparency in the aftermath of the tragedy, which were partially addressed in the face of escalating public pressure;

    25. Expresses deep concern about the systemic issues highlighted by the student protests and various other protests in Serbia, such as issues relating to civil liberties, separation of powers, corruption, environmental protection, institutional and financial transparency, especially in relation to infrastructure projects, and accountability; regrets the fact that the government missed the opportunity to meet the demands of the students and of the citizens who support the students in good faith; affirms that the students’ demands align with reforms that Serbia is expected to implement on its European path;

    26. Underlines the importance of freedom of speech and assembly; calls on the authorities of Serbia to ensure the protection of those participating in the peaceful protests; takes note of the mass protests on 15 March 2025, the largest in the modern history of Serbia; calls for an impartial investigation of the claims that unlawful technology of crowd control was used against the protesters, causing injuries to a number of them;

    27. Condemns, in the strongest terms, the misuse of personal data from public registries to retaliate against peaceful protesters; calls on the prosecution office in Serbia to file charges against all persons who physically attacked and incited violence against the participants of the demonstrations; is deeply concerned about any act of violence; is carefully following developments as regards arrests of protesters and legal proceedings that have been opened against them; is concerned about the reports that the security services were involved in intimidation and surveillance of the protesters; condemns the language used by the Serbian authorities inciting violence against students and other protesters; notes that student activists have faced legal harassment, intimidation and excessive use of force by the authorities; calls for a thorough, impartial and speedy investigation into allegations of violence used against demonstrators and police misconduct during protests; urges the diplomatic missions of the EU and the Member States to continue to monitor closely the ongoing legal cases relating to the protests;

    28.  Is deeply alarmed that the Serbian authorities have engaged in widespread illegal surveillance practices using spyware against activists, journalists and members of civil society, as indicated in the recent reports by Amnesty International and the SHARE Foundation; urges the Government of Serbia to immediately cease the use of advanced surveillance technology against activists, journalists and human rights defenders, and calls on the competent state authorities to conduct a thorough investigation into all existing cases of unlawful surveillance and use of spyware and to initiate appropriate proceedings against those responsible; calls on the European Commission, in the light of this, to follow up on these incidents, address these issues with the Serbian authorities and insist on a thorough investigation into these matters;

    29. Rejects allegations that the EU and some of its Member States were involved in organising the student protests with a view to triggering a ‘colour revolution’; strongly condemns, in that context, the unlawful arrests and expulsions of EU citizens and the public disclosure, by convicted war criminals, of the personal data of EU citizens, as well as hate speech against national minorities; expresses concern about the rising number of detention cases involving EU citizens at Serbia’s border; notes that anti-EU narratives are being manifested in decreasing support for EU integration in Serbian society and in a strengthening of the presence of foreign autocratic actors in the country;

    30. Calls on the Serbian authorities to restore citizens’ confidence in state institutions by granting transparency and accountability; encourages all political and social actors to engage in an inclusive, substantive dialogue aimed at fulfilling EU-related reforms;

    31. Notes that media freedom in Serbia has deteriorated further, as evidenced by Serbia’s drop to 98th place in the 2024 Reporter Without Borders World Press Freedom Index; urges Serbia to improve and protect media professionalism, diversity and media pluralism, and to promote quality investigative journalism, the highest ethical journalistic standards, through respecting journalistic codes of conduct, and media literacy; recalls the importance of the plurality and transparency of the media, including on aspects related to ownership and state financing, most notably through better involvement of the REM; recalls that the concentration of media ownership can have adverse effects on the freedom of the media and the professionalism of reporting; reaffirms that, as part of the accession negotiations, Serbia needs to align with the EU in matters of strategic importance, such as countering FIMI; calls on Serbia to align with EU policies in countering foreign interference and disinformation campaigns by implementing concrete regulatory measures in line with EU standards, such as the provisions included in the Digital Services Act[7] and Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising[8]; encourages cooperation between Serbia, the European External Action Service and the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in tackling disinformation; expects the authorities to investigate and prosecute all instances of hate speech, smear campaigns and strategic lawsuits against journalists;

    32. Expresses its deep concerns about reported cases of abusive attacks, digital surveillance and harassment against journalists, human rights activists and civil society organisations, most recently a police raid on 25 February 2025 on four leading civil society organisations, ostensibly regarding their misuse of US Agency for International Development funds; strongly condemns persistent smear campaigns and intimidation against civil society in Serbia, including false allegations about plots to overthrow the government with foreign support;

    33. Expresses concern that civil society organisations in Serbia face increasing challenges, including restrictive conditions, funding constraints, police raids and other forms of intimidation from state authorities; underlines the importance of a framework that enables local, vibrant civil society organisations to operate freely and participate in policymaking, including EU integration processes, in inclusive and meaningful ways; regrets that Serbia currently does not provide a framework that enables its lively and pluralistic civil society organisations, particularly those engaged in democracy support and electoral observation, to operate freely and participate in policymaking in inclusive and meaningful ways; expresses concern about recent raids of the offices of civil society organisations; calls for investigations into all attacks and smear campaigns against civil society organisations and for the improved transparency of public funding;

    34. Urges the Serbian authorities to expand the availability of public broadcasting services in all minority languages across the country, ensuring equal access to media for all communities, while drawing on the best practice of the region of Vojvodina;

    35. Expresses its deep concern about the draft law submitted to the Serbian Parliament on 29 November 2024, which proposes the establishment of a Russian-style foreign agents law; reminds Serbian legislators that civil society organisations and journalists play a key role in a healthy democratic society; reiterates that such legislation is incompatible with the values of the EU; notes that multiple civil society organisations suspended their cooperation with the legislative and executive branches of the government in February 2025;

    36. Expresses grave concern about the increasing political interference in heritage protection in Serbia, including the removal of protected status from cultural monuments and the disregard for legal procedures governing their preservation, as in the case of the Generalštab Modernist Complex;

    37. Calls on Serbia to fight disinformation, including manipulative anti-EU narratives and, in particular, to end its own state-sponsored disinformation campaigns; condemns the opening of an RT office in Belgrade, the launch of RT’s online news service in Serbian and the continued operation of the Russian online news service Sputnik Srbija, which is used to propagate pro-Russian narratives and misinformation across the Western Balkans region; urges the Serbian authorities to counter hybrid threats and fully align with the Council’s decision on the suspension of the broadcasting activities of Sputnik and RT; is deeply concerned about the spread of disinformation about the Russian aggression against Ukraine; calls on Serbia and the Commission to bolster infrastructure to fight disinformation and other hybrid threats; condemns the increasing influence of Russian and Chinese state-sponsored disinformation in Serbia, including the dissemination of anti-EU and anti-democratic narratives;

    38. Takes note of the adoption of the national strategy for equality and the strategy for prevention of and protection against discrimination, and calls for their full implementation and for further alignment with European standards; urges the Serbian authorities to address the recommendations of the Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (GREVIO), with a view to improving compliance with the Istanbul Convention ratified by Serbia; notes with concern the temporary suspension of the implementation of the Law on Gender Equality by the Constitutional Court; expresses concern about the persistent lack of adequate support for organisations promoting women’s rights and gender equality;

    39.  Stresses that the Serbian authorities must take concrete measures to uphold and strengthen the respect for the rights of the child in the country, including by ratifying the third Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopting a national action plan for the rights of the child, adopting a new strategy on violence against children, given the expiry of the previous framework, and establishing a national framework to protect children from abuse and neglect;

    40. Welcomes the fact that Belgrade Pride 2024 parade, the biggest in Serbia so far, passed off peacefully, though being protected by a high-profile police presence;

    41. Highlights the need for strong commitment to safeguarding the rights of national minorities, ensuring their full representation at all levels of government, preserving their cultural identity through the use of their respective languages and by meeting their educational needs, freedom of expression and access to information, and to actively pursuing investigations into hate-motivated crimes as an irreplaceable part of common European values; regrets the fact that almost all national minorities are protected only formally; expresses concerns about the practice of pro forma representation of national minorities who are under government control; calls on Serbia to protect and promote the cultural heritage and traditions of its national minorities, in particular to create a positive atmosphere for education in minority languages, including by providing sufficient numbers of teachers, textbooks and additional materials, and deplores the violation of minority rights in this area; calls on Serbia to refrain from exploiting the national identities of national minorities that create division within these communities, and strongly condemns recorded cases of hate speech against some of them; notes the considerable delay in drafting a new action plan for the realisation of national minority rights and stresses the urgent need for Serbia to finalise and implement it promptly; highlights the need for the new action plan to fully incorporate the findings and recommendations of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities;

    42. Expresses concerns about the significant decline in the population of certain minority groups, including the Bulgarian minority; calls on Serbia to ensure the right to use names and language specific to minority groups, including women within the Bulgarian community; notes with concern that not all school textbooks have been translated into Bulgarian; calls on the Serbian Government to ensure reciprocal equal rights for the Croatian minority in Serbia as the Serbian minority enjoys in Croatia, in particular with regard to ensuring their reciprocal representation at all levels of government, including regional and local levels; reiterates its concern regarding the restrictive and arbitrary enforcement of the Law on Permanent and Temporary Residence related to the passivation of address of thousands of Albanians in the south of Serbia; emphasises the situation of the Romanian Orthodox Church in Serbia, which is not officially recognised by the state as a traditional church;

    43. Regrets the attempts by the Serbian authorities to undermine the national identity of communities within the country; expresses concern, in this context, about the promotion of narratives such as that of the ‘Shopi nation’, which seek to erase the existence of the Bulgarian community and deny its historical roots and cultural heritage; regrets the searches carried out by the Serbian authorities at the Bosilegrad Cultural Centre and the initiation of pre-trial proceedings for ‘ethnic hatred’ against activists from non-governmental organisations;

    44. Calls on Serbia to refrain from distorting historical events, such as the narrative surrounding the so-called Surdulica massacre, which only serve to spread division and hatred against minorities and neighbouring countries, which is incompatible with EU membership;

    Reconciliation and good neighbourly relations

    45. Reiterates that good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation remain essential elements of the enlargement process; calls on Serbia to stop restrictions on entry for regional civil society activists and artists as such practices undermine regional dialogue and cooperation; reaffirms, furthermore, the importance of the stability of south-eastern European countries and their resilience against foreign interference in internal democratic processes; stresses the importance of Serbia developing good neighbourly relations, implementing bilateral agreements and resolving outstanding bilateral issues with its neighbours; notes Serbia’s participation in regional initiatives and its active involvement in the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans and the Common Regional Market; underlines the fact that respect for national minority rights is an essential condition of Serbia’s advancement along its European path;

    46. Calls for historical reconciliation and the overcoming of discrimination and prejudices from the past; deplores the recent inflammatory rhetoric by the government, targeting neighbouring states that did not support the opening of cluster 3 for Serbia;

    47. Reiterates that Serbia must refrain from influencing the domestic politics of its neighbouring Western Balkan countries, including regarding the unconstitutional celebration of Republika Srpska Day in Bosnia and Herzegovina and questioning Bosnia and Herzegovina’s court decisions;

    48. Urges Serbia to step up its reconciliation efforts and seek solutions to past disputes, in particular when it comes to missing persons, who account for 1 782 people in Croatia, 7 608 people in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 1 595 people in Kosovo; calls on the Serbian authorities to achieve justice for victims by recognising and respecting court verdicts on war crimes, fighting against impunity for wartime crimes, investigating cases of missing persons, investigating grave sites, and supporting domestic prosecutors in bringing perpetrators to justice, which requires the cooperation of other parties too; strongly condemns the widespread public denials of international verdicts for war crimes, including the denial of the Srebrenica genocide;

    49. Calls on the judicial authorities in Serbia to ensure compliance with the standards of fair trial and satisfaction of justice for victims in all war crime cases; calls for the denial of war crimes and the glorification of war criminals to be included in the Criminal Code, with a view to prosecuting any form of denial of war crimes determined by the verdicts of the International Criminal Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia and the International Court of Justice;

    50. Reiterates its position on the importance of opening and publishing wartime archives, and reiterates its call for the former Yugoslav archives to be opened and, in particular, for access to be granted to the files of the former Yugoslav secret service (UDBA) and the Yugoslav People’s Army Counterintelligence Service (KOS), and for the files to be returned to the respective governments if they so request;

    51. Reiterates its full support for the EU-facilitated dialogue and welcomes the appointment of Peter Sørensen as the EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue;

    52. Reiterates the importance of constructive engagement on the part of the authorities of both Serbia and Kosovo in order to achieve a comprehensive, legally binding normalisation agreement, based on mutual recognition and in accordance with international law; calls on both Kosovo and Serbia to implement the Brussels and Ohrid Agreements, including the establishment of the Association/Community of Serb-majority municipalities, and the lifting of Serbia’s opposition of Kosovo’s membership in regional and international organisations, and to avoid unilateral actions that could undermine the dialogue process;

    53. Expects Kosovo and Serbia to fully cooperate and take all the necessary measures to apprehend and swiftly bring to justice the perpetrators of the 2023 terrorist attack in Banjska; deplores the fact that Serbia still has not prosecuted the culprits, most notably Milan Radoičić, the Vice-President of Srpska Lista; reiterates that the perpetrators of the terrorist attack in Zubin Potok must also be held accountable and must face justice without delay;

    54. Calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and on the Commission to take a more proactive role in leading the dialogue process; calls for an enhanced role for the European Parliament in facilitating the dialogue through regular joint parliamentary assembly meetings;

    Socio-economic reforms

    55. Welcomes Serbia’s steady progress towards developing a functioning market economy with positive GDP growth and increased foreign investment in some sectors; takes note of that fact that Serbia received its first-ever investment-grade credit rating; underlines the fact that the EU is Serbia’s main trading partner, the largest source of foreign direct investment and by far the largest donor; reiterates that the financial assistance, which is of great benefit to Serbia, is conditional on the strengthening of democratic principles and alignment with the CFSP and other EU policies; reiterates the need for more substantial reforms in the labour market, education and public administration, including to address social inequalities; expresses concern about the scale and scope of intergovernmental contracts awarded that are exempt from the current legislative framework on public procurement; regrets, however, the fact that public debt as a percentage of GDP remains well above the eastern European average;

    56. Is concerned about the investment in Serbia by Russia and China and their growing influence on the political and economic processes in the region;

    57. Calls on Serbia to intensify efforts and increase investment in the socio-economic development of its border regions to address depopulation and ensure that the residents have access to essential services, including professional opportunities, healthcare and education; underlines the potential of the IPA III cross-border cooperation programmes as a key tool to promote long-term sustainable regional growth;

    58. Welcomes Serbia’s active engagement in the implementation of the new Growth Plan for the Western Balkans; takes note of the fact that Serbia adopted its Reform Agenda on 3 October 2024; believes that embracing the opportunities of the growth plan would further enhance the Serbian economy, which over the past three years benefited from more than EUR 586 million in financial and technical assistance under IPA III; believes that the EU funding should better support the democratic reforms of the country; calls, in that context, for the relevant EU funding, including from the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, to be reprogrammed to redirect more funds towards supporting judiciary reforms and anti-corruption measures, as well as towards independent media and civil society organisations, in order to support their critical work, in particular in the vacuum created by the withdrawal of US donors; calls, furthermore, for the EU and the Western Balkan countries to establish a framework for fruitful cooperation between the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and its Western Balkan counterparts in order to ensure that the EPPO can effectively exercise its power on IPA III and Western Balkan Facility funds in the recipient countries; urges the Serbian authorities to step up efforts to communicate clearly to citizens the benefits of the EU funds and to improve their visibility;

    59. Regrets the lack of public consultation during the adoption of the Serbian Reform Agenda; calls for more effective oversight of the EU funding programmes and projects;

    60. Advocates increased regional cooperation among Western Balkan countries to share best practice and develop joint strategies in combating disinformation and foreign interference; emphasises the role of the EU in facilitating such collaborative efforts; calls for the continuation and further reinforcement of the IPA regional cybersecurity programme;

    61. Recognises the important role of Serbia’s business community in advancing economic convergence with the EU, including through the opportunities offered by and in the implementation of the growth plan as a sustainable alternative to Russian and Chinese investment in the country; welcomes the business community’s contribution to advancing socio-economic relations in the Western Balkans;

    62. Takes note of Serbia’s business community’s efforts in advocating for the accession of the Western Balkans to the EU’s single market as a concrete step towards full EU membership; calls for clear, measurable actions and well-defined roles and responsibilities for the implementation of the Common Regional Market action plan, as a key driver for the region’s successful accession to the EU’s single market;

    Energy, the environment, sustainable development and connectivity

    63. Calls on Serbia to increase its efforts towards the transposition of relevant environmental and climate acquis and to ensure the proper application of environmental protection standards, including by significantly enhancing its administrative and technical capacities at all levels of government, notably on waste management legislation and the adoption of the Climate Change Adaptation Programme and the National Energy and Climate Plan; urges the Serbian authorities to improve the transparency and environmental impact assessment of all investment, including from China and Russia;

    64. Reiterates its regret regarding the lack of action on the pollution of the Dragovishtitsa river by mines operating in the region and the detrimental effect on the health of the local people and the environment;

    65. Calls on Serbia to increase its efforts towards the decarbonisation of its energy system and to enable effective enforcement of pollution reduction regulations related to thermal power plants;

    66. Emphasises the need for further progress in transboundary cooperation with neighbouring countries, especially with regard to transboundary road infrastructure; urges Serbia to begin implementing the activities outlined in the memorandum of understanding on environmental protection cooperation with Bulgaria;

    67. Takes note of the EU-Serbia memorandum of understanding launching a strategic partnership on sustainable raw materials, battery value chains and electric vehicles, in view of the European energy transition and in line with the highest environmental standards; recalls that dialogue with the affected populations, the scientific community and civil society should be at the centre of any such strategic partnership;

    68. Welcomes the agreement reached at the EU-Western Balkans summit in Tirana on reduced roaming costs; calls, in this respect, on the authorities, private actors and all stakeholders to facilitate reaching the agreed targets to achieve a substantial reduction of roaming charges for data and further reductions leading to prices close to the domestic prices between the Western Balkans and the EU by 2027; welcomes the entering into force of the first phase of implementation of the roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU;

    69. Reiterates that it is important for Serbia to continue diversifying its energy supply, to be able to break away from its dependency on Russia; takes note of the sanctions announced by the United States against Naftna Industrija Srbije (NIS), a subsidiary of the Russian Gazprom; welcomes the completion of the gas interconnector between Serbia and Bulgaria (IBS) in December 2023; regrets the postponement of the launching of the IBS’s commercial operation; calls for the swift finalisation of the permitting process to ensure its full operability in compliance with the energy community acquis; notes that Serbia is taking steps to introduce a carbon tax by 2027 as a step towards aligning with the EU emissions trading system;

    70. Notes that all chapters in cluster 4 on the green agenda and sustainable connectivity have been opened; notes the adoption of the Law on Environmental Impact Assessment as a positive step towards environmental protection in Serbia, while expressing its regret that the new law fails to align fully with the relevant EU Directive 2014/52/EU[9], since it still leaves the opportunity for significant projects to advance without comprehensive environmental scrutiny; reiterates the need to designate and rigorously manage protected areas, particularly those identified as Important Bird and Biodiversity Areas (IBAs); calls for special attention to be given to critical sites where enforcement against poaching needs to be improved;

    °

    ° °

    71. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the President, Government and National Assembly of Serbia.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the ninth report on economic and social cohesion – A10-0066/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the ninth report on economic and social cohesion

    (2024/2107(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty on European Union,

     having regard to Articles 4, 162, 174 to 178, and 349 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy[1] (Common Provisions Regulation),

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1058 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 on the European Regional Development Fund and on the Cohesion Fund[2],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1059 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 on specific provisions for the European territorial cooperation goal (Interreg) supported by the European Regional Development Fund and external financing instruments[3],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1296/2013[4],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1056 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the Just Transition Fund[5],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 establishing rules on support for strategic plans to be drawn up by Member States under the common agricultural policy (CAP Strategic Plans) and financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1305/2013 and (EU) No 1307/2013[6],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/460 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 March 2020 amending Regulations (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013 and (EU) No 508/2014 as regards specific measures to mobilise investments in the healthcare systems of Member States and in other sectors of their economies in response to the COVID-19 outbreak (Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative)[7],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/558 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2020 amending Regulations (EU) No 1301/2013 and (EU) No 1303/2013 as regards specific measures to provide exceptional flexibility for the use of the European Structural and Investments Funds in response to the COVID-19 outbreak[8],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/461 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 March 2020 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 in order to provide financial assistance to Member States and to countries negotiating their accession to the Union that are seriously affected by a major public health emergency[9],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/2221 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 December 2020 amending Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 as regards additional resources and implementing arrangements to provide assistance for fostering crisis repair in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and its social consequences and for preparing a green, digital and resilient recovery of the economy (REACT-EU)[10],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/562 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 April 2022 amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013 and (EU) No 223/2014 as regards Cohesion’s Action for Refugees in Europe (CARE)[11],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/2039 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013 and (EU) 2021/1060 as regards additional flexibility to address the consequences of the military aggression of the Russian Federation FAST (Flexible Assistance for Territories) – CARE[12],

     having regard to the URBACT programme for sustainable urban cooperation, established in 2002,

     having regard to the Urban Agenda for the EU of 30 May 2016,

     having regard to the Territorial Agenda 2030 of 1 December 2020,

     having regard to the 9th Cohesion Report, published by the Commission on 27 March 2024[13], and the Commission communication of 27 March 2024 on the 9th Cohesion Report (COM(2024)0149),

     having regard to the study entitled ‘The future of EU cohesion: Scenarios and their impacts on regional inequalities’, published by the European Parliamentary Research Service in December 2024,

     having regard to the Commission report of February 2024 entitled ‘Forging a sustainable future together – Cohesion for a competitive and inclusive Europe’[14],

     having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 31 May 2024 on the 9th Cohesion Report[15],

     having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 21 November 2024 entitled ‘A renewed Cohesion Policy post 2027 that leaves no one behind – CoR responses to the 9th Cohesion Report and the Report of the Group of High-Level Specialists on the Future of Cohesion Policy’,

     having regard to the report entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness – A competitiveness strategy for Europe’, published by the Commission on 9 September 2024,

     having regard to the agreement adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP21) in Paris on 12 December 2015 (the Paris Agreement),

     having regard to the study entitled ‘Streamlining EU Cohesion Funds: addressing administrative burdens and redundancy’, published by its Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union in November 2024[16],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2025/XXXX of the European Parliament and of the Council of [INSERT DATE] on the Border Regions’ Instrument for Development and Growth in the EU (BRIDGEforEU) [INSERT FOOTNOTE ONCE PUBLISHED IN OJ],

     having regard to the Commission communication of 3 May 2022 entitled ‘Putting people first, securing sustainable and inclusive growth, unlocking the potential of the EU’s outermost regions’ (COM(2022)0198),

     having regard to the opinion in the form of a letter from the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (XXX),

     having regard to its resolution of 25 March 2021 on cohesion policy and regional environment strategies in the fight against climate change[17],

     having regard to its resolution of 20 May 2021 on reversing demographic trends in EU regions using cohesion policy instruments[18],

     having regard to its resolution of 14 September 2021 entitled ‘Towards a stronger partnership with the EU outermost regions[19],

     having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on economic, social and territorial cohesion in the EU: the 8th Cohesion Report[20],

     having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2023 on possibilities to increase the reliability of audits and controls by national authorities in shared management[21],

     having regard to its resolution of 23 November 2023 on harnessing talent in Europe’s regions[22],

     having regard to its resolution of 14 March 2024 entitled ‘Cohesion policy 2014-2020 – implementation and outcomes in the Member States[23],

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Regional Development (A10-0066/2025),

    A. whereas cohesion policy is at the heart of EU policies and is the EU’s main tool for investments in sustainable economic, social and territorial development, and contributing to the Green Deal objectives, across the EU under its multiannual financial frameworks for the periods of 2014-2020 and 2021-2027; whereas cohesion policy, as mandated by the Treaties, is fundamental for a well-functioning and thriving internal market by promoting the development of all regions in the EU, and especially the less developed ones;

    B. whereas cohesion policy has fostered economic, social and territorial convergence in the EU, notably by increasing the gross domestic products, for example, of central and eastern EU Member States, which went from 43 % of the EU average in 1995 to around 80 % in 2023; whereas the 9th Cohesion Report highlights that, by the end of 2022, cohesion policy supported over 4.4 million businesses, creating more than 370 000 jobs in these companies; whereas it also underlines that cohesion policy generates a significant return on investment, and that each euro invested in the 2014–2020 and 2021–2027 programmes will have generated 1.3 euros of additional GDP in the Union by 2030; whereas cohesion policy constituted, on average, around 13 % of total public investment in the EU[24];

    C. whereas the Commission report entitled ‘The long-term vision for the EU’s rural areas: key achievements and ways forward’, presented alongside the ninth Cohesion Report, underlines that EUR 24.6 billion, or 8 % of the rural development pillar of the common agricultural policy, is directed towards investments in rural areas beyond farming investments, setting the scene for a debate on the future of rural areas;

    D. whereas between 2021 and 2027, cohesion policy will have invested over EUR 140 billion in the green and digital transitions[25], to help improve networks and infrastructure, support nature conservation, improve green and digital skills and foster job creation and services for the public;

    E. whereas despite the widely acknowledged and proven positive impact of cohesion policy on social, economic and territorial convergence, significant challenges remain, marked notably by development disparities at sub-national level, within regions and in regions caught in a development trap, and by the impact of climate change, in terms of demography, the digital and green transitions, and connectivity, but also in terms of sustainable economic development, in particular in least developed regions and rural and remote areas;

    F. whereas cohesion policy and sectoral programmes of the EU have repeatedly and efficiently helped regions to respond effectively to emergencies and asymmetric shocks such as the COVID-19 crisis, Brexit, the energy crisis and the refugee crisis caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as well as natural disasters, even though it is a long-term, structural policy and not a crisis management instrument or the ‘go-to’ emergency response funding mechanism; whereas such crises have delayed the implementation of the European Structural and Investment Funds and whereas a considerable number of projects financed with Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) funds have been taken for the most part from projects that had been slated for investment under cohesion policy;

    G. whereas despite measures already taken for the 2014-2020 and 2021-2027 periods, the regulatory framework governing the use and administration of cohesion policy instruments and funds should be further simplified and interoperable digital tools better used and developed, including the establishment of one-stop digitalised service centres, with the objective of streamlining procedures, enhancing stakeholder trust, reducing the administrative burden, increasing flexibility in fund management and speeding up payments, not only for the relevant authorities but also for the final beneficiaries; whereas it is necessary to increase the scope for using funds more flexibly, including the possibility of financing the development of dual-use products; whereas it is of utmost importance to formulate any future cohesion policy with a strategic impetus throughout the funding period, which could, however, be reassessed at midterm;

    H. whereas the low absorption rate of the 2021-2027 cohesion policy funds, currently at just 6 %, is not because of a lack of need from Member States or regions, but rather stems from delays in the approval of operational programmes, the transition period between financial frameworks, the prioritisation of NextGenerationEU by national managing authorities, limited administrative capacity and complex bureaucratic procedures; whereas Member States and regions may not rush to absorb all available funds as they anticipate a possible extension under the N+2 or N+3 rules;

    I. whereas radical modifications to the cohesion regulatory framework, from one programming period to the next, contribute to generating insecurity among the authorities responsible and beneficiaries, gold-plating legislation, increasing error rates (and the accompanying negative reputational and financial consequences), delays in implementation and, ultimately, disaffection among beneficiaries and the general population;

    J. whereas there is sometimes competition between cohesion funds, emergency funds and sectoral policies;

    K. whereas demographic changes vary significantly across EU regions, with the populations of some Member States facing a projected decline in the coming years and others projected to grow; whereas demographic changes also take place between regions, including movement away from outermost regions, but are generally observed as movement from rural to urban areas within Member States, wherein women are leaving rural areas in greater numbers than men, but also to metropolitan areas, where villages around big cities encounter difficulties in investing in basic infrastructure; whereas the provision of essential services such as healthcare, education and transportation must be reinforced in all regions, with a particular focus on rural and remote areas; whereas a stronger focus is needed on areas suffering from depopulation and inadequate services, requiring targeted measures to encourage young people to remain through entrepreneurship projects, high-quality agriculture and sustainable tourism;

    L. whereas taking account of the ageing population is crucial in order to ensure justice among the generations and thereby to strengthen participation, especially among young people;

    M. whereas urban areas are burdened by new challenges resulting from the population influx to cities, as well as rising housing and energy prices, requiring the necessary housing development, new environmental protection and energy-saving measures, such as accelerated deep renovation to combat energy poverty and promote energy efficiency; whereas the EU cohesion policy should help to contribute to an affordable and accessible housing market for all people in the EU, especially for low- and middle-income households, urban residents, families with children, women and young people;

    N. whereas effective implementation of the Urban Agenda for the EU can enhance the capacity of cities to contribute to cohesion objectives, thereby improving the quality of life of citizens and guaranteeing a more efficient use of the EU’s financial resources;

    O. whereas particular attention needs to be paid to rural areas, as well as areas affected by industrial transition and EU regions that suffer from severe and permanent natural or demographic handicaps, brain drain, climate-related risks and water scarcity, such as the outermost regions, and in particular islands located at their peripheries or at the periphery of the EU, sparsely populated regions, islands, mountainous areas and cross-border regions, as well as coastal and maritime regions;

    P. whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has created a new geopolitical reality that has had a strong impact on the employment, economic development and opportunities, and general well-being of the population living in regions bordering Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, as well as candidate countries such as Ukraine and Moldova, which therefore require special attention and support, including by accordingly adapting cohesion policy; whereas this war has led to an unprecedented number of people seeking shelter in the EU, placing an additional burden on local communities and services; whereas the collective security of the EU is strongly dependent on the vitality and well-being of regions situated at the EU’s external borders;

    Q. whereas the unique situation of Northern Ireland requires a bespoke approach building on the benefits of PEACE programmes examining how wider cohesion policy can benefit the process of reconciliation;

    R. whereas 79 % of citizens who are aware of EU-funded projects under cohesion policy believe that EU-funded projects have a positive impact on the regions[26], which contributes to a pro-EU attitude;

    S. whereas overall awareness of EU-funded projects under cohesion policy has decreased by 2 percentage points since 2021[27], meaning that greater decentralisation should be pursued to bring cohesion policy even closer to the citizen;

    1. Insists that the regional and local focus, place-based approach and strategic planning of cohesion policy, as well as its decentralised programming and implementation model based on the partnership principle with strengthened implementation of the European code of conduct, the involvement of economic and civil society actors, and multi-level governance, are key and positive elements of the policy, and determine its effectiveness; is firmly convinced that this model of cohesion policy should be continued in all regions and deepened where possible as the EU’s main long-term investment instrument for reducing disparities, ensuring economic, social and territorial cohesion, and stimulating regional and local sustainable growth in line with EU strategies, protecting the environment, and as a key contributor to EU competitiveness and just transition, as well as helping to cope with new challenges ahead;

    2. Calls for a clear demarcation between cohesion policy and other instruments, in order to avoid overlaps and competition between EU instruments, ensure complementarity of the various interventions and increase visibility and readability of EU support; in this context, notes that the RRF funds are committed to economic development and growth, without specifically focusing on economic, social and territorial cohesion between regions; is concerned about the Commission’s plans to apply a performance-based approach to the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF); acknowledges that performance-based mechanisms can be instrumental in making the policy more efficient and results-orientated, but cautions against a one-size-fits-all imposition of the model and expresses serious doubt about ideas to link the disbursement of ESIF to the fulfilment of centrally defined reform goals, even more so if the reform goals do not fall within the scope of competence of the regional level;

    3. Is opposed to any form of top-down centralisation reform of EU funding programmes, including those under shared management, such as the cohesion policy and the common agricultural policy, and advocates for greater decentralisation of decision-making to the local and regional levels; calls for enhanced involvement of local and regional authorities and economic and civil society actors at every stage of EU shared management programmes, from preparation and programming to implementation, delivery and evaluation, keeping in mind that the economic and social development of, and territorial cohesion between, regions can only be accomplished on the basis of good cooperation between all actors;

    4. Emphasises that the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) plays a key role, alongside cohesion policy funds, in supporting rural areas; stresses that the EAFRD’s design must align with the rules of cohesion policy funds to boost synergies and facilitate multi-funded rural development projects;

    5. Is convinced that cohesion policy can only continue to play its role if it has solid funding; underlines that this implies that future cohesion policy must be provided with robust funding for the post-2027 financial period; stresses that it is necessary to provide funding that is ambitious enough and easily accessible to allow cohesion policy to continue to fulfil its role as the EU’s main investment policy, while retaining the flexibility to meet potential new challenges, including the possibility of financing the development of dual-use products, and to enable local authorities, stakeholders and beneficiaries to effectively foster local development; is of the firm opinion that the capacity to offer flexible responses to unpredictable challenges should not come at the expense of the clear long-term strategic focus and objectives of cohesion policy;

    6. Underlines the importance of the next EU multiannual financial framework (MFF) and the mid-term review of cohesion policy programmes 2021-2027 in shaping the future of cohesion policy; reiterates the need for a more ambitious post-2027 cohesion policy in the next MFF 2028-2034; calls, therefore, for the upcoming MFF to ensure that cohesion policy continues to receive at least the same level of funding as in the current period in real terms; furthermore calls for cohesion policy to remain a separate heading in the new MFF; stresses that cohesion policy should be protected from statistical effects that may alter the eligibility of regions by changing the average EU GDP; reiterates the need for new EU own resources;

    7. Proposes, therefore, that next MFF be more responsive to unforeseen needs, including with sufficient margins and flexibilities from the outset; emphasises in this regard, however, that cohesion policy is not a crisis instrument and that it should not deviate from its main objectives, namely from its long-term investment nature; calls for the European Union Solidarity Fund to be strengthened, including in its pre-financing, making it less bureaucratic and more easily accessible, in order to develop an appropriate instrument capable of responding adequately to the economic, social and territorial consequences of future natural disasters or health emergencies; emphasises the need for Parliament to have adequate control over any emergency funds and instruments;

    8. Recognises the need to also use nomenclature of territorial units for statistics (NUTS) 3 classification for specific cases, in a manner that recognises that inequalities in development exist within all NUTS 2 regions; is of the opinion that regional GDP per capita must remain the main criterion for determining Member States’ allocations under cohesion policy; welcomes the fact that, following Parliament’s persistent calls, the Commission has begun considering additional criteria[28] such as greenhouse gas emissions, population density, education levels and unemployment rates, in order to provide a better socio-economic overview of the regions;

    9. Stresses that the rule of law conditionality is an overarching conditionality, recognising and enforcing respect for the rule of law, also as an enabling condition for cohesion policy funding, to ensure that Union resources are used in a transparent, fair and responsible manner with sound financial management; considers it necessary to reinforce respect for the rule of law and fundamental rights, and to ensure that all actions are consistent with supporting democratic principles, gender equality and human rights, including workers’ rights, the rights of disabled people and children’s rights, in the implementation of cohesion policy; highlights the important role of the European Anti-Fraud Office and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office in protecting the financial interests of the Union;

    10. Calls for further efforts to simplify, make more flexible, strengthen synergies and streamline the rules and administrative procedures governing cohesion policy funds at EU, national and regional level, taking full advantage of the technologies available to increase accessibility and efficiency, building on the existing and well-established shared management framework, in order to strengthen confidence among users, thus encouraging the participation of a broader range of economic and civil society actors in projects supported and maximising the funds’ impact; calls for further initiatives enabling better absorption of cohesion funds, including increased co-financing levels, higher pre-financing and faster investment reimbursements; calls for local administration, in particular representing smaller communities, to be technically trained for better administrative management of the funds; stresses, therefore, the importance of strengthening the single audit principle, further expanding simplified cost options and reducing duplicating controls and audits that overlap with national and regional oversight for the same project and beneficiary, with a view to eliminating the possibility of repeating errors in subsequent years of implementation;

    11. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to give regions greater flexibility already at the programming stage, in order to cater for their particular needs and specificities, emphasising the need to involve the economic and civil society actors; underlines that thematic concentration was a key element in aligning cohesion policy with Europe 2020 objectives; asks the Commission, therefore, to present all findings related to the implementation of thematic concentration and to draw lessons for future legislative proposals;

    12. Acknowledges that the green, digital and demographic transitions present significant challenges but, at the same time, opportunities to achieve the objective of economic, social and territorial cohesion; recognises that, statistically, high-income areas can hide the economic problems within a region; is aware of the risk of a widening of regional disparities, a deepening of social inequalities and a rising ‘geography of discontent’ related to the transition process; underlines the need to reach the EU’s sustainability and climate objectives, and to maintain shared economic growth by strengthening the Union’s competitiveness; calls, therefore, for a European strategy that guarantees harmonious growth within the Union, meeting the respective regions’ specific needs; reaffirms its commitment to pursuing the green and digital transitions, as this will create opportunities to improve the EU’s competitiveness; underlines the need to invest in infrastructure projects that enhance connectivity, particularly in sustainable, intelligent transport, and in energy and digital networks, ensuring that all regions, including remote and less-developed ones, are fully integrated into the single market and benefit equitably from the opportunities it provides; emphasises, in this context, the need to support the development of green industries, fostering local specificities and traditions to increase the resilience of the economic environment and civil society to future challenges;

    13. Urges that the cohesion policy remain consistent with a push towards increasing innovation and completing the EU single market, in line with the conclusions of the Draghi report on European competitiveness; underlines, in the context of regional disparities, the problem of the persisting innovation divide and advocates for a tailored, place-based approach to fostering innovation and economic convergence across regions and reducing the innovation gap; calls for a stronger role for local and regional innovation in building competitive research and innovation ecosystems and promoting territorial cohesion; points to new EU initiatives, such as regional innovation valleys and partnerships for regional innovation, that aim to connect territories with different levels of innovation performance and tackle the innovation gap; considers that this approach will reinforce regional autonomy, allowing local and regional authorities to shape EU policies and objectives in line with their specific needs, characteristics and capacities, while safeguarding the partnership principle;

    14. Is convinced that cohesion policy needs to continue to foster the principle of just transition, addressing the specific needs of regions, while leaving no territory and no one behind; calls for continued financing of the just transition process, with the Just Transition Fund being fully integrated into the Common Provisions Regulation and endowed with reinforced financial means for the post-2027 programming period; emphasises, nonetheless, the need to assess the impact of the Just Transition Fund on the transformation of eligible regions and, while ensuring it remains part of cohesion policy, refine its approach in the new MFF on the basis of the findings and concrete measures to ensure the economic and social well-being of affected communities;

    15. Underlines the need to improve the relationship between cohesion policy and EU economic governance, while avoiding a punitive approach; stresses that the European Semester should comply with cohesion policy objectives under Articles 174 and 175 TFEU; calls for the participation of the regions in the fulfilment of these objectives and for a stronger territorial approach; calls for a process of reflection on the concept of macroeconomic conditionality and for the possibility to be explored of replacing this concept with new forms of conditionality to better reflect the new challenges ahead;

    16. Is concerned about the growing number of regions in a development trap, which are stagnating economically and are suffering from sharp demographic decline and limited access to essential services; calls, therefore, for an upward adjustment in co-financing for projects aimed at strengthening essential services; stresses the role of cohesion policy instruments in supporting different regions and local areas that are coping with demographic evolution affecting people’s effective right to stay, including, among others, challenges related to depopulation, ageing, gender imbalances, brain drain, skills shortages and workforce imbalances across regions; recognises the need for targeted economic incentives and structural interventions to counteract these phenomena; in this context, calls for the implementation of targeted programmes to attract, develop and retain talent, particularly in regions experiencing significant outflows of skilled workers, by fostering education, culture, entrepreneurship and innovation ecosystems that align with local and regional economic needs and opportunities;

    17. Recognises the importance of supporting and financing specific solutions for regions with long-standing and serious economic difficulties or severe permanent natural and demographic handicaps; reiterates the need for maintaining and improving the provision of quality essential services (such as education and healthcare), transport and digital connectivity of these regions, fostering their economic diversification and job creation, and helping them respond to challenges such as rural desertification, population ageing, poverty, depopulation, loneliness and isolation, as well as the lack of opportunities for vulnerable people such as persons with disabilities; underlines the need to prioritise the development and adequate funding of strategic sectors, such as renewable energy, sustainable tourism, digital innovation and infrastructure, in a manner that is tailored to the economic potential and resources of each region, in order to create broader conditions for endogenous growth and balanced development across all regions, especially rural, remote and less-developed areas, border regions, islands and outermost regions; recalls the importance of strong rural-urban linkages and particular support for women in rural areas;

    18. Emphasises the need for a tailored approach for the outermost regions, as defined under Article 349 TFEU, which face unique and cumulative structural challenges due to their remoteness, small market size, vulnerability to climate change and economic dependencies; underlines that these permanent constraints, including the small size of the domestic economy, great distance from the European continent, location near third countries, double insularity for most of them, and limited diversification of the productive sector, result in additional costs and reduced competitiveness, making their adaptation to the green and digital transition particularly complex and costly; underlines their great potential to further develop, inter alia through improved regional connectivity, key sectors such as blue economy, sustainable agriculture, renewable energies, space activities, research or eco-tourism; reiterates its long-standing call on the Commission to duly consider the impact of all newly proposed legislation on the outermost regions, with a view to avoiding disproportionate regulatory burdens and adverse effects on these regions’ economies;

    19. Underlines the fact that towns, cities and metropolitan areas have challenges of their own, such as considerable pockets of poverty, housing problems, traffic congestion and poor air quality, generating challenges for social and economic cohesion created by inharmonious territorial development; emphasises the need for a specific agenda for cities and calls for deepening their links with functional urban areas, encompassing smaller cities and towns, to ensure that economic and social benefits are spread more evenly across the entire territory; highlights the need to strengthen coordination between the initiatives of the Urban Agenda for the EU and the instruments of cohesion policy, favouring an integrated approach that takes into account territorial specificities and emerging challenges; calls, furthermore, for more direct access to EU funding for regional and local authorities, as well as cities and urban authorities, by inter alia widening the use of integrated territorial investments (ITI);

    20. Stresses the need to continue and strengthen investments in affordable housing within the cohesion policy framework, recognising its significance for both regions and cities; highlights the need to foster its changes relevant to investing in housing beyond the two current possibilities (energy efficiency and social housing); emphasises the important role that cohesion policy plays in the roll-out and coordination of these initiatives; believes, furthermore, that it is important to include housing affordability in the URBACT initiative;

    21. Stresses the strategic importance of strong external border regions for the security and resilience of the EU; calls on the Commission to support the Member States and regions affected by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, in particular the regions on the EU’s eastern border, by revising the Guidelines on regional State aid[29], through tailor-made tools and investments under the cohesion policy, as well as supporting them to make the most of the possibilities offered by the cohesion policy funds, including Interreg, in a flexible way, to help cope with the detrimental socio-economic impact of the war on their populations and territories; calls, furthermore, for support to be given to regions bordering candidate countries such as Ukraine and Moldova to strengthen connections and promote their EU integration;

    22. Highlights the added value of territorial cooperation in general and cross-border cooperation in particular; underlines the importance of Interreg for cross-border regions, including outermost regions; emphasises its important role in contributing to their development and overcoming cross-border obstacles, including building trust across borders, developing transport links, identifying and reducing legal and administrative obstacles and increasing the provision and use of cross-border public services, among others; considers Interreg as the main EU instrument for tackling the persistent cross-border obstacles faced by emergency services, and proposes that there be a more prominent focus on these services; underlines the fact that cross-border areas, including areas at the EU’s external borders, bordering aggressor countries often face specific challenges; believes that EU border regions, facing multiple challenges, must be supported and is of the opinion that they must be provided with increased means; welcomes the new regulation on BRIDGEforEU; emphasises the importance of small-scale and cross-border projects and stresses the need for effective implementation on the ground; calls on the Commission to encourage Member States to actively support awareness-raising campaigns in bordering regions to maximise the impact of cross-border cooperation;

    23. Recalls the need to ‘support cohesion’, rather than just rely on the ‘do no harm to cohesion’ principle, which means that no action should hamper the convergence process or contribute to regional disparities; calls for a stronger integration of these principles as cross-cutting in all EU policies, to ensure that they support the objectives of social, economic and territorial cohesion, as set out in Articles 3 and 174 TFEU; calls, furthermore, on the Commission to issue specific guidelines on how to implement and enforce these principles across EU policies, paying particular attention to the impact of EU laws on the competitiveness of less developed regions; reiterates that new legislative proposals need to take due account of local and regional realities; suggests that the Commission draw on innovative tools such as RegHUB (the network of regional hubs) to collect data on the impact of EU policies on the regions; to this end, underlines the need to strengthen the territorial impact assessment of EU legislation, with a simultaneous strengthening of the territorial aspects of other relevant policies; insists that promoting cohesion should also be seen as a way of fostering solidarity and mutual support among Member States and their regions; calls on the Commission and the Member States to continue their efforts regarding communication and visibility of the benefits of cohesion policy, demonstrating to citizens the EU’s tangible impact and serving as a key tool in addressing Euroscepticism; welcomes the launch of the multilingual version of the Kohesio platform;

    24. Notes with concern the severe decline in recent years of adequate levels of national funding by Member States towards their poorer regions; recalls the importance of respecting the EU rule on additionality; calls on the Commission to ensure that national authorities take due account of internal cohesion in drafting and implementing structural and investment fund projects;

    25. Insists that, in addition to adjusting to regional needs, cohesion policy must be adapted to the smallest scale, i.e. funds must be accessible to the smallest projects and project bearers; points out that their initiatives are often the most innovative and have a significant impact on rural development; reiterates that these funds should be accessible to all, regardless of their size or scope; approves of the Cohesion Alliance’s call for ‘a post-2027 Cohesion Policy that leaves no one behind’;

    26. Stresses that delays in the MFF negotiations, together with the fact that Member States have placed a greater focus on the programming of the RRF funds, led to considerable delays in the programming period 2021-2027; stresses the importance of a timely agreement in the next framework, and therefore calls for the Common Provisions Regulation (CPR) and the budget negotiations to be finalised at least one year before the start of the new funding period so that Member States can develop their national and regional funding strategies in good time to ensure a successful transition to the next funding period and the continuation of existing ESIF projects;

    27. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the European Economic and Social Committee, the European Committee of the Regions and the national and regional parliaments of the Member States.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI USA: What They’re Saying: Support Grows for Hickenlooper’s Bipartisan Fix Our Forests Act

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Colorado John Hickenlooper

    Hickenlooper’s Fix Our Forests Act will help reduce wildfire risk for Colorado communities and speed up mitigation projects while maintaining environmental safeguards and encouraging local involvement

    WASHINGTON – U.S. Senators John Hickenlooper, John Curtis, Alex Padilla, and Tim Sheehy announced growing support from state officials, community leaders, and environmental organizations for the bipartisan Fix Our Forests Act. The bill works to strengthen wildfire resilience by improving forest management, supporting fire-safe communities, and streamlining approvals for projects that protect communities and ecosystems from extreme wildfires.

    The comprehensive bill reflects months of bipartisan negotiations to find consensus on how to accelerate forest management projects, promote safe and responsible prescribed fire treatments, expand public input in assessments of wildfire resilience needs, and enhance collaboration between federal agencies, states, tribes, and stakeholders.

    The Fix Our Forests Act is supported by Colorado Governor Jared Polis, Utah Governor Spencer Cox, California Governor Gavin Newsom, Colorado Department of Natural Resources, Colorado State Forest Service, ColoradoDivision of Fire Prevention and Control, The Nature Conservancy, Environmental Defense Fund, National Wildlife Federation, National Audubon Society, Theodore Roosevelt Conservation Partnership, Bipartisan Policy Center Action, International Association of Fire Chiefs, Alliance for Wildfire Resilience, Citizens’ Climate Lobby, Federation of American Scientists, American Property Casualty Insurance Association (APCIA), Association of Firetech Innovation (AFI), Hispanics Enjoying Camping, Hunting, and the Outdoors (HECHO), Wildfire Alliance, Tall Timbers, Rural Voices for Conservation Coalition, The Stewardship Project, Megafire Action, Property and Environment Research Center (PERC), National Association of State Foresters (NASF), Congressional Sportsmen’s Foundation, Arnold Ventures, Berkshire Hathaway Energy, American Forests, National Wild Turkey Federation (NWTF), Utah Department of Natural Resources, California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE), Utah Farm Bureau Federation, California Natural Resources Agency, and Climate & Wildfire Institute.

    WHAT THEY’RE SAYING:

    “I applaud the bipartisan work and leadership of the Senate sponsors of this bill, including Colorado’s Senator Hickenlooper, in crafting a bill that will make Colorado communities safer amidst the urgent and growing wildfire crisis in the West. From supporting responsible and expedited on-the-ground fuel reductions, to bolstering the use and development of the latest wildfire satellite monitoring technology which compliments Colorado’s national leadership in the aerospace sector, and to investing in stewardship practices for local communities to be better prepared for wildfires and reforestation efforts with the state nursery to improve our ability to recover – this bill makes major strides in addressing the country’s wildfire risk and will support Colorado’s continued leadership in wildfire preparedness, response and recovery,” said Colorado Governor Jared Polis.

    “Extreme risk of catastrophic wildfires across the West demands urgent action,” said California Governor Gavin Newsom. “In California, we’re fast-tracking projects by streamlining state requirements and using more fuel breaks and prescribed fire. The Fix Our Forests Act is a step forward that will build on this progress — enabling good projects to happen faster on federal lands. I’m appreciative of Senator Padilla and the bipartisan team of Senators who crafted a balanced solution that will both protect communities and improve the health of our forests.”

    “A century of fire suppression and decades of reduced forest management have left us with overgrown, unhealthy forests that are more vulnerable to disease and catastrophic wildfire,” said Utah Governor Spencer Cox. “The Fix Our Forest Act, along with the tools provided by President Trump’s executive order, will help us actively manage our forests—protecting our watersheds, improving wildlife habitat, reducing wildfire risk, and providing the timber we need to build strong homes and neighborhoods.”

    “We applaud the efforts made by Senator Hickenlooper in the Fix Our Forests Act to provide federal, state, and local partners with the tools needed to address wildfire mitigation in the most vulnerable areas in Colorado. Wildfires do not abide by our political boundaries. But here in Colorado we have built strong coordination among federal, state, local land managers and stakeholders to help reduce the impact of wildfires on our critical infrastructure and landscapes,” said Dan Gibbs, Executive Director, Colorado Department of Natural Resources. “We appreciate that this legislation builds upon this important collaboration and draws on existing agreements, such as Shared Stewardship, which will help strengthen our intergovernmental partnerships as we prepare for the next Colorado mega-fire.”

    “Forests are central to our way of life in Colorado. They support world-class outdoor recreation and a vital water supply that more than 40 million Americans rely upon. I am grateful to Senator John Hickenlooper for his work on the bipartisan Fix Our Forests Act,” said Matt McCombs, Colorado State Forester and Director of the Colorado State Forest Service. “This critical legislation will bolster our shared stewardship ethic in Colorado and enhance our ability as a state to improve forest health, protect lives, communities and water supplies from wildfire, and ensure that the forests that define Colorado endure for generations to come.”

    “First of all, thanks to Senators Hickenlooper, Curtis, Sheehy, and Padilla for their leadership in moving all this forward! Having spent so many hours working on the Wildfire Mitigation and Management Commission, it is refreshing to see so many of the recommendations moving forward!” said Mike Morgan, Director of the Colorado Division of Fire Prevention and Control.“Colorado has taken a very aggressive approach in addressing the wildfire challenges we face and we are pleased to see these efforts at the federal level taking a more holistic look at the challenges we all face and in support of the Commission’s recommendations. This bipartisan effort will serve Colorado and America well! I fully support this effort and I am happy to help in any way that would be helpful.”

    “TNC appreciates the serious undertaking of Senators Curtis, Hickenlooper, Sheehy, and Padilla to build on legislation targeted at preventing more catastrophic wildfires through improved forest and fuels management and expanded use of prescribed fire. TNC has been working to restore beneficial fire and improve the resilience of forest systems on the ground for more than 60 years. Every year, wildfires continue to grow deadlier and more devastating to communities and the environment, and we remain concerned that the significant cuts to the Forest Service workforce will impede work to protect people and nature from these wildfire risks.  We support this legislative effort aimed at improving the forest management process to better address catastrophic wildfires,” said Kameran Onley, managing director of North America policy and government relations, The Nature Conservancy.

    “For many Americans, catastrophic wildfires are a very real and growing threat to their homes and lives,” said Environmental Defense Fund Executive Director Amanda Leland. “The U.S. Forest Service needs new tools and more resources now to prevent and control these wildfires, and with the right funding, this bipartisan proposal will help. Protecting people and nature from catastrophic wildfire requires both a robust, science-based plan of forest management and the resources to implement it.”

    “As the megafire crisis grows larger and more severe with each fire season, we need policy solutions that reflect the urgency and scale of the problem. Senators Curtis, Hickenlooper, Padilla and Sheehy have negotiated a Senate companion to the Fix Our Forests Act that will move the federal government towards a science-based, strategic approach to addressing megafires. We look forward to working with the sponsors to advance this bill and enact the most transformative wildfire and land management law in a generation—since the Healthy Forest Restoration Act of 2003, if not the National Forest Management Act of 1976,” said Matt Weiner, CEO of Megafire Action.

    “We are thrilled to see the Fix Our Forests Act introduced in the Senate through a bipartisan cooperation between Senators Curtis, Hickenlooper, Padilla, and Sheehy. The bill greatly expands upon the version that passed the House, adding critical details to support wildfire risk reduction in the built environment and provisions for mitigating the health impacts of smoke to communities while promoting expanded use of prescribed fire,”said Annie Schmidt and Tyson Bertone-Riggs, Managing Directors, Alliance for Wildfire Resilience. “Covering a third of the recommendations of the Wildland Fire Mitigation and Management Commission, this bill is a significant step forward in wildfire policy and, coupled with sufficient funding and staffing to realize the proposed tools and programs, will make a real difference in our nation’s experience with wildfire.”

    “I thank Senators Hickenlooper, Padilla, Curtis, and Sheehy for introducing this bipartisan legislation,” said Fire Chief Josh Waldo, President and Board Chair of the International Association of Fire Chiefs. “As we saw in January’s fires in Los Angeles, the nation faces a serious and growing risk from fires in the wildland urban interface (WUI). This legislation will enact many of the recommendations of the Wildland Fire Mitigation and Management Commission. It also will improve coordination of federal wildland fire preparedness efforts; promote the use of prescribed fires and other preventative measures to prevent WUI fires; and promote the development of new technologies to help local fire departments. We look forward to working with the bill’s sponsors to pass this legislation.”

    “Our national forests provide essential wildlife habitat, store carbon, and supply communities across the nation with clean air and water. These vital landscapes are under threat and must be proactively stewarded if they are to survive the changing climate, rapidly intensifying wildfires, and past management missteps. The bipartisan Fix Our Forests Act will help increase the pace and scale of evidence-backed forest management, including the use of beneficial prescribed fire and the restoration of white oak forests. But we must have a robust and talented federal workforce in place for it to succeed,” said Abby Tinsley, vice president for conservation policy at the National Wildlife Federation. “We will work with Senators Hickenlooper, Padilla, Sheehy, Curtis, and Chairman Westerman in the House to strengthen and advance this important conversation.”

    “The health of our nation’s forests is dependent on the rivers, streams, and wetlands that sustain them. Actively conserving and restoring these critical aquatic resources is an important tool that can be used to mitigate the impacts of wildfire and drought, among other threats,” said Alicia Marrs, director of western water for the National Wildlife Federation. “We’re encouraged to see language in the bipartisan Fix Our Forests Act that recognizes the wildfire benefits of aquatic restoration. We look forward to continuing to work with leaders from both sides of the aisle to elevate these common sense and cost-effective approaches to forest and water management for all Americans.”

    “Wildfires grow more intense and destructive each year, leaving behind immense devastation for our forests, wildlife, and communities,” said Marshall Johnson, chief conservation officer at the National Audubon Society.“The bipartisan Fix Our Forests Act represents an important step in reducing wildfire risks across forested landscapes. Audubon thanks Senators Hickenlooper, Curtis, Padilla, and Sheehy for working together to craft a bill that sets the stage for improved forest management, and we urge Congress to dedicate the resources necessary to ensure federal agencies are well-equipped to reduce wildfire risks, steward our forestlands, and protect wildlife habitat.”

    “The growing frequency and severity of wildfires pose a tremendous threat to the health of our forests and the safety of countless communities. The Fix Our Forests Act takes important steps to mitigate wildfires, improve forest health, and protect local communities. We appreciate this thoughtful, bipartisan effort led by Senators Curtis, Hickenlooper, Sheehy, and Padilla to advance this important legislation,” said Jennifer Tyler, VP of Government Affairs at Citizens’ Climate Lobby.

    “The declining health of our National Forests and the fish and wildlife habitat that they provide is a concern for America’s hunters and anglers,”said Joel Pedersen, president and CEO of the Theodore Roosevelt Conservation Partnership. “TRCP applauds the leadership of Senators Curtis, Sheehy, Hickenlooper, and Padilla for introducing the bipartisan Fix Our Forests Act in the Senate and urges Congress to advance these important forest management provisions and to accompany them with adequate resources and capacity to carry out on-the-ground work.”   

    “HECHO enthusiastically applauds the impressive bipartisan leadership behind the Senate’s Fix Our Forests Act. At a time when cooperation is more important than ever, these Senators are putting forward real, thoughtful solutions to reduce wildfire risk while engaging local and rural communities. This legislation is a critical step toward actively managing our forests to protect public lands, watersheds, and the communities that depend on them. By expediting emergency authorities in high-risk firesheds —and through the creation of the Wildfire Intelligence Center—this effort has the potential to significantly reduce catastrophic wildfires and strengthen prediction and response, particularly in fire-prone states like Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, Nevada, and Utah. It’s a shining example of the kind of balanced, forward-looking leadership we need to protect our natural landscapes and communities,” said Camilla Simon, Executive Director of Hispanics Enjoying Camping, Hunting, and the Outdoors (HECHO).

    “BPC Action applauds the bipartisan leadership of Sens. Curtis (R-UT), Hickenlooper (D-CO), Sheehy (R-MT), and Padilla (D-CA) on the introduction of the Fix Our Forests Act. By streamlining and improving forest and hazardous fuels management activities on public and Tribal lands, this legislation will help reduce wildfire risks, improve forest health, and protect communities in fire-prone areas. The Fix Our Forests Act also delivers substantial economic and environmental benefits by addressing critical needs to enhance the domestic supply chain of seeds and advance biochar commercialization,” said Michele Stockwell, President of Bipartisan Policy Center Action (BPC Action).

    “The Senate’s bipartisan Fix Our Forest Act is a critical step toward restoring forest health and reducing catastrophic wildfire risk. This bipartisan legislation tackles the root causes of catastrophic wildfires by fixing the Cottonwood decision, reforming litigation standards, expanding categorical exclusions up to 10,000 acres, and boosting restoration capacity through long-term stewardship contracts and extended Good Neighbor Authority. Healthy forests require active stewardship—not bureaucratic delay. We thank Senators Hickenlooper, Sheehy, Padilla, and Curtis for bringing forward this bill, and we urge swift passage of this much-needed legislation,” said Brian Yabolnski, CEO of The Property and Environment Research Center (PERC).

    “Wildfires continue to ravage communities igniting homes, businesses, and infrastructure. APCIA commends Senators Curtis, Hickenlooper, Sheehy, and Padilla for their bipartisan leadership of the Fix Our Forests Act. The bill would improve fire assessment and prediction for wildland areas and communities to improve response, reduce hazardous fuels, enable greater vegetation management by utilities in federal rights-of-way to prevent fires, and create a community wildfire risk reduction program to support fire-resistant building methods, codes, and standards, promote ignition-resistant materials, defensible space, and other measures to reduce risk,” said David A. Sampson, President & CEO of APCIA

    “The Fix Our Forests Act streamlines collaboration between the National Wild Turkey Federation, the USDA Forest Service, and other partners, cutting red tape to accelerate urgent forest restoration and management on federal lands,” said Matt Lindler, NWTF Director of Government Affairs. “This bill ensures we can better manage and conserve vital natural resources for wildlife, hunters and anglers. We are grateful to see the Senate introduce this critical piece of legislation and await the signature from the president.”   

    “There is no time to waste in restoring and reforesting the forests that work every day to be the lungs of our nation,” said Brian Kittler, Chief Program Officer-Resilient Forests. “More than ever before successful and timely forest restoration will require strengthened coordination across federal, state, and tribal governments together with non-profit organizations. This bill prioritizes a complementary series of actions that will accelerate wildfire resilience and community resilience including ensuring post-fire reforestation is implemented quickly and with the best available science.”

    “The science is clear: tackling the wildfire crisis requires better forest management, increasing the use of prescribed fire, and investing in and deploying the next generation of wildfire technologies. The Fix Our Forests Act will get this urgently needed work done. Now is the time for the Senate to build on the bipartisan leadership demonstrated by the sponsors and pass this bill,” said James Campbell, Wildfire Policy Specialist at the Federation of American Scientists.

    “CWI commends Senator Curtis, Senator Hickenlooper, Senator Sheehy, and Senator Padilla for their bipartisan efforts to meaningfully address the wildfire crisis. The Fix Our Forests Act is an important step towards accelerating proven solutions to reduce catastrophic fire risk, improve forest and ecosystem health, and safeguard our local communities,” said Marissa Christiansen, Executive Director at the Climate and Wildfire Institute.“We are pleased to see many recommendations from the Wildland Fire Mitigation and Management Commission Report included in the updated legislation, including a directive to establish the Wildfire Intelligence Center to serve as the national hub for wildfire data, prediction, and response. We look forward to working with the bill’s sponsors to help accelerate solutions to the wildfire crisis by incorporating the best available science, data, and management principles into commonsense policy reform and decision-making.”

    “AFI supports the Fix Our Forests Act and calls on the United States Senate to pass it with the urgency the $100 billion a year wildfire crisis warrants from our elected officials,” said Bill Clerico, Founding Chair of AFI and Managing Partner of Convective Capital. “AFI is particularly supportive of the legislation’s inclusion of a Wildfire Intelligence Center, a long-overdue step to better integrate and coordinate wildfire response efforts and invest in cutting-edge technology. Our country’s wildfire response efforts are antiquated and are leaving us ill-prepared for this growing crisis. FOFA is a critical step to refining our wildfire response efforts and protecting our communities.”

    “State forestry agencies play a lead role not only in managing and protecting over 550 million acres of state and private forests, but also working to improve the health and resiliency of federal lands through cross-boundary partnerships nationwide. State Foresters are also responsible for wildfire protection on more than 1.5 billion acres and, in collaboration with local fire departments, responding to 80 percent of the nation’s wildland fires,” said Jay Farrell, Executive Director of the NASF. “NASF applauds the bipartisan work of Senators Sheehy, Curtis, Hickenlooper, and Padilla to chart a path forward to greatly enhance wildfire management and recovery efforts and stem the tide of disastrous wildfires that threaten our nation’s forests and the livelihood of communities that depend on them. We recognize that many of the improvements made in the Fix Our Forests Act are nuanced and look forward to continuing our work with Congress to ensure its landmark reforms become law.”

    “The poor health of our federal forests exacerbates the wildfires that negatively impact wildlife habitat, sportsmen’s access, and communities across the country, and comprehensive reforms are needed to actively treat hazardous fuels efficiently and at scale to increase forest resiliency to severe wildfires, insects, and disease,” said John Culclasure, Senior Director of Forest Policy at the Congressional Sportsmen’s Foundation. “We are grateful for the bipartisan leadership of Congressional Sportsmen’s Caucus Members Senators Curtis, Hickenlooper, Padilla, and Sheehy for introducing the Fix Our Forests Act to improve forest management through strengthened authorities, collaborative tools, and improved processes. We look forward to working with the bill sponsors to advance the legislation quickly as we approach wildfire season.”

    “Arnold Ventures praises the bipartisan introduction of the Fix Our Forests Act, an evidence-based, constructive proposal to cut red tape and prevent catastrophic forest fires. We applaud Senators John Curtis (R‑UT), John Hickenlooper (D‑CO), Tim Sheehy (R‑MT), and Alex Padilla (D‑CA) for their work to craft and introduce this important and necessary legislation. We encourage all Senators to support and ultimately pass the Fix Our Forests Act,” said Charlie Anderson, Executive Vice President for infrastructure at Arnold Ventures. “AV also thanks Reps. Bruce Westerman (R‑AR) and Scott Peters (D‑CA) for championing this vital work in the House of Representatives. We are heartened by the collaborative work across party lines in both chambers to support thoughtful, bipartisan policy that will save lives and property.”

    “Berkshire Hathaway Energy applauds the Senate introduction of the Fix Our Forests Act and thanks the bipartisan group of Senators who worked together to move it forward. The bill’s provisions would improve forest management activities on federal and tribal lands in common-sense ways, improving their resilience to wildfire,” said Scott Thon, President and CEO of Berkshire Hathaway Energy. “Passage and enactment of these provisions would be a step to help prevent catastrophic wildfires and lessen their environmental damage. Berkshire Hathaway Energy recognizes the growing threat of wildfires affects everyone and requires holistic solutions with businesses, governments and key stakeholders working together to design and implement constructive, enduring solutions.”

    Our forests face serious threats, and this bipartisan bill is a vital step forward in addressing complex forest health challenges,” said Joel Ferry, Executive Director of the Utah Department of Natural Resources. “It gives land managers the tools to proactively reduce wildfire risk, protect critical watersheds, and restore forest ecosystems through stronger collaboration.”

    “The bipartisan Fix Our Forests Act provides much-needed tools that will move the needle and improve our work to mitigate wildfires,” said CAL FIRE Director and Fire Chief Joe Tyler. “This bill will bring California’s use of cutting-edge technology to the rest of the country. The proposed Wildfire Intelligence Center will advance the kind of predictive services, monitoring, and early detection work already happening at California’s Wildfire Forecast and Threat Intelligence Integration Center.”

    “Utah’s farmers and ranchers applaud Senator Curtis’ sponsorship of the ‘Fix Our Forests Act’, which will enhance forest health, reduce wildfire risks, and protect vital watersheds. We are particularly encouraged by provisions promoting locally-led restoration efforts, targeted grazing as a wildfire mitigation tool, and watershed protection strategies,” said ValJay Rigby, Utah Farm Bureau Federation President. “The Utah Farm Bureau appreciates the bill’s emphasis on active forest management and increasing the pace and scale of treatment projects to address catastrophic wildfire risks. The ‘Fix Our Forests Act’ represents a significant step toward healthier forests and safer communities.”

    BACKGROUND:

    The West has long been prone to wildfires, but climate change, prolonged drought, and the buildup of dry fuels have increasingly intensified these fires and extended fire seasons. Wildfires today are more catastrophic – growing larger, spreading faster, and burning more land than ever before.

    Colorado has seen four of the five largest fires in our state’s history since 2018. The 2021 Marshall fire was Colorado’s most destructive on record, burning over 1,000 homes. The Cameron Peak and East Troublesome fires in 2020 together burned more than 400,000 acres, the two largest fires in the state’s history. Nationwide, total acres burned rose from 2.7 million in 2023 to nearly 9 million in 2024, a 231% increase.

    Forest health challenges are also increasing in frequency and severity due to climate stressors like drought and fire, and biological threats like invasive species – all of which the West is particularly vulnerable to. From 2001 to 2019, total U.S. forest area declined by 2.3%, with the Intermountain West experiencing the largest losses by area.

    To address these challenges, the Fix Our Forests Act would:

    • Establish new and updated programs to reduce wildfire risks across large, high-priority “firesheds,” with an emphasis on cross-boundary collaboration.
    • Streamline and expand tools for forest health projects (e.g., stewardship contracting, Good Neighbor Agreements) and provide faster processes for certain hazardous fuels treatments.
    • Create a single interagency program to help communities in the wildland-urban interface build and retrofit with wildfire-resistant measures, while simplifying and consolidating grant applications.
    • Boost reforestation with the inclusion of Hickenlooper’s Reforestation, Nurseries, and Genetic Resources (RNGR) Support Act to support reforestation capacity of state, tribal, and private nurseries.
    • Strengthen coordination efforts across agencies through a new Wildfire Intelligence Center with the inclusion of Hickenlooper’s bipartisan Wildfire Intelligence Collaboration and Coordination Act of 2025, which would streamline federal response and create a whole-of-government approach to combating wildfires.
    • Support prescribed fire activities on both federal and non-federal lands – prioritizing large, cross-boundary projects, strengthening the prescribed fire workforce, and facilitating coordination on air quality protections.
    • Expand research and demonstration initiatives – including biochar projects and the Community Wildfire Defense Research Program – to test and deploy cutting-edge wildfire prevention, detection, and mitigation technologies.
    • Enable watershed protection and restoration projects to include adjacent non-federal lands; establish new programs for white oak restoration; and clarify policies to reduce wildfire-related litigation and expedite forest health treatments.

    A one-pager can be found here, and a section-by-section can be found here.

    The Fix Our Forests Act was originally introduced in the House of Representatives by Representatives Bruce Westerman and Scott Peters.

    Hickenlooper has been an active supporter of wildfire resilience, including sponsorship of legislation to restore land management agency staffing and pushback on the firings of the federal employees that support wildfire resilience on our public lands. The Fix Our Forests Act provides the tools necessary to accelerate wildfire resilience, which will work alongside Hickenlooper’s sustained efforts for the funding and staffing necessary for land management efforts.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Advancing Clean Energy Solutions on SUNY Campuses

    Source: US State of New York

    overnor Kathy Hochul today announced that the State University of New York at Oneonta (SUNY Oneonta) is the first SUNY to purchase Tier 1 Renewable Energy Certificates (REC) from the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority’s (NYSERDA) voluntary sales program. This purchase is a model for energy users — commercial, industrial and institutional utility customers — to replicate across the State and will provide enough locally-sourced clean energy to fully power four, 200-bed residence halls on the SUNY Oneonta campus.

    “New York State continues to demonstrate its commitment to advancing clean energy solutions and sustainability,” Governor Hochul said. “I applaud SUNY Oneonta for powering its campus with clean energy. Not only does this program bring the university one step closer to reaching carbon neutrality, but it also provides a blueprint for other SUNY campuses to follow.”

    Implemented by NYSERDA, the Voluntary Tier 1 REC Presale Program was established in 2023 to create an opportunity for any organization — including commercial, industrial and institutional utility customers — to purchase high-quality New York Tier 1 RECs procured by NYSERDA through a competitive process. Tier 1 RECs represent the environmental attributes of one megawatt hour (MWh) of energy derived from renewable resources such as wind and solar. For this program, the sources must be Renewable Energy Standard (RES)-eligible and come from new renewable energy generators that began operation on or after January 1, 2015. Through its REC purchase, SUNY Oneonta will claim 1,000 MWhs of new, local renewable energy in 2025.

    By participating in NYSERDA’s program, organizations can reduce their carbon footprint and support local, renewable energy projects throughout New York State.

    New York State Energy Research and Development Authority President and CEO Doreen M. Harris said, “Securing locally-sourced renewable energy for all New Yorkers, especially for the many students, faculty and others who live and work on a college campus, is a critical part of New York State’s energy leadership. NYSERDA is proud of its collaboration with SUNY Oneonta and looks forward to working with other energy users, such as higher education institutions, through this program in the future.”

    State University of New York Chancellor John B. King Jr. said, “Through SUNY’s Climate and Sustainability Action Plan, campuses like SUNY Oneonta are making changes today that will have a direct impact on their future energy sustainability and the surrounding communities we serve. We applaud SUNY Oneonta for being the first to join Governor Hochul’s program to purchase Tier 1 Renewable Energy Certificates, and I look forward to the shared learnings from this initiative so that more of our colleges and universities will understand how RECs can best be incorporated into their clean energy programs.”

    State University of New York at Oneonta President Alberto Cardelle said, “In my role as co-chair of the SUNY Sustainability Council, I have the opportunity to work alongside leaders across the SUNY system to develop the SUNY Climate and Sustainability Action Plan. Buying Tier 1 Renewable Energy Certificates is one positive action we are taking at SUNY Oneonta to lead the way in addressing climate change and sustainability. Our campus community, from students to faculty and visitors, values sustainability and appreciates that it is one of our core values as an institution.”

    Assemblymember Brian Miller said, “I commend SUNY Oneonta for being a leader amongst SUNY institutions in using locally sourced clean energy. By becoming the first campus to fully power residence halls using NYSERDA’s voluntary sales program through the purchase of Tier 1 Renewable Energy Certificates, they are setting a powerful example of what’s possible when we prioritize sustainability, innovation, and local impact,” said Assemblyman Brian Miller. “This is a model that institutions and energy users across New York can look to as we work toward a cleaner, more resilient future.”

    This purchase is part of SUNY Oneonta’s Clean Energy Master Plan which charts a roadmap for carbon neutrality by 2045. The university converting its campus buildings over to heat pump technology and purchasing these RECs, as well as its onsite solar energy production, will help to offset SUNY Oneonta’s electrical usage.

    NYSERDA is the central administrator of Tier 1 REC purchases and sales in New York and supports a diverse supply of clean energy through its Tier 1 program. Participants in this program can immediately secure the environmental benefits from currently operating projects.

    Additional information about the program is available on NYSERDA’s website.

    New York State’s Climate Agenda
    New York State’s climate agenda calls for an affordable and just transition to a clean energy economy that creates family-sustaining jobs, promotes economic growth through green investments, and directs a minimum of 35 percent of the benefits to disadvantaged communities. New York is advancing a suite of efforts to achieve an emissions-free economy by 2050, including in the energy, buildings, transportation, and waste sectors.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Recruitment starts for Independent Climate Council members23 April 2025 Recruitment has started for the appointment of members of​ Jersey’s newly established Independent Climate Council, which will be funded through the Climate Emergency Fund. The Independent Climate Council… Read more

    Source: Channel Islands – Jersey

    23 April 2025

    Recruitment has started for the appointment of members of​ Jersey’s newly established Independent Climate Council, which will be funded through the Climate Emergency Fund. 

    The Independent Climate Council will play a vital role in ensuring oversight and accountability of the Government of Jersey’s climate actions, as outlined in the Carbon Neutral Roadmap, CNR. The Council will report on progress every four years, aligned with the electoral cycle, and provide independent, science-based analysis on greenhouse gas, GHG, emission reductions and the delivery of climate policy initiatives. 

    Final appointments to the Council will be confirmed jointly by the Minister for the Environment and the Chair of the Environment, Housing and Infrastructure, EHI, Scrutiny Panel, in line with the proposal approved by the States Assembly.

    The recruitment process will be overseen by Jersey Appointments Commission. 

    Minister for the Environment, Deputy Steve Luce, said: “Recruitment for the Independent Climate Council comes at a crucial time, when global climate action is under scrutiny. The Council will provide robust scientific analysis and essential transparency. It will review how effectively the Government of Jersey is delivering the measures set out in the Carbon Neutral Roadmap and progress made towards the Island’s emission reduction targets under the Paris Agreement. In holding the Government to account, the Council will play a vital role in supporting a renewed focus on delivering Jersey’s net zero commitment.

    “Appointment to Jersey’s first Climate Council offers an exceptional opportunity to review our actions and achievements since the Carbon Neutral Roadmap was approved in 2022. The Council’s report and recommendations will be published early next year before final agreement of the priorities for the Roadmap’s second delivery plan running from 2027 to 2030. We welcome applications from suitably qualified and experienced Islanders as well as candidates from further afield. I look forward to supporting the Council’s work when it convenes later this year.” 

    Deputy Hilary Jeune, Chair of the EHI Scrutiny Panel, said: “This initiative stems from an amendment by the EHI Scrutiny Panel to the Carbon Neutral Roadmap, following the recognition that independent oversight was missing. The establishment of this Council is fundamental to maintaining good governance and ensuring Jersey remains on track to meet its climate goals. The four-yearly reports will offer transparent, evidence-based insight to the public, who are central to our collective progress towards becoming a net-zero Island. I’m proud that Scrutiny will continue its role as a constructive and critical friend to Government throughout this process.” 

    The States Assembly declared a climate emergency in May 2019, acknowledging its likely profound effects on Jersey. In response, the Carbon Neutral Roadmap was approved on 29 April 2022, setting out the initial policies to reduce GHG emissions during the 2022–2025 Delivery Plan period.

    The Council’s primary responsibility will be to produce a comprehensive report at the end of each governmental term, assessing Jersey’s progress on GHG emissions reductions and evaluating how effectively the CNR is being delivered. The first report is due to be presented to the States Assembly by the end of Q1 2026. 

    The Independent Climate Council will comprise up to five members, including a Chair elected from within the membership. At least one member must be a full-time Jersey resident. Appointed members will serve a single fixed term and will primarily conduct their work during the final quarter of 2025 and the first quarter of 2026. 

    Council members will bring independent expertise and strategic insight to help guide Jersey’s transition to net zero, evaluating implementation of current policies and advising on how best to apply resources to meet climate objectives. 

    Further details on the recruitment process can be found here: Leading our Island and the candidate brief.​

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Global: Birkin v Wirkin: the backlash against the global elite and their luxury bags – podcast

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Gemma Ware, Host, The Conversation Weekly Podcast, The Conversation

    Tony Neil Thompson/Shutterstock

    The Birkin bag made by French luxury retailer Hermès has become a status symbol for some of the global elite. Notoriously difficult to obtain, a select few obsess over how to get their hands on one.

    But when US retailer Walmart recently launched a much cheaper bag that looked very similar to the Birkin, nicknamed a “Wirkin” by others, it sparked discussions about wealth disparity and the ethics of conspicuous consumption.

    In this episode of The Conversation Weekly podcast, we speak to two sociologists about the Birkin and what it symbolises.

    For the rich housewives of Delhi, the Birkin bag is a must have, says Parul Bhandari. A sociologist at the University of Cambridge in the UK, she’s spent time interviewing wealthy Indian women about their lives and preoccupations. She told us:

     A bag that is carried by rich women of New York, of London, of Paris, is something that you desire as well, so it’s a ticket of entry into the global elite.

    Birkins are also used by some of these rich women as a way to show off their husband’s affection, Bhandari says: “ Not only from the point of view of money, because obviously this bag is extremely expensive, but also because it is difficult to procure.” The harder your husband tries to help you get the bag, the more getting one is a testimony of conjugal love.

    Manufactured scarcity

    Named after the British actress Jane Birkin, Hermès’s signature bag can cost tens of thousands of dollars, or more on the resale market for those made in rare colours or out of rare leathers. But you can’t just walk into any Hermès store to buy one, as Aarushi Bhandari, a sociologist at Davidson College in the US who studies the internet – and is no relation to Parul – explains.

    You need to have a record of spending tens of thousands of dollars even before you’re offered to buy one. But spending that money doesn’t automatically mean you get a bag. You have to develop a relationship with a sales associate at a particular Hermès store and the sales associate really gets to decide, if there’s availability, whether or not you get offered a bag.

    Bhandari became intrigued by online communities where people discuss the best strategies for obtaining an Hermès. So when US retailer Walmart launched a bag in late 2024 that looked very similar to a Birkin, and the internet went wild, Bhandari was fascinated.

    She began to see posts on TikTok discussing the bag. First it was fashion accounts talking it up, but then a backlash began, with some users criticising those who would spend thousands on a real Birkin and praising the “Wirkin” as a way to make an iconic design accessible to regular people. Bhandari sees this as an example of an accelerating form of anti-elitism taking hold within parts of online culture.

    In February, the chief executive of Hermès, Axel Dumas, admitted that he was “irritated” by the Walmart bag and that the company took counterfeiting “very seriously”.

    The Walmart bag quickly sold out and no more were put on sale. It has since entered into a partnership with a secondhand luxury resale platform called Rebag, meaning customers can buy real Birkins secondhand through Walmart’s online marketplace.

    The Conversation approached Hermès for comment on the Walmart bag, and to confirm how the company decides who is eligible to buy a Birkin. Hermès did not respond.

    Listen to the full episode of The Conversation Weekly podcast to hear our conversation with Parul Bhandari and Aarushi Bhandari, plus an introduction from Nick Lehr, arts and culture editor at The Conversation in the US.


    This episode of The Conversation Weekly was written and produced by Katie Flood. Mixing and sound design by Eloise Stevens and theme music by Neeta Sarl.

    TikTok clips in this episode from babydoll2184, chronicallychaotic and pamelawurstvetrini.

    Listen to The Conversation Weekly via any of the apps listed above, download it directly via our RSS feed or find out how else to listen here.

    Parul Bhandari and Aarushi Bhandari do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Birkin v Wirkin: the backlash against the global elite and their luxury bags – podcast – https://theconversation.com/birkin-v-wirkin-the-backlash-against-the-global-elite-and-their-luxury-bags-podcast-254723

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: MOFA thanks Saint Christopher and Nevis National Assembly for passing resolution endorsing Taiwan’s participation in international organizations

    Source: Republic of China Taiwan

    MOFA thanks Saint Christopher and Nevis National Assembly for passing resolution endorsing Taiwan’s participation in international organizations

    Date:2025-04-18
    Data Source:Department of Latin American and Caribbean Affairs

    April 18, 2025  
    No. 101  

    The National Assembly of Saint Christopher and Nevis on April 17 adopted a resolution proposed by Prime Minister Terrance Drew that endorsed Taiwan’s participation in the United Nations, the World Health Organization, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the International Criminal Police Organization, and the International Civil Aviation Organization. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) sincerely appreciates the staunch and unwavering support and friendship that parliamentarians from governing and opposition parties of Saint Christopher and Nevis have shown toward Taiwan through concrete action. 
     
    The resolution pointed out that Saint Christopher and Nevis parliamentarians, as members of the Formosa Club, cherished their country’s diplomatic ties with Taiwan. It stated that over the years the two nations had built a robust friendship based on shared values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. The resolution lauded Taiwan for its contributions to global public health and recognized Taiwan’s efforts and actions in such fields as renewable energy, climate change adaptation, disaster warning systems, the fight against transnational crime, and the development of international civil aviation. It urged all sectors to support Taiwan’s professional, pragmatic, and constructive participation in the United Nations and other international organizations. 
     
    This marks the third consecutive year that the National Assembly of Saint Christopher and Nevis has passed a Taiwan-friendly resolution, underscoring the close and friendly diplomatic alliance between the two countries. Taiwan will continue to work with Saint Christopher and Nevis and other allies and like-minded nations to make even greater contributions to peace, security, and sustainable development across the globe. (E)

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Global: VAT hikes can raise tax without hurting the poor: an economist sets out the evidence

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Imraan Valodia, Pro Vice-Chancellor, Climate, Sustainability and Inequality and Director, Southern Centre for Inequality Studies, University of the Witwatersrand

    South Africa’s 2025-6 budget has been subjected to more comment than usual. This is due to the political tensions generated by a proposed increase in value added tax (VAT).

    South Africa’s choices on how it manages the revenue and expenditure issues in the budget are critical for how the larger issues of the country’s debt and its economic policies are handled. As things stand, the economy is locked into a low-growth trajectory which make the debt, revenue and expenditure issues more difficult to deal with.

    This piece draws on a longer article which explores these issues in greater detail. Here, I focus only on the VAT issue.

    The finance minister originally tabled an increase of 2 percentage points, then changed it to 0.5 percentage points. Still, it is threatening to end the country’s government of national unity, which was set up after elections in 2024.




    Read more:
    South Africa’s finance minister wanted to raise VAT: the pros and cons of a tricky tax


    Most commentators, including the political parties that have opposed the proposal, many academics, and non-governmental organisations claiming to represent low-income groups, have argued that an increase in VAT places an undue burden on low-income groups. This would make it regressive.

    Based on work as an academic economist over the past three decades, I believe that the debate has been based largely on conjecture and ideological opposition to VAT, rather than on the evidence of its impact.

    This is a pity as there is empirical evidence rooted in research that a VAT increase is, in fact, not regressive and is therefore a good policy decision.

    Tax experts usually refer to the three Es in taxes – equity, efficiency and ease of administration – for evaluating tax policy proposals. New taxes should ideally promote equity (they should be progressive and not regressive), be efficient and be easy to administer.

    An increase in VAT in South Africa ticks all these boxes.

    First, contrary to what many commentators have been arguing, VAT isn’t always regressive – it depends on how it’s implemented. As proposed by the finance minister it would not be regressive because, while it would add to the burden of low-income households, most of the VAT would be collected from higher-income households. Added to this is that the proposed expansion of the existing list of zero-rated items would protect the lowest-income households.

    Second, VAT is a very efficient tax. For relatively low increases in the rate, government is able to raise a large amount of revenue.

    Finally, the system is easy to administer and adds very little cost to collection.

    Key to its efficacy is the way VAT is implemented, including the choice of products to zero rate, and the political credibility of government.

    The case for a VAT increase

    VAT is a consumption tax, so it only affects the income that a household consumes.

    According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), VAT is now the mainstay of tax systems in over 160 countries, raising on average one-third of total government revenues.

    In theory, there are good reasons to be concerned about the impact of VAT. First, it can place a high burden on low-income households because they spend a large proportion of their incomes on consumption goods such as food.

    Second, VAT may also place a heavy burden of tax on women. In South Africa and many other countries, women-led households tend to be clustered in the lower end of the income distribution. And women disproportionately take responsibility for feeding and caring for family members.

    So, at least in theory, VAT is a regressive tax. But is it really so in practice?

    Three studies that have explored this issue in some detail have concluded that, in South Africa, VAT is not regressive.

    In 2008, I worked with colleagues in eight countries (South Africa, Ghana, Uganda, Morocco, Mexico, Argentina, India and the United Kingdom) on the gender issues related to tax. In particular we looked at the burden of VAT on low-income and women-headed households.

    Our findings were that, in general, VAT is regressive and discriminates against women, but it depends on how it is implemented.

    In South Africa, the zero-rating of basic consumption goods is very effective, protecting low-income and female-headed households from VAT. It’s an example of a VAT system that is neutral – neither regressive nor progressive.

    A more recent study by South African economist Ingrid Woolard and colleagues reached a similar conclusion in 2018.

    A third study was done in the same year when VAT was increased from 14% to 15%. Following a similar emotive debate, the finance minister appointed an independent committee which I served on and which was chaired by Woolard, to advise on further zero-rating.

    Our conclusion – again – was that zero-rating is highly effective at protecting low-income groups from the deleterious effects of VAT.

    How it’s done matters

    The challenge with zero-rating is that while low-income households benefit, high-income households benefit more (because they spend more, in absolute terms, on zero-rated goods). Large amounts of potential VAT revenue are lost to high-income groups that don’t need protection.

    The trick is to find a basket of goods that low-income households consume a lot of, but which high-income households don’t consume in large quantities. Some typical examples are beans, canned pilchards and cabbage. These are all goods that low-income households consume and high-income households do not.

    National Treasury’s proposals for increasing the basket of goods to be zero-rated are based on solid research.

    A good example of the trade-offs to consider is the case of chicken. Chicken is an important source of protein for low-income households, but also for high-income households. So, if all chicken were zero-rated, this would protect poor households, but a large amount of VAT revenue would be lost.

    In our 2018 zero-rating report, at 2018 prices and consumption patterns, we calculated that zero-rating all chicken products would be equivalent to R1.3 billion (US$67.6 million) but government would lose R4.6 billion (US$244.4 million) to high income households.

    Not a good trade-off.

    However, some chicken products, such as chicken heads and feet, are mostly consumed by low-income groups, and are therefore good candidates for zero-rating.

    The two other Es – efficiency and ease of administration – of taxes are also key to consider.

    On these two considerations, VAT has big advantages.

    It’s very difficult to avoid or evade VAT because it’s collected along the chain of production. There’s evidence that South Africa has very little leakage in the system.

    So it is relatively easy to increase the VAT rate without needing to invest additional resources to collect the tax.

    Credibility is key

    Apart from the economic considerations, tax policy has to be politically credible. People should believe that their tax contributions are being used effectively, and government should be seen to be acting in line with this.

    If people don’t believe in government’s ability to spend wisely, resistance to taxes increases. Then tax avoidance and evasion increases.

    It would be fair to say that, with the high levels of corruption in South Africa’s political system, government’s credibility is low.

    Thus, if VAT is to be increased, government has to do a lot more to improve its credibility and reassure South Africans that the tax revenues will be well spent.

    Imraan Valodia receives funding from a number of foundations and governments that support academic research.

    ref. VAT hikes can raise tax without hurting the poor: an economist sets out the evidence – https://theconversation.com/vat-hikes-can-raise-tax-without-hurting-the-poor-an-economist-sets-out-the-evidence-254213

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Africa: VAT hikes can raise tax without hurting the poor: an economist sets out the evidence

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Imraan Valodia, Pro Vice-Chancellor, Climate, Sustainability and Inequality and Director, Southern Centre for Inequality Studies, University of the Witwatersrand

    South Africa’s 2025-6 budget has been subjected to more comment than usual. This is due to the political tensions generated by a proposed increase in value added tax (VAT).

    South Africa’s choices on how it manages the revenue and expenditure issues in the budget are critical for how the larger issues of the country’s debt and its economic policies are handled. As things stand, the economy is locked into a low-growth trajectory which make the debt, revenue and expenditure issues more difficult to deal with.

    This piece draws on a longer article which explores these issues in greater detail. Here, I focus only on the VAT issue.

    The finance minister originally tabled an increase of 2 percentage points, then changed it to 0.5 percentage points. Still, it is threatening to end the country’s government of national unity, which was set up after elections in 2024.


    Read more: South Africa’s finance minister wanted to raise VAT: the pros and cons of a tricky tax


    Most commentators, including the political parties that have opposed the proposal, many academics, and non-governmental organisations claiming to represent low-income groups, have argued that an increase in VAT places an undue burden on low-income groups. This would make it regressive.

    Based on work as an academic economist over the past three decades, I believe that the debate has been based largely on conjecture and ideological opposition to VAT, rather than on the evidence of its impact.

    This is a pity as there is empirical evidence rooted in research that a VAT increase is, in fact, not regressive and is therefore a good policy decision.

    Tax experts usually refer to the three Es in taxes – equity, efficiency and ease of administration – for evaluating tax policy proposals. New taxes should ideally promote equity (they should be progressive and not regressive), be efficient and be easy to administer.

    An increase in VAT in South Africa ticks all these boxes.

    First, contrary to what many commentators have been arguing, VAT isn’t always regressive – it depends on how it’s implemented. As proposed by the finance minister it would not be regressive because, while it would add to the burden of low-income households, most of the VAT would be collected from higher-income households. Added to this is that the proposed expansion of the existing list of zero-rated items would protect the lowest-income households.

    Second, VAT is a very efficient tax. For relatively low increases in the rate, government is able to raise a large amount of revenue.

    Finally, the system is easy to administer and adds very little cost to collection.

    Key to its efficacy is the way VAT is implemented, including the choice of products to zero rate, and the political credibility of government.

    The case for a VAT increase

    VAT is a consumption tax, so it only affects the income that a household consumes.

    According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), VAT is now the mainstay of tax systems in over 160 countries, raising on average one-third of total government revenues.

    In theory, there are good reasons to be concerned about the impact of VAT. First, it can place a high burden on low-income households because they spend a large proportion of their incomes on consumption goods such as food.

    Second, VAT may also place a heavy burden of tax on women. In South Africa and many other countries, women-led households tend to be clustered in the lower end of the income distribution. And women disproportionately take responsibility for feeding and caring for family members.

    So, at least in theory, VAT is a regressive tax. But is it really so in practice?

    Three studies that have explored this issue in some detail have concluded that, in South Africa, VAT is not regressive.

    In 2008, I worked with colleagues in eight countries (South Africa, Ghana, Uganda, Morocco, Mexico, Argentina, India and the United Kingdom) on the gender issues related to tax. In particular we looked at the burden of VAT on low-income and women-headed households.

    Our findings were that, in general, VAT is regressive and discriminates against women, but it depends on how it is implemented.

    In South Africa, the zero-rating of basic consumption goods is very effective, protecting low-income and female-headed households from VAT. It’s an example of a VAT system that is neutral – neither regressive nor progressive.

    A more recent study by South African economist Ingrid Woolard and colleagues reached a similar conclusion in 2018.

    A third study was done in the same year when VAT was increased from 14% to 15%. Following a similar emotive debate, the finance minister appointed an independent committee which I served on and which was chaired by Woolard, to advise on further zero-rating.

    Our conclusion – again – was that zero-rating is highly effective at protecting low-income groups from the deleterious effects of VAT.

    How it’s done matters

    The challenge with zero-rating is that while low-income households benefit, high-income households benefit more (because they spend more, in absolute terms, on zero-rated goods). Large amounts of potential VAT revenue are lost to high-income groups that don’t need protection.

    The trick is to find a basket of goods that low-income households consume a lot of, but which high-income households don’t consume in large quantities. Some typical examples are beans, canned pilchards and cabbage. These are all goods that low-income households consume and high-income households do not.

    National Treasury’s proposals for increasing the basket of goods to be zero-rated are based on solid research.

    A good example of the trade-offs to consider is the case of chicken. Chicken is an important source of protein for low-income households, but also for high-income households. So, if all chicken were zero-rated, this would protect poor households, but a large amount of VAT revenue would be lost.

    In our 2018 zero-rating report, at 2018 prices and consumption patterns, we calculated that zero-rating all chicken products would be equivalent to R1.3 billion (US$67.6 million) but government would lose R4.6 billion (US$244.4 million) to high income households.

    Not a good trade-off.

    However, some chicken products, such as chicken heads and feet, are mostly consumed by low-income groups, and are therefore good candidates for zero-rating.

    The two other Es – efficiency and ease of administration – of taxes are also key to consider.

    On these two considerations, VAT has big advantages.

    It’s very difficult to avoid or evade VAT because it’s collected along the chain of production. There’s evidence that South Africa has very little leakage in the system.

    So it is relatively easy to increase the VAT rate without needing to invest additional resources to collect the tax.

    Credibility is key

    Apart from the economic considerations, tax policy has to be politically credible. People should believe that their tax contributions are being used effectively, and government should be seen to be acting in line with this.

    If people don’t believe in government’s ability to spend wisely, resistance to taxes increases. Then tax avoidance and evasion increases.

    It would be fair to say that, with the high levels of corruption in South Africa’s political system, government’s credibility is low.

    Thus, if VAT is to be increased, government has to do a lot more to improve its credibility and reassure South Africans that the tax revenues will be well spent.

    – VAT hikes can raise tax without hurting the poor: an economist sets out the evidence
    – https://theconversation.com/vat-hikes-can-raise-tax-without-hurting-the-poor-an-economist-sets-out-the-evidence-254213

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI: Apollo Funds Form $220 Million Community Solar Joint Venture with Bullrock Energy Ventures

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    NEW YORK and SOUTH BURLINGTON, Vt., April 23, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Apollo (NYSE: APO) and Bullrock Energy Ventures (“Bullrock”) today announced that Apollo-managed funds (the “Apollo Funds”) have committed to fund up to $220 million for a new joint venture partnership with Bullrock related to a portfolio of community solar assets located in New York and New England. $100 million of Apollo’s equity commitment will fund the development of Bullrock’s nearly 500 MW pipeline of renewable energy assets.

    Based in Vermont, Bullrock is a high-growth renewable energy company with operations throughout the Northeast. The company’s vertically integrated model includes deal sourcing, underwriting, development, construction, financing and asset management. Bullrock, led by Chairman and Founder Gregg Beldock, alongside partner company NxtGenREA led by Mike Mills, has developed nearly 500 MW of solar projects across New England, New York and the Midwest over the past decade. The projects support local residents and businesses throughout the country with access to affordable clean energy. 

    “We are excited to partner with Gregg and the Bullrock team and invest in this scaled portfolio of solar assets that we believe will offer significant benefits to their surrounding communities,” said Apollo Partner Corinne Still. “Community solar represents an innovative solution to expanding local access to clean, efficient power across the energy grid, benefiting individuals, households and businesses alike. This partnership underscores Apollo’s commitment to serving as a leading capital provider supporting the energy transition, investing in companies and projects that serve the growing demand for diverse sources of power.”

    Bullrock Chairman and Founder Gregg Beldock and Bullrock Managing Partner Amory Beldock stated, “Our partnership with Apollo enhances a leading vertically integrated renewables platform working to meet the growing demand for power while reinforcing American energy security. Our long history in construction and development paired with Apollo’s integrated platform positions us to efficiently scale our portfolio. Community solar lowers energy costs, improves grid resiliency and boosts local economies. Apollo shares our commitment to driving the industry forward and we’re proud to work with them.”

    Over the past five years, Apollo-managed funds and affiliates have committed, deployed or arranged approximately $58 billioni of climate and energy transition-related investments, supporting companies and projects across clean energy and infrastructure.

    Tax Equity for the portfolio is arranged by Mike Mills through his company NxtGenREA.

    Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP served as legal to the Apollo Funds. Brown Rudnick LLP served as legal counsel to Bullrock. 

    i As of December 31, 2024. The firmwide targets (the “Targets”) to deploy, commit, or arrange capital commensurate with Apollo’s proprietary Climate and Transition Investment Framework (the “CTIF”), are (1) $50 billion by 2027 and (2) more than $100 billion by 2030 The CTIF, which is subject to change at any time without notice, sets forth certain activities classified by Apollo as sustainable economic activities (“SEAs”), and the methodologies used to calculate contribution towards the Targets. Only investments determined to be currently contributing to an SEA in accordance with the CTIF are counted toward the Targets. Under the CTIF, Apollo uses different calculation methodologies for different types of investments in equity, debt and real estate. For additional details on the CTIF, please refer to our website here: https://www.apollo.com/strategies/asset-management/real-assets/sustainable-investing-platform.

    About Apollo

    Apollo is a high-growth, global alternative asset manager. In our asset management business, we seek to provide our clients excess return at every point along the risk-reward spectrum from investment grade credit to private equity. For more than three decades, our investing expertise across our fully integrated platform has served the financial return needs of our clients and provided businesses with innovative capital solutions for growth. Through Athene, our retirement services business, we specialize in helping clients achieve financial security by providing a suite of retirement savings products and acting as a solutions provider to institutions. Our patient, creative, and knowledgeable approach to investing aligns our clients, businesses we invest in, our employees, and the communities we impact, to expand opportunity and achieve positive outcomes. As of December 31, 2024, Apollo had approximately $751 billion of assets under management. To learn more, please visit www.apollo.com.

    About Bullrock Energy Ventures

    Bullrock Energy Ventures is a vertically integrated renewable energy investment platform. The company was born out of Bullrock’s long history across renewables, construction, real estate development and healthcare and NxtGenREA’s deep experience in solar development and tax equity financing. Bullrock has developed over 500 MW to date, deployed over $2B in capital across the clean energy space, and is quickly moving to develop its 500 MW pipeline. Our success is a testament to our uniquely integrated model which allows us to build, operate, finance and manage energy assets at scale. We are proud to accelerate the energy transition through our pioneering approach to development while supporting local communities and securing American energy independence. 

    Contacts

    Noah Gunn
    Global Head of Investor Relations
    Apollo Global Management, Inc.
    212-822-0540
    ir@apollo.com 

    Joanna Rose
    Global Head of Corporate Communications
    Apollo Global Management, Inc.
    212-822-0491
    communications@apollo.com 

    For Bullrock Energy Ventures:

    ir@bullrockcorp.com

    For Bullrock Media Contacts:

    Patrick Lenihan
    Gravity Strategic Partners
    patrick@gravitystrat.com
    201-819-9871

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