Source: European Parliament
B10‑0332/2025
European Parliament resolution on tackling China’s critical raw materials export restrictions
The European Parliament,
– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 of 11 April 2024 on establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials (the Critical Raw Materials Act)[1],
– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1735 of 13 June 2024 on establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s net-zero technology manufacturing ecosystem and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1724[2] ,
– having regard to the upcoming EU-China summit on 24-25 July 2025,
– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
A. whereas China dominates in rare earth refining, especially in heavy rare earth elements; whereas China accounts for roughly 70 % of global rare earth mining and over 90 % of the world’s refining capacity; whereas China holds a near monopoly over the global supply chain of several critical minerals, particularly rare earth elements (REEs) and other minerals that are vital for high-tech applications like powerful magnets;
B. whereas critical minerals and REEs are crucial for both the green and digital transitions, owing to their essential role in enabling technologies in areas including renewable energy, electric vehicles, advanced electronics and defence;
C. whereas the global demand for REEs, which are critical materials for various technologies including clean energy, is surging, with a significant increase projected for the coming years;
D. whereas on 4 April 2025, in response to US President Donald Trump’s tariff increases on Chinese products, China imposed export restrictions on 7 of the 17 REEs: samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium and yttrium;
E. whereas on 27 June 2025, Washington and Beijing announced a new trade framework, under which China would resume approving export licences for REEs over the following six months;
F. whereas the new rare earth restrictions are already causing export delays (of up to 45 days for processing a licence application, with additional time needed if the state council or military has to be consulted) as the Chinese Government establishes the licensing system;
1. Expresses deep concern about and strongly criticises China’s recent and unjustified export restrictions on rare earth materials and magnets, which are crucial for European industries such as automotive manufacturing, renewable energy and defence;
2. Notes with concern that the EU, which is not responsible for starting the ongoing trade dispute between the United States and China, is nonetheless bearing its economic consequences and should not become collateral damage in this conflict;
3. Recalls that conservation policies do not allow members of the World Trade Organization to adopt measures to control the international market for a natural resource, which is what the export restrictions do; expresses the view that China’s export restrictions are designed to achieve industrial policy goals rather than conservation; underlines that the export quotas do not work together with measures restricting domestic Chinese use of rare earths, as required by the second part of Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994, and are therefore intended to secure preferential use of those materials for Chinese manufacturers;
4. Calls on China to lift the restrictions and urges both the Commission and the Member States to take a firm and unified stance and engage with the Chinese authorities to seek a structural solution for these unjustified restrictions, which are undermining the global green and digital transitions; calls on the Commission and the Council to address the issue with the Chinese authorities in the upcoming EU-China summit on 24-25 July 2025, with a view to restoring a level playing field as well as securing the lifting of Chinese sanctions against former MEPs and think tanks;
5. Stresses, however, that the EU must firmly reject any attempts by the Chinese authorities to use these restrictions as a tool of coercion to force concessions in ongoing disputes on other unfair practices, such as the anti-dumping duties on battery electric vehicles;
6. Is concerned that this may lead to an unfair trade-off between export restrictions and access to European technological know-how, undermining our industrial competitiveness and strategic autonomy;
7. Urges the Commission to mitigate the risks of the EU’s overdependence on China for critical REEs and regrets that, despite the good intentions and policy initiatives of the Critical Raw Materials Act, the EU’s dependence on China for critical raw materials has continued to grow or, at best, remains stubbornly high;
8. Underlines the need for a clear strategy to ensure the long-term security of supply by focusing on diversification, increased domestic production and the circular economy, with robust recycling infrastructure at its core for the recovery of critical minerals from end-of-life products;
9. Calls on the Commission to make full use of the Clean Industrial Deal to build strategic partnerships with resource-rich countries, strengthen domestic capabilities in extraction, processing and recycling, and reduce reliance on single suppliers;
10. Emphasises the need to secure access to critical raw materials; stresses that the upcoming circular economy act should improve resource efficiency, including through better waste management of products containing critical raw materials, as well as fostering the demand and availability of secondary raw materials; stresses the need to define those secondary raw materials that are strategic and that should be subject to export monitoring, such as steel and metal scrap, and to tackle any imbalance in their supply and demand, including by exploring export restrictions; insists on the effective enforcement of the Waste Shipment Regulation[3];
11. Welcomes the critical minerals action plan agreed at the G7 leaders’ summit in June 2025;
12. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the Government of the People’s Republic of China.