AMENDMENTS 001-002 JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION pursuant to Rule 136(2) and (4) of the Rules of Procedure replacing the following motions: B10-0072/2024 (Renew) B10-0073/2024 (ECR) B10-0080/2024 (PPE) B10-0081/2024 (Verts/ALE) B10-0082/2024 (The Left) B10-0085/2024 (S&D) on strengthening Moldova’s resilience against Russian interference ahead of the upcoming presidential elections and a constitutional referendum on EU integration (2024/2821(RSP)) Siegfried Mureşan, Andrzej Halicki, Michael Gahler, Sebastião Bugalho, David McAllister, Željana Zovko, Nicolás Pascual De La Parte, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Antonio López-Istúriz White, Wouter Beke, Krzysztof Brejza, Daniel Caspary, Jan Farský, Rasa Juknevičienė, Sandra Kalniete, Ondřej Kolář, Andrey Kovatchev, Andrius Kubilius, Miriam Lexmann, Vangelis Meimarakis, Ana Miguel Pedro, Davor Ivo Stier, Michał Szczerba, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Matej Tonin, Milan Zver, Ioan-Rareş Bogdan, Daniel Buda, Gheorghe Falcă, Mircea-Gheorghe Hava, Dan-Ştefan Motreanu, Virgil-Daniel Popescu, Adina Vălean, Loránt Vincze, Iuliu Winkler on behalf of the PPE Group Yannis Maniatis, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Sven Mikser, Thijs Reuten, Dan Nica, Victor Negrescu, Gheorghe Cârciu, Mihai Tudose, Adrian-Dragoş Benea, Gabriela Firea, Maria Grapini, Claudiu Manda, Vasile Dîncu, Ştefan Muşoiu on behalf of the S&D Group Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Adam Bielan, Mariusz Kamiński, Cristian Terheş, Alexandr Vondra, Roberts Zīle, Ivaylo Valchev, Carlo Fidanza, Rihards Kols, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Michał Dworczyk, Assita Kanko, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Maciej Wąsik, Veronika Vrecionová, Georgiana Teodorescu, Adrian-George Axinia, Ondřej Krutílek, Tobiasz Bocheński, Alberico Gambino, Gheorghe Piperea, Aurelijus Veryga, Şerban-Dimitrie Sturdza, Claudiu-Richard Târziu, Charlie Weimers on behalf of the ECR Group Dan Barna, Petras Auštrevičius, Helmut Brandstätter, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Bernard Guetta, Ľubica Karvašová, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Nathalie Loiseau, Urmas Paet, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Eugen Tomac, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar, Dainius Žalimas on behalf of the Renew Group Reinier Van Lanschot on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group Jonas Sjöstedt on behalf of The Left Group
AMENDMENTS 004-004 JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION pursuant to Rule 136(2) and (4) of the Rules of Procedure replacing the following motions: B10-0070/2024 (Renew) B10-0071/2024 (ECR) B10-0079/2024 (PPE) B10-0083/2024 (Verts/ALE) B10-0084/2024 (S&D) on the democratic backsliding and threats to political pluralism in Georgia (2024/2822(RSP)) Rasa Juknevičienė, Michael Gahler, Andrzej Halicki, Sebastião Bugalho, David McAllister, Željana Zovko, Nicolás Pascual De La Parte, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Antonio López-Istúriz White, Wouter Beke, Daniel Caspary, Jan Farský, Sandra Kalniete, Ondřej Kolář, Andrey Kovatchev, Andrius Kubilius, Miriam Lexmann, Vangelis Meimarakis, Ana Miguel Pedro, Davor Ivo Stier, Michał Szczerba, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Matej Tonin, Milan Zver on behalf of the PPE Group Yannis Maniatis, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Sven Mikser on behalf of the S&D Group Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Adam Bielan, Mariusz Kamiński, Rihards Kols, Reinis Pozņaks, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Carlo Fidanza, Veronika Vrecionová, Michał Dworczyk, Ondřej Krutílek, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Alberico Gambino, Assita Kanko on behalf of the ECR Group Urmas Paet, Petras Auštrevičius, Dan Barna, Helmut Brandstätter, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Bernard Guetta, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Nathalie Loiseau, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar, Dainius Žalimas on behalf of the Renew Group Reinier Van Lanschot on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group Jonas Sjöstedt, Hanna Gedin
AMENDMENTS 003-003 JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION pursuant to Rule 136(2) and (4) of the Rules of Procedure replacing the following motions: B10-0070/2024 (Renew) B10-0071/2024 (ECR) B10-0079/2024 (PPE) B10-0083/2024 (Verts/ALE) B10-0084/2024 (S&D) on the democratic backsliding and threats to political pluralism in Georgia (2024/2822(RSP)) Rasa Juknevičienė, Michael Gahler, Andrzej Halicki, Sebastião Bugalho, David McAllister, Željana Zovko, Nicolás Pascual De La Parte, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Antonio López-Istúriz White, Wouter Beke, Daniel Caspary, Jan Farský, Sandra Kalniete, Ondřej Kolář, Andrey Kovatchev, Andrius Kubilius, Miriam Lexmann, Vangelis Meimarakis, Ana Miguel Pedro, Davor Ivo Stier, Michał Szczerba, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Matej Tonin, Milan Zver on behalf of the PPE Group Yannis Maniatis, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Sven Mikser on behalf of the S&D Group Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Adam Bielan, Mariusz Kamiński, Rihards Kols, Reinis Pozņaks, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Carlo Fidanza, Veronika Vrecionová, Michał Dworczyk, Ondřej Krutílek, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Alberico Gambino, Assita Kanko on behalf of the ECR Group Urmas Paet, Petras Auštrevičius, Dan Barna, Helmut Brandstätter, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Bernard Guetta, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Nathalie Loiseau, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar, Dainius Žalimas on behalf of the Renew Group Reinier Van Lanschot on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group Jonas Sjöstedt, Hanna Gedin
The Commission was not aware of the alleged problematic functioning of the coal mine in Achlada.
Industrial installations for the extraction of coal are listed in Annex II (point 2.e) of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Directive[1].
According to Article 4 of the EIA Directive , prior to granting a consent for such projects, Member States are required to determine whether an environmental impact assessment is necessary, based on a case-by-case analysis or by setting specific criteria (such as the location, size or type of a project). Should such an assessment be required it would examine the impacts of the project on various elements, including on air quality.
Member States are primarily responsible to ensure compliance with EU law, including verifying individual cases of potential breach of the relevant rules, and taking the necessary steps for enforcement and the appropriate measures to address any matter that has arisen.
In the present case, the competent Greek authorities should verify whether the private company operating the mine complies with the permit that was granted to it, and in particular with any environmental conditions imposed.
It should be stressed that human health protection aspects shall be fully taken into account in the permitting phase, including at the stages of granting, reviewing and updating of permits.
[1] Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment, OJ L 26, 28.1.2012, p. 1-21, as amended by Directive 2014/52/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014, OJ L 124, 25.4.2014, p. 1-18.
Question for written answer E-001750/2024/rev.1 to the Commission Rule 144 Kosma Złotowski (ECR), Piotr Müller (ECR), Bogdan Rzońca (ECR), Anna Zalewska (ECR), Dominik Tarczyński (ECR), Aurelijus Veryga (ECR), Adrian-George Axinia (ECR), Ivaylo Valchev (ECR), Arkadiusz Mularczyk (ECR), Michał Dworczyk (ECR), Fernand Kartheiser (ECR), Nicolas Bay (ECR), Tobiasz Bocheński (ECR), Jadwiga Wiśniewska (ECR), Ondřej Krutílek (ECR), Gheorghe Piperea (ECR), Charlie Weimers (ECR), Beatrice Timgren (ECR), Dick Erixon (ECR), Laurence Trochu (ECR), Sebastian Tynkkynen (ECR), Marlena Maląg (ECR), Marion Maréchal (ECR), Waldemar Buda (ECR), Carlo Fidanza (ECR)
In the light of the recent letter from EU Commissioner Thierry Breton to Elon Musk, in which the Commissioner exerts direct pressure on X (formerly Twitter) to ensure stricter content moderation under the pretext of managing harmful content, and considering the statement by Meta’s CEO, Mark Zuckerberg, who revealed instances of formal and informal coercion by public authorities to demote or remove specific content:
1.Can the Commission confirm whether Commissioner Breton or any other Commission officials have, at any point, used their political or administrative positions to exert pressure – whether formally or informally – on major social media platforms to enforce specific content moderation actions, even when those actions contradicted the platforms’ own assessments or policies?
2.During negotiations of codes of conduct, or discussions related to best practices under the Digital Services Act (DSA)[1], have Commission officials, including Commissioner Breton, pushed for specific content moderation standards or practices that platforms found contentious or excessive, and, if so, were these requests consistent with the principles of free speech and transparency that the Commission publicly upholds?
3.Does the Commission maintain records of all communications regarding content moderation discussions with social media platforms?
Submitted: 18.9.2024
[1] Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj.
The designated candidates of the von der Leyen Commission will be heard by the EP committees dealing with their respective portfolios from 04/11/2024 until 12/11/2024.
During each confirmation hearing, the commissioner-designate will give an opening speech and then answer questions by committee members. More detailed information, including the candidates’ portfolios, the procedure, the schedule, the latest news and a live webstreaming during and record after the hearing, can be found on the dedicated webpage.
The ACP Trust Fund has received pledges worth more than €74 million from seven EU countries.
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain and Sweden are the first contributors, adding to the EU contribution launched in February 2023.
In line with the EU Global Gateway strategy, the primary focus of the support will be to provide grants and technical assistance to projects promoting sustainable growth in ACP countries.
The European Investment Bank (EIB Global) has signed agreements with seven EU Member States pledging just over €74 million to a new envelope under the ACP Trust Fund. This funding will promote inclusive and sustainable economic growth and human development, especially in least developed countries and fragile states in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. The ACP Trust Fund envelope supported by EU Member States will target EU Global Gateway projects in ACP countries and support the UN’s Agenda 2030 as well as the Sustainable Development Goals.
“This is a great example of Team Europe partners working together. I look forward to welcoming future donors to the fund so that, together, we can invest in energy, health, climate, food security and digital solutions that will foster green and inclusive growth – ultimately boosting prosperity in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific,” said EIB Vice-President Thomas Östros.
Denmark has pledged around €9.9 million, Finland €4.3 million, Germany €30.6 million, Luxembourg €5.4 million, Portugal €2.8 million, Spain €9 million, and Sweden €12.25 million.
Denmark: “Denmark is committed to supporting inclusive green growth globally, including in least developed countries and fragile states. Our ambition is to promote the European Union as an effective and impactful global actor, and that is why we support the EIB’s new ACP Trust Fund. Through the trust fund, we are delighted to be contributing to inclusive and sustainable development – especially in Africa, which is well-aligned with Denmark’s new strategy of stronger engagement with African countries. The trust fund is financed by a true Team Europe approach, and I strongly encourage other European partners to join,” said Lars Løkke Rasmussen, Denmark’s Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Finland: “Finland sees the ACP Trust Fund as an important vehicle to support the implementation of the Global Gateway in African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. We hope that our contribution will, for example, contribute to greater, safer digital connectivity in our partner countries and give European companies more ways to invest in and develop projects in the ACP countries,” said Juha Savolainen, Director General (Department for Development Policy) of Finland’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
Germany: “Fostering human and social development, addressing climate change and mobilising investments for sustainable and inclusive growth are at the heart of the EU-ACP partnership. The EIB ACP Trust Fund can help increase the development impact of EIB projects in ACP partner countries, including with regard to the implementation of Global Gateway projects. Therefore, we support it in a Team Europe spirit together with other EU partners,” said Dirk Meyer, Director-General of Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development.
Luxembourg: “Luxembourg is proud to contribute €5.4 million to the ACP Trust Fund, reflecting our commitment to sustainable and inclusive growth in African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. This funding, from the reflows of the former ACP Investment Facility, aims to empower communities, promote environmental sustainability and enhance resilience. We look forward to ongoing collaboration with the EIB, the European Commission and EU Member States to achieve impactful development outcomes,” said Finance Minister of Luxembourg Gilles Roth.
Portugal: “Portugal’s contribution to the ACP Trust Fund reflects our ongoing commitment to sustainable economic, social and environmental development in these regions. By partnering with the European Union and other Member States, we can better leverage resources and collectively unlock financial and technical assistance to target global challenges and achieve impact in areas like climate action, connectivity and job creation,” said Portugal’s Minister of State and Finance Joaquim Miranda Sarmento.
Spain: Spain’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation José Manuel Albares said, “Spain’s €9 million contribution will increase EIB Global’s capacity to reach ACP countries through tailored instruments, such as technical assistance to support capacity-building. We need to unlock sustainable finance for the countries that need it the most, as they often face adverse financing conditions that hinder sustainable development. This contribution reinforces our support for the ACP countries, and is consistent with our commitment to implementing the SDGs and raising more financing for the development agenda, as shown by Spain’s move to host the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development in Seville in 2025.”
Sweden: “Sweden is glad to contribute to the ACP Trust Fund in a renewal of the historic partnership between the EU and African, Caribbean and Pacific States. The Trust Fund will play an important role in fulfilling the overall objectives of the Global Gateway, linking trade, business and development cooperation in the entire ACP region. We look forward to being part of a broad collaboration encompassing four continents, 79 countries and 1.5 billion people, and to work together on issues of green transition, entrepreneurship and digitalisation”, said Benjamin Dousa, Sweden’s Minister for International Development Cooperation and Foreign Trade.
European Commission: “Enabling the private sector is key to sustainable development. I welcome the Member States’ contribution to the ACP Trust Fund. Together with our powerful risk-sharing instrument, the EFSD+, these resources will underpin the implementation of the Global Gateway investment strategy,” said Commissioner for International Partnerships Jutta Urpilainen.
In 2023, the European Commission and EIB Global signed an agreement for €500 million and launched the first of two envelopes of the ACP Trust Fund to realise high-impact projects in the private sector that could not otherwise be brought to fruition.
The ACP Trust Fund forms part of the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI – Global Europe). Through this programme, the European Commission supports technical assistance and financial instruments spanning equity, quasi-equity, subordinated debt and risk-sharing. Last year in Madagascar, for example, the ACP Trust Fund supported agricultural mechanisation for smallholder farmers and the construction of a refrigerated facility for local fishermen. In Uganda, it helped fund the installation of over 500 telecom towers to broaden access to communications in the countryside.
The Member States envelope of the ACP Trust Fund is an effective complement to the European Commission-financed envelope, and provides technical assistance, investment grants and interest rate subsidies in both the public and private sectors. The technical assistance is expected to help raise standards and ensure that environmental and social requirements are met throughout the preparation and implementation of each project. Investment grants and interest rate subsidies help reduce total financing needs, especially where a project promoter faces debt sustainability constraints.
Background information
The EIB is the long-term lending institution of the European Union, owned by the Member States. It makes long-term finance available for sound investments that pursue EU policy goals. EIB Global is the EIB Group’s specialised arm devoted to increasing the impact of international partnerships and development finance, and a key partner in the Global Gateway. It aims to support €100 billion of investment by the end of 2027 – around one-third of the overall target of this EU initiative. With Team Europe, EIB Global fosters strong, focused partnerships, alongside fellow development finance institutions and civil society. EIB Global brings the Group closer to local people, companies and institutions through its offices around the world.
Global Gateway
The Global Gateway strategy is the European Union’s offer for partner countries to support their resilience and sustainable development. It aims to narrow the global investment gap with value-driven investments from the public and private sectors, supporting global economic recovery and accompanying the twin green and digital transitions outside the European Union. Worldwide, the Global Gateway aims to mobilise €300 billion in investments between 2021 and 2027, with a mix of grants, concessional loans and guarantees to de-risk private sector investments.
At its 14 October meeting, INTA Members will exchange and vote on the financial assistance package in support of Ukraine consisting of a Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism and an exceptional Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) loan of up to €35 billion.
Members will also consider two macro-financial assistance programmes: one for Egypt and one for Jordan. Council adopted a short-term MFA of up to €1 billion on 12 April 2024. The current MFA proposal for Egypt would complement the existing €1 billion MFA with a longer-term operation of up to €4 billion. The proposal for a new MFA operation to Jordan is worth up to €500 million dates back to 8 April 2024.
Chief Trade Enforcement Officer Denis Redonnet will present the 42nd Annual Report on the EU’s Anti-Dumping, Anti-Subsidy and Safeguard activities and the Use of Trade Defence Instruments by Third Countries targeting the EU in 2023.
INTA and IMCO will also jointly examine the draft corrigendum of the Forced Labour regulation adopted in the previous legislature.
Question for written answer E-001933/2024 to the Commission Rule 144 Auke Zijlstra (PfE)
At the European Parliament hearing on Monday 23 September 2024, ECB Executive Board member Piero Cipollone stated that the electronic payments market was dominated by a duopoly made up of two US firms, which, accordingly, charge excessive prices.
According to my reading of the Treaties, the power to identify and address a dominant position on a relevant market, and abuse of that position, lies exclusively with the competition authorities of the Member States and the Commission.
Does the Commission agree with the ECB’s analysis that the two US duopolists are abusing their dominant position on the electronic payments market? If so, when will it bring infringement proceedings against them?
Question for written answer E-001935/2024 to the Commission Rule 144 Dimitris Tsiodras (PPE)
According to a recent WHO report,[1] 11 % of adolescents ‘showed signs of problematic social media behaviour, struggling to control their use’. Scientific studies have also linked prolonged and excessive social media use to sleep disturbances and, therefore, to consequences for children’s mental and physical development, as well as to depression, bullying and increased anxiety. It may be that digital platforms and social media are designed to reinforce children’s addiction through their design, operation and/or use.
In view of this:
1.Following on from the Digital Services Act,[2] what does the Commission plan to do to address addiction to social media among children as a consequence of their design, operation and/or use?
2.How does it plan to help the Member States provide comprehensive and up-to-date digital literacy programmes?
[2] Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act).
Question for written answer E-001863/2024/rev.1 to the Commission Rule 144 Joachim Streit (Renew)
Hungary is increasingly promoting its golden passport and visa programmes, especially among Chinese investors. Such schemes are at odds with the principle of sincere cooperation and commodify EU citizenship and right of residence. The fact that citizenship and right of residence can effectively be purchased in Hungary opens the door to corruption, money laundering, security threats and tax avoidance.
It is also important to add that these schemes jeopardise macroeconomic governance and put other Member States at a competitive disadvantage. Member States that comply with EU rules and that have not introduced similar schemes are at a disadvantage vis-à-vis Hungary. In response to my question to the Hungarian Minister for European Union Affairs on the legality of these plans, János Bóka stated at the AFCO Committee meeting that all Member States could do what they wanted.
1.What is the Commission’s assessment of the distortion of competition caused by these schemes? What compensatory financial mechanisms can it propose to reduce the negative economic impact on other Member States caused by this unfair behaviour?
2.What specific steps has the Commission taken to get Hungary to scrap these programmes?
3.How does the Commission’s plan to prevent the continuation of golden passport and visa schemes in Hungary?
When the Russian bombardments started in Odesa in March 2022, Patrashku fled to Kopparberg in southern Sweden. After a year, she moved north to Skellefteå to work as assistant nurse.
With a population of 76 542, Skellefteå has grown quickly over the past five years. By 2030, it’s expected to add 16 000 further people.
Finding accommodation wasn’t easy for Patrashku. Properties were often taken before she could even visit them. The only option seemed to be living with other Ukrainian refugees, but Patrashku was determined to get a proper place. She signed onto Skebo’s housing list and started collecting “points”.
The number of points required to rent an apartment varies according to location and the applicant’s place in the queue. While those with the greatest need, such as low-income individuals, homeless people, refugees and the disabled, are given priority, others can also qualify if there is enough housing available.
With 53 points, Patrashku qualified for an apartment in Bostäder, a picturesque rural area north of Skellefteå. “Support from the European Investment Bank has given us the opportunity to accelerate housing construction in places where the private sector wouldn’t see an immediate return on investment,” says Ulander, the municipal official.
Question for written answer E-001947/2024 to the Commission Rule 144 Thierry Mariani (PfE)
The Commission has brought forward a new raft of measures in support of Ukraine’s civilian expenditure, which could translate into an overall outlay of up to EUR 45 billion at EU level.
A portion of that sum will be funded by means of an exceptional financial contribution from the Member States, with a potential EUR 9 billion for France, given its weight within the Union.
The Stability and Growth Pact, which provides a framework for monitoring Member States’ deficits and debt, was revised in the spring.
It established net government expenditure as a new variable for tracking the trajectory of public finances, with such expenditure being understood as gross public expenditure less, inter alia, national expenditure on the co-financing of programmes funded by the Union.
1.Will the Commission include expenditure on support measures for Ukraine decided at EU level in its calculation of net government expenditure?
2.If not, how will it take into account this significant financial effort the EU is imposing on Member States, which is liable to distort the way in which their fiscal trajectories are perceived?
Question for written answer E-001931/2024 to the Commission Rule 144 André Rodrigues (S&D)
On 4 May 2024, a major fire broke out at the Divino Espírito Santo Hospital (DESH) in Ponta Delgada, São Miguel, Azores, putting it out of action. The entire hospital had to be evacuated, with patients being moved into alternative accommodation. The health care system and services on the island and in the wider region also had to be reorganised.
DESH is the largest health facility in the region and the hospital for the other health centres, giving it an important role on the island and in the region as a whole. The disaster has therefore considerably disrupted health care and has had a significant financial impact on the Azores region’s health service and budget.
1.Has Portugal activated the EU Solidarity Fund to help cover the costs of this disaster and quickly restore the hospital? If so, how much funding has been requested?
2.What other EU funding is available to the region and Member State to quickly restore and improve a crucial health facility in one of the EU’s outermost regions?
Question for written answer E-001937/2024 to the Commission Rule 144 Borja Giménez Larraz (PPE), Elena Nevado del Campo (PPE)
In August 2024, the Spanish Ministry of Transport pledged to map out the route that the Madrid-Badajoz-Lisbon high-speed rail link would take through the province of Toledo. However, the Spanish Government is still dragging its feet over this decision, jeopardising the 2030 completion deadline set by the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) for this railway.
And Spain is not the only country affected. Portugal will also be impacted, given that this high-speed railway line is a key border crossing between Madrid and Lisbon that would boost regional development and combat depopulation. Not to mention that both countries are hosting the 2030 FIFA World Cup.
Due to the Spanish Government’s lack of commitment and given that this railway line is part of the TEN-T core network, there is a need for EU-level action.
In view of the above:
1.What mechanisms does the Commission have at its disposal to enforce the deadlines for implementing the TEN-T?
2.Has the Spanish Government informed the Commission of its timeline for completing the Madrid-Lisbon high-speed railway?
3.Does the Commission think that the deadlines will be met?
Question for written answer E-001928/2024 to the Commission Rule 144 Estrella Galán (The Left)
Spain’s Ministry of Industry has allocated upwards of EUR 35 million in European funds to a series of projects in the Autonomous Community of Aragon which, besides failing to comply with the obligatory deadlines for implementation (50 % by December 2024), may be in violation of criteria 1, 2, 3 and 6: mitigating and adapting to climate change; sustainably using and protecting water and marine resources; and protecting and restoring biodiversity and ecosystems.
At issue are (i) the construction projects for new ski lifts in Astun-Candanchú and Benasque-Cerler (which would entail tree felling and severe ramifications on biodiversity and ecosystems); (ii) the construction of a golf course in Panticosa (which would require a large quantity of water and have a devastating impacton water resources, making the recovery of biodiversity difficult); and (iii) the construction of car parks in Sallent de Gállego and Formigal (which would promote the use of private vehicles).
1.Does the Commission intend to investigate the infringement of the basic NextGenerationEU criteria and objectives which may result from the use of EU funds to finance these projects?
2.Given that currently only 1 % of the projects has been completed and, as the Autonomous Community of Aragon itself confesses, 50 % of those projects will not have been completed by the end of December, can the Commission clarify whether it has relaxed the implementation dates for these projects?
Question for written answer E-001965/2024 to the Commission Rule 144 Carmen Crespo Díaz (PPE)
The ruling issued by the Court of Justice of the European Union annulling the trade agreements between the European Union and Morocco has caused serious concern to the Spanish fishing fleet, which regularly operates in Moroccan fishing grounds.
Furthermore, the suspension of these agreements entails a loss of income for the fishing fleet not to say a further reduction in fishing possibilities for a sector already affected by the crisis and the cut in days and quotas set by the European Commission itself.
In view of the above:
1.What timetable is the Commission setting itself for negotiations with Morocco with a view to finding a solution for the fisheries sector?
2.What action will the Commission take in response to the CJEU ruling on the agreement with Morocco?
3.What compensatory aid will it provide for the European fishing fleet affected by the suspension of the agreement?
Question for written answer E-001791/2024/rev.1 to the Commission Rule 144 Joachim Streit (Renew)
The latest monitoring report by the Media Freedom Rapid Response consortium reveals that, in the first six months of 2024 alone, there were 756 media freedom violation alerts involving 1 212 media-related persons or entities. Of the alerts in the report, 474 relate to EU Member States, while 282 were recorded in candidate countries. The number of violations in Germany was 72. In Europe, intimidation and online threats targeting members of the press are increasing, and anti-media laws, spoofing, censorship, legal harassment, editorial interference and physical attacks are also on the rise. In many cases, such violations occur at the hands of the government or public officials. This trend is particularly concerning because of its potential to affect national and regional elections in EU Member States and undermine the EU’s democratic principles.
1.Is the Commission – and Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in particular – aware of the dangerous situation faced by journalists? What does the Commission make of this situation in the light of the European Media Freedom Act?
2.What new measures does the Commission intend to take to protect editorial independence, journalistic sources and journalists’ physical safety?
3.Does the Commission plan to cut EU funding to Member States and candidate countries where press freedom is particularly under threat, such as Hungary?
– having regard to the Commission proposal to the European Parliament and the Council (COM(2024)0325 – C10‑0088/2024),
– having regard to Article 107(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
– having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 of 11 November 2002 establishing the European Union Solidarity Fund(1),
– having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027(2), and in particular Article 9 thereof,
– having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources(3), and in particular point 10 thereof,
– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1058 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 on the European Regional Development Fund and on the Cohesion Fund(4),
– having regard to its resolution of 27 February 2024 on the draft Council regulation amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027(5),
– having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2021 on the effectiveness of Member States’ use of EU Solidarity Fund money in cases of natural disasters(6),
– having regard to its resolution of 18 May 2021 on the review of the European Union Solidarity Fund(7),
– having regard to the EEA Report No 1/2024 – European Climate Risk Assessment (EUCRA),
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets (A10-0002/2024),
A. whereas between 1 and 17 May 2023, the Emilia-Romagna region of Italy experienced extremely intense rainfall which led to flooding resulting in total direct damages estimated by the Italian authorities at EUR 8,5 billion;
B. whereas between 3 and 6 August 2023, Slovenia was impacted by heavy rainfall which led to floods across the country and was its worst natural disaster to date, resulting in total direct damages of EUR 7,3 billion according to the Commission;
C. whereas between 3 and 6 August 2023, Austria was impacted by heavy rainfall which led to floods in southern Austrian regions resulting in total direct damages estimated by the Austrian authorities at EUR 208 million;
D. whereas between 4 and 11 September 2023, Greece was impacted by the Mediterranean storm “Daniel” which caused heavy rainfall and led to floods in multiple locations in central Greece, particularly in the Thessaly region, resulting in total direct damages estimated by the Greek authorities at EUR 2,3 billion;
E. whereas between 25 October and 10 November 2023, the Tuscany region of Italy experienced intense rainfall which led to flash floods resulting in total direct damages estimated by the Italian authorities at EUR 2,7 billion;
F. whereas between 2 and 9 November 2023, the former Nord-Pas-de-Calais region of the Hauts-de-France region of France was impacted by heavy rainfall which caused floods resulting in total direct damages estimated by the French authorities at EUR 1,9 billion;
1. Expresses its deepest solidarity with all the victims, their families and all the individuals affected by the destructive floods in Italy, Slovenia, Austria, Greece and France as well as with the national, regional and local authorities involved in the relief efforts;
2. Welcomes the decision as a tangible and visible form of the Union’s solidarity with its citizens and the regions in the affected areas in Italy, Slovenia, Austria, Greece and France;
3. Reiterates the importance of communicating to the public the tangible benefits brought about by the European Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF), also to further increase citizens’ awareness of Union tools and programmes;
4. Highlights the increasing number of severe and destructive natural disasters in Europe and calls on Member States and the Commission to invest in climate mitigation and adaptation measures to avoid human and economic losses; considers that the budget of the EUSF or its equivalent should be expanded in view of the upcoming Commission proposal on the new Multiannual Financial Framework and subsequent inter-institutional negotiations; urges the Commission to increase the budget of the European Solidarity Reserve and to make sure that the overall amount of funding and the allocation modalities ensure the optimal effectiveness of the EUSF;
5. Stresses that, due to climate change, islands and coastal regions are particularly vulnerable to natural calamities; acknowledges that phenomena such as earthquakes, floods, volcanic eruptions, and droughts – which also affect lakes and rivers – represent an increasing threat to many European regions, particularly those in the Mediterranean; questions whether the EUSF is adequately aligned with the emergency needs related to climate adaptation in these particularly fragile territories; therefore, believes that islands and coastal regions should receive adequate funding within the framework of the EUSF to address their specific vulnerabilities;
6. Stresses that the EUSF is only a curative instrument and that the Union should also continue to address climate change adaptation and mitigation by supporting European and national policies to prevent natural disasters; underlines that the EEA Report No 1/2024 ‘European Climate Risk Assessment’ warned that the bloc is unprepared for the effects of climate change and stresses the need for action to avoid that the climate risks identified reach critical levels; calls on the Member States and the Commission to deliver their contribution to achieve the objectives agreed at the Paris Climate Summit; recalls the need for effective synergies with other Union policies and programmes and underlines that Member States should make best use of funding opportunities, in particular of the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund +, the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund, the Cohesion Fund and the rural development programmes; stresses also the need for preventive measures, not only to mitigate future damage but also to prevent the exacerbation of risk conditions following catastrophic events, such as wildfires, landslides or the drying up of lakes and rivers; underlines the importance of adequate flexibility between the different programmes; underscores that assistance provided under the EUSF should not be to the detriment of Union funding received by Member States under other Union programmes or policies; recalls that Member States can grant state aid, in accordance with applicable Union rules, notably for agricultural businesses that have suffered damages due to natural disasters;
7. Recalls the importance of rapid and solid damage assessment that takes due account of the economic repercussions and calls for increased operational efforts to be made in order to reduce the average time for the release of advanced payments, while ensuring the Union budget is protected; calls on the Commission to further streamline the procedure and shorten the time required for the processing of the applications for the mobilisation of the EUSF, to accelerate response times and ensure that funds reach the affected regions promptly as natural disasters inflict significant damage that disrupts daily life and local economies; stresses the need for reasonable flexibility when recipient countries face justifiable delays and challenges in applying for and utilizing allocated funding; calls on Member States to take into consideration that vulnerable populations are particularly affected by natural disasters due to socio-economic factors further hampering their ability to recover;
8. Stresses the urgent need to release immediate financial assistance through the EUSF to ensure that support can reach the affected regions in a timely manner;
9. Approves the decision annexed to this resolution;
10. Instructs its President to sign the decision with the President of the Council and arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union;
11. Instructs its President to forward this resolution, including its annex, to the Council and the Commission.
Sebastião Bugalho, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Michael Gahler, David McAllister, Ana Miguel Pedro, Isabel Wiseler‑Lima, Luděk Niedermayer, Paulo Cunha, Mirosława Nykiel, Marta Wcisło, Vangelis Meimarakis, Danuše Nerudová, Rosa Estaràs Ferragut, Tomáš Zdechovský, Nicolás Pascual De La Parte, Jörgen Warborn, Wouter Beke, Željana Zovko, Miriam Lexmann, Inese Vaidere, Péter Magyar on behalf of the PPE Group Alex Agius Saliba, Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Evin Incir, Nicola Zingaretti on behalf of the S&D Group Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Adam Bielan, Assita Kanko, Alexandr Vondra, Veronika Vrecionová, Ondřej Krutílek, Michał Dworczyk, Ivaylo Valchev, Alberico Gambino, Carlo Fidanza, Emmanouil Fragkos, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Waldemar Tomaszewski on behalf of the ECR Group Abir Al‑Sahlani, Petras Auštrevičius, Helmut Brandstätter, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Raquel García Hermida‑Van Der Walle, Svenja Hahn, Karin Karlsbro, Moritz Körner, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Nathalie Loiseau, Jan‑Christoph Oetjen, Urmas Paet, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar on behalf of the Renew Group Hannah Neumann on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group Per Clausen, Lukas Sieper, Rima Hassan
Document selected :
RC-B10-0089/2024
Texts tabled :
RC-B10-0089/2024
Texts adopted :
European Parliament resolution on Iraq, notably the situation of women’s rights and the recent proposal to amend the Personal Status Law
–having regard to its previous resolutions on Iraq,
–having regard to Rules 150(5) and 136(4) of its Rules of Procedure,
A.whereas Iraq’s Parliament is drafting highly restrictive amendments to Law 188/1959 (the Personal Status Law), affecting women’s rights; whereas as a result, family matters, including marriage, divorce and child custody, would effectively fall under the remit of religious rather than civil courts, entailing disturbing discrepancies along religious lines, according to UN experts; whereas for some, the minimum legal marriageable age would be 9 for girls and 15 for boys, and there are fears of increased violence against women in the future; whereas 22 % of unregistered marriages involve girls under 14; whereas the Supreme Court endorsed the constitutionality of the most problematic amendments before a third reading, which was postponed on 2 October 2024; whereas the women’s rights situation in Iraq already drew fierce criticism;
B.whereas Iraq’s UN mission UNITAD, which had been investigating sexual crimes committed by Daesh against women, particularly Yazidis, had to close on 17 September 2024 following last year’s decision, supported by Russia and China, to discontinue its UN Security Council mandate; whereas Iraq’s UN mission UNAMI will also have to close in 2025;
C.whereas the 2016 Sakharov Prize for freedom of expression was awarded to Nadia Murad and Lamiya Aji Bashar, two Iraqi Yazidi women, for their struggle against conflict-related sexual violence;
D.whereas Article 14 of Iraq’s constitution states that ‘Iraqis are equal before the law without discrimination based on gender’;
E.whereas 73 % of respondents surveyed by the Iraq Polling Team expressed ‘strong opposition’ to the changes to Law 188/1959;
1.Urges Iraq’s Parliament to fully and immediately reject the proposed amendments to Law 188/1959 (the Personal Status Law); underlines, with utmost concern, that the amendments would violate Iraq’s international obligations regarding women’s fundamental rights, and result in a significant rollback, an increasingly negative international reputation and the withholding of some foreign assistance from bilateral and multilateral organisations;
2.Calls on the VP/HR and the Member States to condemn the proposed amendments; calls on the EU delegation to Iraq to make development grants conditional on judicial training on sexual and gender-based violence and the establishment of women’s shelters; urges Iraq to adopt a national action plan to eliminate child marriage, criminalise marital rape, fight domestic violence and strengthen women’s and girls’ rights, in line with the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; calls for a reinforced partnership with the Human Rights Committee of Iraq’s Parliament, in line with Iraq’s international obligations;
3.Calls on the Member States to increase their support to women’s and children’s rights defenders in Iraq;
4.Is highly concerned by the lack of legal protection in the penal code for women and child victims of domestic violence and calls for improvements;
5.Instructs its President to have this resolution translated into Arabic and to forward this resolution to Iraq’s Parliament and Government, the VP/HR and the Member States.
Question for written answer E-001932/2024 to the Commission Rule 144 Jadwiga Wiśniewska (ECR)
In response to the catastrophic flooding in Central Europe, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced that countries hit by the disaster would receive EUR 10 billion from the EU Cohesion Fund.
Regulation 2021/1058 specifies that the Cohesion Fund is intended to level the playing field in the common market for the less prosperous Member States. In the 2021-2027 programming period, its beneficiaries are countries whose gross national income per capita is below 90% of the EU average.
Austria, which in principle is not a beneficiary under the current programming framework, is one of the Central European countries impacted by the flooding that will receive financial aid from the Cohesion Fund.
In view of the above, could the Commission answer the following questions:
1.Has allocating cohesion funding to Austria reduced the amounts which the less wealthy countries are entitled to receive from the Cohesion Fund?
2.What will be the mechanism and the scale of the reallocation of funding under the Cohesion Fund in the 2021-2027 programming period?
3.Is the Commission aware that allocating cohesion funding to Austria will mean that changes will need to be made to investments being carried out and planned by eligible Member States?
On Monday, 14 October 2024, the FEMM Committee will debate the draft recommendation to the Council on the EU priorities for the 69th session of the UN Commission on the Status of Women (CSW).
The main focus of CSW 69 being the implementation of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, the FEMM committee will consider its recommendation to the Council.
Sebastião Bugalho, Miriam Lexmann, Michael Gahler, David McAllister, Isabel Wiseler‑Lima, Luděk Niedermayer, Ana Miguel Pedro, Mirosława Nykiel, Paulo Cunha, Marta Wcisło, Vangelis Meimarakis, Loránt Vincze, Danuše Nerudová, Rosa Estaràs Ferragut, Tomáš Zdechovský, Jörgen Warborn, Wouter Beke, Nicolás Pascual De La Parte, Željana Zovko, Inese Vaidere on behalf of the PPE Group Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Raphaël Glucksmann, Pina Picierno on behalf of the S&D Group Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Adam Bielan, Mariusz Kamiński, Jaak Madison, Reinis Pozņaks, Alexandr Vondra, Jadwiga Wiśniewska, Veronika Vrecionová, Ondřej Krutílek, Michał Dworczyk, Assita Kanko, Alberico Gambino, Carlo Fidanza, Charlie Weimers, Beatrice Timgren, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Roberts Zīle, Waldemar Tomaszewski on behalf of the ECR Group Petras Auštrevičius, Helmut Brandstätter, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Engin Eroglu, João Cotrim De Figueiredo, Svenja Hahn, Karin Karlsbro, Moritz Körner, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Nathalie Loiseau, Urmas Paet, Ana Vasconcelos, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar on behalf of the Renew Group Erik Marquardt, Markéta Gregorová on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group Per Clausen, Rima Hassan, Hanna Gedin, Jonas Sjöstedt
Document selected :
RC-B10-0101/2024
Texts tabled :
RC-B10-0101/2024
Texts adopted :
European Parliament resolution on the cases of unjustly imprisoned Uyghurs in China, notably Ilham Tohti and Gulshan Abbas
–having regard to Articles 4 and 36 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (PRC),
–having regard to Rules 150(5) and 136(4) of its Rules of Procedure,
A.whereas in 2014 Ilham Tohti was convicted of politically motivated charges of ‘separatism’ and sentenced to life imprisonment; whereas he worked to foster dialogue between Uyghurs and Han Chinese; whereas he was awarded the 2019 Sakharov Prize;
B.whereas Gulshan Abbas is serving a 20-year sentence on fallacious terrorism-related charges relating to activities of her sister, a defender of the human rights of persecuted Uyghurs in the PRC;
C.whereas this reflects the PRC authorities’ systemic repression of Uyghurs in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR); whereas Uyghurs are arbitrarily detained in internment camps and forced to renounce their ethnic identity and religious beliefs;
D.whereas the defence of human rights, democracy and the rule of law should be at the centre of EU-PRC relations;
1.Strongly condemns the PRC’s violations of the human rights of Uyghurs and people in Tibet, Hong Kong, Macau and mainland China;
2.Urges the PRC to immediately and unconditionally release Ilham Tohti and Gulshan Abbas, as well as those arbitrarily detained in China and those mentioned by the EU during the 57th session of the UN Human Rights Council, guarantee their access to medical care and lawyers, provide information on their whereabouts and ensure family visiting rights; calls for the EU and the Member States to apply pressure in this respect at every high-level contact;
3.Calls for the EU and the Member States to adopt additional sanctions against high-ranking officials and entities involved in human rights violations in the PRC;
4.Demands that the PRC authorities halt their repression and targeting of Uyghurs with abusive policies, including intense surveillance, forced labour, sterilisation, birth prevention measures and the destruction of Uyghur identity, which amount to crimes against humanity and a serious risk of genocide; calls for the closure of all internment camps;
5.Strongly condemns the PRC for not implementing the recommendations of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR); calls on the PRC to allow the OHCHR independent access to XUAR and invites the OHCHR to issue a comprehensive situational update and an action plan for holding the PRC accountable;
6.Regrets the PRC’s lack of commitment to the Human Rights Dialogue and the absence of results;
7.Calls on Member States and the international community to suspend extradition treaties with the PRC and Hong Kong, respect the non-refoulement principle and implement the OHCHR report;
8.Urges Member States to address the transnational repression of Chinese dissidents and Uyghurs on their territory and prosecute individuals responsible;
9.Welcomes the EU’s forced labour regulation and insists on its full implementation; calls on businesses operating in the PRC, particularly in XUAR, to comply with their HR due diligence obligations;
10.Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the PRC authorities, the VP/HR, the Commission, the Member States and the United Nations.
Sebastião Bugalho, Isabel Wiseler‑Lima, Michael Gahler, Luděk Niedermayer, Ana Miguel Pedro, Mirosława Nykiel, Marta Wcisło, Vangelis Meimarakis, Danuše Nerudová, Tomáš Zdechovský, Nicolás Pascual De La Parte, Jörgen Warborn, Željana Zovko, Miriam Lexmann, Inese Vaidere on behalf of the PPE Group Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Nikos Papandreou on behalf of the S&D Group Rihards Kols, Ondřej Krutílek, Ivaylo Valchev, Assita Kanko, Emmanouil Fragkos, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Waldemar Tomaszewski, Veronika Vrecionová on behalf of the ECR Group Lucia Yar, Petras Auštrevičius, Helmut Brandstätter, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Engin Eroglu, Svenja Hahn, Karin Karlsbro, Moritz Körner, Nathalie Loiseau, Jan‑Christoph Oetjen, Hilde Vautmans on behalf of the Renew Group Vladimir Prebilič on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group Isabel Serra Sánchez on behalf of The Left Group
European Parliament resolution on the case of Bülent Mumay in Türkiye
–having regard to its previous reports and resolutions on Türkiye,
–having regard to the 2024 World Press Freedom Index, which ranks Türkiye 158th out of 180 countries,
–having regard to Rules 150(5) and 136(4) of its Rules of Procedure,
A.whereas, on 6 May 2023, Bülent Mumay, a Turkish journalist and coordinator of the Istanbul bureau of Deutsche Welle’s Turkish editorial office, was sentenced to 20 months in prison for social media posts about a pro-government company’s seizure of Istanbul Municipality’s subway funds during the AKP administration; whereas his appeal was rejected, and his tweets removed;
B.whereas, on 20 August 2024, Istanbul’s 26th Regional Court, acting as an appeals court, upheld the sentence and ordered the Information and Communication Technologies Authority to block access to news reports about the upheld prison sentence;
C.whereas the verdict, coupled with repeated censorship, demonstrates the escalating pressure on press freedom in Türkiye, with Bülent Mumay’s case not being an isolated incident but part of a broader pattern of judicial harassment and censorship targeting Türkiye’s independent media;
D.whereas Türkiye, as a member of the Council of Europe and EU candidate country, is required to apply the highest democratic standards and practices, including respect for human rights, the rule of law, fundamental freedoms (such as press freedom and freedom of expression), the universal right to a fair trial and strict respect for the principle of presumption of innocence and the right to due process;
1.Condemns the sentence against Bülent Mumay, which follows a broader pattern of silencing critical journalism; calls on the Turkish authorities to drop the charges against Bülent Mumay, and all arbitrarily detained media workers and journalists;
2.Is deeply concerned about the ongoing deterioration of democratic standards in Türkiye, relentless crackdown on any critical voices and targeting of independent journalists, activists and opposition members amid frequent reports of legal intimidation, censorship and financial coercion as ways to suppress criticism and investigative journalism;
3.Deplores the fact that, the Turkish Government, through a number of laws, including the 2020 social media law, the 2021 anti-money laundering law, and the 2022 disinformation law, has built a complex web of legislation serving as a tool to systematically control and silence journalists; is highly concerned about the new ‘foreign agent regulation’ to be introduced by the end of 2024;
4.Continues to condemn the lack of independence of the prosecution and judiciary and the political instrumentalisation of the judicial system in Türkiye and calls on the Turkish authorities to restore judicial independence, respect press freedom and ensure compliance with international human rights obligations;
5.Calls on the EEAS to adequately support the EU Delegation to Türkiye in intensifying trial observation of detained journalists and media workers and raising their cases with the Turkish authorities at all levels, while maintaining close relations with civil society;
6.Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the EEAS, and the President, Government and Parliament of Türkiye and have it translated into Turkish.
Source: Switzerland – Federal Administration in English
Federal Department of Foreign Affairs
Bern, 09.10.2024 – Switzerland was elected today to the UN Human Rights Council by the UN General Assembly in New York with 175 votes. It will serve as a member of the UN’s most important intergovernmental human rights body for three years starting in early 2025.
Promoting and protecting human rights globally is a core objective of Swiss foreign policy. Respect for human rights is enshrined in the Swiss Federal Constitution and reflected in various international agreements to which Switzerland is a party. Switzerland is also the host state for the Human Rights Council and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. In 2006, it played a key role in the establishment of the Human Rights Council. Today, Switzerland was elected to the Human Rights Council for the fourth time and will serve from January 2025 until the end of 2027. Alongside Switzerland, 46 other states will serve on the UN’s most significant intergovernmental body in the field of human rights during this period.
During its term on the Human Rights Council, Switzerland will work to strengthen the institution, promote human rights across the UN system, and implement them at national level. Its key priorities are the worldwide abolition of the death penalty, enforcing the prohibition of torture, promoting freedom of expression, and protecting minorities and women’s rights. In addition, Switzerland will work to strengthen democratic institutions globally by promoting electoral standards and emphasising the role of human rights in peaceful protests. In this context, Switzerland will also address the impact of new technologies, such as cyber, digital, and neurotechnologies, on human rights.
As a bridge-builder, Switzerland will foster dialogue and cooperation among all states and contribute to solutions founded on international norms and standards. Ensuring the inclusion of civil society in the work of the Human Rights Council is a key concern for Switzerland.
The UN and human rights The UN Human Rights Council is one of the UN’s main bodies dedicated to promoting and protecting human rights. Its mandate includes addressing human rights violations worldwide, setting international standards, and promoting human rights, for example, through providing technical support to states. The Human Rights Council comprises 47 member states and is based in Geneva.
Address for enquiries
FDFA Communication Federal Palace West Wing CH-3003 Bern, Switzerland Tel. Press service: +41 58 460 55 55 E-mail: kommunikation@eda.admin.ch Twitter: @SwissMFA
Sebastião Bugalho, Miriam Lexmann, Michael Gahler, David McAllister, Isabel Wiseler‑Lima, Luděk Niedermayer, Ana Miguel Pedro, Mirosława Nykiel, Paulo Cunha, Marta Wcisło, Vangelis Meimarakis, Loránt Vincze, Danuše Nerudová, Rosa Estaràs Ferragut, Tomáš Zdechovský, Jörgen Warborn, Wouter Beke, Nicolás Pascual De La Parte, Željana Zovko, Inese Vaidere on behalf of the PPE Group Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Raphaël Glucksmann, Pina Picierno on behalf of the S&D Group Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Adam Bielan, Mariusz Kamiński, Jaak Madison, Reinis Pozņaks, Alexandr Vondra, Jadwiga Wiśniewska, Veronika Vrecionová, Ondřej Krutílek, Michał Dworczyk, Assita Kanko, Alberico Gambino, Carlo Fidanza, Charlie Weimers, Beatrice Timgren, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Roberts Zīle, Waldemar Tomaszewski on behalf of the ECR Group Petras Auštrevičius, Helmut Brandstätter, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Engin Eroglu, João Cotrim De Figueiredo, Svenja Hahn, Karin Karlsbro, Moritz Körner, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Nathalie Loiseau, Urmas Paet, Ana Vasconcelos, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar on behalf of the Renew Group Erik Marquardt, Markéta Gregorová on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group Per Clausen, Rima Hassan, Hanna Gedin, Jonas Sjöstedt, Lukas Sieper
Document selected :
RC-B10-0101/2024
Texts tabled :
RC-B10-0101/2024
Texts adopted :
European Parliament resolution on the cases of unjustly imprisoned Uyghurs in China, notably Ilham Tohti and Gulshan Abbas
–having regard to Articles 4 and 36 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (PRC),
–having regard to Rules 150(5) and 136(4) of its Rules of Procedure,
A.whereas in 2014 Ilham Tohti was convicted of politically motivated charges of ‘separatism’ and sentenced to life imprisonment; whereas he worked to foster dialogue between Uyghurs and Han Chinese; whereas he was awarded the 2019 Sakharov Prize;
B.whereas Gulshan Abbas is serving a 20-year sentence on fallacious terrorism-related charges relating to activities of her sister, a defender of the human rights of persecuted Uyghurs in the PRC;
C.whereas this reflects the PRC authorities’ systemic repression of Uyghurs in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR); whereas Uyghurs are arbitrarily detained in internment camps and forced to renounce their ethnic identity and religious beliefs;
D.whereas the defence of human rights, democracy and the rule of law should be at the centre of EU-PRC relations;
1.Strongly condemns the PRC’s violations of the human rights of Uyghurs and people in Tibet, Hong Kong, Macau and mainland China;
2.Urges the PRC to immediately and unconditionally release Ilham Tohti and Gulshan Abbas, as well as those arbitrarily detained in China and those mentioned by the EU during the 57th session of the UN Human Rights Council, guarantee their access to medical care and lawyers, provide information on their whereabouts and ensure family visiting rights; calls for the EU and the Member States to apply pressure in this respect at every high-level contact;
3.Calls for the EU and the Member States to adopt additional sanctions against high-ranking officials and entities involved in human rights violations in the PRC;
4.Demands that the PRC authorities halt their repression and targeting of Uyghurs with abusive policies, including intense surveillance, forced labour, sterilisation, birth prevention measures and the destruction of Uyghur identity, which amount to crimes against humanity and a serious risk of genocide; calls for the closure of all internment camps;
5.Strongly condemns the PRC for not implementing the recommendations of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR); calls on the PRC to allow the OHCHR independent access to XUAR and invites the OHCHR to issue a comprehensive situational update and an action plan for holding the PRC accountable;
6.Regrets the PRC’s lack of commitment to the Human Rights Dialogue and the absence of results;
7.Calls on Member States and the international community to suspend extradition treaties with the PRC and Hong Kong, respect the non-refoulement principle and implement the OHCHR report;
8.Urges Member States to address the transnational repression of Chinese dissidents and Uyghurs on their territory and prosecute individuals responsible;
9.Welcomes the EU’s forced labour regulation and insists on its full implementation; calls on businesses operating in the PRC, particularly in XUAR, to comply with their HR due diligence obligations;
10.Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the PRC authorities, the VP/HR, the Commission, the Member States and the United Nations.
Source: United States House of Representatives – Congresswoman María Elvira Salazar’s (FL-27)
WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, Western Hemisphere Subcommittee Chairwoman María Elvira Salazar (R-FL) was joined by Republican members of Congress to urge the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to open new negotiations with the Republic of Argentina to create a robust financial package in order to support Argentina on their economic path to recovery. Joining Congresswoman Salazar on the letter were Representatives Chris Smith (R-NJ), Carlos Giménez (R-FL), Bill Huizenga (R-MI), Mario Diaz-Balart (R-FL), Mike Lawler (R-NY), Mike Waltz (R-FL), Joe Wilson (R-SC), Tom Kean, Jr. (R-NJ), and Keith Self (R-TX).
In their letter to Dr. Kristalina Georgieva, Managing Director of the IMF, the Representatives commended President Milei’s efforts to restore reliability as an economic borrower and end Argentina’s historical financial mismanagement under previous socialist administrations. The Members highlighted Milei’s background as an economist, his already-enacted measures to curtail inflation, and his Déficit Cero budget austerity plan as positive steps taken to accomplish those outcomes.
“The United States is the largest shareholder of the International Monetary Fund and therefore takes a keen interest in its activities. In Argentina, President Milei has vowed to restore his country’s reputation as a country that pays its debts and belongs in the club of countries that are reliable borrowers,” wrote the legislators. “According to reports, the economic adjustment plans he has implemented through the executive branch and the legislature are already curtailing inflation, hopefully setting Argentina on a path that ensures it will not miss any international financial obligations. As such, we ask that you consider these positive measures as you assist Argentina in charting the course ahead.”
Below is the text of the letter. The full letter can be found HERE.
Dear Managing Director Georgieva,
As members of Congress of the United States who oversee foreign affairs issues, we write to you concerning the Republic of Argentina’s stated commitment to putting its fiscal house in order and righting the ship of state. The United States is the largest shareholder of the International Monetary Fund and therefore takes a keen interest in its activities. In Argentina, President Milei has vowed to restore his country’s reputation as a country that pays its debts and belongs in the club of countries that are reliable borrowers. According to reports, the economic adjustment plans he has implemented through the executive branch and the legislature are already curtailing inflation, hopefully setting Argentina on a path that ensures it will not miss any international financial obligations. As such, we ask that you consider these positive measures as you assist Argentina in charting the course ahead.
We are encouraged that President Milei appears to be working toward meeting Argentina’s international obligations.
As an economist, President Milei knows what the necessary measures are to tame inflation and ensure Argentina meets its commitments to the International Monetary Fund and other international creditors. In fact, should his Déficit Cero budget austerity plan be implemented in its entirety, the result would go beyond what the IMF has requested, cutting spending across the board and responsibly tackling Argentina’s economic challenges.
We believe that the IMF was generous with past profligate socialist governments.
Since the Presidency of socialist Néstor Kirchner, the IMF has treated Argentina with incredible generosity, despite refusals of consecutive socialist governments to cut spending. The few times these governments did pay, it was because they printed more of the Argentine peso (ARS), a strategy which many economists believe caused a painful inflation crisis which wrecked Argentina’s economy. Nonetheless, these profligate governments received deals for $21.6 billion in 2001, $15.6 billion in 2003 and most recently $44 billion in 2022. Despite the IMF’s generosity, the Kirchner government was in default from 2007-2015. We are encouraged by President Milei’s stated commitment to leaving this shameful and damaging legacy where it belongs – in the past.
President Milei’s government appears to be reinstituting fiscal responsibility after decades of mismanagement, but needs support.
The current $800 million disbursement provided earlier this year is helpful. To repair the years of corruption and mismanagement, we believe that Argentina will need robust multilateral bank support, such as through a comprehensive IMF program, that would support Argentina’s difficult path toward economic health. Within all applicable rules and regulations, we respectfully request that you assess whether such support would both complement and reward the tough decisions that President Milei has made toward promoting Argentina’s long-term solvency and prosperity.
We appreciate President Milei’s efforts to pay down Argentina’s debt and bring prosperity to his country. We think that these efforts could be bolstered by time and help from multilateral financial institutions such as the IMF.
One concerning trend is the misuse of voice cloning. In seconds, scammers can clone a voice and trick people into thinking a friend or a family member urgently needs money.
News outlets, including CNN, warn these types of scams have the potential to impact millions of people.
As technology makes it easier for criminals to invade our personal spaces, staying cautious about its use is more important than ever.
What is voice cloning?
The rise of AI has created possibilities for image, text, voice generation and machine learning.
While AI offers many benefits, it also provides fraudsters new methods to exploit individuals for money.
You may have heard of “deepfakes,” where AI is used to create fake images, videos and even audio, often involving celebrities or politicians.
Voice cloning, a type of deepfake technology, creates a digital replica of a person’s voice by capturing their speech patterns, accent and breathing from brief audio samples.
Once the speech pattern is captured, an AI voice generator can convert text input into highly realistic speech resembling the targeted person’s voice.
While a simple phrase like “hello, is anyone there?” can lead to a voice cloning scam, a longer conversation helps scammers capture more vocal details. It is therefore best to keep calls brief until you are sure of the caller’s identity.
Voice cloning has valuable applications in entertainment and health care – enabling remote voice work for artists (even posthumously) and assisting people with speech disabilities.
However, it raises serious privacy and security concerns, underscoring the need for safeguards.
How it’s being exploited by criminals
Cybercriminals exploit voice cloning technology to impersonate celebrities, authorities or ordinary people for fraud.
They create urgency, gain the victim’s trust and request money via gift cards, wire transfers or cryptocurrency.
The process begins by collecting audio samples from sources like YouTube and TikTok.
Next, the technology analyses the audio to generate new recordings.
Once the voice is cloned, it can be used in deceptive communications, often accompanied by spoofing Caller ID to appear trustworthy.
Many voice cloning scam cases have made headlines.
For example, criminals cloned the voice of a company director in the United Arab Emirates to orchestrate a $A51 million heist.
A businessman in Mumbai fell victim to a voice cloning scam involving a fake call from the Indian Embassy in Dubai.
In Australia recently, scammers employed a voice clone of Queensland Premier Steven Miles to attempt to trick people to invest in Bitcoin.
Teenagers and children are also targeted. In a kidnapping scam in the United States, a teenager’s voice was cloned and her parents manipulated into complying with demands.
It only takes a few seconds of audio for AI to clone someone’s voice.
How widespread is it?
Recent research shows 28% of adults in the United Kingdom faced voice cloning scams last year, with 46% unaware of the existence of this type of scam.
It highlights a significant knowledge gap, leaving millions at risk of fraud.
In 2022, almost 240,000 Australians reported being victims of voice cloning scams, leading to a financial loss of $A568 million.
How people and organisations can safeguard against it
Public-private collaboration can provide clear information and consent options for voice cloning.
Second, people and organisations should look to use biometric security with liveness detection, which is new technology that can recognise and verify a live voice as opposed to a fake. And organisations using voice recognition should consider adopting multi-factor authentication.
Third, enhancing investigative capability against voice cloning is another crucial measure for law enforcement.
There are also calls for possible intervention strategies that law enforcement could use to combat this problem.
Such efforts should connect with the overall National Plan to Combat Cybercrime, which focuses on proactive, reactive and restorative strategies.
That national plan stipulates a duty of care for service providers, reflected in the Australian government’s new legislation to safeguard the public and small businesses.
The legislation aims for new obligations to prevent, detect, report and disrupt scams.
This will apply to regulated organisations such as telcos, banks and digital platform providers. The goal is to protect customers by preventing, detecting, reporting, and disrupting cyber scams involving deception.
Reducing the risk
As cybercrime costs the Australian economy an estimated A$42 billion, public awareness and strong safeguards are essential.
Countries like Australia are recognising the growing risk. The effectiveness of measures against voice cloning and other frauds depends on their adaptability, cost, feasibility and regulatory compliance.
All stakeholders — government, citizens, and law enforcement — must stay vigilant and raise public awareness to reduce the risk of victimisation.
The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Women seeking publicly funded fertility treatment in New Zealand must have a body mass index (BMI) under 32, according to clinical priority assessment criteria for access to assisted reproductive technology.
But as our in-depth interviews and a growing body of evidence show, this approach is outdated and unethical.
One of our study participants described the system as “completely rigged if you’re a fat person”. Nina, a 37-year-old dance teacher, was denied public funding support to help her conceive because her BMI was above 32 – even though the cause of infertility was her husband’s sperm count.
Nina is not alone. Paratta, who moved to Aotearoa from Sri Lanka in 2009, was also denied because of her BMI. She raced to lose the required weight in spite of a medical condition, but was then denied again because she had reached 40, the age limit for access to public funding.
Both women’s experiences highlight New Zealand’s obsolete and discriminating BMI limit. The United Kingdom does not include BMI as a criterion for public funding, and international cutoffs are generally between 35 and 45.
We argue New Zealand’s BMI threshold must be scrapped to reflect impactful research and respond ethically to New Zealand’s diverse population.
Our study participants have raised concerns about the BMI limit. International and local studies concur with them. Research shows Polynesians are much leaner than Europeans at significantly higher BMIs, meaning Māori and Pacific women are disadvantaged before they even step into the clinic.
Quick weight loss unlikely to help
In New Zealand, people seeking public support are told that “making lifestyle changes like quitting smoking or losing weight” could help them become eligible. They are given a stand-down period wherein they must lose the requisite weight before referrals.
As in Paratta’s case, this can lead to a race to lose weight before the inflexible age limit of 40 is reached. Evidence-based research advises that fertility care should balance the risk of age-related fertility decline with weight-loss advice.
Nina rejected the advice to lose weight. She was concerned that quick weight loss would require unhealthy practices that could affect her success rate during the embryo transfer.
Lifestyle changes made within a short time before conception don’t improve outcomes. Getty Images
At the Australia and New Zealand Fertility Association’s annual conference last month, US obstetrician Kurt Barnhart confirmed that lifestyle interventions made weeks or months before conception are unlikely to improve outcomes. They may even cause harm.
He discussed the FIT—PLESE randomised control study, which compared two groups of infertile women. One underwent a targeted weight-loss program and another exercised but did not lose weight. The results showed no statistically significant difference between the groups’ fertility and live-birth rates. These findings suggest the stand-down period should be revised.
Barnhart also highlighted that weight loss through lifestyle changes can be practically impossible given obesity is often linked to endocrine issues that have nothing to do with choice. He observed signals that the medical community is changing its views on obesity as a “lifestyle” choice – a welcome shift.
BMI, lifestyle and ethics
Social science research has long challenged a colonial and biomedical habit of imposing standards on women whose bodies do not conform to Western ideas of a healthy or ideal body.
Historically, the emphasis on weight as a criterion for reproductive health echoes harmful eugenicist beliefs. As US science historian Arleen Tuchman writes, the discovery of insulin prompted some groups to recommended banning marriages for people with diabetes to prevent the “unfit” from reproducing. New Zealand’s BMI criteria similarly suggest only those who fit specific physical standards deserve access to fertility care.
The high economic burden of obesity has led biomedical experts to recommended obese people should be considered for particular support, given the prohibitive cost of assisted reproductive technologies.
Nina exercises more than eight hours a week and Paratta leads an active lifestyle. For both women, behavioural advice – and the stigma and assumptions it underscores – is offensive.
Weight-loss advice can be particularly culturally offensive for Māori and Pacific peoples, who may be stigmatised in clinic settings for being too “fat” but considered “skinny” in their communities if they lose the required weight.
New Zealand’s assessment criteria for publicly funded fertility treatment have not been updated in 27 years. While infertility and health risks associated with obesity during pregnancy and at birth should not be ignored, research shows these risks can be managed effectively and with empathy through a transdisciplinary approach.
The Australian state of Victoria now offers two free cycles of fertility treatment to any Medicare-holding woman, regardless of BMI, up to the age of 42. The program deliberately reaches out to specific groups whose ethnicity, sexuality and environment limit their access. It has been highly successful and should inspire New Zealand to approach fertility funding with fresh perspectives.
The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Could this indicate a broader decline in health advancements in English-speaking countries? Our new study compared life expectancy between English-speaking countries and against other high-income countries.
We found Australians born between 1930 and 1969 continue to do exceptionally well for life expectancy. But the picture for those under 50 is not so rosy – life expectancy is stagnating for that younger group.
Why measure life expectancy?
Life expectancy is a valuable and widely used measure to examine health trends and patterns over time and compare different places or population groups.
It estimates the average number of years a person would be expected to live. This is calculated using the mortality – or death rates – across different age groups within a specific period. When death rates fall, life expectancy rises, and vice versa.
Not only does life expectancy tell us about mortality in a population, it is indirectly a measure of overall population health. Most leading causes of death in high-income countries are chronic diseases. These typically affect the health of a person for multiple years before their death.
Stagnations or reversals in life expectancy can be warning signs of both longstanding and emerging health problems.
Nobel Prize-winning economist Amartya Sen has also pointed to mortality as a key indicator of economic success and failure. This makes it a powerful tool for researchers and policymakers.
Thanks to a long and largely standardised tradition of collecting mortality statistics across high-income countries, researchers are able to carry out in-depth, comparative studies. This can help uncover how specific causes of death have contributed to the changes in life expectancy.
What we did
In our study, we analysed mortality trends and patterns in a broader group of English-speaking countries and compared them with other high-income countries. English-speaking countries have shown similarities in recent mortality trends and their causes, such as patterns of drug overdose and obesity prevalence.
Our analysis focuses on six high-income English-speaking countries: Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the UK and US. We compared them with the average in 14 other high-income, low-mortality countries from Western Europe (such as France and Norway), plus Japan. This was the “comparison group”.
For each English-speaking country and the comparison group, we estimated:
life expectancy at birth
partial life expectancy between ages 0 and 50 years
remaining life expectancy at age 50
average length of life.
Looking at average length of life helps to compare the mortality of the birth cohorts (people born in the same calendar year) as they age. This measure is the closest way to estimate how long people in different populations actually live, and can be used to assess the differences in survival between populations.
First we looked at how age and causes of death were contributing to a gap between English-speaking countries and the comparison group. Then we compared the average length of life of different birth cohorts.
What we found
In the pre-COVID period, both men and women in Australia had a higher life expectancy at birth, compared to the non-English speaking comparison group (the average between those 14 countries). This was also true for men in Ireland, New Zealand and Canada. In the UK and US, however, life expectancy at birth was lower for both men and women, compared to the non-English speaking group.
But the most striking finding was the difference in mortality for those under 50 in English-speaking versus non-English speaking countries.
Relatively high death rates for those under 50 dragged the overall life expectancy at birth down for each English-speaking country, including Australia. Suicides and drug or alcohol-related deaths were the main reason for these trends.
But over age 50, Australia performs exceptionally well in life expectancy for both men and women. Australians born in the 1930s-60s are likely to live longer than those in the non-English speaking comparison group and all other English-speaking countries. But Australians born in the 1970s onwards had lower life expectancy than the comparison group.
This means overall, life expectancy at birth in Australia is higher than the average for the non-English group. But when you break it down by age, the results show a clear distinction in life expectancy according to when you were born.
For example, in 2017-19 , male life expectancy between ages 0 and 50 years was 0.3 years lower in Australia compared to the average for the non-English group, while remaining life expectancy at age 50 was 1.45 years higher.
What this means
Our study shows a worrying trend for people born from the 1970s onwards. This is true in all English-speaking countries, even before accounting for the negative impacts of the COVID pandemic in places like the UK and US.
In Australia, the results point to significant generational differences in life expectancy compared to other high-income countries. If the relatively high mortality rates of Australians born from the 1970s onwards continue into the future, then the gains in Australian life expectancy will likely slow. Our status as having one of the highest life expectancies of any country will diminish.
Our research aimed to examine trends and potential causes of stagnating life expectancy, rather than make policy recommendations.
But the results suggest real improvement could come through measures that reduce inequality and structural disadvantages that lead to poor health outcomes, such as improving access to education and security of employment and housing, supporting mental health and drug-related safety, and addressing diseases like obesity and diabetes.
Sergey Timonin receives funding from the Australian Research Council (DP210100401).
Tim Adair receives funding from the Australian Research Council.