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Source: ForeignAffairs4

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Tyrell Haberkorn, Professor of Southeast Asian Studies, University of Wisconsin-Madison

Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra is currently feeling the sharp end of the country’s powerful judiciary.

On July 2, 2025, Thailand’s Constitutional Court suspended Paetongtarn from office as a result of a leaked phone conversation in which she was heard disparaging Thailand’s military and showing deference to former the prime minister of Cambodia, Hun Sen, despite an ongoing border dispute between the two countries. Initially set for 14 days, many onlookers believe the court’s suspension is likely to become permanent.

Meanwhile, far from the prime minister’s office is Arnon Nampa, another Thai national whose future is at the mercy of the Thai judiciary – in this case, the Criminal Court.

Arnon, a lawyer and internationally recognized human rights defender, is one of 32 political prisoners imprisoned over “lèse majesté,” or insulting the Thai monarchy. He is currently serving a sentence of nearly 30 years for a speech questioning the monarchy during pro-democracy protests in 2020. Unless he is both acquitted in his remaining cases and his current convictions are overturned on appeal, Arnon will likely spend the rest of his life in prison.

The plights of Paetongtarn and Arnon may seem distant. But as a historian of Thai politics, I see the cases as connected by a judiciary using the law and its power to diminish the prospects for democracy in Thailand and constrain the ability of its citizens to participate freely in society.

Familiar troubles

The Shinawatra family is no stranger to the reach of both the Thai military and the country’s courts.

Paetongtarn is the third of her family to be prime minister – and could become the third to be ousted. Her father, Thaksin Shinawatra, was removed in a 2006 military coup. Her aunt, Yingluck Shinawatra, was ousted prior to the May 22, 2014, coup. In common with past coups, the juntas who fomented them were shielded from the law, with none facing prosecution.

For now, it is unclear whether Paetongtarn’s suspension is the precursor to another coup, the dissolution of parliament and new elections, or a reshuffle of the cabinet. But what is clear is that the Constitutional Court’s intervention is one of several in which the nine appointed judges are playing a critical role in the future of Thai democracy.

Protecting the monarchy

The root of the judiciary’s power can be found in the way the modern Thai nation was set up nearly 100 years ago.

On June 24, 1932, Thailand transitioned from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy. Since then, the country has experienced 13 coups, as the country has shifted from democracy to dictatorship and back again.

But throughout, the monarchy has remained a constant presence – protected by Article 112 of the Criminal Code, which defines the crime and penalty of lese majesté: “Whoever defames, insults, or threatens the king, queen, heir-apparent or regent shall be subject to three-to-fifteen years imprisonment.”

The law is widely feared among dissidents in Thailand both because it is interpreted broadly to include any speech or action that is not laudatory and innocent verdicts are rare.

Although Article 112 has been law since 1957, it was rarely used until after the 2006 coup.

Since then, cases have risen steadily and reached record levels following a youth-led movement for democracy in 2020. At least 281 people have been, or are currently being, prosecuted for alleged violation of Article 112, according to Thai Lawyers for Human Rights.

Challenging the status quo

The 2020 youth-led movement for democracy was sparked by the Constitutional Court’s dissolution of the progressive Future Forward Party at the beginning of that year, the disappearance of a Thai dissident in exile in Cambodia, and economic problems caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

In protests in Bangkok and in provinces across the country, they called for a new election, a new constitution and an end to state repression of dissent.

On Aug. 3, 2020, Nampa added another demand: The monarchy must be openly discussed and questioned.

Without addressing such a key, unquestionable institution in the nation, Arnon argued, the struggle for democracy would inevitably fail.

This message resonated with many Thai citizens, and despite the fearsome Article 112, protests grew throughout the last months of 2020.

Students at Thammasat University, the center of student protest since the 1950s, expanded Arnon’s call into a 10-point set of demands for reform of the monarchy.

Making it clear that they did not aim to abolish the monarchy, the students’ proposal aimed to clarify the monarchy’s economic, political and military role and make it truly constitutional.

As the protests began to seem unstoppable, with tens of thousands joining, the police began cracking down on demonstrations. Many were arrested for violating anti-COVID-19 measures and other minor laws. By late November 2020, however, Article 112 charges began to be brought against Arnon and other protest leaders for their peaceful speech.

In September 2023, Arnon was convicted in his first case, and he has been behind bars since. He is joined by other political prisoners, whose numbers grow weekly as their cases move through the judicial process.

Capricious courts

Unlike Arnon, Paetongtarn Shinawatra is not facing prison.

But the Constitutional Court’s decision to suspend her from her position as prime minister because of a leaked recording of an indiscreet telephone conversation is, to many legal minds, a capricious response that has the effect of short-circuiting the democratic process.

So too, I believe, does bringing the weight of the law against Arnon and other political prisoners in Thailand who remain behind bars as the current political turmoil plays out.

Tyrell Haberkorn does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Thailand’s judiciary is flexing its muscles, but away from PM’s plight, dozens of activists are at the mercy of capricious courts – https://theconversation.com/thailands-judiciary-is-flexing-its-muscles-but-away-from-pms-plight-dozens-of-activists-are-at-the-mercy-of-capricious-courts-260408

Source: ForeignAffairs4

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Jorge Heine, Outgoing Interim Director of the Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future, Boston University

In 2020, as Latin American countries were contending with the triple challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic, a global economic shock and U.S. policy under the first Trump administration, Jorge Heine, research professor at Boston University and a former Chilean ambassador, in association with two colleagues, Carlos Fortin and Carlos Ominami, put forward the notion of “active nonalignment.”

Five years on, the foreign policy approach is more relevant than ever, with trends including the rise of the Global South and the fragmentation of the global order, encouraging countries around the world to reassess their relationships with both the United States and China.

It led Heine, along with Fortin and Ominami, to follow up on their original arguments in a new book, “The Non-Aligned World,” published in June 2025.

The Conversation spoke with Heine on what is behind the push toward active nonalignment, and where it may lead.

For those not familiar, what is active nonalignment?

Active nonalignment is a foreign policy approach in which countries put their own interests front and center and refuse to take sides in the great power rivalry between the U.S. and China.

It takes its cue from the Non-Aligned Movement of the 1950s and 1960s but updates it to the realities of the 21st century. Today’s rising Global South is very different from the “Third World” that made up the Non-Aligned Movement. Countries like India, Turkey, Brazil and Indonesia have greater economic heft and wherewithal. They thus have more options than in the past.

They can pick and choose policies in accordance with what is in their national interests. And because there is competition between Washington and Beijing to win over such countries’ hearts and minds, those looking to promote a nonaligned agenda have greater leverage.

Traditional international relations literature suggests that in relations between nations, you can either “balance,” meaning take a strong position against another power, or “bandwagon” – that is, go along with the wishes of that power. The notion was that weaker states couldn’t balance against the Great Powers because they don’t have the military power to do so, so they had to bandwagon.

What we are saying is that there is an intermediate approach: hedging. Countries can hedge their bets or equivocate by playing one power off the other. So, on some issues you side with the U.S., and others you side with China.

Thus, the grand strategy of active nonalignment is “playing the field,” or in other words, searching for opportunities among what is available in the international environment. This means being constantly on the lookout for potential advantages and available resources – in short, being active, rather than passive or reactive.

So active nonalignment is not so much a movement as it is a doctrine.

It’s been five years since you first came up with the idea of active nonalignment. Why did you think it was time to revisit it now?

The notion of active nonalignment came up during the first Trump administration and in the context of a Latin America hit by the triple-whammy of U.S. pressure, a pandemic and the ensuing recession – which in Latin America translated into the biggest economic downturn in 120 years, a 6.6% drop of regional gross domestic product in 2020.

ANA was intended as a guide for Latin American countries to navigate those difficult moments, and it led us to the publication of a symposium volume with contributions by six former Latin American foreign ministers in November 2021, in which we elaborated on the concept.

Three months later, with the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the reaction to it by many countries in Asia and Africa, nonalignment was back with a vengeance.

Countries like India, Pakistan, South Africa and Indonesia, among others, took positions that were at odds with the West on Ukraine. Many of them, though not all, condemned Russian aggression but also wanted no part in the West’s sanctions on Moscow. These sanctions were seen as unwarranted and as an expression of Western double standards – no sanctions were applied on the U.S. for invading Iraq, of course.

And then there were the Hamas attacks on Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, and the resulting war in the Gaza Strip. Countries across the Global South strongly condemned the Hamas attacks, but the West’s response to the subsequent deaths of tens of thousands of Palestinians brought home the notion of double standards when it came to international human rights.

Why weren’t Palestinians deserving of the same compassion as Ukrainians? For many in the Global South, that question hit very hard – the idea that “human rights are limited to Europeans and people who looked like them did not go down well.”

Thus, South Africa brought a case against Israel in the International Court of Justice alleging genocide, and Brazil spearheaded ceasefire efforts at the United Nations.

A third development is the expansion of the BRICS bloc of economies from its original five members – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – to 10 members. Although China and Russia are not members of the Global South, those other founding members are, and the BRICS group has promoted key issues on the Global South’s agenda. The addition of countries such as Egypt and Ethiopia has meant that BRICS has increasingly taken on the guise of the Global South forum. Brazil President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, a leading proponent of BRICS, is keen on advancing this Global South agenda.

All three of these developments have made active nonalignment more relevant than ever before.

How are China and the US responding to active nonalignment – or are they?

I’ll give you two examples: Angola and Argentina.

In Angola, the African country that has received most Chinese cooperation to the tune of US$45 billion, you now have the U.S. financing what is known as the Lobito Corridor – a railway line that stretches from the eastern border of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to Angola’s Atlantic coast.

Ten years ago, the notion that the U.S. would be financing railway projects in southern Africa would have been considered unfathomable. Yet it has happened. Why? Because China has built significant railway lines in countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia, and the U.S. realized that it was being left behind.

For the longest time, the U.S. would condemn such Chinese-financed infrastructure projects via the “Belt and Road Initiative” as nothing but “debt-trap diplomacy” designed to saddle developing nations with “white elephants” nobody needed. But a couple of years ago, that tune changed: The U.S. and Europe realized that there is a big infrastructure deficit in Asia, Africa and Latin America that China was stepping in to reduce – and the West was nowhere to be seen in this critical area.

In short, the West changed it approach – and countries like Angola are now able to play the U.S. off against China for its own national interests.

Then take Argentina. In 2023, Javier Milei was elected president on a strong anti-China platform. He said his government would have nothing to do with Beijing. But just two years later, Milei announced in an Economist interview that he is a great admirer of Beijing.

Why? Because Argentina has a very significant foreign debt, and Milei knew that a continued anti-China stance would mean a credit line from Beijing would likely not be renewed. The Argentinian president was under pressure from the International Monetary Fund and Washington to let the credit line with China lapse, but Milei refused to do so and managed to hold his own, playing both sides against the middle.

Milei is a populist conservative; Brazil’s Lula a leftist. So is active nonalignment immune to ideological differences?

Absolutely. When people ask me what the difference is between traditional nonalignment and active nonalignment, one of the most obvious things is that the latter is nonideological – it can be used by people of the right, left and center. It is a guide to action, a compass to navigate the waters of a highly troubled world, and can be used by governments of very different ideological hues.

The book talks a lot about the fragmentation of the rules-based order. Where do you see this heading?

There is little doubt that the liberal international order that framed world politics from 1945 to 2016 has come to an end. Some of its bedrock principles, like multilateralism, free trade and respect for international law and existing international treaties, have been severely undermined.

We are now in a transitional stage. The notion of the West as a geopolitical entity, as we knew it, has ceased to exist. We now have the extraordinary situation where illiberal forces in Hungary, Germany and Poland, among other places, are being supported by those in power in both Washington and Moscow.

And this decline of the West has not come about because of any economic issue – the U.S. still represents around 25% of global GDP, much as it did in 1970 – but because of the breakdown of the trans-Atlantic alliance.

So we are moving toward a very different type of world order – and one in which the Global South has the opportunity to have much more of a role, especially if it deploys active nonalignment.

How have events since Trump’s inauguration played into your argument?

The notion of active nonalignment was triggered by the first Trump administration’s pressure on Latin American countries. I would argue that the measures undertaken in Trump’s second administration – the tariffs imposed on 90 countries around the world; the U.S. leaving the Paris climate agreement, the World Health Organization and the U.N. Human Rights Council; and other “America First” policies – have only underscored the validity of active nonalignment as a foreign policy approach.

The pressures on countries across the Global South are very strong, and there is a temptation to give in to Trump and align with U.S. Yet, all indications are that simply giving in to Trump’s demands isn’t a recipe for success. Those countries that have gone down the route of giving in to Trump’s demands only see more demands after that. Countries need a different approach – and that can be found in active nonalignment.

Jorge Heine does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Nations are increasingly ‘playing the field’ when it comes to US and China – a new book explains explains why ‘active nonalignment’ is on the march – https://theconversation.com/nations-are-increasingly-playing-the-field-when-it-comes-to-us-and-china-a-new-book-explains-explains-why-active-nonalignment-is-on-the-march-260234

Source: ForeignAffairs4

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Helen Atherton, Professor of Primary Care Research, University of Southampton

Booking a GP appointment is a routine task, yet for many people it’s a source of frustration. Long waits, confusing systems and impersonal processes have become all too familiar. While much attention has been paid to how difficult it is to get an appointment, less research has asked a more fundamental question: what do patients actually want from their general practice?

To answer this, my colleagues and I reviewed 33 studies that were a mixture of study designs, and focused on patients’ expectations and preferences regarding access to their GP in England and Scotland.

What people wanted was not complicated or cutting edge. People were looking for connection; a friendly receptionist and good communication from the practice about how they could expect to make an appointment. And they wanted a general practice in their own neighbourhood with clean, calm waiting rooms. So far, so simple.

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People wanted booking systems that were simple and user-friendly, without long automated phone menus (“press one for reception”). Preferences varied. Some patients valued the option to book appointments in person at the reception desk, while others preferred the convenience of online booking.

Regardless of how they booked, patients wanted shorter waiting times or, at least, clear information about when they could expect an appointment or a callback.

Ideally, general practice would be open on Saturdays and Sundays for those who cannot attend during the week.

Remote consultations – by phone, video or email – have become more common since the pandemic, and many patients found them helpful. For those with caring responsibilities or mobility issues, they offered a convenient way to access care without needing to leave home.

However, remote appointments weren’t suitable for everyone. Some patients lacked privacy at work, while others – particularly those with hearing impairments – found telephone consultations difficult or impossible to use.

What patients consistently wanted was choice, particularly when it came to remote consultations. While in-person appointments were seen as the gold standard, many recognised that telephone or video consultations could be useful in certain situations. Preferences varied widely, which made the ability to choose the type of consultation especially important.

Patients also wanted choice over who they saw, especially for non-urgent issues or when managing ongoing health conditions.

In today’s general practice, care is often delivered by a range of professionals, including nurses, pharmacists and physiotherapists. While many patients were open to seeing different healthcare professionals, older adults and people from minority ethnic backgrounds were more likely to prefer seeing a GP.

Overall, patients wanted the option to choose a GP over another healthcare professional – or at least be involved in that decision.

Satisfaction at all-time low

Unsurprisingly, what patients want from general practice varies, reflecting different lifestyles, needs and circumstances. But what was equally clear is that many people are not able to get what they want from the appointment system.

According to a recent British Social Attitudes survey, patient satisfaction with general practice is at an all-time low, with just below one in three people reporting that they are very or quite satisfied with GP services.

Some elements of the UK government’s recently announced ten-year plan for the NHS in England may address some of these concerns, but it remains far from certain. The emphasis on the NHS app as a “doctor in your pocket” does not align with what many patients are asking for: genuine choice over whether they access care online or in person.

Read more:
NHS ten-year plan for England: what’s in it and what’s needed to make it work

The proposal to open neighbourhood health centres on weekends could benefit those who need more flexible access. However, simply increasing the number of appointments misses the point: patients want more than just availability. They want care that is accessible, personalised and responsive to their individual needs.

The evidence is clear and the solutions simple, yet patient satisfaction remains at an all-time low. The government must stop assuming technology is the answer and start listening to what patients are actually telling them. The cost of ignoring their voices is a healthcare system that serves no one well.

Helen Atherton receives funding from the National Institute for Health Research and the Research Council of Norway.

– ref. What people really want from their GP – it’s simpler than you might think – https://theconversation.com/what-people-really-want-from-their-gp-its-simpler-than-you-might-think-260520

Source: ForeignAffairs4

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of Birmingham

Recent news from Ukraine has generally been bad. Since the end of May, ever larger Russian air strikes have been documented against Ukrainian cities with devastating consequences for civilians, including in the country’s capital, Kyiv.

Amid small and costly but steady gains along the almost 1,000km long frontline, Russia reportedly took full control of the Ukrainian region of Luhansk, part of which it had already occupied before the beginning of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

And according to Dutch and German intelligence reports, some of Russia’s gains on the battlefield are enabled by the widespread use of chemical weapons.

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It was therefore something of a relief that Nato’s summit in The Hague produced a short joint declaration on June 25 in which Russia was clearly named as a “long-term threat … to Euro-Atlantic security”. Member states restated “their enduring sovereign commitments to provide support to Ukraine”. While the summit declaration made no mention of future Nato membership for Ukraine, the fact that US president Donald Trump agreed to these two statements was widely seen as a success.

Yet, within a week of the summit, Washington paused the delivery of critical weapons to Ukraine, including Patriot air defence missiles and long-range precision-strike rockets. The move was ostensibly in response to depleting US stockpiles.

This despite the Pentagon’s own analysis, which suggested that the shipment – authorised by the former US president Joe Biden last year – posed no risk to US ammunition supplies.

This was bad news for Ukraine. The halt in supplies weakens Kyiv’s ability to protect its large population centres and critical infrastructure against intensifying Russian airstrikes. It also puts limits on Ukraine’s ability to target Russian supply lines and logistics hubs behind the frontlines that have been enabling ground advances.

Despite protests from Ukraine and an offer from Germany to buy Patriot missiles from the US for Ukraine, Trump has been in no rush to reverse the decision by the Pentagon.

Another phone call with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, on July 3, failed to change Trump’s mind, even though he acknowledged his disappointment with the clear lack of willingness by the Kremlin to stop the fighting. What’s more, within hours of the call between the two presidents, Moscow launched the largest drone attack of the war against Kyiv.

A day later, Trump spoke with Zelensky. And while the call between them was apparently productive, neither side gave any indication that US weapons shipments to Ukraine would resume quickly.

Trump previously paused arms shipments and intelligence sharing with Ukraine in March, 2025 after his acrimonious encounter with Zelensky in the Oval Office. But the US president reversed course after certain concessions had been agreed – whether that was an agreement by Ukraine to an unconditional ceasefire or a deal on the country’s minerals.

It is not clear with the current disruption whether Trump is after yet more concessions from Ukraine. The timing is ominous, coming after what had appeared to be a productive Nato summit with a unified stance on Russia’s war of aggression. And it preceded Trump’s call with Putin.

This could be read as a signal that Trump was still keen to accommodate at least some of the Russian president’s demands in exchange for the necessary concessions from the Kremlin to agree, finally, the ceasefire that Trump had once envisaged he could achieve in 24 hours.

If this is indeed the case, the fact that Trump continues to misread the Russian position is deeply worrying. The Kremlin has clearly drawn its red lines on what it is after in any peace deal with Ukraine.

These demands – virtually unchanged since the beginning of the war – include a lifting of sanctions against Russia and no Nato membership for Ukraine, while also insisting that Kyiv must accept limits on its future military forces and recognise Russia’s annexation of Crimea and four regions on the Ukrainian mainland.

This will not change as a result of US concessions to Russia but only through pressure on Putin. And Trump has so far been unwilling to apply pressure in a concrete and meaningful way beyond the occasional hints to the press or on social media.

Coalition of the willing

It is equally clear that Russia’s maximalist demands are unacceptable to Ukraine and its European allies. With little doubt that the US can no longer be relied upon to back the European and Ukrainian position, Kyiv and Europe need to accelerate their own defence efforts.

A European coalition of the willing to do just that is slowly taking shape. It straddles the once more rigid boundaries of EU and Nato membership and non-membership, involving countries such as Moldova, Norway and the UK.
and including non-European allies including Canada, Japan and South Korea.

The European commission’s white paper on European defence is an obvious indication that the threat from Russia and the needs of Ukraine are being taken seriously and, crucially, acted upon. It mobilises some €800 billion (£690 billion) in defence spending and will enable deeper integration of the Ukrainian defence sector with that of the European Union.

At the national level, key European allies, in particular Germany, have also committed to increased defence spending and stepped up their forward deployment of forces closer to the borders with Russia.

US equivocation will not mean that Ukraine is now on the brink of losing the war against Russia. Nor will Europe discovering its spine on defence put Kyiv immediately in a position to defeat Moscow’s aggression.

After decades of relying on the US and neglecting their own defence capabilities, these recent European efforts are a first step in the right direction. They will not turn Europe into a military heavyweight overnight. But they will buy time to do so.

Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU’s Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK and a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London.

– ref. US backs Nato’s latest pledge of support for Ukraine, but in reality seems to have abandoned its European partners – https://theconversation.com/us-backs-natos-latest-pledge-of-support-for-ukraine-but-in-reality-seems-to-have-abandoned-its-european-partners-260334

Source: ForeignAffairs4

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Nathalie Seddon, Professor of Biodiversity, Smith School of Enterprise and Environment and Department of Biology, University of Oxford

Nature in the UK appeared to receive a rare funding boost in the June spending review, with the government setting a spending target of up to £2 billion a year for England’s environmental land management (ELM) scheme by 2028-29.

By steering public funds toward farmers who restore hedgerows, soils and wetlands, England’s ELM programme is meant to renew landscapes that absorb carbon, support pollinators and keep water clean while helping rural businesses stay viable in a changing climate.

If delivered in full, the package would elevate the UK’s post-Brexit model of investing public money in shared ecological care (rather than payments based on acreage) to one of the most generously funded in the world.

Yet, scrutinise the details and a more complicated story emerges.

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The review has trimmed the day-to-day budget of the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) in real terms. Defra now faces the unenviable task of signing and monitoring thousands of new ELM agreements with fewer staff and shrinking data resources. Without the capacity to check whether fields really have become richer in skylarks or streams clearer of fertiliser, large sums could be delayed or misdirected.

Scale is another challenge. An independent analysis published in 2024 estimated that roughly £6 billion every year across the UK is needed to bring agriculture in line with the Environment Act targets for habitat restoration and net zero commitments.

Even the full £2 billion promised for England would meet only about half of that evidence-based need. And the “up to” £400 million for trees and peatlands is not new money: it is funding that was first promised in 2024 and the payment schedule has still not been confirmed.

While the review earmarked £4.2 billion for flood and coastal defence, it does not specify how much of that will support nature-based measures such as floodplain restoration, or the creation of saltmarshes or riparian woodlands. The Environment Agency is consulting on a funding model that could embed such solutions, but the Treasury papers are silent on who will pay for that shift.

Tech spending dwarfs habitat investment

Contrast this with the sums heading to the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero.

Roughly £30 billion is earmarked for nuclear fission, fusion research and carbon-capture hubs. These projects are heavy on concrete and steel (materials with a hefty carbon cost) but have no immediate ecological benefit.

While new low-carbon technologies are crucial, thriving and resilient soils, wetlands and woodlands nourish food systems, safeguard water and hold vast stores of carbon – benefits that deepen and become more cost-effective over time.

Nature-based solutions can also revitalise local economies. The Office for National Statistics estimates that replacing the benefits flowing from the UK’s forests, rivers and soils – flood buffering, crop pollination, cleaner air, recreation and more – would cost about £1.8 trillion, a figure that only hints at their deeper, immeasurable value.

Yet the review sets out no plan to safeguard these life-support systems, or to factor their decline into the Treasury’s green book (the rule book used to appraise public investments) or the Bank of England’s stress tests, which check how shocks could ripple through the financial system.

This is also a matter of fairness and public health. Growing evidence shows that regular contact with nature lowers the risks of heart disease and anxiety, while improving children’s cognitive development. These are benefits with a value that defies any price tag.

Yet the places with the fewest trees and parks tend to be the same post-industrial towns ministers want to “level up”. The review is silent on biodiversity net gain (the flagship policy meant to channel private finance into local habitats) and on a proposed national nature wealth fund that could blend public and private capital for large-scale restoration.

Housing money could repeat past mistakes

One line in the spending review could still shift the balance.

The chancellor has earmarked £39 billion for building social and affordable housing over the next decade. If every development delivers at least a 10% net gain for biodiversity onsite, and if schemes build in climate-smart design (living roofs, shade-giving street trees, permeable surfaces) with local residents, Britain could pioneer the world’s first large-scale, nature-positive, net-zero housing programme.

Without those safeguards, “levelling up” risks repeating old mistakes: sealing green space under concrete today and paying tomorrow to retrofit drainage, shade and parks.

That risk is heightened by the government’s planning and infrastructure bill, now before parliament. In an open letter to MPs, economists and ecologists warn that the bill would let developers “pay cash to trash” irreplaceable habitats by swapping onsite protection for a levy, a move they describe as a “licence to kill nature”.

At the next UN climate summit, Cop30 in Brazil in November 2025, the UK will have to show the world that its domestic spending matches its international rhetoric.

More than 150 UK researchers made that point in an open letter to the prime minister, urging him to put nature at the centre of the UK’s Cop30 stance. Converting the Treasury’s headline figures into habitat gains and locking robust rules into both the planning bill and the housing drive would give ministers credible proof of progress when they update the UK’s climate and nature pledges on the Cop30 stage.

The spending review may have nudged farm policy in the right direction and set a new higher water mark for nature-positive agriculture. Yet amid the squeeze on Defra, the recycling rather than expansion of tree and peat budgets and the continued dominance of technology over habitat, nature still comes a distant second to hard infrastructure in the UK growth model.

There is still time to change course. Guaranteeing Defra’s capacity, publishing a timetable for the tree-and-peat fund, reserving part of the flood budget for community-led nature-based solutions and hardwiring strong biodiversity net gain rules into housing and planning reforms would turn headline promises into projects that enrich daily life while stewarding public money wisely.

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Nathalie Seddon receives funding from UKRI and the Leverhulme Trust and sits on the UK Climate Change Committee. She is also a trustee of the Circular Bioeconomy Alliance and is a non-executive director of the social venture, Nature-based Insights.

– ref. Nature-friendly farming budget swells in UK – but cuts elsewhere make recovery fraught – https://theconversation.com/nature-friendly-farming-budget-swells-in-uk-but-cuts-elsewhere-make-recovery-fraught-259091