Category: Academic Analysis

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Rebecca Strating, Director, La Trobe Asia, and Professor of International Relations, La Trobe University

Debating Australia’s role in world politics is not always high on the political agenda. Elections here are more often fought on economic issues than foreign or defence policy. And while the major parties have different views on foreign policy, there tends to be bipartisanship on the central tenets of our strategic policy, including Australia’s alliance with the United States.

In recent years, however, Australia has found itself wedged between two great powers: its security guarantor, the US, and its major trading partner, China. The increasing strategic competition between these two great powers, especially in Asia, has raised new questions about how Australia should manage these relationships and conceive of its role in the world.

For some countries, having a prominent role on the global stage may be more obvious than for others. Wealthy states with large militaries and populations, for example, often play the part of “great powers”. These countries tend to make claims about their unique rights and responsibilities, such as having a greater say in multilateral institutions (like the United Nations) and the “rules” intended to govern international conduct.

However, most of the world’s countries are not great powers. For a middle-sized nation like Australia, its role on the global stage is not necessarily static but determined by how our leaders balance national interests and values.

These, in turn, are shaped by “material factors”, such as geography, population and economy size, natural resources, shared political ideals (for example, our belief in democratic institutions), norms and culture.

In addition, a middle-sized country’s global role can change depending on how leaders perceive contemporary threats and challenges to their security.

Australia as a ‘middle power’

The National Defence Strategy released in 2024 describes Australia as an “influential middle power”. According to the strategy, this is demonstrated by several things:

• our enduring democratic values
• our history of safeguarding international rules and contributing to regional partnerships
• the strong foundations of our economy
• the strength of our partnerships in the Indo-Pacific.

Whether Australia should be described as a “middle power”, though, has long been the subject of political debate. Since H.V. “Doc” Evatt, then-attorney general and minister for external affairs, used the term in 1945, it has been most often (but not always) associated with the Labor Party.

Recent Coalition governments have been more reluctant to view Australia as “just” a middle power.

Alexander Downer, the foreign minister in the Howard government, would occasionally use the term “pivotal power”. Pivotal powers, as one political analyst put it, are “destined to shape the contours of geopolitics in key regions of the world” due to their strategic location, economic power and political influence.

Meanwhile, Julie Bishop, foreign minister in the Abbott and Turnbull administrations, preferred the term “top 20 country”, arguing this better reflected Australia’s standing and level of influence on the global stage.

At the core of this historical debate is the extent to which a country like Australia can – and does – have influence in the region and globally.

Middle powers have different characteristics from great or smaller powers. Size, geography and economic wealth affect the extent to which they can shape the world. As a result, middle powers often adopt certain types of actions or behaviours to enhance their influence.

This concept, known as “middle power diplomacy”, has often been associated with Australia.

There are a number of ways middle powers do this, such as by:

• supporting adherence to international law and rules (because these can help restrain more powerful states from imposing their will on others)

• encouraging cooperation through multilateralism (cooperation between multiple states)

• finding creative new solutions to global problems, such as climate change

• taking the diplomatic lead on specific, but important, issues.

A liberal-democratic middle power, such as Australia, may also seek to promote its values internationally, including the respect for human rights, free and open trade, and the principles of democratic governance and accountability.

Australia’s reliance on ‘great and powerful friends’

In addition, middle powers often choose to align themselves with a bigger power to boost their influence even further.

In Australia’s case, its strategic dependence on the United States developed, in part, by historical anxieties that faraway “great and powerful friends”, as former diplomat Allan Gyngell phrased it, might abandon it in a potentially hostile region.

Prior to the second world war, Australia relied on its former colonial ruler, Britain, for its security. The Fall of Singapore in 1942, in which Japanese forces routed British and Australian troops defending the island, demonstrated the risks of our overdependence on a distant ally.

In the aftermath of the war, Australia forged a new security alliance with a new global superpower, the United States, through the ANZUS Treaty. Yet, replacing one “great and powerful” but distant friend with another did not alleviate Australia’s abandonment anxieties.

Since then, debates about Australia’s international role have largely focused on the extent to which it can – and should be – self-reliant in the context of the US alliance, or if it should pursue a more independent foreign policy.

US domestic politics – particularly during President Donald Trump’s time in office – have also driven uncertainty about Washington’s reliability, as well as its commitment to Asia and the implications for allies like Australia.

Despite such concerns, Australia’s relationship with the US is as strong and deeply entwined as it has ever been. In fact, it only got stronger during Trump’s first term. While Canberra has sought to deepen engagement with regional states it views as “like-minded”, such as Japan, South Korea and India, it has done so firmly in the context of its broader alliance with the United States.

This, of course, is driven by the new anxieties over China’s rise as a major economic and military power in the region. In recent years, Beijing’s assertive and coercive behaviours in the region have made it the key national security threat facing Australia.

This is a break from the past, when Australian leaders – both Labor and Liberal – broadly agreed that a “pragmatic approach” to engaging great powers meant Canberra would not have to “choose sides” between China and the US.

In 2023, the Albanese government sought a détente of sorts with China, attempting to return to this pragmatic approach. But wariness of Beijing remains.

Opponents to this strategy have called the government’s efforts to re-engage with China a “threat to Australian sovereignty, principles, and values”.

An Indo-Pacific power?

In the context of these new challenges presented by a rising China, Australia has increasingly leaned into becoming an “Indo-Pacific” power in recent years. There are a number of ways in which this shift is observable.

First, Australia has been instrumental in encouraging the global adoption of this phrase, “Indo-Pacific”, as a new way of referring to the region. This is partly driven by the desire to maintain US leadership and presence in Australia’s neighbourhood. The US is a Pacific state, so this concept anchors the US in our region in a way that “Asia” does not.

And when people used the term “Asia-Pacific” to talk about the region in the past, this had a primarily economic connotation. This is due to the importance of the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and the move towards free-trade agreements between Australia and other countries in the region.

However, the US has become less economically engaged in the region in recent years, with a focus on rebuilding its own industrial base. India, the other major economy in Asia, has also been reluctant to sign up to multilateral, regional free-trade agreements. Neither are parties to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CP-TPP) or the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreements.

As such, the new term “Indo-Pacific” has become more of a security concept centred on the region’s waters. Generally, it is used to incorporate South, Southeast and Northeast Asia, Oceania (Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific Islands) and the United States. By connecting the Indian (“Indo”) and the Pacific Oceans, it has become primarily a maritime strategic concept.

The narratives usually associated with the Indo-Pacific also relate to the need to protect the international rules-based order, and freedom of navigation and overflight for ships and aircraft in the region. This, again, reflects the growing geopolitical anxieties about a rising China, particularly in the disputed South and East China seas and the Taiwan Strait.

Australia does not have territorial or maritime claims in either sea, but we are nonetheless concerned about China’s efforts to undermine the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and what this might mean for the “rules-based order” more generally.

The second way Australia is moving more towards becoming a regional power is in the narrowing of its core defence interests to an “inner ring” focused on the South Pacific and maritime Southeast Asia, and to a lesser extent, an “outer ring” in the broader Indo-Pacific and wider world. These geographical boundaries have consequences for how Australia views its international role.

After nearly two decades of military engagement in the Middle East and Afghanistan, Australia is shifting its focus back on its home region. This reflects not just the limits of our military capabilities, but also new concerns about the changing balance of power in Asia.

Third, Australia is increasingly focusing on a more strategic, narrower form of multilateralism. This, too, has been more centred on our region.

Multilateralism has always been seen as an important part of middle power identity. Australia, for instance, played a key role in setting up institutions like the United Nations.

However, this began to shift under recent Coalition governments. Prime Minister Scott Morrison expressed scepticism about such institutions, criticising them as an “often ill-defined borderless global community” that promoted “negative globalism”.

Under successive Coalition governments, Australia instead became a key player in two smaller groups of nations – the re-branded “Quad” in 2017 (along with Japan, the US and India) and AUKUS in 2021 (with the US and United Kingdom).

Under the Albanese government, global multilateralism was reinstated as an important pillar of foreign policy. But Australia’s investment and involvement in these smaller groups has only deepened.

Both AUKUS and the Quad demonstrate Australia’s changing role as a regional power in the Indo-Pacific. These groups offer Australia an opportunity to shape the regional security agenda by joining forces with other powerful states. They also provide a way of encouraging the US to maintain its presence and leadership in the region and to counterbalance China’s rise.

As part of this, Australia has become a key proponent of what the Biden administration coined “integrated deterrence”.

This is a central pillar of the US’ Indo-Pacific strategy that seeks to mobilise “like-minded” states – especially its regional allies such as Australia, Japan and South Korea – to form a regional coalition against rival states. This strategy reflects a growing awareness the US can’t provide security in Asia alone.

The AUKUS security agreement, including the commitment to develop new nuclear-powered submarines for Australia, is a part of this strategy.

Since the announcement of the submarine plan in 2021, both the procurement plan and the language that American and Australian leaders have been using suggest that Canberra is preparing to play a bigger security role in the region alongside the US.

Time for a new ‘strategic imagination’?

Has Australia’s shift to an Indo-Pacific regional power served it well?

It has allowed the deepening of defence relationships with partners like Japan and India. And through its roles in the Quad and AUKUS, Australia has a seat at the table and is more visible in regional security discussions.

But there are risks to a more assertive regional power stance. Australia could be viewed by its neighbours as too focused on military and not invested enough (or in the right way) in diplomacy or regional development. Australia’s overseas aid contribution, for example, has been declining for three decades.

It is also unclear which other regional states are likely to participate in a US-led coalition if a real conflict with China ever broke out. The Quad and AUKUS groups may be viewed by others as exclusionary or contributing to increasing tensions in the region.

How nuclear-powered submarines will “deter” potential adversaries is also yet to be clearly explained. These submarines could potentially entangle Australia in a regional conflict instead. Being able to clearly articulate and distinguish between Australian and US interests will remain vital for ensuring that future governments don’t “sleepwalk” into war.

Finally, Australia’s advocacy of the “rules-based order” has left it – and the US – exposed to criticisms of hypocrisy and double standards, particularly with Washington’s support for Israel’s war on Gaza.

In our recent book, Girt by Sea: Re-imagining Australian Security, Joanne Wallis and I argue that Australia needs to reconceptualise its role as a regional actor to

…one which can develop a coherent security strategy by working with old and new allies and partners to shape the regional order in ways that ensure its security.

The approach emphasises the need for all parts of our government to work in coordination to protect Australians from the range of complex conventional and unconventional challenges it faces (including climate change).

Australia’s security and its international role should not be viewed through the lens of the “China threat” alone. Doing so is counter-productive, as many states in the region do not share the same perception about China.

Instead, as Wallis and I wrote, Australia needs a “more comprehensive, nuanced and contingent understanding of the range of security opportunities and threats” we face.

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This is an edited extract from How Australian Democracy Works, a new collection of essays from The Conversation on all aspects of the country’s political landscape.

Rebecca Strating receives funding from Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

– ref. A middle power with ‘great and powerful friends’: Australia’s changing role in the region – https://theconversation.com/a-middle-power-with-great-and-powerful-friends-australias-changing-role-in-the-region-228897