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Category: Africa

  • MIL-OSI Europe: JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the further deterioration of the political situation in Georgia – RC-B10-0106/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Rasa Juknevičienė, Michael Gahler, Andrzej Halicki, Sebastião Bugalho, David McAllister, Željana Zovko, Isabel Wiseler‑Lima, Antonio López‑Istúriz White, Wouter Beke, Krzysztof Brejza, Daniel Caspary, Andrey Kovatchev, Miriam Lexmann, Reinhold Lopatka, Ana Miguel Pedro, Davor Ivo Stier, Michał Szczerba, Alice Teodorescu Måwe, Inese Vaidere, Michał Wawrykiewicz
    on behalf of the PPE Group
    Yannis Maniatis, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Tobias Cremer
    on behalf of the S&D Group
    Adam Bielan, Rihards Kols, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Mariusz Kamiński, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Veronika Vrecionová, Ondřej Krutílek, Michał Dworczyk, Roberts Zīle, Marlena Maląg, Ivaylo Valchev, Alexandr Vondra, Jadwiga Wiśniewska, Assita Kanko
    on behalf of the ECR Group
    Urmas Paet, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Helmut Brandstätter, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Engin Eroglu, Bernard Guetta, Karin Karlsbro, Michał Kobosko, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Nathalie Loiseau, Jan‑Christoph Oetjen, Marie‑Agnes Strack‑Zimmermann, Eugen Tomac, Hilde Vautmans, Sophie Wilmès, Dainius Žalimas
    on behalf of the Renew Group
    Reinier Van Lanschot
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

    European Parliament resolution on the further deterioration of the political situation in Georgia

    (2025/2522(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to its previous resolutions on Georgia, in particular that of 28 November 2024 on Georgia’s worsening democratic crisis following the recent parliamentary elections and alleged electoral fraud[1],

    – having regard to Georgia’s status as an EU candidate country, granted by the European Council at its summit of 14 and 15 December 2023,

    – having regard to Article 78 of the Georgian Constitution, which demands the implementation of all possible measures to guarantee Georgia’s complete integration into the EU and NATO,

    – having regard to the final report of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on the parliamentary elections held in Georgia on 26 October 2024,

    – having regard to Rules 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas the democratic backsliding in Georgia has dramatically accelerated since the parliamentary elections of 26 October 2024, which were deeply flawed and marked by grave irregularities, and failed to meet international democratic standards and Georgia’s OSCE commitments; whereas these elections violated the democratic norms and standards set for free and fair elections, failing to reflect the will of the people and rendering the resulting ‘parliament’, and subsequently the ‘president’, devoid of any democratic legitimacy; whereas from the very beginning of its activity, the current Georgian parliament has operated as a one-party (Georgian Dream) organ, which is incompatible with the essence of pluralistic parliamentary democracy;

    B. whereas Article 2 of the EU-Georgia Association Agreement[2] concerns the general principles of the agreement, which include democratic principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms;

    C. whereas Article 78 of the Georgian Constitution states that the constitutional bodies must take all measures within the scope of their competences to ensure the full integration of Georgia into the European Union;

    D. whereas the President of Georgia, Salome Zourabichvili, publicly condemned the parliamentary elections as rigged, declared that she would not recognise them and called for an international investigation; whereas the current Georgian regime, led by the Georgian Dream party and its founder, Bidzina Ivanishvili, has orchestrated an unconstitutional usurpation of power, systematically dismantling democratic institutions, undermining judicial independence and eroding fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, thereby deepening Georgia’s political and constitutional crisis;

    E. whereas Georgia has officially held the status of EU candidate country since December 2023; whereas on 28 November 2024, Irakli Kobakhidze announced that Georgia would delay initiating accession talks with the EU and reject its financial assistance until the end of 2028, disregarding the country’s constitutional commitment to European integration and effectively undermining Georgia’s sovereign Euro-Atlantic aspirations;

    F. whereas on 28 November 2024, peaceful mass anti-government protests began across the country, demanding new, free and fair elections, an end to political violence and repression, and the return of the country to its European path; whereas the protests have been taking place without interruption for over 75 days;

    G. whereas on 14 December 2024, the de facto parliament held a ‘presidential election’ with a single candidate from the Georgian Dream party, former footballer Mikheil Kavelashvili, elected with 224 out of 225 votes cast;

    H. whereas Georgia’s self-appointed authorities have plunged the country into a fully fledged constitutional and political crisis, as well as a human rights and democracy crisis; whereas this has been marked by the brutal repression of peaceful protesters, political opponents and media representatives, with judges, prosecutors and police officers actively fabricating politically motivated administrative and criminal charges against protesters, journalists and opposition figures detained during peaceful anti-government demonstrations; whereas, as of December 2024, more than 460 people have been arrested or punished since the protests began, with this number growing by the day;

    I. whereas riot police deliberately lacking force identification numbers have forcefully dispersed protesters with tear gas and water cannons; whereas numerous journalists have reported being targeted and beaten, and having their equipment destroyed and personal items stolen; whereas dozens of protesters have been brutally assaulted, and several hundred people have been arrested; whereas Georgia’s Public Defender has revealed that 80 % of those detained reported experiencing violence and inhumane treatment at the hands of law enforcement officers; whereas despite international condemnation, the illegitimate Georgian Government has awarded medals to officials involved in the crackdown;

    J. whereas independent media outlets, including TV Formula, TV Mtavari and TV Pirveli, face severe operational and financial constraints due to the regime’s interference, while dozens of media representatives are being subjected to various forms of intense physical and psychological pressure; whereas numerous violent attacks on journalists have been documented, including the severe beatings of Aleksandre Keshelashvili, Maka Chikhladze and Giorgi Shetsiruli, and the harassment of detained journalist Saba Kevkhishvili; whereas on 12 January 2025, the Georgian authorities arrested journalist Mzia Amaghlobeli, who has been in pre-trial detention since then and is on hunger strike in solidarity with all political prisoners in Georgia; whereas she faces between four and seven years in prison;

    K. whereas, on the night of 14 January 2025, Giorgi Gakharia, opposition leader of the For Georgia party and former Prime Minister, and Zviad Koridze, journalist and Transparency International activist, were physically assaulted by Georgian Dream officials in separate incidents at the same venue in Batumi;

    L. whereas on 2 February 2025, Nika Melia, a leader of the pro-European Akhali party, and Gigi Ugulava, the former mayor of Tbilisi, were arrested during the anti-government protests and subjected to physical violence in detention; whereas on 12 January 2025, Elene Khoshtaria, leader of the Droa political movement, was detained in Batumi;

    M. whereas the de facto Georgian authorities have used disproportionate force and excessive violence against peaceful protesters and resorted to arbitrary mass arrests to thwart dissent; whereas independent human rights organisations have reported the systemic mistreatment of detainees, including torture; whereas to date, not a single law enforcement official involved in the brutal crackdowns, arbitrary arrests and mistreatment has been brought to justice;

    N. whereas the self-appointed authorities introduced new draconian legislation that came into force on 30 December 2024 and amended the Criminal Code, the Code of Administrative Offences and the Law on Assemblies and Manifestations, imposing further arbitrary restrictions on the rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, introducing, among other things, hefty fines for putting up protest slogans and posters, and granting police the power to detain individuals ‘preventively’ for 48 hours on suspicion of planning to violate the rules governing public assembly; whereas on 3 February 2025, the Georgian Dream party unveiled further draft legislation designed to tighten control, ramping up penalties for a variety of offences directly targeting protestors, critics and political dissent, such as harsher punishments for ‘insulting officials’, the criminalisation of road blocks and an increase in the duration of administrative detention from 15 to 60 days;

    O. whereas on 27 January 2025, the Council decided to suspend parts of the EU-Georgia visa facilitation agreement for Georgian diplomats and officials, but failed to impose individual sanctions in response to the continued crackdown; whereas the Hungarian and Slovak Governments have been consistently blocking impactful EU-wide sanctions, preventing the remaining 25 Member States (EU-25) from effectively introducing sanctions against the self-appointed Georgian authorities;

    P. whereas several Member States, including Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia and Czechia, have imposed bilateral sanctions on some Georgian politicians, judges and other officials responsible for the brutal crackdown on protesters, violations of human rights and abuse of the rule of law; whereas in December 2024, the United States sanctioned Bidzina Ivanishvili, alongside Georgia’s ‘Minister of Internal Affairs’ Vakhtang Gomelauri and Deputy Head of the Special Tasks Department Mirza Kezevadze, for their involvement in brutal crackdowns on media representatives, opposition figures and protesters; whereas the UK and Ukraine have imposed similar sanctions on high-level Georgian officials; whereas Ivanishvili, through hastily adopted laws tailored to his personal situation, is moving his offshore assets to Georgia in anticipation of further sanctions;

    Q. whereas on 29 January 2025, Georgian Dream announced that it would withdraw its delegation from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) after it demanded new, genuinely democratic parliamentary elections, the release of political prisoners and accountability for perpetrators of violence; whereas UN experts have condemned the pattern of repression and human rights violations in Georgia, while the OSCE has called this suppression a serious breach of the right to freedom of assembly;

    R. whereas the ruling Georgian Dream party convened the new parliament in violation of the country’s constitution, resulting in a boycott of parliament by the opposition; whereas on 5 February 2025, the self-appointed ‘parliament’ voted to approve the early termination of the mandates of 49 out of 61 members of parliament, representing the Coalition for Change, Strong Georgia and the United National Movement, in order to strip them of their immunity and facilitate their arrest and prosecution; whereas the same ‘parliament’ established a commission to punish former ruling party United National Movement;

    S. whereas a growing number of civil servants have been dismissed after speaking out against the halting of Georgia’s EU accession process; whereas Georgian Dream has amended laws on public service, simplifying procedures to dismiss public servants, several of whom have been dismissed for participating in protests, in a clear attempt to silence critical voices;

    1. Condemns the Georgian Dream ‘authorities’ and urges them to immediately cease the violent repression of peaceful protesters, political opponents and media representatives; underlines that Georgia’s self-appointed authorities are currently violating fundamental freedoms, basic human rights and the core international obligations of the country, thereby undermining decades of democratic reforms driven by the country’s political class and civil society; considers Georgia as a state captured by the illegitimate Georgian Dream regime; expresses deep regret over the fact that the ruling Georgian Dream party has abandoned its path towards European integration and NATO membership; recalls that the ongoing democratic backsliding and adoption of anti-democratic laws has effectively suspended Georgia’s EU integration process; reiterates its unwavering support for the Georgian people’s legitimate European aspirations and their wish to live in a prosperous and democratic country;

    2. Does not recognise the self-proclaimed authorities of the Georgian Dream party established following the rigged election of 26 October 2024, which was neither free nor fair, was held in violation of democratic norms and standards, and did not reflect the will of the people of Georgia; underlines that the extensive electoral fraud has undermined the integrity of the election process, cast doubt on the legitimacy of the result and eroded public trust, both domestically and internationally, in any new government;

    3. Calls for the EU and its Member States, as well as national parliaments and interparliamentary institutions, not to recognise the legitimacy of the Georgian Dream one-party parliament and their appointed president; calls, therefore, on the international community to join the boycott of the self-proclaimed Georgian authorities;

    4. Continues to recognise Salome Zourabichvili as the legitimate President of Georgia and representative of the Georgian people; praises her efforts to peacefully steer the country back towards a democratic and European path of development; calls on the President of the European Council to invite President Zourabichvili to represent Georgia at an upcoming European Council meeting and at the next European Political Community summit;

    5. Underlines that the settlement of the current political and constitutional crisis in Georgia can only be achieved by way of new parliamentary elections; demands that new elections take place in Georgia within the next few months in an improved electoral environment, overseen by an independent and impartial election administration and monitored through diligent international observation to guarantee a genuinely fair, free and transparent process; encourages the Member States and EU officials to firmly demand new elections and to make any future engagement explicitly conditional on setting a new date for parliamentary elections and establishing a mechanism to ensure they are free and fair;

    6. Calls on the Council and the Member States, particularly the EU-25 on a bilateral and coordinated basis, to impose immediate and targeted personal sanctions on Bidzina Ivanishvili, his family and his companies, and to freeze all his assets within the EU for his role in the deterioration of the political process in Georgia, enabling democratic backsliding and acting against the country’s constitutionally declared interests of Euro-Atlantic integration; calls on the French Government to strip Bidzina Ivanishvili of the Legion of Honour and impose individual sanctions on him; welcomes, in this regard, the sanctions imposed bilaterally by Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Czechia, as well as those already imposed by the US and the UK;

    7. Calls for the EU and its Member States, in particular the EU-25 on a bilateral and coordinated basis, to impose personal sanctions on the officials and political leaders in Georgia responsible for democratic backsliding, electoral fraud, human rights violations and the persecution of political opponents and activists, including Irakli Kobakhidze, Shalva Papuashvili, Vakhtang Gomelauri, Mayor of Tbilisi and Secretary General of the ruling Georgian Dream party Kakha Kaladze, and Chair of the Georgian Dream party Irakli Garibashvili; calls for them to extend these sanctions to judges, including those of the Constitutional Court of Georgia who are passing politically motivated sentences, and representatives of the law enforcement services, as well as to financial enablers tacitly or openly supporting the regime and the owners of regime-aligned media outlets, including TV Imedi, Pos TV and Rustavi 2 TV, for their role in spreading disinformation and seeking to manipulate public discourse in order to sustain the current ruling party’s authoritarian rule;

    8. Calls on the Council and the Member States to impose sanctions on Bidzina Ivanishvili’s network of enablers, elite entourage, corrupt financial operatives, propagandists and those facilitating the repressive state apparatus, including, among others, Ekaterine Khvedelidze, Uta Ivanishvili, Tsotne Ivanishvili, Bera Ivanishvili, Gvantsa Ivanishvili, Alexander Ivanishvili, Shmagi Kobakhidze, Ucha Mamatsashvili, Natia Turnava, Ivane Chkhartishvili, Sulkhan Papashvili, Giorgi Kapanadze, Tornike Rizhvadze, Ilia Tsulaia, Kakha Bekauri, Lasha Natsvlishvili, Vasil Maglaperidze, Grigol Liluashvili, Mikheil Chinchaladze, Levan Murusidze, Irakli Rukhadze, Tinatin Berdzenishvili, Tamaz Gaiashvili, Anton Obolashvili and Gocha Enukidze;

    9. Maintains the view that the measures taken so far by the EU in response to the flagrant democratic backsliding and reneging on previous commitments does not yet fully reflect the severity of the situation in Georgia and the latest developments; welcomes the Council’s decision to suspend visa-free travel for Georgian diplomats and officials, but considers it as only a first step, which must be followed by tougher measures; deplores the obstruction by the Hungarian and Slovak Governments of the Council decisions on introducing sanctions against individuals responsible for democratic backsliding in Georgia;

    10. Emphasises that respect for fundamental rights is vital to the EU’s visa liberalisation benchmarks; reiterates its call on the Commission and the Council to review Georgia’s visa-free status, with the possibility of suspension if it is considered that EU standards on democratic governance and freedoms are not being upheld;

    11. Strongly condemns the brutal violence and repression used by Georgia’s ruling regime against peaceful protesters since 28 November 2024; calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners and those detained during the anti-government protests; demands the release of journalist Mzia Amaghlobeli, who has been on hunger strike for over four weeks now because of her unjust detention and risks facing critical, irreversible and life-threatening consequences; denounces the assault and beating of former Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia, resulting in his hospitalisation, followed by the arrest on 2 February 2025 of political leaders including Nika Melia and Gigi Ugulava, as a shocking escalation of state-orchestrated violence by Georgian Dream and its allies against peaceful demonstrators and political opponents; reminds of the detention of Elene Khoshtaria on 12 January 2025 in Batumi; 

    12. Reiterates its solidarity with the people of Georgia and its vibrant civil society in fighting for their legitimate democratic rights and for a European future for their country; urges the Georgian Government to reverse its current political course and return to implementing the will of the Georgian people for continued democratic reforms that would reopen the prospect of future EU membership;

    13. Strongly condemns the enactment of draconian legislation that imposes unjustified restrictions on freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly, and demands the annulment of such recently adopted repressive legislation; urges the Georgian authorities to immediately and unconditionally release all individuals detained for peacefully exercising their fundamental rights to freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly, and to ensure prompt, thorough and impartial investigations into all allegations of unlawful and disproportionate use of force by the law enforcement agencies; considers that the Georgian justice system has been weaponised to stifle dissent, instil fear and silence free speech;

    14. Calls for the ‘Georgian authorities’ to take immediate action to ensure the safety and freedom of journalists and to investigate all instances of violence and misconduct by law enforcement agencies; emphasises the importance of fostering a democratic environment where media, civil society and the opposition can operate freely without fear of retaliation or censorship;

    15. Demands an independent, transparent and impartial investigation into police brutality and the excessive use of force against peaceful demonstrators; calls for those responsible for human rights violations, including law enforcement and government officials ordering acts of repression, to be held fully accountable before the law;

    16. Denounces the launch of an investigation by the Prosecutor’s Office on 8 February 2025 into non-governmental organisations accused of aggravated sabotage, attempted sabotage and assisting foreign and foreign-controlled organisations in hostile activities aimed at undermining the state interests of Georgia, for which they could receive multiple-year sentences; views this action as further escalation of repression by the regime, misuse of the judicial system and accelerated democratic backsliding;

    17. Condemns the broader campaign of attacks by the Georgian authorities vilifying civil society organisations and reputable international donors that support democracy, the rule of law and the protection of human rights in Georgia;

    18. Denounces the termination by Georgian Dream of the mandates of 49 opposition members of parliament as a sign of further democratic backsliding, and considers this the latest move in Georgian Dream’s attack on political pluralism in the country;

    19. Welcomes PACE’s decision to challenge the credentials of Georgia’s parliamentary delegation due to democratic backsliding and human rights abuses; supports PACE’s call for Georgia to immediately initiate an inclusive process involving all political and social actors, including the ruling party, the opposition and civil society, to urgently address the deficiencies and shortcomings noted during the recent parliamentary elections and to create an electoral environment conducive to new, genuinely democratic elections to be announced in the coming months;

    20. Notes that Georgia, once a front runner for Euro-Atlantic integration, is undergoing an accelerated process of democratic backsliding, in a seemingly deliberate attempt to demonstrate that the will of the Georgian people no longer determines the country’s future, which could result in the country taking the Belarussian path of political development, transitioning from the current authoritarian state to a dictatorial regime;

    21. Deplores the decision of Irakli Kobakhidze to suspend accession talks and reject EU funding until the end of 2028; recalls that all polls consistently show the overwhelming support of the Georgian population for a Euro-Atlantic future; expresses strong support for the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the Georgian people;

    22. Calls for an immediate and comprehensive audit of EU policy towards Georgia due to the democratic backsliding; calls on the Commission to review the EU-Georgia Association Agreement in the light of the self-declared Georgian authorities’ breach of the general principles, as laid down in Article 2, namely respect for democratic principles, the rule of law and fundamental freedoms; points out that non-fulfilment of obligations may result in the conditional suspension of economic cooperation and privileges afforded by the Agreement;

    23. Welcomes the Commission’s decision to cease all budgetary support to the Georgian authorities and to suspend the initiation of any future investment projects; encourages the Commission to terminate all financial support for ongoing projects; calls for a moratorium on all investment projects in the field of connectivity; calls on the Commission to start identifying economic sectors of relevance to the oligarchic interests that support and sustain the current authoritarian rule, with a view to a potential future decision about restrictive measures or economic sanctions; calls on the Commission to start identifying connectivity projects that support and sustain the current authoritarian rule and to consider their suspension until a rerun of the parliamentary elections;

    24. Condemns the climate of intimidation and polarisation fuelled by statements by Georgian Government representatives and political leaders, as well as by attacks against political pluralism, including through disturbing cases of intimidation and violence against the Georgian democratic political forces and repeated threats to ban opposition parties, to arrest their leaders and even ordinary supporters, and to silence dissent; underlines that anything but the full restoration of Georgia’s democratic standards will entail a further deterioration of EU-Georgia relations, make any move towards EU accession impossible and result in additional sanctions;

    25. Calls on the Commission to swiftly redirect the frozen EUR 120 million originally intended as support for the Georgian authorities to enhance the EU’s support for Georgia’s civil society, in particular the non-governmental sector and independent media, which are increasingly coming under undue pressure from the ruling political party and the authorities, as well as to support programmes supporting democratic resilience and electoral integrity; calls for the EU’s funding mechanisms to be adjusted to take into account the needs that arise in a more hostile and anti-democratic environment; highlights the urgency of the need to support civil society in the light of growing repression and the suspension of activities of the US Agency for International Development (USAID), and therefore urges the Commission to ramp up support without delay;

    26. Expresses deep concern about the increasing Russian influence in the country and about the Georgian Dream government’s actions in pursuing a policy of rapprochement and collaboration with Russia, in spite of its creeping occupation of Georgian territory; deplores, in this regard, the growing anti-Western and hostile rhetoric of the Georgian Dream party’s representatives towards Georgia’s strategic Western partners, including the EU, and its MEPs and officials, and Georgian Dream’s promotion of Russian disinformation and manipulation;

    27. Strongly reiterates its urgent demand for the immediate release of former President Mikheil Saakashvili on humanitarian grounds, specifically for the purpose of seeking medical treatment abroad; emphasises that the self-appointed authorities bear full and undeniable responsibility for the life, health, safety and well-being of former President Mikheil Saakashvili and must be held fully accountable for any harm that befalls him;

    28. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the self-appointed authorities of Georgia.

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: CSIR-NIScPR hosts One-Day Workshop on International Day of Women and Girls in Science: Empowering Girls in STEM

    Source: Government of India (2)

    Posted On: 12 FEB 2025 6:01PM by PIB Delhi

    The Council of Scientific & Industrial Research – National Institute of Science Communication and Policy Research (CSIR-NIScPR) successfully organized a one-day workshop on the first decadal anniversary of the International Day of Women and Girls in Science. Themed “Empowering Girls for Participation in STEM: Fostering Awareness for Inclusive Education,” the event aimed to inspire and encourage young girls to pursue careers in Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM). Aligning with UNESCO’s theme, “Unpacking STEM Careers: Her Voice in Science,” the workshop was held at the CSIR-NIScPR, New Delhi. The workshop brought together 56 undergraduate female students from four renowned women’s colleges of the University of Delhi, Gargi College, Kalindi College, Lady Irwin College, Deshbandhu College and Miranda House, alongside esteemed academicians, researchers, and policymakers. It provided a valuable platform for mentorship, resources, and critical insights into government initiatives, scholarships, and funding opportunities available for women in STEM.

    In the welcome address Prof. Ranjana Aggarwal, Director, CSIR-NIScPR emphasized the importance of gender equality in STEM and the need to create an enabling environment for women to excel in scientific careers. She reflected on the challenges faced by women in transitioning from academia to professional roles, underscoring the significance of gender sensitization and breaking stereotypes. Dr. GeethaVaniRayasam, Head, CSIR-Human Resource Development Group, delivered an insightful talk on CSIR’s various initiatives to support women in science. The session was further enriched by esteemed speakers discussing challenges and opportunities in STEM for young women. The keynote address was delivered by Prof. Mini Thomas, Dean, Faculty of Engineering & Technology, Jamia Millia Islamia, and Former Director, NIT Trichy, who served as the Chief Guest. She encouraged young women to break barriers in traditionally male-dominated STEM fields and urged institutions to create more opportunities for women scientists.

    The second session featured Dr. Monika Kulshrestha, Chief Scientist, CSIR-National Physical Laboratory, who emphasized the importance of maintaining good health while striving for lifelong learning and professional growth. This was followed by an expert lecture by Dr. AmbikaBehl, Senior Principal Scientist, CSIR-Central Road Research Institute, titled “Highway Engineering Field: A Man’s World” She shared her journey from laboratory research to fieldwork, addressing gender biases and societal expectations. She emphasized the need for women to step out of their comfort zones, recognize their strengths, and navigate professional challenges with confidence. Dr. Kanika Malik, Senior Principal Scientist, CSIR-NIScPR and Delhi branch convenor of the Indian Women Scientists’ Association (IWSA), delivered an IWSA related talk. The interactive segment of the workshop included a group discussion based on pre-filled questionnaires, allowing students to express their aspirations and challenges in STEM education. Mrs. SandhyaWakdikar, Senior Principal Scientist, CSIR-NIScPR, delivered a talk on “Opportunities for Undergraduate Girls in STEM” and provided valuable information on government schemes, funding opportunities, and resources available to support women in STEM careers.

    The workshop concluded with a vote of thanks by Mrs. SandhyaWakdikar, followed by the National Anthem. CSIR-NIScPR reaffirmed its commitment to bridging the gender gap in STEM and fostering an inclusive scientific community for future generations. This initiative marks a significant step towards empowering young women in STEM, ensuring that they receive the necessary support and resources to thrive in scientific careers.

    ***

    NKR/PSM

    (Release ID: 2102402) Visitor Counter : 29

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Why federal courts are unlikely to save democracy from Trump’s and Musk’s attacks

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Maya Sen, Professor of Public Policy, Harvard Kennedy School

    Many people may look to federal courts as a bulwark of the U.S. Constitution. Jose Luis Pelaez/Stone via Getty Images

    State governments, community groups, advocacy nonprofits and regular Americans have filed a large and growing number of federal lawsuits opposing President Donald Trump’s barrage of executive orders and policy statements. Some of his actions have been put on hold by the federal courts, at least temporarily.

    As a scholar of the federal courts, however, I expect the courts will be of limited help in navigating through this complicated new political landscape.

    One problem is that the U.S. Supreme Court in recent years has moved sharply to the right and has approved of past efforts to expand the powers of the presidency. But the problem with relying on the courts for help goes beyond ideology and right-leaning justices going along with a right-leaning president, as happened in Trump’s first term.

    One challenge is speed: The Trump administration is moving much faster than courts do, or even can. The other is authority: The courts’ ability to compel government action is limited, and also slow.

    And that doesn’t even factor in statements by Trump, Vice President JD Vance and “special government employee” multibillionaire Elon Musk. All three have indicated that they are open to ignoring court rulings and have even threatened to seek the impeachment of judges who rule in ways they don’t like.

    President Donald Trump and multibillionaire Elon Musk are working together to restructure the U.S. government.
    Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images

    Speed

    Musk has been put in charge of White House efforts to cut government services, both in spending amount and reach.

    Constitutional law is clear: The executive branch cannot, on its own, close or shut down a federal agency that has been established by Congress. That is Congress’ job. But Trump and Musk are trying to do so anyway, including declaring that the congressionally established U.S. Agency for International Development will be shut down and turning employees away from the agency’s offices in Washington, D.C.

    The administration’s strategy, it seems, is the longstanding tech-company mantra: “move fast and break things.” The U.S. courts do not – and by design cannot – move equally quickly.

    It can take years for a case to wind its way through the lower courts to reach the U.S. Supreme Court. This is by design.

    Courts are deliberative in nature. They take into account multiple factors and can engage in multiple rounds of deliberation and fact-finding before reaching a final ruling. At every stage, lawyers on both sides are given time to make their cases. Even when a case does get to the Supreme Court – as many of these lawsuits likely will – it can take months to be fully resolved.

    By contrast, Trump’s and Musk’s actions are happening in a matter of days. By the time a court finally resolves an issue that happened in late January or early February 2025, the situation may have changed substantially.

    Volunteers hand out USAID flour at the Zanzalima Camp in Ethiopia in 2021.
    J. Countess/Getty Images

    For an example, consider the effort to shut down the U.S. Agency for International Development. In the space of a week, the Trump administration put most of USAID’s workers on administrative leave and halted USAID’s overseas medical trials, which included pausing potentially lifesaving treatments.

    As of this writing, a district judge has temporarily blocked the order putting USAID workers on leave. But even if the courts ultimately conclude several months from now that the Trump administration’s actions regarding USAID were unlawful, it might be impossible to reconstitute the agency the way it used to be.

    For instance, many workers may have been demoralized and sought other employment. New personnel would have to be recruited and trained to replace them. Contracts that were terminated or invalidated or expired would have to be renegotiated. And the countries and communities that had received help from USAID might be less committed to the renewed programs, because of concerns services could be cut off again.

    Breadth

    When Republicans disagreed with any of Joe Biden’s executive actions – for example, his student debt forgiveness plan – they went to federal court to obtain nationwide injunctions stopping the implementation of the plan.

    But injunctions will not be as helpful given Trump’s recent playbook. A court blocking one order isn’t enough to stop the administration from trying different tactics. In 2017, courts blocked the first two versions of Trump’s ban on travel to the U.S. from majority-Muslim countries – but ultimately allowed a third version to take effect. And if an attack on one agency is blocked, the administration can try similar – or different – tactics against other agencies.

    The strategy of moving fast and breaking things is successful if the other side – or even the process of repair – can’t keep up with all the different strategies. Courts can be part of the strategy to preserve the Constitution, but they cannot be its only defenders.

    Authority

    John Marshall served as the nation’s fourth chief justice, from 1801 to 1835.
    Painted by Henry Inman, via Wikimedia Commons

    Researchers have argued that court-issued injunctions mostly work to stop the government from doing something, not to compel the government into doing something. Judges are already expressing concern that the Trump administration may fail to comply with orders to stop funding freezes.

    For instance, a federal district judge in Massachusetts has ordered the government not only to refrain from implementing changes to federal research grant funding but to provide evidence to the court that it was complying with the court’s order, immediately and every two weeks until the case is decided.

    Another federal judge has already found the administration failed to abide by a court order – but so far has not imposed any consequences on Trump, the administration or other officials.

    It’s unclear whether Trump would obey Supreme Court rulings against him, either. On the campaign trail, Trump’s running mate JD Vance said, “When the courts stop you, stand before the country like Andrew Jackson did and say, ‘The chief justice has made his ruling, now let him enforce it.’” He also recently remarked that “Judges aren’t allowed to control the executive’s legitimate power,” hinting at strong opposition to rulings the administration disagrees with.

    All this doesn’t mean the courts are useless, nor that people shouldn’t sue to challenge actions they deem illegal or unconstitutional. The courts – and the Supreme Court in particular – exist in part to arbitrate power disputes between Congress and the presidency. As Chief Justice John Marshall said in his landmark 1803 Marbury v. Madison ruling, “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”

    But the courts alone will not be sufficient. The courts are like an antibiotic on a cut, helping healing and staving off further infection. They cannot keep a grievously wounded patient alive. For this, a robust political strategy is necessary. It is in all Americans’ hands collectively to make sure that the constitutional structure is not just enforced, but also sustained.

    Maya Sen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Why federal courts are unlikely to save democracy from Trump’s and Musk’s attacks – https://theconversation.com/why-federal-courts-are-unlikely-to-save-democracy-from-trumps-and-musks-attacks-249533

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on repression by the Ortega-Murillo regime in Nicaragua, targeting human rights defenders, political opponents and religious communities in particular – RC-B10-0126/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    pursuant to Rules 150(5) and 136(4) of the Rules of Procedure
    replacing the following motions:
    B10‑0126/2025 (PPE)
    B10‑0128/2025 (Verts/ALE)
    B10‑0131/2025 (Renew)
    B10‑0134/2025 (S&D)
    B10‑0135/2024 (ECR)

    Sebastião Bugalho, Željana Zovko, Antonio López‑Istúriz White, Gabriel Mato, David McAllister, Vangelis Meimarakis, Wouter Beke, Isabel Wiseler‑Lima, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Tomáš Zdechovský, Mirosława Nykiel, Jessica Polfjärd, Luděk Niedermayer, Jan Farský, Andrey Kovatchev, Inese Vaidere
    on behalf of the PPE Group
    Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Leire Pajín
    on behalf of the S&D Group
    Adam Bielan, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Carlo Fidanza, Alberico Gambino, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Assita Kanko, Mariusz Kamiński, Marlena Maląg, Bogdan Rzońca, Waldemar Tomaszewski, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Ivaylo Valchev, Jadwiga Wiśniewska
    on behalf of the ECR Group
    Bernard Guetta, Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Engin Eroglu, Karin Karlsbro, Ľubica Karvašová, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Urmas Paet, Marie‑Agnes Strack‑Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar
    on behalf of the Renew Group
    Catarina Vieira
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

    Document selected :  

    RC-B10-0126/2025

    Texts tabled :

    RC-B10-0126/2025

    Texts adopted :

    European Parliament resolution on repression by the Ortega-Murillo regime in Nicaragua, targeting human rights defenders, political opponents and religious communities in particular

    (2025/2547(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to its previous resolutions on Nicaragua,

    – having regard to Rules 150(5) and 136(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas since 2018, the Nicaraguan regime has systematically, repeatedly and arbitrarily persecuted human rights defenders (HRDs), opposition and religious representatives, among others; whereas over 5 600 NGOs have been dissolved, including religious groups – mainly Catholic – and their assets confiscated;

    B. whereas imprisoned political opponents, along with HRDs, have been expelled from the country, stripped of their nationality and deprived of their political rights; whereas since 2018, 245 members of the clergy have been arbitrarily arrested or expelled, including Bishop Rolando Álvarez, Sakharov Prize finalist;

    C. whereas in January 2025, the regime passed a constitutional reform that eliminates the separation of powers and political pluralism, establishing an Ortega-Murillo co-presidency that controls all branches of government, independent institutions and the media, and ignores adherence to international human rights conventions and treaties;

    1. Strongly condemns the Ortega-Murillo regime’s widespread, systemic human rights violations against its population, democratic opposition, students, civil society organisations (CSOs) and its persecution of religious leaders, primarily Catholic; urges the immediate release of all those arbitrarily detained, and the restoration of the rule of law and the legal status of all organisations, freedoms and the rights of exiled individuals, including their safe return; insists that these are essential conditions for any prospect of meaningful dialogue;

    2. Denounces the use of statelessness and exile as a weapon against dissenting voices; reiterates the need to end restrictions on civic space and to respect the right to dissent;

    3. Calls on the Ortega-Murillo regime to reverse its constitutional reform and all repressive laws institutionalising totalitarianism, to fully respect its international human rights obligations, and to implement the recommendations made by the UN Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua; calls for its mandate to be extended;

    4. Calls for the EU to include specific guarantees of human rights compliance when allocating EU funds, including through multilateral and financial institutions, and to ensure that the funds do not contribute to strengthening the Ortega-Murillo regime;

    5. Highlights the key role played by CSOs, HRDs, the Catholic Church and journalists in Nicaragua; calls for the EU to reinforce its regular dialogue with them, including those in exile, to support their vital work, as well as countries receiving migrants fleeing Nicaragua, such as Costa Rica;

    6. Calls on the Member States, in accordance with the Rome Statute, to open investigations through the International Criminal Court into the Ortega-Murillo regime for crimes against humanity;

    7. Reiterates its demand that the democratic clause of the EU Association Agreement be triggered; rejects any prospect of holding any parliamentary dialogue with members of Nicaragua’s regime-controlled National Assembly;

    8. Reiterates its call to expand the list of sanctioned individuals to include Ortega, Rosario Murillo and their inner circle;

    9. Calls for the immediate extradition of Alessio Casimirri to Italy;

    10. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, Commission, the VP/HR, the Member States and the Nicaraguan authorities.

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the recent dismissals and arrests of mayors in Türkiye – RC-B10-0100/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    pursuant to Rules 150(5) and 136(4) of the Rules of Procedure
    replacing the following motions:
    B10‑0100/2025 (The Left)
    B10‑0103/2025 (Verts/ALE)
    B10‑0110/2025 (Renew)
    B10‑0119/2025 (S&D)
    B10‑0121/2025 (PPE)
    B10‑0124/2025 (ECR)

    Sebastião Bugalho, Michalis Hadjipantela, Vangelis Meimarakis, Željana Zovko, Wouter Beke, Antonio López‑Istúriz White, Isabel Wiseler‑Lima, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Tomáš Zdechovský, Mirosława Nykiel, Jessica Polfjärd, Luděk Niedermayer, Jan Farský, Inese Vaidere
    on behalf of the PPE Group
    Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Evin Incir, Nikos Papandreou, Pina Picierno
    on behalf of the S&D Group
    Sebastian Tynkkynen, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Waldemar Tomaszewski, Alexandr Vondra, Assita Kanko, Carlo Fidanza, Emmanouil Fragkos, Galato Alexandraki, Alberico Gambino
    on behalf of the ECR Group
    Malik Azmani, Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Petras Auštrevičius, Dan Barna, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Karin Karlsbro, Ľubica Karvašová, Jan‑Christoph Oetjen, Marie‑Agnes Strack‑Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar
    on behalf of the Renew Group
    Vladimir Prebilič
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
    Isabel Serra Sánchez, Özlem Demirel
    on behalf of The Left Group

    Document selected :  

    RC-B10-0100/2025

    Texts tabled :

    RC-B10-0100/2025

    Texts adopted :

    European Parliament resolution on the recent dismissals and arrests of mayors in Türkiye

    (2025/2546(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to Rules 150(5) and 136(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas Türkiye is expected, as a candidate country, to align with the EU acquis in all areas, including adherence to the rule of law and fundamental rights, as outlined in the Copenhagen criteria; whereas the accession process has been stalled since 2018 due to a continued deterioration in democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law;

    B. whereas Türkiye has systematically misused counter-terrorism laws to target elected officials, opposition politicians and human rights defenders, as noted by the UN Special Rapporteur and the Venice Commission;

    C. whereas Türkiye’s practice of replacing democratically elected mayors with government-appointed trustees instead of a member of the municipal council is a blatant attack on the most basic principles of local democracy, predominantly targeting Kurdish regions;

    D. whereas since the 2024 local elections, the interior ministry has dismissed eight mayors from the pro-Kurdish DEM Party and two from the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), replacing them with Ankara-appointed trustees; whereas this practice has been enabled by legal amendments introduced through an emergency decree in 2016;

    E. whereas several mayors, including DEM mayors Mehmet Sıddık Akış (Hakkâri) and Abdullah Zeydan (Van), have been arrested on the basis of vague and unsubstantiated terrorism-related allegations; whereas Ekrem İmamoğlu, Mayor of Istanbul, is facing multiple legal challenges and possible political disqualification;

    1. Condemns the arbitrary dismissal and imprisonment of democratically elected mayors and their replacement by unelected government trustees, a practice that violates democratic principles and disenfranchises millions of voters;

    2. Calls for the immediate release, acquittal and reinstatement of all elected mayors, unless there is credible, court-verified evidence of wrongdoing, in line with international legal standards;

    3. Expresses deep concern over the impact of these actions on local governance, particularly in Kurdish-majority areas; underlines the need to continue the Kurdish peace process;

    4. Calls for judicial reforms to abolish the trustee system, in line with the recommendation by the Council of Europe and the Venice Commission, and restore the independence of the judiciary;

    5. Urges Türkiye to align its policies with the ECHR and fully implement all ECtHR rulings, in line with Article 46 ECHR, including in cases involving political imprisonment;

    6. Recalls that financial assistance to Türkiye under the IPA III and the NDICI is conditional upon respect for the rule of law and fundamental rights, and that sufficient funding needs to be allocated to civil society;

    7. Reaffirms the EU’s commitment to supporting democracy, human rights and the rule of law in Türkiye, and calls for the EU to closely monitor the situation and take the necessary diplomatic measures; calls on the VP/HR to consider imposing restrictive measures under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime against Turkish officials assuming the role of trustee and those appointing them;

    8. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the VP/HR, the Council of Europe and the Turkish authorities.

     

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-Evening Report: A new report card shows inequality in Australia isn’t as bad as in the US – but we’re headed in the wrong direction

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Cameron Allen, Senior Research Fellow, Monash University

    Shutterstock

    It’s hard to remember a time the United States seemed as tense and divided as it does today. That should serve as a stark reminder of just how important it is to monitor the health of our own nation.

    Today, our new report card on Australia’s progress will be launched in Canberra. It assesses progress on 80 economic, social and environmental targets and models a range of policy shifts that could boost progress.

    We find that progress on more than half of these targets has either stagnated or is going backwards. And growing inequalities threaten the wellbeing of many Australians.

    Our report comes on the heels of America’s own State of the Nation report, which puts the US near the bottom of global rankings on inequality, violence, trust and polarisation.

    The situation in Australia is not yet as dire. However, our results signal a need to start thinking long-term and take bold action on inequality to avoid a similar fate.

    Not an A+ student overall

    Our report draws on the 17 UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to select a broad and balanced set of 80 economic, social and environmental indicators.

    Each of our indicators can be grouped under one of these 17 goals and includes a 2030 target. We use this target to evaluate progress and allocate “traffic lights” that tell us about the direction in which the country is moving.

    We also benchmark Australia against peer nations from the OECD, including the US.

    The overall outlook for Australia is mixed. We aren’t completely on track to meet any of the 17 SDGs. And on some indicators, Australia is actually going backwards, away from the target.

    Many areas of concern centre on increasing inequality. These include:

    • a 30% decline in the share of wealth held by the bottom 40% of Australians since 2004
    • almost 20% of Australians living in financial stress
    • over 40% of lower-income renter households living in housing stress
    • household debt levels now exceed Australia’s annual gross domestic product (GDP).

    There are also some broader economic concerns. Australia’s level of investment in innovation is nearly 40% below OECD averages. Economic complexity – which measures the sophistication and diversity of what our economy produces – has fallen behind Honduras, Armenia and Uganda.

    And there’s been a rapid decline in education outcomes for students from lower socio-economic groups.

    Shining in some areas

    On the other hand, Australia is on track and actually leading our peers in life expectancy, road fatalities, tertiary education, water efficiency and government debt.

    We’re also above average on closing gender gaps in both income and political representation. Australia also has very low homicide rates and high feelings of safety and trust compared to our peers.

    Australia has made some progress on gender equality.
    Andrii Zastrozhnov/Shutterstock

    In some key areas, Australia is actually trending rapidly towards SDG targets.

    The gender gap in superannuation, for example, has fallen from 53% in 2014 to 21% in 2021.

    The share of renewable electricity in our national energy grid has climbed to 35% and greenhouse gas emissions are steadily falling.

    And rates of unemployment, underemployment and youth unemployment have all declined to within or closer to SDG target levels of below 5-6%.

    How does the US compare?

    America’s State of the Nation report, which tracks progress on a range of similar measures to our report, paints a bleak picture.

    There are only four measures where the US performs in the top 20% of high-income countries – economic output, productivity, years of education and long-term unemployment.

    Compared to Australia, the US outperforms us on average per-capita income, investments in research and development and knowledge-based capital, economic complexity, household debt and broadband connection speeds.

    But despite their apparent economic success, mental health and life satisfaction have deteriorated. Social connections are fraying with increased social isolation, polarisation and eroding trust.

    Tragically, suicide rates, fatal overdoses and shootings have increased.

    Far worse on some measures

    In areas where Australia is also trending backwards, things in the US are often far worse.

    Income and wealth inequality, for example, are much higher in the US. The top 1% of Americans hold around 35% of wealth – compared to 24% for the top 1% of Australians.

    US welfare payments are almost 90% below the poverty line and the poverty rate is 30% higher than in Australia. Yet US government debt as a share of GDP is almost double that of Australia.

    This stark contrast suggests America’s approach to pursuing material prosperity is undermining social wellbeing, with rising inequalities fuelling social tensions and polarisation.

    Bold action needed

    For the first time, our new report models two future scenarios for Australia, exploring policies that reverse negative trends and accelerate progress towards SDG targets by 2050.

    Our modelling shows that with increased policy ambition, Australia can halve poverty and reduce income inequality by a third. We can also boost health, education and productivity, improve biodiversity, and deliver net-zero greenhouse gas emissions.

    To do it, we’d need to increase public investment by around 7% a year over 10 years in key areas such as education and health, disaster resilience, sustainable food, energy and urban systems and the natural environment.

    Our modelling shows that with these measures, Australia could achieve 90% of our Sustainable Development Goal targets by 2050.

    Without them, our future prosperity is projected to stagnate and decline by 2050, reaching just 55% progress towards our targets and with GDP around A$300 billion lower than our more ambitious scenario.

    There’s a famous aphorism that in the long run, economic productivity is almost everything. The social fissures in the US despite a strong economy would suggest otherwise.

    Australia should take note and take action to ensure the long-term sustainable prosperity of our nation.

    Cameron Allen receives funding from the Australian Research Council.

    John Thwaites is Chair of Monash Sustainable Development Institute and Climateworks Centre which receive funding for research, education and action projects from the Commonwealth and state governments as well as from philanthropy and industry. He is a former Deputy Premier of Victoria (1999 – 2007)

    – ref. A new report card shows inequality in Australia isn’t as bad as in the US – but we’re headed in the wrong direction – https://theconversation.com/a-new-report-card-shows-inequality-in-australia-isnt-as-bad-as-in-the-us-but-were-headed-in-the-wrong-direction-249579

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – No ‘blood minerals’ in the EU: reliable supply chains in the EU-Rwanda raw materials agreement – E-002684/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    To address illicit trafficking of raw materials the EU is stepping up efforts to promote the sustainable and responsible sourcing, production, and processing.

    The Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) are a tool in this regard, in line with the objectives of the EU’s renewed Great Lakes Strategy[1].

    The MoU signed with Rwanda[2] is a further step and echoes the one the EU signed with the Democratic Republic of Congo[3] in October 2023.

    The MoU with Rwanda places particular emphasis on increased traceability and transparency, to fight against illegal trafficking of minerals. Rwanda’s adhesion to the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI)[4] shall be an essential element for the implementation of other MoU components. In the framework of the MoU, the Commission is ready to support Rwanda’s accession to the EITI.

    The EU also complements the bilateral engagement with Rwanda on critical raw materials with its ongoing support to the Regional Certification Mechanism of the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region.

    The EU is taking measures to ensure full application of the Due Diligence Directive[5] and to support compliance with the obligations under the Conflict Minerals Regulation[6].

    As an example, the EU is financing since 2018 the European Partnership for Responsible Minerals[7], a multi-stakeholder partnership and accompanying measure to the Conflict Minerals Regulation.

    Responsible sourcing and alignment on environmental, social and governance standards constitute one of the five pillars along which all MoUs are structured.

    • [1] https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6631-2023-INIT/en/pdf
    • [2] https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/58035
    • [3] https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/publications/memorandum-understanding-eu-democratic-republic-congo-sustainable-raw-materials_en
    • [4] https://eiti.org/
    • [5] Directive (EU) 2024/1760 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on corporate sustainability due diligence and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 and Regulation (EU) 2023/2859, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1760/oj/eng
    • [6] Regulation (EU) 2017/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 laying down supply chain due diligence obligations for Union importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating from conflict-affected and high-risk areas, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/821/oj/eng
    • [7] https://europeanpartnership-responsibleminerals.eu/
    Last updated: 12 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Evaluation of EU aid to Algeria against the backdrop of the persecution of Christians there – E-002610/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is inscribed in the Algerian Constitution and constitutes a key element of EU-Algeria relations, as enshrined in the Association Agreement[1] and reinforced in the Partnership Priorities[2].

    Human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of religion or belief, are addressed during the regular EU-Algeria political, security and human rights dialogue.

    The EU financial assistance to Algeria does not entail direct transfer of funds to Algerian public authorities. The EU finances projects implemented in the country by international organisations, European public bodies and development agencies, private companies and civil society organisations.

    The EU financial assistance is framed by programming documents[3] and all projects are subject to monitoring missions during their implementation and to audits ensuring that funds are used to the agreed purpose and according to the agreed procedures.

    • [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A22005A1010%2801%29
    • [2] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/13/eu-algeria/
    • [3] Multiannual Indicative Programme (MIP) 2021-2027: https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/18c0dcae-9074-40e0-a8ca-765abb44b281_en
    Last updated: 12 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Statement attributable to the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General – on the Central African Republic [scroll down for French]

    Source: United Nations secretary general

    The Secretary-General strongly condemns the killing of a Tunisian peacekeeper of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) during the night of 11 February by an unidentified armed person near the village of Zobassinda on the Ndele- Akursoubak axis, in Bamingui-Bangoran prefecture. The peacekeepers were attacked while conducting a long-range patrol to protect civilians.
     
    The Secretary-General expresses his deepest condolences to the families of the fallen peacekeeper and to the Government and the people of Tunisia.
     
    The Secretary-General recalls that attacks targeting United Nations peacekeepers may constitute war crimes under international law. He calls on the Central African authorities to spare no effort in identifying the perpetrators of this tragedy so that they can be brought to justice swiftly.
     
    The Secretary-General reaffirms the solidarity of the United Nations with the people and Government of the Central African Republic.
     
      
    ************
     
    Déclaration attribuable au porte-parole du Secrétaire générale sur la République centrafricaine
     
    Le Secrétaire général condamne fermement le meurtre d’un Casque bleu tunisien de la Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en République centrafricaine (MINUSCA) dans la nuit du 11 février par un personne armé non identifié près du village de Zobassinda sur l’axe Ndélé-Akursoubak dans la préfecture de Bamingui-Bangoran. Les Casques bleus ont été attaqués lors d’une patrouille longue portée pour protéger les civils.
     
    Le Secrétaire général exprime ses plus sincères condoléances à la famille du Casque bleu décédé, au Gouvernement et au peuple de la Tunisie.
     
    Le Secrétaire général rappelle que les attaques visant le personnel du maintien de la paix des Nations Unies peuvent constituer des crimes de guerre en vertu du droit international. Il invite les autorités centrafricaines à ne ménager aucun effort pour identifier les auteurs de cette tragédie afin qu’ils soient rapidement traduits en justice.
     
    Le Secrétaire général réaffirme la solidarité des Nations Unies avec le peuple et le gouvernement de la République centrafricaine.
     

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Africa: Statement attributable to the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General – on the Central African Republic [scroll down for French]

    Source: United Nations – English

    he Secretary-General strongly condemns the killing of a Tunisian peacekeeper of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) during the night of 11 February by an unidentified armed person near the village of Zobassinda on the Ndele- Akursoubak axis, in Bamingui-Bangoran prefecture. The peacekeepers were attacked while conducting a long-range patrol to protect civilians.
     
    The Secretary-General expresses his deepest condolences to the families of the fallen peacekeeper and to the Government and the people of Tunisia.
     
    The Secretary-General recalls that attacks targeting United Nations peacekeepers may constitute war crimes under international law. He calls on the Central African authorities to spare no effort in identifying the perpetrators of this tragedy so that they can be brought to justice swiftly.
     
    The Secretary-General reaffirms the solidarity of the United Nations with the people and Government of the Central African Republic.
     
      
    ************
     
    Déclaration attribuable au porte-parole du Secrétaire générale sur la République centrafricaine
     
    Le Secrétaire général condamne fermement le meurtre d’un Casque bleu tunisien de la Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en République centrafricaine (MINUSCA) dans la nuit du 11 février par un personne armé non identifié près du village de Zobassinda sur l’axe Ndélé-Akursoubak dans la préfecture de Bamingui-Bangoran. Les Casques bleus ont été attaqués lors d’une patrouille longue portée pour protéger les civils.
     
    Le Secrétaire général exprime ses plus sincères condoléances à la famille du Casque bleu décédé, au Gouvernement et au peuple de la Tunisie.
     
    Le Secrétaire général rappelle que les attaques visant le personnel du maintien de la paix des Nations Unies peuvent constituer des crimes de guerre en vertu du droit international. Il invite les autorités centrafricaines à ne ménager aucun effort pour identifier les auteurs de cette tragédie afin qu’ils soient rapidement traduits en justice.
     
    Le Secrétaire général réaffirme la solidarité des Nations Unies avec le peuple et le gouvernement de la République centrafricaine.
     

    MIL OSI Africa –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Governor Stein Announces Additional Team Members

    Source: US State of North Carolina

    Headline: Governor Stein Announces Additional Team Members

    Governor Stein Announces Additional Team Members
    lsaito
    Wed, 02/12/2025 – 13:38

    Raleigh, NC

    Today, Governor Stein announces additional staff as he continues to grow his team committed to building a safer, stronger North Carolina. 

    Adam Chandler, Policy Director 

    Adam Chandler is a native of Burlington, North Carolina, and a 12-year veteran of the U.S. Department of Justice, where he served most recently as Associate Deputy Attorney General and Chief of Staff to the Deputy Attorney General. Adam previously practiced at the Department as an appellate attorney, specializing in antitrust law, and served as a speechwriter for two attorneys general. He graduated from Yale Law School; the University of Oxford, where he studied as a Rhodes Scholar; and Duke University.   

    Kindl Detar, Senior Policy Advisor 

    Kindl Detar previously served as a Special Deputy Attorney General and the Director of the Public Protection Section at the North Carolina Department of Justice. Prior to her state government service, she worked at Foundation For The Carolinas and Robinson Bradshaw. Kindl is a graduate of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and the University of Pennsylvania School of Law. A native of Concord, she resides in Charlotte with her husband and three children.

    Sadie Weiner, Senior Advisor 

    Sadie Weiner has worked in state and federal government and campaigns for almost two decades. She served in the Office of Governor Roy Cooper first as Communications Director and most recently as Director of External Affairs. Previously, Weiner was the Communications Director of the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC), supporting campaigns across the country and picking up two Senate seats. She was also the Communications Director for U.S. Senator Kay Hagan in both her Senate office and her re-election campaign. Weiner lives in Raleigh with her husband and two children. 

    Awo Eni, Digital Director 

    Awo Eni returns to North Carolina after working on Cheri Beasley’s campaign for Senate in 2022 as the Deputy Digital Director. She most recently served as Director of Digital Content on Senator Sherrod Brown’s campaign for re-election in Ohio. Awo is a proud British-born Nigerian-American immigrant who calls Texas home. She is a graduate of the University of North Texas. 

    Liz Doherty, Policy Advisor 

    Liz Doherty joins the Stein Administration as a policy advisor in the Governor’s office. Prior to this role, she served as a policy advisor to Governor Roy Cooper and held various campaign roles, including as Governor Cooper’s communications director in 2020. She also serves as a board member on the NC Council for Women and completed a Master’s of Public Policy from the Duke University Sanford School in 2023.  

    Rania Hassan, Policy Analyst 

    Rania Hassan is a policy analyst in the Office of Governor Josh Stein. She previously worked as policy assistant and analyst in the Office of Governor Roy Cooper. She graduated from NC State University with a B.S. in Environmental Science and a minor in Environmental Policy and Justice. 

    Madhu Vulimiri, Senior Advisor for Health & Families Policy  

    Madhu Vulimiri joins the Governor’s Office from the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, where she served as the Deputy Director for the Division of Child and Family Well-Being overseeing nutrition programs that support children and families. Prior to that, she led cross-agency priority initiatives at NCDHHS, including in the COVID-19 response, in chief of staff and senior strategy roles to the Chief Deputy Secretary of NCDHHS and at NC Medicaid. She earned her Bachelor of Science in Public Health from the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, where she was a Morehead-Cain Scholar, and her Master of Public Policy from Duke University, where she was a Margolis Scholar in Health Policy and Management. 

    Elena Ashburn, Senior Advisor for Education Policy 

    Elena Ashburn joins the policy team after serving as an area superintendent in the Wake County Public School System, where she led 17,000 students in 23 schools. She began her career in education as a Teach For America teacher and later served as a middle and high school principal. Elena earned a doctorate in educational leadership from UNC Chapel Hill and was named the North Carolina Wells Fargo Principal of the Year in 2021.  

    Jonathan Moch, Senior Advisor for Climate & Energy Policy 

    Jonathan Moch was most recently Science and Technology Policy Advisor for the Office of the Special Presidential Envoy for Climate and Office of Global Change in the U.S. Department of State, where he designed, negotiated, and implemented international climate and energy initiatives and agreements. Prior to the State Department, he was an interdisciplinary Postdoctoral Fellow with joint appointments in Harvard’s engineering, public health, and government schools. Jonathan holds a Ph.D. in Earth and Planetary Sciences with a secondary field in Science, Technology and Society, a master’s in Environmental Science and Engineering from Harvard University, and an undergraduate degree from Princeton University. 

    P.J. Connelly, Director of the Governor’s Eastern North Carolina Office 

    P.J. Connelly will serve as the Director of the Governor’s Eastern North Carolina Office. He served in this role for former Governor Roy Cooper from 2022 to 2024. Prior to that, Connelly served North Carolina’s rural communities through the Governor’s Hometown Strong Initiative. He also served as Assistant Director of Boards and Commissions in the Office of the Governor from 2017 to 2019. Connelly is from New Bern, North Carolina. 

    Feb 12, 2025

    MIL OSI USA News –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Africa: Minister Itoua: Congo’s Energy Ambitions Set for Full Display at Congo Energy & Investment Forum (CEIF) 2025

    Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

    BRAZZAVILLE, Congo (Republic of the), February 12, 2025/APO Group/ —

    Minister of Hydrocarbons of the Republic of Congo Bruno Jean-Richard Itoua has announced that the Ministry will leverage the upcoming inaugural Congo Energy & Investment Forum (CEIF) to support the country’s long-term view to becoming a major player in regional energy development.

    Taking place from March 24-26, 2025, in Brazzaville, CEIF 2025 will connect project developers with Congolese regulators and policymakers while enabling candid dialogue and facilitating new investments and deals in the country’s energy sector. Set to headline CEIF 2025, Minister Itoua’s leadership in Congo has been instrumental in driving forward ambitious reforms and initiatives aimed at maximizing the country’s energy potential.

    The inaugural Congo Energy & Investment Forum, set for March 24-26, 2025, in Brazzaville, under the patronage of President Denis Sassou Nguesso and supported by the Ministry of Hydrocarbons and Société Nationales des Pétroles du Congo, will bring together international investors and local stakeholders to explore national and regional energy and infrastructure opportunities. The event will explore the latest gas-to-power projects and provide updates on ongoing expansions across the industry.

    During CEIF 2025, the Ministry of Hydrocarbons will launch its 2025 licensing round, offering onshore, offshore and marginal acreage to potential investors and developers. This year’s licensing round aligns with the country’s strategy to increase oil production from the current 274,000 barrels per day (bpd) to 500,000 bpd by the end of this year.

    “We hope that through the conference, we will be able to launch a tender,” Minister Itoua stated. “We have many licenses available, and we will make them available for tender. We have very large areas in which we have information proving that we have high potential.”

    Meanwhile, the Ministry is also set to launch a new Gas Master Plan for the country at CEIF 2025. Originally announced by Minister Itoua at last year’s African Energy Week: Invest in African Energies 2024 in Cape Town, the Gas Master Plan aims to consolidate the position of existing exploration and production companies while attracting new investments to the country’s natural gas sector.

    “We hope to be a key player, especially in gas. We want to become a key player in terms of finding opportunities. Congo could be the biggest place for refining, not only for Africa, but also on an international level,” Minister Itoua added.

    CEIF 2025 will provide a platform for investors and industry leaders to explore the nation’s recent developments, which have been driven by the strategic leadership of Minister Itoua. Among these initiatives is the Marine XII LNG development, which exported its first cargo in early-2024 from the Tango FLNG facility and is projected to reach 3 million tons of LNG per year this year.

    Meanwhile, key players such as Trident Energy and Perenco have expanded their presence in Congo, acquiring major assets and driving upstream development in alignment with the Ministry’s efforts to foster an investment-friendly environment.

    The forum is expected to bring together policymakers, international oil companies, independent explorers and financiers to discuss strategies for maximizing the country’s hydrocarbon potential, expanding LNG production and advancing green energy solutions. As such, Minister Itoua’s participation will set the tone for discussions while highlighting the country’s vision for the energy sector and its plans to secure long-term partnerships.

    MIL OSI Africa –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Africa: Nigeria to Host 32nd Afreximbank Annual Meetings from 23 to 28 June 2025

    Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

    ABUJA, Nigeria, February 12, 2025/APO Group/ —

    The Federal Government of Nigeria and Afreximbank (www.Afreximbank.com) have signed the Host Country Agreement for the 32nd Afreximbank Annual Meetings (AAM) in Abuja, Nigeria, from 23-28 June 2025.

    Afreximbank Annual Meetings is one of the most anticipated gatherings on the African continent, featuring high-level policy discussions, presentations, and side events on issues pertinent to the socio-economic development of Africa as well as business networking sessions that drive integration through trade and investments.

    The 32nd Afreximbank Annual Meetings in June 2025 is expected to be the largest gathering of Global Africa in the Bank’s Annual Meetings history, bringing together over 6,000 delegates including Heads of State, government officials, captains of industry, businesspeople, decision-makers, academics, respected experts and advisors from Africa, the CARICOM region and globally.

    Commenting on the significance of the agreement, H.E. Wale Edun, the Honourable Minister of Finance and Coordinating Minister of the Economy for Nigeria, emphasised Nigeria’s strong partnership with Afreximbank and its commitment to fostering trade and economic growth for Africa and beyond.

    He said: “Nigeria is honoured to host the 2025 Afreximbank Annual Meetings, which will serve as a critical platform to drive discussions on trade financing, economic growth, and investment opportunities across Africa.” He added: “This event is a testament to our commitment to strengthening Africa’s financial sector and positioning Nigeria as a hub for economic transformation.”

    Professor Benedict Oramah, President and Chairman of the Board of Directors, Afreximbank, said: “We greatly appreciate the Federal Government of Nigeria’s acceptance to host the 2025 Afreximbank Annual Meetings, which demonstrates our united determination to accelerating Africa’s economic growth and development.

    “The Government of Nigeria has been a steadfast partner and a strong backbone of the Bank. It has consistently responded positively to capital calls, injecting significant equity into the Bank even when the economic environment seemed challenging; removing regulatory hurdles that would otherwise inhibit the Bank’s business in Nigeria, and being at the forefront of rallying continental support for the Bank.”

     “This year’s theme, ‘Building the Future on Decades of Resilience,’ reflects the progress that we have made over the past three decades and the bold steps that are imperative to navigate the increasingly complex global landscape. The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCTA) has given our continent an unrivalled opportunity to deliver sustainable economic transformation that will propel Africa’s economic growth and raise living standards and prosperity for all Africans.

    “Afreximbank Annual Meetings will provide a platform to reflect on our journey, celebrate contributions, and chart a path forward that reinforces our continent’s economic independence and global influence. We look forward to welcoming and meeting stakeholders from across Africa and other parts of the world to Abuja for this prestigious event.”

    Prof. Oramah noted that Nigeria’s unwavering support to Afreximbank has been the primary driver of the Bank’s strong continental impact. “The impact on the Nigerian economy is equally palpable. Being the largest recipient of the Bank’s trade and development finance, Nigeria has attracted cumulative disbursements of about US$52 billion in addition to being the first beneficiary of several flagship transformative projects being executed by the Bank such as the African Medical Centre of Excellence (AMCE), African Quality Assurance Centre (AQAC), Afreximbank African Trade Centre (AATC), among others.

    This year’s event comes on the backdrop of the highly successful 2024 AAM, held in Nassau, The Bahamas and attended by over 4,000 delegates, including over 20 Heads of State, government ministers, high-level dignitaries, global experts, and world-renowned celebrities and artists.

    Afreximbank was established when the shareholders held their first General Meeting in Abuja, Nigeria in October 1993. Today, Nigeria is Afreximbank’s second-largest shareholder.

    MIL OSI Africa –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth Holds Media Availability in Stuttgart, Germany

    Source: United States Department of Defense

    DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: How’s it going everybody? Sir. Good to see you. It’s been a great day, really. Any day we can spend with the troops from the very early morning of PT with some high speed guys and gals to two COCOMs that are right in the front lines of advancing American interests. Proud to be here today.

    Just an impressive display of what Americans are doing in far flung places for the American people, so proud to be here for sure. I think we have a local — where’s our local reporter? I’d like to go first to our local.

    Q: Thank you so much. So —

    DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: Where are you from?

    Q: I’m from Suddeutsche Zeitung. That’s the second biggest newspaper in Germany.

    DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: Well, it’s my favorite now.

    Q: And you are visiting Africom as one of your first points in your duty. Does that mean that the American strategic aims in Africa are going to change?

    DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: Well, I think it’s a reflection of the importance of that command as well as EUCOM. We spent this morning at EUCOM, as well; made sense to come to both if we’re here in Germany.

    But it’s also a reflection that, you know, the PRC’s intentions are pernicious, not just in their part of the world, but also in South America and on the African continent. And America’s posture there along with allies and partners is going to matter about contesting that space. So, it certainly remains a priority.

    You saw the strike in Somalia on February 1st. That — as we talked to the command, that’s a reflection also of pushing decision authority down, untying the hands of war fighters who in the previous administration made multiple requests and were often denied for that kind of kinetic action, or the decision had to be made at the White House when it should be made at the four star level or at the Secretary of Defense level more quickly based on the ability to degrade the enemy.

    So, this is a very important part of the world for us. The President feels that way, as well, and we’re honored to be here. Thank you.

    Q: Mr. Secretary, are you planning to cut the number of American forces in Europe, shift to the Pacific and focus on China?

    DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: There are no plans right now in the making to cut anything.

    There is an understanding that we’re going to review force posture across the world, right. President Trump’s planning assumptions are different in many ways, or at least strategic assumptions than Joe Biden’s were. We certainly don’t want to plan on the back of the withdrawal from Afghanistan and what happened on October 7th and the war that was unleashed in Ukraine.

    You have to manage and mitigate those things by coming alongside your friends in Israel, ensuring their defense and peacefully resolving the conflict in Ukraine. But those shouldn’t define how we orient and with hopefully a rapid peace deal in Ukraine, which the President is committed to delivering, we can then review force posture and encourage as we’re going to — you’re going to see tomorrow in Ukraine and — or at the Ukraine Contact Group and the NATO ministerial, we’re going to have straight talk with our friends.

    This kind of urgency of this moment requires friends talking to friends about capabilities, about leadership, about stepping up, about burden sharing and the incentives to say the European continent deserves to be free from any aggression.

    But it ought be those in the neighborhood, investing the most in that collective — individual and collective defense. That’s common sense. As the President talks a lot about, common sense is you defend your neighborhood and the Americans will come alongside you in helping in that defense. If and when that happens, and I believe it will because of President Trump, most NATO countries are already close to 2 percent.

    We believe that needs to be higher. The president has said 5 percent. I think he’s right. That’s a reflection of a need to invest on the continent. If and when that happens through investments in the defense industrial base, as well, then yes, America as the leader of the free world defending American interests is going to need to make sure we’re focused properly on the Communist Chinese and their ambitions in the Indo-Pacific, and as I mentioned before, around the world.

    So, we would be remiss in not reviewing force posture everywhere, but it would be the wrong planning assumption to say, oh, America is abandoning something or America is leaving. No, America is smart to observe, plan, prioritize and project power where we need to deter conflict. We don’t want conflict with China.

    We don’t want — the President has ran on being a peace president, and he’s delivered that. But being strong, peace through strength is how you deter that, and we want to posture for that just like we believe the Europeans alongside our support need to on the continent, as well.

    Q: Is China the biggest threat to the United States?

    DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: Well, right now, the biggest threat was securing our own border, which we are addressing rapidly. And I’m proud of what NORTHCOM has done and the Defense Department has done is shifting there. You don’t have a country if you don’t have borders, as the President has pointed out. And we’ve been defending other people’s borders for a long time; time to defend ours. So we’re sealing that border. We continue to do that. But as far as external threats, there’s just no doubt the communist Chinese ambitions are robust. Their view of the world is quite different than ours. And whoever carries that mantle is going to set the tone for the 21st century.

    UNKNOWN: Christine —

    Q: You made the point to do PT with tenth group this morning on very little sleep. Why was it so important for you to do this? And tell us about the workout?

    DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: I did do PT with the troops this morning. Listen, it’s not that long ago that I was right there with them. I probably — no offense, General — I probably connect more with those guys than I do with four-star Generals. But now I get the chance of working with four stars and others who are committed to the troops.

    But when I can get down, do push ups and deadlifts with the troops, and just hear from them, what’s working, what isn’t, how do you see your mission set, I love that. So there was never a doubt. even though we got in at 2:00 in the morning, that we were getting up a couple hours later to go do PT. It’s a reminder that — you guys — the press in Washington might think I’m young, but in military terms, I’m old.

    And that showed this morning with these young guys who ran circles around me in that parking lot.

    UNKNOWN: We’ll [Inaudible] then Zach.

    DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: Go ahead.

    Q: Thanks for doing this. Uh, you mentioned earlier that President Trump wants, uh, NATO countries to spend 5 percent of their GDP on defense. Do you think the US should also spend 5 percent of its GDP on defense?

    DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: Well, I think the US needs to spend more than the Biden administration was willing to, who historically underinvested in the capabilities of our military. So the president is committed, as he was in the first term, to rebuilding America’s military by investing. And you’re going to see that in the conversations on Capitol Hill.

    We’ve already been intimately involved with the folks on HASC and SASC and appropriations, talking about the capabilities we’re going to need, not just next year and the year after that or for the next four years, but for power projection going forward and then the reforms needed to make sure that every dollar goes further.

    Now at a minimum, we should not go below 3 percent. That’s a view I know the President shares. But as far as going forward in that, those are decisions he will make based on my consultations with him. Listen, any defense secretary would be lying if they said they didn’t want more. You always want more.

    But we live in fiscally constrained times where we need to be responsible with taxpayer dollars. We’re $37 trillion in debt. That’s a national security liability, as well. So, we’re going to work with Capitol Hill. The President is going to lead the way on making sure the troops have the resources they need and that we truly rebuild our military just like President Trump did in the first term.

    Q: And President Biden — President Biden vowed against sending US troops into Ukraine. Would you be open to sending US troops into Ukraine to track weapons shipments?

    DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: We are not sending US troops to Ukraine.

    Q: You talked about wanting to welcome Elon Musk and DOGE into the Pentagon potentially in the next few weeks. Do you expect him to start unilaterally cutting programs and contracts the way he’s done at USAID and other agencies? And are there any limits or supervision you’d want to place on his team, given his conflicts of interest [Inaudible]?

    DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: Well, we’ve been in touch with — I’ve been in touch with Elon Musk, who’s a great patriot, interested in advancing the America First agenda, knows that President Trump got 77 million votes and a mandate from the American people. And part of that is bringing actual businesslike efficiency to government; hence, what DOGE is doing.

    Uh, we’ve been talking to them, in partnership with them. And as I said on social media, we welcome DOGE to the Pentagon, and I hope to welcome Elon to the Pentagon very soon and his team, working in collaboration with us. There are waste, redundancies and headcounts in headquarters that need to be addressed.

    There’s just no doubt. Look at a lot of the climate programs that have been pursued at the Defense Department. The Defense Department is not in the business of climate change, solving the global thermostat. We’re in the business of deterring and winning wars. So, things like that we want to look for to find efficiencies and many others – the way we acquire weapons, system procurement.

    There’s plenty of places where we want the keen eye of DOGE, but we’ll do it in coordination. We’re not going to do things that are to the detriment of American operational or tactical capabilities. There’s just — President Trump is committed to delivering the best possible military. The Defense Department is not USAID. USAID has got a lot of problems that I talked about with the troops, pursuing globalist agendas that don’t have a connection to America First.

    That’s not the Defense Department, but we’re also not perfect, either. So where we can find billions of dollars — and he’s right to say billions — inside the Defense Department, every dollar we save there is a dollar that goes to warfighters, and that’s good for the American people.

    Q: [Inaudible] Mr. Secretary, Since we’re here at AFRICOM, I have a question about Africa. Now when you served, you fought jihadists in the Middle East, and there’s a lot of jihadists in Africa, whether it’s ISIS, al-Qaida, al-Shabab, go on and on. How do you plan to handle that threat?

    I’m not saying put troops on the ground in Africa to fight them, but are you concerned that there could be some sort of cell that might be plotting attacks against other parts of the world, trying to recruit soldiers because it’s Africa with a growing population? How concerned are you about the jihadist threat in Africa today?

    DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: Definitely concerned. I mean, anybody of our — anybody of my generation that served in Iraq and Afghanistan or have been a part of post-9-11 understands the threat of global jihad, especially the desire to export that against our allies in Europe or Israel or certainly the United States of America. So the counterterrorism threat focused on those who would seek to do us harm is of the highest priority, which is why you saw what AFRICOM did so well in that strike in Somalia.

    Where we see those growing, plotting or planning with increased capabilities we will strike. And that pertains to Islamist organizations all across the continent. But it also — we have to work with partners and allies. I mean, foreign internal defense and security force assistance — I was with Green Berets this morning.

    You know, we think of Green Berets in the context of post-9-11, right – kicking down doors, and they’re really good at that. But what they’re best at is doing security force assistance and foreign internal defense where they work with local security forces to build up their capabilities so that it’s indigenous forces fighting Islamists because they want to secure their country, as well.

    And AFRICOM is very directly committed to doing that. That’s a mission very much worth resourcing. I mean Africa is very much the front lines of a fight from Islamists. You’ve got Christian populations that are under siege in Africa and have been ignored for far too long and American interests there. It matters a great deal. And Islamists — we’re not going to allow them to maintain a foothold, especially to try to strike at America.

    UNKNOWN: We’re going to finish up with two questions from these two [Inaudible].

    DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: Ok. One more here and then here.

    Q: John Barrowman, Stars and Stripes. Also related to AFRICOM and Somalia, during the end of President Trump’s first term, he elected to pull forces out of Somalia and switched to more of a rotational concept.

    President Biden sent troops back in there on a full time basis. What’s your vision going forward for Somalia? Do you want to maintain troops there continuously, or are you looking more towards pulling them back?

    DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: Well, I mean, I’m going to listen to the commanders on the ground, first and foremost, as is the President.

    And he’s charged me with, hey, give me your best advice, but also keep your ear to the ground of what’s most effective. But he’s also been very clear that we’re not trying to have American boots all over the globe. Where we can do counterterrorism effectively over the horizon, that’s the preference. But we’ll review the force posture there and with the generals doing the heavy lifting and take it into consideration, no doubt.

    But thankfully, we have the intelligence capabilities to do the kind of strike that we saw, and we believe we can do more of that.

    UNKNOWN: Last question.

    Q: So — so you renamed the name of Fort Liberty into Fort Bragg, and you honored the private first class who lost his life while liberating Germany. What does that mean for the US forces?

    DEFENSE SECRETARY HEGSETH: Well, first, it means Bragg is back. It means the legacy of an institution that generations of Americans have mobilized through and served at is back.

    I mean, it’s a shame what was done to vets, service members, their families who were born there, deployed out of there, lived there, gave there — I was with airborne troops here, some of which spent 25 years at Fort Bragg and never called it Fort Liberty because it wasn’t Fort Liberty, it’s Fort Bragg.

    And so I was honored to be able to put my signature on that. By the way, with the support of the President of the United States who set the tone on this and said, I want Fort Bragg back.

    And we’re honored to support a private first class who received a Purple Heart and the Silver Star at the battle of the bulge. We’re honoring a private first class and I’m proud that we have a Marine corporal as the vice president of the United States too. Junior enlisted have never seen better days. But it’s about that legacy.

    It’s about the connection to the community, to those who served. And we’re not, as the President has said and I’ve said as well, we’re not done there. There are other bases that have been renamed that erodes that very same legacy. There’s a reason I said Bragg and Benning when I walked into the Pentagon on day one.

    But it’s not just Bragg and Benning. There are a lot of other service members that have connections and we’re going to do our best to restore it. It’s an honor to do so. Thank you all for your time. Appreciate it. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Africa: AMMAT Unpacks Strategic Approach to Optimizing Oil & Gas Operations in Congo

    Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

    BRAZZAVILLE, Congo (Republic of the), February 12, 2025/APO Group/ —

    As part of the Republic of Congo’s strategy to double its oil production, the government is encouraging independent operators to revitalize mature fields and boost output. Companies like AMMAT – participating as a Platinum Sponsor at the inaugural Congo Energy & Investment Forum (CEIF) 2025 – are playing a key role in this effort. In an in-depth conversation with Energy Capital & Power (https://EnergyCapitalPower.com), AMMAT CEO Massimiliano Mignacca outlines the company’s approach to technological innovations, a focus on sustainability and optimizing oil and gas operations in mature fields in Congo.

    Can you provide an overview of AMMAT’s activities in Congo?

    When we began exploring opportunities in 2021, we focused on West Africa and found promising prospects in the Republic of Congo. The Congolese authorities recognized our potential and supported our asset management approach. By the end of 2022, we had officially established our presence in the country. In March 2023, we secured exploration and production permits for the Zatchi and Loango fields – mature assets previously operated by a joint venture between Eni and Total until 2021 – followed by a transition period under SNPC [Congo’s national oil company Société nationale des pétroles du Congo]. We commenced operations in July 2023, applying our proven asset management strategies from Italy to optimize production in Congo.

    How does your partnership with SNPC contribute to Congo’s plan to double oil production?

    We operate under a joint venture framework, where SNPC plays a key role alongside two Congolese companies that collectively hold a 25% stake. Managing mature fields presents significant challenges, requiring close coordination with SNPC at all levels. We conduct regular meetings to align on work plans, performance, and projects that enhance safety, boost production and improve asset management. Our close collaboration with SNPC’s leadership ensures that our initiatives contribute directly to Congo’s production growth targets.

    AMMAT employs a data-driven approach to reservoir management. What technologies and methodologies are you using?

    One major initiative is the modernization of the sea pipeline linking our Loango treatment platform to peripheral platforms. We are also implementing an environmental risk mitigation program in partnership with other operators. Additionally, we have launched a campaign to replace outdated pumps and reactivate wells, utilizing advanced workover techniques such as ESP pump upgrades to enhance production. In 2024, we successfully revamped three platforms in Loango and are currently rehabilitating two more in the Zatchi field. We remain committed to integrating cutting-edge technology into our operations to maximize efficiency and sustainability.

    What sustainable practices does AMMAT implement in its operations?

    Sustainability is at the core of our asset management approach. The [oil and gas] sector has been central to Congo’s economy since the 1970s, producing a strong engineering workforce. Recognizing this, we have initiated partnerships with local universities and currently host three graduates in our maintenance, IT and HSE [health, safety and environment] divisions. This initiative strengthens local talent and ensures the long-term sustainability of our operations.

    AMMAT will be a Platinum Sponsor at the Congo Energy & Investment Forum (CEIF) in March 2025. What do you aim to achieve at this event?

    Our primary objective [at CEIF 2025] is to showcase AMMAT as a reliable and committed partner in Congo. The country entrusted us with two crucial production fields, and we want to demonstrate how our asset management expertise adds value. Additionally, we are looking to expand our upstream presence in Congo and other markets. Being a Platinum Sponsor allows us to make a strong impact, emphasizing our commitment to compliance with local regulations, collaboration and sustainable operations. This event provides an excellent platform to engage with stakeholders and reinforce our role in driving growth in Congo’s oil and gas industry.

    MIL OSI Africa –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Board member reappointed to Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew

    Source: United Kingdom – Government Statements

    Professor Ian Graham will rejoin the Board for a second term.

    Professor Ian Graham has been reappointed to the board of Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew for a second term of three years.

    His term will run from 1 May 2025 to 30 April 2028.

    The reappointment has been made in accordance with the Governance Code on Public Appointments.

    Biography

    • Professor Graham is currently based at the University of York, in the Centre for Novel Agricultural Products and holds the Weston Chair in Biochemical Genetics. He has previously held roles in the University of Glasgow, University of Oxford, and Stanford University.
    • Professor Ian Graham completed his PhD in Plant Molecular Biology from the University of Edinburgh. His research interests now focus on plant natural products such as noscapine (anti-cancer), codeine (analgesic), and artemisinin (antimalarial).
    • Ian was elected as a Fellow of the Royal Society in 2016 and won the Biochemical Society’s 2017 Heatley Medal and Prize for “exceptional work in applying advances in biochemistry, and especially for developing practical uses that have created widespread benefits and value for society”.

    The Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew

    • The Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew is a world-famous scientific organisation, internationally respected for its outstanding collections as well as its scientific expertise in plant and fungal diversity, conservation and sustainable development in the UK and around the world.
    • Kew Gardens is a major international and a top London visitor attraction. Kew Gardens’ 132 hectares of landscaped gardens, and Wakehurst, Kew’s wild botanic garden in Sussex, attract over 2.5 million visits every year. Kew Gardens was made a UNESCO World Heritage site in July 2003 and celebrated its 260th anniversary in 2019. Wakehurst is home to Kew’s Millennium Seed Bank, the largest wild plant seed bank in the world, as well as over 500 acres of designed landscapes, wild woodlands, ornamental gardens and a nature reserve.
    • The Kew Madagascar Conservation Centre is Kew’s third research centre and only overseas office. RBG Kew receives approximately one third of its funding from government through the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and research councils. Further funding needed to support RBG Kew’s vital work comes from donors, membership and commercial activity including ticket sales.

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    Published 12 February 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Why ‘low carbon’ roses are flown around the world

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Will de Freitas, Environment + Energy Editor, UK edition

    Grown in Ecuador (Équateur en français), sold in Paris. Robert Crum / shutterstock

    As you read this, planes full of roses are heading from east Africa and South America to almost every corner of the world. If you buy someone a rose this Valentine’s Day, it may be in the air right now or perhaps in a refrigerated warehouse in the Netherlands.

    A huge logistical operation ensures those flowers are timed to be perfectly in bloom on the 14th. From flower farm to bouquet can take just a few days. In all, hundreds of millions of roses will be shipped internationally this week, and many will die before they can be sold.

    Can all this flying be justified?

    You’re reading the Imagine newsletter – a weekly synthesis of academic insight on solutions to climate change, brought to you by The Conversation. I’m Will de Freitas, energy and environment editor, covering for my colleague Jack Marley who is lovesick. This week, we’re looking at flowers.

    Many people don’t realise just how far a Valentine’s rose has probably travelled. Though roses can be grown in the UK (and some species are native), most of them won’t flower for at least another few months.

    Jill Timms and David Bek, academics at the University of Coventry who have researched the global flower trade point out: “This sort of localised growing does not satisfy the demand for volume, variety and year-round supply, or indeed guarantee sustainability in terms of energy, pesticide use and so on.”

    This means most roses are imported from countries with more land, more sunshine, and a cheaper workforce. Major growers include Colombia, Ecuador, Kenya and Ethiopia. The Netherlands is actually the biggest exporter of roses, partly due to its own production in greenhouses but mostly thanks to its position as a crucial hub for the global trade. Flowers sent to the UK from the Netherlands were probably grown elsewhere.

    To ensure they stay fresh, those flowers are kept cool as they’re transported in a series of refrigerated lorries, planes or boats, while some are sprayed with chemicals to freeze them.

    “Geography matters,” say Timms and Bek. “Some flowers travel by sea, some cargo plane and others in the hold of passenger jets, all with very different carbon footprints.”




    Read more:
    Valentine’s Day: five ways to ensure your flowers are ethical


    Low-carbon flowers, a long way away

    Figuring out a flower’s carbon footprint is not straightforward. Jennifer Lavers and Fiona Kerslake from the University of Tasmania compared cut flowers grown in heated or refrigerated greenhouses in the Netherlands with those grown in Kenya.

    “Maintaining the controlled environmental conditions inside these [Dutch] buildings requires artificial light, heat and cooling, so each rose grown in The Netherlands contributes an average of around 2.91kg of CO₂ to the atmosphere.”

    “In contrast”, they write, “a single rose grown on a farm in Kenya contributes only 0.5kg. This is largely because Kenyan hot houses do not use artificial heating or lighting, and most farm workers walk or cycle to work. As a result, flowers grown in tropical regions are sometimes considered low-carbon (of course, this doesn’t always factor in international transport).”




    Read more:
    Sustainable shopping: your guilt-free guide to flowers this Valentine’s Day


    Paul D. Larson of the University of Manitoba points out that, while local production would ground some of the international flower flights, “growing flowers in greenhouses can use as much energy as shipping them [to North America] from Colombia by air freight”.

    Larson, a professor of supply chain management, does highlight one major issue with “low carbon” flowers in the global south, however:

    “Since flowers are not classified as edible, they are often exempt from pesticide regulations. Thus, many flower production workers in Ecuador and Colombia have suffered from respiratory problems, rashes and eye infections caused by exposure to toxic chemicals in fertilizers, fungicides and pesticides.”




    Read more:
    Valentine’s Day: COVID-19 wilted the flower industry, but sustainability still a thorny issue


    The flower trade in Ecuador and Colombia was actually engineered a few decades ago to try and stem the flow of cocaine into the US, says Jay L. Zagorsky, an associate professor at Boston University’s business school.

    “One part of the strategy was to convince farmers in Colombia to stop growing coca leaves – a traditional Andean plant that provides the raw ingredient for making cocaine – by giving them preferential access to US markets if they grew something else.”

    Whether this policy helped stop drug production is unclear, says Zagorsky, but American domestic rose growing has collapsed and “many businesses in Colombia and Ecuador started growing and shipping flowers north”.




    Read more:
    Americans spend millions of dollars on Valentine’s Day roses. I calculated exactly how much


    No one expects you to know exactly how a flower was grown, what conditions were like for workers, or to conduct a full “life cycle assessment” of their carbon footprint. But what can you do to help this Valentine’s Day?

    Timms and Bek, the flower trade experts at Coventry University, wrote about five ways to ensure your flowers are ethical. They contrast flowers grown in the Netherlands and Kenya and say that “your priorities need to guide your purchase: environmental issues include carbon footprint, chemical use, ecological degradation and water use; social issues include health and safety standards, gender discrimination, precarious employment and land rights.”

    – ref. Why ‘low carbon’ roses are flown around the world – https://theconversation.com/why-low-carbon-roses-are-flown-around-the-world-249769

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Only political will can end world hunger: Food isn’t scarce, but many people can’t access it

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Jennifer Clapp, Professor and Canada Research Chair in Global Food Security and Sustainability, and Member of the International Panel of Experts on Sustainable Food Systems, University of Waterloo

    History has shown us again and again that, so long as inequality goes unchecked, no amount of technology can ensure people are well fed.

    Today, the world produces more food per person than ever before. Yet hunger and malnutrition persist in every corner of the globe — even, and increasingly, in some of its wealthiest countries.

    The major drivers of food insecurity are well known: conflict, poverty, inequality, economic shocks and escalating climate change. In other words, the causes of hunger are fundamentally political and economic.

    The urgency of the hunger crisis has prompted 150 Nobel and World Food Prize laureates to call for “moonshot” technological and agricultural innovations to boost food production, meaning monumental and lofty efforts. However, they largely ignored hunger’s root causes — and the need to confront powerful entities and make courageous political choices.

    Food is misallocated

    To focus almost exclusively on promoting agricultural technologies to ramp up food production would be to repeat the mistakes of the past.

    The Green Revolution of the 1960s-70s brought impressive advances in crop yields, though at considerable environmental cost. It failed to eliminate hunger, because it didn’t address inequality. Take Iowa, for example — home to some of the most industrialized food production on the planet. Amid its high-tech corn and soy farms, 11 per cent of the state’s population, and one in six of its children, struggle to access food.

    Even though the world already produces more than enough food to feed everyone, it’s woefully misallocated. Selling food to poor people at affordable prices simply isn’t as profitable for giant food corporations.

    They make far more by exporting it for animal feed, blending it into biofuels for cars or turning it into industrial products and ultra-processed foods. To make matters worse, a third of all food is simply wasted.




    Read more:
    Earth Day 2024: 4 effective strategies to reduce household food waste


    Meanwhile, as the laureates remind us, more than 700 million people — nine per cent of the world’s population — remain chronically undernourished. A staggering 2.3 billion people — more than one in four — cannot access an adequate diet.

    Women queue up to receive food distributed by local volunteers at a camp in Somalia in May 2019. Conflicts hinder the effective delivery of humanitarian aid during food security crisis.
    (AP Photo/Farah Abdi Warsameh)

    Confronting inequity

    Measures to address world hunger must start with its known causes and proven policies. Brazil’s Without Hunger program, for example, has seen dramatic 85 per cent reduction in severe hunger in just 18 months through financial assistance, school food programs and minimum wage policies.

    Our politicians must confront and reverse gross inequities in wealth, power and access to land. Hunger disproportionately affects the poorest and most marginalized people, not because food is scarce, but because people can’t afford it or lack the resources to produce it for themselves. Redistribution policies aren’t optional, they’re essential.

    Governments must put a stop to the use of hunger as a weapon of war. The worst hunger hotspots are conflict zones, as seen in Gaza and Sudan, where violence drives famine. Too many governments have looked the other way on starvation tactics — promoting emergency aid to pick up the pieces instead of taking action to end the conflicts driving hunger.




    Read more:
    Colonialism, starvation and resistance: How food is weaponized, from Gaza to Canada


    Stronger antitrust and competition policies are vital to curb extreme corporate concentration in global food chains — from seeds and agrochemicals to grain trading, meat packing and retail — that allow firms to fix prices and wield outsized political influence.

    Dependency trap

    Governments must also break the stranglehold of inequitable trade rules and export patterns that trap the poorest regions in dependency on food imports, leaving them vulnerable to shocks.

    Instead, supporting local and territorial markets is critical in helping build resilience to economic and supply chain disruptions. These markets provide livelihoods and help ensure diverse, nutritious foods reach those who need them.

    Mitigating and adapting to climate change requires massive investments in transformative approaches that promote resilience and sustainability in food systems.

    Agroecology — a farming system that applies ecological principles to ensure sustainability and promotes social equity in food systems — is a key solution, proven to sequester carbon, build resilience to climate shocks and reduce dependence on expensive and environmentally damaging synthetic fertilizers and pesticides.

    More research should explore agroecology’s full potential. And we must adopt plant-rich, local and seasonal diets, ramp up measures to tackle food waste and reconsider using food crops for biofuels.

    This means pushing back against Big Meat and biofuel lobbies, while investing in climate-resilient food systems.

    Bold political action needed

    This is not to say that technology has no role — all hands need to be on deck. But the innovations most worth pursuing are those that genuinely support more equitable and sustainable food systems, and not corporate profits. Unless scientific efforts are matched by policies that confront power and prioritize equity over profit, then hunger is likely to here to stay.

    The solutions to hunger are neither new nor beyond reach. What’s missing is the political will to address its root causes.

    This message is shared by my colleagues with the International Panel of Experts on Sustainable Food Systems, IPES-Food, whose work covers a range of expertise and experience. Hunger persists because we allow injustice to endure. If we are serious about ending it, we need bold political action, not just scientific breakthroughs.

    Jennifer Clapp receives funding from the Canada Research Chairs program and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. She is a member of the International Panel of Experts on Sustainable Food Systems (IPES-Food).

    – ref. Only political will can end world hunger: Food isn’t scarce, but many people can’t access it – https://theconversation.com/only-political-will-can-end-world-hunger-food-isnt-scarce-but-many-people-cant-access-it-248736

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: M23’s capture of Goma is the latest chapter in eastern Congo’s long-running war

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Evelyn Namakula Mayanja, Assistant Professor, Interdisciplinary Studies, Carleton University

    At a recent summit in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, leaders of eight African states released a statement calling for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

    The statement comes after a flareup in fighting in eastern DRC that has killed hundred and wounded thousands.

    On Jan. 31, 2025 the rebel group known as the March 23 Movement (M23) captured the city of Goma in the eastern DRC. At a news conference, Corneille Nangaa, leader of the Congo River Alliance that includes M23, declared that they were there to stay and would march to the DRC’s capital of Kinshasa.

    The World Health Organization reported 900 bodies had been recovered from the streets of Goma, with about 3,000 people injured and thousands forced to flee. The Congolese government said that it had started burying more than 2,000 people and thousands had been displaced.

    On Feb. 4, 2025, the Congo River Alliance declared a ceasefire. This isn’t the first time M23 attacked Goma and then declared a ceasefire. The renewed violence is the latest in a long-running conflict in the region that has grown to involve local militias, regional countries and foreign companies seeking to exploit Congo’s mineral wealth.

    What is M23?

    M23 is an armed group made up predominantly of ethnic Tutsis. It emerged as an offshoot of the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), which disbanded in March 2009 after the Goma peace agreement. The agreement stipulated the integration of CNDP soldiers into Congo’s military and police, while its political wing would be recognized as an political party.

    However, a faction within the CNDP disapproved of the Goma agreement and created a militia group in 2012 that came to be known as M23. A United Nations group has said senior government officials from Rwanda and Uganda have provided M23 with weapons, intelligence and military support.

    Multiple reports from the UN Group of Experts on the DRC have noted Rwanda’s and Uganda’s support for M23 and other militias such as the Alliance of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo Zaire, the Congolese Rally for Democracy and the CNDP.

    The roots of the conflict lie in the history of Belgium’s colonial rule of the region that pitted the Tutsi and Hutu ethnic groups against each other. In 1956, ethnic tensions in Rwanda forced many Tutsis to seek refuge in Congo (then Zaire), Uganda, Tanzania and beyond.

    Tutsis who fled to Congo and Uganda were not accorded full citizenship rights, and this led to resentment.

    In the mid-1990s, Rwandan President Paul Kagame and Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni collaborated with Congolese rebel leader Laurent-Désiré Kabila to create the AFDL. The group waged the First Congo War from October 1996 to May 1997 that ended with the overthrow of the DRC’s long-time ruler, Mobutu Sese Seko. Kabila became president.

    Kagame and Museveni fought along with Congolese Tutsis to assert their citizenship once the war ended. However, when Kabila turned against his backers, it led to the waged Second Congo War from 1998 to 2003, with Rwandan and Ugandan-backed militas fighting against the DRC government.

    M23 claims that it wants to defend the interests of Congolese Tutsis, and to protect them against the Congo government and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR).

    The FDLR was implicated in orchestrating the 1994 Rwandan genocide that killed 800,000 people, most of whom were Tutsi. The FDLR has been based in eastern Congo since 1996, after the Rwandan Patriotic Front, led by Kagame and others, pushed them out of Rwanda.

    Fear of the FDLR was one of the drivers for the First Congo War. In a recent interview with CNN, Kagame said:

    “If you want to ask me, is there a problem in Congo that concerns Rwanda? And that Rwanda would do anything to protect itself? I’d say 100 per cent.”

    Control of minerals

    Before the fall of Goma in February 2025, M23 captured mineral-rich areas like Rubaya, the largest coltan mine in the Great Lakes region; Kasika and Walikale, where there are numerous gold mines; Numbi, which is rich with tin, tungsten, tantalum and gold; and Minova, which is a trade hub.

    In December 2024, a UN expert group noted that M23 exported about 150 tonnes of coltan to Rwanda, and was involved with Rwanda’s production, leading to “the largest contamination of mineral supply chain.”

    One of the central dynamics of this conflict is the control and profit from natural resources. The DRC is rich in minerals and metals needed around the world, including the critical minerals used in the technology and renewable energy industries.

    The World Bank has noted that the “DRC is endowed with exceptional mineral resources.” However, administration of the sector is dysfunctional and handicapped by insufficient institutional capacity.

    This problem is exacerbated by the interference of neighbouring countries, foreign corporations and their international backers who destabilize the DRC to balkanize and control resources.

    The way forward

    Ending the M23 insurgency requires taking Tutsi citizenship seriously. Politics researcher Filip Reyntjens has argued that any peaceful transition in the DRC needed to take regional countries seriously. He emphasized:

    “By turning a blind eye to Rwanda’s hegemonic claims in eastern Congo, the future stability of the region remains in doubt. Rwanda may once again, in the not too distant future, become the focal point of regional violence.”

    A factor contributing to the violence is the lack of measures to ensure ceasefires are respected by different parties engaged in conflicts. In addition, armed groups and their backers have not been effectively prosecuted. A 2010 UN mapping report describes 617 alleged war crimes, crimes against humanity and human rights between March 1993 and June 2003. No perpetrators have never been prosecuted.

    Furthermore, there must be strong international efforts to prevent conflict minerals from getting into international supply chains. M23 and other militias smuggle Congo’s minerals through regional neighbours, where they are considered conflict-free.

    Tech giants that rely on these minerals must do more to scrutinize where they come from. Equally, all of us, as consumers of products made from the DRC’s minerals, must demand accountability.




    Read more:
    Overcoming racism depends on respect for every person’s dignity


    It’s usually only men who participate in such talks. Women, who endure the brutality of sexual violence and other human rights violations, must be represented in peace and security talks.

    In his 2018 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, Congolese physician and human rights activist Dr. Dennis Mukwege noted that:

    “What is the world waiting for before taking this into account? There is no lasting peace without justice. Yet, justice in not negotiable. Let us have the courage to take a critical and impartial look at what has been going on for too long in the Great Lakes region.”

    To effectively respond to the plight of the people of eastern Congo will take more than situational and short-term intervention. National, regional and international parties must negotiate peaceful and just access to minerals. Peace and security in Congo will happen when sectarian and partisan politics is replaced with commitment to democracy, sovereignty and peoples’ well-being.

    Evelyn Namakula Mayanja receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council Canada and Carleton University.

    – ref. M23’s capture of Goma is the latest chapter in eastern Congo’s long-running war – https://theconversation.com/m23s-capture-of-goma-is-the-latest-chapter-in-eastern-congos-long-running-war-248833

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: President Costa to participate in the 8th EU-South Africa summit on 13 March 2025

    Source: Council of the European Union

    European Council President, António Costa, along with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen will travel to South Africa for the 8th EU-South Africa summit on 13 March 2025. The summit aims to strengthen the EU-South Africa strategic partnership and address key global and regional issues, including geopolitical challenges and bilateral cooperation in trade, security, energy, and innovation.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Economics: Samsung Brings Irregular Heart Rhythm Notification and Sleep Apnea Features to Galaxy Watch in South Africa

    Source: Samsung

    Samsung Electronics recently announced that two health feature updates on its Galaxy Watch line-up are now available for the South African market. The Irregular Heart Rhythm Notification (IHRN) and Sleep Apnea detection features, accessible through the Samsung Health Monitor app, provide Galaxy Watch users with enhanced tools to manage their cardiovascular health more effectively. These software updates, which went live on January 13, 2025, are part of Samsung’s ongoing commitment to improving health monitoring capabilities through wearable technology.
     

     
    The IHRN feature is designed to detect irregular heart rhythms suggestive of atrial fibrillation (AFib), a condition that can lead to severe health complications if left undiagnosed. By continuously monitoring and recording heart rhythms, this feature offers users a better understanding of their heart health. Alongside the IHRN, the Samsung Health Monitor app also allows Galaxy Watch users to monitor their blood pressure and perform on-demand electrocardiogram (ECG) tests, giving a comprehensive view of their cardiovascular health from the convenience of their wrist.
     
    Following its approval by the Korean Ministry of Food and Drug Safety (MFDS) in 2023, the IHRN feature has already been rolled out in various global markets. South Africa is one of the latest regions to benefit from this advancement.
     
    In addition to the IHRN feature, the new Sleep Apnea detection tool offers users the ability to identify early signs of obstructive sleep apnea, a common but serious sleep disorder that often goes undiagnosed. According to the South African Society for Sleep and Health, 26% of adults in South Africa are affected by sleep apnea, a condition that can lead to severe health risks such as high blood pressure, heart disease, and stroke.
     
    Both features, integrated into the Samsung Health Monitor app, further enhance Galaxy Watch’s ability to support users in managing their overall health. These tools are part of Samsung’s larger initiative to provide consumers with the technology they need to easily manage and take control of their health and well-being. Initially available on the Galaxy Watch Ultra, Watch7, Watch6 Classic, and Watch FE, the features will be expanded to previous editions in the near future.
     
    As one of the leaders in wearable health technology, Samsung continues to bring cutting-edge features to its devices, making it easier for users to track and maintain their health and wellness with greater confidence.

    MIL OSI Economics –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: PrimeXBT Introduces 0% Withdrawal Fees

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    GRAND ANSE, Seychelles, Feb. 12, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — PrimeXBT, a leading global crypto and CFD broker, has introduced enhanced trading conditions, further strengthening its commitment to providing traders with a cost-efficient and flexible trading environment. With always-free deposits and now 0% withdrawal fees*, this update is designed to support active traders by providing greater financial flexibility and seamless access to global markets.

    By providing free deposits and withdrawals, PrimeXBT enables traders to retain more capital for trading and capture opportunities in key markets like EUR/USD, NASDAQ, and Gold, reinforcing its commitment to a trader-focused approach.

    “At PrimeXBT, we remain committed to providing traders with the best possible conditions. By introducing free withdrawals alongside our always-free deposits, we’re reinforcing our focus on cost efficiency, accessibility, and financial flexibility,” said Matthew Hayward, Senior Market Analyst at PrimeXBT. “This initiative is part of our broader effort to equip traders with the tools they need to succeed while keeping costs low.”

    PrimeXBT continues to stand out with its latest enhancement, offering traders greater flexibility in managing their capital. With low trading fees for Forex, Indices, and Commodities starting from 0% commission, spreads from 0.1 pips on CFDs, and leverage up to 1000x, the platform remains a key destination for active traders.

    This latest enhancement reflects PrimeXBT’s ongoing efforts to provide traders with maximum flexibility in managing their capital. With free deposits and withdrawals, industry-leading trading fees, and access to a wide range of financial instruments, PrimeXBT continues to empower traders with the tools they need to navigate global markets efficiently.

    To learn more users can visit PrimeXBT.

    *Withdrawals may be free for a limited time and up to a specified amount. T&C Apply.

    About

    PrimeXBT is a leading Crypto and CFD broker, that offers an all-in-one trading platform to buy, sell and store Cryptocurrencies, and trade over 100 popular markets, including Crypto Futures and CFDs on Crypto, Forex, Indices, and Commodities using both fiat or Crypto funds. Since its founding in 2018, PrimeXBT has grown exponentially, serving 1,000,000+ traders in 150+ countries worldwide. With an aim of making investing available to all, PrimeXBT lowers the barriers to entry providing an easy and secure access to the financial markets with industry-leading trading conditions and innovative tools. Clients enjoy the confidence of trading with a trusted and reliable financial service provider, committed to empowering traders and offering more for less.

    Disclaimer: The content provided here is for informational purposes only and is not intended as personal investment advice. Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future results. The financial products offered by the Company are complex and come with a high risk of losing money rapidly due to leverage. Virtual assets are inherently volatile and subject to significant value fluctuations, which could result in substantial gains or losses. These products may not be suitable for all investors. Before engaging, you should consider whether you understand how these leveraged products work and whether you can afford the high risk of losing your money. PrimeXBT does not accept clients from Restricted Jurisdictions as indicated in its website.

    Contact

    PrimeXBT
    pr@primexbt.com

    A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/4f6c596d-3a4b-41c1-8487-596f656c2345

    The MIL Network –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Assessing the Global Climate in January 2025

    Source: US National Oceanographic Data Center

    January Highlights:

    • Temperatures were above average over much of the globe, but much below average over the United States, Greenland and far eastern Russia.
    • Eurasian snow cover extent and Arctic sea ice extent both ranked second lowest on record for January.
    • Global tropical cyclone activity was slightly below average with five named storms, three of which occurred in the Indian Ocean.

    Temperature

    The January global surface temperature was 2.39°F (1.33°C) above the 20th-century average of 53.6°F (12.0°C) and 0.05°F (0.03°C) above the previous record set last year, making last month the warmest January on record. According to NCEI’s Global Annual Temperature Outlook, there is a 7% chance that 2025 will rank as the warmest year on record.

    The new January global record is particularly notable for having occurred during a La Niña episode, the cold phase of El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO). Global temperatures tend to be cooler during periods of ENSO-neutral conditions and even cooler during La Niña. According to NOAA’s Climate Prediction Center’s January 9 ENSO Diagnostic Discussion, La Niña conditions emerged in December 2024 and are expected to persist through February–April 2025 (59% chance), with a transition to ENSO-neutral likely during March–May 2025 (60% chance).

    January temperatures were above average across much of the global land surface, particularly over Alaska, much of western Canada and most of central Eurasia. The United States, Greenland, far eastern Russia and parts of southern Africa and Antarctica were colder than average. Overall it was the warmest January on record over global land areas. Sea surface temperatures were above average over most areas, while much of the central and eastern tropical Pacific was below average (consistent with La Niña), as were parts of the southeast Pacific, western North Atlantic and the northwestern Indian Oceans. The global ocean was the second warmest on record for January.

    Snow Cover

    The Northern Hemisphere snow cover extent in January was the fourth lowest on record. While snow cover over North America and Greenland was slightly above average (by 80,000 square miles), Eurasia ranked second lowest on record (940,000 square miles below average). Areas of below-average snow cover stretched across most of Europe southeastward into central Asia.

    Sea Ice

    Global sea ice extent was the seventh smallest in the 47-year record at 6.89 million square miles, which was 1.17 million square miles below the 1991–2020 average. Arctic sea ice extent was below average (by 330,000 square miles), ranking second lowest on record, and Antarctic extent was slightly below average (by 130,000 square miles).

    Tropical Cyclones

    Five named storms occurred across the globe in January, which was below the average of seven. Three named storms formed in the southwestern Indian Ocean, the most impactful being Intense Tropical Cyclone Dikeledi, which made landfall on Madagascar and Mozambique, bringing high winds and heavy rains to the affected regions.


    For a more complete summary of climate conditions and events, see our January 2025 Global Climate Report or explore our Climate at a Glance Global Time Series.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Trump and South Africa: what is white victimhood, and how is it linked to white supremacy?

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Nicky Falkof, Professor, University of the Witwatersrand

    American president Donald Trump has issued an executive order to withdraw aid from South Africa. He was reacting to what he has called the South African government’s plan to “seize ethnic minority Afrikaners’ agricultural property without compensation”. Afrikaners are an ethnic and linguistic community of white South Africans whose home language is Afrikaans.

    Trump’s outrage is based on a misinterpretation of a new law – the Expropriation Act which came into effect in January 2025.

    Trump’s action, amplified by provocative comments from billionaire Elon Musk, has reignited debate about the concept of “white victimhood”. We asked Nicky Falkof, who has researched the idea of white victimhood, for her insights.

    What does ‘white victimhood’ mean?

    White victimhood refers to a powerful set of beliefs that treats white people as special and different, but also as uniquely at risk. Within this narrative white people see themselves, and are sometimes seen by others, as extraordinary victims, whose exposure to violence or vulnerability is more concerning and important than anyone else’s.

    White victimhood is usually speculative. It relates not to actual events that have happened, but to white people’s feelings of being threatened or unsafe. Entire political agendas develop around the idea that white people must be protected because they face exceptional threats, which are not being taken seriously by a contemporary world order that fails to value whiteness.

    This is by no means particular to South Africa; we see it wherever whiteness is predominant. Indeed, ideas about white victimhood play a significant role in the popularity of Trump, whose call to “make America great again” harks back to an idealised past where white people (particularly men) could easily dominate the nation, the workplace and the home.




    Read more:
    Donald Trump, white victimhood and the South African far-right


    The South African case is important because it plays a central role in global white supremacist claims. These mythologies claim that white South Africans, specifically Afrikaners, are the canary in the coalmine: that the alleged oppression they are facing is a blueprint for what will happen to all white people if they don’t “fight back”.

    What is its history?

    We can trace this idea back to the start of the colonial project. In 1660 Dutch East India Company administrator Jan van Riebeeck planted a hedge of bitter almond shrubs to separate his trading station from the rest of South Africa’s Cape. This hedge was part of a defensive barrier intended to keep indigenous people out of the Dutch trading post, which had been built on top of ancient Khoikhoi grazing routes.

    On a practical level, van Riebeeck’s hedge was meant to shield Dutch settlers and livestock from Khoikhoi raiders. On a philosophical level, the hedge situated the invaders as the “real” victims, who desperately needed protection from the violence and wildness of Africa. The bitter almond hedge is still seen as an enduring symbol of white supremacy in the country.




    Read more:
    Racism in South Africa: why the ANC has failed to dismantle patterns of white privilege


    This early paranoia and securitisation has had a significant effect on white South African culture and anxiety. White people who can afford to do so barricade themselves in gated communities and boomed-off suburban streets, behind high walls topped with razor wire, on the assumption that they are the primary victims of South Africa’s crime rate.

    In what ways has victimhood been used over the centuries or decades?

    Ideas about white victimhood have played a role in many of South Africa’s most influential social formations.

    The 1930s saw a major panic around “poor whites”, which led to commissions of inquiry, upliftment programmes and other attempts at social engineering. The people and institutions behind these initiatives weren’t concerned about poverty in South Africa in general, even though it was becoming more of a problem as the population urbanised. Their only interest was in poverty among white people, drawing on the assumption that it’s wrong or abnormal for white people to be poor, and that this needed to be urgently remedied.




    Read more:
    Afrikaner identity in post-apartheid South Africa remains stuck in whiteness


    These moves were not simply about philanthropy and offering better life chances to poor people; they were about protecting the boundaries of whiteness. Poor whites were seen as a threat to the establishment because they proved that whiteness wasn’t inherently superior.

    More recently, the victimhood narrative has been a central part of the panic around farm murders and claims of “white genocide”, an old idea that has been popularised and spread online.

    Rural violence is a huge problem in South Africa that deserves a strong response. But white people are far from its only casualties. Indeed, violent crime affects pretty much everyone in South Africa. When the deaths of white people are explained as part of a targeted genocide undertaken on the basis of race, the message is that they matter more than the deaths of everyone else.




    Read more:
    Damon Galgut’s Booker-winning novel probes white South Africa and the land issue


    Again, this suggests a kind of naturalisation of violence and harm. When terrible things happen to other people they simply happen and are not remarked on. It’s only when white people are affected that they become a pressing issue.

    Has it helped white South Africans? Has it been effective as a mobilising tool?

    White victimhood, like the racial anxiety it is part of, is not good for white people. It doesn’t keep them safer or help them to live better lives.

    That said, it’s been quite effective as a mobilising tool. The apartheid-era National Party was skilled at using white fear for political gain. Its communications constantly played on white fears of the swart gevaar, the “black danger”, which encapsulated the powerful belief that whites were more at risk from black people than vice versa, despite all evidence to the contrary.




    Read more:
    Violent crime in South Africa happens mostly in a few hotspots: police resources should focus there – criminologist


    Similarly, contemporary organisations like the Afrikaner “minority rights” pressure group AfriForum and the Afrikaans trade union Solidarity activate and manipulate white people’s senses of extraordinary victimhood. This drives them further into a defensive position, where everything from farm murders and road name changes to the National Health Insurance bill is designed to attack them personally.

    White support for these kinds of organisations and the political positions they espouse, whether overtly or covertly, is at least in part driven by the effective manipulation of white victimhood.

    How effective is it still?

    It remains disturbingly powerful. The architecture of white supremacy depends on the idea that white people are extraordinary victims. This is the driving notion beneath the great replacement theory, a far-right conspiracy theory claiming that Jews and non-white foreigners are plotting to “replace” whites. It also underpins violent reactions to the global migration crisis and the rise of populism in the north.




    Read more:
    What’s behind violence in South Africa: a sociologist’s perspective


    I don’t think it’s going too far to say that whiteness as a social construction is intrinsically tied to victimhood. The idea that whiteness actually makes people more rather than less vulnerable is likely to remain a central part of white people’s collective psychic imaginary for some time.

    Nicky Falkof receives funding from the South African National Research Foundation.

    – ref. Trump and South Africa: what is white victimhood, and how is it linked to white supremacy? – https://theconversation.com/trump-and-south-africa-what-is-white-victimhood-and-how-is-it-linked-to-white-supremacy-249648

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Trump White House’s disengagement from HIV/AIDS response could have lethal consequences

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Yolaine Frossard de Saugy, PhD Candidate, International Relations, McGill University

    With the endless stream of announcements, reversals, measures and countermeasures coming from the new administration of United States President Donald Trump, it has become difficult to make sense of what is just noise or opening negotiation offers and what constitutes actual policy change.

    Unfortunately, in the case of the global response against HIV/AIDS, it seems the attacks go beyond bluster.

    The methods used in the fight against HIV/AIDS have long been disputed, but overall commitment to the response was one of the few deeply bipartisan endeavours left, until now. Undercutting this decades-long consensus would mean endangering millions of lives.

    U.S. role in global HIV/AIDS response

    As a PhD candidate in international relations working on the politics of the response to HIV/AIDS, I am very aware of the central role that the U.S. has played in building and sustaining a global response to the epidemic in the past 25 years.

    The U.S. is the largest provider of funds for HIV/AIDS programs worldwide. It does so mainly through the bilateral President’s Emergency Program for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) as well as through its contribution to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. Overall U.S. funding for global AIDS reached $7 billion in 2020, 2021 and 2022. PEPFAR alone is estimated to provide treatment to 20 million people.

    The U.S. is also a fundamental participant in HIV/AIDS research, including through the work of the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and the National Institutes of Health (NIH), as well as USAID.

    All of this involvement has already been dangerously jeopardized by the actions taken by the White House since Trump took office for his second term.

    Many activities of the CDC and NIH have been halted. Funding for PEPFAR was caught in the freeze on foreign aid announced in January. Though an exemption was later made and the order has since been blocked by a federal judge, it has already forced recipients of aid to lay off personnel and close clinics and programs in places like Kenya and South Africa.

    USAID, the primary implementer of bilateral HIV/AIDS funds, is at risk of being dismantled.

    Current changes

    The chaos wrought by these measures has impacted the response to HIV/AIDS in deep ways, even if they may be contested or reversed by the courts and Congress.

    The uncertainty in itself is damaging for programs that need reliable funding and long-term planning, not to mention the clinical trials that have been brutally interrupted. What’s more, there are indications the Trump administration and other Republicans have abandoned the longstanding commitment to the response itself, which may lead to irreparable damage.

    American involvement in the global response to HIV/AIDS has long been shaped by domestic politics. Most notably, PEPFAR’s first rounds of funding were deeply constrained by the views of George W. Bush’s evangelical constituency, including in its focus on abstinence as prevention and denial of funding for sex workers.

    But the overall commitment to fighting HIV/AIDS had enjoyed bipartisan support for over two decades. Even during the first Trump administration, the U.S. maintained its involvement, though this was also due to Congress’s resistance to the White House’s attempts at reducing funding.

    There are indications that things might be different this time. Entire pages on HIV/AIDS have disappeared from government websites.

    The Heritage Foundation, the conservative think-tank behind the potential blueprint for Trump’s government known as Project 2025, has referred to HIV/AIDS as a lifestyle disease, like tobacco consumption. This language is reminiscent of the 1980s playbook of opponents on AIDS action and negates both the nature of the epidemic and the realities of those who live with the virus, casting doubts on the need to engage meaningfully with the response.

    Most ominously, the last reauthorization of PEPFAR in 2024 was limited to one year instead of the customary five, as some Republican representatives sought to end it altogether. This means the entire program is to be re-examined this March with no guarantee of how the debates will unfold, especially in the current climate.




    Read more:
    As the United States disavows the World Health Organization, Canada must double down on its support


    Ultimately most will depend on Congress, including the amount pledged by the U.S. to the Global Fund at its replenishment conference sometime this year.

    Its decisions will be the real test of the depth of change on this matter, though everything that has unfolded so far hints at a far-reaching shattering of the consensus. If conservative Republicans maintain their pressure on PEPFAR, the program could be significantly diminished, and it is unlikely that a White House that withdrew from the World Health Organization on day one will act decisively to save it or insist on a sustained contribution to the Global Fund.

    Consequences of U.S. disengagement

    The consequences of a U.S. retreat from the global response to HIV/AIDS would be immense.

    In the short-term, millions of people would lose access to the treatment they depend on for their survival. In the long term, shrinking American funding would undermine health systems around the world and risk the resurgence of the pandemic and the rise of resistant virus strains.

    This would jeopardize 40 years of progress, returning us to a time when AIDS was considered a key security risk and threat to development.

    Even if funding is maintained, all of this shows that for the next few years the U.S. is unlikely to be reliable. This means others will have to take up the leadership to ensure the worst-case scenario is avoided.

    Among these, Canada could have a crucial role to play. It has long been a key entity in its own right — the seventh largest contributor to the Global Fund — though Ottawa has remained discreet in this area so far. Washington’s withdrawal from the field may force it to step into a more visible role and contribute to reframe Canada’s international involvement.

    Yolaine Frossard de Saugy does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Trump White House’s disengagement from HIV/AIDS response could have lethal consequences – https://theconversation.com/trump-white-houses-disengagement-from-hiv-aids-response-could-have-lethal-consequences-249261

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Africa: Trump and South Africa: what is white victimhood, and how is it linked to white supremacy?

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Nicky Falkof, Professor, University of the Witwatersrand

    American president Donald Trump has issued an executive order to withdraw aid from South Africa. He was reacting to what he has called the South African government’s plan to “seize ethnic minority Afrikaners’ agricultural property without compensation”. Afrikaners are an ethnic and linguistic community of white South Africans whose home language is Afrikaans.

    Trump’s outrage is based on a misinterpretation of a new law – the Expropriation Act which came into effect in January 2025.

    Trump’s action, amplified by provocative comments from billionaire Elon Musk, has reignited debate about the concept of “white victimhood”. We asked Nicky Falkof, who has researched the idea of white victimhood, for her insights.

    What does ‘white victimhood’ mean?

    White victimhood refers to a powerful set of beliefs that treats white people as special and different, but also as uniquely at risk. Within this narrative white people see themselves, and are sometimes seen by others, as extraordinary victims, whose exposure to violence or vulnerability is more concerning and important than anyone else’s.

    White victimhood is usually speculative. It relates not to actual events that have happened, but to white people’s feelings of being threatened or unsafe. Entire political agendas develop around the idea that white people must be protected because they face exceptional threats, which are not being taken seriously by a contemporary world order that fails to value whiteness.

    This is by no means particular to South Africa; we see it wherever whiteness is predominant. Indeed, ideas about white victimhood play a significant role in the popularity of Trump, whose call to “make America great again” harks back to an idealised past where white people (particularly men) could easily dominate the nation, the workplace and the home.


    Read more: Donald Trump, white victimhood and the South African far-right


    The South African case is important because it plays a central role in global white supremacist claims. These mythologies claim that white South Africans, specifically Afrikaners, are the canary in the coalmine: that the alleged oppression they are facing is a blueprint for what will happen to all white people if they don’t “fight back”.

    What is its history?

    We can trace this idea back to the start of the colonial project. In 1660 Dutch East India Company administrator Jan van Riebeeck planted a hedge of bitter almond shrubs to separate his trading station from the rest of South Africa’s Cape. This hedge was part of a defensive barrier intended to keep indigenous people out of the Dutch trading post, which had been built on top of ancient Khoikhoi grazing routes.

    On a practical level, van Riebeeck’s hedge was meant to shield Dutch settlers and livestock from Khoikhoi raiders. On a philosophical level, the hedge situated the invaders as the “real” victims, who desperately needed protection from the violence and wildness of Africa. The bitter almond hedge is still seen as an enduring symbol of white supremacy in the country.


    Read more: Racism in South Africa: why the ANC has failed to dismantle patterns of white privilege


    This early paranoia and securitisation has had a significant effect on white South African culture and anxiety. White people who can afford to do so barricade themselves in gated communities and boomed-off suburban streets, behind high walls topped with razor wire, on the assumption that they are the primary victims of South Africa’s crime rate.

    In what ways has victimhood been used over the centuries or decades?

    Ideas about white victimhood have played a role in many of South Africa’s most influential social formations.

    The 1930s saw a major panic around “poor whites”, which led to commissions of inquiry, upliftment programmes and other attempts at social engineering. The people and institutions behind these initiatives weren’t concerned about poverty in South Africa in general, even though it was becoming more of a problem as the population urbanised. Their only interest was in poverty among white people, drawing on the assumption that it’s wrong or abnormal for white people to be poor, and that this needed to be urgently remedied.


    Read more: Afrikaner identity in post-apartheid South Africa remains stuck in whiteness


    These moves were not simply about philanthropy and offering better life chances to poor people; they were about protecting the boundaries of whiteness. Poor whites were seen as a threat to the establishment because they proved that whiteness wasn’t inherently superior.

    More recently, the victimhood narrative has been a central part of the panic around farm murders and claims of “white genocide”, an old idea that has been popularised and spread online.

    Farmers and supporters protest against farm murders outside the South African parliament in 2020. Jacques Stander/Gallo Images via Getty Images

    Rural violence is a huge problem in South Africa that deserves a strong response. But white people are far from its only casualties. Indeed, violent crime affects pretty much everyone in South Africa. When the deaths of white people are explained as part of a targeted genocide undertaken on the basis of race, the message is that they matter more than the deaths of everyone else.


    Read more: Damon Galgut’s Booker-winning novel probes white South Africa and the land issue


    Again, this suggests a kind of naturalisation of violence and harm. When terrible things happen to other people they simply happen and are not remarked on. It’s only when white people are affected that they become a pressing issue.

    Has it helped white South Africans? Has it been effective as a mobilising tool?

    White victimhood, like the racial anxiety it is part of, is not good for white people. It doesn’t keep them safer or help them to live better lives.

    That said, it’s been quite effective as a mobilising tool. The apartheid-era National Party was skilled at using white fear for political gain. Its communications constantly played on white fears of the swart gevaar, the “black danger”, which encapsulated the powerful belief that whites were more at risk from black people than vice versa, despite all evidence to the contrary.


    Read more: Violent crime in South Africa happens mostly in a few hotspots: police resources should focus there – criminologist


    Similarly, contemporary organisations like the Afrikaner “minority rights” pressure group AfriForum and the Afrikaans trade union Solidarity activate and manipulate white people’s senses of extraordinary victimhood. This drives them further into a defensive position, where everything from farm murders and road name changes to the National Health Insurance bill is designed to attack them personally.

    White support for these kinds of organisations and the political positions they espouse, whether overtly or covertly, is at least in part driven by the effective manipulation of white victimhood.

    How effective is it still?

    It remains disturbingly powerful. The architecture of white supremacy depends on the idea that white people are extraordinary victims. This is the driving notion beneath the great replacement theory, a far-right conspiracy theory claiming that Jews and non-white foreigners are plotting to “replace” whites. It also underpins violent reactions to the global migration crisis and the rise of populism in the north.


    Read more: What’s behind violence in South Africa: a sociologist’s perspective


    I don’t think it’s going too far to say that whiteness as a social construction is intrinsically tied to victimhood. The idea that whiteness actually makes people more rather than less vulnerable is likely to remain a central part of white people’s collective psychic imaginary for some time.

    – Trump and South Africa: what is white victimhood, and how is it linked to white supremacy?
    – https://theconversation.com/trump-and-south-africa-what-is-white-victimhood-and-how-is-it-linked-to-white-supremacy-249648

    MIL OSI Africa –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: China flexes its media muscle in Africa – encouraging positive headlines as part of a soft power agenda

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Mitchell Gallagher, Ph.D Candidate in Political Science, Wayne State University

    An African journalist films President Xi Jinping delivering an opening ceremony speech for the China-Africa forum in Beijing in September 2024. AP Photo/Andy Wong

    Every year, China’s minister of foreign affairs embarks on what has now become a customary odyssey across Africa. The tradition began in the late 1980s and sees Beijing’s top diplomat visit several African nations to reaffirm ties. The most recent visit, by Foreign Minister Wang Yi, took place in mid-January 2025 and included stops in Namibia, the Republic of the Congo, Chad and Nigeria.

    For over two decades, China’s burgeoning influence in Africa was symbolized by grand displays of infrastructural might. From Nairobi’s gleaming towers to expansive ports dotting the continent’s shorelines, China’s investments on the continent have surged, reaching over US$700 billion by 2023 under the Belt and Road Initiative, China’s massive global infrastructure development strategy.

    But in recent years, Beijing has sought to expand beyond roads and skyscrapers and has made a play for the hearts and minds of African people. With a deft mix of persuasion, power and money, Beijing has turned to African media as a potential conduit for its geopolitical ambitions.

    Partnering with local outlets and journalist-training initiatives, China has expanded China’s media footprint in Africa. Its purpose? To change perceptions and anchor the idea of Beijing as a provider of resources and assistance, and a model for development and governance.

    The ploy appears to be paying dividends, with evidence of sections of the media giving favorable coverage to China. But as someone researching the reach of China’s influence overseas, I am beginning to see a nascent backlash against pro-Beijing reporting in countries across the continent.

    The media charm offensive

    China’s approach to Africa rests mainly on its use of “soft power,” manifested through things like the media and cultural programs. Beijing presents this as “win-win cooperation” – a quintessential Chinese diplomatic phrase mixing collaboration with cultural diplomacy.

    Key to China’s media approach in Africa are two institutions: the China Global Television Network (CGTN) Africa and Xinhua News Agency.

    CGTN Africa, which was set up in 2012, offers a Chinese perspective on African news. The network produces content in multiple languages, including English, French and Swahili, and its coverage routinely portrays Beijing as a constructive partner, reporting on infrastructure projects, trade agreements and cultural initiatives. Moreover, Xinhua News Agency, China’s state news agency, now boasts 37 bureaus on the continent.

    By contrast, Western media presence in Africa remains comparatively limited. The BBC, long embedded due to the United Kingdom’s colonial legacy, still maintains a large footprint among foreign outlets, but its influence is largely historical rather than expanding. And as Western media influence in Africa has plateaued, China’s state-backed media has grown exponentially. This expansion is especially evident in the digital domain. On Facebook, for example, CGTN Africa commands a staggering 4.5 million followers, vastly outpacing CNN Africa, which has 1.2 million — a stark indicator of China’s growing soft power reach.

    China’s zero-tariff trade policy with 33 African countries showcases how it uses economic policies to mold perceptions. And state-backed media outlets like CGTN Africa and Xinhua are central to highlighting such projects and pushing an image of China as a benevolent partner.

    Stories of an “all-weather” or steadfast China-Africa partnership are broadcast widely, and the coverage frequently depicts the grand nature of Chinese infrastructure projects. Amid this glowing coverage, the labor disputes, environmental devastation or debt traps associated with some Chinese-built infrastructure are less likely to make headlines.

    Questions of media veracity notwithstanding, China’s strategy is bearing fruit. A Gallup poll from April 2024 showed China’s approval ratings climbing in Africa as U.S. ratings dipped. Afrobarometer, a pan-African research organization, further reports that public opinion of China in many African countries is positively glowing, an apparent validation of China’s discourse engineering.

    Further, studies have shown that pro-Beijing media influences perceptions. A 2023 survey of Zimbabweans found that those who were exposed to Chinese media were more likely to have a positive view of Beijing’s economic activities in the country.

    China’s foreign minister Wang Yi, center, holds hands with his counterparts, Senegal’s Yassine Fall, left, and the Republic of the Congo’s Jean-Claude Gakosso, after a joint news conference.
    AP Photo/Andy Wong

    Co-opting local voices

    The effectiveness of China’s media strategy becomes especially apparent in the integration of local media. Through content-sharing agreements, African outlets have disseminated Beijing’s editorial line and stories from Chinese state media, often without the due diligence of journalistic skepticism.

    Meanwhile, StarTimes, a Chinese media company, delivers a steady stream of curated depictions of translated Chinese movies, TV shows and documentaries across 30 countries in Africa.

    But China is not merely pushing its viewpoint through African channels. It’s also taking a lead role in training African journalists, thousands of whom have been lured by all-expenses-paid trips to China under the guise of “professional development.” On such junkets, they receive training that critics say obscures the distinction between skill-building and propaganda, presenting them with perspectives conforming to Beijing’s line.

    ‘Win-win’ promises

    Ethiopia exemplifies how China’s infrastructure investments and media influence have fostered a largely favorable perception of Beijing. State media outlets, often staffed by journalists trained in Chinese-run programs, consistently frame China’s role as one of selfless partnership. Coverage of projects like the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway line highlights the benefits, while omitting reports on the substandard labor conditions tied to such projects — an approach reflective of Ethiopia’s media landscape, where state-run outlets prioritize economic development narratives and rely heavily on Xinhua as a primary news source.

    In Angola, Chinese oil companies extract considerable resources and channel billions into infrastructure projects. The local media, again regularly staffed by journalists who have accepted invitations to visit China, often portray Sino-Angolan relations in glowing terms. Allegations of corruption, the displacement of local communities and environmental degradation are relegated to side notes in the name of common development.

    The war for Africa’s media soul

    Despite all of the Chinese influence, media perspectives in Africa are far from uniformly pro-Beijing.

    In Kenya, voices of dissent are beginning to rise, and media professionals immune to Beijing’s allure are probing the true costs of Chinese financial undertakings. In South Africa, media watchdogs are sounding alarms, pointing to a gradual attrition of press freedoms that come packaged with promises of growth and prosperity. In Ghana, anxiety about Chinese media influence permeates more than the journalism sector, as officials have raised concerns about the implications of Chinese media cooperation agreements. Wariness in Ghana became especially apparent when local journalists started reporting that Chinese-produced content was being prioritized over domestic stories in state media.

    Beneath the surface of China’s well-publicized projects and media offerings, and the African countries or organizations that embrace Beijing’s line, a significant countervailing force exists that challenges uncritical representations and pursues rigorous journalism.

    Yet as CGTN Africa and Xinhua become entrenched in African media ecosystems, a pertinent question comes to the forefront: Will Africa’s journalists and press be able to uphold their impartiality and retain intellectual independence?

    As China continues to make strategic inroads in Africa, it’s a fair question.

    Mitchell Gallagher does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. China flexes its media muscle in Africa – encouraging positive headlines as part of a soft power agenda – https://theconversation.com/china-flexes-its-media-muscle-in-africa-encouraging-positive-headlines-as-part-of-a-soft-power-agenda-245804

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Will the Gaza ceasefire hold? Where does Trump’s takeover proposal stand? Expert Q&A

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Scott Lucas, Professor of International Politics, Clinton Institute, University College Dublin

    As the deadline approaches for the end of phase one of the ceasefire deal between Israel and Hamas, the likelihood of the agreement making it to the scheduled second phase on March 1 look increasingly remote. Middle East expert, Scott Lucas, addresses the key questions.

    What are the chances of the ceasefire holding into phase two?

    Even before Donald Trump’s proposal for the clearing and redevelopment – what would amount to the ethnic cleansing – of Gaza, an agreement to move from phase one to phase two at the start of March was an increasingly remote possibility.

    We almost did not have a first phase. Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu had held out against a deal for months, and he was under pressure from two hard-right ministers – finance minister Bezalel Smotrich and national security minister, Itamar Ben-Gvir – not to proceed.

    In the end, Netanyahu acceded because of families seeking the return of their relatives held hostage by Hamas, and because of an approach by Trump’s envoy Steve Witkoff.

    Smotrich stayed in the cabinet while Ben-Gvir left but his party said it would continue support for the government. However, both demanded that there be no second phase. They called instead military action to eradicate Hamas and the resettlement of the population of GAza – voluntary or otherwise.

    In the next phase, the Israeli military is supposed to withdraw fully from Gaza while Palestinian governance is restored in the Strip. Israel and the US will demand that Hamas will leave power – indeed, the Israelis may call for Hamas leaders to leave the territory – and Hamas will refuse to do so.

    Trump’s demand for an end of “occupation” of Gaza, not by the Israelis but by Gazans, confirmed the demise of the process. There is no chance that Hamas negotiators will agree to a “solution” in which most if not all residents are evicted.

    That is why Trump, using the pretext of Hamas obstruction of phase one, stopped portraying himself as a “peacemaker” on Monday. Instead, he proclaimed: “All bets are off and let hell break out” — in effect, returning to a blank cheque for Israel’s military action, blockade of humanitarian aid, and mass killing across Gaza.

    Is Donald Trump serious about redeveloping Gaza?

    Many media outlets have been negligent in excusing Trump’s statements by saying alternatively that he is not serious or that he is “thinking outside the box” with his egregious statements.

    Trump’s proposal for “development” of Gaza, clearing out the population, was not just a thought bubble. In his first term, he repeatedly spoke of North Korea’s “great beaches” and “waterfront property” as a prime location for condos and hotels. In March 2024, his son-in-law Jared Kushner turned to the Middle East, saying: “Gaza’s waterfront property could be very valuable… From Israel’s perspective I would do my best to move the people out and then clean it up.”

    Last summer, the Trump team asked Joseph Pelzman, a professor of economic and international affairs at George Washington University to propose a plan for the Strip. He summarised: “You have to destroy the whole place, you have to restart from scratch … It requires that the place be completely emptied out. I mean, literally emptied out.”

    Within a week of returning to the White House on January 20, Trump was telling reporters that Gaza’s civilians should be removed from the “demolition site”. Just over a week later, alongside Netanyahu, he expanded on the declaration – reportedly in a statement written by Kushner.

    What about international law?

    Trump’s proposal is a clear violation of international law. The Geneva conventions stipulate that civilians should not be transferred outside of their territory unless it is “impossible” to do otherwise.

    UN spokesman Stéphane Dujarric told reporters: “Any forced displacement of people is tantamount to ethnic cleansing.”

    But, the Trump administration does not appear to care about international law. Two days after his appearance with Netanyahu, Trump signed an executive order sanctioning the International Criminal Court.

    Indeed, the administration does not believe it should face any legal oversight in the US. As Trump and Elon Musk attempt to destroy US agencies, with mass firings and seizure of records that may be unconstitutional and illegal, the US vice-president, J.D. Vance, maintains: “Judges aren’t allowed to control the executive’s legitimate power.” Trump, demanding the impeachment of a judge who ruled against the unauthorised access to records, said: “No judge should, frankly, be allowed to make that kind of a decision.”

    Does the US have sufficient support to do this?

    Absolutely not, especially if Trump tries to fulfil his declaration that the US should “own” Gaza. Apart from Israel, no country has given support to Trump’s proposal. And most Americans, even Trump backers, would be loath to have “ownership” which required intervention by US troops.

    As for the countries Trump wants to send Palestinians to, they are vehement in their opposition. Within hours of Trump’s February 4 statement, he got a firm rebuttal from Saudi Arabia. Riyadh cited “the Kingdom’s firm and supportive positions on the rights of the Palestinian people” and reinforced its recent shift to “firm and unwavering” support of a Palestinian state.

    The foreign ministry emphasised that this was the position of Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman and noted his phone call with King Abdullah of Jordan as a sign of solidarity.

    After Netanyahu said the Saudis “have plenty of territory” for a Palestinian state, Riyadh denounced the “extremist, occupying mentality” that seeks to expel Palestinians from Gaza.

    Egyptian foreign minister Badr Abdelatty told US secretary of state Marco Rubio on Monday in Washington that Arab states rejected Trump’s pitch. Abdelatty stressed the importance of Gaza’s reconstruction while Palestinians remained there.

    And, on the eve of King Abdullah’s visit to Washington, Jordan expressed its “rejection of any attempts to annex land and displace the Palestinians”.

    How do you see this developing in the foreseeable future?

    Trump and the Israelis will now shift attention to Hamas as an existential threat who cannot be treated as a partner in a phase two ceasefire.

    Phase one is due to expire on March 1. I predict that Israel will return to its open-ended war across Gaza, probably sooner than that.

    And Trump, who only recently presented himself as a “peacemaker”, will give unconditional backing – while bemoaning that Gazans, up to 90% of them displaced from their homes, still won’t leave the Strip.

    Scott Lucas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Will the Gaza ceasefire hold? Where does Trump’s takeover proposal stand? Expert Q&A – https://theconversation.com/will-the-gaza-ceasefire-hold-where-does-trumps-takeover-proposal-stand-expert-qanda-249751

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-Evening Report: Ghana’s urban strategies neglect the needs of street vendors: policy must catch up with reality

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Stephen Appiah Takyi, Senior Lecturer, Department of Planning, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST)

    Street vending is a major economic activity in most of Ghana’s urban areas. The vendors bring everyday goods to residents and commuters at affordable prices in places convenient to them. However, the growing intensity of street vending activities in Ghanaian cities such as Accra and Kumasi is creating management problems for city authorities. Vendors are being removed as cities aim to “clean up” and modernise the urban landscape.

    City authorities haven’t created ways to support street vendors. Instead, they treat them as a nuisance and use stringent regulations aimed at displacing them. This approach overlooks the potential benefits that the thriving street economy could bring to the local economy and social fabric. In contrast, for example, South Africa’s policy supports informal economic activities by providing vending spaces for street traders.

    As academics who specialise in urban planning, we set out to investigate the rules around street vending in Ghana. Our study was conducted in Kumasi, the capital of the Ashanti region and the second most important city in Ghana. We found that the regulation of street vending in Ghana is unclear, contradictory and ineffective. It fails to provide a clear policy direction and adequate planning tools for integrating street vending into urban areas.

    Our research reinforces the argument that the regulation of street vending is often ambiguous. We argue that these policy inconsistencies create loopholes for the hostile attitude of city authorities towards street vendors.

    We call for policies that recognise the socioeconomic value of street vending and make urban spaces more inclusive.

    The lay of the land

    Our analysis is based on two national policy documents. These are the National Urban Policy Framework and the Local Governance Act 2016 (Act 936). We also rely on two local policy documents specific to the Kumasi Metropolitan Area. These are the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly By-Laws on Control of Hawkers 1995 and the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly Medium-Term Development Plan (2018–2021).

    The National Urban Policy recognises and promotes street vending as part of the urban economy. It calls for local government authorities to recognise and include the informal sector.

    But the overarching law regulating street vending in Ghana is the Local Governance Act. It authorises local government bodies (city authorities) to pass by-laws that forbid street vending. This is in conflict with the national policy.

    The gaps

    Our study revealed that in the Kumasi Metropolitan Area, the authorities seem to want to help street vendors in some ways – to strengthen the capacity of informal economic actors. But they don’t make plans or take actions to do so in the medium term development plan. Local government authorities sometimes evict street vendors from the central business district.

    In Kumasi, urban policy, regulations and local development planning do not include street vending in the urban development process even though vendors are the largest group of business people in the city. Instead of building stalls and facilities to accommodate these economic operators, the authorities rather expropriate urban space from them to develop modern structures which are expensive for street vendors to occupy.

    There is conflict over the use of urban public spaces. City authorities view the activities of street vendors as illegal, while the vendors see them as legitimate sources of livelihood. Authorities control vending through eviction and relocation.

    In recent years, city authorities have adopted urban infrastructural planning and development as a strategy to remove street vendors. Take the case of the new Kejetia Market Redevelopment Project, which replaced the largest traditional market in west Africa with a modern urban market structure in Kumasi. Over 10,000 street vendors and 4,000 market traders were displaced.

    The neglect of street vending in the design means vendors will have to earn a living informally – which simply adds to the “problem” as the city sees it.

    What next?

    Policies and practices that try to exclude people are not a solution to the problems of street vending. They are often counter productive. Regulating street vending requires inclusive policy measures and a clear policy direction to manage these activities. At present, Ghana, like many other African countries, lacks effective planning strategies to manage the activities of street vending.

    Our recommendations include:

    • coherent and inclusive policies that recognise the socioeconomic value of street vending and give vendors a rightful place in cities

    • reforming urban governance to support the informal economy

    • coherent and precise policies that give street vendors more security.

    The current policy vacuum fuels repressive regulation and excludes street vendors from urban development processes.

    To develop effective policy models, it is critical to learn from the experiences of street vendors and involve them in urban development processes. This starts with a change of attitude among city authorities.

    The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Ghana’s urban strategies neglect the needs of street vendors: policy must catch up with reality – https://theconversation.com/ghanas-urban-strategies-neglect-the-needs-of-street-vendors-policy-must-catch-up-with-reality-248020

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

    February 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Africa: Donald Trump’s war on global governance: lessons from the past on how to fight back

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Danny Bradlow, Professor/Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Advancement of Scholarship, University of Pretoria

    US president Donald Trump’s recent actions seem designed to reassert American power and demonstrate that it is still the dominant global power and is capable of bullying weaker nations into following America’s lead.

    He has shown contempt for international collaboration by withdrawing from the UN climate negotiations and the World Health Organization. His officials have also indicated that they will not participate in upcoming G20 meetings because he does not like the policies of South Africa, the G20 president for 2025.

    In addition, he’s shown a lack of concern for international solidarity by halting US aid programmes and by undermining efforts to keep businesses honest. He has demonstrated his contempt for allies by imposing tariffs on their exports.

    These actions demand a response from the rest of the international community that mitigates the risk to the well-being of people and planet and the effective management of global affairs.

    My research on global economic governance suggests that history can offer some guidance on how to shape an effective response.

    Such a response should be based on a realistic assessment of the configuration of global forces. It should seek to build tactical coalitions between state and non-state actors in both the global south and the global north who can agree on clear and limited objectives.

    The following three historical lessons help explain this point.

    Cautionary lessons

    The first lesson is about the dangers of being overoptimistic in assessing the potential for change.

    In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the US was confronting defeat in the war in Vietnam, high inflation and domestic unrest, including the assassination of leading politicians and the murder of protesting students.

    The US was also losing confidence in its ability to sustain the international monetary order it had established at the Bretton Woods conference in 1944.

    In addition, the countries of the global south were calling for a new international economic order that was more responsive to their needs. Given the concerns about the political and economic situation in the US and the relative strength of the Soviet bloc at the time, this seemed a realistic demand.

    In August 1971, President Richard Nixon, without any international consultations, launched what became known as the Nixon Shock. He broke the link between gold and the US dollar, thereby ending the international monetary system established in 1944. He also imposed a 10% surcharge on all imports into the US.

    When America’s European allies protested and sought to create a reformed version of the old monetary order, US treasury secretary John Connolly informed them that the dollar was

    our currency but your problem.

    Over the course of the 1970s, US allies in western Europe, Asia and all countries that participated in the old Bretton Woods system were forced to accept what the US preferred: a market-based international monetary system in which the US dollar became the dominant currency.

    The US, along with its allies in the global north, also defeated the calls for a new international economic order and imposed their neo-liberal economic order on the world.

    The second cautionary lesson highlights the importance of building robust tactical coalitions. In 1969, the International Monetary Fund member states agreed to authorise the IMF to create special drawing rights, the IMF’s unique reserve asset. At the time, many IMF developing country member states advocated establishing a link between development and the special drawing rights. This would enable those countries most in need of additional resources to access more than their proportionate share of special drawing rights to fund their development.

    All developing countries supported this demand. But they couldn’t agree on how to do it. The rich countries were able to exploit these differences and defeat the proposed link between the special drawing rights and development. As a result, the special drawing rights are now distributed to all IMF member states according to their quotas in the IMF. This means that most allocations go to the rich countries who do not need them and have no obligation to share them with developing countries.

    A third lesson arises from the successful Jubilee 2000 campaign to forgive the debts of low-income developing countries experiencing debt crises. This campaign, supported by a secretariat in the United Kingdom, eventually involved:

    • civil society organisations and activists in 40 countries

    • a petition signed by 21 million people

    • governments in both creditor and debtor countries.

    These efforts resulted in the cancellation of the debts of 35 developing countries. These debts, totalling about US$100 billion, were owed primarily to bilateral and multilateral official creditors.

    They were also a demonstration of the political power that can be generated by the combined actions of civil society organisations and governments in both rich and poor countries. They can force the most powerful and wealthy institutions and individuals in the world to accept actions that, while requiring them to make affordable sacrifices, benefit low-income countries and potentially poor communities within those states.

    What conclusions should be drawn?

    We shouldn’t under-estimate the power of the US or the determination of the MAGA movement to use that power. However, their power is not absolute. It is constrained by the relative decline in US power as countries such as China and India gain economic and political strength. In addition, there are now mechanisms for international cooperation, such as the G20, where states can coordinate their actions and gain tactical victories that are meaningful to people and planet.

    But gaining such victories will require the following:

    Firstly, the formation of tactical coalitions that include states from both the global south and the global north. If these states cooperate around limited and shared objectives they can counter the vested interests around the world that support Trump’s objectives.

    Secondly, a special kind of public-private partnership in which states and non-state actors set aside their differences and agree to cooperate to achieve limited shared objectives. Neither states alone nor civil society groups alone were able to defeat the vested interests that opposed debt relief in the late 1990s. Working together they were able to defeat powerful creditor interests and gain debt relief for the poorest states.

    Thirdly, this special partnership will only be possible if there’s general agreement on both the diagnosis of the problem and on the general contours of the solution. This was the case with the debt issue in the 1990s.

    There are good candidates for such collaborative actions. For example, many states and non-state actors agree that international financial institutions need to be reformed and made more responsive to the needs of those member states that actually use their services but lack voice and vote in their governance. The institutions also need to be more accountable to those affected by their policies and practices. They also agree that large corporations and financial institutions should pay their fair share of taxes and should be environmentally and socially responsible.

    The urgency of the challenges facing the global community demands that the world begin countering Trump as soon as possible. South Africa as the current chair of the G20 has a special responsibility to ensure that this year the G20, together with its engagement groups, acts creatively and responsibly in relation to people and planet.

    – Donald Trump’s war on global governance: lessons from the past on how to fight back
    – https://theconversation.com/donald-trumps-war-on-global-governance-lessons-from-the-past-on-how-to-fight-back-249666

    MIL OSI Africa –

    February 13, 2025
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